The decision to apply a modified Reagan doctrine towards Mozambique : a case study of the bureaucratic political model

Abstract

The Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began to implement against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what became known as the Reagan Doctrine. The was an effort to break with previous the previous presidential administration’s policies toward the USSR and would involve the rollback of Communism, instead of simply just co-existing with Communism (Détente) or containing the spread of it. Part of the area that was subject to the Reagan Doctrine included the volatile southern African region, which had two Marxist-Leninist Regimes, namely Angola and Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s bureaucratic political model, this study attempts to answer the question: “Even when all the prerequisites were met, why was there a decision to only implement a modified form of the Reagan Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full-blown effort, such as in, for example Angola or Afghanistan?” As will be shown in the research, the Reagan Doctrine was not a written doctrine, but had many different facets, as will be shown. The most significant part of the Reagan Doctrine was the recognition and arming of insurgents who confronted the Soviet backed regimes including RENAMO. There have been claims that the US Government did not recognize RENAMO. This is false as will be shown by the fact that President Reagan urged FRELIMO to negotiate with the RENAMO resistance. The real significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such reluctance to apply the doctrine with the veracity as compared to the effort in Angola and Afghanistan in arming RENAMO. Was the United States Government still trapped in the “Vietnam Syndrome”? Did the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) have the 3 same political and charismatic qualities as the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)? Were special interests or lobbyists influencing government bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way? A significant part of this study is devoted to the question of how much influence did the bureaucracy and the politicians (both appointed and career) had on the important national security decision-making process involving Mozambique. Another question that could be asked is: Was the doctrine indirectly applied through third parties? In 1989 when the Reagan Administration ended, did President Reagan and the Reagan Administration achieve their objectives toward Mozambique. If so, was this due to the Reagan Doctrine or other factors? If not, did any actors or events interfere with the strategy?