The Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program : analysis of how time delay tactics influence the manipulation of alliances leading to entrapment in nuclear negotiations.

Abstract

The research analyses how weaker parties in a negotiation can change the assumed structural outcome of a negotiation. Structural Analysis assumes that the stronger parties always prevail but that is not necessarily always the case. While the structurally stronger party is motivated by what Structural Analysis assumes, the weaker party attempts to create a change in this structure by using tactics to affect the outcome of the negotiation in its favour. Based on pre-existing assumptions that structure always favours the strong party, the strong player in a negotiation overlooks the use of tactics by the weaker party in the hope that the negotiation would eventually go its way. Such a miscalculation creates an environment conducive for entrapment because as the tactic continues to be used and the participants continue with the negotiations the process becomes entrapped and mostly limiting the options of the structurally strong party. In multilateral negotiations that involve alliances, the research points out that the weaker party to entrap the strong could use such an alliance. However, the research shall use the Six-Party Talks with a focus on the U.S., South Korea, and North Korea. The tactic that is analysed is the time delay tactic, which was used by North Korea to frustrate the U.S.-ROK alliance while creating an environment conducive for entrapment.