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The study comparatively scrutinised creditor protection mechanisms entrenched in South African Corporate law to determine their effectiveness in advancing creditor interests in company affairs. The enquiry was triggered by the need for corporate laws to adapt to and align with the pace of global economic changes in open and democratic societies. The 2004 DTI Policy document on South African Corporate Law Reform (SACLR) proposed a shift from the traditional shareholder-centric view, which espouses shareholder importance in corporate governance, to a model that retains the supremacy of shareholder interests while simultaneously catering to the interests of other stakeholders (the enlightened shareholder value approach). In light of the DTI policy proposal, the parliament, in enacting the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Companies Act), reflected on the need to provide appropriate redress to investors' and third parties (creditors`) rights in the preamble to this piece of legislation. It was based on the forgoing expositions that this research work sought to establish whether the South African Corporate law had been adequately modelled to protect creditors and to look beyond the traditional company’s goal of profit maximisation for the shareholder at the expense of other stakeholders, such as the creditors, who equally have stakes in the success and continuation of the company. Thus, a comparative doctrinal and critical analysis of creditor protection laws from selected cognate jurisdictions was undertaken to determine the efficacy of the protection mechanisms accorded to creditors under the South African corporate jurisprudence. It is thus the researcher's findings that the South African provisions on mechanisms to protect creditors are set in motion and are, therefore, effective to a greater extent, subject to legislature dealing with some discrepancies as per lessons drawn from comparator jurisdictions and recommendations. Conclusively, the Companies Act should clearly include the creditor’s interests in those of the company and thus give a secondary duty to directors to ensure creditor interests, among other non-member stakeholders, are assertively safeguarded. |
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