An assessment of the level of independence of electoral management bodies and their effects on democratisation in africa: the case of Ghana and the Democratic Republic of Congo

Abstract

The basic problem in this study is to determine whether the electoral management body (EMB) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is sufficiently independent and whether it complies with most of the criteria of an ideal independent EMB in order to conduct free and fair elections in the promotion of democracy in the DRC. However, an ideal type of an independent EMB is not easily realizable but Ghana’s electoral commission (EC) is widely regarded as a model of an independent EMB in Africa. Therefore, this study uses the EC as a workable ideal type of independent EMB that informs this study in assessing the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI)’s level of independence. The study discovered that while the formal legal framework guarantee the independence of the CENI, it lacks practical independence due to certain factors which include the mode of appointment and composition of the body, the unstable security of tenure of its members, the negative influence of the judiciary, executive and the parliament over the functioning of the CENI, and the lack of adequate funding. The study argues that the composition of the CENI has to be depoliticized; its members should enjoy a strong security of tenure and the issue of political parties funding should be effective and handled by the CENI in order to enhance political competitiveness in the electoral process. An adequate funding should be timely realized so that the CENI carries out its work with autonomy. The judiciary, the parliament and the executive should support the growth of democracy in the DRC by allowing the CENI to work without the interference of any quarter.