An examination of Wittgenstein's approach to the mind-body problem

Abstract

This dissertation explores Wittgenstein’s views on the mind-body problem. It is possible to provide an examination of Wittgenstein’s approach by tracing the evolution of the theory of mind and the mind-body problem, by considering the current ways of dealing with the mind-body problem, and Wittgenstein’s critique of the notion of the mind. Wittgenstein’s views on the nature of philosophy and the relationship between philosophy and psychology make it possible to understand and as this dissertation argues – see beyond – the conceptual confusion that has since arisen out of philosophic tradition that perpetuates a ‘myth of the mind’. Schools of thought such as the Cartesians and cognitivists have attempted, through the construction of various elaborate theories, to solve the ‘riddle’ of the mind and to address the so-called ‘mind-body problem’. Cognitive science, in particular, has used the tradition and the myth of the mind as a basis for its research. Wittgenstein shows that such thinking is particularly muddled. By examining Wittgenstein’s approach to the mind-body problem, it is argued here that theories based on the tradition of the ‘myth of the mind’ are inherently flawed. Wittgenstein uses his methods, consisting of his notions of ‘grammar’, ‘language games’ and the re-arrangement of concepts, to extrapolate meaning and to see through the conceptual confusions that the use of language causes and that give rise to the mind-body problem .