Inconsistency in judicial decisions : the right to life in perspective

Abstract

The dissertation critically examines and compares the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the High Courts in cases dealing with the right to life, as contained in section 11 of the Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. The dissertation analysis the issues of adjudication and the concept of justice in perspective. The main question is as follows: Are the Constitutional Court decisions objective, based on the interpretation of the constitutional text, or do they rather reflect the individual judge(s) personal perspective(s) or preference(s). The purpose of this dissertation is to undertake a comparative study and analysis of the Constitutional Court decisions on the right to life, same aspect from different perspective, and show that the right to life is not given proper effect to on account of the subjective approach to its interpretation undertaken by the judges. It examines and scrutinises the Constitutional Court’s adjudication process. It found that the law is indeterminable, because the court’s decisions are not based on the interpretation of the law, but on the individual judges’ background and personal preferences. This is so because the court uses the majority rule principle in its decisions: The perception of the majority of the judges becomes a decision of the court. It is argued that when taking a decision a judge does not apply the law but instead uses the law to justify his predetermined decision on the matter. The conclusion supports the critical legal scholars’ theory relating to the indeterminacy of the law. It tests the objectivity of the judges using their own previous decisions.