The determinants of board decision quality in South Africa : a case of public entities

Abstract

Effective corporate governance of boards can become a sustainable competitive advantage for organisations. In the extant literature a number of reasons are cited for dysfunctional boards. Some of the reasons attributed to board failure relate to poor corporate governance, practice and oversight. Some of the reasons for board failure pertain to micromanaging of the organisation, an ineffective nominating committee, size of the board, non-functioning committee structure, absence of strategic plan, no orientation\induction plan and no rotational plan. Poor governance practises across all sectors has negatively tainted economic investment in South Africa consequentially affecting economic growth. Below South Africa’s competitive rating slipped from (52nd) in 2012-2013 to 53rd in 2013-2014 rating is given to show that marked improvement is needed in corporate governance. South Africa’s rating in the Corruption Perceptions Index for 2012 was 43 and slipped to position 69 amongst 176 countries for the Corruption Perception Index, 2013. The trend analysis report of the Public Service Commission reported that In 2006/7, there were 1 042 cases of corruption, amounting to R130.6-million; in 2007/8, there were 868 cases, amounting to R21.7-million; in 2008/9, there were 1 204 cases, amounting to R100.1-million; in 2009/10, there were 1 135 cases, amounting to R346.5-million; in 2010/11, there were 1 035 cases, amounting to R932.3-million; in 2011/12, there were 1 243 cases, amounting to R229.9-million. Good governance frameworks, policies, procedures, processes and practices attract foreign direct investments. Better governance practices are critical for improved economic growth and development that will result in an improvement in the South Africa’s competitiveness and corruption perception index ratings. South Africa’s continued economic growth and development is dependent on attracting foreign direct investment. From 1994 corporate governance regimes were promulgated. Although there are a collection of corporate governance codes and guidelines that have been published, few specifically cover governance practices in public entities. Moreover, with better governance practices state-owned enterprises can significantly contribute to the economic transformation and development in South Africa. The purpose of the study is to establish that improved governance is a function of board structure and board process variables. With the presence of structural and process variables board activism will improve resulting in board decision quality. Independent directors without no conflict of interest, the requisite industry expertise and intelligence (functional area knowledge), the information to make decisions are adequate, accurate and timely (information quality), directors exert the needed effort (effort norms), directors robustly explore all dimensions and options (cognitive conflict) and the board functions optimally (cohesiveness) influence board decision quality. Boards which are configured optimally are able to execute their fiduciary responsibility optimally. In 2012 a budget of R845.5 billion was provisioned for infrastructural development to boost economic development. This budget allocation must be prudently and frugally managed in accordance with good governance practises to achieve economic development. In particular South Africa has to improve its competitiveness rating and corruption perception index to attract investments and continual growth. In terms of the research design, to address the research questions, a mixed research approach was selected for the study. The phenomenological (qualitative) and positivist (quantitative) philosophical paradigms were adopted with the purpose to obtain a greater understanding of board decision quality in the Public Entities in South Africa. The data collection instruments used in the study was in-depth interviews, focus group interviews and administration of a survey. The population for the qualitative research was 19 in-depth interviews and two focus group interviews. For the quantitative study a population of 215 public entity board members were selected for the study. A total of 104 board members of Public Entities completed the survey for the study. In relation to data analysis for the qualitative study Tesch’s coding, thematic analysis was used to analyse the in-depth and focus group interviews. For the quantitative study, SPSS was used to analyse responses from the surveys. The hypothesis was tested using inferential statistics, namely, factor analysis and multiple regression was used.. The findings generated from the first phase, the qualitative study that provided support for the positive relationship between board structure, board process variables and board decision quality. The following five variables are incorporated in a model that seeks to identify the strongest predictor of board decision quality: (1) board independence, (2) effort norms, (3) functional area knowledge and skill, (4) cognitive conflict and (5) information quality. The findings show that information quality is the strongest predictor of board decision quality followed by expert knowledge and skill. As expected, expert knowledge does not only increase the cognitive capacity of the board, but it also positively affects company competitiveness. The findings also show that cognitive conflict has a negative association with decision quality. The study argues that political influence exerted by board political appointees may explain the negative relationship between cognitive conflict and board decision quality. The major contribution of this study is that it provides a 28-item instrument that can be used practically by public entity boards in the reflective process to improve board decision quality. The study concludes by offering avenues for further research. The model suggests that board decision quality is a product of board structure (board independence), board process (functional area knowledge, information quality, and cognitive conflict and effort norms).