Virtue as consent to being : a pastoral theological perspective on Jonathan Edwards' construct of virtue

Abstract

Virtue can be seen as a core construct of pastoral theology when it is understood as a relational dynamic which includes the experience of suffering and the pastoral response of compassion. This thesis probes the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards, who proposed that virtue is a form of beauty defined as "consent to being." Edwards' construct of virtue is examined from its inception in his pastoral work at Northampton parish. Although it was offered in the context of the 18th century debates in moral philosophy, it is argued that Edwards' idea of virtue is a unique theological contribution to our understanding of the nature of virtue. The implications of this conception of virtue are weighed against current discussions in ethics and moral philosophy on the theme of virtue. Edwards' idea of "consent to being" is expanded from a pastoral theological perspective to include the notion of compassion as an integrative motif. The structure of experience and how we speak about our experiences are explored in relation to this aesthetic understanding of virtue as a form of beauty. This leads to the notion of compassion as ontological consent. Since language is the vehicle by which our experiences are conveyed, the thesis probes the issue of how moral vision is expressed in "experience-near" language through parable, poem, and lament. Moral vision is articulated most adequately through such language, the formulation of which takes the form of a necessary quest. The thesis concludes with a constructive proposal concerning a mature pastoral theology of virtue. This may be seen as an expansion of Edwards' concept of "consent to being" from the vantage point of pastoral theology. It is argued that a dynamic vision of virtue requires some connection between the experience of suffering and the inward striving toward the greatest good. The essence of virtue can be best understood, from a pastoral theological perspective, as the relational dynamic of "suffering with" another human being.