dc.contributor.advisor |
van Deventer, Vasi
|
|
dc.contributor.author |
Lockhart, Ian Andrew
|
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2015-01-23T04:24:58Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2015-01-23T04:24:58Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
1999-11 |
|
dc.identifier.citation |
Lockhart, Ian Andrew (1999) A memory model of presymbolic unconscious mentation, University of South Africa, Pretoria, <http://hdl.handle.net/10500/17225> |
en |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/10500/17225 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
The biological energy concepts used by Freud to account for unconscious mental processes
in psychoanalysis are discredited by modem biological findings. As a result, different
psychoanalytic schools developed new foundational theories in order to verify unconscious
mentation. The present study argues that these theories are unsuccessful for two main reasons.
Firstly, replacing Freud's drive energy theory with other equally hypothetical foundational
constructs does not solve the problem of finding proof for the existence of unconscious mentation.
Secondly, the clinical psychoanalytic definition of unconscious mentation as imaginary, internally
generated processes, autonomous from the external world is misguided. External sensory data may
play a formative role in producing unconscious mentation. In particular, neurobiological findings
on sensory data encoding and storage in human infants may throw light on the nature of unconscious
processes. The present study therefore compares ideas derived from Lacanian
psychoanalysis with neuropsychological memory and infant research findings to ascertain whether
unconscious mentation is linked to the memory encoding of sensory data in
infants. This analysis is in tum contrasted with a more contemporary psychoanalytic
synthesis of findings on infant memory and unconscious mentation (Lichtenberg, 1989, Lichtenberg,
Lachmann, and Fosshage, 1992). The latter theory identifies connections between unconscious
mentation and the encoding of sensory memories in infancy, but does not connect the episodic and
procedural memory constructs used in this account to specific neurolo·gical mechanisms in the
brain. The present study's original contributions therefore involve firstly connecting the
development of aversive episodic and procedural memories to neurological mechanisms in the brain
during the period between birth and
28 months of age. Secondly, this memory model suggests that the storage of aversive memories in
infancy has lasting unconscious motivational significance for subjects. Presymbolic memories may
unconsciously manipulate conscious attention and memory retrieval in verbal subjects, inviting
comparison with the psychoanalytic concept of dynamic unconscious mentation.
Thirdly, the presymbolic memory model contributes towards a novel understanding of false memories
of childhood sex abuse, and the dissociation of real traumatic memories that occur in many cases of
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. |
en |
dc.format.extent |
1 online resource (174 pages) |
|
dc.language.iso |
en |
en |
dc.subject.ddc |
153.12 |
|
dc.subject.lcsh |
Psychoanalysis |
en |
dc.subject.lcsh |
Neuropsychology |
en |
dc.subject.lcsh |
Dissociation |
en |
dc.subject.lcsh |
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder |
en |
dc.subject.lcsh |
Lacan, Jacques, 1901- |
en |
dc.subject.lcsh |
Freud, Sigmund, 1856-1939 |
en |
dc.subject.lcsh |
Memory |
en |
dc.subject.lcsh |
Sensory perception |
en |
dc.subject.lcsh |
Neuropsychological tests |
en |
dc.title |
A memory model of presymbolic unconscious mentation |
en |
dc.type |
Thesis |
|
dc.description.department |
Psychology |
|
dc.description.degree |
D.Litt. et Phil. (Psychology) |
|