Weens die gebrek aan wetenskaplike bewerking van die legaliteitsbeginsel in die
strafprosesreg, moet leiding gesoek word by leerstukke en beginsels van die staatsreg
wat gemoeid is met die onderdaan-staatsgesagproblematiek (rule of law, die regstaat,
due process of law en menseregte) asook by die legaliteitsbeginsel in die strafreg. 'n
Leerstelling wat gemeenskaplik aan al hierdie leerstukke en beginsels is, is dat
willekeurige owerheidsgesagsuitoefening teenoor die regsonderdaan in bedwang gehou
moet word deur reelgebondenheid. Daar moet veral gelet word of daar blyke is van
ontwikkeling vanaf die formele aspek (die beperkte eis dat daar 'n regsbasis vir
owerheidsoptrede moet wees) na 'n materiele inhoud (of die betrokke leerstuk ingestel
is op waardes wat aanduiding kan gee van 'n besondere geregtigheidsopvatting).
Die legaliteitsbeginsel in sy basiese verskyningsvorm vereis dat owerheidsoptrede moet
voldoen aan voorafbepaalde en vasstaande regsvoorskrifte; met wetmatigheid as
hoofkomponent van hierdie vorm van legaliteit, is die onderskeidende kenmerk daarvan
legalisme. In sy omvattende gedaante sluit die legaliteitsbeginsel die meeste van die
attribute van die engere verskyningsvorm in, maar stel verdere vereistes: dit verg dat
owerheidsoptrede moet voldoen aan voorafbepaalde, vasstaande en regverdige
voorskrifte wat behoorlik verorden is en volgens 'n vaste prosedure uitgeoefen word -
behalwe in daardie gevalle waar owerheidsoptrede, in die afwesigheid van uitvoerige
regsreeling deur toepaslike norme, gestruktureerde en gekontroleerde diskresieuitoefening
noodsaak. Daar word ter oorweging gegee dat die strafprosessuele regte
van die individu die materiele inhoud van die legaliteitsbeginsel in die strafprosesreg
vorm. Die meeste van hierdie regte is vervat in die Grondwet van die Republiek van
Suid-Afrika 200 van 1993.
Weens die eise van geregtigheid in die individuele geval, word diskresie-uitoefening deur
owerheidsagenture soos die polisie en aanklaer asook regterlike beamptes deur die
legaliteitsbeginsel geduld, maar diskresie-aanwending moet gestroop word tot die
noodsaaklike, aan beperkings onderhewig gestel word en ook gekontroleer en
gestruktureer word.
Met die koms van die nuwe grondwetlike bedeling en die instelling van 'n Konstitusionele
Hof kan stellig verwag word dat die strafprosessuele regte verder verfyn sal word en dat
die toekoms nuwe insigte op die gebied van strafprosesregtelike legaliteit sal bring.
Due to the lack of scientific treatment of the principle of legality in criminal procedure,
guidance must be sought from constitutional law doctrines that address the problematic
inter-relation individual vis-a-vis state authority (rule of law, the Rechtsstaat, due process
of law and human rights) and from the principle of legality in criminal law. A tenet
shared by these doctrines, is that the arbitrary exercise of executive power over the
individual should be restrained through adherence to rules. Whether development from
the formal aspect (that a legal basis for executive action is required) to a substantive
content (whether the doctrine concerned is committed to values reflecting a specific
concept of justice) occurs, is examined.
Basic legality requires that state action comply with rules that are certain and previously
formulated; with adherence to rules ("wetmatigheid") as its main component, its
distinguishing feature is legalism. In its comprehensive form, the principle of legality
includes most of the attributes of the basic form, but makes further demands: executive
action must conform to rules that are certain, already formulated and just,
properly ordained and executed in accordance with a fixed procedure - except in those
cases where executive action, in the absence of detailed regulation by legal norms,
necessitates the structured and controlled exercise of discretion. It is submitted that the
procedural rights of the citizen constitute the material content of the principle of legality
in criminal procedure. Most of these rights have been included in the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.
Because of the demands of justice in the individual instance, the exercise of discretion
by the agencies of the state, the police and prosecution, as well as judicial officers, is
tolerated by the principle of legality: provided that this exercise of discretion is limited
to what is absolutely necessary, and is restrained, controlled and structured.
With the advent of the new constitutional dispensation and the institution of the
Constitutional Court, it may be expected that procedural rights will be further emended
and that some new perceptions in the field of legality in criminal procedure are imminent.
