Nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid as verweer in die Suid-Afrikaanse strafreg

Abstract

Die verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse strafreg word bespreek. Hierdie verweer is van onlangse oorsprong en verskil van die verwere van ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid as gevolg van jeugdigheid en geestesongesteldheid soos in artikel 78(1) van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 uiteengesit word. Die verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid dek gevalle waar dit deur faktore soos emosionele spanning veroorsaak is. Hierdie verweer staan ook as die algemene ontoerekeningsvatbaarheidsverweer bekend. In 'n aantal beslissings, soos onder andere, S v Arnold 1985 (3) SA 256 (C); S v Campher 1987 (1) SA 940 (A) en S v Chretien 1981 (1) SA 1097 (A), word die gevolgtrekking gemaak dat die verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid wei in die Suid-Afrikaanse strafreg bestaansreg het. Ten einde met 'n verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid te slaag, is die blote ipse dixit van die beskuldigde onvoldoende. 'n Behoorlike grondslag vir die verweer moet gele word. Die bewyslas in die geval van 'n verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid word bespreek.

The defence of non-pathological criminal incapacity in the South African criminal law is discussed. It is a relatively new defence and should be distinguished from the defences such as youth and mental illness set out in section 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. This defence covers cases in which criminal capacity is excluded by factors such as intoxication and emotional stress. It is also known as a general defence of criminal incapacity. In a number of cases, inter alia in S v Arnold 1985(3) SA 256 (C); S v Campher 1987 (1) SA 940 (A) and S v Chretien 1981 (1) SA 1 097 (A) the conclusion is reached that the defence, non-pathological criminal incapacity, does have a right of existence in the South African criminal law. In order to successfully raise the defence on non-pathological criminal incapacity, the mere ipse dixit of the accused is insufficient. A proper foundation for the defence must be laid. The onus of proof is discussed.