"Democratic" foreign policy making and the Thabo Mbeki presidency : a critical study

Abstract

South African foreign policy is not made in a bubble; as a democracy since 1994, its outward orientation is theoretically subject to lobbying and pressure from outside groups as well as jockeying among bureaucratic entities. This study applies the principles of Foreign Policy Analysis, a theoretical framework that attempts to unpack the processes through which governments’ foreign policies are made, to South Africa to determine whether foreign policy making is in reality open to outside inputs, or whether the foreign policy arena—as in many countries globally—is an elite reserve. The thesis has a specific focus on the 1994-2008 period, during which time Deputy President (1994-99) and later President (1999-2008) Thabo Mbeki dominated government’s foreign policy formulation, to determine whether South Africa’s democratic transition was accompanied by “democratization” of the foreign policy making process compared to the apartheid government. In addition, the thesis sought to disaggregate the various actors involved in the process—both from the influencing and decision making sides of the coin—to analyze their individual roles in influencing foreign policy, both pre- and post-1994. The thesis found that the dominant actor in South African foreign policy, both before and after 1994, was the national leader (Prime Minister before 1984; President thereafter) or, on occasion, his chosen delegate if the leader was disinterested in the external realm. This is in part because South African Constitutions vest most decision-making power in the executive, in line with international norms, but also due to a lack of pressure by non-governmental actors. While South Africa’s post-apartheid dispensation allows for greater inputs by the public and other outside actors, the practice of influencing foreign policy—either through the ballot box or through concerted pressure between elections—changed very little. Public engagement on foreign policy, already weak, did not improve after 1994. Parliament, despite having a dedicated committee on the issue, showed itself largely disinterested, as did the broader ANC. The press, business, the ANC, and most civil society organizations similarly showed little desire to weigh in on foreign policy beyond isolated instances. Only academia consistently attempted to influence policy during the Mandela and Mbeki administrations, with mixed results. Ultimately, blame for this lack of change appears to lie mostly with outside actors themselves, who during the first 14 years of democracy failed to take advantage of political space opened to them. In examining Thabo Mbeki specifically, the thesis found that he took advantage of this leeway to dominate the foreign policy debate and rarely went out of his way to open the foreign policy debate any more than he had to. He gave short shrift to the inputs of pressure groups; had no time for the press or business; and dominated the ANC and its parliamentary caucus. Mbeki had a clear and well-defined worldview, and he had little time for people or organizations with decidedly different views. That said, those close to Mbeki, and even outsiders—notably from the academic community—paint a far more nuanced picture of the man, as someone who would listen and engage with others on foreign policy, at least if he believed they had done their homework on the issues in question. Hence, portrayals of Mbeki as a “dictator” in the foreign policy realm appear to be overstated.