Abstract:
The moral justification of punishment is the fundamental
concern of this thesis. It is argued that a moral response to
crime has to be a civilised response; therefore, the notion of
"civility" is defined and discussed. Punishment is then
defended in such a way that it accords with being a civilised
response to crime. It is argued that in order to be such a
response, and thereby qualify as a moral response, punishment
must have a certain structure, i.e. it must fulfil seven
necessary conditions, which, it is argued, together constitute
the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. In
arguing for each of the necessary conditions, different onedimensional
theories of punishment are dealt with
(retributivism, utilitarianism, deterrence theory,
rehabilitationism, a paternalistic theory of punishment, and
restitutionalism}, indicating that each fulfils some of the
criteria for morally justified punishment. None of the onedimensional
theories fulfils all the necessary conditions,
however, and hence none on its own fulfils the sufficient
condition for morally justified punishment. This is not to
argue that a straightforward theory could never on its own
fulfil the conditions for morally justified punishment, but I
have not been able to conceive how this could be done. The
theory I here present is therefore a hybrid approach,
incorporating elements of all the above-mentioned theories
into a unitary theory. In doing so, it fulfils all the
necessary conditions for being a civilised response to crime,
thereby fulfilling the sufficient condition too, and hence
providing a morally defensible account of punishment.
Finally, the question of how this theory can be put into
practice is addressed. Because the objective of punishment
ought to be a civilised response, thereby benefiting both
society as a whole and those being punished and rehabilitated, the thesis may be seen as a progressive synthesis of the
various approaches examined.
