dc.contributor.author |
Ladikos, A.
|
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2012-02-23T13:32:11Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2012-02-23T13:32:11Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2003 |
|
dc.identifier.citation |
Ladikos, A. 2003,'Hermeneutical paradoxes in the trial of Socrates', Phronimon: Journal of the SA Society for Greek Philosophy and the Humanities, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 62-69. |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/10500/5466 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
The logical role of the paradox is not to state a truth whose
paradoxical nature lies in the difficulty we feel in maintaining it as
true, but rather to state somefhing thaf will cause fo feel as fa/se
something else we previously believed to be true. The Socrafic
paradox, somefimes called the "moral paradox, " is convincing and
true because if implicitly raises the question about the true good.
The drama of Socrates' trial and death indeed iIIustrates a
dilemma, in which on the one hand the philosopher cannot accept
the way of I ife prescribed by his tradition but 0 n the other hand
cannot offer an unquestionable alternative to it. The best
approach to the Socratic problem is an ec/ectic one, using all the
ancient sourees instead of championing a single author at the
expense of the rest. |
en |
dc.language.iso |
en |
en |
dc.subject |
Socratic paradox |
en |
dc.subject |
Socrates |
en |
dc.subject |
Trial |
en |
dc.subject |
Death |
en |
dc.title |
Hermeneutical paradoxes in the trial of Socrates |
en |
dc.type |
Article |
en |