'n Kritiese ondersoek na die inligtingsverwerkingsbenadering in die kognitiewe sielkunde

Abstract

'n Ondersoek word gedoen na die aard, die oorsprong en die geloofwaardigheid van die inligtingsvetwerkingsbenadering in die kognitiewe sielkunde. Reeds vir die antieke Griekse denkers vorm logika 'n uitdrukking van die essensie van rede. Hierdie beskouing sou tydens die sewentiende eeu ontwikkel word tot die gedagte aan die subjek as 'n innerlike ruimte waarbinne die wereld van objekte in terme van logies-wiskundige rekonstruksies geken word. Die materialistiese beskouing reken dat alle dinge op hierdie wyse kenbaar is, maar ontken die subjek as vootwaarde vir sulke kennis, deur te poog om ook dit tot die objektiewe orde te reduseer. Die inligtingsteorie volg uit die ontstaan van die wiskundige logika, en hied 'n algemene teorie van probleemoplossing, die teorie van formele sisteme. Dit lewer 'n model vir die denke as die manipulering van simbole d.m.v. formele manipulasiereels. Hierdie simbole is abstrakte objekte, slegs onderskeibaar aan die hand van hulle vorm, maar kan onderling in hulle logiese samehang die wetmatige relasies tussen dinge soos dit in die wereld voorkom behou, en so dien as voorstellings van die wereld. Die funksionalistiese benadering tot denke is 'n poging om die probleem van die verhouding tussen denke en gedrag (die subjek-objekprobleem) op te los deur 'n toepassing van die inligtingsteorie. Funksionaliste wat die betekenisaspek of intensionele inhoud van die denke emstig opneem, reken dat terwyl voorstellings innerlik funksioneer as simbole in 'n formele sisteem, dit ook dien as verwysings na objekte in die ervaringswereld. Diegene wat 'n materialistiese reduksionisme aanvaarbaar vind ontken bloot die verwysingsvlak, en beskou die innerlike vetwerkings suiwer as sintaktiese prosesse. Aan die hand van 'n ontleding van die inligtingsvetwerkingsbenadering in verskillende manifestasies daarvan, word aangetoon dat die oplossing wat gebied word vir die probleem van die verhouding tussen denke en gedrag onsuksesvol is. Solank die onderliggende objektivistiese vooraannames gehandhaaf word, is die probleem waarskynlik in beginsel onoplosbaar.

'n Verskuiwing van perspektief is wenslik. Aandag moet gegee word aan die konkrete betrokkenheid van 'n mens in sy wereld, wat hy in handeling tot uitdrukking bring, en wat in taal binne 'n gemeenskaplike raamwerk geplaas word.

An inquiry is conducted into the nature, origins, and tenability of the information processing approach in cognitive psychology. Logic regarded as the essence of reason originates with classical Greek philosophy. In the seventeenth century this developed into the idea of the subject as an inner space where the world of objects is known by way of a mathematical-logical reconstruction. To materialists all things are known in this way, but the existence of the subject as a precondition for such knowledge is denied, by attempting to reduce it to the world of objects. Information theory developed in the wake of mathematical logic, and presents a general theory of problem-solving in the theory of formal systems. This suggests a model of the mind in terms of the manipulation of symbols by way of formal rules. Such symbols are abstract objects, individuated only by their form. Through the logical relationships among them they are able to maintain the lawlike relationships that exist among things in the world. In this way they serve as representations of the world. The functionalist approach to mind is an attempt to solve the problem of the relationship between thought and behaviour (i.e. the subject-object problem) by the application of information theory. Those functionalists that take the aspect of meaning or the intentional content of the mind seriously, argue that while representations function inwardly as symbols in a formal system, they also refer to objects in the world of experience. Materialist reductionists simply deny the level of referral, and view the inner computations as a purely syntactical process. By analyzing the information processing approach in various guises, it is shown that the solution given to the problem of the relationship between mind and behaviour does not succeed. As long as the underlying objectivist assumptions are maintained, this problem appears to be insoluble. A shift of perspective is suggested. Attention should be directed to the concrete involvement of a person with his world, as expressed in action, and how this is placed in a communal frame of reference through the power of language.