dc.contributor.author |
van Wyk, Jo-Ansie
|
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2014-08-27T13:42:51Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2014-08-27T13:42:51Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2014 |
|
dc.identifier.citation |
South African Journal of International Affairs, 2014
Vol. 00, No. 00, 1–19, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2014.940374 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/10500/13875 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2014.940374 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
South Africa’s status and prestige as a country that successfully and unilaterally
disarmed its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme enabled it to engage
with the Saddam government of Iraq in the months leading up to the US-led invasion
of March 2003. Following intense international diplomatic efforts, Saddam Hussein
had agreed to allow UN and International Atomic Energy Agency weapons inspectors
to enter Iraq in November 2002. Acting outside the UN Security Council, the US and
its coalition partners maintained that Iraq continued to maintain and produce WMD, a
claim refuted by weapons inspectors, including a South African disarmament team that
visited Iraq in February 2003. Employing three diplomatic strategies associated with
niche diplomacy, South Africa contributed to attempts to avert the invasion by assisting
with the orderly disarmament of Saddam-led Iraq and by practising multilateralism.
These strategies, notwithstanding the US-led invasion signalling a failure of South
Africa’s niche diplomacy in this instance, provide valuable insight into the nuclear
diplomacy of South Africa. |
en |
dc.language.iso |
en |
en |
dc.publisher |
Taylor & Francis |
en |
dc.subject |
South Africa |
en |
dc.subject |
Iraq |
en |
dc.subject |
Nuclear |
en |
dc.subject |
Weapons of Mass Destruction |
en |
dc.subject |
Thabo Mbeki |
en |
dc.subject |
Saddam Hussein |
en |
dc.title |
Playing in the orchestra of peace: South Africa's relations with Iraq (1998-2003) |
en |
dc.type |
Article |
en |
dc.description.department |
Political Sciences |
en |