THE CHANGED MEANING OF NON-ALIGNMENT IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE CASE OF THE NAM [1961 – 1992]

by

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submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the subject

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

at the

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

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15 JUNE 2002

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SUMMARY

This dissertation is a descriptive study in which the changed meaning of non-alignment in international politics between the years 1961 – 1992, is analysed.

The concept non-alignment as manifested in four chronological phases of the Non-Aligned Movement [1960's, 1970's, 1980's, 1990/92] is analysed, compared and evaluated. The comparison shows that the meaning of non-alignment underwent a change in each of these four phases. It's meaning changed from a literal meaning in phases 1-3 [in which the focus shifted from being political to economic], to a symbolic or figurative meaning in phase 4.

The changes to the meaning of non-alignment came about mainly as a result of interaction with the international context and, to a lesser extent, due to the role of influential states in NAM. These changes were of critical importance for non-alignment to remain relevant and for NAM to be able to make a potential impact on an ever-changing world.

Key terms:

non-alignment, Non-aligned Movement, NAM, movement, 1961-1992, international politics, peace, third world, Liberal Institutionalism

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Non-alignment has, since 1961, had an impact on the foreign policy of many countries of the South. For decades thus, non-alignment either directly, or indirectly, influenced hundreds of millions of people of the South without many or most of them probably knowing what non-alignment means.

Chapter 1 starts off [subsection below] by outlining the problem to be studied in this dissertation, being the changed meaning of non-alignment in international politics 1961-1992. This chapter further deals with the reasons why this dissertation is important, the historical events leading up to the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement [NAM], the structure of NAM, a literary review, International Political theory relative to the writing of this dissertation, as well as the methodology used and some conceptual clarifications.

1.2 OUTLINING THE PROBLEM

The research question for this dissertation is given in this subsection. The subsection also states what the research intends to reveal.

The meaning of *non-alignment* has over time undergone a number of changes. These changes to the meaning of *non-alignment*, a concept that from the start was not easy to outline, invariably lead to misconceptions of what *non-alignment* is. These misconceptions again lead to the further problem of potential misunderstanding between individuals or groups dealing with *non-alignment* or the NAM [Non-aligned Movement].

Such misconceptions and misunderstandings could have important implications. Negotiations between for example a Western state and a NAM member could be hampered if the Western state had a wrong

preconceived idea of what non-alignment implies. Also if, for example, politicians of NAM member states themselves did not fully grasp the meaning and importance of non-alignment, their efforts towards making NAM a success may fall short of what it could and should be.

The problem regarding the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment is further exacerbated by the fact that if the meaning of non-alignment has changed in the past, it could change again in future. If one assumes that the meaning of non-alignment has potential implications for actors in international politics, it is important for these actors to know the nature of the changes to the meaning of non-alignment as well as the reasons why these changes took place.
Flowing from this problem, the research question for this dissertation is as follows:

What is the nature of the changes that over time were given to the meaning of non-alignment, why did these changes take place and what are the eventual implications, if any, in the international political system?

The research question stated above is very important relative to the rest of this dissertation. The whole of this dissertation is a structured effort to answer this combination question. Subsection 7.2 [Comparison of phases][p.119] shows how the answer to this question is derived at and subsection 8.3 [Main conclusions of study][p.142] states the final answer to this question.

This dissertation intends to reveal trends and tendencies relative to the NAM in the first three decades of its existence. What for example was the Movements main aim and objectives, in what way, if at all, did it change and what were the reasons for these changes?

This dissertation focus on the period 1961-1992, which is basically NAM's first three decades of existence. NAM for the largest part of this

period was set in an era of the Cold War and a bi-polar international system. NAM and its members, as newly independent states, were caught up in the ideological political "cross fire" of the USA/USSR and their alliances. The NAM member states had to actively guard their newly gained and much prized sovereignty and at the same time address the problem of the economic underdevelopment of their countries.

Today NAM finds itself in an era where the nature of international politics has changed. The predicament of NAM members being politically weak and threatened by outside forces such as globalisation has however not changed. NAM's trends and tendencies, successes and failures, in its three decades of existence should thus be able to be used as a tool of experience and knowledge applicable to NAM in the present.

1.3 IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

This subsection will show that this dissertation is especially of importance from a South African point of view.

South Africa [SA] has only as recently as 1994 become a member of NAM. Prior to this date, due to an international effort to isolate SA, SA was prohibited from being a member of the Movement. Since SA's democratic elections in 1994, the country not only became a member of NAM but also is today chairman of the Movement.

Taking into consideration the long time SA was not a member of NAM, the relative short time of its membership and its current chairmanship, it follows logically that there is political and academic need in SA to become better acquainted with non-alignment and NAM. The need in SA for knowledge and understanding of non-alignment is further exacerbated by the possibility, although it is mere speculation at this stage, that SA could possibly in future become a permanent member of

the United Nations [UN] Security Council.   SA will then be representing the continent of Africa.

This dissertation will not only help interested people to better understand international politics of the past, related directly or indirectly to non-alignment, but it will also help them to understand and explain current International Politics.

1.4   HISTORICAL ROOTS

This subsection shows how the concept non-alignment originated and came to be the name-giving concept to the Non-Aligned Movement [NAM]. This background information is imported to better understand the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment for the period 1961-1992.

The global political mood in the era immediately after the WWII was one of high-tension bloc politics. There was an arms race between the USA and the USSR and their allies, a threat of eminent nuclear war, as well as a struggle for influence over newly independent states culminating in localised wars in Africa and other continents.

The first elements of non-alignment can be traced to the earliest post-WWII foreign policies of, e.g., India and Egypt, and to their reaction to the growing tensions of that new era.   These two countries, together with Indonesia, the country in which the Bandung Conference was held, were instrumental in the convening of the Bandung Conference in 1955.   Out of a great number of separate and temporary efforts towards co-operation made by various neutral countries, i.e. countries outside the cold war power blocks, the Bandung Conference was the most important effort towards co-operation and directly led to the founding of NAM in 1961 [Van Nieuwkerk 1998: 6].

The 1955 Bandung Conference was attended by 29 [Appendix 1] mostly African and Asian countries and colonies.   The Conference

addressed many of the issues, which since became dominant themes of NAM. They, for example, denounced colonialism, spoke with urgency of the need to promote economic development in the Third World and called for a relaxation of international tensions. Participants of the Conference were instilled with what has been called the "Spirit of Bandung" – the recognition of a similarity of purpose and unity of action among peoples of the South to address their common problems and to play an active role in changing the existing world order [Leo Grande 1980: 35; Srivastava and Sahni 1995: 14].

Shortly after the closure of the Bandung Conference two of its most prestigious participants, Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Jawaharlal Nehru of India, travelled to the Yugoslav island of Brioni for a summit with Josip Broz Tito, the only major leader from a South state who distanced himself from the East/West block formation and who were not present at Bandung. Their joint declaration from the Brioni summit expressed support for the Bandung principles and at Tito's urging included a specific attack on the division of the world into hostile power blocks. The Yugoslav were naturally interested in enlisting Third World support for their own anti-block foreign policy of positive co-existence.

It was not until 1961 however, that a major international conference brought together the Brioni theme of non-alignment and the Bandung themes of anti-colonialism, economic development and peaceful co-existence. On 1 - 6 September 1961 twenty-five [Appendix 2] Third World countries, which saw themselves as being independent from the East/West block formation, convened in Belgrade Yugoslavia for the founding of NAM.

Due to the Cuban missile crisis [1961] and the Korean War [1955], political tension between the two super powers [USA and USSR] was particularly high at the time of the convening of the Belgrade conference. The Korean War was in practical terms a war between the USA and its allies, and the USSR and its allies. The independent or

non-involved position taken by some countries, for example Yugoslavia and India, during the war in Korea became particularly prominent in the public eye and non-alignment appeared as the only proper term to describe that position [Leo Grande 1980: 35].

The common bond for members of NAM was to be a foreign policy independent of the policies of the superpowers or associated blocks. The new grouping was seen as an alternative to block formation and not as a third block in its own right [p.52]. Many newly independent countries mainly in Asia and Africa then claimed to have found in non-alignment an identity and strength in numbers which allowed them a middle ground, although not necessarily equal distance, from the super powers of the day [Van Nieuwkerk, 1998: 1].

The subsection above shows that the founding of NAM was not an event resulting from a sudden decision by a few people or states. The NAM and the concept non-alignment indeed had a relative long history of development leading up to the founding of NAM in 1961. The next subsection circumscribes NAM's structure and decision-making process.

1.5 NAM STRUCTURE AND DECISION MAKING PROCESS

This subsection circumscribes NAM's structure [Appendix 3] and decision-making process. This is done to give understanding to the framework within which decisions on non-alignment are taken.

NAM has over the years developed a democratic, non-hierarchical inclusive administrative and organisational structure, which allows it to function coherently and effectively. NAM is not a bloc bound by any kind of international agreement. It has no constitution, permanent secretariat, nor does it have a cohesive ideological framework of its own.

NAM operates through Summit conferences, an official spokesperson and a Co-ordinating Bureau. The Summit meetings of heads of states or governments hosted by a member country, is the most important institution of the NAM. The host country, which assumes the role of chair, makes a significant commitment of its diplomatic and bureaucratic resources and exerts a powerful influence on the Movement. Specialised tasks, however, are carried out by functional bodies or expert groups appointed at the Summit.

Since the Lusaka Conference [1970], the chair has been the official spokesperson or leader of the Movement. The chair maintains contact among other member states, ensures continuity and carries out the decisions, resolutions and directions of the Conference. This gives the leader of the host country international visibility and influence. The chair lobbies as a bloc in the United Nations [UN]. The co-ordinating Bureau [situated in New York] maintains working contact with NAM members at the UN and serves as an intermediary organisation to carry out movement activities between Summit meetings [Magill, Bessette and Gold 1996: 907].

The practice of NAM has always been to make all decisions by consensus. Consensus, while signifying substantial agreement, does not require or imply unanimity. This was re-iterated at the 1996 meeting of the NAM Ministerial Committee on Methodology. Here in the official document the validity of consensus decision-making and the methods of promoting it as enunciated by the Chairman of the 1973 Preparatory Committee of Non-aligned Countries in preparation for the 1973 Algiers Summit, was reconfirmed [Ministerial Committee on Methodology 1996: 4].

Although NAM positions are reached by consensus and not actual voting, members may enter reservations for the record. The consensus procedure of debate until a majority opinion emerges maximises the appearance of unity but weakens the positions taken. Decisions taken

are not binding. It also puts the responsibility and a possibility for being prejudiced in interpreting long NAM debates on the shoulders of the Chairperson. The Chairperson is selected by consensus and remains in office for three years until the next meeting.

1.6   LITERARY REVIEW

The perceived meaning of non-alignment is influenced by what theoretical glasses a particular political, journalistic or academic author wears.   With this in mind it is important to note, as circumscribed in this subsection, how authors from different schools of thought have dealt with non-alignment and the NAM.

In examining the theoretical foundations of the literature of non-alignment, one must turn to the major schools of thought which emerged after World War II [WW II] and which attempted to explain the relations between states.   The main schools of thought came from the West and according to Singham and Hune [1986: 230] were Realism, system analysis and world order values. Another important school of thought, but which did not come from the West, is Marxist transformative theory. These schools of thought also influenced a number of Third World scholars in their explanations of the NAM.

Hans Morgenthau was without a doubt the most influential figure in the study of international relations in the post WW II years. Realism [p.16], of which he was the prime representative, is a power theory with the state as the most important actor, centred on the concepts of power and the national interests of states.   This school of thought took cognisance of the fact that world affairs were determined by power and there were only two powerful nations to emerge after WW II, the United States of America [USA] and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics [USSR]. Sources typically dealing with Realism are among other: J.M. Smith [1986] Realist thought from Weber to Kiminger; M. Hollis and S. Smith [1990] Explaining and understanding international relations and P. Viotti and M. Kaupi [1993] International relations theory: Realism,

Pluralism, Globalism.

Realists saw Third World politics as an appendage of great power politics. Small and weak states were therefore merely client states or members of the global alliance structure. In this construct the NAM was nothing more than part and parcel of the growing global interlocking alliance system. The NAM was seen as a third block, but because power were seen as the determining factor in world affairs, Realist authors did not seriously look at the NAM as a significant player in the power politics of the Cold War [Hollis and Smith 1990: 54].

Moving to the school of thought that dealt with the NAM as an aspect of the global alliance system, it is interesting to note that the literature on the alliance system and notably their treatment of non-alignment in International Relations is sparse. The works of George Liska, *Nations in Alliance* [1962], and Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* [1968] are probably the most representative of this school of thought.

Liska's work links the alliance system with neutralism. In his above mentioned study he takes a fresh look at the NAM and argues that the new states of Asia and Africa have a variety of reasons for being hostile to the then existing alliance system in world politics. First they had a special hostility to the global alliance system that was held over from their historical colonial association with European powers. Secondly, there is an anti-alliance stance that rules out an alliance with a particular country, but approves alliances with other countries. There is then also an anti-alliance stance that calls for an abstention from all global alliances, but does not imply being opposed to the alliance system as such. Finally there is a general opposition, especially from the smaller and less powerful states, to an exclusive alliance system that restricts membership. Liska therefore suggests that in many ways the NAM was a contemporary form of the type of neutralism that manifested itself in Europe earlier and yet it had some distinctive features [Liska 1962: 206].

Liska also links the domestic policy and foreign policy of new states. For him non-alignment, when it is stripped of all its ideology, is simply a policy of small powers to gain some influence in world politics. He even goes so far as to suggest that non-alignment is nothing more than a need to satisfy the physiological, political and economic interest of the newly emerging post-colonial elite [Liska 1962: 207].

In criticism of Liska's work it could be said that he misunderstood the non-aligned concept of anti-block politics and that he mistakenly portrayed non-alignment as a type of neutralism. As will be shown in this dissertation, non-alignment was rooted in two related concepts in foreign policy making. The first was the right of self-determination, namely a capacity developed in an independent foreign policy. The second was to try and break the notion of alliance politics or what is also called block politics.

It is important to note that the non-aligned stance was not simply one opposed to the alliance structure, but was primarily designed to break what it called the block theory of world politics. It wanted to democratise international relations as well as to protect new states losing their sovereignty by being integrated into the then existing alliance system. Non-alignment was thus a positive and activist foreign policy and not a form of neutralism.

There are also a number of studies that deals with the policy of individual Third World countries and examines their foreign policy as one aspect of the political behaviour of these countries. Two of the most perceptive works in this category are Michael Brecher's *India's Foreign Policy* [1957] and Bahgat Korany's *Social Change, Charisma and International Behaviour: Toward a Theory of Foreign Policy – Making in that Third World* [1976].

Looking at Brecher's work, it is an extensive study of India. He tries to

locate non-alignment within the framework of Indian domestic and foreign policy. Brecher attempts to view foreign policy making in non-aligned countries as part of their traditional politics and cultural values. He suggests for example that India's foreign policy is as much a product of traditional Indian assumptions of Western philosophical assumptions. Brecher examines the political philosophy of Nehru and suggests that Hinduism, Buddhism and traditional Muslim values may have influenced his perception of the world system.

Brecher furthermore carefully looks at the assumptions about the role of violence and non-violence in traditional Hindu and Muslim states in India. He suggests that India's predilections for non-alignment may have come from such assumptions. For Brecher non-alignment thus does have domestic roots [Brecher 1957: 5, 151].

In criticism of Brecher's work, it could be argued that India and the Third World countries were an integral part of the then contemporary world system and that traditional values have little or no significance in the process of foreign policy making.

A third and important school which emerged as a reaction against the conventional power theories as well as the system analysis was started by the work of Richard Falk as seen in *What New System of World Order?* [1982]. Falk started what was known as the World Order Models Project. They called for a new approach to the study of internal politics and self-consciously sought to transform the world order and not merely to explain its vicissitudes.

Totally disillusioned after the US war and loss in Vietnam Falk called for a new orientation:
"... we seek by the end of the century a world system that:
    achieves and moves beyond the norm of zero population growth;
    moves to a dismantling of the war system, including putting into
    effect a plan for drastic disarmament;

moves towards a world economic system in which each individual
is assured of a right to the minimum requirements of body, mind
and spirit;.

moves towards an integrated and coherent system of dynamic
equilibriums so far as the human impact on the biosphere are
concerned;

achieves and moves beyond bio-ethical code based on human
survival, planetary habitability and species diversity;

moves towards a conservation policy that is sensitive to the life
changes of future human generations and protective of natural
wonders and species diversity.

achieves an effective system of global oversight on the side effects
of technological innovations" [Falk 1982: 53, 54].

Falk's prescription for the world reads in many ways like a declaration
of the NAM. None of the case studies undertaken by this grouping of
scholars however deal with the NAM. This may be due to the fact that
the World Order Models Project was sceptical about the capacity of
state systems to bring about a new just world order.

In criticism to the World Order Models Project could be said that
although the project included three scholars from the Third World, none
took the contributions of Third World leaders or the NAM seriously. It
can be said that these scholars were prejudiced in their scepticism of
Third World leaders and their commitment to any values other than
their own survival.

Marxist transformative literature uses terminology such as core and
periphery to explain the relationship of the poor underdeveloped Third
World countries relative to the rich capitalist countries [Wallerstein
1979: 1,95]. NAM in the 1970's, under the leading influence of
especially Cuba [p.67], was closely associated with Marxist ideology
and the Eastern bloc as a whole. Sources in this school of thought
include, The capitalist world-economy by I. Wallerstein [1979],

Production, power and world order: social forces in the making of history by R.W. Cox [1987], and The principal of self-determination in international law by W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe [1977].

The world information and communication order in the post WW II era has been dominated by the Western media. There are however writings on non-alignment and the NAM from the non-aligned world itself.

The Yugoslav journal, *Review of International Affairs* for example, documented the NAM from its inception by reproducing its earlier declarations and speeches. India also has had a long tradition of non-aligned publications. Jawaharlal Nehru University, for example, under the editorship of K P Mishra has published a series of case studies of non-alignment that were distributed to the delegates of the seventh Summit [Singham and Hune 1986: 15]. It is however not easy to get hold of copies of these publications and they were not used for the purpose of writing this dissertation.

An Indian pioneering venture began in 1983 to establish a journal of non-aligned studies *The non-aligned world*, suspended publications in 1985 after its editor MS Rajan explained that he was unable to make a commercial success of the journal. Rajan's experience reflects a major difficulty faced by non-aligned countries in maintaining an intellectual publishing program for their work.

India has been a leader in the non-aligned world's information and communication order. Four outstanding Indian analysts deserve mention for their work on non-aligned matters. They are: K Subrahamanyam, AK Damodaran, R Jaipal and J Bandyopadhyaya [Srivastava and Sahni 1995: 99].

In Latin America, Cuba has published a great deal of material on the NAM, especially during its period as chairman of the NAM. A most

significant contribution is its handbook *The non-aligned countries* published in 1979. This work was produced for the 6th Summit and offers interpretations of the internal structures of non-aligned countries.

It should be noted that each summit conference of the NAM published a set of documents on the meeting itself. These volumes are however difficult to obtain. It is most important for the history of the movement and for students of non-alignment to have the compilation of material continually and easily available. More over, if a full and balanced history of the NAM is to be written, it is essential that documents other than final declarations are made available for analysis. The International Institute of Non-Aligned Studies in New Delhi, India, however recently released a CD-rom in which they compiled NAM's declarations since its founding as well as other important documents.

The above subsection shows there is a broad spectrum of literature, although not always easily accessible, dealing directly or indirectly with the NAM. The next subsection focus on the importance of acknowledging theoretical perspectives when involved in research.

1.7 THEORY

This subsection circumscribes three general schools of thought by which a scientific study, such as this dissertation, could be approached. The theoretical perspective through which this dissertation is approached is also identified.

Scientists in International Politics are not only interested in gathering, describing and analysing facts. The interesting part of International Politics is the attempt to understand how things hang together and to search for explanations of puzzling occurrences. To be able to do these things, the help of imaginative constructs [theories] are needed [Nel and McGowan 1999: 53; Bennett 1988: 11].

Some scholars in International Politics, such as A.L. Bennett [1988: xi, 11], make a distinction between empirical theories and normative theories. By this they mean that there are theories that exist only to explain empirical reality so that one can better understand it. There are then also theories that explain reality so that one might evaluate and perhaps even change it. These are called normative theories because they work with a norm [distinguishing between what is preferable and what is not] in terms of which existing reality is evaluated.

Today many scholars such as P. Nel and P.J. McGowan [1999: 52], and A.L. Bennett [1988: xi] believe that it is impossible not to choose in favour of a set of norms. They further say that scientists should do so openly and explicitly. According to them, even if one only wants to focus on understanding the world, one is already taking a normative position. You are leaving the world as it is and you are therefore implicitly expressing support for the political, economic and social status quo.

It can be said that rather than fooling oneself by thinking that it is possible to be detached scientists without normative preconceptions, one should rather be open about your unavoidable normative preferences. It is thus impossible in this dissertation, or any other, to hide behind a smokescreen of objectivity. As author I should rather openly say what I stand for: This dissertation is written from the perspective of Liberal Institutionalism [p.18].

In International Politics there are several theories clustered together into larger schools of thought. It is important to know what the most important theories and schools of thought entail and especially how they relate to the NAM. This will help the scholar in putting forward a sound argument. It will also prevent him/her from jumping, "even unwittingly", from one theory to another [Nel 2001].

According to Prof Phillip Nel there are three theoretical beacons in International Politics today [2001]. These beacons are Realism, Liberal Institutionalism and what may be called New Multilateralism. Other theoretical classifications can also be made such as by P. Viotti and M. Kaupi [1993] in their book International relations theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism. For the purposes of this dissertation, Nel's subdivision will be used as a frame of reference.

1.7.1 REALISM

It is appropriate to start off by looking at Realism since it is the oldest and arguably the most influential theory in the discipline of International Politics. Some of the oldest writings in this theoretical school dates back to the early post-WWII years with the writings of authors such as Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr [Singham and Hune 1986: 38].

Realists in general believe that states are the most important actors in the international political system. For Realists states are rational actors who always seek to maximise their own interests. For them the international system is anarchical. There is no central authority in the world that can enforce peaceful co-existence and/or co-operation between states.

Even without a central authority in the world, realists are adamant that there can be order in the international system. A strict bi-polar balance of power for instance establishes stability in a system even if there is no central source of authority or government.

Given the situation of the absence of a central authority in the international system which could make states obey rules that they do not want to obey, it is perfectly rational for states to look after their own interests. The main national interest of all states is its national security. In a Realists view, for a state to be safe, every state has to look after itself. They have to arm themselves to the best of their abilities, as well

as to make sure that they are powerful enough in other ways to dispel any attack [Nel and McGowan 1999: 56].

Realists believe that the one factor that best explains the dynamics of international relations is power. Although states as political actors in the international system are formally equal, they are however not equal in terms of their power capabilities. Some are strong, that is, they control effective power resources such as a big military force or a strong economy, while other states are weak. The history of International Politics for Realists is the story of how the strong try to maintain their power and how the weak try to become stronger. Order in the interstate system thus emerges primarily because of particular sets of power configurations or balances of power.

Much criticism has been brought against Realism. The once standard state-centric approach now has many challengers. Power is no longer the be-all and end-all in International Politics. To be more accurate, power and security are being seen in ways other than military.

Realists today still regard the state as the major actor in international relations. This however does not mean that they ignore the existence of other actors such as international organisations, trans-national companies or international crime syndicates. Realists argue that analytical concepts such as power can also be applied to these actors and that a Realist analysis can be applied to these other actors as well.

Realists at the same time, however, say that states are crucially important actors in International Politics because they control the means of legitimate violence via their control over the police force and the military. The globalisation of international economic affairs together with other current global developments is however, eroding some of the traditional roles of states thus contributing to outdate Realism [Nel and McGowan 1999: 56, 57].

For the purposes of this dissertation it is however still relevant to note how Realism will deal with an institution such as NAM. In his article, *The false promise of international institutions*, John Mearsheimer *[1994: 8]* defines an institution as follows: " ... a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should co-operate and compete with each other. They prescribe acceptable forms of state behaviour and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behaviour. These rules are negotiated by States and according to many prominent theorists they entail a mutual acceptance of higher norms".

Although these rules are usually incorporated into a formal international organisation such as NAM, it is not the organisation, *per se*, that compels states to obey the rules. States themselves must choose to obey the rules they create.

Realists recognise that states sometimes operate through international organisations such as NAM. They however believe that the Movement reflects state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power. For Realists NAM is essentially an arena for acting out power relationships. Realists believe that the caution of war and peace is mainly a function of the balance of power and institutions such as NAM largely mirror the distribution of power in the international system.

In short, the balance of power is the independent variable that explains war. An international organisation such as NAM is merely an intervening variable in the process [Mearsheimer 1994: 13].

1.7.2 LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM

Liberal Institutionalism is an International Politics theory resorting in a larger group of Institutionalist theories [Mearsheimer 1994: 49]. As seen below, institutionalist theories in general not only offer an alternative to Realism, but they explicitly seek to undermine it [Keohane 1984: 245].

In his book *After hegemony: Co-operation and discord in the world political economy*, Robert Keohane [1984: 245] concludes that Realism is in need of revision. According to Keohane such a step is necessitated by Realism's failure to take into account that states' conception of their interests and of how their objectives should be pursued, depend not merely on national interest and the distribution of world power, but on the quantity and quality and distribution of information. Agreements that are impossible to make under conditions of high uncertainty may become feasible when uncertainty has been reduced. Human beings and governments behave differently in information rich environments than in information poor environments.

Information is a significant systemic variable in world politics. International systems containing institutions that generate a great deal of high quality information and make it available on a reasonably even basis to the major actors are likely to experience more co-operation than systems that do not contain such institutions. NAM is an example of an institution that provides valuable information to its members. In so doing, NAM contributes towards co-operation between its members and potentially with other states as well.

Liberal Institutionalism specifically differs from Realism in a major way in that it does not directly address the question of how to prevent war as does Realism through its balance of power notion. The theory focuses instead on explaining why economic and environmental co-operation among states is more likely than Realists recognise. Increased co-operation in those realms is presumed to reduce the likelihood of war, although Liberal Institutionalism does not explain how [Mearsheimer 1994: 14].

Liberal Institutionalism is predicated on the belief that "cheating" is the main inhibitor of international cooperation and that institutions provide the key to overcoming that problem. The aim of Liberal Institutionalism

is to create rules that constrain states while accepting the fact that states are self-interested actors.

Liberal Institutionalism can be criticised in that it is of little relevance in institutions where states are fundamentally conflicting and neither side thinks it has much to gain from co-operation [Mearsheimer 1994: 15,16]. In these circumstances states aim to gain advantage over each other. They think in terms of winning and losing, invariably leading to intense security competition and sometimes war.

This dissertation is written from the perspective of Liberal Institutionalism notwithstanding the above-mentioned limitations. In principal this dissertation views NAM's role as an institution as being positive, but at the same time it is critical on how NAM fulfils that role. The interests of the NAM members are not fundamentally conflicting and all have much to gain through cooperation. the focus and scope of this theory covers the subject matter of this dissertation and cements it in a strong theoretical foundation. Archer's model [p.32] provides the analytical framework within which the positive or negative role fulfilled by an international organisation such as NAM can be evaluated.

Liberal Institutionalism was chosen because it explains the importance of international rules in regulating states in order to co-operate evenly and fairly. States are self-interested actors and strong states thus need to be constrained. In an era of globalisation, co-operation among states is unavoidable, but it should be in a way not to unjustly disadvantage small or weak states. Liberal Institutionalism, other than for example Realism, proposes that institutions such as NAM have an important role to play to, for example, ensure that international co-operation takes place on the basis of a level playing field.

The assumption of Liberal Institutionalism that International Politics can be divided into two realms namely security and political economy, and that Liberal Institutionalism mainly applies to the latter, is not a

drawback for this study. According to the Liberal Institutionalist Charles Lipson, co-operation between self-interested states is more easily sustained where economic relations are at stake than is the case with security affairs [Mearsheimer 1994: 16].

A link can however be made between the realms of political economy and security. If for instance it can be proven that the activities of NAM lead to political economic co-operation between north and south, it is also fair to say that NAM contributed to international stability and world peace [Mearsheimer 1994: 16]. To proof this, it will have to be shown how a NAM initiative or activity resulted in a voluntary North-South political or economic agreement.

Thus far two of the three theoretical beacons [p.16, 18] have been circumscribed. The next subsection circumscribes the third theoretical beacon namely Liberal Institutionalism.

1.7.3 NEW MULTILATERALISM

New Multilateralism is a more ambitious theory than Realism and Liberal Institutionalism. New Multilateralism's ultimate aim is to transform the fundamental nature of international politics and to create a world where there is not just increased co-operation among States, but a possibility of genuine peace [Mearsheimer 1994:14].

New Multilateralism can thus be categorised under a group of theories which one can call Transformative theories. Realism and Liberal Institutionalism on the other hand are categorised under the opposing International Politics category of theories that seek to explain international politics. By this is meant that theories that seek to explain are not primarily structured to uproot or change the nature of international politics [Mearsheimer 1994:14].

Where Theories of explanation's most important function is the explanation of international reality. Transformative theories on the

other hand agree that understanding the world is an important enterprise, but would add that understanding for its own sake cannot be the highest value. Instead, understanding should be in the service of transforming the world in order to make it a better place. The word *transform* as used in Transformative Theory does not merely refer to reform, but means radical change, or change that goes to the root of things [Nel and McGowan 1999: 62].

Although there is more than one definition of multilateralism as such, it will suffice for the purposes of this dissertation to look at an influential definition of multilateralism given to us by Robert Keohane: Multilateralism refers to the "... practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states" [Nel, Taylor and Van der Westhuizen 2000: 43, 44].

Andy Knight made an important contribution to Multilateralism when he recently described the emergence of what he called a "New Multilateralism" [1999: 259]. Old Multilateralism is described by Knight as "top-down" Multilateralism i.e. relying on conventional international institutions. New Multilateralism is described as bottom-up Multilateralism i.e. involving a New Multilateralism grounded in civil society. New Multilateralism has the potential of allowing civil society actors i.e. the broader community outside of political authority and expanded and increasingly important role in the workings of global governments.

The State-centric top-down approach to multi-lateral activities is still the dominant method of co-operation in global politics. The recent systemic transformations that has split open the once dominant political and economic orders, will however, have lasting consequences. In both of these significant international areas the concept of global sovereignty is being challenged [Schechter 1999: 8,9].

NGO's and other concerned non-state actors are demanding a seat at the global bargaining table and are thus speeding into the increasingly gaping sovereignty vacuum. The top-down multilateral order may still be attendant, but the emerge of new multilateral arrangements is unlikely to be hindered in a world that is witnessing the decline of State sovereignty [Schechter 1999: 8,9].

In criticism of New Multilateralism it can be said that the creation of "space" in global governance for civil society is somewhat problematic. There is no guarantee that multi-lateral governance will become more democratic or egalitarian as a result of the increasing of civil society or bottom-up forces. Not all elements in civil society are benign or progressive. Some of them for example represent reactionary and exclusionary movements. Furthermore, not all of them want to be placed under a government's structure of any type. Some such as the environmental groups have become co-opted by hegemonic institutions and ideologies [Knight 1999: 258].

If one looks at how New Multilateralism views NAM, it is fair to say that NAM to a large extent will be seen as an elitist movement. For as long as NAM's modus operandi is fundamentally top-down, certain stronger members will take the Movement hostage. They will use it for their own benefit and to the detriment of others. This dissertation will however show that strong leaders within NAM can and do project their own goals to be incorporated in that of the Movement. This is however not necessarily to the detriment of NAM members, but can in fact be beneficial to all.

In conclusion to the above subsection it can be said that Realism acknowledges that states sometimes operate through international organisations such as NAM. Realists however believe that NAM is merely an arena for acting out power relationships and institutions such as NAM thus largely mirror the distribution of power in the international system. New Multilateralism on the other hand views NAM as an elitist

movement where the strongest members will use the organisation to their own benefit and the detriment of others. Liberal Institutionalism on the other hand favourably views the role of an institution such as NAM in overcoming the problem of strong states inhibiting fair co-operation among all states. Liberal Institutionalism's main aim is to create rules that constrain states while accepting the fact that states are self-interested actors.

The above-mentioned three theoretical beacons were circumscribed in this dissertation as possible theoretical approaches to the writing of this dissertation. Liberal Institutionalism is used as theoretical approach for the writing of this dissertation. It gives understanding and lends weight to the constructive role NAM has to fulfil in international relations.

The author stands theoretically furthest from Realism. Realism's assumptions that war is politics by other means and that peace is only obtained by balance of power, is, in the author's view, somewhat outdated. His theoretical viewpoint on the other hand is not totally distant from New Multilateralism. The author believes that bottom up Multilateralism has the potential to enhance the effectiveness of NAM.

1.8   METHODOLOGY

This subsection circumscribes the methodology used in the research and writing of this dissertation.

The dissertation is an explanation of the changed meaning of the concept *non-alignment.* It analyses the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment in international politics during NAM's first three years of existence [p.2]. It will be shown in this dissertation that especially international context and to a lesser degree the influence of important states, such as India, Egypt, Yugoslavia and Cuba, within NAM were the main reason for changes to the meaning of non-alignment. The nature of the changes to non-alignment in short is a shift away from an initiative for peace in a bi-polar system to the

economic upliftment and equal opportunities for the South in both the late Cold War and post Cold War eras.

The author made use of a historical and documentary analysis in the writing of this dissertation. He analysed primary documents of NAM such as declarations and speeches made at summit conferences. He also used secondary sources in the form of academic works relating to non-alignment and NAM as well as general International Politics works.

The author also benefited from International Politics theory relating to international organisations. This helped him to distinguish between different interpretations of a given empirical situation. He also made use of interviews with specialists such as Prof. P. Nel from the University of Stellenbosch on trends in contemporary International Political theory. He also interviewed Ms M. Dyem from the NAM desk at the Department of Foreign Affairs [SA] and Mr. A. van Nieuwkerk from the Foundation for Global Dialogue on the changed meaning of non-alignment.

This dissertation is a descriptive study where, the developments within NAM during different time periods in the history of the Movement are juxtaposed. An analytical model as used by Clive Archer [1992] [p.32] is used as analytical framework creating a standard by which developments in different time periods of NAM could be compared.

For the purposes of this dissertation, NAM's historical evolution is divided into four chronological time periods or phases. In each of these phases, which co-incidentally corresponds with consecutive decades, NAM had specific characteristics unique to that phase.

In looking at the four phases, the first phase [1961 – 1969] can best be described as a survival phase for NAM. NAM had to find its feet amidst moderate and radical factions that, from the outset, were visible within the Movement. The second phase [1970 – 1979] can be

described as a radical era for NAM. In this phase the radical faction influenced NAM to follow an aggressive path in trying to obtain its goals. NAM in its third phase [1980-1989] moved away from its radical approach but was unable to stay focused or to get dedicated co-operation from its members. NAM in its fourth phase [1990 – 1992] was more focused. This phase coincided with the start of the post-Cold War era and NAM worked together to meet the challenges of this new era.

The meaning of non-alignment as manifested in the above mentioned four chronological phases of NAM is analysed and compared. For this purpose, each of the four phases is further analytically subdivided in [i.] international context, [ii.] role and influence of most important states, [iii.] goals and [iv.] the role fulfilled by NAM.

In comparing the four phases in terms of the above-mentioned four subdivisions, certain indicators are used according to which the comparison can be made. For the first subdivision [international context], the prevailing international political climate and major international political-economic developments are used in terms of which NAM's four phases are compared. With role and influence of most influential states, the role and leadership of specific figures within NAM are focused upon, while with goals, the main goals NAM set itself as a Movement [usually at summit meetings] are used. The role NAM fulfilled is compared in terms of Archers model circumscribed in 2.2 [p.32] comparison is methodologically approached by using the same four analytical subdivisions with their own specific indicators in each of NAM's four phases. In analysing and comparing international context, for example, the prevailing international political climate and major international political-economic developments are taken into consideration. With the role and influence of most influential states the role and leadership of specific figures within NAM are focused upon. In analysing and comparing NAM's goals, the main goals NAM set itself as a Movement [usually at summit meetings] are focused upon. The

fourth category, namely role, is analysed and compared in terms of Archer's analytical model [p.32], where he proposes three possible roles [instrument, actor and arena] that an international organisation can fulfil.

By juxtaposing and comparing NAM's four phases, certain diversions over and above the self-evident facts that came to the fore with the analysis of each phase, could be made. Not only will the nature of the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment become clear, but so too the reasons for these changes as well as their possible implications.

The chapter divisions of this dissertation is as follows:
Chapter 2 describes the analytical mechanism used in the dissertation to analyse the changed meaning of non-alignment in international politics. In Chapters 3 – 6 each of NAM's four chronological phases [1906's. 1970's, 1980's, 1990: 1992] is analysed individually.

Chapter 7 compares the four phases of NAM. This is done by comparing the sub-divisions of each phase, namely international context, role and influence of most important states, goals, and the role of NAM, with each other. In Chapter 8, certain diversions from the comparison in Chapter 7 are made. This enables me to answer the research question as stated in the first part of the introductory chapter [p.2].

Holistically the chapter divisions of this dissertation can be summarised as follows:

Chapter 1 outlines the problem set against a historical review of NAM and states my own theoretical perspective. Chapter 2 shows the framework in which the subject material will be analysed. Chapters 3 – 6 analyses the subject material while Chapter 7 compares and assesses it. In Chapter 8 everything is put back together again and

the research question is answered. Chapter 8 also concludes the dissertation by giving an overview and emphasising the most important points.

1.9 CONCEPTUAL CLARRIFICATION

This subsection circumscribes a number of key concepts relative to this dissertation.

globalisation: Globalisation means more than the growing importance of trade in the world. It rather refers to the overall trend that began in the early to mid 1980's, and which is characterised by the declining importance of national boundaries to production, finance and trade [Nel and McGowan 1999: 42].

intergovernmental organisation [igo]: Intergovernmental organisations are organisations which facilitate collaboration towards co-ordination between governments, the need for which increased due to an increasingly dense mesh of international relationships, ranging from security and commercial to social interactions. Although these organisations are made up of states, they act as single actors and sometimes their policies contravene the interest of any single member state [Nel and McGowan 1999: 122].

international non-governmental organisation [ingo]: An international non-governmental organisation is a trans-national non-profit making service group. Although ingo's constituent members are states, the state representatives are non-governmental [Evans and Newnhan 1990: 145].

Non-alignment: Non-alignment is a foreign policy orientation towards the avoidance of war and the furtherance of certain long-term social, economic and political objectives. Non-alignment is neither neutrality, nor non-involvement, but a considered approach towards specific goals [Srivastava and Sahni 1995: 40].

1.10 CONCLUSION

The research question of this dissertation [p.2] inquires to the nature of the changes to the meaning of non-alignment, the reasons why these changes took place and the subsequent implications in the international system. This dissertation is written from a liberal institutionalist perspective. IT is a descriptive study where, the developments within NAM during different time periods in the history of the Movement, are juxtaposed. An analytical model as used by Clive Archer [1992] [p.32] is used as analytical framework creating a standard by which a comparison of phases could be made.

Chapter 2 will circumscribe Archer's model. In this chapter, reasons will be given why it was chosen as analytical model for this dissertation, as well as to indicate how this model is to be used as analytical framework for this dissertation.

2. THEORETICAL APPROACH

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In this dissertation the NAM will be analysed in terms of the different roles it fulfilled in the international political system since it's founding. It is however important to first have a better understanding of what the possible different roles of an international organisation in the international political system entails, as well as to have an understanding of how the model used to analyse NAM in terms of the roles it fulfils in the international system, works.

This chapter therefore starts off by describing Archer's analytical model used to examine international organisations in the contemporary world. The three possible roles, namely instrument, actor and arena, which, according to Archer, an international organisation can fulfil in the international system are then described in some detail. An explanation is also given of why Archer's model was chosen as analytical model for this dissertation.

Before going into the detail of what is listed above, a question that must be addressed is: To what extent is NAM [as a movement] an organisation? Stated differently, is it valid to analyse the NAM in terms of a model designed to analyse international organisations?

Footnote

Archer's model is based on the conventional international institution. NAM, as its name indicates, is not a conventional international institution. In terms of its nature and functions, however, NAM functionally fits into Archer's model.

According to A.L. Bennett, in his book International Organisations [1988: 4], the chief function of international organisations is to provide a means of co-operation among states in areas in which co-operation provides advantages for all or a large number of nations. Other functions of international

organisations are to provide multiple channels of communication, together with the prevention of conflict between states.

If one looks at the Charter of the United Nations [UN] as an example of an international organisation, the first article in short stipulates the purposes of the UN to be [UN Charter]:

[i]   *To maintain international peace and security.*

[ii]   *To develop friendly relationships among nations based on respect for the principal of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.*

[iii]   *To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural and a humanitarian character and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedom for all.*

[iv]   *To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.*

NAM as a movement does not have a charter or constitution. There are, however, fundamental goals incorporated in the Belgrade Declaration, which is a founding and principal document of the NAM. These goals are peace based on co-operation and not domination, prosperity and social justice for all people and the elimination of colonialism in all its forms [p.49].

If these fundamental goals of NAM are compared with that of Article 1 of the UN, it is clear that NAM's fundamental goals fall within the scope of the UN as an international organisation. In viewing NAM's fundamental goals, it is also clear that the Movement falls within the framework of functions fulfilled by an international organisation as circumscribed by Bennett [p.30].

NAM as a movement, for the purposes of this dissertation, is thus functionally an international organisation. Archer's model, designed for the analysis of international organisations, can thus be used as analytical model for this dissertation.

2.2 ARCHER'S MODEL

In this subsection Archer's analytical model will be circumscribed. Since his model is used as the analytical model for this dissertation, the circumscription below is essential for the reader to understand the reasoning of the dissertation as a whole.

In his book, *International Organisation, Key Concepts in International Relations: 1* [1983: 126-169], Clive Archer focuses on international organisations by analysing them in terms of their possible role in the international political system. Archer envisaged three possible roles for international organisations in the international system.

Archer's model metaphorically likens contemporary international relations to a global market place. Just as a seemingly unimportant messenger boy or an armed policeman have certain roles to fulfil in a market situation enabling or facilitating transactions between traders, international organisations fulfil certain roles in international relations enabling or facilitating interaction between states.

Clive Archer views international relations as part of a world system rather than as part of a network [1983: 127, 128].

In identifying with a world political system, Archer [1983: 128] is of consideration that it consists of numerous more or less autonomous actors [e.g. states] interacting in patterned ways to influence one another. Their independent decisions and policies serve as stimuli for one another and induce or constrain the behaviour of others.

This view of a world political system is among other echoed in a definition by Russett and Starr [1981:17] who defined a system as a set of interacting elements. When they speak of a global or regional system, they imply that the major elements or influences at different levels of analysis affect each other.

Both Archer's and Russett and Starr's view of a world political system provides the scope for an international organisation such as NAM to fulfil certain roles vis-à-vis the states of the world. Russett and Starr's definition however also shows that the principal of a system is applicable on different levels. In analysing the different influences on the changing of the meaning of non-alignment, the elements of international context and NAM's goals can, seen on a different level, again influence each other.

International relations viewed as a network is less organised and suggests inter-connections and contact between individual entities that may not be used in a patterned fashion to influence each other. A network is less active and reactive, less enclosed than a system. A network acknowledges interaction between states, but the outcome of certain actions follows les of a pattern in that the action of a certain state not necessary has a direct influence on the action of a second state.

The question can now be asked of what role an international organisation [e.g. NAM] plays in this global market place? Secondly, the question comes to the fore of how then might an international organisation such as NAM, in whatever role, affect the working of the world market place – that is present day international relations. In other words, what functions may NAM perform in the international system, which are not already performed by other actors, or how does it affect this system?

To answer such questions, some thought must be given to the difficult problem of just how an international system works? Generally, any system to function utilises its resources in order to transform inputs to the system into outputs. This is what Almond and Powell, in their book Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach [1966: 28,29], call its conversion function. The international political system behaves as a unit in its relation to other social systems and the environment. In other

words, actors within in the system do not only react to the actions of other actors but also to happenings in other spheres of the globe, for example finance. Further more, the system is not static. It has to maintain and adapt itself as was the case with the end of bi-polarity in the late 1980's.

Looking at the role international organisations play in the metaphorical political market place, some questions come to the fore. These questions relate to the three possible roles of an international organisation in the international system namely instrument, actor and arena [Archer 1983: 226]:

[i]   Is the organisation the mere instrument of the other players being used as a tool to gain advantages or as means of communication between interlocutors? Alternatively an organisation could be a relatively independent actor or a convenient meeting place of actors.

[ii]   Is the organisation one of the many participants jostling in transactions with other groups, with political leaders and state representatives? Is the organisation [e.g. NAM] able to act as an independent actor keeping in mind its own hierarchical position in the international political system as well as the fact that it is composed out of sovereign states?

Is the organisation part of the scenery itself, forums for meetings or common ground for gathering? In other words, is the organisation merely a meeting place for individual states lacking a dedicate effort to reach certain common goals [Archer 1983: 226]?

Regarding the functions of an international organisation vis-à-vis the political market place, certain questions relating to Archer's metaphoric model also come to the fore: How does the international organisation influence the functioning of the global market place? Does it allow those who frequent it to organise themselves more efficiently, to express their desires more forcefully or more clearly? Does it affect the

running of the market place or behaviour there? Can it determine who shall do business there, even to set standards of behaviour and perhaps enforce rules and regulations? Can they affect the functioning of the market place by themselves trading in it or indirectly by providing information to those who buy and sell?

It is clear that some international organisations will fulfil limited roles and functions while other, for example the UN, may cover a wide range. It also follows logically that the role played by an international organisation will affect the functions it performs in international relations.

Before analysing NAM as an international organisation in terms of the role it fulfils, it is important to first have a better understanding of what role entail [2.4]. In discerning the role NAM fulfilled in the international political system, the hierarchical position of NAM relative to other international organisations can also be determined.

2.3   WHY CHOOSE ARCHER'S MODEL?

Where the above subsection circumscribed Archer's model, this subsection will explain why Archer's model was chosen as analytical model for this dissertation.

Not all studies dealing with international organisations work from a specific or single model. For example, A.L. Bennett, in his book International Organizations [1988: xi], does not follow any single model and is eclectic in his interests. He, in this book, focuses on the philosophy and principals of international organisations and on a broad range of issues with which these organisations try to deal.

Archer's model is used in this dissertation because it provides an analytical framework within which the historical development of the meaning of non-alignment can be paraphrased. It is only through such analysis that the research question of this dissertation [p.2] could be

answered. Working from the assumption that changes to the meaning of non-alignment have an influence on the international system, it is important for actors of, especially the South, to know what changes could influence them and in what way. By studying past events and revealing certain patterns and trends, the efficiency of NAM could be enhanced. Repetition of past mistakes could be avoided, present day international politics could be understood better and the outcome of future action could be envisaged more accurately.

In analysing NAM in terms of the three possible roles in the international system, definite changes to the meaning of non-alignment are revealed together with the context and reasons why it took place. The main problem however in using Archer's model was that it is a very broad model and not specifically designed for a study in which different time periods of an organisation are juxtaposed. It was thus up to the author to analytically subdivide the subject material. He also had to categorise my own theoretical perspective in using Archer's model.

2.4 ROLE

There are three major roles international organisations play in the international political system, namely those of instrument, actor and arena [Archer 1983: 130].

2.4.1 Instrument

Probably the most usual image of the role of an international organisation is that of an instrument being used by its members for particular ends. International organisations, many a time inter governmental organisations, are used by their members [states] mainly as handy tools to achieve their own foreign affair goals [Archer 1983: 130, 131].

In the case of inter-governmental organisations, such as NAM, the members are sovereign states. They thus usually have the ability to limit the actions of an international organisation over them.

International organisations in this category are however susceptible to have their membership dominated by one powerful member and the organisation thus being used as a hegemonic instrument. It will be easier for an IGO with a limited membership to be conformed to the role of instrument, where as an organisation with a nearly universal membership [e.g. UN] will find it increasingly difficult to remain the instrument of a small group of members.

Apart from being dominated by one or more powerful members, an international organisation susceptible to being an instrument has the further problem that it is likely to become fought over by the most powerful members eager to utilise it. This could have the effect that such an international organisation could become ineffective. A lot of time and energy will be lost to internal manoeuvring, while the chances for a collective outward focus will diminish.

For an international organisation to function as an instrument, it is not necessary for all the members to agree on a program. One or several states should not hinder two or more other states from using the organisation to reach a settlement among them. If the members believe they are not in a zero sum game and that co-operation in the organisation can produce new benefits that would otherwise remain unexploited and that all or most members can take advantage of these, then it is logical to allow the institutions of the organisation some scope for action [Archer 1983: 130, 131].

Also a long-term view could persuade a member to suffer apparent losses by not preventing decisions detrimental to its interest in the expectation that larger gains will be made when other decisions are taken. To describe international organisations as functioning as instruments of their membership does not mean that each and every decision made must be explicable in terms of serving the interest of each and every member.

An instrument's purpose is demonstrated if it shows its utility over a period of time to those who have brought it into service. When another makes use of the instrument their satisfaction should not be overshadowed, provided it is not turned into a weapon against them. This implies that smaller members will tolerate an organisation being used as an instrument by more influential members, as long as such a system will bear fruit for them in the long run [Archer 1983: 133, 134].

2.4.2 Arena

The role of international organisations can secondly be seen as there being arenas or forums within which action takes place. The organisation, in this case, functions as a [neutral] meeting place where members come together to interact.

International organisations functioning as arenas provide to their members the opportunity of advancing their own viewpoints / suggestions in a more open forum than that provided by bilateral diplomacy. This does however not mean that all discussions in an arena lead to consensus or unanimity. Arenas can also be a battleground for opposing members. NAM summits, especially in the 1970's as well as the 1980's, were marked by sharp differences between the moderate and radical factions within the Movement.

Organisations whose members are of about the same weight or strength will however be more egalitarian by nature and thereby act as a meeting place for equals. Likewise, international organisations with extensive / near universal membership will find it increasingly difficult to remain the instrument of a small group of members or to be an active independent actor on the world stage. It is much more likely that such organisations will function as forums for their members. The reason for this is that less powerful members are usually the majority in a large organisation and should they stand together, they usually are able to curtail the influence of the powerful member/s.

In their role as a forum, international organisations fulfil a requirement often sought of in international relations. When members of organisations want to negotiate, agree or publicly disagree, they can, should they choose do so, on a bi or multilateral basis. An ad hoc meeting, especially for that purpose, will however have to be arranged. This inevitably involves complicated and often time-consuming negotiations to agree on, amongst other, the time, place, protocol, rules of conduct, agenda and the status of any conclusion reached by the negotiations.

It is generally agreed that an existing international organisation by having an acceptable meeting place, set of rules and conventions together with back-up services, provides members with a forum which otherwise would have had to be created from the start [Archer 1983: 134, 135].

2.4.3 Actor

The third role of international organisations in the international system is the image of an independent actor. This does not mean that an international organisation can act on the world scene without being significantly affected by outside forces. Not even an independent state can claim such independence.

Independent actor rather points to the autonomous action of an actor [Deutsch 1966: 7]. Autonomous action refers to those actors whose actions are prescribed by other actors. Its external influences do still effect the decisions taken by actors. Independent actors however possess stable and coherent decision making machinery within itself.

Moreover, an international organisation with a charter that creates strong institutions, insulated from interference by their membership and with powerful resources, is more likely to fulfil the role of an independent actor. On the other hand if there are constitutional

safeguards for the members that allow them to prevent the growth of strong institutions, the organisations is not likely to function as an independent actor. It will either function as a forum for the membership as a whole or as a tool [instrument] for the furtherance of the policy of some members.

An international organisation functioning as an actor can to a certain extent be described as stronger than the sum of its membership. It can thus act effectively on the world stage.

The activities of an international organisation acting as an independent actor can compel governments to act differently than they would have otherwise. The extent to which these organisations themselves are significantly affected by outside forces, varies according to the organisation and the circumstances. It can however be said that certain international organisations in the modern era is more of an independent actor in the international system than for instance many a small, poor and heavily indebted African state [Archer 1983: 134, 135].

A problem now coming to the fore, is the question of how to estimate the degree of independent actor capacity of inter-govemmental organisations in the international system. Since these organisations are established by inter-governmental agreement, how can they then have a role separate from that willed by their membership? How can they be anything more than instruments of or forums for their member states [Archer 1983: 152, 153]?

The International Court of Justice has a structure preventing any interference in its work by the signatories to its articles. The judges who are appointed by the members of the UN, are not the delegates of their states of origin. Their decisions are taken independently, not by instruction from their state of origin. It is thus clear that an international organisation, by the sovereign will of their founders, can be given a separate capacity to act on the international scene and that this is

reflected in their institutions. Any independent actor capacity is not only dependent for its existence on the desires of the member government but also the very substance of that capacity implementation is reliant on authorities and agencies of the members.

It becomes politically more difficult for a member state of an inter-governmental organisation to effectively stop that organisation's activities once the IGO has started to build up a bureaucracy, a modus operandi and a role not totally dependent on the acceptance of its every act by all its members. To prevent unwanted action by the international organisation, a member state risks being alienated or alienating other states, as well as ending any benefits the IGO may provide. This gives organisations with a wide range of members and activities and well-developed central services a certain degree of autonomy in their actions.

There is however a distinction between the above mentioned and an IGO with mere universal membership such as the UN. Last mentioned type organisation will find it increasingly difficult to be an independent actor on the world stage or to remain the instrument of a small group of members. On the other hand, an international organisation will more regularly fulfil the role of an independent actor should it be headed by a strong independent leader who likes to keep the reigns in his/her own hands. This is because a strong leader more readily succeeds in getting all the different members and factions within an organisation to work together towards a common goal/s [Archer 1983: 153].

2.5 CONCLUSION

In the above chapter, Archer's analytical model concerning three possible rolls namely, instrument, arena and actor, which international organisations can fulfil in the international system, were circumscribed. The main advantage in using Archer's model in this dissertation is that it provides a functional analytical framework within which potential changes to the meaning of non-alignment can be discerned. In allowing

for different roles to be fulfilled by NAM in different phases, the model enables the annalist to make important comparisons and deductions.

The model has a weakness in that it does not clearly show how to measure or establish what role an international organisation fulfils at a certain time. This problem was overcome by analytically subdividing each chapter in terms of [I] international context, [ii] roles and influence of influential states, [iii] goals and [iv] roles fulfilled, as well as to use certain indicators [p.26].

The next four chapters chronologically cover NAM between the years 1961-1992 in four phases. Archer's model is used in each chapter to discern changes to the meaning of non-alignment.

3. COLD WAR ERA PHASE 1

NAM AS AN INSTRUMENT [1961-1969]

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter, together with Chapters 4,5, and 6 forms the nucleus of this dissertation as a comparative evaluation analysis. The evolution of NAM is split up in four chronological phases. The choice of the four phases can be explained in that, seen as a whole, NAM during the years 1961-1992 took on four distinct [time related] identities [p.25] in terms of how the members interacted with each other and how the Movement interacted with the world at large.

In analysing NAM in each of these four phases, the meaning of non-alignment in each phase can be deduced. The analysis of the four phases will then be compared with each other in Chapter 7. It will then be possible to point out the [possible] changes to the meaning of non-alignment.

Each of the four NAM phases will be analysed according to Archer's basic framework as described in Chapter 2 [p.32]. By analysing each of the four phases under the same terms namely international context, role and influence of most important states, goals and role as instrument, actor or arena, a comparative evaluation is possible in Chapter 7 [p.119].

3.2 INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

To understand the founding of NAM as well as its first decade of existence, it is important to have an understanding of the context in which it took place.

The end of the Second World War [WW II] in 1945 marked the beginning of an important new era in international relations. One very important aspect was the decolonisation crises after the WW II in Asia,

Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America. This resulted in the emergence of many new states most of which were small, under-developed and politically weak.

Their people were fragmented internally and they had the twin tasks of creating new political structures and abolishing institutions used by their former colonial masters. [Srivastava and Sahni 1995: 7].

At the same time as these developing states emerged and entered the international political system, the global power structure was being transformed. The predominance of Western Europe in world affairs was replaced with the bipolar world dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, new political strains were created globally when the USA adopted a policy of containing communism throughout the world just as the USSR was consolidating communism and itself and advocating support for national liberation. This Cold War, as it came to be called, brought about a growth in military pacts, an increase in armaments, the gradual polarisation of the world into power blocs and, with the onset of the nuclear age, the possible annihilation of the human race. Newly independent states thus faced the challenge of political, economic and social development with the handicap of an exploitative colonial past and the severe constrains of international power politics [Srivastava and Sahni 1995: 9]. The newly independent countries had to a large extent associate themselves to one of the two power blocks in order to secure protection, trade and development help. In doing so, they were however compelled to embrace certain ideological norms.

Speaking of power politics in the 1960's era, one thinks first of all about the development of new weapons of mass destruction. Particularly of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems produced to give them practically unlimited range. This has had a deep and decisive effect on the prospects of war and hence also on international relations.

If war must end in utter and mutual destruction, then foreign policy must be essentially changed [Mates 1983 : 11, 12].

Since it's founding, NAM advanced an anti-war policy to its members as well as to the rest of the world. NAM was especially set against nuclear arms since this held the greatest threat in the post WWII era. The Movement was also set against the East-West block formation since this heightened tension, as well as according to them, the possibility for the outbreak of a nuclear war [Singham 1986:45].

In the past, political pressure was applied by the assumption that, if opposed, political pressure could be followed by the use of armed force and a declaration of war. Therefore traditionally high tensions were an overture to war or submission of the weaker without war. This scenario lost its validity after the introduction of nuclear arms. Even the weaker nuclear force, before being wiped out, could have the capacity to inflict unprecedented damage to the initiator of a war. In these new circumstances, even substantial superiority no longer permitted pressure beyond the point of no return. This implied that all states with a nuclear capability had less of a chance to be invaded or submission by a stronger military force. India is an example of a NAM member who was thus not directly involved in the Cold War, but still had a nuclear capability providing it with" special" protection against foreign threats [Srivastava and Sahni 1995: 69].

The international system in the 1960's was a bipolar system marked by high-tension bloc politics, an arms race between the Super Powers and their allies, as well as a struggle for influence over newly independent states. Each block tried to bring newly independent states under their wing to secure new markets for their export products, use them as a supplier of commodities as well as to broaden the belief in their own ideology.

The bi-polar system and what it brought about for the Third World, was one of the main reasons for the quest of reshaping the world order. Non-alignment partially springs from insight into this scenario. Consequently the political elements being opposed against the bipolar system and the arms race in the non-alignment platform become directly linked to this fundamental change, marking the post WW II era.

However, the advent of nuclear weapons is by far not the only fundamental and deep change occurring after 1945. The WW II initiated and brought to a full swing the movement against colonialism. With India in the lead, other nations in Asia and elsewhere followed. What started as the reaction of a few colonies turned into a general anti-colonial movement. The result was the emergence of dozens of newly liberated nations forming their new states on the ruins of colonial empires.

This immense and unprecedented world wide anti-colonial revolution brought about two important changes in world relations. Firstly, the difference in the level of economic development between the newly liberated countries and the industrially developed ones became obvious and began to create difficulties such as a shortage in development capital for the less developed countries. Secondly, the inexorable spread of decolonisation induced the former colonial powers and other industrially developed countries to impose on the newly liberated countries unequal relations based upon their advantages in development and in military power.

The difference in the level of development grew over the years in the colonial period but was not present in international relations since that remained an internal affair of each empire. With independence, the former colonies obtained the right to stand independently on the world scene but also had to suffer the disadvantages of their low level of economic development [Mates 1983: 11].

On the other hand, the industrially developed countries could afford to forego the exercise of sovereign rights because they could impose their will economically by relying on high industrial development, organisation and technical knowledge [Mates 1983 : 11, 12].

The problem of the less developed countries emerged thus in world politics as also in the pre-occupations of the founders of the Movement of Non-aligned states. They too fell in the category of less developed countries and they could not disregard a problem that was common to them all.

Newly independent states are also sometimes referred to as less developed or developing states. States [usually European] that are referred to as colonial masters are sometimes called developed states. The terms developed state and less developed state, in general distinguish these two categories of states on account of their level of economic development. Less developed states however sometimes perceive this type of labelling as Euro centric.

It must also be remembered that the founding of the UN in 1945 provided a climate of internationalism which allowed Asian, African and Latin delegations to meet for the first time and to explore common interests. This climate of internationalism gave rise to a series of regional conferences that for example culminated in the founding of the Arab League [1945], the Organisation of American States [1951] and the Organisation of African Unity [1963] [Van Nieuwkerk 1998: 9].

As far as the NAM was concerned, an important [preliminary] meeting took place at Bandung in 1955 [p.4] bringing together Asian and African delegations. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India made, here a lasting contribution to the foundations of the eventual NAM by introducing the so-called Panch Sheel [five principles] as a basis for international relations.

These principles are [Alimov, 1987: 22]

[i]   Respect for territorial integrity.

[ii]   Mutual non-aggression.

[iii]   Mutual non-interference in internal affairs.

[iv]   Equality and mutual benefit.

[v]   Peaceful co-existence.

These principles provided a framework for the evolution of non-alignment. Stated differently Panch Sheel was to become the building blocks around which the meaning of non-alignment was to be constructed at NAM's founding meeting at Belgrade in 1961.

Together with Nehru, Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia and Gamal Nasser Abdel of Egypt took the leadership in getting the Movement off the ground. The new international consciousness among new states and the role of the founding trio were essential elements leading to the Belgrade summit of 1961, generally seen as the starting point of the NAM. It was at this meeting that the participants decided that the new institution will be a loose association of members as a Movement with a revolving chair and not an organisation with a permanent secretariat and constitution. This was done to pave the way for most South states to join this new institution, even though they represented a range of ideologies, and without having to fear a threat to their sovereignty [Alimov, 1987: 23].

At the end of the Belgrade Conference [1961] a declaration [Belgrade Declaration] was adopted unanimously and would serve as a common platform for the Movement. When assessing the significance of the Belgrade Conference, one should remember that the wide spread view that the NAM was founded at this Conference , is not exactly correct. At the time of the Conference, the delicates to the Conference did not regard the Conference as a founding of a movement [Willetts, 1978: 127].

It was only in later years that the Belgrade Conference was called NAM's first Conference. The label "non-alignment" was then given to the Conference and the Movement as a whole. Non-alignment was the basic point of departure of all the thinking leading up to [p.4], and at the Conference itself. On the whole, the struggle for peace, freedom and equal co-operation among countries, were the keynote of the Belgrade Conference [Mates, 1983: 7].

In defining the role of the Non-Aligned states in the world arena in the Cold War conditions, the participants to the Belgrade Conference stated that the activities of these states in the interest of peace were among the more important factors of safeguarding world peace. The Declaration expressed the firm conviction that the further extension of the non-committed area of the world constitutes the only possible and indispensable alternative to the policy of total division of the world into blocs and the intensification of Cold War policies. It also stated that Non-Aligned countries did not which, and indeed could not, form a new bloc [Belgrade Declaration 1961: 20, 21].

It is significant that the points of departure in the Declaration are the general attitude of criticism of the then existing world order. In the introductory part of the Declaration "the transition from the old and existing order based on domination to a new order based on co-operation between nations, founded on freedom, equality and social justice for the promotion of prosperity" is given as the starting point of the whole thinking of the assembled leading statesmen [Belgrade Declaration 1961,21].

The Belgrade Declaration was significant in that it did not only address certain issues, such as decolonisation, within the then international political system, but challenged the system itself. It asked for an end to bi-polarity, as this would be the only key to world peace.

The intention is clear that the whole text of this document should be read in the light of the above believe and aspirations about the necessity and the inevitability of fundamental changes in the world. These changes were not defined in terms of the narrow and dogmatic framework of any ideology. The text does not presume to express a definite formula concerning developments in the world, but leaves open the ways and means as well as the concrete implementation of the given idea [Belgrade Declaration 1961: 21 – 24].

The Belgrade Declaration was a founding document of the NAM and, as such, could not limit itself by including time and/or ideological specific details of how its main aims should be reached. The Declaration specified that world peace was the Movements main aim, an aim all South states would in principal agree upon and aspire to. Once lasting world peace was reached, the goals of freedom, equality and social justice would be realized [Mates, 1983: 9].

This subsection gave a broad outline of the international context in the era NAM was founded and had to find its feet. The next subsection will deal with how influential states within NAM came to terms with this scenario.

3.3 ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL STATES

As with International Context [subsection above], the role played by influential states in NAM that is covered in this subsection, together with the goals achieved, could have an impact on what role NAM would fulfil in each phase. This analysis will enable the meaning of non-alignment within each phase to be deduced.

After the WW II, the experiences of Tito of Yugoslavia, Nasser of Egypt and Nehru of India led them to work together in developing a common approach for the formation of a new movement for the less influential states. [Dyani, 1998: 3]

Following are certain reasons, among others, which influenced these leaders to declare themselves to be non-aligned [Srivastava and Sahni 1995: 41, 42].

Tito was a leader of a country that in 1948 successfully survived a confrontation with the USSR. The 1956 Hungarian crisis further strained relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Various crises, such as the Korea War of 1955 and Suez Canal crisis of 1956 that had caused so much concern to Egypt, were seen by Nasser as being the result of great power interference in Arab affairs. As Prime Minister of a newly independent India, Nehru too was of the opinion that the restricting Cold War scenario was detrimental to the well being of this own country.

After clashing with the great powers, the above-mentioned three founders began to work together and developed the Non-aligned Movement. Non-alignment was chosen by the founder leaders to be an instrument [role] or a means of foreign policy in order that it enables them to give fuller meaning and content to their newly achieved political independence [Srivastava and Sahni 1995: 41, 42]. Non-alignment to them was a political framework of reference within which they could structure their foreign policy more comprehensively and well considered. Not content with the formal transfer of political power, they wanted to go beyond this and autonomously shape their destiny in a manner that protect and promote their national interests. This essentially lay in accelerated socio-economic development of their weak and underdeveloped societies [Srivastava and Sahni 1995:42].

In order to achieve this objective, international peace was considered to be a prerequisite and the Cold War, bloc politics and power politics injurious and hence needed to be opposed. The leaders were opposed to bloc power configurations because they involved limitations imposed by the world political environment upon freedom.

The founding leaders of NAM categorically emphasised that NAM in a true sense should be a broad platform rather than a narrowly defined alliance. The reason for this was that they did not want to create a third block and felt that every member state, irrespective of their socio-political system should have a right to express its opinion and voice its concern over international issues. The world does not consist only of blocs. The majority of countries are outside blocs and they accept peaceful and active co-existence as the sole way to avoid the catastrophe of war.

Prime Minister Nehru's pioneering five principles or Panch Sheel, originally formulated as a guideline upon which Asian countries should base their relations, would become an important foundation to the development of non-alignment [Stremlau 1998 - 63; Van Nieuwkerk 1998; 8, 9].

Nehru's Panch Sheel was later incorporated into the ten Bandung principles [1955]; [Alimov 1987: 32, 33].

[i] Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN.

[ii] Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.

[iii] Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small.

[iv] For abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.

[v] Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself signally or collectively in conformity with the Charter of the UN.

[vi]a Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interest of any of the big powers.

b Abstention by any country from external pressures on other countries.

[vii]   Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.

[viii]   Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means of the party's own choice in conformity with the Charter of the UN.

[ix]   Promotion of mutual interest and co-operation.

[x]   Respect for justice and international obligations.

These principles represented a major revision in existing international Relations. It for example specifically asked for an abstention of the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the interest of a big power, it also asked for the promotion of mutual interest and co-operation between all states. It thus directly opposed the core of the then existing international world order, being the bi-polar structure.

As the Bandung principals was incorporated in the Belgrade Declaration [1961], it served as the basis for the principles of non-alignment. Although these principals addressed specific issues, it still provided the scope for NAM members to be sympathetic to either USA or USSR.

A significant characteristic of the NAM was that the practitioners and founding fathers were also its best theorists. Where as Nehru with his Panch Sheel laid the first important theoretical foundations, Nehru and Nasser played a leading role in the eventual establishment of the Bandung Principles.

Tito's theoretical input is best illustrated by his opening address as host of the 1961 Belgrade Conference. He underlined the necessity of consensus on all questions of a fundamental nature pertaining to the main aims and purposes of the NAM. In his view, such issues could not be solved if there was not unanimity among all participating countries. On the other hand he warned that there were and would be current issues in particular among neighbours where unanimity may be

difficult or impossible to attain. He thought that this should cause no undue concern and described such issues as secondary in comparison with the main and fundamental issues [Srivastava and Sahni 1995 : 42].

The structure and content of the final documents of the conference reflected faithfully Tito's above-mentioned ideas expressed in his address [Belgrade Declaration 1961: 10]. The Belgrade Declaration states that a principle of unanimity will apply for all primary or fundamental issues concerning the Movement.

The founding leaders of NAM thus indeed played a decisive role in the founding and establishing of NAM. The concept of non-alignment was mutually re-enforced via the different interests and focus of the founding trio.

Nehru was primarily concerned with the right of self-determination and especially the capacity of newly independent states to retain their sovereignty. Tito was primarily interested in peace that is to stop the arms race and the possible confrontation between the USA and the USSR. Nasser was concerned about the existence of a Jewish state in the Middle East and the future of dispossessed Palestinians.

The founding trio knew that the above-mentioned issues as well as other had less chance of being addressed if it was laid on the international table by an individual developing state. Issues such as the above mentioned had a much better chance of being addressed if these issues were brought forward collectively by a recognised institution.

Non-alignment was the theoretical framework within which these issues of mutual concern could be anchored. NAM on the other hand, was the institution through which these issues were structured and presented to the international community.

There were differences among the leading heads of states of the Movement at all times, including the 1960's. They came to the surface especially at the summit conferences. This was natural because of the mere fact that heads of states are individuals representing different peoples, most often from different parts of the world.

What was important, was that the Movement was a free assembly of countries bound together by essential and mostly long-term common interests and aspirations. Hence, there was no need to wonder that such vision of the future could and did give rise to different interpretations.

Since NAM was not a narrow ideological movement in the sense of being communist or Western democratic orientated, it could co-exist with all the sub streams and differences and still maintain the essential harmony of the Movement [Srivastava and Sahni 1995: 39, 40]. What was more significant at the time, was that the founding trio, Nehru, Nasser and Tito, represented what was later categorised as the mainstream of NAM. They symbolised in themselves the various essential strands of non-alignment: anti imperialism, serious involvement in the questions of war and peace, strengthening the independence of NAM and encouragement of the process of social change in the Third World [Srivastava and Sahni 1995: 40].

These were essential elements of the NAM and each of the three leaders were able to give expression to all these strands, work in harmony among themselves and thus acquired the status of spokesmen of the majority of the population of the world.

Looking back at the role and influence of NAM member states in the above subsection, it would seem that strong leadership, as was shown by the founding trio heads of state, was essential for the South at the time. There were many newly independent states exposed to an unfair

international system and vulnerable to the super powers. The positive role by the leading states, as shown in the above subsection, gave hope, purpose and direction to many a newly independent state. The next subsection will give more details of the specific goals of NAM in this phase.

3.4   GOALS

This subsection will show the problems NAM focused upon, together with the goals it set itself, during its first phase. This subsection, together with the previous two, will then make it possible to identify the role, according to Archer's model [p.32]], NAM fulfilled in its first phase.

Since their beginning, the NAM believed that the economic predicament of the less developed countries was only one aspect of a larger problem. World peace and stability was the only foundation on which prosperity and development of less developed states could be built. Because this was lacking, the situation was not right for the presentation of an ambitious program for the reshaping of the world economic order.

The 1961 Belgrade Conference dealt with the same basic themes as the Bandung Conference. While Bandung's emphasis had been on decolonisation and economic development, the Belgrade meeting's first priority was world peace. This emphasis reflected not only the Yugoslavian influence but also the Third World's desire to play a positive role in relaxing international tensions [Leo Grande 1980: 36, 37].

This strong emphasis on peace must be understood within the previously mentioned context of, for example, the then recent Korean War and the fear of an eminent nuclear war resulting from the Cuban missile crisis of 1961. If the Cold War could be brought to an end, such wars and threats of war could stop.

The position of non-alignment was based upon the realisation that isolationism or uninvolved neutrality would provide no refuge from the ravages of a nuclear war. Non-alignment was thus a position from which to exert persuasion in the interest of peace and on occasion, to act as a honest broker mediating conflicts that threatened to escalate into an all out war. At the same time the emphasis stemmed from a desire to avoid entangling alliances with the great powers that might jeopardise the security of weaker states over issues not of their choosing. [Singham and Hune, 1986: 15]

From the outset, the non-aligned nations vehemently denied an intent to create a third bloc in the same mould as the Western and Eastern blocks. The consensus was that the division of the world into opposing blocs was the cause of world tension [Mates 1983:9]. The demolition of such blocs was their goal.

The 25 states [Appendix 2] represented at the Belgrade Conference and which became the first members of NAM were not only geographically dispersed but also represented a spectrum of internal political and economic dispensations. The idea behind NAM was not so much to address these internal arrangements of its members, but to address internationally the external circumstances negatively influencing its members.

Without taking the text of the Belgrade Declaration as the final word on non-alignment, it cannot be overlooked as the first considered expression of the common believe and basic aspirations of the assembled countries which were also founders of the Movement [Belgrade Declaration 1961: 21; Mates 1983: 9].

The document refers to the international tension and emergencies that threatened world peace in 1961. It also stated that big power rivalry was likely to result in a world conflagration [Mates, 1983 : 9, 10]. The

document thus also reflected the realities of the time when the conference was held.

The last part of the introduction to the Belgrade Declaration dealt with colonialism. The task was to eradicate colonialism in all its manifestations. The main reason for this strong anti-colonial stance was because all the NAM members had felt the yoke of colonialism and through non-alignment strove for the ideal of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This was followed by a plea for peaceful co-existence in the world. Peaceful co-existence referred to the right of a state not to be dominated by another state nor to be threatened, but to be free to willingly co-operate with other states. Fundamental changes in the whole world order, the overcoming of great power rivalry and the elimination of all forms of colonialism emerged as the fundamental thought on which the whole edifice of the Declaration was constructed [Belgrade Declaration 1961 : 25]. The Belgrade Declaration was in fact a thoughtful and faithful elaboration of the premises given in the introduction. These premises include the transition from the then existing world order based on domination to a new order based on co-operation between nations founded on freedom, equality and social justice for the promotion of prosperity. It was intended that the whole text of the Belgrade Declaration should be read in the light of this belief in the necessity and the inevitability of fundamental changes in the world order.

NAM thus started with and kept as the centre of attention throughout the 1960's three fundamental world wide and long term problems: peace based on co-operation and not on domination, prosperity and social justice for all peoples and elimination of colonialism in all its forms. NAM reiterated the necessity of approaching all current issues in a way conducive to the attainment of these fundamental goals.

NAM generally used the UN General Assembly as a platform to address issues that were of importance to them. Although NAM did not succeed in bringing about world peace or an end to bi-polarity, it did contribute in the demise of colonialism bringing about social justice to millions of people.

At the 1964 Cairo Summit, NAM elaborated and stated that a non-aligned country must pursue an independent policy based on:

[i]   peaceful co-existence,

[ii]   non-participation in any multilateral military alliances,

[iii]   support liberation and independence movements, and

[iv]   not to participate in bilateral military alliances with great powers [Leo Grande 1980: 4].

In evaluating the main goals of NAM in its first phase, it can be said that, given the context of this phase, the Movement did succeed in identifying the fundamental issues pertaining to its members and the developing world as a whole. The foremost issue in the international context of this phase was the bipolar tension and threat of a nuclear war. Other burning issues were the lack of prosperity of the people in the many newly independent states as well as the fact that many colonies still had to be liberated. NAM's main goals addressed all of these fundamental issues.

3.5   ROLE AS INSTRUMENT

In this subsection the preceding analysis of the international context, role and influence of most influential states and goals, will be used to determine the role fulfilled by NAM in its first phase. In chapters 4, 5 and 6 respectively, this procedure will be repeated for NAM's second, third and fourth phases.

Referring to the analytical model of Archer as described in Chapter 2 [p.32], NAM during its first phase bore the characteristics of an institution fulfilling the role of an instrument in the hands of a select few

of its members. These members were India, Egypt and Yugoslavia. This section elaborates this theme.

Although NAM's membership grew by leaps and bounds, it brought with it problems - the NAM found it hard to deal with territorial conflicts, coup de tats, the liberation struggles in Southern Africa and ongoing East West tension.

These growth pains however did not delete the fact that Tito of Yugoslavia, Nasser of Egypt and Nehru of India worked together in establishing NAM as well as directing it in its first years of existence.

In the early years of NAM the founding trio were, as previously described, both the theoreticians and practitioners of the Movement. It was mainly through their inputs and deliberations that non-alignment came to be a foreign policy orientation for the members of NAM. In NAM the member states found a separate political identity and role rather than fixed positions defined in relation to the Super Powers.

It can be said that the founding trio had certain foreign affairs ideals that they projected to NAM and thus were able to use the Movement as a tool to promote these ideals. These ideals would nevertheless supposedly be to the good of the other members.

With its founding, NAM had a membership of only 25 states [Appendix 2] and thus was susceptible to be dominated by these three influential members. All members however still remained sovereign states and the organisation was not something more than its component parts. The founding trio however did succeed in leading the way for NAM. This was especially evident in that NAM's fundamental goals correlated with the ideals/goals of the founding trio.

The less influential members did not believe their membership to be a zero sum game. They in fact believed that co-operation in the

Movement could produce new benefits such as peace and prosperity to them as well as to other peoples still under the yoke of colonialism, under-development and/or threat of war.

The long-term view of the NAM members was that their own countries could break the shackles of underdevelopment within an international climate of peace and stability. From the beginning the structure [Appendix 3] and policy of NAM was such that it served merely as a guideline to the policies of its members. It did not threaten or dent the sovereignty of any of its members. It also accommodated domestic political differences between members and thus made it less problematic for the lesser states to be a member of the Movement directed by the founding trio. Non-alignment was not foreign policy itself but it was a meaningful foreign policy frame of reference for NAM members.

NAM as a movement provided the structural breathing space for its members not to fear the possibility of interference by NAM in their internal affairs. Having been newly independent states, sovereignty was a very dear and sensitive issue and the NAM members had to be at ease that this precious commodity was not harmed in any way.

From the outset, the NAM encompassed three streams that may be defined as the *main stream, left stream* and the *conservative stream* [Srivastava and Sahni 1995: 39; Leo Grande 1980: 34]. Since the NAM was not a narrow ideological movement [p.55], it could co-exist with all the sub streams and maintain the essential harmony of the Movement.

States associated with the left stream included Iraq, Sudan, Syria and Cambodia, while states associated with the right stream included the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana and Morocco. India, Egypt and Yugoslavia constituted the main stream [Willetts, 1978: 128].

The left stream was characterised by being more antagonistic to the West and aggressive in its proposed methodology in obtaining goals. The conservative stream was opposed to an aggressive methodology in obtaining goals and pro-West in relation to the left stream. The main stream was poised as a middle stream regarding its political and methodological stance.

What was significant in the 1960's was that the three most prominent leaders of the NAM, Nehru, Nasser and Tito represented the *main stream*. They symbolised in themselves the various essential strands of non-alignment : anti-imperialism as well as serious involvement in the questions of war and peace, strengthening the independence of NAM and maintenance of a useful constructive relationship with the Socialist countries and encouragement of the process of social change in the Third World countries without embracing an adventurous approach.

Each of the three leaders was able to give expression to these essential elements of the NAM, work in harmony amongst them and succeed in convincing the other NAM members to follow their queue.

3.6 CONCLUSION

The analytical model described in Chapter 2 showed 3 possible roles for an international organisation or movement in the international system. These roles were that of instrument, actor and arena. In view of the evidence, it can be said that, given the analysis in Chapter 2, the characteristics of NAM in its first phase correlated more closely to the role of an instrument than that of actor or arena. For the purposes of this dissertation, NAM's first phase [1960's] will be labelled as being an instrument in the hands of the mainstream leaders.

Non-alignment in NAM's first phase had, first and foremost, a political character. Apart from the main aim of world peace, political issues such as decolonialism and social justice, were also addressed. Economic

issues such as the world economic system and the economic underdevelopment of NAM members, were not addressed directly. Non-Alignment in this phase thus had a political, but not an economic meaning.

The meaning and possible changes to the meaning of non-alignment in NAM's second phase [1970-1979] is investigated in chapter 4. As in chapter 3, Archer's model will again be used in chapter 4 four analysing NAM in terms of the role it fulfilled in the international system.

4. COLD WAR ERA PHASE 2
NAM AS AN ACTOR [1970-1979]

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Where chapter 3 covered NAM's first phase [1961-1969], chapter 4 covers NAM's second phase [1970-1979]. Chapter 4, as are chapters 5 and 6, is constructed similarly to chapter 3.

NAM is again analysed in terms of international context, role and influence of most influential states, goals and the role the Movement fulfilled during this phase. The analysis will be used to indicate changes [if any] to the meaning of non-alignment as discerned in the previous chapter.

During phase 2 NAM fulfilled the role of an independent actor and was more radical than in the 1960's. By this is meant that generally speaking NAM in this phase fulfilled a role where the Movement as a whole acted independently and in a dedicated and aggressive way. NAM followed this aggressive approach in correlation with the views of the left [radical] stream that was the dominant stream in this phase.

4.2 INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

This subsection deals with the prevailing international context at the time of NAM's second phase. The international context is analysed as a potential influence on the meaning of non-alignment.

Where favourable external market conditions and the commodity prices of the 1960's allowed the newly independent countries to accumulate the necessary capital to expend on various development projects, the economic picture for the 1970's was much more sombre. The rise of oil prices in the 1970's had a devastating effect on growth rates and therefore development progress, particularly in the developing world. [Lambrechts 1998:33]

Due to the oil shock of 1973 the growth rate in world production and exports declined by one-third from between 1973 and 1983 [Lambrechts 1998: 33]. In developing countries the annual growth rate and per capita income tumbled. The terms of trade of developing countries also fell rapidly forcing them to borrow "petrodollars" from commercial institutions that were eager to lend below the inflation rate. Eventually this would lead to the debt crisis of the 1980's. In the 1970's however it had the effect of a new and intense focus on international and national economic matters by the developing countries. In this NAM had an important role to play.

Another important change was NAM membership. A mere 25 at its founding in 1961, it rapidly grew to 94 [Appendix 2] in 1979. This was mainly due to the growing number of states, such as Angola and Mozambique, receiving their independence. The growth in number of developing countries in itself was significant for they then constituted an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly of the UN. Many NAM states were also members of the G-77 who, on mainly different issues, was also a pressure group for the developing world within the UN. Moreover, the Super Powers [USA/USSR] that had so often ignored their plight were now jealously courting their good will [Leo Grande 1980: 35].

As more and more colonies became newly independent states, both super powers tried to extend their own influence sphere over as many of these states as possible. They wanted to establish their political and economic ideology in the developing world as proof of the ideal of their own system. They however also wanted their influence to reign over the newly independent states as these states were mostly exporters of commodities and potential exporters of commodities and potential importers of the super powers' own exports.

The international environment in the 1970's thus differed substantially from that in the 1960's. Although the big powers were still engaged in the Cold War, the threat of an eminent nuclear war shifted somewhat to the background in the face of a world economic crisis and depression.

4.3   ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL STATES

The picture of which states played a leading role within NAM looked somewhat different in its second phase than in the first phase. This subsection will point out which state or states fulfilled a leading role, what was the impact of this on NAM's approach towards the rest of the world as well as the impact on the meaning of non-alignment.

Where the promotion of world peace that was the original impetus for the Movement's founding continued to be its first priority throughout the 1960's, an ideological division was apparent in the 1970's. The issues of colonialism and economic development with their anti Western thrust were more contentious and the ideological cleavage within the NAM came to the fore at the 1964 Cairo Summit and the 1970 Lusaka Summit [Leo Grande 1980: 39, 41; Singham and Hune, 1986: 212 – 214]

Moderate members such as India, Kenya and Nigeria tended to concentrate their attention on the Cold War while the more radical nations such as Egypt, Ghana, Algeria and Cuba pressed for equal emphasis on the anti colonial and economic themes. In contrast to the Cairo Summit [1964] where the radicals faired well, the Lusaka Summit [1970] was quite conservative. The 1970's Summit can for the purposes of this dissertation be categorised as a closing off of NAM's first phase where the main stream leaders [states] were the more influential.

In the six years between Cairo and Lusaka the radical group in the Movement lost nearly all of its most prestigious leaders. Nasser, Nkrumah, Sukarno, and Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, all departed from

the scene. As a result, the final declaration from the Lusaka Summit was "depoliticised". Avoiding economic issues, it condemned "big powers" but did not make any special reference to capitalism or imperialism. Only on the issue of colonialism was the more radical tone of the Cairo Declaration retained.

With the changed circumstances in the international environment in the 1970's, there was a consequent reduction in the urgency of the peace issue. International economics thus came to the fore as the most urgent issue for the Third World. The shift in the Movement's major concerns was accompanied by the emergence of a new international leader, Cuba's Fidel Castro, whose prestige in the Movement rivalled that of its founding trio.

Although Cuba was a founding member of NAM, Cuba placed a relatively low priority on its own role within the Movement during the 1960's. Cuba's new interest in the NAM grew directly out of the new activism of Cuba's foreign policy in the early 1970's. Once internal equilibrium was restored after the disasters sugar harvest of 1970, Cuba emerged from the shadow of domestic preoccupation to play a major role in world affairs. The failure of Cuba's attempts to "export" revolution to Latin America, produced a strategy aimed at braking Cuba's isolation by diplomatic, rather than paramilitary means [Leo Grande 1980: 42].

Faced with what it perceived as a formidable threat from the USA, Cuba would probably have preferred a formal USSR commitment to its security, even if that meant ineligibility as a NAM member. Furthermore, Cuba's militant foreign policy of the 1960's was sharply at odds with the then prevailing consensus, regarding world peace, within the Movement. While the NAM summits focused on easing international tensions between the Super Powers, Cuba remained deeply sceptical about the prospects for peaceful co-existence unless and until it extended to co-existence between big and small powers.

It was not until 1970, in the Lusaka Declaration, when Cuban-Soviet relations were on firmer ground that Cuba finally articulated the detail of its anti imperialist stance - *"The real division in the world is between exploited and exploiter countries; between oppressed and oppressor countries. Let us not place the developed socialist countries and the developed capitalist countries under the same flag. The socialist countries are the strongest support and most pugnacious force of the anti-imperialist front. We cannot leave out or isolate them if we except to engage in a battle with the imperialist countries headed by the US"* [Lusaka Declaration 1970].

At Lusaka this view was distinctly in the minority but its expression was an indication of things to come.

The prioritising of international economic issues by developing states is best illustrated by the New International Economic Order [NIEO] of the early 1970"s. The search by the developing states for a NIEO surfaced in the 1970's at the third UN Conference on Trade And Development [UNCTAD 3] in 1972. The 1973 Algiers Summit of NAM produced a draft declaration and program of action for the establishment of a NIEO ready for the UN General Assembly's sixth special session on raw materials and development. The four basic points advanced were [Archer, 1983: 137, 138; Bennett 1988: 246]:

[i]   Permanent sovereignty over natural resources.

[ii]   The right to establish commodity producers associations by developing states.

[iii]   The indexation of commodity export prices linking them to the cost of imports from industrialised countries.

[iv]   International control of multinational corporations.

The NIEO unified the under-developed countries around the demand for a more favourable set of international economic relations. Earlier attempts to place this issue on the global agenda had failed but the

success of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries produced an unprecedented believe that through unity the under-developed world could overcome the developed world's reluctance to grant any real concessions. With the relaxing of international political tension as a result of the Soviet-American détente international economics moved to the fore as the Third World's priority issue. The tone of the 1973 Algiers NAM Summit was thus considerably more radical than that of earlier conferences.

The Economic Declaration of the Algiers Summit opened with the bitter observation that détente, so long sought by the NAM countries, did not have any beneficial effect on the developing countries through international co-operation. NAM previously maintained that peace between the big powers would automatically lead to increased co-operation between states that would be to the economic benefit of developing states. The reason the conference concluded was imperialism.

"Imperialism is still the greatest obstacle on the road to the emancipation and progress of the developing countries. Imperialism does not only oppose the economic progress of the developing countries, but also adopts a more aggressive attitude to those who knows who oppose its intentions and endeavours to impose political, social and economical structures which stimulate foreign domination, dependence or neo-colonialism on them" [Leo Grande 1980: 41].

Behind such radical language, however, was a sharp disagreement over precisely who the imperialists were. The most dramatic issue of the 1973 Summit was whether to cast global economic issues in a strictly North South dimension castigating both western imperialism and soviet social imperialism, or whether to distinguish between the developed socialist and the developed capitalist countries reserving condemnation for the latter.

Draft resolutions for the Summit drawn up by Algeria criticised both East and West. Fidel Castro, attending his first NAM Summit, led the opposition to Algeria and Libya's theory of two imperialisms. This turn of events is a further consequence of the left stream and mainstream tension already present in NAM's first phase. [p.61]. Unlike Cuban spokesmen at earlier Summits who avoided mention of Cuba's socialist character or its friendship with the USSR, Castro addressed these issues head on: *"I want to remind you that Cuba is a socialist country, Marxist/Leninist whose final goal is communism. We are proud of this.*

The theory of two imperialisms, one headed by the United States and the other allegedly headed by the Soviet Union have been echoed by leaders and spokesmen of non-aligned countries. Any attempt to pit the non-aligned countries against the socialist camp, is profoundly counterrevolutionary and benefits only imperialist interest.

Inventing a false enemy can have only one aim - to evade the real enemy. Any estrangement from the socialist camp means weakening and exposing us to the mercy of the still powerful forces of imperialism. It would be a stupid strategy, a case of severe political short sightedness "[Algiers Summit 1973: 43].

Reviewing the resolutions of the first three NAM Summits, Castro reminded the conference that it was the forces of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, lead by the United States, which the NAM countries had consistently condemned. Not only did Castro's performance elevate him to prominence as one of the Movement's foremost leaders, but it also succeeded in defeating efforts to put the conference on record as condemning the Soviet Union.

NAM was now ideologically more closely linked to the Eastern block than ever before. The implication of this is that NAM opened itself for scepticism from the West as being Soviet sympathisers. This could be counter-productive in that it created the impression that NAM thought of

obtaining world peace and prosperity in terms of Soviet ideology. This scenario came to being even though the Soviet Union itself as a big power would never be allowed membership of NAM.

Non-alignment was still a stance for world peace, derived from a transition from the then existing world order to a new order. Where the old order was based on domination, the new order was to be based on co-operation between nations, founded on freedom, equality and social justice. Non-alignment in this phase, nevertheless, meant more co-operation intermediately with the Eastern bloc in an effort to realize these ultimate goals.

The Final Declaration was masterfully ambiguous in defining imperialism [Leo Grande: 1980: 42]. It did not state that the USA was the sole imperialist. However, every specific reference was to a developed Western nation and the Economic Declaration singled out the negative policies of developed countries with market economies.

Only in the Political Declaration was a single reference to the need for underdeveloped nations to maintain vigilance against any kind of hegemony, implicitly including Soviet domination.

The transition from Cold War to détente also reduced the direct security threat that Cuba perceived stemming from the USA. Cuba policy makers could consequently pay greater attention to Cuba's larger global relations, which had previously taken a backseat because of the immediate concern with deterring and US attack. The prominence of international economic issues and the anti colonial wars in Africa were moving the political centre of non-alignment to the left just when Cuban policy was adopting a more global orientation. This naturally led to an increased Cuban role in NAM. Long on record as emphasising colonial and developmental issues Cuba became a leading voice in the Movement when these issues came to the fore. Castro's efforts in

moving NAM to the left was somewhat counterbalanced by the mainstream thinker, Tito as well as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.

At the 1976 NAM Summit in Colombo, [Sri Lanka] the Movement praised the Cuban involvement. The fifth Summit was a victory for the Cuban view of non-alignment in other ways as well: economic issues were defined as the most acute problem internationally. The Western nations were held to be primarily responsible for resistance to the NIEO.

Imperialism, colonialism, new colonialism, apartheid, racism, Zionism and all forms of alien domination were routinely denounced, but hegemony was notably absent from the list. In omitting hegemony NAM although it had condemned the USA, implicitly did not condemn the Soviet Union's role [as hegemony] in the bipolar battle. Moreover, the conference selected Cuba as the venue for its next summit. Even though pressing political matters on his home front, as well as a rumoured security problem for Castro in Sri Lanka, prevented him from attending the Colombo Summit, the outcome of this meeting brought the Movement closer to the Cuban view of non-alignment than it had ever been before.

The Cuban view of non-alignment was a foreign policy orientation strongly opposed to the USA and western alliance. The USA and its allies were the hindrance that stood in the way of an international economic order conducive for economic growth and prosperity for developing states. The Cuban view of non-alignment was not adopted by NAM in total. NAM's view of non-alignment nevertheless changed from what it was in the previous phase in that it moved away from peace issues, now focused more on economic issues and was more sympathetic regarding the Soviet ideology [Alimov 1987: 54].

In the 1960's Cuban was part of the left stream or radical wing of NAM. By the 1970's the Movement itself had become so radicalised that

Cuba's views were widely shared. The reason for this was that NAM's view of non-alignment moved to the left as is seen for example in NAM's closer affinity with the Soviet ideology [Leo Grande 1980: 42].

There was however by no means consensus in NAM about Cuba's contention that the Soviet Union represented a natural ally of the non-aligned. Cuba's deployment of combat troops in Ethiopia accomplished with much greater Soviet involvement and co-operation than the Angola intervention catalysed debate around this issue. Cuba's close co-operation with the Soviet Union in Ethiopia and the Soviet's readiness to replace the United States as Ethiopia's patron gave weight to Western charges that Cuban policy was being set in Moscow. The suspicion of Soviet motives in Africa that were harboured by many NAM nations, thus tended to be generalised to Cuba.

The changing perception of Cuban Soviet military co-operation became the principle topic of debate at the 1978 Belgrade meeting of NAM foreign ministers [Leo Grande 1980: 43]. Tito opened the conference with a speech in which, although he never mentioned the Cubans by name, accused them of assisting the introduction of new forms of colonial presence or bloc dependence in Africa. In the debate that followed, a number of delegates attacked either directly or indirectly, the Cuban's role in Africa.

Shortly after the Belgrade meeting full-scale war erupted between Vietnam and Cambodia. Cuba's position on this issue proved to be much more damaging diplomatically than any of its African involvements. In the UN debate over Vietnam's active role in the overthrow of Pol Pot no delegation was more vitriolic than Cuba's in its denunciation of Pol Pot or more unwavering in its defence of Vietnam, Havana's long-term friend and ally. When the NAM countries composed a compromise resolution on Cambodia, which called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops but did not mention the Vietnamese by name, Cuba opposed it. Solidarity with Vietnam took precedence in

this case over Cuba's support for the principle of territorial integrity, thus making Cuba's defence of the same principle in Ethiopia less credible.

Sensing that the sixth NAM Summit at Havana in 1979 could proof to be as pivotal for NAM as the 1973 Summit in Algiers, a number of countries, namely Yugoslavia, Tanzania, Egypt and India, launched intense diplomatic efforts in early 1979 to influence its outcome [Alimov 1987: 54,55].

The radical wing of the Movement lead by the Cubans and including Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan among others saw the upcoming Summit as an opportunity to consolidate the leftward course the Movement had been on since Algiers. The moderate wing of the Movement led by Yugoslavia and including Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Singapore and Egypt among others mobilised their own diplomatic efforts aimed at countering Cuba's campaign in favour of its draft resolution as new Chairman of NAM. This draft resolution included Cuba's thesis that the Soviet Union was the natural ally of the Non-aligned states and the capitalist West; its enemy. Yugoslavia lobbied particularly hard to prevent the Movement from endorsing the Cuban thesis that the Soviets were the natural allies of the non-aligned.

A sharp clash was expected between Castro and Tito at the Havana Summit. The reason for this expected clash was mainly because Castro and Tito were respectively the leaders of the left and moderate wings within the Movement. Tito wanted to oppose Castro's natural alliance thesis and his efforts for NAM to have a close-knit relationship with the Soviet Union.

Castro's opening address to the Summit like his 1973 speech in Algiers frankly set forth Cuba's views on the main issues under debate. He did not however dwell on the Movement's relationship with the communist camp or insist on the natural alliance thesis. He chose to emphasise

the need for unity in the struggle against imperialism and to promise that Cuba would not try to impose their radicalism on anyone [Leo Grande 1980: 43].

The significance of this was that Castro left a door open for the moderate wing to denounce his natural alliance thesis. The implications of this were that it was possible for NAM to regroup, reposition itself vis-à-vis both super powers and thus de-radicalise the meaning of non-alignment [Leo Grande 1980: 44].

Tito, who delivered a low-key address was hardly the spirited answer to Castro that many delegates had expected. Yet it hardly needed to be for there was no climax to the issue. Castro was unwilling to provoke conflict over the natural alliance thesis because he was astute enough to know that the consensus of the Movement was against Cuba on the issue.

Julius Nyerere, who was perhaps the most respected leader and a consistent supporter of the liberation of Southern Africa, also stood with the moderates on the issue of a natural alliance between NAM and the communist camp. He warned that such a course would cause the Movement to seize to be an influence on the world and fall apart.

In the final declaration of the Summit, virtually all the draft references to co-operation with the communist camp were omitted. To the numerous condemnations of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, Zionism and apartheid, the evils of bloc politics and hegemony were added. Finally, a large number of criticisms directed at the policies of specific Western countries were replaced by more ambiguous references to imperialist forces.

The adding of the condemnation of block politics and hegemony to that of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism and apartheid together with the criticism of imperial forces in general confirmed

NAM's repositioning of itself vis-à-vis the two super powers. The meaning of non-alignment was less radical than in the mid 1970"s. the meaning of non-alignment also reclaimed it content of the 1960's of being opposed to block politics in general.

Although the substantive positions adopted on many global issues made the final Havana Declaration more anti Western than any proceeding declaration, it did not even implicitly embrace the Cuban thesis of a natural alliance between the NAM countries and the communist camp [Mates, 1983: 19; Leo Grande, 1980: 49].

Neither the radicals nor the moderates could claim the sixth Summit as a clear victory. Given NAM's tradition of unanimous decision-making and the desire of both Cuba and Yugoslavia to avoid an open split, most issues were settled by compromise. The pivotal group at the Summit turned out to be the states which were not so radical as the Cubans, but more radical than the Yugoslavs, Tanzania being the best example.

Precisely because this middle group as mentioned above, did not operate as a bloc at the Summit, each issue found some of these states siding with the radicals and others with the moderates. In competing for the support of this middle group both Yugoslavia and Cuba were forced to shift their own positions towards the centre.

Looking at NAM/s second phase in general, it is clear that Cuba was most influential in bringing NAM's political centre to the left nearer to the thinking of the Soviet camp and more vehemently opposed to the West. Cuba also had an important part in putting economics per se on the NAM agenda. More moderate states such as Yugoslavia and Tanzania were able to counterbalance Cuba's influence on NAM. The meaning of non-alignment in the 1970's had a more radical and anti-western content than in NAM's first phase. Non-alignment now also embraced the idea not only of being opposed to block politics, but also

the idea of the necessity of a new international economic order conducive of rather economic development of developing states [Although the substantive positions adopted on many global issues made the final Havana Declaration more anti Western than any proceeding declaration, it did not even implicitly embrace the Cuban thesis of a natural alliance between the NAM countries and the communist camp [Mates 1983: 19; Leo Grande 1980: 49].

4.4 GOALS

In this subsection NAM's goals between the years 1970-1979 will be analysed. This analysis, together with that of international context and role and influence of most influential states [previous two subsections], will be used to determine the role [subsection below] NAM fulfilled during this phase.

The problem of peace and the tensions between the two super powers diminished with the détente [1963 - 1974]. The colonial problem also lost its overwhelming weight as more colonies obtained independence.

In contrast with the above-mentioned issues which were so prominent in the 1960's but which now diminished, the issue of the economic predicament of developing countries however grew rapidly. Most developing states started experiencing balance of payment problems. This was generally as a result of the high costs involved with the import of oil, manufactured goods and even food. It not only increased with the growing number of newly independent countries but also with the growing difference between the level of development in the North and the South.

Finally, the overwhelming indebtedness of all the countries of the Third World created a new emergency since most of them had no means to pay back their debts [Mates 1983: 30].

The growing importance of this one element in the totality of the platform of non-aligned countries induced them to focus on the issue of a new economic order. The concern with a new economic order started in the first years of the 1970's. It was however an element of the fundamental concept of non-alignment since Belgrade, although spelt out only in general terms in the Belgrade Declaration.

While NAM countries welcomed the decolonisation process, they recognised that political independence was not accompanied by economic independence. Colonialism instead gave way to neo-colonialism and independence to dependence. Economic blockades and border wars further exacerbated economic dependence.

Many newly independent states were particularly sensitive to the ability of the world economic system to bring their governments to a standstill by manipulating the prices of the commodities they produced. These commodities included for example copper, rubber and coffee. NAM countries hence focused their attention on the problem of themselves maintaining political independence under conditions of economic crisis.

The watershed was the 1973 Algiers Summit where NAM turned to economic matters and demanded the establishment of a New International Economic Order [NIEO][p.68]. This was the time of the international oil crisis where the international price of crude oil skyrocketed, instigating a drop in the world economy. This led to a decrease in the demand for raw materials resulting in a substantial decrease of their prices. NAM members argued that the colonisation of the world by Europe produced at least three types of inequalities - [i] between the coloniser and the colonised, [ii] between the rich and the poor and [iii] between races [Srivastava and Sahni 1995: 31, 32]. NAM hence pointed out that one of the major problems of the 20th century was to rectify these inequalities.

By the 1970's it was thus becoming apparent to the NAM countries that in order to have political and racial equality, a nation also had to have some semblance of economic equality. The NIEO initiated a debate between the so-called *haves* [North] and the so-called *have nots* [South] calling for negotiations to work towards greater global economic equality.

The basic demands for the NIEO can be summarised as follows:

[i]   The establishment of producer associations following the pattern set by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC] for the producer nations.

[ii]   The creation of new commodity agreements to assure just prices.

[iii]   Indexation.

[iv]   Sovereignty over natural resources.

[v]   Transfer of technology.

[vi]   Control over two major international private organisations namely, Trans National Corporations and Trans National Banks.

NAM was unsuccessful in obtaining significant concessions or changes from the developed nations. For example, no significant economic agreement could be reached between the developing and developed worlds guaranteeing favourable prices for commodities, which was the primary source of foreign income for most developing states [Mates 1983: 31]. It also became apparent to the Movement that western nations attempted to politically divide the Non-aligned as well as to try and destroy the economic unity that was achieved in such groupings as OPEC. Notwithstanding the failure to a large extent of the NIEO, the call for a change in the international economic order placed on the world stage a major debate on the redistribution of global resources. No immediate positive results emanated from this for developing states but since the issue was now logged, it could be referred to in future and possibly be re-opened.

In looking at this subsection as a whole, NAM in this phase had an idealistic goal of reforming the international economic order. NAM, however, never touched the point of possible economic reform within its own members.

4.5 ROLE AS ACTOR

Of the three possible roles proposed in the analytical model [p.32] used in this dissertation, NAM in its second phase generally fulfilled the role of an actor. NAM in this phase rallied round the issue of international economic reform and was able to act as a collective actor.

Where in the 1960's NAM politics was defined by the Cold War conflict between East and West, its politics in the 1970's was defined largely by the members' grievances against the West alone. There was thus a change in NAM's relative position being closer to the East in the 1970"s than in the 1960's.

The Lusaka Summit in 1970 initiated a new focus on economic issues. The 1970's saw a series of closely linked NAM and G77 meetings devoted to economic issues. The Group of Seventy Seven [G77] came into existence in 1964. Its name was derived from its original 77 member states, but its membership rapidly grew to more than a hundred. The G77 is an international organisation for developing states in matters of collective economic interest. In this function it has showed shared large parts of the international economic program of the Third World [Sauvant, 1981: xxxvii].

The 1970's were also the time of the rise of the "new left" led by intellectuals such as Frantz Fanon and Jean Paul Sartre [Van Nieuwkerk 1998: 4].

Algeria, as the 1973 host, was quick to capitalise on these developments. It's leader, Houari Boumedienne, argued forcefully to shift the focus of non-alignment from peaceful co-existence and

traditional principles to militant anti colonialism and anti-imperialism. The existing economic order was identified by NAM as a legacy of colonialism. Global financial institutions were seen as vehicles for re-colonisation of the Third World by industrialised countries. This opened the door for the adoption of NAM resolutions condemning colonial suppression and supporting armed struggle. It also marked the beginning of the NAM as a voting bloc within the UN and international agencies.

In the meantime, ideological battles between Yugoslavia and Cuba reflected a power struggle for control of the Movement. At the Havana Summit in 1979 Castro made sure to take charge of the situation. This however did not happen and the 1970's cannot be depicted as NAM being an instrument in the hands of Castro. Although consensus on a number of political issues could not be found, the Movement as a whole did fulfil a role of a radical actor in the international system. NAM took up a militant anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism stance as is illustrated by for example, the Movement's support to Cuba in opposing the South African invasion of Angola.

With the 1970's NAM Summit, the Movement was firmly established as an international organisation with stable and coherent decision-making machinery. NAM as an independent actor was significantly affected in the 1970's by outside forces such as an upswing in left wing international political thought and the changed international economic situation.

Independent actor points to the autonomous action of an actor. In this regard, NAM's anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and NIEO stance and action, regardless strong opposition from the West, indicates that NAM was an independent actor in the 1970's. "Independent" used in this sense of the word, refers to the Movement taking a certain course of action regardless strong, external opposition from the West to discourage NAM taking such action.

NAM was not equally successful on all issues. NIEO did not lead to a change of the then current international economic system, but it did open a North/South debate that was logged and might be referred to in future [Van Nieuwkerk 1998: 4].

NAM however was a relatively successful forum for the developing countries in the UN. It kept issues imported to them on the table and used its majority in the General Assembly in an organised way. Making it difficult for NAM to act as an independent actor to an even larger extent was the fact that NAM was an international organisation without a [strong] constitution or permanent secretariat. NAM's consensus decision-making principle also made it difficult for the Movement to take a decisive stance on controversial issues. Despite these inherent difficulties NAM, in the 1970's, did fulfil a role as an independent actor mainly in opposition to the West. This however does not mean that NAM did not react from stimuli from the West, but means that NAM did not allow itself to be submissive to the West's prescriptions.

NAM by this time had built up a modus operandi and a role not totally dependent on the acceptance of its every act by all its members. To oppose an overwhelming majority in NAM, a member state risked being alienated or to alienate other states and/or possibly ending benefits NAM might have provided. One example of this is where Castro did not persevere with his natural alliance thesis because he knew that the majority of the NAM members were set against it.

In phase 2, NAM did have a certain degree of autonomy in its action. neither Castro nor Tito, for example, fully had his own way. The Movement thus did fulfil a role of actor.

4.6 CONCLUSION

NAM in its second phase was successful in taking up a militant anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism stance and portrayed itself as being in

favour of a new international economic order. Although the substantive positions adopted on many global issues made the final Havana Declaration more anti Western than any proceeding declaration, it did not even implicitly embrace the Cuban thesis of a natural alliance between the NAM countries and the communist camp [Mates, 1983: 19; Leo Grande, 1980: 49].

It can be said that NAM's own structure and modus operandi hindered itself in being more effective. Without a constitution and permanent secretariat, the Movement's decisions were not binding on its members and they could not be brought to order as decided upon within the Movement. Consensus decision-making also strengthened the inclination of the Movement to address issues that would not implicate internal compromises of its members.

The meaning of non-alignment in this phase changed from that in the previous phase in that a specific economic content was added to its meaning. Non-alignment was still a stance for world peace, to be derived from a transition of the then existing world order, based on domination, to a new order based on co-operation among all nations. Co-operation during this phase was however more with the Eastern bloc states and non-alignment as such was more militant and anti-Western in character than in the previous phase.

5. COLD WAR ERA PHASE 3 –
NAM AS AN ARENA [1980-1989]

5.1 INTRODUCTION

During this phase NAM fulfilled the role of an arena. By an arena is meant that NAM generally fulfilled a role as a forum where members came together proposing different views but without being effective in collectively and enthusiastically pursuing certain goals. This was in contrast to NAM's previous two phases where it was respectively an instrument in the hands of a few influential states and an independent actor.

Similar to chapters 3 and 4, this chapter will use international context, the role and influence of most influential states, goals and the role NAM fulfilled, as analytical framework to discern the meaning of non-alignment in NAM's third phase. NAM's third phase is the last phase that fell within the era of the Cold War. NAM's fourth phase, as described in chapter 6, falls within the post-Cold War era.

5.2 INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The international context, as described in this subsection, is an important potential influence on the meaning of non-alignment. Changes to the international context can have a changing influence on the meaning of non-alignment.

The economic predicament of developing states in the 1980's was to a large extent the result of what happened globally in the 1960's and the 1970's. Many states received their independence in these two decades and decided to borrow money internationally for development purposes. With the oil crisis in the 1970's resulting in a drop in the world economy and commodity prices, developing states were to experience a debt crisis in the 1980's.

At the beginning of 1980, the economic growth of 36 LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES [LDC's], 26 of them in Africa, stopped. A decrease of the gross per capita product was also registered in many newly free states for the first time since WWII. Within the mere five years 1980-1984 the financial debt of the Non-Aligned and other development countries shot up 60% to reach a staggering $1 trillion [Alimov, 1987: 145].

Trade in commodities was the life-blood of many developing countries, especially the LDC's. The 1980's, however, saw the collapse of commodity prices internationally and a disarray in the commodity markets which severely undermined the LDC's development.

Most LDC's rely on one or two commodities only for more than 50% of their export earnings. During the 1980's anti-inflationary policies, new technological developments, the shift away from the manufacturing to the services sector and agricultural protectionism negatively affected the demand of developed countries for commodities. This depressed real commodity prices to their lowest level since the great depression of the 1930's [Lambrechts, 1998: 39].

Very little was done by the international community to mitigate the effect of this decline on development in developing countries. Attempts to control prices generally took on two forms namely cartels, such as OPEC and The union of banana exporting countries, and international commodity agreements between producers and consumers, such as the International Natural Rubber Agreement [Lambrechts 1998: 34].

The attempts to control prices were, with the exception of oil that OPEC did succeed in pushing up, not very successful. The implication of this was that commodity prices stayed low and most developing countries struggled to repay their debt. This left them without efficient funds for development purposes. The only international commodity agreement

designed to regulate a specific commodity market that lasted was the International Natural Rubber Agreement [Lambrechts 1998: 34].

Where newly independent countries registered high growth rates during the 1950's and 1960's, the rise of oil prices in the 1970's together with falling commodity prices had a devastating effect on the growth rate in world production and exports. Between the years 1973 and 1983 the growth rate in world production and exports declined by one third with a very negative effect on development progress in the developing world.

The debt crisis that started in 1982 was thus initiated because developing countries were forced to borrow money as a result of declining terms of trade [Tenth Conference of Ministerial Committee 1992: 6]. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that the money was borrowed from commercial institutions such as Western banks. These funds also did not generate income for export earnings. The debt trap thus created was considered the single largest factor perpetuating the development and poverty crisis.

The majority of developing countries were affected by debt problems. Debt service ratios were unsustainable and the debt-servicing outflow forced a number of developing countries to suspend servicing their external debts or to go into arrears.

Due to rising interest rates in the 1980's, like South Africa, developing countries had to pay an average of one third of their aggregate export earnings to service debt.   This, in many instances, exceeded their capacity to serve these obligations. Some developing countries argued that debt interest payments should be limited to a certain share of export earnings, but Western Banks and Governments, such as that of the USA, UK and France, did not agree to these measures.

Debt arrears further accumulated because of civil wars, stagnant growth in both the industrial and the developing countries coupled with

low export earnings. By 1985, the sum being repaid on debt by developing countries, exceeded all the 1975 foreign debt of the developing countries five time over and amounted to $130 000 million [Alimov, 1987: 146]. In 1984 the repayment of interest of the 1980-1984 period increased by 130% with the total sum for the developing countries being $235 000 million which is more than the total debt in 1975 [Alimov, 1987: 146]. The subsequent shortage in their balance of payments account and financial resources for debt interest repayments led developing countries to borrow at reduced interest rates from the Bretton Woods institutions, such as the IBRD and IMF [Bond 1998: 78].

The World Bank and International Monetary Fund [IMF] made such loans conditional on the implementation of economic Structural Adjustment Programs [SAP's]. Due to the requirement that governments cut social expenditure on health, education, food subsidies and welfare payments, SAP's had a devastating effect on social development in developing countries. Developing governments also had to encourage production of primary commodities primarily for external and not domestic markets further exacerbating dependence on market fluctuations [Lambrechts 1998: 33, 34].

The above-mentioned SAP restrictions and prescriptions were felt deeply and were resented by many NAM members. This strengthened a general feeling of animosity to the Bretton Woods institutions. The NAM further saw the debt crisis affecting most of its members as a result of an unjust international system. This system was to the advantage of the rich North and to the disadvantage of the impoverished South.

The next subsection will show how NAM states tried to deal with the bleak scenario sketched above.

5.3 ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL STATES

This subsection will show and give the reasons why, in NAM's third phase, no individual state/s fulfilled a strong leadership role leading the Movement decisively. This is in contrast to NAM's first two phases where firstly, the mainstream leaders and then the left stream leaders fulfilled a strong leadership role.

With no meaningful debt-relief on the table by the mid 1980's Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere labelled the IMF a new colonial institution that exploits the poor to make them poorer and serves the rich to become richer. Julius Nyerere was also the first chairman of the independent South Commission established in 1986. The Commission was charged with the responsibility to present a set of proposals and recommendations to the NAM to revive and sustain the people-centred sustainable development in the South. Together with the major changes in the international system in the late 1980's, the inputs of the South Commission contributed to a new approach within NAM [Bond 1998: 80].

The steadily worsening conditions, human suffering and possible political instability as a result of IMF lending conditions also led to appeals from Julius Nyerere and Fidel Castro for a Third World debtors cartel [Bond, 1998: 80]. This was considered far too radical by many leaders in NAM. At the NAM 1986 Harare Conference, Castro also made a powerful appeal for Third World debtor co-ordination. This too, together with other strong rhetoric produced by the 1986 conference led to no substantive collective action.

Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe was a pretentious, but by many viewed as ultimately over-rated, leader of NAM between 1986 and 1989 [Bond, 1998: 80]. In the midst of the 1980's Third World debtor's crisis the NAM chairmanship would have enabled Zimbabwe to provide an input into global discussions and negotiations on issues of trade and finance reflecting the NAM's North-South preoccupation. The result was,

however, discouraging. In criticism it could be said that apart from the emphasis on opposing the Apartheid regime of South Africa, Zimbabwe failed in mobilising the NAM to address the then burning debt issue in a concerted way.

There can be different reasons for NAM failing on a specific issue, depending on what that issue is. The reason for failing in resolving the debt crises of the 1980's, can be seen as two fold: The Western creditors on the one hand had the power to refuse debt relieve. NAM on the other hand could have used its majority in the UN General Assembly more effectively to exert pressure on Western governments to alleviate the debt crises in a meaningful way.

Other contributing factors leading to NAM failing on specific issues, is the Movements tradition of general consensus [p.7] in decision making. This leads to decisions on many issues being generalized and thus lessening the chance of it being effective. NAM not having a constitution is a further problem resulting in the Movement not being able to address problems such as economic mismanagement within the realm of its own members.

Immediately following Mugabe in the hierarchy of the 1986-1989 NAM, was Peruvian president, Alan Garcia. He was an enthusiastic promoter of a unilateral debt repayment limitation of 10% of foreign currency earnings. This attempt too was unsuccessful. [Bond, 1998: 80]

The NAM voice in the 1980's asking for debt relief was not well co-ordinated and unified. It, however, together with voices of other organisations speaking on the same issue, such as the G77, did have some effect on debt relief, although not enough.

The international debt crisis of the mid 1980's was severely felt by most developing states. The NAM as an international movement representing most developing states, could be criticised for not doing

more to alleviate the immense pressure brought about by the international debt crisis. To a large extent this failure can be contributed to the lack of decisive and for-sighted leadership.

During 1988/89 there was a growing consensus and recognition among donor and creditor governments and institutions that sub-Saharan Africa's debt situation needed to be addressed with exceptional measures. In 1987 the World Bank, other multilateral institutions and bilateral donors launched a Special Program of Assistance that they called SPA. It aimed at decreasing the debt constraint and increasing growth among the low-income African countries. By mid-1989, 22 countries had been declared eligible for the SPA based on their implementation of IMF and World Bank reform programs. IMF and World Bank financial aid was however received by the NAM with mixed feelings as this help was conditional [p.87] and in the mind of the NAM encroaching on the sovereignty of its members. Because of their desperate need, there was hardly a choice but to accept the conditional aid [Bond 1998: 79].

In 1988 Canada, Germany and Japan converted some of their loans to grants. In 1989 both France and the USA announced plans to cancel debt service of respectively 2.5 billion Dollars and 1 billion Dollars of concessional debt owed by 23 sub-Saharan African countries. The 1988 Toronto Agreement between G7 countries [USA, Canada, Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Japan] allowed for a number of options to reduce the burden of official non-concessional debt owed by countries including cancellation and rescheduling.

By the time of the Belgrade NAM summit in 1989, NAM countries had realised not only that many developing countries would never be able to service their debts to bilateral, multilateral or commercial creditors, but that their debt service ratios were linked directly to their inability to eradicate poverty. Sub-Saharan African countries, for example, were

spending more on debt servicing every year than on primary education and health care combined [Lambrechts, 1998 : 34].

In Africa, the debt crisis had deterred private investment, led to higher inflation, increased taxation and diverted scarce resources away from health and education. The United Nations Development Program [UNDP] calculated that by the year 2000 African governments could have funded the primary education of 90 million children and would have saved the lives of 21 million children at less the cost of their then current debt servicing [Lambrechts, 1998: 34, 35; http://www.undp.org/].

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, symbolically marking the end of the Cold War, the NAM was faced with the further problem of marginalisation with the possibility of becoming more ineffectual and powerless. It is, however, important to note that the 9th NAM summit shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, did take note of the fact that the world was moving from confrontation towards reconciliation. This summit marked the first step towards reconciliation and co-operation with the USA and its disengagement with the crumbling USSR.

This would have an important impact on non-alignment. Non-Alignment was now becoming more true to its original intent that included, among other, the co-operation between all nations. The transition from the old world order to a new order would however also lead to the question if non-alignment had outlived its purpose? These questions will be dealt with in further detail in chapter 6 [p.99].

In general it can be said that the NAM's third phase was marked by an international debt crisis severely impacting on the financial position of most of its members. States receiving aid from the IMF and World Bank were submitted to certain conditionality such as the requirements that governments cut social expenditure on health, education, food subsidies and welfare payments [p.87]. The 1980's were also marked

by a lack of strong and decisive leadership to match the immense problems that faced the developing states in this era. The next subsection will analyse the goals NAM set to address the problems of this era.

5.4 GOALS

This subsection deals with the goals the NAM set itself in its third phase [1980's]. As was the case with the NAM's second phase, economic issues again were important to NAM in its third phase. This subsection, together with the section on the role of the most important states, will be of aid to determine what general role the NAM fulfilled in its third phase and what changes to the meaning of non-alignment it entailed.

In the 1980's regional, political and economic disparities between NAM members tended to reduce consensus to a high level of generality. The Movement's ability to take positive action or to put forward realistic proposals was hereby limited. This was illustrated by the growing list of items on the NAM summit and ministerial agendas requiring analysis and action, These included, among other, South Africa, help to the front line countries, Namibia, Palestine, collective action from the South and debt.

NAM raised alarm on the worsening economic situation of most developing states and stressed the need to create a new equitable and universal international monetary system [Dyani, 1998: 1, 2]

The 1986 NAM Summit in Harare marked the beginning of a gradual shift in the Movement towards a clearly defined and distinguishable alternative development agenda. NAM theory and practice of development moved away from a narrow focus on economic growth and capital accumulation to a focus on people as a means and end to development. In the NAM's first two phases the Movement believed that the changing of external factors such as the bi-polar system and

the international economic order were enough to guarantee the development of its own members. The broadening of its focus to include human development was a further step in the content giving and changing meaning of non-alignment. This new focus, however, did not reach real maturity in the 1980's.

Regarding the people-centred focus on development, the 1986 summit was important for establishing an independent South Commission chaired by Julius Nyerere. The South Commission [later institutionalised as the South Centre, p.104] was established as a research institution to investigate technical areas such as intellectual property rights and trade from a South perspective. The Commission was also charged with the responsibility to present a set of proposals and recommendations to the NAM to assist the equitable and sustainable people-centred development in the South [Nel and McGowan 1999: 223].

The extraordinary ministerial conference on South-South Co-operation held in 1987 in Harare as a follow up to the 1986 summit, devised an action plan for South-South Co-operation. To this end it set up a group to serve as a forum, consulting developing countries and to assist developing countries to implement specific co-operation programs. South-South Cooperation in terms of increased trade and the sharing of knowledge and technology was seen by the NAM as being another instrument by way of which the development of developing states could be enhanced.

The standing NAM Ministerial Committee on Economic Co-operation met for the first time in July 1988 in Harare. Its report called for the convening of a special session of the UN General Assembly in April 1990 to ease out the kind of approach necessary to solve the crisis of development in the South. This in part led to the convention of the second UN Conference in Least Developed Countries that, together with various other conferences in the first half of the 1990's, determined

the substance of the UN Agenda for Development [Lambrechts, 1998: 36; http://www.unsystem.org/].

At the 9th NAM summit in Belgrade the NAM started articulating its new priorities. These included economic co-operation among developing countries and the establishing of a new information order that would ensure a free and balanced flow of information between industrial and developing countries and among developing countries. [Belgrade Conference, 1989: 20 – 25]

At the recommendation of the summit a summit level group of developing countries was established. This group referred to as Group of Fifteen, included members from both the non-aligned and other developing countries. It aimed to work towards mutual beneficial co-operation among developing countries with a view to enlarge collective self-reliance in an increasingly interdependent world. In this regard the summit also recommended the rationalisation and harmonisation of the economic and technical co-operation programs of the G77 and the NAM [Lambrechts, 1998: 52].

Apart from South-South cooperation, the protection of the environment was also articulated as a new goal for the NAM. India's Rajiv Ghandi proposed the establishment of a Planet Protection Fund under the aegis of the UN [NAM constituted a majority in the UN General Assembly]. Summit participants argued that since developed countries carry the largest share of the responsibility for planetary environmental problems, they should bear the major share of the environmental burden. They should do this partly by supporting developing countries in developing including the accessing environmentally friendly technologies. The Fund would then provide developing countries with the necessary financial resources to research and develop environmentally friendly technologies.

Although this proposal was widely acclaimed, the Planet Protection Fund was never established. This is one example where a NAM decision in the 1980's was not put into practice. The reasons for this can be found in a lack of strong leadership during this time, the NAM's decisions being generalized and placing the onus of substantial contributions and sacrifice on the developed world.

The Belgrade Summit also recommended that NAM countries should pledge to reduce military spending by 10 to 20 per cent of their capital GNP and to use the resources gained to promote development. The Summit hoped that this would provide an incentive for developed countries to invest 10% of their total military expenditure in a international fund for promoting the development of the LDC's [Lambrechts 1998: 52]. This proposal was never implemented and could be seen as conformation of the lack of the willingness of the NAM members to make substantial sacrifices to serve the purposes of development.

It is however significant to note that the 1989 Belgrade Conference was the first time a NAM summit resolved unambiguously that North-South dialogue should take place in a spirit of co-operation and not confrontation. The Conference also continued to reiterate that strengthened commitments from developed countries were required [Lambrechts 1998: 52].

The insight gained with the analysis of this subsection, together with that of the previous two subsections dealing with the international context and the role and influence of most influential states, would be used in the next subsection to discern the role NAM fulfilled during this phase.

5.5   ROLE AS ARENA

In referring to Archer's model described in Chapter 2 [p.32], the NAM in its third phase generally fulfilled the role of an arena. This is in contrast

to where NAM in its first phase fulfilled the role as an instrument in the hands of the mainstream leaders and in its second phase the role of an actor. The NAM in its third phase, compared with the first two phases, was less decisive and concerted in its efforts.

A number of problems in the NAM became more obvious in the 1980's. There was no question about the ability of the Movement to, at least, keep important global issues such as the economic predicament of the developing world alive and to use the UN to promote its objectives. It, however, became clear that the functioning and structure of the NAM became less and less relevant to the problems of the late 20th Century including the national needs of its members [Van Nieuwkerk 1998: 4].

One reason why problems with the NAM became so obvious in the 1980's, is because apart from the Movement's anti-colonial stance which was by then less relevant because most colonies had received their independence, no other objective of the NAM seemed to be bearing fruit. Another reason is that regional, political and economic disparities tended to reduce consensus to a high level of generality. This limited the Movement's ability to take positive action or to put forward realistic proposals. The reason for this scenario is that where it is easier to obtain consensus on idealistic goals that favours all members without binding them to certain prescriptions, it is less easy to voluntary commit members to regulations of contribution and sacrifice. This was perhaps best illustrated by the growing list of items on the NAM summit and ministerial agendas requiring analysis and action [Appendix 4].

At the time of the 1983 Delhi Summit, NAM membership had grown to over a hundred [Appendix 2] mainly because most colonies had by then received independence. This extensive membership largely led to the NAM finding it exceedingly difficult to remain an instrument of a small group of members or to be an independent actor on the world stage. Using the term "independent" actor is a relative term and does

not imply that the Movement is not influenced by outside forces, but rather refers to the Movement's ability to collectively act on the world stage.

It is clear that NAM in the 1980's fulfilled the role of a forum or meeting place where the members came together to discuss, argue, co-operate or disagree upon matters of mutual interest. In the 1980's a large number of issues had been thoroughly discussed and certain action agreed upon [Appendix 4]. The problem was, however, that because of decisions only being taken by consensus the end result was much watered down to generalised resolutions. In criticism it can be said that the NAM could have been more effective if it had its members bound to decisions taken by a constitution, as well as by having a permanent secretariat which can ensure that decisions taken is adhered to. Coinciding was a further problem: so many action plans were agreed upon while the political willpower to co-operate and implement these actions were lacking.

As a forum the NAM provided its members individually and collectively with a platform to advance their viewpoints in a more open and effective way than through bilateral diplomacy. Relating to the debt crisis of the 1980's, the NAM was potentially an ideal arena to discuss and apply a united effort to address this problem. The problem was discussed but sadly co-operation and political willpower to make a telling impact was lacking. Nevertheless, a united voice of a kind did go out. It however did not have a strong enough impact in the international system to, for example, unconditionally alleviate the debt crisis.

NAM, however, did not utilise the organisation in its role as an arena to nearly its full potential. Fulfilling a role of an arena does not have to imply to be less effective than when fulfilling a role as an instrument or actor. Part of the problem was however that the NAM did not have the "international political and economic weight" that its mere voice in a role

as arena was enough to bring the international community to adhere to the NAM's claims. This is despite the fact that NAM constituted a strong voting bloc in the UN [p.81] [Willetts 1978: 60].

5.6 CONCLUSION

The meaning of non-alignment in NAM's third phase retained its economic component, as was the case in NAM's second phase. The political content of non-alignment however shifted away from a focus on the East-West divide to a focus on the North-South divide. This focus on the relation between the rich and developed North and the poor and underdeveloped South would receive even more emphasis in the early 1990's after the end of the bi-polar system.

The difficulties developing states experienced during the 1980's, brought to the surface problems concerning NAM that previously have not been as prominent. Because NAM decisions are taken on the basis of broad consensus [p.7], the end result is much watered down resolutions. The fact that NAM did not have a constitution or permanent secretariat, also meant in reality that its members were neither bound to decisions taken, nor were there an effective means of ensuring that decisions taken were adhered to. NAM also did not address internal issues such as potential economic mismanagement within its own members. A further problem was also that there were to many issues on the NAM agenda for it to act concertedly.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 covered the three phases of NAM within the Cold War era. Chapter six will view the meaning and possible changes to the meaning of non-alignment during the first years of the post-Cold War era.

6. POST-COLD WAR ERA PHASE 4 – NAM AS AN ACTOR [1990-1992]

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment in the years 1990 – 92 will be addressed. This period Co-insides with the time immediately after the end of the cold war and the bi-polar system. An analysis of the international context, the role of most important states within the NAM, the Movement's goals and what role it fulfilled in this period will again be used to discern the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment.

NAM's fourth phase, analysed in this chapter, is the last phase covered in this dissertation. In chapter 7 the four phases will be compared with each other in order to make certain conclusions relating to the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment.

6.2 INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

This subsection will show that the international context at the time of NAM's fourth phase differed substantively from the international context of the previous three phases.

The beginning of the decade of the 1990's saw NAM at a crossroads. Significant changes in the geopolitical context and in the international economic sphere raised doubts about the optimal strategy for developing countries. Questions concerning the continuing role of NAM were also raised internationally.

The end of the Cold War in 1989 saw revolutionary global developments long in the making, coming strongly to the fore. Where globalisation [p.28] led to the end of the Cold War, the war's ending enabled globalisation to advance even more quickly [Rajan, 1990: 10 – 12].

The bi-polar system came to an end with the dissolve of the Soviet Union and an international capitalist system was now adhered to globally. All states were now exposed to international market forces and happenings in one part of the world could potentially influence states in another part of the world.

Globalisation as both concept and process was increasingly questioned and contested. This questioning and contestation was expressed in the increasing notion of many countries in the world to, not multilateralism and global integration, but to regionalism and regional integration. This was a very contradictory and complex process and the compliments or contradictions between these trends were neither given nor simple [Keet, 1998: 7].

The new liberalised global order gave rise to a highly integrated liberalised system. Very important to NAM countries was that globalisation and increased polarisation between regions and within countries could further marginalize and expose countries of the South. The reasons for this were that the economies of all developing states were exposed to the international market forces and fluctuations. The developed states of North America and Europe economically also stuck together, making it difficult for developing countries to compete on equal economic terms.

Although the end of the Cold War brought a change to the international political system, it did not mean that all the problems associated with bipolar tension disappeared. New tensions in the form of successional wars, such as the Gulf War and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were, for example, appearing in the vacuum left by the end of the Cold War.

An unwillingness in the speedy dismantling of nuclear weapons and the dismantling of conventional arms as well as the resurgence of neighbouring, regional and internal conflicts that even involved NAM

members, were at the order of the day. Taking a Southern perspective, it could be said that the post-Cold War world with its international capitalism, globalisation and continuing wars was no less unjust, inequitable, unfair or dangerous than it used to be [South Centre 1992:1].

Old problems thus remained on the international agenda, unresolved and often more acute. New problems also emerged posing completely new challenges for the international community and for developing countries in particular.

Certain characteristics of the new international order was seen by the NAM as being able to have an impact on the NAM and thus influence its prospects. These characteristics are [Handley, 1998:63,64]:

[i]   The post-Cold War world could be viewed as an unipolar place in two senses: The world firstly witnessed the victory of the politics of the USA and its NATO allies in the Cold War following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Secondly, and more controversially, some Western policy makers argued that they had also seen the triumph of their economics - the so-called *Washington Consensus*. There were also very few alternatives to the neo-liberal economic prescriptions which were regarded in the West as viable and sustainable.

It could be said that while the Cold War had ended, bloc formation in the world had not. The globe was still very much dominated by the Western bloc. NAM, since its inauguration, opposed block formation and did not view itself as an alternative block in the bi-polar system. Western states economically and politically continuing to function as a block, could only mean that developing states will be unable to compete on equal terms with such an overwhelmingly strong block. What then did this mean for non-alignment? Did it mean that the Movement was set against a broad American coalition of liberal ideas?

The end of the Cold War led to an international spirit of co-operation and non-confrontation that again led to a new possibility of dialogue and partnership through cooperation between the North and South. It could however be asked if it was possible for two groupings to have a genuine partnership or agreement to cooperate on equal terms when there had been a vast disparity in power and influence between them? The international structures of power between the North and South essentially remained unchanged.

The end of the bi-polar system did not change the UN system. The Security Council of the UN was still dominated by the five big permanent members. Although the South had a overwhelming majority in the General Assembly, the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council meant that they had a dominant say over which global issues get dealt with and how.

It is thus clear that the international context did change in that the bi-polar system with its accompanying tension and rivalry was something of the past. A new unipolar system dominated by a Western political and economic block and international capitalism, together with international verbalisation was however still an unfavourable international context for the NAM states in which to come to their own. As a Movement non-aligned in a bi-polar system, the end of this system brought the NAM to the point of choosing to either close up shop or alternatively re-align itself in the new international system. The next subsection will, given the above changed international context, analyse the role and influence of most important states within NAM.

6.3 ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL STATES

This subsection deals with the role the most important states of the NAM's forth phase played in the Movement. This together with the other subsections of this chapter will help to determine the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment in the NAM's phase.

The 1989 NAM summit in Belgrade was the first step towards reconciliation and co-operation with the USA and disengagement with the USSR. The end of the Cold War however also strengthened the view of NAM's critics that the Movement had become ineffectual, powerless, passive, disunited and removed from the main international political stage. These remarks were pointed at, for example, the fact that the NAM did not have a good track record of obtaining its goals. The NAM in the 1980's did not present a united front to the world and the end of the bi-polar system in itself put a question mark to the continued relevance of the Movement. An important debate within the Movement on the continued relevance of NAM in the post Cold War era was thus initiated by the NAM in the early 1990's [Lambrechts, 1998: 58; Krishnan, 1998: 47].

Just because an institution such as the NAM existed and had a long history did not necessarily mean that it had to continue. The NAM was also an inherited institution with a huge amount of ideological and organisational baggage. For NAM to continue effectively in the post-Cold War era, the concept of non-alignment would thus have to be redefined. In other words, NAM would have to be realigned.

The basic reason why the NAM was founded and even took its name from, namely opposition to an international system dominated by two alliances opposing each other, did not exist any more. This was known by NAM's members and also pointed out by its Western critics. The question had thus to be asked by the NAM if it still had a meaningful role to fulfil given the context of a new international system.

It would not have been easy for NAM as a Movement to objectively make an independent analysis, including a possible re-definition of the concept of non-alignment and thus also of NAM. The main reason was that an institution which existed for such a long time, acquired what could be called "a life of its own", thus making it difficult for the

Movement's members to objectively decide if the Movement should continue or not.

To assist in this important task and more, NAM in 1990 established an independent information and research centre, the South Centre, in Geneva. The South Centre was established as the follow up office of the South Commission [p.88]. Importantly the Centre, as part of its regular activities, was engaged in analytical work related to the rationale for a Non Aligned Movement in an age not dominated by Cold War politics. The South Centre further undertook a range of information-gathering and research activities aimed at strengthening Southern Solidarity and enhancing South-South co-operation in order to promote Southern based perspectives on global development issues. [South Centre 1993: 2; http://www.southcentre.org]. The term "South-South" refers to interaction between states of the South or developing states.

According to the South Centre [1992: 1,2], many of the debates and interpretations during 1990 – 1991 concerning the meaning of non-alignment, aimed to confuse because it was built on a misconception. They seemed preoccupied with the notion that it was only possible to be non-aligned when there were two or more sides with which it would be possible to become aligned. Non-alignment could also have a figurative meaning. According to NAM, non-alignment was always a positive stance for peace, human rights and an economically just world [South Centre 1992: 2]. This implied the rejection of relationships that involved servitude and sacrifice of national self-interest by perpetuating injustice and inequity.

Regarding the post Cold War question of *non- aligned against what* or *for what*, it was important for *non-alignment* not to be confined to the prison of a literal meaning. Not only has the term *non-alignment* a special historical context and meaning for the developing world, but also it has a life of its own. In other words, non-alignment has obtained

a symbolic meaning, and was not necessarily bound to the literal meaning attached to the concept in the Cold War era. It refers to the South's opposition to undue external influences or, in other words, the structure and functioning of the international system [Lambrechts, 1998:59]. It also refers to the South's efforts in upholding and promoting the ideals and principles of international relations that NAM has always stood for [Pedroza, 1998: 21, 22.]

It is thus clear that NAM had to rationalise its existence in a new international context where non-alignment in NAM's first three phases had a literal meaning, it was now reinterpreted to have a figurative meaning.

The main reason for this reinterpretation was that the old bi-polar system with its two alliances did not exist any more. The reason for NAM's founding to a large extent, however pivoted on the notion that an end to the Cold War and bi-polar system would bring about peace based on cooperation and not domination as well as prosperity and social justice for all people.

The Cold War and bi-polar system did come to an end but apart from the ending of colonialism that for the greatest part was achieved, it did not automatically lead to the fulfilling of the above-mentioned long-term goals. NAM thus had had to reinterpret the meaning of non-alignment if it wanted to continue pursuing these long-term goals.

Although non-alignment in the early 1990's was thus not defined in terms of an East/West confrontation any more, the NAM principles were as valid then as when adopted originally. These principles [See Chapters 3, 4] were peace and disarmament, independence and economic equality with an emphasis on restructuring the existing international economic order while supporting the UN system. The principles were also intricately linked with one another. Without peace, for example, there could be no economic development. Also, without

the proposed restructuring of the UN system to make it more democratic and representative including the international financial institutions, consensus agreements in the General Assembly would not bind financial development agencies. NAM therefore maintained a broad focus on all of these areas for it to be able to monitor and change their interaction [Lambrechts, 1998: 58].

Because the NAM principles were broad concepts, they were able to remain valid, notwithstanding a changing context. These principles were not exclusively bound to an East-West divide, but to an international system and practice in general which were detrimental to the South. Non-alignment at first however was a more narrowly defined term linked especially to the bipolar system. Non-alignment with its literal meaning thus had to be re-conceptionalised to a figurative meaning for it had to remain applicable in a changed international context of a post bi-polar system.

In the words of the South Centre [1992: 2]: "*The basic values and objectives of non-alignment not only remain valid in the current world, they need to be promoted and defended vigorously. This world is no less unjust, inequitable, unfair or dangerous than it used to be. Old problems broadly defined as North/South remain on the international agenda.*"

New problems such as globalisation also emerged posing completely new challenges for the international community and for developing countries in particular. Economic divisions and rivalries continued and political tensions and conflicts had increased in the North as well as in the South. Potentially conflictive issues involving national sovereignty were also multiplying in the South and in the North including nuclear weaponry, narcotics trafficking, the environment, migration, Aids, etc.

The above-mentioned confirms that the end of the Cold War and bi-polar system did not bring an end to international problems facing the

developing states. Developing states in the 1990's in fact were faced with a growing amount of international difficulties. To this end NAM as an international movement fighting for favourable and just international circumstances for developing states, was justified in continuing its existence and pursuing its goals.

The definition of non-alignment has thus changed in that it was not a position relative to the East/West conflict with accompanying baggage any more. The essence of non-alignment in the early 1990's remained the same, being a positive stance for peace, social justice and an economically just world. It is fair to say, the most important influence regarding the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment in NAM's fourth phase came from the South Centre and not individual states.

Given the changes in the international context and its impact on the NAM, the next subsection will analyse the goals NAM set itself in this new era.

6.4 GOALS

In this subsection the NAM's goals in its fourth phase will be analysed in an effort to throw further light on the meaning and changes of the meaning of non-alignment.

As mentioned before, in the early 1990's it was clear that any political or economic agenda for NAM would need to be adapted to the vast changes that had taken place on the world scene with the end of the Cold War and bi-polar system [South Centre 1992: 8; Rajan, 1990: 10]. In 1990/91 these changes were continuing to unfold and considerable uncertainties regarding the future course of events prevailed. Any platform for NAM put together then had to remain flexible to be able to respond to the realities of a relatively fluid situation. It also had to be subject to constant adaptation.

The then recent political changes had already affected part of the frame that fashioned NAM's orientation in the past. The end of the East/West confrontation removed for the developing countries the rationale of equal distance from rival power blocs as a way of safeguarding their independence and of furthering their economic and social goals. This however did not mean that a new global scenario had come into being which would ensure that their basic goals would henceforth be met.

The logic of developing countries working together did not weaken merely because East/West tensions subsided. For as long as developing states had common interests in the global political and economic sphere, the logic of collective action would remain valid. It was however up to developing states and the NAM to identify such common interest in the 1990's and to promote them . Possible common interests could include an international economic system, favourable to the South, as well as changes to the UN Security Council giving more apt representation to the South.

According to the South Centre [1992:2], it was necessary for NAM to recognise the linkage between the economic and political platforms of the Movement. This was not only a linkage between the issues that arose in each of these areas, for example, the link between a favourable economic environment and a favourable political environment. It also included the link between the political cohesion and strength of the Movement and its ability to pursue its economic goals.

The implementation of any economic agenda for NAM would require the political mobilisation of its members. This was necessary to ensure that decisions on economics taken by the NAM were adhered to by member states. It would also involve international institutions as well as an international forum where negotiating processes would be as much political as economic. A choice between a political and an economic agenda for NAM was thus not a valid option for the

Movement because an economic agenda could only be implemented if it was backed by sufficient political willpower.

For NAM to articulate and promote its goals, certain prioritisation of thoughts and actions had to take place [Krishnan, 1998: 47, 49]: As a first priority NAM members had to shed any lingering doubt and uncertainty about the NAM and its future. Only after convinced of the important role NAM could and had to play in future years, NAM could prepare its agenda and action programme. Freed from the ideological baggage of the Cold War era, this agenda had to be adapted to the task of engaging in constructive dialogue with the North. NAM was now to focus on cooperation with the developed world and not confrontation as in the previous phases.

As a second priority, the NAM agenda would comprise in one part of the carry over from the past the many problems that were then still present in the world. To this had to be added a new agenda of new manifestations of old problems as well as new issues [Krishnan, 1998: 49].

At the time of the early 1990's it was clear to NAM that the future of developing countries lay in their economic development and the building of new strength [South Centre 1992:1]. It was therefore of vital importance for NAM to define an updated economic agenda. This should aim to secure a more favourable international economic environment for the national development efforts of individual countries in the South.

Such an economic agenda was however of necessity closely related to the political agenda of NAM that reflected the aspirations of all developing countries to maintain their national sovereignty and self-determination. According to the South Centre [1992 : 4,5] the central objective of NAM should be the quest for successfully achieving greater

global economic and political balance as it was a decisive determinant of peace and security.

The end of the Cold War brought about, through the ending of bi-polar rivalry and the rapid growth of globalisation, a new openness to the world economy. In 1990/91 most NAM members as well as other developing countries were engaged in introducing new orientations to their domestic economic policies. These policies largely aimed at enhancing the dynamism of their national economies in an effort to benefit from the world economic order. This was done through greater openness to the outside world and through the provision of greater scope for enterprise, innovation and the operation of market forces. Examples of states who at this time largely opened up to the world economy were South Africa and Mozambique.

The developing countries on the one hand had a vital role in ensuring that conditions were favourable for the success of these policies. Often in the past the reversal or modification of policies had involved political, economic and social costs. A good example of this is the suffering as a result of Structural Adjustment Programs [p.87].

On the other hand, success was not merely dependent on the soundness and efficiency of the policies themselves. It was also crucially dependent on a supportive global environment without which the best of policies could be undermined and doomed to failure.

Such a supportive environment was all the more important since the policies themselves stressed outward looking patterns of development through, for example trade and investment. Virtually all countries were however looking to benefit at the same time through trade, investment flows and exchanges of various kinds from greater integration into the global economy making it imperative for NAM states not to lag behind.

It was for this reason that any economic agenda for NAM had to place a strong emphasis on the external economic environment as well as on the several elements that constituted such an environment. These elements included crucial issues such as debt service burdens, capital flows, market access and commodity prices.

Favourable conditions in each of these areas were crucial to the efficiency of domestic policies. The consequence for the NAM states being in such a position was that they were extremely vulnerable in their own economic development depending strongly on a favourable external economic environment. The issues themselves had figured on the platform of the development countries for a long time. They however took on new aspects and new dimensions in a changed situation. These issues were in any event so basic and fundamental that they remained relevant over time.

The quest for change and improvement in these areas was not merely a quest for more aid or concessions from the developed countries. It was essentially a search for equitable policies, mechanisms and systems which would give strength to the development process and thus to the global economy as a whole. NAM kept on its agenda pleas for a favourable economic environment for not only will it help the development of their own members, but also strong developing economies will boost the world economy through their greater purchasing power.

In the years running up to and including the early 1990's, new issues as items for international dialogue and action also emerged. These issues included growing concern for the environment and for social and human development. All of these were issues of the greatest importance to the world at large and the increased attention given to them were to be welcomed. Nevertheless, the new issues were not in any way a substitute for the hard issues in the areas of money, finance

and trade. There should therefore not be any trade off between these sets of issues as subjects for international negotiations.

Many of the major actions called for in relation to the new issues fell within the realm of domestic policies. The hard issues on the other hand essentially involved international actions and called for responses from the developed countries.

It is however important to bear in mind that the NAM states were not in a position to dictate the agenda of the new international politics. The NAM as a whole had more international bargaining power than its individual members. And it was therefore important for the NAM to keep these issues of importance to them, on the international agenda. It is however true that through the lack of economic bargaining power and the political stumbling block of the Veto in the Security Council of the UN, NAM as a whole were still not in a position to force the hand of the rest of the world to adhere to their demands.

South-South co-operation was another goal and, especially in the light of the above, had to form an important part of the economic agenda of NAM. It could not be expected of the countries of the North to be the sole engine for growth in the developing world. It was important for trade and other linkages within the south to grow in importance and to be consciously pursued through regional and interregional co-operation arrangements [South Centre 1992:2]. Strong South-South linkages would also have strengthened the position of developing countries in negotiations with the North.

A further important goal for the NAM was for a new development consensus to be obtained. This was of critical importance for a foundation on which negotiations on a variety of issues between North and South could be built.

It was also a goal of NAM to monitor and give inputs to the process of reform and restructuring of the United Nations system and institutions. For this purpose, NAN established a high level working group for the restructuring of the UN. It was very important for the developing countries to make known their views on the several issues involved. Without the inputs of the NAM and the developing world, there was the risk that the UN could be reformed with the end result still being discriminatory of prejudice to the developing world.

The developing countries in particular had to ensure that the economic and social roles of the UN were not diminished by any effort to enhance its political role. This could result in the external international economic environment still being prejudiced in favour of the developed states with a reformed UN unable in levelling the playing field of the international economic environment. They had to ensure that vital matters relating to money, finance and trade did not become the essential concern of institutions in which the voice of the developing world was weak. The economic agenda of NAM would have had little chance of success if the international institutional framework came to be unfavourably modified.

In evaluating the goals of NAM in this phase, it can be pointed out again that the NAM was not in a position of power to enforce its goals. States are self-interested actors and it is therefore essential that international rules and international rule making institutions, such as the UN institutions, constrains powerful states [Mearsheimer 1994: 14]. Even though NAM had a majority in the UN General Assembly and arguably the moral higher ground vis-à-vis the international economic system, it was not likely in the early 1990's that the goals of NAM at large would be adhered to.

NAM did not have a choice but to persist in its well-worn way to keep on pecking at its superior powers for the grant of a more favourable dispensation. It can be said in criticism that NAM could have pursued a

policy of enforcing and/or monitoring political economic reform with its own members in order for them to be more competitive and thus powerful in the international system.

The international context, role and influence of most influential states and NAM's goals in its fourth phase, were analysed thus far in this chapter. The next subsection will analyse the role NAM fulfilled during this phase.

6.5 ROLE AS ACTOR

Categorising the general role NAM fulfilled in this phase, makes it possible to analytically determine the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment. It will be shown in this subsection that NAM in its fourth phase fulfilled the role of an actor.

The end of the Cold War presented to the world a great opportunity for change in the international system. According to the South Centre [1992: 3, 4] it was however regrettably hostage to the lack of balance on the world scene and the drive by the dominant power centre in the North to impose its own vision on the international system.

The statement above is a debatable point. Evidence however strongly suggest that the beginning of the 1990's did present a huge opportunity to the world for reform in the international system and that the nature of the changes to the international system were dictated by the North.

At the time of 1990/91 it was clear that this scenario where the North could dictate to and manipulate the South was unacceptable for the South. It had already given rise to resentment and concern among countries of the South as was evident throughout the history of NAM. Their perceived powerlessness and marginalisation by, for example, not being able to bring greater balance to the international system, were felt more acutely then than at any time since the colonial era. The

South also had to face the new powerful forces of globalisation and interdependence. These forces eroded their economic and political sovereignty in subtle, yet highly effective ways and were also difficult to resist.

Whether or not this new thrust radiating from the North was called neo colonialism, the effect was undeniable. According to NAM, countries of the South would continue to be subject to economic and political pressure and thus dependent until they overcame their economic weakness. It was realised that awareness and knowledge were essential tools in this undertaking [Van Nieuwkerk, 1998: 6,7].

Collective awareness and knowledge were seen by the NAM as of equal importance and called the Movement to an increased effort to be a spokesman for the South in the new world situation. Collective awareness and knowledge provided the foundation for future collective action which could play a critical role in enabling individual developing countries to advance in a number of crucial ways [Van Nieuwkerk, 1998: 7]. These ways included:

- to strengthen their own national development and benefit from South/South Co-operation;

- to increase their influence and countervailing power vis-à-vis the North which in their turn had already strengthened their mechanisms of political, economic and military co-operation and co-ordination, including those intended to deal with and intervene in the South;

- to influence and shape the functioning of the structures governing international political and economic relations with the view to democratise international relations in the world economic system. This meant that the functioning of the world economic system could not be manipulated or dictated to by a small group of powerful Northern states.

To the NAM it was clear that only by means of a collective stance could countries of the South wield influence on the global scene. In criticism, it could be said that a collective stance would increase their moral pressure, but will still not provide them with the power needed to change the international system in their favour. By so doing, they could overcome their situation of helpless onlookers unable to change the course of events or to obtain shared objectives.

The NAM was an instrument by which the countries of the South could, although unsuccessful in this phase, collectively seek to establish a degree of balance on the global scene. NAM thus had an important role to play in renewing the democratic debate and dialogue among nations so that more than the voice of a chosen few were listened to. This debate dealt with changes to the international system including representation in the UN Security Council to give to the South equal representation and opportunity.

It was thus clear that NAM was, in the years immediately after the end of the Cold War, set to fulfil a role of actor in the international system. Fulfilling the role of an actor in the early 1990's of course did not imply that the Movement acted on the world scene without being affected by outside forces. NAM was indeed significantly affected by the end of the Cold War, especially in view of the changes it brought about to the international system or was to bring about.

Rather than free from external influences, the role of actor points to the autonomous action of the actor. By this is meant that the actor is not being dictated to or submissive to other actors.

NAM acted autonomously in 1990, or be it with the help of donors, by setting up the South Centre [p.104] and tasking it amongst other to research, analyse and comment on the future relevance of NAM. Importantly, the research revealed that NAM did have a future role to fulfil. NAM was thus, thanks to the South Centre, in a position to

autonomously and objectively realign itself to fulfil an important role and function on behalf of the South. The establishment of the South Centre, thus also contributed to the independent actor capacity of NAM by enhancing the stable and coherent decision making machinery of the Movement.

It can be argued that the crisis in terms of the future relevance of NAM brought about by the end of the Cold War, was a strong enough catalyst to bind the Movement into the role of actor. As was seen in subsection 6.2 [International Context], the question [p.99] was asked at that time if the reason for NAM's existence had not ceased or did the Movement still have a role to fulfil? This forced the Movement to re-assess and hone its focus, thus bringing its members nearer to each other. The further potential marginalisation and manipulation of the South as a result of changes to the international political system, further inspired NAM to get together in a role as actor. It was only by means of a combined and concerted effort by which NAM, and by implication the South, could hope to make a constructive contribution to the changes taking place as a result of the end of the Cold War. Although there was no immediate success for the NAM, the Movement did succeed in putting international issues concerning the developing world on the international table.

It is thus clear that it was possible for the NAM, even with a large membership, to fulfil the role of an actor and thus be more than an instrument or a forum for its members. The NAM in the early 1990's was thus stronger than the sum of its members enabling it to act more effectively on the world stage.

6.6 CONCLUSION

In evaluating NAM's fourth phase, it could be said that NAM did indeed have a role to fulfil in a post-Cold War era. NAM still was not able to act from a position of influence, thus not being able to effect the changes in the international system to best suit the developing states.

This phase was a time of change in international relations and the NAM could possibly have used it to change its strategy. It could have tried to be more influential on the policies of its own members thus possibly giving it more bargaining power/leverage in the international community. This implied that NAM probably had to cease being a movement and constitute itself as an organisation with compellable authority over its members.

The future relevance of non-alignment was seriously challenged in NAM's fourth phase. With the bi-polar system coming to an end, non-alignment was now faced with the question of non-aligned against what or for what.

NAM had to rationalise its existence in a new international context. Where non-alignment in NAM's first three phases had a literal meaning, it was now reinterpreted to have a figurative meaning. In other words, non-alignment obtained a symbolic meaning and was not bound to the literal meaning attached to the concept in the three Cold War era phases.

Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6, analysed NAM in terms of the international context, role and influence of most influential states, goals and the role NAM fulfilled in each particular phase. This was done to discern the meaning and possible changes to the meaning of non-alignment in each phase. In the next chapter [chapter 7] the four phases of NAM will be compared. In chapter 8 deductions from this comparison will be made, enabling the research question of this dissertation [p.2] too be answered.

7. ASSESSING THE CHANGED MEANING OF NON-ALIGNMENT

7.1 INTRODUCTION

In chapters 3 to 6 the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment were revealed through an analysis of the NAM in four chronological phases. This analysis of the NAM [in four phases] will be brought together again in this Chapter in order to have a holistic picture of the meaning of non-alignment.

The changed meaning of non-alignment will be assessed by looking at a comparison between the four NAM phases [subsection 7.2] and the subsequent assessment [subsection 7.3], relative to the research question. The research question of this dissertation [p.2] deals with the nature of the changes to the meaning of non-alignment, the reasons why these changes took place and the subsequent implications in the international system. In other words, the comparison of NAM's four phases is used to answer the research question.

7.2 COMPARISON OF PHASES

To understand the changed meaning of non-alignment, it is not enough to compare in isolation the different roles NAM fulfilled. It is also necessary to know the reasons why the meaning of non-alignment changed and what the implications of these changes are for the international system. For this reason it is also necessary to look at a comparison of the international context, role and influence of most influential states, as well as goals.

The comparison is methodologically approached by using the same four analytical subdivisions with their own specific indicators in each of NAM's four phases. In analysing and comparing international context, the prevailing international political climate and major international political-economic developments are taken into consideration. With the

role and influence of most influential states the role and leadership of specific figures within NAM are focused upon. In analysing and comparing NAM's goals, the main goals NAM set itself as a Movement [usually at summit meetings] are focused upon. The fourth category, namely role, is analysed and compared in terms of Archer's analytical model [p.32], where he proposes three possible roles [instrument, actor and arena] that an international organisation can fulfil.

7.2.1 INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

As discussed previously, the first phase of NAM [1960's] was set in an era of changed international relations. The end of the Second World War led to a decolonisation crises in three continents [p.43]. This led to the emergence of many new states, most of which were small, underdeveloped and politically weak. These states were politically and economically vulnerable and many of them thus found a "political home" in NAM without their sovereignty being threatened.

The global power structure had been transformed from one dominated by Western Europe to the bi-polar structure dominated by the USA and USSR. The tension between these two hegemonies was particularly high during the decade of the 1960's. There was a distinct possibility for the outbreak of nuclear war, the arms race in nuclear and conventional weapons intensified and there was a struggle for influence over the Third World countries. These factors were a threat to developing states, and non-alignment thus had a high emphasis on world peace, co-operation among states and social justice.

At the time of NAM's second phase [1970's] the decolonisation crises compared with the 1960's had lost much of its impetus. At the time of the 1970's, most former colonies had obtained their political independence and only a handful was still to be liberated. This lead to decolonisation being less emphasized in non-alignment than in the 1960's.

Détente had resulted in the considerable diminishing of East/West tension compared with the high level of the 1960's. The international economic climate of the 1970's, however, was much bleaker than that of the 1960's. The rising oil prices of the 1970's had a devastating effect on growth rates, particularly in the developing world. The terms of trade for developing countries fell rapidly, forcing them to borrow money internationally. This would become an important contributing factor to the debt crisis of the 1980's and lead to non-alignment obtaining a direct focus on economics.

NAM's third phase [1980's] saw the international collapse of commodity prices and disarray in commodity markets. Trade in commodities, however, inevitably remained the main source of foreign income for most developing countries, especially the LDC's. Where developing countries registered high growth rates in the 1950's and 1960's, the rise in oil prices in the 1970's together with falling commodity prices, had a devastating effect on the growth rate in world production and exports. Developing countries were forced to borrow money as a result of declining terms of trade. The debt trap of the 1980's was thus created [p.86]. Non-alignment thus , as in the previous decade, had apart from its political focus, also an economic focus.

Although détente was something of the past, East/West political tension was still lower relative to the 1960's. The decolonisation problem all but came to an end in the decade of the 1980's. It was almost only South Africa that was to remain an unresolved problem internationally. Decolonisation thus had a low emphasis in non-alignment, but non-alignment was still set in the bi-polar system with a focus on peace based on co-operation and not domination, social justice as well as prosperity.

NAM's fourth phase [early 1990's] saw significant changes in the geo-political context and the international economic sphere. The Cold War ended in 1989 bringing to an end the bi-polar system and the

accompanying East/West tension. This brought about a serious challenge to the future relevance of non-alignment.

The new international order was a highly integrated liberalised system. This system brought about rapid globalisation and a high degree of interdependence. In this phase, the developing countries were as a result vulnerable to be economically and politically more marginalized and exposed than in any of the preceding three phases. Non-alignment was thus still seen as being relevant, but changed from having a literal meaning to having a figurative meaning.

In the military field the end of the bi-polar system did not bring to an end all the problems associated with the Cold War. There was a marked unwillingness by Eastern and Western nuclear forces for a total dismantling of nuclear arms. Developing states for their part were in the whole unwilling to reduce their conventional arms. There was also a resurgence in neighbouring, regional and internal conflicts such as in Czechoslovakia for example. New international issues concerning among other the environment also came to the fore. The decolonisation problem nearly fully came to an end during this phase.

From the analysis of international context in NAM's four phases and the above comparison, it is clear that international context had a direct and changing influence on the meaning of non-alignment. Examples of this are, the threat of nuclear war in the 1960's resulting in an emphasis on peace in non-alignment, as well as the economic climate of the 1970's leading to non-alignment obtaining a direct focus on economics

Non-alignment, however, also influenced the international context. An example of this is where non-alignment's emphasis on decolonisation contributed to the process, which resulted in the founding of many new Third World states.

7.2.2 ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF MOST INFLUENCIAL STATES

NAM's three founding leaders, Nehru of India, Nasser of Egypt and Tito of Yugoslavia, not only played a decisive role in getting the Movement off the ground, but were also instrumental in laying a foundation for the meaning of *non-alignment*. The foundation was laid through Nehru's Panch Sheel [p.47], the Bandung Conference and the Belgrade Conference of 1961. Non-alignment to them was a foreign policy orientation, opposing the bipolar system and positioning the NAM members away from the Eastern and Western blocks. These three leaders believed in the necessity and inevitability of fundamental changes to the then existing world order. Apart from Nehru's Panch Sheel being incorporated into non-alignment, it was especially at Tito's urging that world peace became a corner stone in the meaning of non-alignment.

In NAM's first phase [1960's] under the guidance of the founding trio, NAM strived for a transition from the then existing order based on domination by big states over lesser states, to a new order based on co-operation between nations. This new order was to be founded on freedom, equality and social justice for the promotion of prosperity for all countries. International peace was considered to be a prerequisite for the protection and promotion of the national interest of developing countries. Only then was accelerated socio-economic development of their weak and under-developed societies possible. The Cold War and block power politics undermined this objective and hence needed to be opposed. NAM in this phase was thus internally strongly influenced by the founding trio to give a specific content to the meaning of non-alignment.

NAM's second phase [1970's] saw changed circumstances in the international environment with a consequent reduction in the urgency of the peace issue. International economics thus came to the fore as the most important issue for the developing world. This change was accompanied by the emergence of a new international leader, Cuba's

Fidel Castro, whose prestige in NAM rivalled that of its founding trio [p.67]. Under Castro's leading influence in the 1970's, non-alignment was to become more radical than in NAM's previous phase.

As indicated in Chapter 4 [p.64], the prominence of international economic issues and the anti-colonial wars in Africa of the 1970's moved the political centre of NAM to the left. Long on record for emphasising colonial and developmental issues, Cuba became a leading voice in NAM when these issues came to the fore. Under strong influence of Cuba's Castro NAM not only identified economic issues as the most acute problems internationally, but the Western nations were held primarily responsible for resistance to the NIEO. Imperialism, neo- colonialism, apartheid, Zionism and all forms of alien domination, but excluding hegemony, were routinely denounced. Hegemony was excluded not to affront the USSR, who itself was a hegemony. Although Castro's thesis that the Soviets were the natural allies of NAM was never adopted, the Movement in its second phase, largely under the influence of Castro, shifted to the political left in contrast with the mainstream politics of its first phase. Individual leadership in NAM's second phase, as in its first phase, had a definite impact on the meaning of non-alignment, and directed its change.

In contrast with the first two phases, NAM in it's third phase [1980's] had an absence of strong individual leadership. In the midst of the 1980's the developing countries were also seriously suffering from the effect of the Third World debt crisis. NAM's voice in this decade was neither well co-ordinated nor unified. This was as a result of a combination of weak leadership and a too large agenda. The net result in terms of debt relieve actions were as a result discouraging. Without strong leadership in this phase, non-alignment was less focused than in the previous two phases.

In NAM's fourth phase [early 1990's] the South Centre established in Geneva, gave strong new guidance/leadership to the Movement. With

the end of the Cold War, NAM faced strong criticism from mainly Western critics, that it had become ineffectual, powerless, outlived its purpose and had come to the end of its political life. This criticism was mainly based on NAM's ineffectiveness in the1980's and on the fact that the bi-polar system, opposition to which was a corner stone of non-alignment, had fallen away. The future relevance of non-alignment was thus seriously challenged.

The guidance of the South Centre made it possible for NAM to realign itself in an age not dominated by Cold War politics. The South Centre, as a research centre independent of NAM, confirmed that the NAM did have a future role to fulfil and helped to establish its new goals. Decisions on realigning NAM were taken by NAM members themselves. The South Centre, however, researched the feasibility of realignment and what functions NAM could fulfil in future [e-pos South Centre]. In answer to outside criticism relating to the future relevance of NAM, the Movement's own notion of a future role for NAM was thus confirmed and enhanced independently. Non-alignment in this phase was not defined in terms of an East/West confrontation any more but it was however still a stance for peace, human rights and an economically just world.

7.2.3 GOALS

During NAM's first phase [1960's] it kept at the centre of attention three fundamental goals. As was seen in Chapter 3 [p.58], these goals were world peace based on co-operation and not domination, prosperity and social justice for all people and the elimination of colonialism in all its forms. The strong political content of non-alignment in NAM's first phase was thus reflected in its goals.

The problems of world peace and decolonisation had lost its overwhelming weight by the time of NAM's second phase [1970's]. During this phase, however, it became apparent to the NAM that in order to have political and racial equality, a nation had to have some

semblance of economic equality. This was only possible within a fair international system and NAM thus strove towards the goal of a New International Economic Order. Comparing NAM's goals in the 1970's, to that of the 1960's, the meaning of non-alignment changed in that a strong economic component was added to it.

The most important goals in NAM's third phase [1980's] remained in the economic and socio-economic spheres. NAM stressed the need to create a new equitable and universal international monetary system. There was also a gradual shift to a clearly defined alternative development agenda where the need was identified that the people of developing states had to be empowered. NAM thus moved away from a narrow focus on economic growth and capital accumulation to a focus on people as a means and end to development. Non-alignment in NAM's third phase not only continued to have an economic focus as in phase two, but it now also extended further to include issues such as human development.

At the time of NAM's fourth phase [early 1990's] the end of the East/West confrontation had removed for the developing countries the rational of equal distance from rival power blocks as a way of safeguarding their independence and of furthering their economic and social goals. In this phase it was clear that the future of developing countries still lay in their economic development, but it was equally important for NAM to try and secure a more favourable international economic environment.

NAM, however, could not focus purely on economic issues such as a NIEO [second phase, or the debt crisis [third phase. Economic issues such as these could only be satisfactorily addressed for the South if the international political system was changed. NAM thus focused on addressing changes to the international system where, for example, the UN Security Council was discriminatory to the South. The economic

agenda of NAM was thus of necessity closely related to the political agenda of NAM.

NAM's main goal in its fourth phase was the quest for successfully achieving greater global economic and political balance as it was a decisive determinant for peace and security. Non-alignment in NAM's fourth phase thus changed substantively from the previous three phases. Peace and security was not the foundation of non-alignment any more. The core of non-alignment was rather a just political and economic system that would enable the South to grow in prosperity and create a real opportunity for world peace.

7.2.4 ROLE

In NAM's first phase it fulfilled the role of an *instrument* in the hands of its mainstream founding leaders. The three founding leaders succeeded in transferring their own goals to be part and parcel of that of NAM. They thus "used" the Movement to further their own goals, all be it to the advantage of the NAM and the South as a whole.

Fulfilling the role of an instrument, NAM was able to make a significant input in the international relations of the 1960's. The NAM did this by providing a foreign policy orientation for many newly independent states and being combined was a stronger voice for these new states. Through NAM, its members did not only find a separate political identity and role in contrast with fixed positions defined in relation to the super powers. It also made a meaningful impact on world decolonisation.

NAM in its second phase fulfilled the role of an *actor* who in the whole was aggressively anti-Western. By this is meant that there was a strong cohesiveness in the Movement and it was able to act on certain issues in a concerted way. NAM subsequently was able to act autonomously giving co-ordinated and unified inputs to the international system. NAM's more radical stance embraced anti colonialism, anti imperialism and NIEO.

NAM in its third phase fulfilled the role of an *arena* where its members came together to discuss issues. NAM in other words was a mere platform to its members where they could advance their viewpoints in a more open and effective way than through bi-lateral diplomacy. Fulfilling the role of arena also implies that NAM lacked the focus and thrust which it had in its roles as instrument and actor in its previous two phases. The issues discussed by NAM were wide ranging, including opposition to the South African Apartheid-regime. NAM was also impaired by having to take decisions by consensus and was without political willpower. This resulted in NAM being unable to take positive action or to put forward realistic proposals.

As in the second phase, NAM in its fourth phase fulfilled the role of an *actor* rallying round the challenges of the post Cold War era. By this is mint that NAM had a strong cohesiveness and was able to act in a concerted way. This enabled NAM to prove the opposite of criticism brought against it, namely that NAM had outlived its purpose. In asking for a restructuring of the UN system, NAM subsequently played an important part in renewing the democratic debate and dialogue among nations so that more than the voice of a chosen few were listened to. Unlike the third phase, NAM in the fourth phase made a collective and committed stance [by asking for a restructuring of the UN system] and was thus more able to potentially make an impact on the global scene.

By way of an interim conclusion on 7.2 [Comparison of phases], it can be said that it was significant to compare NAM's four phases in terms of the four analytical subdivisions. International context had a definite impact on the meaning of non-alignment and will therefore have important implications when looking at the reasons for changes to the meaning of non-alignment [7.3.2]. In comparing the role and influence of most influential states, it became clear that they too had an impact on the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment. They

too will thus be imported in looking at possible reasons for changes to the meaning of non-alignment [7.3.2].

The comparison of NAM's goals showed that they were not the same in each phase. The changes to NAM's goals will thus be significant in determining the nature of the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment [7.3.1]. Comparing the different roles NAM fulfilled in each phase showed that NAM was potentially more effective when fulfilling the role of an instrument or actor, than when it was fulfilling the role off an arena. The comparison of the roles NAM fulfilled will thus be significant in determining the implications of changes to the meaning of non-alignment [7.3.3].

7.3 ASSESSMENT

In view of the comparison above, certain deductions regarding the nature and reason of the changes to the meaning of the concept of non-alignment, as inducted by NAM as well as the implications in international politics, can be made. This is done to be able to give, in 8.3 [Main conclusions of study], a final answer to the research question of this dissertation.

7.3.1 NATURE OF CHANGES TO THE MEANING OF NON-ALIGNMENT

To understand the nature of the changes that over time had been given to the meaning of non-alignment, it is important to, among other, look at the goals set by NAM in each of the four phases. Where NAM's goals identified with each of its four phases were compared in subsection 7.2.3, this subsection uses that information to determine the nature and changes to the nature of non-alignment in each of the four phases.

In its first phase NAM set itself three fundamental goals, namely world peace based on co-operation and not domination, prosperity and social justice for all people and the elimination of colonialism in all its forms. NAM opposed the bi-polar system/Cold War because it inherently threatened world peace that was considered by NAM to be a pre-

requisite for the protection and promotion of the national interest of developing countries. The Movement thus strove for a transition from the then existing world order based on domination to a new order based on co-operation between nations. This new order had to be found on freedom, equality and social justice for the promotion of prosperity.

Non-alignment at the time of NAM's second and third phases remained a position relative to the East/West confrontation and in opposition to the bipolar system as such. The meaning given to non-alignment by the NAM in these two phases changed from that given in the first phase in that a greater impetus was given to international economics.

Although the issues of political and racial equality were still relative in NAM's second and third phases, the Movement in its second phase acknowledged that for these aspirations to be fully realised, Southern countries had to have some semblance of economic equality with the countries of the North. This was however only possible within a fair international economic system. NAM hence introduced the concept of a new international economic order via NIEO into its thinking and thus into the concept of non-alignment.

In NAM's third phase the meaning of non-alignment underwent a further subtle change. This was seen in, although the focus strongly remained on economics, there was a gradual shift away from a narrow focus on economic growth and capital accumulation to a focus on people as a means and end to development.

The meaning of non-alignment in NAM's fourth phase differed from that in the previous three phases in that it was not defined in terms of the East/West bi-polar confrontation any more. Non-alignment was however still a stance for peace, equality, independence and prosperity within a free and just political and economic system. Only by achieving

greater global political and economic balance, could these fundamental objectives of non-alignment be realised.

7.3.2 POSSIBLE REASONS FOR CHANGES TO THE MEANING OF NON-ALIGNMENT

The reason for changes to the meaning of the concept of non-alignment was mainly as a result of changes in the international context and to a lesser extent, as a result of the influence of the most influential states of NAM. This will be verified below by showing how in NAM's different phases, events in the international context [as external factors], and the inputs of specific states or leaders [as internal factors], were reflected in the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment.

As shown in Chapter 3.2 [International Context, p.43], the contextual issues of decolonisation and world peace were identified by Nehru, Nasser and Tito as fundamental issues regarding the national interest and well being of their own and other South countries and territories.

The net result was that international peace and decolonisation were reflected in the meaning of non-alignment. This could be seen in non-alignment being defined as a foreign policy orientation opposed to the bipolar system, block politics and imperialism. International peace, national independence and the right to independent decision-making were thus incorporated in the meaning of non-alignment during NAM's first phase.

At the time of NAM's second phase, the international context had changed considerably. Détente led to the subsiding of tension between East and West with the result that world peace was not such a burning issue any more. Many Third World countries received their independence during the 1960's with the result that even the decolonisation process was not such a burning issue in the 1970's as in the previous decade.

The international economic climate at the time of NAM's second phase was however much bleaker than during the 1960's. High oil prices led to a decline in the international economic growth rate. The economies of the non-oil producing developing countries were the most negatively influenced.

It was the first time that the economic vulnerability and backwardness of newly independent countries, relative to that of their former colonial masters, were accentuated. This was seen in the balance of payments problems many developing countries experienced due to a large drop in their export earnings as a result of low commodity prices as well as having to pay much more for oil imports. The contextual issue of economics was very important to the South and thus forced itself upon NAM and became more explicitly part of the meaning of non-alignment.

Fidel Castro was an influential leader at the time of NAM's second phase. Apart from striving for a strong economic emphasis in non-alignment, NAM mainly under his directing became more radical and anti-Western inclined.

At the time of NAM's third phase international economics still overshadowed issues such as world peace and decolonisation. Falling commodity prices further exacerbated the economic predicament of developing countries culminating in the debt crisis of the 1980's. Without the assistance of any particular leader, the economic contextual issue forced NAM in the 1980's to maintain the emphasis on the economic component of non-alignment.

At the time of NAM's fourth phase, the international context had changed considerably. This came about with the bipolar system coming to an end and the USA emerging as the centre of a unipolar system. This inevitably led to a major change in the meaning of non-

alignment. It could not be a foreign policy orientation relative to the bipolar block formation any more since this state of affairs did not exist any more.

The end of the Cold War brought about an end to the bi-polar power structure and tension. Helped by the guiding influence of the South Centre, NAM was able to realign itself. Non-alignment now had a figurative and not literal meaning. Its focus was also not on an East-West devised any more, but on a North-South divide.

The South Centre's independent research showed that the NAM did have a future role to fulfil. In criticism it can be said that yes, NAM did have a future role to fulfil, but it will have to take measures to increase its effectiveness.

Following the exposition in Chapters 3 to 6 as well as the subsection 7.2 [Comparison of Phases] and as shown in the summary above, it is thus clear that throughout the four phases of NAM, the international context and to a lesser degree the influence of individual states within NAM, had a direct impact on the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment. It is however also important to note that the influence of the international context on non-alignment was in fact a two-way interaction. The meaning of non-alignment through the actions of NAM, in whatever phase, influenced and changed the international context. Given that it is not easy to proof cause and affect in international politics, it will be fair to say that NAM did contribute to, for example, eradicating colonialism or establishing an anti-racist climate. Details of these influences and changes will be given in the subsection below.

7.3.3 IMPLICATIONS

The meaning of non-alignment and changes to the meaning had certain implications for the international political system. To best know

what these implications entail, it is important to look at the different roles NAM fulfilled in its different phases.

NAM in its first phase fulfilled the role of an instrument, in its second and fourth phases the role of an actor and in its third phase the role of an arena. NAM thus fulfilled each of the roles of the spectrum of three, with the role of actor having been fulfilled in two phases.

NAM in its fourth phase had a considerably large membership [113][Appendix 2]. NAM was however still able to fulfil the role of an independent actor. This is thus proof that NAM, because of its size or other factors, is not delivered to the role of an arena.

NAM's first, second and fourth phases in the roles of instrument and actor correlated with strong leadership and the prioritising of certain items in NAM's bigger agenda. NAM's third phase, fulfilling the role of an arena, on the other hand correlated with an absence of strong leadership and an absence of political willpower within the Movement to execute decisions taken.

Going a step further, it can be said that there seems to be a correlation between strong leadership within NAM and concerted and unified actions being taken. This can be seen in the strong leadership of India, Egypt and Yugoslavia in NAM's first phase and that of Cuba in NAM's second phase. There is also a correlation between the absence of strong leadership within the Movement and no concerted or unified action being taken as was seen throughout NAM's third phase. It is thus beneficial to NAM and its members to have strong leadership even though this will mean that there is a possibility for the Movement to be an instrument in the hands of a number of influential states.

As was explained earlier [see 7.2.1 International Context, p.120], the international context influenced the meaning of non-alignment in each

of NAM's four phases. NAM however on the other hand set out in each of its four phases to influence the international context.

Throughout the first three phases NAM opposed the bi-polar system, colonialism and racism with its own declarations and bringing it to the table at the UN General Assembly. Where attitudes and actions regarding colonialism and racism as part of the international context started to change even in NAM's first phase, the bi-polar system fell away only at the end of the third phase.

NAM in its second phase particularly tried to get established a new international economic order by promoting the NIEO. Such a new order would have been a very important part of the international context for all countries, especially developing countries. Non-alignment was not able to bring this change about in the international context, but the issue was not dead and buried. It surfaced again in NAM's fourth phase where greater global political and economic balance was asked for.

It is thus clear that apart from the context influencing non-alignment, non-alignment in some instances influenced the context. The interaction between non-alignment and the context however goes further.

The changed context brought about by influences of, among other, non-alignment, in its turn again influenced non-alignment. The best example of this is where the bi-polar system fell away due to, among other, the influences of non-alignment. The post bi-polar system again immediately had new influences on non-alignment. This was because now there were not two blocks [alignments] to be disassociated with. A major founding reason for the NAM thus fell away, challenging its continued existence. The meaning of non-alignment changed in reaction to these influences and was thus again able to try and influence the context.

7.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter showed that, since the founding of NAM in 1961, the meaning of non-alignment underwent a number of changes. The comparison of NAM's four phases in terms of the same analytical subdivisions enabled the research question of this dissertation [p.2] to be addressed.

It was shown in this chapter that NAM's goals, to a large extent, determined the nature and changes to the nature of the meaning of non-alignment. The chapter also showed that the reasons for changes to the meaning of non-alignment primarily lay in the influences from the international context and the role and influence of most influential states within NAM. It was also shown that the implications flowing from the changes to the meaning of non-alignment could be derived from the comparison of the different roles NAM fulfilled in various phases.

The changes to the meaning of non-alignment was of critical importance for non-alignment to remain relevant, as well as for it to be able to make an potential impact in a changing world. The meaning of non-alignment will therefore in future again have to undergo changes as the world changes.

Where chapter 7 used a comparison of NAM's different phases to address the research question, the final answer to this question will be given in chapter 8 [p.137, 142]. Apart from an overview of the first seven chapters, suggestions for further study, a main conclusion will also be made.

8. CONCLUSION

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is an analysis of the changed meaning of non-alignment in international politics between the years 1961 – 1992. It will hopefully not only help interested people to better understand international politics of the past, related directly or indirectly to non-alignment, but it will also help them to understand and explain current international politics.

This chapter starts off by reviewing each of the previous seven chapters of this dissertation. It then states the main conclusions of this dissertation including the answer to the research question [p.142]. In the following subsection some suggestions for further research are made while the last subsection provides some concluding remarks.

8.2 REVIEW OF CHAPTERS AND IMPORTANT CONCLUSIONS

In Chapter 1 the problem postulation of this dissertation is circumscribed.

The research question [p.2] for this dissertation is:

i] What is the nature of the changes that over time had been given to the meaning of non-alignment?

ii] Why did these changes take place?

iii] What is the eventual implications in the international political system?

It is also important to point out the current three theoretical beacons in International Politics. This is important because the theoretical perspective someone works from influences the way in which reality is perceived or projected. The three beacons are realism, liberal institutionalism and new multilateralism. This dissertation is written from a liberal institutionalist perspective.

In short Realism is a power theory where the state is seen as the most important actor in international relations and states are seen to act in a self interested way. In the Realism construct Third World politics, including the NAM, is merely seen as an appendage of great power politics.

New Multilateralism is a transformative theory whose ultimate aim is to transform the fundamental nature of international politics and to create a world where there is not just increased co-operation among states, but a possibility of genuine peace. New Multilateralism will however view an international organisation such as NAM as an elitist organisation, for as long as NAM's modus operandi is fundamentally top-down, stronger members will take the Movement hostage. And use it to its own benefit.

Liberal Institutionalism focuses on explaining why economic and environmental co-operation among states is a likelihood. It presumes that increased co-operation in those realms is presumed to reduce the likelihood of war.

The aim of Liberal Institutionalism is, while accepting states are self-interested actors, to create rules that constrain states. Liberal Institutionalism views institutions such as NAM as being the key to overcoming the problem of "cheating" as the main inhibitor of international co-operation.

This dissertation is written from the perspective of Liberal Institutionalism and the role of NAM in international relations is thus seen as being constructive in principal. In this regard Liberal Institutionalism supports the conviction in this dissertation that political co-operation between states contributes to international stability and world peace.

Chapter 2 shows the analytical framework as used by Clive Archer [p.32] as analytical mechanism. Archer's model is well suited for the purposes of this dissertation in that it can be used to analyse the NAM, bringing to the surface the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment. In this framework an international organisation is analysed in terms of three possible roles the organisation might fulfil in the international political system. The three possible roles are that of an *instrument* or tool in the hands of certain members of the organisation, the organisation as an *actor* and the role of an *arena* or forum as a meeting place for the organisation's members.

Chapter 2 further shows that international relations are viewed as part of a world system and not as part of a network. This implies that contemporary international relations take place within a defined area but which is nevertheless defused. Activities in one area are clearly seen to affect activities elsewhere and the whole structure is seen to be interconnected.

To understand the meaning and changes to the meaning of *Non-alignment* the activities of the Non Aligned Movement [NAM] between the years 1961-1992 were analysed [Chapters 3 – 6]. Four phases were distinguished: Survival [1960's], radicalisation [1970's], cynicism and frustration [1980's] and search for a new vision [1990-92]. Each phase was further analysed in terms of international context, role and influence of most important states, goals and role.

NAM in its first phase [Chapter 3], under the guiding influence of its founding leaders, Nehru, Nasser and Tito, fulfilled the role of an instrument. The end of the Second World War marked the beginning of an important new era in international relations. One very important aspect of this new era was the decolonisation crisis which led to the emergence of many new states, most of them small, underdeveloped and politically weak. The period after the Second World War also saw a transformation of the global power structure. The predominance of

Western Europe was replaced by the bi-polar system dominated by the USA and USSR.

Non-alignment in the first phase was a foreign policy orientation chosen by the founder leaders to enable the NAM members to give fuller meaning and content to their newly achieved political independence. For NAM member's non-alignment meant to be able to autonomously shape their own destinies in a manner that protected and promoted their national interests. This essentially lay in accelerated socio-economic development of their weak and underdeveloped societies.

To achieve this objective, international peace was considered to be a prerequisite and the Cold War and power politics injurious and hence needed to be opposed. Non-alignment, from the start, thus also included an aspiration for a transition from the then existing order based on domination to a new order based on co-operation between nations founded on freedom, equality and social justice for the promotion of prosperity.

As seen in Chapter 4 [p.80], NAM in its second phase [1970's] fulfilled the role of an actor and was more radical than in the 1960's. Where favourable external market conditions and high commodity prices favoured developing countries in NAM's first phase, high oil prices and low international growth rates had a devastating effect on the development progress of Southern countries. This, together with the guiding influence of Fidel Castro, forced economics to the foreground in non-alignment. For a nation to have political and racial equality, it had to have some semblance of economic equality. NAM thus introduced its program for a New International Economic Order. Non-alignment in the 1970's was also decidedly anti-Western but did not go as far as to embrace the Soviets as their natural ally.

As seen in Chapter 5 [p.95], NAM in its third phase [1980's] fulfilled the role of an arena. The 1980's saw an international collapse of

commodity prices, the economic lifeblood of most developing countries. This setback, together with the economic difficulties of the 1970's, forced most developing countries into a debt crisis. The net result was that non-alignment in the 1980's retained its economic focus.

NAM in this phase lacked strong unifying leadership. This in a sense could partly be attributed to the difficulties facing the NAM in this phase including the financial difficulties facing developing countries as well as a very broad agenda within the Movement. This resulted in the Movement not being able to put forward a realistic and unified proposal to help the developing world out of its economic woe. The third phase however saw NAM's theory and practice of development move away from a narrow focus on economic growth and accumulation to a focus on people as a means and end to development.

As in the second phase, NAM in its fourth phase [1990 – 1992; Chapter 6] fulfilled the role of an actor. This phase followed immediately after the end of the Cold War and saw NAM at a crossroads. The end of the bi-polar system and with it tensions between East and West created by the Cold War, brought NAM before the question if it had outlived its purpose and needed to be disbanded? Was it still possible to be non-aligned?

The bi-polar system was replaced by a highly integrated liberalised system. In this new order developing countries ran the risk of being further marginalized and exposed by the effects of globalisation, interdependence and polarisation. Within this context the South Centre was able to help NAM to realign itself and thus give a new meaning to non-alignment.

For the developing world non-alignment referred to the South's independence and freedom from undue external influences. It also referred to the South being active in upholding and promoting the universal ideals and principles of international relations which NAM had

always stood for. The definition of non-alignment has thus changed in that it was not a position relative to the East/West conflict any more, the essence of non-alignment however remained the same. Non-alignment was the autonomy of choice especially vis-à-vis North/South relations within a fair international economic and political system.

8.3 MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF STUDY

This subsection answers the research question [p.2] of this dissertation. The question inquires to the nature of the changes to the meaning of non-alignment, why these changes took place and what the implications are for the international system.

The nature of non-alignment in its first phase was a foreign policy orientation opposing the bi-polar system. Non-alignment stood for peace, prosperity and the freedom to choose without domination or servitude. In NAM's second and third phases non-alignment remained a position relative to the East/West confrontation. The meaning given to non-alignment in these two phases, however, changed from that in the first phase in that a greater emphasis and content was given to international economics. There was also a gradual shift in NAM's third phase away from a narrow focus on economic growth and accumulation to a focus on people as a means and end to development.

In NAM's fourth phase the meaning of non-alignment differed from that in the first three phases in that it was not defined in terms of the Cold War and bi-polar system any more. Non-alignment, as in the second and third phases, however still emphasised international economic issues. The economic difficulties and backwardness of Southern countries were put in a North/South perspective. World peace was not any more the first step to prosperity, but prosperity for all nations was seen as a prerequisite to lasting peace. This prosperity can only be found in a free and just international system.

Looking at reasons for the change to the meaning of non-alignment, it is clear that the international context and to a lesser degree, important states within the NAM had a direct impact on the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment. Non-alignment, however, also influenced the international context resulting in an interaction between non-alignment and the international context.

Moving to the implications the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment had in the international political system, it is useful to look at the different roles NAM fulfilled in its different phases. NAM in a role as arena [phase three] did not in a concerted way bring across to the international community a feasible agenda of help to the South. This was however done by NAM in its roles as an instrument and actor [phases one, two, four].

NAM to a large extent was a voice to the South. It was therefore very important for the NAM and a crucial element in its fundamental aim to, in a concerted way, bring across to the international community a feasible agenda of help to the South. The fundamental aim of the NAM was to try and influence the international system to be more favourable in leading to the enhancement of the national interest of countries of the South.

In view of the fact that the role fulfilled by an international organisation such as the NAM to a large extent has an impact on the efficiency of bringing across its fundamental aim. It can be said that it will be in NAM's best interest to try and avoid fulfilling the role of an arena. The best chance for accomplishing this is by having strong leadership within the Movement since there is a correlation between strong leadership and well-motivated and united action being taken. It is only through well-motivated and united action by NAM that non-alignment can hope to influence the international context.

Apart from non-alignment influencing the international context in each of the four phases, NAM in each phase also set out to influence the context. Non-alignment was successful in influencing the international context in terms of decolonisation, racism, ending of the bi-polar system [world peace] and bringing the issue of a new international economic order to the table.

The interaction between non-alignment and the context however went further. The changed context brought about by, among other, the influences of non-alignment had in its turn in a new way an impact on the meaning of non-alignment.

The meaning of non-alignment underwent a number of changes since the founding of NAM in 1961 up to 1991. These changes came about mainly as a result of interaction with the international context and were of critical importance for non-alignment if it was to remain relevant and be able to make an impact on an ever-changing world. The meaning of non-alignment will therefore in future again have to undergo changes as the world changes.

8.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

As a result of the knowledge gained in the research and writing of this dissertation, some suggestions for further research can be made.

First of all, more research could be done on how the NAM could enhance its international efficiency. Would its efficiency for example be enhanced by internal changes such as obtaining a constitution and secretariat?

Without the direction giving continuity that a permanent secretariat could have provided, NAM relied heavily on tradition for its continuity. This resulted in NAM failing to be a dynamic organisation. NAM rather became a cumbersome international organisation struggling to be effective.

It can be said that the NAM is to a great disadvantage not having any "teeth" or inclination to regulate or influence the actions of its members. If NAM did have such powers, it could possibly have had an influence on how their economies was conducted with a net result of having stronger individual members and thus a stronger NAM. This could have a double-up effect of NAM having greater prestige and bargaining power internationally, which in turn should benefit its members.

Research can also be done on how NAM could make its agenda shorter and more focused. Will such steps increase its effectiveness?

The question could also be asked if NAM's efficiency would be enhanced if it ceases to be a state-centric top-down organisation, but rather embrace non-governmental organisations and a bottom-up structure? NGO's can for example potentially help NAM to be more legitimate in understanding and addressing problems within south states themselves.

8.5 IN CONCLUSION

Looking at the dissertation as a whole, it could be said that the meaning and changes to the meaning of non-alignment between the years 1961 – 1992 did have an impact on international politics as concluded in subsection 8.3 [Main Conclusions of Study] [p.142]. Nevertheless, although the NAM for the greatest part occupies the moral higher ground, it will fail in most of its fundamental objectives. It will fail because international politics is not politics of morality, but politics of power. It cannot be foreseen that NAM can bring about fundamental change to the international system in such a way to economically and politically empower them to an equal footing with the North. Having said this, it does not imply that there is no right of existence for a Southern organisation such as the NAM. The international system is indeed prejudiced to the South. The NAM therefore must do all it can to level the international political and

economic playing field, but at the same time countries of the South will have to put their hand in their own bosom to empower themselves.

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APPENDIX

STATES ATTENDING THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE 1955

Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, People's Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, South Vietnam, Yemen.

APPENDIX II

Membership of the Non-Aligned Movement

The year given in parenthesis after each country indicates the first summit conference that they attended as a full member of the Movement. The total is 113 members of which all except Palestine are members of the United Nations.

Afghanistan (1961)	Ecuador (1983)	Mali (1961)	Singapore (1970)
Algeria (1961)	Egypt (1961)	Malta (1973)	Somalia (1961)
Angola (1976)	Equatorial Guinea	Mauritania (1964)	Sri Lanka (1961)
Bahamas (1983)	(1970)	Mauritius (1973)	St Lucia (1983)
Bahrain (1973)	Ethiopia (1961)	Mongolia (1992)	Sudan (1961)
Bangladesh (1973)	Gabon (1963)	Morocco (1961)	Surinam (1979)
Barbados (1983)	The Gambia (1973)	Mozambique (1976)	Swaziland (1970)
Belize (1983)	Ghana (1961)	Myanmar (1961)	Syria (1961)
Benin (1964)	Grenada (1979)	Namibia (1992)	Tanzania (1964)
Bhutan (1973)	Guatemala (1992)	Nepal (1961)	Togo (1964)
Bolivia (1979)	Guinea (1961)	Nicaragua (1979)	Trinidad and
Botswana (1970)	Guinea-Bissau (1976)	Niger (1973)	Tobago (1970)
Brunei Dar Es Salaam	Guyana (1970)	Nigeria (1964)	Tunisia (1961)
(1992)	India (1961)	North Korea (1976)	Uganda (1964)
Burkina Faso (1973)	Indonesia (1961)	Oman (1973)	United Arab
Burundi (1964)	Iran (1979)	Pakistan (1979)	Emirates (1973)
Cambodia (1961)	Iraq (1961)	Palestine (1976)	Uzbekistan(1992)
Cameroon (1964)	Jamaica (1970)	Panama (1976)	Vanatu (1983)
Cape Verde (1976)	Jordan (1964)	Papua New	Venezuela (1989)
Central African	Kenya (1964)	Guinea (1992	Vietnam (1976)
Republic (1964)	Kuwait (1964)	Peru (1973)	Yemen (1961) *
Chad (1964)	Laos (1964)	Philippines (1992)	Yugoslavia
Chile (1992)	Lebanon (1961)	Qatar (1973)	(1961) **
Colombia (1963)	Lesotho (1970)	Rwanda (1970)	Zaire (1961) ***
Comoros (1978)	Liberia (1964)	Sao Tome and	Zambia (1964)
Congo (1964)	Libya (1964)	Principe (1976)	Zimbabwe (1983)
Cotè de Voire (1973)	Madagascar (1973)	Saudi Arabia (1961)	
Cuba (1961)	Malawi (1964)	Senegal (1964)	
Cyprus (1961)	Malaysia (1970)	Seychelles (1976)	
Djibouti (1979)	Maldives (1976)	Sierra Leone (1964)	

\#   Argentina was a member from the 1973 Summit until an announcement in September 1991 that it had withdrawn.

*   Myanmar was a founder member in 1961, withdrew in October 1979 after the Havana Summit and rejoined in September 1992 at the Jakarta Summit.

+   Palestine first became a member of the Movement as the Palestine Liberation Organisation, in August 1975; it was accepted as the State of Palestine, after its Declaration of Independence of November 1988.

-    North Yemen was a founder member in 1961 and South Yemen joined at the Lusaka Summit in 1970. North and South Yemen united on 22 May 1990.

**   Yugoslavia was a founder member in 1961. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is still regarded as a member. The NAM countries decided at the Jakarta summit in September 1992 that they would conform to any decision of the subsequent UN General Assembly. Yugoslavia's membership was suspended and it was not represented at any Non-Aligned meeting thereafter.

***   Now know as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

APPENDIX III

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NAM

APPENDIX IV

NAM SUMMITS 1961 – 1992

FIRST CONFERENCE ON NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

Belgrade (September 1-6, 1961)

25 Participants

3 Observers

Documents adopted

Declaration

Statement on the danger of war and an appeal for peace. Letters to the leaders of super powers, Khruschev and Kennedy in post-war history. The Belgrade Conference will be remembers as the founding of the non-aligned movement, and for its strategic plea for a transition from an order based on the domination to one founded on freedom, justice and well-being for all.

Participants

Algeria, Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon (today Sri Lanka), Congo (today Zaire), Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic (today two states: Egypt and Syria), Yemen and Yugoslavia.

SECOND CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

Cairo (October 5-10, 1964)

47 Participants

Documents adopted

Programme for peace and international co-operation Special resolutions.

At the Cairo Conference, the non-aligned countries made a significant contribution to the further development and affirmation of the principles and goals of active and peaceful co-existence as the only basis for surpassing bloc divisions and confrontations.

Participants

Algeria, Angola, Afghanistan, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Nepal, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanganyika, Zanzibar (today Tanzania), Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

Observers

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Finland, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.

THIRD CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

Lusaka (September 8-10, 1970)

> 54 Participants

> 9 Observers

Documents adopted

Declaration on peace, independence, development co-operation and democratisation of international relations.

Declaration on non-alignment and economic progress. Numerous special declaration and resolutions. The Lusaka Conference, which marked the surpassing of the so-called crisis of continuity in the development of the non-aligned movement, re-affirmed the principles of non-alignment and defined the place and role of the movement in conditions of decreasing international tension.

Participants

Algeria, Afghanistan, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Congo Kinshasa, Cuba, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lesotho, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Nepal, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Yemen, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Observers

Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, South Vietnam, Venezuela.

FOURTH CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

Algiers (September 5-9, 1973)

> 75 Participants

> 9 Observers

Documents adopted

Political declaration, Economic declaration, Action programme of economic co-operation, Numerous special declarations and resolutions.

The Algiers Conference initiated activity for the creation of a new international economic order, which should supplant the present system of economic relations in the world, based on the privileges of the developed countries and the exploitation and discrimination of developing countries.

Participants

Algeria, Argentina, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Bhutan, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lesotho, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Mauritius, Mauritania, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Vietnam, Sudan, Swaziland, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Upper Volta, Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen People's Democratic Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Observers

Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, Venezuela

Guests

Austria, Finland, Sweden.

FIFTH CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

Colombia (August 16-19, 1976)

86 Participants

1 Special participant (Belize)

10 Observers

7 Guest countries

Documents adopted

Political declaration, Economic declaration

Action programme of economic co-operation, Resolution on the composition and mandate of the Co-ordination Bureau, Numerous resolutions.

The Colombo Conference made a significant contribution to the widening of the global activity of the non-aligned countries by initiating the creation of a new information order and by paying more attention to events in Europe.

Participants

Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Bhutan, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kampuchea, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldive Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Omen, Palestine Liberation Organisation, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Rwanda, Sao Tome Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Senegal, Sierra Leonie, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad, Tobago, Tunisia,

Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Upper Volta, Vietnam, Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen People's Democratic, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Special Status

Belize

Observers

Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Grenada, Mexico, Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Guests

Austria, Finland, Portugal, Romania, Philippines, Sweden, Switzerland.

SIXTH CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

Havana (September 3-9, 1979)

> 93 Participants
>
> 1 Special participant (Belize)
>
> 12 Observers
>
> 8 Guest Countries

Documents accepted

Final declaration (political and economic part), Action programme of economic co-operation, Several special decisions and recommendations, Numerous resolutions, Resolution honouring President Tito.

The Havana Conference will go down in the history of non-alignment as the gathering where the basic principles and goals of non-alignment, which define the independent political role of the non-aligned countries in international relations, were decisively reaffirmed.

Participants

Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Bhutan, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kampuchea, Kenya, Korea, People's Democratic Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Lesotho, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Maldive Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nepal, Ngwane, Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Liberation Organisation, Panama, Patriotica Front of Zimbabwe, Peru, Qatar, Rwanda, Sao Tome Principle, Seychelles, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Surinam, Sri Lanka, SWAPO, Syria, Tanzania, Togo,

Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen People's Democratic Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Special Status

Belize

Observers

Barbados, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, Philippines, Mexico, Salvador, Santa Lucia, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Guests

Austria, Finland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.

SEVENTH CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

New Delhi (March 7-11, 1983)

100 Participants

10 Observers

10 Guest Countries

Document adopted

Final declaration (political and economic part), Action programme of economic co-operation, Message from New Delhi, Numerous special messages, declarations, statements, resolutions.

The New Delhi Conference made a significant contribution to the strengthening of the solidarity and action unity of non-aligned countries in the struggle for peace and international security and solving of serious economic problems faced by the developing countries and the entire international community

Participants

Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Bhutan, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kampuchea, Kenya, Korea People's Democratic Republic, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Maldive Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nepal, Ngwane, Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Oman, Palestine Liberation Organisation, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Rwanda, Sao Tome Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Surinam, Sri Lanka, SWAPO, Syria,

Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen People's Democratic Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Observers

Antigua and Barbuda, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominica, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Guests

Austria, Dominican Republic, Finland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.

EIGHTH CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

Harare (September 1-6, 1986)

    101 Participants

    10 Observers

    12 Guests

Documents adopted

Political declaration, Economic declaration, Programme of action for economic co-operation, Declaration from Harare on the strengthening of collective action, Special declaration of South Africa.

Package of suggestions for help to the front-line countries and other neighbouring countries in alleviating difficulties.

Special Appeal of the VIII Conference of non-aligned Countries for the immediate independence of Namibia Appeal to the President of the USA, Ronald Reagan, and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, in the history of the movement, the VIII Conference will go down as mainly economically oriented. The Summit placed the problems of economic development of member countries in the category of the Movement's strategic goals, along with peace, security and the solving of the most important fact of conflict in the modern world. The VIII Conference devoted significant attention to the problems of Southern Africa and apartheid, treating them not as African, but as global problems, which they, indeed, are.

Participants

Algeria, Angola, Angetian, Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Bhutan, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq,

Iran, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kampuchea, Kenya, Korean People's Democratic Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Lesotho, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy, Malawi, Maldive, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nepal, Ngwane, Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Oman, Palestine, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Rwanda, Qater, Santa Lucia, Sao Tome Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, SWAPO, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yemen, Yemen People's Democratic Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Observers

Antigua and Barbuda, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominica, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Guests

Australia, Austria, Dominican Republic, Finland, Mongolia, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.

NINTH CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

Belgrade (September 4-7, 1989)

> 100 Participants

> 16 Observers

Document Adopted

Political Declaration, Economic Declaration, Programme of action for economic Co-operation, Adoption of Report on the Africa Fund, Review the situation in South Africa, Special declaration on Namibia, Communique on Palestine.

Ninth Summit gave particular attention to the problems of peace and international security, international economic relations, environmental, human rights and decolonisation issue as well as to the strengthening of the role of the United Nations.

Participants

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Brunei, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cote Divoire, Cuba, Cyprus, D P R, Korea, D R Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Rwanda, Sao Rome Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, SWAPO, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, U A E, Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen.

Observers

Antigua, Barbuda, Brazil, Mexico, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Uruguay, African National Congress, Afro Asian People's solidarity Organisation, Front De Liberation National Kanak El Socialist, International Centre for Public Enterprises, League of Arab States, Organisation of African Unity, Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Pan African Congress of Azania, Socialist Party of Puerto Rico, United Nations.

Guests

Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Finland, G D R, Greece, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.

TENTH CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

Jakarta (September 1-6, 1992)

102 Participants

17 Observers

20 Guest Countries

Documents Adopted and Decisions

Political Declaration, Economic Declaration, Establishment of High level working group for the restructuring of the United Nations. Utilisation of and contributions to Africa Fund, Preparations for conference on population and Development, Strengthening international co-operation, Food Security, External Debt Efforts to reduce national disasters, Drug abuse and illicit trafficking. Curb on environmental degradation, Human rights – rights to development, Collective action and democratisation in international relations.

At the Tenth Summit many major decision were taken and fresh initiatives taken encompassing establishment of high level working group for the restructuring of the United Nations, conference on population and development, food security, natural disaster, environmental degradation, human rights and above all democratisation in international relations. The Summit at Jakarta clarified the strategies it had to adopt to resolve NAM problems. All doubts about the relevance of NAM in the post cold war era vanished with the Tenth NAM Summit.

Participants

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Dar Es Salaam, Bukina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cote De Voire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica,

Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Syria, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Observers

Armenia, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Honduras, Mexico, Thailand, African National Congress, Afro Asian People's Solidarity Organisation, Front de Liberation National Kanak Socialist, League of Arab States, Organisation of African Unity, Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Pan African Congress of Azania, Socialist party of Puerto Rico, United Nations.

Guests

Australia, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Dominican Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.

APPENDIX V

ACRONYMS

G7	-	Group of 7 (seven major industrial states)
G77	-	Group of 77 (developing countries)
IBRD	-	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IGO	-	Inter-Governmental Organisation
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
INGO	-	International Non-Governmental Organisations
LDC	-	Least Developed Country
NAM	-	Non-Aligned Movement
NIEO	-	New International Economic Order
OPEC	-	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SA	-	South Africa
SPA	-	Special Programme of Assistance
UN	-	United Nations
UNCTAD	-	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
USA	-	United States of America
USSR	-	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
WW II	-	World War II
WWW	-	World Wide Web