

**THEORY BUILDING AND DEMOCRACY: AN APPRAISAL AND ANALYSIS  
OF THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY THEORY**

By

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Para meu familia

Para todo

Mae et Pai – a vos legado

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# THEORY BUILDING AND DEMOCRACY: AN ANALYSIS AND AN APPRAISAL OF THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

## **ABSTRACT**

The dominant construction of democracy on a global scale is in the liberal tradition. It is evident in the criteria which constitute democratic barometers in organisations like Freedom House, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation. This study seeks to provide a third-order analysis of liberal democratic consolidation theory in order to highlight that its theoretical discourse and underlying structure is not necessarily compatible with the cultural values of the non-Western world using a critical discourse analysis. Democratic consolidation in the non-Western world may not necessarily mirror the theoretical model of liberal democratic consolidation. Given the hegemonic position of liberal democracy's criteria and its dominant discourse and role as a barometer of democracy, this study focuses on democratic consolidation in this tradition. It is primarily due to the perceived inability of non-Western states to consolidate their democracies in the liberal democratic tradition and by default, construct thriving liberal democracies. Present theories of liberal democratic consolidation theory deal with governmental, political organisational and societal aspects of liberal democracy. The level of change these theories propagate is all encompassing, and consequently one cannot merely study one aspect of liberal democratic consolidation theory, but needs to analyse the paradigm as a whole in order to explore its metatheoretical structure. It is in this light that the study conducts an appraisal of liberal democratic consolidation theory. The critique developed in this study is aimed at addressing a disparity that currently exists within contemporary consolidation of liberal democracy theory, namely a failure of producers of liberal democratic discourse to understand the philosophical and ideological undertone of liberal democratic consolidation's understructure. The study does not seek to conceptualise alternative criteria of democratic consolidation in the non-Western context, but focuses on liberal democratic consolidation theory, to demonstrate that its criteria is not necessarily an appropriate barometer to measure democracy in the non-Western world.

**Key terms:**

Metatheory, critical discourse analysis, Liberal democracy; liberal democratic consolidation; procedural liberal democracy; substantive liberal democracy; liberty, equality and the liberal civic virtue; political culture and emerging liberal democracies.

Student Number: 3661-6559

I declare that **THEORY BUILDING AND DEMOCRACY: AN ANALYSIS AND AN APPRAISAL OF THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY THEORY** is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete referencing

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SIGNATURE (MRS J. STEYN KOTZE)

.....

DATE

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

Democratisation in the liberal tradition is high on the global agenda and indeed many states, generally from a non-Western background, are in the process of constructing and/or strengthening their democratic regimes resulting in many societies restructuring their political organisation to mirror a representative, liberal democracy. Institutions are created to implement the rule of the people; and economies are restructured to facilitate the creation of a free political and economic society. All this in the name of *democracy* (Rejai 1967:202, Holden 1993: xi). Yet, democracy as a concept and how it applies to a human society is a bone of academic and ideological contention. There is little consensus on what is the ideal form of *democracy*, thus rendering democracy a contested concept. Indeed, Shin, Dalton and Jou (2007: 1) observed that although the World Values Survey reveals that there is an almost global support for liberal democracy, most nations in the non-Western world lack a substantive commitment to the ideal of liberal democracy. They summarise that in explaining the lack of substantive commitments to liberal democracy, some argue that economic needs precede the need for democratisation, whilst others deem the non-Western world as incapable of understanding the concept of liberal democracy. This, they argue, renders “...democracy itself [is] a term without meaning embraced by non-democratic regimes because of its positive connotations”.

The present construction of democracy on a global scale is in the liberal tradition. This tradition occupies a hegemonic position in the current global order evident in the criteria which constitutes democratic barometers in organisations like Freedom House, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation. The United Nations Democracy Fund utilises essentially liberal democratic principles and barometers to sustain and encourage the spread of liberal democracy. This is evident in their *elements of democracy* which, according to the United Nations, constitute a fully working democracy. These elements of democracy are limited to constitutionalism, electoral processes, parliamentary processes as a mechanism through which governments are held responsible in the representative democratic tradition, justice and the rule of law which encompasses a form of conflict

management and ensures the upholding of human rights, including freedom of expression and of association, civil society participation with an understanding that democracy is the process that links the individual citizen to governmental processes, the existence of political parties which focus on political ideologies and how societies should be arranged and the rules on how to achieve this vision, access to information and transparency, and accountability of the executive and public administration (United Nations Democracy Fund, n.d.). Central to the International Monetary Fund's view of democracy is institutions, specifically liberal democratic institutions, aimed at the creation of a normative commitment to liberal democracy, and commitment to constitutionalism and the rule of law (Lal, 1999). Indeed, Diamond (1999: 62) observed that the present hegemony of liberal democracy essentially refers to a standardisation of the state structures rooted in the principles of rational political organisation. Liberal democracy and its global reach are further celebrated on the premise that presently there is no anti-democratic ideology able to generate sufficient global appeal to challenge liberal democracy's hegemony (Diamond, 1999: 62). The *end of history*, as Fukuyama prematurely argued, had arrived, and following on Diamond's assessment, the world ideological stage had been set in favour of liberal democracy.

This study conducts a third-order analysis of liberal democratic consolidation theory in order to highlight its theoretical discourse and underlying structure. It will reveal the discourse of liberal democratic consolidation theory as a form of philosophical dominance by extracting its underlying metatheoretical structure. This is done utilising a critical discourse analysis. Given the hegemonic position of liberal democracy's criteria and its dominant discourse and role as a barometer of democracy, this study focused on democratic consolidation in this tradition.

Democracy as interpreted in the liberal democratic paradigm generally refers to Dahl's polyarchy in that democracy has a specific character and structure generally associated with the democratic structure of the Western world (Ethier 1990:5). In this sense, there is an underlying and unstated assumption that the non-Western world must evolve and adopt the liberal democratic structures that characterise socio-political organisation in the Western world. This notion is premised on what Fukuyama assertively argued in the *End of History* about the demise of communism as *an alternative to liberal democratic socio-political* organisation. Liberal democracy, in this view, had proved

itself to be superior and more *desired* and viable than communism. The Western world celebrated their victory and international liberal democratic (re)construction was strongly advocated. The *End of history*, for these theorists thus proved that liberal democracy was the most desired and sustainable form of democracy, and consequently, all states now desired the status, stability and prestige of a liberal democratic order. Wokler (1994:21) points out that

so extensive is its [liberal democracy] prevalence in the modern world that it apparently cannot be overcome by any ideological dispute...This all but universal triumph of democracy over the past half-century or so may seem bewildering, since the predominant political doctrines that have shaped world affairs since the French Revolution....

Zakaria (1997:1) equates democracy with constitutional liberalism where the rule of law, free and fair elections, separation of powers and the guaranteed protection of basic liberties, much in line with the tradition adopted by the United Nations. For Zakaria, it is a tradition rooted firmly in the Western democratic experience that focuses on guaranteeing the individual's freedom and protecting against any form of oppression. Therefore, to secure individual rights and freedoms, an emphasis is placed on separation of power, rule of law, political equality and secularism (Zakaria, 1997: 2). Liberal democracy, which Diamond (1999) also equates with Dahl's polyarchy, is subject to values like individual freedom, electoral competition and choice, institutionalism and rule of law, much in line with the conditions of a fully operation democracy highlighted by the United Nations. Indeed, Pharek (1992: 160) observed that

In the aftermath of the collapse of communism...many in the west ha[d] begun to argue that western liberal democracy is the best form of government discovered so far and ideally suited to the modern age...as the 'moral leader' of the world the west has a duty to encourage its spread and to create a new world order on this basis. This western triumphalism has aroused deep fears in the fragile and nervous societies of the rest of the world which were until very recently at the receiving end of the western civilising mission

Yet, within the same period of the early 1990s, when scholars stressed the universality of liberal democracy as the most desired form of political organisation, Whitehead (1992) argued that the alternatives to Western liberal democracy will emerge from Latin America, which Whitehead classified as "democracy by default" or "democratic

facades”<sup>1</sup>. Similarly, the universality of liberal democratic is a debate that has increased relevance in recent scholarship on liberal democracy. Some scholars positing the East Asian and Chinese alternatives to liberal democracy (Blokker 2009; Bell 2010; Gat, 2007); others defending the universality of liberal democracy (Deudney and Ikenberry, 2009); some arguing the inherent flaws of liberal democracy and advocating social democracy (Sankatsing, 2004); and others posting that the era of post-democracy<sup>2</sup> has arrived (Fonte, 2002). However, as Fonte (2002) noted:

In October 2001, Fukuyama stated that his ‘end of history’ thesis remained valid: that after the defeat of communism and fascism, no serious ideological competitor to Western-style liberal democracy was likely to emerge in the future. Thus, in terms of political philosophy, liberal democracy is the end of the evolutionary process. There will be wars and terrorism, but no alternative ideology with a universal appeal will seriously challenge the principles of Western liberal democracy on a global scale. The 9/11 attacks notwithstanding, there is nothing beyond liberal democracy ‘towards which we could expect to evolve’. Fukuyama concluded that there will be challenges from those who resist progress, ‘but time and resources are on the side of modernity’. Indeed, but is ‘modernity’ on the side of liberal democracy? Fukuyama is very likely right that the current crisis with radical Islam will be overcome and that there will be no serious ideological challenge originating outside of Western civilization.

It is accepted that when a state has consolidated its democracy, it has a *fully operational democracy* in the liberal tradition. One can conceptualise a working definition of liberal democratic consolidation as follows: Once a state has abandoned authoritarianism, and has reconstructed its political society to mirror the institutions and processes of liberal democracy, and has achieved institutional stability through processes and institutions such as elections, parliaments, and constitutions, and has adopted a commitment to values such as individualism, human rights with a focus on freedom of the individual, and a commitment of individual and procedural justice and the rule of law; and, the democratic procedures and institutions, such a state is a *fully functioning democracy or a consolidated democracy*.

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<sup>1</sup> See for example Whitehead, L. 1992. *Alternatives of liberal democracy: A Latin American Perspective* in *Political Studies XL Special Issue*. Pp. 146 – 159.

<sup>2</sup> Fonte (2002) argued that there is an alternative ideology to liberal democracy with a stronghold in Europe. He posits :...that it is entirely possible that modernity—thirty or forty years hence—will witness not the final triumph of liberal democracy, but the emergence of a new transnational hybrid regime that is post-liberal democratic, and in the American context, post-Constitutional and post-American. This alternative ideology, "transnational progressivism," constitutes a universal and modern worldview that challenges both the liberal democratic nation-state in general and the American regime in particular”.

The world, it seems, remains in the midst of a liberal democratic *evolution* where more states than ever before are seeking, fighting for, and embracing liberal democracy, if scholars such as Huntington (1996) are to be believed. Others, such as Diamond (2008) are concerned with *democracy's retreat* as in Venezuela and Russia which exhibit *anti-liberal democratic* tendencies.

### **1.1. Delimitation of the study**

There is a vast body of literature concerned with democratisation and democratic consolidation. Similarly, there are a number of approaches ranging from modernisation and political development, to historical sociology, and transition studies (Grugel, 2002: 32 – 67). Modernisation and political development theories focus their attention on the relationship between capitalism and democracy in the quest to attain Westernisation and/or *development* (Grugel, 1999; and Grugel, 2002). Structuralists argue that the path to democratic development is firmly rooted in the presence of preconditions in that the level of democracy is determined by certain preconditions such as the level of education, level of modernity, and level of economic development (Femia, 1972; Grugel, 1999; Grugel 2002; Thjin, Aurugay and Kraft, 2003). Grugel (1999) points out that at the centre of structuralist and modernisation approaches is the relationship between capitalism and democratic development, where liberal democracy emerges out of the middle classes benefiting from the free market of a capitalist system. For structuralist and modernisation theorists, the relationship between politics and economics is considered a central aspect of the creation of a new democracy. Ignoring the human element to some extent, liberal democracy theorists equates democracy with a process of development: an inevitable outcome should states follow the path of development the Western world had carved in their journey of political and economic development.

This study is rooted in transitionology, and is consequently concerned with the process of crafting liberal democracy and not necessarily the preconditions associated with the historical sociological and modernisation paradigms in democratisation studies. The pre-conditions approach to democratisation or regime change focus their attention on the conditions that must be present for states to evolve towards a liberal democracy, including socio-economic and politico-cultural preconditions. The basic premise of this approach is that there exists a strong causal link between socio-economic development and liberal democratic political systems (Hague, Harrop and Bresling, 1998: 28 and

Hwang, 1991: 57). Affluence in this tradition breeds liberal democracy (Lipset, 1959: 69 – 105). The politico-cultural preconditions are rooted in the notion of political culture whereby the overall political values and behaviour of a society changes to mirror the values proposed by the liberal democratic model. Dahl (1971: 78–79) argued that in countries where a reasonable amount of economic development has occurred, relative economic freedom has given rise to a pluralistic culture which in turn places greater strain on hegemonic regimes, so as to ensure that these regimes become more receptive to the needs of this plural and complex society. The pre-conditions approach sees liberal democratic development as an evolutionary exercise in that through economic development and attaining a reasonably affluent level of economic development and societal prosperity, the demand for greater political participation will lead to the inevitable outcome of liberal democracy.

The crafting approach or genetics approach to transitionology focuses on the democratisation or regime change as a process of construction with a specific focus on political elites. Political elites, engaged in a strategic political game when faced with authoritarian regime deterioration, will ultimately engage in regime change when it is strategically viable to do so (Przeworski, 1988: 64-68). Therefore, democratisation is not as deterministic as set out by the preconditions approach, but is dependent upon the strength of the regime vis-à-vis the dominant contenders at the transition point (Di Palma, 1990: 4-6). In opting for this approach numerous authors have conceived democratisation of being divided into three phases: *liberalisation*, *transition* and *consolidation* with each of these being the result of and consisting of contingent choices by elites (those within and outside the regime) (Przeworski, 1988; Hague and Harrop, 1998).

Transitionology is understood as the crafting approach whereby democracies are created by committed political elites, who if they are lucky, hard-working and committed to liberal democratic reconstruction, and are willing to compromise will construct a liberal democratic political order (Grugel, 2002: 56). Rooted in the agency approach, transitionology rests upon the assumption that the structural context in which the transition occurs is central and that should political elites be taught the right behaviour liberal democratic success is inevitable (Di Palma, 1990; Ethier, 1991; Grugel, 2002, Huntington, 1996; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Thjin, Aurugay and Kraft, 2003).

In their conceptualisation of the typologies of democratisation Thjin, Aurugay, and Kraft (2003: 5 – 7) include the agency approach to democratisation study as a theoretical paradigm. They posit that, like the transition approach, developing democracy sees democratisation as a process, but developing democracy is focused on the “...problems and necessary factors and conditions that would be conducive to the development or consolidation of the democratic regime” (Thjin, Aurugay, and Kraft, 2003: 6). If democratisation studies essentially deals with departing from authoritarianism to liberal democracy (Grugel, 2002:12), democratic consolidation is thus concerned with the necessary societal, cultural, political and economic factors that facilitate the cementing of liberal democracy in this context.

Carothers (2002: 6 – 9) posits five assumptions that underlie the transition paradigm. Firstly, if a country is abandoning authoritarianism in favour of democracy, then a democratic transition is underway. Secondly, the process of democratisation is sequential, moving from authoritarian regime deterioration, liberalisation, transition, democratisation, and **into democratic consolidation**. The third assumption rests on the centrality of elections in that “democracy promoters have not been guilty—as critics often charge — of believing that elections equal democracy” (Carothers, 2002: 7), rooted in the belief that democratic legitimacy are bestowed upon governments, and elections lead to broadened participation and democratic accountability. The fourth assumption is concerned with the structural, historical, and cultural conditions within emerging democracies. This includes the level of economic development, the political history, institutional legacies, cultural-linguistic composition, and socio-cultural traditions. Carothers (2002: 8) observed that at the onset of Huntington’s Third Wave, these conditions were often regarded as inconsequential, as democracy emerged in the most improbable regions, placing political elites at the centre of the democratisation process. Indeed, Carothers (2002: 8) observed: political elites were seen as central to the democratisation process and this saw a movement away from the preconditions approach to democratisation to the “...encouraging message that, when it comes to democracy, ‘anyone can do it’”. Lastly, given the focus on redesigning state institutions, transitionology assumes that functioning states are in place in that the emerging democracy already has a solid foundation in terms of a functioning state and bureaucracy. In this sense, Carothers (2002: 9) posits that the process approach to democratisation assumes that redesigning state institutions is merely a metamorphosis



of already functioning states into democratic states. This assumption, as Carothers further noted, undermined the challenges of democratising societies that also have to engage in state-building.

Many non-Western states experience difficulties with consolidating their liberal democracies in Latin America, Africa and Asia. These states are the anomalies of liberal democratic consolidation theory as the theoretical trajectory set out by the genetics approach to transitionology theory is never quite within reach. The result is that many states are reduced to the status of *emerging democracy* for many decades unable to consolidate their liberal democracies; they remain in perpetual democratisation. In this sense, emerging democracies have often been reduced to electoral democracy void of the liberal democratic values that characterises liberal democracy (Puhle, 2005: 7 – 9).

The focus of the study will fall on what Carothers termed the *Grey Zone* where emerging democracies “...are neither dictatorial nor clearly headed towards democracy...” (Carothers, 2002: 9) or the democracy has some deficiency to their democratic quality (Diamond and Morlino, 2004). In criticizing Carothers, Nodia (2002: 14) noted that Carothers, when speaking of democratic transition, it seems to be a more or less permanent condition for many countries. Further to this, she asks: should transitioning be a permanent status, what is the new conceptualisation that can describe these states caught in perpetual transition? This study is not concerned with this question *per se*, but will provide an exploration of the possible reasons why some emerging states are caught in the seemingly everlasting state of *democratic transition* in the theoretical realm.

The study is concerned with the factors that surround the construction of liberal democracy rooted in the genetics approach to transitionology. This tradition posits that states undergoing a process of regime change are expected to model the system of governance and society of the Western liberal democratic states, without any consideration for their historical trajectory of development. Political elites are central in that if political elites adhere to the rules, procedures, processes and institutions, society will eventually follow and mirror the behaviour of the political elites, thus creating a participant political culture.

## 1.2. Motivation and Rationale

Should every state that engaged in a transition-to-democracy have consolidated their democracy to mirror their liberal, Western peers; achieving liberal democratic consolidation would be an easily achievable target in democratic development. Transitionologists assumed that with the ideal liberal democratic consolidation theory set out to achieve the creation of a liberal democratic political order it has proven quite difficult to predict the final product in some states, rendering the theoretical realm somewhat perplexed by the *un*-democratic development in many emerging democracies. Consequently, Parry and Moran (1994:11) state that “...despite a generation’s systematic social science research, we now seem less certain than ever about how to create and sustain democratic political institutions”.

Bratton and De Walle (1997:19) also highlight that democratisation scholarship offers a wide array of theories, concepts, processes, procedures, preconditions and explanations on changing regimes from authoritarian to democratic political orders. The body of literature around liberal democratic consolidation, although valuable in its insights pertaining to process and institutions, has however, failed to explain why some states seem to manage to consolidate their liberal democracies and why others find liberal democratic consolidation difficult and remain in democratic limbo caught between democratisation and democratic consolidation.

There are a multitude of models, assumptions, and hypotheses regarding the definition of liberal democratic consolidation, its characteristics and variables from which to identify it, and the process through which a state may attain the eminent status of a consolidated democracy. These include multiculturalism and democracy (Vetik, 2001), institutional design and democratic consolidation (Di Palma 1990), market prosperity and democratic consolidation (Pzeworski *et al*, 1996), and political elites and democratic consolidation (Diamond, 1999), amongst others. *Consolidationists* debate the importance of liberal democratic institutions vis-à-vis the market, the centrality of political parties’ vis-à-vis state-civil society engagement, preconditions (cultural, social and economic) vis-à-vis crafting a liberal democratic society, culture and capitalist economy. Indeed, Ethier (1990:3) states that “the collation of these models shows those hypotheses which can be verified empirically are subject to fairly broad consensus among specialists, whereas those of a speculative nature vary considerably from one author to another”. Election results and the number of people

who participated in the electoral results are relatively undisputable, depending on the context. One may perhaps argue that the people had exercised a right to choice and consequently the democratic exercise was successful. However, what if a right to choice results in a tyranny of the majority as experienced in Hitler's Germany? How reflective of reality are the conclusions one can draw from the data provided? Consider for a moment the measurements used by the Freedom House Index in measuring freedom in a society like India or South Africa. The data will in all probability point to a free society, but the reality is these societies are some of the most unequal in the world. Therefore data on the assumed relationship between socio-economic equality and political democracy is not self-evident. The issues of debate around liberal democratic consolidation would thus include intangible values such as equality, freedom, a discourse of rights and responsibilities and a democratic culture.

It is in this light that this study is undertaken. This study conducts a metatheoretical assessment of liberal democratic consolidation theory rooted in the genetics approach to transitionology utilising a critical discourse analysis. Different historical trajectories of state and political development influence the realities constructed by different states in different geographical regions. These realities shapes the value and belief system that is found within a state as well as interpretations of democracy and its associated ideals of freedom, equality, citizenship, and civic culture. Parry and Moran (1994:1) note that

The vocabulary of politics is nowhere near fixed. There is not – and there certainly should not be – a learned Academy whose task it is to construct a dictionary of political terms which lays down how they are to be used in perpetuity...The task of political thought has been in large measure one of such definition and reconstruction.

Imagine for a moment that a Western scholar asks two people from different non-Western backgrounds to define democracy. The results may vary and it may not be exactly what the Western scholar had imagined, as demonstrated with the following:

to take a simple, physical object as an illustration...we can meaningfully communicate with each other about a 'pencil' only so long as we are generally agreed that the word denotes a 'slender cylinder or strip of black lead, coloured chalk, etc., usually encased in wood, for writing or drawing'. Suppose...we are talking to A and B, and to A a 'pencil' is a four-legged animal that eats grass, moos, and gives milk to consumers other than its own offspring, while to B a 'pencil' is an inflated oblate leather spheroid employed in athletic contests between two teams of eleven men each. If we say to A and B respectively, 'Please bring us a pencil', the results are likely to be interesting but not those we expected when making the request (Ranney and Kendall,1951:433).

There is much debate within the liberal democratic consolidation paradigm in that as much as states are encouraged to consolidate their emerging liberal democratic regimes, and are given the necessary theoretical tools to achieve liberal democratic consolidation, most non-Western emerging democracies have not necessarily yielded the expected result of a liberal democratic political order. Due to different values and interpretations associated with what constitutes the rule of the people, who constitutes the polity, what democracy is supposed to mean, what constitutes freedom, what represents equality, and which system of governance is best for a particular society, the results of liberal democratic consolidation is not guaranteed. Similarly, states in transition and democratisation process cannot be empirically recreated to tests the various hypotheses. There will hardly be a case study in the non-Western world that followed the linear track postulated in transitionology, except perhaps states that are closest to the Western European hub of liberal democracy, like Portugal and Spain.

In other words, emerging democracies will not necessarily follow the process that liberal democratic development in the transitionology paradigm postulates. Negotiated settlements and liberal democratic institutional development will not necessarily lead to democratic *stability* and the germination of a new liberal political culture. The gestation period of transition phases does not necessarily lead to the birth of a liberal democracy. Eastern European states find it difficult to adopt the liberal democratic model of their neighbours, Asian democracies have created Asian-style illiberal democracies, and in Africa and Latin America the democratic history has been quite rebellious to the theoretical path to consolidate liberal democracy mapped out in liberal democratisation discourse. It is for this reason that Di Palma (1990: 14 - 15) asks whether *democracy is a hot house plant*, in other words, can democracy grow anywhere it is replanted. The question is thus whether liberal democracy can be reproduced regardless of the context. The path to democracy may also take alternative routes. Different authoritarian regimes emerge in different contexts, and as such liberal democratic forms of governance will also take alternate routes which differ based on different circumstantial and politico-cultural factors. Yet, the outcome of democratisation theoretically remains static: a liberal democratic order.

Those wanting support for their regimes fling the term democracy in the international arena, whether democratic or not and nearly everyone considers themselves democrats (McCahery 2001:1). Mays (1932:195) argued that “one of the most magnificent

achievements of man, which he has wrought from his long, bitter struggle up from the beginning, is the concept and ideal of democracy. Wherever democracy in some or other degree obtains, it is held as a priceless possession". This indicates a perceived view of the divine and almost godly nature which is assigned to democracy, but specifically to liberal democracy. Ebenstein (1969:532) captures the dilemma of democracy theory perfectly by stating that:

as long as democracy was a dream, it was impossible to appraise it realistically, and the history and discussions of democracy, from Plato to Burke suffer from a sense of unreality and lack of sufficient experience. Defenders of democracy often saw it as a kind of paradise within the reach of man, whereas its opponents predicted that, if it were ever allowed to exist long enough, it would end in the destruction of society and the moral values that support it.

The purpose of the study is in essence to conduct a third-order analysis of liberal democratic consolidation theory in order to identify the key shortcomings within the liberal democratic consolidation paradigm in order to theorise the difficulty that non-Western States experience in consolidating a liberal democratic order. This is a necessary given that Di Palma (1990:3) noted that "the greater the pool of independent nations and the more we move away from the core of long-established Western-style democracies, the more the nations facing democratisation fall short of qualities associated with Western democracy". Yet scholars of democratic consolidation in the liberal tradition has found no fault with theory, but shifted the blame onto the case studies that are too traditional, too authoritarian, or too radical to democratise to mirror their Western, liberal peers. Scholars adopt a view of "Are they democrats? Does it matter?" (Masoud, 2008).

### **1.3 The research objectives**

The primary concern of this study is an overall appraisal of liberal democratic consolidation in order to determine its underlying structure utilising a critical discourse analysis. Such an action is necessary given the struggle of many non-Western states to consolidate their emerging liberal democratic regimes. In order to identify the underlying structure of liberal democratic consolidation theory, the study sets out to trace the philosophical evolution of liberal democracy theory so as to determine the primary themes and logic of liberal democracy. Due to the vast amount of literature associated with this, the study samples some of the philosophical works associated with liberal democracy which is representative of the liberal democratic theoretical tradition.

This also constitutes the textual level of liberal democratic consolidation discourse tracing.

The second research objective relates to the primary themes of liberal democratic consolidation theory in the genetics approach within the transitionology paradigm. The study presents an overview of a sample of works drawn from the transitionology paradigm which is representative of this tradition. Given that the concern of this study is the underlying structure of liberal democratic consolidation theory, one must identify the primary themes of liberal democratic consolidation in conjunction with their philosophical tradition. This constitutes the contextual level of liberal democratic consolidation theory.

Finally this study unpacks the underlying structure of liberal democratic consolidation theory in order to assess its applicability in a non-Western context. Given the many difficulties and failures of liberal democratic consolidation theory in the non-Western world, it is essential to highlight a theoretical undercurrent that may explain its perceived lack of touch with democratic realities in a non-Western context. This constitutes the crux of the study: the interpretative level of the critical discourse analysis. This study does not provide alternatives forms, conceptualisations, or typologies of democratic consolidation in a non-Western context, but focuses purely on liberal democratic consolidation discourse and its applicability to the non-Western world.

#### **1.4 The context of the research**

Liberal democratic consolidation generally refers to institutions, regime performance, and the creation of a liberal political culture rooted in tolerance, moderation, participation, and multiculturalism which collectively must ensure liberty and equality through inclusion and participation. Liberal democratic institutions are founded upon the principles of Dahl's polyarchy which generally encapsulates the essence of Western, liberal democracy. Ethier (1990: 5) adopts a polyarchic view of liberal democracy through stressing that the primary characteristics of liberal democracy are pluralism (plural groups that alleviate conflict of interests and favour consultation), multipartyism implied competition and alternation of power in a pluralist system), effective guarantees of fundamental individual and collective rights and freedoms (which implies in particular the electing leaders through universal suffrage,

parliamentary responsibility of government and judicial controls of the rules”. Linz and Stepan (1996:10) conceptualise a democracy as a form of governance that guarantees basic civil rights and are able to effectively cater for the basic needs of citizens, claiming a legitimate monopoly of force over a specific territory. For Linz and Stepan thus, a functioning bureaucracy is central to liberal democratic sustainability.

For both Ethier and Linz and Stepan, freedom, rights and institutions form the centre of liberal democracy. Yet these cannot operate in a state of anarchy, which is why the state has the exclusive right to use legitimate force to police society in order ensure that order prevails and humankind is no longer trapped in a state of nature. Central to this remains a strong state coupled with a strong civil society.

Emerging democracies are *strongly urged* to adopt the liberal democratic model as international trade, foreign aid, and international prestige are dangled as rewards when states *modernise* to adopt a liberal democratic system. Therefore, states in transition become inundated with active campaigns that promote its democracy’s distribution, through promises of foreign aid in reconstructing institutions, international access to markets through the liberalisation of economies, and international approval and prestige for joining the liberal democratic ranks.

Indeed there is clear evidence of efforts by emerging democracies to move towards the values stressed by liberal democracy. This is evident in, for example, the African Peer Review Mechanism which assesses the health of the democratic experiment in Africa in the liberal democratic tradition. Some Asian states engage in electoral activities, although they are at times regarded as a rubber stamp to ‘soft authoritarianism’, in which these states were able to retain basic democratic institutions imported through the process of colonialism, but the accompanying democratic ideals and practices is somewhat lacking (Means, 1996: 103). This, Means argued “...can be attributed to the failure of the people in both countries to cultivate the habits and attitudes required in a civic culture and participatory democracy”. Thus, after decades of freedom and independence, and liberal democratic construction, non-Western emerging democracies are still struggling to fully take on values associated with Western, liberal political and associational life.

Ethier (1990:10) also identified a problem with liberal democratic consolidation theory in that its explanations and hypotheses cannot be generalised across all cases and

consequently theory has relative and approximate value. Therefore, liberal democratic consolidation theory cannot effectively account for the diversity of *democratic* results that appeared at the end of the great democratisation experiments of the world. Generally transitionology assumes that the transition process and democratisation will lead to the establishment of a polyarchy or liberal democracy. For that reason Ethier (1990:14-16) thus concludes that there is a social consensus among scholars and authors surrounding liberal democracy or polyarchy<sup>3</sup>. Social consensus centres on institutionalism, where one finds civilised form of competition through electoral competition and strong cooperative relationships between state and civil society as different forms of collaboration (Ethier, 1990: 14). Thus, institution-building or crafting becomes central in changing the model of interaction between state and civil society, and institutions become central in managing mêlées in order to ensure that there is more stability within state boundaries.

At the same time, the *emergence of different forms of collaboration (solidarity between members of society)* is an attempt at nation-building through the institutional mechanisms created. The expected behaviour in the liberal democratic institutions are charged with the dissemination of liberal democratic values to ensure that the polity will adhere to the values associated with the participant political culture that characterises liberal democracies in the Western world. Therefore, a form of solidarity between different members of a society is needed or a national identity rooted in a form of national social cohesion, which sets the tone for the generation of nation-building and the crafting of solidarity or social cohesion in the liberal democratic tradition.

In addition to state- and nation-building, emerging liberal democratic states are expected to undergo a cultural revolution in order to adopt a Western culture by committing to the fundamental liberal political and cultural political values (Di Palma, 1990: 5). Ethier (1990:14) also alludes to a cultural revolution as “... [democracy] is associated with the adherence of a majority of citizens to the cultural values and forms of behaviour of modern democracy (or Western) societies, which include individualism, rationalism, respect for others, moderation and so forth”. This alludes to the view that there is one form of acceptable democracy that a state may find

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<sup>3</sup> Ethier (1990: 14) is of the view that “...in the...studies on the consolidation of new democracies in Southern Europe and Latin America, most authors attach a relatively similar meaning to the term [democracy and polyarchy].



consolidation in, the liberal democratic model. Essentially, nations have to alter their value system to embrace the values and principles of liberal democracy, i.e. non-Western nations need to change values and customs in order to consolidate their imported liberal democracies.

These values however, may be in conflict with non-Western values. Not all societies are individualist orientated, but may embrace principles of communalism, where a form of consensus democracy may be more applicable. This may capture the essence of Huntington's *Clash of Civilisations*, as states engage in political and economic development; the capitalist economic system will prevail, while the liberal strand of democracy will be fostered in the process of political development, due to the West's hegemonic position in the contemporary world. Liberal democracy assumes a premature perception of desirability in that all non-Western societies will desire their form of governance and way of life. In other words, there is an assumption that all states, regardless of their history and geography want to become westernised.

The export of liberal values can be regarded as a historical process. Ethier (1990:15 – 16) invokes three explanations for democratic diffusion at a global level. The first explanation is premised on the preconditions approach to transitionology, maintaining that during the post-1945 period economic reconstruction in Europe lead to sufficient levels of economic development that laid the foundation for liberal political development. The creation of institutions like the World Bank, the former General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, and the International Monetary Fund set about the rebuilding of Western Europe. One saw the successful creation of democracies by force such as Austria, thus demonstrating to the Western world that democracy's installation by force can yield successful results, yet the democracy-by-force experiment in Iraq is proving somewhat difficult. Di Palma (1990:32) highlights that “defeat and occupation by democratic superpowers have historically created favourable circumstances for democracy, in that they have tended to make a clean break with the past”. Although states have a clean slate from which to start, the assumption that institutions will facilitate the alteration of a value system can prove problematic. Means (1996: 104), in discussing the Malaysian and Singaporean case study, asserts that the introduction of democratic institutions and procedures such as elections and its associated representative institutions did not necessarily facilitate popular participation.

The more interaction between the liberal world and the non-Western world, the more liberal values are exported. Colonies in Africa and Latin America were linked to this process via the occupation through colonisation as they had to adopt the cultural values and modes of behaviour of the colonial power all in the name of the journey to modernisation. At independence many former colonies adopted Western models of governance evident in the Westminster style parliaments, the types of constitutions rooted in legal-rational authority and a commitment to representative democracy through seeming objective institutions like elections. This was indeed necessary as foreign aid and further economic interaction with their Western counterparts rested upon the adoption of liberal democratic institutions and processes. This links to the second factor identified by Ethier (1990). Through increased aid and assistance in the reconstruction of the post-1945 Europe, a majority of the political elites adhered to Western cultural values as a consequence of the economic and social reconstruction that characterised this period. Consequently, Ethier (1990) asserts, “there exists a causal relation between the modernisation of economic structures, the differentiation of social structures, and the stability of democratic political institutions.” Therefore, by dangling foreign aid as a reward, these states emulated liberal democratic values and were able to integrate them as part of a national political culture. The non-Western world, specifically Africa, however, finds this emulation somewhat difficult. Many African states are dependent upon foreign aid, and may superficially demonstrate a commitment to the creation of a liberal democratic order; however, Nyamnjoh (2003: 10) argued that

the identity and power conferred by consuming foreign [goods, ideas, and values] explains why, despite much rhetoric about cultural renaissance in many an African country...the ruling elites continue to acculturate themselves to ‘progressively take on the look of strangers in their own country due to their daily lifestyle, modelled on that of *homo consumes universalis*’...the paradox with...elites is that they know what they do not need to and need what they do not know.

Finally, the third factor centres on a positive evaluation of democratic regime performance in relation to individual needs, aspirations, and desires (Ethier, 1990: 15 – 16). This relates to the ability of the new democratic regime to perform satisfactorily so as to satisfy the needs of the polity within society. Societies that suffer greatly economically and socially for extended periods of time are more susceptible to domestic instability and the overthrow of democratically elected regimes. It is also

through bad regime performance and increasing dissatisfaction that authoritarian regimes are overthrown, replaced, or transformed. Therefore, there is awareness amongst liberal democratic consolidation theorists that there is a delicate balance between regime performance and structural inequalities within the state. This balance proves essential to ensure that emerging democracies endure and eventually consolidate their liberal democracy. Regardless of the level of economic and political development an *emerging democracy* may achieve, one needs to remember that on a normative level, as Kim (1997:1123) noted, many democratic experiments are happening: "...among the non-democracies in the Third World, there have been only a few cases...in which there was success in achieving meaningful economic development". Kupchan (1998:1) points out that the

The current wave of democratisation is taking place in regions that have little or no experience in constitutional liberalism. Many countries...have a long history of paternalism and social norms that privilege the group over the individual. Without a tradition of liberal protection, the introduction of democracy is critical to instilling respect for individual rights and values of accountability and responsibility. Participatory democracy helps bring about the incremental changes in political culture necessary for liberal governance. Constitutional liberalism, after all, rests not just on the formal institutions, but on the political attitudes and habits that bring them life.

Carothers (2002: 8) highlights that because states undergoing democratic transitions sprang up from the most unlikely of societies, the structural conditions were not necessarily that important in its creation, but the role of political elites prove central to liberal democratic construction in the transitionology paradigm. Yet, even if states are engaged in political elite-driven liberal democratic construction, cultural values are more static. The likely result is that liberal cultural assimilation may be retarded and the normative commitment society needs to demonstrate to its new liberal democracy may be weak. Therefore, for Fukuyama (1996: 14), the "...struggle that will help determine the fate of liberal democracy will not be over the nature of institutions...the real battles will occur at the levels of civil society and culture".

To date no metatheoretical analysis of liberal democratic consolidation has been conducted in attempting either to contextualise the *struggles of liberal democracy* or to deconstruct liberal democratic consolidation theory. Given the dominant position that liberal democracy occupies in the present global order, and the strong lobbying for its

adoption by all states, liberal democratic consolidation theory scholars needs to engage in a reflective process of self-evaluation so as to determine its strengths and weaknesses at an institutional and normative level. Coupled with the debates found within liberal democratic consolidation theory, there is a need to identify its underlying philosophical and ideological pattern and structure. This is especially necessary considering the dominance and aggressive export of democracy in the liberal tradition as evident in amongst others the African Peer Review Mechanism, the adoption of constitutions rooted in the principles of constitutionalism and liberal justice, and a Bill of Rights committed to individual liberties in many post-colonial nations.

### **1.5 The processes of democracy development in the transitionology paradigm**

Liberal democratic development in the genetics tradition of transitionology can be presented in three phases through which emerging democracies proceeds. These are the transition phase, the democratisation phase, and finally the democratic consolidation phase.

The transition phase entails a transfer of power through relatively free and fair elections. This is achieved through a founding election which marks the birth of the new democracy, although the negotiation and bargaining prior to the founding election characterises this stage. The democratisation phase relates to the inauguration of the major democratic reforms such as constitutional design, changing institutions, extending citizenship and, essentially, moving away from authoritarian policies to democratic policies. The last phase of consolidation of democracy refers to either a stabilising within the new liberal democratic regime, or a deepening of the values of a liberal democratic state. For democratisation to be considered successful, when a state consolidates its liberal democracy, three features must be present. Civil society must be active in its participation in the liberal democratic process; the liberal democratic process must be supported by the institutions that guarantee freedom in the execution of political life and participation, and equality<sup>4</sup> in that in the political process all members of the polity are treated without discrimination and distinction. This relates to the

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<sup>4</sup> The term equality is debatable. One has to remember that equality from a procedural point of view refers to equality in the political process and from a substantive point of view it refers to decreasing socio-economic inequality as conceptualised in this study. The use in this sense refers to the procedural interpretation of equality.

interpretation of liberal democratic consolidation as stability within a state's democracy. The substantive interpretation of liberal democracy equates to liberal democratic consolidation as deepening democracy or democratic quality. The creation of a civic virtue is dependent upon declining socio-economic inequality or a reduction in the class differences. The state and its associated democratic institutions must act in a way to ensure that redistribution of income leads to declining inequality and increased participation as society becomes more equitable.

### **1.5.1 Transition**

Transition entails change, conversion, or evolution. The word itself denotes that one is altering some aspect or sprouting a better alternative to the *status quo*. The revision of the *status quo* within political society generally stems from a crisis (Linz and Stepan, 1996, Huntington, 1996, and Bratton and De Walle, 1997). This crisis is characterised by increased opposition to the exclusive nature of the authoritarian regime where supporters of the regime are essentially in conflict with those opposed to the regime. This crisis is driven by outright revolution or military defeat, a loss of authority due to declining levels of fear within society and economic crisis, (Ethier, 1990:7). For Casper and Taylor (1996:1) the spark that ignites democratic transitions are often the result of protracted repression and the authoritarian regime is unsuccessful in excluding people from political life.

The common theme found in transitionology studies is that the authoritarian regime finds it increasingly difficult to maintain authentic legitimacy in the eyes of both the domestic and international community. Justifications for oppressive, violent, and predatory behaviour by the state become increasingly difficult to formulate and there is increasing pressure from within and outside the authoritarian state to engage in some form of a move towards a liberal democratic dispensation.

Transitions involve intense political conflict among the political contenders competing to implement policies founded on different and mutually exclusive versions of government, state and regime. For Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:10) this process of regime change means abandoning one set of political rules and procedures for another where the transition is characterised by competing political actors for the resources of the political game. Linz and Stepan (1996), Huntington (1996), Di Palma (1990) and

Ethier (1990), and Casper and Taylor (1996) share similar sentiments when they assess competition between the authoritarian and democratic forces within a state engaged in a transition process. In this context, cardinal to the change of the political society is the restructuring of state-societal relationships to be more responsive to the needs expressed by civil society. Institutions and the means for transferring power are crafted to ensure a smooth transition which lacks violence and is conducted in a peaceful manner. The process of transition is finalised when the new democratic administration is in office – that is when the founding election has taken place. Linz and Stephan (1996:3) refer to *completed democratic transitions* which are defined as

when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*.

Thus, the *institutional nucleus* of the emerging democracy is in the process of being sculpted by a government that was chosen to govern by the people. Central to transitionology, as Carothers (1995) had pointed out, is elections. Huntington (1996: 109) argued extensively that elections are the institutional core of liberal democracy based on the principle that government representatives must be chosen through competitive elections in which all citizens are able to participate. The founding election, therefore, is of extreme importance in the democratisation process, as the new government needs the endorsement of the people before the new democratic society can be crafted legally. The founding election also allows legitimisation of the incoming democratic regime. In a Schumpeterian sense then the purpose of democracy has been achieved once the people in a democratic process choose leaders. Yet, there still remains significant debate on the role of the primary actors in the electoral system: political parties (Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 2005: 551). Some theorists like Zakaria (2004) are fearful that extreme and radical parties could be elected into power which could in the words of Pastor (1994: 253) “...shift the country into ethnic strife and possibly dictatorship”

The nature of the emerging democracy will not be clear until the founding election has taken place and the new popular government is in power. Negotiation and bargaining are central in creating a new democracy (Casper and Taylor, 1996:1; Huntington

1996:165). These negotiations must be characterised by cooperation and compromise in order to attain a non-zero sum solution where the agreement is mutually acceptable to all parties involved. Indeed, Huntington (1996: 165) regards compromise necessary for negotiation as the “...the heart of the democratisation processes...”. Central to Huntington’s analysis is the *participation/moderation trade off* which essentially argued that in order to participate in the birth of the new democracy, the moderate factors of society need to come to the fore in order to participate in the negotiations that will shape the new democracy.

With relative consensus surrounding the concept of transition, it is also important to point out that there are three general models of transitions that a state can engage in. Huntington (1996) identifies transplacements, replacements, and transformations. Ethier (1990: 5 – 6) identified the following types of transitions: transitions driven by external forces; transitions emerging from a violent, internal revolution; and continuing transitions brought about by internal crises. The primary theme that these types of transitions have in common is the role of the authoritarian leaders and the opposition or liberators. Both Huntington (1996) and Ethier (1990) concur however that moderate factions need to surface in order to have the successful negotiation needed to ensure a rewarding transition. The type of transition will also set the stage for the process of liberal democratic consolidation, the prevailing argument being that a state that has gone through a process of transplacement has a higher chance of consolidating its new liberal democracy than replacements (Huntington, 1996; Ethier, 1990; and Diamond, 1999).

Ethier’s externally driven transition type embraces Huntington’s waves of democratisation and Di Palma’s (1990: 14 – 51) diffusion. The basic premise is that regional factors influence whether a state will democratise or not, that is if the majority of states in a region engage in democratisation exercises, the others are more likely to follow. The author refers to these as “...democratic restorations...” as seen in Austria and Japan, and as currently being undertaken in Iraq. Di Palma (1990:14 - 15) concurs when he asserts that

for all its historical and geographical ups and downs, diffusion remains a key...ingredient of democratic development... democratisation may be helped by the suppliers (advanced democracies, regional or global powers) as much as by consumers...new democracies are thus less the result of cumulative, necessary, predictable, and systematic developments than of

historical busts and booms, global opinion climates, shifting opportunities, and contingent preferences.

Bratton and De Walle (1997:27) share similar sentiments through their observation that states are not isolated entities and consequently are influenced by the changes that occur in the international environment. For Bratton and De Walle a combination of internal and external or domestic and international factors influence the possibility of a transition, thus highlighting the intermestic approach to the spread of liberal democracy.

Liberal democratic hegemons of the Western world *export* their values, system of governance, and system of trade and commerce generally to the non-Western world. These external influences take on a multitude of identities depending on the perspective they are analysed from; the West may regard it as economic and political development, whereas the developing world may regard this as neo-colonialism or domination. Consequently, due to the dominant position of liberal political ideas, the consequent action is the diffusion of liberal democracy through the grand process of globalisation or market fundamentalism (Vale 2007: 247).

When a state takes the first steps towards transitioning from authoritarianism to liberal democracy, an air of optimism prevails. For transitionologists, many emerging democracies need to construct viable inclusive political institutions, and marry the traditions of the past with the new liberal traditions they are expected to adopt, whilst ensuring effective regime performance ensuring that the population receives the new emerging democratic regime positively. In the transformation mode of transition the elites realise that the *status quo* is not viable under their secured political rule, and consequently initiates a process of liberalisation or opening of the political realm. Replacements may have the highest possibility for non-consolidation, as in many cases liberators become oppressors, as evident in the turbulent history of states on the Latin American and African continents.

Scholars such as Huntington (1996) are of the opinion that transplacements may have the highest possibility of consolidation as one sees cooperation between two conflicting groups in order to liberalise and democratise. This mode requires bargaining between the authoritarian regime and the resistance to the authoritarian regime. However, the authoritarian regime will engage in this process upon the realisation that the *status quo*



cannot continue and it is in the interest of the authoritarian regime to enter into liberalisation or *arbetura*<sup>5</sup> exercises. Thus, part of the compromise entails how political freedoms are restored, and who is included and considered a citizen within the polity, as Ethier (1993: 12) argued that

the rapid, but apparent, re-establishment of democratic liberties and institutions is imposed by the seriousness of the legitimacy crisis or the social crisis accompanying the internal crisis of the regime...if one admits that the institutionalisation of democracy begins with the conclusion of a comparison between the regime and the moderate forces of the opposition, one has to recognise that said developments do not indicate that the process has reached its end point.

Consequently, one finds reluctance within the academic community to see liberalisation and democratisation in the same light. The basic tenet of the argument is that liberalisation does not necessarily guarantee further democratisation or stronger efforts towards *achieving* liberal democracy. Ethier (1993:12) highlights that liberalisation reforms are seen as provisional and arbitrary, and *arbetura* as an evaluative exercise to determine the inherent risk of reintroducing the democratic reforms. From Ethier's analysis one can determine that liberalisation and *arbetura* is a temporary state of affairs while the basic tenets of the new future democratic regime are completed. Linz and Stepan (1996:3) share similar sentiments by defining liberalisation as a mixture of policy and social changes. Democratisation links to liberalisation in that the democratisation phase requires *arbetura*, but on a broader scale than the initial liberalisation necessary to inaugurate the new democratic regime. They also note that there can be *arbetura* without democratisation, essentially highlighting that liberalisation or *arbetura* does not necessarily lead to the automatic conclusion of democratisation. Consequently, Di Palma (1990:36) noted that "the challenge is how to reconcile those forces and interests to a democratic compromise while, at a minimum, removing those structures that are incompatible with political democracy".

The Asian experience has demonstrated that states can liberalise but not necessarily democratise with states like Singapore labelled as 'soft authoritarian'. States can liberalise their economies but have no intention of democratising the political system such as is evident in China. A free market system can exist in an authoritarian state.

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<sup>5</sup> Portuguese word that means opening. This term was coined by Linz and Stepan (1996: 168) when discussing the Brazilian transition to democracy and its retreat.

The relationship between liberalisation and democratisation is therefore not mutually inclusive in the sense that liberalisation will not necessarily signal the start of a move towards democracy.

Similarly, one cannot only determine whether democratisation will occur when the institutional aspects and criteria for founding elections are on the table. At any juncture in this process one of the parties, either the authoritarian regime or the resistance to the authoritarian regime, can withdraw from the negotiation. In essence, transition entails a process that brings about a change in the nature of the regime found in a particular state whereas democratisation is the progression towards democracy that involves the implementation of substantive aspects of the political transition (De Villiers, 1993: 38; 44).

### **1.5.2 Democratisation**

In keeping with the genetics approach to transitionology, the process that follows the transition process is that of democratisation. Prior to liberal democratic consolidation, the remnants of the old authoritarian regime must be destroyed. Its institutions, processes, values, and political routines need to be dismantled to make space for the new liberal democratic institutions, processes, values, and routines. Therefore, states will engage in an exercise of massive political, social, and economic restructuring, which can only occur via the democratisation process.

A crucial aspect of the democratisation process involves a change in the *rules of the game* and the replacement of old norms and practices with a new set of values and assumptions (McCahery 2001:1). The democratic consequences of these institutions must reflect the popular will of the people that is the majority. The new liberal democratic administration should be a product of the majority, however, the majority need to formulate universal principles and beliefs about the new liberal administration. This will inevitably denote a change in the relationship between state and civil society, democratisation at state and grassroots level. This may also entail facilitating a situation where liberal democracy deepens or facilitate stability that will ensure democracy remains the *only game in town*.

De Villiers (1993:44) regards democratisation as the expansion of citizenship in society during the course of transition. Democratisation thus refers to processes whereby the basic questions relating to the character of and conduct within the new democratic

political sphere are addressed. Here one can assume that political elites engage in moves to alter a society of exclusion to one of inclusion; a socio-political system based on embargo against political participation engages in a process to ensure that incorporation of previously excluded groups. If perceived exclusion still exists, individual assessments on their position in the new political dispensation are skewed. Similarly, if perceived exclusion is a dominant feeling within society, liberal democratic consolidation cannot occur. Instead pathways to change will be sought out; either through further democratisation, revolutions or *coup d'états*. Therefore, Di Palma (1990: 36) is of the view that in order to facilitate successful democratisation towards liberal democracy, the attitudinal changes that accompany the *democratic restructuring* need to remain stable and positive.

One can gather that it is through democratisation that states attempt to move towards the values of Dahl's polyarchy or Diamond's liberal democracy. Constitutional redesigns to include previously excluded groups, resurrecting new liberal democratic political structures, and generating a sense of political equality amongst citizens characterise democratisation. Through the democratisation process the implementation of the aspirations and agreements during the transition phase are affected. Political, administrative, and societal structures changes and new liberal democratic values germinate within new liberal democratic polities. Ethier (1993) refers to this process as *democratic installation*. All of this is ultimately aimed at stabilising society and creating a fully operational democracy.

Nation-building exercises are also central to *deepening democracy* if they follow a broader interpretation of liberal democratic consolidation. The exercises undertaken by political elites essentially aim to create liberty, equality, and the construction of a liberal democratic civic virtue. Through expanding citizenship, restructuring state-societal relations, and through facilitating stability and legitimacy, the emerging liberal democracy attempts to guarantee civil liberties, ensure political equality, and creates a deep sense of obligation to participate in the new democratic process. With time these aspects will become routine and new values like tolerance, moderation, and diversity, as well as efficient conflict management of diverse interests in the institutions will allow liberal democratic consolidation. This is the final step in the process of liberal democratic regime reconstruction - consolidation of liberal democracy. As this is the primary focus of the study, it will prove premature to deal with the concept in-depth

now. It is however necessary to introduce in a preliminary sense some conceptual issues pertaining to liberal democratic consolidation.

### **1.5.3 Introducing liberal democratic consolidation**

There is little agreement on what liberal democratic consolidation is – does one refer to merely political stability, or is there a deeper element associated with liberal democratic consolidation? As with the evolution of liberal democracy, certain themes and principles are present to dictate the discourse around democratic consolidation in the liberal tradition. The primary themes of liberal democratic consolidation focus on institutions and the transmission of liberal democratic values. It therefore becomes essential to perhaps separate the institutional from the normative. For the purpose of this study, the institutional element relates to liberal democracy in practice, whereas the normative relates to democracy as the normative commitment to the liberal democratic regime and acceptance of the values that directs liberal democracy as the normative framework of the society.

There are a multitude of approaches to the study of liberal democratic consolidation. These range from an intermestic approach, to a structural approach, to an institutional approach, and to an economic and political approach. All of these approaches have two common themes: Firstly, the creation of a constitutional liberal democracy that sees political liberty and political equality in a system that provides some degree of certainty in the political game of diverse interest management. Secondly, the transmission of liberal democratic values to create liberal democratic political orders committed to the overarching umbrella ideology of liberalism. These values, as Diamond (1999: 161) reminds us, includes “...moderation, tolerance, civility, efficiency, knowledge, and participation...”. This is a daunting task, especially in post-conflict societies that are still battling with the creation of a stable polity. Therefore, the transmission of values through rebuilding of democratic institutions becomes central to the assurance that liberal democratic consolidation will occur, or so theory postulates.

Liberal democratic consolidation entails an acceptance of liberal democratic values by both political elites and masses. Consequently, civil society and the state need to exhibit political behaviour rooted in liberal democratic values. These include a commitment to the liberal democratic institutions, negotiation and compromise (as opposed to violence), moderate political behaviour, and inclusion and participation of

all citizens. Diamond (1996:33) is of the view that this commitment to liberal democracy must be on a much deeper level than abstract in that it must be underpinned by a shared normative and behavioural commitment to the rules, procedures, institutions, processes and institutions that form the liberal democratic structure. For Diamond, liberal democratic consolidation entails the unquestioning embrace of liberal democratic institutions. In other words, liberal democratic institutionalism and a commitment to that institutionalism form the foundation of liberal democratic consolidation. Once this unquestioning commitment is present in society, democratic uncertainty lessens through the rules and methods of political competition and interaction. As this institutional socialisation continues, the range of political participants and actors widens and one sees the emergence of a *principled commitment* to the liberal democratic framework, an increase in cooperation through the liberal democratic institutions by the various political actors, and a form of liberal democratic socialisation of the masses who observe the new political behaviour of political elites. Huntington (1996:7), however, is somewhat sceptical regarding the liberal democratic values transmission through liberal democratic institutions. He argued that democratisation entails demolishing any form of state constraints on individuals or citizens, which results in a socio-political vacuum characterised by the "...loosening of social inhibitions, and uncertainties and confusion about standards of morality". Therefore, democratisation will not necessarily lead to liberal democratic socialisation through its institutions, but may also bring into question issues surrounding authority and can promote a "...amoral, *laissez-faire*...atmosphere" (Huntington 1996: 7). During democratisation, political certainty is replaced with uncertainty, and accepted values and knowledge are no longer relevant as new (democratic) values need to trickle down into society at large. These values are, as Ethier (1993:14) points out "...associated with the absence of a majority of citizens to the cultural values and forms of behaviour of modern democracy (or Western) societies". Thus, consolidation in the liberal tradition would entail civil society's internalisation of a new form of outlook on socio-political life. It also points to adopting a new way of life associated with a liberal democratic society. Diamond (1998:1) supports this by stating that "...theories of democracies, both classical and modern claim that democracy requires a distinctive set of political values and orientations from their citizens...expecting that political culture plays an important role in the development and maintenance (or failure) of democracy".

There is general consensus amongst the main scholars (such as Linz, Stepan and Diamond) that one may speak of a consolidated liberal democracy when there is consensus that the democracy system is unlikely to break down, in other words, when the people will not accept any other form of rule other than the liberal democratic one. Ethier (1993:14) concurs with her view of democratic consolidation as an institutional means of conflict management that requires solidarity among all relevant actors. This entails deepening democracy to such an extent that the *solidarity* is interpreted as building a new democratic nation. Consequently through a commitment to the liberal democratic institutions and values, liberal democratic consolidation seeks to construct citizenship in the liberal democratic tradition. Indeed, Diamond (1997:15) argued that liberal democratic consolidation involves the rules that govern political behaviour in the liberal democratic structures and self-enforcing limitations or restraints on the ability of political elites to exercise power. For Diamond, liberal democratic consolidation is interpreted at political elite level as the "...behavioural patterns, symbolic gestures, public rhetoric, official documents, and ideologies declarations of leaders, parties and organisations...". Therefore, assessing liberal democratic consolidation at elite level is evident in the limitations placed upon the political elites and their subsequent interaction and behavioural patterns within those limitations on power. At mass level however, Diamond stresses the necessity of public opinion surveys to assess not only the degree of support and perceived legitimacy of the liberal democratic order, but to assess its sustainability, strength, and depth.

Liberal democracy is meaningful when there are extensive civil liberties present and one finds true political pluralism and freedom, (Diamond 1997:13). Consequently, Diamond equates Dahl's idea of polyarchy with that of liberal democracy, which "...demands that autonomous government exist to constrain executive power, which the military be subordinate to elected civilian authority, that minority groups and civil society have freedom to organise and participate in the political process, and that citizens have access to alternative sources of information." This deals with the procedural dimension of determining the level of liberal democracy, in other words the variables that allow measurement of liberal democracy in the empirical world, as evident in for example the Freedom House Survey (Diamond, 1997: 13).

Theoretically the works concerned with liberal democratic consolidation in the liberal tradition attempt to allude to the interconnectedness of institutions and regime

performance as the mechanism to create a liberal democratic commitment or a balance between procedural and substantive democracy. Liberal democratic consolidation can hint at stability through increased effective institutional performance and effective regime performance on a social and economic level. It is also through effective institutional and regime performance that a sense of allegiance to the new democratic dispensation is created and liberal democratic values become integrated as part of political behaviour and culture. Consequently institutions are a key tradition within liberal democratic consolidation discourse. Institutions are glorified in the sense that they enable pursuance of political equality and liberty through participation. This participation secures moderation in that through increased experience with the institution, both elites and masses generate a civic commitment to the values upon which the institutions of the liberal democratic tradition are founded. Schedler (2001:70), however, noted liberal democracy essentially remained a human creation in that only when the players decide that they can play only in accordance with the liberal rules of the game, can a democracy become consolidated. This stability of democracy therefore is dependent upon the conscious decision by political actors to abide by the rules as set out in the process, procedures, and institutions of liberal democracy. Diamond (1997: 14) shares similar sentiments when assessing the durability and sustainability of liberal democracy in achieving liberal democratic consolidation. Thus, democracy is consolidated when it is the only acceptable means of governance in a specified territory or country when political actors consciously abide by its processes, procedures, and institutions. This refers to liberal democratic consolidation as democratic stability. Munck (2001:126), however, points out that the interpretation of liberal democratic consolidation as a concept was initially born out of the Latin American context where liberal democracy was initially attained but later lost. The states in transition essentially engaged in a redemocratisation, and consequently the focus was on the durability and sustainability of the new liberal democracy rules so as to avoid a regression into authoritarianism.

It will be argued in this study that liberal democratic consolidation, as a concept, has proven problematic in a non-Western context. Invariably, the concern of liberal democratic consolidation is the entrenchment of the commitment to liberal democracy so as to avoid a re-authoritarianisation of society. This requires some form of role associated with both political elites and masses in adopting the new liberal democratic

order. Therefore, it is necessary to institutionalise some form of change in societal values as well as values emanating from the state. In this context, Schedler (2001:75) adds, “like any other game, the democratic game requires actors to play by its rules. Actors who play authoritarian games may sustain the façade of democratic regime. But they inevitably erode its foundations”. The generation of a normative commitment to liberal democracy is thus essential in obtaining the coveted status of a consolidated democracy in the liberal tradition. If a true normative commitment to democracy is missing one cannot adequately speak of a liberal democratic order. Therefore, to be considered a liberal democracy; emerging democracies are required to create the environment in which liberal democratic values can germinate. This is evident in the works of Linz and Stepan (1996:16) who take an all-encircling approach to democratic consolidation when they posit the conditions under which a liberal democracy becomes consolidated. There are three elements to liberal democratic consolidation for Linz and Stepan:

- (1) Behavioural consolidation where there is no noteworthy national, social, economic, political or institutional actors that seek to utilise their resources for the establishment of a nondemocratic regime or attempt to succession from the territorial unit of the state;
- (2) Attitudinal consolidation where a large segment of public opinion, even in economic and/or political crisis, consider liberal democracy the most desirable form of government and anti-democratic alternatives carry little public support;
- (3) Constitutional consolidation where the rule of law and democratic procedures and institutions are central to conflict resolution through a democratic process;

This point to the all encompassing level of change associated with liberal democratic tradition. The attitudinal and constitutional dimensions of consolidation of democracy come to the fore. Attitudinally, civil society and government need to embrace the notion of democratic legitimacy, which refers to the intrinsic and authentic support for liberal democracy (Schedler, 2001: 75). Indeed, Schedler is of the view that this support is the defining element of liberal democratic consolidation in that political systems rooted in a liberal democratic consensus has not broken down. Underpinning the liberal democratic consensus is a constitutional foundation where all the significant political actors are committed and adhere to the rules of the liberal democratic game, and, no significant financial, human and social resources are spend on attempting to



create authoritarian regimes (Schedler 2001:76 – 77). Essentially the liberal democratic consensus stabilises the new liberal democratic order by ensuring that no political actor will have a desire to act outside the acceptable limitations on political behaviour.

Furthermore, one sees other terms construed as synonymous with liberal democratic consolidation such as habituation (Di Palma, 1990), democratic installation (Ethier, 1990), and democratic quality (Diamond, 2008). Habituation refers to making something a habit; therefore, for a state to be consolidated in the liberal tradition, the institutions and values must have become second nature to state and civil society. In the case of democratic installation, liberal democracy is installed, much like a computer programme, in a state. Democratic quality refers to the substantive level of liberal democracy within a state. Interestingly, not one of these terms highlights the nature of acceptance that emanates from the emerging democracy. Therefore, one finds the presumption that liberal democracy is a much desired and much needed system and way of life present in liberal democratic consolidation theory.

If the pre-conditions for liberal democratic development are insufficient, then these must be created, as the genetics approach to transitionology postulates. Consequently one sees a crafting versus pre-condition debate within liberal democratic consolidation discourse. This debate is concerned with the conditions needed for successful democratic consolidation; the creation of the prerequisite conditions for liberal democratic consolidation, and the different roles that elites are to play in either crafting or strengthening the pre-conditions of the successful installation of liberal democracy. Consequently, one sees many scholars such as Di Palma, Pastor, and Huntington asking: Can democracy be created? This debate was necessitated by the grand liberal democratic failures in the non-Western world and the re-authoritarianisation of regimes in Africa and Latin America. Consequently, liberal democratic consolidation theory theorists saw the relevance of (1) which conditions lead to liberal democratic installations; (2) how must these conditions interact with one another; (3) if these conditions are lacking, how can one create them; and (4) what is the role of the elites in either crafting the conditions conducive to liberal democracy or ensuring the persistence of the preconditions (should they be present).

Crafting, as the word implies, means to make or mould or fashion into something tangible, while ‘preconditions’ implies prerequisites or necessities for a liberal

democracy to become consolidated. This then entails a debate as to whether liberal democratic consolidation can be moulded to fit a particular picture, or whether certain conditions must be present before the process towards consolidation in the liberal tradition can occur.

The latter would then mean that liberal democratic consolidation is out of the political elites' hands, while the former provides a very active role for political elites in constructing their new liberal democratic regime. Yet it is widely agreed that certain preconditions aid the consolidation process. In asking *what makes a democracy endure*, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheirub, and Limongi (1996:39) answer "...democracy, affluence, growth with moderate inflation, declining inequality, a favourable international climate, and parliamentary institutions". These are generally regarded as the preconditions of consolidation for a liberal democracy, which may be summarised as a stable economy, a free market, structural power and influence, equality and good governance.

Theories essentially aim at predicting and highlighting a process on how to achieve an end result or objective. Theory outlines the process and conditions of consolidation of democracy in a normative fashion. This however must have a behavioural foundation from which to operate, that is a factual premise which enables theory to accurately reflect reality. Thus, an accurate and rigid definition of key dependent and independent variables must be present. Interpretations of concepts have to be clear. Normative, value-laden concepts are difficult to place in a rigid definitional domain due to diverging interpretations. Various ideological and philosophical variables come into play. Historical trajectories are also a key consideration that must be considered, and consequently, Munck (2001:122) argued that the process of testing theories of liberal democratic consolidation is problematic for democratisation theory in that it is based on speculations drawn from data of a diverse community that has yielded a vast array of empirical results.

As Munck (2001:122) observed "...key concepts used to define dependent variables are frequently employed in a diverse and unclear fashion, making it hard to know whether different scholars are actually focusing on the same research question". Similarly, Paris (1987:217) noted that there is a need to find credible methods to evaluate democratic theories in the empirical realm, as there is much diversity in empirical results that

emanate from the research nucleus of liberal democratic consolidation theory. Does one, then, study individual states and determine whether they are consolidated or not according to their uniqueness and home-grown criteria for democracy, or does one employ a more universal and objective method in attempting to determine the level of democracy within states? Diamond (1997:14) argued that liberal democratic consolidation and its associated hypotheses and principle concepts is most usefully interpreted as the achievement of deepening liberal democracy through the liberal democratic consensus and its associated constitutional foundation rooted in legal-rationalism. Thus, for Diamond one needs to look at the individual cases, but this opens up a new set of conceptual and measurement problems. For example, at each assessment of consolidation of democracy, new criteria must be created for each individual case, which will lead to data overload, and make generalisations impossible. This demonstrates that there is a need to identify universal standards from which to assess liberal democratic consolidation in all contexts. From this the central purpose of theory surrounding democracy studies is to determine what will ensure the embedding of liberal democratic regimes in emerging democracies. Liberal democratic consolidation theory centres on political stability and identifies conditions that may lead to political instability as well as identify those conditions that have to be present or crafted in order to obtain liberal democratic institutional stability and commitment.

This study is rooted in democracy studies with its focus on liberal democracy, liberal democratic transitions and liberal democratic consolidation and quality. Thus, the study will be rooted in theory concerned with entrenching democracy, but specifically cementing liberal democracy in a non-Western context where emerging democracies remain in a seemingly unending state unconsolidation.

An accurate appraisal of theories of liberal democratic consolidation is lacking in the field of democracy studies. Essentially, the fluid nature of the international system in its relationship to liberal democracy requires a theoretical exploration of the underlying structure of liberal democratic consolidation theory. Therefore, this study will conduct an overall assessment and evaluation of liberal democratic consolidation theory. It will outline the purpose of liberal democratic consolidation theory on three levels: institutionalism and regime performance, and political culture. This is essential given the all-encompassing nature of the changes associated with liberal democratic development. The study will then through the use of a discourse analysis conduct an

exploration of the metatheoretical undercurrent that informs liberal democratic consolidation.

## **1.6 The structure of the study**

Chapter two of the study will describe the critical discourse analysis utilised in this study. The chapter will present the method employed by the study, as well as the criteria used to delineate the textual, contextual and interpretative levels of the critical discourse analysis. Chapter three will construct the philosophical evolution of liberal democratic consolidation theory. The primary aim is to track the development of liberal democracy's trajectory in order to identify and isolate variables of liberal democracy to conduct the metatheoretical appraisal and identify the textual level of the critical discourse analysis. Consequently, in order to determine the path of liberal democratic consolidation theory, it is essential to start with its first overarching influences: its philosophical roots in liberal democracy. In other words, the growth of democracy sets the metaframework from which liberal democratic consolidation theory finds its basic premises or contextual level.

Chapter four provides an appraisal of a sample of the main texts of liberal democratic consolidation. The focus of the chapter will fall on the institutions of liberal democratic consolidation and the relationship between liberal democratic consolidation, economic development and growth, and regime performance. Chapter five focuses on the relationship between liberal democratic consolidation and political culture. Liberal democratic consolidation requires a shift in the political culture of an emerging liberal democracy. Consequently, this chapter appraised a sample of primary works surrounding the relationship between liberal democratic consolidation and political culture. Collectively chapter four and five constitute the contextual level of the critical discourse analysis.

Chapter six presents an exploratory analysis of the underlying metatheoretical structure of liberal democratic consolidation theory. It is also here that the interpretative level of the critical discourse analysis occurs and thus identifies the undercurrent that informs liberal democratic consolidation theory as a form of philosophical and ideological dominance. The focus is on the physical, social, and linguistic transmission associated with liberal democratic consolidation theory. Chapter seven presents the conclusion of the study.

## Chapter 2

### **Critical discourse analysis and liberal democratic consolidation discourse: Methods and techniques of the study**

Chapter one highlighted the fact that critical discourse analysis is a qualitative approach employed as an oppositional stance to a particular ideological aspect represented in theory or attempts to reveal the presence of a form of dominance within a discourse. It further presented that the primary focus of the study is the deconstruction of liberal democratic consolidation discourse in order to reveal its metatheoretical structure as a form of social dominance. Consequently, the study thus seeks to conduct a third-order analysis of liberal democratic consolidation theory in that it seeks to act as a metatheoretical critique of liberal democratic consolidation theory.

Discourse is understood as any practice by which individuals imbue reality with meaning (Ruiz-Ruiz, 2009). Consequently, “the social universe is largely a space of shared meaning, thus making discursive practises important for our knowledge and understanding of social reality” (Ruiz-Ruiz, 2009). In this sense the overall aim of discourse analysis amounts to “...deconstructive and critical reading an interpretation of a problem or text” (Discourse Analysis, no date). Therefore discourse analysis seeks to enable an understanding of the conditions behind the research problem and seek to:

...enable us to understand the conditions behind a specific "problem" and make us realize that the essence of that "problem", and its resolution, lie in its assumptions; the very assumptions that enable the existence of that "problem". By enabling us to make these assumption explicit, discourse analysis aims at allowing us to view the "problem" from a higher stance and to gain a comprehensive view of the "problem" and ourselves in relation to that "problem". Discourse analysis is meant to provide a higher awareness of the hidden motivations in others and ourselves and, therefore, enable us to solve concrete problems - not by providing unequivocal answers, but by making us ask ontological and epistemological questions (Discourse Analysis, no date)

The general aim of a discourse analysis is the revelation of ontological and epistemological foundations embedded in language allowing a statement understood as rational or interpreted as meaningful (Pederson, 2009). Silbergh (2001:14) identified two ontological frameworks to classify philosophical thinking on the nature of social reality: the individual framework and the holistic ontological framework.

Individualism is of the view that there is a fixed and universal human nature, independent of the effects of social conditioning, which is the ultimate explanation for social life (Silbergh 2001:5). Thus, the focus will either fall on the structure of society and the relationships within society or a specific individual within a given society. This study departs from the premise that there is one democratic experience in the world, although liberal democratic consolidation presently occupies a dominant position. The Western democratic experience is not necessarily the socially shared experiences of the non-Western world with liberal democracy. This is also a central tenet of critical discourse analysis: diversity of experiences in relation to dominance and its reproduction and the subsequent resistance to such perceived dominance. In this sense, thus, an acknowledgement of the constructivist nature of socio-political reality is central. The very nature of discourse analysis requires the adoption of a holistic ontological framework based on the two basic assumptions of discourse analysis: (1) knowledge of the social intersubjectivity provides indirect knowledge about social order as intersubjectivity is produced by the social order through social subjectivity, and; (2) through discourse analysis one is able to understand social intersubjectivity as it is contained in discourses, as well as produced by discursive practises (Ruiz-Ruiz, 2009).

There are three general approaches to discourse analysis: (1) Discourse-analytical; (2) Discourse-theoretical, and; (3) Critical discourse analysis. All discourses are concerned with the "...study of rationality and how it is expressed in a past historical context" (Pederson, 2009), however, they differ on the overall aim of the discourse analysis. Discourse theoretical approaches are concerned with a theory of discourse (Pederson, 2009). As this study does not seek to provide an overall theory of discourse analysis, this approach was ignored. Discourse analytical approaches seek to assess and explain what is being said (Pederson, 2009), whilst critical discourse analysis seeks to demonstrate "...how discourse and institution interact in the constitution of a social world, and how discursive practices are institutionalised or are moved from being linguistic utterances to set conditions for stable social relations". Another aim of critical discourse analysis is to decipher several competing discourses and the contestation of dominant ideologies (Pederson, 2009). This study is only concerned with one element of critical discourse analysis: revealing the ideological and philosophical dominance of liberal democratic consolidation theory that underlies its metatheoretical structure.

Therefore, as this study incorporates the role of ideology in the liberal democratic consolidation theoretical realm, a critical discourse analysis is the most appropriate method of discourse analysis. Thus, the study posits that the perpetual inability of the emerging democracies in the non-Western world to become democratically consolidated is rooted in the individualist approach to the nature of social reality employed by scholars of liberal democratic consolidation, which amounts to a form of philosophical and ideological dominance. Chapter six of the study traces the metatheoretical undercurrent of liberal democratic consolidation theory in order to reveal and substantiate the claim that the liberal democratic consolidation theory constitutes a form of ideological and philosophical dominance.

The methodological framework to be pursued by the study is essentially deductive in nature. The study does not employ a process where primary data from the empirical world is central to the discourse analysis, but rather departs from the theoretical realm. This proves the most appropriate methodological framework as the study looks towards theory to determine the underlying structure of liberal democratic consolidation theory in order to explore possible reasons for the democratic failures of the non-Western world.

Central to the deductive approach adopted by the study is the view that liberal democratic consolidation theory constitutes a form of grounded theory, whereby in its theoretical development, it has already been subjected to a process of theory-building, whereby scholars sampled theoretically relevant data and moved from substantive theorising to formal theory-building (Weed: 2005). In the process of theory-building, theorists in liberal democratic consolidation thus engaged in constant comparisons between different cases studies, thus allowing a mini-synthesis to emerge whereby scholars progress from substantive theory to more formal grounded theory (Weed, 2005). In a metainterpretation, this process of theory-building thus allows the interpreter to select the samples for the metatheoretical appraisal based on conceptual rather than representative grounds as the development of liberal democratic consolidation theory resulted in empirical saturation, meaning that data collections have been so extensive that no further insights could emerge from empirical data (Weed, 2005).

## **2.1. Discourse and content analysis: The textual level of critical discourse analysis**

Ideas, hypotheses and theory are communicated to the academic world in language. The study operates on a metalevel rooted in both a content and discourse analysis. As discourse analysis is concerned with the role and meaningful social practises and ideas in political life (Howarth 1995: 115) language is central to its transmission. Shared meanings and intersubjectivity are communicated through language, thus making structures of shared meaning known through language that underpins discourses. Through language and dialogue major views and lines of reasoning pertaining to consolidation theory are made known. These views and arguments become the theoretical framework from which application and analysis stem in the interpretative level of the critical discourse analysis.

In order to execute the critical discourse analysis, qualitative content analysis was the primary method employed in the study. Qualitative content analysis is concerned with knowledge production and understanding of a specific phenomenon (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1277). In this sense, qualitative content analysis is specifically concerned with the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through systematically coding and identifying themes or patterns and the main ideas of the text (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1278; Mayring, 2002). In conducting the qualitative content analysis, the researcher must engage in either inductive<sup>6</sup> or deductive<sup>7</sup> category development (Mayring, 2002). This study adopted a deductive category development approach focused on liberal democracy and subsequently liberal democratic consolidation theory. Essentially, the first step was to formulate the criterion for definition (Mayring, 2002), whereby the basic underlying concepts associated with liberal democracy are identified. In order to do this, the study traces liberal democratic theory development by classifying the data of classical liberal democratic theorists into meaningful categories of liberty, equality and the civic virtue. Liberal democracy is essentially rooted in the ideological paradigm of liberalism (Pharek, 1992: 163). Given

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<sup>6</sup> Inductive category development develops aspects of the interpretative categories as near as possible to the material under review.

<sup>7</sup> Deductive category development works with prior formulated aspects of analysis and brings them in connection with the text.



the ideological paradigm in which liberal democracy is situated, the foundation of liberal democracy is the individual (Pharek, 1992: 165).

Although Pharek (1992: 165) stresses that the Athenian democracy and liberal democracy are different in respect of their view of the individual, the Athenian being communal in nature and the liberal being individualist in nature, the Athenian democracy provides the "...mechanism by which the people can control the and compel the government to fulfil its trust" (Pharek, 1992:165). Consequently, as Pharek further argued, although liberal democracy cannot accommodate classical Athenian democratic theory, democracy becomes the mechanism through which the polity constitutes and controls public authority. Therefore, to provide the textual level of liberal democratic consolidation theory, there is a need to conduct a qualitative textual analysis of classical Athenian democracy theory through the work of Aristotle.

Similarly, liberty and political equality form a basic foundation of liberal democracy in that "...democracy is understood by the liberal [as] grounded in, and derive[ing] legitimacy from sovereign individuals" (Pharek, 1992: 165). Sovereignty amongst individuals thus requires a high level of political equality and freedom amongst sovereign individuals. Therefore the study identifies liberty and equality as central concepts to liberal democracy. As this study is conducted at a metalevel of analysis, broad knowledge is essential and consequently, one does not require a large sample, but can select a minimum of four studies, utilising a maximum variation sampling by choosing those studies that provide the greatest opportunity to learn (Weed, 2005). Therefore, the choice of text is "...conceptual rather than on representative grounds" Weed (2005). The formulation of criteria for deductive categorisation, the criteria must be derived from a theoretical background and research question, which in turn, determines the aspects of the textual material that must be taken into account (Mayring 2002).

Thus, this study utilised a thematic approach to identify the conceptual micro-genres of liberal democracy theory. In other words, using a deductive approach, the study is able to develop deductive codes for the critical discourse analysis, which are found in existing theory and literature. As a large sample is not necessary for a critical discourse analysis, the study conducts a qualitative content analysis of the Aristotle's *Politics*, Hobbes *Leviathan*, Rousseau's *Social Contract*, and De Tocqueville's *On democracy*,

and Mill's *On Liberty*. These texts were selected as they represented the greatest diversity in dealing with the themes of liberal democracy from the Athenian era to the Enlightenment period. Whilst there are a number of texts such as Plato's *The Republic*, Locke's *Two Treatise of Government*, and Voltaire's *Lettres Philosophiques du Anglaise*, the sample texts were chosen based on the thematic deconstruction of liberal democracy in line with the primary research question of this study and they represented the *greatest opportunity to learn*.

Data reduction is a basic coding process associated with qualitative content analysis, where the researcher organises large quantities of text into fewer content categories (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1285). Essentially the qualitative content analysis requires the researcher to reveal the themes in the narrative subjected to the qualitative content analysis. Using MAXQDA software<sup>8</sup>, the narratives is reduced to fractured texts to the elements where the words democracy, liberty, equality, and citizen or civic virtue appeared. A lexicon search was conducted on the texts to assess the frequency of the deductive categories identified as well as assess the level of comparison between the documents. This was essential to determine whether the deductive categories identified were indeed the correct categories for the intertextual analysis between liberal democracy and liberal democratic consolidation theory.

Typology table <sup>9</sup>			
	Democracy <> 408 (N=5)	Equality <> 408 (N=5)	Liberty <> 408 (N=4)
Number of coded segments, Mean (SD)	1070.5 (658.6)	1070.5 (658.6)	776.3 (481.9)
Equality, Mean (SD)	304.3 (178.5)	304.3 (178.5)	234.0 (150.8)
Liberty, Mean (SD)	157.8 (147.6)	157.8 (147.6)	74.3 (35.0)
Democracy, Mean (SD)	304.3 (178.5)	304.3 (178.5)	234.0 (150.8)

Figure 1: Typology table of textual analysis of classical democracy texts

<sup>8</sup> Maximum Qualitative Discourse Analysis Software is a computer programme that engages in content analysis of texts. The study utilises the software for word frequency of democracy, liberty, equality, and a civic virtue in the texts identified.

<sup>9</sup> Shows relative relationship between the coded segments and the variables identified. Table generated using MAXQDA software

Code System	Citizen	Equality	Liberty	Democracy
Citizen		4	4	4
Equality	4		4	4
Liberty	4	4		4
Democracy	4	4	4	

**Figure 2: Code Relations Browser of Analysed Texts**

Figure 2 demonstrates codes that regularly overlap with each other in the selected texts. It demonstrates that a textual relationship exists between democracy, liberty, equality, and the notion of citizenship. It further demonstrates and validates that there is relationship between the deductive categories identified and liberal democracy. In this sense, the categories constructs emerges from patterns or themes that are directly derived or expressed in the text or are derived from the text through analysis, and relationships between these categories are identified (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1285).

As a summary this study identifies three deductive categories of liberal democracy, which facilitates the development of deductive categories of liberal democratic consolidation theory<sup>10</sup> in the contextual level of the discourse level. The deductive categories of liberal democratic consolidation derive from liberal democratic theory and translate into political institutionalism, regime performance, and liberal democratic political culture in the contextual level of liberal democratic consolidation theory<sup>11</sup>. The logic of the categories chosen is based on the premise that there exists

<sup>10</sup> The deductive category development of liberal democratic consolidation theory was developed by employing a thematic literature review and content analysis. It revealed that in the samples of liberal democratic consolidation texts, political institutions, regime performance, and liberal democratic political cultures proved a constant theme in the works appraised. Chapter 4 and 5 presents the context in which these dedcutive categories were identified. Please refer to Chapter 4 and 5 for further detail.

<sup>11</sup> Chapter three presents a the textual analysis of the deductive categories of liberal democracy. Please refer to chapter three for further detail.

intertextuality between the deductive categories of liberal democracy and the deductive categories of liberal democratic consolidation theory. A central argument of liberal democracy theory is the necessity of a social contract and constitutional state to guarantee political liberty and equality of the individual, thus placing political institutionalism and constitutionalism as a central concern for liberal democratic consolidation theory. Following liberty, the equality of the individual must be addressed through effective and efficient regime performance (both procedural and substantive) of the new liberal democracy. Essentially, there is an expectation that the new liberal democratic state will perform sufficiently on an economic level in order to address major inequalities within society and ensure the overall well-being of the individuals that comprise the polity and address issues pertaining to social justice. With increased political institutionalism and effective regime performance, the polity will eventually adopt a liberal civic virtue. Essentially, the mass level of society see political elites firmly committed to liberal democratic political institutions and processes, and also enjoy an increase in the quality of life through regime performance, resulted in a commitment and internal adoption of liberal democratic values, thus cultivating a liberal civic virtue. Therefore, the study organises these categories into two overarching themes: procedural (creating political institutions and liberal democratic processes) and substantive (effective regime performance to address social justice and the cultivation of liberal democratic political culture or participant political culture). Central to the categories is the relationship between political institutionalism as creating a stable socio-political environment, effective regime performance to address societal needs and social justice, further entrenching political stability, and the germination of participant political cultures, committed to constitutionalism and liberal democracy as a whole necessary for liberal democratic durability<sup>12</sup>. Indeed, Diamond and Morlino (2004: 21) stress that “...different elements of democracy not only overlap, but also depend upon one another, forming a system in which improvement along one dimension (such as participation) can have beneficial effects along others

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
<sup>12</sup> See for example Diamond, L.J. and L. Morlino. 2005. “The quality of democracy: An overview” in Journal of Democracy Vol. 15 (4). Pp. 20 – 31; Beetham, D. 2005. “The foundations of freedom” in Journal of Democracy Vol. 15 (4). Pp. 61 – 75; Rueschemeyer, D. 2005. “Addressing inequality” in Journal of Democracy Vol. 15 (4). Pp. 76 – 90; and, O’Donnell, G. 2005. “The quality of democracy: Why the rule of law matters” in Journal of Democracy Vol. 15 (4). Pp. 32 – 46.

(such as equality and accountability)”. Similarly, with regard to equality, Rueschemeyer (2005: 76) stress that:

...quality of democracy varies. What is at stake is political equality, not equality in all areas of life. Yet, structures of social and economic inequality are intertwined with political equality, and shape it in profound ways, both directly and indirectly.

Through data reduction the theoretical data set is further reduced to two overarching categories: procedural approaches to liberal democracy and substantive approaches to liberal democracy. This was essential to further delineate liberal democratic consolidation theory’s deductive categories into two overarching categories: procedural democratisation and deepening or substantive democratisation.

This process thus allows for the development of the conceptual micro-genres of liberal democracy and how they are related to liberal democratic consolidation theory as presented below. The development of micro-genres supports intertextual analysis in chapter 4 and 5 by stressing the conceptual relationship between the micro-genres of liberal democracy and the meso-genres of liberal democratic consolidation theory. The micro-genres of liberal democracy theory can be represented as follows:



**Figure 3: Conceptual micro-genres of liberal democracy theory and its relationship to liberal democratic consolidation theory**

## **2.2. Critical discourse analysis and the contextual level of analysis**

Discourse analysis draws from the Foucaultian tradition through the use of archives and archaeology (Pederson, 2009). Archives see discourses, as historical and determined form of knowledge when coupled with other discourses becomes a form of institutional rationality (Pederson, 2009). Consequently, archives are equated with “historically determined knowledge horizons, a framework for how ideas are produced and sustained

and for how knowledge is accepted as being trustworthy or not” (Pederson, 2009). Archaeology of discourse refers to the knowledge of history and various forms of knowledge and of the limitations and possibilities of generating new knowledge (Pederson, 2009). Archives and archaeology of knowledge are central to critical discourse analysis, as there is no unitary conceptual and theoretical framework that guides this type of discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 2001: 353). In this sense, critical discourse analysis thus addresses issues around the manner in which specific discourses structures are redeployed, but with a focus on the reproduction of dominance, as the “...typical vocabulary of scholars in critical discourse analysis will features such notions as ‘power’, ‘dominance’, ‘hegemony’, ‘ideology’, ‘class’, ‘gender’, ‘race’, ‘discrimination’, ‘institution’, ‘social structure’, and ‘social order’...” (Van Dijk, 2001: 353 – 354). This is done with the aim of offering an alternative perspective, analysis, and **application** (*author’s emphasis*) of theory (Van Dijk, 2001: 352). Chapter one presented that the study seeks to reveal the philosophical and ideological dominance that underlies the metatheoretical structure of liberal democratic consolidation theory. The archaeology of knowledge is constructed by engaging the contextual level of critical discourse analysis. Essentially the context is understood as the space in which the discourse emerged or the situation that shaped it and gave it meaning (Ruiz-Ruiz, 2009). Consequently, “on this level, discourse is understood as a singular event who is immersed in a specific time and place within a given symbolic universe and who have their own discursive intention” (Ruiz-Ruiz, 2009). Central to this is first identifying whether the discourse is spontaneous or induced<sup>13</sup>. Discourse on liberal democratic consolidation is classified in this study as an induced form of discourse, as it developed within a specific framework of liberal democracy, and through theory-building, founded in a transitionology framework. In this sense, then the archive of liberal democratic consolidation theory constitutes the micro-genres identified in the textual level of analysis.

Liberal democratic consolidation theory is rooted in the Western archive of knowledge associated with economic and political modernisation. Therefore, in reproducing knowledge, the transmission of knowledge to the non-Western world is that a similar

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<sup>13</sup> Spontaneous discourse refers to discourse produced by subjects in everyday life and Inductive discourse is produced within a specific framework of research.

process of economic and political development must be followed to achieve success. This is considered a historical form of knowledge, in that; the Western world regards itself as the matured democracies of the world, thus rendering emerging democracies to a position of subordination. Therefore, there is a "...mentally represented structure of those properties of the social situation relevant to the production and comprehension of discourse" (Van Dijk, 2001: 356). Thus, the overall definition of the situation, the setting, on-going events, and participants in various communicative social and institutional roles and mental representations of those roles such as goals, knowledge, opinion, attitudes, and ideologies) become central in the contextual level of a critical discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 2001: 356; Ruiz-Ruiz, 2009).

In executing the contextual level of critical discourse analysis, one can employ either a situational analysis or intertextual analysis<sup>14</sup>. The situational analysis of liberal democratic consolidation theory will be somewhat futile. There is a common shared meaning on the context in which liberal democratic consolidation discourse emerged, which are the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent global spread of liberal democracy<sup>15</sup>. The focus of the study was rather on the intertextual analysis of liberal democratic consolidation discourse, demonstrating that the archive of knowledge for liberal democratic consolidation theory is rooted in liberal democracy. The deductive categories of liberal democracy rooted in liberty, equality and a liberal civic virtue are also the deductive categories of liberal democratic consolidation theory of political institutionalism, effective regime performance and the cultivation of a liberal political culture. These become the democratic barometers according to which emerging democracies in the non-Western context are judged. Puhle (2005) in developing a typology of unconsolidated democracies or defective democracy<sup>16</sup> outlines eleven

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<sup>14</sup> A situational analysis of the contextual level of discourse analysis provides a detailed description of the circumstances under which the discourse was produced and the characteristics of the subjects that produce it. An intertextual analysis analyses the presence of certain features in the discourse premised on the intention that discourse circulates in the social space as different actors build different discursive structures to produce their own discourse.

<sup>15</sup> Whilst there are theories of liberal democratic consolidation theory prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, for the purpose of this study, the focus falls on the situational context created with Huntington's Third Wave characterised by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the perceived global spread of liberal democracy that characterised the late 1980s and early 1990s period.

<sup>16</sup> Defective democracy for Phule (2005: 11) refers to It refers to "those regimes in transformation which have not achieved the consolidation of a liberal democracy in the sense of our 11 criteria for 'embedded democracy',

criteria in 6 overarching themes that must be met for a democracy to become consolidated or embedded, to use Puhle's terminology. These criteria are presented as follows:

**Table 1: Puhle's categorisation for judging democratic consolidation or embedded democracy**

Criterion	Variable
Stateness	This is regarded as a fundamental prerequisite for a political regime and is rooted in Max Weber's conceptualisation of the state as independent and autonomous.
Electoral regime	Elected officials Inclusive suffrage Right to run for office/full contestation Free and fair elections
Political liberties	Freedom of press Freedom of Speech Freedom of Information Freedom of Association
Effective power to govern	Government of elected officials/no reserved domains
Horizontal accountability	System of checks and balances
<i>Rechtsstaat</i>	Civil liberties Rule of law and judicial review/independent courts Equal access and equality in court

Source: Puhle (2005: 9).

Should an emerging democracy not meet one aspect of the criteria in Table 1, they are then classified as a defective democracy. In this sense, Puhle's (2005) typology is as follows:

**Table 2: Types of defective democracy and criteria for such classification**

Type of Defective Democracy	Criteria for classification
Exclusive democracy	Some criteria of the electoral regime is violated, but not the democratic core
Illiberal democracy	An exclusive democracy coupled with the infringement of political liberties
Tutelary democracy	Also a guided democracy in that there are reserved political domains for undemocratic forces
Delegative democracy	Checks and balances are ineffective and reduces the

but which, at the same time, should no longer be considered as autocratic regimes for the simple reason that they have established an electoral regime which essentially functions along democratic lines (free and fair elections)".




	principles of horizontal accountability
2 <sup>nd</sup> type of Illiberal democracy	Defects in the areas of rule of law and the guarantee of human and civil rights

Constructed from Puhle (2005: 11)

From the above, it is possible to state that emerging democracies are judged on the basis of procedural and substantive liberal democratic criteria. In this sense, the intertextuality between liberal democratic consolidation theories relates to how emerging democracies in the non-Western world are judged to determine their level of liberal democratic consolidation or embedded democracy. Furthermore, given that the end product of liberal democratic consolidation theory is liberal democracy, intertextuality between the archive of liberal democracy and the archaeology of liberal democratic consolidation theory will be demonstrated. This becomes necessary for the interpretative level in order to reveal the ideological and philosophical domination within the metatheory of liberal democratic consolidation theory. Therefore, intertextuality becomes the method to reveal the metatheoretical undercurrent of liberal democratic consolidation theory as “...social practise that involves particular socially regulated ways of producing and interpreting discourse” (Wang 2006: 74). In this sense, through a thematic deconstruction of the narrative in chapter 3, the contextual relationship between the deductive categories of liberal democracy and liberal democratic consolidation theory will be revealed. In other words, to what extent were there similarities in the primary themes of the text scrutinised in chapter 3? Were there similar interpretations of the concepts?

Essentially in deconstructing the archaeology of liberal democratic consolidation theory, the micro-genres, as the archive of liberal democracy theory, influences the knowledge production deeming political institutionalism, regime performance and a participant political culture as the indicators of a stable and growing liberal democracy. The construction of the archaeology in chapter 4 and 5 stresses the intertextuality between liberal democracy theory and liberal democratic consolidation theory, as represented in figure 4 below. This allows for the interpretative level in chapter 6 to demonstrate the presence of ideological influences and a language of dominance that underlies the metatheory of liberal democratic consolidation theory.


Intertextuality between liberal democracy and liberal democratic consolidation theory is founded upon the relationship between the concepts that comprise the archive of liberal democracy and the subsequent construction of the archaeology of liberal democratic consolidation theory.



**Figure 4: Intertextual representation of conceptual micro-genres of liberal democracy theory and its relationship to liberal democratic consolidation theory**

Similarly, with liberal democracy as the archive of liberal democratic consolidation theory, a dual and reciprocal relationship with the archaeology of liberal democratic consolidation is evident<sup>17</sup>. Essentially, chapter 4 and 5 demonstrates, through the discourse tracing of liberal democratic consolidation theory that an emerging democracy may consolidate on a procedural level, but not on a substantive level. In other words, an emerging democracy may institutionalise political life in the liberal democratic tradition, but will not necessarily be able to guarantee effective regime performance and facilitate the development of a participant political culture. This relationship between procedural and substantive remains reciprocal in that procedural democratic consolidation is only one aspect of liberal democratic consolidation and in the absence of procedural and substantive liberal democratic consolidation theory, an emerging liberal democracy is classified as defective democracy, in Puhle's typology.

<sup>17</sup> Refer to chapter 4 and 5 in the study



**Figure 5: Duality of archive and archaeology of liberal democratic consolidation theory**

The textual level of the critical discourse analysis in this study focuses on deductive categorisation of the theoretical data set, and thus constructed the knowledge archive of liberal democratic consolidation theory as represented in figure 3. In this sense, the shared meaning of the micro-genres is found in the interrelationship between the normative goal of liberal democracy as the ultimate political good, and the elements that must be addressed in order to achieve this ultimate good.

### **2.3. Interpreting discourse: Critical discourse analysis and liberal democratic consolidation theory**

The interpretation of discourse in the social sphere is concerned with the social cognition of the role-players within the market in which the discourse is situated (Van Dijk, 1994: 107; Van Dijk, 2001; LeGreco and Tracy, 2009: 1516). The relationship between discourse and society departs from the premise that discourses are located in societies as a form of social practice or as an interaction between social members of a group and/or institutions (Van Dijk, 1994: 107). Therefore in conducting the discourse analysis, it is important to keep in mind that the “social nature of these relations is traditionally accounted for in terms of speakers and recipients as social actors in the social contexts” (Van Dijk, 1994: 108). This refers to the specific linguistic markets within which the discourse is located. Linguistic markets focus on the discourse as a reflection of the habitués of those who produce the discourse (Ruiz-Ruiz, 2009). The

habitués essentially refers to the discursive competence of subjects within the linguistic markets, and the particular group to which subjects belong coupled with the social experience of belonging based on group membership (Ruiz-Ruiz, 2009). As discourse is dependent upon social position, linguistic markets become the mechanism that establishes and/or maintain unequal value in different discourses (Ruiz-Ruiz, 2009). Indeed, Freedan (1996: 50 – 51) argued that there is a direct relationship between political words and political thoughts in that there is a direct observable relationship between a political word and a political thought. Political concepts, such as liberty, equality and the civic virtue are situated within patterns of ideas concerning the understanding and shaping of political worlds (Freedan, 1996: 51). Therefore, in constructing the interpretative level of the discourse analysis, the social structure of the area in which the discourse takes place is essential. The focus then of the interpretative level of critical discourse analysis falls on dominance and inequality within the theoretical realm where “...central to this endeavour is the analysis of the complex relationships between dominance and discourse” (Van Dijk, 1993: 252).

In executing the critical discourse analysis, the study delineates the society of liberal democratic consolidation theory into Western (mature) and non-Western (emerging) democracies. This delineation is based on the nature of the language within the texts sampled. The language within the text refers to the Western mature democracies as an example from which non-Western emerging democracies must learn. Consequently, the social actors are pitched in a relationship of discursive inequality, as through the linguistic transmission of liberal democratic consolidation theory, the underlying assumption essentially focused on a type of child-parent relationship where non-Western states must learn and emulate the political behaviour of the Western democracies. This became evident in deconstructing the linguistic transmission of liberal democratic consolidation theory, allowed the identification of different actors and the roles that they occupy with the discourse. In addition, models and social attitudes became central to deconstructing the linguistic transmission of liberal democratic consolidation theory. Social attitudes are also central to understanding and interpreting political concepts in that opinions represented in the model must also be contextually specific (Van Dijk, 1994: 110 – 111). Central to the study was thus the deconstruction of liberal democratic consolidation theory’s linguistic transmission, to reveal ideological and philosophical dominance inherent in the language liberal

democratic consolidation scholars use. In conceptualising non-Western discourse, Shi-Xu (2005: 5- 6) stresses that there is not a well-defined conceptual theoretical boundary for non-Western discourse. Non-Western discourse is underpinned by cultural politics geared to the resisting dominance of Western discourse and regain cultural freedom and cultural identity. There are three elements of non-Western discourse: (1) non-Western discourse emerges and is produced by a different cultural and historical background than that of the non-Western world; (2) non-Western discourse deals with the same topics, but in a different way; and, (3) non-Western discourse must be understood from the perspective of colonialism, postcolonialism and neo-colonialism (Shi-Xu, 2005: 5 – 6). For Shi-Xu (2005: 1), non-Western discourse is thus discourses that have been marginalised by the West, but has the capacity to act as “...the agency to reinvent culturally liberating experience and reality” (Shi-Xu, 2005: 6). Spurr (1999: 61 -62) provides an insightful analysis of a *Times* article which make judgement on Africa’s successes and failures. Spurr quotes the article as follows: “A quarter-century after *Uhuru!*, African leaders must recognise that anti-colonial rhetoric may win votes, but it will not solve problems...The legacies of the past must be emphasised”. Spurr’s analysis centres on the representation of the *Times* article as characteristic of Western writing on the developing world by stressing the condescending tone of the article. In this sense, “the failures of Africans are attributed, by implication, to the African character rather than historical causes, as if Africans were somehow incapable of comprehending the value of political stability” (Spurr, 1999: 6). Judging the success of nations in the non-Western context is firmly based on the standards set by the Western world (Spurr, 1999: 63).

This can be seen in the discourses around colonialism and anti-colonialism or the struggle against *empire*<sup>18</sup> and the non-Western world. Christian (2008: 4) in analysing liberal discourse observed that “...the manner in which liberal discourse is spoken by individual and the word choices they use, such as ‘democratic’ or ‘civilised’, authorises social orders and constructs of meaning”. Further to this, if one accepts that “...liberal discourse is referenced in congruence with what white societies represent, this

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<sup>18</sup> Hugo Chavez in pursuing his *social, participatory democracy* stresses that a collision with the American empire is inevitable as he offers a viable alternative to the dominant form of democracy, which is liberal democracy. (War on Democracy, 2007).

connection becomes naturalised and the meaning behind liberal discourse is socially reproduced to represent notions of whiteness” (Christian, 2008:4). Indeed, Adem (2005: 62) observed the civilising themes that dictate the political rhetoric of the War on Terror by placing Iraq in the “...barbarian/civilising dichotomy...”. Further to this, one sees the emergence of African cultural theories of democracy<sup>19</sup>, and as highlighted earlier in this chapter, Asian-inspired models of democracy, or the *Chinese alternative to liberal democracy*. Similarly, one sees the emergence of texts posting Islamic modernity as a response to Western modernisation in the Middle East (Baraz, 2010). Also, the proposed create of a Bank of the South by Venezuela’s Chavez is a response to the perceived dominance and “...debt enslavement...”<sup>20</sup>, and is an attempt to “...liberate the [South America] region's countries from IMF, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IBD) control that condemn millions to poverty through their lending practices” (Lendman, 2010). These are examples of non-Western responses to Western discourse, but it does not form the foundation of the study. This study is concerned with the uncovering ideological and philosophical dominance within the metatheory of liberal democratic consolidation theory, and as such, the focus falls on liberal democratic consolidation theory and the metatheoretical undercurrent of dominance inherent to liberal democratic consolidation theory.

The relationship of philosophical and ideological inequality within liberal democratic consolidation discourse is rooted in the social cognition of liberal democratic consolidation theory within its linguistic market. Social cognition refers to the processes that reproduce dominance and relations of dominance found within the discourse under study and the shared representations of such text (Van Dijk, 1994: 110). For the purposes of the study, social cognition was analysed by deconstructing

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<sup>19</sup> See for example Jinadu, L.A. 2007. Explaining and managing ethnic conflict in Africa: Towards a cultural theory of democracy. Claude Ake Memorial Papers No. 1. Universitetryckeriet: Upsala; and, Fayemi, A.K. 2009. “Towards an African theory of democracy” in Thought and Practice Vol. 1 (1). Pp. 101 – 126.

<sup>20</sup> Debt enslaves in this sense refers to the phenomenon that poor states need new loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to service old loans and are trapped in indebtedness. Strucutural adjustment programme lead to a situation where one finds an ever-growing gap between rich and poor (Lendman 2010).

the physical and social transmission of liberal democratic consolidation theory described in chapter six in the study. Models were central to the deconstruction of the physical transmission of liberal democratic consolidation theory. Models refer to all social perception and action, including the reproduction and interpretation of the discourse, based on mental representations of particular events or episodes (Van Dijk, 1994: 111). In deconstructing the physical transmission<sup>21</sup> of the liberal democratic consolidation theory, the structure of the international system in an increasingly globalising world facilitates inequality. Consider for example, *first world vis-à-vis third world*, and *developed world vis-à-vis developing world*. There is a common understanding that the first world is *better* than the developing world and that to be developed is more gratifying than being developing. Inequality dictates the international system, and therefore, the actors are pitched in a relationship of inequality. It is also inequality, power and dominance that is central to critical discourse analysis. Through constructing the social cognition of the discourse under study, one thus links the discourse to the notion of dominance and enables an explanation of the production, understanding, and influence of the dominant discourse (Van Dijk, 1993: 257). Central to this are power elites within the discourse, who by definition of being elites in the discourse, have special access to the discourse and as such the most say (Van Dijk, 1993: 255). The linguistic transmission of liberal democratic consolidation theory thus stressed the nature of power relations between the Western world (as producers of discourse) and the non-Western world (as recipients of the discourse) as the knowledge archive of liberal democratic consolidation theory is rooted in the Western democratic experience, which reinforces the knowledge archaeology of liberal democratic consolidation theory.

Central the social transmission of liberal democratic consolidation theory is the impact of ideologies on the discourse of liberal democratic consolidation theory. Critical discourse analysis utilises the concept of ideology as the attitudes that are grounded and organised by ideological frameworks that provide coherence and function as the general building blocks and inference mechanism of attitudes (Van Dijk, 1994: 111). Also,

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<sup>21</sup> Physical transmission abstracts metatheory from the physical world, requiring the theorist to isolate variables consistent with their experiences of the environment. For the purpose of this this, liberal democratic consolidation discourse's metatheoretical transmission is found on three levels: domestically with a focus on political elites, internationally with a focus on the export of liberal democracy, and the relationship between economic development and regime performance.

ideologies are regarded as permanent influences bounded by different interests and fundamental for the social cohesion of the group (Van Dijk, 1994: 112). Invariably any attempt to utilise discourse analysis would have to take into consideration the impact of ideologies on political life and theory. As Daniels (1966:71) states: "Ideology is...the only medium of public discourse, the language of politics...". Szalay and Kelly (1982: 585) argued that political ideologies can be a dominant factor in influencing political choices and behaviour observing that through ideological discourse one is able to develop potent political forces when different groups adopt sets of political doctrines that is central to their belief system and guides their actions. Therefore, ideological constructs also influence the social knowledge different groups have about different events. Social knowledge and ideologies are therefore linked in that social members share social knowledge represented in different scripts about socio-political episodes (Van Dijk, 1994: 111). In constructing social knowledge, a system of perceptual-representation will become central in constructing specific social knowledge.

Ideologies are a contributing factor to the spread of liberal democracy and its related theories of consolidation of democracy. An unstated theoretical underpinning of liberal democracy theory is the belief that liberal democracy is the ultimate good that must be constructed to achieve political and economic modernisation.

Essentially, ideology governs the language of discourse. Realities are gradually reconstructed using words which depict different representations of realities. Szalay and Kelly (1982: 586) argue that political ideologies become part of a people's belief system and constitute more or less a sphere in the broader society. Burks (1949: 185) also noted that "this philosophy [ideology] is reducible to an interpretation of history conceived in three stages. There is a prophecy or promise of a favourable termination of the historical process, a theory of the nature of that process, and a postulate of origins, explaining how the particular historical process imagined got started with". In this sense, the archive of knowledge of liberal democracy constitutes the historical process of knowledge development that underpins liberal democratic consolidation theory. The process of democratic development within the transitionology paradigm constitutes the archaeology of liberal democratic consolidation theory in that in order to reach the liberal democratic utopia, states have to implement liberal political institutionalism, generate sufficient liberal democratic regime performance, both



politically and economically, which will eventually lead to the development of a participant political culture.

There is also the link between ideology and subjective culture, (Szalay and Kelly 1990). Szalay and Kelly (1982: 585 – 587) uses a perceptual-representation system when analysing the link between culture and political ideology.<sup>22</sup> This system attempts to determine how political ideology can fit in with a subjective culture. The basic premise of the argument is that “...dominant shared perceptions, beliefs and motivations...[the] psycho-cultural dispositions will predict how the doctrine, if accepted, may be adopted and possibly changed” (Szalay and Kelly 1982: 586). The system will then follow a basic human function of responding to “...configurations of characteristics...” and from these “...extract[ing] from the extensive flow of representation provided by our senses that relatively modest amount which can be effectively stored and used for survival” (Szalay and Kelly 1982: 586). The system is multi-dimensional in that when one utilises perceptions as mental representations, it includes all facets of society<sup>23</sup>. The system also demonstrates immediacy in that there “...is a compelling sense of reality conveyed by perceptions that have the power to order, organise and control human behaviour” (Szalay and Kelly 1982: 587). From this view then interpretations of reality are experienced as a true and accurate reflection or experience of reality. Subjective selectivity is the final characteristic of the system in that the interpretations of reality will depend on a mixture of aspects relating to the experience of reality.


It is within the system of perceptual-representation that the link between discourse, society and cognition can be found. Social cognition mediates discourse and society (Van Dijk, 1994: 113). In this sense, the interpretative level and contextual level of analysis is mediated in that context models of the discourse must have subjective credibility and not be inconsistent with known facts (Van Dijk, 1994: 116). Therefore, the archaeology of liberal democratic consolidation theory is contextualised within the broader knowledge archive of liberal democratic consolidation theory, which is founded within liberal democracy. This renders its metatheoretical structures in line

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<sup>22</sup> Chapter 6 of the study presents this finding.

<sup>23</sup> Szalay and Kelly (1990:586 – 587) states that the dimensions which the system influences “...include the observable dimension and material, human, social, racial, political, and other dimensions used by people to sort and organise experiences”.


with the known history of the Western world and the Western experience. The social transmission of liberal democratic consolidation theory discussed in chapter six stresses the relationship between traditional and modernity and the associated processes of political and economic modernisation and the social reinforcement of political values.



**Figure 6: Discourse-cognition-society interface (Constructed from Van Dijk (1994: 113))**

Further to the discourse-cognition-society interface are the organisational elements of the system of perceptual-representation. Szalay and Kelly (1982: 586) posit that the system has organisational elements. When the perceptual-representation system is organised as a whole, it results in inclusive and dominant world worldviews of different societies (Szalay and Kelly 1982: 586). The system at this level result in the interdependent and representational units organised along identified parameters organised in terms of hierarchy of priorities, relatedness or affinity and affect loading (Szalay and Kelly 1982: 586). This is related to the rhetoric, schemata, and local meaning structures of discourses within their specific linguistic markets. Rhetoric is concerned with the emphasis or de-emphasis of the specific meanings of the discourse (Van Dijk, 1994: 122). This relates to the hierarchy of priorities, which represent representational units that are either more or less salient (Szalay and Kelly, 1982: 586). Schematas refers to global meanings of discourse represented in the topics found within the linguistic markets, and these are usually organised into fixed and conventional categories that form the superstructure of the discourse (Van Dijk, 1994: 119). This relates to the relatedness of affinity as representational units of the discourse that share a great deal of meaning is then indicative of strong views and beliefs (Szalay and Kelly, 1982: 586). Schematas or the relatedness of affinity of the liberal democratic

consolidation discourse was generated through the identification of the micro-genres of liberal democracy at the textual level of analysis and the identification of intertextuality between the micro-genres of liberal democracy (as discussed in chapter three) and topics of liberal democratic consolidation theory in chapter four and five. The final parameter of the critical discourse analysis is that of local meaning; the local coherence achieved under how well they articulate the facts of the mental representations related in the mental models of interpretation and how well they denote intentionality when they denote facts in terms of proportionality and function relative to the discourse (Van Dijk, 1994: 119). For Szalay and Kelly (1982: 586) this refers to affect loading where perceptions and images are re-evaluated and cultures will ultimately be attracted to certain elements of the discourse and repulsed by others. Chapter six captures the essence of local meaning and affect loading in the deconstruction of the linguistic, physical and social transmission of liberal democratic consolidation discourse. This can be represented as follows:



**Figure 7: Three parameters of critical discourse analysis - Constructed from Van Dijk (1994: 117 - 122)**

There is a diversity of culture in the contemporary world and as a consequence of this there will be diverse volumes of knowledge pertaining to democracy. This knowledge will essentially be rooted in the perceptions of reality as they relate to a specific state or nation. Ideology can “...starting with single, more or less isolated, beliefs, political ideologies can progressively expand their influence into larger segments of the system of perceptual representation” (Szalay and Kelly, 1982: 587). The basic concepts of democracy, liberty and equality will depending on which takes precedence, translate into an ideological orientation of the recipient of the discourse. The diversity of economic situations and political orientations see some cultures more prone to liberty and others more appreciative of equality. The dominant cultures that perceive liberty and the most important virtue of democracy is essentially Western in nature, and the

non-Western world expresses a preference for equality, hence the struggle with liberal democracy and a tendency of authoritarianism. Therefore, as highlighted in chapter one, non-Western nations stand accused of merely desiring the economic prosperity of liberal democracy, but not necessarily the political institutionalism and constitutional nature of the socio-political organisation. Thus, the analysis of discourse structures will invariably express the structure of the mental models related to the more permanent social representations such as knowledge, attitudes, and ideologies (Van Dijk, 1994: 122). The consequences of the social representations are found in the knowledge scripts (knowledge archives) and attitudes and ideologies within the context models (archaeology of knowledge). Social representations are crafted by two conditions: (1) ideological framework that reflects the interests of the group dominant within the discourse; and (2) there are already similar social representations that share context and structure (Van Dijk, 1994: 114 – 115). In constructing the second condition, three factors are present: (1) recipients are constantly confronted with similar models; (2) the models are consistent with other knowledge and beliefs that are credible and acceptable, and; (3) the authors of discourses are thought to be reliable.

In deconstructing the discourse of liberal democratic consolidation theory, chapter four and five thus demonstrates that social representation of the actors within its linguistic market are subjected to one constant message: democratise in the liberal tradition. This message is further strengthened by stressing a process approach whereby if non-Western emerging democracies engage in the activities advocated by the elites within the discourse, liberal democratic construction is merely a matter of evolution, modernisation, and political development. Indeed, the focus of critical discourse analysis is the discursive strategies that legitimises control of the discourse and/or naturalises the social order and relations of inequality (Van Dijk, 1993: 254). By constructing political and economic modernisation in the Western tradition as the universal process of modernity, the discourse of liberal democratic consolidation theory resulted in the creation of group-based hierarchies, with the non-Western states acting as the recipients of its discourse, and the Western world, producing the discourse. Therefore, a hegemony was created in that the minds of the dominated was influenced in such a way that they accept dominance and act in the interest of the powerful out of their own will (Van Dijk, 1993: 255).

Deconstructing the nature of power relations in critical discourse analysis is linked to the system of perceptual-representation on three factors. Firstly, there is a need to determine how ideological influences can be traced by comparing the doctrine with people's actual perceptions and meanings. Throughout the study, various examples and *anomalies of democratisation* are represented. The study also utilised data sets from Freedom House and World Values Survey to demonstrate that there are empirical contradictions to the liberal democratic discourse, however, the producers of this discourse, maintain that the non-Western states are incapable of democracy and therefore doomed to perpetual underdevelopment and traditionalism



**Figure 8: Freedom House Map of Freedom in the World (Source: [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org))**World (Source: [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)).<sup>24</sup>

Whilst there are states that are considered to be free in the non-Western world, figure eight demonstrates that freedom (based on liberal democratic criteria) is generally based in the Western world. The entire North America and Europe is free, whilst in the highest concentration of unfree states are on the Asian and African continent.

Secondly, one needs to determine how similarity and distance between various cultural groups can be measured. A central tenet of critical discourse analysis is “...detailed description, explanation, and critique of the ways dominant discourse (indirectly) influence such socially shared knowledge, attitudes, and ideologies” (Van Dijk, 1993: 258 – 259). In describing the archaeology of knowledge of liberal democratic consolidation theory, chapter five delineates the problems of cultivating the liberal

<sup>24</sup> Light grey partly free, medium grey indicate free and dark grey indicates not free. For a full map please refer to Appendix 1.

democratic civic virtue necessary for the substantive democratisation or deepening of democracy. Essentially, the discourse analysis reveals that the values upon which liberal democracy's micro-genres are built are not necessarily interpreted by all actors within the linguistic market of liberal democratic consolidation theory. This links with the need to analyse how deep-rooted cultural views and modern ideologies interact in shaping people's views, their shared subjective, representation of the world and their behaviour. This becomes especially true when assessing liberal democratic consolidation discourse as a form of philosophical and ideological dominance. Indeed, in creating the hierarchy of mature vis-à-vis traditional, the discourse of liberal democratic consolidation theory, instead of creating socially shared representations in its linguistic market, facilitates antagonism and dominance in that mature liberal democracies are thus constructed as power elites dictating to emerging liberal democracies. Therefore, the study, in chapter six, consolidated the focus on the relationship between the discourse structure (archive knowledge and archaeology of knowledge) and the structures of social cognition of actors within the linguistic market of liberal democratic consolidation discourse.

## 2.4. Summary of the method and process in conducting the critical discourse analysis

Culture, ideology and discourse remains intrinsically linked based on the nature of social representations of actors within the linguistic markets. Thus, in deconstructing discourse, Szalay and Kelly (1982: 587) stress that one needs to determine the following: (1) what is the level of compatibility between culture and ideology, and; (2) what are the possibilities of tracing the ideological inferences and influences on the early judgement stages by a particular culture to assess when the ideology became roughly integrated with the culture. In deconstructing the discourse the following elements of perceptual-representation guided the discourse:

**Table 3: A comparison of political ideology and subjective culture**

	Political Ideology	Subjective culture
Psychological and behavioural nature	A system of beliefs organised around a set of abstract doctrines adopted and used by people in their interpretation of social and political issues, events and conditions	A system of subjective representation composed of images and psychological meanings shared by people of the same historical background, similar life conditions, and experiences
Origin	A body of doctrines develops and integrates by one or more political philosophies which is usually	A spontaneous, natural product of heritage of large ethnic or natural collectives which gradually evolves in their

	critical of existing social and political conditions	effort to understand or cope with problems of their existence.
Selected dominant characteristics	<p>Explicit, often forcefully stated opinions</p> <p>Affect-laden solutions based frequently on one-sided critical analysis of the social situation</p> <p>Simplified solutions based frequently on one-sided critical analysis of the social situation</p>	<p>Implicit assumptions built into the system of representation of entire worldviews</p> <p>A subjective worldview</p> <p>Starting from early childhood the system is gradually built through the accumulative learning process</p>
	<p>Categorical conclusions supported by a set of doctrines that reinforce each other by internal logic</p> <p>Although the central assumptions are explicit, the systematic influences are subtle and hidden</p> <p>Centres on political and social domains</p>	<p>Subjectivity and selectivity of the system promoted by the myriad subconscious influences of the social environment</p> <p>Both central assumption and systemic influence are implicit and hidden</p> <p>Encompass all domains of life and influence as well as their relationship.</p>

Source: Szalay and Kelly (1982: 588).

In utilising the above delineation of perceptual-representation, the critical discourse analysis highlights the relationship between the discursive structure and the structures of social cognition of the discourse. Critical discourse analysis requires an analysis of both discursive and social cognition structures, which must be embedded in a broader social, cultural, or political theory of situations, contexts, institutions, groups, and overall power relations that result in or enable the creation of symbolic power structures (Van Dijk, 1993: 259). This study is a macro-level study in that it endeavours to apply a critical discourse analysis to liberal democratic consolidation theory. As a discourse, liberal democratic consolidation theory operates at a global level, within the context of the global spread of liberal democracy. Thus, liberal democratic consolidation discourse facilitates the creation of symbolic power structures between the Western mature democracies and the non-Western emerging democracies.

## 2.5. Concluding remarks

Critical discourse analysis concerns itself with the nature of the discourse from a domination and power-relationship perspective, with a focus on the ideological influence on discourse, manifested in social representations through rhetoric, schematas, and local meanings. Central to executing the critical discourse analysis in

this study is a system of perceptual-representation in identifying and explanation the nature of domination found within liberal democratic consolidation discourse.

Three levels of interpretation form the foundation of the critical discourse analysis employed in the study. First, the textual level that identifies the micro-genres of liberal democracy through a process of deductive categorisation of sample texts, identified using a maximum variation sample whereby texts representative of the liberal democratic tradition were utilised to conduct the textual analysis. The objective here is the categorisation of the discourse and identifying the situation in which the discourse emerged. This will be the task of chapter 3. The description and identification of the knowledge archive of liberal democratic consolidation theory facilitates the contextual analysis at the second level of the critical discourse analysis. The contextual level of analysis demonstrates the archaeology of knowledge of liberal democratic consolidation discourse and also contextualises the theory with an overall aim of understanding the discourse. Intertextuality is central to this level as it demonstrates the relationship between liberal democracy archives and the process of liberal democratic consolidation theory as the archaeology of knowledge. This is central for the final phase of critical discourse analysis: the interpretative level. Central to this level is social cognition of the discourse and the revealing of domination in the relationship between producers and recipients of discourse. Thus, the chapter six draws deductive inferences from the texts analysed in order to construct the metatheory of liberal democratic consolidation theory.



## Chapter 3

### **Constructing the liberal democratic consolidation theory archive: The textual level of analysis**

conduct the textual analysis of the study. The narratives for the textual level of analysis This chapter begins with an overview of the classical works on liberal democracy drawing on a sample of political thinkers that adequately capture the primary themes associated with liberal democracy. Using a maximum variation sampling technique, six classical theorists were selected to be Aristotle, Hobbes, Rousseau, De Tocqueville, and Mill. They form the focus this chapter in executing the textual analysis and therefore the text with which the qualitative content analysis is concerned with. The texts associated with liberal democratic consolidation theory are subjected to the thematic literature review and content analysis at a contextual level in chapter 4 and 5. As the spectrum of classic works is vast, a sample of the works that capture the primary arguments will be analysed. The texts identified are associated with liberal democracy, and as liberal democracy is the *end-product* of liberal democratic consolidation theory, it is essential to lay the textual foundation of liberal democratic consolidation theory with an overview of liberal democracy. The purpose of this overview is to delineate the primary themes that dictate in discourses on liberal democracy in order to demonstrate how they interlink with liberal democratic consolidation theory and its associated process of development and thus facilitates intertextuality between liberal democracy discourse and liberal democratic consolidation theory discourse.

The purpose of the chapter is to identify the micro-genres of liberal democracy as the ultimate goal of liberal democratic political development captured in liberal democratic consolidation discourse. This is done by subjecting the works identified to a qualitative content analysis using MAXQDA software to reduce the texts to the data categories of liberty, equality and the civic virtue. By utilising a method of deductive categorisation, the chapter engages on the meaning of the micro-genres and places the micro-genres in two overarching categories of liberal democracy: procedural and substantive interpretations of democracy. The overarching categories of procedural and substantive democracy (modern interpretations of democracy) become essential for the

contextual level of analysis which subjects liberal democratic consolidation theory to the thematic literature review and content analysis. The critical discourse analysis is the task of chapter 6. As stressed earlier, liberal democratic consolidation scholars have in increased concern with democratic quality of emerging democracies and mature democracies, which relates to the consolidation of liberal democracy on both a procedural and substantive components associated with liberal democratic consolidation. In executing the textual analysis of liberal democracy theory, the chapter thus concerns itself primarily with the construction of the knowledge archive that underpins liberal democratic consolidation discourse by engaging the works of the classical theorists and delineating procedural and substantive description of liberal democracy.

### **3.1 Classical views of liberal democracy – a utopian ideal?**

Democracy is an emotive term used by struggling or oppressed peoples in search of a better life or an alternative to their browbeaten existence through the right to govern themselves. One is able to trace this theme from the Athenian democracy to modern interpretations of what constitutes a democracy. Democracy's morality and noble status lies in its ability to ensure rule by the people or *demos kratos*.

However, *demos kratos* can be manipulated to suit authoritarian agendas. The Red Revolution, for example, inspired a 'people's government' as an alternative to the rule of the Tsar, yet in later years, it was the people who suffered under an oligarchic and elitist one-party form of rule. Every revolution or struggle will contain utopian dream, and as Ebenstein (1969:532) argued, democracy was regarded not a beginning of mankind, but the end product of a society's evolution towards the achievement of freedom. Liberal democracy is seen as the best form of government in that it guarantees both rule of the people and freedom of the polity (Schmitter and Karl, 1991:75, Ranney and Kendall, 1951:431). Democracy it seems is the *catchword of contemporary political discourse* (Schmitter and Karl 1991: 75). Ranney and Kendal (1951: 431) observe that

the use of the word 'democracy' to cover all sorts of variegated and mutually antagonistic ideas and institutions...is by no means peculiar. Spokesmen of the Soviet Union and its satellites describe their one-party elite regimes as 'people's democracies', Stalin assured us, indeed, that they are the only 'true democracies' in the world. Fifteen years ago, Signor Mussolini was hailing

his version of the corporate state as ‘the realisation of true democracy, and Dr Goebbels was proclaiming that the Third Reich was ‘the most ennobled form of modern democratic state’.

These regimes unleashed suffering, horror and terror on their respective polities, but claimed that they were democratic as *the people ruled*. *If the people decide then it must be democracy?* As Stalin asserted; communist states were seen as people’s democracy, for perhaps the reason that all was nationalised and thus all people shared in the redistribution of goods as well as governing, and Hitler was able to obtain the support of the *German people*, thus using his charismatic authority, leadership, and nationalist sentiments that had inspired a nation albeit in a perverse way, to act for a better future for themselves. Ranney and Kendall (1951:431) made a valid point by arguing that all undergo a circular reasoning when dealing democracy in that if individuals believe in democracy the conversion is actually when the word democracy is heard, there an automatic desire to associate with it and so emerges glorified societies and political ideas and ideals.

In tracing the historical construction of liberal democracy one can identify the Aristotle’s influence through the centrality of rule of law and constitutionalism for democratic durability, and the principles of liberty and equality. The influence of the Enlightenment period on a *democratic renaissance* becomes evident in the spread of the ideas of political equality, freedom, and individualism that characterised the development of Western philosophy during the late 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century. The American Revolution and its liberal democratic system also serve as a foundation of analysis through the writings of de Tocqueville and Mill, primarily due to a focus on the liberal institutions of democracy that can best assure liberty and political equality through a form of representative democracy, and can guarantee that tyrannies of majorities are not possible in liberal democratic regimes by formalising protection for minorities. To understand the foundations of liberty, equality and the civic virtue, it becomes essential to deal with the philosophical traditions and themes that informed the development of political thinking surrounding liberal democracy.

### **3.1.1. Aristotle’s *Politics***

The word democracy as used by the Greeks referred to the *demos* and *kratos*, which essentially translate into rule of the people. Although one of the most exclusionary forms of rule, scholars concur that the Greeks captured the essence of a democratic system, that of rule by the people. In this sense, rule is not executed by a monarch or

politically absolute leader, but by citizens debating issues of the state and collectively reaching consensus on a decision.

Liberty is a central theme in Aristotle's *Politics* in that he regards liberty as the basis of democracy and in this sense "...affirms to the great end of every democracy" (Aristotle, 391). In discussing the principle of liberty, Aristotle argued that central to liberty is "...for all to rule and be ruled in turn..." (Aristotle, 391). This requires equality, but Aristotle further distinguishes numerical equality vis-à-vis proportional equality (Aristotle, 391). In this sense, numerical equality is seen as sameness or equality as numbers, while proportional equality deals with justice in that "...some think that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely" (Aristotle, 300). For Aristotle the presence of democratic justice was found in numerical equality and not proportional equality, as in a democracy the majority are absolute.

Aristotle's *Politics* provides an analysis of the typology of regimes describing good and bad political regimes. In his typology, Aristotle identifies and divides political regimes as follows: what he considers true forms are kingly rule, aristocracy, and constitutional government, and its associated perversions are tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy (Aristotle, 174). In this sense, for Aristotle, "...tyranny is a kind of monarchy which as in view the interests of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy, democracy, of the needy; none of them the common good of all". (Aristotle, 174). In defining democracy, Aristotle argued that although there is a tendency to equate democracy with majority rule, this is incorrect, and he conceptualises democracy as where the free rule (Aristotle, 238). Therefore central to the conceptualisation of democracy is an intrinsic relationship between the concepts of freedom and equality. He further posits that democracy being the rule of many, and oligarchy being the rule of rich, that "...oligarchy and democracy are not sufficiently distinguished by these two characteristics of wealth and freedom" (Aristotle, 238). Numerical equality is also an element that must be taken into account in that for democracy to be present, *freemen*, who are also poor must rule (Aristotle, 238). Further to his analysis, Aristotle also distinguishes five types of democracy (Aristotle, 241). First is a democracy founded upon political equality in that both rich and poor are equal and none has more advantage than the other. The second type of democracy is founded on majority rule and the binding decisions of the majority, or a general will. The third type of democracy can be classified as electoral in that magistrates are eligible for

election based on a property qualification and are then elected by the people. A fourth type of democracy is equivalent to a constitutional democracy where the rule of law prevails and the constitutions or law is supreme. The final type of democracy identified by Aristotle is that of a tyranny of the majority whereby the general will of the people are superior to the law and this eventually leads to the creation of demagogues.

The premises of the classical Greek democracy are rooted in a basic belief codes centred on a politically equal rule of the people; however, in an attempt to curb the tyranny of the majority, the polity needed to subject their freedom to the rule of law for the greater good, the so-called moral civic virtue. This is the essence of liberal democracy in that through absconding some freedom to the state, the individual's freedom and political equality is protected. This is also the basic foundation of the social contract (which follows later in the chapter), which is essential in constructing national solidarity around the state. This may be contextualised in terms of Dahl's individual civic virtue, (Dahl, 1982: 142 – 150). Here the interests of the individual are reliant upon the common good and, in turn, the common good is reliant upon individual interests. Dahl further highlights two conditions essential for the individualistic civic culture, namely harmonious interests and perceptions of common good grounded in reality rather than in a *false consciousness* (Held, 1995). Essentially, a sense of solidarity is needed to ensure some form of congruence around public issues, and this solidarity, through discussion, will then lead to decisions in the interest of the majority. A sense of collectivism is introduced, in that individual well-being is in the interest of the individual. Indeed, Aristotle argued that without the moral commitment to justice, "...the community becomes a merely alliance which differs only in place from alliance of which the members live apart" (Aristotle, 188). It is, however, still focused on the individual in the liberal tradition in that society or the common good must act in the interest of the individual, and not the individual in the interest of the common good or society. The relationship between the individual and the common good can thus be described as symbiotic in that if common and individual interests are in harmony, it will be to the good of all. Indeed, Aristotle stated that "...all things should be decided is a characteristic of democracy; this is the sort of equality people desire" (Aristotle, 281). This is also rooted in the conceptualisation of the state by Aristotle. The state, Aristotle argued, is for the purpose of the good life, which means that the state does not exist for *life only*, but *for the share in happiness of free choice*

(Aristotle, 188). Good government is thus found in virtue, which becomes the cornerstone of justice (Aristotle, 188). The moral commitment to justice can only be executed in the civic virtue, which in turn is the only viable means to ensure that democracy prevailed.

The value of Aristotle's *Politics* is that it provided scholars with an inferential relationship between two variables: democracy entails some sort of charter to the people to decide on matters of the state that would invariably impact on their private lives, **and** the active and attentive participation and vital inclusion of the citizenry, whether direct inclusion of all citizens or a sample of citizenry. Saxonhouse (1993:487) states that when analysing the Athenian democracy scholars often assume a peoples' will that will translate into rule of the people, and consequently, the Athenian model is often glorified as the example of popular government and rational engagement on public issues. The concept of democracy is coupled with civic debate on public issues, civic participation in debates on those issues, and a collective decision taken by the ancient Greek civil society.

Rule of the people invariably requires inclusion and participation. These are regarded as fundamental democratic variables in that they form the foundation of rule of the people and act as a precondition for political liberty and political equality necessary for representative democracy.

Liberty and equality are essential ingredients for successful implementation of the liberal democratic ideal. For rule of the people to be present it must be signified by equality of all. In this sense, then, equality in the vote or political equality is an essential concept for rule of the people to prevail. Liberty on the other hand entails sufficient freedom to participate and as such execute rule of the people. Consequently there must be sufficient guarantees for safety to create a safe and enabling environment for rule of the people. Therefore, through equality and liberty an enabling environment is created for rule of the people, and for inclusion and participation. These are the foundations of liberal democratic theory in that freedom of the individual and political equality creates an environment where the individual is free to make choices and stand equally in expressing those choices.

Liberal democratic discourse is also criticised for the possibility of tyranny of the majority. It was not seen as a viable and just means of governing by Aristotle,

(Diamond, 1999:2, Tilly, 2000:1, and Held, 1995:19). But as demonstrated, Aristotle argued that the law must remain supreme in an effort to curb a tyranny of the majority or the creation of demagogues. Saxonhouse (1993:488) states that the Athenian model served as a warning of the excesses of democracy where power of the people is too excessive. He further argued that Aristotle regarded democracy, interpreted as a system where the *multitudes have supreme power*, as a means to create demagogues, which translates into a transgression of good government. Rule of law or good constitution is central for Aristotle when he states that

And in democracies of the more extreme type there has arisen a false idea of freedom which is contradictory to the true interests of the state. For two principles are characteristic of democracy, the government of the majority and freedom. Men think that what is equal; and that equality is the supremacy of the popular will; and that freedom means doing what a man likes. In such democracies, everyone lives as he pleases, or in the words of Euripides, 'according to his fancy'. But this is all wrong; men should not think it slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution; for it is their salvation (Aristotle, 351).

The difficulty of ensuring equality and liberty in a government of popular sovereignty is compounded by the tyranny of the majority. In this sense, minorities may suffer at the hands of a majority. This can be seen as a type of tyranny in that the majority and strength of the legislature far outweighed the voices of civil society in a political sense. It is not to say that those in government are more *equal* than the groups that occupy civil society, but rather to stress the political strength the political elite *vis-a-vis* civil society.

Tyranny of the majority is ascribed to a lack of knowledge lacking from the uneducated on matters of the public may lead to what is now known as the tyranny of the majority where those in power will only rule according to what is in their best interest to do, i.e. an individualist civic culture. Indeed, Aristotle argued that:

But of all the things which I have mentioned that which most contributes to the permanence of constitutions is the adaptation of education to the form of government, and yet in our own day this principle is universally neglected. The best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen of the state, will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the constitution, if the laws are democratical, democratically (Aristotle, 300).

Tyranny of the majority is one of the inherent problems that are associated with liberal democracy as a form of governance. Democracy thus became the curse of many and

oligarchy the curse of few. Democracy as the curse of many sees rule of the people executed according to the interests of those who are in power. Consequently rule of the people is dictated to by the interests of those who occupy political office. Oligarchy focuses on the tyranny of the few, while liberal democracy is able to result in the tyranny of many. Consequently, Saxonhouse (1993:489) is of the opinion that the Athenian model of democracy is best served for rhetorical purposes and has little theoretical significance in that there is a failure to consider the difficulties that surrounding this extreme form of *representative democracy*.

The primary themes emerging from this overview is that liberty, equality, and a civic virtue rooted in a moral commitment to the rule of law formed the basis of Aristotle's work on democracy. Aristotle argued the centrality of rule of law to ensure that a democracy, seen as the rule of *freemen*, does not spiral into a demagogue.

### **3.1.2. The influence of the Enlightenment era: A democratic renaissance?**

The Enlightenment period focused on rationalism and reason as the source for authority and legitimacy. Following the Renaissance period with its focus on self-awareness, the Enlightenment period saw a birth in the legal-rational tradition of liberal democracy. Political equality and the limitation of state power made up the diktat that was in line with the *Zeitgeist* of this era. It is important to note that at this point in history, the most dominant form of rule in the world was that of monarchies and the people had very little say or influence over matters of the state. Church and state were married as it was through divine right that monarchs ruled.

Held (1995:42 - 43) states that the primary contribution of this period to the growth of democracy is the *possibility of self-government* essentially through the institutions of liberal democracy which centred upon guaranteeing individual freedom and rights through majoritarianism. However, this rested upon two interrelated democratic variables: inclusion and participation. The influence of the Enlightenment rooted in rationalism therefore saw freedom in the pursuit of individually chosen paths and the right of people to government themselves as the highest political aspirations, and consequently, rules had to ensure these aspirations were achievable as they were not the agents, but administrators of justice (Held, 1995: 43). Indeed, Gupta, (1999: 2314) highlights that in traditional societies "...citizenship was in the language of duties...[and] in modern liberal democracy...only citizenship can enlarge one's



potential for development...in traditional regimes of duties the state and community were superior to the individual. In the modern [liberal] regime of rights the individual comes before membership to any other organisation”.

The main arguments that emerged in the period of the Enlightenment is the centrality of the individual through his ability to make choices and consequently govern himself as a rational human being; this is the philosophical essence of liberal democratic discourse. Indeed Rousseau noted that “This common liberty results from the nature of man” (Rousseau, 1). Self-government by the people can only be possible through a representative democracy rooted in a liberal social contract and constitutional mechanisms firmly grounded in the doctrine of constitutionalism.

#### **3.1.2.1. *Creating a social contract***

According to Hobbes, man is in a state of nature where there is no higher authority to enforce the agreed upon rules, thus a representative government is needed to ensure that all individuals are able to enjoy complete freedom in a peaceful, equitable and orderly fashion. The obligation of the state is to protect the citizen and enforce rules, whereas the duty of the citizens is to conduct their freedom in a restrained manner. This is evident in the statement:

From this fundamental law of nature...is rederived this law: that a man be willing, when others are too, as for forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contended with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself. For as long as every man holdeth this right, of doing anything he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right, as well as he, then there is no reason for anyone to divest himself of his: for that were to expose himself to prey, which no man is bound to, rather to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the gospel: Whatsoever you that others should do to you, that do ye to them...To lay down a man's right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the same. For he that renounceth or passeth away his right giveth not to any other man a right which he had not before, because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature, but only standeth out of his way that he may enjoy his own original right without hindrance from him, not with hindrance from another (Hobbes, 681).

As the state is a necessary mechanism to govern society, so too democracy becomes a necessary form of government to ensure that the society governs itself through the institutional provisions of the state. In this sense Rousseau states that

This sum of forces can arise only where several persons come together: but, as the force and liberty of each man are the chief instruments of his self-preservation, how can he pledge them without harming his own interests, and neglecting the care he owes to himself? This difficulty, in its bearing on my present subject, may be stated in the following terms: *‘The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before’* This is the fundamental problem of which the *Social Contract* provides the solution (Rousseau, 6).

In the social contract a distinction is made between natural liberty and civil liberty in that:

What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses. If we are to avoid mistake in weighing one against the other, we must clearly distinguish natural liberty, which is bounded only by the strength of the individual, from civil liberty, which is limited by the general will; and possession, which is merely the effect of force or the right of the first occupier, from property, which can be founded only on a positive title (Rousseau, 8).

What is evident from this thesis of rule is that a system is interpreted as a means of conflict management rooted in a rational choice by the people. The basic premise is that there must be some form of authority that can regulate the interests of society to the benefit of all. It is important to note that *all* in this sense implies that society “...is assumed to contain large elements of ‘naturalness’...since they are...the products of rational contractual association” (Chatterjee, 1997: 31 – 32). Indeed, Hobbes argued that

what Rights we pass away, when we make a Common-wealth; or (which is all one,) what Liberty we deny ourselves, by owning all the Actions (without exception) of the Man, or Assembly we make our Sovereign. For in the act of our Submission, consisteth both our Obligation, and our Liberty; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from hence; there being no Obligation on any man, which ariseth not from some Act of his own; for all men equally, are by Nature Free. And because such arguments, must either be drawn from the express words, "I Authorise all his Actions," or from the Intention of him that submitteth himself to his Power, (which Intention is to be understood by the End for which he so submitteth). The Obligation, and Liberty of the Subject, is to be derived, either from those Words, (or others equivalent) or else from the End of the Institution of Sovereignty; namely, the Peace of the Subjects within themselves, and their Defence against a common (Hobbes, 210).

Liberal democracy therefore requires that a mandate be given to a higher authority to stabilise social and political life so that no citizen is treated unfairly and unequally. Invariably, this points to a restriction on society from the state. That is, if freedom is the ultimate guarantee for society, the state must limit certain freedoms. Equality is the fundamental principle that allows limitations on the conduct of society. This is necessary to ensure that freedom is guaranteed this limitation in order to ensure equality. This is expressed by Rousseau who states that

if we ask in what precisely consists the greatest good of all, which should be the end of every system of legislation, we shall find it reduce itself to two main objects, liberty and equality — liberty, because all particular dependence means so much force taken from the body of the State and equality, because liberty cannot exist without it. Every system of legislation, we shall find it reduce itself to two main objects, liberty and equality — liberty, because all particular dependence means so much force taken from the body of the State and equality, because liberty cannot exist without it (Rousseau, 23).

By stating that “...the condition of mere Nature, that is to say, of absolute Liberty, such as is theirs, that neither are Sovereigns, nor Subjects, is Anarchy, and the condition of war” (Hobbes, 321), Hobbes’ thesis also has an element of Machiavellianism. Here human nature is viewed in an essentially negative light, i.e. man is by nature selfish and will only act in his self-interest to ensure survival, a concern shared by Aristotle. This is evident in the statement:

...if there were no civil laws nor Commonwealth at all...for as amongst the masterless men, there is perpetual war of everyman against his neighbour; no inheritance to transmit to his son, nor to expect from the father; no propriety of goods or lands; no security; but a full an absolute liberty in every particular man: so in states and Commonwealths, not every man, has absolute liberty to do what it shall judge, that is to say, what man or assembly that representeth it shall judge, most conducing to their benefit (Hobbes, 780).

Therefore, by institutionalising limitations on liberty, the self-interest of the individual is curtailed to the greater benefit of all. This social contract is equivalent to designing democratic institutions. A democratic rule needs to safeguard these people from the state of nature in order to ensure that socio-political conduct is fair, orderly and equitable. Hobbes’ analysis emerged from the foundation of equality able to guarantee freedom. Everyone is entitled to the same protection of the state regardless of intellectual capability and physical strength, and so forth. In essence, all are entitled to be freed from the state of nature as all citizens are equal by nature. This is evident in

Rousseau's statement that "each citizen would then be perfectly independent of all the rest, and at the same time very dependent on the city; which is brought about always by the same means, as the strength of the State can alone secure the liberty of its members" (Rousseau, 25). Government, which Hobbes equates to a Commonwealth, is thus "an intermediate body set up between the subjects and the Sovereign, to secure their mutual correspondence, charged with the execution of the laws and the maintenance of liberty, both civil and political" (Rousseau, 27).

Although the focus of Rousseau's work was essentially freedom, the idea of democracy as an institutionalised tool for conflict management comes to the fore. What becomes evident from Rousseau's social contract is that all are equal, free and need a higher authority to guarantee freedom within the state. Liberty and equality have to be guaranteed through the implementation of the social contract. The government as chosen by the people needs to be vigilant to ensure the freedom of the individual. Thus, what is of importance is that the people collectively must share in the power of the chosen collective authority aimed at protecting individual freedom as well as guarantee the principle of political equality. As Held (1995:57-58) argued that Rousseau envisioned direct citizen involvement in the enactment of laws that governed them and consequently saw a civic virtue as an active and involved citizenry. The essence of this view, Held continues, is the formation of a liberal democratic society where public affairs are integrated into the private realm and sovereignty, originating from the people, will ultimately remain of the people.

From this thesis citizens remain free and sovereign in their socio-political conduct; however, it is the duty of government to ensure the implementation of the general will. For the general will to be implemented, the civic culture as identified by the Greeks needs to be present. Only through participation and inclusion can the general will be made known, and duly implemented.

From both Hobbes and Rousseau, one can deduce that the rule of the people remains central, but limitations are placed on the rule of the people, in that the state or ruling authority now needs to manage diverse interests to ensure that no-one's freedom is infringed upon, while guaranteeing equality. It is only through the ruling authority as embodied in the laws and rule of law that society can successfully govern; in other words constitutionalism through legal-rational authority. The contribution of Rousseau

and Hobbes is that a liberal democratic form of governance is essentially aimed at managing conflict and diverse interests and giving political recognition to the identities present within a state boundary. All citizens are afforded equality and freedom, and limitations are placed upon society to ensure equality and peace for all citizens. However, Hobbes and Rousseau operated from the premise of a *naturalness* of identity within a certain political society.

For Hobbes and Rousseau, state and civil society relations are similar to that of Aristotle's conceptualisation. Their interpretation of civic virtue is that society must be willing to surrender some freedoms and rights in order to ensure equality and freedom for all. Civic virtue in this sense may be seen as limiting behaviour and actions to ensure the greatest good for the greatest numbers, which may be translated into majoritarianism. Participation is essential, but there must be certain limits on how participation is to be executed. Institutions of the state become necessary to ensure civic virtue in this sense prevails.

O'Dwyer (2003: 40) argued that there are essentially two classic liberal political ideals: first, liberty recognised through fundamental, natural human rights such as life, property, freedom of association, speech, religion, and freedom of choice; and second, equality in that all citizens are entitled to exercise these rights irrespective of their station in life, political affiliation, sexual orientation, racial group, or religious devotion. For O'Dwyer the essence of the social contract is a bill of rights that captures an essentially Western view of fundamental and natural human rights.

### **3.1.2.2. *Tocqueville and Mill: Balancing the tyranny of the majority***

The liberal thinkers, Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill, highlighted an ambiguity in the ideal of liberal democracy. Tocqueville stated that "I hold it to be an impious and execrable maxim that, politically speaking, a people has a right to do whatsoever it pleases; and yet I have asserted that all authority originates in the will of the majority" (Tocqueville in Ebenstein, 1969: 547). This is evident in his statement that

At periods of equality men have no faith in one another, by reason of their common resemblance; but this very resemblance gives them almost unbounded confidence in the judgment of the public; for it would not seem probable, as they are all endowed with equal means of judging, but that the greater truth should go with the greater number (Tocqueville, 9).

The primary premise of Tocqueville's analysis stemmed from a concern with the tyranny of the majority in his thesis *Democracy in America* in that "the same equality which renders him independent of each of his fellow-citizens taken severally, exposes him alone and unprotected to the influence of the greater number" (Tocqueville, 9). This concern was not new as it was also shared by Aristotle in the Ancient Greek democracies when the majority, in the absence of law could lead the *constitution* into a demagogue.

Tocqueville essentially argued for two principles, that of separation of power and checks and balances. If these institutional devices were in place, the risk of tyranny of the majority would be minimised. The problem of individual civic culture will be replaced by an organic civic culture *where one moves beyond the self to the collective* (Dahl, 1982:142 – 150). The majority will be controlled should it become perverse thus guaranteeing freedom and equality for all. Equality and freedom are assured as the majority still govern, although it will be controlled through the institutional devices of separation of powers and a system of checks and balances, which will ensure that equality leads to liberty and liberty leads to equality. In this sense, Tocqueville argued:

The principle of equality may be established in civil society, without prevailing in the political world. Equal rights may exist of indulging in the same pleasures, of entering the same professions, of frequenting the same places — in a word, of living in the same manner and seeking wealth by the same means, although all men do not take an equal share in the government. A kind of equality may even be established in the political world, though there should be no political freedom there. A man may be the equal of all his countrymen save one, who is the master of all without distinction, and who selects equally from among them all the agents of his power. Several other combinations might be easily imagined, by which very great equality would be united to institutions more or less free, or even to institutions wholly without freedom. Although men cannot become absolutely equal unless they be entirely free, and consequently equality, pushed to its furthest extent, may be confounded with freedom, yet there is good reason for distinguishing the one from the other. The taste which men have for liberty, and that which they feel for equality, are, in fact, two different things; and I am not afraid to add that, amongst democratic nations, they are two unequal things (Tocqueville, 72).

This however requires the presence of a strong allegiance to the nation-state. For Tocqueville, the American democracy had an advantage over its French counterpart in that "the great advantage of the Americans is that they have arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution; and that they are born equal, instead of becoming so" (Tocqueville, 78). He judges the success of the American democracy based on its institutions in that "the Americans have combated by

free institutions the tendency of equality to keep men asunder, and they have subdued it” (Tocqueville, 79). Similarly, the fact that the *magistrates* are elected adds to the success of the American democracy (Tocqueville, 80). In this sense, the French fear of equality of condition is curtailed by political freedom (Tocqueville, 81). However, he does stress that no society will ever obtain the degree of equality *desired by men* (Tocqueville, 104).

This constant interaction in political life leads to the creation of a common identity in that

The general affairs of a country only engage the attention of leading politicians, who assemble from time to time in the same places; and as they often lose sight of each other afterwards, no lasting ties are established between them. But if the object be to have the local affairs of a district conducted by the men who reside there, the same persons are always in contact, and they are, in a manner, forced to be acquainted, and to adapt themselves to one another... Local freedom, then, which leads a great number of citizens to value the affection of their neighbours and of their kindred, perpetually brings men together, and forces them to help one another, in spite of the propensities which sever them (Tocqueville, 79 -80).

Consequently, Tocqueville states that “democracy does not attach men strongly to each other; but it places their habitual intercourse upon an easier footing” (Tocqueville, 127). Because all citizens of a democracy are bound by equality and their interests, there will be a tendency to mutual assistance (Tocqueville, 132). Similarly, democracy also leads to the creation of classes and changes the nature of interaction between master and servant by placing them in relative positions (Tocqueville, 132 - 133). In this sense,

It is in vain that wealth and poverty, authority and obedience, accidentally interpose great distances between two men; public opinion, founded upon the usual order of things, draws them to a common level, and creates a species of imaginary equality between them, in spite of the real inequality of their conditions (Tocqueville, 136).

Alexis de Tocqueville's argument can be represented as follows:




Figure 9: Diagrammatic representation of Tocqueville's argument

Emerging from Tocqueville's thesis were two broad types of democratic regimes which differed on the basis of political culture and state-civil society relations. The first democracy, or good prototype, is synonymous with a liberal democratic order in that there is order and authority through a social contract, each citizen understands their obligations and rights, and they perform the obligations freely whilst pursuing their own self-interest. The second democracy, or bad prototype sees limited authority of the state due to an absence of a social contract, and a political culture rooted in self-interest, suspicion, and hatred between classes, groups and citizens (Maletz 1998:516). An element of *state of nature* is found in the *second democracy* identified by Tocqueville. In this *democracy* citizens are reluctant to surrender their interests and freedoms to the higher authority of the state by entering into a social contract. Freedom and equality are compromised as the state is seen as a vehicle of dominance, there to serve the interest of those who control it in the absence of a commitment to the rule of law, an argument posited by Aristotle and similar to that of Hobbes' state of nature.

Should one apply the views of democracy as captured by Tocqueville, one will see that the *good* prototype is in essence liberal democracy where institutions foster cooperation to ensure survival of the community. The civic virtue stipulated by the *first type of democracy* sees the state fostering institutions that attempt to ensure maximum cooperation through participation. Peace is guaranteed as civil society knows that only through cooperation they can ensure the greatest good for the greatest number. By stating that *law is majesty*, Tocqueville argued that the institutions of democracy are the ultimate conflict management tool as civil society respects the institutions of



government and candidly relinquish rights and liberties to ensure equality through cooperation, which will guarantee constitutionalism and legal-rational authority. In this sense, the rule of law thus prevails.

Civic virtue is what the *second type of democracy* is lacking due to a prevailing *state of nature* ensures that civil society will participate through means not necessarily provided for by the authorities of the law within a state. These institutions are coverings for the interests of those who govern and civil society must engage in behaviour that does not necessarily attempt to maximise cooperation.

Freedom and equality are not present in this *bad prototype* of democracy due to the unwillingness to adhere to the institutions of government, which may not be legitimate in the eyes of the polity or the lack of desire to support multipartyism so as to truly exercise the liberty of choice. In the *bad prototype*, the institutions of government exacerbate conflict as it is merely a puppet played at the whim of those who are in power, or acts as a measure where the state dominates civil society and, consequently, the people. Excluded groups will engage in behaviour deemed necessary to ensure their survival or recognition of rights. The result is that the ruling elite are thus obliged to use oppression to ensure that they remain in power, or civil societies are so weak that they do not challenge government. Therefore, similar to Aristotle's argument, Tocqueville stresses that injustice can lead to revolution.

Consequently, inequality, conflict, domination and chaos prevail in the *second type of democracy*, while in the *first type of democracy* equality is innate as the *commune* in the *pre-constitutional era* was forced to cooperate in order to survive (Maletz, 1998: 520 – 521). The civic virtue fostered the growth of the utopian democracy captured by Tocqueville as the civic spirit was cultivated through an active public and political life and consequently, “the early communities were ‘completely democratic and republican’ internally...” (Maletz, 1998:521).

What is evident from the writings of Tocqueville and Mill is that civil society developed a *civic spirit* due to a common identity, i.e. settlers in the Americas. Should this common identity as a nation be absent, the civic spirit may not have sprouted from the necessity to ensure equality as survival depended upon cooperation.

Mill's contribution to liberal democratic theory resonates with some ideas captured by Tocqueville, specifically pertaining to the tyranny of the majority (Qualter, 1960: 883). Mill's posits inalienable individual rights in that

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws (Mill, 4).

He argued that freedom can only be assured if there are certain limitations imposed on the majority as *no individual must impose nuisance on another* (Mill, 39). *On Liberty* argued that: state limitations are necessary in that it is only through certain limitations imposed by and on the state that freedom can be guaranteed. A system of checks and balances proved essential to ensure a balanced division of power within the state accompanied by fundamental human rights which, if infringed upon, call for a "...general rebellion ... to be held justifiable" (Mill in Ebenstein, 1969: 564).

What is evident here is that a strong argument for a basic Bill of Rights. Indeed, Mill states that

The spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of liberty, for it may aim at forcing improvements on an unwilling people; and the spirit of liberty, in so far as it resists such attempts, may ally itself locally and temporarily with the opponents of improvement; but the only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are as many possible independent centers of improvement as there are individuals" (Mill, 50).

Certain freedoms may not be imposed on, and in the event of such imposition, the ruler's position of authority must be revoked. Freedom of expression is regarded as the most divine of all human rights in that no-one has the right to silence another (Qualter 1960:884). This is evident in his discussion on Mormonism, in which he argued that as much personal disdain he demonstrates for Mormonism due to the sanctioning of polygamy, Mill does argue that it is an individual choice (Mill, 68 – 70). He continues to argue, with regard to Mormonism, that as much as there is a strong will to *civilise* the Mormon community, Mill was unaware that "...any community has a right to force another to be civilised" (Mill, 70). Therefore, "the reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a person's voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty" (Mill, 70). Tyranny of the majority in silencing minorities for their own benefit and self-

interest was central to Mill's thesis, similar to those concerns raised by Aristotle. Qualter (1960: 884) posits that Mill's argued that

such phrases as 'self-government', and the 'power of the people over themselves', do not express the true state of the case. The 'people' who exercise power are not always the same people as those over whom it is exercised; and the 'self-government' spoken of is not the government by each for himself, but each by all the rest.

Self-government in this sense is merely a game of numbers in that the phrase therefore is merely an issue of numbers in that the most abundant population may indeed oppress the minorities within their midst (Qualter 1960: 884). In an attempt to ensure the true liberty and equality of the electorate, there are necessary limitations on state power that must be implemented. This will guarantee that the tyranny of the majority, no matter how strong the will of the majority, is curbed in that political elites who hold power are held accountable for their actions and decisions. The premise is that power is held by society, however, if civil society happens to *issue a wrong* mandate that may undermined the rights of minorities, a form of social tyranny emerges (Qualter 1960: 884). Consequently, independent judiciaries are not enough, but needs to be extended to prevailing nostrum within civil society through limiting individual liberty (Qualter 1960: 884).

Civic virtue needs to guard against the imposition and perversion of the majority to ensure that liberal democracy does not become a means of oppression through a tyranny of the majority. Civic virtue is thus a great responsibility - that of behaviour which one is accountable to and decisions through the institutions of government to ensure that societal tyranny does not prevail. Liberties are a given, but those liberties must be limited to some extent and the civic culture must allow for such limitations. Powers of institutions must be separated and as a result will ensure freedom and equality.

The state is given the mandate to act as caregiver and caretaker of the citizens, while authority still remains within civil society. The state must engage in the necessary activities and steps in order to ensure that the citizenry remains equal and free. Here the state obtains the role of protector of liberties and equality, as well as administrator and the provider of basic necessities vital to survival.

However, what is of importance is that due to the nature of the association of the mandate of society to govern, liberal democracy is generally regarded as the most virtuous form of government. It is justified that, due to the essential characteristic of rule of the people, it is the only acceptable form of democracy. Rule of law is guaranteed through its institutions as captured by the classical thinkers and attempts are made to protect those who go against the grain of the majority. Political liberty and political equality are the ideals that liberal democracy promises to guarantee.

This can only be guaranteed through the civic virtue or the principles of inclusion and participation. From this perspective then, it is the duty of all citizens to participate in political life to ensure *rule of the people*.

Liberal democracy is understood as the best form of government precisely because *sovereignty* is vested in the people, thus rendering the polity in charge of their own destiny through the creation of appropriate laws that would govern them without prejudice and ensure political equality. The foundation, upon which liberal democracy becomes an idealised way of life, is that human kind is by nature free and equal, and should thus have the right to be governed through a popular sovereignty, which requires political equality of all citizens. With regard to freedom, there must be limitations on freedom as decided upon by the majority, for no man can flourish in a *state of nature* or in the absence of an authority to which the people relinquish some freedoms. Only through a system of governance in which the people govern themselves can freedom and equality be guaranteed.

There is a warning to guard against the tyranny of the majority whereby the majorities will rule in their advantage and not take cognisance of the liberty and equality of other social groups. Although liberal democracy is seen as the embodiment of a system of governance that can ensure liberty and equality, it is also one of the most difficult to attain. For liberal democracy can also limit equality and freedom through the tyranny of the majority. The ideal is a free and equal society that is sovereign through governing their society according to policies made as a collective. Freedom is restricted to ensure equality, and equality ensures freedom in that all are protected by the principle of equality. In essence, classical theory dictates that liberal democracy translates into a limited government of the people in which all are free and equal to govern themselves and thus embody sovereignty of the people through rule of the

people, and the moral and ethical conscientiousness to guard against domination that may occur from the irresponsible majority rule.




Figure 10: Diagrammatic representation of the concepts of liberal democracy from classical theory

With this model in mind and the foundation of liberal democracy theory as applicable to this study is outlined. This will serve as a foundation for the discussion on procedural and substantive interpretations of liberal democracy. Given the ambiguity that surrounds interpreting liberal democracy's principles, the academic world distinguishes between procedural and substantive interpretations of equality. This distinction is rooted in an interpretation of the social contract and curbing tyranny of the majority and how to guarantee political equality and liberty.

### 3.2. Modern interpretations of democracy: The procedural and substantive traditions

Modern views of liberal democracy capture the essence of the arguments of the classical authors. The concept of civic virtue was translated into that of inclusion and participation. Freedom, equality, and rule of the people all translate into the guarantee of liberty and equality. These attributes of liberal democracy that emanated from the classical period can be seen in the development of the procedural and substantive interpretations of liberal democracy. Interpreting liberal democracy in contemporary theory is a complex process that needs to be a balance between the minimalist and maximalist definitions of democracy. The primary argument that comes through from

theory is that stability is guaranteed through the institutions of the liberal democratic process and the socio-economic improvement of citizens, i.e. a responsive government.

The procedural or minimalist definition of liberal democracy highlights descriptive indicators like elections, multipartyism as the foundation of political organisation and constitutionality as a means of government succession rooted in the presence of the rule of law (Qadar, Clapham, and Gills, 1993:416). The procedural interpretation of liberal democracy captures the essence of the values and ideals stipulated by the classical works, albeit from an operational stance focusing on the workings of liberal democracy through its institutions, processes, and procedures. In the era of absolutist monarchies, democracy theorists praised the ability of people to choose their own rulers, the ideals of freedom and equality are ensured through the systems associated with constitutionalism and the rule of law, and the inherent accountability of the rulers to the people through periodic elections. Thus, the institutional dimension of liberal democracy is facilitated through the procedural definition of democracy. One may argue for practical purposes that the procedural definition of liberal democracy captures the institutionalised nature of the democracy as foreseen by the classical theorists. In addition, the procedural definition allows for comparisons between different case studies to assess the level of liberal democracy.

The substantive or maximalist definition of liberal democracy, however, focuses on redistributive issues such as socio-economic reform necessary for broadened political participation, social justice and human rights (Qadar, Clapham, and Gills, 1993:416). With the expansion of the debate surrounding liberal democracy from the procedural views, an element of equality is introduced in that proceduralists would concur that the institutional and operational requirements of liberal democracy cannot be sustained if not legitimised by responsive governments to the human needs of the polity (Qadar, Clapham, and Gills, 1993:416).

The basic premise from this argument can be traced back to the hierarchy of needs as captured by Maslow in that basic human needs for food, shelter, security and esteem have to be met in order to ensure human beings are fulfilled and secure which, in a group, will lead to relative cohesion, and in a diverse society, should lead to stability. Needs theory to conflict pioneered by authors like Burton, place social rights such as recognition at the centre of many intrastate conflicts. If one group or some segments of

the group are void of needs satisfaction, this will lead to conflict. Liberal democracy, whether procedurally or substantively, attempts to ensure needs attainment in issues of governance and access to political power by providing formal political equality and liberty to all citizens of the state. Liberal democracy also assumes that when granted political equality and liberty, the polity will operate within the boundaries of its institutions, processes and procedures in order to obtain a piece of the proverbial redistributive pie, whether these are economic, social, or political benefits of citizenship. In addition, without basic needs being met, there is a limited chance that the people will participate in the electoral process and will endure *de facto* exclusion. Indeed, Burton (1988: 53) cited in Bradshaw (2007) posits that if societal norms inhibit the satisfaction of basic human needs of groups that compose the polity, the group will decide that the institutions, processes and procedures geared towards needs attainment are not conducive to their needs attainment and will consequently operate outside those institutions. In other words, excluded groups may decide that elections are not necessarily conducive to guaranteeing some form of political recognition and protection, and may consequently engage in other acts such as sabotage and secessionist activities in order to create a political society where they may meet their basic human needs. Social norms will thus no longer inhibit group behaviour, as it may be those social norms that fuels the perception of exclusion; a concern which Mill's had expressed in his writings.

Sartori (1987:298) states that "the difficulty of our theme [is] compounded by the fact that the term freedom, and the assertion 'I am free' stand for the kaleidoscope and variety of human life itself...it will be sufficient for us to consider this chameleon-like work in one specific context: freedom in politics". As a result, liberal democracy is the move towards rule of the people and away from rule by the one of the few. From this viewpoint, dictatorship limits freedom whereas liberal democracy guarantees freedom through the democratic process. It should be reiterated that the ideal is political liberty and the associated concepts of procedural liberal democracy.

### **3.2.1. The procedural definition of liberal democracy**

The formal institutions of liberal democracy attempt to attain an equitable distribution of power among groups. Through institutionalising power, liberty and equality are guaranteed. Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens (1997:323) highlight that formal democracy is synonymous with institutions of liberal democracy in that it refers to a

political system founded on four basic principles: regular and relatively free and fair elections, universal suffrage, state accountability through holding elected representatives accountable and the guarantee of fundamental liberal human rights. The diffusion of political power in this sense entails that all which competes in the system of liberal democracy do so equally, and as such, political equality dictates. It also ensures choice within a representative democracy through the principle of multipartyism. For this reason then, liberal democracy is generally regarded as a better alternative to any imposed government, primarily because it guarantees political equality and political liberty and political choice through rule of the people. Sartori (1987:298) states that “it was easy to concoct democracy; we never coined the word free-cracy”. In this sense, freedom must be guaranteed through the liberal democratic process upon which procedural justifications for liberal democracy are dependent. This democratic process in turn is dependent upon the doctrine of constitutionalism to ensure political equality in the liberal democratic process. Consequently, political liberty is dependent upon the *majesty of law* through legal-rational authority.

The procedural interpretation of liberal democracy can be seen as ensuring the mechanisms for freedom and political equality are present. It essentially points to a form of representative democracy through a commitment to multipartyism, political equality and liberty in the execution of political choices in choosing the incumbents of the representative system. From the work of Qadar, Clapham and Gills (1993) one will note that the minimalist interpretation in this sense defines liberal democracy according to its institutions (the mechanisms used to implement the general will, and ensure freedom and equality), as well as the revival of the civic virtue. Thus, the polity is required to participate in the mechanisms that ensure the endurance of this democratic process, as liberal democracy is aimed at the general will, freedom and equality. Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens (1997:324) state that formalising political decision at regular intervals leads to a genuine advantage and accountability of representatives elected into power restrains the abuse of this power.

Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens (1997:324) continue that formal democracy expands on the prospect of participatory and social democracy. Therefore, by institutionalising democracy through liberal democratic institutions, processes and procedures, a higher degree of responsive and redistributive government is generated through the logic of representative democracy. The logic is quite simple: for a liberal



democracy to survive on a substantive level there need to be procedural elements in place. This is primarily due to what stability and routine procedures and institutions bring to governance and political life. Political equality is also then guaranteed through stability of the liberal democratic process as well as the principles of the doctrine of constitutionalism. Consequently, Dahl (1971:2) argued strongly for a responsive government where the polity is able to formulate their preferences, engage in collective or individual action to show their preference and to have their preferences evaluated equally at state level in the absence of any form of discrimination. For that reason, Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens (1997:325) identify the following conditions necessary for procedural democracy: (a) a balance of class power; (b) the structure of state-civil society relations<sup>25</sup>; and (c) the transnational structures of power in the international economy and the state system<sup>26</sup>.

Dahl's work in this sense focuses on the internal dynamics of the liberal democratic process. The focus falls on how civil society interacts with government, the process of setting the political and redistributive agenda and actions that influence such decisions, and how a decision is reached. Huber *et al* focus on the structural arrangements that impact on the liberal democratic process, both nationally and internationally.

A work that is closely related to that of Dahl (1971) is that of Mayo (1962) nine years earlier. Mayo (1962:555 – 556) identified four criteria necessary for a liberal democracy: (a) public policies are made by representatives on a majority rule; (b) the representatives are elected periodically; (c) political equality of voting prevails with the universal franchise and the familiar rule of one person one vote; and (d) the presence of political liberties. The basic premise of Mayo's analysis is one of legal-rational authority, a tradition born from the Enlightenment period. Mayo's work argued for the entrenchment of certain political freedoms as divine, while simultaneously ensuring that the processes of elections, policy-making and agenda-setting do not infringe on freedoms and can guarantee equality as it is a position and not necessarily in an individual or political party.

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<sup>25</sup> i.e. the institutions of civic virtue or inclusion and participation and balance of power

<sup>26</sup> Invariably the international economic arena will affect how the state is able to maintain policies hence the compatibility thesis

Thus, procedurally, this view of liberal democracy is an institutionalised means of interest management and aggregation in order to attempt to ensure that the will of the majority is adhered to, while attempting to give equal weight to concerns of the minorities. Therefore, for Mayo, liberal democracy is a "...system is one which institutionalises popular control of policy-makers, and this popular control may be called 'the broadest, most general, the highest-level principle of democracy, underlying and unifying the separate principles'" (Mayo 1962:556). From this it can be concluded that only through the legal-rational authority associated with the liberal democratic process that freedom and equality (political) is guaranteed. Thus, the institutional dynamics and mechanics of this democratic process guarantee liberty and political equality, and political equality in turn is guaranteed through the doctrine of constitutionalism.

Diamond (1999:3 – 5) presents a strong argument for the necessity of liberal democracy to guarantee freedom of the people. His argument presents three instrumental ways in which democracy is central to freedom. Firstly, democracy allows relatively free and fair elections which facilitate freedom of expression, assembly, and organisation, and the right of opposition political parties, which is separate to basic human rights or civil liberties. Secondly, self-determination is guaranteed under democracy, as by choosing for a particular government, people consent to rule of the majority, and as such govern themselves. Finally, democracy facilitates choice, which Diamond equates with moral autonomy, in that each individual makes normative political choices, thus governing themselves. Therefore, for Diamond (1999: 5), "...the democratic process promotes human development (the growth of personal responsibility and intelligence) while also providing the best means for people to protect and advance their shared interest".

In essence, Diamond's argument captures the minimum set of requirements for the procedural definition of liberal democracy as coined by Dahl (1971). These rights form the centre of the civic virtue by allowing political inclusivity and participation and are conceptualised by Dahl as follows: (1) the right for the opposition parties to exist and challenge governments-of-the-day; (2) the right to form political organisations; (3) the right to challenge or express an opinion of government with fear of arbitrary action by the state; (4) the right to information and different perspectives and standpoints on different political and socio-economic issues; (5) the right to cast a vote by secret ballot where the polity has a choice between competing political alternatives; and, (6)

the agreement that losing political candidature is not a reason to violently and unconstitutionally claim political office.

Through the institutional nature of the liberal democratic process popular control is institutionalised and therefore this institutionalised core becomes the common characteristic which all liberal democracy share (Huntington, 1996: 109; and Mayo 1962:559). The themes identified through the works of Hobbes and Rousseau are evident that in the act of institutionalising political and governance activities in the liberal democratic process, one is acting in such a way to ensure majority rule while attempting to balance minority concerns. Consequently, institutionalising the social contract ensures that tyranny of the majority is curbed. Therefore Huber *et al* (1997:325) post that formal democracy becomes a means of power and power sharing.

Formal or procedural democracy is overly concerned with the social contract. For Diamond (1990: 49 - 50) democracy is the institutionalised competition for power, however, as essential as competition and conflict are for liberal democracy, it must be done within clearly defined and universally accepted boundaries. For Barsch (1992:121) central to liberal democracy is power sharing amongst diverse groups that comprise the polity and grounded in the acceptance that all who comprise the polity has a basic right to express views and compete for the opportunity to make or influence decisions. Barsch further highlights that by “...this is not precisely ‘consent by the governed’, as groups may be bound by decisions they oppose. Rather, contemporary democracy represents...a system that gives legal recognition to more than one organisation of interest”. The liberal democratic process then becomes the process through which diverse interests are aggregated in order to ensure stability through the institutional management of conflicting needs and interests. Furthermore, the institutional nature of liberal democracy allows for democratic legitimacy of decisions taken by the majority, whilst not imposing on the rights of minorities.

There is a fallacy associated with this view in that there is an automatic assumption that an equal pluralist society is in place. In many cases in the non-Western world, pluralism is to the detriment of stability in that co-habiting groups still cling to ethnic and culturally defined social systems, ways of engagement and stigmas, or are encouraged to do so through the liberal democratic systems and a process of ethnic mobilisation, which can result in genocide such as those experienced in Rwanda and

the Balkan area. The table below presents the World Value Survey findings on political competition comparable to freedom ratings.

**Table 4: Value of political competition compared to Freedom Ratings<sup>27</sup>**

Country	Score 1 (competition is good)	Score 5	Score 10 (Competition is harmful)	Freedom House Rating
France	10.90	23.50	6.10	Free
Great Britain	15.50	14.90	3.60	Free
Italy	11.60	21.20	4.00	Free
Netherlands	4.70	20.20	2.80	Free
Spain	9.40	23.60	1.20	Free
USA	21.30	16.90	1.00	Free
Canada	15.00	14.80	1.30	Free
Japan	8.20	27.80	3.90	Free
Mexico	50.50	8.90	6.80	Free
South Africa	25.20	12.80	4.40	Free
Australia	18.80	15.50	2.20	Free
Sweden	16.60	12.60	0.80	Free
Argentina	27.80	16.90	15.00	Free
Finland	7.30	16.70	0.80	Free
South Korea	10.40	12.90	0.50	Free
Poland	12.00	17.90	8.70	Free
Switzerland	13.00	15.20	1.60	Free
Brazil	26.50	16.20	8.40	Free
Chile	15.30	21.90	7.60	Free
India	63.90	14.30	7.60	Free
Slovenia	20.60	20.80	3.30	Free

<sup>27</sup> Table constructed from [www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org) and [www.freedomhouse.org.za](http://www.freedomhouse.org.za)

Bulgaria	21.20	17.80	2.40	Free
Romania	31.40	14.00	1.50	Free
China	24.60	11.10	1.80	Not free
Taiwan	16.00	20.90	1.90	Free
Turkey	19.20	15.40	3.60	Party Free
Ukraine	15.90	17.20	5.40	Free
Russian Federation	27.80	17.20	8.40	Not Free
Peru	35.90	10.50	4.70	Free
Ghana	44.80	5.00	3.70	Free
Moldova	21.80	18.00	3.00	Partly Free
Georgia	33.70	15.00	1.80	Partly Free
Thailand	10.90	17.00	2.30	Partly Free
Indonesia	34.30	14.10	2.80	Free
Vietnam	27.00	30.30	2.20	Not free
Colombia	38.80	14.60	7.90	Partly Free
Serbia	16.30	17.40	2.40	Free
New Zealand	23.30	12.30	2.60	Free
Egypt	42.90	10.80	1.10	Not Free
Morocco	21.90	17.70	2.10	Partly Free
Iran	36.40	8.90	2.20	Not Free
Jordan	56.10	8.00	3.10	Partly Free
Cyprus	22.00	13.90	4.10	Free
Hong Kong	13.30	80.10 (scored at 4)	0.40	Partly Free
Trinidad and Tobago	42.30	10.90	6.50	Free
Andorra	12.60	18.50	2.90	Free
Malaysia	13.20	14.40	1.10	Partly Free
Burkina Faso	30.70	16.80	2.70	Partly Free
Ethiopia	18.30	10.60	2.60	Partly Free

Mali	39.40	15.00	8.60	Free
Rwanda	13.30	13.70	1.40	Not Free
Zambia	30.90	6.60	8.30	Partly Free
Germany	10.20	15.50	1.80	Free

The findings of the World Value Survey indicate that most countries surveyed found political competition to be mid-range, neither good nor bad for society. What is interesting in the findings of the World Values Survey, when compared to freedom ratings, is that states that are considered either not free or partly free place a higher value on political competition than mature Western democracies. States with high levels of diversity such as India placed as high value on political competition, as opposed to South Africa that had a rather low ranking of political competition. China, which is considered a communist state, placed the value of political competition rather high, compared to states like France, Great Britain, and Spain, who placed the value of political competition mid-range. If political competition allows power sharing and the management of diverse political interests, it proves interesting that partly free or authoritarian states generally regarded as oppressive and not open to power-sharing, places more value on political competition than their liberal democratic counterparts. Liberal democracy allows for power sharing, but it is not necessarily a value that, although verbally committed to, may not materialise in the non-Western world. In addition, the liberal democratic process may further institutionalise traditional or ethnic conflict in that it becomes institutions of competition rather than representation of the diversity in interests. Rwanda, which serves as an example of the point to which political competition can escalate, although not regarded as free, gives a relatively high ranking on the value of political competition. Rwanda had demonstrated that political competition can breed hatred and fear sufficient to generate some level of commitment for genocide. Diamond (1990:53) also noted this discrepancy when he observed that in these scenarios, the democratic process is equivalent to a power struggle rather than effective policy contestation, escalating along a conflict spiral, where groups will do anything within their means to win.

The values that underlie the procedural operation of liberal democracy may not necessarily be reflected in its process. As a system of governance rooted in

representivity, liberal democracy requires a commitment to due process in amongst other political competition. The World Values Survey when compared to Freedom House rankings, demonstrate that although societies may hold dear the value of political competition, it is not necessarily political competition within the democratic process.

The focus of the liberal democratic process cannot merely apply to elections, and political competition, but needs to apply to all aspects of governance. Indeed, in Singapore the opposition is rendered virtually ineffective as the threat of bankruptcy in payment of defamation of character costs to the ruling political elite, the banning of political films and television programmes, and strict regulations on political association ([www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)). In Africa one sees one political party dominating the electoral process able to generate large majorities, and effectively rendering the opposition ineffective. The overarching sentiment that elections are central to the operability of liberal democracy has been well documented, however, as Youngers (1999:1) aptly observed: elections, albeit a necessary component of liberal democracy cannot effectively ensure citizen control over political life as authoritarian legacies, corruption and elite dominated political parties limit informed electoral choice. Zakaria (1997:8) therefore argued that elections are not the only virtuous element of liberal democracy, and hence there is a need broaden the focus to constitutional liberalism and Linz and Stepan (1996:4) also warn against the electoral fallacy.

Yet, Schumpeter (1943: 269 – 273) argued *Another Theory of Democracy*, which denotes an essentially electoralist view of democracy in that liberal democracy only serves to elect leaders. Schumpeter (1943: 235) also argued that the presence of power relationships limits the possibility of liberal democracy. Schumpeter was sceptical about the substantive view of liberal democracy and as such downplayed the essence of liberal democracy to that of electoralism.

Huntington (1996:6) observed that in the debates over democracy's meaning, three general approaches emerged when looking at democracy as a form of government. The first is as a form of government rooted in the location of authority. In this tradition, authority is located within the polity, and consequently, liberal democracy needs to generate a system of governance able to represent the interests found within the polity. Secondly liberal democracy relates to the purposes that governments serve. In this

sense, the essence of the social contract comes to the fore in that governments must be able to guarantee the basic civil and political liberties of the polity while remaining responsive to their demands. The final theme identified by Huntington refers to the procedures of how a government is constituted. When creating a government, elections form the central procedural requirement that must be adhered to. In this sense, there must be some form of commitment to the rules of the liberal democratic game, and this includes the negotiated settlements that resulted in a liberal democratic institutional design. There are therefore three elements of liberal democracy that come to the fore from Huntington's work. Firstly, one notes the tradition of rationality and sovereignty located in the polity. Secondly, one notes the execution of the social contract. Lastly, one notes the institutionalised nature of the political game in giving effect to rational authority and sovereignty of the people.

There is a sense of morality associated with the liberal democratic process. In this sense, as Mayo (1962:556) noted, liberal democracy is both normative and explanatory. Through the procedural interpretation, one is able to pass judgement on moral discourses associated with governance, specifically liberal democratic governance, as well as highlight and explain the liberal democratic process and the purposes of such a process. Consequently, by passing judgment on the moral discourses, one engages in a normative activity identifying how things are and comparing them with how they should be. Through engagement with the liberal democratic process and the purposes of such a process, one engages in an explanatory role where the virtues of the *how things should be* are transferred through knowledge. This democratic process in Mayo's interpretation is primarily the implementation of the general will as coined by Rousseau and, consequently, Mayo (1962: 557) argued extensively for a procedural democracy that gave a "justification of any political system that consists of the answers it gives to the questions of political leadership".

For Mayo (1962), Dahl (1971), and Diamond (1999) freedom is guaranteed through the presence of basic political rights, however one needs to take cognisance of the fact that this is merely political equality and does not necessarily refer to socio-economic equality and associated discourses on social justice. The freedoms or minimum requirements of liberal democracy will ensure that rule of the people will prevail. Thus, it institutionalises self-governance through the presence of processes, and vital political and civil liberties. Diamond (1999:3) further argued that "...more democracy



[freedom] makes government more responsive to a wider range of citizens". Consequently, the more liberties the people have, the more institutionalised those freedoms become, the more inclusion will be found within politics.

The basic tenets of the argument that liberty is the ultimate good of liberal democracy is also captured by Schmitter and Karl (1991:77 – 79) who identify the following criteria as necessary to guarantee liberty: competition, majority rule, constitutionalism and participation and moderation. For Schmitter and Karl modern (liberal) democracy is the process which offers a variety of competitive processes and channels that aggregate interests and values, including associational and partisan interests and individual and collective interests. The essence of liberal democracy is therefore not only elections, but representation and competition. The argument is that "for democracy to thrive...specific procedural norms must be followed and civic rights must be respected" (Schmitter and Karl, 1991:77).

Constitutionalism is essential to guarantee freedom and self-determination and curb the practise of social tyranny. The polity needs to ensure that it is able to restrict its own action. Failure to do so will result in a democratic demotion in that this system can no longer be considered democracy (Schmitter and Karl 1991: 80). Constitutionalism as a doctrine of thought stipulates a system of governance that adheres to the principles of rule of law, separation of powers, checks and balances, and due process. These principles ensure that government or a certain segment of government does not become too strong or engage in arbitrary behaviour against the governed, including tyranny of majorities over minorities.

Liberal democracy also brings an element of stability to the political process and the competing interests that dictate this process. Liberal democracy, Schmitter and Karl (1991: 83) argue, institutionalises normal limited political uncertainty in that once there is consensus on the rules, political actors are more likely to act within their boundaries. This facilitates a degree of stability in a representative system that must mediate between a multitude of interests and demands.

These principles become essential for the implementation of the liberal democratic process through a system of representation (Dahl, 1989). Dahl (1989: 109 – 113) further identifies criteria for the liberal democratic process to be considered successful. The primary premise is that through entrenching equality through liberty, a fair liberal

democratic process will be in place. Here one sees a return to a classical view on democracy, that of equality through freedom and freedom through equality.

The criteria which lead to this conclusion are identified as effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, and control of the agenda. For Dasgupta and Muskin (1999: 69) these criteria collectively define the essence of a liberal, representative democracy in that there are limits on the agenda subject to collective decision-making and ensure that the divine arena of individual liberties cannot be infringed upon. Freedom in this view is also guaranteed through the institutionalised nature of the liberal democratic process, i.e. entrenching political liberty and equality as fundamental non-negotiable minimum freedoms in the institutions of collective decision-making or government.

Democracy, including liberal democracy, needs people. In order to be successful, liberal, representative democracy requires the polity to actively participate in its processes in order to remain responsive to their needs. This requires a civic virtue, much in the Athenian tradition, to exist. Participation leads to the ability of the people to influence the liberal democratic process and the government to be responsive to the citizenry. Dahl (1989:109) asserts that “to deny any citizen adequate opportunities for effective participation mean that because their preferences are unknown or incorrectly perceived, they cannot be taken into account”. If the views of a certain segment of the people are ignored, the democratic process will be compromised. There will be no true freedom, as only a few will be represented in the decision, and consequently can lead to a tyranny of the majority.

The idea of participation as a means of entrenching freedom is rooted in Western classical theory, and as such, one needs to take cognisance of cultural interpretations of what constitutes freedom and effective participation. This is not to say that non-Western governments do not adopt the institutions and processes associated with liberty or liberal procedural democracy. Their operation and implementation however may be problematic due to a lack of a liberal civic culture. Botswana was able to ensure a relatively stable liberal democratic dispensation due to a traditional engagement with the civic virtue through the traditional practices associated with *kgotla* (Steyn-Kotze, 2008). The Botswana traditional system of governance is rooted in the *Diane*, which dictates that discussion and debate is a better alternative to confrontation, violence, and fighting

(Mitchinson, 1967:261; and Maudeni (2004(b):261). In addition, the *Batswana*<sup>28</sup> is a nation that consists of eight tribes who share a national identity in that their language, cultural practices, and traditions are similar, and the impact of colonialism on the Batswana was limited (Mitchinson, 1967:261; and Molutsi and Holm, 1990:324). The foundation of a nation-state was therefore firmly rooted in the history of the Batswana<sup>29</sup>.

The Rwandan experience, on the other hand, yielded different results to that of the Botswana experience. The relationship between the Hutu and the Tutsi was essentially one of class rather than ethnicity (Ajulu, 2007: 289). Social mobility within the class structure that characterised Hutu and Tutsi relations was possible, and the patron-client structures were flexible to allow for upward social mobility in that a Hutu could claim more honour than a Tutsi from a unprivileged background (Ajulu 2007: 290). However the colonial administration embarked on a system of divide and rule that effectively politicised ethnicity using the Tutsi monarchies to administer the Rwandan territory. Invariable, at independence, the nature of the competition was firmly rooted in Hutu and Tutsi identities. The majoritarian tendency of liberal democracy resulted in a game of numbers in that democracy was identified as "...majority rule with Hutu rule" (Ajulu 2007: 294). The Rwandan Patriotic Front won overwhelming majorities in the 2008 General Elections. Although the focus is on national reconciliation, Freedom House does not regard Rwanda as free due to the presence of human rights abuses and the dominant position of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, who was central to the genocide of 1994 ([www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)). In an environment where identity is politicised, liberal democracy and the tradition of representation may not necessarily result in a commitment to a social contract and diffusion of power sufficient to curb social tyranny.

Liberal democracy in a non-Western context disappoints as there is limited understanding of the socio-political and cultural conditions that impact on its implementation. There is a lack of civic virtue, opportunities for participation, and a political will to unlock political participation in civil society. These are not the only problems of rule of the people in the developing world, as one may include absolute poverty, failure to develop economically, and authoritarianism and its legacies that

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<sup>28</sup> Batswana is a term that collectively refers to the peoples of Botswana

<sup>29</sup> This is not an exclusive conclusion, in that the San, who dwell in the Kalahari Nature Reserve, are seen to occupy the status of second-class citizens.

refuse to die a silent and forgotten death. Indeed, Linz and Stepan (1996:254) posit that "...ethno-authoritarianism, ethnic conflict, and state erosion are the more dominant features of many of these polities than is democratisation or even full liberalisation...the discourse of 'national liberation' was privileged over democratisation and the discourse of 'titular nationalities' was privileged over individual rights".

Yet, liberal democracy is still regarded as a better alternative. Cardoso (2001:8) celebrated the global spread of liberal democracy: "...we are pleased to see that today democracy has a worldwide reach that probably has not been equalled at any other moment in history of mankind...this extraordinary reach reflects the universality of the values on which the democratic system is based". Still, it is the *universality of values* that is problematic. As much as the polity may voice support for liberal democracy's basic principles of liberty, equality, justice guaranteed through liberal democratic institutions and limits on majorities, it may not necessarily be reflected in the political process. One cannot ignore the context in which liberal democracy must operate. Indeed, Huntington (1996: 310) highlights two factors that may be regarded as hostile towards liberal democracy:

Islamic and Confucian cultures pose insuperable obstacles to democratic development. Several reasons exist...great historic cultural traditions are complex bodies of ideas, beliefs, doctrines, assumptions, writings, and behaviour patterns...Confucianism may be a contradiction in terms...The question is: What elements in Islam and Confucianism are favourable to democracy, and how and under what circumstances can these supersede the undemocratic elements in those cultural traditions.

Yet, this line of reasoning points to an inherent flaw in conceptions of the values of liberal democracy. If the values are different to what is known, generally as liberal democracy, then there needs to be an investigation into which cultural factors should be focused on to ensure the emergence of liberal democracy. The World Values Survey had demonstrated that Singapore, for example, is committed to political competition, but is regarded as partly free. The Russian Federation also demonstrates a commitment to political competition but is regarded as not free. The criteria used to assess the value of political competition are open to interpretation. The Russian Federation, for example, may value political competition within party structures as opposed to engagement between civil society and government. Therefore, although political

competition is valued, it is the structures within which this political competition is executed that differs.

In addition, the assumption that institutions will be sufficient to manage conflict is somewhat problematic in that democratic institutions are created by humans and as such may be vulnerable to manipulations. At times a rules-are-meant-to-be-broken attitude prevails through constitutional amendments and corrupt behaviour within the institutions of liberal democracy. Africa is rich with examples of the presidents-for-life phenomenon, where constitutions that aimed at limited power were amended to increase power of the president. Coupled with definitional issues surrounding who constitutes the polity, institutions geared towards rule of the people becomes problematic and may further exacerbate conflict as opposed to managing conflict.

What is of importance here is that the problems the classical thinkers of liberal democracy focused their writings on are still persistent in the developing world, which indicates a need to find alternative ways of *doing* democracy that are suitable for the developing world. Rousseau argued that sovereignty is vested in the people, yet the placing of sovereignty in the developing world is deficient due to challenges of building a national identity or polity and the institutions of the liberal democratic process. Instead, one may see the rise of the tyranny of the majority that Aristotle equated with the *evil* of democracy. Estlund (2003:387) warns against the temptation to deduce that the correct institutions will promote justice and avoid social tyranny because they exist. Held (1995) asserts that democracy is the only *political* good in any given society. Ranney and Kendall (1951:432) concur by stating that “one harmful consequence of our habit of equating ‘democracy’ with ‘the good’ is...an attempt to give ‘democracy’ more concrete content...runs up against stubborn ideas”. Other traditional forms of decision-making are ignored or dismissed as undemocratic or too traditional. There is a premature assumption that the liberal democratic process and its institutions will result in freedom and equality. This assumption does not allow one to take into consideration the apparent *state of nature* many non-Western countries still find themselves in.

There is a need to explore the system of governance and way of life that liberal democracy aims to legitimise through participation. For example, to what degree does legal-rational authority rooted in liberal democracy cater for traditional authority, which is still a relevant institution of authority in Africa. The Botswana democracy

incorporates their traditional leaders and chiefs in the democratic process as does South Africa and Namibia. Procedural liberal democracy theory does not cater for traditional or home-grown forms of decision-making and governance. This is challenging in an African context, as there must be a process to break down traditional forms of government and allow for legal-rational institutions to govern rather than hereditary rulers or monarchs.

Huntington (1996:165 – 174) refers to the *democratic trade off* where groups are required to engage in behaviours conducive to successful negotiation around conflicting interests. There are codes of conduct that need to be followed in order to ensure successful democracy, and these are rooted in extending suffrage and inclusion as well as peaceful co-existence and negotiation. Again, a move from state of nature to social contract can be said to be present. Therefore, the social contract will be executed via the institutions of the liberal democratic process.

Sartori (1987:41 – 42) distinguishes between a *war-like view of politics* and a *legalitarian view of politics* where “...[in war-like politics] force monitors persuasion, might establishes right, and conflict resolution is sought in terms of the defeat of the enemy...in [the legalitarian view]...conflict resolution is sought by means of covenants, courts, and ‘rightful’ procedures”. A similar view is captured by Huber *et al* (1997: 324 – 325). These authors identify two cycles which can be compared to Tocqueville’s good and bad prototype of liberal democracy. The *virtuous cycle* of the liberal democratic process allows increased participation through more egalitarian policies. The *vicious cycle* on the other hand allows inequality to facilitate a decrease in political participation and increased negative and often violent competition. McCahery (2001:1) favours modern constitutionalism reliant on a normative constitutional identity legitimised through political actors. Central to this constitutional identity is the protection of fundamental human rights. Liberal democracy, then, if implemented correctly, will ensure a peaceful, urbane and overall gentlemanly natured political society as there are institutions and structures that govern conflict in a gentlemanly fashion. Perhaps it is the civility of liberal democracy that has drawn so many *democrats* out in the world, however the institutions can be perverted to suit elite, individual or collective needs. For this reason Dahl (1971:2) is of the opinion that there is no such government as a liberal democracy; it is merely a pipedream, by stating that

I should like to reserve the term ‘democracy’ for a political system one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to its citizens. Whether such a system actually exists, has existed, or can exist need not concern us for the moment. Surely one can conceive a hypothetical system of this kind; such a conception would have served as an ideal, or part of an ideal, for many people


Dahl (1971) regards liberal democracy as the ultimate embodiment of the civic virtue. This is due to the level of public participation that the liberal democratic process and its institutions require. For this reason, Dahl prefers the term polyarchy as no system in the world can be regarded as fully democratised. The closest system to a polyarchy is found predominantly in the Western world predominantly. A polyarchy is interpreted as a political system or regime that is open and competitive in a civil nature (Dahl 1971: 80). Within polyarchies, three paradoxes are present: *conflict and consensus*, *governability and representatives*, and *consent and effectiveness* (Diamond 1990:48 – 60). The basic argument is that liberal democracy requires some degree of conflict in order to negotiate a viable agreement for all. Secondly, liberal democracy requires that the majority rule and as such power must never be centralised in an oligarchy, but at the same time, opposing political actors must speak to diverse interests to create a balance. Thirdly, legitimacy is the essence of legal-rational authority as captured by Diamond, for “democracy requires consent...consent requires legitimacy” (Diamond, 1990: 50). Being systems that are open and liberal, the structures and institutions of liberal democracy ensures that it is capable of contending with its own paradoxes: balancing conflict and consensus, balancing the representative tradition and governance, and balancing permission of the polity with responsive governance.

Zakaria (1997) argued that constitutional liberalism is an essential ingredient to ensure liberal democracy. From his perspective freedom is guaranteed by the presence of an equitable system of rule of law. These assumptions point implicitly to an institutional system of popular governance and a procedural definition of liberal democracy that prevails.

Voting equality as a criterion for the liberal democratic process is essential for liberty as it ensures that all are treated fairly. One vote cannot have more value or higher currency than another, and as a result, through equality there is freedom and through freedom there is equality. Dahl (1989:109 – 110) warns against the failure of institutionalising political equality in this sense by stating that “without it, citizens

would face the prospect of an infinite regress of potential inequalities in their influence over decisions, with no final court of appeal in which, as political equals, they could decide whether their interests, as they interpreted them, were given equal consideration”.

What is evident is that the element of liberal democracy associated with liberty can be translated into a procedural approach to defining liberal democracy. By guaranteeing freedom or liberty through the liberal democratic process, political equality is entrenched. Constitutionalism is the institutional mechanism aimed at ensuring equality through liberty and liberty through equality.



**Figure 11: Diagrammatic representation of procedural liberal democracy**

It is evident that the procedural interpretation of liberal democracy creates the institutions and mechanisms needed to ensure that rule of the people are executed in the democratic process. This interpretation focuses on representation, procedural processes like elections, accountability, and transparency. Essentially then the stage is set for the execution of the liberal democratic process through rule of the people.

What is important to note is that the procedural interpretation stresses a very specific civic virtue that is individual in nature. It does not facilitate the creation of an obligatory feeling to participate in the liberal democratic process, but merely provides the mechanisms and structures through which the liberal democratic process can be executed. This is where the substantive liberal democratic interpretation becomes important. Freedom or liberty is the focus of the procedural interpretation of liberal



democracy. Equality or increased possibility of participation is the realm of the substantive interpretation of liberal democracy. Therefore, in order to ensure that the mechanisms of the liberal democratic process are used and a broadened civic virtue is bred, one needs to pay attention to the substantive or maximalist interpretation of liberal democracy.

### **3.2.2. The substantive interpretation of liberal democracy**

The procedural interpretation of liberal democracy is equated with establishing the necessary institutions for a representative, constitutional state. It is rooted in classical democratic theory in that it seeks to create and implement the mechanisms to ensure rule of the people can be executed and guarantee freedom of the individual. The substantive tradition of democracy can also be traced back to classical democratic theory in that this tradition focuses on equality in socio-political life to ensure equality of participation in the liberal democratic process. In other words, for citizens to participate in the liberal democratic process, the political and social playing field needs to be levelled to some degree and thus generating a liberal democratic commitment or congruence (Welzel and Klingemann 2008: 63).

Welzel and Klingemann (2008: 63) equate democracy with demand and supply. In their conceptualisation of democracy, the argument posited is that substantive democracy is interpreted as “...the process by which democracy becomes effectively respected on the supply-side and intrinsically valued on the demand-side”. The central focus of substantive democracy, for Welzel and Klingemann remains one that focuses on the basic liberties of the people and to what extent these liberties are respected by those who rule.

With this focus on demand and supply of democracy, Welzel and Klingemann contribute to the view that the substantive tradition attempts to facilitate a culture of participation or civic virtue aimed at participation in the liberal democratic process through a responsive government. This responsiveness deals with redistribution or socio-economic development and includes issues of social justice. Indeed Welzel and Klingemann (2008: 63) posit that people may demonstrate a preference for democracy (liberal), not necessarily out of a commitment to freedom, but due to beliefs that it will ensure prosperity for their country or that some redistributive efforts will emanate from the democratic regime. Consequently, if the procedural interpretation of liberal

democracy focuses on the socio-political development of the citizen, the substantive interpretation of liberal democracy focuses on the socio-economic development of the citizen.

The substantive view of liberal democracy attempts to create an enabling environment for participation in that through increased equality the polity will be more receptive to participate in the liberal democratic process. The argument can be simple in that if the basic issues of survival like food and shelter are taken care of, the polity can then busy itself with issues of governance and democracy. This is not a new sentiment expressed in democracy theory's writings, but one that was shared by Aristotle when he argued that democracy is a middle-class activity where all share egalitarian participatory orientations (Welzel and Klingemann, 2008: 58). Huber *et al* (1997:324) argue extensively for equality as a criterion for increased participation as the additional feature of liberal democracy in a participatory and not necessarily representative tradition. For Huber *et al*, participation requires limited systematic difference across the different social classes, which requires some form of redistribution that facilitates a level playing field in which the political game takes place. Therefore, "...egalitarian policies enable more inclusion (Huber *et al* 1997: 324). The argument is that decreasing socio-economic differences will facilitate the growth of a civic virtue which will lead to the higher levels of participation as required by the democratic process. In the absence of redistributive action by government, one sees political disengagement and the democratic process is reduced to a "...delegative democracy that reduces government accountability" (Huber *et al* 1997: 324). Therefore, a link between the procedural and substantive interpretation is made in that the integrity of the liberal democratic process as captured by the procedural interpretation is compromised through factors that inhibit the full participation of the polity in the liberal democratic process.

Di Zerega (1988:468) observed that democracy and equality are intimately linked in the theoretical realm, but the nature of its relationship remains awkward. Scholars, according to Di Zerega, are concerned with the inequalities in political resources among citizens, which threaten the very nature of the democratic state. These resources include wealth, knowledge and education (Dahl, 1971: 82). Social justice and increased redistribution of public resources needs to be incorporated with concerns over the institutional concerns of liberal democracy, otherwise, as Dahl (1971: 82) argued,

“...the privileged remain privileged and the underprivileged”. Indeed, Cunningham (1990:99) concurs by stating that “badly put, the principle reason a liberal democrat should favour is socialism in that economic egalitarianism associated with socialism is a necessary condition for the realisation of core liberal democratic values”. Some level of social equality is necessary to ensure a lively and thriving democracy as the level of socio-economic activity of a given person will determine the level of access.

Schmitter and Karl (1991:77) place citizens at the centre of democracy by arguing that they are the *distinctive element* of democracy. Consequently liberal democratic governments need to be inclusive of citizens, but also responsive to their needs and ensure some form redistributive activities geared towards generated increasing equality as opposed to increasing inequality. Equality for each member that comprises the polity is guaranteed on a political level in the procedural tradition. All citizens regardless of creed and social station remain politically equal, for example, all are equal before the law and all votes are treated equally. Politically speaking equality dictates what will guarantee freedom of the citizen. The state is there to govern as the people see fit and it is only through political equality that a government is able to determine the needs of the people and provide accordingly. This is the essence of Dahl’s thesis of political equality. Socio-economic equality does not necessarily correlate with political freedom and equality as demonstrated with Table 5 below.

**Table 5: Freedom Ratings in comparison to World Values Survey 2005 - 2008 on poverty, income equality and perceived democraticness of own state**

Country	Poverty as the most serious problem facing country	Incomes should be made more equal	Perceived democraticness scored as completely democratic	Gini-Coefficient Ranking <sup>30</sup>	Freedom House Rating
France	-	6.5	11.20	32.7	Free
Great Britain	-	6.9	6.9	36	Free
Italy	59.0	16.2	5.00	36	Free

<sup>30</sup> Compiled from [www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org) and United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2007/2008 available online at <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/147.html> accessed on 18 August 2009. A score of 0 represents absolute equality and a score of 100 represents absolute inequality

Netherlands	-	8.2	5.7	30.9	Free
Spain	57.0	2.1	18.1	34.7	Free
USA	-	18.5	7.0	40.8	Free
Canada	55.1	1.3	9.8	32.6	Free
Japan	10.7	4.3	3.0	24.9	Free
Mexico	53.1	13.8	18.7	46.1	Free
South Africa	55.2	1.8	21.4	57.8	Free
Australia	51.2	8.6	13.2	35.2	Free
Sweden	21.9	-	11.4	25.0	Free
Argentina	73.0	1.4	22.7	51.3	Free
Finland	46.9	-	6.7	26.9	Free
South Korea	59.3	1.4	3.3	-	Free
Poland	79.9	7.9	3.2	34.5	Free
Switzerland	37.8	0.1	10.5	33.7	Free
Brazil	63.0	16.9	12.1	57.0	Free
Chile	69.7	2.6	14.3	54.9	Free
India	57.1	20.6	41.3	36.8	Free
Slovenia	59.2	9.7	3.4	28.4	Free
Bulgaria	71.6	31.0	1.5	29.2	Free
Romania	81.0	11.2	3.3	31.0	Free
China	54.1	11.2	10.2	46.9	Not free
Taiwan	49.6	8.1	17.7	-	Free
Turkey	49.0	12.5	8.9	43.6	Party Free
Ukraine	67.5	44.4	3.3	28.1	Free
Russian Federation	-	22.1	1.3	39.9	Not Free
Peru	66.8	21.5	7.1	52.0	Free
Ghana	-	34.7	-	40.8	Free
Moldova	82.6	12.9	1.5	33.2	Partly

					Free
Georgia	89.3	7.5	1.1	40.4	Partly Free
Thailand	65.1	6.2	7.2	42.0	Partly Free
Indonesia	72.9	25	9.5	34.3	Free
Vietnam	69.7	1.8	23.5	34.4	Not free
Colombia	-	11.4	13	-	Partly Free
Serbia	76.4	11.6	0.8	-	Free
New Zealand	-	-	-	36.2	Free
Egypt	79.9	-	-	34.4	Not Free
Morocco	78.0	13.6	1.5	39.5	Partly Free
Iran	-	13.0	3.8	43.0	Not Free
Jordan	82.6	-	42.3	38.8	Partly Free
Cyprus	30.1	7.7	7.4	-	Free
Hong Kong	-	-	-	43.4	Partly Free
Trinidad and Tobago	62.9	11.3	15.9	38.9	Free
Andorra	59.8	5.1	3.3	-	Free
Malaysia	14.3	3.2	8.6	49.2	Partly Free
Burkina Faso	60.7	11.6	12.0	39.5	Partly Free
Ethiopia	42.7	14.0	1.8	30.0	Partly Free
Mali	46.8	9.7	23.1	40.1	Free
Rwanda	72.6	-	-	46.8	Not Free
Zambia	64.1	6.2	18.5	50.8	Partly Free

Germany	43.7	7.4	5.3	28.3	Free
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The paradox of liberal democracy lies in the challenge of socio-economic equality and how to bring about a decline in inequality relating to incomes, wealth, status, and power. Severe socio-economic equality can threaten the durability of liberal democracy and centralise the concentration of political resources such as the ability to influence the redistributive agenda of the state. Indeed, Dahl (1971: 82) argued that “...a country with extreme inequalities in political resources stands a high chance of having extreme inequalities in the exercise of power and hence a hegemonic regime” (Dahl, 1971: 82). Theorists like Sartori (1987: 337 – 338) argue extensively that equality is a protest ideal due to its unattainability in that “...a society that seeks equality is a society that fights with itself, that fights the inner laws of inertia”. Sartori further argued that complete equality remains the *most insatiable* of human ideals and renders it a futile search. For that reason equality in opportunity remains a sufficient criterion to measure equality in liberal democratic discourse. It does not necessarily affect the perceptions associated with democraticness. Table 5 demonstrated that, although most of the states sampled in the World Values Survey 2005 – 2008 highlighted that extreme poverty was their primary challenge, the perceptions that incomes should be more equal was not necessarily a high priority when dealing with inequality. Most states also felt that their democraticness was mid-range and not necessarily completely democratic. Mutisi (2007: 45) contend that although incomes gaps are widening as a consequence of globalisation, there is dual effect in that as much as globalisation results in inequality, it also unites democratic movements. The data supports the inconsistency provided in table 5 supports Mutisi’s assertion in that as much as poverty remains a central issue for many states, it does not necessarily translate into a commitment to increasing income equality and perceptions of democraticness.

This forces the question: how does equality relate to the civic virtue and the liberal democratic process? A civic virtue will require a distinctive set of political values including a commitment to the legal-rational authority associated with the various political offices and state administrations, as well as the processes of elections and so forth. Underpinning the civic virtue are the ideals of freedom and equality. Sartori

(1987:338) argued that equality is tangible in that one is able to compare one's socio-economic station with that of another. Freedom on the other hand is not to be found in that we are all free. In this light, one needs to question the relationship between the substantive liberal democratic tradition and freedom. Questions that Sartori (1987) fails to address include whether mass poverty and inequality generate less freedom by virtue of creating increased inequality. Are some more free than others due to freedom from the shackles of poverty? What is the relationship between socio-economic equality and the actual political freedom a citizen enjoys? To what extent does socio-economic inequality undermine political participation?

Cardoso (2001:9) attempts to answer these questions. He maintains that democratic values do not necessarily apply to social rights. Central to his argument is the view that social differences and poverty challenges the *truly equitable treatment* of all that constitute the polity. Although equality remains, for Cardoso, a democratic value, it is challenged by the presence of extreme poverty and social inequality in daily life. To this extent, the responsibilities of governments remain to make and implement the policies that underlie human rights at a macro-level. However, the challenge lies in dealing effectively with issues of inequalities at the micro-levels of society. Indeed, Adedeji (1992:32) maintains that "democracy cannot strive on empty stomachs. It cannot thrive in conditions of abject poverty and in societies where poverty has a brutalising impact. It cannot thrive where life is generally short and brutal". For Adedeji, extreme poverty renders a state in a *state of nature*, struggling to meet the bare necessities of a social contract that can guarantee equality, albeit politically. In this sense, it is each individual for themselves in the quest of basic day-to-day survival. Given the fact that extreme poverty seems to be centred in the developing world, it may further compound the achievement of liberal democracy as envisaged by the classical thinkers and the more contemporary views on procedural and substantive democracy. In this context, the social contract is failing to deliver the security, popular control and equality it has promised to bring to those caught in this type of *state of nature*. A liberal democratic civic virtue cannot be cultivated in the absence of more substantive concerns

### **3.3. Concluding remarks**

Since its inception in Athens, democracy is founded upon the principle of rule of people through inclusion and participation that translates into the civic virtue. The civic virtue

forms the foundation of a successful democracy, for if there is no participation by the polity, there is no rule of the people. Therefore, in the liberal traditions, institutions are essential and must be created and implemented in such a way as to guarantee participation and the germination of a liberal civic virtue.

Athenian theories of democracy centred upon the implementation of the rule of the people. The institutions of the Athens democracy acted as a premature artefact of what institutions of majority rule may look like. This acted as a foundation for the inception of the procedural interpretation of liberal democracy as a series of institutions and processes, especially in the representative democratic tradition. These institutions and processes are charged with ensuring that liberty of the individual prevails (a theme associated with Renaissance democracy theory).

What is of importance is that liberty and equality as two primary principles of liberal democracy have translated into the modern theoretical debate between the procedural and substantive interpretation of liberal democracy. Procedural processes and institutions bring stability and ensure political equality in any given polity. This stability is necessary as it creates routine in the execution of political life.

The substantive tradition focuses more on socio-economic equality than political equality. The basic argument posed is that political equality cannot be fully implemented if there are vast differences in the socio-economic make-up of a society. For that reason, Sartori (1987) argued that inequality is a natural consequence of societal living. No society will have *sameness* in all spheres of life. Yet, the substantive tradition points to an important factor – stability. If there is no decrease in inequality, it may lead to an unstable democracy in that if life does not improve under the democratic regime, *frustrations will breed* (Dahl, 1971). Procedurally the advance that liberal democratic theory has made pertains to the principles of liberal democracy as well as institutional mechanisms that must be present before one can speak of a liberal democracy. Constitutionalism, rule of law and institutions are all predominant in theories and prescriptions surrounding liberal democracy, especially theories emanating from the West.

The themes identified become central to liberal democratic consolidation: firstly, in order to create a social contract and ensure that tyranny of the majority is curbed, institutions, processes, and procedures must be created. These are generally associated



with the Western tradition of liberal, representative democracy. Consequently, in order to ensure political citizenship of the polity, the procedural requirements of liberal democracy must be satisfied. Secondly, procedural liberal democracy, if it is to be sustained, must find its source in a liberal democratic civic virtue underpinned by liberal democratic values. In order to achieve this, the argument of the substantivists has two elements: firstly, under the liberal democratic regime, a commitment to individual liberty must be created, and secondly, in order to secure this commitment, some form of redistribution to ensure the quality of life of the polity becomes essential. This becomes relevant on three levels for liberal democratic consolidation theory: (1) institutions, processes and procedures must guarantee political equality and freedom for all citizens; (2) regime performance is central to ensure that liberal democracy's sustainability; and (3) through institutions and increased liberal democratic regime performance, a liberal political culture will emerge, which ensures the durability of the liberal democracy. In keeping with the thematic approach that allowed the deconstruction of liberal democracy in the context of liberal democratic consolidation, the following chapters will present an overview and analysis of liberal democratic consolidation theory in terms of its institutions, the relationship to regime performance, and the creation of a liberal political culture.

Much faith is placed in institutions as a mechanism to ensure freedom of the individual, equality in a political sense, and cooperation. The procedural definition of liberal democracy places much emphasis on institutionalism as a mechanism to guarantee liberty and equality. Consequently, the themes with which the liberal procedural interpretation of democracy concerns itself are institutions, cooperation, constitutionalism and political equality and political freedom. What is of consequence, however, is that institutions, constitutionalism and freedom in the sense that there is no government oppression present are highlighted. This is within the realm of the procedural interpretation of democracy. Therefore, liberty is guaranteed through the institutions created by the polity where political equality prevails.

Issues of equality within the liberal tradition are addressed through the works of T.H. Green which argue for a welfare approach to liberalism (Tower-Sargent, 1993:112). In this approach civil society has an obligation to assist those who are unable to attain freedom in such a way that they reach a level where they can fully exercise their freedom. The conundrum of equality is thus dealt with from a liberty perspective.

Although liberty is the primary departure point, from this view one can briefly deduce that amongst other factors that can contribute to the development of individuals to reach their freedom is that of education and an improved socio-economic standing. Freedom will thus allow an individual to generate a civic virtue necessary for the execution of rule of the people in the Schumpeterian tradition. This points to the substantive tradition of liberal democratic theory in that the state needs to ensure a basic level of regime performance in order to address issues of equality within its boundaries.

The creation of liberal democracy will become a joint effort between elites and the masses. The facilitation of the creation of the liberal democratic process will entail a behavioural adjustment on the part of all actors involved in the democratic process. It will entail a change in the manner political elites or decision-makers relate to the masses. It will also need a change in the manner in which the masses engage with political elites and decision-makers. The mechanism or process that guides this expected maturing relationship between elites and masses is the constitution or some institutional arrangement that sets the rule and pace for developing liberal democracy. Hence one is able to identify two traditions within liberal democratic consolidation theory: the institutional and socio-politico approaches.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Creating liberal democracy - appraising liberal democratic consolidation's institutions and regime performance**

Chapter three demonstrated that liberal democracy is informed by both a institutional focus, declining levels of inequality, and a normative shift in political culture. The procedural interpretation of liberal democracy focuses its attention on how democracy operates through its processes, procedures and institutions. The basic premise is that legal-rational authority is guaranteed through constitutional structures and electoral processes that inform the logic of representative democracy to execute the rule of the people. In order to qualify as a liberal democracy, certain institutional criteria must be met, such as relatively free and fair elections, a separation of power, the presence of the rule of law, and a constitutional state. This relates to the creation of a constitutional democracy that has representative substance through the utilisation of elections through which the polity voice their preference for candidates. This denotes a Schumpetarian view of the liberal democratic process, and provides a foundation to argue that citizens will assess their quality of life based on what elected representatives do, or in other words, the performance of the democratic regime.

The substantive interpretation of liberal democracy is concerned with the normative shift in political culture necessary to ensure that the liberal democracy order is sustainable and to attain some level of equality on a socio-economic level in order to secure a commitment to the liberal democratic regime. This requires legitimization and behavioural criteria that must be met for a state to be considered a liberal democracy. This includes a commitment to individual liberty, effective and sufficient democratic regime performance, and a normative commitment to liberal democracy as a system of government by the polity, as well as the performance of the elected representatives. Consequently, Blais and Dion (1990: 250) argue that procedural democracy is how political decision-makers are elected and the substantive tradition refers to what political decision-makers do. Therefore, the micro-genres of liberal democracy, as the archive of liberal democratic consolidation theory, are rooted in liberty, equality, and a liberal civic virtue. These micro-genres can be found in liberal democratic consolidation theory in that liberal democratic consolidation has a two-fold task.

Firstly, it must generate the political institutions needed to ensure that the authenticity and democratic legitimacy of political decisions that emanate from the liberal democratic process. Secondly, it implies relationship between state and civil society in that citizens determines the success of the new liberal democracy based on the level of the quality of life they are able to attain. In other words, liberal democracy requires a responsive government that levels the socio-economic playing field to facilitate broadened political participation. This gives a specific role to the liberal democratic state in that it must keep in touch with its citizens to ensure that it is able to meet their demands and needs as expressed through the channels provided by the institutions and mechanisms of the democratic process for a liberal democratic political culture to germinate.

This chapter will deconstruct liberal democratic consolidation theory on two levels. Firstly, there is much focus on the institutional approach or the procedural tradition and its relationship to liberty, equality and the civic virtue. Therefore the first task at hand is outlining and discussing the institutional approach to consolidation in the liberal tradition. This is related to the crafting tradition in that one is creating a new political democratic dispensation mirroring a liberal democracy. The strong focus of liberal democratic consolidation on institutionalism denotes that liberal democratic consolidation is concerned with stability in the political system. It is imperative to assess the impact of institutional theory on a society in that it sets the procedural tone that a new liberal democracy must take.

The relationship between economic development and democratisation essentially attempts to deal with the substantive issues of liberal democracy. No state will be able to uphold a satisfactory level of regime performance if there is no form of revenue generated through economic activities. On the one hand, institutional development relates to the creation of liberty through creating the institutions necessary for political equality and liberty. Economic development and its relationship to democratisation, on the other hand, is essentially aimed at dealing with the substantive aspects in that practical<sup>31</sup> equality in a truly practical sense must be facilitated through economic

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<sup>31</sup> One needs to distinguish between practical and political equality. Political equality refers to individuals being equal in their vote, in the rule of law and so forth. Practical equality can be equated with *increased sameness* as posited by Sartori (1987).

development. This will enable the state to engage in redistributive activities to alleviate poverty, decrease the illiteracy rate, and ensure overall societal well-being.

The politico-cultural aspect of liberal democratic consolidation will be addressed in the next chapter. This is done merely to ensure that the current of focus of this chapter does not become too wide. Therefore the section dealing with democratic consolidation should be seen in two parts. This chapter is in essence constitutes part one, while part two will be dealt with in Chapter five. It is however important to note that the politico-cultural aspect relates to the normative values and commitments that a polity is required to display towards the new democratic order. It is also the centre of the crafting versus preconditions view in that the institutions, it is argued, will lead to a deep commitment of the polity to the new democracy, thus creating the liberal democratic civic virtue (Ethier, 1990; Di Palma, 1990; Diamond, 1999; and Dahl, 1989).

The first task with which this chapter is concerned is to deconstruct liberal democratic consolidation in the political institutionalisation approach. This will facilitate an understanding of the institutional criteria of liberal democratic consolidation theory as the foundation upon which a liberal, representative democracy is build. This is an essential first step as, scholars such as Diamond (1999), Huntington (1996), and Di Palma (1990) argued: new structures invariably entail new behaviour. Institutionalising liberal democracy is directly related to the procedural view of democracy in the liberal tradition. It is therefore essential to discuss the institutionalisation of liberal democracy and its associated procedures. This will impact on the changing relationship between political elites and the mass levels in that the liberal democratic procedures and institutions will determine the manner in which these groups interact with each other. It will also establish a foundation from which liberal democratic values in a socio-politico context will be transferred from political elites to mass level.

#### **4.1. Institutionalising liberal democracy**

The institutional approach to consolidation of liberal democracy has received much attention throughout the development of democratic consolidation theory in the liberal tradition, especially in the early 1990s with the fall of the communist bloc. In order to create a liberal democratic order, the institutions and processes of liberal democracy needs to be created by the political elites. It is through these institutions that political

currency will become valuable through a deepening of democracy, political institutionalisation of political elites' behaviour, and regime performance (Diamond, 1999: 73). Deepening democracy, for Diamond (1999), stresses a move from authoritarian states to a state founded upon the principles of constitutionalism and rule of law. This in turn leads to the reinforcement of the formal representative and governance structures that underlie a liberal democracy. Indeed, for Diamond (1999), the foundation upon which enhanced political legitimacy and a liberal democratic political culture is built. The logic of Diamond's arguments rests on the assumption that political institutionalisation constructs reliable boundaries around political behaviour and consequently introduces an element of political stability necessary to manage uncertainty surrounding the democratic transition. This institutionalisation in turn assists in the germination of liberal democratic values such as tolerance, moderation, and loyalty to the liberal democratic regime and ensures political trust between the political elites and the masses (Diamond, 1999: 75). Therefore, the institutional approach facilitates the growth of a value system required for the implementation of liberal democracy.

Central to the institutional approach to liberal democratic consolidation is the democratic agreement as the outcome of the transition process (Di Palma 1990; Ethier 1990). For these authors, this signals the start of a commitment to management of interests and conflict through the use of various institutions and procedures as required by the liberal democratic process. The focus is thus firmly on the institutional approach to liberal democratic consolidation.

In fact, Di Palma (1990: 140 - 141) argued extensively that the democratic pact or agreement signifies the beginning of a new democratic dispensation where all parties involved are willing to use the structures to live in relative peace and share in the liberal democratic process. When various political stakeholders are involved in the transition process and are able to reach an agreement, then one can speak of liberal democratic consolidation. Therefore, central to the liberal tradition, once rational bargaining and compromise have been achieved, all that is left for the emerging liberal democracy is to become moderate in their political behaviour through the new liberal democratic institutions and adopt a commitment to those institutions. Di Palma (1990: 141) in contextualising liberal democratic consolidation posits that political institutionalisation of political behaviour, democratic habituation and the political re-socialisation of

political elites and the masses must start after the democratic pact have been achieved. His view of liberal democratic consolidation has a three-fold task, similar to the argument posed by Diamond (1999). In order to achieve successful liberal democratic consolidation, institutions serve as a controlling factor in the behaviour of the polity and the political elites that facilitates the development of the liberal democratic habits in political behaviour, which will lead to the emergence of a new liberal democratic political culture. Consequently, for Di Palma, institutions are central to achieving liberal democratic consolidation in his conceptualisation of liberal democratic consolidation by drawing an inference between institutions and cultural and thus creating an environment conducive to the procedural view of liberal democracy.

Ethier (1990: 14) essentially adopts a conflict management perspective of liberal democratic consolidation. Her argument centres on the mitigation of conflict through liberal democratic institutions and processes as *more civilised forms of competition*. This, for Ethier results in solidarity, as competing interests must lead to a convergence of these interests and their respective groups. The themes of institutional conflict management and political cultural development are also highlighted. The basic premise of this argument is that institutionalisation of conflict through the procedural structures of liberal democracy will lead to greater identification with the new liberal democratic procedures and thus facilitate the unity within society that liberal democracy requires. Therefore, through democratic institutions in the liberal tradition one will be able to build a nation-state around the liberal democratic political order. This view is fundamentally flawed in that dedication to a liberal democratic dispensation will be based on the ability of the state to meet its obligations towards the citizens.

Di Palma (1990: 22 – 23) argued extensively for the use of institutionalisation to ensure relatively peaceful co-existence in the polity. Constitutional design, multipartyism, and structures that facilitate state-civic relations form the foundation of political crafting in an institutional sense. Di Palma (1990: 21 – 23) argued that although conditions for liberal democratic consolidation may be unfavourable, liberal democracy in an effort to curb oppression and reconstitute divided societies, must be encouraged through a process of political crafting geared towards deflecting authoritarian tendencies. Therefore, political crafting becomes essential to ensure the survival of the new liberal democratic order through its focus on inclusion and expansion of citizenship. Central to the expansion of citizenship is the commitment of

political elites in creating the conditions necessary for political stability and inclusion, and entrenching a liberal democratic political commitment to those institutions.

His view of political crafting essentially relates to the management of diverse political interests through creating an institution that can facilitate co-existence of diverse groups in society underpinned by a political commitment of political elites to the institutionalisation of political life in the liberal democratic tradition. For Di Palma (1990), solidarity must be the underlying goal of political crafting in order to achieve liberal democratic consolidation. Essentially, rooted in the individualist tradition of liberalism, the primary objective of political crafting relates to establishing and developing political citizenship of those who constitute the polity within a given territory. Ethier (1990: 15 – 16) adopts a similar argument for consolidation through identifying five principles that favour liberal democratic consolidation. These principles are: (1) free expression of divergent interests due to an autonomisation of civil society; (2) the formation of a majority government and peaceful alteration of power; (3) the enhancing of legitimacy of organisations in civil society and efficient representation of political interests; (4) an accepted constitution; institutionalised means of engagement between state and civil society; and, (5) an expansion of citizenship through a deepening and effective recognition.

Constitutional democracy is the institution that leads to the realisation of these principles. The assumption is that political elites must create a constitutional democracy first, centralising the importance of negotiations, settlements and transition pacts. Ethier (1990: 11 – 12) consequently argued that agreements signal liberal democratic consolidation in that political life becomes institutionalised, it guarantees the liberty of the individual, gives realisation to the presence of fundamental liberties, and limits the behaviour of political elites through rules and procedures that guarantee fundamental liberties and rights. For Ethier (1990: 12) “...constitutional democracy is reached when compromises between dominant actors and social groups are reached”.

The institutionalisation of political life in the liberal democratic tradition underlies liberal democratic consolidation (Di Palma 1990 and O'Donnell 1996: 37). These are, after all, the indicators that the newly created liberal democracy is likely to endure, or so the argument is posed. This is firmly rooted in the thematic evolution of liberal democracy and the associated concepts of liberty and political equality presented in



Chapter 3. Institutions give an opportunity for participation and guarantees political equality in that each participant will have an equal chance to engage politically. This does not, however, relate to any issues pertaining to socio-economic or practical equality rooted in the tradition of the substantive approaches to liberal democracy.

Linz and Stepan (1996 (a): 14) identify three minimum characteristics of liberal democratic consolidation: (1) state, (2) free elections, and, (3) elected representatives that govern democratically. Central to the concept of stateness in this context is social cohesion and the presence of a national identity. In this sense, Linz and Stepan (1996 (b): 7) argue that in order to consolidate a democracy a state is needed first. For Linz and Stepan a lack of a state will undermine the achievement of liberal democratic consolidation, especially when one finds "...an intense lack of identification with the state that a large group of individuals in the territory want to join a different state or create an independent state...". Linz and Stepan (1996) share similar views than that of Ethier (1990) and her concept of solidarity and Di Palma (1990) with his argument that the institutionalisation of political life in the liberal democratic tradition facilitates social cohesion through the expansion of politically inclusive citizenship.

Once stateness is established, Linz and Stepan conclude that the transition is complete. However, for stateness to be complete, in addition to facilitating inclusive citizenship, there must be domestic and international recognition of that stateness denoting an intermestic view of stateness and its associated citizenship within liberal democratic discourse. When *stateness* as a criterion is met, the creation of other aspects of liberal democratic political life forms the focus of political elites in consolidating their liberal democracies. These include a free and lively civil society; the creation of a relatively autonomous and valued political society rooted in constitutionalism; and, the presence of the rule of law. These must be underpinned by a constitutional democracy that guarantees basic liberties and socio-political freedoms; in the presence of a responsive government and democratic regime to citizen rights through institutionalised economic development and performance. Political crafting is geared towards the realisation of a constitutional democracy, where the benefits of the new liberal democratic order must reach all citizens. Linz and Stepan (1996(a): 24) see citizens as the essence of liberal democratic life and therefore the *demos must remain central in the polis*.

The institutionalisation of political life in the liberal democratic tradition also establishes the rules of political engagement within the liberal democratic process, and delineates the boundaries of political inclusion. In this light, Huntington (1996: 169) argued for a democratic bargain, where in order to participate in the political process of negotiations, political actors need to be moderate in their behaviour. Institutional cooperation once the founding election has been conducted is thus able to moderate the behaviour of the political elites in the new liberal democratic order. In order to secure legitimate participation in the liberal democratic process, moderate behaviour will guarantee group acceptance of all those who participate in the new liberal democratic process (Huntington, 1996: 169). Therefore, the democratic bargain is regarded as means of introducing the nature of political life under a liberal democratic political order, in that political elites learn to use institutions to manage diverse political interests and conflicts through the institutionalising of political life advocated by liberal democracy.

In order to participate, key for Huntington (1996: 170) is moderation in speech, behaviour, and actions. This requires an agreement to utilise political institutions as opposed to violence and to accept these institutions on a political, social, and economic level. Power, it must be agreed, can only be achieved through the political institutions of elections and parliamentary procedures, and this must be done only if the polity had given their blessing through the process of the vote. Initial negotiations and participation in the negotiations surrounding the democratic transition ensures a degree of political learning for the political elite on the expectations in the new liberal democratic order. In this sense Huntington (1996) regards the transition period of negotiations as a *finishing school* for the political elite that must drive liberal democratic consolidation. It is through the agreements, negotiations, and bargaining that political elites may learn the *tricks* of the *democratic trade* needed to ensure a behavioural shift once the founding elections have been concluded. Huntington (1996: 172) consequently concludes that “historically the first efforts to establish democracies in countries frequently failed; second efforts often succeeded. One plausible reason for this pattern is that learning occurred...”.

Di Palma (1990: 27 - 29) also expresses similar concerns in that as a lure for a symbiotic relationship between competing groups, political institutions are central and the possibility of political inclusion and participation act as an incentive. Political

institutions become central to achieving some level of social cohesion because of the allure of participation in the political process. Political institutions act as prerequisite to liberal democratic consolidation in that it is only through these institutions that the attractiveness of the political incentives of political inclusion and participation can be realised. Central to political institutions as both a prerequisite and as an incentive is the view that political conflicts and diverse political interests are managed and diffused more effectively in a liberal democratic order. Yet, as Linz and Stepan (1996 (b)) reminds scholars, in order to achieve the institutionalisation of liberal democracy, recognition of those institutions is important. If the institutions are not recognised, a perception that there will be no need to participate in them prevails and undermines the successful institutionalisation of political life.

Huntington (1996: 171) points to another important element needed for successful institutional liberal democracy: the ability to compromise. The successful institutionalisation of political life is determined by the willingness of political leaders to compromise. This, Huntington (1996) argued is underpinned by the customary attitudes towards compromise. Indeed, Huntington (1996: 171) observed that “some culture appears to be more favourable to compromise than others and the legitimacy of and value placed on compromise may vary over time in a society”. This introduces an element of cultural sensitivity to the institutional component of liberal democratic consolidation. It does not, however, attempt to facilitate any understanding as to the relationship between culture and the institutionalisation of democracy on a procedural level, but merely implies that successful institutionalisation of political life in the liberal democratic tradition will be determined by the extent of cultural attitudes to compromise.

Haidenus, (1994: 63) argued that cooperation between groups can be facilitated through political institutions and, as such, these have the potential to reduce political conflict in that one is facilitating a “...democracy of compromise and accommodation...”. Political institutions therefore become essential in mediating and ensuring adequate representation of different views, needs, and wants. Di Palma’s (1990) work is primarily concerned with these political institutions and the way in which they are able to ensure institutionalised conflict management to mitigate the insecurity that surrounds the liberal democratic process. The aim, to reiterate Di Palma’s view, is coexistence through peaceful conflict management. Haidenus (1994:

62 – 63) shares similar sentiments as certain socio-economic crises can be “...circumvented by means of skilful political engineering; it is foremost a matter of finding the appropriate institutional solutions to the problem...those who are engaged in safeguarding of democracy...ought to devote their energy to the design and adjustment of political institutions”.

Liberal democratic consolidation in this tradition becomes a political exercise in institutional engineering in the liberal democratic tradition. Through the institutionalisation of political life one sees elements of the social contract and the necessity to minimise tyranny of the majority through inclusive political life. O'Donnell (1996: 39 – 40) regards Dahl's polyarchy as the ingrained institutional package for liberal democratic consolidation. To this effect, the institutions, rules and the constitutional core of liberal democracy will guide the political elites on their interaction and political behaviour, bringing certainty to the political game. By institutionalising the political game, a normative commitment to liberal democratic values and political culture are enabled through the institutionalisation of political life.

Political elites are responsible for engineering and implementing the structures, institutions and processes of liberal democratic processes (including the relevant social and economic structures), while accommodating the mass level engagement to build a relationship of political trust in the new liberal democracy regime. Similarly, through interaction and engagement in the liberal democratic institutions, underpinned by political liberty and equality, political elites signal their commitment to the new liberal democratic regime to the mass level, and facilitate the transmission of liberal democratic values from elite level to mass level, germinating a liberal political culture. Centeno (1994: 131 – 148) highlights three mechanisms by which this is to be achieved: (i) contracts; (ii) domination, and (iii) trust. For Centeno (1994: 131 – 132) contracts are essential as “they seek to balance promise of reform with guarantees that the status quo will not change past prescribed thresholds”. Effectively contracts are then regarded as a calming mechanism to ensure moderation of the political actors. Yet, as Centeno (1994: 134) correctly observed: contracts need some form of enforcement, and hence the need for liberal domination. In this sense, Centeno (1994: 134 – 137) highlights the central roles of leadership of a bourgeoisie class and the government bureaucracy which successfully incorporates private interests. The bourgeois class is deemed necessary as an exclusionary type of democracy whilst an

emerging liberal democracy attempts to deal with socio-economic and political restructuring. Strong government bureaucracies see the state effectively assuming the role of the dominant class in this context. This is somewhat contradictory to the form of domination put forth by Huntington's moderation/participation trade-off. Centeno focuses on the political elite level guiding the political transformation to liberal democracy, while Huntington focuses on forcing moderate political behaviour through the threat of being excluded from participation in the emerging liberal democratic institutions. Centeno (1994: 137 – 140) highlights the centrality of political trust as a necessary element for successful consolidation in the liberal tradition. The creation of civil society is dependent upon the presence of strong civil and political liberties and a foundation of trust built through the political development of the emerging liberal democracy. Indeed Centeno (1994: 140) concludes that

the creation of a social contract, a dominant but democratic state, and an atmosphere of trust and cooperative behaviour will not in themselves guarantee a successful transition. Each depends in part on the presence of the other. A state able to guarantee contracts will help foster an atmosphere of trust. A shared faith in the future will support the development of a social compact. A sense of common identity and an acceptance of class compromise will facilitate the creation of a legitimate state authority.

What is evident in the works of Ethier (1990), Di Palma (1990), Centeno (1994), Linz and Stepan (1996), and Huntington (1996) is liberal democratic crafting through the implementation, review, and adherence to liberal democratic institutions facilitates and ensures *habituation* in that new political behaviour becomes routine and eventually part of the dominant political culture. It also facilitates an acceptable and necessary level of social cohesion necessary for liberal democratic consolidation. Consequently, by institutionalising political life a social contract is created that guarantees the liberties of the polity and moderate and responsible political behaviour of political elites. This social cohesion is founded on a political basis through democratisation and consolidation of political and institutional systems (Vergopoulos 1990: 145). However, Vergopoulos (1990: 145) observed that political democratisation emerged during a time of great uncertainty, where new states emerged with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and "...all traditional forms of social cohesion are breaking down".

Ducatenzeiler (1990: 235 – 236) adopts a social contract approach and assumes that compromise will be reached based on the creation of liberal democratic political

institutions. There is an automatic assumption that pluralist political societies are already in place and a political commitment to ensure peaceful management of the interest that dominate in a multiparty system (Ducatenzeiler, 1990: 236). This assumption is guided by the belief that a society coming from a protracted social conflict will be open to competing and cooperating in an institutionalised manner and will generate sufficient levels of political trust to sustain the political commitment to the new institutionalisation of political behaviour. There is little or no consideration for the historical trajectory that a conflict-ridden society manifests that will ultimately influence how actors, groups and individuals will operate in a new liberal democratic order with new rules that may not necessarily be unknown. A social contract requires a strong civic virtue, and in many cases in the non-Western world, the liberal civic virtue is illusive or still under construction. Identity politics, nation-building, economic growth, and institutional growth are central to the political agenda, which makes achieving a sufficient social contract somewhat difficult. In this sense, many emerging liberal democracy are reduced to defective democracy in that they cannot meet all the criteria of a strong liberal social contract<sup>32</sup>. Similar to Puhle's (2005) conceptualisation of defective democracy, so too Merkel (2004: 52 - 54) presents his concept of a defective democracy and emphasises low levels of modernity, negative economic trends, a weak civil society, fragmented social capital and civil society, divided society engaged in nation- and state-building, and the international and regional context as underlying causes of the emergence of a defective democracy. This highlights that scholars of liberal democratic consolidation theory needs to re-calculate the value of social contracts in environments where levels of political trust is low, life is harsh, and absolute poverty does not merely threaten the emerging liberal democratic regime, but human life itself. These are not conducive to institutional liberal democratic consolidation and render many emerging democracies as defective in some form.


Institutions of liberal democratic consolidation and their relationship to the procedural view of liberal democracy in essence argue that the democratic process rooted in constitutionalism and rule of law will facilitate political equality and political liberty of citizens and generate sufficient political trust and commitment to liberal democratic political institutions. The idea is that political elites have an obligation to craft political

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<sup>32</sup> Defective democracies range from exclusive democracies to illiberal democracy type II as conceptualised by Puhle (2005). Please refer back to Chapter 2.

institutions that ensures the political equality and liberty of the polity in order to generate sufficient political trust amongst political actors to sustain a commitment to the institutionalisation of political life. In this sense, institutions crafted in the democratisation phase must produce an acceptable set of rules by which political actors abide in the execution of the political game under the new liberal democratic regime. The institutions must allow sufficient political freedom and political equality at mass level to engage political elites without fear of arbitrary action against them. Likewise, political elites are accountable to the masses through the political institutions of liberal democracy, and must govern to the best will of the people in order to be viewed as a responsive government. Therefore, the normative justifications around the institutional approach to consolidation are that political liberty and political equality of the masses facilitates responsive government by the political elites, and thereby execute effective rule of the people. A civic virtue will be created through extensive experience in the liberal democratic political game. It also generates stability in an uncertain political environment by facilitating political trust in the new liberal democratic political institutions.

When engaging with liberal democratic consolidation, one must not be tempted to fall into the trap of one-dimensional analysis in defining consolidation as stability within the emerging democratic system. Although stability is a leg on which liberal democratic consolidation scholars assess consolidation, it cannot be the only factor that informs the act of defining liberal democratic consolidation. Liberal democracy is a system of governance as well as a way of life executed through a social contract between the rulers and the ruled, which guarantees the majority political liberty and equality to sustain self-governance through majority rule.



**Figure 12: The three pillars of liberal democratic consolidation theory**

In achieving liberty, equality and the civic virtue the role of political elites remain central. Merkel (2008: 13) argued that liberal democratic consolidation can only be achieved when the political elite regard the political system as legitimate and that there is no alternative political system. At mass level, the polity need to adjust their behaviour, attitudes and values to reflect a belief in the legitimacy of the liberal democratic system. Similar sentiments are expressed in the works of Diamond (1999) Ethier (1990) and Di Palma (1990). In order to achieve liberty and equality political life needs to be institutionalised, as scholars of liberal democratic consolidation theory argue. It is this institutionalisation of political life that facilitates the germination of the liberal civic virtue through participation and legitimation of new liberal democratic political system. Merkel (2008: 13) provides a multilevel model of liberal democratic consolidation as depicted below:






Figure 13: Multi-level model of democratic consolidation - Source Merkel (2008)

This model attempts to highlight the dual dimension of liberal democratic consolidation on political elite and mass level. In keeping with the genetics approach to transitionology and much like Ethier (1990), Di Palma (1990) and Diamond (1999), Merkel's model ties in with the work by Linz and Stepan (1996) when dealing with the layers of consolidation of democracy in the civil, administrative, economic and political societies of newly democratised states. The model is justified on four layers. Layer one highlights the centrality of constitutional consolidation which pertains to the key political and constitutionally established institutions of the executive, legislative and judiciary and the electoral system through which political representatives are elected. This level essentially refers to the macro-level of liberal democratic consolidation and is concerned with the institutionalisation of political life in the liberal democratic tradition. Negotiations during the transition centre on this level. Consequently Diamond (1999) Ethier (1990) and Di Palma (1990) posit the centrality of the institutional arrangement for liberal democratic consolidation.

What is evident from this model is that liberal democratic consolidation seeks to completely alter a society in favour of a liberal democratic order, starting with institutions that must disseminate representation through the structures established. Essentially, political elites are responsible for the representative tier in that they have to canvass and campaign within society in order to take legitimate power. Central to this

tier is the electoral system, competing political alternatives from which the polity can choose, and reasonably free and fair elections. The overarching umbrella under which the representative tier operates is the constitutional level. Following the representative tier, the model depicts that behavioural liberal democratic consolidation will follow. The task here appears to be two-fold in that representatives through the institutions in which they operate, engage civil society. Civil society, through their interaction with the institutions, now has the power to elect or evict political elites. This leads to political learning that entrenches the final level of liberal democratic consolidation; the germination of a liberal democratic civic virtue. Once the civic virtue is consolidated, liberal democratic consolidation will finally be achieved in that the new liberal democratic regime will be regarded as legitimate and stable.

Diamond (1999: 66 – 70) argued that consolidation occurs in two dimensions within three levels. The dimensions move together to create the salient features of consolidation: a deep normative commitment to democracy that is deeply embedded in institutions and society at large as a process to manage diverse interests and conflicts through set rules and procedures, thereby alleviating the volatility of the political space. Diamond's argument is conceptualised as follows:




Figure 14: Diagrammatic representation of Diamond's argument

What is evident from both Merkel and Diamond is that consolidation is essentially a top-down process in which political elites take a leading role. The transmission of liberal democratic values starts with the institutionalisation of political life. Political elites take an active role in constructing their liberal democratic experiments and the values and behaviour which they exhibit flow down to civil society and the public at large. What is interesting is that both models seem to mirror the modernisation tradition in that, as producers of modernisation economic theory argue, there is a trickle-down effect of economic benefit. So too, do these two models demonstrate that there is a trickle-down effect of political values aimed at securing political freedom and political equality in the liberal tradition from political elite or macro-level to mass or micro-level.

This denotes an essentially elitist approach to liberal democratic consolidation in that the models of Merkel and Diamond place political elites at the centre of achieving liberal democratic consolidation. The models demonstrate that in an emerging liberal state, an elitist top-down approach is needed to facilitate and create the liberal civic virtue. The state, as an institution, is involved in socio-political choreography through the transmission of liberal values and appropriate norms that guide political behaviour. It is therefore essential for political elites to drive this liberal democratic production. The scholars further emphasise the crafting of political freedom and political equality through the institutionalisation of political life. Further to the institutionalisation of political life, are political elites, who act as models for the masses, demonstrating, through their actions and behaviour, the new political values and norms that guide political behaviour in the new liberal democracy.

Schedler (2001: 37) warns "...we are in danger of forgetting that the modern history of representative elections is a tale of authoritarian manipulations as much as it is the saga of democratic triumph". For this reason Schedler distinguishes between authoritarian and democratic electoralism. However, one can for argument's sake state that if elections are present then the minimum democratic conditions are met. Many authors, including Huntington (1996) and Diamond (1999) argue that *elections are the stuff democracy is made of*. Diamond (2008: 37 – 38), however, posits that despite two decades of warning against the electoral fallacy, Western states are still content with elections as the primary indicator of democracy.

By expanding liberal democracy to the institutionalisation of political life in the legal-rational tradition, constitutional liberalism is seen as a more reliable indicator of liberal democracy. In this sense civil and political liberties are a better indicator of liberal democracy than merely using elections only. Indeed, Diamond (1999: 65) argued that the institutionalisation of political democracy will lead to further legitimisation which entails "...the norms, procedures and expectations of democracy become so internalised that actors routinely, instinctively conform to the written (and unwritten) rules of the game, even when they conflict and compete intensely". However, O'Donnell (1996: 35) is suspicious of the institutional approach to consolidation. He states that

the problem with many new polyarchies is not that they lack institutionalisation. Rather the way in which political scientists usually conceptualise some institutions prevents us from recognising that these new polyarchies actually have two extremely important institutions. One is highly formalised, but intermittent: elections. The other is informal, permanent, and pervasive: particularism<sup>33</sup>.

In this regard O'Donnell (1996: 38) argue that theory "...carries a strong teleological flavour...". He urges scholars to take into account the political rules that are institutionalised at macro-level, and the informal rules that guide behaviour of political elites at macro-level. For O'Donnell (1996: 40) the problem emerging liberal democracies faces is not one of institutionalisation of political life, but clientism, as an enduring, influential and informal institution. For that reason, he argued that the task of the political theorist is two-fold, in that one needs to investigate and describe actual behaviour; and secondly, one needs to unfold the informal rules that guide behaviour and expectations. In this sense, for O'Donnell, actors within political institutions are inherently rational, but the key difference is which rules shape their rational political decision-making. This cannot be determined without intimate knowledge pertaining to the informal rules of political engagement, and the extent of solidity of the knowledge pertaining to those informal rules amongst the political actors. Diamond (1999: 13 – 14) also highlights the necessity of the impact of the informal rules on constitutionalism and political equality. Much in agreement with Diamond, O'Donnell (1998: 116) hypothesise that clientism undermines accountability by deteriorating the principles of

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<sup>33</sup> O'Donnell defines particularism as clientism. Ironically Ethier, Di Palma and Diamond's volumes argue extensively on the negative effects of clientism on new democracies. Yet, there are no suggestions as to how to effectively deal with these, except to argue that the institutionalisation of political life will deal with these matters.

good governance, such as separation of powers, and systems of checks and balances, thereby damaging legal-rational authority and legitimacy that underpins liberal democracy. O'Donnell (1998: 116) concludes that

successful social navigation requires keen awareness of both the formal and informal codes, as well as their interlacings. This is true everywhere, but nowhere more pointedly so than in those countries that are furthest removed from the geographical and historical core areas of polyarchy.

These considerations are relevant considering that many processes and institutions have been manipulated to some degree to further entrench authoritarian tendencies that are contradictory to liberal democratic principles of political freedom and political equality in some degree. Africa and Latin America have given rise to the presidents-for-life phenomenon, the most recent being Zimbabwe's Mugabe (Moore, 2006: 120). The Zimbabwean crisis had been a decade in the making signalled by the farm invasions that characterised the early-2000s to allegations of electoral intimidation. It was only when Robert Mugabe staged a one-man election in 2008 that the crisis was finally condemned by the African Union. The opposition leader exited the elections due to increased violence and intimidation that characterising the campaigning period. It is also not the first time the elections in Zimbabwe were characterised by violence and intimidation, yet even as the Western world condemned the elections of 2004, Africa declared them free and fair. Perceptions of Western domination and the West prescribing to Africa will invariably dictate how assessing liberal democratic institutions in Africa are executed by other African *emerging* democracies. This is adequately summarised in the statement by Robert Mugabe in 2004: *Tony Blair, you keep your Britain, and I will keep my Zimbabwe*. Robert Mugabe therefore qualifies as the elected leader of Zimbabwe in 2004, but struggles to qualify his victory in 2008. This scenario is not new in Africa. Electoral *mismanagement* has characterised the procedural ventures of democracy in Africa and other parts of the non-Western world. The informal rules that are common knowledge in this context dictate that elections are open to manipulation, and therefore, although political life is institutionalised, the informal rules that dictate the behaviour of political elites demonstrate that electoral manipulation is acceptable. Indeed, Deegan (2008: 91) warns that elections are not merely about management and choosing representatives, but also about politics and culture. In this sense, Deegan (2008: 92) further highlights that electoral mismanagement in previous elections lead to disillusionment of the voter and results in

alienation and apathy. Although voter education is essential in these contexts, one also needs to take cognisance of the political culture that surround elections, especially electoral abuse. This includes behaviours such as money for votes, distortion of electoral registers, mismanagement, intimidation and violence (Deegan, 2008: 92). Consequently, Dervis (2006: 155 - 156) noted

History and geography matter too...that [these] two variables go far toward predicting how a country will do in terms of democratic development and sustaining freedom. This first shows how much democracy the country had in the past. The second is what sort of regions it inhabits. Countries that have already known a substantial degree of democracy at some point in their history tend to do better at sustaining democracy after dictatorship have ended than countries where dictatorship has been overthrown but where democracy has never been experienced. The same goes for regions. Being in a 'good neighbourhood' is good for the prospects of sustaining and deepening democracy within a country, and being in a more difficult neighbourhood is likely to harm those prospects.

In addition to political culture of apathy and disillusionment that undermines liberal democratic consolidation; identity politics may further curtail liberal democratic consolidation. Spaces, geography, territorial states, and nation-states in a formal sense may not necessarily be reflective of the informal rules and divisions within a society. When attempting to create legitimacy through institutionalising political life in the liberal democratic tradition, Centeno (1994: 139) stresses the importance of the "...imagined community that dictates the transition...".

Yet, O'Donnell (1996: 38) remains perplexed at the state of protracted unconsolidation of many emerging liberal democracies. Diamond (1999) attempts to answer this question by focusing on the different scenarios in which democratisation can result. These are delegative democracy, non-democracy and developmental democracy and Merkel (2004: 48 – 52) adds defective democracy, on which Puhle's analysis elaborated by providing a typology of defective democracies. Although there are attempts to categorise the different trajectories of liberal democratic consolidation, there is still limited scholarship on understanding the root causes for the *unconsolidation problem*. When attempting to deal with unconsolidating liberal democracies, is it perhaps not time to revisit the divine faith that scholars place in political institutionalism rooted in the Western tradition?

Currently producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory does not account for the extent to which political culture influences the formal creation of liberal democracy at a macro-level. This is not to say that a view of cultural relativism prevails in that one cannot criticise processes and procedures for fear of offending, however, it is necessary to investigate the foundation upon which these democratic institutions are initiated, especially in a non-Western context. Indeed, one needs to heed O'Donnell's (1998) conclusion: informal rules are just as important as formal rules when crafting liberal democracy. This allows for a broadened understanding liberal democratic institutional problems in a non-Western context, and can assist in generating new knowledge and scholarship on how to better deal with institutional dilemmas as they relate to democratic institutions and mechanisms of the democratic process in the liberal tradition in this context.

#### **4.2. Economic development and liberal democratic consolidation**

Institution-building is related to the establishment of the normative principles of political equality and liberty. However, there is also an intrinsic relationship between economic performance and liberal democratic consolidation. Chu, Bratton, Lagos, Shastri, and Tessler (2008: 74) indeed argue that for liberal democratic legitimacy to prevail, it must *deliver the goods*. In other words, the new liberal democratic order must result in a better quality of life for the polity reflected in the material welfare of the polity. However, they warn against economic reductionism and hypothesise that the polity's democratic commitment correlates not so much to the market, but to the democratic experience. The foundation of this hypothesis is that it is not the best interest of young democracies to pair economic performance and democratic commitment of the polity (Chu, Bratton, Lagos, Shastri, and Tessler 2008: 74).

The study wishes to challenge this notion in that there is a firm union between economic development and consolidation. This is especially relevant in societies that possess a weak socio-economic structure. It is the relationship between economic development and consolidation that has proven the most difficult to marry. Theorists need to consider the high level of absolute poverty and how this impacts on consolidation as Kapstein and Converse (2008: 61 – 62) argue: “low per capita income, high levels of inequality, high rates of poverty, and higher ethnic fragmentation all harm the prospects of democracy”. Scholars in the liberal democratic consolidation tradition suggest the existence of a relationship between redistribution and its

associated policies and poverty reduction and levelling the political playing field that can aid liberal democratic development on both elite and mass level. More prosperity leads to more democracy, as many democratic pre-conditions scholars such as Dahl (1971) had argued, hence the dual transition of emerging liberal democracies. The relationship between economics and politics in the liberal democratic consolidation tradition has evolved to some extent from a pre-conditions approach to one which focuses on human empowerment (Dervis, 2006; 158 – 159; and Welzel and Inglehart 2008: 126). The relationship between liberal democratic development and capitalism does not have an impressive record in democratisation history, and this consequently explains the sudden focus on development as human empowerment. Cardoso (1979) cited in Centeno (1994:129) makes a valid statement when he posits that “policies calling for ‘social order with economic progress’ often neglect to ask ‘progress for whom’. In many instances, progress is limited to the political, economic and social elites within a state. Redistribution to the poorest of the poor remains a challenge to achieve a more level playing field in highly unequal societies. Another challenge relates to the size of the middle class in emerging democracies. Welfare states require a strong and large middle class to sustain its policies of social welfare and other redistributive activities. This foundation is often lacking in emerging and non-Western context where vast inequalities across different classes still remain. It is perhaps for that reason that Vergopoulos (1990: 139) noted “democratisation is not in contradiction with other symptoms of social anorexia, it is an integral part of it”.

Alongside political liberation, economic liberation must occur when the newly created democracy enters the international system. Maravall (1995: 13) argued that economic markets are a prerequisite for democracy and successful liberal democratic consolidation can only occur once economic development is achieved. This is especially relevant in an increasingly globalising world where markets are increasingly integrated, along with a liberal predisposition that must characterise the political system. Therefore, a duality exists characterised by “...market expansion on the one hand and social control of it on the other hand” (Munck, 2001: 11).

The substantive element of democracy cannot be ignored in theories dealing with liberal democratic consolidation. Hence, economic development that facilitates redistributive efforts in a newly democratised state proves central to liberal democratic



success. Therefore, one is dealing with a dual transition<sup>34</sup> or *double movement* in that states undergoing political reform towards democracy have to engage in economic reform in the liberal tradition as well (Merkel, 2008: 11). These reforms are essentially aimed at creating a free market system to facilitate economic development through modernisation and foreign direct investment. Many states are encouraged to embark on liberal political reforms with the promise of financial aid through foreign investments, foreign aid and further access to loans from institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Central to receiving these benefits are creating liberal democratic political orders.

The polity's expectation of actual economic benefit of liberal democracy is also a focal point of political reforms that characterise the crafting of liberal democracy (Aslund 1995: 84). Centeno (1994: 129) noted that there are many redistributive demands in the emerging liberal democratic states, and the dilemma that presents itself is that some political demands must remain unsatisfied whilst pursuing the capitalist accumulation of economic logic. Kapstein and Converse (2008: 58) observed that emerging liberal democratic states are subject to increased political and economic volatility than their Western peers, and this increases the chances of liberal democratic collapse. Their analysis revealed that although the average per capital income was US\$ 2618 (in 2006 dollars) during Western liberal democratic development, they were still approximately three times wealthier than their emerging counterparts with an average of US\$866. The central question for Kapstein and Coverse is thus the relationship between poverty and democracy, but more specifically liberal democracy. Centeno (1994: 135) adds that

none of the revolutions that produced the developed states of Western Europe and of North America originally established what we call democracy today. Even in the twentieth century large segments of the populations were excluded from voting for reasons of sex, class...and race...the conflict between the economic and political imperatives facing contemporary states...would certainly be less problematic if a state had only to consider the wishes of 8 % of the population, as was the case with Britain in 1867.

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<sup>34</sup> Diamond and Plattner (1995) argue that it is this dual transition that sets the emerging democracies apart from Western political development. However, they forget to note that along with a change in ideology, one saw a change in economic systems in that capitalism reigned supreme over more communist orientated economic philosophies and policies.

The reality is that when *democracy* arrives, there is an expectation that lives will improve. *Democracy* is supposed to bring with it a better quality of life and improved living conditions through the perceived economic benefits of liberal democracy. However, liberal democracy is a political system aimed at securing the political freedom and equality in opportunity of citizens. It is not an economic system. That is the capitalist realm, which is generally regarded as the best complement to a liberal democratic order. Hence, when states are engaged in liberal democratic consolidation activities, they are also engaged in capitalist economic construction.

The basic premise was that “whenever new patterns of reward and opportunity are reorganised as profoundly as they are in programmes of liberalisation and privatisation, new patterns of wealth and privilege will be generated. If those new patterns gain legitimacy, people must be satisfied...” (Diamond and Plattner, 1995: xii). For this reason, Aslund (1995: 83) argued that first there must be a liberal democratic dawn through crafting exercises of the political elites. Just as the political space needs to become more transparent and allow for equality of opportunity, so too must the economic space be subjected to transparency and facilitate the creation of equality of opportunity. Initially, however this, along with the changes in behaviour at institutional level, will further facilitate a deepening of democracy in that civil society will come to regard their new democratic system as legitimate, and through decreasing inequality, as the best form of government in their society.

It is broadly argued that economic instability will lead to a decline in democracy (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995: 2; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheirub, and Limongi, 1996: 49). The basic premise of these arguments is rooted on two foundations. The first is that of regime performance as identified by Diamond (1999: 76). The second is what Pereira (1990: 149) terms the political myth.

Regime performance can be construed as the manner in which a regime is able to operate on two levels. The first level is that of democratic performance, i.e. institutions. This refers to the ability of the state to effectively govern its citizens according the liberal democratic traditions and generate democratic legitimacy for the liberal democratic regime. In essence, the state must ensure institutional conflict management, civil liberties and political equality, and use institutional mechanism such as elections to choose leaders at various intervals.

Diamond (1999: 76) defines regime performance as “...production of sufficiently positive policy outputs to build broad political legitimacy...”. It is imperative to note that the policy outputs generated refer to the general wellbeing of the polity as a whole. Economic regime performance of the emerging liberal democracy, he argued, does not necessarily lead to the democratic transmission of values, but sustaining economic growth and ensuring long-term redistribution will address changes in political culture, class and states structures and civil society that facilitate democratic consolidation in the liberal tradition (Diamond, 1999: 88). Regime performance according to Diamond (1999: 88 – 89) consequently centres on both political and economic performance. Political performance is essential in achieving the substance of liberal democracy and stabilising the socio-political environment on three level: domestic safety and security<sup>35</sup>, a nationalist sentiment that values increased prestige in world affairs<sup>36</sup>, and peace as a foreign policy output<sup>37</sup> (Diamond, 1999: 89).

Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheirub, and Limongi (1996: 49) stresses the importance of high levels of economic performance of emerging democracies, by positing that “poverty is a trap...poverty breeds poverty and dictatorship”. Therefore, the substantive elements need redress when dealing with regime performance. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheirub, and Limongi (1996: 49) noted this in stating that “democracy can survive in the poorest nations if they manage to generate development, if they reduce inequality, if the international climate is propitious...”. In the same breath, Haggard and Kaufman (1995: 2 – 3) have argued that inadequate and weak economic performance undermines the development of liberal democratic attitudes and behaviours. The relationship between economic development and democratisation has been a political challenge for many decades, both for practitioners and theorists (Carothers 1997: 15).

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<sup>35</sup> This includes protection from any arbitrary action against the civilian by the state and in society. It therefore includes crime as a threat to democratic consolidation (Diamond, 1999: 89).

<sup>36</sup> Prestige refers to the ability of the state to climb the international social ladder to a degree (Diamond, 1999: 89). States wish to be seen as being prosperous and successful. It is also an argument posed by Vergopoulos (1990: 141) when he argued that it is essential to consider which positions states occupy in the international division of labour.

<sup>37</sup> This can be related to the democratic peace thesis. When a newly democratised states enters the international system, it needs to conform to the rules of the game in that it will not advocate any aggressive tendencies (Diamond, 1999: 89). That way, one can argue, democracies are less likely to attack one another, especially when they are attempting to consolidate their democracy.

Economic performance also relates to the ability of the state to reduce massive income inequalities within their society (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheirub, and Limongi, 1996: 42 – 43; Haggard and Kaufman, 1996: 6 – 8; Nelson, 1996: 54 – 55; Di Palma, 1990: 107; Haidenus, 1994: 76 – 77). This is logical in that democracy entails equality, albeit political equality. The level of equality is however what is important. It is here that Di Palma (1990: 151) is grossly misled in his argument that “poor material performance does not necessarily hamper the building of democratic support, nor does it hinder the development, in the long run, of a democratic political culture – no more than the initial weakness of democratic culture hampers performance and its popular reception”.

Material performance of a regime and its relationship to socio-economic equality are essential for liberal democratic consolidation, especially in a non-Western context where absolute poverty remains a challenge. Indeed Di Palma (1990: 107) observed, “we can expect a poor environment for democratic growth, for democracy fares better if society provides greater areas for civic participation and communal interaction...democracy does not grow in the soil of social inequality, even if we manage to plant it there”. Socio-economic equality or substantive liberal democracy is an indicator of how well a liberal democratic regime is performing and facilitates an assessment of its durability. Material performance is a crucial indicator as to how healthy a liberal democracy is and facilitates the identification of possible threats to durability of the new liberal democracy. However, economic regime performance as an indicator of liberal democratic health is questioned by Kapstein and Converse (2008: 62) who argue that political institutions are perhaps a better indicator of liberal democratic health. Central as political institutions are to the success of liberal democratic consolidation, economic performance will relate to issues of declining inequality and therefore becomes a central indicator of liberal democratic health. It is essential to remember that dire economic conditions can and have led to the downfall of authoritarian regimes. Liberal democratic regimes are not exempted from this phenomenon due to their presumed desirability. In the end, democracy, even liberal democracy, places citizens and the polity as its primary concern, and being responsive to the polity’s needs and being able to provide for those needs form the foundation of successful liberal democratic consolidation.

Liberal democratic survival is dependent upon the level of economic development (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheirub, and Limongi 1996: 40 – 41). This hypothesis is not new and central to the pre-conditions approach since the 1950s. The genetics approach stresses the importance of crafting the necessary pre-conditions through clever political manoeuvring and strong economic policies and state institutions. Economic crises require quick and urgent attention, as noted by Centeno (1994) and Kapstein and Converse (2008). The euphoria of liberation and celebrations for democracy's arrival will only last a little while. After this euphoria subsides, the state needs to have generated some form of material well-being and socio-economic equality in the substantive liberal democratic tradition. This places an obligation on political elites and other stakeholders to engage in activities aimed at changing the material and social arrangements. Consequently efforts are geared towards economic and social engineering through economic development and increased redistribution through effective democratic regime performance.

This process requires a negative and positive consensus (Merkel, 2008: 13; and Nelson, 1995: 51). Political consensus is more difficult to achieve when negotiating a democratic transition and is also complicated to implement. Economic reforms are essentially easier to implement, but yield difficult results as initial economic restructuring activities increases inequality and foreign penetration of the economy (Nelson, 1995: 51). There is pressure to get an economic crisis under control when engaging in a democratic negotiation for regime change, which translates into a negative consensus, due to the inequalities generated by initial market reforms that undermine the positive consensus that surrounds political reforms. This negative consensus can be translated into a positive consensus in the long term when agreeing on the principles that should "...guide fundamental restructuring..." (Nelson, 1995: 51).

Therefore, consensus on how the state is going to distribute wealth that follows market reforms becomes essential and informs transformational agendas of democratising states (Nelson, 1995: 51). It is here that there exists a delicate balance between markets and state in liberal democratic consolidation. Visions informed by the market is inadequate to achieve long-term transformational goals of equality (Nelson, 1995: 51) and consequently, the state must have a democratic vision of what a newly democratised society will look like and, as such must reallocate the resources to realise

this vision. Equality remains the central concern of redistributive policies. As Huntington (1996: 311) concluded:

The conclusion seems clear. Poverty is a principle and probably the principle obstacle to democratic development. The future of democracy depends on the future of economic development. Obstacles to economic development are obstacles to the expansion of democracy.

Consequently, society will be required to make sacrifices to ensure adequate economic development and growth in the initial creation of a negative consensus. These sacrifices, however, are to be temporary in nature. In the medium-term and long-term there should be decreasing inequality and generous social spending that sees to a higher or better quality of life. Political leadership plays a particularly important role in this regard, especially when crafting the conditions necessary for economic development and growth, and as Haidenus (1994: 62) observed, many social and economic complications associated with democratisation and democratic deepening can be overcome through utilising the “...means of skilful political engineering...”.

The relationship between economic development and political leadership is also a concern raised by Huntington (1996: 315 – 316). Indeed, Huntington goes as far as to argue that liberal democratic unconsolidation is a direct consequence of poverty. For Huntington modernisation is central to poverty eradication, and by implication, liberal democratic consolidation. Asian states have long traditions with strong states with merit-based bureaucracies (Fukuyama 2007: 10). One also needs to consider the role of Confucianism as a state doctrine which provides the cultural foundation, and the technocrats that come through the education system in that region (Fukuyama, 2007: 10). Therefore, economic development in this sense was accompanied by a cultural choreography of ‘democratic’ rule and economic development. The East Asian world, through incorporating their traditional values with economic activities, has achieved a certain level of economic success under the label of soft authoritarianism. What is of value in Huntington’s analysis is that “economic development makes democracy possible, but political leadership makes it real” (Huntington 1996: 361).

Economic development is closely linked to modernisation of a state. There is general consensus that a sufficient level of industrialisation is necessary to achieve economic growth. For societies to industrialise there is a need to move away from the traditional way of life towards modernity that mirrors the Western world’s developmental path.

Therefore, for states to modernise they are required to adopt modern values, techniques, attitudes, and methods associated with development in the Western world. A modern foundation from which to engage in economic development is regarded as a necessary precondition, and, if this condition is not present in a state, it must be crafted as a matter of urgency. Development in literacy rates and a higher percentage of people employed are seen as the requirements needed to bring about needed change in societies to promote liberal democratic rule (Haidenus, 1994: 75).

Continued economic non-performance may affect democratising on four levels. The first level relates to credibility and legitimacy, in that if one group keeps gaining under the new system, this creates the conditions conducive to the emergence of anti-democratic tendencies and impact on political stability (Nelson, 1995: 53). Economic reforms, as difficult as they are, prove essential to demonstrate the commitment of the incoming regime to generate a liberal democratic order. Yet, these reforms may generate further inequalities whereby lower classes become alienated, the middle class becomes impoverished and the wealthy increase their wealth (Nelson, 1995: 53). Therefore, liberal democratic legitimacy is undermined and if identity politics are linked to economic cleavages and benefits have the ability to lead to social and political conflict (Haidenus, 1994: 76 – 77). For this reason Leftwich (2005: 687) posit that economic growth and development can aid in the reduction of political and social instability by providing the polity with greater benefit in social and economic reconstruction, rendering economic development and growth not only moral, but political. Security is generated through the delivering of social and economic goods to the polity. Substantive concerns of liberal democratic consolidation, i.e. the ability to deliver, is political in that it generates the necessary security for liberal democratic consolidation, creating obligations through vested interests of the polity in ensuring political and social delivery through economic development and redistribution: stability and peace has to prevail for liberal democratic consolidation.

Effective democracy is equated with human empowerment coupled with strong and ethical political leadership and sufficient economic performance<sup>38</sup>. This sees a more broad interpretation of liberal democratic consolidation and is also found in the work of


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<sup>38</sup> Welzel and Inglehart (2008: 128) essentially define effective democracy as the “...essence of democracy...[to] empower its citizens” and equate this with the adequate implementation of laws. Therefore there is a relationship between the “...product of formal democracy and elite integrity”.

Schneider and Schmitter (2004: 61 – 62). Liberal democratic consolidation is conceptualised as

regime consolidation consist[s] of transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms and contingent solutions that have emerged during the uncertain struggles of the transition into institutions, that is relationships that are reliably known, regularly practised and normatively accepted by those persons or collectives defined as the participants/citizens/subjects of such institutions; and, in such a way that the ensuing channels of access, patterns of inclusion, resources for action, and norms about decision-making conform to one overriding standard: that of citizenship (Schneider and Schmitter 2004: 62).

This definition sees a shift in the traditional fashion of defining liberal democratic consolidation. It points to an inclusive view that attempts to delineate a holistic approach to understanding the relationship between institutions, economic development, and liberal democratic consolidation. At the centre of this is the citizen. Citizenship therefore entails an element of human empowerment in that adequate representation and civil society-state engagement cannot occur in conditions where one sees a collapse of standard of living. Therefore the relationship between consolidation and its two main components that of institutionalism and regime performance, take on a moralist stance through the focus on the betterment of society under the new liberal democratic dispensation. The definition can be demonstrated as follows:




**Figure 15: The reciprocal nature of liberal democratic consolidation**

Through economic development a certain level of quality of life must be achieved. By improving quality of life of the polity, the eradicating of poverty, and increasing practical equality, democratic values will be fostered in a society. People will learn that



liberal democracy is the most acceptable and prosperous form of government for their societies. Therefore, liberal democratic values will be further entrenched through a process of economic development.

Citizenship will not be generated without a reciprocal relationship between institutions and economic development and empowerment. The liberal democratic institutions must therefore maintain a fine balance between institutional or procedural democracy and regime performance or substantive democracy where all citizens that constitute the polity are included. There is a reciprocal relationship between political institutions that must guarantee liberty, representations, and political equality and the economic institutions that need to generate the resources needed for economic development and regime performance. Schneider and Schmitter (2004: 62) concluded that a primary challenge for liberal democratic consolidation remains the discovery of political institutions that can cater for rule of the people and material benefit for citizens. Welzel and Inglehart (2008: 129) propose the following model to highlight the relationship between economic development or modernisation and democracy.



**Figure 16: The human empowerment model (Welzel and Inglehart, 2008: 129)**

The model rests firmly on the assumption of modernisation theory. Through modernisation and development from a traditional society to a modern society, the basic premise is that development leads to democracy. Therefore, there is a

precondition of development in order to attain liberal democratic consolidation. The model, although useful in understanding the normative relationship between liberal institutions, economic development, and regime performance, does not necessarily take into account the *catch-up* developmental activities that many states in the developing world must undertake. Whilst engaging in the institutional building, many states in the developing world are also attempting to modernise and industrialise. Consequently, in addition to state-building and nation-building, non-Western have an added challenge of crafting a modern social and economic system.

Diamond (2008: 39) noted that democratic feasibility is dependent upon a free market and economic development, yet he links consolidation in this regard to the strength of political institutions. Even though there is an acknowledgement that substantive issues need attention, Diamond (2008) is still an intransigent institutionalist in that he advocates the primacy and importance of institutions in a substantive liberal democratic consolidation. The primary obstacles to democratic consolidation for Diamond (2008: 40 – 48) are bad leadership and corruption, and a lack of horizontal authority. Diamond incessantly argued that

the most urgent imperative is to restructure and empower the institutions of accountability and bolster the rule of law. Changing the way government works means changing the way politics and society work, and that, in turn requires sustained attention to how public officials utilise their office. This is the fundamental risk that all at-risk democracies face.

Diamond's argument resonates with sentiments expressed by Merkel's model. The dual transition remains the *democratic* obstacles many non-Western states must overcome to be elevated to the status of a liberal consolidated democracy. While not attempting to minimise the role of liberal democratic institutions, this is rather a call to highlight the contention that one cannot ignore substantive democratic elements. The free market is not the saviour of substantive liberal democracy, and may even further cement socio-economic inequality.

This leads to the next view of economic development: the political myth. Vergopoulos (1990: 139 – 140) pits political consolidation against social fragility. When many non-

Western states engage in political democratisation, it is usually done against the backdrop of poverty and social deterioration<sup>39</sup>.

There is an unstated belief that when liberal democracy arrives, the liberal democratic order will be more effective in dealing with social ills and provide economic and social upliftment (Pereira, 1990: 199). The reality, however, is that the emerging liberal democracy struggles to manage socio-economic problems and inequalities, which “...is a source of disappointment, representing a major threat to the consolidation of democracy” (Pereira, 1990: 199).

There is a certain cultural imperialist tendency when dealing with non-Western nations. The process of modernisation is perceived as the best alternative to ensure economic prosperity and as such deal with the substantive issues of liberal democracy. There is little consideration for any indigenous knowledge and processes to achieve economic development in a non-Western context. Theories ignore the path of development that the Western world has taken, forgetting the at times violent and protracted conflicts that raged as late as the 1940s, forgetting the poverty and inequality, and forgetting the painful birth of liberal democracy and capitalism in the Western world.<sup>40</sup> Perhaps, a better alternative is to look at the historical trajectory, the indigenous knowledge systems, and the cultural values that drive economic development and democracy in the non-Western world. Economies, like political systems, are human creations and will therefore need to reflect a human element.

#### **4.3. Concluding remarks**

Liberal democratic consolidation theory postulates two criteria that emerging democracies must meet: (1) the institutionalisation of political life in the liberal democratic tradition; and, (2) effective regime performance that enables the emerging democracy to deal with the substantive demands of an improved quality of life of the polity. Democratic institutions facilitate the institutionalisation of a degree of certainty and thus stabilises political uncertainty to some degree. Institutions are necessary to

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<sup>39</sup> Please refer to Table 5, which demonstrates that non-Western states place a much higher value on poverty and inequality as challenges to their democracy than their Western counterparts.

<sup>40</sup> See for example Fukuyama, F. 2007. “Liberalism versus state-building” in Journal of Democracy Vol. 18 (3). Pp. 10 – 13.

ensure that the rules, procedures, and processes of liberal democracy are in place and able to ensure that political elites abide by the rules of the liberal democratic game. They operate on the assumption that with strong institutions there will be an element of behavioural certainty in that actors in the institution will realise that only through abiding by the rules of the game, will they be included in the political game. This shift in behaviour and focus generates the foundation of a liberal democratic civic virtue. Indeed, liberal democratic consolidation needs to generate predictability, a commitment to legal-rational authority, and good economic governance necessary for greater economic prosperity (Dervis 2006: 155). This level of certainty relates both to the economic and political sphere, and has a direct impact on the societal sphere. Civil society will, through standardisation of behaviour through institutions and economic growth, come to appreciate the stability that the liberal democratic way of life brings. Chu, Bratton, Lagos, Shastri and Tessler (2008: 76) argued that an intrinsic support for liberal democracy is present, and that this support hinges on regime performance, yet celebrates the *good news* that citizens are disconnecting economic and political performance.

Human empowerment, as an element of liberal democratic consolidation theory is becoming more prevalent in liberal democratic consolidation discourse. One can therefore agree with Leftwich (2005: 692) that the purpose of consolidation is societal transformation pertaining to social, economic, political and legal institutions. The purpose of the transformation, in this sense thus centres on human welfare through the application of technical and scientific knowledge geared towards welfare of the polity, denoting a view that societal transformation in the liberal tradition is human empowerment. Similarly, one can agree with Welzel and Inglehart (2008: 131) that economic development is linked with democracy. This relationship between economic development and liberal democracy is not a new occurrence within liberal democratic consolidation theory. Dahl (1971) also argued, much in a similar fashion than Welzel and Inglehart that through economic development resources of the polity are increased, which in turn allows self-expression values with a high priority to freedom of choice, thus spurring political elites to embark on regime change towards a liberal democratic regime.

Human empowerment, societal transformation, economic development, and liberal democratic development are still linked on the foundations that inform modernisation

theory. Through modernisation there will be higher levels of education, social security or capital, and industrialisation will be achieved (Welzel and Inglehart, 2008: 131; and Leftwich, 2005: 691). It is therefore essential that when the initial institutions of democracies are crafted, there be a throughput towards development to ensure adequate economic growth. Similar themes emerged within the works of Di Palma (1990), Ethier (1990), Huntington (1996), and, Chu, Bratton, Lagos, Shastri and Tessler (2008) the greater the experience and stability with democratic institutions, the greater the commitment to democracy.

However, one can also agree with Merkel (2004: 52 – 53), which warns that scholars must consider the level of modernisation before taking this hypothesis as the divine proven theory of democratic development. Also, what is the nature of political life within a state engaged in liberal democratic experiments? Do identity politics dictate political life? Who is excluded or included from socio-political and socio-economic life? These are important considerations given that it can directly impact on the quality of citizenship in the emerging liberal democratic order. Institutions provide a platform for participation; they do not necessarily ensure participation and normative commitments to liberal democracy. These commitments that consolidation requires will invariably be dependent upon the performance of the regime. For that reason, Welzel and Inglehart (2008: 138) argue “to understand how democracy emerges, it is insufficient to focus solely on elites – increasingly, one must also study mass-level development”.

One cannot separate institutions and theories about economic development and empowerment from interpretations and experiences of actors that are charged with consolidating their liberal democracy. One cannot expect states to follow developmental trajectories similar to those that occurred in other states. Histories, cultures and values are different. Views of what constitutes empowerment and what is democracy will relate to the interpretation of concepts of liberty and equality, which will have profound impacts on how a civic virtue and rule of the people is generated.

Hegemonic liberal ideologies still dominate, and although institutions are developing and some level of economic development is occurring, the transmission of a normative commitment to liberal democracy may be problematic. In this light, although states may be making the proverbial right noises, there seems to be a lack of liberal

democratic civic virtues and political culture that germinate in emerging liberal democracies. Venezuela, Bolivia, and Russia, for example, are engaged in rhetoric highly critical of liberal democracy and have a strong focus on socio-economic equality and human welfare (not necessarily empowerment). To what extent must normative political culture change in a state to constitute a liberal democracy? Must a state adopt a Western political culture rooted in the liberal democratic tradition? This is the employ of the next chapter that seeks to engage with the generation of the liberal democratic civic virtue democratic consolidation in the liberal tradition necessitates.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Creating liberal democracy – values, norms and behaviour of liberal democratic consolidation**

Liberal democratic consolidation is not only concerned with institutions and regime performance. Cultural conversion to a liberal democratic way of life is a central component of democratic consolidation theory in this tradition. Crafting institutions and effective regime performance set the stage for the development of a new liberal democratic political culture. Through increased perceived positive regime performance, there will be a change in the values of societies. The basic premise of the institutional tradition of liberal democratic consolidation is that through political behaviour regulated by democratic institutions, and the ability of regimes to perform, liberal democratic values will trickle down into the polity, which will in turn be integrated by the demos.

Liberal democratic institutions are necessary as they bring an element of certainty to the political game, and regime performance will allow the demos to make positive assessments of the new liberal democratic dispensation. In addition, institutions are central to ensure political liberty and political equality of the demos. Institutions are only one aspect of liberal democratic consolidation that is subjected to regime performance. It is important for regimes to perform satisfactorily as liberation euphoria subsides, the demos will want to see benefits that the democratic regime brings. It is this benefit, consolidationists argue, that allows for the deepening of liberal democratic political culture (Di Palma 1991 and Diamond 1999).

Liberal democratic values are central to the survival of democracy in this tradition. By altering the value system of an emerging society, one is effectively attempting to cultivate values that will be compatible with the new liberal democratic order. The value system that must be cultivated is essentially rooted in liberal democratic theory, and implies a trend towards pluralism, and, the central role of civic and political liberties. Most importantly, the creation of a liberal democratic value system needs to assess the new democracy as legitimate. Diamond (1999: 161 – 162) infers that political culture is the missing link between economic development and regimes

through the political experience and quality of governance that influence attitudes and feelings towards the political system and impact on political beliefs and behaviour, including the perceived legitimacy of the liberal democratic regime by the polity.

The politico-cultural aspect of liberal democratic consolidation refers to the level of legitimacy the new liberal democracy enjoys in the polity. Institutions, regime performance, and the politico-cultural aspect collectively constitute the manner in which the normative or philosophical foundations of liberal democracy are to be attained. Institutions relate to the creation of political freedom in the procedural tradition of liberal democracy. Regime performance relates to the creation of equality in the substantive tradition of liberal democracy. The cultural-politico aspect relates to the civic virtue that ensures the sustainability of the new liberal democratic order. The liberal civic virtue and its required cultural evolution to achieve liberal democratic consolidation is the focus of this chapter.

This chapter will firstly assess the primary arguments around political culture and the transmission of liberal democratic values within the new democratic regime. As alluded these must be rooted in perceptions of legitimacy pertaining to regime performance and the behaviour of elites. This is essential as it will allow one to determine what the prerequisites according to theory are. Consequently, this will allow an assessment of whether theory does in fact reflect reality. The second task at hand is an assessment of theory based on the realities in a non-Western context.

### **5.1. Liberal democratic consolidation, regime performance, institutions and political culture**

Liberal democratic values are central to the knowledge archive of liberal democracy of which regime legitimacy is the most critical able to impact on the liberal democracy endurance or collapse (Diamond 1999: 161; Huntington 1996: 258, Linz and Stepan 1996: 77 - 83, Di Palma 1990: 109 - 112; Boschi 1990: 230 and Ethier 1990: 17). These scholars stress that when dealing with liberal democratic values it is imperative to assess perceptions pertaining to the legitimacy of the new liberal democratic regime. Indeed this is a logical conclusion given that the very foundation of democracy is rule of the people. Liberal democracy requires participation of the people in order to let the ruling elite know how the demos wishes to be ruled. Therefore, *demos* and *kratos* are essential in cultivating commitments towards the new liberal democratic dispensation.



In essence one is attempting to cultivate liberal democratic citizens in the Western tradition necessary for an operational liberal polity (Kahane, 1996: 699).

Regime performance remains central to the success of a new liberal democratic regime. Interestingly, scholars posit that regime performance is able to generate liberal democratic values through positive regime performance: this is at the heart of liberal democratic legitimacy generated through human empowerment in which the polity remains central. Regime performance is not the only criterion upon which perceptions of legitimacy are based. Institutions are also central in that moderate behaviour is required to 'teach' the public at large what behaviour is required from a liberal democratic order (Diamond 1999: 161; Huntington 1996: 258, Linz and Stepan 1996: 77 - 83, Di Palma 1990: 109 - 112; Boschi 1990: 230 and Ethier 1990: 17).

Political elites and their behaviour within the liberal democratic institutions are also vital for positive legitimacy assessments. Political elites play a central role in shaping these perceptions of legitimacy. There is a great deal of responsibility placed on the political elite to abide by and respect the new institutions, while engaging in activities that ensure human empowerment through regime performance. This denotes a top-down approach to liberal democratic legitimacy. The crux of the hypothesis is that when the demos perceive the desirable behaviour in the actions and activities of political elites, there will be an increase in the commitment to the new liberal democratic regime in the backdrop of economic development and effective regime performance geared towards human empowerment (Di Palma 1990; Huntington 1996; and Diamond 1999).

This hypothesis however lacks a few considerations in a non-Western context. Firstly, to what extent do the informal rules of political life still dictate political life, distrust of political elites and political institutions, and a belief that political elites only engage in behaviour that is for their personal gain. There may be massive cultural and ethnic divides within a state rendering political institutions as a platform for severe and at times political conflict rooted in identity politics as demonstrated with the 2007 December General Elections in Kenya. Indeed, Diamond (1999: 164) observed "... [cultural] differences in basic biases are often greater within nations than between them". Linz and Stepan (1996: 24 – 33) pay considerable attention to these cleavages through arguing the necessity of nation-building in a heterogeneous society through a

nation-state policy where nationalisation of state policies are considered essential in achieving cultural homogeneity. Many leaders in the non-Western world are engaged in both state- and nation-building. In addition to these two activities, leaders are under additional pressure to ensure positive regime performance. Consequently the dual challenge is in fact a tri-legged challenge of liberal democratic consolidation in a non-Western context. This makes the challenge of consolidating liberal democracy in the non-Western context more demanding in that efforts need to spread across institutions facilitating liberty, regime performance facilitating equality, and nation- and state-building facilitating the creation of a civic virtue. Huntington (1996: 262 – 263) argued that disappointment regarding the performance of the new democratic system is an essential element of democratic consolidation, a proverbial “...first step...”. When the *demos* become disillusioned with the new liberal democratic regime, Huntington argued, political learning occurs in that when governments fail, the lesson must be that there are institutionalised ways to change them. Institutions for Huntington remain central, in that unsatisfactory regime performance must be addressed through institutions, and not outside of political institutions. Therefore, democracy is associated with the massive obstacles that the state must overcome<sup>41</sup>; it is coupled with removing non-performers from positions of power. Di Palma (1990: 115) takes a similar view in arguing that democratic rules are exceptional in two ways. Firstly they ensure that political actors abide by rules that provide a balance between certainty and uncertainty in that a result can never be agreed on, but the process on how to reach those results remains constant. For Di Palma (1990: 115), democratic institutions require “...democratic rules justify and require patience...”. Secondly, by having rules, the political terrain is liberalised in that demands may now be expressed, and these happen via the political institutions. In this sense then the mass level can voice their dissatisfaction with a particular government by voting them out of power rather than staging a violent revolution or *coup d'état*. This, for Di Palma is the essence of political stability in that the political rules act as a source of relief to alleviate pique from the masses and facilitates the birth of a pluralist tradition by dispersing decisions


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<sup>41</sup> Huntington (1996: 255 – 256) is of the view that the contextual problems that many emerging new democracies face are irresolvable. Democratic consolidation is thus dependent upon “the intractability of problems, the constraints of the democratic process, the shortcomings of political leaders – these become the order of the day”.

among the political institutions. In this sense “...the new practices call for a mixture of repetitive conflict-and-cooperation games” (Di Palma 1900: 115).

Huntington (1996) departs from an alarmist view point by arguing that economic and other regime performance related problems will not be overcome in emerging democracies. For Huntington (1996), liberal democratic maturity cannot be achieved by emerging democracies in a non-Western context. Chapter four demonstrated the economic advantages mature liberal democracies had in their democratisation exercise in that they were significantly wealthier than their emerging counterparts in contemporary history. Yet, Huntington’s view does not demonstrate much optimism for the achievement of liberal democracy in the non-Western world. For Huntington (1996: 258) the focus is on democratic culture and the relationship between regime performance and legitimacy generated through liberal democratic political institutionalism. Central to this relationship is the perceptions of legitimacy held by both the political elites and masses. Political elites must also, whilst building democratic commitments to the new liberal democratic institutions and generating effective regime performance, whilst ensuring positive legitimacy assessment, ensure inclusive citizenship for all diverse groups that constitute the polity. Diamond (1999: 164) and Linz and Stepan (1996: 27) also highlight the importance of elites, but this is in managing diversities within their territory through negotiations, agreements, and other mechanisms deemed necessary to manage diversity. Consequently, there is some regard for the diversity of political and development within different regions in the world. There is little appreciation that many non-Western states are in essence inexperienced liberal democrats (Ajulu 2007). The peculiarities of non-Western political development are not considered. Africa’s states were created by the Berlin Conference in 1884 following the lines of longitude (Thomson 2004: 11). These arbitrary boundaries separated nations and married groups with little shared identity, language, history or heritage (Meredith 2005: 1). Ethnic mobilisation and rhetoric points to perceptions of exclusion. The perception of *us and them* still persists and through rhetoric laced in ethnicity, and as Ajulu (2007: 288) asserts, the state formation process in Africa encouraged identity related conflicts. Producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory argue that diverse societies must, the pursuit of equality through political citizenship and democratic stability, be in a position to cater for its diversity through the institutions of the liberal democratic process. Yet, many

African states have weak democratic processes that cannot adequately manage the diversity found within its boundaries. Consequently, diverse groups that perceive them to be excluded of the polity will rather operate outside the democratic processes and institutions due to perceptions that the state is an instrument of domination for rival political groupings within the state. This is in line with Ekeh's two publics presented as follows:



**Figure 17: Diagrammatical representation of Ekeh's two publics that characterises African political system - constructed from Osaghae (2006)**

Ekeh's Two Public characterises African socio-political life as unique and different from Western socio-political organisation. African socio-political organisation is unique in that it is characterised by ethnicity, nepotism, corruption, soft or failed states, contested citizenship, and a disengaged relationship between ruling elite and the polity (Osaghae, 2006: 233 – 234). Africa's process of state formation was fundamentally influenced by the colonial legacy, which led to the characterisation of civil society in terms of two publics, one primordial and the other civic (Osaghae, 2006: 234 – 238). Due to the disconnection between state and civil society, or the public and private realm, two publics characterise the composition of civil society in African polities. The primordial public is rooted in ethnicity and guides the individual's behaviour in the public realm (Osaghae, 2006: 238). The primordial public, according to Ekeh, emerged from the divide and rule strategies employed by the colonial occupying powers and its "...failures to basic welfare and developmental needs to the masses of people" (Osaghae, 2006: 238). In order to fill this void, African polities disengaged from the state, and effectively created *exit sites* or *shadow states* that provided public goods, including schools, micro-credit for entrepreneurial activities, and other

resources, which the colonial state did not provide (Osaghae, 2006: 239). The civic public is associated with the colonial administration, and, consequently, the popular politics of Africa (Osaghae, 2006: 238). Osaghae (2006: 239) stresses that its “...historical association with the colonial administration implies that the reference to the colonial state whose alien origins, military-authoritarian character, and role in furthering the interests of the colonisers rather than the colonised, disconnected it from the ‘natives’ and civil society”. In this sense, the civic public encapsulates the “...non-native publics whose institutions are governed by legal-rational rules” (Osaghae, 2006: 238). At independence, similar patterns of socio-political endured (Dorman 2006), and the civic public became an area of contestation characterised by a crisis of ownership (Osaghae, 2006: 238). Consequently, the civic public is associated with “...amorality [which is] conducive to the opportunistic, lawless, prebendalist, corrupt, and plundering tendencies that have come to characterise behaviour in the public sector” (Osaghae, 2006: 238 – 239). There is no sense of loyalty to the civic public, and as the primordial public takes precedence, corruption based on patron-client relationship is unofficially endorsed, as the larger group benefits directly or indirectly (Osaghae, 2006: 239). The result is that states became increasingly centralised around a dominant ethno-cultural group, at times at the exclusion of another (Prempeh, 2008, 113 – 114). Indeed, (Ajulu 2007: 289) asserts that the “...state is core contested terrain and a theatre of ethnic conflict”. The existence of the primordial public in African socio-political organisation remains central. Osaghae (2006) stresses that most Western definitions lay emphasis on national unity, homogeneity as characterised of socio-political organisations, and civility and cohesion as key to the structural composition of civil society. However, Osaghae (2006) concludes that Western scholars do not encompass ethnic and religious organisations as part of civil society and considers an obstacle to civil society development as they are too particularistic in nature. These, however, are central to the continued development of African civil society and play a huge role in post-conflict reconstruction (Osaghae, 2006).

Democratic legitimacy is ultimately the aim of facilitating a liberal democratic civic virtue. Huntington (1996: 258) argued that legitimacy rests liberal democratic institutions, processes and procedures, however “new democracies are, in effect, in a catch-22 situation: lacking legitimacy they cannot become effective; lacking effectiveness, they cannot develop legitimacy”. What Huntington’s observation

demonstrates is that the mass level remains central in liberal democratic legitimacy and consequently, liberal democratic value transmission can only be assessed based on the experiences of the mass level. However, the experiences of the people cannot be limited to the new liberal democratic era, but must be studied over a period of time that includes the authoritarian regime. Haynes (2001: 5) observed that the initial liberal democratic construction has dominated democratisation scholarship and research, and little research focused their attention on what happens after the founding election. Indeed, part of the problem Haynes concedes is that there was a need to wait for the data to be collected, but still twenty years after the initial transitions in some states, there is little scholarship generated on the actual democratic experiences after the transition phase and its liberal democratic construction. Instead, the focus has been based on the Western experience of liberal political development, and what non-Western states need to emulate or adopt in their liberal democratic journey. Encarnation (2000: 490) warns that scholars in this tradition must be sensitive to democratic differences in different contexts and how these differences can affect democratic consolidation, whether in the liberal democratic tradition or not.

Inequality is still a major challenge that the liberal democratic regime must overcome. Hence the importance of effective regime performance for the emerging democracy cannot be overestimated. Vergopoulos (1990: 146 – 147) observed that the dynamics upon which liberal democracy is focused is the equalisation of the individual on an abstract level. If some degree of equalisation does not occur, the facilitation of liberal democratic legitimacy becomes difficult and the generation of a liberal democratic civic virtue becomes retarded. The root cause for Vergopoulos (1990: 147) is “...the conditions of present-day social anorexia...” in that one may see liberal democratic consolidation on a formal level or in the minimalist tradition, but the sustainability of the liberal democracy or democratic deepening does not occur due to the levels of inequality that still persist in the emerging democracy. Merkel (2004: 45) shares similar sentiments when he posits that unequal resource distribution results in striking gaps between rich and poor or incomes and consistently keeps a part of the population below the bread line, liberal democratic consolidation cannot occur. In this context, political participation that liberal democratic consolidation requires in the generation of a liberal civic virtue is hindered as “[political equality] is violated when real political

equality cannot be produced anymore because of extreme socio-economic inequality” (Merkel 2004: 45).

Consequently the germination of the liberal democratic civic virtue can be retarded in the face of severe inequalities. If participation in the liberal democratic process is limited by factors outside the control of people, to what extent will the liberal democratic culture and values be generated? Indeed, inequality is the most debilitating of obstacles in the gestation period of the emerging liberal democracy. Hence there is a need to acknowledge the relationship between regime performance and increased socio-economic equality. Three central features of liberal democratic discourse remain central: political institutions, regime performance, and a liberal democratic civic virtue. Political institutions are essential to ensure that a degree of stability is introduced in the political system and to ensure that the behaviour of political elites are regulated to such an extent that the values of moderation, negotiation and cooperation trickle down to the mass level. Regime performance needs to ensure that the socio-economic playing field is somewhat levelled and generate, in partnership with political institutions generated liberal democratic legitimacy. The sustainability of the new liberal democratic regime is determined by the level in which a liberal democratic political culture trickles down to the mass level. Therefore, stability, deepening of democracy and perceptions of an improved quality of life determine the success of emerging liberal democracies in the liberal democratic consolidation paradigm.

## **5.2 Culture and political culture**

Culture is defined as the “...shared beliefs, values, traditions, and behaviour patterns of particular groups” (Taylor, Peplau, and Sears, 1997: 10). Diamond (1999: 163) defines political culture as “...a people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of their country, and the role of the self in that system”. Garcia-Rivero, Kotze, and Du Toit (2002: 167) assert that political culture denotes “...a set of individual psychological states... [where] different cultures fit different regimes”. One can conceptualise political culture to be as follows: political culture is a concept that operates on the individual and group level within a polity and is informed by arrangements of belief systems, norms, values, and construction of realities that are entrenched through a process of political socialisation.

Political culture operates in all spheres of society, from the nation, the groups, the community, to the individual. Development of cultural views will thus be dependent upon the position which groups perceive they occupy within society, their experiences that shaped their knowledge, and the reinforcement of this knowledge through interaction with other groups and societies.

When dealing with political culture, there are essentially two elements at work: the historical dimension and the developmental dimension (Louw and Edwards, 1993: 772). These two dimensions interact with one another in that the historical dimension deals with changes that may occur in the social environment through time. The basic premise of this argument is that the social dynamic which one attempts to study may in fact change over time. The developmental dynamic refers to the process of socialisation where culture is taught from one generation to the next (Louw and Edwards, 1993: 772; and Taylor, Peplau, and Sears, 1997: 10). The cultivation of liberal values will thus be rooted in the process of liberal socialisation.

Halperin and Lomasney (1998: 136), when discussing liberal democratic failures point out that these "...failures appear to be concentrated in Asia and Africa, where democracy and the regimes necessary for its consolidation are weak; where democratic institutions are more firmly established...". There is an instinctive assumption that the non-Western world is routine for liberal democratic experiments to fail. There is celebration for the success of liberal democracy, as well as the assumptions that states inherently see the good in liberal democracy as a process of electing leaders. Halperin and Lomasney (1998: 146) go further to argue that each nation must assist in the institutionalisation of liberal democratic life in the non-Western world. There is an absolute assumption that liberal democracy is globally desirable and therefore, all states must be committed to the spread of the liberal democratic ideal and its institutionalisation. Schmitter (1995: 15) is perhaps correct when stating that "part of the problem lies in our unfortunate habit of equating 'democracy' with 'modern, representative, liberal, political democracy as practised within nation-states'". This demonstrates a certain degree of political socialisation towards a liberal democracy order in the theoretical paradigm in which liberal democratic consolidation theory finds itself.



Democracy, in the liberal sense, is the ultimate good to which states attempting to consolidate their liberal democracy should strive. There is little regard for the political socialisation processes in a non-Western context when it comes to *democracy* and what *democracy* is supposed to bring with it when it arrives. As O'Donnell (1996 and 1998) highlighted, one will need to consider to what extent informal rules guide behaviour within the transplanted democratic institutions. It is these informal rules that will point to the values grown during the political socialisation process of a state. Informal rules and institutions that characterised the authoritarian past may still persist. The transition to a liberal democracy does not mean that informal and at times negative institutions will completely disappear and all will comply with the new rules and regulation that guide political and social life.

Through the process of socialisation a people are taught social norms, social roles and social rules. Social norms refer to the accepted and expected rules of behaviour and social roles refer to the norms associated with groups that occupy a certain position in society (Taylor, Peplau, and Sears, 1997: 10). Liberal democratic consolidation discourse stress that through institutions and regime performance, political socialisation is rooted in the behaviour of political elites who operate within the boundaries of the political institutions and rules that govern political life. Through the negotiation process political elites are socialised to utilise political institutions, rules and procedures in resolving political difference and managing diverse political interests (Huntington 1996; Di Palma 1990; Casper and Taylor 1996). Kateb (1990: 545) stresses that one needs to appreciate that when dealing with political culture in a democratic sense one needs to regard "...democratic culture as [a] setting...". In this sense, there needs to be some understanding that the knowledge archive of liberal democratic consolidation discourse was developed within the specific context of the experiences of Western world. Indeed, Fukuyama (2007: 10) points out that the path to liberal democracy in Western Europe and America was turbulent and brutal, in that the democratic cultural development was characterised by violent conflict before constructing liberal democratic cultural, social and economic settings. For that reason Tilly (2000: 3 – 4) argued that it is a mere illusion that there is a single path to democracy rooted in necessary and sufficient pre-conditions that must either be present or crafted. He therefore argued for a historical sociological approach where there is a

need to explore more feasible paths to achieving liberal democracy in an *undemocratic* context (Tilly 2000: 4).

The experiences and lessons that the Western, liberal democratic world had learned translates into the archaeological construct of knowledge underpinned by liberal democracy's knowledge archive. The view is thus that the Western world, through their experiences and socialisation processes would be in a position to make the birth of liberal democracy comfortable for new emerging democracies embarking on a liberal democratic transition. The liberal democratic experiences of the Western world, however valuable their lessons may be, do not necessarily suit developing *democracy* in a non-Western context in that the *democratic settings* are too different. Havel (1995: 6) adequately captures the essence of democratic consolidation discourse in declaring that the theoretical path set out in democratisation discourse is not conducive to understanding liberal democratic development in the non-Western world and that it is academic foolishness to hold that liberal democracy will *avert a conflict of cultures*. Schmitter (1995: 16) thus observed: "...it is a historical accident, having little or nothing to do with democracy, that its practices have heretofore been largely confined to states – that is, to a subset of territorial units of very unequal size, level of development, national unity, cultural homogeneity, and so forth". This demonstrates that internationally there is an institutional spread of liberal democracy, but the democratic socialisation necessary for democratic consolidation is somewhat lacking domestically within the research nucleus of liberal democratic consolidation theory. This necessitates a deeper interrogation of the development of culture, but more specifically the development of a political culture that balances liberal democratic values and ideals with traditional and known values.

The concept of culture operates on four levels: the individual, the interpersonal, the positional, and the ideological (Louw and Edwards, 1993: 774 – 780). The individual level relates to certain behaviours in given contexts of the individual. Through a process of social learning, individuals will react to certain situations in a certain manner, for example, when frustrated or angry. Liberal democratic consolidation, for example, requires societies to rather vote out non-performing incumbents in government than overthrow regimes or stage *coups*. It is therefore essential that individuals become culturally sensitive to the purposes of liberal democratic institutions

in addressing their frustration and anger when a regime underperforms. The problem is with the derivatives of liberal democracy, as Havel (1995: 7) states

what many cultural societies see as the inevitable product...of these values: moral relativism, materialism, the denial of any kind of spirituality, a proud disdain for everything suprapersonal, to profound crisis of authority and the resulting general decay, a frenzied consumerism, a lack of solidarity, the selfish cult of material success, the absence of faith in a higher order of things or simply in eternity, an expansionist mentality that holds in contempt everything that in anyway resists the dreary standardisation and rationalisation of technical civilisation...democracy in its present Western form arouses scepticism and mistrust in many parts of the world.

The interpersonal level has an evaluative function in that by nature human beings compare their abilities, opinions, relationships, and values (Louw and Edwards, 1993: 776). It is here that cultural differences will become evident. For example, different cultural groups when interacting with one another will be able to establish whether a group operates from a foundation of individualism or collectivism. Inevitably, values associated with individualism will contradict values of collectivism due to the different roles of the individual.

A liberty-orientated society will place the individual first, whereas the collective culture will favour the community. Two different types of *civic virtues* are at play. The processes of political socialisation will therefore be very different since each system will have a different value system and acceptable norms and rules, whether formal and informal. Therefore, one finds a contradiction in how social and political life should be executed. This relates to the liberal democratic success a state may be able to obtain. Geography and history play an important role in the socialisation process of a society at a political, social and cultural level. Contingent political actors rely on the Western liberal world to such an extent that one may argue it has socialised an international norm of behaviour when interacting with the Western world, even though experiences with the Western world may be negative. In order to contextualise the argument, imagine an individual that is regarded as primitive and traditional due to vast differences in social architecture, value system, religions<sup>42</sup>. This individual, when interacting with seemingly modernised individuals may experience the liberal

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<sup>42</sup> Religion in this sense does not refer to Islam specifically, although it is very fashionable in the post-9/11 period to study it. Religion refers to all religions that contradict the traditional Western spiritual systems and includes ancient and traditional African religions and spirituality.

democratic values as negative in that there is an automatic assumption that this individual needs to be developed to mirror the notion of the citizen in the Western world. There is an expression of contempt for the individual due to stereotypes that all things traditional are primitive. Therefore, the first initial experience with liberal democracy may not be positive and as such, there is a need for political resocialisation.

The view that liberal institutions may best achieve this socialisation is somewhat naïve, as it may those very institutions that may have facilitated the first offensive experience with liberal democracy through for example the colonisation processes. One may relate this to the colonial experience in that liberal democracy imposed a way of life with little regard for indigenous cultures and knowledge. Indigenous communities were seen as in desperate need of modernisation. Consequently, these communities had to become carbon copies of their Western counterparts. Therefore, to what extent can there be liberal democratic development that is in agreement with value systems in non-Western communities? It is interesting to note that much political theory generated since the Islamic *problem* in 2002 has centred on liberal democracy in Islam. Most concerns emanating from scholarship in for example the Journal of Democracy are concerned with issues such as political parties as vehicles of change in Islam, the role of social movements in Islam, diversity and participation in Islam, and installing liberal democracy in Islam. Although the United States of America stated that it will not impose its culture, the very nature of the system of perceptual-representation that facilitates the evaluative function of culture cannot see another way when attempting to liberate the tyrannical world of the Middle East.<sup>43</sup> Pastor (2004: 251) relates the tale that

in the 2002 presidential campaign, George W. Bush criticised the Clinton Administration for pursuing 'nation-building' in Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and elsewhere, and he pledged, if elected, he would 'absolutely not' do nation-building. As president, however, George W. Bush embarked on two other nation-building experiments, in Afghanistan and Iraq that made Clinton's efforts seem modest and inconsequential by comparison.

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<sup>43</sup> The Journal of Democracy Vol. 19 (3) dedicated an entire issue to understanding the nature, if any, of the Islamic democratic debate in 2008. Title of articles included Islamist parties: Three kinds of movements; Islamist parties: Are they democrats? Does it matter?; and Islamist Parties: Participation without power. One needs to question whether this is just coincidence or is there an ideological influence that is not yet recognised.

One needs to be sensitive that a very specific type of international system was created through the *Axis of Evil*: one that consists of liberal democracies that support America's crusade for freedom, and those that do not support the crusade for freedom, and that by default are then regarded as *the allies of the terrorist*.

With this in mind, scholars agree that the rule of the people by definition entails civic virtue open to participation. What is lacking in understanding *democratic* practices of the rule of the people is in Africa, for example, the role of traditional leadership, in Islam religious structures, and in Asian countries values centred on discipline. Liberal democratic consolidation theory and its associated economic discourse practices warn against traditionalism, religious influences and fanaticism, and the danger of patriarchal societies captured in Eastern orthodoxy, and consequently promote modernisation and the adoption of modern liberal democratic culture. This theory criticises patron-client relationships and the seemingly structural obstacles to participation by the polity. If democracy is to work in an African, Islamic or Asian setting, for example, there is a pressing need to take cognisance of the traditional structures of authority, the nature of the relationship between state and church in Islam, and the centrality of respect for authority. These *informal institutions* are known to the masses and in some cases may claim more legitimacy than the institution of the state.

The positional level refers to the membership and social status of different groups in society. This essentially entails power relationships as it is associated with the status various groups occupy in society. Workers, for example, will have a lower status than economic elites and consequently seek more power to influence political elites in their favour. Internationally, when looking at the level of liberal democracy in an institutional sense and with regard to regime performance, the world is divided into stable and semi-stable liberal democracies and areas where liberal democracy seems impossible to grow. Stable liberal democracies are found in well-to-do Western neighbourhoods occupying a hegemonic position. Huntington (1993: 26) proudly observed that the "West at the peak of its power confronts non-Western states that increasingly have the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways". For Huntington the spread of liberal democracy and the ability to enforce liberal democratic development onto non-Western states becomes a point of celebration. He fails however, to take note that the democratic settings are not comparable to that of the Western world.

The last level is the ideological level. Szalay and Kelly (1982: 586) contend that political ideologies become part of a people's belief system and constitute more or less a sphere in the broader society communicated through language. Dimitrova (1990: 8) adequately demonstrates the power of language by stating that "language [as] the lasting quality of civilisation is as powerful as a weapon in the oppression as in the liberation of the human spirit". Burks (1949: 185) maintains

this philosophy [ideology] is reducible to an interpretation of history conceived in three stages. There is a prophecy or promise of a favourable termination of the historical process, a theory of the nature of that process, and a postulate of origins, explaining how the particular historical process imagined got started with.

Therefore, ideology as it relates to political theory and culture primarily deals with perceptions of reality as it pertains to a social or world order. This perception of the social order will attempt to generate knowledge aimed at discovering ways in which to improve it. This knowledge will translate into political theory, which in turn, will attempt to export its enlightenment to others. For Adedeji (2007: 21) this is found in the morality that liberal democracy claims through its language of what constitutes good and evil.

The impact of ideology and the international construction of liberal democracy as the preferred political system is still relevant in, for example, America's *nation-building* efforts in the Middle East. George W. Bush in his State of the Union address in 2002 when discussing terrorist groups and Liberal America stated that "states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world". In addition, he argued that

this time of adversity offers a unique moment of opportunity – a moment we must seize to change our culture...I know we can overcome evil with the greater good. And we have a great opportunity during this time of war to lead the world towards the values that will bring lasting peace...If anyone doubts this, let them look to Afghanistan, where the Islamic 'street' greeted the fall of tyranny with song and celebration. Let the sceptics look to Islam's own rich history, with its centuries of learning and tolerance and progress. America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. We have no intention of imposing our culture. But America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance...In a single instant we realised that this will be the decisive

decade in the history of liberty, that we've been called to a unique role in human events...Steadfast in our purpose, we now press on. We have known freedom's price. We have shown freedom's power. And in this great conflict...we will see freedom's victory.

The extract demonstrates a clear safeguarding of liberal principles and values associated with liberal democracy. There is also a demonstration of the thymos identified by Adedeji (2007) in that the sacred values of liberty will be defended at all costs. Indeed, one observes that America has charged itself with the role of leading the 'free world' in a battle against everything that is perceived to threaten its culture, values, and principles.

Using a system of perceptual-representation, one will therefore note the role of ideology in the construction of reality outlined by Bush. As America is seen as the liberal democratic utopia with the individual as the centre of analysis, one will therefore assume that these values will dictate the division of the world in right and wrong, or moral and immoral. This is evident in the phrases that dismiss Islamic countries as evil, while liberal democratic regimes are portrayed as inherently good. Also, it demonstrates the value of a liberal democratic world order as a basic necessity for lasting peace, while Islamic fanaticism is regarded as a threat to lasting peace. As America perceives itself the 'defender' or 'champion' of liberal democracy they are therefore charged with ensuring its survival at all costs

For that reason, one can therefore concur with Tower-Sargent (1993:2-3) who argued for a relationship between political ideologies, political theory and political philosophy. Accordingly one needs to consider that political ideologies are the belief systems of a particular group, whereas political theory constitute the generalisations about political life based on empirical data extracted from the political world in order to make sense of it. Political philosophy is the normative evaluation or assessment of a given state's behaviour, actions, inter-group relations, and so forth. The link between ideology, theory and philosophy is, according to Tower-Sargent (1993:3), demonstrated in the fact that

every political philosophy is based in part on political theory. In other words, every statement about how people and governments should behave contains a statement about how they do behave. In addition, every political ideology contains both political theory and political philosophy, generalisations about how people and governments do behave and how they should

behave. But in a political ideology, these generalisations become belief systems rather than empirical or normative analysis of behaviour.

Indeed, looking at the ‘current division’ of the world between the *good* liberals and the ‘*evil*’ and *tyrannical* religious regimes of the Middle East, one will note that the keywords of democracy theory focusing on Islamic democracy operate from a premise of participation and inclusion or the civic virtue, liberty, and institutions that facilitate liberty and political equality through the liberal democratic process. This is evident in for example Haqqani and Fradkin (2008: 14) who observe

until very recently, even the idea of an Islamist party (let alone a democratic Islamist party) would have seemed, from the perspective of Islamism itself, a paradox if not a contradiction in terms. Islamism’s original conception of a healthy Islamic political life made no room for – indeed rejected – any role for parties of any sort...Pluralism, which is a precondition for the operation of political parties, was rejected by most Islamist political thinkers as a foreign idea...the novelty not only of actually existing Islamist parties but of the very idea of such parties makes it exceptionally difficult to assess their democratic bona fides.

Masoud (2008: 19) states that


driven by a sense that ‘the Islamists are coming’, journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties...believe in democracy...instead of worrying whether the Islamists are real democrats, our goal should be to help fortify those democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group – Islamist or otherwise – can subvert them.

With these two extracts in mind, one should wonder to what extent the foundations of American political culture are not being applied to essentially a very different cultural arena. To what extent is political theory influenced by the ideological influence of the system of perceptual- representation? To what degree have these scholars studied the Islamic world to determine the way they are, and subsequently, the way they should be?

Perceptions and the interpretations of those perceptions in constructing reality will enforce ideological views. Messages received will invariably be interpreted through ideological realities and will in turn reinforce the belief systems shaped by ideology. Theorists will therefore need to keep in mind that ideological considerations are important in culture in that they shape perceptions of power relations, inequality, fairness, and domination within a society. This is no less valid for liberal democratic consolidation theory. Consequently Dupuis-Deri (2004: 119) posits that the practice of



labelling groups and its institutions result in specific political consequences related to power relationship. For him, labelling political systems allows the organisation of representational units into what or who constitutes legitimate actors and who are not at the same time giving legitimacy to certain actors while removing legitimacy from others. This behaviour will be informed by the processing of information through the system of perceptual-representation.



**Figure 18: Four levels of culture**

For Diamond (1999: 163) political culture reflects three types of orientations: a cognitive, affective, and evaluational orientation. On a cognitive level, political culture denotes knowledge of and beliefs about the political system. The affective orientation consists of feelings about the political system. The evaluational orientation refers to the commitment to political values and judgement of the performance of the political system relative to those values. Diamond's approach signifies a socialisation process in favour of the generation of a liberal civic virtue. For Diamond on a cognitive level there is a need for groups to acquire the new values and belief systems associated with liberal democracy, i.e. tolerance and moderation and others presented in Chapter 1. In terms of the affective orientation, groups must increasingly experience positive regime performance in order to cultivate legitimacy in that the new democratic regime is the best form of government. On an evaluative level, positive regime performance validates liberal democratic values in that the polity learn that the best way to deal with

conflicting interests is through the political system. Diamond's argument can be represented as follows:




Figure 19: Creating liberal democratic political culture - Constructed from Diamond (1999: 163)

Culture and political culture are thus central to liberal democratic consolidation in that they will underpin the behavioural and normative commitment needed for liberal democratic endurance. A central issue is thus the creation of the liberal civic virtue. However, a negative assessment through a system of perceptual-representation may inhibit the cultivation of the liberal civic virtue. Di Palma (1990: 114) concurs by arguing that the political agenda and actions are altered in ways that must strengthen the relevance of liberal democratic processes for the political arena. In the political arena there is a need for being in tune with the demands of the public at large as they are now regulated by a set of institutionalised democratic processes and rules. Therefore, the focus falls on "...group politics, institutional routinisation, and in sum the definition of how the democratic game is unfolding, procedural concerns and substantive issues like redistribution" (Di Palma 1990: 114). Through this routinisation, Di Palma further argued that a democratic bias is created as a normative identification with liberal democracy has germinated within the polity at elite and mass level. Ducatzenzeiler (1990: 246) shares similar conclusions by arguing that liberal democratic consolidation is essentially the construction of a new political system rooted in inclusivity and political recognition through representation. For Ducatzenzeiler and

Di Palma the focus of liberal democratic consolidation is that of citizenship, or newly created citizenship rooted in the new liberal democratic political institutions.

In the absence of an ideological threat to liberal democracy, producers of liberal democratic consolidation discourse are not necessarily objective in the evaluations of the relationship between political institutions and culture. One finds that political elites make the right liberal democratic noises, but do not necessarily engage in the *correct* practices. How does one grow a liberal democratic citizen in a non-Western context? Culture is dependent on the historical and personal experiences of an individual, and is psychologically embedded in an individual or group. Therefore, massive changes need to occur within the internal dynamics of the group or individual and their relationship to the state, as well as the external dynamics on how the state relates to the individual or the group.

### **5.3 Cultivating the liberal civic virtue or cultivating cultural dominance?**

In addressing the question developing a liberal democratic citizen, Diamond (1999: 162) poses three questions regarding political culture and liberal democratic consolidation centred on the following: (1) elements of political culture that matter for democratic consolidation; (2) how and how much does political culture change over time in a democracy, and; (3) what is the source of political change. What is noteworthy in the questions posed is that there is an automatic assumption that political culture will change towards a liberal order. This is indicative of the assumption that for liberal democracy to endure, a liberal civic virtue must be cultivated. Political institutions play a central role in cultivating the liberal culture or civic virtue needed for consolidation. Regime performance provide the foundations of perceived democratic legitimacy, which is an essential leg of consolidation in that it attempts to ensure that there is no great threat to the new liberal democracy. However, Diamond (1990: 49 – 50) is aware of the difference between founding and maintaining liberal democracy. For Diamond, the liberal democratic regime must be deemed legitimate by the mass level through deeming it the most appropriate form of governance for their society, *because* liberal democracy is dependent upon consensual rule of the people, it requires popular legitimacy. This democratic legitimacy must be rooted in a moral commitment and emotional allegiance to the liberal democracy which can only develop over time through adequate regime performance. Liberal democracy will hold no value for the

mass level if it does not “...deals effectively with social and economic problems and achieves a modicum of order and justice” (Diamond 1999: 50).

Institutions also play a central role in socialising a new political culture. This motivation behind the *liberal project* (Kahane 1996: 701) is its ability to manage diverse interests and institutionalise some degree of stability in political life. Di Palma (1990), Huntington (1996) and Diamond (1999) place much faith in the ability of institutions to deal with political conflicts or diverging views. To participate in democratic institutions, certain behavioural limitations are placed on political actors. Indeed, one is attempting to ensure that “...democratic culture...is becoming a particularist stylisation of life – that is, a distinctive set of appearances, habits, rituals, dress, ceremonies, fold traditions, and historical memories” (Kateb, 1990: 545). This is also evident in the works of Linz and Stephan (1996) who places much emphasis on strong liberal democratic institutions and nation-building.

The values that political actors must adhere to are in essence moderation as identified by Huntington’s democratic bargain.<sup>44</sup> Diamond (1990: 51) also advocate the centrality of liberal democratic values in that liberal democratic cultures requires balance, moderation and respect for all diverse groups and their interests in society. The values that democratic consolidation requires are essentially based on liberalism and its associated principles such as abiding to the rule of law, political equality, political liberty, constitutionalism, and cooperation, which form the foundation of political freedom, political equality and a liberal civic virtue. For Diamond (1990: 56) liberal democratic values encompass such behavioural traits as tolerance for opposition political actors, trust in political peers, a willingness to cooperate and compromise in order to balance *conflict and consensus*. Moderation relates to inequalities and class cleavages, and there it is essential to reconcile conflicting political interests (Diamond, 1990: 57). In addition to the participation dimension of the civic virtue, tolerance and moderation come into play as well. Therefore the civic virtue is constructed with tolerance and moderation as the foundation to participate in the political process. These are further underpinned by political equality and political freedom that must at times

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<sup>44</sup> In order to participate in the democratic process, political actors are to renounce radical behaviour and utterance. They are to be moderate in their behaviour and as a reward, will be allowed to participate in the democratic bargaining of the transition process. It is assumed that this sets the stage for further moderate behaviour once the new democratic regime is in place.

prevail in the execution of political life within liberal democratic structures. To generate a cultural commitment to liberal democratic values, the institutionalisation of political life is central.

The institutionalisation of political life and the relationship to regime performance propagate that liberal democratic consolidation is process and not an event (Diamond, 1999: 162; Di Palma 1990: 110 -111 and Encarnation, 2000: 495). Huntington (1996: 265) argued that support for democracy can grow with a 'generational change' or a change of opinion'. He further warns that if the liberal democratic institutions are characterised by too much dynamism, the liberal democratic commitment will not take root in that if political elites change their minds too easily, it cannot generate sufficient time to see the deepening of a liberal democratic commitment. Therefore, generational change sees the development of liberal democratic commitment as one generation has increasingly positive experiences under the new liberal democratic regime.

Whether one prefers habituation, developmental democracy, democratic deepening, or democratic quality, two issues within liberal democratic consolidation discourse remain central. Firstly, there is a need for people to assess this democratic experience as legitimate, and as such start generating a commitment to the new liberal democratic order. Secondly, liberal democratic values like tolerance, moderation, and efficiency need to be accepted as part of the day-to-day political culture. Di Palma (1990: 112) is of the view that the necessary developmental changes can proceed without the necessary attitudinal changes in that it removes the inconsistencies between the old authoritarian values and the new liberal democratic behaviour underpinned by liberal democratic values. While attempting to alter political culture of a liberal civic virtue necessary for liberal democratic consolidation, some form of allegiance to the new liberal democratic state must be created. The easiest way to achieve allegiance is through a national identity through what has become known as nation-state policies (Thomson 2004); some form of common point that the polity will be able to connect to. Logically then, if liberal democracy is to persist a "...shared *public* culture of a constitutional democracy..." must be crafted which encompasses "...the political doctrine constructed from shared political understandings is meant to show a way out of political impasses" (Kahane, 1996: 702).

It is here that the liberal vocabulary is perhaps too presumptuous in that there is little regard for the entrenched and subconscious impacts of traditional cultures within a society, especially if those cultures are considered ancient such as the Indian or Egyptian cultures with their own myths and ritual practices distinct from the Western world (Havel 1995: 3 – 4). In constructing a new political system and a new underlying liberal democratic culture, the historical memory of what is known; including childhood socialisation, national and cultural symbols, and political beliefs that guided political life must be reconfigured in the liberal democratic values and moulds (Centeno 1994: 141). This, according to Centeno leads to a moral collapse within society and consequently liberal democratic development cannot force a choice between the authoritarian past and liberal democratic future. The historical experiences that saw the development of a specific political culture through the socialisation process rooted in the system of perceptual-representation will not necessarily be broken down once the state embarks on a liberal democratic journey. These are remnants of society that are ingrained, and if need be, will be protected against perceived domination, especially sacred beliefs regarding political life and social practises of authority. Is it really surprising that liberal democracy is equated with a “...paranoid style of politics...[that] sees evidence everywhere of a vast and sinister conspiracy, a gigantic yet subtle machinery of influence set in motion to undermine ‘our way life’...the liberal hegemony is blamed for destroying the moral community created in the heroic days...” (Krastev, 2007: 57 – 58). Indeed, Huntington (1996: 262 – 263) argued that the birth of liberal democracy will not necessarily be a wondrous end to all social ills, but is merely a solution to the problem of tyranny through institutionalising political life.

Through liberal institutions the foundations of liberal democracy are being laid down. Political actors are now compelled to abide by the rules of the liberal institutions. This requirement fosters a sense of obligation and those who operate outside of the scope of the rules and institutions are disparaged. In order to maintain favour with the polity, political actors abide by the rules, and therefore entrench liberal democratic stability, or so liberal theory speculates.

The relationship between institutions and regime performance collectively facilitates the development of liberal democratic values. Political elites, through their behaviour within the liberal democratic institutions demonstrate their commitment to liberal democratic values. In the midst of sound economic growth and redistribution, the

liberal democratic regime can generate sufficient commitment and legitimacy from the masses to see the germination of liberal democratic values that, with time, develop into a liberal democratic political culture.

This is a global exercise and all emerging democracies are required to move through the phases of institutions, regime performance and finally liberal democratic political cultural development to ensure that moderation, tolerance, individualism and political equality and political freedom prevail. The pressure is exerted from the representational units of the Western world under the auspices that successful industrialisation and political development in the journey to modernity, if rooted in political stability, emerging democracies can also generate prosperity, wealth, and stability under a liberal democratic order.




Figure 20: Diagrammatic representation of demands placed on emerging democracies

## 5.4 De-cultivation of liberal civic virtue

Disillusionment with regime performance is exacerbated by the perceived failure of liberal institutions. It is exactly this lesson or disenchantment that leads to the so-called recession of democracy that has dictated democracy theory (Diamond 2008). Krastev (2007: 57) adequately captures the dilemma of liberal democracy in the non-Western world:

publics mistrust politicians and political parties. The political class is viewed as corrupt and self-interested. Dissatisfaction with democracy is growing...the liberal language of rights is exhausted, and centrism and liberalism are under attack both as philosophy and as political

practice. The new hard reality...is political polarisation, a rejection of consensual politics, and the rise of populism.

The very effects that liberal democratic consolidation attempts to overcome till persist in political and socio-economic life. Liberal democratic consolidation is fading throughout various non-Western parts of the world in states like Venezuela, Bolivia and Putin's Russia. The great liberal democratic experiment is failing and one sees the political ills against which liberal democratic consolidation warns rise: populism, patron-clientism as a system concurrent with the liberal 'democratic' institutions, increasing inequality, poor regime performance politically, economically and socially, weak institutions that cannot adequately manage diverse interests, political apathy at mass level and disengagement from the state, strong executives that seem to operate unchecked, and an overall lack of belief in the new liberal democratic order.

One cannot express a view that ideology is dead in that the ideological battle that characterised the Cold War is obsolete. The Cold War may be finished, and communism and liberalism may no longer be placed as ideological poles in the world today. But ideology has shifted and taken on a new form in a perceived multi-polar world. The phenomenon of populism that consolidation warns against is taking hold in non-Western states. For example, Venezuela and Russia have made much anti-liberal noise in recent times. There are strong anti-American and anti-Western undertones through allegations of endeavours to create a uni-polar world (Russia) through to claims of the right of people to sovereignty (Venezuela) and the right of states to govern as they see fit (Zimbabwe).

Krastev (2006: 52) has identified *democracy's doubles* as constituting "...the more potent threat to freedom...". For Krastev the present liberal democratic dilemma is seen as a revolt against the liberal democratic requirements and has been reduced to a minimalist complying with liberal democratic requirements of elections. Pluralism and diversity have proved problematic in a non-Western centre where the state becomes the centre of at times violent competition between competing interests, and the manipulation of political elites of the masses result in electoralism prevailing and liberal democratic consolidation fading. Therefore, there seems to be an emerging replacement ideology that can impact on democratic consolidation in the liberal



tradition. Experiences with liberal democracy may not have been positive. Some states have realised that there needs to be an alternative, and it is one that

cannot be explained by an inability or unwillingness to reconcile democratic principles and the liberal principle, or by misguided external pressure to democratise. Such regimes are characterised not by the clash between democratic majoritarianism and constitutional liberalism, but by the ‘instrumentalisation’ of democratic institutions. Democracy’s doubles can be best understood as an attempt to construct political regimes that mimic democratic institutions but work outside the logic of political representation and seek to repress any trace of political pluralism...may be understood as conscious projects – projects that can be replicated elsewhere. The ground has been prepared for them by the rise of populist policies under conditions of declining sovereignty and state weakness (Krastev, 2006: 54).

The need for consolidation of emerging democracy has been severely influenced by ideological considerations. In this sense, theory has initiated a bias in itself. If certain phenomena do not fit the theoretical (or ideological) construction, then it is the case study within which the phenomena occur that is incorrect, misguided, and anti-democratic. Yet scholars within the liberal democratic consolidation tradition continue to urge the non-Western world to continue with its democratisation activities resulting in a “...deepening ‘ideologization’ of democracy promotion” (Buxton, 2006: 710). Through the process of globalisation there is an increase in pressure for states to comply with liberal democratic values, yet the attainment of that goal remains elusive. Hauptmann (2004: 38) shares similar sentiments by arguing that in the present status of political theory is based on judgements of existing political practises and what they should be. In his analysis, he argued that political theory has become too normative and judgemental by arguing the shape, character and nature a political regime should take. The discourse that surrounds liberal democratic consolidation theory is characterised too strongly by the values underpinned by liberalism as an ideological influence, and hence the recipient of the discourse perceive a form of domination in the discourses around the ultimate goal of constructing a liberal democratic order.

Liberal democratic consolidation has a bias towards liberal democracy. It is perhaps somewhat presumptuous to claim that a regeneration of a new value system is needed in consolidating democracy in the liberal tradition. There is no appreciation or exploration of how to integrate democratic institutions and practices with local cultures, histories and shared memories. Indeed, Havel (1995: 8) asserts


if democracy is to spread successfully throughout the world and if civic coexistence and peace are to spread with it, then it must happen as part of an endeavour to find a new and genuinely universal articulation of that global human experience...one that connects us with the mythologies and religions of all cultures and opens us to understand their values.

The producers of discourse within the transitionology paradigm blindly believed in the *anyone-can-do-it* approach where political elites are central to liberal democratic construction and take the part of *superheroes* in fighting off anti-democratic elements within their society (Buxton 2006: 711). There is no real appreciation of the problems, underlying values and informal rules as identified by O'Donnell (1998) when attempting to construct a liberal democracy. Globalisation leads to increasing inequality and facilitates growing social exclusion within and between the representational units that constitute the Western and non-Western world (Munck 2002: 10). One can see the undercurrents of Huntington's *Clash of Civilisation* coming through in Huntington's (1993: 40) prediction that power struggles rooted in military, economic and institutional power sources will comprise one element of conflict between the Western world and their non-Western counterparts. Huntington (1993: 40 – 41) also argued that Western culture has filtered through to the non-Western world but the essential political concepts and their interpretations still differ. In this sense, the Western world disseminate individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, rule of law, democracy, and free and fair elections (Huntington 1993: 40) instead of focussing attention on what he termed *human rights imperialism* and the reaffirmation of indigenous values in the non-Western world. In this sense, Huntington (1993) is of the view that if non-Western states are somewhat resistant to the Western values, they lay claim to the right to culture and engage in activities surrounding *whose rights is it anyway* activities in order to lay claim to their values and ways of life, including political life. However, Centeno (1994: 138) warns that “we should...recognise historical origins...”, but must guard against using ethnicities to explain liberal democratic failures in that “...cultural arguments can easily be reduced to often racist stereotypes depicting inflexible and determinant civilisations”.

In addition to a perceived cultural dominance, the Western liberal democracies tend to forget the hardships that poor states endure when embracing the basic free market principles of capitalism. Krastev (2007: 57) is of the view that the language that informs liberal democratic consolidation discourse is worn out and consequently

exposed for criticism on both a philosophical and political practice level. For Krastev the new reality with which the producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory must deal with is political polarisation, the rejection of consensual politics, and the rise of populism. The *Zeitgeist* of contemporary times is often portrayed as characterised by a strong rebellion against liberal democracy in the world (Krastev 2007). Ironically, Linz and Stepan (1996) used the same argument of *Zeitgeist* when praising and assessing the spread of liberal democracy. Non-Western states have been voicing their obstacles and struggles with liberal democracy and its associated economic arrangements for many years. Instead of political stability and economic affluence through liberal democratic institutions and regime performance, non-Western states find themselves still dealing with mass inequalities, political apathy and civil disengagement from the state, debilitating conflicts, and the politics of exclusion.

Yet there seems to be an ideological block in that the producers of liberal democratic consolidation discourse do not take these into consideration. There is increasing pressure on states to democratise, yet there has been no venture to attempt to understand these struggles that non-Western states face in attempting to construct their liberal democratic order. As noted earlier, Huntington (1996) is convinced that the problems many emerging democracies face are insurmountable and cannot be solved. Hence, it is surprising that with such a view, democratic consolidationists still have not moved beyond the liberal rhetoric. This theoretical inconsistency is not new to liberal democratic consolidation theory. Paris (1987: 215) observed that there is problem if the world does not confirm the theoretical expectations, creating discrepancies between ideals and reality, leading to demands that the world must conform to the ideal stipulated in the theoretical paradigm. In this sense, the political systems and their associated political cultures becomes the centre of intense debate and is primarily motivated by a superfluous concern for *liberal* goods (Kahane 1996: 716).



**Figure 21: Responses of emerging democracy to perceived dominance of established democracy**

Figure 20 and 21 link with social dominance theory in the export of preferred values and ideological orientations and the response this exportation generates (Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar, and Levin, 2004: 848). From this perspective structural inequalities in the global system and the primacy of liberalism as the preferred ideology in the current global system lead to a certain degree of domination. Power is exerted by the established democracies invariably translates into the adoption of institutions, policies and practices which are seen as desirable, normally in the liberal democratic tradition. Related to this are social identity and system justification (Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar and Levin, 2004: 848). In this sense, social identity relates to being labelled as established or emerging, or Western and non-Western. Should one be part of the established liberal democracy group or representational unit, one is part of the prestigious liberal world which has wealth, technology, skills, and the ability to dictate democratic affairs of emerging democracies. It is emerging democracies that are at the receiving end of the stipulations put forward by the established liberal democratic world.

One also needs to take note of the terminology. Established is regarded as something that is complete, that has come to an end. Emerging relates to something that is still growing or being cultivated. This demonstrates that liberal democracies are regarded as developed by referring to them as established. They have reached adulthood.

Emerging democracies that are still struggling to embed liberal democracy are seen as growing through puberty and adolescence. By the words associated with established and emerging democracy, it is conceivable that by definition adults are inclined to guide and push teenagers in the correct direction. This is at times viewed as patronising, in that many emerging non-Western societies are ancient civilisations, with its own unique cultural practices and rituals, beliefs, and values.

The system justification aspects operate on the perception that liberal democracy is a desired good. It is based on the perception that liberal democratic institutions are the moral and best mechanisms to manage diverse political interest through the democratic process and institutionalisation of political life. In addition, morality associated with exporting democracy justifies the processes of implanting and attempting to consolidate democracy in the non-Western world.

In this sense, one sees a social domination orientation (Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar and Levin, 2004: 848). Social domination relates to the perceived absence of a moral ideological orientation other than liberalism. Due to the failure of communism and the continued international construction of liberal democracy as well as the high degree of moralism, established democracies are still continuing to reinforce the views that their democratic system, values, and way of life are superior to the non-Western world. However, one cannot use "...cultural alienation...[as a] legitimate reason for the avoidance practiced (Isaac, 1995: 639).

With a lack of cultural understanding or lack of research pertaining to the behavioural foundations of normative commitments to democracy, or a lack of understanding of the types of civic virtues a state may generate, social dominance will continue since "...social ideologies help to coordinate the actions of institutions and individuals" (Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar and Levin, 2004: 847). Ideology cannot be separated from liberal democracy as it provides the justification for exporting liberal democracy. It provides the foundations of the arguments around liberal democratic consolidation, its democratic legitimacy, its democratic deepening, its democratic quality, its habituation, and its democratic stability. There is little movement towards understanding how discourses shape socio-political systems in a non-Western context. Theory in this sense conveys a prescriptive message by narrating types of political institutions needed to generate normative democratic commitments from the polity and thus guaranteeing

democratic legitimacy. There is a pressing need for democratic consolidationists to get back to the proverbial basics, engage at ground level, and put ideological biases aside. This is essential if one is to gain a deeper understanding of what democracy means to different groups. This will enable one to predict the possible pitfalls of the democratic institutions, mechanisms and processes, and whether these may further exacerbate conflict instead of its management.

Producers of liberal democratic consolidation discourse places too much faith in the perceived desirability of a liberal democratic system. Due to its ideological prejudice established liberal democracies still push democratic construction through the traditional liberal democratic architecture. The basic premise still remains that the suitably crafted institutions will force elites and other relevant actors to adopt the liberal civic virtue. These behaviours will become a tradition in the political institutions and will eventually be translated into the mass level. There is an absolute conviction that institutions and regime performance that can guarantee human empowerment will lead to the construction of a desirable political order preconceived by established democracy.

Buxton (2006: 714) concurs that dominant established liberal democracies attempt to influence democratic development in the non-Western world through the imposition of their ideas about the right types of political actors, and the character of the new political system should resemble. Consider the international reaction to the election of Hamas<sup>45</sup> in 2006 in that many states, generally from the Western world, did not recognise the democratic elections of this political actor (Buxton, 2006: 714). Popularly elected political parties and their elites constitute the point of liberal democracy in a procedural sense. The problem, as demonstrated, is when the elites elected into power do not fit the model put forward by liberal democratic consolidation theory. It becomes essential to question to which extent liberal democratic consolidation attempts to influence and push towards a global agenda that suits the Western world.

Buxton (2006: 715) further argued that globalisation and the associated export of capitalism and liberal democracy entrench inequality. For Buxton this is evident in the *contextual issues* of liberal democratic consolidation such as economic

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<sup>45</sup> Hamas is regarded as a terrorist organisation by Western states and is seen as a threat to international and regional peace and stability in that it does not recognise the existence of Israel (Buxton 2006: 714).

underdevelopment, poverty and unemployment which act as a catalyst for support from non-Western and poor contemporaries. Liberal democratic consolidation and its promotion is seen as an exercise with tainted credibility once freely elected groups that may not necessarily carry the blessing of the Western world are blocked from implementing the mandate given to them by the people (Buxton 2006: 715). The creation of procedural institutions, substantive regime performance, and cultivating a liberal civic virtue were seen as fundamental to ensure a liberal democratic dispensation. Therefore there is a sense of social, economic, and political dominance exercised by established democracies over emerging democracies. The work of Huntington (1993: 41) also carries elements of domination as demonstrated with the following extract:

in the political realm...differences are most manifest in the efforts of the United States and other Western powers to induce other people to adopt Western ideas concerning democracy and human rights...When it has developed in non-Western societies it has usually been the product of Western colonialism or imposition...[an] alternative is to attempt to 'balance' the West by developing economic and military power and cooperating with other non-Western societies against the West, while preserving indigenous values and institutions; in short, to modernise but not to Westernise.

Colonialism and imperialist conquests of the Western world saw the development of the ideals of political freedom and political equality in the anti-colonial struggles. However, the liberal democratic application of these ideals has not necessarily taken root. The alternative that Huntington (1993) suggest may also be subject to condemnation from the West, especially when dealing with human rights issues such as female circumcision, or female suicidal burning at the husband's funeral in India (outlawed, but still prevalent) (Pharek 2007). All values and beliefs that guide political and social life in the Western world will not necessarily be desirable in the non-Western world. Alternative systems and code of social and political practises are prevalent, and as Huntington (1993) suggests, a common ground must be found. The question though is to what extent a common ground can be found, without being to culturally relativist in being non-critical of foreign cultural practices.

Liberal democratic consolidation discourse still remains dominant as its producers demand that the world (both Western and non-Western) engage in liberal democratic development without much consideration for the setting in which this democratic

development must occur. Thus producers of liberal democratic consolidation discourse are too concerned with its morality and justifying the export of liberal democracy to the non-Western world. Nationalism and populism are on the increase in the contemporary international system, as seen in Venezuela's and Bolivia's call for greater involvement of the people, and nationalism denotes a certain pride of being what a non-Western state is. The Western world is seen as too dominant by the recipients of liberal democratic consolidation discourse; and the producers of liberal democratic consolidation discourse too forceful in its liberal democratic quest. In ignoring the pleas and struggles of emerging *liberal* democracies and being overcommitted to institutions as a means to achieve regime performance and cultivating liberal values, producers of liberal democratic consolidation discourse is blinded to alternative realities that were being constructed through a system of perceptual-representation.


The rise of populism and nationalism can be seen as replacing liberalism and the liberal civic virtue in consolidation in the liberal tradition. It is not clear however which civic virtue is to be generated. Nationalism relates to cultural equality and can be seen as a rejection of liberal values and goods. This will relate to Huntington's modernisation without Westernisation argument. There is no clarity as to what political institutions, processes, and methods will look like; nor how the economy will be controlled. Perhaps it will model China where there is a shady human rights record, a strongly centralised state, and fierce control of public knowledge and public expression, but with a free and liberalised market.

These are the challenges that the producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory faces. Instead of attempting to merely cultivate a liberal civic virtue, producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory needs to engage in activities aimed at understanding diversity in the nature of emerging *liberal* democracies. What are the informal rules and institutions that operate parallel to the formal institutions and processes crafted? Krastev (2006: 55) highlights that radical states like Russia and Venezuela become "...infamous grand masters of manipulation...". Is it perhaps unwise to merely condemn manipulation of 'democratic' political institutions and processes? Will it perhaps be worthwhile for liberal democratic consolidationists to engage in research to understand to what extent this perceived manipulation is embedded as an informal rule or practice within emerging democracies? Without answers to these questions liberal democratic consolidation theory will not be



sufficiently dynamic to deal with challenges emerging from an increasingly unstable system.

Recipients of liberal democratic consolidation discourse are demonstrating that they are no longer willing to accept the dominance of liberal democracy. They announce to some extent that it has set out on a path of its own to find its own *democratic* identity. This is the challenge for liberal democratic consolidation discourse production: the uncertainty surrounding political development in a non-Western context. What type of civic virtue will govern participation and interaction within these states? How will liberty and equality be guaranteed?



**Figure 22: The rise of alternative ideological responses to perceived liberal democratic dominance**

Figure 22 does not attempt to demonstrate possible trajectories of communist states. It demonstrates that recipients of liberal democratic consolidation discourse have created other alternatives to liberal democracy. Liberal democratic consolidation is not necessarily the only political outcome that emerging democracies can achieve. This is underpinned by the perceived dominance that producers of liberal democratic consolidation discourse impose on its recipients. Krastev (2006: 57 – 58) provides some insight in this regard in that the perception that drives the birth of populism and

nationalism is the need to *protect our way of life by appealing to the rights of the nation* in order to rejuvenate society through the restoration of historical justice at the cost of individual human rights. The character of nationalism and populism will still remain essentially *paranoid-style politics* (Krastev 2006: 60).

Thus, producers of liberal democratic consolidation discourse need to take note of the sentiments that are signalling louder in an increasingly dynamic and diversifying globalising world. The morality associated with the growth of liberal democracy, its associated superiority to other systems or belief structures since Athenian times, and its presumed endless spread and desirability for non-Western states are inherent weaknesses in liberal democratic consolidation discourse. Liberal democratic consolidation theorists must rethink their discourse in order to remain vibrant in its ability to understand, explain, and predict developments within the international system and how they relate to liberal democracy's construction.

## 5.5 Concluding remarks

Cultivating liberal democratic civic virtue through the transmission of liberal democratic values has proven problematic. Systems of perceptual-representation generate the perception that there is increased dominance from the Western democratic powers. There is little consideration of the obstacles that emerging democracies are struggling with. The perceived insensitivity demonstrated by the Western world sets the stage for the rise of nationalism and populism as alternatives to perceived Western dominance.

There is little regard for different cultural views and practices. The political or liberal democratic process of socialisation is inhibited. The view that liberalism and liberal democracy are desired goods in the international system and the complete devotion to the export of the values, processes, and institutions of liberal democracy hinder *democracy's* construction. This is due to the nature of inequality generated through globalisation and the export of capitalism. It is this process that is seen as one of the primary sources of the problems that non-Western states are experiencing with liberal democratic practices.

There is a need for liberal democratic consolidationists to set a new research agenda. This agenda relates to understanding democracy in a non-Western context. Scholars of liberal democratic consolidation are required to liberate themselves from their

ideological prejudice for liberal democracy. This is essential in order to commence a research agenda that will study how best the traditional institutions, processes, and values must be structured to best complement non-Western societies' cultural contexts.

Nationalist and populist sentiments are evident in the responses of some non-Western states, yet the sequence or causal relationships associated with democratic consolidation have not been able to account for this rise. This is primarily due to absolute belief of the liberal democratic system and that societies will automatically generate a liberal civic virtue through interacting with the democratic institutions and processes, and increased regime performance. Therefore, theoretically there are shared meanings that the institutionalisation of liberal democracy will lead to democratic procedures in the liberal tradition that will invariably translate into the creation of a liberal democratic culture. Thus, producers of liberal democratic consolidation thus posit a developmental path that the creation of institutions will facilitate increase regime performance and inclusion by bringing political stability to the political arena. Following institutional and regime performance a liberal democratic commitment is generated culminating in the birth of the liberal civic virtue. The liberal civic virtue requires a re-socialisation of the polity towards a liberal orientated political culture.

Should states not follow this developmental trajectory to adopting a liberal democratic civic virtue, the assumption of liberal democratic consolidation theory leads one to believe that cultural dynamics are at play. In this sense, a non-Western state is either too traditional or too non-Western to adopt a liberal democratic civic virtue. Producers of liberal democratic consolidation discourse needs to engage in self-reflection and determine whether a re-evaluation of the discourse based on the data from the empirical world in order to gain a deeper understanding and evaluation of the shortcomings of theory. Instead of engaging in further theoretical development, producers of liberal democratic consolidation discourse takes a normative and moral approach to its dissemination by highlighting what is wrong with liberal democratic consolidation in a non-Western context.

## Chapter 6

### **Revealing the metatheory of liberal democratic consolidation theory**

The archaeology of knowledge for liberal democratic consolidation discourse has been shown to be institutionalism, regime performance and the growth of a liberal democratic civic virtue. It is with these foundations that the non-Western world has some difficulty to achieve a degree of success in consolidating their emerging liberal democracies. Producers of liberal democratic consolidation discourse does not account for the challenges of liberal democratic consolidation in a non-Western context. However, instead of challenging the nature and content of its theory based on the data received from the empirical world, producers of liberal democratic consolidation discourse elevates theory to the normative and moral adjudicator, thus rendering it a normative theory as opposed to an explanatory theory geared towards generating understanding and deeper engagement with the empirical world.

Liberal democratic consolidation theory is also open to ideological influence in the liberal tradition. Ideology, philosophy and theory are invariably linked to the development of political theory. This is no different in the case of liberal democracy theory and its related discourses around consolidation. There is agreement amongst the theorists discussed that liberal democratic institutions facilitate moderation and tolerance needed to participate in the liberal democratic process. Through participation in the liberal democratic process there will be an increase in regime performance by adopting the policies needed for a liberal democracy. Similarly, through increased regime performance at a procedural and substantive level, one will generate a liberal civic virtue rooted in pluralism, moderation, tolerance, and other liberal democratic values. Causality is central to liberal democratic consolidation theory's structure in that strengthened liberal political institutionalism lead to higher levels of regime performance, which collectively, generate a new liberal democratic political culture, participant political culture or liberal civic virtue.

This chapter will first present an analysis of liberal democratic consolidation theory as a theory. This is essential given that before conducting a third-order analysis, an

appraisal of what constitutes liberal democratic consolidation theory's epistemology becomes essential.


This will be followed by the metatheoretical appraisal of liberal democratic consolidation theory. In this sense metatheory is understood as a "...set of interlocking rules, principles, or a story (narrative), that both describes and prescribes what is acceptable and unacceptable as theory..." (Overton, 1998: 1). The chapter will construct the narrative of liberal democratic consolidation theory based on Moshman's (1979) construction of the physical, social and linguistic transmission of metatheory. This chapter aims to present an exploration of the underlying structure that accompanies liberal democratic consolidation theory. In order to develop full knowledge of liberal democratic consolidation theory, this is an essential exercise on which producers of liberal democratic discourse is hauntingly silent.

This study does not profess to provide all the answers regarding the metatheoretical structure of liberal democratic consolidation theory, but to engage in an exploratory critical discourse analysis of the underlying assumptions that inform the structure of liberal democratic consolidation theory. This is necessary in order to obtain a view of the epistemological tradition that informs liberal democratic consolidation discourse. Therefore, one needs to explore the belief, truth and justification that informs the liberal democratic consolidation discourse. It will demonstrate that liberal democratic consolidation is a normative theory concerned with the way liberal democracy must be crafted as opposed to explanatory in understanding the dynamics that affect liberal democratic crafting in a non-Western context. Furthermore, ideological and philosophical dominance will be revealed.

### **6.1. Theory and metatheory: Assessing liberal democratic consolidation theory**

Theory plays an important role in understanding and explaining various political phenomena. Christensen and Raynor (2003: 2) regard theory as a statement that is able to predict "...what actions will lead to what results and why" whilst Moshman (1979: 59) regards theory as implicit knowledge regarding one's world. In this sense, for Moshman, theories are not there to be *gotten*, but must be constructed, tested, reformulated and replaced if need be. Theorising is central to the creation of knowledge for Moshman, and in this sense, and as the world is dynamic and constantly

changing, so too does the process of theorising and the content of one's knowledge about the environment change with age. In addition, theory produces causal relationships between variables that constitute the environment which theory attempts to understand. Due to the generation of causal relationships in theory, the Christensen and Raynor (2003) further argue that theory has two overall functions: predictions and interpretation of current events and the factors that drive these events to generate a deeper understanding of these events that shape the future. In this sense then, with sound theory one will be able to adequately anticipate which actions lead to what consequences. In the context of liberal democratic consolidation theory the relationship between political institutionalism and effective regime performance is central to the creation of democratic commitment rooted in perceptions of liberal democratic legitimacy that leads to the generation of a liberal democratic civic virtue.



**Figure 23: Theoretical trajectory of liberal democratic consolidation theory**

As revealed in chapters 4 and 5, the theoretical trajectory that producers of liberal democratic consolidation discourse postulate has remained static with regard to the theoretical path which emerging liberal democracies must follow in order to consolidate their liberal democracies.

Given the dynamisms that characterises the empirical world, Moshman (1979: 60) stresses that *developing theoreticians* must possess a consciousness of the theory of their theories and its underlying logic. The essence of metatheory refers to the underlying structure of the logic and epistemology that informs it. In this sense, Overton (1998: 1) presents metatheory as a representation of the nature the empirical world and the objects that constitute that world. In this sense, for Overton, metatheory is seen as the conscious knowledge of the structure of the theory and its associated generalisations. Therefore, for both Moshman (1979) and Overton (1998) metatheory is concerned with the knowledge implicit to theory and theorising. Metatheory becomes essential in the review of theory in order to ensure that theory is still appropriate for explaining phenomena in the empirical world. In addition theorists are cautioned not to treat theory as the gospel of a discipline since at times the process of theory-building and theorising is removed from the realities within which they are to operate (Lynham, 2002: 221; Van de Ven and Johnson, 2006: 802; Weick, 1995: 386; and Christensen and Raynor, 2003: 6). Weick (1995: 386) conceives this problem as follows:


if everything from a ‘guess’ to a general falsifiable explanation has a tinge of theory to it, then it becomes more difficult to separate what is theory from what it is not, especially if theory development starts with guesses and speculations and ends with explanations and models.

In order to demonstrate this, Montesquieu’s analysis of the traditional societies of Africa proves particularly interesting. According to his *theory*, climate is central to explaining social and political behaviour (Pharek 2007: 57). In hot climates, laziness, polygamy, large families and simple needs prevails whilst in the colder climates of Europe the presence of laziness and polygamy was not allowed and frowned upon, thus rendering these behaviours acceptable in hot climates (Pharek, 2007: 57). In continuing his analysis, Montesquieu further rationalises the naturalness of slavery in that “...extreme heat render men so ‘slothful’ that only the fear of chastisement lead them to perform laborious tasks” (Pharek, 1997: 57) and consequently slavery in these hot climates was *founded upon natural reason*. If there was no review of this theory, the reader must imagine the consequences and knowledge that would have driven further economic and political development in countries with hot climates, which is generally the non-Western world of the southern hemisphere.

In many cases structural inequalities associated with globalisation impedes effective regime performance which further exacerbate inequality within the emerging liberal democratic context. Huntington (1996) gave limited insights, but his analysis had the distinct undertone of a pessimist in that the challenges poor states faces are insurmountable. Therefore, from this point of view, one can dismiss the prospects of liberal democratic consolidation through regime performance. There will be increasing pressure on political elites to demonstrate that normatively and institutionally liberal democracy is the better option. One would perhaps have thought that there would be at least some attempt to generate creative solutions to the obstacles imposed by globalisation on poor states and to further assist them in consolidating their liberal democracies. When engaging in formal liberal democratic consolidation theory, producers of the liberal democratic consolidation discourse ignores these since it is too concerned with morality associated with liberal democracy and the generation of a *deep, normative commitment* to liberal democratic institutions, processes, and procedures and regime performance. Morality as opposed to explaining the empirical world of liberal democratic development in the non-Western context is pre-eminent in liberal democratic consolidation discourse. Therefore, liberal democratic consolidation theory is a moral normative theory and not a descriptive or predictive theory.

Normative political theories are concerned with moral arguments justifying social and political institutions (Glaser 1995: 22 – 23). In this sense, given the discourse that characterise liberal democratic consolidation theory, it constitutes a normative theory in that it focuses its attention on logical relationships in a moral discourse. Liberal democracy is regarded as the ultimate good to which emerging states in the non-Western world aspire, and liberal democratic consolidation theory developed a logical trajectory in which to achieve this perceived ultimate moral political good. Given the inclination towards moral discourse, it somewhat diminishes the predictive value of liberal democratic consolidation theory in a non-Western context. There is a desperate need to engage in ideologically unbiased theory-building focused on explanation and deeper insight in order to find solutions to the liberal democratic stubbornness of the non-Western world. Therefore it becomes essential to ensure a continuous cycle of revision whereby formal theory is subjected to the realities that emerge from the non-Western world. The cycle of theory-building can be demonstrated as follows:





**Figure 24: Theoretical trajectory of theory-building (Lynham, 2002: 222)**

This cycle sees theory-building as an on-going process (Lynham 2002: 222). Essentially this process is attempting to determine implied messages and implied relationships between the phenomena under study (Weick 1995: 388). However, in dealing with implied relationships Weick (1995: 388) cautions that that in developing theory causal relationships must not necessarily be seen as sequential, but rather that these relationships are simultaneous in their engagement with one another. This becomes evident in liberal democratic consolidation theory. Emerging democracies create liberal democratic political institutions, whilst attempting to ensure effective regime performance necessary to create a liberal civic virtue. However, Weick (1995: 388) states that “...history is less crucial than contemporary structure...” and consequently, theory develops and is re-evaluated to ensure that it remains current in its explanation of the empirical world so as to generate understanding of the problems that require solutions. Yet, liberal democratic consolidation theory is firmly rooted in the path of development that dictated liberal democratic development in the Western world. In this sense, the basic premise is that if one has committed political elites ready to implement and operate and abide by the correct liberal democratic institutions, liberal democratic consolidation is attainable. The evaluative cycle within liberal democratic consolidation theory is lacking. The assumptions that guide liberal democratic consolidation theory are established in the trajectory that emerging liberal democracies in the non-Western world must follow. Instead of re-evaluating the discourse, producers of liberal

democratic consolidation are too concerned with institutional systems, regimes, and the altering of political cultures to mirror Western societies. The debate centres on types of institutions, electoral systems, how to measure plurality, liberalising economic systems and generating policies, defining a liberal state.

In this sense the causal relationship between institutions, regime performance and the generation of a liberal civic virtue was impulsive in its application to the non-Western context. The path of political development in the non-Western world has been difficult and marked with additional variables such as nation-building in addition to state building and overcoming structural inequalities to generate inclusive citizenship that liberal democratic consolidation theory does not consider in its normative assessment of liberal democratic construction in the non-Western context. There are many challenges and the desired result that theory predicted has not been achieved. History and geography do matter in liberal democratic construction. One cannot merely assume that the evolution of an entire nation will be replaced by institutions and regime performance and the subsequent liberal democratic political orientation. The challenge which liberal democratic consolidation theory fails to overcome is the expectation that a new way of life must be adopted in order to be considered democratic in the liberal tradition.

It is understandable that theory is regarded as an isolated realm only to be used when one needs to provide evidence of a certain event or relationship between causal factors (Brookesfield, 1992: 79 – 80; and Van de Ven, 2006: 802 – 803). The production of sound theories is essential to be able to understand realities that form the centre of the empirical world, and predict events based on an understanding of these realities. Therefore, theory is aimed at making some aspect of reality understandable and predictable through description. However, as Christensen and Raynor, (2003: 2) posit: good theory cannot be built if the phenomenon is not studied in its complete breadth and complexity. Theorising and providing sound insights into liberal democratic consolidation and its associated phenomena would require its producers to take note of its underlying structure which necessitates a metatheoretical appraisal, especially considering that liberal democratic consolidation theory essentially is a normative theory concerned with the political morality of liberal democracy.

Weick (1995: 385 – 386) argued that a theorising process rarely results in *full-blown* theories these are mere approximations manifested in four forms. Firstly, they

constitute general orientations that specify the variables that need to be considered but it do not necessarily posit a relationship between these variables. The general orientation of liberal democratic consolidation theory can be seen to be institutions (liberty), regime performance (equality), and liberal democratic values (liberal civic virtue). In addition, to build on Weick's point, one will then assume that there are two specifications between liberty and equality. In this sense, there is general consensus that liberal democracy denotes a political system where political liberty and political equality is guaranteed. The relationship between political liberty and political equality is, however problematic in that the specifications that entail the exact nature of what constitutes liberty and its relationship to equality and *vice versa* are lacking. One will then conclude that liberal democratic theory as it applies to liberty and equality is merely an approximation and cannot be regarded as theory in that it is not an adequate representation of the reality that constitutes these two concepts. This is found in the interpretation of liberty and equality from the procedural and substantive interpretations/approaches to liberal democracy.

The second form of approximation as identified by Weick (1995: 385 – 386) is analysing concepts, specifying and defining them. Liberal democratic consolidation theoretical discourse has specific interpretations of political institutions, regime performance, and the liberal civic virtue. This definition and conceptualisation is rooted in the development of liberal democracy philosophical foundations of political equality and political freedom founded in the paradigm of rationality. Yet, these are removed from reality in which these concepts must be interpreted and analysed: the non-Western context. Presently, with the increase of nationalism and populism, one needs to question the approximation that institutions and regime performance will lead to a *deep legitimation* of liberal democracy within society. There is limited understanding and/or appreciation of what the foundations of civic virtue in a non-Western context are. Many theorists such as Ethier (1990), Linz and Stepan (1996) and Huntington (1996) attempt to use Portugal and Spain as cases in point. It is essential to stress that these states are on the European continent and as such are members of a prestigious, wealthy organisation, and form part of the Western world. Therefore, during its liberal democratic adolescence, its European counterparts were able to provide *guidance* and *support* in consolidating their liberal democracies. This particular situation does not

necessarily apply to states in Africa, Latin America or Asia, which are further removed from the institutional nucleus of the Western world.

The third form of approximation is that of post-factum interpretation where single observations constitute proven hypotheses without exploring alternatives (Weick 1995: 387). Weick (1995: 387) utilises the analogy of medical practitioners tend to focus on symptoms to determine the best course of action to combat disease and illness need to diagnose the illness in order to determine the treatment. In this way, knowledge products demand that researchers focus on the symptoms of the problem and based on those symptoms diagnose and define the problem and only then determine what the required course of action or relationship between variables is. In this sense, links between symptoms, treatments and feedback becomes essential in that through re-evaluation scholars are in a better position to explain and predict phenomena (Weick 1995: 387). Therefore it is essential to determine the causal relationship between various concepts when investigating certain phenomena. For example, many analysts are amazed that since their independence, many African countries managed to become poorer than they were under the colonial administration. Many will put that the blame for this on globalisation and an unlevelled playing field in the global political economy that is essentially capitalist in nature. This may be a correct assumption, but cannot be viewed in isolation from issues like bad leadership, conflict and civil war, and the need to construct national identities while attempting to build a state.

The fourth form of approximation that Weick (1995: 385 – 386) identifies is empirical generalisation “...in which an isolated proposition summarises the relationship between two variables, but further interrelations are not attempted”. This refers to isolated hypotheses where researchers merely engage with limited hypotheses while ignoring other possibilities.

The stability that institutions bring is a necessary element in generating enough confidence that policies will not change suddenly. The assumption that through regime performance and institutions a liberal civic virtue can be created can be regarded as approximations. The empirical world has demonstrated through the experiences of the non-Western world that the liberal democratic civic virtue is not necessarily as desirable as producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory assume. Producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory, blinded by political morality associated with

liberal democracy, deems the elusiveness of liberal democratic consolidation in the non-Western world an inability to assimilate the liberal democratic culture and, consequently, the non-Western world is incapable of liberal democracy (Huntington 1996).

Producers of liberal democratic consolidation discourse do not explore alternative hypotheses to explore its theoretical inability to understand and explain the relationship between liberal democracy and non-Western culture, values, beliefs, and norms. Producers of liberal democratic consolidation discourse is not an alchemist involved in generating potions to cure traditional and primitive non-Westernness through the imposition of modernisation upon a non-Western society. Liberal democratic consolidation theory is essential to provide an understanding of how to generate a liberal democracy that is custom made to a specific situation, case study, and cultural environment, which does not necessarily mirror Western political developmental processes. Therefore there will be practical considerations as well as normative value systems that need to be considered in further theory-building in liberal democratic consolidation theory. As a theory liberal democratic consolidation theory is a speculation rooted in a system of assumptions pertaining to the path that emerging liberal democracies in the non-Western world must follow. For this reason, Weick (1995: 386 – 387) argued that theory should be regarded as a continuum in that “...theory work can take a variety of forms...and because most verbally expressed theory leaves tacit some key portions of the original insight”. In this sense, one needs to realise that theory-building is a process which is continuous since the theorist is constantly attempting to predict, refine, facilitate deeper understanding, reconsider, and reconceptualise phenomena as they change. This includes when the empirical yields results that is unexpected or unaccounted for by the theory.

The expressed concern of the study is the obstacles that surround theory construction in the liberal democratic consolidation paradigm and its producers seemingly inability to predict liberal democratic construction in the non-Western context. The point of departure is then to understand the process of theory construction so as to assert whether a particular theory is an adequate representation of the realities that make up different realities, and consequently, Hauptmann (2004: 54) criticises social scientists “...for reducing politics to a part of morality, society, human psychology or the economy”.

Moshman (1979: 60 – 63) describes the process of metatheoretical construction, starting with an analysis of the theory and its variables to epistemic humility. The isolation of variables is seen as the most common aspect of metatheoretical construction in that a conclusion can only be reached if variables remain constant. The study adopted equality, liberty and the civic virtue as the knowledge archive of liberal democracy. These translate into the archaeology of knowledge of liberal democratic consolidation theory as institutions (political freedom), effective regime performance (political equality) and the germination of a liberal democratic political culture (civic virtue).

The second task of a metatheoretical inquiry is hypothetico-deduction where one moves beyond an inductive approach with its focus on the empirical world to generate sufficient knowledge to facilitate generalisations from the data gathered towards a hypothetico-deductive approach where the theorist must systematically deduce predictions (Moshman, 1979: 60). The qualitative content analysis facilitated the deductive categorisation of the variables that constitute liberal democratic consolidation theory. Intertextuality validates the relationship between liberal democracy and liberal democratic consolidation theory, and as discussed in chapter 2, one finds an intertextual relationship between liberty (political institutionalism), equality (regime performance), and civic virtue (liberal political culture or participant political culture).

The third task of metatheoretical analysis is the distinction between testing and using hypotheses where there is a lack of knowledge of theory characterised by an implicit revision during analysis, however, no distinction is made between using and testing theory (Moshman, 1979: 61). A concern is that producers of liberal democratic consolidation discourse do not seem to amend theory to fit the empirical world, but rather demand that case studies and the empirical are incorrect for yielding data that contradicts the theoretical path of liberal democratic consolidation discourse. Is the non-Western world truly incapable of liberal democratic consolidation? Alternatively, does liberal democratic consolidation theory need some level of revision in order to effectively deal with its numerous anomalies in the empirical realm?

Finally theory must be wary of idealisation in the sense that if theory derives from the *quest for parsimony* differentiating between hypothetical and empirical worlds towards an idealisation of theory where theory is falsified in order to neutralise the distorting

facets of the empirical world that does not comply with anything observable but assists in explaining those variables (Moshman 1979: 66). In this sense, one is primarily engaged in speculation in order to explain the phenomenon that does not correspond to the empirical data from the empirical world, but assist in explaining the phenomenon so that theory does not necessarily amend itself. The variable of the liberal civic virtue may be applicable here since there is a resistance to adopt the liberal democratic way of life, yet liberal democratic consolidation theory posits a cultural obstacle thesis (Huntington, 1996) or a clash of civilisations (Huntington, 1993) instead of subjecting liberal democratic consolidation theory to a metatheoretical review.

## **6.2. The physical transmission of liberal democratic consolidation's metatheory**

Moshman (1979: 65) identified three general areas of metatheory: (i) physical transmission, (ii) social transmission; and (iii) linguistic transmission. Physical transmission abstracts metatheory from the physical world, requiring the theorist to isolate variables consistent with their experiences of the environment. Liberal democratic consolidation discourse's metatheoretical transmission is found on three levels: domestically with a focus on political elites, internationally with a focus on the export of liberal democracy, and the relationship between economic development and regime performance. The physical environment of liberal democratic consolidation theory can be explained through structure-agency approaches to the political and social sciences. Structure can be regarded as limitations imposed on political elites in their political behaviour or the limits of demands that citizens can place on political elites (Imbroscio, 1999: 48). Agency refers to the responses of political elites to their imposed structures. Political elites may, for example, abide by the structure or may rebel against the structure in a specific context. Similarly, citizens may accept the limitations of their ability to demand, or may engage in demonstrations and riots in an attempt to change the agency. The relationship between structure and agency is dubious in that there is little agreement on the importance of structures vis-à-vis agents and *vice versa* (Imbroscio, 1999: 46; and Adeney and Wyatt, 2004: 4 – 6).

Given the selfish and essentially Machiavellian characteristics of human nature, liberal democracy theory dictated that through the execution of the social contract it was necessary to impose limitations on agents (political elites) in order to ensure that society does not remain within a state of nature. The result was the creation of the

liberal democratic institutions that facilitate the generation of political equality and political liberty through the rule of law, constitutionalism and the elevation of political and civic liberties to the divine.

The structure of liberal democratic consolidation theory can be analysed on two levels. The first level in the structure of liberal democratic consolidation theory is related to the creation of the negotiations and settlements that characterise the transition period. These agreements create the structures of liberal democracy by expanding citizenship to cater for political liberties, the institutionalisation of constitutionalism and the rule of law through the constitutional agreements and the creation of civic liberties, and the centrality of the rule of the people through the creation and institutionalisation of the rules of the political game and elections. Consequently, the basic premise of the structure of liberal democratic consolidation theory is to limit or constrain the behaviour of the agents or political elites. Therefore, the structure of liberal democratic consolidation fosters a new type of political agent committed to moderation, participation, bargaining and compromise. In order for the agents to remain legitimate within the structures created by liberal democratic consolidation theory, they are required to limit their behaviour and adjust their actions to remain within the boundaries of the liberal democratic structure. Therefore, acts such as violence, rebellion, ethnic mobilisation, and irresponsible electioneering are considered contradictory to the structure and may lead to the expulsion of the political agent from the liberal democratic process. This is not the case during the transition process. In the transition process the political elites become the structure and the structure becomes the agent due to the process of political crafting. With the emphasis on political elites, transitionology concentrates on the agency approach in the physical transmission of liberal democratic consolidation theory by the assumption that liberal democratic outcomes are determined by political elites (Adeney and Wyatt 2004: 4). In this context when the structure of the new liberal democratic dispensation is being created, the choices made by political elites will influence the structure that will eventually dictate and limit their agency. The structure of the transition process however can be equated with the values that dictate the behaviour of political agents. The values are moderation and compromise, which were the focus of the majority of the works on liberal democratic consolidation such as those by Di Palma (1990), Huntington (1996), Diamond (1999) and Linz and Stepan (1996). The structure of liberal democratic




consolidation theory facilitates liberal democratic consolidation in that by adhering to the structure of moderation and participation, participants will eventually need to become agents of the structure they had created. Once this occurs, the idea is that liberal democratic consolidation as stability has occurred.

In order to generate the values necessary for a liberal democratic dispensation, the structure of the newly created emerging liberal democracy is to act as both the agent and the structure. There is a reciprocal relationship between structure and agency within liberal democratic consolidation theory. In this sense structures act as agents in order to set limitations on the behaviour of agents when the political elites become the agents of the structure they had created thereby creating a contingent relationship between liberal democratic structures and their agents of political elites. This was also identified by Bratton and De Walle (1997: 45 – 48) through their political contingency approach to the study of democratisation by an analytical focus on human agency, conflict and choice. This approach thus takes into consideration the human approaches associated with various events or the relationship between structure and agency in the liberal democratic development tradition. Therefore by highlighting the interaction between structures (institutions, rules, regulations, and process) and agents (political elites and actors within the liberal democratic process) liberal democratic consolidation theory attempts to generate a rational view of the execution of rule of the people. Imbroscio (2004: 47) stresses that

each of the two contrasting conceptualisations of the relationship between social structure and human agency yields a different standard of democratic responsiveness. Hence, our ultimate understanding of both democratic theory and practice – indeed of democracy itself – is necessarily linked to our understanding of structure and agency.

This implies the duality of the physical transmission of liberal democratic consolidation theory. In this sense structure controls agent and agent controls structure. The centrality of stability is that as a state continues to consolidate their liberal democracies, the liberal democratic commitment must ensure that political elites are sufficiently committed to liberal democratic success. This will trickle down to the mass level and thus create a sense of liberal democratic legitimacy that will lay the foundation for the creation of the liberal democratic civic virtue.




**Figure 25: Structure and agency of liberal democratic consolidation theory**

The structure and agency approach also applies to the external environment of liberal democratic consolidation theory's physical transmission. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the international system changed to favour liberal democracy. Essentially, the global push for liberal democratic development saw a shift in agency in that political actors were now committing to a liberal democratic dispensation. The result is that the major push for liberal democratic development facilitated a change in the behaviour of political elites as the alternative ideology of communism had failed and the only viable option open to political agents was liberal democracy.

This is primarily due to the centrality that institutions as structures and political elites as agents occupy. The Western liberal models demonstrated that the structures provided for by the liberal democratic process like constitutionalism, elections, rule of law, and civic and political liberties set forth to constrain elites (agents) in their behaviour by ensuring moderation through an adherence to the structures. The structures are also regarded as central to ensure rule of the people, which is isolated as the primary variable and purpose of liberal democratic theory. Therefore structures and agency need to ensure that rule of the people prevails at all costs. The negotiated settlements, bargaining, and participation of elites in the transition process set the tone for the acceptance of the structures, in other words, through this process there is supposed to be a level of buy-in from political elites as agents in the structures that will determine their political behaviour. As a result institutionalism and its relationship to structure-

agency in liberal democratic consolidation theory prove central to attain the goal of liberal democracy – rule of the people where political and civic liberties guarantee the autonomy of the individual.

Structure and agency also relate to the relationship between regime performance and economic development and the upliftment of society to ensure adequate participation. The structure of emancipation is economic development which will facilitate regime performance. Consequently, economic development is the structure that will impact on the capacity and scope of regime performance as an agent. This is rational given that without adequate economic development and growth, the regime cannot generate sufficient resources to engage in its emancipator activities.



**Figure 26: The structure of liberal democratic consolidation theory's economic development in relation to human development**

The institution of economic development and the agency of regime performance are necessary to ensure that people assess their social and political position more favourably in the new liberal democratic regime than in the authoritarian regime. The experience of the Western world saw that through education and viable social security, people are more likely to assess their material and social position in a positive light. In the emerging liberal democracies of the non-Western world, however, poverty ensures that people are more concerned with day-to-day survival rather than assessing the progress of government. The lack of education also facilitates this as physical survival

is more important than gaining an education. In addition, the higher the illiteracy level is within a state, coupled with severe hardships, the easier a demos can be manipulated to further the cause of dissident forces in a society. The question that theorists should ask is firstly, what is the potential for socio-economic development in the new political dispensations to meet the requirements of regime performance? At present there is an inherent belief that economic development will lead to increased regime performance, which in turn, will entrench the liberal democratic values through positive assessment of the new democratic regime and increased participations in its structure.

The physical environment demonstrates that liberal consolidation theory is rooted in the experiences of rationality that dominated the growth of liberal democratic theory. The underlying structure of liberal democratic consolidation theory is firmly set in the rationality associated with institutionalism in that rules, regulations, processes and procedures form the foundation of building a liberal democratic society. Scholars in the liberal democratic consolidation tradition demonstrate that through the interaction with liberal democratic institutions, political actors will emulate the values required in operating within the institutions of liberal democracy. Through their behaviour and commitment to the institutions, liberal democratic values will trickle down to civil society. This is much in keeping with the trickledown effect preached by modernisation theory. Therefore, rationality rooted in institutionalism is an undercurrent that informs liberal democratic consolidation theory.

### **6.3. The social transmission of liberal democratic consolidation's metatheory**

Social transmission of metatheory focuses on social reinforcement through imitating relevant behaviour or following relevant instructions (Moshman, 1979: 65). Therefore, metatheory is dependent upon a fortification of data, or in other words, theoretical data are constantly confirmed and consequently, this confirmation it can lead to a socialisation process that renders theory correct. It is therefore important to attempt to gain a deeper insight into the social reinforcement that informed liberal democratic consolidation theory.

Liberal consolidation theory is firmly rooted in the liberal democratic experience of the Western world. Liberal democratic theory is inherently linked to the process of political development that the Western world experienced, and consequently, liberal

democratic consolidation theory will be amalgamated to the liberal democratic tradition. The successful liberal democratic development that characterised the Western world led to the social reinforcement of the path to political life that best ensures the rule of the people through a social contract that guarantees the political and civil freedoms of the individual and ensures stability through a commitment to the institutions and values of liberal democracy.

Dupuis-Deri (2004: 120) noted that “regarding political history, it was quite common for American and French political figures to see themselves as direct heirs to classic civilisations and to believe that all through history, from Athens to Rome to Boston and Paris, the same political forces have faced off in eternal struggles”. Therefore, the basic premise is that all civilisations have a desire for the values and way of life that the *democrats* had fought for. Chatterjee (1997: 32) is of the view that “the explicit form of the postcolonial state...is that of modern liberal democracy”. The journey to modernity required an overhaul of the social and political system of non-Western states to mirror their mature Western liberal democratic counterparts. Social, political and cultural changes need to evolve to those associated with liberal democratic systems. Therefore, state and civil society interaction through the democratic structures must occur, political and civil liberties in the liberal tradition need to be institutionalised, and an entire society needs to be committed to the values of tolerance, secularism, multiculturalism, solidarity and moderation. These values however may not necessarily be compatible with non-Western cultures.

The liberal democratic experiment for the emerging liberal democracy is three-fold: (1) economic stability must be achieved through the predominant paths to development and capitalism; (2) liberal democracy and its associated behaviours and institutions need to become the only viable means of governance; and (3) a common identity based on nationality rather than ethnicity must be created founded upon a liberal democratic civic virtue. All of this is to be undertaken in the name of constructing a liberal democracy. This denotes a theme of universalism which is a “...legacy of the ‘second modernity’ of the eighteenth century ‘Enlightenment’ and its extension into the nineteenth century positivism” (Castro-Gomez, 2002: 33).

It is this undercurrent of universalism that proves somewhat idealistic on the part of the liberal democratic consolidation theorists. The assumption that all cultures and

societies desire their values is somewhat arrogant, and ties in with the pedagogical interpretation of the development of the non-Western world. This is evident in the work of O'Dwyver (2003: 40) stating that "President Clinton, in a speech at Beijing University in 1998, claimed that these [liberal] rights are 'universal – not American rights or European rights...but the birthrights of people everywhere". The rights he referred to are political liberty and political equality rooted in the development of liberal democratic discourse, and those rights that liberal democratic consolidation discourse seeks to recreate in an emerging liberal democracy. Western liberal political doctrines arose due to a need to struggle against religious intolerance, political tyranny and the emerging class ambitions of the middle classes (O'Dwyver, 2003: 41). In contemporary times the liberal democratic doctrine is defended on the basis of the natural rights of persons, economic rights of individuals and organisations and electoralism through a representative democracy founded upon the foundations of a constitutional state (O'Dwyver, 2003: 41). In discussing the Asian example, O'Dwyver (2003: 43) observed that all theorists of liberal democracy should remember that the current liberal democratic doctrine was a response to the capitalist market order and political absolutism, whilst Confucianism arose to deal with political strife in early China, where Confucius identified the root of the political conflict as a lack of moral education for future political elites and not absolute power, which contrasted the legal rational authority tradition upon which the liberal doctrine was built.

Producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory produce scholarship that advocates changing the foundation upon which different societies are built so that they may mirror the *universal* society that liberal democratic consolidationists claim will lead to prosperity, stability, and overall peace. The reality, however, is quite distinct in that non-Western societies that attempt to modernise and therefore consolidate their new liberal democratic dispensation, "...emerged...shocked to find...the crime, poverty...were not merely propaganda...the dreamers had failed to realise that the unhealthy political culture of the past would persist...most live in societies that embrace the excesses of the West – commercialism, inequality, insecurity – while disdaining the foundation of respect for civil rights and rule of law" (Rosenberg and Hayner, 1999: 92). This translates into volatile socio-political and socio-economic relations in the presence of perpetual liberal democratic unconsolidation.

Social transmission associated with liberal democratic consolidation theory can be found in the traditional versus modern dichotomy. In this sense, the modern nations of the mature liberal democracies saw it necessary to ensure the modernisation of the perceived traditional and backward societies of the non-Western world. Consequently, "...all people want democracy and the market, no matter what their culture or their state of economic development is, these can be installed virtually overnight" (Hassner, 2008: 6 – 7). This created the reality under the system of perceptual-representation that Western cultures and political organisation are being forced onto non-Western states (Nyamnjoh 2003: 9 – 100). Nyamnjoh further argued that evidence of his assessment is found in the contempt that the Western world shows to alternative systems of thought and social and political organisation of the non-Western world, rendering a homogenising view rendering the Western world an oppressor of civilisations that do not comply with their cultures.

Liberal democratic consolidation theory regards itself as the only viable route to achieve modernity by crafting a liberal democratic political order. The self-image it portrays, and indeed reinforces, is that the liberal democratic model is the most ennobled form of modern political organisation. Castro-Gomez (2002: 31) observed that the need for modernity and civilisation in the Latin American context arose over debates within Spain regarding the necessity to submit Native Americans to colonial rule utilising the criteria of race rendering the *mulatto*<sup>46</sup> inferior because of their skin colour and social origin. Social domination was justified on the basis that more advanced populations could legitimately occupy and control the territories of the perceived backward nations of the non-Western world and enlighten them to the advances of the Western world (Castro-Gomez, 2002: 31).

However, no matter how strong the process of social domination, examples from Africa, East Asia and Latin America have created isomorphic liberal democracies, in that although the basic structure of minimalist or procedural liberal democracy is in place, they still remain distinctly different in their civic virtues. Matlosa (2007: 62) for example identified four types of regimes in Africa: (1) liberal democracies with stable and consolidating democratic frameworks like South Africa, (2) electoral democracies where the focus is merely on elections as opposed to strengthening regime

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<sup>46</sup> Portuguese/Spanish word meaning a person of colour.

performance, (3) the grey-zone, illiberal, ambiguous, democracy or liberalised autocracy or electoral authoritarianism where multiparty elections are embraced, but the quality of the elections are question and authoritarianism, (4) dictatorships, authoritarianism, unreformed autocracies where a democratic transition must still occur. This demonstrates that although the practice of electoralism is embraced, these regime types do not necessarily move beyond the initial stages of democratic consolidation to the creation of a liberal democratic civic virtue. Instead, the path of consolidation seems to point towards authoritarian consolidation utilising the process of elections to demonstrate that rule of the people is practised, in theory at least.

Many states attempt to model, albeit not successfully, the liberal democratic model as exported through various processes such as colonialism and globalisation. Political and economic development in the liberal tradition is high on the agenda, and non-Western states, which do not necessarily occupy a power in the international dispensation, are strongly urged to adopt the liberal system and modernise with the help of the mature democracies. Many non-Western world states are struggling with copying the liberal democratic ideal for various reasons such as history, ethnic diversity, or cultural obstacles – if liberal democratic scholars are to be believed. Indeed, Seth (1995: 34) noted that

for the receiving societies<sup>47</sup> of today, adopting and working in the institutions of modern representative democracy has been quite a different story. These societies, for different historical reasons – colonisation, westernisation, and modernisation – have not been able to develop political institutions of democracy on the basis of their own histories and political cultural traditions.

In this sense to postcolonial modernisation project which the Western world undertook with the colonial process will always be incomplete (Chatterjee 1997: 31; Hadiz 2004: 58). Consequently non-Western states are still struggling to emulate the liberal democratic system of governance and way of life, and remain in need of *education* in order to become modern and successful like their Western counterparts. It is interesting to note that this exercise has been in existence since independence of many states from

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<sup>47</sup> Receiving societies in this sense refers to postcolonial states that are urged to adopt a system of liberal democracy. Seth focuses on the case of India in his scholarship.



the 1950s, and yet there still seems to be no end in sight for the modernisation process of the post-colonial state.

The underlying structure that accompanies liberal democratic consolidation theory is rooted in modernisation. In other words, the crusade of *enlightened modernity* is an undercurrent that informs the necessity for liberal democratic consolidation's discourse. It is in the interest of the traditional societies to emulate the models of liberal democracy of their modern counterparts. Therefore a pedagogical mission is well underway to pull the emerging liberal democratic world out of chaos, poverty and suffering; the emerging liberal democratic world needs to be saved from a state of nature. This will enable them to move out of poverty, illiteracy and authoritarianism toward a liberal and equal society coupled with prosperity through economic growth and increased regime performance rooted in citizenship and universalism. Centeno (1994: 141) observed "we use words such as 'market' and 'democracy' as if these mean the same thing in Moscow, Madrid, or Manila". Due to different cultural and ideological contexts, democracy, with its associated discourse on equality and liberty will have different meanings. Seth (1995: 27 – 28) when discussing the case of India observed that even after independence the state continues to struggle with two alternative histories, the political history of ethnic competition and conflict and the civilisational history of sharing the political space with cultural-religious entities rooted in the identity of the nation-state.

Similar challenges confronted the African postcolonial state. The liberation struggle served to unite the people of Africa, both on a continental level and national level (Thomson 2004). The post-independence discourse, however, is filled with contradictions ranging from modernisation to *scientific socialism*, and from single-party necessity to the right to choose under a multiparty regime. The theme that emerges is that the conception of the modern nation-state as envisaged by the Western liberal mature democracies has proven somewhat illusive to achieve in a postcolonial and non-Western context. Therefore the underlying current of modern citizenship in liberal democratic consolidation theory is difficult to achieve in societies which do not know who their citizens are and who their citizens ought to be. The politics of space and belonging cannot be accounted for in liberal democratic consolidation discourse, primarily due to a bias towards the ability of institutions to manage such conflicts. Also, another theme reinforced in liberal democratic consolidation discourse is the idea

of a nation-state, and liberal democracy is the only viable form of government to manage diversity and its conflicts and occupy a position of legal-rational authority as opposed to ethnic or traditional leadership.

Producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory contradicts one of its main values, that of tolerance. By virtue of disregarding anything that is considered traditional or cultural, it occupies a position of politico-cultural domination. Liberal democratic consolidation theory, rooted in the Western tradition of political development, regards itself as charged with the liberal illumination of the non-Western world. Indeed, the discourse on cultural assimilation of liberal democratic values through the institutions of the liberal democratic process points to its perceived superiority over alternative systems found within non-Western political societies exported through the principle of universalism.

Consequently, an undercurrent of liberal democratic consolidation theory is the premise that liberal democracy is the most desirable form of government and way of life. It is elevated to the status of the universal, without recognising that it is merely a global phenomenon due to the culmination of historical events. The fall of the Berlin Wall further reinforced the prestige associated with liberal democracy.

The social reinforcement of liberal democratic consolidation occurs within its institutions and the structure of institutionalism through which political agents must operate. In this sense, the institutions are charged with managing diverse interests and conflict that may arise within the political system. Therefore, within the liberal democratic consolidation tradition, social transmission is seen on one level as managing diversity and interests within the democratic process and its associated rules, processes, and procedures. Liberal democratic consolidation theory prides itself that its ability through the transmission of its values of tolerance, moderation, secularism, and multiculturalism will ensure adequate protection of the individual. These institutions are said to aid the construction of national solidarity in their ability to manage diverse interests and identities. The process of social reinforcement has demonstrated that there are cases where liberal democracy thrive in ethnically diverse societies, but these were essentially the early liberal democratic developers of the Western world where claims to the right to cultural and ethnic identity were not as strong as in the contemporary non-Western context (Beissinger 2008: 87 - 88).

Producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory therefore praises political organisation under a liberal democracy for its ability to managing diversity through inclusion and the institutions of the liberal democratic process. This may have been applicable in the development of the mature liberal democracies, as Beissinger highlights. The reality in a non-Western context is very different. The colonial boundaries grouped together many nation-states into one single territorial unit that will comprise the new nation-state. The colonial experience redrew the boundaries of many territories and attempted to create homogeneous communities rooted in the colonial identity. The only common feature in these state creations of the colonial exercise was unity in a political identity rooted in a colonial state comparable to a politico-environment in the civilisational mission (Seth, 1995: 26). Colonial boundaries sought to create a multitude of new territories, which at independence resulted in the creation of a multitude of new *nation-states* that had joined the international community. Indeed, Gupta and Ferguson (1992: 6 -7) note that it is commonly perceived that each country has its own unique culture and society, but in the realm of the nation-state and scholars speak of Indian culture, American society and so forth with little consideration for the multitudes of identities that dictate in the political space.

In many instances the divine political institutions that liberal democratic consolidation theory seeks to construct are too weak to manage the ethnic undercurrent, or alternatively, are dominated by the majority groups within a territory. The ideas of nation-state, national identity, nation-building and national solidarity that underlie liberal democratic consolidation theory prove somewhat idealistic as long as the institutions remain institutions of competition rather than institutions of cooperation, and peace and stability will not be the expected result. The quality of citizenship, a central theme in liberal democratic consolidation discourse, is thus somewhat tainted in post-colonial and non-Western contexts due to different experiences of the liberal democratic institutions, or alternatively, the different ideological and philosophical foundations that inform a society. Liberal democratic institutions will not ensure the attainment of quality citizenship, but only, as Guillomee noted, different intensities of citizenship.

#### 6.4. The linguistic transmission of liberal democratic consolidation's metatheory

The linguistic transmission of metatheory is rooted in the positivist tradition in that metatheory becomes inherent in the semantics of our language (Moshman, 1979: 65). Liberal democratic consolidation theory can be interpreted as a form of philosophical and ideological dominance. In this sense, the inherent language used by producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory opens itself to discrimination and prejudice creating a systematic group oppression and structural inequality (Sidanius *et al*, 2004: 846). In unpacking the physical and social transmission of liberal democratic consolidation's metatheory, the language associated with it is one that invariably places the mature Western liberal democracies on a higher and more elevated level than the emerging liberal democracies. This is evident in the semantics of liberal democratic consolidation theory. By referring to non-Western societies and civilisations as still emerging, liberal democratic consolidation theory elevates their *mature* counterparts to the position of parent.

In this sense, the emerging liberal democracy must learn from their mature counterparts in order to successfully emulate the developed system of governance and find enlightenment in adopting the liberal values and way of life. An underlying structure in the narrative of liberal democratic consolidation theory is one of paternalism, where by virtue of being developed, it is charged with guiding the growing liberal democracy. Seth (1995: 33 – 33) pointed out earlier in the chapter that many non-Western states are still at the *receiving end* of Western discourse. By implication, this means that many states, which had their own developed form of civilisations prior to the colonial legacy, are still prescribed to in that they are regarded as less developed and inferior to the mature liberal Western democracies. Therefore, by default of the current global organisational structure, they are instructed and expected to emulate the models of development and governance in the path towards development and maturity as pursued by the Western world. This creates a linguistic, cultural and economic divide in that all other forms of governance that contradict liberal democracy is regarded as dubious even if a culture of political democracy is present, the non-Western state must evolve to encapsulate the liberal democratic civic virtue as well (Seth 1995: 36). Therefore, the expectation is that due to the perceived universalism of liberal democratic values, all states, regardless of their cultural heritage, must modernise and develop to adopt the

Western model. Indeed, the discourse of liberal democratic consolidation is rooted in the global movement for liberal democracy; and producers regard this global movement as sufficient empirical evidence that liberal democracy is desirable across the globe, and consequently, it is charged with prescribing to non-Western states how to achieve the liberal democratic model.

The so-called *End of History* resulted in a complete and extreme make-over of many non-Western nations to put them on their journey as *emerging* liberal democracies. So high was the success and victory of liberal democracy on the political agenda, that liberal democratic consolidation theory discourse still continue the narrative of modernisation of the non-Western world. Consider the following for a moment. Jefferey Herbst wrote a piece entitled *The fall of Afro-Marxism* in the Journal of Democracy in 1990. This was a period of massive social and political reforms that had followed the fall of the Berlin Wall. He puts the question as follows in the extract below:

after the historic Eastern European revolutions of 1989, it is only natural to ask whether African countries like Benin, which proclaimed allegiance to 'scientific' socialism in the 1970s, and other countries that adopted 'African' forms of socialism in the 1960s, will now bow to popular disaffection fueled by economic crisis and follow Eastern Europe in a halting march towards democratisation.

By implication, the author implies that there is no alternative to the liberal democratic dream. The reality is that given the position of these states on the global organogram, it is not surprising that most states embarked on structural adjustment and crafting liberal democratic states during the 1990s. However, given the predisposition of the Journal of Democracy to liberal democratic discourse, it is not surprising that the language denotes a positive assessment of the changes that states must undergo to emerge as a liberal democratic replica found in the Western world and the jubilation surrounding the fall of Marxism as it is a direct obstacle to liberal democracy.

It is inherent in the language of liberal democratic consolidation theory that liberal democracy is good, while alternative forms of governance are malevolent. It is inherent in the language of liberal democratic consolidation theory that there is an obligation on non-Western nations, in the name of development, industrialisation, and modernisation, to grow and aspire towards the liberal democratic model. There is an inherent

assumption in the dialogue of liberal democratic consolidation that in order to secure citizenship and the greatest good for the greatest number, non-Western states must cast off the shackles of traditionalism and embark on the journey to modernity. In order to attain stability, non-Western states are urged to abandon theocratic limits on the individual for secularism, tolerance, and multiculturalism.

## **6.5. Concluding remarks**

The structure and agency of the metanarrative of liberal democratic consolidation theory renders it a theory connected with the realities of non-Western nations and sensitive and tolerant to the inherent traditions and histories of evolution of non-Western nations; liberal democratic consolidation theory takes on a prescriptive character. Instead of utilising the data from the empirical field pertaining to the difficulties of non-Western states to consolidate a liberal democracy, liberal democratic consolidation theory is guilty of idealising its own theoretical prescriptions. It is inherent in the language found in liberal democratic consolidation theory that there is an ideological bias towards liberalism present, in that the liberal values and their view of human nature are applicable across the globe. Its system of perceptual-representation is inherent in the theoretical discourse where liberalism and its associated conversation is desirable, and by creating the conditions conducive to liberal democracy, liberal democratic consolidation theory can be regarded as an ideological extension in that it possesses an assessment of the current state of affairs, and contains a plan of action for a better future. Given this consideration, liberal democratic consolidation theorists does not see the need to revisit its theories and discourse, as it is the case studies that do not comply with the theoretical assertions.

Liberal democratic consolidation theory is classified as a means of social dominance in a non-Western context. In this sense, scholars within the theoretical paradigm share beliefs of legitimised discrimination underpinned by the liberal ideology they endorse. Given the nature of the physical and social transmission of liberal democratic consolidation theory's metanarrative, it regards its end-product as far superior to any other forms of socio-political organisation given that it sees liberal democracy as the culmination of modernisation. In other words, to move from an essentially negative traditional society, there is an obligation on non-Western states to modernise and adopt the Western political way of life and system of governance. Its ideology allows social domination given the belief in the centrality of the individual's entitlement to political

liberty and political equality. Through its discourse, it has created "...group-based hierarchies..." (Sidanius *et al*, 2004: 847) through dividing the world into mature and emerging democracies. The former are seen as superior and complete in the journey to liberal democratic development, while the latter are regarded as inferior due to their seeming inability to attain the liberal democratic utopia. Its structure and agency therefore allows for a form of discrimination against all societies that do not necessarily comply with the vision of a liberal world that liberal democratic consolidation theory holds dear.

It is here that the critical variance in liberal democratic consolidation theory lies. It is rooted in the Western experience, which is not necessarily the *democratic* experience in a non-Western context. There is little recognition for the good in the alternative systems of governance and their associated societal values. The consequence is that liberal democratic consolidation theory attempts to deliver a do-it-yourself-guide to emerging states attempting to embrace liberal democracy.

Liberal democratic consolidation theory's epistemology is communicated through its physical, social and linguistic transmissions. Its identification of truths centres on the development of liberal democracy theory and the context in which it grew. The truths of knowledge that liberal democratic consolidation theory therefore holds as its epistemology rest on political liberty, political equality, and the generation of a liberal civic virtue through the institutionalisation of political life and the centrality of the individual. Indeed, it is only through the liberal democratic path that human emancipation can occur; this being demonstrated in the liberal democratic development that led to the success of the Western world.

Therefore, its experience gave it the knowledge that stability, prosperity and wealth are generated through the path to modernisation and individualisation of society. This is also the truth disseminated by liberal democratic consolidation theory. It is justified in its belief, taught by its own experience, that good societies are created in the liberal tradition. Therefore, liberal democratic consolidation theory's epistemology is firmly rooted in its own path to maturation, without very much concern for the journeys that non-Western states underwent in the construction of their societies and their value system. These are seen as shackles of traditionalism that inhibit the development of a

good society founded upon the liberal democratic values and socio-political organisation.

The epistemological foundations of liberal democratic consolidation theory rest on the following pillars. The first pillar relates to the perceived desirability of liberal democracy. Given its social transmission, liberal democratic consolidation theory holds it as an inevitable truth that all cultures and societies have an inherent desire to emulate the Western system. Secondly, the values associated with liberal democracy are regarded as universal. These universal values, it is believed, are applicable to all cultures and societies regardless of their origin or history. Thirdly, the only path to development, prosperity, and peace and stability is rooted in the Western experience. The nature of the liberal democracy's system of governance, and its associated economic system that generates sufficient regime performance, have the capacity to lift states and people out of poverty and suffering. Finally, citizenship can only be guaranteed in the liberal democratic tradition.



## **Chapter 7**

### **Conclusion**

Liberal democratic consolidation theory is a normative theory concerned with the moral and correct form of political and socio-political organisation in crafting liberal democracy in a non-Western context. Consequently, it enjoys an elevated status that sanctifies liberal democratic political systems and beliefs that all people, regardless of their history and geographical location adopt such a system and way of life. Liberal democratic consolidation remains elusive in a non-Western context. When confronted with empirical data from the non-Western world that contradicts the liberal democratic developmental trajectory that liberal democratic consolidation posits as the path to liberal democratic construction, as a theory, the liberal democratic consolidation paradigm engages in moral and normative arguments as to the necessity of installing liberal democracy in order to facilitate the journey to modernity.

The conclusion will provide a brief overview of the main arguments and findings. It will then proceed to provide key recommendations on the nature of the evaluation that liberal democratic consolidation lacks.

#### **7.1 On liberal democracy**

Liberal democracy is the ultimate aim to which non-Western states are to aspire. However, in attempting to deconstruct the discourse of liberal democratic consolidation theory, it became essential to isolate the variables associated with liberal democratic consolidation and its nirvana of liberal democracy. Through tracing the evolution of liberal democracy theory from the Athenian period to the Renaissance period, the study found that the primary principles associated with liberal democracy are liberty, equality, and the civic virtue. These constituted the micro-genres of liberal democracy as the knowledge archive that informs liberal democratic consolidation theory.

The philosophical traditions of liberal democratic consolidation theory are firmly rooted in the Western experience and thus the philosophical foundation from which liberal democratic consolidation theory departs will be influenced by the historical trajectory of Liberal America and its Western European counterparts. Consequently,

the archaeology of knowledge of liberal democratic consolidation discourse is thus firmly rooted in the Western processes of political and economic modernisation.

The primary departure point of *democracy* is the rule of the people. Through advocating rule of the people, *democracy* sees itself as a superior system of governance. In addition, by adding the civic virtue as interpreted by the Athenians, *democracy* is also seen to be a way of life. In this sense there is an obligation on all to participate in the *democratic* process, and there is an obligation on those who govern to take into account what the people say. Hence one appreciates the root of the word democracy as *demos* and *kratos*. This denotes that there is a reciprocal relationship between those who govern and those that are governed.

The rationalism that informed the political theory of the Enlightenment period facilitated the evolution of *democracy* theory from rule of the people to the inclusion of liberty and equality. The historical state of affairs during this period was one of religious conflict and political tyranny and absolutism. The people had limited influence pertaining to how they were governed as final authority rested with the monarch. As church and state were still united, monarchies claimed to rule by the divine will of God. The desires of the people to govern themselves led to a progression in democracy theory in that if the people are to govern, then political liberty becomes central.

As all individuals are not created equal there had to be some form of protection of the equality of individuals. The logic behind the social contract was the safeguarding of individual equality through surrendering some degree liberty to a higher authority, thus creating liberal equality. Therefore, the state is needed to ensure that individuals, whether weak or strong, are guaranteed some form of equality, which forms the essence of liberal democracy.

Liberal democracy in this sense needed a social contract to ensure equality of the individual. Political liberty and political equality were regarded as mutually enforcing since one cannot be free without equality, and one cannot be equal without liberty. The state is therefore charged with ensuring that the collective relationship between political liberty and political equality prevails. This points to the constitutional tradition associated with the institutions of liberal democracy.

Liberty, equality, and the civic virtue collectively form the principles of the rule of the people. As rule of the people is the philosophical foundation from which democracy originates, the normative principles that guide rule of the people are political liberty, political equality and the liberal civic virtue. The presence and adherence to these three principles will allow rule of the people to prevail in the liberal tradition and set the criteria for citizenship.

Political liberty and political equality translated into contemporary liberal democracy theory as the procedural and substantive interpretation of this tradition. Through the liberal democratic processes and institution, the demos will be able to ensure that freedom of the individual is not impinged upon. In this sense, protection is afforded to the individual to participate in the liberal democratic process. Equality on a political level is also guaranteed through the procedural view of liberal democracy. Freedom to participate and participation on an equal footing form the foundations upon which the democratic process is founded. Rule of the people will be guaranteed through elections and other necessary liberal democratic institutions and processes. To balance power between institutions and the people, one will find systems of separation of powers and checks and balances.

The procedural and substantive view of liberal democracy was influenced by the writings of Aristotle, Tocqueville, Mill, Rousseau and Hobbes as it is in the liberal democratic process that the social contract will be executed. Participation in the liberal democratic process requires the individual to submit some freedom to the institutions in order to allow for stability and equality while participating in the liberal democratic process. The procedural view is thus central to executing the rule of the people or citizenship in the liberal democratic tradition.

The procedural view extends beyond elections since they entail the operation of the entire liberal democratic systems' institutions and processes. These include institutions of horizontal accountability and the redistribution of goods from state level to society. Elections are the means through which rulers are put in power. If they perform poorly elections are also the means to remove representatives from power.

This is central to rule of the people in that through the electoral process representatives will be rewarded with the political currency of the vote. If, however, they perform poorly, the electorate is entitled to a 'money-back guarantee' by retracting that vote

from that representative and giving it to another. This assessment will be based on regime performance during the term in office and how the liberal democratic system performed in that period of time.

The procedural interpretation cannot operate without some core function, found in the substantive tradition of liberal democracy theory. The core function associated with the substantive view is the improvement of the quality of life of the polity through the liberal democratic process. Goods such as social justice, social welfare, a responsive government, and equitable distribution of goods through the liberal democratic process become central to the successful functioning of liberal democracy.

The primary purpose of liberal democracy in the substantive tradition is declining levels of inequality within society through effective regime performance to generate commitment and legitimacy for the liberal democratic order. The state is therefore responsible for ensuring protection of equality of the individual. Institutions, processes, and redistribution are the three central issues with which liberal democracy concerns itself. These three underpinnings are essential to ensure rule of the people. In addition, mass dissatisfaction with a regime will impact on the liberal democratic durability of the state; therefore, the substantive elements to liberal democracy cannot be ignored.

Equality's agent of implementation proves to be the substantive interpretation of democracy. Processes of redistribution of resources, managing of diverse interests and conflict, and a welfare system ensure that the substantive issues of democracy are dealt with. The primary premise is that processes are essential to ensure rule of the people. If the liberal democratic system is to continue, some form of improvement in life must occur. In addition, the state must also provide some form of social safety net.

The substantive interpretation of liberal democracy is related to regime performance of the state through its redistributive functions. It has been pointed out that liberal democracy belongs to citizens, and as such, it is the demos that must gain the greatest benefit under a liberal democratic regime. This is central to a liberal democratic government being responsive to its citizens. Jointly political liberty and political equality will determine the durability of a democracy. Processes and institutions must be responsive to civil society. In return, civil society needs to operate within the processes and institutions to voice their preferences for policy choices and other decisions that impact on society. This interaction between state and civil society is the

essence of the liberal civic virtue. The liberal civic virtue sees peaceful, institutionalised, and routine interaction between state structures and civil society agents. This interaction is translated into rule of the people or citizenship if a government remains sensitively in tune with the signals that are coming from civil society. Liberal democratic governments are responsible for being receptive to the concerns and needs emerging from civil society. By the same decree, there is a responsibility on civil society to operate within the institutions of liberal democracy and not outside those institutions.

## **7.2 On liberal democratic consolidation**

The interplay between procedures and substance sets the tone for the liberal democratic consolidation. With its definitional difficulties, liberal democratic consolidation in essence aims to create a reciprocal relationship between the two interpretations of liberal democracy. It is important to keep in mind that the two interpretations cannot be used in isolation. Both interpretations are mutually inclusive and reinforcing. If as argued, political liberty, political equality and the liberal civic virtue form the micro-genres of liberal democracy theory, the procedural and substantive views become the agents through which the underlying foundations of liberal democracy theory are enacted.

The enactment of the underlying structure of liberal democracy theory through the agents of the procedural and substantive view of liberal democracy is found in liberal democratic consolidation discourse. Liberal democratic stability, deepening of democracy, democratic quality, and habituation are all concepts that are assessed on the interplay between the procedural and substantive views of liberal democracy. Liberal democratic stability will not be guaranteed without some form of constructive interaction between procedures of the state and dialogue with civil society. Deepening of liberal democracy cannot occur if the state is unresponsive to the needs of civil society or if civil society operates outside the liberal democratic institutions and processes due to perception of ineptness and ineffectiveness. Liberal democratic quality will not be very high if the processes and institutions are weak or if civil society is isolated in any decision-making and redistribution efforts. Liberal democratic habituation cannot occur if experience with the liberal democratic processes and institutions is negative, and inadequate redistribution of goods occurs regularly.

Therefore the creation of a liberal civic virtue is rooted firmly in the interplay between the substance and procedures of liberal democracy.

In liberal democratic consolidation discourse evidence of creating a relationship between the substantive and procedural views of liberal democracy is apparent. Institutional crafting is essential to liberal democratic consolidation. The institutions are to mirror the institutions of the West to guarantee political equality and political freedom of the individual. The institutions need mechanisms and processes to interact with civil society to ensure that the emerging liberal democracy is in touch with the grassroots level. Crafting is thus central to liberal democratic consolidation and encapsulates the procedural view of liberal democracy. It is through institutions that the liberty of the individual will be guaranteed.

Regime performance within liberal democratic consolidation discourse captures the essence of the substantive view of liberal democracy. Through increased economic performance the new liberal democracy will be able to deal with the redistributive issues it has been charged with. Efficient regime performance also relates to other areas like institutional performance, integrity of the electoral process, and guaranteeing basic civil rights and liberties. Regime performance will also be assessed on the ability of the state to engage civil society and how responsive the state is to civil society.

Political liberty, political equality, and the liberal civic virtue are thus central to both liberal democracy and democratic consolidation theory in the liberal tradition. These principles are rooted in the liberal democratic tradition. It is expected that once a transition process commences and there are indicators that a state is moving towards liberal democracy, the end result is the entrenchment of liberal democracy. In this sense, it is expected that a reciprocal relationship between the procedural and substantive views will be firmly implanted within a new liberal democracy.

The liberal civic virtue, in addition to stipulated participation and inclusion, also includes prescriptions of tolerance and moderation in behaviour. This is necessary given that violence, radicalism and extremism will negatively impact on the habituation of liberal democracy. Democratic consolidation in the liberal tradition relies heavily on the efficient operation of institutions. Extreme radicalism will operate outside the

institutions of liberal democracy and consequently undermine the stability of the emerging liberal democracy. For that reason theorists have argued for a democratic trade off: if participation in the process is desired, then moderate behaviour needs to prevail. It is widely agreed that liberal democracy cannot survive where there are mass inequalities and extreme poverty. Increased redistribution of goods as a function of regime performance is aimed at eradicating the obstacles to liberal democratic consolidation.

### **7.3 Liberal democratic consolidation theory's ontology**

The evolution of liberal democracy and democratic consolidation theory in the liberal tradition has proven to be rooted in an individualistic ontological framework. Liberal democratic consolidation theory aims to firmly establish a liberal democratic order within an emerging liberal democracy, and essentially operates from the premise that there is one universalistic framework from which one is able to explain the move towards liberal democracy. This is evident in the focus that liberal democratic consolidation takes, which is essentially the creation of a liberal democratic system. The processes of liberal democracy, as well as the values and political culture, are the central purpose with which liberal democratic consolidation theory concerns itself. This concern stems from the Western experience of political development. Consequently, the purpose of liberal democratic consolidation in identifying the path to liberal democratic stability and deepening operates from the premise that through the creation of liberal democratic institutions, and increased exposure and interaction with these institutions, liberal democracy as a system of governance and as a way of life will be created. Hence, theory attempts to highlight the process by which one changes a regime's institutions and processes, as well as the political culture in which the regime is to be rooted.

It is this ontological orientation that proves most problematic to liberal democratic consolidation discourse. Given its historical foundation within Western political development, it is understandable that there will be an individualistic ontological orientation. Western cultures are essentially individualistic and operate on the premise that there is one universal reality that governs political and social life.

This is evident in the discourses around liberal democratic consolidation, specifically when constructing a liberal democratic culture. Through its discourse around the

creation of a liberal civic virtue or political culture, democratic consolidation theory in the liberal tradition disregards the historical experiences that shaped the process of social conditioning in a non-Western context. The underlying metadiscourse operates on the assumption that any actor regardless of history and geography desires liberal democracy. Therefore the trajectory to political development will mirror the Western experience. The assumption is therefore logical in that if it is liberal democracy that is desired, states will do what is necessary to obtain liberal democracy.

The linguistic ontologies within liberal democratic consolidation theory are essentially liberal in nature. References to institutions, elections, processes, agreements, moderation, tolerance, and regime performance all relate to the interaction between the procedural and substantive views of liberal democracy as found in the Western world. States which do not necessarily comply with the requirements of the procedural and substantive views of liberal democracy are heavily criticised. The Asian tradition, rooted in Confucianism for example is criticised for using elections or electoralism as a disguise to imitate an isomorphic democracy.

Yet, caught up in its own morality and assumptions of universality, liberal democratic consolidationists fail to adequately explain the anomalies of liberal democratic construction in the non-Western world. Due to the individualistic ontological orientation, however, liberal democratic consolidation cannot process this phenomenon and thus needs to criticise it as it falls outside the universalistic frame of reference liberal democratic consolidation had set for itself.

#### **7.4 The need to re-think liberal democratic consolidation theory**

To gain a deeper understanding of liberal democratic consolidation in a non-Western state it is essential that the ontological framework needs to evolve from an individualistic frame of reference to one that embraces a holistic view. The world is made up of many diverse cultures and societies. It is problematic to attempt to neatly place this diversity in one single frame of reference or philosophical tradition. Consequently, liberal democratic consolidation theory is amazed that liberal democratic consolidation has proven difficult in a non-Western context. This is due to the individualistic framework from which it operates. Therefore, a major flaw in liberal democratic consolidation theory is that it is unable to deal with anomalies that falls outside the scope of its ontological framework.



Interpretations of *democracy* and what *democracy* is supposed to mean will vary depending on the cultural context and traditions. These interpretations of *democracy* will vary due to different realities experienced by states based on their history and their geography. To gain a deeper understanding of what makes *democracy* work in a non-Western context one will have to take into consideration cultural, historical, ideological, and geographical factors. Producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory fail to take into account that there is no single *democratic* experience. *Democratic* experiences will be rooted in social conditioning through historical trajectories and geography. Geography plays a central role in *democratic* experiences since regions share similar experiences.

To understand liberal democratic consolidation in the non-Western context one will need to draw up indicators that are suitable for each case study. The concept of culture is fluid to some extent, but the foundations of culture cannot be changed very easily. To alter the fundamental building blocks of culture, one would need to engage in a process of social re-conditioning to reshape experiences and histories. Political socialisation and the construction of a new culture take time, and therefore producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory needs to acknowledge that its employ cannot be achieved within a few decades. It will essentially take one generational term before one can commence assessing the success of the liberal civic virtue cultivation in a non-Western context.

In the meantime, perhaps producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory should reconsider its purpose and in doing so, re-determine the normative foundations from which it operates. The point is rather that the indicators that liberal democratic consolidation theory sets are founded upon the normative principles of the philosophical tradition of liberal democracy. With this said, the assumption that institutional performance and engagement will automatically alter the value system socialised in a non-Western culture is perhaps too idealistic.

Institutional indicators are somewhat easier to assess. If an election is characterised by mass violence, intimidation and vote rigging, one cannot say that a liberal democratic process occurred. Certain civil liberties and protection need to be present. Yet, states that uphold this minimum standard of democracy but fail to cultivate the liberal civic virtue are criticised and labelled illiberal democracies. The answer that liberal

democratic theory gives regarding this is to take a developmental view of liberal democracy. The hope that through time the liberal civic virtue will be achieved comes to the fore. In this sense, the world is thus divided into emerging and mature liberal democracies, where the mature liberal democracies have an obligation to assist the emerging democracies along their path to democratic liberation.

The philosophical foundation and normative guiding principles of liberal democratic consolidation discourse needs re-conceptualisation to be able to cater for the diversity of experiences of *democracy*. Its discourse will need to be restructured to cater for different interpretations of freedom, equality, and the informal rules of participation in a *democracy*. Liberal democracy as a system of government is easier to implement, yet as a way of life may prove to be more challenging. Experiences are not the same and what is seen as moral and good in one society, may be regarded as unwanted and immoral in another.

Through a system of perceptual-representation, each state will construct a *democratic* reality. This *democratic* reality will consist of an organisation of elements according to a hierarchy. The hierarchy will be dependent upon values and historical experiences that shape reality. Collectively these will merge into an ideological worldview. The substance of history therefore organises experience, reality, and ideology. With an individualistic ontological orientation, liberal democratic consolidation theory fails to take this into account. It operates from an ideological orientation of liberalism, and consequently, will structure its theory and prescriptions around it. This ideological orientation needs to be acknowledged and at the same time needs to be fluid to allow for a level of adaptability in dealing with anomalies.

The system of perceptual-representation highlights the relationship between ideological beliefs, belief systems, and a culturally shared system of perceptual-representation. Through this system one was able to trace the ideological undertones of liberalism within liberal democratic consolidation theory. The end of the Cold War signalled a dominance of liberalism in the international ideological realm. This dominance resulted in many states engaging in liberal democratic transitions. Consolidationists in the liberal tradition rejoiced at this democratic phenomenon, yet failed to consider that the only other ideological option to liberalism no longer existed. Hence, one saw a liberal democratic rush for its institutions and processes. In this sense political actors

are contingent in that there was an urgent need to respond to the international call for liberal democracy's construction. However, weaker states will be in less of a position to challenge the stronger states, which are predominantly liberal Western democracies. Therefore, political actors are dependent upon the international dialogue that constructs the expectations and realities of what is needed to remain in good favour with the liberal democratic hegemons of the world.

The institutions and processes are still operational, but are criticised for being either too weak or too corrupt or both. In this sense, one needs to be able to measure cultural similarities and interpretations of *democracy* as a system of governance and as a way of life. Political culture determines a political way of life. Political socialisation is rooted in the historical experiences of societies and on larger scale regions. With its individualistic ontological framework, liberal democratic consolidation theory has no way to measure the similarities and differences between its own Western cultural socialisation, and that of non-Western states. It is therefore not surprising that institutional liberal democracy prevails, but a deepening of liberal democracy is still lacking. The liberal civic virtue that is required for successful liberal democratic consolidation is not cultivated. Instead, with the increased dominance and perceived superiority of the Western world, there are stronger calls for a nationalist orientation of the non-Western world.

In many instances, producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory are amazed at the liberal democratic failures that are prevalent among the liberal democratic experiments that commenced in the early 1990s. There is a failure to acknowledge that there is no universal interpretation of *democracy*. It is simple to duplicate liberal democratic institutions and processes. These are human creations and can be constructed through negotiations, no matter how difficult. This is not to indicate that institutional liberal democratic construction is simple and easy, but, that compared with the creation of the liberal civic virtue, liberal institutions will be more uncomplicated than re-socialising values. The difficulty relates to the liberal civic virtue. Cultures are not easy to change. Its assumption that a modernised, essentially Western culture is desired across the board is a fundamental flaw in its discourse. Huntington's *Clash of Civilisations* adequately captured it by arguing for modernisation without Westernisation. The West is perceived to be too dominant, too prescriptive and too controlling in the democratic requirements of the non-Western world. The result of this

is an increase in nationalist and populist solutions to the Western dominance and arrogance that some non-Western nations perceive.

There is a need for liberal democratic consolidation theorists to adopt a post-modernist approach in its discourse. To gain a deeper understanding of *democratic consolidation* in a non-Western context, liberal democratic consolidation theory needs to understand that the language of *democracy* is not predetermined. There are different cultural contexts from which *democracy* may operate. These cultural contexts will shape how the discourses of *democracy* are interpreted. This will result in a diversity of how *democratic* systems may be adapted to suit different cultural needs.

Similarly, producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory also need to adopt an anti-essentialist stance in recognising that history, geography, and culture will result in different views of concepts. In a liberal democratic system, for example, there is a perception that life will improve. The example from which this perception emanates is from the prosperous and wealthy West. Theorists of liberal democratic consolidation tells its readers in its discourse that it may further exacerbate inequality initially, but through increased regime performance will be able to counter the shocks of economic underperformance with a strong social network. Yet the experience in non-Western states has been quite the opposite.

By adopting a post-modern orientation, producers of liberal democratic consolidation theory will be in a better position to review its ontological framework from individualism to that of holism (which requires recognition of historically unique experiences). Realities will be more closely reflected in the theoretical paradigm. At present liberal democratic consolidation theory cannot adequately fulfil its predictive function. It did not foresee, for example, the rise of populism and nationalism as a response to liberal democratic exportation, nor did it adequately appreciate the hardships under which many non-Western nations are attempting to construct their liberal democracy, which creates a sense of resentment towards the Western world and its associated liberal and Western traditions. Where the problems were noted, they were disregarded due to the insurmountable nature of the problems as Huntington (1996) had argued. With this said, there is a need for an overdue appraisal of liberal democratic consolidation theory and to start rethinking liberal democratic consolidation theory. This is essential due to the fact that liberal democratic consolidation operates

on an institutional and normative level. The primary source of evaluation needed pertains to political culture or the normative level from which liberal democratic consolidation theory finds its inspiration.

Instead of merely focusing on formal theory, liberal democratic consolidation theory needs to occupy itself with the informal rules that govern *democratic* perceptions and consequent actions. Through studying the informal rules, democratic consolidation theory will be in a better position to understand the inner workings of a non-Western democratic political culture. For example, being rooted in an individualistic ontological framework, liberal democratic consolidation theory will find communal orientated societies and their cultural practices difficult to understand. These practices will not be catered for in theorising and prescribing to non-Western states the path to political development that they are to take. Communal orientated societies will have a different approach to engaging democratic institutions.

In addition, it will be better placed to understand what political leadership means in a non-Western context. At present liberal democratic consolidation theory is presented as operating from a universal platform, which creates a disparity between theory and practice. From this, seasoned liberal democratic consolidationists need to return to the empirical realm to reassess their indicators of liberal democratic consolidation. There are universal characteristics on an institutional level of liberal democratic consolidation that are applicable on a global scale. The issue at hand pertains to political culture and their engagement with the liberal democratic institutions. It is here that the gap between theory and practice is present. Liberal democratic consolidation theory has limited regard for the impact of non-Western or 'illiberal' political culture on liberal democratic consolidation. There is a need to return to basics and determine which criteria are most valuable in assessing civic virtues in an Asian context, an African context, and a Latin American context. Their systems of perceptual-representation, and their contingent political actors would have reacted differently to the international pressures to democratise and establish stable and deep liberal democratic systems.

## **7.5 Liberal democratic consolidation theory or liberal democratic consolidation ideology?**

With this in mind, one needs to consider whether one can regard liberal democratic consolidation theory as theory or as part of ideology. Based on the assessment this

study has made the orientation is to label, if need be, liberal democratic consolidation theory as part of the ideological discourse associated with liberalism. It can be regarded as an approximation of theory in that it is rooted in a general orientation towards liberalism. Political liberty, political equality and the liberal civic virtue are the primary variables used in this study. As the concepts associated with liberal democratic consolidation these principles are interrelated, but not in an unbiased objective manner. They are firmly set in the liberal democratic tradition rooted in the ideological point of reference of liberalism. The institutional relationship between liberal democratic processes and procedures, and regime performance can be regarded as theory in that this can be applicable to all trajectories. The approximation results from the inclusion of the liberal civic virtue or the re-orientation of political culture towards a liberal democratic ethos. Interactions with liberal democratic institutions and regime performance will not necessarily result in a new civilisation rooted in the Western tradition.

Secondly, as an approximation, the concepts of liberal democratic consolidation can be defined and interpreted in various ways and can have various meanings. Political liberty, political equality, and the liberal civic virtue as concepts are interrelated, but their definition, use, implementation, and understanding can vary from case study to case study. Depending on the process of political socialisation within a system of perceptual-representation, as well as the responses of contingent political actors, *liberty*, *equality* and the *civic virtue* will be used in different ways.

Thirdly, liberal democratic consolidation lent itself to a post-factum interpretation. With the arrival of *glasnost* and the subsequent democratisation experiments of the former communist world, liberal democratic consolidationists prematurely rejoiced at the desirability of the infinitely superior system of liberal democracy. The *end of history* had signalled the global rebirth and in some cases birth of liberal democracy and as such the path to political development was set. Instead of engaging on a case-by-case basis, liberal consolidationists attempted to treat all obstacles to liberal democratic consolidation with the same remedy. Institutions and regime performance will lead to the nurturing of a liberal civic virtue. It did not attempt to determine any form of causal relationship between political culture and socialisation of the non-Western liberal democratic experiments. Instead it focused on the increasing failure of

liberal democratic deepening or habituation and could not account for any reason except that liberal democracy is difficult in a non-Western context.

The focus of liberal democratic consolidation discourse is too concentrated on political elites. Much responsibility in cultivating a liberal democratic civic virtue is placed on political elites. As argued, in this sense, the deconstruction of liberal democratic consolidation theory reveals that its producers follows the trajectory of modernisation theory in that liberal democratic values needed for a liberal civic virtue will trickle down to society at large from the top. Therefore, political elites are charged with the development of a political culture that complements the liberal democratic arrangement. There is a rigid assumption that society will in fact integrate these values and become a liberal democratic orientated society. In many cases it is the political elites that are blamed for the institutional failures and the increase in inequality in the new liberal democratic order. Publics become disenchanted with liberal democracy and in some cases one sees nostalgia for the old order and the way things used to be.

*Democracy* is a noble quest, but it must be careful about being perceived as a form of philosophical and ideological dominance. It is a system rooted in fundamental philosophical and virtuous beliefs. Producers of liberal democratic consolidation must ensure that the philosophical tradition of liberal democracy thrives and is held as the greatest good. For this reason it is of the utmost importance for liberal democratic consolidationists to return to basics and rethink the necessity of a holistic ontological orientation. This will facilitate a deeper understanding as to what *democracy* means on a universal and not just a global level. *Democracy* is after all the *worst form of government, except for all the rest*.

## **7.6 Consolidating agonism?**

In order to conclude the discussion, the study wishes to put forward a question that may warrant further research. Liberal democratic consolidation theory has failed to recognise that in non-Western states with diverse ethnicities and cultures, it has created structures that are comparable to agonistic democracy where conflict as opposed to consensus prevail and political life is centred on difference rather the common good (Gabardi, 2001: 552). In this model of democracy the focus of politics is on an existential struggle to create identities and advance alternative systems in a contingent environment (Gabardi, 2001: 552).

Given the nature of agonistic democracy, it is therefore useful to explore its applicability considering the metanarrative of liberal democratic consolidation theory. This by no means attempts to imply that the actual result of liberal democratic consolidation theory is agonism, but rather, the nature of liberal democratic consolidation's metadiscourse, it becomes essential to determine to what extent agonistic democracies are consolidated instead of the liberal democratic regime that must emerge from the theoretical trajectory of liberal democratic consolidation theory.

A vast body of literature is concerned with the growing income gaps between rich and poor nations, and the adverse effects that globalisation and its associated processes have on the poorest of the poor. The assertion that liberal democratic consolidation theory makes regarding the role of regime performance and economic development and growth to deal with poverty, seems nowhere near the reality that many non-Western and poor states are facing. The body of literature also argues the nature of power relations between generally Western and non-Western states as one of contingency and dependency. Given the nature of the inequality between the West and their non-Western counterparts the liberal Western world occupies a dominant position and is able to prescribe to its poor non-Western counterparts. The disparity in income allows liberal democracies to place certain conditions on foreign aid and donations. The result is invariably some form of electoral process or the creation of the initial steps towards embracing liberal democracy. In its metanarrative, liberal democratic consolidation discourse creates an environment conducive to agonistic democracy through a failure to recognise its own internal bias and consequently sets out on a crusade to bring liberal salvation to the non-Western world and nations, states, and culture in need of liberal redemption.



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