

Shifting the Geography of Reason: Psychology in Black

by

Julia Simango

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Declaration


Name: Julia Simango
Student number: 57662843
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy (Psychology)
Thesis title: Shifting the geography of reason: Psychology in black

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28/11/2024

Dedication

For Letumile Rebecca Simango

May you continue to cover me with your love and humility

Continue to rest in peace MOTLASE

Acknowledgments

Writing this project was challenging. I have learned to remain resilient and make writing my place of refuge. I have received plenty of support and encouragement from a lot of people and I would like to thank everyone who was part of this journey. I would like to acknowledge the following people:

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Abstract

This study deploys a theoretical intervention in liberation psychology, from a black point of view, by proposing a different mode of engaging psychology. The intervention is called psychology in black, and its methodological construction is in critical fabulation. Psychology in black articulates a mode of studying that takes black studies as the backdrop of a psychological inquiry. This study is foregrounded in Sylvia Wynter's theoretical framework as a basis to intercede with psychological phenomena. Psychology in black has three themes, viz. black geography, the black body, and the colonial unconscious. These three themes are used to demonstrate what psychology in black is, and how the psyche can be understood and articulated. They also synthesise and identify the signification model of colonial socialites and biologism that accounts for psychic realities. Furthermore, psychology in black is a praxis of investigation that gathers all intersecting modes to critique colonial power which attacks the psychology of black people. The study concludes that psychology in black is not a subdiscipline but a discursive tool that offers a different system of thought aimed at understanding the psychology of black people to chant and marshal discourses of liberation. The possibility of this lies in having to psychologise from a black point of view.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Overview

This study is located within liberatory practices in psychology, which focus on reconfiguring how black people are positioned and understood in psychology. These liberatory practices include black and African psychology, which emanated as a response to the misinterpretation, diagnosis and dehumanising practices of Western psychology. Although, there are other emerging approaches such as decolonial psychology, black and African psychology remain key, because of their already established foundations in problematising mainstream Western psychology, while also developing a sub-discipline in psychology that addresses the psychology of black people. Nonetheless, the study uses psychology in black, drawing from More (2019), who conceived the term philosophy in black. In that riff, the mode of psychologising is executed from similar conceptions. The conceptions of philosophy in black are within the mode of articulating the black experience from various locations and orientations. The foundation More sets that form the structure of philosophy in black requires a mode of thinking through the black experience from that which may not be immediately evident. For psychologising this means the black psyche can be excavated from various modalities outside the bounds of psychology or beyond the disciplinarity of the current canon. Philosophy in black is born out of More's exposure to black consciousness, negritude, Manganyi's existential phenomenology and the emulation of the critiques of the Western canon. As Sithole (2022) argues, philosophy in black is a philosophy from the point of view of those who are philosophising, a living philosophy, and a philosophy of experience. Most importantly it philosophises from the perspective of being black in an anti-black world. Psychology in black, therefore, follows this epistemic tradition, accounting for the psychic experience of the black, from the perspective of being black in the world. The latter explains how psychology in black sets itself apart from the above-explained perspectives psychologising black people.

African and black psychology have conceived the problem of psychology in two ways. First, they have exposed Western psychology's colonising activities which have contributed to the construction of narratives, ideologies, theories, methods, practices and ideologies that perpetuate colonisation, whilst positioning black people as the inferior other (Nsamenang, 2007). Furthermore, they identified the tools and technologies of

Western psychology that justified and assisted colonial governments to continue with the colonial. They have shown how psychology has created black subjects who are vulnerable to any form of subjugation and dehumanisation. Both African and black psychology have captured how black people's bodies and minds become a space of psychic violation and gratuitous violence, which has led to multiple and multifaceted definitions of their image, identity and personalities (Akbar, 2013; Mkhize, 2014; Nwoye, 2015). Moreover, this mode of protest psychology not only served as an eye-opener but has encouraged new ways of understanding the psychology of black people, as new epistemological grounds had been opened.

Second, both Black and African psychology have engaged psychology by situating black people's worldviews, cultures, traditions, epistemologies and ontologies to foreground how they psychologically experience the world. Black people's ontologies and epistemologies served as significant to understanding behaviours and acts of black people, outside stereotypical explanations of Western psychology (Akbar, 2013; Nobles, 2013; Nwoye, 2015). The theoretical engagement of Black and African psychology consisted of cultural practices and doctrines that were believed to articulate black people's psychological world. They further provided/prescribed modes of healing for black people, emphasising the need for healing practices that are aligned with black people's healing systems and realities (Baloyi, 2016). In the quest to move away from Western methods, black and African psychology have elaborated and highlighted the psychological impact of colonial violence on both individuals and black communities at large. Research on multiple topics relating to psychological violence has been done, and interventions have been created to try to address issues relating to colonisation. New liberatory research methods have been created to address some of the methodological bias that comes with Western research methods (Nwoye, 2022). The fundamental element of protest psychology has been to liberate black people from scholarly and intellectual misappropriation and to form appropriate theoretical lenses.

This study considers the theoretical argument of black and African psychology; however, it further expands the engagement of the black subject from a black point of view. That engages the psychological life of black people from multiple intersecting points of colonial impact, looking at a variety of theoretical engagements outside psychology, to gain a holistic understanding of the psychology of black people. The premise of this study is that theoretical engagement in psychology should include any theorisation of humanity

because the mind will always form a template and encrypt daily experiences. Psychology in black introduces an additional element to those introduced by African and black psychology, and that is wrestling with the idea that black people are forced to live within an ontology of anti-blackness. Assuming an ontology of anti-blackness means the formation of one's psychology is infused with a structure informed by anti-blackness.

With that said, the study is set to refigure psychology, not as a discipline but as a question for thought. This means thinking of the word psychology beyond its disciplinary boundaries and as that which addresses questions of being and thought. Psychology in black is articulated by shifting the geography of reason to elucidate the black psyche or psychic reality. Psychology in black rejects the disciplinary decadence that comes with the discipline of psychology, which uses lenses of reasoning that misplace the black experience. Here reason is used outside the epistemological conceptions and boundaries of Eurocentrism. Still, reason is situated in a realm that explains the black experience, which means “a different set of conditions through which reason is taken to be, not only the level of closure, but rapture, this gives reason a different level of conceptualisation” (Sithole, 2022, p. 93). For psychology, it means that the black experience is at the forefront of reasoning the black psychic reality, and not under the conceptual boundaries of humanity that underlie the conceptions of psychology by Eurocentric scholars. When the geography of reason shifts, new relations through different orientations are built (Gordon, 2020). In this way, there is a possibility of implementing various epistemological and ontological conversations in psychology, but also unbinding psychological phenomena to Eurocentric rationality. This comes with realising that “epistemes are situated in their own ‘geo-historical’ and ‘bio-graphical’ locations” (Sithole, 2022, p. 111).

The study thus advocates for the “teleological suspension of disciplinarity” (Gordon, 2014, p 87). This means transgressing and moving beyond psychology disciplinary lines, which could eventually mean the development of a new discipline, by merely advancing a new perspective to psychology, which is psychology in black. Shifting the geography of reason also means changing the location of reference regarding experience, and ontologies. It further challenges the idea of modern man and humanity to disrupt the notion of normality when it concerns humanity. It also means not only building new thoughts of analysis in psychology but also addressing the crises of reason in psychology, where reason is racialised and monopolised by Eurocentric psychology. Shifting the

geography of reason confronts the monopoly and hegemony of reason in Eurocentric psychology, advocating for the pursuit of an ethic of reason and declaring reason as context and historically situated (Gordon, 2011).

This study foregrounds discourses of colonisation as establishing multiple psychic economies, particularly power economies that construct psychological dependency, despondency and malfunction. As such psychology in black is understood as an existential imperative and stance, which is in conversation with black and African psychology. It situates blackness as an ontological position to excavate the psychological experience of black people. The psychological is taken as not just a concern for psychologists but located in black critical thought, situating nuances and discourse outside psychology to enter into a discourse of psychology. The latter demonstrates how the geography of reason is shifted by adopting various black voices to articulate everyday black experiences and illuminate the psychological experience. Psychology in black synthesises black people's experiences as both politicised and cultural, as colonised and emancipated at the same time.

Furthermore, psychology in black synthesises the corporeal, flesh and metaphysical as constructing an ontology of blackness that structures the psyche. It argues that the challenges and meaning of being human in the modern world, place demands for a particular psychological engagement with the world. Hence psychology in black takes up a black existential stance to psychology. By referring to black existentialism I am noting "philosophical questions premised on concerns of freedom, anguish, responsibility, embodied agency, sociality, and liberation" (Gordon, 1997, p. 3). These are the questions that embody being black in the world, demanding an elaboration of blackness and its subjugating entities. Here the problems affecting black people regarding their existence are dealt with. Psychology in black takes black existentialism as a basis to unpack the development of psychic realities, structure and crises emanating from the existential crises of blackness.

Black existentialism becomes important to expand psychology in black because it deals with everyday matters of blackness, which cover not only issues of black subjection but also expands on the everyday conceptualisation of colonial violence and oppression. That means one gets to know how black people's psychic structure functions when encountering difficulties. Nevertheless, psychology in black reminds one to position

history at the centre of each analysis; this is the history that cuts across varied dynamics of oppression. Gordon's (2013) historical nexus defined as putting together a history of violence, freedom, repression, servitude, symbolism, capitalist labour and modernity as a whole, foregrounds psychology in black. The latter provides dialectical arguments to uncover paradoxes and contradictions of black lives but also opens up a conversation about the constructed psychological structure.

Further, psychology in black sees it as imperative to provide and speculate on the extent to which colonial socialisation or inscribed colonial metaphysics becomes a strong force in inscribing and facilitating the establishment of a black psychic structure. Colonial socialisation or metaphysics includes all doctrines, experiences, ideologies, acts, behaviours, symbolism, thoughts, emotions, societal rules, morals, values and such, that are part of everyday life, that become naturalised. Psychology in black therefore says all forms of colonial experiences that are outside psychological experience, eventually formulate a psychological experience by nature of their socialisation. Hence, the study looks at three key themes: the body, geography and the unconscious. Psychology in black hopes to provide the tools and language to modulate the psychological based on what Gordon (2013) refers to as "repressed and suppressed layers of human existence that offer a more complex, nuanced, and mature portrait of the human condition than the sterilised claims of normative whiteness" (p. 48). Another crucial defining feature of psychology in black is focused on locating alternative forms of self-creation, that seek to counteract and transcend colonial indoctrination and socialisation, in the form of poiesis, freedom and liberation nuances. That means addressing and acknowledging psychological imperatives, struggles, expectations, discourses, dialectics and the construction of freedom.

The psychological is addressed as a social and political transfiguration as Vaziri (2016) notes, and rooted in the language and experience of oppression. This study hopes to demystify and rewrite misconstrued modes of identifying and describing black people's mental states. Especially since colonial subject formation positions black people, as Wilderson (2008) puts it, in an absence of subjective presence, absence of cartographic presence, and absence of political presence. This study, therefore shows how the colonial empire robbed black people of establishing their psychic economy and structures but left them to leech on the little that was left while fighting off a competing colonial mentality. Psychology in black seeks also to provide a discursive language to entangle the extent to

which language of otherness and difference infiltrates one's thinking and beliefs about oneself and other black people.

1.2 Literature review

As mentioned, above both black and African psychology have been at the forefront of understanding the black subject accurately in psychology while setting the foundations for liberatory work in psychology. Black psychology is a term founded and used by black psychologists in North America. It has become a critical intervention that situates the psychology of black people on the grounds of race, racism and racialisation. Black psychologists also use the term African psychology when theorising psychological development based on African culture and knowledge systems. The interchangeable use of black and African locates the politics of place and being, in theorising psychological phenomena. Especially since the term African psychology is preferred in contexts such as South Africa, the distinction made in locality gives an account of how psychologists conceive black subjects and their psychological reality. But further, it explains the challenges in framing and theorising psychology for black people. Both black and African references location and identity that are crucial for psychology in black, because they signify a certain ontology, reality and phenomenology. Psychology in black does conceive blackness as a state of being in both culture, history, locality and identity that warrants a conceptual understanding in psychology. Therefore, psychology in black seeks to resolve the conflict above, by locating both black and African within the same matrix that constructs blackness. The reason is that blackness does cover the construction appealing to being black and African together. Here blackness is understood through the intervention by Marriott (2022), who describes blackness as “an ontology, a phenomenology, or a historicity” (p. 137). Doing this means there is an acknowledgment of various sectors of being and existing that captures decades of oppression. When blackness is adopted as a subject/object of analysis for psychology, rather than just the black or African identities, one can place the dilemma into some of the contours of blackness that Marriott (2022) identifies, which I argue is the reason for the imminent dilemma. Marriott (2022) explains blackness as that which:

encompasses and situates what seems first to limit black being or overflow it, but which, when questioned, that is, disclosed, or unconcealed, does not fit into this logos, nor is ordered by it, even making what is most discernible about blackness

in its past, future, or present, seem imaginary, moored in a non-present, and *presence*, but in ways which make the non-being that marks blackness as sign, affect, or speaking being, unthinkable except as an appearing, a manifestation, an identity. (p. 137)

I am placing the problem of naming African and black psychology as a problem that is equitable to particularising experience, and the need to accurately position the problems faced by black people. However, with the sentiments expressed by Marriott, I posit that if we take blackness as a subject of knowledge, we can relieve ourselves of the need to categorise and construct various concepts that end up defining the same thing.

In 1968 the Association of Black Psychologists was founded to create a field in psychology that focuses on theorising about the psychology of black people (Akbar, 2003). The theoretical basis of Black psychology was to articulate and understand the behaviour of Black people in America in relation to their historical, social, economic, cultural and political context. In 1971, S.M. Khatib, D. Phillip McGee, Wade Nobles and Naim Akbar relayed to the Association of Black Psychologists what they theorised as African psychology, to foreground the understanding of African cultural systems as essential to psychological phenomena (Akbar, 2003). They also emphasised the reliance on African philosophy to understand black people's behaviour. As such, black psychology and African psychology are often used interchangeably by black psychologists in America. However black psychology is often used as an umbrella term when defining both cultural and political elements, while African psychology is used when emphasising African worldviews, epistemologies and ontologies as central to the construction of psychology. However, Nobles (2013) sees black psychology as a discipline that corrects Western limitations, restores the African mind, identity and consciousness, and deduces healing practices, focusing on psychological analysis of African realities, cultures and epistemologies. On the other hand, Nobles (2013) defines African psychology as "the system of meaning of human beingness, the features of human functioning, and the restoration of the normal/natural order of human development" (p. 293). The point of contention that is responsible for the emergence of psychology in black, is the separation of ontological experiences (one founding black psychology and one founding African psychology). The matter arising here is that both sets of ontologies take place simultaneously within a structure of colonialism, as such

doing some form of separation displaces interacting experiences that construct a specific psychic reality.

Nonetheless, black psychology is about regeneration, and self-renewal for black people (Jones, 1980). It can also be explained as a study of black people's behavioural patterns and is concerned with tackling social issues, constructing culturally-relevant methodologies, and critiquing racist methodologies (Jones, 1980). It is a psychology of liberation that is aimed at inciting critical consciousness and developing black social theories (Wilson, 1998; Wright, 1984). Nobles (2015) further suggests a move to name Black psychology 'Sakhu Sheti/Djaer', a term based on African people's cultural grounding i.e. emphasis on the human condition and spirit, representing the voice of African people throughout the African continent and the diaspora. Baldwin (1986) explains African (Black) psychology as a system of knowledge governing the social universe from an African cosmology perspective. That means using African epistemologies and ontologies to explain behavioural phenomena. Akbar (2003) further sees it as a perspective lodged in Africa's historical primacy. Jameson (2018) summarises African psychology as a system of knowledge that considers both culture and power dynamics and liberation, that also brings critical consciousness to theory-making, and provides solutions to contemporary conditions African people experience. The African psychology conceptual framework includes an African-centred cultural framework that uses cultural constructs to understand psychological experiences. Further, it seeks to develop and use culturally-specific research methods, culturally-specific instruments and classification of mental disorders and culturally-specific treatment approaches (Jameson, 2018).

Although African/black psychology is critical of the use of Western methods and concepts, it sometimes finds itself trapped in disciplinary descriptions and specifications, especially in the division of psychological phenomena, and in particularising experience in the form of sub-disciplines such as personality, social and developmental psychology, to name but a few. This division sets the possibility to view individuals in a manner that is not holistic. Another trap that African and black psychology find themselves in, comes with matters of praxis, which includes the use of tools such as psychometric instruments (often amended based on cultural context, not necessarily political context). I presume that these are the limits that come with building upon an already-established discipline. This becomes apparent when ontological and epistemological grounds are established,

and praxis becomes difficult to reconfigure. The black-in-black psychology remains crucial for this study because it provides some grounding for a particular psychic experience. Black psychology set the tone in demonstrating how the black subject should be conceived in psychology. The interchange of the term black/African psychology is rather an interest of psychology in black because it demonstrates confusion in naming, which is a confusion in relatability or positionality. This is a paradox that liberatory psychology faces, which shares similar struggles that Marriott (2022), identifies as a problem that occupies defining the state of blackness. Marriott (2022) argues that “blackness is extinguished by the very words used to precipitate it into being” (p. 140). The latter outlines the complications of language in trying to outline the black experience. Defining a discipline that is directed at addressing that which occupies the being of black people experiences such struggles because of the fear of misalignment and misappropriation of black lives. Psychology in black seeks to dissolve and account for this, by making blackness a foundation for analysis, because both ontological bases of being black and African are accounted for in its multitude of vectors.

In South Africa, psychology scholars usually prefer the term African psychology, not black psychology as a reference point. Regardless, the influence of Black/African psychology in North America is seen in African psychology theorised by South African scholars. African psychology in South Africa is a field of study that is founded on African philosophies, epistemologies, ontology and theories describing the realities of black people, while also developing interventions, methodologies and assessments for Africans. Nwoye (2015) notes that African psychology emerged to confront the derogative self-imagery of Africans, perpetuated by Western psychology. However, the challenge for African psychology in Africa, especially in South Africa, is the relationship between theoretical grounding and praxis, which makes it difficult to navigate Eurocentric forms of practice. Training programmes and professional registration boards potentially enforce the responsibility to adhere to already-defined uses and approaches to psychology, hence both African and black psychology have a responsibility to uphold professional practices and align or accommodate epistemological and ontological foundations to allow one the ability to practise as a psychologist.

Nonetheless, the following have structured the theorisation of African psychology in South Africa. The first argument is presented by the likes of Nsamenang (2006), Sodi (2009), Mkhize (2014), Nwoye (2015) and Baloyi (2016), to name but a few, who

conceive and theorise African psychology as stemming from African traditions, cultures, spiritualities and experiences. Nwoye (2014) describes African psychology as a “systematic and informed study of complexities of human mental life, culture and experience in the pre-and post-colonial African world” (p. 57) while Mkhize (2021) describes it as a call to emancipate people of African ancestry from mental and epistemic bondage. Nwoye (2015) explains African psychology as directed towards undoing African image constructions and recovering from colonial disturbance. Further, this emphasises the importance of cultural traditions, ancestral guardianship, spirits, spirituality and interconnection between the mundane and profane in the universe. It also situates complex and perplexing realities of the African population and identifies triumphs, threats and opportunities and dilemmas of being African in post-apartheid or post-segregation context (Nwoye, 2015). Concepts such as Moya (Baloyi & Ramose, 2016), Ubuntu (Mkhabela, 2015), indigenous African language (Segalo & Cakata, 2017), and Botho (Sodi, Bopape, & Makgahlela, 2021) are interpreted as psychological concepts. African psychology does carry and accommodate aspects of cultural psychology and indigenous psychology, which are often developed and emphasised in parts of the world where colonisation happened, such as Australia and New Zealand. Both cultural and indigenous psychology emphasise how culture and social practices inform certain psychological experiences, regulating and transforming the human psyche and behaviours (Mkhize, 2014). This study positions African psychology as representing psychological reality and formation that privileges African people’s cultural life-words. Further, it proposes that this psychological reality functions in parallel and opposite to other psychological realities necessitated by colonial conquest. Psychology in black’s strategy is identifying the functioning of the African cultural system in opposition to other cultural systems in distorting black people’s psychological reality. This perspective of psychology is mainly interested in highlighting the African belief system and demystifying European conceptions of the black psyche. However, the limitation of this perspective is its limited theorisation on psychic formations as a result of race and racialisation, which means it receives less theoretical orientation/attention.

Ratele (2017a) gives another perspective on African psychology that differs from the one provided by Nwoye (2015). Ratele locates his definition of African psychology based on Africa as a geographical location and seems to deposition the relevance of African epistemes and ontology. He defines African psychology as any psychology that is done

in Africa, by Africans. Ratele commits a major error by failing to atone for what geography means but rather becomes generic in his definition. Geography is more than just location - it constructs certain subjectivities and realities. Further, Africa is more than just a location - it is a black geography that needs to be understood as producing subjects affected by colonial oppression and with a rich cultural history. Therefore, accurate linking of geography and psychology should be properly done. Ratele (2017a) further notes that African psychology refers to ways of situating oneself in the field of psychology in Africa, making African psychology a situated knowledge. For Ratele (2017a), the use of the word African is rather limiting, mainly because the word has political contestation since there is questioning surrounding who should be classified as African. Again, language fails black psychologists, as it seems to be insufficient because of the complications/inconceivability that embroil black people. Hence, I argue that disregarding Africa and African identities is removing an entire history of individuals and their communities, and that results in a psychology with no ontological, epistemological or cosmological basis. The question of who is African and who is not sounds ahistorical and undermines what black people have gone through just because of having been born in Africa. With that in mind, the contested nature of African identities should in itself place Africa as more than just a location but rather a location that has specific productive powers, that produce certain kinds of colonial beings. Hence, situating Africa correctly is situating the black subject and their psychic world appropriately. Nonetheless, Ratele (2017b) infers that Western psychology is also African psychology because it is practised in Africa. The inference posed by Ratele signals an ontological issue that can be explained by engaging the dual ontological systems in which black people find themselves.

Nonetheless, psychology in black bridges the inference posed by Ratele (2017a) by showing instances where the Western forms of psychology can be brought into the analysis of the black psychic life. Ratele argues that psychology as situated knowledge, will be based on one's history, birth, context, position, orientation and location it is based. Ratele is not wrong for articulating this, as psychology should be situated based on aspects such as history. My point of contention is why Ratele mentions psychology as situated within history but chooses to argue against the history that comes with Africa. Based on his definition of African psychology, Ratele saw the need to suggest that African psychology has four cardinal points of focus, namely Psychology in Africa, cultural African psychology, critical African psychology, and psychological African

studies. While Ratele's definition of African psychology is set to give an alternative to Nwoye's constitutive elements of African psychology, he ends up using Nwoye's (2015) constitutive elements to position the last three orientations of his definition of African psychology. The first one, psychology in Africa, positions Western or Eurocentric psychology in African psychology. Ratele (2017a, 2017b) finds himself in this conundrum because his definition of African psychology does not have ontological and epistemological constitutive elements, and as such he misses the formation of subjectivities of Africa as integral to psychological theorisation.

Because of these assertions above, Ratele comes up with multiple names of protest psychology referred to as decolonised African psychology and decolonised African community psychology, (Ratele et al., 2018) which could have been avoided if Ratele (2017a) was clear about what Africa(n) means. His legitimisation of Eurocentric psychology as an element of African psychology is to ignore its history and the damage it has done and continues to do in the lives of black people. Naturalising Eurocentric psychology is detrimental, but poses an opportunity for psychology in black to unpack these complexities. In addition, Ratele's multiple definitions and assertions indicate either confusion or a struggle to unpack the multiple psychological realities black people are exposed to, as a result of colonisation. For him, the answer lies in moving between Eurocentric psychology and African psychology for answers. Regardless, the use of Eurocentric psychology must be thought of as a normalisation of colonisation, not as a category of African psychology. The use of Eurocentric perspectives is still a common shift amongst practitioners, who change perspective depending on the kind of problems their clients are presenting with. There are also assumptions that modern problems, like depression and anxiety, should be approached using Eurocentric approaches. The sentiments surrounding the latter are that black people live in modernity and should be understood along those lines. However, I argue that the modern lifestyle lived by black people does not warrant the blind use of Eurocentric methods because their adoption is more complex. This is where psychology in black comes in, the dilemmas and complexity posed by Ratele represent the complexities that come with conceptualising and theoretically situating black people. Psychology in black addresses why Ratele sees the need to have multiple constructs for liberatory psychological practices, by doing psychology that focuses on the makings of a black colonial subject and the continuous signification of the black subject.

Another perspective of liberatory psychology is the decolonisation movement in psychology, which advocates for the decolonial turn in psychology. Its point of departure is the use of the language and theory of decoloniality to decolonise psychology. That involves expanding on matters of coloniality and epistemological violence. It further draws on the works of Fanon (1986) and Maldonado-Torres (2017) to advance the call to decolonise psychology (Stevens & Sonn, 2021; Adams, 2022). Maldonado-Torres (2017) uses Fanon to position the need for a decolonial attitude to chart a decolonial turn in psychology. While Kessi (2016) notes that a decolonial turn in psychology means decentralising the individual as a unit of analysis because as it currently stands, the individual is overdetermined and the people's social, political and economic context are undermined. A decolonial attitude is an attitude that promotes agency in thinking, and practice and promotes and organises humanity in dehumanising places. It promotes agency as central to decolonising sciences and the world. Maldonado-Torres (2017) further concludes that psychology could benefit from adopting a decolonial attitude. A decolonial psychology would link itself with other fields of study, and to social and artistic movements to further advance its course. For Stevens and Sonn (2021), a decolonial turn in psychology must produce counter-catastrophic psychologies. Using Fanon, they suggest the need to dismantle disciplinarity and see the decolonial turn as a counter-psychology that abandons psychology as a discipline and profession. Adams (2022) argues that decolonial perspectives allow the ability to address coloniality and everyday life. In addition, decolonial psychology tracks how knowledge inquiry and practice in psychology perpetuate coloniality and neo-liberalism. Decolonial psychology engages with other sub-fields such as cultural and indigenous psychology as part of its decolonial praxis and focuses on political economy, power, racialised violence and epistemic disruption of colonialism (Adams, 2022). Furthermore, scholars like Kessi, Suffla and Seedat (2021, 2022), and Malherbe and Readsura Decolonial Editorial Collective (2023) have drawn on approaches from community and social psychology to expand the lens of decolonial psychology. There is also an introduction to psychological research methods tailored to advanced decolonial psychology, such as photovoice (Kessi, 2019). Psychology in black extends this by capturing the processes occupying the development of psychological practices by the colonial matrix of power, which explains how colonisation functions in the psychic sphere.

The literature above shows how black psychologists try to advance an understanding of black people from cultural and political standpoints. This study situates Black, African and decolonial psychology standpoints together but goes further to do the psychology of the oppressed from an existential, everyday and continuous position. It does acknowledge the impact of colonisation on the psychology of black people, its destruction of life, and how African culture has its ways of conceiving psychology or delaminating the psychological. Psychology in black recognises these standpoints and further extends the argument to situating oppression as constructing its psychological tenants amongst the colonised. The study argues that the impact of colonisation should not be looked at as just impacting the psychological but that which occupies black metaphysics, and also constructing its own psychological life. African cultural ontologies and viewpoints, as instituting the psychological, are acknowledged in this study to show how this metaphysics lives in parallel with orders of colonial violence and mentality.

Psychology in black takes a holistic view of the psychological and, extends the liberatory inquiry of psychology by dissecting the root of the contradictions and arguments posed on the defining features of African psychology while capturing the genealogy of the development of the black psychologic structures. Psychology in black stands on the premise that says, 'We live through oppression every day, and that means we psychologise oppression daily and find ways to function with it'. This study situates the conversation about colonial violence that is not deemed as worthy of psychological engagement and brings it to psychology, to show how behaviours and acts are founded. This extends the psychological inquiry of colonisation by locating the everyday psychological functioning of otherness and fugitivity.

1.3 Problem Statement

This study is discursive and seeks to construct what is referred to as psychology in black. It theorises the psychological as an everyday functioning order that is influenced by the colonial system and its modes of subject construction. Psychology in black illuminates and prioritises black critical thought as an onto-epistemology, by riffing from More (2019) who deployed philosophy in black. It positions discourses that have focused on what it means to be black in an anti-black world for psychological analysis. Not only does it show why concepts such as colonisation and coloniality (and others) are important for psychology, but also shows how all these concepts function in the psychological realm.

This study shows how oppression and gratuitous violence become infused in the psychological universe of black people. It further traces black existence from the position of exteriority or alterity and as existing in multiple colonial eras, using multiple theories and constructs defining oppression. Hence understanding the episteme of black existence is a route to understanding the black psyche. Therefore, I see it fitting to further trace the psycho-historical and psycho-political position of blackness in the age of coloniality. As such this thesis serves as a historical account of the black psyche in a social and political order of colonisation.

Psychology in black emanates from the question of blackness. It situates blackness as an ontology, phenomenology and historicity (Marriott, 2022), which becomes necessary for psychologising. This study brings sets of theories about blackness to elucidate some of its psychic material. Psychology in black seeks to capture the construction of new forms of life that emanate from mitigating and surviving colonial violence and provides a basis for understanding black poesis in the psychic world. What it foregrounds are multiple modes of being as distinctive elements of the psychology of black people, that could account for thoughts, identities and pathologies. The study further looks at the psychological as an assemblage of black people's symbolic relationship with colonisation and its perversions.

The study uses three themes to engage psychology in black, namely, black geographies, the black body, and the colonial unconscious to intersect the convergence of the non-psychological and psychological of colonial particularity. These themes are indicative of how racial scripts are produced, lived through, embodied, rationalised and encrypted physiologically. They are discussed in a manner that shows how their constructed colonial metaphysics and racial scripts function psychologically, the kind of psychological acts they require, how they write and rewrite psychological tenants, how they engage in subject formation, further demonstrating what psychology in black is.

The study is underpinned by a main research question: What is psychology in black? It is followed by three sub-questions:

1. In what ways do black geographies enact psychology in black?
2. How can the black body be conceived to describe psychology in black?

3. How does the colonial unconscious depict psychology in black as a different mode of understanding the black psyche?

1.4 Significance and aim

Psychology in black is written from a black point of view. The black point of view draws from a wide range of black critical and radical thought, invoking matters of blackness from the present to the past. Blackness is a myriad of ontologies, phenomenology and historicity, that can mainly be understood from various points of view. The black point of view is about creating new episteme and concepts and not trying to fit into already established conceptual and epistemological positions. It rather engages the psychological from a black perspective, without seeking affirmations and acceptance into certain disciplinary codes. Psychology in black reads psychology from multiple registers, across texts, disciple genres and geographies by way of creating what Judy (2020) calls ‘poiesis in black’. It does not separate the affective from the corporeal. It is therefore not against other psychologies but adds to the discourse of the psychological from black people’s perspective. It is rather an extension and an ensemble. Psychology in black positions the “teleological question of black liberation, the ontological question of agency and the question of black identity in an anti-black world” (Gordon, 2000, p. 11). That means it offers a lens to explore the purpose and importance of articulating colonial socialisation and its violence.

The main aim of the study is to reconfigure psychology, not as a discipline but as a question of discourse. This study is not geographically bound, meaning blackness is engaged from different geo-political positions, not to generalise but to gain an in-depth picture of colonial metaphysical violence. Further studying what is not considered psychological to show/illuminate psychological features. That means focusing on scholarly works not written from a psychological perspective and synthesising them with those which have been written from a psychological perspective. In this way, psychology in black can grasp how black colonial metaphysics sustains and controls the everyday portrayal of the black self. The assumption of psychology in black is that the psychological is continuously infiltrated by colonial metaphysics or socialisation, and that these psychological manifestations are found in different discourses that are often not perceived as psychologically related. The study also acknowledges how some black scholars doing this body of work, have tried to psychologise by inferring psychological

effects. This shows the need to debunk the psychological from different references or black points of view/perspectives.

This study aims to do what Sithole (2023) refers to as refiguring in black, which indicates doing things differently and deliberately from a black point of view. Refiguring for this study means turning psychology upside down, by doing unlikely analyses and comparisons. Here, one has to override the limitation of language and modes of analysis, while being comfortable with not knowing or not having definitions for certain experiences. This is to accept that there might be no clear conceptual grammar to define/explain psychological phenomena. Here concepts engaging blackness are given a new meaning in psychology. Furthermore, refiguring psychology means embracing uncertainty as a metaphor for the black psyche and allowing space for analysing incongruent, contradicting and indecipherable black experiences, because this could be a representation of the black psychic structure. Hence psychology in black “grapples with different ways of meditating about black life” (Sithole, 2023, p. 5) while inversely grappling with what grounds the black psychic structure.

The study relies on multiple theoretical lenses to serve as a guideline to merge and engage multidisciplinary text or multiple perspectives from different scholars in different disciplines to necessitate looking at new epistemological raptures, to dissect “interhuman narratives” (McKittrick, 2013, p. 2). This involves looking at the history of colonial violence and its functioning in different historical epochs, emphasising the importance of the positioning of blackness. The metaphysical standpoints of biology, religion, sociology, economics, and poiesis, to name a few, will be discussed in relation to each other to explain the psychic procedure of colonisation and praxis bestowed upon the psyche. This study therefore considers studying the non-psychological as related to the psychological, invoking new ways to look at the episteme of the psychological. Further, the nature and direction of intersectionality of the psychological and non-psychological are explored, to revert to the psychological. The study demonstrates the complexity of black lives, which requires multiple lenses and narratives to be engaged with to excavate the praxis of being a human being and the psychological aspect of it. The study has implications for epistemology or lenses of inquiry in psychology because the avenues of understanding blackness are expanded across metaphysical connotations of colonisation, which complicates black life.

1.5 On method: Towards a critical fabulation

This study makes use of critical fabulation by Hartman (2008), which refers to a process whereby improbable conjunctions such as themes, ideas, contexts, figures and perspectives are merged to elucidate an experience or phenomenon (Hartman, 2008). Hartman demonstrates its use by analysing the lives of enslaved black girls, using multiple accounts of archives to account for the events that took place in their lives. Hartman argues that archives, especially those written into existence by the oppressors misconstrue and miswrite black people into existence. Thus, it was important to look into, because what is left unsaid, misconstrued in translations, refashioned and disfigured in archives to redress the violence produced and fragments of discourses of the captives and slaves done by colonisers are expressed (Hartman, 2008). The archive in this study refers to the collection of black critical thought/works that do not explicitly talk about the psychological or are considered as psychological but rather articulate what it means to be black in an anti-black world. The premise here is that narrating the history and experiences of black lives is the narration of the black psychic composition. Concepts, ideas and perspectives not considered or associated with reflecting psychological nuances are reflected upon to reveal the psychological. Here, I call upon all forms of knowledge or archives, particularly the biological system, that seem essential to combine with social science to generate sites of inquiry into blackness. This refers to the understanding of the human condition not only through the lens of biology but also through social processes. To capture the psychological of the black, knowledge systems had to be connected, calling upon the psyche from all forms of knowledge. This is a call for an interdisciplinary methodology that explores black life through multiple texts, histories and genres to understand racial logic in psychic formations. Critical fabulation becomes pertinent, as it allows multiple points of view to be gathered to create a narrative or discourse. In this study, multiple black points of view are connected, and incongruencies are considered, to show that psychological dimensions can emerge from various perspectives and points. Psychology in black deviates from conventional ways to gather psychological information, because it sees black psychological experience as stemming from different focal points that colonial violence taps into. Critical fabulation in this study mobilises black thought to open different epistemological lenses to activate other modes of knowing, and socialities that go beyond the white gaze (Carter, 2019). Furthermore, it is

to allow one to entangle and disentangle different narratives, tempos and hues that invent and reinvent knowledge together (McKittrick, 2021).

The psychological is viewed not as homogenous but heterogenous, meaning it can embody or situate different modalities of being. It is not static or susceptible to a rigid way of interpretation but guided by what is produced in the outside world. Following this route of knowledge production permitted geography and nationalism to be a non-matter, meaning any articulation of blackness regardless of where one is theorising from did not matter, because black people often hold similar experiences of colonisation. Five steps were devised to outline the steps of critical fabulation.

First, Hartman (2008) uses Mieke Bal's explanation of fabulation, which is described as a basic element of a story and the building block of a narrative to enter into a discussion about critical fabulation. A fabulation considers a series of logical and chronological events caused by actors and experienced by actors. The events also transition from one state to another, and actors are agents to perform actions. Hartman (2008) expands the concept further by defining it as a rearrangement of stories and a sequence of events to imagine what might have happened, been said, or been done. In this context, the first step of critical fabulation incorporates a collection of archives that consists of theories, ideas or even stories written by black scholars, capturing black life or blackness in the form of events, experiences, behaviours and perspectives.

Second, critical fabulation adopts a technique of reconstruction that seeks to indirectly describe acts of violence accepted in the present, (Hartman, 2008) that is inferring unobservable colonial discourses and their associated events. This requires paying attention to processes used to theorise conquest in black contemporary politics and black studies (King, 2021). King argues that the latter opens up analytical and critical pathways that enable different kinds of conversation and ethical engagements within black or other critical studies. This allows for engaging and collaborating with multiple theoretical pathways, disciplines or knowledge avenues about colonial conquest to excavate psychological matters ethically. The process explained above is referred to as rifting. Theories on blackness, which are not classified as belonging to psychology are put together, to speak together and transformed to elucidate psychological phenomena. At this point theories and narratives are identified, recorded, and applied to a particular theme, to describe an associated emerging psychological construct. As such, critical

fabulation is not a form of fabrication of information, but an extension of information provided. It represents a coming together of ideological, philosophical and epistemological features occupying the psychic space. Through riffing one can trace black psychological experiences from narratives of conquest and slavery, which shape the process of self-actualisation, subject formation, modes of life and thinking emanating from conquest, epistemological orders and the geo-temporal dimension of conquest (King, 2021).

Third, Hartman (2008) emphasises a critical way of using and analysing text in such a way that we can see what might be hidden. This was crucial to illuminate the psychic world as imbued by discourses of power and how they might spill over to become unexplainable behaviours. Spiller's (2008) work focusing on how text is engaged was useful as an extension of Hartman's critical fabulation. Spiller (2003) argues for a way of reading, understanding and communicating text within its cultural context and based on an individual's subjective experience. Critical fabulation allows a practice of identifying interstice, which Spillers explains as missing words in lexical gaps. To engage text is to engage language, which means acknowledging that black people have a language they use to articulate their experience of oppression. Therefore, the latter requires an engagement with the technology of semiology. The way language - that could be figures of speech demonstrating a phenomenon - was used by black scholars became central to the analysis. Second, how events i.e., colonial events, are articulated and their underlying acts became crucial to elaborate. Critical fabulation enabled analyses of contested histories, narratives and events but mostly allowed the ability to make sense of contradictory voices of blackness, resulting in a deeper understanding of blackness and its contradictions as depicting a certain mental universe. For example, there are certain words and metaphors used to articulate black life amidst colonial racist discourse. Words often describe emotions, physicality, spatiality, positionality, temporality and experience of colonial violence. How these words function in the text and how they describe sites of struggle and liberation (i.e., zone of non-being) becomes crucial. In addition, the words and phrases articulating an experience and paradoxes of blackness i.e. duality, were also deemed crucial for mapping out the psychological. The writings of black scholars or stories they tell, often document acts of colonisation and their methods in the form of violence, warfare, slavery, capitalism and in knowledge systems. They also portray how black people are engaged within the colonial system, that is, how they act, behave and

think through matters of their survival (i.e., poiesis, freedom). Blackness has been explained from various metaphorical points, which include phrases such as non-being, non-human, condemned, and socially dead. These descriptions sought to explain critically how colonisation denies black people their humanity. It is within these metaphorical points that we attempt to imagine psychological or mental indices of colonial gratuitous violence. Spillers (2003) refers to this process as engaging in the interrogation of interior dynamics of otherness. Further, Spillers's (2003) articulation of intramural dynamics of alterity, which are "intracommunal enactments, re-enactments, and engagement yoking member of the same natal community" (p. 297) becomes vital to assess nuances on how black people engage one another as a point of analysis.

Critical fabulation assists in excavating colonial hostilities that are covert and overt over social economies and establishing psychological tenants that are often concealed. This is important because psychological tenants of colonial violence are usually not understood beyond the narrative of trauma and pathology. As such, reconstituting the protocols of iconographic significance as articulated by Spillers (2008) is essential, to reconfigure what is regarded as normal psychological intervention and representation. Hence, critical fabulation becomes critical in seeking non-conventional ideas, perspectives and activities to divulge how the psychological can be presented.

To critically fabulate and gain a better understanding of the text in black archives, a different mode of reading was applied, referred to as an "intramural protocol of reading" (Spillers, 2003 p. 278), which is the fourth process of critical fabulation. Intramural protocol of reading is a type of reading that acknowledges the writer's subjectivity in how they engage the text. This means while archives were used, the author's historical and current subjectivity became crucial to matters concerning blackness. Spillers (2008) emphasises the importance of focusing on the unsayable and unrepresented. This is by realising that psychological turmoil and functioning are not something visible, and not directly the focus of the theories on blackness. Although some theories do try to visit the realm of psychological experiences toward a historical event, some psychological experiences and tenants remain unsaid and unrepresented.

The last step requires the use of meta-ideologisation by Sandoval (2000), which she describes as one of the methodologies of the oppressed. It is a process of constructing new ideologies based on the old ideologies. It relies on the flexibility of perception,

consciousness, identity and tactics related to power. Here, the analysis is aimed at using the techniques of meta-ideologisation to identify hidden colonial ideologies used to try to effect change by the oppressed. By using this method of analysis, the deduction is that there are limits to what is observable when it comes to acts of oppression and marginalisation, meaning invisible acts and effects of the observable acts must come to light. Hamzic (2017) points out that there is a need to interrupt the silences of what is archived as evidence, or what counts as evidence in our research and the absences produced. The aim would be to provoke the ontological scenes of being in the world (Hamzic, 2017), and how we know and make sense of our existence in a racialised world, which leads to apprehending the psychological in all forms.

1.6 Study limitations

This study aims to construct and account for the teleological sequence of psychic experiences and to devise a differential mode of analysing psychic experiences. It uses writings within black studies to construct psychology in black. Most of the texts/archives/writings belonging to black studies are based in the United States of America (USA), resulting in this study possibly resembling a focus on the psychic anecdotes of black people in the USA. However, I am locating the relevance of black studies for psychological analysis because of the approaches that black studies use, which I foresee as crucial for the analysis of the black psyche. Even though the point is not to generalise, but rather acknowledge that there are similarities in terms of experiencing colonial oppression. Hence the black experience located in the diaspora can also be crucial for understanding the black experience in Africa.

The study engages various scholars with different voices that sometimes seem conflicting and contradictory. There is no one set way of explaining the black experience as such one has to contend with various explanations of being. This dilemma is accounted for in this study by making room for understanding blackness as not having a finality of experience. Black people will continue to experience themselves differently as coloniality continues. Therefore, the views and interpretations of blackness might bring new changes to the black experience.

1.7 Chapter outline

Chapter 1 introduces the study and foregrounds psychology in black, as a perspective that expands on the liberatory practices in psychology. In this chapter, I foreground what

psychology in black intends to do, while positioning and differentiating it from other liberation psychologies such as Black, African and Decolonial psychology. I further outline the problem statement, which describes what psychology in black would entail. The aims, methodology and limitations of the study are outlined.

Chapter 2, 'Theorising psychology in black: A Wynterian perspective', aims to build a theory that explains psychology in black. The chapter argues for a theory of psychology that explains how the formation of psychological structures/scripts is based on colonial metaphysics. Sylvia Wynter's perspectives creates such a theory because of the depth of distillation of colonial organisation and structure, to structure humanity. Wynter's work is essential because she adopts various lenses to understand how the colonial machinery works within the human functioning system. To theorise psychology in black, three themes characteristic of Wynter's viewpoints/perspectives were identified. The themes are: (1) the human question and the human questioned, (2) sociogenic principle and consciousness, and (3) autopoiesis and sociopoiesis; towards a human involved. These three themes function together and not in isolation, to construct the psyche/psychology of a black subject.

Chapter 3, 'Psychology in black and black geographies', traces the construction of the black psyche through black geographies. This chapter focuses on the physical elements that construct the black psyche. It takes a non-psychological concept written from a non-psychological perspective, to demonstrate how the production of certain psychological scripts are produced. Black geography is engaged not just as a physical space but human-constructing space, that informs certain ideologies, constructs, racialised subjectivities, and therefore constructs a dehumanised black being. This means that black geographies are taken as constituents of black subjectivities, which conceive the psychological manifestation of place. The works of scholars such as Glissant, Gilmore and McKittrick are used as a foundation for this chapter. To connect black geographies with the psychological, three themes were derived: Black spaces and their psychological underpinnings, inventions of black relations, and black geographies contra racialisation. This chapter further outlines what psychology in black is and what it consists of, using black geographies as an analytical concept.

Chapter 4, 'Psychology in black and the black body' engages the black body, as theorised within the experience of racial violence, and its signification process that affects the black

psychic reality. The physicality of the black body is interpreted along the lines of signification, symbolism and its endowment in the psychic world. This chapter further establishes psychology in black as an analytic tool for the black body's transmission into the psychic world. The chapter consults the works of Yancy, Spillers, Weheliye and Judy as key. Three themes are engaged to purport the above, which are the black body and its making of the non-being, bodily subjections and the emergence of psychic subjection, and (un)freedom of the black body.

Chapter 5, 'Psychology in black and the colonial unconscious' takes a different route to understanding the unconscious mind of black people, by looking at the colonial unconscious. The colonial unconscious is engaged as a psychological state that shows the functioning of colonial metaphysics. Here I discuss how the unconscious functions in an anti-black society while establishing changes in the psychic structure. The colonial unconscious is articulated as racialised material that is unconscious, encrypted unknowingly, facilitates how a certain subjectivity is formed, and becomes a stumbling block for freedom. This chapter establishes psychology in black as a theoretical foundation that advances a theory of the black psyche, through the interpretation of everyday colonially-induced behaviours. The chapter reflects the works of scholars such as (but not limited to) Fanon, Gordon, West, Warren, Moten, Judy and Marriott. I engage the colonial unconscious through concepts such as bad faith, black nihilism and oppositional consciousness. The chapter comprises four themes, namely, on the colonial unconscious, bad faith and the colonial unconscious, black nihilism and the colonial unconscious, and oppositional consciousness and the colonial unconscious.

Chapter 6, as the conclusion of the thesis summarises what is meant by psychology in black. Findings based on the four chapters of the study are synthesised to outline the demarcation of psychology in black. Further, the contribution, and future research studies are suggested.

Chapter 2: Theorising psychology in black: A Wynterian perspective

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I theorise psychology in black, using a Wynterian perspective, which is about explaining the colonial productive power that forms the black psyche. Foucault (1995) coined the phrase productive power, which speaks to how individuals are produced and possibly signified through power relations i.e. the economy and ideologies. Here I will look at how the black psyche is produced, transformed and configured through various formations of racialised power structures and their abiding structure that configures.

This chapter aims to build a theory that foregrounds psychology in black. I turn to the perspectives advanced by Sylvia Wynter to frame and foreground nuances that could inform psychology in black. Further to this, I argue that the productive power of the colonial structure creates psychological scripts to be encrypted as default psychic templates. Moreover, this theorisation is done on the basis that colonisation has disrupted normal human processes pertaining to the psychological development of black people. This mode of theorising psychology is interested in dissecting the genealogy of psychological development in complex, oppressive social environments such as colonisation.

Various perspectives of Wynter (2003) tap into forms of productive powers related to Western humanism, identify created inventions and categorisation of humanity, inform the racial making of human beings, and show how these racial markers institute social processes and individuals. Wynter extends the productive power to the creation of the colonial system and its social structure, hence this study sees her arguments as significant to the formation of psychological processes that are formed, maintained and function in a context that is racialised. Wynter has developed what she calls genres of being – indicating various colonial determinants structuring reality - which I will use to coin a category of being referred to as the ‘psychological genre of being’. This is a combination and a result of the genres of being that Wynter expands on. The psychological genre of being is not a category that Wynter explicitly names or identifies; however, she does engage with some of the elements that focus on the psyche, such as behaviour, cognition and consciousness. I argue that the multiple genres of being and their sociogenic modes of being, specify and produce a particular psychological being, which means they

encourage a process called ‘psychological determinism’. In this context, psychological determinism refers to particular psychological dispositions/results that arise due to colonial-induced ontologies and epistemologies. Theorising the basis of psychology in black becomes possible because Wynter presents the interconnectedness of colonial ontologies and epistemologies, to show how human beings are instituted as racialised subjects. This interconnectedness is crucial for the articulation of psychology in black because it brings together different ontological and epistemological formations of colonisation that possibly have psychological implications. Theorising psychology in black becomes possible because the genres of being can incite psychological dispositions, due to the metaphysics that each genre of being is attached to. Metaphysics shaping and affecting black people is a conceptualising tool for psychology in black because it outlines how black people are made to relate, experience, rationalise and make meaning of the world in which they live. Ultimately, it becomes possible to identify psychological discursive practices and dispositions from the genres of being. Notably, this is a turning point to perceive the psychological, not just as an effect of colonial activities or a by-product of induced colonial trauma, but rather as something that possibly exists and functions in tandem with colonial violence, and is fashioned to accommodate and construct a certain narrative.

To articulate the theory of psychology in black or the psychology of black people, I have grouped Wynter’s perspectives in three ways: first, I explore works related to the origin story, which explores descriptive/prescriptive genres of being that institute humanity and how human beings are supposed to be socialised into the colonial system. From the origin story, this study argues that these genres or categories of being, form codes and schemas that institute people and create psychological markers associated with these genres. Here theorising psychology in black will be based on the functioning mode/ productive power of the genres, through ideological, ontological and metaphysical indoctrinations. Second, I use the extension of Fanon’s sociogeny by Wynter (1999), which speaks to the formation of social systems and colonial socialisation. Psychology in black theorisation is based on the development of psychological processes as a result of social systems and biological systems that function within colonial socialisation and experience. Third, I discuss Wynter’s (1984, 2015) extension of Maturana’s autopoiesis, which argues for self-creation and auto-institution as a normal part of life. Wynter explores it in a context of colonial violence, expanding its psychological derivatives through cognition and

psycho-affective enclosure. For psychology in black autopoiesis is explained as guiding psychological configurations behind poiesis and resistance narratives. The three themes are not to be analysed in isolation but as functioning together, and simultaneously. The theory of psychology in black suggests an alternative analysis to psychology, that centres the foundation and functioning of colonisation as a productive power that is crucial in identifying factors responsible for the psychological development of black people.

2.2 The human question and the human questioned

Black people's position in the world is sealed with questions about their humanity (Gordon, 2010). The questions posed on black people's humanity serve as a foundation of the productive power of blackness. Black people have been constructed by the Western episteme as a site of inhumanity using a set of categories of being, identified by Wynter (2003). As mentioned, the set of categories of being serves as embodying a productive power, and this is paramount to what constitutes a black subject. Foucault (1995) explains the following about power: "In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production" (p. 194). Productive power is used as a psychic constructor in the process of subject formation. Therefore, theorising psychology in black is focused on what would be the referential point of the black psyche, as it appears in different genres of being. Wynter (2003) starts by addressing the human question, by identifying onto-epistemological concepts that show how black humanity was constructed by colonisers, while also stipulating how concepts of inhumanity function in the present. Wynter argues that the constructed categories of being are descriptive and prescriptive in defining genres of humanity. These genres of being are onto-epistemological because they are constructed terms - or epistemological foundations of knowing things/beings - that are accepted and thus created as an ontology (adopted in daily life experiences). Based on Wynter's articulation of genres of being, I propose that these genres of being show how the psychological genre of being can be produced, which means the genre of being can stipulate the default setting of the black psyche. Psychology in black is hereby enunciated by attempts to situate and formulate a psycho-historical and psycho-political account of colonial productive powers. This is an attempt to trace methodological, discursive formations and functions of colonial narratives.

There have been various assertions made by scholars to suggest the development of psychic dispositions, due to colonisation. Here are a few examples that can be referred to

as a referential point of psychic development. Fanon (1986) points out how colonisation delays the development of national consciousness and neutralises the ability to self-determine. Fanon (1986) further alludes that black people adopt certain attitudes as a result of contact with white civilisation. While Ferreira da Silva (2007) notes that racial making catalogues the mind and that colonial logic provides symbols that are signified and represented in the cognitive world. At the other end of the spectrum, Jackson (2020) describes colonial violence as arresting one's time and forestalling mental capabilities. Based on the latter, it is evident that colonisation does alter black people's psyche - however, the question that remains is how this is done. In retrospect, the theorisation of the 'how' must go beyond just the impact on the psyche by the colonial system but rather show how the psyche gets affected and infected. Nonetheless, the theoretical premise to draw from the expressions above is that any colonial construction, whether in theory or practice, has implications for psychological functioning and process. Psychology in black can be theorised using Wynter's perspectives of Western humanism because she situates colonial ideologies and activities as having a foundation that connects multiple modalities of being. These multiple modalities are what will serve as psychological modalities of productive power and conquest. Based on the above, the theory of psychology in black would then be able to expand on the psychological as both an event and a condition. That means the psychological occurs relatively at all times and within certain conditions and parameters.

To further theorise on the psychology of black people, an association between genres of being of humanity and the racial making of the psychological needs to be made, to argue that the psychological is not only produced and inscribed, but can also become a genre of being. For the psychological to become this, it should be based on the assumption that genres of humanity with colonial logic and ideologies produce physiological activity (in the brain), a cognitive, behavioural and affective activity that is aligned with a particular genre of being. Further, colonial logic functions within a natural psychological structure. The colonial logic and genres of being are represented firstly by ideologies that sustain colonial power, while acting as a signifying tool of the psyche. Ideologies prescribe, sustain, and necessitate certain actions and behaviours, meaning they structure reality and how it is supposed to be lived. Mudimbe (1988) describes it as intellectual and behavioural attitude that is the result of an intricate association between consciousness, science and cultural and social norms of society. The latter explains ideology as a product

of certain life worlds, but also an outcome of particular logic. In theorising psychology in black, ideology is a mode of operation that is attached to a genre of being which emerges as a psychic component like intellectualism and behaviour. Mudimbe shows what institutes a particular metaphysics, which is key in theorising the psychological. In this context, by metaphysics, I refer to all the ontologies, ideologies, sociality and political architecture which structure blackness. These are colonial metaphysics centred around the genres of being, as set out to be a definitive attribute, noted by Ferreira da Silva (2007). Metaphysics governing black people is applied to theorise psychology in black because it holistically captures the transcendental nature of genres of being - in the form of ontologies, epistemologies and ideologies - further capturing how the genres of being are played out through socialisations. In this way, the metaphysic governing black people is seen as essential in structuring psychic structure, and notably, the theory of the psychological is not just relegated to a theory of human behaviour but rather as a theory of human functioning. Here I refer to human functioning because colonisation as a set of laws governing humanity imposes specific human conditions that establish mentally distinct human beings.

On this basis, colonial metaphysics follows the laws and conditions set by colonisation and poses a disclaimer for the colonised to be self-determined or to be an externally-determined subject whose mind is subjected to colonial forces (Ferreira da Silva, 2007). These dynamics are set out by Fanon's (1986) view on ontology. Fanon (1986) writes: "Ontology, once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside does not permit us to understand the being of the black man" (p. 110). Here, one can understand Fanon as directing us to look at the realities of black people in such a way that it points to the development of black metaphysics/colonial metaphysics. This means viewing ontology outside Western lenses so that it becomes possible to expand factors framing black ontological experience, and allowing the complexities and multiplicities of blackness to be easily accounted for. Wynter's (2003) exploration of genres of being is an expansion of the critique of ontology by Fanon (1986). This is based on the assumption that genres of being, gives an ontological account of what is supposed to facilitate human acts/behaviour for a certain segment of reality. That means one has to understand ontology as something to be constructed and approached with caution. This is also based on whether blackness can be fitted into ontology (Marriott, 2022).

The use of genres of being to demarcate a theory of black psychology is to understand that the productive powers are also epistemologically based or constructed. The productive power of these epistemologies is seen in the ontologies formed, resembling those epistemic foundations. Wynter (2003, 1992), argues that the figure of the human is constructed through epistemological histories that value a genre of being/humanity representing the white bourgeois man. Furthermore, she defines these genres of being as descriptive and prescriptive to the formation of black subjects. The genre of being in its descriptive and prescriptive mode auto-institutes, and consists of different metaphysics for each category of being. This metaphysics is a representation of the onto-epistemological process, which Ferreira da Silva (2007) describes as a process of reconfiguration of knowledge bases that configure a racial subject according to its epistemological extracts to postulate a subject's ethical attribute, such as self-determination.

The above-mentioned demarcate how onto-epistemology lays a foundation for a particular set of metaphysics, hence psychology in black considers the psyche as constructed within human defining conditions. Based on the dynamics related to the formation of being, there is a notion of blackness representing an aspect of plasticity noted by Jackson (2020), whereby blackness, is forced towards a particular type of change or transformation. Jackson (2020) states that "plasticity is a mode of transfiguration whereby the fleshy being of blackness is experimented with as if it were infinitely malleable, lexical and biological matter, such that blackness is produced as sub/super/human at once, a form where form shall not hold potentially everything and nothing at the register of ontology" (p. 3). Jackson describes the colonial logic that possibly follows the mode in which markers of humanity function, to instil metaphysics that rearranges the reality of black people, leaving them with no ontological integrity or resistance. Plasticity can be explained alongside multiple genres of being that are dedicated to changing and rewriting black people's metaphysics and state of being in the world. Subsequently, plasticity is a concept that shows the functionality of genres of being, and positions psychology in black as a mode of seeing the psychic structure of black people as going through multiple states of transition or transfiguration.

Thus far I have reiterated that the theorising psychology in black considers the genres of being/humanity as postulating specific ontologies or metaphysics, that also produce a distinct psychological narrative. I now explore what Wynter means by genres of being,

and how they are responsible for creating certain psychic realities. Wynter (2003) starts by explaining the overarching concept of humanity as being represented by a White bourgeois, cisgender, heterosexual male who represents a 'Man', who is economically and biologically chosen, over-represents himself as the ultimate human, worthy of securing their well-being, and full cognitive and behavioural autonomy. This over-representation of man becomes an organising principle and mode of auto-institution guiding one's experience of being human, at the same time presiding over a set of metaphysics and ontological narratives. This is the 'Man' who crystalises racial difference and naturalises whiteness as the centre of being. To put this in perspective, black people's bodies and physiology - even aesthetics - in comparison to this 'Man' are positioned as representing the abnormal other, who is attributed deformed categories of inferiority based on the presumed deformed brain, which is deemed as not deserving of economic autonomy/freedom, and whose knowledge system is deemed as not knowledge. Nonetheless, what is important is the historical and modern mechanism of the productive power that forms a signification, subjectivation and social configuration of the black psyche. Postulating psychology in black here is by articulating a language that explains the process and dialogues responsible for colonial subjectivity.

Another factor distinctive to what Wynter calls the overrepresentation of Man to form a foundation to construct humanity is the notion of disorder, which has been attached to black people to mark their difference from white people. The notion of disorder as a productive power to the psyche of black people suggests a presence of metaphysics and ontology suggesting inhumanity and disability. That means an order of existence will follow a postulate of the significantly ill other i.e. the colonised, using ill-descriptive referents of the physical, which translates to the constitution of irrationality (Wynter, 2003). Fanon (1986) seemingly expresses this when he notes that colonisation tends to give proof to the colonised that they are inherently incapable. Both Fanon and Wynter explain the ontological construction of the othered being, as 'inherently ill' or disfigured. Bahri (2020) would explain the metaphysics produced here as an aesthetic of disability, whereby disorders such as intellectual inferiority are bestowed upon black people. This prejudicial cognition means that those without intellectual capacity need to be injected with the metaphysics of civilisation (Bahri, 2020). Psychologically, black people are then viewed as blank slates. The basis of this perspective is to show how the psychic structure of black people is accounted for from a point of non-existence, hence epistemologies are

constructed about it. Thus, the depiction of an onto-epistemology of the category of significantly ill is attributed to an ontological schema, an assumed ontological position that is already instituted and waiting to be reproduced to confirm the truth. But then Ferreira da Silva (2007) warns that the psyche will take as its own that which needs to be learned. This means if a disorder is relayed to blacks to learn and embody it, that might happen. Ultimately, what is learned becomes a definitive way of being, dictating oneself, others and how the world should be represented. Nevertheless, crucial to the theorising of the psyche are the selected genres of being that Wynter (2003) has outlined, which I believe are crucial to engaging racialised scripts of the psychic structure. These are the colonial referential points that have been attached successfully to the minds of black people.

Psychological referents can be created by a genre of being, called rationality (Wynter, 2003). It is a descriptive determinant of being that brings a psychological component into the discussion, through questioning of cognitive abilities. Besides rationality being a category specifying defectiveness amongst blacks, I argue that what helps it to be a strong psychological determinant is the laws and rules that govern its functioning. What makes a category of being such as rationality effective is the metaphysics it produces, which regulates and enhances certain acts and behaviour making it a psychological determinant with a productive power, that regulates cognitive and behavioural elements of functioning. Seemingly, rationality plays a sovereign role in regulation and representation, while also becoming a productive power. What can be inferred here, is that the mind had become subject to a particular sovereignty, with specific onto-epistemologies. However, its productive power is based on the presumed absence amongst black people, making way for cognitive prejudice, dehumanisation and metaphysics of inferiority. Wynter (2003), asserts that rationality is an order that enacts the relationship between an “overrepresentation of man” (p. 267) and “subjugated human others” (p. 288). Here Wynter speaks about the modes of relation between black and white people, and power structures that enforce an ontology and a lived experience governed by rationality. Ferreira da Silva (2007) uses reason, instead of rationality, and argues that reason is the new ruler of man and a cherished attribute of man. Reason and rationality are used as an interior determinant that are expressed externally through forms of behaviour. Their productive powers are internal and function on one’s interiority to enforce changes in the psychic structure. How the association is done for black people,

presents a logic that argues rationality/reason is absent in the black psychic structure. Ferreira da Silva (2007) is therefore correct when she asserts that “reason is a productive force, that first operates first and foremost from the confines of a rational mind” (p. xv). The implications of genres of being are mainly in how they are acted out in society (forming ontologies), and genres such as rationality have ramifications, like the one explained by Gordon (2000). He argues that “blacks, it was believed, were incapable of committing suicide because, supposedly, like the rest of the animal kingdom they didn’t possess enough apperception or intelligence to understand the ramifications of their situation” (p. 13). Gordon explains how rationality becomes a reason to incite violence, because the assumed lack of, means an inability to judge injustices faced. It enforces the perception that black people cannot comprehend matters affecting themselves and their livelihoods. At this point its deterministic features are not just psychological, but leave black people vulnerable to further gratuitous violence. Hence, this theory acknowledges the domination of the black subject happening in the inner space (interiority).

The latter questions the psychological sovereignty of black people, which is the extent to which black people are allowed to reconfigure ideologies and metaphysics. Rationality, then takes the psychology of black people towards a point of metaphysical catastrophe, especially for black people who are denied the ability to exercise certain cognitive abilities. Maldonado-Torres (2016) notes that a “catastrophe can be considered metaphysical because it transformed the meaning and relation of basic areas of thinking and being, particularly the self and the other, along with temporality and spatiality, among other key concepts in the basic infrastructure that constitutes our human world” (p. 11). The latter explains how the enforced ideologies of being such as rationality and reason can bring about confusion, dislocation and displacement of self. A catastrophe in this regard means a crisis in contending with one’s reality combined with an internal struggle. Metaphysical catastrophe signifies the success of Wynter’s (2003) identified genres of being and an indication that a psychological referent will be expressed.

Another genre of being that has the productive power to institute the psyche is the biocentric genre of being, which is brought into existence by society and pronounces a different set of metaphysics (Wynter, 2003). The biocentric construction postulates a Darwinian narrative of human conception, that says human beings are purely biological or bio-evolutionary beings. It further assumes that human beings do not co-construct a racially-coded bio-evolutionary script, assuming that human beings are all-natural

(McKittrick, 2016). This conception of humanity's productive power is based on the inherently ill/deformed notion of black people's physical outlook, to such an extent that metaphysical constructs are formed based on the body and tied to psychological functioning e.g. blacks described as having small brains, meaning reduced functioning of executive functions of the brain. The biocentric category seems to pronounce two things: categorisation that uses bodily features to describe ontological differences, and one stipulating how the body processes colonial violence. The first category describes ideological conceptions of black people, which categorises them as animals and even beasts (Jackson, 2020). This view characterises black people as physically superior but psychologically inferior. The framing of animality constitutes having a small brain and poor thinking capacity, which ultimately has made black people conceived of as cognitively and intellectually inferior. The productive power of biological conceptions is seen in the way the body is conceived by others, and the response attached, based on the connotations attached. Theorising the biocentric system of being in psychology in black is based on the ontological effect it has, which situates black mental life. Fanon (1986) captures the biocentric genre well in his articulation of Negrophobia:

Look, a Negro!" It was an external stimulus that flicked over me as I passed by. I made a tight smile. "Look, a Negro!" It was true. It amused me. "Look, a Negro!" The circle was drawing a bit tighter. I made no secret of my amusement. "Mama, see the Negro! I'm frightened!" Frightened! Frightened! Now they were beginning to be afraid of me. I made up my mind to laugh myself to tears, but laughter had become impossible. I could no longer laugh, because I already knew that there were legends, stories, history, and above all *historicity*, which I had learned about from Jaspers. Then, assailed at various points, the corporeal schema crumbled, its place taken by a racial epidermal schema. In the train, it was no longer a question of being aware of my body in the third person but in a triple person. (pp. 111-112)

Fanon shows how the biocentric genre of being functions especially when one body reacts to conceive racialised ideas about the self. When Fanon starts to see himself as a figure of fear, he suggests that the mind rationalised this experience as an object of fear. In his rationalisation of the experience of his body, he is showing that the racial epidermal schema can be articulated by the neurophysiological system of the brain - which brings us to the second aspect of the biocentric genre of being - such as the opioid system that

gets activated by a descriptive statement of being. This leads to specific modes of minding, and of experiencing oneself as that particular descriptive statement of being (Wynter, 2003). Ultimately the biocentric system represents a natural phenomenon that is co-opted to physiologically code inferiority. The productive element will be based on what black people would experience about themselves through others, and in Fanon's experience, the experience consists of the metaphysical schematics of fear.

The second aspect of the biocentric genre of being stipulates how the body responds to colonial violence. Wynter (2003) explains physiological reactions as a result of societal relations that trigger psychophysiological laws. For her, the body's physiological response stems from societal relations, and Spillers (1987) deviates from this by positioning the violations of the flesh as central. The flesh is violated based on its social positioning, describing what Spillers (1987), refers to as "the anatomical specifications of rupture, of altered human" (p. 67). Spillers (1987) elevates her argument, stating the following, which positions the reference of the flesh to the discussion of psychology:

These undecipherable markings on the captive body render a kind of hieroglyphics of the flesh whose severe disjunctures come to be hidden to the cultural seeing by skin color. We might well ask if this phenomenon of marking and branding actually 'transfers' from one generation to another, finding its various symbolic substitutions in an efficacy of meanings that repeat the initiating moments? (p. 67)

The productive power that can be inferred from Spillers is based on the constructed imagery and physiological fissures of the body through hieroglyphics of the flesh, which can be attributed to internalised memory of the flesh. Even more crucial in this intervention is how physical changes in the body can be passed on from generation to generation. I, therefore, argue that hieroglyphics of the flesh - as a psychological seeing of the wounded body - illuminates an apperception of the body and its physiological alterations which form certain social and cultural views of the body. The flesh as altered and marked, constructs new subjectivities to the violated, but as Spillers asserts, produces a new set of symbols of the body and humanity. Here the physiological response constitutes certain social and psychological positions, extending Wynter's argument to accommodate the bi-directional relationship between the physiological/biological, the social and the psychological. For psychology in black, it means metaphysic manifested

by the biocentric genre of being functions through socialisation and violations of the flesh, ultimately signifying a particular psychic structure.

The ethno-class genre of being, or homo-economicus serves as a productive power of the psyche based on material possession and political economy. This is an ethno-class genre of being, or a homo-economicus specifying a capitalist's notions of humanity (Wynter, 2003). That means the psychological determinants are based on ideals and ontologies of economy/capital. Furthermore, the logic of capitalism grounds the metaphysics of being. The productive power here symbolises a psyche grounded in the metaphysics of exploitation, poverty, and violence, that will stipulate the livelihood one deserves. This genre of being begins with the institution of slavery, reduces black people to labour only, makes them vulnerable to gratuitous violence, and relegates black people to non-beings. Here we see black people being subjected to dehumanising labour practices. Slavery contributes to the discussion on the black psyche based on the ontological grounds where it places black people. The metaphysics of this genre of being is not just about attaining capital, it is about how the capital is supposed to be derived, and further how that process manifests a particular human being, resulting in a particular metaphysics.

Nonetheless, Wilderson (2015), argues that in slavery, a figure of being is deduced and constructed to define the character responsible for labour. Wilderson further highlights the following about the being of the slave; the slave is dishonoured in their being, relegated to non-humans, and as such their being is instituted within low-class categories, living out abjection, fugitivity and subjection. The experience of the slave produces what Wilderson refers to as the psychic space of social life. The psychic space of social life demonstrates a structure of metaphysics of the ethno-class category of being, characterised by capital-based violence that disfigures and reorients one's view of oneself. This produces a cognitive apparatus aligned with nothingness and inferiority, asserting social death. The metaphysics of slavery has continued to structure labour relations and how black people are conceptualised in workspaces. The continuous material deprivation and socioeconomic issues make poverty the marker of humanity and an acceptable metaphysics for black people. The metaphysics of poverty or socioeconomic lack is crucial because the impact of material deprivation not only goes beyond the psychological effects of poverty but extends to how poverty structures thinking and feeling about the world. Consequently, the homo-economicus being qualifies to be an auto-instituting genre of being because of this element. Du Bois (1986) argues that racial

difference is still important to the formation of a modern economic system. The current ontology of wealth creation continues to view blacks as not deserving of economic success and prevents them from attaining it. It is perceived as normal for black people to remain poor and this naturalises the metaphysics of poverty. This proposes a theory of psychology in black, that dissects socio-economic problems as psychological problems that institute realities, demeanours, behaviours, possibilities and rationalities. The defined consequential result of the ethno-class being is not based on problems witnessed externally - poverty, unemployment - but rather how it fashions thinking and modes of relating with the world.

The genres of being emerge as epistemologies used to constitute knowledge systems, that in turn rewrite laws for the living. Knowledge, in this case takes the form of discourse and writes narratives of being. Wynter (2003) argues that colonial epistemological foundations mediate the ontological experience. Wynter has put forward these epistemological foundations that categorise human beings viz. biocentrism, rationality/reason (philosophy) and economic ideologies as instituting individuals, and as systems of knowledge and power. Hence, I argue that the institution of psychological phenomena should be explained as onto-epistemological. Ferreira da Silva (2007) notably extends this to the problem of science as producing a modern man. Science also backs up these genres of being and turns them into normality and the ultimate truth. According to Ferreira da Silva (2007), scientific reason becomes part of political economy using political-symbolic weapons such as race and culture to validate itself. Wynter (1994) therefore maintains that the order of Western epistemology and ideology that governs how human beings know themselves induces collective behaviours by which people know themselves (Wynter, 1994).

Mignolo (2015) shows how these ideologies behind Western constructions of humanity shape certain beliefs and rules about how one ought to behave. These modes of being human emphasised by Western categories of humanity become socialised in everyday human encounters. It is therefore essential to emphasise that black people encounter themselves in the Western knowledge system through dehumanising lenses, and that includes psychological knowledge and studies. To further expand, knowledge systems and epistemologies propel a different mode of thinking and viewing the world, and this is where its productive power emerges. This means psychological practices such as thinking, reasoning and rationalising styles are formed according to a particular set of

epistemology. The theory of psychology in black captures the production of psychological dispositions, by accounting for behavioural patterns and thinking styles, linked to various epistemologies.

At the heart of the complete psychological theory of blackness is the realisation that, complete psychic functioning is based on the stipulated genres of being functioning simultaneously. That means black people live within this set of genres at the same time, and that means the productive power of the colonial logic is strong and can become definitive. Wynter's ability to see the interrelatedness of multiple epistemological positions has provided a nuanced understanding of the production and regulations of blackness. What can also be seen from her work is how one epistemic or scientific viewpoint is not sufficient to manufacture people for subjugation and to further rationalise subjugation. Hence, Ferreira da Silva (2007) points at both history and science as providing the coordinates for instituting modern representation of people.

Colonial epistemes are not only embodied but produce behaviours that are harmful and detrimental to blacks. Biko (2004) elaborated on this dilemma when he expresses his dissatisfaction with the educated elite political activist, whom he views as "so conditioned by the system as to even manage most well-considered resistance to fit within the system both in terms of the means and the goals" (p. 40). In such cases the presiding colonial knowledge seems to be the only way of knowing and changing the world, hence the change is within the system. Ultimately, this presiding solution did not yield any tangible results, and it is often accused of perpetuating colonisation. In *The Miseducation of the Negro*, Woodson (1933) observes that the educated Negroes have contempt toward their people because "in their own as well as in their mixed schools Negroes are taught to admire the Hebrew, the Greek, the Latin and the Teuton and to despise the African" (p. 5). In this case, the embodiment of colonial episteme makes educated blacks disregard black people, also in an attempt to distance themselves from them and their cultures. In this regard, knowledge systems to some extent become responsible for guiding certain psychosocial, cognitive and prescribed behaviours and the language of being. Thus, anti-blackness is legitimised as the current order of knowledge and the order of behaving. The concern for psychology in black is not just the shift in thought patterns but in identity markers where one feels a certain level of elevation when in possession of Western epistemes.

The reproduction of the genres of being is apparent, especially in the 21st Century, and can be explained as the representation of the coloniality of being (Wynter, 2003). These genres often change their form to suit modernity and continue to orient, configure and manufacture individuals. Coloniality of being is a proclamation that a set of metaphysics or a function of onto-epistemology that carried all the genres of being as part of the human system are produced unconsciously and relived daily. Another important factor for the coloniality of being that both Wynter (2003) and Maldonado-Torres (2007, 2016) articulate, is the naturalisation and normalisation of colonial circumstances and inhabitable spaces, that further normalise colonial behaviours that are detrimental to black people's livelihood. Coloniality of being signifies the normalisation or naturalisation of colonial conditions and ideologies, making racialisation perceived as a culture. Du Bois (1987) argues that race has become a matter of culture and cultural history. That means instituted social orders in coloniality are interpreted as cultural conceptions that become categories of knowledge systems, being and aesthetics (Wynter, 1992).

Expanding on the latter, Gilroy (2000) notes that cultural and nationalistic descriptions of racial differences form a new form of racism when biological inclinations become uncomfortable. Cultural ecologies were formed to rationalise racial differences, identities and behaviour, enforcing cultural alterity (Gilroy, 2000). Hence, Wynter illustrates that culture can be racially constructed but formed outside and within colonial markers. Culture formed from racial markers tends to ontologically construct individuals as racial subjects, with maladaptive social order. It is important to note that racial markers will form nature-culture laws that govern their modes of being, behaving and minding in the world. Adopting cultural conceptions out of racial markers, in addition to Western ways of being, and one's cultural history, contributes to the production of non-adaptive human self-cognition and consciousness/behaviours (Wynter, 2003). Even though cultural alterity is a descriptive/prescriptive statement of being that has gained popularity in the modern "multicultural" society, Gilroy (2000) maintains that cultural differences are still coded using racialised biological discourses. Wynter (2003) challenges us to trace human behaviour historically and to start understanding human beings as hybrid nature-culture beings, as biological and *logos* (word/narratively/cultural). Wynter implies that cultural conception of race and enforced cultural experience become origin stories with an ontological effect, hence a metaphysical/psychological effect. The theory of psychology

in black must then be conceptualised along cultural-historical continuity which for Wynter (1995), means understanding the ontological effects of different historical epochs and generations in shaping the current psyche and its behaviours.

Theorising psychology in black captures the black psyche in its totality and engages the human question with its ordered modes of being, unearthing the techniques of societal order, the values attached, and the cognitive model produced. Furthermore, it should recognise how racial constructions have been attributed as cultural artifacts (Du Bois, 1987) and thus behavioural and cognitive points of entry. The order of knowledge that ultimately drives human societal order and behaviour serves to configure the idea of the human, to popularise Western constructions of being, that continue giving insights into the rules that govern human behaviours, and ways they are socialised into their social reality. Epistemic colonial difference or the coloniality of knowledge would therefore be a unit of analysis to elaborate on the ontological colonial difference or coloniality of being (Maldonado-Torres, 2007), as epistemes are embedded with behaviour-prescriptive categories and functions. The psychological sciences are therefore challenged to assess their productive powers, which serve as the root to discourses of behaviours of the oppressed and essential in determining how the process of instituting these behaviours is done.

2.3 Sociogeny: The social production of the psychological

“Beside phylogeny and ontogeny stands sociogeny” is a critical illustration by Fanon (1986, p. 4), which suggests that social phenomena should be read alongside one’s biological system. Sociogeny is a concept that clarifies all the complexities of social phenomena; hence it qualifies as a segment of psychology in black because it points the social system - especially colonial socialisation - towards the production of psychological phenomena. Psychology in black takes Fanon’s call as crucial since it gives a multifaceted explanation of the black social experience, and how it could transform the psychic realm. Psychology in black is argued from a theoretical engagement that shows how colonisation has its set of psychological apparatus/functions/structure/process grounded in the productive power of colonial socialisation. Theorising psychology in black calls upon analytical lenses that focus on the mechanics, dynamics and discourses of colonial socialisation. Sociogeny is a method of interrogating the social, and it is used here to demonstrate how the social is a signifier of the psychological. Sociogeny is used to ground the multivariate dimensions associated with psychological functioning, that

consider an intersection of race, culture, sociality and biology in the lives of the colonised. The psychological is to be viewed in this context as a by-product of intersections of race, culture, sociality and biology. Hence the approach to sociogeny by Wynter (1999) becomes crucial since it emphasises the amalgamation of the history of humanity and genres of being in the construction of the social system.

The exposition of sociogeny to illuminate psychology in black is purely from a methodological and theoretical point of view. This is for psychology in black to illuminate a different language and perspective to explain the link between the social and the psychological and the mode of productive power involved. Sociogeny enables an analysis that shows how the biological functions connect the two worldviews. This is crucial, especially since colonisation requires a particular mode of socialisation, directed toward survival. Sociogeny as a socio-diagnostic tool is used by Fanon (1986) as an extension of both phylogenic and ontogenic lenses of analysis. It focuses on the social development and socialisation of black people in a colonised world (Maldonado-Torres, 2017).

It is against this background that the definitive contours of sociogeny should be expanded to understand what constitutes socialisation in the context of colonisation, especially since colonisation produces a different system of being. The extraction of the dynamics of colonial socialisation is to bring matters related to the development of black people's relations with themselves, their spaces, and the objects around them. Psychology in black argues for a different lens to theorise social relations, because of the hostile conditions that black sociality is founded on. Black sociality becomes a composed component of underwritten discourses by genres of being, that demarcate that socialisation has taken a different direction or form. Black sociality is a concept coined by Moten (2017), which looks at the discourses and dynamics that conceive black relations. The production of sociality is unpacked from the black condition and manifestation of various identification of colonial demographics. Here, the materiality of the social identification i.e. race, gender, class and sexuality becomes a necessary feature in unpacking the ontology of sociality (Moten, 2017). Based on this, sociogeny will be used to explain the development of an individual's and community's subjective experience and consciousness i.e. psychological determinant as a result of being exposed to the social, cultural and political structures of colonisation (Maldonado-Torres, 2017). Hence colonial socialisation is assumed as instituting and centring subjective experience as a psychological determinant.

The psychological determinants can further be exposed if the theory of psychology in black considers the metaphysics of socialisation or even social systems. In this regard, sociogeny becomes a mode of social analysis that should be able to dissect miniature metaphysical interactions behind social interaction. That means it will require an understanding of history, particularly the genres of being and their psychic productive powers.

Wynter's (1999) extension of sociogeny, articulates the subjective experience of blackness, as experienced through psychophysical laws and guided by social experiences. Wynter approaches sociogeny to explain subjective experience as a phenomenon that does not exist outside psycho-physical laws - the reward system and neurological system - but also as governing/producing what will be referred to as consciousness, identity and mind. In simpler terms, while socialisation takes place, the body processes and absorbs stimuli presented along with their materiality to form a response, similar to epidermisation. Wynter's extension on Fanon's sociogeny is an extension that contends with matters of prolonged socialisation of oppression and violence, giving a biological explanation to coloniality of being, rewriting it as not just about psychological aspects such as memory but also related to the psychophysical process that facilitates it. Such an explanation invites the legitimacy of the sociological and biological reaction towards the body imprinting mental/psychic templates. Hence, Spillers's (1987) view that the captive black body is the convergence of biological, sexual, cultural, ritualistic and psychological matters here. Moreover, if colonial subjectivity is understood through Wynter's sociogenic perspective, one would call for psychological tenants of subordination to be identified. In addition, this analysis of blackness should show the link between the ontogenic and sociogenic to explain the violence of the flesh and related traumas. Marriott (2011) critiques Wynter for overlooking Fanon's engagement with trauma in her articulation of sociogeny. That means Marriott could have read Wynter as blindly overlooking traumas that accompany colonial socialisation. This critique is not only based on the fear of having a myopic view of sociogeny, but also to avoid analysing society from a positivistic perspective (because of its biological emphasis). The critique by Marriott is from a methodological point of view, and it is concerned with why Wynter does not account for Fanon's use of psychoanalysis to explain sociogeny. Marriott further criticises Wynter for particularising sociogeny towards empiricism. For Marriott (2011), sociogeny can show "how (human) inferiority comes to be read in biological, solely

racial-economic terms” (p. 60). What is crucial for psychology in black, is the ‘how’ of reading black experiences that Marriott articulates, which means the argument does not just extend to method, but to why a particular way of reading black social experience is important. This question also extends to why Wynter emphasises biological reading as part of the system to understand the black experience. For psychology in black, the extension of this theory should explain psychological phenomena emanating from everyday social encounters.

As mentioned above, a discussion on sociogeny is also concerned with the interactions between genres of being and how they function together in a colonial context. Descriptive genre of being have a way in which they function in society. They are responsible for how society brings man into being (Fanon, 1986). For example, Wynter (1999) notes that the laws of functioning, which can be classified as socially inducing codes of being, often specify modes of societal interaction and modes of socialisation that could affect the development of the self, consciousness and identity. Here Wynter explains the basis of the metaphysics of sociality that is responsible for producing psychological determinants specific to a specific socially-induced code.

The productive power of social processes is first seen in physiological reactions that demarcate instituted colonial practices, which can be accounted for through psychological outcomes and ontology created. In this regard, one needs to situate how sociogeny analyses the biological sphere as part of the social institution. To view the biological through sociogeny is to make a distinction between the socialised aspect of biology, which captures the racialised biological ideas surrounding the black body. Bahri (2017) introduces a crucial perspective to this argument, adding an argument on hybridity (which refers to living in two world views). This takes the stance that every culture or sociality demands a different mode of biology. Bahri talks about biological plasticity and epigenetic factors in evaluating the significance of intercultural contact. The assumption is that human biology interacts with ideas, objects, things and commodities that are forced upon the body and the mind, with or without subject awareness. The hybridity involves the senses, and the biologics of the body interacting with dominating rationalities. Assimilating/being socialised into a culture means assimilating not just ideas and thoughts but food, aesthetics, bodily codes and movement, which implies an alteration of psychophysical laws will be imminent. Bahri further warns that this alteration of biology because of hybridity/rather coloniality is a factor in sustaining modernity. The argument

presented by Bahri sees the biological and the mind being altered by dominating ideas and rationalities, while for Wynter (1984), it is not alteration but a normal process of response to societal conditions, that the body automatically responds to. The point of view presented by Bahri (2017), directs narratives about trauma and the body's response to a social environment that leads to alteration. That means Bahri, adds to the probable impact of what happens when violence or unpleasant beliefs and acts are taken in by normal psychophysical laws. The productive power is then seen in the psychophysical laws. The alteration of the biological should also be viewed as instituting cognitive and mental schemas, that are necessary for an individual to make sense of their environment. This expands the lens of psychology in black towards a holistic understanding of anti-black violence on the flesh and the social as underwriting psychological referent of being. Theorising psychology in black is a holistic act that nurtures every social and biological encounter experienced by a black being. Here the productive power of the psyche is never one-dimensional but rather an assemblage of multiple connecting systems.

Colonial socialisation is a normalisation and continuity of social phenomena aligned with colonial conditions, by way of repeated exposure. When social phenomena are normalised, so are physiological responses by the body. As a result, there is an equilibrium of responses reached, and that means there should have been a development of cognitive schemas that help make sense of the social world. This should happen in such a way that socialising practices that are maladaptive can become part of an individual's organic/physiological and cognitive systems. Subsequently, black people are expected to adapt to and adopt the Western social-political order that created the colonial era and Western modernity. Further, black people are socialised into subjection, practice modes of subjection, and to embody them. Sithole (2014) maintains that subjection is produced and maintained by power and reproduces conditions of life that are informed and reproduced by colonial mechanisms such as oppression, subordination, injustice and dehumanisation. Self-making in this instance becomes a product of social and political condition that necessitates a position of nothingness. It necessitates a position of servitude and re-enactments of subordination and oppressive behaviours. This brings forward the concept of coloniality of power that maintains acts of socialised oppression. Hartman (1997) therefore asks this very pertinent question: "How does one discern enabling conditions when the very constitution of the subject renders him socially dead or subversively redeploy an identity determined by violent domination, dishonour, and natal

alienation?” (p. 56). This question unpacks the possibility of transcending the colonial social system if the remnants of it are still intact in how black people view and identify themselves. Further, the social production of the psychological seems to be a strong force in providing the language of auto-institution, especially with embedded racial scripts. The sociogenic principle is an:

Information-encoding organizational principle of each culture's criterion of being/non-being, that functions to *artificially* activate the neurochemistry of the reward and punishment pathway; doing so in the terms needed to institute the human subjects as a culture-specific and thereby verbally defined, if physiologically implemented, mode of being and sense of self. (Wynter, 1999, p. 29)

Here Wynter (1999) explains the process of instituting, portraying how ideologies/concepts/ideas become part of the cognitive system. Memory is crucial for the formation of schemas or mental notes born out of colonial socialisation. Manganyi (1973) refers to the officially constructed system of meaning as a sociological schema, which means not only an awareness of one's black body, but also an awareness of one's social environment, with its accepted patterns of behaviours and norms accepted within a society. This depicts a nature-culture phenomenon demonstrating how social dynamics are instituted and how experiences are inscribed in the mind. Spillers (1987) refers to them as codes which are generated to represent certain characteristic features and social procedures. These codes and schemas serve as directives or methods of channelling societal orders in an organised way, giving structure for behaviour modification and cognitive processes. Therefore, socialisation encompasses rule-governed nature of the system of representations (Eudell, 2015). Being socialised in a colonial system means being engaged in a system that has its rule-governed system of representation, and knowledge of the system-orientating modes of mind which will guide the social order and institute certain norms and behaviours (Eudell, 2015). The above-mentioned argues how colonial socialisation could be signified in the mind of black people.

Wynter (1999) further builds upon Fanon's sociogenic principle, by extending it to how consciousness develops using Chalmers's "puzzle of conscious experience". This extension is a direct indication of how successful the productive powers of colonial socialisation can be. Chalmers (1995) emphasises that the mind or consciousness is not

just what the brain does, it is driven by what sensory organs perceive in the social world, and as such the social world and the biological function together. Wynter's extension of sociogeny is to explain the process involved in the conception of human consciousness (Marriott, 2011) and identify problems of consciousness relating to being black, and to subjective experience (Wynter, 1999). Consciousness can be articulated as an epistemic intervention into the experience of blackness or colonial socialisation. It exemplifies what black people know and feel about racism after the neurobiological processes have taken place (McKittrick, 2021). To be conscious is to be able to subjectively experience oneself and position oneself in the world. Hence the paradox of human consciousness for black people is a liberating act of freedom (Wynter, 1999). Even Gilroy (2000) encourages the importance of questioning the forms of consciousness that are produced by social orders. This is articulated in Biko's (1987) black consciousness, which is a mental attitude, portraying awareness, and a different way of thinking about blackness. Consciousness becomes central for this study because it represents how the social manifests in the psychological. Emphasising what consciousness is concerned with for psychology in black is to begin the analysis of blackness from a psychological perspective. The manner of reading and understanding the consciousness of black people is to realise multiple factors, situations, processes and thinking that amalgamate the state of being for black people. Psychology in black captures the amalgamations of colonisation in the form of the signification of experiences. The phenomenon of the mind or mode of consciousness should be understood along the context in which it arises.

The "socialised sense of self" as McKittrick (2021, 60) puts it, is a constitutive element of subjective experience, portraying what will structure one's consciousness. In this case, the black subjective experience is particularised, as the basis for consciousness, which any psychological analysis must account for. Understanding the puzzle of consciousness should thus make us understand the *why* of subjective experience and the *why* of the centrality of the experience of identity to our experience of being human (Wynter, 1999). Consciousness may be a culturally constructed mode of subjective experience that is specific to the culture of one's sociogenic sense of organic life (Wynter, 1999). Hence, I argue that a depiction of a certain mode of consciousness is a demonstration of how successful colonial socialisation is. That means the productive powers of certain metaphysics can be identified, in the form of culture. Black subjects often experience an order of consciousness that is anti-black, which eventually becomes their order of

consciousness. It is an order of consciousness that represents the Western mode of humanity, with its governing sociogenic principle.

At the heart of the development of consciousness is the matter of socialisation of a specific culture, which leads to the set of “symbolically coded consciousness” (Wynter, 1999, p. 24). The self that is subjectively experienced becomes instinctual and culturally defined as sociogenetically owned. As such the way we experience ourselves as human is a result of socio-cultural and political context whereby the self is transformed through social conditioning. It is at this point, that one can argue consciousness as a sign that shows which genre of being, or sociogenic mode of being, is successfully ingrained or which one has more productive power. However, consciousness is an all-inclusive term that represents a coupling of multiple ontologies or metaphysics. Through the biological system, consciousness becomes a result of the embodiment of socio-cultural constructs and the metaphysics of genres of being are accounted for through the production of emotions, thoughts and behaviours.

The black experience and behaviour are produced and regulated by the same socialised colonial metaphysics. As every genre of being “carries in its own sociogenic code of symbolic life/death that is actualised by eugenic/dysgenic men/native behavior-regulatory principle of dominion” (Wynter & McKrittick, 2015, p. 42), one can determine how oppressed one is, through one’s consciousness. These genres of being and their encoded metaphysic, in addition to their social laws, produce a certain order of consciousness, which in turn produces certain behaviours and attitudes, leading to the imprinting of a particular mode of consciousness. A theory of psychology in black is then, concerned about how the sociogenic principle can be applied to various genres of being, in order to identify how they are instituted and interpreted in one’s consciousness. For the sociogenic principle to properly show itself as a tool, it should be able to see consciousness as all socialised colonial constructs.

Consciousness as a product of productive powers shows which encrypted genres of being are internalised. From this mode of consciousness, one gets to pick up epistemological and ontological artefacts of genres of being based on what an individual is communicating. Consciousness as experienced by black people is the mirror of all colonial apparatus of gratuitous violence and antiblackness. What matters most for psychology in black is how the world is packaged and received by an individual to

disseminate and adopt a particular mode of consciousness. Concepts such as race and culture are central to why there is a possibility of two modes of consciousness. Both race and culture give polarised views of how society is constructed. Du Bois's (1986) double consciousness, which describes being controlled by two modes of consciousness exposes the secularisation of human experience, to one benefiting Western conceptions and socialisation. But it also shows the limits of colonial sociality, encrypted genres of being as explained by Wynter (2003), because by experiencing the world in duality, it means there are other forms of being that transcend colonial construction. Hence, Manganyi's (1973) explanation of black consciousness as being "understood to mean that there is a mutuality of knowledge with respect to the totality of impressions, thoughts, and feelings of all black people" (p. 18) makes sense. Nonetheless, Wynter (1999) sees consciousness representing that which has been instilled and imprinted through a process of socialisation, demonstrating what it is like being a black person. The difference between Manganyi (1973) and Wynter (1999) is that one is about understanding consciousness by seeing it as a consequence and the other is a process/event of awakening. The two positions are important because they refer back to why sociogeny is a sociodiagnostic tool that must expand the multiple dimensions in which concepts should be understood, based on how individuals perceive and experience them.

Theorising the genres of being - the construction of humanity - and its sociogenic nature have opened avenues to question the foundations of the behaviour and identity of black people. Nonetheless, identity is explained as a socialised concept; as something that develops, and transforms based on one's socialisations and subjective experience or as a way one experiences oneself in the world (Wynter, 1999). It arises from one's specific sociocultural position. Psychology in black engages identity as another product of colonial socialisation, questioning the process of identity development and factors aligned with what black people choose to identify with, especially in an anti-black society. The assumption made is that identity formation is not automatic but rather a selective process, that considers one's social experience and consciousness. Wynter further sees identity as a socialised sense of self and the social situation in which the self is placed. Identities arise out of social situations that are constructed and symbolised but sustained through the neurological/biochemical system. For example, life experiences associated with inferiority and superiority can induce neural correlates that attach to good and bad experiences. Hence the black person who might want to identify with whiteness

could be propelled by the type of emotion or thought they produce. The sociogenic process of developing a sense of identity, begins with a “socio-cultural situation” that in turn activates the biochemical system, forming social and biological correlates of certain experiences (Wynter, 1999). Identity is another psychological construct conceptualised to show the psychological determinant of colonisation and the adoption of colonial metaphysics. The sociogenic principle becomes a tool to excavate how psychological constructs during hostile environments such as colonisation develop. The assertions of Du Bois (1986) when arguing that the colonial world does not provide true self-consciousness for the colonised, and the assertion made by Spillers (2018) that psychological constructs such as personality, often assumed to be stable in Western psychology, do not have a strong ontological ground/disposition amongst black people. These further demonstrate the foundations and constructs responsible for the formation of psychological constructs such as identity. Spillers warns us about assuming definite existential categories or characters of black people because of the unbalanced life encounters and experiences of black people. Therefore, any form of identity-defining features for a black person should be approached with caution, because of the conditions that produce it.

Sociogenic principle identifies a productive power of colonial socialisation by exposing psychological processes and activities that are produced in accordance. This aspect of theorising psychology in black captures what could be referred to as the psychogenic principle, which addresses the development of psychological processes, based on a social system interfered with by colonial metaphysics. Psychology in black is, therefore, a synthesis of various intersecting colonial metaphysics along with its sociogenic interventions. With this kind of psychological theory, the interference of a normal human functioning system is identified, and the implications related are due to be outlined. The development of psychic states arising from racial scripts can be perceived as a disturbance of normal psychological processes. Based on the above, psychology in black also appears as a discursive tool that synthesises and links colonial metaphysics to excavate psychological referents.

2.4 Autopoiesis: Towards the human involved

It is key to comprehend the discourse responsible for psychological activity in a colonial setting. The underlying principle in this chapter has been to recognise the productive power of colonial metaphysics - genres of being and sociogeny - in producing

psychological narratives, processes and development to be understood within social and historical events, while also describing biological mappings of oppression. I have pointed out the genesis of psychological scripts, while noting that normal psychological process and their formations have been driven and affected by the colonial system and its founding and functioning principles. Now, I add to the theory of psychology in black, which suggests that individuals are capable of instituting themselves outside the productive power of colonisation. This is a process that is natural and bound to take place by virtue of being human. Wynter (1984) calls this process autopoiesis, in which she suggests that black people would still have to act out their natural inclination of producing their modes of being regardless of colonial bondage. Wynter (1984), borrows the term autopoiesis from Maturana and Varela (1980). This explains the autonomy of the living system, or the ability to naturally produce/reproduce. To include autopoiesis as one of the constituents to theorise psychology in black is to figure out the process involved in psychogenesis. That is to say, regardless of any disruption to the social system, psychological processes will always be formed. However, the question is how the processes are formed and what will form the basis of the formations? Wynter (1984) argues that black people's mode of auto-institution arises within a colonial setting, following racialised genres of being and their sociogenic modes of being. However, if black people are to have distinctive processes of auto-institutions the use of Cesaire's science of the word and Fanon's (1986) sociogeny to stipulate an autopoietic turn becomes essential (Wynter, 1999). By using autopoiesis, it is assumed that elaborating on the adaptation and creation of psychological structures/scripts is possible. Psychology in black takes an existential stance which makes it easy to depict the psyche as continuously formed or developing, and as building upon previous structures, knowledge and systems to compose that which currently affirms its state.

Maturana and Varela (1980) define autopoiesis as a system that explains the autonomy of a living system, which has biological and cognitive implications. Maturana and Varela argue that by living in a social system, interacting and having relationships with others, autopoiesis is bound to happen. The social system is crucial for autopoiesis to take place. However, social systems also rely on autopoietic organisation to foster relations for advancement and growth. Autopoiesis simply says human beings are autonomous and capable of reproducing, regardless of the social system they live in (Maturana & Varela, 1980). Wynter (1980) transform this theory by focusing on how auto-institution takes

place within the colonial system's mode of socialisation. Based on the above, one can argue that black people can auto-institute within their particular sociogenic code. However, the question that Wynter (1984) deems important to ask is: To which sociogenic experience does the auto-institution take place? Even so, we are yet to ask where psychological processes fit in, and whether we can equate autopoiesis in psychology with concepts such as autonomy or agency. Autopoiesis in psychology not necessarily equates to all functioning human processing systems that are essential for the processing of psychological systems and functioning (i.e. emotions and cognitions). Autonomy may fit in here, if one considers the autonomy of these systems by looking at colonial influences. The colonial social system is not conducive to healthy modes of autopoiesis. Either way, autopoiesis will take place, but the results of it might show the creation of a new cultural system and detrimental modes of surviving. Hence, Wynter (1984) notes that to auto-institute is a human praxis, which means people will continuously co-create or be self-advancing regardless of the condition in which they find themselves.

In this context, autopoiesis takes place in two modes: one aspect of it occurs within colonial sociogenic modes of being, and the other diverts attention away from psychological deterministic conditions set out by colonisation. The deterministic nature of colonialism has been argued above, and the need to point out the possibility for alternative psychic assertions is possible. However, the process of auto-institution has various points of intersection, and it does not always mean the creation of totally new systems of being, but rather an ability to carry out certain experiences alone.

McKittrick's (2016) interpretation of autopoiesis responds to Wynter's (1984) assertion that questions which sociogenic experience auto-institution takes place when she notes that "autopoiesis, put another way, is the process through which we repeat the conditions of our present mode of existence in order to seemingly, keep the living system, our environmental and existential world, our humanness" (McKittrick, 2016, p. 17). This suggests the possibility of a psychological state with colonial inferences which suggests that colonial auto-institution has become unconscious and symbolises the control of the black psychic structure. Here we see the productive powers producing psychic states remaining intact, while also infecting the unconscious system. McKittrick, sees it as a re-enactment of social life, reality and relational practices, with their associated affective and material codes, naturalising the system and making it difficult to penetrate. At this

point, this explanation of autopoiesis says people are victims of their unconsciousness, and the productive power has penetrated the psyche to such an extent. Alternatively, autopoiesis can account for any process that resembles progress and that includes self-defeating creations directed toward surviving complex social systems such as colonisation. Seemingly, autopoiesis can lead to a conscious process of creation, accounting for the formation of poetics that transcends colonial violence. In theorising psychology in black, the connection between autopoiesis and psychological determinant is one based on the social system and consciousness.

Based on the arguments by Maturana and Varela (1980), Wynter, (1984) and McKittrick (2016), autopoiesis can appear as an unconscious process that is susceptible to social circumstances and multiple orders of consciousness. For autopoiesis, to be expanded towards a psychological theory it needs to start by addressing the order of cognition - mode of thinking - that is posited by Western humanism, and its orders of being. Autopoiesis amongst black people exists within the parameters of Western socialisation but is also enacted to transcend colonial doctrines. By order of cognition, I refer to the systems of thinking and perceiving that should be considered as developing from a particular sociogenic mode of being. If modes of cognition are altered one can start to question how thinking ought to proceed. In blackness, multiple ontologies/metaphysics are ordering various modes of auto-institution psychological activities which reflect conflicting psychic systems because of various auto-instituting social systems. It is important to note that the colonial system has its system of autopoiesis, which is responsible for continuously reinventing and creating behaviours and acts of the system, which can be explained through the colonality of being. In such instances, the possibility of hybrid human beings - individuals with a double consciousness - as Wynter (2015) suggests, is possible, due to individuals having the ability to auto-institute amidst the permanency of genres of being, that are cosmogonic-defined. On the other hand, Maturana (1980) indicates that this is possible because autopoiesis can take place within multiple social systems.

For psychology in black, this brings a new inquiry into what it takes to break out of colonial mentality or psychic structure because it appears that the process would require going beyond just self-determination (positive thoughts) to an awareness of the cognitive mechanisms that colonise. Autopoiesis for black people takes place within two cultural/cosmogonic systems, whereby one is based on cosmogonies of colonial genres

of being, and the other is based on their culture and mythical and cosmogonical auto-institutions. Even so, there is apparently another reality that fosters an ability to auto-institute, which is outside of Western and African ways of being. The reality presumed here is grounded by an ontology/metaphysics forced upon by colonial violence to survive. This is the reality that Wynter (1984) ponders on, which triggers the ability to auto-institute, especially the ability to think outside the social reality constituted by colonisation. Psychology in black acknowledges this aspect of auto-institution as trying to enforce a new productive power, by encrypting new psychological markers of self-institution or development, especially since the development of self and cognition arises within a myriad of cosmogonies. Perhaps the development of self is to be understood as a counter-cosmogony, which may be related to one's cultural and social reality and constructed realities that are made outside Western influence. The latter emphasises the importance of understanding black poetics, which demarcates the praxis of living under antiblackness. Perhaps the understanding of *poiēsis* in black, by Judy (2020) can provide a solution to Wynter's dilemma. Judy (2020) states:

Poiēsis in black, we may very well say it instantiates *para-semiosis*; that is to say, multiplicitous vectors of performance-in-referentiality are established. These vectors, in turn, may be regarded metaphorically as topological long lines, such that, although roughly homomorphic to one another, the characteristic of the line's relationality is apposition. (p. 317)

Judy explains the way alternative praxis can be done, in the form of para-semiosis, which means there are multiple reference points in which we can determine new forms of praxis, and in blackness, the praxis can be new or distinct but at the same time preserve the structure of its system. Hence the relationality in apposition explains that elements always function in parallel when the relation and thinking are done in action. In this regard autopoiesis, does not necessarily mean to completely rid oneself of the colonial system, but it means finding a gap to pursue another form of being. Hence it can be betrayed by both consciousness and the unconscious. It, therefore, makes psychology in black a theory or a *technē* (method) that would configure the processes of individuation, self-determination, creation and praxis amongst the colonised, which are still connected to doctrines of Western individuation and determination. This is due to genres of being having specific self-programming schemas structuring consciousness that allows for individual behaviours with its consciousness to motivate behaviour (Wynter, 1984,

1999). Counter-cosmogonies and creating a new order of sociality delaminate the new structures of cognition that challenge the old orders of thinking, reasoning, feeling, perceiving and consciousness about the self. Laws governing one's origin and history become crucial determinants of cosmogony/sociogeny or mode of consciousness, but further determine the praxis of poesis, or rather a mode of auto-instituting.

Wynter (1999) always argues for the importance of biology, and the autopoietic process is one such process that is not immune to biological influence. However, for psychology in black, the connection is between biology and cognition, to explain how people auto-institute. Maturana and Varela (1980) touch on this, but explain them as separate processes or systems, while Wynter (2015) expands this as a linear process, where the social produces the biological responses, which in turn activate a mode of cognition. The role of the biological system in the process of auto-institution is articulated using the opiate-activating behaviour system, which produces negating and positive attachments in individuals and collective behaviours that enable society to auto-institute. The autopoietic system is multidimensional, and combined with the experience of colonisation, it makes any reform against colonial violence multi-layered. This multiplicity of auto-poeses allows for a theoretical entry in psychology to speak towards, the dynamics related to what alludes to concepts such as mental liberation and decolonising the mind. That should account for psychological determinants of poesis, which are linked to re-wiring cognition and its associated patterns of behaviours. This means putting the presumed life cycle or psychic structure of black lives into perspective. The task here is to elaborate on the place of metaphysical configurations that come with cognitive re-wiring, and the ability to counteract the metaphysics of anti-blackness.

Throughout this chapter, I have tried to demonstrate that there are psychological ties to Western forms of creation or auto-institution, and this does not exclude emotional ties with colonial structures and ideologies. Wynter (1984) explains this by highlighting psycho-affective determinants or references that are tied to every genre-specific mode of being. Moreover, every social reality that induces the ability to auto-institute has its psycho-affective enclosure. These are the enclosures that psychology in black seeks to derive, and link with concepts related to freedom and resistance. Psycho-affective enclosure directly shows that psychic formations are inevitable and are relative to sociogenic codes and cosmogonies, synchronised with the neurological system activating the opioid reward system. Psycho-affective enclosure probably best explains the

attachment black people have with the colonial system. This brings us to understanding psycho-affective enclosures as having their metaphysics, which may be linked to the genres of being. Psycho-affective enclosure explained within the context of autopoiesis captures feelings and emotions related to acts of resistance and emotional relief from oppression. This also captures how emotions are politicised and the autopoietic process that emotions go through. Maturana and Varela (1980) acknowledge the psychological functioning of autopoiesis, noting that any mode of autopoiesis has its determinants of cognition - and its affective determinants - hence there is variety in behavioural outcomes. Further, the cognitive realm changes the extent to which the mode of autopoiesis transforms. The changes in autopoiesis are seen in the changes in ontology (Maturana & Varela, 1980). This brings up the concept of behaviour-programming mythical schemas, that Wynter (2015, p. 219) uses to demonstrate how psychological or conscious experiences are vulnerable to social systems or realities and modes of autopoiesis. The importance here is that these behaviour-programming mythical schemas are in tune with the psycho-affective closure of subjective experience. The latter is what sets the argument for what auto-institution means for psychological reality, what psychological codes/constructs can assist with transcending colonial violence, and what builds a different mode of consciousness. Similarly, there must be psychological laws that determine the types of responses, which could be in the form of cognition or behaviour, to be produced as a result of social conditions and their sociogenic codes. The point made here is that any form of self-renewal against colonial sociality, in addition to its biological inducing system, produces a different mode of consciousness.

Wynter (1984, 2015) has suggested a praxis for autopoiesis, called the autopoietic turn/overturn, which follows Césaire's new science and Fanon's redefinition of who we are/as hybrid beings. This new science of the word captures blackness and its hybridity and emphasises science beyond the limits of natural science. The latter suggests that doing a theory of the psyche, such as psychology in black, requires a new way of looking at theorising blackness. Césaire's new science of the word is the study of the word or language with its symbolism and meanings that open up the study of nature, such as psychological complexities. Wynter (1984) expands on this by proposing that not only does it go beyond the domains of inquiry of natural science but also proposes a new order of cognition that will have its inquiry on the biological and metabiological (both body and mind). Fanon's (1986) redefinition of the study of nature or humanity towards

sociogeny is a praxis of autopoiesis. If one questions what this has to do with psychology, I propose that Wynter hopes that this new study of science, or the hybrid person would be directed at understanding performative enactment and behavioural praxis of cosmogonical and sociogenic determinants. We then understand the coherence of the latter as that which activates and together forms a genre-specific supra-individual order of consciousness (or modes of mind) while integrating the individual's fictive mode of kind. What we gather from Wynter is how schemas and behaviour have been developed and acted out, creating distinct behavioural patterns. Those are the modes of living concerned with laws of auto-institution that govern our genre-specific behaviours. Therefore, this presumes a way of theorising the psychological, and recognises the establishment of a new mode of cognition or thinking and of behaving. This means propelling a theory that unites all aspects and elements acting and taken in by the body to form specific new metaphysics. However, psychology in black, as mentioned above acknowledges the limits of autopoiesis due to the nature and severity of colonisation, as there are limits to what people can self-correct and change. In this instance, psychology in black articulates the limiting nature of auto-instituting, and the entrapment to the system that is not just social, physical and psychological, but forbids total reformation of the psychic structure. That could mean that even while trying to reform certain colonial structures, one might still be trapped in other colonial metaphysics.

Autopoiesis is further advanced by Wynter as an approach to constructing an alternative to Western forms of humanism and transforming the constructed other to the status of humanity (Wynter, 1976). Here psychology in black looks towards the development of new social systems or relations, as essential for new psychic productive powers. Wynter calls this sociopoetics, which is a new ideological reframing of one's cultural position. It is a practice of introspection that is necessary to reframe one's thinking, or a turning point towards realising how unnatural oppressive environments are. I, therefore, argue that to engage in sociopoetics is to look towards social relations to rewire actions and thoughts. The narrative advanced here is to reach "autopoietic collective-ecumenical possibilities of re-narrating new origin stories as a metaphysical resignifying imperative with class-archaic impact" (Odysseos, 2023, p. 9). The possibilities described by Odysseos could represent the formation of new counter-cosmogony and sociogenic pathways to override established metaphysics.

The restructuring of metaphysics prioritises changing the orders of consciousness and challenging colonial-induced schemas and modes of sociogeny. To extend Wynter's understanding of autopoiesis is to understand it as an opposing form of consciousness, that maintain the markers of colonial sociality. I would like to further argue that an autopoietic process is never complete, and it is particularistic to a particular kind of thinking space. The goal here is for psychology in black to narrate what it takes to restructure the psyche or reach a point of racial consciousness. Then the question would be what sort of actions, practices and thought patterns should be involved in this process, and how can one fully unpack the entangled system of oppression and multiple metaphysical conceptions? Autopoiesis in a colonial system is rather intricate because the colonial system can become totalistic and has an overarching social structure. Therefore the willingness to self-reinvent, to re-humanise and to create a new man outside Western formation and modernist prescriptions as Odysseos, (2019) hopes, can be impossible.

The task of psychology in black would also be to identify the pitfalls and limits to restructuring psychological dispositions and identify the challenge of reconfiguring several colonial narratives i.e. genres of being, simultaneously. Based on the above, one can only hope for a mode of auto-institute that can be characterised by setting the ground for the creation of strategies for reconfiguration/revitalisation of identity and culture, setting grounds for hermeneutical play, and gaining competency in manipulating social systems (Spillers, 2016). Hence, the starting point should be a psychic configuration that considers cultural formations, art, and language. Wynter (1984) would say this requires developing a certain persona, which is a particular way in which the self recreates itself within a hostile and subjugating political and social environment. Hartman's (2019) concept of waywardness symbolises the character of black people in search of a better life. Being wayward means being a fugitive, rebellious, anarchic and being cognisant of your position in the world. Those who are wayward long not to be ruled but want to self-determine (Hartman, 2019). Waywardness can be taken as a cognitive shift and autopoietic personality, which means autopoiesis is an attempt to escape, to not use the master's tools to fight captivity, to wander, to strike/riot, to claim the right to freedom and justice, and to create and insist on resisting western social and cultural ideologies, to dream about the social otherwise with new possibilities. In addition to waywardness, a wandering spirit is needed to see the possibilities of black lives beyond the intricacies

and violence of the colonial forces (Cervenak, 2014). To wander gives foundation to acts of sociopoietics; it enables that ability to diagnose problems and rethink how black lives and their modes of being could look like if they were not enforced by a colonial productive power. Cervenack (2014, p. 2) equates wandering with “daydreaming, mental and rhetorical ramblings”, that provide new pathways of thinking and being black. Black wanderers disrupt space and deviate from the normal social order in all spaces of being, whether it is through art, protest, or intellectual spaces. Wandering is not only a cognitive process, associated with rethinking oppression and being black, but also about praxis to humanity. It is the praxis that psychology in black assess, to identify regulatory practices black people engage in to start the process of detachment to colonial metaphysics.

The praxis of sociopoesis, is to grasp historically the social life and its transformations. Furthermore, it is about thinking through futural imagination and the transformation of the power of captivity towards one of futurity (Odysseos, 2019). The practice of autopoiesis, brings blackness into a paraontological state because it puts blackness in a different ontological existence. Carter (2013) notes the following as a situation to incite a paraontological state:

This very particularity of situation sets in motion, or calls for, a form of supra-inhabitation of thought or demands that a certain meta-perspective take shape right in the midst of experience, self-consciousness, or the particularities of existence. It solicits the development of a paraontological discourse (p. 591).

Carter not only invokes Fanon’s contentions with ontology by thinking of blackness with its ontological contentions, but also questions whether the use of ontology captures the multitude of blackness. This is an analytic stance that psychology in black encounters but is also suspicious of, especially when considering how one ought to think about the formation of the psychological structure when parallel modes of institution are taking place simultaneously. To narrate psychology in black during contradicting parallel ontological formations and ultimately psychological dispositions is to actively understand how black people reconcile their psychic structure/positions amidst two world positions and still think about transcending oppressive systems of thought. The implications are that autopoiesis can render the black psychic structure inconceivable and inconclusive and that leaves the theory of psychology in black as one that is open to multiple vectors of the psychic structure of blackness. Perhaps autopoiesis focuses on the

need to have a different set of analytic tools to explain the psychology of black people and its developments, especially the unconceivable tropes of thinking and being that encourage possibilities for change. Alternatively, psychology in black could highlight colonially-induced cognitive operating systems and behaviours enhancing/suppressive orders of being.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter is focused on theorising psychology in black using a Wynterian perspective. This mode of theorising is aimed at extracting the genesis of the psychic structure of black people, suggesting an analytic and methodological framing that is all-inclusive in matters concerning black psychic composition. Wynter's perspectives enable colonial factors responsible for the disruption of human systems to be expanded on and amalgamated in a way that shows the signification process of the psychological system. The purpose was to determine how psychological processes, discourses, narratives and developments are instituted by genres of being, through sociogeny and autopoiesis. The chapter argues that the institution of psychological determinants can be facilitated by colonial metaphysics. I have posited that the psychology of black people can be reiterated and theorised accurately if we consider that the psychological can be instituted. I have argued that there are genres of being that Wynter identifies, which describe modes of being in the world that have instituted particular metaphysics. The genres of being are prescriptive statements because they seek to institute who is human and who is not. They become the organising and auto-instituting principles guiding how black people experience their humanity. This auto-institution has been documented as taking place across time and space, transcending different colonial eras to become part of modernity. The latter also institutes a certain mode of sociogeny, specifying modes of cognition and behaving. From these genres of being, it was proven that psychological determinants or referential points tend to arise.

Sociogeny, as an analysis of social realities and processes, has been demonstrated as functioning within psychophysical laws, which gives it a psychological basis. Sociogeny is used in this chapter to show how the social system is crucial in the development of psychological realities and constructs. Psychology is engaged from the perspective of colonial socialisation, with its accompanying physiological response to articulate the formation of psychological phenomena. Sociogeny has led to identifying psychological constructs such as consciousness and identity, which are a result of how black people

subjectively experience themselves in a racialised setting. For psychology in black, using this theory allows for a deeper understanding of the social processes and realities associated with colonisation, possibly expanding on how colonial metaphysics is socialised to become a psychological determinant.

Genres of being and their sociogenic modes of being do not institute without an act of autopoiesis. Autopoiesis is responsible for the creation of self within multiple social contexts. As a process that takes place amongst black people in a colonial context, it guides the ability to be conscious of one's environment towards a process of escaping colonial violence. In psychological terms, it is seen in this study as representing a process of psychic configuring, allowing for the development of new psychological narratives and possibilities, but also responsible for maintaining certain colonial psychological racial scripts. From what is articulated above psychology in black can be synthesised through a theoretical grounding that engages the psychology of the black person from an onto-epistemological approach, social configuration and autopoietic perspective.

Chapter 3: Psychology in black and black geographies

3.1 Introduction

This chapter articulates psychology in black using black geographies as an enumerative concept, while demonstrating how black geographies as colonial spaces act as productive powers of the psychic structure. I commence the articulation of psychology in black by engaging black geographies first, because they symbolise the colonial structure in its physical form. The production and processing of one's being start where one occupies space. For black people, the beginning of colonial occupation starts with the invasion of their space. Black geographies represent spaces where all colonial metaphysics are groomed, tested and constructed. It is the breeding ground of all social ills, which control and dehumanise black people.

Based on the above, black geographies are essential for articulating psychology in black, because they represent an operating system and a functioning modality founded on the premise of anti-blackness. The assumption presented in this chapter is that black geographies affect the psychological operation system through underwritten colonial doctrines that facilitate spatial occupation. Black people's engagement with black geographies warrants an onto-epistemological engagement that propagates the key formation of the psychological structure. What is key to these psychic formations is the subjectivities formed, which will serve as a guide to relay functionality to the psychic structure of black geographies. Hence in this chapter, I argue that black geographies are normalised sets of colonial machinery that facilitate anti-blackness and related colonial metaphysics and ontology to create a psychological operating system. This chapter invokes a methodological and analytic stance of what psychology in black argues for, in understanding the psychology of black people. Therefore, referential points will be flagged to disseminate how the black psyche operates and is produced; this includes inferences about how psychological dispositions can be inferred, and what analytical tools can be used for analysis.

Black geographies are important for conveying psychology in black because the invasion of various spaces by white settlers symbolises where an encounter with dehumanisation starts, is maintained and managed. Since then, spaces have continued to serve as a point of crisis for black people because of the endearing danger they produce to both physical and psychological proponents of being. Land invasion and theft, forced migration,

disruption of family and social relations, spatial development and redesign are key to the development of black geographies. The ontological formations that follow also become key to extracting a psychology in black. Furthermore, the abiding ideological constructions that accompany a spatial construct of black geographies become crucial. It is within these formations that psychology in black can foreground the psychology of spatial construction within a black geographic setting. This is done while noting that spaces occupied by black people are not just places of residence, but are convoluted with techniques of oppression; meaning they not only marginalise but create states of being depicting a marginalised state. What is paramount to the discussion, is the reproduction of various social, political, and economic problems that sustain anti-blackness. Hence theorising on the black psyche from a spatialised viewpoint begins with realising that black people do not have healthy relations and attachments to the spaces they occupy. Psychology in black directs attention to spatial limitations and responses to those limitations. It proposes a psychological theory that accounts for all forms of colonial constructions that enforce multiple forms of being in black geographies.

This chapter proposes a nuanced perspective on colonial spatiality and its psychological manifestations. Here we refer to black geographies as essential in the production of blackness and the articulation of psychology in black. This study argues that the psychological is part of the discursive practices of black geographies, and can be extracted through subjectivities formed. This chapter will examine three factors. First, it looks at black spaces and their psychological underpinnings. In particular, how black geographies fashion and underwrite how black people experience themselves in the world, while identifying psychological modalities/dispositions and psychological discursive practices necessitated by black geographies. Second, it looks at black people's relations in black geographies. Here spatial practices are engaged to dissect how relations are formed and sustained in black geographies. Last, the focus is shifted to what is called black geographies contra racialisation. Here I look at how black people are set to reconfigure their occupied geographies.

3.2 Black geographies and their psychological underpinnings

“Black being then lacks not only physical space in the world but also an existential place in the antiblack world” (Palmer, 2020, p. 266). This is a presiding fact for black people residing in black geographies. Not only do black people officially experience placelessness, but they also struggle with maintaining/forming a formidable sense of

being in black geographies that have a constructed existential reality. The latter presents the argument of this chapter by tapping into the existential crisis point of black geographies. For psychology in black, black geographies are a formation and functional system that amalgamates various geographical systems and patterns to foreground a psychological reality. My view is that black geographies have demarcated psychological enclosures, which means black people's world has been tampered with and a barrier has been created in the development of social and psychological systems. In order to substantiate this a compelling account of what black geographies foreclose in the psychic realm is essential. The basis of psychology in black will be to figure out the interplay between black geographies and possible psychic configurations that further open up how the psychological manifestation of space can be theorised.

Black geographies refer to social and environmental processes with their materiality; shaped by racialised demographic patterns and historical precedents. Furthermore, they are a racially-produced and demarcated space that is also shaped by class and gender relations (McKittrick & Woods, 2007; Gilmore, 2002). Black geographies are politicised geographies with a history of enslavement, gratuitous violence, and segregation. Ideologies presiding over racialised power form foundations of black geographies, but also pre-set social and psychological discursive practices. Black people have occupied different formations of black geographies such as the shoal, oceanic, tide, middle passage, exile, prison, land and sand (King, 2019). That means one can expect multiple formations of being to be articulated. The intersection of black geographies and psychology is based on the experience of blackness, which integrates all forms of geographic violence, actions, meanings, symbols, relations and structures that black people come into contact with. Black geographies are spaces that complicate human development because they are based on the foundation of displacement and uprooting. Black geographies are scenes of torture and should be remembered as floodgates of pain that black people call home, regardless of its continuous production of a myriad of haunting thoughts, emotions, anxieties, and behaviours. Black people live in uprooted places that are highly controlled and pathologised. That is a dysfunctional, unstable, debilitating structure grounding metaphysical, ontological and psychological experiences as is expected. The above-mentioned makes way to theorise black geographies as a creator for specific cultural, ontological and psychological experiences. Psychology in black is interested in what will be the governing codes for the psychological realm, instituted by black geographies.

Psychology in black conceptualises the black psyche as revolving around multiple demarcations and dynamics of racial spatialisation. Here psychology in black sees black geographies as ideological constructs, a governing code, behavioural modifier, and relational modality, to the development of the psychic structure - in the form of subjectivities and metaphysics.

The association between black geographies and their psychological underpinnings is based on the assumption that black geographies are racial signifiers. Racialised spaces such as black geographies represent racialised ideology in a physical form. While race is known to be a determinant of socio-spatial location (Gilmore, 2002), there is an expectation that black geographies partition an exclusive mode of being and relating with the world. According to Gilmore, black geographies are essential to enforce power and create hierarchies in society. In light of the above, black geography becomes what Marriott (2021) refers to as racial symbolism because it becomes embedded with instituted structures of domination that are reflected in its social structure. Racial symbolism signifies the racialised subject to identify with it and become its possession. Black geographies are homes to many black people - in fact, an attachment is formed as well as an identification with it. I argue here that understanding black geography as a racial signifier is not only noting the social processes comprising black subjectivities, but also realising that these social processes are predetermined by racial markers embedded in black geographies (McKittrick, 2006). As such, deducing the psychological process involved in spatial internalisation and the infiltration of physical spaces in the psychological realm becomes possible. Acknowledging black geographies as racial signifiers is arguing that black geographies are driven by racial assemblages which means they represent complex political, social, and economic relations constituting the black experience (Weheliye, 2014).

To determine the psychological manifestation of black geographies one has to also recognise the amalgamation of spatial assemblages, which is noting that there is no singular experience that can explain blackness and its psychological variants. This also specifies that there is no singular psychological focal point, and any claims to such, do not accurately bring to light the convoluted nature of black experiences. Assemblages explain multiple networks or systems that are infused and then articulated to produce acts and statements, based on their relational connectivity (Weheliye, 2014). The racial assemblage that constitutes black geographies ranges from racial-spatial ideologies to

capitalist-based ideas; structural and physical violence - social and environmental violence and relational-based struggles. Based on the latter, there is a need to realise that psychological dispositions can be thought of as resulting from racial assemblages. To further expand this point, it is important to realise that each factor forming an assemblage presents a different template that guides and directs one's psychic reality. As such a racial assemblage such as black geographies can consist of multiple psychological dispositions, which can be understood through the *modus operandi* of assemblages, as articulated by Weheliye (2014): "assemblages are inherently productive entering into polyvalent becoming to produce and give expression to previously non-existent realities, thoughts, bodies, affects, spaces, actions, ideas and so on" (p. 46). This is a process of merging to institute a particular result, bringing to the fore a question of methodology to psychology in black because it encourages an analysis that focuses on how discourses, nuances and concepts intersect and combine to solidify an experience. In such a case there is a need to understand the internal operation of events and structures responsible for social and psychological formations. This suggests that there is a focal intersection point, where there are spatial conditions, structure, and racial ideologies that intersect to form a reaction, that can be categorised into a psychological experience. Therefore, black geographies are an amalgamation of racial ideologies transformed spatially, and further transformed internally by an individual. This is an account of methodological imperative for psychology in black that will be used to highlight processes involved in merging geographical experiences to form psychological constructs.

The essence of this argument is to understand what makes spatial configurations effective and successful. I argue that they are successful because the functioning of black geographies has undertones that are not communicated to the oppressed. Here we look at spatial configurations as part of colonial ideology and the emanating psychological differences that become a guiding tool for how spatial allocation should be done. In Ferreira da Silva's (2007) terms one can explain this as a movement of exteriority determining interiority. The success of spatial configurations can be explained through the concept of fatal couplings of power and difference, which Gilmore (2002) uses in the context of geographical studies, taken from Hall (1992). For Hall, fatal couplings of power and difference involve outlining combinations of power structures and resources that keep racial inhumanity successful. The extension of the fatal coupling of power and difference by Gilmore (2002) is to ascertain that the development of geographical spaces

or spatial allocation is a combination of racial ideologies and power structures that intensify the production of inhumane experiences. The fatal couplings of black geographies in the form of racial ideology, political power, gratuitous violence, and social and economic disenfranchisement produce individuals who are occupied by an enormous invisible power that forecloses specific realities and processes of signification. The process of signifying these fatal couplings is that of co-opting and confluence, and this becomes how the link between black geographies and the psychological manifestation of geographies can be fully comprehended. To further argue how the signification of spatial configurations functions between black geography and psychology is to remember that black geographies belong to a racial structure of power, and doing racial abstraction can assist in identifying the process of signification. Gilmore (2002) argues that “racism is a practice of abstraction, a death-dealing displacement of difference into hierarchies that organise relations within and between the planet’s sovereign political territories” (p. 16). Doing racial abstraction in black geographies for the purpose of psychologising would mean invoking ideologies and events structuring and mapping multiple experiences of colonial symbolism to construct a unique psychic template. In such an instance, the transformation and creation of new concepts are expected to proclaim a new language of abstraction. A new language of abstraction is a way to rid blackness of residual fluff attached to Western forms of interpretation or *logos* (Marriott, 2021). This form of abstraction is encouraged because it leads to a psychic interpretation of black people through the lens of blackness, as blackness captures experience and ideals of racialisation as it occupies multiple avenues of black life.

Below is a description of what the racial assemblage of black geographies presents, which is also an example of fatal coupling, demonstrated by Fanon (1963) below. Here, black geographies are compared to white geographies, and a racial logic is applied by Fanon to explain the “supposed” mannerisms of people occupying black geographies and we see the association between geography and behaviour:

The zone where the natives live is not complementary to the zone inhabited by the settlers. The two zones are opposed, but not in the service of a higher unity.... The settlers' town is a strongly built town, all made of stone and steel. It is a brightly lit town; the streets are covered with asphalt, and the garbage cans swallow all the leavings, unseen, unknown and hardly thought about. The settler's feet are never visible, except perhaps in the sea; but there you're never close

enough to see them. His feet are protected by strong shoes although the streets of his town are clean and even, with no holes or stones. The settler's town is a well-fed town, an easy going town; its belly is always full of good things. The settlers' town is a town of white people, of foreigners. The town belonging to the colonized people, or at least the native town, the Negro village, the medina, the reservation, is a place of ill fame, peopled by men of evil repute. They are born there, it matters little where or how; they die there, it matters not where, nor how. It is a world without spaciousness; men live there on top of each other, and their huts are built one on top of the other. The native town is a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. The native town is a crouching village, a town on its knees, a town wallowing in the mire. It is a town of niggers and dirty Arabs. (Fanon, 1963, pp. 39-40)

The description above by Fanon is probably one of the first to identify what constitutes a black geography and a 'white' geography. As seen above these two geographies show different structural formations, both physically and socially. The structural formation of black geographies is itself planned to be and produce fatal couplings. Fanon (1963) demonstrates here the level of dehumanisation considered when black geographies are constructed, and one notes the intended social realities that are to be produced. The coupled fatalities are produced through the construction of sub-par structures. Any other fatalities are a product of the type of structures built, which makes it difficult to live there. For example, racialised, economic disparities become a visible feature. This shows how black geographies are spaces where the social production of capitalism thrives, and where there is an intentional underdevelopment, making living conditions unbearable. Gilmore (2007) is correct to state that "capitalist states displace and contain highly differentiated moments of class struggle in many ways" (p. 16). In other words, class differences in black geographies occur even in structural and environmental limitations of space, and in the social reality produced.

Consequently, economic struggles facilitate the creation of survival-related ontologies and even metaphysics. One can also expect related psychic formations and experiences, which would include emotions, perceptions and behaviours, but most importantly, one should expect the rising of cognitive tools aimed at dealing with a dehumanising space. The foundation that holds black geographies implies that metaphysics will form out of the fatalities outlined, such as those of lack, poverty and death. The subjection that comes

with spatial fatalities creates subjugating realities, limiting the ability to thrive in black geographies. The above proves that psychological theory should look towards an analysis of a psychological subject, focusing on “interrelated fatalities” (Gilmore, 2002, p. 22) as enhanced by faculties of power in black geographies.

Spatial allocation is tantamount to the creation of the black subjects and their subjectivities because the ideology and doctrine of spatiality consider how social, cultural and economic characteristics of a place will construct humanity in that particular context. In addition to this, an ontological development of black geographies is also found within its social, cultural and economic compositions. Blackness, in this case, can be referred to as a psychic reality consisting of distinct psychological referential points. Blackness as a psychic reality and product of black geographies means that enunciating the psychology of black people should be about lobbying for accuracy in psychologising black people within their geographical setting. One element to be avoided in matters of black spatialisation is the ruse of analogy, referred to by Wilderson (2010), which explains the misalignment of black experiences with other racial experiences. Marriott (2021) argues that modern thought or perspective always ignores the ontological reality of the slave or black people. For example, the ontological grounding of black geography is often misinterpreted as just a consequence, and the ontological and metaphysical grounding produced by black people’s reactions to black spaces is often missed. This further means blackness as a representation of the psychological realm delineated by black geographies could be misplaced and analysed within pre-set racial scripts. That is to say, it is not enough to speak about the psychology of black people without speaking about blackness and accompanying psychological matters. Hence an argument put forward by Weheliye (2014) emphasising blackness to be at the centre of conceptual production, productive power, and an object of knowledge is important. Privileging this mode of looking at blackness geographically and psychologically means recognising that the subject being discussed produces an onto-epistemological outlook produced in oppression.

Based on the above, black geographies are considered to have a productive power and an assembling space for blackness. The diverse nature of black subjectivity and ongoing forces of powers of domination - in the form of black geographies - warrants a different form of inquiry that will deflect the naturalisation of psychological concepts. The kind of analysis being advanced here is one recognising that black geographies continue to be reformed and restructured under the liberal consensus, but also adapted by black people

to make it a liveable and comfortable space, regardless of the abiding colonial metaphysics. In such an instance, the analysis advanced here captures the continuous making of blackness, which recognises the infiniteness of black experiences or of psychic realities.

Black geographies have an ontological function, and their formation is involved in cataloguing the mind - framing certain mentalities that are equivalent to surviving that specific geography. Ultimately black geographies should be addressed as immediately partitioning acts and behaviours. This considers the various ways in which black people come to know and occupy their spaces. That means accounting for a history of black geographical occupations, and ongoing experience of space that would divulge the intricacies of occupying space. Furthermore, this is about engaging blackness as couplings of experiences that will constitute underlying psychological experiences. I further argue that psychologising on black geography can happen in two ways. First, by taking into account how individuals are introduced into a particular black geography, which is aligned with predilections about that particular geography that determines forms of interaction to come. Second, black geographies have political and power inclinations; as such there is an intended configuration and cataloguing of minds that comes from black geographies; these could refer to what Woods and McKittrick (2007) describe as “unknowable figures producing space” (p. 4) which translates into unknowable referents and determinants of the psyche.

To take into account how black people are introduced to their current occupied spaces is to historicise dynamics related to the connections and attachment with space, but also always a provocation that addresses how space is used if it is forced upon an individual. For example, displacement - through slavery and modern forms of geographic violence - and constant modern involuntary migration act as a configuration enactor, meaning an individual would know how to position themselves based on the reason that brought them to that area. Even though McKittrick (2006) makes this point when she discusses how transatlantic slavery took place in stages and locations i.e. the wall, ships, containers, colonies and slave holdings, and how different current geographic movements are formed, it is within the scope that one can note the possibility for the development of sociological and cultural movements that emanates and is aligned with a geographical location. What then matters most is how subjectivities formed will not only function and negotiate human relations but also naturalise any presiding norms of black geographies.

It is useful to look at the coupling and confluence of subjectivities formed, due to spatial patterns and black geographical movements that can be used to presume a set of parameters describing psychological functioning and phenomena. Further, to think through a process of amalgamating subjectivities from uncommon unthinkable geographies (ships or walls) or informal black geographies.

Amalgamating experiences emanating from multiple locations of black geographies to excavate subjectivities across time, requires what Wright (2015) refers to as an ‘epiphenomenal analysis of time’. Epiphenomenal time denotes that current moments/experiences are not directly caused by previous moments or encounters, which means causality is not always linear or direct and sometimes it is not given (Wright, 2015). I propose that this is how blackness - as implicitly and explicitly defining behaviour and phenomenology - in black geographies presents itself. For example, the effects of displacement might be experienced in a different location and time. This is the case because causality is enclosed by a particular time and spatiality. While epiphenomenal analysis by Wright might sound like a racial assemblage mode of analysis, epiphenomenal time analysis emphasises the need to engage different periods of black oppression to explain current phenomena. Wright also makes a case against overreliance on the exclusivity of narratives to define blackness and urges various forms of interpretation.

I would presume that the point raised by Wright is to allow a platform to link what is presumed to not be linked, especially in terms of geographical practices and their historical moments. An intervention like this simultaneously arbitrates geographical acts and behaviours. However, the above-mentioned can conceal what King (2019) refers to as a generative conceptual problem for blackness - this means coming to terms with the experience of nonlinear and contradictory experiences. Furthermore, it is to realise that there is no absolute epistemological truth in blackness, which means “disruption of the binarities and chasm that overrepresents as an epistemological truth” (King, 2019, p. 28) and must be applied to psychological knowledge and its rigid ways to the analysis of being. The analysis of subjectivities as understood through the amalgamation of spatial assemblages of black geographies demonstrates that the psychological conceptualisation of blackness is not privy to the finalities of behavioural causality but rather multiple co-causalities that function in time and space. The process of describing a psychological phenomenon is not a clear-cut one, because of the diverse ways blackness is put into

existence, and the confluences that must be considered. The difficulty in the articulation of the black psyche is an assertion that the black psyche is rather peculiar and difficult to grasp especially since there is no synchronicity between black people's experiences compared to those of other races.

Black geographies open up avenues for interpreting blackness and its psychological tenants through discursive practices that outline black geographic thoughts. Black geographical practices and their affective registers demonstrate existential conditions of blackness. The aim here is to argue that there are psychic reflexes that emanate from living in black geographies that often become characteristic features of black people occupying a certain geography. Colonial doctrine and violence write black people into space, but most importantly into a particular type of existence that necessitates the perversion of the pathology. Spillers (2018) elucidates this well when she explains that the abrupt collapse of space and time contributes to the crises configuring black passage in the world. In black geographies, blackness is written into existence with certain predispositions, attitudes, emotions, and actions. Some of the psychological phenomena identified by McKittrick (2006) characterising geographical practices include the production of corporeal schemas that are encrypted out of geographical captivity and dispossession; a disrupted sense of place; a disrupted sense of autonomy of feelings and behaviour; socialised inferiority; the creation of psychopathologies.

On the other hand, it is important to note how black people are auto-instituted ideologically and socially into these spaces, as they are co-opted to represent a particular geographical narrative. This refers to narratives structuring black geographies, which are responsible for similar discursive practices amongst black people living in places such as townships, slums, and ghettos. Seemingly, black geographies establish overarching ways in which black people should be known, behave and think, which becomes a baseline for their blackness. Meanwhile, when black people live in certain geographies, they automatically embody ideologies attached to that space, which psychologically manifest in thought patterns, beliefs, and the fashioning of societal and cultural norms. The way space is organised, and set to function represents underlying codes and laws fuelling particular political narratives through spatial interactions, and these manifest psychologically as behavioural and cognitive schemas. The apartheid regime's spatial policy is an example of how black geographies are a representation of ideologies of space, that make it easy for governments to exercise mental/psychological control. Apartheid

can be identified as a racial ideology that advances racial segregation, discrimination, control of black people and a system of social engineering (Bonner et al., 1995). Apartheid was based on segregation and separate development amongst black and white people.

Segregation is the policy of pushing the Black man out of the way of the White man, in order that the European can preserve his own racial purity, and keep it free from the so-called impure colour of the Native. But since the cheap labour of the Native would be needed in the European industries, segregation would ensure that this labour would always be available.....Worst of all, under segregation, the Bantu would remain in a state of semi-slavery for a period that might stretch into centuries. There would be no outlets in any direction, 'and they would continue to be regarded as an inferior race to the White man. (Bonner et al., 1995, p. 365)

Bringing apartheid spatial policy into the discussion is to show that spaces should not be taken as just places of occupation with emerging outcomes, but rather be seen first from their partitioning and fashioning narratives, before specifying what they have done to an individual. To be able to excavate the premises set on black geographies is to realise its founding ideologies and provisions but also a way to outline its psychological imperatives. The ideology of segregation is rooted in racial codes i.e. racial purity, white supremacy, and laws of being which are used as a premise in founding townships and Bantustans. Spillers (1987) argues that governance in spaces of segregation threatens self-consciousness, the autonomy of behaviour and morality. To support Spillers' point, apartheid spatial ideology has set ideologies that would determine how black people relate to themselves and their environment, and also driving a metaphysical agenda related to control and lack. The abiding metaphysics is the one facilitated by the ethos of capitalism and autonomy. Bonner et al., (1995) argue that apartheid spatial ideology advanced the following: regulation of spaces, that inform movement to certain areas and behavioural codes; control over economic activity and making townships a place to source labour, and sustaining the apartheid government's economy; keeping black people in poverty, by placing them far away from economic hubs, and not permitting any economic movement to be initiated by black people; confinement of black people to townships unless they had a pass to work and provide labour; an inability for black people to own a house, trade, or distribute anything; and received limited or no service delivery.

The above not only explains the segregation policy, endorsed by capital gain and inequality, but also gives coherency and rationality for uneven geographic processes and arrangements (McKittrick, 2006). These are various components of spatial segregation that translate into the formation of multitudes of racial assemblages, and that will unite into an amalgamation process instituting a metaphysics of racial capitalism. This necessitates the use of class to further understand the social and psychological narrative of place. The danger in the latter is the naturalisation of inequality, which leads to certain capital-based socially determined acts (McKittrick, 2006). Alternatively, one can simply look at the form of consciousness emerging out of ideologies based on economic forms of power in black societies as Woods (1998) noted.

If one considers the consciousness of space, one expects confusion or need to realign because of racial assemblages that need to be made sense of to develop a cohesive and comprehensive state of being or self. Epiphenomenal time (Wright, 2015) is still relevant because the analysis of consciousness becomes multifaceted, as it links the experience of a colonial phenomenon i.e. capitalism, associated with black geography across various time frames. If analysis is done in this way, consciousness is understood from the emanating social system, which will inform the psychological structuring involved. Seemingly, unthought metaphysical outcomes that appear in one's consciousness can be analysed. Black geographies as initiated under economic deprivation, for example, form a metaphysics of lack and desperation, which means invoking a survival praxis that will not only heighten one's consciousness, but a physiological system as well. Survival is a praxis of being that requires one to identify practices, behaviour, thoughts and acts in ideologies and systems available regardless of whether they are detrimental or not. I argue here that this is how one can account for or identify psychological entrapments and growth associated with black geographies. The latter puts Woods's (1998) concept of arrested movements into perspective. In a sense, survival can hinder attempts to transform, which helps make a case for the appearance of psychological entrapments, further opening space to psychic reflexes or conditioned responses as geographical patterns.

Psychology in black would then see psychological determinants such as ideologies as invisible aspects of space, and that psychic signifiers should be part of the analysis of spatiality, because psychic signifiers are also attached to the processes of social configuration. Furthermore, it is important to understand the internal operating systems

of being that make black geographies successful in co-opting an individual mindset. Psychology in black then identifies what black geographies partition out of black people to form a functioning system of being. Manganyi (1973) provides more insight into this by outlining what could be referred to as psychic demands of space. When I refer to these, I propose that which naturalises an individual to a space occupied, which could be due to manipulation or wilful participation. Manganyi (1973) facilitates the realisation that for black geographies in the context of South Africa i.e. townships, to be fully functional an appeal must be made to the moral consciousness of people. This means both black and white people have to be convinced to conform to the new structure of separation. To demonstrate this, Manganyi (1973) uses a concept called “psychology of ideological totalism” by Lifton (1989) to demonstrate this. Lifton (1989) explains the psychology of ideological totalism as:

any set of emotionally charged convictions about man and his relationship to the natural or supernatural world, may be carried by its adherents in a totalistic direction. But this is most likely to occur with those ideologies which are most sweeping in their content and most ambitious or messianic in their claims, whether religious, political, or scientific. (p. 419)

By using this definition, Manganyi (1973) teases out several criteria to show how psychological, ideological totalism works in apartheid South Africa. The criteria include: milieu control, taking the form of censorship and indoctrination; totalistic environments developing mystic imperatives - emphasise higher purpose for an act -; there is a demand for purity, resulting in binaries of good/bad; demand for purity leads to demand for total exposure to an individual, to exercise control; ideologies are made sacred with their underlying assumptions; creation of sacredness of ideology and prohibiting any form of questioning; tendency to load language with emotionally charging words; and elevation of doctrine over an individual (Manganyi, 1973). Manganyi's intervention shows how black geographies can be interjected by constructed laws of space that are unconsciously inscribed using psychic techniques. There is a case to be made regarding the justification and psychological manipulation of spatial segregation and violence. One would argue here that this act of manipulation results in internalisation of spatial violence and manipulates black people to believe and adapt to the spatial unevenness.

To sum up, black geographies are planned spatiality, existing within a set of ideologies and metaphysics. It further co-opts one's psychic structure and turns itself into a dominating structure in the lives of black people. It uses space to show the enactment of colonial rule, and its manifestation in the black psyche symbolises an enchantment of psychology in black. Regardless, black geographies incite various modes of understanding the black psyche, because of its complexity and multiplicity. Hence psychology in black is articulated as an adoption of various methods and lenses, an analytical standpoint to understand the psyche from a spatial perspective. The ability to do this makes black geographies a strong productive power of the psyche.

3.3 Inventions of black relations

Black geographies - spatial injustices and complexities - have to be extended to the functionality and genesis of black people's relations. Black people's relations - also referred to as 'black relations' - are a significant part of black geographies' social process. They are responsible for what is referred to as the social production of space; which demonstrates through relations meanings and identities formed, social relations that become spatial practices and relations that begin to mirror black geographies.

The purpose of outlining the genealogy of black relations is to map out and understand the relations of those who are enslaved and violated; displaced and thus wander; and those who are homeless and at home at the same time. In addition, it is important to note that black people have to relate to one another, within the set of predetermined limitations that are both socially and structurally invented. Black geographies as colonial-infested space, foregrounds how black relations will be structured and function.

Psychology in black argues that social relations are determined by black geographies and their determined psychic structure. Moreover, psychology in black is interested in selected psychological by-products that emanate from the development of relations in black geographies. Psychology in black does assume that black geographies directly underwrite black relations. Similarly, social interactions are also guided by the space and possibilities they bring. Black relations depict a particular form of metaphysics that is indicative of the structure of black geographies and their experience. Seemingly, black geographies dictate the manner and mode in which relating is done. With that said, it will be essential to bring forth a theory of black relationality that articulates relationships as framed by black geographies. To foreground the link between black relationality and

black geography, the work by Glissant (1997) is crucial, because it is located within encounters of slavery, privileging history to explain the existential relationality - probing the nature of black relations and functionality - of blackness.

Before expanding on black relationality, I would like to lay a foundation for what the process and journey of developing black geographies represents for black relations. Black geographies are developed under the principle of land disposition. Black people living in black geographies do not own the land they occupy, rather they would occupy a flat or a yard. Land dispossession ultimately means a disruption in the black ecological system and its metaphysical function. Ramose (2005) expands on the notion of humanness as grounding the African ecological system based on ubuntu - which serves as an ontology for African people's relations. This explains that humanness is a complex system of wholeness that involves a multilayered interaction of all entities marking humanity. The principle of wholeness implies that there is an everlasting relationship between human beings and their environment. The latter unfolds as part of the African ontological and metaphysical system that emphasises the notion of care for one another and the environment. Caring for one another means caring for the environment. This ecological system has since been eroded and affected by land dispossessions and the slave trade; that includes any colonial activity that has removed people from their homelands and placed them in black geographies that do not offer an opportunity to have autonomy over the land. Lack of land autonomy in black geographies means people cannot take care of the land and one another, or not rely on the environment to take care of one another or themselves. Hence, More (2011) argues that denial of land denies an individual access to life and the right to life, thus, condemning people to a life of poverty. Ramose (2005) further argues that the autopoietic act of interacting with the environment is the pursuit of self-preservation. In black geographies the assertion made by Ramose is nearly impossible, meaning black people's relations will suffer due to not having land to use and to take care of each other and themselves.

Psychology in black is interested in this breakdown of the metaphysical structure of relational care, seen through the disruption of the ecological system, which ultimately displaces psychological nuances attached to creating and maintaining relations. I argue that black relationality has been destroyed by land dispossession, coupled with the kidnapping of black people, and formations of slavery. Furthermore, a breakdown in the

ecological system equates to a breakdown in the metaphysical foundation of black relations, which was the guiding framework of relating. Moreover, black people were then forced to create relations based on the physical and metaphysical structures of black geographies, and even create new ecological systems that would be responsible for how individuals relate/connect with their environment. While focusing on this breakdown, Palmer (2020) makes one aware that relationality creates subjectivity. As such the breakdown of black relations raises concerns about the metaphysics and ontology of relations brewing/growing in such relational and spatial dysfunctions. Another breakage of the black ecological system which sought to replace the structure of black metaphysics, is slavery or any master-slave relation that becomes a symbol of black relations. As Spillers (2003) notes, slave masters ensured that the enslaved did not belong to any natural order i.e. flora and fauna. As explicated in her earlier works, Spillers (1987) expands on the following about the disruption of the ecological system: “The loss of the indigenous name/land provides a metaphor of displacement for other human and cultural features and relations, including the displacement of the genitalia, the female's and the male's desire that engenders future” (p. 3). Here Spillers explains how the social structure suffers most due to ecological disruptions, because of the potential to be disarmed socially and vulnerable to embody other ecological systems. Spillers (1987) expands on two ways in which slavery directly discourages social relations: First; the enslaved becomes the property of the slave master, and as a result, being kinless becomes a requirement. Second, the conditions of slavery create economic and social agents that encourage being outside the kinship system (Spillers, 1987). Hartman (1997) associates this with the possibility of being the property of the slave master, which renders one's social condition to be fungible. The slave-master relation is crucial for black relational development because of the possibilities it brings in the dynamics of black people's relations. For example, the practice of ownership of black people by slave masters is a social process that tends to be unconsciously transferred to black people. This often opens avenues for black people to see themselves through the lens of white people. This is the possibility that Fanon (1986) alludes to which has become a social and psychological reality. In such circumstances, it is notable that even relations have their metaphysical constructions, and these metaphysical constructions include those advanced by spatiality. The interference of slavery in black relations originates in what Winnibust (2019) refers to as an ‘economic ontology’. An economic ontology is based on the fungibility of

blackness. Fungibility depicts a system of commodification and exchange of black lives as commodities. It is captured through a *modus operandi* of the slave system and can translate to other sectors of the social system such as gender (Spillers, 1987). At the same time, it occupies an ontological system of humanity. Black geographies harbour this system of fungibility and are directly created to support its enforcement by providing the labour force. Fungibility necessitates relations that support and enhance the commodification of relations, through the mirroring system (witnessing slave-master practices), the norms and values of the structure of relations are within the ontology of exchange. The fungibility of black relations becomes a possibility, based on Hartman's demonstration that slavery was made to look like an organic relationship, whereby the hierarchy of dominance and subordinate still exists today. Black geographies provide a perfect fatal coupling with relations by virtue of their being established to provide labour to economic hubs. Based on this, I argue that the ontology of economics or exchange filters into black people's relations, resulting in relations that mimic transactions; relations suffer due to lack of resources; and rewrite the metaphysic of black relations towards a system of commodities.

An economic ontology bases the legitimacy of black relations based on the merits of what will be beneficial for the system. The devaluing of the kinship structure depicts this, and misplaces the black family system. In addition to this, black kinships have suffered the most in the creation of black geographies. The kinship structure was first disrupted during the kidnappings of black people in plantations and slave ships, and the introduction of the labour migration system. Within the slavery system, the children of slaves did not belong to them, but rather to the master; thus the children became orphans even while their parents were alive (Spillers, 1987). The negation of kinship, as Hartman (1997) explains, is relevant in cases like South Africa, where the migrant labour system displaced fathers outside of their families. The latter shows the destabilisation of black kinship, making kinships a mirror of the geography they currently occupy. As such relations function similarly to their geographical location to such an extent that cultures are formed based on sets of relations produced. I invoke this discussion because history is happening in the current, where in black geographies this represents a vestibular culture that Spillers (1987) mentions as taking place, in the sense that black geographies become sources of labour and economic activities that continuously estrange black people from their

families. With this in mind, historiography should be a crucial framing tool in identifying relational patterns in the present and future.

The concept of vestibular culture by Spillers (1987) explains how black people mirror the society around them or do what their space requires of them making a referential point towards noting the existential relationality of blackness. The point here is to note whether black relations mirror their environment and if their development is based on spatial circumstances or limitations. Also, can this mirroring be attributed to the adaptation of black people to black geographies, which also makes a case for the formation of cultures? The presiding matter is also about the unconscious restructuring and destruction of black relations, the pathways of negation that were developed, and normalising the disintegration of black people through the geographical social system. Hence in black geographies one would need to do what King (2015) refers to as canvassing a different relational praxis. King argues that kinships - whether relatives, nations or citizens - must surrender to the erotic of chaos, enabling new forms of affects and new ways of being black. Being uprooted into black geographies must not only have rifled with norms and values attached to relationship structures, but also the occupation means the creation of new familial structures. With that being said the structure of emotions/attachment changes to accommodate new spatial requirements; this includes gender relations that are under immersed pressure as demonstrated by Fanon (1986) and more especially in the colonial condition. Hence, Glissant's (1997) synopsis of spatiality and its historicity seems fitting to announce the metaphysics of black people's relations and their psychological significance. Being cognisant of the social, spatial and political schemas built into metaphysics governing black people's relations is imperative, further questioning how black relations portray wounds and traumas of the colonial past. Moreover, to theorise black geographies with their relationality is calling on various vectors of relational encounters.

Black relations can be articulated as discursive and demonstrative of the violent and oppressive conditions of black geographies. It is through relations that the function of space is seen and understood. Glissant lays a foundation for this, by outlining some of the social and individual encounters that account for the structural elements of black relations. Glissant coined the term poetics of relations, to theorise not only the politics of relations and relating, but also the intricacies and protocols that underline black people's

relations. His work encourages the reading of black people's relations as political and needing a historical reading; that means situating the onset of any spatial encounter and the emergence of new spaces and geographies on black relations. The history of slave kidnappings and the location of enslavement as articulated above opens up avenues for theorising about the foundations of black people's relations. Noting the slave ship as a first encounter of black spatiality and its bearing on relationships, opens up an avenue to historicise any colonial encounter that participates in tearing apart the structure of black relations. Building a theory of relations means identifying some of the protocols black people use to devise ideas about relating with others, especially within an oppressed colonial setting. This means identifying psychic practices that facilitate modes of relating. An important protocol Glissant describes as fundamental for black relations includes having shared knowledge. Further to this, black relations function through a rhizomatic thought process, which means making sense of one's space and people in that space and the relational needs required to survive that particular space. The other person is also an important factor because a shared goal with the other is important for relating in an antiblack world to effect change. To extend what Glissant articulates, a theory of black relationality needs to be extended further, by locating psychological nuances that emanate from relational processes in black geographies. Black geographies consist of a plethora of symbols, acts, behaviours and cultures that form discourses that will "conjugate social relations" (Spillers, 2003, p. xxi). They include a process of figuration and configuration that associates spatial artefacts, and products and structures to form connecting ties between individuals occupying that space.

To construct a discourse of relationality that intercedes between black geography and the black psyche, one has to detect affective elements related to the occupation of space. Palmer (2020) argues that "the World comes into being through the affective encounter" (p. 247). Here Palmer indicates the internalising proposition of being in the world, which indicates an affective encounter to explain how an individual is affected by the world. One of the ways to be sure of the productive power of black geographies would be through affective encounters and connections that are made. Ultimately, these affective encounters become a structure of black relations and their metaphysics in black geographies, especially since "the affective encounter is defined by the grammars of relation and becoming" (Palmer, 2020, p. 247). The argument here is that any geographical movement, practice, or pattern i.e. how individuals are introduced to a

particular location, partitions the connections individuals will have with each other because space mediates the quality of relations as space forecloses the autonomy and movements needed for the relations to be nurtured. If one looks at involuntary migration patterns, it has a bearing on the structure of relations, since there has to be a restructuring of previous relations and the formation of new ones. New relationships formed should be aligned with patterns, rules, ideas, and functions, which had to mirror and assist in the survival of occupying new places. The metaphor of 'the open boat' by Glissant (1997, p. 5) assists in articulating this idea. The open boat in this study is not only an approach and a depiction of a situation, but also a methodology of reading black geographical relations. It is a methodology of deriving social patterns, ideological formation ascribed to relations and psychic modalities attached to black people's relations. Additionally, the open boat signifies for psychology in black how crucial it is to outline geopolitical formations of relations to accurately extract psychological enclosures. The open boat analogy is expanded on by Glissant as a moment between the abduction of black people to the new lands, whereby the boat becomes/signifies the first space/place of torture (such as the slave ship), where the anticipation of a new land arises, and becomes the womb that carries death and life. I would like to portray the boat as expressed here, to be a highly emotive place, and Glissant (1997) expresses it as consisting of affective narratives that resemble moments of trauma and anxiety due to displacement and dislocation. The open boat depicts a "complicated relationship that obtains between a geopolitical entity and an individual subject" (Spillers, 2003, p. 29). In this case, the layers of spatial dominations cut across multiple derivatives that define human experience. But what could also be seen here is the formation of cognitive schema, which puts together templates of relations and related geography.

Nevertheless, the formation of relations with others does not necessarily mean freedom but a moment of survival, which also does not necessarily mean better adjustment to the colonial conditions. Theorising black people's relations should be done in a way that compares how relations were occurring and in which geographical location. Moreover, knowing what shapes black geographies - that is the assemblages that form it and its geopolitical formation - allows the possibility to engage how each of those geopolitical factors writes the schemas of black relations. The open boat allows for the interpretation of the multiple figurations of the psychic structure, such as emotions, behaviours and acts that become founding principles of relations.

A matter to consider in theorising black relationality is using the historicity of relations to identify the possibility of black relations forming part of the subjugation machinery. This is to question how geographical spaces sustain and nourish subjugating relations. To answer this question, the concept of relationality with affectability by Ferreira da Silva (2003) is useful. Affectability, according to Ferreira da Silva (2003), refers to “the condition of being subjected to both natural conditions - in the scientific and lay sense - of others’ power” (p. xv). In addition to affectability, Ferreira da Silva devises a concept called affectable I which refers to the construction of non-European minds. Relationality and spatiality are part of the colonial tools that construct affectability and affectable I. An important factor Ferreira da Silva explains is how the colonised other is constructed through relations and colonial factors that structures black people’s conditions of existence. It appears as though da Silva brings in the conversation of relationality, to the individual self and the apparent psychological apparatus employed by colonial relationality. She positions colonial doctrine established within relations to an individual psychic space, by noting the ‘I’ that is subjugated by colonial power. Ferreira da Silva (2003) writes: “Spatiality demarcates and displaces interiority to establish exteriority as the ruler of signification” (p. 26-27). Any means that is internal to establishing the self is taken over by external factors such as spatiality, which can overtake self-consciousness and overemphasise social dynamics as essential for the establishment of the self. In such a context, psychology in black should dissect how external factors such as spatiality and relationality transform the affectable ‘I’. That asks to what extent does the formation of this part of the psychic structure happen and when do external factors transition to internal factors - the affectable ‘I’?

Another crucial element raised by Ferreira da Silva (2003) is viewing spatiality as the site for signification and subjectification. To give the latter some depth, the open boat/ship is the first point/location of spatial signification and subjectification because this encounter required black people to immediately start rationalising their new space and how their new relationships were going to be negotiated and structured. The type of relations i.e. domineering or submissive relations in black geographies, becomes a factor to consider, if one is to argue for the presence of subjection in black relations. Relationships of domination in black geographies are common, mainly due to the imbalance and inequalities of the social and economic structure. Simultaneously, Glissant (1997) raises the affective component of space, which positions relationality to be viewed from a

perspective of multiplicity. Multiplicity in black relations should be taken as a methodology that accounts for factors that concord with how one forms black relations. Multiplicity accounts for relational making, in the form of culture, relational affections, spatial limitations towards relationship formation and the subsequent type of relationship that forms. If one uses spatial affect and relationality as an example of multiplicity, a factor such as spatial displacement, shown by Glissant, becomes informative in identifying how emotions related to space are produced. When individuals are displaced, one gets to see what Macharia (2019) refers to as a “multiplicity of sense-apprehensions, including recognition, disorientation, compassion, pity, disgust, condescension, lust, titillation, arousal and exhaustion” (p. 17). The latter is coupled with feelings of being disarmed, mourning and grief because black geographies are connected to multiple forms of loss, which include the loss of people, culture and the land that sustained relations. Hence, Glissant, (1997) describes that black people felt “the panic of the new land, the haunting of the former land, finally the alliance with the imposed land, suffered and redeemed” (p. 7). To bring this discussion into the ‘modern society’ or new world is to figure out the extent to which generations struggle to relate. The concept of the abyss articulated by Glissant also captures the feelings that are brought by black geographies, that people occupying the space adopt and use to relate with one another as shared knowledge. Here is an example from Glissant (1997) that shows how the feeling of the abyss unfolds:

Experience of the abyss lies inside and outside the abyss. The torment of those who never escaped it: straight from the belly of the slave ship into the violet belly of the ocean depths they went. But their ordeal did not die; it quickened into this continuous/discontinuous thing: the panic of the new land, the haunting of the former land, and finally the alliance with the imposed land, suffered and redeemed. The unconscious memory of the abyss served as the alluvium for these metamorphoses. (p. 7)

The experience of the abyss demonstrates an internal occupation of space and describes how black geographies are affective discordant spaces, symbolising a state of duplicity but also a feeling of the unknown, and as a space that cannot be escaped from. I, therefore, argue that having a discordant sense of space can translate into having ambiguous relations; meaning relations that mimic black geographies. Black geographies therefore

disrupt the structure of black relations; that means any experience of spatial violence or limitation can be taken into one's personal space, leading to a circumstance whereby any "form of pleasure and pain are tethered to each other under the conditions of conquest" (King, 2015, p. 153). Blackness and its relational structures will mirror the conditions of the occupied geography. The concern about this is that black relations are forming under duress and amidst spatial limitations, and hence the concern will be on the foundation of black relations. In such conditions, relationships form under the banner of "work out survival with and through one another" (King, 2015, p. 152). Here black relations mimic a state of liminality because of constant feelings of the abyss. Since black relations can either be a tool for both colonisation and anti-colonial struggles (Adair, 2019), liminality in relations can be explained by Wilderson's (2010) term 'conflictual harmony'. Wilderson uses this term to explain the relationship between the slave and his master, and this conflictual harmony became a protective factor, shielding black people from the cold incoherence of antagonism. Conflict and harmony are two opposing words that are used to indicate an individual survival entry in racial relationships. Black people's relationships are like this; they are conflicting, good, and bad at the same time, hence liminal. Liminality is an important mediator of space and relationship because it highlights not only the uncertainties of blackness and the contradiction between freedom and oppression, but also the infiltration of power into the internal (interior space).

The relevance of the above-mentioned is based on whether black geographical aesthetics and utility provide dignity and self-respect to allow the development of healthy relations. Alternatively, one could argue that black geographies deactivate an intellectual dimension responsible for creating healthy relations between black people. This symbolises the need to determine if there is psychological apparatus used to cultivate relations, to realise that relations are what depicted, and whether black geographies have been successful in their intended colonial role. The breakdown of the ecological system and land dispossession can misalign and restructure black people's relations, especially since people are direct recipients of any spatial inequalities and development. Relations that stem from or develop with elements of spatial deficit, will have implications on the individual's and community's self-hood, self-determination, and self-development. The burden that black people occupy is the ability to be held hostage by racialised metaphysics related to black relationality, which seems to be based on internalised struggles of black geographies. Fanon (1986) demonstrates how deep racialised discourses of blackness

affect black people's relations by pointing out the crisis that exists in their gender relations. There is a crisis that exists in what we would presume to be romantic relationships/gender relations where racial stereotypes surface to determine if there will be any form of interaction. Additionally, spatial dynamics naturalise such preconceived ideas. By naturalising I mean that relational practices, whether good or not, become part of the social contract of that particular geography. Even more so a relational practice can be given a space to function in both the metaphysics of black geographies and of black relations. In black geographies, social constructs are even fashioned out of social and material needs, which means there will be unique behaviours that will emanate in such instances. Hence, in the presence of relational metaphysics, there is metaphysics attached to space, which is often used to identify individuals from a particular place, and how they do things. A crucial psychological matter to be derived from the metaphysics of relations is that they are mainly unconscious. They are unconscious because what drives spatially informed relations is a combination of preconceived ideas and the previous experience of space and others. The social and physical spaces are convoluted by internalised, racial discourse making the possibility of black relations unhealthy.

Every discursive practice of space has to be traced back to the political functionality of that space, particularly the structure or spatiality. It is also important to figure out what spatial qualities or structural forms allow for different use of space and allow a better formation of relations. In the context of this study, relations become a reflection of spatiality and also a depiction of how black people conceptualise and partition their relations. Hence, I argue that relations are part of the discursive construction of space. A point raised by Massey (1993) is that "society is necessarily constructed spatially - and that fact, the spatial organisation of society - makes a difference in how it works" (p. 143-144). Massey is indicating that spaces do not function without people and people do not function without spaces. The functionality of spatiality has to be understood as a social production of space through past racial geographies and merged with the current depiction or maintenance of geography (McKittrick, 2006). The latter forms part of unpacking relational subjectivity and existential relationality.

At the other end of the underwritten metaphysics of relations, there is a social production of space, which takes a different course of direction in black geographies. It is a form of use of space that Moten (2017) and Harris (2018) call 'black sociality'. The production of sociality exists within a state and "act of natal alienation: this is the social death of the

slave” (Patterson, 1985, p. 38). Hence the question of producing a healthy black sociality becomes a call for concern, because of the history of social negation that has established a black social system that is desocialised and depersonalised (Patterson, 1985). Moten (2017) raises a question similar to previous remarks, by sharing a concern of socio-economic dispossession, as opening a possibility that forestalls black relations. Nonetheless, we call on what Moten refers to as black (socio-) apparatus and ontology of sociality to advance an alternative. Black sociality also theorises on alternative ways of living that congregate resources, organisations, collaborations, and people. Seemingly black sociality equates to how black people make black geographies liveable, regardless of their limitations. A crucial element here, is the poesis involved and questions that could inform black existential relationality. Black existential relationality is concerned with how black relations are thought of in relation to the questions of being, freedom, survival and oppression. Here matters of relating are intertwined with possibilities and limitations of spatiality. In this regard, black sociality demonstrates psychic approaches that facilitate acts and thoughts behind the formation and maintenance of relationships (Harris, 2018). One way to demonstrate black existential relationality is through the concept of errantry by Glissant (1997) which considers how sociality takes place in black geographies. Glissant apprehends relations by highlighting the unruliness, scatteredness, creativity and disorderly thoughts/behaviours that are demanded by virtue of occupying black geographies. Glissant actually argues that black people’s relations must demonstrate some form of deviance to navigate oppression. Adopting a sense of deviance in black relations happens in diverse ways, but most often in the form of protest movements. However, if one equates it to everyday experiences, it becomes unclear. It is unclear because the consideration of errantry as a social practice looks towards dynamics presented in the socialisation of black people. The nature of black socialisation in black geographies should take up the discussion on sociality and existential questions of relationality. Below Manganyi (1973) puts sociality and its existential concerns for relations in perspective:

An idea which appeals to my fancy amounts to saying that Black Consciousness and solidarity must mean to us that we have to re-examine the forms assumed by personal and community relationships in our midst. This is necessary for the simple reason that we have the mutual knowledge about the assault on the sense of community that befell us. Our spirit of communalism was gradually eroded

until we were left with individualism and its stablemate materialism. Solidarity among other things means that we as a people have to share. This sharing is all-embracing, since it involves the sharing not only of material things but also of suffering and the possible joys of being-black-in-the-world. It may now be said that in the past we have not shared as we should have because in order to share, it is imperative to have the mutuality of knowledge of suffering which is now anchored in Black Consciousness. (p. 20)

Black consciousness, as Manganyi argues, becomes a socialising ontology and a mode of sociality that seeks to guide and enhance black people's relations under a common goal. It proposes a guiding ontology or principle, based on shared struggle, and a basis for sharing resources. However, the limitation of this is that black people generally do not have resources sufficient to share and the guiding metaphysics of poverty or lack may permeate black relations. Similarly, black consciousness can be explained as an aesthetic of sociality of blackness, which Harries (2018) identifies as a process of reconstruction, innovation, insurgence and reconfiguring. Here Black Consciousness emphasises mutual knowledge and sharing material resources; any success of the formation of a community is based on the knowledge of being an oppressed subject. Manganyi (1973) holds that if a community does not identify with one another, no formation of relations can be expected, especially in a fragmented community that has been rid of its sense of communalism. This form of sociality raises concerns about what it means to be conscious about one's relations and the formation thereof. This means consciousness is not theorised as not an individual matter but a collective matter, which presupposes the rewiring of thought about blackness on a collective scale. When Biko (2004) centres black consciousness as a communal act, he recognises that black relations are at a fragmented point and will become a barrier to achieving any form of freedom. Most importantly, he realises that it is a unifying idea that gives a "black community new-found pride in themselves, their efforts, their value systems, their culture, their religion and their outlook to life" (Biko, 2004, p. 53). To centre black geographies here, do black people need to have consciousness of what their occupied geographies entail? Do they need to be aware of how their suffering is linked to the systematic creation of their occupied geography, which fairly means they can be aware of the disintegration their communities experience?

One key element demonstrated by Glissant (1997) is that relations are also rationalised and thought of and often do not exist by chance. This is what the theorisation of black consciousness presupposes. The reliance on psychological resources, such as consciousness and knowledge to plan and mend black relations, while considering matters of geographical oppression, opens up the possibility of an honest discussion about the impact of black geographies on black relations. Here I am pointing towards the possibility of creating new subjectivities in black people's relations to allow a response to a hostile environment that does not negate others. Through this synthesis, one needs to be able to deduct discursive practices that culminate psychological acts to precipitate recreating one's sense of self through relations and space, especially since the self is built with others within a geographical setting. Through relational theories such as black consciousness, there is a possibility of creating a methodological directive that outlines the social discourse of relating that argues for how black people think and rationalise oppressive circumstances. Psychology in black in this case partitions how relations are made functional and thought about. The occupied black geography, its mode of minding and the avenues it provides in the formation of relationships become crucial.

Black relations mimic the contradictions of blackness, and this can be demonstrated by the "ties and tensions between material, ideological domination, and oppositional spatial practices" (McKittrick, 2006, xiv). For example, black people are expected to present a sense of unity, or a togetherness based on their shared brutal history. It is somehow expected that a shared colonial past should inform the foundation of their relations. However, this is not an utterly wrong demand but a misguided one, that doesn't consider the demeanour of colonial violence and continued colonial enforcement and power. If shared history forms a basis for relating, then the shared history will be the reason relations will be fragmented. They become fragments because envisioned relations are envisioned within a set racial scripts, and lived within the racial script (this refers to black geographies). Seemingly, if relations formed on this basis are referred to as oppositional relational practice, then black relationality is based on a poor foundation. Moreover, there is a possibility for an occurrence of incongruence between expected relationality, ontology and geography. If the process of reorienting and restructuring consciousness to fight racial domination is done on a collective level, how much of it is done unto relations? Restructuring or reorienting relations becomes tricky because they take the form of the presiding ontology of where individuals reside. If black geographies resemble

an economic ontology, where communication and connection are transactional and based on classist norms, there is a possibility that any proclamation of unity will not be successful. In addition, if living conditions do not change, there is no possibility of having successful relations. Hence Glissant (1997) is correct when he opines that relations tend to be tragic. They are convoluted by every political, social and economic state. For example, the fragmentation of the black resistance movement that Biko (2004) describes was because leaders wanted to work with the apartheid government, and there was a concern about what it would mean for the movement and black people. This pitfall of the resistance movement is a pitfall from an ideological basis of relation that shows how the economic ontology stalls thinking and being. The precarity of blackness is a proclamation of the precariousness of black relations. The fragility and vulnerability of black relations are based on the state of consciousness of individuals and unconscious experiences. The limitation imposed by black geographies makes approaching relations on the level of survival, meaning the focus of relating is to address structural issues, which is demonstrated through protest movements. In this case, building a community means uniting against a common issue, such as service delivery, imposition and concessions of colonial violence, which means geographical spatialisation issues are not addressed. This form of errantry still embodies the socialisation and norms of the colonial order which might impede or undermine what the relations were intended to do. This means the envisioned progressive mode of relating has social and spatial constraints and restrictions that might permeate psychic and social structures. There are two ways in which one can view this matter; - one is based on the fact that black people can unite to address communal and at some point, racial struggles. The second way is to realise that even when they can come together under a unifying cause, black relations are still fragmented because of pervasive violence and ontologies internalised that are beyond their control. It is therefore acceptable to say black relations taking place in a racialised society and geographies, ultimately maintain the production of racial undertones and ideologies and even relational pathologies.

Black people's relations are a conflicting practice, surrounded by suspicion and incongruity. These relations can simultaneously be good and bad, especially since they emanate from an unconscious dominated by colonial doctrines and dominating geography. They continue to become a negotiated social and psychological practice, because of the alienated foundation they stem from. At this point, black relations continue

to change in patterns and adjust to geographical circumstances. To move from the parasitic nature of black geographies that partition alienation towards one another, the practice of opacity, as demonstrated by Glissant (1997), becomes important. The right to opacity is essentially the right to difference, asserting the importance of difference as a core to relations and embracing human beings in their natural cultural state. There needs to be a willingness to accept the contradiction and ties of ideological domination and oppositional spatial practices, as McKittrick (2006) notes they infiltrate the personal space of relating. In this context, opacity is harmonised as a psychic practice that is akin to compartmentalising relations for them to be thought of from a diverse standpoint. The ability to be cognisant of the contradictions that emerge in black relations is what opacity represents, and that which black geographies necessitate, but also require of an individual. The latter emphasises the need to read and assess black relations as opaque, inconsistent, apperceptive, inconceivable, inconclusive, unpalatable, and non-homogeneous. This is even more relevant for those occupying black geographies, as the conditions do not allow the development of healthy relations. This is another way to figure out the racialised unconscious stereotypes that have been internalised, in which black people view one another. The process of relating to developing a mindset that overwrites internalised and stereotypic schemas becomes difficult.

Black people's relations are vulnerable to spatial ideologies and structures. They form relational subjectivities to space and are merged by affect. Black relations are vulnerable to the metaphysics of black geographies, hence they mimic the structure and ontology of it. Black relations were portrayed as susceptible to continuous changes imposed by colonial structures. Most importantly black geographies bring the relevance of black relations to psychology in black, by providing an emphasis of black relations on black psychic formations, but it is also to realise what black relations serve in the metaphysical construction of blackness, which in hindsight addresses the psychological need black people fulfil in matters of developing a psychic apparatus of blackness. By reimagining black relations as an amalgamated process of being, shaped by multiple coupling of black geography, colonial metaphysics and power structures, psychology in black is enunciated as a discourse that unpacks black existential reality. Psychology in black becomes a discursive practice, identifying analytical ways to synthesise psychological constructs resulting from black geographical relations. Psychology in black makes this an important

link between black geographies and black relations, and set to realise the social production of psychic material.

3.4 Black geographies contra racialisation

The discussion on black sociality and relations has shown some of the complexities pertaining to rewriting relational metaphysics. Black people are known to live in a multi-layered world system, in a state of liminality, duality, double consciousness and with states of poiesis. To live in black geographies is to be open to various modes of being, which includes going against the norms of black geographical rules. The interest is in how these new modes of being and the redefinition of black geographies are thought of and implemented. That means engaging in protocols behind contradicting areas of being that necessitate a creative solution to spatial oppression. I want to argue that in black geographies there has to be the enactment of certain protocols of being to counteract the limitations posed by racialised geographies. In this way, psychology in black would engage the process responsible for trying to rewrite thought patterns and systems of thought, by referring to it as a creation of counter-narratives. Whether these acts can transcend the colonial system requires further discussion. What is essential is understanding spatial practices that enforce new ways of being. This means delaminating and restructuring new schemas and the processes involved. Through articulating spatial resistance, psychology in black would engage blackness as a continuous, redefining state, which can be described as a complex existential act, requiring extra survival and behavioural reflexes. Below is a proclamation by Gilmore (2017), which I use to frame the matters arising in spatial resistance and its binaries.

Therefore, instead of imagining the persistent reiteration of static relations, it might be more powerful to analyze relationship dynamics that extend beyond obvious conceptual or spatial boundaries, and then decide what a particular form, old or new is made of, by trying to make it into something else. This making something into something else is what negation is. To do so is to wonder about a form's present, future-shaping design, something we can discern from the evidence of its constitutive patterns, without being beguiled or distracted by social ancestors we perceive, reasonably or emotionally, in the form's features. (p. 229)

Gilmore provides a methodological guideline to engage the omnipresence of geographical formations, advocating for a perspective in analysis that goes beyond what is visible, and channelling the analytic apparatus towards what may seem inconceivable. To convey spatial resistance and its psychological by-products, analysis should convey what spatiality conceals in space and time. Another analytical tool Gilmore proposes is concerned with the design of black geographies, which entraps or determines the use of designed landscape and infrastructure. The future-shaping design that Gilmore articulates is tied to the metaphysics of that particular spatial entity. An entity can only be future-shaping if a particular metaphysics and ontology are attached to its design. Spatial practices formed to go against racial logic must also go against the metaphysical connotation of black geographies, which are attached to its designs and landscape. Therefore, an approach to assembling and fracturing psychological enclosures is explained by King (2014) who deploys the metaphorical use of black shoals, which explains the process of converging, gathering, reassembling, and bringing together black people's experience of black geographical landscape, design and infrastructure. There is an implication here for analysis, that psychology in black is divulging what it is to have psychological conceptions to remain flexible when black spatiality is the centre of analysis. Psychology in black does acknowledge the complexity and difficulty of unpacking blackness but rather sees it fit to capture dynamics that lead to different actions and behavioural outcomes by emphasising the internal dynamics or protocols of space. This is the task recommended by Spillers (2018) who writes: "We are interested in a more acute understanding of black personality's total predicament and his/her passage through everyday life. To execute a deeper conceptualisation of the totality, we look towards reports from the mental theatre of black lifeworlds" (p. 30). The mental theatre or even mental life that Spillers speaks about, is captured by multiple orders or modes of depicting how alternative ways of being in black geographies are thought of and carried out. The mental theatre in this regard would depict a struggle of metaphysics - ones already established and to be established. In hindsight, I am inferring approaches seeking to change metaphysical structures, not necessarily physical structures, but also visible in physical structures - in the negotiation with space, and location - that can be intramural. Hence, I argue that there are two ways in which black people try to transcend the racial logic of black geographies, which firstly include the manipulation of physical structures or landscapes and the occupation of land that is not 'legally' reserved for black people, making a new set of black geographies founded by black people, or rather extending

them. I note here that continuous changes in mental/psychic activity will be fully bestowed in the physical world.

Black geographies continue to be a space of contradiction and make metaphysical changes a challenge to bestow, especially if a permanent solution is needed. Hence psychology in black flags this as a caution because of the limitations/challenges it brings to maintaining a state of equilibrium, even after efforts to assert some freedom. Black geographies often suffocate and are torturous to black people; as such they often limit the use of psychic utilities - meaning you can only think about what you are exposed to. As such, breaking the patterns of thought in black geographies becomes limited. The discussion on intramural protocols offers a reference point for reflection, especially on psychological concepts focusing on positivism, motivation, self-determination, self-actualisation and resilience as drivers of geographical change. Psychology in black notes the extent to which scholars explain how different self-creation is for black, by theorising using concepts such as unruliness, madness, errantry, rhizomatic, disordered thinking, poetics, and opacity, to name but a few (Glissant, 1997; Judy, 2020; Bruce, 2020). The latter shows psychic strives that could necessitate geographical changes. Nonetheless, I write this noting the complexity of going against Western logic or its sovereign rules, because in black geographies those alternative geographical patterns can make conditions of black people even more dire, as McKittrick, (2006) observes.

Going against the logic of black geographies is often seen through the manipulation of spatial structures. In the pursuit to ascertain a black sense of place referred to by McKittrick (2011), the manipulation of geographical structures in the form of buildings and landscapes is often seen. McKittrick (2011) explains the black sense of space as a “process to materially and imaginatively situating historical and contemporary struggles against practices of domination and the difficult entanglement of racial encounter” (p. 949). The main feature that is often manipulated is the geographical landscape. Manipulation of the landscape brings various social possibilities such as bodily freedom in the form of movement; integrating oneself into a better life, which is outside the boundaries of spatiality. If the landscape is manipulated it facilitates better social practices, allowing for more efficient ways to organise, build and imagine our surroundings and self. Contrary to the latter, the black geographical landscape is haunted by past and current narratives of humanness and depicts the alienation of black people from land (McKittrick, 2006). The changes made to the landscape are often thought of as

a way to adapt, however, this is a way to make space for oneself and others, to make living conditions conducive.

In black geographies, one often sees patterns of people erecting multiple housing structures in congested spaces. In such cases, black people rely on their knowledge of space, landscapes, and social dynamics to determine where they can adjust dominating geographical structures. For example, the housing system and structure introduced by the apartheid government and continued by the democratic government of South Africa, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), adopted a system where small houses were built in small yards, allowing limited autonomy to manipulate the landscape. The limitation posed by dominating geographical structures has resulted in black people having to erect multiple corrugated houses in those small yards, while also trying to extend the small houses within the limits of small yards (Comins, 2023). Often these houses are rented out as accommodation for others, as a means to gain income. These spatial practices indicate the development of new pathways of thinking and being in traditional geographical arrangements. This has led to overpopulation in places such as townships where this is practiced. The overlapping of building structures with government structures becomes a norm, to such an extent that the landscape changes to accommodate new houses that are often not supposed to be there. People end up building on the infrastructure that is meant to help the government provide services to the people (Comins, 2023). Even though these types of actions are driven by economic problems, they also become a quick way to address spatial needs. Black geographies provide limited landscape and spatiality to allow some sense of autonomy. The overlap between the given landscape and the “constructed” landscape makes black geography not only a site of contradiction, but also a space limiting in its avenues for change. Black geographical landscapes entrap any psychological thought aligned with change and provide limited avenues to effect change. McKittrick (2006) expresses this problem within the physical landscape together with geographic knowledge, as they are responsible for the suppression, imprisonment and spatialisation of black people. In cases where black people try to apply some sense of autonomy, the limits of the size of the landscape become a problem, and thus people create physical structures equivalent to the size of the landscape. The limitation of spatial autonomy indicates limits in the use of space and landscape to address economic needs. Therefore, the only changes allowed in black geographies “augment existing geographic narratives” (McKittrick, 2006, p. 10).

Black geographies only allow blackness to be trapped in proprieties of self-preservation poetics. Self-preservation poetics are modes and spatial practices where black people can only adjust and adapt to their given landscape and spatial limitations. The reason is that the desires and advances made to manipulate and adjust their landscapes for any reason, be it economical or expansion of space, are trapped in dominant geographical ontologies. Perhaps resisting ontological and metaphysics attached to landscapes becomes difficult, and a call for concern. This means any revival in thought to revamp a black geography gets trapped on a metaphysical level and a physical level. Even though McKittrick (2007) purports that in black geographies, black histories, bodies and experiences interrupt and rewrite human geographies, one can argue that this might take place psychologically but remain difficult to change spatially. Seemingly, black people in black geographies/spaces do try to debunk racial schemas of place, to create a platform to allow individuals to produce necessary opportunities to navigate racial oppression; however, the limits are in landscapes and structures developed. The principle of convergence and enumeration by Spillers (2007) becomes relevant here. This refers to a point in which people, resources, and knowledge to sustain being alive meet to uphold spatial agency. Hence, I note that the intramural protocol of space is not just about responding to spatial limitations but breaking the metaphysical ties to geographical landscapes, which are being reproduced by the oppressed. Spatial resistance is tricky because the thoughts, behaviours and acts go against the landscape that seems permanent; meaning the removal of infrastructure i.e. houses that limit spatial autonomy seems impossible.

‘Illegal’ occupation of land is a frequent occurrence that keeps happening in black geographies, or in areas that are closer to the labour towns or cities - that is mining towns or industrial areas. In such situations, we often see landless black people involved in what is referred to in the South African context as ‘land grabs’. These are acts that could be considered radical and a characteristic of spatial resistance. They resemble an act of stealing referred to by Moten (2018a) when explaining black people's ability to put their needs first. The concept of ‘stealing’ by Moten refers to acts against the normal Western logic and taking what was previously yours. One has to assume a deviant position and be willing to do the opposite of what is regarded as normal. To occupy land is considered stealing and an illegal act. The act is mainly caused by landlessness, an inability to afford housing, or having no access to spaces that allow proximity to workplaces, but mostly by being homeless. Informal settlements are an extension of black geographies, founded by

black people in dire need of accommodation. I choose to profile land grabs or occupations because they are the most common practice that can be referred to as spatial resistance, as black people forcefully take land that is regarded as belonging to government, or land reserved for capitalist gains. This is an essential act in the history of land dispossession, especially in countries like South Africa. Fanon (1963) explains this phenomenon very well when he notes:

The landless peasants, who make up the *lumpenproletariat*, leave the country districts, where vital statistics are just so many insoluble problems, rush toward the towns, crowd into tin-shack settlements, and try to make their way into the ports and cities founded by colonial domination. The bulk of the country people for their part continue to live within a rigid framework, and the extra mouths to feed have no other alternative than to emigrate toward the centers of population. The peasant who stays put defends his traditions stubbornly, and in a colonized society stands for the disciplined element whose interests lie in maintaining the social structure. It is true that this unchanging way of life, which hangs on like grim death to rigid social structures, may occasionally give birth to movements which are based on religious fanaticism or tribal wars. But in their spontaneous movements the country people as a whole remain disciplined and altruistic. The individual stands aside in favor of the community. (p. 112)

Above Fanon has demonstrated the contradictions within the occupation of land. The merits that warrant land occupation as radical or resistant, are often argued from the point of suffering that comes when the government does not fully recognise these areas or does not provide people with basic services essential for survival (Pithouse, 2006, & Gibson, 2007). My interest is in the functionality of spatial autonomy, especially if the resistance serves a particular role in the metaphysical world. I am questioning if occupying a new land comes with the development of new metaphysics, or if previous spatial metaphysics remains; this refers to which metaphysics black people adopt/use when encountering a new space. If metaphysics does not change, the same ontological and psychological features of black geographies will remain. Abahlali baseMjondolo (Shack Dwellers Movement) is one such movement that was founded by shack dwellers in Durban who have been neglected by the government and even threatened with removal to allow for property development. This movement was founded to respond to being forcefully removed and to deal with service delivery issues (Pithouse, 2006 & Gibson, 2007). The

development of the movement is what makes land occupations a radical, conflicting act because they perpetuate continuous struggles, affirming black geographies as places that breed protest. Another problem with shack dwellers or informal settlements, is that they can only become radicalised in cases where they have posited changes. The situation becomes detrimental if this radical act is completely avoided by governments.

The acceptance and formalisation of informal settlements feed into the narrative of black geographies and thus suffer the same plight, leaving this honorary step of transcending racial logic space to be problematic. In essence, spatial resistance is limited by rules and laws provisioned by the government; that means the government needs to recognise and affirm the geographical changes presented. Hence, as I mentioned earlier on, that metaphysics and ontological resistance are not necessarily a concern here. However, the metaphysics of oppression and struggle continues, and further new metaphysics will be produced because of the new dynamics brought by this particular type of black geography. The names of these places often show where the individuals in that society are at - affectively, historically, and ontologically. Psychology in black is interested in the intersection between spatial psychic acts that lead to social movements such as the above-mentioned, but also recognising the extent to which black people are self-conscious about their problems. There is a notion that places such as slums or informal settlements provide some sense of freedom and autonomy because of their existence outside state interference (Gibson, 2007).

Pithouse (2006) does note that even services in informal settlements or shanty towns are appropriated from the state. The valorisation of informal settlements stems from this ability to manipulate spatial structures. An assumption made about these black geographies is that they will allow a new way of thinking and being. However, that will be done as part of survival strategies or as an autopoietic process. New impulses, reflexes, compulsions and cognitions will be created based on the required spatial and social needs. Even so, an assumption that the metaphysics rewritten will be linked to freedom and that spatial practices of metaphysics linked to the previous place of occupation will be absolved, is yet to be seen. The metaphysics that remain will depend on the legitimacy and recognition by the government. Otherwise, it becomes just black geography with racialised metaphysics.

The difficulty black people find in making a difference in spatial matters is that spatiality is a structural issue that needs the government's intervention. For black people, the continuous need to find an antidote to the problems not created by them represents a case of madness. This is probably due to the amount of resistance they receive from power structures. Bruce (2021) explains this perfectly when he notes:

The way to go mad without losing your mind is sometimes unruly. It might send you staggering across asylum hallways, heckled by disembodied voices or shimmying over spotlit stages, greeted by loving applause. It might find you freewheeling through fever dreams, then marching toward freedom dreams, then scrambling from sleep, with blood starts in your eyes, the whole world a waking dream. (p. 1)

Bruce demonstrates the conflicting nature of trying to resist power structures. As it has been demonstrated spatial resistance does depict “freewheeling through fever dreams and then marching towards freedom dreams” (Bruce, 2021, p. 1); this is expressed when black people experience spatial relief (by finding accommodation) and torture (poor living conditions with no service delivery) at the same time.

To account for this need to resist spatial injustices of black geographies and their capitalist gains, the concepts of “phenomenal madness” and “psychosocial madness” coined by Bruce (2021, p. 6, 8) seem fitting. The two concepts point to the affective effects of black geographies that produce uncomfortable emotions. Phenomenal madness is portrayed by intense unruliness, which is a response to lived experience that produces crises in perception, selfhood, emotions and meaning. The protocol of being here contends with existential dislocation and blur. Psychosocial madness captures those living outside the normative standards of modernity, exhibiting acts of rebellion (Bruce, 2021). Madness as a conceptual phenomenon could assist in linking psychological, social and geographical practices. Madness as a term gives a language to explain experiences that are inconceivable or intelligible. For example, one would be able to understand informal settlements as an oppositional geography that is aligned with black resistance but also with black dispossession. Madness as a method becomes essential to determine the burden of complexity black people have to adjust to in black geographies. It becomes a lens to engage psychic enclosures that facilitate thought processes in black geographies. It is essential because McKittrick (2006) argues that black geographies possess

sociogeographic madness, meaning they provide various kinds of madness. It becomes madness because an individual is anchored into the new world and seemingly their cartographic needs, expressions and knowledge are suppressed (McKittrick, 2006).

Psychology in black does recognise that resistance as a praxis in black geographies deserves to be accounted for through dissecting uncommon patterns and unreconciled endings. The reason is that blackness is riddled with ambiguity. Additionally, the demeanour of silencing by black geographical landscapes and infrastructure makes the aftermath or afterlives of resistance difficult to adjust to. Ultimately, resistance in black geographies is about reorganising the landscape, and hopefully, soon it will be about reorienting thoughts and psychologies. However, if land matters are not addressed it is unlikely that new metaphysics will be formed. Psychology in black attempts to map out the possibilities of psychological practices that will accompany black people's ability to transcend white supremacist structures, especially black geographies, while also advancing the possibility of gaining new ontologies and metaphysics in return. For psychology in black resistance is a conflicting practice that needs to be theorised two-fold - physical and metaphysical. An analysis of spatiality poesis is based on identifying spatial practices and their entrenched thought processes.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, black geographies serve as an enumerative encounter to extract the conceptual bases of psychology in black; further to this, it functions as an exemplary construct to do a psychological analysis that will be indicative of the productive nature of colonisation. Engaging black geographies, using a mode of analysis that is based on the encounters of psychology in black, provides a basis for how black geographies occupy an individual or constructs one. It was demonstrated that black geographies can be referred to as an operational system and a productive *nomos*, that uses various spatial functionalities tied with racialisation to underwrite the black psychic structure. In this chapter, I highlighted some of the spatial acts, practices, behaviours and discursive patterns that build vectors of psychic reality. I have also grounded the interpretation of psychic reality and analysis to the physical structure and social structures because black geographical spatiality is not just about the occupation but also about constructing human beings. The oppressive nature of black geographies facilitated new spatial practices that partitioned the black psyche. The intersecting link of the psyche and black geographies

is through the creation of spatial metaphysical, and that makes the impact of these structures live beyond physical barriers. The barriers of black geographies are also expanded to the psyche of black people, where we witness black relations being stalled by geographical structure and metaphysics. Further barriers are located in developing spatial practices that will transcend black geographical systems. However, I have realised the call to transcend or fight for freedom requires a distinction to be made regarding how and from what perspective (physical or metaphysical) change will come. Black geographies depict a discursive practice of psychologising by allowing for an in-depth analysis of black psychic formation from a point of spatiality, foregrounding psychology in black.

Using black geographies, psychology in black presents the black psyche as stemming from the amalgamation of intersecting spatial assemblages. Further to this, the protocols of space have been highlighted and unpacks the behavioural dimensions of being that are geographically based. Psychology in black also opened up a reading or assessment of geographical experiences in a way that transforms the physical world into the metaphysical world. Moreover, an analysis of spatial practices has been done across various historical times, by focusing on the link between past and current practices. It has also been noted that the type of analysis foregrounded by psychology in black allows a multiplicity of blackness to be captured and emphasised, and for it to be key in understanding the psychology of black people. The use of black geographies to eloquently communicate psychology in black represents a way to configure the structural elements of the black psyche, which is detecting the physical elements that inform/signify and produce black psychic life. The conception of space that seemed useful for psychology in black is that both the physical and metaphysical are geographical elements that function together and separately. They both make black geographies a mystery to configure as the longevity and sustenance of the physical space is in the psychic space.

Chapter 4: Psychology in black and the black body

4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the black body in its captive state to outline the contours of psychology in black. The black body is relevant for articulating psychology in black because the body houses the mind, further articulating the embodiment of the psyche. The most important component of this study is the configuration of the black body, which is endured both ideologically and physically i.e. gratuitous colonial violence. The black body has been violated, and given ideological formation that reconstructs and reconfigures it to be easily oppressed. In this study, the psychic life of the body is engaged by identifying metaphysical and ontological applications of the colonised black body. The black body is taken as an object and vessel of colonisation constructed to transport the suffering brought by colonisation. This chapter argues that to psychologise the black body, one must view it as a violated, captive body, an ideologically created figure - with various functioning systems - that lives in a multimodal system of oppression, that creates a psychic structure that is based on maintaining and mitigating violence. Here we note that metaphysics and ontologies are created to facilitate bodily processes, and are entangled with physical and psychic violence. To explore the basis of psychology in black, the black body will be psychologised by considering its amalgamation of racial assemblages acting upon it.

The natural processes of the body are considered to be convoluted by colonial violence. As such there is an expectation that psychological processes (i.e. cognitive, senses) are also affected by colonial encounters. In this chapter the emphasis on the consciousness of the body is made, outlining the relationship of the mind and body in the context of physical and psychic violence. The disturbances of natural processes of the body by colonial violence incite a physical world that recreates an unsettled psychic structure that partially develops. The body is that which exposes human beings to a larger society, and for black bodies, racialisation marks an introduction into a hostile and painful society. The black body walks around with an already determined ontology, physiology, metaphysics, and functionality. As such the procedural and natural process where individuals must develop their functioning modality and determine their aesthetics in both form and imagery is quite disturbed. One then realises that black people are disarmed from occupying their bodies and living outside their symbolic and material influence.

Based on the above psychology in black assesses the racialised assemblages of the black body and how the amalgamation of the psychic structure takes place.

Hence, psychology in black emphasise how this transformation/transfiguration of the black body should be understood in conjunction with the psychic structure. The operating schemas of the black body are also of concern to the articulation of the black psyche, hence psychology in black focuses its attention on the appropriate method of analysing the body. In this chapter, psychology in black appears as striving to be an alternative reading of the black body. This chapter has three themes: the black body: the making of the non-being, bodily subjections and the emergence of psychic subjections, and (Un)freedom of the black body.

4.2 The black body: The making of the non-being.

The black body's phenotypic structure has formed part of colonial machinery to the extent that it became a reason for black people's inhumane status. That means the black body has been given a metaphysical and ontological association, naturalised to justify violations and injustices towards black people. The vast body of work by Fanon (1986), Manganyi (1973), Spillers (1986) and Hartman (1997) has focused on the black body with specific reference to seeing and reading the black body to extract psychic genres (a transference of bodily experience in the psyche) it produces. There have been three ways in which the black body has been theorised based on its experience in an anti-black world. First, the experience of the black body has been elucidated using psychophysical laws (social-to-biological-to-psychological) to articulate the transition of colonial experiences into the body. Second, the black body's experience of direct pain and flesh violations has been outlined. Last, the black body's imagery and perception become sources of violation and analysis. With these elucidations, I argue for a psychological account of the body that shows how various violations of the black body produce psychic genres or psychological by-laws, which means the body is transmitting or passing psychological inferences not officiated as normal, but which symbolise a reactive psyche (a segment of body-psyche relational laws). Psychology in black will be enunciated using these psychic genres as they represent a mode of receiving the body when it transmits or passes psychic reflexes. These psychic reflexes are passed on to become permanent psychic inclinations, modalities, and enclosures. Psychology in black propels the reading text about blackness and the body - formation of blackness by the body - to identify modes of thinking, conceptualising, and feeling about the black body; that is the process of extracting and

linking the body and the psyche. In extracting psychic genres, one has to note the possibility of having various psychic modalities depending on an aspect of the black body being targeted. Furthermore, psychic genres show that the black psyche has no choice but to assimilate the violated black body as it exists within normal body-mind activities. Genres in psychological work denote out-of-normal psychological constructions based on current and previous experienced social and body modalities. This serves as a basis to determine the foundation and functions of the metaphysics of the black body. Moreover, the processes that the black body goes through in responding to all forms of violations will serve as the basis for upcoming existential and phenomenological interpretations of the body.

I would first like to outline or position the black body as theorised within the colonial context it occupies, to allow for the possibility to identify the metaphysical development of the black body. The theorisation of the black body always comes with a prefix, specifying how the black body functions, is treated and perceived. I will demonstrate this point, by using enunciation of the captive body by Spillers (1987), which Judy (2022) presumes as given a semiological activity, and that I presume will act within the boundaries of its identifier. That means if it is captive, the semiological activity representing being captive will be enacted. Judy is attesting that the black body tends to become what it is signified for it to be. For example, if the black body is a captive and a stolen body, it loses value and autonomy, as Judy (2022) sees it, it becomes a signifier of the value economy and that sociopolitical system. Basically, the captive body is an owned entity that is attached to multiple forms of identification, making it vulnerable to objectification. This is explained as representing an automation system, which is the unconscious compartment facilitating bodily activities. Not only does it represent an automation system, but specifies a development of psychic genres, aligned with the signified black body. When it comes to psychic genres of the body, we expect a signification of multiple forms of identification as a result of conjuring of “convergence of biological, sexual, social, cultural, linguistic, ritualistic and psychological fortunes” (Spillers, 1987, p. 67) of the body. This assertion by Spillers offers a constitutive rudiment of what amalgamates the black body’s experience. In hindsight, the amalgamation of intersections of the black body should form part of the black body’s analytic framework.

The black body is passive and not passive at the same time, or “neither autonomous nor coincident” (Terlasco, 2024, p. 4) meaning it can embody a conscious and unconscious stance. To further this argument, I will use four capital points by Spillers (1986), capturing the definitive elements of the black captive body, and based on those four points an ontological basis and metaphysics of the body, can be realised. Judy (2022) expands the narration of the captive body, by acknowledging it as functioning within a mythological system or semiological activity. Judy (2022) notes that a “*Negro* is the signification of the mythical semiological system, the signifier and concept of which are flesh/captive body and sociopolitical order of racialised capitalist slavery” (p. 185). To extend this conversation to articulate a psychological system of function, I argue that the mythological system falls under the system of representation that uses language to form cognitive schemas - which means the process of the signification of the body is a psychological process. The captive body functions as a schema that underlies a way in which black people will understand and use their bodies. Making sense of the psychic structure of the black captive body is to understand its politicised and socialised roles while being cognisant of the body’s sensory system and use by the colonial system. In retrospect, the baseline for human bodily processes has to be recognised, while taking cognisance of the baseline of the signification process of ideological formations and the disruptions of natural physiological systems, including that of the brain, as a result of gratuitous violence.

The semiological or the mythological system functionality is seen in the four pillars that mark the captive body. Black people are constructed and signified within these semiological systems, and ultimately see themselves according to this mythological ideological positioning. First, “the captive body becomes the source of an irresistible, destructive sensuality” (Spillers, 1987, p. 67). This means the black body serves as a pleasure point, which Farley (1997) explains, as fulfilling a desire for race pleasure. For Farley, (1997) the desires are not just for sexual pleasure but for suffering and inflicting pain. The pleasure can be for the oppressor, but the destructive sensuality can be presented to the oppressed by the master through socialisation. Hartman (1997) makes a compelling argument about pleasure as part of the web of manipulation, domination, abjection, and accumulation by oppression. The reason is that pleasure serves a different standpoint for the oppressor and the oppressed. For the oppressed, pleasure is used to heal bodily pains i.e., found in forms of dancing, and relieve pain inflicted by slave masters

(Hartman,1997). The enslaved is rather manipulated with pleasure to relieve pain. Pleasure then becomes accompanied by two opposing metaphysics of pleasure related to the body, which positions the black body in a state of objectification. This notion of pleasure as a relief for the black body has created a mode of being that has seen an overreliance on pleasure as a source of relief in everyday black metaphysics, especially if one looks at the relationship between black people and dancing. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Spillers (1987), Farley (1997) and Hartman (1997) have demonstrated that any bodily incident is attached to a psychological interpretation or term. This has become an important link between the body and mind to explain the nature of subjection. In this instance, the feeling produced by the body's pleasure becomes complicit in strategies of subjection (Hartman, 1997). This means an emotion produced by the body (through the biological system) can be used as a source of oppression/strategy of oppression, meaning the mind and body cannot be separated in conjuring avenues of enslavement and colonisation.

The second point is related to how the black body stands in contradiction with the mind, because of how the body experiences it. The physiological results of bodily experience are different from the given explanation. This happens when black bodies are being reduced to a thing, and becoming the being of the captor, regardless of them serving as a source of pleasure (Spillers, 1987). Here black bodies are 'thingified' (Cesaire, 1950) and objectified (Fanon, 1986). 'Thingification' describes some sense of utility attached to the black body as it belongs to others. This means the black body is exposed and vulnerable to both physical and psychic violations. According to Hartman (1997), the vulnerability of the black body stands in alignment with its wilful submission. Wilful submission is a contradiction of blackness, that shows how the black body's vulnerability and its experience of injury leave the mind in a conflicting state and forced to make choices under duress. It is a point of this psychic disintegration that psychology in black identifies as the points of dislocation for the body and mind to depict the dynamics of servitude and subjection that allow the misalignment of the mind and body. The contradictions highlight what the body and mind do to put each other in jeopardy. This can be done by realising the psychological tenants often associated i.e. concepts such as pleasure, with the black body during time acts of subjection and servitude. In hindsight, the association made to the black body is a directive of the implication that is supposed to be experienced in the psychic sphere, and vice versa.

Third, the ideologies governing the black body are based on the phenotypic look and presumed functioning capabilities as defining codes of black people. Here Spillers (1987) points to assumptions made about the physical and biological expression of the otherness of the black body. In such cases, the black body's physiognomy and phenotype are put under surveillance. The black body is being described within particular imagery and that has implications for both the epistemological and ontological functioning of the black body (which will be explored in detail later) (Johnson, 2020). The implication of this is that every physiognomy has been attributed a function, which ends up being a defining characteristic of black people. For example, the big black man is assumed to be strong and capable of doing heavy-duty work and mostly dangerous to others. This has become a strong feature in the type of work they occupy and the assumption of criminality.

Lastly, the black body begins its social praxis under assumptions of its non-beingness. Spillers, (1987) explains the conception of this non-beingness, grounding the captive black body as a "potential for pornotroping and embodies sheer physical powerlessness that slides into a more general powerlessness resonating through various centres of human and social meaning" (p. 67). Weheliye (2008) expands on the concept of pornotroping as a process where flesh becomes the body, where a human being is converted into a bare life. A bare life means being barred from the category of being human literally and symbolically. Weheliye in his explanation of bare life describes not only the discursive practices of the body, but also how the practices transcend generations. The crux of interpretation here is to show the metaphysical conceptions of the black body as vulnerable and invisible. The ascribed powerlessness of the black body becomes the basis on which others see the black body. This ascribed positionality is what directs the metaphysics of the black body, but also creates an ontology that facilitates the black body to be exploited and to accept exploitation. Such an ontology determines how black people think about the use of their bodies. An example is when black people are more willing to offer their bodies at a lower value because of their non-value status in the world. These assertions made by Spillers can be positioned not only as metaphysical conceptions of blackness but also as a way to direct the psychologisation of the black body in its praxis and theory. This helps engage the value of the black body as perceived by black people. Here value is attributed to the ability to decide how one's body is utilised, especially concerning labour practices. Racial subjection unconsciously places

black people in a position to choose dangerous vocations, putting their bodies at the risk of torture.

I have traced the constructed myth of the captive body to its signification properties, which are an operative schema of black bodies. The elucidation of the captive body as explained by Spillers, is to determine the way of seeing and reading the body. As articulated above, the black body mirrors its social conditions, as such an analytic of seeing the body should be adopted, which Palmer (2016) describes as a hermeneutic method. Spillers (1987) denotes a cultural way of seeing the body, while Torlasco (2024) denotes a psychoanalytic way of seeing the body.

With this in mind, I would suggest a hermeneutic to allow spatiotemporal-physical-social analytics, which functions like an assemblage. This becomes a hermeneutic that identifies the “inauguration of a new indirect ontology, not by remapping the sensible world on behalf of a disappearing subject, but by reconceiving of its depth in the intertwining of the visible and the invisible” (Torlasco, 2024, p. 3). In this way, one can realise multiple proponents of the body and the parallel configured schemas that emulate an ontological grounding. A hermeneutic of interpreting visible and invisible proponents of the body becomes powerful because it forces an analysis that considers the unrecognisable/misunderstood acts of the black body and the possibility of identifying bodily acts with one’s state of mind. This is essential in identifying embedded racialised metaphysics exerted through the body. I am now moving on to the three ways in which the black body has been theorised, captured, and understood within the black body metaphysics explained above.

One of the three ways, the body is elucidated is through psychophysical laws. Here psychophysical laws are identified to show the transition of the colonial experience to the physiological modalities of the black body to identify some of the psychic genres that may appear. The assumption is that psychophysical laws can open up a discussion about some of the psychic patterns that emanate from physiological reactions of bodily experiences. The phenomenological account of the body by Merleau-Ponty (1981) serves as a start to describe psychophysical laws, as it describes the body as an introductory figure of an individual to the environment it occupies. Merleau-Ponty, also theorises the body as the link between the environment and the mind, which takes place through the process of perception, and further leads to the development of consciousness of one's

body. Merleau-Ponty further explains the amalgamation of bodily experience which gives rise to psychological templates, an embodiment of human behaviour. To argue for the relationship between the physiological and the psychological, will be through explaining the emergence of consciousness of the body based on receptors or sensations of the body. Merleau-Ponty indirectly points to the principles of psychophysical laws that Chalmers (1996) expands on, which one can use to understand bodily experiences. Psychophysical laws refer to physical laws in conjunction with laws of conscious experience to explicate physical laws. Further, it explains how phenomenological properties depend on the physical ones, explicitly stating that people's everyday experience arises from physical experiences. It is significant to note that physical experience is through conscious experience (Chalmers, 1996). In this regard, Merleau-Ponty (1981) points to the body's conscious experience and stipulates how the mind receives the body. Hence, Merleau-Ponty, (1981) explains that "the experience of the body degenerated into a representation of the body; it was not a phenomenon but a fact of the psyche" (p. 94). The representation of the body marks the making of body ontology and the metaphysics of the body. The discussion above makes a case for linking the body with the mind, but it does not expand the argument to multiple racialised violence experienced by the black body. Both Merleau-Ponty and Chalmers introduce a psychic genre based on body processes that rely on the biological system. Here the biological system becomes an indication of how much the individual was affected by a particular stimulus to the extent that there is a psychological outcome - coming out through conscious experience.

Psychophysical laws are perceived here as one of the theoretical tools by which violence experienced by black bodies can be unveiled. The multifaceted ways in which the black body is transformed by colonisation show the possibility of having multiple forms of signification by subjection, hence exploring avenues whereby the psyche can be addressed along the continuum of these violations is essential. Since the violence of the black body is responsible for producing genres of articulating the psyche. This reminds one of Fanon's (1986) experiences of his racialised body in multiple ways, which gave rise to a self-dialogue between his consciousness and the physiological responses of his body. Fanon experienced the racialised social environment and felt it physiologically, because of his body consciousness. Here the experience of the body is not limited to physiological responses caused by an object being in contact with the body but rather involves physiological reactions emanating from outright witnessing, hearing, and

smelling violence in colonial spaces. The three senses require a certain level of internalisation of the external world to experience them. Ferreira da Silva (2007) points out that the body is a signifier for the mind. All the colonial ideologies and doctrines associated with the body are to be configured by the mind. These particular narratives develop about oneself - as a black person - based on what the body receives and experiences. It explains the concept More (2021) calls “structure of perception” which I perceive as effective in explaining the social context in which the body is grounded. If one takes the structure of perception, the body is viewed in its totality because all conditioned and wired conceptions of the body are retrieved by the mind and made sense of, regardless of its racialised connotations. The structure of perception should then be combined with the “futural past” (Torlasco, 2024, p. 9) which is the future that comes after the past. This sees the analysis of the body as spatio-temporal. It probably puts epigenetics in perspective, which touches on the unconscious dynamics of the body and the transmission of bodily knowledge or trauma to generations to come, in physiological and social forms.

Bodies form part of the ideology of signification in colonial rule, and that is done in two ways: first, a signifying strategy defines the black body as having physical deficiencies that institute mental differences; second, the violence of the body and prejudice experienced produce psychological reactions, which facilitate the formation of a certain perspective about existence. The second form of signification is often a response to the first form of signification, and it is here that the psychophysical laws take place. Psychophysical laws are accounted for differently in relation to black people, especially since the stimuli they often respond to are about themselves, not others. Fanon (1986) articulates the latter when he explains his experience of being racially profiled by a child, which resulted in him being viewed as a feared object.

Below the corporeal schema I had sketched a historico-racial schema. The elements that I used had been provided for me not by ‘residual sensations and perceptions primarily of a tactile, vestibular, kinaesthetic, and visual character,’ but by the other, the white man, who had woven me out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories. I thought that what I had in hand was to construct a physiological self, to balance space, to localize sensations, and here I was called on for more’ ‘Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened!’ Frightened! Frightened! Now they were beginning to be afraid of me. I made up my mind to laugh myself

to tears, but laughter had become impossible. I could no longer laugh, because I already knew that there were legends, stories, history, and above all *historicity*, which I had learned about from Jaspers. Then, assailed at various points, the corporeal schema crumbled, its place taken by a racial epidermal schema. (p. 84)

Fanon explored the body as socially constructed and the experience of it arises from its social status, which is the racial logic and lenses associated with it. To add to this, Fanon puts forward a process that emanates when experiencing the black body; that includes the body having its own racialised status and representation; the knowledge of what the black body automatically incites in others (whites), and a physiological reaction based on the social treatment of the body. Furthermore, Fanon shows while conversing with himself how he positions himself in the world. He indicates how conscious he was of his bodily reactions and was trying to make sense of the discomfort he felt. This discomfort has induced a psychic genre, sealed with dislocation and incoherence of identity. The outlined composition reads the body in a bifurcated manner; meaning it is simultaneously read as a biological and a social system. Moreover, this is to note the black body is malleable and modified by the hostile racial environment, whereby constant exposure to a racialised environment produces a particular psychological response. Here the psychophysical process sees consciousness of body and memory, producing different physiological responses.

Again, a continuous cycle of this process normalises this situation for the black body and its psychological processes. The by-product of the residual experience of body violations, not only affects the physiological process of the body but also the psychic structure, which is the overall perception and ideas about oneself as an individual. What it highlights here is a situation in which there is a continuous transactional relationship between the body and the mind. The body is a vessel to exist in the world, and the mind allows the interpretation of the experience and also how one responds to the world. It is in such circumstances that an individual is conscious of their body and the limitations it poses. The burdens that the black body carries are the burdens that the mind carries. What is key to psychology in black is how the politics of the body remains key in the development of certain psychological faculties.

Fanon (1986) writes: “In the white world the man of color encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a negating

activity. It is a third-person consciousness” (p. 83). The phenomenological experience of blackness, as embodying contradictions of the body brings a state of uncertainty to not just bodily schema but rather to the idea of the self, and the state of beingness. If the bodily schema appears in the conscious sphere as negative, what does it say about the psychic structure that harnesses particularities of the body as representing the self? The “racial epidermal schema” (Fanon, 1984, p. 84) is what becomes the stimuli for the body to react to physiologically. Laws facilitating the process of sensation and perception are now structured by racial epidermal schemas, which means black people's subjectivity becomes restricted to what they have been theorised to be, to the extent that the body even produces physiological responses attached to these experiences. The residuals of the racial epidermal schema are often left to be interrogated, and the body receives multiple irritations by an individual toward a state of nothingness. Fanon demonstrates racial epidermal schema, which is indicative of the way the black body can embody all racial analytics and assemblages that occupy one's thoughts and mind as a valid description of the black body, in the following statement: “I was battered down by tom-toms, fetishism, racial defects, slave ships and above all else” (Fanon, 1986, p. 85). The thought and moments related to being racially classified based on body appearance are explained by Fanon as a moment encompassing painful physical experiences such as amputation, excision, and haemorrhage, and further presented to him as distorted, recoloured and clad in mourning. The black body is described as a figure representing inadequacy, allowing a prejudgment of self towards nothingness.

The black body is also understood from the position of pain, which is experienced in the flesh. That means a black person will experience their bodies not from their social constructions but rather from the direct infliction of pain in the flesh. Here the analysis is not merely based on racialised perception of the body but rather acts of racial violence that penetrated the body. Spillers (1987) made it a point to distinguish between body and flesh, which in my view gives a strong differentiation to various ways in which a human being is conceptualised and oppressed in its physicality. The differentiation has allowed Spillers (1987) to focus on what happens when violence is received on the flesh, and the kind of social implication wounding of the flesh precludes. The flesh is defined by Spillers (1987) as “the zero degrees of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of discourse or the reflexes of iconography” (p. 67). The flesh does not escape any racial assemblages, and like any violated colonial feature is

susceptible to embody the discursive practices of colonisation. To put this definition into perspective, the violations of the flesh are open to social interpretation and experience the likelihood of receiving multiple interpretations and analyses. To summarise briefly what Spillers says; the flesh accounts for stolen black bodies, which are wounded, ripped apart, divided and altered. Further, this wounding also alters the anatomy of the flesh, leaving the body with marks rendering the hieroglyphics of the flesh, which are hidden as cultural seeing of skin colour and create cultural vestibularity. Spillers makes a point of thinking through the violated body as birthing a cultural understanding of a particular body, that often becomes its identity.

Weheliye (2014) sees Spillers's distinction of the body and flesh as important to highlight the embodiment of violence, and how bare life is transmitted historically to be fixed in certain bodies. This opens a way to think about the psychic implication of the hieroglyphics of the flesh, which means not only psychologising on the narratives of flesh and its forms of language, but also the markers of pain as key in thinking through genres of psychic dislocation/location. If the flesh creates a particular cultural vestibularity, it can certainly open avenues for psychic structure centred around navigation and surviving through pain, and also identity dynamics of bodily markers. Spillers (1987) outlines the implications of violence of the flesh, as she notes that the atomised captured body loses its personality. Judy (2020) also echoes this by acknowledging how the theft of the body, robs a person of their personhood; facilitating a particular terrain of thought, mainly because the body purports an order of signification and a semiological system. Here Spillers (1987) asks us to think about what bodily violations deprive an individual of, that is identifying what is not signified by the body to the mind, but rather what the body deprives the psychic structure of. This could refer to the implications of “disruption in proprioception or corporeal sense of the body in space and in the making of space” (Jackson, 2026, p. 2016). This expresses a psychic genre that deals with the disruption of the development of natural psychological dimensions associated with bodily processes. The fixation is on bodily features and pain and the development of healthy psychic dispositions of the body is left unattended. As much as the body signifies the mind, it leaves some aspects of the psychic structure and the body to perish.

The pain inflicted on the flesh/body opens another avenue of psychic representations of the colonised body. The body is a medium of experience, expression, being and knowing (Farley, 2009). When violence becomes the link between experience and knowledge, the

body is reduced only to pain that the body must become accustomed to. The black body's reflexes are continuously trying to subvert pain penetrated through the flesh. Acts against the flesh, through torture, rape, and beatings, are all violations of the body that forms memories of pain in its physicality. Bodily pain is the memory that gets registered in the mind and would be attributed to a certain character or representation. The black body, therefore, becomes a centre of memories of pain and torture, which in turn bring into focus certain social realities. Hartman (1997) explains the black body as a pained body, and its pain must be recognised based on its historicity, social condition of brutal constraint, and constant violence. As such pain becomes a persistent condition that the black body endures, developing its affective registers and cognitive accounts. Further, pain encapsulates the narrative of captivity, dispossession, and domination (Hartman, 1997). In essence, cognition is not devoid of corporeality. Pain has important interpersonal/internal communication to the one who embodies the pain, but also pain comes with its ontological interpretation (Manganyi, 1973). To position the function of pain into the psychic structure is to engage the black body from its affective avenues and ontological creations. In this case, the analysis of the body should be beyond the current feelings or physiological reaction of the body, but rather to deprivations of the body. The presence of pain means there is a lack of "motive will, active desires" (Spiller, 1987, p. 67), an indication that the black body is denied its ontology. For example, Hartman (1997) makes an interesting point about the constraints the captive body experiences, and the consequences, which make the pained body fixate towards achieving pleasure. Hartman makes an example using pleasure, as something not received by the black body, and as such the need to experience it and encourage behaviours that will allow the experience of it. Pleasure in this case is derived as a strategy for releasing pain, but also the body's way to find avenues of hindered bodily process that need to be released. It is necessary to theorise about the implications of deprivation of certain body or biological processes.

In addition, there is a need to point out what the body is frequently exposed to and realises the social and psychological processes it renders. As such the pained body's interpretation of its pain caused by racial violence is where we could engage how the signification takes place and the subjectivities formed. Another psychic genre is advanced, and it capitalises on bodily sensation for introspection about one's selfhood and identity. If pain becomes a signifying tool, then the subjectivities it creates warrant a need for exploration. By subjectivities of bodily pain, I refer to segments of thought that respond to pain,

rationalise its origin, embody it and make it part of their social and psychological structure.

Ideological conceptions of the black body are signifiers of the mind and seemingly produce particular psychological enclosures and archetypes. Moreover, an ideological conception of the body comes with metaphysics aligned, meaning the black body as defined by the gaze of whiteness has been transformed socially and culturally. By being attributed specific features, psychic genres have also been concluded; this includes mental states and abilities. Hence, I argue that the black body is essentially a marker of how blackness is socially and psychologically positioned. Essentially, the black body gathers all forms of dehumanisation and is made to embody an ontology that is based on phenotypic identifications. Johnson (2020) argues that the black body is thought of to supplement the immateriality of reason and historicity. This is due to the black body entering the colonial space as just flesh, an object, a tool, and a physically strong object with no strong cognitive faculties. For example, black bodies were likened to the physicality of animals, which extended to their brain size and functionality; to the point whereby black minds represented feeble-mindedness (Linstrum, 2016). Black psychologies were tied to the body in its perceived defectiveness. This became a representation of black people's body metaphysics and made an onto-epistemology of human-animal hybrids. The psychic genre represented here argues for a defective mental sphere, producing mental and behavioural capabilities that are reducible to those of animals. In such a case, this psychic genre becomes an epistemology or a line of thinking and rationale, giving the body legitimacy to announce functionality, cognition, conduct and behaviour. The latter is treated as the truth and has become what black people are known to be like mentally. I am arguing here that the black psyche is already determined by the figure of the black body; meaning subjectivities are created based on that particular mental sphere. In such a case, black people will be expected to embody this metaphysical position, and their world will be created to mimic this metaphysic. The fallacies attached to the black body have structured black lives, and have done what Johnson expresses:

The African 'failure' to achieve humanity has historically been thought to be rooted in 'the body' in an insatiable appetite that has made it possible for the African to rise above the body, the organ in order to come back to itself in self-reflection, never achieving the distance required in order to complete the self what. (Johnson, 2020, p. 9-10)

The latter is related to how black people discern the violent indoctrination of their bodies. As such the ideological indoctrination of the body happens in two ways; first, it denotes the enclosure/contradictions of the black body; second, the process of discernment and internalisation of body ideologies. This process of discernment assents a psychic genre of being, and Manganyi (1973) explains the process elusively when he imagines that individuals often develop a personalised, mental image or concept of their body. The development of this mental image is a result of a sociological schema - that is a societal assumption about the black body representing what is opposite to the white body. Fanon (1986) experiences this discernment when he notes, "Sealed into that crushing objecthood, I turned beseechingly to others. Their attention was a liberation, running over my body suddenly abraded into nonbeing, endowing me once more with an agility that I had thought lost, and by taking me out of the world, restoring me to it" (p. 82). Fanon experiences himself as symbolised by white people (as a nonbeing) and also showing a sense of being uncomfortable with his existence. Already Fanon is thinking about the symbolism of his objecthood, which brings him contradicting emotional experiences. I highlight the above to demonstrate how the black body can be read and theorised, especially if one has to account for how the body and the mind intersect. Psychology in black perceives this as a way to identify how ontologies and metaphysics about the body are established and hence, become part of the social world for generations to come.

Yancy (2017) postulates that the construction of black bodies is followed by an embodied relational ontology, which I perceive as the psychic apparatus of the body. It became an apparatus because it facilitated how one negotiates their presence with themselves and others. Here the process of objectification and subjection becomes the activation of the epidermal system (based on racial epidermal schemas). The burden on the black body rests on the assumption of what it will do - that is the behaviour and acts that will be associated with the presence of black people. Yancy reiterates that the position and description of black bodies are prescriptive of certain forms of behaviour. The dangers of this mode of meaning-making and construction are the semiotic construction and power relations that will inscribe the black body (Yancy, 2017). That means ontological descriptions of the black body are cemented and reproduced. The body's meaning is solidified through symbolic repetition and emits certain signs to presuppose certain norms (Yancy, 2017). Yancy's assumptions can be interpreted as the psychic inscription and interpellation of the body being internalised and externally expressed as normative

behaviour of black people. The psychic genre produced follows the question imposed by Haile (2017) which asks, “How consciousness is influenced by embodiment and historicity of embodiment?” (p. 498). For psychology in black, symbolism ontology and subjection are essential frames of reference to unpack the psychological representation of the black body. It is within this referential point that one is able to understand how consciousness is influenced by embodiment.

The black body’s continuous violations (in both physicality and appearance) make the suffering of the body an existential problem. Since the black body has received abnormal and insidious descriptions that are ontologised in addition to gratuitous violence, the notion of disorder and pathology might need to be articulated and presented differently. The genres of psychology, structured by notions of pathology, need to account for the state of normality that defines the black body. I argue this because the black body has already been entered into “regulatory metaphysics that undergirds” (Moten, 2008, p. 177) its ontological outcomes. This means for psychology in black to deconstruct the abnormal and referred pathology of the body, is to ask if there is a normal presentation of the black body. Is there an alternative to what the body is experiencing for the psyche to register an outcome of normality? When Manganyi (1973) argues that continuous violation of the body leads to psychological dislocation and limitations on the development of body image, he points out the metaphysics of regulation and limitation to the development of the psychic sphere. Therefore, the black body is operated at the nexus of social and ontological, historical and essentiality (Moten, 2008). Weheliye (2008) concludes the functionality of the body/flesh as part of racial assemblages that perpetuate the hierarchical organisation based on nationality, gender, religion, culture and race. The black body/flesh as a racial assemblage bears all the knowledge it receives from violence, regulations, and transmissions, to cement some form of subjection (Weheliye, 2008).

Bodies have affective registers, relational, psychological, and cognitive character. As such they will reorient themselves to what the world requires of them (Manganyi, 1977). Sociological schemas of the body from racialised environments develop with abjection, whereby the body-ego integration is disrupted, and integration of both individual schemas of the body and sociological schemas becomes difficult, resulting in psychic splitting (Manganyi, 1977). Psychology in black takes the body as key in unpacking the process of subjection, especially since the body is the recipient of gratuitous violence and is subjected to continuous ridicule. The black body is a recipient of all colonial-enforced

subjection. Butler (1997) notes that subjection forms and regulates a subject. Synthesising the latter statement by Butler is to realise that the regulation of the body, through ideological forms and violence is to enforce subjection. The black body is constructed as an unethical entity, justified and negated in various theological and political positions. To bring subjection to an individual level, Butler argues that subjection leads to self-enslavement and can be described as a self-negating attachment. To extend what Butler asserts, there is a possibility of internalisation of the black body as it is morally obliterated by whiteness, to the extent that it gets embraced as such.

The danger about the subjugated body is the impossibility of ownership and autonomy, relinquishing black people of expanding avenues of their ontologies using the body. Wilderson (2010) notes that violence experienced by the black body/flesh destroys the possibility of ontology because it makes blacks vulnerable and open to others to subjugate. If blacks experience an impossibility of developing their ontology, it means they are embodying or using a body ontology that is anti-black. The adoption of another's view of your body marks a process of subjection. An additional element to consider is the limitation that this ontological incapacity has on the body. The latter means the black body is unable to function on its terms and produce its subjectivities, hence it writes an alienated psychic structure. The body's ontological formation problem, which Judy (1993) refers to as caused by the muted body, becomes a dilemma for metaphysics to be created by the body, and ultimately is a psychic problem. Body ontology as outlined above is crucial because it emphasises the need to distinguish how the body is written about and conceptualised to excavate its psychological inceptions. For psychology in black, the process of ontologising the body is rooted in what Judy calls the process of grounding narratives in the bifurcation of consciousness in modernity; that is the splitting of perception and apperception as two heterogeneous processes of the mind. The functionality of the body transcends the bounds of the biological system and a system of assembles that consists of ideologies and categories of the body sees the body more as socialised than as a purely biological entity.

Psychology in black argues for a way of seeing the black body that can enhance the ability to dissect the psychic formation of the body. This way of seeing is through looking at the signification process of the black body, to the mind. This analytic way of seeing priorities engages vectors involved in the subjugation of the black body, and further shows how it is signified in the mind. Psychology in black further presents a synthesis of the body and

mind while demonstrating various oppressive elements attenuated to the body, and its signification process to produce psychic genres. In this theorisation, it is important to privilege the normal body processes and the ability to form psychic processes out of abnormal body experiences.

4.3 Bodily subjections and the emergence of psychic subjection

The black body's exposure to physical violence raises concerns about the functioning dynamics of subjection, especially the link between the wounded body and the emergence of psychic forms of subjection. With this concern in mind, there is a need to expand how one can make sense of physical violence received by their body. Hence, I use the concept of subjection to make sense of the black body's experience of violence to the flesh and to determine the kind of psychological enclosures produced. I argue that the subjugation of the black body through violence - or alteration of the flesh - intensifies colonial subjugation by enforcing psychological forms of subjection, which should open up a different way of psychologising black bodies. The main focus here is on physical violence as it enters and alters the flesh, and leaves scarring and markers on the flesh. I am arguing that the wounding of the black body ascends a different form of consciousness, and constructs a particular metaphysics that responds to violence, which further demonstrates subjection in a psychic form.

Before establishing the nature of psychic subjection, I will explain what I call bodily subjection and the type of violence responsible for body subjection. By referring to bodily subjections, I will only refer to acts against the flesh, which refer to acts of violence such as torture, sexual violations, beatings, burnings, scarring/markings, shootings, stabbings, electric shocking, poisoning, suffocation, abduction, and murder (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, 1998). I also consider slave labour and other outrageous labour practices to be acts of violence. These are the types of violence, aimed at controlling behaviour, enforcing labour (slavery), and for pleasure purposes (rape) that the black body is subjected to daily. These are discourses of violence that are essential for the discourse of psychic subjection. Important to the discussion on psychic forms of subjection, is how excessive and continuous these forms of violence are to result in mental illness or deformation (Henderson, 2002).

Nevertheless, there is another aspect of violence that needs to be attended to and that is the beating on the head. Psychological impairment seems to be a power-related move that

silences but also destroys the faculties of the brain. When they do not function there is a possibility that conscious awareness of one's environment is limited. Psychological impairments and scars render an individual powerless and controllable. The black body serves as an “instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon it to imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the individual of a liberty that is regarded both as a right and as property” (Foucault, 1979, p. 11). Body subjection entails the body as tortured and brutalised, to be restricted and forced to act against its will.

The body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body. This subjection is not only obtained by the instrument of violence or ideology; it can also be direct, physical, pitting force against force, bearing on material elements, and yet without involving violence; it may be calculated, organized, technically thought out; it may be subtle, make use neither of weapons nor terror and yet remain of a physical order. (Foucault, 1979, p. 260)

The various ways in which subjection takes place as Foucault claims, open up a discussion on how subjection can be explained as a psychological phenomenon that capitalises on oppressive power structures. Foucault's description of subjection is understood in the context of this study as considering subjection to be an amalgamated process that gathers multiple sources of power, functioning simultaneously, to subordinate the black body. The concern is about the nature of subjection on the black body and how the psychological signification of the wounded black body is generated. I argue that the physically violated black body produces psychological demands, hence the wounded black body can be seen as a psychic apparatus. This is to note that the body is crucial in the subordination of the black subject. Subjection is a process whereby power creates the conditions of life while imposing itself on the individual to maintain and reproduce oppressive ways of living, that further become internalised (Butler, 1997; Sithole, 2014). Therefore, to be subjugated is to take an external form of power - which often comes in ideology and structures - and internalise it, thus, taking over one's thinking and behaviour, meaning a preceding metaphysics is established and further developed. According to Butler (1997), subjection signifies the process of being subordinated by power and becoming a subject. Further, the becoming of a subject assumes a psychic form of subjection because of the subject's identity being tampered with. Butler sees subjection as a by-product of newly formed identities, which is the identity given by the oppressor and the ideological mantra the oppressor wants a subject to identify with. When

one looks at the theory of subjugation by Butler, it puts forward the psychic operation of ideological structures of oppression into perspective, and this relates to the ideological constructions of the body for oppression. For Butler bodily subjection results from psychic subjection, which is associated with regulatory and productive effects of power. Further bodily subjection is a result of an unhappy unconscious, which makes body subjection a result of self-enslavement and self-imposed ethical imperative. I am assuming that Butler refers to the ideological claims of the body as imprisoning it, and that body subjection is based on psychic forms of subjection, just like Fanon (1986) suggests when articulating racial epidermal schema. For black people, the points made by Butler (1997) about bodily subjection are likened to the creation of racial codes attached to black bodies, that function as racial signifiers to force foreign exchanges and assembles of the black body. Here, subjection functions because of racial codes, symbols and ideologies attached to the body.

The use of psychic subjection by Butler (1997) is key to proposing the way the signification of the violated, wounded body might take place. If one considers psychic subjection to be based on...

forms of regulatory power that are sustained in part through the formation of a subject, and if that formation takes place according to the requirements of power, specifically, as the incorporation of norms, then a theory of subject formation must give an account of this process of incorporation, and the notion of incorporation must be interrogated to ascertain the psychic topography it assumes. (Butler, 1997, p. 19)

Then the body as psychic apparatus must activate the ability to regulate some aspect of psychological functioning to produce a certain type of being. Akin to this process is the internalisation of norms from certain power structures to operate as psychic phenomena to restrict and produce aspects of behaviour. However, in the context of a wounded body or flesh, one cannot speak of psychic subjection as a result of internalisation of norms related to the body; it may be part of it but not completely.

Psychology in black therefore asks; what would be the psychic operation of the violated wounded black body? Especially if “psychic subjection marks a specific modality of subjection” as Butler (1997, p. 21) suggests. Perhaps as a starting point, one should look at the intended role or function of the violence imposed on black people to demarcate the

psychic operation of the wounded black body. The work on subjection by Hartman (1997) becomes essential because it positions the subjection of the black body, to be perceived through its occupation as property and its fungibility. According to Hartman, subjection has been tailored to produce specific outcomes, based on various uses of the black body. Here subordination of the black body, through labour, sex, entertainment, and gratuitous violence, is understood as serving a specific role that will guide the manner of subjugation. For example, Hartman (1997) posits that “the fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of other’s feelings, ideas, desires and values” (p. 21). Hartman addresses subordination based on labour, and how it can be translated into the oppressed psyche. Winnubst (2019) articulates the latter well when she says such instances show the capaciousness and elasticity of blackness, which further signals ontological fungibility. Therefore, the violations of the flesh, as they continuously take place produce an ontology, making the mind vulnerable to be constructed by violations. Amongst this is using the very same black body to conceal the forms of subjugation produced. I have observed that to understand how violence works to subjugate it is to align it with the subjugating emotion or thought associated with it. For example, if an act is aimed at instilling terror, the violating act will resemble that; that means psychological subjugation will present itself through emotions/feelings related to terror. Hartman (1997) notes that sometimes white masters would engage in beating black people for their pleasure; they also used the very same pleasure to conceal and permit subjugating activities to happen by allowing black people to engage in activities that excite the body. Here pleasure serves as a psychic operation for facilitating violations of the flesh, that restrict and produce at the same time. Psychology in black emphasises a mode of analysis that categorises the body as a lived or occupied symbol that will form a representation in the mind. The representation here will be based on making sense of flesh violations that signify a particular experience. Gil (1998) notes the following about how a symbol transforms: “One cannot neglect, for the unique signifying function of symbol, their relation to the build-up of energies that carry them and are carried by them, in other words, the relationship between semiology and economic theory of signs” (p. 88). Gil further notes that the body can be viewed from an economic point of view based on the symbolic logic attached. In other words, to denote how the wounded black body is in its symbolism is to effectively unearth the function of rapture and alteration of black flesh that form psychic subjection. Revealing the body as a ruptured and altered symbol is to recognise its “economic theory of signs”. As the black

body is transformed to some extent it signifies uncommon and unfamiliar messages to the brain. Similar to the hieroglyphics of the flesh presented by Spillers (1987), the wounded black body can inform a mode of being or a culture that is a response to a physiological reaction of induced violence. The black body as a symbol is forever transformed in its phenotypic outlook and physiological function, as such the psychic operation here is revealed through the production of behavioural responses.

The wounded body does communicate unconsciously, as the responses are automatic, which then alerts the associated psychic and social activity. Ultimately psychic subjection as a result of the wounded black body can be seen in subjectivities that are formed. The formation of consciousness is amongst the myriad psychic operations observed as a result of the wounded body. Here a black person's way of being is fashioned by the acts of violence and their signifying communicative undertones. In such cases, psychic subjections are magnified because the violation of the black body is followed by behaviour modification measures such as torture and punishment. Scarry (1985, p.45) magnifies the latter when she argues that the "prisoner's pain will be perverted into the fraudulent assertion of power". In this context, consciousness is built around bodily experiences, which can often come about as being signified by the experience of pleasure or pain. Further, the discourse surrounding unleashed violence becomes a guiding signifier of how the mind will make sense of the wounding experience. Also, the success of subjugation is viewed by how the body receives pain, as it is the instrument of subordination and a link between the physical and the psychological. This is where psychophysical laws take their course. Nonetheless, pain is a signifier of power and communicates the message of subordination. Seemingly those who are violated physically need to find the language to communicate pain, and that builds consciousness around what one's bodily subjugation means to them. Moreover, the consciousness that is based on the experience of the body extends to internal and outward behaviour, and a sense of identity (evaluation of identity based on bodily violation).

Psychic forms of subjection from a wounded black body are also seen in the preoccupation with pain and its management, especially since black people are inundated with extreme levels of violation. According to Hartman (1997), "the purported immunity of blacks to pain is essential to the spectacle of contended subjection or, at the very least to discrediting the claims of pain" (p. 51). It is the submission to pain that becomes a concern, which can be noted as a manifestation of psychic subjection. The latter is based

on the regulatory function of subjection that is responsible for hindering certain physical and psychological acts/tasks, but also produces acts that mitigate them.

Here the psychological and social pathways that the wounded body produces are highlighted. Within the realm of bodily subjections, the body is transformed, which means its representation in the mind also changes. By transformation, I mean there is scarring and markings that are physical residuals of flesh violation, that also signify psychic scarring. Markings, as theorised by Spillers (1987), are thought of along the lines of property and possibilities of self-marking. To be marked is to be shown your prescribed identity, but also to be signified as a property of the colonial state. As marking happens, it always comes with its loaded abiding metaphysics and ontologies. On the other hand, Crawford (2024) asserts markings are not absolute, meaning one can be marked and unmarked, solely because a marker is not the only present signifying property. A marker represents various properties for Spillers (1987), which are telegraphically coded and loaded with mythical prepossession; difficult to rid oneself of signifying properties or relegating one into a certain figure of being attenuated with meaning that presents a certain historical order. Based on the above, I foresee marking as an imprinting process, but also a formation of body schemas, or cognitive body schemas. The marking comes with physical and functional modalities, hence the representation of it in the mind will be based on its physiological effects and functional possibilities. Markers are also operational, meaning they allow an individual to form ideas around them to live. As a result, Crawford (2024) reads it as a possibility of unmarking. Unmarking for Crawford is a practice of refusal aimed at cancelling the colonial formations of the black body and its hieroglyphics. Crawford interprets Spiller's words, "I describe a locus of confounded identities" (Spillers, 1987, p. 64) as an unmarking, which is confusing because Spillers says, "I am a marked woman" (Spillers, 1987, p. 64). The text, as I interpret it opens up avenues of multiplicities of being/identities that can emanate from being marked; however, I believe the unmarking may depend on the nature of the autopoietic process if one decides to be an insurgent. Psychology in black presents here the operation of the body as a political tool, which is a part of the subjugating doctrine guiding colonial government to subjugate on a psychological level. Nonetheless, the text below by Spillers places what is expressed above in perspective:

These undecipherable markings on the captive body render a kind of hieroglyphics of the flesh whose severe disjunctures come to be hidden to the

cultural seeing by skin color. We might well ask if this phenomenon of marking and branding actually "transfers" from one generation to another, finding its various symbolic substitutions in an efficacy of meanings that repeat the initiating moments? As Elaine Scarry describes the mechanisms of torture [Scarry 27-59], these lacerations, woundings, fissures, tears, scars, openings, ruptures, lesions, rendings, punctures of the flesh create the distance between what I would designate a cultural vestibularity and the culture, whose state apparatus, including judges, attorneys, owners, soul drivers, overseers and men of God, apparently colludes with a protocol of search and destroy. This body whose flesh carries the female and the male to the frontiers of survival bears in person the marks of a cultural text whose inside has been turned outside. (Spillers, 1987, p. 67)

The teleological sequence of bodily subjection is what I have shown thus far, and matters related to consciousness and culture depict how the wounded, violated body outlives its pains. Subjection to the body does not end with immediate violence or pain but is sustained through markers on the skin, which in turn form a psychic life, as has been demonstrated above. In emphasising, the hieroglyphics of the flesh as a theory of psychic subjection, I argue that Spillers (1987) is articulating the psychic life of bodily subjection. By asking if markings of the flesh are transferred from one generation to another, Spillers is questioning the presence of a socialising element of scars, that is the possibility of these scars being presented with meaning and included in one's cultural composition. Furthermore, can the references made to these scars give a purpose to black people's cultural life? If that is the case what sort of meaning is attached to the wounded black body to allow it to form a cultural representation? One should also bear in mind that these are not chosen markers (as in the case of 'tribal' markings in cultural rituals), and as such they were never part of black people's cultural or psychic lives. Therefore, if the assertions made by Spillers do take place as she suggests they do, then one should assume interruption of 'normal' body representation and body sensations (interrupted by the presence of pain). Another important matter here is how this composition takes place, or how the scars are signified and given a new representation in the black psyche. Even so, why does the latter take place, and what is its use? Perhaps it is an inevitable act, and the body is bound to shape cultural discourses regardless of its outlook. Two accountable acts can be theorised here, where one is an act that depicts bondage (refers to being

trapped by memories of scars) and one that is responsible for aversions to further colonial beatings.

Weheliye (2014) expands Spillers's conceptualisation of hieroglyphics of the flesh, which emphasises the role of the flesh in constructing Man (human beings). For Weheliye, flesh can be explained as that which defines the phenomenology of man; and metamorphosises the human into a particular group - turning one into a property for others; and creating a possibility for new ontologies. To contextualise, the latter, a wounded flesh will transform an individual, potentially creating subjugating thoughts and mentalities based on the type of wounding involved, producing a new person. Hence Weheliye (2014) resorts to explaining that “the flesh thus operates as a vestibular gash in the armor of Man, simultaneously a tool of dehumanization and a relational vestibule to alternate ways of being that do not possess the luxury of eliding phenomenology with biology” (p. 44).

The interpellation exposed by the operations of the flesh has a bearing on the transmogrification of the physiological realm to the psychological realm. The body assumes multiple psychological enclosures and also an interrelated figure that has to be analysed based on all parts that make up the body, be it skin, flesh, bones and the brain. Furthermore, it realises the need to understand the wounded flesh as a continuously constructing human being, because as Spillers (1987) indicates, it appears as a hieroglyphic. The violence of the black body penetrates time and space through markers that have formed part of body schemas - which is the symbolism of the body through violence. With that being said, the black body is vulnerable to becoming what the oppressor wants it to be but also susceptible to producing its ontologies and discourses. One other aspect of psychological subjection by the wounded body that Spillers notes is when the ruptured flesh creates a distance between cultural vestibularity and culture. This means there is some form of incongruence between one's cultural perception of their body and general cultural relations/norms. The body is always defined culturally by societies, and the body is built into the social discourse of society as a sign/object/language (Henderson, 2002). However, when wounding is involved, the image of the body begins to fall outside one's cultural reference or psychic structure. When one considers assertions made by Henderson, it is notable that racialised violence changes the functions of the black body and its cultural significance. In addition, the functioning role of the body as a source of identity and cultural formation is interrupted and its role changes to align itself with the current discursive practice of the black body.

There is a large part of psychic subjection that is based on the experience of blackness. Therefore, phenomenological conceptions of the black body should become a conceptual lens. To do this, one has to remember where the black body fits in in the discussion of racialisation. More (2021) reminds us that race is grounded on the perception that it is manifested in bodily appearance and that means the black body already assumes an existential signification. This means a phenomenological analysis of the black body would not only require taking cognisance of the above points, but also realise that the black body has an operative schema, that is either taken by black or other races as guiding bodily processes. The operative black body schema highlights how the imagery and conceptions of the black body precede its existence. It has been given an experience *in absentia*. This framing is essential because it puts into perspective the relationship between the violence of the flesh and pre-existing body operative schemas. This is important for a psycho-phenomenological approach, purported by Manganyi (1973), which studies alienation and racism from the point of the black body and conceptualising the psychosocial reality in a phenomenological way (More, 2021).

Manganyi (1973) posits that individual existence is bound by one's relationship with their environment, their bodies, others, objects, space, and time. He further shows that black people's relations with all these aspects presents a relation representing a Manichean structure (Fanon, 1967). Manganyi (1977) further contends that the black body is perceived as inferior to white people's bodies, and that affects the interpersonal relationship between black and white people. It is through Manganyi's engagement of alienation towards oneself, that one gets to understand that it is a product of the unconscious. Alienation brings a series of antagonisms to self and others. It also becomes a barrier to communicating with others as Manganyi articulates. The barriers to communication and strained interpersonal relations explain an embodiment of alienation, that is unconsciously constructed by disavowing one's body. To elaborate further on alienation as an unconscious manifestation of poor symbolisation of the body draws on Manganyi's argument on failure/limitations to individualise the black body because the sociological schema is more developed out of bastardisation of the black body. In fact, poor individuation renders society to have more power over one's psychic structure, bearing in mind that societal perception of the body is negative. Unconsciously an individual will further disintegrate and be unable to fully self-actualise.

African/black phenomenology encompasses the mode of self-reaction that occupies the consciousness of African people (Henry, 2005), while also being rooted in the course of racial liberation and matters concerning racial domination. Henry further argues that African phenomenology is trapped by the current existential crisis of black people, which necessitates self-reflection based on navigating racist forms of humanity. This description can also be attributable to the phenomenology of the black body, whereby to reflect on bodily experience is to capture how it is violated (phenotypically and in the flesh). Racist acts on the black body become a common feature in how the black body is acclimatised by an individual. Suppose one is to compare the phenomenology of the body as explained by Merleau-Ponty (1981) to the phenomenology of the black body. In that case, it does not provide an analysis of the body that lives in a hostile environment but also a body made hostile to occupy. Black bodies come with an added element attached to their corporality. The perception black people have to make about their bodies will reveal a psychic operation that demonstrates a different mode of thinking, sensing, and feeling. The argument here is that the body that is wounded or subjugated in any manner propels the creation of a psychological experience that is similar to the experience of being black.

To demonstrate an example of African phenomenology with reference to the black body, I use the reference of double consciousness by Henry (2005) as a phenomenological stance, and as one of the ways black people self-reflect about their existence. Double consciousness depicts a psychic operation, showing psychic subjection because it is a state of conflict, whereby there is a conversation with oneself about choosing between two ways of being (where one way of being is anti-black). The fact that one has to consider an anti-black position for the sake of surviving depicts how thinking is done differently. The same applies to the black body - its phenomenological stance can be conflicting, as it has implications for behaviour and thought. The ability to accept what is debilitating to survive demonstrates that to be subjugated psychologically can come across in the language of survival as wilful submission.

Often black bodies have to go to unwanted territories, where wounding happens. This underpins a discussion around what black people do to their bodies after being violated. Racialised dysmorphia, which is a desire to be white, (often seen when black people bleach their skin) and a phenomenon of 'passing' (where light-skinned black people present themselves as white) become a possible alternative to deny being disappointed by their skin colour. Based on the above, the black body's experience of violence breeds

situations that try to disassociate the body and mind. This can be explained by Gordon's (1995) concept of bad faith, which is the ability to have displeasing truths about oneself.

The body in bad faith is a demonstration of bodily subjections that have transformed to become psychic subjection. Bad faith is an embodied consciousness, as Gordon notes. It explains the perception of one's body after an experience of a particular bodily event. It can be linked to the alienation of the body. In the case of racialised dysmorphia, bad faith becomes abiding as an individual chooses a safe space to identify. That means one changes one's view of oneself psychologically and uses the body to avert the horrors of blackness. The latter means individuals themselves try to disassociate their mind and the body, by adopting a different mindset that is opposite to their phenotypes. Gordon (1995) succinctly describes what happens: "In bad faith, I deny my body as mine through convincing myself that my real perspective is my perspective beyond my body" (p. 36). In such circumstances, rejection of their body is associated with an imaginary body, beyond their physical bodies. This phenomenological account of the body argues for studying the psyche of the black body based on one's views of the body and representation of it (which comes through forms of deceiving oneself and objectification of the self). In this instance, one can look towards the forms of identification that deviate from one's true identity.

Psychology in black finds African/black phenomenology to be resourceful in engaging the body, because of its ethical imperatives to show how black people engage in self-reflection and evaluations. Furthermore, it considers colonial metaphysics imposed on black people to define themselves and affects how the process of experiencing will be felt and made sense of. Henry (2005) explains this dynamic:

As negrification takes hold, the second set begins to transform the first. In its being for another Africana self-consciousness, the negrified African will be profoundly influenced by the relationship with the white other. Self-evaluation will take the form: I am better off or worse than another 'negro' depending on whether I am whiter or more Europeanized. This detouring of all intersubjective relations through white norms and evaluations is a major disturbance in the interactive relations of the Africana subject that follows from its 'two dimensions'. (p. 97)

Even though the focus is on the body, it could be useful to first acknowledge pre-existing ideals about the body, when identifying what it would feel like to be wounded. The assumption here is that before even engaging in the moment of violation, there is an existing psychological violation that has normalised a particular view about one's body. The phenomenology of the black body therefore exists as an assembly that amalgamates the old metaphysical of the body with the new ones. Furthermore, the wounding of the flesh produces a new metaphysics of the body but also sustains the pre-existing one. Henry (2005) compels a methodology of evaluation of every sphere of blackness, even on the body, to consider pre-existing ideologies and experiences. That means to fully know the psychic operation of the wounded black body, is to realise that there is a history of black body metaphysics and overall colonial metaphysics that has already established the foundation for psychic forms of subjugation. Psychology in black recommends a genealogical and teleological reading of the black body, to outline the process of amalgamation that makes bodily subjection a concern for psychological functioning.

4.4 (Un)freedom of the black body

Black people have been using different methods to fight for liberation and freedom. Of course, the black body has always been a site of struggle. This is the body that is possessed but refuses possession. At the same time, the black body has to go through a process of change to be liberated from its racialised symbolism and classifications. The black body has to be removed from its racialised symbolism and at the same time participate in liberation activities i.e. protest. Furthermore, the black body has to be deconstructed along with its embodied ideologies and racialised corporeal schemas. Based on these two ways the black body is located within the liberatory praxis, I would argue that the black body aids emancipated thoughts and ideologies - that is liberatory praxis - and is also called to embody emancipation acts and new ideologies in the form of restoration aesthetics. Hence, I propose that any limitations in thought and ideologies that are not conceptualised to be part of the liberatory praxis of the black body will ultimately compromise the liberation of the black body.

For psychology in black, this is essential because the black body must be conceptualised alongside thoughts, behaviours, acts, and emotions of emancipation. Seemingly what matters for this argument, is not just the process and acts of what would accompany a liberated body; the physiological/biological response of the body, and the permanency of liberatory praxis of the body - especially in actions - become essential. Perhaps,

psychology in black describes blackness as a state of being that enforces the renewal of psychological enclosures of the black body that lead the black body to the path of resistance, to re-inscribe its symbolism, and aesthetics, and to renew the physiological pathway created by violence. Psychology in black seeks to highlight the complexities of the black body when in the pursuit of having racial schemas decoded from it. Moreover, psychology in black explores the black body's resignification process by advocating for the re-coding of the black body. The argument will be presented in two stages: by looking at the body as a protesting symbol or tool and the black body as its aesthetics are reimagined.

Yancy (2017) makes a compelling argument when he notes that black resistance "is a profoundly embodied *human* act of epistemological re-cognition, an affirmation that carries with it an ontological repositioning of the being of black embodiment as a significant site of discursive (and material) self-possession" (p. 109), because he describes how the black body should actualises black resistance. Yancy tries to announce resistance as depicted by behaviour, which I foresee can be explained by how the body shows in action an idea/feeling of resistance. Further, Yancy assumes that this act of embodiment is also a reconstruction of ontology. Based on this stance, one should assume that the black body can be given a chance to reverse overdetermined epistemological and ontologically constructed imagery. The goal of liberatory praxis is to re-imagine the resistance and redress of the body by rewriting the predetermined colonial metaphysics, both in thoughts and action. Hence, I argue that changing the metaphysics attached to the body, which includes how bodies are used and perceived becomes crucial. As such, how the body is socialised in colonial societies becomes a factor, to determine if the black body can be socialised differently. Seemingly, one would be forced to factor in the conditions under which black people intercede in their thinking around freedom and liberation. The black body must then be revisited/envisioned and accounted for adequately based on matters related to the metaphysical, psychological, and sociological determinants. The body and its emancipatory acts cannot be theorised without demonstrating how the mind has structured anti-blackness and emancipatory forms of blackness. Nevertheless, this is not to neglect the violence imposed on the black body and how it has been stored since physically induced trauma becomes a factor in considering conceptualising embodied liberation. To further explore this argument, Wynter's (1992) words become important:

The goal this time is that of realizing, at long last, the autonomy of human cognition with respect to the reality of the social universes of which we are always already discursively instituted speaking/knowing/feeling subjects, and, therefore, with respect to the processes which govern our modes of being/ behaving, in the context of the increasing hegemony of cinematography's and audio-visual technology's 'combination of the iconic and linguistic sign'. (p. 239)

The line of argument Wynter is advancing, questions the social discourse that enhances or perpetuates the will to be autonomous. Furthermore, Wynter advances an opinion that centres processes that govern modes of being/behaving, which can assist in locating how the black body exists within a system of behaviours and particularities of being that are already regulated and predetermined. This means, that any mode of agency or autonomy of the black body is thought of amid oppression and emancipation ideologies. Similarly, the opposing metaphysics of the latter has to be considered. In as much as the body is often imagined as a tool and symbol that will be put upfront to demonstrate the inner content of the mental liberation, one should be mindful that the body has discourses and metaphysics of its own - some are part of the overall colonial metaphysics. The black body presents various forms of colonial symbolism that must be disintegrated and re-inscribed. The latter is brought into the discussion because they outline conscious and unconscious streams of thought that govern the body. For psychology in black, the crucial task is to highlight ontological, epistemological, and metaphysical orders that are newly created. Further, the task for psychology in black would be to identify the possibility of having different referential points about the black body that could give it a new psychic composition.

Wynter (1992) suggests three historical standpoints that are relevant to this discussion on autonomy and the body, which I will refer to as referential points of the black body. Wynter identifies cultural, social, and material production as historical standpoints that should be analysed separately to allow intercommunication between them and other significations of life imposed. In my view, these referential points/historical standpoints govern the body differently, and as such, separating them for analysis is purely based on the possibility of deciphering which factor at a particular point is acting on the body and driving the mentality of autonomy. This is to show how different referential points play different roles and orientate the body differently. In addition to the three referential points, an additional should be added; and that is a physiological reference point, to

account for biological reactions towards a particular context or experience. For example, autonomy realised for the cultural production of the body is differently realised in social production, which means if a community has constructed the use of the body for rituals, that might differ with the general society's discourse.

Since the cultural production of the black body is distorted by the colonial, social discourse of the black body, the black body's cultural functions and identification might struggle or be delayed in progress. To be autonomous in this situation can mean deciphering what needs to be revisited in igniting certain segments of the body. These referential points mask a distinct psychological outcome of deconstructing the functionality and aesthetics of the black body. In methodological terms, the black body should be looked at as a "dynamic confluence of elements of these multiplicitous vectors of referentiality" (Judy, 2022, p. 304). The black body should be deconstructed and transformed to avoid becoming a means to an end for the praxis of liberation. The black body should not just be a tool to release frustration or anger towards the oppressor, but should rather be conceptualised within the realm of freedom fighting. The latter is said in reference to the stance by Fanon (1963), where he emphasises the importance of having a created form of national consciousness that will be responsible for creating a new lifeworld for people, opposite to the coloniser's version. This is important because Gil (1998) notes the body is susceptible to over-coding, which incarcerates the representation of the body, and it becomes the inscriptive surface for all possible codes. It is, therefore, crucial to have over-turning codes of the black body. This is merely about repurposing the body, before it automatically puts itself in the position to be used. Seemingly, to repurpose and to reconfigure the black body extends to identity markers of the body.

Black people have been protesting, putting their bodies on the line to overturn colonial rule. Judy (2022) refers to protest as poetics, which elucidates a sociality and signifies the community's social consciousness. During the protests, there is an assumption that new possibilities of life will emerge. As a poetic expression, protest indicates a particular way of thinking, conceiving, and perceiving the world (Judy, 2022). Judy accounts for protest, as more than an activity but rather a guide to human consciousness and state of being. Poetic expression as explained by Judy, can be used to account for the body's acts of resistance. This can be done by deciphering the body's role in protest but also in a general sense, how the body commands a new sociability. The body communicates a lived reality as well, and as such it should be seen as advancing a semiotic process. That

means bodies are given a new meaning beyond being a tool relaying a message of struggle. Bodies are used in all sorts of demonstrations and as a result they become symbols of hope and death. Through protest the assumption is that individuals are asserting their rights and political life by signifying the demand for better conditions of living (Butler, 2015). In protest, there are embodied forms of actions, mobility and symbols that signify what needs to be done for justice. Butler puts forward an argument that explains how the body functions during protest action and that includes the body's physiology, dimensions, and actions (Butler, 2015). In essence, an assertion of one's assumed political power is made through the body. Moten (2003) would call this protest assembly the "scene of objection" (p. 1). At the scene of objection there will be a transformation of the body when current and historical demands are made on the body. This is probably why Yancy (2017) sees the body as a process, to-ing between the current and the future. Regardless, black bodies still engage and participate in protest hoping to produce new discourses of being, even though Butler (2015) warns of the limitation of the assembly's performativity to yield any permanent change. Moten (2003) calls this a freedom drive, that serves as a praxis for protest that animates black performance. When black people put their bodies on the line, they express and chant their psychic reality and social reality. The principle of protest for the black body is to create new avenues of being and produce new ontological imaginations.

I argue that the black body should be reimagined beyond protesting as a site for a new sociality. Here we imagine, a time where black people are not alienated from their bodies as Manganyi (1977) notes, but rather see black people in possession of their bodies, in both space and time. Black bodies are often thought of in the present and not as something to be preserved or thought to exist in the future. The alienation towards time, as Manganyi notes, restricts black people's thoughts of their bodies to the current, and few thoughts emerge on the possibilities of the body's outlook of the future. This is based on the fact that the black body always exists in survival mode, taking in punishment/all sorts of pain to preserve the body in its current form. The significance of the body is not realised and the potential to create new forms of sociality and cultural practices of the body is rarely seen. Nonetheless, the repurposing of the body can happen according to the argument made by Hartman (1997), stating that "belonging together endeavors to redress and nurture the broken body; it is a becoming together dedicated to establishing other terms of sociality, however transient of that offer a small measure of relief from the

debasements constitutive of one's condition” (p. 61). However, the argument made by Hartman (1997) on healing the broken body does not ascertain how this is done and what mode of healing is set for constructing a mode of sociality that puts the body at the centre, not the body as the means to an end.

Regardless, I do agree that the body needs to be investigated as a new site for sociality, and that means having intentions about its functions; that includes how it needs to be nurtured. For this reason, I will turn to a resistance movement by Nelson (2019) which is tailored to caring for the body through vectors associated with trying to maintain its well-being and that which has decentred the use of the body’s physique to fight for justice. This form of resistance is supposed to deal with somatic states of the body to appeal to physical trauma. The appeal here is to have the black body repose. Nelson uses the resistance movement called the ‘die-in’, which is a protest action in which participants lie on the ground and pretend to be dead, to communicate how black people are already dead. The die-in is done with the hope that it will attract sympathy from white people, allowing white people to imagine themselves in the position of black people. The die-in does show the fungibility of blackness that Nelson accuses of annihilating black-ontological resistance through affective registers. I am assuming that Nelson is trying to say that the die-in can form part of black ontological resistance by targeting affective registers. There must be a restructuring of feelings in the body and a repose of trauma. However, my disagreement with this idea is that this can only be periodic, implying it can allow a change in emotions on that particular day. The die-in might be triggering for others because it resorts to the activation of others' emotions through parading death as an empathy invoker. It is rather uncertain if it will rewire the black body’s affective registers of trauma. However, the die-in provides a platform for black bodies to regulate the somatic sense of danger, which has to be embodied when physicality is relied on for protest action. The nap-in is a type of social justice movement that I would agree to see the possibility of rewiring the somatic system because it prioritises sleep. The nap-in movement advocates for getting enough good sleep for black people, solely because black people have not been sleeping in good conditions, or rarely receive good enough sleep. Sleeping becomes part of self-care, but also a possibility to imagine new vectors of being black (Nelson, 2019). Here, Nelson suggests the possibility of also rewiring thoughts and possibly affective registers. This is probably one of the few movements that directly centres the body for healing purposes. This honours the analytics of seeing or looking,

which directly focuses on the altered flesh or human tissue, to possibly find a way to transform the flesh from its altered materiality and sensorily unmark it.

Investigating the black body as a site for sociality means particularising its roles, emphasising the body's role in cultural development, and as a socialising tool and probably metaphysical conceptions of psychic formations that stabilises the imagery and symbolism of the black body. There should be an inclination to reconfigure the previously "systematically overdetermined and mythically configured black body" (Brooks, 2006. p. 61). The black body's configured status by colonial doctrine also facilitates how the black body functions. For example, the black body suffers from labour exploitation in the current economic climate, which means the black body does what is required, not what it wants. This is the danger of not having an imaginative stance and as a result, the ontological position of the black body will be indirectly constructed. Brooks determines the body is a site of intellectual knowing i.e. whatever the body does is imprinted in both the body and the mind. I argue that if the black body's social and cultural role includes protest, it deserves to be prepared for such an activity. This is to avoid the body being represented as a casualty in the minds of black people. Moreover, this is to allow a feeling of autonomy beyond a protesting event. Here the interest lies in the alignment of the mind and the body, beyond a particular event or experience. The feelings of autonomy must be felt even when there is no event taking place. Gordon (1995) notes that the body is the consciousness of flesh, as it connects with the environment or embodies what the environment/geography provides. Since the body is the consciousness of the flesh or consciousness contextualised, it means the body can be rewritten for a specific narrative and purpose to enact a new consciousness of the body. This is what psychology in black seeks to attend to - that is the new formation of body consciousness, that could become part of channelling resistance, while also creating a new historical outlook that repurposes the black body and its socialising metaphysics. This is relevant to consider for the aesthetic of the black body and its embodiment. Psychologising on black body performance is about highlighting the techniques, expressions and affective forces that employ black bodies to articulate their psychic and social reality in the present and the future.

Body aesthetics is a significant part of colonial merchandise because it can channel misconceptions about defining characteristics of black people (this is highlighted earlier in the chapter). Moreover, aesthetics of the body as presented by colonial powers, has

been integrated into societies, and forms part of the socialising space. It is integrated in both cultures of black people, in the sense that colonial body aesthetics is part of black people's life-words. Based on the above, any form of black aesthetics should be about reconfiguring one's view of the world and oneself. Body aesthetics are more centred on individual emotions and perception of self, which are elements that socialise one in the world. Black people's physical outlook evokes all forms of racism that immediately socialise them, into a certain category of being. The socialising nature of the black body's aesthetics is a concern for psychology in black because it discerns signifying thoughts and behaviours about black people, and their position in the world. The latter shows how important it is to be able to reverse predetermined ideologies presiding over black body aesthetics. Yancy (2017) emphasises what transcending the colonial body's consciousness entails, using the 'black is beautiful' campaign:

Black is beautiful! marks an identificatory mode of being-in-the-world grounded within social ontological and epistemological orders that involve assertive and agential modes of identity narrative formation. Historically, this affirmation has had a powerful perlocutionary impact on Blacks in terms of how they have affirmed their Black embodiment, creating a collective celebration of Black embodiment that functions as a powerful source of pleasure. Black is beautiful! can, must, and does occupy that Black existential space— a space within which Blacks responsibly affirm socio-ontologically who they are— where whiteness has ceased to matter, where it has ceased to be a point of reference. (p. 116)

Black is beautiful is an affirming statement, that is supposed to change black people's outlook on themselves, and a useful start in responding to negative conceptions about black people's phenotypic look. However, it fell short in its semiotic and signifying practices; it failed to account for other body aesthetics not related to the skin that form part of features demonised for belonging to black bodies (i.e. facial structure/features). Although, it did open up new ontological grounds, and new forms of thinking about black images. The problems associated with it are based on assuming some signifying features of the black body to be qualified with that of white people. That means the imagery that should signify beauty was not conclusive of all features black people have, and the affirmation failed to produce a long-lasting system of meaning and ultimately might not have warranted the desired change it was supposed to bring. One important matter that psychology in black looks at is what codes of behaviours were supposed to be recorded

or what type of metaphysics and ideology were to be installed, matching both the history and current circumstances of black people's outlook on their bodies. The aesthetics of black is beautiful should not only appeal to perception but be able to match the everyday experience of black people. Taylor (2010) argues that black aesthetics should be used to identify norms that will guide and evaluate expressive objects to form black life-worlds. Based on Taylor's argument, the aesthetic of beauty should have signifying properties that make statements like black is beautiful to feature all dimensions of the black body. Black is beautiful is a political statement, aimed at affirming black people, and appears to target skin colour as a source of beauty. As such black people are then left with other bodily features that need to be validated and legitimised. If we are to compare the black is beautiful conceptual grounding by Yancy (2017) with the words by Biko (1987) stating:

Being black is not a matter of pigmentation - being black is a reflection of a mental attitude. By merely describing yourself as black, you have started on a road towards emancipation, you have committed yourself to fight against all forces that seek to use your blackness as a stamp that marks you out as a subservient being.
(p. 48)

One realises that body aesthetics should be beyond skin colour, and require an in-depth distillation on the position and use of the skin colour. It means knowing exactly why and how the position of the black body particularises the black experience. For Biko (1978), the body in the form of skin pigmentation cannot be the first line of self-identification but consciousness or psychological rewiring is paramount. Biko alludes that to acknowledge your body's pigment as black does not protect you from further subjection, in both physical and psychological forms. The embodiment of black consciousness might have good implications for black aesthetics, which can prevent black people from falling into white aesthetics of beauty that is blackened. Emancipation ideologies such as black consciousness allow new norms to be written to allow the marginalised body to embody and enact new behaviour and imagery of the black body without failing to tap into other black aesthetic politics.

Nonetheless, the complication that arises out of affirming aesthetics is that it does not adequately eliminate all the discourses that have been applied to the black body. I argue that the physical outlook of black people has been translated into various social and

political classifications, which means they have become defining elements, suitable for specific roles. Therefore, affirming aesthetics does not translate to changes in colonising metaphysics attached to black bodies. What is then visible is the reaffirmation of blackness, which is susceptible to capitalistic gains and consumption culture, leading black people to become properties of pleasure and labour. Any reconfiguration of imagery or functionality should target the metaphysical components of body aesthetics; that is how these body metaphysics function in society and how they are embedded in the structures of society. It is of no use if society aesthetically changes the perception of imagery while it does not translate into everyday life. This can lead to a misjudgement towards changed affirmatory aesthetics, which might be perceived as not effective, further perpetuating colonial aesthetics.

One must revisit ideologies and modes of consciousness being constructed to devise changes to the body politic. The reason is that the body does not exist in isolation, it exists within a social and political sphere that often subordinates it and sometimes functions in tandem. As Foucault (1980) notes, power manifests itself materially but also manipulates the biologics of the body and imprints itself in the body. This assertion made by Foucault, informs a need to anticipate what other forms of power are redirected towards a body that is on the path of emancipation. It also makes one aware of the value of physiological processes in rebranding the black body, especially since they are occupied by responses fuelled by colonial aesthetics of the black body. While Fanon (1986) acknowledges the black body's physiological reactions i.e. epidermal racial schemas as a response to a hostile environment, then there should be a way to explain the physiological responses of a reimagined black body. This is to ascertain whether an assertion made by Foucault (1980) stating that to respond, "to the revolt of the body, we find a new mode of investment which presents itself no longer in the form of control by repression but that of control by stimulation" (p. 57) is legitimate in this case. Foucault highlights that the body can just be controlled by physical stimulation, however, he fails to recognise that even repression induces some form of stimulation. If physical stimulation is present for repression and freedom, then there is a need to determine which is the stronger. Nonetheless, the matter for discussion is whether stimulation induced by the change in the narratives of body aesthetics is good enough to change the way black people feel about their bodies permanently. In addition to this, it is to figure out how psychophysical laws function where we consider an emotion such as pleasure and not pain. With that said

we should question whether the body in protest is stimulated to produce long-lasting physiological changes. Are the feelings stimulated or produced able to control the black body to a permanent renewal of the body? Can we say pleasure, or any related good feeling produced, functions the same way as it does when white masters are the ones enforcing it i.e. when Hartman explains the function of pleasure, as produced in dance, to manipulate black people's feeling? Or would one need institutional backing to produce a long-lasting impact?

Great consideration needs to be made for how changes in body aesthetics are accepted socially and politically. That means there is a possibility of a reward system to encourage changes aligned with liberatory practice. In this case, consumer capitalism has become that reward system, whereby certain practices are rewarded, especially those that still depict the fetishised components of the black body. Hence, I argued earlier that positioning the metaphysics of the body to reclaim the body from oppression becomes crucial to rewiring how the black body is thought of, and expressed. For example, fetishisation of black women's 'ass', has become a feature in body politics, that encourages black women to love and accept their bodies. This is a narrative that emanated from the Sarah Baartman story, where her bodily features were simultaneously demonised and fetishised. In the current discourse, the very same forced practices - such as the display of 'ass' - have become common under the banner of black women reclaiming their bodies; this is to note that the same fetish that caused Sarah Baartman's body to be exhibited is gaining momentum. I bring up this scenario to question whether the black body can ultimately be free, especially since power transforms and depicts a consumerist black culture. Bringing this discourse out for critique is essential for psychology in black, to note which colonial discourses hinder complete ownership of black bodies, and to realise the social, political, and material discourses that manipulate freedom enclosures of the black body, especially since body aesthetics can perpetuate oppression (Irvin, 2016). Irvin argues that body aesthetics functions as a disciplinary code, which means it organises what individuals may receive based on their ability to appeal to Western standards of beauty. This is what black people who appeal to renewed black body aesthetics have to contend with; where there is no reward for assuming new body aesthetics and there is actual punishment where one will be deprived of certain benefits by looking different.

Psychology in black understands that what is said above depicts a process of inhibition through punishment, which reinforces anti-black sentiments toward the black body. This also means the possibility of rewriting metaphysics and behaviours related to body aesthetics will be overpowered by everyday Western discourses of beauty. I include behaviour in this discussion because body aesthetics may determine behaviour; I refer to how exhibiting certain body aesthetics requires a new way of being, to present that aesthetic to people. Depending on what aesthetic one exhibits, certain types of metaphysics and social discourse are being perpetuated. That means body aesthetics is more than just about exploring the imaginary, but can also be described as depicting a related behaviour and metaphysics. For the body, this would be a way to see how an individual relates with the world or is positioned in the cultural sphere. Therefore, blackness is embodied in transcendental modes of being. It honours new characters and practices that embrace the phenotypic and morphological body of black people.

Psychology in black welcomes the symbolism and signification of the body towards the conceptualisation of freedom that is permanent. To reflect on the black body and its freedom-signifying enclosures, a methodological appeal should be made; this is to infuse semiotic apparatuses to extract what behaviours are exhibited by the black body, and what it says about their assumed freedom. Moreover, a referential look at vast colonial impositions that amalgamate and conflate the body becomes key.

4.5 Conclusion

Psychology in black has presented an argument about possible assemblages of the black body along with the signification process that attaches the black body to the black psyche. As a captive body, the black body signifies the black psyche, through violence and ideological formations. Here, the black body is subjugated through its imagery and physiology, and in turn, formulates an ontology and metaphysics aligned. It produces the ontological world predetermined by colonial narratives of the black body; this is where the signification of the mind emerges. Various bodily experiences were shown and the psychic version it produces. The chapter also highlights the contradiction of freeing the body, which equates to the idea of changing the metaphysics of the black body. Psychology in black is presented as a mode of seeing or a technique that encourages an investigation of the black psyche through the black body. For example, psychology in black unpacks the components that make the black psyche, by looking at that which makes the black body. Here the process of racialising the black body, ideologising the

black body and the procedures involved, are captured to detect how it is best to subjugate the black mind. Psychology in black captures the hidden processes and enactments of the black body, which are not often associated with racialisation. Furthermore, an association between past and present enactments was discussed, to argue how the captive black body can appear in the black psyche across time and space. Psychology in black presents an analytic way of seeing that excavate acts that signify and address multiple forms of body assembles and amalgamations responsible for psychic formations. The movements of the body are understood as behaviours and acts; as such this hermeneutic was expanded to represent the contents of the black psyche. The hermeneutic of analysis employed to understand the black body's relevance to the black psyche makes psychology in black an analytical way of seeing the black psyche.

Chapter 5: Psychology in black and the colonial unconscious

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the concept called the colonial unconscious. It focuses on describing the parameters of the colonial unconscious as a state that occupies the black psyche due to colonial metaphysics. Furthermore, it demonstrates the contours of psychology in black through the colonial unconscious. The colonial unconscious serves as a psychological state that presents the layers of colonial metaphysics. It suggests that those who have been colonised present and relive an unconscious that demonstrates thoughts, ideas and perspectives representative of colonial mentality. This colonial mentality serves as a baseline/template for black people's thinking process, being and ability to be with time and not be alienated by it. The chapter argues that the colonial unconscious is an extension of how colonial metaphysics and violence entrap black people's psychic structure and restrain the ability of black people to create new psychic endeavours. The colonial unconscious is an important concept for psychology in black because it captures the long-standing situatedness of colonial experience, ontologies, and metaphysics. It serves as a platform that assists in identifying the extent to which colonisation is embedded and functioning in the black psyche, especially since colonial metaphysics has become an everyday practice. This then challenges psychology in black to imply a different reading of the psyche, which will depict the mechanics and dynamics responsible for a sustained colonial mentality. The colonial unconscious as articulated by psychology in black is a deep-seated colonised space that offers insights into the psyche of black people across time and space, through behaviour. Using the term colonial in tandem with the unconscious is an indication of employing a different set of apparatus not only to deduce the unseen world and the psychic structure of black people but also the operation of the unconscious. Psychology in black offers a different approach to engaging the unconscious of black people, insisting that the unconscious structure of black people should be articulated in such a way that it depicts the state of blackness and its ontological structure by first recognising colonial roots.

This chapter first defines the colonial unconscious and positions its relevance to psychology in black. The theory of the unconscious is explained through a racial-ontological lens, followed by the expansion and theorisation of the colonial unconscious. The chapter uses three concepts that show the state of blackness, which also outline how

the colonial unconscious functions in the psyche of black people. The three concepts are black faith, black nihilism, and oppositional consciousness; which are articulated to capture the thinking processes and practices, black affect or emotions, and ontological dynamics of blackness. The latter are presumed to affect aspects of the psychic structure as a result of colonial violence and ontology. The second theme to be discussed in detail is bad faith which will be used to demonstrate how the thinking patterns of black people are affected by unconscious colonial metaphysics, which in turn leads to the functioning of the colonial unconscious. The third theme focuses on black nihilism which explains the unconscious colonial metaphysics of black affect, and its functioning as a colonial unconscious. Lastly, oppositional consciousness captures how unconscious colonial material complicates the ontological grounding of black people and their ways of being in the world. The colonial unconscious is defined here as a product of unreconciled ontological practices that cause conflicting ways of relating and being in the world. In this chapter, psychology in black seeks to demonstrate an alternative way of looking at the unconscious and consciousness. Psychology in black is an analytic space that argues for blackness as depicting a sum of unreconciled, unconscious, colonial strivings. Additionally, psychology in black offers a distinct reading of the unconscious, unearthing the psychic disjuncture of being black in an anti-black world.

5.2 On the colonial unconscious

The unconscious remains a controversial topic in psychology but is also significant to the roots of psychology. At the core of its conceptualisation, one finds Freud (1915), Jung (1969) and Lacan (1966). Although other scholars might have engaged in the theorisation of the unconscious, Freud, Jung, and Lacan's work are of concern to this study because they have received a great deal of attention from black scholars doing work on race and racism, such as Fanon (1967), Manganyi (1973), Wilderson (2010) and Marriott (2021, 2022). The intention here is to outline the concept named the colonial unconscious. The intervention on race and the unconscious made by these black scholars serves as a foundation for the colonial unconscious. The colonial unconscious seeks to elaborate on how colonial violence in its metaphysical and physical manifestation is processed/registered in the unconscious and how it creates multiple subjectivities of being. Before elaborating on the colonial unconscious, I briefly outline the theory of the unconscious and then turn to its uses in the scholarship on race.

Freud (1915) defines the unconscious as the psychological material that human beings have no access to in the conscious world. It involves a process of repression that prevents something from becoming conscious but at some point, produces behaviours that often penetrate the conscious mind. Its structure is often explained as formed by repressed conscious material from everyday experiences (Freud, 1915). According to Freud, making everyday stimuli unconscious is rather a selective process. Furthermore, the unconscious consists of acts that are latent and temporarily unconscious. Freud proposes the topographical structure of the unconscious, where he insists that censorship of psychic acts exists for the formation of consciousness, preconsciousness and unconsciousness. The unconscious falls within the first phase of the topographical structure, which means it is rejected by censorship, hence the repressed material would remain in the unconscious. However, if it passes through censorship, it goes to the conscious system, which is the second phase.

Conscious material has to pass through the preconscious first, and the censorship taking place will determine if the material becomes conscious/unconscious. The engagement with the unconscious automatically calls upon the assumptions of psychoanalysis in this study. Psychoanalysis has been deemed problematic for diagnosing racial problems. Based on this I would like to position the suggestion by Spillers (1996) that sees psychoanalytic discourse offering a supplementary protocol to consider, like in the case of Fanon. This is the premise that psychology in black engages with the unconscious, considering a different dynamic in which the unconscious could be presented. By denoting the racial lens, the unconscious is suggested as a product of racialisation or functioning within racial modalities of thoughts and being. The focus is on the content of the unconscious, which indicates its functionality. The power of racial or colonial socialisation will be based on what remains in the unconscious.

The above conceptualisation of the unconscious by Freud (1915) is crucial, especially the founding principles of the unconscious since it relays the process involved in the development of the unconscious amidst racialised violence. The limitation of this process is that it assumes that in all situations individuals have an authority over what becomes unconscious through selection because one's context and reality influence how an individual engages with what they receive as conscious stimuli. The issue is with the material traced back to the contents of the unconscious, which warrants an act of suppression or release. Unconscious processes are not fixed but rather follow the nature

of stimuli received. Based on this, one can say that black people's everyday experience of violence and oppression does not give them an option to choose what could be a repressed material. Fanon (1986) views the process of repression as non-existent, and that black people, do not have time to filter out or choose which racialised ideologies and violence should be hidden, as it happens to them unwillingly. Spillers (1996) concurs with this, as she notes: "The black man does not have time to make racist practice unconscious" (p. 119). That means experiences that have racialised connotations of oppression function outside the control of the oppressed. Subsequently, by making the processing and encryption of unconscious material voluntary, questions arise whether they are unconscious. The release of the unconscious material is an important indicator of what has occupied an individual to a point of release. For Freud, the release comes as an important symbolism that will distinguish whether pathology is present. Freud characterises the release as presenting itself as either an instinct, cathexis dreams or even in the form of pathology (psychosis or neurosis).

Unconscious materials withstand time and have no reference to it (Freud 1915). If we were to speak of the release of unconscious material for black people, the conversation would be based on to what extent the subject formation has taken place. As seen later in the chapter, the identification of unconscious material is rather vague, because of what has been signified by colonisation. Referred to here is the ability to distinguish unwanted, expressed behaviour as unconscious material, as in the case mentioned by Freud, which is close to impossible. For black people, this is a difficult task because almost every behavioural act that we might presume as unconscious in racialised society is unwanted. So far, we can even argue that all that colonisation does is produce an individual that doesn't want himself, desire to assume another's mode of being because theirs is pleasant. In interpreting the black unconscious, Fanon (1986) finds Freud's methods lacking because they focus more on individual factors. Fanon (1986) notes the following: "Freud insisted that the individual factor be taken into account through psychoanalysis, and substituted the phylogenetic theory with the ontogenetic perspective" (p. 4). Fanon (1986) further argues that individualism will not provide an understanding of the black man's alienation in the world. Freud's (1915) ontogenetic and individualistic perspectives suggest that psychological factors are all genetic and permanent. For Fanon psychological factors are a result of sociogenic factors, which means that social factors are crucial to unpacking the unconscious material and its processes specifically for black people.

Sociogenic or social factors can be equitable to colonial socialisation, which is key in the formation of the black psychic structure. Spillers (1996) critiques Freud along these lines, mentioning that his take on psychoanalysis does not consider the systematic trajectory of societies and its implications. The analysis of the unconscious can easily overlook colonial sociality and take on an individual unconscious material as instinctual, natural, or chosen based on importance. From this discussion, this implies that the acts of the unconscious represent the success of subject formation, subjectivity, and metaphysics, solely because of how blackness is constructed. Here I refer to colonised consciousness and ultimately unconscious that Fanon (1986) explains as occupying the being of black people i.e. black people being the being of the other, which foregrounds the nature of black pathology. The conscious and unconscious of black people might present with fairly similar material, and dynamics that might be confusing, because of having no autonomy to influence conscious and unconscious material. To close off criticism of Freud, another psychoanalyst, Jung, should be engaged.

Jung (1969) sees the unconscious as consisting of a personal and a collective unconscious. The personal unconscious is concerned with individuals' life experiences and rests upon the collective unconscious which is not based on personal experience. The collective unconscious includes behaviours that are similar everywhere, which means Jung sees them as identical for all people regardless of race, suggesting a common psychic structure across races. The collective unconscious is Jung's attempt to be inclusive of other races; however, he does not take into consideration differences in ontology and lived experience, because for him they follow an innate consciousness structure. The unconscious consists of archetypes which are universal images that are mostly represented by religious symbols and mythologies. Jung claims that since people across racial lines have a set of religious beliefs, they have a set psychic structure, and therefore function the same, regardless of differences in belief. Jung possibly implies that religious/cultural schemas, symbolism, and mythologies form the psychic structure in which every conscious stimulus will be received. This will in turn be responsible for forming the unconscious. However, we should bear in mind that black people are not included in the races that share the same archetypes, simply because Jung describes them as primitive. According to him, the primitives are unaware of their psychic processes, including the unconscious, but rather know the world through myths. This attempt to include black people is short-sighted because it relegates black people to creatures who

experience the world through mythologies and typologies. Another issue with his definition of the unconscious is that it will negate the colonial structure that the so-called 'primitives' live in. If one is to consider Jung's personal unconscious, black people's experience of colonisation will be relegated to just personal experience, and not something to be analysed collectively. Fanon (1986) sees it fit to redefine the collective unconscious as the sum of prejudice, myths, and collective attitudes of a group, as Jung's definition is limiting. Rather than the collective unconscious being genetic or innate, it would be socialised. Fanon, therefore introduces the defining features of the unconscious as embedded in socialisation or everyday interaction with people and social systems. The unconscious therefore becomes a shared social and psychological experience. Fanon's elaboration is important in elaborating how racism can form part of a racial group's collective makeup, but further how it can be projected onto others. Black people might experience their unconscious from racialised behaviours of others, and not necessarily them socialising themselves as racial beings but are assimilated by others.

Like Freud (1915) and Jung (1969), Lacan (1966) attempts to explain the structure of the unconscious, and he identifies three registers, which he introduces as symbolic, imaginary and the real. He explains the symbolic order as focused on how people speak and write themselves into existence. Lacan (2006) uses the signifier and signified analogy to show how the symbolic order is represented in the unconscious. A signifier presents an idea or state that is symbolised, forming a representation in the unconscious, and this signifier can be a behaviour, laws, or rules of the signified (Lacan, 2006). The imaginary describes how others view you and how you view yourself, hence Lacan further says, "the unconscious is the Other's discourse" (Lacan, 2006, 16). Lastly, the real explains unrepresentable trauma that is difficult to articulate. Amongst his famous contributions is that the unconscious is structured by language and that language brings society into existence (Lacan, 2006). The structure of language is what structures/constructs the unconscious, not the language an individual speaks. Lacan seems not to realise that the structure of language or even speech, cannot be understood outside one's spoken language, unless he is saying linguistic aspects of languages are universal. Lacan also dismisses ontology and lived experience that comes with a language that communicates certain techniques of a language, or experiences that change a language. Language communicates an epistemology and a lived experience that is not devoid of certain techniques of speech. I posit that every language has its symbolism and therefore creates

a different unconscious. It is unclear whether Lacan makes a distinction between language as structuring the unconscious or language as communicating unconscious phenomena. Marriott (2022) questions whether Lacan's subject represents how white people construct themselves based on how they position black people, especially since Lacan mentions that the unconscious is the Other's discourse. The above summary of the unconscious simply engages the psychoanalytic description of the unconscious but also provides a race-based critique, particularly the applicability of definitive concepts of the unconscious towards black people.

I want to situate the unconscious in a racial context, and also foreground how the unconscious will be theorised for psychology in black. Earlier I mentioned that the deviating route between the unconscious as explained by Freud and Jung is based on the contents of what underlines the unconscious and how it can play out in the open. I argue that the unconscious of blacks is lived daily, meaning it is played out in the open without the awareness of black people. It is presented by the behaviour, demeanour, identity and aesthetic of black people, but also comes across as conscious to black people. I refer to the unconscious as a perceived normal, automatic behaviour that is even accepted. The basis for describing unconsciousness in this particular manner originates in certain of the assertions by Fanon (1986), Marriott (2021, 2022), Spillers (1996) and Manganyi (1973). Fanon (1986) insists that the formation of the unconscious is represented by some form of psychopathology. Fanon's redefinition of the collective unconscious, previously defined by Jung, is to demonstrate how the unconscious of both black and white people is based on their "unreflected imposition of a culture" (Fanon, 1986, p. 147). Fanon goes beyond Jung because he demonstrates how in any form of socialisation, whether it is through culture, religion or politics, archetypes will be formed. For Fanon, the unconscious cannot be understood outside the experience of colonial violence, which seems to occupy black people's psychic structure. Fanon could be saying when colonial acts happen, they imprint certain ideas and memories without one's knowledge and choice. It is here where we can relegate the black unconscious as a product of subjection. As mentioned earlier the product of subject formation is seen in how the unconscious transpires in everyday lives. The unconscious of black people as explained by Fanon forms within the representation of whiteness as the defining factor for black people - which is seeing the self through their eyes. Fanon (1986) argues this by stating how the colonised often present a desire to be unconsciously white, and "to select himself as

capable of carrying the burden of the original sin” (p. 148) because of the imposed and systematised inferiority complex. That means the unconscious does what Butler (1997) says when subordination provides the condition of possibility. It can function as a limitation of what an individual sees as a possibility to live fully. Fanon (1986) uses the phrase fateful hieroglyphics to demonstrate how black people always await for a white person to lead them. In this context, hieroglyphics is defined as an engraved idea, identity and activity, or asocial acts that remain the building blocks of the unconscious that form the contradictions of black life. Through hieroglyphics, one can anticipate an unconscious, deeply ingrained with ideologies and ontologies beyond black people’s control, represented by permanent markings of white imagery and morality, as appealing forms of self-identity. The unconscious of blacks is to be fortified with latent content, constructed within the structures of ideology and ontology of colonisation.

Another factor to consider is one raised by Marriott (2000) who focuses on the relationship between the unconscious and identity formation. Marriott approaches the state of the black unconscious through Fanon’s (1986) lens of imagery - black imago - and the representation of whiteness and blackness in the black psyche. The black *imago* reveals the black person as a phobogenic subject, an object of fear (Fanon, 1986), based on white people’s sensibilities. Marriott (1998) reveals how this inferred position interferes with black people’s identity and identification; so that this traumatic displacement produces an unconscious that is white and displaces the conscious black identity. The unconscious in this case is an inferred representation of self from others’ projections of one, hence Marriott calls it a phantom unconsciousness, that will undermine one’s psychic well-being. Black people have to contend with what lies in white people’s unconscious; they have to make sense of how others feel about them, and that could become the beginning of a misrecognition of self through the negative and problematic unconscious representation of self that is imposed by others. The misrecognition is highlighted by Manganyi (1977) when he notes that a society’s negative views of others leads to the objectification of oneself; that is experiencing themselves as objects, or becoming things, for they unconsciously distrust what is black in them (Fanon, 1963). The black unconscious is an unconscious that is likely to be fragmented and consist of painful, degrading schemas of self (Marriott, 2000). This is likely a pathological unconscious that projects self-defeating behaviours. The biggest problem that the black unconscious faces, that both Fanon (1986) and Marriott (2000) articulate,

is the unconscious desire to assume whiteness no matter how brutal whiteness is. The limitation with both Fanon (1986) and Marriott (2000) is not being able to account for the functioning of the unconscious material that makes whiteness appealing, regardless of its brutality. This is where a different take on the unconscious is encouraged; that is a form of analysis that Marriott emphasises whereby the unconscious is synonymous with the registers of the invisible power of violence, mutilation, fear, and torture of racism that renders black people powerless to influence their unconscious

While Fanon (1986) and Marriott (2000) explain what lies in the unconscious, this study builds on what has already been done by expanding the term to its prolonged functionality and manifestations. Hence the term 'colonial unconscious' becomes part of the discussion, which is the internal functioning of the unconscious, the continuation of racialised material, and the reinforcement of colonial conduct. The assumption is that in a racist context, certain behaviours often become scripted and enacted unknowingly. Lane (1997) explains clearly what could define the colonial unconscious by stating the following: "If consciousness is the civilising element of our subjectivity, the argument goes, unconscious must not only be a disordering influence but also the racial component that prevents us from reaching our civilised ideal" (p.13). To articulate it clearly, it means the black's unconscious can be thought of as the stumbling block to freedom, which makes the presence of racialisation a structural part of the psyche. However, this is not to say that whiteness and its doctrine are privileged by black people, or that black people are unable to transcend colonial doctrines; the argument is that even though black people make a way to transcend, there is often an opposing force that comes unconsciously to disturb any form of progress.

To advance the argument above further, the term 'colonial unconscious' is used to situate how the black unconscious functions and the type of thinking and behaviour it necessitates. Colonial unconscious was first introduced by Ezra (2000) in her quest to understand the French colonial culture and their perception of themselves and others, using literary text. She explains colonial unconscious as consisting of ingrained colonial ideologies that ceased to disappear from the culture of the French, and about modes of maintaining power. It includes a set of unconscious beliefs, images, ambivalences and perceptions about themselves and the colonised other (Ezra 2000). Ezra's intervention on the unconscious proves useful in engaging the psyche of the coloniser. It can be said that the colonial unconscious taps into the construction of white subjectivity, and how this

white subjectivity can filter into black subjectivity. The term can be put in conversation with Lacan's formation of the unconscious, which lies in the formation of white subjectivity. Lacan's (2006) use of the unconscious as the other's discourse, shows how white people's idea of self is an extension of how they position the black other. This is fitting for Fanon's rendition of the collective unconscious, which facilitates a society's collective thinking, fantasies, history and reality. The colonial unconscious can be accounted for using a practice proposed by (Jameson 1981), termed the political unconscious, which puts forth a process of analysis that historicises text and its interpretations. A historicising operation looks at the path of a subject and object, historical origins and intangible historicity of concepts and categories. It is a trans-historical analysis of dialectical thought. The political unconscious also looks at the dynamics of interpretation and presupposes apprehending previous layers of interpretation and identifying developed layers from inherited traditions. The political unconscious is a concept that outlines a method of exploring the unconscious, which it does through the analysis of text. I employ it as a method that unpacks the behavioural acts as a basis of the unconscious. In so doing one can account for black people's daily behavioural expressions within a historical path, which interprets what the present says about the past so that a claim about the workings of the unconscious can be identified. The unconscious can be explained as a psychic formation of history, packaged, and moulded as a functioning historicity, that even appears as an intangible aspect of a historical concept/context.

Hudson (2013) further extends the colonial unconscious, by arguing that white people's colonial mentality and associated behaviours - such as racism towards black people - have become a way of life. He approaches the presence and functioning of the colonial unconscious as part of the current liberal democratic state and a specific mode or way of colonialism. His analysis positioned identity, and subject creation as the core features that make the presence of the colonial unconscious possible. Unlike Ezra (2000), Hudson (2013) engages the subject position of both black and white people as dependent on each other. That means the white unconscious is solidified in the presence of a black man. I assume that the process taking place here is one where racial differences are made to seem ontological, and as if they were made to be part of their biological structure. Hudson taps into the unconscious through the identity formation of white people based on given identifiers such as self-sufficiency and autonomy, while black people are given the

subjectivity of inferiority. This indicates clearly how black people do not have a choice in terms of what goes in their unconscious. Based on the assertions above by Hudson, the development of certain segments of the unconscious would be based on views and ideals, that produce an array of behaviours and qualities for self-identification. This is how colonial symbolism becomes the core of the unconscious structure, facilitating the desire for whiteness.

The colonial unconscious is described by Hudson as facilitated by power structures. For example, in post-Apartheid South Africa (post-1994) black and white people were constructed as non-racial democratic citizens and not as colonial subjects. What arises here is a deliberate unconscious erasure of colonial experience and its embodiment, which means modernity becomes part of everyday narrative while trying to erase the colonial subjectivity, or rather presents a good narrative for “post-colonial” South Africa. Although Hudson does a good analysis of the unconscious material that forms identities and personalities, he does not engage in the violence that transfers with colonial ideologies in the quest to maintain the colonial structure. Through, Hudson’s assertions one can see just how white people’s internalisation of their prejudice and construction of blackness is done and possibly filtered through black people unconsciously. This can be taken as a perspective of the unconscious that is associated with mimicry of behaviour, and a consideration of how the unconscious can be encrypted. The colonial unconscious in the context of blackness can be framed within physical symbolism, such as the body, and geography expanding the unconscious not to just apply metaphysical concepts such as ideologies, doctrines, and ontologies.

Here the unconscious is positioned in the context of coloniality and theorisation of it. That means the psychic structure of black people can be deduced from everyday behaviour, and that shows the continuation of colonial-induced behaviours and thinking practices. The theorisation of the colonial unconscious is a reaffirmation that demonstrates how colonisation will continue forming the black psychic structure. Although coloniality and coloniality of being have long been articulated (i.e. Wynter 2003; Maldonado-Torres, 2007), it has not been fully explained in relation to the psychic structure of blacks. Maldonado-Torres (2007) explains:

The concept of coloniality of being was born in conversations about the implications of the coloniality of power in different areas of society. The idea was

that colonial relations of power left profound markers not only in the areas of authority, sexuality, knowledge and the economy, but on the general understanding of being as well. (p. 242)

Maldonado-Torres describes what the colonial unconscious is about. The reference made to colonial relations of power leaving marks on various sectors of being is what occupies the unconscious. The colonial unconscious is then articulated with reference to various power relations that have become lingering baseline markers of being. Maldonado-Torres sees the coloniality of being as an extension of whiteness when he says coloniality of being refers to “others (blacks) are not” which means Western humanity is still prevalent to proponents of structuring the black unconscious. Hence, the black psychological state will sustain itself continuously by subjugating authorities of modernity still functioning to regulate and structure life. Not only is the coloniality of being about defining the other, but it emphasises the naturalisation and normalisation of non-ethics of war, further producing ontological colonial difference and organising existential crises and symbolic realities (Maldonado-Torres, 2007). The normalisation and naturalisation of non-ethics of war is an important concept to the conceptualisation of the colonial unconscious because it shows how any form of naturalisation to the colonial order means instituting black as the symbolic other in the psychic structure was successful. Psychology in black enunciates the unconscious through an analysis based on ontological fissures of colonisation.

To depart from Hudson’s idea of the colonial unconscious to situate black people warrants taking note of the structure of antiblackness. Antiblackness produces a different mode of an unconscious structure. For example, Wilderson (2010) argues that the structure of slavery produces new ontological relations and epistemes. One can then expect certain unconscious materials from this type of existence. However, being cognisant of how different positionalities of colonial violence has implications for the metaphysics of antiblackness is essential. New ontological relations and epistemes refer to any mode of socialisation that responds to colonial violence and the violence that colonial masters and structures enforce to define blackness. The ontological relation thus becomes a marker of psychological and social constructs that unconsciously will underwrite black sociality. The colonial unconscious is underwritten by colonisation and colonial violence, and related psychological or symbolic influences, directing cognitive functions and behaviours in the modern world. When Wilderson asserts that violence

accrues to the human body as a result of colonial transgression, whether real or imagined within a symbolic order, he pushes the infusion of violence in the unconscious. Hence the colonial unconscious is described as a mode of functioning that has permeated the psychic structure and is presented in the open, merely because the body and mind must account for the unending consequences of violence.

To further unpack the colonial unconscious, the libidinal economy has to be included because it deals with parts of the unconscious that deal with certain desires and identifications that facilitate a complex relationship between sexuality and the unconscious (Wilderson, 2010). That means the colonial unconscious deals with the harbouring of ideas, attachment, aggression, destruction and affection that are part colonial empire. References are made to identify established and attached desires and emotions to the system. This echoes sentiments by Butler (1997), who states that no subject comes out without a passionate attachment to an oppressive power structure. Colonial unconscious raises a concern about the development of the pathological because it shows how black people might have internalised that which might be self-destructive. The colonial unconscious is the transaction between the environment and the person. At this point, it carries the aftermath of colonial trauma, ideologies, previous and current subject constructions. In essence, the question becomes to what extent an individual can embody subjection.

The colonial unconscious demonstrates how black subjectivities will continue being created under modernity. This is the lingering effect of subjugation and abjection. It is important to make this distinction before a colonial unconscious can be extracted from behaviours or activities that are naturalised and normalised, and are 'inherited' as a 'cultural' way of living. The reason is that which is regarded as cultural or that which forms one's core concept of self and identity is positioned through a set of relations and subject positions inclusive of oppression and violence or any form of colonial identity formation. Colonial oppression creates a certain type of individuals or subjects; however, it is often not known by the oppressed other that they are being constructed to become certain beings; they are aware of the conditions they are in. For example, an inferiority complex is that unconscious behaviour, that is not expressed willingly but is necessitated by the hostile conditions, in which black people find themselves. Black people are, therefore "unconscious of the mechanism producing this effect of subjectivity" (Hudson, 2013, p. 269). They are not aware of the symbolic construction of their constitution, or

that which will become the foundation of their identity. The thinking process and how they should feel about certain things is a construction. The unconscious however is not fully hidden, but often recognised by others and not the oppressed being themselves. It is embedded in everyday practices and social normativity, (Hudson, 2013). The colonial unconscious further demonstrates the accumulation of various attacks and violence on both the body and mind of black people. In light of what is expressed, the importance of Biko's (1978) assertion of self-awareness and self-examination becomes crucial.

For psychology in black, the colonial unconscious expresses how the colonial system unconsciously views and shapes behaviours and everyday perceptions of black people. It shows the continuous legacy or the inscription of colonial violence, ideology, symbolism and ontology on the psyche or mental template of black people. Some reproduction of colonial material remains an unseen or unrecognised reaction to oppression. One cannot fully debunk what colonial unconscious is without addressing acts or behaviour of surviving colonial violence in its physical and metaphysical form. This extends to matters relating to autonomy and how black people respond to colonial violence. Unconscious memories and naturalised thoughts and emotions serve as by-products of acts of the system. They become barriers to a total overhaul of the system. Butler (1997) explains this well when she says that in cases where subordination has conditions for acts of autonomy the subject emerges in tandem with the unconscious. In light of this, the current democratic and post-liberation dispensations, the possibility for black people to continue to affect their unconsciousness becomes limited. Psychology in black sees the colonial unconscious as a continuous function of colonial ideologies of blackness within the modern world, that is often depicted as beneficial for black people. It argues that self-defeating ideas, ideologies, contradictions of life and emotions of pain and sorrow in democratic modernity are a product of the democratic subject creations as well. The colonial unconscious in modernity shifts black people's psychological and social issues to themselves and not to the omnipresent colonial empire. This means the colonial system unconsciously produces messages that would make oppression a way of life and still necessitate oppression. This happens while driving the narrative of freedom, making black people feel free, and at the same time unconsciously pushing further disenfranchisement. From a methodological standpoint psychology in black assesses and analyses the colonial unconscious from a communicated conscious experience. That means there is no need to wait for one to have dreams or have instinctual thinking to

access what could be embedded unconsciously, but rather everyday conscious experiences become a gateway to access. From the expressed experience, one can determine the extent of colonial indoctrination and the metaphysical control of black people. I here move away from the pathological explanation of unconscious phenomena to everyday phenomena that can explain one's psychic position.

5.3 Bad faith and the colonial unconscious

Bad faith is presented in this study as a function/demonstration of the colonial unconscious. The genealogy of the term can be traced to Sartre (1958), who defines bad faith as a state of consciousness whereby one self-negates or deceives oneself; instead of directing it outward, one turns it inward. Sartre articulates bad faith within the bounds of nothingness and negation. Negation atones a quality of one's judgment of self. Nothingness can derive from the origin of negative judgments. This judgment is affirmative and depicts that a psychic operation has taken place. Nothingness stems from the origin of negative judgments because it is a form of negation. This nothingness happens in the consciousness, and this is where bad faith comes in. Being in bad faith means being aware of one's lies and the truth concerning one's lies. That means an individual lies while in possession of the truth. An individual becomes conscious of themselves, how they want to present themselves in the world, and how others should be perceived in relation to them. Although the one who is in bad faith feels and experiences it at the moment, it is also transcendental, in so far as being in bad faith is about being apprehensive about the future.

One important aspect of bad faith that Sartre grapples with, which is important for psychology in black, is whether it belongs to the conscious and unconscious world. This is an important distinction to make because bad faith is enunciated within the context of the colonial unconscious, by articulating how it can function as an unconscious phenomenon. I am aware that Sartre does not see how the unconscious can be part of bad faith, especially since the subject of bad faith is conscious of their acts of negation. Below are Sartre's (1958) sentiments on the unconscious of bad faith.

But what type of self-consciousness can the censor have? It must be the consciousness (of) being conscious of the drive to be repressed, but precisely in order *to not be* conscious of it. What does this mean if not that the censor is in bad faith? Psychoanalysis has not gained anything for us since in order to overcome

bad faith, it has established between the unconscious and consciousness an autonomous consciousness in bad faith. (p. 53)

To respond to Sartre and argue for bad faith as functioning in the unconscious, the subject of bad faith should be identified as black. That means the circumstances necessitating one to be in bad faith would be different from those that might have been considered by Sartre. This would invoke some doubt in the point made by Sartre which states that bad faith does not require an ontological function. Furthermore, one would have to dismiss the point made by Sartre, that says that the subject knows the truth they think they are possessing. My opinion is that in blackness the truth is hardly known, because the gymnastic of the colonial enterprise isn't open for black people to see. When black people are in doubt and bad faith happens, the source of bad faith is sometimes not known, and the awareness of being in bad faith is diminished. Sartre is correct when he states that bad faith is based on an annihilated psychic structure and belongs to the psychic structure that is metastable. The premise here suggests that there is unconscious material that facilitates being in bad faith. I argue that in coloniality, one does not always know that one is acting or even living in bad faith. The argument posed by Sartre is based on the process of repression, which he does not believe is taking place during self-deception. An issue Sartre faces when trying to find a psychoanalytic explanation for bad faith is whether truth is censored or not, and if it is censored, it means its status of being unconscious ceases to exist because one needs to know what one is censoring for it to be censored. Regardless, in this study, the unconscious is an automatic process embedded with colonial, racialised material, that produces deceiving truths and lies. In psychoanalytic terms, bad faith might perhaps be referred to as an act of repression and resistance, where the truth is suppressed, and the lies are not. That means one can unconsciously choose that which provides some sense of psychic relief. The latter could be the premise for race-based analysis of the psychic process behind bad faith.

More (2005) argues that bad faith has been described as self-deception in psychological literature, which is misleading because bad faith is not based just on the self, but also on being in a society with others. Describing it as self-deception also has implications for the argument of consciousness and unconsciousness because of the liminality that accompanies the functionality of the term. More asks where the lie would be hidden if it happens in the conscious, and if then the truth is hidden in the unconscious, does it cease to exist as conscious? That means consciousness is established as duality (Sartre, 1958;

More, 2005). Nonetheless, it is not quite clear what this duality means, whether it is a consciousness that also happens to be unconscious. This is a possibility in blackness because psychic processes are not always clear or concise because of the brutality of colonial violence. Sartre's dismissal of the unconscious as an aspect that can define bad faith is rather untimely, the reason being that self-negation has a historicity and cannot take place in isolation. Further history does not always function consciously like an element of facticity. Bad faith in this study is understood as taking place within the unconscious and conscious realms - this is different from Sartre's autonomous consciousness.

The emphasis is placed on the unconscious, because of the need to understand how coloniality and anti-black racism function in the realm of thinking or thought processes linked with self-negation. I would like to argue that bad faith resembles an act of fungibility, which Winnubst (2019) explains as "the mechanism that writes anti-blackness in an ontological register" (p. 104). This means the ontological markers of blackness render it fitting for one to be in bad faith. Bad faith becomes a signified state of colonial ontology because the structure of colonial ontology and metaphysics only opens avenues to thoughts that are self-negation. Furthermore, identifying oneself as a black person in an antiblack world is thinking of oneself as the other, hence the ability for an individual to be in bad faith is synonymous with everyday function. If an ontology is antiblack, it means one possesses a fungible mind, with a psyche that is ontologised against oneself. Bad faith is a depiction of this, showing the dynamic ways of black thought or thinking practices. Bad faith shows the ability of anti-black ontology to "incapacitate the possibility of black subjectivity" (Winnibust, 2019, p. 105). This presents an arrested form of thinking in the form of autonomy and agency. It also keeps one in an anxiety-provoking mode, whereby all human defences are released along with misleading cognitive defences. Misleading cognitive defences are a demonstration of the colonial unconscious.

Gordon (1995) takes us through multiple ways in which bad faith takes place in an anti-black society. He notes that bad faith can be defined based on what an individual rejects but ultimately needs, hiding from one's responsibility of freedom, and fleeing displeasing truth for a pleasing falsehood. Notably bad faith is based on one's belief and the ability to choose based on the belief presented or belief based on a certain reality. It can also be inferred to as a move towards making life bearable, especially when adopting a pleasing

truth and divorcing oneself from detrimental definitions of self. In an anti-black world, one sees a negation of the black identity for a white identity; this disavowal of self is a representation of the colonial unconscious. Here, the colonial unconscious would be partitioned by misleading identity referents, using misleading cognitive defences to deal with ontological markers and referents of anti-blackness. For Gordon bad faith engages the pre-reflective consciousness and reflective consciousness. Here bad faith is attended from an awareness position to a reflective position, hence demonstrating how blackness functions in psychic states of plurality. The pre-reflective consciousness opens the possibility of having unconscious material creeping into the process of reflecting or decision-making. This means lying to self becomes ontologically bound, and based on what aspect of blackness an individual perceives that needs to be concealed. Experience and reality will therefore serve as the basis for the lie. In this case, the unconscious affects how one reaches bad faith, through a mediation between historical context and current reality. One can argue for the position of the colonial unconscious when Gordon says that the object of consciousness exists with multiple attitudes towards it and that these attitudes can be accounted for unconsciously in their manifestation of negative questions, errors, hate, fears, and interpretations. Gordon is probably saying that being in bad faith, is more than just lying or deceiving oneself; it goes beyond the present but caters to the ontology and historical reality of people. Ontological referents of bad faith are diversified into multiple attitudes about self, sparking a conversation on how cognitive defences frame bad faith.

An example of misleading cognitive defences, often used to protect oneself from the anti-black colonial ontology is to adopt good faith. Black people take this cognitive stance to be in good faith, which is an effort to avoid being part of stereotypical imagery of black people. Good faith is based on their past and presence (facticity) to assert change in their future (transcendence) (Gordon, 1995). However, what seems like good faith is historically linked to black oppression and white liberation, because ontological referents of anti-blackness are abiding. Bad faith is made in hindsight, hence good faith could represent what is referred to here as the colonial unconscious. The blurred line between the conscious and unconscious is identified because good faith is in hindsight bad faith. Bad faith as positioned within the unconscious world, opens up a platform to dissect, how colonial assimilation (equivalent to good faith) partitions cognitive defences. Therefore, bad faith can be used to determine the cognitive processes that take place when thoughts

interject the self in relation to others in the presence of altered perceptions and experiences of being black. Bad faith is a self-fulfilling prophecy and a psychological reflex that keeps colonial ontology as an omnipresent and legitimate form of symbolism and materiality that unconsciously represents colonial metaphysics as stable and a default setting. Indicating bad faith as a psychological reflex is based on seeing negating thoughts being an automatic response to protect oneself from racial stereotypes. This is explained well by Butler (1997) who says instinct is where history meets the present. It seems as if being in bad faith is like engaging in a slippery slope fallacy, a fallacy maintained by lies or negation of self to escape a painful incident, which is only escaped psychologically, not in physical terms (which means no real tangible relief is given by bad faith).

Gordon (1995) highlights how anti-black racism is a form of bad faith and manifests differently for white and black people. For white people to be in black faith, they simply enforce their superiority, avoid uncomfortable truths about themselves, relegate inferiority to blacks, and choose comfortable falsehoods about other people. Bad faith ultimately becomes an exchange between blacks and whites, whereby black people unconsciously take what whites impose, and inversely decide to take a stance that is presumed to be opposite to what whites impose on them. Thus, asserting the notion by Fanon (1986) that stipulates how black people, start to perceive themselves the way others see them (this in itself bad faith). This is done by unconsciously devaluing blackness and valuing whiteness. This form of bad faith indicates that when one is ontologically referred to as absent, their mode of existence is that of denial of self (Gordon 1995). Such a mode of existence solidified the foundation of bad faith in black people because it rendered a weak psychic structure, making self-negation an ontological reality. When self-negation becomes an ontological reality, one can see the work of the unconscious as negating of self becomes an automatic process. In hindsight, Gordon acknowledges that blacks who self-deceive have taken a white foundational ego which is represented as unconscious. Nevertheless, this is not something black people do intentionally but rather a consumption of what is in the fabric of society, and that means assuming the roles and beliefs of whiteness. An analysis of bad faith from the black perspective does allow the unconscious to be assessed through modes of power and subjugation that are responsible for articulating autonomy and agency.

In the context of coloniality and the freedom/liberation era, bad faith uses cognitive apparatus informing agency and autonomy. Sartre (1958) used freedom to demonstrate

it, but he thinks of it as the ability to choose a certain ontological reality, not from a point of oppression. In times of modernity and coloniality, freedom has become an ambiguous term; it is an ideological construct that has been difficult to attain, hence bad faith will presume an analysis based on ambiguity. Nevertheless, what is referred to as freedom and bad faith in blackness, can be synonymous because choosing freedom is often related to choosing whiteness as freedom emanates from white ontology and reality. Hartman (1997) explains this as the “traversals of freedom and subordination, sovereignty and subjection, and autonomy and compulsion” (p. 115) which signifies freedom as a dilemma. Hence, being in bad faith emulates the “strategies of individuation constitutive of the liberal individual” (Hartman, 1997, p. 116). Bad faith represents a manifestation of internal psychic conflict, whereby facticity and transcendence conflict. Thus bad faith is part of a cognitive process that engages the politics of thinking and acting in a racialised society, since deciphering multiple thoughts and ideological positions takes place simultaneously.

Both Sartre (1958) and Gordon (1995) discuss freedom in the context of bad faith, and they discuss it as unsettling and provoking. For Sartre (1958) freedom comes across as something that is averted, and that aversion towards the responsibility to choose is bad faith (Sartre 1958). However, freedom is not something averted but wanted by black people, and attainment of it or the search for it can lead to an unconscious act of bad faith. This is due to politics, narratives, and loaded agendas that come with the freedom that serves as a basis for that which is unconsciously registered. Freedom discourses are essential for the practice of bad faith because of the new black subjectivities it constructs. Freedom is insinuated as bringing a refigured subject, with a liberated mentality and rights-bearing individual, who should enjoy social and political privileges that they were previously not allowed to enjoy. However, Hartman (1997) reminds us that oppression and freedom mirror each other, whereby subjections mirroring slavery are common in the era of freedom. Further, the subordination of the freed and the production of the black as poor, abject, irrational, dangerous and servile are defining features of modernity (Hartman, 1997). These discourses of freedom are indicative of the discord between black people and power structures, whereby what is promised and assumed is different. What is important in this discussion is the ability to have a choice, especially since the tenets of bad faith are about the ability to choose. Again Hartman assists in interrogating this assumption of choice when she claims that when you are free, your autonomy is

precarious because it is riddled with exploitation, domination and subjection embodied in the narrative of rights. The precarity of autonomy is at the centre of the colonial unconscious. The nature of the unconscious in this case is implicated in how autonomy or agency will be practised. Therefore, bad faith exposes those anxieties (hence Gordon says it is a form of anxiety) that befall black people, forcing them to make certain choices that negate their existence, often not perceived as such. Amidst this, it is the decision to choose which will give life and becomes a point of analysis for an individual who is supposedly free. What seems to matter here, is what the unconscious does to entrap freedom or a newly 'liberated mind'.

Du Bois's (1903) famous words "How does it feel to be a problem" (, p. 7) are indicative of how black people think about their position in the world. It is through this mode of self-questioning that bad faith exists. Another question about existence is from Fanon (1963) who says, "In reality, who am I" (p. 250). This is a question that comes from being systematically negated, also representative of the existential angst black people experience. Gordon (2000) sees this type of question as an existential one that opens questions about one's being in the world. This line of questioning is indicative of the thought patterns and perceptions about the self. These are the types of questions that show why bad faith exists. That means bad faith signposts existential problems and develops identity/self-image. Hence Gordon (1995) can argue that blacks who oppress other blacks develop self-awareness through their oppression, and this is a form of bad faith. I am raising Gordon's assertion because it happens in times of modernity and freedom. For example, there is a tendency for black people who are in a different class or social setting to disassociate themselves from other black people of a class lower than themselves or label them as non-thinking others. Initially, they sometimes think they are offering a critical viewpoint of their race, however, they are advancing racial stereotypes associated with black people. Unconsciously they negate and disassociate themselves from their racial group. A disassociation of self in a racialised context would entail a disconnection of oneself from the sense of identity, thoughts, and emotions of one's racial group. An oppressive environment necessitates thought patterns such as bad faith that would drive the need to remove and distance oneself from oppressive/stereotypical facts about one's life/racial group.

It is within this situation that false consciousness about the self and others is introduced, and becomes part of the colonial unconscious. False consciousness is explained as a

process whereby an individual is driven by a certain ideology but is not fully aware of it (Marx & Engels, 1975). Even though the term was used to explain the functioning of capitalism, it can be used to show what enables bad faith, because bad faith requires one to make ideological decisions that negate, and usually these negating decisions are from the available set of ideologies. False consciousness demonstrates how the colonial unconscious functions, because the decisions that black people make, and the powers that influence them to make those decisions are usually unknown to them - the invisible hand of colonial powers. Here, one is critically engaging how colonial ideologies, culture and symbolism can linger in the unconscious of the colonised without their awareness, but also occupies and amends psychological processes. In a colonial state, black people have the pressure of making certain choices to depict their autonomy from the system; however, the autonomy is distorted, and decisions made become precarious as the colonial system does not enforce this agency. Motives and drivers of autonomy and agency are often ill-informed and relegated. The sense of freedom to make decisions is outweighed by unknown ideological imperatives. Bad faith naturalises colonial propaganda which can be explained as a way the unconscious wrestles with one's ontological significance.

Naturalisation means unconsciously that there is a deflection and minimisation of the extensiveness of colonial powers in the minds of the colonised, thus minimising the suffering that black people have endured. In this case, bad faith is not just about the experience of self-negation, but rather minimising the full extent of oppression. The interesting phenomenon about bad faith is the unconscious development of self-beratement, and a poor opinion of oneself - but a better opinion of white people. This is often seen in statements praising acts by white people or classifying white people as saviours. Often, this is perceived as being self-reflective about one's blackness without being biased. Unconsciously seeing white people being in good faith further internalises their own inferiority. The colonial unconscious points out the narratives pushed by the government/states, to be carried in its country's national consciousness. Those in power structures recreate blacks' subjective experience to maintain power, especially psychic forms of power. Bad faith in the national consciousness becomes disguised as a critique of ontologies and epistemologies of space, geography and culture, and as such become a natural part of everyday consciousness.

Further, the unconscious holds irrational beliefs about the self and others. This is a pure demonstration of the following statement by Fanon (1963): “The efforts of the native to rehabilitate and to escape the claws of colonialism are logically inscribed from the same point of view as that of colonialism” (p. 212). This means when black people choose to avert the truth or negate their reality, they are deciding not to associate themselves with blackness. In this case, the truth is associated with choosing an identity with oppressive and harsh conditions; however, a decision not to identify does not mean the consequences of being black will be averted, and for black people, any option could lead to being in bad faith. Fanon (1964) indicates that race is always central to how black people view themselves in the world, and that whiteness is a basis for any form of comparison. Statements such as ‘black people’s lives were better under apartheid’ are currently uttered a lot because people supposedly see the current political and social landscape as more difficult than during apartheid. Such a statement shows the colonial unconscious, coming through in Butler and Athanasiou’s (2013) articulation of dispossession, whereby the individual submits to norms of intelligibility and submission constituting ambivalence and a process of subjection. Further psychic forces come together to decide which “passionate attachments” (Butler, 1997) are possible and plausible. Fitting to bad faith, is that dispossession can be a condition for autonomy and a limit for autonomy, that distorts the self-sufficiency of the liberal subject (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013). Dispossession tells the tale of servitude and burden individuality, and the inscription of colonial ideology that still permeates how black people engage their thoughts. In actuality, dispossession shows the entrapment and fallacy of decision-making and limits of independent thought in blackness. Bad faith is inevitable and bound to happen because black people are “denied the consciousness of their subjugation as they are interpellated as subjects of inalienable freedom” (Butler & Athanasiou 2013, p. 6).

Psychology in black highlights the interpellation of normalised colonial practices, including acts normalised by black people, their ideologies and acts of resistance that might form part of the colonial unconscious. Psychology in black seeks to deconstruct unconscious mechanisms by understanding that naturalisation, normalisation, and internalisation of oppression and oppressive practices/ideologies lie at the centre of understanding the colonial unconscious. Bad faith is an act by those who are distressed and trying to navigate being attached to oppression. It positions analysing racialised material by pointing out thinking patterns facilitated by both cultural, political, and

symbolic racialised material. Bad faith in the unconscious brings forth a conversation of self-awareness, self-appraisal, and reflexivity to matters of coloniality. It is a way in which one can see how black people feel and think about themselves and matters of their freedom and modernity. Psychology in black thus adds to the discussion of psychological material that is a result of black people engaging with their oppression; this includes patterns of thoughts, developed ideologies or ideas about the world, perspectives about how they relate to and position themselves in relation to others; and the development of self and identity. Bad faith shows that in the unconscious world, there is a struggle of re-claiming of self, a continuous shift in black people's self-perception but most importantly a conflicted self that seeks positive imagery of self rather than the negative one that it always presented.

5.4 Black nihilism and the colonial unconscious

Black nihilism serves as an analysis and affective register of blackness and anti-black racism. Johnson (2014) explains black nihilism as describing the existential situation and crises of living in an anti-black world. Although much of its theoretical articulation has been philosophical, this study proposes a different approach to black nihilism that enunciates the complexities of black affect. This is to provide a psychological account of black nihilism in the context of colonisation and the freedom era. Black nihilism is understood as demonstrating black affective language, and to signify how black affect functions. Black affects capture what it feels like to be black - a way of experiencing the world in both physiological and ontological terms. Palmer (2017) argues for relevant positioning of black affect when he says, "If one adopts the position that blackness stands as the embodiment of the antisocial within the symbolic order as the constitutive negation of humanness how does the fact of blackness impact intersubjective relationality and affective exchange?" (p. 35). The use of black affect, based on the terms of black nihilism, predicates that the processing of feelings and emotions in blackness should come from understanding the embodiment of anti-blackness. That means one can expect a different structure of affect that sees blackness as the affirming structure. This reference can go to the extent of configuring what Palmer refers to as the ontology of affect, which I believe comes with its metaphysical connotations. What is expected from the ontology of black affect and its metaphysics, is often inconceivable and unthinkable, as Palmer notes. In actuality, black affect or even sentience is something that does not exist for black people, especially if we consider the amount of gratuitous violence black people suffer. Under no

circumstances were black people considered to feel anything because of their presumed inferiority, and ‘humongous body structure’ that saw black people being reduced to having no understanding and recollection of their pain. In the light of this, we can expect black affect to be a mystery that still has to be accurately expanded on; even locating the metaphysical conception of black affect and its colonising nature can be a struggle. In essence, the metaphysical conception of black affect and its unconscious mechanism becomes an unknown phenomenon in colonial aesthetics and domination. Even the conception of black nihilism happens in such epistemological conditions. Hence, I suggest an onto-epistemological take on black nihilism that considers its functional modes as unconscious phenomena.

Riccardi (2018) argues that to understand nihilism as a psychological construct, one needs to explore it as both phenomenological (being) and cognitive (thought). However, there is a need to look at black nihilism as that which highlights an existential crisis, outlined by black affective disjuncture, because nihilism symbolises a group of emotions that signify a state of nothingness. Therefore, I argue for black nihilism as representing an unconscious phenomenon, imitating the colonial unconscious emotions. I distinguish these unconscious emotions from those expressed by Freud (1915), as they prioritise the processes of repression. Freud explains how emotions are involved in repressing general unconscious material. In blackness, unconscious emotions are not voluntarily repressed material but rather unanticipated, unconceivable, and undecipherable, and often lack vocabulary. These emotions become bundles themselves without the permission of the one experiencing them. Unconscious emotion can be due to a lingering emotional state functioning unconsciously and omitted/mirrored from others. It is unending and runs concurrently with other metaphysical catastrophes. This foregrounds a conversation on affective futures, especially the transmission and re-emission of emotions. The colonial unconscious is foregrounded in the realm of emotions; that means conjuring how colonial materials are expressed emotively and kept in the unconscious, used, and processed in the event of anti-black violence. Psychology in black seeks to expose what Palmer (2017, p. 32) expresses as the “unthinkability of black affect” by theorising black nihilism as an intersecting thought between black metaphysics and affect manifested through subjugation and dispossession. This is to “point to the racial logics underlying the (political) ontology of affect itself” (Palmer, 2020, p. 251). About the latter, there is an expectation to find not only particular forms of emotions under a specific ontological

experience, but also that black people are not supposed to feel certain emotions; that means some emotions miss an interpretation or get lost in translation. In blackness one has to account for the denial of emotions, which is a denial of experience or ontology, that results in the inability to explain emotions. The danger of these unaccounted emotions is that they become unconscious emotions with no space for accountability. For, psychology in black exploring the unconscious of black nihilism is to consider the trajectory of ontology and metaphysics of black affect and to configure manifestation of hidden affective narratives. Thus, black nihilism serves as a critical lens that questions how affective discourses serve colonial power or coloniality. The two major arguments about black nihilism are those of West (1993) and Warren (2015). West (1993) understands black nihilism to be an affective symptom of colonisation that emerges as pathological. Warren positions it as an analytical frame towards the black conditions and its metaphysical connotations. To do justice to these two arguments, I employ what Palmer (202) refers to as the metaphysics of feeling and the metaphysics of rationality (reason). The metaphysics of feeling implies the meaning of being in the world is felt, (as in West's account of black nihilism), while the metaphysics of rationality refers to the meaning of the world implied through operations of reasoning (as in Warren's explanation of black nihilism). The intervention that comes from this study is a synthesis of the two perspectives, but a synthesis that looks at black nihilism as an unconscious drive.

As noted above, West's (1993) explanation of black nihilism falls within the metaphysics of feeling, which explains knowing the world through our feelings. The black condition is what black people experience when encountering the world. Conditions such as unemployment, poverty, incarceration, high rates of crime and mortality, are part of the colonial system, producing what West refers to as the nihilistic threat. The nihilistic threat consists of an experience of psychological depression, personal unworthiness, social despair, and inability to achieve one's goals. This pathological account of black nihilism, that West articulates suggests a great intensity of emotions are induced collectively. Here West the internalisation of anti-black practices and oppressive ideologies. He demonstrates black interiority and the affectability of colonial violence. Outside psychopathology, self-determination seems to be an issue that emanates, portraying black affect as entrapping the future. Based on the above assumption by West, black nihilism can be seen as alienating one from time, especially the future. This is the facilitation of

the unconscious drive, that functions in tandem with colonial structures and metaphysics. The nihilist threat is an embodiment of colonial metaphysics and ontology since it removes any thought and emotive language that is responsible for poiesis.

West (1993) argues against the metaphysics of rationality as he describes black nihilism as follows: “Nihilism is to be understood here not as philosophy doctrine, that there are no rational grounds for legitimate standards or authority; it is far more, the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaninglessness, hopelessness and lovelessness” (p. 14). Black nihilism is described as an array of emotions that are individually felt with an outcome that affects the present and the future. It is an affective register that is implicated on an ontological level, whereby other emotions are unconsciously manifested through an effect of nihilism. As an entity of black affect, it has been demonstrated by West as situational and conditional, but most importantly, it is a lingering experience that has been felt by black people for a long duration. It is accumulative and an assembly of affects that might mimic affective economies by Ahmed (2004). Affective economies describe the dynamics involved in the functioning of emotions in aligning individuals with communities (Ahmed 2004). Ahmed notes that emotions mediate between a psychic and a social space and between an individual and the collective. However, affective economies of blackness are timeless and imply that the one experiencing the emotions will make future-related decisions. Even though Ahmed explains that emotions bind one to historical events and political narratives, black emotions are current and historical at the same time because they adhere to the rules of subjugation and dispossession. This is what makes them unconscious and entrapping while being able to serve as a tool of racial domination (Palmer (2017)). This opens a platform to theorise black affective registers such as black nihilism as not only inducing invisible effects on people, but also inducing acts that entrap a collective i.e. self-destructive elements or detachment from others, and attaching itself as part of a community’s ontological world. The danger of the unconscious manifestation of emotions like nihilism is when they form part of the community’s psychological disposition and are accommodated daily. According to West (1993) the nihilist threat causes depression, feelings of worthlessness, social despair, and poor self-mastery. These emotions have been socially and individually moved toward a community’s identity marker. They induce self-destructive behaviours and account for activities such as crime, suicide and so forth. These emotions are not intentionally given to each other, they are

experienced by an individual and given to others, and then experienced as a collective. Black nihilism thus presents emotions that are socialised and naturalised daily. It serves the colonial unconscious because it moves from one generation to the next. Black nihilism represents a history of pain, torture, violence, and dispossession that has already been structured as a functioning tool for blacks. Ahmed (2004) would call this a tactic of oppression that the oppressor uses to make emotions a part of their oppressive strategies. In the context of colonial violence, black nihilism could serve a colonial and modern government because it appears to highlight the preoccupation with emotional states that lead to destructive behaviours, as West (1993) alludes to. Ahmed (2004) indicates this when she says that emotions produce effects that might be beyond the conscious awareness of the one who carries them. Perhaps, the pathological explanation of black nihilism by West (1993) makes sense, especially because self-destructive acts need a platform to be released.

Black nihilism exposes the logic of dispossession and its regulatory practices. Dispossession is a discursive colonial practice that encompasses appropriation, submission, subjection, and regulation of the subject dispositions (Butler & Athanasiou 2013). Dispossession becomes key to unpacking black nihilism because of the kind of metaphysic it produces or the type of subjectivities it enhances. The assumption is that unconscious, dispossessed subjectivities might emerge, depicting behaviours that are confined within distress, destruction, and detachment from one's racial grouping. Colonial violence opens up what Butler and Athanasiou, call discursive and affective appropriations, that get imbricated with the construction of subjectivities of victimhood. In addition, Butler and Athanasiou make one aware that discourses of suffering and pain are affective assembles that are silencing and regulating tools for behaviour. To integrate this into the language of the unconscious, the oppressed do not get to choose what they will feel; rather what they feel will always be taken as a political weapon. This means while emotions are regulated within a political space, they open up channels of unaccounted behaviours and acts that are outside the control of people. Black nihilism functions within such space, where suffering and pain accumulate at an excessive point until an all-encompassing existential state appears. It is important to note that the rampant, multiple emotions/affective states that black people experience, make it difficult and even impossible to attain full autonomy of their emotional states, and to creatively find solutions to them. The premise is that emotions form part of the colonial machinery

and construct certain colonial subjectivities, without one being aware. It is here that we can perceive black nihilism as portraying an ontological orientation and an assemblage of emotions, due to it being an accumulative affective register. Emotions depict the time we live in, and the norms and expectations of a society based on race, class, and gender. However, the question becomes how black people's emotions are centralised, received, constructed, and politicised in the colonial context.

Psychology in black questions the role of emotions in history and in shaping certain political and social discourses. For psychology in black, black nihilism can be understood as a discursive analysis of a collection of emotions, centred around the preoccupation with colonial violence. This creates a certain type of subjectivity or individual who will continue to be vulnerable and used by the colonial empire. The subjectivities created are often an aspect of invisible power, which can be referred to as the colonial unconscious. That means emotions have the potential to create human beings without them knowing. Often an individual will know that they are reacting towards a certain social and political object/event but not realising what they are constructed to be out of that emotion-induced. Hence historicising black affective registers is important, and needs to be done in context to what oppression necessitates. If the latter is not done, the risk will be depicted in the colonial unconscious. For example, West (1993) decontextualises the solution to nihilism, by removing the context of the nihilism that he initially mentions; in so doing he misplaces the ability to point out the colonial forces that infiltrate black nihilism:

The major enemy of black survival in America has been neither oppression nor exploitation but rather against the nihilistic threat, that is loss of hope and absence of meaning. For as long as hope remains and meaning is received, the possibility of overcoming oppression stays alive. (p. 15)

The solution proposed by West is not aligned with dealing with black affective registers, because it depoliticises and decontextualises black nihilism by not taking into account the metaphysics of black nihilism in an anti-black society. He deals with the nihilistic threat in a literal way, by assuming that bad emotions must be dealt with by imagining good emotions. Affect will be dealt with by affect. It is the very same solution that suggests the functioning of the colonial unconscious because it removes colonial constructions of black affective registers as part of the solution, which means colonial constructions will emerge and remain unaccounted for. The pitfall of this solution is that

it doesn't consider how hope is contextual, situational, and time-specific; it can only be maintained for a specific time and with a certain number of resources, which the colonial system and racist government do not provide to black people. The failure of hope could further drive a person to a deeper nihilist state. This then shows how dispossession can bind an individual into the same state of being. This has become an issue of contention between Warren (2015) and West (1995), as Warren posits that the discourse of hope has the potential to reproduce the same colonial metaphysics of violence, and pulverise the black being. Perhaps, this is the platform to talk about the limits of affect if reason does not become part of making sense of emotions. If emotions are not reasoned out, unconscious phenomena are more likely to thrive. Black people risk living in perpetual struggle while internally making adjustments and managing their suffering. The limiting forces are explained through the lens of cruel optimism, whereby the "pleasures of being inside a relation have become sustaining regardless of the content of relation" (Berlant, 2011, p. 2). This suggests that conditions that are responsible for black people's nihilism will remain unengaged because they are not reasoned out, while an affective sense of relief is held tightly because of the pleasant feelings of hope.

The demand for relief may suggest the need for positive emotions, for both the internal and external self. Internally the release can either be in cognitive stances such as hope, or externally it could be an assertion of futuristic behaviours. However, this produces a situation that may be threatening to the self and affirming at the same time (Berlant 2011). Hope as a response to the nihilist threat is governed by discourses of spirituality and an aspect of positive psychology that assumes that emotions induced by terror and violence can be transcended by self-talk or motivation. Nonetheless, the cure does not match the crises, because being hopeful cannot cure the depressive state that West speaks about. Perhaps black nihilism should be given a new interpretation to avoid being a legible, black, affective response that is a sign of pathology because of its assumed excess and unthinkability (Palmer, 2017). This is to say black nihilism should not be seen as an uncommon emotion - to the extent that it induces pathology - but rather a normal response to an abnormal situation.

Warren (2015) brings a metaphysics of reasoning to black nihilism to question the stance made by West (1993). West (1993) refuses to use philosophy as an entry point, while Warren does:

This piece attempts to rescue black nihilism from discursive and intellectual obliteration; rather than thinking about black nihilism as a set of pathologies in need of treatment, this essay considers black nihilism a necessary philosophical posture capable of unravelling the Political and its devastating logic of political hope. Black nihilism resists emancipatory rhetoric that assumes it is possible to purge the Political of anti-black violence and advances *political apostasy* as the only ‘ethical’ response to black suffering. (p. 218)

The dissenting views on how to dissect black nihilism pose an intricate issue on how the unconscious mechanism and its dispossessing mechanism ought to be seen. For psychology in black, it signifies how blackness is prone to entries of assessment but no final solution. Warren warns of accepting a solution that seeks to make internalised changes without affecting external changes because it is within such solutions a disconnection between psychological phenomena and their context arises. Black affective registers should then be removed from political apostasy to being actual carriers for political acts and decisions. This allows the possibility to unearth unconscious acts that are facilitated through emotions. Nevertheless, the recent work by Warren (2023) on black nihilism suggests a psychological lens that troubles how the unconscious should be engaged. Warren (2023) uses psychoanalytics, expanding on hieroglyphics by Spillers to further distil his position on black nihilism. He notes that hieroglyphics are represented by various symbolic substitutions and undecipherable symptoms are repeated and transferred from one generation to the next, in what he called a ‘black pass’. Black nihilism as an affect can be that undecipherable symptom, while the transferability of hieroglyphics can resemble the colonial unconscious. Yet Warren (2015) sees it as an interstice between consciousness and unconscious. This articulation by Warren is essential when analysing black people’s demeanours and acts because living through repeated colonial violence distorts the ability to decipher what is conscious and what is not; heightens the possibility of adopting different consciousness and unconscious material; and the possibility to be affected by it differently. This is not a matter of relaying subconscious material, it is a matter of having partial, full or no awareness. The transferability of hieroglyphics offers a language to understand symbols, signs, acts, and undecipherable behaviours that often transcend generations. For black nihilism the matter to be conjured here is what forms of language are used that explain affect through symptoms, signs, and behaviours, to form part of the black pass, that might be given new

meanings and interpretations, risking the presence of the colonial unconscious, even in analytical frameworks. Hence Warren (2023) concludes that West misreads black nihilism by misreading the hieroglyphics, symptomising nihilism, and offering reaffirmation of humanity, through conversion instead of pushing for symbolic substitution (the marking as asymptomatic). Here, I assume that Warren argues for identifying the symbolic figure that sustains nihilist thoughts/emotions to be identified and rewritten within tangible metaphysical constructions That in turn means writing black affective registers within metaphysical constructions, and not only as an undecipherable symptom of depression.

This version of black nihilism proposed by Warren (2015, 2023) serves as a demystifying practice, that could uncover subjugating affect and symptoms that present as ultimate reality. Black nihilism as adopted here emphasises that everything must be interjected at the level of the unconscious mind, which means “if what is repeated, transmitted is undecipherable, resistant to transparency and sense-making (deciphering), then obtaining knowledge of these “phenomena” and presenting a “protocol of address is crucial” (Warren, 2023, p. 71). The latter directs how black affect can be interjected as something that is not directly identifiable or seen just like nihilism, as it comes alive through other emotions. Describing it as an undecipherable symptom, which is transferable and can be re-enacted by others, indicates how the colonial unconscious works. Black nihilism accumulates the metaphysics of nothingness and allows the undetectable navigation of it in the world alongside other affective registers.

The argument between Warren (2015, 2023) and West (1993) about whether hope is the solution, questions how unconscious material or drives can be interjected, especially those that have the potential to write one's metaphysics. Warren suggests the need to interject colonial narratives with discourses of change, freedom and emancipation. If black nihilism presents as an unconscious black affect as I argue, and explained by hieroglyphic properties, its solution should be based on reversing metaphysical imprinting. Warren (2018) replaces hope with being free (freedom), but also realises freedom as problematic. Warren (2018) writes: “Our metaphysical notions of freedom also reduce antiblackness to social, political, and legal understanding and we miss the ontological function of antiblackness to deny the ontological ground of freedom by severing the (non)relation between blackness and Being” (p. 15). An emerging concern is how black affect is redirected and cleansed from colonial obliterations. The

metaphysics of black nihilism, which foregrounds the source of this affect, establishes the “ontological horrors of antiblackness” (Warren, 2018, p. 15). It is safe to assume that any conception that is not discursively dissected continuously manifests and manifests differently, especially in modernity. A problem emanating from the solution of black nihilism is the inability to tap into the unconscious, which means being unable to tap into affective practices or untapped psychological discourses of anti-blackness that are unconscious.

To situate black nihilism within a metaphysical argument is to tap into the historical conscious and historical unconscious. This renders black nihilism as moving along two psychic structures, requiring both conscious and unconscious states of being. Nonetheless, to position black nihilism as functioning within the realm of the colonial unconscious, the historical unconscious would have to refer to persistent problems/existential traumas encountered by the unconscious and memory, that need to be analysed. This will require an understanding of history in its present, which means black affect would be understood based on the history of current behaviour. This would allow the use of black nihilism as an analytical space, as Warren (2023) suggests. In hindsight, the black affective registers would have to be understood as a rational practice of discernment. Again, the struggle to determine and decipher the conscious and unconscious material of black affect becomes blurred, and the colonial unconscious becomes the blur that engulfs blackness. The latter becomes clear when Moten (2008) states that being conscious-minded is aligned with subordination, and this self-consciousness is also a wound that wounds, making cruel optimism a product of the colonial unconscious, because of the failed attempt to decipher how to deal with colonial-induced symptoms. Psychology in black highlights the latter as an attempt to rewire affective registers from its oppressive state, but fails to go beyond metaphysical thinking that foregrounds the function of anti-blackness in structuring thought (Warren, 2015) and affect, hence the unconscious appears in the realm of the conscious.

Another contending issue to be addressed when unpacking the unconscious is pathology; that means contending with the extent to which emotions become just a register of affect or a pathology. The arguments between Warren and West prove this dilemma. For West (1993) nihilism represents pathology, leading to depression and social ills. On the other hand, Warren (2015) argues that this pathological view is antiblack, and this perspective submits to narratives that blacks are socially dead and situated in a political and social

impasse. Perhaps Warren is right when he suggests that nihilism must assume an anti-grammar to give pathology a different explanation or viewpoint. The point is not that there is no pathology, but rather that categorising undecipherable symptoms as a pathology is problematic. Akbar (2003) notes that oppression dehumanises and necessitates unnatural human behaviour (Akbar, 2003). This means responding to a normal situation that is antiblack requires an adequate response that will match the situation. Fanon (1967) shares similar sentiments to those of Akbar (2003), noting that black children will grow up with a normal sense of being and experience abnormality when in contact with whiteness. Emotive responses making up black nihilism are often a reaction to what the world gives black people. Akbar (2003) believes that “mental illness is a myth” (p. 165) and that using the word ‘disorder’ is more fitting. Fanon’s (1967) and Akbar’s (2003) assertions are crucial to the scepticism shown by Warren (2015), regarding how we should view pathology, because they move away from individualising abnormal behaviour necessitated by oppression, to questioning what is abnormal, and what is the basis of normality that black people have been told about. Fanon (1967) endeavours to understand psychopathology and has identified the unconscious to be key to understanding black psychopathology. However, for Fanon pathology is not a matter arising out of existential issues only but a presentation of physiological responses.

On the other hand, West (1993) discusses depression as a black nihilist problem. This misreading and misrecognition leads to the sustenance of the colonial spectacle such as the colonial unconscious. What should be taken from Warren’s position of black nihilism and Fanon’s (1967) descriptions of psychopathology is how the languaging of pathology is important for an accurate inscription of the pathological in the unconscious. To loosely identify and categorise does more harm than good, especially if there is a failure to accurately describe the problem, its nature, and how it occupies the individual because that also influences how they respond to it. I suspect that Warren is cautious about how induced pathology is a regulating tool of the colonial system, a control measure that leads to preoccupation with the system and produces insufficient measures of escape. Butler (1993) helps us understand Warren by stating that “melancholy offers potential insight into how the boundaries of the social are instituted and maintained, not only at the expense of psychic life but through binding psychic life into forms of melancholic ambivalence” (p. 167-168). In this case, melancholy is replaced with pathology/psychopathology. The latter symbolises the subjectivation of the pathological,

which Fanon (1986) sees as stemming from the unconscious. Black nihilism then becomes critical to the discursive practices leading to unconscious significations of black affective registers that subjugate, and are not easily identified.

Engaging pathology brings into perspective the functioning of the colonial unconscious and its metaphysical relations. If pathology is understood as descriptive of how metaphysical violence is internalised and indicative of certain behavioural traits, then the colonial unconscious is taking place. I argue that pathology is indicative of subjugation and the becoming of subjects that are consumed by the colonial system. The perspective by West (1993) indicates the presence of metaphysical violations and a state of fungibility that activates abject emotion, inscribed with racial schemas of self. As it stands Warren (2015) does acknowledge that colonial conditions are pathological; however, he is against identifying with those pathologies to avoid further entrapment with the system as socially dead individuals because this will influence how black people would ontologically construct themselves. I believe Warren is cautious of having pathological sociability and identifying with the pathological. However, one cannot avoid the impact of colonial conditions in one's psyche and the importance of identifying them; furthermore, the process of naming and identifying this induced pathology should be identified as a colonial condition and a normal response to oppression, to avoid a misdiagnosis. Pathology is an inference of metaphysical violence and thus infers what is in the unconscious. This is captured by Moten's (2008) narration that the unconscious mind erupts in the conscious mind, and the conscious mind relegates to pathological sociality. Marriott (2000) positions the nihilist feelings as feelings towards objects that cause painful psychic splitting and self-obliteration. This latter becomes part of the psychic formation of blackness, which is at the core of subject formation or identity formation. Although Warren (2015) questions the latter articulation to prevent black people from identifying with racialised schemas and not identifying as pathological subjects, this critical view questions the normal emotional response of metaphysical and physical violence that black people embody, which has formed part of black people's ontology and personality.

Psychology in black considers black nihilism as a black affect that functions within an unconscious realm. It adopts an epistemological inquiry that may be blurred, ambiguous and undecipherable. Psychology in black shows how West's pathological description of black nihilism falls within the realm of the unconscious, by discussing the ontology and

metaphysics of black affective registers. Black nihilism cannot be understood outside the metaphysics that captures anti-blackness and the related functionality of black affective registers. The unconscious materials of emotions are perceived mainly in behavioural exhibitions such as black nihilism; they present a colonial unconscious because it is an overarching emotion that produces subjectivities that co-opt further subjugation. Black nihilism, perceived through the lens of the colonial unconscious provides a platform to understand the development of affective states and the process that facilitates their movement, in an individual and a society. The inquiry of black nihilism considers the need to use Warren's philosophical stance on black nihilism that situates how the presence of these kinds of emotions functions in the context of anti-blackness. This becomes a strategy for detecting unconscious phenomena, as it forces one to unearth the hidden affective claws of anti-blackness. For psychology in black, black nihilism provides an inquiry into black affective registers and their psychic structure. The articulation of the colonial unconscious using black nihilism indicates that black affective registers should not be explained outside their metaphysical conceptions. Black nihilism represents a signification of colonial metaphysics and is not to be seen as a by-product of suffering. Seemingly, black nihilism and affected affective registers create their metaphysics, where the colonial unconscious survives. Psychology in black has since used black nihilism as an inquiry into determinist and residual factors and facilitating aspects of black affect in blackness.

5.5 Oppositional consciousness and the colonial unconscious

The colonial unconscious thrives when one lives in multiple world systems. It also becomes eminent in unequal world systems, especially when one dominates the other. The double consciousness is amongst the first concepts coined by Du Bois (1903) that theorise what it is like for black people to be socialised within two world systems that are at opposing ends with each other. Du Bois argues that black people embody a double consciousness, which wreaks havoc in their psyche due to the effort it takes to reconcile two world systems into a truer self. Du Bois's double consciousness explains how black people have no true self-consciousness, seeing themselves through the eyes of others, and measuring their souls through contempt and pity. Fanon, (1967) also notices this duality when he observes, "Not only must a black man be black, he must be black in relation to the white man" (p. 82-83). Both Du Bois (1903) and Fanon (1967) notice that living in this dual world is a matter of survival and a need to be accepted into the world as a human.

Du Bois (1903) further explains how living in double consciousness is a prerequisite to survival: “He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of opportunity closed roughly in his face” (p. 9). On the other hand, Moten (2008) acknowledges the presence of duality; however, he criticises this emphasis on duality as neglecting the ontological fugitivity of black people. Moten emphasises the importance of considering black operations and escapes that frame of unthought positions and appositions. The latter argument puts forward the concept of appositionality, to be explored here. The reasoning is that black experiences encompass what Du Bois, Fanon, and Moten together articulate.

Appositionality is approached in this study as an everyday practice of black people, which entails living with a double consciousness and doing acts of ontological fugitivity or resistance. Judy’s (2020) phrase ‘practices of living’ seems fitting to explain this. It is a dynamic way of doing life in relation to the world’s conceptualisation and conventionality, entailing transmissible traditions of know-how of lineages and thinking about the human condition within an existential disorder. Attending modernity and capitalism within a racialised system explains how black people end up being in apposition. Moten (2007) regards this as a black operation, that claims blackness through optimism within the realm of resistance and escapes from colonial constraints. Moten sees black fugitivity as essential; however, Fanon (1963) and Judy (2020) argue that in most cases, black people might act in line with how they are constructed and based on living practices imposed, which are often in turn based on the colonial system of reference. Judy believes that the practice of living engages psychological features and struggles which are foregrounded by schemas and behaviours put forward by colonial doctrine and ideologies. Appositionality as a core construct of this study must be understood as a response to anti-blackness and foregrounded by blackness through racial assembles and amalgamations. This study uses appositionality alongside consciousness to indicate an awareness of having to live in two worlds or modes of consciousness, where conflicting ontologies, ideologies and perspectives are often forced upon black people to live successfully. Appositional consciousness is a form of consciousness that exists in relation to or in parallel with other forms of consciousness. A black person is positioned in this study as living such a life, by constructing a life that balances both historical and cultural artefacts and new ways of ontological construction that has become crucial to

surviving colonial brutality, in parallel to also living out or embodying and idolising Western ontologies and ideologies. I therefore argue appositional consciousness “articulates specific ways of thinking and knowing” (Judy, 2020, 15). Judy (2020) observes an important practice of blackness which he explains as “ways of thinking that seek to achieve a tightly regulated homeostasis between thinking and living” (p. 15). The latter is crucial to understand why appositional living exists, and why black people embody and constitute two forms of consciousness that contradict each other. Appositional living and thinking are indicative of how Western systems or doctrines have been a point of reference for centuries. The colonial unconscious fits into this discussion because the unconscious colonial reference point makes having an appositional consciousness possible. Rather, if individuals were aware of these reference points they would not be living in parallel. The argument is that while black people are practising their customs and creating new ways of being through resistance they end up being trapped by unconscious colonial referential points and hence relying on colonial concepts to facilitate their practices or operations.

In coloniality and the emancipation era, black people find themselves constructing ways of being in parallel to colonial ideologies that require a different form of psychic structure. What makes appositional consciousness a manifestation of the colonial unconscious is that an individual is not fully conscious that they are in appositionality, meaning colonial practices become part of one’s psychic and social structure and eventually become an ascribed ontology. The deciphering of multiple ontological world systems has become a necessity for the survival of black people. The possibility of assimilation into multiple world systems becomes an automatic process. For instance, they must embody African and Western ontologies while participating in resistance thought and symbolism. This requires the cognitive ability to make sense of multiple living ideologies and practices to provide safety and longevity for black lives. To fully situate living in appositionality, two positions will be engaged - that is being conscious and unconscious at the same time. This is the narrative of freedom and unfreedom, which translates into the subjectivity of resistance and assimilation as functioning in parallel. The colonial unconscious is thus entered through the subject formed in ‘post-legalised oppression’.

Appositional consciousness and double consciousness differ in the sense that in appositionality some behaviours are triggered unconsciously - one does not have control

over what emerges. Oppositional consciousness emerges within coloniality, showing how the oppressed rethink survival and life while evading physical and social death. The transition from one form of consciousness to another is symptomatic of the colonial unconscious. It is not something that black people are intentionally doing but seems automatic as both forms of consciousness are part of black people's socialised structure and way of life. Oppositional consciousness is a type of consciousness that explains the creation of strategies or ways to adjust to continuous changes in the colonial system. It is the ability to know that one must keep adapting to the system to survive it. It is important to note that it is not assimilation *per se* but a readjustment of strategies that allows living to continue. I refer here to the readjustment of strategies to live because of the inability to abandon Western forms of consciousness and ideologies, simply because they are engraved or embedded in the social structure. Further, Western consciousness is part of black people's socialisation, especially at the macro level, and other forms of socialisation at a micro level i.e. African ways of living, while making others discordant with the created social and political structure. This form of consciousness demonstrates what subjection entails. Oppositional consciousness foregrounds an element of living disorderly or creating existence in a disorderly manner. For psychology in black, oppositional consciousness introduces the psychic self as an autopoietic space that seeks to form its subjecthood mainly because the mind and body unconsciously know what it needs or deserves. Moten (2018b) alludes to this when articulating that "relative deprivations open out onto absolute chance" (p. xii). As such psychology in black captures an everyday act of refusal laced up with ontological and existential re-wiring of thought and action, but also an alternative form of balancing out the pains of the flesh, body, and mind. Psychology in black foregrounds oppositional consciousness as thoughts and emotions of dissent and restraint. This is explained well by Sexton (2011) when describing blackness as "inhabiting multiplicity" (p. 8) and making it a necessary virtue. This double-bind of blackness is where the colonial unconscious fits in, meaning the constitutive elements of what constitutes a black subject still linger in their consciousness, alongside the oppressive colonial structures that structure the daily lives of black people. In oppositionality, two forces are at play pulling black people towards opposite sides of being, but are also being pulled together.

Ultimately oppositionally alludes to limitations of resisting, especially if the constraints are driven by the colonial unconscious. Some thoughts and behaviours are so ingrained

in the psyche that they make it difficult to abandon the colonial mode of thinking, thus imprisoning resistance thought. Oppositional consciousness demonstrates a co-construction of an ontological order that comes across as resistance and can be attributed to the development of a new psychological order. The “violence of ontology” by Karera (2022, p. 162), which refers to whiteness being transcendental, depicts how Western consciousness appears to be omnipresent in both conscious and unconscious structures. The colonial unconscious depicts how the permanence and violence of Western ontology are given a home in a black person’s mind and imagery, forming part of “existential characteristics and symbolic realities” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, p. 257).

Oppositionality illustrates the psychological entrapment experienced in coloniality because of incomplete freedom. When Hartman (1997) refers to indebted servitude, she explores a phrase called ‘psychological disposition to servitude’, which means being vulnerable to dispossession through violence, domination and exploitation. Having a psychological disposition to servitude captures the colonial unconscious, which automatically facilitates oppositionality. Upholding colonial ideologies is not just a matter of choice, but rather an unconscious process that signifies that there are no opportunities for a different functional mode of consciousness; as such colonial ideologies become a default-setting consciousness. It becomes quite easy to adopt oppressive ontologies as daily acts of emancipation. Sexton (2011) says blackness can become counterintuitive as one pays the social costs accrued by being black. Unconsciously, one becomes a wilful participant in adopting oppressive ideologies because one’s own proven not to be sufficient to survive in a colonial state. Oppositional consciousness unearths how black subject-making in a colonial society is unconsciously driven, particularly in post-emancipation eras. Subject-making is not only about adhering to the colonial constructs of whiteness but also a construction of racial schemas that guide how black people view themselves, others, events taking place and how they react to them. Manganyi (1973) stipulates the characteristics of subject-making of black people as involving the formation of the self as negatively attributed and positively attributed to white people. Sharpe’s (2010) monstrous intimacies, defined as “a set of known and unknown performances and inhabited horrors, desires and positions produced, reproduced, circulated and transmitted, that are breathed in like air and often unacknowledged as monstrous” (p. 3) indicate what oppositionally means and why I argue that it is unconscious. This definition describes new forms of subjectivity that make

black people unconsciously become authors of their subjection (Sharpe 2010). These new forms of subjectivity are bound up with narratives of emancipation and colonial practices that are “positioned within psychic and material architectonics where there may be no escapes from those brutalities, but in the mind” (Sharpe 2010, p. 9). Monstrous intimacies enlighten how colonial violence affects one’s subjectivity through the embracing of colonial practices and forming a love attachment to them, without one’s conscious awareness of it. Opening up the re-enactments of violence, pleasure and familiar subjections into the present means that living with parallel consciousness or ideologies is inevitable, and sites that were usually of pain, are now presented as sites for pleasure. Sharpe (2010) calls this a form of psychic, temporal and bodily breach.

Appositional consciousness proves how a subjugated mind or mind susceptible to servitude unconsciously infiltrates the resistance discourse. It positions black people’s ontology as something to be reconstructed all the time. It further shows how power and subjugation continue to construct people living in democratic ‘post-colonial’, ‘post-segregation’ and ‘post-independence’ subjects to live in duality. Behaviours and acts that appear in these parallel lives are not always intended but are embedded in one’s consciousness. Butler (1997) explains that power is central to constructing existence and that people are weakened by it and its imposition to internalise its terms and become dependent on its discourses. The latter helps one understand how resistance thought can be laced with some colonial practices. Resistance becomes about social and psychological alignment with colonial structures or whiteness and its ontologies, ideologies and psychological structure. The goal of freedom and what it is supposed to be, does change its form to living in appositionality, and that is an unconscious phenomenon that black people are not aware of. Butler’s assertion that power assumes a psychic position by constituting one’s self-identity, poses a challenge because it makes it difficult to transcend ideas, ontologies and doctrines of the colonial system making appositionality a way of life. When colonial doctrines are socialised, they cement the constructed subject’s identity within its colonial framework. Fanon (1963) sets this out well when explaining that the pitfalls of national consciousness make the national bourgeoisie or Biko’s (1978) non-whites. Fanon (1963) notes that the national bourgeoisie in colonial countries have a hedonistic mentality, mainly because they identify with the Western bourgeoisie on the psychological level. The national bourgeoisie represents the current state of present black leaders, who have emulated the

West's ideas and structure. These are people who might have engaged the Western structure and doctrine and see it as a norm in terms of how the government's rules and structures should be. This behaviour seems to become naturalised or normalised for some and they identify with it. The colonial unconscious is the pitfall of national consciousness when colonial doctrine is adopted. This also put Butler's (1997) work on subject formation into perspective, because if the unconscious and ingrained ideologies and doctrines are not reformed by "post-colonial" leaders, the continuation of colonial subjectivity continues.

Butler contradicts herself in a chapter where she talks about subjection, resistance, and resignification as she says the psyche exceeds the imprisoning effects of power and resists being regulated to adhere to normal discourses. The two positions Butler assumes signify both the limits of subjection, and how other ways, of being or consciousness can become an opposing force in colonial constructs/acts. This makes blackness a conflicting state of being because two forms of being are in power struggles and in competition to occupy the psychic space. It is safe to assume that each form of consciousness will alternate or keep appearing together in one's conscious space. The colonial unconscious survives because behaviours and acts become automatic and reproduced again, and this includes behaviours that black people observe white people do, which can be built into their unconscious or socialised. This means assuming an identity that has subjugated you because there seems to be no other position to assume than the coloniser's way. This is done to such an extent that black people forget that what is done is the coloniser's way of doing things, but rather attribute it to modern ways of doing things. Hence Fanon (1963) asks for the mind to be revitalised.

The marker of the colonial unconscious includes the modern subject that is presented as liberated and emancipated. The modern subject is made to believe that they can choose the life they want and the ability to change their prospects. The colonial doctrine gives ideologies to look towards and to hold as your own. This opens a conversation about what is psychologically programmed in coloniality that is taken in and produced by black people as their own. This further complicates the process of self-development and individuation. Another contributing for black people to consider is that African ways of being have been relegated to an inferior position and have been unconsciously internalised by some black people as well. In the presence of the colonial unconscious, one can question to what extent black people have consciousness of ideals that are based

on their cultural systems and thoughts since colonial doctrine has emerged in the formation of their ideas about themselves. This includes doctrines that orient life, practices of living and acts of being that could be difficult to separate oneself from. It is at this moment that thinking in disorder by Judy (2020) becomes relevant to represent oppositional consciousness, because it is a practice of thought that seems to hold and accommodate opposing views, - blackness and whiteness - requiring black people to be creative in their will to survive.

Appositionality is a depiction of failed racial or ontological dehiscence because of failed or partial freedom, that is within the boundaries of colonial governments and their ideologies. A failed task of dehiscence means that the colonial system and its doctrines are still intact and unable to flee one consciousness. They are enforced daily but also are not addressed fully as problematic. The sustenance of the colonial unconscious, or rather colonial material, is a depiction of the Afropessimist position, meaning regardless of poetics, there is going to be an equal force pulling blacks towards Western ideologies and doctrines, putting black people in trenches and psychological turmoil. Oppositional consciousness enters the argument between Fanon (1967) and Moten (2008), and between black pessimism and black optimism, which Marriott (2016) sees as a crisis to define blackness. The dilemma between the pathological or Afropessimist stance (in Fanon (1967) and Wilderson (2017) and the optimist position (by Moten, 2008), captures the functioning of the colonial unconscious in the sense that these two concepts are deciding factors for whether one can abide by Western or African doctrines and practices in a specific situation.

The libidinal economy is a concept that can be used to show an aspect of the colonial unconscious that deals with pleasant and passionate attachments produced by the colonial empire. The libidinal economy is defined as the:

Economy, or distribution and arrangement, of desire and identification of energies, concerns, points of attention, anxieties, pleasures, appetites, revulsions and phobias the whole structure of psychic and emotional life that is unconscious and invisible but that has a visible effect on the world, including the money economy. (Wilderson, 2017, 7)

The interest here lies in the distribution of whiteness and its doctrine, which often masquerades as desire and pleasure points for black people. These then structure how

black people think and become in modernity. By using the libidinal economy, appositionality can be understood as a depiction of an unconscious structure that shows forms of attraction, affection, aggression and violence of lethal consumption, that co-opts black people to seek pleasure points of colonial living. Basically, to live in appositionality in the psychic life means whiteness has become a central figure in black lives, based on the presumption of how living and being are. The libidinal economy often shows aspects of being that white people expect from black people; however, it also focuses on what black people expect from white people and themselves. The purpose here is to identify psychological dispositions that are carried out by unconscious desires and drives that are divided and together at the same time. The libidinal economy of the black experience is unconsciously vested in ontological values of whiteness, which are often normalised and naturalised unconsciously.

Appositionality shows the imposed normality of living in duality. To further engage the colonial unconscious is to critically review traits and cultures accepted as normal or part of black people's identity. It is to highlight the origin of behaviours and to interject the pathological where necessary. Further, it is to engage a moment of resignification and mind shifting when engaging whiteness - particularly whiteness as it is a pleasure and suffering point for black people- and blackness. Sexton (2016) articulates the latter as the consequence of the difficulties in consolidating what psychological or cultural transcendence brings to the act of thinking. As blackness is explained as a state of accumulation and fungibility (Wilderson 2017) the psychological state or dispositions of black people need to be explored as fungible. This means that it goes through a process of negotiation with the social, material, cultural and political world. It is also expected to receive other ontologies and make them their own. This resembles appositional living whereby the unconscious and conscious colonial doctrine penetrates. The above encourages a psychological reading of blackness through a recollection of racialised schema and political ontology. This elaborates on a theory of black psychological experience grounded in exploring racialised theories and practices complicating blackness, further identifying operations of political systems, and grounding the structuring of the psychic life of black people.

In view of describing black lives as multi-dimensional or multi-ontological, questioning how blackness is ontologically and epistemologically understood becomes topical. Fanon (1986) remarks that it does not allow for a permissible understanding of the black man.

He makes this statement just before he mentions that the black man's ways of being are done in comparison to that of the white man (Fanon, 1986). Fanon must have been intentional about these statements following each other because he is explaining a reality that includes two modes of being. Regardless of their difference in what defines blackness, both Fanon (1986) and Moten (2008) agree that ontology as traditionally defined cannot explain blackness or account for it. Moten (2008) further argues that "the lived experience of blackness is, among other things, a constant demand for an ontology of disorder, an ontology of dehiscence, a para-ontology whose components will have been (toward) the ontic or existential field of things and events" (p. 187). Therefore, oppositional consciousness and the colonial unconscious tap into the non-definitiveness of black ontology and epistemology, which has implications on how the psychological will be theorised.

Chandler (2008) echoes Fanon's sentiments by stating that the black person is positioned ambivalently as outside of transcendental historicity and as outside democratic bequest. Further, Chandler acknowledges that blackness should be understood from a position of deferential positioning and that black people's sense of being is that of an obsession with making and finding a way, a historical inhabitation, that must always be reinvented and rediscovered. Hence, black people's experience of the world as double-sided makes the principles of traditional ontology inapplicable (Chandler, 2008). This emanating dilemma of black ontology implicates the psychic structure, especially the ability to directly outline the sources of psychological disjuncture and pathologies. The mental theatre or lifeworld becomes a complicated phenomenon in blackness, and that means one would have to be open to uncommon evaluations and analyses to be made. Psychological phenomena in blackness stand in an ambiguous and incongruent position. This raises a concern in the interpretation and reading of the black psychic structure. The black psychic structure may have to be known as a convoluted psychic structure with competing structures. For analysis purposes, it will not be enough to say you are analysing black people, but it will be appropriate to say you are engaging blackness. By particularising the psychic experience to blackness, one can capture the vectors of ontologies that occupy the black psychic structure.

Chandler (2018) explains the above phenomenon as paraontological. He describes paraontology as a project of desedimentation of encrusted layers and the bedrock of inherited systems of thought and conceptions. It is "a kind of transcendental illusion,

sophism, fooling oneself, or a paralogism, a fooling others' resource as ostensible origin or end in the service of preserving its ultimate" (Karera, 2022, p. 182). Chandler illustrates blackness as symbolising constant restructuring of thought and self, and a process of detachment from the inherited colonial system. In the language of appositionality blackness requires always being in a state of juggling contradicting ontologies, and sieving through what ideology works in neo-liberal society. Marriott, (2022) expands on this well when he states:

Everything that is deemed black has to be made meaningful in apposition to ontology, but everything black must also, it seems, always return apposition to the white *para of* ontology; to be black *and* appositional would, it seems, produce only the disavowal of the philosophical genealogy that always already determines it. (p. 139)

Based on this, I would then suggest paraontology be considered as a form of analysis, that will track the modalities of ontological experiences with its interacting and intersecting standpoints. Here one can trace psychological processes with their ontological features. Psychology in black thus puts into perspective ontological systems and the foundational modalities as crucial for the development of psychological systems.

Both Chandler and Marriott, are demonstrating the politics of identifying and using an ontology. Here, paraontology poses a challenge to ontology, which is related to the unconscious colonial material that is seen as an "inherited system of thought" (Karera, 2022, p. 182). There is an acknowledgment here that an "inherited system of thought" propels unconscious automatic acts propelling thoughts and behaviours, which leads to Chandler explaining paraontology as characterising "a kind of transcendental illusion, sophism, fooling oneself, or a paralogism" (as cited in Karera, 2022, p. 182). To avoid this indirect warning of retrieval of unconscious colonial drives, appositional living becomes a norm, hence the position of the colonial unconscious is intensified. Using paraontology to expand on appositional consciousness acknowledges how ontological positions informing blackness become visible, as a result of their being part of an automatic behavioural system and an abiding system of functioning. Meanwhile, Judy (2020) argues blackness is an expression of para-semiosis, which denotes a mode of thinking in disorder that does not fit into descriptions of ontology. For Judy, the embodiment of para-semiosis, is being-in-flight, which is being in appositionality that is

neither a flight from (capitalistic modernity) nor towards (redemption of self). The use of a biological system (fight or flight system) as an analogy by Judy, demonstrates an autopoietic process, that makes appositional living an automatic survival mechanism, that does not need intense decision-making but is prompted/triggered by conditions of existence. Judy further puts forward para-semiosis as an operating system of a deferential multiplicity of multiple semiosis that converges without synthesis, thus thinking in action (Judy, 2020). Here, Judy assumes that two ontological world systems are ingrained in black people's operating system to such an extent that even exercising the two world systems can operate simultaneously, minimally/not influencing each other. These simultaneous operations are induced unconsciously. Both Chandler (2008) and Judy (2020) assist in understanding appositional living as a signification of ontologies and metaphysics of violence that is encrypted consciously and unconsciously.

Psychology in black, therefore, argues that the constitutive elements marking the psyche of black people are not definitive but dynamic. Hence arguing that situating the black experience, as belonging to two dichotomies of being - Western and African ontologies - is short-sighted and misses an array of constructions that are beyond these dichotomies. For example, Du Bois (1903) acknowledges that double consciousness can cause psychological tension, psychic disturbance, and dissonance, embodying these contradicting realities - two orders of psychic personification and formation, and orders of thinking. He also praises it as a gift of foresight. Walcott (2022) adds to this argument, by stating that black ontology is simultaneously coherent and incoherent and that the coherency of blackness is a site for crises for black studies (even in psychological studies). Incoherence and coherence of the ontological follow after continuous self-development and ideologies that precede eras of colonial rule and the new forms of colonial violence and ideologies. These new subjugation methods require black people to adjust their life strategies and survival methods to deal with the continuity of colonisation. In such circumstances, psychology in black becomes a hermeneutic tool that filters various subjugating modes of being, while determining how the psychic structure might form.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter adopts a different approach to understanding the structure of the unconscious. The formation of the unconscious of black people is theorised as structured and accessed differently. I argue that black people experience all that the world gives to

them, and do not have time to engage in the process of repression to filter out material that needs to go to the unconscious. Living under oppression leaves one vulnerable to any form of psychic activity. It is within these circumstances that the unconscious for blacks was premised as possessing a different processing system. I have argued that the unconscious phenomena leave one vulnerable to further colonisation, mainly because the unconscious thrives on normalisation and naturalisation of phenomena while colonial strategies align themselves within the psychic structure. I have introduced the colonial unconscious to show how the colonial system unconsciously shapes various processes of the psychic structure, while becoming a default setting. The argument presented demonstrates how colonial violence, ideology, symbolism and ontology affect the processes of the psyche. When the processes of the psyche take on the form of the colonial structure it means the enforcement of colonisation is strong and continuous. The colonial unconscious represents another word for modernity because it symbolises how past colonial practices have manifested in the current, which means psychic processes and reflexes might be embedded permanently.

The three themes presented in this chapter are bad faith, black nihilism and oppositional consciousness. They show how the unconscious is structured under different ontological and existential outcomes. First, one has to note that some ontologies erupt because of dealing and engaging with anti-blackness. This means a certain form of unconsciousness material erupts, and we see existential experiences such as bad faith and black nihilism. Second, we see competing ontologies, whereby Western ontologies and African ways of being are used in parallel, while Western ontologies become default ontologies. This is where oppositional consciousness becomes a possibility. The colonial unconscious thrives when these two modes of ontologising come into effect separately and together. The psychic processes that have emerged within the colonial unconscious include the faculties of the psyche representing thought processes, affective processes and processes that solidify one's sense of reality. For thought processes bad faith is used to explain how the colonial unconscious appears through self-negation and disavowing of self. Bad faith represents an unconscious process that produces cognitive defences, such as self-negation to make sense of reality. Black nihilism is used to show not only how black affect functions through the colonial unconscious, but also how affective registers can be understood in antiblackness. Black nihilism is an affective register that occupies one state of being, by presenting a variety of feelings of nothingness, which continues to determine

unconscious phenomena because of its inconceivability. Last, appositional consciousness is approached as a state of being that explains how the colonial unconscious manifests through living a life of duality. Duality demarcates the presence of multiple ontologies and metaphysics that the black psyche is supposed to contend with. With this in mind, colonial consciousness has become baseline consciousness, while other forms of consciousness supplement what can be regarded as a missing element, especially in the context of culture. This can be said to be an unconscious selection of reality because whiteness has been made an abiding ontological structure on which society is based. Here we conclude that the black psychic structure will forever be affected by colonisation, and the psychic process will also form and function in a way that sustains individuals, regardless of whether the sustenance is detrimental or not. In the process of explaining the colonial unconscious, there is a realisation that blackness is an inconsistent way of understanding the world because it moves within both conscious and unconscious processes.

In this chapter psychology in black partitions an analysis that accounts for the inconceivability of blackness in the realm of the psyche. It points out how psychological processes are affected by colonial experiences. Colonial experiences partition psychological processes to be experienced in a manner that is different from what is perceived as normal psychological processes, particularly when physical and psychological violence are involved. The colonial unconscious not only shows how coloniality successfully survives, but also how it survives in the psyche. Psychology in black provides a different reading of the psyche that shows how coloniality is maintained. A different reading entails outlining the psychic processes involved, by highlighting how they were affected or amended to adjust to colonisation. Psychology in black captures how colonial endeavours have remained successful through the colonial unconscious, showing how the black subject is made to carry the psychic structure perpetuated by the colonial structure. Here the metaphysics and ontology of the colonial structure are privileged because they act as a neural network that connects all psychic faculties to demand an action to be done. Methodological psychology in black uses everyday conscious behaviour to unearth the unconscious behaviour. It does not necessarily wait for pathology to be exerted; hence it sees the unconscious as presenting with normal practices and behaviour. Psychology in black serves as a discursive intervention that elucidates how psychic processes are generated and sustained by anti-black metaphysics.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

This study is positioned within the liberatory praxis in psychology and seeks to use a different outlook on studying and understanding the psychology of black people. This distinctive outlook is referred to as psychology in black, riffing from More (2019) who coined the phrase philosophy in black. Psychology in black is introduced as a discursive tool that seeks to engage matters of the black psyche beyond psychology's disciplinary boundaries. Hence, the psychological was conceptualised within the everydayness of colonisation and its metaphysics. Psychology in black emerged by intersecting and merging the works of black radical scholars. I have argued that the works of black radical scholars remain essential in providing avenues and multiple theoretical vectors to unearth the psychological phenomena of black people. Hence the use of the phrase psychology in black; because psychology is accounted for, from the black point of view (More, 2019). Even though most of the scholars do not theorise in the field of psychology, their work touches on everyday aspects of black life that open up psychological derivatives. To analyse and put together these scholars' work, I used a method by Hartman (2008) called critical fabulation. Critical fabulation is a mode of analysis that encourages a different way of reading and perceiving text, by considering improbable conjunctions, themes, ideas, contexts, figures, themes, and perspectives to be merged and amalgamated to elucidate an experience or phenomenon (Hartman, 2008). The method enables the ability to excavate and assemble various segments that make up black life to be unearthed in the psychic realm.

To make sense of the conjunctions of ideas and perspectives by black scholars, I used the works/perspectives by Wynter to develop a theoretical framework that becomes a theory of psychology in black, which consists of three thematic areas that unpack the constructions of humanity and inversely, the psychological. To expand on what psychology in black entails, three themes were used for demonstration. The main purpose of these three thematic areas is to show how psychology in black is conceived, how it can function, and to demonstrate what it is. The themes are black geographies, the black body and the colonial unconscious. The three themes serve as spaces where both internal and external manifestations of anti-blackness are delineated and synthesised. Psychology in black is positioned as a necessary intervention in liberation psychology because of its

conceptual and theoretical basis that seeks to give a comprehensive etiology of the black psyche while focusing on processes that make psychological dispositions of blackness possible. Three research questions were explored: The main research question asked what psychology in black? The three sub-questions enquired; In what ways do black geographies enact psychology in black? How the black body can be perceived to describe psychology in black? and how does the colonial unconscious depict psychology in black as a different mode of understanding the black psyche?

6.2 Critical response research question

Psychology in black is introduced as a discursive intervention, and an analytic lens conceptualised to articulate the psychology of black people. Here a different hermeneutical exploration of the psychological is explored. The conceptual definitive factors of psychology in black are explored within a revolving system of colonisation which captures colonisation as a living system that in turn captures one's psychological systems and functioning. The productive power of colonisation is demarcated in the exploration of psychology in black. This productive power is explained through the formation of social and psychological systems in the form of colonial metaphysics and ontology.

In chapter 2 the theoretical grounding of psychology in black takes place, through the works of Wynter. The theory is used to extract the development of the psychological as onto-epistemological is explored. It is a theory that goes back in history to capture the inventions of colonial humanism and presents a teleological sequence of the formations of a colonial subject and its sovereignty. Psychology in black is explained as formed in the trenches of colonial figurations (which articulate colonial ontology and metaphysics) and its productive powers. Here psychological determinants are formed or produced based on the productive power of colonial figurations i.e. rationality, economics, biology, and epistemology. Thus, psychology in black privileges the productive power of the colonial systems, as key in the formation of the psyche through colonial metaphysics. Psychology in black is based on the historical primacy of the black psyche. The functioning of the social system is understood as the foundation of psychological processes such as consciousness and identity emanating from colonial socialisation. Furthermore, psychology in black is premised on the ability to auto-institute, which is the ability to form new psychic templates out of the metaphysics provided by colonial socialisation. Here the trajectory of black psychic formations is captured. Therefore

psychology in black seems to capture all variations of colonial systems while providing a discursive practice that captures the colonial system's residual effects of the psychological. It points out that the psyche of black people is the mirror of the works of colonisation. The psychological is positioned as an anecdote of the colonial system, a core feature in how the human system is run, hence it is convoluted by colonisation. The black psyche is put under a magnifying glass through distillations of blackness and anti-blackness. Psychology in black highlights the etymology of the black psyche; this allows various forms of interpretations about the psyche, especially about how to deal with formations of psychological enclosures. The formations of psychic scripts or determinants through various colonial endeavours makes psychology in black a discursive practice that engages the psyche as affectable by vectors of colonial symbolism. Theorising psychology in this manner is beneficial because it shows how signifying colonial constructions are based on stipulated colonial symbols and signifiers. The three thematic themes appear as signifiers of the black psyche, and the themes addressed in empirical chapters are engaged as segments of colonial signifiers. The psyche becomes a signified state that appears as the amalgamated assemblage of colonial signifiers.

Black geographies are signifiers of the black psyche and are used in this study as an enumerative concept. This concept is used extensively to explain a conceptual idea to a point of saturation, demonstrating what psychology in black is. The analysis of black geographies introduces a perspective that focuses on the physicality of psychological conceptions. In other words, the link between the two has to be explained through concepts such as relations, emotions, metaphysics, ontology, and ideology. The intervention made by black geographies towards psychology in black is to determine the abstract relationship between psychological and non-psychological concepts - physical and metaphysical. Black geographies depict a physical representation of colonial constructions, as they carry out the metaphysical conceptions of the colonial order. Psychology in black is presented as a concept that demonstrates psychological configurations in black geographies. Black geographies serve as an operational system and productive *nomos* of the psyche. Here one sees vectors of spatiality constructing the black psyche, through which psychological determinants emerge. In this case, non-psychological concepts are explored and linked with psychological ones, to create an effective analysis of the transference of spatial experiences to the psychic realm.

Psychological determinants of space are identified as stemming from black geographical governing codes - including all historical vectors of colonisation - behaviour modifiers or creators, spatial practices - such as migration movements - and the structure of the landscape. Psychology in black becomes a demonstrative tool that seeks to extract the interiority of exteriority to detect how the environment translates into the psychic sphere. The intricacies and dynamics of geographical movement translate into psychological forms, unpacked by psychology in black. Psychology in black identifies the black subjectivities formed in black geographies based on spatiality and relating to others. It is found that black relations are at the mercy of spatial problems and construction, to such an extent that relational metaphysics becomes geographical. It is noticeable that psychology in black encourages a space to unpack how the experience of spatiality is transferred from one person to another. Psychology in black looks at the extent to which black people transcend spatially. I argue that metaphysical barriers are eminent stumbling blocks to spatial transcendence. The changes to black spaces always take place in physical, not metaphysical, forms. Hence psychology in black argues that resistance has to be metaphysical first, and then physical. This approach aims to rewrite patterns, neural pathways, and reflexes. Moreover, psychology in black is built to represent a theoretical encounter that foregrounds an analysis of space and its occupation on the individual. By exploring black geographies and their psychic productions, it is concluded that psychology in black is not just a discursive intervention capturing the black psyche. It not only unpacks the genesis of the black psychic structure using a discursive framework that highlights how racial - spatial assemblages are amalgamated psychologically but also allows for a non-grammar of black experiences to capture the inconclusiveness and multiplicity of blackness. This opens up avenues for multiple psychological conceptions in space and time.

The black body is used in this study as a relational concept, configured to affect change in the psyche of black people. As a relational concept of causality, it is adopted by psychology in black as a construct that can be configured to extract the black psychic structure. This is done by viewing the body as a signifying construct of the black psychic structure. To foreground psychology in black, the analytics of seeing the black body was described as different. Psychology in black emerges as an analytic of seeing, and as an ideational praxis, which means it first identifies various black body trajectories of colonial violence and then identifies them sequentially in oppression to investigate an

order of the psyche. Psychology in black represents a mode of seeing that penetrates the physiological and ideological conceptions of the body to foreground psychic features. It presents a hermeneutics of seeing that combines various segments of the racialised black body to determine the signification process responsible for signifying the black psyche. The analytics of seeing includes the type of hermeneutics that can capture what foregrounds the black psyche by looking at the genealogical formation of the black body and procedures and methods involved in subjugating a body and capturing hidden colonial practices of the body. Psychology in black proposes the body as yet another model to understand the black psyche. The body is not just a relational concept of the mind but an abstract concept that forms part of the theorisation of the mind. The extent to which the black psyche is conjured by colonial violence is expendable to the body that houses it. Psychology in black points to systems and modalities that are responsible for bringing colonial violence and rationality to the black psyche. The black body belongs to a category of systems or models that bring the external world to the psyche. The latter is visible in the three sections proposed to dissect the body and its psychic tenants. The tenants shaping the black body through ideologies and violence become signifiers of the black psyche, producing different psychic genres. They function together as an assemblage of the black body. Here the process of signification of the body symbolism is taken as a psychological process, that borrows onto senses (biology) and perception of the social and political world. The reactions which can be thoughts and ideas to the body present a form of psychic subjection. Hence an emphasis is placed on changing the metaphysics of the body to avert change.

The colonial unconscious emerges as theoretical concepts that explain the success of the significations of colonial metaphysics. In essence, the colonial unconscious becomes a psychic space of conference where abstract outcomes of colonisation can be revisited for analysis. The role of consciousness becomes imperative because of the possibility of inferring what colonial metaphysics means to the psychic structure and everyday processes. It is here that we can engage with what is transferable, represented and transmitted for generations and centuries to a point where normality is devised or deduced. This is a point of solidification of colonial significations and a point of genesis. A point of genesis refers to the beginning of reactive psychological processes that become responsible for passing new templates of colonial aesthetics in the form of acts and behaviour. The colonial unconscious is a conflating space, which means it houses

racialised, amalgamated assemblages and in return presents them as a template of inferences about reality. Here, one sees the finality of one's understanding of reality, or even an intramural protocol of being and thinking developed and executed. Based on the above, one may confidently state that psychology in black is a concept that understands the multimodal system of the black psyche, and acknowledges that there is a thin line between conscious states and unconscious states in blackness. The lines of demarcation are not essentially pointed out, purely because an individual is simultaneously conscious and unconscious. Here psychology in black becomes an intermediary praxis between mental states. This is based on the possibility of individuals being unaware of the unconscious mechanism driving their conscious behaviour. This elicits a mode of understanding of the black psyche as a liminal, ambiguous space, that outlines the vulnerability and unstableness of the black psychic structure. Psychology in black becomes that which interlinks the experience and ontologies occupying blackness, in order to chart a dynamic system that interweaves behaviours of black people. This is seen in how bad faith, black nihilism and the colonial unconscious demonstrate various forms of ontological positions, that could be concluded as being survivalist. Psychology in black captures what it would mean to negotiate an ontological reality and modes of consciousness. In this way, the black psyche is understood from a perspective that unpacks the teleology of unconscious behavioural phenomena. Psychology in black becomes a discursive tool that interrogates the interiority and affectability of affective power structures within colonial enterprises. Psychology in black looks at the dynamics of affective transference of interiority within colonial metaphysics, while also thinking about dynamics, protocols and processes emanating from being in bad faith, as well as black nihilism as ontological foundations and metaphysical transcripts. Psychology in black becomes an interpolation of unconscious subjectivities. Here oppositional consciousness segments augment multiple subjectivities that conflate to form a colonial unconscious. In this case, psychology in black becomes an inferential constituent of the black psyche.

Black geographies, the black body and the colonial unconscious demarcate psychology in black on three levels. The first is based on expanding the transmission of external factors on the psyche. In contrast, the second expands matters of imagery and physiology on the psyche and the last directly focuses on emerging psychic processes along ontological lines. I show here that the black psyche cannot be understood outside black

geographies, black bodies and the unconscious because that is where colonial signification emerges to form a black psyche. It appears that the black psyche is understood as an outcome of colonial signification, hence psychology in black is a discursive practice, extracting this signification process. This has made it easier for psychology in black to connect presiding psychic reality as part of colonial functionality.

6.3 Remarks on psychology in black

Psychology in black is a meaningful approach to looking at the psychic life of black people amid colonial violence. As a stance to shift the geography of reason in psychology, psychology in black is not be categorised as a sub-discipline of psychology but rather an analytical perspective. It cuts across disciplinary boundaries to psychologise, so that a synthesis of multiple systems of being can be identified. It further suspends the disciplinary boundaries of psychology so that it goes beyond the disciplinary teleological sequence, to create a new way of theorising the black psyche. It is a discursive project that positions various black thoughts in different fields to extract what builds and can account for the black psyche. It traces psychic networks along and across eras. It is a synthesised and signified model that accounts for psychic realities. Psychology in black is a black existential referential point, which means it is an assessment of being black in an anti-black world. It serves as a modality that exposes the psychic complexities because of intersecting modes of power and their demands on the black psyche. Thus, psychology in black is a praxis of investigation that is supposed to assist in recognising the colonial setup and the possibility it brings for psychological development. Psychology in black is simultaneously a diagnostic tool and a discursive practice that combines discourses of colonial violence to give a genealogy of issues presenting on the black psyche. In a way, psychology in black is a teleological sequence of colonial logic of power in the formation of the psychic world. Furthermore, it is a systematic mode of thinking that holistically puts the logic of black psychic development within a colonial matrix of power. It is a way to study psychic power modalities or discourses of psychic demands of power. Psychology in black is a unification of several systems of thoughts and being, coming together to form the template for the black psyche. Moreover, it studies interactions of systems in the formation of mental processes and modalities. Psychology in black is a mediating point, a link to the past, present and future, which means a linking system that captures psychic modalities as generational.

Psychology in black uses various critical concepts to unpack the black psyche illustrated by various black scholars. To successfully chart psychology in black, one needs to unearth different segments of black life using different anecdotal references such as objects, symbols, codes, theories, ideas, acts, and behaviours/thought patterns to unpack vectors of black life. These anecdotal references enforce a distinctive discourse that gives accounts of being black, which this study seeks as an account of the black psychic structure. Psychology in black capitalises on the captured history of black inhumanity to psychologise on blackness, further identifying vast discourses to extract what forms the psychic structure of black people. These include theories of ontology, metaphysics, pathology, lived experience of blackness and survival demands caused by colonial violence. With this in mind psychology in black has a premise in which it perceives the black psyche.

The crisis of ontology gives the impression that the black psyche has a lot to process, assume and filter through to adopt a stable psychic state. Psychology in black takes from the matters of ontology, the presence of competing psychic realities solidified by the unconscious, and the permanency of metaphysics. Here we understand the naturalisation of psychic phenomena through different modes of ontologising.

Psychology in black also takes matters of pathology and presents them as a state of being that is more than just illness or disorder; it is associated with reactions and behaviours formed due to exposure to colonial violence and hostility, either physical or psychological. Relevant to this discussion is the politics of abjection and subjection that hinder the healthy development of psychic apparatuses and tools. Scholars like Fanon (1986) and Wilderson (2010) conceptualised areas of psychopathology that are within the scope of violence, mostly physical violence. The functioning of psychopathology in blackness takes a different direction because it is functional and ingrained as part of black metaphysics. This implies that psychology in black conceives the psyche as symbolising an arrested development while being preoccupied with maladaptive behaviours associated with escaping colonial violence.

The psychology of black people has also been demonstrated as procedural and functioning, which means it is actively involved in processing anti-black violence. The experience of blackness puts the black psyche in a vulnerable state - even the imposed forms of the white psyche on black people make black people vulnerable to suffering.

The unsteadiness and malleability of the black psyche render black people vulnerable and fungible. What one learns from black scholars is that the black psyche develops when being subjected to certain enactments of oppression through the process of subjection and objectification. Psychology in black outlines modes of psychic integration and psychic alienation. Psychology in black as a perspective, grapples with what integrates the psyche, particularly in a violent colonial context.

The narration of blackness has demonstrated the cognitive and behavioural demands required to survive an anti-black world. Living while black has been equated to words such as madness, which is an insistence that surviving blackness is rather an extensive myriad process that is not reconcilable. The madness demonstrates the existential dilemmas that black people encounter. Psychological experiences are then shaped by the navigation of a violent and hostile environment that requires black people to be creative. Here the creation of psychic faculties can be seen from a point of survival and sustenance. Similar to this is the discourse that looks at the thought processes and cognitive activity amidst colonial violence. Here blackness is noted as interfering with normal psychological processes or creating its own in the process. In the pursuit to explain the psyche through the body, geography and unconscious, one can surmise the pressure that comes with processing these particularities, posing the psyche of blacks as constructed by cognitive and behavioural conduct emanating from conducting oneself in response to oppression. Psychological discourses are also shaped from the point of psychic configuration to point toward new modes of signification. This is to theorise on the psychic modalities of freedom, liberation and emancipation that seek to oppose predetermined psychic enclosures.

Psychology in black is rather an exploration of black history to tap into the history of psychic formations and what structures the black psyche. This is done by tapping into colonial experiences - through black geographies, the body, and the colonial unconscious - identifying how they progressed to form psychic modalities. Further, psychology in black can be realised by capturing competing realities and signifying modes of being, thus, needing an intradisciplinary approach that captures different positions of black life worlds. Psychology in black is therefore an account of the black psyche from a point of colonial signification.

Various methodological perspectives have been outlined and considered to reveal multimodal black reality. These are methodological perspectives that mostly emphasise the emergence of history on the current, and emergence of various colonial systems acting upon the black body. They have an extensive way of looking at blackness, and the following methods proved to be significant in unpacking psychology in black; for example, the methods often engage how history or experience was written (meaning there is an analysis of text); explore time eras (looking at the association between various colonial eras and their functional mode); explore the process of signification (looking at the process of the subject making through subjections); explore the relationship between various colonial factors and their intersection to cause an effect (involves the process of assemblage and amalgamation); dissect black experience from multiple oppressive contexts for comparison i.e. the Diaspora and Africa; and last they investigate the foundations and principle of ontology and epistemology to verify if they function the same in blackness (i.e. introduction of concepts such as para-ontology and para-semiosis) (see, Hartman, 2008; King, 2019; Weheliye, 2014). Methodological intersections of blackness allow for the construction of psychology in black to be about computing several points of intersection of blackness. In closing, the call to shift the geography of reason in psychology has been accomplished by opening various avenues of thinking and theorising the black psyche. This is done by unpacking where the black subject stands in relation to subject formation tactics done by colonial power. In essence by shifting how the black subject is engaged - using blackness as an intersection point – directs effective analytical lenses toward the black psyche.

6.4 Contribution of the study

Psychology in black enters psychology from a black point of view, which means it focuses on the voices and opinions of black scholars who have theorised about blackness from various schools of thought. Psychology in black takes in these voices and places them where they can be psychologised. In fact, this study shows how the exploration of blackness accounts for various psychological practices. Based on this, this study hopes for psychology not to be reduced to being a discipline only, but a way of life that needs to be extracted. In this study, one realises that blackness is encapsulated and enacted in everyday psychic acts and practices. It uses everyday psychological processes to cement its experience. In actuality, psychology in black shows how the psychology of black people can be approached from a multimodal system of thoughts, or rather how it can be

multidisciplinary. Psychology in black proves that to study the psychology of black people, one should not reduce perspectives and practices to categorised disciplines such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, or biology, but rather look towards black studies because it writes blackness as an experience already encapsulated in experiences that the discipline mentioned above touches on separately. Black study and conceptualisation of blackness already configures what is done individually by these disciplines and does it collectively because the black experience is an expression of simultaneous colonial factors as they act upon the black body. Psychology in black uses blackness as a unit of analysis to extrapolate the psyche. Positioning the black subject within an overarching concept of blackness means the subject of study - in this case, a black person – is analysed as a racial assemblage, with a functioning historical background. The biggest contribution of this study is not just how the subject of the study is approached but also the method of approaching the experience of blackness to expose its psychological enclosures. On a methodological front psychology in black shows how various texts can be engaged and fabulated to allow the black experience and ontology to be relayed within the parameters of psychology. Finally, psychology in black encourages what can be referred to as a new grammar or a non-grammar (not following the rules attached to certain concepts) to understand the psychology of black people. This is done to abscond the practice of universalising concepts and accepting incongruous terminologies, further understanding the limits of language to explain the black psyche. This allows the possibility to accept the inconclusiveness and indefinability of black lives and in turn the psychic reality. Therefore, psychology in black does a metacritique of psychological referential points ascribed to black people, by allowing a mode of languaging and conceptualising aligned with the ontology and metaphysics governing blackness.

6.5 Future research topics

This study attempts to do a psychological reading of a black colonised subject. Psychology in black is presented as a conceptual study that seeks to compute multiple factors of colonial function to devise a new way of looking at the psychological. In its conceptual stages, it centres the black perspective using black thought and perspectives relating to being black in an anti-black world. This kind of study can be explored empirically by locating causal factors of specific ontological realities. It may include numerical/statistical comparisons of behavioural phenomena. A study framed within the lens of psychology in black can be extended to other areas of research that look into

autobiographies of activist or struggle heroes, and trace the trajectory of their lives as colonial subjects and emanating psychological makeup. An analysis of an individual gives an analysis that particularises subject formation and its teleological sequence. The concept of psychology in black opens up room to study political text to determine the power dynamics implored to determine psychic nuances and determinants. Here we can devise mechanisms, tools and techniques that are supposed to be directed at politically brainwashing black people for a sustained period. This goes further to unpacking political texts such as apartheid policy documents and even 'post-apartheid' policy documents (policies in the democratic state). Policies are then seen as constructions that guide social systems, affecting the behavioural system on both individual and societal levels.

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