

The Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program: Analysis of how time delay tactics influence the manipulation of alliances leading to entrapment in nuclear negotiations.

By

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
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Declaration

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I declare that the above dissertation is my own work and that all sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

A photograph of a handwritten signature in black ink on a light-colored surface. The signature appears to be 'Fleming' written in a cursive style, with a horizontal line underneath the name.

Signature

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Abstract

The research analyses how weaker parties in a negotiation can change the assumed structural outcome of a negotiation. Structural Analysis assumes that the stronger parties always prevail but that is not necessarily always the case. While the structurally stronger party is motivated by what Structural Analysis assumes, the weaker party attempts to create a change in this structure by using tactics to affect the outcome of the negotiation in its favour. Based on pre-existing assumptions that structure always favours the strong party, the strong player in a negotiation overlooks the use of tactics by the weaker party in the hope that the negotiation would eventually go its way. Such a miscalculation creates an environment conducive for entrapment because as the tactic continues to be used and the participants continue with the negotiations the process becomes entrapped and mostly limiting the options of the structurally strong party. In multilateral negotiations that involve alliances, the research points out that the weaker party to entrap the strong could use such an alliance. However, the research shall use the Six-Party Talks with a focus on the U.S., South Korea, and North Korea. The tactic that is analysed is the time delay tactic, which was used by North Korea to frustrate the U.S.-ROK alliance while creating an environment conducive for entrapment.

Key words: Alliances, Diplomacy, Entrapment, North Korea, Nuclear negotiations, Nuclear Proliferation, Power, Six-Party Talks, Structural analysis, Time delay tactics

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Gloria Patri, et Filio, et Spiritui Sancto. Sicut erat in principio, et nunc, et semper, et in saecula saeculorūm. Amen

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|------|--|
| BDA | Banco Delta Asia |
| CVID | Complete Verifiable and Irreversible Disarmament |
| DMZ | De-militarized Zone |
| DPRK | Democratic People's Republic of Korea |
| HEU | Highly Enriched Uranium |
| IAEA | International Atomic Energy Agency |
| LWRs | Light Water Reactors |
| MDL | Military Demarcation Line |
| MFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NLL | North Limit Line |
| NPT | Non-Proliferation Treaty |
| ROK | Republic of Korea |
| SST | State Sponsors of Terrorism |
| TWEA | Trading With the Enemy Act |
| UEP | Uranium Enriched Program |
| USA | United States of America |

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“There is nothing fast or easy about diplomacy. I have no illusions about that.” –Hillary
Rodham Clinton

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

North Korea has conducted five successful nuclear tests: in 2006, 2009, and 2013 and in January and September 2016 (BBC, 2017). The 2006 and 2009 nuclear and missile tests were carried out during the Six-Party Talks, which was meant to stop the progression of nuclear activity in North Korea. The study points out that North Korea was able to carry out the nuclear tests partly because of its use of time delay tactics, which were used to strain the United States (U.S.)-South Korea (ROK) alliance and eventually created an environment conducive for entrapment. The parties to the Six-Party Talks had become entrapped in a negotiation that could not stop North Korea from pursuing its nuclear program. Meerts (2005: 114) argues that “entrapment is the result of choices made - not just one or two, but many of them; small, step by step decisions that result in a step by step loss of room for maneuver”. Among the members being manipulated by North Korea during the negotiations, South Korea was a target for the North because of its close alliance with the US, which was instrumental in influencing the decisions of the US to be favorable for North Korea. This put the United States in an untenable position with lack of room to maneuver because the United States was adopting positions that were held with its alliance member, South Korea, and the positions that South Korea had begun to adopt were a move away from the United States’ positions. Furthermore, the Bush administration’s 2006 National Security Strategy and South Korea’s Sunshine Policy played into North Korea’s strategy to strain the alliance.

The study focuses on three of the six parties (US, South Korea, and North Korea) that were involved in the Six-Party Talks because of how the three states are connected.

North and South Korea have existed since 1945 when the Korean Peninsula was divided into two. Stack (2018), notes that the three-year Korean War conflict pitted communist and capitalist forces against each other and set the stage for decades of tension among North Korea, South Korea, and the US. The US helped to establish the Republic of Korea (ROK) on 15 August 1945, while the Soviets helped to establish a communist state in their occupation zone called the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) or North Korea on September 9, 1945 (Suh, 2013: 1). Since 1945, the US has maintained a strong alliance with South Korea while North Korea has become a pariah because of its communist foundations. Suh (2013: 1) goes further to point out that even though there is a shared history between the two Koreas, the occupation of the US and Soviet forces in South and North Korea respectively made the Koreans independent but divided into two ideologically contrasting systems.

The U.S.-ROK alliance was supposed to give pressure as a joint force against North Korea, which made the invitation of South Korea by the United States a strategic way to form a coalition against North Korea. To some extent, having South Korea as a participant in the negotiations was largely supposed to be in the US' favor but this did not become the case because the alliance became a source of weakness. North Korea managed to strain the U.S.-ROK alliance so that it could affect the outcome of the negotiations. The study points out that North Korea's manipulation of the alliance created an environment conducive for entrapment during the Six-Party Talks. According to Meerts (2005: 112), entrapment comprises of loss of freedom, choice, and alternatives leading to loss of power. One of the tactics used in order to entrap the parties was the time delay, which left the United States with fewer choices and alternatives to stop Pyongyang's nuclear program. In this way, North Korea managed to overcome its structural weakness with the time delay tactic that strained the U.S.-ROK alliance, leading the negotiations to become entrapped. Thus, Hampson and Hart (1995: 9) point out that there are various approaches that weaker parties take in order to overcome structural impediments in power capabilities to achieve bargaining outcomes favorable to them.

1.2 **Background**

In the early 1990s, the foreign ministers of North Korea and South Korea met in Pyongyang and Seoul, signing the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North in December 1991, and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in February 1992 (Suh, 2013: 3). Although all these pacts between Pyongyang and Seoul were held as achievements at the time, they were not successful in completely dismantling North Korea's nuclear program because North Korea managed to walk away from these agreements. Some of these pacts such as the Agreement on Reconciliation and Nonaggression made it possible during the Six-Party Talks to use Seoul as a pawn that could be used to manipulate Washington because North Korea realized that South Korean policies favored them which made it possible to isolate the US from its Asian ally. The point of this study is not to focus on events pre-2005, but the 1990s background serves to inform how North Korea's ability to strategically manipulate an alliance was rooted in past events and interactions between the two Korean counterparts.

North Korean negotiation strategy is primarily aimed only at gaining concessions and could be labeled a cyclic parallel strategy of provocation and negotiation, which is continuously modified, based on the current situation and the needs of the North Korea regime (Lee & Wilson, 2014: 53). During the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK warmed up to South Korea so that Seoul could facilitate concessions from the United States. Provocations or coercive bargaining strategies like the nuclear test of 2006 served North Korea's purpose and served to prolong the settling of the nuclear program. During the summit level talks of the 1990s, while negotiating these agreements, North Korea continued to orchestrate several provocations with South Korea, for example, the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) firing incident of 13 February 1990 and the Wolsan Military Demarcation Line (MDL) violation of 26 June 1990 (Soo, 1999: 284). This serves to illustrate the consistency in North Korean behavior during a negotiation and after a negotiation, a factor that would be important in understanding how the time delay tactic helped North Korea to continue escalating tensions during the Six-Party Talks. Thus, to some extent, the behavior of the DPRK during the Six-Party Talks was similar to its behavior in past negotiations of the nuclear program.

There was a change in relations when Kim Dae-jung became the president of South Korea in 1998, President Kim Dae-jung unveiled the Sunshine Policy and offered North Korea a platform to transform the Korean Peninsula (Suh, 2013: 4). Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy was formulated in 1998 as a policy that would encourage engagement with North Korea (Suh, 2013: 4). The Sunshine Policy's impact on the US-ROK alliance shall be discussed in detail in chapter three. The Sunshine Policy is also vital in understanding why South Korea ended up opting to side with its North Korean neighbor instead of its ally, the United States. There remains nostalgia from the South Korean side for unification and common understanding with North Korea, which makes it possible for North Korea to manipulate South Korea. However, the Sunshine Policy's stance on North Korea and the United States' hardline approach towards North Korea created an incoherent message within the U.S.-ROK alliance when the Bush administration came into power, a factor that could weaken the alliance's message on how to handle the Korean nuclear crisis.

After the collapse of the Agreed Framework that was between the United States and North Korea in October 2002, following North Korea's alleged secret uranium enrichment program, the United States initiated the halting of energy assistance to North Korea and Pyongyang expelled international monitors (Liang, 2012: 1). The Agreed Framework was not only a precursor to the Six-Party Talks but was one of many attempts made to stop North Korea's nuclear program. The United States viewed the framework as primarily a non-proliferation agreement while, North Korea placed greater value on normalizing relations with the United States in the hopes of getting sanctions lifted (Ginsburg, 2014). The divergent mindsets with which both countries approached the agreement perhaps contributed to its eventual unraveling. It could be argued that North Korea's covert and overt nuclear ambitions, which facilitated in the failure of the Agreed Framework, were instrumental in the tactics that North Korea used to entrap the US by using South Korea as a pawn to achieve its end goal. However, Kligner (2012: 1) argues, "Pyongyang is able to obscure its true intentions through a sophisticated, comprehensive negotiating strategy that enables it to develop its nuclear weapons capability while retaining sufficient strategic ambiguity to derail international efforts to prevent it." These strategic negotiation practices have made it possible for North Korea

to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and from safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Chinese convened a face-saving trilateral meeting, which initially involved Beijing, North Korea, and the US in August 2003 to assist in stabilizing rapidly escalating tensions between Pyongyang and Washington, (Park, 2005: 76). However, the U.S. thought that for a successful North Korean disarmament other parties had to be involved in the negotiations. Involving South Korea to some degree was meant to put North Korea in a corner where it would have been forced to agree to the terms of the negotiations. It can be argued that by involving South Korea, the United States did not realize that North Korea would use their alliance to manipulate the United States indirectly into making decisions that would entrap them. South Korea had amongst other reasons, been invited to the negotiations, because of its interest in unfreezing the unresolved conflict with North Korea, its interests in denuclearization and reunification of the Korean Peninsula (Bajoria & Xu, 2013). However, the inclusion of South Korea would later put the United States in a position that limited its options to denuclearize North Korea due to the diverging interests that were between the U.S.-ROK alliance. For example, the US maintained a strong case for the Complete, Verification and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID) but South Korea took a kinder view to North Korea's quest for nuclear weapons as a cost-effective deterrent strategy. The inclusion of South Korea, amongst other reasons, influenced the United States to shift from CVID to softening up to the idea of a light water nuclear reactor (Kerr, 2005: 2). The United States' actions of being ensnared in North Korea's coercive bargaining tactics whilst declaring its desire for negotiations, managed to make the outcome of the Six-Party Talks to be in favor of the DPRK. This is one of the reasons this study will focus on investigating the time delay tactic as a form of coercive bargaining that was used to bring about an outcome favorable to Pyongyang.

1.3 **Problem Statement**

North Korea as the weaker party, in the Six-Party Talks, was able to strain the stronger, U.S.-ROK alliance. The weaker state in the negotiation managed to weaken a strong alliance and this frustrated the alliance from addressing the nuclear program. The use of tactics is common in negotiations but in the case of the Six-Party Talks, time delay tactics were instrumental in overcoming structural impediments that could bar a weaker party from having any influence in a negotiation. The use of the time delay tactic during the Six-Party Talks created an environment conducive for entrapment and strained the U.S.-ROK alliance. North Korea's use of the time delay tactic changed one of the commonly held assumptions held by scholars such as Hampson and Hart (1995: 8), that the outcome of the negotiations always favors the stronger party. Therefore, the problem that needs to be addressed is how the time delay tactic helped North Korea to overcome structural impediments in a negotiation that should have favored a structurally powerful alliance (U.S.-ROK). The time delay tactic used illustrates that strong states do not always achieve all their goals in international negotiations. However, the time delay tactic can give a weaker party some leverage during a negotiation, because it can control whether the process should move forward or delay based on how they feel about the direction of the negotiations. For instance, the weaker party knows that the stronger party already has an advantage, which would encourage the weaker party to limit the alternatives of the stronger party.

1.4 **Research Question**

The study will discuss tactics in negotiations with a specific focus on the time delay tactics that were used to manipulate an alliance during the fourth to the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks. The paper shall answer-:

Was the time delay tactic effective in straining the U.S.-ROK alliance even though, the alliance was meant to be a joined force against North Korea?

It should be noted that it is important for the study to identify how North Korea was able to entrap the United States by putting it in an untenable position, affected the negotiation process. The following sub-questions will enable the study to critically

discuss and analyze how North Korea was able to strain the alliance through the time delay tactics so that the outcome of the negotiation would be in its favor.

1.4.1 **Sub-Questions**

1. How was the alliance strained by the time delay tactics that were used by North Korea from Round Four to Six of the Six-Party Talks?
2. How did the delay tactic differ in every Round of the Six-Party Talks?
3. Why does a weak party in negotiations easily manipulate structurally strong alliances? Why did the United States think it would work to have an alliance member in the negotiations?
4. How was North Korea able to use the diverging interests within the alliance (US-ROK) to achieve its end goal of keeping its nuclear capability?
5. How did South Korean policies and United States policies towards North Korea work to the advantage of Pyongyang in its strategy to strain the relationship between Washington and Seoul?
6. What were the consequences of the time delay tactic on the alliance?
7. How did the relationship between North Korea and South Korea versus South Korea and Washington, change during Round Six of the Six-Party Talks?

1.5 **Objectives of the study**

The study aims to:

- Analyze how the ROK-U.S. alliance was strained by the time delay tactic, which North Korea used.
- Illustrate how the time delay tactic was used in every round of the Six-Party Talks and the consequences in every round.
- To illustrate how a structurally weak party in negotiations easily manipulates strong alliances.

- Analyze how Seoul was manipulated by Pyongyang, which resulted in the strain of its alliance with Washington to create an environment conducive for entrapment.
- Investigate how South Korean policies in regards to its relationship with the DPRK made it easy for Pyongyang to manipulate South Korea. To analyze also how Washington's policies also played into North Korea's strategy.
- To investigate why the relationships between the DPRK-ROK and U.S.-ROK transformed during Round Six of the Six-Party Talks.
- To analyze the decisions and actions that were taken during the Six-Party Talks that created an entrapped negotiation.

1.6 **Key concepts**

The most used concepts in the Six-Party Talks shall be defined to clearly lay out the ground for this research.

Comprehensive Verifiable Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID)

Verified dismantlement of the nuclear weapons program of the DPRK was pressed for by the US to work toward verified denuclearization of the Korean peninsula with the cooperation of the DPRK (Kwak, 2004:34). The issue of CVID was contentious during the Six-Party Talks to the extent that the DPRK refused to sign any agreements, which could stop the nuclear program. The papers shall point out that CVID was one of the decisions taken that influenced entrapment.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

President George W. Bush announced 31 May 2003, that the United States would lead a new effort, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related goods to terrorists and countries of proliferation concern (Arms Control, 2016).

Deterrence

Deterrence is a strategy for combining two competing goals: countering an enemy and avoiding war. The basic concept is quite simple: an enemy will not strike if it knows the defender can defeat the attack or can inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation (Betts, 2013). In the case of the Six-Party Talks, North Korea justified its nuclear build up as a deterrent to Hostile American policies.

Entrapment

The essence of entrapment is that, even though parties may not like the agreement, they seem to be moving forward and, they find it extremely difficult to extricate themselves from the process (Meerts, 2005: 113). The U.S. had to continue with the negotiations even though North Korea was constantly delaying the process because South Korea was influencing the United States to stay in the negotiations.

Light Water Reactor

A light water reactor is a type of thermal- neutron reactor that utilizes normal water as opposed to heavy water, a form of water that contains a larger amount of the hydrogen isotope deuterium (Zarubin, 2016). North Korea tried to persuade the US into moving away from CVID when they tried to negotiate for LWR, which they claimed, would be for energy purposes.

Coercive power

Coercive power is the power of the strong party to impose their will even against resistance on the weak, and it encompasses power as strength, power as control over resources, over others and over outcomes (Petersen et al., 2012: 6). In the case of the Six-Party Talks, coercive power is understood not as a tool for the strong to influence the weak only but the weaker party to influence and manipulate the strong party can use it. The weaker party uses tactics as a coercive source of power against their strong counterpart to affect the outcome of a negotiation.

Bargaining power

Bargaining power relies on implements and resources; the weak party becomes strong enough, endowed with sufficient resolve and resources that the strong party cannot impose its will unilaterally (Petersen et al., 2012: 6). It should be noted that tactics can be a resource that a weak party can use against the strong party to balance power in the negotiations. The tactics would also act as a tool to undermine the power structure in negotiations.

The Sunshine Policy

The Sunshine Policy or the Engagement Policy was a policy meant to commit to engagement between the Kim Dae-jung administration and North Korea. Kim Dae-jung used the Sunshine policy as a vehicle for persuading North Korea to give up its hostility and end its international isolation (Lee, 2005: 7). The Sunshine policy shall be used as a reason why South Korea was aligning with North Korea at the detriment of its alliance with the United States.

1.7 **Research methodology**

A qualitative study shall be used to answer the research question, for the purpose of this research, by pointing out how time delay tactics can be used to strain an alliance, which could lead to entrapment in a negotiation process. Primary source shall be used in the qualitative study. For example, government documents on South Korea's Sunshine Policy, the 2011 Axis of Evil speech by former U.S. President Bush, Condoleezza Rice's statements during her 2005 Senate confirmation hearing and after, Christopher Hill's 2005 remarks when he testified before the House of Representatives (Congressional Record-Senate, Vol 155 pt. 8), statements from the Roh administration; speeches made by the delegates to the Six-Party Talks; memoirs that were written by the participants and observers to the talks and the accounts of American and South Korean officials. These primary sources shall help the study to illustrate how relations between South Korea and the United States were strained during the negotiations and how their policies on North Korea (Sunshine Policy and 2006 Bush National Security Strategy) played into North Korea's strategy of trying to strain the coalition. The primary

sources, especially from Christopher Hill's Elusive vision of a non-nuclear North Korea and President Lee's Address to The Korea Society 2008 Annual Dinner, shall also point out the pivot that took place in the U.S.-ROK alliance during Round Six when the Obama and Lee administrations came into power in 2008.

The study shall make use of the deductive approach by testing how the time delay tactic can be used to strain an alliance, which could lead to an environment conducive for entrapment. A deductive approach entails reaching a hypothesis while using existing theory and the empirical world is then explored, and data are collected, in order to test the truth or falsity of the hypothesis (O'Reilly, 2012: 2). There were also contributing variables to the strain such as the Sunshine Policy and the Bush administration's 2006 National Security Strategy that North Korea used to its own advantage to additionally strain on the alliance, shall also be analyzed. The study argues that these policies played into North Korea's overall strategy to weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance. For the purpose of this study, a case study shall be used of the last three rounds of the Six-Party Talks. A case study is an in-depth research methodology, typically used in social and life sciences and it involves a study of a particular situation rather than a sweeping statistical survey (Elman et al, 2016: 375). From the fourth round of 2005 to the sixth round of 2007, their different phases shall be looked at, specifically focusing on instances when North Korea delayed starting a negotiation or returning to a negotiation. The study recognizes that the Six-Party Talks had three rounds prior to 2005, but the focus is not given to those specific rounds because during the first three Rounds there was no substantial agreement that was made besides the Chairman's statement of June 2004 (Liang, 2012: 2). During the first three rounds of the Six-Party Talks, the negotiations only had three participants, and South Korea only got invited later to join the negotiations.

The dependent variable examined in this study is the strain of the alliance and the general entrapment of the parties. The strain that developed between the United States-South Korea alliance because of the manipulation of the alliance by North Korea informs the dependent variable. The alliance was manipulated from the fourth round to the sixth round, which had influenced how it ended up being entrapped in the

negotiations. A strain developed in the alliance and this was demonstrated following the first Joint Statement of 2005 when commenting in private, on South Korea's attitude towards North Korea a senior US official described Seoul's behaviour as not helpful (Flake, 2005: 83-84). It should be noted that statements from both the Seoul and Washington officials are crucial in understanding the strain that had taken place in the alliance. The study will illustrate how the manipulation created a rift between the US and South Korea, which made it possible for North Korea to get concessions favorable to their nuclear ambitions during the negotiations.

The time delay tactic that is employed to manipulate the alliance is the independent variable. For instance, the result of the time delay tactics. In early February 2005 in Round Four, North Korea declared itself in possession of nuclear weapons which led the US to engage in lengthy bilateral discussions with the North Korean delegation, lifting prior restrictions prohibiting United States negotiators from engaging the North Koreans directly (Liang, 2012: 2). South Korea met with North Korea without the US , which influenced the U.S. to agree to a light water reactor even though it had previously advocated for CVID; and the impact that the time delay tactic had on the negotiations especially the alliance. However, the variables that illustrate the impact of the time delay tactic will also be illustrated from Round Four and Six of the talks.

1.8 **Delimitation**

Meerts (2015: 19) points out that by approaching diplomatic negotiation processes from different angles, it would help in understanding how they can be analyzed. This study, however, cannot explore all different angles that are covered with diplomatic negotiation. The study shall focus on the time delay tactic as a type of coercive bargaining in negotiations. The impact of the tactic is very important in understanding how North Korea managed to create an environment conducive for entrapment through the straining of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Time delay tactics can be used to create a strain between alliances, as the paper shall illustrate. Even though the Six-Party Talks were a multilateral forum, the main focus will be on South Korea, the US, and North Korea

because their relationship is instrumental in showing how an alliance can be indirectly manipulated by a weak party in the negotiation to get an outcome favorable to them. The other parties (Russia, China and Japan) that were present during the talks, their roles although important in the Six-Party Talks negotiations, are peripheral to the study's aim of analyzing the dynamics between ROK-U.S. and North Korea who are linked with historical baggage (ROK and DPRK) and extensive bilateral relations (U.S. and ROK) in a negotiation process. However, this is not to say that there is no historical baggage with the other three parties, but it is to say that, the U.S.-ROK and DPRK's history is more than that of the other parties. South Korea's involvement in the talks as a close U.S. ally indirectly helped North Korea to some extent to retain its nuclear program. Its involvement, in the Six-Party Talks, made it possible for North Korea's time delay tactics to put a strain on the U.S.-ROK alliance. Moon (2008: 73) identifies how the Six-Party Talks process failed to pay attention to the role of South Korea yet South Korea played a very proactive role in the outcome of the negotiations. Thus, it is important for the study to analyze the manipulation of alliances by using the role of South Korea in the negotiation process.

The last three rounds have been identified by scholars such as Mishra (2006: 88), Park (2005: 76) and Snyder (2007: 54) as the beginning of the Six-Party Talks process. The most critical agreement, the Joint Statement, was in 2005. Following that statement, decisions were made over the course of the fifth and sixth rounds that entrapped the participants leading to the dismantlement of the Six-Party Talks in 2007 after North Korea's nuclear test. This would help the study to analyze the tactics that were used and their impact on the negotiation process as well as the parties to the negotiation. It is important to note that there shall be considerable emphasis on the start of the process in 2003, first agreement in 2005, second agreement in 2007, and finally the dissolution of the negotiations in 2008. The first, second and third rounds shall only be mentioned in passing to give an understanding of how North Korea had already started the process of entrapment from the start of the negotiations.

A negotiation Structural Analysis gives context to this study. "Structural Analysis puts an emphasis on the effect of the international power distribution on the behavior of states

and the role of power in deciding political outcomes.” (Hampson & Hart, 1995: 8). However, the study does not seek to have an in-depth discussion on power. Power definitely plays a role in a negotiation’s outcome, but the structure that the study is most interested in is one of coalitions and how another party in a negotiation can manipulate them. Structural Analysis is not only about how individual power determines the outcome of negotiations; it is about how any type of structure can influence the outcome of a negotiation. This will illustrate how structure and tactics are also interrelated. The study shall use the time delay tactics to analyze how the U.S.-ROK alliance was strained through the manipulation of South Korea during Round Four to Round Six of the Six-Party Talks.

1.9 Literature review

Kim (2011: 250-251) examines the framework of the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue within multilateral negotiations, by examining different objectives and the stakes of each player, in order to make a comprehensive analysis of how the ways in which these parties are interdependent with one another either facilitate or impede the complex multilateral nuclear talks. It is important to use Kim’s (2011) analysis because the scholar clearly demonstrates how each individual has an objective when they enter into a negotiation. Some of these objectives might be in contrast with the other parties, which might create a problem for the negotiations. Instead of looking at all the players that were involved in the Six-Party Talks like Kim, this study shall only focus on a triangulation of three parties South Korea, the US, and North Korea. The study, however, uses Kim to illustrate how the diverging interests among South Korea, the United States, and North Korea affected each other’s outcomes during the negotiations. North Korea’s tactics to manipulate the U.S.-ROK alliance through the time delay tactic was a deliberate attempt to sway the negotiation process by using South Korea as a pawn for its agenda. However, Kim (2011) does not go further to show that one party’s objectives might be the reason why a negotiation might end because of competing objectives within a negotiation.

The Six-Party Talks can be evaluated based on the negotiating and behavioral styles of both Washington and Pyongyang. For instance, Washington uses a Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction strategy or the Tit-for-Tat strategies while North Korea resorts to escalation (Yi, 2008: 762). Behavioral styles mean that there are styles that a party is well known for using when negotiating with another party. Both Washington and North Korea's negotiating and behavioral styles are important to this study and Yi (2008)'s findings can be applied to analyze how those negotiation styles impacted the outcome of the Six-Party Talks negotiations. Yi (2008) mentions reciprocation as a style that the US always adopts when negotiating with North Korea but in this case, the study will display that the US adopted a 'wait and see' strategy because it did not want to escalate tensions with Pyongyang. However, this is not to say that there was no use of sticks during the Six-Party Talks.

On the other hand, Yi 2008's assertion that North Korea resorts to escalation shall be used to illustrate how North Korea resorted to escalation through missile tests following its use of the time delay tactic to stall the negotiations or when the negotiations did not go according to their plan. Washington's behavioral styles during negotiations although they are important in this particular case, will only be discussed in conjunction with North Korea's use of the time delay tactic. The study shall argue that even though tit-for-tat strategies did not work for Washington, they were needed during the fourth to the sixth round because North Korea had to realize that there were consequences for using the time delay tactic or other actions that might have made it harder for the negotiations to progress. It can be argued further that the failure of gradual reciprocation in tension reduction made it possible to highlight that North Korea had adopted a "pretense" negotiation strategy because even that tactic did not work to stop North Korea's nuclear program.

Galini (2015: 146) argues that time delay is a tactic typically used by negotiators who adopt the "pretense" negotiation strategy, which attempts to avoid reaching a final agreement, or the "beating about the bush" tactic, which aims to prolong the negotiation. It can be inferred that parties who utilize the time delay tactic do not always want to reach an agreement but want to appear as if they are being cooperative. This was the

case during the Six-Party Talks; North Korea's strategy of using the time delay tactic was aimed at frustrating the parties from reaching an agreement. However, the study will add to Galin's (2015) work by pointing out that not only had North Korea adopted a pretense negotiation due to its use of the time delay tactic but also that it wanted to strain the U.S.-ROK alliance while foot-dragging the process into an entrapped environment. Galin did not apply this framework to the Six-Party Talks. Therefore, this is what the study will add to the literature. Negotiators who use time delay tactics believe they can achieve benefits by dragging out the negotiation process until some external or internal change occurs (Galín, 2015: 146). The internal and external changes that are described by Galin in his study, in the case of the Six-Party Talks could be the strained relations between South Korea and Washington, and the external changes would be the failure of the Six-Party Talks to dismantle North Korea's nuclear program. The 'pretense' negotiation strategy was mainly used towards South Korea so that North Korea could use them to indirectly affect the decisions that would be taken by the US.

Galín (2015: 146) concludes that a time delay may even encourage cooperation between negotiation parties even though they can be used for pressure purposes, to buy time to evaluate complex situations and search for more information or for consultation purposes in order to prevent an impasse. In as much as his work realizes that time delays can be used for pressure purposes, the scholar does not give examples of the circumstances or type of negotiations in which the time delay might encourage cooperation for instance in *The world of Negotiation: Theories, Perceptions and Practice* and in *What makes a court-referred mediation effective*. In the case of the Six-Party Talks, the time delay tactic did not encourage participation between the negotiating parties. The tactic was used more for pressure and to demoralize the parties who wanted a resolution of North Korea's nuclear program. The study will add by also showing how time delay tactics can be used for negative purposes, for instance, manipulating or straining an alliance. It can also be argued that time delay tactics can motivate an impasse instead of preventing it as shall be demonstrated in the case of the Six-Party Talks. However, the study will add to Galin's work by highlighting that, in the case of the Six-Party Talks, the U.S. and South Korea interpreted North Korea's use of the time delay tactic as a means to avoid an impasse. The alliances' failure to

understand North Korea's use of the time delay tactic during each round of negotiations, led them into an untenable position that limited their options when dealing with the DPRK.

In his study, Schoppa (1999: 307) finds that coercive tactics should yield less of a backlash and more concessions, especially when they take place within a social context where the parties accept that they are operating within a hierarchy. In addition, when the specific tactics employed fall within the range that is accepted as legitimate in the terms of this relationship; when the coercion takes place within an institutionalized process that establishes mutually accepted rules of the game; and when the parties trust each other (Schoppa, 1999: 307). It can be inferred that coercive tactics such as time delays should be able to win the user some concessions especially when there is an imbalance of structural power in the negotiations. In the case of the Six-Party Talks, the delay tactic managed to win North Korea some concessions as illustrated in Schoppa's (1999) study. However, they also did more than that. The study will add on to the findings of Schoppa (1999) by illustrating that even though a party might get some concessions from using the time delay tactic, the continued use of the tactic creates an environment conducive for entrapment, which might not be good for the negotiations as seen in the Six-Party Talks. Schoppa does not mention that parties might use their need for concessions to delay the negotiations, as was the case during the Six-Party Talks. When North Korea wanted concessions from the United States or when it felt that, the concessions were not good enough it resorted to delaying the negotiation process.

Brockner (1992: 39) identifies time as a factor that could influence entrapment - in the hope of attaining some goals that a party might want to attain from the negotiations. However, this study shall go further to also show that the parties to the Six-Party Talks, especially the U.S., might have ignored how the issue of time in a negotiation was detrimental to the outcome of the Six-Party Talks process, which could have led to entrapment. This directs the study to investigate how the United States alliance with South Korea was an influential factor in the decision to carry on with the negotiations. The alliance had an option of either continuing with the Six-Party Talks or not since North Korea's was constantly delaying the negotiations to frustrate them. Maiese (2004)

points out that there are instances when one can back down from an entrapped negotiation by admitting defeat and implicitly agreeing that the opponent is stronger and more capable. The study shall conclude that the United States could have avoided North Korea's consistent time delay tactic, which entrapped them, if they had walked away from the negotiations at the time, North Korea carried out an underground nuclear device test in 2006. Brockner's (1992) argument resonates with Young (1991)'s argument because they both bring forward the argument that time delay is usually used to gain some concessions during the negotiation. Both their assumptions in talking about entrapment and the time delay tactic shall be used in this study to illustrate how time delay created an environment conducive for entrapment through the manipulation of South Korea and its alliance with the US.

1.10 **Analytical Framework**

The study is informed by a negotiation Structural Analysis and it gives the context of the study to analyze how North Korean time delay tactics were able to strain the U.S.-ROK relationship. However, to analyze the problem statement, the study applies Galin (2015)'s framework that shows how time delay tactics can be seen in a negotiation. By applying a framework that illustrates how a weak party uses time delay tactics, the objectives of the study shall be met. Furthermore, the time delay tactic is used as the method to analyze Round Four to Round Six of the Six-Party Talks to illustrate the effects of the tactic on a negotiation process. The external variables that also contributed to North Korea's strategy such as the Sunshine Policy and the Bush administration's 2006 National Security Strategy shall be used. The analysis will show that the diverging interests within the alliance created room for North Korea to strain the alliance. This was usually done by using one alliance members' position on North Korea against the other alliance member's position. However, the parties to the negotiation, particularly the US and its allies, underestimated North Korea's use of the time delay tactics which resulted in straining the U.S.-ROK alliance and the failure to succeed in stopping the nuclear program.

1.11 Chapter Outline

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter one introduces the study's importance and logic. The problem statement, as well as the objectives of the paper, is defined in this section, to clearly elaborate what the study lays out as the problem that needs to be studied. The objectives of the study give a clear view of how the paper shall answer the problem statement and the possible answers that might be given. Research questions and sub-questions are crucial in articulating which questions need to be answered for the objectives of the study to be met. Key concepts that constitute the study are defined, and limitations of the study are identified. The research methodology to the study is laid out. The different kinds of literature that have been written on entrapment in diplomatic negotiations are illustrated. Structural Analysis is laid out as a method that informs the study.

Chapter Two: Theoretical and conceptual analytical framework

Chapter two lays down the analytical framework for the study. A negotiation Structural Analysis gives context to the study and theories of realism are also discussed because Structural Analysis emanates from the school of realism. Structural Analysis assumes that negotiation outcomes always favor the stronger party. However, during the Six-Party Talks, this was not the case. The study analyzes how the outcome of the Six-Party Talks was in favor of North Korea. This leads the study to argue that weaker states can have an advantage over their powerful counterparts if they use tactics to balance the symmetry of power. Time delay tactics are discussed as a source of power for North Korea.

Chapter Three: The Strategic foundation of the time delay tactic

This chapter begins with a background overview of the negotiations mainly focusing on events that took place before Round Four. The role of South Korean policies and their

potential aiding factor, in acting as a tool that North Korea could use against them, to manipulate them into taking pro-DPRK positions at the expense of the United States shall also be investigated in this section. These policies would be instrumental in understanding how North Korea was able to put a strain between the United States-South Korea alliance. In this section, the policies that South Korea has towards North Korea are illustrated as a force that made it possible for North Korea to the detriment of both the United States and the ROK. However, the chapter illustrates the how North Korea created the foundation of the time delay tactic that would eventually influence every proceeding round of the negotiations.

Chapter Four: The time delay tactic and the first nuclear test during the 5TH round

Chapter four continues with the discussion of the time delay tactic and analyzes why North Korea continued using the tactic during Round Five. The chapter gives an outline of the consequences of the time delay tactic by analyzing the nuclear and missile test of 2006. It should be noted that both the user and the instigator of the tactic are vulnerable to the effects of the tactic. Therefore, it is important to further analyze how its own tactics affected North Korea during this round. In this section, the sanctions are demonstrated because of the delay tactic on North Korea and concessions that North Korea managed to get because of its ability to drag the negotiation shall be illustrated. The decisions the United States took to respond to Pyongyang's tactics are analyzed in this section to illustrate that by continuing with the negotiation they had no room to maneuver and further entrapped themselves in a failing negotiation process.

Chapter Five: Round Six: The second nuclear test in an entrapped negotiation

Chapter five discusses Round Six of the Six-Party Talks and how entrapment had limited the options of the Six-Party Talks. This section argues that Round Six did not stop North Korea from using the time delay tactic but encouraged North Korea to use the Six-Party Talks platform to continue working on its nuclear capability. Much

emphasis is given on how the time delay tactic makes it possible for parties using it during negotiations to maintain a façade that they are interested in negotiating yet their only aim is to tip the structural balance in their favor. The role of North Korea as the weaker state in the negotiations is analyzed and how they resort to using tactics that ensnare powerful states in a trap. The decision of the US to stay in an entrapped negotiation even though it might have realized that the process would result in failure is also analyzed. The chapter attempts to illustrate that the outcome of a negotiation does not necessarily favor the powerful state.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

Chapter six will present the main research findings of the study. In this section, the paper argues that entrapment is a tool for the weak and the weak can manipulate the powerful during negotiations so that the outcome is favorable to their objectives. Recommendations and suggestions on future nuclear negotiations shall be given based on past and present nuclear negotiations that have been successful in stopping nuclear proliferation. The study does not attempt to give absolute answers or solutions to the North Korea nuclear proliferation problem. The conclusion shall determine whether the main objectives of the study have been met and whether the main questions have been answered.

“Tactics are acts of attempted power, and all of them are ways to bring about acceptance of a given offer.” - William Zartman

CHAPTER TWO

Theoretical and conceptual analytical framework

2.1 Introduction

Concepts are theories about ontology: they are theories about the fundamental constitutive elements of a phenomenon because a concept seeks to explain what reality is, for example, political reality (Goertz, 2006a: 5). In this study, time delay and entrapment are two concepts that are used to explain one of the reasons why the Six-Party Talks failed to stop North Korea’s nuclear program. While concepts are theories about ontology, a theory is used to explain the international political phenomenon (Wendt, 1987: 335). It can be argued that a concept is the foundation of a theory. However, neoclassical and structural realism are identified as theories in this study. An analytical framework provides the basic vocabulary of concepts and terms that may be used to construct the kinds of causal explanations expected of a theory (Coral et al., 2017: 1). It can be inferred that an analytical framework, is the structure that a research paper will follow to analyze the problem statement, for example, the aspects identified by Galin (2015: 146) to analyze the time delay tactics shall be used.

The study explores concepts within the context of a negotiation Structural Analysis to address the Problem Statement. Structural Analysis examines the structure of negotiations and the interaction within them to understand the outcome that might arise (Buszynski, 2013: 13). The theoretical assumptions held by Structural Analysis are illustrated and discussed in the context of International Relations and Diplomacy. In this case, the concepts within Structural Analysis can be used to understand and analyze the Six-Party Talks negotiations and how the concept of time delay tactic and entrapment influenced the outcome of the negotiations. The time delay tactic, as a concept, explains how Structural Analysis’ assumption that “negotiation outcomes

always favor the structurally powerful parties in a negotiation” is not enough to understand and analyze the outcome of the Six-Party Talks. The study’s theoretical and analytical foundation comes from realism and structural negotiation analysis. In this section, the concepts, theories, and analytical framework shall be discussed.

2.2 International Relations and Diplomacy

International Relations is the field that explores assumptions about the conduct of international relationships on the world stage (Berridge, 2015: 16). The Six-Party Talks were a multilateral negotiation that was carried out under the guise of IR. The core assumption of the discipline of IR is that the international system is anarchic or devoid of authority (Lake, 2009: 1). Therefore, to understand how states act in international relations, the anarchic nature of the international system should be understood as a contributing factor to the interaction. It can further be argued that even though there is no hierarchy in the international system there is an existing structure that influences the behavior of states. The structure or the hierarchy that exists in international relations influence the strategies that states adopt when they are in diplomatic negotiations (Lake, 2009: 1). However, the hierarchy does not demotivate structurally weaker states in negotiations from pursuing a negotiation strategy that is coercive like the use of the time delay tactic. In other words, it is the presumed hierarchy and the lack of a high authority that influences weaker parties to look for ways that can put them at an advantage against their stronger counterparts. Thus, it is important for this section to create the context of the study by analyzing theories within realism that create the foundation of Structural Analysis.

2.3 Realism as a foundation of Structural Analysis

Realism talks about the role of power in the international system. Additionally, in this study, neo-realism is the basis of Structural Analysis (the approach) and the concepts within the theories are the focus of this study. Neo-classical realism is important for this

study because it is important as a base for Structural Analysis in international negotiations. Furthermore, neo-realism is important because of how it focuses on power as the most important factor in international relations (Firoozabadi et al., 2016: 94). It can be pointed out that the theories of realism are a foundation of Structural Analysis in international negotiations because of how they all give importance to the concept of power in international relations. The aim of the study is not to delve into the power debate but to illustrate the foundation how structure comes about in international negotiations.

2.3.1 *Neo-classical realism*

In this study, neo-classical realism is used as a theory that informs the approach that is used in this study to analyze the Six-Party Talks and from which to explore concepts within the approach like time delay tactics. The approach that is used is a negotiation Structural Analysis. Therefore, discussing neo-classical realism before explaining Structural Analysis will help the study understand how Structural Analysis comes about or has its foundation in realism theories such as neo-classical realism. Neo-classical realism is the result of foreign policy studies through studying both structures of the international system and domestic factors and their complex interactions with each other (Firoozabadi et al., 2016: 95). Neo-classical realism puts structure at the forefront of understanding how state actors act in international relations. It can be argued that structure is very important in the international system and that structure that is perceived influences how states conduct negotiations. However, it should be noted that in as much as the structure is important in the study of diplomacy, the structure can be undermined and it is important to note that theoretical assumptions on the structure are not absolute.

Rose (1998: 152) argues that in neo-classical realism world leaders can be compelled by both international and domestic politics. International and domestic politics might affect how states interact with each other in negotiations. Domestic factors could be policies that the state follows, and international factors could be the makeup of the

international system of a categorization between weaker and strong powers (Waltz, 1996: 55). In other words, when it comes to using certain tactics in international negotiations the process of choosing a tactic does not happen in a vacuum. When a weaker party that is structurally disadvantaged, adopts a tactic, it wants to show that it can influence the other players who are regarded as structurally strong. It can further be argued that whichever tactic is adopted is meant to illustrate power because weakness would affect the party's domestic politics and would put it at a disadvantage in international negotiations (Rose, 1998: 151). Thus, neo-classical realism's explicit incorporation of both external and internal variables makes it easier to understand what encourages a party to use certain tactics in asymmetrical negotiations. However, Zakaria (2008) argues that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy are driven primarily by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. Power structure becomes important if not, a dominant part of a party's adoption of a tactic and how they react to those tactics when they are used in international negotiations. One cannot separate how structure emanates from the assumptions made by realism and how the same aspects build neo-classical realism, for instance, domestic and international politics as driving forces or influencers can undermine that structure.

Foreign Policy is driven by both internal and external factors, and therefore there should not be a need to strive for a truly theoretical explanation of it (Waltz, 1996: 54-55). As mentioned above Foreign Policy is influenced by many factors, but there are also other factors that are relevant to the analysis of decision making and taking in international negotiations that influence parties to act in a certain manner. Neo-classical realism presents an argument that if there is any single, dominant factor shaping the broad pattern of nations' Foreign Policies over time, it is their relative material power vis-a-vis the rest of the international system (Rose, 1998: 150). Therefore, it can be suggested that the assumptions made by Structural Analysis that power is material, is informed by neo-classical realism, but it should be noted that power should not only be understood as thus.

Neo-classical realism assumes that systemic constraints are interposed between states and their Foreign Policy behavior (Linklater, 1996: 242). These systemic forces are responsible for the remarkable similarities or differences of Foreign Policy behavior. It can further be argued that similarities in foreign policy are visible when states belong in the same power category and differences in foreign policy behavior when they are not in the same power structure. Therefore, a problem arises when there is an intersection, between parties who are involved in international negotiations but with different power standings. The scope and ambition of a country's Foreign Policy are driven primarily by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities (Rose, 1998: 146). The problem that arises is an attempt on either one of the parties, mostly the weaker party, attempts to even out the negotiation playing field through tactics. Due to different power structures, the responses to the tactics could be different. Neo-realism in some respects converges with classical realism as it evolves from classical realism.

Neo-classical realists caution that analysts who do not begin by looking carefully for the influence of structural factors such as relative power may mistakenly attribute causal significance to other factors (Rose, 1998: 158). Neo-classical realism's argument helps link relative material power and foreign policy outputs; systematic forces and relative material power shape state behavior and traces precisely how relative power is translated and operationalized into the behavior of state actions. It can be deduced based on Rose (1998)'s argument that power can be the resourcefulness of a party in a negotiation, which influences or directs it to use tactics or strategies. Therefore, in the context of the Six-Party Talks, the resourcefulness of a party is illustrated in how North Korea uses the time delay tactic to strain the U.S.-ROK alliance while leading them into an entrapped negotiation. These tactics are not affected by the other party's material power but they are to some extent independent, thus resourcefulness of an actor does not necessarily emanate from its material power standpoint. Although the adoption of a tactic might be influenced by internal and external factors in international negotiations, material power is not enough to foretell the outcome of a negotiation.

2.3.2 Structural realism

Structural realism attributes interstate conflict to the lack of an overarching authority above states and relative distribution of power in the international system (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008: 98). The lack of an overarching authority, leading to the anarchic nature of the international system, influences states to act in a way that serves their own self-interests. Anarchy makes it possible for states to go ahead with certain actions and not be necessarily punished for them. However, the anarchic nature of the international system favors the structurally stronger powers than the weak powers. This creates a system that benefits the strong parties as opposed to the weak parties. A weak actor in international relations realizes that if it does not attempt to undermine structure, the strong actors would take advantage of its weakness (Firoozabadi et al., 2016: 95). Therefore, a weak actor, as a result, has to source its “power” from somewhere else not from the material but from being resourceful for example with the use of tactics.

Waltz (1990: 58), arguably one of the chief proponents of structural realism, asserts that the absence of “social structure” that is, “institutionalized restraints and institutionalized methods of altering and adjusting interests,” are fertile conditions that cause conflict. States are mostly influenced to act against their opponents in any way that they want or that serves their self-interest without any regard of how their actions could influence or affect their counterparts. This is influenced by the lack of institutionalized restraints and institutionalized methods that are identified by Waltz (1990). In other words, the international system, due to the lack of a hierarchy in international relations creates an environment where a party can do whatever it wants without being accountable. Kenneth Waltz’s 1979 *Theory of International Politics* objected to the use of his theory in explaining specific Foreign Policy decisions by states. The theory does not attempt to explain the behavioral motivations behind individual states in international relations (Waltz, 1990: 58). It should be noted despite that, the theory does not purport to explain the behavior of states in detail, and this does not mean its basic precepts cannot be employed to analyze the interaction of states within the international system. The interactions of states, especially between a weak and a strong party, illustrate the

different power structures that influence states to act in a certain way when conducting diplomatic negotiations.

Structural realist theory ignores cultural differences among states as well as differences in regime type, mainly because the international system creates the same basic incentives for all great powers (Mearsheimer, 2013: 72). Such factors influence how a party acts in international negotiations due to the manner in which the structure of the international system is made up. This could help in understanding why parties act the way they do in negotiations. The stronger party might underestimate how its own power might act as a motivating factor for the weak party to find ways to undermine structure in negotiations. However, Mearsheimer (2013: 72) goes further to argue that whether a state is democratic or autocratic matters relatively little for how it acts towards other states because structural realists treat states as if they were black boxes: they are assumed to be alike, save for the fact that some states are more or less powerful than others (Mearsheimer, 2013: 72). Therefore, states are more alike than they are different. However, this creates a problem in understanding how the structure might influence one party to act in a certain manner while the other acts in a different way.

Waltz (1979: 88) identifies the anarchic nature of the international system, as the ordering principle of the international system. He argues, “The parts of international-political systems stand in relations of coordination. Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic”. It can be argued that the international system illustrates how states are pressured to adapt to the structure because the system does not have a set of rules that states can follow in their interactions with one another. Hierarchy does not eliminate coercion but changes its role and meaning in those international relationships where it exists (Lake, 2009: 96). The research can further point out that the character of the international system is not created in a way that favors those actors that are less powerful. However, this is not to say the strong party should take advantage of the weak party because the weak actors can also use the anarchic nature of the international system to their own advantage. This could explain why Dunne and Schmidt (2008: 98) and Griffiths (2007: 13) all agreed that structural

realism attributed competition among states to the lack of an overarching authority above states and relative distribution of power in the international system. The anarchic nature of the international system is very important in analyzing this study which is why it is important to apply structural realism to this study.

2.4 A negotiation Structural Analysis approach

Structural Analysis, like realism, puts power at the center of the negotiations or as a contributing factor of how a process of negotiation is handled (Zartman, 1989: 240). It can also be pointed out that power or a lack of it, and interests influence the behavior of state actors in international negotiations. Such a standpoint held by Structural Analysis would be a determining factor in what the parties get from the negotiations based on their different power capabilities. Based, on the assumption made by Hampson and Hart (1999: 345) that power determines the outcome of a negotiation, the structurally strong actor is already given an advantage by the structure while the weak actor's options are limited because of its power status. Thus, Holsti (1964: 193) asserts that power is the integral factor in how states interact with one another. However, the weaker party can find ways to undermine that presumed structural advantages by using tactics to illustrate that the outcome of a negotiation is not necessarily predetermined in favor of the strong party. The weaker party has an immediate goal based on its power position to make sure that it also gets something from the negotiations (Buszynski, 2013: 14). The long-term view blinds the stronger party from addressing the tactics that a weaker party may be using because they assume the negotiation will be in their favor because of the distribution of power. However, due to the use of the time delay tactic or other means to affect the outcome of the negotiations, the stronger or the entire negotiation becomes entrapped due to the environment conducive for entrapment that the weaker player would have created from its use of the tactic.

However, some aspects of Structural Analysis shall be utilized for instance the roles of the parties in negotiations, their interests, bargaining positions, and outcomes. Although Structural Analysis deals with the structure of negotiations and the power balances in a

negotiation, the focus is given to how weak parties (who always remain structurally weak) use their weakness in their tactics in order to undermine power structures. In the case of the Six-Party Talks, the study points out that the time delay tactic was one of the tactics used by North Korea not to only undermine power structures, but to illustrate that a weaker party has an advantage over structurally stronger parties. The components of the time delay tactic shall be analyzed to show how a party can use the tactic to have an advantage in a negotiation.

“Structural Analysis is based on a distribution of elements, in this case, of instrumental elements or power, defined either as parties' relative positions (resource possessions) or as their relative ability to make their options prevail (or to counter the other's efforts to make its options prevail)” (Zartman, 1989: 243). The phrase that can be picked up is “relative ability to make their options prevail.” The relative ability to make a state's actions prevail could be found with tactics or any other means that a state might use to gain an advantage in negotiations. A distinction can be made between issue related power and aggregate power, and this could undermine structure (Zartman, 1989: 243). Understanding power as a resource that can be used by an actor in negotiations undermines the basic premise of what informs Structural Analysis. Therefore, both the weak party and the strong party have a “relative ability” to influence the actions of each other in a negotiation. Furthermore, relative ability can be in the form of tactics that could be a tool that can be used to make another party do something they would not have normally done. The assumptions made by Structural Analysis would be undermined considering that “relative ability” can also help the weak party to have an advantage over its stronger counterpart in the negotiations. Thus, Zartman (1989: 243) argues that tactics generally serve to restore the structural equality of power between the two parties. On the other hand, when “relative ability” of a party can undermine structure, the weaker party might attempt to form coalitions or break up coalitions so that it has some power or control in the negotiations.

Negotiations do not take place in a vacuum because their political environment shapes them (Hampson & Hart, 1999: 345). Based on this assumption, it can be deduced that structural impediments emanate from the environment in which negotiations are held.

As has been argued before, the international system is anarchic, therefore, that factor influences the way states act in conducting diplomacy in a multilateral or bilateral setting. Without the existence of a moral authority that governs how states act in conducting diplomacy, they can act in whichever way that saves their own personal interest (Waltz, 1979: 88). Therefore, an environment conducive for a competition is created whereby each party tries to outdo the other. It can further be argued that Structural Analysis fails to bring attention to how the environments in which negotiations are held as a contributing factor to the Structural Analysis paradox identified by Zartman (1997: 1). In the case of the Six-Party Talks, the environment motivated North Korea to adopt the time delay tactics, which weakened the U.S.-ROK alliance and was an impediment to the assumptions made by Structural Analysis.

Zartman (1988: 33) also argues that to avoid the deterministic nature of structural negotiation analysis an independent measure of power should be used so that there can be a focus on the way in which sides of different relative strengths achieve their outcomes. It should be noted that parties have different motivations when they enter a negotiation. Therefore, these parties are bound to adopt strategies and means to make sure that they come out on top of the other. This is why tactics, specifically time delay tactics open the door for Structural Analysis to be questioned in how it offers an absolute answer to the outcome of a negotiation without taking into cognizance the interests of the weaker parties that might influence them to adopt strategies that put them at an advantage in the negotiation process. This is not to say Structural Analysis is not important, but it can be undermined by certain strategies that can be used by weaker states. North Korea conduct during the Six-Party Talks illustrated the tautological and post hoc nature of the foundations of structural analysis. This presents a problem when using Structural Analysis to analyze negotiations that have a weaker party like North Korea that can use tactics to lead a negotiation in unforeseen directions.

Each state is a separate autonomous and formally equal political unit that must count ultimately on its own resources to realize its interests (Donnelly, 2000: 17). Therefore, in a system that has a hierarchy that entails super and subordination, the weaker party is forced, based on its own capabilities or resources to find means to undermine what

could be labeled an unfair structure of the international system. The structure of a negotiation, although unfavorable to the weak actor, should not discourage the weak actor from using its own resourcefulness in the use of tactics to frame how power also manifests outside the traditional form. Zartman (1997: 1) argues that asymmetries that exist in negotiations raise the question of how weaker parties can negotiate with stronger parties and still get something from the negotiation. This is identified as the structural paradox because Structural Analysis assumes that the stronger always prevail, that does not mean weaker parties cannot conduct negotiations with their structurally stronger counterparts (Zartman, 1997: 1). Based on the assumption made by Hampson and Hart (1995: 8), “the outcome of international negotiations, whether they are bilateral or multilateral always tend to represent the preferences of the more powerful actors in the international system. That is, outcomes are predetermined”. Stronger parties have an advantage in a negotiation due to their power capability, and their power is argued as the reason why the outcomes of a negotiation always favor them (Hampson & Hart, 1996: 8). This might be the case in other negotiations, but in the case of the Six-Party Talks, North Korea had to look for other means to affect the outcome of the negotiations because a weaker party also needs an outcome that favors its own goals. If negotiations were always in favor of stronger parties, then weaker parties would see no reason to attempt to negotiate with their stronger counterparts. Thus creating what Zartman, (1997: 1) coined as the structural paradox in international negotiations.

Structural Analysis acknowledges that powerful states encourage measures only if they save their own long-term interest and this may end up frustrating any agreement (Hampson, 1995: 9). According to Structural Analysis, stronger parties would only follow a certain path of the negotiations if the path would eventually favor their position. Inasmuch as self-interest might frustrate agreement, weaker parties to follow a certain path in the negotiations with the time delay tactic that could frustrate agreement might also coerce stronger parties. The tactics adopted by the weaker party, influence the stronger parties to take a direction that they would not have normally taken had the tactic not been used (Galvin, 2015: 156). Therefore, to assume that the strong are only bound to follow a path that favors their interest is to ignore that a weaker party can use

tactics against the strong to frustrate reaching an agreement. In negotiations, every actor attempts to have the negotiation go its way. This might not be a case of how powerful a state is, but a motivation of achieving the best result from a negotiation. If stronger states can also frustrate the process of a negotiation, weaker states can also do the same if they use coercive tactics that can frustrate the parties within a negotiation. It can be argued that the case of tactics and who gets to affect the outcome is determined by the party that uses a certain tactic first, before the other parties can influence the negotiation in their favor. Thus, Zartman (1988: 33) argues that various tactics provide various prescriptions for overcoming asymmetry, where the better performance of the weaker of the two sides is a direct result of the use of tactics.

Structural Analysis assumes that negotiations are called into being by a dominant player or a great power, one that has the diplomatic authority and national power to initiate negotiations and is sufficiently concerned about the issue to commit itself to the proceedings (Buszynski, 2013: 13). Negotiations are called into being by stronger parties because of their power status and the weak parties have to follow the stronger party's lead. However, both the strong and the weak party have one goal in the negotiations, that is, to get the most from the process and getting the most from the process should not be influenced by whether a strong party initiated the negotiations. States try to perform tasks, most of which are common to all of them but the ends they aspire to are similar (Waltz, 1979: 96). The weaker party might have an influence in controlling the pace of the negotiations by threatening to delay the process or telling the other parties when negotiations should reconvene. Even though the weaker party might not have initiated the negotiations, it would be in control of the pace and the direction that the negotiation follows. The power to control the negotiations is not reserved for only the strong states when tactics are in play. If a state decides to use time delay tactics even if a powerful actor has called for the negotiation to begin the process might be stalled or the party, using the time delay tactic might end up deciding when a round of negotiation should start or end. Therefore, the structure can be undermined when a weaker party overtakes the movement, pace, and direction of the negotiation from the stronger party which would have no option but to succumb to the weak party's timing or stalling tactic.

Buszynski (2013: 14) points out that a state may refuse to implement agreements it has accepted or otherwise create difficulties intended to exacerbate divisions within the negotiations if it feels to be at a disadvantage. As a result, of the structure of the negotiations, weaker states may also look into creating divisions in the negotiations in order to undo the structure that favors the more prominent parties. To some extent, what Buszynski (2013) argues is almost the same as what Hampson and Hart (1999) argue when they refer to the issue of coalition building in negotiations. The way, in which the structure of the negotiations is made, is to create an environment conducive for weaker states to be at a disadvantage against the stronger parties. The divisions that North Korea created between the alliance helped North Korea to obstruct the process even though this influenced entrapment. Thus Zartman (1997: 6) points out that the weak parties in a negotiation become assertive, rather than submissive, especially if they are not winning which leads the initial power disadvantage into resistance. Hampson's view is very critical to this study because it cements the argument that the big powers such as the United States might overlook that states like North Korea have tactics at their disposal that they can use in negotiations to make sure that the outcome does not always favor the strong.

Zartman (1988: 243) argues that parties do best in negotiation when they are or feel equal. If parties are equal in a negotiation or if they have the same power status, there is a less chance that there would be divisions or the use of certain tactics that are meant to equal or level the negotiation field while frustrating any agreement from being reached. Based on the foundational structure of the international system, states are not equal, which means there would always be competition between states. Therefore, international relations are often marked by insecurity, competition, and conflict even where there are strong incentives to cooperate due to the anarchic nature of the international system (Donnelly, 2001: 21). It can further be suggested that a superpower, to increase its power against the weaker state might invite an alliance member to intimidate the weaker party. Such a move by the strong party could be translated as being weak but in an international system where competition is the order of the day, it should not be surprising that a strong party would use every strategy to outperform a weak party in the negotiations while asserting its dominance. Thus,

Buszynski (2013: 1) asserts that even though a superpower like the U.S. would normally adopt a dominant position defining the agenda and expecting the result to conform to its interests, some parties may feign cooperation but actually work to a different agenda.

In a critique of the structural approach to negotiation, some students of international negotiations have focused on the ways weaker parties can overcome structural impediments and asymmetries in power capabilities to achieve bargaining outcomes favorable to themselves (Hampson, 1995: 9). Therefore, Structural Analysis has some pitfalls that cannot be ignored. It is because of such shortcomings that makes it possible for weak parties to assume the role of a powerful party with the time delay tactics. For the sake of this study, time delay tactics are instrumental in straining an alliance. Structural Analysis creates a context for the study but an analysis of time delay tactics within the framework of a structural negotiation analysis is important. Therefore, Structural Analysis is the foundational approach that an analysis of tactics can be based on. The analysis of Round Four to Round Six of the Six-Party Talks shall show that the outcome of a negotiation is not predetermined by the amount of power an actor has because there are other means in which power could be attained. Instead of viewing power capabilities and resources as immutable, there are other ways weaker parties can manipulate bargaining situations to their advantage when the initial power balance is not tipped in their favor (Hampson & Hart, 1999: 9).

Structural Analysis together with the time delay tactics can explain why a weaker party manages to affect the stronger party's alliance and make it impossible for the issue that influenced the negotiations to be discussed. Zartman (1989: 242) argues that the confusion arises from the presence of many different attempts at analysis, sometimes inventing their own wheels to carry forward their insights and sometimes cross-referencing from a number of different analytical approaches (Zartman, 1989: 242). Structural Analysis should to some extent address that the outcome of a negotiation does not necessarily favor the stronger parties all the time. This raises the question of how can the outcome of the Six-Party Talks be explained if Structural Analysis argues that the outcome of a negotiation always favors the strong. To some extent, basing the outcome of a negotiation as predetermined in favor of stronger states limits the way in

which structural analysis could be analyzed. Strategies and behavioral rules during a negotiation might have the same impact as power could have in deciding the outcome of a negotiation.

Wight (2006: 123) points out that the concept of Structural Analysis remains ambiguous and imprecise because of how different theories define structure in different ways. Thus, Hampson and Hart (1995: 10) identify a number of problems with Structural Analysis, not only as a theoretical tool but also in its application to multilateral negotiations. The problem of a lack of consensus on the definition of structure is arguably one of the reasons why there are problems with the concept. In this instance, the study identifies that even though structure might determine the outcome of a negotiation based on the power capabilities of the parties, to avoid structural impediments negotiators should be aware that weaker states could affect the outcome of any negotiation by using time delay tactics. The power that weaker parties have is their advantage in controlling or influencing the pace of a negotiation especially when they want to affect the outcome. Therefore, time delay tactics offer an alternative way in which weaker parties can influence the outcome of a negotiation.

2.5 Conceptual analysis: Time delay tactics in international negotiations

Tactics and time delay tactics, in particular, are investigated as a concept that explains how and why weaker states use the tactic to undermine structure in international negotiations. By understanding time delay tactic as a concept, it would be easy to understand the role of weak parties in international negotiations when they get more concessions from the process as compared to their strong counterparts. In other words, as has been illustrated, the tactic not only undermines structure but it illustrates how weak states can have some influence on their structurally stronger counterparts in the conduct of diplomacy. Concepts are adopted as a general idea that can be used to explain a certain phenomenon. Concepts are adopted either from the large class of events to a new case or from the ethnographic study to another class of projects on symbols and ceremonies (Maggetti, et al. 2015: 2). In other words, even though a

concept might be an abstract idea it can be implemented in other cases to explain a phenomenon. Therefore, the time delay tactic is not meant to be only applied scientifically to the case in question, but it is meant also to be applied in other international negotiations that have an asymmetrical relationship. The tactic is a coercive bargaining tool and could be used by a party that seeks to get more from a negotiation than it is willing to offer.

In the study of international politics, tactics are a resource that can be used to show bargaining power in negotiations. The weak party possesses bargaining power against its opponent in the negotiations, - the stronger party, which evens out the negotiating playing field to some extent. Petersen et al. (2012: 9) argue that the stronger party no longer imposes its will on the weak party without making some concessions due to the resources such as tactics that the weak party would be using in the negotiations. The concept of tactics becomes a way in which power manifests in negotiations and its impact on the negotiation process. However, it should be noted that even though the weaker party might possess some bargaining power, the strong party remains a powerful actor that also has some influence in the negotiations.

Concepts are empirical generalizations, which need to be tested and refined based on empirical research results - that is, of knowledge of the world (Maggetti et al., 2015: 4). Tactics are a concept because they can be tested in the case of the Six-Party Talks negotiations or any other negotiations and could be refined based on research results. Therefore, a concept helps to create a theory and explain how the theory might arise based on empirical evidence. The concept is meant to be tested or applied against a case study to show its validity or lack thereof in building theory. Therefore, the time delay tactic can be seen in how it gets used or how it comes about in international negotiations by studying negotiations. Thus, Botes (2002: 23) and van Wyk (2013: 23) argues that concepts are the basic building blocks of scientific knowledge or theoretical frameworks for any discipline. It can be argued that concepts are meant to give understanding and meaning to a study, and this could be either normative or descriptive. In the case of the Six-Party Talks, the time delay tactic is neither normative nor descriptive.

2.6 How tactics can act in power structures

Habeb (1988) differentiates between aggregate and issue specific power. He does it by pointing out that aggregate power is unchangeable while issue-related power is what can change the outcome; it is what is malleable (Habeb, 1988: 133). Issue related power is what North Korea managed to manipulate from Round Four to Round Six of the Six-Party Talks. As has been pointed out, weaker parties in negotiations can undermine structure by the use of tactics, which are a source of aggregate power. However, this is not to say that tactics are only an instrument for weaker states. To some extent, a stronger state tries to make sure that the structure of negotiations works in its favor while a weaker state realizes its limitations also tries to work within that framework to benefit from the same structure. North Korea's aggregate power was largely more influential than the power that the United States and South Korea had as an alliance. Tactics are specifically, also used to undermine structural power. Tactics illustrate how a negotiation might be affected by aggregate power. However, Petersen et al. (2012: 9) point out that the relationship between the weak and strong party remains competitive even though the weak party might have tactics as a source of aggregate power.

Buszynski (2013: 13) points out that aggregate power can influence behavior during the negotiations. It can be argued that the time delay tactic can influence how a strong party in a negotiation can react to certain behavior from the weaker party. Such a reaction from the strong party because of the tactic might put the stronger party in a tight position whereby its options are limited because it would have given up its power to control the negotiation to the weaker party. Amongst other consequences that can emulate from the reaction of the strong party is that alliances can be strained because the alliance would fail to agree on how they should react to the time delay tactics that would be used by the weaker party (Galín, 2015: 147). It can be argued that the time delay tactics motivate a reaction from the structurally stronger parties in negotiations. The reaction usually benefits the structurally weaker parties. However, the time delay tactic could also have an adverse reaction if the stronger party refuses to be manipulated by the tactic. In the event that, the weaker party is using the tactic, not for false pretense

negotiation, an adverse reaction could jeopardize the whole negotiation process from moving forward.

Saner (2008: 36) points out that the choice of a strategy or tactic is influenced by the power balance between the participants, relationship and also the importance of the negotiation for each of the participants. The choice of tactic would be an attempt by the party, to also show that it can be influential despite the power disparity against its opponent. The choice of tactic would be a direct result of how the parties view each other and to some extent the kind of relations they have with one another (Zartman, 1988: 34). If the relationship between the parties is not friendly, the tactics that are used by the weaker party would be meant to undermine the structure of the negotiations by causing a strain in an alliance. On the other hand, if the relationship is friendly the tactics would have a different impact on the negotiations and the outcome. Therefore, such factors such as power balances, relationship and the value of the negotiations could have influenced North Korea's decision to use time delay tactics because of its antagonistic relationship with the U.S.-ROK alliance. The time delay tactic was meant to demonstrate that North Korea was adopting a hard bargaining approach with the alliance and was meant to shift the power balance in the negotiations in North Korea's favor.

Three aspects are identified by Saner (2008) as contributing factors of how a weaker party might adopt a tactic, but there are also other contributing factors that can influence the choice of a tactic. It can be argued that the choice of a tactic might be influenced by the need to frustrate or divide an alliance. For instance, North Korea used the time delay tactic to frustrate the U.S.-ROK alliance. The frustration of an alliance becomes a result of the use of the tactic to create balance in the negotiations while undermining the structure (Saner, 2008). The structurally weaker party in the negotiations does not underestimate how a weak alliance could help shift the power balance in its favor. Dur and Mateo (2010: 562) assert that a party that adopts a hard bargaining tactic that is meant to frustrate an alliance makes strong, public commitment of not giving in, or of not accepting the addition of an issue to the agenda of the negotiations that is dear to the other side. North Korea's decision to resort to delaying the negotiations as a tactic

was a demonstration of power to control the agenda of the negotiations as well as assert its commitment to having the negotiations go its way. However, adopting a hard bargaining strategy such as the use of the time delay tactic does not present an absolute answer that the structurally weaker party could get what it wants from the negotiations, but it offers an opportunity to disrupt alliances as well as frustrate the pace of the negotiations.

A weak state does not possess the aggregate structural power resources. Therefore, it must rely on tactics whose effectiveness and credibility derive from other sources (Habeeb, 1988: 133). As has been pointed out above, a weak party gets its issue related power from other sources. However, the tactics that might be adopted by the weaker party is meant to coerce a reaction from the strong party or from an alliance (Habeeb, 1988: 133). An alliance in a negotiation can be a source for power for a weaker party because the weaker party would use the tactic to strain the alliance. To some extent, the tactic is meant to make sure that the alliance would not be coherent against it. Therefore, the weaker party sways one of the members of the alliance to turn against its alliance member to make it harder for the alliance to be a more powerful cohesive force against the weak party. By playing the alliance one against the other, with the time delay tactics, the weaker party hopes to create a “good cop, bad cop” scenario (Lee, 2008: 12). Through the manipulation of the alliance, an illusion of factionalism is created which benefits the end goals of the weaker party. The principal lesson for the weak state is that despite its weakness it may still achieve many, even most, of its objectives if it acknowledges its various strengths and advantages going into the negotiation (Habeeb, 1988: 143). The weaker party’s advantages in an asymmetrical negotiation are the realization that tactics and the “divide and rule” strategy creates chaos in a negotiation especially when the stronger parties do not have a coherent approach in dealing with the weaker party.

Actors in negotiations have a wide range of strategies they can choose from, but the difference in strategies is influenced by the power status (weak/strong) of the actor (Dur & Mateo, 2010: 564). It can be inferred that weaker and strong states choose their tactics or strategies in negotiations differently. However, weaker states might go as far

as adopting strategies or tactics that are meant to demoralize the negotiation because of the disadvantage they have in the negotiation. Weaker states are willing to use any tactic to undermine the advantages of the strong parties in favor of their agenda. A weaker party would adopt a strategy that it knows would create a power balance in the negotiations whilst a stronger party would want to assert its dominance in the negotiations. For instance, weaker parties would adopt an aggressive negotiation strategy because they think that is the only way the negotiation outcome can favor them. Thus, Zartman (1988: 33) argues that tactics generally serve to restore the structural equality of power between parties with different relative strengths to achieve their outcomes, because different tactics and strategies provide various prescriptions for overcoming asymmetry. Therefore, tactics are can negatively be used by the weak party to even out the negotiation playing field because that is the only source of power a weaker party has to control the negotiation as well as influence the strong party. Although there are various tactics that a weak party can use against its strong opponent, the time delay tactics destruct an alliance while also creating an environment conducive for entrapment in its bid to overcome the asymmetry. It can be argued that using the time delay tactic the weak party would be attempting to coerce a settlement that favors its own agenda.

Gruder (1970: 130) points out that tactics are often attempts to convince the other that one should receive a greater share of the total outcomes than the other offers or is willing to agree to. Therefore, time delay tactics are also used to influence other parties into changing their positions so that the outcome of the negotiation outcome or the negotiation agenda would be in the party using the tactic's favor. The time delay tactic would be used to win over as many concessions as possible from the negotiations while the user of the tactic is not reciprocating (Galín, 2015: 146). The user of the time delay tactic holds the movement of the negotiation as ransom against the stronger parties, forcing them to succumb to the time delay tactic by offering the weak party concessions because they want to continue with the negotiations. This change in attitude from the strong party (succumbing to the use of the time delay) leads the negotiation into uncharted territories of entrapment.

Inasmuch as either party may want a favorable resolution to its own goals in a negotiation, attaining the favorable goals may not always be possible because of how tactics might be used in that negotiation and how they are responded to. The deliberate and strategic use of tactics is the determining factor of who overcomes structure in a negotiation (Gruder, 1970: 130). The time delay tactic might help the weak party to change the direction of the negotiation, but that does not necessarily mean a win for the weak party. Therefore, structure and tactics are closely interlinked and should be discussed as a component that is joined and not separate from the other to do justice in understanding the outcome of a negotiation based on the structure or makeup of the process. By demonstrating the degree to which a weaker party can control the outcome of a negotiation, stronger states might have to evaluate their bargaining position when they are entering into a negotiation with a less powerful actor that has tactics at its disposal (Gruder, 1970: 129). This leads the study to analyze the use of the time delay tactic as a component of issue power, and how it forms the foundation of structural analysis.

2.6.1 Time delay tactic as a concept to analyze negotiations

Galín (2015: 146) asserts that time delays are used when opponents are not ready to make significant concessions. Parties that use the time delay tactic are usually trying to avoid reaching an agreement because they might not be satisfied with the way the negotiation is going or they might be engaging in false pretense negotiations. In other words, they would have joined the negotiations under the false pretense that they want to reach a settlement. In nuclear proliferation negotiations, it can be argued that weaker states might be less accepting of a negotiation that seeks to dismantle the nuclear program especially if the strong party in the negotiations has nuclear weapons. The weaker party would then pretend that it wants to negotiate while it holds back or delays when it comes to giving concessions on the issue at hand (Galín, 2015: 146). If the weaker party concedes or does not use the time delay tactic, it means that the structurally stronger party would be winning. Therefore, if a party is not ready to make considerable concessions or is not yet ready to agree to an agreement, the party would

try to delay the negotiations (Galvin, 2015: 146). In this study, it is argued that the weaker party was not ready to offer any concessions because it was engaging in “false pretense” negotiations because it did not want to let go of the nuclear program but also wanted to weaken the resolve of the U.S.-ROK alliance in attaining a nuclear agreement that would stop the nuclear program.

Even though time delay tactics can be used in a number of scenarios, in the context of negotiations of the possession of nuclear arms, the party being forced to dismantle the nuclear program to influence concessions from the stronger party while maintaining a false pretense negotiation strategy uses the time delay tactic. Therefore, a weaker party’s use of the time delay tactic is an attempt to get the stronger party to agree to concessions that were to a certain extent in favor of the nuclear program. It can be argued that agreeing to such concessions would give more power to the weaker party and would open the door for the other parties to be entrapped because they would be agreeing to positions that favor the weaker states.

Young (1991: 14) argues, “Delay is a relatively innocuous example of coercive bargaining, a tactic in which one urges, or threatens to impose, costs on the other side unless it yields to some demand.” The party that uses the time delay tactic uses the tactic as bait to coerce other parties into yielding to its demands. The tactic becomes an instrument that is used by the weaker party to make sure that the strong party stays inline because the strong party would not want to derail the negotiations (Young, 1991: 14), therefore, it would be forced to fall for the tactic. It can be argued that it is usually the weaker states that use the tactic in order to influence the negotiation, but it threatens the other party that it would delay the negotiations if it were not given what it wants. The consequences of the tactic could be more if the tactic is directed at an alliance because the alliance members might not react or respond in the same manner to the tactic (Schoppa, 1999: 306). This would cause a strain in the alliance if it fails to respond cohesively to the threat of the use of the tactic. As pointed out in the previous section, what weaker states do not have in structural power makeup with the use of tactics that create a balance of symmetry in negotiations.

The parties participating in a negotiation can influence the outcomes of the negotiations, through tactics that reshape the material context of negotiations (Schoppa, 1999: 307). Even though Schoppa generalizes the context in which tactics are used, this study argues that time delay tactics also reshape the material context of the negotiations. The party that uses the tactic delays the negotiation as much as it can until the other party concedes (Schoppa, 1999: 307). Using the time delay tactic to threaten the progress of the negotiations, puts the stronger party in a complex situation where they have to choose whether to end the negotiations or concede to the weaker party's demands. Either scenario limits the options of the strong party going forward because the weaker party would continue using the same tactic repeatedly to force concessions from the strong party. The study could also argue that when the decisions of the stronger parties are changed because of the time delay tactic, the weaker party would be gaining some control of the negotiations and undermining structural assumptions.

If a group is part of the decision-making process but does not want change, the slower the process, the better. If they do not have a say in the design of the process, then they can deliberately delay it by stalling on their involvement, parties that do not have the power to win the political power contests, which are being used to resolve the immediate dispute (Spangler, 2003), often use delaying strategies. Therefore, the structure of a negotiation motivates structurally weaker states to look for power elsewhere, and this creates a problem for structural analysts that argue that the outcome of a negotiation would always favor the structurally stronger players. It can be argued that the time delay tactics would only work effectively if they were used by weaker states because stronger parties have much to lose from a negotiation that constantly stalls than weaker parties. When a weaker party adopts the time delay tactics, it realizes that it has nothing to lose because the assumptions made by structural analysis put it at a disadvantage without using a tactic.

Insomuch as the time delay tactic was beneficial to North Korea's strategy, it had consequences for both the US and South Korea. The study analyzes how the tactic acted as a tool to disprove assumptions made by structural analysis regarding multilateral negotiations and their outcomes. Spangler's argument does not illustrate

how the time delay tactic affects the parties that are on the receiving end (structurally stronger) of the tactic and why they choose to continue in such circumstances that limit their overall performance. However, Maiese (2004) just like Meerts (2005: 111) highlight how the consequences of continuation could be a sign of entrapment because there will be greater need to continue towards "victory" in order to justify the sacrifices that would have already been made. The negotiating parties, mainly the stronger states that are on the receiving end of the time delay tactic, would be focused on continuing with the negotiations even though the time delay tactics are putting a strain on their alliance. The time delay tactic is overlooked by stronger states because they assume that if they draw the party using the tactic back into the negotiations, the tactic would not be used again (Galini, 2015: 4). The parties do not realize that once weaker states resort to using the tactic, chances are that it will continue using the tactic throughout the negotiations to make sure that the stronger parties are kept in check.

The leadership in Pyongyang has relied on various familiar approaches in the beginning stages of any rounds of talks, including deliberate efforts to use tactics and creating situations where other parties feel obliged to take actions to "save face" of North Korean counterparts (Snyder, 2007: 48 & 60). It can be argued that Snyder (2007) identifies tactics as synonymous with the DPRK's negotiating strategy; stronger parties that negotiate with the DPRK continuously fall for its tactics. The use of tactics puts the weaker party in a position that it wants to be from the very start of the negotiations, of being taken seriously by the other parties. For the strong parties, the need to keep the negotiations alive leads them to succumb to the tactics in order for the negotiations to continue. This could be because stronger states do not want to fail in negotiations. Thus Pritchard (2003: 2) argues that the stakes are usually too high and the consequences for others (not necessarily the negotiators) unacceptable if diplomacy fails. It can further be suggested that stronger parties give substance to tactics because to some extent they cannot use tactics in a manner that the weak parties do. Therefore, the strong party ends up succumbing to the tactics when it chooses to continue with the negotiations.

For the purpose of this study, power is identified, as the ability to get a party to do what it otherwise would not have done (Buszynski, 2013: 13). Based on how the tactic, manages to influence the positions, decisions, and actions of the stronger parties, it is an illustration of the ability that a weaker state has over the stronger states in negotiations. Snyder (1999: 146) cements this view by pointing out that time delay may shape the agenda by fixing the attention of the negotiating counterpart off balance because the stronger party's attention shifts from its own agenda to responding to the use of the time delay tactic from the weaker party. Therefore, the time delay tactic is meant to influence the negotiation from going in a certain way that does not favor the weaker party. To some extent, the tactic puts the weaker party at the center of the negotiations, because it becomes the party that controls the direction of the negotiations. The tactic in itself becomes an advantage against the stronger party, and these would force or persuade the stronger party not to underestimate the weaker party. The response to the tactic, by the stronger party, is a result of the strong party becoming hamstrung by all kinds of strains and limitations, which might make it impossible for it to use its power (Buszynski, 2013: 6). Therefore, the use of the time delay tactic limits the extent to which a strong party may use its power in international negotiations.

Spangler (2003) argues that disputants use a delay to deliberately stall the decision-making process so that an agreement might not be reached. However, Glozman (2015: 672) goes further than Spangler (2003) by pointing out that a party may use the time delay tactic in expectation to reap greater benefits by delaying the negotiations indefinitely. If the pivotal party cooperates with the dominant party, the path to resolution would be smooth, and the outcome would be predicted (Buszynski, 2013: 14). It can be argued that based on Spangler (2003)'s analysis of the reasons why a weak party might use the time delay tactic; it would be hard to reach an agreement if the agreement does not favor their goals.

Hampson and Hart (1995: 9) assert that, "the reason a state might decline to join or threaten to exit the negotiation process or would limit its commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that gaps in otherwise mutually positive gains favor partners

presents a major challenge to international negotiations and may frustrate agreement.” The analysis offered by Hampson and Hart (1995) is a description of how the time delay tactics are used. The party using the tactic threatens to slow down the negotiation by leaving the negotiations, or it would limit its participation in the negotiations in a manner that delays the negotiations. However, based on the actions that weaker states adopt during the negotiations time delay tactics can be picked up or shown in the user’s actions. The tactic does not necessarily show its presence by directly stalling the negotiations through taking time to get back in the negotiations after a break but can also be shown by how a party conducts itself when it agrees to restart the negotiation process (Galín, 2015: 144). Therefore, a party that uses the tactic, even though this might not be the aim of those on the receiving end, the weaker party tries to delay the negotiations as much as it can to avoid settlement. Thus, Galín (2015: 146) points out that the use of a time delay tactic may assist negotiators in exhausting their opponents until they are ready to concede.

Weaker states that use the tactic are most likely to commit to following through with their own demands even though there is a possibility that the other parties might not curve in light of their time delay tactics. Snyder (1999: 146) describes such a scenario, as a demonstration of stubbornness of the party using the time delay tactic. In other words, Snyder argues that the stubbornness during the negotiation is a time delay tactic. It can be argued that the party that uses the tactic has to be strong-willed in its convictions because the time delay tactic might not work if they are easily persuaded to abandon their convictions by other parties. Thus, Habeeb (1988: 130) points out that the negotiation process consists of tactics that are directed at limiting alternatives, control, and commitment of the other party.

Buszynski (2013: 14) argues that states exploit relations by adopting a deliberate strategy of sabotage in which the rivalries between parties may be exploited, and supporters played off against opponents by resorting to tactic bargaining techniques. For example, the weak party may engage in diplomacy by charade to present a false face to parties in negotiations, which are persuaded that an agreement is possible with little additional effort. It should be noted that the charade diplomacy, even though it is a

part of time delay tactics, in this study, it shall only be used as an argument that the weak party engages in pretense negotiation as a strategy to avoid reaching an agreement. The weak party uses time delay tactics that give the impression that progress could be made, agreement accepted if certain concessions are made. Such a strategy that uses a pretense negotiation tactic is deeply rooted in an approach that time delay users apply when they want to stall the negotiation process. Gluzman *et al.* (2015: 671) describe the characteristic by asserting that false negotiation occurs when a party gains more by using the time delay tactic to improve its position during the negotiation because the party negotiates without any intention of reaching an agreement. To some extent, it can be argued that parties that adopt the time delay tactic are not willing to reach an agreement as the study has shown so far. The parties are motivated by a variety of issues, for instance, they want to appear as if they are willing to negotiate yet that is not their end goal because they realize what might be lost if they involve themselves in a negotiation process that would take away what they have worked hard to attain. Therefore, their only solution is to use time delay tactics that are meant to frustrate agreement but also appear as if they are willing to engage in a negotiation.

2.6.2 Entrapment because of the time delay tactic

As the structurally weaker party uses the time delay tactic, the consequences go beyond acting only as a strategy that can stop the strong party from having the ultimate advantage in the negotiations, but the tactic can also create an environment conducive for entrapment. Meerts (2005: 127) identifies entrapment as an instrument that is used by the weak party to ensnare the strong. As a result of using the time delay tactic, the weak party leads the strong party into an entrapment. Entrapment does not only affect the strong, but it can also affect the weaker party that creates the environment conducive for entrapment (Meerts, 2005: 126). In other words, nothing happens in a vacuum in international negotiations meaning entrapment could affect both parties. Therefore, a structurally weaker party would use the time delay tactic with the hope that the other players continue with the negotiations even though they might not be getting

any reasonable concessions from the weaker party. This would result in the time delay tactic entrapping the powerful parties, and it would force them to grant more concessions to the weaker state at the detriment of their own agenda (Galini, 2015: 146). The more the parties continue following the weak party's stalling tactic, the more they get ensnared in a negotiation that is increasingly limiting their options in favor of the weaker party's strategy. The time delay, which results in entrapment of the alliance, is a direct result of weak party's effort to strain the alliance because the alliance ends up succumbing to the time delay tactics by shifting positions that lead them further away from their goals when they started the negotiations with the weak party.

In entrapment, the balance will be lost because one party gets a stronger grip on the other party, which is losing its grip (Meerts, 2005: 111). The weaker player has tactics at its disposal to make sure that the structural outcome of the negotiations does not favor the powerful party. To some extent, the weaker party's ability to shift the negotiations process in its favor disorients the negotiation process because the tactics that would have led to the strong party to change its position are not meant to benefit the negotiation process but to undermine its success. This is not to say that a weak party's use of a tactic is not a success, but it means the structural assumptions would have been undermined if the tactic works in favor of the weak party's goals. In this study, entrapment and time delay are closely related to each other because of how the tactic influences entrapment of the stronger parties. Both time delay tactic and entrapment just like all other tactics have the same goal noted by Young (1999) and Meerts (2005) of trying to influence or affect the outcome of a negotiation and weak parties mostly use them. Using Meerts' explanation of entrapment, the study shall illustrate that with every decision that was made one party's alternatives were being limited to the advantage of the other party.

Spangler (2003) argues that some use delaying tactics to frustrate their opponent. The weak party's frustration of an opponent with the tactic is meant to force the opponent into giving up with the negotiation process. However, it can also be pointed out that, even though the stronger party might be frustrated, they continue with the negotiations to their own detriment, which leads to entrapment. In the event that a frustrated

opponent chooses to continue with the negotiations, it creates a situation where the weak party has a platform to continue using the time delay tactics to affect the decisions of the strong party. Snyder (2002: 146) describes North Korea's ability to frustrate their opponent to delay the negotiation as, "their ability to use crisis diplomacy as a powerful tool for enhancing alternatives, demonstrating commitment and maintaining control of an issue-specific negotiating process to diminish the strength of a more powerful negotiating counterpart such as the U.S." It can be argued that if a weak party manages to frustrate an opponent and if the opponent carries on with what Park, (2008: 359) describes as a "tunnel vision" of the negotiation, this could result in self-entrapment.

Meerts (2005: 120) notes repetition during a negotiation as a feature of entrapment and the constant time delays of moving from one round to the other illustrate how repetition within a negotiation can frustrate any chance at reaching an agreement. The aspects of entrapment identified by Meerts (2005) are the same as the characteristics that show if a party is using the time delay tactic. Having many rounds or phases that repeat the same style of negotiation strategy, does not entail that the party that had caused the repetition of the round or phase through the time delay would stop using the tactic. It can be suggested that repetition might help a party that seeks to use the time delay tactic. Parties always hope that a participant using the time delay might stop using the tactic in the next phase of the negotiations, which is not always the case. If the party decides to use the time delay tactic, this would result in entrapment. Repetitions create a conducive environment for the time delay tactic to influence entrapment. As the commitment deepens, decision-makers who are trying to outdo each other, end up making reckless decisions that give the other party an upper hand while trying to minimize losses (Brockner & Rubin, 1985: 146).

The argument of entrapment should be looked at in all its form because in an attempt to entrap the strong party by using the time delay tactics the weak party might entrap itself as well. Park (2008: 358) suggests that the fact that the US and other parties in the talks created and depended on their own version of North Korea's rationality might have led to "self-entrapment." The U.S.-ROK alliance's understanding of their own version of North Korea led them to ignore and to underestimate the impact that the time delay

tactics could have on the negotiations. Such tunnel vision enables the weak party in the negotiation to continue using the time delay tactic and influenced the stronger states to continue going further with the negotiations, instead of addressing the use of the tactic. Parties to the negotiation process according to Park (2008: 360) did not think that North Korea would leave up to its threats or continue stalling the process if the negotiations did not go according to its plan. It can be argued that, if a weaker party continues using the time delay tactic the stronger parties should call off the negotiations because if they continue, they would become entrapped or what Park (2008) identifies as “self-entrapment.” It should be noted that, in this study, self-entrapment is identified as the decision made by the strong parties to continue with negotiations even though it might be entrapped.

Power changes from a being a position or a possession, something a party "has" to being a way of exercising a causal relation, something one "does" to bring about an outcome and not just the ability to do so (Zartman, 1988: 33). The weaker state's resourcefulness with the use of the time delay tactic to entrap the other parties demonstrates how the actions or tactics that participants within a negotiation use to change or affect the process influence structural power. The time delay tactic on its own, influences to some certain degree, the stronger states to make hasty and erroneous decisions that entrap them (Galín, 2015: 145). From the stronger party perspective, ceding to the time delay tactics gives them hope that a resolution could be reached eventually if they continue with the negotiations. Faced with a time pressure, opponents may be forced to reduce their expectations and make significant concessions in order to reach an agreement, which probably would be sub-optimal for them (Galín, 2015: 147).

Meerts (2003: 186) asserts that “in entrapment, the initiating party deliberately steers itself into self-inflicted entrapment in order to force an outcome that it believes is necessary.” The weaker party that uses the time delay tactic to entrap the other parties might also use the tactic knowing that it would be affected by the entrapment. It can be argued that self-inflicted entrapment that a weaker party might end up in is a demonstration that weaker parties in negotiation are willing to self-harm if it means the

outcome of a negotiation will not be in the stronger party's favor. When weaker parties that really want a resolution from a negotiation, consider using tactics that could entrap them, they should consider the effects that entrapment could have on them gaining an outcome favorable to their goals.

2.7 Framework of the study

The framework is the structure that shall help the study approach the topic in question. Galin (2015: 146) identifies five stages in which the time delay tactics can be identified in international negotiations. Slowing down the negotiation as much as possible; avoiding reaching a final agreement; beating about the bush to prolong the negotiation; dragging out the negotiation process until some external or internal change occurs and exhausting opponents until they are ready to concede are the points identified by Galin (2015). The elements identified by Galin as synonymous to time delay shall be used to illustrate how North Korea used the tactic from Round Four of the Six-Party Talks. These elements of time delay tactic illustrate how the tactic has the potential to frustrate the negotiations from reaching an agreement if the party that is using it is not pleased with the path the negotiations might be taking. The use of the time delay tactics is a demonstration of how a structurally weaker party might not have the intention to reach an agreement with its stronger counterparts hence it engages in a negotiation strategy that impedes the negotiation process. However, Galin (2015) does not make a clear distinction, on the effects following such a path might have on the weaker state that might use the negotiation tactic.

2.7.1 Slowing down the negotiation as much as possible

The study will highlight how a weaker state can slow down the negotiation as much as possible to affect the process. The slowing down of negotiations could be an attempt to make sure that the other parties, mostly the strong party, start to make rash decisions that favor the weak party's positions on the matter that is being negotiated (Galín, 2015:

144). The weak party tries to strain the alliance that the strong party has in the negotiations, and the strain in the alliance helps the negotiations to stall. It can be argued that, when negotiations start, the strong party hopes for a resolution at the end of the negotiations but this might not necessarily be what drives or motivates the weak party. The weak party hopes to get as much as it can from a process that it does not necessarily want to see a resolution being reached particularly in nuclear negotiations. During the time that the negotiations would be stopped because of the time delay tactic, the weak party escalates tensions (Spangler, 2003). This could be a strategy to show the stronger party that if it does not concede there will be an escalation. The dynamics and motivations could be different in other international negotiations as compared to nuclear negotiations.

2.7.2 Avoiding reaching a final agreement

The next step that a weak party would take is to avoid reaching an agreement. Avoiding reaching an agreement could be done in many ways, for example, a weak party would threaten to leave a negotiation, try to manipulate the parties until they concede to its demands or even go to an extent of walking out of the negotiations (Galín, 2015: 146). The weaker party could raise unrelated issues to the negotiation, in order to distract the parties from focusing on the real issue on the agenda. On the other hand, unrelated issues are meant to drag the negotiation as much as possible so that the other parties get frustrated with the negotiation process. There are also consequences in avoiding reaching an agreement.

2.7.3 Beating about the bush to prolong the negotiation

A party that adopts the time delay tactic is arguably using a false pretense negotiation strategy (Galín, 2015: 146). Therefore, beating about the bush would be a strategy that it upholds to maintain its pretense negotiation strategy. This study will investigate whether the party that was using the time delay tactic was beating about the bush to stall the negotiations. Various ways in which the party beats about the bush is illustrated to understand how beating about the bush could be detrimental for international negotiations.

2.7.4 Dragging out the negotiation process until some external or internal change occurs

Time delay tactic is meant to change the balance in international negotiations (Galín, 2015: 146). Therefore, parties that use the tactic hope that they would affect the negotiations. To some extent, this undermines diplomacy because the party would be trying to undermine the diplomatic negotiations. In the case of the Six-Party Talks, the weaker party wanted to get concessions from the other parties even though it did not want to offer its own concessions in reciprocation. The internal or external change that the party using the tactic would hope for is the failure of the strong party to focus on issues that can lead to a resolution (Spangler, 2003). As a result of the time delay tactic, the negotiation would have many rounds and many breaks between rounds of negotiations.

2.7.5 Exhausting opponents until they are ready to concede

A weak party threatens to leave the negotiations if its demands are not met (Galín, 2015). The other parties continue being dragged along by the weaker party because they hope to achieve a settlement or resolution. However, exhaustion of an opponent shall be shown by analyzing how North Korea, in every round resorted to the same strategies of bringing up unrelated issues and refusing to concede in a manner that would facilitate the negotiations into moving forward. It can be argued that when opponents become exhausted, that is when they start making decisions that entrap them.

2.8 Conclusion

The concepts of time delay and entrapment illustrate how structure can be undermined in international negotiations. Power, in international negotiations, becomes how one actor can influence the other. However, Holsti (1964: 179) points out that the concept of power presents a challenge because the concept remains ambiguous (Holsti, 1964:

179). The concept mainly presents a challenge when the negotiation structure is taken into consideration. The most commonly held assumption is that power emanates from a country's military forces or military capability. Such a premise ignores power as a means to an end. If structural power seems unmovable or deterministic, then it explains why weaker states use tactics that undermine it. The only way that weaker states could overcome structural impediments in international negotiation is if they use tactics against their powerful counterparts to balance the negotiation playing field. If power is considered the act or acts that state A commits toward another state B so that it pursues a course of behavior in accordance with state, A's wishes (Holsti, 1964: 180). Then tactics should fall in the realm of an act that forces states to act in a manner that they would have acted had the tactic not been used. In other words, tactics are a manifestation of power because they influence other states to do certain acts that favor the agenda of the state using the tactic.

Meerts (2005: 114) suggests that the essence of entrapment is that, even though one or more of the parties may not like the agreement they seem to be moving toward, they find it extremely difficult to extricate themselves from the process. The parties in a negotiation are motivated by reaching an agreement, which forces them to overlook tactics that might be used to derail the negotiation or entrap them. Therefore, participants in a negotiation should know that the outcome of the negotiation could favor either party, and power capabilities should not be used as a litmus to test who might get a favorable outcome. A negotiator may convince his opponent to change his behavior without actually altering the opponent's outcomes. If the opponent knows that the negotiator possesses the power to affect his outcomes, he is going to be responsive to suggestions from the negotiator (Gruder, 1970: 132).

The weak party's ability to affect the outcome of the negotiations with time delay tactics illustrates that an outcome of a negotiation does not always favor powerful states. The negotiation might end up failing to resolve the issue due to the constant time delays that are meant to frustrate reaching an agreement. Thus, Bercovitch and Jackson (2009: 28) assert that even though negotiation is the most frequently preferred conflict resolution method, it often fails to produce a negotiated solution or political agreement. The

outcome of a negotiation cannot be predetermined by power structures. This could explain why Zartman and Faure (2005: 4) go on further to point out that engaging in a negotiation process does not imply the obligation to reach an agreement but rather the intention to aim at such a goal. However, the fourth to the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks illustrate how decision makers find themselves entrapped if one of the parties decides to use the time delay tactic as a means to get an upper hand in the negotiations. Through the escalation of commitment to continue with a negotiation process that is constantly delayed puts the parties in an untenable position where the weaker party gains control of the negotiation process. The analysis of the time delay tactics that were used during the course of the negotiation shall point out how North Korea manages to obtain its objectives by influencing the direction of the negotiations due to its ability to use tactics as a means to create a balance of structural power in a negotiation.

“The function of many international negotiations is to develop an explicit agreement for the allocation of benefits or costs.” – Ho-Won Jeong

CHAPTER THREE

Strategic foundation of the time delay tactics

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the study seeks to identify how time delay tactics or strategies are instrumental in framing the direction of a negotiation. The study argues that Round Four of the Six-Party Talks framed how the negotiations would move forward into the next rounds of negotiations. Different tactics or strategies are used to get certain outcomes favorable to the state using the tactic. Time delay strategies are used to resolve conflicts of interest; successful use leads to concessions by the opponent of the user (Gruder, 1970: 136). From the very first “breakthrough” of the Six-Party Talks, in 2005, when the parties made their first Joint Statement, it was illustrated that North Korea had been successful in getting concessions from the United States. According to (Zhongying, 2009: 6) all the parties including the DPRK agreed on a common objective—a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, even though a day later North Korea backtracked from the Joint Statement because it wanted light water reactors (LWRs). This illustrates how North Korea was able to use time delay tactics as an effective tool to make up for the power deficiency they had when negotiating with a superpower like the US Gruder (1970: 136) cements this view by pointing out that power deficiencies may even be overcome by intelligent use of strategies. This study will explore whether North Korea used delaying tactics to manipulate the outcome of the Six-Party Talks.

For the time delay tactic to work, North Korea had to slow down the negotiations as much as it could so that it could continue advancing its nuclear capability. A delayed negotiation frustrated both the United States and the ROK alliance, which resulted in the alliance taking split decisions on North Korea (Lee, 2005: 2). In this Chapter, the successful use of the time delay tactic is illustrated by the concessions that North Korea

received from the alliance in a bid to coerce it back into the negotiation. However, there were also certain factors like South Korea's Sunshine Policy that played into North Korea's strategy to weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance. Even though the Sunshine Policy was implemented by South Korea before the Six-Party Talks, the decisions that South Korea took during Round Four were, arguably influenced by the Policy. Elements such as the Sunshine Policy, Operational Plan (OPLAN) shall be applied to analyze the argument in this chapter.

3.1.1 *Background information*

The 2003, Trilateral Talks between the United States, North Korea and China were held to resume the diplomatic talks between the US and North Korea which had stalled three years earlier, following the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US as well as North Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (Grzelczyk, 2009: 99). The Trilateral Talks were the start of the Six-Party Talks before Russia and South Korea was invited to the negotiations. The Beijing Trilateral talks created the environment conducive to lay the groundwork for the start of the Six-Party Talks. However, the decisions that were taken during the Trilateral Talks had a lasting impact on the last three rounds of the Six-Party Talks. The Trilateral negotiations influenced the creation of a more comfortable framework of negotiations that included the United States, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, China, Russia, and Japan as a logical extension of the Trilateral negotiations (Grzelczyk, 2009: 99). The study can argue that South Korea's role in the Six-Party Talks although understandable due to its proximity to North Korea, was very instrumental in aiding North Korea to pursue with their nuclear program because of North Korea's ability to manipulate the ROK-U.S. alliance.

The initial North Korean position during the first round of talks in August 2003, called for a normalization of relations and a non-aggression pact with the United States, without which, Pyongyang maintained, a dismantling of its nuclear program would be out of the question (Liang, 2012: 1). Even though the DPRK made it known at the start of the

negotiations that it would not be willing to denuclearize, the parties to the Six-Party Talks continued with the process even though the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program was the main reason the Six-Party Talks process had started. North Korea's position on the issue of dismantling its nuclear program should have been questioned because if it did not want to stop pursuing its nuclear program, the purpose of the negotiation process would have been defeated. This could explain why Mishra (2006: 85) argues that the consensus that was reached from 27 to 29 August 2003 invited many interpretations because, in contrast to North Korea's position, the US insisted on a CVID of the North Korean nuclear program in a verifiable and irreversible manner.

In the second round of negotiations held on 25 February 2004, the U.S. stuck to its hardline position of not agreeing to detailed negotiations as long as Pyongyang did not commit to CVID (Grzelczyk, 2009: 102). The issue of CVID became a defining concept throughout the negotiations and the study will explore how Pyongyang was willing to use tactics that would entrap the U.S. into taking decisions that did not illustrate its once held position of complete disarmament. North Korea aimed to utilize the differences between the American insistence on non-proliferation and the concerns of South Korea. The concerns were focused on regional stability with North Korea and perceived the American unwillingness to hold serious bilateral talks with North Korea as a primary obstacle to resolving the crisis (Snyder, 2007: 54). North Korea from the onset of the negotiations was looking for a way that it could put a strain on the United States-South Korea alliance. One can argue that the alliance, due to its different views on how to handle the North Korean nuclear threat, it was already vulnerable to being manipulated by North Korea. This cements Park (2005: 86)'s assertion that Pyongyang has been known of its ability to exploit differences among negotiation counterparts. As the study progresses, it shall be made clear how inviting South Korea (which favored a more restrained engagement with Pyongyang) into the Six-Party Talks put the United States in a position of vulnerability

The third round of the Six-Party Talks made modest progress, mainly because the United States became more flexible and realistic in dealing with the North Korean

nuclear issue (Kwak, 2004: 42). It can be inferred that the third round was considered to have some progress because the US was making concessions that were favorable to North Korean positions, a move that could have made North Korea realize that the United States could be swayed into taking positions that would lead to failure to stop its nuclear program. Thus, Jeong (2016: 152) argues that modification in another negotiator's behavior triggers a change in the perceptions of their counterpart that, in turn, is likely to reset the former's bargaining position. By being more flexible during the third round of the negotiations, the US proved to North Korea that it could be pressured into giving concessions that were agreeable to the DPRK. Even though a Joint Statement was not issued during the third round, a Chairman's Statement was agreed on while key issues remained unresolved (Kwak, 2004: 47). The lack of substantial success during the third round forced parties to meet for more rounds.

3.2 Slowing down the negotiations

Galín (2015: 144) highlights that the slowing down of negotiations could be an attempt to make sure that the other parties, mostly the strong party, start to make rash decisions that favor the weak party's positions on the matter that is being negotiated. Slowing down the negotiations as much possible is one of the five elements identified in the analytical framework. Before Round Four had started, North Korea had backtracked from all agreements and common understandings that had been agreed upon in the prior round because of what it characterized as verbal attacks that were made by George W. Bush (Grzelczyk, 2009: 104). The verbal attacks from George W. Bush strengthened North Korea's resolve to slow down the negotiation by using any excuse it could get to delay the negotiation process.

It can be argued that North Korea was laying down the groundwork on how Round Four would continue. The time delay tactics that it used during the fourth round were informed by its earlier decision when it backtracked from the agreements made in the third round. Lewicki, Saunders, and Barry (2015: 114) point out that the first step in developing and executing a negotiation strategy is to determine one's goals.

Negotiators must anticipate what goals they want to achieve in a negotiation and focus on how to achieve those goals, for example, shaping the agenda or simply having a voice at the table. By giving George W. Bush's verbal attacks, as an excuse, Pyongyang was laying down the groundwork of how it would conduct further rounds, especially when it came to how it was willing to use any means not directly related to the negotiations to delay the negotiation process. North Korea's decision to backtrack from negotiations was done so that it could blame the US for lack of progress in the negotiations and this would isolate the United States from South Korea, which wanted a soft line approach on North Korea. Thus, Pritchard (2007: 114) argues that by the fourth round the United States found itself isolated from its four allies and friends on the issue of the DPRK's right to peace-oriented nuclear technology.

The South Korean Unification Minister visited Pyongyang and pledged a package deal for North Korea if it resumed the fourth round (Mishra, 2006: 86). Although it could be argued that offering gestures of goodwill is part of the negotiation process, in the context of negotiating with North Korea such an act gives more power to North Korea, as it is always trying to gain much even though it offers little. Based on past interactions in negotiations between South Korea and North Korea, South Korea's appeasement of North Korea has not acquired the desired reaction from Pyongyang (Mishra, 2006: 86). North Korea has acquired a penchant of gaining concessions or being awarded for its bad behavior due to the time delay tactics that it employed during the negotiation. Therefore, South Korea's move to coerce North Korea into returning to the negotiating table cements Flake's (2005) argument that South Korea's advocacy on North Korea's behalf, and in particular its repeated, vocal insistence that coercive measures or force are not an option, might actually increase the likelihood of further North Korean provocations. Therefore, South Korea's advocacy on behalf of North Korea is less likely to change North Korea's perceptions on South Korea or its alliance with Washington but could be used by North Korea to manipulate South Korea against the United States.

North Korea from the very onset, of what was to be the beginning of the fourth round, stated that it intended to wait for a restatement of the second Bush administration's policies before deciding on whether to attend the next round of talks (Liang, 2012: 3).

North Korea was referring to the Bush administration's assertion that North Korea was an "Axis of Evil". The Bush administration had asserted that North Korea was an "Axis of Evil" because of its rogue nuclear program and this was motivated by the Bush administration's assumption that rogue states like Iraq and North Korea were a threat to the United States. The hardline policies that the Bush administration had towards North Korea, gave North Korea reason to justify its slowing down of the negotiations as much as it could because they would leave and re-enter the negotiations based on issues that were, arguably indirectly related to Round Four. Ha and Chun (2010: 93) labels these such methods that North Korea used to exit and re-enter negotiations in a bid to slow down the negotiations as much as possible as, "exit and entry brinkmanship". They point out that exit brinkmanship, involves various extreme threats and bluffs when leaving the negotiating table and entry brinkmanship, referred to a kind of destructive behavior of North Korea similar to its exit brinkmanship (Ha & Chun, 2010: 93). North Korea's time delays during the negotiations were a strategy they used to avoid negotiating with the United States because they were at a disadvantage as a weaker party in the negotiations. Therefore, their source of strength came from their ability to delay the negotiation process. Thus, Zartman and Rubin (2005: 4) argue that expecting to lose; a weaker party would want to avoid negotiation with a stronger party at all costs; a stronger party would have no need to negotiate since it could simply take what it wants.

The study could also question whether there was a deliberate move by the US to ignore North Korea's negotiation slowing down efforts because North Korea deliberately made countless demands and threats to exit the negotiations if the demands were not addressed. By delaying the start of the fourth round through blaming Washington's actions, Pyongyang to a certain extent realized that if it blamed its failure to return to the fourth round, it could put a strain on its relationship with South Korea (Liang, 2012: 3). This action can further be described as what Zartman (1998: 34) coined as Pyongyang's ability to "divide and rule" a negotiation process. Thus, Snyder (1999: 146) describes the ability of North Korean negotiators to identify points of advantage to gain concessions in negotiations as very impressive. However, unlike Zartman and Rubin (2005) who point out that a strong party might not have the need to negotiate because

they can easily benefit from the negotiations due to their status, this was not the case in Round Four. The US wanted an agreement and North Korea's time delay strategy made it impossible for them to attain an agreement that would end the nuclear program. Not only did North Korea want to frustrate the alliance but it also hoped to blame one of the alliance members for the lack of progress in the negotiations even though most of the delays were instigated by North Korea.

Seoul and Washington's alliance has endured many obstacles, but when it comes to Pyongyang, the alliance has a different approach and splits within the alliance start showing at a time when the alliance should create a façade of a united front with one voice towards North Korea's tactics and nuclear proliferation program (Lee, 2005: 2). To a certain extent, Pyongyang has always recognized the vulnerabilities within the alliance and it uses those vulnerabilities to weaken the resolve of the partnership. If the partnership weakens, this gives North Korea an opportunity to play one partner against the other while also building its nuclear arsenal (Lee, 2005: 2). North Korea does not have to influence South Korea's decisions that are in contrast to the United States by showing goodwill towards Seoul; it has to show the United States as the party that seeks violence at the expense of dialogue.

One can argue that North Korea's delay tactics were mostly reactionary to events that would have taken place prior to the tactic being used. On 30 August, North Korea cited U.S.-ROK joint military drills as a reason for delaying the resumption of the fourth round but said they were willing to return to the negotiation table on 12 September (Grzelczyk, 2009: 105). It can be argued that Pyongyang was not going to make it easy for the process that was meant to dismantle their nuclear program and the reasons for delaying the fourth round cements Jeong's (2016: 111) argument that time delays could be adapted to induce an opponent's concessions. Delaying the resumption of the fourth round illustrated that North Korea had the power that the United States did not have over the negotiation process showing that tactics could be a source of power in nuclear negotiations. However, using the time delay tactic to get concessions from the United States was strategic because North Korea realized that if the United States wanted the negotiations to continue, they had to cede to the pressure of the time delay tactic. That

gives concessions to North Korea that were most likely in contrast to the concessions that the US would have wanted to be given to end the nuclear program.

North Korea had made it clear that it was not ready to give up its nuclear weapons program until the two Light-Water Reactors (LWRs), which were promised in the Nuclear Accord of 1994, were provided and it would be accepted that it has a legitimate right to peaceful use of nuclear energy (Mishra, 2006: 88-89). This cements Galin's (2015: 146) argument that time delays are also used when opponents are not ready to make significant concessions. Therefore, it can be argued that North Korea was not yet ready to give up its nuclear program even though it had agreed to the Six-Party Talks that were meant to dismantle the nuclear program. Zartman and Rubin (2005: 4) who argue that differences in power to make a difference in the way negotiations precede and the outcomes that result explain North Korea's time delay strategy. The intentions of North Korea should be questioned since nuclear disarmament was not part of its agenda based on its actions of dragging its feet when it came to discussing the nuclear issue, for instance, it was giving excuses on why it had a right to possess nuclear weapons. By giving preconditions on what it needed to get back to the negotiations, North Korea's rhetoric could also be labeled as backtracking from CVID (Liang, 2012: 3). It can be argued that North Korea realized that the US would want to start the process. Therefore, any preconditions that North Korea gave that could stop the time delay strategy would be accepted.

Furthermore, the United States would be entrapped if it accepted Pyongyang's precondition to resume the second phase of the fourth round. It has been noted above that, the US wanted CVID (Liang, 2012: 3). Therefore, it was not in their interests to reverse the course of the negotiation by giving into North Korea demands. Despite his closeness with Christopher Hill, Song Min-Soon, South Korea's chief envoy to the negotiations, blamed the United States for making it hard to reach an agreement at the negotiations by arguing that, "North Korea should have access to peaceful nuclear energy", thereby creating a rift between Seoul and Washington (Grzelczyk, 2009: 105). South Korea was playing into North Korea's tactics, which were straining the ROK-U.S. alliance. Thus, it is important for the study to look at how South Korea's policies played

a role in North Korea's time delay tactic and the strain between the U.S.-ROK alliance. As a result, it should be noted that the United States' ability to control the negotiations had deteriorated and went against the popular assumption held by Zartman and Rubin (2005: 4). Who argue that more powerful parties in a negotiation are better able to control the negotiation process and obtain results to their liking because negotiations only confirm a given power distribution.

When analyzing North Korea's actions and the results during negotiations, it can be argued that, during the Six-Party Talks, not only was Kim Jong-il, a rational actor, he was the most rational actor compared to his counterparts in the negotiations. For one, the North's strategy and tactics appear to have worked (Cossa, 2012: 28). Not only was North Korea making sure that the negotiations would be on its own terms but it was making sure that it dictated the time in which a round of talks could begin, and this could have facilitated in limiting the options of the US. The resumption of the fourth round going into the second phase of the fourth round which was meant to start on 29 August was repeatedly delayed (Grzelczyk, 2009: 104). It can be argued that to some extent North Korea wanted to frustrate the parties to the negotiations and wanted to see how further they were willing to be dragged in a negotiation that was continuously being delayed due to issues that North Korea considered unfair. By choosing to continue after every single set back, the parties enabled themselves to be entrapped in a negotiation that would be controlled by Pyongyang instead of the US.

3.3 Avoiding reaching an agreement

There were certain factors that Pyongyang used to avoid to reach an agreement while putting a strain on the U.S.-ROK alliance. Avoiding reaching an agreement is identified as one of the five elements mentions by Galin (2015) as a sign that demonstrates that a party is using the time delay tactics. The Engagement Policy and Operational Plan (OPLAN) are some of the factors identified in this section, that were implicitly used by North Korea in creating an environment conducive enough for Pyongyang to carry out the strategy that it followed during the fourth round and throughout the whole Six-Party

Talks negotiations. The Engagement Policy was also, one of the instruments independent of the Six-Party Talks, which North Korea used to affect the U.S.-ROK alliance. The Sunshine Policy played into North Korea's motives to weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance even though the Policy had been implemented before the start of the Six-Party Talks negotiations. Lee (2005: 2) notes that the U.S.-ROK alliance has served as an effective security framework to deter North Korean aggression. During Round Four, the alliance was at a crossroads due to the increasing perception gap between the United States and South Korea about threats from North Korea, and policy divergence between the two governments that produced tension, fissure, and mutual distrust between the two allies (Lee, 2005: 2). Domestic policies from the U.S. and South Korea were easily used by North Korea to play one ally against the other. It can be argued that the strain in relations of the U.S.-ROK alliance due to different factors uplifted the role of the DPRK during the fourth round. The Engagement Policy could lay the foundation in understanding why the South decided to isolate from Washington in favor of Pyongyang. Playing one ally against the other increased Pyongyang's ability to create an environment conducive for entrapment.

When a weaker party creates division in an alliance by its use of tactics, it illustrates that the weaker party can influence how the other parties act in the international negotiation (Lee, 2005: 6). The weak party would only be acting in its own self-interest to make sure that the stronger party does not have an advantage in the negotiations. The strong actor invites an alliance member because it also wants to safeguard its interests in the negotiations by jointly giving pressure to the strong party (Snyder, 1999: 130). This raises the question of why the stronger party needs an alliance member to form a coalition against a weaker party if the structure of the negotiation already favors the strong actor. Therefore, each party no matter its power status attempts to outdo the other party, this could be done by inviting an alliance member to a negotiation, or it could be done by using tactics. Whichever strategy a state actor adopts serves to cement the assertions assumed by realist theories that a state will always want to increase its advantages against its counterparts (Waltz, 1979: 100). Therefore, if the Six-Party Talks are taken into context, North Korea had to use tactics to gain some level of power over the United States or the U.S.-ROK alliance and the other participants

within the negotiations. Its power standing, without tactics, could not have matched that of the other participating parties. Thus, Hampson and Hart (1999: 345) point out that negotiating strategies and tactics, and formulas are directed at and related to the process of building coalitions.

3.3.1 *Engagement policy / Sunshine policy* (화해협력정책)

South Korea's policies towards North Korea were to some extent influential in how it dealt with North Korea during the negotiations and how its conduct threatened its old alliance with the United States. The Sunshine Policy played into North Korea's strategy to weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance with its use of the time delay tactics. Christopher Hill who was part of the United States delegation to the Six-Party Talks stated that "The Washington-Seoul alliance seemed as if it would not last another decade even though South Korea's alliance with the United States had allowed it to punch above its weight and gain notice in the entire region" (Hill, 2013: 11). The Sunshine Policy motivated North Korea to falsely align with North Korea against the US because North Korea realized how the policy would encourage South Korea to leave the United States (an alliance member) in favor of fulfilling its domestic policy. Through these policies, Pyongyang knew how it could manipulate South Korea to the detriment of its alliance with Washington. Thus, it is important for this study to illustrate how some policies that South Korea has towards the North could have easily made it possible for DPRK to strain relations between Seoul and Washington. It can be argued that North Korea used the time delay tactic and blamed the lack of progress on the United States with the knowledge that its moves would create a rift between South Korea and Washington. Differing North Korean approaches in dealing with the US and South Korea, and differing tactical and strategic considerations between the United States and South Korea following the end of the Cold War, have made the policy coordination task between Washington and Seoul more difficult as both capitals have attempted to calibrate their respective policies toward North Korea (Snyder, 1999: 146).

President Roh Moo-hyun made continuing the Sunshine Policy the cornerstone of his campaign platform and his rival, the archconservative Lee Hoi-chang, essentially aligned himself with the United States' approach (Park, 2005: 80). It should be noted that the Seoul-Washington relationship was already strained to a certain extent due to the Sunshine Policy. Washington made sure that it supported Lee Hoi-chang because he was more aligned with their policies on North Korea instead of Roh Moo-hyun. However, going into the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks, North Korea only had to strengthen the strain by making sure that it had to blame the failure of the negotiations to move forward because of the United States (Park, 2005: 80). By casting the United States as the enemy during its stalling tactics, North Korea was sowing the seeds that would affect the relationship between Seoul and Washington. For the United States, the purpose of South Korea in the negotiations was defeated because it was aligned with North Korea instead of forcefully being against North Korea. It can be argued that South Korea had been invited to join the Six-Party Talks by Washington so that it could have an ally in the negotiations that would side with them and not an ally that would side with an enemy. Therefore, the invitation of an alliance member to join a negotiation might affect the alliance because the alliance might have different opinions on how they should handle a party that they consider an adversary.

For a long time, political leaders in Seoul and Washington have had little reason to disagree about how to manage relations with Pyongyang until President Roh Moo-hyun, started to focus on developing inter-Korean relations and the institutionalization of peaceful coexistence, prepared plans for economic cooperation with the North as a partner in the eventual unification of the Korean Peninsula (Bae, 2010: 337). The Six-Party Talks negotiations opened room for South Korean domestic policies to affect its alliance with the United States. It can be argued that Roh Moo-hyun was bound to be influenced by the "Engagement Policy" during the negotiations. What the Roh Moo-hyun delegation to the negotiations underestimated, was how the Engagement Policy would play into North Korea's strategy to weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance, and how it would affect South Korea's alliance with the US. Pyongyang's use of the Engagement Policy for its own agenda illustrates how the Kim regime is very resourceful when it sees an opportunity that could give it an upper hand in a negotiation (Bae, 2010: 337). South

Korea on the other hand, because of the Engagement Policy, was susceptible to siding with North Korea instead of its ally the United States so that it could realize the purpose of its domestic policies towards North Korea. Therefore, it can be suggested that even though it might be strategic to invite an alliance member to a negotiation, it can also be the source of weakness. The Engagement Policy made it possible for North Korea's time delay tactics during Round Four to go unchecked because South Korea needed to maintain its engagement with North Korea instead of giving them pressure as the United States would have wanted.

During the fourth round, in 2005, President Roh publicly declared that Seoul might not side with the United States against North Korea (Kim, 2010: 124). The public declaration from the South Korean president illustrated how South Korea was prepared to jeopardize its alliance with the United States in favor of North Korea. The Roh administration's nostalgic perceptions of how there could be peace on the Korean Peninsula threatened the success of the Six-Party Talks (Kim, 2010: 124). The alliance had differing opinions on how to handle North Korea, which on its own made it harder to address how to move forward in a negotiation that North Korea was constantly delaying when the negotiations were not going its way. Thus, it was in North Korea's best interests to make sure that during the negotiations it had to affect the alliance between Seoul and Washington so that an agreement on its nuclear program would not be reached due to the uncoordinated policies between Washington and Seoul. It could further be argued that South Korea's stance towards its northern neighbor was an illustration that alliances will not always agree in negotiations, which might be a problem for the alliance. It should be noted that the Roh government's position on the North Korean nuclear crisis was far closer to that of China than that of the United States (Kim, 2010: 124).

Roh preferred to offer various economic benefits to the North if it would renounce its nuclear program, which could bring Pyongyang to the negotiating table and keep the Six-Party Talks moving forward with economic incentives (Bae, 2010: 338). The Engagement Policy was not only influencing a strain in ROK-U.S. relations, but it was also, a conduit that could create entrapment for the parties. Choosing to continue with

the negotiations even though North Korea was using the time delay tactic to continue with its nuclear program should not have been rewarded but the Roh administration's Engagement Policy could not foretell the ramifications of its policies to the negotiation process. The Roh administration's actions led to repeated clashes with Bush over how to proceed with the negotiations and in the first five months of 2005 and again from October 2006, these differences were especially pronounced, as Bush failed to convince Roh to apply the pressure he sought (Bae, 2010: 338). It can be argued that the strain in U.S.-ROK relations had begun to take shape, as South Korea remained more steadfast about engagement.

Mishra (2008: 88) notes that the Sunshine Policy did not ask for strict or short-term reciprocity in the ROK-DPRK relationship but provided various unilateral concessions to Pyongyang. Even though the policy was part of the government's liberal approach to engaging the North Korean regime in a more comprehensive manner, it was tipped in favor of North Korea because South Korea could not punish North Korea for delaying the negotiation process because such a move would conflict with 'engagement'. Arguably, the Engagement Policy was a source of vulnerability if the United States and South Korea wanted to dismantle North Korea's nuclear program because North Korea was using the policy to gain support from South Korea. However, Mishra (2008: 88) notes that South Korea looked upon North Korea's agreement to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable manner as a vindication of its policy of engagement vis-à-vis North Korea. The study can argue that amongst all the other pitfalls of South Korea's policy as an instrument that led to them being manipulated by North Korea, South Korea did not realize how the policy could hinder the success of the Six-Party Talks. Thus, Blumenthal (2005) argues that South Korea's failure to use coercion alongside persuasion shows how the ROK government is beholden to delusions born during the era of inter-Korean engagement under former president Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine Policy." Since the failure of the Agreed Framework, South Korea should have realized that North Korea is not prepared to uphold its end of the "engagement" bargain.

The Engagement Policy has been criticized for making unilateral concessions to the North without reciprocal gain, for failing to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, and

for compromising the South's national security posture (Bae & Moon, 2014: 16). It can be argued that going into the fourth round Seoul's Engagement Policy was its Achilles' heel because it was caught up between two parties (one it had an alliance with and the other it hoped to have cordial relations with) whom it wanted to please. However, its engagement with the North during the negotiations led to Seoul leading the US into giving Pyongyang concessions that made it possible for North Korea to entrap the United States. Thus, Cossa (2012: 28) argues that the behavior of North Korea during the Six-Party Talks could be equated to a "tail wagging a dog", or in this case, several dogs illustrating how Pyongyang has managed to survive for decades by playing hot and cold with the United States and South Korea. South Korea should have realized that North Korea was using them to affect the negotiation process and based on its actions or failure to reciprocate South Korea's engagement strategy, there was no hope that North Korea would become the reliable engagement partner that South Korea hoped it would be.

It should also be noted that the intentions of Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine Policy" should not be dismissed as only enabling North Korea to manipulate the alliance with the US. Govindasamy's (2005: 1) argument that for over half a century, South Korea's security has been tied to North Korea's political behavior, and this could explain why South Korean governments have strived for improving inter-Korean relations based upon concepts of reconciliation and cooperation. Thus, it could be argued that the interlinked relationship between the two Koreas makes it hard for South Korea to pursue an aggressive policy stance against their northern neighbor with whom they hope to be amicable with. However, Pyongyang has not been willing to meet South Korea's concerted efforts to bring peace to the Korean peninsula because it continues manipulating the policies with a hidden agenda.

In the Bush administration's view, the link between South Korea's engagement and denuclearization efforts toward North Korea was not as strong as it should have been (Schneider, 2010: 93). Despite South Korea's Song Min-soon's (chief envoy to the talks) close ties with Christopher Hill, he was caught between trying to strike a balance that would not jeopardize its relations with the US and its potential reunification with North

Korea. Thus Song Min-soon blamed the US as much as North Korea for making it difficult to reach an agreement during the fourth round (Grzelczyk, 2009: 105). However, South Korea's approach towards North Korea left the US in an isolated place because Seoul's Engagement Policy seemed to have made them overlook how its northern neighbour was trying to keep its nuclear program running. It can be suggested that the United States' decision to form a coalition against North Korea with South Korea was miscalculated because of the historical ties between the two Koreas, which made it hard for South Korea to pursue a hard-line stance against its northern neighbor. The Roh government was daring in its diplomatic efforts of occasionally defying and changing the policy behavior of Washington, which is unprecedented in South Korea's diplomatic history (Moon, 2008: 102).

North Korea has manipulated differences between the United States and South Korea to gain advantage through seeking equivalency and reciprocity in its negotiations with the U.S. while engaging in zero-sum, one-upmanship tactics with South Korea (Snyder, 1999: 146). The Engagement Policy presented the right opportunity for differences between South Korea and the US to arise. This was mostly abetted by North Korea's negotiation strategy, which aimed to make sure that there would be no resolution to its nuclear program. However, South Korea's stance led the negotiation in the direction that Pyongyang wanted, a direction that would benefit North Korea. Thus, Snyder (1999: 146) argues that South Korea's Toughness Dilemma and tendency to respond to North Korea with its own brand of one-upmanship is likely to create a stalemate. On the other hand, Bae's (2010: 355) recommendation that, "regarding the North Korean policies and attitudes of the South, and the policy differences between the South and the United States, it follows that United States policymakers should take as their starting point for policy coordination with the South a realistic assessment of the changes in South Korean strategic thinking" could be applied to avoid any future differences between the allies on how to handle Pyongyang.

3.3.2 *Conflicting interests in the U.S.-ROK alliance*

It may be observed that the range of bargaining space is typically reduced dramatically in the case of multilateral negotiations since the agreement must serve the simultaneous interests of many parties, not just two (Hopmann, 1996: 249). During the fourth round of the negotiations, there was bound to be conflicting interests between Washington and Seoul on how to handle North Korea mostly because of how both parties had different expectations for the negotiation process. This is why the time delay tactics had a different response from South Korea and the US. The study can argue that when an alliance enters into a joint negotiation with a party, they have differing opinions on and attachments to; the negotiation environment becomes more fragile to the influence of outside sources that have an ulterior motive. Although parties had an idea of what needed to be achieved, the sequence and manner in which they sought to meet these objectives distracted from any progress (Park, 2005: 75). Washington's inclusion of Seoul only made it possible for the groundwork to be formed in which North Korea could utilize their differing interests to suit its own agenda in regards to the nuclear program. Even though the U.S.-ROK alliance's participation together in the Six-Party Talks was not explicitly to blame for the failure of the Six-Party Talks, the fourth round multilateral setting created an environment good enough for Pyongyang to entrap the United States by using Seoul indirectly. Thus, Vogelaar (2008: 49) asserts that the status of South Korea in the negotiations was both a privilege and a handicap.

The role of South Korea in the Six-Party Talks is largely debated as either being non-proactive or proactive (Lee, 2005: 22). South Korea's role in the negotiations influenced the outcome, directions and was eventually used by North Korea to affect the entire negotiation process. South Korea's actions of aligning with North Korea more than it should have, illustrated that actions during a negotiations matter and it is because of such actions that have a possibility of affecting the whole negotiation process. Thus, Jeong (2016: 12) points out that the central elements of a negotiation process are the actions of negotiators participating in the negotiations. Statements from and policies of the South Korean government that suggested that the Roh administration perceived the need to blunt or block United States pressure on the North had an underlying

implication that South Korea had more to fear from United States policy than from the misdeeds of the North (Flake 2005). However, South Korea miscalculated who the threat to any possible nuclear agreement was during the fourth round. The miscalculation led to North Korea to insist that it had a right to a nuclear arsenal and further put the security of the Korean Peninsula at risk. It can be argued further that it is best for parties to stick with their long-term alliances in negotiations instead of deciding to back parties that have been known to have a hostile policy against them.

The Roh administration's support for the Bush administration's DPRK policy decreased considerably, and the efforts by North Korea to weaken the alliance were becoming successful. The "special allied relationship" between the U.S. and the ROK was most threatened by a lack of agreement on the nature of the North Korean threat and on what constitutes an appropriate conflict management approach (Kim, 2010: 124). Events of Round Four made it clear that there were differing and competing opinions between Seoul and Washington on how to move further with the negotiations. It would have been impossible for Seoul and Washington to dismantle North Korea's nuclear program because they did not have one cohesive voice. The time delay tactic only made the division between the two allies more visible. On 12 September 2005, South Korea asserted that North Korea did not specifically call for a provision regarding light water reactors during the talks, but that Pyongyang stated that it wanted to have access to peaceful nuclear activities (Grzelczyk, 2009: 105). It should be noted that South Korea agreeing to the provisions of allowing North Korea to have a light water reactor even though the United States advocated for CVID was a clear sign that the Roh administration was willing to side with North Korea at the expense of its alliance with Washington. South Korea by offering to concede light water nuclear reactors to Pyongyang enabled the DPRK to feel comfortable in pursuing stalling tactics. Thus Cossa (2008: 1) describes the U.S.-ROK relationship during the Six-Party Talks as a "Same Bed, Different Dreams" because of their increasingly different priorities and perceptions.

There was increasingly less accord between South Korea and the United States in dealing with North Korea: The United States viewed the nuclear problem through post-

September 11 lenses while South Korea viewed it through summit reconciliation lenses (Cha, 2004: 139). The study can infer that for the US, the DPRK was a hostile actor whilst for South Korea it was the means to the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, both parties had different ways of dealing with the DPRK, which could have widened their differing views on Pyongyang. On September 20, 2005, the U.S. Department of Treasury blacklisted the Banco Delta Asia (BDA), but South Korea continued sustaining economic engagement with Pyongyang (Moon, 2008: 92 & Cho, 2016: 107). It can be argued that South Korea did not want to be aggressive with North Korea, but it was willing to go against its closest ally because it did not want to upset a part of Korea that it wanted to unite with. Thus, Park (2005: 75) argues that despite extensive diplomatic efforts to facilitate and host the Six-Party Talks, differing priorities, and conflicting historical analogies among each of the countries brought vastly differing perspectives to the multilateral negotiating table.

Moon (2008: 92) asserts North Korea declared that it would not attend the negotiations due to the U.S' "hostile policy." Based on Moon's assertion it can be argued that North Korea was blaming the US for its own stalling the negotiation process tactic. Habeeb (1988: 143) notes, "The principal lesson for the weak state is that despite its weakness it may still achieve many, even most, of its objectives but to succeed, it must be aware of its strengths and advantages." This move by North Korea to blame the United States cemented North Korea's advantage of blaming the failure of progress or time delay on the US, knowing full well that ROK would not take kindly to a slow negotiation process that could hamper any progress to the nuclear talks. On the other hand, North Korea realized that the lack of progress in the negotiations from its time delay tactic would create division in the U.S.-ROK alliance and weaken the alliance's resolve to solve the nuclear dilemma as a coalition. This isolation forced the United States to accept the September 2005 Joint Statement that allowed the DPRK eventual access to such technology such as the light water reactors (LWRs) (Pritchard, 2007: 114). Therefore, North Korea's use of South Korea as a pawn to manipulate or influence the decisions of the United States was working in favor of its goal to put a strain on the alliance while also influencing the decisions of the United States. North Korea's success at being able to affect the decisions that the United States would take, was illustrated when, Pritchard

(2007) who was also part of the United States team to the talks argued that, “the unspecified point at which the DPRK will be allowed this technology gives the state a ‘false promise’. As the United States retains the right to determine when the DPRK had satisfied the arbitrary (and unspecified) goals to commence negotiations to allow the DPRK this technology.”

“Due to diverging perceptions of the principal threat, coordination problems regarding policies toward North Korea” and due to “a significant erosion of public support for the alliance among elites in both countries,” the U.S.-ROK alliance was on the verge of unraveling (Cho, 2016: 107). An unstable or rather a strained ROK-U.S. alliance arguably presented an opportunity for North Korea to control and frame the negotiation agenda. However, negotiators not only play with the other party’s representatives but also face internal constraints such as political or constituent pressure (Jeong, 2016: 13). This was not only detrimental to a successful fourth round, but it was detrimental to how alliances could be broken when they have diverging views on how to handle a matter in a negotiation. Further, it can be pointed out that the fourth round illustrated that getting into a negotiation with an alliance member might act against the alliance. It should be noted that, even though there was a clear strain in the U.S.-ROK alliance at the end of the fourth round, Christopher Hill argued that throughout the talks, the US appreciated the close cooperation and steadfast support of the Japanese and ROK allies and the trilateral consultations had allowed them to achieve progress (U.S. State Department, 2005).

Most South Koreans felt the US was sabotaging North-South interactions and they viewed Bush’s policy toward North Korea as “aggressive, even hostile, and unaccommodating to South Korea’s interests,” sparking anti-U.S. sentiment among the South Korean public. The then South Korean Foreign Minister even warned that if the U.S. were not more forthcoming during the Six-Party Talks, the South Korean government might not send troops to Iraq (Cho, 2016: 107). It can be argued that the Bush administration’s strategy of holding North Korea accountable during the fourth round was not an act of “sabotage” to a possible Korean unification. Gruder also implies

a similar possibility when he asserts that, the simplest strategy is to maintain one's bargaining demands, that is, not concede (Gruder, (1970: 131).

Blumenthal (2005) argues that Kim and his clan wanted to break the U.S.-ROK alliance and attain a nuclear arsenal so that they could achieve their national goals, which meant the negotiations had to fail to resolve the nuclear matter. It should be noted that, even though the United States was mainly blamed by North Korea for its own actions, South Korea was also used to justify why Pyongyang wanted to maintain a nuclear arsenal. South Korea had enriched uranium in 2000, and although Seoul had argued that it was developing experiments out of scientific curiosity, the experiments could still technically be considered a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) provisions. This led North Korea to accuse the United States of maintaining a double standard concerning the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula (Grzelczyk, 2009: 104). To some extent, North Korea used the relationship between South Korea and the United States to justify its own actions of refusing to commence negotiations or delay the process in order to get concessions out of the United States. One thing that was arguably consistent in the North Korean strategy, in its bid to strain the U.S.-ROK alliance during the fourth round, was its use of South Korea as a pawn to dismantle the relationship and to justify reasons why it was stalling the negotiation process. However, Blumenthal (2005) concludes that the talks had long been destined for failure due to North Korea's fascination with nuclear weapons.

While U.S.-South Korean working-level coordination and cooperation on, and particularly at, the Six-Party Talks was at an all-time low, South Korean President Roh and some of his political appointees' efforts to raise Seoul's foreign policy profile in the North Korean nuclear dispute came at the expense of United States policy (Lee, 2005: 2). In as much as it could be argued that South Korea's decision to overlook United States policy towards North Korea was influenced by South Korean policies, it should be noted that South Korea was taking the stand against the U.S. because of Pyongyang's efforts during the fourth round to discredit the United States intentions during the talks. Roh even went as far to state publicly that Pyongyang's nuclear weapons ambitions were "understandable considering the environment they live in,"

thus implicitly blaming confrontational US policies for the nuclear standoff while backing Pyongyang (Lee, 2005: 2). The study can argue that the time delay tactic that the DPRK was using was having a tremendous effect on the ROK-U.S. alliance, North Korea only had to sow the seeds that showed that they wanted nuclear power for peaceful purposes (Light Water Reactor) so that South Korea could act as its advocate to the United States.

The decision of the Blue House and national level Korean leaders not to publicly voice the same concerns left the United States on its own without an ally within the negotiations and painted the United States as overly hawkish and aggressive (Flake, 2005). Going further, the relationship between the United States and South Korea would suffer due to their differences on North Korea. It can also be suggested that the alliances' differences which came about because of North Korea's tactics could be argued as a contributing factor to the Six-Party Talks process ending in entrapment. Both the United States and South Korea by consistently failing to be amicable on how to handle North Korea could have facilitated in limiting their options as an alliance, which could have been seen as a weakness by Pyongyang to take advantage of. Thus, Habeeb (1988: 133) argues that a weak state does not possess the aggregate structural power resources. Therefore, it must rely on tactics whose effectiveness and credibility derive from other sources, for example, coalition building based on the ability to find allies and persuade them to join their case; and threats of disruption based on commitment; and threats to veto negotiations, based on the nature of the negotiation process (Habeeb, 1988: 133).

3.3.3 *Operational Plan (OPLAN)*

There are also other factors such as the Operational Plan (OPLAN) 5029, which need to be investigated to find out how they affected the U.S.-ROK relationship concerning North Korea. It should be noted that the study still maintains that even though North Korea did not strain the U.S.-ROK alliance on its own, it took advantage of certain agreements between Washington and Seoul to strain the alliance. Roh's National

Security Council rejected OPLAN 5029 in January 2005, warning that it might constrain South Korean sovereignty because they did not want the US. Army to make the sole military decisions against the North (Bae, 2010: 337-338). It can be argued that the main reason South Korea rejected OPLAN was that they felt it would not fall in line with their engagement policy with North Korea. OPLAN presented a threat to everything (non-hostile relations with Pyongyang) that the Roh administration hoped to achieve with the negotiations. To some extent, even though it might not have been direct; it should be noted that the myriad of policies (OPLAN and Sunshine Policy) that South Korea had or did not agree to when it came to North Korea played a crucial role in how North Korea acted during the fourth round and the ones that followed.

Roh stated his views to Bush at a summit in June 2005, making it clear that South Korea insisted on keeping the initiative in any military operation on North Korean territory (Bae, 2010: 337-338). To a certain degree, South Korea's attitude of failure to agree to initiatives that were hardline towards North Korea made North Korea more powerful in resisting talks; delaying talks and walking back from previous agreements because they realized that South Korea, a United States ally, did not approve of aggressiveness towards them. Thus, Rozman (2010: 145) argues that hard evidence revealed that there was a strain during the Six-Party Talks between the United States and South Korea by differences over how to deal with the North, damaging not only coordination in the Six-Party Talks but also three-way alliance building among the United States, Republic of Korea, and Japan. The United States could not respond to North Korea's nuclear test because South Korea opposed the OPLAN. South Korea's stance influenced the United States to continue with the negotiations instead of seeking a hardline reaction to North Korea's time delay tactics or possible future nuclear tests. It can be argued that opting to continue with negotiations into Round Five, even though the North had made it certain that it would not agree to any resolution that did not accommodate its nuclear ambitions, might have created an environment conducive for the US to be entrapped in the negotiations.

3.4 Dragging out the negotiation process until some external or internal change occurs

To delay the negotiations North Korea followed what Galin (2015: 146) points out as a characteristic of time delay- dragging out the negotiations until some external or internal change occurs. Pyongyang dragged reaching an agreement by citing unrelated issues as a precondition for it to return to the negotiating table. In early February 2005, North Korea declared itself in possession of nuclear weapons and said it would not attend future Six-Party Talks and accused the United States of attempting to overthrow its government while referring to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's statement in her confirmation hearing that North Korea was an "outpost of tyranny" (Liang, 2012: 2-3). While North Korea was delaying the negotiation process, it was pursuing its nuclear program cementing O'Neill's (1991: 89) argument that, "delaying tactics have the same goal as escalatory moves, but they are passive – one side simply withholds negotiation or agreement." It could be argued that when they agreed to the Six-Party Talks process coming to the negotiation table was just to save face because the process did not stop it from pursuing its nuclear program. Galin (2015: 158) points out that using time delay tactics is risky because it might result in the initiator losing the object or objects around which the negotiation is centered. By using this tactic, Pyongyang demonstrated that it had not come to the negotiating table seeking a resolution to the nuclear program, but it was a deceiving tactic that was meant to show that they were willing to negotiate even though they did not want to seize on nuclear proliferation.

Roh and his aides permanently and publicly painted the picture that the Bush administration had been intent on attacking North Korea militarily and that only Seoul's intervention had changed US strategy and thus averted a second Korean War (Lee, 2005: 2). This was a consequence of North Korea's game of blaming the United States for its own misdeeds, for instance, its continuation with the nuclear program in February 2005. South Korea might have assumed that if it played the "good cop" towards North Korea, it would get the same treatment from the Kim regime. Instead of clearly siding with its long-term US ally, the South Korean government raised doubts about United States intelligence on North Korea, played down North Korea's nuclear weapons

development, and regularly interpreted Pyongyang's provocative behaviour in the most benign ways, lecturing Washington in public on the North (Lee, 2005: 2). It can be argued that the fourth round was showing signs of chaos and finger pointing which could have worked as an obstruction for the US and South Korea to notice that North Korea had been pursuing the nuclear program. The increasing chaos between the U.S.-ROK alliance had its foundation or roots in the time delay tactic that North Korea was using to strain the alliance.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the Roh administration's worries about the United States posing a threat to South Korean security could have been justifiable although arguably exaggerated. The George W. Bush administration's foreign policy was aggressive, and it led to the second nuclear crisis on the Peninsula, characterization of the Kim regime as part of the "Axis of Evil" (Mishra, 2008: 88) could not have helped the situation. In as much as the relations between South Korea and the United States were strained due to the tactics by North Korea, it could also be argued that the Bush administration's worldview might have given South Korea a reason to be wary in how the US could handle the Korean Peninsula nuclear debacle. Therefore, to some extent, the U.S.-ROK alliance was not strong enough because the parties viewed each other's policies on North Korea as a possible obstacle that could impede the other party's objectives on the Korean Peninsula.

Negotiators who use time delay tactics believe they can achieve benefits by dragging out the negotiation process until some external or internal change occurs (Galini, 2015: 146). The tactic is meant to affect the outcome of the negotiation or go as far as coercing the other parties to agree to an initiator's demands. The United States softened its opposition to a North Korean civil energy program (Liang, 2012). The study has illustrated that the United States initially opposed any agreement that did not facilitate for CVID. However, due to the time delay tactic, North Korea managed to get what it wanted from the negotiation process because of its ability used strategies to its own advantage. It can be argued that the United States fell into the trap that would eventually lead to it failing to obtain its own objectives or goals to the negotiations. However, the US agreeing to any sort of nuclear program for North Korea could be

explained by Suh (2013: 7) who notes that negotiations imply each side is willing to exchange something it has for something it wants, to achieve higher interests. In this regard, the United States had shown some level of tolerance towards North Korea's need for an LWR because it hoped it would achieve the military denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The United States did not get something in return from Pyongyang for softening its position on the nuclear issue, but it continued to shift positions in favor of the North Korean agenda. The United States engaged in lengthy bilateral discussions with the North Korean delegation, lifting prior restrictions prohibiting US negotiators from engaging the North Koreans directly (Liang, 2012: 5). Prior to the fourth round and the issuing of the Joint Statement the United States had maintained an unfavorable view to holding bilateral dialogue with North Korea but in the fourth round, this had changed. It can be argued that the bilateral meeting between North Korea and Washington was a consequence of the time delay tactic as well as South Korea's influence. Therefore, the participation of South Korea in the talks was having an impact on the decisions that the United States was taking. Some scholars like Zartman (2008: 1-2) also argue that the United States change in position could have been done as a means that could be described as "mutually satisfactory," so that both parties could have an interest in the outcome's durability. However, the United States' move did not result in an interest that was favorable to their non-proliferation agenda but only resulted in producing the opposite.

After the Joint Statement of 2005, North Korea made it clear that it was not ready to give up its nuclear weapons program until the two LWRs, which were promised in the Nuclear Accord of 1994, would be provided and it would be accepted that the North has legitimate right to peaceful use of nuclear energy (Mishra, 2008: 88-89). The Joint Statement was an agreement that was agreed among the six parties to reaffirm that the goal of the Six-Party Talks was the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner (Mishra, 2008: 88). By forwarding, a new proposition or demand for it to accept CVID North Korea was laying down the groundwork that would ensnare both the United States and South Korea. However, Jeong (2016: 12) notes that the

movement toward reaching an agreement is not always linear, as each party does not easily accept the other's initial offer and subsequent proposals. North Korea realized that if it delayed the negotiation process enough, possibly there would be more concessions from the United States since South Korea had managed to make the United States grant it concessions when it met with North Korea without the United States. The move by South Korea had shown North Korea that an alliance could be disrupted if certain conditions were created and North Korea was prepared to use this strategy to gain as many concessions as it could whilst stalling a possible nuclear agreement. Gruder (1970: 130) explains such a strategy as one that comes along after a party takes into account its goals in a negotiation of receiving a larger share of the outcomes than its opponent, which leads it to adopt a competitive strategy.

In his statement before the House International Relations Committee, Christopher Hill said that he did not think any of the parties were completely satisfied with the final product of the Joint Statement; because that was the way with consensus documents, on which all parties have to make compromises. The document allowed them to get to the implementation phase as quickly as possible so that they could move closer to the goal of denuclearization (U.S. Department of State, 2005). From the statement made by the Assistant Secretary, the United States like the DPRK was also not pleased with the final version of the Joint Statement. However, they accepted the statement so that they would not prolong the negotiation even though their compromises were not reciprocated by the DPRK, which decided to backtrack from the Joint Statement altogether. This could explain why Jeong (2016: 12) argues that the movement toward reaching agreement in negotiations is not always linear, as each party does not easily accept the other's initial offer and subsequent proposals.

By walking back from the Joint Statement without consequences, North Korea had developed a competitive edge in the negotiation process. One that left the United States with no alternatives, but to continue with the process with the hope of success. One can say Christopher Hill and his delegation should not have allowed North Korea to hold the procession of the negotiations if it could not get the light water reactor because their acceptance of any nuclear program could have been misinterpreted by North Korea to

mean that the United States would finally accept Pyongyang as a nuclear power. Trading concessions for getting something desired is, in part, the heart of a negotiation. The process can be less competitive if the interests are complementary, not overlapping (Jeong 2016: 4). In case of the fourth round, it should be noted that the US and the DPRK did not have the complementary interests when it came to the nuclear issue yet somehow the US was moving toward the possibility of accepting a North Korea in possession of nuclear capability for energy purposes.

Considering the direction in which the negotiation was going, Washington should have discontinued the negotiations the moment North Korea walked back on agreeing to dismantle its nuclear program in a verifiable manner after issuing the Joint Statement. CVID for the United States was what Jeong (2016: 9) identifies as an upper boundary a negotiator's aspiration point but failure to acquire CVID, the aspirational point should not have made the United States accept a light water reactor which a move that could be interpreted by Jeong (2016: 9) as the minimum outcome. It can be argued that the light water reactor or North Korea walking away from total dismantlement was not advantageous to the United States or even South Korea. North Koreans are predictable; their use of certain tactics is repetitive and disorienting to the United States (Snyder, 1999: ix). Therefore, the United States should have acknowledged that North Korea's use of the delay tactic was a calculated long strategy that would eventually lead to them walking away from any agreements. It should be noted that the United States gave North Korea an ultimatum of freezing some of North Korea's assets if there was no breakthrough when it came time to issue the Joint Statement (Grzelczyk, 2009: 105). The ultimatum could be translated as a way Washington was trying to stop North Korea from pursuing further delay to the negotiations even though the ultimatum did not have the effect of persuading North Korea to stick to the Joint Statement.

The United States chief negotiator, Christopher Hill, accepted that North Korea's threat to continue with its nuclear program was not helpful but remained optimistic that the U.S. would achieve its goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Mishra, 2006: 89). By using the time delay tactic, North Korea managed to hide its true intentions from the other parties until it was too late for the United States to escape the process.

North Korea manipulated South Korea (because when the Joint Statement was declared South Korea thought its engagement policy was vindicated vis-a-vis North Korea). South Korea went as far as isolating Washington in favor of the DPRK, and it found itself helping to put the United States in an increasingly difficult position because of its soft line approach towards the DPRK. South Korea's behavior as a pawn ensured that the process of nuclear proliferation could proceed with the unintended help of South Korea. It can be suggested that alliances should stay close because if they choose to support a party like North Korea that does not have the best of intentions, they would jeopardize their relationship for a party that does not have their best interests in the negotiations.

Seoul no longer feared allied abandonment of its own security interests in Washington's pursuit of a separate deal with Pyongyang, Seoul's main security dilemma centered on allied entrapment in the Bush administration's evil state strangulation strategy sucking South Korea into a military conflict escalation not of its own making (Kim, 2010: 124). South Korea's dilemma of allied entrapment by the Bush administration's North Korea policies stemmed from the uneasiness that Pyongyang had managed to create throughout the round of talks. It has been illustrated how North Korea was able to strain the U.S.-ROK alliance due to the time delay tactics and the same can be said about South Korea's fears of a possible security dilemma in the Korean peninsula. Negotiators typically employ the time delay tactic in order to inspire uneasiness and doubt in an opponent (Jensen, 2011). It can be argued that the United States and South Korea should have avoided North Korea's stalling tactic by recognizing how the negotiation was unfolding whilst weakening their alliance.

Spangler (2003) recommends that negotiations can be pushed forward toward an agreement by setting a deadline by which a decision must be reached, or the negotiations should be terminated. The fourth round of the negotiations did not have a set deadline or period on which the parties called follow. This presented North Korea with an opportunity to use such a loophole to its own advantage. However, putting a deadline to walk away from the talks could have also worked against the parties because Jeong (2016: 5) notes that in every negotiation the outcome or settlement

might be better than the alternative. It can further be pointed out that, the outcome of the Six-Party Talks did not save any benefits for both South Korea and Washington, therefore, walking away from the negotiations would have been better as compared to negotiating with a party that showed increasing signs that it was not willing to cooperate. Walking away was, also, on the other hand, becoming difficult because the negotiations were far underway to the extent that extrication would have been a sign of failure or weakness. On the other hand, the failure to end the negotiations is described by Grzelczyk (2009: 104) who argues that Washington wanted to change the format of the Six-Party Talks to allow time for extended negotiations without having a fixed set of days.

Modalities of the dismantling of the North Korean nuclear program were not discussed in the fourth round or even in the prior rounds (Mishra, 2006: 90). Even though Christopher Hill stated that “although the DPRK’s pledge to dismantle is unambiguous, the proof of its intent will, of course, be in the nature of its declaration of nuclear weapons and programs, and then in the speed with which it abandons them (U.S. State Department, 2005). The reason the negotiation had begun in the first place was for the dismantling the nuclear program, but there were no discussions on the matter on how it could be done. It can be argued that the failure to discuss the modalities was due to mainly three factors that have been discussed in this chapter, diverging interests between the U.S.-ROK alliance, North Korea’s use of the time delay tactic and the lack of organization within the Six-Party process. All factors led to the negotiation to lack in structure and could have created confusion on how to move forward. Thereby nuances on the issue of dismantlement could have been lost in trying to stop North Korea from delaying the negotiation or the U.S.-ROK trying to wither through their differences on how to handle the nuclear program. Questions should be asked on how the Six-Party Talks process got to Round Four with no substantial discussion on how to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program. Galin (2015: 146) argues that the risk in using time delays is losing the object/objects of desire at the center of the negotiation process, for example, a user can get concessions out of using the tactic, - exhausting the other parties and slowing down progress so that the parties cannot honor their commitments.

During the fourth round the failure to discuss the modalities of dismantling North Korea's nuclear program, illustrate how the parties had lost the purpose of why they had started the negotiations in the first place. As Galin (2015) points out, losing the objects of desire is a direct result or consequence of the time delay tactic. The Joint Statement of 19 September did not address how the dismantling would occur, but it should be noted that it did mention the nuclear issue. The Six Parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner (U.S. State Department, 2005). It can be argued that mentioning CVID and describing the manner it would be done failed to meet the modalities or nuances that give a backbone to the implementation of a policy. The study can go further to argue that living out the modalities could have created room for Pyongyang not only to delay the next round but to backtrack on its commitment of abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.

The difficulties encountered during the fourth round particularly North Korea's decision to backtrack from the Joint Statement, arose because parties had ulterior motives that fell beyond nuclear disarmament. Testifying before the House International Relations Committee, Christopher Hill went as far as arguing that his counterparts from all the other parties to the Six-Party Talks had stipulated in their own closing remarks that the signal achievement of the fourth round was the DPRK's commitment to undertake full denuclearization. His counterparts stressed that it was incumbent on the DPRK to abandon its nuclear status, return to the NPT and abide by IAEA safeguards (U.S. State Department, 2005). Based on his statement, to some extent, mentioning that it was incumbent on the DPRK to stop its proliferation program showed some skepticism from Christopher Hill that the DPRK would follow through. Vick (2012) finds that the process of negotiation on its own can be used to stall any agreement that could hinder the other party's ulterior motives. Therefore, agreeing to a negotiation or starting a negotiation should not be seen as the end of the stalling tactic but a possible continuation of the delay process because a party might want to hinder a resolution by pretending to negotiate.

The day after the Joint Statement was released North Korea said that it would not abandon its nuclear program until it received a light water reactor (Grzelczyk, 2009: 105). North Korea's move was calculated in that, it recognized that if it backtracked from the provisions in the Joint Statement, the negotiation would have to continue because the issue of nuclear armament would not have been solved and they would have introduced a new issue (the need for a light water reactor) to justify why the negotiations had to continue. Therefore, parties to a negotiation should be wary of negotiations that take too long to reach an agreement because stalling on finishing the negotiation is a time delay tactic in its own right. Besides negotiations with North Korea that could be on their own a stalling tactic, there are alternatives that the US could use. Strohmaier (2006: 4) argues that in the absence of negotiation, the United States should opt for a strategy of putting pressure on the DPRK and that strategy should include offensive measures to cause sufficient utility losses to the North Korean regime that it will return to either the negotiating table or collapse. It should be noted that past attempts at directing utility losses against the DPRK have not produced the required effect but have acted as a motivation behind the need to carry on with the nuclear program. Therefore, it would probably be a challenge to invoke utility losses that would force North Korea to the negotiating table or force it to abandon its nuclear program.

North Korea's failure to commit cemented the United States' view that North Korea was untrustworthy and statements by the Bush administration officials suggested that, since the stalemate following the Joint Statement, Washington no longer believed North Korea could be convinced to abandon its nuclear weapons program through incentives alone (Strohmaier, 2006: 5). It can be argued that the United States realized how it was impossible for them to get Pyongyang to agree to an agreement on disarmament but they chose to continue with the negotiation for two more rounds. Pushing forward with a process that was bound to fail to attain the desired result remains questionable, as signs were there following the reversal of the Joint Statement that going forward North Korea would not settle for any agreement that did not support the nuclear development issue. North Korea's decision to backtrack from the Joint Statement was an early sign that would have alarmed the parties that reaching an agreement would be hard. In the

fourth chapter, the study shall discuss the Bush administration's 2006 national security strategy to understand why they might have continued with the negotiations.

The party using the time delay during negotiations may put themselves under pressure (Galin, 2015: 59). The DPRK to some extent was putting itself under some pressure because they did not know how the other parties particularly the US would react from their use of the tactic. Therefore, the use of the tactic needed to be used in a manner that would not frustrate the US to the extent of it escalating the situation. North Korea had put itself under pressure to perform much better than they would have done if they were not using the tactic to affect the outcome of the negotiations. The DPRK's preliminary concession in agreeing to "word for word and action for action" made them alarmed and suspicious of any preliminary concessions after it had witnessed how Iraq had first been disarmed, only to be subsequently attacked by the United States (Ceuster, 2008: 29). Pyongyang felt that by agreeing to words for action they had given up a tool that could be used for further successive interruptions of the negotiations. Given that North Korea was aware of how the United States had reacted to the Iraq issue, it did not want to escalate the situation to the point of the United States disarming its nuclear program, as it had done in Iraq.

3.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, it is cemented that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was more of a wish rather than a goal of the Six-Party Talks. This conclusion is informed by Lewicki, Saunders, and Barry (2015: 114)'s argument that wishes are not goals, especially in negotiation. Wishes may be related to interests or needs that motivate goals, but they are not goals themselves. A wish is a fantasy, a hope that something might happen; a goal is specific, focused target that one can realistically develop a plan to achieve (Lewicki et al. 2015: 114). The fourth round did not go beyond proving that a success could be reached of denuclearizing the DPRK. This is based on actions and decisions that were taken by the parties during the negotiation. South Korea decided to isolate its strategy from that of the US, which was very detrimental in how the time delay

tactic would affect the alliance and outcome of the negotiations. It would have been best, had Seoul maintained close alignment with the US to avoid Pyongyang's strategies that were meant to create a rift between the alliances.

The outcome of the fourth round illustrates that when an alliance is not speaking with one voice, the weaker party can use their differences to sow seeds of discontent in the alliance to weaken the negotiation from negotiating a resolution. Jeong (2016: 22) argues that there are certain instances when the outcome for each participant relies on mutual decisions; an individual's success depends on the choices of others. In the case of the fourth round, there was a lack of cohesion between Seoul and Washington due to differing policies on how to handle the North Korea issue. North Korea's decision to backtrack from the 2005 Joint Statement illustrated that when there are no consequences or penalties given during a negotiation for parties who use tactics that are meant to stall the negotiation process. The room is created where participants feel at liberty to hold the diplomatic process and its participants at ransom to get concessions that it feels are owed to it.

Additionally, Strohmaier (2006: 3) argues that punitive measures might spiral the conflict in three ways. First, successive rounds of escalating tit-for-tat coercive measures can lead to open hostilities. Second, one of the two actors "concedes" and returns to the bargaining table to try to negotiate a settlement of the issue and thirdly, least likely both actors simultaneously yield with neither receiving a payoff (saving face) though both are spared the inevitable headlong drive to war. The United States using the punitive measure to coerce North Korea to get back to the negotiation table following its countless time delay tactics or backtracking from agreements could have escalated the situation. It can be argued that Strohmaier's (2006) second suggestion of continuing with the negotiation with the hope of getting to a settlement is the reason why the Six-Party Talks process ended up in entrapment. However, walking away from the negotiations could have been a better alternative since any attempt at progressing with the process was only met with pretense to settle the nuclear problem by the North Korean officials during the fourth round. Furthermore, it could be questioned whether the Bush administration really believed that North Korea would abandon its nuclear

weapons program for any incentives or concessions that did not include nuclear capability. North Korea's refusal to accept CVID and the United States' support for CVID deadlocked the negotiations and could have facilitated the failure of the Joint Statement to reverse North Korea's nuclear intentions. Deadlocked international negotiations risk prolonged uncertainty and, worse, the possible onset of hostilities (Spector, 2006: 273). Therefore, the groundwork for the nuclear test of 2006 had already started to take form from the moment the United States and North Korea could not reach an agreement on the process of CVID.

“The future rewards those who press on, but we will not engage in an endless process of negotiations.” – Barack Obama

CHAPTER FOUR

Time delay tactics and the first nuclear test during the 5TH round

4.1 Introduction

The fifth round of the Six-Party Talks was consequential for the Six-Party Talks process. It illustrated how Pyongyang was motivated to pursue its nuclear ambitions even though there were skeptics who thought the “hermit kingdom” did not possess the necessary resources to carry out a nuclear test. The round of talks began on November 9, 2005, and lasted three days (Liang, 2012: 3). In this chapter, the study continues with the analysis of the time delay tactic that made it possible for North Korea to test a nuclear weapon. A discussion on the strained alliance between Washington and Seoul also informs how Pyongyang was able to test fire a nuclear missile even though the Six-Party Talks were meant to put a stop to the nuclear program. The nuclear test of 2006 was an example of how successful the DPRK had managed to create an environment conducive for entrapment from the start of the Six-Party Talks going into the fifth round.

The first session of the fifth round, which was held from the 9th to the 11th November of 2005, the parties conducted serious, pragmatic and constructive discussions and put forward proposals on how to implement the Joint Statement of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2005). Pyongyang had withdrawn from the Joint Statement of the fourth round a day after it was issued and it was important for the parties to the Six-Party Talks to make sure that the Joint Statement would be implemented during the first phase of the fifth round. However, it can be argued that the parties particularly the US and South Korea maintained the character of the fourth round during the fifth, which raises the question why they thought Round Five would be any different from the previous round, which had failed to motivate North Korea to stick to the Joint Statement. Chief ROK delegate Song

Min-soon appealed all parties to have patience in nuclear talks. "The path is still 'open' for all sides to implement the joint statement through consultations." (Xinhua, 2005). To some extent, the Chief Republic of Korea delegate recognized that the time delay that had overshadowed progress during Round Four would also define Round Five but South Korea was not ready to encourage the U.S. to exit the negotiations.

Before the fifth round commenced, Christopher Hill made it clear that the United States would only support the subject of the provision of an LWR for the DPRK after the DPRK had promptly eliminated all nuclear weapons and all nuclear programs, and this had been verified to the satisfaction of all parties by credible international means. Including the IAEA, and after the DPRK had come into full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards, had demonstrated a sustained commitment to cooperation and transparency, and had ceased proliferating nuclear technology (U.S. State Department, 2005). The US was arguably sticking to its initial stance on CVID even though the statement from Christopher Hill shows that Washington was willing to be flexible on giving North Korea a light water reactor. To some extent, the US' stance was a clear step back from its earlier fourth round reservations on rewarding North Korea for freezing its nuclear arsenal. It can be argued, that the flexibility that the statement from Christopher Hill reviewed on United States policy was that it had been largely impacted with North Korea's use of the time delay tactics in Round Four and its decision to backtrack from the Joint Statement. The use of the time delay tactic was having an impact on US policy, and this was working to the advantage of North Korea.

Mr. Hill pointed out that he would be willing to go to North Korea as long as the United States interests would not be compromised by such a visit (Grzelczyk, 2009: 106). The United States was willing to backtrack from having bilateral talks with Pyongyang if it meant the controversy that occurred following the signing of the 19 September 2005 agreement would be rectified. Christopher Hill's attempt at meeting Pyongyang on the sidelines of the Six-Party Talks process could have arguably framed the way the negotiations would go because the United States to some extent put themselves in a vulnerable position from North Korea's manipulations and time delay tactics. In October 2005, the New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson had a personal conversation with North

Korean officials and said “North Korea was willing to attend the new round of Six-Party Talks planned for November without any precondition.” (Grzelczyk, 2009: 106). Therefore, to some extent, the United States’ decision to break from its earlier position of not meeting North Korea on a bilateral level had paid off, even though the consequences of the US’ actions would be felt during the fifth round.

The usual purpose of negotiations is to explore options and reach an agreement, if possible (Glozman *et al.*, 2014: 671). Christopher Hill’s attempt to meet Pyongyang officials on the sidelines would have been an attempt to make sure that North Korea’s break from the Joint Statement would not be the end of the Six-Party Talks process. Meeting with North Korea was another way to explore options on how to bring North Korea to the negotiation table. It can be argued that the United States was trying to use North Korea’s time delay to even encourage negotiations on the sidelines even though meeting bilaterally with the United States was part of North Korea’s plan. However, in as much as the United States’ actions were admirable from a negotiation perspective the implications of such a move should not be overlooked especially when dealing with a party like North Korea that is historically known of entering into negotiations with false intentions. This has led scholars like Klinger (2012: 1) to describe North Korea as a regime that has the ability to, “hide its true intentions through sophisticated, comprehensive negotiating strategy that has enabled it to develop its nuclear weapons capability while retaining sufficient strategic ambiguity to derail international efforts to prevent it.” Therefore, it can be argued that Washington was over its head and should have refrained from meeting North Korea on the sidelines. Such a move had clearly given power to Pyongyang and cemented how the time delay tactic was having an impact on the decisions that Washington was taking.

In the Opening Address, the Chairman of this round of talks, the Head of the Chinese Delegation and Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei said, “the focus mission of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks was to carry out the detailed rules, means and steps of the Joint Statement according to the principle of “promise to promise, action to action”. He hoped that all parties could adopt an attitude of sincerity, responsibility, flexibility, and pragmatism in active discussions and suggestion making, to develop implementation

programs acceptable to all parties as soon as possible (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2005). It can be argued that Round Five was to continue where Round Four had left off; however, the success of Round Five depended on the implementation of the promises and actions that were laid down in Round Four. Hill had argued that Round Five was the next step to discuss the key elements of the Joint Statement, especially regarding DPRK actions to declare and dismantle its nuclear weapons program, and actions that the international community will take to verify that dismantlement (State Department, 2005).

It was not only the US that had high hopes for the fifth round, but the other optimistic parties were to find out soon that after the first phase, the fifth round, just like the previous round was going to be dogged with tactics that would derail earlier optimism on the denuclearization process of North Korea. Thus, the US chief delegation member to the Six-Party Talks argued that "The way forward is to build on the agreement that was reached in September and the issues are complex and interrelated. Negotiations will be difficult, but each of the parties should recognize that the realization of the vision laid out in the September 19 Joint Statement is in its fundamental interest." (U.S. State Department, 2005). The statements from the United States officials to the Six-Party Talks showed what was driving the United States' strategy in the negotiations. There was a great degree of the need to attain a resolution, which led the United States to miscalculate the damage of North Korea's use of the time delay tactic. It can be argued that goal attainment also contributed to entrapment because the United States wanted to continue with a negotiation process that was increasingly putting them in an untenable position.

4.2 Slowing down the negotiations in Round Five

Washington and Seoul for years have questioned North Korea's intentions for developing nuclear weapons. Reduced to its most basic element, the question is simply, "had North Korea spent billions of dollars, devoted countless man-years of effort, and risked international ostracism and devastating sanctions to build a nuclear military

capability or a merely a negotiating chip to be bargained away?” (Klingner, 2012: 3). It can be argued that the questions behind the reasons or purpose of North Korea’s nuclear program presented an opportunity for parties to understand why the time delay tactic was very important for North Korea and its nuclear program. In this instance delaying the process showed that North Korea had gone through international ostracism to fulfill its nuclear ambitions. Thus, parties may enter into negotiations to achieve ulterior goals to establish a reputation as either tough or cooperative in an environment where they expect to have future interactions and to appease concerns of the international community as well as garner international support and avoid potential economic sanctions (Glozman *et al.*, 2015: 672). The intentions of North Korea accepting to join the fifth round of the negotiation was an ongoing process of maintaining the falsehood that it wanted to negotiate to put an end to its nuclear program. It can also be argued that there is a strong connection between parties who adopt a “pretense negotiation strategy” and those that use the time delay tactic as a ‘pretense negotiation strategy.’

However, it can also be argued that the parties to the negotiations were playing into North Korea’s tactics and strategies because they wanted an agreement to be reached at the end of the Six-Party Talks. It should be questioned whether it is in the best interests of negotiations to only focus on attaining an agreement while exposing vulnerable lines that could derail the negotiation process. Based on the time delay tactics that had been used in Round Four, there was no evidence that the tactic could not be used again in Round Five. Therefore, to some extent, the negotiating parties might have gone into Round Five with the expectation that North Korea would continue to drag their feet in the negotiations, in order to affect or derail the process. In most cases, the worst negotiation outcome is no outcome at all, and if the drive to an agreement is sincere, a deadlocked negotiation process fails all sides (Spector, 2006: 273). Based on the outcome and the events that shaped Round Five, the negotiation, at least from the **United States** side was going well but North Korea was playing a different ball game, with the use of the time delay tactic, which could represent its insincerity in taking part in the negotiations.

In November 2005, the North Korean side accused the United States of violating the spirit of the Joint Statement by issuing financial sanctions against the DPRK, and this issue became a major obstacle and pretext for suspending renewal of the Six-Party Talks (Snyder, 2007: 56). The sanctions that were imposed on Macao-based Banco Delta Asia (MBD) were used as a reason by North Korea to suspend the negotiations and delay the prospects of reaching an agreement. The sanctions on the Macau based bank for its complicity in North Korea's illegal activities lade North Korea to delay compliance with the Joint Statement (Klingner, 2007: 1). It can be argued that even though Glozman (2015) points out that when parties who use the time delay tactic enter a negotiation they are doing so to make sure that they do not face punitive measures; North Korea had failed to avoid punitive measure and to assume its position of a "willing participant" in the negotiations. Choosing to delay the fifth round by opting to suspend the entire negotiation process could have been a move made by North Korea to show its frustration. However, the US' punitive measure was a warning against any further moves from North Korea that would derail the success of the Six-Party Talks. The United States had not given any punitive measures when North Korea had stalled the negotiations; therefore, backtracking from the Joint Statement had to be mate with some consequences, which could demotivate North Korea from pursuing a strategy that was meant to delay the negotiation process.

The Bush administration perceived Seoul as reluctant to use its economic cooperation with the North as a means to make Pyongyang abandon its nuclear program (Schneider, 2010: 93). Seoul's stance in 2006 was mainly motivated by its "engagement policy" and this complicated their relationship with Washington, which had taken a hard-line approach by imposing sanctions on the Macau based BDA prior to the nuclear test. Vice President Dick Cheney's remark, that the U.S. would defeat evil instead of negotiating with it, haunted Roh (Moon, 2008: 75). The United States would have supported Seoul had they scaled back its economic projects with its Northern neighbor. David Asher, who led the United States effort to crack down on North Korea's illicit activities during the Bush administration, asserted that there was a greater need for an extreme financial containment and a pressure strategy against North Korea more than ever (Jiha, 2016). Based on its actions, that were increasingly isolating the United

States, South Korea had learned nothing from the Joint Statement of 2005 and forgotten that North Korea was in the negotiations for themselves and not for anyone else. The Bush administration following the 2006 nuclear test would undoubtedly have welcomed a hard-line approach economically from South Korea towards North Korea (Schneider, 2010: 93). The alliance was not only having trouble in having one message when it came to North Korea, but North Korea was using the diverging interests to continue straining the alliance.

The resumption of negotiations appeared even more impossible towards the end of the summer because North Korea was restating that no new Six-Party Talks would take place unless the United States was to remove financial sanctions imposed on Pyongyang the previous year (Grzelczyk, 2009: 106). The delay that came because of the sanctions could have been to some extent a result of the negotiation process itself. Delay may also be the natural outcome of a difficult negotiation process because parties involved in consensus building can take a long time to agree on a settlement (Spangler, 2003). Even though the delay that came about because of the economic sanctions, was not a direct result of lack of consensus among the parties. It can be argued that going into the fifth round the negotiation process had been difficult due to diverging interests between the Washington-Seoul alliance and the DPRK's reluctant nature to accept any agreement that did not facilitate its nuclear program. South Korea wanted to continue with engaging North Korea economically, and North Korea realized that the alliance had differing opinions on the sanctions that were imposed on BDA. On the other hand, the time delay tactic was going to be used whether there was consensus or lack thereof because North Korea saw the tactic as a means to frustrate the U.S.-ROK alliance because they could not agree on whether sanctions were the best option for the negotiations or not.

Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon and Roh's National Security Adviser, Song Min-soon, appealed to the Bush administration to show a flexible attitude on the BDA issue as an incentive to bring the North back into the Six-Party Talks (Moon, 2008: 95). Removing sanctions that were imposed on BDA did not guarantee that North Korea would get back to the negotiation table even though North Korea was using the sanctions on BDA

as an excuse for delaying the continuation of the fifth round. What North Korea was doing and what South Korea was falling for, was what Glozman *et al.* (2015: 689) explained as a tactic used by time delayers in negotiations to conceal their true intentions by creating a smoke screen through making claims attesting to become cooperative if certain conditions are created. For example, North Korea's claim that it was willing to restart the negotiations and interested in an agreement if the sanctions on BDA were removed. Therefore, South Korea's move to compel the United States to show restraint on the sanctions that were imposed in reaction to North Korea's bad behavior, undermined the U.S.' foreign policy tools that could be used for punitive measures only because Ban Ki-moon and Song Min-soon wanted to continue appeasing North Korea.

No new achievements were registered, and substantial negotiations were neither attempted nor envisioned, and this led to the United States negotiator Christopher Hill to say that "we were not expecting to make any major breakthroughs" (Liang, 2012: 3). The failure to make any substantial breakthroughs was to some extent also a result of the difficulty of the negotiation, which could have helped the time delay of the process. However, Glozman *et al.* (2015: 672) go further to say that stalling the current phase could have been that the negotiator expects the upcoming round to bring softer positions that are much more favorable to themselves. This explains why it was always North Korea that was demanding many concessions and used the time delay tactics, if what it wanted from the negotiations was not met, for instance, the removal of sanctions on BDA. However, the use of the tactic, for South Korea, cemented what North Korea had been implying that the United States was the party that did not want to negotiate and was the cause of the stalling negotiations. This is why the alliance's relationship continued to deteriorate and weaken because North Korea was labeling the US to South Korea as the party that did not want a resolution of which this went against South Korea's engagement strategy.

Even though the first phase only lasted a few days, North Korea used bargaining demands to make the U.S. lift the sanctions, which forced the negotiation process to go into a recess. Compensation for freeze was not going to go well with the United States.

Therefore, Pyongyang used this to prolong the negotiation process by calling for a recess to show that if they could not get what they wanted the negotiation process would not go any further. Secretary of state Condoleezza Rice also argued that the DPRK was the reason why the negotiations were stalling, and Pyongyang had to bring a “different attitude and different approach” to subsequent rounds of talks (Grzelczyk, 2009: 106). It can be argued that holding off on continuing with the negotiations, North Korea was using the only tactic it could use to coerce the U.S. into giving them what they wanted.

Engaging with Seoul only when Washington is moving to reconcile is a well-established policy in Pyongyang, and it has acted on that policy for two decades (Sigal, 2008: 12). North Korea had used Seoul as a pawn to get through to Washington for a while, and this tactic was proving to be worthwhile because Seoul was being drawn into the false pretense at engagement that was being offered by North Korea. South Korea’s proactive role in resolving the dilemma constituted the core principles of Roh’s North Korean nuclear policy, and these principles were implemented according to zero-tolerance of war on the Korean Peninsula, and his rigid stance became a primary source of friction between South Korea and the U.S. (Moon, 2008: 75-76). As long as South Korea maintains the engagement policy, it can be argued, that there will always be friction between ROK and the United States with issues that involve North Korea. It is not that, South Korea does not believe the threat posed by a nuclear-armed North Korea, but it is the response that might come from the U.S. that Seoul is worried about. Thus, the Roh administration went as far as dismissing the credibility of North Korea’s claims that it had nuclear weapons.

The US, even though it was not getting the support it needed from South Korea, it was willing to demonstrate to North Korea that there were consequences for its nuclear program even though this could not stop North Korea from delaying the negotiation process. The sanctions played into North Korea’s strategy because they were being used to label the United States as a party that was only out to get North Korea. This could explain why South Korea maintained funding of the Kaesong project even though the United States thought continuing with the project would defeat the purpose of the

sanctions. The project was launched in 2004, largely financed by the South to increase co-operation with North Korea and its purpose was to develop an industrial park where South Korean companies could manufacture their products using North Korean labor (Klingner, 2012: 13). However, Zartman and Berman, 1982 question the dynamics and approaches to negotiation by asking when should a party during a negotiation be tough and when should it be soft, knowing that conceding little will mean holding to its position but decrease the chances of an agreement while conceding a lot will increase the chances of an agreement but move it away from the positions it values. Their questions are fundamental in the current study because Washington refused initially to remove the sanctions on BDA and this led North Korea to cut off the negotiations to the detriment of the negotiations moving ahead which had a negative impact on the U.S.-ROK alliance. North Korea's time delay tactic had to be faced with consequences so that they would realize that dragging or delaying the negotiations in order to frustrate reaching an agreement could have a negative impact. However, Meerts (2005: 137) notes that one should also have a stick available to narrow down the other side's option. Therefore, to some extent, the United States' decision to sanction North Korea was justifiable even though this made North Korea delay the negotiations even further.

South Korean Ambassador to the United States, Hong Seok-hyun, criticized the United States hardline policy, "as diplomatic means, there are carrots and sticks, but they say the finest horse trainers use carrots first." (Klingner, 2012: 13). Ambassador Hong was not only criticizing the United States for its sanctions on BDA but was also justifying South Korea's stance towards North Korea after Washington had imposed the sanctions. It can be argued that Washington could not have been happy with Seoul's position of maintaining reluctance to use punitive measures against their northern neighbor. North Korea had been enabled by this sort of reluctance to get to the point of test firing a nuclear weapon since the United States was the only member of the alliance that was willing to punish the DPRK. However, Jeong (2016: 13) asserts that some experimental studies show that negotiators are more inclined to utilize persuasion and other influential activities in the second half of the negotiation. Therefore, the decision of the United States to opt for sticks instead of carrots was not because they were not the "finest horse trainers" compared to ROK, but it was in line with trying to

bring the DPRK to account for its actions that had been derailing the negotiations from moving further.

In this case, time delays are only effective if opponents do not have any alternative at all or any good alternatives (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) (Galini, 2015: 146). North Korea's decision to drag the first phase of Round Five, to some extent was a result of a lack of a better alternative than to slow down the negotiation so that it could get a better deal from the United States. Besides wanting to get the United States to remove the sanctions, North Korea was also splitting the alliance under the guise of wanting a better alternative and blaming the United States as non-cooperative. However, delaying because of the lack of a better alternative should not be regarded as a better solution to any negotiation because North Korea managed to maintain its nuclear weapons because of the time delay tactic. The parties had agreed to hold the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing in November and discussions on key elements had been made when Christopher Hill visited North Korea before the fifth round (U.S. State Department, 2005). Therefore, the issue of sanctions should have been raised when North Korean officials met with Christopher Hill on the sidelines of Round Five, so that the negotiations would not have been disrupted because one of the parties was not pleased with the sanctions that were imposed on them.

Following the end of the first session, the negotiating climate deteriorated significantly, and the resumption of Talks appeared even more improbable because North Korea restated that no new Six-Party Talks would take place unless the U.S. stopped its hostile policy (imposing of sanctions the previous year) (Grzelczyk, 2009: 106). It should be noted that North Korea labeling the US as hostile, was meant to damage its ties with South Korea, which had hoped at the beginning of the fifth round that the United States would change its approach towards North Korea. The issue of sanctions that were imposed on BDA had been put at the center of North Korea's reasons to delay the negotiation process (Grzelczyk, 2009: 106). It can be argued that for North Korea, sanctions on BDA were an opportunity to make the United States choose which was important between the sanctions, the ROK alliance or the continuation of the negotiation that would put a halt to North Korea's nuclear program. However, based on past

negotiations that the United States and North Korea have been involved in there is no evidence that shows that Pyongyang would have cooperated or resumed the talks had the US removed the economic sanctions on BDA. Far from giving Washington advantage, the financial measures provoked Pyongyang to retaliate for over a year it refused to return to the negotiations, which served to put more strain on the alliance (Sigal, 2008: 11).

Pyongyang had put Washington where it wanted it to be, and this gave it power in the negotiations. Thus, Meerts (2005: 127) argues that weaker parties to trap the stronger participants in the negotiations mostly use entrapment. North Korea was using the power imbalance for its own advantage. It should be noted that not only was the financial sanctions providing a reason to delay the negotiations but it had become a weapon to use so that North Korea could get a direct meeting with the United States. It can be argued that the sanctions might not have been so much of a problem for North Korea but they provided a means to get bilateral meetings with the US Bilateral negotiations with the United States had always been a negotiation choice for Pyongyang. From the very onset of the Six-Party Talks, North Korea had insisted on pursuing negotiations with the United States on a bilateral basis but the administration of George W. Bush, on its part, preferred a multilateral approach (Liang, 2012: 1). It should be noted that South Korea had mate with North Korea on the sidelines of the negotiations even though the U.S. had voiced its disapproval for bilateral meetings.

Kim Jong-il agreed to a summit meeting with South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun who had on 14 August 2007, said, "Recently there have been signs that the situation on the Korean peninsula is easing" (Sigal, 2008: 12). North Korea decided to meet with South Korea as a strategic move to weaken the alliance because Washington had declined to meet with the DPRK on a bilateral level. The alliance's position in the negotiations was weakening, and their different stunts on North Korea policy was playing into North Korea's strategy to "divide and conquer" so that it would appear as if it was willing to cooperate following its nuclear test which had left it isolated. The decision of the Roh Moo-hyun administration to meet with Kim Jong-il was to some extent a result of the "engagement policy" which would have been threatened if the Six-

Party Talks came to an end. The Roh Moo-hyun administration could not be deterred from continuing its unconditional outreach to Pyongyang. Chung and Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon asserted that there was no immediate reason to change Seoul's policy of engaging with the North "despite fresh uncertainty" over Pyongyang's nuclear program (Klingner, 2012: 13). Therefore, Seoul's hope that there could be cordial relations between the two Koreas was creating an environment in which Seoul was tolerant of North Korea's actions to the extent of defending them. On the other hand, Moon (2008: 102) notes that the structure of the Six-Party Talks did not allow for South Korea's leadership, but South Korea ultimately contributed to steering the process.

Therefore, based on North Korea's actions of trying to weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance with its use of the time delay tactic, it should be noted that meeting with South Korea was intended to do harm rather than an attempt to have the sanctions on BDA reversed. On the other, North Korea wanted to keep the negotiation process alive and if keeping the negotiation alive meant that the U.S.-ROK alliance's diverging interests could be used against them through the bilateral meetings, then North Korea was prepared to do that. However, Glozman *et al* (2015: 671) explain that while parties who use the time delay tactics aim to avoid agreement within the current frame of the negotiations, they also aim to keep the negotiation process alive, since walking away from the negotiation table could endanger their position. Therefore, it could be argued that North Korea requesting a bilateral meeting was an attempt to keep the negotiation alive so that they could maintain the façade of the willing negotiator whilst also weakening the U.S.-ROK alliance at the same time.

North Korea then pointed the finger at the United States for the lack of progress during the fifth round even after Kim Jong-il secretly visited China and pledged North Korea's commitment to the Six-Party Talks, no new developments regarding new rounds of negotiations occurred for the next few months (Grzelczyk, 2009: 106). It should be noted that from the previous chapter, every time North Korea fails to get what it wants it blames the United States for the lack of progress in the negotiations. This is done so that South Korea stops supporting the U.S. and the U.S. starts making unilateral decisions that do not have South Korean support. Jeong (2016: 13) argues that in the

middle of a negotiation, the prevalence of conflicting interests may encourage a stronger party to resort to unilateral measures such as coercive force or sanctions. Therefore, the use of sanctions by the United States leading to the fifth round was a result of the problems that had been encountered during the fourth round. By imposing sanctions, the United States wanted to make sure that the problems that were prevalent in the fourth round would not be in the fifth round even though this meant its alliance with ROK would suffer.

North Korea's goal was not only to make sure that a resolution on its nuclear program would not be made but also it was to make sure that by the end of the negotiations; the U.S.-ROK alliance would have weakened. It can be argued further that, North Korea sees a stronger U.S.-ROK alliance as a threat to its survival, therefore, weakening it would present the best option. Delayers hurt themselves to prove to the other party how much they want a favorable agreement (O'Neill, 1991: 105). North Korea failed to get the sanctions lifted and a bilateral meeting with the United States; even though it used the delay tactic. What North Korea managed to get was a weakening U.S.-ROK alliance because of their different policies on how to handle North Korea's use of the time delay tactics. However, it can also be argued that the effects of the time delay were felt and there were consequences during the fifth round even though they were not directly felt immediately after the tactic was used for example the nuclear test of 2006. Thus, it is important for the study to investigate the effects of the time delay tactic that could have hurt or helped North Korea and the United States during the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks. The third phase of the fifth round started almost eight months after the second phase and almost two years after the first phase.

In the Joint Agreement of February 2007, United States attention concentrated on complete information and initial verification in Stage 2 and abandonment of the nuclear program and weapons in Stage 3. In contrast, North Korea sought to make Stage 2 as reversible as possible with only limited information disclosure, while dragging out the talks through many additional stages in which it would be generously rewarded without loss of its nuclear arsenal (Rozman, 2010: 144). Based on the events that had taken place prior to the third phase, the parties could have assumed that North Korea would

be corporative since a lot of maneuvering had been used to coerce Pyongyang back to the negotiating table. North Korea had gone back to its usual tactics of dragging its feet to an agreement that was meant to end its nuclear program. In contrast to the United States, that was certain of North Korea's buildup of the nuclear program; South Korea remained suspicious of the United States findings and this further created a rift within the alliance.

Following North Korea's 2005 declaration that it was a nuclear state, South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young sought to undermine the veracity of Pyongyang's own admission. Chung dismissed North Korea's nuclear declaration since it "couldn't be independently verified." (Klingner, 2012: 13). South Korea's dismissal was a contrast to the Bush administration, and it was a result of North Korea's need to strain the alliance that had entered into the negotiation with the aim to form a coalition that would give pressure on North Korea. It should be noted that in early 2005 South Korea's defense minister, Yoon Kwang-ung, had told a National Assembly Committee that North Korea had reprocessed "only part" of the 8,000 spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor (Arms Control, 2017). Therefore, South Korea's flip-flops on where it stood regarding the nuclear program should be questioned since they had once agreed with the US' views that North Korea was building a nuclear arsenal. Their motives for saying different statements, whether affirming or discrediting the nuclear program present a challenge on stating clearly, where Seoul stood on the nuclear issue. However, the contradictions served a different purpose depending on the time they were said, either to please Pyongyang or to maintain its relations with Washington.

For some conservatives in the US, Chung Dong-young's stance was interpreted as acceptance of the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons because of fear of war on the Korean peninsula, critically undermining the bilateral alliance (Moon, 2008: 76). It can be argued that Seoul's failure to accept the probability of nuclear arms in North Korea was astonishing because Seoul had much to lose from a nuclear-armed North Korea, therefore alienating from its ally was not the best move the Roh administration could have made. Thus, Moon (2012: 2) argues, "Failure to handle North Korea's nuclear quagmire through peaceful and diplomatic means could bear serious negative

security implications for the Korean peninsula through destabilizing inter-Korean military balance and threatens regional strategic stability by precipitating a precarious nuclear domino effect in Northeast Asia.” South Korea’s dismissal of North Korea’s nuclear program did not only present a threat to its security, but it was meant to discredit the Bush administration’s intelligence on the nuclear program because they thought the Bush administration, under the circumstances, would invade Pyongyang as they had done in Iraq based on intelligence.

However, US authorities confirmed that the underground explosion was nuclear, but that the test produced a low yield of less than one kiloton while Secretary of State Rice reiterated the US security commitment to South Korea and she continued to call for Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks (Chantlett-Avery *et al.*, 2006: 1). North Korea was using its ‘time out’ from the negotiations to continue building its nuclear program. It can be argued that the time delay tactic was working as a diversion for North Korea to pursue its nuclear program while it was also straining the U.S.-ROK alliance in the process. North Korea’s strategy was producing a win-win situation because even though it was stalling the negotiations, it was covertly straining an old alliance that presented a threat to North Korea’s ambitions to acquire a nuclear missile. Based on the underground explosion that took place during Round Five, it can be suggested that in this instance North Korea’s use of the time delay tactic illustrated that it was pretending that it wanted a resolution for its nuclear program. However, Roh’s decision to downplay the nuclear issue is explained by Moon (2008: 75) who argues that “if the Clinton administration, which he considered liberal, had considered military action, the Bush administration would have a greater probability of resorting to military action, particularly under neoconservative influence.”

The second phase’s actions would have effectively ended the DPRK’s production of plutonium, a major step towards the goal of achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (U.S. Department of State, 2007). Based on North Korea’s decision to backtrack from the Joint Statement of 2005, a day after it had agreed to it, it should not have come as a surprise that North Korea wanted to reverse the aspects of Stage 2. North Korea’s ability to change from being a willing corporate participant to

the use of provocations led Lee and Wilson (2014: 53) to describe it as having multi-polar behavior and schizophrenic. It can be argued that North Korea's attempt to reverse the success and some aspects of Stage 2, were enabled by South Korea's failure to believe that North Korea was building a nuclear weapon. North Korea was in control of the negotiations and was indirectly controlling the decisions and actions of South Korea. The alliance between Seoul and Washington that had meant to strengthen the US' position against North Korea, in the negotiations, had become a source of weakness and to some extent the reason for the discontent within the alliance.

Negotiators choose bargaining strategies or tactics in their attempt to optimize their payoffs from the situation (Habeb, 1988: 28). North Korea's strategy was to make sure that the alliance would be weak and the core nuclear facilities at Yongbyon 5-MW(e) nuclear reactor, reprocessing plant (Radiochemical Laboratory), and fuel rod fabrication facility identified in Stage 2 could be reopened and not completely dismantled. This was a continued attempt by North Korea of conceding while not conceding a lot so that it could find a loophole that would make it able to carry on its covert nuclear program. The nature of any negotiation is to attempt to find the largest mutually satisfactory agreement with anyone (and therefore, each) getting at least enough to make it want to keep the agreement. Therefore, the provisions of Stage 2 did not live up to the "largest mutually satisfactory" nature of an agreement since North Korea ended up reversing or the Joint agreement of 2007 by proceeding with the Stage 2 programs of enabling 5 megawatt Experimental Reactor, the Processing Plant and the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility at Yongbyon. However, Zartman (1988: 38) goes further to say that by their very nature, negotiation is not a process of winning and losing so that success must be evaluated against the problem, not against the adversary.

4.3 Analysis: How dragging out the negotiations created a strain in the alliance

At a press conference, with the South Korean media on 17 October 2006, Christopher Hill, criticized public tours to the North's Mt. Kumgang as a diversion of money that North Korea could use at its discretions (Bae, 2010: 339). Bae (2010: 339) goes further to say that the US Ambassador to South Korea, likewise pointed out on 18 October that the Gaeseung Industrial Complex, as well as the Mt. Kumgang tours, should be reconsidered in light of the new international sanctions against North Korea. By continuing with the public tours to Mt Kumgang and Gaeseung Industrial Complex, South Korea was giving North Korea a financial lifeline that the sanctions had hoped to block following the nuclear test. The move by Seoul explain why sanctions have not been able to compel North Korea to stop its nuclear program because there are always states like South Korea that provide it with a financial lifeline, which defeats the purpose of the sanctions as a punitive measure. It can further be stated that South Korea's financial lifeline to North Korea did not help the United States' agenda towards North Korea. The United States had invited South Korea to join the negotiations so that they could form an alliance that would give pressure on North Korea and not aid North Korea. South Korea's stance was playing into North Korea's strategy to strain the alliance and isolate the United States in the negotiations. Thus, Moon (2008: 108) asserts that what is particularly noteworthy is that the Roh government's daring diplomatic efforts to occasionally defy and even change the policy behavior of the US, which is unprecedented in South Korea's diplomatic history.

It should be noted that the Mt. Kumgang tours and the Gaeseung Industrial Complex were part of South Korea's Engagement Policy. However, the continuation of the projects was putting a further strain on the U.S.-ROK alliance and this largely benefitted North Korea that wanted to see the coalition fail to give pressure on the DPRK. Furthermore, both projects undermined what the United States sanctions hoped to achieve, and South Korea had taken to attach itself to North Korea because it believed (as North Korea had stated the United States' hostility) its ally did not seek to reach a resolution. Kim, (2011: 264) notes that the Sunshine Policy, to engage Pyongyang, with a number of major economic cooperation projects, such as the Mt. Kumgang Tourism Project and the Gaeseung Industrial Complex Project, were meant to build trust in its relations with North Korea and to jump-start the North's moribund economy as a prelude

to reunification. In as much as the Mt., Kumgang Tourism Project and the Kaesong Industrial Complex Project were enacted before the economic sanctions on BDA; South Korea should have stopped directly giving North Korea a financial lifeline, a move that saved to widen the conflict of interest between Washington and Seoul. Thus Kim (2011: 264) argues that South Korea was not well prepared to encounter unintended consequences of its engagement policy, which added greater complexity to the ideal solidarity between Seoul and Washington by creating lines of division over how best to deal with the Pyongyang regime.

United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, added to the chorus of U.S. voices on 16 and 19 October 2006, reminding the South of the importance of its participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The South Korean government's responses were defiant because officials insisted on keeping these two projects moving forward without interruption and in the case of the Gaeseung project, even attempting to enlarge it, while again refusing to join the PSI fully (Bae, 2010: 339). It can be argued that the U.S. was discontent with South Korea's actions. From the United States point of view, South Korea was supposed to back up the policies that were imposed by Washington and not to find a way to support policies that would undermine the United States' agenda. In Round Five, South Korea was not holding North Korea accountable for its use of the time delay tactic. If South Korea were, it would have stopped the projects that gave a financial lifeline to North Korea so that it could be in accord with the United States. South Korea was clearly not going to support the United States' efforts following Pyongyang's underground nuclear device test and its decision to attempt a compromise, of either siding with Washington or maintain its Engagement Policy strained its relations with the United States during the Six-Party Talks.

The deceptive nature of many strategies may lead to an enhancement of the conflict when their use has been discovered (Gruder, 1970: 136). Pyongyang had used the Six-Party Talks platform to drag its feet in the negotiations whilst building its nuclear capability, and their strategy had motivated parties like the U.S. to seek resolutions that would stop them. Therefore, South Korea's view that carrots were better than sticks, in the case of North Korea it was a strategy that had been used and had only seen North

Korea increase its nuclear missile capability (Moon, 2008: 77). South Korea's stance of being against the United States sanctions, was exactly what the DPRK wanted because this illustrated how the alliance was speaking with different voices, which put a further strain on the U.S.-ROK alliance. However, this is not to say that 'sticks' are much better than 'carrots' but to illustrate how the U.S.-ROK alliance was strained due to its failure to speak with one voice in the negotiations considering that the United States wanted South Korea to support its North Korea agenda. The United States had implemented both strategies to the detriment of reaching an agreement, and Seoul's Engagement Policy had not deterred North Korea's nuclear ambitions. It should be noted that president Roh had suggested that ROK would stay on the sidelines if war broke out between the U.S. and North Korea (Moon, 2008: 76). Therefore, the Roh administration was motivated with their own self-preservation than backing an ally, which could possibly increase North Korea's sense of insecurity and isolation, a move that would make it more probable for North Korea to use its possible nuclear weapons against Seoul.

Seoul declared coercive pressure unacceptable to bring Pyongyang to heel in the nuclear dispute (Schneider, 2010: 93). North Korea had sowed the seeds by labeling the United States as the party that was not willing to cooperate, that was causing the delay in the negotiations, and that had a hostile policy towards North Korea. Statements from South Korean officials show that they were opposed to stringent measures even though North Korea had proven to be difficult during the negotiation through its use of the time delay tactic. The diverging interests between Seoul and Washington were a byproduct of the use of the time delay tactic during the negotiations. North Korea had justified its use of the delay tactic on the U.S.' hostile policy which influenced South Korea to break away from having a cohesive message with the U.S. Seoul's claims that pressure might not be the answer to the North Korean nuclear crisis was the reason why North Korea had used Seoul as a pawn to drive its agenda while weakening the alliance (Bae, 2010: 327). Given past track records, it is virtually impossible to change North Korea's behavior through dialogue and negotiations, and the only credible way to disarm North Korea's nuclear arsenal is either to transform the regime through isolation and containment or to reply with military options (Moon, 2012: 3). It can be argued that

negotiating with North Korea without the use of punitive measures when it uses escalatory tactics only saves the interests of North Korea's nuclear program but due to the manipulation, South Korea did not see that but went on to put its alliance in a vulnerable position due to its utterances. Therefore, going forward Seoul should reconsider its lukewarm approach towards North Korea at the expense of its alliance with Washington.

The diverging interests between Washington and Seoul were made even worse with the events that had happened in the U.S. on 9/11 (Moon, 2012: 7). Seoul's reluctance to accept that North Korea was building a nuclear arsenal was to some degree influenced by the thought that the US would react in the same manner that it had following 9/11. Therefore, South Korea aligned itself with North Korea because it wanted to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula. Since 9/11, Washington and Seoul's views of the DPRK, and more importantly of how North Korea should be approached, had rapidly diverged but both U.S. and ROK officials routinely insisted that the bilateral relationship is as strong as ever and that alarm about the future of the alliance is exaggerated by over-active analysts (Flake, 2005). The study can argue that both Washington and Seoul are to some extent responsible for the strain that they experienced during the negotiations mainly due to their policies. In chapter three, South Korea's Engagement Policy was analyzed as a contributing factor to the strain. In this chapter, it is important to also analyze some aspects of the 2006 Bush administration's National Security Strategy because the Strategy was a consequence of North Korea's underground nuclear device test and Seoul did not agree with how the Bush administration's Axis of Evil speech had labeled North Korea. Therefore, the Bush administration's 2006 National Security Strategy might have contributed to the strain because of its hardline approach on North Korea following the underground nuclear test of 2006.

Even though, there was daily cooperation between the US State Department and the ROK Foreign Ministry, between the Blue House (ROK) and the White House, and even between the Pentagon and the Ministry of National Defense (ROK) continued, in a manner that was professional, to disregard the dramatic changes in perception among the opinion leaders and political class in both Seoul and Washington is sheer folly (Arms

Control, 2016). The time delay that North Korea had been using to divide and rule the alliance was making it close to impossible for the different structures of government in the U.S. and ROK to work together because there was constantly an issue that the alliance did not see eye to eye when it came to the negotiations. Even though the officials from Washington and Seoul might dismiss the strain that was created as a result of North Korea's use of the time delay tactics, their statements on how the negotiations were conducted and their reactions during the negotiations tell a different story (Jeong, 2016: 6). It can be argued that it is better to analyze the strain from official statements and actions that were made during the rounds of Talks to make it clear that the United States and South Korea alliance was suffering because of lack of cohesion on how to deal with North Korea's nuclear program. The lack of modalities on how the nuclear problem would be dismantled and the use of the time delay tactics contributed to the strain to some extent.

The study argues that South Korea was manipulated not because North Korea was strategic in its bid to manipulate South Korea, but it was because South Korea was a willing participant, which presented the opportunity and gave the means to North Korea to be manipulated against Washington. Kim Jong-il agreed to a summit meeting with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun (Sigal, 2008: 12). North Korea only engages with South Korea when it has something to benefit from the engagement. Meeting with South Korea on a bilateral level was motivated by the need to get an ally in the negotiation since North Korea had been isolated following the underground low yield nuclear device test of 2006. The bilateral meeting was also strategic in that it would put a strain on the U.S.-ROK alliance. However, Seoul's decision to meet with Kim Jong-il contradicted Washington's decision to not hold bilateral meetings with North Korea, and this was not the first time that Seoul's 'proactive diplomacy' had diverged with U.S. policy. President Roh had dispatched his envoy, Chung Dong-young, then Unification Minister, to Pyongyang (Moon, 2008: 90). Thus, Schneider (2010: 94) argues that South Korean President Roh and some of his political appointees' efforts to raise Seoul's foreign policy profile in the North Korean nuclear dispute came at the expense of United States policy.

The intentions of the Roh administration could have been unwillingly in contrast to the United States interests considering that Washington and Seoul are in different continents. However, the weakness in coordination or contrast within the alliance was only made worse by North Korea's time delay tactics that were meant to create a wager between the U.S. and ROK. It can be argued that to avoid manipulation of one alliance against the other; alliances should at least enter into negotiations with the highest level of coordination to avoid the fate that the U.S.-ROK alliance suffered during the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks. Round Five exacerbated the uncompromising and even incomprehensible attitude of North Korea and the politics of spoiler ship by South Korea which contributed to the stalemate (Moon, 2012: 2). South Korea continued to play the so-called "advocate in chief" of North Korea, which allowed for lack of coordination between Washington and Seoul in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. Not only did the lack of coordination aid in North Korea's agenda to acquire a nuclear weapon but also it allowed North Korea to use South Korea as a willing advocate in its strategic goals of defeating the purpose of the Six-Party Talks.

South Korea was eagerly willing to play a central role in influencing the future of the Korean Peninsula and inter-Korean relations when it experienced a period of rapprochement and reconciliation during the decade when South Korea was under the leadership of President Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008), with their policies of vigorous engagement with North Korea (Kim, 2011: 264). The eagerness from the South had not gone unnoticed, and North Korea had not forgotten the role that Seoul had played when sanctions were imposed on BDA. It should be noted that the time delay tactics that North Korea had been using had managed to put South Korea at the center of the negotiations. North Korea had much to win if South Korea took a more proactive role in Round Five because South Korea would encourage the U.S. to continue in an entrapped negotiation while also putting a strain on the alliance. Thus, Jeong (2016: 3) argues that negotiators can deploy a diverse set of strategies either to influence the other's motives and calculations or to minimize the negative effects of an opposing party's actions. South Korea became much more active in resolving the BDA issue, and this yielded positive benefits, and it is not an exaggeration to state that the South Korean government played a crucial role in untangling the maze-like BDA issue through

innovative ideas (Moon, 2008: 95). It can be argued that Kim Jong-il was aware of how South Korea could influence the decisions of the United States. Therefore, warming up to Seoul when it wanted to influence the direction of the negotiation was part of its strategy of getting what it wanted from the Washington and Seoul was a means to an end.

It can be argued that the diverging interests between Washington and Seoul not only created a strain between their relationships but it also entrapped them in the negotiations. Seoul had taken a proactive role in the Six-Party Talks, and even though Washington and Seoul did not agree with each other on how to handle the North Korean nuclear issue, they both had to be part of the negotiations not to disrupt the structure of the negotiations. Thus to some extent, they “self-entrapped” themselves in a negotiation whereby neither of them could discontinue the process without the input of the other. Meerts likens, entrapped parties to gamblers who fail to turn back even though they might know that they might lose but want to recover some of the losses they have already suffered – are often compelled to continue (2005: 114). Therefore, the U.S.-South Korea alliance amidst their diverging interests made it possible for North Korea to use the alliance to its own advantage. As the study has argued, the strain that came because of North Korea’s ability to manipulate the alliance could have been avoided if South Korea had not decided to take decisions that strained its relations with the United States. Thus, Klingner (2012: 7) points out that, Pyongyang always attempts to expose fault lines in a coalition so that they can exploit- in this case South Korea was the one that was exploited.

South Korea ended up being used as a pawn in the negotiation process because it believed that inter-Korean relations could improve if the negotiations continued. Thus, Meerts explains that the motivations behind entrapment result from the need to continue with the negotiation process even though there is still room to turn back like gamblers parties are always compelled to continue (2005: 114). Brockner and Ruben attribute such a scenario because of expectancy-value and face-saving forces by the parties (1985: 103). In as much as this move by negotiating parties might appear somewhat irrational- the study can argue that the conflicting interests between Washington and

Seoul were much more trivial compared to the goal of solving North Korea's nuclear program. As illustrated in the first section of this chapter, North Korea made it seem as if the U.S. was the one that did not want to move on with the negotiations when it spoke to South Korea. This made South Korea encourage the United States to stay in the negotiations even though the time delay tactics were making slimmer the chances of resolving the nuclear issue. By continuing with the negotiations due to South Korea's encouragement, the U.S. had become entrapped. It can be argued that North Korea understood that if the negotiations became entrapped by using the time delay tactics, it could advance in nuclear development as the Six-Party Talks progressed.

4.3 Exhausting opponents until they are ready to concede

The second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2006 was arguably the most critical event of the Six-Party Talks. To some extent, the nuclear crisis illustrated that North Korea was willing to exhaust its opponents by bringing unrelated issues such as the Bush 2006 National Security Strategy and closely related consequences of the time delay tactic such as the nuclear crisis to coerce the alliance into conceding. North Korea, put the parties in a position where they had to choose to continue with the negotiations or to stop considering that North Korea had test-fired a low-yield underground nuclear missile while the negotiations were still taking place. The United States utilized effective counter-tactics to blunt the most underhanded aspects of North Korea's negotiating style but was unable in the early stages of the crisis to design an effective strategy to achieve North Korea's denuclearization (Snyder, 2007: 69). It can be argued that the US' failure to counter North Korea's tactics in the previous rounds of talks created an environment where North Korea could test fire nuclear missiles. In this section, the study concentrates on the 2006 underground low-yield nuclear test; the diverging interests between the US and their South Korean counterparts during the nuclear crisis. The study also argues that these were the consequences of the time delay tactic that North Korea had been using to strain the alliance from the fourth round into the consequential fifth round of the Six-Party Talks.

4.3.1 *The 2006 North Korea nuclear crisis*

Delays are difficult to manage and may raise questions about one's sincerity because they call on the other party to predict the other's response (O'Neill, 1991: 105). The fifth round was more difficult to manage than the previous round because the delay tactic led the nuclear crisis in a path that the parties wanted to avoid. One of the main reasons that the negotiations had carried on from Round Four into Round Five, even though North Korea was using the delay tactics to strain the alliance, was so that the nuclear program would be halted. The stalemate that was experienced in between the second phase and the third phase of the fifth round was a demonstration that North Korea would continue raising the stakes if its bargaining positions were not met. Spector (2006:274) cements this view by pointing out that when the stakes involve the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction failed negotiation as a result of deadlocks can be devastating not only to regional relations but to the entire international system. The U.S. and South Korea should have known that North Korea would continue raising the stakes to get attention or to delay the negotiations. However, O'Neill (1991: 105) argues that predicting the actions of the other party that uses the time delay tactic is difficult while at the same time the party that seems to be losing will be tempted to keep raising the ante. Pyongyang actions when it used the time delay tactics had to some extent become unpredictable for example test-firing a nuclear missile.

During the recess of the negotiations, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon and conducted multiple low-yield underground nuclear and missile test in early October 2006, but President Bush once again rejected calls for bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang (Liang, 2012: 3 and Grzelczyk, 2009: 106). North Korea escalated tensions to put pressure on the U.S. It can be argued that escalating a conflict might be used by negotiators who use the stalling tactic as a way to show that if the negotiation does not go their way, there would be consequences. However, Washington had no answer to Pyongyang's crisis escalation tactics, which proved impossible to contain since North Korea inevitably would ratchet up the sense of crisis to higher levels than Washington would be willing to bear and as a result these North Korean tactics were vindicated against the backdrop of the nuclear test (Snyder, 2007: 69). There was a common

thread during Round Five when the DPRK used the time delay tactic it would resort to escalation, for instance, the nuclear test. Escalation was synonymous with the time delay tactic because North Korea hoped to divert the attention of the parties from the negotiation process that was slowly entrapping them.

North Korea's decision to escalate the nuclear crisis could have resulted in a negotiation becoming entrapped since the parties involved decided to carry on with the negotiations. The escalation was a result of the time delay tactic because during the time that North Korea would use the time delay tactics that is when it ended up escalating. The nuclear test illustrated that both Seoul and Washington had become entrapped since North Korea had gone as far as test-firing a nuclear weapon during the negotiations process. Unintended consequences as a result of the step by step actions taken by the DPRK made it possible for the 'Hermit Kingdom' to advance in nuclear development as the Six-Party Talks progressed (Ha and Chun, 2010: 87). North Korea was not able to only test a nuclear weapon, but it was able to show that Seoul's so-called "engagement policy" was not enough to persuade them to not pursue a nuclear program. Negotiations are meant to de-escalate a conflict (Zartman, 2001: 3-4), which begs the question of why there was a need to continue with a process that was showing signs of failure. The time delay tactics that were being used by North Korea and the U.S.-ROK's decision to go ahead with the negotiations had led the negotiations into entrapment.

Pyongyang has historically escalated tensions in order to define negotiating parameters and extract maximum benefits for minimal concessions (Klingner, 2012: 7). The U.S.-ROK alliance should have realized that by escalating, North Korea knew that South Korea would continue downplaying North Korea's nuclear buildup, which would put a strain on its alliance with the United States. The alliance should have been prepared for North Korea's escalation tactics to avoid entrapment mostly because, as the study has shown, there were opposing views on how the negotiations should be handled, whether or not North Korea had a nuclear missile and how to handle the negotiations when the DPRK chose to delay the negotiations. On the other hand, knowing Pyongyang's art of brinkmanship could have led the United States to underestimate North Korea's

rationality. That could explain why Park (2008: 354) argues that policymakers usually made and implemented policies toward North Korea assuming that North Korean policymakers used the same rational policymaking models; as a result, policy toward North Korea is based on preconceived notions and Western logic that have little relevance to the regime's unique character. When looking at the tactics used during the Six-Party Talks either deliberately used or unintended, the question arises of why the participants continued with the negotiations even if there were clear signs that the negotiation process was creating an environment conducive for entrapment. However, Klingner (2012: 7) points out that, "North Korea's escalation is opportunistic rather than reactive to U.S. actions. By incrementally moving up the escalatory ladder, North Korea retains the initiative and controls the pace of the game; forcing the U.S. and raising tensions may gain Pyongyang what it desires or at least exposes fault lines in an alliance that North Korea can then exploit."

The ROK-U.S. alliance was still not on the same level on the North Korean nuclear issue, they had differing views, which made a clash of interests within the Talks imminent. It should be noted that, the failure of the U.S.-ROK alliance to mutually align on a strategy to deal with the nuclear crisis that had resulted from the time delay tactic played right into North Korea's strategy of wanting to weaken the negotiations. Even though North Korea was conducting nuclear test while it delayed the negotiations, the strain between ROK and the U.S. was making it easier for North Korea to realize its ambitions during a negotiation that was meant to dismantle any nuclear capability from North Korea. From the outset, the Roh Moo-hyun administration believed that the North Korean nuclear issue was deeply embedded in the structure of the Korean conflict. As President Roh once said, North Korea's claim to a nuclear deterrent was seen as a logical response to American nuclear and conventional threats emanating from the military confrontation along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) (Moon, 2008: 99). The U.S. and South Korea had different views on the structure of the nuclear problem, which also played into North Korea's grand strategy of straining the alliance. North Korea was able to strain the alliance because it manipulated the weaknesses within the alliance, which worked in its overall strategy. It can be argued that from the US perspective, even though Washington has nuclear weapons this did not give North Korea the leeway to

carry out a full-blown nuclear program. Whether this justification is fair or not could be discussed in later studies on North Korea's nuclear program against the US. The escalation went on to disrupt communication between the parties, which made it difficult and impossible for them to negotiate with each other (Pruitt, 2005: 254).

However, O'Neill (1991: 105) argues that delays are more acceptable as coercive moves than escalations or threats because holding back seems less actively hostile. In this instance, the delays had a huge impact on the ROK-U.S. alliance because the delays managed to put a strain on the alliance. In the case of the nuclear and missile test during the fourth round, the delay was used to escalate the situation, which could have threatened the Six-Party Talks from moving forward had the parties seen the actions of Pyongyang as deserving an equal reaction. Therefore, by testing nuclear missile device underground in July and test firing a nuclear weapon on 9 October 2006, North Korea risked being labeled a hostile actor. This could have proved the Bush administration right for labeling North Korea as a threat in the "Axis of Evil" speech even though this affected its alliance with South Korea which thought the United States policy was hostile towards North Korea. On the other hand, delays can sometimes raise doubts about whether you really want an agreement and sap the other's motivation to compromise (O'Neill, 1991: 105). Based on the events of 9 October 2006, there is little doubt that North Korea was only using the negotiation time delaying to build up its nuclear weapons. Spangler (2003) makes a contrast argument than that made by O'Neill (1991:105) by arguing, "that if parties are involved in negotiations although there are several tactics that can be used to speed the process up, in extremely complex cases involving multiple parties and many issues, any effort to speed the process must be made carefully. Rushing can easily lead to the process breaking down or to poor agreements being made that will not hold up over the long term."

The nuclear test did not happen by chance as a reaction to the Bush administration's refusal to have bilateral talks with North Korea on the issue of sanctions that were imposed on BDA. It was consequential to Pyongyang's years of stalling the negotiation process that was meant to stop them from pursuing their nuclear ambitions. It can also be argued that the nuclear test happened when the United States had refused to meet

with North Korea on a bilateral level, and South Korea had met with the leaders of North Korea. South Korea's decision to break away from its alliance partner did not stop North Korea from test firing the nuclear missile underground but could have motivated North Korea to do it because this would have strained the alliance even more. The United States had shown North Korea, when it backtracked from the Joint Statement of 2005, that there would be consequences for their actions and South Korea was entertaining North Korea by meeting with them on a bilateral level even though the alliance was meant to be one unit within the negotiation, with one goal and voice. Thus, Sigal (2008: 19) suggests that Seoul and Washington should follow a reciprocal step by step in sustained negotiations to reconcile with Pyongyang in return for its disarming because they cannot be sure whether Pyongyang would abandon its nuclear program.

The **4 July 2006**, tests of seven missiles, including the Taepo-dong 2, prompted the United States to seek a resolution from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemning the tests and threatening sanctions (United Nations, 2006). It can be argued that North Korea had managed to use manipulation and coercive tactics through Round Four with no consequences. Therefore, the United States' decision to call for Resolution 1695, in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) illustrated that any further escalatory action to the already tense situation would be taken seriously. The representative of the DPRK condemned the attempt by stating that "of some countries to misuse the Security Council for the despicable political aim to isolate and put pressure" on his country, and vowed to continue the launches to bolster his country's self-defense (UN, 2006). Therefore, North Korea's decision to escalate the conflict was calculated in order to affect the United States and the path of the negotiation because Pyongyang thought they were not being taken seriously. Thus, Young (1991: 15) argues that calculated escalation has two purposes. One is to convey information, to tell the other side who you are, and most important to demonstrate resolve. The second purpose is to change the objective situation to your advantage or to the other's disadvantage and thus make the other side more eager to compromise. In the case of Round Five, the escalation was also meant to test the limits of the U.S.-ROK alliance. North Korea realized that one party had a soft line approach and the other had a hardline approach to its actions. Therefore, if the party, which had a soft line approach

continued to warm up to North Korea, its strain of the alliance would have been working, because the other party to the alliance would be left isolated.

The U.S. Treasury Department in 2007, following the 2006 underground low-yield nuclear device test, finally relented and allowed the BDA accounts to be returned to North Korea, a test of good faith in Pyongyang (Sigal, 2008: 11-12). It can be argued that the Bush administration's decision to show "good faith" at Pyongyang by allowing the BDA accounts to be returned to North Korea might have been rewarding North Korea's bad behavior, a move that would certainly motivate North Korea to escalate tensions with impunity. The Bush administration was now doing what it had accused South Korea of doing, opening a financial lifeline for North Korea through the Gaeseong projects. The issue of the BDA sanctions had been used to create a wager between South Korea and the United States, which had affected the alliance. The United States' decision to relent on the issue of the sanctions could have been influenced by South Korea that had argued for more carrots instead of sticks which was exactly what North Korea wanted from South Korea. Snyder (2007: 60) points out that the North's use of crisis escalation is an attempt to influence dialogue with Washington as well as efforts to get concessions, preconditions, and responses from the United States at the negotiating table. Based on Snyder (2007), the study argues that the United States had acted the way Pyongyang expected it to act when it decided to test fire a nuclear missile and South Korea had had an influence on the change in direction from the United States. The U.S. should not have given Pyongyang the opportunity to be rewarded for its bad behavior because such a move would have convinced Pyongyang that its tactics were working in favor of their objectives.

Even though the nuclear test ironically worked as a catalyst for renewed Six-Party Talks negotiations, the nuclear test was a strategic failure since Pyongyang came back to the talks more isolated than ever (Snyder, 2007: 67-68). The North's strategy was to delay the negotiations while creating a rift between the U.S. and ROK but not to necessarily end the negotiations before the alliance had been weakened. The United States must have realized that if the negotiations were delayed any further, the process would end therefore it was better to cede certain concessions that would bring Pyongyang back to

the table. Delays do not cost the bargainers directly, but if both delay too long the negotiations will end, and each negotiator would be uncertain whether an agreement is really worth it, but each holds some relevant knowledge on this question, which is signaled back and forth by each party's eagerness or reserve in putting an agreement off (O'Neill, 1991: 105). It can be argued that even though Pyongyang had escalated the tensions during the impasse, the need for a resolution was still there. However, Seoul's earlier stance of adopting policies or views that were in favor of North Korea, was now being used to influence the United States to adopt favorable soft line approaches which were in sync with North Korea's to the detriment of holding North Korea accountable for delaying the negotiations as well as conducting two missile nuclear tests. The United States failed to claim the role of a superpower of leveling North Korea's ability to limit alternatives and control during a negotiation. Meeting North Korea on a bilateral level was some form of loss in that control and ceded power to North Korea that its strategy was working.

It can be argued that North Korea's low-yield underground nuclear device test of 2006 was a result of a well-oiled tactical machine that has become a conduit for North Korea's negotiation strategy of playing one alliance member against the other to weaken their resolve. The North Korean leadership has relied on a variety of familiar approaches in the initial rounds of talks, including calculated efforts to utilize tactics and threats, crisis escalation tactics and creating situations where other parties feel obliged to take actions to "save face" (Snyder, 2007: 48 & 60). In Round Five, North Korea used the diverging policies between the United States and South Korea against the alliance so that the more the other party spoke out against the other party's policies towards North Korea in the negotiations; the more the alliance was strained. Scholars like Pritchard (2003: 2) argue that the primary reason Pyongyang is taken seriously at the negotiating table is because of its track record for violence and because the stakes are usually too high and the consequences for others (not necessarily the negotiators) unacceptable if diplomacy fails. Inaction and overreaction during the Talks, of stalling the process through an exit and operational brinkmanship from the DPRK especially following the nuclear test in 2006 should have been a cause for alarm (Ha and Chun, 2010: 358). It can be argued that the nuclear test of 2006 should have been a wakeup

call to the parties of how North Korea was using their diverging policies to further put a strain on them while continuing its nuclear program. The alliance was focused on addressing their different policies towards North Korea to the extent that North Korea had room to continue with its nuclear ambitions.

The time delay tactic might make those at the receiving end to lose focus on the objectives of the negotiation because of the continuous stalling in the negotiation process. The U.S.-ROK alliance had lost focus, on what had made them get into the negotiations together which made them weaker against North Korea that had the ability to use their weaknesses to strain their alliance. As mentioned above, the alliance was supposed to give pressure to North Korea, but the opposite was taking place. Besides the pressure that the alliance was giving itself through its diverging policies, North Korea was using South Korea as a pawn against the United States. Decision makers have a real choice in deciding whether to persist with or withdraw from the previously chosen course of action which could have entrapped them (Brockner, 1992: 40). Not only did the nuclear test entrap the parties but illustrated that the ROK-U.S. alliance was weak to do anything about it as a cohesive force, that the alliance was supposed to be before North Korea used the time delay tactics.

The alliance's lack of cohesion questions the ability of an alliance to solve a nuclear dilemma when there are competing interests between the alliances. The ballistic missile tests and the nuclear test explosion; were actions, which led critics to liken the Talks to a "dead man walking" (Kerr, 2006: 1). It should be questioned why Washington carried on with the negotiations if it could not even agree with its own alliance partner on the North Korean nuclear issue. Negotiations alone were not enough, and it can further be argued that future negotiations with Pyongyang on its nuclear program would be in vain because North Korea will not give up the only aspect of leverage that has made the Kim regime remain at the center of international dialogue for decades. The "tunnel vision" described by Brockner made it impossible for the United States to see the bad consequences associated with the course of actions they were pursuing. This explains why Meerts (2005: 113) describes parties involved in an entrapped negotiation as failing

to escape from the costs and investments, which they would have already made during or at the start of the process.

Wit (2009: 5) recommends that in order to maximize its chances for success, Washington should: 1) combine measures to convince the North that it is unwilling to accept Pyongyang's nuclear status with progressively tighter negotiated limits on its program; 2) not reach for too much progress too soon since that would lessen the chances of success and endanger any incremental gains already made; and 3) avoid the Bush administration's mistake of setting ambitious objectives not supported by adequate means. Therefore, setting deadlines to the negotiations is very important in dealing with the Korean nuclear issue, the lack of time limits on the negotiations made it possible for North Korea to delay the negotiations to a point that they had the upper hand and the capability to test fire a nuclear weapon. The involvement of South Korea that had its own views, different from those of the United States, to get involved in the negotiations was a miscalculation that worked against the ROK-U.S. partnership. Therefore, future negotiations with North Korea should involve a combination of both cohesive messages between the alliance and time limits if Pyongyang decides to drag its feet in the negotiation process.

4.3.2 Bush administration's 2006 National Security Strategy

The Bush administration's 2006 National Security Strategy, helped to some extent in straining the U.S.-ROK alliance during the Six-Party Talks. Furthermore, the National Security Strategy influenced South Korea to dismiss North Korea's nuclear test because they feared that the US government would react abruptly if an alliance member felt threatened with the development of a nuclear arsenal on the Peninsula. It can be argued that, even though the National Security Strategy was not a direct result of North Korea's time delay tactics, it was a result of North Korea's nuclear test in 2006 that had been aided also by the use of the time delay tactics. The Nuclear Proliferation Strategy stated that the North Korean regime posed a serious nuclear proliferation challenge and it presented a long and bleak record of duplicity and bad faith negotiations (White

house, 2006). The National Security Strategy alarmed Seoul because they thought it was provocative and North Korea could react to it the same way they had reacted to the “Axis of Evil” speech. Instead of supporting the Bush administration policies against North Korea during Round Five, the Roh administration alienated the United States in favor of North Korea, because the United States policies towards North Korea motivated the DPRK to use the time delay tactics.

President Roh even went as far as defending North Korea’s reasons for having nuclear weapons as a deterrent from external threats as rational grounds for Pyongyang to have nuclear weapons (Moon, 2008: 77). It can be argued that the Roh administration was almost on the verge of supporting North Korea’s nuclear program to the detriment of its alliance with the United States, which wanted a complete disarmament of the nuclear program in a verifiable manner. Such a stance from South Korea continued to strain the already strained, alliance and played into Pyongyang’s negation strategy. Lee argues that Pyongyang’s continued brinkmanship had been exacerbated by significant shifts in South Korea’s threat perceptions vis-à-vis North Korea and changes in the ROK-U.S. alliance (2006: 253-254). The statements from Seoul encouraged North Korea to continue justifying its use of the time delay tactic, based on the so-called “hostile policies” by the U.S. that were not friendly towards North Korea.

The Bush administration opposed the broader effort through South Korean President Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy” to normalize relations with the DPRK following the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Litwak, 2017: 14). It invited South Korea to the Six-Party Talks to impose pressure on the DPRK, but the policies that South Korea was following did not encourage a hardline stance on policy. South Korea’s decision to side with North Korea played into North Korea’s strategy to strain the alliance and did not discourage North Korea’s use of the time delay tactics. Before Washington had invited South Korea, they knew about South Korea’s Engagement Policy, which was in complete contrast to the Bush administration’s hardline approach. Therefore, the purpose of South Korea was no longer to give pressure on North Korea, instead North Korea had shifted the tides to make South Korea its ally against the Bush hardline policies which it argued to be of a hostile nature. President Bush’s hardline strategy was influenced by an intelligence

assessment that the DPRK system was under extraordinary stress (Litwak, 2017: 14-15). The United States miscalculated when it invited South Korea to the negotiations because its hardline approach could not be reconciled with South Korea's "Sunshine Policy." Therefore, there was a weakness within the alliance during Round Five, which the DPRK manipulated to strain the alliance from having any successes in addressing its nuclear program.

The U.S. hardline policy toward North Korea is perhaps one of the most fundamental factors that led to the current North Korean nuclear crisis (Lin, 2006: 21). It has been illustrated how throughout the rounds of the Talks, North Korea has always justified its actions based on U.S.-North Korean policy, particularly what the Hermit Kingdom identifies as the "hostile policy." In this section, the purpose of the study is to illustrate how the United States National Security Policy just like South Korea's Engagement Policy played into straining the U.S.-ROK alliance. The study can argue that the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy, was influential in North Korea's nuclear test of 2006 because it argued that it felt threatened by the United States. Throughout Round Five when North Korea used the time delay tactics as the study has illustrated, it gave the United States policy as a justification for its actions. However, this is not to say that North Korea would not have conducted a test of an underground low-yield nuclear missile had the Bush administration's National Security Strategy been any different.

The National Security Strategy was a catalyst amongst a wide range of factors that have motivated North Korea to delay the negotiations while proceeding with its nuclear development. Kim (2011: 249) also argues that even though North Korea is poor and backward, it has been working on nuclear weapons development for several decades even though the diplomatic relationship between Washington and Pyongyang has become highly tense, filled with harsh rhetoric on both sides. Ballbach (2013: 234) concludes that the DPRK's decision to cooperate or not to cooperate in the Six-Party Talks is heavily influenced by its definition of its security situation at a given moment. In other words, North Korea viewed the United States as a threat to its security. Therefore, it justified its low-yield underground nuclear device test during a time it had used the time delay tactic to stall the negotiations on the Bush administration's National Security

Strategy. However, South Korea's decision throughout the fifth round to dismiss North Korea's nuclear program based on Washington's hardline policy remains open for debate.

The United States National Security Strategy labeled North Korea as a threat to national security in different ways, for instance, North Korea was in a position to disrupt global disarmament and non-proliferation agenda; - undermine peace and stability in East Asia and also posed a strategic threat to the United States (Wit, 2009: 7-8). The wording of the National Security Strategy, was all that North Korea needed to justify itself by threatening not to return to the negotiations until what is considered to be a hostile policy was reconsidered by the United States. Furthermore, the hardline stance only gave North Korea ammunition for using the time delay tactics that would derail any progress of reaching a resolution on the nuclear program. The DPRK also used the Bush strategy to justify to South Korea why the United States was the one that was not willing to cooperate with North Korea during Round Five. Thus, the Bush administration's National Security Strategy could have been seen by South Korea as a policy that had a potential to disrupt peace in the Korean Peninsula if negotiations failed to stop North Korea's nuclear program. Litwak (2017: 17) argues that the U.S.' ambivalence about the Six-Party Talks was evident throughout because there were some within the administration that were concerned with "rewarding bad behavior," while pro-engagement pragmatists viewed the talks as a possible mechanism to constrain the North's nuclear capabilities. However, South Korea's decision to align with Pyongyang at the expense of its alliance with Washington could have been handled differently even though South Korea did not agree with the United States approach. They could have had dialogues with Washington on a bilateral level instead of on a platform that had the ability to give North Korea the upper hand in the negotiations.

It should be noted that besides the diverging policy interests that existed between the United States and South Korea, which were working in favor of the DPRK's strategy to strain the alliance, there, was a huge discord within the Bush administration itself on how to handle North Korea as illustrated by Litwak (2017). The diverging policies within the U.S.-ROK alliance played in favor of North Korea because it had been following a

strategy that it new would weaken the alliance. The pro-engagement pragmatists and the hardliners within the Bush administration did not make it easier for the United States to follow one policy that would dismantle North Korea's nuclear program, this could explain why there were always policy shifts from the U.S., for instance, the US did not favor meeting North Korea on a bilateral level but it then went on to carry out countless bilateral meetings with Pyongyang during the whole Six-Party Talks negotiation process. It can be argued that the time delay tactics were given much power to strain the alliance by other factors that North Korea could manipulate to its own advantage, for instance, the National Security Strategy of 2006, which was a direct result of North Korea's nuclear test. Furth More, the discord within the Bush administration made it possible for South Korea to persuade the US to see the negotiations from North Korea's point of view, which also showed how South Korea had become a pawn for North Korea's agenda. It can further be argued that the existence of such disparities contributed to the failure of the US to meet its goal of dismantling North Korea's nuclear program.

4.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be argued that the fifth round did not inspire hope that the North Korea nuclear problem would be resolved. Both carrots and sticks were used in the round, but neither was able to stop North Korea's ambitious nuclear program. The stalling tactic was in itself a means to an end for North Korea and, it can further be argued that North Korea managed to entrap and strain the U.S.-ROK alliance by using their policies against them. Even though North Korea engaged in what could have been labeled as a false negotiation strategy, the Bush National Security Strategy of 2006 and the Sunshine Policy played into North Korea's strategy to weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance. Glozman et al. (2015: 671) point out that false negotiators aim to avoid agreement within the current frame of the negotiations, they also aim to keep the negotiation process alive while concealing their intentions by maintaining a facade of cooperation. Both Washington and Seoul were caught up in a negotiation that was not

coming to a resolution but one that was increasingly weakening their alliance due to their diverging interests that played into North Korea's strategy.

At the beginning of the chapter, the study illustrated how the time delay tactic, remained a source to shift blame towards Washington for the lack of progress in the negotiations. North Korea argued that the Bush administration's Security Strategy and Bush's Axis of Evil speech were used by North Korea to justify why it was using the time delay tactics. The use of the National Security Strategy, as a justification was meant to put a strain on the alliance since one party would be blamed for the lack of progress in the negotiations. However, Seoul continued to play into North Korea's strategy by the isolation of its longtime ally in favor of North Korea that had backtracked from the Joint Statement of 2005. During the fifth round, it continued offering its unwavering support to Pyongyang at the detriment of its alliance with the US. Its Engagement Policy with North Korea was not acting as a source that would motivate North Korea to disarm but was showing signs of vulnerability in the policy. It should be noted that in Chapter 2 the paper argued that the Engagement Policy was one of the reasons that Seoul continued to act as an "advocate in chief" for North Korea even though this was straining its own alliance with the US. Therefore, the nuclear test illustrated that Seoul's approach of warming up to North Korea was only one-sided and was only reciprocated when and if North Korea wanted to use Seoul for its negotiation agenda.

The fifth round ended without significant progress and little substantive discussion about nuclear dismantlement (Pritchard, 2005: 10). Instead of building on the Joint Statement that was signed in 2005, the parties found themselves in enchanted territory where North Korea had raised the stakes by escalating the situation. Christopher Hill had testified before the House of Representatives that Round Five was aimed at considering economic cooperation, energy assistance and a start of the normalization process by drawing up timelines and sequencing of actions through diplomatic channels (U.S. State Department, 2005). However, not all these plans were realized, but instead, Washington imposed sanctions on Pyongyang instead of cooperating with the DPRK because the DPRK had decided to escalate the crisis to new levels by test firing a nuclear weapon. The question that should be raised is since the parties had failed to stop North Korea's

low-yield underground nuclear device test during Round Five, what was going to be changed in Round Six. The diverging interests between the US and South Korea had not been rectified after the nuclear test since Seoul went as far as dismissing North Korea's nuclear program. Therefore the alliance needed to change its approach to the talks moving forward.

The time delay tactic was North Korea's way to show that it did not agree with the course the negotiations were taking even though the course the negotiations had taken as a result of North Korea's actions. Therefore, North Korea's decision to escalate the nuclear crisis although not excusable; was a direct reaction to its frustration with the sanctions that were imposed on BDA and what it called the US' "hostile policy." Thus, Habeeb (1988: 138) argues that the negotiation process consists of the tactical efforts by each side to change the pre-negotiation issue power balance in a more favorable direction to achieve more of its preferred outcomes in an agreement. It should be noted that the time delay tactic that was used in Round Five was a source of North Korea's power to strain the U.S.-ROK alliance even though the alliance' different policies diverged and played into North Korea's strategy of weakening the alliance. Zartman and Rubin (2005: 3) assert that an old-age puzzle in negotiation is the structuralism paradox: on how parties that are considered weak negotiate with states that are regarded as strong and still get something? Or more specifically: how do known (or perceived) weaklings negotiate at all with known (or perceived) heavies and emerge satisfied with the results? It can be argued that Zartman and Rubin's (2005: 3) old age puzzle was showcased during the fifth round. North Korea when it could not get what it wanted it used tactics that had the capacity to derail the negotiations from moving further.

Brockner and Rubin (1985: 151) argue that it seems only logical that individuals would withdraw from a course of action that seems doomed to fail. However, the justification process underlying entrapment may make individuals feel even more committed to the failing course of action. The fifth round illustrated how the parties were committed to continuing with the negotiations even though there were signs that the negotiations alone would not stop North Korea's nuclear program. With each phase that was taken

by the participants, it only saved North Korea to be able to affect the outcome of the negotiation. However, Brockner and Rubin (1985: 151) justify such a turn of events in entrapment by noting that, "It may not be that entrapped decision makers persist in spite of their pessimistic chances for goal attainment rather, they may persist because of such negative expectations." Therefore, it should be questioned whether the United States realized that by the end of the negotiations they would not have attained their goals since they followed a failing course of action.

“Clearly we cannot be reaching a nuclear agreement with North Korea if at the same time they are proliferating.” – Christopher Hill

CHAPTER FIVE

Round Six: The second nuclear test in an entrapped negotiation

5.1 Introduction

The Six-Party Talks process is analogous to a ship sinking, and despite the availability of life vests, the passengers sink with the ship. Meerts (2005: 111) would describe such a scenario as parties draining in a swamp with each move they make the swamp continues to drag them down. Despite the nuclear and missile tests that were carried out, which could have been considered a turning point for the negotiations, the US carried on with the talks into Round Six. Thus, Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance argues that “Decision makers become entrapped in a previous course of action because of their unwillingness to admit to themselves or others that the prior resources were allocated in vain. Therefore, increasing commitment to the negotiation might be seen as the only option.” It can be argued that the missile and nuclear tests that were carried during the process of trying to dismantle the nuclear program should have alerted the parties to the talks that the Six-Party Talks process would be a failure. There were no signs in Round Five that could have inspired parties that North Korea would stop utilizing the time delay tactic to stall any progression during the sixth round of the negotiations. Questions on how to actually get to an agreement and which path to take in order to reach the destination and how and when to stop have been part of the negotiation process since Round one (Grzelczyk, 2009: 108).

The sixth round of the Six-Party Talks on the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula opened at Fangfeiyuan, Diaoyutai State Guesthouse on the morning of 19 March 2007. Wu Dawei, Chairman of this round of talks, Head of the Chinese delegation, said that the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks identified the initial actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement, which indicated that the Six-Party Talks have entered a new

phase of "action-to-action" (MFA China, 2007). The sixth round was seen as the implementation phase of both 9.19 Joint Statement and 2.13 Joint Document even though Round five had failed to implement the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005. Therefore, going into Round six, there was some sense of optimism among the parties that North Korea would dismantle its nuclear program. Hill, Head of the United States delegation and Chun Yung Woo, Head of the delegation of South Korea indicated that the US and the DPRK had to concentrate on efforts to discuss how to carry out the initial actions (MFA China, 2007).

Some scholars saw the Six-Party frameworks as a step towards the future possibility of multilateral security arrangement in East Asia even though on the other hand, security experts were more pessimistic about the prospects of the Six-Party Talks to become an effective framework for confidence-building measures or develop a multilateral security framework (Nakato, 2009: 89). Thus far, the negotiations had not shown that they were capable of securing East Asia and they had served as a platform that North Korea was able to divert parties from the issue at hand to other issues that would help to install any decision on dismantling the nuclear program. The sixth round further cements that parties are bound to continue with a negotiation even though they are on a failing course. Negotiation is needed to end the conflict, to decide the terms of the outcome jointly whether one party prevails or all parties' stalemate in their efforts to prevail (Zartman, 2008: 1). However, the sixth round shall illustrate that even though negotiations are vital they do not always resolve conflict, but they might be an indirect catalyst in escalating a crisis. This is based on how North Korea was able to test fire 2 low yield underground nuclear weapons and missiles during the course of the negotiations. However, this is not to say that negotiations should not be carried out or diplomacy should not be an option when dealing with states like North Korea that can use the platform as a smokescreen for its real agenda.

It is the uncertainty surrounding goal attainment that prompts decision makers to view their allocated resources simultaneously as either investments or expenses (Brockner, 1992: 40). With the commencement of the sixth round, the parties could have known that their investments were becoming expenses because they were not any closer to

resolving the nuclear issue. The assumption made about structural negotiations that the outcome of a negotiation always favors the strong was proving not to be true because the direction the Talks were taking was mostly in favor of North Korea. Brockner (1992: 40) who goes further to point out that sums up the result of the entrapped negotiation, "If the resources allocated lead to goal attainment, then they may be viewed as investments; if they do not, they are considered to be expenses." In light of Brockner's argument, entrapment during the negotiations was a result of the adverse reaction that the time delay tactic had brought with it, and the US' decision to carry on with the negotiations only made North Korea more powerful in affecting the outcome of the Six-Party Talks.

5.2 Beating about the bush to prolong the negotiations

The first session of the sixth round (19-22 March 2007) began on time but came to no substantive agreement in its initial sessions after the North Korean delegation walked out over delays in the release of funds from the sanctioned Banco Delta Asia (Liang, 2012: 4). Such diversions were taking away from the parties the time, to focus on the important matter that had influenced the negotiations, - the issue of denuclearization. Even though the sanctions on BDA were part of resolving the nuclear issue since it had been blacklisted by the United States for money laundering which aided its nuclear program, BDA was a distraction and a reason that was being used by North Korea to continue beating about the bush to avoid reaching an agreement. Thus, Grzelczyk (2009: 111) argues that perhaps Round Six, would have gone more smoothly if they had been limited to the already complex issue of nuclear weapons in contrast to Quinones and Moltz (2004) who assert that it would not have been possible to settle the nuclear problem, at least peacefully, in isolation from other issues.

The sanctions that had been imposed on BDA were part of the efforts by Washington to hold North Korea accountable for its proliferation activities during Round Five (Liang, 2012: 4). Even though the matter spilled over into Round Six, Washington had used sanctions on BDA to stop North Korea from resorting to escalation. It can further be

argued be pointed out that the sanctions not only gave Pyongyang an opportunity to delay the proceedings of the negotiations but made it possible for them to divert attention from the proliferation activities. Thus, Huntley (2007: 457) argues, “North Korea, expresses unshakable faith in its own convictions and its eventual victory, despite its evident inferiority.” Even though the DPRK realized that there would be consequences for the nuclear test, which it carried out, it made sure that Round Six of the Six-Party Talks process would be affected as long as the United States did not remove the sanctions. To some extent, the parties found themselves in a deadlock because of wanting to use sticks for North Korea’s behavior and on the other hand trying to avoid any further delays to the negotiations due to the sticks, which North Korea was not pleased with.

Furthermore, North Korea’s diversions and efforts to distract the parties from discussing the nuclear issue could be translated as its ability to display power within a negotiation process. It can be argued that North Korea’s tactic manifested into power because it held all the cards, which could be used to affect whether a negotiation would move forward or not. However, Bauman *et al.* (1998: 10) argue that it remains open for an argument to what extent North Korea demonstrated the status of a powerful actor during the negotiations. In this instance power was the ability to control the negotiations by avoiding key issues that the Six-Party Talks hoped to address and by alienating the United States from South Korea. Thus Ballbach (2013: 233-234) points out that, “The DPRK’s power position in the Six-Party Talks mainly results from the power structure of its relationship with the other parties involved, primarily the United States and China.”

Kim Gye-gwan, Head of the delegation of the DPRK expressed that if the other sides fulfill their promises as scheduled, DPRK would prepare to shut down, seal up its Yongbyon nuclear facilities, and accept the supervision and verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (MFA China, 2007). From the very start, the DPRK was setting the tone for the sixth round- the negotiations had to go their way, or they would not be cooperative. They were prepared to use promises that were made on the sidelines of discussing its nuclear program to drag the process of denuclearizing and closing down it’s Yongbyon nuclear facility. Even though the negotiation process is a

series of offers, demands, and concessions, in which the two sides inch toward an agreement (Habeeb, 1988: 27), it can be argued that when analyzing North Korea's preconditions during the sixth round they were more than following the precepts of how a negotiation is supposed to be. North Korea was going to use its set of demands as a way out of the negotiations if the other parties did not meet them.

Delaying the negotiations over the release of funds from the sanctioned BDA was a demonstration of power. The negotiation would not move forward if Pyongyang's demands were not met and the success of the whole negotiation process depended on North Korea's participation- North Korea knew this, and they used it to their own advantage. The weaker party may find it advantageous to protect his or her interests by blocking progress and hence avoiding an agreement that reflects the existing power imbalance (Faure, 2005: 34). It can be argued that the existing sanctions on BDA (reason North Korea was using as an excuse to delay the process) were interpreted in Pyongyang as Washington's attempt to show its power over North Korea, therefore, the only way that they could overturn the power imbalance was if, they delayed Round Six until the sanctions were removed. North Korea wanted sanctions on BDA lifted and at the same time maintain its nuclear program, even if it meant they would not be held accountable for their actions.

When linked together in a relationship, the two unequal parties should seek the greatest independence of action rather than submit to the other's restraints; yet weaker parties not only take on stronger ones in negotiation, they often emerge with sizable – even better than expected results (Zartman & Rubin, 2005: 4). It can be argued that even though the United States had better options as the stronger party getting into the negotiation, Kim Gye-gwan's demands at the start of the sixth round illustrated that Pyongyang wanted to emerge out of the negotiations not only with its nuclear program but also with a financial system that was not under sanctions. However, Ballbach (2013: 230) notes that after the technical problems in transferring the sums of money to North Korea, the six nations barely negotiated as they waited for the money transfer and this broke down the negotiations. It is important to note that North Korea was in control of the pace the negotiations were taking even though structurally they were not in a

powerful position to do so. However, Martin (2008: 8) argues that at times North Korea has shown its willingness to delay and thwart negotiations and achievements in the short term, whether by calling for the expulsion of Japan from the Six-Party Talks process or the on/off relationship that it maintains with the Republic of Korea to its south.

It can be argued that the first phase of Round Six ended without any progress because the release of the North's funds had become the main issue that would determine the course of the negotiations. Based on the nuclear test that was carried during the sixth round, it can be argued that the issue of funds was merely a time delay tactic to distract the key players from focusing on the development of the nuclear program. Bauman *et al.* (1998: 10) argue that for a weaker state the autonomy and influence are less than that of a superpower, its opportunities for actually pursuing autonomy and influence seeking policy are low. Therefore, the DPRK used every opportunity that it could get during the negotiations to stall the process because that was how it could only affect the negotiations. Thus, tactics, when used strategically within a negotiation by a weaker party, can redirect the campus on who poses the power within a negotiation setting. On the other hand, Ballbach (2013: 232) argues that the DPRK should have hardly been able to induce any sort of influence on its main counterpart in the Six-Party Talks- the US.

Zartman and Rubin (2005: 4) argue that the negotiation process might even power asymmetries because the very act of negotiating has the real effect of leveling the playing field, producing at least rough symmetry. The US was no longer controlling the negotiation, but it was now being controlled by North Korea. It can be argued that the party that has most to lose in a negotiation is the one that is most likely to use tactics that might derail the negotiation process. In the case of Round Six, North Korea had the most to lose since it had a crumbling financial system and a clear goal of maintaining its nuclear ambitions at the same time. The effects of the restrictions on BDA had devastating economic ramifications on North Korea's ability to generate badly needed hard currency. (Bechtol, 2009: 33). Thus, the issue of sanctions that were imposed on BDA became at the forefront of Round Six and influenced the stalemate; even though

putting the issue on the forefront was a mere destruction. However, Buszynski (2013: 192) points out that the top leadership in North Korea was undecided about the value of the Six-Party Talks, or unsure about the technical feasibility of developing nuclear weapons, therefore it could have been possible to influence them.

On the other hand, Glozman *et al.* (2015: 689) argue that those who use the time delay tactic delay their responses, avoid discussion of core issues, postpone concrete offers, and at the end, these measures contributed to the derailment of the negotiations. The issue of BDA that became the major topic of the sixth round was North Korea's attempt to avoid discussing the core issue of the nuclear program. However, this is not to discredit North Korea's concerns about the sanctions on BDA but to display how the issue overshadowed the nuclear talks and even went further to cause a stalemate during the beginning of the negotiations. It can be argued that the time delay tactic had affected the alternatives, commitment and control of the United States during the negotiations and as the negotiations continued the use of the tactic was favoring an outcome in line with North Korea and the Six-Party process was moving further away from reaching an agreement on North Korea's nuclear program.

Habeeb (1988: 140) argues that both weak and strong states should constantly try to assess the components of the issue power balance- alternatives, commitment, and control; negotiators must be able to assess the issue power balance at any given point in the negotiations as well as try to understand to what degree and to whose favor the balance is changing. Instead of assessing how Pyongyang was laying down a trap for them, Washington was focused on removing sanctions on BDA even though they had proved to be effective. On the other hand, Ballbach (2013: 234) describes the position of the DPRK as that of seeking influence to convert capabilities into influence, to that end the North's participation in the negotiations did not necessarily predict a cooperative policy within the Talks. Therefore, the US should have focused more on trying to interpret the intentions of the DPRK in the negotiations instead of being strung along to focus on matters that were destructing to the negotiation process.

One result from the sanctions on BDA's illicit activities surprised even American policymakers because of the large-scale benefit for North Korea's elite, Kim Jong-il's

slush fund, and even military funding, Pyongyang actually began to hurt financially (Bechtol, 2009: 33). The decision by Pyongyang to put the issue of BDA on the forefront of the negotiations although it could be described as a distraction from the real issues that the parties could have focused on, it was a sign that economic sanctions could ruffle the DPRK, and there was an important tool that could be used by the parties during the negotiations to stop North Korea from delaying the negotiation process or walking out. However, future studies could analyze how the sanctions on the Macao based Banco Delta Asia could have been used by the United States to stop North Korea from carrying out another nuclear test since their presence had showcased that sanctions were still an important tool. The United States had been looking for a way to leverage the North Koreans since the very beginning of the Six-Party Talks in 2003 (Bechtol, 2009: 33). Therefore, the question that could be raised is was North Korea's threat to delay the negotiations from commencing more powerful than the sanctions that had proved that North Korea could be brought to its knees.

It could be argued that delaying the negotiations or threatening to delay the negotiations if Pyongyang could not get what it wanted must have been frustrating for the parties particularly the United States. Thus, O'Neil (1991: 105) points out that there is always a risk that negotiations will end and this gives the delay tactic its credibility as a signal (O'Neill, 1991: 105). Therefore, the United States had two options, either to ignore North Korea's demands as the negotiations crumbled or to agree to North Korea's demands so that the negotiations would continue. In 2007, President Bush had shown that he was willing to reverse his hitherto hardline stance in an attempt to see if engagement with North Korea, even after it tested a nuclear device, would possibly break the logjam (Kim, 2008: 107). The United States had chosen to give in to North Korea's delaying tactics so that the negotiation process would stay alive even though the DPRK's tactics had not been in the best interests of the United States. However, it should be questioned whether it was in the best interests of the negotiations to keep them going since North Korea had proven to be uncooperative in the past and during the current round of negotiations.

Glozman *et al.* (2015: 673) would describe North Korea as a party that engages in false negotiations, because like false negotiators the 'Hermit Kingdom' tends to assume that its prospects are superior to those it might obtain from sincere negotiations; it also assumes that their chances of being exposed are small and that the potential damage to their reputation (if they are exposed) would be limited and well worth the risk. Pyongyang had demonstrated that it was not worried about a damaged reputation but was more worried about making sure that they would outplay Washington during the negotiations. Although resumption of the Six-Party Talks in 2007 was followed by the DPRK's demolition of the cooling tower at Yongbyon and Pyongyang's release to the United States of key documents relating to its nuclear program in 2008, this did not result in the DPRK's termination of its nuclear program (Tan, 2014: 9). The demolition of the cooling tower was in return for lifting the BDA sanctions. It can further be argued that the use of the time delay tactic and its ability to avoid the nuclear issue, illustrates that North Korea did not intend to maintain a long-term relationship with the US or South Korea. Both Washington and Seoul were being dragged along for the purpose of achieving something greater- a nuclear capability.

A party may delay the current process because it expects or considers that the tenure of the administration being difficult as a reason to delay the negotiation hoping the new administration would be more amenable to its interests (Glozman *et al.*, 2015: 672). The sixth round of the Six-Party Talks had started towards the last year of the Bush administration, and this could have encouraged North Korea decision to stall any Talks before the issue of BDA was resolved. It can be argued that Pyongyang viewed the Bush administration's policy as stiff when it came to North Korea, and it had justified its nuclear intentions based on what it perceived as a hardline Bush national security against the DPRK. North Korea's views on the Bush administration had strained the Washington-Seoul alliance. Therefore Pyongyang stalling the negotiation in hopes for favorable Korean policies from the next administration was to some extent a calculated response.

Pyongyang seemed to play a waiting game until the Obama administration took office because during the election campaign, Obama announced that he proposed to engage

in dialogue with North Korea and even visit Pyongyang if necessary (Pardo, 2014: 80-81). It should be noted that stalling a negotiation process based on the electoral process in another system is not unique to the Six-Party Talks. The tactic has been used in several negotiations, and the DPRK saw an opportunity when then-presidential elect Obama announced that he was willing to talk or even visit Pyongyang. Pyongyang became increasingly unwilling to make more than the necessary concessions to the Bush administration, hoping that an Obama administration would prove easier to negotiate with (Pardo, 2014: 81). It can be argued that there was no reason for North Korea to continue negotiating with an administration that had a term which was coming to an end, besides the incoming Obama administration had given Pyongyang reason to hope that its policies would be accommodating because it was willing to send the president to have direct bilateral talks with the Kim administration. Although North Korean nuclear and missile tests must be strongly condemned, its actions suggest that the country had taken a note of the Obama administration's willingness to engage and had started to prepare for future negotiations by strengthening its bargaining position (Michishita, 2009: 139).

5.3 Dragging out the negotiations until some external or internal change occurs

Even though North Korea might have been labeled as a cooperative participant during Round Six, its tendency to resort to time delay when it was not happy with the agreements during the negotiations or when it wanted to divert attention from the main subject had implications on the success of the sixth round. The round was supposed to illustrate that the past years of negotiating with North Korea on its nuclear program had borne fruit, but instead, the round broke down the negotiations. By widely accepted definition, negotiation occurs between parties who seek agreement, but there are situations in which one party appears to negotiate even though they are determined to avoid any "meeting of the minds" (Willihan, 1998: 257). Throughout Round Six, North Korea had made it impossible for the nuclear issue to be at the forefront of the negotiations which also made it possible for it to follow a 'delay the talks' strategy in an attempt to maintain its nuclear program. However, there were consequences that

emanated after the tactic was used mostly to the detriment of Washington that had hoped to reach an agreement that would facilitate the termination of North Korea's nuclear program.

5.3.1 The 2009 underground nuclear test

On September 17, 2008, there were reports that North Korea has nearly completed a new missile test site on its western coast near the village of Pongdong-ni (Arms control, 2017). The reports came out during the time when the negotiations had a stalemate because of lack of cohesion on how to move forward on a verification system. This cements the argument that, North Korea used the time delays to develop its nuclear program. Faure (2005: 23-24) goes further to argue that a stalemate may trigger escalation, which would force the other party to restart the process. It can be argued that North Korea's strategy of developing its nuclear capability while the negotiations were in limbo had started since the fourth round and because the strategy had worked leading to the 2006 nuclear and missile test, they decided to carry on using it. Every time Pyongyang resorted to escalation, it expected a response from the US in either a concession to break the deadlock or direct bilateral meetings with the Bush administration. Thus, Bechtol (2009: 40) argues that the year 2008 proved to be a very frustrating one for many in both the Bush administration and those involved in the Six-Party Talks who were hoping to oversee the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program.

As the North Koreans were preparing to launch another missile test, respected analysts in both the United States and South Korea assessed that it was being used to get the United States to ease its stranglehold on the North Korean economy that was a result of the crackdown on illicit activities and the banks that supported it (Bechtol, 2009: 34). It can be argued that North Korea's escalatory nature during a negotiation is highly motivated with the actions of the US. In this instance Pyongyang was preparing to launch a test because the sanctions on BDA had managed to strangle North Korea's economy, therefore, preparation for launching a test amidst the hiatus of the

negotiations was to force a reaction from Washington. In as much as it could be argued that Pyongyang's preparation to launch a test was to demonstrate resolve, it should be noted that by increasing the stacks in the negotiation it was repeating actions that it had previously used in Round Five. The negotiations had continued. Therefore, Pyongyang realized that another test in the same negotiation process would not jeopardize the negotiation process from moving forward. Thus, Meerts (2005: 120) argues that victims of entrapment are often trapped by their own actions. Washington's decision to continue with the negotiations following the 2006 nuclear and missile test had created an environment conducive for North Korea to do it again in the sixth round. Therefore, Pyongyang's actions during the sixth round were a continuation of lessons learned from the previous rounds on how Washington would react if the stacks were raised during the negotiations.

In many negotiations, not all the parties benefit either simultaneously or equally because negotiations rarely have a win-lose structure, it can be safely assumed that neither do they always produce a win-win outcome (Jeong, 2016: 109). The DPRK managed to test fire two nuclear weapons from 2006 to 2009, during the Six-Party Talks even though the yield capacity of the bombs has been widely contested; North Korea had kept its nuclear ambitions alive. Therefore, in the case of Round Six of the Six-Party Talks, there was a winner who managed to keep its nuclear weapons and divert attention to issues that made the issue of nuclear disarmament get at the bottom of the Round Six negotiation agenda. The DPRK's strategy of using coercion as a result of its delaying tactic against the United States had worked. Even after the missile and nuclear tests, the United States had expressed willingness to engage with North Korea if it demonstrated a serious willingness to negotiate (Michishita, 2009: 144). Even though the United States, had problems with the way South Korea engaged with North Korea, it was also falling into a trap where it would engage North Korea even though it was an uncooperative participant.

North Korea's strategy and tactics of escalation have served North Korea well in pursuing its objectives during negotiations over nuclear issues, thus North Korean negotiators seek equivalency and observe reciprocity in negotiations with the U.S. while

continuing to be trapped by a zero-sum dynamic of one-upmanship in negotiations with South Korea (Snyder, 1999: 9). It can be argued that the nuclear test did not happen by chance, but there was an opportunity which was presented to North Korea that showed Washington that Pyongyang's nuclear program would be the focal point of the DPRK's negotiating strategy in the current framework of negotiations and in the future. In other words, the DPRK's nuclear program is a strategy on its own that is used to react to a situation in the negotiations that the Kim regime might not be amused with. Carrying out a second underground nuclear test a few kilometers from its 2006 test site near the village of P'unggye in the same framework of negotiations demonstrated that whatever decision that would be taken in the Six-Party Talks negotiations had to be in favor of North Korea's positions otherwise they would resort to escalation (Snyder, 1999: 22). Therefore, the question that should be asked is how negotiators should deal with states like North Korea who always resort to escalation while using the time delay tactics when the negotiations are not going their way.

Downs (2009: 5) explains the dilemma that negotiators are presented with when dealing with the DPRK by pointing out that, "North Korea escapes being called to task for infractions of international agreements because those who wish to see them stay at a negotiating table strive to maintain a commodious environment. It can be argued that Washington had not found a way to deal with Pyongyang's penchant to always increase the stakes if the negotiations did not go their way. Withdrawing from the Six-Party Talks because it was not happy with the way the negotiations had not started with the Six-Party Talks because North Korea had resorted to the same strategy to get out of the Agreed Framework and the NPT. Bechtol (2009: 21) goes further to point out that North Korea's was not even willing to answer important questions about its proliferation to rogue states, its Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) program, and the locations or numbers of its plutonium weapons. To some extent North Korea's need to avoid discussing its HEU program and plutonium weapons illustrated that the negotiations would end in failure with parties being where they had been with North Korea before the negotiations started.

North Korea rejected IAEA and US monitors from the Yongbyon nuclear complex (Arms control, 2017). All the gains that were made in round six and the previous rounds were reversed by North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Six-Party Talks. It can be argued that fear of the DPRK's withdrawal from the negotiations is what had driven Washington and Seoul to overlook its use of the time delay to derail the negotiation process because they wanted an agreement more than they wanted to hold the DPRK accountable for its tactics. Thus Down (2009: 2-3) argues that Western negotiators avoid raising some issues that might irritate the North Koreans and cause them to call off the talks. The North Koreans, accordingly, benefit from merely entering into negotiations, regardless of the outcome. Therefore, by virtue of having participated in the Six-Party Talks, the outcome would have benefitted the DPRK.

5.3.2 The U.S.' miscalculations

In 2007, President Bush started reversing his hitherto hardline stance in an attempt to see if engagement with North Korea, even after it tested a nuclear device, would possibly break the logjam (Kim, 2008: 107). It should be noted that South Korea had pushed the United States to engage with North Korea and stop its hardline approach towards Pyongyang as a result of its own 'engagement policy' towards the DPRK. The South Korean policy had not only strained the U.S.-ROK alliance, but it had failed to stop North Korea's nuclear program. Therefore, the U.S.' decision to opt for a more engaging approach towards North Korea could have come as a surprising pivot considering they had been critical of South Korea's policy during Round Four of the Six-Party Talks. This raises the question of how the United States' choice to reverse on engaging North Korea because it wanted to avoid instances where Pyongyang would delay the negotiations affect the outcome of Round Six of the negotiations.

North Korea had been removed from the Trading with the enemy act (TWEA) (the US had considered North Korea to be technically an enemy and had had no official trade relations for almost sixty years) and the Department of State's list of state sponsors of terrorism (SST) in June and October 2008 (Pardo, 2014: 80). Round Six of the Six-Party

Talks revealed that during a negotiation the stronger parties in a negotiation could miscalculate the direction in which a negotiation was headed. Washington had removed Pyongyang on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, a concession that should have shown North Korea that Washington was willing to cooperate but, Washington's gesture was met with a blow when North Korea rejected the request for nuclear sampling which is a crucial means of nuclear verification and which was previously agreed to in 2007 between the US and the DPRK by an oral agreement. In this regard, Pyongyang denied such an agreement was made and refused to include it in an agreed document between the two sides (Lee *et al.*, 2009: 540). It can be argued that even though the US had miscalculated, North Korea's decision to walk back on a previous agreement was also influenced by the domestic political changes (the election of President Obama) that were taking place in Washington.

Even though the US' removal of the DPRK from the state sponsors of terrorism was a way of inducing a nuclear solution (Lee *et al.*, 2009: 540); it did not acquire the desired result but could have paved the way for North Korea's nuclear program. It should be noted that North Korea had threatened to delay and had used its inclusion on the state sponsors of terrorism as a reason to delay the negotiations as well as pursue a nuclear program. However, the removal of North Korea from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism did not stop North Korea from going ahead with the nuclear test even though it had once stated that the Bush administration's National Security Strategy against Pyongyang was the reason it had been pursuing the nuclear program. Therefore, North Korea would have pursued the nuclear program either way, and this created a lose-lose situation for Washington. Thus Downs, (2009: 2-3) argue that although North Korea brings very little to the negotiating table, it has consistently won benefits that strengthen the regime's political control and improve its military capabilities and North Korea's manipulation of the negotiating process, is what makes North Korea matter at all. Were it not for the regime's careful and clever management of the process of negotiation, few people outside the Korean peninsula would have had any reason at all to concern themselves with North Korea (Downs, 2009: 2-3).

While there is no uniform interpretation of North Korea's foreign policy with regard to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), one commonly held perspective is to view it as irrational and thus beyond systematic explanation (Kim & Choy, 2011: 462). It can be argued that the United States miscalculation of thinking that Pyongyang would move towards dismantling its nuclear program because it had been removed from the SPT list shortsighted because the DPRK's negotiation strategy throughout the Six-Party Talks was to improve its position in the negotiations while weakening the position of the US. Even though the United States policy had been developed around the ill-founded belief that the United States could exploit the DPRK's "overriding stake in joining the international community by forcing it to alter its behavior without serious direct engagement" (Pritchard, 2007: 58-59). Washington's decision to yield to Pyongyang's pressure of a possible delay in the negotiations limited their alternatives and choices in how they would respond to North Korea if it decided not to follow through on its promise that it would dismantle the nuclear program if certain concessions were met.

The blueprint that was released by the parties during Round Six did not call for North Korea to either give details of its HEU program or its proliferation to Syria (Bechtol, 2009: 40). It can be argued that since the beginning of the fourth round the United States had chosen to ignore issues of verification that were important in addressing North Korea's nuclear program. Arguably, this was motivated by the need to move towards an agreement while appeasing North Korea instead of focusing on the core issues that would make sure that North Korea's nuclear program would be dismantled in a way that would close loopholes for it to walk back on agreements. Therefore, the Bush administration was caught up in a trap where it felt obliged to appease Pyongyang so that they would not walk out of negotiations or risk a time delay of the negotiations. Thus, Huntley (2007: 455) argues that the Bush administration's policies toward North Korea frequently highlighted the administration's insufficient responsiveness to the "real" circumstances prevailing on the Korean Peninsula and ideationally informed outlooks continued to blinker its responses to Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions and growing capabilities. Therefore, to some extent, the Bush administration's handling of North Korea was complacent in how the DPRK managed to attain nuclear weapons.

The North Koreans pursue every tactic in the book, and they have a reputation for being hardnosed, unyielding, and uncompromising by simply refusing to come to terms, they force tensions to a breaking point, leaving their cliff-hanging opponents biting their nails (Downs, 1999: ix). Therefore, Washington's miscalculation by the lifting of the TWEA and rescinding North Korea's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) was too premature because North Korea had shown that it would use the time to advance its nuclear program through obfuscating and procrastinating. In the case of Round Six, the DPRK's negotiation had not changed, and Bechtol (2009: 40) describes North Korea's efforts at dismantling the facilities at Yongbyon following the Bush administration's rescinding of TWEA and SST as an "agonizingly slow disabling" of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor. However, TWEA and SST were not the only instances that the United States was led into miscalculating the path of the negotiations due to North Korea's time delay tactics, there was also the bilateral meetings that were held between the DPRK and the United States. Both miscalculations might have likely reinforced North Korean core goals and bolstered its confidence and self-assuredness in pursuing them.

It should be noted that there were also high points during Round Six that could have led the United States to miscalculate the direction the negotiation was taking. Pyongyang blew up its cooling tower and made an official declaration of its past nuclear activities but such high moments were soon followed by crises as Pyongyang reversed some of its disablement measures (Kim, 2008: 108). It can be argued that even though Pyongyang was leaning towards dismantling the nuclear program, the moment it received what it wanted particularly being removed from the SST and TWAA it reversed the gains that could have motivated the United States to miscalculate, a strategic tactic that North Korea has used in previous negotiations with the United States. However, Habeeb (1988: 28) argues that the negotiation process thus consists of each side assessing, and revising if necessary, its expectations about what the ultimate agreement will be, based on the concession behavior of the opponent.

5.3.2.1 *The bilateral meetings*

North Korea has always favored bilateral meetings with Washington to the extent that it had used the delay tactic in Round Four to coerce Washington into meeting with them on a bilateral level. However, Washington and Pyongyang held nine bilateral meetings to discuss CVID between June 2007 and December 2008 and the talks resulted in the Kim Jong-il government publishing a document concerning verification that was acceptable to the Bush administration (Pardo, 2014: 83). It can be argued that the bilateral meetings that were held between Washington and Pyongyang were a result of North Korea's use of the delay tactic. Washington wanted to use every strategy to make sure that North Korea would get back to the negotiating table even though it meant that it had to walk back from its earlier standpoint (during the initial rounds of the Six-Party Talks) that it was not willing to meet North Korea on a bilateral level. However, it should be noted that the nine bilateral meetings that took place during the course of Round Six were not unique to Round Six, since, in chapter three and four, it was illustrated how the use of the time delay tactic made it possible for Washington to backtrack from its views on holding bilateral meetings with North Korea.

The meetings that took place between Christopher Hill and North Korea's vice foreign minister, Kim Kye-gwan, were unsuccessful in finding agreement on how to handle the two key issues of contention: UEP and proliferation activities (Kim, 2008: 110). It can be argued that the process of verification should have been dealt with earlier on during the talks and should not have been left as a last minute issue considering nuclear disarmament had influenced the start of the Six-Party Talks. The Bush administration's policy to engage North Korea on a bilateral level was further from its criticism of avoiding the Clinton-era "failure" of dealing with the DPRK bilaterally (Pritchard, 2007: 57). It can be argued that the Bush administration did not have a solid policy on how to handle the Six-Party Talks with North Korea because from the very onset then-President Bush had made it clear that he "loathed" the Kim family in his Axis of Evil speech.

However, Pritchard's accounts of his visits to the DPRK as public servant in his book *"Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic story of how North Korea got the bomb"* makes it clear

that the Bush administration's flip-flops on whether to directly engage North Korea or not were a blatant result of their lack of policy and the United States' isolation from their ally: South Korea since the fourth round of the negotiations (Pritchard, 2007: 1-57). On the other hand, Moore (2008: 18) goes further to argue that, "the divisions within the administration on how to deal with North Korea certainly played some role in explaining why Washington seemed engaged at some points and disengaged at others." It can be argued that the Bush administration should have stuck to one policy to avoid inconsistencies, in as much as negotiations are critical they must be part of a broader strategy that does not create conflict within an administration's policy. By meeting Pyongyang on a bilateral level, Washington had played or given up its highest card, which limited its options during Round Six.

Stephen Bosworth, the United States special representative for North Korea, was given a frosty reception when he visited in March 2009 despite bearing an olive branch of an offer of direct talks toward potential full diplomatic recognition, long thought to be one of the main goals of North Korean policy (Howe, 2010: 77). The study can argue that the United States' decision to have bilateral meetings with Pyongyang was to some extent playing right into North Korea's grand strategy of the optics that came with meeting the United States on a bilateral level. Thus, Kim (2008: 113) points out that there were some United States hardliners who denounced what they called the administration's excessive concessions to the North. It should be noted that most of the miscalculations that the United States took during Round Six were a result of the bilateral meetings, for instance, the October 2008 removal of North Korea from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Although these were carried out as an act of 'good faith', they did not have the desired outcome. However, some scholars like Moore (2008: 10) argue that the attempts by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill via bilateral meetings within the Six-Party Talks to draw North Korea into a bilateral agreement with the United States were admirable even though they were a little too late.

Questions should be raised on why Washington chose to change its policy towards North Korea at a point where the negotiations were showing signs that there would not

be a nuclear deal. It can be suggested that further research on the Six-Party Talks should address why parties in a negotiation might decide to change strategy at a point when the negotiation is showing signs of failure. In the case of Round Six the bilateral meetings did not change North Korea's position on nuclear weapons nor did they change the direction the negotiation was taking but the bilateral meetings managed to stall North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Six-Party Talks. Thus Bush's ambassador to the UN, arms-control specialist John Bolton, who maintains to this day that the bilateral meetings, the overall 2007 agreement with North Korea, and the removal of the DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism were a mistake and a giveaway (Moore, 2008: 18).

On the other hand, it can be argued that the bilateral meetings should not be looked at as a discrepancy in United States policy towards North Korea but should be viewed as an attempt by the United States to keep the negotiations moving forward or an attempt to avoid further delays in a negotiation. These meetings not only allowed the United States insight into the DPRK's thinking but also enabled the United States to directly explain its rather complicated (and often contradictory) policy decisions to the DPRK, as well as negotiate visits by United States officials to Pyongyang and repackage statements of intent (such as the U.S.' "no hostile intent") as "official messages and present them through official channels to the North Koreans" (Pritchard, 2007: 136). However, there was no substantial breakthrough that resulted from the direct talks since North Korea went on to break away from the Six-Party Talks and carried out another nuclear and missile test. Thus, Kim (2013: 289) argues that even though existing theories of coercive diplomacy logically pinpoint missing elements in the negotiating process and resulting outcomes concerning North Korean issues, they do not explain why there has been a failure to obtain the elements crucial for influencing North Korean leaders' perceptions. Therefore, it can be suggested that the bilateral meetings could not have changed North Korea's perceptions

5.3.3 North Korea withdraws from the Six-Party Talks

While the Obama administration was making overtures for improved relations to Pyongyang, a variant of the Taepodong-2 missile was launched by North Korea on April 5, 2009, followed by a second medium range-missile test on 25 May 2009, and Scud and No-dong missile tests on 4 July 2009 (Michishita, 2009: 140). Pyongyang's stalling of the Six-Party Talks had outlived the Bush administration, and its strategy had worked to make sure that they would not be an agreement with the Bush administration that would not facilitate its light water reactor. It can further be argued that since the Obama administration had shown a willingness to engage with North Korea, the Kim regime might have assumed that chances were higher of attaining the light water reactor as opposed to the Bush administration that had followed a hardline approach towards North Korea's nuclear program. President Obama's administration had to shift from its earlier position of engagement to adopting a stance that officials characterized as "strategic patience," maintained the emphasis on changing Pyongyang's behavior and ruled out any concessions merely to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table (Litwak, 2017: 20).

The time delaying strategy that had been used during Round Six had not helped Washington's ambitions of stopping the nuclear program but had led to the failure of the Six-Party Talks. On 14 April 2009, North Korea's Foreign Ministry indicated that Pyongyang was withdrawing from the Six-Party Talks and "will no longer be bound" by any of its agreements (Arms control, 2017). North Korea also said that it would reverse steps taken to disable its nuclear facilities under Six-Party agreements in 2007 and would "fully reprocess" the 8,000 spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor in order to extract plutonium for nuclear weapons (Arms control, 2017). It can be argued that Pyongyang's decision to withdraw from the Six-Party Talks should not have come as a surprise to the other parties. North Korea had used the same strategy of threatening to pull out of negotiations every time the negotiations did not go its way in the hopes of getting high-level political talks with Washington as it had achieved after it threatened to withdraw from the NPT in June 1994. Threatening to withdraw from the negotiations served to advance the DPRK's goals at the expense of Washington's own goals. Nikitin

et al. (2010: 18) argue that Pyongyang's behavior suggested that hard-line elements held sway in decisions such as missile launch, nuclear test, and withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks.

5.4 South Korea's pivot/re-alignment with its ally

In chapter three and four, the study illustrated how the time delay tactic managed to strain the U.S.–ROK alliance, however, during Round Six there was a pivot in South Korea's attitude towards North Korea and the United States. South Korea had isolated its ally because it was convinced that the United States' strategy towards North Korea was not helping in facilitating an agreement and it had chosen to align with the DPRK at the expense of its alliance with Washington. Round Six shows a different attitude from South Korea towards North Korea's actions and realignment between the United States and South Korea. In this section, the study seeks to illustrate the change in South Korean attitude towards the DPRK in a negotiation that had mostly seen South Korea and Washington being manipulated by Pyongyang to affect the Six-Party Talks. The re-alignment of the U.S.-ROK alliance in Round Six illustrates how the time delay tactics can have an adverse reaction once the other parties realize that the tactic is being used to strain their alliance.

Although the Lee government had been complying with American leadership in Round Six, domestic supporters of President Lee have been critical of the Bush administration's conciliatory posture on the North and it represents a complete reversal of the first Bush administration, when hardline United States policies clashed with South Korea's soft-line (Moon, 2008: 103). It can be argued that Seoul had been frustrated with Washington's hardline policy, which is viewed as a deterrent to the success of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but once the tides had turned, it was willing to show discontent with Washington's soft line policy. However, Huntley (2007: 460) argues that throughout the first Bush administration they had made no apparent effort to shape its North Korea policy on the basis of extant conditions and the administration's policy floundered, increasing strains with other regional governments, including ally

South Korea. It can be argued the lack of policy on how to handle the Korean nuclear issue affected the negotiations and could have facilitated in getting Washington entrapped in a failing negotiation because at the beginning of the process they had not formulated a policy that would guard their decisions or that would shape how the negotiations were to be handled. Thus, North Korea saw this as a weakness and used it to its own advantage by (1) straining the Seoul-Washington alliance and (2) continuing with the nuclear program in during a forum that was meant to disable their capability.

In October 2007, Kim Jong Il hosted President Roh and sealed several agreements which he hoped would be honored by Roh's successor, who in all probability would be a conservative (Pardo, 2014: 83). The meeting between Roh and Kim Jong Il took place after North Korea had pulled out of the negotiations due to the sanctions that were imposed on BDA. It can be argued that Kim Jong Il was using the hiatus period from the negotiations to lay down the groundwork that would characterize the South and North relations after Roh's administration ended in 2008. Delaying to get back to the sixth round made it possible for the two Koreas to conduct bilateral meetings since the strategy had proved to be fruitful for North Korea in the previous rounds. It can be argued that at every time Pyongyang had delayed to get back to the Talks, it tried to have bilateral meetings with Seoul in the hopes that Seoul would give pressure to Washington so that they would offer more concession to North Korea. In this case, the BDA sanctions were a major part of the first phase of round six, therefore, North Korea wanted allies that would support the removal of the sanctions thereby leaving Washington isolated.

The Six-Party Talks reconvened in Beijing on 10 July 2008, for three days after a nine-month hiatus and dynamics among six-party members since the previous round of talks had changed dramatically: the two Koreas having become more hostile toward each other and the United States and the DPRK more open for active dialogue (Kim, 2008: 113). This was the first time that South Korea had become critical of North Korea during the Six-Party Talks since it had been pro-engagement with South Korea since the beginning of Round Four. The change is explained by Snyder (2009: 1) who points out that during his election campaign, Lee Myung-bak pledged to restore the alliance with

the United States and campaigned on a policy of conditional engagement toward North Korea. The incoming South Korean government realized how the Roh administration's engagement policy had strained the relations between Washington and Seoul.

It should be noted that there was a change in 'policy' dynamics especially from the alliance, the United States, which had opposed engagement, was now the one initiating engagement and South Korea that had put engagement as a focal point of its policy towards the DPRK was now against engaging their neighbor to the North. Thus, Kim (2007: 284) argues that the six parties appeared to behave more like unitary and rational actors rather than plural and diffused ones. It can be argued that even though Seoul and Washington were an alliance when it came to dealing with North Korea, there was no cohesion, which could have presented North Korea with an opportunity to use their weakness to continue building their nuclear capability.

It can be argued that the change in South Korean behavior towards Pyongyang can be attributed to the election of a new government in Seoul and the sinking of South Korea's navy corvette Cheonan. Kim (2013: 183) argues that the South Korean government has had difficulty pursuing stable and consistent security policies toward North Korea because of indigenous and exogenous variables on the peninsula but the Lee Myung-bak government's hardline approach increased military tension and economic anxiety on the peninsula. The Lee government might have realized that engaging with North Korea would not change its views since the previous Roh administration had tried to engage Pyongyang to no avail. However, North Korea's tactic of always resorting to escalation might have pushed South Korea's posture that had been softening to adopt the hardline approach, which was a clear pivot from the previous approach that South Korea had used towards North Korea.

On 26 March 2010, a mystery explosion near the North Limit Line (NLL) sank the South Korean navy corvette Cheonan. With a heavy loss of life, North Korea was immediately suspected and was seemingly confirmed on May 7, 2010, with the discovery by an international investigatory task force of gunpowder residue on the wreckage consistent with that left from a submarine explosive device (Howe, 2010: 77). It can be argued that the Lee administration was frustrated with North Korea, even though North Korea had

raised the ante in previous rounds through the nuclear test of 2006, these events were not directed at South Korea, but the sinking of the Cheonan was a direct blow to South Korea. Worsening inter-Korean relations could have become burdensome, eroding the previous virtuousness of the Six-Party Talks process and under this situation, South Korea was more likely to be marginalized (Moon, 2010: 103).

Thus South Korea's behavior towards North Korea could have to some extent strained the alliance because the United States was now following a different policy approach to North Korea which was in complete contrast to that Seoul had adopted. To some extent, South Korea had learned that Pyongyang would raise the ante when it suited them-whether there was a hardline approach or the opposite. However, Lee had been under pressure within South Korea to soften his policy toward the North, so as to preserve South Korean influence over events on the Peninsula (Manyin *et al.*, 2010: 2). Within the political branches of South Korea, there will always be those who advocate the hardline approach and those who think following the Sunshine Policy presents a better option for Seoul. Based on past experiences in which Seoul had used both approaches there has always been the same reaction and outcome from North Korea. Therefore, there is no clear alternative that could arguably work to transform the relations or influences between Seoul and Pyongyang.

In late March, South Korea also endorsed the UN Human Rights Council's resolution against North Korea's human rights violations and approved the extension of the mandate for a special rapporteur (Kim, 2008: 114). The sinking of the South Korean naval ship had provoked Seoul considering that in the past rounds of the Six-Party Talks they had refrained from supporting resolutions that would provoke North Korea. It can further be pointed out that Seoul's hardline approach was also a reaction of the direction Round Six was taking. Based on what has been discussed above, Round Six was heading for failure, therefore, continued engagement of North Korea was not going to benefit the Six-Party Talks. However, Kim (2008: 114) goes further to say that, tensions between the two Koreas were raised further after the shooting death of a South Korean tourist at Mount Geumgang in North Korea by a North Korean soldier on July 11. Issues that distracted from discussing the nuclear issue had characterized Round

Six, and the tensions between the North and South (who had once been in agreement in previous rounds) did not help the Six-Party Talks negotiation process.

Even though the Lee government had been pursuing a two-track approach that proposed to the North “De-nuke, Open 3,000,” in which if North Korea denuclearizes, the South would lift its per capita income to \$3,000 within ten years by facilitating opening and reform in the North, it had largely followed the American lead in Round Six (Moon, 2008: 103). South Korea was moving towards adopting a pragmatic approach with less appeasement of Pyongyang since the Roh administration’s appeasement approach towards North Korea had not worked. On the other hand, North Korea was moving towards changing its strategy towards South Korea and at the same time escalating tensions on the peninsula which could have made it, even more, harder for the Lee administration not to follow the U.S.’ lead as it had done in the previous rounds. Thus North Korea severed ties with South Korea and shut down the Consultative Office in the zone as a retaliation to South Korea’s cancellation of almost all trade and aid to North Korea, and went on to cut in half the number of workers employed in the Gaeseung Industrial Complex (Howe, 2010: 77). Thus Snyder (2009: 1-2) argues that Lee’s policies represented a return to a traditional South Korean strategy of closely cooperating with the United States and maintaining a cautious and defensive approach toward North Korea (especially compared with the active engagement approaches of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun).

It can be argued that even though South Korea’s role in Round Six was not as proactive as it had been during the previous rounds, the decision by the Lee administration to follow the lead of the United States in the negotiations illustrated that the ROK-U.S. alliance had not suffered beyond repair as a result of the Roh’s administration’s engagement of North Korea. The more conservative Lee administration illustrated that there would always be different ways in which South Korea (taking into consideration its alliance with Washington) reacts to North Korea. Even though scholars like Moon 2008, doubt the role of South Korea during the Talks its ability to be manipulated by the DPRK to influence United States’ policies should not be dismissed.

South Korea's diplomacy of facilitation aimed at mingling through the horns of the dilemma between no-nukes and no-war, which often created an image of a pro-North Korea, anti-U.S. South Korean position that bandwagon with China showed how impressive South Korea was as a facilitator of the Six-Party process (Moon, 2008: 102). However, the differing approaches (non-engagement and engagement respectively) that both Seoul and Washington had during the final round of the Six-Party Talks should be a testament for future negotiations that alliances are most likely to adopt different approaches at different times in a negotiation depending on the situation or the negotiation climate. Thus, Carpenter and Bandow (2004: 9) argue that "The U.S. and ROK have been allied for more than a half-century and like any relationship between great power and protectorate, the parties frequently have been irritated and angry with one another. Nevertheless, the tie, however strained, has survived."

The relationship with the United States has been the traditional foundation of South Korean strategic thinking. Based on the idea that alliance ties with a distant great power would provide protection for South Korea while maintaining autonomy over one's internal affairs, as opposed to the options of strategic independence (usually regarded as attractive, but untenable) or bandwagoning with a nearby power, which potentially carries greater costs to national sovereignty (Snyder, 2009: 3). Since the Roh administration had come into power, South Korea had pursued policies that threatened the almost fifty-year alliance between Seoul and Washington. The alliance was stronger when it was aligned in policy because this did not present North Korea with a tool that could be used to manipulate the relationship. During his first stop in the United States in April 2008, Lee declared that the "politicization of alliance relations will be behind us" and pledged that the alliance should be based on the principles of "common values, trust, and peace" (Lee, 2008). Further research on the strain that came about between the U.S.-ROK alliance as a product of North Korea's ability to manipulate the alliance could address in depth how the alliance could handle Korean peninsula matters without a possibility of threatening their alliance.

Inter-Korean relations had begun to sour when conservative President Lee Myung-bak took office in February 2008, implementing hardline policies against the North (Kim,

2008: 114). In late 2007, before the Lee administration had gotten into power tensions had been rising between North and South Korea. It can be argued that the sour relations had been a result of many factors, for instance, the transitioning of power that was happening in South Korea. However, the sinking of the South Korean vessels was a major push that changed the relations. Therefore, there was only one option for Seoul- to return and mend its alliance with the United States since this alliance was a source of defense security against North Korea. Thus, President Lee pointed out that, "There have been some concerns about a possible weakening of the Korea-U.S. alliance in recent years. I assure you that we should, and we will move forward. The days of ideology are over. The politicization of alliance relations shall be behind us. We shall not let ideology and politics blind us from common interests, values, and norms" (Lee, 2008). Lee's statement was a demonstration that even though there had been some strains during the course of the Six-Party Talks process, the Washington-Seoul alliance was needed to move forward in addressing a same shared interest of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.

5.5 Conclusion

Round Six of the Six-Party Talks negotiations was a pivotal moment of a process that had sort to address the proliferation activities on the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang continued to use the delay tactic to make sure that the negotiations would not progress. However, Round Six was different to some extent from the previous rounds because there were strategies that were used by North Korea to justify the time delaying the negotiation process. Diversions from the main issue (denuclearization) that had influenced the beginning of the negotiations had been put at the forefront of the Six-Party Talks agenda. The study argued that the time delay tactic was methodically used by using the sanctions on BDA as destruction from addressing the main issue of North Korea's nuclear program as well as its nuclear test in Round Five. Zartman (2008: 1-2) argues that some things are worth escalating and not everything is negotiable, but for the most part, there is a practical as well as moral obligation to investigate the path of negotiation so as to widen it and better enable it to lead to satisfactory outcomes. The

path that Round Six had taken demonstrated that widening the path to a resolution during the Six-Party Talks was destructive to parties who should have been giving their main focus to discussing how to handle North Korea's nuclear program.

It can be argued that the progression of North Korea's nuclear program to carry out two nuclear tests in 2008 and 2009 was also inspired by the domestic political climate in North Korea mainly in the Kim family. United States intelligence analysts speculated that the spike in North Korean belligerence was linked to domestic politics; the ailing Kim Jong-il, who was reported to have suffered a stroke in August 2008, sought to bolster the position of his heir apparent, third son Kim Jong-un (Litwak, 2017: 21). Therefore, the United States and South Korea were not the only parties who were being encouraged to change their policies during the sixth round due to the changing political climates in their states. However, many forces motivated Round six to be different from the other rounds that were held in the Six-Party Talks.

The destructions that were created by North Korea opened a route for a chain of events that would lead to the failure of the Six-Party Talks process. Focus during the time that the negotiations were in session parties were destructed which could have enabled them to fail to address how they would verify the dismantlement of the nuclear program. Hill (2013: 13) argues, "BDA became a sideshow to the ultimate fate of the Six-Party Talks process. To the extent that North Korea failed to note any uranium enrichment in its declaration of nuclear assets which influenced the US negotiators to refuse to accept a verification protocol that did not permit the rest of the six parties to verify its completeness or accuracy". It can be argued that by creating a diversion North Korea wanted to frustrate Washington, which had started the negotiation on a platform that championed CVID. However, due to such destructions that always happened to take the lead in the negotiations verification protocols were never discussed because Pyongyang was in a position where it could affect the direction and a position it could frame the negotiations.

The Bush administration's reluctance to negotiate with North Korea also took a heavy toll on the United States relationship with South Korea however, by Round Six, the U.S.-ROK alliance had begun to show its age, as a new Korean generation seemed

uninterested in celebrating the liturgy of the alliance or reliving the Korean War (Hill, 2013: 11). However, Round Six had happened at a moment where the political climate was changing in both Seoul and Washington which could have made it easier for the incoming Obama and Lee administrations in Washington and Seoul respectively to look at amending the strained alliance during Round Six. The growing gaps in perceptions between a right-leaning United States administration and a left-leaning ROK administration presented North Korea with an opportunity to weaken the alliance so that it could drive its nuclear agenda. The Lee administration, on the other hand, realized the importance of the alliance and it adopted a hard-line stance on North Korea at a time when the U.S. was adopting a soft line approach, which could have complicated further the already strained alliance.

South Korea's decision during Round Six to relook at the importance of its alliance with the United States forms part of a very important dynamic of Round Six of the negotiations. As argued above, there was a chain of events that influenced South Korea to consider which partnership was important between Washington and Pyongyang. However, President Lee summed up the importance of old alliances in his address at the 2008 Annual Korean Society Dinner when he pointed out that, "old friends" are the best friends because, with time, people develop common values, interests, and visions. Second, the friend that stands by in time of challenge is the true friend" (Lee, 2008). Therefore, Lee understood that in an environment where North Korea was increasingly escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula, it was in the interests of Seoul to amend and work on the alliance that they had had with Washington for the past fifty years. It can be suggested that the U.S.-ROK strain during the Six-Party Talks is a dynamic that overshadows negotiations because when an alliance fails to have a cohesive message towards an opponent, the opponent might use this to their advantage and drive their own agenda that which derails the success of the negotiations.

“Unless both sides win, no agreement can be permanent.”- Jimmy Carter

Chapter SIX

Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

From the beginning of Round Four, the DPRK was laying down the groundwork for entrapping the parties to the Six-Party Talks in a negotiation that would not dismantle its nuclear program. Pyongyang’s use of the time delay tactic was an illustration that, it was not willing to dismantle the nuclear program. The negotiations were to a larger extent an extension of North Korea’s pursuit to achieve nuclear capability under the guise of a negotiation that was meant to stop proliferation activities in North Korea. It can further be argued that the tactic mostly worked because of the strained U.S.-ROK alliance. Therefore, in future negotiations with North Korea, both Washington and Seoul should attempt to avoid being entrapped with North Korea’s false pretense negotiation tactics that are meant to create discord within the alliance. Even though Meerts (2005: 137) asserts “Entrapment happens beyond the will of the entrapped, and as such is difficult to see in its early stages of development to the extent that, by the time it has begun to become apparent, it is often too late to escape from it.” The study can argue that the Six-Party Talks consisted of six rounds and the parties had enough opportunity to notice how the negotiations were becoming entrapped, with every Round that the same tactics were used to frustrate any chance of reaching an agreement. By the time it was apparent to the U.S.-ROK alliance, that North Korea was not going to give up its nuclear ambitions it was too late to escape the trap that North Korea had been setting up since Round Four.

6.2 The lack of choices, alternatives, and options

Although the U.S.-ROK alliance, had entered the Six-Party Talks as a coalition or an alliance, they did not possess the qualities of a coalition within the negotiations. A coalition is defined as a set of actors that coordinate their behavior in order to reach goals they have agreed upon (Elgström *et al*, 2001: 112). The U.S.-ROK alliance failed to live up to this litmus test of what an alliance should be in the confines of a negotiation. The failure of the alliance to be a cohesive force against North Korea created a vacuum that did not only leave room for North Korea's time delay tactics to work but also showcase the vulnerabilities that an alliance is faced with in multilateral negotiations. By being strained, the alliance had become uncoordinated on how they would reach their shared goal of dismantling North Korea's nuclear program. The study has made it clear that even though the prospects of having an alliance within a negotiation are good the downsides are even worse if the alliance is not strong enough to overcome the tactics of an opponent that might want to derail the negotiation process. Therefore, in future negotiations, when dealing with a party that uses tactics strategically like North Korea, an alliance should realize that if it is going to attain any success the definitional aspects of a coalition identified by Elgström *et al* 2001 should guide it. Furthermore, it can be suggested that to avoid being frustrated by another party's attempt to create discord in an alliance, negotiators that invite an alliance member to join the negotiations should strive to speak with the same voice.

However, it should be noted that the use of tactics is not unique to the Six-Party Talks but in the case of the Six-Party Talks, North Korea's use of the time delay was highly effective mostly because the U.S.-ROK alliance had different strategies to obtain denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The U.S.-ROK alliance had differing views on how the negotiations should move forward due to diverging policies and different opinions on the DPRK. North Korea used these set of weaknesses to its own advantage. The time delay tactic, in a negotiation that had an alliance that was weak, was used to limit the choices, alternatives, and options for the United States. However, the study does not assume that alliances should not enter into negotiations with a potential adversary together, but seeks to illustrate that when an alliance like that

between U.S. and ROK enters a negotiation, they should stand firm on their mutual goals so that they do not show signs of weaknesses which an adversarial party in a negotiation might use to its own advantage.

South Korea had become a pawn to fulfill North Korea's strategy of weakening the U.S.-ROK alliance but due to its nostalgia for a unified Korean Peninsula, it isolated itself from the U.S. to align with North Korea. Meerts (2005: 114) argues that the party that is used as a pawn does not know the intentions of the instigator because the instigator hides its true intentions until the party it wants to entrap is sufficiently entrapped so that they could no longer escape from the process. As the study has shown, South Korea was not aware that it was being used as a pawn in North Korea's strategy of straining the U.S.-ROK alliance while limiting the choices of the United States in the negotiations. It can be suggested that, when members of an alliance join a negotiation against a party that views them with antagonism, it is better if they also view the other party as a possible threat to their coalition. Such a strategy would ensure that the alliance remains aligned without creating an opportunity for the party that seeks to weaken the alliance to do so. This would make it less likely for states like North Korea to use one member of an alliance as a pawn to limit the choices of the other party to the alliance. Even though North Korea and the United States were the two principal actors, the invitation of South Korea to the Six-Party Talks gave South Korea the power to steer the process mostly in North Korea's favor.

The time delay tactics are sometimes calculated to take advantage of the proverbial Western short patience and tendency to reach hurried decisions (Goldman and Rojot, 2003). The assumption that Western democracies tend to make hasty decisions when faced with the time delay tactic contributed to the trap that was set by North Korea. The United States wanted to continue with the process even though there were signs that North Korea was using the tactic to frustrate reaching an agreement. There were decisions that were made by the United States mostly to make sure that the negotiations would progress from one round to another round thereby giving power to North Korea. Some of the concessions that were given to North Korea so that it could get back to the negotiation table only served to limit the options of the United States

during the Six-Party Talks process. Therefore, when parties in a negotiation are faced with another party that is using the stalling tactic, they should avoid focusing on getting an agreement because this could result into the parties giving concessions that they would not have given had the time delay tactic not been used.

The case of the strained U.S.-ROK alliance is a testament to other alliances that get into negotiations to try by all means necessary to avoid being on the opposite sides of the coin because of the effects that a weak alliance might have to the negotiation process. However, Galin (2016: 147) argues that parties might avoid the delay tactic if they set deadlines if, for some reason reaching an agreement after the deadline is still possible, it would be reached under worse conditions than those available before the other party decided to use the time delay tactic. The U.S.-ROK had options that were available for example setting deadlines, which could have helped them to avoid the strain that resulted from North Korea's use of the time delay tactic. It can be suggested that options such as setting deadlines to avoid delaying or stalling the negotiation can only be effective if parties are willing to use punitive measures such as sanctions against a party that attempts to deliberately delay the negotiation process.

It can be argued that a party that uses the time delay tactic does not seek to reach a resolution. Therefore, the adoption of the tactic illustrates how a party has adopted a pretense negotiation strategy. Thus Glazman et al. (2015: 672) argue that false negotiators are motivated to avoid reaching an agreement within the current negotiations, yet they are also motivated to keep the process alive since walking away from the negotiation table would worsen their position and expose them to risks and penalties. Setting deadlines to avoid the time delay tactic would have kept North Korea in the negotiations even though this does not mean the result of the Six-Party Talks would have been any different. The parties would have avoided a strain in their alliance and possibly getting entrapped in a negotiation that North Korea controlled and framed from the time it started using the time delay tactic as a component of issue power in the negotiations.

Besides the time delay tactic being a tool for false negotiators, it can be pointed out that those who utilize the tactic also give false reasons of why they are pursuing a course of

action that is more escalatory than de-escalatory. Pyongyang has repeatedly declared its right to counter the U.S. nuclear threat with a strong physical deterrent, a nuclear deterrent and nuclear weapons which was the justification behind the 9 October 2006, underground nuclear test and 25 May 2009, nuclear test (Kihl, 2011: 79). As the study has illustrated the DPRK was using the United States policies to manipulate South Korea into taking positions that were favorable to the DPRK even though the U.S. had made it clear that it would not attack North Korea. The United States policies were giving North Korea to delay the negotiations whilst also building its nuclear weapons.

A party that is entrapped (or that entraps itself) is in an unenviable position because they lose out on a deal they had hoped to achieve (Meerts, 2005: 113). The time delay tactic did not only strain the alliance as the research has shown but it also created an environment conducive for entrapment. The alliance between the U.S. and South Korea was an opportunity for North Korea to illustrate how Brockner and Rubin (1985) had labeled group decision making as a factor that could possibly influence entrapment. Brockner and Rubin (1985: 99) assert that entrapment describes just one of the many processes by which cohesive groups can become victims of groupthink, and that group cohesiveness may be just one of the many antecedent conditions of entrapment. As illustrated in the study, the U.S.-ROK alliance was not cohesive in its message on how to deal with North Korea yet they were entrapped in the Six-Party Talks negotiations. It could be argued that this was the case because North Korea had managed to strain the alliance through the manipulation of South Korea to affect the decisions of the U.S., which was to some extent how North Korea created group think dynamics between South Korea and Washington. However, it should also be noted that sometimes groups might be prone to entrapment than individuals, whereas in other instances the opposite might be true (Brockner & Rubin, 1985: 100). This raises the question for later studies which could explore whether the outcome of the Six-Party Talks could have been different if the United States had entered the Six-Party Talks without its ally- South Korea.

The U.S.' creation and dependence on their version of North Korea's rationality might have led to "self-entrapment" (Park, 2008: 358). The United States underestimated how

capable North Korea was to change the narrative of the negotiation and how its alliance with South Korea could be used against it. Parties to the negotiation process according to Park (2008: 360) did not think that North Korea would leave up to its threats or let alone test a nuclear weapon. It can be argued that negotiators should not underestimate the capabilities of a weak actor in a negotiation because when they resort to using tactics (which is their only veto power in a negotiation) mostly it is because they have nothing to lose considering the common assumption that the outcome of a negotiation always favor the stronger party in a negotiation. The underestimation of North Korea's use of the time delay tactic facilitated what Park (2008) labeled "self-entrapment," and this also led to the strain in the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Structural approaches typically treat international bargaining problems in terms of the power resources and capabilities of the parties to a negotiation (Hampson & Hart, 1995: 8). However, in this case, the power resources were the tactics that were used to manipulate the outcome of the Six-Party Talks. It can be argued that the methodical use of the time delay tactic by North Korea was a demonstration that strategies and tactics were a tool that could be used by the weaker party so that it can influence the outcome of a negotiation. Thus, Zartman (1988: 33) argues that "tactics" generally serve to restore the structural equality of power between the two parties. Thus, Buszynski (2013: 14) points out that a pivotal player could withhold cooperation from the dominant player because it seizes the opportunity to promote its own objectives, tensions would immediately arise, and the negotiations may stall. It can be argued that the structural approach also explains how the time delay tactic might create an impasse for the negotiations thereby affecting any chance of reaching a resolution.

Chief ROK delegate Song Min-soon appealed all parties to have patience in nuclear talks, "The path is still 'open' for all sides to implement the joint statement through consultations," (Xinhua, 2005). It can be argued that South Korea's role in the Six-Party Talks was more than that of an alliance member that had to sit on the sidelines of the negotiations because its delegation to the Six-Party Talks had the power to influence the continuation of the negotiations even though there was a stalemate as a result of North Korea's time delay tactic. South Korea's influence was the reason why it could be

used by North Korea as a pawn to realize North Korea's strategy in the negotiations. It should be noted that even though the DPRK had walked back from the commitments of the Joint Statement of 2005, South Korea did not see this as an alarming move but instead encouraged the continuation of the Six-Party Talks. It can be argued that based on South Korea's actions, an alliance member like the ROK might not be equipped to encourage the continuation of the negotiations that might end up getting entrapped if they are being influenced by their domestic policies that seek engagement. Such factors could lead an alliance member to miscalculate when a negotiation should end or continue, and the factors could lead the other party to the alliance like the U.S. into getting entrapped in a failing negotiation. In conclusion, diplomacy still remains the best alternative to solve the North Korean nuclear issue and a path for dialogue is can still be achieved if all parties come together. Even though CVID might not happen, the U.S. can still limit North Korea's buildup of its nuclear stockpile. However, it might be time for both the U.S. and South Korea to recognize North Korea as an illegal nuclear power instead of trying to advocate for CVID which North Korea would never agree to.

6.3 Recommendations for future studies

From the beginning of this Chapter, the findings of this study were presented. However, the findings that were listed above are not absolute but could be applied and developed in other future studies. The role of South Korea is very important in any negotiations that involve North Korea's nuclear program. In the future, it would be beneficial if the U.S.-ROK alliance realize the vital role that South Korea can play in denuclearization efforts to avoid South Korea being used by North Korea for its own gains. Furthermore, the alliance would benefit if South Korea's role were not just to give pressure to North Korea but also to act like a party that understands the importance of resolving inter-Korean issues because of its proximity and shared history with North Korea.

The study of Diplomacy could benefit if analysts were to indulge in giving further attention to the conduct of negotiations especially when there is an alliance and another party that views the alliance in an antagonistic manner. The role of an invited alliance

member to a negotiation should not be underestimated, because that party might influence how a structurally weak party acts and reacts in multilateral negotiations.

Finally, when parties enter into a negotiation they should consider how structurally weak parties could tip the outcome of the negotiations in their favor. Therefore, the outcome of a negotiation should not be predetermined because it could go either way especially when tactics are used as a source of power. It should be noted that both a weaker party and a stronger party can use tactics but it is how the tactics are effectively used that can affect the outcome of the negotiations. States like North Korea, which are structurally weak, will always resort to the use of tactics in an attempt to create a level playing field in the negotiations.

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