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THE LIFE OF JOHN DUNN,  
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ZULULAND,  
1879 - 1937.

Thesis submitted for  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS,  
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by

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

- R.C.Z. Resident Commissioner, Zululand.
- D.B.M.O. Dispatch Book of Melmoth Osborn.
- P.P.H.E. Private Papers of Harry Escombe, Natal Archives.
- Uys. "In the Era of Shepstone" C.J.Uys.
- de Kiewiet. "The Imperial Factor" C.W. de Kiewiet.
- Gibson. "The Story of the Zulus" J.Y.Gibson.
- Dunn. "John Dunn, Cetywayo and the Three Generals."
- Walker, "A History of South Africa" Eric A. Walker.
- Russell. "Natal, the Land and its Story" Robert Russell.
- Dybars. "Select Constitutional Documents illustrating South African History, 1795-1910." G.W.Dybars.
- Grant. "Journal of a visit to Cetywayo, King of the Zulus, 1883-1884" Colenso Papers, Natal Archives.
- Digest. "Bishop Colenso's Commentary on Frere's Policy."
- Mackeurtan. "Cradle Days of Natal" G.Mackeurtan.
- op cit. In the work cited.
- ibid. In the same place.
- id. the same person or author.
- passim. In various places in the authority cited.
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P R E F A C E .

The lives of some men are so transmogrified after death as to represent them rather as their mothers believed them to be instead of the men that they really were. The opposite seems to be the fate of John Dunn, whose good has been interred with his bones; for those historians who have mentioned him have not done so in the most favourable light. The reason for this is, perhaps, because their reference to him has been the briefest, and just as a photograph, of say, the Victoria Falls, can never adequately reveal the awe-inspiring object it represents, so a succinct phrase seldom, if ever, shows forth the man.

To date, the following extracts sum up what is thought of John Dunn. Dr. Uys regards him as "the renegade John Dunn who has become a Zulu chief, and who (sic) was in all but name a Zulu";<sup>1</sup> further, he was "that polygamous Anglo-Zulu" who, "it is almost certain .... inspired Cetywayo.... if the diplomatic Cetywayo had stood in need of inspiration...to move against Umbandine."<sup>2</sup> Professor de Kiewiet tells us that "he was that renegade Englishman and gun-runner who lived, in the euphemistic words of Walpole, a mormon-like mode of life, with the habits of a man<sup>3</sup> and yet able to take his place in an officers' mess."<sup>4</sup> Mr. Gibson, who was appointed a magistrate in Zululand in 1889, six years before Dunn's death, speaks of "John Dunn, of subsequent notoriety"<sup>4</sup>, "who had<sup>5</sup> ingratiated himself....with Cetywayo."

1. Uys p. 220.

2. *ibid* p. 209. The passage itself proves that Dunn did not inspire Cetywayo.

3. de Kiewiet p. 247.

4. Gibson p. 103.

5. *Ibid* p. 121.

Professor Walker coupled his name with that of "the traitor Hamu" and briefly refers to him as "the gun-runner who deserted Cetshwayo in his hour of need." <sup>1</sup> Bishop Colenso of Natal remarks that he (Cetshwayo) had obtained .....firearms chiefly by the lucrative agency of Mr. John Dunn who was up till the (Zulu) war began, Cetshwayo's chief adviser although receiving £300 per annum as "Immigration Agent" of the Natal Government". The final touch to this portrait is added by the Bishop's daughter, Miss Harriet Colenso, who, reiterating her father, says, "He was for many years Tonga Emigration Agent to the Natal Government while known <sup>3</sup> to be supplying the Natives with guns wholesale <sup>4</sup>. The "notorious" is an epithet that might suit him. It is rather odd that I have not been able to procure a copy of "Dunn's Book" in Natal. It is called "Cetshwayo and the Three <sup>5</sup> Generals" or something of that sort, but was edited, and no doubt carefully, by Mister Rider <sup>6</sup> Haggard."

Who then was this "notorious" person who has been so denigrated? It is the object of this essay to show John Dunn as he really was; a human being with human failings; a wise chief among both cunning and stupid ones; a beneficent father to his tribe; and one, who although badly treated by the Imperial Government, served that Government both faithfully and well. At the same time we hope to show his place in the South African cosmos.

1. Walker. p.385.
2. Digest. page 433 in notis. No authority is cited.
3. Miss Colenso fails to supply source of information.
4. "by hundreds" was originally intended for "wholesale".
5. Its called "John Dunn, Cetshwayo and the Three Chiefs".
6. It was edited, but by D.C.F. MOODIE. The extract by Miss Colenso, is from the Colenso papers in the possession of Miss Killie Campbell, Durban and is simply referred to as Vol 11, p. ccccxciv.

EARLY DAYS.

In 1824 Robert Newton Dunn married, in England, a beautiful and highly cultured Englishwoman, Ann Harold. She was descended, on her mother's side, from an old titled family. The Duns were apparently respectable middle class people. Robert and Ann had six children. John, one of the younger ones, was born in England in 1834. When he was two years old he came with his parents to Natal<sup>1</sup>. No reason has been advanced for this move.

These were hard times; the Diaspora<sup>2</sup> so innocently begun in Cammander Van Riebeck's day had pushed far afield; so that there were Boer encampments in the present Free State, Transvaal and Natal, while a handful of Englishmen was trying to make a living at Port Natal, (Durban)

It was to this straggling port that the Dunn Family<sup>3</sup> came. At the same time the contemporaneous Lifegane had come to a standstill, and the Bantu hemmed in on all sides were seeking an opportunity to irrupt the white encirclement. In particular, in Zululand, Dingaan was<sup>4</sup> king of the Zulus. Two years after the Duns arrival in Natal this barbarian butchered Retief, who with others had come to 'claim the land' that they had earned<sup>5</sup> by returning to Dingaan cattle stolen by Sikonyela. After the massacre "company after company dashed westward, plumes tossing, shields brandished, assegais flashing to fall upon the scattered and unsuspecting Boer encampments in Natal".<sup>6</sup>

1. F. Dunn, Ginginhlovu: Natal Mercury 19/11/1834.
2. Walker p.203 and p.40.
3. Agar -Hamilton p.3, p.111.
4. He had assassinated King Chaka in October 1829.
5. Walker E.A., "Great Trek" Chap. V. Mackeurtan C.
6. Walker "The Gret Trek" p.165.

<sup>6</sup>  
Natal". Weenen was the first to fall.

After the Weenen massacre and the annihilation of the "Natal Army", Dingaan's impi sacked Port Natal, and John with his parents, and small sisters Louisa, Agnes and Sarah Mary, narrowly escaped with their lives by taking refuge on the brig "Comet" which was luckily at anchor in the bay.<sup>1</sup>

The Dunns sailed in the "Comet" for the Cape and remained there until the trouble in Natal was over, when they returned and settled at Sea View. Their house was the only one there for many years; it was later owned by the Heathcote family, but has disappeared long since,<sup>2</sup> together with the elephants which at that time used to come to the flats "where the racecourse now is, and wander all about, often within a few yards of father's (Robert Dunn) house at Sea View near Clairmont.....and, where the elephants then trumpeted, other rushing monsters called locomotives now shriek"<sup>3</sup>. Like the old fashioned ladies of Cranford, John Dunn had no sympathy for the Industrial Revolution. It was in this early paradise that John, as a boy, hunted big game, often going out at night with "Dr. Taylor of Durban and the officers of the 27th Regiment then stationed at Durban"<sup>4</sup>. But Captain Thomas Charlton Smith of the 27th Foot (the Inniskillings) on his arrival in Natal had more to do than shoot elephants, and in the battle that ensued between his men and the Boers for possession of Natal, John's father remained neutral and suffered much by his pacifism.<sup>5</sup> He was possibly one of the thirty-seven souls aboard the "Mazeppa" which sailed, through an oversight of the Boers, to get help from Delagoa Bay should Dick King's mission prove abortive;

1. Mackeurtan p.228.
2. Natal Mercury 19/11/1934.
3. Dunn's notes. Page-3.
4. Ibid.r..
5. ibid p.100-101. Vide Mackeurtan, Chap.12.

/It so....



It so chanced that King was successful, while the Masepa failed <sup>1</sup>. Natal passed into British hands and the Boers trekked north to found the South African Republic under their President, Andries Pretorius.

When John was fourteen he lost his father, who met his death suddenly on the 4th September, 1847, while elephant hunting <sup>2</sup>. It is the fashion of historians to lay great stress upon events in puberty as affecting later life <sup>3</sup>. John, it will be seen, came from what is termed "a good family" on his mother's side; got a quaint pacificism from his father who preferred to shoot elephants/ <sup>to men;</sup> and above all, there was the loneliness in the boy's life - for a youngster to shoot elephants with 'Dr Taylor and officers of the 27th Foot' clearly indicates the lack of companionship of boys of his own age, and with it a certain precocity.

Now that his father was gone he was deprived of a strong hand so necessary, we are told, to growing boys. Mrs Dunn followed her husband to the grave four years later <sup>4</sup> and John seems to have been utterly alone - no mention being made of his sisters or brothers, if he had any, <sup>5</sup> - and at seventeen he was ready to face the world. His adventurous career from seventeen onwards he has told us himself in his book "John Dunn, Cetywayo and the Three Generals" <sup>6</sup>

/at first.....

1. Mackeurtan. p. 277. et seq.
2. He was trampled to death (Sparks) Robert Dunn died in his 52nd year. His tombstone is in the West St. Cemetery, Durban.
3. Cf A.F. Pollard "Thomas Cranmer" passim and J.E. Neale, "Queen Elizabeth" p.16 and 40. Both regard the Marian persecution as partly blameable to the fact that Mary Tudor at the time of her Mother's disgrace was adolescent and was swept by her emotion into a passionate resistance to the new order of things.
4. She lies buried next to her husband in the West St. Cemetery, Durban. She died 20th June 1851
5. He was possibly the youngest boy and his older sisters were married or had returned to England.
6. The Generals were Chelmsford, Crealock and Wolseley.

At first he took to a wandering existence as he had always been fond of his gun and a solitary life. In 1850 he was engaged, as was also his wagon, to go to the Transvaal with a gentleman who was the proprietor of a Durban paper. On his return he was refused payment and learned that by Roman-Dutch law he could not claim the money as he was not of age. As this was all that civilisation could do for an orphan he wiped the dust of civilisation from off his feet and sought the haunts of large game in uncivilised Zululand, and thus spent the next year shooting with varied success, until, in 1854, he met Captain Walmsley who took him under his wing. Walmsley persuaded him to return to Natal and, eventually, to take office under him at the border between Zululand and Natal <sup>1</sup>, where Walmsley had been appointed Border Guard. Like a famous contemporary, John Rowlands, <sup>2</sup> he found the man who had befriended him more of a father than a master.

By this time the indolent <sup>3</sup> Panda was king of the Zulus, which came about in this wise. Panda was nauseated with the bloodshed of his brother Dingaan and apparently let it be known, for he soon fell under suspicion, and to avoid the consequences, fled into Natal. He was joined in his flight by many of the Zulu people. From the south of the Tongaat River where he halted with all his followers, he sent messages to the Boer leaders asking for protection. After an interview between Panda and a deputation from the Boers, it was agreed that he should assist the farmers in overthrowing Dingaan and be recognised as "Prince of the Emigrant Zulus".

/Thus.....

1. Gibson. Page 103 -104.
2. Better known as Sir Henry Morton Stanley, who had assumed the name of the man who had befriended him. (History of National Biography)
3. Mackeurtan p.254: Gibson p.102.

Thus it came about that in January, 1840, Dingana<sup>1</sup> was hemmed in by Boer and Native forces, and was compelled to seek refuge in the Amaswazi country, north of the Pongola River, on the crest of the Lebombo Mountains, where their King, Sobuza, had him tortured to death. On the 14th February, 1840, at the camp on the Black Umfolosi, Andries Pretorius, in the name of the "Volksraad of the South African Society", claimed as the Republic of Natalia, all the land from the Umzimvubu to the Black Umfolosi and from the Drakensberg to the Sea: at the same time formally installed Panda, the vassal and "great ally" of the farmers, as king of the Zulus. The Republic of Natalia was short-lived. With the British conquest of that territory in 1843, Her Majesty's Commissioner, Colonel Cloete, visited Panda. The result of his visit was a treaty with Panda declaring the Zulu boundary to be the Tugela and also the cession of St. Lucia Bay to Great Britain to prevent Boer outlet to the sea. The documents to which Panda affixed the royal mark were dated the 5th October, 1843. Panda remained under British protection until 1872, when he died, - so stout that he could not walk.

Besides his obesity, Panda was much married and was the father of twenty-four children<sup>4</sup>. His favourite was possibly Umbulazi, but his eldest-born was Cetywayo, "the Slandered One,"<sup>5</sup> Panda's weakness as a ruler was so much felt by the people that their hopes early turned to his sons. Parties began gradually to <sup>(5-6)</sup>

/associate.....

1. The Boers did little of the fighting. Walker p.218. Mackeurtan p.258.
2. Year Book of Union of South Africa, No 4. p. 984. Mackeurtan p.p 253-259. Russell p.p 175-176.
3. Mackeurtan .p. 289.
4. Gibson, p.318 -319, Genealogical table.
5. For the implication of this vide Gibson p.102.

associate themselves either with Umbulazi or Cetywayo. The Izigoza regarded the former as their leader while the famous Usutu party acknowledged Cetywayo. By the time Panda had reigned sixteen years the Zulu nation was thus divided against itself, and he had no power to control the two parties into which it was formed. Sir George Grey, the High Commissioner at that time, urged Panda to divide his lands among all his sons, <sup>2</sup> but ~~and~~ both Theophilus Shepstone, the Secretary of Native Affairs in Natal, <sup>3</sup> and M.W. Pretorius, who had succeeded his father, Andries Pretorius, as President of the South African Republic, advised against this, the former because he hoped thereby to further his schemes for acquiring an undivided Zululand <sup>4</sup>, and the latter because there was more hope of getting a road to St. Lucia Bay from one chief than many. <sup>5</sup> Thus by November 1856 matters reached a crisis; both the twenty-seven year old Cetywayo and Umbulazi were prepared for war. The story of Cetywayo's defeat of his brother at the battle of Mdonakusuka on the 2nd December along the banks of the swollen Tugela River has often been told. <sup>6</sup> Umbulazi sought the aid of the British Government in vain, but Captain Walmsley, the Border Agent, to whom the chief applied personally for help, <sup>7</sup> allowed young Dunn to volunteer with any of the Native police who would go with him to aid Umbulazi.

/ Dunn

1. Gibson, p. 102 - 103.
2. Uys, p. 64/65. Walker p. 723.
3. Shepstone arrived in Natal in 1845. The following year he began to carry out Cloete's Native location policy. Without a police force he shepherded 80,000 Natives into 8 Reserves of some 1,163,000 acres in Natal, which Brookes regards as one of the most brilliant pieces of administrative work recorded in South African History. In 1853 Shepstone became Secretary of Native Affairs, an office which he held until 1876, when he set off to annex the Transvaal.
4. Walker p. 323. Walker here antedates and gives further point to Uys's contention that Shepstone sought a 'safety valve' for Natal vide Uys p. 52, 54 & 30 and especially p. 33; also p. 64.
5. Walker p. 323.
6. Gibson p. 102-105; Russell 209-212; Dunn's Notes p. 4-8
7. Gibson p. 103.

Dunn tells us he "raised a small force and took up quarters with Umbulazi's force of 7,000, but the result was a foregone conclusion. Cetywayo had 20,000 Usutu,<sup>1</sup> in spite of the fact that Dunn's fusillade and presence on horseback caused a feeling of uneasiness among the Usutu, - a horse at that time being an object of terror to many of them<sup>2</sup> - Umbulazi and five brothers were killed.<sup>3</sup> The effect of this battle was to place Cetywayo virtually in possession of the kingdom and he devoted the remaining years of Panda's 'harmless' life to getting rid of any who might pretend to the kingship.

An immediate consequence of this battle of 'Ndondakusuka' was the sweeping off of all the Natal traders' cattle, numbering a thousand, by Cetywayo. The Natal Government later sent Mr. H.F. Fynn to claim them, but he failed to do so. Dunn felt that he could get back this herd and set off to accomplish this self-imposed task. He first met Panda. The old King received him kindly and thanked him for his assistance to his favourite son and told him to see Cetywayo as the cattle were ready to be returned.<sup>4</sup> A little later Dunn made his first acquaintance with Cetywayo, and, strange to relate, they became great friends.<sup>5</sup> It came about in this way; Cetywayo had organised a big hunt when a pride of<sup>Lions</sup> was disturbed, and as they were crossing a ridge about 300 yards distant, Dunn, an excellent shottist, managed to bag three of them. Cetywayo in exultation, embraced him.<sup>6</sup>

/This.....

1. Dunn. p. 4.
2. Dunn p. 5.
3. Mantanteshiya, Undumba, Tshenkweni, SomKawana, Dagulesinge - Gibson P.319.
4. ibid. p.9
5. Gibson says he ingratiated himself with Cetywayo. Gibson p .121.
6. I am indebted to Col. Sparks, Sydenham, for this story which he affirms Dunn told him himself.

This incident possibly was instrumental in Dunn's being able to restore the Traders' cattle but Dunn himself says that Cetywayo mistook him for a Government official, although there was no attempt on Dunn's part to deceive him. He now had to bring the cattle from the Mangwini kraal across the Tugela into Natal, a feat he accomplished without mishap, and one of which "Buffalo Bill" might have been proud. After much red tape and palaver he received £250 for his labour from the Traders.

Cetywayo had asked Janton before his departure if he would not return. The offer seemed tempting enough and as soon as the protracted affair with the traders' cattle was completed, he no doubt bought such kaffir truck as his money would buy and set off for Zululand, and so, by trading with kaffir truck and buying cattle and then selling them in Natal he got together a fortune. His cattle dealings were also responsible for his great friendship with two famous Durban men - Sam Beningfield, the auctioneer, and later, Harry Sparks (now Colonel) who started the firm of Sparks and Young. Colonel Sparks has only the warmest recollections of Dunn.

Dunn settled about 80 miles from Cetywayo's kraal in the Ungoye Forest, a hunter's paradise. Here he built a house and married the first of his forty-eight wives. She was a coloured woman, Catherine Pearson, and had her own house; the others were Natives and 'paid for' under the lobola system. Each lived in a separate hut, and, if we may believe an intimate friend, they were all faithful. For years to come world-famous hunters visited this thick-set, strongly built, heavily bearded man, who spoke slowly and deliberately, and shot extremely well.

/Shortly .....

1. Dunn's Notes p.10-12
2. Dunn's Native name.
3. Dunn's Notes p.12.
4. Natal Mercury 19.11.1934. Col. Sparks is yet with us.
5. Dunn's Notes.
6. So says Col. Sparks who knew her. <sup>Her</sup> ~~and~~ father was white while her mother was Native.
7. Vide Dunn Chap.111 for some fine hunting tales-Godé, Walsbergen & Viasher. S.A. History in pictures. P.70 Dunn's

1  
 Shortly after he was settled he "got mixed up with the politics of the country" , for Cetywayo asked him to be his adviser and occasionally used him in this capacity <sup>2</sup> of which more hereafter. This coming into contact with Cetwayo and the tendering of advice brought with it a certain reward, for verily the labourer is worthy of his hire. Dunn cherished a scheme of getting a further grant of land on the Tugela which was totally uninhabited. This was a belt of country lying between the Tugela and the Amatikulu Rivers and as reward for services rendered he succeeded in obtaining the land. Upon the fact becoming known a number of Natal Natives, who had been attached to him when he had resided in Natal, got permission from the Natal Government to go across the border to reside with him. Cetywayo also gave his consent to some Zulus and this was "the commencement of my starting an independent tribe acknowledging me as their chief and head " <sup>3</sup> . Any Natives who left their headman or chief in Zululand and went to reside in Dunn's district were looked upon as having left the Zulu country and the king's service, and they were not subject to the king's call to arms unless under Dunn, and they were as free from allegiance to their former master as Zulus who had crossed into Natal, but they were not allowed to take their cattle with them as these were considered to be forfeited to the king.

Dunn's land became a haven in a barbarian land; for we are told that Dunn had to prevent many of his people from being taken away by Cetywayo's henchmen and killed, - life was held very cheap in Zululand in those days, - and "if Cetywayo has in some future day to give an account of all the lives he has taken in cold blood, he will have a heavy score to settle " <sup>4</sup>

/Dunn was...

1. Possibly not with any consequence until 1872.  
(See next chapter)
2. Dunn's Notes pp.12-13.
3. ibid p.29.
4. " " p.29.

Dunn was thus established in Zululand. His object now was to try to get all the sparsely populated district from the Tugela to beyond the Ungoye under his control. So far he possessed both ends, each with its own "capital"; the village in the Ungoye district was known as Thwayo N'duku; in the Tugela area it was Mangete. Gradually he was to get the middle district, first, by getting his people to settle there, and then to get a title from the king and Zulu nation to a strip along the coast and part of the Tugela.

These were the happiest days of Dunn's life. Having left civilization<sup>2</sup> he established himself simply upon the model of King Solomon, the Wise.

/CHAPTER II.

1. *ibid.*
2. How civilized Natal was we glean from Mackeurtan pp 260-261. This should be remembered when judging Dunn. Cf. *Lady Dixie* "In the Land of Misfortune" p 72.



Chapter 2."Gun-runner"

What was the high politics of which Dunn had spoken, and in which later on we find him interested? It was none other than that famous trilogy, 'land, labour and security'<sup>1</sup> all over again. Southern Africa is 'no three acres and a cow country', nor is it level or even well watered<sup>2</sup>. The emigrant Boers were, par excellence, pastoralists, and because of the nature of the country they needed, or felt they needed, large tracts of land. Well meaning people use the word transhumance to explain an economic phenomenon peculiar to pastoral people in mountainous countries, namely, that cattle must feed in the highlands in summer and in the lowlands in winter, and, just as the Norwegian farmer has his saeter, or highland farm in summer, and a home farm in the lowlands during winter, so, we find the Boer with a farm in the Highveld and one in the low. When the Boers left the Republic of Natalia after the annexation by the British, they trekked north to a land where transhumance obtained. It is also important to note that besides land they sought security and when they arrived north<sup>3</sup> they found the land was sparsely populated with Natives<sup>4</sup>, who would supply just the labour required.

It is doubtful whether they realised that the Lifaqane, a movement akin to their own, had taken place, or that the land to which they had taken a liking had been temporarily vacated owing to the depredations of Dingaan<sup>5</sup>.

/Suffice.....

1. Walker. The Great Trek.
2. Knowles. Economic Development of the Overseas Empire Volume III. South Africa.
3. In the Utrecht District.
4. Agar Hamilton p.41. Uys p. 66.
5. Hattersley "More Annals of Natal" p.235.

Suffice it is, that they squatted,<sup>(12)</sup> as their economics  
1 expanded, in the present Utrecht district, on land  
belonging to Panda, and from whom they got a concession. 2  
Slowly the Zulus returned to their old haunts, and  
3 Metywago, the virtual ruler of the country felt that he  
needed this land in which were but a handful of Boers. 4  
Civilised people like to annex land legally we can understand  
the high politics which ensued. There can be no doubt that  
land, labour and security were the prime causes of the Zulu  
war of 1879.

We are not here concerned with the moral issue, - that  
3 is not the historian's task; so, we are not going to question  
the right of the more powerful, gun-equipped, land-hungry  
handful of Boers to land which was "practically uninhabited"  
4 but nevertheless belonged to the assegai-armed, but  
numerically superior Zulus; we are not even alarmed at the  
5 Boer forgery of documents to substantiate a claim to part of  
this land, - the Forged Decretals have long shown the unrig-  
ority of their method to concoct a legal weapon with which  
to annex territory; nor are we concerned that Christians  
should take advantage of Barbarians; this was the nature of  
things; the more powerful through dire economic exigency  
usually ousts the weaker and sometimes more civilised tribe;  
6 but we are interested in the facts of the case and we shall  
try to detail what happened dispassionately.

By 1848, the Natal Boers who had crossed over into Northern  
Natal were organising the little Republic of Utrecht.

/on land....

1. Besides the problem of transhumance it should be remembered that the Pongola Bush was the chief source of timber used for the indispensable wagons in the poorly-wooded Transvaal hinterland. de Kiewiet (p. 218)
2. Walker. p. 272.
3. We realise that the moral issue is here expressed as a (preterition.
4. Uys p. 66.
5. de Kiewiet p. 219; p. 225; p. 234.
6. Of Rome and Greece:- Philologists in the centuries to come will no doubt help to interpret historical facts from the Zulu loan words that have entered Afrikaans & vice versa. Cf. Jeaperson-Growth & Structure of the English language passim.

Utrecht on land ceded them by Panda along the Blood River with a hunting track to the Pongola River which significantly enough flows into Delagoa Bay; when in 1855 the neighbouring Leydenburg<sup>1</sup> Republic secured title and right from the Swazis to a wedge of land thrust between Zululand and Swaziland far down towards the Indian Ocean<sup>2</sup> the Boers were ~~now~~<sup>well</sup> on the way towards gaining an outlet to the sea and the consequent realisation of their most cherished dreams— an independent republic, impossible without a port.

Cetywayo was too pre-occupied at this time to devote much attention to the stupidity of the Swazis who were giving away land to the Boers . His preoccupation consisted of securing the succession for himself; for he had not destroyed all pretenders to the throne in 1856. Four years later, two half-brothers, Umtonga and Umgidhlana, sons of Panda and Nomantshali, were felt to be in the way. When they learned that their brother was sending an impi after them, Fléance- like, they fled. Unfortunately they chose as their place of refuge, the Republic of Utrecht. Cetywayo, remembering what the Boers and Panda had done to Dingaan got into touch with the Boers through Cornelius Van Rooyen and asked for the surrender of the refugees. Pretorius was prepared to comply on condition that there should be no

/bloodshed.....

1. In 1946 the emigrant Boers occupied the Leydenburg District which was in possession of the Bapedi (whose future ruler, Sekukuni, was to give the Transvaal Boers so much trouble) and other weak tribes. The Boers decided to purchase the land from Mawazi II, who, they considered had acquired it by conquest. Mswazi II sold the territory for one hundred breeding cattle. His rights to the territory were probably nebulous, but in 1855 he signed a document purporting to cede the actual territory over which he ruled to the Leydenburg Republic (Year Book 1910-20, No 4., pages 964-965; Uys p.120; Gibson pp.115-116.)

2. Vide Walker Map facing p.240.

bloodshed, and would acknowledge Cetywayo as Panda's heir, and give Panda twenty-five head of cattle, provided that they received in return an increase of territory bounded on the east by a line from Rorke's Drift on the Tugela to the Pongola River, the so-called- and perhaps not euphemistically, -Blood River<sup>1</sup> territory, also known as the "Disputed Territory"<sup>1</sup>. Before the final arrangements could be made Pretorius went out of office in September, 1860.

Seven months later, Cetywayo, duly assisted by two brothers, Usiwetu and Usiteku,<sup>2</sup> signed the document of cession in April, 1861, at the farm called "Waaihoek", and Panda eventually ratified it.<sup>3</sup>

Panda, after Umbulazi's defeat in 1856, had tried to safeguard at least two other of his sons, Sikota<sup>4</sup> and Usukungu, by sending them secretly to Natal where they were placed under the protection of the Government and hence Theophilus Shepstone its Secretary of Native Affairs, whose policy it was to get control of Zululand. It was only natural that Cetywayo should suspect Natal, by offering refuge to his brothers, of favouring them to him. Shepstone, alive or not to the treaty of Waaihoek, and taking advantage of Pretorius's absence from office, went to Zululand and amid great pomp and circumstance acknowledged Cetywayo as Panda's heir, but astutely refused to surrender the refugees, thus retaining a handle with which to keep Cetywayo in order. This expedition of Shepstone's was "the thin end of the wedge whereby he hoped to gain control of Zululand, and safeguard Natal's trade"<sup>5</sup>.

/Cetywayo.....

1. Theal IV. p. 151 ff; Uys pp 60-63. p 65; Gibson p 106; Walker p. 323. "six different maps of the Transvaal published between 1870 and 1877, all of them semi-official showed no agreement whatever on either the western or the eastern Transvaal boundaries, varying sometimes as much 150 miles." (de Kiewiet p 213) Vide Walker Historical Atlas Map 15.

2. but see Uys p 66; 3. Walker p 327; 4. Walker p 323, Uys p 63-64, p 80; 5. Uys p. 64.

Cetywayo realised that although Shepstone had acknowledged him as Panda's heir he had been baulked in his desire to rid himself of all opposition, and, on being refused the refugees, petulantly massed his impi on the border. The Natal Garrison and volunteers turned out, and Grey, although strongly deprecating Shepstone's action which stultified his scheme that Panda should divide up his land among his many sons and thereby destroy the Zulu power,<sup>1</sup> nevertheless sent up reinforcements from the Cape; but the crisis passed.<sup>2</sup>

When Pretorius was reelected President in May 1864, he lost no time in implementing the "treaty of Waaikhoek", and thereby furthering his scheme of securing for his Republic an outlet to the sea.<sup>3</sup> He appointed a Transvaal-Zulu Commission to beacon off the line; at the same time, having a care that the Zulus really knew what they were about, he insisted that the Zulu Commission should lay the first stone of every beacon before he allowed his men to build it up.<sup>4</sup>

Unfortunately for the Boers the Zulu Princes Untonga and Umgidhlana evaded the Boer officials and made good their escape into Natal, thereby adding immensely to Shepstone's bargaining power and aiding him to outwit the Boers for control of Zululand. Pretorius, however, knew that the greater part of his contract had been fulfilled; he had acknowledged Cetywayo as heir and cattle had been paid to Panda; further the line had been laid down; surely Cetywayo could not go back on his word; but the Prince had a loophole and had been baulked of his prey a second time

/He .....

1. Uys p.64.
2. Walker p 323.
3. Uys p 61.
4. Walker p 323; Uys p 62.

He refused to acknowledge the Treaty; father Panda returned the bull and cows and denied the cession; and Cetywayo mobilised once more and demanded his land back. The Utrecht farmers went into laager and Kruger, now a rising power in the north gathered a large commando at Wakkerstroom<sup>1</sup> but again war was averted because of affairs in Basutoland, where the Boers had to concentrate their energies against Moshesh. In 1869 Lieutenant-Governor Keate of Natal tried to settle the Blood River controversy<sup>2</sup> with the Zulus but his attempt proved abortive. The Pretoria Government had allotted a few farms in the 'Disputed territory'<sup>3</sup> but had not ventured to do anything more definite when in 1872 Panda lay e-dying; filial Umtonga leaving Natal, avoided Cetywayo's spies and gained the dying King's bedside, received the paternal blessing and left once more for the Republic. When Shepstone learned of the turn of events<sup>4</sup> Panda was no more.

It should be carefully noted that Dunn says nothing about the Boers, and we infer therefore that he had nothing whatsoever to do with them before 1872, eleven years after the Treaty of Waaihoek.

It was about this time that Dunn, 38 years old, began to play an important role in Zulu affairs. This is conjecture based upon his book wherein he makes no reference to the Treaty of Waaihoek. It is assumed that this took place before Dunn became Cetywayo's adviser.

Now Cetywayo, like Charlemagne, could not write and the needs of the time demanded an amanuensis; here was Dunn's work.

/Being.....

1. Theal IV p. 155.
2. Walker p. 343.
3. Walker p. 358.
4. Uys 79 -80.

Being a European he knew the ways of white men, and at the same time the Black men did not doubt his integrity; but to hurl epithets, as some have done, at those who take the other side just because they are on the other side seems to be burking enquiry; to have called Dunn a gun-runner and in all but name a Zulu, rather means that as their adviser he was attempting to meet arms with arms<sup>2</sup>, and being a Zulu in all but name he, better than anyone else understood the Zulu viewpoint. Dunn wrote all Cetywayo's correspondence and no message was sent to the Natal Government without Dunn being first consulted, and when the Natal messenger returned Dunn wrote the letter. He always heard the verbal message and read the answer from the Government<sup>3</sup>. Shepstone<sup>4</sup> seems to have relied on and consulted him

Some time elapsed after Panda's death before the Cetywayo took steps to assume kingship. He designed first to send an expedition against the Swazis whose overlord he claimed to be, but they in turn denied this with good reason.<sup>5</sup> There also lived in the north Cetywayo's half-brother Uhamu (Hamu) and a very capable cousin, Usibebu, both his bitter enemies. Dunn advised against the expedition (because of this northern discontent) and the fact that "all tribes outside Zululand were armed". Cetywayo thereupon asked for guns and Dunn promised that he would try to get some if he would put off the expedition.

/This....

1. A year after Dunn had 'deserted' Cetywayo, for instance, Cetywayo caused the most friendly and cordial letter to be addressed to him - quoted in full: 'Dunn' p. 107-108.
2. Again we repeat that we are not concerned with the moral issue.
3. Notes p. 33. (DUNN. p 33)
4. Uys p. 220.
5. Year Book of the Union No 4. pp 963-64 gives the origin of the Ama Swazi and their relationship to the Zulu.

This decided the issue, and Dunn left for Durban, where at the Royal Hotel he saw Theophilus Shepstone on this matter, telling him that it was his object to arm Cetuyayo as strongly as he could, because he believed in so doing it would be the means of preventing another civil war in Zululand, as, if it were known that Cetuyayo had guns, he would get all the nation on his side. Shepstone, who did not think that Dunn was 'far out' advised him to see Lieutenant-Governor Keate and to state his views to him, which he did.<sup>1</sup> His Excellency granted Dunn a permit to purchase 150 guns and ammunition in open market and on a subsequent occasion granted him another permit to purchase 100 more guns and necessary ammunition. The people of Natal opposed the course he pursued and he was requested not to make any more applications which he refrained from doing, and "as the Government had acted very liberally towards me, I determined not to smuggle any guns or ammunition through Natal, - a resolution I stuck to, although often tempted to break it, as many influential people offered me guns etc at low prices". Cetuyayo was greatly delighted with the guns and powder and said he now really saw that " I was his friend and was advising him for the best "<sup>2</sup>

Because Dunn sold guns to the Natives he was not a gun-runner , - a person engaged in illegal introduction of fire arms into dependent country,<sup>3</sup> for there was 'law and warrant' for what he did and Zululand was not a dependent country at this time.

/It may.....

1. Permission was not obtained by correspondence but verbally. He was introduced by Shepstone and purchased the necessary guns in open market.F.Dunn.
2. Dunn, pp. 27-28.
3. Definition of gun-runner. Oxford Dictionary.



It may be argued that we have only Dunn's word for this, but, happily, J.Y.Gibson, vouches for the truth of these statements which he published in his book, "The Story of the Zulus".<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately Gibson does not quote his authority and it may be that he has quoted from Dunn's book as he has done elsewhere in his history. Are we then to accept the statements made by the Colensos,<sup>2</sup> Walker,<sup>3</sup> and de Kiewiet<sup>4</sup> to the effect that Dunn was a gun-runner. The evidence is overwhelming but, in fairness to Dunn, both the Colensos and de Kiewiet do not cite any authority, and although Walker cites three, two are secondary sources while it is doubtful if he made use of his single primary source.<sup>5</sup> Surely Gibson, a Magistrate of Zyluland would not vindicate Dunn in a revised and extended edition of his work unless it were true? One who knew Dunn intimately denied that he was a gun-runner.<sup>6</sup> Yet, how are we to account for the fact that 7,700 fire arms were surrendered by November, 1880, after the Zulu War,<sup>7</sup> unless we accept the fact that the Zulus were able to buy guns, and then the point is, was Dunn the sole responsible party? Gibson and Russell tell us that they were easily purchased through Delagoa Bay, but many were obviously brought across the Natal border.<sup>8</sup> Dunn says himself that he did not smuggle these guns but he did give his own tribe guns and it is possible that these were confused with those possessed by Cetywayo.<sup>9</sup>

/Again.....

1. Gibson. page 121.
2. Digest p.433 in notis; Colenso papers in possession of Miss Killie Campbell referred to as Vol.2.p. cccxcv.
3. Walker. p.385.
4. de Kiewiet p.247.
5. Vide Walker p.385 in notis and then pp 391-393 in notis where the reference is not specifically mentioned.
6. Sparks.
7. D.B.M.O. Osborn ~~and~~ <sup>to</sup> Colley 10/11/80.
8. Gibson p.121; Russell p. 229.
9. Dunn. page 95.

Again we must not confuse a moral issue with an illegal transaction. We must distinguish between the rightness of selling guns to Natives and Dunn's right to sell such guns. <sup>1</sup> Below we shall show that no less a person than Theophilus Shepstone, the Secretary of Native Affairs, in his official capacity, gave Cetywayo guns. It is quite obvious that this would not have happened had it been wrong to do so. Hence there is not a moral case against Dunn, while Dunn tells us that he had Government permission to sell guns; hence there was no illegal transaction.

If a strict adherence be made to the definition of "Gun-running", he was no gun-runner; for there to be an offence the sale must be illicit, which it was not, and the country must be dependent, which it was not.

Cetywayo now besought Somtseu (Shepstone) to support his assumption of the crown, and Dunn was sent with a deputation to Pietermaritzburg to ask Somtseu to be present at his installation as king at Amahlabatini. <sup>2</sup> Then the rumour was bruited that Umbulazi had not been killed in 1856, but had fled to Natal, <sup>3</sup> and now claimed the throne. Cetywayo would not go to Amahlabatini without Dunn as he feared that the Government wished to make Umbulazi king instead of him. It should be remembered that both Sikota and Usukungu were still safe in Natal, which fact might explain the distorted rumour. Dunn's eldest son at this time was seriously ill and not expected to live, so that he could not leave him, and we are told that Cetywayo who was "by far the ablest of Panda's many sons who proved to be a match for both (Natal and the Transvaal), (and had) for many years successfully played the two European communities off against each other "

/other ".....

1. Vide p.23. *INFRA*.
2. Dunn op cit p.33.
3. Vide p 14. *supra*.

other"<sup>1</sup> burst into tears crying, "if you can't go, I will not; the Spirits would not be with me if you did not go."<sup>2</sup> . Dunn's son recovered, however, and Dunn returned to Cetywayo when both made a start.

The muster was a grand sight. Dunn took up a fine trap<sup>3</sup> with four greys, but Cetywayo, fearing the jealousies of his counsellors would not travel in it at first. They got to their camping ground on the Entonjaneni early, - the exact spot where a decade later Cetywayo was to be re-established on his return from England after exile in the Cape as a result of the Zulu War of 1879. - on the north side of the Umfolosi at a kraal named Umhlambongwena, pool of the crocodile. About 10,000 Zulus, armed only with sticks and shields were ranged about the kraal.<sup>4</sup>

Again there was rumour of war. Many thought that Uhamu and Usibebu were going to take Cetywayo by force, but at the appointed time both Uhamu and Usibebu behaved themselves, and Masipula, Panda's chief induna,<sup>5</sup> proclaimed Cetywayo king. Everything was now ready for the Government nominee, Theophilus Shepstone, whose arrival was awaited with both misgivings and eagerness.<sup>6</sup>

Eventually Mr. Shepstone's escort rode over. It included Lewis Reynolds, a friend of Dunn's, and a later sugar king; Mr. Baines and two officers, Major Clarke<sup>7</sup> and Capt. Escombe. Many suspicious Natives no doubt craned their necks to see Umbulazi, but as soon as the first tension was over, a day of meeting was at last fixed upon for the coronation.

At.....

1. Uys op cdt p.60. It should be noted Uys is here very closely following Walker (Walker op cit p.358)
2. Dunn op cit p.33.
3. There is a photograph of the trap in "Picture Post" Vol 4.No 1.(July 8.1939).p 38. as well as one of Dunn with Zulus bearing arms. (p.39)
4. Russell p.217.
5. Gibson op cit p 124.
6. Dunn op cit pp.33-42.
7. Later Sir Marshall Clarke, the Resident Commissioner of Zululand

At a second meeting the subject of Amatonga labour was broached by Shepstone. It was necessary for Natal to be supplied with Tonga labour, and, in particular, to appoint someone to see that the supply was maintained.<sup>1</sup> Cetywayo agreed that Amatonga Natives on their way to and from Natal should be allowed to travel through Zululand, and he authorised Mr. John Dunn, his chief adviser,<sup>2</sup> to arrange for resting places to be provided for them.<sup>3</sup> The Natal Government duly approved of him in this capacity at a salary of £300 a year, an appointment he retained until the outbreak of the Zulu War in 1879.<sup>3</sup>

At a great hunt before the Coronation Dunn's reputation as a shottist was revealed to the Zulu nation<sup>4</sup>; then on Monday, September 1.1873, the ceremony and installation took place.<sup>5</sup> The new laws were proclaimed by Shepstone after an "audible and hearty assent had been given to them, not by the King (as is erroneously believed), but by his brothers and the Natives and Counsellors in reply to corresponding questions."<sup>6</sup> Thereupon Shepstone "safely planted the symbol of royalty on Cetywayo's swarthy head"<sup>7</sup> to the roar of the full throated acclamations of 10,000 Zulus.

/ When.....

1. Uys contends p.453 under 'de Kiewiet' that the 'Native Problem' was as much a question of labour as of land.
2. Russell p.28.
3. Dunn op cit p.42-49; p 53. vide preface page 2.
4. Dunn op cit. p.46.
5. 1.No indiscriminate shedding of blood.  
2.No Zulu to be condemned without open trial and the public examination of witnesses, and that he would have the right of appeal to the king.  
3.No Zulu life would be taken without the sanction of the king even after such trial had taken place.  
4.For minor crimes, a fine would be substituted for the punishment of death (Gibson op cit.pp 123-128; Dunn op cit pp 40-42; Russell op cit pp 217-218)
- 6.C.1137 p.15 Extracts from Blue Books quoted by Bishop Colenso (Digest p.363)
7. Uys op cit p.84.
8. Russell p 217.

When the order desired was established, Cetywayo wished to examine the guns ! Captain Escombe caused the peculiarity of the breech-loading to be explained to him; he was surprised at the facility with which an open cylinder could be closed for firing, but seemed disappointed that they were not larger." Thus Cetywayo had the mysteries of breech-loading explained to him under the authority of Mr. Shepstone himself, and under the same authority, it is stated, he was presented on this occasion with one or more breech-loaders.<sup>1</sup> "Moreover, he seems to have appreciated the value of fire arms and of the later improvements made in their manufacture, like any European War Minister. And he showed readiness to make "progress" in this respect by arming his men, as far as he could, with breech-loaders."<sup>2</sup> Surely further proof is not required to rid Dunn of the charge of gun-running ! The really important thing is that Cetywayo is reviving the old military system under Shepstone's very nose.

What had Shepstone gained by crowning Cetywayo ? He had given the Natal Government hope of acquiring a "safety valve" for their surplus Native population;<sup>3</sup> he had preserved Zululand for British enterprise and had put a check on Boer encroachment.<sup>4</sup> He possibly hoped to control the trade of Delagoa Bay by controlling, through Cetywayo, the chief of the area; but the Secretary of State gave him no support,<sup>5</sup> and even had he so desired to help him, all plans were scotched for the moment by the Langalibalele affair, which "revealed in a flash the dangers of the /gun....

1. Colenso - Digest p.363.
2. ibid p. 533.
3. Uys p.84.
4. ibid. p.85
5. For details Vide Uys pp 84-88.

gun-trade and the radical weakness of the Native  
policy in Natal " <sup>1</sup>

Shepstone had hardly got back to Natal when Cetywayo opened the "ball of killing without trial which was usual in his reign" <sup>2</sup>. There was the case of "the chlorodyne man" who drank Shepstone's chlorodyne which he had stolen, much to his discom-  
fiture, - and also Panda's old servant. Both these men were executed without trial. <sup>3</sup> But before we condemn Cetywayo by our standards we should remember that at the time it was really believed that "the Zulu is only to be ruled by the fear of death, or the confiscation of his entire property" <sup>4</sup>, and a point often forgotten is that Cetywayo was regarded as a good king by the Zulus themselves <sup>5</sup>. In 1879 the Zulu deputies said "No one had been put to death without cause. The utmost forbearance had been shown to those guilty of witchcraft" <sup>6</sup>. It might well be so.

Cetywayo gave orders for all the late king's cattle to be collected and brought before him. It was a wonderful sight to behold the cattle come pouring in day after day. Dunn estimated their number at 100,000 <sup>7</sup>. The king selected some fancy-  
coloured ones and gave many away as presents <sup>8</sup>.

/Then.....

1. Walker op cit p. 358. For full details of the Langalibalele affair see Walker pp.358-360; Uys op cit p 88-101, especially p.102-104; Hattersley- "More Annals of Natal." Chap 7. especially p 243.
2. Dunn op cit p.56.
3. For details vide Dunn p 54. Gibson p.127-128.
4. Dunn op cit at p. 54.
5. Gibson pp 131-132.
6. Gibson p.163.
7. Even at £5 a head it made Cetywayo a very rich man.
8. Dunn. p. 56.

Then the Natal Land and Colonization Company asked Dunn to try <sup>to</sup> and secure for them a tract of Zululand. At a meeting at which Dunn was able to arrange, the great Umnyamana, one of Cetywayo's chief advisers <sup>2</sup> said - "Our land is our own; we don't like parting with it; besides we are afraid of you white men. If we give you a piece for more than one to live on they will want more and so on until they get the whole, and we will have to wander about as if we had no land. It is well with you personally (Dunn). You are living with us, - but we don't know the other whitemen" <sup>3</sup>. This ended the land scheme.

The ancient custom on the accession of a king had been the washing of spears in the blood of some neighbouring tribe. Cetywayo be-thought himself of this tradition and who better than the Swazis as a fitting victim? But first he must get the consent of the Boers. When in May, 1875, he asked them to countenance his ritual their President Burgers was overseas trying to raise a loan for his Delagoa Railway, but the Transvaal Executive under Joubert refused to countenance such a thing. The fact that Cetywayo had asked the Boers for permission, emboldened them to proclaim on May 25 <sup>4</sup>, a new boundary between the Republic and Zululand; actually it was the old one laid down in the Treaty of Waaihoek. Little wonder that Cetywayo was 'annoyed' at the 'well-intended' measures of Joubert, who now appointed a commission to register land claims, which gave out all the Blood /River....

1. CF de Riewiet. p.192.

2. Masipula had died, naturally, just after Cetywayo's coronation. Umnyamana was chief of the Butelezi.

3. Dunn op cit p. 57.

4. A straight line running from where the Pongola River cuts through the Lebombo Mountains via "Choenjiesnek" past the head waters of the White Umfolosi and Assegai's Kloof to a point near Rorke's Drift on the Buffalo River (Staatscourant Vol XVIII. No 581 of June 9.1875). Vide Walker. Historical Atlas p.15.

5. Uys op cit p.120.

River Territory in farms and tried to tax the 15,000 Zulus living in it.<sup>1</sup> Then, as a counter stroke to Shepstone, Joubert hurried with an awe-inspiring commando of 350 picked men to the Swazi Great Place and crowned the 17 year old Umbandine<sup>2</sup>, over whom Cetywayo claimed suzerainty, King of the Swazis, and induced him to sign a treaty/whether he understood it or not, made him a Transvaal subject<sup>3</sup>.

An event now took place outside Zululand which may be regarded as one of the greatest single events in Zulu history: In July, 1875, the French President Macmahon, awarded Portugal "all and more than she had asked for at Delagoa Bay, and though Great Britain secured a promise that the bay should not be sold to a third party, the Transvaal was at last sure of a non-British port as soon as the fever belt could be traversed safely.<sup>4</sup> Here lies the solution to Republic history and politics; at last a way was free to the sea, but there was a difficulty- a railway had to be built through the fever-laden area. This the Republic failed to do immediately, with the result once more Zululand, with its possible harbours at St Lucia Lake, Sorówana Bay and Kosi Bay, became the object of Transvaal pretensions.

We have noted above that Burgers was in Europe trying to raise money for the Railway. Joubert, uncannily aware, it seemed, that his endeavours would prove abortive, prosecuted his old scheme and sent Cetywayo a kind of ultimatum in which he "skilfully introduced an allegation of rights between two assertions of grievances": he regretted that

/Umbandine.....

1. Walker op cit p.366. The labour problem again!
2. Mswazi had died in 1868 and his heir, Ludonga in 1874 (Year Book of U.S.A. No 4 (1910-1920) p.965.
3. ibid: Uys op cit p.121: Walker op cit p.166.
4. Walker p. 366.



Urbandine should still have cause to complain against Cetwayo, demanded an assurance that he would respect the new boundary, (which incidentally the Zulus had been ordered by their King to pull down,) and reminded him of his repeated failure to extradite Republican criminals. His failure to comply would result in Joubert "eating him up "

Cetwayo now turned to Shepstone and caused Dunn to write to him shortly after the 3rd April, 1876. In the letter he denied the right or claim to further land by the Boers, on the Zulu Nation and asked for permission to wash his spears, claiming that "the Amaswazi were formerly our people as Sobuza (father of Mswazi II) their great original chief was one of Chaka's people,<sup>3</sup> but the Amaswazi are now claimed by the Boers".<sup>4</sup> The Lieutenant-Governor of Natal entirely disapproved of his sanguinary expedition,<sup>5</sup> and Cetwayo acquiesced. On the 26th April, 1876, President Burgers, returned from Europe, wrote to Cetwayo asking him to hold a meeting where they would discuss the boundary and then beacon it off in the interests of peace,<sup>6</sup> but before anything could be done the Transvaal was involved in the Sekukuni imbroglio; President Burgers led 1,100 Boers supported by 2,400 Swazi warriors into the Bapedi Chief's location.<sup>7</sup> Sekukuni<sup>had</sup> refused to pay his taxes or give up land which the Republic claimed as part of the Swazi concession of 1846 or to allow prospectors to enter his valleys.<sup>8</sup>

/Burgers.....

1. Dunn. page 128.
2. Uys. page 126.
3. Vide Union Year Book, No 4, p.964 for the reasons for this
4. Dunn letter quoted in full p.137 ff.
5. Uys p.127; Dunn pp 56-57.
6. Dunn. p. 132.
7. Uys p. 202.
8. Walker p. 369; de Kiewiet p.100.

Burgers scored an initial success, but failed to assist the Swazis, who not only regarded the Boers as cowards, but also resented their confiscating the cattle they had had the good fortune to capture; in high dudgeon, they returned home as did the commandoes who distrusted Burgers. "In the final analysis the failure of the expedition was the failure to capture Native cattle"<sup>1</sup>. Cetywayo closely watched events, began to mobilise his regiments at Ondini and "sent the Swazi, Umbelina, to raid little clans in the eastern Transvaal"<sup>2</sup>, one of which was the Swazis. Uys contends that if Cetywayo did not receive a hint from Pietermaritzburg to move against Umbandine, it is "almost certain that he was inspired by that polygamous Anglo-Zulu, John Dunn, - that is, if the diplomatic Cetywayo had stood in need of inspiration."<sup>3</sup> Uys bases his assertion on the letter that Dunn wrote to Shepstone (April 20, 1876)<sup>4</sup>, but it is quite clear from what has been said above that Cetywayo was merely observing a custom of his tribe by washing his spears. We do not deny that this is a horrible custom, comparable with say, suttee, but that is to take sides with a moral issue. It would have taken more than Dunn to alter an established custom.<sup>5</sup> If we may believe Dunn, Cetywayo did not know of Umbeline's raid upon the Swazis until after it was over, but when he learned that Sekukuni had not been defeated, he was prepared to act in concert

/with.....

1. de Riewiet. p.151.
2. Walker p.369; Uys p.205.
3. Uys 209.
4. referred to above vide p.<sup>27</sup>33. (The dates do not tally because Dunn composed the letter after 3rd April).
5. Later when Cetywayo is dead Dinizulu, his son wishes to wash his spears.

with that chief against the Boers.<sup>1</sup>

Before this happened peace with Sekukuni was formally concluded on February 15, 1877<sup>2</sup>.

The upshot of the whole affair was two-fold; it resulted in the annexation of the Transvaal; and Cetywayo, who had revived the military machine<sup>3</sup> of the Zulus, wondered if Sekukuni had been so successful what could not he perform against the ever-encroaching Boers ?

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1. Digest pp 630 -631.
  2. Uys. p. 212.
  3. For a full definition of the Zulu war machine vide Stuart "History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906" Chap. IV.

Chapter III.The Renegade.

The parlous state of affairs in the Transvaal alarmed the British Cabinet; a Native chief, Sekukuni, had defied the Transvaal Government, and the latter had been unable to punish him; a special war tax had been voted without the slightest hope of its being collected; President Burgers had been unable to raise a third of the necessary loan for the Delagoa Bay railway; the Cape Commercial Bank demanded repayment of its loans to the Transvaal; officials were going unpaid; the President was unpopular; the Transvaal-Zulu boundary dispute was unsettled and Cetywayo, in any angry mood, was likely to attack the Boers. Lord Carnarvon, The Colonial Secretary, thereupon, commissioned the newly knighted Theophilus Shepstone, then in England, to annex the Transvaal by the wish of the people if possible; if not, to annex in time-honoured fashion. He then asked Sir Bartle Frere, a tried Indian Officer, to go out to the Cape as High Commissioner, to federate South Africa and thereafter to remain as its first Governor General. Frere, ignorant of Shepstone's mission assented.<sup>1</sup>

Sir Theophilus Shepstone arrived at Capetown,<sup>2</sup> "with the Republic's death-warrant in his pocket," and proceeded first to Pietermaritzburg to try to take the pulse of Cetywayo. To do this he tried to get into touch with Dunn, to hear first-hand what was going on at Ondini. Unfortunately, he missed him, and the news he gleaned from a Mr. Nunn who at that time was living with Uhamu was to the effect that Cetywayo was /determined.....

1. Walker p. 369-370; Uys pp215-219.
2. Uys p.219.

determined to get the "Disputed Territory" and would not accept any modification of his boundary<sup>1</sup>. To enforce his rights he was collecting his impi at Ondini, but under the cloak of the celebration of the solemn ceremony of the First-fruits, a festival which marks the beginning of the Zulu year and falls at the end of December or the beginning of January, when all the people assemble at the king's kraal and none may eat of the new fruits until after the solemnities; then, everyone feasts and dances.<sup>2</sup>

It was felt that Cetywayo's celibate warriors would not only dance but would also 'wash their spears' either in the Amaswazi or the Boers.

Then on December 23, 1878, Shepstone saw a note written by Dunn to a friend in Natal which said, "I've had a long talk with Cetywayo and he has gone on so long without the intervention of the English Government, although requested to do so several times, he will allow matters to take their course, especially as he has heard about the move said to be taken by the British Government in the Transvaal. Cetywayo is, however, determined to hold the boundary against the Dutch"

This information decided Shepstone that Cetywayo had given up the idea of 'eating up' the Amaswazi for punishing the Boers; so on the 27th December he left Pietermaritzburg to annex the Transvaal. He was followed by his 'trojan horse', comprising in particular the 3rd Buffs. The troops were to put down the Zulus as well as to intimidate the Boers, and for this reason were at first marched only as far as Newcastle in order not to rouse suspicion either in the minds of the Boers or of Cetywayo;<sup>3</sup>

Once .....

1. Uys pp 220-221.
2. Frazer "Golden Bough" p.467.
3. Uys pp 222-223.

Once the annexation of the Transvaal was accomplished <sup>1</sup> - and this was partly possible owing to transhumance as the fighting men had gone to the low veld with the approach of winter, - <sup>2</sup> the most important question of the day was the boundary dispute. Hitherto, Shepstone had supported Cetywayo in his claim to the Blood River Territory, but now that he was administrator of the Transvaal, his opinions underwent a complete change: He examined the documents of nearly twenty years of dispute and compromise in the "one-sided archives" at Pretoria; for the first time he was horrified at the desolation of the farmsteads in the disputed area, and perhaps most of all, he was mortified at the disrespectful tone and overbearing manner assumed by the King's indunas towards the British Government. Fortified with the legality of the Boer claim he now considered it his duty "to protect a civilised settlement against a brutal invasion of established rights" <sup>3</sup>

It was about this time that Bishop Colenso began to interest himself in Cetywayo's affairs. His Lordship was no hell-fire missionary. <sup>3a</sup> He had been responsible for the unhappy Langalibalele's removal from Robben Island to the Mainland. <sup>4</sup> His interest in Cetywayo was of a similar nature, - "to look into the blots and stains of right", - but, if we may believe Dunn, Colenso tried to insinuate himself into Cetywayo's counsel and supplant Shepstone.

It appears that the King sent for Dunn to read a letter purporting to have come from the Natal Government. On his handing him the supposed dispatch he was surprised to find it to be an appointment of a Dr. Smith and Mr. Colenso to act for the king as his agents in all diplomatic affairs connected with the Colonial Government.

/On.....

1. 12th April, 1877.
2. Uys pp. 369-370 also vide p.319-320.
3. Walker p.378 (C 2079 of 187 p.50); de Kiewiet p.219; Gibson p.142-144. *3a Vide Gibson p 58 for typical Missionary.*
4. Walker p.360; Uys pp91-104.

"On my saying to him, "this is no message, where is the letter ? ' thinking there was a mistake, he said that it was the only one. I then told him the purport of the document, and at the same time asking him who these men were he had appointed. His answer was 'I am the same as you; I don't know them, or anything written on that paper; the words are not mine. ' He then sent for the messengers (his own, who had returned to him) and on their arrival he asked them the meaning of what was in the letter they had brought. The answer was, 'Yes, we delivered the King's message as it was given to us, but on going to Sobantu (Bishop Colenso) he advised us to make a statement, and as we thought it was for the good of our king we did so; Sobantu further stating that if the king listened to the Inhlwana of Sonzica (meaning, the little house of Shepstone) he would go astray as they (the Shepstones) had to leave the Amaxosa country for having got the Amaxosa into trouble with the whites, and they would treat Cetywayo likewise unless he appointed some white man to look after his interest with the Government of Natal, proposing the before-named gentlemen to be such Agents." Dunn advised Cetywayo against such a mistake and the King agreed. Not long afterwards Mr. Colenso came into Zululand to get an explanation from Cetywayo and to claim certain expenses to which he thought himself entitled in consequence of an appointment. On arriving at Amahlabatini he took up his quarters with Mr. Mullins, a trader; and one morning he came over to my camp and explained his mission to me, requesting me to assist him in his recovery from Cetywayo, the sum of £500, a sum he said he felt he was entitled to. I knowing the circumstances tried to persuade him that he was wrong and that there was small probability of his getting redress; at the same time declining to intercede for  
/him.....

him.<sup>1</sup> It is quite easy to see, if Dunn be correct, that there would, in future, be no love lost between him and Colenso.

One thing is certain, - Cetuywayo was furious at Shepstone's volte face and when the latter attempted to arrange a settlement of the dispute and with that intent proceeded towards the Zulu frontier on the Blood River, Cetuywayo refused to discuss the matter and demanded the immediate cession of the land in dispute. Shepstone concluded that war was imminent and found Sir Bartle Frere ready to believe him. Sir Henry Bulwer, the Lieutenant -Governor of Natal, however, could not or would not, follow Shepstone's reasoning, and suggested as a way out of the impasse that a commission should make an enquiry into the rival claims; that both the Transvaal Government and the Zulus should abide by the decision, while the final award lay with Sir Bartle Frere.<sup>2</sup> Cetuywayo was, at this moment, troubled by internal strife between his old warriors and his young ones, both being jealous of the other<sup>3</sup> and so agreed to Bulwer's suggestion.

Meanwhile Sekukuni had risen once more at Cetuywato's instigation<sup>4</sup> and a British Expedition under Colonel Rowlands sent against him in 1878 met with the same fate as Burger's, and it was not until the end of 1879, a matter of twenty months, when a renewed attack of 1800 men under the command of Sir Garnet Wolseley aided by 5,000 Amaswazi that the chief was captured. He was taken to Pretoria and afterwards released. On his return to his own country he was murdered by one of his minor chiefs.<sup>5</sup>

/The....

1. Walker p 378. DUNN P 60 et seq.
2. Russell p 229; Walker p 378.
3. Details of this -Gibson .Chap 13.
4. Gibson p. 145-146.
5. de Kiewiet p.232; Uys p.250; Russell p.227; Gibson p.145-146.



The Commission was appointed in February, 1878, but before it reported an incident occurred which antagonised the Zulus: May was the usual month for the Boers to move their flocks to warmer pastures.<sup>1</sup> Their movement into Zululand in 1878, a year of unusual<sup>2</sup> shortage of grass and water, particularly aggrieved the Border Zulus, and Cetywayo towards the end of September notified the German Settlers about Luneberg to "leave their farms and homesteads as the lands were required for grazing purposes for the King's cattle which were being sent up from Zululand; also the garden grounds were required; that as the winter was now over and there was plenty of young grass to be found at the Vaal River for stock, they (the Germans) were required to go away"<sup>3</sup>. War talk grew more insistent and the farmers laagered<sup>4</sup>. The order was never put into effect but a military force had to be placed there to protect the farmers.<sup>5</sup>

The English, German and Norwegian Missionaries, who had settled in Zululand with the permission of Panda had also been told that Cetywayo had "thrown them off", meaning that he would no longer protect them, regarding a Christian Native as a good Zulu lost. The Missionaries were advised by Shepstone to quit the land and they left in May<sup>6</sup>. Dunn wrote to the Aborigines' Protection Society<sup>7</sup> in England telling them that war was imminent because of the land claims of the Boers.<sup>8</sup>

Frere revealed in a letter to the new Colonial Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, what would be his attitude to the report when it came; he did not see

/how.....

1. Vide p.14 supra.

2. Gibson p.155.

3. de Kiewiet pp.222-224.

4. Walker p.378.

5. Gibson p.156.

6. Gibson pp.147-148.

7. "which ecclesiastical machinery Colenso was instrumental in exhuming during the Langalebalele affair" Uys p.91-92.

8. Dunn Notes p.67.

how the Zulu claims could be admitted without the Transvaal giving up portions of territory which for years had unquestionably belonged to them; also it would be inconsistent with the pledges given by Sir Theophilus Shepstone to the inhabitants of the Transvaal that on taking them over the British Government would maintain the integrity of the Boer state. Concessions would not make the frontier any more secure: Cetywayo must be destroyed, whatever the original or legal rights of the Zulus; the Settlers were there on the frontier, and were entitled to be protected. "South African policy would ill be served by an expulsion of the Boers "

To the perpetual question of responsibility for the Zulu War there can be no simple answer. Frere's critics have made him the scapegoat; his apologists have absolved him of all serious blame. It would appear that he was merely a willing instrument: when Shepstone was in Natal service he desired Zululand as a 'safety valve' for Natal Natives to the detriment of the aspirations of the Boers seeking an independent republic with an outlet to the sea: now that the Transvaal was British territory the aims of the two European countries had commingled but both were insistent in their demands for Zululand, and instead of each trying to oust the other and getting the land for itself they had united to share the prey. Frere under these circumstances was merely bringing to the problem to its logical conclusion.

The Commission handed in its report in June, 1878, and its finding was that "the evidence shows that this so-called 'disputed territory' has never been occupied by the Boers, but has always been inhabited by the

/Border....

Border clans, who had never moved their kraals, and the only use ever made of the land by the Boers has been for grazing purposes, which in itself proves nothing" <sup>1</sup> .

The Commission therefore awarded the Zulus this land. 2

The Report reached Frere at the Cape in July for his award. He quickly seized upon the weakness of the Commission's finding; there were at least three areas; <sup>3</sup> the report only dealt with one. There was first of all the area of indisputable Boer settlement. In the district of Utrecht, for example, the Boers were too firmly established to be evicted. Then there was an indeterminate region of intermingled white and black settlement round the town of Luneberg, for example, and finally, the area in which there were many claims but few Europeans. It was with this area that the Commission had primarily concerned itself. The 'disputed territory' of the report was not the entire Transvaal-Zulu border, but only the Blood River territory. Had the Commission covered the entire frontier line its finding must necessarily have been less severe. As it was, it was too inflexible, and its execution, sans phrase, would be too direct an affront to the Boers and too signal a victory for the Natives. The British Government had promised the Transvaal a secure frontier and protection against Native aggression. That promise must be kept, but to communicate that fact to the Zulus would mean war, Frere therefore resorted to the expedient of delay in his award until war preparation was complete, and he was assured that the result of that war would be in his favour. <sup>4</sup>

/The.....

1. Quoted de Kiewiet p.225.

2. Gibson p.152.

3. Vide Walker, map facing p.378.

4. de Kiewiet pp 223-227.

The contents of the report soon leaked out and when Cetywayo learned that much of the Boer evidence had been thrown aside and that he had been given more than he asked, he reasoned, having so much he should have all. He built a kraal in the Blood River territory, - a Zulu method of indicating ownership of land, - for an Induna to rule the Zulus living alongside the 75 Boer homesteads; he followed this up by building another north of the Pongola near the German settlers at Luneberg. He was told that he was jumping to conclusions and that the final award had yet to be made. He withdrew the men, but not before the farmers had laagered. Shepstone had asked for troops and Commodore Sullivan had examined the Zulu coast in August for the possible landing of troops and army stores.

Then without his knowledge two <sup>unfaithful</sup> wives of Sirayo, one of Cetywayo's counsellors, whose kraals were near Rorke's Drift, fled across the Buffalo River in July 1878 and were seized on Natal soil by Sirayo's three sons Mehlokazulu, Inkumbokazulu and Tyckwana, aided by some thirty warriors, and were carried back into Zululand where they were shot. Bulwer demanded that the murderers should be handed over, but Cetywayo, who had previously had such a one returned upon his hands, sent a perfunctory offer of compensation and his regrets for this 'boyish excess'.

Frere reached Durban by the R.M.S. "Courland" on the 23rd September, 1878. He found the colony in the grip of a violent war scare; Cetywayo being regarded as a Dingaen redivivus. He took a serious view of

/the.....

1. de Riewiet. p.230.
2. ibid p.227; Walker p,378.
3. Walker 378. Digest p. 631.
4. Gibson pp.149-151; Walker p.378-379; de Riewiet p. 227; Russell p.239.

the military kraals built in the Blood River Territory and close to the settlement of Luneberg. Even more seriously did he regard the Sirayo affair and insisted on having the murderers and a fine. Sekukuni was still unsubdued; Frere concluded that Cetywayo was acting in bad faith and that Natal was in imminent danger. It must be remembered that Frere was a soldier, and "to the professional soldier there is a war on every poorly defended frontier". Months previously he<sup>had</sup> submitted plans for an invasion of Zululand, but Carnarvon had forbidden a Zulu war. His successor, Hicks Beach, did not have Carnarvon's original interest in the affairs of South Africa; his unfamiliarity with South Africa inclined him to put his faith in the men on the spot. For the nonce South Africa was not being ruled by Downing Street, although it would appear that the vacillating Colonial Office almost wished for a war<sup>1</sup>. Then in October Cetywayo once more unleashed his 'dog' Umbelini who attacked some four or five Swazi kraals<sup>2</sup>. Messengers were now constantly passing between Cetywayo and the Government, and reports were made that troops were collecting in Natal<sup>3</sup>. Cetywayo sent for Dunn and asked him to write 'an angry letter' which he refused to do as he now plainly saw that it was his intention to quarrel with the English; for all this while he had been calling up his soldiers and marshalling them. Cetywayo then wished to get rid of Dunn and plainly told him to go home, but Dunn waited until Umnyamana, Uhamu<sup>4</sup> and Usibebu arrived, when he told these Indunas that he would not write letters to the Natal Government as long as Sirayo and Rabanina advised Cetywayo.

/The.....

1. de Riewiet p 227; Walker p 378.

2. Gibson p 756; Walker p 378 is confusing here -often the learned professor has a schoolboy's scorn for exact dates.

3. Gibson p.154.

4. Dunn did not know that Uhamu had promised to remain neutral in the event of war.

The next day Dunn was warned to fly, but he confronted Cetywayo who was ashamed and asked Dunn to stay, but he refused. "No" he said "I now can go, as I know that no one will blame me if anything goes wrong between you and the English"<sup>1</sup>. That same evening Dunn bid Cetywayo farewell. The King tried to persuade him to stay and said "I am no child; I see the English wish to have my country; but if they come I will fight!"<sup>2</sup> Eventually he gave Dunn permission to leave the country.<sup>3</sup>

On reaching home Dunn sent several messengers to the King to try to persuade him to desist from war. Little did Dunn know that Frere had determined upon war, although he knew that troops were being massed in Natal, and were on their way to the border.

Frere had kept the indigestible report of the Boundary Commission for nearly six months. Now, in December, when he was fully prepared for war, he <sup>would</sup> make his award and accompany its promulgation with an ultimatum to Cetywayo which he knew he could not fulfil. The attack had been carefully planned to avoid the winter and to take place during summer, normally the rainy season, when there would be water and pasture for the indispensable draught animals. It would also be the season just before the harvest when Cetywayo might find it difficult to collect an army and keep it in the field; and Uhamu, Cetywayo's brother, had promised to remain neutral.<sup>4</sup>

All was now ready for the famous meeting at the Tugela Drift overlooking what was afterwards called Fort Pearson. Here, on 11th December, 1878, representatives from the Governor and Cetywayo met. Dunn was invited to be present by both sides and the award was pronounced assigning the boundary that the commission had recommended.

/Half.....

1. Dunn p.73.
2. ibid.p.74.
3. Col.Sparks to me July 1939.
4. de Kiewiet p 231: Walker p.380: Gibson p.154-155.

Half an hour after its delivery the king's deputies were called together and an Ultimatum demanding compensation for the dispossessed farmers, the handing over of the sons of Sirayo and Umbelini, reparations for Sirayo and other incidents; the observance of the promises which Frere had been led to believe Cetywayo had made to Shepstone at his coronation, the break up of the Zulu war machine and the reception of a Resident in Zululand.<sup>1</sup> Thirty days was given for the expiry of the Ultimatum which would expire on the 10th January, 1879.<sup>2</sup> The King's envoys set off at a leisurely pace with the 4,000 worded document committed to memory, the substance of which in due course they would transmit to the king. Dunn realising the need for speed sent his own messengers to inform the king in advance what was required of him, - the written ultimatum was left with Dunn which he kept at Mangete.<sup>3</sup> He afterwards told a friend, "I dare not send it; it would mean death to anyone who carried an ultimatum of that sort."<sup>4</sup>

Thus it came about that conflicting reports of these proposals reached the King who, in spite of the rains, set about collecting the reparations cattle, while Frere completed his military preparations which he believed would at least be necessary to support Cetywayo against his warriors if he tried to comply with his demands!<sup>5</sup> Cetywayo complained of the short time in which we had to collect the reparation cattle and got Dunn to write a letter to this effect

- /on.....
1. Gibson pp.158-163: Walker p.380: de Kiewiet p.229: Dunn pp 71-92
  2. Gibson. p. 165.
  3. Gibson p.164-165: Dunn p.75.
  4. Sparks to me July 1939.
  5. Walker p.380.

on the 13th December to the Natal Government, and received a reply on the 26th to say that no extension of time would be granted and that the troops which Frere was collecting would advance at the end of the thirty days<sup>1</sup>; but Frere was not to have any Boer troops for they apparently did not appreciate all that Frere<sup>he</sup> was doing for them and refused their co-operation, although they gave good advice. The farmers of the frontier district of Utrecht alone, under brave Dirk Uys, scion of a brave family, loyally joined the British Force<sup>2</sup>.

X Dunn advised the Secretary of Native Affairs that he wished either to quit the country or to remain neutral in the event of war<sup>3</sup>, and Lord Chelmsford, the General Commanding-in-chief in South Africa advised him to cross with all his people into Natal, and that he would feed them; he promised to see Dunn re-instated in his possessions after the war was over<sup>4</sup>. "Thus", says Dunn, "on the 30th December I gave notice to all my people at Ungoye to come to Mangete, which they did by the 31st. We went to the Tugela. The river was full and the scene can be imagined: I had 3,000 head of cattle of my own. It took three days to get all across; thanks to the assistance of the Naval Brigade. When my people arrived on the Natal side they were deprived of all guns which were mine, and these were given to the Native police for the defence of the border. I was never compensated for the guns (Had Colenso confused these guns with Cetywayo's?) I lost 300 head of cattle, but sold many at a good price. Lord Chelmsford broke his promise as to the feeding of my people who were encamped by the 11th between the Umvoti River and Umhlali<sup>5</sup>"; so Dunn had to feed them himself.

X  
/On.....

1. Dunn p.92.
2. de Kiewiet p 232.
3. Dunn p.74.
4. Dunn p.93.
5. Dunn pp.93-95.



On the appointed day for the expiry of the Ultimatum, four columns crossed the Zulu border, and on the following day the Transvaalers unhelpfully called a great meeting at Wonderfontein to pledge themselves solemnly to regain their independence<sup>1</sup>. Dunn had advised Lord Chelmsford that Cetuywayo would concentrate his forces and risking everything in one great battle, would fall upon the column that he thought would give him the most trouble; he therefore suggested that the General should divide his forces into two strong columns, making each strong enough to cope with the whole Zulu army. Chelmsford, we are told only laughed; he did not think that Cetuywayo would fight; "I must drive him into a corner"<sup>2</sup>. Had Chelmsford listened to Dunn perhaps the disaster of 22nd January might have been avoided, when 800 regulars and as many Native levies were wiped out by the Zulus at Isandhlwana<sup>3</sup>. Luckily the Zulus did not follow up their success. Several reasons have been advanced: Cetuywayo may still have thought he was the friend of the British; Bishop Colenso may have told him he would get better terms if he did not advance; perhaps it was because his Usutu and the hostile Usibebu faction thinking the war was over, fought each other in a bloody battle<sup>4</sup>. Whatever the reason, Frere's best laid schemes had gone astray; the growing crops had not kept the Zulus in the fields. The rains did not come till the middle of December, and as the first planting had failed there was no harvest to keep the Natives from joining their impis. Drought, the collapse of Natal's transportation system and the bitter quarrelling between the military and civil authorities in Natal all contributed to

/the....

1. Walker p.237; de Kiewiet p 232.
2. Dunn. p 93.
3. Russell p.235; Walker 382.
4. Walker. p. 383.

the disaster<sup>1</sup> and two days after Isandhlwana we find Frere writing that Cetuywayo was armed to such an "unprecedented" extent and in numbers that cause him to be regarded by his own people as well as by most other Native tribes in South Africa, as more than a match for any power, Native or European; was in fact the greatest military power in South Africa.<sup>2</sup> Bishop Colenso, apparently not realising that the disaster of Isandhlwana would take a lot of explaining away and that this was part of Frere's explanation, ascribed the pernicious evil to our John Dunn, from whom Colenso<sup>3</sup> alleged, Cetuywayo had chiefly obtained these firearms. It is worth noticing that Frere does not say Cetuywayo should not be armed, but merely that he was armed to an unprecedented extent, implying that a fair number was reasonable.

On the 25th March, Lord Chelmsford asked Dunn to accompany him as adviser. Dunn rode over to see the General, and told him that he preferred to remain neutral, to which Chelmsford replied, "You know what will be thought of you for withholding the assistance you can give, and you can expect nothing after the war is over". Dunn asked for time to think over this veiled threat. He tells us that, "I knew my father had suffered by remaining neutral in the fighting between the Boers and the English at Congella"; so the next day he rode over and accepted the offer.<sup>4</sup> For this worthy action Dunn has been described as a renegade. There is a surface case against Dunn, for he himself denied that Cetuywayo was the prime instigator of all the mischief since becoming King. We agree. He admits that

/there.....

1. de Kiewiet p.232.

2. Digest p.433 being citation from Blue Book 2252.p.46,

3. Digest p.437 in notis.

4. Dunn Notes pp.100-101.

there was an understanding between Cetywayo and Sekukuni to act in concert against the Transvaal Boers, but this was arranged after President Burgers had retired in commando from the Bapedi Reserve in August 1876, and the execution of the plan was only prevented by Dunn's endeavour and the urgent representations from the Government of Natal. Dunn made no secret of the fact that since the annexation of the Transvaal, his conviction was that the Zulus had not had fair play. He pointed to recorded facts and enumerable dispatches for proof of a plan, long ago conceived and politically worked out to bring about the overthrow of Cetywayo. As far as the gravamen of the present charge against Cetywayo is concerned, namely, his inciting Umbelini to attack the Amaswazi, his failure to implement his coronation oaths, and his countenancing the outrage of Sirayo's sons and thus violating the Rights of Nations, Dunn was able to explain them away at least to his own satisfaction. With reference to Umbelini, Dunn asserts that Cetywayo did not know of his raid upon the Swazis until after it was over. This might be so, since Umbelini who was Umbandeni's half-brother, lived near the Swazi King. As regards the alleged coronation oaths, Dunn affirms that no such undertaking was made by or even asked from Cetywayo. In the act of coronation Shepstone gave Cetywayo a piece of paternal counsel, and the conditions to which the King is said to have assented were in reality nothing more than recommendations urged upon his acceptance by the Special Commissioner with the laudible purpose of securing a more regular government of the Zulu people. We have already noted that it was the brothers and certain Counsellors who assented to the "new Laws".

/All....

All the more reason, then, that they should have been adhered to, but this is to forget the circumstances in which Cetywayo was "crowned"<sup>1</sup>. Nor was the King personally responsible for the outrage by the sons of Sirayo. There formerly existed an arrangement by which women and cattle were both reckoned as property, and, when they crossed the river, in either direction, it was customary to send them back. How much easier all South African history would be if this custom had always been observed! Latterly, as far as the women were concerned the understanding had not been carried out. Dunn then pertinently asks the question whether outraged husbands, even among civilised people, are prone to pay much respect to the Rights of Nations when upon the track of their unfaithful spouses, but Dunn forgets that Mahlokazulu was a son, not a husband. Besides this, Dunn affirms that it was admitted in the Legislative Council of Natal, that previous violations of the frontier have been passed over without any hubbub<sup>2</sup>.

Dunn also contended that Cetywayo still did not know fully the contents of the Ultimatum. He believed that the troops were being sent up as a scare, but when he realised what was intended he told Dunn that he would fight and that his regiments would pursue right to Durban.<sup>3</sup> Condoning all that Cetywayo did, why did Dunn desert Cetywayo?

Dunn advised Cetywayo not to fight, but the king refused the counsel of his adviser. In the circumstances Dunn did the only thing he could - he remained neutral.

/Now.....

1. ~~See~~ Vide p.23...supra.

2. Vide Walker p.378.

3 Digest pp 630-631, being a full account of Dunn's views.

Now that his late master was victorious a lesser man would have left those who brought about the war to their own devices, but Dunn realised the meaning of the menace and he knew that the destruction of Cetywayo meant a happy Zululand. His duty was to aid the English to bring about this state of affairs. To call Dunn a deserter or a renegade is a mere logomachy. His case is paralleled with that of John Churchill, later the Duke of Marlborough who deserted James while high in his military service in the hour of his need and afterwards corresponded with the Jacobites. Yet both Professor Trevelyan and Winston Churchill agree that "Marlborough's desertion of James was in the circumstances commendable."<sup>1</sup> Like Churchill, there was a surface case against him: "many people thought ill of him in his own day"<sup>2</sup> - but we with the "hindsight of history", must judge him fairly to-day. Dunn did not know what we now do, that Frere had determined upon war, not Cetywayo: so that Cetywayo's quondam adviser was nothing more than a pawn in the game. To remain neutral was also an untenable position: Dunn, as father of his tribe had to consider what would happen to his family after the war. Chelmsford had made it quite clear that "he could expect nothing after the war", unless he sided with the British. Under such circumstances he had to align himself with the one side that could now assist his people.

There are two other points:-

Cetywayo told Dunn to go: this was not desertion: and when the war was over and Cetywayo was a prisoner

/at.....

1. Trevelyan "Peace and the Protestant Succession" p. XI
2. *ibid.*

at the Cape, he must have thought little enough of Dunn's "desertion" to have caused the most cordial and friendly letter to have been written to him<sup>1</sup>

Dunn was now Lord Chelmsford's intelligence officer. His first good service was to tender Chelmsford advice and to raise a body of 150 of his own men to act as scouts, as the General had been greatly misled by people who knew nothing of either Zululand or its people. Dunn's men were attached to Major Barrow's Horse. While the column was camped one night on the other side of the Amatikulu River, Dunn's men formed the outside picket while the infantry pickets were between them and bivouac. Dunn's men had orders to retire to camp when in touch with the enemy. A false alarm caused them to retire hurriedly, and in the confusion, they were mistaken for the enemy, and a number killed.

When the force under Colonel Pearson at Eshowe<sup>2</sup> was beleaguered, Dunn's assistance was again sought, and a high reward offered if he could get someone to run despatches to the beséged. "This I did, sending two men. Three times they went; one was killed." Lord Chelmsford did not reward these men as promised, - "nothing came of it beyond what I paid myself and a<sup>3</sup> couple of sovereigns given by the Revd R. Robertson. So much for the word of anyone representing the authority of a military Government". Dunn also had to pay for all the food he got from the Government at a much higher rate than he could have bought it privately, Besides that,<sup>4</sup> it was insufficient and he had to kill his own cattle

Lord Chelmsford organised and led the relief column to relieve Pearson and his garrison at Eshowe. Dunn was asked to put into writing what he thought the duty of the scouts to be. This he did, and Chelmsford asked him

/to.....

1. Letter quoted in full Dunn's Notes pp 107-108 Cetywayo to Dunn 29/10/1880.
2. Panda's old kraal & strategic point.
3. The famous Anglican Missionary at Kwa Magwaza, Zululand.

to accompany him as far as the Inyezane River as his experience in Zulu warfare would be invaluable to him, but he would ask him to go no farther as "I quite understand that you do not feel justified in running a risk of depriving those who look to you for support of your helping hand"<sup>1</sup> But Dunn elected to remain with Chelmsford.

Dunn selected a good position at Inyezane (the present Gingindhlovo) for the camp. Then Chelmsford and he reconnoitered and Dunn saw thin columns of blue smoke rising here and there, betokening Zulu kraals in the vicinity. He advised Chelmsford to send mounted men the next morning to draw them on to an attack before breaking camp for the forward march. Early the next morning (April 3) the Zulus tried to encircle the camp. The soldiers fired at 1500 yards. They fired wildly and Dunn noticed that they still had their long range sights up, although the Zulus had advanced 1200 yards. On advising Chelmsford of this the order was given to lower the sights. The battle was soon over and the Zulus put to flight. Eshowe was relieved. The second day they all returned to Gingindhlovo<sup>2</sup>; and afterwards Dunn was attached to General Cradock's staff as Intelligence Officer, by Chelmsford.

Grievances in the Transvaal reached breaking point. The Transvaal had become British soil against the wish of the majority of its peoples:<sup>3</sup> its institutions were suppressed: an autocracy of Natal and Cape officials who snubbed its leaders were placed over it. This was unexpected and intolerable. Small hearted economy and pitiless tactlessness ruined the British chances of holding the Transvaal.<sup>4</sup>

- /The....
1. Letter in possession of F. Dunn, Gingindhlovo.
  2. Dunn's notes pp 101-103.
  3. Uys p. 316-322.
  4. de Kiewiet p. 115.

The dissatisfied Boers laagered some sixteen miles from Pretoria, and Frere, who had rushed up to the Transvaal, promised to transmit to England their memorandum of grievances. They had hardly broken up when the harassed Disraeli ministry censured Frere for the Zulu war policy and informed him that even if Cetwayo were utterly crushed Zululand would not be annexed. The censure was consolingly accompanied by the request that Frere would remain in office and informed him that the High Commissionership was being split and that it was sending out General Sir Garnet Wolseley to be High Commissioner for South East Africa.<sup>1</sup>

When Chelmsford learned that Wolseley was coming to supersede him, "he ploughed his way through Central Zululand, losing the Prince Imperial on the way and forced Cetwayo to a final battle at Ulundi," -the High Place - on the 4th of July, 1879.<sup>2</sup>

Cetwayo borrowed horses from Usibebu and made north for Umnyamana's country. A month later, on the 28th August, he was captured by Major Harper. He was hurried away to the Coast and sent by the steamer "Hatal" to Capetown, "where he arrived in silk hat, grey tweeds and bare feet" to be confined for a while in the Castle.<sup>3</sup> Few Zulus were curious about his fate. They accepted the fact that the white man had him and that he was dead as far as they were concerned.<sup>4</sup>

Dunn received instructions to collect all the cattle that had belonged to the King, and to return the remainder to their owners.<sup>5</sup>

/CHAPTER IV.....

1. Walker p.384; de Kiewiet p.236: p.245.
2. Russell p.244; Walker p.384.
3. It was from here that Cetwayo wrote to Dunn vide p.47 supra.
4. Report Zulu Boundary commission R.C.Z. 24/2/30.
5. *ibid*; Dunn's Notes p.112.



Chapter IV.A WHITE BLACK CHIEF.

The post-war settlement was entrusted to Chelmsford's successor, Sir Garnet Wolseley. What was now to be done with Zululand? England had had a surfeit of annexations - the Transvaal had proved a veritable hornet's nest. She had recourse therefore to the suggestions made previously with regard to the best policy towards Zululand: Sir George Grey had urged Panda to divide up his country among his sons. This it was believed would ensure the break-up of the Zulu power:<sup>1</sup> Charles Brownlee, the Minister of Native Affairs at the Cape, advised the making independent of every clan that had been incorporated by Chaka, and that a British Resident be appointed with supreme authority<sup>2</sup> under the High Commissioner or Governor of Natal. It was upon these lines that Wolseley proceeded to work; for he had been enjoined by Hicks Beach that Zululand was not to be annexed:  
 "Carefully bear in mind" the Secretary of State urged, "that the object of Her Majesty's Government is not to add to the extent of British Possessions".<sup>3</sup>

Wolseley divided the country into thirteen kinglets under rois faineants. Two were scions of the houses which had ruled before the days of Chaka; the aged Umlandela, hereditary chief of the Umtetwa, and Umcojana, hereditary chief of the Ndwandwe; Seven were indunas or descendants of indunas of the Zulu kings: Somkele of the coast, Umfanawenlela, Umgitywa, Gaozi, who was soon to die from old age, Fakukasinigo, Seketwayo and Chingweyo and four who had supported the British forces, Hlubi

/the....

1. vide p.6 supra.
2. Gibson pp 204 -205.
3. de Kiewiet p 246.

the Basuto, Uhamu, "the traitor", the valiant Usibebu and John Dunn,<sup>1</sup> "whose invaluable services" as political and intelligence officer to General Crealock, had been brought to the notice of Sir Garnet Wolseley by that General.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Wheelwright was appointed the Resident,<sup>3</sup> 'to be the eyes and ears', but not, as we shall see, the mouth of the British Government.

Dunn was the first of the thirteen chiefs appointed under the new scheme. He signed at Ulundi on the 1st September 1879, a document, as did all the other chiefs, recognising the victory of British arms over the Zulu nation, and the right of the Queen to deal with the conquered as she thought fit; he promised to respect the boundaries to be assigned to him, to prohibit any military system within his territory; to encourage his ~~his~~ people to live peacefully; to prevent the importation of arms and ammunition without the permission of the Resident; to see that no life was taken without a fair trial; that there was no witchcraft or "smelling out"; to surrender to the British fugitives from justice who had fled into his territory; to undertake no war without the previous sanction of the Resident; to settle all disputes with a chief by arbitration, the British Government to arbitrate; to grant succession to the chieftainship according to <sup>the</sup> ancient laws and customs of his people, and the British Government was to approve of the successor; he would neither sell nor alienate any of his land; he recognised that all people were to reside in his territory if they would accept him as chief, if not, they were to go elsewhere unmolested; the British Resident was to decide a case between a

/British....

1. R.C.Z. 24/2/80: Report of Zululand Boundary Commission.
2. In a letter dated 7/7/79 from General Crealock to Sir Garnet Wolseley. (F, Dunn.)
3. Documents 70 and 90 presented to Legislative Council, Natal, 1879. Vo. 37.

British subject and a Zulu, and was to try all British subjects.<sup>1</sup> All Cetywayo's brothers, except Unamu, choosing to remain in Zululand were to be collected into the neighbourhood of his chief brother, Dabulamanzi's kraal, which was near to Dunn, and would be under his eye. Chief John Dunn was to assign localities to them within his boundary, but neither Ndabuko, who was looking after Cetywayo's heir, Dinizulu, nor Usiwetu went to Dunn's land until after two years had elapsed. Dunn was to collect all of Cetywayo's cattle, and to return the remainder to their owners<sup>2</sup>, while the resident was to see that all guns were surrendered; By November, 1830, some 7,700 fire-arms had been handed in.<sup>3</sup> Missionaries were to be allowed to re-settle, if the chiefs so consented.<sup>4</sup>

Thus was set on foot the Wolseley Settlement which was destined to last some three years. On paper it was a good settlement; the people were under the chiefs they could respect; the land had been so divided up that the Zulu military machine could never again rear its grisly head; and the land had been left intact. But in reality the settlement was bristling with difficulties; the aftermath of war saw squabbles among the appointed chiefs about cattle and grain;<sup>5</sup> the chiefs, except for Dunn, Hlubi and Usibebu were men of straw; the hereditary chiefs<sup>6</sup> refused to kow-tow to the appointed chiefs whom they considered their inferiors, and the resident had no power to enforce his decisions.

The Zulu Boundary Commission commenced its work of defining the thirteen territories on the 13th September, 1879, and completed its work on the 19th November.

/Dunn's.....

1. Dunn page 130 ff.
2. Dunn p. 112. R.C.Z. 24/2/80.
3. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Colley 10/11/80.
4. R.C.Z. 24/2/80. Report of Zululand Boundary Commission Dunn p. 112.
5. de Kiewiet. p 289.
6. e.g. Cetywayo's brothers Dabulamanzi, Ndabuko, Mavumangwana, and Godido.

1

Dunn's Territory adjoined Chief Hlubi's. He had the largest and finest territory; it formed a broad buffer between the rest of Zululand and Natal. Along the coast was significantly an abundance of land for sugar plantations, which Dunn apparently did not develop, - his chief occupation being the rearing of cattle. He commanded all the drifts of the Tugela into Zululand, except the one by Rorke's farm. His inhabitants were more alien and more divided in their affections to him than in any other of the twelve locations, but being a European he was the more able to deal with them. It was for this reason that the King's brothers who elected to stay in Zululand were told to stay under his care around Dabulamanzi's kraal near the Nkandhla forest, and, as would be expected, they were a wen which spread disaffection. Of the other territories the only two that need mention were Uhamu's and Usibebu's, which were both in the north, Uhamu's adjoining the Transvaal. Dunn had realised his dream, - he had a much larger territory than he could ever have hoped for under Cetywayo, and as soon as his people were settled again in their old haunts, he put into practice his idea of a paternal government. He appointed and maintained three European magistrates, Galloway, Oftebro and Brummer, to exercise both civil and criminal jurisdiction, to collect the hut tax of 5/- a hut he was going to impose within their respective districts, and to receive money paid by traders for licences. Their decisions were subject to himself as a final court of appeal. <sup>2</sup>

In 1880, the first year that Dunn imposed a hut tax, he collected, at 5/-s a hut, the total sum of £2,468. The following year he raised the tax to the permanent rate of 10/-s, when the sum raised was £5,101. <sup>3</sup>

/ He.....

1. Vide Walker Historical Atlas Map p.15.

2. R.C.Z.24/2/80. Report of Zululand Boundary Commission: Gibson pp.223-224. 3. Colenso thought the amount was between £5,000 and £10,000 (Digest p.70)

He used this money for salaries, general expenses, the purchase of ploughs<sup>1</sup> and for road-making<sup>2</sup>, thus anticipating in part Rhodes's Glen Grey Act<sup>3</sup> by some fourteen years.

Dunn was now a landed squire. He spent his year moving about his territory giving his advice here and tending to some problem there. His favourite sports were fishing and hunting big game which he indulged to the full. Cattle were his chief concern next to ruling his territory. It had been decided by the Government when Dunn had collected the 500 Royal Cattle that a number should be sold, and Dunn seized the opportunity to buy as many as he could. This business transaction led to a friendship only terminated by his death, with Harry Sparks (now Colonel), then a young man of 24. Mr. Sparks was then a meat purveyor, and his business necessitated his going to Zululand to buy cattle, which, in his opinion, were beautiful, and before the Zulu War without a tick. We are indebted to Sparks for the following incident which occurred in 1880, when both he and Dunn were hunting near Hluhluwe and Dunn had his narrowest escape from a buffalo. It was an old beast that had been driven from the herd. Dunn was walking alone through a bush after game some distance from the buffalo haunts when he heard a grunt behind him and before he had time to turn he was tossed through the thorny branches of a mimosa tree and landed spread-eagled on top. He was much pricked and bruised by the thorns. The beast kept him up the tree for about an hour and then retired to a short distance; but when he attempted to get down to reach for his rifle, the brute was back again. However,

/after...

1.D.B.M.C. Osborn to Colley 5/11/80.

2.D.B.M.C. Osborn to Bulwer 2/8/82.

3.Vide Knowles op cit 319-324: Union Year Book No 16.p.966.

after a time it retired and Dunn hurried down, secured his gun, fired and wounded it. The buffalo then charged, but Dunn brought it down with a second shot.<sup>1</sup>

There were three stations, by this time, in Dunsland. The first, on the farm Emoyeni, was Mangete. It was five miles from the Tugela River, and was quite a village consisting of five houses, one being used for guests.<sup>2</sup> He was very hospitable and provided a splendid table and wines for visitors. His chief wife lived there. There were also very large kraals at this spot to accommodate his headmen, hunters and their families. His second station was at Inyezane, and named Udigilene, about 20 miles from Mangete, and here also was an up-to-date building and several large kraals. Beyond this again was the third station at Ungoye and named Thwayo N'duku. It, too, was quite a large village with several kraals.<sup>3</sup> Some of these buildings were made of wood and iron; others of brick and cement; all were well furnished with furniture imported from Durban. He had kraals for his Natives, and Natives alone. He took particular care that all his children were well clothed and well-cared for. They were educated by a European, Gilling, who eventually married one of his daughters.<sup>4</sup> Thus it cannot be said, pace Uys, that Dunn "was in all but name a Zulu."<sup>5</sup>

During the last campaign, all the Mission Stations, except Bishop Schroeder's were burnt.<sup>6</sup>

/Now.....

1. Sparks to me July 1939.
2. Usually famous world hunters.
3. Colonel Sparks "Natal Mercury" 24/11/1934.
4. "Natal Mercury" Sparks's Zululand's White Chief. November, 1934.
5. Uys. p.225.
6. R.C.Z. 24/2/80. Report Zululand Boundary Commission.

Now that peace was restored, and consequent upon the terms of the Deed of Chieftainship, several of the chiefs were willing to allow the Missionaries to return, but Chief Hlubi refused permission to the Norwegian Missionaries <sup>1</sup> and it was not within Wheelwright's power to interfere in internal matters. Dunn, likewise, refused to allow the five German Missionaries to return because they had voluntarily left their stations, unlike the other missionaries, long before the war began, and therefore could not be regarded as having been forced to abandon them on account of war; nor were they of the type of missionary he considered likely to benefit the Natives; the Revd Volckner voluntarily abandoned his station in 1877, while the Revd Muller left before the war by order of Cetuyayo, because he had severely beaten several Zulu women; and the other missionary (possibly a Mr. Kuick) <sup>2</sup> had hit an old Zulu over the head with a piece of iron, from which injury he had died. <sup>3</sup> The Missionaries had also refused to sign Dunn's ten conditions upon which he <sup>4</sup> was willing to admit them to his territory. Briefly they were, to acknowledge his authority; to have no personal claim or title to land, to teach both Zulu and English in their schools, which were to be "an ordinary plain English School", where no undue attention was to be made to such accomplishments as music; to teach a trade to any Native so inclined; that no Native was to remove from any kraal to settle on a station without Dunn's permission; if permitted, he was bound to erect a dwelling house in European style; that no native becomes exempt from tribal duties to his chief by residing on a Mission Station;

/every.....

1. R.C.Z.-K.L. Titlestad to Wheelwright 3/1/80.  
Nine Norwegian Mission Stations were abandoned about 18th April 1878 (Natal Advertiser 18/4/78).
2. Vide D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer p.151.
3. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Havelock 27/11/86. 4.D.B.M.O. Osborn to Colley 4/8/80.

every encouragement be given to industrial pursuits to make the station, in time, self-supporting; to cultivate for a market; and, what was to Dunn, his chief complaint against the Missionary, no station to be a trading station for dealing in cattle for profit <sup>1</sup>. Little wonder that the Hanoverians would not subscribe to his decalogue; the bilingual difficulty might appear insuperable; to insist upon a house of European style would possibly deter the Native; and to prevent the Missionary, <sup>FROM</sup> trading in cattle for profit while the chief did such a thing, must have annoyed people whose allowance was usually a pittance. Nevertheless, Dunn's conditions exhibited the current Colonial conception of a missionary's duty to God's backward children. K. Hohls petitioned the Governor in November, but as Dunn was Leviathan, his Excellency would not interfere. <sup>2</sup> Eventually Dunn allowed ~~the~~ <sup>HLUBI'S</sup> Norwegian <sup>3</sup> to take the place of the Hanoverians.

It was not until November 1826 when Dunn was no longer an appointed chief that the German Missionaries were allowed by the British Government to <sup>4</sup> return to their former stations.

When drunkenness broke out amongst the Natives and the evil was attributable to excessive beer-drinking, Dunn instituted an enquiry and found that European traders sold notes to Natives on canteens for liquor. Dunn thereupon promulgated a new law to stop this, <sup>5</sup>

Towards the end of 1831 it was reported that his people were contented and thriving under the laws which the chief had laid down and were being administered by himself and three administrators. <sup>6</sup>

/It.....

1. Dunn p. 143.

2. D.B.M.C. Osborn to Colley 17/1/81.

3. D.B.M.C. Osborn to Havelock 19/10/83; 21/12/83.

4. D.B.M.C. Osborn to Havelock 27/11/86; 11/5/87

5. Natal Mercury 20/12/1831. "John Dunn's views"

6. Digest p. 62-70.



It would have been very strange had no one found fault with Dunn; people are usually envious of other folks' good fortune: Mr. Campbell was such an one. He wrote to Sir Henry Bulwer accusing John Dunn of levying a beast from the headmen of the kraals in his district; of trading in and buying oxen and other cattle, and of compelling the Natives in certain districts to take them although suffering from lung sickness, which was rife at that time.<sup>1</sup> Also, other Chiefs were following Dunn's example.<sup>2</sup> J.W. Shepstone, who had succeeded Sir Theophilus Shepstone as Secretary of Native Affairs, Natal, explained in so far as the other Chiefs were concerned, the "levy of cattle" was merely a thank-offering to the British Government, which had had Wolseley's approval. As for Dunn he had collected Cetywayo's cattle, which he had been instructed to do, and had bought some in an open market; so that when the Chiefs, who had been Campbell's informant, saw these among Dunn's cattle they not unnaturally concluded that the chief had appropriated same. The Resident suggested that sales should cease.<sup>3</sup>

A more serious charge against Dunn was brought by Mr. Fannin, Border Agent, Umvoti, who accused him of ill-treating Mavumengwana, one of Cetywayo's brothers, who was peremptorily ordered to leave his kraal, and that five companies pulled down two of his kraals.<sup>4</sup> Wheelwright, however, considered that Dunn had acted rightly as the complainant was unfriendly towards other people, and it was Dunn's duty to maintain peace within his district.<sup>5</sup> Sir Garnet Wolseley also approved of Dunn's action, and observed that "reference of such

/matters....

1. de Kiewiet p.215.
2. F.C.Z. Bulwer to Wheelwright. 7/11/79.
3. Vide Supra p.49; D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 2/11/82
4. F.C.Z. Bulwer to Wheelwright 3/11/79. (F.C.Z.)
5. ibid 4/12/79.

matters of internal government to the British Resident must so weaken the authority of the independent chiefs as to render their effective rule impossible", but "the Resident should keep a vigilant watch upon the character of the government of each territory, and should be able, without interposing his authority in each individual case, to understand before long whether there is any misgovernment so grave as to call for rebuke or intervention from the British Government. He should give his advice where he thinks it is called for to the chiefs, but each chief must be allowed to rule his people and to settle disputes among them by his own rights or sovereignty and independently of British Authority. "<sup>1</sup> It was quite clear that the Resident was to be the eyes and ears, but not the mouth of the British Government. In the circumstances Wheelwright found that he could not continue in office, as he was unable "to interpose authoritatively in many questions referred to him by the chiefs."<sup>2</sup> Thus six months after its initiation the Wolseley Settlement was about to founder on the rock of 'No Authority'. Wolseley was on the horns of a dilemma; to admit failure because of the lack of authority was useless; England would not alter her declared policy. He therefore had to look round for a person who possessed the qualifications necessary for so invidious a position. He chose Melmoth Osborn, who for many years had been a resident magistrate in Natal, was a brilliant Zulu linguist, a friend of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and at that time the Colonial Secretary in the Transvaal, to Sir Owen Lanyon who had

/succeeded ....

1. R.C.Z. Bulwer to Wheelwright 19/2/79, enclosing copy of Garnet Wolseley's dispatch.

2. R.C.Z. Minute paper 1/7/80. Wheelwright unfortunately did not indicate what these many questions were.

succeeded Sir Theophilus Shepstone as administrator in March 1879;<sup>1</sup> and so on the Ides of March 1880, Osborn assumed office.<sup>2</sup> Gibson rightly said of him, "His task was one of great difficulty, how difficult will perhaps never be realised. His position was one in which it was difficult to obtain credit for the trouble he prevented, because of the large amount of trouble that occurred."<sup>3</sup>

It is convenient here to sum up how the new scheme was working; All men under forty who were still unmarried lost no time in availing themselves of the general permission to marry. No shield-bearing Zulu had been permitted to leave the country; now these young men hastened to places where they could earn money to acquire herds. A large number of them had gone to Natal for work which they obtained chiefly on the railway construction. Those who had returned were pleased with the wages they had earned, and "going to work" was becoming popular in Zululand. Osborn suggested the continuation of the Agent system for getting labour.<sup>4</sup> All this augured well for the future especially as their complaints and sorrows had been many after their enormous losses in cattle and grain during the Zulu war.<sup>5</sup> What then led to "the large amount of trouble" to which Gibson referred in his estimate of Osborn?<sup>6</sup>

It was strange that their conquerors required no form of tribute from them. Those who know the Zulu mind say that they regarded this as a form of weakness,- such magnanimity is incomprehensible to a barbarian.

/They.....

1. Sir T. Shepstone was now living in retirement in Pietermaritzburg. Russell p. 220. de Kiewiet p. 237.
2. Votes and Proceedings, Legislative Council, Natal, telegram Wolseley to Bulwer 7/1/80.
3. Gibson op cit p. 222.
4. D.B.M.C. Osborn to Colley 10/11/80; Gibson pp. 222-3.
5. de Kiewiet p. 289.
6. Cf. Stuart op cit p. 312.

They regarded the appointed chiefs as Indunas of the British Government rather than as independent rulers, and those who had once been in high authority resented the uncontrolled authority of those whom they had not always regarded as people to be obeyed. Both Umnyamana and Ndiabuko smarted under these grievances, and the latter began to agitate for the return of his brother Cetywayo<sup>1</sup>. The representative of the conquerors had no authority, and even if he had, he had no force with which to back it up; further, he had resigned his post, and there were many who asked why, and in a land of superstition weird and wonderful rumours spread.

Through Dunn's intervention, however, the Resident got a certain increase of authority. It happened that Dunn was having trouble with cattle traders whose cattle were trespassing on the gardens of Natives; he also complained of this to the High Commissioner and wished to know who was to deal with British subjects travelling through the country as this was not envisaged in his Deed of Chieftainship. The upshot of this was that Osborn was appointed a magistrate within Zululand<sup>2</sup> and from 14th September 1880.

At the same time Dunn wrote to Sir Garnet Wolseley suggesting certain proposals for the betterment of Zululand. He wrote because he could not help noticing the feeling in Natal against the Settlement of the Zulu country, owing "chiefly to the British Resident in here receiving his pay from Natal"<sup>3</sup>. Dunn first proposed

/that.....

1. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer. 13/7/80.
2. R.C.Z. Colley to Osborn 14/9/80.
3. Actually Natal paid one half and the Transvaal the other. Doc 90 and 107 presented to Legislative Council Natal; Vol 37 and Vo 39: Votes and Proceedings Legislative Council, Natal: Telegram Wolseley to Bulwer 11/1/80.

that the Native Chiefs of the Territories should have two white administrators of Zulu law, men who thoroughly understood the language and customs of the people. The said administrators to be under appeal to the chiefs in cases of Zulu vs. Zulu, and to the British Resident in cases of British subjects vs Zulus. All chiefs should be authorised to levy a tax of 10/-s a hut on all people under them. From this tax pay the British Resident £500 a year to cover administration costs. The Chiefs should keep the roads in repair and for their upkeep should put a toll on them. There should be an immigration scheme. Each immigrant to pay £25 a year in advance. He is to be there for the purpose of agriculture, stock-farming or pursuits if industry. No spirits are to be introduced for either sale or barter. Out of the revenue received, £50<sup>1</sup> a year is to be ear-marked as a grant-in-aid for education. That the scheme was feasible Dunn could inform Sir Garnet Wolseley;<sup>1</sup> with the exception of the immigration proposal, he was successfully carrying out such a programme. Osborn supported Dunn's view<sup>2</sup> and Sir Theophilus Shepstone concurred but suggested a hut tax of 14/-s.<sup>3</sup> Osborn sounded the chiefs on the new proposals<sup>4</sup> but nothing was done at the time as the Boer War had broken out, but the suggestions were kept in mind.<sup>5</sup>

A new Government had succeeded Disraeli's in July 1880. The political philosophy of this mid-Victorian Liberal party to whom both Kimberley<sup>6</sup> and Gladstone belonged was one that counselled abstention rather than

/interference....

- 1.R.C.Z. Kimberley to Sir Hercules Robinson 28/4/81 enclosing Dunn's proposals.
- 2.D.B.M.O. Osborn's memorandum to Colley 4/9/80.
- 3.R.C.Z. Shepstone to Colley 13/9/80. Shepstone had levied a hut tax of 7s on every native hut in Natal as early as 1849.
- 4.D.B.M.O. Osborn to Evelyn Wood 1/6/81.
- 5.Vide p. 72 ff'infra.
- 6.The new Secretary of State for Colonies.

interference, and that saw self-help as a leading virtue of all self-government". Its platform had been that the Tulu War was an unjust one; it now behoved the Government to evince sympathy towards those who had suffered by it. Cetywayo was not slow to make the best use of this hint and eventually succeeded in visiting the Queen.<sup>a</sup> Gladstone's cabinet also adversely criticised the annexation of the Transvaal. It soon witnessed the retrocession of that land to the Boers, and, later the restoration of Cetywayo. A new ministry in England also saw a change of Governors in Natal; Sir Henry Bulwer was succeeded by Sir George Pomeroy Colley, who as Colonel Colley had accompanied Sir Garnet Wolseley, after the Langalibalele outbreak, to Natal where the latter carried "Jamaica" reforms and drowned the liberties of the Natalians 'in sherry and champagne'<sup>1</sup>

In November the Potchefstroom officials had sued the Boer, Bezuidenhout, for his taxes and when he proved that he had paid them, they mulcted him with costs and distrained upon his wagon. This was too much for the Boers. Cronje with 300 men rescued the wagon; 1500 armed men speedily assembled and British troops were rushed up to the Transvaal. A great meeting of Boers was held from the 8th to the 13th December at Paardekraal (present Krugersdorp), when it was decided to fight. On historic December 16, the Vierkleur was hoisted and the War of Independence began<sup>2</sup>. It was destined to be short and indecisive.

/In Zululand....

*a Lady Dixie op.cit. Chap 27.*

1. Vide Walker p.363.

2. *ibid* p. 387-388; Russell p. 249-250.

In Zululand, Umnyamana had been placed in Uhamu's territory but refused to acknowledge him as his overlord. The latter had demanded from Umnyamana the full restoration of all cattle, some 1400, seized from him and his people by the Zulus during the late war immediately after his secession from Cetywayo. This the former had refused. Umnyamana appealed to Osborn, but he could not deal with the internal affairs of the chief, although he considered that Uhamu had acted oppressively since the cattle he claimed were Royal cattle and legally belonged to the British. Osborn realised that this would mean trouble and asked Colley for advice. The Governor suggested giving Umnyamana a territory, but Osborn considered that this would lead to other disaffected chiefs throwing off their allegiance to the appointed chiefs, and before Colley could answer him he had given his life at Majuba on the 27th February, 1881, and Osborn anxiously awaited his successor's<sup>1</sup> decision.

Ndabuko who was residing in Usibebu's location was trying to get Cetywayo restored. He had been to Pietermaritzburg in May, 1880, to petition the Government in this respect, but had been referred to the Resident. Usibebu fined him for going to Pietermaritzburg without permission, but he refused to pay. He too, smarted under a grievance, and was in touch with Umnyamana.<sup>2</sup> Osborn thought that if only the Governor could interfere authorita-<sup>3</sup>tively all would be well, but the time was out of joint; for both the new Governor, Sir Evelyn Wood, and the new High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, had gone first to Newcastle and then to Pretoria to complete the final terms<sup>4</sup> of the Pretoria Convention which terminated the first Boer<sup>5</sup> War .

/The one.....

1. D.B.M.O. 25/1/81; 13/5/81; 20/9/81; 30/5/81; 4/12/80; 7/12/80; 6/4/81; Gibson p.225-227.
2. D.B.M.O. Minutes dated 31/4/81.
3. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Wood 22/4/81.
4. Eybers Select Constitutional Documents p.455 ff.
5. Walker pp.383-391; Russell p.258-259; Lady Dixie *op.cit. passim*

The one peaceful spot in Zululand was Dunnsland, and three months after the conclusion of hostilities with the Boers, Dunn asked to be allowed to construct a harbour on his sea coast, and to enter into agreements with the chiefs of Zululand for the right of transit through their territories for a railway which he intended to build to the Transvaal. The moment was thought to be unpropitious for such a grandiose scheme, and Dunn was thanked for his offer.<sup>1</sup> It is idle to speculate what would have been the political result had such a scheme been put into operation. There was much of Rhodes in Chief John Dunn.

Osborn informed Colonel Mitchell, who was acting in Natal, that a Natal Native, Sitimela, was causing mischief in Zululand; that he would apprehend him and send him to Natal if his information were correct.<sup>2</sup>

The greatest stigma attaches to Dunn over this affair. Bishop Colenso accused his people of slaughtering women and children as well as men, - his eye witness being one Manxele.

Sitimela laid claim to the chieftainship of the Umtetwa over which his Uncle, Umlandela, an appointed chief, ruled. He based his claim on the fact that he was the son of Somveli, son of Dingiswayo, a predecessor of Chaka. Chaka drove Somveli out of Zululand, but by the principle followed by Sir Garnet Wolesley he should be chief.<sup>3</sup> When Osborn learned that he claimed the chieftainship he sent for him, but he had fled back to Natal.<sup>4</sup> Bishop Colenso says, according to his informant, Maxele, that Sitimela had gone to Zululand to discuss tribal matters (not specified) and had no desire to turn out his old uncle, but when he heard that Umlandela was sending an impi after him he fled.<sup>5</sup>

/In July....

1. D. B. M. O. Osborn to Wood 8/8/81, enclosing Dunn's letter dated 25/6/81. 2. D. B. M. O. Osborn to Mitchell 28/6/81. 3. Vide p. 50 supra. 4. D. B. M. O. Osborn to Mitchell 10/7/81. 5. Digest p. 114.



In July, 1881, some six months after his first appearance in Zululand he reappeared, as Colenso avers not to fight but to talk over matters 'amicably' with his uncle. He had merely come, says Colenso, to claim the house and property of Somveli. Umlandela refused this and Sitimela then went to the appointed chief Somkele to ask him to send over some of his headmen to be present at the negotiations with Umlandela. On his return from Somkele, Umlandela had left and gone to John Dunn.<sup>1</sup> The truth seems to be that Sitimela went to Somkele to solicit his aid to turn out his Uncle, who was very ill and incompetent. Sitimela gathered a force round him, - his claim to the chieftainship, false or true, having gained credence, - and forced the aged chief to flee to Dunn for protection. Sitimela then assumed the chieftainship and, as is the custom in these cases, sent Osborn two head of cattle. Osborn ordered the pretender to appear before him,<sup>2</sup> but instead of obeying he formed an impi of 1,000 strong.

Sir E. Wood received a telegram from Dunn, dated July 8, stating that rebellion had broken out in the territory of Chief Umlandela, who had fled to Dunn for protection. Dunn, in absence of the Resident, asked for authority to suppress the rebellion. Wood replied that while Umlandela was in Dunn's territory, his person should be protected but Umlandela must not organise his followers, nor was Dunn to interfere with anyone outside his territory,<sup>3</sup> beyond using his influence in favour of good order.

/ Dunn.....

1. Digest pp.259-275 for Colenso version.
2. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Mitchell 6/7/81 erroneously dated 28/6/81.
3. ibid 13/7/81.

Dunn restored Umlandela to his territory in a wagon, whereupon Osborn told Dunn not to interfere, and apprehensively awaited Sitimela's and Umlandela's indunas. But Dunn, "without authority, or in complete disregard of the above instructions of which he was fully aware" <sup>1</sup> called out an impi and marched into Umlandela's territory. This unauthorised, or rather disobedient action on the part of John Dunn, says Colenso, must, of course, have precipitated matters and rendered a peaceful solution of the difficulty almost impossible. But Colenso forgets that once Umlandela had entered his territory he needed protection and where was he to get it except from Dunn.

The Resident again cited the two chiefs to appear before him. Sitimela was only too willing to appear, while Umlandela refused! "Here we have an appointed chief backed up by John Dunn", says Colenso "refusing to appear before the Resident." Osborn, however, excused Umlandela on the plea that he feared his representatives would meet with harm from Sitimela's followers on their way to him. <sup>2</sup> Sitimela, in spite of his protestations, did not put in an appearance.

Osborn considered that his own appearance in Umlandela's territory would be inadvisable unless Sitimela refused to comply. As Sitimela did not appear the Resident set off for Mount Unhlazatye, the scene of the action. <sup>3</sup> Dunn was still assisting Umlandela with success, while Somkele tacitly acknowledged Sitimela. Osborn realised there was no chance of suppressing Sitimela without some exhibition of force, which he could get by advising the loyal chiefs to send strong contingents to help Umlandela. <sup>4</sup>

/Colenso.....

1. Colenso.
2. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Mitchell 11/7/81.
3. ibid 24/7/81.
4. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Mitchell 21/7/81.

Colenso makes much of this. He says Osborn actually told the loyal chiefs before the 25th that he would possibly have to call upon their aid, so that when Sitimela heard of this he would not, for fear, go to Osborn. But Sitimela's attitude was that of a person in the wrong. What is more he was not afraid because he knew that Somkele was sending him aid. The crisis came with the arrival of Somkele's eight companies<sup>1</sup>. Somkele afterwards explained this away by saying that his men would not return when told not to interfere, but this explanation was not accepted.<sup>2</sup>

Sitimela refused to go before Osborn if Dunn was present as he had threatened he would seize him, he alleged, even in front of the Resident. Osborn could not send Dunn out of the territory; for to do so would be to leave Umlandela imperilled, since Sitimela would not disperse his impi.

On the 27th Sitimela appeared with his impi. The people were told to disperse and to submit to Umlandela. Sitimela was told to leave the country. Sitimela disobeyed and Osborn called upon loyal chiefs Dunn, Umgitywa, Usibebu, and the Regent Siungaza<sup>3</sup> to render armed force if applied for, but no women or children were to be hurt in the event of war.<sup>4</sup>

The next day at 8 a.m. Osborn sent Sitimela a last warning to disperse his people and to leave the territory. By 3 p.m. Sitimela prevaricated by saying he had ordered the women and children to return home peacefully. Osborn insisted on the men being dispersed. On the 30th Dunn sent a party to ascertain if these men had been dispersed. The reconnoitring party was attacked and seven men killed. Dunn then led forward his contingent, attacked and put the impi to flight. Sitimela escaped over the

/Umfolosi.....

1. A Company consisted of 50 men. 2. D.B.M.O. Osborn to
3. Appointed chief Gaozi had died. Mitchell 24/7/81,
4. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Mitchell 28/7/81.

Umfolosi into the bush country. <sup>1</sup> Colenso says this is not a true version of what happened, and quoted his eye witness, Manxele, who testified before Mr. Fred B. Fynney that "on the morning of the fight Sitimela was with his followers at a kraal named Uyengo near the Nongidi Hills, when Chief John Dunn rode up, followed by his impi. As soon as he got within range he dismounted and fired upon Sitimela's followers, and then otherwhite men who were with him, five in number, fired also. Sitimela ordered his people to retreat as he did not want to fight." Dunn also at that time, says Colenso, killed women and children. This he assures us upon the testimony of two <sup>3</sup> eyewitnesses and published a list of 38 wives and <sup>4</sup> children of men of note who were killed on that occasion.

Manxele could not know what had previously happened to the reconnoitring party and that Dunn had already been attacked, nevertheless, if Colenso's allegations were true, then Dunn deserved the stigma that His Lordship would put upon his name. Dunn, for his part, categorically denied this inhuman barbarity, questioned the trustworthiness of Colenso's witnesses, and accused Mr. Fynney <sup>5</sup> of partiality, he being 'one of Colenso's jingoes.' Fynney, in reply, vituperated Dunn in a long letter to the local press <sup>6</sup>. Had there been no other evidence Dunn's accusers would have to admit that a state of rebellion existed, or at least that matters called for speedy action; that Dunn, along with other loyal chiefs had been authorised to suppress Sitimela's faction. His action, too, would no doubt have been vindicated in a court of <sup>7</sup> law.

/ Fortunately....

1. Notes and Proceedings Legislative Council, Natal, Governor's speech, October 6 1881. Vide also Digest p. 128 for Dunn's actual account.
2. Digest. p.17-18. 3. ibid pp.127-129. 4. Digest pp.259-275. 5. Digest p.148. 6. Ibid pp.173-175.
7. Cf the case of General Dyer who ordered his troops to fire on a mob of rebels in the Punjab, India in 1919 when martial law had been proclaimed. He was removed from the army-later tried by English Judge and Jury when main issue was whether he had used "unnecessary force". Both the Court & public opinion vindicated him & conceded his action had "saved India". (Natal Mercury, 7/9/39) What Martial Law means.

Fortunately there is other evidence; Osborn who was almost on the spot said "All the information which has reached me on the subject shows that no bodily harm was done to the women and families of Sitimela's party: they were, however, taken prisoners, the captors granting their release on receiving one head of cattle for each as ransom." This rather knocked the bottom out of Colenso's allegations, but nothing daunted he sulkily remarked, "Those who had no relations to ransom them were kept by the captives." <sup>1</sup> There was no proof of this.

3000 head of cattle were captured, of which Umlandela recognised 1400 as his own. He then unwillingly distributed 60 among his adherents who complained bitterly of his meanness. The balance, about 1500, were kept by Dunn as a reward for his services. Gibson says Sitimela disappeared and no enquiry was ever made to find out if he were the rightful heir to the chieftainship of the Umtetwa. <sup>3</sup>

At this juncture Osborn suggested that Sir Evelyn Wood with 100 mounted men as escort should come to Zululand, now that his work at Pretoria was completed, <sup>4</sup> to deal with Somkele, and to make awards in connection <sup>5</sup> with Umnyamana and Ndabuko, who were still truculent. It was also an excellent moment politically to bolster up Wolseley's tattered settlement: The Chiefs now knew that the Resident had no supreme power: Chiefs Tshingana and Umfanwenlela, too, were having trouble with the tribes under them; possibly, says Osborn, this agitation had <sup>6</sup> been engineered by Ndabuko and Umnyamana.

/Outside.....

1. Digest pp.259-275. Give both sides together with Colenso's comments.
2. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Wood. 18/2/82.
3. Gibson p.230.
4. Pretoria Convention signed 3rd August 1881(Eybers)
5. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Wood 12/8/81.
6. Ibid. 1/6/81.

Outside of Zululand the Basutos had won the honours of war in the Disarmament affair; Majuba had lost English prestige: the Boers had got back the Transvaal, albeit, under the suzerainty of the Queen, if anybody knew what that meant, and the Pretoria Convention had defined the boundaries of the Transvaal state on all sides, with which it was now necessary that all concerned should be acquainted. Further the time was propitious to broach the subject of a general imposition of the Hut Tax, - with the exception of Dunn, the collection of Taxes by the Chiefs had proved abortive: - the appointment of sub-Residents in both a political and a magisterial capacity with the chiefs; and the granting of increased powers to the Resident, - innovations that would render the Wolseley Settlement nugatory.<sup>2</sup>

The meeting was arranged for the 29th August, but inclement weather caused it to be postponed until the 31st. Six of the appointed chiefs put in an appearance: Umcojana, the Regent Siyungazi (Gaozi's territory), Hlubi, Chingwayo, Usibebu and John Dunn. Representatives came instead of Seketwayo, Fakukasinigo and Uhamu: these Chiefs were either obese or too infirm to attend personally. Umlandela, Umfanawenlela, Umgitywa and Somkele were unrepresented, although apologies were received from each. In the case of Somkele it was highly significant.. About a thousand followers together with certain hereditary chiefs which included Ndabuko with Cetywayo's little heir, Dinizulu, Usiwetu and Umtonga of 1861 fame, completed the indaba.

The proceedings began with address "A", summarising the pros and cons of Majuba. It was interpreted by Mr. Boast,<sup>3</sup> and was designed to recoup British Prestige. Mr. Rudolf<sup>4</sup> then interpreted Memorandum "B" comprising

/proposals.....

1. Walker pages 286-391.
2. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Wood 6/8/81.
3. Osborn's interpreter
4. viz Evelyn Wood's interpreter.

for the better government of Zululand. Dunn's<sup>1</sup> influence will be patent as we discuss them. The Chiefs unanimously assented to the general imposition of a 10/-s hut tax, part of which was to meet all the expenses incurred by the British Government for the good of the Chiefs, the Zulu people and Zululand. This envisaged sub-Residents. Dunn declined and two of the Chiefs deferred their answer to the proposal that Chiefs were to have European Officers if desired. All agreed that the Resident, sub-Residents and expenses of Zululand should be met by part of the hut tax to be imposed, while not one desired to defray the expenses of a border police from this source. Again it was unanimously decided to maintain roads and to levy reasonable tolls: Dunn alone considered his territory sufficiently advanced to establish industrial schools. Two chiefs deferred their opinion on the proposal that no liquor was to be for sale, barter or gift. All agreed to a periodic assembly of the chiefs.

His Excellency then proceeded to deal with the recalcitrant chiefs. His award was that Uhamu was to restore one half of the 1400 cattle seized from Umnyamana, considering that a fine of 700 on Umnyamana was sufficient. Usibebu was likewise to restore one third of the cattle to Ndabuko and Usiwetu as soon as the two last named quitted his territory. It was at this point that the interpreter, Rudolf, is alleged by Colenso to have translated His Excellency as having said, "We turn you out, Ndabuko, Dinizulu and Usiwetu because you are always saying that you want the 'bone' of that scoundrel (ishanga) whom we have done away with". The reference to Cetywayo as 'a scoundrel'

/deeply.....

1. Vide p.61 -62 supra.

deeply offended, we are told, the hereditary chiefs present <sup>1</sup>, but Osborn who was present and was a brilliant linguist, denied hearing the offending word <sup>2</sup>. The indaba concluded and Lord Kimberley was duly informed of what had taken place. Her Majesty's Government agreed to the levy of the hut tax; to the making of and maintenance of roads and their upkeep by means of tolls; to the preventing of the importation of spirituous liquors; and to the periodical assembly of chiefs, since "these proposals involve in themselves no increase of interference on the part of the British Resident", but no part of the hut tax raised could be used to pay the salaries of either Resident or proposed sub-Residents; for in so doing the Chiefs might believe that it "would secure the general direction of Zulu affairs by the British Government". Her Majesty's Government further refused to extend the powers of the Resident as that "would lead to placing Zululand virtually under British rule. To pay the Resident would constitute a direct obligation on the part of the British Government. He would then exercise real authority, and this to be effectually exercised must necessitate a force adequate to compel obedience. The combination of Chiefs could not be relied upon for this purpose, as they might even resist their orders if they were directed against oppression or misgovernment on their part, or they might be divided amongst themselves <sup>3</sup>. The crux of the matter was that the British Government refused to incur further expenditure. The Treasury curmudgeon had had bitter experience of the cost of Colonial defences, and had ingeminated economy, which

/de Kiewiet...

1. Digest, passim, consult index ishanga (scoundrel)  
P.P.H.E. "Bishop Colenso on Cetywayo". R.C.Z. Wood to Osborn enclosing Colenso's letter 18/10/81.
2. D.B.M.C. Report on Bishop of Natal's letter to Sir E. Wood 15/10/81.
3. R.C.Z. Wood to Kimberley 16/9/81: Bulwer to Osborn 15/3/82 enclosing Lord Kimberley's dispatch.



De Kiewiet considers was false economy; we subscribe to that opinion in view of the events that follow. Had the resident an adequate force, which could have been maintained at least partly out of the proceeds of the hut tax, he would have been able to prevent most of the bloodshed that followed. Cetywayo would not have been restored and there would not have been his war with Usibebu, nor would the New Republic have been formed, which resulted from this war as the sequel will show. This was not to be, and Lord Kimberley now had to seek a formula which would enable England to withdraw, he hoped, from her present invidious position. His solution was the eventual restoration of Cetywayo.

But first we must deal with the events immediately after the great indaba. There had been so much talk of sub-Residents that the idea even stimulated the incompetent Umlandela, but in a way unthought of by its proposers. He caused a minor stir by asking John Dunn to be his umlele(sub-Resident). The suggestion was unthinkable; an appointed chief to be the sub-Resident of another appointed chief, but he had made the request in good faith: he owed his life to Dunn: his people would not obey him and the Resident was powerless to aid him. Dunn was unwilling to act in this capacity, but was quite prepared to take over the territory. Osborn scotched the idea, because other chiefs might do the same and so stultify the present settlement; Kimberley upheld his decision.

/Uhamu.....

1. de Kiewiet p.197.

2. D.B.M.C. Osborn to Evelyn Wood 15/9/81; R.C.Z. Wood to Osborn 12/12/81 enclosing Lord Kimberley's dispatch; Digest p.275.

Uhamu refused to obey Wood's award to restore Umnyamana's cattle, and in September the disaffected Abaqulusi tribe in his district joined Umnyamana. The Abaqulusi were the personal retainers of the ex-king, and had suffered on his behalf in the late war. By the Wolseley Settlement they had been placed in Uhamu's charge, and he had done nothing to make them feel at home. In January previously, Osborn had learned that they were on the move as their position had become intolerable. All he could find out was that they were thought to be going to join the Boers<sup>1</sup>. Osborn now set off to see Uhamu<sup>2</sup>. Usibebu, in fulfilment of Wood's Award, expelled Ndabuko, Dinizulu and Usiwetu, and they ran into Umnyamana's open arms. They should have gone to Dunn's territory but instead they elected to reside with Umfanawenlela because he was a weak ruler and his land was contiguous with Uhamu's<sup>3</sup>. So much for the best laid scheme of Wolseley. War was imminent, and on the 2nd October Uhamu met the Abaqulusi on the right bank of the Bivana River, the boundary between the Transvaal and Zululand. The battle was short and bloody; hundreds of defeated Abaqulusi were killed; only those crossing the river escaped with their lives. By the 21st of the month all was quiet and the impi<sup>4</sup> had dispersed.

The Sitimela and Abaqulusi affrays were the only two serious conflicts that took place under the 1879 Settlement but they were sufficient to indicate the ineffectualness of such a scheme. Some other and better method had to be devised. Wolseley's Settlement was moribund; the Abaqulusi affair was its swan-song; it now only needed interment.<sup>n</sup>

Dunn, writing in 1886, summed up the Wolseley Settlement: "the so-called settlement of Zululand was

1.D.B.M.O. Osborn to Colley 24/1/81. /the....  
 2.D.B.M.O. Ibid 23/9/81:23/9/81:1/10/81:Gibson p.233.  
 3.D.B.M.O. Osborn to Pulver 6/3/82.  
 4.D.B.M.O. Osborn to Wood 4/10/81:7/10/81:16/10/81;21/10/81

the maddest piece of policy ever heard of, as the Zulu people, after their defeat naturally looked upon themselves as subjects of the Government and then they would willingly have allowed themselves to be moulded into any shape . The country ought to have been annexed and brought under British Rule at first without sending Cetuyayo away. The settlement as made by Sir Garnet Wolseley having no alternative would have worked well for some years if the Resident had been vested with greater authority, and a small force had been at his command to carry out his orders " <sup>i</sup>

## /CHAPTER V.

1. Dunn pp.118-119.

Chapter VTHE BULWER SETTLEMENT.

Before the final scheme for the future policy of Zululand was determined upon several proposals were submitted to the British Government. As some supreme authority was felt to be absolutely necessary, John Dunn modestly proposed himself as supreme chief. This was refused,<sup>1</sup> although it was recognised that his was the only territory where law and order had prevailed since the Ulundi Settlement.<sup>2</sup> The Transvaal,<sup>3</sup> Bishop Colenso<sup>4</sup> and Lady Dixie<sup>5</sup> wished for Cetywayo's restoration. The Revd. Robertson, a lifetime missionary in Zululand, wished for Magistrates.<sup>6</sup> Natal, for the most part, clamoured for the annexation of Zululand to Natal, - the 'safety valve'<sup>7</sup> was still working. Cetywayo himself, was, like Dunn, most importunate in his own behalf. His letters to the various persons in high authority had been frequent and elegant, - Lady Dixie, the well-meaning authoress and others had visited him at Cape Town, helping him to pen mellifluous epistles.<sup>8</sup> He soon began to produce the desired effect; on the 15th July, 1881, he addressed a letter to Lord Kimberley, begging to be taken to England to state his case.

/ A telegraphic....

1. Gibson op cit p.232.
2. Doc.112, 1881, Presented to Legislative Council, Natal. Vol 41.
3. D.B.M.C. Osborn to Wood 8/10/81: Gibson op cit pp.230-232 for details.
4. This solution of the problem had been advanced as early as May 1880 when Sir Henry Bulwer maintained that it was the Bishop's interference in Zulu Affairs that caused the agitation for Cetywayo's return. (Doc.37, 1883, Presented to Legislative Council, Natal. Vol. 44.
5. D.B.M.C. Osborn to Bulwer 22/11/82: "Lady Dixie declared that Cetywayo's restoration was owing to the efforts of the Bishop and his daughter." Vide also Lady Dixie "In the Land of Misfortune" passim.
6. F.C.Z. Revd. Robertson to Osborn 1/7/80.
7. Docs. 112 and 113, 1881, presented to Legislative Council, Natal. Vol 41. (Cetywayo)
8. Grant, Thursday, 20th Sept, 1883, "Do you remember a lady visiting you with Sir Hercules Robinson while you were at Oude Molen?" He at once described Lady Dixie. He spoke in the warmest terms of her friendship for him and all she had done." Lady Dixie op.cit pp 10-12; Chap 27.

A telegraphic reply came on the 14th September informing him that his application was being favourably considered. and in 1882 he went to England where he saw the Queen and impressed the English so much that he was to be restored to half his territory <sup>1</sup>.

Dunn considered that the restoration of Cetywayo "would turn the country upside down" and was most emphatic that he would not come into Zululand across the Tugela. Both Sir Evelyn Wood and Sir Hercules Robinson in an interview with him at Newcastle after the Transvaal settlement stated that "they could ALMOST guarantee that the Imperial Government would not restore Cetywayo". Dunn had no objection to the Imperial Government annexing the whole country and leaving Cetywayo to rule the northern while he retained the present territory with the Umhlatuzi River as a "buffer". He was also emphatic that he would not give up his territory without remuneration <sup>2</sup>.

When Sir Garnet Wolseley had approached Dunn to be a chief he had promised in the name of the English Government that Cetywayo would not be restored. Only on this condition would Dunn accept the post <sup>3</sup>. Now in January, 1882, Her Majesty's Government intimated that it intended to re-establish Cetywayo in part of the country <sup>4</sup>, Dunn now learned that what one Cabinet promised, its successor might and often did forswear.

As soon as Ndabuko and Umnyamana learned of the possibility of Cetywayo's return they tried to get territories of their own, complaining that they had no land in which to live. This was simply untrue. They had been told to go to Dunnsland where there was plenty, but had not done so.

/ To them.....

1. Gibson pp.223-234:Russell p.259; *Lady Dixie's* *sp. cit.* Chap 27.
2. Natal Mercury 20/12/1881 "John Dunn's Views"
3. R.C.Z. Bulwer to Osborn 13/1/83, enclosing Wolseley's dispatch to Secretary of State: Dunn p.117.
4. R.C.Z. Wood to J.W. Shepstone 12/1/82.

To them Dunn's land was a gilded cage. Their demand for territories was refused. Then they stirred up agitation on Cetywayo's behalf. They told certain chiefs in Dunn's territory not to regard Dunn as chief any longer. It is the refusal of Ndabuko and Umnyamana, said Osborn, "to recognise the appointed chiefs over them that causes all the trouble, and further trouble is likely to ensue because of their demands for independent territories. <sup>I</sup> The Usutu opposition to Dunn is explicable by the fact that he chiefly would oppose the restoration: and had not Dunn said in February, 1882, to a friend, "As soon as I get sight of Cetywayo I'll shoot him ? " <sup>2</sup> . Dabulamanzii aided Ndabuko and the strangest rumours pervaded Dunn's land: Dunn had run away from Pietermaritzburg to escape imprisonment because he had incurred His Excellency's displeasure: Dunn was going to refund all the hut tax money he had collected: and Melimata (Osborn) was to see this implemented. <sup>3</sup> Sir Henry Bulwer insisted that Dunn should not resort to arms without Osborn's permission. There must not be a second Sitimela. It was decided to expel Dabulamanzii for refusing to acknowledge Dunn as chief <sup>6</sup> but Cetywayo's brother refused to budge and Dunn wished to use arms if Osborn could do nothing. Once more the Resident advised Dunn that arms were only to be used as a last resort, and that he would be in Dunn's land as soon as he had dealt with Umnyamana who had raised an impi against Uhamu. Osborn was able to persuade Uhamu and Umnyamana to disperse their impis and when Dabulamanzii's people

/saw....

1. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 2/7/82:

31/4/82: 17/4/82: 29/6/82: 8/6/82.

2. Digest p.105 in notis.

3. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 29/6/82.

4. Returned to Natal once more as Governor in March 1882

5. R.C.Z. Bulwer to Osborn 15/6/82.

6. Ibid 8/7/82.

saw Osborn and learned how they had been gulled by idle rumour, they, too, gave no more trouble for the time being. Thus Osborn vindicated Wolseley's faith in him: Without a Police force he had been able alone to disperse two impi and to bring peace where an ugly situation had presented itself: for this meritorious service Her Majesty was pleased to confer the C.M.G. upon him <sup>1</sup>.

While Osborn was having his hands full with the hereditary chiefs Boer Adventurers on the western frontier penetrated Seketwayo's and Uhamu's territories <sup>2</sup>. This was the beginning of the future New Republic.

As soon as it was bruited that Her Majesty's Government intended to restore Cetywayo, the agitation for and against his restoration worked up once more to fever pitch. The British Government was wisely testing public opinion, but unwisely acted contrary to the opinion of the majority. Those who had the ear of the Government also led it by the nose. Natal <sup>3</sup>, Durban <sup>4</sup>, and Dunn <sup>5</sup> were against his return. The Transvaal <sup>6</sup>, The Aborigines' Protection Society <sup>7</sup>, Lady Dixie <sup>8</sup>, and seven Memorialists wished the ex-king to be restored. Henry Binns, later to become the premier of Natal, was in London in August, 1882, supporting Cetywayo's restoration. He wrote to Harry Escombe, another future Natal Premier, that "I am to see Lord Kimberley in a /day .....

1. Ibid 21/7/82: R.C.Z. Bulwer to Osborn 29/6/82: 6/9/82: 15/7/82:.
2. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 22/7/82: 17/11/82: 17/11/82 Digest pp.533-534. Vide p 99 ff infra.
3. Votes and Proceedings, Legislative Council, Natal, 1882. p 83. p.84.
4. Doc.83.1882, presented to Legislative Council, Natal. Vol 43. 31/1/83
5. R.C.Z. Bulwer to Osborn 7/11/82, encl. Dunn's letter/
6. Doc.37, 1883, presented Legislative Council, Natal. Vol.44. Vide pages 78 and 127.
7. Ibid p.194 ff: D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 25/10/82.
8. Grant 29/9/83; 2/6/83: D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 22/11/82
9. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer, 1883. p.151.

day or two, but it is very clear that he is leaving South African matters pretty much to Courtney<sup>1</sup>. I told Courtney that I had no fear of any danger<sup>2</sup> to Natal from Cetywayo's return, but that it was premature to discuss it. They quite understood that Dunn and the Kinglets would have to be squared first, but they are very anxious to bring it about as soon as it is safe and practicable."<sup>3</sup> Here briefly we have what the Secretary of State thought of South African public opinion. The responsibility and blame for the war that followed consequent upon Cetywayo's restoration must fall upon the shoulders of those who blindly ignored the warnings and imprecations of the folk on the spot. Binns was wrong, too, in supposing that there was no danger to Natal; for as soon as Cetywayo was back he commenced to revive the Zulu war machine. The British Government was also prepared unashamedly to waive the most solemn promise of its proconsul, by squaring Dunn and the kinglets. Unfortunately it not only broke its promise but also neglected to square Dunn. It says a great deal for the man that he remained ever loyal to the British Government. British Colonial policy in South Africa was at its lowest ebb.

Just as Sir Garnet Wolseley had been entrusted with the post war settlement of Zululand, so Sir Henry Bulwer had to find a formula whereby Cetywayo was restored to half his kingdom; the kinglets could be satisfactorily squared; the future of Natal was safeguarded; private individuals whom the king disliked were secured; and a better administration put on foot. His first essay was to divide Zululand into two, the northern half for Cetywayo, and the southern adjoining Natal for those who could not live under his rule<sup>4</sup>.

/Sassandra-like..

1. Lord Kimberley was succeeded by the Earl of Derby. December 1882.
2. The Zulu war machine (Vide Stuart op cit pp.67-91)
3. P.P.H.E. Binns to Escombe 12/3/82.
4. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 12/7/82: Gibson p.236.



Cassandra-like Osborn, however, did not doubt but that Cetywayo would re-organise the Zulu military machine and suggested a tripartite division of Zululand, which left faithful Usibebu independent in the north; placed Cetywayo conveniently in the centre and created a Reserve for those whom Cetywayo disliked in the south <sup>1</sup>. This was the scheme that Bulwer put up to the Secretary of State. It aimed at as nearly as possible a fifty-fifty basis; - Usibebu being allocated about a quarter of Zululand, Cetywayo, a half, and the Reserve territory the final quarter, - with the added security of a loyal chief and a warrior on the northern side of Cetywayo's territory. The British Government accepted the tripartite division but gave Cetywayo two-thirds instead of half Zululand <sup>2</sup>. Bulwer strongly opposed this final arrangement, but to no purpose <sup>3</sup>.

X It was left to Osborn to square the kinglets. They were deposed from their independent chieftainships, although they still remained chief of their tribe; they were informed of Cetywayo's impending return and that they must choose either to stay under him or to reside in the Reserved Territory <sup>4</sup>. Hlubi and Dunn were within the Reserved Territory; there would be no need for their tribes to move. Hlubi was satisfied with what the Government had decided to do. Dunn was disgusted and would say what he had to say in writing. In his letter he claimed compensation amounting to £20,000; to a sufficient location for his people; and to the payment of his three European Administrators for the unexpired period of their engagement <sup>5</sup>.

/The Secretary.....

1. D.B.M.O. Memorandum for His Excellency Aug. 1882.

2. Doc. 37, 1883, presented to Legislative Council, Natal. Vol 44. p. 239 et seq (Lord Kimberley's instructions as contained in dispatches 28th & 30th November 1882.)

3. R.C.Z. Bulwer to Osborn 4/12/82.

4. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 23/12/82.

5. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 23/12/82.

6. R.C.Z. Osborn to J. Shepstone 8/1/83 enclosing Dunn's letter; D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 30/7/83 enclosing Dunn's letter

The Secretary of State declined to pay compensation "as there were no funds to meet John Dunn's claims even if they were admissible", yet in the same dispatch he was quite prepared to pay compensation to the chiefs themselves.<sup>1</sup> This did not satisfy Dunn, and for the next two years he persisted in making claim for compensation. To take a leaf from his "book" - "He was deeply wronged by being deprived of his country and his chieftainship, after having been of the utmost use to the British cause during the Zulu War"<sup>2</sup>. Sir Henry Bulwer realising the injustice that had been done begged him to stay peacefully on his land near the Tugela<sup>3</sup> in order to act as a buffer between Natal and Zululand, and he would see to his rights; but this promise was not kept<sup>4</sup>, unless we regard his being appointed Amatonga Agent again in 1883<sup>5</sup>. Dunn's ward was bounded in the south by the Tugela River, in the north by the Umhlatuzi River, on the west by a line from Bond's Drift on the Tugela to a spur of the Umgaga Range abutting the Umhlatuzi River, and on the east by the Indian Ocean.<sup>6</sup>

It was not until August, 1886, that Dunn received £216.13. 4 in respect of payment to his three administrators but Dunn asked for an additional £150, being three amounts of £50 to each Commissioner towards building. Osborn suggested giving Galloway £100 for his building, but nothing for the other two, and this was done<sup>7</sup>. In 1888 Dunn was still hankering after £133. 6. 8 for salary paid to his administrators. He was told to get receipts and vouchers together and the Governor would approach the Lords of the Treasury who eventually liquidated this amount.<sup>8</sup>

/Usibebu.....

1. R.C.Z. Bulwer to Osborn 22/12/83 enclosing Derby's dispatch.
2. Woodie preface to Dunn's "notes"
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.            5 Vide infra p. 90. ff.
6. D.B.M.C. Clarke to Hely Hutchinson 18/9/95.
7. D.B.M.C. Osborn to Bulwer 15/8/85; Osborn to Havelock 14/9/86: 11/10/86: R.C.Z. Bulwer to Osborn 4/9/85.
8. R.C.Z. Havelock to Osborn 5/3/88: 3/4/88: D.B.M.C. Osborn to Havelock 31/3/88.

Usibebu was set up as an independent chief in his old lands. Of the remaining ten appointed chiefs, five elected to remain with Cetywayo - the unpunished Somkele, Umlandela and Umcojana, - these two chiefs were related to<sup>1</sup> Cetywayo by marriage, - Fakukasinigo and Seketwayo;<sup>2</sup> Henry Francis Fynn was appointed Resident with Cetywayo.

Bulwer also put up a scheme for the future administration of the Reserved Territory. He envisaged the division of the territory into districts over which he would place competent Magistrates. The Secretary of State considered this premature but recognised the immediate necessity for a bodyguard of police for the Resident of the Reserved Territory. The European element of the bodyguard was to be limited to a small number of officers who should organise the Native Police.<sup>3</sup> It was also agreed to raise a hut tax of 14/-s in the Reserved Territory "if there is no reason to apprehend any resistance to it"<sup>4</sup>

All was now ready for the return of Cetywayo, who, on the 10th January, 1883, set foot once more in Zululand; seven days later he was re-installed as king in his truncated territory.<sup>5</sup> He was no sooner back than he began to cultivate his party.<sup>6</sup>

The Usutus dwelling within Usibebu's territory failed to submit to that chief's authority and committed acts of violence against his loyal subjects. Usibebu reported these acts to the British Government and finally assembled a large force. On the 30th March a memorable

/battle.....

1. For detailed replies of Chiefs vide D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 28/12/82.
2. Doc. 37, 1883, presented to Legislative Council, Natal. Vol 44, p. 239 et seq.
3. R.C.Z. Kimberley to Bulwer 30/11/82.
4. R.C.Z. Bulwer to J. Shepstone 18/1/83
5. Doc. 38, 1883, presented to Legislative Council, Natal, Vol 44, p. 18; Gibson pp. 231-241.
6. R.C.Z. Bulwer to Shepstone 24/2/83: Gibson p. 245.

the  
 battle was fought in the valley of Umsebe and the  
 Usutu ~~was~~<sup>were</sup> routed <sup>1</sup>. Osborn formed his bodyguard, the  
 Nongqai or Zululand Native Police, in April under the  
 command of George Mansel. It comprised 50 Natives,  
 N.C.O.s and men, half of whom were recruited from Natal.  
 This half was mounted and was under the command of two  
 European Officers. Dunn had little faith in this Native  
 bodyguard <sup>2</sup>. On the first of May Mr. Pretorius took up  
 his residence as sub-Resident with Hlubi; the Reserve  
 being an elongated territory it strategically required  
 some competent person in the west to treat with the  
 Resident Commissioner stationed at Eshowe <sup>3</sup>. This was  
 the beginning of the division of Zululand into magis-  
 tracies as envisaged by Bulwer.

It is not proven that Cetywayo sent the impi which  
 Usibebu routed at Umsebe, although Bulwer thought that  
 he did <sup>4</sup> but it is quite clear that he summoned the men  
 in the Reserved Territory to rise in arms against Uhamu  
 the traitor. <sup>5</sup> So great was the uneasiness in the  
 Reserved Territory that Dunn wrote to the Resident asking  
 if the inhabitants of the Territory were assured of  
 protection in case of molestation from Cetywayo, and  
 asked the Resident Commissioner <sup>6</sup> to point out to the  
 Special Commissioner Sir Henry Bulwer, the increasing  
 interference of Cetywayo with the people of the Reserved  
 Territory; the threats of vengeance which he holds out  
 against all those who refuse to acknowledge his authority,  
 and also the consequent uneasiness. <sup>7</sup> Osborn replied that  
 a meeting of loyal chiefs was to be held <sup>8</sup>, but as things  
 quietened down nothing was done in the matter.

/Cetywayo.....

1. R.C.Z. Bulwer to Osborn 21/4/83:

Gibson pp. 246-249.

2. Stuart's op cit p. 558. Vide below p. 107.

3. R.C.Z. Bulwer to Osborn 28/4/83.

4. R.C.Z. Bulwer to Osborn 21/4/83: Gibson p. 250.

5. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer. 12/4/83: 13/4/83.

6. The new title for the official locally in charge of  
 the Reserved Territory.

7. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 3/5/83 enclosing Dunn's letter

8. R.C.Z. Bulwer to Osborn 12/5/83.

Cetywayo became impatient of Fynn's good advice and reposed his confidence in one William Grant of Durban. Grant was a friend of Lady Dixie's, Chessom of the Aborigines' Protection Society, Bishop Colenso and Harry Escombe, to name but a few. He visited Cetywayo on the 2nd June and learned from the King his point of view: "Mkosan gave an account of the interview in London between Cetywayo and Lord Kimberley and said the expression used respecting the land to be reserved was 'nidoman', a small piece.<sup>1</sup> Hence Cetywayo's dissatisfaction, but this does not explain why he should attack either Usibebu or Uhamu. Grant then tells us that "the truth appears to be that excepting John Dunn and his personal following and Hlubi with his personal following, also the Natal Natives who had been recently allowed to cross into the Reserve, the whole body of Zulus in the Reserve are heartily with their king.<sup>2</sup> This does not tally with the decision made by the appointed chiefs recorded above, although Grant would say that an appointed chief was not his people.

On the 14th June Cetywayo appointed Grant to be his Resident Adviser and Counsellor<sup>3</sup> and told him, "I am being killed, but I have been sitting still 'rolled up by the English law,' but I find I must soon unroll myself"<sup>4</sup>. Cetywayo had thus poetically declared war, a fact that Grant should have made known to Fynn, - as well as the fact that Makahlelega, son of Umbandine, King of the Swazis, had interviewed him<sup>5</sup> - when he met Fynn for the first time on the 15th June. Fynn told him that he had caused great mischief in the country by unsettling the people and that all sorts of rumours were in circulation about Grant;<sup>6</sup> /to which....

1. Grant 2/6/83: 9/6/83.

2. Ibid 11/6/83.

3. Grant 14/6/83.

4. Ibid 13/6/83.

5. Ibid 14/6/83.

6. Ibid 15/6/83.

to which the latter replied that he had come up simply as a friend of the king and that "I was not in any way connected with the (English ?) Government"<sup>1</sup>. Fynn, Grant tells us, sympathised with the King in his position and agreed that he had a grievance, to wit, the number of cattle which were now in the possession of John Dunn.<sup>2</sup>

Grant returned to Durban on the 22nd June, two days after the demise of Bishop Colenso, to consult his lawyer, Harry Escombe, about his procedure with reference to his new position with Cetywayo. Escombe, impartially, gave him sound advice as to how to influence Cetywayo for the good of his people and for the safety of all concerned,<sup>3</sup> and Grant set off for Zululand.

Meanwhile Fynn tendered his resignation, but it was not accepted because his presence at Cetywayo's kraal would ensure the safety of those chiefs who dare not now leave the king.<sup>4</sup> Bulwer wrote to Derby, the Secretary

of State that "Cetywayo had disregarded some of the more important conditions of his restoration, and begged for the presence of a sufficient force to give assurance to the people in the Reserve"<sup>5</sup> but he pleaded in vain.<sup>6</sup>

Cetywayo now determined to retaliate upon Usibebu, and on the 14th July his forces, under Umyamana, went a considerable distance into Usibebu's dominion, swept back and killed a number of people. Usibebu resolved to avenge his murdered people, attacked the coast chief Somkele on the way,<sup>7</sup> and on the 21st he surprised Cetywayo at his kraal Ulundi.

/The Usutu.....

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. P.P.H.E. Escombe to Grant 25/6/83.

4. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 19/6/83.

5. Doc.106 1883, presented to Legislative Council, Natal. Vol.48. p.101.

6. Ibid p.101. ff: de Kiewiet p.301.

7. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 20/8/83.

The Usutu were put to flight, and Mr. Fynn, who witnessed the whole affair estimated that 1,000 kraals were set on fire. Uhamu attacked a portion of Cetywayo's forces but was defeated.<sup>1</sup> Cetywayo fled on a horse and was accompanied by his old Counsellor, Sirayo.<sup>2</sup> The king was a poor rider and dismounted. He was discovered by some young warriors and was wounded.<sup>3</sup> By devious means he got to the Reserved Territory and entrenched himself in the Nkandhla forest, at a spot overlooking the Mome waterfall.<sup>4</sup> Below which 24 years later the decisive battle of the Bambata Rebellion was to be fought.<sup>5</sup> Cetywayo was then believed to<sup>have</sup> got into touch with the Boers who hoped to make capital out of the disaffection.<sup>6</sup> Grant was back with Cetywayo by the 19th September, and found the King disconsolate. He dressed his wound and gave him a pair of boots.<sup>7</sup>

The problem now was how to get Cetywayo from out of his hiding place, from which he refused to budge. To Osborn there was only one course open and that was an appeal to force. He consulted with Dunn and other loyal chiefs in respect of defence,<sup>9</sup> but Usibebu's impi had already joined forces with Uhamu's and after laying waste Usutu kraals headed for the Nkandhla and the King. Cetywayo on learning this intimated on the 21st September that he was willing to treat with the Resident Commissioner.<sup>10</sup>

Usibebu was thereupon warned not to cross the Umhlatuzi, the boundary between the Reserved

/Territory.....

1. Grant 4/9/83.
2. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 25/7/83:22/7/83: Grant 6/8/83: Gibson pp 254-256.
3. For details of Cetywayo's version of what happened vide Grant 22/9/83. Gibson p.257.
4. Stuart op cit p.210.
5. Ibid p.310 ff: Bosman The Natal Rebellion of 1906
6. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 31/8/83. p.78 ff.
7. Grant 19/9/83.
8. R.C.Z. Bulwer to Osborn 29/8/83.
9. Ibid 8/9/83: 10 Ibid 24/9/83.

Territory and Cetywayo's domains<sup>1</sup>. After a while he turned east to punish Somkele who had attacked some of his people<sup>2</sup>. Fynn volunteered, on his arrival at Eshowe, to visit Cetywayo and bring him to Osborn, a mission he successfully accomplished<sup>3</sup>. Grant who accompanied the King to Eshowe was peremptorily ordered to quit the territory which he did post haste<sup>4</sup>.

Now that Cetywayo was a refugee, the problem was what to do with him; four chiefs, including Dunn and six headmen with 800 men urged his removal from the Reserved Territory<sup>5</sup>. Then Cetywayo solved his own problem: On Friday, the 8th February 1884, "The Slandered One" passed away. He had died of a fatty heart<sup>6</sup>. What was to be done with his territory? His marriages had not been very successful; he had but one son, Dinizulu, a lad in his teens, and four daughters although One of the ~~daughters~~<sup>girls</sup> Cetywayo had ~~married~~<sup>his</sup> since ~~his~~ return from the Cape ~~and was~~ pregnant. Bulwer wished to share his territory with Usibebu, making the Black Umfolosi their common boundary<sup>7</sup>. The proposal was rejected by the British Government: a telegram dated 16th May 1884, announced their purpose to "adhere to their decision not to extend sovereignty or protection over Zululand."<sup>8</sup>

/CHAPTER VI.....

1. Ibid 4/10/83.
2. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 14/5/84.
3. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 15/10/83.
4. Grant 18/10/83: 19/10/83.
5. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 1/12/83.
6. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 8/2/84.
7. Ibid 24/3/84.
8. Gibson p.268.



CHAPTER VIAMATONGA AGENT AGAIN.

There was an ominous quietness immediately after Cetywayo's death. Zulu custom demanded that their dead should be respectfully buried. After the burial of a king it was also the custom to proclaim the "hlambolika" (Ihlambu), or cleansing process, by washing assegais in blood<sup>1</sup>. It was therefore felt in the Reserved Territory that they were living on the edge of a live volcano which would erupt as soon as the royal obsequies were completed<sup>2</sup>. In thinking this, they were not wrong, and the loyal chiefs were told to hold themselves ready to suppress a possible Usutu rising<sup>3</sup>. Meanwhile Osborn proceeded to collect the 14s hut tax from Dunn's people as well as from the Coast Chiefs. He informs us that "they pay up very well". The same could not be said of all of them, but this was because they were instructed to behave as they did, by Cetywayo's brothers<sup>4</sup>.

Usibebu had not remained quiet. Deprived of his royal quarry in the Reserved Territory he had vented his spleen on Somkele, who was punished for having attacked some of Usibebu's people. Dunn, thereupon, offered to make effectual peace beyond the Reserved Territory provided that His Excellency paid him £4,000<sup>5</sup>. Needless to say the offer was refused. Dunn, it should be remembered, was still hankering after his compensation money.

Yet Bulwer was not altogether unsympathetic; for when chief Umfanawenlela was killed by Mankulamana the state of affairs was so unsettled that it was necessary for the Amatonga to travel via the Coast to the labour market in Natal, and he therefore temporarily appointed

/Dunn.....

1. D.B.M.O. Bulwer to Osborn 22/9/84.
2. Ibid. 29/3/84: R.C.Z Bulwer to Osborn 10/4/84.
3. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 13/4/84.
4. Ibid 11/4/84: 20/4/84: 19/2/84: 21/2/84: 22/2/84; 20/4/84
5. Ibid 1/3/84: 18/3/84: 20/3/84.

Dunn to act as Agent in this respect.<sup>1</sup> We find Dunn still acting in this capacity four years later when it was decided that instead of charging the Tongas wishing to pass through his country to Natal, that they should be charged double on their return to Tongaland when they would have money as they usually had nothing on the forward journey to find work in Natal.<sup>2</sup>

On the 23rd April the brothers buried Cetywayo at Dabulamanzi's kraal near the Nkunzana stream, on a small exposed ridge to the east of the Kome Gorge.<sup>3</sup> The eulogy was delivered, and respects were paid to the survivor,<sup>4</sup> in this case Ndabuko, the eldest of the five brothers. All was now ready for the final ceremony, - the hlambolika Cetywayo. On the 9th May, Dabulamanzi with 1000 armed men attacked Osborn's camp. The Resident Commissioner recorded: "We met at 300 yards off and repulsed them within twenty-five minutes. Our loss is two killed and two wounded. Of the enemy, twenty bodies were found in the field."<sup>5</sup> The Nonqai had won its spurs and it had not been necessary to use the troops which Bulwer had previously sent up as a moral support. No one was more surprised than Dunn at the success of the Native police<sup>6</sup> in whom he had no faith and had refused to assist Osborn unless the troops were used.<sup>7</sup> That he would have given Osborn every assistance had his wish been complied with is proved by the fact that he had engaged 10 men, - 8 white and 2 coloured, - at £10 a month to assist him against the Usutu. He discharged these men<sup>8</sup> on the 5th June but not before their troops had looted /cattle.....

1. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 1/12/83.

2. R.C.Z. Havelock to Osborn 16/2/87.

3. Ibid. 26/4/84; Stuart op cit 210.

4. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 26/4/84.

5. Ibid 14/5/84.

6. Stuart op cit 558.

7. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 14/4/84; 14/5/84.

8. Ibid. 14/4/84; 7/6/84.

cattle after the 'battle', and Osborn had found it useless remonstrating with Dunn who said his force was kept "under arms by order of the general to whom I presume he looks for instructions"<sup>1</sup>

We have noted above that Boer adventurers were penetrating Western Zululand once again<sup>2</sup> with the object of acquiring a home for themselves. Nothing could have suited their purposes better than the present Imperial inactivity in Zululand to advance their own objects. Osborn was fully aware of what was going on while the Boers did not attempt to deceive him or the Natalians. Their spokesman, Wilhelm, was commissioned by the other Boers to visit Natal to test the feeling there, and at the same time to see Grant. Wilhelm saw Gallwey, the Attorney-General as well as Sir Theophilus Shepstone in Pietermaritzburg, with both of whom he had much conversation on the subject of Boer interference in Zululand and concluded from what was said that the British Government would not interfere. In Durban he saw Grant and told him that it was the intention of the Boers to interfere by forcible means on behalf of the Usutu and with that object to subdue Usibebu, for which services they would claim a cession of Zululand. Grant agreed to this and undertook to report favourably to the Aborigines' Protection Society, - thus indirectly influencing the "Evangelical vote in the House of Commons", - in the action the Boers contemplated<sup>3</sup>. Grant gave Wilhelm a signed memorandum which he handed to Gallwey on his return to Hlobane.<sup>4</sup> It was also Grant's intention to return to Zululand where he would be able to advance the Boer cause among the Zulus, This Grant succeeded in doing.<sup>5</sup>

/In May.....

1. Ibid 29/5/84: Grant 8/5/84: Gibson pp.269-270
2. Vide p.80 supra.
3. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 1/10/85.
4. Ibid 4/9/85.
5. Ibid 7/7/84.

In May the Hlobane Boers secured a cession of land from Dinizulu whereunder in return for establishing his authority they were promised as much land as their leaders might consider necessary for the founding of the New Republic about Vryheid.<sup>1</sup> This was to include a great deal more than the Disputed Pastures of famous memory.<sup>2</sup>

The bargain was struck. The Usutu covered by Boer fire totally defeated Usibebu on the 5th June at the memorable battle of Itshana.<sup>3</sup> Usibebu fled into the Thwayo Nduku forest, where only two or three days before Sparks and Dunn were having a picnic.<sup>4</sup> From there he eventually got to the Reserved Territory and was placed in Dunn's ward.<sup>5</sup> Two months after Itshana the Boers presented their bill which was paid on the 16th August when the New Republic was born in spite of Zulu protestations headed by Umnyamana who denied that the Zulus had given Grant the power to sign together with Dinizulu, - now recognised by such as would acknowledge him to be King of the Zulus -, any document which gave away their lands.<sup>6</sup> On the strength of this document the Boers proceeded to measure farms. They measured and measured and measured until the sea was reached and there remained little for the Usutu beyond what had formed the territory of Usibebu.<sup>7</sup> The Usutu repented of their bargain and repeatedly wrote and complained to the British.<sup>8</sup>

/In April....

1. R.C.Z. Bulwer to Osborn 16/3/85.
2. Walker, Historical Atlas Map 15.
3. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 30/6/85:22/6/85:Gibson pp. 270-272.
4. Sparks to me July 1939.
5. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Bulwer 23/6/84.
6. R.C.Z. Bulwer to Osborn 16/3/85; 19/9/94.
7. R.C.Z. Bulwer to Osborn 26/9/94.
8. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Mitchell 21/12/85. Gibson p.274. Vide Walker, Historical Atlas p.15.
9. R.C.Z. Bulwer to Osborn 16/7/85:22/4/86: Havelock to Osborn 10/6/86. "Natal Mercury" 27/5/86.

In April 1886 they asked for British help against their Boer Allies <sup>1</sup>, with the result the new Governor of Natal, Sir Arthur Havelock, was able to recover about one half of the land for the Zulus from the Boers, who were again cut off from the sea: they abandoned, subject to the approval of the Zulus, all claim to protection over them; but retained until 1902 the present <sup>EASTERN</sup> boundary from a point on the Umhlatuzi River to the Entonjaneni Mountain thence to the Ulundi Drift on the White Umfolosi, up that river to Louw's Drift, thence over the Idhlebe and Ceza Mountains and by way of the Umkuzana and Umkuzi streams and the ridge of the Lebombo Mountains to the Pongola River. <sup>2</sup>

Dunn, it will be remembered had been acting temporarily as Amatonga Agent <sup>3</sup>. This agency brought him into contact with the tribes up north and in particular with Chief Umgongobali, whose territory was situated north and adjoining St. Lucia Bay between the Lebombo Mountains and the sea.

At this time the imperial <sup>IN</sup> activity had not only inspired the Boers to seek new territories but it also gave rise to a "foreign menace" ; Germany in particular was seeking a harbour on the coast of Zululand to link up with Angra Pequena, on the west, possibly <sup>to</sup> join forces with the Transvaal Boers and thus shut in British South Africa. England awaking from her lethargy had annexed, in December 1884, St Lucia Bay, <sup>4</sup> but there was still Kosi Bay in Amatongaland and Sordwana Bay in Umgongobali's territory.

/When.....

1. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Havelock 7/4/86: R.C.Z. Havelock to Osborn 5/6/86.
2. "Natal Witness" and "Natal Mercury" July 1-July 9 1886  
D.B.M.O. Osborn to Havelock 2/1/87; 5/3/86: 11/1/87.  
R.C.Z. map used in Zulu wars dated 16/7/81: Notes and proceedings Legislative Council. Natal 1886. p.311.  
Vide Walker, Historical map 15.
3. Vide pp. 90-91 supra.
4. R.C.Z. Confidential Bulwer to Osborn. 9/1/85. Walker pp. 407-408. Russell p. 261. Vide p. 7 supra.

When Umgongobali died in 1885 he was succeeded by his son Sibonda, but the late chief gave his territory to John Dunn and Sibonda confirmed his father's gift. Dunn, alive to the political significance of the gift, and, also desirous of getting away from the Reserved Territory into a land of his own again,<sup>1</sup> wrote, in July 1886, asking the Government to take over Umgongobali's country and that he be appointed chief. Osborn recognised that Dunn had loyally placed the land under Her Majesty's protection, but was not certain whether the British right to St. Lucia Bay and the neighbouring ground included this territory. He was anxious to know what to say to Dunn as he thought it probable that the Boers contemplated securing the territory for themselves and thus not only extend their own borders, but also at the same time gain access to the sea.<sup>2</sup> Sir Arthur Havelock replied that Dunn was a British subject, and, as such was not qualified to take over territory in the sense of assuming sovereign authority over it.

Osborn was not to do anything, except to ascertain the exact boundaries of the territory, until they heard what was to be done from the new Secretary of State, Sir H. Holland (later Lord Knutsford). With regard to the Boers contemplating securing this territory for themselves, they were debarred from taking it, if it were in the bounds of Cetywayo's territory during his reign, as it would then be contained within the territory over which it was shortly intended to extend

/British.....

1. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Havelock 23/10/88.
2. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Havelock 28/12/86.

British authority, but if it were beyond the bounds of Zululand the Boers of the New Republic will again<sup>1</sup> be debarred by the London Convention from getting a concession of it from the Natives without the previous consent of her Majesty's Government<sup>2</sup>. Once again nothing was done in the matter immediately. England refused to be hurried; procrastination is not an evil thing, but as intimated by Havelock, British Protection, carrying with it the supreme authority of Her Majesty's Government was extended over Eastern Zululand on the 5th February, 1887. This land comprised what was left of Cetywayo's dominion and included Usibebu's territory. Eastern Zululand, together with the Reserved Territory was henceforth to be known as the British Possession of Zululand and comprised six districts, Eshowe under Osborn- the Resident Commissioner and Chief Magistrate, Nkandhla under Pretorius, Nqutu under Major McKean, Entonjaneni under Mr. Knight, Ndwandwe under Mr. R.H. Addison and Lower Umfolosi under Mr. A.J. Shepstone. The Zululand Police were still under the able command of George Mansel, who was now assisted by three sub-inspectors:- Addison, Osborn- the Resident's son, and Pierce<sup>3</sup>. What a lot of bloodshed would have been avoided had England done this five years previously, as was suggested by those on the spot, instead of then dividing Zululand into three unequal parts.

The effect of the assumption of protection over Zululand by Britain on the Boers of the New Republic was to hasten them to throw in their lot with the Transvaal, which they did on the 29th June, 1888, when the New Republic became the Transvaal District of Vryheid.<sup>4</sup> /Dinizulu.....

1. 27/2/1884. Eybers op cit p.469 ff vide article 4.
2. R.C.Z Havelock to Osborn 15/1/87.
3. R.C.Z. Havelock to Osborn 14/5/87 enclosing proclamation 14/12/87.
4. Votes and Proceedings Legislative Council 1887.p.32 7/7/88.

Dinizulu and his Usutus had been placed in the Ndwandwe district of Zululand, and when Usibebu was repatriated there in 1888 the fat was in the fire. Matters came to a head when Dinizulu built a stronghold at Ceza in the district on the border between Zululand and the Transvaal. It was an old story repeating itself; following in his father's footsteps, and inspired by his Uncles Ndabuko and Tshingana, he was reviving the dreaded Zulu war machine. It was therefore felt necessary to strengthen the new magistracy set up at Ivuna, and Usibebu and his impi were placed in front of the camp. They were no sooner in position than Dinizulu attacked. Many of Usibebu's men were killed and the invading army returned in triumph to Ceza. This was the signal for disloyal chiefs to rise, and it became necessary to put down three insurrections; Dinizulu and his 3-4,000 Usutu laying waste the Ndwandwe District; the rebellious chiefs of the Lower Umfolosi District headed by Somkele; and Uncle Tshingana at Hlopekulu in the Entonjaneni District.

Osborn decided to campaign first against Tshingana. On the 2nd July, 1888, the Zululand Police under Mansel, Hlubi's Basutos under Major McKean, loyal Natives under Indunas and European leaders morally supported by Captain Pennefather and the troops left for Hlopekulu to apprehend Tshingana. Another contingent of Natives, some two thousand strong was levied by Dunn. These operated from the south against Somkele and were to guard the road to Empangeni. Osborn's attack on Tshingana was successful, although the chief fled during the night for Ceza. This was the turning point of the  
 1  
 insurrection. /Major.....



Major McKean was now dispatched to the Lower Umfolosi District and together with Dunn was successful in putting down the rebellious chiefs and causing Somkele to surrender.<sup>1</sup> Dinizulu realised the hopelessness of his task and fled into the Transvaal. Dissatisfied with his position in the Vryheid District, he appealed to Dunn 'for advice' because he had been his father's adviser. Havelock on being informed<sup>2</sup> about this told Dunn to do nothing in the matter and on the 6th November ~~Dinizulu~~<sup>TSHINGANA</sup> was captured at his kraal at Hlopekulu to which he had returned<sup>3</sup>. After various movements Dinizulu proceeded to Pietermaritzburg and on the 15th November surrendered to the authorities<sup>4</sup>. After a long trial, he together with his uncles Ndabuko and Tshingana, was sentenced on the 27th April 1889, to imprisonment<sup>5</sup> and dispatched to St. Helena. The House of Chaka was no more, -"like water that is spilt". And the story of Zululand from now onwards is one of slow progress, fight against disease, commercial exploitation and enlargement until Zululand included the whole sea coast from the Portuguese boundary in the north to the Tugela.

The first enlargement of Zululand was owing to the interference of a certain Colonel W. Jesse Coope who had been up to Sibonda's and Umcamana's territory trying to get concessions<sup>6</sup>. In order to put a stop to such interlopers and to avoid any misunderstanding between the Government and John Dunn, as well as to

/forestall.....

1. R.C.Z. Havelock to Osborn 29/7/88: 10/7/88. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Havelock 25/7/88: Gibson p.314.
2. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Havelock 30/10/89: R.C.Z. Havelock to Osborn 4/11/88.
3. R.C.Z. Havelock to Osborn 8/11/88.
4. Gibson op cit. page 316.
5. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Havelock 25/4/89: 27/4/89. Dinizulu was sentenced to 10 yrs; Ndabuko to 15 yrs; Tshingana to 12 yrs imprisonment.
6. R.C.Z. Havelock to Osborn 30/10/88. 16/2/89: 5/4/89: D.B.M.O. Osborn to Havelock 23/1/88.

forestall the Transvaal moves in that direction it was decided to annex the territories of Chiefs Sibonda and Umcamana to Zululand. This became the Lebombo district of Zululand. <sup>1</sup> Dunn still wishing to remove from the Eshowe District asked for permission to go to the Lower Umfolosi District, and wished the Government to pay him for all improvements. These Osborn considered would be difficult to estimate, nor did he know why Dunn wished to move <sup>2</sup>. It may have been pique over the Sibonda affair; perhaps it was because the hunting was better there or perhaps it was because he wished to have a higher status than the other chiefs in the Eshowe District; or perhaps it was because at the moment he was under a cloud; Havelock was annoyed with him because of his raising objections and making difficulties in respect of Osborn's requisition for a levy of Natives at the beginning of the recent disturbance. "If this happens again", warned Havelock, he will possibly be relieved of his chieftainship", and unknown to Dunn, the Secretary of State wished Osborn to censure him <sup>3</sup>. But this was never done, possibly because there was wisdom in his repeated demand for European Troops and his want of faith in Native levies. The matter ended by Osborn sending him a semi-official letter thanking him for his services. <sup>4</sup>

The Secretary of State would not allow Dunn to remove to the Lower Umfolosi District, but asked if there were not <sup>5</sup> some other place in Northern Zululand to which a chief of Dunn's ability could be removed. Osborn could think of no such place <sup>5</sup>.

/Dunn.....

1. R.C.Z. Havelock to Osborn 10/12/88.
2. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Havelock 23/10/88.
3. R.C.Z. Havelock to Osborn 16/2/89:25/4/89
4. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Mitchell 31/8/89. Clarke to Hely-  
R.C.Z. Mitchell to Osborn 3/8/89:20/1/90 (Hutcheson 19/6/94).
5. R.C.Z. Havelock to Osborn 10/1/89:12/4/89:D.B.M.O.  
Osborn to Havelock 16/1/89.

Dunn then wished to issue a pass to Natives leaving his location and to charge a fee. Osborn maintained, however, that he had no right to do so if the Native wished to leave Zululand as this was part of the Magistrate's duty, but from one location to another it was possibly fair, as he was entitled to remuneration for work done. On the other hand it would amount to a recognition of a right on the part of chiefs to impose fees and probably other taxes on the people of his tribe; for this reason Osborn dis-<sup>1</sup>allowed it and Havelock concurred. Dunn petitioned His Excellency in vain to reconsider his decision<sup>2</sup>. For the next four years there is no reference to Dunn in Zululand records, and it may be assumed that he was living happily in the Eshowe district hunting and fishing. It was during this happy period that he was at Richard's Bay after hippo. He was standing with his legs apart across a hippo track leading from the lake through reeds in at least four feet of water. While waiting for the hippo he noticed a slight movement under him, and looking down he saw a crocodile with huge jaws wide open within a foot of his body. He fired three shots into his throat killing it on the spot. This crocodile was twenty-two feet in length, the longest<sup>3</sup> he had ever shot.

In 1894 Sir Marshall Clarke, who had succeeded Sir Melmoth Osborn, K.C.M.G. as the Resident Commissioner of Zululand submitted a list of thirty-two chiefs who under a new proposal were to have extended jurisdiction in Native civil cases; Dunn, once more, tried to get a higher social status than that accorded to some of the chiefs, but his request was turned down.<sup>4</sup>

/On.....

1. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Havelock 25/10/88. R.C.Z. Havelock to Osborn 2/11/88.
2. D.B.M.O. Osborn to Havelock 27/1/89: R.C.Z. Havelock to Osborn 31/1/89.
3. Colonel Sparks. "Natal Mercury" 28/11/1894.
4. D.B.M.O. Clarke to Hely-Hutcheson 16/2/94: 17/4/94: 19/6/94.

On the 5th August, 1895, Chief John Dunn died at Mangete on his farm Emoyneni having lived over 42 years in Zululand; he was about 61 years of age. He was buried at Emoyneni, five miles from the village of Gingindhlovu, where a tombstone to his memory has been erected<sup>1</sup>. His death bereft his followers of a leader. His following comprised a number of Zulu tribes or fragments of tribes who occupy their old kraal sites: hunters and others who were personally attached to the Chief; many immigrants from Natal and elsewhere: 70 children<sup>2</sup> and a few Europeans connected by marriage with the chief who had granted them permission to squat in his ward. There was no Zulu chief strong enough to take his place; not one of his half caste sons would command the respect of either the Zulus or of the Government. As Dunn had selected his own indunas, it was decided for the time being that the four chief ones should carry on reporting direct to the Resident Magistrate of Eshowe, but it was realised that this practice could not endure owing to the jealousies which were certain to arise now that they were deprived of "the strong hand" which kept them in their places. Sir Marshall Clarke then suggested, and it was approved, that an Assistant Magistrate should be appointed, stationed at a central position in John Dunn's ward<sup>3</sup>, to retain the services of the four indunas, and safeguard the interest of the 70 orphans left by Dunn, who in spite of what everyone thought, only left cattle. Mr. W.W. Barker was appointed to look after the ward which henceforth was known as the Umlalazi District<sup>4</sup>. Mr. Barker proved unsuitable, the Resident Commissioner finding him in a stupid condition and his books unsatisfactorily kept. He was suspended and allowed to resign<sup>5</sup>.

/Then.....

1. F. Dunn.
2. The number had been variously stated as 93 and 131.
3. For definitions of the boundaries of the ward see p. 96 supra.
4. D.B.M.O. Clarke to Hely-Hutchinson 18/9/95:13/10/95:  
F. Dunn writing in "Natal Mercury" 24/11/34.
5. D.B.M.O. Clarke to Hely-Hutchinson 25/1/96:4/2/96:R.C.Z.  
Hely-Hutchinson to Clarke 8/4/96;18/4/96:24/4/96.

Then Mr. Wheelwright, son of the first Resident of Zululand, was temporarily placed in charge of affairs, but as he was needed at Eshowe, Sub-Inspector Higneth was appointed to the position<sup>1</sup>. He was succeeded by various other Assistant-Magistrates.

The same year that Dunn died witnessed the setting up of the first Roman Catholic Mission in Zululand. The Station was established at Emoyeni, the late chief's residence and is there to this day, although Dunn's original homestead was burnt down on the 2nd March, 1928.<sup>3</sup>

With the demise of its chief, Dunn's tribe began to disintegrate and when Zululand became a province of Natal in 1897, portion of the tribe had considerably scattered, with the result that in 1900 the Government of the Colony of Natal decided to set apart land for the occupation of John Dunn's descendants, and instructed the Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission then sitting to inquire into and to make a recommendation as to what land should be set apart for the said purpose. The Commission recommended 10,000 acres; to be known as Dunn's Reserve, also referred to as Reserve 7a; but that Natives then residing on that land should not be removed. This Reserve was granted to the Zululand Native Trust by deed of grant issued by the Governor of Natal, dated 6th April, 1909. There were however a number of descendants still occupying land at or near Emoyeni, known as Reserve 9. Disputes then arose between Dunn's descendants and others living in the said reserves concerning their respective rights of occupation. Hence, in 1935, a law was enacted by the Union Government that each child of the late John Dunn should have a plot not exceeding 100 acres in extent, and situate in Reserve 7a, provided that if any child is dead at the commencement of the Act, his descendants who are alive, shall,

1. Ibid.

2. D. B. M. E. Clarke to Hely Hutchinson 28/1/96.

3. F. Dunn. Gingindhlovu.

/per stirpes....

per stirpes, be entitled jointly to such award. A meeting of descendants was called by the Native Commissioner of the District of Mtunzini to carry out the terms of this act which is known as The John Dunn Act, 1935.<sup>1</sup> Thus thirty years after Dunn's death the UNION Government gave to his descendants a large tract of country over which he had once ruled with despotic power. It was recognition and compensation at last.

/ENVOI.....

1. Statutes of Union of South Africa. Act 15 of 1935 assented to 6th April 1935 and signed by the Governor General in Afrikaans.

ENVOI.

We have reviewed in haste a man's life. It is impossible that in so short a space we have done him justice. All that we can hope for is an outline rather than the vivid flashes that so far have stood for John Dunn. We have tried not to gloss over his defects, great as the temptation to white wash him has been, and we feel that weighed in the balance he has not been found wanting. His youth lacked something that we give to our boyhood to-day. This resulted in a curious deliberately-spoken man, who acquired many of the characteristics of the Natives among whom he lived; yet he was no Zulu and the euphemistic "Anglo-Zulu" does not imply what we infer from "Anglo-Indian". To the end he was a European 'able to take his place in an officers' mess'. All those who knew him personally testify that he was quiet, retiring and hospitable a gentleman of pleasant appearance<sup>1</sup> and manners, of good family, straight in business dealings and much esteemed by all who had the privilege of his acquaintance. He cannot, therefore, be confused with a degenerate adventurer like "Coenraad Buijs who had fled from the Cape Colony to Kaffir-land in the early days of the nineteenth century, and gathered around him a gang of cut-throat scoundrels of diverse races and colour, which wandered about the interior,<sup>2</sup> profiting by its unsettled state, and a terror to tribes"; although he did have this in common with Buijs-both men established a Native harem - but there the comparison ended.

We have tried to show that he was a "renegade" like John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough and the parallel seems to hold good. Both placed ideals before men even if those men were their Masters and Benefactors. Confucius said, five centuries before Christ,

"When.....

1. Vide Godee-Molsbergen & Visscher "South African History told in Pictures". p.70. also photograph of Dunn, Old Durbar Room, City Hall, Durban. Vide also p.3. "Picture Post 8/7/39. Vol, Vol 4 for a full length portrait of Dunn.
2. Agar-Hamilton op cit pp 66-67.

"When the command is wrong a son should resist his father, and a minister his August Master ". Both Dunn and Churchill resisted their Masters for the good of their countries. And today we honour them for the stand they took.

Nor was Dunn a gun-runner. All the evidence we have goes to prove that he bought guns in an open market, and had the Governor's permission to sell them to the Natives. This is not an illegal introduction of guns into a dependent country.

Dunn was a romantic figure after the type of Rajah Brooke of Sarawak. He, too, became a white chief of a Native race. Dunn's first appearance on horseback struck terror into the Natives and his wizardry with a gun caused Cetywayo to embrace him. Sequence of events has gone to show that he ruled his territory with firmness as we might expect of a despotic ruler, but he also ruled with kindness; which explains the Zulu's loyalty towards him in spite of the fact that his subjects were 'more alien and more divided in their affections to him than in any other of the twelve locations. The Imperial Government acknowledged the fact that there was law and order in his ward when everywhere else in Zululand there was a state of disorder, and the Union Government recognised the fine things he did, by making provision for his descendants.

He was more sinned against than sinning. He was ever loyal to the Government that did not always keep its promises. He gave that Government both good and loyal advice, which, to the detriment of Zululand, it had neither the inclination, nor apparently the money to put into practice. His influence on South African history has been small but good; he tried, in vain, to influence

/Cetywayo.....



Cetywayo against throwing his country into war: he helped to subdue the enemy in the Zulu war: he assisted the Imperial Government by assuming a chieftainship and maintaining order, as in the Sitimela affair, to the possible prejudice of his good name. When later deposed and unrecompensed he loyally continued to assist that Government to subdue its enemies; again he was ever ready with his good counsel; and the Government knew that they could look to him to take the lead in any of their ventures; he was the first chief to pay the Hut Tax to the Government; he guided the chiefs at meetings; was ever ready with his full quota of Native troops provided they were backed up by European troops; and he was instrumental in the Lebombo district being added to Zululand.

There is much ill-founded rumour about Dunn but in all the official correspondence of Zululand we have noted but one instance where Dunn was under a cloud, and even this passed away.

A reporter from the "Cape Argus", whose duty it was to interview all sorts of men and women, had two lengthy conversations with Dunn and tells us that "he was about as agreeable a man as one could meet within a day's march".<sup>1</sup>

1. Digest p.631 containing Dunn's interview with the Cape Argus representative.

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Briefly referred to as the "DIGEST". (The copy in the Natal Archives has marginal notes in the late Bishop's handwriting; the copy in the Killie Campbell Collection, Durban, is unmarked.)

JOHN DUNN'S NOTES (John Dunn, Cetywayo and the Three General)

edited by D.C.F. Moodie, Pietermaritzburg, Natal, 1886  
 (Copies in the Killie Campbell Collection, Durban and in the possession of G. Crompton Esq., Pietermaritzburg)

Note: This book was begun in 1861 and was about to be published in 1878, but was stopped owing to the unsettled state of affairs. The Zulu War of 1879 came so unexpectedly that Dunn was unable to get all his effects secured and a great many of his M.S.S. were burnt by the Zulus, so that twenty years of studiously gathered and interesting records were lost for ever.

This book has to be treated with suspicion; for it was written in part as Dunn's Apology:

Unfortunately we have only Dunn's word for some of the statements made. Dunn had a school-boy's scorn for dates.

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