A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEASIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE-RELATED REMUNERATION FOR ELECTED PUBLIC OFFICE-BEARERS OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES IN SOUTH AFRICA

by

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A Critical Analysis of the Feasibility of Performance-Related Remuneration for Elected Public Office-Bearers of Provincial Legislatures in South Africa

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Peter Motshegwa Makapan

Date: 29 February 2024

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to the glory and grace of the Almighty Heavenly Father God, to my parents, Adam Radipoka and Setswakae Dabea, and my late brother Stanley Titus Makapan. My brother, your educational support to the family will always be remembered and your legacy will always be preserved. May your soul rest in peace. I will always love you and the family.

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ABSTRACT

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEASIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE-RELATED REMUNERATION FOR ELECTED PUBLIC OFFICE-BEARERS OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES IN SOUTH AFRICA

Despite the attention given to the performance management (PM) of civil servants, performance-related remuneration (PRR) has not been implemented for elected public office-bearers (POBs). The lack of recommendations and determinations of PRR for elected POBs has resulted in a gap in and obstacles to best practices in the sector's remuneration practices. This research was conducted in an attempt to close this gap. It further aimed to investigate the feasibility of implementing PRR and PM systems for elected POBs, specifically for provincial legislatures in South Africa.

The study followed an interpretivist philosophy and a qualitative research approach, and 21 POBs were interviewed. The data were analysed using thematic analysis, and it was found that, inter alia, there is a consensus that performance should be directly linked to remuneration.

The study found that various factors need to be considered in implementing PRR and PM in provincial legislatures in South Africa. These include a lack of accountability, internal politics, and resistance to performance being monitored. Systemic challenges include POBs being accountable to their respective political parties, rather than to the public.

The findings of the study may serve as an incentive for improved performance and accountability in the provincial legislatures of South Africa. The study enhances the literature on and adds empirical value to human resource management, PM, and PRR in the civil service.

The study recommended that any efforts to introduce PRR and PM systems be preceded by readiness assessments and leaders creating support and buy-in, followed by detailed implementation planning. Such initiatives would also require the implementation of supportive policies and practices and the clarification of roles and specific job descriptions. These strategies should be underpinned by a culture of accountability, collaboration between parties, continuous learning, and engagement with the public, supported by investment in skills development and capacity-building. Future research could focus on developing a framework for the successful implementation of performance management (PM) and performance-related reward (PRR) systems for Public Office Bearers (POBs) in provincial legislatures, local government, and parliament.

Keywords: remuneration; performance management; performance-related remuneration; public office-bearers; provincial legislatures and South Africa

TSHOBOKANYO

TOKOLOLO E E TSENELETSENG YA KGONAGALO YA TUELO E E AMANANG LE TIRAGATSO YA BADIREDIPUSO BA BA TLHOPHILWENG MO DIKGOTLAPEOMOLAONG TSA DIPOROFENSE MO AFORIKABORWA

Le fa go lebelelwa thata tsamaiso ya tiragatso (PM) ya badiredipuso, ga go ise go tsenngwe tirisong tuelo e e amanang le tiragatso ya badiredipuso ba ba tlhophilweng (diPOB). Tlhaelo ya dikatlenegiso le diswetsi tsa PRR tsa badiredipuso ba ba tlhophilweng e bakile phatlha le dikgoreletsi mo ditiragatsong tse di gaisang mo ditiragatsong tsa tuelo mo lephateng. Patlisiso eno e dirilwe ka maiteko a go tswala phatlha eno. Gape maikaelelo a yona e ne e le go batlisisa kgonagalo ya go tsenya tirisong dithulaganyo tsa PRR le PM mo badiredipusong ba ba tlhophilweng, bogolo segolo malebana le dikokoanopeomolao tsa diporofense tsa Aforikaborwa.

Thutopatlisiso eno e dirisitse filosofi ya boranodi le molebo wa patlisiso ya khwalitatifi, mme go botsoloditswe badiredipuso ba le 21. Datha e lokolotswe ka go dirisa tokololo ya merero, mme go fitlhetswe, gareng ga tse dingwe, gore go na le tumelano ya gore tiragatso e tshwanetse go golagana ka tlhamalalo le tuelo.

Thutopatlisiso e fitlhetse gore go na le dintlha tse di farologaneng tse di tshwanetseng go lebelelewa mo tsenyotirisong ya PRR le PM mo dikokoanopeomolaong tsa diporofense mo Aforikaborwa. Tsona di akaretsa go se rwale maikarabelo, dipolotiki tsa selegae, le go se batle gore tiragatso e bewe leitlho. Dikgwetlho tse di mo thulaganyong di akaretsa gore badiredipuso ba ba tlhophilweng ba ikarabela kwa mekgatlhong ya bona ya sepolotiki, go na le mo setšhabeng.

Diphitlhelelo tsa thutopatlisiso e ka nna thotloetso ya gore go nne le tiragatso le maikarabelo a a tokafetseng mo dikgotlapeomolaong tsa diporofense mo Aforikaborwa. Thutopatlisiso e tokafatsa dikwalo le go oketsa boleng jwa dintlha mo tsamaisong ya badiri, PM le PRR mo tirelong setšhaba.

Thutopatlisiso e atlenegisitse gore maiteko ape a go itsise ditsamaiso tsa PRR le PM a etelelwe pele ke ditlhatlhobo tsa go siamela tsenyotirisong ga one mme baeteledipele ba dire gore go nne le tshegetso, mme morago go latele thulaganyo ka botlalo ya tsenyotirisong. Maitshimololedi a a jalo a tlaa tlhoka gape gore go tsenngwe tirisong dipholisi le ditiragatso tse di tshegetsang gammogo le gore go tlhalosiwe

diabe le ditlhaloso tsa ditiro tse di rileng. Ditogamaano tseno di tshwanetse go thewa mo mokgwatirisong wa maikarabelo, tirisanommogo gareng ga maphata, go tswelela go ithuta, le tirisano le setšhaba, mme go ntse go beelediwa mo tlhabolololong ya dikgono le maatlafatso ya bokgoni. Patlisiso ya isago e ka lebelela go dira letlhomeso la tsenyotirisong e e atlegileng ya tsamaiso ya tiragatso (PM) le dithulaganyo tsa dikatso tse di amanang le tiragatso (PRR) tsa badiredipuso ba ba tlhophilweng mo dikgotlapeomolaong tsa diporofense, pusoselegae, le palamente

Mafoko a botlhokwa: tuelo; tsamaiso ya tiragatso; tuelo e e amanang le tiragatso; badiredipuso ba ba tlhophilweng; dikokoanopeomolao tsa diporofense le Aforikaborwa

OKUCASHUNIWE

UCWANINGO OLUNZULU MAQONDANA NOKUSEBENZA KAHLE KOHLELO LWEMIHLOMULO NGOKUSEBENZA OKUNCOMEKAYO EMAHHOVISI KAHULUMENI AKHETHIWE EZISHAYAMTHETHO ZEZIFUNDAZWE ENINGIZIMU AFRIKA

Nakuba kubhekwe ngeso elibanzi ukuphathwa kwendlela yokusebenza (i*PM*) kwabasebenzi bakahulumeni, kepha akukaqaliswa ukusebenza kwemihlomulo ngokusebenza okuncomekayo (i*PRR*) kubasebenzi bahulumeni emahhovisi akhethiwe. Ukuntuleka kwezincomo kanye nezinqumo ze*PRR* kuma*POB* akhethiwe kubangele ukuba kuvuleke igebe kwaphinda kwaba nezithiyo ekusebenzeni kangcono maqondana nohlelo oluthinta amaholo kuhulumeni. Lolu cwaningo lwenziwe ngenxa yokuzama ukuvala leli gebe. Okunye futhi ukuthi luhlose ukuphenya ukuthi zingaqaliswa zisebenze kahle yini izinhlelo ze*PRR* ne*PM* kuma*POB* akhethiwe, ikakhulu ezishayamthetho zezifundazwe eNingizimu Afrika.

Ucwaningo lulandele ifilosofi yokuhumusha indlela yokucabanga nokuhlolwa kweqophelo, kanti lapha kuxoxiswane nama*POB* angama-21. Iminingwane ihlaziywe kusetshenziswa indlela yokuhlaziywa kwezihlokwana, kwatholakala ukuthi, phakathi kokunye, kukhona ukuvumelana ngokuthi ukusebenza kufanele kuxhunyaniswe ngqo namaholo.

Ucwaningo luthole ukuthi miningi imithelela okufanele ibhekwe uma kuqaliswa ukusebenza kwe*PRR* ne*PM* ezishayamthetho zezifundazwe eNingizimu Afrika. Lokhu kubandakanya ukuntuleka kokuziphendulela, ipolitiki yangaphakathi, kanye nokungafuni ukwamukela ukuba kuhlolwe indlela okusetshenzwa ngayo. Phakathi kwezinselelo ezikhona kubalwa ukuziphendulela kwama*POB* maqondana namaqembu awo ezepolitiki, kunokuba aphendule emphakathini.

Imiphumela yalolu cwaningo ingase isebenze ukukhuthaza ekwenzeni kangcono uma kusetshenzwa kanye nokuziphendulela ezishayamthetho zezifundazwe zaseNingizimu Afrika. Lolu cwaningo luzokwenza kangcono uma kubhalwa izincwadi luphinde lube nomthelela omuhle ekuphathweni kwabasebenzi, i*PM*, kanye ne*PRR* emisebenzini kahulumeni.

Ucwaningo luncome ukuthi nanoma yimiphi imizamo yokwethula izinhlelo ze*PRR* ne*PM* yandulelwe ngokuhlolwa kokuzilungiselela kanjalo nokuthi abaholi bakweseke futhi bakwamukele lokhu, bese kulandela uhlelo oluphelele lokuqalisa lokhu. Lolu hlelo luzodinga ukuba kuqaliswe nokusebenza kwezinqubomgomo zokweseka nokusebenza kohlelo kanye nokucaciswa kohlu lwemisebenzi ezokwenziwa. Lawa masu okusebenza kufanele asekelwe nangesiko lokuziphendulela, ukusebenzisana phakathi kwezinhlangothi, ukufunda okuqhubekayo, nokuxhumana nomphakathi, okusekelwe ngezinhlelo zokuthuthukiswa nokufukulwa kwamakhono. Olunye ucwaningo kungaba olugxile ekuthuthukiseni uhlaka lokuqaliswa ukusebenza ngempumelelo kokuphathwa kwendlela yokusebenza (i*PM*) nezinhlelo zemihlomulo ngokusebenza okuncomekayo (i*PRR*) kuBasebenzi Bahulumeni (ama*POB*) ezishayamthetho zezifundazwe, kuhulumeni wendawo, nasephalamende.

Amagama amqoka: umholo; ukuphathwa kwendlela yokusebenza; umhlomulo ngokusebenza okuncomekayo; abasebenzi bahulumeni; izishayamthetho zezifundazwe kanye neNingizimu Afrika

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOP	:	Annual Operational Plan
APP	:	Annual Performance Plan
CoS	:	Conditions of service
CPA	:	Commonwealth Parliamentary Association
DPME	:	Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
DPSA	:	Department of Public Service and Administration
HoD	:	head of department
HR	:	Human resources
HRM	:	Human resource management
IT	:	Information technology
IOP	:	Industrial and organisational psychology
KGFA	:	Key government focus areas
KPA	:	Key performance area
KPI	:	Key performance indicator
KRA	:	Key result area
MEC	:	Member of the Executive Council
MPL	:	Member of provincial legislature
KPI	:	Key performance indicator
MS	:	Microsoft
NCoP	:	National Council of Provinces
OAM	:	Oversight and accountability model

OECD	:	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PA	:	Performance Agreement
PAP	:	Pan-African Parliament
PEC	:	Provincial Executive Council
PM	:	Performance management
POBs	:	Public office-bearers
PPM	:	Public Participation Model
PRR	:	Performance-related remuneration
RSA	:	Republic of South Africa
SADC-PF	:	South African Development Community Parliamentary Forum
SP	:	Strategic Plan
ToTs	:	Tools of trade
UK	:	United Kingdom
USA	:	United States of America

CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE STUDY

This research explored the feasibility of implementing performance-related remuneration (PRR), underpinned by a performance management (PM) system, for elected public office-bearers (POBs) of provincial legislatures in South Africa. The study further examined the readiness of these institutions to introduce such measures.

This chapter discusses the context and rationale for the research, the problem statement, and the research questions, together with the related theoretical and empirical objectives. The subsequent section provides a preliminary review of extant literature in this domain. This is followed by an outline of the methodology employed in conducting the study, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The chapter concludes with the study's delimitations and the layout of the dissertation.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The link between performance and remuneration is controversial, yet it often underpins the success of PM systems. Over the years, PRR has grown in popularity, and many organisations have attempted to link remuneration to performance (Mans-Kemp & Viviers, 2018). PRR is a widely used management tool that originated in the private sector and is endorsed as a core measure by the United States Civil Service Reform Act 1978. Many governments in Europe, the United States of America (USA), and Australia have adopted this approach. PRR has been lauded as an advanced policy, but there is little evidence of its success in either the public- or private sector (Blom, Kruyen, Van der Heijeri & Van Thiel, 2018; Lapuente & Van de Walle, 2020).

More research is required on employees' perceptions of the fairness and efficacy of PM in South Africa's civil service to identify organisational factors that may influence the efficacy of PM systems. Botha, Makhubela, and Swanepoel (2016) posit that such research should also further explore the strength of the link between rewards and performance.

In South Africa, the enactment of the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office-bearers Act No. 92 of 1997 led to the establishment of the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office-bearers. However, there is a paucity of research on the readiness of South African public-service organisations, specifically provincial legislatures, to implement PRR, coupled with a lack of evidence to support its effectiveness. In addition, limited research has been conducted on the factors affecting the adoption and outcomes of PRR systems and employees' perceptions of such systems (Kang & Lee, 2021). This makes it challenging to choose a system appropriate for an organisation's context-specific characteristics (Park, 2021).

PRR is the process whereby organisations set standards and reward employees based on their achievement of those standards. Remuneration should, therefore, not be seen as a standalone process (Egloff, 2016) but instead as part of comprehensive management processes, and thus includes PM, learning, and talent development (Grubb, 2016). Therefore, the resolution of challenges around remuneration requires a collective effort (Tharp & Freeman, 2021).

In South Africa, strategic PM systems are not only prevalent in private-sector organisations but have also become standard practice in the public sector (Bussin & Maloa, 2016), which led to a comprehensive redesign of the traditional framework for public management (Minaar, 2010). However, measuring the performance of public servants remains a challenge.

Measuring performance requires a definition of outstanding performance, and it must be clear who determines performance standards and how these are measured. It is also necessary to distinguish whether performance relates to ordinary formal duties in provincial legislatures, parliament, the cabinet, or councils or whether it relates to the delivery of services and expectations as undertaken in election manifestos (Larsson, Eriksson & Adolfsson, 2021). In provincial legislatures, it is difficult to determine what constitutes talent management or learning and development because officials are elected based on their campaigns and those of their parties. Furthermore, although imbalances in PRR are a concern across all levels, such imbalances at the executive level are especially controversial, as there is an increasing demand for justification for the considerable cost of salaries and benefits (Larsson et al., 2021).

The call for more research on the relationship between performance and remuneration emanates from many sources, including the media, human resource (HR) practitioners, organisations, remuneration committees, and shareholders (Bussin & Carlson, 2020). Such research is thus not only in the public interest but also an academic and business necessity.

1.2 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY

PM aims to improve individual performance to maximise organisational outcomes and has been a focal point for organisations as they strive to enhance competitiveness, improve productivity, and attract and retain talent. The premise on which PM is based is that appropriate incentivisation will result in employees making substantial contributions to attaining organisational goals (Walk & Kennedy, 2017: 2).

The remuneration of South African POBs is legislated. The Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office-bearers was established by an Act of Parliament, with a mandate to provide annual recommendations on salaries, maximum salary indices, benefits, allowances, and specific resource requirements of POBs (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 1997). The Act acknowledges the role of performance as a determinant of fair remuneration. The Commission argues that the absence of a remuneration system may lead to improper or unlawful use of authority concerning financial rewards (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2007). The remuneration philosophy of the Commission is akin to that of the private sector, namely that remuneration should be based on performance, which is why performance incentive schemes were considered in the Commission’s review (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2017).

However, the Commission did not recommend the introduction of PRR for POBs because of the political landscape of POBs’ jobs and the challenges related to determining who oversees POBs’ performance. For instance, it was questioned whether the political party, parliament, the executive authority (the president, cabinet, and deputy ministers), the various whips, the chairpersons of Portfolio Committees, or parliamentary standing committees should oversee POBs’ performance. Additionally, what constituted performance for elected POBs was questioned, together with which work should be considered — work performed formally in parliamentary meetings, committees, the constituency, or a combination of the two. Additionally, there were questions about whether loyalty to the party and 'towing the party line' were examples of good performance or whether independent, verifiable, and objective criteria for each POB should be applied (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2017)

The Commission found it could not impose a PRR system in an environment where the ruling political party drove the national system. Political parties take responsibility for their members' performance, conduct, and desirability, rather than parliament, a municipal council or the executive authority. The party deploys members, allocates roles, responsibilities, disciplines, and even recalls members (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2007).

The adoption of PM systems for POBs in South Africa, particularly elected POBs, would thus require a political paradigm shift. Parliament and provincial legislatures would need to manage the performance of elected POBs, link performance to remuneration and other rewards, and do so independently of the political parties that deployed those members (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2007). Concerned political parties would need to relinquish authority to parliament, council, and other bodies about decisions on the performance of their employees. However, the findings of the Commission or strategy deployed by the executive should be based on evidence and research on the context in which PRR is implemented, considering employees' perceptions of PRR. The way work is evaluated and how these evaluations are performed should also be carefully considered (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2017).

In 2014, the amalgamation of the Presidency's National Planning Commission Secretariat and the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation was followed by the establishment of the Department of Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation (DPME) (2015). The DPME plays a role in researching and pioneering PM approaches and linking performance to remuneration and other rewards for elected POBs (DPME, 2015). The establishment of the DPME was a gesture to demonstrate the government's commitment to ensuring the measurement of service delivery and to reward public officials according to their performance (DPME, 2015).

The main challenge in applying private-sector remuneration principles in the public sector is that the public sector structures are vastly different from those in the public sector (Lapuente & Van de Walle, 2020). For example, all elected members of South African provincial legislatures (MPLs), including chairpersons of committees, chief whips, and speakers, are remunerated equally, regardless of the size or wealth of the province. The remuneration of POBs is also not performance based. The Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs (2017) explained this to the constitutional duties of elected POBs and the mandate they must fulfil, which is common amongst them, regardless of the economics or demographics of their respective legislatures. These considerations cause complexities in contemplating individual remuneration in this context. It is essentially a collective and egalitarian context and thus not comparable to a career in the highly competitive corporate sector (Sundström, 2019).

This research did not include debates on the quantum of remuneration of POBs but explored whether POBs' remuneration could be linked to performance and how PRR can be introduced successfully.

Blom et al. (2018) argue that PRR is effective in the private sector but question whether the benefits and merits of PRR are relevant to POBs. PRR has received much attention from researchers and government. Gould and O'Donohue (2020) assert that, in the public sector, PRR has the potential to create a results-oriented work culture focused on inputs and throughputs and that it could produce positive results in terms of government efficiency, accountability, and legitimacy, which would benefit society.

When a PRR system functions as it should, it creates motivation for continuous high performance, with mediocre or poor performers receiving lower remuneration (Arashpor et al., 2019). An effective PRR system will encourage these employees to work harder to attain raises (Anuradha, 2018). However, Lin, Chen, Ashford, Lee, and Qian (2018) posit that organisations should not rely solely on monetary rewards to improve employee- and organisational performance. Employees have other driving motivations, such as self-esteem (Lin, Chen, Ashford, Lee & Qian, 2018), fulfilment from their work (Vui-Lee & Paggy, 2018), and a longing to make a meaningful contribution (Morris, 2022). This requires a balance between extrinsic motivation (remuneration) and intrinsic motivation (internal motivation factors) (Morris, 2022).

The use of PRR in the private sector has also not been without challenges and remains a complex and ambiguous practice. Issues such as goal clarification, setting individual targets, constant and on-going engagement, and progress checks and reviews require careful consideration. Measuring individuals' achievements through assessment is complex, and adding a related remuneration dimension increases the complexity of measurement (Di Luozzo, Del Beato & Schiraldi, 2021). These factors are more easily measured and dealt with in profit-driven organisations, and there is limited research on the role of these factors concerning POBs' remuneration.

Mabuza (2017) asserts it is inappropriate for country leaders who perform an integral role in a country's economic management to receive remuneration disconnected from their performance, significantly when many South African citizens are deeply affected by economic and fiscal downturns. Mabuza (2017) supports the use of PM and PRR systems, indicating that poor economic and fiscal performance should negatively impact POBs' remuneration. However, this position does not consider the nature of POBs' unique roles and the public's ability to vote political parties into and out of power.

1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The size and magnitude of public sectors make them susceptible to bureaucratic red tape, inefficiencies, and poor service delivery (Hay Group, 2004). Governments, therefore, must consider the possibility of PRR to improve quality, efficiency, overall service delivery, productivity, and individual and overall performance. While PRR has been tested and implemented to some extent, most governments' PRR systems are still in the infancy stage and mainly aimed at those in senior positions, a practice notable in the European public sector (Hay Group, 2004: 7).

The South African government, under the leadership of President Cyril Ramaphosa, who was elected in February 2018, has committed to addressing the misuse of state resources and authority to improve delivery. Ministers have been given deadlines for solving crises falling within their ambit. However, the PM of POBs in the cabinet, parliament, provincial legislatures, and local municipalities remains challenging. PM is not institutionalised, and there is no link to remuneration. Properly assessing and managing employees' performance and linking it to remuneration is fraught with complications, and effectively doing so would require well-designed and carefully implemented PRR and PM systems.

Currently, no South African legislation provides remuneration linked to POBs' performance. The Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs (2017) recommended the alignment of POBs' total remuneration with that of the private sector, as is done for senior management positions in the public service; there are no recommendations regarding the PM of POBs. This gap provided the rationale for the current study. The research was aimed at addressing the problem of the lack of a PM system through the PRR of POBs. Furthermore, no research was available on the readiness of South African provincial legislatures to implement PRR and PM, the factors that need to be considered, and the attitude of POBs towards implementing PRR and PM. Based on the above, the following research objectives and questions were formulated.

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The overall research objective of this research was:

> *To explore the readiness of South African provincial legislators to implement PRR and PM systems for POBs.*

The overall research objective was achieved by addressing the following secondary research objectives (SROs):

SRO1: To determine attitudes towards implementation of PRR and PM;

SRO2: To determine the main factors that need to be considered in developing and implementing effective PRR and PM systems and

SRO3: To determine the challenges that may obstruct the introduction of PRR and PM systems.

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The main research question was:

Are South African provincial legislatures ready to implement PRR and PM systems for POBs?

To answer the main research question, two sets of secondary research questions (SRQs) were formulated, one to be answered through a review of the literature and the other through empirical evidence gathered in the current study. The questions are listed below.

1.5.1 Literature review research questions

The following were the study's literature review questions (LRQs):

LRQ1: What research evidence supports the introduction of PRR and PM for POBs in the public sector?

LRQ2: How are the constructs PRR and PM in the public sector conceptualised and explained in theoretical models in the literature?

LRQ3: What are the success factors in implementing PRR and PM systems in the public sector?

LRQ4: What are the challenges in implementing PRR and PM systems in the public sector?

1.5.2 Empirical research questions

The following questions were answered through the empirical findings of the study:

ERQ1: What are the attitudes towards the implementation of PRR and PM systems for POBs?;

ERQ2: What are the key success factors in implementing PRR and PM systems for POBs?; and

ERQ3: What are the challenges in implementing PRR and PM systems for POBs?

1.6 VALUE-ADD OF THE STUDY

Limited research has been conducted on the subject of PM and PRR systems in South Africa's public sector, especially concerning their feasibility and potential impact on elected POBs' performance and institutions' levels of service delivery. This research study was aimed at addressing this gap. The study findings provide insights into POBs' understanding of these systems, their attitude towards them, and their views regarding the readiness of provincial legislatures for implementing such systems. The study further contributes insights into the success factors of implementation and the unique challenges posed by this sector. Based on these, the study offers suggestions for strategies to ensure effective implementation of PRR and PM in the provincial legislatures in South Africa. These findings could inform best practices in the public service in strengthening the PM of POBs, as recommended by the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs (2017).

The study's findings may be useful to practitioners and researchers in human resource management (HRM), industrial and organisational psychology, remuneration, and civil service leaders in initiatives to increase individual motivation and the overall performance of public-sector organisations.

The study was set in the field of HRM, with a focus on the practices of PRR and PM, specifically for POBs in South African provincial legislatures. The next section offers a preliminary literature review on the main constructs of interest in the current study.

1.7 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

This section defines the key terms used in this study.

Remuneration, or employee compensation, includes both direct and indirect payments to employees, including wages, bonuses, stock options, and benefits (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992). The Public Finance Management Act (RSA, 1999) defines remuneration as any consideration or benefit received, whether directly or indirectly, by individuals serving in the following capacities: (a) members of the accounting authority, (b) the chief executive officer or the person in charge of the public entity, (c) the chief financial officer, and (d) senior management or other individuals within the entity under the public entity's ownership control.

Performance Management, according to Armstrong (2022), is a strategic process designed to enhance individual and team performance in alignment with organisational goals.

Performance-related remuneration, as described by Shields (2016:240), is to any remuneration practice where all or part of an employee's remuneration is directly and explicitly linked to their assessed work behaviour and/or measured outcomes.

According to the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers Act (No. 20 of 1980, a **Public-office bearers, or 'office bearer",** includes individuals such as the Deputy President, Ministers, Deputy Ministers, members of the National Assembly, permanent delegates, Premiers, members of Executive Councils, members of provincial legislatures, traditional leaders, members of provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders, members of the Council of Traditional Leaders, and members of municipal councils.

A **legislative authority** holds the power to enact laws for the country in accordance with the Constitution. In South Africa, the legislative authority is vested in Parliament, which consists of the National Assembly (NA) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) (South African Yearbook, 2022/2023)

1.8 PRELIMINARY LITERATURE REVIEW SOUTH AFRICAN YEARBOOK

This study focused on the constructs of PRR and PM. This preliminary review commences with a discussion of PM in general and moves to a discussion of PM systems. This is followed by an overview of PRR and organisational change and concludes with a discussion of readiness for change. The literature on these constructs is discussed in detail in subsequent chapters.

1.8.1 Performance management

Pulakos, Mueller-Hanson, and Arad (2019) note that the term 'performance management' is used universally and applied at all organisational levels. PM became an organisational tool during the late 1980s and 1990s as organisational theory moved away from ‘personnel management’ or ‘-administration’ towards using HRM models (Williams, 2002). Williams (2002) argues that it is challenging to define PM but delineates the following three main aims of implementing such systems: to manage the performance of employees, to manage the performance of the organisation, and to align the performance of both. Tahiri, Kovaci, and Krasniqi (2020) and Mone and London (2018) assert that PM is a comprehensive and continuous process of managing employees' performance.

Metha (2016) considers PM a multifaceted system that could impact individuals and organisations through collaboration between managers and employees in setting expectations, evaluating outcomes, and rewarding high performance, all aimed at enhancing organisational success. Helmold and Samara (2019) define PM as a cyclical practice of integrating performance measurement, management, and improvement, whose definition is aligned with that of Aguinis (2019). Aguinis (2019) describes PM as a continual process whereby the performance of individuals and teams is recognised, quantified, and enhanced to align with the organisation's strategic objectives. Effective PM could thus contribute directly to achieving the overall business strategy (Pulakos et al., 2019).

PM is not an isolated appraisal event; it is a continual process that involves planning, management, coaching, appraisal, and reward (Schleicher et al., 2018), aimed at ensuring individuals and organisations deliver the targeted performance levels (Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018). Effective PM requires establishing appropriate monitoring mechanisms to track progress towards the planned performance achievement and constant evaluation of performance (Aguinis, 2019). Spangenberg (1994) emphasises the critical nature of planning employee performance and facilitating achieving work-related goals. PM also seeks to motivate employees, including assisting them in realising their full potential (Spangenberg, 1994).

In South Africa, the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) (2000) provided guidelines for developing PM as a component of a structure to integrate processes and systems. This description provides for the alignment of several essential elements:

- Tactical objectives, judgements, and activities associated with daily operations and strategic goals across and within government entities;
- Organisational management structures of respective departments towards attaining improved efficiency, reviewing service concerning outputs and outcomes, and the effect on citizens' livelihoods; and
- HR practices, systems, and processes are required to recruit, develop, and support employees and assist them in actualising their potential (DPSA, 2000: 11).

1.8.2 Performance Management Systems

Tweedie et al. (2018) indicate that PM systems should be aligned with organisational strategy and goals and consistent with standards and competencies. PM systems usually serve three primary purposes: facilitating strategy implementation (Pulakos et al., 2019), driving cultural transformation (Hurdubei & Profirou, 2019), and providing input into HRM systems, including training and development and remuneration systems (Murphy, 2020).

Introducing a PM system is done to support strategies aimed at improving productivity (Salamat, Mirsepassi & Reshadjatoo, 2019), which ultimately aim to increase revenue (Nelongo, 2011). Kumar (2019) confirmed the relationship between an effective PM strategy and organisational effectiveness in a study of Indian manufacturing enterprises.

Jyothi and Venkatesh (2013:15) summarise salient aspects or dimensions of designing a PM system:

- Results and output: Defining the measurable outcomes that employees need to achieve;
- Input dimensions: Identifying the specific activities/tasks that employees are responsible for;
- Time dimension: Measuring the time taken by employees to complete their tasks, especially in competitive environments;
- Focus dimension: Understanding the connection between employees' jobs;

- Input-output relationship: Understanding the connection between employees' performance efforts and the outcomes; and
- Role clarity and performance facilitation: Ensuring employees clearly understand their roles and responsibilities.

Implementing a PM system may be subjective and, thus, controversial. There is a potential for disharmony or litigation if employees are dissatisfied with the process and outcomes, especially when the appraisal outcomes influence decisions regarding their remuneration or promotion (Fazey, 2010). This concern necessitates continuous research to understand which PM systems are appropriate for different government and private organisational cultures (Williams, 2006).

1.8.3 Performance-related remuneration

PRR is a remuneration practice that ties employee rewards to assessing their work behaviour and measured performance results (Shields, 2016: 240). It represents a reorganisation of organisations' relationships with employees, affording management more control over their employees (Shields, 2016: 240). Using PRR is thus aimed at rewarding employees according to their productivity levels, and the rewards could take the form of various types of incentives other than cash (Kumar, 2019). However, measuring performance is a challenge and could range from individual employee performance (for example, piece rates or sales commission) and team performance (for example, gain-sharing) to organisational performance (for example, profit sharing or stock ownership plans) (Bender & Bryson, 2013: R1). Shields (2016: 246) notes that PRR is more attractive to some categories of employees than others. For example, white-collar workers tend to prefer individual performance-based remuneration systems, while blue-collar workers often do not (Brown, 2001).

Trevor (2011: 11) argues that organisations benefit from implementing PRR. This practice can signal a change in the organisational culture. It introduces restructuring the employment relationship and allows companies to reward in a selective manner without significantly increasing the remuneration budget. Furthermore, PRR promotes the decentralisation of collective bargaining by marginalising the role of trade unions in organisations. PRR also enhances corporate financial control and paves the way for the integration of development programmes to mitigate employee dissatisfaction.

The effectiveness of PRR depends on its ability to motivate employees. Several motivational theories find application in PRR, such as Alderfer's ERG (existence, relatedness, and growth) theory, Herzberg's two-factor motivation theory, Locke's goal-setting theory, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, and McClelland's achievement motivation theory. These theories focus on the content of motivation and addressing fundamental needs. In contrast, process-focused motivational theories include Adams's equity theory, cognitive dissonance theory, and Vroom's expectancy theory (Erasmus et al., 2003: 331).

Nel et al. (2000: 343) define motivation as "intentional and persistent behaviour intended to achieve an individual goal". Motivated employees display positive behaviours such as volunteering, persisting in work, and demonstrating initiative, and they work towards achieving the organisation's goals. A study by Hanaysha and Majid (2021) on employee motivation and its influence on productivity determined that motivated employees tend to be more productive. Van der Kolk, Van Veen-Dirks, and Ter Bogt (2019) emphasise the complexity of workplaces and note the usefulness of utilising various motivational theories to explain behaviour. Their study on the influence of management control on public service employees' motivation and performance identified a positive correlation between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation and performance.

A study investigating the impact of remuneration, motivation, and job satisfaction on the performance of employees applied Maslow's and Herzberg's content theories to outline what motivates employees. In explaining their findings, Sudiardhita et al. (2018) highlight that remuneration and employee motivation significantly and positively impact employee performance. Theories like Vroom's expectancy theory and Adams's equity theory outline variables influencing motivation and explain how individuals' behaviour commences, is managed and is sustained. These theories hold that motivation is a process (Nel et al., 2000: 335-336).

Theorists differ in their beliefs about the form of motivation (extrinsic versus intrinsic) that monetary rewards enhance. While money is considered a motivator if directly linked to performance (Sudiardhita et al., 2018), one cannot discount the effect of intrinsic rewards on motivation. Including motivational factors in the job content and organisational environment may enhance employees' performance and enable them to be more productive (Sudiardhita et al., 2018).

1.8.4 Change and readiness for change

Organisations constantly face the challenge of assessing and amending policies and processes to ensure these remain relevant and satisfactory, and amendments often necessitate organisational change (Rosenbaum, More & Steane, 2018). Change requires synchronised management of a transitional period from one state to another to attain a permanent organisational change (Ochurub, 2012; Jones et al., 2005). Schalk et al. (1998, as cited by Harishchandra, 2021) state that change is usually an organisation's attempt to secure its survival and goal accomplishment by applying new ways of thinking and doing.

To avoid distrust, organisations must ensure transparency and involve employees in formulating the change strategy, as distrust often causes operational problems that implement the change difficult (Searle & Rice, 2018). PRR is widely considered a means to mitigate the adverse effects of organisational change (Hume, 1995: 60). Resistance to organisational change could also be managed by ensuring buy-in from key role players and stakeholders (Searle & Rice, 2018).

Extensive research and theory in organisational change and change management exist. Kurt Lewin (1951, as cited by Bedser, 2012) conducted seminal work in this area, particularly on change readiness. Lewin (1951) describes the organisation process as occurring in three stages: unfreezing, moving, and then refreezing. Unfreezing, according to Lewin (1951), constitutes disengagement with the past, including the practices, organisational culture, and physical and psychological behaviours. Unfreezing is the phase in which individual and organisational readiness for change is created and is a prerequisite for moving ahead and embracing the new and the different (Lewin, 1951).

Organisations' readiness to change depends mainly on the change readiness of employees and their commitment to the change, which is affected by their view of how effective the change will be (Seggewiss et al., 2018). Armenikas, Field, Harris, and Holt (2007: 235) define change readiness as an attitude shaped by various factors, including content, process, context, and individual involvement. The focus is on what, how, and under which conditions the desired defined change is being recommended and by whom the change is needed. Diab, Safan, and Bakeer (2018: 69) define change readiness as a mental state or determination to change and the capacity to alter behaviours to achieve the desired outcomes. Readiness for change is increased by positive thinking and ideas (Rafferty & Minbashian, 2018).

The current study focused on the readiness of South African provincial legislatures to implement PRR as part of PM for POBs. This section provided an introduction to the literature on the constructs of interest in the current study. The literature on these constructs and the context of POBs in South Africa is discussed in detail in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. The next section provides a brief overview of the methodology followed in conducting the present study; a detailed discussion is provided in Chapter 5.

1.9 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This section provides an overview of the research philosophy and approach that underpinned the study. Detailed descriptions of the research design, population, sampling methods, and the methods employed to gather and analyse the data are presented in Chapter 4.

1.9.1 Research philosophy and approach

The study followed an interpretive epistemology and ontology, focusing on POBs' perceptions regarding the provincial legislature's readiness to implement PRR and PM. Interpretivism holds that reality is subjective and that knowledge is socially constructed (Asenahabi, 2019). The study adopted a qualitative approach to gain an in-depth understanding of participants' perspectives.

1.9.2 Research design

The study followed a descriptive research design, appropriate for studying groups with characteristics in a specific context. The research comprised two phases: a literature review on PRR and PM (Chapter 3) and an empirical study of POBs' perceptions (Chapter 6).

1.9.3 Population and sampling

Participants were selected using purposive and convenience sampling and included officials from provincial legislatures and former members of the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs. This approach ensured the inclusion of accessible participants who could provide rich data.

1.9.4 Data collection and analysis

Data were collected through one-on-one semi-structured interviews conducted via Microsoft Teams. Thematic analysis was used to analyse the data, which enables the identification of themes and patterns from the interview transcripts (Braun & Clark, 2006). Thematic analysis provides a flexible method for a comprehensive account of the information. The next section details the researcher’s role, followed by an overview of the research ethics pertaining to the study.

1.10 RESEARCHER’S ROLE

The secretariat of the Independent Commission employs the present researcher for the Remuneration of POBs, which resides in the Presidency. Since 2008, the Commission has implemented comprehensive reviews of POBs’ remuneration and introduced the practice of examining total-cost-to-employer remuneration. The aim was to ensure that the total annual salary bill of POBs was transparent and predictable. The Commission had decided to investigate the use of PRR for POBs, as the system had not been considered in previous reviews. The decision was motivated by calls by the public and other stakeholders that the Commission consider recommending PRR for POBs to enhance their accountability and improve their performance-related to service delivery.

Due to the nature of the research, the researcher formed part of the study. In addition, the employment position of the researcher exposed him directly or indirectly to the call by the public and stakeholders, as the researcher often engages directly with critical stakeholders and commissioners. To maintain objectivity and mitigate potential biases stemming from personal opinions about the feasibility of PRR and PM for POBs, the researcher carefully selected research participants. The researcher aimed to select various informed participants to enhance the data's quality and depth, maintain objectivity, and avoid confirmation bias. The researcher also guarded against personal prior knowledge influencing the interpretation of the gathered data.

1.11 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The study received ethical clearance (Approval number: 2019_HRM_014) from the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Pretoria (see Annexure A), and the researcher maintained the research ethics of the university (UNISA, 2014). Permission to conduct the study was obtained from the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs and the provincial legislatures. Participants were informed of the aim of the research and what their participation would entail, and they had to sign a consent form before the interviews were conducted (see Annexure B). Participation was voluntary, and participants were informed of anonymity.The data are stored securely and will be destroyed five years after completion of the study.

The next section details the layout of the dissertation.

1.12 LAYOUT OF THE DISSERTATION

The dissertation comprises eight chapters:

Chapter 1: Background and context of the study

The chapter provided background to the study and the context of the research, followed by the rationale for the study, the problem statement, the research objectives and research questions, and the value-add of the study. This was followed by a preliminary literature review of the constructs under study, where after the research philosophy, research approach and the methods employed in conducting the study were outlined. The subsequent sections provide brief descriptions of the researchers' role and the ethical considerations pertinent to the study.

Chapter 2: Context, legislation, and conditions of service related to POBs

This chapter discusses the work context of POBs, their legislative and policy obligations, and their conditions of service.

Chapter 3: Review of literature on PM, PRR, and readiness to implement

This chapter reviews the literature and theories related to PM, PM systems, and PRR, together with the possible benefits and challenges associated with implementing these systems in the context of organisations such as provincial legislatures. The chapter also reviews key factors that need to be considered prior to implementation.

This chapter then explores different perspectives on change management and change readiness, with a focus on provincial legislatures.

Chapter 4: Research philosophy, design, and methodology
This chapter contains a complete picture of the research design and methodology, such as its research approach, population, variables, research instrument, data collection, processing and analysis.

Chapter 5: Findings and discussion
The chapter reports the study's findings according to the themes that emerged from the empirical data.

Chapter 6: Conclusions, recommendations, and limitations
This chapter provides an overview of the research findings, their implications, and recommendations for practice and management. This is followed by a reconciliation of the findings and a discussion of the limitations of the study, together with recommendations for future research. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the research process.

1.13 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter discussed the background and context of the study, the rationale for the study, the problem statement, and the research objectives and research questions, as well as the value-add of the study. This was followed by a preliminary overview of the constructs under study, namely PM, PM, systems, PRR, and change and readiness for change.

The study's rationale was to explore the feasibility of implementing PRR and PM for POBs in provincial legislatures. The findings may assist the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs and the government in considering recommendations regarding the remuneration of POBs. After that, the methodology followed in conducting the study was outlined, together with the researcher's role in the research and ethical considerations relevant to the study. Finally, the layout of the dissertation was provided.

The next chapter details the context of POBs, including relevant legislation and their conditions of service.

CHAPTER 2: CONTEXT, LEGISLATION, AND POBs CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides context to the study through an overview of the functions of POBs. The overview includes historical background on the remuneration of POBs in provincial legislatures and how their conditions of service (CoS) are managed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of legal, fair, and best practices followed by provincial legislatures in implementing POBs' remuneration.

2.2 ESTABLISHMENT OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES

The Liberation Struggle produced numerous political settlements (from 1990 to 1994) before promulgating the Constitution of South Africa (1996). In 1994, South Africa became a democratic country with a new national unity government constituted of partnerships between the old regime and liberation organisations (Brand South Africa, 2006). The new dispensation led to the abolishment of the central government, the Bantustans (Qwaqwa, Lebowa, KwaZulu, KwaNdebele, Kangwane, Gazankulu), and the self-governing states (Venda, Transkei, Ciskei, and Bophuthatswana) (Allister, 1994; Anthea, 2019; Butler, Rotberg & Adams, 1978; Hassen, 1998).

The central government, homelands, and independent states were founded on the principle of grouping different ethnic communities in South Africa based on their homogeneity. For instance, the former Bophuthatswana homeland government governed the Tswana people (South African History Online, 2017). Governments previously operated within their independent legislatures and defined geographical jurisdictions. However, following the politically negotiated settlement, these governments were melded into a unitary state, the Republic of South Africa (RSA), operating under democratic principles outlined in the new Constitution (Allister, 1994; Anthea, 2019; Hassen, 1998; South African History Online, 2017).

The enactment of the Constitution of RSA (1996) pre-empted the formation of nine provinces in RSA, which established their provincial governments and guiding legislations within demarcated boundaries to conform to the constitution (Allister, 1994; Anthea, 2019; Hassen, 1998; South African History Online, 2017). Currently, each provincial legislature serves as the legislative authority of a particular province, abiding by Section 104 of the Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996). The provinces are autonomous and distinct but co-operate with each other. They are empowered to revoke, enact, and modify laws in their jurisdictional areas. For example, the national parliament manages the legislation that impacts the entire country, whereas provincial legislatures manage laws in their respective provinces. Municipalities are managed through by-laws of the respective municipal jurisdictions (The Constitution, 1996). Figure 2.1 provides a summary of the structure and functions of the South African government.



Figure 2.1: Structure and functions of the South African government (Adapted from Government Communication Information Services, 2018: 3)

The impact of legislation passed is not confined to individual provinces; the mandates of houses of parliament also play a role. In South Africa, the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) is constitutionally mandated to ensure the consideration of provincial interests at the national government level. Comprising delegates from each province, the NCOP ensures provincial and local government participation in parliamentary law-making. Legislation passed by the NCOP impacts all provinces, distinguishing it from legislation passed by provincial legislatures, which affects only a particular province (Parliament of RSA, 2010).

2.2.1 Structure and authority of provincial legislatures

Provincial legislatures comprise South African citizens selected by the electorate. Before eligible public members are elected as POBs and assume their responsibilities, they are required to take an oath affirming their loyalty to and respect for RSA and its Constitution (RSA, 1996).

The role of provincial legislatures established before the 1994 general elections was 1) to repeal laws that pre-existed the new democratic era and 2) to develop legislation specific to individual provinces. However, the legislation had to conform to the constitutional provisions, specifically those related to the Bill of Rights, as outlined in Chapter 2. Provinces developed provincial legislatures following the authorisation of the Constitution (RSA, 1996), as highlighted above.

The allocation of seats for political parties in provincial legislatures was based on the 'proportional representation' method, whereby parties received seats in proportion to the number of votes received from respective parties. This method of proportional representation applies as it does in the National Assembly and NCOP, both of which collectively constitute the national legislative authority (Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2020).

2.2.2 South African Legislative Sector

The establishment of the South African legislative sector by national and provincial legislative authorities preceded the creation of the Speakers' Forum. The Forum brought structure and organisation to the legislative sector through co-operation within the sector, per Section 43 of the Constitution (Scott, 2009). The executing authorities of legislatures, known as speakers, met regularly to discuss issues in South Africa's political dynamics and other administrative matters that affect legislatures (Jenkins, 2005; Scott, 2009; South African Legislative Sector Support, 2009).

Today, the central goal of South Africa's legislative sector is to form a formal collaboration among various constituents of the legislative sector and parliament. Despite its membership and leadership role in South Africa's legislative sector, the national parliament does not actively partake in co-operation initiatives. Parliament essentially plays a supporting role for provincial legislatures.

Despite the legislative sector’s development of co-operation legislation concerning provincial legislatures, these legislatures maintain their distinct identities. Their autonomous nature grants them the authority to create internal arrangements by establishing provincial rules and orders (South African Legislative Sector Support, 2009).

2.3 POLICY OBLIGATIONS OF ELECTED POBS OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES

Provincial legislatures underwent a significant transformation, particularly after the second national and provincial elections of 1999. This shift directed provincial legislatures towards enhancing and strengthening their capacity (South African History Online, 2017). The second set of constitutionally elected POBs, serving from 1999 to 2004, strongly emphasised overseeing and holding the provincial legislatures’ machinery accountable. This emphasis established oversight and accountability models (OAMs) in the nine provincial legislatures (South African Legislative Sector Support, 2009). These models were designed to facilitate the process of ensuring that members of the Provincial Executive Council (PEC), who served under the premier, reported on their executive mandate through their elected representatives, the POBs.

Provincial legislatures were initially tasked with repealing existing laws and enacting new ones, which was a significant undertaking. However, considering South Africa’s historical context, very few people had the requisite skills to perform these functions. Some provincial legislatures initially struggled to repeal old laws and enact new ones, as they lacked infrastructure and human resources (South African History Online, 2017).

Today, a primary concern in determining remuneration levels is, or should be, institutions’ abilities to deploy competent and experienced individuals in executive roles. The competencies and experiences of individuals in these positions significantly influence overall performance. This concern becomes particularly pronounced in the public service, where recruitment is open to candidates from various sectors (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2012: 40).

Government executives seemed willing to discharge the responsibilities connected to their designation for non-monetary reasons. Many government executives were motivated by the opportunity to serve the public but may have experienced frustration. Research has revealed that employees driven by public service motivation may become dissatisfied and, ultimately, uncommitted (OECD, 2012: 40).

2.3.1 Oversight and Accountability Models of Provincial Legislatures

OAMs ensure accountability of the national and provincial executive (cabinet) and the electorate through the legislative sectors. OAMs play an essential role in preventing the abuse of authority by cabinet and PEC members (South African Legislative Sector Oversight Model, 2012). These models oversee departmental plans and budget allocation and ensure that POBs are actively engaged in monitoring the implementation of legislation and programmes. Additionally, OAMs provide a platform for elected representatives to communicate matters affecting them.

OAMs aim to ensure that all PEC members are accountable to provincial legislatures. They are systems of checks and balances used to remedy or mitigate any potential risk to the provincial administration, headed by the provincial cabinets, and to address shortcomings. OAMs are aimed at upholding good governance and ensuring public accountability of members of the PEC and entities owned by the province (Jenkins, 2005; Parliament of RSA, 2010; South African Legislative Sector Oversight Model, 2012; Tools for Parliamentary Oversight, 2007). The Office of the Auditor-General ensures that public funds adhere to South African laws, including the Public Finance Management Act No. 1 of 1999. This Act regulates the allocation and utilisation of public funds. Executive members are periodically invited to submit annual departmental plans outlining how their budget will be utilised, with subsequent reports provided to the legislature to account for the use of the funds (Scott, 2009; South African Legislative Sector Oversight Model, 2012).

2.3.2 Public participation

Another characteristic of OAMs is public participation. The third set of democratically elected POBs, who served from 2004 to 2009, concentrated on reinforcing public participation (South African Legislative Sector Oversight Model, 2012). The Public Participation Model (PPM) ensures that electorates participate in public hearings focused on matters affecting, with consideration of new laws to be enacted (Parliament of RSA, 2010).

Public participation has progressed since the early democratic elections, with the ‘People’s Parliament’ informing the PPM. The People’s Parliament calls for national and provincial legislative authorities’ engagement with and responsiveness to the public. The public is involved in participatory democracy and thus included in making law-related decisions, while POBs represent the electorate’s views (Legislative Sector Oversight Model, 2012).

The electorate processes (such as public participation) direct the decision-making processes, replicating society’s aspirations. The South African legislative sector acknowledged the requirement to function and participate within public participation frameworks. The Public Participation Policy Framework was an attempt to enhance societal involvement by providing minimum requirements for public participation. The Speakers’ Forum was adopted, which necessitated parliament and provincial legislatures to tailor their models of public participation (Legislative Sector Oversight Model, 2012). Provincial legislatures must, therefore, ensure they reach all areas in their provinces, including deep rural areas and marginalised communities. In doing so, legislatures aim to reach all groups of people and address societal issues (Parliament of RSA Knowledge Information Services Division, 2006).

The public engages in in-person meetings, and written proposals relating to committee agenda matters established by legislatures. Affected stakeholders’ petitions and meetings form part of the public participation process. Additional forums may include women and youth parliaments (Parliament of RSA, 2010; Scott, 2009; Tools for Parliamentary Oversight, 2007).

2.3.3 International relations and co-operation

South Africa is a member of a global community, but its legislature has international authority. The South African legislative may co-operate with, learn from, and adopt best practices from other national legislatures globally (Parliament of RSA Knowledge Information Services Division, 2008). Co-operation with other legislatures is imperative, as legislatures are responsible for influencing the growth and development of South Africa (Girma, 2012). When the legislative sector functions within constitutional provisions, it influences two government facets: the judiciary and the executive (Girma, 2012; Parliament of RSA, 2010).

Multilateral relations and engagements influence the exchange of best practice methods to improve the mechanisms, systems, and methods of good governance and to hone the role of parliament globally. Multilateral relations are expressed through engagements and partnerships involving more than two international parliaments or legislatures (South African Legislative Sector, 2019). Multilateral engagements may occur in three domains:

- regionally, in Southern Africa, via the Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF);
- continentally, in Africa, via the Pan-African Parliament (PAP); and
- internationally, via the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA).

The British colonies established the CPA to support and develop POBs and their staff by strengthening economic and political relationships and promoting good governance amongst member states (International Consultative Seminar of the South African Legislative Sector, 2011).

2.4 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON REMUNERATION OF ELECTED POBS OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES

Before the introduction of the democratic regime, remuneration practice decisions and CoS of the state president, cabinet members and legislative authority members presented difficulties. Remuneration and CoS decisions were primarily established provisionally but lacked transparent processes. Determining the base pay, perks, and allowances for POBs was challenging. As a result, POBs took the initiative to draft and pass legislation that would set their pay and CoS (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2007).

The parliament established a temporary commission, the Schlebusch Commission of Inquiry, in 1985 to investigate and review POBs' remuneration and benefits. The Schlebusch Commission investigated the remuneration structure and CoS of various high-ranking government officials, including the state president, ministers and deputy ministers, parliament members, and President's Council members (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2007).

Modifications to POBs' remuneration and CoS were constantly required. In 1993, the Melamet Commission was assigned to review and recommend a coherent national and provisional legislation remuneration structure before adopting the Schlebusch recommendations. Preceding the commencement of constitutional democracy, several recommendations of the Schlebusch Commission were accepted and implemented (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2007).

2.5 LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF REMUNERATION OF ELECTED POBS IN PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES

An interim Constitution of RSA, Act 200 of 1993 (Interim Constitution), aimed to end the ad-hoc practices of POBs noted above. The Constitution was aimed at establishing a permanent independent commission to make recommendations regarding remuneration and related matters concerning the Traditional Leaders' Council and local, provincial, and national legislative government members of provincial houses (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2007). The Remuneration Commission of Representatives was later constituted based on legislation.

The new South African Constitution, enacted in 1996, provides for the establishment of an autonomous remuneration commission to propose recommendations regarding salaries, benefits, and allowances for POBs. It also influenced the establishment of a structure to determine salaries, allowances, and benefits (or upper limits) of certain positions in public office (RSA, 1996). The Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs (also referred to as 'the Commission' in this dissertation) was thus established.

The functions of the Commission, as prescribed by the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs Act No. 92 of 1997, include:

- recommending salaries, benefits, and allowances for various categories of office-bearers, including National Assembly members, NCOP delegates, deputy ministers, cabinet members, executive council members, municipal council members, provincial legislature members, traditional leaders, and traditional leaders' council members;

- conducting statutory investigations regarding any matter prescribed;
- undertaking research to enhance the commission's performance;
- annually publishing recommendations regarding salaries, benefits, and allowances for POBs, along with the necessary resources to support them in conducting their duties successfully; and
- publishing an annual report detailing the commission's activities and findings.

After considering the Commission's guidelines, a designated executive member was authorised to determine and employ the framework. The legislative framework required parliament to determine the president's remuneration once the Commission's recommendations had been addressed. Following the Commission's recommendations, the president was responsible for establishing parliament members' and executive members' remuneration. Additionally, the president determined judiciary members' remuneration following parliament's approval, which practices have remained in use. Table 2.1 summarises the legislative framework adopted by the Commission.

Table 2.1: Legislative framework adopted by the Commission

Legislation	Relevance
Constitution No. 108 of 1996	Affords parliament authority to enact legislation allowing an independent commission to recommend POBs' salaries, benefits, and allowances
Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs Act No. 92 of 1997	Established to recommend POBs' salaries, benefits, and allowances
Remuneration of POBs Act No. 20 of 1998	Offers a framework to establish specified POBs' salaries, benefits, and allowances
Remuneration of POBs Amendment Act No. 97 of 2000	Controls political POBs' remuneration
Remuneration of POBs Amendment Act No. 21 of 2000	Controls the remuneration of traditional leaders responsible for multiple offices

Judges' Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act No. 47 of 2001	Provides a framework for judges' remuneration and employment conditions
Judicial Officers (Amendment of CoS) Act No. 28 of 2003	Includes all judicial POBs by extending the scope and definition of POBs to include these individuals
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act No. 41 of 2003	Includes structural changes of the POB positions of traditional leaders
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Amendment Act No. 23 of 2009	Revised the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003 by extending definitions, and revised the Public Office-bearers Act of 1998, with recommendations regarding remuneration-related concerns
Determination of Remuneration of Office-bearers of Independent Constitutional Institutions Laws Amendment Act No. 2014	Sets remuneration and employment conditions of traditional and Khoisan leaders

Source: Adapted from the Independent Commission for Remuneration of POBs (2018: 13-14)

The statutory definition of POBs prescribed by the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs Act No. 92 of 1997 and the Remuneration of POBs Act No. 20 of 1998 allows the Commission to make annual remuneration recommendations. The definition is extended by the Judicial Officers (Amendment of CoS) Act No. 28 of 2003 and the Determination of Remuneration of Office-bearers of Independent Constitutional Institutions Laws Amendment Act No. 22 of 2014, and includes various office-bearers:

- President;
- Deputy president;
- Deputy ministers;
- Cabinet members;
- National Assembly members;
- Permanent NCOP delegates;
- Traditional leaders;
- Provincial and national traditional leader house members;
- Provincial legislature members;
- Provincial executive council members and premiers;

- Municipal council members and mayors;
- Constitutional Court judges, other judges, and magistrates; and
- Heads of independent constitutional institutions
  (including the Public Protector; Deputy Public Protector; South African Human Rights Commission commissioners; Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities members; Commission for Gender Equality members; Auditor-General; Electoral Commission members; and Independent Communications Authority of South Africa councillors).

2.6 CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF ELECTED POBS IN PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES

CoS include various employment-related elements, including leave, working hours (ordinary days, Sundays, and public holidays), overtime, remuneration, and termination of services (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2007).

Before the democratic dispensation, commissions made remuneration recommendations tied to the specific mandates of POBs' positions. Implementing these practices resulted in different standards, often leading to inequity in the structure of POBs' remuneration. Previous commissions either overlooked the dynamics of these practices or failed to address the extent of remuneration inequalities. Furthermore, these commissions did not propose eliminating remuneration inequalities (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2007).

2.6.1 Remuneration

In the era of constitutional and democratic governance, established in 1994, the Commission faced the challenge of formulating annual remuneration recommendations for POBs without a remuneration commission to guide remuneration structures. To address this issue, the Commission conducted a comprehensive review of the entire remuneration system for POBs and set standards and policies governing their remuneration (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2007).

The Commission further investigated whether POBs’ remuneration systems and practices remained current. Recent market developments generated interest in performance assessments in remuneration-related practices and the accommodation of diverse requirements of office holders (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2007).

In 1999, the Commission advocated the conversion of POBs’ remuneration to total package form. The Commission also revisited POBs' remuneration structures in 2002 (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2007). The review entailed job profiling, job grading, and benchmarking positions of all POBs, and recommendations for appropriate remuneration levels (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2007).

In 2007, a review report of the results and recommendations on the total package structure was released. This new structure aimed to establish transparency, fairness, and integration in remuneration for all POBs, and it was successfully implemented in 2008. Incremental inflation rates guided subsequent annual adjustments for the cost of living to ensure that the remuneration remained equitable and competitive.

The summary of the Commission’s recommendations included the following:

- The provision of separate tables, rather than integrated ones, to reflect information on grading and remuneration for different groups of POBs, allowing for a clear contrast and recognition of the distinctive traits of each group;
- the implementation of an objective and systematic grading and benchmarking system for all POB positions based on job profiles for each position;
- the formulation of a total remuneration structure for POBs, characterised by comprehensiveness, transparency, and alignment with the resources necessary for POBs to carry out their duties effectively and efficiently;
- flexibility for POBs in structuring their remuneration packages according to their individual needs and
- The establishment of rules to structure POBs' total remuneration packages is similar to those of senior management positions in public service.

2.6.2 Parliamentary allowance

Since 2008, a parliamentary allowance as prescribed by Section 8(1) (d) of Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 has been included in POBs total remuneration packages (Republic of South Africa, 1962). Parliamentary allowance is a portion of POBs' salary covering expenditure incurred by POBs in performing the duties of the public office they hold. This practice deferred POBs' tax liability to tax assessment time.

2.6.3 Pension benefits

The Political Office Bearers Pension Fund was established in 1998 (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2008). It was mandated to provide retirement benefits for provincial legislatures and national parliament, including provincial and National Executive members, and membership is compulsory. Although established in 1998, the fund was officially backdated to 1994 to accommodate cadres involved in the Freedom Struggle who had taken up POB positions (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2008).

At its inception, the fund had a simple benefit design; however, since 1999, it has undergone various ad hoc changes. Members of the Freedom Struggle joined the service and remained for five years, on average, due to their age. Their minimal retirement benefits led to various attempts to extend benefits for those who exited the fund in, or shortly after, 1994 (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2008).

2.6.4 Medical aid benefits

Medical aid provision for POBs is regulated by a restricted medical aid scheme under Act 131 of the 1998 Medical Schemes Act (Department of Health, 1998). Membership of the scheme is compulsory. With the introduction of the consideration of total cost to the company after the Commission review in 2008, the employer contribution equated to the medical aid expense of two adults and two children. This amount was added to members' packages, and members' medical costs after that were borne entirely (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2008).

After reviewing POBs’ roles in 2007, the Commission indicated the need for structural change to pension benefits and medical aid, as it could not provide sufficient functional suggestions for these remuneration elements (which formed the cash component of POBs’ total remuneration packages). The cash component was to be determined before the provision of a fair or affordable pension- or medical benefit contribution. In 2008, the Commission published a second major review report, introducing a new regime for POBs’ medical aid and pension (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2008).

2.6.5 Tools of trade

Tools of trade (ToTs) are the mandatory resources for POBs to execute their roles effectively and efficiently. Before 2011, disparities existed in the approach of POB associations in allocating resources to POBs. This resulted in associations having their own independent handbooks providing a framework for managing and allocating ToTs to POBs. The practice was unable to ensure uniform and cost-effective management of ToT usage and to hold POBs accountable for ToT usage (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2011). Following previous recommendations, existing ToTs for POBs now include the following (Independent Commission for the remuneration of POBs, 2011):

- adequate staff support;
- care facilities, such as daycare facilities for children;
- communication and information technology equipment;
- offices, office supplies, and stationery;
- official and private accommodation;
- official travelling facilities provided by the state employer to enable POBs to execute their duties cost-effectively;
- reimbursement allowances;
- security measures required for the safety of POBs in their work and living environments; and
- study assistance, which is provided to aid POBs in performing their role duties or for developmental purposes (to enhance their careers or official performance).

These ToTs are vital in ensuring that POBs can fulfil their roles and responsibilities efficiently and effectively through enhanced productivity.

2.6.6 Leave arrangements

The national parliament and provincial legislatures are authorised to establish their own internal arrangements, which may include legislature sitting-time designations, members' legislature programme attendance, constituency engagements, and members' absence management, by establishing rules and orders (RSA, 1996; South African Legislative Sector Support, 2009).

The national parliament executing authority (presiding officers, i.e., speaker and chairperson of the NCoP) may take leave as required, and the accounting officer (secretary to the parliament) must ensure systematic recording and documentation of leave periods of presiding officers (Handbook on Facilities for the Executive Authority of Parliament, 2012). The same arrangement is applicable in provincial legislatures.

A 'leave period' and 'constituency period' are periods designated to members of parliament in any financial year by the Joint Programme Committee (Facilities for Members of the National Assembly and Permanent Delegates to the NCOP, 2017). The same arrangement is applicable to POBs.

2.7 MANAGING THE REMUNERATION OF ELECTED POBS IN PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES

The Commission was to submit its recommendations on salaries or upper limits, benefits, and allowances of all POBs to the president and parliament and annually publish the recommendations in the Government Gazette (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 1997). The president determined the cut-off points for allowances and salaries of PEC members and other POBs after considering the Commission's recommendations.

In implementing the president's determinations, the provincial legislature determined the actual salary and allowances of the premier by passing a legislative resolution, and the actual salaries of other members of PECs and POBs were decided by the premier (Remuneration of POBs Act, 1998).

The Speakers' Forum led the establishment of the legislative internal structures, and the aim was to facilitate co-operation between provincial legislatures after the Speakers' Forum had realised that administrative matters required more attention. This realisation prompted the establishment of several internal professional structures, such as the Secretaries Forum (accounting officers), the Finance Forum, and the Human Resource Management Forum (HRM Forum), amongst others.

In compliance with the Financial Management of Parliament and Provincial Legislature Act 10 of 2009, provincial legislatures' accounting officers oversee provincial legislatures' resource usage (Republic of South Africa, 2009). These resources are to be used economically, efficiently, and effectively. Provincial legislatures comply with obligations required by legislation concerning POBs' remuneration and employees' taxation, levies, duties, pensions, medical aid, and auditing processes.

The HRM Forum aims to govern the legislative sector's internal HR-related processes by managing POBs and employees' remuneration. The forum aims to build a competent workforce to meet the public's requirements and support POBs (South African Legislative Sector, Annual Report, 2010; South African Legislative Sector Human Resource Development Strategic Framework, 2008).

Provincial legislatures have relationships, share functional similarities and HRM guidelines, and are expected to influence one another by sharing employees' expertise and knowledge. Again, the legislatures are limited in benchmarking various HR strategies, skills, ideas, knowledge, and expertise in various organisational areas by the differences in the application of the HRM policies and practices (South African Legislative Sector Support, 2009). Provincial legislatures establish members' support components to oversee members' affairs, including management of POBs remuneration and related matters.

HRM is important in the civil service, as human capital is necessary to implement the prescripts determined by the executing authorities. Significantly, POBs rely on the support of employed bureaucrats. High-ranking bureaucrats who advise executing authorities need to be acquainted with political dynamics emanating from political structures as translated into executive policies. The civil service advocates that humans are founders and renderers of public sector services (Public Service Act, Proclamation 103 of 1994, Section 8).

As previously mentioned, the president determines POBs' remuneration. However, their remuneration must be aligned with POBs' administration frameworks, accounting officers' managerial expertise, and HR officials' technical ability. This requires the expertise of senior officials of provincial legislatures and the appointment of skilled individuals with expertise in various functions (including administration of POBs' remuneration) by provincial legislatures. This expertise is mainly required of specialists in remuneration, public participation, financial management, oversight, legal services, and other related mandates of provincial legislatures (Thornhill, 2012).

2.8 SIMILAR REMUNERATION PRACTICES OF OFFICE-BEARERS IN AFRICA AND ABROAD

In the business context, corporate boards generally have remuneration committees consisting of external individuals (i.e., non-employees) who influence or control decisions on executive remuneration. These remuneration committees interrogate and endorse recommendations for salary adjustments, award bonuses, and propose policies and programmes. Remuneration committees are expected to comply with applicable laws and regulations (OECD, 2012: 47). To plan, assist, and justify senior government pay levels, public review boards need to be established, following applicable country legislations. These boards act similarly to a corporate board of directors (OECD, 2012: 46). The following review of other countries' remuneration practices.

2.8.1 New Zealand

The New Zealand Remuneration Authority, established by parliament, is an independent body governing remuneration, recoverable employment link expenses, superannuation, and allowances of key office holders (Remuneration Authority Act, 1977). Section 18 of the Remuneration Authority (New Zealand) Act 1977 mandates the authority to consider several criteria when determining remuneration:

- fair relativity with remuneration elsewhere;
- fairness to job holders;

- fairness to tax- or ratepayers;
- the necessity of attracting and retaining skilled individuals;
- the position's specific requirements;
- other CoS; and
- adverse economic conditions.

Remuneration authorities ensure that representative house- and house members are appropriately motivated to sustain the integrity of the Parliament of New Zealand. House representatives and members of parliament are provided with remuneration, services empowering them to undertake their roles and functions, and travel services for their family members (New Zealand, Members of Parliament Act No. 9 of 2013). Remuneration authorities have no obligation to consider performance when setting remuneration. Where remuneration authorities set high remuneration, individuals are expected to perform at high levels in executing their roles.

2.8.2 Australia

The Australian Capital Territory established the Australian Capital Territory Remuneration Tribunal to determine the remuneration and allowance levels awarded to holders of certain offices (Remuneration Tribunal Act, 1995). The tribunal considers the following data, derived from various sources, in its investigation:

- countrywide economic indicators (i.e., wage price index, labour force data, weekly average earnings, and the consumer price index);
- Australian Capital Territory-specific economic factors, including present and onward projections;
- work value and remuneration relativity of the public service, which is considered a main contributor to employment and the economy;
- executive and non-executive employees’ salary movements in previous years;
- pay escalations defined in the 2013–2017 ACT Public Service Administrative and Related Classifications Enterprise Agreement;
- other jurisdictions’ salary comparisons; and

- chief ministers’ submissions on behalf of the government.

A base salary is paid to members of parliament with an additional portion of the base salary that is not a parliamentary allowance for purposes of the Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation Act 1948 (Members of Parliament (Staff) Act, 1984). Other entitlements of members of parliament comprise the following: electorate allowance; travel entitlement; family reunion travel; car transport; private vehicle allowance; provision of a vehicle; charter aircraft/drive-yourself vehicle; life gold pass; severance benefits; office facilities; and frequent flyer points.

2.8.3 Canada

The House of Commons Administration governs the remuneration of federal office bearers. Members’ remuneration packages comprise three core components: 1) a sessional allowance, 2) an incidental expense allowance, and 3) a pension plan (Parliament of Canada Act, 1985). Other benefits include the following:

- Members who hold certain other offices and positions (e.g., committee chairperson) are entitled to additional salaries and non-accountable incidental expense allowances. Members are not required to record the receipts of allowance usage, as it is not subject to taxation.
- Members representing remote constituencies are eligible for slightly higher expense allowances, such as accountable travel expense allowances and housing allowances. Members may be reimbursed for meals and accommodation on official engagements farther than 100 kilometres from their primary residence.

Canada has an advisory committee for retention and compensation at the senior level (OECD, 2012: 46), which, in its December 2010 report, recommended:

- improved alignment between benefits and those offered by the market;
- freezing base pay;
- raising at-risk pay;
- keeping total remuneration at 5% of the market level; and
- meeting government objectives by employing at-risk pay.

2.8.4 United Kingdom

The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority is an autonomous body in the United Kingdom, established by the Parliamentary Standards Act (U.K.) of 2009. The authority determines and monitors the expense scheme for members of the House of Commons and is responsible for administrating members' salaries and expenses. The authority also sets the salaries and pensions of members of parliament (Parliamentary Standards (U.K.) Act, 2009). The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority has three main functions: 1) provision of guidelines on the parliamentary spending of members of parliament; 2) their financial support; and 3) determination of their pay and pension.

2.8.5 Northern Ireland

On 01 July 2011, the Northern Ireland Assembly established the Northern Ireland Assembly's Independent Financial Review Panel (Independent Financial Review and Standards (Northern Ireland) Act, 2011). The panel was to determine salaries, pensions, allowances, expenses, constituency office expenses, staff costs, and travel and subsistence expenses payable to assembly members. The panel subsequently developed a remuneration package comprising the above elements (Independent Financial Review and Standards (Northern Ireland) Act, 2011).

2.8.6 Namibia

The key mandate of the Namibian POBs Commission is investigating, researching, and deciding on matters relating to POBs' remuneration, benefits, and CoS (Namibia. Public Office-Bearers (Remuneration and Benefits) Commission Act, 2005). The commission considers the country's financial state the key factor when making recommendations. Other factors are the economy, revenue base (availability of resources), regional and international benchmarks, evidence-based research, the wage bill, public service trends, and competing needs of POBs.

Namibian POBs receive annual salaries as cash benefits, and annual remuneration recommendations are mostly based on the consumer price index. After seeking approval from the president during the first major review, the commission recommended POBs' entitlement to vacation leave, compassionate leave, sick leave, and study leave. At the end of their term, POBs are paid a leave gratuity for the full term served, which they may only access at the end of their term.

POBs and public servants belong to the same pension fund, the Government Institution's Pension Fund. Different portfolios exist for each party. POBs are entitled to a defined-benefit option. The same medical aid scheme covers POBs and public servants.

Different institutions allocate laptops, cell phones, data, and office equipment, following POBs recommendations to the president. These are allocated per different institutional policies. POBs are entitled to furniture for their official homes (and are entitled to own it at the end of their term), a transport allowance or official vehicles (ministers have the choice of purchasing these vehicles at the depreciated value), housing allowance, water and electricity, subsistence- and travelling allowance (including travel by air), security, and support staff. Presidents and vice presidents are allocated official houses (Public Office-bearers (Remuneration and Benefits) Commission Act, 2005).

2.8.7 Kenya

The Constitution of the Republic of Kenya of 2010 established an autonomous body known as the Salaries and Remuneration Commission under Article 230. The commission was mandated to:

- review and determine state officers' remuneration and benefits; and
- provide advice to county and national governments on remuneration and benefits of POBs.

In executing its tasks, the Salaries and Remuneration Commission, per Article 230 (5) of the Constitution (2010), must consider the following principles:

- fiscal sustainability of the Total Public Compensation Bill;
- attraction and retention of skills in the public service to execute the required tasks;
- recognition of performance and productivity; and
- fairness and transparency.

Key recommendations of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission review of remuneration and benefits of state officers included the following:

- a fixed salary, informed by economic performance rather than incremental notches;
- decreasing certain allowances;
- phasing out of certain allowances and benefits, and
- zoning of transport by clustering them according to distance.

The Kenyan Parliamentary Service Commission is another autonomous government commission formed under the Constitution to ensure the efficient operation of the Kenyan National Assembly (Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 2010). The commission's tasks comprise:

- provision of facilities and services to allow parliament to function efficiently and effectively;
- instituting offices in parliament and assigning and managing those in office;
- annually estimating and submitting parliamentary service expenditure to the national assembly and regulating the service budget;
- independently or with other organisations, initiating projects to advocate the values of parliamentary democracy;
- undertaking programmes to promote the ideals of parliamentary democracy, singly or with applicable organisations; and
- addressing the well-being of parliamentary staff and members.

2.8.8 Ghana

The members of the executive arm of Ghana are classed as Article 71 officeholders. These members' remuneration and employment elements are determined by committees of up to five individuals appointed by the president, whom the Council of State advises. Executive, legislative, and judicial salaries and allowances are paid from the consolidated fund once established by the president, following committee recommendations (Constitution of Ghana, 1992).

Reportedly, committees' recommendations include remuneration guidelines, resettling practices of top politicians and officers, and the following:

- salary relativity restoration and maintenance for the three arms of government;
- establishment of clear and justifiable relativities of salary structure for the Article 71 POBs;
- anchoring the president's position on a point system of 100 points;
- anchoring the representatives of the executive, parliament, and the judiciary (Vice-President, Chief Justice, and Speaker of Parliament) on 90 points; and
- awarding 50 points to members of parliament, with the implication that members' salaries are equivalent to 50% of the president's earnings.

2.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter provided insights into the establishment and composition of provincial legislatures, POBs' policy obligations, the historical background and legislative frameworks of POBs' remuneration, POBs' CoS, management of POBs remuneration, and international remuneration practices.

Arguably, public institutions like provincial legislatures should have oversight boards that address the remuneration and performance of public officials. A conceivable role exists at the helm of the central government, where central principles should be addressed, and at the department or agency level, where staffing needs of the executive, performance goals, and problems of individuals could be addressed (OECD, 2012: 47).

The board members at the agency level should have backgrounds relevant to the institution's mission. Their significant contribution at both levels would be defending executive remuneration decisions to the media and the public. An assessment of performance goals and decisions regarding executive remuneration would assist in justifying the adequate remuneration of executives (OECD, 2012: 47).

Media reports have highlighted the public's growing dissatisfaction with governments and leaders following the 2008 global financial crisis. Concern over government spending and accountability is international. Unemployment, poverty, and inadequate public service delivery have intensified, which received wide media attention. The public has grown increasingly concerned about state remuneration and state officials' productivity (OECD, 2012: 11). Government officials are not covered by collective bargaining agreements, which raises suspicions about policies that are more beneficial to the government than the public (OECD, 2012: 11).

Most countries continually investigate alternative and proven approaches to remunerating senior executives. Unavoidably, political considerations and the availability of state resources curb the upper limits of executive pay and incentive rewards. The political consideration of executive pay is most noticeable during political and governmental transitions. An example case is former French president Francois Hollande, who reduced his and his ministers' salaries by 30%, while his predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, increased his salary. The extensive inequality in executive compensation levels amongst countries is evidence of country values and politics influencing executive pay decisions (OECD, 2012: 40).

In 2020, the President of South Africa withheld senior POBs' salary adjustments where after benefits declined (according to the Reviewed Ministerial Handbook that outlines executive members' benefits). In 2020, the South African government intended to publish a new law to provide a remuneration framework that would aid state-owned companies and public entities in curbing exorbitant remuneration for executives and board members (The Presidency, 2020).

Chapter 3 reviews the literature on PM, PRR, and readiness to implement such systems.

CHAPTER 3: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON PM, PRR, AND READINESS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The theoretical base of this research study is anchored in two constructs, namely PM and PRR. This chapter examines the literature on the constructs, including an overview of implementation constraints, the impact of contextual factors, the benefits of PM and PRR, and key considerations in implementing PM and PRR.The chapter concludes with a review of change management.

3.2 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

The most prominent aspiration of organisations is to realise their intended vision, mission, and goals (Shahi, Farrokhsheresht, Taghipourian & Aghajani, 2020). The means to achieve these aspirations are captured in strategic objectives, which depend on employees' operational performance. This section provides an overview of PM, including its definition, historical context, various levels, and significance.

3.2.1 Definition of PM

PM is a strategic process to enhance individual and team performance in alignment with organisational goals (Armstrong, 2022). Effective PM is a systematic and inclusive approach to optimising overall organisational performance through improved employee performance at all levels (Armstrong, 2017). Bacal (2003, as cited by Modipane, Botha & Blom, 2019) adds that PM involves ongoing communication between management and employees, establishing clear expectations, and addressing obstacles to performance through measurements and interventions when necessary. PM plays a crucial role in translating organisational strategies into actionable goals at the departmental and individual levels (Aguinis, 2019; Chatto, 2020).

There are numerous facets to PM, including communication of the organisation's vision, goals, and performance requirements, reporting on progress, and identifying training and development needs (Chatto, 2020; Fenech, Baguant & Ivanov, 2019;

Schleicher et al., 2019). PM is considered essential for managers in ensuring that everyone in the organisation contributes satisfactorily (Bird, 2021).

The complexity of PM is evident in its connection to various aspects of organisational operations, including HR policies, culture, communication systems, and management practices (Boudlaie et al., 2020). Its unique application can vary depending on organisational context and characteristics (Brown, O'Kane, Mazumdar & McCracken, 2018).

PM, while a management approach, utilises the input of both managers and employees to achieve strategic organisational objectives (Brown et al., 2018). It outlines objectives, encourages commitment, and measures results meticulously, promoting continuous improvement (Shahi et al., 2020). Fundamental principles for effective PM include planning, employee- and manager buy-in, alignment with the organisational strategy, and meeting stakeholder expectations (Blackman, Buick, O'Flynn, O'Donnell & West, 2017; Chatto, 2020).

Various perspectives on PM exist, namely as a set of practices to achieve desired behaviours and outcomes, a set of management practices for results, and a function to improve both individual and team practices (McClean & Collins, 2018; Stone, Cox & Gavin, 2020; Brown et al., 2018). Viedge's (2011) systematic view highlights the interlinked components of PM, including defining objectives, planning, continual attention, feedback, performance analysis, incremental reviews, addressing underperformance, and providing coaching.

The PM process involves performance planning, maintenance, review, and reward (Shahi et al., 2020). It requires a holistic view of employee improvement and can potentially optimise resource utilisation, equity, and the relationship between inputs and outputs (Chatto, 2020; Beeri, Uster & Vigoda-Gadot, 2019).

Continuous review, evaluation, and improvement are essential for an effective PM process (Pulakos et al., 2019). Although scholars may not entirely agree on PM's core elements, consensus exists on the importance of performance leadership, management structure, and knowledge production (Aramoon, Aramoon & Bazrkar, 2020; Tseng & Levy, 2019).

PM must be a continuous process to identify, measure, and enhance the performance of individuals and teams in alignment with the strategic organisational goals (Aguinis, 2019). Armstrong (2022) provides additional definitions, emphasising PM's diverse activities and the challenges in providing a clear, complete definition due to the construct's breadth and context dependency (Ashdown, 2014).

A summary of the reviewed definitions of PM is provided in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Review of the definition of PM

Similarities	Differences	Components	Stages	Principle
Setting individual and team goals that are aligned to the strategic goals of the organisation	PM can vary depending on the organisation's context and unique characteristics	A multifaceted strategy that relates to various aspects of an organisation's operations	Defining objectives, planning, offering continual attention, providing feedback, analysing performance, conducting incremental reviews, addressing underperformance, and providing coaching	Sharing a mutual understanding of the organisation's strategies
Comprises the establishment of well-defined objectives and targets for employees and teams	It is challenging to define the exact nature of PM, and it may differ according to organisational context	Interlinking components aimed at achieving superior performance	Performance planning, maintenance, review, and reward	Effective, planning, buy-in, and involvement of employees and managers
Systematic and inclusive method of optimising organisational performance by enhancing employee performance		Combination of internal organisational system processes and formulated strategies	Requires regular review, evaluation, and improvement	Offering support and guidance to employees to realise their full potential
Ongoing communication between management and employees			Involves self-correction procedures	Everyone is doing what the organisation needs them to do
How organisations communicate expectations and drive behaviour to achieve important goals				Input of managers and employees to achieve the strategic objectives of the organisation
Aimed at achieving desirable behaviours and cultivating successful outcomes amongst employees and for the organisation				Employees' performance improvement should be viewed holistically, and not only as the transformation of input into output

Similarities	Differences	Components	Stages	Principle
Comprises several important stages, including performance planning, maintenance, review and reward				Managerial behaviours aimed at defining, measuring, motivating, and developing the desired performance of employees
				To identify ineffective performers for development programmes or other development initiatives

Source: Author's own

In conclusion, PM is a multifaceted, continuous process that is pivotal in optimising individual and team performance in alignment with organisational goals. Its complexity is reflected in the variety of definitions, which emphasise its varied nature and adaptability to different organisational contexts.

3.2.2 The historical context of PM

The historical background of managerial and organisational behaviour processes provides a base for understanding modern PM. Martinez (2022) notes several early mentions to performance appraisals in the USA that date back over a century. This section provides an overview of the progression of PM.

3.2.2.1 1908–1914: The rise of Taylorism and scientific management principles

The Scientific School of Management and Frederick Winslow Taylor influenced early work on implementing PM from 1856 to 1917 (Birnhaum & Somers, 2022). Taylor proposed that effective performance resulted from a structured approach to work design with assigned work, agreed targets, and clear demarcation of financial rewards (Chatto, 2020). Martinez (2022) indicates that, in 1908, Taylor applied his 'scientific management' principles to investigate how the work potential of individuals affected their productivity, as noted in a publication by Taylor, Harper, and Row (1911). These principles can be summarised as follows:

- The application of a scientific study of tasks, rather than rule-of-thumb work methods;
- Workers' self-training was discouraged by scientifically selecting, training, and developing each worker;
- Working together with employees to ensure adherence to scientifically developed methods; and
- Nearly equal distribution of work between managers and workers, to ensure managers consider scientific management principles in planning.

Henry Ford, who initiated the mass production of vehicles, was highly influenced by Taylor's scientific principles and adopted Taylorism from 1909 to 1913 (Ford, 2005). Following Taylorism, car production was divided into unsophisticated, repetitive tasks, so individuals could learn how to do any job quickly.

3.2.2.2 1914–1920: Taylorism gains popularity in the Soviet Union

In 1914, Taylor presented a performance appraisal process that concentrated on employee productivity and how to improve it over time. His appraisals focused on the individual's personality and traits like knowledge, punctuality, and loyalty, amongst others, instead of accomplishing workplace goals and service quality (Martinez, 2022). Ford was recognised by many in the Soviet Union during the 1920s for his contribution to assembly line production through the streamlining of tasks and practices. Many enthusiastically accepted Taylorism when it was introduced into the Soviet Union in 1920. It was also accepted by Bolshevik leaders like Trotsky and Lenin. Lenin did not approve of Taylorism in 1913 but came to appreciate it by 1918 (Lenin, 1914).

3.2.2.3 1930–1960: Growing popularity of Scott's performance appraisal process

Walter D. Scott of WD Scott & Co., Sydney, one of the largest consultancy firms in Australia, introduced the concept of rating employees' abilities as early as World War I (1914–1918). Scott introduced the Man-to-Man Comparison Scale, which Taylor influenced. Scott's performance appraisal system was not extensively recognised until the 1930s (Martinez, 2022). Many companies started to consider a formal performance appraisal process by the mid-1950s. It assisted managers in measuring the performance of their subordinates based on personality traits that are not directly linked to workplace productivity.

The human relations school and the focus on social factors further contributed to the impact of social factors on employees' behaviour towards organisational performance instead of concentrating on the rational, psychological, and social needs and complexities of employees (Amrutha & Geetha, 2020). Evidence of the importance of human relationships in the workplace was revealed in the 1920s by the Hawthorne Experiments.

Most early formal PM systems emanate from Taylorism. During the 1800s, factories utilised stick systems, where management placed a coloured stick by employees' work benches after the workday to indicate how the employees had performed. The outcome determined which employees would be hired for the following shift (Ashdown, 2014: 4).

Ashdown (2014: 4) highlights the popularity of the merit rating system in the USA and the United Kingdom (UK) from the 1950s until 1960. Merit rating was a performance assessment method in which managers utilised a tick-box rating scheme to rate employees against qualities or traits. The practice was likened to a school report.

3.2.2.4 1960–1970: Annual confidential reports become a part of performance appraisals

Martinez (2022) highlights that performance appraisals in the early 1960s were based on annual confidential reports that outlined important information regarding workers' performance. These reports were called 'employee service records. The information in the reports was not shared with employees. Most government organisations used this approach. These annual reports served as an essential source of employee information, and any negative remarks about employees in the reports could negatively affect career growth.

Around the 1970s, employees were provided feedback that included the negative remarks from these reports, allowing them to take corrective measures. Steadily, the performance appraisals based on inherited personality traits moved to evaluations against goals and objectives. There was a greater focus on what an employee could attain in the future with the correct action plan. Even though this is an old system of performance appraisals, some public sector organisations in less industrialised countries, including India, Sri Lanka, and Swaziland, are still using it (Martinez, 2022).

3.2.2.5 1980–2000: 360-degree feedback

Multi-person rating, known as 360-degree feedback, became popular during the 1980s and 1990s. Some organisations did not accept it due to the high cost involved. During this period, performance appraisals focused on motivating employees and improving their performance. Organisations began measuring numerous new traits, such as teamwork, communication, conflict reduction, and efficiency, to name a few (Martinez, 2022). Esso Research and Engineering Company, in the 1950s, was the first to use 360-degree feedback. The method gained popularity after the invention of typewriters, as, previously, it was difficult to ensure the anonymity of hand-written response forms.

During the 2000s, the performance appraisal process became more development-driven, transparent, and flexible, instead of being limited to individuals. The process now involved the employee and manager jointly deciding on goals and objectives for the coming year. This was the start of a period of change to the structure of PM, and annual performance reviews were considered the most effective way of measuring performance (Martinez, 2022).

3.2.3 Modern Trends in Performance Management

Armstrong (2009) believes that many of the current competency rating systems share traits with those used over 70 years ago. To understand the evolution of PM, Islami, Mulolli, and Mustafa (2018) drew a comparison based on the concept of management by objectives as a foundational PM system. Management by objectives aligns organisational goals with employee performance and involves employees and managers in developing objectives, continuous monitoring and evaluation, and meaningful rewards (Islami et al., 2018). Ashdown (2014: 5) emphasises the congruity of current PM processes with management by objectives, highlighting the shared practices of setting objectives and consistent reviews. Despite a decline in the approach's popularity after the 1970s, PM again gained recognition in the late 1980s.

Over the past two decades, there has been a shift from a judgmental approach, where management sets goals without employee input, to a problem-solving approach, emphasising collaborative performance review and objective setting. While direction and feedback remain vital, collaborative decision-making has replaced management's authoritarian role in PM (Chatto, 2020).

Recent PM implementation trends include aligning employee performance with organisational strategic goals (Chatto, 2020) and recognising the crucial role of managers in fostering trust within the manager-employee relationship (Mone & London, 2018). These trends signify a departure from traditional top-down approaches to a more collaborative and employee-involved model in PM.

The COVID-19 global pandemic has had a tremendous impact on human interaction and how people go about their daily activities, and many organisations have adopted remote work or a hybrid system (Awoyemi, 2022). This necessitated reconsidering PM, as the workplace structure was altered considerably, specifically through a lack of humans in the office (Awoyemi, 2022). Awoyemi (2022) also suggests that organisations must consider digital and information technology (IT) solutions in PM management since the workplace has moved towards digitalisation. Awoyemi (2022) recommends the following with regard to PM strategies in light of the new realities:

- Managers should overcome the misconception that workers who work remotely will slack off;
- Managers should maintain flexibility while defining parameters for evaluating performance to reflect the realities of the new work environment;
- Assessment is required of how well employees communicate with colleagues, team members, and supervisors using accepted mediums;
- Periodic self-evaluation by employees is required to develop strategies to ensure interaction between supervisors and their subordinates; and
- It is essential to involve employees in adopting a suitable IT-based solution for workplace communication, e.g., Zoom, Slack, Figma.

Organisations are increasingly moving away from annual performance reviews and towards frequent feedback. The definition of effective PM continues to evolve, with a growing recognition of the importance of fostering a positive and productive work culture (Martinez, 2022). Martinez (2022) indicates that, according to Josh Bersin, a well-known industry analyst in the corporate sector, artificial intelligence is expected to revolutionise HRM. Another prediction related to PM is that the focus will turn from the number of feedback check-ins to the quality of the feedback given — a shift from quantity to quality. Future PM processes are also predicted to become less complicated and more flexible.

3.2.4 Levels of Performance Management

Bussin (2010:2) outlines the systematic and adaptive views of organisation towards PM. Koskinen (2013) defines the systemic view as the view that all systems consist of interconnected subsystems, while the adaptive view is concerned with how employees adjust to and understand the change in the workplace. PM occurs on three levels, which are explained below.

3.2.4.1 The individual level

This PM level focuses on employees' performance, which is evaluated according to their individual contribution to a group in attaining the organisational goals. Performance of employees is demonstrated by their level of effectiveness, efficiency, productivity, and quality of work (Whatfix, 2023). It includes the extent to which workers execute their job responsibilities, attain agreed goals and objectives, and contribute to the organisation's overall success. Employee performance is not determined only by quantitative metrics; qualitative factors like communication skills, teamwork, problem-solving abilities, and adaptability are also considered.

Whatfix (2023) suggests the following six strategies to measure employees' performance:

1. Set measurable objectives, key results, and employee goals;
2. Benchmark performance by applying 'sprints';
3. Implement project- or task-management tools;
4. Oversee completion of training;
5. Undertake a skills gap analysis; and
6. Analyse, measure and track key performance indicators (KPIs).

The following are metrics that enable managers to evaluate their subordinates' performance levels (Whatfix, 2023):

- 360-degree performance reviews;
- net promoter score (NPS);
- percentage of employee goals, KPIs, or objectives achieved;
- qualitative customer- and peer feedback;
- percentage of assignment(s) completed;
- nine-box grid method;
- quality of work;
- work attendance; and
- return on investment in human capital.

3.2.4.2 The organisation level

Considering the macro-system, the organisation entails considering its relationship with its operating environment, together with the significant functions of the organisation. Variables at this level that impact performance include strategies, organisational goals and measures, the organisational structure, and the deployment of resources (Rummler & Brache, 2024).

Concerning the organisation's relationship with key external stakeholders and markets, the following should be considered:

- Long- and short-term organisational goals should be aligned with the strategic and operational targets to attain the organisation's vision and mission (Chatto, 2020). An example is the establishment of clear organisational goals for the organisation's competitive benefit(s), innovative services and new markets, concentration on specific products or services and markets, and investment of identified resources, organisational operations and expected return on these investments (Rummler & Brache, 2024).
- Organisation design that incorporates the structural realignment of organisational functions (like the HR unit) with organisational targets. The organisational structure development should include more than merely determining departmental boundaries and reporting lines. It is more important to consider how the work gets done and whether it makes sense. The process commences with developing a relationship map that shows interfaces among all the functions and sub-functions (Rummler & Brache, 2024).
- Organisational management entails directing processes and managing resources to attain organisational goals through several management activities. Goal management encompasses generating functional sub-goals that support the attainment of the whole organisation's goals. PM activities include obtaining regular customer feedback, resource management (balancing the distribution of human and capital capacity and equipment across the system), and interface management to ensure congruence of all systems.

3.2.4.3 The process level

The systems view goes beyond observing distinct functions, which fails to provide a comprehensive understanding of how work is carried out, a crucial consideration in performance improvement. In taking the systems view, the focus shifts towards processes. Key dimensions of organisational performance are shaped by cross-functional processes such as supply chain processes, billing, product development, customer service, and sales forecasting (Rummler & Brache, 2024).

The process level consists of the internal view of the practices and procedures (Rummler & Brache, 2024) that function within organisations and enhance systems' value. The focus should be on the utilisation of exceptional ‘path-finding’. Once organisations have process goals, they need to ensure that the processes are structured (designed) to meet the desired goals proficiently. Processes should be logical and streamlined paths to the achievement of the goals. However, even a process with a logical structure will be unsuccessful if it is not managed well.

3.2.5 Purpose, importance, and constraints to Performance Management in South Africa

PM aims to enhance performance by providing a performance-enabling environment and systems (Brown et al., 2018). PM defines expectations regarding inputs and outputs, creating clarity (Blackman et al., 2017). Effective communication is thus vital (Mone & London, 2018). PM aims to convey a shared vision supported by suitable leadership styles (Chatto, 2020). When implemented successfully, the PM also clarifies the required performance standards, promotes equitable remuneration, and diminishes stakeholders’ subjectivity (Chatto, 2020). It promotes organisational integrity and transparency and enhances stakeholder engagements. The system will improve individual placement and career planning and inform employee training and development.

Erasmus, Schenk, Swanepoel, Mulaudzi, and Grobler (2019) highlight key PM constraints in South Africa, based on Spangenberg's (1993: 30-34) research:

- Lack of commitment to an ethos of productivity and quality;
- Insufficient support from management;
- Employee distrust in agreed-upon performance review targets (Chatto 2020);
- Mechanisation and a regulation-oriented system;
- Discontent arising from extended implementation delays; and
- Challenges in integrating PM alignment with other organisational systems include linking the reward system with the PM system (Chatto, 2020).

Kanyangale and Chikandiwa (2022) identify shortcomings in PM in South African higher education during the COVID-19 pandemic, which may have broader applicability. The shortcomings and proposed strategic solutions are as follows:

- Rigid performance planning and timing of feedback during uncertain times.

The PM was conducted according to an inflexible schedule and was not adaptable to external circumstances beyond the individual's control. Korn (2021) notes the importance of agility and strategizing for change rather than a narrow focus on deadlines. The institution also did not adapt individuals' KPIs and performance metrics during this time. In addition, the PM was focused on individual performance, without consideration of teamwork, despite it being vital to multi-task forces' rapid and collective response to a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous context (Du Plessis et al., 2022; Menon & Motala, 2021).

- Lack of communication and feedback

There was a marked absence of regular performance check-ins and discussion of near-term goals, which are vital in timeously closing the gap between actual and desired performance (Chowdhury & Williams, 2020; Murphy, 2020). There were insufficient channels for bottom-up communication, which led to employees feeling isolated. This was subsequently addressed through real-time feedback centres. The lack of communication also meant a lack of coaching by managers, which plays a vital role in performance enhancement and career growth through a focus on the human element (Mortensen & Gardner, 2022).

- Loss of trust

Due to their perception of a lack of empathetic leadership, employees felt peripheral to and disconnected from the bureaucratic approach to PM. They saw it as a compliance exercise by the HR department.

The pandemic serves as an example of disruptive forces to which the PM must be adaptable (Menon & Motala, 2021), and the findings of Kanyangale and Chikandiwa (2022) present valuable insight into important elements of an effective PM system. PM demands an agile mindset and the development of the managerial competencies of manager-as-coach and compassionate leadership.

Mattone (2013: 3) advocates positive PM, which approach centres on fostering self-esteem and confidence and providing individuals with a platform to showcase their capabilities, even in the face of challenges. The Positive Performance Management Framework contains ten key principles that leaders can employ to facilitate comprehensive, authentic, and timely performance reviews. These principles are as follows: 1) utilise employee input to formulate objectives; 2) use lawful performance standards by rating performance via criteria emanating from employees' jobs; 3) ensure continuous engagement between supervisors and employees; 4) delegate collective responsibility to leaders and employees to arrange performance appraisals; 5) remove bias in practice; 6) invite all stakeholders influencing employees' roles to contribute to employees' performance reviews (e.g., colleagues, juniors, and other stakeholders); 7) provide uniformity to ensure reliable feedback; 8) ensure integrity in the performance rating; 9) guarantee ongoing engagement between leaders and employees; and 10) promote employee ownership of the process (Matone, 2013).

In the context of South African public service, performance appraisal challenges often stem from technical aspects within the system (e.g., issues related to additional HRM systems and administrative procedures) and employee-related matters (e.g., distrust in the process or inconsistent feedback hindering performance improvement (Chatto, 2020). The Public Service Commission (2020) recommends adherence to the following principles of positive PM:

1. Proactively managing individual and professional development to enhance expertise within the public service;
2. Ensuring consistent and constructive communication between managers and subordinates;
3. Valuing the strengths, needs, and circumstances of individual workers and appreciating their contributions;
4. Recognising and rewarding performance that meets or exceeds expectations;
5. Creating opportunities and providing support to enable employees to enhance their performance;
6. Facilitating ongoing performance improvement through training and development;
7. Early identification of performance that does not meet expectations; and
8. Integrating the principles mentioned above into management practices and policies.

3.3 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

PM systems are essential for organisations, as they provide the performance standards for various roles (Chatto, 2020). PM systems rely primarily on performance planning, which entails collaboration between managers and employees. Management's appraisal and measurement of employees' performance and identification of developmental and training requirements to enhance employees' performance (Brown et al., 2018). PM systems provide a means to assess employees' and organisations' performance levels against the predetermined performance levels, which assessments can then inform rewards for exceptional employee performance.

If not applied correctly in organisations, the credibility of PM systems declines, ultimately rendering them ineffective (Beeri et al., 2019). The correct application of PM systems in organisations relies on their introduction in line with organisational policy. PM system implementation in organisations may be challenging (Chatto, 2020), as PM systems are prone to manipulation, particularly in favouritism and subjectivity. To avoid these, organisational stakeholders should be educated about the application of PM systems (Lee, 2020). Bereno (2011) adds that organisations should ensure that the system cannot be manipulated.

Presbitero and Teng-Calleja (2019: 36) argue that PM systems are not dependent on only HR experts and that managers are also accountable. This necessitates their active engagement. For the PM system to be effective, organisations must align their performance bonus structures to those provided by the labour market to ensure talent attraction and retention (Khaliq, Maqsood, & Siddiqui, 2021). An effective PM system shows employees a clear link between their efforts and organisational success (Martono, Khoiruddin & Wulansari, 2018) and allows the organisation to assess its operations. The ability to oversee supports the identification of performance gaps and rapid intervention and improvement (Pulakos et al., 2019). Performance data derived from these systems also inform various HR processes, including career planning, reward systems, identification of development needs, disciplinary decisions, considerations for promotions, and the identification and development of talented employees (Schleicher et al., 2019). The next section examines Newton-Lewis, Munar, and Chanturidze (2021) model and the public sector's PM model.

3.3.1 The Conceptual Model of a Performance Management System

The Conceptual Model of a Performance Management System of Newton-Lewis, Munar, and Chanturidze (2021: 3) is a multifaceted framework that includes various factors influencing organisational performance. The model measures performance financially (via budget utilisation) and non-financially (via service delivery performance) (Höglund, Mårtensson & Nylinder, 2023).

The model of Newton-Lewis et al. (2021) illustrates that individual performance transpires if employees are given the required means, motives, and opportunities. *Means* refers to an institution's cognitive and behavioural capacity to evaluate and deduce performance data in designing and deploying appropriate strategies. *Motives* refer to the shared objective of working towards performance objectives. *Opportunity* refers to the accessibility of resources and agencies to achieve targets (Newton-Lewis et al., 2021).

System changes surface from interactions between individuals, connections within organisational boundaries, and networks of system elements. This creates non-linear and unpredictable outcomes. During high-complexity systems, directive approaches to PM are less effective than enabling approaches, which generate a favourable environment for high performance from relational interactions (Newton-Lewis et al., 2021). The conceptual model is shown in Figure 3.1.



Figure 3.1: Conceptual Model of a Performance Management System (Newton-Lewis et al., 2021: 3)

The framework shows the three interactions between PM cycles in a government department (Newton-Lewis et al., 2021):

- The performance of institutions is 'managed' by system-level actors (a ministry) and sanctioned through target-setting and accountability relationships. The accounting authority (speaker) could manage this in a provincial legislature.
- Sufficient resources, decision space and data afford opportunities and means to undertake PM.
- The effect of the PM cycle on a person's means, motives, and opportunities (and, therefore, performance) is facilitated by the organisational culture, system-level actions, and the wider socio-political, cultural and governance context.

. Provincial legislatures can employ the model to manage their performance by providing the required resources, exerting employees' motivation, and exploring performance opportunities for individual members.

3.3.2 South African Civil Service Performance Management and Development System

The Performance Management and Development System (PMDS) is the designated PM system in the South African public sector. The DPSA developed the PMDS to oversee civil servants' performance through strategies focused on development, training, and rewards (Mdoda, 2021). The vision for the PMDS is to foster a culture of transparency, collaboration, and continuous improvement amongst senior managers, supervisors, employees, and teams. This culture encourages open communication, sharing expectations, and a commitment to enhancing competencies. The goal is to enable the organisation to perform exceptionally (Public Service Commission, 2018: 13).

At its core, a PMDS is designed to enhance service delivery by optimising the utilisation of resources (Zvavahera, 2014) to improve service delivery. The system aims to align individual and team efforts with the organisation's goals and objectives, thereby contributing to the overall success and performance of the institution. Masenya, Mokoele, and Makalela (2018) note that the PMDS enhances governmental performance in the following ways:

- Enhanced data about the internal performance of programmes to allow government agencies and executives authorities to make better decisions in the allocation of required resources (Curristine, Lonti & Joumard, 2007);
- Serves as an instrument for holding the executives of government programmes accountable (Fletcher, 2008);
- Improved social contributions through service delivery;
- Improved planning through identification and linking of the objectives and the strategies of government institutions to the responsibility of each public servant;
- Enhanced trust through individual participation in job planning and continuing discussions, feedback, and open appraisal;
- Communication of unsatisfactory performance through constant feedback and discussion during the PM cycle (Fakir, 2006).
- An inclusive data source to permit institutional skills development and identification and prioritisation of training needs of employees; and

The system can also be connected to broader organisational initiatives like ethics, competency, and quality programmes to establish a broad HRM framework.

The next section discusses PM challenges in the South African civil service.

3.3.2.1 Performance Management challenges faced by the South African civil service

Khumalo (2022) indicates that, according to the Public Service Commission (2014), ineffective PM of senior management has a ripple effect on how performance is managed at lower levels throughout the department. Some of the challenges identified by Khumalo (2022) are as follows:

- Poorly structured performance agreements and an increase of grievances: Agreed-upon and clearly structured agreements aligned to organisational objectives are vital for the organisation;
- Supervisors' failure to facilitate the development of appropriate performance standards (Van der Westhuizen, 2016);

  This is a central feature of successful performance appraisal because they are the instruments to measure actual performance. Poorly developed performance standards increase the possibility of rating errors and vice versa;
- Protests encountered by the departments during moderating and after awarding incentive bonuses to the eligible employee's impact service delivery;
- Persistent unprotected strikes in some government departments:

  This causes concern because they have become the norm, leading to dysfunctional public services. Promotion of sound labour relations and engagement of parties must be promoted; and
- Common rating errors associated with performance appraisal.

  These include personal biases and preferential treatment or nepotism errors (Khan, 2012: 2). Personal bias arises from bias or prejudice either in favour of or against a worker (Van Der Westhuizen, 2016). Managers must recognise and reward employees who perform exceptionally well to motivate them to maintain the high-level standard they have accomplished and inspire others to strive for better performance.

3.3.2.2 Regulatory framework of Performance Management and Development System and practice in South African government

The Public Service Regulation 2001 was created to provide a structured framework to regulate the use of PMDS. Additionally, the Republic of South Africa's government provided a platform for discussing PM implementation for civil servants in the form of the 1997 White Paper on HRM in the Public Service.

The Public Service Human Resource Development Strategic Framework Vision (2015) was established to address performance gaps within the public service sector, ultimately enhancing the overall performance of the sector. It was envisioned that developing public service employee's skills would improve service delivery for South Africans (Matthews & Mokoena, 2020). The PM serves as a cornerstone among HRM tools. It contributes to employees' awareness of their work expectations; provides managers with feedback on employee performance; detects impeding factors on target achievement; highlights poor performance and allows for intervention to improve performance; and recognises and rewards outstanding performance (Chatto, 2020).

In the Senior Management Service Handbook, the process and conditions governing PMDSs for Senior Management Service members are described (DPSA, 2018: 1). The introduction of outcomes-based PM in 2010 required PMDSs for Senior Management Service members to adopt an outcomes-based methodology. Subsequently, this system ensured that certain principles flowed down to other members' Performance Agreements (PAs). These principles pertained to goals and objectives provided in the departmental Annual Performance Plan (APP), Strategic Plan (SP), and key government focus areas (KGFAs) of heads of departments (HoDs).

PAs form the basis of PM and play an integral role in assessing and evaluating senior management service members' performance levels, contributing to the attainment of departmental performance targets (Chatto, 2020). The objective is to establish a sound and collaborative framework for performance expectations pertaining to employee roles and goals (Shahi et al., 2020). PAs assist both management and Senior Management Service members in having a foundation for monitoring and assessing performance on an ongoing basis (DPSA, 2018: 1).

The PM cycle in the public service sector spans 12 months. This cycle incorporates the creation of job descriptions and is supported by strategic plans. It includes five stages in the PM cycle, namely, 1) performance planning, 2) performance review, 3) performance assessment and appraisal, 4) performance development, and 5) reward and recognition (as reflected in Figure 3.2). This cycle is ongoing, as PM is a continuous employee developmental function (Brown et al., 2018).



Figure 3.2: Schematic of PM in the South Africa public sector (DPSA: PMDS for Senior Management Service Members, 2018: 3)

PM for Senior Management Service members at the levels of Directors, Chief Directors, and Deputy Directors-General is integrated into organisational performance and centred on the following three elements (DPSA, 2018: 3):

a. Optimal employee performance is achieved when employees' role outputs align with departmental strategies, APPs, and/or Annual Operational Plans (AOPs). This alignment is detailed through role descriptions for Senior Management Service members, which include key result areas (KRAs).

b. Organisational performance relies on annual performance plans that outline departmental' annual goals, KPAs, and departmental targets. APPs assist departments in implementing their strategies, with Senior Management Service members being monitored against their specified targets.

c. Opinion and findings of Auditor-Generals: To ensure a credible audit report, an organisation's financial statements must be free of misstatements, show no evidence of legislatorial non-compliance, and demonstrate the presence of internal monitoring controls. To substantiate Senior Management Service members' performance metrics, AG reports are suitable for managers to conduct. These reports can include improvements for Senior Management Service members to be attended to in further assessments.

Gowon, Fortunasari, and Yusnaini (2020) differentiate between internal and external factors influencing PM systems in the public sector. External factors include support for civilian and political parties of elected officials, involvement of trade unions, and conformity to required legislation. Internal factors, such as performance and rewards, are critical success factors (Martono et al., 2018). Additionally, the contextual aspect of each country plays a significant role in the successful implementation of PRR in the public sector. Dahlström and Lapuente (2010: 577) advise that PRR regulations are more successfully applied in countries where there are no conflicts of interest between POBs and senior managers in government.

St-Jean (2023) notes some of the following challenges faced during the implementation of PMDS and suggests potential ways to address them:

i. Leadership buy-in: Leadership acceptance and willingness to support a PM programme in functioning is vital in the organisation. If internal organisational participants see that their organisational leadership is not supporting or involved in the PM process, they might also feel despondent and less compelled to participate. HR experts can make a difference in the field by sharing PM experiences and success stories with other counterparts. This form of engagement can convey the organisational programme's results, as well as detailed and interesting feedback from leaders and employees.

ii. Motivation and employee morale: Employees may perceive PM as an additional compliance task, leading to stress and decreased morale. Clear communication about the programme's details and benefits is essential. Involving employees in goal-setting and review processes helps them understand their organisational role and fosters a sense of ownership.

iii. Inadequate budget: Implementation costs, including software fees, may pose a challenge if there is insufficient budget. HR practitioners can explore cost-effective software solutions or adopt a less formal approach, utilising existing tools like employee recognition platforms. Involving higher-ups in budget considerations is also recommended.

iv. Application of the software: The failure of the software to meet the organisational expectations can negatively impact the whole initiative. For example, employees may feel uneasy about or dissatisfied with the PM when they encounter problems in accessing the review platform. The service provider might be able to fix the problem or find a workable solution. Upfront communication with employees in relation to some of the challenges and potential workarounds is required.

v. Managers' buy-in: Getting managers' support is crucial for the programme's success, and lack of buy-in can lead to misunderstandings. Collaboration between HR and IT can automate PM processes, facilitating reminders for managers. Encouraging managerial participation in meetings with top management can reinforce the importance of ongoing feedback.

vi. Reorganisations and acquisitions of a company: Major organisational changes can disrupt the performance review process. HR practitioners should involve IT in these instances to update the PM software with the new reporting structure. The updates will provide the managers with more clarity on what they are required to do to finalise the reviews for all their team members. Other interventions can be the availability and involvement of previous managers and the extension of the performance review deadlines.

vii. Poor usage of tools: The programme's success relies on the effective use of tools, and improper usage can lead to varied and inconsistent submissions. Establishing a system to monitor the quality of performance review submissions ensures adherence to required standards.

viii. Absence of HR tech skills: Adequate skill sets within the HR department are necessary for a successful PM programme. Clear role clarification, delegation of authority, and targeted training can empower HR personnel. Alternatively, external consultants with specific skills could provide the necessary support.

3.3.2.3 Performance Management systems in provincial legislatures

The operation of PM systems in provincial legislatures is a multifaceted challenge. The report from the Portfolio Committee on Public Service and Administration (2010, as cited by Mokoena, 2019) highlights the variance in PM system implementation from internal organisations to provincial legislatures. This challenge calls for an institutional review of every provincial legislature across all sectors (South African Legislative Sector Support, 2009). Furthermore, the report highlights the necessity of creating PM systems and policies for provincial legislatures to prevent inter-institutional competition.

Research by Mkhonza and Musundire (2020) revealed that performance reviews at the Gauteng Provincial Legislature were undertaken regularly and adhered to. However, there are disparities in linking the provincial legislature reward system to the Gauteng Provincial Legislature Integrated Performance Management System Policy. At the stage of performance appraisals, matters related to employees' performance are raised instead of PM being monitored continuously. The applied performance managerial process of formulating the organisational goals needs to include all employees to understand their expectations better.

Mabelane's (2007) research on the Limpopo Provincial Legislature highlighted the challenges within the administrative and political facets affecting PM administration. The study also highlighted the monotonous nature of PM practices, noting that it often becomes a mere formality focused on granting officials their annual salary increments while neglecting a thorough evaluation of their actual individual performance.

In the context of provincial legislatures, a crucial facet of PM systems is its distinctive alignment with the Financial Management of Parliament and Provincial Legislature Act No. 10 of 2009. This legislation provides a clear framework for assessing the performance of accounting officers, establishing a close connection between their responsibilities and the objectives of the PM system. According to the Financial Management of Parliament and Provincial Legislature Act (RSA, 2009), executive authorities (speakers) and accounting officers (secretaries to the legislature) are obligated to develop annual performance agreements for accounting officers. These agreements should:

- be concluded one week before the start of each financial year;
- specify performance standards in line with parliament’s financial year performance plan, connected to targets and objectives;
- facilitate an annual performance assessment conducted by executive authorities; and
- disclose the outcome of sub-par performance.

The responsibilities assigned to accounting officers are integral to their performance agreements. The annual audit report on the financial statements of the parliament or legislatures is an essential component of the performance assessment for accounting officers. This accountability framework will cascade down from senior managers to other employees, contributing to attaining organisational objectives.

In this context, continuous research is needed to understand and cultivate the appropriate culture for an empowering bureaucratic system. Research helps shape a culture of trust, collaboration, and belongingness among employees, which, in turn, can significantly impact the effectiveness of the PM system (Beeri et al., 2019).

Investigating PM is a critical endeavour, especially when it comes to balancing public perceptions of service delivery in provincial legislatures and the remuneration received from the government. Provincial legislatures should assess the performance of their members with the involvement of Ministers of Monitoring and Evaluation, utilising tools such as APPs for measurement. The performance of members of provincial legislatures is closely linked to that of the President, as they sign performance agreements guided by the Executive Members’ Ethics Act 82 of 1998, and their political parties also assess their performance political parties assess their performance.

Mabelane (2007) recommended that the provincial legislatures establish an integrated approach to PM of their employees, especially those who provide direct services and support to legislature members. The approach means members of the legislature who are key clients should also play a part in evaluating both the service they received and the performance of the employees supporting them.

This concludes the discussion of the literature on PM and PM systems. The next section delves into the literature on PRR.

3.4 PERFORMANCE-RELATED REMUNERATION

PRR is any remuneration practice in which all or part of an employee’s remuneration is directly and explicitly linked to their assessed work behaviour and/or measured results (Shields, 2016: 240). Typically, PRR rewards employees with monetary payment (either consolidated or non-consolidated) after their performance assessment and, usually, the accomplishment of their objectives (Martono et al., 2018).

Bussin (2020: 67) suggests that PRR differs depending on the stakeholders (individual employees, teams, or organisations) whose performance is being measured. PRR, when provided to individual employees, is related to remuneration structures, grades, a performance rating, and/or competence rating. PRR differs from incentive schemes, which are team- or organisation-based and involve formulas and idiosyncratic payments. In individual PRR schemes, managers' ratings relate to the pay increase magnitude compared to the available budget.

Management is often described as the art of obtaining optimal results. A management philosophy may be defined as a set of principles and practices that guide managers in supervising their staff. PRR is one of the tools used to implement these principles. PPR serves as a managerial instrument to incentivise and reward good performance, aligning with the belief that exceptional performance should be rewarded (Martono et al., 2018).

Choosing appropriate managerial instruments to remunerate employees while running a business provides an added advantage on the organisation's overall performance. One kind of supplementary remuneration organisations might utilise to empower workers is the PRR on results. PRR schemes have become more widespread in today’s business environment. The expectation is for such financial incentive schemes to improve organisational productivity, profits, and revenues (Milton, no date).

The widespread introduction of PRR occurred in the UK during the 1980s. Many organisations anticipated that PRR would spur a culture change and inspire higher performance levels among individuals and organisations. PRR has become an integral component of the reward strategies employed by numerous organisations, specifically in the financial services sector (Martono et al., 2018).

Research conducted by various international organisations has shown that organisations with robust PRR and PM systems surpassed their competitors across multiple metrics. These organisations applied PRR for the following several reasons (Bussin, 2020: 67-68):

- To reinforce links between performance and remuneration;
- To spearhead organisational strategy implementation towards the employee level;
- To retain top-performing employees by rewarding them for continuously high performance;
- To communicate with non-performers and intervene via counselling or training;
- To promote a culture of performance throughout organisations;
- To co-ordinate and performance contracting, performance reviews, and performance assessments;
- To link salaries and wage bills to organisational income; and
- To differentiate reward levels in a justifiable manner.

For PRR to be effective, PM systems require a strong basis: providing rewards to top performers and incentives to poorer performers (Ali & Rehman, 2013: 514). The advantages and disadvantages of PRR are outlined in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Advantages and disadvantages of PRR

Advantages	**Disadvantages**
• The contribution and effects of PRR are greater at lower levels of the organisation, where employee obligations are transparent compared to the management level. • Management can utilise PRR to differentiate between the superior and inferior performers. • PRR guides employees in improving their performance within an organisation. • PRR allows employees to determine their own targets to be achieved within a particular defined period. • PRR assists employers in recognising the outstanding performance of employees. • PRR creates acceptable, healthy competition between employees and motivates them to meet established rewardable targets.	• Organisations sometimes battle to introduce and implement fair performance appraisals of employees. • PRR sometimes leads to conflict within organisations and demotivates employees. • Using PRR, the focus is on team effort more than individual effort. This demotivates employees. • Time is required for organisations to research the introduction of new remuneration systems related to PRR.

Source: Rehman and Ali (2013: 513).

Ana-Mădălina and Nica (2014: 56-61) argue that providing employees with fixed remuneration regardless of individual performance and contribution to positive organisational outcomes is not a significant foundation for creating high-performing civil services institutions. Similarly, rewarding all employees equivalently may cause unfair and unjust remuneration practices (Chatto, 2020). Linking remuneration to output-related performance can increase employee motivation and improve the standard of service provided to consumers (Unnikrishnan, Sharma & Sharma, 2022).

Generally, organisations opt for PRR systems to improve their overall performance. Personnel economics may account for the effects of PRR systems on organisational performance. Guided by agency theory, it is understood that employee motivation, as enhanced by incentives, can lead to increased productivity and, therefore, higher profits for organisations. Agency theory is a principle utilised to describe and analyse relationships within organisations, particularly between shareholders as principals and company executives as agents (Kopp, 2023). Additionally, PRR systems contribute to improved organisational performance by attracting high-performing employees and reducing employee turnover (Brown et al., 2018; McClean & Collins, 2018). Robbins (1994: 56-58) recommends that organisations consider the following factors when establishing their PRR system:

- Recognise individual differences in employees' preferences and what factors motivate them;
- Appoint and fit people in jobs which are congruent to their personalities;
- Formulate desirable goals for employees;
- Provide constant feedback to employees on their performance;
- Ensure employees agreed goals are achieved;
- Modify rewards in recognition of employees' different needs to fulfil their different expectations motivated by different types of rewards;
- Clearly align rewards to performance; and
- Integrate the principle of internal equity in the organisational reward strategy and ensure its attainment.

3.5 PERFORMANCE-RELATED REMUNERATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Research conducted by Hasnain, Manning, and Pierskalla (2012) highlighted that PRP was introduced as a possible tool for improving the productivity and accountability of civil service in many countries. During the past years, many OECD countries implemented PRP in the main administration (key civil service), particularly entities like revenue administration, and for strategic service delivery employees such as educators and health personnel. Drawing on the OECD example, middle- and low-income countries have also tested PRP to promote a performance orientation in dysfunctional bureaucracies. Some theoretical and empirical literature has analysed numerous dimensions of PRP, revealing a small but increasing body of robust evidence on the influence of PRP.

Hasnain et al. (2012) further suggest that introducing PRP can impact the wider public sector, especially on the fiscal sustainability of the wage bill, civil service pay competitiveness, and social objectives such as gender equity. PRP can contribute to cost containment by restraining remuneration increases to less affordable performance bonuses (Marsden & French, 1998).

PRPs in the OECD countries have been introduced in the context of changing remuneration policy, like moving towards differentiated pay arrangements and re-arranging delegation of authority on remuneration from central HR departments to line departments or agencies. What is outstanding is exploring the potential linkages between these reforms and whether or not PRP triggered the effect of remuneration policy changes (Hasnain et al., 2012).

3.6 PERFORMANCE-RELATED REMUNERATION THEORIES

Effective PRR is a cornerstone of motivating employees and driving organisational success. In the workplace, various factors influence employees' behaviours and productivity. Among these factors, motivation is pivotal in guiding individuals toward specific goals and enhancing their performance (Milkovich, Newman & Gerhart, 2021). This section examines several key theories of motivation and their relevance to PRR in the workplace.

One of the most significant impacts of motivation on employee behaviour is reflected in their remuneration. Motivated employees are more likely to excel, and financial or non-financial remuneration often serves as a key driver of motivation (Smith & Taylor, 2021).

To understand which remuneration system is more relevant, it is important to explore theories of motivation. These theories can be segregated into three main groups: process, content, and reinforcement. Each category offers unique insights into what drives individuals in the workplace.

3.6.1 Process theories of motivation

Process theories include examining individuals' behavioural and psychological processes that drive their actions in the workplace. This research focuses on three process theories related to motivation: cognitive dissonance theory, Vroom's expectancy theory, and Adams's equity theory.

3.6.1.1 Cognitive dissonance theory

This theory suggests that individuals who consistently underperform on a task tend to continue performing poorly, driven by their self-perception of incompetence (Harmon-Jones, Nail & Boniecki, 2022).

Addressing the cognitive dissonance experienced by employees, where they receive praise for their efforts but feel inadequately remunerated, is important for organisational harmony. This dissonance arises from the perceived mismatch between their contributions and financial rewards. Implementing a transparent performance review and remuneration system is essential to mitigate this. Such a system clarifies the correlation between outstanding contributions and corresponding pay raises or bonuses (Dane, 2023).

Ensure that recognition translates into tangible rewards and that the dissonance is resolved, promoting fairness and motivation among employees. While this theory clarifies the complex interaction between rewards, attitudes, behaviours, motivations, cognitions, and perceptions (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007), it is worth noting that a study conducted by Dechawatanapaisal and Siengthai (2006) found no significant relationship between rewards and cognitive dissonance.

3.6.1.2 Expectancy theory

Expectancy theory, initially proposed by Vroom in 1964, posits that individuals are inclined to be motivated when they believe their additional efforts and performance will be acknowledged and appropriately rewarded (Rowley & Harry, 2011). Consequently, organisations implementing performance-based remuneration systems can anticipate positive employee performance and motivation enhancements. Vroom's expectancy theory posits that individuals' propensity to act in specific ways depends on their expectations of achieving certain outcomes and their desire for those outcomes (Lloyd & Mertens, 2018).

The strength of motivation, therefore, depends on three variables: attractiveness, the link between performance and reward, and the link between effort and performance. Attractiveness refers to individuals' perceptions of the importance of rewards derived from their performance. The link between performance and reward relates to the extent to which individuals perceive a specific level of performance will obtain the desirable outcome. Lastly, the link between effort performances pertains to how individuals perceive their efforts will result in the necessary performance for desired outcomes (Lloyd & Mertens, 2018).

3.6.1.3 Equity theory

Adams's equity theory, rooted in cognitive dissonance theory, postulates that individuals compare their efforts and rewards with their peers in a workplace setting. When these input-output ratios align, employees perceive equity, fostering a sense of fairness (Chatto, 2020).

In practical terms, within a workplace context, this theory signifies that individuals naturally strive to balance their contributions to the organisation and the corresponding rewards they receive (Indeed, 2023). Organisations offering equitable remuneration for their teams' efforts often experience increased motivation. This equilibrium positively influences teamwork, job commitment, and communication dynamics (Indeed, 2023).

Extensive research supports the application of equity theory in understanding work behaviour. Choi, Clark, and Presslee (2018) study revealed specific situations where tailored reward systems could be appropriate. Choi et al. (2018) recommend that if the quantity of output is more important than the quality, the organisation should implement a piece-rate reward system, remunerating employees per unit produced, potentially slightly below the market rate. If quality is more important than quantity, employees could be paid on a piece rate or an hourly basis, with a slight premium to the market rate, ensuring recognition for their exceptional quality contributions.

3.6.2 Content theories of motivation

Content models of motivation explore the 'what' aspects, examining the various elements individuals perceive as essential in their lives. These theories propose that people's motivation is rooted in fulfilling their perceived needs and desires. Consequently, understanding individuals' wants and needs provides valuable insights into the foundation of their motivation, clarifying the reasons and mechanisms driving their actions (The World of Work Project, 2023).

The content theories examined in this research include Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs and Herzberg's two-factor motivation theory, as discussed by Erasmus, Schenk, Swanepoel and Van Wyk (2003) and Dipboye (2018).

3.6.2.1 Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

The Hierarchy of Needs, introduced by Abraham Maslow in 1954, is a fundamental framework for understanding human motivation in various contexts, including the workplace. This theory outlines a five-level hierarchy, as depicted in Figure 3.3.



Figure 3.3: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs (in Campbell & Craig, 2012: 609)

The World of Work Project 2023 provides a brief overview on each level of needs and how they relate to remuneration.

Level 1: Physiological needs

The most basic category of needs that humans have is physiological. These are individuals' survival needs that must be achieved first before moving towards more complex and aspirational needs in life. These include bodily requirements like food, sleep, and water, as well as basics of shelter and clothing.

Level 2: Safety needs

When achieving physiological needs, individuals are motivated to realise their safety needs. Essentially, these safety needs are about eliminating risk from life and assisting individuals in preserving their physiological needs for the future. Safety needs comprise physical and emotional security, housing beyond the most basic accommodation, health and financial security.

Level 3: Social needs

This level introduces the need for social belonging. The model states that once individuals have encountered their physiological and safety needs, their priority becomes the search for social belonging. Once humans have met their basic needs, they start to follow things like family relationships, friendships, community relationships and the sense of acceptance and belonging that many people find rewarding.

Level 4: Esteem needs

Maslow's Hierarchy holds that once humans have met their need for social belonging and acceptance, they concentrate on themselves and their self-esteem. These needs encompass satisfying the ego and being valued. This need is divided into two levels. At the lower level, people strive to achieve status, respect, and recognition from others. At the higher level, people seek these things from themselves.

Level 5: Self-actualisation needs

Maslow's hierarchy of needs holds that once people have fulfilled their ego and obtained self-esteem, their ultimate need is self-actualisation. This means that humans want to feel they are fulfilling their potential and making the most of their abilities.

According to this model, individuals possess an innate drive to reach their full potential. However, the demands of daily life can hinder their self-actualisation, thereby constraining their performance. For instance, employees who struggle to meet their basic needs would not be motivated to obtain a better office. Conversely, individuals remunerated above the average might be motivated by status symbols like modern office technology or larger office desks (Erasmus et al*.,* 2003: 325-326). Recent research by Ihensekhien and Arimie (2023) supports the usefulness of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs in understanding workplace motivation and performance.

The World of Work Project (2023) provides a work perspective on Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs that the model can be a setting tool of direction for improving satisfaction. Managers can also use the model as a tool to use in motivating and coaching the individuals within their team. P Proper management control is required for remuneration administration since it is part of the deficiency needs that serve as a security measure. Employees will feel unfulfilled in their need for safety until they have it.

3.6.2.2 Herzberg's two-factor motivation theory

Herzberg's two-factor motivation theory, developed by Frederick Herzberg in 1959, aimed to identify the factors influencing job satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Herzberg categorised these factors into two main groups: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic factors encompass elements such as recognition, achievement, responsibility, advancement, personal growth, and the nature of the work itself. Extrinsic factors, in contrast, include considerations like job security, status, company policies, remuneration, and administrative aspects (Rahman, Wahab & Nadzri, 2018).

Herzberg's theory introduced the concept that job satisfaction and dissatisfaction are not merely opposing ends of a single spectrum but two separate spectrums. Removing dissatisfying elements, often termed hygiene factors, does not automatically lead to job satisfaction. However, subsequent research conducted by various scholars has encountered challenges when attempting to replicate Herzberg's original findings, which raises questions about potential limitations in the initial research design (Rahman et al., 2018).

The model holds that basic factors like safety and salary must be met to avert dissatisfaction at the workplace. Other sets of higher-order motivating factors like autonomy and recognition are also required to create actual happiness at work. One key lesson from the theory is that organisations and leaders need to get the basics right first. Only once they have successfully provided an individual with the basic hygiene factors will the individual become moderately satisfied. Furthermore, once their hygiene factors have been met, an individual will start to be motivated by and achieve higher levels of performance as a result of motivating factors (The World of Work Project, 2023).

3.6.2.3 Alderfer’s ERG Theory of Motivation

Alderfer postulated that every individual has three innate needs: existence, relatedness, and growth (hence the acronym ERG theory). Like Maslow’s proposed physiological and safety needs, Alderfer stated that existence needs to relate to material needs. Like Maslow’s postulation of social and esteem needs, Alderfer’s proposed relatedness needs refers to individuals’ desires for interpersonal interaction and relationships. Finally, similar to Maslow’s proposed esteem and self-actualisation needs, Alderfer proposed that growth needs relate to individuals’ internal longing for personal development.

ERG infers two factors for consideration: 1) employees’ display of an amplified need for something could suggest they are frustrated in pursuit of fulfilling a higher-order need, and 2) needs realisation is a multidimensional process as two or more levels of needs can exist simultaneously within individuals (Erasmus et al., 2003: 327-328).

According to Alderfer's model, people can be motivated by different levels simultaneously, and their motivational priorities can be adjusted in relation to their sense of progress. Given this, people should not focus on one level of need at a time but balance their motivations across levels. Similarly, leaders should not pay attention to assist their team members satisfy one level of need at a time. Instead, they should be aware of the assortment of needs humans can have and aid their team members' progress in relation to a blend of needs, which will change over time.

3.6.2.4 Goal-setting theory

Locke suggested that individuals will perform better if they strive towards a specific objective than without (Konstantara & Galanakis, 2022). Therefore, goal-setting theory hypothesises that specific goals act as motivators that guide individuals on what needs to be achieved and how much effort to exert (Konstantara & Galanakis, 2022).

3.6.2.5 Achievement motivation theory

McClelland suggested that employees have three basic needs, namely, the need for achievement, the need for power, and the need for affiliation (Hamidi, Permadi & Setiawan, 2018). A need for achievement refers to employees' need to surpass a level of behaviour and the need to succeed and excel. A need for power refers to employees' needs to be influential, to control others, and to influence others' behaviour in ways they would not have otherwise behaved. Lastly, the need for affiliation refers to employees' need for close interpersonal relationships and their need to be accepted and liked by others (Hamidi et al., 2018). If the factors mentioned above construct the total needs of employees, management is obligated to establish their prevailing needs and provide them opportunities for their needs to be met, congruent with the organisational goals (Shahi et al., 2020).

One of the thoughts on this model is that executives' focus is on identifying employees in their teams with high levels of an emotional need for power. These employees, while highly valuable in certain circumstances, generate a toxic culture, which could harm an organisation in the long run (The World of Work Project, 2023).

3.6.2.6 Reinforcement theory

Reinforcement theory assumes a behavioural approach to motivation. Behavioural approaches assume that mental processes dictating behaviour are immeasurable and that inputs provoke reactions. Thus, behaviour is shaped by certain consequences, as with operant conditioning, as the work of B. F. Skinner (Leeder, 2022). Reinforcement theory suggests a direct connection between an anticipated target behaviour (e.g., performance) and its significance (e.g., pay). It proposes that remuneration be used to create consequences for desired behaviours, like a compelling performance that will reinforce the behaviours (Perry, Mesch & Paarlberg, 2006).

3.6.2.7 Theory X and Theory X (McGregor)

In his work, *The human side enterprise*, Douglas McGregor (1960) hypothesised that managers adopt one of two human nature stances dictating their managerial style (De Almeida, Caetano & Porto, 2018). These stances are referred to as 'theory X' and 'theory Y'. Comparing McGregor's theory to Maslow's, theory X proposes that individuals are controlled by their lower-order needs, while theory Y assumes individuals are controlled by higher-order needs (De Almeida et al., 2018).

Understanding these motivational theories is essential for organisations seeking to design effective PRR systems. By aligning remuneration with employees' motivational drivers, organisations can foster a culture of motivation, ultimately leading to improved performance and enhanced workplace satisfaction (Johnson & Smith, 2022). These theories provide an understanding of workplace motivation's complexities, and organisations can use this knowledge to design remuneration systems that drive success.

3.6.3 Rationale for implementing PRR in the workplace

PRR serves several crucial purposes within organisations. Aguinis (2019) highlights that companies commonly employ PRR for the following reasons:

- Reinforce the performance-reward relationship: The justification behind PRR is that it provides employees an incentive to work harder in return for financial gains and in doing so, produces a greater level of productivity in the organisation (Pollock, 2021);

- Implement organisational strategy at the individual level: Remuneration management system and involvement of employees in decision-making are commonly used practices by organisations to accomplish their objectives (Güngör, 2011);
- Retain top performers by providing them with rewards after continual and enhanced performance: Dasgupta (2016) indicates that the survey by WorldatWork revealed that the most cited reason why top-performers quit their jobs are 'absence of promotional opportunities'. This demonstrates that top-performers want much more than tangible benefits like career progression opportunities and a learning environment. It is the responsibility of management to detect their needs, craft engaging jobs, and remunerate them appropriately;
- Communicate with non-performers (often using training and/or counselling): It is important to have a consistent transparent feedback system and to monitor performance at all times. The relevant parties should not wait for the scheduled organisation performance reviews to deal with poor performance as this may affect business. Regular checks and dealing with performance deficiencies will assist to understand and managing non-performers not as a challenge but as an opportunity to mentor, coach and develop employees (The African Talent Company, 2019);
- Inspire a culture of performance in the organisation: Supervisors have a massive influence on institutions and subordinates' performance. As part of organisational leadership, they set the stage for organisational values and mission, influence the behaviours and beliefs that constitute a shared culture, and recoup the best out of their employees. Managers are a key component in motivating and inspiring employees to realise their potential. In addition, they create an environment that fosters trust, transparency, authenticity, and mutual respect (Tansey & Hogg, 2023).
- Conduct performance contracting which results in performance reviews and assessments: Hope (2012) indicates that the performance contracts or agreements stipulate performance standards or measurable targets which a government requires public servants or bureaucrats of public/state-owned agencies or ministries/departments to agree over a stated period, and provides agreed incentives for achieving these targets (Hope, 2001, 2008). Employee performance can then be measured against the set standards or targets at the end

of the stated period or agreed intervals. As part of the PM practice in government, the common aim of performance contracting is to explain the objectives of the institutions and their relationship with the whole of government and to enable performance evaluation based on outcomes instead of conformity with administrative rules and regulations;

- Link salaries and wage bills to business financials: The most important component of a company's performance-based pay programme is the balance of costs and benefits. Studies have shown that many companies overestimate the benefits of performance pay systems and severely underestimate the costs. In order for an organisation's performance pay programme to be successful, they must be realistic about the costs and benefits (Jensen, 2016); and
- Ensure justifiable reward levels: Reward systems are drivers of the organisational culture to promote high performance, striving for excellence, equity and fairness. The justification behind the rewards should be discussed clearly and openly to the top performers as part of procedural justice (Dasgupta, 2016).

Procedural justice is defined as fairness and transparency in the process, methods and mechanisms used to determine employee remuneration (Azman, Asilah & Rahmad, 2016; Sung, Choi & Kang, 2017).

3.7 THE INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF PERFORMANCE RELATED REMUNERATION AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

The primary objective of the literature review was to theoretically explore and conceptualise PM, PM systems, and PRR. Organisations have shifted from time-based pay systems to performance-based ones (Nordgren Selar et al., 2020). Current practices in PRR involve rewards separate from base pay, determined by performance assessment outcomes and budget constraints.

The OECD (2012:14) acknowledges promotions as a form of PRR, representing recognition of employees' ability to perform at a higher career level. However, the limited availability of promotion opportunities makes it an incentive for only a few employees. Promotions are occasionally based on tenure, which may not be a motivational incentive. Zafar, Sarwar, and Sheeraz (2020) stress that promotions into new job roles and grades were traditionally seen as a reward for exemplary performance.

3.7.1 Link between Performance and Performance-Related Remuneration

Morris (2021) suggests that the basic reason behind PRR is its aim to reinforce the link between the input of effort by the worker and the financial rewards they receive as a result. This should, in turn, motivate the employees to increase their effort and expand their output, which should eventually improve the organisation's overall outcomes.

The strength of PRR links depends on organisations and PM systems in place. Williams (2002:29) found that more than half of senior managers in organisations that employ formal PRR systems uphold and require a direct link between performance achievement and remuneration. However, when lower-level employees are considered, the desire to link remuneration to performance decreases.

Shields (2016: 18) argues that a direct link exists between performance and the attainment of business goals via PRR. Effective performance-based systems should reward behaviours closely aligned with he required business outcomes (Chatto, 2020). This refers not only to business goals but also to organisational culture (Shields, 2016).

Chatto (2020) highlights that in previous years, organisations in South Africa aligned rewards to organisational performance. Consequence management was driven by the underlying assumption that provisioning or freezing of rewards would positively influence employees' motivation to perform effectively.

The following assumptions often underpin the link between performance and reward:

- When measured, employees performed more effectively and sustained their performance by being rewarded.
- Measures make rewards relevant, and rewards make measures meaningful.
- Most workers desire recognition for achievement, while greater retention is linked to rewards.

Interestingly, the survey by Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) (2003) provides a contrasting view that performance is not positively related to monetary reward. Only 43% of respondents in the IPD survey on received PRR. This number was not unique to a specific sector — 46% of civil service organisations, 43% of private-sector manufacturing organisations and 46% of private-sector service companies utilised a PRR approach (Armstrong & Baron, 2003: 238). However, monetary rewards have been found to significantly and positively impact performance (Ojeleye, 2017; Sudiardhita et al., 2018).

3.7.2 Contribution of Performance Management to Performance-Related Remuneration Success

PM plays a vital role in PRR programmes, as it contributes to the success of PRR policies. Employees need to believe their rating and the linkage to financial rewards are fair (Chatto, 2020). PM serves two purposes: First, it provides feedback to help employees grow and improve; second, it helps them evaluate their performance to support career management and reward decisions.

The success of PRR strategies is influenced by establishing a work culture around PRR, exerting effort to generate employees' acceptance of the system, communicating clear objectives, setting high, manageable, clear, simple, understandable, and well-defined performance standards, and effectively administering the system. Individual PRR is designed to engage workers directly with the organisational goals and embed a high-performance and entrepreneurial culture (Morris, 2021).

3.7.3 Challenges related to Performance Management and Performance-Related Remuneration

This aspect of the PM process often fails to derive positive results. Dilemmas related to reward may often be due to a lack of transparency and/or objectivity, affordability, and influences from prior practices and systems. Often, PRR fails due to a lack of quantitative and/or objective measures, union involvement and perceptions, employees' opposition to change, PRR levels being unproportionate to employees' efforts, poor communication of procedures, benefits, and procedures (Chatto, 2020), aspects rewarded are unlinked to strategy, and no immediate reinforcement or poor linkage between performance and remuneration.

Even though PRR systems can assist in incentivising employees and boosting productivity, there are potential challenges for using performance as a basis for pay. For instance, it can skew workers' efforts toward the measured and rewarded tasks, while missing equally important areas that are more difficult to measure or not rewarded. This mismatch type can contribute to quantity over quality issues (Morris, 2021). Equally, PRR could lead to unhealthy comparison or an increase in the level of risk-taking, especially where performance indicators become high stakes.

3.8 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE-RELATED REMUNERATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Schnell et al. (2021) believe PM is a vital tool to positively influence public sector productivity, regulation, infrastructure and service delivery, and whole expenditure. The general government wage bill is estimated to account for around 10 per cent of the gross domestic product, globally and the civil sector workforce is estimated to account for around one-third of formal employment. This explains the magnitude required to increase the output of public sector employees to stabilise government spending. This could yield to the allocation of financial resources to new investments and build citizens' confidence in government (Beeri et al., 2019).

At the heart of PRR is the principal agent problem flowing from agency theory, which describes the employment relationship and the role of remuneration. The Work Foundation/Lancaster University (2014) provides an argument that the employment relationship does not certainly align with the principal (employer) and agent (employee) interests. The principal's interest is for the worker to perform hard, efficiently, and quickly in order to increase profit and productivity. While the agent's interest is to minimise the effort they display to reach minimum required standards to receive remuneration. From this viewpoint, PRR serves as a mechanism intended to align the interests of the principal and agent.

The use of PRR within the public service is widespread in the OECD because 28 of 34 OECD countries although at varying scales use PRR in the central government (OECD, 2012:7). The acceptance of PRR reflects the influence of the private sector culture of remuneration practices and individual accountability on public administration.

PRR is seen as a solution to what new public management theory would suggest as one of the central challenges facing the public sector: the absence of strong relations between performance and remuneration that can be used to enforce productivity improvements (The Work Foundation/Lancaster University, 2014). These are discussed below.

Theories of PRR suggest some mechanisms by which it can be applied. Through the simple logic chain based on economic foundations, PRR intends to strengthen the interaction between the worker input of effort and the rewards they receive in remuneration. This will motivate employees to do more and increase their outcomes, ultimately influencing the organisation's outcomes and goals (The Work Foundation/Lancaster University, 2014). This simple arrangement is set out below in Table 3.3, which asserts the alignment of PRR strategies to achieve outcomes within civil service institutions.

Table 3.3: Simple logic chain based on economic foundations

Inputs →	Incentives →	Outputs →	Outcomes
• Employees' effort • Employees' efficacy • Management of employees • Employee's cooperation and teamwork	• Employees' base pay • Employees' PRR • Employees' intrinsic motivation • Effects on employees' peers	• Number of tasks finished by employees • Worth of tasks accomplished by employees • Responses of employees	• Organisational profit generated • Mission of organisation • Outcomes of service user • Experience of service user • Value for money of the taxpayer

Source: The Work Foundation/Lancaster University (2014: 25)

Cerina and Deidda (2017:1-3) found the demand for reward from the public sector had two effects, 1) the 'selection effect' whereby more skilful employees engage in politics to increase their average quality of life, and 2) the 'manipulation effect' which considers the possibility that people may manipulate information to ensure their preferred, unskilled candidates are elected and can after that be manipulated to receive higher rewards matching their responsibilities.

In its report, the World Bank (2012) outlined general criticism of PRR being that it cannot be implemented in the civil service sector due to divergent political difficulties in choosing appropriate design features to address the challenges associated with job variables. For example, providing performance bonuses to all employees may be perceived as an indirect salary supplement rather than incentivising performance. The research findings by Madingwane et al. (2023) indicated that the DPSA should link job performance with remuneration by implementing a ‘no work, no pay’ rule.

The research findings of Park (2021) suggest that PRR has a positive link with organisational performance but differs with the aspects of performance it may affect depending on to whom is implemented. The findings assume that individuals yielding top managerial power in the organisations may be incentivised. Civil service institutions can select to design PRR in various ways. Rewards can be linked to the performance of a worker, a team, a department, or even the whole organisation.

3.9 CHANGE MANAGEMENT

Change is defined as a departure from established norms, practices, and expectations, causing disruption when the actual change deviates from stakeholders' anticipated outcomes (Harrington & Voehl, 2018). Change management includes organisational and individual change processes and models (Sutton & Summers, 2021). It involves the ongoing revitalisation of an organisation's structure, direction, and capabilities to meet the needs of both internal and external stakeholders (Weideman, 2021).

Tang (2019) emphasises that change management is a crucial aspect of management that assists organisations in responding to their operating environment. The consequence of displeasure with the existing strategies informs change. The development of strategies by leaders is important to implement change as it is similar important to establish a vision for a better alternative (Weideman, 2021).

Change manifests at various levels, including the individual, team, organisational, national, regional, and international. Whether resulting in positive or negative outcomes, change is an inherent aspect of organisational life, continually shaping internal and external environments over time. The failure of employees to adapt to changes can exacerbate existing organisational challenges, anticipate future problems threatening organisational survival (Harun, 2020), and contribute to adverse societal and environmental impacts (Ha, 2014: 4).

The pace of change is increasing and requires dedication, discipline, and an attentive management process. Change readiness occurs when key elements like employees and the organisation are prepared for change (Moeini Gharagozloo, Chen & Pour, 2021). Other forces that require attention are organisational inertia and employees’ resistance to change, which must be closely evaluated in the change process. The fundamentals that build up the constituents of the change process must be known and weighed for the organisation to pronounce its change readiness.

3.9.1 Organisational change management

Ha (2014: 1) defines organisational change management as the systematic planning, organisation, leadership, and control of organisational change processes aimed at achieving strategic objectives and positively impacting performance. According to Jones (2013, as cited by Weideman, 2021), organisational change is a process through which organisations transition from their current state to an anticipated one, seeking to enhance effectiveness. Ohemeng, Amoako, and Obuobisa-Darko (2018) affirm that organisational change is an anticipated reality for modern organisations, influenced by traditional and contemporary business contexts.

Organisational change is an inescapable, ongoing process driven by real workplace environmental pressures organisations encounter (Ohemeng et al., 2018). These pressures result from changes in the workforce influenced by internal or external organisational forces. Factors such as flexible jobs, rapidly evolving work situations, continuous technological innovations, fluctuating business conditions, and best practices necessitate a future workforce that is adaptable and responsive (Tamers et al., 2020). Kuipers et al. (2014) describe change in public service as a complex process that can involve the development or growth of several key elements. These elements include the nature of the service provided, the structure of the public service entity, the skills needed for effective management and delivery, and the administration of public entities.

Alqatawenah (2018) emphasises individuals' significant roles in organisational change management, underscoring the importance of focusing on activities such as advanced means to motivate, measure, and reward performance. Ultimately, employees play a pivotal role in influencing the success or failure of change initiatives. Change management endeavours to develop organisations and ensure their success when replacing one system, process, leader, or culture with a new one.

Peacock's (2017: 20-25) literature review identifies three categories of organisational change:

i. **Incremental or tangential** are numerous, occurring gradually in individuals' daily lives, personally and professionally. These changes are often overlooked, requiring employees to adjust their working processes to meet new requirements.

ii. **Transitional change** is more complex than tangential change, involving the substitution of one facet with another and potentially including slim amendments. It encompasses creating an entirely new process or system, necessitating changes in employee behaviour and mindset to meet new assignments and understand new processes and requirements.

iii. **Transformational change** is the most complex form, involving a fundamental change in organisational mission, vision, and value systems, leading to an overhaul of organisational operations. It equates to a complete re-engineering or reinvention of an organisation. Employees must endorse and embrace these changes emerging from the organisation's core.

Peacock (2017:28) argues that these categories are not necessarily independent of each other; sometimes, amendments involving each category are required on some level. Tangential change can serve as a subset of transitional change, which may also be entrenched within transformational change. Therefore, HR and change practitioners should not be restricted in their investigation of the situation based on the specific category of change an organisation is undergoing.

3.9.2 Change management theories

Change management theory is a conceptual framework for guiding the transition of individuals, processes, and resources to attain improved outcomes. It provides a structured approach that aids both individuals and organisations in directing their attention toward the future, facilitating informed decision-making aligned with the envisioned goals (Altdonna, 2023).

According to Ha (2014: 8-10), change management theories can be broadly categorised into two main schools of thought: technical and non-technical focuses. The technical-focused school has its roots in the work of pioneers such as Frederik Taylor, recognised as the 'father of scientific management theory,' and Henry Ford, often referred to as the 'father of Fordism theory.' Advocates of this school of thought, largely comprised of engineers and scientists, contend that organisations can enhance their day-to-day operational efficiency by scrutinising and modifying technical aspects. This includes a thorough examination of organisational policies, adjustments to procedures, processes, and systems, and the strategic reorganisation of the steps involved in performing specific tasks (Ugwu, Osisioma, Onwuzuligbo & Nnaji-ihedinmah, 2020).

In comparison, the non-technical (social or human) focused school has been supported by psychologists and behaviourists like William Bridges, Elton Mayo, and Fritz Roethlisberger. On the other hand, scholars endorsing this school of thought stress the significance of human factors, i.e., employees' skills and readiness for change and their capacity to adapt to change (Ha (2014: 8-10).

Ha (2014) highlights the convergence of two perspectives on change management, a viewpoint echoed in contemporary business change management theories. These theories agree that emphasising technical aspects without considering individuals' emotions and adaptability can demotivate employees. Conversely, concentrating on social elements without incorporating technical aspects hinders opportunities for innovation, a crucial driver of sustainability. Given the rapid evolution of technology, employees must cultivate both technical and social skills to stay relevant in the evolving global economy. Therefore, change models should integrate both social and technical elements.

3.9.3 Change management models

In preparing for organisational change, adopting a structured framework is crucial. Utilising change management models and theories offers guidance to organisations, aiding in identifying essential elements to incorporate into their plan. Moreover, it provides strategies to address common challenges, particularly individuals' inherent resistance to change (Altadonna, 2023).

Several authors have considered two prominent types of change models applied by various firms, namely, the planned change and unplanned change models (Beycioglu & Kondakci, 2020). While there are many approaches to planned change, this research reflects on the ADKAR change management model and Kurt Lewin's Three-Step Change Model. The rationale for choosing the two models is that the ADKAR model focuses on the entire population of the organisation at all levels on how to embrace an organisational change to be effective. Lewin's model is simple to apply, popular, and focuses on empowering and rewarding employees to adapt and communicate with them regularly (Altdonna, 2023).

3.9.3.1 ADKAR Model

Jeff Hiatt's (2003) ADKAR Model is utilised by Prosci (a well-known change management practitioner) as an applied tool (Tang, 2019). The ADKAR model (Hiatt, 2003) is primarily envisioned as an instruction and change management instrument to support subordinates in navigating organisational change processes (Kiani & Shah, 2014). ADKAR (an acronym for awareness, desire, knowledge, ability, and reinforcement) explains positive change at the individual level and sketches the objectives of successful change as managers must manage organisational change commencing with the appreciation of how to manage an individual subordinate. If the necessary change is cultural, the ADKAR Model (Hiatt, 2003) would be suitable as it considers the emotional needs of employees (Mulder, 2023). Table 3.4 indicates the action steps of the ADKAR Model.

Table 3.4: Action steps of the ADKAR Model

Establish awareness	• Use of effective and directed communications • Conveyance of the aim and the ideal of the organisation by leadership • Provision of immediate accessibility of information
Create a desire	• Indication of obligation by leadership • Promotion of change by managers and supervisors • Participation and involvement of subordinates
Knowledge development	• Provision of effective and contextualised training • Provision of education during or after the change • Delegation of job assistants and practical application
Nurture ability	• Coaching by managers and supervisors • Timeous execution and practice • Reduction of any potential hindrances
Reinforce change	• Celebration of successes by individuals and teams • Provision of meaningful rewards and recognition • Commentary on performance and accountability

Source: NCCI Workshop July 14, 2016, at Montreal, Canada

The ADKAR Model effectively mitigates resistance and expedites implementation by centring on employees. The ADKAR Model places importance on employee input and support. Rather than imposing a change mandate on employees, it initiates a dialogue to raise awareness about the necessity for change, convincing them of the benefits. This approach nurtures their willingness to engage in the implementation (Goyal & Patwardhan, 2018).

3.9.3.2 Lewin's Change Management Model

Structural changes give rise to both logistical and emotional concerns that require effective management. In such instances, it is advisable to combine models, such as Lewin's Change Management Model, designed for cultural change, with a system that incorporates practical steps for the effective management and planning of change-related activities.

Although Lewin developed his change management model in the 1940s, its enduring popularity can be attributed to its simplicity and effectiveness (Hussain, Akram & Haider, 2018). Lewin's Three-step Planned Change Model suggests that change is the consequence of the relations between two forms of forces, namely, (1) forces that drive for change and (2) forces that resist change and try to continue with the status quo. A quasi-stationary equilibrium is realised when there is a balance between forces for change and resistant forces against change. For change to occur, the driving forces should dominate the resisting forces. The model breaks organisational change into three steps, as shown in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4: Lewin's Change management model (Adapted from Oojorah, 2011)

involves unfreezing and unfreesing the existing equilibrium to eliminate old behaviours and facilitate the successful implementation of new behaviours. The second step introduces new practices or behaviours, employing initiatives to make them more acceptable to relevant stakeholders. Positive reinforcement is crucial, as changes may be short-lived without it. The third step involves refreesing the new behaviours to establish a stable equilibrium and safeguard against regression (Ha, 2014).

Lewin's Model typically extends the *Change* phase over an extended period to address resistance and offer sufficient training. This model is suitable when there is robust support from senior management and the necessity for organisation- or team-wide changes exists.

Juneja (no date) indicated that Dunphy and Stace (1993) proposed an unplanned change theory — the contingency approach. The Contingency Model is an extended version of Lewin's model and explains the change process from the transformational organisation perspective. The model emphasises that institutions should accommodate their different change strategies following environmental changes to arrive at an 'optimum fit'.

Dunphy and Stace (1993) contended that changes could be planned or unplanned and change management approaches to these emerging situations should be aligned accordingly. The contingency approach permits change agents and relevant parties to consider various scales of change (fine-tuning, incremental adjustment, and modular or corporate transformation) and apply styles of management (collaborative, consultative, directive, and coercive) when handling change in an organisation. This approach is situational because intended change depends on attaining optimum fit with the changing setting. Thus, change may be appropriate for a specific condition or unsuitable for other circumstances.

3.9.4 Key factors to consider before implementing change

Before implementing organisational change, key considerations are multifaceted and require a nuanced understanding of factors influencing successful change initiatives. Drawing insights from Peacock (2017), Onyeneke and Abe (2021), Darmawan and Azizah (2019), and Brown et al. (2005, as cited by Adams & Hes, 2001), the discussion includes several critical aspects.

Peacock (2017) emphasises the importance of supportive change drivers, increased dissatisfaction with the status quo, an expanded vision of the desired outcome, and a well-planned step-by-step approach, with celebrations at key milestones. This framework suggests a proactive approach to managing change by fostering positive attitudes, clarifying objectives, and recognising achievements throughout the process.

Nevertheless, the desired change will not be as impactful, beneficial, or long-lasting if people oppose change (Onyeneke & Abe, 2021). Understanding the reasons behind employees' resistance to change is important as highlighted by Darmawan and Azizah (2019). The ability to do this allows HR professionals to provide needed and valued change management expertise (Peacock, 2017: 45).

Adams and Hess (2010) consider community engagement concerns in providing a framework for collaboration and connection between governments and the public. Because of its influence, the community has been deemed a key stakeholder in considering the path and nature of change in public services. Ways of associating with community–government relations and codifying formal linkages have been embedded in institutional arrangements as part of the public services change agenda.

Other features or elements that change practitioners or initiators can consider as pre-conditions for organisations implementing change initiatives are outlined as follows:

a. Pre-conditions of change

- Mobilise the entire organisation to make change happen (Persson & Hermelin, 2018).
- Explain and manage responsibilities, roles, and expectations of citizens and provincial legislatures, and between POBs and officials (Rosenbaum et al., 2018).
- Convey the above inside the organisation and to the public.
- Foster democracy through public participation by communicating performance information and the establishment of vehicles to hold POBs accountable during their tenure (Mansaray, 2019).
- Provide efficient decision-making mechanisms for allocation of required resources.

- Launch analytical tools that indicate that POBs of provincial legislatures are efficient and effectively performing.
- If necessary, redefine or review the incentive structure by rewarding successful performance, provide alternative opportunities for growth, learning, and development as interventions (Mansaray, 2019).
- Adhere to comprehensive, participatory, transparent, realistic, simple, fair, and non-punitive objective developmental processes.

b. Organisational 'self-concept'

Van Tonder (2004) contends that institutions must point out and analyse their 'self-concept' (the view the organisation has of itself) and complement the prevailing operative perspective. Thus, organisations must focus on practical matters contributing to unpleasant change and concentrate on employees who are demoralised or disillusioned with the system or on the capability of leaders to change the organisation (Faupel & Süß, 2019).

c. Change architecture

The initial stage of change is normally referred to as change architecture and pertains to examining how change programmes are developed (Carnall, 2007). This includes the processes involving the entire system for rapid change (Bunker & Alban, 1996). Recognition of three successive processes is essential to accomplish strategic change, namely, the construction of a familiar database, determining the future from different perspectives, and assuring action plans (Jacobs, 1994).

Change architecture should be considered before implementing PRR and PM systems, as it is important to determine arrangements, systems, resources, and processes required to enable engagement with POBs in a meaningful manner by concentrating on the establishment of a progressive future (Greenly & Carnall, 2001). Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer (2018) add that change should be well-planned. Considering the above statement, change architecture is an important aspect and a base strategy for the possible implementation of PRR and PM systems for POBs of provincial legislatures.

d. Stakeholder buy-in

Key interest parties' buy-in and commitment to the successful implementation of PRR and PM systems is critical (Vokes, Bearman & Bazzoli, 2018). Information sharing on

PRR and PM systems for possible implementation is vital for POBs to understand the possible change intention. This can complement the implementation of a major remuneration review capacity-building strategy. Moreover, POB officials should conceptualise what PRR and PM systems entail and how they can gain from the new system. Hale (2004) reinforces this statement and asserts that individuals require a clear direction and comprehension of what organisations are attempting to attain and what role employees carry in attaining the organisational goals. Kok (2007) emphasises this view and cites that when introducing PRR and PM systems, it is useful for POBs to be made aware of and appreciate the need for PRR and PM systems and the principles and objectives that will regulate the development and use of these systems in provincial legislatures.

The assumption is that individuals will be encouraged to accept change if they are aware of the change, see the importance of change, value the need for change, participate in the change process, and feel secure in the change process (Roos & Nilsson, 2020). Individuals change not only because of new knowledge but also because of their attitudes, feelings, and status (Dung & Hai, 2020).

e. Developing and sustaining a culture of change

Tran (2020) states that organisational culture refers to the various conventions, norms, and behaviours influencing how employees behave and think. Different to Tran (2020), Asikhia and Arokodare (2019) define organisational culture as the scheme of mutual beliefs, values, and assumptions governing organisations' interactions with internal and external settings. Challenges arise from difficulties in establishing a culture that is accepted by all stakeholders (Hellreigel et al., 2005). Organisational culture is manifested in the enhanced performance of employees via their accountability, obligation, acceptance of responsibility, engagement, commitment, and collaboration (Pathiranage, Jayatilake & Abeysekera, 2020). Organisational culture also projects how employees react to the numerous opportunities and threats presented to organisations (Hellreigel et al., 2005).

Provincial legislatures must institute a shared culture, allowing for change to be undertaken. Establishing and shaping organisational culture at provincial legislatures would require a scheme that incorporates a set of common approaches and beliefs about a different system that will provide POBs with a sense of belonging in organisations. Forming a common culture will contribute to employees' understanding of the required behaviour and processes of organisations (which is important for the implementation of a new system) (Lubis & Hanum, 2019).

Najeemdeen, Abidemi, Rahmat, and Bulus (2018) stress that organisational culture should be managed, and a high level of employee commitment should be generated. Consequently, POBs should progress towards a task culture with assigned demands. POBs objectives should be merged with those of POBs in changing circumstances. Thus, the implementation of PRR and PM systems ought to be aligned and implemented with the aim of generating a performance–oriented culture within provincial legislatures. Myerson (2001) emphasises this view and upholds that managing change includes inspiring employees of diverse cultures in organisations through communication, compassion, sensitivity, and understanding of cultural differences.

f. Change readiness assessment

It is important to undertake a change readiness assessment before introducing PRR and PM systems which should be interpreted as change initiatives within the POB sector. Change readiness assessments are custom-made processes to determine the levels of understanding, approval, and pledge expected to affect the success of the intended change (Amatayakul, 2005).

Amatayakul (2005), Hardison (1998), Kotter (1996), and O'Connor and Fiol (2006) propose the following steps and methodologies to be employed during the change readiness assessment: 1) comprehend the context and scope of change by involving or engaging with sponsors and key stakeholders, 2) design an assessment founded on explaining key data needed, sources of data, and collection instruments, 3) collect and analyse information by using planned interviews, focus groups, questionnaires, archival data or any mixture of these methods depending on the scope and magnitude of the change, 4) provide feedback and interpret a summary of the data to sponsors and key stakeholders, and 5) determine a plan of action.

3.9.5 Resistance to change and organisational inertia

The previous section explored the literature on the definition of change and organisational change management and provided an overview of specific change management theories and models. The section examines why employee resistance to organisational change exists and thereafter reviews organisational inertia.

In the contemporary business landscape, an organisation's survival and endurance hinge on its capacity to effectively introduce change. Nevertheless, when undertaking change initiatives, organisations frequently encounter a significant hurdle in the form of resistance from their employees (Rehman et al., 2021).

Organisational change initiatives often encounter failure due to substantial resistance stemming from employees' negative perceptions of the proposed changes. Perceptions play a crucial and impactful role in the dynamics of any change process, especially in generating resistance (Mdletye, Coetzee & Ukpere, 2014). This highlights the significance of acknowledging resistance to change as a substantial barrier to the efficient and successful execution of organisational change interventions.

Resistance to change is a complex concept, initially conceptualised by Lewin (1947) as a psychodynamic construct denoting the active force impeding the efforts of change leaders. Damawan and Azizah's (2019) research further characterises resistance to change is an individual trait characterised by a negative attitude toward change, often manifesting as a tendency to avoid or actively oppose it. Anderson (2011: 3) indicates that resistance can manifest in various forms, ranging from reasonably gentle verbal disagreements to more destructive measures, including acts of sabotage by employees seeking to protect the organisation (Baillien, Griep, Vander Elst & De Witte, 2019). To address resistance, change initiators can involve employees in the design phases of organisational change or opt for subcontracting entire sections of organisations (Sistare, 2022).

Carnall (2007) and Robbins et al. (2003) propose an alternative perspective, viewing resistance to change as a reaction to the way change is controlled and managed rather than the change itself. Carnall (2007) elaborates that resistance to change entails the actions of people or groups when they notice that an occurring change might be a threat to them. It can oppose or dissent to something, it may be dynamic, inactive, evident or concealed, distinct or organised, and destructive or diffident.

Described as a force that hinders progress, resistance to change, as noted by Karaxha (2019) and Mullins (1999: 824), is a significant challenge. Mullins (1999) characterises resistance as 'forces that are against change in the workplace', while Shahbaz, Gao, Zhai, Shahzad, and Hu (2019) highlight its negative impact on employees' willingness to adopt new systems. However, Srivastava and Agrawal (2020) present a contrasting view, suggesting that resistance to change may stem from efforts to maintain the status quo.

In the role of change practitioners, leaders must exhibit motivation and commitment to implementing change with the overarching goal of enhancing organisational effectiveness (Murthy, 2007: 67).

3.9.5.1 Underlying factors of employee resistance to change

Robbins and Galperin (2010) assert that employee resistance to organisational change is inherent, rooted in their discomfort with leaving their established comfort zones. The natural inclination of employees is often to resist change as it introduces an element of uncertainty, leading to stress arising from the fear of the unknown (Rehman et al., 2021). Employees resist change for several reasons, one of which is the discomfort caused by uncertainty, as individuals often prefer the known over ambiguity and uncertainty (Amarantou, Kazakopoulou, Chatzoudes & Chatzolglou, 2018). Additionally, employees may experience anxiety over feelings of experiencing personal loss (Amarantou et al., 2018). Employees' resistance to change may also stem from their conviction that change is not in the interest of the organisation as it is mismatched with the organisational goals. Reasons for resistance to change may relate to shortcomings in the change proposal. Some researchers argue that not all change is appropriate and could have negative consequences for organisations (Holten, Hancock, & Bollingtoft, 2020).

Resistance to change may come from one or both levels of change, namely, individual resistance to change, or organisational resistance to change (Aldiabat, Aityassine & Al-rjoub, 2022). Self and Shraeder (2009, as cited by Bedser, 2012) identified prospective causes of resistance to change, categorising them into the following three domains:

i. **Personal domain:** these are definite personality traits informing individuals' readiness for change, including their current situation or circumstances.

ii. **Organisational factors**: this relates to matters such as the trustworthiness of the organisation and the influential ability of those implementing the change (Weideman, 2021).

iii **Specifics of the change**: individual and organisational aspects, including whether change is the correct organisational happenstance or whether suitable plans for change were conducted, will influence the extent of employees' resistance to change.

3.9.5.2 Navigating employee resistance: Effective strategies for change management

Murthy (2007: 68) emphasises that effective management involves identifying and addressing dysfunctional resistance to change. The following strategies are recommended to combat or minimise resistance:

- Providing education and effective communication: Through communication, organisations can understand the reasoning behind change as change often relates to misinformation or non-communication.
- Open participation: Individuals who partake in the process find it difficult to reject decisions of change. Thus, organisations should allow employees to participate in the plan for change.
- Conducting and providing support: Change practitioners should provide supportive efforts to diminish employees' resistance to change and to reduce their anxiety or fear associated with the change. Supportive efforts include providing employees with new expertise via training (Bogel, Pereverza, Upham & Kordas, 2019), therapy and counselling, and paid leave of absence to influence their adjustment.
- Negotiation: Organisations may engage with employees with the intention of providing value to decrease their resistance to change. If resistance to change lies within powerful stakeholders, an adjusted reward package can be moulded to their individual needs. This may be a consideration in relation to powerful sources such as unions.
- Influencing and co-optation: Organisations may practice manipulation and attempt to influence employees (meandering and twisting facts to make them more appealing). Otherwise, organisations can utilise co-optation which refers to both participation and manipulation (to coerce the leaders of a confrontational group by providing them a key role in the change decision).

Peacock (2017) states that resistance to change can also be addressed by ensuring human resources organisational processes are aligned with and support the requisite amendments process. Therefore, changes to organisational roles should not be advanced with a silo approach. Changes should be supplemented by a suitable review of the remuneration system, PM system, rewards and recognition benefits, training and development opportunities, and recruitment and selection processes. HR practitioners and change agents must certify that changes to roles are sustained and strengthened by adaptations to added processes (Peacock, 2017: 53).

3.9.5.3 Positive aspects of employee resistance to change

While employee resistance to change is commonly associated with negative outcomes, Bedser (2012) argues that it can serve as a protective mechanism for organisations or indicate a lack of preparedness for change. Peacock (2017) echoes this perspective, highlighting that resistance implies employees are cognisant of the recurring nature of change, rather than dismissing it. Understanding the reasons behind resistance becomes a valuable tool for examining power dynamics, enabling the development of strategies to respond effectively to change.

Employee resistance to change may signify disparities in the plans for and execution of change. Those responsible for managing change may use this information to adjust the process to influence the success of the change initiative. Employee resistance to change can defer the implementation of change and provide an opportunity for employees to acclimatise and acquire the necessary abilities and reserves to support the change. Furthermore, employee resistance to change allows them to convey their concerns, feel engaged, and minimise feelings of loss or anxiety. Providing employees with opportunities to express their concerns allows them to feel valued (Peacock, 2017).

3.9.5.4 Organisational inertia: Navigating the resistance to change

In the face of continuous external pressures demanding adaptation, organisations often grapple with overcoming organisational inertia (Jones, 2019). This phenomenon refers to the persistent resistance of the organisational system to change, development, and redesign (Bedser, 2012). The larger and more complex an organisation becomes, the more pronounced its inertia, requiring additional energy to facilitate successful change (Woelders, 2020).

Montgomery (1995) provided an analogy of organisational inertia, comparing it to malleability or plasticity. Montgomery (1995) argued that using microeconomic theories, organisations are described as having the malleability to respond to external factors such as changes in supply and demand. Montgomery (1995) therefore, proposed the notion of automatic change, despite change rarely being automatic. The lack of malleability or plasticity is what Montgomery et al. (1995) therefore refer to as organisational inertia.

Ironically, a drive exists in organisational inertia, which hinders change but acquires the energy to propel organisations (sometimes in the direction not anticipated). A concept closely related to organisational inertia is resistance to change (Kinnear & Roodt, 1998a). Arifin (2020) proposes that forces influencing or resisting change influence organisational behaviour. Similarities exist between organisational inertia and resistance to change as organisational inertia refers to organisations' stagnation (Moradi, Jafari, Doorbash & Mirzaei, 2021), while resistance to change relates to employees' active resistance (Wannasook, 2018). Organisational inertia and organisational change readiness act as opposites as organisational inertia may be seen as organisations' stakeholders' resistance to undergoing transitions. In contrast, organisational change readiness may be described as organisations' ability to respond to change quickly and effectively (Kinnear & Roodt, 1998).

Peacock (2017) states that for change to be successful, organisations should assist employees in embracing and enacting change by addressing dissatisfaction with the status quo, sharing the vision of the anticipated outcome, creating and following steps of a plan, and celebrating accomplished yardsticks. The desired change will be beneficial, impactful, and long-term only when organisational stakeholders are not opposed to change. Thus, issues that constrain change should be addressed.

3.10 CHANGE READINESS

Change readiness calls for organisations to be ready for change and to ensure willingness and assurance by employees towards change processes for effective implementation of change initiatives (Alolabi, Ayupp & Dwaikat, 2021). Change readiness, a pivotal aspect of organisational dynamics, has been defined through multiple lenses by prominent scholars. Armenakis, Harris, and Mossholder (1993: 681) offer a widely cited definition, characterising it as the amalgamation of employees' attitudes, beliefs, and intentions regarding the necessity for changes and the organisation's competence in executing them. Eby, Adams, Russell, and Gaby (2000:

422) take a slightly different route, defining change readiness in relation to employees' preparedness for change concerning their perceptions of specific aspects of their work environment. Cunningham et al. (2002:377) propose a comprehensive definition that incorporates a perceived need for change, a sense of self-efficacy to effect positive change, and an opportunity to contribute to the change process. Jones, Jimmieson, and Griffiths (2005: 362) emphasise the positive aspect, defining readiness for change as the extent to which workers embrace positive opinions about the necessity for organisational change and believe in the positive consequences of such changes for themselves and the organisation at large. Weiner (2009: 68) broadens the perspective by defining readiness for change as organisational associates' commitment to change and their self-efficacy in undertaking organisational change.

While some scholars focus on the psychological and behavioural aspects of organisational readiness for change, others explore the tangible resources that shape an organisation's preparedness. Weiner's (2009) perspective, as echoed by Ahmed, Aydinli, and Saka (2022), emphasises the mental and behavioural state of preparedness. This highlights the importance of individuals being dedicated, enthusiastic, and ready to engage collectively in the change process. On a parallel note, Storkholm, Mazzocato, Tessma, and Savage (2018) contribute to this discourse by highlighting the impact of employees' change commitment and efficacy on organisational readiness for change. This aligns with Weiner's emphasis on the collective effort required for successful change implementation.

When employees, change practitioners, or organisations commence with a change initiative programme, certain factors should be recognised to evaluate how prepared organisations are for change and to curb omissions, ultimately leading to more effective processes for current and future organisational change efforts. It is valuable to evaluate readiness for change by using the training needs assessment framework of the task, person (employee), and organisational levels (Peacock, 2017: 61-63). At the task level, a simple consideration when initiating change is the actual requirement for the amendment. The question is whether the change is needed or necessary. Alignment with the increased dissatisfaction with the status quo will influence the likelihood of others to begin thinking about change. At the personal level, assessing the readiness of stakeholders involved in the change is important. Reflection on employees' openness and eagerness to commence thinking about or undertaking things differently is important. This can be achieved by understanding the compelling and shared need and developing trust (Weideman, 2020). At the organisational level, the commencement of the change process requires a deep understanding of the organisational elements or factors that will influence how the requested change is perceived and received. This can be attained through an examination of history and culture.

3.10.1 Importance of change readiness

Abdow (2019) views leadership's organisational change planning as necessary in realising their strategic initiatives for change. The literature review findings indicate that organisations' common mistakes relate to their assumptions that they are already ready for change. Most literature revealed that failure of organisational change occurs prior to the commencement of the change as organisations may fail to influence change readiness by planning for change and through the purposeful execution of change. The flawed assumption of readiness for change also influences change initiatives. Evidently, the presumption that readiness for change exists, causes organisations' failure in ensuring readiness for change through objective methods and design. This inappropriate assumption is thus a liability for organisations.

Julsrud (2018) notes that readiness for change is a crucial feature in the change procedure and emphasises that the workforce is the main contributor to achieving the desired change. Organisations that intend for their change initiatives to succeed should attend to their stakeholders' readiness for change and deploy effective expertise. The human capital aspect of change readiness requires critical consideration during the change process. Furthermore, the involvement of change agents is necessary to ensure that the various beliefs of stakeholders regarding change are understood and aligned with the desired change.

3.10.2 The difference between resistance and readiness

Bedser (2012: 50) offers a cautionary note, referencing Self (2007) and Hultman (2006:84), urging against a simplistic view that positions resistance as the direct opposite of readiness for change. This perspective emphasises that the absence of resistance does not automatically imply acceptance of change or readiness for it. Even when not overtly resisting, employees may present other challenges that demand attention. Insufficient information or skills related to change, for instance, can diminish employees' readiness for change without necessarily indicating resistance.

Organisations frequently encounter difficulties associated with the negative aspects of resistance to change, presenting a significant challenge (Repovš, Drnovšek & Kaše, 2019). Addressing these negative facets requires collaborative efforts and trust among change stakeholders (Weideman, 2021). Recognising that readiness and resistance are nuanced concepts and addressing one does not automatically resolve the other. Comprehensive strategies that acknowledge and tackle both aspects are essential for effectively navigating organisational change's complexities.

3.10.3 Importance of change readiness of the provincial legislature

It is not always averse to comparing resistance to change and organisational inertia. For example, in organisations where operations are stable, quantities and prudency depend on organisational inertia and may assist in protecting organisations from negative change. Resistance to change and organisational inertia are neither identical nor opposites.

Change is routine in organisations owing to strategies and measures for cost-cutting, organisational reconfiguration, remuneration practice reviews, technology innovations, quality enhancements, and new products or services. Resistance to change is a substantial barricade to successful organisational change (DuBose & Mayo, 2020). Causes of change guide and direct practitioners in developing support for change while sustaining competitiveness. Applied approaches utilised by new case studies illustrate successful means to manage resistance to change by management's strong working relationships with employees (Sikerbol & Aller-Stead, 2021). This assumption is explained by alluding that resistance to change is an exhibition or activity by change stakeholders who endeavour to preserve the status quo (El Gohary & Abdelazyz, 2020).

Changes experienced by most organisations in their operating environment inform the purposes of this research, which is to assess the provincial legislature's challenges, especially by focusing on the foundation of the research by critically analysing the feasibility of PRR for elected POBs. This means that the possible or potential resistance to change and organisational inertia will necessitate careful management to guarantee that the sector is prepared for potential change and is capable enough to create a successful change initiative from the change plan.

Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) (2018) requested that the South African President, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, reject the Commission's POB remuneration recommendations. The reasons attributed to this decision relate to the government's incapacity to meet its obligations through taxation. Decreasing its responsibilities after resorting to precarious levels of inflationary borrowing over past years is questioned. POBs across the board do not warrant a salary increase and have caused citizens increased immigration, a rise in crime, substandard service delivery (depicted by the collapse of the health system), an impeded judicial system, and a lack of novel ideas from the political establishment about how to solve the country and its economy. COSATU highlighted that most POBs lack relevant competencies, are inexperienced, and provide subpar output. COSATU believes negative outcomes in South Africa should be attributed to POBs.

Sander (2015) poses a suggestion about PRR related to politicians' interest in applying the concept. Following numerous recent world events concerning politicians' parliamentary performance and behaviour and usage of entitlements, Sander (2015) believes the application of PRR should not stop at civil servants and should also be introduced to POBs. Commonly, POBs believe that voters have the option to vote them out in the following election if they are not satisfied with their actions. Consequently, POBs may contest annual performance reviews, fearing their dismissal after dissatisfaction with their performance (Sander, 2015).

Substituting politicians may seem logical, feasible, and practical. However, this is not always the case, specifically when implementing change creates difficulties. Additionally, citizens may assume ' service. POBs have potential and, therefore, attempt to elongate the service of POBs. Oppositely, citizens may perceive POBs as failing to actualise their potential. In both cases, PM seems to be a sensible option rather than observing the outcome after several years, where POBs will need to be removed from parliament or provincial legislatures. The aforementioned provides a reason for electorates to implement annual performance evaluation systems for POBs, determining their remuneration advancement for the subsequent year (Sander, 2015).

The adoption of a PM system in South Africa for POBs, particularly elected POBs, requires a political paradigm shift within political parties. Political parties would have to support the system whereby parliament or provincial legislatures can manage the performance of their elected members and link this to remuneration and other rewards independent of the political parties that deployed those members to those structures (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2007).

The decision made by one of the biggest trade unions in South Africa (COSATU) and the Commission's call for the future adoption of a PM system for POBs is appropriate reasons for the researcher to critically analyse the feasibility of PRR and PM systems for elected POBs of provincial legislatures in South Africa, and POBs' readiness to change from receiving annual remuneration based on inflationary increase through assessment of their performance.

3.10.4 Readiness for the implementation of PRR and PM systems

Maheshwari and Singh (2010) emphasise the contemporary drive for competitiveness and enhanced productivity, prompting organisations to reassess their existing systems. An avenue for optimising employee performance is linking remuneration to performance (Kang & Lee, 2020). Though implementing PRR and PM systems is a challenging process for organisations, the challenge may be averted by organisations assessing their readiness for change before implementing PRR and PM systems. Organisations should also concentrate on the psychological preparedness of employees (who are POBs in provincial legislatures).

Maheshwari and Singh (2010) provide the following framework for organisations to analyse provincial legislatures' readiness for implementation of PRR and PM systems:

3.10.4.1 Push factors

Turbulence in organisations is caused by existing pressures emanating from WTO, structural adjustments, competitiveness of markets, regionalisation of economies and domestic realities, and developing countries (Saxena, 2016). It is important for provincial legislatures to manage similar challenges to improve their legislative mandates, reduce costs associated with mandates, and promote transparency, accountability, and efficiency of the public delivery system. Provincial legislatures would need more participation, autonomy, information sharing, and responsiveness of the POB to manage stakeholder pressures.

Introducing PRR and PM systems for POBs will allow provincial legislatures to evaluate their prevailing systems, culture, structural matters, and operations (Sayeed & Bhide, 2003) and reform systems by presenting new processes. Citizens' right and access to information lead them to demand that provincial legislatures disclose relevant information to the public regarding their own performance. This democratic process has provided citizens with the power to probe the performance of governing bodies like provincial legislatures and question unsatisfactory POB performance. Furthermore, the process places government bodies under continuous observance, necessitating provincial legislatures to re-evaluate their performance.

A universal problem affecting government organisations is the lack of employee motivation and, therefore, their failure to deliver results (Torabi & Jamshidvand, 2022). This requires a system that may distinguish between high and low performers and influence employees to reach desirable outcomes (Appelbaum & Mackenzie, 1996; Martha, 1992). Developing a performance culture is necessary for institutionalising a remuneration system for influencing employee performance (Dewi, Yuliansyah, Sarumpaet & Gamayuni, 2022) and commitment (Ariawaty, 2020) provincial legislatures' methodology in developing and managing remuneration systems can affect their culture it differs extensively from other government sectors (Sopow, 2007).

PRR and PM systems would assist in reforming the structure to promote performance in provincial legislatures. Research findings reveal the importance of aligning HR systems, particularly PRR and PM systems, with annual strategic plans (Agarwal, 2021). Provincial legislatures must also provide direction and clarity on their short- and long-term targets to achieve them.

3.10.4.2 Pre-requisites

The successful implementation of a new system requires POBs participation. Those in positions of authority should provide support and assurance in the transformation process to influence change in the work culture and the mindset of POBs. By provincial legislatures' investing interest in POBs and encouraging their participation and involvement in PRR and PM systems, POBs commitment and trust may be developed (Roos & Nilsson, 2020). To provide the public with an environment of change, provincial legislatures must balance their beliefs, values, and traditions with the Universal Service Obligations (USO).

3.10.4.3 Challenges

A consistent constraint in the successful implementation of PRR systems relates to the failure to identify suitable parameters to evaluate and measure performance. Effective and timely feedback should be provided to employees, who rely on the people management skills of those in authoritative positions. Employees' expectations need to be managed so that PRR systems can engage all employees (Larsson et al., 2022). Improper management of employees' expectations may motivate some employees but may have the opposite effect on most employees (Larsson et al., 2022). Division of rewards among employees influences their interest in PRR systems (Nugroho & Siswandari, 2021) but division of rewards may pose problems in organisations.

The available literature consistently highlights a noticeable correlation between initiatives in change management and the implementation of PM systems (Mabasa & Flotman, 2021).

Mabasa and Flotman (2022) support the recommendations that institutions should start by developing a change management plan before embarking on introducing a PM system, as Kirrane, Lennon, O'Connor, and Fu (2017) noted. Khumalo, Ejoke, Oppong Asante, and Rugira (2021) and Sachane, Bezuidenhout, and Botha (2018) emphasise the fact that the PM system is contributing to the introduction of strategic change by ensuring the linkage of employees' behaviour with the established organisational objectives.

3.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The main purpose of implementing PM is to measure and increase employees' capabilities. In addition, a just and objective PM process contributes positively to employee retention in organisations (Malik, Budhwar, Patel & Laker, 2021).

As Schnell et al. (2021: 27) explain: "The successful achievement of PM model goals depends largely on the performance of individual employee and manager's engagement and leadership quality". Goal attainment may be ensured by employees' participation in the design and continual update of PM systems. Public institutions are required to have a dedicated budget specifically for training and development and support direct managers in all areas of PM (including holistic and fair assessment, linking employee and organisational goals, constructive conversation with employees, and coaching employees for high performance (Brown et al., 2018). Entrenching effective PM practices requires continuous leadership assurance for supporting and refining PM systems,. PM is not a routine procedure but a strategic process of organisational culture and practice (Chatto, 2020).

PRR in civil service institutions should be implemented with sensitivity to ensure the best outcomes. Caution must be exercised within civil service to secure appropriate conditions for civil institutions (Nica, 2013: 179-184).

This chapter outlined a theoretical background and literature on PM, PM systems and PRR in the workplace. It explored the importance of these constructs within the civil service and provincial legislatures and examined factors for consideration before implementing PRR and PM. The chapter explored the challenges and opportunities related to the implementation of PRR and PM, as well as reflected on different theories relating to PRR in the workplace.

The chapter defined change as a departure point from what is known, practised, anticipated, and may be disruptive. Change that most organisations experience in their operating environment informed the purposes of this research. The Commission's recommendation for the future adoption of a PM system for POBs prompted the researcher to critically analyse the feasibility of implementing PRR and PM systems for elected POBs of provincial legislatures in South Africa, as well as the readiness of these POBs to transition from receiving annual remuneration adjustments based solely on inflation to a system that assesses their performance. From this research, the basic prerequisite of a PRR system is the development of a performance culture, which consequently requires a shift from the traditional POB remuneration system based on tenure and inflation to a new PRR system based on performance results.

This study's background and aim was to critically examine the feasibility of PRR and PM systems for elected POBs of provincial legislatures in South Africa. The study was linked to Swanson's (1996) opinion that a meticulous and systematic diagnosis and documentation of the workplace will afford a true basis for enhancing performance at individual, organisational, and process levels. Hence, a diagnosis of the problem, considering the organisation's systemic nature, is needed, and this refers to the implementation of PRR and PM systems (Armstrong, 2006).

In recent decades, different types of remuneration systems were introduced in private and public sectors within OECD countries as a component of changing practices of New Public Management (OECD, 2005a, 2005b; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). Previously, the remuneration of civil servants in OECD member countries was centred on salary scales. PRR systems differ per country. However, they have pay flexibility (differentiation in remuneration between individuals) as a common element (OECD, 2005b). It is established that. This notion provides a motive for change readiness of provincial legislatures, which is the fundamental basis for realising ideas and change initiatives within the South African legislative sector (Karve, 2009).

The next chapter provides the research design and methodology, including the research approach, population, data collection, and data management and analysis.

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a detailed description of the research philosophy underpinning the study, the research approach and design, as well as the methods employed in conducting the study, including the population, sampling, data collection and the method of analysis. This is followed by a discussion of the strategies employed to ensure rigour, followed by a review of the research ethics that were upheld throughout the study.

4.2 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY

A research philosophy comprises a researcher's beliefs regarding the nature of knowledge (epistemology) and how it can be gathered (ontology). Researchers are expected to explain the philosophical assumptions underpinning their study (Creswell & Creswell, 2018), clarifying their ontological and epistemological positions. Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2012, 128) explain that ontology is the belief about what is true or what exists, while epistemology relates to methods of gathering information on truths or reality. Terre Blanche, Durrheim, and Painter (2006: 40) describe paradigms as systems of interconnected ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions that act as viewpoints in the choice of methods of data collection, analysis, and interpretation.

A research philosophy is either objectivist or subjectivist. Objectivism holds that reality exists independently and that it can be objectively measured, while subjectivism holds that reality is socially constructed. The current research was underpinned by a subjectivist philosophy, namely interpretivism, whereby reality was considered to be socially constructed and only knowable from the perspective and views of the individuals within that context (Kalén, 2017: 52-53).

In this regard, Saunders et al. (2012: 129) state:

> *Diverse research beliefs are appropriate for accomplishing different matters, and this depends on the research question that the researcher aims to respond to. Interpretivism concentrates on the importance of interpretation when developing the knowledge and*

promotes that it is critically important for a researcher to comprehend the differences between individuals as social actors.

To realise the objectives of this research required an understanding and interpretation of the meanings of human behaviour rather than generalising and predicting cause-and-effect relationships. Therefore, the study was grounded in an interpretivist epistemology. This philosophy is appropriate in research on exceptional and complicated contexts involving specific people and situations (Saunders et al., 2007: 106).

Axiology, a branch of practical philosophy, studies the nature of value and its determination. The term "axiology" originates from the Greek words axios, meaning "worthy," and logos, meaning "science," together describing the expansion of our understanding of value and what it encompasses (Given, 2008). Unlike the narrower focus on moral values, axiologists examine the concept of value in its broadest sense, emphasising the plurality and heterogeneity of values while often endorsing various forms of realism about values (Bahm, 1993).

In ethics and the social sciences, axiology's value theory explores how humans ascribe value to various entities—people, ideas, objects, or other subjects of interest. This branch of philosophy also referred to as ethics or value theory, delves into patterns of thought and the criteria by which we assess people, tasks, and systems (Grünberg, 1995).

Axiology, particularly within the research context, plays a pivotal role in shaping the ethical framework that guides the entire research process (Given, 2008). In this study, specific values and ethical considerations were instrumental in the design and execution of the research. For example, the decision to transition from a quantitative to a qualitative methodology was driven by the ethical imperative to honour participants' ability and willingness to contribute meaningfully, especially in light of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and the closure of Provincial Legislatures (Awoyemi, 2022).

Ethical considerations, such as obtaining informed consent, ensuring confidentiality, and minimizing potential harm, were prioritized, reflecting core values of respect, autonomy, and integrity (Leavy, 2017; Tansey & Hogg, 2023). Establishing trust with political figures, an essential component of this research, required advanced interpersonal skills and a strong commitment to ethical engagement. This approach ensured that participants felt secure in candidly sharing their perspectives.

These axiological principles profoundly influenced the data collection, analysis, and interpretation processes. By adhering to these ethical standards, the research not only upholds the integrity of its methodology but also provides significant insights into the dynamics of PRR and PMS within civil service organisations.

4.3 RESEARCH APPROACH

The appropriate research approach is contingent on the researcher's problem statement, objectives, and the study's purpose (Lichtman, 2014). Research could follow a quantitative or qualitative approach, with mixed-methods research being a combination of both (Blumberg et al., 2014: 152-153; Lichtman, 2014: 7). Researchers used mixed methods for the purposes of detailed understanding and corroboration (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).

Quantitative studies rely on numerical information (i.e., numbers and figures), and involve collecting large amounts of data, which are analysed statistically to enable generalisations of the results to the study population (Blumberg et al., 2014: 152-153). Thus, the aim is to extrapolate the results from a specific sample to the broader population (Tustin, 2006: 30). Govender, Grobler, Van der Merwe, and Wärnich (2001: 14) outline various categorisations of quantitative research, including traditional, experimental, and positivist, and note that this research approach is employed to address questions regarding relationships between measurable variables. Quantitative analysis typically follows a deductive approach (Bryman, 2008). This type of research often takes place in controlled settings, such as laboratories, and involves experiments or surveys conducted on large groups of people (Blaxter, Hughes, & Tight, 2006: 64; Lichtman, 2014: 12).

In the qualitative approach, data are gathered in the form of words, sentences, and narratives contained in texts, interview transcripts, field notes, and images (Adu, 2019; Blumberg et al., 2014). This approach is considered appropriate for studying social interactions and phenomena (Saldaña, 2011). Qualitative research aims to provide in-depth insights into social complexities (Asenahabi, 2019). The qualitative approach thus enables a deeper understanding of social occurrences, which may not be achievable through quantitative research using instruments containing pre-determined questions and answers (Babbie, 2020). As the aim of the study was to gain an in-depth understanding of people's perspectives, rather than gathering vast amounts of numerical data for statistical analysis, a qualitative approach was adopted. The study followed a qualitative approach. The study followed a qualitative approa. This approach focuses on gathering rich data in the form of texts and images, rather than numerical values (Asenahabi, 2019). The qualitative approach was thus considered appropriate for gaining in-depth insights into the personal views of POBs with regard to PRR and PM.

Qualitative researchers concentrate on the meaning individuals attach to objects and events. The key focus of qualitative research is to comprehend people's own views and experienced realities (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The qualitative researcher also considers people's past and the situations in which they find themselves (Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Tracy, 2013; Yin, 2011), and all participants' perspectives are considered valuable. Hence, the present researcher rejected what Becker (1967) refers to as 'the hierarchy of credibility', which is the notion that the viewpoints of influential people are more valid than those of less powerful or powerless individuals. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the characteristics of qualitative and quantitative research.

Table 4.1: Quantitative Research versus Qualitative Research

Quantitative Research	**Qualitative Research**
Aimed at testing hypotheses	Aimed at capturing and determining meaning
Concepts are represented by distinct variables.	Concepts are represented by themes, motifs, generalisations, and taxonomies
Measures are thoroughly formed before data collection, and are standardised	Measures are generated in temporary manner, and are often adapted to the individual setting or researcher
Data are in the form of numbers from exact measurements	Data are in the form of words and images contained in documents, observations, and transcripts
Procedures are standardised and replicable	Research procedures are particular to the context, and replication is rare
Statistical analysis	Qualitative analysis methods such as thematic analysis, grounded theory or content analysis

Source: Adapted from Neuman (2014:110)

There is a common misconception amongst those unfamiliar with qualitative studies that qualitative data are intangible and inconsequential, implying that nothing can be gained from them. However, qualitative data is empirical and captures real events, such as verbal or gestural expressions and observations of specific behaviours (Neuman, 2014: 111).

Qualitative research entails the selection of suitable theories, the acknowledgement and exploration of diverse perspectives, the integration of researchers' reflections as a part of the knowledge-creation process and providing a comprehensive and truthful understanding of human experiences by delving into the accounts, perspectives, and interpretations of the individuals involved (Flick, 2014; Polit & Hungler, 1993; Ritchie, Lewis, Nicholls, & Ormston, (2014).

Human beings differ, and each participant interprets their life experiences in a particular way (Joubert, 2012). Therefore, the researcher engaged closely with the participants to explore their experiences and the insights they gained as elected POBs of provincial legislatures, officials of legislatures, and members of the Commission. The advantage of qualitative research is its ability to provide complex textual descriptions of how people experience a given research issue. It offers information about the 'human' side of an issue, that is, the sometimes-contradictory behaviours, beliefs, views, emotions, and relationships of individuals (Klenke, 2008; Thakur, 2012).

The strength of qualitative research is perceived to be its ability to afford complex textual descriptions of how people experience a given research subject and further provides information about the "human" side of an issue – that is, the often-contradictory behaviours, beliefs, opinions, emotions, and relationships of individuals. Furthermore, qualitative methods are also perceived to be effective in detecting intangible factors, such as social norms, socioeconomic status, gender roles, ethnicity, and religion, whose role in the research issue may not be readily apparent (Eyisi, 2016; Thakur, 2012).

The following advantages of qualitative research, posited by Leedy and Ormrod (2020), informed the present researcher's choice of this approach.

- Exploration, which allows the researcher to acquire original understandings of issues or phenomena that have received little research attention;
- Multifaceted descriptions of circumstances, situations, processes, connections, systems, or individuals;
- Verification, as the researcher is able to examine the validity of certain conventions, assertions, concepts, or views in practical contexts;

- Theory development, as the researcher may discover new concepts or theoretical viewpoints linked to a phenomenon;
- Problem identification, including impediments or challenges that are integral to a phenomenon and
- Evaluation, as the researcher is able to judge the success of policies, practices, or innovations.

Despite all these advantages, Matsuo (2005) and Johnson and Christensen (2012) note that qualitative research is not immune to weaknesses and limitations. The qualitative research weaknesses are mostly experienced during the analysis and interpretation of data and may result in less reliability. It is, therefore, imperative that the researcher dedicates sufficient time to the data analysis and avoids bias influencing the interpretation and findings (Bellenger, Berhardt & Goldstucker, 2011).

4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN

A research design is a framework or plan for conducting the research, outlining the methods to be employed (Asenahabi, 2019). It involves determining the population and the methods for sampling, collecting, and analysing the data (Blumberg, Cooper & Schindler, 2014: 152-153; Kerlinger, 1986: 279).

The current study followed a descriptive design aimed at exploring the characteristics of a certain population or phenomenon in a certain context and is thus aligned with the qualitative research approach. a descriptive design, the researcher aims to identify patterns in the characteristics. Following a descriptive design, the researcher aims to identify patterns in the characteristics by conducting qualitative data analyses such as thematic analysis (Asenahabi, 2019).

The study comprised two phases. Phase 1 was a review of the literature on the terms PRR and PM, together with readiness to implement such systems (Chapter 3). In contrast, Phase 2 was an empirical study of the perceptions of POBs in South African provincial legislatures of PRR and PM (with the findings reported and discussed in Chapter 6).

4.5 RESEARCH METHODS

This section describes the population and details the methods employed for sampling, data collection, and data analysis.

4.5.1 Population and sampling

A study's population is the entire group of interest to the researcher, while the sample is a subset of the population chosen to participate in the study (Leavy, 2017: 76; Neuman, 2014: 10). In the current study, the population originally consisted of 429 civil servants in South African provincial legislatures. However, the initial recruitment of research participants proved challenging due to limited accessibility. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown regulations, the provincial legislatures were closed. Consequently, the study population was adjusted to include officials from the provincial legislatures and current and former members of the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs.

Sampling is the process of describing sampling as the process of choosing units (e.g., individuals, institutions) from the population of interest (Thakur, 2012). There are two types of sampling, namely probability sampling and non-probability sampling. In using probability sampling, each unit or element in the population has a known and equal chance of being selected for participation, while this is not the case in using non-probability sampling. Qualitative researchers use non-probability (non-random) sampling (Daniel, 2012).

Researchers have the following choices for non-probability sampling (Neuman, 2014: 167):

- Convenience sampling, also called accidental, availability, or haphazard sampling, entails selecting participants based on ease of access.
- Quota sampling is used to select a quasi-representative sample. Researchers first determine the relevant categories within the population to capture diversity amongst the units, such as gender and age groups. They then determine how many cases to acquire for each category, which is the 'quota'.
- Purposive sampling, also known as judgement sampling, is the selection of participants based on the researcher's judgement regarding their knowledge of the topic under study and their ability to contribute rich data.

- Snowball sampling, also called network, chain referral, or reputational sampling, is a method for identifying additional participants through referral by existing participants.
- Deviant case sampling, also known as extreme case sampling, is used when the researcher wants to pursue cases that differ from the dominant pattern or have features that differ from the predominant features of most other cases.
- Sequential sampling is similar to purposive sampling, but the researcher wants to discover as many relevant cases as possible within the relevant financial and time constraints.

The present researcher used purposive and convenience sampling to select participants from South Africa's nine provincial legislatures, including POBs and former members of the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs. The researcher selected accessible participants who were directly familiar with the situation being explored, as recommended by Heyd et al. (2019), and who could provide rich data on the research topic (see Asenahabi, 2019). The following inclusion criteria were applied:

- an individual serving as an elected POB (elected or re-elected) in a provincial legislature or a former member of the Commission;
- aged at least 18 years; and
- Those categorised as re-elected POBs or newly elected POBs.

Thus, all individuals under the age of 18 years in national parliament and local government and who did not hold the position of elected POB in a provincial legislature were excluded.

During the sampling process, the researcher remained aware of the dual role of the researcher and employee of the Commission. Permission to conduct the study in the provincial legislatures was obtained from the chairperson of the Commission, and requests to participate were disseminated via gatekeepers, the speakers of the provincial legislatures. The role of the gatekeeper was to invite the participants to participate and to allow them to make an informed decision regarding participation, without feeling forced by the researcher to participate in the study.

Sample sizes in qualitative studies are generally small — less than 30 participants (Bluman, 2007), and a qualitative study can be trustworthy with even a single participant, as in the case of biographies. Madondo (2021) notes that qualitative studies aim to explore individuals' emotions and experiences with less emphasis on popular views. Carrillo-Durán and Pulido (2022), Patton (2002a), and Yin (2016) emphasise the absence of a formula or golden rule for determining an ideal sample size in qualitative studies. Bryman (2012) underscores the importance of collecting data until saturation is achieved, which requires an iterative process of sampling, data collection, and data analysis.

Data saturation is a critical concept in qualitative research, marking the point at which further data collection no longer yields new themes or insights, indicating that the sample size is sufficient to capture the full range of perspectives relevant to the study. Creswell (2007: 240) describes data saturation as the stage where no further patterns emerge, and additional data contributes little to enhancing the understanding of existing categories. Similarly, Grady (1998) and Faulkner and Atkinson (2023) note that data saturation is reached when new information ceases to emerge, signifying that the phenomenon under investigation is fully understood.

In this study, data saturation was achieved through several indicators, ensuring the comprehensiveness and credibility of the findings (Grady, 1998; Faulkner & Atkinson, 2023):

1. **Theme replication**: Throughout the interviews, themes and patterns were consistently repeated across participants without introducing new insights. This consistent replication across a diverse participant group suggested that the full spectrum of relevant perspectives had been captured.
2. **Theoretical saturation:** The study reached a point where the existing theoretical frameworks sufficiently explained the data. At this stage, additional interviews were unlikely to yield new or meaningful contributions to the theoretical understanding of the subject.
3. **Information redundancy**: As the data collection progressed, new interviews increasingly reiterated previously identified themes, indicating a saturation point where further data collection would likely be redundant.
4. **Diversity of participants**: The study included a diverse range of participants from the target population, ensuring that common themes emerged across different groups. This diversity strengthened the confidence that the data saturation reflected a comprehensive view of the phenomenon.

5. **Richness and depth**: The collected data provided a thorough understanding of the research questions and objectives, with no significant gaps in information. The depth and richness of the data indicated that the research had achieved its objectives.
6. **Theoretical sampling**: In the grounded theory approach, data saturation was achieved through theoretical sampling, which allowed for the development of a comprehensive theory explaining the phenomenon under study. The theory was thoroughly developed and refined by continuously collecting and analysing data until no new themes or insights emerged.
7. **Practical constraints**: Data saturation was also influenced by practical constraints, such as time, resources, and participant availability. These factors made additional interviews difficult or unnecessary, as further data collection was unlikely to contribute to the findings significantly.
8. **Researcher judgement**: The researcher exercised professional judgment in determining data saturation, taking into account the depth, breadth, and richness of the data collected. This judgment was guided by the principle that no new concepts or insights were emerging, thus signalling the completion of data collection.

These factors collectively suggest that data saturation marks the point in a qualitative research study where additional insights from further interviews become minimal or negligible, signalling the end of data collection. Willig (2013: 71) posits that in grounded theory, data saturation occurs when continued sampling and coding no longer yield new categories or instances of variation within existing categories. However, it is crucial to recognise that the judgement of data saturation is inherently subjective. The researcher is responsible for determining when data collection is sufficient, which depends largely on the specific context or phenomenon under study (Kumar, 2011).

In this study, the researcher adhered to the principle of saturation, identifying the point where no new concepts, perspectives, or suggestions emerged, and there was sufficient clarity regarding the categories and concepts. This saturation point was characterised by the absence of new categories, despite the potential for conceptual differences in participants' views. To ensure validity (see Section 4.6), the researcher objectively determined that no new categories or concepts arose during comparison and cross-comparison (Jones & Alony, 2011). This critical approach to achieving data saturation underscores the rigour and thoroughness of the research process.

Adler and Adler (1998) suggest a range of 12 to 60 interviews, with 30 as the mean, and Ragin and Becker (1992) propose 20 for a Master's thesis and 50 for a Ph.D. thesis. Guest, Bunce, and Johnson (2006) reported that 92% of the codes that emerged from their study emanated from the data of 12 interviews, while Hagaman and Wutich (2017) achieved saturation with 16 interviews. Young and Casey (2019) found that nine interviews were sufficient to identify over 95% of the final codes in their review. The current study had 21 participants, deemed sufficient by Creswell and Creswell (2018), with the interview conducted between July 2022 and August 2022.

4.5.2 Data collection

Two common methods for collecting qualitative information are in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Thakur (2012), Creswell and Creswell (2018), Taylor, Bogdad, and DeVault (2016), and Leavy (2020) assert that in-depth interviews are ideal for collecting data on individuals' personal backgrounds, perceptions, and experiences, especially when sensitive subjects are being explored. Focus groups effective data on a group's cultural norms, giving broad overviews of issues of concern to the cultural groups or sub-groups. Given the sensitive nature of the present research topic, the researcher conducted one-on-one semi-structured interviews with participants.

Qualitative interviews can be unstructured, semi-structured, or structured (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). In-depth qualitative interviewing requires less structured personal interaction between the researcher and informants to comprehend their perspectives on life events, experiences, or situations conveyed in their own words. In-depth interviewing, as highlighted by Seidman (2013), seeks to comprehend the lived experiences of individuals and the meanings they attribute to those experiences. It is modelled as a conversation between equals, avoiding a formal question-and-answer exchange. The present researcher elected to conduct semi-structured interviews, as this method is more appropriate for obtaining rich data from a small sample on various attributes, perceptions, behaviours, feelings, and opinions (Walker, 2012). Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to alter the order of the questions posed, and to ask probing questions to obtain additional insights and clarity (Walker, 2012). The interviews followed a conversational style, resembling an exchange between equals rather than a formal question-and-answer session, as recommended by Taylor et al. (2016: 102), and had a duration of 30 to 60 minutes, as recommended by Kallio, Pietilä, Johnson, and Kangasniemi (2016).

The researcher used an interview guide to ensure the discussions remained relevant and that all participants were asked all same questions (Bryman, 2008). An interview guide also assisted the researcher in asking probing questions to gain additional insights and clarity regarding participants' perceptions (see Braun & Clark, 2006). The researcher first gathered biographical data on the participants (work location, job title, ethnic group, level of education, and tenure). The interview questions were open-ended to ensure discussions remained relevant while allowing the participants to share their thoughts and to express themselves freely and provide background and deeper insights, as, according to Yin (2016), closed-ended questions limit participants' responses. The interview guide was distributed to participants through gatekeepers well before the interviews were conducted. Participants were asked the following questions:

- Please provide your understanding of the two constructs PRR and PM.
- According to you, what are the attitudes of provincial legislature POBs towards the implementation of PRR and PM in the provisional legislature?
- What is the extent/level of readiness of the provincial legislature regarding the introduction of PRR and PM for POBs in provincial legislatures?
- What would you say are the key factors for the successful development and implementation of a fair and equitable PRR and PM for elected POBs in provincial legislatures?
- What are the challenges that hinder the introduction of PRR and PM for POBs of provincial legislatures? Please explain.

The researcher adhered to the following recommendations when conducting the interviews (Hofisi, Hofisi & Mago, 2014): being non-judgmental, letting people talk, paying attention, and being sensitive. To ensure that rich data were collected and until saturation was reached, participants were invited to provide additional thoughts or clarification through probing questions (see Lawrence, 2017). The researcher sensed that he had heard something so repeatedly that he could anticipate it, as noted by Given (2008). After each interview, participants were invited to share their opinions of the questions posed, and their responses affirmed the relevance and thought-provoking nature of the inquiry.

The interviews were conducted online via Microsoft (MS) Teams, as no participants were available for an in-person interview, and the interviews were recorded (with the participant's permission). The researcher also made field notes during the interviews, as recommended by Creswell and Creswell (2018). The recorded interviews were transcribed by an independent transcriber/coder, using the transcription function of MS Teams.

4.5.3 Data analysis and interpretation

Polit and Hungler (1993) describe data analysis as methodologically reducing, organising, and giving a meaningful description of the data collected. De Vos (2005: 218) explains that the objective of analysis is to sift data into an intelligible and interpretable format to address the research problem and answering the research questions.

Qualitative data analysis usually follows an inductive approach — moving from detailed data to higher-level insights, to determine meanings and practices, with a focus on shared meanings and common practices that inform the way participants think (Wilson & Hutchinson, 1991:1). Mouton (1996: 108) explains that the process of qualitative data analysis is the breaking up of the data into controllable themes, patterns, trends, and relationships. Subsequently, the data are interpreted and presented to reflect the participants' opinions, feelings, and beliefs regarding the subject matter. Miles et al. (2020:12) employ the term 'data condensation', which is the selection, focus, simplification, abstraction, and transformation of data derived from participant interviews into objective and valuable insights.

The gathered data in the current study were analysed using thematic analysis, a flexible and widely utilised method in qualitative research for systematic classification, coding, and identifying patterns or themes that emerge from the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 5; Nowell, Norris, White & Moules, 2017). It enables the researcher to provide a comprehensive account of the information contained in the data (Braun & Clark, 2006). The data were analysed using ATLAS.ti Version 23, which is software that allows the researcher to code and collate data electronically.

Neuman (2014:112) explains the process of qualitative analysis and interpretation as follows:

i. First-order interpretation is the perspective of the participants. This step aims to comprehend how they see the world and define situations and the meanings they attach to these. The first-order interpretation thus encompasses the participants' inner motives, personal reasons, and points of view. The researcher aimed to correctly describe and understand participants' practices and perceptions (Wilson & Hutchinson, 1991). Therefore, the participants' opinions, feelings, and beliefs regarding the subject matter (Miles et al., 2020:12) were transcribed verbatim. Additionally, while transcribing the data, familiarity with the information was ensured to make a second-order interpretation of the data.

ii. Second-order interpretation is the researcher's viewpoint. While the researcher maintains a certain distance in first-order interpretation, this step entails incorporating the researcher's perspective to bring coherence or broader meaning to the context-specific data. Per Corbin and Strauss (1990), the researcher colour-coded critical information or words in the interview transcripts, where after the codes were sorted into categories (sub-themes), the sub-themes were consolidated into themes, and the themes were refined and labelled with a short description. The second-order interpretation of the data set the scene for the third-order interpretation, namely the writing up of the data.

iii. Third-order interpretation entails connections between the detailed understandings of specific people or events and abstract concepts, generalisations, or theories used to analyse the data and then communicating these to individuals outside the research setting.

In reporting the findings, the present researcher heeded the recommendations of Babbie (2008: 486), specifically to ensure clear and transparent communication with sufficient detail to permit an informed evaluation of the findings by others.

The next section details the strategies employed to ensure the study's trustworthiness.

4.6 TRUSTWORTHINESS

The trustworthiness of qualitative research is achieved through four criteria: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).

Credibility, akin to validity in quantitative research, relates to the believability of the findings. Transferability refers to the extent to which qualitative research outcomes can be applied to different contexts or scenarios. Dependability relies on recognised research methods and detailed documentation of the process. Confirmability is achieved by ensuring that research findings reflect the participants' views and are not influenced by the researcher's biases (Babbie & Mouton, 2010).

The following strategies were employed to enhance the trustworthiness of the current study.

An extensive literature review shaped the interview questions, and the researcher ensured their alignment with the research objectives. To ensure dependability, the researcher employed widely recognised and accepted research methods, which were transparently reported in detail, as recommended by Creswell and Miller (2000). To enhance confirmability, the 'audit trail' contains raw data, notes, personal notes, and descriptions of the approach to analysis and interpretation (see Klenke, 2016; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

Transferability entails readers being able to judge the applicability of research findings to their own contexts. The degree to which a study allows readers to decide whether similar processes are relevant in their own normal situations defines transferability (Mangal & Mangal, 2013; Polit & Hungler, 1993). To enhance transferability, the researcher provided detailed descriptions of the context of the study and the methods employed in conducting the study, including how the findings were derived (see Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Given, 2008; Shenton, 2004). The researcher also included verbatim quotes from the participants' interview transcripts to support the findings, as recommended by Creswell and Miller (2000).

Triangulation was employed to enhance credibility, which is the process of seeking convergence of data from different sources, such as the findings from the interview data and literature (Creswell & Miller, 2000). A study becomes more credible through triangulations because the data collected from diverse sources show the same information or patterns (Creswell & Miller, 2000). During the interviews, the researcher heard the same comments and remarks and used all available data sources to ensure saturation. Saturation is defined as the point at which no more concepts or categories arise following cross-comparison. At this time, a theory could be developed based on the central phenomena.

The researcher also guarded against personal biases influencing the research outcomes throughout the study, as recommended by (Smith & Noble, 2014), to enhance confirmability. Identifying sampling biases and continuous critical reflection on methods ensures sufficient depth and relevance of the data (Silverman, 2016). The present researcher was committed to ensuring that research findings reflect the participants' perspectives, including opposing perspectives (see Babbie & Mouton, 2010). Acknowledging and mitigating biases are essential to ensuring objectivity (Shenton, 2004). The researcher took reflective notes throughout the study, as proposed by Guba (1981).

Participants in qualitative studies serve as the first judges of the study's credibility (Trochim & Donnelly, 2007), which is why the present researcher employed member-checking. Participants were asked to confirm the accuracy of the interview transcripts and the researcher's interpretation of the data. However, Creswell and Miller (2000) assert that member-checking is the most precarious method of establishing credibility.

The next section details the ethical considerations pertinent to the current study.

4.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Leavy (2017) explains that the word *ethic* originates from the Greek word *ethos,* meaning *character*. Ethics encompass morality, integrity, fairness, and truthfulness. Morality is about understanding right and wrong, and integrity is about living according to that knowledge. It is critical that researchers uphold ethics in research that involves humans to ensure that no harm comes to the participants (Leavy, 2017).

There rests a moral obligation on the researcher in selecting a research topic. First, the researcher must ask: What is the potential value or significance of research on the proposed topic? The research's value or significance is determined by who will benefit from new knowledge on the subject if the research will address an identified social need, and its potential to promote new learning or social change. Second, a researcher must ensure there are no potential conflicts of interest (Leavy, 2017). For instance, if the research is funded, the researcher has to ensure the sponsor's agenda does not conflict with research ethics. There should be no influence or financial gain linked to certain research outcomes.

In the present study, the principle of beneficence was applied, which means the benefits to be derived from the research should outweigh any possible potential harm or risk. The researcher also prioritised the welfare of the participants. The present researcher upheld the policy on research ethics of the University of South Africa (UNISA, 2014), the stipulations of which were adhered to as follows:

Ethical clearance for the study (Approval number: 2019_HRM_014) was obtained from UNISA's Ethics Review Committee (see Annexure A). Permission to conduct the study was obtained from the provincial legislatures (see Annexure B).

Participants were fully informed of the nature and aims of the study and had to sign a consent form prior to the commencement of the interviews (see Annexure C). The Participant Information Sheet explained the study's purpose, the nature of participation, withdrawal options, potential benefits, inconveniences, and confidentiality measures. Participation in the research was voluntary, and participants were assured of anonymity. Participants' names were replaced with pseudonyms in the reporting, and the researcher avoided using personal identifiers.

The recordings and transcripts are stored on a private, restricted-access computer and will be destroyed five years after completion of the study. Details of participants will remain in the strictest confidence, as Charmaz (2014) recommended.

Further to the above, the researcher followed the guidelines of Denzin and Lincoln (2011) by offering participants access to the final research report after examination. While Denzin and Lincoln (2011) acknowledge the necessity of some deception, particularly by omission, it was deemed unethical in this study. The purpose of the study was communicated to participants before and during the interviews.

4.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter discussed the research process through a detailed explanation of the interpretivist philosophy, the qualitative research approach, and the descriptive research design, including the methods employed. The discussion included a description of the research population and the purposive and convenience sampling of members of the South African provincial legislatures and former members of the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, which yielded a sample of 21 interviewees. This was followed by a discussion of the thematic analysis conducted and the strategies employed to enhance the study's trustworthiness. The chapter concluded with the ethical considerations pertinent to the study and how these were upheld throughout the research process. The next chapter reports the findings of the study.

CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The chapter reports the study's findings according to the themes and sub-themes that emerged from the data. The themes relate to participants' understanding of PRR and PM and the interconnectedness of the constructs; the suitability and implementation of PRR and PM for POBs; the factors that would affect such implementation, including specific challenges; and the readiness of provincial legislatures to implement PRR and PM.

The reporting of the findings commences with a profile of the interview participants, followed by the themes that arose from the qualitative data in relation to the primary and secondary research objectives.

5.2 PROFILE OF SAMPLE

Interviews were conducted with 21 participants, whose demographic details are shown in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Demographic profile of the participants

NO.	DESIGNATION (JOB TITLE)	JOB LEVEL	GENDER	ETHNIC GROUP	HIGHEST QUALIFICATION	YEARS OF SERVICE
1	Secretary to Legislature	Executive	F	Indian	Master’s degree	16+
2	Senior Manager	Senior Manager	M	Black African	Undergraduate degree	16+
3	Former Chairperson of Commission	Commissioner	M	Black African	Master’s degree	16+
4	Former Secretary	Executive	M	Black African	Master’s degree	16+
5	Former Commissioner	Commissioner	F	Black African	Doctorate	16+
6	Chairperson of Human Settlement Standing Committee	MPL	M	Coloured	Undergraduate degree/ Advanced diploma	6–10
7	Manager: Members’ Affairs	Manager	F	Coloured	Undergraduate degree/ Advanced diploma	16+
8	Senior Manager: HRM and LR	Senior Manager	M	Black African	Master’s degree	16+
9	Unit Manager: HR Benefits	Manager	M	Black African	Master’s degree	16+
10	Chief whip of the majority party	MPL	F	Coloured	Undergraduate degree/ Advanced diploma	6–10
11	Chairperson of Human Settlement Standing Committee	MPL	F	Black African	Undergraduate degree/ Advanced diploma	6–10
12	Secretary to Legislature	Executive	M	Black African	Master’s degree	11–15
13	Leader of the official opposition party	MPL	M	White	Honours degree	16+
14	Former Commissioner	Commissioner	M	White	Doctorate	2–5
15	Member of provincial legislature & caucus whip	MPL	F	Black African	Grade 12	6–10
16	Chairperson of committees	MPL	M	Black African	National Diploma	6–10
17	MEC and former speaker	MPL	F	Black African	Master’s degree	6–10
18	Chief whip of the official opposition party	MPL	M	White	Honours degree	16+
19	Chief whip of the majority in the legislature	MPL	M	Black African	National Diploma	6–10
20	Deputy CH & chairperson of LOC	MPL	F	Black African	Undergraduate degree/ Advanced diploma	11–15
21	Chief whip FS	MPL	M	Black African	Undergraduate degree/ Advanced diploma	6–10

The participants included 11 members of provincial legislatures, six senior officials of provincial legislatures, one former senior official of a provincial legislature, one former chairperson of the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, and two former members of the Commission. Participants consisted of 13 men and eight women, representing the following population groups: black African (14), white (three), Coloured (three), and Indian (one). The participants' tenure ranged from four to more than 16 years, and their academic qualifications ranged from a National Qualification Framework Level 7 to Level 10.

5.3 ANALYSIS

For ease of reference, the interview questions are listed below.

- *Please provide your understanding of the two constructs PRR and PM.*
- *According to you, what are the attitudes of POBs of provincial legislatures towards the implementation of PRR and PM in the provisional legislature?*
- *What is the extent/level of readiness of the provincial legislature regarding the introduction of PRR and PM for POBs in provincial legislatures?*
- *What would you say are the key factors for the successful development and implementation of a fair and equitable PRR and PM for elected POBs in provincial legislatures?*
- *What are the challenges that hinder the introduction of PRR and PM for POBs of provincial legislatures? Please explain.*

The data were analysed using ATLAS.ti Version 23. Figure 5.1 is the Word Cloud derived from the initial coding of all the interview transcripts, highlighting the prominent verbs and nouns used by the participants in answering the interview questions.



Figure 5.1: ATLAS.ti Word Cloud

The subsequent sections discuss the themes and their related sub-themes that emerged from the interview data.

5.4 EMERGENT SUB-THEMES AND THEMES

Five themes emerged from the data. The themes and their sub-themes are listed in Table 5.2 and discussed below.

Table 5.2: Summary of themes and sub-themes

THEME	SUB-THEME
1. Understanding of PRR and PM	Conceptualisation of PRR and PM
	Interconnectedness of PM and PRR
2. Attitudes towards implementation of PRR and PM for POBs	
3. Success factors in implementing PRR and PM	Consultation regarding implementation
	Buy-in and accountability
	Performance-enabling budgets
	Change management
	Training and skills development
	Fairness and transparency
	Clear and measurable goals
	Performance feedback
4. Current challenges in the implementation of PRR and OM	Accountability, transparency and fairness
	Capacity and readiness
	External factors
	Internal politics
	Systemic hindrances
	Resistance
5. PRR and PM implementation strategies	Conduct a readiness assessment
	Supportive policies and practices
	Drive collaboration and cohesion
	Ensure role clarity
	Create public awareness and engagement
	Invest in skills development and capacity-building

Source: Researchers own

5.4.1 Theme 1: Understanding of PRR and PM

This theme encapsulates participants' knowledge and beliefs related to PRR and PM. The theme had two sub-themes: *Conceptualisation of PRR and PM* and *Interconnectedness of PM and PRR*.



5.4.1.1 Sub-theme: Conceptualisation of PRR and PM

Participants' conceptualisation of PRR and PM reflected a diverse range of interpretations, highlighting the complexity of these constructs in the public sector. For instance, while some participants, like P8, perceived PRR primarily as an incentive mechanism aimed at enhancing performance ("*PRR concept is trying to convey that an employee is going to perform and that performance will serve as a basis for his or her remuneration*"), others, such as P19, framed it within the context of contractual obligations, where fulfilling certain criteria and processes become paramount. This dual perspective highlights the multifaced nature of PRR and PM in public office settings

P16's extensive experience as a municipal manager, beginning in the early stages of South Africa's democratic local administration, informed his understanding of PRR and PM. He highlighted the relevance of these concepts to his role, describing his involvement in establishing a new governance structure across the country. He noted, "*They started actually with the new system of local government as a country*," illustrating his role in operationalising PM systems integral to the municipal structures. This context adds depth to P16's interpretation, as his insights are rooted in practical implementation and strategic oversight.

P16 further emphasised that "*the PM system is critical; it tried to address the issue of productivity and delivery*," underscoring the functional importance of performance management within municipal governance. His emphasis on goal setting, motivation enhancement, and performance monitoring reflects a well-rounded understanding of PM, informed by his extensive training and hands-on experience. This perspective aligns with the broader literature on PM, which advocates for its role in driving organisational efficiency and accountability in the public sector.

The alignment of personal and organisational goals emerged as a recurring theme in the participants' responses. P12 and P19, for example, articulated this alignment as central to the effectiveness of PRR systems. P19's remark that "*it is almost like building a contract or a compact with the community*" encapsulates the dual function of PRR as both an incentive mechanism and a framework for accountability. This highlights the critical role of consensus-building in managing public expectations and delivering on organisational promises. This viewpoint resonates with established theories on performance-based rewards in the public sector.

Other participants, such as P2, P3, P4, and P9, highlighted the cyclical nature of PRR and PM, where regular oversight and feedback play crucial roles. For example, P2, noted, ***"****PM is about planning and the monitoring the implementation of that plans providing feedbacks and which is part of the evaluation cycle".*

This view aligns with existing models of performance management that emphasise continuous improvement and iterative feedback loops. *"The Speaker must drive all legislation and oversight mechanisms emanating from the Parliament" (*P3).

"*Generally mean a person's performance is managed and you don't work and work, but there must be an instance of agreement that you must do one to three tasks"* (P4).

*"In relation to PM, the employees should sign an agreement and if there are clear targets, role players like the speaker and chairperson can provide a little oversight" (*P9).

P13 offered a historical perspective, indicating that PM and PRR have traditionally been associated with senior management at various levels of government rather than with public representatives such as councillors, MPLs, or members of Parliament. P13 stated, "*The terms historically have been related specifically to senior management, whether at national, provincial, or local governments*." This distinction highlights the evolving nature of these constructs as they are increasingly applied across different levels of public service.

These two constructs are concerned with ensuring that the performance contracts signed by top management, in particular, are upheld. Still, the idea or concept can also be applied to subordinate managers. P13 held the same view: "… *in essence, it is about performance agreements signed with senior management*."

P4 provided a practical understanding of PRR, indicating that it is fundamentally about being remunerated based on one's output rather than a fixed salary. For example, if a person produces tables and is paid R10 for each table, the total payment will vary depending on the number of tables created. In some regions, a basic salary is paid, followed by further compensation based on individual performance. P4 explained: "…*there is a relationship between the amount of what you do and the remuneration that you get...*" and "..*you are rewarding someone's efficiency; it is his or her output that is making the difference*." This illustrated the merit-based nature of PRR in certain contexts.

Other participants expressed similar sentiments, linking PM and PRR to incentive structures that promote improved performance through pay progression. system promotes productivity and delivery in the public sector. It is often implemented in cycles, with a midpoint for assessing progress. PRR determines an employee's remuneration based on performance, and it pays for great performance on the job. It entails signing performance agreements, achieving specific objectives, and getting bonuses. This conceptualisation is highlighted in the comments of the following participants:

> *"It* [PRR] *involves creating incentives for improved performance by linking pay progression to performance"* (P1).
>
> *"PRR involves signing performance agreements, meeting certain objectives, and receiving bonuses"* (P2).
>
> *"A PM system improves productivity and delivery in the public service"* (P4).
>
> *"PM is usually done in cycles and supposed to have a midway point in the cycle where you review progress"* (P5).
>
> *"PRR is performance based and it is payment based on high performing in the job"* (P6).
>
> *"*[PRR is] *Determining an employee's salary based on their performance"* (P19).

These insights collectively reinforce the interconnectedness of PRR and PM, demonstrating how these systems work together to drive organisational performance and individual accountability.

From the above, there seems to be consensus on the meaning of the constructs ‘performance-related remuneration’ and ‘performance management’. Participants also indicated the interconnectedness of PRR and PM, as evident from their views. This consensus highlights the importance of these constructs in fostering a performance-oriented culture within public sector organisations.

5.4.1.2 Sub-theme: Interconnectedness of Performance Management and Performance-Related Remuneration

Participants highlighted that PM requires setting clear performance expectations through agreements or specified targets and regular performance assessments to identify when corrective actions or interventions are needed. This process is deemed critical for employees and POBs to ensure they fulfil their roles effectively. Furthermore, participants further noted the importance of linking remuneration to performance, arguing that this connection is an effective incentive for enhancing performance and accountability. They stressed that remuneration should not only reward top performers but ensure that all individuals deliver according to their remunerated role.

For instance, P5 noted that PM is supposed to be contractual, relevant to the task, and consensual. This highlights the necessity for clear agreements and mutual understanding in the PM process.

“… it [PM] *is supposed to be contractual, relevant to the task and to be a consensual thing”* (P5).

Similarly, P1 elaborated on the effectiveness of linking pay progression to performance, stating, *“It involves creating incentives for improved performance by linking pay progression to performance”*. This perspective highlights how remuneration can drive consistent, high-quality performance across the board rather than merely recognising a few top performers.

The relationship between PM and PRT was further explored by P7, who explained that “*PRR deals with the emphasis of performance, on how it links or relates to the* *remuneration that individuals are placed on*". This insight underscores the integral connection between these two concepts, suggesting that they work together to motivate continuous and aligned organisational efforts.

P14 added another layer to this discussion, distinguishing between PM as " *the system and process of assessing my performance and talent development*," and PRR "*is the remuneration attached to performance*" highlighting the complementary nature of PM and PRR in evaluating and rewarding employees. This distinction illustrates the complementary nature of PM and PRR, both of which contribute to a comprehensive evaluation and reward system within organisations.

P8's observation t that "*the two concepts differ but are interrelated and have a thin line between them*" This further emphasises the close relationship between PM and PRR. These two processes are deeply intertwined and mutually reinforcing, driving organisational success despite their differences.

Participants agreed that linking PM and PRR is essential for aligning remuneration with actual performance and fostering a work environment rooted in trust, engagement, and commitment. This alignment is crucial for internal organisational harmony and ensures compliance with legislative frameworks, thereby maintaining transparency and fairness. Organising employees through PRR can enhance individual and collective performance, ultimately leading to greater overall success. The tight connection between PRR and PM ensures that incentives are closely aligned with actual performance, as P3 articulated: "*For PRR, one needs a tool to measure performance and then a structure within which you can say because the person performed optimally or surpassed the average, they will be paid accordingly*."

The consensus among participants was that the interrelation between PRR and PM, especially within a legislative framework, ensures that organisational practices remain compliant with legal standards while promoting fairness and transparency. This connection not only supports effective performance management but also upholds the integrity of remuneration systems, ensuring that employees are duly rewarded for their contributions in a manner consistent with their performance.

5.4.2 Theme 2: Attitudes towards implementation of Performance-Related Remuneration and Performance Management

Participants held different views on the implementation of PRR and PM for POBs in provincial legislatures, evident in positive and negative responses, as well as hesitancy, regarding the implementation of such systems.



P13 noted that they were not aware of any white papers or bills that addressed PM and PRR and stated that there is a need to formalise these processes in provincial legislatures. This formalisation, P13 believed, would make POBs more accountable, ultimately leading to improved service delivery.

P4 and P5 expressed concerns about the complexities of applying performance measurements in a divided political arena where the media may influence the objectivity of appraisal. However, these participants indicated a need to balance party objectives with broader mandates, which the use of PM may help achieve..

P16 highlighted a gap in the lack of knowledge of the Public Finance Management Act, noting that it does not mandate a PM system as is required in local government. He inquired from chief directors about how they measure their activities, reflecting on the absence of a formal instrument to track progress over time. According to P16, this absence underscores a critical need for effective management tools: *“No necessary instruments on the level of the legislature to ensure that members play their part in a way that can be measured”*). Without such tools, P16 argued, effective management becomes impossible: *"say if you cannot measure, then how do you manage it*". This emphasises a need for management tools to manage performance.

Concerns about media influence on performance appraisals (bonuses) were also raised by P5, who tied these concerns to the legislative context. In the public eye, politicians' perceived performance can be shaped by media narratives, making objective and fair evaluations challenging. This, in turn, emphasises the need for a more nuanced approach when considering PRR for elected officials.

P19 leads a political party Caucus Office, which is the Office of the Chief Whip, emphasises the importance of PM within his role, overseeing regular performance reviews every three months. According to P19, elected officials demonstrate a high level of commitment and understanding of their responsibilities, which is crucial for the successful implementation of PM and PRR systems: *“Elected officials are seen as having a high level of commitment and understanding of their responsibilities”* (P19).

Some participants, like P2, were optimistic about the potential for provincial legislatures to create PMS comparable to those used for employees: *“It is possible for PL* [provincial legislature] *to create performance management systems that are almost equivalent to the ones that is applicable to the employees”* (P2).

Drawing from his experience as a job assessor at the national and provincial levels, P2 highlighted the ongoing debate about effectively tracking the performance of elected members within a political party. This complex issue remains a topic of academic discussion, with further research needed to develop viable solutions: “There should be *more discussion and investigation into applying performance appraisal to public representatives”* (P2).

For P5, a former member of a Commission argued that PM and PRR should be considered within the public sector but noted that success in this area would require a focus on objective criteria rather than media-driven perceptions. This view reflects broader concerns about the feasibility of linking individual performance to pay in a legislative environment, as expressed by several participants. “*Question how individual performance can be measured and linked to pay in a legislative environment*”. P5 also expressed scepticism about the likelihood of such a system being implemented successfully: “*I honestly do not see it happening*” (P5)

Attitudes towards PRR varied among participants. P4 suggested that resistance to PRR might stem from individuals' varying performance levels, with poor performers likely to resist due to the potential negative impact on their pay. Conversely, P9 reported a “*generally positive attitude*” towards PRR, while P6 and P7 expressed greater enthusiasm. Notably, P7 is particularly eager, highlighting “*an eagerness to benefit and increase accountability*” through such a system.

However, not all participants were optimistic. P14 voiced concerns about the practical implementation of PRR, especially regarding accountability. P14 noted that there might be "*insufficient buy-in*" from POBs, which could hinder the successful linking of pay to performance. P16 echoed these concerns, emphasising that while PM is critical for public institutions, there may be a reluctance to implement PRR for elected POBs. According to P14 and P16, the challenge lies in the complexity of assigning value to individual contributions in a legislative context.

P1 argued that members should be held accountable, given their government salaries and the routine nature of performance reviews and accountability in the public sector. He suggested that the legislature is ready for such systems, having already established a unit to oversee performance. However, P1 also acknowledged that resistance is likely, especially in the initial stages: "*… since PRR and PM has never been implemented in the legislature, there will be resistance, and the noble thing may be the manner in which this system is communicated to members"*.

P3 provided anecdotal inputs into the attitude towards the implementation of PM and PRR, suggesting that resistance was widespread: "*... implementation was resisted across the board"* (P3). This resistance, he believed, stemmed from a general aversion to change and accountability among politicians. P8 shared similar sentiments, noting, *"There is no positive attitude toward the PRR … and the lack of understanding"* (P8). and a general reluctance towards PRR.

P17, reflecting on her experience as a MEC and Speaker, highlighted the complexities of PRR and PM in South Africa's unique historical and demographic landscape. She suggested that the nation must navigate a dichotomy where issues related to PRR and PM are often left unaddressed: "*Determining the function of Parliament or legislatures in light of the new era is what needs to happen in the future*."

P11 and P15 believed that PM could significantly contribute to POBs working towards shared goals, though P14 expressed concerns about resistance due to fears of linking pay to performance: *"People are afraid of being accountable"; "People are currently unsure and resistant to PRR and PM for many reasons"; "Insufficient buy-in from the POBs";* and *"People are afraid to link their pay to their performance".* P15 echoed these concerns, suggesting that many parliamentarians might resist accountability measures.

P18, while not taking a firm position on PM, acknowledged that it is accepted within his party: *"Members in my party accept that there is a performance system, and you have to comply with that performance system because it counts as a certain percentage* *towards your re-election"* (P18). However, he noted that the incentive to comply with PM requirements might be driven more by electoral considerations than a genuine commitment to accountability. In this regard, one has an incentive to work because failing to do so would prevent them from being chosen by the party or be re-elected.

P5 emphasised that for PRR and PM to be successful in the public sector, they must focus on the objective work roles and criteria rather than being influenced by the media's perceptions. This point highlights the importance of maintaining objectivity in performance evaluations to ensure fairness and effectiveness.

P13 asserted that MPs accept the need for performance appraisal and accountability in the legislatures. However, he remained uncertain whether linking these appraisals to remuneration would be accepted. This uncertainty reflects the broader challenges of implementing PRR and PM in the legislative context, where complexities abound and further exploration is necessary. Most participants highlighted the potential benefits of PRR and PM in the public sector, such as enhanced productivity, goal alignment, and improved service delivery. They emphasised the cyclical nature of PM to ensure objectives are continuously met. However, some participants believed that while PRR and PM could enhance the performance of POBs, their application in the legislative context is complex and it needs further exploration.

5.4.3 Theme 3: Success factors in implementing Performance Related Remuneration and Performance Management

This theme explores the critical success factors identified by participants for effectively implementing PRR and PM for POBs. The success factors were categorised into eight sub-themes, namely *Consultation*, *Buy-in and accountability*, *Performance-enabling budget*, *Change management*, *Training and skills development*, *Fairness and transparency*, *Clear and measurable goals*, and *Performance feedback*.



These success factors collectively contribute to the effective implementation of PRR and PM for POBs, ensuring that these systems are adopted and integrated to enhance overall performance and accountability in public office.

5.4.3.1 Sub-theme: Consultation regarding implementation

Effective consultation with all relevant stakeholders, including (POBs), is crucial in designing and implementing PRR and PM. P4, a former Secretary of the provincial legislature, underlined the necessity of understanding the political dynamics within the political arena. According to P4, crafting a successful PM system for members requires a strategy distinct from that used in the civil service or private sector. This understanding is essential to navigate potential political complications and ensure the system's acceptance. P4 elaborated: *"It must not be administrative decision that is taken. That decision must not come from the legislature as an institution, like a decision taken by the speaker or the Rules Committee, but a decision taken by political parties"*.

This perspective highlights the importance of political buy-in, suggesting that decisions on PM systems should originate from political parties rather than administrative bodies. Such an approach could prevent resistance and ensure broader acceptance.

Supporting this view, P13, P5 and P12 also highlighted the need for extensive consultation. P13 noted that successful implementation requires a *"… consultation process with all political parties serving in a provincial parliament or legislature. There should obviously need to be the political will to do it, given our system …"* (P13). Similarly, P5 described the process as needing to be "consensual", while P12 echoed the importance of involving all political parties in the consultation.

These comments collectively suggest that administrative decisions and thorough consultations are pivotal for effectively implementing PM tools. It becomes clear that for such a system to succeed, members of Parliament must fully understand the objectives, alignment with the tools, the initial investment required, and the anticipated outcomes. Regular communication before, during, and after introducing these tools ensures that stakeholders remain informed and engaged, ultimately preventing delays and fostering a smoother implementation process.

5.4.3.2 Sub-theme: Buy-in and accountability

Buy-in refers to the acceptance of a policy or decision, while accountability involves individuals taking responsibility for their actions and decisions in fulfilling job roles and meeting performance goals. Participants emphasised the importance of buy-in in ensuring a sense of accountability, which is essential for successfully implementing PRR and PM systems. P8 highlighted the necessity of buy-in, stating: *"Firstly, there should be a buy-in of this model, and if, for whatever reason this model would not have a support, therefore the successful implementation will be very much difficult".* This suggests that without the endorsement of key stakeholders, particularly in the political and leadership spheres, implementing the PRR and PM models would face significant challenges. P14 reinforced this by stressing the need for full support from the top leadership, indicating *"Full support and ownership of the PRR and PM by the very top person and team."*

Participants also linked buy-in to the adaptability of the PRR and PM models to the specific conditions within various legislatures. P12 emphasised that accountability should be enforced with a clear standard, especially in terms of qualifications and consequences for non-performance, stating that members should meet minimum academic qualifications. This view was echoed by P15, who advocated for shared responsibilities to enhance discipline and accountability, including consequences for poor performance.

The concept of accountability was further explored by P13, who noted a growing acceptance among MPs for performance appraisal and accountability mechanisms, both within their organisations and in the legislature itself and that MPs were increasingly *"…accepting the need for performance appraisal, and they need accountability both within our organisation and within the legislature itself."* The assertion by P13 also supports the commens made by P12 and P15, which were already alluded to previously.

This view aligns with the concerns raised by P2, who highlighted the need for clear accountability structures, especially since POBs are often accountable to their political parties rather than the electorate. P2 noted the concern that, currently, POBs are accountable to the party, but the party does not pay the members. It merely deploys them; the government pays the members. This causes unclear accountability. P6 supported this view, stating that the public should hold the members and employees to account.

P8 called for all political parties, including opposition parties, to be involved in driving PM and ensuring accountability.

The proposal suggested by P8 is that the PRR and PM implementation process should be inclusive so that it may be successful. In other words, the PRR and PM requires the buy-in and accountability of all members involved in the entire process of their implementation.

P13 indicated:

> *"… there is a process internally looking at how to ensure accountability and performance monitoring of counsellors and MPLs, assessing whether they attend committee meetings, whether they have report back meeting in the community, whether they attend organisation meetings, etc."*

P13 felt strongly that office attendance be used as a performance measure:

> *"Ideologies of parties will be different, but it does feed into the system of attendance at committee meetings, and could be a criteria"* (P1).

P10 and P3 also raised the issue of attendance:

> *"Within provincial parliament, member's performance is being look at the level of performance in a committee or standing committee and attendance thereof"* (P10).
>
> *"An individual can be appraised by starting with the attendance"* (P3).

P13, P1, P10 and P3 felt that attendance at committee meetings, for example, should be the starting point for the successful implementation of the PRR and PM because the attendance system indirectly inculcates accountability among members of Parliament. However, P9 offered a contrasting view, arguing that attendance alone is not a reliable performance measure, given the unique nature of parliamentary work. P9 explained: *"… regarding office attendance, it's not like the workplace, like coming every day. Members do not come to the chamber every day, and their work is arranged according to their plan".*

This debate over attendance highlights a critical issue: while physical presence may be linked to accountability, it does not necessarily equate to productivity. P15 suggested a more punitive approach to enforce attendance, proposing salary deductions for non-attendance to promote discipline.: *"When you take money from someone, we do feel a pinch. This can be applied to members by saying if a member does not attend a meeting, there will be a deduction from the salary to promote people effective attendance to their duties in their side of the legislature".* However, as some participants pointed out, true performance is determined by the quality of work and contributions rather than mere attendance. Therefore, while attendance management may help monitor engagement, it should not be the sole criterion for assessing performance within the provincial legislatures.

Participants agreed that buy-in and accountability are critical to successfully implementing PRR and PM. However, they also recognised that accountability should be measured through meaningful contributions rather than just attendance. A more nuanced approach is needed to ensure that these systems promote engagement and high-quality performance.

5.4.3.3 *Sub-theme: Performance-enabling budgets*

Participants emphasised the critical importance of securing funds to support effective performance. They pointed out that while the national treasury holds the financial resources, these funds cannot be disbursed without parliamentary approval. This process can create delays and challenges in aligning financial resources with governmental priorities.

P2 highlighted the need for a systematic approach to convert government manifestos into actionable programs that can attract the required funding. P2 stated, *"The manifesto should be a government policy and followed by the process that will ensure it is converted effectively into government programmes. The process can attract resources from the national treasury, which is responsible for tabling a budget for government".*

In contrast, P11 provided a practical example from the Western Cape region, noting that despite limited resources, processes are executed efficiently. This raises concerns about remuneration, especially in high-performing departments like Health, where members feel they should be remunerated better. P11 remarked: *"They always say that members should be earning more because, with the minimum they have, they are still* [performing well] … *when you look at our budget to implementing the processes for our communities, … like Department of Health as the one that is doing well in the audit outcomes"* (P11).

Participants explained that budgeting cycles vary between national, provincial, and local levels, causing a lack of synchronisation. This means priority projects in one area may not be priorities in another. They noted that there is a need to align budgeting systems across government spheres. The also voiced their concern regarding the challenge of standardising performance reviews and rewards across different departments, given the vast differences in budget sizes and responsibilities. For instance, P17 explained the challenges faced by providing the example of the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) of Sports, whose budget is much smaller than the MEC of Education. P17 noted: *"The planning systems, the budget systems at the province and national starts in March. When it comes to a local government, it is May and June, so even those cycles are not synchronised, and projects that might be a priority on your IDP from local government perspective, it is not necessarily a priority at the province. So, alignment of systems or planning, alignment of budgets needs, it is critical over the three spheres of government. That is where the problem lies. If one wants to introduce PRR for MECs, how are you* *going to do that between MEC of Sports with a budget of maybe R500 000 and the MEC for Education with a budget of R30 billion?"* (P17).

Further complicating the situation are budget cuts to smaller departments, which can create tensions and undermine inter-departmental collaboration. These cuts negatively impact accountability, performance management, and the effectiveness of PRR, as department heads might attribute poor performance to insufficient financial resources. P17 illustrated this issue, stating, *"This is something like that will just cause unnecessary tensions and defeat the purpose of interrelation in terms of government working together. Also, in terms of the accountability in the legislature, because then, when the MEC have to go to the legislature to account for their department, the MEC would say, 'You know, my department is small', and there is nothing the MEC can do because they have cut the budget and everything, and then it will be a problem"* (P17).

Similarly, P3 raised concerns about the readiness of physical resources and the mindset of individual Members of the Provincial Legislature (MPLs), suggesting that these factors are significant barriers to effective performance. P3 commented, *"The physical and resource state of readiness is quite lacking. Also, the mindset state of readiness of the individual MPLs is also a problem"* (P3).

5.4.3.4 Sub-theme: Change management

Participants viewed change management as a structured process to achieve a desired future state. They emphasised that transitioning to PRR and PM systems necessitates meticulous planning and management. Effective change management is not only about introducing new systems but also about ensuring their seamless integration and sustainability within the organisation. Participants highlighted that successful change management must address both the technical aspects of the transition and the human factors involved.

P14 underscored the importance of leadership driving successful change. According to P14: "*Full support and ownership of the PRR and PM by the very top person and team …"* and *"… great change management throughout the process".*

This comment by P14 indicates that supportive leadership is crucial for effective change management. Leaders who actively champion PRR and PM can create an enabling environment that fosters employee excellence. This supportive leadership is seen as a key element in ensuring that the transition to new systems is both effective and sustainable.

Adding to this, P20 highlighted the importance of a well-planned communication strategy in managing change: *"The communication strategy can be one of the instruments to enable the implementation of the model. The role players who can contribute to the implementations of the concept within legislature can be the speaker, deputy speaker, chairperson or chairpersons, and chief whip*. *But that, for sure, if, for it to be above board, I think one would need to bring in a person, even if it is a Public Service Commissioner or Chapter 10 Institution, but it is not necessarily resting on that."*

P20's observation emphasises that a well-defined communication strategy is vital for implementing PRR and PM. Effective communication across organisational levels is essential for ensuring that all stakeholders are informed and engaged: *"The communication strategy can be one of the instruments to enable the implementation of the model.* This approach aligns with P14's observation: *"Great communication and buy-in as to why it is necessary to implement these two systems"* (P14).

5.4.3.5 Sub-theme: Training and skills development

Participants highlighted the significant benefits of PRR for enhancing commitment and aligning with the public service's productivity and delivery goals. They emphasized that the cyclical nature of PM helps ensure that objectives are continuously met. A key focus was the importance of adequate training and skills development to support high performance within the PM system. P4 noted: *"*[An effective] *PM system improves productivity and delivery in the public service"* (P4).

P4's comment highlights the role of a well-designed PM system in enhancing productivity and public service delivery, which can be achieved through proper training and skills development. This underscores the need for ongoing educational initiatives to equip public office bearers with the skills required for effective performance management. P13 added: *"… then you know there is going to have to be discussion about strengthening, monitoring, and evaluation within the organisation. In the context of the renewal programme of the organisation that the participant belongs to is pushing part of the renewal, which is about accountability performance"*.

P13's statement points to the necessity of strengthening monitoring and evaluation within the organisation, which includes investing in training and skill development to ensure effective performance assessment. This aligns with the view that continuous improvement in performance management relies on a well-trained workforce. P7 asserted that education is key to the performance of elected POBs of provincial legislatures.

P7's comment reinforces the notion that education and skill development are critical for the performance of elected public office bearers, highlighting the importance of targeted training programs to support effective performance management in provincial legislatures.

5.4.3.6 Sub-theme: Fairness and transparency

Participants noted that the processes of PPR and PM should be fair and transparent, with employees involved in the goal-setting and performance evaluation processes. They emphasised that both processes should be equitable, with the active involvement of employees in goal-setting and performance evaluations. The criteria for evaluation should be communicated clearly and aligned with the overall objectives to avoid misunderstandings and ensure transparency.

Participant 14 articulated a fundamental concern: *"No-one must be worse off because of its implementation in Year One"*. This statement reflects a broader sentiment among participants that introducing PRR and PM should not disadvantage any individual in the initial stages of implementation.

Participants emphasised the importance of using objective criteria for assessments and ensuring that evaluations are based strictly on actual work performed rather than without external influences such as media perceptions. P1 noted: *"The lack of transparency and feedback regarding performance contracts create uncertainty and confusion for the nation"* (P1). This quote highlights the need for clear, unbiased performance evaluation processes to prevent confusion and build trust.

To address these concerns, participants highlighted the need for structured mechanisms, such as clearly outlined well-defined performance agreements to ensure evaluations and rewards are transparent and free from bias. P2 mentioned: *"… involves signing performance agreements, meeting certain objectives, and receiving bonuses"*.

Moreover, P3 pointed out a gap: *"There is a lack of benchmarking … in the provincial legislature"*. This lack of benchmarking indicates a need for standardised criteria to ensure that evaluations are consistent and fair.

P5 emphasised the necessity of focusing on objective criteria rather than media perceptions: *"The notion that media perceptions shouldn't play a role in PRR highlights the sentiment that the evaluation should focus on genuine work and objective criteria"* . Such emphasis underscores the importance of evaluating performance based on actual contributions.

Participants agreed that understanding how efforts are acknowledged and rewarded based on objective criteria increases confidence in the fairness of the performance evaluation processes. This reinforces the need for clear, measurable criteria to enhance transparency and trust.

5.4.3.7 Sub-theme: Clear and measurable goals

Participants indicated that it is vital to ensure that performance goals are explicit, quantifiable, attainable, appropriate, and time bound. This approach would ensure that employees understand what is expected of them and how their performance will be evaluated.

Several mechanisms were suggested to achieve this clarity. P6 proposed: *"Incentivising members of the legislature, determining the criteria for incentivising members, and deciding who will be responsible for conducting performance management"*. This reflects a structured approach to setting and managing performance goals.

P7 stressed the importance of job profiles: *"Having job profiles for each position is crucial, as it sets clear expectations for performance"*. Job profiles help in defining specific expectations and responsibilities, which is crucial for effective performance management.

P19 added: *"Setting targets, determining the means to reach those targets, and assessing performance"*. This highlights the need for clear targets and means to achieve them to facilitate objective performance assessment.

P14 advocated for simplicity: *“Simple and easy to use* [PRR system], *so that everyone understands how it works”*. An uncomplicated system ensures that all members can easily grasp how performance is measured and managed.

Participants also noted the importance of aligning individual objectives with organisational goals. Understanding how personal efforts contribute to broader success can enhance motivation and engagement. Participant 19 remarked: *“… one of the key factors that should be considered is that they would have to set a target for each job that is performed by elected officials”*. This alignment ensures that individual performance contributes effectively to organisational success.

To ensure that the performance evaluation process is fair and unbiased, if possible, efforts should be made to prevent favouritism and subjectivity in the assessment, such as using standardised criteria and multiple evaluators. P3 suggested: *“An attendance participation in committees, and a number of committees can assist for assessment and proof given”*. P12 elaborated on assessment criteria: *“Parties use that assessment, the effectiveness of the adequacy and effectiveness of that is something … not quite certain about how it translates itself into real action, what evidence members must produce, and so on. In other parties, it includes, amongst other things, the number of the questions asked, motions, or questions for written or oral response. It also includes the aspect that the number of motions that member state, the general discipline that the members have out or display, including the attendance and their effectiveness in the committees and in the house, but it may differ from party to party”*. This indicates the need for clarity on what evidence is required for performance evaluation.

Some participants felt that it is important to involve the private sector in job profiling and remuneration in order to overcome this thumbs suck figure or “I like you, or I dislike you” decision. P7 proposed involving the private sector in job profiling to ensure objectivity: *“… when we speak about the remuneration is that is linked to performance, is the job profiling exercise that the Commission is undertaking for legislative sector with the assistance of a private company”*.

Similarly, P16 mentioned: *“… to have a system that is fairly or relatively objective they appointed an independent person, PricewaterCoopers”*.

From the above, ensuring that the performance evaluation process is fair and unbiased is critical. These suggestions aim to reduce subjective decision-making by incorporating external, objective assessments. Favouritism and subjectivity should be prevented by applying clear and standardised criteria and multiple evaluators.

5.4.3.8 Sub-theme: Performance feedback

Participants highlighted the importance of performance feedback in maintaining high performance and facilitating improvements. P9 highlighted that "*when there is an agreement, there will be communication and feedback, because one will be able to know if the job has been done*." This underscores the importance of clear agreements t and feedback mechanisms for effective performance management.

Participant further noted that performance reviews should be done regularly, as frequent check-ins allow for timely feedback and course correction. P13 advocated for regular performance reviews: *"Then, you know there is going to have to be discussion about strengthening monitoring and evaluation within the organisation. In the context of the renewal programme of the organisation that the participant belongs to, is pushing part of the renewal, which is about accountability performance".* Regular check-ins allow for timely feedback and adjustments, contributing to ongoing performance improvement.

P15 suggested: *"… monitoring of how members are performing in terms of accessing their attendance register of committee meetings to see which members or political parties are attending committee meetings, whereby they engage with departments on a quarterly basis, going through their quarterly reports as well as their annual reports and APP* [Annual Performance Plan] *in the new financial year".*

Participants agreed that establishing a culture of continuous feedback is essential. Managers should regularly communicate with employees about their performance, strengths, and areas for improvement. Feedback should be constructive and supportive, promoting ongoing development and high performance.

5.4.4 Theme 4: Current challenges in implementing Performance-Related Remuneration and Performance Management

This theme addresses the challenges identified by participants in PRR and PM for POBs. Six subthemes were identified: *Lack of accountability, transparency and fairness*, *Lack of capacity and readiness*, *External factors*, *Internal politics*, *Systemic hindrances*, and *Resistance*.



5.4.4.1 *Sub-theme: Lack of accountability, transparency, and fairness*

A core challenge in implementing PRR and PM is the perceived lack of accountability, transparency, and fairness. Participants expressed concerns about the difficulties in holding politicians accountable and ensuring fair performance evaluations. P3 noted that politicians generally resist accountability, suggesting that this aversion undermines effective governance.

Conversely, P19, argued that: *Elected officials are often seen as having a high level of commitment and understanding of their responsibilities"*. This view contrasts with the general critique of lack of accountability. It further highlights the mixed views among participants regarding the effectiveness of current accountability measures.

Participants also criticised the handling of disciplinary actions by political parties, suggesting that this practice exacerbates issues of fairness and accountability (P3). This is the interaction challenge between the parties and the provincial legislature in terms of performance control for POBs. P8 remarked that accountability is particularly unpopular in South Africa, especially among politicians who are uncomfortable with performance scrutiny that might affect their job security.

P17 added that the diverse political affiliations of members complicate PRR implementation. Members are primarily accountable to their parties rather than to the legislature or public, which poses challenges for assessing individual performance objectively. This would make PRR difficult to determine. P19 and P18 echoed this sentiment, who highlighted the difficulties of evaluating performance across different political parties. P4 explained that legislature members do not function as individuals, but as members of a political party, and they have to follow the party's instructions.

In this regard, Participant 21 stated: *"The election manifestos are critical, which, in terms of our democratic system, are said to be the demands of the people, because our democratic system allows political organisations to canvas their perspective or expectations in terms of how government should serve their interest"*.

P3 was opposed to PM, stating: *"… we have seen how things ensued. We have seen how ministers and MECs not performing, and they are not kept accountable by the parliaments because any member who thinks of keeping them accountable risks being censored by the party and even expelled."*

Participants thus held mixed views regarding PM and PRR. Even if they agreed with holding members accountable and ensuring transparency and fairness, some doubted that it would be practicable in the provincial legislature. The participants' remarks demonstrate how much politicians loathe being extensively observed since it limits their freedom of choice and makes them accountable to political parties.

5.4.4.2 Sub-theme: Lack of capacity and readiness

This theme relates to the organisation's preparedness and capability to introduce and manage PRR and PM. P4 and P19 highlighted the need for substantial preparatory work before these systems can be effectively introduced. P14's observations leaned towards broader issues: a poor performance culture and a lack of understanding of PRR and PM: *"There is still work to be done in terms of readiness for the implementation of PRR and PM"*. This comment indicates a need for foundational improvements before introducing these systems.

Further, P4 observed broader issues such as a poor performance culture and insufficient understanding of PRR and PM. P14 noted: *"While there are pockets of excellence, there is generally a culture of mediocracy"* and *"… insufficient understanding as the powerful advantages of implementing these systems".* This suggests that a lack of commitment and understanding may hinder successful implementation.

Participants also emphasised the need for extensive planning and consultations. P19 elaborated, *“It would take a long time and require extensive workshops, consultations, and agreement among political parties”*. This statement highlights the complexity of achieving consensus and readiness.

The lack of transparency and feedback regarding performance contracts was a major concern, leading to uncertainty and confusion. P1 highlighted this issue, stating, *"the lack of transparency and feedback regarding performance contracts create uncertainty and confusion for the nation"*. This observation highlights the critical role of clear and open communication in successfully implementing PRR and PM systems. Without such transparency, the effectiveness of these systems is compromised, leading to potential implementation challenges.

In addition to transparency issues, participants identified significant barriers related to both physical resources and the mindset of individual Members of Provincial Legislatures (MPLs) were significant barriers. P3 emphasised that *"the physical and resource state of readiness is quite lacking. Also, the mindset state of readiness of the individual MPLs is also a problem"*. This dual challenge reflects both the inadequate physical infrastructure necessary for PRR and PM and the need for a shift in the attitudes of MPLs to embrace these systems effectively. P5 shared a similar view, observing, “*There is no level of readiness, and she did not even need to explain all but emphasized her initial views"*. This perspective was supported by P13, indicating a consensus on the lack of preparedness.

P7 quantified this problem, stating, *“The level of readiness is currently at 0 out of 10, without job profiles in place”*. This stark assessment points to the absence of fundamental elements required for the successful implementation of PRR and PM, such as clearly defined job roles and adequate preparation. P8 further reinforced the view that the provisional legislature is not prepared for the introduction of PRR and PM, stating that "the provincial legislature is not ready for PRR and PM introduction due to various challenges". This position was shared by P17 and P20, attributing this unpreparedness to various challenges. As P8 noted, *“The provincial legislature is not ready for PRR and PM introduction due to various challenges”*.

Participants also expressed doubts about the readiness of the members themselves. P9 voiced concerns about whether members were truly prepared for such systems, suggesting a lack of commitment, or understanding. P11 was more definitive, asserting that members were not ready, thus reflecting a broader scepticism about the overall preparedness for PRR and PM systems.

Overall, participants indicated a need for engagement and capacity-building that requires sufficient time, understanding, and a cultural shift to implement systems.

5.4.4.3 Sub-theme: External factors

External factors, including political dynamics and public perceptions, were identified as significant challenges affecting the implementation of PRR and PM systems. These factors are largely beyond the control of members' control and have a significant influence on their performance and the perceived efficacy of PRR and PM initiatives.

External events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, were also identified as complicating factors. P5 remarked on the *"Complexity of assessing performance considering external factors like the COVID-19 pandemic"*. This suggests that unprecedented global events create additional layers of difficulty in evaluating performance fairly.

Public perceptions and resistance were other critical issues highlighted by participants. P6 expressed concern that *"The main or biggest challenge of PRR will be from the public",* predicting that public scepticism about politicians' intentions could undermine PRR efforts. Similarly, P13 noted, *"… there might be resistance from the public who say these people are being paid enough anyway"*, reflecting concerns about potential backlash against perceived self-enrichment.

Participants emphasised the need to consider and account for these uncontrollable and unprecedented external factors when designing PRR and PM systems. They argued that addressing these challenges proactively is essential for creating effective and resilient performance management frameworks that can withstand external pressures and public scrutiny.

5.4.4.4 Sub-theme: Internal politics

This sub-theme is related to the dynamics of politics and how it affects legislative functions. Participants noted that internal disagreements, power struggles, division, factionalism, and the formation of in- and out-groups significantly impact performance within the legislature.

P3 noted that internal politics within the governing party disrupt legislative functions, stating, *“Internal politics within the governing party interferes with legislative functions”*. This view was corroborated by P15, who added, “*The lack of separating political issues and of the state it is a huge problem”.* These comments reflect how internal political conflicts can disrupt legislative processes and affect the performance evaluation of members. These perspectives further highlight the difficulties of intertwining political agendas with legislative responsibilities.

The influence of internal politics extends to the political-administrative relationship. Political directives can create conflicts during the legislative process, particularly when party instructions clash with individual members’ beliefs or interests. This tension can lead to an impasse, challenging traditional lines of accountability, especially when an individual's rank in the party hierarchy conflicts with their legislative role.

Several participants discussed the broader implications of internal politics on legislative performance. P15 emphasised the importance of oversight bodies like the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and other stakeholders, stating, *“… importance of the role of IEC and stakeholders in overseeing MPLs”*). P15 further elaborated on this role, noting, *“… the IEC can play the role, and can be involved as well, and others who feel the need or who can motivate to say, ‘This is the role we will play in terms of ensuring that public representatives are being held accountable or they perform and that they do deserve to be remunerated or be paid this amount of money’”*.

Furthermore, P14 pointed out the challenge of insufficient support from top leadership, stating, *“… the area is an area of power. People fight for power, so it is not about whether a person is performing or not performing”*. This lack of support exacerbates the issues stemming from internal political dynamics, impacting the effective implementation of performance-related measures. P4 further illustrated these dynamics with the example that during elections, a candidate's position on the party list is often influenced by political considerations rather than individual performance. P4 mentioned that the individual perceived as not performing will be at the top of the party list, while the one performing the best will be at the bottom.

P13 raised concerns about potential internal tensions regarding performance-based incentives, saying: *“… there may be internal tensions between people who feel that members will not be able to qualify where someone else might be able to qualify for this* *incentive or PRR, and there might be internal resentment"*. This indicates that internal politics can lead to dissatisfaction and disputes over performance rewards.

Additionally, P14 noted the challenge of insufficient support from senior leadership, stating, *"… insufficient support from the very top"*. This reflects how a lack of support from top political figures can further exacerbate the difficulties in implementing performance-related systems.

From participants' responses, internal politics play a leading role in POBs execution of their duties confined to the electoral processes.

5.4.4.5 Sub-theme: Systemic hindrances

P1 stated that the main challenge is the question of who oversees the overseer because the overseers are the POBs of the provincial legislature. The electorate holds them accountable, and elections are only held every five years. The challenge is the existing system, which differs from the administration. For example, the Labour Relations Act applies to officials employed by the state rather than members.

> *"In essence, members' contracts and availability to legislature every day can hinder the introduction of PM"* (P9).

P2 indicated that the country's political system is the main hindrance to performance. Members represent parties; they do not operate independently. P2 felt that this could only be addressed through radical political change at the caucus level and legislation to enforce performance.

P3 agreed and stated that the problem would only be remedied once citizens can vote for the individuals they deem competent to be MPLs, as it is only then that the public would be in a position to hold members accountable.

> *"… politics is hindering it in the sense that, for almost, we are going for three decades now, we are still as a country rewarding the liberation fighters"* (P5).

> *"… there should be an electoral change to introduce PM so that everybody can perform because if you are only introducing it as a policy, then people will opt out of it"* (P6).

> *"Political parties focus more on constituency work and election campaigning, neglecting their responsibilities within the legislature"* (P3).

P18 agreed that changing the electoral system to a partly constituency-based system could assist in enhancing the performance of members and political parties through greater personal accountability during the term of office. The question that requires a response is whether we should continue rewarding the liberation struggle or reward performance (P5).

5.4.4.6 Sub-theme: Resistance

Resistance to PM and PRR was a prevalent concern among participants. This sub-theme addresses the challenges and opposition faced in implementing these systems, focusing on perceived barriers and resistance.

P7 highlighted that resistance could stem from individuals' reluctance to be assessed due to their performance levels, stating "*… the biggest factor could be people might not want to be assessed because of a lack of performance or poor performance, or not performing according to the required level"*.

This apprehension was supported by other participants, who noted concerns about accountability and exposure of underperformance. P7 further emphasised "Resistance to being closely monitored and concerns about accountability", and P9 stated, *"Potential resistance from elected officials who fear exposing their lack of performance"*.

Participants such as P10 and P14 also pointed out that any change may face resistance, irrespective of its nature. P10 stated, *"… change itself is a challenge, and members have not been formally assessed at all"*, while P14 added, *"Resistance to change, especially from those who have not been formally assessed before"*.

P8 observed that MPLs dislike being closely monitored, as it would limit their autonomy, *"… and they are not happy about it".* P3 agreed, asserting that South African politicians are generally resistant to accountability, stating, *"In the country, South Africa, particularly politicians, they do not like the idea of accountability. Therefore, the minute that you say, 'We will keep … you accountable', there will be resistance"*.

Despite the resistance, P13 identified a potential appetite for PRR and PM among provincial legislators. However, P19 expressed scepticism about the feasibility of introducing a new system, questioning whether all political parties would implement it objectively. P19 remarked, "*… all political parties will do it objectively*".

Participants' views on resistance centred around two issues: apprehension amongst elected officials regarding potential performance shortcomings and general resistance to change. The fear of exposure, especially if they have not been assessed in a formal capacity before, would lead to resistance to any system aimed at closely monitoring their performance. Participants noted a fear of being scrutinised and the associated challenges of being held accountable.

5.4.5 Theme 5: Performance-Related Remuneration and Performance Management implementation strategies

This theme explores participants' suggestions for strategies that underpin the introduction of PRR and PM in provincial legislatures. Three sub-themes emerged: *Addressing challenges and resistance*, *fostering collaboration and cohesion*, and *addressing current systems and practices*.



5.4.5.1 Sub-theme: Conduct a readiness assessment

Participants emphasised the importance of conducting a thorough readiness assessment before implementing PRR and PM. They noted that the provincial legislatures currently need more preparedness to introduce these systems successfully, and a readiness assessment would be critical to identify factors that could undermine their success.

One primary concern was the need for established role profiles and job descriptions, foundational to any effective performance management system. P3 indicated that the readiness assessment would include determining the availability of capable role players and suitable assessment methods. This highlights the need to evaluate whether the necessary structures and competencies are in place.

Moreover, the readiness assessment would also have to include determining the level of openness to PRR and PM. P5 proposed that to enhance buy-in, *"This would need a kind of champion within government itself that is willing, even if it is a committee where the Commission reports that is willing to actually say, 'We need a different way of doing things in South Africa*". P5, an academic and former member of the Commission, pointed out that while the need for PM and PRR has been recognised, South Africa lacks a professional champion who can effectively drive these initiatives forward. This indicates the necessity for institutional leadership to spearhead the implementation of PRR and PM.

Participants further noted that the readiness assessment should account for current levels of transparency and feedback (P1), the existing performance contracts (P1), and the individual readiness of MPLs (P3). Similarly, P12 stressed that the provincial legislature must be prepared to handle the multifaceted challenges, such as the depth, quality, adequacy, and effectiveness of political party systems (P12).

P12 also pointed out, *"Readiness requires buy-in from political office bearers, systems development, and a high level of understanding"*. This sentiment highlights the importance of developing systems for objectively assessing the performance of elected representatives, which could improve transparency and accountability.

P18 added that readiness would also demand clarity regarding the roles of PRR and PM of members of the provincial legislatures, *"… because they have different responsibilities, political, constituency and the party might decide that, 'That is your priority'".*

The overarching sentiment among participants was that a successful introduction of PRR and PM requires comprehensive buy-in from political office bearers, thorough discussion, and a deep-rooted understanding of the significance and implications of these systems.

5.4.5.2 Sub-theme: Ensure supportive policies and practices are in place

In response to an inquiry about whether amending the Electoral Act could facilitate the introduction of PRR and PM) P12 expressed support for this idea. The participant emphasised the need for innovative approaches to hold elected public officials accountable to the population in a meaningful way, including the possibility of enabling citizens to recall officials when necessary. P12 also suggested that adapting current practices or leveraging processes from the local government system could lay a strong foundation for such changes.

Participants highlighted the importance of addressing the prevailing structures, processes, and behaviours to identify gaps, deficiencies, or misaligned priorities that may influence the effective implementation of PRR and PM. The discussions revealed a consensus that no legislative measures or comprehensive systems support these initiatives. Despite a sector oversight model, established norms and standards must be developed to guide the implementation process. As P2 succinctly stated, *"No current legislative measures addressing this".* P5 echoed this sentiment, noting, *"... there is no such system"*, while P12 pointed out, *"… there is no absolute system" to support these initiatives.* P10 added, *"… no legislation or policy is guiding the intended change"*), highlighting the change posed by the lack of formal norms and standards.

As indicated by participants, this absence of norms and standards is a significant barrier to the successful implementation of PRR and PM. P12 noted that even though a sector oversight model exists, it lacks the necessary guidelines to ensure its effectiveness: *"… we do not have the norms and standards of even though we have a like a sector oversight model"*. P17 further elaborated, *"… how do we make sure that we pay for what is due, but the problem is the legislation, which she thinks they are trying to change to say people must select or can stand as an individual, be a president and account to certain constituents"*.

The participants also pointed out that the current policies and practices need to be revised or more developed, which poses a significant challenge for implementing the PRR and PM model. Considerable concern is the absence of formal legislative measures or policies to guide any proposed changes. Participants also shed light on the present priorities of political parties, noting a disproportionate emphasis on election-related activities over legislative duties. These conflicting priorities could pose an obstacle to introducing PRR and PM.

To address these challenges, participants like P8 and P6 suggested that a readiness assessment should inform the careful planning and implementation of the PRR and PM system. P8 remarked, "*There should be systems that will be used to implement this intended good model; if there is no system for the implementation, this is going to be difficult*." P6 proposed that the system could be integrated with the overall administration of the provincial legislature through the Parliamentary Oversight Committee, which already has oversight responsibilities: "*The system can be implemented and aligned to the overall administration of the legislature by introduction through the Parliamentary Oversight Committee that has oversight over parliament itself. They are ready immediately because the PL already has its internal monitoring system*." This proposal suggests that existing oversight structures within the provincial legislature could be leveraged to support the implementation of PRR and PM, thereby enhancing accountability and governance.

5.4.5.3 Sub-theme: Drive collaboration and a performance culture

This sub-theme emphasises the imperative nature of harmonisation, unity, and joint efforts across the various government structures and amongst elected officials to ensure the successful implementation and continuation of PRR and PM. Participants consistently underscored the importance of collaboration across all levels of government, stressing that effective alignment is essential for any new system to succeed.

P4 emphasised this point, stating, *“There is a need for alignment and collaboration across government structures, " reflecting* the collective understanding that without cohesive efforts, the effectiveness of PRR and PM could be severely compromised.

Moreover, participants highlighted the necessity of embedding a performance culture within POBs. P14 articulated this vision, noting, *“The culture of performance needs to be woven into the DNA of POBs so that it becomes ‘the way we do things here*”. This perspective points to a transformative shift, suggesting that fostering a performance-oriented mindset is not just about implementing new systems but ingraining a culture where performance and accountability become intrinsic to the organisational ethos.

Additionally, P19 stressed the importance of equipping elected officials with the necessary skills and preparation for their roles, stating, *"Parties should ensure their members are equipped for their roles"*). This comment highlights the proactive approach required in capacity-building, where the focus extends beyond current performance to include the development of future capabilities, ensuring that officials are aligned with and actively contributing to the desired performance culture.

The participants underlined the importance of collaboration across governmental tiers and structures, suggesting that any attempt to overhaul or introduce new systems would necessitate wide alignment. Furthermore, there was an emphasis on ensuring that elected officials are adequately prepared and skilled for their roles, indicating a proactive approach to capacity-building. A noteworthy perspective was the idea of fostering a performance-oriented culture. This suggests a transformative shift in attitudes, moving beyond mere systems to cultivating a culture that naturally gravitates towards performance and accountability.

5.4.5.4 Sub-theme: Ensure role clarity

Participants underscored the influence and responsibility of political parties in shaping the landscape for introducing PRR and PM and ensuring their members' effectiveness in the legislature. P4 emphasised that for such a system to be successful, it must be deeply rooted in discussions and initiatives at the political party level. According to P4, *"For a system like this to take root, there must have been discussions at political party level"*, suggesting that the foundation for PRR and PM must start with parties instilling a culture of performance and monitoring from the ground up.

Further elaborating on this point, P4 argued that the current system needs to be reformed, beginning with how parties select individuals for the legislature and progressing towards integrating a robust performance culture. This would involve political parties taking greater responsibility for their members' readiness to fulfil their legislative roles. As P5 succinctly put it, *"Political parties should take responsibility for members' readiness"*, while P19 added that parties must *"monitor members to ensure they fulfil their roles effectively"*.

The participants seem to feel that political parties bear the primary responsibility to ensure that their members are adequately prepared for their roles. Furthermore, parties should monitor performance and ensure that their members are not just present but are discharging their duties effectively. Addressing this issue requires recognising the power that political parties wield and their influence on the success or failure of any performance-related system.

5.4.5.5 Sub-theme: Create public awareness and engagement

Participants noted the importance of actively educating and engaging the public and other influential stakeholders in holding the legislature accountable. P15 emphasised the need for comprehensive efforts to involve citizens, academics, and journalists in promoting accountability within the legislature. According to P 15, *"Educate citizens on the role of MPLs and the legislature*. *Engage academics and journalists on motivation and accountability"*, highlighting the role of informed and engaged stakeholders in fostering transparency.

P13 added that the primary focus should be on engaging the public—the main beneficiaries of service delivery. P13 stated, *"It is important that the entire issue is to engage the public or engage with the main beneficiary of the service delivery — the public"*. This engagement is not only about ensuring transparency but also about building trust and strengthening the democratic process.

This strategy would foster transparency, build trust, and strengthen the democratic process. Participants saw the active involvement of citizens, independent institutions, academics, and journalists as crucial to motivating members and maintaining checks and balances by ensuring that public representatives are held accountable.

5.4.5.6 Sub-theme: Invest in skills development and capacity-building

Participants felt strongly about continuous skill enhancement and developing capacities amongst members to ensure they can perform optimally. This strategy was essential for rank-and-file members and those in leadership positions, such as Speakers, committee chairpersons, and chief whips.

P19 highlighted the critical need for ongoing skills enhancement, stating, *"Emphasise skills development for members"*. This perspective emphasises the importance of equipping all members with the necessary skills to navigate the complexities of their roles within the provincial legislature.

Moreover, P5 suggested that performance assessments should extend to key leadership roles, emphasising the need for a targeted approach to capacity-building: *"Performance assessments for committee chairpersons and chief whips"*. This suggests that skills development should not be limited to general members but should also focus on those with significant legislative responsibilities.

Participant 19 indicated that multiple stakeholders should be engaged in determining development needs. The engagement of political parties is vital to formulating a common agreement regarding the aims and objectives of the intended system. P19 articulated this, stating: *"… it will take a long time. It needs a long time for workshopping. It needs a long engagement with the different political parties"*. This reflects the complexity of aligning the interests of various political entities while ensuring that capacity-building efforts are effective and inclusive.

Participants noted that members should be continually equipped with relevant and up-to-date skills. The emphasis is on the rank-and-file members and leadership roles such as Speakers, committee chairpersons and chief whips. This suggests a comprehensive approach to ensure that individuals at all levels are prepared and competent in alignment with the objectives of the provincial legislature.

5.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter reported the themes and sub-themes from the participants' interview data.

In exploring the current system of remuneration and PM for elected POBs in provincial legislatures, Theme 1: *Understanding of PRR and PM* provided insights into how participants define and apply these concepts and that they identified a clear link between them. With regard to Theme 2: *Attitudes towards implementation of PRR and PM*, their responses varied. Most were in favour of PRR and PM, but some raised a number of concerns, particularly about transparency.

With regard to Theme 3: Success factors in implementing PRR and PM, participants noted a number of factors they considered vital to successful implementation of such systems, namely consultation, buy-in and accountability, performance-enabling budgets, change management, training and skills development, fairness and transparency, clear and measurable goals, and feedback. With regard to the challenges in introducing PRR and PM (Theme 4: *Challenges in implementing PRR and PM*), participants noted challenges related to capacity and readiness, internal and external politics, systemic hindrances, and resistance, as well as accountability, transparency and fairness.

With regard to recommendations for the effective introduction of PRR and PM for elected POBs in provincial legislatures (Theme 5: *PRR and PM* strategies).,

The next chapter discusses findings, together with extant literature, and offers recommendations based on the findings.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapter reported the findings of the thematic analysis according to the themes that emerged from the data. In this chapter, the main study findings are deliberated with regard to the literature that guided the formulation of the study's research questions. This is followed by arguments for and against the implementation of PRR and PM for POBs in provincial legislatures and recommendations for practice. The chapter concludes with an overview of the study's limitations and recommendations, followed by an evaluation of the research process and the challenges encountered. For ease of reference, the research questions and objectives are listed below.

The main research objective was:

To explore the readiness of South African provincial legislators to implement PRR and PM systems for POBs.

The secondary research objectives (SROs) were:

SRO1: To determine attitudes towards implementation of PRR and PM for POBs;

SRO2: To determine the main factors that need to be considered in developing and implementing effective PRR and PM systems; and

SRO3: To determine the challenges that may obstruct the introduction of PRR and PM systems.

The main research question was:

Are provincial legislatures ready to implement PRR and PM systems?

The main research question was addressed through two sets of secondary research questions, one set to be answered through a review of the literature and the other through the empirical evidence gathered in the study.

Literature review research questions:

LRQ1: What research evidence supports the introduction of PRR and PM for POBs in the public sector?

LRQ2: How are the constructs PRR and PM in the public sector conceptualised and explained in theoretical models in the literature?

LRQ3: What are the success factors in the implementation of PRR and PM systems in the public sector?

LRQ4: What are the challenges in implementing PRR and PM systems in the public sector?

Empirical research questions:

ERQ1: What are the attitudes towards the implementation of PRR and PM for POBs?

ERQ2: What are the key success factors in implementing PRR and PM systems for POBs?

ERQ3: What are the challenges in implementing PRR and PM systems for POBs?

The next section discusses the findings related to the conceptualisation of PRR and PM.

6.2 CONCEPTUALISATION OF PERFORMANCE-RELATED REMUNERATION AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

In exploring the current remuneration system and PM for elected POBs of provincial legislatures, Theme 1 provided insights into how participants define and apply the concepts of PRR and PM. There was a general consensus that performance should be directly linked to remuneration. Participants argued that this could act as an effective incentive to improve performance and accountability. Notably, the emphasis was not on rewarding top performers; participants felt that everyone who delivered in line with expectations should be rewarded.

Participants indicated the importance of setting clear performance expectations through agreements or targets, regularly assessing performance, and ensuring the necessary interventions when targets are unmet. This process was again deemed critical for all employees. Participants stated that organisational instruments such as regulations and policies must provide a context that is conducive to the implementation of a PM system. They noted that there is currently no PM framework for POBs. They also noted the absence of legislation with which to enforce a link between remuneration and POBs' performance, despite the Commission having recommended that POBs' total remuneration be aligned with that of the private sector, as was done with senior management positions (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2017).

While some internal measures to ensure performance may exist within political parties, there was a strong call to formalise these processes in the legislatures. This formalisation, participants believe, would assist in holding POBs accountable, ultimately leading to improved service delivery. Erasmus et al. (1998) indicate that some of the major constraints in PM in South Africa, as outlined by Spangenberg's research (1993: 30-34), include the difficulty of integrating PM into other organisational systems, including the reward system. This view is supported by Chatto (2020).

The report of the Portfolio Committee on Public Service and Administration (2010, as cited by Mokoena, 2019) states that PM varies between other public service organisations and provincial legislatures and called for an organisational review of every provincial legislature (South African Legislative Sector Support, 2009). Furthermore, the report highlights the necessity of creating PM systems and policies for provincial legislatures to prevent inter-institutional competition (Mokoena, 2019).

Armstrong (2017) defines PM as a methodical and inclusive system of optimising organisational operations by improving employee performance at every level. Bacal (2003, p. viii, as cited by Modipane, Botha & Blom, 2019) indicates that PM entails continual communication between management and employees to ensure clarity regarding expectations of employees and contributions towards organisational goals. Furthermore, a PM system should include performance measurements to inform necessary interventions (Bacal, 2003, p. viii, as cited by Modipane, Botha & Blom, 2019).

PM and PRR may foster an environment that is conducive to improved organisational performance (Brown et al., 2018). An effective PM system defines the expected inputs and outputs of employees creating clarity (Blackman et al., 2017). Participants in the current study also indicated that the two concepts differed but were interrelated and that there was "a thin line between the two concepts". The link between PRR and PM ensures that employee incentives are aligned with their actual and required performance. The connection between the two within a legislative framework ensures that practices are compliant with the law, transparent, and fair "... because it is supposed to be contractual, relevant to the task and consensual".

The use of PRR in the public service is widespread in OECD member countries. Of 34 OECD countries, 28 use PRR in their central government (OECD, 2012: 7). Mattone (2013: 3) recommends positive performance management, a framework incorporating 10 key principles leaders could utilise to produce comprehensive, authentic, and timely performance reviews. Correct application of PM systems in organisations relies on their introduction through organisational policy, as PM system implementation in organisations could be challenging (Chatto, 2020). PM systems are prone to manipulation and subjectiveness, particularly when favouritism exists. To mitigate these challenges, organisational stakeholders should be educated on the application of PM systems (Lee, 2020).

There is an alignment between the literature and the findings of the current study with regard to the linking of remuneration to performance and the fact that this would enhance individuals' accountability and effectiveness. Furthermore, the performance targets need to be communicated clearly and in a timely manner.

6.3 ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION OF PRR AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE

Participants' attitudes towards implementation of PRR and PM and the provincial legislatures' readiness for implementation varied greatly. Participants expressed concerns such as a lack of accountability and apprehension about linking pay to performance. Participants also expressed fears that such systems, while well-intentioned, if not instituted properly, could exacerbate the concerns around the remuneration of public service employees.

Some participants expressed reluctance regarding implementing PRR for elected POBs, noting that they had little hope of it being successful. Even participants in favour of such systems noted that their implementation may be faced with resistance from elected officials because they are unsure of the long-term implications.

The next section discusses the overall readiness of provincial legislatures to implement PRR and PM systems through a collation of the empirical findings regarding various success factors and challenges, together with extant literature.

6.4 READINESS OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES TO IMPLEMENT PERFORMANCE-RELATED REMUNERATION AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

The data highlighted concern amongst elected officials regarding unveiling any potential shortcomings in their performance. This fear of exposure, especially if they have not been assessed in a formal capacity before, may lead to resistance to any system that aims to closely monitor them in the execution of their duties and hold them accountable. Participants also indicated reluctance to change and move from their 'comfort' zones.

P13 indicated that there is an appetite for PM, but P19 noted a lack of initiative in legislatures to implement such systems. The participant could not recall an instance where there was an attempt to engage in the PM process. Participants noted that the present systems were either non-existent or inadequate to support PM and mentioned the lack of formal legislative measures and policies to guide changes. Participants also shed light on the priorities of political parties, alluding to a disproportionate emphasis on election-related activities over legislative duties. This suggests a potential misalignment in priorities, which could be an obstacle to introducing performance-based systems.

Participants noted the importance of collaboration across governmental tiers and institutions, suggesting that any attempt at overhauling systems or introducing new ones would necessitate broad alignment. Participants also emphasised the importance of ensuring that elected officials were adequately prepared and skilled for their roles, indicating a proactive approach to capacity-building. A noteworthy perspective was that of fostering a performance-oriented culture to the point that it became part of the organisation's DNA. This suggests a transformative shift in attitudes and moving beyond mere systems to cultivating a culture that gravitates towards performance and accountability. The culture change should be managed diligently, and the main focus should be directed at moulding the attitudes and behaviour of POBs to ensure they support the change process.

The literature review on the readiness of South African legislatures to implement PM and PRR systems revealed that inadequate research had been conducted in this sector and that no PM and PRR systems had been officially implemented in the provincial legislatures. Most governments are still in the infancy stage of ensuring alignment in the remuneration of top and senior roles to that of the private sector. This practice is noticeable in the European public sector (Hay Group, 2004:7).

Many countries continually investigate alternative and proven approaches to remunerating senior executives. considerations and limits to state resources constrain the upper limits of executive pay and incentive rewards. The political consideration of executive pay is most noticeable during political and governmental transitions. An example is the former President of France, Francois Hollande, who decreased his and his ministers' salaries by 30%. His predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, raised his salary after being elected. The extensive inequality in executive remuneration levels between countries indicates country values and politics influencing decisions on executive pay (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012: 40).

Change readiness of organisations includes a willingness to change and assuring employees of the effective implementation of positive change initiatives (Alolabi et al., 2021). It is thus important to conduct a change readiness assessment before introducing PRR and PM systems for POBs. Change readiness assessments are custom-made processes aimed at determining the levels of understanding, approval, and pledge expected with regard to the intended change (Amatayakul, 2005). Participants mostly viewed the state's readiness to adopt PRR and PM in a rather unfavourable light. One participant rated the level of readiness as extremely low, which is evident in the absence of established job profiles. P1, however, indicated that the legislature has been ready for it for some time. The participant indicated that the legislature had created a unit that deals with and oversees PM and that it was raising the performance bar of the entire institution, not only officials.

It is evident from most participants' views that legislatures would need to address certain shortcomings before introducing PRR and PM, specifically policies around appraisal and assessors. One participant suggested that the Parliamentary Oversight Committee could play a major role in overseeing the implementation of PM and PRR systems and ensuring they achieve their intended purpose. P6, however, felt that the legislatures were ready and indicated that an internal monitoring system had already been employed. P8 opined that it was time to introduce such systems to address the lack of commitment to projects and implementation of political decisions in the country. Schnell et al. (2021) assert that PM is an effective tool in positively influencing public sector productivity, regulation, infrastructure development, service delivery, and overall expenditure, which view was raised by P19.

Maheshwari and Singh (2010) emphasise that competition and efforts to improve productivity often lead to organisations reviewing their existing remuneration systems, and many link employees' remuneration to their performance (Kang & Lee, 2020). P11 added the additional benefit of PM ensuring that performance targets are achievable or whether they have to be adjusted.

In 2023, South Africa's government acknowledged its increasing wage bill and fiscal consolidation was offered to decrease government consumption and mitigate the tendency of the wage bill to increase more rapidly than the nominal gross domestic product. The government wage bill has been at the centre of discussion over the previous decade but has received more attention since the COVID-19 pandemic (Sachs, Ewinyu & Shedi, 2023), which led to calls to increase the output of public sector employees and curb government spending. Beer et al. (2019) posit that this could lead to the allocation of financial resources to new investments, which would build citizens' confidence in government. Such efforts would require champions at the top government levels. However, PRR and PM for civil service institutions should be implemented cautiously, sensitively, and under appropriate conditions to ensure the best outcomes (Nica, 2013: 179-184). In this regard, P13 emphasised a need for the political will of all political parties represented in the legislatures to implement the PM and PRR.

Other participants opined that provincial legislatures are not geared for change due to multifaceted challenges. They indicated that readiness entailed more than just having systems and required comprehensive buy-in from POBs, consultation, and a deep-rooted understanding of the importance and implications of introducing PM systems. Participants noted that political parties are vital in establishing readiness, as they bear the primary responsibility for ensuring their members are well-prepared for their roles. Furthermore, these parties are entrusted monitoring their members and ensuring that theyare not just present, but are also effectively discharging their duties. This suggests an intrinsic acknowledgement of the power that political parties wield and their influence in shaping the success or failure of any performance-related system.

P4 and P19 implied that a considerable amount of groundwork needed to be done to achieve readiness which would require extensive consultation and workshops. On the other hand, P14's observations leaned towards the broader issue of *"a culture of mediocracy"* and a lack of understanding of the advantages of implementing PRR and PM. Many participants, in essence, indicated a need for capacity-building, creating an understanding of these systems, and a cultural shift to implement these systems successfully. Educating the general public on the roles and responsibilities of members of parliament emerged as a priority. This would not only foster transparency but also contribute to building trust and strengthen the democratic process. Additionally, participants saw the active involvement of independent institutions, academics, and journalists as a crucial step to motivate members and maintain checks and balances, thereby ensuring that public representatives remain accountable.

Skill development emerged as a pivotal component of performance and readiness. For a PM system to be effective, members and officials on all levels, including speakers, committee chairpersons, and chief whips, would have to be continually equipped with relevant skills. This suggests a comprehensive approach to ensuring that individuals at all levels are prepared, competent, and aligned with the objectives of the provincial legislature.

Participants emphasised the importance of maintaining the cyclical nature of PM to ensure that objectives are met. The findings revealed that some participants believe that while PRR could enhance performance in public service, its application in the legislative context is complex and needs further exploration.

P13 noted the importance of accountability and believed that MPs were increasingly *"accepting the need for performance appraisal and they need accountability both within their organisation and the legislature itself*'. The accountability system promotes transparency and builds trust. When employees understand that their efforts are acknowledged and rewarded based on objective criteria, they have greater confidence in the fairness of remuneration and performance evaluation processes. Accountability also enhances motivation and work engagement as individuals take ownership of their tasks and strive to excel, knowing their efforts directly impact their compensation and career progression.

Participants were of the view that the development and implementation of PRR and PM should not be an administrative decision; the decision should not come from the legislature as an institution via the speaker or the Rules Committee but should be taken by political parties, to ensure buy-in. This notion was supported by P4, P8, P12, P13, P14, and P19.

Participants indicated that transitioning to PRR and PM should include effective change management. Change is a departure from what is known, practised, and anticipated and it is particularly disruptive when there is a gap between the expected change and the change that occurred (Harrington & Voehl, 2018). Jones (2013, as cited by Weideman, 2021) defines organisational change as a process whereby organisations transition from their present existence to an anticipated existence to improve their effectiveness. Change is disruptive, particularly when there is a gap between the expected change and the change that occurred (Harrington & Voehl, 2018).

Participants further noted that such change management should follow a structured process and strategic approach of transitioning people, teams, and organisations from their present state to the preferred future state. They emphasised the importance of strengthening monitoring and evaluation systems during the change process. Some participants indicated that effective change management entails much more than merely introducing reforms; the reforms have to be seamlessly integrated and sustained throughout the organisation. Participants also emphasised the importance of considering both the technical and people aspects during the transition. The provincial legislature must institute a shared culture that allows and supports change to enhance performance. Such a culture would contribute to employees' understanding of the required behaviours, which is important in implementing a new system (Lubis & Hanum, 2019).

As part of this culture, managers should regularly communicate with employees about their performance, strengths, and areas for improvement. Participants noted that performance feedback should be constructive and supportive. Feedback is vital in ensuring that the process is perceived as fair, transparent, and inclusive. Participants also emphasised the importance of two-way feedback, whereby employees are involved in goal-setting and performance evaluation processes. Employees must be informed about the PM and remuneration system, its purpose, and any possible updates or changes.

Participants placed a strong emphasis on learning and development to improve performance. Adequate training and resources should be available for the employees to enable better performance.

Many participants noted the importance of accountability, with some stating that PM could enhance it. At the same time, P3 emphasised that a lack of accountability is the reason individuals are opposed to PM. P19 provides a more optimistic viewpoint, suggesting that elected officials understand their responsibilities. P17 and P19 indicated the problem in the legislature of members representing different political parties. Members are charged with helping to achieve the manifesto of the party, which is why parties, and not individuals, are represented in the legislature. In addition, parties would have to manage non-members. This dispensation undermines accountability and complicates PRR and PM. P3 noted the same lack of accountability at the national level.

PM and PRR systems should be sufficiently flexible to take into account external factors beyond individuals' control. Participants named the COVID-19 pandemic as an example, during which offices were closed in compliance with national lockdown regulations.

Another significant challenge in implementing PRR is resistance from the public due to the already high cost of government salaries. The World Bank (2012) has noted that PRR should not be implemented in the public sector due to various political intricacies and disparate job variables. Providing performance bonuses to all employees may be perceived as an indirect salary supplement rather than a performance incentive.

The internal dynamics of politics, marked by division and factionalism, and how these affect legislative functions may be a considerable challenge in implementing PM and PRR. These dynamics may also deleteriously affect the perceived fairness of performance awards, with some suggesting greater oversight by independent institutions. A number of participants raised the issue of who would oversee the overseer, as elections take place only every five years. P3 emphasised that effective PM would be difficult until the electoral system allows the public to vote directly for an individual.

Political parties would have to support the system whereby parliament or provincial legislatures manage the performance of their elected members and link their performance to remuneration and other rewards independent from the political parties that deployed those members (Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, 2007).

This concludes the discussion of the findings. The next section offers recommendations for practice.

6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE

Based on the study findings, the following should be considered in linking the remuneration of South African provincial legislatures' POBs to their performance.

Efforts to implement PRR and PM should be made with the public's involvement, who should hold members accountable for their performance and service delivery. This requires transparency and communication. Provincial legislatures need to ensure that sound policies are in place to maintain the system and that the organisational climate is conducive to performance. In addition, citizens should be given a say in the appointment of the individuals to public office.

Coherent policies and regulations for PRR and PM need to be established to ensure collaboration and alignment and realise efficiencies across governmental tiers and structures. The system should be underpinned by provincial legislatures fostering a culture of accountability aligned to society's values and expectations. Initiatives to implement PM should be preceded by wide consultation to ensure the buy-in of all stakeholders. Independent institutions should oversee the implementation and functioning of PRR and PM systems. Readiness assessments should be conducted prior to implementation to ensure that the success factors and likely challenges are adequately addressed.

Provincial legislatures should ensure that their POBs are continually trained and developed to ensure they have the required skills to perform optimally. Gaps in skills and their effects on performance should be communicated clearly and timeously and addressed rapidly. POBs also need to be informed of the functioning of the PRR and PM systems and kept abreast of changes. Provincial legislators, therefore, have to establish wide-reaching and effective communication channels as an initial step in ensuring readiness. Envisioned changes need to be communicated in a transparent and inclusive manner to POBs, and communication should, at the same time, foster a culture of high performance.

The next section provides a reconciliation of the research questions and objectives, followed by an overview of the study's limitations together with recommendations for future research.

6.6 RECONCILIATION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES

6.6.1 Reconciliation of research objectives

The principal research objective of this research was: *To explore the readiness of South African provincial legislators to implement PRR and PM systems for POBs*, which was achieved by addressing the secondary research objectives.

SRO1, to determine attitudes towards implementation of PRR and PM for POBs, was addressed in the findings reported in Section 5.2.2 (*Theme 2: Attitudes towards implementation of PRR and PM*).

SRO2, to determine the main factors that need to be considered in developing and implementing effective PRR and PM systems, was addressed in the findings reported in Section 5.2.3 (*Theme 3: Success factors in implementing PRR and PM*), which were aligned with extant literature in Section 6.5.

SRO3, to determine the challenges that may obstruct the introduction of PRR and PM systems, was addressed in the findings reported in Section 5.2.4 (*Theme 4: Current challenges in implementing PRR and PM*), which were aligned with extant literature in Section 6.6.

6.6.2 Reconciliation of research questions

The main research question was: *Are South African provincial legislatures ready to implement PRR and PM systems for POBs?* The main RQ was answered by addressing two sets of secondary research questions.

6.6.2.1 Literature review RQs

LRQ1: What research evidence supports the introduction of PRR and PM for POBs in the public sector? was addressed in Section 3.8 (*PM and PRR in the public sector*).

LRQ2: How are the constructs PM and PRR in the public sector conceptualised and explained by theoretical models in the literature? was addressed in Section 3.2.1 (*Definitions of PM*) and Section 3.4 (*Performance-related remuneration*).

LRQ3: What are the success factors in the implementation of PRR and PM systems in the public sector? was addressed in Chapter 3.

LRQ4: What are the challenges in implementing PRR and PM systems in the public sector? was addressed in Section 3.7.3.

6.6.2.2 Empirical RQs

ERQ1: What are the attitudes towards the implementation of PRR and PM systems? was addressed in Section 5.2.2 (*Attitudes towards implementation of PRR and PM*).

ERQ2: What are the key success factors in implementing PRR and PM systems for POBs? was addressed in Section 5.2.3 (*Success factors in implementing PRR and PM*).

ERQ4: What are the challenges in implementing PRR and PM systems for POBs? was addressed in Section 5.2.4 (*Current challenges in implementing PRR and PM*).

6.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

While this study provides valuable insights into the feasibility of PRR and PM systems for POBs within provincial legislatures, it is important to acknowledge its limitations. One significant limitation is the study's focus on a specific subset of POBs within provincial legislatures. This narrow focus may limit the transferability of the findings to other contexts or levels of government. The unique political, cultural, and organisational characteristics of provincial legislatures may differ significantly from those of other governmental bodies, potentially influencing the applicability of the study's conclusions. This limitation highlights the need for caution when transferring the findings to other settings. Provincial legislatures operate within a specific political framework that may not fully represent the broader governmental landscape. For instance, accountability mechanisms, internal politics, and readiness for change may vary significantly between local, provincial, and national levels of government and between different regions. As such, the effectiveness and challenges of implementing PRR and PM systems observed in this study might differ in other contexts.

To mitigate this limitation and enhance the applicability of the findings, future research could expand the scope to include a broader range of elected officials and comparison across regions. Such research could provide a more comprehensive understanding of the feasibility and challenges of PRR and PM systems in various governmental contexts. Specific future research directions could include:

- Comparative studies: Conducting comparative studies between provincial legislatures and other levels of government, such as local municipalities and national parliaments. This could help identify common challenges and unique barriers at different levels of government.
- Broader range of elected officials: Expanding the research to include a wider range of elected officials, such as those in executive positions (e.g. minister, deputy minister and local government councillors) and different branches of government (e.g. national, provincial and local government).

The study was cross-sectional and qualitative, and future studies could be conducted longitudinally and incorporate quantitative data to determine the effectiveness of PRR and PM systems in the public sector.

Due to public concerns regarding the remuneration of public servants, the topic may have discouraged participation and limited the open and honest sharing of views. Future studies could include other stakeholders, to obtain additional insights from parties who would not be directly affected by the implementation of PM systems.

Future research could focus on developing a framework for the successful implementation of PM and PRR systems for POBs in the provincial legislatures, local government, and parliament. Such studies could explore the following focus areas:

- Institutional readiness to ensure successful implementation of change initiatives;
- Optimisation of service delivery through an effective PM system;
- Linking the productivity and remuneration of POBs;
- Political parties' role in the implementation of change initiatives;
- The role of independent institutions in enforcing PM and PRR for POBs;
- Benchmarking the performance of South African POBs against that of peers in other countries; and
- Assessment of the responsibilities of POBs in relation to remuneration.

There is a lack of research on the public sector in South and Southern Africa, evident in the limited sources available to assist the researchers in taking a Southern African perspective. PM and PRR have not been widely implemented in the public service, which limits practical understanding of the topic.

6.9 EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS AND THE CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED IN CONDUCTING THE STUDY

The decision to advance academic studies was driven by an interest in addressing societal challenges. This study was prompted by public outcries and stakeholder dissatisfaction with the remuneration of POBs in relation to service delivery levels. The extensive scope of the sector made it challenging to define the research parameters. Once relevant materials and interdisciplinary frameworks for understanding PM and PRR were identified, including past determinations of POBs' remuneration, the topic was selected within an overarching theoretical context.

The chosen topic not only offered an opportunity to contribute new insights to the field of HRM and related disciplines, such as industrial and organisational psychology, but also proved to be engaging. The research proposal was reviewed by supervisors, and feedback from former Commission members helped refine the topic. The subsequent task was to prepare a clear, concise bursary application outlining the research goals and significance to secure financial support from the university. This process was challenging but ultimately successful, with the university providing a bursary for the study.

Selecting the appropriate research methodology also presented challenges. Initially, a quantitative approach was adopted, involving an online questionnaire via SurveyMonkey to reach the entire population of 429 elected POBs across nine provincial legislatures. Despite efforts to include participants of all ages, responsibilities, job titles, and tenures, the response rate was poor due to the global COVID-19 lockdown, which led to the closure of provincial legislatures. By August 2021, only two responses were received, prompting a request to amend the research methodology.

Following extensive discussions with supervisors, an application was submitted to UNISA’s College of Economic and Management Sciences Research Ethics Review Committee to transition to a qualitative approach. This amendment was approved from 27 July 2022 to 31 December 2023, necessitating a complete revision of the study's methodology.

Securing interviews with participants proved challenging due to their extensive political engagements, legislative duties, and international travel, often resulting in abrupt cancellations. Some interviews were conducted after hours, and finding replacements for POBs was occasionally difficult. Nevertheless, 21 knowledgeable and experienced participants were eventually interviewed. Assistance from provincial legislatures facilitated the identification of gatekeepers and access to participants, and research objectives were communicated to promote understanding.

The research implementation plan was adjusted to meet required milestones, necessitating effective time management, prioritisation, and goal setting. Valuable feedback from supervisors and former commissioners enriched the research and offered new perspectives.

The scarcity of resources on readiness for implementing PRR and PM systems for POBs in South Africa, particularly for provincial legislatures, posed a challenge. Collating relevant literature and previous research on PM and PRR was sometimes difficult. Balancing work and personal commitments with the study's demands required perseverance. The belief that the research would positively impact provincial legislatures and society at large, supported by the encouragement from supervisors and family, provided motivation. Each milestone achieved was appreciated as a step toward completing the research process.

The final challenge involved making sense of the extensive data collected while avoiding bias and maintaining research ethics. Despite these difficulties, the research process further ignited interest in the field, and it is hoped that the study's findings will be valuable to policymakers and practitioners in this domain.

6.10 CONCLUSION

The literature review about readiness for the implementation of PRR and PM systems of POBs and the detection of challenges that hinder the introduction of these systems within the South African provincial legislatures disclosed that inadequate research has been conducted in this area and within the sector in South Africa to date. Nonetheless, the main findings of this study revealed a general consensus that performance should be directly linked to remuneration. This can act as an effective incentive for improved performance and accountability in the provincial legislatures of South Africa. The essence captured here is that there is a need for capacity building, understanding, and a cultural shift to implement these systems successfully.

The general consensus that performance should be directly linked to remuneration should be interpreted as a change initiative. These recommendations would contribute to the implementation of change management practices, more especially, to the successful implementation of a PM and PRR in the provincial legislature of South Africa. The researcher suggests that such a change process should be considered by all involved and affected by it. Therefore, it is crucial that POBs should comprehend why there is a need to introduce a change.

As discussed in Chapter 4, Peacock (2017: 45) suggests people should be supported to appreciate and endorse change by change drivers, increasing displeasure with the status quo, increasing the vision about the preferred outcome by means of planned steps and celebrating the achievement of key milestones during the process. Nevertheless, the anticipated change will not be as impactful, valuable, or enduring if people oppose change (Onyeneke & Abe, 2021).

The communication strategy is a vital instrument to enable the implementation of the model, and this is part of the concept of the buy-in because the communication strategy would give a detail as to how this intended model is used and to what extent this would assist. Before implementing a PM and PRR, stakeholder management is required, and key stakeholders have to be identified and assigned defined roles as part of the change management shield. This should be undertaken through stakeholder impact analysis to deal with possible anxieties, contests, hazards, and apparent expectations by the POBs. Hence, an action plan must be put together and assigned to specific responsible individuals, and the execution and ongoing awareness be monitored.

There is a necessity for the introduction of PM and PRR for POBs at the provincial legislatures. However, a major issue is whether the provincial legislatures are ready for this change in terms of understanding and buy-in. This requires a political paradigm shift in the political parties. A political party represented in the provincial legislature should adopt a policy that regulates the PM of its members within the institutional mandate.

There should be a common understanding regarding the readiness and acceptance of the introduction of PRR and PM. This may result in promoting positive sentiments of

POBs and their understanding of their responsibilities. The literature reviewed revealed that individuals should understand the requisite for change and how it can be beneficial.

The participants' information revealed that the identification of key elements required for the successful development and implementation of PRR and PM must not be anadministrative decision that is taken from the legislature as an institution, or a decision taken by the speaker or the Rules Committee, but a decision taken by political parties and a buy-in. This should be shared institutional responsibility driven by the political parties.

The data collected revealed that participants' descriptions of the attitudes and willingness of elected POBs towards introducing PRR and PM vary in opinions, and views captured reflect dichotomy. On the one hand, there is a sentiment of positivity and understanding of the responsibilities. The main problem with the PRR is that the attitude differs from person to person and depends largely on performance, amplified by concerns about fears related to accountability and the possibility of apprehensions about linking pay to performance, especially when it comes to money it is a very sensitive area. Participants echoed a concern that sometimes we start things in South Africa with good intentions, but it turns out to become a problem if it is not properly instituted so that it can deliver on the honest intention. Participants' overall sense indicates varying levels of acceptance and resistance to introducing PRR and PM amongst the elected officials. The attitudes differ from person to person, but many POBs might inevitably be reluctant to implement the plan because they do not know how the implications will affect them. In theory and practice, POBs should see the implementation of a PM and PRR as the introduction of new practices in their jobs and that their remuneration could be increased with the increased performance.

In conclusion, it is apparent from the data gathered that the provincial legislatures of South Africa are ready to implement a PM and PRR, and that the POBs have diverse attitudes and feelings concerning implementing a PM system, which is mostly positive. However, it is certain that the POBs are enthusiastic to take part in the change initiative, provided that formal legislative measures or policies to guide any proposed changes required on PM and PRR of POBs is considered. There should be a collaboration across POB institutions and the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of POBs, broad-based alignment, and structures in attempting to overhaul or introduce PM and PRR.

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ANNEXURE A: ETHICAL CLEARANCE

UNISA university of south africa

UNISA COLLEGE OF ECONOMIC AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE

17 October 2019 (Date of issue)

27 July 2022 **(Date of amendment)**

Ref #: 2019_HRM_014
Name: Mr Peter Motshegawa Makapan
Staff number # 32863233

Dear Mr Peter Motshegawa Makapan

Decision: Ethics Approval Extended to 31 December 2023

Working title of research:

"A critical analysis of the feasibility of performance-related remuneration for elected public office-bearers of Provincial legislatures in South Africa"

Qualification: MCOM

Thank you for the application requesting **amendments** to the original research ethics certificate issued by the CEMS Department of Human Resource Management Ethics Review Committee, for the above mentioned research on 19 October 2019. The approval of the requested amendment is granted/extended for the study for the period 27 July 2022 until 31 December 2023.

*The **low risk application** was reviewed by College Research Ethics Review Committee (CRERC) in compliance with the Unisa Policy on Research Ethics using the expedited method.*

The proposed research may now continue with the proviso that:

1. *The researcher/s will ensure that the research project adheres to the values and principles expressed in the UNISA Policy on Research Ethics.*
2. *Any adverse circumstance arising in the undertaking of the research project that is relevant to the ethicality of the study, as well as changes in the methodology,*

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should be communicated in writing to the CRERC. An amended application could be requested if there are substantial changes from the existing proposal, especially if those changes affect any of the study-related risks for the research participants.

3. *The researcher will ensure that the research project adheres to any applicable national legislation, professional codes of conduct, institutional guidelines and scientific standards relevant to the specific field of study.*

Kind regards,

____

Dr Vaola Sambo
Chairperson, CRERC
E-mail: Esambovt@unisa.ac.za
Tel: 012 429 4355

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ANNEXURE B: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM

Enquiries: Mr. PM Makapan
Tel: 012 308 1706/7
Fax: 012 300 5735
E-mail: Peterm@presidency.gov.za

The Presidency
Private Bag X1000
PRETORIA
0001

INDEPENDENT COMMISSION FOR THE REMUNERATION OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEARERS

04 June 2019

Mr. PM Makapan
P.O. Box 69046
HIGHVELD PARK
0169

Dear Mr. Makapan

RE: REQUEST FOR RESEARCH PERMISSION

1. Your letter dated 03 June 2019 has reference.
2. The Commission is highly delighted to note that its employee is studying towards Masters Degree and researching on a topic that is more relevant to its mandate.
3. Your topic "***A critical analysis on the feasibility of performance-related remuneration for elected Public Office-Bearers of Provincial Legislatures (EPOBPL) in South Africa***" will add value to the literature on performance management and remuneration in the civil service.
4. The study will further inform future recommendations of the Commission regarding the development of a performance related remuneration system.
5. The Commission is endorsing your request to conduct research within Provincial Legislatures.
6. The Commission will appreciate to receive the final research report after it has been considered by the University.

Yours sincerely

JUDGE CJ MUSI
CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION

NORTH WEST PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE

Legislature Building
Dr Moroka & Luthuli Drive
Private Bag X2018
MMABATHO
2735

Office of the Speaker
02nd Floor
Tel: 018 392 7012
Fax: 018 392 7166
Email: daimy@nwpl.org.za

OFFICE OF THE SPEAKER

Mr P M Makapan

P.O.Box 69046

Highveld park

0169

13 June 2019

Dear Mr Makapan

RE: REQUEST FOR RESEARCH PERMISSION

We confirm receipt of your request to be granted permission to conduct research within North West Provincial Legislature under the following title;

"A critical analysis on the feasibility of performance-related remuneration for elected Public Office Bearers of Provincial Legislatures(EPOBPL) in South Africa".

After careful consideration of your request, I am delighted to advise that permission has been granted subject to adherence to all ethical requirements of your University in executing such a research and the willingness of Members to participate. There will be no expectation on the side of the Legislature to censor or to receive feedback before submission of the thesis. All Elected POBs will be advised of your request as well as the importance of the research.

Yours Faithfully

Mr O S Mosiane

Secretary to the Legislature

15/06/19

Date

Wes-Kaapse Provinsiale Parlement
Western Cape Provincial Parliament
IPalamente yePhondo leNtshona Koloni

KANTOOR VAN DIE SEKRETARIS
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
I-OFISI KANOBHALA

Navrae Enquiries Imibuzo	James Retief
Tel Umnxeba	+27 (0)21 487 1853
Epos Email I-imeyile	jretief@wcpp.gov.za
Datum Date Umhla	28 June 2019
Verwysing Reference Isalathiso	4/13

PM Makapan
PO Box 69046
Highveld Park
0169
peterm@presidency.gov.za

Dear Mr Makapan,

RESPONSE IRO REQUEST TO CONDUCT ONLINE SURVEY

Your correspondence to Speaker Mnqasela, dated 18 June 2019, refers:

We would be happy to provide you with a list (attached to accompanying email) of the email addresses of the Members of the Western Cape Provincial Parliament in order for you to contact them regarding the conducting of your online survey questionnaire.

What we would require from you is in indication of when you intend to publish the questionnaire and communicate your request to the individual Members, in order that we may alert them in advance and express our support for your research.

Please liaise with our Manager: Stakeholder Management and Communication, James Retief, at jretief@wcpp.gov.za, regarding the above request.

We wish you all of the best with your research.

Yours sincerely,

ROMEO ADAMS
SECRETARY

Posbus 648, Kaapstad
8000, Suid-Afrika

PO Box 648, Cape Town
8000, South Africa

PO Box 648, Ekapa
8000, Mzantsi Afrika

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Limpopo Legislature

OFFICE OF THE SPEAKER

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Postal Address:
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Enq: Rudzani Makhado
Cell: 082 744 2988 / 015 633 8049
Email: makhador@limpopoleg.gov.za

Peter Motshegwa Makapan (Student No.: 32863233)
Masters of Commerce in Business Management
Human Resource Department
University of South Africa

20 June 2019

RE: REQUEST FOR RESEARCH PERMISSION

The above matters refers,

1. The Office of the Speaker kindly acknowledges receipt of your letter requesting to conduct academic research with the Public Office-Bearers and Members of the Limpopo Legislature.

2. You are kindly informed that your request has been approved. This approval also authorise you to conduct interviews with the Public Office-Bearers and Members of the Limpopo Legislature as well as access to public documents which might be relevant to your study.

3. The Limpopo Legislature will assist with the emails as well as the identification of participants, but our advice is that the online survey questionnaire using the emails won't yield maximum response. It is thus recommended that the student should conduct face to face or telephonic interviews with the Office-Bearers and Members of the Limpopo Legislature.

4. Your topic "***A critical analysis on the feasibility of performance-related remuneration for elected Public Office-Bearers of Provincial Legislatures (EPOBPL) in South Africa***" is essential as it will form the basis for the introduction and implementation of performance related remuneration and performance management for honourable members within the legislative sector.

5. We look forward to your research outcomes, which we hope will benefit the institution in improving its performance related remuneration and performance management.

Kind regards

....

Hon. Mavhungu Lerule-Ramakhanya
Speaker: Limpopo Legislature

ANNEXURE C: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE AND PROTOCOL

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

Ethics clearance reference number: 2019_HRM_014
Research permission reference number (if applicable):

Date: 25 July 2022

Title: A critical analysis of the feasibility of performance-related remuneration for elected public office-bearers of Provincial legislatures in South Africa

Dear Prospective Participant

My name is Mr. Peter Motshegwa Makapan and I am doing research with **Dr ML Bezuidenhout**, senior lecturer at the Department of Human Resources Management, Unisa and **Prof M Bussin**, Professor at the Department of IOP and People Management, the University of Johannesburg towards a Masters of Commerce in Business Management at University of South Africa. We are inviting you to participate in a study entitled:

A critical analysis of the feasibility of performance-related remuneration for elected public office-bearers of Provincial legislatures in South Africa

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY?

The purpose of the study is to collect important information that could help us to assess whether Provincial Legislatures are ready for the implementation of a performance related remuneration (PRR) and performance management (PM) for elected public office bearers of Provincial Legislature (EPOBPL). Another anticipated outcome is to determine the challenges that hinder the introduction of PRR and PM within the South African Provincial Legislatures.

WHY AM I BEING INVITED TO PARTICIPATE?

You were selected to participate in this survey because of your working experience and exposure to the operations of the legislative and executive sectors environment and your understanding of the responsibilities of public office bearers. Your information and contacts details had been obtained through our past working relations, from the Commission database and the Accounting Officer of your institution. Approximately ± 20 participants will be engaged in this study.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF MY PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY?

You will be subjected to the interview where the researcher will pose questions and your responses will assist in achieving the research objective. The interview session is anticipated to last at least for 60 minutes.

1

CAN I WITHDRAW FROM THIS STUDY EVEN AFTER HAVING AGREED TO PARTICIPATE?

Participating in this study is voluntary and you are under no obligation to consent to participation. If you do decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a written consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason during the interview session.

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?

We do not foresee that you will experience any negative consequences during the interview. You will not benefit from your participation as an individual, however, it is envisioned that the findings of this study will highlight how the government can shape its remuneration strategy to enhance a performance driven society, especially among its elected public representatives.

ARE THERE ANY NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR ME IF I PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH PROJECT?

We do not foresee that you will experience any negative consequences from participating in the interview session or that the study will harm you in any way.

WILL THE INFORMATION THAT I CONVEY TO THE RESEARCHER AND MY IDENTITY BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL?

The researcher(s) undertake to keep any information provided herein confidential, not to let it out of our possession and to report on the findings from the perspective of the participating group and not from the perspective of an individual.

HOW WILL THE RESEARCHER(S) PROTECT THE SECURITY OF DATA?

The researcher(s) undertake to keep any information provided herein confidential, not to let it out of our possession and to report on the findings from the perspective of the participating group and not from the perspective of an individual. The research records will be kept for five years for audit purposes whereafter it will be permanently destroyed (e.g. meeting notes will be shredded and electronic versions will be permanently deleted from the hard drive of the computer). Permission to record the proceedings of the interviews will be requested from the interviewee/participant.

WILL I RECEIVE PAYMENT OR ANY INCENTIVES FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY?

You will not be reimbursed or receive any incentives for your participation in the survey.

HAS THE STUDY RECEIVED ETHICS APPROVAL?

This study has received written approval from the Research Ethics Review Committee of the Department of Human Resource Management at Unisa. A copy of the approval letter can be obtained from the researcher on request.

HOW WILL I BE INFORMED OF THE FINDINGS/RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH?

If you would like to be informed of the final research findings, please contact Peter Motshegwa Makapan during office hours at 012 308 1707 / 082 802 3539 or 32863233@mylife.unisa.ac.za. The findings are accessible after six months. Should you require any further information or want to contact the researcher about any aspect of this study, please contact Dr ML Bezuidenhout during office hours at 012 429 4535 or Bezuiml@unisa.ac.za.

Should you have concerns about the way in which the research has been conducted, you may contact Dr ML Bezuidenhout during office hours at 012 429 4535 or Bezuiml@unisa.ac.za. Alternatively, you can contact the CEMS Research Ethics and Integrity Advisor if you have any concerns: Dr M Engelbrecht at engelm1@unisa.ac.za .

Thank you for taking time to read this information sheet and for participating in this study. Thank you.

Signature: ____________________

Peter Motshegwa Makapan

Signature of Participant: ____________________

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Dear Prospective participant,

You are invited to participate in an interview conducted by ***Peter Motshegwa Makapan*** under the supervision of ***Dr ML Bezuidenhout***, senior lecturer at the Department of Human Resources Management, Unisa and ***Prof M Bussin***, Professor at the Department of IOP and People Management, the University of Johannesburg towards a Master of Commerce in Business Management at the University of South Africa.

You were selected to participate in this survey because of your working experience and exposure to the operations of the legislative and executive sectors environment and understanding of the responsibilities of public office-bearers. If you are younger than 18 years and have less than 5 years' experience in the sectors mentioned above, you will not be eligible to participate in the interview. By participating in this project, you agree that the information you provide may be used for research purposes, including dissemination through peer-reviewed publications and conference proceedings.

It is anticipated that the information we gain from this survey will help us to assess whether Provincial Legislatures are ready for the implementation of a performance related remuneration (PRR) and performance management (PM) for elected public office bearers of Provincial Legislature (EPOBPL). Another anticipated outcome is to determine the challenges that hinder the introduction of PRR and PM within the South African Provincial Legislatures.

You are, however, under no obligation to participate and you can withdraw from the study prior to completing the interview. If you choose to participate it will take up no more than 60 minutes of your time.

You will not benefit from your participation as an individual, however, it is envisioned that the findings of this study will increase the body of knowledge in the human resources discipline and assess the readiness of Provincial Legislatures to implement performance related remuneration and performance management for their public office bearers.

We do not foresee that you will experience any negative consequences by attending the scheduled interview or that the study will harm you in any way. The researcher(s) undertake to keep any information provided herein confidential, not to let it out of our possession and to report on the findings from the perspective of the participating group and not from the perspective of an individual.

The interview will be recorded and videotaped via MS Teams. The records will be kept for five years for audit purposes whereafter it will be permanently destroyed, and interview notes will be shredded, and electronic versions will be permanently deleted from the hard drive of the computer. You will not be reimbursed or receive any incentives for your participation in the survey.

The research was reviewed and approved by the UNISA HRM Ethics Review Committee. The primary researcher, **Peter Motshegwa Makapan**, can be contacted during office hours at 012 308 1707 / 082 802 3539 or Makapanpm@gmail.gov.za. The study leader, **Dr ML Bezuidenhout**, can be contacted during office hours at 012 429 4535 or Bezuiml@unisa.ac.za . Should you have any questions regarding the ethical aspects of the study, you can contact the CEMS Research Ethics and Integrity Advisor, Dr M Engelbrecht, during office hours at 012 429 3111 or engelm1@unisa.ac.za. Alternatively, you can report any serious unethical behaviour at the University's Toll-Free Hotline at 0800 86 96 93.

Peter M Makapan

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS / SCHEDULE

1. Please indicate the following:

1.1. Name of the Provincial Legislature you are serving or the Province you are residing in.

1.2. Your job designation and nature of your current employment

DESIGNATION/TITLE	NATURE OF APPOINTMENT	LEVEL

1.3. Ethnic group

Asian	Black African	Coloured	White	Other

1.4. Highest qualification

Matric/Gr 12	
National Diploma	

Undergraduate Degree	
Masters Degree	
Doctorate Degree	
Other	

1.5. Length of service as an elected public office bearer at the current Provincial Legislature or civil servant:

Less than 2 years	
2 - 5 years	
6 – 10 years	
11 – 15 years	
16 years or more	

2. Please provide your understanding of the two constructs, performance related remuneration/pay (PRR) and performance management (PM)?

3. What would you say are the key factors for the successful development and implementation of a fair and equitable PRR and PM for EPOBPL?

4. According to you, what are the attitudes of EPOBPL towards the implementation of PRR and PM within the Provisional Legislature?

5. What are the challenges that hinder the introduction of PRR and PM for EPOBPL? Please explain why.

6. What is the extent/level of readiness of the Provincial Legislature regarding the introduction of PRR and PM for EPOBPL?

Thank you for the time you have invested in this research effort.
Your contribution is valued and will contribute enormously toward the successful implementation of change initiatives within the Legislative sector.

ANNEXURE D: CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT WITH TRANSCRIBER AND CODER

UNISA university of south africa

Confidentiality Agreement Transcriber / Coder

This is to certify that I, **Ms. Monique van der Walt**, the Research Consultant assisted in coding interviews report on the research project "*A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEASIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE-RELATED REMUNERATION FOR ELECTED PUBLIC OFFICE-BEARERS OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES IN SOUTH AFRICA*".

I acknowledge that the research project is conducted by **Peter Motshegwa Makapan** of the Department of Business Management, University of South Africa.

I understand that any information (written, verbal or any other form) obtained during the performance of my duties must remain confidential and in line with the UNISA Policy on Research Ethics.

This includes all information about participants, their employees/their employers/their organisation, as well as any other information.

I understand that any unauthorised release or carelessness in the handling of this confidential information is considered a breach of the duty to maintain confidentiality.

I further understand that any breach of the duty to maintain confidentiality could be grounds for immediate dismissal and/or possible liability in any legal action arising from such breach.

Full Name of Research Consultant: **Monique van der Walt**

Signature of Research Consultant: ______________________ Date: 13/02/2024

Full Name of Primary Researcher: **PETER M MAKAPAN**

Signature of Primary Researcher: ______________________ Date: 13/02/2024

University of South Africa
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ANNEXURE E: CERTIFICATE OF LANGUAGE EDITING

TERESA KAPP

Phone:
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E-mail:
tekapp@mweb.co.za
info@teresakapp.com

This serves to certify that I duly edited:

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEASIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE-RELATED REMUNERATION FOR ELECTED PUBLIC OFFICE-BEARERS OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES IN SOUTH AFRICA

by

Peter Motshegwa Makapan

I am an accredited editor with the University of Johannesburg, University of Stellenbosch Business School, NWU, UP, UCT, and GIBS, and my clients include the United Nations Global Compact, Absa, FNB, Takealot, and various other universities and organisations in South Africa and Namibia.

Please note that all editing is done in *Track Changes*, and I therefore have no control over what is accepted or rejected by the author. Furthermore, I have no control over text added at a later stage.

Should there be any queries, please contact me on the number provided above.

Teresa Kapp