The archaeology of the skirmish at Redelinghuys (Vegkop) during the South African War, December 1901

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The archaeology of the skirmish at Redelinghuys (Vegkop) during the South African War, December 1901

I declare that the above dissertation is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

I further declare that I submitted the dissertation to originality checking software and that it falls within the accepted requirements for originality.

I further declare that I have not previously submitted this work, or part of it, for examination at Unisa for another qualification or at any other higher education institution.

31 January 2024

SIGNATURE DATE

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Abstract

The dynamics of skirmishes during a war differ quite a bit from formal engagements. The skirmish on Vegkop during the latter part of the South African War of 1899 to 1902 is a typical example of such an incident. Through the use of metal detectors and the aid of written and oral tradition, the researcher was able to establish the events of the skirmish, as well as highlight the key differences between a skirmish and a battle. Although very small in comparison to the more popular battle sites, any skirmish site investigation can improve our understanding of the dynamics of war. The archaeological investigation into the skirmish between the Boer forces and the British forces in the Sandveld area of the Western Cape provides new insight into the mindset of the guerrilla fighters who boldly took on the British forces on their own territory and who were vastly unprepared for such an invasion.

KEY TERMS: battlefield archaeology; conflict archaeology; metal detector surveys; South African War (1899 to 1902); Smuts; Jeudwine; Skirmishes; Vegkop; Redelinghuys

Opsomming

Daar bestaan ‘n wesentlike verskil in die dinamika tussen skermutselings en die meer formele gevegte tydens ‘n oorlog. Die gebeure by Vegkop gedurende die laaste deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse Oorlog van 1899 tot 1902 is ‘n sprekende voorbeeld van so ‘n skermutseling. Die gebruik van metaalverklikkers, tesame met geskrewe bronne en mondelinge oorvertellings, het die navorser in staat gestel om die gebeure tydens die skermutseling te ondersoek, sowel as om die oorwegende verskille tussen ‘n skermutseling en ‘n formele geveg aan te dui. Hoewel ‘n skermutseling klein is in vergelyking met die meer bekende gevegte, kan enige ondersoek na ‘n skermutselingsterrein ons meer insig gee oor die dinamika van ‘n oorlog. Die argeologiese ondersoek na die skermutseling tussen die Boeremagte en die Britse magte, in die Sandveld-streek van die Wes-Kaap, bied nuwe insigte tot die ingesteldheid van die guerrillavegters wat waaghalsig die niksvermoedende Britse magte op hul eie grondgebied aangepak het.

Isishwankathelo

Ubudlelwane bongquzulwano ngexesha lemfazwe bohlukile kancinane kwidabi elisesikweni. Ungquzulwano lwaseVegkop njengenxalenye yokugqibela yeMfazwe yoMzantsi Afrika yowe1899 ukuya kowe1902 ngumzekelo oqhelekileyo wesiganeko esinjalo. Ngokusebenzisa izixhobo zentsimbi kunye noncedo lwembali ebhaliweyo neyomlomo, umphandi ukwazile ukufumana iziganeko zolu ngquzulwano, kunye nokubhentsisa umahluko ophambili phakathi kongquzulwano kunye nedabi okanye imfazwe. Nangona ezi ziganeko zincinci kakhulu xa zithelekiswa neendawo zamadabi/iimfazwe ezaziwa kakhulu, naluphi na uphando lwendawo yongquzulwano lunokuphucula ukuqonda kwethu iintshukumo zemfazwe. Uphando lwenzululwazi ngezakudala malunga nongquzulwano phakathi kwemikhosi yamaBhulu kunye nemikhosi yaseBritani kwindawo yaseSandveld eNtshona Koloni lunika umbono omtsha malunga nendlela yokucinga yabanqolobi abathi ngenkalipho bahlasela imikhosi yaseBritani kwindawo yayo neyayingalilungiselelanga kwaphela olo hlaselo.

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List of Abbreviations

°	Degree(s)
BCE	Before Common Era
CCF	Cape Colonial Forces
CE	Common Era
cm	Centimetre(s)
g	Gram(s)
GPS	Global Positioning System
HWC	Heritage Western Cape
km	Kilometre(s)
km²	Square kilometre(s)
m	Metre(s)
mm	Millimetre(s)
mmR	Millimetre rimmed
NHRA	National Heritage Resources Act
UK	United Kingdom
UNISA	University of South Africa
US	United States
USA	United States of America

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Prelude to the skirmish at Vegkop, Redelinghuys

Around December 1901, a small hill called Vegkop, just outside the town of Redelinghuys, became the scene of a skirmish between the Boer forces under the control of General Jan Christian Smuts and the British forces under the command of Major Hugh Sandham Jeudwine. Redelinghuys is a small settlement approximately 160 km north of Cape Town between the port town of Elands Bay and Piketberg.

Smuts urged the Boer leaders in June 1901 to send a more powerful expedition into the British-controlled Cape Colony, as all the previous expeditions into the Cape led by General Christiaan Rudolf de Wet, General James Barry Munnik Hertzog, and General Pieter Hendrik Kritzinger failed to rally the support they hoped for (Steyn 2017: 31). Approval was given and on 1 August 1901 Smuts, together with around 340 volunteers, entered the Cape Colony (Steyn 2017: 32).

Smuts invasion was done for two reasons: firstly, to cause as much disruption as possible in the hope that the British authorities would recall troops from the Boer republics to combat the invasion (Steyn 2017: 31); and secondly, to mobilise the local community in support of the Boer republics (Maritz 1939: 40). During Smuts' invasion of the Cape Colony, multiple raids were launched on British supply convoys travelling between Lambert's Bay and Clanwilliam after the invading Boer force shifted its focus to British supply routes (Maritz 1939: 42; Van Bart & Scholtz 2003: 286). One particular supply route between Elands Bay and Piketberg was also targeted, and it was along this route that the skirmish at Vegkop occurred.

The Boer Republics had a history of fighting for independence from the British Empire, and after successfully repelling the British attempt at annexation during the First Boer War of 1880 to 1881 (Pretorius 1998: 8), they found themselves facing a more aggressive and powerful British Empire during the South African War (also known as the Second Boer War or Anglo-Boer War). The only option to combat the British was to change their fighting techniques to those of guerrilla fighters and to engage in more skirmish-style attacks (Wessels 2011b: 1). Raiding for resources during the guerrilla phase became more common as the Boer forces

found themselves isolated from their home base and supplies. Low on supplies, the British supply lines was attacked during an ambush assault.

1.2 Research question and research objective

This study's research questions are as follows: Is it possible to identify the dynamics of skirmishes versus battles using archaeological means? Furthermore, can these data be used to analyse the differences between skirmishes, which are normally short-lived, and more planned and formal battles?

The primary aims of the research were to gain an understanding of the scope of a skirmish through archaeological methods, and to gain an understanding of the dynamics of an unplanned or unstructured skirmish between a professional standing army and guerrilla forces in the South African context during the South African War.

The study's goal or objective was to explore the dynamics of a skirmish and to compare it to planned fights between a professional standing army (the British forces) and guerrilla fighters (the Boer forces). Because most battlefield encounters were more of a skirmish than a full-fledged battle, archaeological sites such as Vegkop might shed more light on unstructured warfare and the dynamics around utilising the surroundings and landscape to surprise the opponent and thus gaining an advantage.

By analysing and reconstructing the skirmish at Vegkop, the researcher was able to verify the sources used (Maritz 1939; Wessels 1993; Reitz & Emslie 1999; Van Bart & Scholtz 2003; Steyn 2017) and supplement the oral traditions that are available on the movement and actions of the Boer forces in the Sandveld area. This was also a unique opportunity to investigate a skirmish style of engagement during the South African War in the Western Cape Sandveld area. This is significant in the sense that little to no archaeological research has been conducted on the many skirmishes in the Sandveld and West Coast region of South Africa to date.

To conduct the archaeological phase of the research, the following approvals were obtained:

- Appendix A: Piketberg Museum (Local authority: Piketberg) (see Appendix A);
- Appendix B: West Coast Aboriginal Council (Registered conservation body: St Helena Bay) (see Appendix B);
- Appendix C: Iziko Museum (Museum to host the artefacts excavated: Cape Town) (see Appendix C);
- Appendix D: Unifrutti (Farm on which Vegkop is located: Redelinghuys) (see Appendix D);
- Appendix E: University of South Africa (UNISA) (Affiliated university: Pretoria) (see Appendix E); and
- Appendix F: Stamped Locality Plan (Bergrivier Municipality: Velddrif) (see Appendix F).

Heritage Western Cape approved the application process and Appendix G: Heritage Western Cape (HWC) Permit Number 1081105NK0412E (see Appendix G) was issued to conduct an archaeological investigation of the site using metal detectors. The College of Human Science Research Ethics Review Committee at UNISA issued Appendix H: Ethics Approval to Conduct Oral Interviews. The transcripts for the interviews are attached in Appendix I: Personal Interview Transcripts.

1.3 Research significance

Historical sources and investigations into South African conflicts tend to focus on major battles and formal engagements. For instance, battles fought in Natal, such as the Battle of Isandlwana (1879), Majuba (1881), and Spionkop (1900), were immortalised in films and their sites or locations of battle became popular tourist destinations. There have been few archaeological investigations into the Cape Colony clashes, which have mostly focused on infiltrations into the Karoo region (De Jongh & Gordon 2018).

Although various historical sources recorded and documented Smuts' campaign into the Western Cape (Reitz & Emslie 1999; Grobler 2004; Steyn 2017), archaeological evidence of the raid is lacking, particularly in the area of the Sandveld. As a result, an archaeological investigation of the Boer assaults on the West Coast of the Cape Colony could be a valuable contribution to gaining a better understanding of the actions employed by the invading force

around the Sandveld area during the South African War, particularly at Vegkop. Environmental factors, routes taken, and military tactics employed can all be used to supplement historical records of the war.

According to Knight and Passmore (2019: 3), any skirmish, no matter how insignificant, could be of heritage value, even if there is no visible evidence of a battle. It is the archaeologist's task to examine each small item in order to map our understanding of human behaviour through the material left behind (Deetz 1996: 4). A broad understanding of the use and development of weapons, tactics, and the various modes of conflict can be gained by studying small-scale wars and skirmishes (Knight & Passmore 2019: 1). As reported by Scott and McFeaters (2011: 116), battlefield archaeology has evolved into a reliable field of study that, when combined with maps and historical documents, can provide a more accurate portrait of battle strategies and tactics. The National Heritage Resources Act (NHRA), Act 25 of 1999, states that society has a responsibility to preserve all tangible objects for future generations, especially those of cultural significance to promote respect and understanding (South Africa 1999: Section 5.1(b)). The NHRA further identifies "victims of conflict" (South Africa 1999: Section 3.2(g)(iii)) as people who died because of war, including members of Great Britain who died before 1914 (South Africa 1999: Section 2(xviil)(b)) and those who died during the South African War (South Africa 1999: Section 2(xviil)(c)).

Battlefield archaeology is a relatively small and new sub-discipline of archaeology that only became popular in the late mid-1950s (Scott 2010: 29) but has the potential to provide valuable insight into the actions and shaping of the archaeological landscape because it involves soldiers' actions, as well as their cultural and political beliefs. These violent battlefield acts have shaped today's society and cultural boundaries. We can gain insight into human behaviour and a more accurate picture of the past by studying and investigating these violent actions and the destruction they left behind. We can learn how these soldiers changed their offensive strategy in the latter stages of the war by adapting to and using the environment to their advantage, outmanoeuvring their opponent, and employing an effective hit-and-run tactic (Maritz 1939; Wessels 1993; Reitz & Emslie 1999).

Documentation and oral tradition are conducted after a battle, sometimes years later, which can result in a biased account of what had occurred. A more accurate picture can be

established when supplementing these sources with archaeological records. Battlefield archaeology has proven useful in areas where applying standard archaeological methods is difficult due to the vast area and the short timeframe of the events (compared to the more general archaeological investigation where thousands of years of archaeological records accumulate).

1.4 Project location

Vegkop (see Map 1) is located approximately 4 km outside Redelinghuys, on the R366 heading towards Piketberg. The hill where the skirmish took place is located on the Matroozefontein farm, which is marked in red on the locality plane obtained from the Bergrivier Local Municipality (see Map 2). Today, the farm is a fruit farm owned and administered by the company Unifrutti. The hill measures around 200 x 200 m. The boulders on the hill restrict the practice of agriculture.

To the north of the hill, the R366 connects Redelinghuys and Piketberg, while citrus trees are grown further north. The famous seasonal and reed-filled Verlorenvlei[1] is located to the south of the hill. Between the hill and wetlands on the south side is a small dirt road that functioned as the main road during the South African War and up until the construction of a tar road on the north side of the hill. Consequently, the area has remained relatively unchanged throughout the years.

[1] Verlorenvlei is a waterway that runs from Elands Bay to Redelinghuys and is the district's most important wetlands.



Map 1: Topographical location of the study area
Source: Chief Directorate: Survey and Mapping (2007)



Map 2: Locality plan indicates the town of Redelinghuys (orange) and the Matroozefontein farm (red)

1.5 Chapter outline

Chapter 2 discusses the contributions of battlefield and conflict archaeology to archaeology in general. Since the 1950s (Carman 2005: 216; Scott 2010: 29), when it became popular, it has risen from an aficionado and historian of military historical studies to a key discipline of archaeology and anthropological studies. In recent years, military geosciences have also gained popularity. Consequently, large-scale archaeological investigations into the World Wars and antecedent battles are being conducted across Europe (Gassend *et al*. 2018; Petrauskas *et al*. 2018; Bordáč 2020). Since the United States of America (USA) has a long history of conflict dating back to its founding, there are numerous battlefield investigations such as the research being conducted on the Battle of Camden during the American Revolutionary War (National Park Service 2015), and the Battle of the Little Bighorn during the American Indian Wars (Scott 2010).

Multiple excavations in South Africa have centred on the archaeology of conflicts with the most of them concerned with the colonial era (Webley 1993; Van Vollenhoven 1994; Van Vollenhoven *et al.* 1998; Hutten 2019).

Chapter 3 examines available sources on the topic (Maritz 1939; Wessels 1993; Reitz & Emslie 1999). The sources consist of the diary of Jeudwine and the memoirs of two individuals (General Manie Maritz and Deneys Reitz) who, despite not being directly engaged in the skirmish, operated in the area and among the combatants. The remaining primary materials were recorded by Redelinghuys residents Jacobus Louw (Van Zyl n.d.) and Maans Smith (Piketberg Museum 2014) as the story was told to them.

The secondary sources in Chapter 3 (Constantine 1996; Shearing & Shearing 2000; Wessels 2011b; Shearing 2005; Schoeman 2019) focus on several works that have investigated the activities and movements of guerrilla and local combatants in the Western Cape during the war. Some documented sources include rebel actions further north in the province (Thomas 2011).

In Chapter 4, the historical terrain is described, analysed, and reconstructed to determine the skirmish's flow and potential combatant movements. To establish routes travelled before, during, and after the conflict, Global Positioning System (GPS) markers and artefact

discoveries are cross-referenced with maps. The applied methodologies (GPS, surveys, field surveys, and survey reports) are discussed in the chapter.

In Chapter 5, the results of the archaeological findings are presented by evaluating the colour, condition, depth found, weight, length of the object, and position found of each artefact type. Each artefact type is discussed based on the findings.

In Chapter 6, the researcher draws conclusions from the analyses of the artefacts found, as well as his observations of the documentary and oral traditions. Recommendations are also made regarding how to improve the visibility of battlefield archaeology in the Western Cape in order to educate the public on these important sites.

Chapter 2: Battlefield Archaeology

2.1 Introduction

Despite its current popularity, battlefield archaeology only became popular in Europe in the 1950s, when the Portuguese began exploring historic battlefields such as the Battle of Aljubarotta (Carman 2005: 216). Scott and Fox (1987) used archaeological practices in conjunction with metal detectors to pinpoint events during the American Revolutionary Wars in the USA.

Archaeologists are becoming increasingly interested in investigating and analysing previous wars, such as those fought during World War II in Europe. Although the majority of studies continue to focus on larger conflicts and engagements, some small-scale skirmishes are now also being investigated, such as the case in Lithuania (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018), France (Gassend *et al.* 2018) and Slovakia (Bordáč 2020).

When conducting this type of research, it is critical to consider the vastly different dynamics between full-scale battles and skirmishes. Skirmishes were typically shorter, whereas larger battles could last several months and necessitated massive armies and supporting infrastructure. The archaeological record of large-scale battles is typically more extensive than that of small-scale battles. For this reason, the archaeologist must be able to work with a limited number of artefacts, or, in some cases, without any artefacts at all when identifying a skirmish. Skirmishes can happen for a variety of reasons, such as an accidental encounter between opposing forces or an engagement to achieve a specific short-term goal. The goal for at least one of the opponents in a skirmish is to quickly engage and withdraw before the opponent has time to react to assemble a larger force. Battles, on the other hand, require logistical and extensive planning and the end goal for almost all battles is to neutralise the opponent in order to win the conflict.

Lastly, in order to understand the differences, one should investigate the context in which the two different types of engagement start, progress, and finally end.

2.2 Different approaches to battlefield archaeology

To better understand battlefield archaeology and the broader subject, the researcher examined three different arenas. While the European examples focus on more recent military conflicts (World War II and after), the American inquiries focus on Native American and Revolutionary War battlefield archaeology. It is concluded by highlighting recent archaeological discoveries and local conflicts in South Africa.

By comparing the different geographical areas of battlefield archaeology, the different techniques and approaches taken by archaeologists of each of the areas are scrutinised and compared with one another. This provides an indication of how the different types of engagements differ from one another to enable one to make more accurate assumptions about the differences. For a holistic view of battlefield behaviour, the motives, data/information on the types of engagements, and the strategy and technology used need to be collected and analysed before an accurate picture of the events can be formulated or explained.

To understand battlefield archaeology in South Africa, the researcher set out to discuss some key contributions towards the field made in South Africa. Although there are many interesting writings around battles fought, only a handful were archaeologically investigated. Rorke's Drift and the Battle of Blaauwberg are such examples that contribute to our understanding of the early battles fought on South African soil. Furthermore, some archaeologically related studies have investigated aspects such as forts, temporary camping, and concentration camps.

The concept of battlefield archaeology has been used in several excavations in South Africa. These excavations, however, focused on fixed structures rather than physical engagements. For example, the fort in Potchefstroom was excavated with the goal of discovering the fort's original structures, as well as archaeological deposits from the town's siege during the First Boer War (Mason 1975). The archaeological deposits found during the excavations were predominantly deposits one would find during the construction of a fort (Mason 1975). A blockhouse discovered in Bergville, KwaZulu-Natal (Pelser & Van de Venter-Radford 2017: 1) was significant because it demonstrated that non-battle-related objects such as screws, washers, and nails contributed to battlefield archaeology research. More recently, during the

excavation project for the Battle of Blaauwberg, the emphasis shifted from object retrieval to deposit analysis and the identification of battle formation lines (Hutten 2019: 20).

The Battle of Rorke's Drift (1879) was another famous battle that occurred on South African soil, which demonstrated that even if you are outnumbered by your opponent, a well-drilled and organised group of soldiers can defeat the onslaught of a mass attack. By combining maps with the only structure (a graveyard) that remained standing after the battle, the archaeologists were able to pinpoint the structures and battle lines (Webley 1993: 25).

According to Knight and Passmore (2019: 2), there is academic interest in the South African War, but it lacks comprehensive archaeological support. Indeed, there have been only a few scattered archaeological studies on this conflict, such as the daily activities surrounding a British outpost in the Kruger National Park (Van Vollenhoven *et al*. 1998), and investigations into black concentration camps during the South African War (Benneyworth 2019; 2020a; 2020b).

Skirmishes like the one at Vegkop were common in Europe during World War II. One such incident occurred near the town of Thorame-Haute in France (1944), between the French resistance (the *maquisards*) and the German army (Gassend *et al.* 2018). Gassend *et al.* (2018) demonstrated that archaeological research can supplement oral and documentary sources and can be a valuable tool for reconstructing historical events. When the Battle of Camden was investigated in America, the same method was used to determine the disastrous defeat of America by the British Empire (National Park Service 2015). Archaeologists, metal detectorists, and historians were also employed by the National Park Service to create a comprehensive overview of the battle (National Park Service 2015).

Modern archaeologists used these new techniques to pinpoint the location of a skirmish between rebel forces in Lithuania and the army of the former Soviet Union (1949) (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018). Petrauskas *et al.* (2018) identified the location of the skirmish near Užpelkiai by closely studying maps of the event and conducting oral interviews. The artefacts recovered could be used to determine the location of the skirmish that occurred that day using metal detecting and archaeological techniques (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018).

During the latter stages of the South African War, the Boers adopted guerrilla warfare, since they were too weak to engage in full-scale military combat and instead attacked the British force through stealth and the element of surprise (Wessels 2011b). During World War II, the French resistance used the same strategy against a far more powerful German adversary (Gassend *et al.* 2018). Guerrilla warfare is more commonly employed in skirmishes than battles. According to Ulčar and Menard (2016: 3), guerrilla fighters, although vastly outnumbered by their opponent, have the advantage of speed and agility over a more formal and structured army.

The British military was forced to adapt its military academy syllabus to cater for guerrilla-style warfare during the latter part of the South African War (Laqueur 1975: 360). The British Army, although familiar with skirmish-style battles, which it encountered during the campaigns in India and Afghanistan, needed to adapt to the Boer style of guerrilla fighting (Laqueur 1975: 361). The Boers rarely engaged with counter-attack movements, nor did they expose themselves in the line of fire, in order to avoid being cornered and defeated by superior numbers of force.

2.3 American region

2.3.1 Battle of the Little Bighorn, Indian Reservation, Montana

On 25 June 1876, a battle took place between the Lakota and Cheyenne Native American tribes and the 7th United States (US) Cavalry unit (Scott 2010: 2). This conflict, which took place on America's northern plains, resulted in the defeat of the US army and the famous last stand of Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer and his soldiers, who died defending the ridge above Little Bighorn (Scott 2010: 19).

The Battle of the Little Bighorn, which is well known in American history, gained significance in the field of archaeological studies. The on-site archaeological work resulted in the rise of a new sub-discipline of archaeology in the USA known as battlefield archaeology (Scott 2010: 2).

Given that the conflict has received much attention over the years, much of the archaeological record has been lost because of people attempting to obtain battlefield souvenirs. The Battle

of the Little Bighorn site was exposed to theft and looting until the 1940s (Scott 2010: 24). Superintendent Edward Smith Luce, a veteran of the 7th US Cavalry, had a deep interest in the battle and, under his leadership, the US National Park Service acquired the management of the site and built a coordinated research facility (Scott 2010: 24).

Luce's attention extended not only to the discovery of actual battle-related material, but also to the documentation of pertinent objects (Scott 2010: 27), and he made every effort to capture the physical position of the artefacts on a map. Unfortunately, the broader archaeological community was unable to aid this new area of archaeology on the grounds that the early archaeological field's interests were almost solely focused on the prehistoric past (Scott 2010: 28). In the 1950s, collaboration between the archaeological and historical communities gave rise to the field of historical archaeology. This has raised the value of battlefield archaeology as archaeological evidence can supplement historical accounts (Scott 2010: 29).

Although Luce was the first to employ "radio metal detection equipment" in 1943, it was his successor, Don Gladstone Rickey, a historian of the Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument in Montana, with the assistance of Jess W. Vaughn, who was also a park historian, who successfully used metal detectors and marked the site with wooden sticks in 1956 (Scott 2010: 29). Rickey also examined the places listed on a map to try to decipher Custer's defence strategy (Scott 2010: 30).

When a walkway was proposed on the battlefield, Robert Bray was the first archaeologist to conduct a professional investigation (Scott 2010: 31). His unique use of metal detection made him a pioneer in applying this form of aid in the field of artefact collection (Scott 2010: 32). Jerome Greene, a philanthropist, conducted the first professional research into the war in the 1980s by investigating the distribution patterns of the finds and reassessing the long-established interpretations of the conflict using documented data and oral interviews with Native Americans (Scott 2010: 34). Greene also critiqued several of the earlier publications based on his study and oral interview remarks, pointing out that the absence of terrain and Native American testimony caused severe flaws in the assumptions made by earlier investigators (Scott 2010: 35).

Scott (2010: 37) indicated that as time passed, public support and awareness of battlefield archaeology and its role in the archaeological record increased, and with this renewed vigour came an increase in funding for such initiatives and the formal recognition of the profession in its rightful place. The Little Bighorn research methodology became the international standard in the new field of archaeology (Scott 2010: 38). Related investigations, such as identifying firearm usage on the battlefield based on the kind of cartridge or casing, were also presented (Scott 2010: 38), and is a technique that is now practically universal in any battlefield study.

The public's interest in the Battle of the Little Bighorn also raised public knowledge of these archaeological methods, which contributed to a better understanding of archaeological preservation and historical importance. In the instance of the Little Bighorn project, the park reported a 20% increase in visitors after becoming aware of the excavations taking place on site (Scott 2010: 41). Associated businesses such as bookshops and clubs benefitted and witnessed an increase in membership, which contributed to archaeological financing, indicating that, as Scott (2010: 43) stated, "archaeology was, in a sense, paying for itself".

The Little Bighorn archaeological project not only saw the first use of metal detectors, but it also used GPS technology since 1984 (Scott 2010: 46). These markers were plotted with the assistance of computer design technology to position the artefacts (Scott 2010: 46). During this study, the approach of transecting was used when an initial survey was conducted utilising a metal detecting field of roughly 3 to 5 m each sweep to cover as much area as possible due to the vast area under inquiry (Scott 2010: 47). A second survey is then done utilising a denser (approximately 2 m) survey in regions identified as more artefact-rich using computer-generated recording (Scott 2010: 47). The terrain and artefacts were then photographed before removal of the artefacts (Scott 2010: 47).

Scott (2010: 103) argued that artefacts removed from a site without context are "just relics, curiosities that arouse romantic imaginations" and that if these relics are accompanied by context, they become an invaluable repository of information that is a crucial asset in the analysis of battle events and can stand on their own against accompanied documentation and oral tradition.

2.3.2 Battle of Camden, South Carolina

The Battle of Camden took place near the town of Camden in South Carolina, which was under the authority of British forces during the American Revolutionary War of 1774 to 1783 (National Park Service 2015: 1). This battle was notable because it was the most devastating defeat for the Americans by the British during the entire Revolutionary War (National Park Service 2015: 1). The battlefield size of almost 5 km² demonstrates the immense area that a battle can cover, which necessitates the development of new research methodologies for battlefield archaeologists (National Park Service 2015:1). The battle took place on 16 August 1780, when the Americans, led by General Horatio Lloyd Gates, suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the British, led by General Charles Cornwallis (National Park Service 2015: 1). The Americans were defeated by the more prepared and organised British attack, and their lack of discipline caused them to retreat in large numbers, which resulted in a disastrous outcome for the revolutionary army (National Park Service 2015: 9).

The British, who had formed a stronghold in the Camden area in the months preceding the battle, had only approximately 2 000 troops, which gave General Gates a false sense of security when he landed in South Carolina with a defence force of roughly 4 000 soldiers (National Park Service 2015: 9). In the early morning of 16 August 1780, British troops, led by Cornwallis, unexpectedly clashed with American militia led by Gates approximately 15 km north of Camden (National Park Service 2015: 9). After an exchange of fire, a barrage of cannon fire, and finally a bayonet charge on Gates' forces, his main force fled the conflict (National Park Service 2015: 9). A group of American forces, led by Baron Johann de Kalb, attempted to seize possession but suffered terrible losses and were defeated in the counter-attack (National Park Service 2015: 9). This brief conflict was regarded as the most humiliating setback suffered by the independent American colony during the Revolutionary War. It was evident that a smaller number of well-trained and disciplined troops, as the British were famed for, could stand up to a body of soldiers almost double their number. The study of the Battle of Camden became noteworthy because it revealed archaeological material about life during the early American colony's autonomous struggles (National Park Service 2015: 11). As a result, in the 1980s, the American National Park Service began research to determine the viability of incorporating the battle site into its park system (National Park Service 2015: 10).

The history of the development of any town is already historically significant and in this case the history of the town of Camden was well established and contributed to understanding the development of the early colonial frontier settlements (National Park Service 2015: 17). The archaeological findings around the battle that took place around Camden further supplemented the history as it was archaeologically proven that the town consisted of two rows, which were also indicated on a map drawn in 1781 (National Park Service 2015: 17). Dr Lewis (Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology, University of South Carolina), who studied the site for nearly 25 years, believed that the military action at the town during the Revolutionary Battle is critical to our understanding of the American War of Independence (National Park Service 2015: 17). Oral and documentary resources can be supplemented by archaeological research; however, Sellick (2016) warned that the misinterpretation of oral events can lead to further complications. For example, the erection of a monument to honour Baron De Kalb's place of death was later disproved by archaeologists who could not find any indication that De Kalb's troops were at that location (Sellick 2016: 15). According to Charles Baxley (interviewed by Sellick 2016), the monument's location made the battle site more visible from the main road and thus maybe served an alternative role of promoting tourism (Sellick 2016: 16).

Dr Lewis was not unfamiliar with new archaeology methodologies, and he evaluated the archaeological findings using scientific procedures and hypothesis testing (National Park Service 2015: 17). Patterns emerge from archaeological evidence, and artefacts validate these patterns (National Park Service 2015: 17). Dr Smith (lead research professor of the University of North Carolina) effectively identified the events leading up to the conflict, the combat itself, and environmental conditions to depict the action in detail using archaeological evidence and oral and documentary research (National Park Service 2015: 25). Smith's investigation raised concerns regarding the accuracy of previous discoveries and, with the use of metal detectors, located burial grounds and the location of the principal engagement (National Park Service 2015: 25). By analysing the archaeological record of the artefacts found on the site and utilising metal detectors, the path used by the combat forces could be determined (National Park Service 2015: 28). The research conducted at the site of the Battle of Camden proved to be quite beneficial for comprehending the combat actions of the two nations involved.

2.4 European region

2.4.1 Ambush at Thorame-Haute, France

On 18 July 1944, a group of French resistance fighters ambushed a German convoy near the town of Thorame-Haute in south-eastern France (Gassend *et al*. 2018: 117). The French resistance forces stepped up their ambush tactics to "create as much havoc as possible within occupied France" (Gassend *et al*. 2018: 117). This was done to help the Allied troops launch land-based assaults on German-occupied France during World War II.

Unfortunately, skirmishes, especially ones that are short-lived, lack comprehensive archaeological investigations, as we have in this case only the work done by Gassend and his team (2018) on the specific skirmish. This highlights the importance of promoting investigations into smaller type of skirmishes to create a more comprehensive analysis of results.

Gassend *et al*. (2018) set out to investigate the events of that day between the German army and the French resistance fighters, often known as the *maquisards* (Gassend *et al*. 2018: 118). Furthermore, they sought to reproduce the events that transpired to validate the claims made by the *maquisards*, who claimed that 58 German soldiers were killed and that a large explosion had occurred (most likely a vehicle exploding with ammunition onboard) (Gassend *et al*. 2018: 117).

Interviewing eyewitnesses, checking through archival records, and complementing the data with a metal detecting study of the damaged area were all done to create a comprehensive understanding of the events during the skirmish (Gassend *et al.* 2018: 118). Furthermore, after reading through the archival data, issues were raised as the people who updated these records were not directly involved with the occurrence (Gassend *et al.* 2018: 121). Gassend *et al.*'s (2018) investigation had two goals: firstly, to determine whether an explosion occurred during the attack, and secondly, to determine why the German casualty count was so high. Gassend *et al.* (2018: 122) based their assumptions on two factors: firstly, the combat was short-lived, and secondly, the French resistance recorded no casualties, which cast doubt on the number of German soldiers killed.

The probability of external influence on oral tradition is always a real problem, especially if interviewed long after an incident. This was identified when the interviewees' testimony corresponded exactly with existing public works during the analysis phase of the oral tradition (Gassend *et al.* 2018: 123).

Through considerable archival investigation, German documents revealed that only nine troops were killed during the Thorame-Haute battle, which put to rest the French claim of a huge death toll (Gassend *et al.* 2018: 125). According to Gassend *et al.* (2018: 145), the high death toll could be linked to French resistance fighters raising the death toll to get respect from their peers or even to outdo one another.

To generate a clear portrayal of events, it is always preferable to integrate oral tradition, historical texts, and archaeological evidence. Gassend *et al.* (2018: 117) used this style of information gathering to successfully disprove concerns highlighted during the Thorame-Haute skirmish. Firstly, the French resistance overstated the number of deaths (Gassend *et al.* 2018: 145), and secondly, archaeological evidence supports the assertion that a truck exploded (Gassend *et al.* 2018: 138).

Gassend *et al.* (2018: 133) discovered German 7.92 mm casings on the road's north-west side. These German casings and debris showed traces of heavy fire, which supported eyewitness and documentation sources of an explosion during the raid (Gassend *et al.* 2018: 133). Furthermore, Gassend *et al.* (2018: 129) identified both the German and French firing lines using artefacts found during the archaeological project's metal detecting phase.

The employment of automatic weapons could be proven through geographical analysis of cartridge positions, and it was a well-known fact that French resistance fighters utilised high-power automatic rifles at the time (Gassend *et al.* 2018: 141). The only dubious item was an American .30 calibre casing that was also discovered (Gassend *et al.* 2018: 140). Gassend *et al.* (2018: 140) corroborated the availability of these munition types by demonstrating that Allied troops provided ammunition to French resistance fighters during aerial drops.

The inquiry into the ambush at Thorame-Haute during the Allied invasion provided proof that the archaeological record can supplement oral and documentary sources (Gassend *et al.* 2018: 147). Several artefacts were discovered using metal detecting approximately 70 years

after a single occurrence that could not have lasted more than a few minutes (Gassend *et al.* 2018: 148). When dealing with a fraction-of-time event, especially so long after the war, the value of archaeological research cannot be overstated, especially in the case of skirmishes. These artefacts could positively verify the occurrence of an explosion and identify both the attacking and defending positions; thus, lending credibility to the existing sources (Gassend *et al.* 2018: 147).

According to Gassend *et al.* (2018: 147), even if artefacts were to be retrieved and evaluated based on their spatial location, specific knowledge of the kinds of ammunition was critical in interpreting the findings. This conclusion proved what Scott (2010) found when he researched the Battle of the Little Bighorn, namely that historical archaeology and battlefield archaeology are closely linked.

2.4.2 Skirmish of Užpelkiai Forest, Lithuania

Numerous military clashes have occurred throughout the last century. Some of these military confrontations, such as the two World Wars, are well recognised and documented, while others are not. We are just now beginning to investigate these conflicts because the sub-discipline of battlefield archaeology has emerged from archaeology and now specialises in all aspects of conflict and combat investigations.

Following World War II, a brief conflict erupted between the former Soviet Union (Russia) and Lithuania. Following the demise of the German Nazi regime in Europe, the Soviet Union annexed and occupied Lithuania in 1944 (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018: 5). During this time, the Soviet Union exiled and imprisoned hundreds of Lithuanians, which resulted in the formation of a resistance group. This resistance group was known as the "Forest Brothers" by locals because they met in secret in the Lithuanian woodland area (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018: 5).

On 13 August 1949, a skirmish in the forest, known as the Skirmish of Užpelkiai Forest, occurred between the Soviet army and Lithuanian freedom fighters (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018: 6). Five Lithuanians and approximately 18 Soviet soldiers were killed during this brief skirmish (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018: 6). Mingėlas, one of the partisans[2] who escaped the conflict,

[2] A partisan is a member of a paramilitary group who opposes control by a foreign power; in this case Russia.

produced a detailed map of the battleground and concealed it on his farm, which was located in 1993 (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018: 7). This map, along with Soviet records and a collection of oral interviews, aided Petrauskas and his colleagues in locating the skirmish site in August 2016 (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018: 8).

Metal detectors were utilised by Petrauskas *et al.* (2018), and six groups of participants searched the region marked on Mingėlas' map (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018: 8). The metal detecting was profitable, as no less than 221 skirmish-related artefacts were discovered (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018: 9). The number of artefacts discovered is exceptional for a short skirmish like the one in Užpelkiai Forest. This validated the eyewitness accounts that reported that around 400 Soviet soldiers attacked the partisans in the woods while they were assembling (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018: 6).

For a long time in Lithuania, researchers were solely interested in the forensic and anthropological aspects of the conflict with Russia because it was still fresh in people's memories; however, Petrauskas *et al.* (2018: 4) thought that current conflict and battlefield archaeology could help reconstruct skirmish events by combining oral interviews, documentary sources, and maps. Archaeological evidence might subsequently be used to support these sources.

The archaeological survey strategy used was to split the five-hectare region into strips 2 to 3 m wide so that metal detectors could conveniently survey it (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018: 9). Using the archaeological data obtained, Petrauskas *et al.* (2018: 9) were able to identify the course of the skirmish, the shooting positions of the Soviet soldiers, and the route the partisans used to try to escape. The cartridge position showed that Soviet troops attacked from the west, north, and south-west, while the partisans withdrew to the west (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018: 13). In this case, the archaeological excavation aided and corroborated Mingėlas' post-skirmish map (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018: 13). Furthermore, the combat manoeuvres could be determined by identifying the ammunition used in the engagement, as the partisans used German cartridges (possibly World War II leftovers) while the Soviet troops were issued Russian ammunition (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018: 10).

Petrauskas *et al.* (2018: 14) stated that to portray an accurate flow of events, a variety of sources should be used to investigate current conflict archaeology. In this example, the

archaeological data were compared to existing sources (papers and maps) before being unravelled with the help of people who were either eyewitnesses to the events or informants who had the information passed down to them (Petrauskas *et al.* 2018: 14).

We will be able to gain a comprehensive understanding of events if we allow multidisciplinary inquiry across historical, anthropological, and archaeological domains, as each discipline brings its unique set of tools to bear in unravelling the occurrence of events.

2.4.3 American B-24 Liberator bomber crash, Trenčín, Slovakia

According to Bordáč (2020: 198), the field of archaeology has evolved sufficiently to have "got[ten] rid of former dogmatic ideas of something like an imaginary border". Recent events, particularly severe ones like World War II, have generated enough curiosity and artefacts for archaeologists to take notice. Unfortunately, not all archaeologists consider these occurrences noteworthy enough to investigate; research on modern warfare thus remains rare (Bordáč 2020: 198).

Bordáč (2020: 198) witnessed the devastation caused by unlawful excavations and relic hunting during the examination of an American B-24 Liberator bomber crash near the town of Trenčín, as evidence showed that extensive looting had taken place at the site (Bordáč 2020: 199). For this reason, Bordáč (2020: 199) argued that archaeological organisations must respond by increasing their focus on military archaeology.

Bordáč (2020: 199) also connected history with archaeology, thinking that archaeology should not be practised in isolation from supporting disciplines, but should rather contribute to the correction of existing materials. Furthermore, Bordáč (2020: 199) believed that historical records can provide intellectual data compilation, and archaeology can provide concrete evidence to back it up.

On 17 December 1944, an American bomber was part of a group of 31 aircraft on a bombing flight when it had to detach from the flight formation due to engine failure (Bordáč 2020: 199). When it was alone, it became the target of three Germain FW-190 air combat fighters, who shot it down near the Slovakian town of Trenčín (Bordáč 2020: 200). By escaping the

crippled aircraft before it crashed, nine of the ten crewmembers survived the disaster (Bordáč 2020: 200).

Bordáč (2020: 205) was able to clarify contradictions in the historical record even before excavation began by reviewing the available sources. Then, using metal detectors, Bordáč (2020: 201) discovered a location with the highest concentration of metal fragments, which indicated a possible crash site. He was then able to conduct a more thorough archaeological dig. The artefacts were largely made up of fuselage components and showed traces of fire damage, in correlation with the documentary sources that revealed that the plane had crashed (Bordáč 2020: 201). Bordáč (2020: 201) also discovered a number of interesting artefacts, including a spent Browning machine gun cartridge, which indicates that the plane was most likely firing on its attackers before crashing. Another amazing discovery was a cockpit switch that still had design stamps on it, which could be traced through the USA trademark office (Bordáč 2020: 208). The existence of a flak jacket, which the crewmembers used to shield themselves from shrapnel, could conceivably imply that the coat was removed before the crewmember disembarked the aircraft (Bordáč 2020: 208).

Bordáč (2020) proved that by combining historical research with archaeological practices, this style of collaboration should be recognised as a solid research methodology to conserve these sites before they become the target of looters. Furthermore, catastrophic events such as wars that have damaged the current landscape necessitate increasing archaeological attention in order to preserve these sites for future generations.

2.5 South African region

2.5.1 Steinaecker Horse outpost, Kruger National Park

During the South African War, a British Mounted Infantry battalion operated in the now Kruger National Park's Lowveld region of South Africa (Van Vollenhoven *et al.* 1998: 113). This unit, known as Steinaecker's[3] Horse Unit, operated on horseback to scout a large region for Boer activities (Van Vollenhoven *et al.* 1998: 113).

[3] Named after their leader, Ludwig von Steinaecker.

Despite being a German, Ludwig von Steinaecker became a British subject after the war broke out in 1899 and later joined the Colonial Scouts (Badenhorst *et al*. 2002: 57). Due to Steinaecker military success against the Boers, General Redvers Henry Buller, gave Steinaecker permission to assemble a mounted infantry regiment whose primary mission was to keep the Boer republics from contacting pro-Boer followers in the Portuguese territory that is now modern-day Mozambique (Badenhorst *et al.* 2002: 57). Although there was little Boer activity in the Lowveld, the regiment was attacked by General Tobias Smuts, commander of the Transvaal Burger force in the area on 24 July 1901 (Van Vollenhoven *et al.* 1998: 116). Document sources around the Steinaecker Horse Unit's operations were scarce and only with the assistance of the Kruger National Park rangers, who were familiar with the area, was the camp identified in 1997 (Van Vollenhoven *et al.* 1998: 113).

Excavations done by Van Vollenhoven revealed around five middens, which confirmed the force of roughly 450 troops on site (Badenhorst *et al.* 2002: 57). Material evidence indicated that British forces held the mid-section, while native soldiers and servants occupied the southern part, which demonstrates that racial and social segregation existed at the location (Badenhorst *et al.* 2002: 57). Despite the large number of faunal remains discovered (approximately 2 301 bone and shell fragments), only 13 bone remnants exhibited signs of human-related damage such as cut marks (Badenhorst *et al.* 2002: 59). A total of 367 bones were burned, with various differences in colour variations, which, according to Badenhorst *et al.* (2002: 61), indicated that the site was used for food processing as opposed to a bush fire.

According to Badenhorst *et al.* (2002: 61), the faunal examination of the archaeological deposits recovered at the camp site can provide information on the dietary supplements for the soldiers during the unit's station at the camp. As evidenced by the presence of both wild and domesticated stock in the middens, nutrition sources consisted of hunting, herding, gathering, and fishing (Badenhorst *et al.* 2002: 61). The large concentration of middens and irregular disposal patterns indicated to Van Vollenhoven that this unit lacked the discipline of a British enlisted force. In addition, the unit was primarily made up of volunteers from Britain and from the surrounding area (Van Vollenhoven *et al.* 1998: 117).

Aside from the faunal remains, a significant amount of ceramics, glass, and metal artefacts and fragments were identified. Metal fragments and artefacts were found in abundance, which are representative of military unit occupation. The metal artefacts identified included belt buckles, cutlery, uniform buttons, and cartridges (Van Vollenhoven *et al.* 1998: 118). A huge number of tin fragments were identified at the site, which indicated that "bully beef" (canned beef) was the staple food source provided to British troops at the time (Van Vollenhoven *et al.* 1998: 119).

The artefacts recovered from the site date from two separate periods: the earliest date recorded was during the South African War, and the second date was recorded as 1920 to 1940 (Van Vollenhoven *et al.* 1998: 119). Van Vollenhoven *et al.* (1998: 119) argued that the place was also used by park guards who were aware of its location. Prehistoric artefacts were also discovered in the form of potsherds dating to 900 CE (Van Vollenhoven *et al.* 1998: 119).

Van Vollenhoven *et al.* (1998: 119) concluded that the absence of permanent structures on the site was most likely due to the fact that the unit was mostly mounted[4] and only operated for a brief time during the war. The research conducted at this site provides insight into the domestic and military operations of a makeshift campsite during the South African War.

2.5.2 Battle at Rorke's Drift, northern KwaZulu-Natal

During the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, Rorke's Drift[5] was the site of a battle between a small British force and a massive Zulu army. Although the battle is classified as a minor interaction, this battle became "the most famous battle in British military history" (Simner 2023). The Anglo-Zulu War was the result of British ambitious expansion of their territory into the Zulu kingdom's territory (Simner 2023).

According to Webley (1993: 25), the attack by the Zulus was done in haste and in disregard of orders by the attacking force expecting that their larger numbers would prove victorious. On the back of an earlier success over the British[6] at Isandlwana[7], Prince Dabulamanzi kaMpande

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[4] Refers to riding a horse, especially for military purposes.

[5] Rorke's Drift was a mission station and trading post on the Buffalo River that served as the border between the Zulu kingdom and the British colony of Natal (Jacobs 2016).

[6] Around 1 300 British soldiers were killed during the battle (Simner 2023).

[7] Isandlwana is a hill in the KwaZulu-Natal province of South Africa. It is approximately 169 km north of Durban.

and his warriors believed they could maintain their winning run without a premeditated offensive strategy (Webley 1993: 25). The reason for the attack is contested by Jacobs (2016), who believed that Rorke's Drift was attacked by kaMpande and his forces as they missed the main battle at Isandlwana and were eager to join the Zulu successes by choosing Rorke's Drift to attack (Jacobs 2016).

Between 4 000 and 5 000 Zulus attacked Rorke's Drift on the afternoon of 22 January 1879, which was defended by only 139 British troops (Jacobs 2016). Rorke's Drift, which included a store and a field hospital, was rapidly prepared for an impending attack after word arrived of the devastating annihilation of the British soldiers at Isandlwana earlier on the morning of 22 January 1879 (Webley 1993: 25; Jacobs 2016; Simner 2023). It is believed that Lt John Rouse Merriot Chad and Lt Gonville Bromhead of the British forces chose to stay at Rorke's Drift to defend it as the patients in the hospital would be difficult to relocate (Simner 2023). Chad also had a much larger force of around 400 soldiers; however, moments before the fight, the native soldiers unit decided to withdraw from the fight, leaving Chad's and Bromhead's units to defend it (Simner 2023).

A temporary barricade made of corn bags was created between the hospital and the store, and the structures on the property were loop-holed so that they could be used as shooting holes (Webley 1993: 25; Jacobs 2023). The attack, albeit a British victory, was not easy, as evidenced by the discovery of approximately 20 000 rounds of ammunition on the site (Webley 1993: 25). Jacobs (2016) indicated that the number could be as high as 25 000 spent cartridges. The Zulus also managed to set fire to the hospital before fleeing the battlefield (Webley 1993: 25). Simner (2016) also believes the fire might be the result of a paraffin lamp that set the roof alight during the attack on the hospital. The hospital was attacked first, and fierce hand-to-hand combat ensued, which resulted in five of the 11 Victoria Crosses awarded to soldiers who were trying to defend the hospital during the afternoon (Jacobs 2016).

The reason for the Zulus' retreat and the failure to take Rorke's Drift is unclear, as victory for them was imminent. Simner (2023) believed that the British repelling the Zulu attacks and substantial losses made them withdraw; however, Jacobs (2016) believed that the Zulus witnessed a relief column from General Frederic Augustus Thesiger Chelmsford on its way to Rorke's Drift and broke off the engagement.

Casualties on the Zulu side are uncertain. Webley (1993: 25) indicated around 379 Zulus killed; however, modern sources conclude that 351 were buried by Chad's soldiers (Jacobs 2016; Simner 2023). Another 300 Zulus died of their wounds after the battle (Jacobs 2016). On the British side, only 17 were killed (Jacobs 2016). Following the British victory at Rorke's Drift, the Zulu kingdom eventually fell at the Battle of Ulundi on 4 July 1879 (Simner 2023), ending the Anglo-Zulu War.

Following the battle, the fallen British soldiers were buried behind the hospital, which is the only structure that remains today and serves as a reference point from where archaeologists attempted to locate the store and hospital (Webley 1993: 25). After the fight at Rorke's Drift, a fort was constructed on 25 January 1879 to protect the region from future attacks, which disrupted the buildings utilised during the war (Webley 1993: 25).

The archaeological team intended to establish the exact site of the store and hospital, to confirm the existence of a stone wall that served as a combat line between the forces, and to investigate if there was any proof that the attacking force employed firearms[8] to fire at British forces, as they had claimed (Webley 1993: 27).

By excavating random test pits, the site of the hospital was successfully located. Deposits of charcoal and melted glass were identified, which indicated the presence of the fire set by the Zulus (Webley 1993: 27). The store's location was also determined and battle-related products such as cartridge casings and gin bottles were identified (Webley 1993: 28). In terms of the combat itself, the barricades were only temporary, but archaeological examination revealed that the lines were identifiable by the number of spent cartridges and military fragments (Webley 1993: 29).

Webley's (1993: 30) final archaeological research was to determine if there was any truth to the narrative that Zulu warriors shot at the British from the Shiyane[9] heights. Utilising metal detectors, three .577 calibre bullet remnants were discovered in caves overlooking the battlefield (Webley 1993: 31). The same type of slug was also discovered north of the engagement, which indicated that while the Zulus possessed modern weapons in the conflict,

[8] The Zulus' preferred weapon of choice was the *assegai* (a wooden pole with an iron head) and not firearms.
[9] Shiyane is a peak in KwaZulu-Natal that overlooks Rorke's Drift.

the riflemen's aim was not accurate (Webley 1993: 31). Jacobs (2016) indicated that the Zulus indeed had rifles – around 10 000 – although most were in poor condition. The Zulus also had Martini-Henry rifles recovered from the battle at Isandlwana (Simner 2023). It was also established that all British casualties were due to gunshot wounds rather than being stabbed (Jacobs 2016).

The evidence of a brief but intense battle was recorded through the artefactual remains, as huge amounts of metal in the form of battle-related items, as well as burned objects, were recovered, despite the loss of many related items due to unauthorised removal of objects as souvenirs prior to the archaeological excavations (Webley 1993: 31). Although brief, battle-related incidents such as the one at Rorke's Drift demonstrate the disruptions that military engagements can cause to the environment (Webley 1993: 33).

The approach used to analyse this site (i.e., archaeological excavations, documentary analysis, and oral collections) proved useful in providing a more accurate picture of the events that occurred on that day. These case studies highlight the usefulness of employing a multifaceted approach to battlefields in South Africa.

2.5.3 Investigation of Fort Daspoortrand, Pretoria

Following the failure of the Jameson Raid[10] in 1895/1896, the decision was made to fortify Pretoria against future British attacks (Van Vollenhoven 1994: 49). Four forts were built prior to the South African War, but none of them saw action because, just before the fall of Pretoria, the decision was made to abandon them and to switch to guerrilla warfare (Van Vollenhoven 1994: 50). The South African army converted Fort Klapperkop and Schanskop into museums. Fort Daspoortrand, on the other hand, was neglected and in poor shape due to abandonment (Van Vollenhoven 1994: 50). Today the fort lays in ruins.

Towers were initially considered as a means of protecting Pretoria. However, forts were chosen to achieve this goal because a garrison was also required to protect the area (Van Vollenhoven 1994: 50). Fort Daspoortrand had a good view of Pretoria's west side and its

[10] The Jameson Raid, named after the British colonial administrator, was a failed attempt by him to rally local British support for an invasion of the South African Republic.

surroundings, as did the other forts (Van Vollenhoven 1994: 50). These forts were quite technologically advanced, and some even had telegraph lines, electricity, and telephones (Van Vollenhoven 1994: 50). When the Boers' tactics shifted from defensive to guerrilla warfare, it was decided to abandon the forts. The British discovered them in good condition after the annexation of Pretoria and took over the forts and maintained them during the occupation of Pretoria (Van Vollenhoven 1994: 50).

Even though the fort has been relatively well preserved, vandalism and erosion have put the structure at risk (Van Vollenhoven 1994: 51). This led to an archaeological investigation at Fort Daspoortrand, of which the aim was to create a blueprint of the fort to be used for future archaeological reconstruction and analysis (Van Vollenhoven 1994: 49). Aside from an impressive front gate made of two steel doors, the investigation also identified an underground ammunition room, a kitchen, and a telegraph and machine room (Van Vollenhoven 1994: 51).

Van Vollenhoven (1994: 51) decided to concentrate on specific archaeological areas rather than random test pits as the fort's structures were relatively well maintained. A test pit of the ammunition tunnel, storeroom, and fort entrenchment was conducted (Van Vollenhoven 1994: 52). The entrance was excavated to determine the original floor level and to examine the features of the entrance beneath the floor level (Van Vollenhoven 1994: 52). Aside from some fragments and landfill left over from years of neglect, not many artefacts were recovered from the site (Van Vollenhoven 1994: 52). This result did not surprise Van Vollenhoven (1994), who explained that while the fort's structure was permanent, the occupation was brief (1898 to 1904), which explained the lack of period-related finds (Van Vollenhoven 1994: 52).

Some materials were discovered in the archaeological record. Metal artefacts such as nails and screws, for example, were examples of building materials used during the time period. British military uniform buttons were also discovered, which indicated that the British did occupy the fort at some point (Van Vollenhoven 1994: 53).

2.5.4 Black concentration camps

Field Marshal Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts needed a counter-guerrilla strategy for the escalated guerrilla warfare and, to do so, civilian livestock and property were destroyed (Benneyworth 2019: 3). This escalated under the command of Field Marshal Horatio Herbert Kitchener, who took over from Roberts. He initiated a systematic scorched-earth policy, which included the forceful removal of the civilian population to so-called internment camps, later known as concentration camps (Benneyworth 2019: 3).

From the onset, black and white detainees were separate in different camps and as there are many sources and information around white concentration camps, Benneyworth (2019; 2020a) set out to investigate four black concentration camps to understand the nature of these camps and to shed more light on this almost forgotten part of history. These concentration camps operated on a different model and were used as labour camps to support the British in their war effort (Benneyworth 2019: 1; 2020a: 1).

The black civilian population was most of the time dropped off next to a railway garrison and had to support themselves. This was especially hard for them, as the many graves at the Taung concentration camp have shown (Benneyworth 2020a: 6). It is at this camp that fieldwork proved to be an asset in analysing the daily lives of the inhabitants (Benneyworth 2019: 18). Concentration camps also served as support for blockhouses, which made it difficult for the guerrilla fighters to approach stealthily (Benneyworth 2020a: 7). It further also functioned as a “morale breaker” (Benneyworth 2019: 6) as some of these camps were constructed on guerrilla fighters’ farms.

Since mining operations were crucial for the British to continue, most of the labour came from the black concentration camps (Benneyworth 2020a: 5). The British created the Native Refugee department, which was responsible for the administration and supply of workers for the war effort (Benneyworth 2020a: 6). Men were usually deployed as miners and functioned as reserves for the army, while the women and elderly were used for agricultural duties (Benneyworth 2020a: 6). A work-for-food model was used by the British, whereby the detainees were paid in food (Benneyworth 2020a: 14).

To identify the camps, various archival sources such as staff diaries were consulted, as in the case of the Witkop concentration camp (Benneyworth 2020a: 11). These diaries, together with the location of block houses, proved to be valuable sources in identifying the camps (Benneyworth 2020a: 18). A combination of oral history, archaeological surveys, and written sources made the identification of the Vryburg camp possible (Benneyworth 2019: 7).

By analysing these camps, Benneyworth was able to paint a conclusive picture of the daily lives and struggles that the inhabitants had to endure during the war; not only were they forcefully removed and detained, but they also had to fight for survival and work under difficult conditions.

2.5.5 Battle of Blaauwberg, Cape Town

Hutten (2019: 5) set out to pinpoint the precise location of the 1806 Battle at Blaauwberg, which was the decisive conflict between the British and the Batavian[11] force for control of Cape Town. Even though there are numerous historical accounts of the events and numerous published eyewitness accounts, Hutten (2019: 5) determined that these lacked knowledge of the terrain to properly identify the battle actions, and consequently conducted an archaeological investigation of the battle. How the terrain and landscape played a role in the development of the battle was the primary archaeological question to be addressed.

Archaeology, according to Hutten (2019: 7), can play a significant role in understanding the events and outcomes of military engagements and must be investigated in conjunction with sources, as sources tend to be more biased and may provide a “one-sided” perspective of events. Many previous battlefields, such as the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg, are neglected due to the fact that battles sometimes represent historical events associated with individuals or groups that are no longer prominent or in power; however, this should not impede their investigation or diminish the significance of the historical event (Hutten 2019: 7).

Hutten (2019: 8) argued that the lack of evidence from primary sources, particularly for smaller engagements, contributes to the misinterpretation of these events, and that only

[11] Dutch republic.

through archaeological investigations can the historical record be aligned to the facts and an objective interpretation of what actually transpired between opposing forces during a battle.

With the sparse analysis of all the archaeological evidence unearthed during the investigation into the battle, crucial conclusions could be drawn, and more light could be cast on the events of the day of the battle (Hutten 2019: 182). Hutten (2019: 182) was able to reveal areas of intense combat of the forces that historical sources were unable to determine by overlaying the artefacts retrieved, such as buckles (Hutton 2019: 170), musket balls (Hutton 2019: 135), and buttons (Hutton 2019: 161), and plot them on a map using GPS to identify the spatial distribution pattern. By using the material records that were left behind, he could clearly identify the Batavian forces' path of retreat (Hutten 2019: 183).

Another observation that Hutten (2019: 190) made was that the archaeological evidence did not support some dogmatic ideas of war. For example, a painting that was commissioned and hung in the Library of the Parliament in Cape Town depicts the two forces engaged in battle in typical European style, where each side is neatly lined up and facing each other (Hutten 2019: 190). In reality, the British battle lines were never aligned in a straight line towards the Batavian force, as evidence indicates that they proceeded along the existing paths (Hutten 2019: 190).

2.6 Conclusion

Early American archaeologists were more focused on the study of material remains and people's daily lives. This changed as battlefield studies became more popular and sites became tourist attractions. Due to the expansive nature of early battles on the American frontier, metal detectors became an essential instrument in the arsenal of archaeologists. Both the American Revolutionary War and the American Civil War have abundant archaeological deposits, and American archaeologists have become pioneers in the field of battlefield archaeology. The investigation techniques utilised in the excavation of the site of the Battle of the Little Bighorn set the standard for modern battlefield archaeologists.

Spatial analysis and the distribution of battle-related objects became more useful as museum artefacts, and conclusions could be drawn from the archaeological record that could indicate forces' movements during a battle. These actions and occurrences can help us to comprehend the results of these engagements and the lives they impacted.

For European archaeologists, the transition from medieval or classical archaeology to modern battlefield archaeology did not occur until after the World Wars, and for a long time only the anthropological impact was studied as the memory of these events was still fresh. The need to investigate these modern encounters, as well as the devastation that these engagements can have on the archaeological record, has become the focus of modern archaeologists' analysis. The European archaeologists believed that studying archival and document sources was the focus point of investigations and the archaeological record could supplement the written records and even adjust it as new evidence became available.

South Africa, despite being a relatively young country, has experienced its fair share of violence since the pre-colonial era, and although there is a great deal of historical documentation and writings of these events, the archaeological aspect represents a very small portion of it. Battles such as the early colonial war against the Khoisan, the frontier wars against the Zulus by the British, and the British attempt to annex the Cape Colony during the Napoleonic Wars, as well as the subsequent two wars against the independent Boer Republics, are well documented but lack archaeological evidence. Archaeological studies in South Africa were initially limited to structures or military camps. More recently, new studies

have also included the effects of war on the civilians and the focus has shifted to understanding battlefield behaviour, as well as analysing the dogmatics of conflict.

All sectors of archaeology agree that looting and the direct or indirect destruction of battlefield sites pose a huge problem to the archaeological record. After the looting of priceless artefacts by the Nazi regime during World War II, the USA created a civil affairs division to deal with the recovery of these artefacts (Geraci 2012: 11). However, the destruction of archaeological sites during the US invasion of Iraq in 1990 exemplified the need for archaeologists to assist external parties in matters of cultural heritage (Geraci 2012: 12).

Although each region's approach to military and battle-related archaeology differs for different reasons, they all share the same goal and objective: firstly, to educate and prevent the devastation of these sites so that academics can study and comprehend the underlying causes of these engagements, and secondly, to preserve these sites not only as memorials but to serve as a reminder for future generations of the destructive impact of these events.

Chapter 3: Sources

3.1 Introduction

The primary sources for the attack on Vegkop from the British side are limited to the diary of Jeudwine, which was published by André Wessels in 1993, which provides a day-to-day account of the British military's struggle with guerrilla forces in the Cape Colony. Although the dates and locations are precise, the number of soldiers involved and the reasons for the clashes are unclear.

From the Boer side, the primary written sources came from Maritz (Maritz 1939) and Reitz (Reitz & Emslie 1999), who wrote about the movements and actions of Boer guerrilla fighters in the Sandveld region despite not being actively involved in the Vegkop skirmish. Both Maritz and Reitz had to rely on their recollection years after the events occurred to record the deeds of the period. The last of the main sources were oral traditions (Van Zyl n.d.; Piketberg Museum 2014) passed down the generations; however, these tales do not correspond, which indicates that there were either two separate episodes or two different versions of the same event.

The secondary sources provide a broader scope of Boer movements in the Boland and West Coast regions. Both Constantine (1996) and Wessels (2011a; 2011b) provided insight into the lives and actions of the Cape rebels who joined Smuts' guerrilla troops. Shearing and Shearing (2000) provided a good description of the overall movement of Smuts' forces in the West Coast and northern region of the Cape Colony, whereas Schoeman (2019) and Thomas (2011) provided a tragic account of the repercussions of the guerrilla fighters' actions on the locals, who were willingly or unwillingly drawn into the conflict between the Boer Republics and the British Empire.

3.2 Role players

The major role players during the skirmish at Vegkop and others that were indirectly involved are listed in the tables below.

Boer officers / guerrilla fighters	
General Jan Christian Smuts	Leader of the invading force that penetrated the Western Cape and whose troops ambushed the British supply waggons at Vegkop. Smuts would later become the Prime Minister of South Africa and would play a major role in South Africa's involvement in World War I & II.
Commandant Jan Theron	The nephew of the famous Danie Theron, Theron was in command of Danie's scout troops after the latter's death in September 1900, and it is these troops that led the ambush at Vegkop. Theron died in April 1902 of typhoid fever and was laid to rest in the family graveyard in Ceres.
Commandant Stoffel Schoeman	Schoeman was from the Free State and joined the Cape Colony invasion with Commandant Wynand Malan (Shearing & Shearing 2000: 156). Schoeman and Theron led the ambush at Vegkop.
Deneys Reitz	The son of a former Orange Free State president, Reitz was Smuts' personal assistant and wrote a book about his experience during the South African War, including Smuts' Cape Colony invasion.
Jacobus "Koos Blootvoet" Adriaan Visser Louw	A local rebel who joined the guerrilla fighters when they arrived in the Sandveld area. His actions with the guerrilla fighters on Vegkop were written down by his grandson, Jan Van Zyl.
Maans Smith	A local rebel who joined Maritz's guerrilla fighters when they arrived in the Sandveld, and later became the headmaster of the local school in Redelinghuys.
Cornelius Brink	A farmer of the district who was court-martialled for aiding the guerrilla fighters during the skirmish.
Christiaan van Lill	A farmer of the district who was also court-martialled for aiding the guerrilla fighters.

Table 1: Role players on the Boer/guerrilla fighters' side during the skirmish

The organisational structure of Smuts' force (see Figure 1) comprised three generals with two to four commandants under each general. It is unclear how many troops were assigned to each unit, as both Theron and Schoeman's units are given two alternative results, with Schoeman having either 120 or 150 soldiers and Theron having either 100 or 200 troops under their command (Shearing & Shearing 2000: 156-158).



Figure 1: The command hierarchy of the Boer leaders during the invasion of the Cape Colony
Source: Adapted from Shearing and Shearing (2000: 156-158)

British military officers	
Major Hugh Sandham Jeudwine	Commander of the military escort assigned to protect the supply run between Elands Bay and Piketberg, Jeudwine's primary goal was to capture or neutralise Maritz. Jeudwine became a Major General during World War I.
Colonel Thompson Capper	Capper was in command of the construction of the blockhouses between Lambert's Bay and Victoria West. Capper travelled with Jeudwine when the supply run came under fire. Capper also became a Major General and retired after World War II.

British military officers	
Major Frank Wormald	Wormald was also assigned to hunt and capture Maritz during the Sandveld invasion. Brigadier-General Wormald was killed in action during World War I.
Colonel Charles Toler MacMorrough Kavanagh	Kavanagh was tasked with guarding the construction of the blockhouse line from Lambert's Bay, where he took possession of the supply waggons delivered to him at Elands Bay. Kavanagh retired as a Lieutenant General after World War I.

Table 2: Role players on the British' side during the skirmish

3.3 Primary sources

3.3.1 General Manie Maritz

Maritz wrote his autobiography "*My Lewe en Strewe*" (Translated: My Life and Pursuit) almost 40 years after the war ended (Maritz 1939), in which recalled the actions and movements of himself and his guerrilla fighters during the Cape Colony invasion. Maritz, one of the most visible figures during Smuts' Cape Colony invasion, was a man whose soldiers would follow him despite his aggressive reputation. After leading numerous successful raids against the British, he became one of Smuts' most trusted generals. Maritz was forthright and he was a police constable in one of Johannesburg's most violent areas prior to the war (Maritz 1939: 7). Maritz believed it was his destiny to be a part of the Natal invasion in the early phases of the South African War (Maritz 1939: 13).

Not only that, but he did not tolerate any lack of discipline, which was common on the Boer side at the time, and he frequently referenced this indiscipline:

"*Hierdie gebrek aan tug het die Boere-kommandos baie duur te staan gekom. Dit het gebeur dat die offisier uit die posisie wegja, en nie eers sy burgers waarsku nie*"

(Maritz 1939: 14).

(Translated: This lack of discipline cost the Boer commandos dearly. It happened that the officer rushed out of the position and did not even warn his troops.)

Maritz initially rode with De Wet when they invaded the Cape Colony during 1900, but soon joined Smuts' commando. De Wet's command was constantly under attack, and Maritz stated

that at one point 500 British soldiers were pursuing about 25 of his troops (Maritz 1939: 26). According to Van Zyl (n.d.), Maritz was able to recruit around 300 soldiers from the Sandveld area alone.

Maritz also used cunning tactics to outsmart the superior British forces. For example, at Niewoudtville, the Boers were outnumbered 80 to 15, but Maritz lured the British away with a decoy raid on the town, and when the British pursued him, he raided the depot in town with his main force (Maritz 1939: 40). Maritz turned his attention to the Boland and learned of a convoy on their way from Lambert's Bay to Clanwilliam. A commando of 15 troops attacked the convoy at the farm Bodam and took 15 supply waggons from the British, after which Smuts and his soldiers arrived to join forces with Maritz (Maritz 1939: 42).

Maritz then moved west towards Velddrif, where he attacked and took control of a blockhouse. When they arrived in Saldanha Bay, two of his men, Thys Boonzaaier and P. van Niekerk, opened fire on an English navy vessel in the harbour (Maritz 1939: 43; Constantine 1996: 122).

Maritz did not directly mention the skirmishes at Vegkop or Redelinghuys in his war memoirs, which was written nearly 40 years after the event, and at a realistic old age, one can forgive the author for leaving out minor events, especially since skirmishes with the British were an almost daily occurrence for the Boer commandos in the Sandveld area. The guerrilla fighters were constantly attacked and had no orders to record their actions; in contrast to British commanders, who had a culture of recording events under their command (Davies n.d.).

Two different sources placed Maritz and his troops at Vegkop (see Figure 2). Jeudwine wrote in his journal that he encountered Maritz's men (Schoeman and Theron), who attacked the supply convoy that his unit was escorting (Wessels 1993: 80), and Jacobus Louw wrote about the encounter with Maritz's soldiers at Vegkop (Van Zyl n.d.). In his book, Maritz also recalled attacking the towns of Hopefield, Piketberg, Darling, Saldanha, and Porterville (Maritz 1939: 43), which were in proximity of Redelinghuys. Smuts directed Maritz to advance further south, and the towns of Mooreesburg and Darling were also taken over (Maritz 1939: 44).

Figure 2: Maritz (sitting on the large boulder) and his soldiers in the Sandveld area (Schoeman is third from the left in the back row)
Source: Shearing and Shearing (2000: 151)

Maritz was on his way to Ceres when he received a telegram from Smuts asking him to return north to assist him as his troops were in poor condition and needed immediate assistance (Maritz 1939: 45). Maritz raided another depot in Tontelboskolk to replenish Smuts' commando with much-needed supplies (Maritz 1939: 45). Commandant Jacob (Jaap) Louis van Deventer, Commandant Ben Bouwer, and Smuts decided to move north into Namaqualand, with Springbok as the goal, to supplement the commando with enough food, ammunition, and clothing for a full-scale Boland attack (Maritz 1939: 51). Concordia had been captured and Port Nolloth was under siege when Smuts learned of the peace treaty, and all hostilities were suspended.

Reitz and Maritz, who both wrote about their experiences during the war, had no feelings for each other and had shown displeasure with each other. Maritz did not conceal the fact that he and Reitz had a rift because they were from different backgrounds and had different perspectives on the conflict. Maritz viewed Reitz as arrogant and disinterested when he wrote about him.

"*Denys [sic] was maar so 'n traak my nie*"

(Maritz 1939: 51).

(Translated: Deneys could not be bothered)

Reitz, on the other hand, viewed Maritz as a cruel and merciless individual, categorising him as:

"*a short, dark man, of enormous physical strength, cruel and ruthless in his methods*"
(Reitz & Emslie 1999: 274)

Maritz openly praised the Cape rebels under his command's bravery and marksmanship, and genuinely believed that the Cape invasion would have been futile without them (Maritz 1939: 43).

3.3.2 Deneys Reitz

3.3.2.1 Prelude to the invasion

Reitz, a member of Smuts' commando, provided an accurate depiction of the commando/guerrilla fighter's living conditions during the war. His first-hand experiences of life on command during the Cape Colony invasion were documented in his book, titled *Commando* (Reitz & Emslie 1999).

Reitz gives the reader a glimpse of his experiences with the cruelty of war, as well as the harsh conditions they had to endure. Fighting, no matter how adventurous it may sound, is a very bleak reality. At one such skirmish, they came across the rotting carcasses of horses and the disturbed ground of newly dug graves (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 153). Upon entering the northern part of the Cape Colony in late September 1901, the rainy season had begun. For the commandos, this meant spending their time in cold, wet, and muddy conditions, which had a severe impact on the mobility of the units in the area (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 201).

Reitz, however, believed that the difficulties did not deter them from their cause. They believed that convincing the Cape Colony residents to join their cause was critical if the two Republics were to survive. Reitz was so confident in his invasion of the Cape that the previous two failed attempts by De Wet and Hertzog did not deter him from joining Smuts in this invasion (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 183). He did realise, however, that if his path had not crossed that of Smuts, his small force of troops would not have survived a week in British territory (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 193).

The appointment of Lord Roberts on 3 January 1901 (*The London Gazette* 1901: 83) as the commander of the British forces signalled the end of the Boer Republics. Roberts' army moved in massive columns (around 30 000 soldiers), and the Boers were outnumbered and unable to halt the British forces' slow, steady advance (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 113). Jeudwine estimated that the British troops would number around 50 000 to deal with the growing guerrilla attacks (Wessels 1993: 53).

The Boers, now without their formal capitals and with almost all towns overrun by the British, moved into the veld where they knew they could survive and could launch their guerrilla warfare strategy against the occupying forces. This type of engagement enabled them to strike quickly and unexpectedly, but also to flee to the safety of the rugged terrain if events did not go as planned. Reitz and Emslie (1999: 215) believed that at one point during their Cape Colony invasion, around 1 000 British soldiers were within striking distance of them.

When the British realised that conventional warfare would not be able to quell the rebel uprising, they adopted a scorched-earth policy. These tactics included the forcible removal of women and children left at homesteads to concentration camps (Hobhouse 1902: 3) and the destruction of these farms after looting them (Hobhouse 1902: 4), as well as the unlawful destruction and theft of private property (Hobhouse 1902: 5).

Reitz painted a bleak picture of the impact these policies had on the commandos in the field:

"Pillars of smoke began to rise behind the English advance, and to our astonishment we saw that they were burning the farmhouses as they came"
(Reitz & Emslie 1999: 142).

Reitz and Emslie (1999: 142) believed that this had the opposite effect, as the Boers became more fervent in their rebellious beliefs. A strategy to shorten the war had thus only served to prolong it.

3.3.2.2 Smuts' Cape invasion

Reitz was determined to travel to the Cape to assist the local Boer commandos. He met up with Smuts' commando by chance and remained with him until the end of the war (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 193). Reitz would later claim that Smuts' commando was "the finest commando

with which I ever served" (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 193). This reinforced the notion that Smuts was more of a strategic thinker and more fortunate than his contemporaries, who failed to make a significant impact on the Cape Colony.

Smuts chose to enter the Cape Colony from the Lesotho side, at Zastron in the Free State, and quickly began moving west through Adelaide, eventually arriving near Port Elizabeth (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 229). Smuts changed course and headed for the Atlantic coast of the south-western Cape (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 240). After that, Smuts' commando made their way to the Great Karoo via the Seven Weeks Poort and on to Calvinia (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 226). At the same time, the British Army, led by General John Denton Pinkstone French, was closing in on them (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 263). As all previous expeditions into the Cape Colony had resulted in disastrous clashes, Smuts' gamble to move quickly and to circumvent British main forces' stations like the Karoo and Matjiesfontein was successful, and he encountered local rebels already engaged in skirmishes on the West Coast. They encountered Maritz at Vanrhynsdorp, who would also join Smuts' command (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 269). Smuts, a dynamic and shrewd leader, decided to unify all these small guerrilla fighting groups into a formidable force (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 270). What the rebels were unable to plunder, they destroyed. On one event, Van Deventer and his soldiers infiltrated a British camp and set alight 120 supply waggons (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 275).

Near Vanrhynsdorp, on the farm Windhoek, Smuts' forces engaged a group of British soldiers that posed a considerable threat to the guerrilla fighters (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 282). During the engagement, roughly 200 British soldiers were captured, which proved the capability of the guerrilla forces (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 282). Shearing and Shearing (2000: 170) estimated that approximately 80 Cape Mounted Police were entrenched in and fortifying the farmhouse. The outcome, although a triumph for the Boers, was costly, since five Boers and two British soldiers were killed in hand-to-hand action before the farmstead was taken (Shearing & Shearing 2000: 171).

Kavanagh and his Cape Mounted Police halted the southernly incursion of guerrilla combatants on 18 February 1902 as a result of this engagement (Shearing & Shearing 2000: 172). Smuts and his commandos then moved to Okiep in the north-western Cape, and it was

from this location that he was summoned to the peace treaty that led to the eventual end of the war.

3.3.3 Major Hugh Sandham Jeudwine

The diaries kept by Jeudwine contained the first conclusive piece of evidence regarding the Vegkop skirmish. In December 1899, Jeudwine was appointed as a special service officer for the Cape Colony (Wessels 1993: 52). His diary contained evidence concerning troop movements along the Cape Colony's West Coast. The writings also highlighted the British officers' frustrations in dealing with the guerrilla rebels (Van Zyl n.d.; Wessels 1993: 56). Wessels (1993: 53) believed that the invasion of the Cape Colony left a "legacy of unrest that would not be easily stamped out".

Jeudwine was tasked with tracking down and capturing Maritz (whose units operated in the West Coast and Sandveld area) due to his aggressive movements, but this task proved impossible for him (Wessels 1993: 53). Jeudwine was unable to apprehend Maritz, who operated under the command of Smuts in the Sandveld area, but he was able to keep them moving and thus preventing them from assimilating into the colony (Wessels 1993: 54).

Jeudwine began his pursuit in Van Wyk's Vlei, near Carnarvon, with soldiers from the Cape Police, the Welsh Regiment, and the Lancashire Fusiliers (Wessels 1993: 63). The combined force was constantly on the move due to the highly mobile Maritz and his commando. On one occasion, shortly after arriving in Carnarvon, Jeudwine was forced to mobilise his troops and move west to Brandvlei after Maritz and his guerrilla fighters were spotted in the area (Wessels 1993: 63). Jeudwine then went to Calvinia, only to be called back to Brandvlei to try to intercept Maritz, who had moved again (Wessels 1993: 66).

The only real chance for Jeudwine to capture Maritz during the war came on 19 June 1901, when Maritz's soldiers rode too close to his regiment in the thick mist. Maritz, however, triumphed and was soon back to causing havoc in the area (Wessels 1993: 68). Wessels (1993: 72) believed that when French assumed operational command of the Cape Colony in August 1901, the British became more organised and thus achieved greater success against the guerrillas. However, the British were still a long way from major success. Around September 1901, intelligence reports from Cape Town directed Capper to move south and to reorganise

in Ceres, which allowed Maritz and his soldiers to gain significant territory further south, towards Malmesbury (Wessels 1993: 75).

The Boers, who had taken control of towns like Hopefield and Clanwilliam by this point, proved to be a formidable force as they attacked British supply routes. Along the Lambert's Bay road towards Clanwilliam, Wormald was surrounded by Maritz's soldiers (Wessels 1993: 78). They captured around 20 supply waggons with 600 soldiers, which provided ammunition and supplies to the guerrilla fighters (Wessels 1993: 78). As the Boer forces had no facilities for interning prisoners, the captured soldiers were usually stripped of their food, ammunition, and clothes and let go. Even after French and Major General Stephenson arrived in the area with an armoured train and approximately 1 000 additional troops, the guerrilla fighters maintained their advantage (Wessels 1993: 76). This lasted until 12 November 1901, when the British liberated Darling with the loss of Field Cornet Hildebrand, a member of Maritz's guerrilla commando (Wessels 1993: 79). During this time, the British had lost a significant amount of supplies to the guerrilla fighters (Van Zyl n.d.; Maurice 1906: 460; Wessels 1993: 71; Shearing & Shearing 2000: 163). To avoid raids and losses caused by frequent skirmishes, supply runs were escorted by the Cape Mounted Police (Shearing & Shearing 2000: 169). On one of these supply runs, on 8 December 1901, Jeudwine encountered Schoeman's and Theron's commandos (who operated under the leadership of Maritz) while transporting critical engineering equipment for the construction of blockhouses (Wessels 1993: 80; Shearing & Shearing 2000: 154). Their combined forces numbered approximately 350 soldiers (150 under Schoeman and 200 under Theron) and were stationed approximately 3.5 km south-east of Wittedrift, across from Verlorenvlei close to the town of Redelinghuys (Wessels 1993: 80).

The British supply run, consisting of approximately 50 waggons, left Piketberg on 7 December 1901, and was en route to Lambert's Bay via Elands Bay when they were ambushed by guerrilla forces at Vegkop, Redelinghuys, on the afternoon of 8 December 1901 at around 16h00 (Wessels 1993: 80). According to Jeudwine's diary, the Boers were driven off when darkness fell, with only one officer and one soldier injured (Wessels 1993: 80). This contradicted Jacobus Louw's statement as recorded by his grandson, Jan van Zyl, which claimed that the Boers captured their waggons and defeated the British during the skirmish (Van Zyl n.d.).

T.P.R. Goldstone of the Western Province Mounted Rifle's Brigade died at Wittedrift in December 1901, according to a grave in Piketberg Historical Graveyard (see Figure 3), which indicates that at least one British soldier died as a result of an engagement in the area. After the skirmish, the convoy continued towards Elands Bay where the military escort was handed over to Kavanagh by Jeudwine and the blockhouse parts were distributed along the Lambert's Bay – Clanwilliam road (Wessels 1993: 81).

Figure 3: Goldstone's grave in the Piketberg Historical Graveyard
Source: Researcher (2021)

3.3.4 Jacobus "Koos Blootvoet" Louw

Jan van Zyl recorded the oral statements of his grandfather, Jacobus "Koos Blootvoet" Louw's, actions and involvement during the skirmish at Vegkop. According to Louw, the skirmish occurred on 11 December 1901 (Van Zyl n.d.). However, this contradicts the notes made by Jeudwine in his diary, who indicated that the supply run was ambushed on the evening of 8 December 1901 (Wessels 1993: 80).

An English convoy was escorted by Jeudwine's regiment and was on their way to Elands Bay when they were attacked by guerrilla fighters (Van Zyl n.d.). After learning of the convoy's movement, the rebel forces decided to ambush it, and Vegkop was chosen for its tactical attacking value (Van Zyl n.d.).

According to Jacobus Louw, approximately 30 guerrilla fighters were involved in the skirmish (Van Zyl n.d.). Ten fighters were stationed on the west side of the hill, ten more on the east side, and the rest were sharpshooters stationed on the river's side towards Het Kruis, opposite the hill (Van Zyl n.d.). Scouts stood guard on the high north side of the river to alert the attacking force when the convoy approached (Van Zyl n.d.). The scout team confirmed that the English convoy was on the march around 15h00, and the first shots on the convoy were fired at 16h10 (Van Zyl n.d.). The British took refuge on the south side of their waggons to avoid being hit by the attacking Boers who were positioned on the hill and were unaware of the sharpshooters who now had a clear view of them from across the *vlei* (Van Zyl n.d.). Jacobus Louw stated that the skirmish was brief as the convoy was vastly outnumbered by the attacking force, and the fight was almost one-sided as the convoy had nowhere to hide (Van Zyl n.d.). Following the fight, the Boers took what they could and retired from the skirmish (Van Zyl n.d.). Jacobus Louw mentioned that the British dead were buried in a shallow grave near the river, of which the remains were exposed during the flood of 1925 (Van Zyl n.d.). He did not say what happened to the skeletal remains after that.

Following the skirmish, the British were enraged, believing that local farmers had aided the guerrilla rebels by providing food for them and their horses (Van Zyl n.d.). Jacobus Louw was imprisoned in Grahamstown until the war ended in May 1902 (Van Zyl n.d.). According to Western Cape provincial archive records, Cornelius Brink, Maans Smith, and Christiaan van Lill were arrested for assisting and aiding the Boers by providing food and water for their horses (Attorney General 1901b). This may explain why Jeudwine returned to Wittedrift on 11 December 1901, as he was likely involved in the judicial proceedings (Wessels 1993: 81).

After the skirmish, the Boers were reported to be at Brandburg, north of Redelinghuys, and Kavanagh and Capper were ordered to attack them at dawn the next morning; however, the guerrilla fighters were gone when they arrived (Wessels 1993: 81).

3.3.5 Maans Smith

Maans Smith (Meester), a Redelinghuys resident at the time of the war, joined the rebel forces in November 1901 (Burger 1975: 238). He and four others joined Field Cornet Hildebrand and moved to the northwest to serve the Boer forces in the Upington area (Burger 1975: 238).

According to Maans Smith, the local town guards, known as "*Die Krupp se Kommando*" (The Krupp's Commando) engaged in a conflict with the local farmers after killing some sheep on Koos Visser's farm, Rietvlei (Piketberg Museum 2014). The town guard deliberately killed the animals due to the farmers' refusal to give some of them to the starving commando (Piketberg Museum 2014). According to Maans, this incident resulted in the deaths of some British horses and a British soldier (Piketberg Museum 2014).

This statement made by Maans Smith might indicate an alternative account of the events at Vegkop that was passed down orally or this incident is unrelated to the supply run ambush and is a different incident in the area during the South African War.

According to court records, Maans Smith was tried for high treason and convicted in Cradock on 4 July 1902, under proclamation 100 of 1902, whereby he was found guilty of joining the British from November 1901 until 5 June 1902 (Attorney General 1901b).

3.3.6 Cornelius Brink and Christiaan van Lill

According to the court papers (Magistrate Paper D.5/501/1901) of 29 April 1903, both Cornelius Brink and Christiaan van Lill were court-martialled and tried for high treason for providing the guerrilla fighters' horses with food and water on 3 December 1901 (Attorney General 1901c). Cornelius Brink gave food and water to the Boers at Drommel Vlei and Christiaan van Lill provided the Boers with proviant at Kruisfontein (Attorney General 1901c).

3.4 Secondary sources

3.4.1 Constantine (1996): Guerrilla war in the Cape Colony

Long before the South African War, the Cape Colony had a history of revolting against British rule over the territory; in fact, there were conflicts and attempts to revolt as early as 1801 (Constantine 1996: 1). In 1899, a failed attempt to invade the Cape Colony resulted only in the court-martialling of the Cape rebels and the desired result of quelling any revolt in British territory (Constantine 1996: 3).

However, after delegates to a "*volkskongres*" in Worcester were nearly shot on 6 December 1900, and reports of farm burnings reached the Cape Colony, the pro-Boer movement re-emerged and the foundation for a second invasion was formed (Constantine 1996: 5).

The Western Cape was largely unaffected by the South African War's activities during the early stages of the conflict. In January 1901, Hertzog saw an opportunity and invaded the region (Constantine 1996: 113). Calvinia and Vanrhynsdorp soon fell under his command, allowing rebels to join his commando (Constantine 1996: 113).

The local coloured force, who served as town guards under British command, strongly opposed Hertzog (Constantine 1996: 115). However, the capture of 21 British troops during a skirmish near Lambert's Bay by Niewoudt's soldiers demonstrated the effectiveness of the guerrilla fighters' hit-and-run tactics (Constantine 1996: 115).

Constantine (1996: 118) also described the heinous practice of destroying farmlands and towns, as was the case on 12 May 1901, when Jeudwine's regiments took Brandvlei from Maritz. He went on to describe the distress felt by women and children whose homes had been destroyed by the British (Constantine 1996: 119), giving the reader a bleak picture of how the war affected the public, even those who were not directly involved.

Constantine (1996: 120) believed that to operate in British-controlled territory, the guerrillas required a base of operations. The rebels would seize control of a town for as long as possible, such as the case of Vanrhynsdorp, and this would have a considerable impact on the British, who would fight for control in the Republics only to lose control of towns under their governance (Constantine 1996: 120). Constantine (1996: 123) wrote that Maritz's guerrilla fighters stole horses as far south as Parow. If Cape Town was ever in danger of falling into rebel hands, it might have had an impact on resupplying the troops in the battle.

During the last months of 1901, guerrilla fighters wreaked havoc on the entire West Coast, with multiple skirmishes taking place across the colony (Wessels 1993: 78-79). Because it was heavily fortified, Piketberg was the only town that was not threatened by Maritz's commando's attacks (Wessels 1993: 79; Constantine 1996: 122). This did not prevent Maritz's soldiers from opening fire on the HMS Partridge, a British destroyer stationed in Saldanha Bay

(Constantine 1996: 122). During that time, approximately 3 000 soldiers were active as guerrilla fighters (Constantine 1996: 124).

A line of blockhouses was erected between Lambert's Bay and Clanwilliam in January 1902, accompanied by soldiers brought in to control the rebel movement and to take control of the Western Cape Colony (Constantine 1996: 130). The 450-km-long blockhouse line constructed to halt Smuts' movements now linked Victoria West to Lambert's Bay (Gale and Polden Ltd 1910: 363).

The success of Smuts, Maritz, and other guerrilla commanders in the Western Cape was due to the area's pro-Boer community, as well as the landscape's geographical isolation and the lack of infrastructure, such as railway lines, for the British to counter the fast-moving commandos (Constantine 1996: 129).

Hertzog was the first to infiltrate the area, igniting the insurgency. Following Hertzog's success, Smuts would invade the Cape Colony and prove to be more successful in his endeavours. However, Constantine (1996: 131) was unimpressed by Smuts, viewing his Cape Colony invasion as a "absence of thought-out offensive strategy".

According to Constantine (1996: 177), 3 437 (95%) of the 3 635 guerrilla fighters in the field at the time of surrender were Cape rebels. However, the Cape invasion would have affected approximately 10 000 people, and a significant number were imprisoned for assisting guerrilla fighters (Constantine 1996: 177). Some paid with their lives (about 50 rebels), while others paid with their property (Constantine 1996: 183). Finally, the presence of guerrilla fighters in the colony sparked a long-lasting civil rivalry in the Afrikaner nation, which continues to this day.

3.4.2 Wessels (2011): Boer guerrilla and British counter-guerrilla operations

Wessels (2011b) documented the Boer guerrilla phase and explained the rationale behind the transition from conventional warfare to guerrilla operations, as well as the initial success brought about by this transition. The final portion of Wessels' (2011b) writing focused on the British counter-measures that ultimately led to the failure of the insurgency phase.

3.4.2.1 Boer guerrilla phase

To understand why the Boer forces switched from a semi-conventional to a fully fledged guerrilla war, one must first examine the stages that led up to their decision to change tactics. Following the outbreak of the war in October 1899, the Boers took the initiative and invaded the British colony of Natal (Wessels 2011b: 4). They had good successes in the beginning, but they failed to build on them, which allowed the British to regroup (Wessels 2011b: 5). As more British soldiers were sent to the front, a full-scale war appeared to be impossible, which gave the British the opportunity to launch the second phase of the war, namely the counter-offensive phase (Wessels 2011b: 5). This offensive initially failed, but when Roberts took command, the British quickly overran the Boer capitals (Wessels 2011b: 5).

After General Pieter (Piet) Arnoldus Cronjé surrendered with a large force at Paardeberg, the Boers needed to restrategise, and a meeting was held on 17 March 1900 in Kroonstad in the Orange Free State (Wessels 2011b: 6). At the meeting, a decision was made to continue the fight against the British, but to adopt guerrilla tactics (Wessels 2011b: 6). Wessels (2011b: 6) believed that the Boer Republics' goal during the guerrilla phase was to "prolong the conflict so that it could drain Britain's resources".

Guerrilla tactics included using high mobility, withdrawing as quickly as possible from an engagement, living off the land, and relying on reconnaissance to outmanoeuvre the enemy (Wessels 2011b: 7). As a result, the Boer guerrilla fighters had tremendous success in the early stages of the guerrilla war. De Wet's decisive victory over the British on 31 March 1900 at Sannaspos solidified his reputation as an effective commander among both his allies and the opposition (De Wet 1902: 61; Wessels 2011b: 7). De Wet then launched a hit-and-run attack near Vredefort and Roodewal (De Wet 1902: 99; Wessels 2011b: 8). On 13 December 1900, the Boer forces won another battle near Nooitgedacht, west of Pretoria (Pretorius 2000: 119; Wessels 2011b: 9). One of the main reasons for these early victories was that the Boers still received a great deal of help from local farmers and residents. Another factor was Lord Roberts' erroneous assumption that the war ended when the Boer capitals fell into British hands (Wessels 2011b: 8). As the war progressed, Lord Roberts labelled the remaining fighters as guerrilla fighters, which annoyed De Wet because he believed the Boer government was still intact and they were only defending their sovereign state (De Wet 1902: 228).

3.4.2.2 British counter-guerrilla operations

Britain soon realised that they were not dealing with a typical European war or foe. The British had to change their tactics to win. Britain used counter-guerrilla tactics that were not novel but would give them an advantage. These counter-measures, which De Wet (1902: 148) referred to as "a policy of destruction", prevented the guerrilla fighters from receiving the food, medical care, and intelligence that they desperately needed and thousands of farms, cattle, and food were destroyed (Wessels 2011b: 12). At first, only the farms of the Cape rebels were destroyed, but as the conflict dragged on and Britain's aggression increased, entire communities (about 40 towns) and homesteads (approximately 100 000 white and black homes) were also obliterated (Wessels 2011b: 12).

The next step was to forcibly remove the guerrilla fighters' families to concentration camps, severing all ties between them (Wessels 2011b: 13). This tactic was used to demoralise the guerrilla fighters and to break their resolve to keep fighting. Another deterioration tactic used by the British was to place black concentration camps on land owned by guerrilla fighters (Benneyworth 2019: 6). Instead, the Boers became more determined to continue their attacks on the British in the former Republics and the Cape Colony (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 142).

In order for the British to make the switch from an infantry army to a more mobile force, around 669 575 horses were imported (Wessels 2011b: 14). The Boers continued to have the advantage when it came to mobility because they were renowned for their ability to shoot while mounted. Including local combatants, the number of British soldiers fighting increased to 380 000 in May 1901, compared to the Boer forces' 35 000 or so (Wessels 2011b: 14). Approximately 326 073 horses and 51 399 mules perished as a result of the war (Swart 2010: 249), which shows the impact of the conflict not only on human lives but also on animals as nearly half of the serving animals perished.

One advantage the British had over the guerrilla combatants was the construction of blockhouses, and over 8 000 of these were built to guard railway lines and other crucial areas (Wessels 2011b: 15). Blockhouses were also used to reinforce the garrisons next to them, as was the case with the Dry Harts railway station and concentration camp (Benneyworth 2020b: 100). Blockhouse building posed a hindrance to guerrilla mobility, as well as acting as a catch-all for capturing guerrilla combatants in the field (Hattingh & Wessels 2013: 109). The Boers

would be chased by the British to the blockhouses, where they would be surrounded and taken prisoner (De Wet 1902: 260). De Wet (1902: 260) referred to this technique as "hurdling animals into the *kraal*".

As the war dragged on and the British changed tactics, the war began to take its toll on the guerrilla fighters as the lack of mobility, loss of replacement horses, and food and ammunition shortages, particularly in the latter stages of the conflict, put the guerrilla fighters on the defensive. All these factors contributed to the British military's victory over the Boers. Skirmishes at Boschbult on 31 March 1901 and Roodewal on 11 April 1901 resulted in heavy losses for the guerrilla fighters, who could barely keep it going at that point (De Wet 1902: 111; Pretorius 2000: 123; Wessels 2011b: 11).

By April 1902, there were still approximately 21 000 Boers in the field, including approximately 4 000 Cape rebels (Wessels 2011b: 16). The lack of mobility and firepower meant the end of guerrilla operations, and the Boer leaders were aware of this when they attended the Vereeniging Peace Treaty (Wessels 2011b: 16). Although Smuts in the Cape region and De Wet in the former Transvaal still had substantial armies, it was clear that the British counter-guerrilla operations had taken their toll on them (Wessels 2011b: 16).

Due to the Cape Colony's involvement in the war, the Boer and British supporters of the Afrikaner population had a deep-seated animosity toward one another (Wessels 2011b: 17). The almost £200 million cost of the war had a lasting effect on the British economy and left a path of death and destruction in South Africa (Wessels 2011b: 17).

3.4.3 Shearing (2005): The Cape rebel of the South African War

Shearing (2005) concentrated on the impact of military martial law on the Cape colonists and presented a different side of the rebels when he described their ruthless and destructive behaviour towards some colonists. Shearing (2005) focused on the role of the Cape rebels throughout the guerrilla phase of the war, as well as the effects of the rebel rebellion on the inhabitants of the Colony both during and after the war, in contrast to Constantine (1996), who concentrated on guerrilla fighting in the Cape Colony.

The most notorious Cape leader mentioned by Shearing (2005) was Theron, a man from Ceres who, because of his popularity, would find himself in charge of a huge group of soldiers and who would "draw Boer fighters to him like a magnet" (Shearing 2005: 130).

Theron led the farthest southern skirmish at Still Bay on 12 September 1901 while operating in the most southern reaches of the Cape Colony (Vriende van Afrikaans 2009: 295). Theron allegedly displayed cruelty and destructive behaviour by either destroying or taking over colonists' property during his invasion of the Cape Colony and on one occasion, he even had people executed for spying on him (Shearing 2005: 131). According to Shearing (2005: 131), this behaviour would have a long-term impact on how the British perceived the rebel leaders.

The British government had to put down any resistance from its colony as the South African War advanced, and the anti-war movement emerged to maintain peace in the non-combat zones (Cosgrove 1980: 124). In essence, it meant that military leaders could hold, imprison, and ultimately judge any civilian who disobeyed martial law (Cosgrove 1980: 125). The Cape region was the one affected the most severely by the declaration of martial law. Any earlier indulgence of the insurrection was gone, and any treasonous conduct was severely punished (Shearing 2005: 146). However, because the rebels operated beyond the bounds of the law, the new rules under the legislation largely affected law-abiding residents (Shearing 2005: 146).

The severe sentences of the military tribunal indicated that the military used these court procedures to punish and dissuade rebels in the Cape Colony with the worst punishment available, in some cases the death penalty which was applied (Shearing 2005: 152).

3.4.4 Wessels (2011): Japie Neser, Cape colonial and Afrikaner rebel

Wessels (2011a: 58) argued that writers of the Cape invasion unfairly favoured men like Smuts, Hertzog, and De Wet. These individuals eclipse lesser-known Cape rebel commanders such as Japie Neser and Johannes Cornelius Jacobus (Hans) Lötter on account of their outstanding guerrilla tactics (Wessels 2011a: 58). As they were still citizens of the British-controlled Cape Colony, death awaited the Cape rebels if they were apprehended, which may have reflected their commitment to their cause and desire to avoid capture.

After the failed first invasion of the Cape Colony by Boer rebels (Constantine 1996: 115), Neser opted to stay behind to observe the colony's attitude toward the Boer soldiers (Wessels 2011a: 64). Good intelligence gathering was crucial to the success of the second invasion, even though he faced certain death if he was apprehended.

Neser's intelligence report informed Hertzog of the colony's conditions and attitude towards the Boers, which affected his decision to invade (Wessels 2011a: 65). Primarily, Hertzog wanted to relieve pressure on the commandos in the Boer Republics, but he was also resolved to return the conflict to the British by invading British territory (Wessels 2011a: 66). The disruption of British communication and the recruitment of new recruits for the cause were additional contributing elements (Wessels 2011a: 66).

Hertzog's invasion was more successful than that of De Wet, who had made a name for himself by this time and had inadvertently caused the British target him with a large force. Approximately 14 000 British soldiers pursued Hertzog during the Cape invasion (Wessels 2011a: 66). In one month, Hertzog moved his forces around 1 000 km from Philippolis in the Orange Free State to Vanrhynsdorp on the West Coast, which he occupied on 19 January 1901 (Wessels 2011a: 66). Neser and around 40 Cape rebels joined Hertzog's invasion, which took place in the barren Northern Cape region near Carnarvon and Calvinia (Wessels 2011a: 68).

On 25 February 1901, guerrilla fighters led by Neser had a successful skirmish on the farm Windhoek, approximately 15 km south of Vanrhynsdorp (Constantine 1996: 126; Wessels 2011a: 71). During this skirmish, 90 British soldiers, as well as horses and supplies, were captured (Wessels 2011a: 72). This figure contradicts the number of captured British as Reitz estimated around 200 captured (Reitz & Emslie 1999: 282).

Neser was promoted to Commandant around October 1901 and was now in command of around 300 soldiers and for the first time during the war, a Boer and rebel force had taken control of a British territory (Wessels 2011a: 69). During November 1901, Neser's commandos were involved in several skirmishes along the West Coast and inland regions, moving actively around the towns of Fraserburg, Sutherland, Vanrhynsdorp, and Clanwilliam (Wessels 2011a: 69). Another skirmish was recorded on 5 February 1902, when Van Deventer and 28 soldiers attacked a convoy near Middelpos and captured many supplies and horses (Maurice 1906:

468; Wessels 2011a: 71). The British also suffered numerous casualties during the skirmish (see Figure 4).

Wessels (2011a: 72) believed that the war had a strong civil war character in the Cape Colony. Many clashes between guerrilla fighters and British forces were with the district mounted troops and local town guards, which were made up of local Afrikaner, black, and coloured communities. Wessels (2011a: 73) completed his study of the Cape rebels' operations by noting that, despite certain triumphs, the overall invasion was ineffective because the rebels were constantly on the run and lacked the numbers to make a substantial impact on the British. Wessels (2011a: 73) further believed their guerrilla tactics had simply served to prolong the war and resulted in the destruction of property under the scorched-earth policy and the construction of internment camps.

3.4.5 Shearing and Shearing (2000): General Jan Smuts and his long ride

The chapter about Smuts' West Coast invasion in Shearing and Shearing's (2000) book begins on 23 November 1901, almost two weeks before the skirmish at Vegkop, when Smuts' troops moved into Vanrhynsdorp (Shearing & Shearing 2000: 151).

Simultaneously, French was engaged in clearing the Boland and West Coast region of rebels, not knowing that a Boer army had entered the northern portion of the territory and were plotting an all-out invasion of the Boland and West Coast region (Shearing & Shearing 2000: 153).

Kitchener ordered the construction of blockhouses from Lambert's Bay to Victoria West on 3 December 1901 in response to Smuts' invasion (Shearing & Shearing 2000: 154). Kavanagh was tasked with guarding the construction of the blockhouse line from Lambert's Bay, and a convoy of 50 waggons arrived at Lambert's Bay at the same time (Shearing & Shearing 2000: 154). This is the same convoy that was attacked at Vegkop and, after a brief fight with the rebels, continued to Elands Bay before arriving at Lambert's Bay.

Shearing and Shearing (2000: 154) also mentioned the skirmish between Schoeman and Theron's guerrilla fighters and Capper's and Jeudwine's forces 3.2 km south-west of Wittedrift on 9 December 1901, after which Capper and Jeudwine drove the guerrilla forces north. Following the skirmish at Vegkop, Theron and approximately 350 soldiers were occupied

along the Lambert's Bay – Doringbos line in December and January 1902 (Shearing & Shearing 2000: 162). On 5 February 1902, Van Deventer marched his soldiers (including Schoeman) to Calvinia, where they attacked Lieutenant Colonel W. Doran's units at the Middelpos hotel (Shearing & Shearing 2000: 164).

During the skirmish at Middelpos, nine British soldiers and one Boer combatant were killed (Wessels 1993: 71); approximately 15 British soldiers were also killed in and near Middelpos and Omkyk at that time (Maurice 1906: 468). A grave for the fallen soldiers was constructed behind the hotel (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Grave of the nine British troops from the 11th Imperial Yeomanry unit who perished on 5 February 1902
Source: Researcher (2021)

3.4.6 Schoeman (2019): Rebel Hans Lötter

Schoeman (2019) provides a glimpse into the lives and dangers of the Cape rebel soldiers as they attempted to aid the Boer Republic commandos who invaded the Cape Colony. Lötter, like many other Cape Boer sympathisers, joined the Boers when the war broke out. As a citizen of the British-controlled Cape Colony, he faced execution if he was apprehended. They were all convinced that the British injustice could no longer be tolerated (Schoeman 2019: 33).

After an unsuccessful first invasion of the Cape Colony in 1899, Hertzog, De Wet, and Martinus Theunis Steyn planned a second invasion for December 1900 (Schoeman 2019: 35). On 16 December 1900, Lötter joined Hertzog's invading force as it entered the Cape Colony between Norvalspont and Hopetown (Schoeman 2019: 38). Hertzog had divided his army into two divisions, –one marching to Sutherland and Ceres and the other to Calvinia. This second group marched to Lambert's Bay after hearing that a ship from Europe had brought supplies and material for the invading force (Schoeman 2019: 40). This rumour turned out to be false. They did, however, come across a British naval ship, H.M.S. Sybille, which, upon seeing the Boer forces, opened fire on them (Schoeman 2019: 40).

Hertzog's soldiers quickly realised that the invasion was not what they had hoped for. With the constant fear of British soldiers closing in on them and the toll on their horses, an increasing number of guerrilla fighters found themselves on foot and unable to keep up with the commando's quick pace (Schoeman 2019: 41). Schoeman (2019: 41) believed that the inability to move caused 200 Boers to fall into British hands and become prisoners of war. This could be the main reason Smuts chose to have a base of operations and a supply source to avoid repeating the failure of the first two invasions. One British officer recalled:

> It was not until you found opportunity to see these prisoners that you realized what this war meant for these farmer guerrillas. Amongst the 200 prisoners that were brought in that day, there was only one man – a man who called himself Hertzog's secretary who was completely dressed (Schoeman 2019: 41)

Even though Hertzog only managed to rally around 200 Cape rebels for his cause, the consequences of the invasion were far worse in the colony for the Boer supporters. Martial law was declared in 14 districts, and the Cape Colonial Forces (CCF) were formed (Schoeman 2019: 43). The CCF was made up of local town guards and mounted troops from the district, led by General Edward Brabant (Schoeman 2019: 43).

Colonel Henry Jenner (Harry) Scobell, who had around 280 soldiers from the Cape Mounted Rifles and the 9th Lancers at his disposal, pursued Lötter relentlessly (Schoeman 2019: 112). They eventually caught up with him after months of pursuit, and he was captured during a skirmish near Cradock (Schoeman 2019: 117). Lötter, a Cape Colony citizen, was executed for

treason on 11 October 1901 (Schoeman 2019: 141). This was a sobering reminder of the dangers that the Cape rebels faced if they were apprehended.

3.4.7 Thomas (2011): The men who would not march

According to Thomas (2011: 79-80), Smuts was the "boldest of the Boer leaders" and his Cape Colony invasion was "astonishing". This is based on the account that, in the final stages of the war (around April 1902), Smuts invaded the Namaqualand district, first conquering the town of Concordia, which surrendered without a fight, and then threatened the vital coastal town of Port Nolloth, which served as a major transportation depot for the British.

The British, who were already stretched and thinly spread across a large area, were unable to stop the determined and motivated Smuts, who managed to rally around 3 000 soldiers for the northern invasion of the West Coast (Thomas 2011: 80). The British required approximately 9 000 troops to pursue the Boers, but it was in vain (Thomas 2011: 80).

Okiep, a small settlement in the north-western Cape, was strategically significant to both sides. In order to advance their cause, the Boers needed to continue seizing Cape Colony towns, and this region also included important copper mines to be exploited (Thomas 2011: 81). Thomas (2011: 83) believed that the town guards' failure to defend Concordia was due to their lack of combat experience, and that even though the guard was around 110 soldiers strong, the area was simply too vast to defend successfully. Finally, the town guards were left to defend themselves; no assistance was sent from the neighbouring Okiep, which had a force of around 1 000 soldiers at the time (Thomas 2011: 85).

Realising that Smuts' Boer forces were drawing closer, the town guards resisted Captain Francis Phillips' order to abandon their families and retreat to Okiep in order to defend the town (Thomas 2011: 97). Phillips, upon realising he was dealing with a mutiny, ordered the guards to disband and return home in order to safeguard their families. Before approaching Okiep, Smuts issued Phillips a memorandum stating that no lives would be lost, and no property would be damaged if they surrendered, which led Phillips to capitulate without firing a shot (Thomas 2011: 113). The actions of the Concordia town guard and Phillips demonstrated the fear and accounts surrounding Smuts and his soldiers, who appeared to be unstoppable in the West Coast region of the Cape Colony for the latter part of 1901 and 1902.

3.5 Conclusion

The scarcity of official documentation surrounding the Cape Colony invasion makes it difficult for researchers to draw definitive conclusions. One must rely on the personal diaries of the role players, as well as material generated years after the event. A few official court documents also exist, which provide more detail on the consequences of the skirmish.

Although the skirmish at Redelinghuys appears insignificant when viewed in the context of the war, it does provide a good indication of the type of actions used by the Boer guerrillas during the latter part of the war, particularly the skirmishes used by the guerrilla fighters on supply runs in the Sandveld area. These raids became so frequent that active fighting soldiers like the Western Cape Mounted troops, the 9th Lancers and the 11th Yeomanry units, the Cape Police, a company of Welsh Regiment, and the Lancashire Fusiliers were called away from the main battle areas in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies to accompany supply runs and bring order to the Cape Colony (Wessels 1993: 63).

No matter how many soldiers were deployed to capture the highly mobile Boer guerrilla warriors, the British were unable to succeed. The only way to stop the guerrilla combatants was for the British to proclaim martial law, prohibiting colonial citizens from providing help or refuge to the fighters, which proved to be insufficient as the guerrilla fighters had a great deal of sympathy from the locals. Colonial town guards attempted unsuccessfully to keep the guerrilla fighters out of the towns. However, the British military was able to prevent the rebels from advancing and establish a foothold in the Cape Colony. Nevertheless, the British Army had lost a substantial section of its territory, resulting in a negative reflection and loss of reputation for military leaders.

Men like Smuts, Hertzog, De Wet, Maritz, and rebel leaders like Theron, Schoeman, and Lötter made life difficult for the British Empire, and while their actions did not stop the war, they did relieve some pressure off the Republics, if only temporarily. The question is whether the invasion of the Cape Colony was an exercise in futility or whether it had some value. Undoubtedly, the Boer invasion prompted fighting in the British colony and a rebellion on the outskirts of the British realm.

What is of interest among the documentary sources of the people involved in the skirmish is who the victors were in this skirmish. According to Jan Van Zyl's grandfather, Jacobus Louw (Van Zyl n.d.), Maritz and his group left the fight only once they had helped themselves to the supplies, and according to Jeudwine (as cited in Wessels 1993: 80), who was in command of the supply run, they stopped the attack on the supply run and drove the Boers away.

The second variation regards the number of guerrilla combatants documented; Jacobus Louw believes there were 30 rebel fighters (Van Zyl n.d.), while Jeudwine estimated there were perhaps 350 Boers present at the skirmish (Wessels 1993: 80). The last variation pertains to the actual combatants. Was it a supply run attack or a local dispute between the town guards and the local Boers? Was this a totally different skirmish that occurred around Vegkop, or an alternate version of the conflict between Jeudwine and the rebel force? To legitimise the issue, it is necessary to explore the discrepancies between the sources using an archaeological approach.

Regarding the outcome of Smuts' Cape assault, sources are mixed on whether it was worth the risk to remove capable fighters from the battle in the Republics to pursue an invasion on the doorstep of the British territory. Wessels (2011b) thought that the invasion, which he considered futile, had a significant impact on the colony's inhabitants and drove a wedge between them after the Boer fighters departed. Constantine (1996), Schoeman (2019), and Thomas (2011) demonstrated to the reader the influence of Smuts' choice to invade the colony on the locals and Shearing and Shearing (2000) viewed Smuts' prolonged march to be significant and, to some degree, constructive.

One thing is certain: this small skirmish at Vegkop had such an impact on the town of Redelinghuys and the Sandveld that it is still widely discussed by locals today.

Chapter 4: Methodology

4.1 Introduction

The difference between battlefield archaeology and archaeology is that the area of investigation may be relatively large and devoid of the fixed structures and other identifying markers that are typical of conventional archaeological sites. Archaeologists have therefore developed a different approach to deal with the fact that many battlefield sites lack tangible structures or a significant amount of artefact material. One of the techniques employed by the modern battlefield archaeologist is the employment of metal detectors to cover a vast area, and as the majority of artefacts from a battle contain metal, this approach seems to be the most logical. Campillo *et al*. (2012: 347), however, believed the use of metal detectors might bring challenges on its own such as that the nature and dispersion of the material remains make it difficult to locate any associated organic material on battle sites as and metal detectors are typically used to retrieve metal artefacts.

The primary purpose of the battlefield archaeologist is to conduct spatial pattern analysis, which can be accomplished by identifying objects as they landed on the battlefield using metal detectors (Campillo *et al.* 2012: 347). However, environmental conditions may impact the archaeological techniques employed (Campillo *et al.* 2012: 347). Grid location and GPS coordinates play an essential role on these sites and are among the survey team's arsenal of instruments (Campillo *et al.* 2012: 348).

The second component of the approach employed throughout the excavation process is data refinement in the form of analysis of the GPS markers. By comparing the placements of the discovered artefacts to historical maps of the conflict, a clearer picture of how the war unfolded may be created.

According to Campillo *et al.* (2012), the most important goal of battlefield archaeology is to legitimise the existing knowledge and interpretation of battle events; however, at the same time they questioned whether archaeology can answer all the questions regarding battle events (Campillo *et al.* 2012: 349). To guarantee that the data are understood to the best of our knowledge, we must also have an accurate indication of the weapons employed and their

capabilities. The battle lines and firing ranges would be determined by the weather, the mentality of the combatants, and the type of weaponry.

Due to the complexity and different types of engagements, it is difficult to determine the flow of a battle and even the type of engagement; however, based on the written sources, it was determined that the engagement was of a rapid nature; the artefacts excavated should through analysis be able to validate these claims. Campillo *et al.* (2012: 347) relied on the building of a computer model to replicate and analyse various theories. Although this is a relatively novel approach, battlefield archaeologists are increasingly adopting it.

To comprehend battlefield behaviour, particularly that of brief encounters such as the skirmish at Vegkop, one must examine the distribution of archaeological items on the effective terrain. Only by meticulously surveying the region and identifying artefacts can a complete image emerge, and for this analysis to be successful, the survey methodology and data-collection procedures must be accurate. The impacted area survey will aid in identifying and reconstructing the landscape and this form of reconstruction is crucial to understanding the actions taken during the skirmish, as the landscape may no longer resemble the area as it was over 120 years ago.

The Verlorenvlei Wetlands is classified as a Ramsar[12] estuarine wetland because it is home to numerous birds, fish, and plant species that contribute to the region's high ecological diversity (Watson *et al*. 2020: 2); extra care was thus taken not to disturb the wetlands' natural surroundings. Only experienced[13] metal detectorists were used to find the artefacts. Due to the character of the effective region, a grid system was insufficient. Historical archaeology differs from conventional archaeology in both time and purpose. Historical archaeology, and battlefield archaeology in particular, requires a distinct technique for identifying and extracting artefacts. The use of metal detectors for combat behaviour analysis was identified early on in the field of military archaeology. The contribution of metal detectors to finding

[12] Convention on Wetlands of International Importance to facilitate international cooperation for the preservation of wetland habitats.

[13] The metal detectors each have years of experience and worked on previous battlefield excavations.

items associated with the skirmish proved invaluable, as over 100 artefacts were recovered from Vegkop using this method.

By employing metal detectors for battlefield research, a more accurate image of artefact displacement can be obtained. As it was previously determined that the Boer positions were on the hilltop and the British supply run positions were on the road leading to Redelinghuys, two separate metal detecting sessions were conducted.

Degradation of artefacts and looting play an important role and must be considered when analysing material remains. This is especially true for the Vegkop skirmish, which was well known to the people of Redelinghuys and surroundings and people removed cartridges and other battle-related items from the site as far back as the 1950s according to some sources,[14] and the researcher assumes that if any of these artefacts still exist, they are in private collections as none of them are displayed in any museum.

4.2 Reconstruction

4.2.1 Historical landscape

Various maps of the Vegkop area were used to identify positions and movements during the skirmish to reconstruct the historical landscape. The route taken by the British supply convoy could be traced because the supply convoy would have used the same road as the locals used between Piketberg and Redelinghuys for transportation. The movements of the Boer forces prior to the skirmish became the subject of investigation to determine how the two groups came into contact at the Vegkop location.

The hill area is not very high, but the hilltop provided large boulders that would have been optimal for concealment during an ambush. The hill also overlooks the route the supply waggons were travelling on, which allowed the Boers to easily pin down the British, who were unable to turn around due to the size of the convoy (Wessels 1993: 80) or seek shelter because they were being fired upon from two locations (Van Zyl n.d.). From the hilltop, the

[14] Interview with Sampie Boonzaaier at Kraaifontein, Cape Town, in January 2022 and E.J. van Lill at Oudtshoorn in December 2021.

Boers could see a great distance toward Piketberg and would have easily detected the supply convoy well before the convoy became aware of the ambush.

The area of Verlorenvlei had become inundated with reeds that were not present in 1901 (see Figures 5, 6, and 8). This presented a challenge during the metal detecting and survey phases of the fieldwork because the metal detectors could not penetrate the dense reeds and therefore could not scan that particular area.

Figure 5: Verlorenvlei from the hilltop towards Piketberg showing the extensive dense reeds

Figure 6: View from Vegkop to the south (Grid C); the path that was used by the supply waggons are between the reeds and the cultivated area, and the path parallel to the hill was added later

Figure 7: View from Vegkop towards the north (Grid A), with a smooth slope down from the hill

Figure 8: View from Vegkop to the west showing Verlorenvlei with its reeds and the opposite hill area

Figure 9: Huge boulders on top of the hill provided ample hiding space for the guerrilla fighters

Figure 10: Massive boulders on top of the hill to the west side overlooking the supply waggon path

4.2.2 Movements

To comprehend the cause of the skirmish, one must examine the actions and movements that occurred prior to the conflict on both sides. Skirmishes differ from formal battlefields in that most skirmishes are planned shortly before the engagement, whereas formal battle engagements require a degree off advanced planning to achieve set objectives.

The objective of most skirmishes initiated by the Boer forces was to quickly engage the British forces and accomplish their goal as soon as possible before the British could launch a counter-attack. By the guerrilla phase of the war, the Boers lacked the equipment and sustenance to engage in more formal and prolonged battles. During the southward engagement of the West Coast, Maritz and his troops adopted a slightly more offensive strategy when they began targeting British positions on purpose (Fourie 1975: 94). This change in strategy caused the British to focus more on the Boer insurgents on the West Coast (Fourie 1975: 95).

Both the first and second attacks of the Boers on the Sandveld were investigated to determine why the guerrilla forces ended up at Vegkop and what their strategy was for the area. Jeudwine's diary was consulted to create a picture of the British movements and why they ended up at Vegkop. Finally, the site of Vegkop was analysed to determine if a flow of events could be constructed in order to archaeologically determine the events of the skirmish.

4.3 The survey

Metal detectors were brought in to cater for a skirmish-type of excavation because they can easily identify any battle-related items such as cartridges and bullets. Also, because a skirmish usually lasts only a few hours and covers a large area, normal archaeological methods such as sampling techniques and layer-by-layer digging would not produce the same results that are used on sites that had a long-term occupancy.

The initial survey of the area yielded no results of any surface finds by scouting, which indicated that without the assistance of a metal detector, few, if any, artefacts would be recovered, as most visible artefacts had been looted over the years. During September/October 2022, two survey sessions were conducted. The first session was restricted to Grid A and B (see Map 3), where potential British graves and Boer firing positions were identified. The second session concentrated on Grid C (see Map 3), which successfully established the firing positions of the British escort unit, as well as potential supply waggon positions.

An experienced extractor/recorder assisted each of the metal detectorists, who used their metal detectors to identify potential artefact locations. Once a potential object was identified by the metal detector, the artefact was recovered using a trowel and brush. If the artefact was not located, the metal detector would use a pin pointer[15] to zoom in on the general vicinity of the artefact until it was found. Excavations were only carried out up to 30 cm, but all objects identified by the metal detectors were exhumed within that range.

The metal detector team that assisted the researcher consisted of:

- Alan Wright (Garrett Sea Hunter Mark II metal detector);
- John Gravenor (Minelab 705 metal detector);
- Lance Turner (Minelab CTX 3030 metal detector); and
- Bernard Jacobs (Minelab Equinox 800 metal detector).

[15] A mini version of a metal detector with a small tip to identify small metal objects.

The excavation/survey team that assisted the researcher consisted of:

- Willem Hutten (on-site supervisor and UNISA PhD student);
- Adrian Haye (volunteer);
- Barend Biermann (UNISA Biblical Archaeology postgraduate student); and
- Anja Huisaman (UNISA Archaeology honours student).

The metal detectorists systematically surveyed the area and attempted to cover as much of the surface as possible due to the nature of the boulders on the hill. When they detected Grid C, they followed the dirt road until they found objects, then took a circular approach to see if any adjacent objects could be found. The firing range of the supply waggon escort was successfully established using this method.

During the extraction process, the recorder used the following items:

- Field survey manual;
- Pencil and eraser;
- Colour labels for numbering the object;
- Handheld GPS device for artefact location recording;
- Ruler for determining the depth of the object in the ground; and
- A variety of bags in various shapes for storing the object and its associated number.

The excavators' field survey manual included the following information:

- Area maps;
- Google Maps image indicating grid areas and their boundaries;
- Field data sheet;
- Site survey drawing sheet; and
- Munsell chart[16].

Once an artefact item was identified by the metal detector, the excavator extracted the object using an archaeological trowel and brush and care was taken to identify the depth at which

[16] A Munsell chart is a colour chart used to identify soil types found in association with artefacts.

the object was found. The object was stored with its associated detail in a bag. The field data sheet (see Figure 14) was updated with the object detail on site.

4.3.1 The survey grid



Map 3: The survey area, displaying four grids (Grids A to D) to the north and one grid (Grid E) south of Verlorenvlei

Before the actual metal detecting survey was conducted, current maps of the area were studied, and the area was divided into five grids. Each of the geographical regions was assigned a letter that determined the boundary of that sector. The main geographical areas (see Map 3) are indicated in Table 3.

For this research, the researcher adopted the organic transect employed in the analysis of the Battle of Talamanca,[17] in which every potential path is studied, and no predetermined pattern is applied (Campillo *et al.* 2012: 348). The researcher found this pattern to be the most effective technique in studying a location such as a hillside with many obstacles. Although not

[17] The Battle of Talamanca occurred during the Catalan Rebellion (1713-1714) between Austria and Spain

to deviate from the fixed grid system, the grid was expanded to include more generic areas, and the site north of Verlorenvlei was separated into four grids to accommodate this.

Due to the terrain's density and difficulty, the region was divided into five major regions. Grids A to D were located north of Verlorenvlei, and its eastern boundary was the R366 road that connects Elands Bay to Piketberg via Redelinghuys. The west boundary is the historical dirt road that was in use before the asphalt road was constructed. This road was also presumably used during the South African War, and supply waggons would have travelled along it. Grid E was located to the south of Verlorenvlei, and its western border was a modern gravel road that is used for agricultural purposes.

Grid table	
Grid A	The cultivated area just north of the hilltop.
Grid B	The hilltop itself that was occupied by the Boer forces under the command of Schoeman (Van Zyl n.d.).
Grid C	The area just south of the hilltop where the supply run under the escort of Jeudwine was attacked.
Grid D	The area further south that may contain any overshooting bullets or artefacts from the trail.
Grid E	The area west and adjacent to Verlorenvlei that potentially holds the second shooting location of the Boers where Theron's guerrilla fighters was believed to have attacked from (Van Zyl n.d.).

Table 3: Grid detail for Grids A to E

4.3.1.1 Grid A

Grid A (see Map 3) encompassed the region just to the north of the hill and is a 135 m x 160 m area of fruit trees that has been identified as the potential location of British overshot bullets. As shown in Figure 6, Grid C is substantially lower than the hill area, which caused the British to fire at a 45^{o} angle, which could have caused the projectiles to miss their target and overshoot into Grid A. According to a local resident, Willem Klaassen (2022), of Redelinghuys, this area was also the location of the graves that were exhumed around 2003/2004 in order for fruit trees to be planted were the graves were located. According to Jacobus Louw (Van

Zyl n.d.), the original grave site was much closer to Verlorenvlei; however, it was exposed during the great flood of 1925 and subsequently reburied closer to the road, which was much higher than the normal flood level where it was exposed in 2003/2004 when digging started for the planting of trees. Unfortunately, Klaassen was unable to recall where the exhumed graves were reinterred. Any objects recovered from this area would be inconsequential as they would have shifted due to agricultural activities.

4.3.1.2 Grid B

The Boers under the command of Schoeman attacked from Grid B (the hilltop area) (see Map 3). Grid B has dimensions of 190 m x 150 m. The area, which also has massive boulders, was the highest point of the engagement, with an elevation of 29 m and 67 m above sea level. These massive boulders (see Figures 9 and 10) would have been an ideal shooting location because they provided protection from British return fire. If the Boers needed to abandon the fighting, Grid A provided an easy escape route, as the gradient slope on this side provided excellent retreating opportunities. Biermann (2022), a survey team member, believed that not all the Boer forces were involved in the skirmish and that some of them would have looked after the horses behind the hill in Grid A, which was the custom of the guerrilla fighters.

4.3.1.3 Grid C

Grid C (see Map 3) contained the region from where the supply waggon drivers and the British soldiers were firing slightly south of the hill towards Piketberg. This area is 290 m x 110 m in size and is used for onion cultivation. This region is heavily sanded due to years of cultivation and Verlorenvlei's intermittent flooding.

4.3.1.4 Grid D

Grid D (see Map 3) is immediately adjacent to Grid C and is further south towards Piketberg and potentially contains overshot bullets from the Boer forces. The area is approximately 210 m x 135 m and was also planted with onions. This region is also extensively sanded due to agricultural activities and the intermittent flooding of Verlorenvlei.

4.3.1.5 Grid E

Grid E (see Map 3) is on the opposite side of Verlorenvlei and could potentially hold the position of the sniper team of Theron, as told by Jacobus Louw (Van Zyl n.d.). Because of the presence of reeds and cultivation, this area was difficult to detect. A preliminary detection of the area yielded no results. The size of the area is 460 m x 125 m.

4.3.2 Global Positioning System (GPS) mapping

Every metal detector was paired with an excavator/recorder. When a metal detectorist found an object, it was retrieved by the excavator, who also recorded the item on the field data sheet (see Figure 11 on the right). The GPS position of the item was plotted on the GPS system (as seen in Figure 11 on the left), as well as on the field data sheet once it was recorded.

Figure 11: Recorder determining the GPS position of an artefact found (left), and recorder and metal detectorist working together to excavate an artefact (right)

The GPS coordinates were double-checked against the manual entry of the GPS position on the field data sheet (see Figure 14) to ensure that the artefacts were recorded to the correct GPS markers. The GPS coordinates were downloaded to the Garmin BaseCamp application, where reclassification was performed (see Figure 12). Each GPS device detail was formatted and saved in the BaseCamp application based on the date, the user who used the GPS, and the colour used by the extractor. This would make exporting and controlling the GPS data easier. The coordinates were then downloaded into a GPX file and reimported into Google Earth Pro to generate images from the GPS points.



Figure 12: Associated data linked to each artefact's GPS coordinates

The details recorded and saved in the Garmin Base Camp application included:

- Name of the artefact;
- Position (GPS coordinates) of the artefact;
- Elevation;
- Depth of find; and
- Date created.

Once all data had been collected and configured, it was exported to Microsoft Excel. The GPS coordinates were compared in Microsoft Excel to the GPS coordinates manually recorded in the field data sheet as an extra measure to ensure that the coordinates were correctly assigned to the artefacts. There were no discrepancies up to five decimals, which confirmed that the GPS coordinates were captured correctly. Any additional information was added to the artefact to provide a unified view of all artefact-related data in Microsoft Excel (see Figure 13). The final step in the GPS processing was to export the GPS coordinates to a GPX file, which could then be imported into Google Earth Pro to generate images from the GPS points.

Grid Colour	Grid	Grid Nr	Google Earth Nbr	Colour	Soil Type	Munsell	Dept	Length	Fired	Headstamp	Type	Condition	Additional information	Trauma	Latitude	Longitude
Green	Grid-B	6	006	Brown	Sand		0	50	Yes	FNM	Nov-76	Good	Top dented		32° 29' 40,9" S	18° 34' 37,7" S
Green	Grid-B	10	010	Brown	Rocky		5	56	Yes	KN	C2	Good	Marking on top (-)		32° 29' 41,9" S	18° 34' 38,4" S
Green	Grid-B	15	015	Green	Sand		30	40	Yes	K	C2	Bad	Top part (1,5cm) missing	Yes	32° 29' 44,5" S	18° 34' 37,5" S
Green	Grid-B	16	016	Brown	Sand		30	40	Yes	RL	C2	Bad	Top part (1,5cm) missing	Yes	32° 29' 44,4" S	18° 34' 37,4" S
Green	Grid-B	17	017	Green	Soil		30	65	Yes	NORMA	270W	Bad	Top flattend (corroded?)		32° 29' 44,7" S	18° 34' 35,1" S
Green	Grid-B	22	022	Green	Soil	2,5 YR 5/2	10	56	Yes	RL	C2	Fair	Top deliberate cut opened.		32° 29' 42" S	18° 34' 38,3" S
Green	Grid-B	23	023	Green	Rocks		0	56	Yes	RL	C2	Good	Small cut on top.		32° 29' 41,8" S	18° 34' 38,2" S
Green	Grid-B	24	024	Brown	Rocks	2,5 YR 5/2	0	56	Yes	K	C2	Good	Missing top markings (-)		32° 29' 41,8" S	18° 34' 38,2" S
Green	Grid-B	25	025	Brown	Rocks		0	56	Yes	K	C2	Fair	Small cut on top.		32° 29' 41,8" S	18° 34' 38,2" S
Green	Grid-B	26	026	Black	Gravel / Rock	2,5 YR 3/2	10	56	Yes	RL	C2	Fair			32° 29' 41,8" S	18° 34' 38,1" S
Green	Grid-B	27	027	Brown	Gravel / Rock	2,5 YR 4/3	10	56	Yes	RL	C2	Fair			32° 29' 41,8" S	18° 34' 38" S
Green	Grid-B	28	028	Brown	Gravel / Rock	2,5 YR 3/2	10	56	Yes	K	C2	Good			32° 29' 41,8" S	18° 34' 38" S
Green	Grid-B	29	029	Brown	Gravel		20	56	Yes	RL	C2	Fair	External layer exposed copper		32° 29' 41,8" S	18° 34' 38" S
Green	Grid-B	30	030	Brown	Gravel / Rock	2,5 YR 5/2	0	56	Yes	Unknown	C2	Good	Small cut on top.		32° 29' 41,8" S	18° 34' 38,2" S
Green	Grid-B	31	031	Brown	Gravel / Sand	7,5 YR 6/3	20	56	Yes	RL	C2	Fair	Copper exposed on bottom.		32° 29' 41,8" S	18° 34' 38,1" S
Green	Grid-B	32	032	Brown	Soft Sand		20	56	Yes	RL	C2	Fair	Copper exposed on bottom.		32° 29' 41,8" S	18° 34' 38,1" S
Green	Grid-B	33	033	Brown	Sand	7,5 YR 5/2	20	56	Yes	RL	C2	Fair	Dark brown colour		32° 29' 41,7" S	18° 34' 38,2" S
Green	Grid-B	34	034	Brown	Sand		10	56	Yes	K	C2	Good	Small dots on cartridge		32° 29' 41,7" S	18° 34' 38,2" S
Green	Grid-B	35	035	Brown	Rocks		0	56	Yes	K	C2	Damage	Top flattend / marks made		32° 29' 41,8" S	18° 34' 38,3" S
Green	Grid-B	36	036	Brown	Rocks		0	45	Yes	RL	C2	Damage	Top 1 cm smashed in.		32° 29' 44,6" S	18° 34' 38,4" S
Green	Grid-B	37	037	Brown	Gravel / Sand	7,5 YR 6/3	10	56	Yes	K	C2	Damage	Top part missing.	Yes	32° 29' 41,6" S	18° 34' 38,4" S
Green	Grid-B	38	038	Brown	Gravel / Sand		10	56	Yes	KN	C2	Fair			32° 29' 41,5" S	18° 34' 38,4" S
Green	Grid-B	39	039	Brown	Gravel		0	56	Yes	KN	C2	Good			32° 29' 41,4" S	18° 34' 38,2" S
Green	Grid-B	40	040	Brown	Sand		20	56	Yes	RL	C2	Good	Scar on lower part		32° 29' 41,4" S	18° 34' 38,1" S
Green	Grid-B	42	041	Brown	Soil		0	56	Yes	RL	C2	Bad	Cuts on top part, white dots all over cartridge		32° 29' 41,4" S	18° 34' 38,1" S
Yellow	Grid-B	9	049	Brown			0	56	Yes	RL	C2	Good			32° 29' 43,4" S	18° 34' 37,8" S
Yellow	Grid-B	7	050	Green			15	56	Yes	RL	C2	Good			32° 29' 43,3" S	18° 34' 37,7" S
Yellow	Grid-B	8	051	Brown			10	56	Yes	K	C2	Damage	Top broken off (corrotion?)	Yes	32° 29' 43,3" S	18° 34' 37,7" S
Yellow	Grid-B	10	052	Green		5 YR 5/2	0	56	Yes	K	C2	Good			32° 29' 43,2" S	18° 34' 38" S
Yellow	Grid-B	11	53	Green			5	45	Yes	K	C2	Damage	Top broken off (separate part)	Yes	32° 29' 42,2" S	18° 34' 38,3" S
Yellow	Grid-B	12	054	Brown			5	56	Yes	RL	C2	Good	Marking on top (-)		32° 29' 42,4" S	18° 34' 38,4" S
Yellow	Grid-B	13	055	Brown		5 YR 5/2	5	56	No	K	C2	Damage	Top opened up, bottom indented for use as can		32° 29' 42,4" S	18° 34' 38,4" S
Yellow	Grid-B	14	056	Brown			5	56	Yes	RL	C2	Fair	Marking on top (-)		32° 29' 42,4" S	18° 34' 38,3" S
Yellow	Grid-B	15	057	Green			5	56	Yes	RL	C2	Damage	Top broken	Yes	32° 29' 43,4" S	18° 34' 38,5" S

Figure 13: Record of all .303 cartridges found and their associated data

4.4 Reporting

4.4.1 Field data sheet

The recorder completed the field data sheet on-site, as per Figure 14, which was used to add all the additional information to the various analysis reports to construct a result from the artefacts retrieved. It was also used for auditing purposes to compare the physical artefact to an entry in the field data sheet to ensure that no artefact retrieved was not recorded on the GPS device.

The field data sheet included:

- The name of the recorder and metal detectorist;
- Date of the excavation;
- Assigned colour of the labels issued to the recorder;
- Grid number;
- Object number;
- Object description;
- Depth (in cm) at which the object was located;
- Object's latitude and longitude; and
- Soil type (if available).



Field Data Sheet						
Prepared by :		ADRIAN		Date :	24/9/22	
Detector detail :		BERNARD		Colour :	GREEN	
				Grid :		
Nr.	Object	Description	Depth	Latitude	Longitude	Soil type
001	MUSKET BALL		20cm	32°29'43.5"S	18°34'37.3"E	SAND
002	MUSKET BALL		20cm	32°29'42.4"S	18°34'34.8"E	SAND.
003	.22 BULLET		10cm	32°29'43.0"S	18°34'36.8"E	SAND
004	MUSKET BALL		10cm	32°29'42.8"S	18°34'37.5"E	SAND
005	MUSKET BALL	FRAGMENT.	5cm	32°29'41.8"S	18°34'37.7"E	Rocky.
006	CASING	SURFACE FIND	-	32°29'40.9"S	18°34'37.7"E	SANDY
007	SHOE BUCKLE	SURFACE FIND	-	32°29'40.6"S	18°34'37.9"E	ROCKY.
008	WEDGE	IRON WEDGE (FRAGMENT.	5cm	32°29'40.1"S	18°34'40.0"E	SANDY
009	CERO		30cm	32°29'39.6"S	18°34'37.7"E	SANDY
010	CASING		5cm	32°29'41.9"S	18°34'38.4"E	ROCKY
011	MUSKET	FRAGMENT	10cm	32°29'42.1"S	18°34'38.7"E	ROCKY/SANDY
012	MUSKET BALL		10cm	32°29'42.2"S	18°34'38.1"E	ROCKY/SANDY
013	MUSKET BALL.		30cm	32°29'42.1"S	18°34'38.9"E	ROCKY
014	MUSKET BALL		30cm	32°29'41.8"S	18°34'40.8"E	SAND
015	CASING		30 cm	32°29'44.5"S	18°34'37.5"E	SAND
016	CASING		30cm	32°29'44.4"S	18°34'37.6"E	SAND.
017	CASING		30cm	32°29'44.7"S	18°34'35.1"E	SOIL
018	MUSKET BALL.		30cm	32°29'44.0"S	18°34'33.6"E	SOIL
019	musket	fragment impact	20cm	32°29'42.9"S	18°34'40.9"E	SAND

Figure 14: Field data sheet used by recorders on site

4.4.2 Site survey report

Each extractor was required to create a site survey drawing (see Figure 15) to indicate any identifiable features that could potentially aid in reconstructing the movement and actions during the skirmish. This drawing was not to scale and was meant to determine how the recorder saw the survey area and to potentially aid in drawing up an accurate map of the manoeuvres during the skirmish.



Figure 15: Site survey drawing by one of the excavators indicating possible attack and defend positions

4.5 Analysis of the artefacts

During the project's analysis phase, all artefacts were analysed and classified into categories. The excavated artefacts were sorted into their respective grids, and a new number was assigned to each artefact to link it to the grid. Since the artefacts in question were primarily of metal origin, any associated artefacts were sought in the surrounding finds, but none were discovered during the metal detecting phase.

Most of the artefacts discovered were:

- Cartridges (mostly .303 that were used during the South African War);
- Additional cartridges (shotgun, .22);
- Metal balls (potentially also used during the South African War);
- Buttons;
- Other metal items such as coins and a harmonica piece; and
- Objects commonly associated with farming practices, such as nuts, bolts, and plough teeth.

The final step in the analysis was to create a report for each artefact type. Depending on the type, different information was recorded. The analysis of both the .303 cartridges and metal balls is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

4.5.1 Cartridges

One advantage for modern battlefield archaeologists is that they have a time capsule in the form of a used cartridge, as each cartridge contains an indicator that links it to a specific time and origin. Once a cartridge is spent, it is rendered useless, and it is almost never recovered from the battlefield. This makes the cartridge a valuable tool in battlefield analysis because it not only serves as a dating mechanism but can also indicate the soldier's position when he used it.

Cartridge analysis can be a useful tool in assisting archaeologists in reconstructing events, particularly those of a brief nature, such as a skirmish, and since cartridges finds are usually the highest number of finds, it provides a good source of information around the analysis of

battle & skirmish events. The following analyses were performed on the cartridges to determine the events of the late afternoon of 8 December 1901:

- Analysis of the cartridge colour;
- Analysis of the cartridge depth;
- Analysis of the cartridge length;
- Analysis of the cartridge manufacturer;
- Analysis of the condition of the cartridge; and
- Analysis of the GPS coordinates of the cartridge.

4.5.1.1 Curation

All cartridges recovered with the help of the metal detectors were placed in a plastic sample bag with a colour label. The colour label identified the field data sheet number and the extractor who recovered the artefact, as well as the grid indicator.

The cartridges were removed from the bags in the workroom, and any soil was removed with a soft brush. A Munsell identification was also made if there was enough soil. After removing the soil, each cartridge was individually washed with a toothbrush and a mild soap and water mixture. While the cartridges dried, each artefact was placed upright in an empty egg carton (see Figure 16) next to its assigned number. After cleaning, the cartridge was placed in a new bag with its new associated number, which was linked to the Google Earth application.

Figure 16: Cartridges drying in empty carton, with their identification numbers

The next step was to identify specific cartridge details to create a cartridge analysis report (as per Figure 13). The report consisted of:

- The colour of the cartridge;
- The soil type and Munsell identification to determine if the soil had any influence on the cartridges retrieved;
- The depth at which the cartridge was retrieved;
- The length of the cartridge in order to determine if the cartridge was subjected to any trauma during or after the firing process;
- Whether the cartridge was fired;
- The manufacturer's headstamp in order to determine the origin of the cartridge;
- The cartridge type in order to determine the manufacturing date range of the cartridge;
- The condition in which the cartridge was discovered;
- Any other markings or signs of trauma to the cartridge; and
- The GPS marker's latitude and longitude.

A magnifying glass was used to identify the headstamp and cartridge type because some cartridges were in poor condition and the printing on them was very small.

The depth of the shell casings was analysed to determine if it played a role in the casing being discovered at that specific location after laying *in situ* for 122 years, as the site was known by residents who visited it to see the impact of the skirmish for themselves. It appears that cartridges discovered on the path were buried much deeper than cartridges found on the hill, some of which were found on the surface, which indicates that its location made it difficult for artefact collectors to locate.

4.5.2 Metal balls

To analyse the 19 metal balls found on Vegkop, the following analyses were conducted:

- The metal ball colour;
- The depth at which metal balls were found;
- The size of the metal balls;

- Whether the metal balls had any impact indicators;
- The condition of the metal balls; and
- The GPS position of the metal balls.

4.5.2.1 Curation

The location of the metal balls, like the other objects discovered during excavation, was recorded in the field using a handheld GPS device. Each metal ball was then placed in a Ziplock bag with a colour-coded label number indicating its position on the field data sheet and who retrieved the artefact.

The metal balls were lightly brushed with a toothbrush at the workshop to remove any access dirt. The following information was then recorded for each metal ball:

- The colour of the metal ball;
- The size of the metal ball;
- Whether the metal ball had any impact, as indicated by either a flat surface on the ball itself or being perfectly round;
- The weight of the metal ball;
- The condition of the metal ball; and
- Any associated detail, such as markers, on it.

A magnifying glass was used to examine the metal ball for any small defects or markings. The GPS coordinates of the metal ball were also recorded in Google Earth Pro, and a permanent indicator number was assigned to it.

4.6 Conclusion

Battlefield archaeology differs from traditional archaeology in that the archaeologist must adapt his/her retrieval and analysis techniques to account for objects that were used for a brief period over a large area and sometimes in extremely difficult terrain.

The landscape determines the flow of the excavation, and the archaeologist must sometimes adapt to the environment to recover as many objects for study as feasible. In the case of the excavation on Vegkop, the extractors had to endure difficult terrain, while physical obstacles

such as trenches, steep gradients, and thick reeds prevented them from excavating the entire area. Additionally, one must keep in mind that, except for the hill area, the other areas were previously cultivated, which could have influenced the location of recovered artefacts.

The excavations would not have been feasible without metal detecting, as even surface finds would have been impossible to locate among the enormous rocks and dense vegetation. Normal grid systems could not be adhered to because the terrain was neither flat nor sparse; however, metal detectorists with years of experience in battlefield detecting were able to identify over 100 artefacts in only two detecting sessions.

The cooperation between the metal detectorists and the excavators contributed to an efficient retrieval process, and each team member knew precisely what was expected of them. With the field data sheet and GPS coordinates, the researcher was able to assign numerous details to each object, and by plotting these GPS markers, a true picture of the conflict emerged.

By analysing battle-related objects such as .303 cartridges and metal balls, it was possible to obtain a distinct picture of the engagement. The characteristics of the artefacts made it possible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a South African War skirmish occurred in an area that was already known from historical and oral tradition, and by excavating evidence, a true picture of the events of 8 December 1901 could be constructed.

Chapter 5: Results

5.1 Introduction

The retrieved artefacts from the site were analysed to determine any archaeological value and to provide literary and oral tradition with additional information. All objects, including cartridges and metal balls, were analysed and evaluated. To provide an authentic account of the events that transpired on the evening of 8 December 1901, the combined examination of all artefacts would yield a precedent that could be used to supplement historical sources.

5.2 Reconstruction

5.2.1 Historical landscape

Although not technically very high (only 29 m), the hillside chosen by the Boer forces proved to be a good vantage point from which to shoot at the unsuspecting British supply waggons. The Boer forces, who were familiar with bush terrain and were known for exploiting it, had clearly chosen a good location from which to launch a surprise attack. Although the Boers had little time to prepare because the attack appeared to be more likely from opportunity than a planned attack, they chose a very good area to attack from.

The hillside would have given the attacking force an advantage, as shooting from higher ground has been proven to be the better option throughout history. An assessment by the US intelligence services during World War II indicated that one of the Imperial Japanese Army's strategies was to take advantage of high ground to restrict the attacking forces' (in this case the USA) access to their positions and to use any natural objects (such as rocks) to conceal themselves (Ford 2009: 335). During the American Civil War, despite his best efforts, Major General E. Lee's frontal assault up Malvern Hill against Union soldiers failed (Fax 2019: 34). On 5 December 1944, nearly 80 years later, the same mistake was repeated by the US Infantry when the 2nd Battalion failed to secure the high ground south of the village of Vossenack in the Hürtgen forest in Germany, which resulted in numerous American casualties (Bradbeer 2010: 28). This demonstrates that whoever holds the high ground has a higher probability of success than the opponent. During the Battle of Belmont, the Boers who were almost

outnumbered 1/5,[18] were well dug into the hill at Belmont and Field Marshal Paul Sanford Methuen's victory over them came at a high cost (Miller 1996). Methuen's strategy almost failed when he attacked and tried to advance to the hill during the cover of night, but the battalions got lost and ended up facing the Boers at a steep hill early in the morning (Miller 1996).

Another factor was that when the attack came, the supply convoy could easily be pinned down because retreat lines were cut off by Verlorenvlei on the west side of the road, which made turning a supply convoy around and fleeing impossible. It appears that the British military forces were able to retreat to a more tactical position because the return fire cartridges were discovered close to a small slope, which gave the surprised British forces an advantageous point to shoot from.

The presence of metal balls found on the hillside opened the possibility of two distinct scenarios: (1) it could indicate a potential use of musket pistols by the supply drivers who most likely would have defended themselves against the Boer attack, indicating that the leading waggons were very close to the hillside, or (2) they were shrapnel from an artillery attack on the hill by the British forces.

The opposite bank from Verlorenvlei would also provide a strategic position for a second ambush site. The British would have been confused as to where the firing came from if the Boers had divided their forces and fired from two different positions, as told by Jacobus Louw (Van Zyl n.d.). The Verlorenvlei area west of the road would serve as a natural barrier between the opposing attacking force and the supply convoy. Both areas appear to have been chosen by the Boers as an ideal retreat location and were used as such. Jeudwine wrote in his diary: "Engaged them 4p.m. till dark and drove them out. They retired North" (Wessels 2011b: 80).

One advantage of surveying with a GPS device is that the device can track the movement of the user. The user's GPS coordinates were recorded every five seconds, which results in a path that can be plotted on a map to view the area covered during the survey (as indicated on

[18] The Boers were around 2 000 strong, versus the 10 000 troops at Methuen's disposal (Miller 1996).

Maps 4, 5, and 6). The researcher set up each GPS device to have its own distinct track colour so that he could see the various routes that each of the metal detectorists and recorders took.

5.2.1.1 Grid A

A preliminary survey of Grid A yielded few artefacts because this area is actively cultivated. The only recovered artefacts were metal balls discovered at the western end of the grid. The proximity of these metal balls to Verlorenvlei and the area where Klaassen (2022) indicated the graves were may imply the initial graveyard. However, the possibility of it being a graveyard for people who died during the skirmish is unlikely unless the graves are of the transport drivers who were hired by the British.

5.2.1.2 Grid B

The tracks that the metal detectorists and extractors followed on the hillside can be seen on Map 4. Some areas (Markers 1 to 5 on the map) proved to be quite difficult to excavate, as explained in Table 4.



Map 4: Survey tracks of the metal detectorists of the hillside (Grid B) and the cultivated side just north of the hill (Grid A)

The walking paths also indicated that the areas available for detecting were quite extensive and surveyed by multiple detectors, which reduced the risk of metal detector oversight. This method proved to be the most appropriate for this type of landscape. The path to the west of the hill was also thoroughly surveyed, but it yielded little archaeological evidence, which indicates that the attacks did not take place in proximity of each other.

Table markers	
Marker 1	Area that could be surveyed in the future.
Marker 2	A steep slope area on the north side of the hill; however, due to the high risk of injury and difficulty surveying, detecting in this area was not undertaken.
Marker 3	A deep, difficult-to-enter trench.
Marker 4	A steep slope to the south that was not surveyed because of the danger it posed.
Marker 5	A deep, difficult-to-enter trench.

Table 4: Table marker indicators

5.2.1.3 Grids C and D



Map 5: Survey tracks of Grid C (supply waggon trail and British attack position)

The second survey was carried out in Grids C and D (see Map 5) to determine the position of the British supply convoy when they came under fire from the Boer forces. According to historical evidence and weapon range calculations, a marker approximately 250 m from the line of fire on the hillside was identified on the road south of the hill. Map 5 shows that the identified marker did indeed contain the British forces' return fire. The area identified yielded a wealth of archaeological evidence of the skirmish. The fact that almost no archaeological evidence was discovered in Grid D led the researcher to believe that the actual conflict occurred only in Grid C.

5.2.1.4 Grid E



Map 6: Survey grid of the opposite side from the hilltop (Grid E)

Grid E yielded no evidence of any Boer force attacking position because it was heavily cultivated and densely forested with bushes and reeds. The survey found no archaeological evidence of the skirmish.

5.2.2 Movement

5.2.2.1 Boers' first attack on the Sandveld

Maritz started his first southward movement when he moved his forces from Clanwilliam towards Piketberg on 27 September 1901 (Fourie 1975: 95). Hopefield was attacked on 10 October 1901, which was followed on 13 October 1901 by the attack on Piketberg (Fourie 1975: 96). Maritz was around the area of Tzaarskuil just north of Piketberg around 12 October 1901, according to the arrest report of Christoffel Brand and Dirk Heyns (Attorney General 1901b).

Maritz's success continued when the towns of Mooreesburg and Porterville were successfully attacked; however, at Vierentwintig River, close to the town of Saron, approximately 20 km south of Porterville, he engaged a large British combined force of Capper, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Henry Wyndham, and Wormald, which stopped Maritz's southward movement, and a decision was made to return north to the town of Calvinia (Fourie 1975: 99).

Perhaps Maritz took on more than he could handle, or perhaps his previous string of quick victories led him to believe that his small guerrilla force could take on a much larger British force that was waiting for him at the time, which rendered the element of surprise useless because the British forces were prepared for them. Despite this, Maritz led his army north and began plotting his second invasion of the West Coast; by this time, his reputation had grown as word of his successes in the south spread, and men like Scheepers, Theron, and Schoeman joined forces with him (Fourie 1975: 100).

5.2.2.2 Boers' second attack on the Sandveld

The British were surprised by Maritz's second southward movement since they did not believe the guerrilla fighters could launch another attack so rapidly (Fourie 1975: 101). The first victory of the second invasion occurred on 29 October 1901 when a supply convoy between Lambert's Bay and Clanwilliam was successfully attacked, resulting in the deaths or wounding of 35 British soldiers (Fourie 1975: 102). This resulted in the swift mobilisation of the British forces under command of Wormald, Capper, Wyndham, Kavanagh, and Lieutenant

Colonel Eyre Macdonnell Stewart Crabbe in order to pursue Maritz and his soldiers (Fourie 1975: 102).

On 12 November 1901, the British relieved Darling, which was besieged by Field Cornet Hildebrand and his group of guerrilla fighters, which led to the death of Hildebrand (Wessels 1993: 79). During Jan Laubscher's trial it was indicated that the Boer forces were around Hopefield during November 1901 (Attorney General 1901b), which led the researcher to believe that Hildebrand's troops moved north towards Hopefield after losing the attack at Darling. Christiaan van Lill and Cornelius Brink were arrested for giving water and food to the guerrilla fighters' horses near Kruisfontein and Drommel Vlei just north of Redelinghuys on 3 December 1901 (Attorney General 1901c).

From this detail is it clear that the Boer forces were operating in two separate groups; one under Maritz, who was attacking Piketberg, and one attacking Darling, most likely under Van Deventer. Both these groups consolidated just north of Redelinghuys after retreating from Piketberg and Darling just before the skirmish at Vegkop. Since Maritz just came from Piketberg, he was probably aware of the supply convoy and decided to ambush it close to Wittedrift.

5.2.2.3 British movement

Jeudwine's diary provides good reference of the movements of the British before and after the attack on Vegkop. On 12 November 1901, Jeudwine's company arrived at Piketberg from Clanwilliam (Wessels 1993: 79). Jeudwine's regiment moved south towards Mooreesburg and arrived on 26 November 1901 (Wessels 1993: 80).

Jeudwine indicated in his diary that the Boers were spotted around 28 November 1901 at Kradouw Pass near Citrusdal and a scout unit reported that two sets of Boers were spotted on 29 November 1901; one with around 300 Boers was sighted at Het Kruis, a small railroad town approximately 40 km north of Piketberg and a second set, also 300 strong, was spotted at Bitterfontein approximately 30 km north of Piketberg (Wessels 1993: 80). The presence of the guerrilla fighters so close to the garrison on Piketberg caused him to return to Piketberg on 29 November 1901 (Wessels 1993: 80). From 1 to 6 December 1901, they patrolled the Piketberg area for Boer activities when the order came to escort a supply waggon from

Piketberg to Lambert's Bay (Wessels 1993: 80). Leaving Piketberg on 7 December 1901, they engaged with Maritz's troops at Vegkop on the evening of 8 December 1901 (Wessels 1993: 80).

After the engagement, the convoy moved onwards and reached Elands Bay on 10 December 1901, where Jeudwine handed the patrol over to Kavanagh to escort the convoy to Lambert's Bay (Wessels 1993: 81). After handing over the convoy, Jeudwine returned to Redelinghuys on 11 December 1901 and went back to Piketberg on 16 December 1901 (Wessels 1993: 81).

5.2.2.4 The skirmish

According to Jacobus Louw (Van Zyl n.d.), the Boers set up an ambush for the British supply convoy on Vegkop the morning of the attack and were already in position hours before the skirmish. Capper and Jeudwine of the Western Province Mounted Rifles were escorting a supply run between Piketberg and Elands Bay when they were ambushed on the road just before they reached the hillside. The location of the Boer forces (the hill area) is known from historical sources such as those written by Van Zyl (n.d.), Shearing and Shearing (2000) and Wessels (1993), as well as oral tradition such as Van Lill (2021) and Boonzaaier (2022). The researcher therefore used their location as a starting point to pinpoint where the supply convoy would have come under fire from the attacking force coming from Piketberg – keeping in mind the distance and preferred firing range of the Boer forces.

Nearly all the excavators' site survey reports indicated that the Boers were stationary on the hilltop and that the British convoy was trapped between the hill and Verlorenvlei. Biermann (2022) believed that the absence of spent cartridges on the path before the hill on the west side indicated that the Boers were successful in preventing the supply run from reaching the west side of the hill, where the British troops would have been able to seek cover or even outflank the Boer forces if they were able to reach the hill. The Boer forces would have used the gentle slope on the north side of the hill to escape if they failed to halt the convoy or were driven away by the military escort.

5.3 Cartridges

5.3.1 Discussion

The .303 cartridge was first introduced by the British in 1889 with the Lee-Metford rifle and has undergone some changes over the years but is still in use today (Tebbutt 2016). Initially, the .303 cartridge was loaded with black powder, which produced black smoke when fired and thus revealed the shooter's location and obstructed visibility, particularly when fired near other soldiers (Andr 2019). This antiquated propellant was quickly replaced in 1891 by a smokeless agent known as cordite (Tebbutt 2016). As a result, each cartridge infused with the new cordite propellant was stamped with a letter "C" at the headstamp's 7 o'clock position to indicate the type of cartridge. The make number indicator was located at the 5 o'clock position on the cartridge head and for the cordite range was from I to VII (Tebbutt 2016). The manufacturer's initials were embedded in the cartridge head at the 12 o'clock position. Five different manufacturers were identified among the cartridges discovered, each producing the .303 Cordite Mark II cartridge.

5.3.2 Cordite

James Dewar and Frederick Abel patented cordite in 1889 and this smokeless propellant quickly became a better alternative to the black power used in weapons (Bergman 2022: 204). These technological advances came into use just in time for the South African War.

Cordite was designated Magazine Rifle Cordite Mark I in 1891 as a replacement for the older and much less effective black powder due to its high firing rate and lack of smoke (Tebbutt 2016).

Cordite was made up of 58% nitro-glycerine, 37% nitrocellulose, and 5% mineral jelly (Bergman 2022: 204). The mixture is pressed together in a cord configuration but has a tubular shape and was widely used in .303 cartridges until the 1960s (Tebbutt 2016).

The Cordite Mark II introduced in 1893 was an updated version that used Berdan priming and had two flash holes that required the fire pin to strike the centre of the cartridge (Andr 2019). All South African War cartridges discovered at Vegkop and the supply waggon trail were Cordite Mark II.

The Cordite Mark III began production in October 1898, and the Mark IV was produced since February 1899; however, both the Mark III and IV were withdrawn due to design issues (Andr 2019). The Cordite Mark V was manufactured from October 1899, but this bullet type was in direct violation of the 1899 Hague Convention and was thus withdrawn from service and eventually replaced by the Mark VI in 1904 (Andr 2019).

5.3.3 Different rifle types

5.3.3.1 Mauser

Figure 17: German-manufactured Mauser
Source: American Rifleman (2016)

As war with the British Empire drew closer, President Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger of the *Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek* realised that the able soldiers to commandeer for war were far from prepared for battle, with only approximately 60%[19] of them owning a rifle, and many of them having a rifle far inferior to that of the British soldier (Storey 2004: 700). To prepare for war, President Kruger ordered from Germany approximately 37 000 Mauser rifles with magazine-repeating capability (Storey 2004: 700). This would give the Boer Republic an advantage over the British Empire, which was slow to adapt to new technology and still used the older Lee-Metford single-loaded rifles compared to the five-round loading stripper-clip system of the Mauser (see Figure 18) (American Rifleman 2016).

[19] Of the 24 238 soldiers available for active duty, 9 996 did not own a rifle (Storey 2004: 700).

Figure 18: Stripper-clip five-loaded cartridge holder that could load five cartridges simultaneously
Source: Goldiproductions (2005)

The Mauser rifle (see Figure 17) was a bolt-action, five-shot repeating rifle and quickly became popular among the Boers. The Boer Mauser was based on the Spanish version of 1893, but the later versions, Models 1895, 1896, and 1897, were also seen in battle (American Rifleman 2016). These weapons were regarded by the Boers as a treasured possession rather than a military weapon and were frequently adorned with beautiful carvings of their names and battle honours (American Rifleman 2016). Since the Boer Mauser was far superior to the British's weapons, they could easily open fire from 1 800 m away (Tylden 1951: 33). The majority of the time, the British, who did not anticipate an engagement at this range, had empty magazines, which left them little time to resupply when contact was made.

However, due to the guerrilla phase and general accessibility to weapons and ammunition, the Boers ended up using any available weapon, including captured British Lee-Metford and Lee-Enfield weapons, to restock in the latter part of the war by capturing or attacking supply runs (Maritz 1939: 42; Fourie 1975: 102; Wessels 1993: 78; Constantine 1996: 115).

A popular phrase among the Boers was "with God and my Mauser", indicating their admiration for the weapon and their firm belief in their fight against the British Empire (American Rifleman 2016). A Mauser pistol with a 7.63 x 25 mm cartridge was also used, but it was extremely rare and was usually only used by officers (American Rifleman 2016). Some of the officer staff who possessed such weapons included Smuts, Van Deventer, and Maritz (American Rifleman 2016).

5.3.3.2 Lee-Metford

Figure 19: Lee-Metford rifle
Source: Watson (2023)

The Lee-Metford, designed by James Lee in 1889, was the first rifle to use the .303 cartridges and, at the time, was still propelled by black powder (American Rifleman 2016; Tebbutt 2016). In 1891, only two years after the weapon's introduction, black powder was replaced by cordite (Tebbutt 2016). The cordite, however, quickly eroded the barrel's groove rifling and it was replaced by the Lee-Enfield, which had a much deeper groove to handle the high explosive (American Rifleman 2016). Despite being replaced by the Lee-Enfield before the war, many Lee-Metford saw action during the South African War. Another distinct difference between the two British rifles was the absence of the ram rod[20] on the Lee-Enfield. In Figure 19 the ram rod can be seen just below the front barrel of the Lee-Metford.

5.3.3.3 Lee-Enfield

Figure 20: Lee-Enfield rifle
Source: Watson (2023)

The Lee-Enfield was an improved version of the Lee-Metford, which quickly became obsolete due to issues with the switch from black powder to cordite. The Lee-Enfield had issues that were possibly unrelated to the weapon itself, but rather to the doctrine used to handle the

[20] A small rod that was used to push the musket ball up against the propellant to secure it.

weapon. Tylden (1951: 31) believed the problem was that the military initially misunderstood the proper use of the magazine holder and mistook the weapon for a single loader, as its predecessors were.

Those who used the magazine had issues because when it was empty, it had to be reloaded with a single load action, which made reloading in the heat of battle difficult. Another issue was British military doctrine, which held that using a collective firing solution rather than an individual or fire-at-will stance was the best approach. Years of old dogma may not have been easily changed, but during the Indian campaign of 1857 to 1858 and the latter part of the South African War, they were forced to adapt to a fire-at-will style of shooting (Tylden 1951: 32).

The Boer Mauser rifle, with its five-round reloading capability using a stripper-clip system (see Figure 18), put the British at a disadvantage (American Rifleman 2016). Together with the practice of not keeping the magazine in reserve, the British would pay dearly (Tylden 1951: 33). Because of the single-loading doctrine, many cartridges were dropped during the heat of battle; these would be scavenged by Boer fighters after a skirmish (Tylden 1951: 33), and the Boers sometimes engaged with large groups of British soldiers deliberately for that reason.

5.3.4 Headstamps

Ammunition manufacturers used to wrap their logo and some details around the cartridge on the base (also called the head). These markings are useful for identifying the cartridge's manufacturer, ammunition type, and manufacturing period. Later cartridges would include the actual year of manufacture.

Table 5 shows the various headstamps on the .303 cartridges that were discovered at Vegkop and the surrounding area. Five manufacturers were identified from the recovered cartridges. Figures 21, 22, and 23 display images of the different manufacturer headstamps found on the recovered .303 cartridges as photographed by the researcher.

Headstamp manufacturer and detail	
	**Kynoch & Co., Witton, Birmingham, UK** One of the largest commercial ammunition factories in Britain; this brand was made since 1862 and continued manufacturing ammunition until it was assimilated into Explosives Trades Ltd in 1918 (Tebbutt 2016).
	**Kings Norton Metal Co., Birmingham, UK** Kings Norton Metal Company produced ammunition since 1890 and the company also owned its own rolling mills and loading plant at Abbey Wood factory (Tebbutt 2016). This manufacturer would also be assimilated into Explosives Trades Ltd in 1918 (Tebbutt 2016).
	**Greenwood and Batley, Leeds, UK** Produced ammunition from 1856 until its closure in the late 1950s (Tebbutt 2016).
	**Royal Laboratory, Woolwich Arsenal, Kent, UK** The Royal Laboratory or Arsenal produced ammunition from 1670 until its closure in 1957 (Tebbutt 2016). The Royal Laboratory also stamped the War Department's official Broad Arrow mark (**/|**) known commonly as the "crow's foot" or "devil's claws" between its initials in order to indicate that the ammunition was for government use only (Taylor 2020).
	**Birmingham Metal and Munitions Co Ltd., Birmingham, UK** Birmingham Metal and Munitions Co Ltd produced ammunition from its inception in 1897 until its closure in 1920 (Tebbutt 2016).

Table 5: Different headstamps' manufacturers


Figure 21: Royal Laboratory (left), and Kynoch & Co (right) headstamp


Figure 22: Kings Norton Metal Co. (left), and Birmingham Metal and Munitions (right) headstamp

Figure 23: Greenwood and Batley headstamp

5.3.5 Results

Two cartridges discovered on the hill area in Grid B appear to have been purposefully modified to have a secondary function (see Figure 25, .303 cartridges that were deliberately flattened). Because there was no pin mark on the head of one of the cartridges, it was not fired. Both cartridges were flattened by an external object and could have potentially been used as either a makeshift candle or for cauterisation[21]. Unexploded ammunition was rare during the guerrilla war period because the Boer forces could only use ammunition stolen or taken from British forces; an unfired cartridge could thus potentially have been used to close an open wound with cordite, or the cartridge was unusable. In order to stop bleeding or infection of an open wound, cordite would have been applied to the wound and then set alight. This extremely primitive and most probably painful event might seem extreme but in an area and time when no medical treatment was available, this method was sometimes utilised.

Figure 24: .303 cartridge located on the surface using a metal detector (left), and .303 cartridge located approximately 25 cm deep (right)

[21] To burn a part of the body in order to seal a wound.

Figure 25: .303 cartridges that were deliberately flattened

5.3.5.1 Cartridge positioning

Most of the cartridges discovered on the hilltop were found in a single line and clustered together, as shown on Map 7, which indicates that the Boer forces were positioned in a line abreast and had plenty of cover behind the boulders as almost all the cartridges discovered on the hill were behind the large boulders. There are locations with an abundance of spent cartridges, which signified a stationary shooting position that was most likely the result of an attack as opposed to hunting activities where one would have to move in order to shoot multiple shots at a target. The Boer attack line was approximately 90 m long according to the cartridges found in the line formation. No cartridges were discovered behind the firing line, which indicates that the Boer snipers were in a single-line abreast formation when they fired on the supply route.



Map 7: Grid B (hilltop area) where .303 cartridges were found

Assuming that the distance between each guerrilla fighter's firing position was approximately 3 m, it can be estimated that at least 30[22] Boers were stationed on the summit. This estimation is higher than Jacobus Louw's estimate of only 20 Boers on the main hill (Van Zyl n.d.) and significantly lower than Jeudwine's estimate of around 350 soldiers (Wessels 1993: 80).

Three cartridges were discovered on a path west of the hill (see Map 7). There is no archaeological evidence of Boer positions on the other side of the valley because excavations in that area were hampered by the terrain and Verlorenvlei itself. Future excavations may identify these areas, which could provide a more accurate number of attacking force soldiers.

Grid C cartridges indicate a more vertical approach and are perpendicular to the line formation on Grid B (see Map 8). This could imply that the British were firing from their position next to the supply waggons, as they would have sought cover before defending themselves. In addition to the cartridges found in the path, there was an abundance of spent

[22] The length of the attacking line was about 90 m, which is divided by ± 3 m between each fighter.

cartridges to the right of the path, behind a small incline, which indicates that the British return fire may have originated from this location as they reorganised their defences.



Map 8: Grid C (supply road area) .303 cartridges' location

The distance between the two clusters of cartridges was approximately 250 m, as indicated in Map 9, which was close to the preferred engagement distance of the Boer fighters. Archaeological research supports the existence of this practice and it would have been the ideal shooting range for both sides.



Map 9: Distance between the two .303 cartridge clusters (Grids B and C)

5.3.5.2 Cartridge colour



Figure 26: .303 cartridge colour chart (Grids B and C)

The .303 cartridge was made of a brass called “cartridge brass” as it was primarily used in the manufacturing of cartridges, but it was also used in the manufacturing of other elements (Copper Development Association 2000). In order to save costs, a mixture of zinc (around

30%) was added to the copper in the manufacturing process (Copper Development Association 2000). The base colour of the cartridges was thus brown, as indicated in Figure 26. The presence of other colour cartridges could be due to the soil in which it was found or as the result of copper corrosion.

Copper oxidises when exposed to the atmosphere for too long, which resulted in the surface of the cartridge to tarnish. The oxidation will create a blue-green colour to copper, brass, and bronze over time (Corrosionpedia 2020). The green in some cartridges could be due to Verdigris[23] where acetic acid attacked it. Most of the cartridge surface finds came from Grid B, which could explain the high level of corrosion of the cartridges.

5.3.5.3 Cartridge depth



Figure 27: .303 cartridge depth chart (Grids B and C)

The high number of cartridges found on the surface (0 cm) or near the surface (5 to 10 cm) came from Grid B and could be the result of not being removed from the hilltop due to the large boulders and bushes on the hill and thus not being disturbed over the years. Deeper finds (20 to 30 cm) were more associated with Grid C, which indicates that most of

[23] Verdigris is also responsible for the green appearance of coins and statues.

the surface or near-surface finds may have been removed over the past 122 years due to the area being easily accessible and experiencing high traffic, leaving only deep embedded cartridge *in situ*. The cartridges found deeper than 20 cm in Grid B were all discovered on the pathway on the west site below the hilltop, which may explain why they were able to be located and were not removed from the site.

5.3.5.4 Cartridge length



Figure 28: .303 cartridge length chart (Grids B and C)

The standard .303 cartridge is a 7.7 x 56 mmR, which means it has a width of 7.7 mm, a length of 56 mm, and a rim at the bottom to act as a stop, as seen in Figure 29. The overall size of a standard .303 bullet was around 77 mm, including the bullet point.



Figure 29: Standard .303 British cartridge
Source: American Rifleman (2016)

Approximately 22%[24] of the recovered cartridges were much shorter, with one as short as 35 mm. The length discrepancy of the undersize cartridges is most likely due to corrosion of the neck of the cartridge. Since the neck and shoulders were the thinnest part of the casing, it would have eroded faster than the rest of the cartridge. The neck would also have been softened by the cordite explosion, which would make it more brittle and therefore would tend to damage the cartridge more on that location. All the cartridges that were shorter were due to the damage to the neck of the cartridges.

The amount of damage to the cartridges found in Grid C (British position) was far greater than those found in Grid B (Boer position).

On the Boer side, approximately 13% of the cartridges showed signs of erosion, compared to a third (32%) on the British side (see Table 6), which indicates that the cartridges found in Grid C eroded faster, perhaps because they were buried deeper and were influenced by the soil. Both grids have about the same number of spend cartridges, which could potentially indicate that both sides were firing at each other.

Cartridges	**Grid B**	**Grid C**
Total cartridges found	45	41
Total damaged cartridges	6	13
Percentage damaged cartridges per grid	13.3%	31.7%

Table 6: Percentage trauma to cartridges per grid

[24] Nineteen of the 86 .303 cartridges recovered.

5.3.5.5 Cartridge manufacturing



Figure 30: .303 cartridge manufacturers

Abbreviation	Manufacturer
(RL)	Laboratory, Woolwich Arsenal, Kent, UK
(K)	Kynoch & Co, Witton, Birmingham, UK
(KN)	Kings Norton Metal Co., Birmingham, UK
(B)	Birmingham Metal and Munitions Co Ltd., Birmingham, UK
(G)	Greenwood and Batley, Leeds, UK
Unknown	Unknown manufacturer / headstamp not visible

Table 7: Manufacturer types
Source: Tebbutt (2016)

No Mauser or Henry Martini cartridges were discovered on the hilltop; only .303 cartridges, which indicates that all the Boer fighters at this point used confiscated British Lee-Metford and Lee-Enfield rifles. By the guerrilla phase of the war, the Boer ammunition had run out, and they had to rely on whatever ammunition they could appropriate from the British. According to Reitz and Emslie (1999: 181), if the British had been more careful with their ammunition, the war could have ended much sooner because the Boer republics had run out of ammunition.

Given the archaeological evidence, Royal Laboratory manufactured most of the spent cartridges on Vegkop (58%), followed by Kynoch & Co (31%). Royal Laboratory was the official supplier of .303 cartridges during the war and the only manufacturing facility that bore the British war department seal, the Broad Arrow mark (see Figure 31), as shown in Figure 21, and therefore would have produced most of the ammunition.

Figure 31: Broad Arrow mark
Source: Adapted from Taylor (2020)

In addition to the various manufacturer types, all cartridges discovered were marked **C II**, which indicated that they were Cordite Mark II ammunition produced between 1893 and October 1898 (Andr 2019). This proved that the cartridges discovered were produced well before the South African War and were most likely used during the skirmish.

Unreadable headstamps prevented identification of the manufacturer of three recovered cartridges.

5.3.5.6 Cartridge condition



Figure 32: .303 cartridge condition chart (Grids B and C)

After the cleaning process, the condition of the cartridges was determined, and factors such as the surface condition and damage to the cartridge itself were considered when determining the overall condition of the cartridges. The cartridges found in Grid B were in a far better condition (approximately 40%) than those found in Grid C (approximately 20%). These factors could be skirmish-related, but environmental factors such as the soil in which the cartridges were discovered and exposure also contributed to the condition of the cartridges. One cartridge was left *in situ* for future analysis; its condition was therefore not determined.

Images of cartridges that were recovered in a relatively good condition are shown in Figure 33. Figure 34 shows some cartridges in poor condition. Figure 35 depicts a .303 cartridge with a precise incision made to the cartridge head. The cartridge's head was discovered together with the rest of the cartridge.

Figure 33: .303 cartridges found that are in a good condition

Figure 34: .303 cartridges found that are in a poor condition (notice the front part of all of them are ripped off)

Figure 35: .303 cartridge with its front part neatly cut off

5.4 Metal balls

5.4.1 Discussion

The detection of metal balls was one of the most surprising discoveries at the Vegkop site. As previously mentioned, the presence of the metal balls could potentially indicate one of two possibilities:

(1) The metal balls could potentially be musket balls used by the supply drivers who wanted to protect themselves against the Boer attacks; or
(2) The metal balls could be British artillery shrapnel fired by cannons in order to subdue the Boer attack.

5.4.1.1 Musket ball theory

The musket a period-specific weapon, could indicate that both the supply drivers (possibly armed with musket pistols) and the British military were firing at the hill (Boer) position. Approximately 19 were located during excavations and most of the musket balls were located on Vegkop itself, which indicates that the ammunition was fired at the hill. Approximately 68%[25] had signs of impact, which indicates that it could be the result of being fired as opposed to being accidentally dropped. One of the musket balls was recovered from a boulder on the hill, which clearly revealed the angle and position at which the musket ball was discharged.

During the investigation of musket balls from a Revolutionary War site in New Jersey, the Deep Search Metal Detecting Club employed three distinct procedures (Sivilich 1996: 101). They performed site preparations, inventory collecting, and inventory analysis. During the phase of inventory gathering, the metal detectorists walked the entire site while using an electronic metal detector to locate the musket balls (Sivilich 1996: 102). They utilised garden trowels as the preferred method of recovering the antiquities, and this research team employed the same technique. Sivilich (1996: 103) discovered numerous indentation marks on the musket balls and concluded that they could not have been caused by an impact, but rather by "faceting", in which the balls were stored near one another, where hammering against one

[25] Thirteen of the 19 musket balls.

another created small circular indentation marks. During the analysis, the researcher did not locate any minor indications that indicated that any deformation was caused by musket ball impact.

5.4.1.2 British artillery shrapnel theory

The change-over from muzzle loading to breech loading also affected the artillery guns that were employed during the South African War (Hall 1971). As troops no longer battled on open terrain, artillery methods needed to be changed to adapt to the more conventional war style (Hall 1971).

Three types of artillery shells were in use during the South African War:

(1) The common shell was a steel case filled with high explosives;
(2) The case shell was a cylinder or case filled with metal balls, which would spray anyone in front of the gun; and
(3) Shrapnel, a shot-like musket ball that was included in a case with a timer fuse only to open at some distance from the target (Williamson 2021).

Shrapnel was the invention of Lieutenant Henry Shrapnel of the Royal Artillery in 1784, who created a shell that would be filled with musket-type lead balls and closed by a timer fuse. This fuse could be set manually depending on the range of the target to explode before the target and force the metal balls to spray the target (Hall 1975; Canadian War Museum 2014; Williamson 2021). If the timer fuse was set correctly, the projectile would explode over the target, releasing hundreds of shrapnel bullets in a wide pattern (Canadian War Museum 2014). This type of destruction was particularly effective against soldiers and horses in more open terrain (Canadian War Museum 2014). Shrapnel-type ammunition became obsolete during World War I when it was replaced by more explosive ammunition (Canadian War Museum 2014).

The metal balls found on Vegkop could potentially be of an artillery shell firing at the Boer position or could even be the result of later artillery shelling of the hill after news spread of the site being used by the Boer forces to ambush transport waggons.

5.4.2 Analysis

5.4.2.1 Musket ball

Unlike .303 cartridges, which can be linked to a specific weapon and date range, musket ball analysis is more complex, as explained below. The musket ball, along with the muzzle-loader weapon and black powder, were introduced as early as the 15th century (Flynn 2016). Musket balls are measured in bore size rather than height or width because they are round. The bore size is the number of musket balls that can be produced with one pound of lead.

The weight of the musket ball is used to identify the bore size by weighing the musket ball and then dividing one pound by the value. The bore size provides an indication of what type of musket ball was used. The musket ball could come from either a musket, or carbine, or from a pistol.

During the 18th century, the British Army standardised their bore sizes, and the musket ball could be associated with a weapon type based on its bore size (Flynn 2016). Table 8 depicts the three main types of British muskets used during the 18th century.

Approximate weight of shot	Weapon type	Bore size
31 g	Musket	14½
23 g	Carbine	20
13 g	Pistol	34

Table 8: Different musket ball sizes adopted by the British Army
Source: Flynn (2016)

5.4.2.2 British artillery shrapnel

A clear indicator that artillery guns are employed during any battle or skirmish is the presence of a T-friction tube (named for its T shape) (Hall 1975). This tube acts as the triggering mechanism for artillery guns when the loop of the tube is pulled to trigger a downward explosion that ignites the propellant, which deploys the case or shell from the gun (Hall 1975).

The T-friction tube is only used once, the same as a cartridge, and is normally discarded by the cannoneer[26] and therefore could indicate the location of the gun (Hall 1975). The researcher, however, did not find the presence of any T-friction tubes and no evidence is therefore available of the presence or use of artillery guns during or after the skirmish at Vegkop.

During the early stages of the war, the Boer artillery guns far outperformed the British artillery and the British took some time to catch up with them and to adapt to the Boers' manoeuvrability (Williamson 2021). The British artillery was divided into three groups:

(1) The Royal Horse Artillery predominantly used the 12 pr 6 cwt BL gun (commonly known as the 12-pounder) (Hall 1971). The Royal Horse artillery had around 78 12-pounder guns at their disposal (Williamson 2021).
(2) The Royal Field Artillery used the 15 pr 7 cwt BL gun (commonly known as the 15-pounder) (Hall 1971). The gun was almost the same as the 12-pounders but could fire a larger case/shell.
(3) The Royal Garrison Artillery was the third group. Other gun types were excluded from this research due to them using different ammunition from the metal balls found on Vegkop.

Both the 12- and 15-pounder used shrapnel as its primary ammunition type (Hall 1971). The 12-pounder guns were less effective than the 15-pounders as more metal balls could be introduced into a single 15-pounder shot (it thus weighed more) (Hall 1971). The 15-pounder was also the first cannon to introduce smokeless cordite around 1895 (Hall 1971) and therefore could propel larger shells; however, it had one major flaw in that it was outranged by the Boer guns and thus had to be moved into the line of small arms fire to be effective (Hall 1971).

The 15-pounder gun was most effective for ammunition types that would go off in the air like shrapnel and would later have a range of almost 3 750 m with the introduction of better time fuses (Hall 1975). The shell of the 15-pounder was packed with around 200 metal balls (see

[26] The term "cannoneer" is normally associated with a person in charge of shooting an artillery gun.

Figure 36) at a weight of 41 balls per pound. This means that the average weight of the shrapnel metal balls was about 11 g (see Table 9).

Pound	Amount of balls per pound	Weight per ball (pound)	Weight per ball (Kg)[27]	Weight per ball (g)
1	41	0.024390244	0.011073171	11.07

Table 9: Shrapnel conversion table



Figure 36: British shrapnel used in the 15-pounder gun
Source: Hall (1975)

[27] One pound (1) = 0.454 kg

5.4.3 Results

Irongate Armory (2022) listed the musket as the preferred weapon used by waggon drivers and mail carriers to defend themselves against highway robbers. Perhaps the British Empire-hired waggon drivers used these weapons to defend themselves against Boer attacks. The British military escorted the supply waggons; it may therefore be assumed that arming the waggon drivers was unnecessary. The discovery of a substantial number of metal balls on the hilltop suggests that the drivers of the supply waggons could certainly have employed the weapon for self-defence.

To connect these musket balls to the actual conflict, much investigation was required as this type of ammunition was associated with the muzzle-loader weapons of the 15th to 17th century. At first glance, the musket balls appear to be unrelated to the South African War. However, based on the researcher's analysis, the weapon could have been used during the skirmish between the guerrilla forces and the supply waggon drivers. Firstly, the musket balls were only found on the hillside itself (except for three in proximity of each other on the west side of Grid A, which could be the result of the cultivation in Grid A), which indicates that the hillside was the target. Secondly, the ancient musket could have been used by supply waggon drivers who were not armed by the British, as was the case with the town guards, but who felt the need to arm themselves as they were surely aware of the attacks on supply waggons in and around the Sandveld area during this time.

The metal balls could also be the result of British artillery shells during or even after the skirmish to subdue any surprise attacks. The pattern of the metal balls indicates that either a single or multiple shells of shrapnel were shot at the hill. The weight of the metal balls recovered most probably indicates that it could be from a shell containing shrapnel as the average weight was 11 g, which is in line with the average weight of the shrapnel metal balls found (see Figure 42).

Lastly, the distribution pattern of the metal balls in conjunction with the line position of the Boer assailants (see Map 10) indicates that the metal ball fire was directed at the attackers. Figure 37 shows metal balls that had no impact and Figure 38 shows metal balls that had an impact imprint.



Map 10: GPS position of the metal balls in association with the .303 cartridges found on the hilltop (Grid B)

Figure 37: Metal balls found with no impact and in good condition

Figure 38: Metal balls that had an impact

5.4.3.1 Metal ball positioning

The metal balls that were found on Grid B were almost linear to the road and might indicate the shooting position of the supply drivers (see Map 11) as the high concentration of metal balls was almost 90 m from the split in the road. The average shooting range for the muzzle-loading pistol was also around 90 m (Hartwig 2010: 230), which indicates the possible shooting position of the supply waggon drivers. This location is approximately 150 m north of where British cartridges were discovered in Grid C, which indicates that the front drivers may have been at the bend in the road that led in front of the hilltop and that the British military escort either retreated to a more advantageous defensive position or was regrouping from the rear of the trail. Three metal balls were recovered from Grid A that might indicate the initial location of the graves before the 1925 flood, or it could be the result of cultivation in Grid A.

If the metal balls are the results of the British gun artillery the position of the guns would be difficult to determine without any physical indicator like the T-friction tube as the artillery gun position could be any distance away as the timing fuse would be set accordantly (probably in Grid E or even further south).



Map 11: GPS position of the metal balls found in Grid B (Google Earth Pro)

5.4.3.2 Metal ball colour



Figure 39: Metal ball colour chart (Grids A and B)

Even though the metal balls are made of lead, they will lose their grey lead appearance when exposed to the elements or buried in soil over a long period. The metal balls retrieved from Grids A and B were grey, brown, and black in colour. Duo to oxidation, a patina layer can form around the metal ball that gives it a grey or black colour (Austin 2020). Tannic acid from trees or high levels of oxide in the soil can turn the ball a dark brown colour (Austin 2020).

5.4.3.3 Metal ball depth



Figure 40: Metal ball depth chart (Grids A and B)

Due to the light weight of the metal ball, it is likely that balls buried deeper than 5 cm were covered by sand over the years of laying *in situ*. Metal balls were found 20 cm to 30 cm deep in Grid A and the northern side of Grid B, which may indicate that they were reburied due to agricultural activities. The other deeper metal balls were located in front of the south-facing incline and may have been buried by direct shots into the softer sand areas. The majority of metal balls buried between 0 cm and 10 cm were located atop the hill in Grid B.

5.4.3.4 Metal ball length



Figure 41: Metal ball length chart (Grids A and B)

The average size of the metal balls retrieved was approximately 12 mm and no metal ball was wider than 14 mm. Five of the metal balls were unable to be measured as they were only fragments.

5.4.3.5 Metal ball weight



Figure 42: Metal ball weight chart (Grids A and B)

In order to identify the type of weapons that the metal ball belonged to, the bore size needed to be calculated. The bore size is calculated by the number of metal balls that can be produced by using one pound of lead. The researcher could only include seven of the 19 metal balls' weight in the calculation as they were still intact and showed no signs of impact. The average weight of the metal balls in the sample was 11.57 g. Based on the average weight, the researcher calculated that the bore size used during the skirmish was approximately 39.6[28]. The bore size represents the maximum size of a lead ball that could be inserted into the barrel of a particular type of gun.

The researcher was able to determine from a standardised list (see Table 8) that the weapons used to shoot the metal balls recovered on Vegkop were either musket pistols (as the metal balls are less than 13 g) or the result of British shrapnel employed by artillery fire of a 12- or 15-pounder gun (the majority of the metal balls weighed about 11 g, which is the same standard size as the metal shrapnel used in the artillery shells).

Muzzle-loading pistols were the preferred weapon for Dragoon[29] units because they could be fired with one hand, which made riding and shooting possible (Irongate Armory 2022). Muzzle-loading weapons were phased out of service in the mid-19th century in favour of more advanced breech-loading[30] weapons that could hold a cartridge.

This could indicate that the supply waggon drivers had armed themselves with pistol muskets, probably left-over muskets from the Dragoon or Sea Service muskets. Figure 43 compares the metal balls found on Vegkop to a musket ball from the 17th/18th century. The size difference is quite big as the musket ball on the left was fired from a rifle musket compared to the metal ball from either a pistol or shrapnel ball on the right.

[28] One pound or 453.59 g / 11.57 g.
[29] A Dragoon is a class of mounted infantry that utilised horses for mobility.
[30] A breech-loading weapon's ammunition is loaded from the rear or "breech".

Figure 43: Metal ball recovered on Vegkop (right), compared to a musket ball (left)

5.4.3.6 Musket ball condition



Figure 44: Musket ball condition chart (Grids A and B)

Only about a third of the metal balls (six of the 19) recovered were in a good shape; the rest were either damaged or were fragment pieces. The presence of the large number of fragments is most likely due to the impact of the ball against the boulders on the hilltop.

5.5 Other finds

Five different types of objects were found at Vegkop hill during the metal detecting phase that could not be directly linked to the skirmish at Vegkop. These objects included:

- Buttons;
- Coins;
- A harmonica fragment;
- Non-skirmish-related cartridges; and
- Farming activity-related items.

5.5.1 Buttons

The buttons found may or may not be period related. No significant markers were found on the buttons; they were therefore excluded from the archaeological analysis of the skirmish.

The locations of two buttons (see Figure 45) that were found in Grid B are shown in Map 12.



Map 12: GPS position of the buttons found in Grid B

Figure 45: Buttons found in Grid B

5.5.2 Coins

The coin discovered on the hilltop was very corroded, and only the year (1903) could be read. Although the coin was not directly related to the skirmish, it may have been indirectly related as it was well known that the site was visited by curious individuals who wanted to see the site for themselves. This could suggest that the site was visited by such individuals as early as a few years later, who may have lost a coin in the process. The location where the coin was found is shown on Map 13 and an image of the coin is shown in Figure 46.



Map 13: GPS position of the coin found in Grid B

Figure 46: Coin found in Grid B

5.5.3 Harmonica fragment

The harmonica, a portable, inexpensive, and readily available musical instrument, was introduced in several wars, including the American Civil War of 1775, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Great Wars of the 20th century (Harp Surgery n.d.). Musical instruments were often used by soldiers to remind them of a more tranquil time and to relax (Harp Surgery n.d.).

During a skirmish or fight, it is typical to find shards of these instruments strewn among other artefacts. Whether this harmonica piece was utilised during the South African War could not be determined, but the probability exists. The instrument could also be an indicator that a British campsite was present and maybe used after the skirmish.

The harmonica piece (see Figure 47) was found in Grid B on the west side overlooking the pathway below (see Map 14).



Map 14: GPS position of the harmonica piece found in Grid B



Figure 47: Harmonica piece found in Grid B

5.5.4 Non-skirmish-related cartridges

Several non-skirmish-related cartridges were discovered on the hilltop in Grid B, which may imply that the hilltop area was used as a hiding area for hunting or for recreation purposes before and after the war. These cartridges included:

- .22 shells (five cartridges);
- Shotgun shells (three cartridges); and
- .303 cartridges (two cartridges).

5.5.4.1 .22 shells

.22 shells are mostly associated with small animal hunting like rabbits or birds, but also for recreational target practice. The cartridges (see Figure 48) recovered from Grid B are indicated in Map 15. What is also of interest is that the .22 shells were close together and from the high boulder area overlooking the pathway at the west side of the hill area.



Map 15: GPS position of the .22 shells found in Grid B

Figure 48: .22 shells found in Grid B

5.5.4.2 Shotgun shells

Three shotgun shells (see Figure 49) were found also on the higher point of the hill area (see Map 16).



Map 16: GPS position of the shotgun shells found in Grid B

Figure 49: Shotgun shells found in Grid B

5.5.4.3 .303 cartridges

The two .303 cartridges (see Figure 50) that were not associated with the South African War skirmish were located away from the main assault line (see Map 17). One cartridge was located on top of the hill and the other on the pathway at the bottom of the hill.

The top-side .303 cartridge was manufactured in 1976 and had the headstamp of **FNM**, which indicates that it was manufactured by Fábrica Nacional de Munições de Armas Ligeiras, Moscavide, in Portugal (Tebbutt 2016). Later types of .303 cartridges included the year of manufacturing, and in this case was November 1976.

The bottom-side .303 cartridge had a headstamp of **NORMA**, which indicates it was manufactured by Norma Projectilfabrik, Åmotfors, in Sweden (Tebbutt 2016). The cartridge type is 270W, which indicates that it is a cartridge for a Winchester short magnum rifle that is primarily used for hunting activities.



Map 17: Two .303 cartridges found in Grid B that are not linked to the skirmish

Figure 50: Shotgun shells found in Grid B that are not linked to the skirmish

5.5.5 Farming material

The hilltop is bordered by an active farm; the presence of farming-related material was therefore expected (see Figures 51 and 52). The following farming materials were found:

- Bolts;
- Nuts;

- Iron wedge;
- Lead fragments;
- Brass ring;
- Plough teeth;
- Large steel bar; and
- Iron pieces.

According to agriculturist Tertius van Lill[31], broken plough teeth on the hilltop may be the result of farmworkers disposing of the teeth so as not to contaminate the cultivated area if the teeth broke off the plough. Since the hillside is not in use, it was likely dumped or thrown there. There was also a great deal of material closer to the R366 road to the west of the hill, which could be the result of vehicles using the road. The locations of the farming material found in Grids A and B are indicated in Map 18, and the images are shown in Figures 51 and 52.



Map 18: GPS position of farming material found in Grid B

[31] Interviewed 30 December 2022, Oudtshoorn, Western Cape.

Figure 51: Some farming material found in Grid B

Figure 52: Plough teeth found in Grid B

5.6 Conclusion

The quantity of cartridges discovered at both Grid B (Hill area) and Grid C (supply route south of the hill) demonstrates conclusively that a South African War conflict occurred at the location as specified by historical sources (Van Zyl n.d.; Wessels 1993; Shearing & Shearing 2000) and oral tradition (Van Lill 2021; Boonzaaier 2022). The identification markings on the cartridges indicate that they were created prior to and utilised during the South African War.

Multiple cartridges at a single area indicate that the weapon was most likely employed during a stationary skirmish as opposed to hunting, where the shooter must frequently change position. Based on the recorded sources, it was concluded that the fight was brief. Through archaeological investigations, the small grouping of cartridges suggested that the skirmish was indeed brief. Regarding the number of soldiers on either side, it is evident that the recorded sources are conflicting. Jacobus Louw (Van Zyl n.d.) indicate between 20 and 30 Boers attacking, while Jeudwine indicated around 350 Boers (Wessels 1993: 80); however, through archaeological analysis, the evidence suggests that there were approximately 30 fighters on the summit. The opposite side's numbers are undetermined as no archaeological survey could be conducted due to the terrain.

An unexpected discovery was the presence of metal balls. Tow theories were put forward for the presents of these balls. The musket ball theory indicates that the ammunition was likely utilised by the supply waggon drivers, who could have been armed with pistols and defending themselves, or the result of British shrapnel from cannon fire at the hill either during the skirmish or later to confirm that no guerrilla fighters were present on the hill for another surprise attack on transport waggons.

Archaeological evidence indicates that the Boer fighters were successful in stopping the supply run, since there is no indication that fighting continued north of the hillside. Due to nightfall and likely the awareness by the guerrilla fighters that the supply run did not bring any valuable plunder, the guerrilla fighters withdrew north, as was their custom.

Also, the likelihood that the military escorts further down the supply line had caught up with the skirmish by that time, and that the Boer guerrillas opted not to pursue the risk, was also disputed by Jeudwine (as cited in Wessels 1993: 80) as he indicated that the guerrilla forces

were chased away. Through historical records and oral histories, it was found that there were no deaths on the Boer side, but that the supply convoy had several deaths. As the British were very particular with their recordings of deaths, it remains unclear why these graves were not reported. Perhaps the reasoning is that it might be transport drivers and not soldiers who were killed and buried on-site. It remains to be known what happened to the graves that were unearthed in 2003/2004 during the region's conversion into farmland.

The absence of bullet points from the .303 cartridges on both sides was noted as a major problem during the archaeological excavation of the skirmish side. By studying historical records, oral history, and archaeological evidence, a theory to explain this phenomenon was developed. As it is difficult to shoot uphill, it is likely that the British overshot their aim. If the bullet had not struck an obstacle, it would have overshot into the farmed area (Grid A) and was probably relocated during the cultivation of that area. Due to the lack of bullets on the Boer side, flooding in the Verlorenvlei region would have likely washed away the considerably lighter bullet tip, as the bullets would not have entered the soil deeply. It is also evident from the cartridge depth investigation that fewer cartridges were located near the surface and only cartridges buried at a depth of around 20 to 30 cm remained in place.

Through archaeological methods, the skirmish that occurred on 8 December 1901 between the guerrilla forces of the Boer fighters and the British supply run escorted by the Western Cape Mounted Rifle brigade could be archaeologically proven.

Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion

6.1 Discussion

Battlefield archaeology, and particularly the archaeology of minor skirmishes, provides crucial evidence of the nature and actions of inter-society conflict. By studying and analysing skirmishes, one can gain a better understanding of how the war progressed for individual soldiers, who were neither heroes nor great generals, but rather average humans, and how they perceived the war through the struggle for survival in this fight-or-die mentality.

Very few non-conquerors are known in history, as only the names of the boldest and most audacious commanders will be remembered, and their legacy will endure. Human history is replete with examples of conflict and warfare. For instance, the early Roman Empire under Julius Caesar expanded solely through violent battles with its neighbours. Alexander the Great from Macedonia, who ruled from 336 to 323 BCE, desired to dominate the world and engaged in a massive military campaign to achieve this objective. The early Mongolians under Genghis Khan's rule engaged in resource-related conflict around 1206 to 1215 CE with the Chinese. Napoleon Bonaparte of France desired to emancipate the common man and overthrow the established European oligarch rule, initiating Europe's first major multinational war in which numerous nations united to defeat him in 1814 CE.

The new America was forged in conflict; first between the Native Americans, then against their colonial oppressors, and finally against each other in a civil war. Europe bears the scars of two significant World Wars, which affected the whole world. Moreover, the conquest of Southern Africa is replete with military engagements. The same pattern emerged in South Africa when the Western colonialist and African tribes fought first against the indigenous people (Khoikhoi-Dutch war during the last half of the 17th century, the Xhosa wars of 1779 to 1879, and the Zulu wars of 1879 to 1896), then against their colonial rulers (South African War / Anglo-Boer War), and finally against each other during the Maritz Rebellion during World War I (1914).

The modern battlefield archaeologist can only recreate and comprehend the actions of soldiers – soldiers who were willing to risk everything, who were willing to fight and perish for their beliefs – by analysing even the smallest of details and the smallest of battles.

To understand the complex dynamics of warfare, one must look beyond strategy and manoeuvres and concentrate research on smaller actions by soldiers through the archaeological landscape (Scott & McFeaters 2011: 104). This is because the investigation of battle sites and battle-related incidents may contribute to our understanding of the broader dynamics of war.

The researcher's archaeological and historical investigations identified three discrepancies within the underlying context, namely:

- The date of the assault;
- The number of soldiers engaged in the skirmish; and
- The outcome of the attack.

The information provided by Jacobus Louw (Van Zyl n.d.) indicates that the assault was launched on 11 December 1901; however, according to Jeudwine's diary, which described the events of December 1901 in greater detail, the attack occurred on 8 December, with the Major returning on 11 December 1901 to Wittedrift. The reason for his stop at Wittedrift is not clear; however, it could very well have been to conduct and assist with the trials of the people accused of assisting the Boer guerrilla fighters during the attack.

The second discrepancy relates to the number of forces present at the attack; according to Jacobus Louw (Van Zyl n.d.), only 30 soldiers were present (20 of whom were on the hill itself). According to Jeudwine (Wessels 1993: 80), he encountered approximately 350 of Schoeman and Theron's soldiers at Vegkop. Archaeological evidence led the researcher to conclude that there were approximately 30 Boer soldiers on the hilltop. Jeudwine's estimation of the size of the guerrilla forces was likely based on the general insight the British had into Boer guerrilla fighters in the area at the time, or perhaps he aggregated the numbers due to the surprise attack on the convoy and the fact that the guerrilla fighters got away. Either way, more research needs to be conducted to determine the huge discrepancy in numbers.

The final disagreement concerns the outcome of the skirmish. Jacobus Louw (Van Zyl n.d.) stated that the Boer guerrilla fighters had won the attack, plundered the supply waggons, and then fled to the north. Jeudwine (Wessels 1993: 80) believed that the outcome favoured the supply run escorts and that they therefore repelled the attackers. It is more likely that the Boers withdrew instead of Jeudwine driving them away, as fewer cartridges were discovered on the pathway closer to Vegkop, which indicates that the British did not pursue the Boer withdrawal. Jeudwine's diary provides a good account of the movements of the British military before and after the ambush at Vegkop; however, he did not report on the actions of any of the supply waggon drivers during the conflict, which is understandable given that he was only in charge of the British escort and therefore only reported on their actions.

Maritz (1939) and Reitz and Emslie (1999) shed light on the movements of Boer combatants in the Sandveld region. Although they were not present during the skirmish, their descriptions of the events preceding and following it provide a clear indication of the mentality and conduct of the Boer guerrilla combatants during the Smuts Cape invasion.

Maans Smith described an entirely separate or alternative event and suggested that the skirmish was a more local dispute (Piketberg Museum 2014). This report was likely about a distinct incident in the same area, unrelated to the conflict between Boer guerrilla fighters and the Jeudwine supply run. The archaeological evidence from Vegkop does not corroborate this account, as the quantity of skirmish-related artefacts implies a much longer engagement involving a greater number of soldiers (at least 30) and firing in an almost straight line on the south side of the hilltop.

Most of the available secondary sources for the Boer actions in the Western Cape focused on the actions of the Cape Rebels, including Neser, Lötter, and Theron, who endangered their lives to aid the Boer invaders. It was also established that the Boer invaders greatly embarrassed Britain. At the time of the South African War, Britain viewed itself as a world conqueror and won almost all its military campaigns with relative ease. This overconfidence of the British Empire would prove to be a costly exercise both in terms of financial and human cost. Britain could not afford to lose extant territory while attempting to conquer new territory. Evidently, unlike his predecessors like Hertzog and De Wet, Smuts was a brilliant and shrewd general who was able to outmanoeuvre his overpowering adversary through his high

mobility and careful movement choices. Constantine (1996) was one of the few writers who criticised Smuts' invasion of the Cape, believing that the presence of the guerrilla units led to more oppression of the locals by the British in the form of martial law and harsh punishments for those who aided the Boer invaders. Shearing and Shearing (2000), on the other hand, focused on Smuts' accomplishment during the Cape Colony invasion within such a short period of time.

Wessels (2011b) believed that the transition from conventional warfare to guerrilla warfare only increased the suffering of the Boer warriors, who were already exhausted by the time the guerrilla phase of the war began. This also allowed the British to adopt a strict policy for controlling the guerrilla combatants, as they were unable to fight a force that was indistinguishable. The British forces employed more extreme measures, such as the scorched-earth policy, in which numerous animals were slain and farms were torched. Finally, the British placed people in concentration camps in an attempt to cut off the guerrilla fighters' means of survival by removing the general populace, which could have provided sustenance and intelligence to the guerrilla fighters. A further unintended consequence of the Cape invasion was the schism it caused in the Afrikaner community between supporters of the British monarchy and the rebels. Although the actions of the Boers and Cape rebels were justifiable and even heroic in some sense, the invasion did not accomplish its intended purpose of aiding the Boer Republics in their fight against Britain and was perhaps not worth the effort and expense.

Archaeological and historical sources demonstrate that this skirmish differed from others in that it was not an unplanned or accidental encounter between the British and the guerrilla forces, as the Boer forces were aware of the supply waggons' movement and had planned an ambush at Vegkop. On the morning of the attack, the assailants were already in position and awaited the arrival of the supply waggons. The attack was possibly more opportunistic than inadvertent but brilliantly planned and executed. The Boer forces were arrayed in a line along the crest of the hill for a distance of approximately 100 m, which provided them with excellent cover behind the large boulders and favourable terrain for an advantageous attacking position. Archaeological evidence demonstrated conclusively that the assaulting Boers stopped the supply waggons in their tracks. The pinned-down supply carriers either returned fire with flintlock pistols approximately 90 m from the hillside, most likely around the bend in

the road, or the British used cannons to fire at the attackers in an attempt to subdue them. Approximately 250 m from the hill, the British military escort returned fire with their Lee-Metford and Lee-Enfield rifles, which indicates that they likely reorganised and took cover behind a small hill directly across the road from the waggons. The disparity between the firing positions of the defenders is most likely due to the fog of war[32] effect in which the defenders first attempt to avoid being fired at by securing cover and then assessing the situation before firing back. The majority of the return fire came from behind a small hill, but cartridges were also found on the road, which indicates that some of Jeudwine's soldiers were trapped with the supply waggons.

The fact that there were no casualties on the Boer side indicates both the effectiveness of the Boers during and after the skirmish, as well as the terrain they chose. They could easily halt the supply waggons and retreat without fear of being shot by the British. The people killed in the skirmish, with the exception of one solder buried in Piketberg, were most likely those buried at the side of the skirmish site. This indicates that they most likely were local transport drivers hired by the British who were probably killed when firing at the guerrilla fighters on the hill.

The query posed at the outset of this research was to establish the nature of skirmishes versus organised battles and to attempt to identify and reconstruct the events of 8 December 1901. By using archaeological techniques, two primary areas of cartridges and skirmish-related objects were identified, one on the hilltop itself and the other approximately 250 m towards Piketberg on the roadside. As similar cartridges were identified in both areas, it was impossible to ascertain the Boer positions. However, the presence of metal balls on the hilltop indicated that the Boers occupied the hill area and were targeted by the supply party. The second cluster of cartridges demonstrated that the attack was launched from behind a small hill and from the road, thereby indicating the location of the return fire. The skirmish in the region of Vegkop indicated that the engagement was fleeting and confined to small areas, as opposed to a more extensive battle engagement where battle-related materials would be

[32] When a person is unaware of his surroundings due to the sudden onset of violence or distraction.

scattered throughout the area. The essence of a skirmish is not to engage by moving between vast areas but rather to engage in a brief close-quarters skirmish and then retreat.

Through the analysis of the artefacts recovered at the skirmish, the researcher was able to conclude the following:

- All ammunition types were .303 cartridges, most likely used by Lee-Metford and Lee-Enfield weapons; thus indicating that both sides were armed with British weapons during the skirmish.
- The cartridges had two distinct groupings: one on a linear line on the hilltop itself, which indicated the firing line of the Boer guerrilla forces and one perpendicular to that line, which indicates that the British fired from their position on the waggon trail; and one small cluster of cartridges were found together, which indicates a possible return firing stance.
- The presence of metal balls, although surprising, indicated either that the supply waggon drivers also employed weapons and returned fire on the guerrilla fighters, which probably put them in harm's way of the more concealed and advanced attackers, or that the British forces employed cannons and shelled the guerrilla fighters with shrapnel either during the skirmish on Vegkop or in a separate event after the skirmish.
- Other non-skirmish-related cartridges were a sign that this hilltop was also a preferred spot for other types of shooting, probably hunting or recreation.
- The amount of farming material found was the result of the hilltop being surrounded by an active farm.

The analysis of the historical landscape showed that the Boer guerrilla fighters took some time to plan the ambush as they had chosen a good ambush spot and that it was their intention to halt and probably raid the supply waggons, as were their intentions on several other occasions. This time, however, the bounty of the waggons proved to be useless for the guerrilla fighters as it only contained building materials. The lack of supply goods to raid could indicate the haste the attackers left the site with so as to not engage further with a larger British force that was probably being assembled to counter-attack them. The Boers, however, lost a great opportunity and failed to recognise the importance of the supplies that were

escorted. If they were successful in destroying the equipment, as was their custom in earlier raids, they could have prevented or delayed the blockhouses from being constructed and given Smuts and the larger Boer force the opportunity to operate more southwards in the Western Cape, probably even threatening or taking control of the capital of the British territory.

Archaeological evidence was able to enrich the existing sources, but some discrepancies were identified that are largely attributable to how individuals perceived the same event differently.

This research on a small skirmish in the Sandveld area proved to be unique and contributes towards the study of battlefield archaeology due to the following:

(1) It is an event that might seem unimportant or even lost to history, but through archaeological investigations the essence and dynamics of skirmishes can contribute to the richness of the subject.
(2) It highlights the general actions taken by the Boer guerrilla fighters during the unconventional phase of the South African War, and it shows the boldness of the Boer Republics who foolhardily took on a much bigger opponent even when the odds were against them.
(3) Due to the lack of battlefield and conflict archaeology, especially in South Africa, archaeological investigation contributes to our understanding of conflict and the impact it might have on its surroundings and the people it affected.

6.2 Recommendations

The researcher was unable to locate any graves of people killed during the skirmish (except for a grave in the historical graveyard in Piketberg that might be linked to the skirmish). Oral tradition and historical records exist of these graves; however, when they were reinterred when the grave area was reallocated as farmland in 2004, it was not reported to any heritage association. Further investigation into this is recommended.

Although some monuments and roadside indicators are located throughout South Africa, not enough on the Boer invasion of the Western Cape is available. The researcher recommends that some sort of battlefield sign be erected on the site to indicate the skirmish that took place there to make more people aware of the extent of the South African War and the impact it had on the Sandveld area.

Lastly, the researcher recommends that some of the artefacts be put on display in the Piketberg Museum, which already has a very small exhibit for the South African War, in order to make more people aware of the effect and influence of the war on the area.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Piketberg Museum

For Attention : Heritage Western Cape

I Susanna Klaase, in my capacity as manager of the Piketberg museum hereby declared that I were consulted in terms of the HWC Public Consultation Guide (2016) of the below intention.

That Francois van Lill (id Number 731112 50440 085) , Masters of Archaeology candidate will be conducting a Archaeological investigation of the Skirmish at Vegkop on the Farm Matroosefontein (Farm Nr 13, Portion 5) near Redelinghuys.

The intent of the abovementioned candidate is to conduct an archaeological survey of the area and with the aid of metal detecting trying to locate any artifacts that might have arise of the Skirmish during December 1901.

The candidate have approval by the site owner (Unifrutti) as well as the collaborating institution (University of South Africa) and all artifact recovered during the archaeological excavations will be hosted at Izikio Museum, Cape Town.

Name of the consulted body : Piketberg Museum

Head of the consulted body : Sonnie Klaase Voorsitter

Signature of the person consulted : [signature]

Date consulted : 5.4.2022

Appendix B: West Coast Aboriginal Council

Re: Permit application approval request - West Coast Aboriginal Council

CC CRAZY CRAFTS by Shumara <wcacouncil@gmail.com>
To FRANCOIS VAN LILL

Reply | Reply All | Forward | ...
Fri 04/01/2022 17:24

Approved.

On Fri, 25 Mar 2022, 10:20 FRANCOIS VAN LILL, <31138551@mylife.unisa.ac.za> wrote:

> **West Coast Aboriginal Council**
>
> For Attention : Charika Barends
>
> Hi Charika,
>
> I am currently doing my Master's in Archeology at the University of South Africa (UNISA). My Master's thesis is around a South African War skirmish that took place during December 1901 at Vegkop (about 4 km south of Redelinghuys on the R366 towards Piketberg).
>
> I am in the process of obtaining an Archeological excavation permit from HWC to conduct a metal detecting survey of the site. I have already obtained the approval of the registered owner of the site (Simon Baty of Unifrutti) to conduct the excavations on his farm Matroozefontein where the site is located.
>
> I have also obtained the approval of Paul Tichmann the Director of collections at the Izikio museum in Cape town who will be hosting any artifacts collected as well as the approval of the Piketberg museum (Mrs. Marie Ehlers) who I am collaborating with.
>
> My thesis approval from Unisa is also attached and my supervisor is Mrs. Karodia Khan and Miss Mpho Maripane. The onsite supervisor will be Mr. Willem Hutten a PhD Candidate of Unisa.
>
> As your institution is identified as the closed conservation body I would like to apply for approval by the West Coast Aboriginal council to excavate the identified area.
>
> I am submitting herewith my HWC application form which elaborates in more detail the proposed archeological excavation and description of my thesis.
>
> Please feel free to contact me to answer any questions you may have.
>
> Thank you
>
> Francois van Lill
>
> Masters candidate Archeology UNISA
>
> Email address: 31138551@myfile.unisa.ac.za
>
> Cell phone: 079 883 3208

Appendix C: Iziko Museum

I, Francois van Lill , hereby declare that I have read this document, that I understand the contents and that I accept the provisions therein.

_____**Francois van Lill (Unisa)** _____
FULL NAME, INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION ANDSIGNATURE OF SUBMITTER

Signed at _____**Bonnie Brae (Kraaifontein)** __, on this _**19**__ day of ___**May**_____ **2021**.

_____Jaco Jacqes Boshoff_____
FULL NAME AND SIGNATURE OF IZIKO ARCHAEOLOGY CURATOR AND/OR COLLECTIONS MANAGER

Signed at __Cape Town_____, on this _24__ day of ___May_____ 2021

Useful References for Curating Archaeological Material

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DETAILS OF COLLABORATING INSTITUTION WHERE THE APPLICANT WILL BE BASED WHILE UNDERTAKING THE PROJECT

Name of the collaborating institution: Iziko Museums

Name and title of Head of the collaborating institution: PAUL TICHMANN DIRECTOR COLLECTIONS & DIGITISATION

Identity number of the Head of the collaborating institution: 590504 5053 084

Address: PO Box 61 Cape Town

Postal code: 8000

Telephone area code: (021) Telephone number: 467 7215

Facsimile area code: (021) Facsimile number: 461 2960

Cellular phone number: 072 519 8054

E-mail: ptichmann@iziko.org.za

Declaration of the Head of the collaborating institution:

I, PAUL TICHMANN in my capacity as DIRECTOR of the IZIKO CHD DEPARTMENT hereby declare that the collaborating institution has an official written collections policy and undertakes to store and curate the material and records from this project, once completed.

Signature of the Head of the collaborating institution: P Tichmann Date: 26/05/2021

Appendix D: Unifrutti

DETAILS OF THE REGISTERED OWNER OF THE SITE

Name and Title: Unifrutti SA (Pty) Ltd.

Address: PO Box 32, Redelinghuys, 8105

Postal code: 8105

Contact detail

Telephone area code: (022) Telephone number: 962 1730

Facsimile area code: (.....) Facsimile number: N/A

Cellular phone number: 072 839 1069

E-mail: simon@unifrutti.co.za

Identity number: 6012275085081

Declaration: I, Simon Charles Batty am fully aware of this application and accept its contents.

Manager.

Signature of ~~owner~~: Date: 7/5/2021.

Comments from owner on planned action (if any)

Appendix E: University of South Africa

7. DETAILS OF COLLABORATING INSTITUTION WHERE THE APPLICANT WILL BE BASED WHILE UNDERTAKING THE PROJECT

7.1 Name of the collaborating institution: **University of South Africa**.....

7.2 Name and Title of Head of the collaborating institution: ……**Dr Natalie Swanepoel**.....

7.3 Identity number of the Head of the collaborating institution: ...**7412040014086**.....

7.4 Address: ...**Department of Anthropology & Archaeology, Rm 4-156 Winnie Madikizela-Mandela Building, PO Box 392, University of South Africa** .....

7.5 Postal code: **0003**.....

7.6 Telephone area code: (**012**) Telephone number: ... **429 6348**.....

7.7 Facsimile area code: (……..) Facsimile number: .....

7.8 Cellular phone number: .....**084 592 6142**.....

7.9 E-mail: .....**swanenj@unisa.ac.za**.....

7.10 Declaration of the Head of the collaborating institution: I, ..**Natalie Josephine Swanepoel**.....

in my capacity as ……**Discipline Head: Archaeology**……of the ...**Department of Anthropology & Archaeology,** `` **University of South Africa** hereby declare that the applicant will be based at this institution while undertaking the project and that I support the application.

Signature of the Head of the collaborating institution: …  …… Date:....**07/05/2021**.....

Appendix F: Stamped Locality Plan



Appendix G: Heritage Western Cape (HWC) Permit Number 1081105NK0412E

Our Ref: HM/ WEST COAST/ BERG RIVER/ REDELINGHUYS/ FARM 13 PTN 5
Case No.: 21081105NK0412E
Enquiries: Natalie Kendrick
E-mail: natalie.kendrick@westerncape.gov.za
Tel 021 483 5959

ILifa leMveli leNtshona Koloni
Erfenis Wes-Kaap
Heritage Western Cape

Francois van Lill
whutten44@gmail.com; 31138551@mylife.unisa.ac.za; simon@unifrutti.co.za

---

PERMIT
CASE NUMBER: 21081105NK0412E
Issued in terms of Section 35(4) of the National Heritage Resources Act, 1999 (Act 25 of 1999) and Regulation 3(3)(a) of PN 298 (29 August 2003)
This permit is valid for three years from the date of issue

Your application for proposed survey with metal detectors and excavation (where applicable) at Matroozefontein was tabled at the Heritage Officers' Meeting Committee (HOMs) meeting held on 25th of April 2022.

This permit is issued for:

Proposed Action: Survey with metal detectors and excavation (where applicable) no deeper than 300mm at Matroozefontein
Site: Farm No 13, Portion 5

Conditions applicable to this Permit:

1. Adequate recording methods as specified in the Regulations and Guidelines pertaining to the National Heritage Resources Act must be used.
2. Adequate recording methods as specified in the Regulations and Guidelines pertaining to the National Heritage Resources Act must be used.
3. A final report, in both digital and hardcopy format, MUST be submitted to HWC on or before **30th of April 2024**
4. An extension to this permit can be granted on submission of a progress report (if work was initiated) and a letter stating reasons for the extension. HWC reserves the right to withhold further permits if progress is not deemed satisfactory.
5. All material collected and excavated, as well as field notes and records, will be curated by the Izikio.
6. Reprints of all published papers or copies of theses or reports resulting from this work must be lodged with HWC.
7. If a published report has not appeared within three years of the lapsing of this permit, the report in terms of the permit will be made available to researchers on request.
8. It is the responsibility of the permit holder to obtain permission from the landowner for each visit, and conditions of access imposed the landowner must be observed.
9. HWC shall not be liable for any losses, damages or injuries to persons or properties as a result of any activities in connection with this permit.
10. HWC reserves the right to cancel this permit by notice to the permit holder.

Heritage Western Cape
Erfenis Wes-Kaap
ILifa leMveli leNtshona Koloni
06 May 2022
APPROVED

Appendix H: Ethics Approval to Conduct Oral Interviews

UNISA university of south africa

COLLEGE OF HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE

23 April 2021

Dear Francois van Lill

Decision:
Ethics Approval from 23 April 2021 to 23 April 2024

NHREC Registration # :
Rec-240816-052
CREC Reference # :
31138551_CREC_CHS_2021

Researcher(s): **Name: Francois van Lill**
Contact details: 31138551@mylife.unisa.ac.za
Supervisor(s): **Name: S. Kharodia Khan**
Contact details: 0124296359

Title: The archaeology of the 1901 battle at Redelinghuys (Vegkop)

Degree Purpose: Masters

Thank you for the application for research ethics clearance by the Unisa College of Human Science Ethics Committee. Ethics approval is granted for three years.

The ***Low-risk application*** *was* ***reviewed on the 23 April 2021*** by College of Human Sciences Research Ethics Committee, in compliance with the Unisa Policy on Research Ethics and the Standard Operating Procedure on Research Ethics Risk Assessment.

The proposed research may now commence with the provisions that:

1. The researcher(s) will ensure that the research project adheres to the values and principles expressed in the UNISA Policy on Research Ethics.
2. Any adverse circumstance arising in the undertaking of the research project that is relevant to the ethicality of the study should be communicated in writing to the College Ethics Review Committee.
3. The researcher(s) will conduct the study according to the methods and procedures set out in the approved application.
4. Any changes that can affect the study-related risks for the research participants, particularly in terms of assurances made with regards to the protection of participants' privacy and the confidentiality of the data, should be reported to the Committee in writing, accompanied by a progress report.

University of South Africa
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge, City of Tshwane
PO Box 392 UNISA 0003 South Africa
Telephone: +27 12 429 3111 Facsimile: +27 12 429 4150
www.unisa.ac.za

5. The researcher will ensure that the research project adheres to any applicable national legislation, professional codes of conduct, institutional guidelines and scientific standards relevant to the specific field of study. Adherence to the following South African legislation is important, if applicable: Protection of Personal Information Act, no 4 of 2013; Children's act no 38 of 2005 and the National Health Act, no 61 of 2003.
6. Only de-identified research data may be used for secondary research purposes in future on condition that the research objectives are similar to those of the original research. Secondary use of identifiable human research data require additional ethics clearance.
7. No fieldwork activities may continue after the expiry date **(23 April 2024).** Submission of a completed research ethics progress report will constitute an application for renewal of Ethics Research Committee approval.

Note:

*The reference number **31138551_CREC_CHS_2021** should be clearly indicated on all forms of communication with the intended research participants, as well as with the Committee.*

Yours sincerely,

Signature : pp

Prof. KB Khan
CHS Ethics Chairperson
Email: khankb@unisa.ac.za
Tel: (012) 429 8210

Signature : PP

Prof K. Masemola
Exécutive Dean : CHS
E-mail: masemk@unisa.ac.za
Tel: (012) 429 2298

Appendix I: Personal Interview Transcripts

B. Biermann

Question 6:

Do you have, or know of any information related to such incident that occurred at Vegkop?

X Yes

☐ No

Please supply any information around this event that is known to you.
The location of the Commando positions on the hill where the skirmish took place was well selected. This location offers a good 'ambush' position from where enemy forces approaching from the south could be viewed and then attacked when in proximity. The access from the north, offers secure cover from being noticed by forces approaching from the south. At the same note, the north access also offers an easy and protected escape route for the ambushing force. The hill itself offers secure positions from where to fire at approaching enemy forces, however, it must be noted that due to the actual extent and size of this location as well as the cover it offers that it was probably not a large force that took in position on this hill. It must also be considered that the attack/ambush force would position some members on and around the hill with several members who had to guard the horses on the northern side of the hill - out of line of fire and ready for the escape in a northerly direction after the attack.

Question 7:

Are you willing to reveal the source of your knowledge around this incident?

X Yes (supply in box below)

☐ No

Source
Visits to the area and part took in the surveying of the location. Numerous books and other notes/discussions about the War in the Cape Colony. I am an ex-military officer, with extensive training and experience in terrain studies.

Question 8:

Can I include you as a source in my thesis and acknowledge you for your contribution?

X Yes (Supply your full name and surname and date of survey in box below)

☐ No

Full name and Surname
Barend Gysbert Biermann
Date of Survey
24 September 2022

Thank you for your participation in this questionnaire. Please forward this survey to 31138551@mylife.unisa.ac.za

B G Biermann

25 September 2022

EJ van Lill

Question 7:

Are you willing to reveal the source of your knowledge around this incident?

☑ Yes (supply in box below)
☐ No

Source(s)
Father EJ VAN LILL Grandfather H van Lill

Question 8:

Can I include you as a source in my thesis and acknowledge you for your contribution?

☑ Yes (Supply your full name and surname and date of survey in box below)
☐ No

Full name and Surname
LYCORHARDUS JOHANNES VAN LILL
Date of Survey
27-06-21

Thank you for your participation in this questionnaire. Please forward this survey to

Francois van Lill : 31138551@mylife.unisa.ac.za

S Boonzaaier

Question 7:

Are you willing to reveal the source of your knowledge around this incident?

☑ Yes (supply in box below)
☐ No

Source
Oupa S., by verby Vegkop met Paskar. Kentyd gestop daar rol.

Question 8:

Can I include you as a source in my thesis and acknowledge you for your contribution?

☑ Yes (Supply your full name and surname and date of survey in box below)
☐ No

Full name and Surname
SAMUEL L BOONZAAIER
Date of Survey

Thank you for your participation in this questionnaire. Please forward this survey to 31138551@mylife.unisa.ac.za

EJT van Lill

Question 6:

Do you have, or know of any information related to such incident that occurred at Vegkop?

- ☒ Yes
- ☐ No

Please supply any information around this event that is known to you.
PART OF THE FINDINGS WERE AN OLD USED POTATO PLOW SHARE THAT I EMEDIATELY RECOGNISED FROM WHAT I USED TO SELL TO FARMERS. FARMERS IN THE AREA OF REDELINGHUYS HAVE LONG AGO STARTED FARMING POTATOES AS WELL, HENCE THE CONCLUTION THAT THE ITEM MENTIONED CAN ONLY BE A SHARE FOR FARMING.

Question 7:

Are you willing to reveal the source of your knowledge around this incident?

- [x] Yes (supply in box below)
- [ ] No

Source
I WAS A PARTS SALES CONSULTANT FOR KLEIN KAROO KOOPERATION WHERE I SOLD THOSE ITEMS.

Question 8:

Can I include you as a source in my thesis and acknowledge you for your contribution?

- [x] Yes (Supply your full name and surname and date of survey in box below)
- [ ] No

Full name and Surname
EVERHARDUS JOHANNES TERTIUS VAN LILL
Date of Survey
30 - DESEMBER - 2022

Thank you for your participation in this questionnaire. Please forward this survey to 31138551@mylife.unisa.ac.za