THE ROLE OF SOCIAL POLICY AND LEADERSHIP IN POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING: THE CASE STUDY OF RWANDA AND LIBERIA

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Glossary of key Indigenous Terms

ABUNZI: A committee responsible for conciliating parties involved in disputes under its jurisdiction. The service of members of Abunzi committee is performed on a voluntary and non-remunerative basis.

UMUGOROBA W'ABABYEYI: Umugoroba w'Ababyeyi,' translated as 'Evening for Parents' is a time when parents from the same village sit together, discuss government policies, and social issues like gender issues, domestic violence, domestic sanitation, nutrition, and family planning, and educate one another in general about different subjects for the sake of families' welfare.

GIRA INKA MUNYARWANDA: The word Girinka itself, (may you have cows) is a greeting model which is more like a blessing upon those you meet. The programme is, therefore, symbolic of giving back value to Rwandans by giving them the most prized belonging in their tradition.

UMUGANDA: Umuganda [community work] means to come together in order to achieve a collective goal. Thus, in Rwanda on every last Saturday of the month people in their villages come together to carry out different tasks to breed harmony in society and improve communal living standards.

IMIHIGO: Originates from the Kinyarwanda word *Umuhigo* which closely translates to mean *a commitment/vow or undertaken to deliver*. The concept of *Imihigo* is presently used as a cultural model of a performance contract for mainly Civil Servants.

INTEKO Y'ABATURAGE: A village meeting/village council.

MUTUELLES DE SANTÉ/ MUTUELLES: Health/Medical insurance

ISIBO: Is the smallest unit of a Village/ *Umudugudu*

MUTWARASIBO: Head of the smallest unit of a Village/*Umudugudu*

UBUDEHE: Refers to the long-standing Rwandan practice and culture of collective action and mutual support to solve problems within a community. The focus of traditional Ubudehe was mostly on cultivation.

TABLE OF FIGURES

ABSTRACT

This thesis examined the future of durable peace in Africa using Liberia and Rwanda as case studies. It did so by examining how leadership emerges and shapes social policy for building inclusivity and addressing the root causes of violent conflicts. Also, the study examined the extent to which the approaches to peacebuilding in both countries are shaping the future of peace using the concepts of Transformative Social Policy and Leadership as process (TSP-L). This study is an explanatory comparative case study. Both countries are chosen due to their similar but 'seemingly' differences in approach and outcome in their peacebuilding efforts. As a comparative qualitative case study, it combines critical discourse analysis, Stuart Mills' *logic of difference* and *process tracing* to systematically understand how the leadership in both countries frame social policy instruments to build inclusive societies as part of their respective efforts at post-conflict reconstruction. Hence, in conducting this study, I deployed qualitative data collection tools of: In-depth interviewing, documentary analysis and observation. Conceptually, this study relies on the theoretical strands and ideational relevance of Transformative Social Policy and Leadership (TSP-L) to analyse the data presented in the study and arguments advanced herein. It engages this conceptual framework to understand how the leadership of both countries are building post-conflict inclusive peace and development respectively. The usefulness of the TSP-L approach is to examine the challenges that post-conflict peacebuilding poses to leaders in their quest to transform the triggers of conflict, which are historically rooted and complex relational practices. Specifically, this thesis examines how the adoption and implementation of social policy instruments such as Imidugudu, and mutual health insurance scheme Mutuelle de Santé in Rwanda; Social Cash Transfer and Free Compulsory Education programmes in Liberia respectively, instigate social cohesion and durable development as part of the ongoing peacebuilding processes. The study makes three key findings: First, the design and deployment of social assistance policy interventions for post-conflict reconstruction in Liberia and Rwanda portray a pro-poor approach to nested issues of post-conflict nation-building. However, in the case of Liberia, this simplification of the development condition is informed by the unidimensional diagnosis of post-conflict reconstruction that frames the crisis of identity, marginalisation, (in)security and development as technocratic and managerial issues fixable by state-centric institutions. Secondly, this study concludes that historical and contemporary factors that occasioned the violent conflict in both countries persist despite the numerous social assistance interventions in the quest for nation-building. Finally, the study concludes that there is a dearth of difference in the (in)ability of the leadership in both countries to translate these social assistance policy interventions into durable nation-building and development ethos that transforms the root causes of violent conflict.

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1.0 Background, Problem, and Justification for the Study

1.1 Introduction: Limits to Liberal Peacebuilding.

This study sets out, as its primary objective, to explain how the problematic of liberal peacebuilding and its attendant state-building praxis in Africa can be ameliorated. It does so by relying on the core ideational elements of Transformative Social Policy and Leadership as a process. My interest is premised on the contested outcomes and relatively low success of peacebuilding interventions on the continent (Chandler, 2013, 2015; Duffield, 2014; Ikpe et al., 2021; Richmond, 2022; 2014). The telos of liberal peace and state-building are to modify the nature of the state recovering from conflict "into rights-observing and rights-bearing subjects in a neoliberal world of self-help, so that local, state, and systemic conflict may be avoided" (Richmond 2018, p. 4). Hence, at the minimum, liberal peace and state-building through the intervention of Western-modelled policy interventions promise to minimise the structural nature of violence, end impunity of elites whose actions are deemed as primarily responsible for violence, and shepherd post-conflict states into viable members of the international system free from conflict and chaos as witnessed in countries recovering from the ruins of violent conflicts such as Liberia, Timor-Leste, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Chandler, 2013; Richmond, 2015, 2022b). Thereby ensuring through the promotion of Western liberal constitutional democracies with its associated institutions to mediate governance, economic and social relations; political aggregation of interests and contestations, and civil and military administration of the political system – a reconstructed liberal state neutral or above its internal contradictions (Richmond 2018, 2022b; D. Chandler, 2013b; Lemay-Hébert, 2009).

Yet these exalted promises of liberal peacebuilding have been confounded by a profound set of implementation challenges even with its draconian policy diffusion methods of "bargaining, bypassing or constraining local elites" (Chandler, 2013b). Constraining state-level institutional mechanisms of evolving autonomous conversations around building cohesive and inclusive societies; and the emphasis on imbibing Western norms and institutional ethos as precursors to development (see Paris, 2010; Richmond, 2011, 2014, 2018) This modus-operandi by the proponents of the liberal peacebuilding agenda problematises post-conflict states as resistant to change or unable to evolve by themselves a viable nation-state entity for incorporation into the global system, hence requiring tutelage from external experts with the requisite knowledge to reform the structures of the re-emerging state and its governance and security architecture (Duffield, 2014; Richmond, 2018). It then follows that "direct, structural and governmental forms

of power [relations] do not recognise the contemporary post-colonial world as autonomously evolving, so they intervene to reshape the state in their own image" (Richmond 2018, p. 5).

Subsequently, Eurocentric avatars continue to dominate the telos of liberal peacebuilding and neoliberal state-building, entrenching the controversies between the universalisation of 'western' norms of relations and non-western worldviews by "perpetuating tensions between universalism versus culture or identity, individual versus collective rights and the liberal construction of citizenship" (Richmond 2014, p.6). In part, this often shapes the western policy understanding of what constitutes *citizenship* and its benefits thereof, and what constitute *peace* under the onslaught of modernisation's globalised agenda (Berdal, 2013; Duffield, 2014; Richmond, 2022,2020,2010; Sabaratnam, 2011a). As Richmond notes, the spaces in which liberal peacebuilding is being experienced are constituted by populations that relate to authority and states merely in terms of their 'being subjects, and often only very distantly' (Richmond, 2014, p.10). However, Western knowledge about power, institutions and norms of relations linearly focuses on rights, institutions, and Westphalia-like states instead of the pluriverse of peoples with complex needs (Chandler, 2015; Richmond, 2001, 2014; Richmond, 2011; Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2015; Sabaratnam, 2011b, 2013). Ostensibly, this is because Eurocentrism conceptualises these peoples and spaces as 'subjects' of a globalised system for which the liberal peace debate thrives (Liden, 2014; Richmond, 2018; Sabaratnam, 2011a; Willett, 2005).

Despite almost three decades of post-Cold War international engagement with liberal peace put forward by the United Nations, the dynamics and symptoms associated with 'failed states' keep mutating (Richmond, 2018, 2022; Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2015; Berdal, 2013). Even so, in the face of mounting evidence in the literature from field studies in the Balkans, South Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mozambique, Timor-Leste, Burundi, among others, each failure of peacebuilding as state-building is covered by its apostles as a characteristic of "local actors and institutions' aversion towards undertaking 'sensible reforms'… rather than of the 'imperfections' such peacebuilding interventions and their epistemic assumptions they themselves apply" (Richmond, 2014, p.10). Peacebuilding as state-building policy intervention is always foregrounded with a 'liberal or neoliberal institutional design': a selection of policy reforms, institutions, and their assumptive norms (Richmond, 2014,2022; MacGinty and Richmond, 2013; Lidén, 2011). Also, this demands conformity from the plethora of local public and private collaborators in post-conflict states. The singular objective of the proponents of the liberal peacebuilding framework is to sustain the global assemblages and regulatory mechanisms to maintain a liberal world order despite the abject nature of structural political and socio-economic inequalities and injustices, contradictory

norms of relations and institutions, polarised identities, and the commodification of interests (Duffield, 2014; Paris, 2010, p. 201, 2012; Richmond, 2011, 2013, 2022b; Sabaratnam, 2013, 2017).

Post-conflict countries are embedded with respective continuums of ontological and historical contradictions, and norms of relations. This provides the space for conversations on context-specific epistemologies of durable peace and inclusive development. It enables local norms of relations to evolve mechanisms for securing order and stability, shapes national interests and a process of leadership emergence that is attuned to the everyday of post-conflict societies. Hence what debates on the policy and institutional intervention for peacebuilding as state-building is the failure of framing peacebuilding as nation-building. The inability of liberal peace praxis to comprehend that people and communities can evolve a conversation on the processes for building peace. Thus, the need to examine the everyday sources of agency and inspiration upon which durable peace can be built. What prevents post-conflict societies from achieving national cohesion and inclusive development? Essentially, peacebuilding as nation-building is a process of accommodation and reconciliation of norms, interests, institutions, and goals, as opposed to the linear and technocratic approach of liberal peacebuilding.

There is a need to reconceptualise how peacebuilding is practised if we assume the task of post-conflict peacebuilding is to transform causes of violence and build a cohesive polity. In this regard, we conceptualise peacebuilding as nation-building that revolves around a process-based leadership approach to effect public policies that is grounded in the everyday realities of post-conflict societies. In a wider sense, social policy incorporates different aspects of public policy to deal with the economic, social, and political basis of human relations and reproduction in a given context or situation. Accordingly, social policy in this study refers to specific policies and programmes adopted by government(s) and policy actors within a definite geographical space. The destructions to human conditions associated with violent conflicts require the use of policy prescriptions to intervene and repair the ruins of war. Hence, social policy as a subset of public policy needs to transform the break-down of norms of relations – socially, economically, and politically to build a durable and inclusive society. Hence, this study relies on the core elements of transformative social policy and leadership as process to provide some insights into building effective post-conflict states in Africa. In doing this, given the mix-record of outcomes of the liberal peace praxes, the study adopts Liberia and Rwanda as poster cases to examine the source(s) of divergences in liberal peacebuilding.

The contrasting nature of these cases provides the basis for exploring the use of social policy instruments and leadership in building effective peace and inclusive development. Both countries are selected as their respective peace-building processes are occurring under the same liberal peace milieu. Also, the peace pacts in both countries that heralded the post-violence peacebuilding sets out to design and implement policies to build inclusivity to avoid a relapse into violence. Among others, the recommendation of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission enjoins the government of Liberia to "build a more just and equitable society in which everyone is equal before one set of laws which guarantees equal protection and opportunity for all" (Republic of Liberia, p. 23), while the revised National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation of Rwanda policy states as its objective: "to build a united Rwanda in which all citizens have equal rights and are free to fully participate in the governance and development of their country" (Republic of Rwanda, 2020, p. 5). Logically, it follows that public policies designed and implemented by the governments of both countries for addressing the root causes of conflict hinges on the desire to forge a new sense of nationhood to vivify the aspirations of all citizens.

To be sure, this framing of social policy in the context of nation-building or building social cohesion in divided territories is to cause peoples to identify with and commit to the nation-state without dismissing their primordial identities. Primordial identifies such as ethnic labels are deeply rooted in the worldviews of groups and norms of relations in a mutating and evolving manner. This influences their inter-relations in the course of the state-making process. In societies where primordial identities have been manipulated and used as currencies to foment atrocities against a particular group, or where violent conflicts have been fought along such fault lines, building nationally cohesive post-conflict states require transforming the causative factors of such violence, especially when they are embedded (pre)historic intergroup relations.

In the broadest sense, Mkandawire views social policy as the "collective interventions directly affecting transformation in social welfare, social institutions and social relations" (Mkandawire, 2001c, p. 1) In particular, he defines social policy as "an instrument for ensuring a sense of citizenship…an important instrument for conflict management, which is in turn a prerequisite for sustained economic development" (Mkandawire, 2001c, p. 12). In reading Mkandawire's views together, the transformative ethos of social policy is premised upon how policy actors devise institutional mechanisms and policy tools to shape human relations and (re)production in ways that erode the fault lines in society. Applying social policy tools to knead social cohesion requires the creation and use of institutions and enabling mechanisms that addresses the mutating and evolving nature of historical grievances and privileges that shape inter-group framings and norms

of relation. Hence, the grievances and privileges that instigate intra-state conflicts are not episodic but rooted in the pre-historic inter-group relations in divided countries.

The post-conflict period presents an opportunity for nation-building – reconstructing the ethos of state-society relations in ways that breeds inclusivity. The reconstruction of post-conflict states presents state-level policy actors with the task of designing context relevant policies or programmes that assuage the previous and emerging contestations in the society by creating an enabling space that secures the living arrangements and livelihoods of peoples regardless of their origins, circumstances, and status in a given territory. Consequently, we understand social policy within the broad frame of public policy in post-conflict contexts as policies aimed at both the institutional and inter-group relational mechanisms that address issues of deprivation, wellbeing, and inclusivity for nation-building. However, the means to achieving these ambitious objectives in both countries is being heralded by policy prescriptions by the donor community under the liberal peace framework.

1.2 Cases: state formation and the historical context of violence conflict in Liberia and Rwanda

1.2.1 Rwanda

State formation is a process in perpetuity spawned by group struggles over property and belonging. Constituent of this is the scope and constitution of social norms and political authority in defining access to resources and citizenship of a polity (Lund, 2016; Southall, 1974; Wimmer, 2013). The ability to determine the conditions for accessing resources by groups together with the power to frame who belongs and who does not, to establish and uphold hierarchies and liberties is constitutive of the fundamental power that shapes state formation (Lund, 2016; Maquet, 1971; Southall, 1974). Hence, moments in the history of the state riven by colonialism, violent conflict, and misrule among others gives insights into how rights and privileges are not end products of formal authority but constitutive of the whole. Subsequently, the violence of colonialism in Africa, the many civil wars of belonging and rights bargain, poor governance among others provide incentives for state formation.

To begin a discussion on the historical emergence of present-day Rwanda, one is readily confronted with the sharp division in the colonial, postcolonial and post-genocide literature on Rwanda. This distinction is even sharper among scholars who self-identify as Hutu or Tutsi given the emphasis they respectively place on the Rwandan narrative (Mamdani, 2001). This presupposes contemporary studies on Rwanda need to be sensitive to constructed identifies or divisions and the use of such labels in understanding the contextual nature of post-conflict

peacebuilding evolvement. Much of the convincing arguments in the literature converges around the claim of Rwandese: Hutu or Tutsi being same, evolving common social norms and spheres of exchange centuries before any form of colonialism emerged to truncate and delineate what has since become the basis of identifying who a Rwandan is (Vansina, 1995). In essence both Hutu and Tutsi have been sharing a single social and economic community regardless of their physical features (Mamdani, 2001; Maquet, 1971; Vansina, 1995). This evolution can be attributed to the two-way cultural assimilation and integration based on a combination of co-optation, corporation or conquest through migration and the exchange of ideas between the distinct communities based on their agrarian predispositions (Mamdani, 2001; Vansina, 1995).

The expansion of small units of habitats of groups of people with virtually the same sociolinguistic characteristics and cultural norms, but with very limited interactions hitherto begun to emerge around the Seventeenth Century more concretely (Vansina, 1994) as "the people called Tutsi, and those who came to be called Hutu, spoke the same language, lived on the same hills, and had more or less the same culture, depending on the cultural zone in which they lived. But they had yet to become one people" (Mamdani, 2001, p. 52). Hence, the process of state formation in Rwanda was occasioned by the growth in clan sizes and the exchange of norms of relation and institutions that cemented the many clans under a centralised authority from the 17th century onwards. Particularly, the exchange of ideas is emphasised in this study due to its fundamental relevance to the rituals, norms and institutions that evolved in weaving together the peoples before the polarization of identity and its ramifications on the present.

The hitherto cultural and economic community of peoples that occupy present-day Rwanda engaged in three different sorts of activities for survival as their environment permitted. Even though most were farmers, some amongst this group also reared a few cattle. However, a sizeable segment adopted sedentary subsistence as cattle herders, land was the property of the *ubukonde* – community, held in trust by *abatware* – communal leaders representing the King (Vansina, 1995). Central to this economic and cultural community of pre-colonial Rwanda which began to crystalise into a polity, was a people who had evolved complementary kin and inter-group communal social and political norms, rituals, and institutions for maintaining social cohesion and advancing economic prosperity through the interexchange of ideas (Mamdani, 2001; Maquet, 1971; Vansina, 1995). Also, while the communities of the hills shared a common family structure, there evolved two distinct political systems based on "lineage territory and principality" that coexisted in a complementary form to order the norms of relations and advance society (Vansina, 1995).

Rwandans were conscious of this unique characteristic of their peoplehood that they decided to have the "hoe as the symbol to stand for the unity of the country in the royal rituals, rather than the royal bull, despite the attraction and the political importance of cattle at the time" (Mamdani, 2001, p. 43). To make effective use of the land to sustain their agricultural engagements on the principle of collective rights for effective land tenure management considered an important aspect of minimising the incidence of conflict and firming the foundation of a political community. Any member of the community from the lineage that first settled who prepared a piece of land became its rightful owner. A direct descendant within the lineage earliest to have settled on any part of the hills was made leader and tasked to mediate a land-tenure-client relationship, "*abagererwa*", with later settlers or their descended. This was done through inter-marriages and cohabitations between the founding lineages and later settlers, and at other times through a blood pact in a clientele relationship of *umuheto* (Vansina, 1995). This communal land-tenure system helped to maintain inter-group cohesion.

Secondly, the political entity that was emerging in a form of a nation-state was one best thought about in "terms of domains pertaining to chiefs, major or small, royal clients, or ritualists" (Vansina, 1995, p. 62). The unfolding political relations were sustained partly through rituals. For the most part, societal cohesion was maintained using rituals to express unity and solidarity among the peoples of the Kingdom. The use of rituals was not just about the incorporation of persons who engaged in menials but also to provide a mechanism for inclusivity for all persons across the Kingdom. The performance of rituals to knit together society was mainly through the many cults housed in shrines. Significantly, the cults proffered some form of 'papal' reverence in legitimating the authority of the King through the perpetual flame and "the place where the cattle are milked" (Vansina, 1995, p. 56). Also, the yearly ritual of the 'first fruits', *umuganura*, premised on the performance of *igicurasi* was an authoritative affair that politically harmonised inter-group relations. This ritual was performed under the auspices of the *Tsobe*. Not much is recorded about the elaborateness of the performance of this annual ritual, although it is believed to have been prominent from the nineteenth century with some form of elaboration over the years. Rituals for the progressive maintenance of societal relations recognised the distinct agrarian bias of each Rwandan. In the words of Vansina, this ritual was:

> at the core of the polity because they expressed the unity of the kingdom and the solidarity of its inhabitants in concrete terms by mobilizing not just workers belonging to the corporations of menials, but also providers of the needed paraphernalia who were scattered all over the realm (Vansina 1995, p. 56).

Similarly, the creation of social and political institutions nonetheless aided the inter-group solidarity of pre-colonial Rwanda. Principally, the institutions of the 'court-capital', the *umurwa*

district, the political *ubuhake* clientele, and a standing army made up of diverse personnel with intersecting loyalty, which later functioned as the administrative machinery of the Kingdom were key to harmonising relations for the progress of the society (see Vansina, 1995). Emphasizing the exchange of ideas as core to pre-colonial Rwanda is useful in illuminating our understanding of the formation of pre-1995 Rwanda, in what was made into a *political identity* in colonial times and transformed into a *polarised* identity (Mamdani, 2001). This is meant in no way to discount the migration debate (Mafeje, 1971, 1995; Rodney, 1972).

Present-day Rwanda is a political muster of the pre-colonial Kingdom of Central Rwanda and adjoining nation-states at the instigation of colonialism (Bornkamm, 2012; Mamdani, 2001; Vansina, 1995). Among others, the Nyiginya Kingdom emerged in the seventeenth century as a concretion between clans, and both old and settled with an administrative system that centralised authority in its Kingship. Mediating the affairs of the Kingdom was done by borrowing from the already existing Kingship system in the region that had evolved and the incorporation of ideas from the different clans within the jurisdiction. Under this system of administration, ritual performance was vested and exercised by a set of specialists, different from those entrusted with secular power. The king was singularly presented as the unifying figure and the connexion between the secular and the spiritual and responsible for ensuring the wellbeing of the public. Like its many contemporary centralised states in Africa, Asia and Europe, the authority and position of the King foregrounded the social unity of the state and was regarded as sacrosanct to both the well-being of all its inhabitants and the viability of the state (Vansina, 1994).

The reign of Ndori consolidated the *ubuhake* patron-client relationship (Mamdani, 2001) that interwove clans to form a whole state-society structure that ensured the success of each great chief linked to the central authority (Vansina, 1994). Institutionally, it had created an effective military organization for the internal organisation and protection of the state. Its defence force was populated "based on hereditary recruitment from lineages living all over the country and linked to the management of lands and herds" (Vansina, 1994, p. 197). This was ostensibly to ensure the effectiveness of a centralized system of rulership. Also, it was an institutional innovation at the time that spurred to involve all units of the society in the process towards achieving the collective good of society by charting "the destiny of the kingdom and truly distinguish it from all others" (ibid). This did not, however, evert the rapturous moments in the history of the kingdom as suffered by other centralised Kingdoms according to history. Thus, the expansion and clamour for wealth power by its aristocracy weakened the leadership base of the Kingdom because of the incessant confrontations, occasioning the fall of the once secured Kingdom. This socio-economic class

emerged from the 'rich' Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi who made up Rwanda. This class-induced cocktail of chaos would affect the stability and development of the Kingdom, from which it barely recovered from, thence into the twentieth century as:

> the triumph of the law of the strongest and its train of troubles, insecurity, and clamour for revenge …causing disputes over succession and untrammelled growth of turbulent elite lineages"; enough to erode the capacity of its military set-up and ritual court that maintained the needed cohesion (Vansina, 1995, p. 197).

The now weak leadership base of the society, the zest of exploitation and disdain for the majority of the populace and the prevalence of humiliation ignited a series of violent conflicts that disintegrated the whole society. The deterioration of the kingdom of Rwabugiri and subsequent ones was so intense that by 1890, it could be described as a society in "total anomy on the verge of an abyss" (Vansina, 1995, p. 197). Then came the turn of colonial imperialism with its sets of disruptions. The colonizer's ways of exercising power, particularly through the divide-and-rule policy, politicised identity and gave impetus to the episodic violence experienced in Rwanda between 1959 and 1993; mainly in 1959-1961, 1963, 1967, and 1973 (Mamdani, 2001). The lack of social grace in colonial policies, ostensibly for ease of rule, exploitation and pillage by German and Belgian colonialists, distorted the evolving social and political system (Mamdani, 2002; Maquet, 1971). Further to eroding the pre-colonial bonds of relations, the politicisation and heightening of invented identities during colonialism contributed to the outbreaks of such violence (Bornkamm, 2012; Mamdani, 2002; Melvern, 2014). Subsequently, these invented colonial identities of Hutu, Twa, and Tutsis are underpinned by the logic of social categorization, self-identification, and socioeconomic comparison. The colonial administration's engraving of difference among pre-colonial Rwandans on the idea of a group sharing or possessing 'dominant' or 'similar characteristics' heightened the in-group framing of 'us' against 'them, evolving into enduring polarised identities after independence (Mamdani, 2001).

The ascription and use of identity by the colonialist as a medium of administration and framing of indigene versus settler as the basis of enjoying the liberties of citizenship, ascribing 'divine' rights to rule on a specific group heightened tensions in inter-group 'relations from about 1896 to 1994, mutating in varying forms and degrees of intensity' (Bornkamm, 2012; Gourevitch, 2015; Mamdani, 2002; Prunier, 1995, 1997). The Tutsi were designated as 'settlers' due to their sedentary nature, the Hutu was native because they tilled the land (Mamdani, 2020; Prunier, 1995; Vansina, 2004). Further, Tutsi considered to have migrated to present-day Rwanda and given land for their activities by the native Hutu, recognised the divine position and rights Hutu King, sealed in some instances with a blood-pact (Vansina, 2004). This was appropriated by the colonialist to confer 'divine rulership' on the Hutu. The pre-independence identity-making and resource

contestations, the failure of colonial and post-independence leadership to avert the politicisation and polarisation of identity and develop a state-society relational mechanism to address the underlining issues of national cohesion between 1958 and 1994 landed in an abyss of genocide (Hintjens, 2008; Mamdani, 2001; Reed, 1996; Vansina, 2004). Such latent hostility is at the core of Rwanda's post-conflict reconstruction.

1.2.2 Liberia

Relatedly, Liberia's history of violence bares some similarities with that of Rwanda. Issues of identity contestation, marginalisation and exploitation of indigenous settlers, 'colonialism', weak leadership characterised the Liberian conflict (Alao, 2017; Ellis, 1999; Shick, 1980). Prior to the resettling of freed slaves from the United States, known as *Americo-Liberians* in 1821, the many nation-states that occupied the interior regions of the territory were exchanging influence with one another as part of state formation processes. The indigens can be categorised into three major ethno-linguistic groups. The Kwa linguistic group – presumed to be the earliest settlers presently consists of the Bassa, Grebo, Belle, Krahn, Kru and Dei. Next is the Mende, the most populous indigenous group comprised of the Vai, Mende, Madingo, Gbande, Mano, Gio, Loma and Kpelle. Finally, the Mel socio-linguistic group is made up of the Kissi and Gola people (Alao, 2017; Olukoju, 2006).

The settled former slaves formed their society with the establishment of an American-inspired political system to organise themselves with no regard to the indigenous population already living in the territory – who equally felt no need to recognise the freed slaves. However, at the turn of the twentieth century, Arthur Barclay the president at the time maintained that "all Negroes inhabiting Liberia are Liberians" (Wrubel, 1971, p. 190), formally conferring second-rated citizenship on the indigenous states. This was ostensibly to shove off the influence of British and French colonialism lingering in the neighbourhood. As history unfolded, the socio-economic inequality created by the freed slaves is indicative of the extent to which the settled slaves and their subsequent generations considered the indigenous population peers in the civic society – and to fully forge a nation-state that accorded equal rights and responsibilities, and the benefits thereof. This became the key trigger of the decades of violence witnessed in Liberia (Alao, 2017; Kieh, 2009; Wrubel, 1971).

Identity-based contestations sparked and intensified in present-day Liberia with the arrival of settled slaves on the coast of Monrovia through the efforts of the American Colonisation Society. Constituting about 2% of the population, this group created American inspired institutions for the

administration of the territory – centralising power among America-Liberians – alienating the indigenous groups with disdain. For about a century, socio-political and economic marginalisation of the indigenous peoples was carried out through the main institutions of the True Whig Party; the Church and the Masonic Temple – "ironically imposing on the local inhabitants the slavish oppression from which they themselves had only recently been liberated in Feudal governance system" (Alao, 2017, p. 6). Therefore, the establishment of Western-style institutions by the America-Liberians raised the issue of citizenship, the nature of governance and inclusive nature of state-society relations; with the majority of Liberians – the indigenous populations – being denied benefits of civic citizenship. For instance, similar to the nature of colonial administration in (West) Africa during this period, adult suffrage and any form of representation in the administration of Liberia was tied to land ownership until the 1980s (Alao, 2017). Accordingly, the America-Liberian government assumed the eminence of *black* 'colonisers over the indigenous communities' (Shick, 1980). The situation was radically different from existing social and political structures and relations of the indigenous peoples (Liebenow, 1987).

The institutionalisation of this exclusionary and abasing system of distributing resources and values would directly fracture the state formation process, leading to the rupture of the Liberian state a century later. The balance of evidence suggests the resettled immigrants, once comfortable, lorded to themselves a divine sense of obligation to rule over their hosts whom they regarded as needing 'civilisation' from their backwardness (Alao, 2017; Rowlands, 2008; Whyte, 2017). According to Whyte, the Liberian government of freed slaves viewed the indigenous people as a ground that needed to "be taught how to perform manual labour, to become industrious citizens and thus, part of the political process" (Whyte, 2017, p.2). This, among others, essentially inspired a feudal governance system that denigrated the indigenes and rarely incorporated them into the emerging society in a functional manner that created a cohesive state. Liberia's First President of slave descent, Joseph Jenkins Roberts, emphasised this as reported by one scholar:

> …the redemption of Africa from the deep degradation, superstition, and idolatry in which she has so long been involved ... lay on our shoulders. The Gospel... is yet to be preached to vast numbers inhabiting this dark continent, and I have the highest reason to believe that it was one of the great objects of the Almighty in establishing these colonies, that they might be the means of introducing civilization and religion among the barbarous nations of this country (Alao, 2017, p. 5).

This vision of colonialism by the America-Liberians can be understood from how the settled slaves adopted a colonizer's mentality to segregate themselves from the indigenous population (Kieh, 2009; Whyte, 2017; Wrubel, 1971). The America-Liberians controlled the entire state socially, economically, and politically wielding absolute power over resource allocation (Alao, 2017; Ellis,

1999; Johnston, 2004; Liebenow, 1969). This situation lasted from the 1860s until when Master Sergeant Samuel Doe overthrew President Tolbert in a bloody coup in 1980 (Liebenow, 1981; Sesay, 1996), resulting in a civil war in Liberia. The socio-economic and political dynamics of state formation that culminated in the violent conflict are rooted in the history of the politics of identities, power relations, and the allocation of resources for the commonwealth. Thus, the inability of the institutional process to mediate the issues of power and authority in forging a cohesive Liberian state –the subject of the violence that ravaged a hitherto prosperous state admired by its peers at the time – is at the heart of its ongoing post-conflict reconstruction. This situation has led to the ongoing reconstruction of a 'new' Liberian state through liberal peacebuilding prescriptions (Alao, 2017; Olonisakin, 2015; Caplan 2005)

1.3 Thesis problem, objective, and questions

The crises of economic, social, and political relations that led to violent conflicts in both Liberia and Rwanda are ever-present, notwithstanding the significant assistance provided through liberal peace-building policy ethos. These challenges are similar to those faced in the immediate years of independence when emerging ethno-linguistic and cultural nation-states were bundled into a civic state without an imagined sense of togetherness (Adésínà, 2007; Adesina, 2011a; Aina, 2004; M. Kpessa, 2011; Mkandawire, 2004a, 2007, 2009). The causes of the atrocities: a massacre and genocide in both Liberia and Rwanda, can be equated to the contemporary problems of civic citizenship, norms of relation and the power relations that underpin state cohesion. This is informed by the kind of policies pursued by both countries' leadership to mediate state-society relation that animates the social contract.

In this respect, the policy-making capacity of the post-conflict state must be seen to function towards the goal of durable reconstruction and inclusive development; its politics must give impetus to institutional mechanisms of the state to administer state-society relations by defining context-specific common challenges with mitigative policy measures that resonates with the citizenry. This embedded function of the state in achieving a balance between social, economic, and political challenges, and choices for the progress of society is a call and challenge of leadership that is fundamental to building peace as national cohesion. Without a leadership emergence based on a process that relates to the experiences of society, peacebuilding as nation-building suffers from the pre-violence crises of relations of reproduction that shape state-society relations.

The UN adoption of the *Agenda for Peace* happened together with the end of the Cold War, that brought into prominence *liberal ideology*. This has now become the ideological foregrounding of

peacebuilding policy practices as envisioned in the agenda for peace (Sabaratnam, 2011b). Although Africa is not the only region that has experienced violent conflicts, it has been the focus of several UN-led peacebuilding programmes since the early 1990s, leading to different outcomes of peacebuilding missions on the continent (Berdal, 2003, 2017b; Duffield, 2014; Denney & Barron, 2015; Richmond, 2022a; Richmond & Pogodda, 2016).

Conflicts erupt due to the prevalence of 'structural violence' in a country – the set of issues that systematically affect a people's right to attain their full potential within the socio-political space (see Galtung, 1964). As argued by Adésínà (2007), among others, the "widening sea of human vulnerability and deprivation... questioning fundamentally the legitimacy of the state serves as triggers of conflict" (Adésínà, 2007, p. 24). Hence, the task of peacebuilding as nation-building is for the leadership of a country to frame, design and implement policy tools and initiatives that address the historical and structural causes of violence to the least possible level. This way, the leadership is able to instigate the social, political and economic conditions that nurture inclusive peace – socioeconomic and political relational ethos that breed 'conciliation and cooperation' for the common good (Cox, Sisk and Hester, 2017; Olonisakin 2017; Richmond 2009b Duffield, 2007). The extant literature on peacebuilding primarily focuses on state-building as peacebuilding; enhancing the capacity of the state to perform its Weberian function (see Richmond 2018,2014; Chandler, 2013b; Paris, 2010; M. Pugh et al., 2016). However, recent studies have argued theoretically and normatively about the importance of the 'social' (see Cocozzelli, 2014; 2009; Ezeanya-Esiobu, 2017; Mustafa, 2021) and 'leadership' (Olonisakin, 2017; 2015) in building durable peace and inclusive development.

Within the policy community, concerns have been expressed by the African Union, United Nations and other international organisations on the need to bring back the 'social' and 'leadership' into building effective peace and development (African Union, 2006; UNDP, 2012; World Bank, 2009, 2018). Occurring during the post-Cold War global order, both countries share similar experiences with violent conflict (Alao et al., 1999, p. 199; Clark, 2014; Lucey & Kumalo, 2017; Olonisakin, 2003). Yet their attempts at post-conflict peacebuilding and development have taken different trajectories in their quest to ameliorate the contextual structural issues that occasioned conflict in reconstructing society and bring about inclusive development (Berdal, 2003, 2017; Clark, 2014a; Duffield, 2007; Richmond, 2013, 2019).

The main aim of this study was to understand the process of peacebuilding in post-conflict Africa using Liberia and Rwanda as a case study. The study examinedthe role leadership in post-conflict countries plays in shaping the process of peacebuilding through the use of social policy as a sub-

set of public policy. And how transformative social policy tools can be adopted to address the shortcoming of the liberal peace approach. This doctoral study, as a point of departure, compares the peacebuilding approaches in Liberia and Rwanda through the lens of leadership and social policy to explain the degree to which post-conflict peacebuilding has been successful as nation-building. As an explanatory study, I systematically examine the role of leadership and social policy in building durable peace and inclusive development in Liberia and Rwanda (Adesina, 2011; 2007; Mkandawire, 2004, 2007, 2009; 2017; Olonisakin, 2015).

The aim of this study was to *understand the pursuit of peacebuilding as nation-building in post-conflict Liberia and Rwanda.* Subsequently, the central guiding research question is: *how have leadership and social policy shaped inclusive peacebuilding and development in Liberia and Rwanda?*

The guiding supplementary questions are:

1. What context-specific realities define the aspiration for peacebuilding as nation-building in Liberia and Rwanda?

2. How are the non-coercive state efforts as components of peacebuilding in Liberia and Rwanda addressing the root causes of conflict?

3. To what extent is leadership and social policy shaping the quest for durable peacebuilding in Liberia and Rwanda?

4. How do the different paths to peacebuilding as nation-building in both Liberia and Rwanda explain present socio-economic outcomes?

The awareness of a process approach to building inclusive peace should encourage policy actors, both local and international, to refrain from the linearity of thinking about what constitutes peace (Chandler, 2013b; Richmond, 2018). As Mac Ginty notes, liberal peacebuilding as state-building employs linear approaches that ignore the local relational and contextual aspects of building effective peace (Mac Ginty, 2011). Körppen and Ropers have argued: "systemic approaches understand phenomena as an emergent property of an interrelated whole; hence, a phenomenon cannot be fully comprehended by analysing its constituent parts" (Körppen & Ropers, 2011, p. 13). Thus, understanding peacebuilding as a series of context-specific state-society conversations about defining and attaining societal goals crucial for this study. This way, it suffices to emphasise three issues. First, context is the structural embodiment of power relations in defining norms of relations. Hence, context raises issues about power and authority in kneading a cohesive state that constantly responds to everyday contestations in a transformative manner. Effective peacebuilding policies must comprehend means of ensuring progressive mechanisms to deal with the range of

economic, social, and political needs and constraints of the post-conflict society (see Richmond 2020,2011). Secondly, power and authority, in this case, normative power in the Foucauldian sense of governmentality, should operate in a subtle manner through context-generating knowledge and discourses, norms of relations and institutions. Defining state-society conversation this way places the population of the post-conflict state at the core of the processes of inclusive peacebuilding. Thirdly, the need for what Richmond refers to as "subaltern power, in which critical agency offers discursive political challenges, resistance and everyday patterns of activity are able to some degree at least to subvert both forms of power" (Richmond, 2014, p. 17). Animating the circulation of power and authority among citizens within the web of relations in society rather than unidirectional, top-down, or bottom-up, is useful to the process of building cohesive post-conflict societies. This is contingent upon progressive power relations and political mechanisms for animating public reasoning in post-conflict societies.

This version of the diffusion of power and authority offers a means to producing peace that reflects the legal basis of legitimacy upon which policy and political actors 'ideally' operate. In the Weberian sense, it is the legal-rational basis wielding control over the means of violence and its constitutional objects in conformity with liberalised international norms. If this is the basis for recognising state authority and legitimacy, then it stands to reason that power, authority and legitimacy are more legitimised in a society when it is resourced contextually. This is shaped by the generality of rules and institutions evolved by a people over a period akin to their collective experiences (see Autesserre, 2017; Gruber, 2000; Liden, 2014; Richmond, 2018, 2019; Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2020; Woodward, 2011; Zartman, 1995).

This sociological view of transformative peace reflects the importance of the locale. The polity, in this sense, is an embodiment of conversations through contestations, with the goal of building general agreements about how to evolve or institute mechanisms for the exercise of public authority that creates the necessary space for self-actualisation and the collective security of the citizenry. The basis for inclusive peace and transformative development. A prerequisite for state to engage purposefully socially, politically, legally, and materially among the comity of nations.

The current peacebuilding and development challenges in post-conflict societies such as Liberia and Rwanda are deeply rooted in the hostile historical nature of state formation, making peacebuilding a complex process which liberal peacebuilding templates barely comprehend and respond to. As such, current liberal peacebuilding policies continue to reflect various colonial policies, practices, and political reconfiguration that contributed to the institutionalization of conflict, marginalisation, poverty, insecurity, and underdevelopment. Peacebuilding broadly

encompasses far-ranging set of policy initiatives for dealing with the immediate consequences of violent conflicts by various institutional and non-institutional actors at the community, national, and international levels (see Richmond 2022,2014; Berdal, 2017a; Chandler, 2013a; Call & Cousens, 2008). The fundamental aim of peacebuilding is to 'identify and support structures' that advance freedom from fear and want and consolidate efforts at achieving holistic well-being and a sense of national cohesion (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Galtung, 2011; Richmond, 2013; Simonsen, 2004). Accordingly, the African Union defines peacebuilding as measures that "address the needs of countries emerging from conflict, including the needs of affected populations; prevent escalation of disputes; avoid relapse into violence; address the root causes of conflict; and consolidate sustainable peace" (African Union, 2006, p. 4). Thus, Peacebuilding in this study is conceptualised as nation-building that thrives on transformative social policy prescriptions – the "collective intervention in the economy to influence the access to secure adequate livelihoods and income" for the collective good (Adésínà, 2007, 2011; Mkandawire, 2004a, p. 1).

Equally, political leadership plays a crucial role in articulating and implementing policies to for state reconstruction and nation building aimed at achieving the collective will and aspirations of the citizenry. As noted by Olonisakin, it is important to "pay attention to how leaders frame the relational dynamics between them and the citizenry in post-conflict settings" (Olonisakin, 2015, 2017). Hence, Peter Northouse defines leadership as "a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal" (2010, p. 3). Reading from the extant literature, leadership crystallises around four main perspectives as espoused by Grint (2010b, p. 4):

> *Position-based* – it is where leaders operate that makes them leaders.
> *Person* – it is the traits; physical and cognitive characteristics that make a person a leader.
> *Results approach*: the achievement of individuals makes them leaders.
> *Process approach*: how people get things done is what makes them leaders

In this research, I rely on the *process approach* to leadership. Conceptualising *leadership as process* provides an encompassing framework for understanding the contextual factors that enable a person to assume a leadership position and be effective. Therefore, leadership as the "process of legitimacy-building where individuals emerge to interact with the citizenry (followers) and give meaning to a common problem while exhibiting capability for addressing such goals" (Hollander & Julian, 2008; Northouse, 2016; Olonisakin, 2017).

Existing studies on Rwanda's peacebuilding and development processes point to it being anchored on state-led developmentalism (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Golooba-Mutebi, 2008), driven by a 'strong-man' rule (Reyntjens, 2013; Thomson, 2018a). Similar studies on Liberia suggest its reconstruction and development efforts revolve around the liberal peace template (Alao, 2017;

Shilue & Fagen, 2014). As an explanatory comparative case study, both countries are chosen due to their similar but 'seemingly' differences in approach and outcome in their peacebuilding efforts. According to Mahoney and Rueschmeyer (2003:6) the resort by social scientist to comparative case study research is "oriented towards the explanation of substantively important outcomes; through causal analysis, emphasis on process over time, and contextual comparison". This methodological approach has been used in a multiplicity of social science studies to "understand the origins and trajectories of Welfare (under) development in many parts of the World, and to examine the processes of state formation and building in Africa, Latin America, and Asia among others" (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003, p. 6). Therefore, to understand the processes of peacebuilding aimed at addressing the root causes of 'settled' conflicts to prevent the risk of relapse and generate insights for wider application on the continent, the study chose Liberia and Rwanda. They are useful poster cases for drawing lessons on peacebuilding to inform policy at the broader level due to their underpinning historical dynamics and contemporary differences to post-conflict reconstruction though present 'post-cold war neoliberal' economic conditions. The study offers insights on building inclusive peace and development and adds to the body of literature on post-conflict peacebuilding, social policy, leadership and development.

1.4 Ethical Note

This study was commenced after Ethical approval was granted by the College of Human Sciences, at the University of South Africa (UNISA). This required I adhere to all necessary procedures and requirements of my field research in compliance with credible standard procedures established within the academic community. To this end, I can affirm that no respondent was coerced and/or enticed with monetary or other incentives to participate in this research. Prior to conducting interviews, considerable time was spent on explaining the details of the research as stated in the briefing note that was read out to research participants in both countries in the language they were most comfortable with, primarily English and Kinyarwanda. I was cognizant that the larger portion of this research involved interviewing persons of varied backgrounds and experience with the war in both Liberia and Rwanda. The study adopted the necessary protocols to protect the identity, dignity and honour of the persons interviewed, given the sensitive nature of such spaces. The consent of participants was sought before the commencement of interviews to solicit their considered opinions on the core issues being examined in this study. Information provided by my participants in this study was exclusively used for the arguments, analysis or explanations contained in this study. However, participants were encouraged to feel willing to opt out of our interaction(s) as and when it became necessary to them.

Also, a provision was made for respondents who wanted some time off in the course of my interviews with them. This study is an attempt to understand the nexus between leadership and social policy in post-conflict peacebuilding as nation-building. Hence, the need for emphasis on the voices of respondents. Respondents were encouraged to express themselves on their lived experiences with regard to the ongoing peacebuilding efforts in their respective countries. The study was conducted by placing the researcher as a learner in the scheme of affairs to understand how respondents consider their lived experiences. Accordingly, it is not merely to associate meanings and put interpretations to citizens' lived experiences in the post-conflict context. The anonymity of respondents was also protected at all times during this study, with all information gathered treated sensitively and confidentially to protect their respective identities. All persons who took part in this study were pre-informed of the research before the commencement of any conversation. Participation of all persons interviewed for this study was non-mandatory, and there was no compulsion whatsoever applied. Also, all formal ethical requirements of the University of South Africa were adhered to without compromise during the conduct of this study.

1.5 Study limitations

This study encountered limitations which were mainly linked to the global COVID-19 disruptions which were followed by restrictions that were out in place by different countries. In Liberia, while the data collection happened just after the restrictions on movement had been lifted, there was still partial lockdown in many government offices. This meant that access to respondents was delayed and, in some cases, postponed. In one instance, a meeting scheduled with a ministry official in Liberia was cut short as the officials had to respond to COVID-19 related cases. Despite these challenges the researcher managed to adjust and work with the schedule of the respondents. By the time the second wave of COVID-19 was announced in Liberia, it was found necessary for the researcher to leave the country. Further follow ups were done via phone calls or through internet-based calls, a method that was useful to fill the gaps due tothe challenges mentioned above.

For Rwanda, approval for entry and authorization to conduct in-country research could not be obtained. In October 2019 the researcher sought to know the requirements needed to get this approval including affiliation to a Rwandan based institution. The process took long to complete and after consultations, it was agreed that the services of a research assistant be solicited to support data collection. The decision to engage a research assistant was also informed by conversations with researchers who either lived or had experience working in Rwanda who indicated the complexity of getting approval to conduct research in Rwanda. One contact informed that, to get approval from government, I needed to change or amend the topic of my study given that the topics

of inquiry – especially the leadership aspect is a sensitive one in the country at the moment. This challenge is not new as other studies in Rwanda have highlighted the complexity of obtaining approvals and the research processes (Beloff, 2017; Finn, 2018; Ingelaere, 2012; Jessee, 2012; Thomson, 2010). Equipped with this information from different sources, the researcher discussed with the research assistant about the best way to approach the data collection process. Additional follow ups and debriefs were helpful in coordinating the data collection process.

1.6 Outline of the study

The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part, inclusive of this chapter, comprises of four chapters: this introductory chapter that presents the background and central research problem guiding this study. It then gives a historical background and a justification for the study. The remainder of the front end discusses the pertinent literature for the study, while situating it within the set of concepts adopted to situate this research. This section also explains the approach used in conducting this study.

Chapter Two: Methodology and approach to the study. This thesis employs interdisciplinary approaches to understanding the role(s) of leadership and social policy in nation-building. And in this chapter, I discuss the methodological approach of the study. It begins by discussing qualitative comparative case study as a methodological approach in the social sciences and its usefulness to the present study. The assumption of this study is that implicit in post-conflict peacebuilding is the task of nation-building that requires the deployment of social policy instruments rooted in the social contract that mediates state-society relations to guarantee universal access to social and economic goods to all sections of the society.

Hence, the study adopts an explanatory comparative case study approach in social science research to understand the nexus between leadership, social policy, and peacebuilding as nation-building. It combines two methodological approaches – Stuart Mills' *logic of difference* and process tracing. Process tracing will be used to trace the causes – issues, and actors that influenced the eruption of conflict. This will help examine the views expressed by respondents against the causes of conflict and ongoing attempts at peacebuilding. Linked to process tracing, the logic of difference method is used to unpack the difference in approach to post-conflict peacebuilding in both countries by examining sources and relevance of social policy and leadership in the ongoing peacebuilding outcome in Liberia and Rwanda. To help in fusing the two methods adopted for this study, the ideational approach to knowledge generation by Parsons (2007) in analysing the field data in waving the arguments that would constitute the main chapters of the study to enhance our

understanding of peacebuilding as nation-building. Next, I detail the specific qualitative data-gathering tool: In-depth Interviews, Focused Group Discussion, and Content Analysis of secondary materials such as police statements, newspaper articles, online videos, published texts books, journal publications and other scholarly materials used for sourcing the necessary information for analysis in this study and my reflections on same. Also, the chapter discusses how the methods adopted in this study are used to assemble the necessary information to construct the arguments in each of the subsequent chapters of the study. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion.

Chapter Three: Literature Review and Conceptual framework for the study. This chapter discusses the pertinent literature that relates to this study and the key concepts in this study that relate to leadership and post-conflict peacebuilding: *peace-formation – leadership as a process – social policy* around which this study attempts to understand the divergence or otherwise in post-conflict reconstruction in Liberia and Rwanda. The section begins with a brief historical background and institutional evolution of peacebuilding and its liberal character. It then proceeds to discuss what liberal peacebuilding is in contemporary times or what it has come to mean, and the institutional dynamics of liberal peace efforts in sub-Sahara Africa. In discussing the relationship between these concepts, the chapter delves into how the political system evolves mechanisms and institutions to mediate state-society relations in divided societies. How such political processes shape the emergency of leadership and public policies in kneading together the conflicting demands within the political system to ensure an inclusive society. How do such political arrangements and socialisation in divided societies frame issues of belonging, identity, participation, and authority as the basis for inter-group relations? How does social policy as an aspect of public policy function in such divided societies? How transformative can social policy be for inclusive peace and development? Social policies do not originate and function by themselves. They are products of institutional and political processes to respond to the aggregate risk faced by the polity and its citizen. Also, they are partly products of leadership, and as exemplified by the early post-colonial period in Africa, are foregrounded in the visionary agenda grounded leaders and how they seek to address conflicting issues of the norms of (re)production, equality, and solidarity for the common good in the post-colonial civic state. Partly, I will also discuss how the current claims and framings of issues of peacebuilding by the international community to support or direct efforts at peacebuilding in post-conflict societies are characterized by technocratic assumptions of what constitutes peace and how it should be built devoid of contextual realities that underpin inclusive development and nation-building.

As such, how the post-conflict setting evolves process for leadership emerges in both polities will be discussed. Also, how does the emergency of leadership in such post-conflict settings shape the framing of inclusivity and sustainable peace in the formulation and implement policies to transform the basis of (re)production in ways that repair, reconstruct, or transform the triggers of conflict? Hence, to build an inclusive and progressive society, it is crucial to understand how the non-coercive functions of the emerging post-conflict state underpin emancipatory peacebuilding that minimises, to the barest minimum, the prospect of future conflicts. From this perspective, I argue that the standardised logic of (neo)liberal peacebuilding as state-building, characterized by its peculiar, received wisdom of what the modern state, animated by a political system, should be, lacks an understanding of the contextual realities in such polities as Rwanda and Liberia, and its constituents to enable the building of effective peace and inclusive development.

Secondly, the conceptual section of this chapter examines the assumptions of liberal peacebuilding prescriptions. This section focuses on why liberal peacebuilding efforts have been elusive and tend to perpetuate practices with the potential of re-igniting violence. Therefore, mainstream technocratic peacebuilding ethos goaded by modernist rationales and assumptions in such an active polity leads to policy misfit and further crises. Without barely understanding the locale, the liberal technocratic peacebuilding policies are characterized by implementation difficulties that barely address the root causes of violent conflict. Next, this chapter provides a conceptual framework that draws on the assumptions of *Leadership as process* and *Transformative Social Policy* that would guide subsequently the analytical chapters of the study.

Chapter Four: Issues in post-conflict nation-building in Liberia and Rwanda. This chapter discusses the contemporary nature of both cases being compared in the context of the everyday realities of citizens and how the nature of the political system is shaping peacebuilding practices for inclusive development. It begins with a brief historical sketch of the conflicts in both countries and measures aimed at addressing them. This gives readers insight into where the two countries find themselves presently in their peacebuilding efforts. The focus here is to examine the socio-economic lived experiences of the citizen in both societies, the nature of the polity through evolving political relations and how this shapes appraisal(s) of inter-group relations. This section is largely constructed through the lenses of individuals' perspectives as captured in the interviews conducted for this study. This gives an account of the contextual realities of the ongoing peacebuilding practices in both spaces from how citizens self-appraise their lived experiences. The aim of this chapter is to empirically tease out their circumstances in relation to the efforts of governments. The chapter answers in detail the first question outlined in this study: *What context-*

specific realities define the aspiration for peacebuilding, as nation-building in Liberia and Rwanda? I posit that the post-conflict efforts at reconstructing society for inclusive development and durable peace in Rwanda and Liberia are influenced by their historical relational antecedents, constituting an inevitably complex problem.

Since the contentious issues of violence are rooted in historically shaped adverse social framings and relational practices. My argument here is that the rationale of liberal peacebuilding through its technocratic policy prescriptions has reduced the complexity of the post-conflict Liberia and Rwanda. Thus, the need to focus on peacebuilding as nation-building that requires leadership to move beyond the simplistic problem-solving or technical solutions to focusing on nation-building through transformative social policy tools. The driving approaches through which inclusive peace and transformative social policy prescriptions connect to peacebuilding as nation-building needs to be articulated through empowerment, capacity building, and participation – a situation that has been differently approached by both Rwanda and Liberia. To prove this central argument, selected social policies in health, education, and agriculture will be analysed as vital sectors for development-focused peacebuilding. The chapter concludes by highlighting the implications of liberal technocratic global peacebuilding policy templates on Rwanda and Liberia.

Chapter Five: Social policy as vectors for durable peace and inclusive development in Liberia and Rwanda. This chapter discusses the nature of post-conflict peacebuilding as nation-building in Liberia and Rwanda. The argument in this analytical chapter is woven around the second part of question Two of the thesis: *What is the role of social policy in building durable peace and inclusive development in Liberia and Rwanda?* In answering this question, the chapter looks at how social policies in health, education and agriculture are being adopted and pursued by the leadership in both polities. How are such policies framed, what are the ideational underpinnings of such policies? How can transformative social policy prescriptions assist with policy efforts at reconstructing both polities to build inclusivity and ameliorate the root causes of violence?

Chapter Six: Leadership as process for peacebuilding as nation building Liberia and Rwanda. This chapter discusses the nature of post-conflict peacebuilding as nation-building in Liberia and Rwanda. The argument in this analytical chapter is woven around the second subsidiary question of this thesis: *To what extent is leadership and social policy shaping the quest for durable peacebuilding in Liberia and Rwanda?* In answering this question, the narrative here begins by constructing the nature of post-conflict peacebuilding as nation-building through the lenses of leadership. It maps how leadership has emerged in both countries, the processes for legitimacy building between leaders and followers for the collective good. It continues by

analysing how this animates power relations and participation, and how they and the reproduction of society.

Chapter Seven: Accounting for the sources of divergence in post-conflict peacebuilding outcomes in Liberia and Rwanda. No two polities are the same, so are public policies and outcomes. This chapter will tease out the observable contradictions in the policies choices pursed to foster nationalism, durable peace, and effective development in both countries. The chapter revolves around the fourth sub-question: *To what extent do the different paths to peacebuilding explain the socio-economic outcomes in Liberia and Rwanda?* This chapter discusses the underlying factors of such contradictions in the outcome of the ongoing peacebuilding project in both Liberia and Rwanda. I tease out the contradictions in the construction of leadership and the use of social policy in both countries. I further argue that liberal communal or individualistic-oriented policy interventions and practices that are undergird by rationales of responsibility and autonomy explains the contradictions of current policy defects in both countries. Hence the continuous manifestations of exclusionary practices that caused the conflict in both countries, at the detriment of building durable peace and inclusive development.

Chapter Eight: Conclusion: Leadership and Social Policy in shaping inclusive peacebuilding in Liberia and Rwanda. In this chapter, I return to the central question of the study: *how do leadership and social policy shape inclusive peacebuilding and development in Liberia and Rwanda?* to assess the feasibility of peacebuilding as nation-building from the perspective of leadership as process and transformative social policy in post-conflict societies – Liberia and Rwanda. The next section of this chapter focuses on the concluding notes of the study in which I provide a summary of the main issues and findings of the study, key contributions to the existing literature and areas for further research in post-conflict peacebuilding, transformative social policy, and leadership as process. The chapter concludes by discussing the inevitable limitations of the study.

2.0 Methodological Approach to the Study

2.1 Introduction

The intention of this study is to comparatively examine how social policy and leadership influence the quest for nation-building and inclusive development in post-conflict Africa with Liberia and Rwanda as case studies. It aims to flesh out our understanding of how the quest for inclusivity is being pursued in post-conflict polities after violent conflicts have ceased and the leadership process that shapes the framing and implementation of social policies as a sub-set of public policy in Liberia and Rwanda. As a qualitative comparative case study, this research employs qualitative modes of social inquiry to examine the process through which leaders emerge and exchange influence with citizens in post-conflict societies using public policy mechanisms to animate social contract. Therefore, to help adequately address the above questions, the research adopted a comparative qualitative methodological approach grounded in the Social Science tradition of knowledge production. This chapter discusses how qualitative research tools were adopted in conducting the study. The first section discusses comparative case study in the social sciences and its relevance to the present study. I then proceed to describe research design, how respondents were reached to solicit their views. Next, is a discussion of how the data generated from respondents' views are processed and analysed to answer the research questions. Lastly, the chapter highlights some challenges faced during the conduct of the study and how these were mitigated to ensure the integrity of the study outcome. The final section contains the conclusion of the chapter.

This study utilises a qualitative research design to understand the implicit complex and contested undertakings of post-conflict peacebuilding as nation-building, focusing on how the leadership of both countries are adopting social policy practices to this end. I adopt a comparative qualitative case study approach. According to some scholars, the alterations or shifting 'beliefs and behaviours of policy actors are constitutively embedded within networks of knowledge expertise as well as within localized socio-institutional spheres' (see Peck & Theodore, 2012; Theodore et al., 2011). Hence, policy framings, tools and "designs are immersed in intricate and evolving social constructions instead of concretely fixed objects" (Kavalski, 2009, 2012, p. 23). This draws attention to the fact that 'internationalised' peacebuilding ideas and practices involve public policy-making mechanisms that reflect the outlooks of the actors involved – representing various institutional interests and worldview(s). This way, it was important to interview local policy actors

in the peacebuilding process to understand better their ideational foregrounding that shapes public policy making, together with accessing frameworks and discourses that drive institutional policy actors and their interventionist activities in post-conflict reconstruction.

My chosen methodological perspective is directed by my understanding that focusing on the results of peacebuilding policies or programmes without paying attention to context-specific processes to illuminate or clarify our knowledge of peacebuilding outcomes is deficient. Hence from my methodological approach, the study sites of Liberia and Rwanda are unpredictable and precarious, generating several kinds of negotiated settlements, orders, inclusions, exclusions, and contradictions. Also, these spaces are nebulous; thus, assuming linear interconnection of distinct sectors is far from reality. Accordingly, we can safely suggest the plausible implication of peacebuilding policy interventions defy linear or straightforward ways of doing (Kavalski, 2009). This way, conceiving peacebuilding outcomes requires an examination of the content and origins of the ideas that lend support to peacebuilding policy practices, interventions, or programme, particularly the unstated assumptions or rationales behind the policy prescriptions. With this background, the methodological position adopted for this research is a critical interpretivist approach. This is adopted to question the pure scientific, one-dimensional, or liberal frame currently in use. Due to the complex, precarious and constant state of reconstruction, it is my understanding that researching post-conflict contexts should not rely on a scientific tradition that has objectivity as one of its cardinal goals. Especially, as a methodological and philosophical approach which emphasise the study of social phenomena independently of societal norms of relations. In addition, the scientific tradition is undergirded by positivistic ethos of knowing, by producing ways of researching for general application in contrasting contexts. Consequently, particular societal divergences (history, political systems, experiences with colonialism, among others are inconsequential. The disregard for the contrasting nature of societies by the scientific tradition can be ascribable to its fundamental presuppositions of uniformity and regularity of peoples' lived realities and their underlying conditions, even when deployed in very diverse polities. Also, the positivist methodological approach suggests there are 'observable regularities in nature that can be described from linear patterns to established causes or effects' (see Moses & Knutsen, 2007; Searle, 1995).

Also, fundamental to the interpretivist approach is the key roles of researchers and their social relations in shaping what is studied. By implication, all knowledge is contextually produced and constructed (see Flyvbjerg, 2011, p. 303; Stake, 2005, p. 452). Writing in defence of the interpretive research approach, Guba and Lincoln (2005, p. 204), and Mabry (2008, p. 216)

separately draw our attention to the ontology of subjectivist epistemology which makes meaning-making a socially constructed activity. This ontology of knowledge creation that undergird the interpretative approach to studies in the social sciences de-emphasises foundational truths, as it assumes that reality is not merely a foundational reference point. As a result, for me to scrutinize broader and fundamental exposures of human life in different post-conflict settings I utilised diverse interpretative techniques. This relates to institutional powers, social relations, between-group contestations, insecurity, poverty, and the nature of the global political economy of peacebuilding and development policy practices. The major issues that my study contends with are not set in values or tenets that may be considered *a priori*. In this regard, Lash (2009) thinks this as critical to the ways of knowing by social science researchers, where the 'pertinence of the experiences of people living in unpredictable social systems' that are uncertain, precarious and the 'near' perpetual state of fear from want to characterise their daily realities. These lived experiences have a bearing on understanding how social policy and leadership helps to build inclusive development in Liberia and Rwanda. A justification for using the chosen methodological approach in the present research is to better illuminate our understanding of how the leadership of post-conflict polities are adopting social policy tools to shape inter-group interactions for inclusive development. This methodological preference amplifies how I regard the distinctive complexities of post-conflict peacebuilding in Liberia and Rwanda.

2.2 Comparative Case Study in the Social Sciences

The nature of my study sites and the issues being examined necessitate the use of a context-specific approaches. In this case, Berg (2007) and Geertz (1973) are of the opinion that a researcher needs to the adopt an engaging approach relying on one or more illustrative events or conditions to give a detailed and distinct explanation(s) to the issues being researched – hence my reason for deciding to use this approach. Qualitative case studies denote understanding of a 'particular phenomenon as a complete whole' to the best of the researcher's ability, particularly in real-life contexts (King et al., 1994). Understood this way, case studies are appropriate for studies that defy definite boundaries between the issues and the context being researched to enrich our knowledge. A qualitative case study is also useful for studying volatile post-conflict polities and complex issues such as peace, inclusivity, security, policy, leadership, and development to affirm the variedness of lived experiences and their irreducibility to lineal ways of comprehension, statistical predictability, or generalizable variables. Another reason for using a qualitative case study approach for my research is the complicated context of both Liberia and Rwanda and the issues conditioning their instituted processes of peacebuilding as nation-building.

In part, the complexity of Liberia and Rwanda stems from the nature of ethnic group structuring by colonial practices that have shaped postcolonial political, social, and economic arrangements that conditions the eruption of violent conflicts. For instance, Barron, Diprose and Woolcock (2011) utilized a qualitative case study approach to study the conflict-development nexus in evaluating the World Bank's intervention program to aid development of some Indonesian districts severely troubled by the 1997 financial crisis. This enabled them to use process tracing to identify the issues or mechanisms that trigger and nourish conflict or help to resolve it (Barron et al., 2011). Insights from their study illuminates our understanding of the symbolic contestations that define peacebuilding policy interventions. Thus, my study, in part, examines liberal peacebuilding processes or policy interventions. Accordingly, Yin (2009, pp 27-28) suggests the use of qualitative case study as appropriate procedure for addressing "how" and "why" questions which relate to my study. Also, a qualitative case study does not commit to examining phenomena exhibiting any form of proportional change(s) and, therefore, an unscripted means to understand liberal peace-building policy interventions by different Western policy actors. Moreover, the definition of a case study by Gerring as "an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units" (2004, p.342) suggests it can help to unravel pertinent practices which helps to deepen our understanding of the subject matter.

Given that my study sites are Liberia and Rwanda, I specifically adopt a comparative case study approach. This is an established research approach in the Social Sciences (see G. King et al., 1994; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003; Ragin, 1987; Rubinson & Ragin, 2007). Generally, comparative studies of politics and/or society are defined both by their essence – "more than one society or system(s) – and by its method – cross-cultural or national, in-group or between-group comparable cases, etc." (Ragin, 1987, 2000). Therefore, qualitative studies examine the discernible differences of a phenomenon to test assumptions for corroboration or falsification. For the purposes of researchers "to engage in the development, testing, and revision of theory" (Ragin & Rubinson, 2009, p. 13). This comparative case study approach, sometimes called 'small-N comparison', is a particular strand in qualitative social inquiries that allows for description, interpretation, and explanations about social phenomena (see Creswell & Creswell, 2017; Guest et al., 2013; Ragin & Rubinson, 2009). Also, this approach has been used over the years to examine the issues of (under) development and developmental state in Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Scholarships dedicated to the focus on examining state formation and state-building dynamics have oftentimes resorted to this methodological approach (see Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003). Accordingly, Mahoney and Rueschmeyer (2003, p. 6) further note that studies that utilise comparative approaches constitute a "long-standing intellectual tradition in the Social Sciences oriented

towards the explanation of substantively important outcomes; through causal analysis, emphasis on process over time, and contextual comparison". Hence, it helps to "identify the similarities and differences among macro-social units, by relying on the knowledge provided by respondents or informants to understand, explain and interpret diverse historical outcomes or processes, and their significance for current institutional arrangements" (Ragin, 1987, p. 6). Again, Ragin is of the opinion this approach helps in "cross-societal similarities and differences...[between] the different historical experiences, not simply in relations between variables characterizing broad categories of cases" (ibid). However, comparative studies hold some limitations to their scope of practice, particularly, the disposition towards distinctively examining the differences and similarities of cases may lead to interruptions in the narrative of authors as is the case in other conventional forms of research.

In recent times, comparative methodological tools have been deployed in studies that undertake to investigate problems that demands a blend of cases or contexts to adduce evidence and insights for the consumption of its audience. In a way, the use comparative methods for historical studies enables researchers to delve into the past to illuminate our understanding of the present. Hence, such comprehensions are rooted in the histories of the cases being examined, with the aim of universal acceptability (King et al., 1994; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003). Comparative qualitative studies make causal postulations by knowingly choosing and examining cases 'over time and in time' by focusing on 'systematic and contextual comparison of similar and contrasting cases. It allows researchers to embark on establishing, challenging, and revising theory, normally by relying on aspects of both qualitative and quantitative methods to overcome some of the limitations of both approaches. To this end, Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003, pp. 9-13) identify three main features of comparative studies. First, causal arguments are core to the analysis of comparative studies. Causal propositions are deliberately selected and tested. Second, studies of a comparative nature analyse processes that unfold over 'time and in time'. Thirdly, such studies focus on the 'systematic and contextual comparison of similar and contrasting cases' given the centrality of causal explanation(s) (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003, pp. 9–13). This presents research endeavour requires examining interactions between institutional power relations, how this deals with particular segments of society, and how this shapes state-society relations (Niang, 2021). To achieve this objective, I applied qualitative data collection methods, mainly: in-depth interviews and documentary analysis.

To be sure, this study's resort to qualitative comparative case study brings to the fore the diverse contentions and contradictions cognate with the mindset of leaders vis-à-vis the daily realities of

the citizenry in post-conflict countries. How the leader(ship) that emerge in such countries as Liberia and Rwanda animate the social contract to attain collective and inclusive developmental goals. This approach according to Jasny et al. (2021) has featured prominently in research that adopts 'participant engagements in environmentally focused social science research'. Such an approach is argued by Cheah et al (2023, pp. 3–4) as helping researchers in situations where research participants consider certain issues as '"sensitive" or concerning vulnerable communities or sections of a polity and [may] feels anxious, fearful, or restless in expressing their thoughts [about the social issues being explored by the researcher when expressing their opinions'. Since there the tendency for potential respondents unwilling to divulge "sensitive information" or provide desirable answers when soliciting their views, "fearing their identities would be exposed" (ibid). Also, in their study, Lewis et al. (2003) highlight the usefulness of adopting such a qualitative case study approach in researching post-conflict reconstruction or peacebuilding policy practices, for the most part when the focus of the research is to understand the ways in which these policy instruments are constructed, negotiated, and implemented to prevent the relapse of violent conflict. They suggest 'in-depth interviews' and the analysis of material records are of primary importance for collecting data when conducting such evaluative comparative case study research (Lune & Berg, 2017).

2.2.1 Why the use of the Qualitative Research Approach

The justification for my choice of methodology against the use of a quantitative research approach is precisely because it is rooted in linear policy prescriptions typified by quantitative studies on conflict and security such as *Breaking the Conflict Trap*. In this study, Collier et al.'s (2003) adoption of econometric model to study selected conflicts conclude that "resource curses, youth population bulges and low income are the main causes of conflict, insecurity, and underdevelopment in difficult regions." Policy design arising from these recommendations has been proven to be problematic – incapable of addressing the root causes of violent conflicts. As a matter of fact, the empirical studies of conflict-afflicted states such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi, Central African Republic Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Somalia show that market-led policy programmes targeted at the poor have barely addressed the triggers of conflict, let alone the quest for inclusive peace and development (see Richmond 2020,2014,2009; Kühn, 2015; Brauer & Caruso, 2013; Newman, 2009; Pugh et al., 2008; Chandler 2006). The alternative yet may not be decoupled from the research procedures and techniques that fuses contrasting contextual experiences with general descriptive variables. At its core, quantitative studies decontextualise and ignore the norms of relations and historical-political

processes that nourish conflict and underdevelopment in societies recovering from violent episodes of conflict.

Again, there is a suasive demand for researchers to embrace more contextualized ways of undertaking post-conflict studies, which influenced my choice of adopting a qualitative comparative case study approach. This is to enable me to generate context-dependent knowledge that illuminates our understanding of how social policy programmes – a sub-set of public policy – is framed and deployed by leadership in specific post-conflict contexts – Liberia and Rwanda – to achieve the goals of nation-building – minimising the risks associated with the everyday for inclusive peace and development. Thus, Honke and Müller (2012, p. 395) are of the opinion that qualitative case studies help us understand the contradictions between interveners and their policy prescriptions and the local or recipients of these interventions. In their study, they propose the use of this approach to expose the contradictions inherent in peacebuilding policy interventions to falsify the positivistic methodological approaches used by Western donor and policy institutions that dominate the peacebuilding sector – giving salience to external policy prescriptions over context-relevant policy designs – hegemonizing received knowledge. In this regard, they note that resorting to a 'practice-oriented methodological approach, that applies in-depth interviews and observation provides effective explanations that are empirically grounded' (Hönke & Müller, 2012, p.395; also see Lune & Berg, 2017). Thus, they deem qualitative methods best suited for critical qualitative studies than quantitative-driven peace and security studies based on abstracted frameworks and statistical manipulations.

While conducting in-depth interviews and having informal conversations with the many acquaintances I made in Liberia, I made critical observations on the various areas I visited to broaden my understanding and be able to extract in close as possible meanings associated by my research participants to their lived experiences. My use of comparative qualitative case study provided knowledge into the historical developments of trustee-inspired peacebuilding policy interventions. This aided my receptivity to both Liberia and Rwanda, and how I reflected on the colonial-inspired peacebuilding interventions that barely address the causes of violent conflicts in Africa. According to Mabry (2008, p. 217) and Stake (2005, p. 449), "contextuality constitutes an aspect of the dynamism and complexity of a case, which implies that cases are shaped by many contexts, including historical, social, political, ideological, and cultural contexts". Therefore, 'contextuality' in this study is applied with dynamic to connote giving detailed attention to the fluid and diverse expressions of leadership, power, authority, and competing demands in the political system with the fundamental purpose to forge institutional mechanisms that are

responsive to the daily interactions of the citizenry. It follows that contextuality, this research was undertaken in the Liberia and Rwanda. As is the case of other post-conflict countries in Africa, state-society relations in Liberia and Rwanda are shaped by a multiplicity of inter-relations between and among different groups.

This research has benefited immensely from respondents' insights that statistically motivated studies cannot grapple with. A notable revelation originating from my study is the deep silence of discontent that threatens the quest for post-conflict reconstruction that enables inclusive development and durable peace. This silence is equally grounded in the historical development of marginalisation, conflict and insecurity in both Liberia and Rwanda. While recognising the plurality of current procedures for making meaning the qualitative way, this approach benefits from analytic frames of practicality and flexibility of thought for purposes of addressing the central aim and research question of this study. This helped to escape popular understandings to enable 'new' conceptual insights. According to Eakin and Gladstone (2020), the usefulness of such an approach helps the researcher to "assign meaning to data and produce "findings"—all of which are bounded by the researchers' theoretical perspective, bank of knowledge, personal experience, methodological repertoire, creativity, and imagination" (see p. 3).

Additionally, using comparative case studies to offer insights about the usefulness of Transformative Social Policy and Leadership (TSP-L) an alternative framework or approach to pursing effective peace and inclusive development in countries repairing the ruins of violence. This way, we accommodate Karl Popper's falsification rationale against 'positivist conclusions' for which liberal peacebuilding scholarship often thrives on (see Popper, 1962). Given that liberal peace policy interventions rarely achieve its expected outcomes, it should be possible to evaluate the ineffectiveness of liberal peace policies and programme using TSP-L as an evaluative framework, while applying same to the design and implementation of policy instruments for the re-building society and kitting together a 'new' nation out the destructive remains of conflict. Regardless of jurisdiction, region or the historical antecedence of a country in such a situation.

Consequently, my resort to a qualitative comparative methodology enabled me to examine how contextual issues shape peacebuilding policies in both countries to instigate social, economic, and political (re)production of between group relations. How the political system shapes the display of authority, group contestations and demands, historical process of state formation and how post-conflict state-society relations are evolving in both Rwanda and Liberia. Knowledge about these issues offer understanding of how durable peace and inclusive development may be fashioned. Therefore, I conducted this study mindful of the primary analytical objective of comparative

qualitative research meant "to describe and understand human actions rather than merely explain them" (see Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 270).

2.3 Characteristics of participants – Liberia and Rwanda

The detailed characteristics of the participants in this study for Liberia are described as follows. More than half of the interviewees for this study – thirty-six (36) were males, while twenty-two (22) were females. The majority of respondents twenty-six (26) were aged between 25 and 30 years, followed by persons aged between 31 and 35 years – eighteen (18). The cross-section of Liberians interviewed for this study were from different counties representing Grad Bassa, Grebo, Loma, Kru, Kpelleh, Mandingo and Kissi, respectively. Table 1 below illustrates the demography of citizens interviewed and their counties of origin.

Table 1: Representation of the demographic characteristics of citizens interviewed in Liberia.

Demographic Characteristics of respondents interviewed in Liberia	
Respondents	**Total Number of Respondents**
Sex	
Male	36
Female	22
Total	**58**
Age	**Number of Respondents**
25-30	26
31-35	18
36-40	14
Total	**58**
County	**Number of Respondents**
Grad Bassa	10
Grebo	10
Kissi	9
Kru	7
Loma	8
Mandingo	9
Kpelleh	5
Total	**58**

The respondents were located across several places in Monrovia, such as Congo Town, Jallah's Town, Du-Port Road, Paynesville, Redlight, Pipeline community, Shara community and Seye Town. Figure 1 below is a depiction of the specific places where interviews were conducted in Liberia.

Figure 1: Map showing study locations in Liberia.

Moreover, the participants were engaged in certain economic activities. These include self-employed, unemployed, social workers, teachers, nurses, technicians, cashiers, civil servants, and public servants. The views of the cross-sections of citizens who were randomly selected, were solicited to give an insight into the self-appraisal and lived experiences of the primary beneficiaries of the ongoing peacebuilding efforts in both countries. Also, Key Informants, government institutions, particularly the Ministries of Gender and Social Protection, Health, and the Liberian Lands Authority were interviewed to provide insights on their institutional or policy role in peacebuilding. The immediate past head of the Liberian Human Rights Commission and the Former Minister for Foreign Affairs were also interviewed for their knowledge about the ongoing peacebuilding process. For Rwanda, I solicited the views of thirty-four people on their appreciation and perceptions of the current peacebuilding efforts. Out of the total respondents interviewed for this study, nineteen (19) persons – representing the majority were females, while men constituted Fifteen (15). About one-third, ten (10) of the participants were aged between 20-30 years, while seven (7) were between the ages (31-40) years. Only five (5) participants were aged between 61-70 years. Table 2 below is a representation of the demographic characteristics of Rwandans interviewed for this study.

Table 2: Demographic representation of citizens interviewed in Rwanda.

Demographic characteristics of respondents in Rwanda	
Respondents by category	**Number of Respondents**
Sex	
Male	15
Female	19
Total	34
Age	**Number of Respondents**
20-30	10
31-40	7
41-50	6
51-60	6
61-70	5
Total	**34**
District	**Number of Respondents**
Bugesera	6
Gasabo	6
Kicukiro	18
Nyarugenge	7
Total	**34**

Out of the total number of interviewees, eighteen (18) are from the Kicukiro districts, six (6) each from Bugesera and Gasabo districts respectively, and seven (7) from Nyarugenge districts. Also, five local government officials who have direct roles in the implementation of villagisation – *immigudu,* and health, were interviewed. Figure 2 below gives an illustration of the places where interviews were conducted in Rwanda.

Figure 2: Map showing study locations in Rwanda.

2.4 Conducting the study: methods and their application

The views of a cross-section of citizens – survivors primarily the urban and peri-urban areas in both countries. Hence, selection of location(s) becomes primarily crucial when adopting the case study method in comparative studies. Accordingly, to achieve meaningful insights into a phenomenon being researched depends significantly on how the researcher selects the study sites (Yin, 2009). My fieldwork was conducted in the cities of Monrovia and Kigali for strategic and pragmatic reasons, with more interviews conducted in the former than the latter due to the raging political situation, which made it difficult to reach the study site for my kind of study. All efforts I made with my supervisor's support (including other academic friends) to secure access to Rwanda between October 2019 and September 2021 yielded very little results. The institutions we had contacted to assist with affiliation as part of the government's requirements for granting a study/research permit were not favourable to our request. One institution was willing to support our request only if we agreed to drop the leadership aspect of the study. Its main reason was that issues of leadership are equated to the 'persona' of the current president, hence making my research a 'sensitive' one.

The overall, the research design as was initially conceptualised, did not significantly change while conducting the study. I had to employ other approaches to data collection during the fieldwork phase to enable me access the needed information for analysis. To do this, I employed the services of a research assistant in Kigali to assist with conducting interviews with key informants and a cross-section of citizens. The hired assistant was recommended by a colleague from Social Science Research Council-African Peacebuilding Network who had faced similar challenges while

conducting research in Rwanda. To ensure that I had the needed information from respondents, the interview guide was translated into Kinyarwanda by two different Rwandans who had no knowledge of each other. The two translated versions were then given to a third person together with the original English version for cross-checking and harmonisation to sync with the original English version. The standardised version was then used by my research assistant to interview respondents.

Although the spot of data collection in Rwanda slightly differed from that of Liberia, it does not alter the quality of information or the output of this study, rather it adds to the quality of the research outcome, by the availability of diverse micro and macro-level information to help in the reassurance of evidence available for analysis. For instance, while in Liberia, I was able to interview key government officials at the national level, the case of Rwanda was different. This was anticipated in designing the study from the onset, as Rwanda is a nesting place for this kind of research. Hence, the flexibility of the comparative case-study research design allows the researcher to draw on multi-data points across the cases being compared to collect information (King et al., 1994). It is also useful for triangulation and verification purposes (Yin, 2014, pp. 16–17). Which enables the research findings to account for the uniqueness and complexities in the cases to generate rich explanations and theoretical insights that can transfer to other times and places (Flyvbjerg, 2011; Stake, 2003). As Stake notes, this methodological flexibility in designing comparative case study research allows shifts during the research, allowing the researcher to discover other important problems, relationships and events that were initially thought otherwise (Stake, 1994, pp. 240–241). Additionally, King et al observe that this complexity does not make inferences less scientific; rather, "when data is limited, and relationships are uncertain, the biggest payoff for using the scientific inference may produce new answers" (King et al., 1994, p. 10).

The politics of nation-building in countries recovering from violent conflict such as Liberia and Rwanda are characterised by in-group framings in relation to others. As such, labels are devised by groups within the polity to frame others as 'victims' and 'perpetrators' in ways that breed mutual apprehension, guilt, and despondency. However, the process of reconstruction in such societies also embodies hope and the 'promise of never again'. Thus, I examined in comparative terms contradictory empirical cases of Liberia and Rwanda to aid the understanding of the problem(s) of nation-building in countries recovering from violent conflict in ways defy single cases studies. This approach helped me to identify and examine the marked differences or otherwise between socio-political variable together with information supplied by respondents and from other sources. underpinned by Stuart-Mill's Logic of Difference (Mill, 1973). Accordingly,

we are able to appreciate how diverse historical developments influence current institutional arrangements and their outcomes.

Also, my readings and inquiries suggest that Liberia and Rwanda have received significant international peacebuilding and development and security assistance from multi-lateral and bilateral institutions over the years. This is due to the grievous nature of their respective conflicts and its impact on the 'conscience' of the international community. Hence, both sites have remained key places in colonial and postcolonial trusteeship practices and intervention policies of liberal peacebuilding. Significantly, while Rwanda has a 'fairly' homogenous population, Liberia is made up of a large multi-ethnic population, this contrast makes both cases useful for my study. Also, both study sites have experiences with diverse insecurity problems, which continue to threaten their respective liberal peacebuilding processes. Therefore, their selection is befitting in order to provide a suitable litmus test for applying TSP-L. Also, they make useful comparative scenarios in seeking to understand the limits of liberal peacebuilding interventions in Africa.

Beyond this, the nature of historical social relational associated with both countries furnished me with intuitive knowledge to enable me answer the primary and supplementary research questions of my study. As well as to help address the primary aim of this study. In my resolve to acquire discerning information relating to the fundamental focus of my study, I ensured that my participants and key informants are both citizens and persons in some form of official capacity with lived experiences of the conflict, insecurity, (under)development and leadership conundrum in both countries, as well as knowledge and understanding of the peacebuilding policy practices. The key informants or policymakers maybe participants in the peacebuilding process through their engagement in the policy design/formulation, planning or implementation, peacebuilding program/project management etc. For me to interview appropriate key informants for my study, I went through a process of booking appointments for each interview in the case of Liberia. However, given the nature of Rwanda, this was done informally with the assistance of my research assistant. In this case, some of the participants were hesitant to share their views, while others rejected my request outright.

In-depth interviewing – "conversations with a purpose" in which research adopts several posturing to during the interview process to gain deeper insights (Lune & Berg, 2017, pp. 65–66) was applied to the interviews for this study as a conversational process to elicit accurate or reliable information. My use of in-depth interviews was not only to collect information but to examine the facts presented to construct meaning. Given the uncertain nature of liberal peacebuilding and development as conceptualised by policy interveners, as opposed to peacebuilding as nation-building from the perspective of the populations that are recipients of peacebuilding interventions.

Therefore, it was appropriate I conducted in-depth interviews with a cross section of the population to allow me elicit a nuanced understanding of the contextual issues that are germane to peacebuilding as nation-building; and how the leadership of both countries are evolving mechanisms to address them. This is contrary to quantitative methods such as the use of closed or ended questions for conducting surveys. Because to my understanding, this would limit my quest to discern how the assumptions of liberal peacebuilding interventions were articulated through policy diffusion in post-conflict spaces such as Liberia and Rwanda. Importantly, since the research objective is to understand how the non-coercive efforts of the state are addressing the lived experiences of citizens in building durable peace given the differences and unequal nature of power relations, contradictions, and exclusionary practices that liberal peacebuilding polices have come to be associated with. Essentially, the use of in-depth interviews was an appropriate information gathering tool.

I conducted in-depth interviews from among a diverse range of key participants in Liberia and Rwanda. In Liberia, the data collection entailed in-depth interviews with policy makers and, individual interviews and focus group discussions. This included seven (7) key informant interviews; one each from the Ministry of Gender and Social Protection, Ministry of Finance, Human Rights Commission, Lands Authority and, two (2) were from USAID. Further 58 in-depth interviews with a cross section of Liberians   and FGDs (4) selected from the cross section of Liberians in the study sites. Field work was conducted between 08 – 23 June 2021 in Monrovia.

Averagely, the key informant and individual interviews in Liberia lasted for about 1 hour and 20 minutes. The shortest interview lasted 48 minutes, while the longest lasted about 2 hours. On average therefore, interviews lasted for 55 minutes. During the interviews, Participants were asked questions guided by an interview guide. The research led the discussion and questions and recorded the conversation.

The FGDs were conducted for an average 90 minutes. In one instance, one of the focus groups was shorter and lasted for 40 minutes as a result of only 3 out of the 7 engaged in the conversation. The other 4 participants were passive – concurring with the responses given by the other participants. Attempts to have them voice their own understanding of the issue did not suffice. During the FGDs, the researcher facilitated the discussion while a research assistant took notes and assisted in translating from Pidgin to English

Scholars working on qualitative methods have shown the need to limit the length of individual interviews both to ensure the questions are focused but also to ensure such studies do not exploit respondents' time. Further, while FGDs have been fronted as useful data collection methods to gather group perceptions, participants in some cases dominate conversations and in other cases

participants fear expressing alternative views. In both instances it is the role of the researcher to ensure inclusion of diverse voices during the FGDs.

In Rwanda, seven (7) key informant interviews were conducted – made up of *Mudugudu*[1] or Village Chairpersons in charge of Health, Development, Welfare, Cell Executives, and a coordinator of *Amasibo*[2]. Besides, 34 individual interviews were conducted. The average length of the in-depth interviews lasted for about 35 minutes. The longest interview lasted for about 50 minutes, with the shortest recorded being 28 minutes. The interviews in Rwanda were conducted by a research assistant as the Researcher could not secure a permit to conduct the study at the time of data collection. The researcher engaged with the research assistant to think through the study questions and overall research objectives. The research assistant translated the interview guide, which was later reviewed by a Rwandan researcher to ensure that the meaning of the questions was not lost. Throughout the data collection process, the researcher and the research assistant debriefed on the data collection process, discussed challenges and ways to overcome the challenges some of the challenges included selection of the respondents and the challenges of accessing government officials for interviews.

Overall, data collection was conducted with an appropriate interview and FGD guides that focused on relevant questions informed by the central and supplementary research questions. These questions around which my conversation with the research participants revolved included questions about their understanding of inclusive peacebuilding and development, social policy, and leadership – how policies for peacebuilding inclusive peace are determined, how policymakers exchange influence with citizens to identify, define and pursue policies to achieve durable peace and inclusive development. In doing my fieldwork research, the issue of the 'insider-outsider' concerns in qualitative study about the ideal locus of the researcher to obtain insightful information emerged. It became obvious from my fieldwork that being an insider does necessarily increase the ability of a person to gain meaningful data, as the interactive nature of a qualitative methods such as the logic of difference and process-tracing are not tired to a binary designation. Also, given the interactive nature of the interviews, the place of both the researcher and participant alternated during the interviewing process. As an interview may be affected by variables such as respondent's age, marital status, and occupation, locality, or place of origin. Therefore, as muted by Collins (1991) when conducting a qualitative case study, the researcher must endeavour to 'develop an attitude of empathy or caring'. Importantly, in conducting my interviews, I developed keen interest

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[1] The administrative unit at the Village level in Rwanda.
[2] The smallest local or sub-administrative entity below the village level in Rwanda.

in my participants as an *interested listener* and a researcher willing to *incorporate my informants'* views in the analysis of my thesis (Lune & Berg, 2017).

My almost 2-hours journey from the Roberts International Airport via the Monrovia-Kakata highway to Congo Town in Monrovia, where I stayed during my fieldwork. During my many other travels to conduct interviews and make observations of my study location gave me the first impression of the challenges of inclusive peacebuilding and development in post-conflict Libera. This is not very different from that of Rwanda. The scenes of different people enduring deplorable conditions of doing menial jobs and hawking, among other things to meet their daily sustenance against the panorama of the many policy interventions aimed at peacebuilding and development in Liberia. This brought to the fore the inherent liberal peace contradictions I discuss in this study. The discordance of liberal peace interventions affirmed my avidity to understand the conditions of multi-dimensional crises under which the locals lived in post-conflict settings as the desire for improved living conditions. This gloomy spectacle, as I had observed, sustained my purpose to examine the adverse nature of norms of relations, supranational policies, and programme, and processes of state-society relations – the issues that condition the quagmire of post-conflict inclusive peace.

The adverse nature of liberal peacebuilding interventions in relation to the deplorable living conditions actually experienced by the locale re-affirmed my initial aim to examine how the lived realities of post-conflict societies are articulated by leadership to achieve inclusive peace and development. In this regard, I agree with Merriam et al. (2001) that, when carrying out a such an enquiry, it is necessary for the researcher to show comprehension of lived experiences or peoples' states of being in the specific locality of the study. In essence, my research prioritised the poor and marginalized people as they constitute a researchable unit whose perspectives, worldviews, and ways of understanding their daily realities are imperative to the objective of my study. In the course of my study, the cross-section of citizens interviewed in both Liberia and Rwanda consisted of a diverse 'poor' in different localities, and in the case of Libera different counties and ethnic background. In conducting such a qualitative study, it is important to empathise with the local population, while paying attention to the mindset of study participants. But equally important is the need for the researcher to be conscious of his or her presumptions and perceptions, and to constantly rethink existing assumptions, biases and values when analysing information from the field.

When interviewing for a qualitative study, the 'relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee' is fundamental to the quality of the interview process (see Lune & Berg, 2017). Hence

it is important for the researcher to adopt and exercise a sufficient degree of flexibility during the research process. This is as deemed as an important tactic to solicit useful information from relevant participants (Lune & Berg, 2017; Naples, 2003). For a deeper understanding of an interviewee's perspectives when conducting a comparative qualitative case study research, one must endeavour, in addition to other data spots, engage in observation when gathering information. Fundamental to this, the researcher must reasonably create a distance – decouple oneself from the situation being studies. This is essential to for effective observation, to analyse and describe the phenomenon under study to the 'outsider' with a certainty of objectivity. To achieve this, I adopted the position of an 'outsider' considerably while conducting field work in Liberia. However, I frequently interacted community members enabled me to develop a sense of self interest and understanding of their worldview and appreciation of peacebuilding policy interventions in their community. In this regard, I established a cordial relationship with the local residents in communities such as Congo Town in Monrovia – Liberia. Some members of these communities were initially curious about the purpose of my visit and stay. After some interactions, we forged a relationship – myself and the community in which I lived. Also, I remained aware of the imbalanced power relations inherent during my conversations with key informants/policy actors from government institutions or agencies who made efforts to assert themselves while responding to some of my queries. I endeavoured, however, to preside over these interview processes in order to exact sufficient and vital information to enhance the analysis and outcome of my study.

To be sure, it is imperative for a researcher to ensure that his or her data analysis, in a comparative qualitative case study, is accurate or rigorous to adequately evince the range of issues that transpired in the course of conducting the study. Therefore, when analysing information in a qualitative case study, it is important to exercise a degree of 'reflexive subjectivity' as information from the field is filtered through the researcher's understanding and orientation. This way, the researcher is able to fundamentally recognise interpretation or discussion of field information devolves from themes that are emerseed in the responses of study participants. Accordingly, Gubrium and Holstein (1997) suggest there are 'many concerns about the possibility of subduing participants' voices when conducting such dialogical interviews'. Yet, in conducting this study, I strived for fairness when presenting the diverse opinions expressed by the participants in the analytical sections of this dissertation.

In part, this study sourced and analysed information from both policy and archival documents on Liberia and Rwanda. Document analysis has a long history as a research technique to categorize, investigate, and interpret phenomena in the social sciences and humanities. The resort to

documentary analysis in sociological studies in reflected in the works of both classical and contemporary sociologists like Ibn Khaldun, Émile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and Max Weber, Charles Tilly, Jimi Adesina, Cherryl Walker, Michael Neocosmos, Gurminder Bhambra who have variously relied on the use of official government information and archival documents in their works and contribution to the field of sociology. Following this, Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 163) suggest that sociological studies should consider the use of documents as a "source of data or as sociological interviewee or anthropological informant". In the field of Anthropologist, scholars such as Jack Goody (1977) argues that written documents are rich sources of information. In this regard, we can safely assume that documents are sources for salient information, without which a study might suffer from information inadequacy. This might affect the understanding illuminated in study analysis by the researcher. Similarly, Latour (1987) also refers to the use of documents as a research activity that helps generate meanings from decisions written in one context with future relevance. Impliedly, documents can be relied on to construct narratives about communities or peoples as such variables are mutable with subjective with the nature of information they offer. As such, resorting to document analysis in sociological understanding of space or peoples serves as a means to create meaning out a peoples' lived experiences or describe the relationship between the diversity of policy actors and local residents.

It is my considered opinion that documents or archival materials are not objective or neutral materials as they communicate a particular position on an issue of public interest. In this regard, Prior (2008) is of the opinion that documents are situated records concerning social interactions. Hence the usefulness of documents in this regard are in two forms. First, as repository of information and second, as active liaisons in networks (see Prior, 2008, pp. 485–489). In essence, documents can be considered as 'objects' and 'actors' in the interactive space of social relations. Again, Scott (2006) proposes two crucial resort to documents in sociological studies as a tool for data collection. The first relates to information registered "within the document, while the second suggests the ways in which documents are utilised in communities". Read together, documents are basically data sources topics in their own right within a research activity (see L. Prior, 2003, 2008; Zimmerman & Pollner, 1971). To this end, my study resorts to the use of documents proposed by Scott as it provides relevant information useful to my examination of the rationales that undergird social policy and leadership in articulating the daily realities of the local population by mediating the non-coercive functions of the state in building inclusive peace in post-conflict societies – Liberia and Rwanda.

At present, there is little research that applies the rationales of social policy and leadership within the context of Liberia and Rwanda to evaluate the effectiveness of liberal peacebuilding policies

in achieving effective peace and development by minimising the risk of conflict relapsing. My study, therefore, examines the conceptual assumptions that led to the (re)production and application of liberal peacebuilding ethos by using reports or documents as both topics the information they contain in addressing the central objective and research questions of this study to enable me to unearth the usefulness of social policy and leadership in transforming state-society relations in post-conflict societies in achieving durable peace and development. Thus, archival material provides comprehension about the historical context of marginalisation, identity, deprivation, insecurity, and conflict. Also, it provides insights into the politics the undergird them to produce violent conflicts in Liberia and Rwanda. They also provide reliable information for a deeper understanding of the complexity of post-conflict societies and the risk of everyday that cannot be reduced to technocratic or simplistic assumptions. Hence, I resort to the use of documents a research tool because it provides me with useful and background information required to complement the in-depth interviews conducted to fortify my analysis.

In conducting this research, I used two non-probability sampling techniques to settle on the respondents I interviewed – purposive and semi-snowball sampling methods (Berg, 2007). According to scholars such Berg (2007) and Stake (2005), the importance of purposive sampling is considered as an ideal technique for a comparative qualitative case study, in which the researcher decides the samples that would serve the object of the study. Therefore, a key consideration in selecting cases for comparative research is the need for comparative researchers to have a good enough understanding of the study sites, processes and actors concerned with the phenomenon of interest (see Yin, 2009). In selecting the study sites and setting up for this research, I had prior interactions with a number of actors knowledgeable in the ongoing peacebuilding efforts in both Liberia and Rwanda, together with my familiarity with available policy documents gave me a fair experiential perception of the many post-conflict peacebuilding and development issues in both countries. Further, the nature and relevance of the policy actors involved in the ongoing peacebuilding efforts in relation to this research was an important criterion in selecting key informants I interviewed for this study. Also, the semi-snowball sampling technique was adopted for selecting a cross-section of Liberians and Rwandan who were willing and available to be interviewed. For Liberia, to enable me to triangulate the perspectives shared with me by respondents to establish authenticity of the various viewpoints expressed, I interacted with the almost the same respondents on a number of times to help me observe and establish consistency and or variations from the diverse responses I received in Liberia. In the case of Rwanda documentary sources were used to achieve this. Hence the analysis in this dissertation is primarily illuminated by responses from my field study, together with my assessment of relevant documents

and literature in the fields of this study, and in relation to the complexity of relations between donor-centred peacebuilding policy practices and societies recovering from violent wars.

2.5 Conclusion

The chapter presents an outline and discusses how this study was conducted. As a Comparative Case Study, qualitative research approaches of inquiry were employed to examine the role of social policy and leadership in building inclusive peace in Liberia and Rwanda. This approach was used to solicit information in evaluating the place of social policy and leadership in transforming post-conflict norms of relations for effective peacebuilding in Liberia and Rwanda. The two cases compared in this study are used to reflect the nuanced nature of post-conflict peacebuilding by furthering our knowledge beyond what is known to engage the contextual lived experiences of nationals in both countries to establish how ongoing peacebuilding effort ground with their daily realities in avoiding a relapse into violence. Given the political context of both countries, the use of a comparative case study is helpful in understanding the relational issues that are cardinal to building and transforming norms of socioeconomic and political relations to address the causes of conflict considering the influence of historical issues in (re)shaping contemporary situations. In this regard, both Liberia and Rwanda present us with a similar historical antecedent to the outbreak of violent conflicts while offering differing post-conflict peacebuilding contexts. To illuminate our understanding of how liberal peace-building policies address the root causes of conflict to build national cohesion and durable development – the differing contemporary contexts of Liberia and Rwanda present an interesting case to explore the usefulness of Transformative Social Policy and Leadership as process in building effective post-conflict societies. Therefore, the cases were deliberately selected.

A cross-section of citizens' views which forms the primary source of data for this study, was solicited to enable us to gain deeper insights into the everyday realities in both countries. Also, in-depth interviews with an array of policy actors and researchers on Rwanda and Liberia were conducted. The interviews for this study were conducted using semi-structured interview guide to enable a conversation that allows for the respondents to express themselves beyond questions that the researcher asked. This also allowed the researcher space to explore issues hitherto not considered when designing the study but are useful in providing insights into ongoing efforts by the leadership of both countries to build a cohesive society. Equally important to this study was the use of archival or documentary sources or materials from government institutions, local and international organisations made accessible through online means or gathered during field provided useful information to enrich the analysis of the study. The information generated from

both interviews and documentary sources was thematically analysed. Primary data from interviews were initially coded to generate themes in sync with the question guides using the software ATLAS.ti The entire conduct of this study was done in accordance with the University of South Africa's ethical guidelines. As is the case with every social science study, three are methodological challenges. Those encountered in this study are also discussed accordingly. The next chapter discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on liberal peacebuilding as state-building, (transformative) social policy, and leadership to provide a framework that foregrounds the subsequent analytical chapters of this study.

3.0 Conceptual Framework for the Study: Peacebuilding as Nation-building

3.1 Introduction

The central objective of this study is to establish the nexus between social policy, leadership, and inclusive peacebuilding. As a starting point, it is important to trace the ideas that have shaped liberal peacebuilding and its shortcomings since the early 1990s, as captured in the extant literature. Despite the explicit silence on social policy and leadership in the policy consideration of the United Nations *Agenda for Peace* – the policy blueprint for peacebuilding and development, I suggest that leadership and social policy have been an overarching consideration for the UN's quest for effective peacebuilding since the early 1990s if not an integral part of its interventionist policies in conflict-affected states since 1994. According to the foundational policy document, the UN aimed to fashion out policy responses with respect to "action to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 32). In a sense, the Agenda for Peace was the foremost attempt by the UN to understanding the causes of conflict structural violence and social grievance resulting from malfunctioning economic development programme and associated political practices. Importantly, the UN sought to reassert its dwindling presence and effectiveness as the global institution of its worth by using the Agenda for Peace as a framework to *rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Fundamentally, the policy blueprint was set to find solutions to the root causes of conflict in the world: economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression. (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

Arguably, therefore, there is a sense in the literature on post-conflict reconstruction and peace building, irrespective of the divergence in ideas about the transformational need for peacebuilding policy interventions (see Chandler, 2015; Ikpe et al., 2021; Richmond, 2014, 2017; Sabaratnam, 2011). The nexus between leadership and transformative social policy essentially provides conceptual space for peacebuilding as nation-building to warrant the reciprocal relation between peacebuilding practices and inclusive development. In this regard, several international development institutions have emphasised the need for transformative peacebuilding policies. Likewise, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on Governance for Peace argued for rethinking governance, peacebuilding and the social contract in post-conflict and fragile

contexts (UNDP, 2012). The report noted that the lack of such attention "erodes the social contract between a state and its population and transforms the fundamentals of society, creating conditions of chronic fragility and underdevelopment" (UNDP, 2012, p. 11). Thus, the UN's emphasis on bolstering efforts at forestalling 'the outbreak, escalation, recurrence, or continuation of conflicts' (See UN General Assembly 2016; UN Security Council 2016). A recently published World Bank study on *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict* by the Bank, together with the United Nations, the call is made for "a shift away from managing and responding to crises and toward preventing conflict sustainably, inclusively, and collectively can save lives and greatly reduce these costs" (World Bank, 2018, p. iii). Similarly, the African regional body, the African Union has noted the need to "address the needs of countries emerging from conflict, including the needs of affected populations; prevent escalation of disputes; avoid a relapse into violence; address the root causes of conflict; and consolidate sustainable peace" (African Union, 2006, p. 2-4). In this regard, the UN Secretary-General's Report sought to present a rethinking about repositioning the Agenda for Peace for an emancipatory interventionist policy. Admittedly, this is in acknowledgement of the numerous academic criticisms of the liberal peace paradigm since the 1990s and the poor results it had chalked since the inception of the Agenda for Peace (Jahn, 2021; Richmond, 2017; Sabaratnam, 2011b). Pugh (2013a, p. 14) reflects this by noting that the "echoes of work by academic critics of the liberal peace, of liberal imperialism in peacebuilding and of the neglect of local agency" has caused the UN to try and reassert its relevance in securing inclusive peace globally.

The declaration of interest by the international peacebuilding industry for bringing back the 'social and leadership' into peacebuilding has spawned a plethora of diverse visions and representations in identifying measures for transformative interventions in post-conflict societies. Africa is consigned as lagging in development and a security threats. Smith notes that this labelling of Africa situates it as a "chaotic and volatile political and socio-economic" space (Smith, 2005, p. 1), requiring direct intervention and tutelage by experts and institutions from the global North who possess the knowledge and magic wand. This categorisation's potency goes beyond the negativity about the continent. It invariably delimits ways of perceiving peacebuilding that in many ways undergird the linearity of thought or simplistic understanding of peacebuilding policy practices meant for implementation in post-conflict countries. It is my considered opinion that such delimitation potentially elicits a counter-hegemonic response from locales where these technocratic liberal peace policy interventions are fabricated to achieve success. The failures of these programmatic policies laden with (neo)liberal values is due to the lack of appreciation for

the complex nature and struggles of lived experience occasioned by the active local political economy of states meant to implement such programmable policies.

The call for emancipatory-driven peacebuilding interventions has ignited the interest of scholars devoted to critical studies in leadership, peace, and security; conflict and development; international relations, and public policy such as Sabaratnam (2011b, 2013, 2017), Olonisakin (2017) and Richmond (2017; 2022) among others. For instance, Willett (2005), based on her studies on Sierra Leone and elsewhere, is of the opinion that the depiction of Africa as a conflict-ravaged underdeveloped space privileges Western institutions and policy actors to frame and uncritical peace, security and development policy practices (p. 570). Hence, the fundamental issue that arises here is to unpack the rationales and ideational underpinning through which liberal peacebuilding polices meant to aid post-conflict reconstruction are framed, understood, and represented. Hence for peacebuilding policies to meaningfully address the root causes of violent conflict and transform the norms of relations for inclusive development is required in part, as Booth admonishes, "emancipation from both orthodox knowledge framing and from the authority that comes from unchallenged power that often poses as 'common sense' or coping with 'the real world'"(Booth, 1997, p. 111). Beyond these issues, the ideas that underlie peacebuilding interventions require examination.

Conceptually, this study is the first systematic attempt at highlighting the ideational relevance of Transformative Social Policy (TSP) and Leadership (TSP-L) nexus in building inclusive peace and development in post-conflict societies. Using TSP-L as an evaluative framework, the present research demonstrates the relevance of TSP-L framework in examining the design and implementation of social policies as an offshoot of public for peacebuilding-as- nation-building in countries rebuilding from the ruins of violent conflict in Africa. This is to enhance our knowledge on the conceptual and normative value of the TSP-L model. Hence, the study's conceptualisation of the current liberal peacebuilding approach as an avatar of formulaic institutional processes and policy tenets imposed post-conflict states. Inherent in these policy and institutional practices are ever-changing rationales and/or assumptions that influence the specific policy contents and operational guides, and procedures of the peacebuilding programme imposed on post-conflict states.

To be sure, the foisting of such noncontextually policy ethos on the leadership of countries recovering from violent conflicts generates unascertainable, complicated, and questionable results. The complicated, exclusionary and distorted results outcomes of the liberal peace paradigm give

reason for challenging the usefulness of the liberal peace paradigm and its predictive desirability for inclusive peace and development in societies recovering from conflict as espoused by orthodox liberal peace scholars like Paris (2007, 2010); Duffield (2007, 2010); Chandler (2010); Richmond (2012); Heathershaw (2013); Joshi, Lee and MacGinty (2014). My conceptual framework provides grounds to (re)consider alternative policy framings or paradigms beyond the technocratic, stylized, orthodox peacebuilding and development.

The chapter beings with a synopsis of the relevance of how ideas shape policy. This is useful in understanding the different phases of peacebuilding since the early 1990s and the challenges that have come to be associated with it. The chapter then reviews the ideas in the literature on liberal peacebuilding as state-building. This is followed by a discussion of social policy and leadership as a response to the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. The second part of this chapter draws on the assumptions of social policy and leadership to construct a conceptual foregrounding for the study.

3.2 Ideas and how they matter in the intellectual and policy spaces

Ideas have historically shaped the politics of state-society relations through public policy framing and learning processes (Campbell, 2002; Dobbin, 1994; Hall, 1993,1989; Rueschemeyer, 1996; Skrentny, 1996, p. 1, 2002; Stone, 1988). Robert Cox described way of understanding international relations by advancing a binary and partly adversarial conceptualization of problem-solving and paradigm-shifting approaches (Cox, 1999). This classification engages attention to the orthodoxy of conceptual frameworks that reinforce thinking policy associated with internationalism (Pugh, 2013a). Ideational factors therefore interact with institutional practices, interest groups, and state-cantered narratives in many ways to produce programme for implementation (Skocpol & Zollars, 1994; Skrentny, 1996; Weir, 1992). To this end ideas matter as citizens and institutions in their everyday practices routinely participate, actively or passively, in thinking about everyday social and political issues. As espoused by Mehta, ideas are important for two reasons: they "shape people's actions and (b) are not reducible to some other non-ideational force" (Mehta, 2011, p. 24). The Age of Enlightenment, the Great Renaissance, Colonialism, Neo-colonialism, Scientific Socialism and Ujamaa are products of ideas. To be sure, ideas about democracy, peace, social welfare, security, and development, among others, affect how we interact in a polity. Put differently, people are a product of ideas. How ideas matter is important to appreciating policy diffusion and its outcomes. Understanding how the ideas of liberal peacebuilding as state-building shape post-conflict reconstruction policies are important to understanding why the produce outcomes that rarely address the root causes of violent conflicts.

From a broader perspective, ideas are core to issue identification and agenda setting, policy alternative and diffusion, policy autonomy, politics, path dependency and path-shaping change, institution building, institutional stability, institutional change, participation, inclusivity, peacebuilding, the transformation of state-society relations and their conceptual framings (Mehta, 2011). Knowing this helps us determine what kinds of ideas are useful to a particular end goal, how different ideas compete with the political system, the evolution of ideas and the interplay of interest and actors in this process. This way the researcher can unpack the epistemology and ontological framing of specific policy ideas and provide an evaluation and alternatives. This provides an analytical currency of exactly how ideas matter (Béland, 2009; Campbell, 2002; Mehta, 2011).

Society, at any period is a product of ideas that shape policy thinking. The centrality of ideas relates to the discursive processes in constructing society through public policies and the politics that undergird it (Berland, 2009). Ontologically, the "tenets of the ideational perspective are that the world is socially constructed (Berland, 2011, p. 11). Thus, the three main nodes through which ideas influences public policies are: problem identification, policy-making, and political contestations (Kingdom, 1995). There is a growing number of scholarly works that have emphasised how ideas shape public policy and the making of society (Adésínà, 2009, 2011b, 2014, 2015; Anderson, 2014; Cox, 2001, 2004; Dobbin, 1994; Fischer, 2003; Mkandawire, 2001a, 2004, 2007; Parsons, 2004; Schmidt, 2003). Drawing an inference from this literature, policy propositions are nourished by ideas about issues actors consider as compelling to be on the policy agenda (Beland & Cox, 2011; Mehta, 2011). Ideas are constructed out of public discourse through framing processes by actors in the public space to sway policymakers, institutions, and other interested parties about the need for a particular policy or why a change of policy is essential (Béland, 2009; Schmidt, 2003). This process can be described as the social formulation of public problems or the need to reform. Cox notes that "in a political environment, the advocates of policy reforms need to employ strategies to overcome the scepticism of others and persuade them of the importance of reform" (Cox, 2001, p. 475). Accordingly, ideas serve as key ingredients in framing social, economic, political and environmental problems, among others, that political and policy actors may deem appropriate in (re) constructing society (Mehta, 2011; Stone, 1997).

The framing of social and political problems is usually related to policy vestiges, as actors in the policy space evaluate the outcomes of existing programme on such problems. In essence, how policy problems are redacted is tied to institutional logic (Weir, 1992). The World Bank and the UNDP are examples of such. Also, ideas can be a paradigm of economic and social assumptions

that give legitimacy to or questions existing institutions and policies. According to Peter Hall, a policy paradigm is "a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and kind of instruments that can be used to attain them but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing" (Hall, 1993, p. 279). Hence, policy paradigms inform learning processes through which existing policy outcomes are assessed, criticized, or transformed (Berland, 2009). Similarly, ideas are useful ideological tools that "allow agents to challenge existing institutional arrangements and the patterns of distribution that they enshrine" (Blyth, 2001, p. 4).

Although these learning processes may be technocratic, they are also products of political contestations between institutions and other policy actors with a direct impact on policy implementation (King & Hansen, 1999). For instance, reading the World Development Reports and the Human Development Reports by the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme, leading global policy institutions one can easily discern the contestation between the two to shape global public policy learning processes. In the same vein, neo-liberalism has been an 'influential policy paradigm that constitutes an intellectual and ideological backbone of contemporary social policy debates and learning processes' (Adesina, 2022, 2004). However, the assumptions embedded in policy perspectives change over time, either during periods of crises or uncertainty or when the society is ravaged by violence (Béland, 2009). In such a precarious context, policy actors may turn to alternative ideas of reconstructing society to address the underlying causes of crises confronting them. This ideational logic is a source of change in the direction of public policy (Blyth, 2002).

Borrowing from Kingdon, three different points of ideas are relevant to understanding the policy process (Kingdon, 1995). At the minimum is the conception of ideas as *policy solutions*. Liberal peacebuilding as state-building is the most influential policy idea in the conflict, security, and development field (Boutros-Ghali, 1992a, 1995; Duffield, 2014; Duffield & Hewitt, 2009; Pugh, 2014; Richmond, 2009, 2012, 2017 2019). Although there are contrary ideas which are yet to gain the deserved recognition (Chandler, 2013a, 2015; Lidén, 2009; Sabaratnam, 2011c, 2013; Torto, 2013). By implication, the assumption of ideas as solutions is that problems are a given: deprivation, inequality, marginalisation, ethnicization of politics, institutional bias; the objectives are given to institute western-style governance systems, conduct regular elections, and institute social assistance programme as a form of empowerment. In the context of post-conflict peacebuilding the idea of liberal peacebuilding is seen as the means for solving the problem of conflict ravaged societies and accomplishing the objectives of state-building. However, scholars

have noted the difficulty in the thinking that 'problems and objectives are preestablished' (Rein & Schön, 1977).

From this perspective, the central question for our understanding is why some policy ideas gain policy traction while others do not. This should be understood differently from the usual explanation of why policy choices are made. The drift here is that the examination of policy ideas is linked to the properties of the ideas themselves (Mehta, 2011). For this reason, Peter Hall's assertion that a successful policy idea combines policy viability, administrative viability, and political viability is useful for appreciating the point (Hall, 1989). This functional understanding offered by Hall suggests that the inherent value of an idea in solving the problem (policy viability) is enough for policy actors to consider the same as worthy to be adopted (Weaver, 2000). This view may be explained away by the fact that there is a low causal relationship between research and the desire of policymakers (Mehta, 2011). Hence, the anticipated value of a policy intervention must be regarded along with a variety of other political and normative considerations (Rein & Winship, 1999), such as administrative feasibility (Evans et al., 1985). Understood this way, Mehta notes that "debates about problem definitions of policy ideas are more concrete and thus subject to considerations of cost and administrative feasibility (Mehta, 2011, p. 27). Likewise, John Kingdom noes that policy ideas become successful only when policy entrepreneurs frame such ideas as problems politically (Kingdon, 1995). Hence, some scholars assert that dominating ideas are shaped by the historical considerations and past policies (Mehta, 2011).

Next is the understanding of ideas as *policy definition*. How an issue is designated as a problem gives meaning to the kind of policy solutions that actors in the policy arena will consider as desirable. This way, much of the political argument around policy alternatives happens at the level of defining the policy problem. According to Mehta, "problem definition is a particular way of understanding a complex reality" (Mehta, 2011, p. 27). For instance, violent conflict can be a result of poor political institutions, social, economic, and political exclusion, and ethnicization of state resources distribution, among others. In many instances, ideas are causal beliefs held by policy and political actors assumed by institutions as important for influencing attitudes and actions about a particular course (Emmerij et al., 2005, p. 214; Schmidt, 2002; Shön & Rein, 1994). On his part, Campbell (2004) is of the opinion that, ideas embody a form of high-profile public conversation around 'frames, discourses, and ideologies at the foreground of the political system. Similarly, ideas may represent lower-profile assumptions and paradigms that often remain at the background of public space (Berland, 2009; Hall, 1993). Normally, ideas could be specific, concrete, or programmatic: such as the introduction of a Public Health Insurance policy or policy to assist the

aged in society, to general ideas such as liberal peacebuilding or state-building (Tannenwald, 2005), central to ideologies such as liberalism, neoliberalism, Marxism, or socialism (Berland, 2011). From the extant literature, the often-discussed ideas in the social science literature on politics and society include 'participation, inclusion, policy choices, norms, belief systems, ideologies, and broad worldviews, among others (Berland, 2011).

Ideas provide the *ideational* foregrounding that shape how academic and policy actors make sense of the daily realities of people in any given context. Understandably, we frame political, social, and economic problems through the ideational lenses that we employ (Béland & Cox, 2011). Hence, the definition, aims and strategies employed to address issues in society are valued by the ideas underpinning what is espoused about society, politics, and policy. Politics in all forms is the competition for the ability to control institutions and people motivated by myriad ideas. This way, ideas serve as sources of values and preferences with interpretive frameworks that enable us to evaluate what we observe or make meaning of facts available to us to "be appropriate, legitimate, and proper" as they shape our beliefs about phenomena (Béland & Cox, 2011, p. 3).

Consequently, ideas are 'products of cognition'. We frame in our minds how we want our daily realities to be, from our sensory capabilities. Such ideas may have no bearing on our reality. In this case, there is a challenge to believing in the imaginaries about our immediate surroundings. Also, ideas can be causal beliefs, postulating associations between things and between people in a given space. As noted by Béland and Cox, "these connections might be causal in the proper sense, such as suggesting that one event was responsible for bringing about a series of successive events" (Béland & Cox, 2011). However, ideas can form connexions in informal ways, by making parallels between things or people with a belief that they are related. It is also the case that ideas are guides for directing our action. They instigate our actions by helping us think about challenges, difficulties and problems that confront us daily (Béland & Cox, 2011; Mehta, 2011). In policy circles, deciding what issues to consider for action or addressing, how to address them or the specific policy actions to deal with a situation, and the transformation of institutions or systems that constitute a society are all products of prevailing ideas at a particular period (Béland, 2009). Thus, ideas are "claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions" (Parsons, 2002, p. 48).

3.3 The idea(s) of liberal peacebuilding

The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General's report on the *Agenda for Peace* is the grounding intellectual and policy framework for post-conflict peacebuilding in the post-cold war era

(Boutros-Ghali, 1992a). The report associated violent conflicts with structural violence and social grievance, poor economic development, and political exclusion as the root causes of intra-state conflicts (Boutros-Ghali, 1992a). Accordingly, the *Agenda for Peace* framework is to "identify and support efforts at addressing the generative causes of violent conflicts and to consolidate the peace and advance the well-being among citizens by restoring order, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992a, p. 16). After initial implementation difficulties in Bosnia and Angola, the Secretary-General published an addendum – *Supplementary to the Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali, 1995b). By this time, the experiences in Bosnia and Angola had created a situation of limited international support for the agenda for peace (Sabaratnam, 2011b). This UN' backed framework for solving peace was in the mid-1990s 'hijacked' by the Bretton Woods Institutions and other international development organisations, with a deeper involvement in peacebuilding activities (Willett, 2005). Along these lines, the initial glitches in the Agenda for Peace were narrowed to the lack of intervention ideas to build and maintain peace rather than an overambitious framework. Hence, the ideological and political foundations of peacebuilding was redefined by these multilateral institutions at the early stage, given their foothold in the international political arena.

In practice, the multi-lateral institution operating in the global development space resorted to the assumption of Immanuel Kant's Liberal Peace Theory (LPT) which postulates that 'economic interdependence, democracy, and the rule of law constitute the sustainable foundations for world peace as the ideological foregrounding for implementing peace programme in non-western societies' (see Doyle, 2005). Kant's liberal peace, as espoused in his article *Perpetual Peace* (Kant, 1970), argues that when states internalise the ethos of the *peace treaty* 'constitutional, international, and cosmopolitan laws' they are less likely to engage in acts of war that breach world peace. Roland Paris refers to this variant of liberalism as 'liberal Internationalism' (Paris, 2007, p. 56).

States that incorporated these 'three liberal articles' of the peace treaty were affecting the process of interdependence in the global system to bring about world peace (Doyle, 2005). Kant argued that two significant orderliness in the relations among states is the international arena; the inclination of liberal states to always strive for peace in their 'relations with each other and war-prone in their relations with non-liberal states'(ibid). Buchan notes, "liberal states are more peaceful than illiberal states and that global conflict can be reduced by the spread of Western liberal ethos through Civil Societies worldwide" (Buchan, 2002, p. 407). As such, when states

mimic their institutions along Western liberal civilisation based on constitutionalism: limiting the power of elected leaders and the exercise of authority, formal separation of powers among the arms of government; periodic multi-party elections, and the rule of a representative government to regulate the affairs between the private and the public creates favourable conditions that place such states in a greater position of remaining peaceful both internally and with each other. In contrast, states not considered operating on such a liberal governance framework constituted a threat to peace (ibid). Notably, John Rawls argues that "peoples living under liberal constitutional democracies" are not motivated by "power or glory, or the . . . pride of ruling," have no interest in "the religious conversion of other societies," and in fact "have nothing to go to war about" (Rawls, 1999). Hence, violence is attributable to illiberal states that are "uncivilized". In the same vein, any use of violence against such states is whatsoever to civilise it is justified (Buchan, 2002).

In advancing Kant's liberal postulation on peaceful coexistence, Michael Doyle contends that liberal peace policies for post-conflict peacebuilding have the predictive capacity of reconstructing societies in a modern liberal frame. Seen this way, Doyle and other liberal peace advocates maintain that the orthodoxy of liberal peace practices position states in the global system such that it allows for the easy diffusion of the liberal ethos of governance and economic reforms – claimed as the only means to achieving the needs of humanity (Doyle, 1997; Paris, 2012). The apostles of Kant's view conceptualise world peace narrowly as an embodiment of Anglo-American modernity, evangelising this in its frame, irrespective of contextual differentials. In a nutshell, three issues are discernible from their explanation of Kant's thesis. First, is that the ethos of liberal democracy dictates that states function on the aspirations of its citizens. Through channels of decision-making, they determine whether to go to war or not because they suffer the most from the effects of war. Also, states that interdepend economically and commercially are less likely to militarily engage each other because it does not serve their interests. Finally, they argue that implicit in democratic states are the core values of compromise and plurality that guide their international relations (Cox et al., 2009, p. 11; Doyle, 1983; Hameiri, 2011, p. 191; Ray, 1995; Russett, 1993).

This approach to peacebuilding is meant to secure states against what they term the 'illiberal other' – states that do not religiously follow the liberal scripts of organising society, and thereby preventing the possibility of conflict. Taking cognisance of the domineering posture of international institutions, Doyle further notes that the global design of economic and political institutions are needed to compel non-western states to choose between liberalisation and state decay. Hence for states that have experienced violent conflicts are considered dysfunctional and

as such need peacebuilding programme to modernise them into liberal entities fit to participate in the global liberal architecture state relations despite the absence of clear empirical data to support this assertion by the liberal peace theory. To my understanding, the liberal peace theory in its traditional sense, is conceived on a narrow hypothesis to claim that democratic states do not fancy conflict with each other. Otherwise, how could President George W. Bush justify US interventions by referring to the 'transformative power of liberty' (Appiah, 2004, p. 6) Contrary to studies that highlight the dangers inherent in focusing on an overly simplistic conceptualisation of the link between democracy and peace (Jayasuriya, 2005; Snyder, 2000).

Among others, the intellectual justification for adopting a liberalised approach to peacebuilding by the dominant states and institutions in the global North was birthed in the justification of former senior government officials doubling as academics. The works of Helman and Ratner (Helman & Ratner, 1992) 'Saving Failed States' in Foreign Policy, Robert Kaplan's 'The Coming Anarchy' (1994) and William Zartman's (1995) edited collection 'Collapsed States: the disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority' are worthy of note. Invariably, these influential but provocative publications arguing from different strands advanced in unison the ideas of non-western worlds in a trench of 'disorder' – from the post-Cold War liberal form of state authority and order. These 'failing' or 'failed' were a threat to the liberal ethos of regional and global security. From the extant literature, liberal peacebuilding as state-building refers to the appreciation of peace within the framings of 'liberal democracy', 'market-informed policy reforms', and Western-styled institutions of governance (Berdal, 2017b; Curtis, 2013; Duffield, 2007; 2014; Paris, 2007; Richmond, 2010; 2014).

From the above, this departure in global thinking about building peaceful and inclusive states, equally signalled the emergence of peacebuilding scholarship from the hitherto separate fields of peace and security studies from the late 1960s and 1980s (Ryan, 2013). This led to the resurgence of *peace* and *security* studies from its political oblivion, given impetus to the donor-community's agenda for peace in non-western sates (Sabaratnam, 2011a). In particular, there was a leap in the emerging literature in peacebuilding from the early 1990s (Kumar, 1997; Lederach, 1997; Pugh, 2000; Sambanis, 2000). These discussions borrowed from theories of human need (Burton, 1987)(Burton 1987) and social grievances (Azar, 1986). The debate among peacebuilding scholars during this period focused on 'conflict prevention and early warning' (see Lund 1996), 'management of spoilers' (Stedman, 1997), 'mediation processes' (Akashi, 1995; Augsburger, 1992; Leigh-Phippard, 1998; Zartman & Touval, 1985), the involvement of 'humanitarian actors' (Prendergast, 1996; Smock, 1996; Woodhouse & Ramsbotham, 1996). Later, the importance of human rights couched as the *responsibility to protect* became part of a much wider scholarship on

peacebuilding practices (Chandler, 2002; Evans & Sahnoun, 2002; Evans, 2008; Orford, 2011; Thakur, 2011). Similarly, this set of issues began to attract the attention of Think Thanks within the international community, with various funding streams and research streams coalescing around this agenda.

The first of such was UNRISD's War-Torn Societies Project (1994-1998) and the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1994-1999) that concurrently sought to expand understanding of conflict prevention and resolutions through a pile of case studies intentionally meant to address what was regarded as the disturbing growing pervasiveness of intrastate conflict. For instance, United States Institute for Peace sponsored volume on *Managing Global Chaos* (see Crocker et al., 1996) signpost some of the main intellectual courses which undergirded the liberal peace agenda of the peacebuilding industry. In a nutshell, the volume explores the causes of conflict, giving emphasis to both the 'structural' and 'social-psychological' underpinnings of such conflicts (ibid). It then looks at the role of 'traditional' diplomacy, collective security, peacekeeping, and humanitarian intervention' in managing and resolving the raging violence at the time (ibid). The volume also substantially focuses on conflict management though mediation, conflict prevention and problem-solving (ibid). It ends with an exploration of the consolidation of peace and the need for ownership of post-conflict peace settlements (ibid).

In my understanding, reading together the various strands of literature at the time, not only did it present a coherent of stream of analysis on conflict and its management. It also gave impetus of peace-based interventions by further legitimising the (neo)liberal economic and political climate which privileges so-called 'expert' knowledge of Western academics, policy actors and politicians in peacebuilding (Chandler, 2015; Richmond, 2011, 2015; Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2020; Ryan, 2013). This further bolstered the resolve of a willing donor-community and international multi-lateral institutions to take on the responsibility of resolving conflicts and building peace by modernising norms of relations and institutions in non-western countries with an Anglo-Saxon logic (Chandler, 2006; Richmond, 2015; Sabaratnam, 2013). As Meera Sabratnam points out in her article *Avatars of Eurocentrism in the critique of the liberal peace* – liberal peace operates on the logic that "Europe is historically, economically, culturally and politically distinctive in ways that significantly determine the overall character of world politics" (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 261). Thus, the Foucauldian gaze of Eurocentrism in the theoretical and normative fleshing out of what constitute peace and how it can be constructed is the "problem within the study of world politics" that need to be overcome (ibid:260). This requires a re-orientation of scholarship that illuminates the vernacular of spaces. In recent years, this has become the fundamental ideational underpinning

of postcolonial sociology, security studies and international relations (Adésínà, 2002, 2008; Hobson, 2012; Sabaratnam, 2013; Shilliam, 2010).

The conceptual intervention of these foundational scholarships on building peaceful non-western countries by modernising them in the likeness of Anglo-American civilisation is rooted in the logic of colonialism (Chandler, 2014; Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2020). The impetus carried from the colonial era policies that framed non-western countries in a particular negative milieu to justify the necessity to intervene and civilise. Studies by Rist (2008) and Crush (1995) suggest contemporary policy practices by the international multi-lateral, governmental and non-governmental institutions are a direct offshoot of colonial practice. This idea leads to the reproduction or replication of colonial practices in contemporary peacebuilding efforts. Reflecting on this idea, Crush (1995) laments the fact that decolonization essentially led to a shift from settled colonialism to international diffusion of policy practices by institutions in the Global North and their local partners in continuation of the civilizing mission. This assertion by Crush denotes the centrality of colonial traits in contemporary (neo) liberal peacebuilding practices. Eminently, embedded in the continuance of colonial rationales behind policy diffusion and practice is the necessity, desirability, and moral duty to intervene ways deemed to assure the progress of humankind. This sense influences the (neo)liberal peacebuilding actors. This ethical obligation to intervene foregrounds the trusteeship of peacebuilding policy practices and the justification for their actions. The sum, of research by peace and security studies scholars – nonetheless cemented the basis for multi-lateral and bilateral policy nodes on conflict management and reconstruction – peacebuilding: based on 'superior knowledge', deeper involvement, and the use of both overt and covert force where necessary (Chandler, 2013a, 2015; Duffield, 2014; Richmond, 2009, 2014a,2014b, 2017, 2018, 2022a). This body of research informed the consensus on what is known as 'the liberal peace'.

In the 1990s, as part of the quest to manage 'global chaos' *intervention* among policy actors within the donor community was presented as necessary, given that states in 'crises' were a threat to the peace and security of the 'secured' Global north (Chandler, 2016; Heathershaw, 2013; Newman et al., 2009; Paris, 2010; Richmond, 2018). The international community, spearheaded by the UN Security Council, softened its policy position on restrictions, making intervention increasingly permissible (Berdal, 2017b; Chesterman & Pouligny, 2002; Liden, 2014). Legally and politically, this exception was created to accommodate the spread of (neo)liberal norms through the problem-solving capabilities of the donor community. In my understanding, this led to undermining the sovereignty and capacity of 'recipient' states and local policy makers rights. This premises the

resort to 'expert knowledge' and resources by policy interveners from the Bretton Woods and allied institutions curtailed their legitimacy. Hence, contemporary nodes of peacebuilding interventions are deployed in a manner that assumes the knowledge and power of international actors in linear and reductive ways. Understood this way, interventions of peacebuilding and state-building intervention highlight the asymmetrical and oppressive nature of the 'right of intervention' as undermining rights of policy autonomy (Chandler, 2007; Mkandawire, 2007).

In many instances the notion of *realpolitik* primarily influences the scholarship of traditional International Relations and Political Science scholars – both realists and liberals. This perspective importantly shapes the study conflict and peacebuilding in developing countries. The abundance of literature on conflict and corporation produced by such scholars accords the potential of reducing conflict to the barest minimum though the practice of western norms. Western policy actors and politicians considered way of legitimising their neo-colonial hold on non-western states without destabilizing the order they seek in the international system. Thus, the problematisation of the institution of sovereignty as is germane to interventionist activities (see Schmidt, 2002,2003). To legitimize intervention without cause to rebuke and destabilization of international legal norms, sovereignty was reconceptualised to enable intervention (see Krasner, 1999; Krasner & Risse, 2014), animating discussions about which aspect of sovereignty constitutes national and international in liberal IR writings. It is impossible to discuss intervention without having to think about the place of sovereignty. For without sovereignty, it is impossible to have a framework for understanding, enabling judgements to be made as to "who would be the target of intervention and what would be violated or transgressed" (Weber, 1995, p. 11). Accordingly, it is worthy of quoting Helle Malmvig:

> Whether any given event constitutes an intervention or a non-intervention, is hence dependent on what meaning sovereignty is attributed in advance. In order for something to be portrayed as an intervention, there must always already be an idea of what falls and what does not fall within the sovereign sphere of the state (Malmvig, 2006, p. 16).

Intervention and sovereignty are inseparable in construction as they are co-constitutive. Consequently, I understand that intervention policies aimed at reconstructing post-conflict countries are not unbiased measures, but practices informed by many obvious and covert interests and ideas. These rationales can be likened to what Scott (1998) calls 'high modernist interventions'. Therefore my analysis of liberal peace and state-building policy practices that necessitate interventions characterised by 'modernist', 'decontextualised' reliance on 'western expertise', the maintenance of international relevance, technocratic experimentation, and replication of standardised policy ideas (Chandler, 2015; Lewis, 2017; Liden, 2014; Lidén et al.,

2009; Richmond, 2021; Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2020; Ryan, 2013). Importantly, I examine how these ideas shape liberal peacebuilding as state-building interventions, which practices reflect colonial ideas, interests, and institutional power dynamics. This added to the policy ideas and debates around conflicts and peacebuilding interventions as "sources of information and testimony" (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 3). However, it is my thinking that the understanding of these international policymakers of complex and deep-seated conflicts was lacking, hence the prescription of linear-technical policies and programme.

Reflecting on the knowledge produced by researchers on liberal peace, it is evident that the problematic relationship between knowledge production and peacebuilding interventions resulting from the 'trusteeship' and 'superior knowledge' mentality of multi-lateral and bilateral actors in the peacebuilding industry (Autesserre, 2015; Distler, 2022; Waldman, 2014). In her study of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Séverine Autesserre explains how expertise from institutions in the West employed standardised templates and models that skewed data and analysis to fit a blanket understanding of the conflict (Autesserre, 2015). Suggesting the inclination to dominant narratives of peacebuilding that oversimplifies the root causes of conflict, leading to misfit policy responses. Another study that focuses on British external interventions in civil wars offers more insights to buttresses to resort to skewed information by Western policymakers in providing solutions to conflict in Africa. The study concludes that rather than knowledge informing policy, "research is often sought selectively and subsequently retrofitted to predetermined or pre-existing programmes" (Waldman, 2014, p. 151). Similar studies on Afghanistan show that even where external actors acknowledged the importance of local knowledge, it was construed and applied to reinforce basic and fundamental understandings of local social and political realities of effective peace (Wimpelmann, 2013). There are similar studies from various non-western countries to support this claim. Imperatively, this evidence shows how Western bureaucrats and institutions at the forefront of peacebuilding in Africa and elsewhere ignore the relevance of alternative knowledge in policy formulation. Current discursive structures of knowledge production and policymaking confine policy shifts as context-specific conditions and are clearly made subordinate to the dominant discourse of (neo)liberalism, thus knowledge of local conditions is ignored in the face of required changes in liberal peacebuilding predisposition (Chandler, 2016; Goetze, 2020; Goetze & De Guevara, 2012; Lewis, 2017; Wimpelmann, 2020).

The current liberal peacebuilding regime has become a period of intervention apace. Peacebuilding, state building, modernisation and development have become a heuristic political exercise of intervention by state and non-state actors domiciled in the Global North, often aimed

at conflict-affected or developing countries in the Global South such as Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Rwanda, Congo, Central African Republic, Timor- Leste, Cambodia, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Libya, and Afghanistan etc. Representing a form of neo-trusteeship often conducted in an authoritarian style contrary to prescriptions about liberal democratic ethos (Jayasuriya, 2006; Lewis, 2017, p. 20; Richmond, 2018). I understand liberal peacebuilding as an idea practised by the donor entities that operates on convoluted processes of governance. Markedly, liberal peacebuilding practice encapsulates problematic rationales and assumptions that give is impetus (Chandler, 2015; Duffield, 2014; Liden, 2014; Richmond, 2021; Ryan, 2013). Hence, my analysis of liberal peacebuilding practices from information available in this study exposes the thorny assumptions of peacebuilding interventions (see Duffield, 2014; Richmond, 2011, 2015, 2021; Schneckener, 2016). Thus, Duffield (2003, 2007) notes that, despite the many peacebuilding interventions pursued by donor organisations in different conflict or post-conflict countries, the inherent assumptions remain alike. I intend to understand how these rationales enable or otherwise the quest for inclusive peace in post-conflict states which informs my primary research question.

Liberal peacebuilding is explicitly aided by broad discursive efforts at framing outside interventions to address everyday challenges of inclusive reconstruction efforts in post-conflict societies (Call & Cousens, 2008; Kumar, 1997; Lederach, 1995; Lewis et al., 2018; Mac Ginty, 2014). Beyond this, it is important to examine the processes in which these discursive liberal peace policies are implemented to understand the contextual misfit or otherwise of the underlying rationales of liberal peace and state-building policy practices. The expansive influence of liberal peacebuilding practices by the multi-lateral and bilateral institutions is foregrounded by the reliance on institutional dominance, positioned to experiment and reproduce colonially-driven practices through a multiplicity of policy channels (Chandler, 2015; Lewis, 2017; Richmond, 2021). Consequently, Kothari's (2006) influential study on postcolonial development insinuates the "manifest continuity in the expert-driven framing and policy practices of colonial administrators similar to contemporary practices by practitioners and institutions within the donor-community". The multi-lateral and bilateral institutions engaged in peacebuilding activities portray themselves as custodians of the requisite knowledge and capacity to help 'failed', 'conflict-driven', and 'poor' states in developing areas, especially in Africa. Critically, Kothari argues against 'western expert-driven development practice that warrants technocratic and standardized policies' as best practices, by emphasising the need for robustness and dynamism in the contextual conditions from which policies must emanate to resolve. Studies by Lewis (2016), Chandler (2016), Richmond (2010, 2021), Mac Ginty and Richmond (2020) equally emphasise this point. In this sense, the colonial development policies and practices operated with a template of brute

paternalistic orientation to govern the 'natives,' conceived as lacking the capacity to forge their own systems and institutions to mediate their affairs (Mamdani, 1996). Applied to liberal peacebuilding, it is imperative to question the ideas that informed the interventions and its 'targeted' population.

A careful appraisal of current liberal peacebuilding practices depicts a similar paternalistic orientation since the 1990s. This paternalistic orientation propels the imposition of technocratic ideas to solve complex external situations. In their respective writings, Cooke (2004) and Chhotray and Hulme (2009) give insights into what undergirds this paternalism being perpetrated by actors in the peacebuilding space as being in sync with the framing of developing countries as endemic with internal deficiencies endemic that constraints building inclusive and stable development. Specifically, Chhotray and Hulme (2009, p. 36) assert how the two international programme: the Millennium Challenge Account by the United States government and the DFID's Driver of Change policy program by the government of the United Kingdom, associated poor governance with the underdevelopment in developing countries.

When considered from a historical perspective, one is convinced 'interventionist' policy practices intentional set of complex policy prescriptions and processes used to achieve a particular purpose. Consequently, the objective of interventionist acts is to manage the development enterprise of the state being intervened upon. Critically, Cowen and Shenton's (1996) influential examination of Britain's development pursuits across selected colonies argues that such interventions become a means for devising 'trusteeship relationships'. Understood this way, trusteeship is a deliberate mechanism adopted by the 'trustees' to place themselves in an all-knowing position capable of addressing the problems of the recipient country. Thus, three main factors shape this form of relationship: 1) the claim to referent knowledge, 2) the claim of technical capability or skills, and 3) resources. With reference to liberal peacebuilding, I am of the opinion that political permissibility and moral dominion has critically shaped and consolidated the hegemonic practice of 'trusteeship' in conflict-affected societies. As such, the enactment of 'trusteeship' is an act of realpolitik where institutional power politics play a key role in the choice of discourses, strategies, policies, and actors involved in liberal peacebuilding interventions as problem-solving. This problem-solving ethos of intervention prioritises western-technocratic knowledge and resources in the framing, design and roll-out of liberal peacebuilding policy interventions in post-conflict countries. Examining the empirical manifestations of liberal peace interventions as problem-solving will enhance our understanding of its failings and how alternative approaches: Transformative Social Policy and Leadership may offer a more robust approach to building

inclusive peace. The next section of this chapter delves into the problem-solving nature of liberal peacebuilding.

3.4 Problem-solving approach to liberal peacebuilding

The extant literature on peacebuilding is diverse and extensive, denoting the importance being accorded (in)security and development internationally. The bunch of literature includes policy briefs by think-tank and non-governmental organisations for practitioners and policymakers. Broadly, the literature covers various case studies that discuss thematic issues relating to democratization, security sector reform and conflict resolution, and policy solutions. However, this does not help us to fully comprehend the limits of liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict states in Africa. Borrowing from Pugh (Pugh, 2013), I classify the literature in two broad streams: problem-solving and epistemic critique in tracing the ideas and contestations in the thinking about peacebuilding for effective development in Africa. The first set of literature constitutes debates between academics and researchers from diverse perspectives, many within the academy on peacebuilding, split along individual's ideational predisposition. One set of the scholarship seeks to illuminate our understanding of the liberal peace paradigm by offering explanations of *what is and or what ought to be* about peacebuilding and state-building (see Cooper, 2007; Doyle, 2011; Newman, 2009; Owen, 2000; Paris, 1997, 2010)

The second batch of research in this regard adopts a critical lens to unpacking the ideational foregrounding of liberal peacebuilding and (neo) liberal state-building in non-western societies (Campbell et al., 2011; Chandler, 2016; Lewis, 2017; Newman et al., 2009; Pogodda et al., 2022; Pugh et al., 2016; Richmond, 2013, 2015, 2021; Richmond & Pogodda, 2016; Sabaratnam, 2011c). For those advancing the ideational critique – usually questioning the assumptions that foreground the practice of peacebuilding and the governance framework for its implementations – the aim is to escalate how the liberal peace paradigm has shaped thinking, practice, and outcomes of peacebuilding without preventing the (re)occurrence of conflict in post-conflict societies. As noted by Pugh, these scholars concern themselves with going "beyond the limits of analysis established by hegemonic orthodoxies" (Pugh, 2013b, p. 11). The second set of literature is primarily concerned with problem-solving (Call & Cousens, 2008; Lederach, 1997; Stedman et al., 2002). For this set of literature, the concentration is mainly on ensuring that the existing system for peacebuilding delivers as expected. In other words, how do the current systems for implementing peacebuilding policies work more effectively.

The problem-solving approach to contemporary (neo) liberal peacebuilding is important has taken centre-stage in the peacebuilding agenda. To make a case for peacebuilding as nation-building in

addressing the root causes of violent conflicts, we first have to understand the problem-solving approach to liberal peacebuilding as state-building. This paradigm is heavily influenced by the tenets of liberalism (Sabaratnam, 2011c), and subsequently neoliberalism – corporate governance and development (Pugh 2011). The first two are associated with the United Nations, and the third – the United Nations Development Programme

3.4.1 The United Nation's problem-solving discourse of liberal peacebuilding.

In general, *discourse* refers to "a set of statements or language for talking or representing a particular kind of knowledge about a topic, making it possible to construct the topic in a certain way in which the topic can be constructed" (Hall, 1992, p. 291). In its original form, Michael Foucault used the term discourse in a purely textual sense. He notes that discourses are "irreducible to the language and to speech" (Foucault, 2002, p. 54). Deductively, language and text play a fundamental role in giving singular meaning defining what is considered knowledge or acceptable. Importantly, discourse carries disciplinary effects, delimiting the voices to be heard, actors or participants to be included or marginalized, and which form(s) of knowledge is considered or ignored. The idea of (neo)liberal peace becoming a dominant discourse for understanding violent conflicts drives the how the causes of conflict are articulated: broadly as social, economic, and political grievances. Consequently, the best approach deemed to resolve such complaints through liberalised public policy tools (Jacobsen & Lidén, 2012; Lidén, 2013; Richmond, 2021; Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2020) by offering specific western-dominated meanings to key concepts such as 'peace' (Lewis, 2017; Richmond, 2023). As argued by Kühn, this renders "alternative forms of peace unthinkable" (Kühn, 2012, p. 404).

In this regard, the dominant liberal peace discourse has omitted certain normative positions as unacceptable, whether those of a new form of international trusteeship (Paris 2003) or conservative ideas that oppose intervention in wars and actors whose perspectives on peace are deemed incompatible with liberal values (Lewis, 2017). Arguing in this regard, Oliver Richmond notes liberal peace as a discourse, "framework and structure, with a specific ontology and methodology" (Richmond, 2006, p. 295); forming a "hegemonic discourse, to which it is difficult to say resist" (Richmond 2010b, p. 669). Likewise, Howarth avers that "the hegemonic discourse of liberal peace, which aims to reconstruct and develop post-conflict societies" (Howarth, 2014, p. 261). In the same vein, from studies on Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq, Jabri suggests "the discourse is used to aim at reconstructing societies and their government in accordance with a distinctly western liberal model the formative elements of which centre on open markets, human rights and the rule of law, and of democratic elections as the basis of legitimacy" (Jabri, 2007, p. 124).

The United Nations' preoccupation with (neo)liberal peacebuilding is occasioned by a number of reports commissioned by the world's governing body. Besides the Agenda for Peace, other influential documents that provide insights into (neo) liberal peacebuilding are the *Agenda for Development* (Boutros-Ghali, 1995a), which sees *peace-building offers the chance to establish new institutions, social, political, and judicial, that can give impetus to development*…in transition states as *peace-building measures as a chance to put their national systems on the path of sustainable development*' (par. 23). In like manner, the *Agenda for Democratization* (Boutros-Ghali, 1996) states *the entire range of United Nations assistance, from support for a culture of democracy to assistance in institution-building for democratization, may well be understood as a key component of peace-building* (par. 46). Similar reports worth mentioning are *Inventories of United Nations Peacebuilding Activities* (United Nations, 1996) and *Peacebuilding Capacity* (United Nations 2006). However, three significant UN documents relating to addressing post-conflict peacebuilding are of importance here: 1) *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations; Brahimi Report of 2000* (Brahimi, 2000), 2) *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict* (United Nations, 2009), 3) *Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture* (United Nations 2015).

Firstly, at the end of the 1990s, the UN commissioned a comprehensive review of its peace operations in an attempt to learn from the challenges and failures of its peacebuilding activities in the 1990s. The aim was to use the knowledge to expand and deepen its role in peacebuilding activities. The report noted, among others, the need for complementing peacebuilding efforts with action against corruption. Significantly, the United Nations became the hub for coordinating peacebuilding activities following the adoption in 1998 of the Security Council Resolution permitting the Secretary-General to institute peacebuilding structures within the organisation. To execute this mandate, the Secretary-General:

> an Executive Committee on Peace and Security to discuss and recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peacebuilding strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies (par. 47).

It is worth noting that, this report re-echoes the liberal peace discourse, by emphasising the 'expert-knowledge' of the UN and its 'trusteeship' role in post-conflict societies. Secondly, the report on *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict* (United Nations, 2009), suggested the need to place importance of the local in addressing the triggers of violent conflict. This in part, was influenced by the rising body of knowledge being generated by critical peace scholars. In this regard, and concerned with the legacy of war on socioeconomic development, the report noted the need:

to restore State authority, particularly in remote border areas, may create new sources of threat, hence the need to protect livelihoods and generate employment avenues. Inter-alia, the document recommended the fundamental need for building local capacities and national ownership of peacebuilding activities to provide motivation and accord legitimacy to peacebuilding interventions… local and traditional authorities as well as civil society actors, including marginalized groups, have a role to play in bringing multiple voices to the table for early priority-setting and to broaden the sense of ownership around a common vision for the country's future, recognising women as victims of conflict and drivers of recovery (see United Nations, 2009).

Impliedly, these notable concerns of the United Nations were gestures in acknowledging the importance of the local for effective peacebuilding. However, given its fixation on liberal peacebuilding and neoliberal ethos of state-building discourses, the quest for emancipatory repositioning in peacebuilding is a mere appendix in the discourse of the UN.

Thirdly, the UN commissioned an Advisory Group of Experts made-up of prominent diplomats and academics to review and advise on the *United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture*. The mandate of this expert group was to help the UN address the shortcomings in its efforts to fill the "gaping hole" in the UN's institutional framework for building peace (United Nations, 2015). Arguably, these "shortcomings are systemic in nature. They result from a generalized misunderstanding of the nature of peacebuilding and, even more, from the fragmentation of the UN into separate "silos"" (United Nations, 2015, p.7 additional quotes original). In this regard, the report noted the need to strengthen the "inclusion and empowerment of youth in national peacebuilding priorities and actions… in ensuring maximum participation by a broad array of societal actors, in both design and implementation" (United Nations, 2015, p. 57). Accordingly, the report shows that the UN was more concerned with interventionist efficiency. As its peacebuilding priorities and activities should be about: "'sustaining peace'… through the complete cycle of UN engagement, from preventive action, through deployment and subsequent drawdown of peace operations, and beyond to post-conflict recovery and reconstruction.", the report concluded (United Nations, 2015, p.57).

In essence, reading together these reports points to the fact that regardless of the crisis of liberal peacebuilding framing acknowledged in these reports, the UN favourably considered it as the only potent approach to world progress. In this regard, as an institution, the UN's decided "to perpetuate a hierarchical view of peacebuilding through increased efficiency [as] answer to crisis requiring interventions and therapeutic treatment to protect subalterns from the (unacknowledged) consequences of contradictions in the system of global governance" (Pugh, 2013b, p. 17). To emphasise the UN's interventionist stance, the reports suggested a unified, partner-laden, policy designed to enable a "statist, hierarchical and feral capitalist order conceptualised though neoliberal corporate thinking" (ibid), to address the crisis of liberal peacebuilding. To this end, the

problem-solving approach of the UN evolved to encapsulate an array of institutional actors to ensure the effectiveness of deliverable tasks, escalate peacebuilding upstream and the desired source of knowledge for liberal peace activities.

Nonetheless, the UNDP in contrast, had published its report on *Post-Conflict Economic Recovery Enabling Local Ingenuity* (UNDP, 2008). This report presented a contradictory narrative with a nuanced approach to understanding context-related issues with striking reference to supporting inclusive peacebuilding. The UNDP's discourse centred around issues such as 'nurturing indigenous drivers' and 'enabling local ingenuity' to enable liberation from top-down peacebuilding. The report's emphasis on context and disaggregated data on conflict countries supports its claim for transformative peacebuilding that addresses two key issues: the autonomy of inhabitants; and human security through economic well-being. However, to prevent a return to the *status quo ante* (Cramer, 2006), the UNDP noted the need for reforming current peacebuilding practices rather than resorting to policies of restoration, thus the importance of "rigorous analysis of pre-war flaws and distortions" (UNDP, 2008, p 65). Taking cognisance of the UN Advisory Group of Experts report (2015), it called for a "robust and inclusive social contract to reflect the aspirations and expectations of the people and the institutional capacity of state and non-state actors, focusing on the relationship between institutions and all groups in society including the most vulnerable ones and those previously discriminated against." (UNDP, 2016, p. 11).

3.5 Liberal peacebuilding as state-building

Most importantly, the various UN reports gave impetus to state-building as a way of absolving these international actors from the problem of consent in intervention, placing emphasis on the free movement of capital through market-friendly policies (Richmond, 2014). The huge resources channelled into peacebuilding interventions since the 1990s, resulting in unsatisfactory forms of peace (Paris, 2002; Richmond, 2010), occasioned the repeated emphasis on the need for liberal peace actors to do more to prevent the resumption of violence in unstable states. The narrative shifted to the claim that "unstable and conflict-ridden societies remained a threat to international security and stability" (Newman, 2013, p. 143). To bring about 'sustainable' liberal peace, policy actors in the liberal peacebuilding industry, with their institutionalist approach, resolved that fragile states or conflict-prone countries have the tendency to relapse due to the absence of 'effective' state institutions (World Bank, 2011). In this sense, state-building was incorporated into peacebuilding with a neoliberal ideological framing to 'reflect the preference for a smaller state architecture, anchored by and in liberal democracy and human rights, the global economy and global governance' (Richmond, 2014; 2021).

The influencing idea of this narrative is that state classified as weak and failing, regardless of the conceptual usefulness of this labelling (Di John, 2010), became the fundamental problem for international order (Fukuyama, 2004; Hagel & Simon, 2004; Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, the idea of state-building was conceived as effective liberal states with the surest prospect of enabling peaceful states for a stable international order (Fukuyama, 2004; Paris, 1997; Shilliam, 2010). The basic unit of the international system is the state; therefore, it serves as the surest means for transmitting western liberal "norms of territorial sovereignty, individualism, and property rights conceived by international rules to mediate the conduct state-state relations" (Waldman, 2014). State-building, with its recent historical antecedents in Structural Adjustment Policies, is about aiding 'fragile' state to have a monopoly over the use of violence with the ability to ensure the "rule of law, taxation, development, the environment and public services" as essential "vehicle for security and development, through which performance can be better coordinated, so that 'good enough' governance is achieved" (Richmond, 2015, p. 65). In effect, peacebuilding efforts begun to focus on making post-conflict states participate in the neoliberal international system (Joshi et al., 2014; Newman, 2013; Pugh, 2013b; Pugh et al., 2016; Sabaratnam, 2013). Fundamentally, state-building policies such as Security Sector Reform programme were conceived and implemented for regime 'security, property rights, basic services, and public finances' (Badie, 2022). Hence, capacitating the state to be effective in maintaining law and order, providing basic public service is essential to sustaining a peaceful international order. Notwithstanding there is little evidence to buttress such claims (see Di John, 2010). In my view, the resolve to the markets as critical avenues for dispensing resources and opportunities, through neoliberal principles partly undergird developmental and democratic tenets of state building processes.

At this point, the interest of the United Nations and other multi-lateral and bilateral institutions centred on 'sustaining' peace by reducing violence to the just beneath the threshold of disruption to the state system. From this juncture, state-building became a central aspect of peacebuilding (Richmond, 2010, 2015; World Bank, 2011). Th UN, learning from its various commissioned reports, begun to position itself as a focal point to effectively coordinate multilateral and bilateral resource for peacebuilding, by robing in other multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. These organisations have been participants in the implementation market-friendly Structural Adjustment Policies form which state-building as peacebuilding borrows its contemporary roots from. The World Bank had begun experimenting with state-building in post-conflict states through its Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries Program, United States' Reconstruction and Stabilization program under the Department of Defence and that of the UK Department for International Development, among others became a part of the

international effort at liberal peacebuilding as state-building, conceptualised with neoliberal ideas (see De Guevara, 2012; Richmond, 2015; United Nations 2004; Department of Defence 2008; DFID 2008; OECD 2008).

Liberal peacebuilding as state-building as a problem-solving concept in mainstream international governance and development circles is undergird by a deliberate construct of intentional will to modernise state-society relations to maintain a liberal international order as a means to improving the lives of humanity. To achieve this, multi-lateral and bilateral governance and development institutions devise policy mechanisms and solutions to enable post-conflict states' capacity to function internationally. Such policies are 'claimed' to be workable irrespective of the context dynamic of a post-conflict state. Further, liberal-peacebuilding policy options are framed in ways that classify and categorize peoples as determinable entities to advance simplistic antidotes to issue of (under)development in post-conflict societies. Additionally, the emphasis and dependence on such technocratic policies by liberal peace-building institutions also requires a particular kind of foreign expertise, or a local agent capable of implementing expert-made policies to render post-conflict issues visible and quantifiable as a means to stabilising post-conflict states. In effect, liberal peacebuilding as state-building entails expert-driven standardised policy interventions and benchmarks for facilitating assessment of implementation goals, classifications, and to draw likeness with other polities. The difficulty herein is that liberal peace interventions have failed to deliver on their own expectations despite the many attempts at refining its normative usefulness (Ikpe et al., 2021; Richmond, 2023; Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2020).

The problem-solving nature of liberal peacebuilding from the prevalent literature is embedded with the interventionist assumptions and averse to complex, non-linear viewpoints. Against this backdrop, the guiding research question of this thesis seeks to understand how contextual realities condition the process of peacebuilding as nation-building in Liberia and Rwanda. In their respective studies, Mac Ginty and Richmond eds (2021) and Ikpe et al. (2021), have shown how liberal peacebuilding as state-building practices have become a contemporary 'password' or 'buzzword' for modernising, non-western countries with oily promises of hope regardless of the incontrovertible failures. These fulsome promises are couched in global policy discourses to reassure stability and progress in spite of previous policy flops through the evocation of 'new global' priorities, goals, and programmes such as the SDGs. In essence, the previous failure to realize or achieve the promises liberal peacebuilding institutions presents a new avenue for experimenting new propositions and schemes. Empirically, post-conflict peacebuilding should be

conceptualised as nation-building to comprise a broad and diverse historical process of a given society's economic, political, and social norms of relations.

Given this background, I conceive of post-conflict peace and development reconstruction as involving a complex process of seeking to bring together society economically, socially, and politically through context-inspired policies, practices, and programmes to address the everyday dilemmas of citizens by shaping their conduct to achieve this common goal. Understood this way, peacebuilding thus encompasses policy practices directed at guaranteeing wellbeing of peoples and minimising societal risks enshrined with the persistent contestations among the many identifiable groups making demands on the processes of state-society relations. These daily contestations of defining, setting, and attaining societal goals are indeterminate tasks, attributable to the everyday nature of society. Hence, peacebuilding as nation building cannot be pre-determined by any measure of accurate determination. It is in this regard, that privileging western-driven liberal technocratic and universal policy solutions for context-specific contestation has generated many resistances and failures (Chandler, 2006; Cox & Sisk, 2017; Lewis, 2017).

3.6 Perspectives on Social Policy

The documented practice of studies on social policy, and by extension its formal study is traced to the late nineteenth century in Europe, described by Flora (1986: vol. 1, xii), as *European invention* occasioned politically by the French Revolutions and economically by the Industrial Revolution (Rimlinger, 1971a, pp. 2–3). Europe, prior to the end of the Middle Ages, was characterised by endemic poverty which was regarded as local issues for municipalities to deal with, and only become an issue of national public and political significance at the turn of the continent's socioeconomic transformation (Daigneault et al., 2021; Pierson & Leimgruber, 2021; Marsh, 1980). As Karl Polanyi (1957; 1944]) avers the period known as the *Great Transformation* – industrialization, the rise of capitalism, urbanization, and population growth in Europe exacerbated the canker of poverty and destitution 'grave societal, economic, and political morass. Rendering the traditional forms of welfare provision offered by the family, benevolent groups, churches, and municipalities incapable of the situation. The growing social insecurity (Kuhnle & Sander, 2021) situation informed the German economist Adolph Wagner, to postulate in 1893 that occurring notable changes in economy and society would lead a to large public sphere requiring significant state interventions through increasing public expenditure (Lindert, 2004; also see Wagner 1893).

The ongoing transformations in the mode of economic production and social organisation in Europe during this period had accrued power to a tiny few (Polanyi, 1944), notably wealth in the

powerful nobles or bourgeois class, the Catholic church, wealthy families who possessed significant resources of economic value, and controlled access to opportunities, and social mobility to the exclusion of the masses (Acemoglu, 2012; Piketty, 2014; Polanyi, 1944). Outside mainland Europe, the British had passed an Act criminalising those it considered beggars and vagabonds from 1531 (Marsh 1980; Pierson & Leimgruber 2021) in the quest of the government to categorise the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor, a distinction that is explicit in contemporary social policy programme such as cash transfer' programme in many countries. This began to change with the development of nation-states (Pierson & Leimgruber, 2021; Polanyi, 1944).

Before the development of what is now known as the 'Welfare State', the problem of endemic poverty in Europe was deemed as a social problem consigned to the realms of local administration, philanthropy, and the Church (Pierson & Leimgruber, 2021; Piketty, 2014; Polanyi, 1944; Rimlinger, 1971a). The Elizabethan Act for the Relief of the Poor in 1601 established a safety system for the poor under the administration of the parishes, which meant relief of the plight of the "destitute children, the disabled and infirm, the unemployed, and the work-shy" (Kuhnle & Sander, 2021, p. 76). Similarly, the Prussian Landrecht of 1794 handed patriarchal responsibility for the poor to the state, but its implementation was delegated to localities to provide social care (Dorwart, 1971). In France, the state did not think it necessary to establish a legal right to poor relief, as noted by Rimlinger, "In France, the feeling was still [mid-nineteenth century] that the poor had to be threatened with the possibility of starvation to be kept industrious" (Rimlinger, 1971b, p. 46). Thus, these poor laws can be described as repressive legal regimes against the poor (Kuhnle & Sander, 2021).

The ensuing changes in the social and economic structure of European states, population growth and movements, and increase in wage labour, with its accompanying risks birthed the *rethinking* about the social role of the state in advancing inclusive development (Kuhnle & Sander, 2021; Pierson, 1991; Pierson & Leimgruber, 2021). The remarkable social problems unleashed by the industrial, urban, and capitalist developments in Europe during the nineteenth century instigated political demands on governments, calling for regime changes and greater social rights that are progressive (Kuhnle & Sander, 2021). Hence, poor laws lacked in adequacy to respond to the increasing poverty and exclusion in Europe (Marsh, 1980, p. 5).

Intellectually, the origins of the welfare state are tangled and difficult to attribute to a single source (Pierson & Leimgruber, 2021). Consequently, the valency of the term 'welfare state' is conceptually crowded, often associated with terms such as 'social security', 'social insurance',

'Sozialstaat', 'Wohlfahrtstaat', and 'État providence' and a miscellany of institutions and policy practices (see (Béland & Petersen, 2015). The policy-making function of all kinds of society involves problem-solving under constantly mutating social and political contexts requiring policy actors to find responses to puzzling situations (Heclo, 1974; Thomann, 2015). To be sure, the ideational canonisation of the 'welfare state' must consider the fact that there were parallel knowledge and systems outside of Europe about the wholistic wellbeing of society (Heclo, 1974; Perrin, 1969). In African societies, communal solidarity and risk pooling has been a critical feature of the norms of relations that bind communities in a given territory (Adésínà, 2006).

However, in Europe, the gradual shift in state practice related to the welfare of citizens emerged from the 1880s with the expansion in state-society relations with the emergence of new modes of economic production. Pierson (2006) and Lindert (2004), think of the period between 1875 and 1914 as the 'birthing' of the welfare state in Europe. Plausibly owing to the magnitude of social insurance policy proliferations to deal with social ills during these years (Hennock, 2007). At the same time, many European (Germany, Britain, France, the Scandinavian countries, Italy, USSR, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, etc.) countries' budgetary allocation to social expenditure grew considerably (Perrin, 1969; Pierson & Castles, 2006; Pierson & Leimgruber, 2021). This crystallised into what has become the European inventions of the 'welfare state', with its present transnational nature after the second World War (Flora, 1986). Overall, the welfare state emerged out of concerns about maintaining or securing economic progress, given the mounting political and moral threat to the authority of the state imposed by the conditions of the working class (Pierson and Leimgruber 2021). The solution was thought of as requiring the intervention of the state somehow.

The scholarly works of T. H. Marshall (1950) on 'Citizenship and Social Class', Alva Myrdal's 1934 essay on 'Crisis of the Population Question', Erving Goffman's work on 'stigma' (Goffman, 1990[1963]), John Maynard Keynes's 'General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money', and Richard Titmuss's essay 'The Social Division of Welfare' (1976 [1955]) foregrounds the post-war development of welfare regimes under the rubric of social policy studies. In the immediate post-war period, social policy scholars focused on welfare policies in aiding the development of advanced capitalist economies and developing countries (Esping-Anderson, 1990). In particular, Keynes, in his opinion, argued that it was important for governments to manage the economy by creating full employment and controlling the investment function of income to cause distributional linkages in the economy through a blend of taxes and benefits as the basis for repairing the post-war economies and political landscape.

Similarly, the incremental expansion of rights in response to capitalist control and expansion of social and economic relations influenced the conceptualization of social policies in Europe from the onset. In this regard, the legal notion of citizenship becomes one of the considerations in thinking about social policy. Accordingly, Marshall's conception of equating the social rights of citizens to that civic and political rights is noteworthy. Marshall examines the evolution of political, civic, and social rights in Britain and notes: "it was still true that basic equality, when enshrined in substance and embodied in the formal rights of citizenship, was consistent with the inequalities of social class?" (Marshall, 1950, p. 9). Subsequently, he avers that British policy actors had assumed "that the two are still compatible, so much that citizenship itself had become, in certain respects, the architect of legitimate social inequality" (1950, p. 9). Subsequently, he contends, "if we maintain that, in the nineteenth century, citizenship in the form of civil rights was universal, the political franchise was not one of the rights of citizenship. It was the privilege of an economic class, whose limits were extended by each successive reform" (1950, p. 20). Put differently, citizenship is to serve as the least common denominator in the provision, accessibility, and enjoyment of public services. Public services were to be extended to all persons by virtue of citizenship rights accrued to them. Thus, citizenship is to be the distributive mechanism for public services and not the markets. Marshall (1950, p. 8) notes:

> by social element [of citizenship] I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.

For this Richard Titmuss, in part; "the industrial achievement-performance model of social policy… incorporates a significant role for social welfare institutions as adjuncts of the economy. It holds that social needs should be met on the basis of merit, work performance and productivity" (Titmuss, 1974, p. 31). Thus, social policy is conceptualised, according to Titmuss (1974, p. 141) "as a positive instrument of change; as an unpredictable, incalculable part of the whole political process. This observation by Titmuss of social policy as a predetermined consequence of capitalist development meant to achieve balance and order in society is rooted in the development antecedents of social services in Britain before the 20th century. Hence, political administrations, Titmuss argued, "assumed a measure of direct concern for the health and well-being of the population which… by contrast with that in the 1930s was little short of remarkable" (1950, p. 506).

However, Titmuss's conceptualisation of social policy and the role of national governments was one that consigns social policy as an appendage to capitalist development. This is due to the reasoning by Titmuss of the social life and wellbeing of citizens that was seen a better off during

the post-war period with the involvement of the government. This observation was credited to the British government's "regular employment, regular sums for housekeeping, food, clothes and other necessities, stable prices—all this not for a period of weeks, but years" (Titmuss, 1950, p. 532). In recent times, this reasoning has been amplified by the basic needs and human development or capability proponents in both academia and non-governmental spaces, such as Amartya Sen (1993, 1999, 2010), Martha Nussbaum, Ilse Oosterlaken (2009), Ingrid Robeyns (2006), Sabina Alkire (2005), and the UNDP (1990 – 2005), who contend that for the expansion in social and economic production to translate into wellbeing, human freedom must be placed at the centre of economic growth without unnecessary government interventions. This *decommodification* of social provisioning, as illuminated by Esping-Andersen (1990), is the degree to which economic (re) production provides access to decent living at the behest of an individual's capacity to purchase the necessary social and economic goods and services in the marketplace or "such access to decent living based on collective provisioning" (J. Adésínà, 2015p. 102) Thus, securing the basic needs of a people is fundamental to enhancing democratic citizenship and social rights.

I believe this conceptual basis of liberal welfare social policy holds a residual-developmental orientation. Social policy here is construed as the interventions needed for the (re-) industrialisation of (post-war) countries by using social tools to placate economic policies without disrupting the means of capitalist production and mass accumulation. Consequently, state-indulgent in contemporary development process became tied to "both civil society and the market in promoting development goals" (Hall & Midgley, 2004, p. 40). The expansion of liberal welfarism in Europe, according to Polanyi (1944), resulted from instinctive reactions to the alienating nature of economic outcomes and its effects on general social relations caused by the expansion and development of capital.

The development and spread of capitalism in Europe correlate to colonialism and the neo-colonial scramble for resources in Africa and elsewhere (Holmwood, 2000; Hansen 2000; Willson 2015). For instance, unpacking the formation of the European Economic Community, which has its key members as "former colonial and imperial powers, with France, the Netherlands and Belgium entering the EEC together with their colonial possessions" is a way of reasoning through this phenomenon (see Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018, p. 576). Even if Germany and Italy had lost this tag due to their respective wartime defeats and later entrants into the pact, such as UK, Spain, and Portugal (ibid). Notwithstanding discounting the anti-colonial and civil rights movements making welfare demands on the colonial governments. Strang (1994) observes that "with massive de-colonization, Britain and France were reduced to second-rate powers and forced to turn inward.

This inward turn may have facilitated the further expansion of metropolitan political, social, and especially welfare rights" (1994, p. 292).

In this regard, granting independence and popular sovereignty was a 'sympathy' gift to the colonies, as the metropole shifted attention to concentrate inward (Strang, 1994). As argued by Hansen and Jonsson (2012), developments after the war processes culminated in the founding of the European Economic Commission which maintained "Africa and the common market were bound together in one imperial polity" (2012, p. 1029). Hence the integration of Europe was birthed, conjoined to "Africa as dowry to Europe" (Hansen & Jonsson, 2011, p. 455), permitting access to the continent's natural resources – namely, land, labour, and markets, considered as cardinal to the success of the European integration project (Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018; Bond, 2006). However, this neo colonies being "subjected to incorporation" for the advancement of Europe had no say (Hansen & Jonsson, 2011, p. 455), just at the Berlin conference sliced African territories among Europe a century earlier. Impliedly, the European "unification could succeed only if it was fashioned as a joint colonization of Africa" (Hansen & Jonsson, 2013, p. 11), maintaining Europe's trusteeship of Africa (Bond, 2006; Cowen & Shenton, 1991)

Further, this residual-developmentalist notion of the Welfare state-formation in Europe, North America, and Australia (including New Zealand) is rooted in colonialism which birthed capitalism – its blemish for which the ideology of welfare public policy is meant to address. Put differently, the development and spread of capitalism are contingent upon the context in which the welfare state emerged and expanded. Thus, studies by Wilensky (1975), Bhambra and Holmwood (2018), Hansen (2000), and Willson (2015) suggest that capitalist economic advancement with its demographic and administrative expansion partly explains differences in the welfare-state among European and industrialised countries.

Capitalism is conceptualised as an economic system of rules that emphasise the market's 'impersonal' exchange relations (Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018; Ferguson, 2010; Harvey, 2007). Understood this way, the *economic* sphere of a society is secernated from both the *social* and *political* spheres. With the evolution and practice of colonialism as a political phenomenon, its analytical usefulness in the origins in capitalist development is usually glossed over, although, partly, colonialism birthed and facilitated the evolution and spread of capitalism in Western Europe, North America, and their satellite metropole in Oceania (Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018). Illustratively, colonialism in Africa, the Caribbeans and elsewhere nourished the creation of enterprises for which investments exacted labour as was the case in the rubber, sugar and cotton

plantations in Africa, America, and the Caribbean colonies. Understandably, colonialism and its settler forms could not provide its own required workforce from 'self-owned' labour needing "forced labour, specifically, chattel slavery" (Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018, p. 578). As espoused by Bhambra and Holmwood (2018), the egress of capitalism was beside chattel slavery that carried no conceptual or normative distinction "between the human individual and his or her labour" (p. 578). The individual under this form of slavery is decoupled from "his or her labour power, is treated as a commodity and is detached from the rest of life and 'stored' and 'mobilised'" (ibid, quotations original). Consequently, both terminologies of 'slave' and 'enslavement' and 'slave master' dehumanises, dispossess, and commodify peoples, their labour activity and power through practices of inhumanity or public policies that create deprivation differences structurally and functionally (Bhambra, 2021a; Ferguson, 2010). This ideational framing is fundamental to the anthropological and sociological understanding of the classical versions of liberalism and neo-liberalism (Bhambra, 2007, 2016, 2021a; Ferguson, 2010; Harvey, 2007; Polanyi, 1944; Rodriguez-Salgado, 2009).

Colonialism and, consequently, capitalism constructed different subjugation of labour to capital – 'wage labour, family labour, indentured service and enslavement, and precarious forms of labour, and the creation of a market for luxury goods are cardinal to the logic of capitalism' (Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018; also see Bhambra, 2007, 2021a; Fanon, 1952; Fraser & Jaeggi, 2018; Harvey, 2007; Rodney, 1972). Thus, the institutions of political control mechanisms for these forms of labour provided the impetus for classifying membership into the colonial and post-colonial state in terms of the value placed on one's labour and person and the subsequent confirmation of citizenship that predicated sanctions, rewards, and privileges. Equally, this led to the evolution of a sense of governability through public policies to frame 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' as categories for control, acceptance and blame within the political system (JAnderson, 2014; Hart, 1973). As argued by Bhambra and Holmwood (2018), this development led to the:

> commodified' labour power and its separation from human individuality might be understood as a 'moral', rather than an 'economic' category, deriving from a particular religious tradition and applied, in the first instance, only to those understood as members (p.579).

In this context emerged the privatisation of communal rights in land, knowledge, and labour, among others and, in turn, the creation of a system for dispossession, class, and landless labourers for which the coloniser held trusteeship (Cowen & Shenton, 1991). The colonial system represented these labourers as 'self-possessed', with the "capacity to work and able to 'alienate' their labour power in return for wages" (Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018). However, Polanyi argues

in disagreement, noting that equating a person's labour to a commodity is a 'fiction' (Polanyi, 2001). This assertion of Polanyi arises from the fact that labour, however it is conceptualised, is basically a synonym for "a human activity which goes with life itself, which in turn, is not produced for sale but for entirely different reasons, nor can that activity be detached from the rest of life, be stored or mobilized" (2001, p. 72). The *self* cannot merely be reduced to 'labour', and the fundamental conception of *self* implies the claim to rights associated with one's humanity (Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018). This extends to the 'common conditions of labour' that foreground the development of 'solidarities and dignity' of people's capabilities and capacities for self-organisation to advance their collective good through the reciprocation of norms and mutuality of actions (ibid).

The introduction of colonial rules of classification, sanctions, and dispossession into African and other non-western societies through colonialism become canonised as formal – applicable to what is controllable by the 'colonial state and inherited by the post-colonial state' (Fanon, 1952; Mamdani, 1996, 2001; Rodney, 1972). Hence scholarship across disciplines in the African context has tended predominantly to regurgitate Anglo-Saxon imaginations (Rosenau 1992, Mafeje 1997; Adésínà 2002). However, there have been attempts, especially in the social sciences, to counter this fixation of Western ontologies within the African context (Adésínà, 2002; Mafeje, 1997; Mamdani, 1996, 2002; Ake 1984). Osaghae observes that "local and foreign researchers were critiqued for giving intellectual muscle to a supposedly neo-colonial project meant to keep the fragile African states weak and divided (Osaghae 2001, p. 119). Hence, the imperialism of knowledge production (Ake 1984) grounded in the colonial project has relegated the norms of reciprocity, values, prescripts, mutuality, shared risks, security, and expectations that mediated political and social relations and economic spheres of exchange – the *cultural norms of humane treatment* have been designated as 'informal'. Consigning the normative and epistemological understanding of a people – their endogenous forms of knowledge that shapes state-society relations to the realm of 'informality' – leaving the post-colonial state in a dilemma of "dualism – the formal and the informal, the modern and the traditional, the rational and the moral, the urban and the rural, the state and the ethnic nation" (Adi, 2005, p.7).

Ostensibly, the various forms of social policy in Western societies and their acute subordination to capital accumulation, economic, and structural transformation (Bhambra, 2007, 2021b, p. 1; Hansen & Jonsson, 2011, 2013) is attributable to the ideational overstate about the extent to which the state is detached from societal forces as espoused by classical development state theorists (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Mkandawire & Yi, 2014). Historical accounts of social policy posit it

as a political tool for assuring the legitimacy of governments to assuage any forms of protestation by forces within the state capable of disrupting process of capitalist industrialisation, and in recent times, (neo)liberal governance (Esping-Andersen, 1992; UNRISD 2014). However, Mkandawire and Yi are of the opinion that states have always been aware of the social demands of society exigent to their corporate strength (Mkandawire & Yi, 2014). It is in this view that the nation building ethos of social policy in the African context is fundamental to transforming the norms and practices state-society relations it relates to socioeconomic reproduction for inclusive development in the bourgeoning nation-state, especially in post-conflict (Adésínà, 2009; 2015; Mkandawire, 2001b, 2004, 2007, 2010).

3.7 Social Policy in the African Context

A careful reading of the literature on social policy suggest little attention has been devoted to the endogenous forms of enabling societal welfare in its antique and contemporary forms. Myrdal notes lack of attention by scholars to understand the important constitutive norms and practices of inclusivity in the African way of life (Myrdal, 1981). Thus, in Africa the thought of social policy is often associated with European colonialism and the socioeconomic ill it left in its wake and featured in most literature on social policy as illustrative of how African countries welfare systems are shaped by their political, economic, and social history (Adésínà, 2009; Aina, 2004;Kpessa et al., 2011; Kpessa & Beland, 2013; Patel, 2012). This assumption, though fare stretched, arises from the tendency of scholarship on the subject matter being bounced off the evolution of the 'welfare state' in Europe in the late 19th and 20th Centuries traceable to colonialism and struggles for independence in Africa. Hence, colonialism becomes the starting point of thinking social policy in Africa due to the introduction of colonial rules of classification, sanctions, and dispossession in African societies, canonised as formal – applicable to what is controllable, disregarded and shaped by the colonial state to foster is hold on the polity in colonised societies (Cowen & Shenton, 1991; Hart, 1973). This is reflected in the colonial public policy of providing basic amenities to facilitate the plunder and erosion of a peoples' way of life and knowing (Adésínà, 2009; Bulhan, 2015; Fanon, 1952, 1963, p. 19; Hodges, 1972, p. 19; Kpessa & Beland, 2013; Mkandawire, 2001a, 2004, 2011; Nkrumah, 1965; Rodney, 1972).

What is original to the *Weltanschauung* of African societies expressed as norms, values, and prescripts of reciprocity, mutuality, shared risks, security, and expectations that mediated political, and social relations and economic spheres of exchange – the *cultural norms of humane treatment* have been designated as 'informal' (Adésínà, 2002; 2006; Adi, 2005; Arrow, 1950). This concept of 'informality' has been influential and may studies dedicated to   political economy of

development in Africa, not least the influential work of Nobel laureate Sir Arthur Lewis on *The Unlimited Supply of Labour* (Lewis, 1954). This influenced policy thinking in a number of independent states, such as Ghana in the 1950s and 1960s. Hence, consigning the endogenous forms of state-society relations in Africa to the realm of 'informality' (Kpessa-Whyte, 2018), leaving the post-colonial state in a dilemma of "dualism – the formal and the informal, the modern and the traditional, the rational and the moral, the urban and the rural, the state and the ethnic nation" (Adi, 2005, p. 7). Alas, some of the everyday norms of relations have been eroded due to the continuous disregard of time-tested communal modes of engagement such as solidarity, risk-pooling, and generosity, among others (Adesina, 2022). In this regard, Osei-Hwedie is of the view that social policies are both "formal and informal rules and guidelines underlying the organised efforts of society to meet the need of its members and ameliorate the problems confronting them on individual, group and community bases" (Osei-Hwedie, 1998, p. 6). Hence, social policy as a means to achieving inclusive development is not alien to African societies (Adesina, 2022; Kpessa-Whyte, 2018).

At the minimum, social policy is considered as a government's public policy interventions and programme to affect people's welfare. Welfare is then understood to mean the set of ideas and practices to mitigate everyday risks intended to ensure individual wellbeing and the commonwealth of members in a polity. Modern social policy literature is associated with social provisioning in the form of livelihoods assistance, provision of healthcare, housing and other programme geared towards assisting the poor, unemployed and marginalized in society (Foli, 2016; Jo & Todorova, 2017; Kpessa, 2013). Thus, it is fair to understand social policy in the African context as the risk pooling of resources to secure the collective good. This connotes the utility of collective value for inclusivity. Departing from the Rawlsian notion that primes tokenism and incorporation in the liberal sense of the concept. Understood in this context, social policy is context-specific – grounded in the values and worldview of a society (Adésínà, 2002; 2006).

Consequently, the literature on social policy in Africa begins with examining how the leaders of the post-independent countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia among others adopted and used social policy instruments to mitigate the socioeconomic mutilations of the African conditions on the emerging civic state, out of the multiplicity of ethnic nations (Adésínà, 2006, 2009; 2015; Aina, 2004; Kpessa & Beland, 2013; Mkandawire, 2001a, 2004, 2007). These efforts were attempts by the various leaders and policy makers at the time to foster varieties of inclusive imagined communities (Adesina, 2022; Anderson, 2006), and socioeconomic development by kneading together the many ethnic societies into a common socioeconomic and political civic

community in the immediate years after independence (Adésínà, 2007; 2009, 2015; Kpessa, 2010; Kpessa & Beland, 2013; Mkandawire, 2001b, 2004; Olukoshi, 2001, 2007).

Therefore, the pretermit nature of the human condition under colonialism and the general deficiency in socioeconomic development propelled the need for, and justification for social policy as a means to development. As argued by Olukoshi, the "nationalist agitation was a concern with the inadequacy of the social provisioning that was available to them under the colonial dispensation in spite of the heavy taxes which were levied by the colonial authorities" (Olukoshi, 2000, p. 8). This encouraged African leaders of the emerging post-independence nation-state to pursue statist-oriented social provisioning in education and, health care, housing, among others as a means of incentivising civic citizenship (Adésínà, 2009; 2011; Aina et al., 2004; Mkandawire, 2001b, 2011).

The immediate period after independence in Africa was a watershed moment in social policy development premised on the norms of nation-building and solidarity (Adesina, 2009; Aina, 2004; Garba, 2007; Kpessa & Beland, 2013). Reading examples from Ghana, Tanzania, and Western Nigeria, Adésínà (Adésínà, 2015; 2022) corroborates the deliberate, albeit different, approaches to inclusive social and economic development adopted by Léopold Senghor, Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah. For instance, in Western Nigeria, policymakers pursued social provisioning in agriculture and industrial development as a route to achieving collective development. Though in Tanzania, the social approach to inclusivity was underpinned by the policy praxis of Villagization or *Ujamaa*, a communal-based development strategy that prioritised communal norms of relations, risk sharing, and generosity, among others (Adésínà, 2015; 2022). In the case of Ghana, state investment in the socioeconomic sectors through the delivery of public services and infrastructure in education, housing, health etc., the setting up of industries and the drive to open up access to these services was considered by policymakers as the means of improving the human conditions in post-independence Africa and providing avenues for socioeconomic (re)production (Adésínà, 2007, 2015b; Foli et al., 2018; Kpessa, 2010; Kpessa & Beland, 2013). As a consequence, the norm during the immediate post-independence period saw most African countries deliberately purse state-funded investment in social and economic sectors through a mixture of public policy programmes (see Adésínà, 2009; Aina, 2004; Chachage, 2007; Mkandawire, 2001b, 2004) based on principles of equity and inclusivity (Adésínà, 2015b; Garba, 2007). Impliedly, these deliberate policy considerations were informed by the desire to ameliorate the socioeconomic situation of the nouveau citizens in the emerging nation-state, and to promote social cohesion. As shown by Adésínà (2009, 2006), Kpessa (2010), and Chachage (2007), the deliberate pursuit of state-led investment in these countries showed obvious growth in the social and economic sectors and

enhanced avenues for individual well-being and capacity enhancement to escape the appalling conditions bequeathed by colonialism.

Unlike the welfare state in Europe and North America that originated out of the negative outcomes of industrialisation, social policy in Africa was used as a public policy means for inclusive socioeconomic and political development (Mkandawire 2001; Adésínà 2022, 2015, 2006), similar to trajectories of the developmental welfare state in the East Asian region (see Kwon, 2005; Kwon et al., 2009). As Mkandawire has elaborated forcefully "in Africa, we have many examples of states whose performance until the mid-1970s would have qualified them as ''developmental states'' in the sense conveyed by current definitions, but which now seem anti-developmental because hard times brought the economic expansions of their countries to a halt" (Mkandawire, 2001a, p. 291). This can be attributed to the fact that from the late 1970s to the 1980s, many emerging civic states in Africa faced severe challenges that led policy-makers to cut back spending on social development programme on the policy advise by the World Bank as evidenced in the roll-out of structural adjustment programme (Adésínà, 2007; Mkandawire, 2001a; Olukoshi, 2000). The idea underpinning this policy advice was that social spending was anti-developmental. Specifically, the roll back of the state during this period led to a reduction in spending by African governments on social services and the introduction of out-of-pocket fee payment for social welfare programmes that undergird inclusive development (Adésínà, 2006, 2009, 2015a; Aina et al., 2004; Olukoshi, 2007). In this context, social policy was conceived within the liberal sense of ascribing the responsibility of socioeconomic wellbeing to the individual and consigned to a residual category (Adésínà, 2009, 2015b; Kpessa, 2010; Kpessa & Beland, 2013).

3.7.1 Social Policy in the Neoliberal Age

After the reconstruction of Europe following the Second World War, emerged an ideological debate in Western academic, policy, and political circles about the approach to shape the basis of political, social, and economic relation, especially with regards to formerly colonized (now independent) states (Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018; Rodney, 1972; Shilliam, 2017). The effect of the ideational and policy contestations during this period in general, is what Polanyi (Polanyi, 2001) refers to as 'the great transformation' that birthed neoliberal variant of capitalism. The economic ideas of Keynes were fundamental to the post-war reconstruction of Western economies (Keynes, 2018). Keynesian policies were opposed to the policy blueprint of 'laissez-faire' policies that partially led to the world wars, and in particular the Great Depression (ibid). As such, it was argued that the use of public policy to intervene in the economic and social spheres of the state by governments through the creation of 'full employment' was important to "redistribute wealth and

regulate corporate profit" (Klein, 2007, p. 17). In this regard, public policy prioritised direct state intervention in the economy through welfare provision as a necessary condition for economic growth and moderation of the avarice for profit, which had become the keystone of capitalism.

However, framed in the language of modernisation (Rostow, 1971), learning from the ideology of trusteeship deployed during colonialism and the commodification of human relations (Anderson, 2014; Bhambra, 2021b; Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018; Cowen & Shenton, 1996; Harvey, 2007) arose a counter school of thought with a fundamental belief in the market as a means to achieving 'wholistic' development. Among the many proponents of the market-led school of thought in its variations is (Hayek, 2007). Reading together their ideas brings to the fore the market-centric economics of neoliberalism that individualises the (re)production of state-society relations. In this sense, they posit that individuals as consumers were better left to make choices by themselves as rational 'object' in the midst of market forces. Hence the (neo) liberal thinking that with the markets free from government 'meddling' contrary to Keynesian ideas would lead to a more efficient distribution of goods and services (Hayek, 2007). In sum, Hayek espouses this idea in his book *The Road to Serfdom* succinctly by stating:

> The state should confine itself to establishing rules applying to general types of situations and should allow individual's freedom in everything which depends on the circumstances of time and place because only the individual concerned in each instance can fully know these circumstances and adapt their actions to them. If individuals are able to use their knowledge effectively in making plans, they must be able to predict actions of the state which may affect these plans. But if the actions of the state are to be predictable, they must be determined by rules fixed independently of the concrete circumstances which can be neither foreseen nor considered beforehand; and the particular effect of such action will be unpredictable. If, on the other hand, the state was to direct the individual's actions so as to achieve a particular end, its action would have to be decided on the basis of the full circumstances of the moment and would therefore be unpredictable. Hence, the familiar fact that the more the state "plans", the more difficult planning becomes for the individual" (Hayek 2007, p. 114).

To give currency to the praxis of this idea of (re) ordering the state-society relations was the experimentation of an 'aggressive' new form of capitalism through the application of *shock therapy* in Latin America (beginning with Chile) (see Friedman 1962; Klein 2007). This crystalised into a departure from the classical conception of capitalism, culminating in the triumph of neoliberal policy ideology that claimed no alternatives the mode of economic relations posts western reconstruction after World War II (see Klein 2007; Harvey 2007). In this sense, the ideology of neo-liberalism becomes cemented in the ways of knowing and doing in mainstream social science departments (especially in Economics) and Western policy institutions led by Bretton Woods Institutions (Klein 2007). Beyond the Western academic and policy chambers at the forefront of diffusing the policy prescriptions of neoliberalism were Margaret Thatcher and her

compatriot Ronald Reagan, both leaders of their respective countries at the time – animated this policy with the free market ethos of neoliberalism in the real world (Klein 2007).

The primary policy attributes of neoliberalism – the retrenchment of the state and the exclusion of its politically constitutive elements, to allow the 'imaginary' free hands of the market through the abolishment of government controls in the economy, free trade, privatization of communal or state-owned resources and an individualistic approach to the articulation of social rights as the efficient means to societal (re)production. Accordingly, neoliberal thinking championed the ability of human initiatives for innovation, such as undertakings in the pursuit of personal benefit. It notes that the productivity of the economy was less costly to the state (reduction in social spending or collective intervention for inclusive development) in the distribution of services, resulting in 'more beneficial' social outcomes. Thus, markets-driven provisioning of public services and needs such as education, housing, health care, pensions and positive-discriminatory policies was emphasised.

Thandika Mkandawire fleshes out the inherent contradictions in the ideological underpinnings of neoliberalism and its policy effects when he argues that with the triumph of neoliberalism:

> [T]the rise of the right in the 1980s and 1990s privileged individual responsibility and a limited role for the state. This had a profound influence in some of the key industrial countries. Thatcher's insistence that there "is no such a thing as community" touched on one of the most important ideological underpinnings of social policy—solidarity and citizenship. It is this neoliberal ideological position that has set the limits on social policy and underpins the preferences for "user fees', means-testing, market delivery of social services or "partnerships" in their delivery. This ideology has also eliminated the equity concerns that have been central to all the successful experiences of poverty reduction (2005: 2).

However, Said Adejumobi (2004), observes that whereas African states were compelled by the Bretton Woods Institutions to lower their spending in the social sphere of their respective economies, the converse was happening in Western countries to the effect that it was estimated that such spending in OECD countries during the 1980s increased by about 20%, varying across countries in this cluster. This led to the discrediting of the statist-liberation ideas that shaped social policy making in Africa after independence (Mkandawire, 2001b; Shivji, 2009). Accordingly, social provisioning – housing, education, health, nutrition, rates of literacy, employment and life expectancy slumped (Adésínà 2009,2015; Shivji 2009; Kpessa 2010), eroding the self-respect and dignity among the poor segment of the population (Adésínà 2015).

3.8 The turn of Transformative Social Policy (TSP) Framework

By the 1980s, after a conscientious pursuit of developmentalism, a combination of external and internal factors plunged African economies into debt distress (Mkandawire 2001). Couched in the ideology of neoliberalism, the Bretton Woods Institutions designed a set of technical solutions as

beholders of knowledge to Africa's socioeconomic problems in the contexts of policy ownership, diffusion, and learning. This was heralded by the publication of the Berg Report in 1981. A study set out to diagnose and recommend policy 'best' practices for African governments. The adopted report became the source document for the implementation of (neo)liberal structural adjustment policy reforms seeking to address the debacle development that had characterized African countries by the 1980s. However, the structural adjustment policy recommendations did little to improve the socioeconomic conditions of implementing countries. Rather, evidence suggests the orthodox roll-out of structural adjustment policies had a compounding effect on human conditions, with severe social costs. In response, Adésínà (2011) notes how the Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) Program were launched in 1987 primarily as a multi-agency programme led by the World Bank. Countries such as Ghana had to adopt context-specific mitigation policy measures such as Program of Action to Mitigation the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) (see Hutchful 1994; Barwa 1995).

This trusteeship mentality of Western policy institutions towards development, peace and security has tended to focus on liberalised policies *alleviating* and not *eradication* the underlying causes of the fear from want and lack of inclusivity in state-society relations. Likewise, these neoliberal policy institutions continue to self-reward their ephemeral *successes* sandwiched by worsening inequality, poverty, conflict, and lack of opportunity personal growth and achieving collective goals. Thus, the 'Western' hegemonic ideas couched in Anglo-American realities, biases, and influences decontextualises the *locale* by privileging knowledge suffers implementation muddles. Hence the need for ideational policy that is ontologically relevant and is able to articulation the everyday needs of citizen to minimise the risk of fear from want. This is quest for alternative thinking was occasioned by the development debacle faced by African countries among others in the Global South.

The *ideas* of Transformative Social Policy (TSP) evolved as an epistemic and ontological response to the trust mentality of technocratic (neo)liberal received policies framings by Anglo-American policy chambers headquartered in western capitals (Mkandawire 2001). This conceptual alternative draw inspiration from the outcome of the Bandung Conference in 1955, and to some extent the Lagos Plan of Action. At the beginning of the millennium, Mkandawire begun to advocate for a rethink of the developmental state in Africa where social rights were embedded in the quest for economic development. Thus, Mkandawire (2001, p.1) argued "developments in economics and other disciplines gave impetus to new analysis— as well as a rediscovery of some

of the 'old' development insights—bringing to the fore what hitherto had been treated passively, reactively, and secondarily to macroeconomic of growth and development".

The ideational ethos of TSP is grounded in endogenous policy practices that utilises several public policy tools for development that is equitable, inclusive, and democratic (Mkandawire 2005; Adésínà 2015). In a sense, TSP is premised on securing the lived experiences of citizens jurisdictions throughout their life cycle, specific by ensuring social justice for all. This holds contextual relevance for understanding the rebuilding of post-conflict societies in which violent conflict was triggered by underdevelopment. The foundational texts that birthed this conceptual paradigm came from Thandika Mkandawire and Jimi Adésínà (See Mkandawire 2017, 2016, 2010, 2007, 2005, 2001; also see Adésínà 2020, 2015, 2011, 2009). The roadshow to discuss the core ideas that foreground TSP was heralded by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) commissioned study on "Social Policy in a Development Context" (see Mkandawire & Unies, 2001). The roadshow was aimed at providing a conducive and contextual experiential basis for the coherent conceptualization of transformative social policy, particularly for policy relevance to the African condition. This Mkandawire noted was inspired by the Copenhagen Social Summit organised in 1995. The outcome of this summit resolved that social and economic development were not separate but mutually constitutive. Hence, irrespective of the experiential differences in context-specific development, economic development fundamentally revolves around social issues of 'welfare, equity and social justice' (Mkandawire, 2010).

This study partly draws on the concept of Transformative Social Policy (TSP) as a means to policy (re)consideration in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies in the sense espoused by Mkandawire and Adésínà (See Adésínà 2015, 2011, 2007; Mkandawire 2001, 2004, 2007, 2009). Initially conceptualised as policy prescriptions for the "collective intervention in the economy to influence the access to secure adequate livelihoods and income" for the collective good (Mkandawire 2004 p.1). Its normative framing was expanded by Adésínà who conceptualised transformative social policy as "a wide range of instruments to raise human well-being, transform social institutions, social relations and the economy" Adésínà (2015, p. 113). The conditions of underdevelopment that trigger disharmony in society are clumsy and nested, breeding uncertainty and unintended consequences. This does not lend itself to technocratic and deluxe policy prescriptions as construed by liberal policy institutions as *better orderly* for oiling the wheels of the international liberal order; rather the triggers of underdevelopment and conflict are embedded in *complex truths* of the local arising from the unpredictable nature of socioeconomic and political interactions of human relations in a polity.

Figure 3: Transformative Social Policy: Norms, Functions, Instruments and Outcomes

(Adopted from Adesina 2011, p. 463)

Inspired by the Bandung spirit, the normative enterprise of transformative social policy is aimed at transforming the complexity of everyday risks of a people's existence through the design of public policies embedded with the potentiality of ceaselessly altering the nature of socioeconomic and political norms of relations to achieve inclusivity – equity and social justice (Adésínà, 2011; 2015b; Cocozzelli, 2014). Inclusive development here is construed in the sense that institutions are designed to mediate norms of relations interacting with public [social] policy in advancing patterns of development in society that is cognisant of and incorporates the diverse risks of peoples beyond mere tokenism. Cognisant of the embedded and complex nature of the development debacle challenging many 'developing' countries, TSP is concerned with policy decisions that cut across multiple public institutions and norms. Precisely in recognition of the clumsy nature of the conditions of underdevelopment and the need to transcend the monocropping and monotasking design and implementation of public policies that have been the norm.

Applied to post-conflict states, Bangura (1994, 2000) calls for the use of public policy prescriptions to instigate conducive situations for reforming institutional mechanism that defines and animates decent lived experiences and responsive public authority that accommodates competing demands in the quest for durable development using social policy tools. To my understanding, the nature of contextual issues that undergird peacebuilding as nation-building defy the technocratic and 'done this before' policies, but a dextrous process that requires collaboration between and among multiple institutions and norms in a cloudlike policy praxis to build durable peace and inclusive coexistence. Given that inequality – vertically and horizontally is multidimensional and breeds marginalisation, as was the case in Libera and Rwanda, with the potency of triggering violent conflicts. Thus, post-conflict peace reconstruction policies must aim to address such socioeconomic imbalances.

For instance, using the TSP design approach, education policy is considered as an intrinsic policy tool for redressing inequality and transforming the issues that condition the same (Adesina, 2009, 2011b; Mkandawire, 2004b, 2007; Tekwa & Adesina, 2018). In designing such educational policies, TSP favour a policy design that enhances individuals' knowledge and skill sets to enable their progression along the socioeconomic grid irrespective of race, ethnicity, gender, and religious differences. But equally, as a mechanism for retooling the social services in health and housing, as well as instigating scientific and technical innovation to instigate, boost and propel agricultural, trade and safeguard the environment for meaningful living (Adésínà, 2007, 2015, 2014, 2020; Mkandawire, 2004b, 2005, 2007; Ouma & Adésínà, 2019). Postcolonial education policy design in countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Senegal, Malawi and Zambia give credence to this assertion (Adésínà , 2009, 2022; Kpessa & Beland, 2013). In post-conflict situations, doing this requires purposeful leadership.

Accordingly, TSP is concerned with how leadership in a polity evolves deliberative democratic institutional mechanisms for animating socioeconomic norms of relations and (re)production pertaining to the protection livelihoods, redistribution and building social cohesion (see Adésínà 2009, 2011, 2022; Mkandawire 2010). Hence, public policy must be rooted in public reasoning that considers the popular struggle of the citizenry, the historical dynamics of state-society relations and the people's sovereign will. Social policy design should lead to the transformation of society grounded in contextual norms of reciprocity and solidarity for economic advancement. Consequently, Adésínà avers that the pursuit of policy autonomy the immediate post-independence leadership of Ghana, Senegal, and Tanzania, in the aftermath of colonial rule was grounded in their country-specific experiential realities. This he noted, shaped their commitment to using public policies to evolve a public sector that married the social and economic sectors for inclusive development.

This context induced policy agenda engendered the provisioning of social and economic goods and services to repair the ruins of colonialism and build an 'new' nation-state (Adésínà 2022). Scholars such as Tekwa (2020), Ouma (2019) and Phiri and Adésínà (2020) have applied the transformative social policy approach in various studies. For instance, Tekwa applies TSP to illuminate our understanding of agrarian change, land reforms in Zimbabwe and how it is addressing the existing gendered nature of access to land and welfare issues (Tekwa 2020; also see Tekwa and Adesina 2018; Chipenda 2022). On her part Ouma (2019, 2020), using TSP, argues that social assistance programmes in Kenya are unable to mitigate the situation of inequality as a result of the decontextualised nature of their design and implementation.

Similar conclusion was drawn by Madalitso (2019) in his comparative study of the welfare regimes of South Africa and Brazil. He notes that the social policy architecture of both countries is of little relevance in building inclusivity as specific social policies 'barely challenge the institutional legacies of anti-black racism' (see Madalitso 2020). Juxtaposing this in a post-war context, the paramountcy of TSP is the risk-pooling of agency, norms, and resources for the collective improvement in lived realities across the life cycle; improvements in social conditions; enhancement of citizenship and participation in building social cohesion or inclusive societies shaped by the history of exclusion, violence, and underdevelopment (Adésínà, 2009, 2015; Cocozzelli 2009). To my understanding, the nation-building function of TSP conveys its ultimate normative goal as putting 'humanity' at the core of enabling the social contract that binds state-society relations, in particular reference to post-conflict Liberia and Rwanda.

3.8.1 The nation-building function of transformative social policy.

The nation-building of social policy as a sub-set of public policy relates to the use of inclusive social policy tools framed by the leadership or policy actors of countries to address the socioeconomic fissures. With the primary objective to achieve equity, ameliorate the everyday risk of living, create inclusive political, social, and economic relations and belonging for the progressive good of society (Adésínà 2011; Jenson, 2010). Social cohesion refers to the norms of community relations that 'reflect community members' tendency to cohere and cooperate within and across groups' (Bennet and D'onofrio, 2015). Particularly, Adésínà is of the view that transformative social policy is constitutive of using policy tools to risk-pool the agency, consent, and resourcefulness of all segments of society; young and old, rich, and poor, abled, and challenged, faith and faithless among others for the collective good (Adésínà 2011). In this regard, purposive social cohesion and trust are underpinned by how deliberative and distributive institutions interact in a democratic milieu. These institutional interactions must be anchored on the sovereignty of a state, and the contextual realities of socioeconomic development out of which social policies are designed for inclusion. Policies that are meant to animate the equal rights of persons, citizenship, and solidarity of all persons "living in a given territory" (Adésínà 2009, p. 38; also see Mkandawire 2005).

Regardless of the ethnic constituent of post-conflict societies, peacebuilding as nation-building involves the deliberate deployment of policy tools to knead together all segments of the population in a specific jurisdiction with their unique attributes into a single community with a communal aim of collective progress (see Anderson 1991; Cocozzelli 2009). For instance, in some parts of Africa, the immediate years after independence witnessed the leadership in Ghana, Senegal and Tanzania

showing public policy commitment to creating "trans-ethnic national identities that bound their citizens together" (Adesina 2022), made possible using social policies in health, education, housing, transportation and agriculture to construct the post-colonial state by securing the wellbeing of citizens (Mkandawire 2001, 2005). The sovereign autonomy over policy making, taking cognisance of the specific histories of these post-colonial states, enabled these leaders to envision context-induced development that addressed the social and economic realities in a mutually constituted manner through the exchange of influence with citizens. This gave meaning to sovereignty as it hinged on collective public reasoning to transform social and economic norms of relations and (re)production of society by ensuring equity in the (re)distribution of social and economic goods and services to minimise the risk associated with lived realities and promote collective well-being.

For it is impossible to consign peacebuilding as nation-building to individual control of goods and services in a market environment that is intrinsically driven by profit considerations. Economically, how can the ruins of war be repaired if such market principles herald post-conflict construction? In effect, survivors of violent conflict are commodified and made to exchange their quest for self-fulfilment as dictated by the conditions of the market. Politically, leadership that is entrusted with animating the social pact in the collective interest emerges out of the rhetoric of the less evil and the purchasing ability of political party over the other without recourse to the ethos of social contract and sovereignty of the people. In this regard, the exchange of influence is becoming an economic good available for transaction between individual with purchasing ability. Here, private consideration overrides the collective good. Sovereignty becomes meaningless and development is controlled by capital consideration over collective welfare interests. Among others, this creates the conditions for the relapse into violent conflict. Additionally, Adésínà notes the unrestrained liberalisation of state-society relations in Africa occasioned by the structural adjustment decade and the various phases of neoliberalism hinders transformation (Adésínà, 2007). The effect of this neoliberal onslaught on the polity and its bureaucracy eroded state legitimacy, creating:

> avenues for massive enrichment of individuals in a widening sea of human vulnerability and deprivation… questioning, fundamentally, the legitimacy of the state, and the spill over of difference into conflict, occurred within this context of declining legitimacy of the state. While not the root cause of these conflicts—domestic policy and leadership issues were strong contenders—the retrenchment of the state at least served as the trigger mechanism (Adésínà 2007: 24).

In every polity, the web of relations that defines the constitutive state–society relations by ascribing obligations and privileges are shaped by leadership responsiveness to citizens needs through the exchange of influence. The imposition of adjustment policies from the 1980s, forcing the roll-back

of the state from social provisioning in healthcare, education, housing, transportation, and agriculture eroded the legitimacy of the state and its autonomy over policy making, and diminishing the value of the peoples' sovereignty. Among other factors this culminated primarily in the eruption of violent conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda etc.

Therefore, national "leadership issues are strong contenders as triggers" of violence in conflict affected societies in Africa (Adésínà 2009, p. 48). Thus, post-conflict reconstruction that breads inclusivity is dependent on autonomy over policy design and implementation shaped by deliberative institutional relations for enabling public reasoning and emerging leadership that is sufficiently aware of the historical and contemporary nature of society specific development realities and prioritises equity and social justice as cardinal to making relevant the social contract (Adésínà 2009; Olonisakin 2015, 2017). Instructively, Adésínà's admission to the functional role leadership plays in actuating violent conflicts in society, equally brings to the fore the fundamental role of leadership in post-conflict nation-building. Paying attention to the leadership process – the mindset of leader, contextual realities, and the medium for exchanging influence to securing public legitimacy and policy effectiveness for the collective goals in post-conflict societies is relevant to transforming the norms of social, economic, and political (re)production for durable peace. Accordingly, the normative framing of TSP – equity and solidarity, its nation-building functions, and development outcomes are partly a function of process-based leadership. Next, this chapter discusses leadership as process withing the objective of this study.

3.9 Leadership in Society

Every post-conflict polity is riddled with messy conditions of development. In this regard, the post-conflict condition of states requires an embedded approach to mediating citizens' needs, risks, and expectations in constructing a 'new' polity with the barest minimum likelihood of relapsing into violent conflict. In many ways, leadership like its many related social science concepts have no precise definitions or corporate labels (Robinson, 1980). Joseph Rost in *Leadership in the Twenty-First Century* identified 221 scholarly definitions of leadership with diverging points of emphasis (Rost, 1991). According to Yukl (2008), the differences in perspective in the definition of leadership are not just an issue of 'scholarly nit-picking, but a reflection of the contestations about the identification of leaders and the leadership process (p.3). In her review of numerous publications on leadership, Ciculla assumed "one can detect a family of resemblance between the different definitions. All talk about leadership as some kind of process, act, or influence that in some way gets people to do something" (Ciulla, 1995, p. 12). In her opinion, the notable difference in these definitions relates to how the many authors emphasise aspects of the interconnections

between leaders and followers regarding how they achieve set aim(s) and objective(s) etc. Understood this way, leadership in a society is relational – it forsakes any form of individual heroics – as Robinson notes, associating leadership to the political limits our understanding of the concept. He argues that we:

> identify leadership with the political by association, but they are aspects or elements of it rather than its actual nature. Figures and institutions – president, the legislature, bureaucracies, parties, armies etc – can be recognised as being of the nexus of the political, but they are by no means identical with it. These are not the substance of the political but its phenomenology: the objects which express the presence and influence of the political (Robinson 1980, p. 7).

However, as we may conceptualise it, leadership is fundamentally relational (Bass & Bass, 2009; Bennis, 1989; Grint, 2010a; Hollander, 1964; Murphy, 1941; Northouse, 2016; Olonisakin, 2017; Pierce & Newstrom, 2003). In essence, any attempt at post-conflict reconstruction is fundamentally an exercise of leadership – the process of exchanging influence between those designated to lead and the multiplicity of individuals that make up the local (see Olonisakin 2015, 2017). This process is inclusive of the ability of persons who emerge as leaders to define the challenges confronting society in a manner that resonates with the collective to exact their cooperation and give legitimacy to public policy and outcomes. As conceived by Albert Murphy, leadership in society concerns the 'interaction between the leader (person) and the situation, where the situation consists of the followers and the context in which both parties find themselves (Murphy 1941). Consequently, Leadership in society is expressed as L= f [(Person) (Follower/s) (Context)] (see Pierce and Newstrom 2003). From the extant literature on leadership, the interaction between persons who lead and followers and how leaders' approach what they are meant to do, is fundamentally evident with respect to process-based leadership (Olonisakin 2017; Grint 2010; Pierce and Newstrom 2003; Ciculla 1995; Murphy 1941). This presupposes that leadership relates to the institutional arrangements in a polity to create orderliness by ascribing what is permissible or otherwise in achieving (a) collective goal(s). Conceived this way, the elements of leadership are constitutive of – context/situation, leaders, and followers in a fluid web of (inter)relations (Grint, 2010b; Hollander & Julian, 1969; Murphy, 1941; Pierce & Newstrom, 2003; Robinson, 1980). Consequently, leadership in society relates to the "more 'mundane' and everyday practices through which social relationships and thus social capital are built and strengthened" (Grint 2010a, p.13). The mundane nature of leadership makes it a fastidious enterprise for mediating the complex nature of human socioeconomic and political relations.

Put differently, leadership as a process encompasses giving value to an issue that resonates with the publics' interest by resorting to skills and resources such as rhetoric, coercion, bribery, exemplary behaviour, and bravery, among others to motivates followers (Grint, 2010a; Murphy,

1941). It does not matter the individual attributes or competences possessed by a person or leader, but precisely how leaders frame issues or experiences in a convincing manner for followers to perceive and accept to achieve a collective goal (Grint, 2010a; Pierce & Newstrom, 2003; Smircich & Morgan, 1982). Writing on *Why Leaders Can't Lead,* Warren Bennis notes that effective leadership is contingent upon what leaders do to exact legitimacy from followers by providing, managing, and communicating a 'vision'; courting trust through practices that exude 'reliability and consistency'; being sufficiently aware of the context through time and space and 'knowing' when and how to do what (see Bennis 1989, p. 118-120).

In a societal context, leadership is about deliberately facilitating through a mix of practices the construction of innovative policy responses to the challenges or problems that confront a people. It follows that challenges or problems faced by any given society can be described in essence as *recalcitrant, uncertain,* or *wicked*, demanding complex responses to deal with effectively (Grint, 2010; Kavalski, 2009). Here, I adopt Rittell and Webber's (1973) typology of 'tame' and 'wicked' problems to distinguish between management and leadership. Tame problems are puzzle-like situations that may be complicated but are resolvable if one applies known or laid down procedures (Rittell & Webber, 1973). Usually, such problems have the propensity of recurring such as floods, fire outbreaks in congested settlements, locust infestation etc. For such tame problems there is a limited degree of precariousness and are easily dealt with using management principles (Grint, 2010). In other words, a manager adopting the right standard procedures should find solutions to such problems. For instance, if we consider the popular narrative of climate change being a threat to our collective existence, the solution then becomes zero carbon emission.

Conversely, wicked problems are in the form of uncertain complex risks and phenomenon that affect human interactions in relation to their surroundings (Kavalski, 2009; Rittell & Webber, 1973). By its very nature, any form of solution to a wicked problem cannot be decoupled from its environment as there are no clear linkages between causes and effects. They are deeply embedded complex issues that straddle a range of institutional arrangements by their fluid nature (Grint, 2010). For instance, we cannot stop; we have stopped substance abuse because we have built more rehabilitation facilities and legislated harsher measures. Because 'wicked' problems are knotty it is often assumed it cannot be solved (Rittel, 1967). Leadership, understood in liberal terms, is "associated with precisely the ability to solve problems, act decisively, and to know what to do" (Grint 2010, p.17). The danger herein when it comes to leadership in society is that many of the issues that confront the leadership of a country do not lend themselves to static resolutions. Therefore, both students and practitioners of leadership should be very circumspect about taking

decisive actions, just as it is not obvious what needs to be done. Assuming such societal problems elicit clear and precise solutions, they become 'tame problems', not 'wicked problems. Yet the compulsion to act emphatically often causes leaders to fashion solutions to such societal predicaments as though they were 'tame problems'.

The authority to make public policy decisions and pursue inclusive peace is linked to power as it is ascribed by a political system. The ability for a person or group of persons to offer any form of persuasive appraisals of problem being mutually experiences is shaped by the nature of power. The forms of power that conditions persons to emerge and exchange influence for a shared goal is described by Grint as "the irony of 'leadership': it remains the most difficult of approaches that many decision-makers will try to avoid at all costs" (Grint, 2010, p. 20). I adopt Steven Lukes conceptualisation of power as *A* exercising power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests (Lukes, 2005, p. 37). To be sure, power is a relations activity performed in specific domain of experience to secure compliance through the exchange and acquisition of notions and the formation of preferences for the attainment of interests. Hence exercise of power involves exacting compliance. For this study, I adopt Etzioni's normative compliance, which conceives of power in a polity as the exercise of control based on shared values (Etzioni, 1975). Consequently, the nested, complicated, and embedded nature of problems faced by post-conflict societies demands normative compliance. Leaders cannot force people to follow them in addressing the wicked problems of society because such situations demand transformation of the norms of relations in post-conflict societies. While followers must desire to be a part of the solution.

The process of exacting compliance can be constructive or destructive (Grint 2010). Destructive consent is when persons "comply with authority, even if that leads to the infliction of pain upon innocent others – providing the rationale is accepted by the followers, and they are exempt from responsibility" (Grint 2010, p. 29). This form of compliance is easily acquired in both democratic and authoritarian systems where power is exercised erratically without recourse to public reason, and interest and responsibility is to the 'self' and not the 'collective'. Otherwise, constructive dissent is when persons involved in the leadership process at any given point of the spectrum, and at any point in time are willing to speaks truth to power in the attainment of the collective good.

The relational nature of leadership emphasises the collective as an integral aspect of dealing with *wicked problems* in a way that transforms norms of socio-economic and political relations and societal (re)production. The conditions of post-conflict societies are not tame issues as has been offered by liberal peace scholars, thus defying managerial and technocratic solutions. To be sure, situations faced by polities recovering from violent conflicts – pursing peacebuilding as nation-

building are wicked problems – requiring a relational and institutional mechanisms that diffuses public authority as the responsibility of the individual to the function of the collective (Grint 2010; Robinson 1980; Murphy 1941). Impliedly, the emphasis on collective process in solving a peoples' common challenge is an encompassing approach that places *the people* at the fulcrum of engaging in inter-related set of processes in addressing societal problems for the common interest. Precisely so as the *uncertain* nature of deeply embedded issues that confront post-conflict peacebuilding implies that the substance of leadership is an art – a process of engaging a people, polity, or community to brace up and address the complex problems that conditions their collective wellbeing along the lifecycle.

Figure 4: Leadership in Society – a typology of problems, power, and authority

(Adopted from Grint 2010, p.21).

3.9.1 Leadership as process

In definitional terms, leadership as process is a dynamic interactive social influence relationship built consciously over time between more than two persons or among a community dependent on each other for the attainment of a desirable collective goal. Leadership in this sense, involves a mutuality of threats and expectations faced and desired by both the leader and the follower (Northouse 2021; Olonisakin 2017; Grint 2010; Bass and Bass 2009; Pierce and Newstrom 2003; Bennis 1989; Hollander and Julian 1969). This form of leadership thrives upon and is embedded in the collective will of society. Hence, the resources of leadership are embedded in the situation or context in which people find themselves at any point in time (Northouse 2021; Grint 2010; Smirch and Morgan 1982; Bennis 1989; Hollander and Julian 1969; Murphy 1941). Such resources or attributes — collective action, trust, and networks, resolve among others — are to achieving inclusive development (Grootaert 1998). A processed-based approach to leadership in post-

conflict contexts offers a robust mechanism for deploying public policy tools to pursue durable peace and inclusive development to transform the root causes of violent conflicts (Olonisakin 2017).

This pathway to peacebuilding ensures a mechanism for continues engagement with the nested issues about the triggers of violent intra-state conflicts to find sustainable and progressive means to peace and development. Deducing from the extant literature on leadership three main elements of leadership as process are relevant to post-conflict societies in the pursuit of nation-building: a) context, b) mutuality, c) influence (see Olonisakin 2017; Robinson 1980; Smirch and Morgan 1982; Hollander and Julian 1969; Murphy 1941). The existential risks to a community's survival, progress or otherwise defines the context in which leadership occurs. *Context* – the situation or conditions of human inter-relations a community or society faces that constantly (re)frames their leadership experience (Olonisakin 2017). In post-conflict polities such as Liberia and Rwanda, the norms of socioeconomic and political relations – inter-group framings, power relations, marginalisation, and poverty etc condition their lived experiences. To be sure, appraising the magnitude to which these issues affect the experiential and daily fears of living for the different segments of society across the life cycle constitutes an important basis for analysing the role of leadership building durable peace.

Relatedly, the *mutuality* negotiated and exhibited by a community is a significant part of building social cohesion (see Haythorn et al., 1956; Maier & Hoffman, 1965). As noted by Olonisakin (2017), nurturing mutuality breeds "a sense of shared feelings or intentions among people experiencing a particular situation" (p. 20). Hence the task of leadership in post-conflict settings is to be sufficiently aware of the range of issues, the diversity of citizens, and the many actors both local and external whose interests, concerns or otherwise are mutually associated to the quest or efforts at designing and deploying public policy tools to build social cohesion and progressive development (Olonisakin 2017; Adésínà 2009,2022). This allows those who emerge as leaders to be aware of the potential of risk-pooling and evolving relations mechanism that accommodates all segments of society, offering the potential for achieving collective goals that animates the social pact in post-conflict societies.

The final aspect of process-based leadership is *influence* – how persons who emerge to lead or find themselves in positions of leadership to exchange and asserted their appraisal of societal issues in given context for acceptance by the populace. According to Homans (1961), "influence over others is purchased at the price of allowing one' self to be influenced by the other (p286). This involves the awareness of resources available to both the leader and the following to be exchanged for

collective benefits (Blau, 1964; Fiedler, 1966; Hollander, 1958; Katz & Kahn, 1966; Rosen, 1961; Stogdill, 1959). These resources in the broadest sense, are the collective capabilities of all persons involved in the leadership process. These can be both innate and acquired through the passage of time as part of societal learning processes.

Crucial to the effectiveness of leadership as process is how influence is exchanged (Maier and Hoffman 1965; Blau 1964; Rosen 1961). According to Olonisakin, "influence is the heartbeat – the single most important driving force – of leadership" (Olonisakin 2017, p.20). The relational nature of leadership emphasises the fundamental nature of how social and institutional mechanisms evolved to instigate, accommodate, and shape interactions, conversations or public reasoning between leaders and followers in appraising issues of public concern for collective action(s) (Grint 2010; Pierce and Newstrom 2003; Bennis 1989; Maier and Hoffman 1965; Murphy 1941). Since inclusive peacebuilding in post-conflict spaces require is underpinned by an ideational ethos of how to solve the embedded and complex issues that triggered violence and germane to the post-violence state of affairs, there is the need for persons who emerge to lead to assert influence in their spheres of operation with survivors mutually affected by the complexity of the risks associated with their daily experiences and desire for self-actualisation in a fulfilling manner. As noted by Grint (2010), Smircich and Morgan (1982) and Murphy (1941), it is not the skills that a person possesses that make leaders; it is how followers, citizens, or people perceive and accept the situation presented by a person or one who emerges as a leader that makes leadership.

Figure 5: The process-based approach to leadership

Thus, leadership does not reside in a person regardless of the power, position or what one has previously achieved. It is about how the social interaction in a polity conditions the emergence of an individual or a collective based on how a common issues or set of issues are famed and approaches, means or ideas to solving them are present and accepted by the collective. Leadership in this context is a group effort through conscious and controlling societal mechanisms that results in a desirable situation – more rewarding to the aspirations of the group as a whole.

Given the nature of the international system and the interconnected nature of economies, this behoves on external actors and policy institutions seeking to intervene in societies recovering from violent conflicts through peacebuilding policies to have contextual knowledge the setting and recognize the context-specific mechanisms and persons with sufficient knowledge to appraise and articulate the mutual needs, desires, and goals of the collective for the common good. Such mutuality presents an all-encompassing approach to building cohesive societies and progressive development. Fundamentally, making public policy decisions aimed at building social cohesion and inclusive development involves a process of legitimising the actions of public official though an institutional mechanism for offering persuasive account of the lived experiences of a people and identifying significant means to collectively achieving them. In essence, grounding with the people helps to socially construct collective problems and solutions and legitimize the authority and actions of public officials to this end. The caution however is that opposition to such an approach is easy and common – but precisely why leadership is required.

Associated with post-conflict societies is the erosion and weak nature of the social fabric and norms of social, economic, and political relations (Colletta & Cullen, 2000). Thus, non-material resources such as — collective will or resolve, trust and mutuality if absent from peacebuilding efforts, would hinder the quest for inclusive development that transforms the root causes of violent conflicts. Evidence from case studies reported in the literature points to the salience of these non-material resources on a variety of development outcomes (see Ferroni et al., 2008; Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2002; Hayami, 2009; Ritzen et al., 2000).

Equally, has been touted as a core pillar of strengthening deliberative democratic systems (Putnam, 1993), enhance educational systems and outcomes (Coleman, 1990), and as a means to recovery from situations that disturb the social harmony of society (Aldrich, 2012). Hence nation-building efforts in post-conflict societies require the peacebuilding actors pay attention to the complex web of issues and the cardinal of political leadership in making public policy decisions. Deliberative democratic mechanisms in post-conflict settings formally confer legitimacy through the election or appointment of public officials, ignoring informal forms of conferring legitimacy and the variety

of locale and voices that exist in the polity. The nature of such opposing views of power, authority and policy preferences or choices demands a process of continually defining and articulating the formal and informal practices and structural conditions of agency for transforming the socioeconomic norms of relations for building inclusive peace.

3.10 Conclusion: Transformative Social Policy and Leadership for Inclusive Peacebuilding

From the extant literature examined in this chapter, the ideational foregrounding of peacebuilding policy interventions has been to solve the problems that occasion violent intra-state conflicts. On its part, liberal peacebuilding policy interventions in post-conflict countries in Africa has been to a mission to 'modernise' Africa in the image of Anglo-American norms of relations through 'superior knowledge', 'technicalised', 'expert-driven' policy prescriptions that decontextualises the daily realities that conditions peacebuilding in post-conflict societies. This approach focuses on problematising the *individuals* as the focal point in peacebuilding policy prescriptions – individuals are to be more responsible for their own wellbeing across the life cycle with the state playing a limited role. Therefore, liberal peace's problem-solving approach has been through liberal market and democratic institutions framed in Anglo-American ethos to building state-security, market reforms for economic development; and political reform to enable the rule of law, justice, and reconciliation as a means to create lasting peace. This way, development assistance, with its associated policy conditionalities for intervening in post-conflict societies is to empower state institutions to perform the regulatory function of the state as a means to participating in the liberal international order.

From the evidence in the existing literature on post-conflict peacebuilding, this approach to peacebuilding holds little contextual relevance and seldom leads to any form of durable peace beyond capacitating the post-conflict state to perform its Weberian-regulatory function in meeting the minimum requirements for participating in the international system (see Richmond 2015; Duffield 2015; Sabaratnam, 2015; Chandler 2013,2015; Pugh et all 2014; Torto, 2013; Lidén, 2009). An increasing number of critical scholarships on post-conflict peacebuilding have sought to question the ideational underpinning of liberal peacebuilding. However, many of these highly rated critical writings that have evaluated liberal peacebuilding's problem-solving approach using diverse methodological and epistemic approaches through case single and comparative case studies with respect to questioning the epistemic assumptions and normative applications of liberal peace ascriptions, seek not to dismantle them but to rehabilitate them.

Accordingly, this study adopts a TSP-L approach to post-conflict peacebuilding to understand how post-conflict peacebuilding is addressing the genesis violent conflicts to avert a relapse using

Liberia and Rwanda. The post-conflict development condition is one that is embedded, chaotic, clumsy, and dynamic. This reflects Karl Popper exposition of communities or societies as "an interlocking system of clouds and clocks . . . to some degree all clocks are clouds, or in other words, that only clouds exist, though clouds of very different degrees of cloudiness" (Popper 1972, pp. 206–242). In this study, we conceptualise peacebuilding as nation-building. Hence, we focus on the social policy as a sub-set of public policy is deployed as promote national cohesion and progressive development. Consequently, the study adopts a Transformative Social Policy (TSP) approach combined with leadership as process (LP) or process-based leadership as TSP by its current conceptualisation, is inadequate in explaining how leaders appraise the context-specific conditions of post-conflict polities, adopt social policies instruments in a manner that resonates with survivors to build a cohesive and progressive society with the barest risk to violent erupting. Here, and throughout this thesis, the crucial aim is to combine normative imperatives of TSP and LP as an evaluative framework to understand how the root causes of violent conflict can be transformed, with implications for further scholarship and policy practice. In turn, this pushes the discussion on post-conflict peacebuilding to one that considers not just the normative usefulness of peacebuilding interventions, but how leadership in these societies play a crucial role in exchanging influence with actors that fits into the contextual realities of everyday peacebuilding to transform the state-society norm of social and economic relation and (re)production that builds inclusivity and brings about durable development for the collective good.

Chapter Four

4.0 After the slaughter: issues of inclusivity in post-conflict nation-building in Liberia and Rwanda

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I explore the post-conflict development issues that are germane to building inclusive peace in both Liberia and Rwanda. The unequal development in both Liberia and Rwanda that triggered the violence experienced by both countries was characterised by marginalisation, ethnic divisions, pillage, and poor human development. These cocktails of issues culminated in the outbreak of genocide in Rwanda and the massacre in Liberia. In this respect, I examine the nature of policy framing to address the catastrophic consequences of the civil strife in both Liberia and Rwanda and the circumstances for building durable development. Hence this chapter discusses the current contextual development and inclusivity issues in both countries. Relying on documentary sources and the narratives of my respondents during fieldwork, this chapter brings to the fore post-conflict development trajectory of Liberia and Rwanda from 2003 when both countries promulgated new constitutions as the foundation for their respective post-conflict peacebuilding-as-nation-building. This comparative analysis is done by juxtaposing key provisions of *the 1986 Constitution of the Republic of Liberia* – (2004 as amended) with the *Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda* (as amended, 2003), together with other official policy documents and records of development in both countries against the lived experiences of citizens as narrated to me during my fieldwork. The aim of this chapter is to bring to the fore present contextual realities that undergird the quest for post-conflict durable peacebuilding and nation-building.

The end to violent conflicts presents a space for a countries leadership to remould the social and economic norms of relations in a transformative manner. The promulgation of 'new' constitutions is meant to define the basis of state-society relations and to provide the necessary impetus from which policy makers formulate public policies to spawn a new development agenda. This way, the social pact upon which state-society relations is rooted is (re)cast through public policy tools and mechanisms to build an inclusive and progressive society. However, if this is not approached in a transformatively, it is possible for the numerous unsettled historical policy practices that caused grievances, exclusion, discrimination, and ethnic cleansing, among others to re-emerge and intensify during the post-conflict era can create new forms of disharmony in society. This can trigger insecurity and eventually lead to the resumption of violent hostilities. To my understanding,

the nature of the post-conflict situation is nested and deeply rooted, demanding transformative social or public policies with multi-tasking institutional mechanisms to address the plethora of issues and accommodate the diversity of internal and external actors.

More often than usual, the pre-violence-stricken state offers little resemblance to the post-conflict polity in terms of demographic dynamics, education and knowledge formation, ecological changes, and technological advancement, among others, even if the present population consist significantly of remnants from the past era who still carry with them some form of memory. The refrain, however, is that "the present does not flow from the past as if it was the only possible future that could have emerged from that, nonetheless the past and present are linked by active ties of collective memory according to the principle that what happened once can happen again" (Vansina 1995, 199-200). Thinking along these lines, we avoid conjectures and postulations of 'if this had happened'… 'that hadn't happened' and the invocation and exploitation of between-group framing of 'us' versus 'them' – 'exploiters', 'victims', 'saviours' 'executioners' etc (see Mamdani 2001, 2009, 2012; Vansina 1995). The subjective of the now should be the raison d'être for which one begins an attempt at rethinking the basis for transforming societal norms of relations for inclusive peace and progressive development. Collective memory plays an important role in post-conflict nation-building when people decide 'never again do they want to experience a horrific episode in their associational life'. Otherwise, the 'mis'-recollections of such memories are counter-productive to building national cohesion, regardless of the medium through which it is expressed.

Essentially, the ultimate policy objective of social policy prescriptions for nation-building is to dismantle the potency of ethnicization of norms of relations in building a national cohesion. In doing so, it is expected of policy actors to institute measures that allows citizens to acknowledge the role of ethnic polarisation in violent conflicts. While the lived experiences of survivors must be more reflective of a nationally constructed identity, it must equally embrace the differences in identity as constitutive elements of the emerging national identity. This must be reflected in both official narratives and the everyday of citizens. With regards to the antecedence of violence that culminated in the genocide suffered by all Rwandese, directly or indirectly; there is the need for creating consciousness among citizens about the polarisation of identity that trigged the violence. Hence official policy positions should be reflective of the fact that, predominantly, Tutsi suffered the most, but all Rwandans are survivors of genocide and its devastating effect on the fabric of society – individually and collectively. It is within this context the peacebuilding as nation-building that transforms the societal relations must present neither only Tutsi as designated

victims, nor are Hutu perpetrators. For the experience of victims and survivors is shaped by Tutsi, Twa, and Hutu killers; Twa Tutsi, and Hutu opposers to the crime; Hutu, Twa, and Tutsi saviours; and Hutu, Twa, and Tutsi survivors (see Mamdani, 2020; Thomson, 2011; Vansina, 1995).

The focus of this chapter is to examine the contemporary nature of post-conflict nation-building developments in both Liberia and Rwanda by examining the everyday realities of citizens within the context of peacebuilding as a development lexicon as coined and popularised by actors in the peacebuilding industry. By examining the nature of the 're-emerging' state is shaping peacebuilding practices for inclusive development. In part, the guiding assumption in this chapter is that the everyday contestations over the authoritative allocations of resources in post-conflict Liberia and Rwanda cannot be decoupled from its violence phase. In writing this chapter, I acknowledge the extensive studies previously conducted on the various aspects of peacebuilding in both Liberia and Rwanda. Accordingly, this chapter is constructed, bearing in mind the tendency of projecting a wishful mimicry of past social and political relations that may contradict the experiential accounts of the cross-section of citizens who participated in this study. The greater error, however, is the nostalgic projection of pre-colonial cultural norms of relations as though the constitutive elements of a people's culture: institutions, values, customs, and practices are static. Given that they are constantly being redefined as and when circumstance demand, and shape social, civic, and economic relations at present.

Examining citizens' self-reported experiences of the efforts being made by policy actors and their effects of post-conflict reconstruction is partly a relational function of leadership in both Liberia and Rwanda. This provides the foundation that will offer further contextual discussion of the transformative capacity of leadership in pursuing the objectives of durable peacebuilding as nation-building through the use of social policy instruments in chapter five. The basis for this approach is the exposition by the general scholarship on liberal peace and development with the new framing that incorporates the 'local' (Richmond 2009, 2017), and "national-level ownership and leadership" as 'new' practice and discourse in peacebuilding (United Nations, 2015, p. 56). The aim of this chapter is to tease out the experiential social, political, and economic relations as reported by respondents vis-à-vis the intentions and efforts by the leadership of both countries at building inclusive peace and durable development. The chapter answers in detail this study's first research question: *What context-specific realities define the aspiration for peacebuilding as nation-building in Liberia and Rwanda?*

The next section examines the policy context that situates the reconstruction process in both countries. Subsequently, I discuss selected policy frameworks earmarked by both countries as

drivers of their peacebuilding as nation-building and how they measure on selected key socio-economic indicators of inclusive development such as life expectancy, social inclusion and equity, and participation among others. Next, I present the narrative of daily realities of a cross-section of citizens as shared with me during field work in relation to the quest for peacebuilding as nation building in both Liberia and Rwanda.

4.2 Policy framework for transitioning from violence to peace

In this section, I discuss the efforts of policy makers at creating the necessary conditions for inclusive post-conflict development and the how this addresses the precarity of social, economic, and political experiences of the citizenry. Accordingly, it is useful to begin an examination of the transformative underpinnings of the peacebuilding process in contemporary Liberia and Rwanda within the confines of the lived experiences of the citizenry. Especially, by taken into consideration norms of social, economic, and political relations. Doing so requires the use of diversity of data points and approaches that allow one to obtain varied perspective (Barker et al., 2002; Barker & Pistrang, 2005)(see Bailie 2022; Dow 2012). Especially those often overlooked in weaving together the mutilated fabric of society, by taking cognisance of the past and the gamut of present-day conditions of development and social cohesion in both countries (see Mamdani, 2001, 2020; Gourevitch 2015; Bornkamm 2012; Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002; Vansina 1995; Maquet, 1971). This gives readers insight into where the two countries find themselves presently in their peacebuilding efforts. The first part of this chapter focuses on the socio-economic and political relations and lived experiences of citizen in both polities. Through the fame of how both polities are emerging from the violence of the past towards inclusive social, economic, and political relations of (re)production. This is helpful in providing insights into how person and between group framings and appraisal are being shaped though social policy tools in both Liberia and Rwanda.

Normally, a rudimentary approach to peacebuilding efforts in a post-conflict setting such a Liberia and Rwanda usually begin with the setting-up of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to assessing the causes of the violence establish the directive principles that should guide the reconstruction process. The cumulative outcome of this process situates peacebuilding as nation-building. It expresses the collective basis and process of repairing the ruins of violence. To (re)design and establish a social pact – one that cements state-society relations in way that are grounded in transformative ethos. By evoking and emphasising norms of relations and breads inclusivity – socially, politically, and economically. At the minimum, the constitutive policy framework that births design of public policies for inclusive post conflict reconstruction in Liberia

are a) The *Truth and Reconciliation Report* (2009), b) *The 1986 Constitution of the Republic of Liberia – as amended* (2004), and c) the *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* (2003). In the case of Rwanda: *Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda* (as amended, 2003), *Report on the National Summit of Unity and Reconciliation* (2000) and the *Report on the Reflection Meeting held in the Office of the President of the Republic* (1999) among others are the primary documents that foregrounds the nation-building process.

In Liberia, the Truth, and Reconciliation Commission's (TRC) report sets out the basis for post-conflict reconstruction as nation-building. Therefore, the report expresses the need for a 'new' Liberia to eschew oppressive and polarised socioeconomic and political relations as "*sine qua non* to sustaining the fight against impunity, and the promotion of justice, and genuine reconciliation" – which public policy actors and decision-makers must give priority, in kneading together a country (Republic of Liberia 2009, p. 6-10, emphasis original). Additionally, the report asserts the historically weak institutional arrangement for allocating values and resources, and mediating inter-group relations led to the destruction of the Liberian nation by:

> [the] over centralization and the oppressive dominance of the Americo-Liberian oligarchy over the indigenous peoples of Liberia rights and culture. Entrenched political and social system founded on privilege, patronage, politicization of the military and endemic corruption which created limited access to education and justice, economic and social opportunities, and amenities. Duality of the Liberian political, social, and legal systems which polarizes and widens the disparities between the Liberian peoples – a chasm between settler Liberia and indigenous Liberia. Identity and the crisis of identity engender disunity and undermine Liberian patriotism and sense of nationhood. Historical disputes over land acquisition, distribution, and accessibility. The gradual breakdown of the family and loss of its traditional value system (Republic of Liberia 2009, p 6-7).

Accordingly, the report sets the foundation upon which both constitutional provisions and policy practice by the leadership of post-conflict Liberia are expected to institute mechanisms that address these nested issues of deprivation, marginalisation, identity crises social strife in Liberia. In this sense, the post-conflict government of Liberia – leadership is mandated to fashion out institutional and policy measures that purposively pursues the national reconstruction of the country to address the fundamental weaknesses in political and social system that resources privilege, patronage, and endemic socioeconomic injustices. During field interviews, a middle-aged woman who works as an administrator in a public institution noted that Liberia's peace building should revolve around policy practices that breeds: *among Liberians living together in harmony at all times* (Respondent, 5), while an unemployed man expressed the desire to see *leaders make every effort so that all citizens can see each other as one and to ensure the absence of issues that can take us back to war* (Respondent, 9).

It is in this respect that undoing such historically oppressive and polarised norms of relation must engender a progressively equitable value system that repairs the ruins of society and enables self-actualisation for nation-building. It follows that the architects of Liberia's reconstruction recognise the continuum nature of nation-building as an evolving contestation of value creation and identity formation situated in pre-historical narratives. Hence, this observation reinforces the fundamental believe by the architects of Liberia's reconstruction for reforms of public institutions and mechanisms for inter-relations, the making of public policies to promote peace, security, national reconciliation, good governance, and human rights. Ultimately, to reduce poverty and alleviate illiteracy, it emphasises the need for leadership to progressively frame policy programmes that addressed these anomalies by:

> building a more just and equitable society in which everyone is equal before one set of laws which guarantees equal protection and opportunity for all, and enable citizens maintain abiding faith in the potential of the Liberian Nation to rise beyond the current dilemma; begin to adopt positive attitudes and change the old mind sets in how we view ourselves as an African nation, breakdown the social, economic, and cultural barriers, that keep the nation apart, and envision a new Liberia founded on equal rights and mutual respect for the cultural values of all Liberians, and equal opportunities for all (Republic of Liberia, 2009, p. 12).

As a result, the present Head of State – President George Manneh Weah recognises the responsibility of leadership in designing public policies that reflects the complexities of post-conflict Liberia as espoused by the outcome of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in its report. He notes the essence of the task by acknowledging that the peoples of Liberia have: "entrusted me with the responsibility of leading the effort to build a capable state that is united in purpose and filled with hope and prosperity" (Weah, 2018).

In recent years, following the efforts of successive administrations through a consultative process, consistent with the import of the Truth and Reconciliation Report emerged the *Pro-Poor Agenda* policy guide, among others as the fundamental policy framework to making policy decisions to repair ruins of the war, and its nation-building agenda. This policy blueprint is also aims at:

> crafting a national identity aligned to the Africa Agenda 2063 and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Vision 2020. What clearly emerged from the national consultations on the future of Liberia held in 2012 is that the tendency to bifurcate the Liberian identity into an Americo-Liberian vs. Indigenes cleavage leaves the "erroneous impression of two discreet communities" that need to be reconciled for political, social, and economic, development to take hold. But it is evident that the Liberian identity is a fusion of values of multiple "largely patriarchal traditional societies", different tenets of faith, and the "influence of black settler culture". Moreover, new cleavages emerged out of the civil war—between the Diaspora and those Liberians who remained at home, and between those who were victimized and those who were the perpetrators of violence. All these cleavages must be addressed for Liberia to go forward successfully as a united people and a progressive nation (Government of Liberia, 2018).

Thus, it appears the leadership during successive administrations have made policy attempts to address the issues of discord in an attempt to realise the vision of the nationhood in post-conflict Liberia. It however remains to be seen from the lived experiences of citizens in Liberia how the articulation and use of policy instruments by leadership relates with their aspirations. I shall examine this in the next section of this chapter.

In the case of Rwanda, the Republican Constitution of Rwanda expresses the justiciability of creating an inclusive nation-state by guaranteeing the political, social, and economic rights of all citizens. It further requires policy actors to enact policy prescriptions that dismantles the divisive imprints of exiting identities (see Republic of Rwanda 2003 (as amended 2015), Articles 9,11, and 178). Likewise, the foundational policy framework for post-conflict rebuilding is documented in the reports of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). This report is a product of commissioned research and stakeholder consultations through public fora. In its first report published in the year 2000 after the National Summit on *Unity and Reconciliation* held in Kigali, the commission emphasised the importance of social policy tools to repair the socioeconomic causes of the strife that plagued Rwanda, and the burden of Rwanda building a nationally inclusive nation-state (NURC, 2000). Furthermore, its revised policy documents acknowledge the role of leadership in Rwanda to use public policies in addressing the:

> various historical eras of bad governance characterized by divisions and discriminations based on ethnicity, religion, the spread of genocidal ideology, indiscriminate killings and nepotism which have had devastating effects on its people's social relations (Republic of Rwanda/NURC 2020, p. 4).

Hence, the plausible fundamental objective for rebuilding a post-genocide nationally cohesive nation-state in Rwanda is for the leadership in Rwanda to articulate the relational basis for designing social policy programs with the vision of "a united Rwanda in which all citizens have equal rights and are free to fully participate in the governance and development of their country" (Republic of Rwanda 2020, p.5). Thus, the quest is to build a pan-Rwandan identity as an integral aspect of the country's post-nation-building efforts to achieve inclusivity and progressive development. Consequently, for the framers of Rwanda's post-1994 endeavour of peacebuilding as nation-building to revitalise the norms of relations for the collective good, it is envisioned the country's leadership would formulate public policies that instigates the forging of:

> relationships which bring nationals [citizens] together, so that they feel that they are moving together, sharing everything, sharing the country, all having the same right on it, and feeling that anything disturbing one part of that country is disturbing the whole country, and that nationals must fight against it together [national cohesion] (Republic of Rwanda 1999, p. 16).

It is within this context that leadership of Rwanda policy framework construes nation-building as:

> Relationship linking fellow-countrymen who feel they have a sense of their common goal, who share a common destiny; who belong to the same country and understands that no-one has more right to it than the other (to the point of chasing others out of it), and who consider that anything that threatens the security of part of their country is in fact endangering the whole of it, and that they must stand up and fight it together (Government of Rwanda 2000).

As such, the meaning ascribed to the country's nation-building agenda emanates from what may be described as a *Leadership Forum* – the first in the post-genocide era instigated by the transitional government of National Unity. The fundamental aim of the forum held on 9th May 1998 under the auspices of the National Consultative was to engage a selected segment of the citizenry at the *Urugwiro* village on what should constitute 'National Unity' and the relational basis upon which it should be pursed and achieved (Government of Rwanda 1999). This fundamentally defines the ongoing attempts by the leadership in Rwanda to build a pan-Rwandan identity by eroding the constructions of divisions that segregated a people bound together by a common language, and with similar customs. The remarks by government officials interviewed in the Kicukiro District of Kigali City gives credence this as follows:

> In general, I would say that the principles or Ethics and other values applies to everyone in the country and not a particular region. But the first principle we all value is patriotism because when one loves the country, he loves her with all her people but also accept and work with others. There are other values that people gradually based on such as honesty, politeness, self-esteem, and various other values that people can base themselves on but especially emphasizing that 'I am a Rwandan' that everyone is a Rwandan and should not be side-lined or asked. My role is to mobilize the community, we hold community meetings at various *umudugudu*. The assembly takes place every Tuesday where we campaign on various government programs, so it is in this context that we talk about *Ndumynyarwanda* which is one of the things that helps us in this peace process. (Government Official 5 – 8/12/2022).

> The first thing is that leadership was brought closer to us because some citizens were left behind because of ethnicity that led to Genocide against Tutsi in 1994, so a lot of efforts are made in order that Rwandans feel that they are Rwandans again thus it is important that they have the same goal, it is required a lot of teachings and also many different activities related to unity. The country is being built on Rwandans, feeling that you are a Rwandan, that you are not a certain ethnicity, because as Rwandans we know where divisions lead us, the first thing today that we put forward is we are all Rwandans and work towards a common goal without leaving anyone behind (Government Official 3 – 7/12/2022).

Likewise, a research participant noted: *we Rwandans are the same person because we speak the same language, so today someone who brings racism is punished. It's a journey we're all on* (Respondent 7). Hence, the thrust of Rwanda's nation-building for which policy actors are encouraged to perpetrate hinges on *patriotism* in creating *solidarity* amongst a people with common heritage, yet divided socially, politically, and economically. This is in recognition of the peculiarity of Rwanda's history of episodic post-independence violence that culminated in the atrocities of 1994.

Therefore, building a sense national unity by reversing the ills of the past is anchored on the framing of 'Rwandanness' (*Banyarwanda*) – unity in diversity is cardinal to such an endeavour.

Expressed politically, the Republican Constitution of Rwanda expresses the justiciability of creating an inclusive nation-state by guaranteeing the political, social, and economic rights of all citizens. It further requires policy actors to enact policy prescriptions that dismantles the divisive imprints of exiting identities (see Republic of Rwanda 2003, Articles 9,11, and 178). Put differently, unity in diversity represents the appreciation of different approaches or way of addressing issues of harmony and development. Effecting mechanisms to aggregate diverse views, encourage the sharing of opinions however uncomfortable they may sound. Unity from this perspective is reflective of when there is a positive value to being different either in perceptive or in real terms, and the uniqueness in that bounds together these differences in unison.

For both Liberia and Rwanda, building cohesive social includes the reconstruction of economic, and political relations to address complex issues of exploitation, bad governance, persecution, and discrimination, among others. In the minds of the framers of the nation-building architecture, must drawing on the collective capabilities of the citizenry, and the resort to those traditional norms of relations that were jettisoned but are required for nation-building. To this end, Liberia's Truth and Reconciliation Policy document emphasises the need for decision-makers and policy actors to fashion out measures that create an "equitable society in which everyone is equal before one set of laws which guarantees equal protection and opportunity for all" (Republic of Liberia 2009, p. 12) by:

> maintain abiding faith in the potential of the Liberian Nation to rise beyond the current dilemma and work assiduously for the implementation of all the recommendations of the TRC. That the people of Liberia begin to adopt positive attitudes and change the old mind sets in how we view ourselves as an African nation, breakdown the social, economic, and cultural barriers, that keep the nation apart, and envision a new Liberia founded on equal rights and mutual respect for the cultural values of all Liberians, and equal opportunities for all. (ibid)

Similarly, Rwanda's policy on reconciliation and national unity recognises the "wanton destruction of the National Unity and that its reconstruction is an inevitable obligation of all Rwandans. It emphasizes that unity and reconciliation is the option that Rwanda has adopted" (Republic of Rwanda 2020, p.4). By this, the state invites the use of public policy mechanisms that addresses the existing or emerging daily uncertainties faced by Rwandans, especially those domiciled in poor areas, the marginalised, less educated and those physically incapacitated. For this reason, policy makers are encouraged to ensure inclusive space where is the "responsibility of every Rwandan to strive for these values and to ensure that they are attained, preserved and safeguarded through the synergy derived from participation of every individual and all institutions" (ibid).

Again, the peacebuilding objective that undergirds public policy making and implementation efforts in both countries is to build cohesive national entities/institutions on the collective will of

all. Thus, in the case of Liberia, the fulcrum of the nation-building process is the recognition and requirement for policy actors to ensure policy tools are deployed to transform the social, political, and economic basis of inter-relations and (re)production in a socially just and equitable manner. This is framed as *reparation* for all groups made worse off by the war, with the recognition by the Government of Liberia to:

> gives full and equal recognition to the economic, social and culture rights of the Liberian people especially minority groups to the extent that every citizen will have access to economic opportunity for personal and group advance; that the cultural values and social orientation of Liberians generally including minorities will at all times be respected as fundamental equal rights and that the rights of women to self-actualization and equity will be respected and that children will be accorded their full rights as members of the human family (Republic of Liberia 2009, p. 279)

Hence it enjoins policymakers to utilise state resources to ensure "community development projects and programme including school, health facilities, road, be considered for communities most victimized by years of conflict" (ibid). Beyond the provision of these facilities, it recognises the use of social policy for nation-building and development strategy by requiring policy actors to enact measures for the provision of public goods that are gender sensitive and enhances the capability of survivors through:

> free education to all Liberians from primary to secondary education and for certain disciplines at the college level. Said disciplines are medicine, nursing, education, teachers training, agriculture, science, and technology, and according to the human development resource needs of the country, together with programme for the empowerment of women devastated by the civil war to advance their economic pursuits in the form of soft micro credit economic programme, small enterprise, and marketing programme with education on small business management for sustainability (Republic of Liberia 2009, p. 277).

To the framers of the Liberian nation-building pact, it is inconceivable to transform the norms of relations that breeds inclusivity for the collective good without a change in the institutional mechanisms for deciding and making public policy decisions. Thus, it proposes the need for:

> a new political culture of tolerance and respect for the human rights of all persons including opposition in a pluralistic society that lends itself to freedom and liberty generally with all Liberians including the opposition understanding that the Government represents the people and that the people owe the Government a corresponding duty of loyalty and support, with institutions such the military, the civil service and paramilitary *demanded to be dutiful to the national interest*, and outlawed by statute under which it shall be unlawful to engage in partisan politics (ibid, p. 278 emphasis mine)

In particular, and with hindsight of the devastating effect of its civil war, the Liberian State by making these provisions for policy actions, recognises the need to create institutions that are inter-connected in their functions and mechanism for creating mutuality by both leaders and followers as crucial to building social justice and national unity in a progressive progressively if it is to avoid a relapse into violent conflict. It is in this context that President acknowledges the responsibility

of "leading policy effort to build a Liberian State capable of fulfilling the aspirations and prosperity *of all citizens in an inclusive manner*" (Weah, 2018 with emphasis).

Similarly, in Rwanda, post-conflict nation-building is highlighted as a cardinal aspect of the reconstruction and development of efforts currently being undertaken by the Government. In essence, it posits that building an inclusive and just society is dependent in part on the rule of law and a vision of sustainable development. Hence, on its part:

> the Government of Rwanda believes that unity and reconciliation of Rwandans is the cornerstone in reconstructing a nation characterized by the rule of home-grown nation with a clear vision for sustainable development to build a united Rwanda in which all citizens have equal rights and are free to fully participate in the governance and development of their country as emphasized in the fundamental principles and home grown solutions of National Constitution, in its article 10 which stipulates the self-reliance principle. (Republic of Rwanda 2020, p.5-7).

This policy standpoint of the Rwandan state is plausibly in recognition of the unique and dynamic nature of this genocidal history, thus the resolve for self-reliance, to the extent that it can, in fashioning out policy solutions for building a cohesive and progressive country. In doing so, the government intends to deploy public policy strategies in building a civic identity and national interests that meets the aspirations of all regardless of ethnicity, blood relations, gender, religion, or region of origin.

Reading together the enactments for building a cohesive society by both countries, one might think the foregrounding of post-conflict public policy for rebuilding the emerging state in Liberia and Rwanda is using policy instruments to engender a new basis of relation(s) that transforms the causes of violence. To accomplish this aim is to use social policy to ameliorate the socioeconomic conditions of poverty, marginalisation, discrimination, pillage, and divisions through the use of nested policy tool to capacitate survivors, eradicate the bitter memory of violence, create, and instil cooperative norms of trust, dedication and reciprocity that would build mutuality for building a just and progressive post-conflict society.

In doing this, policymakers are enjoined by the post-conflict existential risks to a secured living, and the reconciliation pact to enact policy measures that give meaning to the social contract. As such, they are encouraged to formulate public policies that draws-in every member of society through interrelated institutional mechanism. With the aim of ensuring the overriding essence of the Constitutions and peacebuilding policy frameworks of both countries animates equality and participation of all living within the jurisdiction. The recognition of this position as espoused in the national reconciliation and development policies admits to the points that post-conflict reconstruction involves a number of complex issues that bothers beyond the immediate post-

conflict situation. Hence the need to minimising the propensity of conflict recurring by securing the economic and social wellbeing of all through deliberative policy-making systems in which public reasoning and building mutuality through effective participation becomes the means to achieving collective goals is guaranteed (J. Adesina, 2009; Olonisakin, 2015; O. P. Richmond, 2009, 2015; Standish et al., 2022; Tom, 2017).

However, for peacebuilding policies to effectively address the deluge of nested issues that policy actors are confronted with in post-conflict states, it is necessary to appreciate the historical and contemporary issues that condition inclusive peacebuilding. Given the crucial nature of public policy in reducing to the barest minimum the daily constraints faced by people in their daily routines of socioeconomic survival – it is important for us to understand the contextual *realities that undergird peacebuilding as nation-building in Liberia and Rwanda.* An understanding of these issues as captured in the extant literature on both Liberia and Rwanda and the narrative of the lived experience is key to evaluating how current peacebuilding policies are enabling the transformation of relations for inclusive peace and durable development. Here, I draw on Charles Tilly and Robert Goodin's *relational realism* typology for contextual analysis to systematically explain the relational mechanisms aimed at building 'inclusive' peace in Libera and Rwanda (Goodin & Tilly, 2006, p. 28). Also, this approach helps to unpack the institutional milieu within which societal conversations occur for mediating the rules, processes, and a peoples' position as part of the state-society mechanism for determining policy choices to achieve collective ends. Related to this is the ideational frames or affective elements that policy official use to organize, think or make meaning of the demands made on the political system by a people given their unique historical and contemporary circumstances (Parsons 2007).

4.3 Policy efforts at rebuilding post-conflict Liberia and Rwanda

The current policy narrative by both liberal policy institutions and academics on 'effective' peacebuilding places emphasis on donor efforts, including local ownership policy programs and the demonstration of leadership in addressing post-conflict issues to achieve the maximum outcome(s) of state-building. The hitherto Development Security Nexus assumed that effective peacebuilding was pursuant to the international development community committing aid – finance policy prescriptions to post-conflict states to support local institutions in bringing about stability as the only means though which existential risks could be reduced (Keijzer et al., 2020; Richmond, 2019). However, receiving such donor-driven assistance did not usher post-conflict states out of their dire development quagmire, increasing their reliance on aid dependence and its associated

risk (Pugh 2009; Pugh et al. 2011; Newman et al. 2009; Chandler 2010; Mac Ginty 2011; Duffield 2015; Richmond 2009, 2014, 2017).

The trusteeship approach to peacebuilding as development through the imposition of external technocratic priorities subsequently produced little results (Richmond 2015,2013; Duffield 2015; Torto 2013), hence a rethink of this logic. It is for this reason that in this study, we seek to illuminate the principles and effectiveness of transformative approaches to peacebuilding by emphasising the importance of country-led and context-driven peacebuilding underpinned by nation-building ethos – building norms of mutuality, attitudes, inter-personal and group behaviours to transform the causes and triggers of conflict through social policies that create inclusivity and minimises the risks of new violent conflicts (Cox et al., 2017; Lidén, 2009; Mateos & Rodríguez, 2021; Olonisakin, 2015). It follows that the condition in many post-conflict countries is qualified by:

> The weakness of state institutions, the support provided to non-state actors for the delivery of social services, more so than for the state, existing social cleavages, the distrust of the 'other' on the part of the leaders, the impact of the war economy, the desire to control institutions and their services as a means for survival, and the unwillingness of the factional leaders to lose prestige or power, all contribute to a volatile context for development (Dagher 2018, p. 86).

To this end, the question remains to what extent are post-conflict social (public) policies in Liberia and Rwanda responding to the everyday risks of citizens? Among others, both Liberia and Rwanda's post-conflict development efforts have been shaped by, among others the following broad policy guides: Rwanda – a) Vision 2020 (Republic of Rwanda 2000), b) Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Government of Rwanda 2002), c) Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2008–2012 (Republic of Rwanda 2007), and d) Economic Development Poverty Reduction Strategy II, 2013–2018 (Republic of Rwanda 2013). In the case of Libera the: a) Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008), b) *Lift Liberia* Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS -2008 – 2011), c) National Social Protection Policy and Strategy (2013), d) Pro-Poor Agenda for Prosperity and Development 2018 to 2023 (2018), and e) Agenda for Transformation: Steps Towards Liberia Rising 2030 (Government of Liberia, n.d). These short, medium, and long-term plans and initiatives for socio-economic transformation and development are anchored generally around good governance, human capital development, land and agriculture, and infrastructure development.

By the year 2003, the transitional government in Rwanda had laid the foundations for the take-off of the country's national development and cohesion. It would focus mainly on expanding social services in health, education, health, and land reform to enhance the capacity of the population sustained economic development (Republic of Rwanda 2002,2007). The primary policy objective

is to build progressive and cohesive nation-state were grounded by state systems that functioned to ignite the capabilities and aspirations of all Rwandans to silence ethnic and elite impunity. Universal access to and participation in the process of building and inclusive post-genocide state was regarded as fundamental to building a viable state capable of cementing national unity and withstanding the conflicting demands. According to the World Banks's World Development Indicators, Rwanda has recorded substantial macro-economic improvement as shown by its key measurement indexes. It reports that during the period 2000 to 2015, real GDP grew by about 5.0 percent per year on average, mainly driven by high commodity prices and services.[3] However, Jerven (2013) cautions about the use of such statistics to gauge development in Africa primarily due to lack of reliable data in many African countries. Therefore, how does these remarkable macro-economic improvements translate into addressing and transforming the root causes of violent conflicts.

Rwanda has transitioned from its initial post-conflict stabilisation phase of making peace and establishing the requisite institutional framework to guide policy initiatives and programs to promote inclusive social, economic, and political transformation. Yet, how are these policy tools managing the everyday societal contestations and effecting the lives of ordinary Rwandans, especially the poor and vulnerable. A number of studies have been conducted on the different sectors of Rwanda's development to ascertain the progress being made with building an inclusive nation-state (see Behuria, 2018; Dawson et al., 2016; McDoom, 2022; Pritchard, 2013; Takeuchi, 2019; Takeuchi & Marara, 2014; Thomson, 2018a) In a recent study, Takeuchi (2019) notes that the rapid economic growth in Rwanda is fraught with sustainability challenges predicate on the political environment that favours RPF favoured business entities.

Exposing them to the vulnerabilities of regime change and oligopoly effects. Also, Cioffo et al (2016) and Dawson et al (2016) in their assessment of agricultural reforms in Rwanda. In Ansoms and Murison's assessment of the Crop Intensification Program, the aver that the aims of achieving food self-sufficiency, induce farmer specialisation and reducing poverty is lagging due to implementation challenges evidenced by the 'widening gap effects among farmers' a resulted of excessive bureaucratisation occasioned by the 'top-down approach' administering the program (Cioffo et al., 2016). However, Harrison is of the opinion government policies aimed at fostering development and harmonious living should be appraised 'on the basis of the peculiar historical' trajectory which places the country in a 'disadvantageous' position from the onset (see Harrison, 2016). To be fair, whilst scholarly criticisms of Rwanda's post-genocide development may be

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[3] See https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators

useful in providing alternative insights into the policy design and implementation for effective development. It may be reasonable to admit the viability, success or otherwise of these policies on their own merit as there are no alternatives worth considering.

Likewise in Liberia, in spite of progress made since the coming into effect of the 2003 peace accord, Liberia remains one of the poorest countries in the world according to the World Bank development indicators.[4] The government has recently prepared an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (Republic of Liberia 2006), which organizes the country's development strategy around four pillars: enhancing national security, revitalizing economic growth (Lucey & Kumalo, 2017; Radelet, 2007; Republic of Liberia 2006, 2008). Studies on Liberia suggest that although efforts by governments have contributed to maintaining a semblance of peace and stability, there has been little socio-economic advancement in a manner that portends transformation across socioeconomic spheres.

Also, Shilue and Fagen (2014) report that while it is commendable to note the continuous stability in post-conflict Liberia, "intra-communal cohesion and trust, both of which are important indicators of reconciliation, have yet to be achieved as communities remain fragmented, and perceptions of entitlement and legitimacy are often distorted" (p.20). This observation shows the disconnect between the post-conflict social pact in Liberia and the deployment of social policy tools to drive both local and national levels of development that address the root causes of identity crises and confrontations that resulted in the civil war. Lucey and Kumalo (2017) attribute this to the inability of policy stakeholders, such us political parties, to adequately reflect on the development challenges they are confronted with and fashion effective policy responses to address them. Similarly, there are raging inter-generational tensions over natural resource management, especially access to land, which many young Liberians deem as an important resource for community development and livelihood enhancement (Shilue and Fagen 2014).

Politically, Rwanda is acclaimed for the encouraging role women play in its politics and development. 'Good governance' is acknowledged as fundamental to the government's ongoing construction of peace in Rwanda (Government of Rwanda n.d)[5]. The term good governance is used formally to connote "accountability, transparency and efficiency in deploying scarce resources" (Republic of Rwanda 2000, 14), using the contractual norm of *imihigo* to engender efficiency in the public service. This contractual pact between the presidency and the bureaucracy requires government officials to ensure their work relations with external actors – on the balance of

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[4] https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators
[5] See http://www.gov.rw/about-the-government/governance-home-grown-solutions/

probability advances the cause of the common good. As a developing country, Rwanda is still donor-dependent for development resources which comes with policy conditionalities hence, *imihigo* empowers civil servants and policy officials to strive for policy ownership in pursuing inclusive peace.

In some respects, the *imihigo* instilling such an ethos for public officials is cardinal to instituting a state bureaucracy that is likely, at all times defend and promote the interest of the citizenry. The government's mantra of "we need a small but effective, flexible public sector" (Republic of Rwanda 2000, 14) has been repeatedly echoed in its policy documents. The World Governance Indicators (WDI), which measure political stability, government effectiveness, voice and accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption, ranks Rwanda fairly on most of these indices. However, the country is rated poorly on voice and accountability[6]. The situation in Liberia is contrasting. Its political regime seems to provide space for free speech and expression of dissent. It also allows for plural participation in the political processes. However, the structures to ensure participation and freedom of expression are reflective of the mutuality between governance institutions and the people. It appears in this context that the post-conflict development process that facilitates the participation of Liberians with minimum or no education, those who are impoverished and lacking the necessary resources are unable to participate and make demands on the political system. The majority of citizens are largely absent in the process of aggregating and articulating interests for policy actions, reducing the process to a few persons resourceful enough to partake in the political process (Krawczyk, 2021; Moran, 2013). This is supported by the public perception of the nature of participation, governance arrangement and service delivery (Isbell & Jacobs, 2017).

The identity polarisation that, eventually instigated the orchestration of genocide in Rwanda meant the Arusha Peace Accords between Tutsi-dominated RPF and the Hutu Government emphasised power-sharing governance arrangement to provide the political framework for national cohesion. This was meant to ensure the future formation of any Government in Rwanda reflects the national fabric of the state. It is with this knowledge, that the RPF-led government in Rwanda sought to compose a government of National Unity that comprises returnees, reintegrated combatants, and the military. However, in its current form, the practice of this governance arrangement in Rwanda is lacking in effecting hemming together the competing forces that constitute the Rwandan state. A male respondent resident in the Nyarugenge district shared the following sentiments with me:

> It is difficult to get anything because they think our people were part of those who committed the genocide and so we are the same. It is very difficult as we struggle to get

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[6] See https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports

very little support. But we are all Rwandans and there should be no division among us (Respondent 17).

As noted by Reyntjens (2013), this repression of public reasoning is amplified by the facts that even opposition political elements in the non-RPF parties both within and outside of the legislature, have unconditionally supported President Kagame at each of the previous presidential elections he has contested. This is manifested by the unquestioning rulership that oppresses opposing views, exclusion of Rwandans considered to have 'strong Hutu' affiliation from strategic governance and development institutions. In the words of a Rwandanswho participated in this study: *when we avoid conflicts peace prevails. The crime is to feel that your neighbour should not exist, so if we ignore all these there can be more peace* (Respondent 17 – 08/12/2021).

Arguably, this state of affairs may be attributable to the threat of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) a pro-Hutu armed rebel group that primarily opposed the present dominance of Tutsi in the political affairs of Rwanda, operating from the secluded region of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (Hedlund, 2017). This group consist of remnants of *Interahamwe* that actively instigated the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In 2005, after a UN backed talks in Rome between the pro-Hutu militia and the Tutsi-dominated RPF government, the FDLR agreed to disband, transform into a political party, and return to Rwanda. On its part, the Rwandan government stated that any returning genocidaires would face justice. The United Nations further issued a statement in support of the disarmament and reintegration of the FDLR. The statement warned against "the failure of the Forces démocratiques pour la liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) to proceed with the disarmament and repatriation of their combatants without further delay and in accordance with the declaration they signed in Rome on 31 March"[7]. They are primarily opposed to the present dominance of Tutsi in the political affairs of Rwanda (Hedlund, 2017). However, the strength of the FDLR has significantly waned since 2011.

Within the wider Rwanda state, both Tutsi, Hutu and Twa operate in the same socioeconomic space – markets, churches, schools among others as both victims and survivors of the genocide. They interrelate as a people scared by a common history, while yearning for a better future for all. Thus, altogether, both Arusha Accord, Constitution of Rwanda, and its National Unity and Reconciliation policy underscores a governance arrangement that it inclusive of the divisions within the state. Hence a Government of National Unity with representation and power-sharing arrangements between the victors, victims, refugee, repatriated and reintegrated combatants, and

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[7] See https://news.un.org/en/story/2005/10/155352 [accessed on 30/08/2023]

the military integration. In the words of this female respondent from the Bugesera District, she constantly keeps to herself to prevent any interaction with local officials as:

> It is the only way to make a living in peace. My people also died, and I have lost everything, all my family but because of my people I am to speak 'my truth'. This makes it difficult to get my village welfare official to help me get some assistance. But he knows my 'truth' that I lost everything (Respondent 23).

As discussed by Autesserre (2021) violence and its associated destructions can be resolved regardless of constraints or unyielding nature of a party. Violent conflicts breed 'new' actor both winners and losers; power over the distribution of resources and the mandate to determine the course of the 'emerging' state. In this context, the nation-building ethos of Transformative Social Policy and Leadership as process (TSP-L) approach to inclusive peacebuilding accentuates the use of social policy to harness the diversity of a people in building a cohesive and progressive state capable of withstanding mutating socioeconomic and political contradictions. It is the responsibility of leaders to devise means of articulating and formulating policies that acknowledge the polarisations and other triggers of conflict and weave through such divisions to build inclusivity. Therefore, it can be argued this, in part, inflects the Tutsi-led RPF's government in Rwanda to frame national unity and reconciliation as:

> a consensus practice of citizens who have common nationality, who share the same culture and have equal rights; citizens characterised by trust, tolerance, mutual respect, equality, complementarity, truth, and healing of one another's wounds inflicted by their dark history, with the objectives of laying a foundation for development in sustainable peace (NURC 2020, p. 4).

According to a local government official interviewed for this study, the periodic engagement with both victims and survivors of the genocide and individuals who are done serving their punishments for their role in the atrocities of 1994 within the various localities is an essential aspect to inclusive peace and development:

> In fact, the only way to be truly effective is to take part in solving this great task. One of the things you can say is that when we go out to meet people; let's say in the meetings, solving their problems, that's when we meet the citizens, and we talk to them about different things, for example, we talk about peace especially, the reason why the people [should] understand it, is that we know why our country has lost its peace due to racism, which led to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, so there has been a lot of talk about both genocide survivors and those who have finished serving their Genocide punishments. Just like the others in general, by saying that the conversations are going on constantly, I would say that is the main channel we use to keep that peace (Government official 5).

However, it remains to be seen the extent to which leadership is pursuing this objective of building an inclusive state-society relations for the collective good, with the inclusion of other groups – Twa and Hutu. Where constitutional rights of free speech, self-determination among others is guarded without discrimination to identity or distant connection to past atrocities. A female respondent had this to say:

> My cell leader knows that I am also a victim of the genocide by losing my entire family. Since I am vulnerable, he demands the 'truth' from me. So, I need to do what he wants from me to get recognised as a survivor of the genocide; so I can get some [financial] support. It is hard to ask for social intervention when I decide not to engage with my cell leader due to the fear that he will make demands for me to confess and feel bad about something that I did not do (Respondent 15 – 08/12/2021).

Overall, the seemingly absolute control over power by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) ruling elites may suggest a skewed implementation of public policies as against its imperative utility for kneading together the scared people with a shared history (see Beswick, 2010; Ingelaere, 2010; Pottier, 2002; Reyntjens, 2011, 2013; Silva-Lender 2008). However, a female government official was of the opinion that the present political systems in relation to the peacebuilding process in Rwanda are not at odds with the quest for inclusivity in post-conflict Rwanda. She reiterated how citizens present a challenge to the process in the following statement:

> The peace building process itself has no problem, but the people we have been employed to educate do not all perceive it in the same way. There are those who disagree, in fact, that the law exists to kill. Some of them when they are told to follow laws they don't (Government Official 4 – 09/12/2021).

This expression shows the existence of some form of resistance to current policy programs initiated by the government for building inclusivity. Every polity is made up of such contradictions as public policies can create both beneficiaries and losers. Thus, to transform such contradictions using public policy tools requires the leadership of a country to develop mechanisms for mitigating and addressing the many demands, expectations, attitudes, and discontents of citizens. The inability of leadership to appreciate such complex, but valuable forms of social ordering at the locale as germane to building national cohesion may cause disruption(s) to the quest of achieving inclusivity. Likewise, Susan Thomson argues that irrespective of what seems to be a widespread popular support given to the Government of Rwanda, many ordinary Rwandans are of the opinion that the various policy mechanisms aimed at building national unity and reconciliation are unjust and illegitimate (Thomson, 2011, 2018a). Yet, the views of some Rwandans suggest contentment with the current configuration of Rwanda's political system:

> I live a peaceful life; the reason is that I am in a country with good governance, and it gives us hope that the events will not happen again based on the past 27 years of genocide and we have been without war or racism (Respondent 21 – 8/12/2021).

Socially, the macro-economic indicator is yet to show a trickle-down effect on citizens living circumstances, although there has been cumulative improvement in the social sector of the

economy, particularly in health and education (see Golooba-Mutebi, 2013; Takeuchi, 2019)[8]. During the same period of recorded macro-economic growth, Rwanda's public health sector performed correspondingly well. For instance, the World Bank estimates that Infant and under-five-year mortality rates decreased considerably within 20 years from 129.6 and 268.3 in 1995 to 29.65 and 39.44 in 2021, respectively. There was equally a corresponding increase in life expectancy at birth, which doubled from 31.6 years in 1995 to 67 years in 2020. For Liberia, that of Infant and under-five-years mortality was recorded as 127.63 and 189.18 in 2000 to 56.72 and 76.04 in 2021, respectively, while data for life expectancy at birth shows a 38.64% increase from 44 years in 1995 to 61 years in 2020. Also, there was a plausive improvement in the education sector with regards to service provision and accessibility. The World Banks, World Development Index reports that gross rate of primary school enrolment increased to about 141% in 2021 from the late 1990s.[9] Likewise, there was an increase in the gross rate of secondary school enrolment stands at about 46% in 2021 from figures recorded in the late 1990s, with more girls getting into secondary school than boys. Thus, the country also witnessed a significant gender parity index above 1.0 since 2011. When we unpack the data for Liberia, it shows that the gross rate of primary school enrolment showed a steady decrease form higher levels in the early 2000s to about 77% in 2020[10]. However, there was an increase in the gross rate of secondary school enrolment from 36% in 2000 to about 40% in 2020. Liberia during the period under review had more boys than girls getting into secondary school.

Figure 6: Comparative trends in Infant Mortality in Rwanda and Liberia

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[8] Also see World Development Indicator for 2021 available at http://www.gov.rw/about-the-government/governance-home-grown-solutions/
[9] Ibid
[10] Ibid

Figure 7: Under Five Mortality rate in both Rwanda and Liberia

Figure 8: Primary School Enrolment in Rwanda and Liberia

Figure 9: Secondary school enrolment in both Rwanda and Liberia

Figure 10: Rate of Life Expectancy in Rwanda and Liberia

When considered, in part, as an indicator of national development, the above overview of the development trajectory of both countries shows the intent and disposition of policy actors and national leaders towards the creation of a state capable of addressing the demands of its citizens. The remarkable gains achieved in the last two decades are indicate of laying the social foundations of development – an integral aspect to building inclusive and progressive post-conflict countries. However, whilst such indices of development present a way a measuring the effort of leadership in engendering development. Yet, linear suppositions and blind faith in general quantitative policy targets do not offer a robust mechanism for addressing the daily realities of citizens that policy interventions are formulated to address.

This decontextualises and de-emphasises the place of relational processes in understanding and addressing the complex causes of violence and the clumsy nature of post-conflict peacebuilding practices. For instance, Mosse (2007) deplores the aversion by leaders towards adopting processes that are relational, multi-institutional and cumbersome in addressing the complex situations of post conflict states. This quest for linear technocratic solutions is a plausible deduction that can be assigned to why post-conflict peacebuilding rarely transforms norms of relations for durable development. According to Ferguson, the de-grounding of post-conflict peacebuilding practices with citizens is based on the bureaucratic gaze on policy donors and technical experts' recommendation of standardized policy measures that are foisted on post-conflict countries' donor institutions and countries (Ferguson, 2006). In my view, it is essential to examine how the de-processed approach to peacebuilding interacts with the socio-economic and political realities of citizens in Liberia and Rwanda recovering from violent conflicts.

4.4 After the slaughter: the daily realities of building national cohesion and progressive development in Liberia and Rwanda

A fundamental concern that challenges countries recovering from violent conflict is how to deal with the complexity of issues bequeathed by the violence and its underlying causative issues. Conflicts have immensely destructive effects on all aspects of a country's existence – social, political, and economic, with embedded scars on relational dynamics. The veracity of conflicts is context-specific, which makes it important for rebuilding efforts to consider and relate the specific experiences of particular countries. At the minimum, the conciliatory and reconstruction of both Rwanda and Liberia is heralded by both countries' resolve to undo the injustice of the past by transforming the norms of relations for the collective good. For Rwanda, it is emphasized that in recognition of its troubled history, "the Government of Rwanda believes that unity and reconciliation of Rwandans is the cornerstone in reconstructing a nation characterized by the rule of law and a nation with a clear vision for sustainable development" (Republic of Rwanda 2020, p. 7). While in Liberia it is argued that nation-building and social justice in uniting all Liberians are fundamental to building a prosperous country (Republic of Liberia 2009). However, how do citizens perceive their place in the efforts at construction and building inclusive Liberia and Rwanda. During my field study, the views of a cross-section of Rwandans and Liberians were sought on issues of inclusive peace, development, and leadership. The views expressed and captured by respondents from both countries are presented in the next section in a comparative perspective.

The national development agenda and strategy of both Liberia and Rwanda, read from a social policy perspective fundamentally considers building and transforming norms of relations a prerequisite for durable development. Hence, the policy framework mandates policy actors to bridge the economic and political divide between mainly 'Americo-Liberians' and 'Indigenous-Liberians using social policy programme that transforms the everyday socio-economic relations of production and reinforce inclusivity in the pursuit of a stable Liberia and, as a prerequisite for holistic development in the long term (see Government of Liberia, 2018,2009); as the Rwandan version notes that "unity and reconciliation of Rwandans is the cornerstone in reconstructing a nation through the promotion of values existing in the Rwandan culture that contribute to social cohesion and wellbeing of Rwandans" (Republic of Rwanda 2020, p. 6-7). In my view, leadership for building inclusive peace is considered as part of the policy blueprint of both countries to be fundamentally critical for addressing the issues of (under)development that occasioned violent conflict and securing the future of all Liberians and Rwandans inclusively.

4.5 The Quest for Inclusive Peace

According to the views expressed by a cross-section of Liberians who participated in this study, peace is important for a stable country. It will transition the country into a brighter future with employment, improved infrastructure development, better leaders, a healthier and sustainable future for the country for all. Specifically, the following responses were shared by respondents in Liberian about peace and what its relation to durable development. The following sample responses were recorded from participants who were interviewed in Congo Town, ELWA Junction, Paynesville, Capitol Hill – ULL-park, Du-port Road respectively:

> Peace is important because it makes things happen, such as having a good medical system, economic conditions improving, jobs opportunities are created, citizens are working, and people knowing their values as to why they went to school; these things will bring peace to my personal life (Respondent 24)

> Peace means a whole lot to us, without peace we will not be able to develop ourselves, we will not be able to improve as a society (Respondent 13).

> Peace makes us live without embarrassments; having everything at your disposal, things that will satisfy a person, a family for them to live happily (Respondent 2)

> In the process of peace, people will be able to boast of the essence of peace. Where I am working, and I am able to provide for my family. And at the community level, peace would be in a positive way when peoples' living standards are good, and government does more to improve the livelihoods of the citizens (Respondent 10).

> Once there is peace, I will be able to have what is good for me, like for instance, job, to have my own family. It is not because I am not experiencing gun firing or because I am going to school; would mean that I have peace (Respondent 7).

> As a young man also growing up and seeing violence as a culture and also experiencing a bit of normalcy, I consider peace as a moment or a period at which individuals be it they have and they have not find themselves in a society where they can share of the national covers in terms of security, in terms of their basic needs with respect to the economy and health care facilities (Respondent 12 – 03/06/2021).

> Currently, I go to school under stress, I don't have those things that I need. So, the only way that can happen is when the opportunity is created where young people will have something to do, will be able to provide for themselves and do things that are best suited for them that they want to have in life. That is how I want to see peace manifested (Respondent 21).

In expressing their knowledge and understanding of what constitutes peace, respondents in Liberia indicated "absence of war" (n= 7) and "free movement and access to social amenities" (n= 6). Other participants noted that "living together in harmony" (n=5), "social justice" (n=4), and "stability and having freedom" (n=9) are the fundamental understanding of Liberians about what would constitute peace for them at any given moment in the country. In sum, an inclusive Liberia is one where:

> I foresee a very healthier and sustainable future for Liberia. Our leaders are getting there and at the same time, we have emerging leaders that will be supportive, and Liberia will become a self-support country in the future (Respondent 10).

However, some Liberian participants equally expressed contrary views. Noting that irrespective of the current peace and stability in the country, they do not see any clear policy direction for securing the collective future of Liberians. For them, the country was in a *recession* towards the pre-war period. The reason adduced by these participants to make their point included bad leadership – these leaders are not what we thought they were. *[We thought they] could help the country to progress* (Interview with a cross-section of Liberians June-July 2021). The view illustrated below is how a participant puts it:

> The country is moving backwards, as a result of the bad leadership that we are having as a country. I don't see a bright future at the moment, because our leaders are not what we thought they could be in helping our country to develop. (Respondent 11).

In the case of Rwanda, the responses given by citizens contacted for this study reflects the view of peace as constitutive of development: *helping build harmony and an environment for everyone to have a good and quality of life* is germane to their post-conflict situation. The following expressions from a cross-section of Rwandans in Kicukiro, Nyarugenge, Gasabo and Bugesera. A responded mentioned: *living in freedom with no one left behind* as constitutive of peace (Respondent 21 – 8/12/2022); *freedom and peaceful coexistence* (Respondent 22 – 08/12/2021); *Living a good life, you don't feel insecure; we live well according to the past* (Respondent 12 – 09/12/2021); *Peace is when you [can] talk to your neighbour and find security and live in harmony and you can help each other without hiding from each other* (Respondent 8 – 06/12/2021). Others had this to say:

> Peace is a great thing. When there is peace, everyone feels it for themselves; some feel it when they are able to eat [have regular daily meals]. For others, the country is peaceful when they can go about their when their activities when the day comes, go to bed early and wake up, day after day. It is recovering from the chaos that disturbs us or what makes my illness feel peaceful[better] (Respondent 10 – 08/12/2021).

> Compared to the life I lived, now I live a better life in terms of peace, my daily life There have been times when I was hopeless, and it felt like I can't accomplish anything but now I have a lot of hope. Also, I have been developing now I have basic needs. I feel like I have long term security to which I participate in, order for it to continue (Respondent 4 – 06/12/2021).

From respondents in Rwanda, what constitutes or sustain peace was described by participants as follows: "community meetings" (n=13), "communal labour" (n=11), "hygiene and cleanliness club" (n=2), "parent's evening program" (n=2), and "*ndi umunyarwanda*" (I am Rwandan) (n=1) (Interview with a cross-section of Rwandans January – May 2022). To this end the views expressed by Rwandans regarding the quest for inclusive peace and development can be read from the following words:

> In building unity, we have community assemblies, leaders come and talk to us about the country, or they tell us about government programme, and we come together to mobilize each other to love each other and maintain security and cleanliness (Respondent, 30).

According to a Rwandese, forging cooperation among existing groups and generally among citizens to live in harmony helps to maintain peace:

> this includes community work, where we all work together to clean our living quarters and if there is a person within us who has a problem, he/she is helped, and during the meeting we are taught how-to live-in peace and warmth; to be one" (Respondent, 33 – 28/02/2022).

> We Rwandans are the same person because we speak the same language, so today someone who brings racism is punished. It's a journey we're all on, as such –others are those who discourage others or those who do not wish Rwanda the best" (Respondent, 28 – 28/02/2022).

On the balance of probability, both Rwandans and Liberians interviewed for this study suggest a general level of satisfaction with the ongoing peacebuilding efforts.

When asked about specific government social assistance programme in addressing the development challenges facing Liberia such as 'Youth Employment Scheme (YES)', 'School Feeding', 'Fee waivers for health and education', 'general subsidies for food, energy, housing, or utilities': opinions were divided. Some responded in the affirmative but added they did not know much about the policy or how to access any of them; while others reported they had never heard of any such policies. On the part of Rwandese, "*Mituelle*" insurance policy, and *imidugudu* were referred to by respondents as some of the policies being implemented to building socioeconomic harmony. The following expressions are used to buttress this point:

> They are good programmes which bring us together like Mituelle, kitchen garden, Evening for Parents. Those programmes make us meet and also improve our lives. Because our leaders always sensitize us to work together (Respondent, 4).

> I think the reason the government brings people in imidugudu is that they see that they are in a bad place, so when they bring them to the mudugudu a good life begins because if you leave a bad place, coming to a good place or life has a lot to do with the life you had (Respondent, 32).

On their part, respondents in Liberia enumerated some social programme or activities they considered are critical to building inclusivity at both national and community levels. At the national level, key among the suggestions are *national counties sports meets*, *drama and peace awareness on television*, *clean-up campaigns, minimizing individual risk and promoting national security, and* effective *provision and distribution of public services* were deemed as programme and/or activities that are germane to promote peace and inclusivity.

For instance (Respondent 7), noted that the 'national county sports meet is an event that portends togetherness among all citizens. This is because it brings all the counties together to participate in the event and cheer their people on. The comments below from these participants illustrate how they conceive the idea of national sports activities contributing to building an inclusive country:

> the national county sports meet I see it as one program that to some extent contribute to building peace, because the national county sports meet brings the 15 sub-political divisions together. And during this time citizens unite and cheer their various counties to victory.

Also:

> I see sport as one activity that helps in building harmony amongst citizens of my community. We usually organize football and kickball tournaments in the community. As we play these different games, people of different tribes, different religion and political affiliation participate (Respondent 8).

It is instructive to know that some of these programmes mentioned by respondents in both countries were used by the leadership of some post-colonial African states as a means to kneading a civic state devoid of ethnic nationalism.

Similarly, some interviewees were of the opinion that equally important in the quest by policy makes to reconcile the country and build and inclusive society in dependent on measures to that ensures community level peacebuilding practices such as: c*ommunity soccer games* (Respondent 12), *clean up exercise* (Respondent 3), and community *town hall meetings* (Respondent 5). As noted by this participant, community town hall meetings presented the opportunity to discuss development issues specific to a locality and an avenue for managing misunderstandings and settling conflictual issues: *it is through the community town hall meetings that issues are settled, and community dwellers get to share their inputs on matters concerning the community* (Respondent 15). In essence, this means empowering the building of mutuality at the community level as inhabitants within that locality have the opportunity to make input and express concerns on issues regarding their communal welfare.

Also, the respondents related the resort to 'peace forums and traditional mechanisms for settling disputes among family and friends', policies that promote 'family get-togetherness', and 'scholarship opportunities for education' as important peace-building efforts that lead to national unity. Again, a respondent sum this up in the following words: *some of the programme that help with building harmony include community meetings* (Respondent 7). The policy emphasis on building inclusive communal social, political, and economic relations through the use of public policy by the leadership in both Liberia and Rwanda points to acknowledging the usefulness of building mutuality between leaders and followers. This requires the use of policy prescriptions to engender institutional mechanisms that are embedded in the everyday of citizens through 'clumsy' public policy approaches to build durable peace and inclusive post-conflict national cohesion (see Cox et al., 2017; Olonisakin, 2015; Grint, 2010; Kavalski, 2009; Lidén, 2009) However, it remains to be seen how this process is being initiated, negotiated, and shaped for the purposes of progressive peace in both countries.

Critically, for those who participated in this study, the presence of peace in Liberia goes beyond stability and normalcy in the daily relational activities of citizens. For them, peaceful coexistence that is beneficial to the actualization of their capabilities is considered as a *routine of a person living happily*, able to progress in society through knowledge and skills acquisition – *as those who are in school are able to go and complete to the highest level of education and attain a degree certificate* (Respondent 4, 5 &1). For them, without peace, they would not have had the opportunity to get educated:

> Yeah, I am having this peace because, after the war, I was able to finish high school and also obtain a college education by earning a degree; I am able to go about my normal activities. And with the presence of bullets and gunfire, I wouldn't have had the opportunity to make any choices of improving myself as a young person (Respondent 2).

In discussing their reflections about hindrances to achieving what they conceive as peace – 'development and harmony', respondents suggested that achieving this does not occur easily. They mentioned that the leaders were confronted with several challenges, including, but not limited to, 'financial resources' (Respondent 8) and *difficulties in policy implementation* (Respondent 9). Participants mentioned *bad leadership* was a primary challenge to building peace. They also voiced the absence of policy decentralization, corruption, lack of accountability, and irregular public service delivery, such as delay in payment of salaries to civil servants, as other challenges to building effective peace. A participant authored the following words:

> Some of the challenges I see with this policy are lack of information sharing about the policy, implementation, and nepotism. The policy is just confine with these different ministries and agencies because they do not want the citizens to be aware about the workings of the policy (Respondent, 3).

In the case of Rwanda, views expressed by Rwandans were indicative of a smooth peacebuilding process. Generally, majority of Rwandans who shared their opinions with us indicated there were no hurdles or challenges in the ongoing attempts at building durable peace in the country. For them, *a man reaps what he sows*. So, if they *sow peace, they will harvest peace during the harvest period*. Thus, *there was no challenge living in peace with anyone as they strived for peace*. Further, they are of the view that: *some people who do not want the best for the country, discouraging others from living in harmony with others*:

> those who discourage others or those who do not wish Rwanda the best (Respondent, 28); For me, I have not met any challenges because I also strive for it. They say that what a person sows are what he harvests, to mean that when you sow peace you harvest peace. On my side, I have never met any challenges in living in harmony with others even though sometimes there are difficulties, but I don't value them (Respondent, 1).

However, the experiences shared by some Rwandanssuggest persons perceived to be associated with the perpetrators of the violence and in some way opposed to official narratives constructed

by the government of Rwanda face some form of exclusion or marginalisation previously discussed by scholars such as Chemouni (2014), Reyntjens (2015) Thompson (2018a). In relation to this, a respondent had this to share:

> It is difficult to get anything because they think our people were part of those who committed the genocide and so we are the same. It is very difficult as we struggle to get very little support. But we are all Rwandans and there should be no division among us (Respondent 17).

> It is the only way to make a living in peace. My people also died, and I have lost everything, all my family but because of my people I am to speak 'my truth'. This makes it difficult to get my village welfare official to help me get some assistance. But he knows my 'truth' that I lost everything (Respondent 23).

Nonetheless, these challenges of a segment of citizens being excluded from accessing socioeconomic spaces or government services, or those with different views about politics and other issues relating to the ongoing quest to build inclusive peace, form part of the clumsy issues of nation-budling. According to Golooba-Mutebi (2013) some of these criticism against the Rwandan government "disregards the fast-changing nature of the Rwandan context and the changes that occurred as a result. It largely applies to the early post-genocide period when the government was still struggling to find its feet and grappling with the challenges of consolidating its power and authority" (p. 37-38). However, it has been two decades since the present constitutional regime in Rwanda came into effect with the election of the first post-conflict president in 2003, after close to a decade of transitional rule.

Consequently, it is expected of the present administration to have adequate appreciation of the emergent contestations and contradictions in the complex set of everyday interactions within society, and between state and society. Otherwise, adopting a state-centric or governmentality appeached to building national cohesion blinds leaders or policy actors to the complexity of daily interactions – both formally and informally that shape the character of the emerging post-conflict state. This presents a leadership challenge regarding the building of mutuality between the leaders and all segments of the population. Hence, the efforts of leadership should partly be devoted to transforming the basis of this discord that seemingly impedes its effort at building inclusion. As perceived by a respondent, these categories of persons, for instance, may not be in favour of the current dispensation by not 'liking the peace because they do not have land to farm on':

> We all have different opinions, and the good thing is that not everyone enjoys it as much as others. Some people worry or regret it because maybe they don't have land to cultivate (Respondent, 28).

Inferring from these views, we agree with Adesina (2015) that, in part, national leadership response to the contextual conditions of post-conflict reconstruction through transformative social policy is key to addressing the triggers of violence. Thus, it remains to be seen how post-conflict reconstruction policies in Rwanda are trickling down to transform social and economic relations

to induce inclusive peace and development (See Takeuchi 2019; Golooba-Mutebi 2013), as is the case in Liberia (See Lucey and Kumalo 2017; Shilue and Fagen 2014).

4.6 Perceptions of Liberians and Rwandans about Social Policy and the Quest for inclusive peace and development

Social policy has been used in post-conflict societies to address structural inequalities (see Cocozzelli, 2014; Stewart, 2002). Implicit to social policy is the ethos of redistribution using public policies by the government to provide access to resources necessary for socioeconomic survival and political participation, promote employment, and intervene to instigate economic growth for the collective welfare (Mkandawire 2004, 2007; Adesina 2015; 2009; Cocozzelli 2014). Thus, Cocozzelli notes that we can justify the claim by a country's leadership to build an inclusive post-conflict society according to the deployment of social policy tools to "create new political, economic, and social contexts to address issues at the core of the conflict. (p. 12).

During our discussions concerning a number of social policies being pursued by the government of Liberia towards the achievement of general wellbeing and collective development, participants in this study from Liberia offered diverse views. In general, respondents maintained that social protection policies serve as instruments for promoting human well-being. In the context of post-conflict reconstruction in Liberia, respondents' perceptions of well-being may be construed to mean enhancing the capacity of citizens through policy instruments such as educational scholarships and health assistance schemes, sports engagement, among others, to engender individual responsibility and accountability to one another. Some respondents expressed their opinions in the following words:

> Well, I think social protection policy focuses on a little bit of all, but I would consider it as an instrument to raise the human well-being of citizens. Somehow, all other benefits of social protection policy seek to have citizens well-being improved (Respondent 10).

> For that, I think there are programs, for example. the government gives scholarship opportunities to representatives in order that they share with their citizens in the district or the county. Those are programs that aim at helping people within lawmakers' districts and citizens should benefit from these opportunities irrespective of one tribal background, religious background, and political affiliation (Respondent 1 – 03/06/2021).

> The national county meet is one program I think the government is using to bring about peace, and especially it helps to allow us to put aside our tribal differences in coming together with the different games (Respondent 11 – 5/06/2021)

Similarly, another participant in the study uttered that social protection policy is seen to be a policy that transforms both social relations and the economy - *I describe the social protection policy by government as an instrument that develops or transforms social relations and the economy*

(Respondent 11). Other participants mentioned that social protection policy enables the *promotion* and *consolidation* of durable peace (For instance, Respondent 15, 3). Some respondents suggested that given the condition of post-conflict Liberia, the tendency for people to be frustrated by their daily circumstances and engage in social vices or behaviour that could cause them greatly is prevalent. Thus, through the adoption of social protection policies, the disadvantaged, marginalized, disabled, among others who suffer economic and social burdens, could be relieved through public social interventions:

On their part, Rwandans portrayed social policy as a significant approach to forging togetherness. With particular reference to *imidugudu* policy, they were of the view that through the introduction of this villagisation policy, lives have been improved, and it has also "*given homes to the homeless*" (n=2), it has *brought togetherness among individuals* (n=2), *it has supported the promotion of peace"* (n=2), and "*it has built a strong foundation for peace-building"* (n=1), *"builds hope and bring smiles to many people* (n=2), *make members work together* (n=3). Besides other social (public) policies being pursed to promote the collective wellbeing of Rwandese, interviewee referenced *imidugudu* policy to demonstrate how it had improved their lives or that of other people and helped build a sense of harmony with one another. A respondent expressed this in the words below:

> This is a village the government gave to people you can see some people could not pay for accommodation, a person has children with disability, in short, their lives are difficult, and I can't see my fellow having any peace and also feel that I have peace. So, because people have settled in the village now, they are happy and they get along well, if people are happy the country also is happy (Respondent 3).

Another respondent emphasized that *imidugudu* program is core to improving their well-being as people's lives are being transformed into better, or quality living arrangements.

> I think the reason the government brings people in imidugudu is that they see that they are in a bad place, so when they bring them to the mudugudu [where] a good life begins because if you leave in a bad place, coming to a good place life has a lot to do with the life you had (Respondent 32).

To this end, it was suggested that *imidugudu* policy deals with racism and creates a common platform for every child to enrol in school, learn and build a better future for themselves to help in sustainable nation-building. Thus:

> The other is to encourage all children to go to school, and even parents to encourage them to study for those who have reached the age of starting school, and no one is excluded because of his race (Respondent 33).

These views, in part, suggest that citizens of Rwanda have a positive appraisal of the social policies being pursued by policymakers to build durable peace in testament to Cocozzelli's view that social policy can be used as a measure to gauge a post-conflict country's leadership claim to building a

just society (See Cocozzelli 2014). Yet, it is important when one is engaged in such an evaluation to consider fundamentally the political context within which such policies are being implemented. Besides accepting the self-evaluative claims of citizens in Rwanda, citizens' concurrence to these policies may not necessarily reflect their innate appreciation of contemporary peacebuilding issues as Rwandans and especially survivors of the genocide, can only 'truly' express their experiences in government-sanctioned environments such as the officially designated *mourning week*.

4.7 Leadership and the quest for inclusive peace in Liberia and Rwanda

Leadership and the mindset of leaders plays a critical role in rebuilding the relational norms of social and economic production in post-conflict states (Olonisakin 2017). This, in part, ensures local ownership of the peacebuilding process (United Nations 2015). To achieve this, mutuality building between individuals who emerge to become leaders and citizens is a fundament mechanism without which inclusive peace becomes elusive (see Grint, 2010a; Murphy, 1941)(See Murphy 1949). During the field study in Liberia, study participants described according to their understanding of how they perceived leadership and defined the different attributes of a *leader*. A considerable number of the participants noted *a leader is the one that performs well* (n=9); others said that *a leader seeks the interest of the citizens* (n=6). According to some (n=3) respondents, *a leader should give a listening ear to his followers*. Likewise, views from Rwanda about leadership centred around efforts to ensure there was sustainable peace in the country. Interviewees indicated that the leadership involved: *encourage people to be each other's keepers, sensitizing community members issues*, it is about deploying *programme that promote peace and stability*; thus, leadership is about ensuring there was peace by *protecting the citizen's security* and *resolving disputes*. In my understanding, leadership to both Liberians and Rwandans is conceived as an embedded process of addressing issues that bothers on collective wellbeing and securing the commonwealth.

Also, Liberians shared their perceptions about the attributes a leader should possess, given their collective post-conflict circumstances. Insights from participants in Liberia emphasized the qualities such as *hardworking* (n=2), *sincerity* (n=2), *a unifier* (n=3), *tolerant* (n=1), *innovative and disciplined* (n=5), *self-motivated person* (n=4), *problem solver* (n=7), *selfless* (n=5), *honest and accountable* (n=6). From the responses a person seeking to build mutuality with citizens in with the resolve of creating a transformative inter-personal or group relations, and state-society relations to offset the causes of conflict and enable inclusive peace and development should be that leader – *one must be selfless, one must be honest, one must be hardworking, and one must have his/her followers at heart* (Respondent, 10). Essentially, the leadership process must emerge

a leader that: *should be someone that unifies, someone that plays a twin mother role, someone that leads well with example, and someone that seeks others interest over his/her interest* (Respondent, 2). However, respondents also expressed the lack of such leadership or qualities of a leader in their present situation. When describing leaders in their community or at the national level, some of the interviewees expressed concerns about the leaders being unable to show up for the responsibilities expected of them. Primal to this has to do with what they described as leaders' interest in the benefits of the positions they occupy and what they are able to solicit from the people rather than offer an enabling environment through the discharge of their duties in general and at critical moments that of need. To these respondents, their current leaders are not helping achieve the collective well-being as they would normally expect:

> The leaders in my community are not active in a positive manner, they only collect money and don't come to people's needs when they are needed most. I don't see them doing any productive work that will positively affect the community dwellers. They are not accessible, they don't settle issues well (Respondent, 1).

Similarly, for Rwandese, leadership is about how leaders get citizens abreast with the programme aimed at inclusivity: I think their role is to create awareness among the public of all these programmes, *whether it is to promote peace or to bring about development* (Respondent 32). This is thought of as a means to offset the between-group framing or racial ideology that partly triggered the conflict. Thence, it is suggested that leaders have made strides to deal away with such cankers to obtain and sustain peace.

> Look at the racism that has been sown among Rwandans for so many years, even in schools and churches that everyone has been teaching it to grow, but now look at 27 years of what we have achieved and good, I see leaders putting all their efforts into achieving and maintaining peace (Respondent, 27).

For this reason, respondents highlighted the fact that their leaders always reiterate the need for them to live in harmony and be each one another's keepers for effective security.

> The leaders emphasize on us being each other's eye which brings about security and hence living in peace (Respondent 1).

The quest for, or claim to power and resources, and the search for legitimacy after the silence of the guns in many instances becomes a source of insecurity. The loss and gain of power by victors, losers, or survivors in the aftermath of conflicts leads to insecurity. Insecurity in the immediate post-conflict setting remains a delicate part of the reconstruction of process as survivors; losers and winners seek to come to terms with their new reality. This leads to contestations between both losers and winners as they seek to capitalise on the porous nature of the state's security architecture during this period to either re-claim their 'lost' hold on the state – in the case of losers; or assert their authority over the (re) emerging state. Since, the provision of security is a core mandate of

the state, it is consequent upon leadership to engage in the process of instituting a transformative security architecture that accommodates the diversity of survivors and interests without compromising the territorial integrity of the state. Such an approach to fostering security for all must be none-state centric. In the case of Rwanda, it should be embedded in the complex nature of daily interactions among both victims and perpetrators who participate in the same socio-economic space.

However, the emphasis on (in) 'security' has been state centric. For instance, Bentrovato (2016) and Purdeková (2012a) separately argue that in the context post-genocide (in)security narrative in Rwanda, the policies for nation building is being used to construct passive citizenship. This suggest that while both victims and perpetrators participate in the same socioeconomic space in search of their self-actualisation, the security narratives of the state with its associated policies rarely ground with the people. Similarly, Purdeková in analysing Rwanda's as policy programme and activities for nation-building *kubaka ubumwe* and reconciliation argued that one cannot decouple the outlay of such policies from the broader state-centric tightly knitted architecture of power and control (Purdeková, 2011), political authority and display of power is unquestionably the sole preserve of the state apparatus (correspondence with some academics and within and outside of Rwanda).

Rwandese, however, refrained from sharing their opinions on this. This did not appear as a surprise as my pre-fieldwork showed that leadership within the context of Rwanda was construed in the person of the current President Paul Kagame. Thus, any attempt at understanding leadership is automatically understood as an evaluation of Paul Kagame. Also, this observation buttresses the point of the loud silence about the real lived experiences of many Rwandans– for how we reconcile the claim that 'we are all one and working towards a collective good' but cannot express what constitutes our perception of a leader. Put differently, what does participation entail without the ability of constructive wilful expression? In essence, this suggests 'disruptive consent' is favoured against 'constructive dissent' (See Grint 2010) as persons who disagree with government policies are seen as *génocidaire* – meaning those harbouring genocide mindset. Significantly for 'Hutu' this suffices as a ground to be "exclude from public life, especially those Hutu who do not accept this designation" (Thomson 2012, p. 98).

4.8 Conclusion

 In summary, I have in this chapter presented the self-appraised narrative of Liberians and Rwandan about the ongoing efforts at building national cohesion and durable development after the return to normalcy. The self-reported views captured in this chapter highlights the *local realities in both Liberia and Rwanda how public policies are shaping the process of peacebuilding, as nation-building.* In both cases, the assumption to public (social) policies is to construct an inclusive society driven by transformed norms of social, economic, and political relations for the good of the commonwealth. When we analyse together the narratives from both countries withing the broad farmworker of liberal- peace oriented security and development, the reality is that liberalised approaches to peacebuilding intervention seem to grind-slowly the process of nation-building as depicted by the Liberia case. On the other state-led authoritarian process of peacebuilding suggest the implementation of peacebuilding policies to knead together a country torn apart by violence is driven by positivistic rationales constructed by the ruling government.

In a sense, social cohesion in a post-conflict context means defining a set of common rules, and establishment of mechanisms for institutional interaction that allows and facilitate citizens interaction in ways that the citizenry becomes an active partaker in the entirety of the nation-building process. The utility of this emanates from the fact that the authority of leadership to steer the reconstruction process in post-conflict societies hinges on the nature of power redistribution that capacitates the citizenry, particularly the marginalised population whose exclusion from the political, social, and economic processes societal (re) production ignited the violence of the past. Doing this hinge on the use of social policy tools to such as education, health services provision, access to land and resources assistance for economic production; to facilitate the deliberate inclusion of all segments of society in building a progressive nation-state that guarantees the future of the citizenry irrespective of one's place of origin within the given territory, religion, gender, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status.

Adopting social policy tools to knead together a fractured society recovering from the effects of violence transformatively requires the leadership to fashion out measures to allows marginalised groups to participate in policy making process; how knowledge about a particular public issue is generated and shared, the setting of policy goals, the control and allocation of resources, and the operationalisation of policy programs for the collective good, In short, it is the means by which they can induce significant social reform which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent society.

A comparative analysis, however, shows a similarity of concerns by citizens of both countries about the ongoing peacebuilding as development efforts by their respective leadership. Thus, I posit that the post-conflict efforts at reconstructing society for inclusive development and durable peace in Rwanda and Liberia are essentially decoupled from their historical relational antecedents, constituting an inevitably complex problem for building inclusivity at present. My observation is grounded in the contentious issues that instigated violent conflicts in both countries as rooted in historically shaped adverse social framings and relational practices. My argument in this chapter has been that liberal peacebuilding rationales through its technocratic policy framings and prescriptions has influenced the efforts of policy actors in their quest to building inclusive peace and durable development. This carves a reductionist approach to the complexity of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in Liberia and Rwanda. Thus, the need to focus on peacebuilding as nation-building that requires leadership to move beyond the simplistic problem solving or technical solutions to focusing on nation-building through transformative social policy tools.

Nation-building policy process through peacebuilding policy interventions from both cases appear to be conservative in approach. While both cases present a semblance of progress towards building national cohesion, it remains to be known how the peacebuilding process in building inclusivity in a transformative manner, and the extent to which leadership plays a role. Subsequently, if we conceptualise these narratives of policy interventions aimed at building inclusive societies from the conceptual to normative ends, framed through Transformative Social Policy and Leadership as process – what would our findings suggest? In addition, the daily realities of risk, the limited space for self-actualisation, the quest for enhanced living condition and secured livelihoods, and between-group and inter-personal harmony as articulated by respondents in both countries – read in conjunction with official policy documents suggest they are geared towards attaining negative peace. How can social policy enable transformative be peace? We examine this in the next chapter of this study.

5.0 Social policy and the quest for inclusive development in post-conflict Liberia and Rwanda

5.1 Introduction: complexity of conflicts and the transition to peace

The root causes of conflicts are dynamic as are the nature of peacebuilding efforts. The nested nature of post-conflict nation-building requires the adoption of a nested approach to dealing with historical and contemporary contextual issues in (re)building durable inter-personal, group, and state-society relations. The discrimination, deprivation, and inequitable development between and among groups socially, politically, and economically in pre-conflict Liberia and Rwanda hashed out in the previous chapters sets the condition for transforming the state-society relations for building inclusivity and durable development. A fundamental expectation in post-conflict peacebuilding is effectively addressing the underlying triggers of conflict (see Uvin, 2008). In most cases, the embedded nature of intra-state violent conflicts is particularly difficult to address using political, economic, and military responses. The essence of post-conflict nation-building is for public policy to address and secure the social, economic, and political issues of deprivation, exclusion, and inequalities – vertically and horizontally of the 'new' country to be anchored around the transformation of norms of relations. This translates into leadership articulation of inclusive and progressive issues that addresses the triggers of conflict and enables norms of organisation or mobilisation, risk-pooling and collective survival for all persons living within the post-conflict state irrespective of age, region, ethnicity, race, religion, or gender. Transformative Social Policy (TSP) framework is a key component of building inclusive nation-states out of divided, traumatised, and crumbled societies.

In part, the driving approach through which inclusive peace is conceptualised in this study is how social policy prescriptions connect to peacebuilding as nation-building. How the leadership of post-conflict Liberia and Rwanda articulate the need for effective peacebuilding through empowerment, capacity building, and participation – a situation that both Rwanda and Liberia have similarly approached. In this study, the TSP framework is understood as one that anchors the 'human' essence of public policy design and implementation in ways that transforms the social, political, and economic circumstances of individuals, identifiable groups, and state-society norms of relations for the collective good. Hence, the TSP framework constitutes a robust and encompassing policy vehicle for the reconstruction of post-conflict countries by emergent leaders committed to securing the collective good of society (Adesina 2015). How TSP translates

normatively in specific post-conflict contexts, however, should constitute an area of investigation. Both Liberia and Rwanda illustrate these teething features of post-conflict societies. Accordingly, this chapter discusses the social policies being pursued by the leadership of both Liberia and Rwanda as part of the post-conflict peacebuilding as nation-building process. As previously discussed in the chapter Four, in part, the peacebuilding process in both countries hinges on the formulation of social policies by the leadership of a both countries to address or repair the norms of socioeconomic and political relations that binds a polity. Hence, what do we know about post-conflict peacebuilding as nation-building in Liberia and Rwanda through the social policies for constructing national cohesion and durable development?

This chapter explores how social policy in Liberia and Rwanda is being deployed to build inclusivity. The argument in this analytical chapter is woven around the second part of the third supplementary question that guides this research: *To what extent is social policy shaping the quest for durable peacebuilding in Liberia and Rwanda?* In answering this question, the chapter explores how social policies in health, education and agriculture are being adopted and pursued by the leadership in both countries to build national cohesion. How are such policies framed, and what are the ideational underpinnings of such policies? How transformative are these social policy prescripts in assisting efforts at reconstructing both polities to build inclusivity and ameliorate the root causes of violence?

A substantial state of difficulty that is in search of a resolution in relation to the normative instrumental claims of liberal peacebuilding and state-building approach is the disregard of its core assumptions and rationales of practical interventions to appreciate contextual issues (Chandler, 2006; Cooper, 2007). Currently, the rationales that drives liberal peacebuilding enshrined in the 'logic of change' devised elsewhere to address the both the immediate and historical causes of conflict misdiagnose post-conflict conditions and continues to impose ways of doing through various interventionist mechanisms (see Mac Ginty 2015, 2014; Richmond 2015, 2022; Liden 2014; Sabaratnam 2011; Chandler 2006). Accordingly, the core assumptions of this liberal framework are buried in the belief in expert-based and technical solutions derived from Anglo-American knowledge systems. This problematic approach to liberal peacebuilding and policy transfer of technical solutions has yielded little results (See Paris 2007, 2010; Sabaratnam 2011; Liden 2014; Richmond 2015, 2017, 2022).

Also, the current liberal peacebuilding approach assumes that empowerment of individuals is autonomous of context-specific social, political, and economic relational structures that orchestrates both development and peace. Another distinguishing issue of concern is the attempt

to repair the neoliberal peace paradigm by supplanting case study investigations into the underlying ethos of the liberal peace frame as the 'local turn' or 'hybrid peace' (see Bargués-Pedreny & Randazzo, 2018; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016, 2013; Richmond & Mitchell, 2011; Ssorin-Chaikov, 2018; Wallis & Richmond, 2017). Hence, I suggest that, to explore the attributes of TSP framework for post-conflict nation-building as peacebuilding, its conceptual strands should be tested normatively diverse post-war countries. The objectives here are to understand the extent to which rationales and assumptions of social policy prescriptions are being deployed in Liberia and Rwanda, upon which current peacebuilding practices are being implemented. A core aspect of the scholarship on global social policy ideas and diffusions is the orthodox and dominant design of programme rather than normative and empirical construction of social (public) policies for implementation such as conditional cash transfer, livelihood empowerment against poverty policies. This chapter draws on the conceptualisation of peacebuilding as nation-building as discussed previously in chapter Three as an encompassing framework for reconstructing the ruins of war faced by post-conflict countries by virtue of the resort to social policy instruments in a nested and multi-institutional arrangement. This is meant to transforms and effectively addresses the condition of post-conflict societies to reduce inequality, marginalisation and exclusion, and deprivation that collectively triggered the eruption of violent conflicts in Liberia and Rwanda.

As previous noted in this study, externally conceived, and imposed technocratic solutions is the bane of peacebuilding policy imposition in Liberia and Rwanda. Their often linear and shallow understanding of the embedded and clumsy maladjusted conditions of post-conflict nation-building. My intimation here is that to make attempts and the resolve by leadership in post-conflict societies to articulate and exchange influence with citizens to achieve the collective good of transforming norms of relations that prevent the relapse into conflict into a successful enterprise, there is the need to contextualise the rationales and assumptions of peacebuilding policies and interventions. To help the critical analysis in this chapter, the social policies deployed in both countries to build national cohesion and drive durable development is analysed against the background of dominant problem-solving peacebuilding policy measures and the social relational trajectory of both Liberia and Rwanda from the past.

Furthermore, the case of Liberia depicts a peacebuilding policy environment that is not locally driven to empower the locales. The adequacy of these approaches to engender transformative norms of collective social, economic, and political risk pooling and the authoritative allocation of resources is critically examined. The arguments made are in two parts. First, I examine the orthodoxy of the current social policy framework being implemented in both Liberia and Rwanda.

The next section discusses specific social policy interventions under the rubric of building cohesive nation-states and eclectic development. Basically, my intention is to highlight how the notions and reasoning of the leadership in both countries are in harmony with the nested nature of competing demands, in the design and implementation of social policy instruments. Section three concludes this chapter by concisely weighing in on the implications of the lack of transformative rationale and assumptions in the implementation of social policies for post-conflict nation-building to secure the collective interest. Also, I renew the call for reconsidering the assumptions of internally driven technocratic peacebuilding policy practices This requirement for rethinking informs the next chapter, which examines the nature of process-based leadership in addressing the challenges of post-conflict societies to build durable communities and progressive development. This chapter is woven around the empirical information collected during my field study, through in-depth interviews with a cross-section of citizens and selected government officials and relevant policy documents to construct the arguments herein critically.

5.2 Social (protection) policy and peacebuilding in Liberia and Rwanda

This section explores how social policy prescriptions connects to post-conflict peacebuilding as nation-building in both countries. Similar to the experiences of African countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia that adopted variegated forms of social policies shortly after independence to repair fractures in society as a result of colonial rule (see Adésínà 2016, 2015, 2011, 2009; Kpessa and Béland 2013; Kpessa et al. 2011), both Liberia and Rwanda have adopted similar approaches of nation-building in their post-conflict peacebuilding processes. It begins by examining how the leadership of Liberia and Rwanda conceptualise and articulate the need, design, and use of social (assistance) policies to heal the wounds of the social fractures that led to the civil wars, besides the mere efforts at relieving poverty. How does the design of social (assistance) policies aid the efforts of leadership at building social cohesion and effective development through capacity building, and participation – a situation that has been similarly approached by both Rwanda and Liberia. In exploring this, social assistance programme of education support in Liberia and *imidugudu* (villagisation). Hence it is important to examine the normative determinants of the design and implementation of social policy programme to ameliorate the ruins and development situation of post-conflict Liberia and Rwanda. There is however a divide between what is conceived and deployed by the leadership through public policy and the aspirations of the people.

5.2.1 The case of Rwanda

Both the Arusha Peace Accord of 1993 and the 2003 constitution of Rwanda provides the overarching legal framework for policy making and implementation in Rwanda since the return to constitutional order after the 1994 brutalities. As the "Fundamental Laws" for reconstructing Rwanda, Article 3 and 4 of the Accord are made supreme over all other enactments in directing public policy making Rwanda. In instances of conflict between the Arusha Peace Accord and the Constitution of Rwanda or any other rules and regulations as follows: in case of conflict between the other provisions of the Constitution and those of the Peace Agreement, the provision of the Peace Agreement shall prevail" and "in case of conflict between the provisions of the Fundamental Law and those of other Laws and Regulations, the provisions of the Fundamental Law shall prevail," (Arusha Peace Accord Government of Rwanda 1994; NURC 2016). A cardinal concept that undergirds the flux of public policies for the purposes of post-conflict nation building is the encouragement and incorporation of the traditional practice of *Umuganda* – 'collective work' (Government of Rwanda 2006: 61) and *Ubudehe* collective action and mutual support to achieving collective goals. Imidugudu is also posited to building collective norms of relations that are cardinal to the effective peacebuilding in Rwanda. This is done through the active encouragement of participation in programme such as *Mutuelle* (community mutual health insurance)*, Akarima k'igikoni* (backyard gardening)*,* and *Itorero* (civic education).

Reading from multiple documentary sources, together with information sources during the field study, posits the norm of corporation as the overarching normative reasoning that foregrounds the design and implementation of nation-building policies in post-conflict Rwanda (Government of Rwanda 2003; 2020). Government officials at the community level with oversight responsibility over the implementation of policy mentioned that: "Unity, work and patriotism" (Government official 4, 9/12/2021) – "unity is one of the fundamental values that the Rwandan community is built on, because we know where division led us to" (Government official 6, 8/12/2021); "it is based on the principle of building a family. So that people will again come together to bring back humanity so that people will live together in harmony. If a family is restored, then we shall have a safe and peaceful country" (Government official 1, 8/12/2021).

This framing of harmony is systematically woven into the social intervention policy programme designed to build mutuality at the communal level relative to various activities at different levels of the social structure in Rwanda aimed at social transformation. This forms part of the narrative of nation-building drawing inspiration from embedded localised approaches, departing from the fatigue of 'western approaches' (Purdeková 2011). Hence, one can aver that the mix of social

policy interventions such as mutuelle forms part of the Rwandan Government's framework, strategies, and quest towards the "attainment of a range of national development targets" by averting risk(s) that challenge the socioeconomic transformation of the country (Government of Rwanda 2022, p. viii).

5.2.2 A brief overview of the policymaking context in Rwanda

The context of policy making in post-1994 Rwanda follows what can be described as: policy discussion, approval, and implementation. The Rwandan policy process is meant to be an interactive institutional process that also involves citizens participation. The aim of such a process is to ensure that policy design and outcome(s) is embedded in the reality of the citizenry by improving their quality of life through public service deliver. This is also meant to capacitate policy actors and provide legitimacy to the policy environment and its outcomes. Besides providing stability to the policy making process, this is meant to aid the effective enforcement policies.

The present policy making environment in Rwanda is characterised by a combination of political dominated as may be the case in any other developing country, albeit with a strong administrative control over the policy making process. Therefore, the government machinery centrally plans, organises, and controls all aspects of the policy making process to maximize its intended socioeconomic and political objectives. During the initial stages of the return to civil governance between 1994 and 2000 public policies were mainly decided by either a ministerial committee or at the cabinet level and communicated through Ministerial Directives for implementation. This may be attributed to the lack of institutional capacity and unstable political regime conditions. Gradually this approach shifted to with the adoption of the Vision 2020 policy framework, and by the year by 2004 firm guidelines for aid co-ordination were instituted to enable the participation of multi-lateral and bilateral institutions in the policy making process (Republic of Rwanda 2006).

Also, the government promulgated policies that ensured it had control over the management, funding, and agreed projects or policy programs with the donor community or their local agency or NGOs (Gready, 2010). At the same time, other governance, and state institutions, such as the legislature and a permanent secretary's forum, and a development partners co-ordination group with defined roles and responsibilities. This is supported by the work of a number of inter-sectoral working groups. The meetings of these working groups present a forum for policy officials to regularly meet with the donor community, the private sector and, in some instances, selected civil society involved with a policy (Republic of Rwanda 2017). This provided a basis for donor participation and assistance through medium to long term policy plans. Even so, the government

of Rwanda has managed to ensure its autonomy over policy space (Zorbas, 2011; Republic of Rwanda 2017).

Once a policy is approved, it is communicated to officials at sub-national, district and village levels for implementation. The implementation process is under the supervision of Councillors and Cell Leaders, who head the various cells that constitute a sector(s). The Burgomasters is the administrator responsible for the imidugudu or communes. The Burgomaster is supposed to be advised or assisted in the implementation of government policies by a committee which is mostly entirely composed of appointed government officials. Before 2004, government officials would usually deliver instructions to local officials and the citizenry during public political meetings meant to persuade and convince the populace about the goal(s) or benefits of the policy. This has shifted as legislators and local councillors more regularly engage with citizens, with the government-controlled media also engaged in the sensitisation of citizens about policy issues. The use of *Imihigo* as a system of public service performance appraisal further consolidates the autonomy of the state over the policy making process as performance targets are set at each level bureaucracy as a means for ensuring the prioritisation of needs to inform policy planning at the national (Hasselskog, 2016). The overall achievement of policy goals is the responsibility of senior policy officials.

5.3 Social policies and nation-building in Rwanda

5.3.1 Imidugudu

The policy of *Imidugudu* (villagisation) emanates from articles 2 and 3 of the Arusha Peace Accord identified as one of the fundamental policy prescriptions for building inclusivity in post-conflict Rwanda and enshrined in the 2003 Constitution of Rwanda (Government of Rwanda 1993; 2003). The Accords along with the Constitution of Rwanda constitute the "Fundamental Law" and by way of Article 3 and 4 of the Accord, were given supremacy in situations where other rules and regulations conflict with these provisions as follows: "in case of conflict between the other provisions of the Constitution and those of the Peace Agreement, the provision of the Peace Agreement shall prevail" and "in case of conflict between the provisions of the Fundamental Law and those of other Laws and Regulations, the provisions of the Fundamental Law shall prevail," (Government of Rwanda 1994). According to article 2 and 3 of the Arusha Peace Accord, the post-genocide government shall provide housing (re)settlements for both survivors and returnees, without preventing returnees from building their own homes or settlements elsewhere: *each person who returns shall be free to settle down in any place of their choice inside the country, so long as they do not encroach upon the rights of other people* (Government of Rwanda 1993, Article 2).

The imidugudu programme is to settle returnees (old and new cases)[11] and displaced persons on settlements designed by the state to engender a sense of social integration among the Rwandan society.

However, the post-genocide government expanded the policy remit of the Arusha Accords by prohibiting returnees and any other Rwandan from constructing their own homes on legally acquired lands (see Protocol d'Accord, articles 3, 4, 13, and 28 cited in Human Rights Watch 2001). Also, the Imidugudu policy categorically provides that refugees shall be resettled in sites modelled according to the 'village, grouped type of settlement to encourage the establishment of development centres in the rural area and break with the traditional scattered housing' (Republic of Rwanda, 1993, Article 28). The policy conception in the Arusha Accords was primarily aimed at resettling returnees who fled the violent atrocities of the time (Republic of Rwanda, 1993, Article 8). According to a government of Rwanda Report published in 2009, the Imidugudu programme is being implemented for resettling mainly Tutsi returnees (Government of Rwanda 2009, p. 13). However, the cabinet decision on villagisation adopted in 1996 for implementation policy in 1997 by the Ministry of Social Reintegration is contained in provisional Ministerial order No. MINITRAPE/01/97 (Government of Rwanda 2009, p.15). The directive extended the policy to cover all rural dwellers beyond the Arusha Accord.

According to the records of the Rwandan Government, between the inception of the programme and the year 2001, it had managed to build more than 265,0001 houses under the *imidugudu* resettlement programme (Government of Rwanda 2009, p.1). In 2009, the government's assessment of the programme estimated that about 20% expected Rwandansbeneficiaries have been captured under the programme (Government of Rwanda 2009, p. 13). The is attributed to dwindling funding for the programme which heavily reliant on foreign donor support from both bilateral and multilateral agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), CARE-UK, The German Government, United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). In 19997, at the initial stages of the programme, the UNHCR spent about USD 10 Million in support of the programme. However, the updated version of the Resettlement Policy, the *National Human Settlement Policy* (Republic of Rwanda 2009) captured the vison of the government of Rwanda as follows:

> the development of a sustainable human settlement policy in Rwanda should aim at a kind
> of Imidugudu-oriented planning based on a participatory approach and an urban planning
> requiring land security and area allocations. The same planning should take into

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[11] "Old Cases" is used by the Rwandan government in reference to refugees most of whom had spent 35 years in exile, while "New Cases" represents refugees from the 1994 violence.

consideration the complementarity between urban and rural development. Moreover, it should ensure to all Rwandans decent housings as well as more salubrious, viable, equitable, sustainable, and productive human facilities. The projected policy is likely to reduce the existing gap in accessing infrastructures and social services; to involve and make local authorities and the community more aware of their responsibilities with regard to the development and management of the settlement by means of endogenous building technologies and production of cheap, sufficient, and decent local materials. Besides, the policy shall be a platform to put in place sound mechanisms for mobilizing internal and external resources needed for a long-term funding of affordable settlements. The policy shall be endowed with an institutional framework, adapted and flexible legal and regulatory instruments that meet the great demand and technical requirements of rational planning (Government of Rwanda 2009, p. 2).

The justification by policy makers was to instigate economic development by reducing poverty and providing access to economic specs that will "create non-agricultural employment and so reduce pressure on the land" (Republic of Rwanda 1996, p20)[12] and a means to diversify the economy by moving it from a consumption to production economy. In a sense, villagisation represented a quest by the leadership of Rwanda to use the policy as a means to address issues of landlessness and homelessness among survivors and especially the poor. Therefore, the resettlement policy made provisions for the homeless, poor, and vulnerable (widows, orphans, persons with disability…) and bringing all the houses in the Imidugudu to an acceptable level in terms of housing and access to social and economic services.

Accordingly, the government of Rwanda considers the Imidugudu policy as crucial to the social and economic functioning of the Rwandan economy:

> the human settlement policy must integrate the aspects of the recovery and transformation of the national economy and become a component of the country's economic policy. A society in emergency situation as a result of the 1994 genocide against Tutsi and its aftermath. The effects of this tragedy are still felt, and some actions should be considered as a matter of urgency, particularly the construction of homes for households which still live in poor structures, among others, former refugees that are coming back into their country (Government of Rwanda, 2009, p8-9).

Therefore, the Imidugudu policy is to: a) resettle survivors and victims of different ethnic origin and background together so as to enhance peace and reconciliation; b) to regroup survivors to counter the dispersion which makes it difficult to "persuade" them [to follow government policy] (rend difficile la sensibilisation de la population), c) provide the basis for authorities to provide public amenities to ensure basic living arrangements for those captured under the programme (Isaksson, 2013; Government of Rwanda 1996; 1999). Each *Umudugudu* settlement is planned to accommodate an estimated 100 to 200 houses in rural areas and about twice this number in urban

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[12] République Rwandaise, Ministère des Travaux Publics, Politique Nationale de l'Habitat, December 1996, p. 20.

areas on a land size of between 10 to 20 hectares with a possibility of expansion as may be possible (Government of Rwanda 2009).

To be sure, policy actors meant to provide a form of socioeconomic impetus for the recovery from violence by helping to address conceived problems such as: a) land administration and scarcity by redistributing land, creating terracing and ensuring ineffective land use; b) to protect the environment; c) resolve the housing shortage and crisis address, d) to promote security and reconciliation and to facilitate the provision of basic services and infrastructure. (Isaksson, 2013; also see PNUD & MINIREISO, 1997; Republic of Rwanda, 2001, 2004). Hence, by clustering Rwandans into created settlements, policy makers conceived the villagisation programme as a means of creating growth enclaves; as the basic and necessary conditions for developing the markets that will instigate opportunities for other sectors of the economy (Hilhorst & Leeuwen, 2000).

However, the programme was negatively affected when the many external financing sources declined at the end of 1999 -2000 (Republic of Rwanda, 2004,2009). Also, the programme suffered implementation difficulties due to lack up adequate conception, planning legal framework regarding the redistribution and acquisition of land, and non-financial resources such building materials and human resources (Republic of Rwanda 2009). Also, the inability of policy actors to in properly integrating issues of:

> Low-income levels, insufficient operational capacity, bad management of land, top-down planning approaches with line management structure across sectors, and non-inclusive planning procedures among other factors, contributed to the expansion of unplanned, health-endangering and environmentally degrading, urbanising areas (Republic of Rwanda 2018, p 6).

Therefore, by the year 2004, the Government of Rwanda did not have a coherent policy incorporating all the elements of the human settlement sector (ibid). This policy lacuna and its associated challenges would lead the subsequent adoption of a number of different but inter-linked policies for the improvement of cross-sectoral and intra-institutional coordination, integration, planning and development management, for effective delivery of the overall policy objectives need to firmly anchor the imidugudu programme. The Urbanisation and Rural Settlement Strategic Plan was subsequently developed in tandem with the EDPRS-II (2013). The first Sector Strategic Plan (2013-2018) provided a coherent policy, legal and institutional frameworks for human settlement and development. The SSP – 2013-2018, also outlined the necessary policy guides for effective land management to cluster dispersed settlements into planned neighbourhoods in accordance with the following objectives:

To develop the basis for good urban and rural settlement management crosscutting all development sectors and following clear guidelines and procedures at all levels of governance;

To create a hierarchical network of urban and urbanizing centres providing services and attracting economic activities countrywide while focusing support to development of secondary cities as poles of economic growth;

To facilitate the financing and supply options for affordable housing through collaboration with the private sector. (Republic of Rwanda 2018, p.10, also see Republic of Rwanda 2013).

Furthermore, this policy objectives of the Government of Rwanda were instituted by reconsidering previous policies while cognisant of exiting measures to bolster its efforts at ensuring an effective Human Settlement programme for the purposes of transforming the Rwandan society. Hence the following polices are deemed critical to the objectives of the National Strategy for Rural and Urban Transformation 2018-2024 (see Republic of Rwanda, 2018, 10-11)[13]:

Human Settlement Policy (2009) – *the first policy which highlighted the need for: planning, efficient use of land through densification and clustering, urban financing mechanisms, development management responsibilities of local authorities, public participation, and development of the building industry. The second core of the document gave the frame to grouping rural habitat into planned rural settlements, supported by small economic centres in the rural areas, as well as support to housing for vulnerable groups.*

National Land Use and Development Master Plan (2011) – *National Land Use and Development Master Plan (NLUMP) provides the general directives for land use development and presents guiding principles for the future development of the country in regard to socioeconomics, infrastructure, environment, and land administration. With its current revision taking a cross-sectoral approach, it is meant to integrate national guidance to a human settlement framework beyond non-urban land uses to illustrate the envisioned future land use distribution, setting long term guidance for any other planning document to follow.*

National Urbanisation Policy (2015) *meant to goal of promoting well-coordinated urban settlement and development that positively transforms the economy of the country, improving the socio-economic conditions for all and preserving resources to sustain the life of future generations. The Policy Pillars are 1) Coordination; 2) Densification; 3) Conviviality and 4) Economic Growth.*

National Informal Urban Settlement Upgrading Strategy (2017) – *supported by the first SSP and the National Housing Policy, is an important strategy to effectively guide the inclusion of existing, currently informal housing stock as part of the formal stock of housing in support of sustainable settlement, affordability of housing, improvement of living conditions and asset value increase.*

Accordingly, the imidugudu policy is being used as a strategy to achieve its wider EDPRS II, SSP 1&2, Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme, and Vision 2050 development objectives among other, by building "economically viable and socially integrated" (Republic of Rwanda 2009, p 15; Republic of Rwanda 2016, 2018). These constructed villages, the government hopes would be "more secure, salubrious, viable, equitable, sustainable and productive" (Republic of Rwanda 2009, p14). The policy of imidugudu is has become an overarching approach to building an economically progressive and socially inclusive Rwanda as it strives to build a durable state. In

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[13] Also see www.minecofin.gov.rw [assessed on 11-03-2024]

this respect, *umudugudu* are being created to correct the disparities in socioeconomic status and access to social and economic amenities that are fundamental to enhancing well-being in both rural and urban areas (Republic of Rwanda 2016). There are currently 14,744 (*imidugudu*) villages (see Chemouni, 2018).

During interview sessions in Rwanda, respondents emphasised that the *Imidugudu* (Villagisation) policy is cardinal to the pursuit and attainment of human well-being in a collective manner. Suggesting that it is a strategy fundamental to helping with post-conflict nation-building as: "the country was destroyed and now rebuilding and for people to live in it safely and be able to have a better life are among the reasons as to why the country is putting in much effort" (Government official 7, 28/02/2022)

Other respondents had the following view:

> Because it brings people to live together and creates a shared history of living amongst them that makes them more united and looking for ways to thrive as one family or neighbours and there is nothing to not accept because they are connected in everything (Respondent 7, 6/12/2021; Respondent 14, 9/12/2021).

> The first thing that *imidugudu* did is settling people together in order to guard their security, another thing is bringing development near them in an easy way, like water, electricity, health centres, schools also there is a way that a person doesn't go to the health centre instead you find that they put health advisors so that once a child gets sick from home, there is a health advisor in order that once he has fever of malaria, there are instruments which they check his health status and also give primary care. All those are benefits of living together and also preserving land that is cultivated by our country (Respondent 5, 9/12/2021).

Similarly, Respondent 6 noted – "it provides us with security and infrastructure", and continues:

> Because when the people are brought in *mudugudu* homes, first they have water, the second have electricity, the third have roads and have advance mind set and they can bathe, and the other is that the education of the children is going up and they are also growing well. When one is in the *mudugudu* one has a better place, whether small or large.

Other views were expressed as follows:

> There are a lot of people who live in bad places, there are those who live in rural areas and sometimes they are alone, there is a place I went to and I saw people living in an isolated place and I was worried that if someone attacks them they would harm them because they are isolated You find a person living in a valley or under a rock facing a problem. But you see, the way we live here if you have a problem your neighbours can rescue you. So, the village plan I see is helping people from the worst to the better place and with light. In the village there is no shortage of water, you can shop, and you can even see what you are doing. The village is a good place because you don't understand it and don't understand the benefits of living together. And I see it as a way to connect people. Also, when one is alone one may think that what one thinks is true, but when you reach others, you find yourself exchanging ideas. The other day a pope found me and told me that he wanted to sell and move here because he felt that would help him, but we talked to him in consultation and from here he was happy to talk to us and changed his mind (Respondent 5).

> We have a good relationship [with one another] even though sometimes there a conflict but if one has a wedding, he invites people. If anyone is sick, you visit them, there is really no problem in imidugudu. I think you see the example of the one who comes to borrow the stove and they give it to him (Respondent 19).

A government official in the Ubumwe village, Kicukiro City – Kigali when asked about how the policy of *imidugudu* contributes to effective peacebuilding by a) *raise the human well-being in your community,* b*) transforming social institutions and social relations and,* c) *the economy* – was of the opinion that the policy was instrumental in helping forge a sense of national cohesion, albeit with some challenges – "*Imidugudu* helps the citizen to overcome the culture of being selfish and helps people to understand the role of reconciliation and working together" (Government official 7, 28/02/2022). According to other officials interviewed for this study:

> When people stay in *Umudugudu* then development reaches them easily. And because they are together you find it easy to help and reach out to them. Even with peacebuilding it is quicker and easy because people already stay together in their daily life (Government official 1, 8/12/2021).

> The *imidugudu* plan is very helpful, as the *imidugudu* leaders at the community level assist the authorities with data, basic information about the people and their livelihoods; and also monitor their daily lives and send reports to other agencies so that the administration can be successful (Government official 4, 9/12/2022).

Likewise, the following responses below give a glimpse of what some Rwandans think about the policy:

> Yes, wealth increases when infrastructure that makes a person get what he wants in an easy way. For example, water, a person finds it nearby instead of going to fetch very far, whereby a person spent three hours thus like a student was late for school. (Respondent 5, 9/12/2021).

> It is a great program because we all live together and find the infrastructure close to us, today where we are, our children study near and study well. The other thing is that we visit each other, we get to know each other more, where you find that neighbours are sometimes better than your siblings because sometimes your partner leaves you with his children (Respondent 27, 28/02/2022).

> Because people have been shifted to communal homes, they are now happy and living well. These are communal homes that the government has given to people. You see there are people who are not able to pay for the accommodation, others have children with disabilities, in short life is difficult for people. If I do not see a friend who has peace, how can I also feel safe? (Respondent 15, 9/12.2021).

> *Imidugudu* help in socializing, communicating, and promoting a culture of peace and well-being through community relations and community engagement (Respondent 22, 18/12/2021).

Another respondent noted the program allow officials to have information on citizens for the purposes of planning for both the present and future generations, regardless of the challenges that it might be fraught with at present:

> In particular, *Imidugudu* are helping to change the lives of people because perhaps as local leaders they have information...and you find that you need" (Respondent 11, 9/12/2021).

Respondents also expressed their thoughts about how imidugudu is aiding the quest for peaceful co-existence during discussions – "we are encouraged to develop ourselves and prosper in everything. There is a plan for unity and reconciliation where we all strive to build a healthy Rwanda that is not based on discrimination" (Respondent 27, 28/02/2022). Another respondent noted that "because it we are together now, a person likely to cause discord or conflict, will be noticed by the neighbours who will rebuke or reprimand such a person to behave and be patient. Out of the embarrassment, the person will refrain from the intended act" (Respondent 29,

28/02/2022). From my investigations, under the villagisation *Itorero* – civic education program is one of the means used to encourage mutual inter-relations for the collective good.

Inferring from the information secured, the *imidugudu* policy by the Rwandan government is used as nation-building strategy to provide affordable housing and ease the pressure of repopulation as a consequence of the genocide, bring together traditionally dispersed villages or communities to address the land question through spatially reengineering. This is aimed at providing decent living arrangements for survivors and persons who cannot afford and bring public services closer to the people as disclosed in the responses:

> as part of the *imidugudu* our village we joined together with other two villages to helped us building together and, during the distribution of incentives such as mosquito nets which is done in every village. It is difficult for mayor of Kicukiro to know each home or each person, but each village is easily known, and we also know each other because each person's information is known to us all. So, if we took care of our people, they also become healthy then our wealth increases (Respondent 2, 3/12/2021).

> We are near the clinic because its 30 minutes to get there, we are near the school, we were given a black [tarred] road before it was dusty (Respondent 19, 7/12/2021).

> You see, the people living here, could have covered the area for the whole administrative cell. But now you see that the land which is inhabited here is so small, looking for a place to set up human development activities, the land is available and the time it takes to build is small, and infrastructure is close to us. It's not like you're living apart. It's easy. We lived in an area to be occupied for the whole administrative cell area, but where we live, the surface is very small. So, it is easy for the authorities to provide us with electricity, give us water, and the leadership administration is close to us. Things are easier now. You see when people are so close, it is helpful economically, especially in terms people's management; it's easy to know how people live. If there are some unemployed people, those who have the ability to work but are not financially able, are supported. Like VUP program, there is a way to help unemployed people, adults, pay them to work. But in my opinion, it is not as easy for you as a leader to live in a village (Respondent 29, 28/02/2022).

Similar to the experiences of countries such as Ethiopia and Mozambique have implemented this policy in variations (Van Leeuwen, 2001). Core to this policy was the reliance on aspects of group's norms of relations to exchange influence in the pursuit of their collective aspiration(s). The deployment of public policy in this regard was to provide an enabling space and guide the various locales withing the nation-state in cohesion (see Roe, 1991; I. Scott, 1989). In the context of post-conflict Rwanda, imidugudu policy is meant to be a participatory process of reintegrating and kneading together Rwandans of different identities (Government of Rwanda 2009). By encouraging cooperation in the norms of relations where people live together, share risk, and create means for collective pooling of resources to overcome their challenges for the greater interest of all. It was used as a poverty reduction strategy for improving the quality of life through the provision of public basic needs for both rural and urban inhabitants such as employment, decent and accessible housing, affordable and efficient transportation system, potable water and energy, access to health services and access to public administration among others (Government of Rwanda 2009).

The present framing of this pro-poor policy is to achieve equitable, sustainable, and productive public mechanisms to "reduce the existing gap in infrastructure and social services for all Rwandans" (Government of Rwanda 2009, p.2), thus, "when people live together, they help each other in solving problems, and solving problems together encouraging peace and avoids conflicts" (Government Official 7, 20/02/2022). In this regard, a government official in Rwanda averred that the rationale underpinning the government's social policy is the need to instigate "cooperative inter-relations that enables the country to progress and sustain the peace they have now without going back to the dark times" (Government official 2). Thus, the overall perspective of the social protection policy framework of Rwanda is the universal protection of all citizens through the provision of:

> essential support to those living in poverty, protecting them from the worst consequences of such and puts in place a safety net that can be activated to catch people in danger of falling into poverty through the promotion and support for poor peoples' investment so that they can pull themselves out of poverty and graduate from the need to receive social protection. Such interventions include skills development, public works (HIMO) to build skills and boost household incomes, income generating activities to promote off farm activities and other subsidized schemes such as fertilizers and seeds to households with ability to invest farm activities and linkages with market opportunities with the expectation that this would transform the social, economic, and political status of the society through promotion of positive values, respect for rights and family and community based support systems (Government of Rwanda 2020, p. 19-20).

It can therefore be deduced that though the villagisation approach the government sort to drive-socioeconomic development through community resources mobilisation and sharing; and also, to make land available for the purpose of pursuing socio-economic investment by various means possible. The Rwandan government estimates that employment opportunities are needed for about 230,000 young Rwandans who enter the labour force every year (International Finance Corporation 2019, p. 2), urgently requiring the need to open productive spaces in the formal sector on a yearly basis to accommodate young adults graduating into the job market. This is also to drive inclusive economic transformation (NISR 2016a; OCED 2017). Out of this estimation, the government is currently able to create slightly above 3571 formal jobs in 2022 (Government of Rwanda 2020; International Finance Corporation 2019)[14]. This then points to the need for the leadership of the country to secure the aspirations of the population as part of its broader development aims. Hence, among other policy measures, the *imidugudu* policy in a way is being used by the government as a growth pole to stimulate inclusive development as noted in the Government of Rwanda's Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy phase II

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[14] See https://www.statistics.gov.rw/publication/1810 Retrieved on 02/03/2023; Also see; https://tradingeconomics.com/rwanda/unemployment-rate; International Finance Corporation. 2019. Creating Markets in Rwanda: Transforming for the Jobs of Tomorrow. Country Private Sector Diagnostic. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/32400/Country-Private-Sector-Diagnostic.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

(EDPRS II), 2013. This policy objective is re-echoed in the sub-policy on *Urbanisation and Rural Settlement* developed under the recently adopted Sector Strategic Plan (SSP) for National Strategy for Transformation (2018-2024). Specifically, the SSP (2018-2024) among other, it highlights the economic goal of *imidugudu* as follows:

> The promotion of a system of urban and rural settlements for local economic development is based on local potentialities, with a focus on resource- and cost-effective public investment, preservation of land for agricultural production, open space, and environmental conservation. The responsibility for well-managed human settlement development is shared across sectors, with the overarching Urbanisation and Rural Settlement Sector having been created with the second Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2013-18 (Government of Rwanda, 2018, p 9).

In part, this resolve to use Urbanisation and Rural human resettlement may be a contributory factor to the decline in levels of inequality according to official records. The Gini index of Rwanda declined from 0.52 in 2006 to 0.43 in 2017 (World Bank 2022).[15]

5.3.2 Building cohesion and inclusivity in Umudugudu

From both policy documents and citizens' self-appraisal of the villagisation policy, the use of villagisation offered a means of reconstructing the ruins of post-conflict Rwanda. The building national cohesion was however construed as consequence thereof. Since the inception of the programme, none of the policies that guides the implementation of imidugudu that is publicly available, and examined in this study makes explicit claims to national building as an objective of the imidugudu. Although during a meeting with the donor community in early 1997, the Minister of Rehabilitation and Social Integration Patrick Mazimhaka alluded to the fact that imidugudu would provide the necessary environment for promoting peace and reconciliation. The minister also claimed that clustered settlement would provide security (see Human Rights Watch 2001). In the mind of the policy actors, clustering both 'victims' and 'perpetrators' together in a community would lead to the building of bonds of corporation that would erase the discord among Rwandans based on age-old norms. This claim of unity is expressed by the government of Rwanda as follows:

> From the time in memorial, Rwandans in their culture held that unity was strength, and that to survive they needed each other s help without any distinction—solidarity by working together . This was Rwanda 's traditional philosophy of mutual solidarity and assistance reflecting a number of collective activities they performed at village level. People jointly put-up houses cleared bushes and tilled land for growing of crops. Efforts were also combined to defend themselves against common enemies and generally came to each other s help both in time of happiness and time of sadness. It is realized that spirit of mutual assistance was deeply rooted in the conventions and customs of the society. Such solidarity kept the Rwandan society quite intact and dynamic (Republic of Rwanda, 2016, p 29).

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[15] See: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview Accessed on 1/03/2023

From the above disposition of the Rwandan government, practices of *Ubudehe*, *umuganda*, *Abunzi, Itorero and Ingando* were actively encouraged as means of fostering national cohesion and inclusivity among Rwandese. During field studies, respondent particularly refereed to the practice of *Ubudehe* as fundamental to their building of cooperation and belonging for the common good within their respective settlements or villages. For that reasons this study shall focus on *Ubudehe.*

Ubudehe and forging social cohesion in Imidugudu

Ubudehe is an age-old cultural practice of community-level mutual assistance in Rwanda (Republic of Rwanda 2014). Historically, tradition of *Ubudehe* was a period set aside by a community for individuals to come together and assist each other through collective activities, such as planting crops and building houses (ibid). Therefore, the traditional essence of *Ubudehe* was 'collective action, at community level, for community development' (MINALOC, 2004). The practice of communal bonding has been re-ignited as a tradition by the post-genocide government in Rwanda to aid the efforts of policy actors at building social cohesion by way of communal or collective action and mutual assistance. (Republic of Rwanda 2014, 2018, 2020). It is present form, it has become a means for "construction/building of houses and maintenance of soil and water infrastructure that could simultaneously reduce soil erosion and modernize agriculture" (ibid, p.107). As such, its re-introduction is to enhance planning and implementation of poverty reduction measures in support of the identified poor and vulnerable in society. Hence, the adoption and practice of Ubudehe by the government of Rwanda in the Imidugudu was used a strategy to help achieve it poverty reduction objectives in PRSP 1 and 2 (Republic of Rwanda 2002, 2013, 2014). The practice of Ubudehe brings together people and communities to deliberate, plan and execute communal responses to their needs. This may be done either locally or together with the government or its assigns (Corry, 2012). In its current form, the practice started as a pilot in the poorest, Southern Province of Rwanda before it was eventually implemented across the country (ibid).

According to government of Rwanda, the practice was re-invoked after 1994 by the RPF as 'community work' to supplement national efforts at reconstructing the ruins of the violence, and "to better promote community participation in addressing poverty issues, as well as fostering the culture of mutual support" (Republic of Rwanda 2014, p. 106). This way, the government of Rwanda is deploying *Ubudehe* to:

> build trust among Rwandans so as to start the process of healing and working together to
> build greater social capital and inclusion, to reduce citizen apathy toward the government

and among themselves, and to strengthen each citizen's power to act and therefore build an active Rwandan citizen (Republic of Rwanda 2014, p. 107).

From the above, the implementation of *Ubudehe*, in each Imidugudu is based on the selection of about two poor families from among the community. The selection is done by members of the community, assisted two locally trained volunteers by the government (Republic of Rwanda 2014). Together, the participating families develop means to assist in uplifting the well-being of the poor family the larger community (ibid).

During the conduct of this study, respondents who reside in *imidugudu* shared their views when asked - *What are some of the activities, policies or programs in your community that helps with building communal harmony*? The responses of citizens corroborated the government's narrative of Ubudehe in building social cohesion. The following responses gives an overview of what a cross-section of Rwandans think;

> When we [arrived] reached here after [the] genocide there were no roads, but we joined efforts so that we can construct some [roads]. We [also] brought water here from a far point, today it's a good [achievement] harvest, there are others who come to fetch from here and they give us money. We share it among ourselves (Respondent 12 – 06/12/2021).

> Where we live the first thing, we do under Ubudehe is general work like building road and doing other community work that help us in living better lives. We also use this to support our neighbours have weddings [to contract marriages], it makes us meet [bond as a community] because if our neighbour has a married a couple or if a son getting married, we can't refuse to support him. [Also] giving social classes without depending on the ethnicity of a person, instead basing on what s/he needs [such as] helping children study, [or] what you own as a family (Respondent 2 – 3/12/2021).

> It helps us in knowing problems that are in the village then we help each other to solve them (Respondent 3 – 06/12/2021).

> We meet in the community work because they tell us where it will take place and we go there. After that there is a meeting to look at how to help people with their problems or to talk to us about how to have a better relationship (Respondent 8 – 6/12/2021).

> We also have a cooperative that helps us meet, every week and every Friday we go there with a contribution of only 200 Frances. It is not a way to make money but a way to get people to see each other better. (Respondent 15 – 09/12/2021)

> The first is to work together in savings group – *n'akagoroba k'ababyeyi*, community work even though it was [stopped] closed due to covid. But you helped us by connecting and getting to know each other and seeing how we could improve our relationship. (Respondent 20 – 07/12/2021).

> We socialize with everyone without discrimination of where one comes from. Looking at it as before or during the genocide you feel it was difficult to see all Rwandans sitting and socializing because of racism but today it is done. We meet in the community, and we find it helpful because people often talk and understand each other. The development of a woman. Today a woman is given the [opportunity] floor and is encouraged to thrive in everything where she also takes the lead in everything a man does (Respondent 24 – 06/12/2021).

From the above sampled responses, we can appreciate the efforts of policy actors in Rwanda using traditional norms such as *Ubudehe* to citizens in umudugudu and other places across the country in forging is sense of cohesion by way of community-level participation to enhance their collective

well-being. The views expressed by Rwandans interviewed for this study is like the findings of previous studies by scholars such as Niringiye and Ayebale (2012) and Brian (2012).

However, the present study also found a number of draw backs to the implementation of the imidugudu policy. Information on the implementation of imidugudu published by the government of Rwanda shows the programme is fraught with a number of challenges, with many of the settlements lacking many essential amenities contrary to the objectives of the programme (Republic of Rwanda 2009). According to official sources, the challenge of implementation fundamentally stems partly from the unavailability of *reliable and accurate statistics*. Therefore, "inadequate tools to support the implementation of the social housing policy, the nonexistence of a study defining the context and regulative framework of social housing that decision- making" (Republic of Rwanda 2009, p. 9). Prominent among the challenges admitted by the government are a) Poor urban planning, b) Limited public financial resources, c) Inadequate urban infrastructure and complementary facilities, d) Inadequate mechanisms to recover the costs invested in human settlement operations, e) Limited human resources, f) Insufficient building materials, and g) Nonexistence of regulation standards governing planning and construction operations (see Republic of Rwanda 2009, p 10-12).

To address the current challenges being faced by the project the government's appraisal report on the programme suggested the need for a participatory approach to the implementation of human settlement, and a coherent mechanism for recovering funds invested by the government of Rwanda in the subsequent construction of Imidugudu. To this end, it was recommended that:

> The involvement of the Government in human settlement programmes [should be preceded by] a financial appraisal defining the practical modalities of costs recovery before committing any public funds. This regulation must apply to all resources from Government finance…the promotion of human settlement projects can be done by the private sector as developers capable of making the beneficiaries pay the cost price. The funds obtained will be recycled in new projects. This vision prevents the establishment of upsetting thresholds of programmes and ensures a confidence building continuity (Republic of Rwanda 2009, p 21).

From the above, the potential of transformation has been dwarfed by the adoption of neo-liberal ethos in the current design of the programme as contained in the *Resettlement Policy Framework* (Republic of Rwanda 2016).

With regard to enhancing participation to ensure inclusivity, the report suggested any future human settlement policy to:

> integrate gender issues into all its programmes. However, there is still a lot to be done: the choice of beneficiaries should be oriented on youth and women which make the majority of rural and agricultural population. Both youth and women should be more integrated into cooperatives, training on entrepreneurship in real estate, facilitation to access housing

The above admission is at odds with the official narrative of *traditional norm* of co-operation being an integral part of imidugudu. Posited as a social intervention programme to support the poor, less privileged, and homeless, the policy did not account for the agency of the recipients as persons with adequate capacity to participate in its design and implementation in a manner that connects individual, communal and national aspirations. Hence, the extent to which these citizens participate in the imidugudu program is to provide validation – as noted by Arnstein (1969), this form of participation simply "allows the powerholders to claim that all sides were considered but, makes it possible for only some of those sides to benefit. It maintains the status quo" (216). Thence, excluding the referent objects "presently excluded from the political, social and economic processes are mere statistical abstractions accounted for through neighbourhood meetings" (ibid, p.219). Such as an appendage form of participation discounts the capabilities of the referent object of the policy – citizens. This deliberately excludes them from the ideas that forms the basis of the policy design robbing it off its transformativeness.

Also, this study finds that the villagisation program is being the government to monitors citizens and where possible to prevent any form of dissenting views or future attempts of insurrection by any group of persons against government policy position, narrative, and rulership of the *Inkotanyi* or the Rwandan Patriotic Front administration. This is done through the rhetoric of *preventing genocidal ideology*. According to the 2003 Rwandan Constitution categorically states Rwandans are 'resolved to fight the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations and to eradicate ethnic, regional and any other form of divisions' (see Preamble 2 of Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda 2003). Especially, given the threats by the activities of *Interahamwe* spread across some parts of Rwanda. The imidugudu became a measure by the government to protect citizens and ensure control over the activities of *Interahamwe*. However, this sense of providing security has also become a means of coercing people and stifling dissent. As voiced by a respondent:

> My cell leader knows that I lost all of my people [family members] during the events. He knows I am vulnerable, so he demands the 'truth' from me. But my people are all dead. All I can do is try to get recognition as a survivor of the genocide so I can get some [financial] support. It is hard to ask for social intervention when I decide not to engage with my cell leader due to the fear that he will make demands for me to confess and feel bad about something that I did not do (Respondent 15 – 08/12/2021).

Other respondent intimated that government knows everything about them: "local leaders they have information...each village and we also know each other because each person's information is known to us all" (Respondent 2, 3/12/2021); Respondent 11, 9/12/2021).

In a sense, the imidugudu has become a commune for the mundane presence and surveillance by the government through *Umuganda* meetings in ways that allows for "easier 'read' and control of a population that hitherto was dispersed and hence difficult to persuade or sensitise" (Purdeková, 2012b, p. 368). Other scholarly dialogue on the socio-political development on post-conflict by Rwanda such as Thomson (2018a), Reyntjens (2013), Ansoms (2009) assert the is a harsh, oppressive, and autocratic nature of the current political administration in Rwanda. For these scholars, the constitutional space for free and responsible expression of thoughts and assembly are used as a weapon against dissenting views and ideas by persons and groups considered as political opponents, or civil society organisations not toeing the official narrative of the government (Thomson, 2018; Reyntjens, 2013).

However, another category of scholars on Rwanda have provided convincing explanation to the seemingly autocratic political space in Rwanda, linking the nature of the present governance system in Rwandan to the nature of previous governments (see Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Chemouni, 2016; Kelsall, 2013). The origin of the current administration is rooted in the overthrow of the pre-genocide administration. According to Straus (2006) government of Rwanda in 1994 was responsible for 'mobilizing the civilian administration for the elimination Tutsis' (p. 1), inferring that the genocide was a product of a planned cause by the leadership at the time, with the state apparatus being the vehicle for implementing their agenda (p. 2). Also, Thompson argues that "killing Tutsi was a state-sanctioned event that brought the authority of key institutions…to bear" (Thomson, 2018b, p. 5). Hence, 'extremist' elements in the leadership of the previous administration 'used the state's extensive reach to prosecute the genocide' (McDoom, 2020, p. 33). It is against this background that the present leadership deems it necessary and a mark of success to have effective control all aspect of the state. This is to ensure the effective admiration of the government's policy objectives and demonstrating the essence of its political and economic leadership. Also, at the minimum, such information is useful for the purposes of policy planning, design, and execution towards achieving durable development. Accordingly, Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2013, p. 13) argue that rather than construing such the present governance in Rwanda as autocratic, the present leadership must be appreciated for instituting a policy regime of "robust inclusiveness: a willingness to adopt into the nation-building project almost anyone [who identifies with the objective and] willing to join it". Consequently, a government official interviewed for this study buttresses this point, by stressing it is crucial to the cause of the RPF government in ensuring policy goals benefits all Rwandans in the following words: when there is stable government with security it is easy for citizen to find those programs that are dictated to them (Government Official 7 – 28/02/2022).

The imidugudu policy programme also sought to reduce inequality among Rwandans given the precarious socioeconomic circumstance of the country. However, not all who reside in the imidugudu are able to relate to this policy objective. Some respondents had this to say: Some people worry or regret it because maybe they don't have land to cultivate (Respondent, 28). There is also the view of rising inequality with wealth and other resources within the state controlled by a few elites affiliated with ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front party (see Ansoms & Rostagno, 2012; Thomson, 2018c). Beyond this, a recent report suggests there is raising unemployment which needs to be addressed if the stabilisation gains are to be consolidated (International Finance Corporation 2019). The contrived inhabitants of these constituted villages from diverse backgrounds across the country. This accords the government enormous control over their relations in a manner inconsistent with the creation of 'imagined state'. The recourse to public policy to create inclusive civic awareness and commitment to the state by transforming in-group framing of others assumes public policy as an embedded set of procedures or rules and associated patterns of behaviour for nurturing and guiding norms of relations deemed appropriate for attaining collective goals by a people. The Rwandan government has however kept faith with the imidugudu program despite the withdrawal of donor-assistance and an accelerated policy shift towards market-driven provision of infrastructure and social services (Takeuchi, 2019; Republic of Rwanda 2016,2009; International Finance Corporation 2019).

5.3.3 Mutuelle de Santé – Community-based Mutual Health Insurance Policy

In 1999, the government of Rwanda began the process of establishing a nationwide community-based health insurance programme with the lunch of a pilot project. The scheme was designed drawing on the experiences of similar existing schemes in Africa (Zambian, Burundi, West Africa) and Europe. In its initial phase the policy designed based on community funding and risk pooling (Binagwaho, 2012; Chemouni, 2018; Republic of Rwanda, 2010). The decision to institute a community mutual health insurance scheme was influenced by two main factors. First, was the emerging precarious post-conflict situation with inadequate health infrastructure. This affected the provision of efficient and adequate public health care provision to Rwanda, with several NGOs providing free services in parts of the county. Also, the destructive effects of the war on Rwandans meant majority of them could barely afford out of pocket payment for the needed services they received at the few and ill-equipped health centres. Secondly, the policy to introduction user fees for healthcare provision in Africa after the Bamako meeting of Health Ministers on the continent had been consolidated among the policy community.

Thus, with the dwindling assistance by the international community to Rwanda's health sector by 1998, the RPF was faced with a policy conundrum of what next to do. According to Chemouni "this spurred the Ministry of Health (MoH) in 1998 to ask USAID for help to improve financial access to healthcare through health insurance. USAID readily agreed, as the request fitted with their existing Partnerships for Health Reform (PHR) project, a global five-year project which began in October 1995 to support health sector reform" (Chemouni, 2018, p 90). Consequently, the government, acting through the Health Ministry, began a series of activities to encourage the communities to create self-help schemes and means to increase their financial ability to access healthcare (see Schneider et al., 2000). This decision was not entirely new to the Rwandan society. Since colonial times, local groups and communities had their own solidarity schemes in many parts of the country to help fund out of pocket expenses such as the treatment of complex illness, emergency health needs, social assistance during funerals among others (Nzisabira, 1992). Also, as at 1991, the then Social Democratic Party (PSD) in Rwanda had as part of its manifesto programme the idea of a CBHI.

Like the ministerial order that birthed the government of Rwanda's decision on Human Settlement (villagization), the decision to make the CBHI compulsory after its initial piloting in 3 health districts was made by ministerial fiat in 2006 (Chemouni, 2018; Schneider et al, 2000). Later in 2007, the government enacted the Community-based Health Insurance Law (CBHIL) which mandated that 'every person who resides in Rwanda shall be obliged to join the mutual health insurance scheme' (CBHIL 2007, Article 33)[16]. The decision to extend the policy nationwide and make it compulsory according to Chemouni to "justify local officials' heavy-handed practices to boost enrolment" (Chemouni, 2018, p 92). However, local government officials suggested otherwise. She averred the government approach was aimed at ensuring that authorities reached target populations of the policy as it works towards the well-being of citizens as part of its peace building objectives as follows:

> *Mituelle de sante* program where in order to improve the quality of life of the people in particular they need to be healthy and wealthy. So, this health insurance scheme has been set up so that every citizen can have a better health and well-being (Government Official 5 – 08/12/2021).

> […] another social plan is that every Rwandan is encouraged to pay for the mituelle, so it is up to me as leader to find out those who have paid mituelle and those who have not yet paid, so that no one dies at home because of not having mituelle (Government Official 4 – 09/12/2021).

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[16] Article 33, Law N° 62/2007 of 30 December 2007 Establishing and Determining the Organisation, Functioning and Management of the Mutual Health Insurance Scheme. In practice, individuals that already subscribed to a health insurance often did not have to join the CBHI.

After a year and a half after the official lunch of the programme, it had recorded significant success. According to Schneider and Diop (2001), about 80 percent of the Rwandans in the 3 pilot districts had enrolled onto the scheme. This resulted in an increase of 'health facility utilization', while reducing 'out-of-pocket expenses' for beneficiaries (ibid). However, despite this success, 'poor Rwandans in the pilot districts could not joint the scheme due to the high 'premiums' which they could not afford (Binagwaho, 2012; Schneider and Diop, 2001). Yet, the initial success of the scheme convinced officials of the Ministry of Health of the possibility of a nationwide expansion of the scheme. This was after an extensive discussion among local policy actors, and between the RPF and the donor community (see Chemouni 2018, p 90-92). Thus, for some Rwandans, it the *mituelle* is helping the ongoing peacebuilding in Rwanda by enhancing their quality of life through access to healthcare. This is reflected in the following responses. A respondent from Nyarugenge district muted as follows:

> The goal [of the government] is to make the village more liveable and healthier, so there is a mituelle government scheme where one makes a small contribution to the model and the government adds another and treats it with his family and for less money, even those who do not have it (Respondent 10 - 08/12/2021).

Another respondent from Amahoro village in Kicukiro District expressed how the government's policy to extend the scheme has helped her in dealing with her illness –

> The good governance we have has helped us. For example, tomorrow I have a doctor's appointment for Diabetes, and we are being treated on mituelle, because the president of the republic is looking for a way to give peace to every Rwandan" (Respondent 19 – 08/12/2021).

This respondent from Kalisimbi village in Kicukiro District mentioned that:

> *mituelle* as one of the social intervention policies that have been beneficial to him – "I would also like to say that today we have mituelle, people are ready and eager to pay for it, and even the poor are paying for it" (Respondent 23 – 08/12/2021).

The above responses give credence to the argument by some researchers who suggest that the decision of government to extend the policy to cover poor Rwandese, especially those in the informal sectors and rural areas (Chemouni, 2018).

The decision by the government to make the policy compulsory and nationwide equally led to a policy shift in 2004. Drawing from the experiences of previous initiatives, the RPF government decided on a scheme that will also involve the community in its management. This way, the policy is to "provide a framework for revitalizing community participation and mobilization for health, for empowering individuals and communities in health, and ensuring their involvement in decisions regarding their own health" (Republic of Rwanda 2010, p.15). This was part of the

government's rhetoric of promoting participation the governance. Thus, the decision was meant to encourage grassroots participation in the administration and financial management of the scheme; as a way of instituting popular oversight; and to promote local 'ownership' of the scheme. The health policy of 2004 was revised in agreement with the government's Vision 2020 (Republic of Rwanda, 2000) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Policy (Republic of Rwanda, 2002). Hence, the government of Rwanda envisages the policy to make all Rwandans "to have access to essential health care and be protected from impoverishment due to health care expenditures, and to provide a national framework for strategies and actions aimed at assuring that all residents of Rwanda can be enrolled in a health insurance plan that provides access to quality health care." (ibid, p 14). Overall, the objective of the policy is to "build a financially and institutionally sustainable health insurance system that can guarantee the coverage of all Rwanda's citizen with health insurance" (ibid). In this respect, the updated policy is set to help the government achieve the following objectives:

    a.   To improve the availability of quality drugs, vaccines, and consumables.
    b.   To expand geographical accessibility to health services.
    c.   To improve the financial accessibility to health services.
    d.   To improve the quality and demand for services in the control of disease.
    e.   To strengthen national referral hospitals and research and treatment.
    f.   To reinforce institutional capacity. (see Republic of Rwanda 2010).

However, the leadership of the country is challenged by how to encourage and expand enrolment to sustain the scheme, especially among the poorest. It also has to grapple with the present nature of financing to ensure equity and sustainability of CBHI. There are also managerial and administrative issues that relates to the improvement of coordination between CBHI and health care providers, and the overall improvement of the CBHI to function effectively. To address these debilitating issues, the finance minister was tasked by the Cabinet to suggest measures for addressing some of these challenges. After cabinet had deliberated and accepted the policy recommendations from the finance minister, the Prime Minister's Office issued an Official Gazette N° 034/01 of 13/01/2020 in February 2020 to operationalize the policy directives. The first of these was the modalities for subsidy payment by the government to the scheme (ibid). The order for Government subsidies to the community-based health insurance scheme was fixed at six billion Rwandan francs as annual budget allocation paid by the Ministry in charge of finance. This is equivalent to about 5% of the country's GDP (ibid). The order further imposed 15 levies and fees on businesses (telecommunications and fuel trade) and individuals to increase funding to the scheme. These levies contained in the Official Gazette N° 034/01 of 13/01/2020 issued in February 2020 are:

a. three thousand Rwandan francs (FRW 3,000) per annum for each needy person in category one of *Ubudehe* paid by the Ministry in charge of finance.
b. fifty percent (50%) of registration fees for pharmaceutical products and medical device paid by the Ministry in charge of health.
c. one hundred percent (100%) of the amount collected as medical research fees paid by the Ministry in charge of health.
d. Ten percent (10%) of fees charged on services offered to gaming companies paid by the Ministry in charge of trade.
e. Fifty percent (50%) of fees collected for motor vehicle mechanical inspection paid by Rwanda National Police.
f. ten percent (10%) of fees collected from road traffic fines paid by Rwanda National Police.
g. One hundred percent (100%) of the amount collected as penalties for trade of sub-standard products paid by the public institution in charge of standards.
h. One hundred Rwandan Francs (FRW100) from parking fee levied on vehicles for each hour of parking, paid by the City of Kigali.
i. Zero-point five percent (0.5%) of the net salary of the employee, paid by the employer.
j. Ten percent (10%) of tourism revenues shared to beneficiary Districts, paid by Rwanda Development Board (RDB).
k. Twenty thousand Rwandan francs (FRW 20,000) levied for transfer of ownership on cars and ten thousand Rwandan Francs (FRW 10,000) levied for transfer of ownership on motorcycles, paid by Rwanda Revenue Authority.
l. Four thousand Rwandan Francs (FRW 4,000) per hectare of marshland, five thousand Rwandan Francs (FRW 5,000) per hectare of hillside and two thousand Rwandan francs (FRW 2,000) per hectare of radical terraces, paid by beneficiary District.
m. the first and the second year after the publication of this Order in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda: two-point five percent (2.5%) of the company's annual turnover.
n. from the third year of publication of this Order in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda: three percent (3%) of the company's annual turnover.
o. Each fuel trade company pays to the community-based health insurance scheme subsidiaries equivalent to twenty Rwandan francs (FRW 20) per litter sold. (Office of the Prime Minister, 2022)

The yet to be known the extent to which these financial measures are helping to ensure the effectiveness of community-based health insurance scheme. However, at the minimum it signals the resolve of the ruling RPF government in exploring all options to ensure the continuous operation of the scheme to help its peacebuilding agenda.

The use of mutuality as a narrative for building cohesion has led to an idealistic consensus-building and sense of nationhood rather than dealing with the complex nature of the root causes of the conflict in Rwanda (Republic of Rwanda, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2001). The pertinent nature of contemporary issues of social justice claims occasions the daily realities of many Rwandans and have been articulated through different mediums such as reports by government ministries, departments, or agencies (See Republic of Rwanda 2020,2018,2016, 2006). The mantra of collectivity in this respect runs akin to the ideas of governmentality that makes the object referent a product of public policy equipped only to secure the monopoly over the use of violence by the state. From the information available to this study, the centrality of my argument here is that this neoliberal market-driven peacebuilding as state building intervention is devoid of any transformational prospects because it staves off any serious exchange of influence with citizens

within the complex and structural social, economic, and political conditions of post-conflict Rwanda.

5.4 The case of Liberia

5.4.1 The policymaking context

Since the return to constitutional rule in 2003, the fundamental policy objective of the Government of Liberia is to ensure socioeconomic inclusion and durable peace (Republic of Liberia 2003,2013, 2018). In part, the policies of the post-war government are essentially driven by international financial and donor institutions or agencies. Liberia's policy environment is dominated by international organisations and aid agencies. Accordingly, the policy context in Liberia is an interactive institutional process among local governance institutions and the donor community. Therefore, the policy making process embodies a participatory and consultative mechanisms with representatives from line ministries, agencies, and commissions (MACs), donor institutions or agencies, and civil society organisations to discussed and deliberated on policy issues (Republic of Liberia, 2018). Plausibly, the deliberation process shapes the content, orientation, and outcomes of specific policies.

Similar, to the policy making process in other jurisdictions, policy issues are revised in relations to the evolving policy context in Liberia. This helps to ensure policy actors incorporate current socio-economic information in their possession to improve policy programme(s) for effective implementation. systems improve. Also, the present policy making process aims to ensure that policy design and outcome(s) are properly coordinated among the various policy stakeholders in achieving the government's objective of building a "capable and trusted state institutions that will lead to a stable, resilient, and inclusive nation" (Republic of Liberia, p, xiii). Hence, the country is developing policies across all socioeconomic sectors to address the structural problems that militate against policy goals of reconstructing a durable and inclusive country. To achieve this requires coordinated policy mechanism for effective public service delivery.

Also, the nature of the current policy making process may constitute a means to capacitate policy actors and provide legitimacy to specific policy programmes. Besides providing stability to the policy making process, this is meant to aid the effective enforcement policies. A plausible reason is that Liberia suffered from internal policy deficiencies, maladministration, and economic mismanagement that led to the war. The effects of such decade-long practices of endemic corruption, malfunctioning public services, reduced efficiency, and political instability contributed to a poorly functioning Liberian state. Thus, the need for such a policy mechanism to address such

weaknesses. The government's Pro-Poor Agenda and Vision 2030 Agenda for Transformation provides a broad policy framework for aid co-ordination, especially with regards to the social intervention (Republic of Liberia 2018;2013).

5.5 Social Protection Strategy for Nation-building and inclusive development

The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Reports underscores the need for the policy actors to create the necessary conditions for building peaceful inter-group relations in ways that rebuilds broken relationships to foster national reconciliation, unity, and security. Therefore, it implores future governments to ensure the institution of policy measures that "reduce poverty and alleviate illiteracy, create opportunities for all, as well as to guarantee that, the experiences and horror of the conflict will not be repeated" (Republic of Liberia 2009, p. 9). Likewise, the Constitution of Liberia (2004 [as amended]) in Article 11 demands that public policies must lead to the equitable improvement in the living conditions of the collective as "all persons are born equally free and independent and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights" (Republic of Liberia, 2004). Given this background, the government of Liberia developed a blanket National Social Protection Strategy to signpost its Human development strategy for instigating durable development.

This strategic policy framework is an output of an inter-ministerial effort among the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs under the National Social Protection Steering Committee (NSPSC), together with key stakeholders from the Counties, the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Gender, Children and Social Protection, Health and Social Welfare, Finance and Development Planning and development partners; International Labour Organisation, United Nations Development Program, United Nations Children's Fund, United States Agency for International Development and the World Food Programme and civil society groups. The policy is foregrounded by government's acknowledgement that despite some gains in efforts at reducing poverty and inequality "a significant portion of the population which remains extremely poor and vulnerable to shocks and stresses, unable to access labour markets or services. This represents a threat to continued stability in Liberia and to future development and economic growth" (Republic of Liberia 2013, p 8). It further notes that the policy framework:

> It represents the collective thinking of all stakeholders in Liberia. The policy strategy coherent social protection system in Liberia. It outlines the priority actions for the Government of Liberia (GoL) in order to establish a coherent social protection system and expand coverage of integrated protections programs. It also provides a national framework to achieve the overall goal of tackling poverty, vulnerability to extreme poverty and inequality in Liberia. Finally, it is in line with Liberia's vision 2030 and Liberia's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS II) 2013-2017, referred to as the "Agenda for Transformation" (AfT) (Republic of Liberia 2013, p. 8).

In this regard, the Government of Liberia conceives this policy strategy of as its commitment to the Human Development and economic policy goals of the country. Thus, specific policies and schemes by the leadership of the country are aimed towards achieving the policy goals its medium to long term economic growth and development strategy, that is meant to usher the country's transition from post-conflict recovery to inclusive growth by 2030 (see Republic of Liberia, 2013, 2018). In part, Liberia's Vision 2030 agenda is to:

> have progressively established a comprehensive social protection system that complements and contributes to equitable and inclusive economic growth by ensuring that the poorest along with the most vulnerable households, people and groups are guaranteed a minimum income and access to core public services providing security against critical levels of deprivation and extreme vulnerability through the life cycle, that those who can work are provided with the means of escaping poverty and that those in the informal sector are able to access mechanisms that protect them from risks and shocks (Republic of Liberia 2013).

In this regard, the primary policy objective of the country's Social Policy Strategy is to ensure "a system that tackles extreme poverty, vulnerability and inequality in Liberia whilst contributing to economic growth, peace and security, through social protection programs which improve food security, access to health and education and enable the working poor to access improved income" (Republic of Liberia, 2013). In the absence of a codified social policy for development, we understand the National Social Protection Social Protection Policy and Strategy of the Republic of Liberia as the official policy positions of policy makers on social policy and its ideational underpinnings thereof. The next sections discuss the adoption of social policy schemes for building inclusivity in Liberia.

5.5.1 Selected social assistance schemes for peacebuilding as nation-building in Liberia

According to the Government of Liberia's National Social Protection Policy and Strategy (2013), social protection refers to "a package of policies and programs, implemented as part of public action that provide income or consumption transfers to the poorest, protect the most vulnerable against livelihood risks, and improve access to economic opportunities, with the aim of reducing food insecurity and deprivation, while increasing resilience of vulnerable households and groups to shocks" (Republic of Liberia, 2013, p. 10). This framing of social protection programme in Liberia is aimed at 'protecting the poor and vulnerable from the worst consequences of poverty'. In the minds of the policy framers, the policy is designed as a mechanism to prevent Liberians to from 'falling into poverty because of a livelihood shocks. Likewise, it is expected to be 'promotive by supporting poor people's investment in their future while also providing those who are fit for productive work, the means for self-development and actualization'(ibid).

Finally, the policy actors in Liberia conceive the country's social protection to be transformative in "responding to the complex and critical needs of traditionally marginalized groups while defining and legislating minimum standards for changing class relationships in society' (Republic of Liberia, 2013, p 11). This framework consists of 3 core pillars: a) Social assistance programs, b) Social insurance schemes, c) Social legislation. Overall, the social protection programme of Liberia is "to maximize positive impact, the social protection system in Liberia must be comprehensive, providing a minimum floor which will protect the poor and most vulnerable against shocks experienced at various stages of the life cycle because of shifting economic tides in society" (ibid). In this study, we shall concentrate on Liberia's social assistance programme. Liberia's social assistance programs comprise schemes that are non-contributory and target the poorest and most vulnerable households, individuals, and groups. These include predictable cash transfers, fee waivers to reduce barriers to accessing essential social services, and a national school feeding program (Republic of Liberia, 2013).

5.5.2 Social Cash Transfer in Liberia

Liberia's Social Cash Transfer (SCT) is devised to provide income support Liberians "identified as 'extremely poor' and 'labour-constrained' in poverty endemic areas in the country" (Government of Liberia 2013, p. 10,14; also, Republic of Liberia 2018, p. 34). Field officers from the National Social Cash Transfer (SCT) Secretariat conduct two rounds of interviews in each village in the selected counties with individual households before determining their eligibility. Then, a provisional list of assessed households is presented for review by the Chiefs of each town, together with and the Community Social Protection Committees (CSPC). The outcome of this assessment determines the programme beneficiary households. After successful piloting of the project in Bomi County. The choice of Bomi County for the pilot project was based on evidence from the *Liberia Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey* conducted in 2006 (Government of Liberia, 2010). Results from the study identified Bomi as the county with the highest incidence of food insecurity and livelihood precarity in Liberia (ibid). Subsequently, the project was extended to cover households in Maryland, Grand Kru, and River Gee counties. Similar to the poverty condition in Bomi, these counties were selected because of their relatively high incidence of poverty and food insecurity in comparison other counties in Liberia. Also, there is a sub-component of the programme – the *Urban Cash Transfer* designed to mitigate the precarity of livelihood for the urban poor, mainly the residents in Montserrado County (Republic of Liberia, n d) The figures below show beneficiary counties and key indicators for selection of beneficiary households.

Figure 11: Map showing beneficiaries of the social cash transfer programme in Liberia.

Figure 12: Figure showing poverty statistics in Liberia.

Figure 13: Figure showing key indicators for beneficiary selection onto the social cash transfer programme.

The SCT is also meant assist households to be food secure and provide a pathway to enhanced living. The programme is also being used as a means to "expanding universal access to self-improvement opportunities in Education, Health, and Livelihood" in line with the country's *Pro-Poor Agenda for Prosperity and Development* (PAPD) (Republic of Liberia, 2018, p. xiii; Republic of Liberia, 2021). The SCT Program is primarily funded by donor institutions, particularly from European Union and the Government of Japan under the *Liberia Social Safety Nets Project*. Between 2011 and 2014, about 5,000 households were beneficiaries of the intervention. Currently, the programme to provides cash transfers and *accompanying measures* to about 12,500 households in the recipient counties identified as 'extremely poor and food-insecure' in Liberia (Republic of Liberia, n.d). The programme is administered by a Secretariat under the Ministry of Gender and Development – the National Social Cash Transfer (SCT), with oversight responsibility by the National Social Protection Steering Committee of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs. Additional administrative support is provided by UNICEF.

Under the CST, "beneficiary households are supported with monthly stipends varying by household size(s), ranging from between US$ 10 – US$34" respectively (Republic of Liberia 2018, p. 36). In general, a family of 4 members and above receives US$25 per month (Republic of Liberia, 2013, p.40,52). Consequently, the scheme is designed and engrained with the intention 'to provide incentives for heads of households to ensure their dependents pursue education, discourage child labour and provide for caregivers with an additional support of US$2 for each child enrolled in primary school and US$4 for households (see Republic of Liberia, 2013, p. 40; Republic of Liberia, n.d). To realize the intended goal of lifting poor Liberians out of poverty, policy actors devised a set of *accompanying measures*. Accompanying measures or which can "Soft Conditions" as couched by policy makers are focused on building resilience (Government of Liberia, 2021). They are meant to encourage beneficiaries to be productive with the assistance being provided in what the policy terms as 'behavioural change', the training of individuals from beneficiary households with skills in health and agriculture. For persons who opt for training in agriculture, the Liberian Ministry of Agriculture training and service to support home gardening. The government provides inputs such as seeds for home gardens. For the health aspect of the soft conditions, the SCT secretariat has partnered with the Liberian Ministry of Health to provide health training.

From the above, it can be argued that policy actors conceive of the SCT with its accompanying measures as a robust means to promote better nutritional and human development outcomes for Liberians living in poverty endemic parts of the country. Hence, it can be argued that the leadership

of Liberia think the SCT as a pathway to capacitate Liberians from poor households or areas known with high incidence of poverty to participate in the country's socioeconomic space for their self-actualization to building national cohesion and inclusive development. This is in tandem with the policy position of the leadership of Liberia which espouses the building of national cohesion as a means of addressing the root causes of conflict as follows: "social protection contributes to lasting peace and security and to the rebuilding of the social contract between the state and citizens. Social protection addresses some of the root causes of social exclusion and discrimination" (Republic of Liberia, 2013, p. 24).

In a way, it can be argued that the accompanying measures of the SCT introduced by the leadership of Liberia as a measure of asserting its hold over the nature of the policy with regards to its national development priorities (Republic of Liberia, 2018). Hence, the SCT in its current form is intended as a vehicle to support governments in enhancing the SCT intervention aligns with medium and long-term national development and inclusivity priorities (see Republic of Liberia, 2021, 2018, 2013). It represents the ongoing efforts by the leadership of Liberia to fashion out policies that ensures collective security and enable the capacity of citizens to afford their vital needs and live with dignity. It is also to maintain a stable minimum livelihood for those who are fit for productive work and build their confidence to undertake on new economic activities through expanding universal access to self-improvement opportunities in Education, Health, and Livelihood (Republic of Liberia, 2013, p.45; also see Republic of Liberia 2018, p. 25).

5.5.3 Free Compulsory Basic Education

The Constitution of Liberia in Article 6 enshrines the need for policy makers to "provide equal access to educational opportunities and facilities for all citizens" and "the elimination of illiteracy" by stating that:

> The Republic shall, because of the vital role assigned to the individual citizen under this Constitution for the social, economic, and political well-being of Liberia, provide equal access to educational opportunities and facilities for all citizens to the extent of available resources. Emphasis shall be placed on the mass education of the Liberian people and the elimination of illiteracy. (Constitution of Liberia, 2004, Article 6).

Further, the government enacted the *Liberia Education Law* (2001) which made primary education free and compulsory for all, while the New Education Reform Act of 2011 established free and compulsory primary education and free and compulsory basic education for all Liberian citizens up to grade nine (9). This was in accordance with the policy objectives of the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS 2008) which recognizes education as a fundamental component to each of the pillar of the PRS strategy; for consolidating peace and security, revitalising the economy, rehabilitation of infrastructure and delivery of basic services. The government instituted additional

policy measures such as the *Education For All National Action Plan* 2004-2015 (EFA-NAP) (2004), *Liberia Primary Education Recovery Programme* (LPERP) (2007), *Education Sector Plan* (ESP) (2010), *Getting to Best Education Sector Plan* (2017–2021), *Liberia Inclusive Education Policy* (LIEP) (2018) to address the challenges of resource allocation, teaching practices, curricula development and assessment, infrastructure ensure the objective of embedding the Free Compulsory Education into the Agenda for Transformation (Agenda 2030) – unlocking human potential of all capable Liberians by providing the environment that is required to secure good health, liberty, security, social and economic well-being, and the participation in forms of legally permitted activities for the collective good of the country social.

To enable the leadership of the country its goals of providing an enable environment for socioeconomic transformation and national cohesion, the overall policy objectives of the several education sector improvement policies was to address the consequences of the war on the country's human resource, which are fundamental challenge facing its post-conflicts reconstruction. Mainly, low levels of universal primary school enrolment, inequitable access to education at all levels of the educational spectrum, especially for girls and students with disabilities (Republic of Liberia 2022). Again, the challenge of 'over-aged enrolment persists as a major challenge across all grade levels, beginning in early childhood' (ibid). According to the World Bank, net enrolment into primary schools is about 38% 2014 (The World Bank, 2014), especially with early childhood education, where the median student is eight years old (Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services, 2016). In terms of location, data from the household survey shows about 70% of the children of primary school age in Montserrado County do not attend school (ibid). In rural Liberia, about 65 percent of young women and 35 percent of young men aged 15-24 are illiterate (ibid). Across the country, learning levels are low. Data suggest 25 percent of 15-24-year-olds adult women who manage to finish elementary school can read a complete sentence, while only about 20 percent of children enrolled in grade one, eventually complete grade 12. (see Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services, 2014)[17]. Also, the backlog of children who were deprived of schooling during the war has led to crowding primary schools in the country (see Ministry of Education 2018, p 15). At present the education situation in Liberia in both public and private schools, and across both curricular-based education and Alternative Learning Programmes is as follows:

> Enrolments at the lower basic level decreased by more than 50,000 students from 2015 to 2019/20, while all other levels witnessed slight increases in overall enrolment. Furthermore, despite the large proportion of over-age students observed across sub-sectors, the alternative education sector remains small, with 13,000 students enrolled in ALPs in 2019/20, which represents just over 2 per cent of primary enrolment. Public schools are the

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[17] There information from LISGIS did not provide information for men.

most prevalent providers at the pre-primary (44 per cent) and lower basic (44 per cent) levels; however, they represent the majority at the upper basic (27 per cent) and secondary (22 per cent) levels. Additionally, the proportion of students enrolled in public schools has decreased across all levels since 2015, in favour of an increased enrolment in community- and faith-based institutions. Alongside decreases in absolute enrolment, both ECE and LBE have witnessed declines in their gross enrolment rate (GER), from 134 to 123 per cent and from 89 to 82 per cent in ECE and LBE, respectively. However, over the same period, GER in UBE and secondary are seen to have undergone a slight increase: from 51 to 54 per cent and from 36 to 38 per cent, respectively. Across all levels, the net enrolment rate (NER) was observed to be much lower than the GER, indicating the enrolment of many students not of the appropriate age across the levels. At the ECE level, net enrolment was observed to be 58 per cent in 2020. This was greatly affected by wealth quintile, signalling the existence of financial barriers to enrolling in ECE at the appropriate age. For lower basic, upper basic, and secondary, the NER has remained stable since 2015, at 43 per cent, 14 per cent, and 10 per cent, respectively. (Republic of Liberia 2022, p32-35).

From the above representation, many Liberians of school going age do not have access to affordable education at all levels despite several policy measures to address these challenges. These challenges persist amidst significant financial support from development partners and participation of private actors in the provision in education. According to UNESCO, between 2006 and 2016, Liberia's basic education budget was about $40 million per year (about 2-3% of the country's GDP). Out of this amount, the donor-institutions contributed about $30 million. Thus, unlike other countries in the lower-income development category that finance their education through domestic revenue generation in Africa, Liberia is notable for about 75% of its education sector financing from external sources (UNESCO, 2016). However, donor financing is directly channelled into donor designed and funded project through third-party local and foreign NGOs for non-salary expenses. Out of the total budget funds available to the Ministry of Education, about 80% is spent on teacher emoluments (Ministry of Education - Republic of Liberia, 2017a). For instance, in 2017 USAID solicited for bid to implement education and related projects to be implemented in public schools totalling about $28 to be implemented by a U.S. contractor over a five-year period (USAID, 2017). This means, many public education sectors services in Liberia beyond the emolument of direct teaching and non-teaching staffs are provided by non-state actors. Put differently, Liberia's quest to use education to empower its human resource base for the transformation of socioeconomic relations aimed and inclusive development is driven by private interests.

5.5.3.1 Addressing the Education Sector Challenges for development and peacebuilding

In 2016, former President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf decried the education situation in Liberia and alluded to reforming it. In the same year, the leadership of the country decided to outsource the management of public schools to private entities. Inspired by the principles of the Charter Schools in the United States, it developed the *Partnership Schools for Liberia* (PSL) – mirroring a

Randomized Control Trail scheme (Ministry of Education, 2017). Selected schools for the implementing the project were randomly selected and assigned to each management entity after they agreed on a school list for a five-year pilot period. According to the framers of the policy it represented the best approach at rolling out the country's Free Compulsory Basic Education. The contracted firms are responsible for pupil enrolment into their respectively managed schools. Pupils enrolled into the selected schools were selected from attendance registers public school the year prior to assigning the schools (ibid). Schools under the PSL scheme are 'free to parents; selective admissions are prohibited, and teachers continue to draw salaries directly from the government' (ibid). Under this, private education providers received cash subsidy per-pupil to provide teaching and learning services to pupils of school going age such as teacher training, teaching, and learning materials, and the general administration of public school under the scheme (ibid).

The scheme was horned by the policy officers as 'a bold, innovative, and revolutionary solution to improve learning outcomes and address the poor quality of education in Liberia' (cited in Romero et al., 2017). In particular, the Minister of Education is cited to have justified the policy decision by rehashing the *claim that Liberia's education system is in crisis* as the core justification for the PSL scheme (Werner, 2017). The private entities providing the services are Bridge International Academies, BRAC, Omega Schools, Street Child, more than Me, Rising Academies, Youth Movement for Collective Action, and Stella Maris – just two of PSL managers are wholly Liberians. Currently the PSL administers 193 public schools on behalf of the Government of Liberia, representing about 10% of public schools. In particular, Bridge International Academies manages majority of the schools, 68 schools (25 in Year 1 and 43 in year 2) (Ministry of Education, 2017). It is backed "by private philanthropists, venture capitalists and the World Bank's International Finance Commission" (IFC) (Romero et al., 2017).

Under the PSL scheme, the government of Liberia retains ownership over public school buildings. Also, teachers under the PSL schools remain employs of the government, selected from the available pool of government teachers. The Liberian national curriculum guides teaching and learning but may be complemented with learning programs deem appropriate and non-contradictory. It is expected from each manager to prioritize of subjects under the curriculum, ensure longer school days, blended with extra-curricular activities, extra teachers, books, or uniforms as long as they pay for them (Werner, 2017; Romero et al, 2017). Through the Ministry of Education, each PSL schools is given the same basic amount the government estimates to be spending on each pupil in the public schools under direct government administration. The Ministry

provides teaching and learning subsidy that is valued at about USD 50 per pupil (Werner, 2017). However, it is important to underscore the fact that each PSL manager receive an additional subsidy of USD 50 per student (up to a maximum of USD 3,250 or totalling the cost for 65 students for each grade) (Romero et al, 2017).

The scheme allows for each entity complete autonomy over the use of the subsidy it receives teaching and learning such as teacher training, learning materials, and other overhead issues. It also allows for additional funds to be sourced by the managers to further enhance their output. Also, they could provide further inputs like additional teachers, books, or uniforms, as long as they carry the cost of the inputs. The figure below gives an overview of interventions instituted by the various education contractors.

Figure 14: Figure showing education contractors and their intervention on the PSL programme in Liberia.

	Stella M	YMCA	Omega	BRAC	Bridge	Rising	St. Child	MtM
Contractor Support								
Operator staff visits at least once a week(%)	0	54	13	93	76	94	91	96
Heard of PSL(%)	42	85	61	42	87	90	68	85
Heard of contractor(%)	46	96	100	95	100	100	100	100
Has anyone from (contractor) been to this school?(%)	42	88	100	94	100	100	99	100
Contractor Ever Provided								
Textbooks(%)	12	96	73	94	99	71	94	96
Teacher training(%)	0	77	62	85	87	97	93	96
Teacher received training since Aug 2016(%)	23	46	58	45	50	81	58	37
Teacher guides (or teacher manuals)(%)	0	69	75	54	97	94	68	98
School repairs(%)	0	12	25	24	53	52	13	93
Paper(%)	0	92	30	86	70	97	88	98
Organize community meetings(%)	0	54	27	69	73	87	83	91
Food programs(%)	0	8	2	1	1	10	0	17
Copybooks(%)	4	65	30	92	18	97	94	91
Computers, tablets, electronics(%)	0	0	94	0	99	3	3	2
Most Recent Contractor Visit								
Provide/deliver educational materials(%)	0	4	45	17	18	26	29	50
Observe teaching practices and give suggestions(%)	0	19	45	81	65	45	74	85
Monitor/observe PSL program(%)	0	12	23	11	13	13	35	65
Monitor other school–based government programs(%)	0	0	7	5	10	6	18	9
Monitor health/sanitation issues(%)	0	8	9	2	5	0	10	28
Meet with PTA committee(%)	0	12	8	10	7	0	21	41
Meet with principal(%)	0	12	54	36	38	6	51	63
Deliver information(%)	0	12	36	16	8	6	16	35
Check attendance and collect records(%)	42	23	43	56	39	19	66	70
Ask students questions to test learning(%)	4	4	24	33	18	58	44	43

The figure reports simple proportions (not treatment effects) of teachers surveyed in PSL schools who reported whether or not the contractor responsible for their school had engaged in each of the activities listed. The sample size, n, of teachers interviewed with respect to each contractor is: Stella Maris, 26; Omega, 141; YMCA, 26; BRAC, 170; Bridge, 157; Street Child, 80; Rising Academy, 31; More than Me, 46. Recall that the standard error for a proportion, p, is $\sqrt{(p(1-p))/n}$. This sample only includes compliant treatment schools.

Source: Centre for Global Development (2017)

Overall, PSL managers have the flexibility in defining the nature of their specific intervention under the ambit of the scheme. They can choose their preferred mix of teaching materials, teacher training, and managerial oversight of the schools according to their respective focus on the scheme. For instance, an evaluation study published by the Centre for Global Development reports:

> considerable variation in the specific activities and the total activity level of contractors. For instance, teachers reported that two contractors (Omega and Bridge) frequently provided computers to schools, which fits with the stated approach of these two international, for-profit firms. Other contractors, such as BRAC and Street Child, put slightly more focus on teacher training and observing teachers in the classroom, though these differences were not dramatic. In general, contractors such as More than Me and

Rising Academies showed high activity levels across dimensions, while teacher surveys confirmed administrative reports that Stella Maris conducted almost no activities in its assigned schools (Romero et al, 2017, p15).

The Minister of Education is reported as saying critics should "judge us on the data—data on whether PSL schools deliver better learning outcomes for children" (Werner, 2017 cited in Romero et al, 2017, p 8). However, there is currently not official evaluation report on this scheme by the government of Liberia to enable a better understanding of how the intervention is contributed to achieving the policy goals of the *Getting to Best* Education Sector Plan (G2B-ESP 2017–2021). Yet the findings by the Centre for Global Development suggest the intervention led to an overall decent increase in school enrolment, higher number of teaching staffs and teacher quality, appropriate infrastructure, and more accessibility from the initial implementation of the scheme. Its study shows that teacher presence in schools increased by 20 percentage points from a baseline of 40%, while hours for teaching and learning in schools increased by 16% points from a baseline of 32%. Also, there was an increase in parent satisfaction by about 7 percentage points (with a p-value of .022). There was an increase of about 6% points (with a p- .022) of pupils in the PSL schools who reported 'enjoying being in school' (see Romero et al, 2017 p 24-52). However, it remains to be seen whether the initial results from this pilot can be replicated across the country, especially in rural areas and public schools for poorer infrastructure compared to the relatively resourced schools operating under the scheme. Also, there is not clear indication from the current intervention of how it is contributing the quest by policy makers to solve some of the persisting problems of in the education sectors towards achieving inclusivity such as "long-term commitment to breaking with the past of overage and low enrolment, especially for children in underserved communities of our country, while contributing to addressing learning gaps to build the technically skilled human capital needed to drive economic growth" (see Minister of Education 2022). Information from official sources, the Education Sector Analysis Report (2021) and the Education Sector Plan (2022-2027) however notes the country's education sector remains "confronted with embedded dysfunctionalities and persistent bottlenecks" (ibid, p.21).

5.6 Discussion: social assistance for nation-building and development in post-conflict Liberia

Policy actors in Liberia maintain that the provision of social assistance interventions is fundamental to the transforming the socioeconomic base of the country for the collective good. Consequently, Liberia's Social Protection Framework notes that the ultimate aim of achieving effective peace and reconciliation is to dedicate resources through social protection policies and programmes to 'build social cohesion and trust between the state and citizens in addressing the

root causes of exclusion and discrimination, in the pursuit of restoring human dignity'
(Government of Liberia, 2013). In this regard the government notes it is:

> Committed to addressing the root causes of the conflict by ensuring its policy measures
> address increasingly social and economic injustices mainly through its social protection
> framework and strategy; by addressing constraints which threaten to jeopardise the future
> stability of the country such as the unmet needs for skills development by large numbers
> of vulnerable youth and increasing lack of employment opportunities. Hence, it deems a
> strong social protection policy program as a means to providing tangible evidence to people
> of Liberia the dividends of peace, transferred from the Government of Liberia to those who
> have been marginalised from development and supporting them to fulfil their basic human
> rights (Government of Liberia 2013, p. 27).

In sourcing information for this study, I interviewed the Minister for Gender and Social Protection
who reiterated the present government's commitment to peace and reconciliation by means of
social protection policies to 'protect and enhance peace and harmony' (Interview with Minister of
Gender and Social Protection, Liberia 17/06/2021). Hence, Liberia's social (policy) protection
framework articulates the governments vision deploying social protection tools to:

> be protective of the poor and vulnerable from the worst consequences of poverty and to
> establish mechanisms to prevent people from falling into poverty as a result of a livelihood
> shock by promoting and supporting poor people's investment in their future while also
> providing those who are fit for productive work, for self-development and actualization
> (Government of Liberia, 2013, p. 11).

During my fieldwork, a cross-section of respondents agreed with the leadership of the country's
use of social intervention as a means of development and national cohesion. In our conversation,
they expressed the possibility of the government's social intervention being helpful in building
effective peace through human capital development. The following responses reflect these views.

> Well, I think social protection policy focuses on a little bit of all, but I would consider it as
> an instrument to raise the human well-being of citizens. Somehow, all other benefits of the
> social protection policy seek to have citizens well-being improved (Respondent, 10).

> I think the significance of the social protection policy is to build or transform social
> relations and the economy. But again, once the policy is implemented and we see the
> impact of it then one will appreciate the policy and as it stands, we are yet to feel the
> importance of this policy. However, the intend of the policy is good, but implementation
> is bad (Respondent 8, 23/06/2021).

> These programmes bring relief to the citizens, most especially vulnerable citizens. And for
> every nation to reach core or full potential in terms of development education is key, so the
> free tuition policy can help to bring about the kind of peace I want to [a] certain level. Once
> people are educated and their capacities are built, they would become more productive
> (Respondent 15, 29/06/2021).

> Well for example the welfare policy, when the government takes care of people that live
> with disabilities, orphans, and older folks, it will help to build unity in the community
> because beneficiaries will live a happy life. There be no need for protest or violent activities
> (Respondent 9, 23/06/2021).

Furthermore, respondents were asked whether themselves or any member of their families have benefited from any of the government social intervention programmes, specifically the SCT or FCBE. None among all the participants in this study had any knowledge about the SCT. This may be due to the rural focus of the programme. Also, at the time of this study the 'Urban' aspect of the programme has not started. Out of all those I interacted with, only six (6) responded in the affirmative, with the remaining responding in the negative. The following responses from respondents at Capitol Hill, Jallah's Town, Shara Community – Du-port Road and Congo Town relates to respondents' knowledge of the Free Compulsory Basic Education (FCBE) intervention as follows:

> Well, the government of Liberia has free compulsory primary education for Liberians has helped. And in fact, currently, little nieces and nephews attend a public school that they are paying little or no fee. And they also have access to health facilities (Respondent 4 – 11/06/2021).

> The only thing or activity [policy] that I can recall is the free tuition policy at public schools (Respondent 25 – 29/06/2021).

> Well, if I should name of the policies, it would be the free tuition policy by the government of Liberia. The free tuition policy is really doing well for several young people and even in my community a lot of young people are benefiting from it. So, for the number of young people in the community here are happy with the policy because to some extent it relieves some financial burden on families that cannot afford to send their children to private universities. And because of this policy this community might be one of the communities that will raise the most educated people in time to come. (Respondent 15 – 24/06/2021)

> Well with all the social protection policies you have mentioned as being implemented by government, I think the only one that I can say is somehow working is the free compulsory primary education policy (Respondent 17 – 23/062021).

> I see that government is giving out scholarships to young people, paying of WAEC fees, and free tuition at public community schools (Respondent 8 – 13/06/2021).

These responses suggest citizens appreciate the role of FCBE policy intervention. While respondents did not have any experience with the SCT programme being implemented, official reports show that 12,500 households are currently benefiting from the intervention in rural Liberia. Similarly, under the urban cash transfer component of the SCT, to ease the impact of Covid-19 pandemic on the urban poor, 15 thousand households in Montserrado County (Government of Liberia, n.d). In essence, the views expressed by respondents suggest social protection interventions are, in part, enhancing their ability to inter-relate in a manner that breeds cooperation and their expectations from the government about their everyday realities.

However, there some respondents suggested the current design and implementation of the social policy interventions is fraught with challenges that risk ruining the current stability in the county the quest for inclusivity. The following responses represents these views:

The policy is not inclusive, because some people are working while others are not and even the free education policy some people are going to school, while others are not (Respondent 9 – 12/06/2021).

Yes, it is creating tension somehow. Because let's take for instance, once the policy on free tuition is not available at every location in the country, it creates room for people to bribe their way through the system (Respondent 21 – 22/06/2021).

Well, it is a challenging, because even those programs that supposed to bring peace among citizens are to a larger extent being compromised. And those who are supposed to articulate the voiceless, are not talking on behalf of us. Let's take for instance, the free tuition policy is only available at certain institutions, and as such students at other schools are excluded from this policy. I find it difficult (Respondent 2, FGD-4 - Centre for Intellectual Freedom (CIF), Carey Street, Monrovia). This response was corroborated by respondent 1, 3 and 7.

Well, with the social protection policies by government, I perceive that all of the different policies are not working. The health delivery system is poor, most public health facilities ask patients to buy fuel to light up the facility [before they can receive treatment]. But truth be told, the government needs to do more in ensuring that the policy is implemented [in all communities] so that our communities develop (Respondent 17 – 23/06/2021).

If you look at the free tuition policy for example, the challenge is payment of salaries, over crowdedness, issues with monitoring productivity of students in the classroom. And on the health side, public hospitals experience over crowdedness as well, poor health delivery and unavailability of medical drugs or equipment to cater to patients (Respondent 20 – 23/06/2021).

Therefore, the need for the government of Liberia to recognise and address the challenges confronting its social intervention policies. It is imperative to design and implement social policy interventions for, not merely maintaining peace and security, but to instigate norms of cooperation towards achieving inclusivity. Also, such policies would hold as a prerequisite, and robust means to achieve economic and social wellbeing. Pursuing such a transformative policy framework would serve as a vehicle through which the government can demonstrate its commitment to transforming the root causes of conflict by building a just social, economic, and political system for mediating societal norms of relations for giving meaning the social pact the undergird state-society relations.

According to the government of Liberia, the social policy rationale is to "comprehensive provide a minimum floor which will protect the poor and most vulnerable against shocks experienced at various stages of the life cycle as a result of shifting economic tides in society" (Government of Liberia, n.d). The policy is noted by policy actors as the basis for transforming the norms of relations towards building inclusivity. I had conversation with some policy makers regarding the sources of social policy framework of country. The purpose of my conversation with was to understand the source(s) of ideas that influenced the framing and of social policy programme. The responses pointed to the donor-community, specifically Liberia's signatory to, and participation in the Millennium Challenge Account Program by the United States Government. Specifically, When

I asked whether the country's social policy rational and framework was dictated by the donor, the response was in the affirmative, by remarking:

> Yes, I mean all governments have things they promise they would do, and you have people coming in to give aid. So obviously if they are coming to give aid, they say in order for us to assist you need to do what is required such as meeting minimum criterion or percentage to benefit or keep benefitting from the help we are giving you. So, all of us who are covered under the Millennium Challenge compact have to then work assiduously to ensure that we're keeping the promise as made by the government and we are ensuring that we are accomplishing the goals and aims that we set. So, once they check off what is under education, what is under health, what is under gender etc., then they let us know whether we have passed the score or not (Interview with Minister of Minister of Gender and Social Protection Liberia 17/06/2021).

This information alludes to that essentially, the social policy framework of both countries is externally driven by concepts and frameworks of foreign development institutions with little relevance to the embedded needs of the post-conflict nation-building and development in Liberia. It is partly for this reason that policy thinking in Liberia adopts a residual (neo) liberal approach to social policy that is reflected in the so-called social protection policy framework. For such policy interventions in essence do not seek to transform relational norms of production (and reproduction), but at best to placate the development debacle of countries recovering from war. Hence social protection helps to mitigate the ruins of war but does not offer any form of robustness in altering and nurturing ways of building positive peace and durable development. As a result, existing studies conducted by donor-assistance institutions such and World Bank (2005), and scholars such as Easterly et al. (2006), Ferroni et al. (2008), and Hayami (2009) support the idea that the use of public policy by countries recovering from conflict in building norms of relations that inspire inclusive and productive socioeconomic relations conduce to a variety of development outcomes.

However, in its current form and content the design of Liberia's SCT and FCBE intervention policies lacks in transforming norms of relations and building inclusivity. The following general remarks about social interventions from my respondents during field study, when asked social protection policy by government is enabling national cohesion worth noting:

> I am not if any of the policies is inclusive or is helping to bring about inclusivity in the society, because let's take for example more people don't benefit from these different programmes, like equal access to employment opportunities and equal access to medical services. Most times people bribe their way through at hospitals before they get attention, and not everyone has the financial will or power to influence health workers to pay the necessary attention at these public health facilities (Respondent 11, 22/06/2021).

> Yes, it is creating tension somehow. Because let's take for instance, once the policy on free tuition is not available at every location in the country, it creates room for people to bribe their way through the system (Respondent 21 – 22/06/2021).

The feeling of marginalization and discontent can be attributed to the neoliberal design and targeting of recipients or beneficiaries of the SCT, FCBE among other policies/schemes related to the country's social assistance programme being implementation as part of social protection framework of the Liberian government. The framing of targeting in selecting participants for social intervention program is underpinned by the logic discrimination as opposed to universal or right-based approaches. How policy makes or sponsors define who gets what may not how such programmes are implemented. The basic challenge here however, is – what mechanisms exist to ensure that all persons needing the specific intervention are identified to receive the benefits they are require.

Understandably, design and implementation of the are directed by the sponsoring institution, with the Government of Liberia only acting as the implementing agency. This decontextualises the need(s) of the policy – who benefits and its overall impact on the reconstruction, nation-building and inclusive development agenda of the country. From one participant in this study, it is "absolutely no" for such a policy as FCBE or SCT to help build inclusivity (Respondent 12, 26/072021). While the Minister pointed out the successes of the government's SCT intervention (s) among others as:

> ensuring beneficiaries are protected from social and economic shocks that risk their ability to live in dignity and contribute to the transformation of Liberia across the country. Especially in Montserrado, Grand Bassa, Bong, Nimba and Lofa counties (Interview with Minister of Minister of Gender and Social Protection 17/06/2021).

While there was no verifiable information from official sources to buttress these claims made by the minister, citizens' appraisal of this statement gives a glimpse of the intervention's lack of grounding with the people and the inefficiencies associated with its implementation. For instance, the following views expressed by respondents provide some insight into this observation –

> I am not sure this policy is inclusive or is helping to bring about inclusivity in the society because let's take for example more people don't benefit from these different programmes. Most times people bribe their way through at hospitals before they get attention, and not everyone has the financial will or power to influence health workers to pay the necessary attention at these public health facilities (Respondent 11, 22/06/2021).

> Actually, I have not read the social protection policy, but I think that it is not effective. For example, we see a whole lot of people on the street begging and the government is not in any way helping these people to get off the street. So, if [the government says] these things are happening, then I will say I have not been lucky to see them manifest. But what I do know! This is Liberia, it has good policies on the books, however the implementation is the problem (Respondent 8, 23/08/2021).

> One major problem or challenge I see the delay in salaries payment and just benefits for vulnerable citizens, accountability, and poor delivery of services under the schemes. Poor logistics support, accessibility, proper management or implementation, and limited financial resources (Respondent 13, 29/06/2021).

From my understanding of the perspectives shared by citizens there is a disconnect between governments intention(s) to build an inclusive county, donor supported policy interventions and the needs and expectations of citizens. In a country recovering from the devastations bequeathed by violent conflict – poor human capabilities and development, and to enable its population, of which majority are classified poor and lacking socioeconomic means, nationwide provision of education presents the surest means to decent living. This equips individuals with the requisite knowledge and skill sets to actualise their aspirations withing the space and limits of the polity. Such an approach presents a robust means to erasing the ruins of the conflict. Therefore, policies of education as were the case in countries such as Zambia, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Ghana in the years after independence should be nationwide and progressive with particular focus on requisite learning and skills acquisition needed for ameliorating the conditions of post-conflict Liberia. In doing so, families with little or no capacity to afford education should be given priority while adequate provisions are made available to encourage those with the means.

However, in a country like Liberian with low administrative capacity to harness internal resources for development, social protection or assistance policies may support and aid the efforts of the Liberian government in addressing the post-conflict conditions and constraints which threaten to jeopardise its future stability. It is imperative to begin a process of re-orienting social policy programme to address the unmet needs of the large numbers of needy and vulnerable segments of the population, especially the youth with requisite skills for addressing the immediate and contextual development and employment needs for enhancing their social and economic realities. In its current form, the social protection system lacks the necessary transformative mechanisms needed and reinforces across and between social and economic sectors that constrains human capital development. Social transfers may complement the desire and efforts by the Government of Liberia to expand and improve, especially the social condition of education and health services delivery as a means of investing in the capacity of citizens as a matter of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. Yet, these investments will only instigate wider socioeconomic development in a durable manner and ameliorate to the barest minimum the risk of reigniting conflict if its transformation norms of socioeconomic relations and the capacity of public administration and service provision institutions.

5.6.1 Social Policy in post-conflict Liberia and Rwanda: a potential for building inclusive peace?

The social policy intervention frameworks of Liberia and Rwanda serve partly as the development policy frameworks that guides the post-conflict reconstruction efforts in both countries. The adoption of social intervention policies in both countries has been primarily influenced by different

factors. In the case of Rwanda, its adoption of social intervention such as Imidugudu or Ubudehe is inspired by traditional norms that have been invoked in the design of present social interventions to build inclusivity and durable peace. Policy actors in Rwanda are able to persistently invoke and articulate ethno-historical norms of relations to stress as sense of 'commonality' in the design of policies for building social cohesion and progressive development (see Republic of Rwanda, 2020). In this sense, the leadership of the county resort to such narratives to emphasise the intended outcomes of the state's efforts towards achieving transformation. Hence, in instances where policies are designed with the participation of donor-institutions such the Imidugudu or CBHI, donor funding does not define the primary interest of the policy intervention. At present, it may be argued that embedded in the resolve and approach of policy makers in Rwanda is the idea to create interventions and a local policy environment which in the long run would be less donor dependent.

However, in the case of Liberia, the global diffusion of policy ideas though the many donor agencies such as the World Bank has become the norm (see Republic of Liberia, 2013; 2018), and Millennium Challenge Account for Liberia as was confirmed to me by my Interviewee (Interview with Minister of Gender and Social Protection, Liberia 17/06/2021). Primarily, this is part of donor institutions conditionalities for these countries to access financial assistance for development as is the case with developing countries. Essentially, the social protection policies are market-led neoliberal growth-driven development policy framework. The social protection policy framework for both countries read like they are anchored on market-based social security, social care services, short-term social assistance and, livelihood and employment support (Government of Liberia, 2013; Government of Rwanda, 2022). Both countries aim to use this as a mechanism for the eradication of extreme poverty through human capital development, and as the foundation for securing long-term prosperity (ibid). In essence it is expected to help the leadership in both countries to break the cycle and incidence of deprivation by institution policy measures that deliver equitable and inclusive seriocomic public services in a transformative manner.

However, discernible in the definition is that social policy framework of both Liberia and Rwanda is underpinned by the rationale of pro-poor targeting and altering the significant object and dimensions of inclusive peacebuilding. The fundamental charge of the referent object in durable peacebuilding is the focus on collective human-centred transformation. The nature of relational structures or mechanisms state-society relations and governance processes towards addressing the triggers of violent conflicts and conditions the current nature of post-conflict states. Rather the policy approach in the cases studied adopts a realist-gaze on individuals and groups capable of attaining economic ascriptions. This particular focus on securing the daily fears of post-conflict

inhabitants relates with market-driven liberal doctrines that emphasise individual's agency forms the fundamental aim of the problem-solving strategy of liberal peacebuilding interventions. In the case of Liberia, the articulation of nation-building through public policy defies a 'single' narrative, yet it is directed by technocratic templates inspired by the allure of donor assistance. Also, there is a noticeable gap between the framing and implementation of nation-building policies and the expectations of citizens.

In the case of Rwanda, the analysis in this chapter would show that this template for nation-building conscripts Rwanda into a single narrative of the 'only truth' around which all efforts by Rwandans toward re-building a 'new' society must revolve. To be sure, the Rwandan government relies on the narrative of repairing a ruptured national identity – *One Rwandan* or *Banyarwanda* through what may be described as a homogenising process, an attempt to numb all other affinities of sense of belonging. This can be understood given the historical ethno-linguistic and territorial evolution of present-day Rwanda (see Vansina Mamdani). There is evidence from a section of the literature on Rwanda to suggest 'elite consensus' drives the agenda for nation-building in Rwanda, with the ruling RPF government open to all persons who identify with the objectives of the government. However, in the preceding sections of this chapter, some respondent in Rwanda expressed how they have to deny their identity or 'forced' to 'speak their truth' to enable them access benefit from government intervention(s) in their respective *Imidugudu* through their local leaders. These everyday experiences of some Rwandans who are also survivors of the genocide, especially those with Hutu and Twa identity suggest not all groups within the Rwandan polity are being integrated into the nation-building project on equal terms. This suggest any 'contrary views' are construed as anti-effective peacebuilding or counterproductive to the ongoing efforts at creating homogeneous citizenship. From an elitist perspective, given the historical antecedent to the genocide in Rwanda one can appreciate the use of a single narrative in the reconstruction of the country. This finding is consisted with recent studies on Rwanda that suggest the process of building inclusivity is subtly underpinned by the incorporation of adverse imbalances in power relations (see Adamczyk, 2011; Fox, 2021; Jessee, 2017; Thomson, 2013).

Furthermore, I deduce from the information provided by respondents and official documents available that, while the social intervention(s) framing articulates in clear terms the undesirable post-conflict development condition, the implementation of such policies towards building effective peace lacks the necessary impetus in addressing the complexity of issues that condition the daily reality of post-conflict circumstances in both Liberia and Rwanda. Both countries resort to the use of both interventionist and market-based logics to design their policies for instigating

inclusivity. In the case of Liberia, the use of poverty-driven policy tools is reflective of the simplistic donor prescriptions to complex problems. The official narrative of government is that these policies are framed within the context of international development narratives such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, which sets policy targets. In this regard, the social protection interventions and strategies are developed to align with such goals. Implicit to the development of such 'global' goals is that it does not account for multiplicity of contradictions in the state-society relations. At the minimum, the ability to develop and implement policies to meet such goals is contingent on the capacity of the state and its ability to mobilise the necessary resources for effective implementation. In the design of both the SCT and FCBE interventions, policy makers in Liberia emphasised the need to both address the negative impact of the war on the population, and to achieve the global development targets. For instance, the FCBE policy was primarily designed to absolve the cost of education, increase enrolment, and improve the knowledge base of the society. However, due to the lack of resources and capacity on the part of the government in addressing its human capital development deficit for progressive development, the policy has been passed on to private actors to implement with considerable autonomy over the policy. These public schools under private management may not be accessible to many of school going age from poor backgrounds, privileging the affluent and 'well connected' in society. Hence, in its current state, the FCBE has assumed a segregated social assistance schemes under the social policy architecture of Liberia. In a sense, the policy risks becoming a market-based self-provisioning scheme as contractors are encouraged to raise additional funding to support teaching and learning in Liberia's public schools.

In Rwanda, the Human Settlement policy was designed and implemented by the post-war leadership with an interventionist ethos for building effective mutual coexistence and durable development for the collective. The immediate aim of the policy was to help resettle survivors of the genocide and returnees of previous conflicts, while using the created settlements to instigate national development in a clustered, in concurrently with other policy interventions. However, besides the admission on the part of policy makers that only 20% of estimated Rwandans have been covered under the policy intervention. From official records, the current implementation of the policy is at odds with its objective, as many of the Imidugudu still lack basic social services such as electricity, water, and roads to drive the desired transformation envisioned, basically due to recourse constraints. To address this, policy makers have resorted to a 'full cost recovery' approach to investing in the human settlement programme together with the private sector. It is understood that private developers are 'capable of making the beneficiaries pay the cost price of the' of human settlements as:

> promotion of human settlement projects can be done by the private sector as developers capable of making the beneficiaries pay the cost price. The funds obtained will be recycled in new projects. This vision prevents the establishment of upsetting thresholds of programmes and ensures a confidence building continuity (Republic of Rwanda 2009, p.21).

Thus, from an initially conceived interventionist policy, the current framing of the Human Settlement policy is for private sector participation under the realm of demand and supply. Allowing the private capital and the configurations of the markets to take lead.

The all-important issue here is whether the quest for inclusive peace in post-conflict countries is feasible through market-based policy prescriptions and desirable for the attainment of a people's collective good. In the case of Rwanda, a recent World Bank report suggests about 38 percent of the population are considered poor, while 70 percent of the population are still primarily engaged in subsistence agriculture, and about 230,000 young Rwandans seeking productive jobs on a yearly basis (World Bank 2019). How feasible is it for those captured under the World Bank's description to access housing under full market conditions? For Liberia, official statistics from the 2016 *Household Income and Expenditure Survey* (HIES) describes majority of the country's population as poor with figures to show "50.9 per cent of people were living below the poverty line in 2016, of which 71.6 per cent were in rural and 31.5 per cent in urban areas" (LISGIS, 2017, p. 14). Equally, results from the country's 2019-2020 Liberia Demographic and Health Survey (LDHS) published in 2021 showed a significant rise in recorded poverty levels which is further "projected to increase by as much as 9.7 to 13.4 percentage points in 2024 as per capita income contracts and food prices rise" (LISGIS, 2021). Therefore, it remains to be seen how this segment of the population will be able to access education for their dependents. Hence Shilliam (2012) queries ideas that market-based policy prescriptions guarantee human freedom and inclusivity on the basis that the same market, is self-contradictory, and undermines the attainment of mutual or collective human-centred goals human through its inherent exploitative practices.

This technocratic approach to meliorating the condition of post-conflict societies without considering the clumsy and contextual nature of norms and values of a people automatically positions such interventions for failure. Hence the failure of peculiar understanding of a people's self-appraisal of their situation and quest for change or transformation in post-conflict countries such as Liberia and Rwanda, from my perspective, belies the broader relational and structural issues that condition, define and determine individuals' ability to self-actualisation. Therefore, reducing the building of inclusive and durable development in post-conflict societies to market-driven social policy tools and mechanism constitutes little or no assuring mechanism for transformation. Pursing policy measures to enable the capacities of individuals, without creating a

capacitating social, economic, and political systems and structures in state, either formal or informal, on reaffirms the status quo that triggered the violent conflict. This, I have discussed in chapters one and three.

While the social policy strategy of both countries desire to transform the socioeconomic basis of their norms of relations, the transformational prospect of the current social policy framework in both Liberia and Rwanda is doubtful as their framings, rationale and implementation logic is founded in current non-transformational external policy prescriptions. This suggests the design of specific social policy interventions contain no inbuilt multi-dimensional or heterodox prescriptions capable of dealing specifically with the nested and multi-faceted nature of post-conflict nation-building and development challenges in Liberia and Rwanda.

The social protection policy interventions of both countries focus on the dynamism of its population as the mainstay for building inclusivity. This entails protecting the poor and vulnerable segments of the population against risks and preventing the relapse of violent conflict. This is the basis upon which the post-conflict condition or problem is defined, and policy practices to address them have been implemented. The implementation of such policy instruments is underpinned by community-based development interventions. In the case of Rwanda, the villagisation program, according to its 'community mantra' is analogous to practices of colonial development, as it prioritises building the capacity of 'village' members with the intention of fitting individual members and the collective with skills for maintaining the imposed order to secure the RPF regime. Hence, in comparing the experiences from of Liberia to Rwanda my core argument here is that this individual-driven peacebuilding approach to post-conflict nation-building is lacking in its ability to transform prospects. This emanates from the inability of the leadership to engage with the complex structural conditions that influences ongoing efforts at building inclusive peace. In particular, the problematic nature of policy enterprise, systemic institutional challenges, and imperfect political systems yet to instigate the needed cross-cutting mechanisms for achieving its quest for transformative peace.

These counterclaims as recounted by respondents in this study indicate the recycling of practices or what may be described as the 'normalcy' agenda liberal problem-solving policy framework that drive social protection and assistance policies that has been designed to 'transform' the (under)development condition of both countries. Accordingly, this rehashing of non-transformative practices confirms the extent to which externally influenced policy instruments fail to draw lessons from past failures. The precept around which western expertise conceive problem-solving policies to address the debacle of development as part of the reconstruction efforts by war-

affected countries are not locally conditioned. Thus, the diffusion of policy tools or practices by these western or donor institutions rarely articulate the contextual contradictions. This affirms the efforts by critical peacebuilding and policy scholars demanding a shift in approach that considers the local as a paramount source durable solution. However, a plausible logical expectation and the unfolding reality is that western or donor institutions accord themselves a blameless status, limiting the possibility of switching their current stance to compel transformation. Equally, the resort to ahistorical and depoliticized intervention application of policy prescriptions have been of little effect in addressing the fundamental factors that conditions the fragility of war affected Liberia and Rwanda. In effect, symptomatic nature of liberal peacebuilding failures are equally present post-conflict peacebuilding settings such as practice such as Somalia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Timor Leste, Kosovo etc (see Willett, 2005; Liden, 2014; Richmond, 2018). The challenging issue here, is that donor institutions involved in peacebuilding interventions are bonded to the impervious logic behind their problem-solving policy prescriptions even in the face of mounting evidence point to their failed outcomes.

From my appraisal of the information available to me, I can assert that the imposition of an externally designed policy programme, as exemplified by the Liberian experience, does not cause a change in norms of relations nor exact compliance beyond meeting project targets. As pointed out by my respondents, these interventionist programmes do not offer a mechanism to transform the primary issues challenging efforts at effect reconstruction in both Liberia and Rwanda. By contrast, they exude a flimsy means to achieving inclusivity as a panacea to the complex challenges to durable development. Consequently, Liden (2014), Pupavac (2012) and Duffield (2010) are the reason that this presents a misrepresentation of externally conceived technocratic solutions that characterise international liberal peacebuilding and development interventions or practices.

From my perspective, the lack of transformation underpinning the framing of interventionist policies can be attributed to the drive to display immediate liberal peacebuilding intervention outcomes that rede the rationales of these policies. Ensuing the simplification of complex post-conflict conditions of (under)development for which technocratic short-term programme are designed to fix, leading eventually lacking the means to address the breakdown of norms of relations, trust, and inclusivity. Plausibly, this approach evades the nested and pertinent interplay of socio-economic and historical issues at various levels of state-society relations upon which the causes of conflict are rooted.

With the influence of (neo)liberal policy ethos and commitment to pro-growth orientation confirmed by the official policy standpoints of both countries, it follows that their social policy

tools are not necessarily innovative in design and hold little impetus to address the context-specific issues of reconstructing the ruins of violent conflicts transformatively. Instead, these policy tools seek to give a new corporate or political image to the development conditions of post-conflict Liberia and Rwanda as an *existential novelty* in order to gain the legitimacy for western intervenors based on existing neoliberal policy frameworks. Indeed, the incidence of poverty and development is a global phenomenon of different variations, yet in other to perpetuate the asymmetrical global liberal order that only acknowledges the role and place of African countries as an appendage of exploitation for the benefit of the more advanced countries effectuate the novelty of poverty narrative (Bhambra, 2022,2021; Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018; Mkandawire, 2010,2005). This narrative is indicative of the trans-nationalisation of social protection policy ideas as a means to poverty reduction and development in post-conflict countries when the reality of the situation demands transformative policy mechanisms. This policy labelling and diffusion invariably endorses neoliberal market-driven policy practices as the only effective means to undoing the challenges of post-conflict nation-building facing Liberia and Rwanda. This gives further thrust to how leadership in these countries articulate the issues of nation-building and development, and the policy tools adopted to pursues such goals. However, since the social protection framework holds no transformational character, it evident that this policy idea is riddled with a gradualist and technocratic residual policy programme to address historical and contemporary nested problems that it barely comprehends. The next section concludes this chapter and will deal with the market and technocratically driven social protection policies for peacebuilding in Liberia and Rwanda.

5.7 Conclusion

Social policy as an aspect public policy has become the vehicle for proclaiming, instituting, perpetuating, and consolidating narratives of government's narrative of nation-building. While that of Rwanda is primarily shaped by the objectives of the Sustainable Development Goals, and other international policy guides aimed at improving living standards through poverty reduction. To be sure, in the case of Rwanda, the quest for post-conflict nation-building is being presented through the victor's narrative of a nation-state by which its public policy practices are shaped (Bentrovato, 2022; Purdeková, 2015, 2020; Thomson, 2018c), or what Grever and van der Vlies (2017, p. 286) argues as a "strong revival of national narratives". Comparatively, the case of Liberia's social framework is fundamentally influenced by its signatory to the Millennium Challenge Account Program and other doner-driven policy intervention initiatives. Yet, a thorough reading of both policy framework shows identical framings.

By reason of social assistance policies for peacebuilding of both Liberia and Rwanda analysed suggest such social policy practice in both Liberia and Rwanda resonate with the articulations of liberal peace and development. In the form of the problem-solving practices being championed by the United Nations. The specific framings and implementation are soundly in conformity the ideational foregrounding of (neo)liberal policy intervention mechanisms established by the donor community, particularly the peacebuilding industry. With the adoption of social protection as an aspect of the (neo)liberal policy frameworks for advancing the poverty, insecurity and development condition of countries recovering from violent conflict – I suggest that social protection/assistance policy regime being pursued by both countries is an appendage of (neo)liberal peacebuilding as state-building policy framework. In effect, this policy milieu lacks any robust mechanism or potency for transforming norms of socioeconomic relations that ameliorates the issues the occasion the breakdown on cooperative inter-relations and instigate violent conflicts. Hence this cannot instigate nor secure transformation that breeds inclusive peace and development in both Liberia and Rwanda.

From the information available to me that I have analysed, I suggest that the social assistance policies being pursued exemplify controlling or colonial mentality that does not reflect contextual conditions and requirements for transformation. An important issue within the liberal peacebuilding policy practices is framed by rationales that seldom transforms countries where these prescriptions are implemented. In particular, the ineptitude of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm to transforms recipient countries can be attributed to the decontextualise-technocratic framing that inhibit the potential of such policies to address the conditions of countries recovering from the ruins of violent intra-state conflict. This is precisely due to their reduction to standardized solutions seeking short-term solutions. Also, the ineffectiveness of such policies is reflected in the insensitivity on the part of the framers of these policies to recognize the relational dynamics that influence social, economic, and political (re)production, creating a disconnect with the various levels of institutional dynamics and foundations. In this regard, I must emphasise that the exclusionary and contradictory mechanisms in which social assistance programme implemented hinder the possibility of such policies to transform spaces where they are deployed. This affects the quest to building cohesive state-society relations reliant upon long-term, realistic, and embedded policy interventions for transforming the causes of conflict and building durable peace and inclusive development in Liberia and Rwanda.

6.0 Leadership and post-conflict peacebuilding in Liberia and Rwanda

6.1 Introduction

The argument in this chapter is woven around the Third guiding question of this thesis – *What is the role of Leadership in building peace in Liberia and Rwanda*. The outbreak of violent conflicts is often attributed to the failure of leadership or the lack of it in society. However, rarely does the quest for building durable peace in post-conflict countries systematically engage the place of leadership. Hence, though leadership in society occurs as part of the everyday, as it underlines policy practices and norms of relations that continuously re-enforces acts that breed conciliation or otherwise in specific spaces. This chapter explores the relations between leadership and the quest for inclusive peace and development in Liberia and Rwanda. I rely on the framing of process-based approach to leadership (see Olonisakin, 2017; Northouse, 2015; Grint, 2010; Murphy, 1946) to explore how leadership. In the first sub-section of this chapter, I would explore the nature of leadership in both countries. How does citizens perceive leader and their role in building effective peace, and how do leaders see themselves vis a vis the expectations of citizens. The next section discusses the present leadership in both countries is anchoring ongoing peacebuilding in both countries to instigate durable development. The discussion in this chapter is primarily informed by information supplied by respondents who participate in this study.

Peacebuilding-as nation-building is a relational process of public policy making and implementation that transforms the nested issues that triggers violent conflict. As discussed in Chapter Three, at the minimum, leadership in society is *the exchange of influence between both (s)elected persons and the citizenry in the exercise of public authority to for the common good*. In durable societies, leadership in society is thus underpinned by the mutuality of relationships between and among the diversity of identities that make-up a country's population; individuals, kin groups, secular associations, and the gamut of institutions for securing the territorial integrity of a state. This equally applies to the exercise of leadership of a post-conflict country. In chapters – Four and Five, we examined the post-conflict condition(s) in Liberia and Rwanda and the ongoing efforts at addressing such issues to secure the everyday of citizens and maintain the corporate image of both countries. In part, this thesis argues that paying attention to the exercise of leadership is important to building effective peace and durable development. The nature of these post-conflict settings require leadership that emerges to transform the norms or relations and ruins of society to ensure durable and progressive peace and development. For such transformation to occur, individual(s) who emerges to become a leader must be sufficiently aware of the contextual

needs and dynamics of recovering from conflict to build an inclusive country. Stated differently, peacebuilding that ensures inclusivity requires leadership to enable political, social, and economic process of negotiating and defining the limits of state-society relations capable of enabling policy effectuation that legitimises the state in ways that are acceptable to the citizenry. This is contradicting the technocratic problem-solving liberal peacebuilding as state-building paradigm that pays much attention to the establishment of institutions of governance ostensibly to enable such post-conflict recovering states participate in the market-oriented neoliberal world order.

The basis for examining the place of leadership in post-conflict peacebuilding in both Liberia and Rwanda stems from the scant attention by the mainstream literature on conflict, peacebuilding and development and security on leadership in society as an integral part of building transformative peace. Although leadership is framed as both cause and effect of violent conflicts, it is rarely engaged in post-conflict peacebuilding practices and discourse. Hence, a comparative analysis of the role of leadership in articulating and exchanging influence or enacting power relations to navigate societal dynamics for addressing the root causes of conflict, and forging norms of inclusivity is fundamental to understand how social policy as a sub-set of public policy is designed to transform the conditions of underdevelopment, marginalisation and exclusion, low human capital, participation among others in of post-conflict Liberia and Rwanda. Illuminating our understanding of this vector for building effective peace in Liberia and Rwanda would also help to unravel why both countries have resorted to the kind of social policies being pursued as part of their respective reconstruction processes. In essence, the argument in this chapter would show that currently the practice or leadership in both countries holds no new approaches to transforming the causes of conflict besides maintaining the status quo ante of the referent object in the market-based neoliberal world order.

To this extent, the art of leadership equally entails the evolving a progressive mechanism for empowered participation as espoused by Sherry Arnstein (1969). In the framework of Arnstein's *Ladder of Participation* such a process must empower citizens in exchanging influence with public officials and institutions progressively. Such a redistributive form of participation ensures public engagement or reasoning that is effective instigates inclusivity. Hence given the post-conflict peacebuilding and development condition and recovery process of both Liberia and Rwanda, it requires process-based leadership that negotiates a common or shared goal of development that is transformational and durable. Consequently, leadership is fundamental to transformative peacebuilding when it is sociologically grounded – effectively articulating the contextual issues being faced by both countries and facilitating an architecture for mediating and addressing

grievances of marginalisation and exclusion, participation, group framing, poverty, infrastructure deficit, social and economic services, unemployment and the general risk to livelihood and meaningful lived experiences. Such issues and narrative are unaddressed, the assume the currency capable of rapturing the secured peace and triggering the relapse into violent conflict. In essences, a process-based leadership presents a robust mechanism for building the legitimacy of leaders, other state actors and the mechanism for mediating state-society relations that fundamentally is the bedrock of societal goal setting and addressing the common and diverse risks to citizens self-actualisation and lived experiences in a given post-conflict societies. As discussed by Olonisakin a process-based leadership is cardinal "to an inclusive, all-encompassing peace that can be sustained, because it concentrates attention on mutually held goals by people of the target society and their leaders" (Olonisakin, 2017, p. 26).

Examining leadership withing the context of national-level policy thinking and design in achieving collective interests as part of mechanisms for securing effective post-conflict peace and development is relevant if effective peace continuous to be elusive in many post-conflict countries. Pursuing efforts that help minimises to the barest minimum the risk of disruption to state-society relations and the re-eruption of violence between or among groups in the polity is cardinal to the function of leadership in society. Engaging in this enterprise in the context of Liberia and Rwanda will provide further our understanding of the contextual basis of the design and implementation of social policy interventions as a sub-set of public policy for transforming norms of relations that breeds inclusivity.

6.2 Post-conflict leadership emergence in Liberia and Rwanda

What is the nature of leadership in both Liberia and Rwanda as a vector for peacebuilding? In any given society where sovereignty resides and emanates from the people, the art of exercising public political authority expressed through leadership is nurtured by norms of relation. Consequently, the exercise of leadership is a continuous relational exercise that stems from the historical configuration of specific countries and the ensuing political system. Hence leadership is a relational process of power sharing and the exercise of public authority by both the leader and follower (citizens) through a social pact that binds society for the collective good. In post-conflict settings such us Liberia and Rwanda, the transformation of conflict triggers into durable peace partly rests on the nature and commitment of leadership that is sufficiently aware of the conditions of their country and demands thereof. Equally important is the ability to articulate such contextual needs and instigates concerted reinforcing norms of relations between both the leader and the citizenry. How then does leadership emerge or occur?

Both Liberia and Rwanda like any other modern Westphalia state, functions on a constitution that directs how individuals and institutions can exercise leadership and exercise authority in lieu of the national interest through the bill of rights. Recognising the history of violence and its devastation, both countries have provisions for civic engagements in their respective national constitutions as a basis for addressing the historical injustices that triggered years of violent conflict in both countries. The 2003 Constitution of Rwanda in Articles 11 states:

> All Rwandans are born and remain free and equal in rights and duties. Discrimination of whatever kind based on, inter alia, ethnic origin, tribe, colour, sex, region, social origin, religion or faith, opinion, economic status, culture, language, social status, physical or mental disability or other form of discrimination is prohibited and punishable by Law (2003 Constitution of Rwanda, p 5).

In particular, this provision has led to a record number of women playing diverse roles as part of the reconstruction agenda. Also, articles 19 and 33 respectively establishes that all are equal before the law and criminalizes the propagation of any kind of discrimination or divisionism (see Republic of Rwanda 2003). For Liberia, the constitution in Article 11(a) stipulates:

> All persons are born equally free and independent and have certain natural, inherent, and inalienable rights, among which are the right of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of pursuing and maintaining the security of the person and of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, subject to such qualifications as provided for in this Constitution. (Republic of Liberia 1986).

From the above, both constitutions have enshrined provisions that guarantees political and social rights, and welfare rights. Political and social rights are fundamental, made common and imperative to all persons living within the defined geographical space of the respective countries, concomitant to effective governance and inclusive development. By such constitutional emphasis, social and welfare-related rights allow followers of sound mind, irrespective of their ethnic, regional, education, health, and religious status to participate in the governance process, as least through voting. On the face of it such rights are fundamentally akin to enabling citizens' participation in the processes of decision-making and development practice through – the right to uphold and defend the values of the constitution, the right to vote and be voted for, and the right to hold public office subject to the minimum requirements stipulated. Equally fundamental are the welfare rights of citizens relating to their well-being and the security of space for self-actualisation (For Rwanda see 1993 Arusha Peace Agreements (Article 13); 2003 Constitution of Rwanda preamble, p.4, also see articles 56, 58,180 For Liberia see - articles 11 (b) (c), 12, 13(a), 14, 15(a), 17, and 18). The social welfare right contained in both constitutions and found in the respective policy frameworks for building peace and national cohesion are constructed to guide the process and mechanisms for policy decision-making that guarantees enabling spaces for citizens to be economically and financially adequate and secure at all times, have the right to access and enjoy basic and essential public services, and social goods at any given time without discrimination.

In both cases, constitutional provisions on civil liberties provides the formal framework for leadership emergence. The electoral regime that guides the emergence of public leadership in both countries emanates from the respective various constitutional provisions (for Liberia see Electoral Law 1986 [2014] as amended, and for Rwanda - The Presidential Election Law [No. 27/2010]). This occurs through periodic elections at both national and sub-national administrative regions or districts in both countries. Citizens wishing to lead or exercise public authority at any level make themselves available to contest elections on the ticket of a legitimate political party or individually in accordance with the requisite requirements or is appointed into such a position of public authority. Besides, the legislative and political framework for leadership emergence, person wishing, able, and willing to become a leader is expected to build mutuality with followers by articulating an understanding of the issues confronting and inhibiting their everyday – voter mobilisation. Similarly, a person appointed into a position of public authority is mandated by the constitution to uphold the sovereignty of the people and ensure policy prescriptions do not make followers worse off. However justiciable these provisions and requirements are. By exchanging influence with followers, potential leaders demonstrate their capacity, ability, and qualities that for evaluation by followers to enable them to make a choice. The decision by majority of followers is deemed as what best works in securing the common good. The effectiveness or otherwise of such a person or group of persons who emerge as the leadership of the country is subject to various analysis, discussions, and verdicts without any likelihood of a consensus in both countries. However, what remains common to leadership emergence in both countries, is the perceptions of citizens (followers) of what a person who emerges as leader or what leadership should embody. This is essential to any social, political, and economic processes for building inclusivity and ensuring progressive development in Liberia and Rwanda. Hence, I present citizens' appraisal of leadership and its emergence in both Liberia and Rwanda.

6.2.1 Citizens' appraisal of Leadership and its emergence in Liberia and Rwanda

During my field study in Liberia, respondents expressed their perceptions of the qualities expected from a person who aspirers to lead or occupy public office. They used the following words or phrases to define who they perceive as a leader, or what leadership is. From the many responses, a considerable number of the participants noted that a leader is one that performs *well* (n=9), *a leader seeks the interest of the citizens* (n=6), *must have a good educational background* (n=1), *should have a good working relationship with others* (n=1). According to other participants, a leader *should give a listening ear to his followers* (n=3), while others noted a leader must be *hardworking* (n=2), *sincere* (n=2), *a unifier* (n=3), *tolerant* (n=1), *innovative and disciplined* (n=1). Other framings of what a leader should be were expressed as follows: *a leader must live an*

exemplary life, *generous*, *self-motivated person*, a *problem solver*, be *selfless*, *honest,* and *accountable.*

Insights from the various responses provided by Liberians who participated in this study show they conceive leadership as a process-based art of securing the welfare of the public in a mutually reinforcing manner. Hence, leadership for achieving the collective goal of Liberians is one that partly engages the people at every stage of the process. In this case, responses from Liberians suggest the desire to have leaders not only seeking their consent at elections but an institutional mechanism that ensures public office holders exercise authority guided by the follower's attribution of their lived experiences in a mutually transforming sense - *one of the main challenges of leadership at the moment, both at the national and community levels are; not everyone has the opportunity to contribute to decision-making or is given the right to decide as to who becomes a leader, there is poor accountability, and poor record management* (Respondent, 3). Often, liberal approaches to leadership ignore how both the historical and contemporary configurations of power relations affect the art of leadership in society. Fundamentally, power relations are nested in state-society relations through the social and political systems and the sociocultural norms and discourses that shape and reinforce norms of relations (Northouse 2015). By reason of this, process-based leadership requires attention to the 'contextual complexities and issues that shape power configurations and relations within the socio-political system of a country.

In essence, within the framework of leadership as process, leadership emergence through elections or by appointment is expected to build mutuality with followers through the building of mutuality and the articulating issues around their everyday. To do this effectively, leaders suppose supposed to pay attention to the issues and concerns highlighted by citizens and demonstrate the ability and capacity to address those issues. Similarly, the respondents interviewed in Rwanda were of the opinion the current institutional arrangement for electing leaders is the only means available to them for participating in the leadership process. Generally, participants voiced the voting process as the main means for leadership emergence and the exercise of power. Hence, respondents concurred that through the "voting" process (n=18), leaders must show they "have good moral values" (n=7), and the person must have a "good working relationship with electorates or community member" (n=5). A respondent was of the opinion that such a means is capable of garnering inclusivity – *also, in voting, there is inclusiveness. There is no one who is not allowed because of his ethnicity* (Respondent, 2). Citizens are allowed *in [our]local authorities or the national level [to engage in] self-campaigns; we vote for them like the President of the Republic* (Respondent, 25).

In both contexts, the citizenry expects leadership to display qualities that portend sincerity, honesty, accountability, and inclusivity in advancing the collective interest of citizens. Accordingly, a leader is deemed to be effective when the person's conduct in office and performance is perceived as follows: *one must be selfless, be honest, one must be hardworking, and one must have his/her followers at heart* (Respondent, 10 [Liberia]). Thus, persons who put themselves up to be elected to lead must demonstrate the ability to build mutuality with the people undergird by such shared qualities. Ciulla and Forsyth (2011) suggest that ethical considerations and implications are fundamental to process-based leadership. This is reflected in how 'leaders behave', how they relate with followers, to the outcome(s) or their actions. Taking into consideration the views expressed by respondents in both Liberia and Rwanda, leadership ethics is important to achieving solving common challenges. Hence how leaders act in a given situation with regards to the moral order is not just important, but effective leadership concerns leaders doing the right things in the right manner and for the right reason(s) given the contextual situation. However, there is more empirical research that examines this aspect of process-based leadership. Beyond this, leaders must demonstrate the capacity to innovate ideas that are embedded in the everyday of the citizenry. In practice, persons selected to exercise public authority are expected to animate their mandate through public policy prescriptions that addresses or ameliorates the issues that condition their present circumstances, with the threat of chaos. Put differently, leadership is expected to assuage the daily issues of insecurity to advance the collective security and development.

6.3 The exercise of Leadership in post-conflict Liberia and Rwanda

The previous sections examined the appraisal of a cross-section of Liberians and Rwandans on the issues of *leadership* in their respective counties. This sections specifically discusses the exercise of leadership in both countries.

6.3.1 Liberia

 In post-war Liberia, the legitimate practices of leadership are birthed by the *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* (CPA) among all concerned parties. The signing of this pact signalled an end to the conflict and re-occasioned the establishment of institutional mechanisms exercise of civic relations for the reconstruction of durable peace and development. Subsequently, an interim government was established to help transition the country unto a path of sustainable reconstruction under the leadership of Charles Gyude Bryant. The transition leader re-affirmed the quest for effective peace and reconciliation that 'ordinary' Liberians were yarning for, women groups who have exercised

their agency in the absence of formal structures of participation to champion for peace in the midst of the ravaging war in the following words:

> Today, we defiantly draw a line in the sand between good and evil. We challenge those who believe that this country cannot and will not redeem its pledge of justice for all, to test our character and our resolve. Liberia shall be a nation of peace, at peace with herself; at peace with her neighbours; and at peace with the international community (Inaugural Speech, 15 October 2003).

This statement was affirmed the commitment of the leadership to implement the objectives of the peace agreement "scrupulously and meticulously" (ibid). The two-year mandate of the Transitional Government ended with a relative stability and a conducive space for the reconstructing the ills of the war. The ensuing elections led to the Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf becoming the substantive post-conflict leader of Liberia after edging out her main contender, George Weah. During the inaugural event on January 16, 2006, President Sirleaf affirmed her leadership commitment towards reconciliation and national cohesion, eradicating corruption, improving governance, political and economic renewal. She emphasised, somewhat the willingness of her administration to pursue shared values in the common interest:

> Fellow Citizens: Let me assure you that my presidency shall remain committed to serve all Liberians without fear or favour. I am President for all of the people of this country. There will be no policies of political, social, and economic exclusion. We will be an inclusive and tolerant Government, ever sensitive to the anxieties, fears, hopes, and aspirations of all of our people irrespective of ethnic, political, religious affiliations, and social status. This administration therefore commits itself to the creation the security of our nation and people, we will work tirelessly to ensure economic renewal. This call for the translation of our economic vision into economic goals that are consistent with our national endowment and regional and global dynamics. We will call upon our development partners to likewise recognize that although they have made significant investment to bring peace to our country; this peace can only be consolidated and sustained if we bring development to our people. We are confident that we can continue to count on the assistance of the United States and on our other development partners in the urgent task of rebuilding of our nation. (President Johnson Sirleaf – Inaugural Address, 16 January 2006)[18].

Furthermore, the leadership of the country underscored the need for mutuality among Liberians in ways that enable citizens commit to the nation-building agenda of the country. In the minds of the leadership, this presents a viable approach to achieving durable development. While acknowledging the responsibility and commitment of those selected as leaders to fashion out policy measures in a pro-poor manner to alleviate the plight of Liberians in the following remarks:

> We should all strive to put aside our differences and join hands in the task of nation building. We must learn how to celebrate our diversity without drawing lines of divisions in our new Liberia. We belong to Liberia first before we belong to our inherited tribes or chosen counties. We must not allow political loyalties to prevent us from collaborating in the national interest. We must respect each other and act as neighbours, regardless of religious, social, and economic differences. I intend [over the next six years] to construct the greatest machinery of pro-poor governance in the history of this country; by the quality of the decisions that I will make to advance the lives of poor Liberians. I will do more than

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[18] https://awpc.cattcenter.iastate.edu/2017/03/09/inaugural-address-jan-16-2006/

my fair share to meet your expectations. I ask you to meet mine, for I cannot do it alone (President George Weah – Inaugural Address, 22 January,2018) [19].

Besides being the norm, the leadership of Liberia resort to communication means to exchange mutuality with the citizenry by demonstrating to them an understanding of the issues that afflict them, and how they intend to use public policy prescriptions to address them. This includes the leaderships' engagement with its 'development partners' in the exercise of leadership towards achieving mutual goals. In respect of the country's development the leadership acknowledges its duty to followers in the web of mutuality: "the responsibility of leading the effort to build a capable state that is united in purpose and filled with hope and prosperity, importantly, we will invest in our people particularly into their education, health, and in ending widespread vulnerability" (Speech by President George Weah, 2018)[20] . For instance, with respect to improving the nature of education which the leadership of the country admits is integral to efforts at re-building a durable society, its re-affirmed commitment to such a vision a policy notes as follows:

> Our vision for education in Liberia is a system in which every child can go to school, where there is a quality teacher in every classroom, and where children achieve a good standard of learning. We have a vision of education for young people where they are able to access relevant quality education and training which improves their skills for livelihoods and work. We advance this vision because education is the foundation of development (President Johnson Sirleaf 2017)[21].

However, during my field work, it became obvious from the expressions of respondents that the exercise of leadership by selected public officers is at variance with their expectations. The cross-section of citizens who participated in this study suggested they are rarely involved beyond the voting process to elect their leaders. The following expression describes how citizens narrated their experiences about the absence of mutuality in the leadership process in Liberia: *most of the times leaders at the national level do not involve us. And for example, this district, since our current lawmaker took over, she has only visited here once, since 2018* (Respondent 21- 22/06/2022). In another interview, a former Minster of the Republic of Liberia explained the plausible reason why leaders are unable ensure the exchange of influence towards the quest addressing the nested issues of post-conflict reconstruction in Liberia:

> Well, the role they stand to bear is to be ensure policies are in the interest of citizens form the ideas that parties solicit the citizenry. All these doses do not happen in practice. If you're in opposition (your role) is to do what the opposition does best, criticize, block government from doing what they're supposed to do to improve the lives of the people. It's a vicious cycle, because every six years there's election and if government doesn't succeed

[19] See https://unmil.unmissions.org/President-Weah.
[20] See Forward to Liberia medium term development policy – *Pro-Poor Agenda for Prosperity and Development* (PAPD), 2018
[21] See Forward to Policy on Getting *to Best Education Sector Plan July 2017–June 2021* (Republic of Liberia 2017, p. vi).

my chances of getting elected and taking power from them is greater. So as opposition the whole objective is to ensure that you frustrate the government effort from becoming the government that is going to deliver and make a difference in the lives of the people or deliver what the manifesto requires. On the other end the government has had some serious difficulties delivering the political commitment to the people and that is simple because everything is built around the standard bearer, so the standard bearer becomes President, everybody looks up to the standard bearer for guardianship for instructions, and if they don't get that instruction, it becomes a difficult process for them to implement. The party manifesto is there but you see that the political parties because they are no institution and structured well, the manifesto in fact becomes a side thing, it's not the party driving its manifesto, it's driven by the head of government, it's driven by the legislature that sometimes dictates what happens to our resources and how resources are allocated the different social sectors of or country. So, unless political institutions can recognize the fact that they're political institutions and they are not government, they are not legal, yes the government comes from them, but the political institutions have to also understand that they have a role to play whenever you take power and that is where I think has been lacking in our country (Interview with Minister Finlay – Monrovia 20/06 2021).

The above illustration was further espoused by a respondent who emphasised the nature of impoverishment in the country as a contributory factor to the lack of commitment by policy actors to evolve mechanism that allow for effective building of mutuality among citizens and leaders. His exposition is reproduced below:

Low living standard of the people makes people to lose their sense of making independent judgement as to whom is the right candidate. The reason is most people are already poor, so you notice that people who are not capable to lead to become leaders will influence the poor people based on free donation, free giving, and ransom cash to buy their vote. The right leaders are not always given the opportunity to lead because of the lack of finance. Bad leadership has made citizens to even think that the right time to get or benefit from the national resource is during election time, as a result citizens have interest in what they can get now then what will come later, which is not guaranteed. Bribery and corruption are very common during these processes (Respondent 24 – 21/06/2021).

This information reveals that the open nature of Liberia's political system, coupled with the development debacle being faced on a daily basis inhibits the institutionalisation of a mechanism for exchanging influence. As a result, it is more fancied for individuals to engage in acts and means that satisfy their immediate needs, irrespective of its effect on the collective.

Also, the insights shared by respondents points to the seeming display of inability by persons who emerge as leaders in Liberia to drive the post-conflict reconstruction process in a manner that demonstrate their ability to exchange influence with the citizenry and external policy actors in ways that might not immediately lead to the transformation of norms of relation that support the creation of durable development of through public policy measures. The lack of ability on the part of leader to resonate their vision and policy proposals with citizens can be attributed to the framing of Liberia as a 'fragile' country that needs intervention in ways that mimics 'trusteeship'. Such framing and its acceptance by the leadership of the country incapacitate the institution of mechanism that embeds the practice of leadership with the everyday of citizens in a manner that addresses and transforms the causes of conflict. Overall, a key informant interviewed for this study

summarises the exercise of leaders with respect to the quest for effective post-conflict reconstruction and national cohesion in the following words:

> It's either a recycle of the old Liberia or it's a lost Liberia that had not learned from the debris and loopholes of the past and for some of us, that's frustrating. You learn from history to make a lead; you don't repeat mistakes repeatedly. So, the post conflict Liberia that we have, we thought we were now moving to a glimmering multipartyism which now brings the debate to the table. The regime changed, yet the situation remains the same. So summarily, Liberians now have is a repeat of the old order (Former Head of Liberian Human Rights Commission, Liberia – June 2021).

The above response attest to the fact that the building of mutuality between the leadership of the country and the citizenry lacks expression directly. It can be argued that this non-existence of the expression if mutuality with citizens as a result of low capacity and underdeveloped mechanisms for the exchange of influence. This points to the absence of a transformative mechanism for the building of mutuality. Hence the current system for enhancing influence in Liberia favours 'destructive consent' rather than 'constructive dissent' as noted by Grint (2010). This inhibits the ability of selected leaders to actualise their articulated intentions in enhancing the post-conflict daily realities of Liberians.

While the rhetoric of leaders animates their intentions of exchanging influence through public policy making to address the nested issues that conditions a post-conflict country like Liberia. The actual exercise of such leadership with regards to policy can only be inferred from such public rhetoric at the minimum. This is inconsistent with the survey finding, of Fearon et al. (2011) that suggest the potential for durability according to Liberians is embedded in context-informed 'heterogenous mechanisms for mobilisation and interaction between leaders and followers premised on their common norms and conditions'. They argue that such a multi-dimensional institutional framework allows for more "cooperative behaviour" for building trust and achieving desirable collective outcomes (Fearon et al. 2008, 2011). Insights from respondents in Liberia shows that citizens' aspirations to have an institutional mechanism for governance that allows them to continuously participate in deciding the conduct of public policy and the exercise of public authority is lacking. This does not allow them serving as counterbalance to the actions of the country's leadership – elected and appointed persons into positions of public trust.

6.3.2 Rwanda

In accordance with the 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement provided for an inclusive transitional agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF. This agreement lasted for 9 years, from 1994 to 2003, with the framing and adoption of a new Constitution for the 'new' Republic of Rwanda through a referendum held on May 26th, 2003. Arguably, the notable face of the RPF

is Pau Kagame. In this regard, utterance made by Paul Kagame can be used as a measure of how leadership is exercised in the 'formal' settings within the Rwandan polity. The adoption of the new constitution was to usher the country into a stable and progressive phase in the quest for addressing the debacle of development. Hence, Paul Kagame noted:

> We now have put a constitution that has been agreed upon democratically. We have a constitution that reflects the views of a very big part of our population. I believe, on this basis, that we put the interest of the country above any individual or any political group. I think a consensus has developed that we should be able to rebuild our country on a rule of law based on this constitution that we have formulated ourselves. I think, increasingly, there is a sense that we are moving firmly forward and there is a sense of direction, and everybody is on board. So, the constitution we have put in place is really an embodiment of our diversity. The people have been able to look back into our history, realizing what caused these problems. We have been able to formulate a way forward that would deal with future problems[22].

Given the RPF's quest for reconciliation and national unity, it marshalled its strong leadership and political will, to institute a good governance mechanism system to ensure a viable 'emerging' country capable of withstanding '*any evil that would threaten national unity*'[23]. This, in a sense demonstrates the intentions of the present RPF leadership in building a progressive and nationally cohesive country informed by the devastation of the violent conflict. Hence, Paul Kagame noted the need for:

> Rebuilding Rwandan society requires responses to conflict that draw upon our own culture. Efforts to achieve justice, peace, healing, and reconciliation must derive from concepts and practices that the Rwandan population recognizes and can own[24].

In reiterating the need to exchange influence with Rwandans to avert the re-emergence of conflict, Paul Kagame echoed the idea for the country's quest to building inclusivity, anchored on the creating of "institutions rather than individuals if we are to make it sustainable"[25]. This would translate into the establishment of a number of governance institutions for mediating group contestations, particularly the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). On its part, the NURC admonished the need for resort to diverse traditional mechanisms to engineer a reconciliatory process that addresses the country's reality and desire for a post-genocide Rwanda that should 'never again' experience such atrocities. It called for the resort to approaches that will cause a:

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[22] Clare Short interview with Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda (cited in Jha et al., 2004 pp. 220-221).
[23] See Resolutions of the 1st National Summit on Unity and Reconciliation in Rwanda (NURC, 2000, Report on the National Summit of Unity and Reconciliation, 18-20 October, Kigali, p.5&25
[24] President Paul Kagame, cited in Clark, Phil, and Kaufman Zachary, 2009. After the genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction, and reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond, New York: Columbia University press, p. xxv.
[25] President Paul Kagame, during the 8th National Dialogue Council, 2010.

radical change on the part of the Rwandan society and willingness to transform Rwanda into a reconciled and united nation in which all citizens have equal freedoms, and a country that has a common vision for a better future (NURC, 2014, p 45).

Overall, these statements form the leadership of Rwanda is in lieu of its 's recognition the need for:

Unity [as the] corner stone on which rest any action undertaken in order to develop Rwanda. It should be clear that if this foundation, that is to say national unity, does not exist we would be building on shaky grounds. It is the policy of our Government of National Unity to involve all Rwandans in search for good governance and find solution to our problems...It is necessary to give the population a greater role in the governance of the country and in the development of solutions to its problems[26].

In the case of Rwanda, the common words and phrases for perceiving leadership among participants were recorded as follows: leaders are "good", "advocates", "supportive", "motivators" and they strive to "*fulfil their duties*" among other. In the words of a respondent: *I see them putting in a lot of effort. This includes volunteering and advocating for the community in the face of challenges* (Respondent, 32). The majority of the interviewees emphatically stated that *"our leaders are good"* (Respondent, 33). For instance, one interviewee said: *our leadership that is in our village is good because everything that comes which advances our development, they immediately bring it to us* (Respondent, 3). This description is influenced by the fact that respondents perceive their leaders, for instance, the president as frequently encouraging them and advocating for them to work together and reconcile with one another to promote peace and unity among them – *"Yes, it does apply, I would like to talk about how our President always encourage us to work, and reconcile and he also tells us that we are able and can achieve anything if we [focus] set our eyes on it. And if there is any injustice, they advocate for us"* (Respondent, 1). These expressions are symptomatic of the contextual leadership situation in Rwanda.

Accordingly, the experiences recounted to me by a cross-section of respondents in Rwanda points to the RFP government resonating its policy and rhetoric with citizens. The following selected remarks depicts the observations shared with me by respondents:

The fact that we have good leadership is something that everyone sees. Because today we have good leadership, and we understand our future. even today it is good. Because at all levels, from the village level to the head of state, they are trying to work for the unity of Rwandans (Respondent 13 – 09/12/2021).

Leadership was brought near citizens, no one is stopped from speaking, when there is something that bothers you even if it is on a leader, you say it. You feel free. With national leaders it is much more. They are good. National leaders are the best unless I see the President of Republic and thank him. He took me from the slams, today I am in a story-building, in a good house. I couldn't think about [this] in my dreams, whereby there was no one in our family who lived in it. I feel like there is nothing that I can do that could show him that he did me a huge favour (Respondent 31 – 28/02/2022).

Essentially, understanding political leadership in Rwanda and Liberia from a process-based perspective is critical to the functioning of the emerging democratic society and its resolve to transform the norms that underpin state-society relations to transform into a progressive, peaceful, and prosperous country.

In a sense, followers' perception of leadership in society borrows from the framing of the issues around leadership revolves. In Rwanda, the genocidal effect of the violent and its antecedents has

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[26] See Report on the *National Summit of Unity and Reconciliation*, 18-20 October, Kigali, p.25.

occasioned the invention of 'new' societal relations framed around 'fear of the past' and the absoluteness of the state machinery. This way, the present leadership, and the state apparatus resort to public policies to create now subjects as a means of addressing the past issues of group farming and marginalisation (Mamdani, 2001, 1996). Therefore, some interviewees indicated that past practices of 'racism has been ingrained in Rwandans for so long', requiring 'people discriminate against each other which brings about differences among them'. For this reason, "our leaders have made strides to deal away with such cankers to obtain and sustain peace": –

> Look at the racism that has been sown among Rwandans for so many years, even in schools and churches that everyone has been teaching it to grow, but now look at 27 years of what we have achieved and good, I see leaders putting all their efforts into achieving and maintaining peace" (Respondent, 27).

From the responses of study participants in Rwanda, the nature of leadership in the country has been fundamental to enabling 'effective' peacebuilding. Accordingly, a cross-section of respondents in Rwanda used the following expressions to reference their reasons for considering the efforts by leadership of the country as worthwhile in ensuring a sense of sustainable peace and progressive development in the country. Phrases such as *encourage people to be each other's keepers,* they *sensitized the community members"* about programme that promote peace and stability *protecting the citizen's security*, and *resolving disputes* were used by interviewees when asked about their reflection on the role of leadership in building effective peace. This may be accounted for by the nature of the political and social system within which efforts at building inclusivity are occurring in post-genocide Rwanda.

These opinions stem from the fact that interviewees believed their leaders were doing enough to conscientize them about the policies and programme being implemented to encourage peace and development. As such, they are of the opinion that effective peace can be maintained in the course of time in the country. This following quote s from a participant illustrates this: *"I think their role is to sensitize the public to all these programmes whether it is to promote peace or to bring about development"* (Respondent, 32). As argued by Murphy (1946) effective leadership in society is one that achieved the desired results of the collective without becoming the referent to it. Hence relating peace building process though public policy in Rwanda means the country's leadership is mobilising public resources to transform the incidence of past occurrences for the common good. It however remains to be seen how the present mechanism is sufficiently progressive to offer a robust approach to transformative peacebuilding in Rwanda beyond the current leadership.

However, respondents in both countries contend that an effective process-based leadership in their respective countries is limited by the present institutional arrangement for electing and appointing leaders. In the case of Rwanda, this observation is expressed in the following words:

> They are good leaders but, at the national level, it would be better for them to go into at the population level to see if there are any problems. Because these national leaders, who report on how things are going, usually receive reports the local administration sometimes, the local leaders do not want to speak badly and want to report nice things only. They get the reports but focus only on the good things. For example, if a manager goes to require for a cleaning and security fees and the citizen comes out with a stick and wants to hit him, he will not report that one; he says only good things. They often say only good things, and bad things, they put aside. However, the leader needs to understand the plight of the citizens at the local level (Respondent 29 – 28/02/2022).

Conversely in Liberia, the expression of this observation is summed in the words of this respondent:

> The efforts of the leaders in this country are not helping to a large extent to involve us and to bring about development to my community. They are very tricky; I say so because our national leaders wait for the electioneering period before they start to carry on quick ['impact'] projects or programs that do not last. Another thing they usually do is scout out most populated communities and influence their leaders with lucrative positions so that the community leadership can support their candidacy. So, in most instances, you realize that we the people don't really matter to them. Because national leaders are easily able to buy the community leadership. The end result is, they manipulate the system to get re-elected (Respondent 26 – 29/06/2021).

From the narratives effective peacebuilding is partly consequent upon mechanisms for participation. However, it is important for such mechanism to have in-build measures that for providing feedback for to enable leaders to provide the needed policy programs in the interest of the collective. In their study in Uganda, Baldassarri and Grossman (2011), show that participation in elections with the potential of dispersing electoral gains beyond primary parties increased citizens support for public policy that contributes to the collective interest of the public with little related effects on the leader's character.. Electing leaders mostly along partisan political basis clouds national interest seeking attitudes, affecting relational processes of leadership for addressing issues of common interest. They noted that many leaders elected project their parties' interest ahead of the collective interest of the country. The following word from a respondent sums up this opinion: *I see that people are party driven, that is people put the interest of their political parties over the interest of the country's interest* (Respondent, 4). It follows that the use of elections themselves as a means for leadership emergence and the distribution of public authority is of marginal effect on cooperation for shared outcomes through public policy choices. In a way, to avoid such a situation account for why the leadership of Rwanda uses the RPF as a purposive vehicle for, mainly elite participation in the drive towards a durable post-conflict society (see Golooba-Mutebi, 2013)

Effective public leadership for transforming norms of relations to bring about desired change(s) that breeds durable peace and inclusive development is nested in a process-based leadership where those who emerge as leaders serve as agents to articulate and demonstrate the capability to instigate public reasoning around a set of shared goals. On this account, leaders are required to draw on a

variety of contextual institutional and practices and mechanisms, together with leadership capabilities considered by followers as cardinal to exercising public authority. The many views expressed by respondents in both Rwanda and Liberia show the quest for relational leadership that is purposive and committed to nation-building by transforming the triggers of conflict. Accordingly, citizens in both countries expressed the importance for having an institutional mechanism that allow for shared-exercise of public authority in a reinforcing manner that animates the social pact that binds state-society relations for the collective good. This is reflecting of findings by Dal B´o et al (2010), that suggest constitutional and democratic mechanisms that reflects the cleavages in society 'increases the effect of citizens cooperation or support for public policy for the common interest'. Similarly, Hamman et al (2011) in their study suggest that using the electoral system to delegate authority in a manner that balances the interest of both followers and leader increased contributions to achieving common goals, despite the potential for it becoming morally corrupt to leader.

Consequently, Hartley and Benington (2011) are of the opinion that political leadership must move beyond the confirmation of legitimacy at elections or by appointment to accommodate the many contending views through a mechanism that ensures the continuous renewal of its legitimacy to exercise public authority. To my appreciation, such a mechanism must marry the diversity of what may be described as formal and informal institutional arrangements capable of influencing the quest for transforming the (under)development conditions in the country and the structural that undergird them. The allows for the effective utilising of institutional and peoples' agency to affect the desired collective change in a multifaceted and mutually rewarding and reinforcing manner. Hence, the proposition implied by Liberians who shared their opinions on that nexus between leadership and secured post-conflict development reflects the relations premise of leadership – *mutuality*, *context*, and *results* in society. Hence, political office holder, both elected and appointed are expected to demonstrate adequate contextual knowledge about the post-conflict condition of poverty, marginalization, inadequate social and public services, lack of effective participation and economic opportunities, and exhibit the ability to innovate policy designs and programme to transform such issues in a manner that accommodates the diversity of capacities and capabilities of the whole. They expect leadership to rouse social policies and programme that are grounded with citizens (followers) and make them a part of the problem identification and solutions to the challenges faced by the collective.

6.4 Conclusion

Leadership in society is a process-based practice that embraces institutional mechanisms for both leaders and followers to exchange influence for achieving a common goal (see Olonisakin 2017; Northouse 2015; Burns 2003; Rost 1991; Burns 1978). For this reason, leadership for the common good requires an embedded degree of mutuality between or among leaders and followers. From information supplied to me by respondents in both Liberia and Rwanda leadership is cardinal to fashioning out public (social) policies for inclusive post-conflict nation-building and durable development. Equally, both set of respondents conceive leadership for post-conflict nation-building in the framework of a reinforcing relations of cooperation for value and resources mobilisation withing the space of share-exercise of public authority. Here, the authoritative allocation of values and resources for mediating competing interests and kneading together different peoples within the definite geographical territory of both countries is acknowledge as a shared responsibility to be achieved through dialogue and contextual learning given the specific conditions of (under)development. This creates a situational milieu for accomplishing the quest for an 'imagined community out of the ethnic divisions in society or socioeconomic fault lines. Drath refers this as mediating and reconstructing differing "perspectives, values, beliefs, cultures, and worldviews" (Drath 2001, p. 15). However, ostensibly, process-based leadership can occur in fragile context where there is little inter-group cooperation, this still offers the possibility for leadership to emerge and build mutuality with followers or among groups for cohesive inter-relations.

Process based leadership as a robust mechanism for understanding leadership in society, especially in fragile contexts such as Liberia and Rwanda imply the resort to embedded and varying means to policy making and implementation for transformation. This way, the potential and possibility for leadership occurring in different space, by or among many people and at different times is high. But how do we understand the relational dynamics of process-based leadership, especially in divide-spaces? There is the need for more empirical research from diverse methodological perspectives that illuminates our awareness of the societal and relational dynamics effecting transformative policies for durable peace and development. How do countries evolve mechanisms for insulating followers or citizens and leaders 'cultic' framing and influence? And how best can leaders emerge within a seemingly or potentially weak or dysfunctional state to build mutuality with followers through democratic and policy practices, without ultimately, harming the historical and contemporary social and political basis for leadership emergence and effectiveness. In essence, this chapter has highlighted the importance of relational leadership for post-conflict nation-building in both Liberia and Rwanda.

7.0 Accounting for the differences in outcomes of pursing (neo)liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Liberia and Rwanda

7.1 Introduction

In previous chapters, we discussed and showed how the post-conflict peace and development condition of both Liberia and Rwanda is being addressed through liberal peacebuilding problem-solving policies. The social policy interventions being deployed in both countries is underpinned by the ethos of liberal peace logic. This approach to post-conflict nation-building offers a technocratic, top-down, one-dimensional barely addresses the issues of deprivation, marginalisation, inequitable development, and low human capital development to foster inclusivity. In this case, the social policy interventions being pursued by both countries discussed in Chapter Five show how the neoliberal peace paradigm has occasioned policy space for multilateral institutions concerned with peacebuilding issues. This logic for framing peace-building policies in the case of Liberia lacks contextual nuance and usefulness, depriving it of transforming norms of relations – vertically and horizontally. Hence, they are unable to instigate a nested mechanism for transforming the root causes of violent conflicts for effective peace. In the case of Rwanda, policy framing adopts a mix of endogenous practices with liberal prescriptions. The invocation of age-old norms and practices around the mantra of 'Never again' and the 'One Rwanda' policy has enabled the leadership of the country to maintain a strong hold on the direction of policy prescriptions in aid of the process of building durable peace. This chapter discusses the conditions that account for the difference in approach in both countries.

The claim around which the argument of this thesis is woven is that: post-conflict countries embody clumsy conditions of state-society relations. Hence social policy and leadership are crucial contextual vectors for instigating the transformation of norms or social, economic, and political relations by addressing the disparities in power relations, attitudes, and relationships in an embedded manner. This mechanism augurs a robust mechanism for fomenting wider societal changes among diverging groups for inclusive social order progressively. The evidence from both case studies presented in this study shows that both social policy and leadership are important elements in transitioning both countries from the immediate post-conflict condition of despair, ruins, etc into a phase of stabilisation. In the case of Rwanda, the resort to the use of *Imidugudu* for instance, in part is aiding the quest of its leadership in ameliorating the causes of conflict into durable peace. However, the respective political system in both countries presents a common

denominator of both cases from which the differences and similarity in the emergence of leadership and design of public policy aimed at peacebuilding as depicted by the case studies spring forth. This chapter highlights this observation further.

The patent tensions between groups in such divided countries, flamed by forms of institutionalised policy practices that marginalised, subverted the will of groups, and subjugated their space in the polity to 'second-rated citizens' persists in both countries. Particularly, in the Liberian case, as shown in this study, the influencing narrative about its reconstruction filtrates policy practices that is creating what I term 'para-citizens' or 'peripheral citizens' – *(a) group(s) of persons(s) in a polity ascribed the status of citizenship but, lacking the capacity given the institutional mechanism available to express their everyday obligations and benefits thereof for self-actualisation.* Therefore, to perform the duties and responsibilities of citizens without accordance of a corresponding full and justiciable bill of rights for these group(s) within a given territory. This stems from the exclusionary nature of the ongoing policy practices by the leadership in-charge of the authoritative allocation of values and resources. This not only poses a 'dehumanising' threat, but it also excessively limits their participation in economic and political affairs of the state. It curtails the ability of these inhabitants in the polity without any form(s) of influential kin linkages to actualise their innate capacity and participate in an enabling social, economic, and political system as and when. The intensification of such between-group framing and its effects in both post-conflict countries is creating the 'myth of peace'. In Rwanda, this is reflected in the policing of citizenship and the use of social protection policies to create 'artificial' citizens out of a state-centric narrative that is synonymous with the causes of violence that culminated in the genocide in 1994. Participants in this study repeatedly used phrases such as 'we are being thought', 'our leaders educated us...', 'our leaders tell us', 'Our leaders encourage us', 'I am happy because our leaders said to us…'. The use of such expressions to represent the lived experiences of individuals in Rwanda may be understood as a deliberate resort to social policies to create 'para-citizens' through the evocation and remoulding of aged norms of relations to bind the policy efforts at building durable peace. In a sense, this resonates the resort to endogeneity to instigate an organics symbiosis of state-directed efforts with the everyday of individual worldviews as the leadership of the country strives to build a progressive post-genocide state that transcends its control over the state-society relations.

However, resort to the above phrases does not explain the government's rhetoric of 'realizing what caused these problems…to formulate a way forward that would deal with future problems'[27]. From

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[27] See Report on the *National Summit of Unity and Reconciliation*, 18-20 October, Kigali, p.25.

the official policy position, if the aim of the leadership is to rebuild a Rwanda where no "evil [can] threaten national unity"[28], to which the bare satisfaction of particularly the mass through pro-poor polices is of essence to the RPF and its control of power. Therefore, why would the government not implement such social interventions in ways that grind with the lived experiences of citizens without the leadership being a referent point? Somewhat, the answer lies in the dominance of the RPF-led political settlement which makes it the referent point in the nature of the ongoing peacebuilding processes. Hence, beyond the provision of immediate redistribution effects of policies to address immediate issues of deprivation and content the citizenry. The RPF see itself in the longer term of the scheme of affairs, hence reference by citizens to its can be understood as part of a long-term strategy of legitimation of its rulership. Also, it can be explained as the only feasible means construed by the government as essential to the needed transformation for progressive development and durable peace, which is preferred over short-term achievements of redistribution policies that may later expose structural contradictions in the society leading to the relapse into violence.

Concerning Liberia, the arrival of resettled 'Americo-Liberians' and its ensuing tension in relations of conflict and corporation for over a century, triggered socioeconomic and political insecurity that culminated in the violent conflict remains. Hence, in many respects, current post-conflict Liberia bears semblance to the condition that led to civil war as those in control of the means of publicly allocating resources and the means of socioeconomic (re)production of state-society relations can be linked to the dominant actors whose hold on the Liberian state occasioned the violent conflict. As reflected by a key informant, the present nation building in Liberia is akin to:

> what I call in our political history *political pigmentation*. When the college was established, you had to be a mulatto to come to school, or you cannot walk in line where people with light skin were marching. So, if you build the system not on ideology but on skin colour you're heading for danger. Somebody remarked that racism has been in America since…and agency in America is racism, so perhaps we transported racism from America to this land. So, the mulattos were the political pigmentation in Liberian political culture (Key Informant- Former Head of Liberian Human Rights Commission, Liberia – June 2021).

Reading this, together with the information shared by respondents on the policy initiatives for the post-conflict reconstruction process in Liberia, depict a state of affairs that is not reflective of the experiential reality of the people. Rather, a condition of elite control of public resource allocation mimicked the purported scientific ethos of state-building from which policy centres in the West design social assistance intervention. On their part, the leadership of Liberia is overly dependent on these policy designs in ways that suggests the government's *certitude* in the ability of such

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[28] See Resolutions of the 1st National Summit on Unity and Reconciliation in Rwanda (NURC, 2000, Report on the National Summit of Unity and Reconciliation, 18-20 October, Kigali, p.5&25

policies to deliver in inclusive society in the sense illuminated by James Scott in his seminal work 'Seeing Like a State' (see Scott, 1998). Yet, what in reality is the case is an elite control mechanism for parochial or sectional interest through the everyday politics that rarely attempts to address problems that occasion violent conflicts. Equally, this reflects existing findings by scholars such as Sesay et al. (2009), whose comparative study of post-war reconstruction in Liberia and Sierra Leone show that the 'power elite' in Liberia continue to mismanage public resources in ways similar to the decades preceding the civil war. In their comparative examination of both Liberia and Sierra Leone, Sesay and his colleagues analysed citizen's appraisal of the ongoing reconstruction process in both countries. Their findings suggest that:

> In Liberia, 15 percent of respondents noted the peace process was 'inappropriate' [with their aspirations], while only 3.33 percent indicated this in Sierra Leone. Also, 12 percent of respondents in Liberia stated that the peace process in Liberia was problematic, while 5 percent alluded to the same issues in Sierra Leone. Again, while 12 percent of respondents in Liberia had 'no idea' about peace process in their country, only 3.33 percent made a similar observation in Sierra Leone" (Sesay *et al.* 2009, p. 79).

In both Liberia and Rwanda, fragmentation(s) of state-society relations around issues of participation, belonging and equitable access to public services by all inhabitants, irrespective of socioeconomic classification, region, or creed in the (re)emerging state remains pertinent to the post-conflict nation-building process. According to information from the Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services (LISGIS, 2021, p. 17-42), 16% of women and 27% of men aged 15-49 have completed senior high or a higher level of education, while 41% of females and 30% of males aged 6 and older have no formal education (ibid). More that 75% of both women and men in households describes as poor have any form of employment. Also, only 24% of households have access to electricity (39% of urban households and 4% of rural households) (ibid). Hence the increasing incidence of deprivation, lack of employment and socioeconomic opportunities for particularly the young and rural dweller, creates conditions capable of triggering the relapse into violence. Observations in the extant literature on post-conflict peacebuilding suggest these issues defy technocratic and liberal policy prescriptions or solutions (Dodge, 2021; Torto, 2020; Visoka, 2016; Lidén, 2013, 2009; Roberts, 2011; Richmond &Franks, 2008; Cooper, 2007; Chandler, 2006).

7.2 What accounts for the similarities and differences in approach and outcomes of pursing (neo)liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Liberia and Rwanda?

Transforming the triggers of conflict requires embedded policy and institutional mechanisms that are contextually appropriate to the aspirations of the people in specific jurisdictions. This not only empowers locally conducive peacebuilding approaches, but it also equally provides the needed impetus for both followers and leaders to own and lead peace efforts. Securing peace and building

inclusivity in both Rwanda and Liberia based on liberal market-inspired social policy prescriptions remains a challenge in securing the goals of transformative peace (Dodge, 2021; Richmond, 2015; Lidén, 2013). This assumption limits government's intervention to spending more on social services such as roads, education, and healthcare to improve the quality of the labour force that contributes to higher productivity, while allowing the 'free' forces of the market to interact in eliminating such imbalances in addressing the structural issues that occasions violence. However, the 'trust' invested in the market by global policy and governance institutions, and policy actors in the peacebuilding industry as the means to rebuild norms of relations and inclusivity in post-conflict society renders it arduous to achieve.

Accordingly, the resort to social assistance policy prescription under the liberal peacebuilding paradigm by the leadership in both countries is inspired by the human capability logic. Hence Amartya Sen's capabilities notion entered around the integration of particular development measures such as life expectancy, literacy, and economic affluence (Sen, 2000,1989). However, the design and deployment of social assistance policies intended for reconstruction post-conflict countries and build peace in part is contingent on the institutional arrangements for ensuing participation in the decision-making and allocation of values – the political system, in a particular geographical space. Fundamental to the emergence of leadership to exchange influence with the collective is the nature of the political system. The evolution and interaction of institutions – both formal and informal determines the rules of the game by mediating competing group interests and enacting agency – capacitating individuals and or groups as change agents in society. This remains the critical infrastructure for transformative peacebuilding.

From my discussion in Chapter Five on the use of Imidugudu and mutuelles de sate in Rwanda, the Social Cash Transferer and Free Compulsory Basic Education in Liberia, suggest the resort to such social intervention policies by the leadership of both countries is meant to improve the immediate condition of citizens while capacitating them to participate in the wider economy. In Liberia, the leadership of the country relied on policy diffusion with regards to interventions implemented in other jurisdictions in the design and implementation of the FCBE. The programme was modelled on the *Charter schools* in the United States. In the case of Rwanda, the RPF framed the intervention as a means to instigate citizen's participation in the reconstruction, hence the need for Rwandans to be an integral part of the poverty reduction process. In a way, the rhetoric of by policy makers in the public discourse is to use Imidugudu and Mutuelles de sate interventions to change the 'mindset' and 'mentality' of Rwandans as important to any form of transformation (e.g., Ansoms, 2009, p. 298; Gaynor, 2014, p.56).

However, while the design and implementation of the CBHI and Imidugudu are endogenously designed, and hardly the result of policy diffusion. Hence both policy interventions as a means to addressing the post-conflict predicament of the Rwandans favoured government intervention and lower financial subscriptions to human settlement and healthcare as best suited for the kind of redistribution of resources in the society, consistent with the RPF's ideology. Hence, the policy document on Human Settlement in Rwanda notes:

> the human settlement policy must integrate the aspects of the recovery and transformation of the national economy and become a component of the country's economic policy. A society in emergency situation as a result of the 1994 genocide against Tutsi and its aftermath. The effects of this tragedy are still felt, and some actions should be considered as a matter of urgency, particularly the construction of homes for households which still live in poor structures, among others, former refugees that are coming back into their country (Government of Rwanda, 2009, p8-9).

Likewise, with regards to the CBHI, somewhat, the policy ethos of the RPF is:

> What matters is not only getting out of poverty, but also the effort put into the process itself. Part of the effort is to find the money to pay for the CBHI premium. Poverty, including poor access to health- care, is not only envisioned as a trap in which people are caught. It is also a disease of dependency that compulsory CBHI enrolment can help fighting (Chemouni, 2018, p. 95).

Therefore, it was the belief of the RPF's that the CBHI will instigate grassroots democratic participation, promote reconciliation and ownership the peacebuilding agenda, and fights "the culture of passive obedience which left people open to political and sectarian manipulation" (MINALOC, 2004 p. 11). However, the with the passage of the time and the increasing difficulties of efficient management, financial sustainability and staff quality facing the CBHI (see Republic of Rwanda, 2010), the government ditched the conception of 'popular ownership' for a more pragmatic policy positioning to avert any risk of the policy intervention collapsing to undermining its legitimacy. Thus, it resorted widening the tax net to increase the national pooling of resources to support the scheme, professional staffing, to supplement official donor assistance to the scheme. With regards to the Imidugudu policy, the government revised its policy stands as follows:

> The involvement of the Government in human settlement programmes [should be preceded by] a financial appraisal defining the practical modalities of costs recovery before committing any public funds. This regulation must apply to all resources from Government finance…the promotion of human settlement projects can be done by the private sector as developers capable of making the beneficiaries pay the cost price. The funds obtained will be recycled in new projects. This vision prevents the establishment of upsetting thresholds of programmes and ensures a confidence building continuity (Republic of Rwanda 2009, p 21).

In this sense, leadership as process-based relational activity places emphasis on the agency of both leaders and followers. It affords both leaders and followers the capacity to use their agency to instigate the kind of change desired as an aggregate of the aspirations of the collective expressed through the various communication and feedback mechanisms inbuild in state-society relations.

This is a cardinal determinant of how an individual or group of individuals emerge and demonstrate understanding of the historical and contemporary nature of context-specific conditions, and to articulate means for assuaging peoples' fear from risk of deprivation and socioeconomic want, marginalisation from economic and political spaces, and self-fulfilment in ways that reproduces society progressively. The nature of building mutuality in any given context shapes the design and implementation of public policies for improving the commonwealth for both the present and future. As a policy framework that emphasises contextual sensitivity to policy framing, design and implementation, the ethos of transformative social policy for nation-building requires the leadership of countries to device nested relational mechanisms for anchoring public policies with the people. Especially when the cardinal ascription of post-conflict nation-building is kneading together peoples in a country divided by common history and sense of identity.

7.3 Consciousness building, leadership and post-conflict peacebuilding in Liberia and Rwanda

What role does the political system play in post-conflict transformative peace building? There is little attention to the political system by studies on post-conflict peacebuilding and leadership. Yet, how leaders emerge in country specific situations is attributable to the nature of the political systems at particular moments during the course of its history-making, leading to the rise of specific individuals to lead a country or people. Fundamentally, the political system gives the character that clothes order, power relations, and authority. In ancient and modern western political thought, the political system refers to actors and institutions such as the legislature, judiciary, military, executive, civil service, and the prominent figureheads in a state. According to Robinson while this attributions to the political system "forms the nexus of the political, they are by no means identical with it" (Robinson, 1980, p. 7). These are expressions of what constitute the political in any given state regardless of its origin(s) and form. In modern governance, these are usually created by a small group of persons with or without a political, corporate identity in governing, deciding the course of public policy and its effect on the desired form of harmony by citizens.

However, when considering the political system as the sum of all parts that constitute the historical experiences of 'boundary formation(s), decision-making process, evolution of rules and norms of relations, negotiating of interests, navigating conflicting claims, party formations and legitimation of institutions through force or consensus building' – we are simply referring to the consciousness of a people within a recognisable geographical space (Robinson, 1980, p. 8). This may be a community, society, or state. Hence, the political systems are simply the progressive composite of "habits, forms, histories, and characters of authority" that forms the basis for inter-group interactions that give visibility to a legally recognisable definite geographical space (ibid). Given

the uncertainties faced by post-conflict Liberia and Rwanda, and the clumsiness of issues that condition the quest for inclusivity, the emergency of leadership must be sensitive the development debacle of the people. It is imaginable from both the point of abstraction and the everyday of people – as expressed by respondents during fieldwork that transforming the triggers of conflict through repairing and building norms of relations is a function of corduroying consciousness among citizens.

Building the consciousness that underpins and transforms norms of relations for inclusive and durable peace in both Liberia and Rwanda is fundamental to the peacebuilding process. It nourishes leadership emergence and the exchange of influence in the exercise of public authority for the order and progress of both countries. Since every political system is faced with challenges that it has to deal with for its continuous survival, context sensitive relational approach to leadership is fundamental to how everyday contestations are managed, addressed, or transformed. The political system is the integrating mechanism for communities of peoples around collective existential realities through the configuration and dynamics of power, political authority and coercion for survival and order of the collective interest. Presumably, this gives form to the leadership emergence and public policy making for advancing mutual end goals.

A systematic analysis of the situation in Rwanda reveals a different patten. While Rwanda's liberal political system embodies characteristics of authoritarianism, there appears to be an overarching state-centric blueprint aimed at building post-conflict inclusivity. For instance, my key informant had this reflection:

> We work well with the citizens because what we prioritize is the community as we always say 'citizen at the top' so we work well with them because the services are based on them even the opinions they give we take them to those they address them to, that's to say we work with them on a day-to-day basis because they are most collaborative, especially when we talk about community work or problem-solving or when we talk about some development we want to achieve, we work together and it works well. (Key Informant – Rwanda, December 2021).

This reflection on the situation in Rwanda suggests the presence of some level of consciousness among citizens. This consciousness is, however, contestable as one of a deliberate ideology in championing a course of peacebuilding that denounces the composite of historical evolutions of events. Impliedly, this construction escalates the immediate causes of the conflict and its associated atrocities in as the starting point in reconstructing post-conflict Rwanda in way that are likely to build inclusivity. However, this creates a situation where followers may be seen to be cooperating due to the fear of marginalization rather than the genuine desire to living in an imagined community in which differences in identities, opinions, status etc becomes the thread around which

national unity is woven. This at best consolidates peace-making but does not engender the transformation of the triggers of conflict.

According to Robinson (1980, p. 41), leadership in this context "represents and relates the objective reality of political order and political authority" in interest of its referent object – followers or citizens. When conceived from a process-based leadership perspective, this goes beyond building trust. Trust as an integral aspect of exchanging influence between leaders and followers in society, often in praxis, relates to a core group of people with the requisite knowledge to guide what society does or otherwise. Follower naturally defer to this group of persons because of their position, expertise, and power. Instead, building consciousness encompass the awareness among followers of the contextual historical and contemporary conditions that shape their daily realities in securing the collective good of the community. Such would represent the counterbalance of norms, institutions, and power relations in the exercise of public authority for inclusive peace.

This way, transformative social policy making as an aspect of public policy provides both an ideational and robust, predictive mechanism for thinking and making policy decisions for implementation that creates a sense of commonality among complex identities and communities within a polity. In the case of both Liberia and Rwanda the fragmentation of citizenship and sense of belonging remains fluid and poignant (see Ouafaa, 2021; Pailey, 2018; Hintjens, 2008; Konneh, 2006; Mamdani, 2002).

From the insights of study participants in both Liberia and Rwanda, they viewed the role of leadership and public policy for durable peacebuilding in their respective political polity as consequent of the nature of the political order. Hence the institutional processes through leadership and followership build mutuality for addressing collective contextual issues remains is, in part, crucial for understanding leadership and the nature of public policies. For instance, Adésínà (2020) notes that 'agency' and the 'variations in postcolonial conditions' in Africa marked the leadership of Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah and Léopold Sédar Senghor of Tanzania, Ghana, and Senegal respectively.

7.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have discussed how the approach to post-conflict reconstruction in both countries differ. From the above discussion, leadership-led change is evidenced in the Rwandan case compared to Liberia. In essence, this study finds that leadership led change in post-conflict counties takes different forms. The nature of leadership in countries recovering form conflict

primarily reflects how persons who emerge within the formal arena of politics to lead in the immediate post-conflict era engages the rhetoric of peacebuilding that relates with the wider society. In this case how the emergent leadership in is able to contextually marshal public authority in mediating the both the driving and inhibiting factors in the polity shapes the processes that occasion the peacebuilding process. Also, how the leadership of a country frames policy issues and mechanisms of engagement are cardinal in the process of reconstruction and building societal harmony. Hence leadership engagement with the collective in the process of reconstruction and development is fundamental to building any form of effective peace. Grindle and Thomas (1997) reflects this as the political economy context of fashioning leadership solutions in different context.

In this case we can argue the RPF emergence and resort to power-sharing agreement with other political entities and, somewhat with the bureaucracy made the country amenable to the vision of transformation by the leadership of the country. In essence, ability of leadership to animate institutional and political process that undergird the peacebuilding in Rwanda is integral to the ongoing transformation. In a way, the ongoing transformation is reflective in how the evocation of norms is being deployed as an imperative to effective peace by the leadership of the country. Similarly, how leadership emerged in the aftermath of the conflict in Liberia is a core factor in the nature of its ongoing peacebuilding. The inability of the immediate post-conflict leadership to relate the democratic process to the predicaments of the country in ways that embed with the citizenry is a major concern to the quest for durable peace. From both cases, it is apparent that post-conflict contexts are not necessarily ready or 'custom made' for any form of leadership to transform norms of relations and (re)production. But the citizens in these spaces seek a relational approach to leadership that is sensitive to the contextual contradictions.

8.0 Conclusion

This study has systematically examined the place of transformative social policy and leadership as vectors in building inclusive peace in Liberia and Rwanda. It examined the ideational foregrounding of the social policy prescription and emergence of leadership for performing peacebuilding and development practices in both countries. Specifically, this study focused on exploring the how the rationales and assumptions of transformative social policy and process-based leadership offer an alternative and robust mechanism for addresses the embedded nature of the post-conflict condition, and the quest for inclusivity in both Liberia and Rwanda. This is done by interrogating the neoliberal peacebuilding and state-building assumptions that underpin the multiple peace, security, and practices in both countries. In relation to the neoliberal policy ethos that underscore peacebuilding policy practices, this thesis marks a departure by problematizing the current policy interventions of the donor-community as technocratic, idiosyncratic and at odds with context-specific conditions that require inclusive peace and durable development. The nature of such policy ethos and practices associated with post-conflict peacebuilding is shrouded in the knowledge of what constitute effective peace. However, the practical construction of such policies in specific countries is shaped by the diverse institutional actors engaged in peacebuilding; their interests and capacity to diffuse policies and ensure compliance by recipient countries. Also, the definition and prescribing of such policy responses for intervention in countries recovering form violent conflict – Liberia and Rwanda are undergirded by the orientation of its leadership. Hence, the aim of this study was to *understand the process of peacebuilding in post-conflict Liberia and Rwanda.* In this regard, the guiding research question was: *how does leadership and social policy shape inclusive peacebuilding and development in Liberia and Rwanda?*

Subsequently, this thesis examined how the assumptions of neoliberal peace and development practices articulated by the diverse multilateral institutions are transforming the norms of relations in both countries to undo the fundamental causes of violent conflict. In essence, the key issue that my central question sought to unravel was how the *local reality in both countries is shaping the current peacebuilding policy practices, as nation-building in transforming norms of relations through nested non-coercive institutional mechanisms to build inclusivity and bring about progressive development.* This purports to address some of the knowledge gaps in post-conflict peacebuilding literature that has examined the peace, security, and development nexus from a Transformative Social Policy and Leadership perspective. This gap of knowledge in the extant

studies is expressed by the lack of attention to the relational basis of post-conflict reconstruction that demands mutually reinforcing complex institutional mechanisms to mediate state-society relations. Presently, the focus in research favours the interaction between global policy diffusion institutions and the recipient countries as captured in the mainstream research in policy studies, political economy, development studies and international relations primarily by Political Science, History, International and Development studies scholars.

In particular, the significance of the rationales of transformative social policy and leadership as process (TSP-L) explored in this study is their implicit quality of offering context-specific robust and predictive ideational prism capable of necessitating the possibility of inclusive peace and durable development. The distinguishing features of TSP-L is that unlike neoliberal peacebuilding policies that hold positivistic assumptions and offer one-size fit all policy prescriptions for interventions, TSP-L offers a theoretical and policy framework that allows for context-specific policy framing and implementation to address the post-conflict condition and instigate a reconstruction process akin to nation-building. Is offers an intellectual framework for policy design and making to resonates to the specific historical and contemporary circumstances of countries recovering from war to pursue nation-building policy practices is important to securing their future by amelioration their diverse, but common risk, uncertainties, and fear form both the known and unknown social, political, and economic occurrences. Thus, the assumptions of TSP-L offer a grounded framework for understanding society and transforming norms of relations for social change is ways that are biding, durable but not cohesive.

Notably, the grounded assumptions of TSP-L are that post-conflict reconstruction and development is requisite upon a process-based leadership that endears itself to the thorny triggers of conflict and the nested nature of the post-conflict situation through times and space in any given society. This way, societal problems are knowable and can be unpacked through diverse and somewhat immersed institutional creations to mediate the exercise of public authority, power-sharing mechanisms between leaders and followers, and the distribution of resources for the securing the collective good by capacitating individual to acceptable levels of self-actualisation. In effect, public policy is fashioned to meet the varied needs and aspirations of the may locales found in a polity. This departs from the current neoliberal inspired technocratic and linear framing of peacebuilding and development interventions influenced by Anglo-Saxon epistemologies.

Another inherent assumption of the TSP-L framework is that it denounces technocratic framing and transfer of public policy programmes aimed at peacebuilding. Rather it encourages the cross fertilisation of policies in ways that situates the needs of specific countries. It needs to be

emphasised that such a grounded approach to policy thinking for post-conflict nation-building (and even for relatively stable states) allows for locally driven process that ae not time bound. Put differently, it rejects the current technocratic, quick-fix problem-solving policy approach. The TSP-L acknowledges the complex nature of the post-conflict conditions, and the resources demands. From this perspective, the emphasis is on utilizing knowledge generated from the everyday cognisant of the historical conditions that nourish the same. My study's central objective is to understand the utility of process-based leadership in enabling social policy prescriptions that transform the complexities of specific countries with the promise of affecting norms of social, political, and economic relations (and reproduction) in minimising the possibility of violence recurring. This study was conducted using a comparative case study of Liberia and Rwanda in which I discussed two (2) social intervention programme in Rwanda and Liberia respectively: Imidugudu and Mutuelle de Santé, and Social Cash Transferer and Free Compulsory Basic Education programs. I relied on interviews with a cross-section of citizens and key informants from both countries, together with documentary analysis of related policy documents. This holds for the future of peace in Africa and divided societies elsewhere. For empirical causes, this study comparatively focused on post-conflict peacebuilding in Liberia and Rwanda.

Chapter Three focused discussed the conceptual framework of the study. The first part of this chapter explored the literature on peacebuilding in general and in particular, liberal peace building as state-building. First, this section discussed the contemporary genealogy of peacebuilding around the foundational ideas contained in the United Nations' *Agenda for Peace* (see Boutros-Ghali, 1992,1994). Diverse conceptual perspectives articulated within the agenda for peace by scholars and international peace institutions that coalesce around the notion of trusteeship, for informing technocratic, simplistic, expert-driven rationales and assumptions were discussed. Informed by empirical and conceptual studies by Sabaratnam (2017, 2013, 2011), Jayasuriya (2006), Willet (2011), Chandler (2010), Pugh (2014, 2015), Richmond (2005, 2006, 2009a&b, 2010, 2011, 2020), Richmond and Mac Ginty (2013, 2015), Chandler (2015) among others, I examine the 'global' ideas that influences liberal peacebuilding practices also known as *peacebuilding as state-building*. The next section discussed the conceptual thrust of the study. Relying on the pioneering works of Mkandawire (2001, 2004, 2007, 2015) and Adésínà (2006, 2009, 2011, 2015) on transformative social policy as a counter to mainstream development policy framing and practices in improving the (under)development condition in Africa.

Together with the studies by Murphy (1946), Robinson (1980), and Grint (2010) on the sociological framework of leadership as a relations process of building consciousness for among

a group of people for mitigating their collective risk, managing uncertainties, and securing the good of their human wealth. This typology of leadership – leadership as process is adopted for this study. In the views of Olonisakin (2015, 2017) process-based leadership in peacebuilding in Africa provides a framework for addressing the root causes of conflict. In essence, the combination of these frameworks is useful in understanding the chequered nature of building effective peace and durable development. Combining the conceptual planks of these seminal works, I relied on the transformative social policy – leadership (TSP-L) nexus to foreground the ideograph for this study.

The discursive conversions among dominant scholars on the leadership, security and (under) development question in Africa has been historically framed and presented in a mechanicalized and securitized manner, with the continent posited as a reservoir of many primitive problems multiple such as deprivation, wretchedness, conflict, and violence. Hence, requiring a standardised 'tried and tested' approaches to modernisation and development construed within the worldviews of Anglo-American liberal traditions and ways of performing development. Consequently, the liberalised nature of peacebuilding policy practices to instigate the development war affected countries such a Liberia and Rwanda has resulted in the incapacitation of policy autonomy and the aggravation of the causative triggers of conflicts such as poverty, poor leadership, maladministration, misgovernance and underdevelopment as a 'security' problem. Hence fragile states and post-conflict recovering countries are constituted as obligating theatres of intervention by international governance and development institutions that drive the peace and development industry under the logic of trusteeship.

The post-conflict state of affairs in both Liberia and Rwanda has attracted directly, various external institutions or agencies in pursuing liberal peacebuilding interventions. In, the resort to social assistance or protection policies with its liberal logical framing has barely forged a sense of national cohesion nor laid the foundation, systems or mechanisms for effective development as confirmed to me by persons who shared their lived experiences and self-appraisal of the ongoing efforts at post-conflict nation-building. This chapter examined leadership as a vector in building effective peace after violent conflict. Especially as this has been emphasised by the (neo)liberal peace and state-building proponents as cardinal to securing and sustaining the external interventions of actors in the peacebuilding industry in recipient countries (United Nations, 2016).

This problem-solving approach is however empty on contextual relational norms and structural conditions fundamental to fostering rebuilding the ruins of conflict and fostering inclusivity the diverse group of peoples that constitute the polity in Liberia and Rwanda. Typical of the structural adjustment policy ethos, social assistance policies for peacebuilding policies are driven by

neoliberal market ideas of empowerment. Social assistance programme in Rwanda under the *Ubudehe* program such as *Imidugudu* and *Mutuelle de Santé* are conceived, designed, and implemented on conservative practices. Similarly, observations are apparent in the social assistance policy programme in Liberia. Consequently, they are unable to transform norms of relations and triggers of violent contestations. Rather, they reinforce, consolidate, or re-enact existing or new asymmetric power relations. In effect, problematically, these market-driven policy interventions re-establish and renormalise the adversarial nature of liberal political representations and development practices. This undermines the underdevelopment conditions of fragile or countries recovering from conflict – poverty, poor leadership, and lack of effective policy mechanisms.

Another peculiar effect of such liberal policy interventions is the terms of leadership as fundamental ingredient in the exercise of public authority and power for nation-building process of post-conflict recovering countries. The condition of post-conflict reconstruction countries such as Liberia and Rwanda demand a relational mechanism of consciousness building around the common issues that anchor the fear of everyday – risk, marginalisation, uncertainties, and the capacity of a people to define, manage and circumvent such phenomena. Rather, through the recognition and privileging of liberal political representations and settlements of needs, priorities, and contestations between and among groups, it append the situation of the poor, marginalized youth, among other causes of conflict for consideration. In support of the relational notion of leadership in the exercise of authority and power of the political, Robinson (1980) encourages the vitality of examining the relational foundation of state-society relations in transforming norms of relations for secured futures.

Unpacking the relational underpinning of leadership, Andrews, McConnel and Wescott (2010, p. 3) note will enable a better understanding of the "gap between the change intended in development *by groups of people in a polity* and the change they actually see in evidence" (emphasis mine). Through such relational examination of the enabling institutional mechanisms that condition leadership emergence and effectiveness, we are able to understand why the policy environment and practices of current neoliberal peacebuilding efforts are unable to address the root causes of violence. With this understanding, we are able to rethink how to reconstitute the arena of interest contestations in post-conflict recovering countries such as Liberia and Rwanda for the aggregation of collective interests: social classifications and mobilisation of needs and priorities for the common good. Consequently, I suggest that pursuing post-conflict nation-building and development to secure the future of the commune – a people divided by a common identity and

everyday risks requires nested, and dialectical social re-engineering processes for transforming norms of relations for durable change as I have discussed in chapters five, six and seven. Therefore, cardinal to post-conflict nation-building and search for inclusive development must embody long-term nested institutional mechanism and policy practices foregrounded by context-inspired realistic assumptions and rationales for driving reconstruction interventions aimed at securing the future of the collective. As I suggested in my analytical chapters, consolidating and securing the future of peace in both Liberia and Rwanda critically hinges on the relational nature of the exercise of public authority and power in addressing collective challenges vis-à-vis within the international neoliberal political economy.

Chapter Five discussed how the rationales behind post-conflict social policy interventions were articulated and relate to the lived realities of citizens. In this chapter, I argued that the social protection policy intervention in both Liberia and Rwanda are fundamental to the contextual relational issues, mechanism, and structures for societal (re)production. Such pursuit of simplistic diagnoses and corresponding policy solutions only assuages the underdevelopment conditions and primes these countries for participating in the neoliberal international order. The findings in this study suggest that the targeted social policy interventions in Liberia are exclusionary in many instances and did not directly respond to the contextual need for inclusivity. Also, prominently missing from the social assistance policy interventions is the transformation of the internal adversarial nature of the configurations, and the concentration of tyranny of public authority as power remains concentrated in the domain of a few privileged in society. The inherent logic that underscores the social protection intervention policies for which a number of donor institutions have expended significant resources has been the transfer and establishment of privatization and regulation regimes for public services with the motive of profit maximisation framed as community intervention and poverty reduction.

In the case of Rwanda, the responses from persons interviewed alluded to the improvement in their living condition and seeming inclusivity as a result of the *Imidugudu* and *Mutuelle de Santé*. Critically, in the case of Liberia, the social assistance policies reflect very little the undercurrents of the conflict and the reconfiguration interests of formerly indigenous groups, the privileged and the poor. With regards to Rwanda, official policy documents examined suggest they were designed and implemented to respond to the historical causes of the genocide. Thus, Imidugudu is being used to reconstitute poor, marginalised, and disparate differentiated individuals of the polity into homogenous communities for governability as subjects. This social policy programme exists to address historical narratives and grievances that occasioned the violence in Rwanda, formal and

informal political contestations that are presently inherent and enduring. However, a common feature of the social policy regimes in both counties points to their anchoring in conflict resolution and peace-making strategies of negotiated peace and peace education. These negotiated policy practices align with the state-building orthodoxy of the liberal peace agenda, for which research findings reported in the extant literature primarily shows short-term results. Hence, they are unable to comprehend and robustly address root causes of conflict and the clumsy, long-term, and relational nature of post-conflict peacebuilding as nation-building.

Chapter Seven examined the seeming difference in approach to the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction policies in Liberian and Rwanda. A key finding of this chapter arising from my assessment of information supplied by participants in this study, policy documents and empirical relations of institutions is that the pursuit of peacebuilding as nation-building, besides their technocratic design and implementation are devoid of building consciousness among citizens. The intended assumptions of these policies even if partly driven by contextual factors are opposite in outcomes. This overarching state ideology of both countries shapes public policy design and implementation for peacebuilding. In the case of Liberia, the policy consensus between national-level political and policy elites on the one hand, and policy technocrats and actors of the liberal international system has occasioned a public policy regime where national-level policy actors are become largely dependent on donor agencies to define and prescribe policy responses for addressing common challenges. This has lacked contextual historical form, and rarely addresses the uncertainties and risks that occasions the everyday of inhabitants in these jurisdictions.

Also, social assistance policies aimed at building peace in Liberia pay little attention to the complexity of issues constrain interplay of state-society relations in achieving common objectives of security, peace, and development. Primarily due to the fact that national-level policy actors have seeded the challenge of problem – identification and articulating to suite contextual aspirations to donor agencies. The plausible reasoning here is that alternative voices within the polity that reject such liberal technocratic manipulation of interventions diffused by the global North institutions of governance are treated as turning aside the normal course of events. Hence the issues they raise are considered outliers by policy actors. This reinforces the lack of consciousness building among citizens from which both leaders and followers can effectively build mutuality in the articulation of common challenges to influence actions towards achieving collective goals.

The building of such consciousness among the diversity of citizens and their experiences, challenges, expectations, and aspirations directly responds to the inherent discrepancy in diffused policy ethos by global North peacebuilding institutions unable to thrive on clumsiness of post-

conflict nation-building. A major finding arising from the Rwanda case is that unlike during the structural adjustment period, especially in the 1980s and 1990s where strong regimes guaranteed a measure of success in the implementation of Economic Recovery Policies – axiomatic policy assumptions have lost relevance in developing spaces, particularly those recovering from conflict to the extent that strong states and leaders do not guarantee the success and sustainability of such policy prescriptions. Thus, Liberia with a more open policy regime becomes less favourable achieving any semblance of success. In both cases citizens expectations, aspirations, and quest for building inclusive norms remains at odds with ongoing policy programme for nation-building. The absence of conscious institutional mechanisms for a shared exercise of public authority and power in effecting participation, interest aggregation and articulation of common challenges in a relations manner is fundamental to durable peacebuilding and inclusive development. I conclude that TSP-L presents a policy ideograph that relates to the nested nature of violent ridden states. It offers a robust mechanism for re-making society recovering from violent conflicts using transformative public policy tools to effect norms of relations instigate social, economic, and political progress.

National-building is not process of 're-civilisation' – rather it is multifaceted means of creating awareness among citizens of a given geographical space through social policies such as health and education about their history and capacitate them with the requisite knowledge and set of skills to contribute to their country. From the extant literature nation building in the Scandinavian and Africa in the immediate decade after independence, successful nation-building are those that embedded in the historical and traditional trajectory of a country. Thus, any form of nation-building that discounts the history and culture of a people is ephemeral in essence.

While the leadership in Liberia exhibit in part, a desire to see the improvement in the human condition of citizens, it does not help in transforming the norms of relations for effective social cohesion. Rather, this approach to social policy framing by the leadership is laden with the logic of modernisation and rescue-mission by donor-institutions and their policy incubation hubs in the global north. Such a 'expert' approach fancy post-conflict development as subjectivities to be nurtured by the neoliberal variant of market capitalism. Hence, fragile spaces recovering from violence are steep in their traditional values and norms of societal inter-relations, requiring emancipation. This trusteeship approach to solving the condition of post-conflict space by re-civilizing countries recovering from conflict and integrate them into the liberal world order is apostate to the nation-building needs of such spaces. By this, peace building policies are designed to make and convert these spaces and their inhabitants into subjects capable of responding

neoliberal market dynamics and provocations through social assistance programme as vehicle to achieving self-sustenance and maintain peace.

Taking into consideration the diverse analyses and findings provided in this thesis, I would like to emphasize **three** major conclusions. First, the design and deployment of social assistance policy interventions for post-conflict reconstruction in Liberia and Rwanda portray a pro-poor approach to nested issues of post-conflict nation-building. However, in the case of Liberia, this simplification of the development condition is informed by the unidimensional diagnosis of post-conflict reconstruction that frames the crisis of identity, marginalisation, (in)security and development as technocratic and managerial issues fixable by state-centric institutions. Due to this conception, the deployment of social policy intervention programme neglects cardinal relational issues shaped by historical occurrences. The disregard for such structural and relational factors in nation-building fails to address in-group and between group contestation in favour of homogenous policy prescriptions, even in instances where such interventions are depicted as 'community-driven'. In effect, relational basis of structural and participatory mechanisms required for building inclusive and horizontal fraternity for a sense of communal purpose among citizens of both polities across identities, age, class, colour, creed, gender etc – to address historical divisions, marginalisation, inequalities, and exploitation have been treated as extraneous variables. Hindering the quest for nation-building and durable development. Based on the findings of this study, the reductive nature of social assistance interventions for post-conflict peacebuilding formularised and implemented through the administrative channels of coordination as a panacea to embedded challenges of post-conflict nation-building.

Secondly, this study concludes that historical and contemporary factors that occasioned the violent conflict in both countries persist despite the numerous social assistance interventions in the quest of nation-building. Presently, reported lived experiences point to the impracticability of these policy tools in securing the peace and future of both countries. This stems from the inability of these policies to comprehend the nested nature of the issues confronting both countries and to address the ominous systemic and clumsy challenges of post-violence development – crises of inclusion, identity, and poverty in securing the commonwealth for the collective good; relative to transforming the norms of relations and societal reproduction in transforming the triggers of conflict.

Hence, the resulting policy interventions continue to perpetuate pre-violence issues and practices, privileging a few. Consequently, the quest to transform and secure the future of both countries requires and ideational foregrounding that critical privileges historical contextual understanding

of violent triggers in both countries to evolve deep-seated and cross-cutting institutional mechanisms to engage the embedded structural and relational factors of post-conflict nation-building. Particularly relevant is the need to evolve a political system with nested institutional mechanisms to the contemporary post-conflict nature of both countries and the ensuing process of nation building.

Finally, this study finds the present western-driven technocratic and didactic processes of policy intervention in Liberia has depoliticised the policy enterprise of social intervention programmes. In the case of Rwanda, the political essence of policy framing remains grounded-in the rhetoric of 'never again' and the evocation of traditional norms and approaches to foster capacity building, empowerment, and participation in the pursuit of transformative peace as a consequence of the country's social policy practises. Importantly, both countries are reliant on the technocratic services of multilateral and bilateral institutions in pursuing measures to enable effective peace and progressive development. The problem that arises in that such expertise are considered to know in certain terms solutions to the problems of post-conflict nation building. Therefore, the inability to translate these social (assistance) policy interventions into transformative nation-building ethos with objective outcomes is not surprising.

8.1 Suggestions for Future Research and Policy Direction

The first suggestion is the need for further studies that critically engages how the ideas and discourses of TSP can be deployed to frame post-conflict public policy interventions for durable development. Further critical studies in this area will enable intervention practices from the African perspective. This requires collaborative studies from different context and disciples such as African studies, development studies, leadership studies, sociology, political science, peace and conflict studies and international relations. Such interdisciplinary collaborations with different case studies, may furnish us with both ideational and empirical approaches to animate the ethos of Transformative Social Policy in war-affected countries for effective development and social cohesion in different jurisdictions. Also, there is the need for further studies that critically interrogates process-based approach to leadership in post-conflict societies and how it shapes peacebuilding processes. I view such a broader academic and policy engagement of TSP-L to a means to offering critical perspectives of the studies of peacebuilding given the growing complexity of actors engaged in the peacebuilding industry and the challenge the pose to especially countries in Sub-Sahara Africa

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Appendices

A. Individual Interview Guide – Rwanda

This interview is being conducted by Kafui Tsekpo, a Doctoral student with the South African Research Chair in Social Policy at UNISA. Funding for the study comes from UNISA. The purpose of the interview is to collect data to understand the role social policy and a country's leadership in shaping the peace process in Rwanda for inclusive development. The answers you provide in this interview will be used solely for the purposes of my doctoral thesis and may also be used subsequently for a research paper. Your personal details will be kept confidential. No identifying information will be provided to any third party. The information from this discussion will be reported in a summary fashion only and will not identify any individual person (unless you specifically agree to your name being mentioned).

I respectfully request your participation in this research project. I would like to digitally record our discussion, which will be transcribed with your permission. Your decision to participate in this study is voluntary, and you may withdraw your participation at any stage during the interview without prejudice.

Ethical Clearance reference number: **65103165_CREC_CHS_2021**

[Please shade your answer here: 1.YES 2.NO]

Date: ……………………….
Number of Participants….……..
Venue……………………………………………………………………………….
City/Town: ………………………

1. What is your historical recollection of the Rwandan war which ended in 1994?
2. How is this recollection shaping group cohesion in the country?
3. How would you describe your current lived experience, and why?
4. What does peace mean you or your community? Is there a word for peace in your local language?
5. From your response above, would you agree with the notion of Peace as*: efforts to prevent the escalation of disputes; avoid relapse into violence; address the root causes of conflict, and consolidate sustainable peace*? Why do you agree?
6. What are some of the activities, policies or programs in your community that helps with building communal harmony? Can you mention some of them?
7. What are some of the government policies or programs that are helping to build peace or cohesion in your community, and the country?
8. How would you describe the role of these programmes in ensuring the peace in your community, and the nation as a whole?

9. How is imidugudu helping your community build cohesion at the community level b) how is this translating in peace-building? c) and consolidate peace?
10. Can you mention any *imidugudu* policy that supports your answers to the above question?
11. Please explain any challenges you have experienced with this policy towards helping build peace.
12. Would you agree that *imidugudu* as a government policy is helping as:
    a) an instrument to raise the human well-being in your community.

b) transform social institutions.
c) social relations and the economy?
   Why your answer to each of the sub-segment of the main question?

13. . How do you describe leaders in your community? Is there a single word or phrase in your community/area/region that is used to describe leadership?
14. Does this description apply to your national leaders?

15. How does this translate into understanding leadership at your community level? How does this apply to the national level?
16. How do people emerge to become leaders in your community? Can you describe the process? How about leadership at the national level?
17. How are you able to participate in the process of deciding on who becomes a leader at the national level?
18. How is the leadership processes you have identified connect with your daily realities?

19. How would you describe the efforts by   leaders at the national level in ensuring peace in your community? How about in your community?
20. How do you see leaders at the national level helping your community to build cohesion? b) Is what you have describe also present at the national level?
21. How do you feel involved in the process of building cohesion in your community? What do you think accounts for this?

22. How does your leaders at the national level involve you in decision-making concerning your welfare; b) and that of your community?
23. Are there any means available to you to contribute to the making of these decisions? Can you mention them? At what national level do you see your involvement?
24. How does the welfare policies/decisions of the government that you have mentioned above connect with your daily realities?

25. What are some of the activities, policies, or programs that you can mention to support your answer?
26. Can you explain how the role of leaders as you have narrated in the beginning is helping build and consolidate peace?
27. From what you have been saying, what kind of future do you envisage your leaders are forging?

Thank you very much for taking your time to participate in this research.

(Kinyarwanda Version)

Ibazwa ry'umuntu ku giti cye (Abaturage bafite guhera ku myaka 18 kuzamuka)- Rwanda

Iri bazwa rirakorwa na Kafui Tsekpo Umunyeshuri w'impamyabushobozi y'ikirenga uri mu bushakashatsi ukorana na South African Research Chair mu ngamba z'imibereho myiza muri UNISA. Inkunga yubu bushakashatsi itangwa na UNISA. Impamvu yiri bazwa ni ugushaka amakuru ku gusobanukirwa neza akamaro ingamba z'imibereho myiza ndetse n'ubuyobozi bw'igihugu bufite mu kubaka amahoro mu Rwanda kubw'iterambere ridaheza. Igisubizo utanga muri iri bazwa kizakoreshwa gusa mu kwandika igitabo cy'impamyabushobozi y'ikirenga kandi gishobora nanone gukoreshwa mu mpapuro zo gukora ubushakashatsi. Imyirondoro yawe ku giti cyawe izagirwa ibanga. Nta makuru y'umuntu azahabwa undi muntu wa gatatu. Amakuru yo muri

iki kiganiro azatangwa mu buryo bw'incamake kandi nta muntu uzavugwamo ku giti cye. (keretse niwemera ko izina ryawe rivugwa).

Ncishijwe bugufi no gusaba uruhare rwanyu muri ubu bushakashatsi. Nifuza ko nakoresha ikorabuhanga kugirango mfate amajwi y'ikiganiro tugirana, hanyuma bikazashyirwa mu nyandiko nyuma yuko ubiduhereye uburenganzira. Uruhare rwawe muri ubu bushakashatsi buraturaka mu bushake bwawe, kandi ushobora kwivana muri iki kiganiro nta nkomyi aho washakira.

Ese waba wemera kugira uruhare muri ubu bushakashatsi: yego……. Oya……

Itariki………………………………………..

Umubare w'abagize uruhare……………………..

Aho bibereye……………………………….

Umujyi…………………………..

Ese ni mateka ki wibuka kuri Jenoside yakorewe abatutsi yo muri 1994?

Ese uko kwibuka ni gute kurimo kubaka gukorera hamwe mu matsinda mu gihugu?

Ni gute wasobanura ubuzima ubayeho uyu munsi? Kuberiki?

Ese amahoro asabanuye iki kuri wowe ndetse no kubo mubana?ese hari uko mwita peace mu rurimi rwanyu?

Ukurikijije igisubizo watanze hejuru, ese wakemeranye niyi mvugo ko amahoro ari: *gushyira imbaraga mu kwirinda amakimbirane; kwirinda kongera gusubira mu bugizi bwa nabi; gutanga igisubizo ku muzi w'ibitera amakimbirane, ndetse no gushimangira amahoro arambye?* kuki wemeranya nabyo?

Ni ibihe bikorwa, ingamba cyangwa gahunda aho utuye zibafasha mu kubaka ubumwe? Ese watubirwa bimwe muri byo?

Ni zihe ngamba cyangwa gahunda za leta zifasha mu kubaka amahoro cyangwa ubumwe aho mutuye, ndetse no mu gihugu?

Ese ni gute wasobanura uruhare rwizi gahunda mu kwimakaza amahoro mu gace utuyemo, ndetse no ku gihugu muri rusange?

Ese imidugugu ibafashe ite mu kubaka ubumwe ku rwego rwaho mutuye b) ese ibi bisobanurwa bite mu kubaka amahoro? c) ndetse no kwimakaza amahoro?

Ese hari zimwe mu ngamba za gahunda *y'imidugudu* zashyigikira ibisubizo by'ibibazo watanze ku kibazo kibanziriza iki?

Tubwire zimwe mu mbogamizi wahuye nazo mu gihe cyo gushyira mu bikorwa izi ngamba kugirango wubake amahoro?

Ese wakwemeza ko imidugudu nka gahunda ya Leta ifasha:

Nki gikoresho cyo kuzamura kubaho kwi ikiremwa muntu mu gace utuyemo

Guhindura imibereho

Imibanire y'abantu n'ubukungu?

Kuberi iki icyo gisubizo aricyo utanze kuri buri kamwe muri utu duce twiki kibazo?

Wasobanura ute abayobozi bo mu gace uherereyemo? Ese hari ijambo rimwe cyangwa interuro imwe mu gace utuyemo, mu ntara cyangwa akarere ikoreshwa mu gusobanura ubuyobozi?

Ese iyi mvugo yakora no ku bayobozi b'igihugu

Ese ibi bisobanuye iki mu gusobanukirwa imiyoborere mu gace k'iwanyu? ese ibi bikora bite ku rwego rw'igihugu?

Ese abantu batangira bate kuba abakobozi mu gace kanyu? ese wasobanura uko bigenda? ese ku rwego rw'igihugu ho bigenda bite?

Ni gute ushobora kugira uruhare mu guhitamo uzaba umuyobozi ku rwego rw'igihugu?

Ese ubu buryo bw'imiyoborere wasobanuye haruguru ni gute buhuzwa nibiba mu buzima bwa buri munsi?

Ni gute wasobanura imbaraga abayobozi ku rwego rw'igihugu bashyiramo mu kwimakaza amahoro mu gihugu? nonese mu gace utuyemo bimeze bite?

Ese ubona abayobozi ku rwego rw'igihugu bafashe bate abantu mu kubaka ubumwe?

Ese ibyo wasobanuye bigaragara no ku rwego rw'igihugu?

Ese wumva ufite ruhare ki mu kubaka ubumwe aho utuye? Ese utekereza ko byaba bisobanuye iki?

Ni gute abayobozi banyu ku rwego rw'igihugu babashyira mu gufata ibyemezo y'imibereho yanyu; b) ndetse niyo mu gace mutuyemo?

Ese haba hari uburyo bwabashyiriweho mu kugira uruhare mu gukora ibi byemezo? Wavuga ubwo buryo? Ni kuruhe rwego rw'igihugu ubonamo uruhare rwawe?

Ni gute ingamba z'imibereho ndetse n'imyanzuro ya leta wavuze haruguru ihuzwa n'ubuzima bwa buri munsi?

Ni ibihe bimwe mu bikorwa, ingamba ndetse na gahunda wavuze bishobora gushyigikira icyemezo cyawe?

Ushobora gusobanura uruhare rw'abayobozi nkuko wavuze mu ntangiriro uko bifasha mu kubaka no guhuza amahoro?

Ukurikije ibyo wavuze, ubona abayobozi babategurira ejo hazaza hameze hate?

Ibazwa ry'imbitse (ry'abashingamategeko, abahagarariye inzego za Leta etc)

Iri ribaza riramara iminota mirongo itanu.

Itariki y'ibaza ………………….

Kubaka amahoro n'iterambere ridaheza

Kubaka amahoro

Wasobanura ute umuhate uriho wo kubaka amahoro mu gihugu cyanyu?

Wasobanura ute uruhare rwawe muri gahunda yo kubaka amahoro mu gihugu cyawe?

Nizihe ndangaciro n'amahame yubakiyeho amahoro mu Rwanda?

Niki urimo ukora kuri uri ruhare wasobanuye? b) ni gute abo uyobora babigiramo uruhare?

Ese haba hari izihe mbogamizi mu kubaka amahoro n'iterambere mu gihugu cyanyu?

Mu gutekereza kwawe, n'ibiki bitera imbogamizi zo kubaka amahoro wavuze haruguru?

Ingamba z'imibereho myiza

Ushobora kuvuga zimwe muri gahunda za leta zihariye muri ministeri yawe ziharanira kuzamura imibereho myiza y'abantu mu gihugu cyawe?

Ni bintu ki byafashije mu gushimangira izo ngamba?

Nibande bagize uruhare ku kubaka izo ngamba? wabashyira mu zihe nzego?

Ese babifitemo uruhare kugera ku ruhe rugero?

Ni ruhare ki bagize mu gukora no gushyira mu bikorwa?

Ni gute ibigararagara mu gihugu byagize uruhare mu gukora izi ngamba?

Nizihe ndangagaciro n'amahame agenga ingamba murimo mu Rwanda?

Ni gute gahunda *y'imidugudu* ifasha mu kubaka amahoro? izi nyunganizi wazisobanura ute?

Ni ku kigero ki ingamba [z'imibereho myiza] zagizweho uruhare no gutekereza ku rwego rw'isi binyuze mu miryango mpuzamahanga nka Bnaki y'isi, UNICEF, n'umuryango w'abibumbye w' iterambere[UNDP]? urwo ruhare ruteye rute, ndetse bifite uwuhe mumaro kuri leta?

Ni mu buhe buryo utekereza ko *imidugudu* ifasha mu kubaka amahoro adaheza n'iterambere mu Rwanda?

Ese abaturage bakiriye bate izi ngamba?

Uretse imbogamizi zagaragaye, wavuga ute ko kubaka amahoro mu Rwanda bikemura umuzi w'ibitera amakimbirane?

[D] Imiyoborere

Nkumuyobozi w'ikigo, ni gute ukurikiza amategeko mu gukorera abandi?

Ni gute mwebwe cyangwa ikigo mugirana imikoranire nabo?

Wasobanura iyi mikoranire: nkaho ihuriweho n'impande zombi mu bigaragara?

Mu gutekereza kwawe, imiyoborere ni gute yabaye igisubizo ku buzima bwa buri munsi bw'abantu?

Ni gute ibi bisubizo birimo bifasha mu kubaka amahoro arambye ni iterambere ridaheza mu Rwanda?

Wifuza kuzibukwa gute igihe utazaba uri muri uyu mwanya w'ubuyobozi?

Ni murage ki wifuza gusiga?

Murakoze cyane gufata uyu mwanya wo kugira uruhare muri ubu bushakashatsi.

B. Individual Interview Guide – Liberia

This interview is being conducted by Kafui Tsekpo, a Doctoral student with the South African Research Chair in Social Policy at UNISA. Funding for the study comes from UNISA. The purpose of the interview is to collect data to understand the role social policy and a country's leadership in shaping the peace process in Rwanda for inclusive development. The answers you provide in this interview will be used solely for the purposes of my doctoral thesis and may also be used subsequently for a research paper. Your personal details will be kept confidential. No identifying information will be provided to any third party. The information from this discussion will be reported in a summary fashion only and will not identify any individual person (unless you specifically agree to your name being mentioned).

I respectfully request your participation in this research project. I would like to digitally record our discussion, which will be transcribed with your permission. Your decision to participate in this study is voluntary, and you may withdraw your participation at any stage during the interview without prejudice.

Ethical Clearance reference number: **65103165_CREC_CHS_2021**

[Please shade your answer here: 1.YES 2.NO]

Date: ………………………

Number of Participants…………

Venue……………………………………………………………………………………….

City/Town: ………………………

1.What is your historical recollection of the Liberian war which ended in 1997?

2. How is this recollection shaping group cohesion in the country?

3. How would you describe your current lived experience, and why?

4.What does peace mean you or your community? Is there a word for peace in your local language?

5.From your response above, would you agree with the notion of Peace as: efforts to prevent the escalation of disputes; avoid relapse into violence; address the root causes of conflict, and consolidate sustainable peace? Why do you agree?

6.What are some of the activities, policies or programs in your community that helps with building communal harmony? Can you mention some of them?

7.What are some of the government policies or programs that are helping to build peace or cohesion in your community, and the country?

8.How would you describe the role of these programmes in ensuring the peace in your community, and the nation as a whole?

9.How are the social protection policies of your government helping your community build cohesion at the community level b) how is this translating in peace-building? c) and consolidate peace?

10.Can you mention any social protection policy that supports your answers to the above question?

11.Please explain any challenges you have experienced with this policy towards helping build peace.

12.Would you agree that government's social protection policy is helping as:

a) an instrument to raise the human well-being in your community.

b) transform social institutions.

c) social relations and the economy?

 Why your answer to each of the sub-segment of the main question?

13. How do you describe leaders in your community? Is there a single word or phrase in your community/area/region that is used to describe leadership?

14.Does this description apply to your national leaders?

 15.How does this translate into understanding leadership at your community level? How does this apply to the national level?

16.How do people emerge to become leaders in your community? Can you describe the process? How about leadership at the national level?

17.How are you able to participate in the process of deciding on who becomes a leader at the national level?

18.How is the leadership processes you have identified connect with your daily realities?

19.How would you describe the efforts by leaders at the national level in ensuring peace in your community? How about in your community?

20.How do you see leaders at the national level helping your community to build cohesion? b) Is what you have describe also present at the national level?

21.How do you feel involved in the process of building cohesion in your community? What do you think accounts for this?

22.How does your leaders at the national level involve you in decision-making concerning your welfare; b) and that of your community?

23.Are there any means available to you to contribute to the making of these decisions? Can you mention them? At what national level do you see your involvement?

24.How does the welfare policies/decisions of the government that you have mentioned above connect with your daily realities?

25.What are some of the activities, policies, or programs that you can mention to support your answer?

26.Can you explain how the role of leaders as you have narrated in the beginning is helping build and consolidate peace?

27. From what you have been saying, what kind of future do you envisage your leaders are forging?

Thank you very much for taking your time to participate in this research.

C. In-depth interview guide - Liberia

This interview is being conducted by Kafui Tsekpo, a Doctoral student with the South African Research Chair in Social Policy at UNISA. Funding for the study comes from UNISA. The purpose of the interview is to collect data to understand the role social policy and a country's leadership in shaping the peace process in Rwanda for inclusive development. The answers you provide in this interview will be used solely for the purposes of my doctoral thesis and may also be used subsequently for a research paper. Your personal details will be kept confidential. No identifying information will be provided to any third party. The information from this discussion will be reported in a summary fashion only and will not identify any individual person (unless you specifically agree to your name being mentioned).

I respectfully request your participation in this research project. I would like to digitally record our discussion, which will be transcribed with your permission. Your decision to participate in this study is voluntary, and you may withdraw your participation at any stage during the interview without prejudice.

Ethical Clearance reference number: **65103165_CREC_CHS_2021**

[Please shade your answer here: 1.YES 2.NO]

Date of Interview: ………………………...

Peacebuilding and Inclusive Development

A) Peacebuilding

1.How would you describe ongoing peacebuilding efforts in your country?

2.How would you describe your role in the ongoing peace process in your country?

3.What are the key values and principles underpinning the peacebuilding process in Liberia?

4.How are you playing this role you have described? b) How do you engage those at the receiving end of what you do?

5.Are there any challenges to the peacebuilding and development in your country?

6.In your opinion what are some of the main causes of the challenges to peacebuilding you have described above?

(C) Social Policy

1.Can you mention some government specific programs under your ministry that are intended to enhance the wellbeing of the people in the country?

2.What factors shaped the adoption of such policies?

3.Who were the actors involved in the design of the policy? How would you classify these actors?

4.On what terms are these actors involved?

5.How was their participation in the design and implementation process?

6.How did local realities shape the design of these policies?

7.What are the core values and principles that influence the policies you are engaged with in Liberia?

8.How does the social protection policy of your ministry contributing to peacebuilding? How effective would you describe these contributions?

9.To what extent has social protection policy making / framework been influenced by global thinking through international organisations like the World Bank, UNICEF, and United Nations Development Programme? What is the nature of such influences, and how important are they to the Liberian government?

10.In what ways do you think Liberia's social protection policy is helping build inclusive peace and development in Rwanda?

11.How have citizens been reacting to such policies?

12.Despite the identified challenges, how effective would you say the ongoing peacebuilding in Liberia is addressing the root causes of conflict?

(D) Leadership

1.As head of institution, how do you build legitimacy with the people whom you serve?

2.How do you or the institution interact with them?

3.Would you describe this interaction: as one that is mutual in outlook?

4.In your opinion, how is leadership responding to the everyday realities of the people?

5.How is/are this/these responses helping in shaping effective peace building and inclusive development in Liberia?

6.How would you like to be remembered when you are no longer occupying this position? What would be your legacy?