

**MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT COALITIONS: A CASE OF THE CITY OF  
TSHWANE MUNICIPALITY**

**by**

**Given Maluleke**

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**Promotor: Professor SB Kahn**

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## DECLARATION

Name: Given Maluleke

Student number: 44935536

Degree: Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration

I declare the study on “**MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT COALITIONS: A CASE OF THE CITY OF TSHWANE MUNICIPALITY**” to be my own work. All resources used are acknowledged in the text and listed in the references.

\_\_\_\_\_

G Maluleke

**02 FEBRUARY 2024**

Date

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this work to my wife Wendy Maluleke and my daughters Tshembo, Nhlavutelo, and Ntiyiso Maluleke for their support and for allowing me to sacrifice our precious family time for the purpose of personal and academic development.

## **ABSTRACT**

Coalition governments have proven problematic in many municipalities around the country. This follows the era of coalitions that engulfed local government after the 2016 and 2021 local elections. In this context, the City of Tshwane Municipality (CTMM) was chosen as a case for coalitions research carried out in this study. Coalition at the municipal level results from collaborations between political parties to form a government following a hung Municipal Council.

The research aimed to investigate how the coalition in the CTMM can be improved, for effective service delivery to residents. The study findings indicated a dysfunctional Municipal Council and bankruptcy in the CTMM. Recommendations highlighted the need to intensify private debt collection and prioritize township service delivery to improve coalition in the CTMM. The study utilized a qualitative thematic analysis technique, comprising a study population of 24 councillors elected to the CTMM Municipal Council.

The advent of coalitions created a call for opposition parties to collaborate in providing an alternative government to the ruling party. The narrative expressed itself in the form of the “moon-shot pact”, the “multiparty charter for South Africa” and the “South African Rainbow Alliance”. Based on the study, a coalition model for the CTMM was developed to provide options based on the collaboration of political parties elected to the CTMM Municipal Council. The model is premised on the approach of a “tripartite coalition”, centred on a 50/30/20 formula for allocation of executive and administrative powers.

Keywords: coalition agreement; minority government; Municipal Council; tripartite coalition; section 79 oversight committees; service delivery.

## **NKOMISO**

Mimfumo ya nhlanganelo yi tikombisile ku va na xiphiqo eka timasipala totala etikweni. Leswi swi landzela nguva ya minhlanganelo leyi khumbheke swinene mfumo wa miganga endzhaku ka minhlawulo ya miganga ya 2016 na 2021. Eka xiyimo lexi, Masipala wa Dorobakulu ra Tshwane (CTMM) wu hlawuriwile tanihi dyondzo ya ndzavisiso wa minhlanganelo lowu endliwaka eka dyondzo leyi. Minhlanganelo eka xiyenge xa timasipala yi tumbuluka ku suka eka ntirhisano wa mavandla ya swa tipolitiki ku va ya vumba mfumo hi ku landzela Huvo ya Masipala leyi pfumalaka vunyingi byo ringanela bya vulawuri.

Ndzavisiso a wu kongomisa eka ku lavisisa ndlela leyi nhlanganelo eka CTMM wu nga ta antswisiwa xiswona, leswaku ku ta va na ku dilivhariwa ka vukorhokeri hi ndlela leyi hetisekeke eka vaaki. Leswi kumiweke swa dyondzo swi kombisile Huvo ya Masipala leyi a yi nga tirhi na ku pfumala mali eka CTMM. Swibumabumelo swi kombisile xilaveko xo ndlandlamuxa nhlengeleto wa xikweleti xa phurayivhete na ku rhangisa ku dilivhariwa ka vukorhokeri eka madorobatsongo ku antswisa nhlanganelo eka CTMM. Dyondzo yi tirhisile thekiniki ya nxopanxopo wa xiyimo, leyi katsaka tlawa wa dyondzo ya 24 wa vakhanselara lava hlawuriweke eka Huvo ya Masipala ya CTMM.

Ku fika ka mfumo wa minhlanganelo swi endlile leswaku mavandla yo kaneta ya tirhisana ku tisa mfumo wun'wana eka vandla leri fumaka. Mhaka yi tikombisile hi yoxe hi xivumbeko xa "moon-shot pact", na "multiparty charter for South Africa". Ku ya hi dyondzo/ndzavisiso, modlele wa nhlanganelo wa CTMM wu tumbuluxiwile ku nyika tindlela leti kongomisiweke eka ntirhisano wa mavandla ya swa tipolitiki lama hlawuriweke eka Huvo ya Masipala ya CTMM. Modlele wu kongomisiwile eka endlelo ra "nhlanganelo wa mavandla manharhu", lowu kongomisiweke eka fomula ya 50/30/20 ya mphakelo wa vulawuri na matimba ya vulawuri.

Maritoyankoka: mintwanano ya nhlanganelo; mfumo wa vanhu vatsongo; Huvo ya Masipala; nhlanganelo wa mavandla manharhu, tikomiti ta vuangameri ta xiyenge xa 79; mphakelo wa vukorhokeri.

## MANWELEDZO

Mivhuso ya ṭhanganelano yo sumbedza u vha thaidzo kha vhunzhi ha mimasipala u mona na shango. Hezwi zwi tevhela tshifhinga tsha ṭhanganelano tshine tsha katela muvhuso wapo nga murahu ha khetho dza muvhuso wapo dza 2016 na 2021. Kha nyimele hei, Masipala wa Dorobo khulwane ya Tshwane (CTMM) wo nangwa sa ngudo ya ṭhoḍisiso ya ṭhanganelano yo itwaho kha ngudo heyi. Ṭhanganelano kha vhuimo ha masipala yo bveledza tshumisano vhukati ha mahoro a polotiki u vhumba muvhuso hu tshi tevhela u sa swikelela ha tshivhalo nga Khorotshitumbe ya Masipala.

Ṭhoḍisiso yo livhiswa kha u ṭoḍisisa uri ṭhanganelano kha CTMM i nga khwiniswa hani, kha n̄ḍisedzo ya tshumelo yo teaho ya vhadzulapo. Mawanwa a ngudo o sumbedza u sa shuma ha Khorotshitumbe ya Masipala na u wa kha CTMM. Themendelo yo ombedzela ṭhō̄dea dza u khwạṭhisedza u kuvhanganya zwikolodo zwa phuraivethe na u dzhiela n̄ṭha n̄ḍisedzo ya tshumelo lokhesheni kha u khwinisa ṭhanganelano kha CTMM. Ngudo yo shumisa thekiniki ya musaukanyo wa thero wa khwạḷithathivi, yo bveledzwaho nga vhatu vho dzhenelaho ngudo vha vhakhantsejara vha 24 vho nangwaho kha Khorotshitumbe ya Masipala wa CTMM.

U thōnwa ha ṭhanganelano ho bveledza ṭhō̄dea ya mahoro mahanedzi uri a shumisane kha u n̄etshedza muvhuso wo fhambanaho kha lihoro line la khou vhusa. Nganetshelo yo d̄ibvisela khagala yone ine nga tshivhumbeo tsha “nyambedzano dza mahoro manzhi”, “thendelonzwiwa ya mahoro manzhi Afrika Tshipembe” na “Lushaka Iwa Musengavhadzimu wa Afurika Tshipembe”. Zwo d̄isendeka nga ngudo, tshiedziswa tsha ṭhanganelano kha CTMM tsho bveledzwa u n̄etshedza khetho zwo d̄isendeka nga tshumisano ya mahoro a polotiki o nangwaho kha Khorotshitumbe ya CTMM. Tshiedziswa tsho d̄isendeka nga kuitele kwa “ṭhanganelano ya mahoro mararu”, nga fomula ya 50/30/20 u avhela khorotshitumbe na maanda a ndaulo.

Maipfi a ndeme: thendelano ya ṭhanganelano; muvhuso wa mahoro matuku; Khorotshitumbe ya Masipala; ṭhanganelano ya mahoro mararu; komiti dza u lavhelesa dza khethekanya 79; n̄ḍisedzo ya tshumelo.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION.....	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	ii
DEDICATION.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACRONYMS.....	xii
LIST OF TABLES.....	xiv
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xv
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.2 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CTMM.....	2
1.3 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY.....	3
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT.....	5
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES.....	6
1.5.1 Secondary Research Objectives.....	6
1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	6
1.6.1 Secondary Research Questions.....	6
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	7
1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY.....	7
1.9 LITERATURE REVIEW.....	9
1.9.1 Political conditions.....	9
1.9.2 Coalition effectiveness.....	10
1.9.3 Coalition improvement.....	10
1.10 STUDY LIMITATIONS.....	11
1.11 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS.....	11
1.12 STUDY STRUCTURE.....	12
1.13 CONCLUSION.....	13
CHAPTER 2: THE SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM.....	14
2.1 INTRODUCTION.....	14
2.2 COLONIAL ERA (1652–1910).....	14
2.3 UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA (1910–1948).....	18
2.4 APARTHEID ERA (1948–1994).....	20
2.5 THE DAWN OF DEMOCRACY.....	26
2.6 LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRANSITIONAL PHASES (1993–1999).....	27
2.7 LOCAL ELECTIONS OF 1995.....	30
2.8 LOCAL ELECTIONS OF 2000.....	31
2.9 LOCAL ELECTIONS OF 2006.....	32



2.10 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS 2011 .....	33
2.11 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS 2016 .....	34
2.12 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS 2021 .....	35
2.13 CONCLUSION .....	35
CHAPTER 3: COALITION GOVERNANCE .....	37
3.1 INTRODUCTION.....	37
3.2 GOVERNANCE.....	37
3.3 COALITIONS THEORIES .....	40
3.3.1 Office-driven theory.....	40
3.3.2 Policy-orientated theory .....	41
3.4 TYPOLOGIES OF COALITIONS.....	43
3.4.1 Electoral alliances .....	43
3.4.2 Grand Coalitions .....	44
3.4.3 Legislative coalition.....	45
3.4.4 Coalition government .....	46
3.4.5 Minimal Wining coalitions.....	46
3.4.6 Surplus majority coalitions .....	47
3.4.7 Minority government .....	47
3.5 RATIONALE FOR COALITIONS .....	48
3.6 FACTORS AFFECTING ESTABLISHMENT OF COALITIONS .....	49
3.6.1 Political regime .....	49
3.6.2 Legal framework governing alliances and coalitions.....	50
3.6.3 Electoral system factors.....	51
3.6.4 Ideological factor.....	52
3.7 PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE COALITION.....	53
3.7.1 Communication.....	53
3.7.2 Consultation.....	54
3.7.3 Consensus.....	55
3.7.4 Compromising.....	56
3.8 MANAGEMENT OF POLITICAL COALITIONS .....	57
3.9 COALITION GOVERNANCE.....	58
3.9.1 Benefits of coalition governance .....	59
3.9.2 Challenges of coalition governance .....	61
3.10 GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES OF COALITION GOVERNANCE .....	64
3.10.1 Western Europe perspective.....	65
3.10.2 African perspective .....	67

3.11 SOUTH AFRICA'S COALITION GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY (GNU)	70
3.12 MUNICIPAL COALITIONS IN GAUTENG PROVINCE	72
3.13 POLITICAL LEADERSHIP	73
3.14 CONCLUSION	76
CHAPTER 4: COALITION ARRANGEMENTS IN CITY OF TSHWANE MUNICIPALITY	77
4.1 INTRODUCTION	77
4.2 CTMM-ANC ADMINISTRATION	77
4.3 DA-EFF 2016 LEGISLATIVE ARRANGEMENT	79
4.4 CTMM MINORITY GOVERNMENT	88
4.5 CTMM 2021 COALITION GOVERNMENT	89
4.6 CTMM MUNICIPAL COUNCIL UNDER COALITION ARRANGEMENTS	92
4.7 OFFICE OF EXECUTIVE MAYOR UNDER COALITION ARRANGEMENTS	96
4.8 OFFICE OF THE SPEAKER UNDER COALITION	103
4.9 CHIEF WHIP OFFICE UNDER COALITION ARRANGEMENTS	109
4.10 SECTION 79 COMMITTEES UNDER CTMM COALITION ARRANGEMENTS	111
4.11 CONCLUSION	114
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY	116
5.1 INTRODUCTION	116
5.2 RESEARCH DESIGN	116
5.3 METHODOLOGY	116
5.3.1 Quantitative approach	117
5.3.2 Qualitative approach	117
5.3.3 Mixed-methods approach	118
5.4 DATA COLLECTION	118
5.4.1 Fieldwork	119
5.4.2 Deskwork	119
5.4.3 Focus groups	120
5.4.4 Interviews	120
5.5 SAMPLING	121
5.5.1 Probability sampling	121
5.5.2 Non-probability sampling	123
5.6 DATA ANALYSIS	124
5.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY	125
5.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS	126
5.9 CONCLUSION	127

CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF RESULTS.....	129
6.1 INTRODUCTION.....	129
6.2 BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS.....	129
6.3 DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS.....	131
6.4 DATA ANALYSIS .....	133
6.4.1 Theme 1: Political conditions .....	134
6.4.1.1 <i>Political bullying (arrogance, unequal partnership)</i> .....	135
6.4.1.2 <i>Bankruptcy (low revenue collection, Tshwane YaTima Campaign)</i> .....	136
6.4.1.3 <i>Poor service delivery (over-serviced suburbs, under-serviced townships)</i> .....	138
6.4.2 Theme 2: Coalition effectiveness.....	141
6.4.2.1 <i>Coalition agreement (coalition committee, consultation)</i> .....	141
6.4.2.2 <i>Chaotic Municipal Council (disruptions, walkouts)</i> .....	144
6.4.2.3 <i>Executive mayor (arrogance, ineffectiveness)</i> .....	147
6.4.2.4 <i>Speaker of council (weakened, compromised)</i> .....	149
6.4.2.5 <i>Chief Whip of council (consultative, experienced)</i> .....	152
6.4.2.6 <i>Oversight committees (political protection, unaccountable)</i> .....	155
6.4.3 Theme 3: Coalition improvement.....	157
6.4.3.1 <i>Legislation (Constitution, Structures Act)</i> .....	157
6.5 CONCLUSION .....	159
CHAPTER 7: FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE, AND CONCLUSION .....	160
7.1 INTRODUCTION.....	160
7.2 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS.....	160
7.3 FINDINGS .....	161
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS .....	170
7.5 CONTRIBUTION TO THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE .....	173
7.5.1 Leadership.....	175
7.5.2 Organizational culture.....	177
7.5.3 Legislative framework.....	178
7.5.4 Coalition management process.....	179
7.5.4.1 Coalition agreement.....	179
7.5.4.2 Government program.....	180
7.5.4.3 Municipal structure configuration.....	182
7.5.4.4 Municipal executive configuration .....	183
7.5.4.5 Bureaucratic clusterisation .....	1833
7.5.4.6 Service delivery model.....	183
7.5.4.7. Monitoring and evaluation.....	184

7.5.4.8 Civic oversight .....	185
7.5.4.9 Leadership training .....	186
7.6 CONCLUSION .....	186
APPENDIX 1: GENERAL RULES .....	226
APPENDIX 2: BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION.....	228
APPENDIX 3: PERMISSION LETTER .....	230
APPENDIX 4: CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY .....	232
APPENDIX 5: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET .....	233
APPENDIX 5: LANGUAGE EDITING CERTIFICATE .....	235

## ACRONYMS

ACDP	- African Christian Democratic Party
AG	- Auditor General
AIC	- African Independent Congress
ANC	- African National Congress
ATM	- African Transformation Movement
CCT	- City of Cape Town
CODESA	- Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COG	- Coalition Oversight Group
COGTA	- Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs
COJ	- City of Johannesburg
COO	- Chief Operations Officer
COPE	- Congress of the People
CMC	- Coalition management committee
CTMM	- City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality
DA	- Democratic Alliance
DOP	- Defenders of People
EFF	- Economic Freedom Fighters
EM	- Executive Mayor
FF PLUS	- Freedom Front Plus
EM	- Ekurhuleni Municipality
GEC	- Gauteng Executive Committee
GNU	- Government of National Unity
GPG	- Gauteng Provincial Government
ID	- Independent Democrats
IEC	- Independent Electoral Commission
IFP	- Inkatha Freedom Party

IRASA	- Independent Ratepayers Association of South Africa
LGA	- Local Government Act
LGNF	- Local Government Negotiation Forum
LGTA	- Local Government Transaction Act
MDB	- Municipal Demarcation Board
MDC	- Movement for Democratic Change
MDM	- Metsweding District Municipality
MEC	- Member of Executive Committee
NCCC	- National Coronavirus Command Council
NCOP	- National Council of Provinces
NMBM	- Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality
NP	- National Party
NT	- National Treasury
PA	- Patriotic Alliance
PAC	- Pan Africanist Congress
RC	- Republic Conference of Tshwane
SACP	- South African Communist Party
SADC	- Southern African Development Community
SALGA	- South African Local Government Association
SANCO	- South African National Civic Organization
SCA	- Supreme Court of Appeal
SDBIP	- Service Delivery Budget Implementation Plan
UN	- United Nations
UK	- United Kingdom
VOC	- Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie
ZANU-PF	- Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: General election results of the national assembly in 1994.....	71
Table 3.2: Gauteng Coalition Municipalities.....	72
Table 4.1: CTMM 2021 Coalition.....	90
Table 4.2: Collapsed CTMM Council Meetings.....	94
Table 4.3: CTMM Oversight Committees.....	113
Table 6.1: Themes and sub-themes.....	133

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1: Western Europe coalitions from 1945 - 1999 .....	65
Figure 6.1: Gender profile .....	129
Figure 6.2: Age profile .....	130
Figure 6.3: Educations level .....	131
Figure 7.1: Coalition Governance Model .....	174



## **CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 INTRODUCTION**

Municipal coalitions in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM) following 2016 and 2021 elections have been characterized as survival of the fittest, attributable to physical assaults, confrontations and the hysteria of no confidence motions frequently seen in the municipal chamber. The CTMM after 2021 local elections had a hung council, which resulted in the formation of a coalition. However, in less than 24 months after the coalition, the CTMM already had three executive mayors: Randal Williams, Murunwa Makwarela, and Cilliers Brink. Democratic Alliance (DA) candidate Cilliers Brink was elected as the new executive mayor of Tshwane, as the city has been without a mayor since March 2023 following the resignation of Murunwa Makwarela (Goba, 2023). This highlighted serious challenges in the CTMM, undermining governance and effective service delivery to the community. Why is the CTMM coalition unstable and failing to deliver services? The crisis led to this study to investigate the CTMM coalition, which is generally ineffective and failing to serve the residents adequately. Various factors related to the state of coalition in the CTMM were discussed. The study aimed at investigating the coalition to develop recommendations and a coalition model necessary to ensure good governance in the CTMM. The study discovered challenges that include ineffective governance and lack of service delivery by the CTMM coalition.

A review on the development of local government in South Africa, from the colonial past to coalitions era is discussed in this section of the study. The chapter outlined the background to the formation of the CTMM, motivation and research problem for the study. Research objectives and methodology utilized are discussed. The significance of the study and its ethical considerations formed an important part of the deliberations in this chapter. The limitations to the study, useful for the researcher to identify drawbacks in the research are discussed. In summation, the chapter provided a structure for the study.

## 1.2 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CTMM

The CTMM was established on December 5, 2000, following an amalgamation of approximately 13 local councils that served the Greater Pretoria area and all its outlying areas (Adentunji, 2021:53). The consolidation of these municipalities came with the abolition of apartheid local authorities and the establishment of democratically elected Municipal Councils. The first democratic local elections in 1995 symbolized a paradigm shift from racially polarized local government to a system of representation that reflected the demographics of the South African population. The different local authority entities that were amalgamated under the CTMM included the Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Council, City Council of Pretoria, Town Council of Centurion, Northern Pretoria Metropolitan Substructure, Hammanskraal Local Area Committee, Eastern Gauteng Services Council, Pinaarsrivier Transitional Representative Council, Crocodile River Transitional Council, Western Gauteng Services Council, Winterveld Transitional Representative Council, Temba Transitional Representative Council, Mabopane Transitional Representative Council, and the Ga-Rankuwa Transitional Representative Council and the Eastern District Council ([www.tshwane.gov.za](http://www.tshwane.gov.za)). The amalgamation of these local authorities implies the CTMM covers a massive area of jurisdiction, posing a challenge to its capacity to deliver services in an equitable manner in the municipality.

The Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB) classified the CTMM as a Category A-Grade 6 urban municipality in terms of Section 4 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, No. 117 of 1988 (Senoamadi, 2014:83). The CTMM is the administrative capital of South Africa, with the highest number of embassies, government institutions, and universities in the whole of South Africa. Tshwane's boundary was amended on May 28, 2008, through a proclamation in the Government Gazette that incorporated the former Metsweding District Municipality, including the erstwhile municipalities of Dinokeng tsa Taemane and Kungwini, into the CTMM ([www.tshwane.gov.za](http://www.tshwane.gov.za)) The incorporation, which took place in May 2011 after the local elections, enlarged the geographical size of Tshwane to 6 345 km<sup>2</sup> ([www.tshwane.gov.za](http://www.tshwane.gov.za)). Currently, the CTMM stretches almost 121 km from east to west and 108 km from north to south, making it the third-largest city in the world after New York and Tokyo/Yokohama,

consisting of more than 30% of Gauteng and stretching to approximately 19,055 km<sup>2</sup> in extent ([www.tshwane.gov.za](http://www.tshwane.gov.za)). The CTMM Municipal Council consists of 214 councillors, made up of 107 ward councillors and 107 proportional representative councillors ([www.tshwane.gov.za](http://www.tshwane.gov.za)) These councillors are elected every five years following the end of every term of administration for local government. The CTMM political leadership is headed by the executive mayor, assisted by the mayoral committee, while the administration is led by a city manager (Adetunji, 2021:53).

### **1.3 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY**

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Constitution) is the supreme law that governs all the political, economic, and social aspects of the South African society. Chapter 7 of the Constitution deals with the local government in South African government system. Section 157 of the Constitution outlines requirements for the composition of Municipal Councils according to ward and proportional representation following local elections. However, the Constitution does not make provision for governance through municipal coalitions. In the same way, the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 and the Electoral Act 73 of 1998 do not make provision for municipal coalitions. This, therefore, suggests that there is no specific legislative requirement on hung Municipal Councils as currently seen in several municipalities around the country.

Coalitions predominantly exist in most countries found in different parts of Europe. There is a consensus among public scholars that coalitions have their roots in Western Europe (Masina, 2021:10). This is attributable to a high number of countries in Europe operating under coalitions, compared to other parts of the world. Approximately 20 countries in Europe, including the Netherlands and France, operate most of the time in coalitions (Todd, 2017). Countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany are prime examples of coalition governance done correctly, but they have negotiating guidelines set in their constitutions (Boucek, 2010:19). Germany demonstrates political stability and economic prosperity is entirely attainable under a multi-party government when it is anchored by a big, stable party (Steenhuisen, 2023). The case of Germany among many other European countries demonstrates a model of coalition that

can yield massive social benefits of stable and effective coalition. The multiplicity of coalitions in Europe put most of the western countries in a prime position on coalition studies ahead of many countries around the world.

In the 2016 and 2021 elections, South Africa yielded hung Municipal Councils in several municipalities. These displayed tremendous inefficiencies in the delivery of public services to residents. After the 2021 local elections, South Africa had 81 hung municipalities, with many like Johannesburg beset with infighting, frequent leadership change and lack of service delivery (Child, 2023). South Africa's current near-decade-long experience with coalitions and minority governments has been marred by parasitic predation where parties prioritise their own interests over public welfare (Fakir, 2023). South Africa's experience of coalition governments has contributed to popular skepticism (Cheeseman, 2019). The skepticism is attributable to the pandemonium seen in several Municipal Councils following 2021 local elections. South Africa's local government is in disrepair, with shaky political coalitions ensuring ineffective service for the citizens (Fraser, 2023). The state of coalitions in South Africa suggests a high degree of ineffectiveness which requires urgent attention.

A significant number of studies pertaining to coalitions were conducted in the South African local government space. However, this study focused on the state of coalition in the CTMM and how it can be improved for effective service delivery. The study provided tailor-made solutions to improve the coalition in the CTMM while concurrently providing a valuable model valuable for Municipal Councils under coalitions in South Africa. A combination of six political parties led by the DA which included the ActionSA, Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus), Congress of the People (COPE), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), formed a coalition where the combined support meant the DA-led coalition had a majority backing of 109 seats in the council, enough to meet the 50% plus one requirement (Mahlati, 2021).

However, the CTMM coalition showed signs of instability which culminated with the resignation of DA executive mayor Randal Williams. Mayor Randal Williams was succeeded by Dr Murunwa Makwarela, who was elected by the ANC-EFF alliance. Cope councillor Murunwa Makwarela has been elected mayor of Tshwane, Makwarela who serves as council speaker, received 112 votes,

beating DA councillor Cilliers Brink, who was supported by the DA and coalition partners, Brink received 101 votes (Mahlati, 2023). However, Murunwa Makwarela resigned after a short stint following the misrepresentation of legal documents to the city manager which were required to validate his election. Following Makwarela's resignation, DA councillor Cilliers Brink was elected executive mayor. The DA's Cilliers Brink rose to victory on the third attempt at mayoral elections with the support of a multiparty coalition that includes the DA, ActionSA, the ACDP, and the IFP (Mbolekwa, 2023). Nevertheless, after taking charge of the mayoral office, the CTMM still experienced immense governance and service delivery challenges. Subsequently, the researcher conducted the study to analyse the coalition in the CTMM and its impact on service delivery.

#### **1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT**

The CTMM, after the 2021 local elections, yielded in a hung Municipal Council, because there was no single party that won a majority in the elections. This led to the formation of a coalition by the DA and its partners. The new government started its term as a coalition following a deal sealed by the DA as the leading party, led by executive mayor Randal Williams. We will need to hit the ground running as there is a lot of work that needs to be done, asserted Randal Williams (Mahlakoana, 2021). However, after a few months, when the DA-led coalition took charge of government, challenges between the coalition and opposition arose, which created instability in the municipality. Infighting inside the Municipal Council took place resulting in multiparty councillors opening charges against councillors from the opposition. Audit outcomes from the Auditor General (AG) painted a bleak picture of the municipality suggesting wasteful and irregular expenditure in the municipality. Subsequently, service delivery was affected, and good governance collapsed, creating a great deal of harm and chaos in the Municipal Council.

The levels of instability after 2021 local elections in the resulted in the mayoral office being occupied by Randal Williams, Murunwa Makwarela, and Cilliers Brink in a space of less than twenty-four months. This created a sense of uncertainty about the future of the coalition in the CTMM, as the current term has a long way to go until the 2026 local elections. *The threat of an unstable coalition in the city requires effective and lasting solution.* The inability of political

parties to function effectively has a negative impact on the administration and provision of services to the community. This invariably affects the quality of life in the municipality at the community level. In the long-term, it creates irreversible levels of under-development and poor maintenance of infrastructure in the community. This research endeavours to explore measures the CTMM coalition can use to improve service delivery to residents.

## **1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES**

Outlining research objectives assist in determining the depth and scope of the study. The main objective of this study is to research, develop and present a coalition model to improve service delivery to the residents of the CTMM.

### **1.5.1 Secondary Research Objectives**

This research intends to address the following specific research objectives:

- To examine whether political conditions have an impact on the CTMM coalition.
- To explore factors influencing the effectiveness of the CTMM coalition.
- To investigate measures to improve the CTMM coalition.
- To present a coalition model to improve service delivery to CTMM residents.

## **1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The importance of research questions lies in helping the researcher with the design of the study and subsequently, the data collection process. The main question is stated as: "What are factors affecting the CTMM coalition from rendering service effectively to residents?"

### **1.6.1 Secondary Research Questions**

- What are the political conditions affecting the coalition?
- What are the factors influencing the CTMM coalition?
- What measures can be adopted to improve CTMM coalition?
- What model can be used for effective coalition in the CTMM?

## **1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

It is important to ensure that research processes follow scientific methods of collecting data to investigate research problems. Furthermore, researchers should consider how the data collected will be analysed. The processes entailing the collection and analysis of data are encapsulated in a study design and methodology. Research methodology is the framework that guides the execution of a research study (Silverman, 2016:380). The methodology is key to maintaining the scientific ground on which the study is premised. Research design is a plan that the researcher must use to observe and analyse, as well as the reason why and how this is done (Pillay, 2023:43). In context, the design provides the roadmap the study will follow from inception to conclusion.

The study utilized a mixed-methods approach to adequately investigate the problem under consideration. Mixed-methods research gathers, analyses, combines, and draws inferences from both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or a program of inquiry (Pillay, 2023:43). This provides the study with the flexibility required to investigate research problems by complementing the research techniques found in these two approaches. Both qualitative and quantitative methods have their own advantages and disadvantages; however, a combination of both research techniques provided the study with a tremendous opportunity to ensure the research is carried out in the most effective and productive manner.

## **1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

Coalitions are inevitably part of South Africa's political future. Therefore, the present instability will have to make way for the pursuit of shared objectives (Cassimjee, 2023). However, coalitions' instability displayed in various Municipal Councils has cast doubt on the appropriateness of coalitions to deliver public services and improve the well-being of communities. The CTMM, without exception, experienced serious governance, and service delivery challenges in its coalition. The Tshwane coalition is at loggerheads, with its two biggest parties disagreeing on how to respond to the worker impasse that has plunged the capital city into unrest and debilitated service delivery (Mbolekwa, 2023). This research is significant because it addresses governance challenges under the CTMM coalition for improved service delivery to residents.

Several studies have been conducted on the CTMM coalition, however, no attention is paid to finding ways to meaningfully improve governance in the CTMM coalition. This study adopted a unique approach in recommending measures and a model to improve the coalition and service delivery to residents. Maseremule (2016) delved into the pre-poll mayhem that characterised Tshwane and the subsequent fate of the ANC as the majority party in the CTMM Council. The study explored intra-party conflicts in the Tshwane ANC region attributed to the loss of majority rule in Council, which revealed self-defeating tendencies by the ANC rather than meaningful pressure from opposition parties. However, Maserelule (2016) did not address issues pertaining to coalition management in the CTMM following the demise of the ANC, which were necessary to sustain governance and provide stability in the CTMM.

Breakfast (2020) dealt with the nexus between conflict management and coalition politics in Gauteng municipalities, which by extension included the CTMM coalition. The study outlined a model for the management of conflicts in a coalition but nevertheless fell short of identifying practical ways of managing a coalition for effective governance and delivery of services to residents. Alternatively, this research proposed a coalition model that political parties in the CTMM can use for effective governance. Mawere, Matoane and Khalo (2022) investigated on coalition governance and service delivery in metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng.

The study emphasised gravitation towards common ideology, well-defined coalition agreements, declaration of coalition agreements to the public, and promulgation of legislation to address coalitions. However, the study presented a generic and limited approach to coalition management, essentially achievable in the current frameworks available to coalition parties. This study presents tailor-made solutions to the coalition in the CTMM, which considered the unique environment in which the CTMM coalition operates, categorically different from other municipalities in Gauteng under the different coalition arrangements. Pietersen (2020) assessed the performance of coalition governments in Tshwane, making significant findings that Tshwane did not perform well based on poor management of the Council with party political interests overshadowing service delivery objectives. The study, however, made no reference to



managing challenges in the coalition to improve service delivery in the municipality.

The significance of this study lies in a focused approach to analyse the CTMM coalition and developing measures to improve governance and service delivery in a holistic manner. The research provides political parties in the CTMM with a model for sharing power among coalition partners. Furthermore, the research has the potential to contribute to the body of knowledge through a coalition government model, which can be used in any coalition preferring a three-party approach to constitute a coalition government.

## **1.9 LITERATURE REVIEW**

The literature review dealt extensively with the core aspects of the study and yielded three main themes which are political conditions, coalition effectiveness and coalition improvement.

### **1.9.1 Political conditions**

Political system, political parties in power, political parties in opposition, political maturity of the parties, number of political parties, political awareness of people, political stability, and the like have a great impact on the business environment in a country (Kigera, 2016:13). These factors invariably influence the quality of politics and governments that come out of a political system. South Africa is in a transition from decades of one-party dominance, which include the National Party (NP) between 1948 and 1994 and the ANC since 1994, to a situation where multiple parties are involved, which is therefore by and large, strange, and unfamiliar phenomenon of coalitions (Eloff, 2022). This results in volatile coalitions that collapse easily and fail to deliver services to communities. While it is seen as positive by many, it seems that the negatives far outweigh coalition governments, with instability being the order of the day in coalitions recently in Mandela Bay and in Johannesburg, where councils have been prevented from carrying out their duties towards the public (Nyide, 2022). The prevailing political conditions in several Municipal Councils, including the CTMM, suggest a degree of volatility that requires maturity across political lines.

### **1.9.2 Coalition effectiveness**

The formation of coalition does not guarantee absolute success, as there are many factors that can disturb its effectiveness. Malawi's political system inherently offers neither incentives for coalition formation nor mutual interdependence between the executive and the legislature (Lembani, 2014:115). This serves as an example, pointing out the systematic challenges existing in coalitions that alter its effectiveness. Chaos erupted in the Tshwane Council chamber as councillors disputed the election of a deputy mayor, accusing her of breaking the law (Mbolekwa, 2024). This, among other challenges, points to persisting problems in the coalition, which continue to affect service delivery and good governance in a municipality. Sakeliga sent letters of encouragement to the Tshwane Mayor, praising him for opposing gangsterism and intimidation (Mketane, 2023). Furthermore, this reflects a challenge in the affairs of CTMM, signifying a precarious state of politics impacting its effectiveness.

### **1.9.3 Coalition improvement**

Coalitions in their natural existence are complicated. As a result, it is important for coalition partners to seek to improve their relationship with each other for the benefit of residents. The DA-led Tshwane multiparty coalition has vowed to keep the government strong despite the collapse of a similar government in Johannesburg (Mahlokwane, 2022). This threat emanated from observations made in some Municipal Councils in Gauteng, which went through the turmoil of unceremonious collapse on multiple occasions. Various proposals were outlined to bring stability to Municipal Councils under coalitions. Another proposal is to limit motions of no confidence that lead to the removal of a mayor, deputy mayor, or other key council position, or at the provincial level, the removal of the Premier and the executive, or nationally, the President, Deputy President, and Cabinet (Bregman, 2023). These measures are proposed to address the challenges of instability that occur in Municipal Councils. The failure of dominant political parties to find each other in pragmatic local coalitions hands enormous and unwarranted power to the smallest parties (Visser, 2023). This calls for a profound degree of reflection among political parties to improve the

management of coalitions in a manner that reflects the public will and aspirations of the electorate.

### **1.10 STUDY LIMITATIONS**

Several Municipal Councils across the country were hung after the 2021 elections. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) finalized the outcome of the 2021 local government elections and the number of hung councils has more than doubled this election (Ntsabo, 2021). In the 2016 local elections, 27 councils were hung after the municipal polls, compared to the 2021 elections, with more than 60 hung councils (Ntsabo, 2021). This indicates that municipal coalitions are becoming the new norm in South Africa, and this uncharted terrain requires great circumspection. The study evolved from a minority government coalition in 2016 to a minimal winning coalition after 2021 local elections. The configuration of the municipal government kept on changing as the CTMM kept on chopping and changing its executive mayors.

### **1.11 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

To uphold ethical standards, ethical clearance was obtained through the College of Human Sciences Research Ethics Committee at the University of South Africa (see Annexure 1). After the research was amended, the Department of Public Administration and Management Research Ethics Committee of the College of Economic and Management Sciences at the University of South Africa, granted the amended ethical clearance (see Annexure 2). Brynard, Hanekom and Brynard (2014:97) argue that research ethics committees protect the rights of research participants, society, and researchers. Furthermore, Navalta, Stone and Lyons (2019:3) emphasise that in order to comply with sound research practices, it is integral that approval from an institutional ethics review board is acquired. Although the research is a conceptual study, the researcher adhered to ethical considerations.

Ethical consideration is a fundamental requisite for a successful study in the field of social research, as voluntary participation is an essential requirement in research. This study involved a group of highly important people esteemed by society for their roles of political leadership in communities. All participants were notified about the "informed consent," with which they all granted permission to

participate and reserved the right to withdraw from the study at any given time. In this context, all participants were granted voluntary participation in the study. The people who participated in the study are high-profile politicians who maintain confidentiality at all costs, and as such, this golden rule of research was not compromised. The identities of the participants and their respective political parties were protected following their consent to the study. It is crucial that the study does not pose any hazards or risks to the participant.

The researcher has taken all reasonable measures to ensure that no harm or reputational damage is suffered by the participants. The privacy of the participants was treated as a matter of paramount importance to the researcher, and appropriate codes were developed to protect their identity where necessary. This included having codes for political parties so that maximum effort is taken to protect the participants. A good ethical study is one that affords participants the opportunity to withdraw whenever deemed necessary. The researcher explained to the participants about their right not to respond to any of the questions that make them uncomfortable, including withdrawing from the study whenever deemed important.

## **1.12 STUDY STRUCTURE**

This research thesis is structured as follows:

Chapter 1 provides a background in terms of introducing coalitions and a brief description of the CTMM and its development over the years. The scientific basis on which the study is conducted is explained, including the problem statement, research objectives, and research questions, the significance of the study, ethical considerations, and the clarification of concepts.

Chapter 2 mirrored the legislative and historical development of local government development in South Africa, starting from the colonial era to the demise of the apartheid regime. A discussion on the dawn of democratic local government in South Africa and its development into the fourth administration of local government is highlighted.

Chapter 3 expounded on the concept of coalition governance in theoretical terms. Different types of coalition formations and the advantages and

disadvantages that come with each type are evocatively discussed in the chapter.

Chapter 4 deliberated on the analysis of coalition governance in the CTMM. The background on the contests and challenges that came with the coalition is discussed in this part of the study. The chapter captures the highs and lows of coalition building in the CTMM and the impact it had on governance and service delivery.

Chapter 5 reflected on the research methodology and design of the study. The scientific framework of the study, which guided the research process and maintained discipline within the requirements of a scientific inquiry, is highlighted in this chapter.

Chapter 6 presents the data analysis and interpretation of the data obtained during the in-depth interview to put the views and responses received from the participants into context.

Chapter 7 outlines the findings, recommendations, and conclusion of the study. Critical to this chapter is the presentation of a coalition model to improve coalition and ensure better service delivery to the citizens of the CTMM.

### **1.13 CONCLUSION**

The chapter outlined a framework for the study and established an effective scientific base that will drive the research project. The crucial elements of the study relating to its research objectives, significance, research questions, problem statement, background and motivation for the study, and limitations are explained. The following chapter deals with the development of local government in South Africa, from its inception to the current era of coalition governance.

## **CHAPTER 2: THE SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM**

### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

The previous chapter outlined the scientific framework followed in the study, this chapter focused on the development of the South African local government system. Government in South Africa is consisting of the national, provincial, and local spheres which are distinctive, interdependent, and interrelated. The national government is led by the president and cabinet, working through the national assembly to the promulgate laws for the country. Provincial governments are led by premiers and provincial executive committees, working in the provincial legislatures to promulgate provincial legislation. Municipalities are led by mayors and their mayoral committees, or executive committees in the Municipal Council to promulgating by-laws and making resolutions of council. There are 257 municipalities in South Africa, comprising 8 metropolitan, 44 districts, and 205 local municipalities ([www.cogta.gov.za](http://www.cogta.gov.za)).

This chapter discusses various stages of development in the South African local government sphere. The colonial era as the primary phase of local government evolution in South Africa is expounded in an insightful manner. The apartheid era, characterized by racial discrimination and segregation is highlighted. Transitional local government according to its various phases of development, culminating in democratic local government is also discussed.

### **2.2 COLONIAL ERA (1652–1910)**

Evolution in the history of local government in South Africa goes as far back as the 15th century. In 1486, Bartholomew Diaz sailed around the southern point of Africa, followed by Vasco Da Gama in 1497, where the latter set foot ashore at both present-day Helena Bay and Mossel Bay where they traded with the Khoikhoi people (Olivier & Olivier, 2017:4). The point marks the beginning of early days' interaction between Europeans and Africans which developed over time. Close to the end of the 16th century, the Dutch became a major sea power in 1584 when they sent Jan Huygen van Linschoten by sea to India, followed by Cornelis and Frederik de Houtman in 1595 (Olivier & Olivier, 2017:4). Logically, this explains the reasons why the Dutch became dominant in South Africa in the early days of occupation before a long and sustained colonization that followed

from the British. In the middle of the 17th century, the Dutch, with their home base in Amsterdam, had the 'largest trading enterprise' in the world called the "Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie" (hereafter VOC), established in 1602 (Olivier & Olivier, 2017:8).

The establishment of the South African public service was an effort made possible by the Dutch trading and commercial enterprise founded by Jan van Riebeeck in 1652 (Binza, 2005:71). Because of the long journey on the sea with no fresh meat, fruit, or vegetables, many of the sailors developed scurvy, prompting the need for a halfway station, which could easily be on the southern part of the African continent (Olivier & Olivier 2017:8). In 1650, the directors of the VOC, called "Heeren XVII," decided to establish a refreshment station for passing ships at Table Bay, then called the Cape, and in the next century known as Cape Town (Olivier & Olivier 2017:8). However, the establishment of a fort at Table Bay was the beginning of misery for the local inhabitants of this area, such as the Khoikhoi herders and San and Khoi pastoralists, as evidenced by their being denied access to grazing pastures and water resources, and in some cases, being robbed of their cattle by the Settler Commandos (Mhlauli, Salani & Mokotedi, 2015:204). Whereas it was seemingly the intention of the VOC to establish a halfway station at the Cape, Van Riebeeck soon realized the land had immense possibilities, and a year after landing in the Cape, he released nine company servants to start full-time farming on the eastern side of Table Mountain (Olivier & Olivier, 2017:8). Arguably, this move firmly entrenched the establishment of settlers and their way of life with the local inhabitants at the time.

During the early centuries in South Africa, people made a living from subsistence farming (Olivier & Olivier, 2017:8). Farming was a predominant form of economic activity, as industrialization was not fully developed at the time compared to the present. The need to exist as a community for purposes of survival and security became the most fundamental need for all the people in the land (Cloete, 1997:18). Pre-colonial authority structures were predominantly based on a tribal system of governance. Local authorities emerged gradually at the Cape of Good Hope after Jan van Riebeeck, representing the Dutch East India Company, arrived in Table Bay (Taylor, Tsatsire, Raga, & Nealer,

2009:130). The colleges of "Landrost" and "Heemraden" in Stellenbosch were the first local authorities compared with the present-day South African local authorities (Taylor et al., 2009:131). The occupation of the Cape by the settlers resulted in the extension of the area that the settlers initially occupied. Due to the expansion of the Cape, the free burghers submitted a petition to the body controlling the Dutch East Indian Company. A committee of the high court of justice was established in 1786 to serve as the local authority for the Cape, and the committee became the first urban local authority in Cape Town (Cloete, 1997:10).

Fundamental developments that took place during the sixteenth century entailed the alternate capture of the Cape by the Dutch and British powers. When the British captured the Cape from the Dutch in 1795, they took over responsibility for a thinly populated, loosely knit territory (Thompson, 2001:51). After taking control in 1795, the British replaced the committee with a "burger senate," consisting of six Burghers appointed by the British governor (Cloete, 1997:10). The Dutch, constituted as the Batavian Republic, regained the Cape from the British under the terms of the Treaty of Amiens in 1803 (Thompson, 2001:52). When the British gave the Cape back to the Dutch in 1802, the senate was replaced in 1803 by the "raad der gemeente," as it was commonly known (Cloete 1997:10). In 1806, the British again took the Cape from the Dutch; they replaced the "raad der gemeente" with the "burgher senate" and abolished it later, on December 26, 1827 (Cloete 1997:10). The second British occupation of the Cape serves as a point of departure in explaining the constitutional and administrative development of the public service in the Cape, which are of value in examining the foundations of the contemporary local sphere of government (Bianza 2005:73).

During this period, there was an extemporaneous exchange of power between the Dutch and British forces in the quest for control of the Cape. A system of local government with an elected council, comparable with present-day city and town councils, was laid when the municipal ordinance for the Cape Colony took effect on August 15, 1836 (Taylor et al., 2009:130). The ordinance provided a board of commissioners for various towns, who were elected by the property owners and were responsible for overseeing functions of a municipal nature



such as control of basic services and administration of property taxes (Taylor et al., 2009:131). This structure was not elected by all members of the community, but it had the authority to administer public affairs in its area of jurisdiction.

The Cape Municipal Ordinance successively formed the basis for the Natal Municipal Ordinance of 1847, the Orange Free State Municipal Ordinance in 1857, and the Transvaal Boer Republic Municipal Ordinance in 1877 (Taylor et al., 2009:131). The Cape Municipal Ordinance was presumably advanced, hence its adoption with minor modifications by other colonies of South Africa. The municipalities established during the time of the VOC include Stellenbosch in 1679, Drakenstein in 1687, Swellendam in 1745, and Graaff-Reinet in 1786 (Binza, 2005:72). It was in terms of the Cape Municipal Ordinance in 1836 that provision was made for the existence of local authorities, namely the Cape in 1836, Natal in 1847, Transvaal in 1853, and the Orange Free State in 1856 (Bianza, 2005:74).

When the British government established its African empire, it imposed its own value systems in relation to new forms of government and administration (Brynard & Muthai, 2011:116). This led to a radical change from the traditional forms of governance to western methods prevalent in the administration and governance systems of South Africa today. The institution of the chieftainship underwent immense changes under colonialism, as the chief was a nucleus of tribal life who worked with his subjects in the governance of their communities (Brynard & Muthai, 2011:119). Notwithstanding the changes that western systems brought on the traditional authority systems, strong foundations of civil governance were established during these times. The arrival of European settlers marked a critical turning point in the civilization of South African society; however, simultaneously started the subjugation of the native people occupying the land. In essence, the colonial era represented the replacement of traditional forms of life with the Western culture and ways of living.

It is deduced from Olivier and Olivier (2017:4) that the arrival of Vasco Da Gama and Jan Van Riebeeck was the beginning of ancient trading in the Cape between settlers and native people, which led to a full enterprise necessitating permanent habitation of the Cape by the settlers. Thompson (2001:52) brings into perspective that colonisation was pre-empted by the struggle for control

between the Dutch and British forces, which later impacted South African society in all aspects of social life. Taylor et al, (2009:130) and Bianza (2005:74) immensely contextualised the development of local authorities in the colonies based on various ordinances applicable to the respective colonies. The relationship between western systems of governance and traditional leadership is well captured by Brynard and Muthai (2011:119), establishing a correlation between these two systems of governance. From the above expostulation, it can be observed that the settlers imposed their ways of leadership and governance influenced by western culture, which laid the foundation for local authorities' establishment in the South African local government system.

### **2.3 UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA (1910–1948)**

A total of four colonies, including the Cape, Free State, Natal, and Transvaal, came together in 1910 to form the Union of South Africa (Worden, 2011:36). When the Union of South Africa was formed on May 31, 1910, the South African Act, 1909, prescribed that provincial councils were responsible for municipal and other local authorities (Taylor et al., 2009:132). Right at the onset of the South African Union, municipal affairs were given to provincial authorities to prevent direct control of the central government. Even though the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, the influence of the British Government in South Africa was still prevalent as the country was not entirely free from colonial rule. The South Africa Act introduced the Westminster system of government, and because it represented the aspirations of whites only, it led to the formulation of the ANC in 1912 (Bianza, 2005:74).

Following the Union of South Africa, different local authorities were established that were unique from one another in size, jurisdiction, power, and functions. Local authority structures included rural local authorities, peri-urban local authorities, urban local authorities, and black local authorities (Binza, 2005:76). Rural local authorities were established by the Cape Parliament in 1855 and later managed by the Cape Divisional Council Ordinances in 1952 (Binza, 2005:76). These local authorities were not autonomous, as they were controlled by the central government and literally depended on it. These rural local authorities did not generate enough revenue to sustain themselves and were exclusively established in black community areas.

All peri-urban local authorities were classified into rural and urban areas and varied in size (Binza, 2005:76). These local authorities had a fair advantage over rural local authorities in obtaining financial support from the central government. Peri-urban local authorities enjoyed a degree of independence in certain areas of legislation. Peri-urban local authorities were not developed to deliver community services at full scale, but they were better resourced than rural local authorities. Urban local authorities were established in terms of the provincial legislation, the Local Government Ordinance of 1945 (Binza, 2005:75). The urban local authorities were well established and comprised the white population of South Africa. The economic capacity of urban local authorities was strong and sustained itself through industrial development initiatives strictly limited to their type of areas.

Black local authorities, being the lowest type of local authorities, were established to manage African communities. Black local authorities were characterized by poor standards of management and administration, caused by a shortage of skills in all areas of management, lack of financial resources, duplication and overlapping services, and infrastructural backlogs (Binza, 2005:76). The development of the South African local government system was characterized by discriminatory laws in its early days of transformation. In 1910, the South African Party administration enacted the Natives Land Act of 1913, which prohibited Africans from purchasing or leasing land outside the reserves from people who were not Africans (Thompson, 2001:165). It was imperative for the local authority structures of the time to ensure that the Native Land Act of 1913 was enforced. Later, the Native Areas Act 21 of 1923 was introduced to put more restrictions on the African community. The Native Areas Act 21 of 1923 was passed to entrench urban segregation by controlling the mobility of black people by means of the pass laws (Madumo, 2017:155). These two pieces of legislation became the nexus on which racial segregation in South Africa's population was firmly entrenched.

After 1910, people in the reserves failed to produce enough food for themselves and pay municipal and local taxes of ten shillings per dwelling in the reserve as required by the authorities (Thompson, 2001:164). The economic exclusion of people in the reserves created an inferior standard of living to the extent that

obligations towards the state could not be fulfilled by ordinary citizens. Local government structures were used as instruments of state oppression, perpetrating poor service delivery against African communities. The reserves allocated to black people were neglected areas that not only restricted the free movement of people but also excluded them from social cohesion and development with society in general.

Farmers used local authorities to prevent Africans from getting "passes" to work in town by whipping workers who broke their contracts and placing them in debt (Thompson, 2001:165). In the early days, the era of the Union of South Africa signified the introduction of more repressive laws enforced by all levels of government to perpetuate racially polarized service delivery. During the Union of South Africa, the white population consolidated its control over the state, strengthening its grip on the black population and eliminating the British government's legal power to intervene in South African affairs (Thompson, 2001:154).

The deduction made through Worden (2011:36) implies there were four colonies in the territory of South Africa before the Union was formed on 31 May 1910. Bianza (2005:76) revealed different categories of local authorities varying in size and capacity, established on the basis on racial discrimination which served as preliminary forms of "municipalities" that existed in the Union of South Africa. It is observable in Madumo (2017:155) that fundamental legislation responsible for sustained racial segregation was initially promulgated at the height of Union of South Africa's sovereignty. This is further noticed in Thompson (2001:154) that the humiliation of African people worsened in the Union of South Africa, mainly seen through physical assaults of black people by their white masters.

#### **2.4 APARTHEID ERA (1948–1994)**

South Africa has a well-documented history of apartheid that lasted for over 45 years. Pursuant to the National Party (NP) gaining power in South Africa in 1948, its all-white government immediately began enforcing policies of racial segregation ([www.historyonline.co.za](http://www.historyonline.co.za)). Systematized racial discrimination in South Africa did not begin when the NP came to power in 1948; it was the result of many factors and can be traced as far back as the pre-industrial period, like what happened in Europe, Asia, and America (Pretorius, 2014:327). The NP

government wanted to replace the racial policies of its predecessors and believed that the solution to the country's racial issues lay in the implementation of the policy of apartheid (Pretorius, 2014:328). Apartheid was pervasive in that it was deeply embedded within the economic, social, and political structures of the whole country ([www.historyonline.co.za](http://www.historyonline.co.za)). Apartheid prevailed in all spheres of South African society, discriminating between white and black people in the social, political, and economic aspects of their everyday lives. The NP government was convinced that social apartheid was crucial to the preservation and safeguarding of the white population's identity and well-being (Pretorius, 2014:328).

The apartheid government promoted white people's interests at the expense of black people. The white government, through racially aggressive tactics, subdued the black population and subjected them to inferior standards of living in all spheres of society. This was reflected in many ways, including the promulgation of repressive laws that sought to undermine the inherent dignity of black people. Africans generally lived in a country that took away their human rights. This, without exception, influenced local government institutions and the way they delivered public services to citizens.

Apartheid was not the beginning of geographic, institutional, and social separation at the local level; segregation was already a policy by the time apartheid was introduced in 1948 (Koma, 2012:53). The NP retained control of the government from 1948 to 1994, and the history of South Africa in the second half of the twentieth century was dominated by apartheid and the resistance it evoked (Worden, 2012:104). Prior to 1948, racial discrimination existed, but the NP in 1948 elicited an era of legitimizing racial superiority in extreme social and economic contexts. The NP promulgated various pieces of legislation intended to render black people subservient to white people. During the apartheid era, local government was based on part of the law, which included the Native Areas Act 21 of 1923 and the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 (Maake, 2016:41).

The Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 instituted stringent residential segregation and the compulsory relocation of black people to townships specifically demarcated only for black communities (Madumo, 2017:155). These two sets of laws express in fundamental terms the racial segregation philosophy of the apartheid

government. The Native Areas Act 21 of 1923 segregated urban residential space and created "influx controls" to reduce blacks access to cities. The essence of this piece of legislation is to keep black people as far away from cities as possible. The aim of the apartheid government was to ensure that black people remained predominantly in the reserves that were designated for them.

The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 was introduced to forcefully remove people who were squatting in certain areas. These gave local authorities and government officials many ways of evicting people or demolishing their houses to get them off the land ([www.sahistoryonline.org.za](http://www.sahistoryonline.org.za)). Local authorities became effective in ensuring that the interests of landowners were promoted above those of their tenants. The Natives Laws Amendment Act of 1952 was used by local authorities to regulate black people who had the right to reside in town based on their place of birth or the period that they had been residing in these areas ([www.historyonline.org.za](http://www.historyonline.org.za)). Black people could not freely access certain areas of the country at specific times without permission from the authorities; however, the same level of restriction was not imposed on the white population.

Black people were forcefully removed from their preferred place of residence and relocated to peripheral areas that virtually had no services. The Natives Settlement Act 15 of 1954 gave the state powers to override local municipalities and forcibly remove Africans to separate townships (Worden, 2011:105). The Reservation of Amenities Act 49 of 1953 enforced social segregation in all public amenities, such as transportation, cinemas, restaurants, and sports facilities (Worden, 2011:105). Consequently, society could not be mutually cohesive as people were denied social interaction among the different races.

Throughout the colonial and apartheid years, the central government showed little interest in municipal affairs and contributed nothing to the development of local government and administration systems appropriate for South African urban areas (Cloete, 1997:12). Independent states, namely Venda, Transkei, Ciskei, and Bophutatswana, as well as the self-governing states, including Gazankulu, Kwa-Ndebele, Kangwane, Kwazulu, Lebowa, and Qwaqwa, did not develop their own local government systems (Cloete, 1997:14). This implies that throughout the territory of South Africa, local government institutions were

operating in a fragmented manner as entities deemed fit. Furthermore, the goal of empowering community was not top priority for the apartheid government, as its main goal was suppression and exclusion of the black people. In the long-term this precipitated a sense of frustration and ultimately rebellion against the apartheid system in black communities.

The turbulent forces of resistance and demand for change in the 1960s had a measurable impact on the push to improve local government in South Africa. The Urban Black Council Act 79 of 1961 was introduced as the first provision for black self-government in an urban township ([www.historyonline.org.za](http://www.historyonline.org.za)). The government established the Coloured and Indian Management Committees with the sole purpose of developing settlements in rural areas in the Cape and Natal Provinces (Madumo, 2017:156). Ironically, the main purpose of local government development in the 1960s by the state was intended to make it more efficient (Craythorne, 2006:09). Conversely, the development approach did not address the racial inequalities that existed in the country.

The continued suppression of the black population created persistent problems and crisis situations that were difficult for the white government to control. The Black Affairs Administration Act 45 of 1971 was passed to provide for self-government in the townships. Local authorities in the black areas had an important role to play in ensuring that the objectives of the government were attained by giving the black community a degree of self-governance. The Black Local Authorities Act 102 of 1982 provided for the establishment of a series of local government structures like those operating in white areas and, for the first time, gave African residents of urban locations a degree of autonomy (Omalley, 2020). If Africans could not have access to Parliament, at least they now had local power (Omalley, 2020). Nevertheless, the Black Local Authorities Act did not achieve reasonable success in promoting black people's interests.

A milestone was reached when the Constitution of 1983 was promulgated, aimed at bringing political reforms in South Africa despite the existing government policy of apartheid (Madumo, 2017:157). The Constitution of 1983 split local government in South Africa into "own affairs" and "general affairs" (Craythorne, 2006:03). However, the representation of black people and their interest in parliament were not matters of priority to the apartheid government.

This effectively meant that the interests of the people in the reserves could not be advocated for, as their political aspirations and developmental needs were virtually immaterial to the state. The Constitution of 1983 was complicated and unworkable in practice and structured around the office of the State President; essentially, it was the foundation for a dictatorship (Craythorne, 2006:03). The Constitution of 1983 was, in essence, ineffective in bringing about the transformation needed in South Africa.

Notwithstanding the establishment of local authority structures among the black population, the development of black communities remained a problem. In a quest to address this challenge, the Black Communities Development Act 4 of 1984 was introduced to promote black communities' local government affairs. The purpose of the Black Communities Development Act 4 of 1984 was to provide for the purposeful development of black communities outside the national states. This legislation further separated the development of black communities from that of white communities, essentially meaning that it was still ineffective in resolving the social disparities that existed in these communities.

The apartheid system was not without resistance from black people who felt oppressed and denied quality services by the apartheid state. This led to resistance and rebellion against the services rendered by institutions such as black local authorities. Resistance came in the form of civil disobedience and boycotting services rendered to black communities by these local authority structures. In rejecting the apartheid system, black people were represented by organizations such as the ANC and the South Africa Communist Party (SACP), amongst others. This positioned the liberation movements at the forefront of the struggle and negotiations for the abolition of the apartheid system.

Negotiations on local government between the apartheid government and the liberation movements commenced in earnest at the beginning of the 1990s (Sirovha, 2017:99). In 1991, civic organizations decided to form the South African National Civic Organization (SANCO), which they used as a platform to engage with the Minister of Local Government regarding the transformation of local government in South Africa (Nene, 2016:23). SANCO played an important role in the negotiation process by first pressuring the Minister of Local Government to establish the Local Government Negotiation Forum (LGNF),



whose work would feed into the multi-party negotiation forums followed by the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) on the transformation of the government system and configuration of the country (Nene, 2016:23). The LGNF constituted members from different sectors of society whose main interest was to advocate for effective local government in South Africa. The principal negotiators were the government and various non-statutory bodies, led by the ANC alliance and SANCO, as this was the first step towards the establishment of a democratic local government system in South Africa (Sirovha, 2017:100).

The establishment of the LGNF followed the passing of the interim measures for the Local Government Act 128 of 1991 and the Local Authority Affairs Amendment Act 134 of 1992, respectively (Nene, 2016:23). This was critical to ensure the preparedness of the country for a new government of democratic order, moving towards a transformed local government system providing services to all citizens, irrespective of their race. The Local Government Act 128 of 1991 firmly established the autonomy of local government, which had been, until then, a department in provincial governments, by establishing three phases of transition: the pre-interim phase, an interim phase, and the final phase (Nene, 2016:23). These phases of transformation were necessary for the transition into a local government system entrenched in democratic principles that safeguarded the rights of all South Africans.

The apartheid era is undoubtedly one of the most brutal phases of local government development in South Africa. The wrath of the local authority and its racially polarized service delivery approach intensified during the era of apartheid. Demonstrating that local government is the most effective sphere of government closest to the people, the central government utilized it as a tool to brutalize communities and deliver appalling public services to black people. Local authority structures during apartheid were technically subservient to the central government and did not enjoy meaningful constitutional powers. The level of retrogressive development through repressive legislation is one of the hallmarks of apartheid and will remain so for years to come.

Simultaneously, the injustices perpetrated by the central government through local authority structures during apartheid made it necessary to highlight the

inappropriateness of the system and its disdain for democratic governance. Apartheid's local government was inhumane and degrading to the dignity of any self-respecting society. The end of the apartheid era came with the endorsement of the first democratic elections in South Africa on May 10, 1994. These elections yielded the Government of National Unity (GNU), led by the ANC, in the parliament of South Africa.

It is deduced that racial oppression and discrimination intensified under the apartheid regime, noticeable through the institutionalisation and legalisation of racism that ensued under apartheid era. The exposition noted in Pretorius (2014:327) and Koma (2012:53) postulated apartheid as the culmination point of racism and segregation, not necessarily its inception in policy perspective terms. Moreover, the entrenchment of racist ideology is observed in the plethora of various acts of parliament cited in Maake (2016:14), which were passed by the apartheid regime to oppress Africans. Craythorne (2006:03) brought to light further attempts in constitutional design used to manage institutional racism by the apartheid regime, which failed to produce its intended results. Active participation by civil society and political negotiations as discussed in Sirovha (2017:09), undoubtedly became the necessary means that liberated South Africa.

## **2.5 THE DAWN OF DEMOCRACY**

South Africa has a long history of racism that divided the country since the earliest days of colonialism. The drawbacks of the racism philosophy lie in its translation into policies and legislation that perpetrated violence and social injustice against black people. Racism expressed itself through the elevation of white minority interests at the expense of the black majority. At the core of the racist program was the systematic exclusion of Africans from economic empowerment and land dispossession. This created a defeated black population that was dependent on the wealthy white minority for survival. Over many decades, this resulted in civil unrest amongst black people, who acted to free themselves from the oppression of white minority. The pinnacle of the democratic dawn transpired with the release of many political prisoners such as Nelson Mandela.

The culmination of the apartheid regime started when one of the political prisoners was released on February 11, 1990, 12 hours after waiting Nelson Mandela walked out of prison hand in hand with Winnie Mandela (Phillip, 2015). His full head of hair was now grey, and he walked stiffly but unbent, thinner than he was in the last pictures published of him, he looked less like the firebrand of the 1960s and more like the elder statesman he was about to become (Phillip, 2015). Following his release from prison on February 11, 1990, Mandela became the first black president of South Africa after the general elections on April 27, 1994. South African President Nelson Mandela took the oath of office on May 10, 1994, during his inauguration at the Union Building in Pretoria (Kahla, 2019). Mandela was elected president at the first session of the country's post-apartheid parliament on May 09, 1994, in Cape Town. South Africans voted on April 27, 1994, in the country's first democratic and multiracial general elections (Kahla, 2019). From April 27 1994, to February 3 1997, South Africa was under the GNU led by the ANC, as Clause 88 of the interim Constitution of South Africa provided for the establishment of the GNU ([www.historyonline.org.za](http://www.historyonline.org.za)).

The dawn of democracy on April 27, 1994, became a turning point for racial relations in South Africa. For South Africa, democracy meant colonialism and apartheid were a thing of the past, as the country was entering a new era of human rights and equality. This implied a new configuration of local government designed with the full participation of all citizens of South Africa, regardless of race. Local government transitioned from repressive local authorities to development-oriented municipalities democratically installed by citizens.

It is deduced that racial segregation and apartheid regime was effectively overthrown at the inauguration of the democratic government that took place in May 1994. Phillips (2015) and Kahla (2019) emphasise the unique role and influence of Nelson Mandela in changing South Africa for the better, who later became the first democratically elected president of South Africa.

## **2.6 LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRANSITIONAL PHASES (1993–1999)**

Following the dawn of local government democracy, South Africa transited through three critical phases of local government development. Firstly, the pre-interim phase, which ushered in a wave of democratic local governance after

the apartheid era. The pre-interim phase runs from the period of adoption of the Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 until the first democratic elections held in 1995–1996 (Koma, 2012:54). The year 1993 was marked by a few fundamental political changes towards a democratic South Africa. Stakeholders for the first time represented the entire political spectrum, some in alliance with others and some on their own (Sirovha, 2017:101). During this era, political negotiations were marked by the inclusivity of all sectors of civil society advocating democratic change in South Africa. The two negotiating forums, namely CODESA and the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum, managed to get two important pieces of legislation passed, namely the Constitution of 1993 (200) and the Local Government Transition Act (209) of 1993 (Sirovha, 2017:100).

Chapter Seven (7) of Constitution of 1993 laid an important foundation for democratic local government, which is essentially the current configuration of local government in South Africa. For the first time, local government was designed in consideration of the social and economic aspects of society. The Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 made provision for interim measures while local government was at the same time undergoing major transformation in South Africa. In terms of the Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993, the entire ethos of local government had to change from a passive and unresponsive approach to a responsive, participatory, and developmental approach (Sirovha, 2017:101). The Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 outlined the different phases through which the transition process for local government in South Africa would be implemented.

Secondly, the interim phase presented South Africa with an opportunity to cast their first democratic votes. The interim phase formally established structures that formed the basis for a permanent arrangement (Nene, 2016:24). The interim phase started with the first local government elections and ended with the implementation of the final constitutional model of local government in 1997 (Koma, 2012:54). During this phase of transition, one of the challenges entailed integrating all fragmented and racially configured local authorities into a cohesive and representative system of local government. The Green Paper on Local Government (1997) puts forward a vision for a developmental local government system and outlines options for each aspect of that system. The

purpose was to create a platform for engagement and a framework for the development of local government in South Africa. Furthermore, the 1997 Green Paper on Local Government stimulated a debate on local government transformation from the apartheid system to democratic local government. The promulgation of the Municipal Structures Act, 117 of 1998, dealing with issues such as categories and types of municipalities, establishment of municipalities, composition and dissolution of Municipal Councils, and election of speakers, laid a strong foundation for the transformation of local government.

Lastly, the final phase puts to rest the statutory and legislative configurations of the new democratic local government. The Final Phase began with the final constitutional model of local government in 1997, although some of the constitutional provisions only took effect after the 2000 local government elections (Koma, 2012:55). One of the most critical policy documents that emerged during this phase of local government transformation was the White Paper on Local Government (1998). The purpose of the White Paper on Local Government 1998 was to establish the basis for a new developmental local government system committed to working with citizens, groups, and communities to create sustainable human settlements that provide for a decent quality of life and meet the social, economic, and material needs of communities in a holistic way. The White Paper on Local Government 1998, often referred to as the "constitution for local government", visualized a process where communities will be involved in governance matters, including planning, implementation, and performance monitoring and review, and stated that communities must be empowered to identify their needs, set performance indicators and targets, and hold municipalities accountable for their performance (Msibi & Penzhorn, 2010:05).

The transition period represented one of the most monumental times in the history of South Africa. The demise of colonial and apartheid rule was a lifetime journey that claimed the lives of many innocent people. The transitional stages reflect the gradual development of local government in South Africa from its abhorrent past to its splendiferous future. This process of local government transformation was handled excellently by the government and all political parties involved in the negotiations. The transition was a powerful demonstration

that robust and honest engagement can resolve challenges to governance and service delivery shortcomings experienced by citizens.

It may be deduced that local government transformation towards full democratisation entailed three phases, namely pre-interim, interim and final phases. Koma (2012:55) and Sirovha (2017:101) deliberated on new pieces of legislation and negotiations in CODESA and the Multiparty Negotiating Forum, which played a critical role in the consolidation of the new democratic order, ushering in the current system of local government in South Africa. The necessity for new legislation under democratic local government, detailed in Msibi and Penzhorn (2010:05), provided an understanding to repeal racist legislation of the apartheid regime with a new law that will advance the interests of all South Africans.

## **2.7 LOCAL ELECTIONS OF 1995**

South Africa held its first general elections on May 10, 1994, which resulted in the election of Nelson Mandela as the first democratic president of South Africa. The first democratic local elections took place in 1995. The local elections of 1995 took place at a time when democratic local government institutions were not fully established. This includes institutions like the MDB and the South African Local Government Association (SALGA). The 1995 elections came after the ANC became the ruling party in South Africa.

The local election of 1995 may as well be dubbed "the ANC local elections," attributable to the ANC's overwhelming victory in these elections. The ANC got 58%, the NP 18%, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 8%, Freedom Front Plus (2,6%), the Pan African Congress (1,2%), the African Christian Democratic Party (0,77%), and the Democratic Party (13,4%) ([www.eisa.org](http://www.eisa.org)). The ANC got the highest number of votes, more than all the opposition parties combined. This election solidified a contest for political power emanating from the general elections that positioned the ANC as the "supreme leader" of South African politics.

The deduction made in this extrapolation demonstrates the era of political dominance by the ANC in obtaining a majority vote in several municipal councils more than any other political party. The local elections in 1995 were the first

democratic elections in South Africa for the election of municipal councillors, as no evidence based on the foregoing discussion suggested anything to the contrary. Electoral performance across the party landscape indicated less than 20% for different political parties contesting the elections, which is a clear indication of the magnitude of the ANC during this period of elections.

## **2.8 LOCAL ELECTIONS OF 2000**

Fundamental reforms pertaining to the legislative and structural configuration of local government institutions were at an advanced stage at the time of the 2000 local elections. The system of local government was vastly deracialized, municipal jurisdictions were properly consolidated, a philosophy of developmental local government was introduced, and the intergovernmental fiscal system was overhauled to bring far more financial resources to the municipal level (IEC 2006:52). The 2000 elections were contested by a total of 97 political parties and 45,189 candidates (IEC 2006:02). The number of political parties and candidates increased exponentially in the 2000 elections compared to the previous local election in 1995.

The 2000 local elections were contested in 284 Municipal Councils, comprising 6 metropolitan municipalities, 231 local municipalities, and 47 district municipalities (IEC 2000:4). A total of 18 467 519 people turned out to cast their vote in the 2000 local elections (IEC 2000:34). The ANC won 170 municipalities, DA 18, IFP 36 and the United Democratic Movement (UDM) won 1 municipality (IEC 2000:69). The ANC received 59%, the DA received 22%, the IFP received 9.1%, and the UDM received 2.6% (IEC 2000:69). The ANC slightly increased from 58% to 59% in the 2000 elections. The outcome of the election results indicated that the ANC received a two-thirds majority in the number of municipalities, which in essence equals 75% of all municipalities contesting the elections. The election's outcome projected that at least 25% of municipalities were under the control of opposition parties.

It can be deduced that the ANC grew in the 2000 elections compared to the 1995 elections, according to IEC results. While the IFP decreased in number, signs of growth were clearly observed in the DA as it improved its electoral performance in these elections. Based on the dominance of the ANC in the 2000

local elections, nothing seemed to suggest electoral loss by the ANC as occurred in the successive elections.

## **2.9 LOCAL ELECTIONS OF 2006**

The 2006 local elections presented the third democratic local government in South Africa. A total of 26 938 560 people cast their votes in the 2006 local government elections (IEC 2006:54). The voter turnout in the 2006 local elections was 26 938 560, which made up 48% of the registered voters (IEC 2006:54). The ANC got 66.34% of the vote in the 2006 local government elections (Schoeman & Charles, 2006:154). This was an overwhelming victory for the ANC compared to the 59.4% it received in the 2000 local elections (IEC 2000:70). The DA received 16,32% in the 2006 local elections (Schoeman & Charles 2006:154). This was not an impressive outcome considering that the DA performed better in the 2000 local elections. The IFP got 7.5% in the 2006 local elections but slacked in comparison to the 9% it acquired in the 2000 local elections (Schoeman, & Charles, 2006: 155). Small parties that came into the fray included the Independent Democrats (ID) (2,2%), the ACDP, PAC, and FF Plus, which respectively got 1% each (Schoeman & Charles 2006:155).

The ANC continued to dominate various Municipal Councils across the country, as it got the highest percentage compared to the previous elections in 1995 and 2000. The DA and IFP, on the other hand, started declining as their performance was lower compared to previous elections. The multiplicity of political options across the landscape started to appeal to the electorate, as seen in the ID, ACDP, PAC, and FF Plus, which made an impact in the 2006 elections. The 2006 local elections recorded one of the highest voter turnouts as 26 million people voted, compared to 18 million in the 2000 local elections. An estimated eight (8) Municipal Councils were hung after the local government elections of 2006 (IEC 2006:54). The City of Cape Town (CCT) formed a coalition government after the 2006 local government elections because it yielded a hung Municipal Council (IEC: 2006:55). Elections outcome yielding hung Municipal Councils started in the 2006 local elections.

It is deduced from IEC (2006:54) that the ANC grew stronger in the 2006 elections while the DA and IFP diminished substantially. The number of people who came out to vote increased compared to the previous local elections.



Furthermore, election results yielded the first metropolitan municipality under coalition in the democratic dispensation as outlined in the IEC (IEC, 2006:54).

## **2.10 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS 2011**

A total of 13 664 914 people turned out for the 2011 local elections (IEC 2011:47). The ANC got 62%, the DA got 24%, the IFP got 3%, and the Congress of the People (COPE) got 2%, respectively, in the 2011 local elections (Duncan, 2016:04). The ANC as the ruling party was considered by the voters to be responsible for government inefficiency, while the DA increased from 14% to 23% in the 2011 local government elections (Mbetse, 2016:594). The local government elections of 2011 came at a time when South Africa's democracy was over a decade old. This was at a time the electorate was showing signs of disapproval of the government's inability to meet the expectations of society and deliver quality public services. There was a significant decline by the ANC compared to previous elections in 2006, while the opposition displayed signs of growth.

The 2011 local elections came when there was mayhem caused by members of society who repeatedly voiced their concerns over the government's inability to deliver services to the communities. There were allegations of corruption and maladministration in government, which were seen as precursors to the government's inability to deliver services. Many voters resolved to switch allegiances or abstain from voting as a way of expressing their disapproval of government inefficiencies and maladministration. Allegiance to political parties is not static, however, changes with every election as the electorate is influenced by commitments parties make during political campaigns.

It can be deduced in Duncan (2016:04) that the ANC recorded the highest number of votes compared to all previous elections. Simultaneously, the coming of a new political such as COPE increased the contest for voters in the political terrain, while the IFP continued to diminish in the 2011 local elections. The DA returned to substantial growth in 2011 compared to the election in 2006. Despite good performance of the ANC at the 2011 elections, voters as discussed in Mbetse (2016:594), started expressing sharp disapproval against poor governance and ineffective service delivery of the ANC. Regrettably, the 2011

elections recorded the lowest voter turnout compared to all the previous local elections.

## **2.11 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS 2016**

A total of 15,290,820 people voted in the 2016 local government elections (IEC 2016:74). The ANC received 53.9% of the vote in the 2016 local government elections (Masipa, 2017:43). In the 2016 local government elections, the DA got 26.9% of the total vote (Mbetse, 2016:596). The DA displayed a significant increase of approximately 2% compared to the 2011 local government elections. The 2016 elections witnessed the EFF contesting elections for the first time. The EFF performance superseded other parties, such as the IFP and FF+, in performance. The EFF got 8.2% in its first local government election contest in 2016 (Mbetse, 2017:43). The staying away of voters from the polls in the 2016 local government elections and the emergence of new parties such as the EFF resulted in hung Municipal Councils in several municipalities.

The 2016 local government elections became a turning point for South Africa's local government history as a record number of Municipal Councils were hung. The number of municipalities that clearly had hung Municipal Councils was 27 (Duncan, 2016:05). Strategically, this placed the EFF in the position of kingmaker in several municipalities and effectively meant that the EFF played an important role in influencing voting outcomes in Municipal Councils. This projected local government on a course of coalition politics, with no idea how coalitions will work going into the fifth administration of local government in 2021.

The deduction made in Duncan (2016:05) is that the 2016 local elections yielded a high number of Municipal Councils, which generated much interest from various parties in the political landscape. Mbetse (2017:43) espoused that the EFF became a key factor in influencing the configuration of municipal governments in several municipalities, especially in Gauteng metropolitan municipalities. The multiplicity of hung Municipal Councils signalled a turning point in the South African local government, which had the potential to result in more hung Municipal Councils in future elections.

## **2.12 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS 2021**

The 2021 local election witnessed at least 12 063 302 people turning out to cast their votes out of 26 204 579 who are eligible to vote ([www.elections.org.za](http://www.elections.org.za)). However, the 2021 elections suggested a drastic drop in voter turnout compared to the previous 2016 elections. In the local elections of 2021, the ANC obtained 47%, DA 20%, EFF 10%, FF Plus 2%, IFP 6%, and ActionSA 6% ([www.timeslive.co.za](http://www.timeslive.co.za)). The 2021 local elections witnessed the decline of the ANC and the splitting of the vote among opposition parties. The demise of the ANC further deepened the need for coalitions in municipalities, which means that politicians need to gear themselves up to close the gap and provide effective governance in the absence of ANC majority rule.

It can be deduced that the ANC dropped below 50% in local elections for the first time, while newcomers in ActionSA obtained 6% of the vote. Other political parties like the DA did not show significant signs of growth but shaded votes to parties like the FF Plus contesting for the same white constituency. This signals a potential disaster for the ANC should the 2024 elections yield such a performance, which technically means South Africa will have a coalition government for the first time because of a hung parliament.

## **2.13 CONCLUSION**

This chapter dealt comprehensively with the historical development of local government under colonial, apartheid, and democratic dispensations in South Africa. The ancient foundation of local government, from the days of early settlement by the Europeans to the formation of the Union of South, was explained. The promulgation of racist laws under the Union of South Africa assisted in understanding the foundations of repressive laws in South Africa. This was augmented by the discussion of a variety of apartheid laws promulgated by the state to isolate black people in the country. The demise of the repressive government through resistance and days of political negotiations is reflected in the study. The transition phases leading to the first democratic local government elections and the elections that followed throughout the years epitomized the apex of the struggle for a democratic local government where all citizens are treated equally. These discussions were crucial to establish a relationship between the abhorrent past where south Africa comes from and the

unpredictable current state of coalitions the country finds itself in. The next chapter will outline the theoretical concept of coalition governance in a detailed and scientifically meaningful manner.

## **CHAPTER 3: COALITION GOVERNANCE**

### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

The preceding chapter outlined the historical background of local government in South Africa, from the colonial era to the democratic dispensation, this chapter discussed the concept of coalition governance in a detailed perspective. This is crucial for the purpose of providing a coherent theoretical framework for the study. Coalition governance is common in many countries around the world, however, it is predominantly found in many European countries. Various types of coalitions and factors influencing the formation of coalitions are discussed. The effective management of coalitions, focusing on resources required for coalitions, principles and characteristics of coalitions are discussed. In conclusion, the chapter wraps up with an extrapolation on the benefits and challenges of coalition governance and an elucidation of the comparative analysis of coalition governance from a geopolitical perspective.

### **3.2 GOVERNANCE**

The effective exercise of power requires those who are in authority to undertake a formal process of elections to obtain legitimacy, this is carried out through a formal process of governance. The word governance was first used by the Greeks, which means steering, navigating, or giving direction (Louw, 2012:40). According to Khupuza (2021:12), governance is the relationship and interaction of many stakeholders in shaping public policy, such as the community, civic organizations, and other interested parties. Santiago (2024:51) maintained that it is hard to find in the literature one definition of governance that is completely precise and unambiguous due to the different perspectives from which it can be described in political science, public policies, public administration, international relations, and economics disciplines. To elucidate the concept of governance public administration studies further developed the concept of good governance which intrinsically comprise of the following:

#### **Democracy**

This concept is derived from the Greek word *kratos* meaning power or rule and *demos*, meaning people (Louw, 2012:60). Democracy is often said to mean 'rule by the people' in a system of government in which people vote their elected

representatives into parliament (Thunberg, 2024). In the centre of democracy is the will of the majority and frequent renewal of the mandate to govern through regular elections that are considered to be free and fair. Everybody should be able to assess whether their democracy is working accordingly, there are criteria such as fairness and equitability to measure quality of democracies (Thunberg, 2024)

### **Decision-Making**

A decision-making process is a series of steps one or more individuals take to determine the best option or course of action to address a specific problem or situation (Sheldon, 2024). Councilors are faced with a variety of policy options required to achieve the goals of the municipal council. Bad political decisions are those that are inconsistent with our stated values or preferences, ill-informed, non-rational, non-autonomous, illogical, or even nonsensical (Moscrop, 2022). This requires firm decision-making to advance the objectives of the municipal government. Poor decision making, whether by individual councilors or collectively as a municipal council, can affect the quality of service delivery to residents.

### **Accountability**

Government in all spheres, from the national to the provincial to the local, must develop and take ownership of all actions and decisions taken. This comes in the form of adopting a culture of accountability in the execution of government decisions. Public officials should take responsibility for all that is done in the public's name, be accountable to external bodies, and, more so, be held morally and legally liable (Disoloane, 2012:40). Political accountability, which concerns the relationship that citizens have with their elected officials and vice versa, is one of the fundamental building blocks of a democratic system (Desai, 2023). This follows the principle that it is critical for politicians to take responsibility for their actions or inactions, emanating from the mandate to govern conferred on them by the citizenry.

### **Transparency**

The delivery of public services to residents is often compounded by problems of inefficiency and effectiveness in improving the well-being of society. One

possible explanation is that government inefficiency is frequently associated with a lack of transparency (Monnatlale, 2023:18). Transparency in an organization is the practice of sharing information amongst people on important matters, both internally and externally, and having active and effective communication channels across the organization's stakeholders (Alonso, 2022). Residents ought to know about the standards and cost of services delivered to them by the municipality. This improves the trust and confidence that residents have in their elected officials in the delivery of services.

### **Rule of law**

The eligibility of municipalities as institutions of government is premised on the constitutional and statutory imperatives conferred on them by law. Municipalities are able to function optimally when the rule of law is upheld by all stakeholders in society. The rule of law is a durable system of laws, institutions, norms, and community commitment that delivers accountability, just laws, open government, and impartial justice (Nuekom, 2024). It is crucial that residents uphold by-laws, regulations, and other legislation to create a community that promotes the wellbeing of all members of society. Equally, elected officials and public servants must comply with all the legislative requirements to provide services in a manner that is ethical and fulfills all requirements of legislation. There are great benefits to organizations, and other stakeholders in respecting and supporting the rule of law, because where the rule of law is weak, it is harder for organizations to function, meet their legal obligations, and have their legal rights protected (Breslauer, 2023).

### **Public participation**

Communities are a vital component of municipalities, their role in ensuring capable municipalities is entrenched in their ability to participate effectively in the decision-making processes of the municipality. This is achieved through meaningful processes such as community meetings convened by political leaders to promote public participation. In context, public participation is a voluntary process whereby people, individually or through organized groups, can exchange information, express opinions and articulate interests, and have the potential to influence decisions or the outcome of the matter at hand (Martin, 2020:11). This allows members of the community to take ownership of

government decisions and see themselves as part of the municipality. Public participation ensures that the top-down approach is eliminated to promote development on the terms and preferences of the local community.

### **3.3 COALITIONS THEORIES**

A coalition may be defined as a temporary combination of groups or individuals formed to pursue specific objectives through joint action for the purpose of gaining more influence or power than the individual groups or parties can hope to achieve on their own (Dladla, 2018:15). A coalition government includes several political parties that cooperate to arrive at unanimous decisions, primarily to form a government or to conceptualize different public policies (Ndou, 2022:31). Kadima (2014:02) defines a coalition as the association of at least two parties working together in parliament or government after election outcomes. Baatjes (2011:09) describes coalition as a process of organizing parties collectively in pursuit of a common goal. The 2016 local elections yielded a legislative coalition in the CTMM, as there was no sharing of executive portfolios between the EFF and DA. However, the 2021 local elections resulted in a minimal winning coalition as there is no surplus political party in the coalition led by the DA.

Coalitions are intended to achieve specific goals that are not achievable by a single party. This implies that political parties do not participate in coalitions for non-strategic reasons, however, they engage to achieve outcomes that cannot be achieved by individual political parties acting alone. The formation of coalitions is precipitated by factors that influence parties to participate for various reasons. The following are common theories in the formation of coalitions:

#### **3.3.1 Office-driven theory**

Parties' preferences for office or policy are the most important factors determining their behaviour (Bassi, 2021:2). This is attributable to the fact that these theories invariably affect the posture that a political party takes, either as the governing party or the opposition. Office-driven theory assumes that the main goal of political parties forming coalitions is to access power (Masipa, 2017:40). Parties are motivated in these decisions primarily by a desire for



power or prestige (Kapa & Shale, 2014:93). In Office-driven theory, political parties become part of the executive controlling the government. The assumption is that the party's primary goal is to gain office and model government formation as a zero-sum game in which the cabinet portfolios are the payoffs (Steinert & Yordanova, 2013:56). The logic of campaigning in a political contest is to access power to change the lives of citizens. Office-seeking theories assume that parties only look at the government's size when forming a coalition (Olislagers & Steyvers, 2015:202). Subsequently, the greater the opportunities for participating in government, the more likely for a political party to participate when pursuing the office-driven theory. The office-driven theory is alternatively known as the "office-seeking" or "office-oriented" approach (Masipa, 2017:40).

Office-seeking parties are primarily interested in the perks and benefits that come with holding government positions. These benefits can include ministerial salaries, official vehicles, prestige, and other private rewards associated with being in government (Forsyth, 2023). This suggests politicians in office-seeking theory may run the risk of pursuing narrow agendas, which does not promote the general welfare of the constituency that voted them into power. Nevertheless, the office-driven theory should not be categorically viewed as power-mongering, as some political parties view it as influencing policy outcomes.

The attribution of ministerial office is a central part of the process of negotiation in the formation of governing coalitions because it is the most significant level in the distribution of political influence among the partners (Szmolka, 2015:658). Office-driven theory was refined to assert that the largest party in the legislature is central in coalition negotiations and cannot easily be excluded from office. This was termed the "minimal winning hypothesis" (Masipa, 2017:40). Office-seeking theory in the normal course of politics thrusts the majority party into a central role of leading negotiations and government in pursuit of a common goal with a coalition partner.

### **3.3.2 Policy-orientated theory**

Politicians do not form coalitions exclusively to seek power but also to influence public policy in favour of their interests and those of their parties (Kapa & Shale,

2014:95). In this context, political parties will utilise all platforms at their disposal to ensure that their political aspirations are attained. Policy-oriented parties will behave differently from their purely office-seeking competitors in that they are willing to forgo some office gains in exchange for achieving their policy goals (Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2021:114). This suggests that a policy-oriented approach inherently has a degree of reasonableness in striking a balance between benefits and losses in coalition formation. Policy-seeking is all about influencing government policies, driven by a desire to have a significant impact on public policies, whether by being in the government or by effectively advocating for their policies as a strong opposition force (Forsyth, 2023). Politicians require executive power in government to achieve policy goals. However, smart politicians can effectively use their influence in their opposition benches to achieve their policy goals. When parties are not interested in the office but only in the implementation of their preferred policies. The party controlling the median legislator will become a kind of policy dictator and will get into government (Masipa, 2017:41). The political party with the highest number of votes typically leads the process of forming a government, guiding smaller parties in the policy direction of the government.

The assumption on which policy-seeking theories are based is that party coalitions are justified by policy goals (Kadima, 2006:05). In other words, the aspiration of political parties to coalesce is not motivated by the desire to occupy office but rather by achieving their long-term goals in government. Policy-seeking coalition theories postulate that ideological proximity is the central factor explaining the outcome of the coalition bargaining process (Steinert & Yordanova 2013:56). This suggests like-minded parties engaging in coalitions are likely to pursue policy goals easier than parties with contrasting ideological views. Coalition partners in a governmental coalition prefer to minimise the ideological distance between them because this maximises their beneficial outcomes (Szmolka, 2015:657). This is crucial to narrowing down the space of ideological clashes that can affect the running of the government. In terms of ideological compactness, governing coalitions can be classified as coherent, homogeneous, connected, or non-coherent, heterogeneous, and non-connected (Smozlka, 2015: 657).

Parties seek three primary objectives: first, they aim to be successful in elections; second, they want to staff public offices with their own personnel; and third, they press for the implementation of policies (Graichen, Linhart, Schuster, Heller, & Müller, 2021:274). A study by a group of scholars suggests policy-seeking and office-seeking theories can be achieved through a combination of both. While prior work on coalition theories focuses either solely on office or on the policy motivations of parties, more elaborate theories combine both types of motivation, called “coalizer” (Grachen et al., 2021:274). This theory advocates a combination of office-seeking and policy-seeking approaches.

It can be deduced from Masipa (2017:40) and Kapa and Shale (2014) that accessing power is central to political parties forming coalitions. The personal benefits that come with the office have a tremendous impact (Forsyth, 2023) on persuading politicians to pursue self-centred benefits by occupying government offices. The concepts of ideological proximity (Steinert & Yordanova, 2013:56) and clarity of policy goals (Kadima, 2006:05) are crucial in ensuring policy-seeking fulfils its most strategic objective. The traditional view for the formation of coalitions suggests policy-seeking and office-seeking (Grachen et al., 2021:274) and proposes a new theory in “coalizer’ based on the combination of the two classical theories.

### **3.4 TYPOLOGIES OF COALITIONS**

The prerequisite for any political party to run a government unilaterally requires a majority win in an election. However, political parties often fall short of obtaining the majority needed to govern on their own, as political parties collaborate to form coalitions required to constitute a formal government. Coalition entails pulling resources towards the realization of a common goal and an agreement on distribution arrangements once the intended goal is achieved (Maganga, 2011:38). The following are typologies of political coalitions:

#### **3.4.1 Electoral alliances**

There are various reasons that push political parties to engage in electoral alliances. The main aim of electoral alliances is to combine the resources of two or more parties to improve the electoral outcomes for the members of the alliance (Masipa, 2017:42). This provides political parties with an opportunity to

accomplish the set goal and objective established for the coalition. The main objective of such coalitions is to “pull votes”, that is, to mobilize and collect votes across different constituencies to gain an electoral majority (Ngubane, 2018:75). The outcome of this type of coalition results in political parties positioning themselves to collect a fair share of votes obtainable on the voter’s roll.

Electoral alliances enjoy a great deal of success leading up to an election, however, they may encounter more complexities in the post-election era. The main challenge is the ability to consolidate political power after an election success between parties with different ideological orientations and political cultures that are at the same time formed with the sole purpose of winning an electoral majority (Ngubane, 2018:78). The electoral alliance’s main shortcoming lies in its sole purpose of securing electoral victory rather than maintaining the long-term goals of a common political vision and purpose. Electoral alliances are much more common than coalition governments, though they occur only in some places and at some times (Bogaards, 2006:25). The spoils of collaboration are uncertain because, firstly, the coalition might not win the election, and secondly, there is no guarantee that once in office, the winning candidate will keep his or her promise to share power and resources (Bogaards, 2006:27). However, for the purpose of consolidating support, electoral alliances are significant political coalitions to secure an electoral victory.

### **3.4.2 Grand Coalitions**

A grand coalition occurs when a country’s main political parties unite to form a government (Masipa, 2017:43). According to Dladla (2018:16), grand coalitions occur when the country’s main political parties, those that are typically the main competitors for government control, unite in forming a government. Grand coalition cooperation is based on the principle of big political parties overlooking their differences and focusing on establishing a workable solution that provides stability in a government. Dladla (2018:16) argued that grand coalitions may be formed to circumvent a national political crisis because no other configuration is attainable or to limit the influence of a particular party. Jacoby (2016:331) maintained that grand coalitions are formed to pursue policy goals unreachable in small coalitions. Grand coalitions are favourable for policy options that require an overwhelming majority, including changing a government constitution, which

is unattainable with small parties that do not form an overwhelming majority in a coalition.

A grand coalition sees a chance for larger parties to channel benefits to their constituencies and to enjoy the benefits themselves (Jacoby, 2016:331). This suggests a posture by big political parties denying small parties access to a level of influence that may otherwise be accessible to them. Political parties' resort to grand coalitions as a strategy for limiting the manoeuvring of small parties unacceptable to one of the parties or both (Jacoby, 2016:331). Grand coalitions eliminate the influence of "kingmakers" in the formation of government by political parties represented in the legislature. Grand coalitions have been part of human history for years, most particularly in some of the developed countries in Europe. Countries such as Austria, Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands have had grand coalitions for longer periods, with Italy having a grand coalition that lasted for six months in 2013 (Jacoby, 2016:330). Grand coalitions are a viable option for big parties; however, big parties typically prefer working with small parties that do not pose any threat to their constituency base.

### **3.4.3 Legislative coalition**

Collaboration between political parties does not only take place during campaigns for elections but can extend to the legislature for passing important legislation and other policies. A legislative coalition is a political alliance that does not necessarily share cabinet or executive functions but consists of political parties that are represented in parliamentary or legislative processes of voting and debating on policy options (Ngubane, 2018:76). Legislative coalitions are policy alliances involving cooperation agreements between parties with similar interests (Ngubane, 2018:76). Different political parties, representing different sections of the citizenry and having made different policy promises to voters during the election campaign, may come together in a single legislative coalition that aggregates all these diverse preferences into a single outcome for any given proposal (Dragu & Laver, 2017:287). The essence of a legislative coalition is based on an agreement to pursue specific legislative goals without division of cabinet or executive responsibility (Masipa, 2017:43). There is generally no mutual reciprocity between political parties engaging in a legislative coalition other than achieving a common outcome on matters put to a vote.

#### **3.4.4 Coalition government**

When no political party achieves a strict majority in an election, a coalition government is usually formed (Puy, 2011:65). According to Masipa (2017:43), a coalition government occurs when no single political party wins a clear majority in a parliament. Ndou (2022:62) maintains that coalition government occurs when no single party attained a majority during an election, like in the 2016 local government elections in Tshwane, where parties come together to form a government. The party with the highest number of votes enters negotiations with the party with a smaller number of votes to form a government. Based on the agreement, a cabinet is formed, which consists of representatives from all political parties participating in a coalition government. Coalition governments are the norm in many European governments (Puy, 2011:65). Considering the period from 1945 to 1999 and based on the proportion of time in office, only three countries in western Europe had any significant experience with coalition government (Boucek, 2010:48). More discussion on coalition government is done in section 3.8 of this chapter.

#### **3.4.5 Minimal Wining coalitions**

A coalition is minimal if most of the seats in the legislature are secured and none of the coalition partners is mathematically superfluous, meaning there are no excess parties and the withdrawal of one would bring down the government (Ngubane, 2018:79). Minimal winning coalitions are those winning coalitions in which no participant can be spared; that is, no participant can be removed without the coalition becoming a losing coalition (Thijm, 2021:12). This type of coalition is delicate, as one party can collapse the government as a single party without the involvement of other parties. A party is superfluous if removing it from the coalition does not lead to the loss of the coalition's majority status in the legislature (Ngubane, 2018:76). According to the minimal winning coalition theory, government coalitions should consist of as few political parties as possible (Masipa, 2017:40). In essence, the theory postulates that the slightest number of parties constituting a coalition should proceed to form a government without incorporating all parties represented in the legislature. The rationale for forming a minimal winning coalition is that when surplus members are added to the coalition and thus an oversized coalition is formed, the payoff must be

distributed over more actors than necessary, thus lowering the gains of the parties relatively if they choose to include an additional member (Wieldraaijer, 2015:06).

#### **3.4.6 Surplus majority coalitions**

A surplus coalition consists of a government whose cabinet is oversized, including parties that are not essential to a parliamentary majority (Ngubane, 2018:80). This type of coalition adopts the blanket approach of incorporating all parties available in the legislature without exhaustive consideration of the number of seats allocated to each party. Majority parties sometimes enter a coalition cabinet with several smaller parties as a precaution to avert the problems associated with a minimum-winning coalition or as a means of co-optation to increase dominance over the legislature or political system (Ngubane, 2018:80). Consequently, in a surplus majority government, small coalition partners can cease to be crucial for a majority and thereby lose their leverage or influence over policy outcomes (Ngubane, 2018:80). Surplus-majority coalitions give the majority party excessive influence over small parties in the determination of policy and other matters of governance in the legislature.

#### **3.4.7 Minority government**

A minority government is usually run by the party with the most seats but is not guaranteed to win votes alone because they still have less than half the total number of members in the house (Christodoulou, 2019). A minority government is formed when a political party wins the most seats but less than 50% of the total seats and informally agrees to work with another party or parties on specific areas of agreement to achieve more than 50% of the total seats (Christodoulou, 2019). Minority government electoral outcomes introduce a variety of complex challenges that require a certain level of political sophistication to navigate those challenges, many of which have an intrinsic partisan character (Dufresne & Nevitte, 2012:826). This points to the difficulty that political parties in minority governments have in gaining support for the implementation of their policies in legislatures.

There is no permanent arrangement by political parties for securing a majority vote, politicians support or disapprove of proposals based on the position of

their party's caucus rather than merit. This option is more unpredictable, as it raises the chances of defeat in parliament or of alternative legislative alliances emerging (Hazell, 2011:07). Parties depend on constant lobbying to secure government decisions that require approval by the majority. Nonetheless, the absence of a majority in the office parliament becomes more effective and powerful, as opposition and backbench amendments have more chance of being carried out (Christodoulou, 2019). Minority governments therefore provide a sense of vitality to all parties in the legislature because there is no dominant party that categorically dismisses the ideas of smaller parties.

It can be deduced that there are several types of coalitions that political parties can opt for to achieve their goals. The observation made by Masipa (2017:42) is that smaller parties can collaborate to contest an election under one banner to achieve an electoral victory, while bigger political parties can collaborate after an election to keep small parties out of government. The argument advanced in Ngubane (2018:80) implies that political parties, when needed, can work outside a formal agreement in the legislature to achieve their policy goals, whereas Puy (2011:65) and Ndou (2022:62) outlined a type of coalition based on formal arrangements where political parties share executive portfolios. There are coalition arrangements noticed in Thijm (2021:12), where all coalition partners are equally important, suggesting that not a single party can be lost, whereas Ngubane (2018:80) further points to coalitions with more than the required number of coalition partners, which, in the event of leaving, have the capacity to collapse the government.

### **3.5 RATIONALE FOR COALITIONS**

The establishment of a coalition is precipitated by several factors that push political parties to engage in coalition arrangements. This means that parties should have clear-cut goals they want to achieve when they are participating in coalitions. There are various reasons why political parties become part of a coalition before and after an election. In a government space, coalitions are formed to secure a governing majority (Hanabe & Malinzi, 2019:41). The purpose for the formation of coalition in government is to secure a governing majority (Doherty, 2004:01). A majority in the legislature is required to pass legislation and give effect to the decisions of government. A party with majority



seats but less than 50% of the total seats in a legislature does not have the power to enact laws or take decisions by itself. This logically means the party with majority seats should identify coalition partners to form a government or give support to political parties forming a government.

In opposition coalitions are formed to create a credible alternative to government (Doherty, 2004:01). Coalitions are formed to create a credible alternative to the government (Hanabe & Malinzi, 2019:41). This justifies the existence of opposition parties as alternatives to taking over government when the elected government is failing to fulfil its obligations. Coalitions are formed during elections to consolidate support and maximise results (Hanabe & Malinzi, 2019:41). This takes place between political parties that do not have enough numbers as individual parties to win an election.

It is deduced from Doherty (2004:01) and Hanabe and Malinzi (2019:41) that there are three main reasons why political parties engage in the process of forming coalitions. This is irrespective of the type of coalition formed following an impasse after an election. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that coalition formation is not a voluntary process but rather an outcome emanating from the lack of a majority winner following an election. In this context, in all aspects of engagement, the formation of coalitions is subject to one of the reasons outlined above.

### **3.6 FACTORS AFFECTING ESTABLISHMENT OF COALITIONS**

Political parties are categorically different in their composition and character. Driven by different political ideologies and policy positions, political parties form coalitions influenced, among other things, by the following factors:

#### **3.6.1 Political regime**

Political systems vary widely around nations of the world, ranging from authoritarian on the one end to democracies on the other end of the spectrum (Goel & Nelson, 2021:126). Based on these systems, the probability of accepting coalition varies from one system of politics to the other. A political regime has an impact on the formation of electoral alliances and a government (Kadima, 2014:08). The underlying political regime or government structure and institutional arrangements play a crucial role in how government size is

determined and how it evolves over time (Goel & Nelson, 2021:128). A society with strong civilian rule is likely to embrace the constitutional order approach and accept the electoral outcomes of election agencies, whereas societies hostile to democratic rule has a repulsive approach to coalitions, which fundamentally requires a mutual understanding approach to governance. Nevertheless, the impact of the type of political regime remains unclear, as certain types of authoritarian regimes may exert positive effects on growth: Singapore, one of the richest countries in the world today, has experienced growth above 1000% since the 1960 (Tohme, Caraballo & Dabus, 2022:291).

### **3.6.2 Legal framework governing alliances and coalitions**

Despite the diverse views held by the political parties, there was unanimous agreement on the necessity for a national framework that ensures coalition governments remain responsive to the needs of the people of South Africa (Ditabo & Jan Gerber, 2023). Political parties in their alliances and coalitions are affected by either the absence or the inadequacies of legislation (Kadima, 2014:11). It is imperative that statutory frameworks are developed to guide the establishment of coalition agreements. The framework provides practical and implementable guidelines to political parties and independent councillors in coalition governments to resolve challenges of instability and encourage cooperation in coalitions (Beukes & de Visser, 2021:6). Accordingly, the framework on coalition governments must contribute toward building a prosperous society in which people have access to land for productive purposes and are meaningfully participating in the economy (Mashatile,2023). South Africa does not have specific legislation on coalition at the present moments, nevertheless, some countries have existing laws on coalitions.

In countries such as Kenya and Mexico, various aspects of coalition building are regulated; legislation may cover the definition of a coalition, requirements for registration, and timelines for submitting the necessary documents to relevant authorities (Dladla, 2018:22). Kenya's Political Party Act outlines more than sixteen issues that a coalition agreement must address, these issues include the intra-coalition distribution of party subsidies and how parties plan to allocate positions within a coalition (Dladla, 2018:23). There must be standard, uncompromised principles which ensure the protection of efficient governance;

whatever changes might happen, it cannot be that an overhaul in the political executive sees a complete paralysis of the institution (Ndima, 2023).

### **3.6.3 Electoral system factors**

An electoral system is a set of rules governing an election, comprising mainly of majoritarian plurality and proportional type of electoral systems (Ware, 2023). The electoral system determines the degree to which people can freely express their will in society when electing a government. Government has the responsibility to design a better electoral system (Maseremule, 2023). In other words, political leaders should allow for the establishment of electoral systems that promote the will of society rather than advance narrow party politics. Electoral system is one of the main sources of institutional diversity among democratic countries (Ware, 2023). In essence, electoral systems reflect the quality of a country's vitality in promoting values that ensure people participate freely in processes of electing a government of their choice. The electoral system, as a key element of the constitutional-institutional system, significantly influences other elements of the political system, namely party structure and the system of power and government (Kurunczi, 2023:50). Subsequently, an electoral system that allows citizens to participate freely in electoral processes have the likelihood of yielding more representative and democratic governments reflecting the will of the people. Different electoral systems exist across the globe; there is no perfect system to choose. However, each electoral system is a function of its political context, and when this changes, it also ought to change (Maseremule, 2023).

The choice of an electoral system is one of the essential institutional decisions in any democracy (Ngubeni, 2018:29). This is critical because it affects the behaviour of the electorate, which in turn has an impact on election outcomes. Electoral systems allow the different factions or ideological groups in a country, to have the opportunity to have representatives in public policy decision-making as elected by the voters (Ramirez, 2023). The nature and character of the electoral system predetermine the natural propensity of parties to opt for coalitions or alliances (Kadima, 2018:10). Undisputedly, there is an intricate relationship between a country electoral system, and the type of government a country elects. Parties, on the contrary, have little information about voter

preferences. On top of this, neither parties nor voters have a clear understanding of how the electoral system functions or how it conditions the strategic environment in which elections take place (Roussias, 2022:410). However, electoral systems create a legal framework within which democratic governments, including any type of coalitions can be formed.

#### **3.6.4 Ideological factor**

A vast body of research has demonstrated that beliefs about politically contentious facts are driven primarily by ideology or partisanship (Kossowska, Szwed & Czarnek, 2022:1839). This is attributable to popular narratives that resonate with constituencies when political leaders articulate their viewpoints in the public domain. The influence of political ideology on individuals' behaviour and their endorsement of social policies is pervasive, and its impact on their economic and social well-being is incontrovertible (Aval & Wyer, 2022:248). People's conduct in the social and economic environment can, to a greater extent, be influenced by various philosophical orientations in their political space.

When parties offer clear ideological platforms, they become more consequential for voters, who can easily identify the closest alternative to their interests. In contrast, when party platforms become diluted, voters are less likely to find ideological differences across options and cast a ballot based on policy positions (Riera & Cantu, 2022:463). Arguably, people are motivated to demonstrate support for their political choices based on the ideology that resonates with them. However, the significance of ideology can, to a relative extent, be influenced by socioeconomic factors that exist in different environments. Ideology has not been an essential factor in party coalition-building or splitting in African countries (Kadima, 2018:14). Similarly, in many African countries, such as Senegal, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali, ideology has no bearing at all on the building or collapse of party alliances and coalitions, the single most important motivation is the quest for public office (Kadima, 2018:14). This narrative suggests a hybrid of cultural and societal complexities that exist from one country to another.

Factors motivating the formation of coalitions cannot be exhaustively discussed in this section of the study. The personalities and ambitions of party leaders

fuelled by competition amongst them, differences between alliance and coalition partners, proximity of a general election, inadequate internal democracy, and results of previous elections are some of the factors motivating the formation of coalitions (Kadima, 2018:15). There is no one motivating factor for the formation of coalitions. The common denominator is that coalitions are premised on the clandestine or pretentious pursuits of political parties. Political leaders deal with inherent structural, systematic, and institutional dysfunctions.

It is deduced from Maseremule (2023) that different electoral systems exist. However, respective governments play a critical role to ensure the system works for the benefit of society. Every country's electoral system function within the confines of political regimes as argued in Kadima (2018:14), which typically emanate from legislative and statutory frameworks further discussed in Mashatile (2023). Political ideology has a potential to express itself in a manner that society conducts itself as argued by Adaval and Wyer (2022:248), which Kossowska et al., (2022:1839) maintained is linked to partisan association.

### **3.7 PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE COALITION**

Coalitions are generally very delicate relationships between political parties. Political parties in coalitions need to pursue a course of action that yields a favourable outcome for all the partners involved in a coalition. This calls for a common understanding between coalition partners to sustain the coalition, preventing disintegration due to insignificant differences that can be easily reconciled. The following principles are prerequisites for effective political coalitions:

#### **3.7.1 Communication**

It is imperative for political parties involved in coalitions to constantly communicate, both with partners and constituencies, about matters pertaining to the coalition arrangement. Political communication constitutes an important channel through which coalition partners can directly communicate their policy priorities to their voters without being constrained by parliamentary rules or their coalition partner (Inaki & Heike, 2017:335). This process of communication is essential in ensuring the constituency is not excluded from critical matters of policy that can affect the party in future elections. Party leaders must always

communicate with their members and supporters about the objectives of the coalition (Masipa, 2017:42). The foundation of political power is based on the collective will of the people, therefore, coalition partners must communicate continuously with their members on important issues affecting the coalition. Coalition partners and the coalition itself must transparently explain coalition policies to their constituencies and report back on their achievements (Gumede, 2023). In this context, communication in coalitions must be carefully managed to avoid communicating wrong messages in the public domain. For coalition government, the communication of government action is even more necessary and certainly complex (Delmases, 2021). In the same vein, political parties must constantly communicate with each other when in government, to avoid problems and challenges that could be avoided through sharing of information and ideas. In the absence of effective communication and sharing of information, active participation in decision-making cannot be established (Van Wezel, 2000:17).

### **3.7.2 Consultation**

The process of consultation is important to ensure the exchange of information about what political parties intend to achieve in a coalition. Consultation helps organizations to proactively consider the needs and desires of anyone who has a stake in their organization, which can foster connections, trust, confidence, and buy-in for your organisation's key initiatives (Sedmark, 2021). Coalition governance means there will be constant engagement with coalition partners and other stakeholders on policies and programs to be implemented in accomplishing the goals of a coalition. Consultations are a key mechanism used by bureaucratic and legislative decision-makers to actively engage citizens and interest groups in the design, formulation and evaluation of public policies and legislation (Bunea, 2020). Most importantly, coalition parties should develop effective platform for consultation inside the internal structures of the coalition and the electorate at large. Actively listening to stakeholders concerns and feedback is extremely valuable and helps to identify and control risks (Kemp, 2022). Consequently, coalitions can predict possible clashes with partners and constituencies, which assist in avoiding the collapse of government and policy misplacement with the voters. This is achieved by means of interaction between

coalition partners and all other stakeholders through a meaningful process of effective consultations.

A coalition agreement must set out a mechanism for regular consultation between the coalition partners (Beukes & Visser, 2021:44). In essence, consultation should not be accidental, but requires carefully planning to promote effective dialogue between coalition partners. A successful coalition-building exercise requires individual parties to try to seek and understand each other's point of view (Masipa, 2017:42). In the absence of effective consultation, political parties take unilateral decisions detrimental to the success of the coalition. Ideally, before a matter reaches the agenda of the municipal executive or the Municipal Council, the coalition partners should have reached an agreement on it (Beukes & Visser, 2021:44). This ensures that issues in contradiction with the policy position and programme of the coalition are identified and addressed on the right platforms before reaching the legislature for a vote.

### **3.7.3 Consensus**

It is significant for coalition partners to reach political consensus on critical issues to run an effective coalition. Political consensus is generally concerned with an agreement or collective unanimous opinion among several people (Olanipekun & Awolowo, 2020:3). This implies a group of politicians in this context are obliged to establish a common ground on an issue despite their differences. Consensus adds to the democratic legitimacy of agreements as they approach greater or lesser standards of democratic legitimacy, depending on how participants behave toward one another while reaching their joint decision (Vasilev, 2016). Consensus becomes a direct reflection of group ownership of the decisions taken by politicians in the discharge of their governance responsibilities. The principle of consensus among coalition partners' entails establishing a common ground on conflicting interests for the purpose of the coalition's progress.

A consensus brings more stability to the coalition because it demonstrates to the public and other political parties that the coalition partners are not in conflict but still agree to disagree on specific matters (Beukes & Visser, 2021:18). In other words, all members of the coalition take ownership for decisions taken,

regardless of the outcomes, whether favourable or not. When consensus has been reached, all parties see their views reflected in the outcome (Masipa, 2017:42). This promotes cohesion in coalitions and eliminates scapegoating and unwarranted criticism that can be labelled against other coalition partners. Moreover, consensus enables political parties to desist from actions that betray the confidence of their coalition partners by taking unilateral decisions that affect the cohesion of the coalition. The more consensus the coalition partners can establish, the stronger their relationship will be (Masipa, 2017:42).

#### **3.7.4 Compromising**

One of the biggest challenges facing political parties in a coalition is implementing programmes that may go against party policy and ideology. This requires a high degree of compromise between coalition partners. Political compromise is difficult in a democracy, even though no one doubts it is necessary (Thompson, 2010:1125). This is attributable to the conscious decision political leaders must take in letting go some of their strong views for the benefit of the coalition. This paradox of compromise presents a conundrum for political parties during coalition negotiations, as they must navigate the tension between policy representation and responsibility (Van der Velden, 2023). This is further aggravated by the fact that compromising on a policy position substantially reflects a deviation from the campaign promise that a political party made to voters.

The ultimate objective of compromising should be to create a win-win situation among the various parties involved in a coalition (Masipa, 2017:42). In a compromise, not everyone gets what they want; that is the responsibility of governing (Valsania, 2023). Coalition parties should not take decisions that make a coalition partner walk away, perceiving themselves as losers at the negotiation table. Since the parties to a compromise continue to believe that they are right and that the other party is wrong, agreeing on a compromise means agreeing to a solution that will partially realise values that one considers to be wrong (Spang, 2023:440). Therefore, compromise should not be deemed a defeat but rather a concession for progress in a coalition arrangement.

It can be deduced from Masipa (2017:42) and Gumede (2023) that communication is a vital component for the sustenance of a coalition.



Additionally, an active exchange of information and views in the coalition, as observed in Sedmark (2021) and Kemp (2022), is significant for effective coalition management. The progress of any coalition arrangement is based on the ability to establish a common ground when differences exist, as argued in Olanipekun and Awolowo (2020:3), which is necessary to arrive at a favourable position through compromise, as advocated in Thompson (2010:1125).

### **3.8 MANAGEMENT OF POLITICAL COALITIONS**

It is crucial for coalition partners to maintain a balance between factors of success and failure capable of breaking a coalition arrangement. Coalitions require approaches that encapsulate the policy positions of all political parties coming into a working agreement. Furthermore, it is imperative for political parties to engage in a principled manner to ensure that the coalition project yields intended results. The following are key steps to ensure successful management of coalitions:

Firstly, political parties that believe there is a possibility of a coalition should develop a plan before a coalition is formed (Dladla, 2018:24). Developing a plan ensures that coalition partners have a clear understanding of what they desire to achieve in the coalition arrangement. Coalition negotiations must be aimed at a coalition that represents a broad alignment of interests and serves as an agenda for the incoming coalition government (Beukes & Visser, 2021:19).

Secondly, the adoption of coalition agreements is necessary to maintain cooperation among parties and provide a stable government for effective service delivery. Coalition agreements are not merely symbolic papers but represent important policy documents designed to facilitate inter-party cooperation and devise a policy course for the government (Dladla, 2018:25). Coalition agreements are important policy platforms that crucially determine policymaking and coalition governance during a legislative term (Kluver & Back, 2019:95). Therefore, there is a strong relationship between the content of the agreements and the approach to governance adopted by the parties. In the same vein, the agreement serves as a point of reference for dispute resolution when one of the parties in the coalition breaks the rules of engagement. Coalition agreements are negotiated by various party leaders before the government finally comes into force and, in most cases, are ratified by party

organizations; they could therefore be considered a register of policies that coalition parties wish ministers to implement (Moury, 2010:386). Coalition agreements are critical documents that political parties should develop to promote effective coalition governance. Coalition agreements are regarded as playing an important role in reconciling the fundamental tension between standing apart and sitting together (Matthews, 2019:150).

Lastly, in establishing a structure to patrol and enforce discipline within a coalition, the management committee also plays a role in the enforcement of the coalition agreement (Dladla, 2018:26). Coalitions can also establish specific bodies for the management of conflicts between the parties, which vary in terms of their venue and formality (Matthews, 2019:150). This type of committee becomes critical as they serve the purpose of maintaining mutual relations and possess the capacity to deliberate on the deviant actions of the coalition partners to maintain peace and unity in the coalition. Appropriate examples for coalition bodies include coalition committees, a mixed committee of ministers and parliamentary leaders, a committee of parliamentary leaders, the inner cabinet, and summit parties (Matthews, 2019:151). These committees have a mutual relationship in the running of the coalition, motivated by the desire to achieve a common goal which is their sustenance of the coalition for effective delivery of public services.

It can be deduced from Dladla (2018:24), Beukes and Visser (2021:19) that coalition parties must be intentional about their involvement in a coalition arrangement by crafting a detailed plan of what they aspire to achieve. Beyond coalition plans, parties are challenged with the formulation of policy, which is essentially critical, as discussed in Moury (2010:386) and Matthews (2019:150). The management of a successful coalition, as argued in Matthews (2019:150), cannot be achieved without a leadership structure to guide and control the coalition towards its goals and objectives.

### **3.9 COALITION GOVERNANCE**

Different types of political coalitions have been highlighted in this chapter, nonetheless, this section presents a detailed discussion on coalition governance. Prior to the formation of coalition government, one political party initiates a working relationship with another party to constitute a government.

Coalition parties are political parties that govern in a multiparty government with at least one other party (Kluver & Spoon, 2017:794). In essence, the absence of majority winner in a legislature following an election implies political parties are obliged to work together to form a coalition. Coalescing parties must be convinced that there is greater benefit from working together than working alone (Etyang, 2022:170). The benefits of working in a coalition government, either from a policy-related motive or desire to occupying office, play a critical role in ensuring that political parties take part in the formation of a coalition government.

Coalition governments are also referred to as executive or cabinet coalitions. A cabinet or executive coalition refers to a coalition in parliamentary government in which several parties come together and are allocated portfolios in government (Ngubane, 2018:75). Consequently, one of the most distinguishing characteristics of a coalition government is the sharing of executive portfolios. A coalition government depends on establishing cooperation between political parties represented in a legislature. The distribution of power through the allocation of executive portfolios from the party with the highest number of seats to the party with the lowest number of seats is an essential component of a coalition governance. The establishment of a coalition government presents coalition partners with an opportunity to grow and become better, while simultaneously posing serious ramifications for coalition parties. The participation of a political parties a coalition can yield potential benefits while potentially creating disadvantages that pose a challenge for political parties more, especially during election time. The next section discussed the benefits and challenges of coalition governance:

### **3.9.1 Benefits of coalition governance**

Coalition government brings challenges for the parties involved, notably that of negotiating a way of governing together while still maintaining individual party identities (McEnhill, 2015:101). Coalition governments are common in many countries around the world and are associated with the following benefits:

**Parties gain something they could not on their own.**

Organizations have limited personal, financial, technological, and other resource capacities required to fulfil their goals. Coalitions governance allows political parties to gain something they could not gain on their own (O'Day, 2004:04). The inspiration behind coalitions is building on one another's strengths and deriving benefits relating to issues of common interest, passing a specific piece of legislation, or forming a government (Netswera & Khumalo, 2022:104). Small parties forming coalitions have limited resources compared to bigger parties, subsequently they benefit by coalescing with big parties. Coalition parties can learn from each other and thus strengthen their individual parties based on those experiences (Hanebe & Malinzi, 2019:47). In this context, coalition governance safeguards coalition partners against their weaknesses and provides opportunities to leverage the benefits of their coalition partners.

#### **Opportunity for increased participation in government.**

In a majority-party government, an individual party has the authority to drive the agenda of the government on its own initiative. However, coalition governance provides all partners in government with an opportunity to participate in government and the implementation of its programs. Coalitions can provide opportunities to broaden participation in government (Hanebe & Malinzi, 2019:47). Coalitions can create political stability and governability in areas with "hung" legislatures where no single political party has won a majority vote or where there is a multiplicity of competing parties (Netswera & Khumalo, 2020:174). This creates opportunities for parties represented in a Municipal Council to participate in a coalition government required to govern the affairs of a municipality.

#### **Electoral competitiveness.**

Gains from coalition building not only signalled the enrichment of the country's democratic processes but also equally engendered a positive competitive spirit among the political parties (Mokgosi, Shai & Ogunnibi, 2017:49). Coalition governance puts big parties and small parties on the same pedestal of electoral contest, as no political party can overwhelmingly dictate to the other in the absence of a majority winner. There are different forces at play between the effects of political competition and policy choices (Rezki, 2021:90). These

effects create pressure on political parties in coalition governance to opt for policy choices that seek to attract the attention of the electorate more than their political rivals in electoral contests. Political competition is understood as the result of the actions carried out by two or more parties that contend to win elections and that show their electoral strength under conditions of legal equality and political freedom (Uribe, 2022:122). Moreover, coalition governance eliminates the dominance of political parties in elections by providing small and big parties with an opportunity to compete based on what each achieved in its contribution to the coalition government.

### **Democratic reforms and policy process.**

Another important opportunity that coalition arrangement presents is the likely possibility of inspiring stronger democratic reforms through robust interparty debate in the metropolitan, district and local councils (Mokgosi et al., 2017:50). In this context, coalition governance presents coalition parties with an opportunity to participate in the legislative processes that affect systems of government and the impact they have on the quality of life. To stabilise coalition governments in South Africa, one approach would be to promote a special type of coalition politics that focuses on serving the public rather than preying on their fears and insecurities (Fakir, 2023). This implies a meaningful process of reform inspired by coalition politics, postulating a people-centred approach required to improve the lives of ordinary people. Coalition governance provides coalition partners with policy options that not only criticise the ruling party but also offer credible alternative policies that appeal to voters (Cassimjee, 2023). Democratic reforms that come with coalition governance are not exhaustive, save to say they are informed by political and socioeconomic factors within which a coalition government operates.

### **3.9.2 Challenges of coalition governance**

Coalition governance, in its nature, is a fragile form of arrangement that requires political parties to meticulously manage work relationships. In a single-party government, there are less likely contradictions that can cause the government to collapse compared to a multiparty system with diverse views and political orientations. The following are some of the complexities inherent in coalition governance arrangements:

### **Incapacity to make tough decisions.**

Coalitions are often criticized for being incapable of taking tough decisions and being unable to implement radical policies necessary to kick-start recovery in times of economic crisis (Boucek, 2010:50). The incapacity sometimes stems from ideological differences and policy choices that differ between coalition partners. Coalition governance makes it difficult to take decisive action and unpopular decisions (Todd, 2017). Politicians on both sides of the aisle are optimistically cautious about taking decisions not aligned to their positions of public policy. Coalition governance is a challenge for political parties because it involves cooperation and compromises between parties that have different political goals and are competitors in political elections (Christiansen & Pedersen, 2014:940). Effective decision-making is somewhat difficult in coalition governance compared single majorities.

### **Failure of democracy.**

The purpose of an election is to elect an outright winner to form a new government. Elections ensure that citizens retain the power to determine the composition of government (Biegon, 2008:29). The outcome of coalition governments reflects the opposite will of society, and subsequently, politicians make government arrangements that do not represent the preferences of the electorate. In some instances, coalition governance has negative electoral consequences, as it can be seen by voters as a betrayal of their votes, given that parties are often forced to work with those ideologically opposed to them to access political power (Maile, 2020:08). There is a potential for conflict as political parties are sometimes pushed to support unpopular decisions inconsistent with the preferences of their constituencies. In most cases, the ultimate result is that political parties proceed with the coalition much to the detriment of their constituencies, policies, or ideological positions on certain issues.

Coalitions governments have been characterised by four distinct features, namely political instability, fluidity of power, the criminal arrangements associated with power-brokering and the mafia-style approach to managing the coalition (Mkutu, 2023). This defeats democracy and affects the efficiency of coalition governance as it places personal interest of politicians above the

general welfare of citizens. In contemporary South Africa, coalitions are weaponised as extensions of elections; power that was not won at the polls is pursued under rules determined by power and patronage (Booyesen, 2023).

### **Compromise of ideology, priorities, and principles.**

Parties must establish common ground with partners by compromising their own principles and ideologies (Masipa, 2017:41). The political manifesto that attracted voters and led to the trust of party varnishes, and this leads to diminished ideology of the party in council, and the mandate of the voters is silenced (Hanabe & Malinzi, 2019:48). This takes away the identity of individual parties and negates the core of what establishes the character of an organization. The autonomy of a political party is diminished as parties struggle to find ways to accommodate the interests of their partners. When no single party commands a majority of seats after an election, the party composition of the next government and its policies often depend on the outcomes of coalition talks (Plescia, Ecker & Meyer, 2022:214). Compromise on ideology or priorities becomes inevitable as the only way to ensure that a coalition government is formed. Coalition governments can promote stability through compromise, as they require parties to negotiate and compromise on policies and decisions, which could lead to more balanced governance (Emam, 2023). In essence, political parties taking part in coalition governments must agree to a level of compromise in principles or priorities to strike a meaningful relationship with coalition partners to achieve their goals and objectives.

### **Weakened party identity.**

When political parties embark in a process of coalition government formation, the likelihood for a diminished voice or image in public perception often becomes inevitable. The formation of coalition poses the tendency to weaken party identity in terms of their ideological leanings (Mokgosi et al., 2017:53). Partnership in coalition government relatively means political parties inadvertently finds themselves in a position where their policies and ideologies cannot be articulated with the clarity the of a majority rule political party as intended by the leaders of political parties. Junior partners in a coalition government are torn between an eagerness to profile themselves, and to show loyalty to the coalition (Brommesson & Enkengren, 2019:203). This results in

identity crisis that results in parties overshadowed by coalition partners that are bigger and influential than them. Junior parties generally do not occupy leading positions in the foreign policy executive, and they do not hold any of the relevant departments (Oppermann & Brummer, 2014:555). This arrangement in coalition governance which downgrades the identity of coalition partners emanates from the notion that junior parties' control far lesser seats than their partners in the coalition. Joining a coalition government as a junior partner considerably hurts a party's future electoral prospects and identity as junior partners cannot enact much of what they promised before the election and since they cannot sufficiently differentiate themselves from their larger coalition partner (Kluver & Spoon-Spoon, 2019: 60).

It can be deduced from Oday (2004:04) that the participation of parties in coalition governance brings benefits that would otherwise be out of reach for smaller parties. It is further demonstrated in Uribe (2022:122) that coalition governance brings healthy contests among parties, while Fakir (2023) postulates democratic reforms as strategic benefits of coalition governance. Nevertheless, coalition governance carries with it a level of risk to political parties. In the argument advanced by Boucek (2010:50) and Tod (2017), political parties in coalitions, regardless of size, are constrained in taking decisions that advance their policy goals and objectives. Political parties suffer systematic inefficiencies in coalition governance, which are inherent in the intricate nature of relations resulting from compromised ideology seen in Masipa (2017:41) and identity crises expounded in Mokgosi et al., (2017:53). Ultimately, there is a variety of benefits and challenges that come with coalition governance. The onus is on political parties to take informed decision that promotes the goals and objectives of their parties and members.

### **3.10 GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES OF COALITION GOVERNANCE**


Coalition governance as a form of collaborative governance is common in many parts of the world. However, there are aspects of geopolitical nature which influence characteristics of coalition governance which are different in one part of the world to the other. The practice of coalition governance is influenced by various factors prevalent in one country and absent in another. This section will focus on the international and African perspectives of coalition governance.



### 3.10.1 Western Europe perspective

Many countries in the west have been under coalition governance, more than any other part of the world. In Europe, coalitions have been the norm for many decades; therefore, coalitions are not a new thing in that part of the world (Boucek, 2010:18). This is underscored by Puy (2013:66) who claims that coalition governance is a norm in many European countries. Various cases of success in European coalition governments played a significant role in influencing the development of coalition governance in several parts of the world today. Figure 3.1 shows the prevalence of coalitions among European countries from 1945 to 1999.

Figure 3.1: Western Europe coalitions from 1945 - 1999



Source: Boucek (2010:48)

Figure 3.1 highlights the prevalence of coalition governments in Western Europe from 1945 to 1999. This period spans over 54 years of recurring coalition governments in different countries in Western Europe. Figure 3.1 shows that more than 70% of the countries in Western Europe have been under coalition governments. There are countries that have had coalition governments for several years, while others have experienced coalition governance in the past few years. The Netherlands and Luxembourg has been under coalition governance entirely throughout the whole period under review. Alternatively, Spain, Greece, and the United Kingdom have relatively established coalition

governments in the past few years compared to other countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium, which have had coalition governments for too long.

In Britain, the last peacetime was in the turbulent 1930's, when the three successive prime ministers, Ramsay MacDonald, Stanley Balwin, and Neville Chamberlain, headed government coalitions known as the "National Government" (Boucek, 2010:49). The 2010 General Election in the UK failed to produce an overall majority, the result on May 6, 2010, was the first hung parliament in 36 years and the first full coalition since 1945 (Crouch, 2019). The general election of 2010 broke a decade's long culture of single-party governments in the UK.

Denmark has not had a single-party government for 40 years, which would lead coalition critics to argue this situation as disastrous for a country. Denmark is consistently ranked by the United Nations as the world's "happiest" nation (Todd, 2017). In the general elections of 2019, Denmark yielded yet another coalition government to run office until the next general elections in 2023 (Henley, 2019). Social Democrats leader Mette Frederikse said that after three weeks of negotiations, she had reached an agreement with three leftist parties to form a one-party minority government, a common agreement in Denmark (Henley, 2019).

The 2012 general election in Greece highlighted one of the crucial moments of coalition governance in the history of Western European countries. Antonis Samaras has worked his entire life to become prime minister of Greece, but now that he has achieved his dream job, the biggest question among his friends and his enemies is how long he will be able to hold on to it (Alderman & Donadio, 2012). Scepticism on the ability of Samaras to hold onto government came after the failure to yield a majority winner in the 2012 general elections in Greece. Samaras, the leader of the New Democracy party, was sworn into office, ushering in a new coalition government that will put Greece back at Europe's bargaining table (Alderman & Donadio, 2012). Coalition governance has been a major feature of European politics for decades. Notably, the degree of political stability in many of these European countries under coalition governance speaks volumes about the maturity of coalitions in European politics. However,

there are other countries outside Europe that have a long history of coalition governance, such as India, as a prime example (Masina, 2021:10). Countries such as Japan, Indonesia, Australia, Canada, Manitoba, and Ontario have had coalitions (Todd, 2017).

It may be deduced that European countries practised coalition governance way ahead of many countries in the different parts of the world. European countries had far more successful and longer coalition governments than the rest of the world consistent with arguments raised by Boucek (2010:49). It is appropriate that coalition governments in Africa consider European countries as case studies to perfect the art of coalition governance. Nevertheless, other countries such as India and Japan as espoused in Masina (2021:10) should also be considered as examples of success stories in coalition governance.

### **3.10.2 African perspective**

The practice of coalition governance is relatively new in African polity (Masina, 2021:11). Whereas political party coalitions and alliances have been widely discussed in Western Europe and other regions, little research has been done into the value of these phenomena and why they are formed in Africa (Kapa & Shale, 2014:93). The domination of Africa by Western powers over the last century left an indelible mark of colonialism and imperialism in several African states. Like many European countries that experienced coalition governance because of hung parliaments, a few African countries have crossed the path between coalition governance and single-party majority rule. Whereas political party coalitions and alliances have been widely discussed in Western Europe and other regions, little research has been done into the value of these phenomena and why they form in Africa (Kapa & Shale, 2014:94). When one excludes countries in which multiparty parliamentary elections have not been held for a variety of reasons, pre-election party alliances were formed in the most recent legislative election in 51% of African states, and 54.9% had some form of coalition government (Kadima, 2014:11). The following are some of the African countries which at some stage formed coalition governments:

#### **Kenya**

A decade ago, a broad-based pre-electoral alliance won the national elections in Kenya, therefore, changing the face of contemporary electoral and government politics in that country (Kadima & Awuor, 2014:151). Kenya's coalition government, designed to break the political stalemate following the 2007 disputed elections, is the first of its kind on the continent (Biegon, 2008:45). The coalition government was formed after negotiations through the intervention of Kofi Anan, resulting in a power-sharing deal pact based on consociationalism theory with the creation of the office of the premier and the sharing of cabinet posts (Biegon, 2008:45). Intervention by the Secretary General of the United Nations suggests that parties could not strike a deal among themselves. Since the 2002 general elections, Kenyan politicians have realised that political parties that are serious about winning a national election or referendum and forming a government have no option other than to make a broad-based electoral pact and form parliamentary and governmental coalitions (Kadima & Awuor, 2014:151). The coalition government arrangement in Kenya is a classic example of recent cases of success in coalition governance in Africa.

### **Lesotho**

The Kingdom of Lesotho became one of the most complex and delicate coalition governments in the history of African coalitions. After 2012, when the country was ruled by unstable coalitions, Lesotho attracted little attention, except when there have been bouts of political instability, sometimes prompted by military mayhem (Nyane & Motlamelle, 2022:142). These sets of events placed the Lesotho Kingdom in the limelight following unstable coalitions that rocked the new government. In the space of five years between 2012 and 2017, Lesotho held three elections and experienced the collapse of two coalition governments (Ngubane, 2018:13). Due to internal politics, the ruling party was destabilized through a motion of no confidence in parliament that eventually collapsed the coalition. In the successive May 2012 general elections, three opposition parties came together to form a coalition government (Ngubane, 2018:28). A third coalition government was established after the May 26, 2012, elections, however, it crumbled acrimoniously in June 2014, having lasted for two years (Ngubane, 2018:31).

### **Zimbabwe**

The history of Zimbabwean elections has been marred by disputes, electoral fraud, and violence for many years. After nearly a year of seemingly endless talks brokered by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Zimbabwe's long-ruling ZANU-PF party and the two factions of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formed a coalition government in February (Thornycroft, 2010). The MDC candidate was elected prime minister, while Robert Mugabe retained the position of president. Zimbabwe's power-sharing government is in crisis as the MDC and prime minister in the GNU, Morgan Tsvangirai say President Robert Mugabe has broken the Constitution by unilaterally appointing senior public servants, experts warn that the military and security establishment in Zimbabwe has too much control over the political process (Thornycroft, 2010).

In the 2013 general election, Robert Mugabe was re-elected to the displeasure of the international community after a landslide victory over his rival in the MDC. Tsvangirai became prime minister in a coalition government and believed he could win outright this time, instead, the party has lost many parliamentary strongholds. The results so far paint the electoral map of Zanu-PF green, with only a few pockets of MDC red (Smith, 2013). Whatever the degree of any rigging, some believe Tsvangirai was a weak leader who let the MDC become tarnished by corruption and made careless choices in his search for a wife (Smith, 2013). The general election of 2013 in Zimbabwe marked the unceremonious end of the coalition government.

It can be deduced that coalition governance is relatively new in most African countries and the few that existed had inherently systematic complexities in their nature. The coalition government in Kenya is a relative case of success as argued in Kadima and Awuor (2014:151), compared to the more complex cases of coalition governments of Lesotho which displayed profound levels of instability (Ngubane, 2018:28). There is a room for improving democracy in Africa which is essential for good governance and coalition governance across different African states.

### **3.11 SOUTH AFRICA'S COALITION GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY (GNU)**

The first democratically elected government of South Africa came into power in 1994 as a culmination of the resistance against the apartheid regime and its repressive laws in South Africa. On May 10, 1994, Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela was sworn in as the first black democratically elected president of South Africa ([www.historyonline.com](http://www.historyonline.com)). Nelson Mandela expressed an emotional end to suffering for the masses of black people in South Africa, signalling the beginning of a new future that all South Africa should aspire to build. Never, never, and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another and suffer the indignity of being the skunk of the world, remarked Mandela ([www.sanews.gov.za](http://www.sanews.gov.za)). Mandela's statement reflected the intensity of suffering that many black people experienced in the past while making a solemn commitment about the future that South Africa needs to embrace in healing the wounds of the past.

The ANC, NP, and IFP formed the first democratic GNU in 1994 at both national and provincial levels (Ngubane, 2018:87). The ANC had an absolute majority, however, formed the GNU in accordance with the constitutional clause as provided by the law. The GNU was established and headed by Nelson Mandela as president and FW De Klerk as his deputy president. Mandela's cabinet included ministers from other political parties like the NP and IFP ([www.historyonline.com](http://www.historyonline.com)).

Notwithstanding that the ANC had a sweeping victory in the national elections of 1994, the approach adopted was the establishment of a GNU to include different political parties for the purpose of promoting reconciliation in South Africa, as negotiated during the CODESA. The notion of GNU encompassing all political parties that enjoyed a threshold of 10% support in the electorate came from the ANC as one of many instruments to ensure inclusivity during the transition period from apartheid to democracy, 1990–1994 ([www.historyonline.com](http://www.historyonline.com)). Table 3.1 shows how various political parties forming the GNU performed during the national election of 1994:

Table 3.1: General election results of the national assembly in 1994

Item	Party	Percentage	Votes	Seats
1	ANC	62,65	12 237 655	252
2	NP	20,39	3 983 690	82
3	IFP	10,54	2 058 294	43
4	FF+	2.17	424 555	9
5	DP	1.73	338 426	7
6	PAC	1.25	243 478	5
7	ACDP	0.45	88 104	2

Source: Independent Electoral Commission (2000)

The GNU typifies the first political coalition formed at the dawn of democratic order in South Africa. The principle of cooperation amongst political parties was promoted as different political parties became part of the GNU. The GNU demonstrated that political cooperation based on commonly accepted principles can function optimally and achieve desired outcomes. The withdrawal of political parties such as the NP from the GNU at a later stage did not weaken the coalition, however displayed that principles are stronger than expedience in building sustainable political relations. The NP Federal Executive Committee decided to withdraw from the GNU with effect from June 30 June 1996 ([www.historyonline.com](http://www.historyonline.com)).

It can be deduced that coalition arrangements are not altogether new in South Africa, as seen in Ngubane (2018:87) how the GNU evolved under the leadership of Nelson Mandela. It is therefore, expedient for political parties in South Africa to replicate the successful implementation of the GNU-type of coalition governance notwithstanding ideological and policy difference that exist among political parties.

### 3.12 MUNICIPAL COALITIONS IN GAUTENG PROVINCE

Municipal coalitions, in essence started in the Western Cape in the early days of democratic local government. Pressley (2006) highlighted that the ID leader Patricia de Lille came out firing against the DA over what she described as establishing coalitions with its archival ANC in towns in the Western Cape. Arguably, the most noticeable form of municipal coalition that took place was in the CCT through a multi-party coalition comprised of various parties in its Municipal Council. According to Pressley (2006), the DA elected Helen Zille as mayor of CCT after receiving support from the ACDP, FF Plus, Africa Muslim Party, and other small parties. South Africa experienced 97 coalitions before 2016, however, there is a paucity of research on the performance of coalitions at the municipal level, hence the need to assess the performance of the coalitions in the selected metros (Pietersen, 2021:483). Nevertheless, the local government election of 2016 yielded three metropolitan municipalities with hung Municipal Councils. There was no political party that won an outright majority in all metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng in the 2016 local elections. The following is a breakdown of how the main contenders performed in the 2016 local government elections in Gauteng metropolitan municipalities:

Table 3.2: Gauteng Coalition Municipalities

Party	CoJ	CTMM	EM
1. ANC	44,5%	41, 25%	48,64%
2. DA	38,3%	43,15%	34,1%
3. EFF	11,09%	11,63%	11,23%

Source: IEC, (2016)

Table 3.2 indicates that no single political party got more than 50% in any of the metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng. A coalition in Ekurhuleni metro



consisted of the ANC, AIC, PAC, Patriotic Alliance (PA), and Independent Ratepayers Association of South Africa (IRASA). Even though this arrangement involved many parties, it was still a minimal-majority coalition (Pietersen, 2021:496). The DA, together with COPE, ACDP, FF Plus, and UDM, in cooperation with the IFP and EFF, formed the first coalition government in Johannesburg, which was a minimal-majority coalition as the withdrawal of other small parties would collapse the Council (Pietersen, 2021:497). The first coalition government in Tshwane was led by the DA in a coalition agreement including the FF Plus, ACDP, COPE, and UDM, whereas the EFF opted to support the coalition when necessary (Maserumule, 2016:550). The non-committal position of the EFF rendered the DA-led coalition vulnerable, as this was also a minimal-majority coalition (Pietersen, 2021:499). In the CoJ and CTMM, the DA established coalitions with the support of the EFF on a case-by-case basis, which proved difficult as one of the municipalities was placed under the administration of the GPG. The subsequent local elections in 2021 yielded yet another hung Municipal Council in the CoJ, CTMM and EM, therefore, placing the municipalities in a position of inevitable coalition governance arrangements.

It can be deduced from Pietersen (2021:499) that coalition governments in Gauteng municipalities did not start with the 2021 local elections. Minority parties such as the PAC, AIC and COPE always played a role in assisting with the formation of coalitions in the EMM and CTMM (Maserumule, 2016:550). Coalition governments formed after 2021 is the continuing trend that started in the 2016 elections.

### **3.13 POLITICAL LEADERSHIP**

There are various forms of leadership roles in society in the social, economic, and political spheres of life. This study on municipal coalitions in the CTMM is political in nature; subsequently, a gravitation towards political leadership became a special focus in this section of the study. What is political leadership—a blessing or a curse—and does it bring positive or negative outcomes (Ofosu-Anim, 2022:398)? Political leadership is a complex issue that involves principles of morality, trust, rule of law, and equality before the law (Popova, 2019:266). Pichler (2018) describes a political leader's ability to influence others between

a political leader and a political community, mainly a nation, political party, social class, or local constituency that formally or informally authorises a leader to act on its behalf. The essence of political leadership in this context suggests a relationship of trust between political leaders and the people they represent towards achieving their goals.

Political leadership implies followership on every level of interaction, as the existence of, support of and dialogue with followers are constitutive of the leader, as well as for politics (Zachara-Szymańska, 2023:32). In this context, politicians do not simply lead themselves, but represent the citizenry who have pinned their hope for survival in their elected leaders. Political leadership, through representativeness, requires the ability of political leaders to prove their authenticity toward citizens (Langlais, 2014:7). This requires politicians to prove the worthy trust and confidence citizens have in them through elections to positions of power. This is achieved through strategies and programmes designed to attain the wishes of the people. A political leader must have a vision; they must be able to create visions that can come true, be trustworthy and meet the potential and situations (Pitutecha & Silpcharu, 2019:106). This is necessitated by the fact that politicians embody the aspirations of the people they lead; they represent hope towards the emancipation of people from the complex dynamics of socio-economic challenges to which they are subjected. The fact of being elected as a representative implies the ability for a leader to show his or her true self because he or she embodies the values and wishes of people (Langlais, 2014:7).

Politicians hold one of the highest levels of leadership in society as the people's representatives because they operate within a constitutional and legal framework, and their source of authority is the people's permission to govern (Samad, Jerjawi, & Dadic, 2022:4). Subsequently, there is an expectation based on accountability and responsibility that politicians should provide good governance to the people they lead. Good governance is the exercise of authority through political and institutional processes that are transparent, accountable and encourage public participation (Hlongwane, 2015:290). Good governance refers to public policymaking and implementation processes that are accountable, transparent, inclusive, effective, efficient, consensus-oriented,

responsive to citizens' needs, and that follow the rule of law and ensure citizens' participation (Muronda & Van der Walt, 2023:120). Good governance is generally characterised by a set of personal and institutional values that individuals and organisations must constantly apply in their discharge of government work.

The citizenry requires value for money, measured in terms of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, therefore, making good governance vital for effective service delivery performance (Fourie, 2016:42). This suggests good governance cannot be delineated from service delivery and therefore, becomes a requirement for ethical and professional conduct by politicians in their various roles of leadership. Good governance cannot be divorced from human rights, particularly at the local government level (Hlongwane, 2015:291). This brings into sharp focus the role of politicians at the local government level to maximise good governance. Local government is the coalface of service delivery; therefore, a high degree of exceptional leadership is required for the development of communities and the provision of services in a manner that is effective and efficient. In this context, councillors must diligently fulfil the roles placed upon them by legislation in the pursuit of development in the communities that they serve. The important role councillors play as intermediate, conveying information between residents and the municipal administration and the Council is essential in municipalities (Thornhill & Dlamini, 2012:42). Du Plessis and Lues (2011:107) outlined the following roles of councillors in a Municipal Council:

to provide residents with a progress report explaining the decisions made by the council in committing resources to development projects and programmes affecting the local community.

assess whether his/her municipality's programmes and plans are having their intended impact and whether services are being delivered fairly, effectively and in a sustainable way.

determine whether capital projects meet the requirements of the council's integrated development plan.

maintain close contact with the community to ensure that the council is informed of all issues on the ground and to convey important information from the council to the residents.

Political office-bearers such as the executive mayor, speaker and chief whip of councils are expected to fulfil their obligations towards the community as councillors. However, their added responsibilities, by virtue of their political leadership in council, place a further demand on them to go the extra mile in discharging their responsibilities. This is reflected in the legislative powers vested in them, particularly under the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. In this context, it is expected of them to execute the responsibilities of their political leadership within the ambit of the Constitution, national legislation, council policies, resolutions, and other decision-making mechanisms of their respective municipalities.

It may be deduced that political leadership is a complex type of leadership which requires absolute integrity and honesty from an individual entrusted with the responsibility. There is an intricate level of relationship between political leadership and good governance, which requires those entrusted with the responsibility in Municipal Councils to be above reproach. It is observed from Pichler (2018) and Zachara-Szymańska (2023:32) that political leadership is premised on well-established relationship between the leader and the followers. The translation of political leadership responsibilities forms a cornerstone of good governance standards as argued by Hlongwane (2015:291), Muronda and Van der Walt, (2023:120), which is required of politicians in their various positions of leadership.

### **3.14 CONCLUSION**

The concept of coalition governance and its theoretic foundations such as office-seeking and policy-seeking were discussed in this chapter. Various perspectives on coalition governance emanating from the international to local perspectives on coalition governance were discussed. Coalition governance as a form of collaborative governance appears more pragmatic in theory than in practice. The next chapter is based on the intricacies of coalition arrangement dynamics in the CTMM.

## **CHAPTER 4: COALITION ARRANGEMENTS IN CITY OF TSHWANE MUNICIPALITY**

### **4.1 INTRODUCTION**

The preceding chapter discussed the theoretical foundations of coalition governance. This chapter expounds on the coalition arrangements in the CTMM. The CTMM after 2016 local elections went through different forms of coalition arrangements in the municipality. This entailed legislative, minority government and minimal winning coalitions that took place since 2016 elections. The arrangement between the EFF and DA after 2016 did not involve the sharing of executive power. The minority government that followed did not have enough numbers to govern effectively. The minimal winning coalition that came out of the 2021 elections is precarious and susceptible to collapse and more vulnerable to outcomes like to follow the 2024 general elections. This chapter explored various factors influencing coalition arrangements in the CTMM. The discussions entailed in this chapter reflected on the different administrations of the ANC taking charge of the municipality, from local government elections in 2000 to the coalition after 2021 local elections.

### **4.2 CTMM-ANC ADMINISTRATION**

The CTMM Municipal Council has largely been under the control of the ANC from the first democratic local elections in South Africa. The ANC received 56% of the vote in the 2000 local elections in the CTMM (IEC 2000:17). In the 2000 local elections, the ANC increased its percentage share of the vote in the CTMM municipality. In the local government elections of 2006, the ANC received 57% of the vote in the CTMM (IEC 2006). In the successive elections conducted in 2011, the ANC came out as the majority party with 55% of the vote. However, there was a slight decrease in the percentage of votes for the ANC compared to local election in 2006. The local election outcomes of the years 2000, 2006, and 2011 represented a time when the ANC led the municipality as a majority party.

Father Msangaliso Mkhatswa from the ANC became the first mayor of the CTMM in December 2000 ([www.thepresidency.co.za](http://www.thepresidency.co.za)) The administration of

Father Smangaliso Mkhatswa represented the CTMM transition from apartheid local authorities to democratic local government. Father Smangaliso Mkhatswa ended his term of office in 2006 and became the speaker of council; thereafter, he was succeeded by Gwen Ramokgopa ([www.pressreader.com](http://www.pressreader.com)). The era of Gwen Ramokgopa administration was characterized by the consolidation of governance systems in the CTMM. Gwen Ramokgopa completed her term of office in November 2010 and was succeeded by Kgosientsho Ramokgopa, who was elected mayor over DA candidate Gerhardus Pretorius by 92 votes to 49 votes ([www.mg.co.za](http://www.mg.co.za)). Kgosientsho Ramokgopa led the municipality for a period of six years and ended his term in August 2016, after the local elections. Kgosientsho Ramokgopa came in at the time when the ANC was heading towards the exit door due to poor service delivery and allegations of corruption labelled against the party by the residents.

The transition from an ANC-led single-party majority to coalition had serious repercussions for communities in the CTMM due to internal conflicts of the ANC. Prior to the 2016 local elections, there were acts of vandalism because of mayoral candidate disputes pronounced by the ANC. The ANC took a decision to bring Thoko Didiza as a compromise ANC mayoral candidate for the CTMM rather than nominate the incumbent mayor and ANC regional chairperson Kgosientso Ramokgopa or his deputy Mapiti Matsena, as the two were blamed for leading factions that were divided on who should lead the municipality (Tau, 2016). The 2016 local elections in the CTMM yielded a different outcome, as the ANC did not win an outright majority in the elections. Expert analysis indicated that a dismal performance by the ANC at the 2016 polls was highly probable. We are going to see the ANC lose one or two big metros, like Mandela Bay, Tshwane, and Johannesburg, the party is very vulnerable this year, remarked Prince Mashele (Vorster, 2016). The election results came out as predicted, and the ANC lost control of the CTMM, CoJ, EM, and NMB.

The outcome of the 2016 local elections produced unexpected results for the ANC in the CTMM compared to previous elections. Considering the ANC performance in the previous elections, it was inconceivable that the party could lose the municipality in less than five successive elections since democracy. The dismal performance of the ANC at the polls was attributable to the image

the party suffered in the municipality, which was detrimental to the organization. This reflected low levels of confidence the electorate had in the ANC given a wide range of issues pertaining to poor governance and service delivery.

#### **4.3 DA-EFF 2016 LEGISLATIVE ARRANGEMENT**

In the build-up to the local elections in 2016, many political parties advocated for coalition at the local government level to improve service delivery to communities. The ANC as a leading party in several municipal councils came under criticism from opposition parties, civil society, civic organizations, the media, and various non-government organizations in the build-up to the 2016 local elections. The notion of poor service delivery by the ANC gained momentum including in the CTMM, with a significant number of the electorate displaying their disapproval towards the ANC at the polls in the 2016 local elections. A coalition was imminent in the CTMM; however, political parties did not robustly engage on how to govern the municipality given the possible demise of the ANC, except making inferences that a coalition would be put in place once the ANC is dislodged from the municipal government. After the 2016 local elections, the CTMM had a hung Municipal Council, as there was no overall winner. The DA got 43%, the ANC 41%, the EFF 11%, COPE 0,24%, the ACDP 0,49%, the PAC 0,17%, and the FF+1,99% ([www.elections.org.za](http://www.elections.org.za)). This presented opposition parties with an opportunity to embark on negotiations to install a coalition to run the municipality.

Coalition discussions started taking place immediately after the results of the 2016 local elections were announced at the IEC centre in Pretoria. The DA officially obtained a majority of votes in Tshwane, and the party's leadership says it is now ready to talk about a coalition government with the EFF (Bateman, 2016). This validates the notion that negotiations in earnest started after announcing the election results. The DA and EFF ostensibly did not engage in coalition talks until after the announcement of the 2016 local elections. "Negotiations are now beyond the stage of arguing about ideological concepts into the era of practical arrangements," DA chairperson James Selfe remarked (Du Plessis, 2016). This came as a response to questions posed to senior leaders of the DA regarding the stage of discussions with the EFF on coalition governance, which included the CTMM among other municipalities.

Negotiations for the formation of a coalition in the CTMM specifically took place between the DA and EFF as the main parties with enough numbers to determine the direction of the municipal government. The ACDP, COPE, PAC, and FF Plus were technically insignificant to the talks as they did not have enough numbers. Meanwhile, coalition talks also took place between the ANC and EFF based on specific conditions outlined by the political parties. Julius Malema said the EFF had refused to discuss coalitions with the ANC's Gauteng provincial leadership, and requested that the ruling party's national leadership deal with the EFF national leadership (Marrian, Quintal, Mabuza & Dalmini, 2016). The ANC, led by Gauteng Premier David Makhura and provincial chairperson Paul Mashatile, agreed to this demand and dispatched bigwigs such as Gwede Mantashe, Jessie Duarte, Zweli Mkhize, Andries Nel, and Jeff Radebe (Marrian et al., 2016). The purpose of the talks was to initiate a coalition arrangement based on consensus between the ANC and EFF. Nevertheless, the strenuous efforts of negotiations became futile as parties reached an impasse. The ANC had a choice between Zuma and the metros, and they chose Zuma, so let them lose the metros," stressed Julius Malema (Marrian et al., 2016). Ultimately, negotiations with the CTMM culminated in a coalition arrangement facilitated by the EFF giving support to the DA outside a formal coalition agreement. The other minority parties in the Municipal Council, such as FF Plus, ACDP, and COPE, entered into a formal coalition agreement with the DA. The DA and minority parties did not constitute 50% plus 1 as required by national legislation. This, in theoretical terms, landed the CTMM in a legislative coalition with the EFF working outside a coalition agreement.

After finalizing the coalition arrangement, it was imperative for the DA to allocate portfolios to parties represented in the coalition. Following the election of all office-bearers in the first sitting of the Municipal Council, an executive team was established to steer the CTMM government. "This is the most diverse mayoral committee that the capital has ever seen, and I challenge anyone to prove me otherwise," said mayor Solly Msimanga (Ngoepe, 2016). Msimanga alluded to the fact that his mayoral team included parties such as ACDP and FF Plus. The mayoral committee displays the multi-party nature of this DA-led government, as we welcome mayoral committee members from other parties that have



formed the multi-party government, and as I have said, we will be charging them to deliver to the people with the same enthusiasm, quality, and vigour that we expect of our public representatives" (Ngoepe, 2016). As anticipated, the ANC did not form part of the coalition, considering the perceived historical relationship that exists between the DA and the ANC. The EFF exclusion came as no surprise, as the party categorically stated its intention to abstain from government, however, voted with the DA on issues of common interest. The PAC and COPE did not form part of the government. Nevertheless, the ACDP, with one seat in the council, was part of the government.

The early days of the DA and EFF coalition arrangements started smoothly, with both parties working together to elect political heads such as the executive mayor, speaker, chief whip of council, and chairpersons of committees with relative ease. Hardly a year after its formation, the camaraderie between the DA and EFF started to show cracks, which evolved into a protracted political wrangle (Maseremule, 2020:329). Motions of no confidence were tabled before the council against the executive mayor and speaker and became more volatile than expected.

The DA is at risk of losing the mayoral seat in Tshwane with two motions of no confidence in mayor Solly Msimanga looming from both the ANC and the EFF (Mailovich, 2018). The pursuit against Solly Msimanga was averted by his departure from the mayoral office before the EFF and ANC took him out in motion of no confidence. Nevertheless, the EFF clashed with the speaker of council, in what became the toughest encounter ever witnessed in the municipal chambers of the CTMM. A fight is looming between the EFF and Tshwane Council Speaker Katlego Mathebe over a decision by the latter to convene virtual public meetings to deliberate on the contentious issue of revised ward committee by-laws (Moatshe, 2022). This confrontation derailed the working arrangement between the EFF and DA, which triggered the process of placing the CTMM under administration. Eventually, a showdown ensued between the municipality and the provincial government following the placement of CTMM under administration.

The CTMM had challenges in the running of the Municipal Council, which were experienced in many other municipal legislatures around the country.

Disruptions on points of order, fierce debate, and walkouts prevailed in the council meetings following the 2016 local elections. Political parties constantly walked out of council meetings creating a situation where the municipality became ungovernable. Furthermore, disruption of council proceedings led to the collapse of council meetings, to such a point that the municipality became liable for intervention by the provincial sphere of government.

In the meantime, the Member of the Executive Committee (MEC) for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) in Gauteng, Lebogang Maile, raised concerns about the collapse of service delivery in the municipality. In the meantime, the provincial government issued directives to improve service delivery in the municipality. Tshwane must end the water crisis in Hammanskraal, start collecting waste on time, establish ward committees, and submit information on the city's top 20 contracts, Maile asserted (Appel, 2020). Maile issued strict directives that the municipality is mandated to implement by the end of February 2020. However, are his expectations reasonable or part of a political move to force the DA coalition out of power (Appel, 2020)? In the end, the directives issued by the MEC against the municipality were not rectified to the satisfaction of the provincial government.

The situation in the municipality continued to deteriorate, triggering decisive intervention by COGTA. In one of the Municipal Council meetings, COGTA deployed an official to preside in a Municipal Council meeting for the appointment of a speaker. "Unlike the previous time where a provincial COGTA official had to chair the meeting, Mathebe should ensure that such an incident does not happen again" Maile asserted (De Klerk, 2020). However, the demands of the provincial government were not met and the MEC proceeded to suspend the speaker, which was later rescinded on technical grounds. These and other challenges regarding the directives further put the municipality at risk of having an administrator appointed to take over the municipality.

The Premier of Gauteng ultimately announced that Tshwane would be placed under administration. Makhura said this during a media briefing at the offices of the Gauteng legislature (Tandwa & Madia, 2020). The Gauteng Executive Council met yesterday to assess developments in Tshwane and has decided to invoke section 139(1)(c) of the Constitution, alluded Makhura (Tandwa & Madia,

2020). Due processes to place the municipality under administration were initiated, including approval by the Minister of COGTA and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). Following these developments, the CTMM was placed under administration.

Tshwane Municipal Council was dissolved after the NCOP voted to accept a report recommending dissolution. Most provinces, during a sitting of the NCOP in the Gauteng legislature on Thursday, voted to adopt the report (De Klerk, 2020). The provincial government is invoking section 139 of the Constitution, which will not only dissolve the council and see an administrator appointed to run the city but, read with the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, will require new elections to be held within 90 days, Makhura said (Nicholson, 2020). All the actions taken by the provincial government were intended to put finality on the pandemonium that engulfed the CTMM Municipal Council because of the dysfunctional coalition arrangement.

The MEC for COGTA announced a team of administrators who will work with senior managers in Tshwane for the next 90 days (Chothia, 2020). According to Chotia (2020), the MEC also outlined the scope of work that the administrators will do in the municipality, which includes undertaking all executive functions of the Municipal Council, statutory functions of the executive mayor, and just to mention a few. The administrators took over the municipality and assumed the power and authority conferred upon them by the provincial government. This is despite the inferences expressed by political experts, academics, and the DA itself that the placement of the municipality under administration was for ulterior political motives. Legally, the provincial government has the authority to place the municipality under administration when satisfied after following due processes, where the municipality failed to meet its constitutional obligations of delivering services to the community.

Following the placement of the municipality under administration, opposition parties made their first appeal to the Pretoria High Court against the decision of the provincial government. The DA announced its intention to institute a legal process to overturn the decision of the MEC for COGTA in Gauteng. This assertion was rebuffed by the MEC for COGTA, insisting that his decision was appropriate for the level of intervention taken. "We dare them to go to court, and

we shall meet there, we cannot be blackmailed by the DA, which has failed dismally and brought the city to its knees as such; we are not interested in nursing the DA's feelings; they are wasting our time," argued Maile (Sehloho, 2020). Nevertheless, the DA proceeded with filing a court case against the MEC of COGTA, protesting the decision to place the municipality under administration. The DA filed an urgent application at the Pretoria High Court to get premier David Makhura and his executive committee's decision to dissolve the Tshwane council set aside and declared unlawful (Mahlangu, 2020). In case the DA fails in court, Tshwane will, in about 90 days, go back to the polls to elect a new government (Mahlangu, 2020).

The North Gauteng High Court heard an urgent application against the provincial government's move to intervene in the capital's affairs. The DA believes it has a formidable case in its challenge of the decision to place Tshwane under administration, and judgment in the matter has been reserved indefinitely (Ntshidi, 2020). The Gauteng High Court in Pretoria has ruled in the DA's favor in the party's challenge against an ANC provincial government decision to dissolve the Tshwane council (Tandwa, 2020). The decision of the Gauteng executive council to dissolve Tshwane Council taken on March 4 and communicated to applicants on March 10 is reviewed, declared invalid, and set aside," the court ruled (Tandwa, 2020). The Municipal Council was instructed to reconvene and continue with the obligation of conducting council business.

The High Court was scathing of the MEC and Premier regarding the judgment given in favour of the applicant. The Gauteng government elected to dissolve the Municipal Council, which, in the facts before us is legally unsustainable. This did not amount to enough circumstances to provide Gauteng government with the opportunity to dissolve the Municipal Council (Saflii, 2020). Instead of trying to resolve the deadlock, almost all the action adopted by the Gauteng EC is directed against the speaker (Saflii, 2020). The premier does not address in the answering affidavit the failure to act against the errant ANC and EFF councillors (Saflii, 2020). This and other stern statements were issued by the High Court in Pretoria, which led to the decision to place the municipality under administration being overturned.

As anticipated, the decision of the court was welcomed by the DA and considered a victory in its legal quest to reclaim the municipality. We note that the coup d'état was overturned by the court, and their banana republic behaviour was crushed. The outcome of this ruling means that the DA mayor and speaker will retain their positions until the matter is heard in the same high court on 17 December 2019, according to John Moodey (De Klerk, 2019). Conversely, the general expectation was that the ANC and co-applicants would be less impressed by the court judgment. However, no immediate reaction was given by the provincial government or interested parties. This paved the way for the implementation of the full measures as outlined by the court.

The speaker of council resumed the duties of council as reinstated by the court. In the meantime, the Municipal Council still had no executive mayor or municipal manager. The administrators were given time by the court to hand back power to the Municipal Council within a determined period. The orders in paragraphs 2 and 3 are suspended until after 5 days because the level 5 nationwide lockdown enforced by the National Coronavirus Command Council (NCCC) and the President of the Republic of South Africa has been lifted (Saflii, 2020). After the court judgment, preparation was underway to resume the business of the Municipal Council and elect an executive mayor. Preparations are underway for the embattled Tshwane to elect a new mayor and city manager over the weekend, while another tussle between political parties intensifies and most councillors remain in the dark (Madia, 2020). The meeting was presumed to be of an urgent nature as a way of quickly getting the municipality back on track. However, the meeting did not proceed, and yet another hurdle emanated while preparations for the meeting were still underway.

The greatest obstacle in the way of resuming council activities emanated from the action taken by the provincial government to appeal the High Court outcome in the Constitutional Court. We have considered the judgment in Tshwane, after consulting with legal counsel, we have decided to appeal the decision, as we are of the view that the court erred in several respects, said Maile (Moloko, 2020). Maile maintained there needs to be finality on the issue of the Municipal Council and confirmed the matter was heading to the Constitutional Court for a final verdict (Moloko, 2020).

The appeal by the MEC of COGTA effectively meant the CTMM could not proceed with council business as intended until the appeal process was finalized. This did not go well with the DA, as the judgment by the court was granted in its favour. The DA will file papers in the Gauteng North High Court in Pretoria, asking the court to apply the rules to order that the judgment to overturn the dissolution of Tshwane Council be effective immediately. This suggests that the DA position advocated for immediate resumption of council business without further delays, contrary to the opposition parties' posture prolonging the implementation of the court judgment.

In the meantime, the DA resolved to embark on further legal steps to enforce the outcome of the Pretoria High Court judgment on the matter. The DA said it had received notice that the Gauteng Provincial Government had filed papers at the Constitutional Court for leave to appeal the North Gauteng High Court's judgment, while the EFF subsequently also filed court papers regarding the appeal ([www.iol.co.za](http://www.iol.co.za)). Accordingly, we will file papers to oppose direct access to the Constitutional Court by both the ANC and the EFF. We will oppose the EFF's motion for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court of Appeal, but most significantly, we will file papers in the Gauteng North High Court asking the court to apply the rules to order that the judgment to overturn the dissolution of the Tshwane council be effective immediately, stated Mike Moriaty ([www.iol.co.za](http://www.iol.co.za)). The legal challenges in the CTMM were unprecedented and displayed political tension in a highly unstable coalition.

After a judgment by the Pretoria High Court to rescind the dissolution of the CTMM Municipal Council, Gauteng COGTA applied for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court and conditionally to the Supreme Court. The Gauteng Provincial Government has approached the Constitutional Court on an urgent basis over a damning judgment from the Gauteng High Court in Pretoria, which found the decision to dissolve the Tshwane council unlawful (Madia, 2020). This application by the Gauteng government was intended to put on hold the decision to rescind the dissolution of the CTMM Municipal Council. Accordingly, the Gauteng government succeeded in overturning the decision of the court.

In the meantime, the DA was of the view that while the Gauteng Department is waiting for a decision from the Constitutional Court, it is imperative that the

Municipal Council resume authority in the council and continue with its business. Consequently, the DA filed a second application with the court to compel councillors to go back to work. While the DA celebrated its latest court victory and plans for the resumption of the Tshwane council, the Gauteng government has expressed unhappiness with the High Court ruling and set its sights on yet another appeal (Madia, 2020). The provincial government has lodged an urgent appeal with the Supreme Court of Appeal in terms of Section 18 of the Superior Courts Act, which grants an automatic right of appeal to a higher court (Madia, 2020). This, in essence, means that the Municipal Council could not proceed with the resumption of duty until the appeal was resolved. The Municipal Council was locked between the DA and Gauteng Government court actions until a court decision by the Constitutional Court was handed down.

The Supreme Court of Appeal has reaffirmed the Gauteng High Court, Pretoria ruling passed on June 10 in terms of Section 18 of the Superior Courts Act lodged by the DA, seeking to enforce the April 29 judgment nullifying the provincial executive council decision to dissolve Tshwane council (Moatshe, 2020). The purpose of the Gauteng Provincial Government was to retain the dissolution of the CTMM council until a judgment is handed over by the Constitutional Court. The case at the Constitutional Court, where the executive contested the council dissolution judgment, was heard in September, and judgment was reserved (Moatshe, 2020). A ruling in favour of the DA was granted that while the Gauteng government awaits a decision by the Constitutional Court, the CTMM council must be reinstated. The ruling essentially reinstated Tshwane councillors to their posts after they had been out of work for almost eight months. It also marked an end to the stay in office of the administrators appointed by the provincial executive council in March 2020 to run the CTMM affairs in terms of section 139 of the Constitution (Moatshe, 2020). This marked the end of the bitter and protracted legal battle between the DA and EFF and, invariably, the coalition arrangement between the two parties. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court delivered its judgment, which upheld the decision in April 2020 to set aside the province's decision to put the council under administration. The provincial government misconstrued its powers and failed to apply itself to the issues faced by the municipality. This meant the

dissolution decision was invalid and the municipality must do its job. The dissolution decision was set aside as manner of which it was formulated offending the principles of lawfulness. Provincial leader Solly Msimanga said he was glad that the ruling came before the municipal elections because it set the precedent that no province could abuse processes (Moatshe,2020).

#### **4.4 CTMM MINORITY GOVERNMENT**

Following the reinstatement of the CTMM Municipal Council after the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment, Randal Williams of the DA was elected as executive mayor. Williams won 97 votes out of 125 votes, ahead of the EFF's Moafrika Mabogwana, who received 25 votes after the ANC announced that it would not be participating in the elections, calling the elections a sham (Manyane, 2020). A total of 97 votes instead of 108 majority votes meant that Randal Williams was not elected by most councillors. As a result, the CTMM changed from a legislative coalition supported by the EFF to a minority government arrangement in which the EFF and ANC did not form part of the government.

After his election as executive mayor, Randal Williams proceeded to appoint members of his mayoral committee. Tshwane is back in business after new executive mayor Randall Williams named his executive yesterday. Williams axed those perceived to be part of a faction aligned with former mayor Stevens Mokgalapa, among them Sello Maimane, Isak Pietersen and Richard Moheta (Moatshe, 2020). The minority government included the DA and other political parties such as the FF Plus and ACDP, while the ANC, EFF, and PAC were not part of the minority government.

The DA minority government bemoaned an unfavourable state of finances in the city following a takeover from administrators appointed by the GPG. The ANC provincial administrators inherited a R296-million surplus when they came into the city and left the city with a R4.3-billion deficit. The effect of their mismanagement had a lasting impact on the city, and the challenges we face today in the city can be directly traced back to their time in office (Mothiba, 2023). The appointment of administrators considering this narrative, didn't achieve the intended objective of good governance as anticipated by the provincial government. The DA minority government led the municipality until the 2021 local elections. After the 2021 local elections, the DA returned to form



a coalition with other opposition parties represented in council. The DA's Randall Williams retained his position as the mayor of Tshwane when the new council was inaugurated (Mafolo, 2021).

The CTMM minority government reflected a moment of sharp disapproval between the EFF and ANC on matters of coalition and working relationships. The general expectation given the insufficiency of minority government to form a 50+ in the Municipal Council was that the ANC and EFF would come together to form a government. However, the opposite took place, as both parties did not come forward to form a coalition government in the municipality. Eventually, the DA formed a coalition with other political parties following the 2021 local elections.

#### **4.5 CTMM 2021 COALITION GOVERNMENT**

One of the fundamental responsibilities of a Municipal Council following an election is to ensure that a municipal government is formed based on the outcome of the election process. The CTMM had a hung Municipal Council in the 2021 local elections, a coalition was required to provide political leadership in the municipality. Different political parties represented in the Municipal Council had to start negotiations to form a government. Negotiations were very difficult because of the various perspectives on coalition preferences expressed by political parties during the campaigns. ActionSA expressed its unwillingness to discuss coalitions with the ANC because of rampant corruption labelled against the party. ActionSA committed during the campaign that we would never work with the ANC, and any arrangement that is dependent on ANC support would be a violation of that commitment to the South African people, Mashaba said (Nkosi, 2021). In the same vein, the DA highlighted that it will not initiate any coalition discussions with the EFF. This negatively affected coalition discussions in the municipality and presented a few coalition options in the municipality. Zille told News24 that the party had no shared values with the EFF, which is why the party rejected any proposal to work with the EFF (Mahlati, 2022). Table 4.1 represents the composition of the CTMM coalition after the 2021 local elections:

Table 4.1: CTMM 2021 coalition

Item	Party name	Seats
1	DA	69
2	ActionSA	19
3	FF Plus	17
4	ACDP	2
5	COPE	1
6	IFP	1
<b>Total number seats: 109</b>		

**Source: IEC 2022**

Following the negotiations, a 6-party coalition was formed, made up of the DA, ActionSA, FF Plus, ACDP, IFP, and COPE, with a majority of the 109 seats required to form a government. The coalition was headed by the DA, which took the position of executive mayor, while other parties formed part of the mayoral committee. This mayoral team has been chosen after careful consideration, as we take these appointments very seriously, we will need to hit the ground running as there is a lot of work that needs to be done, said Randal Williams (Mahlakoana, 2021). The following are councillors from different parties who formed part of the municipal government in the CTMM 2021 coalition, led by Randal Williams (Mahlakoana, 2021):

- MMC for Finance - Peter Sutton (DA)
- MMC for Human Settlements - Abel Tau (ActionSA)
- MMC for Community Safety - Grandi Theunissen (FF Plus)
- MMC for Roads and Transport - Dikeledi Selowa (DA)
- MMC for Economic Development and Spatial Planning - Andre le Roux (ActionSA)

- MMC for Health - Rina Marx (FF Plus)
- MMC for Social Development and Community Services - Peggy de Bruin (ActionSA)
- MMC for Corporate and Shared Services - Kingsley Wakelin (DA)
- MMC for Utility Services - Phillip Nel (DA)
- Acting MMC for Environment and Agriculture Management - Dikeledi Selowa

The mayoral committee was made up of coalition partners forming part of the agreement and working together in the municipality. Some coalition partners such as the IFP, were not included in the executive, however, continued forming part of the coalition in the CTMM. The IFP and ACDP did not form part of the mayoral committee, as they did not have their councillors appointed to the team. The DA appointed Randal Williams as executive mayor, while the position of speaker was given to COPE Dr Makwarela (Mahlakoana, 2021). The coalition arrangement took over the CTMM for a considerable period after 2021 elections.

Tshwane's coalition government, made up of six political parties, celebrated a year at the helm of the council, despite the instability of coalition governments in other parts of the country (Khumalo, 2022). This came against the background of instability in municipalities such as the CoJ and EM, which had their coalition governments collapsed and reconstituted at some stage. In the 12 months that we have been in office, we have put the interests of Tshwane residents as a top priority by identifying 10 strategic focus areas to develop the city and fast-track service delivery, argued Williams (Khumalo, 2022). Nonetheless, the CTMM coalition faced its own challenges that boisterously threatened stability in the municipal government.

The coalition following its establishment appeared solid to remain in power, to the end of its term. Nevertheless, the exclusion of some partners from the executive presents a challenge that can affect relations in the future. The inclusion of one coalition partner while excluding the other may have a detrimental effect in coalition relations in the distant future. Nevertheless, the likelihood of consolidating the coalition in the CTMM beyond ActionSA and FF Plus remains high because other political parties such as RC, DOP, GOOD, PAC, ATM, IAC, and PA could be negotiated by the DA in the event of a fallout.

Following a tumultuous coalition after the 2016 local elections, a level of calmness was restoring which remains to be seen how long it will last?

#### **4.6 CTMM MUNICIPAL COUNCIL UNDER COALITION ARRANGEMENTS**

The executive and legislative authority of a municipality is invested in the Municipal Council, according to section 151 of the Constitution. Furthermore, section 156 of the Constitution states that a municipality may make and administer by-laws for effective administration on matters that it has the right to administer. Municipal councils ordinarily delegate responsibilities to governance structures and political office bearers in a Municipal Council for the efficient running of municipalities. However, a Municipal Council may not delegate the responsibility to approve by-laws as stipulated in section 160 of the Constitution.

The CTMM Municipal Council comprises 107 ward councillors and 107 proportional representative councillors (Tshwane 2018:31). Following the 2021 local elections, the number of seats in the council was allocated as follows: ANC 75, DA 69, EFF 23, ACTIONSA 19, FF PLUS 17, ACDP 2, COPE 1, GOOD 1, IFP 1, PAC 1, Patriotic Alliance (PA) 1, African Transformation Movement (ATM) 1, Africa Independent Congress (AIC) 1, Republican of Tshwane (RC) 1, Defenders of People (DOP) 1 ([www.municipalities.co.za](http://www.municipalities.co.za)). The 2021 local elections resulted in a decline in Municipal Council seats for the ANC, DA and EFF. The DA lost 23 council seats in the 2021 local elections, while the ANC and EFF, respectively, lost 14 and 2 seats. The political parties that made significant gains in the 2021 local elections were ActionSA and FF Plus, with 19 and 17 seats, respectively. The ActionSA coming into government for the first time garnered a high number of votes, compared to the FF Plus, which has been contesting municipal elections in the CTMM for many years. The significant number of seats gained by FF Plus and ActionSA predominantly came from the ANC and DA. Following the consolidation of the coalition arrangements, the Municipal Council proceeded to elect a mayor, speaker, and chief whip of council. The successful election of office-bearers was a major step towards full institutionalization of the coalition in the CTMM.

A Municipal Council has an obligation to convene meetings to deliberate on matters tabled before public representatives. Meetings of the Municipal Council must be convened at least once a quarter, according to section 18 of the

Municipal Structures Act, 117 of 1998. However, the CTMM Municipal Council convened meetings monthly, subject to the Rules and Orders By-law Notice 153 of 2013, which makes provision for such meetings. The CTMM council after 2016 elections was terribly unstable and attracted negative publicity in the local government sphere. To delve deep into the 2021 CTMM administration, it is appropriate to make a comparative analysis between the 2016 and 2021 Municipal Councils in the CTMM.

The 2016 Municipal Council convened between 43 ordinary and 7 special council meetings in the period running from August 19, 2016, to March 5, 2020 ([www.tshwane.gov.za](http://www.tshwane.gov.za)). Following the 2016 local elections, the DA relied on the EFF for approval of its budget and the passing of resolutions. However, the EFF withdrew its support for the DA-led government in the 2018–19 financial year. The EFF in Tshwane has, for the first time since the 2016 municipal polls, refused to support a DA-led administration budget (Moatshe, 2019). The withdrawal of the EFF meant the DA-led government could not effectively take decisions because there was no majority. This led to a deadlock in the Municipal Council until the DA-led government reached out to the ANC for support to approve the budget. The 2019/20 budget was passed with 156 votes from the ANC, DA, Cope, PAC, and ACDP, while EFF councillors registered their dissenting votes (Moatshe, 2019). In the end, the Municipal Council was able to proceed with the business of delivering services to the community.

Regardless of the good working relationships displayed by political parties at the onset of the coalition government in 2016, there were challenges to the efficiency of Municipal Council meetings in the years that followed. The breakdown of the working relationship between the EFF and DA created a stalemate in the municipal council. The ANC, as the opposition in council, also embarked on the process of destabilizing council meetings to advance the party's political agenda. Council meetings became characterized by petty squabbles and cross-party condemnation; the bad blood eventually culminated in several EFF members and DA representatives pushing, shoving, and grappling, but no blows were exchanged (Head, 2020).

Objects were thrown at the presiding officer, and heckling occurred when councillors were on the podium addressing council. The Municipal Council

meetings were characterized by persistent walkouts by opposition parties, which often led to the collapse of council meetings. The ANC and EFF have joined forces and disrupted six of our meetings, which means we could get no work done, which is what any councillor worth his salt is there to do for our community, alluded former councillor Johan Jansen (Friedman, 2020). The situation in the Municipal Council in 2020 had become volatile and required special intervention to restore order and improve service delivery to communities. There were numerous walkouts in council meetings to a point where the Municipal Council was no longer able to act decisively due to broken relations between political parties. Table 4.2 shows different meetings of the Municipal Council that collapsed in the 2016 coalition.:

Table 4.2 Collapsed CTMM Council Meetings

Item No	Date of the meeting	Reason
1	27 September 2018	Walkout
2	25 April 2019	Walkout
3	25 July 2019	Walkout
4	29 August 2019	Walkout
5	28 November 2019	Walkout
6	16 January 2020	Walkout
7	30 January 2020	walkout
8	19 February 2020	Non-attendance
9	27 February 2020	Walkout
10	28 February 2020	Non-attendance

**Source: CTMM**

A total of 10 council meetings collapsed due to a lack of quorum in the Municipal Council under the DA and EFF coalition. In the early days of coalition, from 2016

to 2018, the Municipal Council was able to conduct its business with ease. The Municipal Council came under tremendous pressure in the 2018/19 and 2019/20 financial years. In the 2018/19 financial year, four meetings collapsed due to walkouts from opposition parties. This period signified an escalation in the level of tension among political parties in the Municipal Council. The breaking point came in the 2019/20 financial year, when five council meetings collapsed due to a lack of quorum in the Municipal Council. The Municipal Council had already reached a high level of incapacity to transact council business; ultimately, the dissolution of the Municipal Council and the placement of the municipality under administration by the provincial government took place. The dissolution remained in force for a period of months until suspended by a judgment issued by the Supreme Court of Appeal. Following the reinstatement by the Supreme Court of Appeal, the CTMM returned under a minority government led by the DA until local government elections.

The 2021 local elections resulted in the formation of a coalition government comprised of the DA, ActionSA, FF Plus, and other minority parties. This coalition government has the ANC and EFF as the main opposition parties in the council chambers. There have been elements of disruption in the Municipal Council that have made the running of the council difficult. Tshwane's budget presentation was postponed indefinitely following disruptive scenes as councillors tussled with private security in the council sitting (Mahlati, 2022). Williams said Makwarela, a COPE councillor, was attacked inside the council chambers during a heated meeting, he was hit on the head and on other parts of his body by councillors who were attempting to disrupt the meeting, which later had to be reconvened virtually (Goba, 2022). These incidents occurred in the municipal chambers, prompting the coalition to conduct most of its meetings virtually to avoid altercations in its council meetings.

The issue of the CTMM Municipal Council post-2021 elections compared to 2016 is crucial because it is necessary to draw a logical conclusion on how the Municipal Council improved given that it once reached a state of absolute dysfunctionality. However, the order of proceedings in the Municipal Council is not fully restored, the chambers were relatively calm at the inception of the 2021 coalition arrangement, this is crucial as it affects the effectiveness of the

decision-making processes of the Municipal Council in a manner that is meaningful and promotes good governance and accountability.

#### **4.7 OFFICE OF EXECUTIVE MAYOR UNDER COALITION ARRANGEMENTS**

The executive mayor plays a critical role in the leadership of the municipal government. This includes receiving reports from committees of council and administration on delegated and non-delegated functions. Executive mayors exercise powers and function vested in section 54 of the Municipal Structures Acts 117 of 1998 outlined as follows:

- Identify the needs of the municipality.
- Review and evaluate priority need of the municipality.
- Recommends strategies and programs to address the needs of the municipality.
- Recommends partnerships to deliver, programmes and strategies.
- Performing ceremonial roles.
- Reporting to the Municipal Council on decisions taken by the executive mayor.

The CTMM in 2021 yielded a hung Municipal Council like in the previous elections of 2016. This effectively meant no political party could declare a candidate for election as executive mayor based on a majority vote. The outcome resulted in negotiations in the Municipal Council among political parties to agree on a candidate for mayor. The DA, after 2021 elections, proceeded to form a coalition that elected its candidate as executive mayor. Randall Williams proceeded to lead the CTMM as executive mayor in the coalition after the 2021 local elections yielded no majority winner in the CTMM. The DA, Randall Williams has been re-elected as the executive mayor of Tshwane (Mahlangu, 2021).

The 2016 local government elections resulted in the ANC losing power to a coalition formed by opposition parties. South Africa's governing party, the ANC, has been defeated by the opposition, the DA, in local polls in the capital of Pretoria ([www.bbc.com](http://www.bbc.com)). The CTMM henceforth entered a period of coalitions, which replaced single-party rule with political party coalitions to provide stable



governance in the CTMM. During single-party domination by the ANC, the transition from one executive mayor to another always took place when the term of office came to an end for the respective government. However, following the 2016 local election, the CTMM started experiencing instability in the office of the executive mayor. The highlight of the instability resulted in premature resignations by Solly Msimanga and Stevens Mokgalapa before the end of their terms.

Provisions pertaining to the process and procedure for the election of mayors are outlined in the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. If a Municipal Council chooses to have an executive mayor, it must elect one, and subject to approval by the MEC, it may elect a deputy mayor within fourteen days of the council election as stipulated in section 15 of the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. Following the local government elections on August 16, 2016, the Municipal Council embarked on a process to elect a mayor for the CTMM. The DA Solly Msimanga was officially elected mayor of Tshwane, he was elected unopposed during the council meeting that was held in Pretoria (Dlamini, Raba & Mabuza, 2016). The DA alone did not achieve the election of Msimanga, as it relied on the support of other political parties in the Municipal Council to form a majority. The EFF and other opposition parties announced this week that they would support the DA in electing new local governments in several hung municipalities (Dlamini et al., 2016).

Assuming the office of executive mayor for Solly Msimanga implies an immediate responsibility to lead a coalition and expedite service delivery in the municipality. Since taking office in less than 100 days, the DA administration, led by Mayor Solly Msimanga, has begun to turn the tide against corruption in the city (Maimane, 2016). We have stopped lavish catering, banquets, and parties to save money for service delivery and not spend it on politicians' stomachs, we have also rejected luxury cars for politicians; furthermore, just before the DA took over Tshwane, the ANC administration purchased 10 new BMWs for politicians and senior officials. Msimanga redirected the new luxury vehicles to form a new anti-hijack unit in Tshwane, which will fight crime on our streets (Maimane, 2016). These steps were taken by Solly Msimanga at the

beginning of his administration to deal with perceived acts of maladministration perpetuated by the previous government.

The mayoral office has a responsibility to ensure that good governance is promoted in the municipality. This is achieved by maintaining high standards of ethical governance and ensuring that the office of the mayor is beyond reproach. Allegations of impropriety labelled against the mayoral office have far-reaching implications for ethical governance and undermine efforts purported to instil confidence in political leaders and their administrations. The ANC and EFF accused Msimanga's administration of corruption after reports pointed to the alleged irregular awarding of the R12 billion infrastructure management tender to a consultancy firm, GladAfrica (Morebudi, 2018). Allegations of this magnitude against a mayoral office are of great concern and an obstacle to accountable governance. Notwithstanding that the EFF was a voting partner in the DA-led coalition government, it took a stance against what the party perceived to be illegal conduct by the office of the executive mayor.

The employment of members of staff in the office of the executive mayor considered unfit for the job tarnished the image of the mayor's office. I note that Ms. Marietha Aucamp has formally resigned from her position as the chief of staff in the Office of the Executive Mayor of Tshwane after having been asked to do so (Mitchley, Bornman, & Mahlase, 2016). Another top manager employed during the era of the Msimanga administration was found to be underqualified and had to relinquish his position. The beleaguered head of Tshwane Emergency Services, Previn Govender, was shown the door during the ordinary monthly sitting of the council, for two years he was mired in controversy after it surfaced that he misrepresented his qualifications when employed by Tshwane Municipality (Moatshe, 2019). The appointment of these individuals did cast aspersions on the integrity and ethical propriety of the mayoral office. Although political offices are prone to unfounded allegations, it is imperative that such allegations are disputed with impeccable evidence. These allegations triggered a plethora of motions against the executive mayor, which have since become a trend since the coalition era.

The EFF and ANC tabled separate motions of no confidence in Msimanga over a R12-billion consultancy tender, which led to the suspension of city manager

Moeketsi Mosola (Morebudi, 2018). During a heated council meeting, the EFF motion on Msimanga was disallowed as not compliant with council rules, drawing angry reactions from the party (De Klerk, 2018). In essence, the EFF motion failed based on technical grounds in contrast with council rules and procedures. The second motion against Msimanga came from the ANC, which required EFF support to secure a majority, however, the motion failed because EFF had already walked out of council. Despite saying they wouldn't support the motion, the ANC just staged a walkout, and the motion lapsed because the person who tabled it was not in chambers (Mitchley, 2018).

Executive Mayor Solly Msimanga says he is honoured and humbled to have survived a second attempt to have him unseated as mayor through a motion of no confidence (Maphanga, 2018). The EFF and ANC again pursued Msimanga on a third motion of no confidence to remove him from office. Outgoing Tshwane mayor Solly Msimanga has survived a third motion of no confidence brought against him by the opposition ANC (Morebudi, 2019). A minimum of three votes of no confidence were brought against executive mayor Msimanga before his resignation. Msimanga announced that he would be resigning as Tshwane mayor, saying he wanted to focus on his campaign to become Gauteng premier ahead of the national elections set to take place in May (Mitchley & Madia, 2019).

After the departure of Solly Msimanga, it was incumbent upon the DA to elect a new councillor to fill the position of mayor and provide leadership to the coalition. The DA's preferred candidate, Stevens Mokgalapa, was elected mayor of Tshwane after Solly Msimanga's resignation took effect on Monday (Mailovich, 2019). Mokgalapa said in his inaugural address that he would be a mayor of action and focus on stabilizing and refocusing the administration, speeding up service delivery, creating an environment that enabled job creation, keeping the city's residents safe, and rooting out corruption (Mailovich, 2019). Pursuant to his inauguration speech, the mayor embarked on the process of ensuring that he delivers on the promises he made during his election as the executive mayor of the CTMM.

In measuring his performance after taking office, an assessment was done based on his achievements 100 days after taking control over the city.

Mokgalapa, who took office in February, said he was confident he had fulfilled his promises when he highlighted the achievements of his first 100 days in the capital (Kgosana, 2019). He pledged to improve service delivery to the people of Tshwane, as this had declined in recent years. His first successful promise as mayor was the cancellation within two weeks of the irregular multi-million-rand Glad-Africa consultant contract, the costly deal that had affected basic services and created instability in the city (Kgosana, 2019).

The first 100 days of the mayor's term suggested great performance and service delivery, as his words were echoed by the ANC, the main opposition party in the Municipal Council. New DA mayor Stevens Mokgalapa has cooperated since taking office, Mokgalapa's attitude is mature, and he meets us halfway, argues Kgosi Maepa (Kgosana, 2016). The statement by the leader of the main opposition party suggested the executive mayor had a good working relationship with other political parties. However, the relationship between Mokgalapa and the political parties was short-lived, as motions of "no confidence" started coming against him in the Municipal Council.

Contrary to the allegations of corruption and poor service delivery, the executive mayor found himself entangled in the allegations of misconduct with a member of his executive team. At this point, the mayor came under immense pressure following allegations of improper conduct with a female colleague during office hours. Tshwane Mayor Stevens Mokgalapa has been dominating headlines after leaked sex audio surfaced on social media at the weekend. The recording purportedly features a discussion between Mokgalapa and his Member of the Mayoral Committee (MMC) for roads and transport in the city (Bhengi, 2019).

The allegation spurred other political parties to instigate a motion of confidence against the mayor to ensure that the matter is brought before the Municipal Council. The speaker of the council rejected the motion of no confidence against mayor Stevens Mokgalapa, informing the Municipal Council that the motion submitted on November 26 was advancing an argument and opinion and therefore could not be debated (Dlamini, 2019). The rejection of the motion of "no confidence" against the mayor spiralled out of control and brought instability to the city.

The allegations created sustained pressure for motions against the mayor, while at the same time, the DA placed the mayor on suspension pending an investigation that was initiated by the party. Tshwane mayor heard his fate when the DA's federal executive committee met two weeks later. The mayor was put on special leave pending an investigation of his audio recording, purportedly engaging in an intimate act with the former MMC of Transport in Tshwane (Tandwa, 2020).

The investigation led to the resignation of the mayor without a vote of "no confidence" deliberated in the Municipal Council due to the vacillations that took place in several Municipal Council meetings. Embattled Tshwane mayor announced his imminent resignation after he was given two options by the DA: resign or be fired. In a statement, the mayor said he would resign before the next council meeting at the end of February but nevertheless insisted that he did nothing wrong (Hunter, 2020).

During the period when mayor was placed on special leave, councillor Abel Tau came in as acting mayor to take charge of the mayor's office. Abel Tau has been appointed as the acting executive mayor for Tshwane, the DA announced after was placed on special leave (Dlamini, 2019). Councillor Tau proceeded to act on behalf of the executive mayor until his resignation took effect at the end of February 2020. Subsequently, the resignation of the executive mayor signalled the unceremonious exit of the mayor from the mayoral office, who practically served for only 12 months in office as executive mayor of the CTMM.

After the resignation of the mayor the CTMM was without a duly elected mayor and a municipal manager. There is no government here, there is no mayor, and members of the mayoral council are also not present, let the Tshwane chief of police collect all keys to cars belonging to the city from officials who are not here, insisted councillor A (Seleka, 2020). This statement was made after the collapse of a Municipal Council meeting convened to elect a mayor after Mokgalapa's resignation. After the departure of councillor, numerous attempts were made to elect a mayor, but they proved futile as the Municipal Council failed to sit several times. After the resignation of Mokgalapa, the CTMM mayoral chain was taken over by new mayor C, who immediately expressed his disappointment with the work done by the administrators. The newly elected DA

mayor C, has accused the administration team that was appointed by the Gauteng government of failing residents (Manyane, 2020). Mayor C took charge of the municipality from the administrators in the 2021 local elections, after which he was officially elected executive mayor under the coalition.

Mayor C discharged his responsibilities after the 2021 local elections under the coalition. The coalition got off to a start, promising to be an effective government after the 2016 local elections. However, the coalition government after the 2021 elections did not take long before experiencing challenges that threatened the stability of the municipal government. The executive mayor was accused of corruption and interference in the administration of the city, which greatly infuriated the DA coalition partners in the CTMM. The ANC in Tshwane spearheaded a motion of no confidence against the mayor as a probe began into the R26 billion power bid (Njilo, 2022). The allegations of corruption ended with an investigation by the multiparty government, which concluded that no level of wrongdoing was found on the part of the executive mayor. Tshwane mayor C appears to be off the hook after he was cleared of wrongdoing following a probe into allegations that he meddled in the municipal procurement processes involving a R26 billion unsolicited bid proposal (Moatshe, 2022). The image of the executive mayor has been affected by accusations of meddling in the power generation deal. The ActionSA said that it will approach the Public Protector's office with an official complaint against Tshwane Mayor C, who has received widespread criticism over an R26 billion tender that he has been championing (Modise, 2022). ActionSA has accused Williams of contravening the Municipal Finance Management Act by instructing the city's administration about which company to award the tender to refurbish two power stations (Modise, 2022).

These allegations against mayor C put the coalition government under serious scrutiny not only for the ActionSA but also in other parties forming the coalition government. The IFP Gauteng provincial chairperson, Bonginkosi Dhlamini said the party will call for the DA to place Williams under investigation and added that the party will not support a mayor who is compromised (Tandwa, 2022). These shenanigans in the coalition government placed some of the coalition partners

in a situation where a vote of no confidence sponsored by the opposition against Randal Williams could be supported.

Randal Williams left office after taking over as executive mayor following the 2021 elections, after his resignation, Murunwa Makwarela came in as executive mayor but left under allegations of impropriety (. Tshwane mayor Murunwa Makwarela resigns after submitting 'fake' rehabilitation certificate (Moatshe, 2023). He was succeeded by Cilliers Brink voted in by collation partners of the DA. The DA's Cilliers Brink elected as new Tshwane mayor (Goba, 2023). Cilliers Brink is still in charge of CTMM coalition, which remains unknown whether he will finish the fifth term of administration.

Under the coalition government, it is undeniable that the office of executive mayor was subjected to a boisterous attack the municipality never experienced under the single-party rule of the ANC. In a single term of administration, the municipality effectively had three executive mayors. In essence, the office of the executive mayor looked more stable in a single-party majority than it appeared in a coalition arrangement. This brings instability to the implementation of municipal development and service delivery programs. The proposals pertaining to motions of no confidence against all the mayors speak volumes about governance challenges in the mayoral office under coalitions. It is imperative for successful political party coalitions that the office of the executive mayor become the epitome of good governance and exceptional leadership in a municipality.

#### **4.8 OFFICE OF THE SPEAKER UNDER COALITION**

At the beginning of a municipal term following an election, it is incumbent upon municipal councillors to elect a speaker who will preside over the meetings of the municipal councillors. The functions of a speaker in a Municipal Council under the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 include the following:

- Perform duties and exercised delegated to a speaker.
- Ensure that Council meets at least quarterly.
- Preside over the meetings of the Municipal Council.
- Ensure compliance in Council and council committees.
- Ensure council meetings are conducted in orderly manner.

- Perform the duties and exercises the powers delegated to the speaker under of section 32.

The office of the speaker in the CTMM came under spotlight in the municipality following the administration of the 2016 local elections. The CTMM Municipal Council embarked on a process to elect its speaker in its first meeting after the 2016 local elections. Katlego Rachel Mathebe was elected unopposed in council as the new speaker (Raba, Mabuza, & Dlamini, 2016). Arguably, the office of the speaker in the CTMM was relatively stable for a considerable period in the early days of the coalition. The speaker comfortably presided over council meetings in the period between August 2016 until December 2019, when the first vote of no confidence against the speaker was proposed. This was triggered by the ANC and EFF councillors who were dissatisfied with the manner the speaker presided over one of the council meetings. The DA speaker continues to disallow democratic dispensation, debating, voting, and fairness in Tshwane; she is arrogant, biased, and a pure constitutional delinquent, said Maepa (Moatshe, 2020). The DA speaker is a law unto herself, and it is clear to the ANC and other parties in council that she will do everything to stop democracy in the city, asserted Maepa (Moatshe, 2020).

Subsequently, a motion of "no confidence" was proposed against the speaker by the ANC and EFF in the Municipal Council. The DA was dealt another blow after Tshwane Speaker Katlego Mathebe was removed from council through a motion of no confidence (Mitchley, 2019). The special council meeting meant to deal with the motion against Mathebe got off to a chaotic start after the speaker opened the session and then recused herself. Mathebe's recusal, because the motion involved her, was met with anger from both the ANC and the EFF (Mitchley, 2019). In her recusal, the speaker suggested the deputy speaker preside over the meeting, which was vehemently rejected by both the ANC and EFF (Micheley, 2019).

Subsequently, chaos broke out during a special council sitting at Tshwane House Council Chamber when both the ANC and EFF councillors barred the acting Speaker Zweli Khumalo from presiding over the meeting due to allegations that he was drunk (Moatshe, 2019). If the speaker of a Municipal Council is absent or not available to perform the functions of speaker, the council



must elect another councillor to act as speaker, as per Section 41 Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. Accordingly, a motion passed in 2017 appointed Khumalo to act as speaker if Mathebe was unavailable or unable to perform her duties for any specific reason (Moatshe, 2019). The ANC and EFF councillors rejected Khumalo and asserted that he reeked of alcohol and that a councillor should be nominated and elected in that sitting to deal with the motion (Moatshe, 2019). Following the forceful removal of the acting speaker from presiding over the meeting, council proceeded to nominate a speaker and continue with the business of the day.

A member of COGTA identified as deputy director-general stepped in and facilitated a process to appoint a temporary speaker to hear the motion of no confidence (Stuurman, 2019). The process for the election of the speaker was invoked under Section 36 of the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. Tshwane EFF Obakeng Ramabodu was appointed as the acting speaker and presided over the motion against Mathebe (Manyathele, 2019). Tshwane Council voted out the DA Speaker, Katlego Mathebe (Manyathela, 2019). However, the election process was rejected by the DA, and the party proceeded to seek legal recourse. The DA is drawing up legal documents to challenge the appointment of EFF acting speaker, Obakeng Ramabodu, as well as all the decisions taken after his appointment as speaker in the Tshwane Council. The DA says the appointment of EFF's Obakeng Ramabodu as acting speaker is illegal (Magnus, 2019). The DA proceeded to approach the Pretoria High Court, imploring the court to overturn the appointment and all decisions taken with Ramabodu as acting speaker.

The outcome of the court case was pivotal in determining whether the Municipal Council should proceed with the acting speaker or rescind all resolutions taken in the meeting on December 5, 2020. The Pretoria High Court granted an interim order to the DA, setting aside the removal of Tshwane mayor and speaker, furthermore, the judge found that pending the finalization of several applications before it, all resolutions passed by the Tshwane Council at its special council meeting are suspended and of no effect (Stuurman, 2019). The judgment by the court re-instated the speaker and mayor back to office, however, at the time, the mayor could not resume duty due to his placement on special leave pending the

investigation of the allegations labelled against him. The speaker was automatically reinstated following the judgment handed down by the court.

However, while court processes were unfolding, COGTA intervened to suspend the speaker on allegations of failure to execute her responsibilities diligently. In the circumstances, it is our carefully considered opinion that the speaker has breached the Code of Conduct for Councillors, to that end, we invoked the powers vested in us by law and suspended the speaker as a councillor for a period of six months without pay, effective from the date of receipt of our letter (Moloko, 2020). The suspension of the speaker by the MEC of COGTA triggered a response by the speaker, who denied any misconduct in the Municipal Council. Referring to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Tshwane speaker Katlego Mathebe sent a veiled but poignant response to her short-lived suspension, namely, that the national or provincial government must not compromise or impede a municipality's ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions (Michley, 2020).

Pursuant to the response of the speaker, COGTA retracted the earlier statement, indicating the suspension of the speaker. Gauteng MEC for COGTA Lebogang Maile has rescinded the suspension of the speakers of both the Johannesburg and Tshwane metros (Makinana, 2020). Subsequently, the speaker of Tshwane continued with council business, following action to rescind the suspension. In the meantime, the court reversed the decision of the Municipal Council taken on December 5, 2019, which effectively meant that the speaker was reinstated in her position. The High Court in Pretoria has suspended the motions of no confidence in Tshwane mayor Stevens Mokgalapa and speaker Katlego Mathebe, ruling that they are to be set aside pending the outcome of an urgent review into the proceedings (De Klek, 2022). However, with every attempt, the speaker continued to preside over council meetings, and the opposition staged multiple walkouts that collapsed the quorum of the Municipal Council.

Following the reinstatement of the Municipal Council after dissolution, Katlego Mathebe continued in her role as speaker until the 2021 local elections, where she was replaced by COPE councillor Dr Murunwa Makwarela. Tshwane is currently without a council speaker following the resignation of the DA's

councillor, Katlego Mathebe (Mothiba, 2022). Mathebe's resignation was due to the DA trading her position with COPE Tshwane regional chairperson Murunwa Makwarela, as per coalition agreement talks last year (Mothiba, 2022). Following these developments, COPE councillor Dr Murunwa Makwarela was appointed speaker of the CTMM Municipal Council. Tshwane has elected COPE councillor Murunwa Makwarela to take over the reins as speaker of the capital city's council. Makwarela was elected unopposed at a special sitting of the council after the departure of DA speaker Katlego Mathebe (De Klerk, 2022).

The COPE councillor took over the responsibilities of speaker in the new multiparty coalition in the CTMM. Considering that COPE has one seat in the Municipal Council, the appointment of Makwarela displayed a great degree of compromise that comes with coalition negotiations. Arguably, the COPE speaker wields more powers than what naturally comes to a political party with one seat in a 214-seat council like the CTMM. The greatest expectation that naturally comes with occupying the speaker's role in the CTMM is establishing how well the new speaker presides over council and handles councillors who may come from opposition benches. The COPE councillor, Dr Murunwa Makwarela, in less than 12 months of occupying his office, was already in the deep end dealing with the councillors coming from the opposition benches in the CTMM.

The ANC and EFF call for COPE Murunwa Makwarela to step down as speaker of Tshwane and for a thorough investigation to be conducted into allegations of graft and sexual misconduct (Mothiba, 2022). A letter, the contents of which threaten Makwarela's position as speaker if proven to be authentic, was penned by outgoing Group Head of the Council Secretariat, Tiyiselani Babane, opposition parties, including the ANC and the EFF, demanded the immediate removal of Makwarela, while coalition parties like the DA and ActionSA insisted that the matter should first be investigated (Mothiba, 2022). However, the COPE speaker survived all the allegations made against him and continued in his position. In a turn of events, the speaker faced challenges from opposition parties, which included an allegation of assault in one of the council meetings. Fearing that the sitting may never deal with the important business of the day, Makwarela decided to adjourn a council meeting and have it continued online in

a hybrid sitting (Mahlati, 2022). After the decision, Makwarela indicated he was attacked by ANC councillors and chased like a dog until he got to his office (Mahlati, 2022). Following the purported attack by ANC councillors, the speaker laid a charge against the councillors. The Tshwane multiparty coalition says it's going to lay criminal charges against ANC councillors for violently assaulting the Speaker of Council, Councillor Murunwa Makwarela (Mothoa, 2022).

The Speaker of Council, Dr Murunwa Makwarela, however, did not complete the term of his administration due to a resignation he submitted to council. Cope's Dr Murunwa Makwarela has been elected as the new executive mayor of Tshwane after securing 112 votes, mainly from the ANC and the EFF (Masilela, 2023). This technically meant Makwarela resigned as a speaker and accepted the role of Executive Mayor. Following the resignation of Dr Makwarela, the CTMM elected a new speaker to preside over the Municipal Council. Councilor Mncedi Ndzwanana is the new speaker of the City of Tshwane Council (Goba, 2023). However, after a few months in the role of council speaker, Ndzwanana found himself under pressure from the opposition. The Tshwane DA-led coalition has vowed to unseat Speaker Mncedi Ndzwanana after accusations that he has blocked no-confidence motions against him in the past (Mbolekwa, 2023). The attempt to remove Ndzwanana in less than a year after occupying office implies that instability persists in the Municipal Council, subsequently, it remains to be seen how long Ndzwanana will last until the end of his term of administration.

The office of the speaker in the CTMM has without doubt been volatile under coalitions for a significant period. The obstinate firmness of the former speaker Mathebe's refusal to resign became a political agitation that aggrieved parties in council to such a point that working relationship was irretrievably broken. Nonetheless, it is commendable in the context of good governance that the speaker's proposed removal was not based on maladministration or an inference of ethical impropriety. The coalition's persistence in removing Ndzwanana suggests the office of the speaker is still vulnerable to instability that is likely to challenge the Municipal Council in the current term.

#### **4.9 CHIEF WHIP OFFICE UNDER COALITION ARRANGEMENTS**

There is no provision in the Constitution or the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 regarding the mandatory election of chief whips in the Municipal Councils. However, in terms of Gazette 23964 dated October 18, 2002, as approved by the Minister of Provincial and Local Government Administration, which was further condoned by the then MEC for Local Government as a section 12 Notice, Gauteng municipalities were granted powers to appoint a chief whip of council, in line with the election of office bearers as highlighted in sections 36 and 55 of the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 ([www.tshwane.gov.za](http://www.tshwane.gov.za)). The CTMM acknowledged the role of the chief whip in its Council meeting of October 4, 2001, which was re-adopted on May 26, 2011, with the approval of the whippery model ([www.tshwane.gov.za](http://www.tshwane.gov.za)). The following are the roles of a chief whip in a Municipal Council:

- Ensure general discipline within the legislature.
- Manage the allocation of councillors to portfolio and other statutory committees.
- Coordinate the scheduling and compilation of the legislative agenda with the Speaker and Executive Mayor.
- Act as link between the Executive Mayor and the party and/or legislature.
- Protect the party line during debates.
- Protect party members during debates and ensure fair treatment.
- Generally, assist (the Speaker) to maintain order and decorum within the legislature.

The chief whip of council works with a committee known as the multiparty whippery, consisting of the whips of various political parties represented in council (Tshwane, 2019:45). Informally, a programming committee comprising the Speaker, Chairperson of Committees, and Chief Whip meets directly preceding council meetings to plan the order of business for the ensuing council meeting (Napier, 2018:181). The role of Chief Whip therefore cuts across different structures or committees in the Municipal Council for the efficient running of council business in the municipality. The caucus structure featured a management committee consisting of a leader of caucus, a chairperson, a chief whip, and several whips (Labuschagne, 2018:220). This example typifies

another leadership responsibility in the CTMM, which indicates Chief Whips can find themselves with additional responsibilities beyond the traditional roles they usually execute in the Municipal Councils.

The chief whip office prior to coalitions was led by the ANC in the CTMM. The DA mayoral candidate, Solly Msimang said the party had proof of nine councillors, including ANC Chief Whip Jabu Mabona, were living in houses belonging to the city despite owning their own property (Ngoepe, 2015). This accusation against Jabu Mabona came at a time when he was still occupying the office of the chief whip of council. The CTMM coalition, upon assuming office, elected a full-time councillor as chief whip of council. The DA's Christo van der Heever was elected the new chief whip of the Tshwane council (Rusere & Rushwaya, 2016). Christo van der Heever was nominated as the chief whip and elected unopposed (Moatshe, 2016). The roles of the chief whip of council include ensuring that Municipal Council and committees quorate, negotiating and arranging necessary resources to be availed to councillors in pursuance of their work as councillors, and considering and processing applications for leave of absence by councillors in accordance with the Municipal Council's leave policy ([www.tshwane.gov.za](http://www.tshwane.gov.za)). The chief whip of the council plays a critical role in facilitating relations among political parties elected to the municipal council. This becomes more important in coalitions where government is constituted by different political parties with ideologies and policies that are different from one political party to the other.

Christo van den Heever elected as chief whip after 2016 elections, had a relatively good working relationship with political parties in the Municipal Council. This points to the longevity of his service in council without threats of motions or public attacks against his office. However, some political parties raised strong objections against Van der Heever on the conditions required for granting then-executive mayor Stephens Mokgalapa special leave during his suspension. Chief whip Christo van den Heever cancelled Mokgalapa's special leave after EFF and ANC councillors put pressure on him to reject it, furthermore, in a council sitting ahead of a motion of no confidence in Mokgalapa, both the EFF and the ANC councillors rejected his special leave of two months (Chotia, 2019). The chief whip of council, Christo van den Heever,

remained in office throughout the term after 2016 local elections, there was no vote of no confidence proposed against him by the Municipal Council.

Removal of public representatives from their positions requires a majority vote in the Municipal Council. The chief whip of council could not stay in power longer than intended by the political parties represented in council or even return for a second term when most councillors rejected his nomination. The CTMM Municipal Council without doubt went through very serious challenges in the fourth administration, however, the chief whip office made a significant impact in stabilizing relations between political parties following the 2016 local elections.

#### **4.10 SECTION 79 COMMITTEES UNDER CTMM COALITION ARRANGEMENTS**

Municipalities are assigned responsibilities towards their local community's developmental needs under section 153 of the Constitution. To deliver on this mandate, the executive structure of the municipality must ensure that its planning, budget, and administration are in line with the priorities of the local community. The executive mayor, his mayoral committee, and the administration must ensure that services are delivered to the local community in an efficient and effective way. The Municipal Council has a responsibility to ensure that the executive delivers services effectively to the local community. However, due to the size of its structure and the capacity that is required to perform oversight duties, the Municipal Council reserves the right to delegate its responsibilities and functions to council committees it has established.

To ensure the effective performance of the executive, a mechanism for separation of powers is put in place between the legislature and the executive. This is critical to ensure that, while the executive is the custodian of service delivery, it does not account to itself but the Municipal Council for objective reporting. Municipalities are given powers to establish committees of council to execute oversight responsibilities on behalf of council under section 79 Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. Section 79 committees are other mechanisms for effective oversight and accountability in municipalities (Malan, Holtzhausen, & Kraai, 2017:59). Accordingly, municipalities must clearly understand the difference between section 80 portfolio committees reporting to

the mayoral committee and section 79 committees reporting to the council. Section 79 committees are constituted by various councillors from different political parties, as proportionally allocated in the Municipal Council.

Commencing at the beginning of the third Tshwane council on June 9, 2011, the municipality opted for the establishment of 15 section 79 oversight committees to complement the section 80 committees, which remained committees of the Executive Mayor and reported to the Executive Mayor in terms of the Local Municipal Structures Act, 1998 (Napier, 2018:176). The CTMM established its section 79 committee's governance model in accordance with the governance model approved by the Municipal Council in one of its council meetings ([www.tshwane.gov.za](http://www.tshwane.gov.za)). Inclusive of all committees, the CTMM currently has 16 committees performing oversight functions on behalf of the Municipal Council ([www.tshwane.gov.za](http://www.tshwane.gov.za)) Oversight committees focus on departmentally aligned functions, while standing committees deal with issues of principle that cut across all departments.

Executive oversight is necessary for the effective delivery of services to residents. The absence of oversight on the departments implies that the administration is accountable to itself and yet not elected to office by the electorate. Various issues of importance are brought to the attention of the Municipal Council through council committees. Tshwane's close to a million-rand deal each month with an airport management company that was allegedly irregularly awarded and reappointed to the deal to manage the Wonderboom National Airport is under scrutiny was raised by an oversight committee. This highlights the meaningful role that oversight committee fulfils in the municipalities in holding the executive to account for improved service delivery.

Section 79 Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 does not prescribe the number of committees a municipality can establish; however, in line with common practice, municipalities establish committees sufficient for effective oversight in relation to the number of departments that exist in each municipality. Municipalities differ in terms of size from one municipality to the other. This imply that the number of departments will not be the same in these municipalities. In this context, the onus is on the respective municipalities to ensure that enough committees are establishes to ensure proper oversight in the municipality. Table



4.3 provides a breakdown of committees established in the CTMM for oversight purposes (Tshwane 2018:19):

Table 4.3: CTMM Oversight Committees

<b>NO</b>	<b>Committee name</b>	<b>Status</b>
1	Health	Oversight committee
2	Transport	Oversight committee
3	Housing	Oversight committee
4	Services Infrastructure	Oversight committee
5	Community & Social Dev	Oversight committee
6	Community Safety	Oversight committee
7	Integrated Development	Oversight committee
8	Agriculture & Environment	Oversight committee
9	Economic Development	Oversight committee
10	Corporate and Shared	Oversight committee
11	Finance	Oversight committee
12	Rules and Ethics	Standing committee
13	MPAC	Standing committee
14	Local Geographic Names	Standing committee
15	Civilian	Standing committee
16	Petitions	Standing committee

Source: Tshwane 2018

Oversight committees are crucial for holding the executive accountable through mechanisms such as calling for reports or summoning political heads and senior management before the committees. The kind of work done by the oversight committees cannot be effectively executed in a Municipal Council meeting, as there won't be sufficient time to consider every report tabled for consideration. Furthermore, the complexity of the issues under consideration and the subsequent analysis required to follow cannot be properly achieved in an ordinary Municipal Council sitting, hence, committees are designated to execute this type of task.

The efficiency of oversight committees is directly linked to the stability and effectiveness of the Municipal Council, which are required for proper governance. The relationship between a fully functional Municipal Council and oversight committees cannot be overstated. The oversight committees in the CTMM did not fulfil the mandate required of them as the Municipal Council was extremely dysfunctional to the point of dissolution in the fourth term of administration. After the 2021 local elections, which ushered in the fifth term of local government administration, continued instability in the municipality was seen through motions that pointed to the non-efficiency of oversight committees. Therefore, the effectiveness of oversight committees given the volatile situation in the Municipal Council cannot be definitively expressed until clear signs of improved service delivery and accountability beyond reasonable are discernible in the municipality.

#### **4.11 CONCLUSION**

After the 2016 local elections, the CTMM entered the era of coalition politics. This signified a move from single-party dominance to multiparty governance, which never existed in the history of the municipality. The CTMM, like other metropolitan municipalities such as NMB, COE, and COJ, yielded coalitions in the 2016 and 2021 local elections. Many of these metropolitan municipalities displayed signs of dysfunctional Municipal Councils and political tension, which was common in many coalitions. However, the fallout in the CTMM evidently became more vicious and extreme compared to other metropolitan municipalities around the country.

The level of administrative and governance challenges experienced in the CTMM posed a serious risk to its stability. The CTMM had multiple municipal managers in the last few years of coalition politics. There were more collapsed council meetings and walkouts compared to other municipalities. The CTMM experienced extreme violence in its Municipal Council, culminating in the physical assault of elected office-bearers. The CTMM was leading in irregular expenditures more than all other municipalities in Gauteng. A reflection on the governance structures of the CTMM from the Municipal Council, mayoral office, speaker's office, chief whip, and oversight committees formed part of the discussions in this chapter. The next chapter focuses precisely on the methodological orientation of the study.

## **CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

### **5.1 INTRODUCTION**

The preceding chapter extrapolated on the dynamics of coalition governance in the CTMM. This chapter deals with the research design and methodology of the study. The research approach used is discussed to highlight the methodological orientation employed in the study. A discussion of the study population and the methods used for sampling is outlined. The data collection process and methods of analysis employed in the study are explained. In summation, the limitations of the study and its ethical considerations are also discussed.

### **5.2 RESEARCH DESIGN**

The development of an appropriate research design is important to ensure that a study has a coherent plan that guides the entire process of investigation to its conclusion. Bailey (2018:69) defines research design as template for a series of procedures followed for different research purposes and questions. Pillay (2023:45) describes research design as a plan that the researcher must use to observe and analyse, as well as the reason why and how this is done. Research design includes a determination of what is going to be observed and analysed based on why and how questions are formulated (Babbie, 2008:96). A poorly designed study can lead to a waste of time and resources in investigating a research problem. To investigate the research question appropriately, the research design must be framed in a manner that enables the investigation to pursue its intended goals.

### **5.3 METHODOLOGY**

To conduct a study effectively, the researcher must adopt a set of procedures that guides a systematic investigation of the research problem in a manner that resolves the problem or generates new information to understand the phenomenon under investigation. This is achieved through adopting a research approach appropriate for the problem that requires investigation. There are basically three main approaches to research namely: quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods approach.

### **5.3.1 Quantitative approach**

Quantitative research is the numerical representation and manipulation of observations for the purpose of describing and explaining the phenomena that those observations reflect (Babbie, 2015:432). Quantitative research emphasizes quantification in the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2016:548). In essence, there are elements of research quantified in weight, number, or size to describe their characteristics, this is achievable through application of quantitative research techniques. It is an approach to test unbiased theories by examining the association among variables, such variables can be assessed using instruments to analyse data through numerical measures (Pillay, 2023:46). The coherence of data analysis and interpretation using quantitative approaches yields a higher degree of accuracy, as variables are not subjectively interpreted in their entirety. Zivave (2023:152) suggests quantitative research is a means of ensuring objectivity, similarity, and generalisability of the research findings.

### **5.3.2 Qualitative approach**

Qualitative research is a form of research in which a researcher collects and interprets data, making the researcher as much part of the research process as the participants and the data they provide (Cobin & Strauss, 2015:03). Qualitative research is empirical research where data are not in the form of numbers (Punch, 2014:3). Zivave (2023:153) describes qualitative research as a systematic subjective approach used to describe life experiences and situations to give them meaning.

Some of the benefits included in qualitative research entail providing abundant data about real-life situations, unique systems for data retrieval, theories, and viewing human thought and behaviour in a social context emerging from the data (Daniel, 2016:93). Qualitative approach allows subjectivity on how participants view their situations differently. It provides the study with the opportunity to explore participants' independent view entirely from their individual perspective. Qualitative techniques using in-depth interviews and content analysis were utilized to enrich the study by explaining deeper and underlying concepts not easily explained in a quantitative study.

### **5.3.3 Mixed-methods approach**

Mixed-methods research combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches, such as the use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, and inference techniques, for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration (Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017:03). Mixed-methods research methodology is employed to balance the strengths and weaknesses of both quantitative and qualitative research (Zivave, 2023:159). The overall goal of a mixed-methods approach is to expand and strengthen the study's conclusion and therefore contribute to the published literature (Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017:03).

There are limitations in research which cannot be overcome by a single approach either in qualitative or quantitative studies, therefore the mixed-methods approach becomes an alternative to mitigate the weaknesses of a single-approach study. Using only one research methodology, such as quantitative methodology, might leave gaps in the study results, which would make a researcher fail to produce a comprehensive research report (Pillay, 2023:47). This study utilized a mixed-methods approach to improve the credibility of the data collected. A structured interview process with open-ended questions was used to collect data from respondents. The open-ended questions were attached to a rating scale of 1 to 10, where respondents rated 1 as the lowest and 10 as the highest on the scale. The rating scale represented extreme polarities on how respondents viewed the CTMM coalition. The ratings done on the questions given by the respondents were aggregated to obtain an overall rating per question, which is either above or below 50% as the average rating.

## **5.4 DATA COLLECTION**

The process of data collection is a critical step in research and has a tremendous impact on the outcome of the study. Data collection is the process of gathering data from a sample so that research questions can be answered (Bryman, 2016:12). The benefit of high-quality and accurate data is essential to provide a meaningful understanding of the research problem. Poor-quality data leads to misguided interpretations and non-factual conclusions in a study. Sometimes researchers travel long distances to collect data and must go from

one data-collection session to another (Cobin & Strauss, 2015:69). This has a compromising effect on the quality of data, which can affect the outcome of a study. Incoherent data cannot be used to provide meaningful findings or interpretation to a research problem. The onus is on the researcher to ensure that suitable techniques for data collection are utilized accordingly. There are several methods used for collection of data which include the following.

#### **5.4.1 Fieldwork**

Fieldwork refers to the active stage of research, presumably to signify that you have left your study room, office, or library and have entered the field, which can be a natural setting, a library, or whatever is dictated by the research design (Cedras, 2013:49). The essence of fieldwork suggests that the researcher is located at the active site or domain where the phenomenon under investigation can be located. Fieldwork entails going out to collect data that may be described as original or empirical, which cannot be accessed without the researcher engaging in some form of expedition (Cedras, 2013:53). While commonly used as one of the preferred methods of data collection, fieldwork poses other challenges that can hinder the work of effective research.

The social boundaries that characterize day-to-day working life in the office and the laboratory are reconfigured on boats or in field camps. By reducing personal space, fieldworkers can be required to sleep near one another, potentially putting women in vulnerable situations (Shutterstock, 2023). These, among other factors, are some of the social challenges inherent in fieldwork research. The nature of fieldwork research requires a variety of needs that must be made available to the researcher to conduct the study effectively. Fieldwork research can be costly and physically demanding, as researchers are expected to interact with the research environment.

#### **5.4.2 Deskwork**

Another common method of collecting data involves gathering information from resources, the web, or other online devices for the purposes of research, this is also referred to as desktop research. Desk research, also called secondary research, is a research method that involves using existing data (Havryshko, 2021). The desktop approach assists in gathering information or ideas about a

research topic by reviewing reports, articles, or similar documents on the researcher's desk. Examples of this include the administration, collection, and analysis of postal or online surveys, literature searches in the library, and certain kinds of experimental or laboratory work (Cedras, 2013:54). This method of data collection is one of the most affordable and easiest. The availability of equipment such as laptops and computers make collection of data easier. This goes without saying the convenience of gadgets and other devices in common use, makes these methods of data collection preferable in several research projects.

### **5.4.3 Focus groups**

The focus group technique is also called the group depth interview or the focused interview in literature because different authors attribute the origin of the focus group method to different sources (Barry, Steyn, & Brent, 2009:229). Regardless of contrasting definitions and opinions about the focus of great methods, they are commonly used in research and have been proven successful in various studies. The benefits of taking part in a focus group for the participants include the opportunity to be involved in decision-making, the fact that they feel valued as experts, and the chance to work in collaboration with their peers and the researcher (Barry et al., 2009:231). Focus groups are a good solution when the research needs to capture the reactions and uncover deeper insights by observing the interaction of a small group of highly specialized experts (Brett & Melena, 2023).

### **5.4.4 Interviews**

Collecting data using interviews is one of the most common techniques for conducting research studies. Interviews are one of the methods of collecting data, which allows the researchers to explain their questions if the respondent is not clear on what is being asked (Chokoe, 2022:44). This allows for effective interaction between the researcher and participants required to extract as much information as required for purposes of effective study. Interviews are based on one person asking questions of an individual with the expectation of getting answers to a particular question or an elaboration of their views (Pretorius, 2023:149). Interviews enable the researcher to look at the world through the eyes of the participants and to gain rich descriptive data that will assist in



understanding the participants' construction of knowledge and social reality (Jacobs, 2022:83). Interviews give researchers the opportunity to explore the views, perspectives, and deeper feelings of the respondents that otherwise could not be obtained through other methods of data collection.

The study utilised in-depth interviews to provide the researcher and respondents with the opportunity to interact and exchange views about CTMM coalition in a deeper context. Semi-structured interviews were utilized to collect data from respondents. A semi-structured interview typically refers to a context in which the interviewer has a series of questions that are in the general form of an interview guide but can vary in sequence (Bryman, 2016:550). Both telephone and personal interaction were used to collect the data, depending on the preferences of the respondents. The nature of the study during data collection progress from the period of less intense covid restrictions to the stages where it was completely lifted off. Telephone interviews were useful to comply with the coronavirus regulations stipulated by the university guidelines. In cases of personal interaction, all protocols for face-to-face interviews regarding coronavirus compliance were complied with.

## **5.5 SAMPLING**

Conducting research involves collecting data from people who satisfy a specific set of requirements needed for a study population. A study population is a total group of people from whom information is required (Du Plooy Celliers, Davis, & Bezuidenhout, 2014:132). This subset of people is extracted from the general population through a scientific process of sampling. Sampling is the process of acquiring a segment of a population required for a study (Bryman, 2016:549). There are two categories of sampling designated as probability sampling and non-probability sampling. Non-probability is used when it is nearly impossible to determine who the entire population is or when it is difficult to gain access to the entire population (Du Plooy Celliers et al., 2014:133). There following are different types of sampling techniques utilized in research:

### **5.5.1 Probability sampling**

Probability sampling is one of many sampling methods, it aims to ensure that everyone in a population has an opportunity to be part of a sample (Mahmutovic,

2023). In other words, all members of the population stand a chance to be selected for the study without prejudice. There are a variety of techniques used in probability studies, the following techniques are used in probability sampling:

### **Simple random sampling**

Simple random sampling is the most basic form of probability sampling, which involves selecting research sample members randomly from the target population (Mahachi, 2022:65). All members of the population qualify for selection without prejudice or preference over other sample units. The process of selecting a random sample consists of compiling a list of every person in the community and then randomly selecting a predetermined number of samples from the total (Mahachi, 2022:65). This technique ensures all samples in a group are marked and thereafter selected sporadically until the required population study is reached. The researcher assigns numbers to everyone in the sample and then randomly chooses those numbers (Mahmutovic, 2022). Every sample unit must be listed in the survey population to select a simple random sample (Akman, 2023). This ensures that no sample unit is left outside and is denied an opportunity for selection in the study population. Simple random sampling, by all accounts, is considered one of the most basic forms of sampling in conducting a research study.

### **Stratified sampling**

In stratified sampling, each sample population adequately represents each subgroup. Stratification occurs when the examined population is split up into strata according to gender, age, economic levels, and other equivalent factors, with each stratum given a weight based on its size (Mahachi, 2022:65). Stratified random sampling involves dividing a large population into smaller groups that typically don't overlap but represent the entire population (Mahmutovic, 2023). The sample units in stratified sampling bear the same characteristics and features in the different layers in which they are classified.

### **Systematic sampling**

Systematic sampling is a probability sampling technique where the researcher employs a random starting point and predetermined intervals to pick volunteers from the research community (Mahachi, 2022:65). Rather than just randomly

selecting numbers willy-nilly, systematic sampling draws a random sample from the target population by selecting units at regular intervals starting from a random point (Mahmutovic, 2023). Systematic sampling implies that the process of selecting samples has a starting point and intervals where the researcher consistently picks sample units for consolidation of the study population. The sampling frame must be divided into several intervals before beginning a systematic sampling process (Akman, 2023).

### **Cluster sampling**

Cluster sampling, also called multi-stage sampling, is a probability sampling technique used to choose research samples from a sizable population (Mahachi, 2022:66). The cluster technique allows the researcher to deal with samples on a broader scale that are dispersed over a specific area. This sampling method divides the target population into groups or clusters, whereby a subsection of each group is randomly selected (Mahmutovic, 2022). This method can benefit a population spread over a large area (Akman, 2023).

### **5.5.2 Non-probability sampling**

On the other hand, non-probability sampling refers to an informed selection of subjects based on the researcher's perceived suitability of the selected cases (Moletsane, 2018:49).

### **Snowball sampling**

This sampling method is commonly used when studying hard-to-reach or hidden populations, starting with an initial participant who refers to other potential participants, creating a 'snowball' effect until all sample units are acquired (Williams, 2023). Snowball sampling, also known as chain-referral sampling, is a non-probability sampling method where currently enrolled research participants help recruit future subjects for a study (Simkus, 2023). The essence of snowballing is premised on sample units making referrals from one sample unit to another in the process of consolidating a study population.

### **Convenience sampling**

Convenience sampling is the most common type of sampling in studies where the only criterion is the convenience of the researcher (Mokebe, 2018:107).

Convenience sampling is quick and straightforward and is often used for preliminary research or studies with limited resources (Williams, 2023). This method of sampling saves time for the researcher, as the approach is to use sample units that are readily available.

### **Purposive sampling**

Purposive sampling has its basis in individual knowledge of the population, its elements, and the nature of research aims (Babbie & Mutton, 2011:167). This gives the researcher the capacity to navigate through the study population in pursuit of a sample. Purposive sampling is appropriate to select a sample based on a researcher's knowledge of the population, its elements, and the nature of the research aim (Babbie & Mutton, 2011:165). The researcher in this technique possesses foreknowledge of the population before selecting a sample. Purposive sampling allows us to choose a case because it illustrates some features of the process in which we are interested (Silverman, 2011:389).

The study utilized a non-probability method for the sampling of the study population. Purposive sampling was the preferred method to select a specific sample that fulfilled the characteristics of the study population. The study required participants to be elected to the CTMM Municipal Council. These participants, because of their exposure to Municipal Council politics, possessed special characteristics that qualified them to participate in the study. Party members from different political parties in the region who were outside the Municipal Council were not selected for the study. Utilizing the access of party whips in council, the researcher accessed the public representatives base of political parties and selected participants considered appropriate for the study.

### **5.6 DATA ANALYSIS**

Raw data collected in a study is not useful for any scientific purposes unless given meaningful interpretation through proper data analysis. Data analysis refers to the management and interpretation of data (Bryman, 2016:12). Data analysis implies that data is broken down into manageable pieces, with each piece compared for similarities or differences (Cobin & Strauss, 2015:07). Data analysis is useful to provide the information required to guide organizations and government institutions in their policy and decision-making processes.

The study employed thematic analysis method in the analysis of data. Thematic analysis is the study of patterns and themes within your data set to identify the underlying meaning (Crosley, 2022). Data were properly examined to identify common themes that existed in the responses given by the respondents. This entailed getting to understand the data in a deeper context to develop an overview impression of data collected. Codes were developed to ensure that phrases and sentences that were described accordingly. This resulted in the creation of themes and subthemes to provide better interpretation of the data and writing up to provide meaningful interpretation of all the data collected.

### **5.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

The study, by implication, is politically sensitive as it entailed interviewing councillors from political parties elected to the CTMM Municipal Council. Inevitably, there were challenges encountered in the study, which posed tremendous pressure on the researcher. The following are limitations experienced in conducting the study:

#### **Safety and security concerns of the councillors**

Councillors are very sensitive people who, for reasons of safety and security, are hard to find. This limited the degree of participation in the study as other councillors decided to stay away. Some of the councillors are senior citizens who have roles in the party and the municipality and are therefore very busy.

#### **Limited number of participants**

The researcher's intention was to obtain at least 30 councillors to participate in the study; however, only 23 councillors participated. Some of the councillors were evasive and constantly cancelled appointments until such time as the research had progressed beyond data collection stage.

#### **Political manipulation**

Councillors are persuasive people by nature of what they do to lead society and sell their ideas to residents. Some of the councillors attempted to impose their ideas and challenge the researcher in their way of thinking. The researcher, however, maintained the objectivity of the study outlined in the design to make sure it was not derailed from its main aim.

## **Covid- 19 restrictions**

The research project took place at the time of the coronavirus pandemic, which threatened the data collection exercise of the research. Subsequently, participants could not easily engage in the study due to restriction on personal contact. This meant the collection of data could mainly be done through telephone, as most of the participants were sceptical about physical interaction with the researcher. Undoubtedly, data collection exercise with politicians over telephone is more difficult than in person due to issues of trust and confidentiality in the process of acquiring data from participants.

In the face of all these challenges, the research project progressed effectively to its logical conclusion. Councillors who initially agreed to participate but later withdrew due to heavy workloads and other reasons were let out of the study. There were sporadic replacements from different caucuses to replace councillors who were no longer available. The study was not completed before the 2021 local elections, as envisaged. In turn, this was a blessing in disguise because the 2021 local elections produced a minimally winning coalition compared to the legislative coalition in the 2016 local elections. This required the study to be upgraded to the latest form of coalition in the CTMM, which was good for the study. Cost containment measures were employed to avoid long and unnecessary telephone interviews, which did not add value to the study given the extensive engagements likely to come from councillors.

## **5.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Conducting research involving human participants requires a high degree of sensitivity and consideration for the people that the researcher is dealing with. It is significant that a researcher follows relevant principles in scientific inquiry to guide the process of research in a manner that preserves the integrity of every person taking part. The dignity, welfare, and human rights of participants must be protected to prevent the backlash that can follow when researchers transgress the rules and principles of scientific inquiry.

This is achieved by maintaining high ethical standards aimed at managing relations and guiding interaction between researchers and participants throughout the study. Ethics may be recognized as a philosophical discipline

primarily concerned with the evaluation and justification of norms and standards of personhood and interpersonal behaviour (Homan, 1998:01). Participants should be afforded the opportunity to participate in the study out of their own volition. In other words, there should be no intimidation of participants by the researcher to enrol them in the study. The study should, under no circumstances, cause harm to the participants, deliberately or clandestinely. Given the nature of the study, the researchers understood the sensitivity and extra caution required to handle different councillors from all political parties represented in the Municipal Council. Furthermore, maintaining the anonymity of participants became a key factor in the study. In other words, under no circumstances were responses given by councillors captured in a manner that was explicit enough to compromise the identity.

This study was authorized by the CTMM office of the Chief Whip of Council, coupled with an ethical clearance issued by the University of South Africa. This is what gave the researcher permission to interact with councillors across the different political parties represented in the Municipal Council. The researcher gained access to all participants through the chief whips of the different political parties represented in the Municipal Council. Furthermore, all participants gave consent to participate in the study, and the researcher reassured the participants that their engagement is confidential, and their identities will not be disclosed to anyone at any given stage. The option to withdraw from the study at any stage and exercise the right not to answer any question that participants did not feel comfortable with was extended to all participants.

## **5.9 CONCLUSION**

This chapter gave a clear outline of the study design and the various techniques of data collection and analysis employed in the study. The justification for mixed-methods approach used in the study was explained, including aspects population dynamics which led to the selection of the study population. Selecting a suitable study population relied strongly in employing the appropriate sampling technique. Various techniques used in research for obtaining a suitable sample were discussed with an indication of the technique selected for the study. Data analysis method entailing thematic analysis based on the technique of thematic analysis was outlined in the discussions. In conclusion the limitations of the

study, coupled with its ethical observations were highlighted. This chapter dealt with the design and methodological orientation of the study, the following chapter will focus on the presentation of study results.



## CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF RESULTS


### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapter dealt with the design and methodology utilised in the study. This chapter focused on the analysis and interpretation of empirical data collected from respondents. The collection of data entailed in-depth interviews of 23 respondents, mainly ward and proportional councillors elected to the CTMM Municipal Council. The data collected from respondents was triangulated with the literature for effective analysis and interpretation. The presentation of data is structured under specific themes and sub-themes that emerged from the data analysis process.

### 6.2 BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS


The biographical information of participants provided an overview of the composition that constitutes the population study. The typical information included in the profiling of respondents consisted of age, gender, and educational level. The racial classification element of the study was excluded due to the sensitivity of the political nature of the study. However, the study included respondents from all racial groups in the CTMM council consisting of black, white, coloured, and Indian populations. Figure 6.1 gives the gender composition of the participants.

Figure 6.1: Gender profile



The CTMM Municipal Council is made up of 214 wards and proportional councillors. The study population including male and female respondents consists of 23 councillors, which represents 11% of the entire Municipal Council. The gender breakdown is made up of 12 female councillors and 11 male councillors across different political parties represented in the Municipal Council. Female councillors' representation is at 52%, while male councillors' representation is at 47%. This provides for a balanced representation of gender in the population study, with a slight dominance of female participants.


Figure 6.2: Age Profile



A balanced population is crucial for collecting data from both young and older categories of the age structure. Striking a balance between experience in governance and politics for respondents provides the study with a fair chance of analysis on the subject matter. After 2021 local elections, there were councillors who were new in the Municipal Council, while other were returning for their second and third terms of administration. This speaks volumes about the experience gap between new councillors and old councillors. The study comprised 5 respondents in the 21–31 group, 8 respondents in the 43–53 group, 7 respondents in the 32–42 group, and 4 respondents in the 54+ age groups. This represents different sets of age groups in the study population, from both

ends of the age range, serving a good combination of young and older councillors.

Figure 6.3: Education Levels



Proficiency in political work in municipalities is often not attributed to academic qualifications or professional competency. There is no academic qualification required for councillors, every citizen who qualifies to vote for a council has a right to stand as a candidate for that specific council (Thornhill & Cloete, 2013:61). Respondents in the study possessed qualifications, ranging from diplomas to a PhD level. However, 40% of the councillors are without qualifications beyond matriculation level. A total of nine councillors did not have matriculation qualifications; six were conferred with degrees; and seven achieved qualifications at the diploma level. The study had one respondent with a PhD qualification.

### 6.3 DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS

The thematic analysis approach, a qualitative technique for the analysis of data collected through in-depth interviews, was employed in the study. Thematic analysis is the study of patterns to uncover meaning (Crosley, 2021). In other

words, it's about analysing the patterns and themes within your data set to identify the underlying meaning. The approach entails having the researcher conduct a close examination of data frequently collected during the interview. This assist the researcher in identifying different views, perspectives, and topics that were constantly discussed in the interview. The thematic process of analysis utilized a basic process entailing the following steps:

### **Familiarisation**

This process step assists in getting the researcher acquainted with the data being analysed. Familiarisation is making notes on areas of interest discussed by the participants or completing the transcription process (Jones, 2023). This includes the reading of interviews scripts all over again. Researchers can better interpret and understand content that is well-analysed. In the process of familiarization there can be reading through chunks of text or listening to audio material available that contains data to be analysed. This is necessary to assist the researcher in breaking down the data into smaller units for the purpose of identifying themes and subthemes.

### **Coding**

Coding units are a way of examining data closely and deciding how to break it into chunks (Du Plooy-Cilliers 2014:236). This process ensures that codes are developed based on similarities and dissimilarities identified in the data that is analysed in a way that describes their content. It's crucial that data is organized properly to ensure effective and meaningful processes of coding. This may include the labelling of data properly to thoroughly understand different themes and sub-themes that will emerge and how they relate to each other.

### **Generating themes**

This process involves identifying patterns in coded data to develop themes that give meaningful interpretations of the data collected (Du Plooy-Cilliers, 2014:236). Themes in general emanate from different codes combined to provide a coherent meaning of the data. Simultaneously, themes are broader in nature as one theme can reflect a set of different codes put together. In the process of generating themes, some of the codes becomes irrelevant or

appearing very little in data and may be discarded when the research no longer considers them necessary.

### **Write-ups**

This process involves writing up the analysis of the data by reviewing the themes and identifying their meaning, as well as showing how the analysis answered the research question (Jones, 2023). The technique used for the collection of data can be explained indicating whether it involved open-ended or closed ended questions. This in essence speaks to the methodology utilized which helps to explain how the whole research process was conducted.

## **6.4 DATA ANALYSIS**

Analysis of data is important to gain understanding of responses given by the respondents which reflect their views, ideas, and perspective of the research problem under investigation. Table 6.1 reflects the themes and sub-themes emerging from data analysis:

Table 6.1: Themes and sub-themes

<b>Themes</b>	<b>Sub-themes</b>
Political conditions	Political bullying Bankruptcy Poor service delivery
Coalition effectiveness	Coalition agreement Chaotic municipal chamber Executive mayor Speaker of Council Chief Whip of Council Ineffective committees
Coalition improvement	Legislation

#### **6.4.1 Theme 1: Political conditions**

The questions on political conditions are based on objective 1: to examine whether political conditions have an impact on the CTMM coalition. The questions associated with the theme on political conditions are as follows:

Question 1: What do you consider the weakness of the CTMM coalition?

Question 2: What are the challenges facing the CTMM coalition?

Question 3: What is your view about the standard of service delivery in the CTMM?

Question 4: What rating out of 10 would you give for service delivery and why?

##### **6.4.1.1 Political bullying (arrogance, unequal partnership)**

Question 1: What do you consider the weaknesses of the CTMM coalition?

The researcher noted that 70% of the respondents pointed to excessive victimization by *Party X* towards coalition partners, small political parties and opposition in council highlighted the bullying tendencies by *Party X* as weakness in the coalition. Respondents A, B, E, F, G, I, K, N, and P gave some of the following comments:

*Respondent A*

"It is a multiparty coalition that does not enjoy the same level of control as the *Party X*, which always pushes its agenda on every matter."

*Respondent B*

"Parties must enjoy equal rights, however, as it stands, there is a disproportional allocation of power in the municipal executive, as some of the political parties are not even allocated a single seat in the mayoral committee."

*Respondent E*

"The administration must learn to consider inputs made by other councillors and not simply reject everything brought to the table without due consideration. It is important that the voice of minority parties in the coalition be taken into account because, without them, there is no coalition government at all."

*Respondent F*

"The *Party X* weakness is that they are not doing enough to prevent corruption; they are dealing with corruption subjectively based on who is accused without conducting proper investigations when allegations about wrongdoing are reported to them. Party X is pushing its agenda against small parties, such as in securing stuff like unsolicited bids, as we all know."

*Respondent G*

"Multiparty is failing to bear fruit for the residents, as people are still swimming in the pool of poverty and poor service delivery. The approach of the administration is purely racist and undermines the views of the opposition and its coalition partners. "

*Respondent I*

"Party X are bullies running the show by themselves, concentrating on matters of mutual benefit; simply put, they act as the big brother of the coalition government."

*Respondent K*

"There are political parties smuggling reports into the council against the agreement of other parties, this happens against the backdrop of partners having not supported a specific report in the joint caucus."

*Respondent N*

"Most of the councillors in the coalition are ego-centric, and that becomes the biggest challenge of running the coalition government. There is a prevailing mentality that suggests if you don't give me this, you won't receive it; therefore, it is either my way or nothing."

*Respondent P*

"The coalition government is lacking in ethics and integrity. Generally, they are incompetent and unaccountable in their government. They do things their way and refuse to listen to voices bringing sound judgment and advice, which can improve governance and the lives of our people in general. Frankly, they are a law to themselves, not willing to abide by the collective wisdom of the majority of the council."

The position advanced by the respondents suggests that although a coalition management structure exists, sometimes there is failure to reach consensus within the structure, which results in coalition partners forging ahead with their agendas. Arrogance implies respondents view the *Party X* as bullying in the coalition due to its deviation from the position of consensus taken during deliberations of the coalition's joint caucus. Bhengu (2022) conceded that the mayor of Tshwane denied allegations of bullying opposition leaders into endorsing an unsolicited tender. Tandwa (2022) claims that *Party A* is fully behind the coalition, not supporting *Party X* because they are associates, but wants *Party X* to show respect towards its coalition partners. The common thread against *Party X* coalitions by all its partners in Gauteng municipalities stood against complaints related to bullying tendencies. This notion affirms the narrative of the respondents, which points to bullying by the *Party X* as one of the main challenges in the coalition.

Unequal partnership suggest partners are not treated as equals in the working arrangement, which undermines the unity of the coalition. Feketha (2017:01) contends that Bantu Holomisa warned coalition partner *Party X* of acting like "big brother" in their relationship, in metros where they were working together. This is underscored by Mcenhiill (2015:101) who stress that political parties in coalition governments must address the unity and distinctiveness dilemma of how to maintain governing cohesion while sustaining individual identities, stating that within the Cameron-Clegg government, this was a challenge for both parties, but more so for the liberal democrats as the junior partner. Sentiments pertaining to inequality in the coalition arrangement cannot be ignored, as they affect the relationship between coalition partners. Respondents projected *Party X* as a super party in the coalition, much to the displeasure of other parties forming the coalition.

#### **6.4.1.2 Bankruptcy (low revenue collection, TshwaneYaTima Campaign)**

Question 2: What are the immediate challenges facing the CTMM coalition?

The researcher noted that 80% of the respondents highlighted financial challenges in the municipality is negatively affecting the delivery of services. Respondents C, D, E, G, J, K, L, O, Q, T, W, and X provided the following responses:



*Respondent C*

“There are financial constraints due to under collection, and I think we need to improve regarding this situation through the ‘*TshwaneYaTima*’ Campaign used for the collection of revenue to improve finances in the city.”

*Respondent D*

“Our challenges are quite unique; we are almost bankrupt, not able to afford salaries or render services as income from residents and businesses is not enough to sustain the operation of the city.”

*Respondent E*

“We are trying to generate more income for the city, that is the reason the executive mayor initiated the ‘*TshwaneYaTima*’ campaign to improve the city's coffers and expedite service delivery to residents in our area.”

*Respondent G*

“We need to go back to the basics because now we are chewing more than we can swallow, and that is why we need revenue campaigns to alleviate the financial situation.”

*Respondent J*

“The coalition government started ‘*TshwaneYaTima*’ because we have financial problems, this is working very well to ensure services rendered by the city are paid for.”

*Respondent K*

“The municipality is constantly indebted to Eskom, and revenue collection is very poor. I am surprised how the municipality allowed accounts to accumulate such a high amount of arrears.”

*Respondent L*

“The city was in debt for more than 2 billion. We have debtors up to 16 billion that we are going to disrupt the supply of electricity to improve our financial situation, hence, we have embarked on the aggressive disconnection campaign.”

Respondents attested to the financial dilemma the CTMM is experiencing, attributable to low revenue collection. A municipality should structure its administration, budgeting, and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, including the social and economic development of the community. Fanisi (2022) argues that revenue collection affects the forecast of municipalities in running their businesses and effectively responding to service delivery, as both expected and potential revenue become unreliable data. This demonstrates that effective revenue collection is crucial for the sustenance of a municipality. Githahu (2020) maintains that parking lots, billboards, and hotel beds can be taxed if proposals to increase municipal revenue contained in the report by the financial and fiscal commissions are adopted. Ensor (2020) concurs that a negative effect on revenue collection occurred in the fourth quarter of the CTMM municipal 2019–20 financial year, with most expenditures already committed. There is a correlation between poor revenue collection and bankruptcy, which calls for the deepening of the revenue collection program to improve financial stability in municipalities.

#### ***6. 4.1.3 Poor service delivery (over-serviced suburbs, under-serviced townships)***

Question 3: What is your view about the standard of service delivery in the CTMM?

Question 4: What rating out of 10 would you give for service delivery and why?

The researcher noted that respondents expressed a profound sense of displeasure with service delivery by the CTMM coalition. The respondent's average rating for service delivery is 35%. Respondents B, E, D, F, G, I, K, Q, R, and T provided the following responses:

*Respondent B*

“Service delivery is not of the required standard due to financial constraints. We are still new in the office, trying to navigate the storm of stabilising the coalition government to ensure the delivery of services to our communities. I will give it a rating of 5/10.”

*Respondent E*

"There is no service delivery, as townships are terribly affected, and there are no roads and drainage systems in place. My rating for service delivery is 1/10."

*Respondent D*

"I think we are not delivering services equitably in all the areas of the municipality. Regions differ from one another due to a complex set of issues. Region 1 looks terribly bad compared to region 4, for example. My honest rating for service delivery is 4/10."

*Respondent F*

"Service delivery is very poor due to discrimination between suburbs and township areas. Townships and informal areas are not treated the same as suburban areas. I think it's 4/10 for me regarding the service delivery rating."

*Respondent G*

"The multiparty failed to transform the lives of residents from the first day they took office. The standard of service delivery has deteriorated from bad to worse, the less said about the townships and informal areas, the better. This administration deserves a 2/10 for its poor service delivery."

*Respondent I*

"Coalition parties are interested in protecting each other rather than improving service delivery in our communities. Residents in poorer areas have not benefited from anything other than bad waste management, poor road conditions, and a lack of electricity where they live. Service delivery in the city is skewed as more services and other resources are only channelled to affluent areas at the expense of the poor, who can't afford anything. A pathetic 3/10 will do for me, as I don't see anything positive."

*Respondent K*

"There is no water in Hammanskraal, the city response rate is unacceptable, as in certain areas it is terribly slow. The coalition is failing residents on electricity supply as they constantly owe Eskom, besides load-shedding challenges. Service delivery is so bad and has never been this low; regrettably, it is 2/10 as far as I am concerned."

*Respondent Q*

"Service delivery is non-existent due to budget constraints, as 42% of the budget goes to salaries, 41% goes to bulk services, and 15% goes to financial services. It is basically 2 billion out of 44 billion, which goes to service delivery. You can then tell there is no service delivery at all, informal areas and townships are affected the most, hence, I will give a rating of 2%."

*Respondent S*

"Communities are in a state of paralysis concerning service delivery, which is non-existent in townships compared to suburbs. It is public knowledge that poorer communities are neglected at the expense of wealthy areas. Undoubtedly, my rating for service delivery is 1/10."

*Respondent T*

"I am not happy with the standard of service delivery because of the financial constraints we find ourselves in as a city. The situation in our townships speaks for itself compared to the suburbs. We have a lot of unfunded mandates, and our borrowing status is related to junk status. In this context, I will give a 5/10 regarding service delivery."

Considering the responses on service delivery and ratings sitting at 35%, it is clear that the CTMM is in a dire state. Poor service delivery in communities is the main cause of protests, as residents suffer undue losses. Thomassen, Marijke, Leliveld, Van de Walle and Ahaus (2017:895) contended that service failures result in customers experiencing economic or social loss due to a mishap or problem when experiencing a public service. The notion expressed by respondents that there are over-serviced suburbs and under-serviced townships featured predominantly in their responses. The general perception expressed by the respondents implies that more resources are channelled to affluent areas, while impoverished areas are neglected. Chagopa (2023) agrees that the distressing situation unfolding in Hammanskraal may be shocking but not surprising, as people have endured a decade-long struggle with water and sanitation issues, serving as a stark example of what happens when development occurs disproportionately. This is supported by Moatshe (2023) who reiterates that residents in the CTMM have expressed concern that the

metro neglected townships in favour of the suburbs. The point of contention, arguing over-concentration of resources in suburban areas, resonates with multiple views across political parties the municipality regarding poor service delivery in the CTMM.

#### **6.4.2 Theme 2: Coalition effectiveness**

Questions on the effectiveness of the coalition are based on objective 2: to explore factors influencing the effectiveness of the CTMM coalition. The following are questions associated with the theme on coalition improvement:

Question 5: What do you consider the strengths of the CTMM coalition?

Question 6: How effective is the Municipal Council in discharging its responsibilities?

Question 7: What rating would you give the Municipal Council and why?

Question 8: How effective is the Executive Mayor in leading the coalition?

Question 9: What rating will you give to the Executive Mayor and why?

Question 10: How effective is the Speaker of the Council under coalition?

Question 11: What rating will you give to the Speaker of the Council and why?

Question 13: How effective is the Chief Whip under coalitions?

Question 14: What rating will you give to Chief Whip, and why?

Question 15: How effective are oversight committees under coalition governance?

Question 16: What rating will you give to oversight committees and why?

##### **6.4.2.1 Coalition agreement (coalition committee, consultation)**

Question 5: What do you consider the strengths of the CTMM coalition?

The researcher noted that 54% of the respondents indicated the existence of a coalition agreement as a pillar of strength keeping the CTMM coalition intact. Respondents A, D, J, L, N, O, P, T, S, and U provided the following responses to the question:

*Respondent A*

"There is a majority in place for voting purposes in council, working through an agreement that political parties consolidated at the inception of the coalition government. Coalition parties always engage each other on platforms such as joint caucus on critical matters going into the Municipal Council."

*Respondent D*

"The coalition government, like any other, has its challenges, however, the signed coalition agreement communicated to all parties is our central point of engagement."

*Respondent J*

"It is a strong coalition with an agreement on the table managed by the oversight structure, unlike a voting block on a case-by-case basis as we did in the previous council."

*Respondent L*

"It is a coalition that works together for a common purpose, as we do not contest each other for publicity reasons. There is sufficient consultation between parties, guided by our coalition agreement. The coalition oversight committee plays an important role in safeguarding cohesion among partners and thrashing out our differences before reaching critical levels."

*Respondent N*

"The coalition government has strong functional oversight. Coalition parties consult on a wide range of issues such as the appointment of executive members and the approval of budget in honour of the working agreements endorsed by the parties."

*Respondent O*

"We have established the coalition on common ground and ideology, bound by a strong coalition agreement. There are strong mechanisms of oversight at all levels, such as the national committee, a joint caucus, and a diverse multiparty municipal executive."

*Respondent P*

"There is a majority to pass resolutions through council. Furthermore, there are people with political skills and administrative experience among coalition partners who are guided by the agreement."

*Respondent T*

"This is a majority government working according to an agreement, capable of implementing its decisions with little resistance. The coalition oversight committee always maintains the unity and coherence needed to make the coalition functional."

*Respondent S*

"There is a signed agreement canvassed extensively among political parties providing guidelines on who should do what, when, and how it should be done. In the event of irreconcilable differences, we refer all matters to the national committee."

*Respondent U*

"Our position is simple: the coalition agreement as a guiding document must be respected and implemented by all members of the government, and that is exactly why our coalition is still standing."

Respondents indicated the coalition agreement is a key factor keeping the coalition together. The coalition agreement serves as a point of reference in sustaining the cohesion of the coalition and guiding the program of action. Khumalo and Netswera (2020:177) claim that countries such as Kenya, where coalitions are regulated, coalition agreements outline specific coalition building issues and timelines for submitting the necessary documents to relevant authorities. Klüver and Bäck (2019:1995:31) concur that coalition agreements are important policy platforms that determine policymaking during the legislative term. Christiansen and Pedersen (2014:940) are of the view that a key element in coalition coordination is a coalition agreement, which, to a varying degree, even constrains the behaviour of the coalition partners. Coalition agreements typically serve as a point of departure for parties participating in coalitions. However, the existence of coalition agreements does not always translate to actual implementation. Mawere, Matoane, and Titos (2022:272) conceded that

providing for the enforceability of coalition agreements in a court of law must be promoted. This is attributable to the fact that coalition agreements are voluntary codes of agreement in their natural state of existence.

Njilo (2022) agrees that there were disagreements in the CTMM coalition emanating from coalition partners disregarding the coalition agreement. The existence of coalition agreements did not automatically translate to their application by coalition partners. In this context, platforms for the escalation of conflicts become a necessity, as the absence of such platforms creates challenges for the effective management of the coalition. Breakfast (2020:69) agrees that political elites tend to form coalitions without developing a conflict management mechanism to address their differences amicably. In the CTMM, a coalition oversight structure exists for referral and investigation of conflicts among coalition partners.

#### ***6.4.2.2 Chaotic Municipal Council (disruptions, walkouts)***

Question 6: How effective is the Municipal Council in discharging its responsibilities?

Question 7: What rating would you give the Municipal Council and why?

Respondents indicated the Municipal Council is dysfunctional and not capable of executing its functions as expected. Regarding ratings on the effectiveness of the Municipal Council, respondents gave an average rating of 40%. This implies a level of dissatisfaction with the way respondents handled the question. Respondents D, E, G, J, K, L, O, Q, R, S, and U provided the following responses:

##### *Respondent D*

"We are often disrupted by the opposition in the council chamber, which makes us not productive at all. There are never-ending points of order that have no basis except to distract the Municipal Council from its main business. I will rate the effectiveness of the Municipal Council 4/10 in this regard."

##### *Respondent E*

"The multiparty is doing nothing, showing capability to run council effectively. There is a lot of corruption going on inside the council. They use the Municipal



Council to protect one another from wrongdoing; hence, we often walk out of council meetings. Basically, it's 1/10 because council is not effective at all."

*Respondent G*

"The Municipal Council is not delivering on the mandate the people voted for. How can councillors argue the whole night, disrupting each other without finding a common solution? Several council meetings end up with councillors leaving the chamber without concluding on the business of the day. I rate the Municipal Council 2/10."

*Respondent J*

"I am not happy with the state of the Municipal Council; councillors keep on raising points of order that are useless and do not promote effective service delivery. We usually don't finish council business for which we are elected; my rating is 5/10."

*Respondent L*

"There is still a level of disruption taking place in the Municipal Council, however, not as bad as it was in the previous administration. There have been instances of council collapse and chaos; hence, some of our meetings were conducted on the virtual platform. Based on what I think; council qualifies for 6/10 on the ratings."

*Respondent O*

"There have been sporadic disruptions trying to make us lose focus. However, we are determined to fulfil the mandate the people gave us of delivering services to residents. The decorum of the Municipal Council has degenerated to a despicable low. There is no coherent action in council on policy issues. I am of the view that 3/10 is good enough."

*Respondent Q*

"There is no accountability from the Municipal Council. "Furthermore, the coalition government is not tabling reports before the council as required. The council descends into chaos and ends up not finishing its agenda items most of the time. I will rate 4/10 as far as I am concerned."

*Respondent R*

"We are trying to discharge our responsibilities and allow reports to come forward before the Municipal Council. However, we suffer from constant sabotage by the opposition, unleashing violence with the intention of breaking our meetings. "It will be fair to give council a rating of 5/10 in my view."

*Respondent S*

"We are doing our best, however, that becomes possible in an environment of good ethical conduct, which is not the case in the CTMM. We often walk out of council because the chamber can be extremely volatile. My rating for effectiveness is 3/10."

*Respondent U*

"The council is not doing well at all, as the level of chaos is disproportionate, with disruptions and the collapse of the council for petty reasons. The violence inside the chamber is frightening, and coming out unscathed is a privilege. I will give it a rating of 2/10."

Based on the responses received, the Municipal Council is unable to function effectively due to the high level of dysfunction that exists. The dilemma in the CTMM council points to the lack of a majority party in the council, which is a product of the election outcome. Córdova and Annabella (2021:195) maintained that although a proportional representation or mixed electoral system is more permissive and can create more inclusive governing bodies, when no party holds the number of votes needed to pass important legislation, governability can be threatened, policy adoption might take longer, or initiatives might even get stuck in a blocked decision-making process. Lack of sufficient numbers to form a majority in the legislature leads to delays in council processes, which cause instability.

Disruptions pertain to constant breakdowns resulting from physical confrontations that occur in the Municipal Council. Maliti (2023) alluded that proceedings of the CTMM Municipal Council are often disrupted or come to a complete halt, this is at the expense of municipal coffers but, more importantly, seriously compromises the delivery of services to communities. Walkouts occur predominantly when the council reaches a stage of impasse and councillors

from the opposition or coalition leave the chamber unceremoniously. Goba (2023), maintained the multiparty coalition, walked out mid-meeting over the speaker's refusal to remove two councillors who had their memberships terminated by their party. Mbolekwa (2023) agrees that walkouts do not serve the interests of communities and that councillors have a constitutional responsibility to ensure services are prioritized. However, CTMM Municipal Council meetings often result in disruptions and walkouts that, according to respondents, have become the norm and culture of everyday politics in the municipality.

#### **6.4.2.3 Executive mayor (arrogance, ineffectiveness)**

Question 8: How effective is the executive mayor in leading the coalition?

Question 9: What rating will you give to the executive mayor and why?

In this part of the study, the researcher noted that respondents considered the executive mayor incompetent to lead the coalition effectively. The rating given to the executive mayor on average stands at 35%. Respondents C, E, F, G, I, K, P, S, U, and V provided the following responses:

*Respondent C*

"I will say he is not reliable and not effective at all. We all know about the power generation crisis, which he has handled very badly for personal gain. He is incompetent to lead, as far as I am concerned."

*Respondent E*

"The fellow is a bully who only knows to intimidate staff, having no idea about different wards and their needs in Tshwane. He does not attend to issues affecting the wards and comes across as a person who projects a bit of high-mindedness, which is often out of place. He despises the labour forum, bargaining council outcomes and views from his coalition partners."

*Respondent F*

"He is doing badly because he has no regard for the independence of the administration. You can see that by his giving instructions to the city managers and his attempts to sell assets belonging to the municipality, which include the

airport and power stations. This gives you a clear picture of the person who is highly incompetent and corrupt."

*Respondent G*

"The mayor likes to maintain an innocent posture, while deep inside he is full of sinister tricks. I think the coalition can do better with another mayor than the one we have currently. He rejects good advice and sticks to his instincts, which often lead him in the wrong direction. He dismisses the concerns of the workers and treats them as cheap labour."

*Respondent I*

"The EM is not effective at all, he follows his instincts at the expense of coalition partners and, by extension, the whole Municipal Council. He projects a very obstinate posture, which indicates he is not fit for the job. There is no integrity on his part, especially considering the sale of power stations, which he is pushing with all his might. He likes to create his own law to push his selfish agenda, simply consider how he wanted to circumvent the IEC electoral law for speaker elections."

*Respondent K*

"The mayor is a very arrogant person, always trying to reign over the Municipal Council. He overlooks reports coming from MAYCO for purposes of advancing his agenda. He has elements of impropriety and a tendency to always break the law."

*Respondent P*

"I think the mayor is not in charge of government at all, as he is managed from Cape Town. Coalitions are not run by people who elected public representatives in the city but by their political principals, who do not even live in the city. This explains the reason why he does not listen to the concerns of fellow councillors but always proceeds to implement the corrupt endeavours of his handlers."

*Respondent S*

"The executive mayor is not doing enough, there are 107 wards in the CTMM, of which 75 are in the township and 27 are in affluent areas. We have seven

regions yet, there has never been a single mayoral imbizo since he started office. We must admit our mistake of electing an incompetent who excels only in backhanded deals."

*Respondent U*

"I don't think he is fit for the job that he elected to do. He does not listen to the caucus and pushes mischievous deals behind our backs. Frankly speaking, he is a lawbreaker and likes to be a law to himself."

*Respondent V*

"The mayor service delivery favours the rich against the poor, which is basically the *Party X* approach. He is not competent to fulfil the duties, he is a bully and dishonest to my liking."

Responses received suggest ineffectiveness in the mayor's ability to lead the coalition. There are visible signs of tension in the coalition, affirming respondents' assertions of displeasure with the executive mayor as leader of the coalition. Arrogance pertains to the mayor's condescension towards members of the coalition and opposition, which is toxic in collaborative politics. Patrick (2022) states that during a question-and-answer session with the media that the DA mayor demonstrated arrogance toward the community of Tshwane. This is underscored by Bhengu (2022) who claim that the mayor is accused of arrogance and intimidating officials. The prevailing sentiments of arrogance, as espoused by the respondents, resonate with the notion that the mayor is technically incapable of leading the coalition on basis of integrity.

#### **6.4.2.4 Speaker of council (weakened, compromised)**

Question 10: How effective is the speaker of the council under coalition?

Question 11: What rating will you give to the speaker of the council and why?

Respondents perceive the speaker as effective in executing delegated responsibilities, despite the systematic challenges under which the speaker operates. While the speaker is considered effective, respondents highlighted specific shortcomings that otherwise negate the efficiency of the speaker. The researcher noted that the average rating of the speaker is 54%. Respondents B, I, J, K, L, Q, T, U, V, and W provided the following responses:

*Respondent B*

"He is doing a good job because it is difficult to be the speaker of a minority party because he does not have full powers. I must admit that he is not in the strong position that he would like to be, nevertheless, I will give him 5/10 regarding the ratings."

*Respondent I*

"The speaker is trying his level best to ensure council work is done properly. He has a good sense of judgment and capacity. Notwithstanding the limitations of coming from a minority party, I would say he has achieved a level of success in managing council business. He deserves 6/10 for me."

*Respondent J*

"The speaker is still new to active governance work. He is working under tremendous pressure from the majority caucus of *Party X*, however, he stood the ground and maintained a relative posture of resoluteness. He is technically not strong because he does not have enough numbers to influence major decisions in council. My rating is 4/10."

*Respondent K*

"The speaker is an open-minded person who is resolute in what he does. He knows exactly what to do when the council descends into chaos and councillors conduct themselves in an unruly way. Despite insufficient numbers on his side, he has managed to navigate the council through tough times and bring in the stability required. I will give him 6.10."

*Respondent L*

"The speaker is trying his best to stabilize the council but is weakened by the coalition caucus, which always pulls him back. He constantly crosses the lines, unaware, nevertheless impressive in his approach and effective in discharging the duties of a speaker. I will go for 5/10 regarding the rating."

*Respondent Q*

"He is maintaining a good level of control in a chaotic Municipal Council, trying very hard to do his work as speaker. I see he is often bulldozed by bigger parties, but he always stands his ground to ensure we move forward. Considering his efforts, I give him 5/10."

*Respondent T*

"There is progress in council because the new speaker gives a voice to all political parties. Notwithstanding the micro-managing by the opposition and, at times, the coalition government, the speaker is doing well to ensure the business of the council is done. His position carries a lot of pressure; in this regard, 7/10 is okay for me."

*Respondent U*

"I have seen the speaker pushing to maintain a fair balance of politics in council, never mind his weak position as a member of a relatively small party. He has kept the council afloat in the face of disruptions and the collapse of council meetings. I believe he is competent to lead and provide good governance in the municipality. In light of his efforts, 6/10 will do."

*Respondent V*

"The speaker is still new, and I see he is working hard to catch the right momentum. Generally, he is a versatile person whom I think will excel in the position he is holding, even though he does not come from one of the big parties." He is a one-seat councillor doing very well, deserving an 8/10."

*Respondent W*

"The speaker has the most difficult job in council and seems to be doing very well presently. He is capable of the position and understands the political dynamics of the council very well. Simply doing well for me, a 6/10 is good enough."

Respondents suggest the speaker is compromised since he does not belong to the coalition parties. Mahlali (2023) states that parties filed a motion of no confidence in the Tshwane council speaker because the coalition cannot have someone from outside in a key position, as this allows for opposition agendas

to work against those of the governing coalition. Zulu (2023) posit that the future of Tshwane speaker is uncertain due to ongoing political instability in the capital. Njilo (2023) contends that, the parties will approach the High Court to order Tshwane Speaker to recuse himself from no-confidence votes against him on the basis that he is hopelessly conflicted. This barrage of attacks came against the speaker, motivated by the fact that he belongs to a minority party that is not part of the coalition. The assertions of the respondents confirm a strong view that the CTMM speaker is doing well in discharging his responsibilities while under attack from political parties, which consider him an “outsider” due to the nature of coalition arrangements in the CTMM.

#### **6.4.2.5 Chief Whip of council (consultative, experienced)**

Question 13: How effective is the Chief Whip under coalition governance?

Question 14: What rating will you give to Chief Whip, and why?

The chief whip of the council plays a pivotal role in harmonizing political party relations in the Municipal Council. The researcher noted the chief whip of council enjoyed a high level of approval at 70% compared to other political heads in the Municipal Council. Respondents C, D, G, J, O, T, and V expressed some of the following responses:

##### *Respondent C*

"The whip has been around for some time since the 2016 coalition; he is very experienced and has immense ability in people's management. He understands his job very well and interacts effectively with the different political parties represented in the council. The work of the whip is of good quality; it is a deserved 7/10."

##### *Respondent D*

"He is a person of mild disposition and very effective in what he is doing. He understands his responsibilities well and can differentiate between his party and other political parties. He possesses great skills to mediate among political parties in the council when conflicts arise during council meetings. We have a few politicians like him in council; I will give him 8/10."



*Respondent G*

"The whip always takes the whips of other parties into his confidence on various issues in council, making a clear distinction between the work of the party and his responsibilities. He has a calming effect that works easily on people around him and, by extension, most of the councillors in the Municipal Council. My rating is 6/10."

*Respondent J*

"Diplomacy is one of the strongest virtues of the chief whip, which makes him effective in the job. He knows and understands the rules and orders of the council and comes across as very experienced in handling contentious issues through consultation with other parties. I am pretty comfortable with a 6/10."

*Respondent L*

"The whip has always ensured that whippery remains as it is, properly aligned to the business of the council and what parties want to achieve as single entities. He takes time to consult with both small and big parties in council, which is good for coalition relations in a Municipal Council like Tshwane. He is quite good at what he is doing, i will say the rating is 7/10 for me."

*Respondent O*

"Chief Whip is doing exceptionally well to capacitate us as councillors and very well with councillors from other parties in the whippery committee. Having worked as chief whip in the previous coalition provided him with experience and knowledge to navigate the current coalition government. I appreciate his work and will fairly rate him at 5/10."

*Respondent T*

"The chief whip is a very experienced person who knows how to handle volatile situations. This was demonstrated in his ability to manage the boisterous 4th term Municipal Council. I think he is continuing to do the quality work he did previously, which makes it easier for the council to do its work. This kind of leader is hard to find; it is a well-deserved 9/10."

*Respondent V*

"The chief whip of council is building party relations in a constructive way, despite a pull sideways by opposition parties seeking to collapse the government. His experience and consultative approach have saved the situation more than once. I have no problem rating him 7/10 given the quality of his work."

Respondents indicated the chief whip can deliver on his responsibilities in the Municipal Council. The overall rating of 70% makes the chief whip the highly rated political head in the Municipal Council. The concept consultative infers a political leader who engages with leaders of other political parties to ensure the proper functioning of the coalition is achieved. Doherty (2004:3) highlighted that it is essential to maintain constant consultation between coalition partners at all leadership levels. This is essential to ensuring cohesion in decision-making and preventing unnecessary breakdowns in working relationships. Isaack (2017:01) concurred that Meshoe laid the blame for instability in the coalition government on both Bobani and Trollip, saying they were impulsive and quick to make decisions without consulting their political principals. This emphatically suggests that consultation is an essential component of effective coalition.

Respondents view the chief whip as a knowledgeable politician capable of managing complex coalition dynamics. Experience as a prerequisite for competence implies the chief whip is well-placed to proficiently manage political party matters in the Municipal Council. Thygesen (2019) concurs that politicians should look within and look at what they can do to build confidence; the first action should be mandatory work experience as a requirement. This is underscored by Raja and Rauch (2020) who state that politics is a difficult job and experience matters, though it does not ensure competence. Knowing the ropes in government, building political capital, and learning to navigate political crosscurrents take time. Notwithstanding the non-requirement to possess qualifications for the role of chief whip, a level of experience in the political dynamics of the Municipal Council is necessary to function optimally in discharging delegated responsibilities.

#### **6.4.2.6 Oversight committees (political protection, unaccountable)**

Question 15: How effective are oversight committees under coalition governance?

Question 16: What rating will you give to oversight committees and why?

Oversight committees play a pivotal role in assisting the Municipal Council to hold the executive accountable. Respondents expressed sharp disapproval of the oversight committees, which are seen as ineffective. The narrative is reflected in the 34% rating that respondents gave to the oversight committees. Participants E, F, G, I, K, P, and Q provided some of the following responses:

##### *Respondent E*

"Committees are failing to hold the executive accountable, the only thing they do is defend their comrades in the meetings. This affects the effective process of accountability, which is supposed to take place smoothly."

##### *Respondent F*

"These committees are a matter of horse-trading, where positions are given to reward coalition partners. There are no site visits conducted by the committee, as they do everything online, making them ineffective. There is no real accountability by the executive on service delivery, their main goal is to defend their incompetence."

##### *Respondent G*

"The public perception of the coalition was that oversight committees would work much better. However, the reality is that the opposite is taking place. Failure to sit for meetings, in essence, means there is no accountability. In other words, the municipal government is on autopilot, doing as councillors and administrators do as they please."

##### *Respondent I*

"I think the only committee that is working is the one responsible for petitions, the rest are simply useless. There is an endless cancellation of committee meetings, which affects proper reporting to the council. Committee meetings are

convened to secure and validate decisions already taken by the coalition partners."

*Respondent K*

"Coalition governments have no majority in oversight committees yet, structured in a way that protects them from accountability. It basically exists to protect comrades from accounting for their poor service delivery."

*Respondent P*

"There is no guarantee that committee meetings are sitting as scheduled in the process plan. In the event they are convened, recommendations coming from committees are not carried forward to the council. The coalition uses its skewed majority to suppress accountability. The existence of committees therefore becomes more a matter of legislative compliance than the actual work of assisting the council to hold the executive accountable."

*Respondent Q*

"Section 79 committees in the city are used to conceal wrongdoing and corruption in the municipality. They exist to provide accountability to themselves, not the Municipal Council, as required by law. Most departments, such as Human Settlement, are underperforming yet enjoy protection from the chairperson and cronies from the coalition."

*Respondent R*

"Oversight committees are manipulated to express the position of *Party X* and coalition partners. Officials working for the administration are hiding critical information required for proper accountability. There is no desire to hold the executive accountable rather than hide wrongdoing on the multiple failures of the coalition government."

The overall rating of 34% of respondents suggests a state of ineffectiveness exists in the oversight committee structures of the CTMM. This creates the impression that committees are not fulfilling their responsibilities as envisaged. Political protection is derived from the view that partners in the coalition use oversight committees to defend each other rather than to advance the objectives of holding the executive accountable, which is the proper for effective running

of the Municipal Council. Mbolekwa (2023) agrees that the duties of a committee are not to prevent corruption and misuse of public funds but to correct and expose such corruption and misuse of resources. Ndebele and Mdlalose (2021) concur that stating at local government, it is pivotal to monitor the delivery of public services and hold municipal authorities accountable. This is crucial to ensure that accountability is enhanced for decisions and actions taken by government institutions.

### **6.4.3 Theme 3: Coalition improvement**

The question on coalition improvement is based on objective 3: to investigate measures to improve the CTMM coalition. The question associated with the theme coalition improvement is as follows:

Question 17: What can be done to improve the coalition in the CTMM?

#### **6.4.3.1 Legislation (Constitution, Structures Act)**

The researcher noted that 68% of respondents proposed legislation as effective mechanisms for regulating coalitions to ensure stability in the CTMM. Respondents A, B, D, E, G, H, L, O, Q, and R, among others, provided the following responses:

*Respondent A*

*"Coalition government is still new for all of us; we are still learning; however, it can be better managed by initiating some form of constitutional change or other related laws used for local governance."*

*Respondent B*

*"We are doing very well at the moment; however, we need to have by-laws or laws to make these coalitions effective."*

*Respondent D*

*"The administration must go back to the basics of service delivery and reduce the corruption that exists. We need the legislation for coalitions to deal with challenges that are causing problems for our communities."*

*Respondent E*

*"Personally, I don't see stability or effectiveness in these coalitions unless something urgent is done to manage them under the constitution."*

*Respondent G*

*"This coalition is a product of multiparty politics, which is good for the municipality; furthermore, we need to review the Systems Act to make coalitions work effectively."*

*Respondent H*

*"There needs to be a structural fix to the system, as service delivery depends on efficient systems. There is a need for laws for managing coalitions, but we first have to change the constitution, which will most obviously take longer to do."*

*Respondent L*

*"Coalition governance will be the norm for the foreseeable future; the sooner we have it better managed through legal prescripts of some sort, the better. This includes existing, amended, or promulgating new laws by parliament."*

*Respondent O*

*"The absence of effective regulations means coalitions are shambolic; there must be legislative frameworks to limit frivolous motions and the collapse of government."*

*Respondent Q*

*"The inability to promulgate by-laws on coalitions due to constitutional limits should be reviewed. This calls for concerted efforts coming from national that will ensure we have some form of legislation to manage coalition governance at the local level."*

*Respondent U*

*"The non-existence of legal frameworks to handle conflicts that arise in the council is hard to manage. Political parties must act in principle and harmony until legislation is enacted according to which coalitions can be regulated."*

Respondents' dominant view gave the impression that South Africa's challenges in coalition governance are the absence of legislation to regulate coalitions. Khumalo and Netswera (2022:105) highlight that despite being a prominent feature in the South African local government electoral system, coalition governments remain unregulated and unstable. This is underscored by Dladla (2018:28) who states that the South African legal framework does not explicitly recognize party coalitions, as coalitions are founded on non-formal agreements between partners that are not legally binding. Mafisa (2023) indicated that there are calls for national legislation to ensure the stability of municipalities in the local government sphere. There is resonance between local and national government spheres to develop legislation for effective control of coalitions. Maqhina (2023) maintained that the government is developing a framework, including amendments to the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, to address challenges posed by coalition governments in hung municipalities. This gives affirmation to the views expressed by the respondents that the development of statutory mechanisms for effective management of the coalition is a necessity.

## **6.5 CONCLUSION**

The analysis and interpretation conducted followed in-depth interviews conducted with 23 councillors elected to the CTMM Municipal Council. Utilizing a thematic analysis process, various themes and sub-themes emerged to provide a coherent interpretation of the collected data. The three main themes emerging from the study based on the research objectives are political conditions, coalition effectiveness and coalition improvement. The sub-themes emerging from the main themes include the following: political bullying, bankruptcy, poor service delivery, coalition agreement, chaotic municipal chamber, ineffective mayor, effective speaker, ineffective committees, and legislation. The analysis revealed a significant level of paralysis in the CTMM coalition, which does not augur well with the objectives of local government as espoused in the legislation. The next chapter presents the findings, recommendations, and conclusion of the study.

## **CHAPTER 7: FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE, AND CONCLUSION**

### **7.1 INTRODUCTION**

The preceding chapter dealt expansively with the analysis and interpretation of the results of the study, emanating from data collected through in-depth interviews. The focus of this chapter is on the findings, recommendations, and conclusion of the investigation of CTMM coalition done in this research. The essence of research is to provide solutions and generate new information regarding the research problems under investigation. This chapter serves a critical purpose in charting the way forward on the coalition study conducted in the CTMM. The aim of the study was to investigate the effectiveness of the coalition in the CTMM. The chapter outlined the summary of chapters, findings, recommendations, contribution to body of knowledge and the conclusion.

### **7.2 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS**

Chapter 1 dealt with the background to the study, which extrapolated on the critical components entailing the motivation of the study, research problem, research objectives, research questions, significance of the study, limitations of the study, and ethical considerations. The chapter played a crucial role in setting the study into context and constructing the scientific foundation required to guide the study.

Chapter 2 focused on the evolution of local government in South Africa. Emanating from the colonial era, the Union of South Africa, the apartheid regime, and the democratic dispensation. The progression of democratic local government elections from the inaugural local government elections of 1995 to the local elections of 2021 was discussed.

Chapter 3 presents an explanation of coalitions from a theoretical perspective. This serves to ensure the study is maintained within the scope of previous research and available information on the research topic. Parts of the chapter dealt with different types of coalitions, their characteristics, benefits, and challenges, taking a comparative view of coalitions from African and international perspectives.



Chapter 4 discussed the coalition in the CTMM, taking a review on the coalition arrangements which that existed since 2016. The chapter progressed to the current coalition after the 2021 local elections. In this context, the full progression of coalitions in both the 2016 and 2021 terms of administration were discussed.

Chapter 5 placed an emphasis on the design and methodology of the research appropriate for the study. This entailed outlying compelling explanation on the road map the study utilized, and the relevant techniques employed to complete the study.

Chapter 6 focuses on the data analysis and interpretation study results based on the interaction between the researcher and respondents, following in-depth interviews for the collection of data utilized in the study.

In the current chapter which is Chapter 7 the study presents the findings, recommendations, contributions to body of knowledge and conclusion of the study.

### **7.3 FINDINGS**

These findings are informed by responses the researcher received from respondents who participated in the study. The following are research findings emanating from the study, discussed under relevant research objectives:

#### **Objective 1: to examine whether political conditions have an impact on the CTMM coalition:**

##### **Political bullying**

Research results indicate 70% of the respondents highlighted excessive bullying by *Party X*. Respondents suggest that *Party X* is highly inflexible on issues of governance, which requires the consensus of all coalition partners. This is evident in the public spats that characterized the coalition when partners reached an impasse on contrasting views related governance issues. Our organizations guided by principles if our partners choose to engage in politics that undermine the coalition and potentially return the city to the opposition, our caucus will persist in fighting for residents from the opposition benches (Moloto, 2023). *Party X* in Tshwane municipality was lambasted for bullying multiparty

partners and subverting confidentiality in a secret ballot process (Mbolekwa, 2023). This is followed voting instructions in the secret ballot for the election of the executive mayor candidate. Research results suggest minority partners in the coalition have a diminished voice in government, once *Party X* takes a position on a matter, that usually becomes the official position of the whole coalition government.

The coalition government indicated it will take urgent steps to identify the seven traitors on the secret ballot and remove them. The consideration of coalition partners as traitors for exercising political discretion suggests the existence of bullying at a high level, as alluded by the respondents. Respondents suggested that junior partners in the coalition are experiencing political victimisation, which might turn the electorate against them in the future for not subscribing to the policy positions they advocated during election campaigns. Joining a multiparty cabinet as a junior partner considerably hurts a party's future, as junior partners cannot enact much of what they promised before the election and since they cannot sufficiently differentiate themselves from their larger coalition partner (Kluver & Spoon, 2020:1231).

### **Financial distress**

The financial position of a municipality is crucial to determine its capacity to deliver services to residents. Research results revealed that 80% of respondents indicated the CTMM is in a financial crisis. This is augmented by public sentiments suggesting the CTMM is not able to pay for bulk services rendered to the municipality. Walsh (2023) indicated Tshwane owes Eskom around R3.2 billion, which accumulated due to erratic payments. Mahlali and Patrick (2023) maintained that Tshwane cannot afford to pay salaries because it has no financial capacity, it operates on a budget deficit of R3 billion, and the salary increase would add about R600 million to its debt. Research results further indicated the CTMM started a revenue collection campaign to disconnect government entities and departments indebted to the municipality to improve its financial status. Masuabi (2023) maintained that the city revealed its debtor's book, mainly comprising government departments, embassies, businesses, residential customers, and other entities, which currently stands at more than R17 billion. Research results further highlighted concerns with the outcomes of

the AG 2023 report, which indicate the CTMM received an adverse audit opinion. Kgosana (2023) claims the CTMM fruitless and wasteful expenditure were understated by 1 billion, while irregular expenditure was at R10.5 billion. The state of finances in the CTMM gives credence to respondents' overwhelming concerns, suggesting a dire financial state that requires drastic action.

### **Service delivery challenges**

Service delivery to residents is a basic function entrusted to municipalities in the local government sphere. The justification for budgets allocated to municipalities is determined by the quality of services provided to residents. Research results revealed high-level displeasure with the quality of services delivered to residents. This is evident in the average rating of 35% for service delivery, according to responses from participants. In essence, respondents overwhelmingly indicated the standard of service delivery in the CTMM is unsatisfactory.

Research results further indicated there is a dual-system approach to service delivery, where townships and informal areas are neglected while suburban areas are prioritised. This result in poor areas degenerating even further, while affluent areas are ameliorated incredibly. This leads to service delivery protests affecting the effectiveness of operations in the municipality. Protests are more likely to escalate where residents in the informal areas have a greater demand for basic services (Breakfast, Bradshaw & Nomarwayi, 2020:146). Places such as Cape Town have largely become functional cities, but the black majority argue they are continually marginalised, particularly in terms of service delivery (Davids, Masiya & Mazenda, 2019:27). The common narrative suggests townships and informal areas suffer neglect in service delivery in many municipalities around the country. However, suburban areas, on the other hand, receive high-quality services, creating enormous inequalities in society. Ramushawana (2023) maintains that the municipality is failing the people of Olievenhoutbosch, as they are directing more services to affluent areas than townships and informal areas. Moromo (2023) suggests that the CTMM is accused of serving its middle-class residents in the suburbs, arguing that impoverished townships such as Hammanskraal are permanently ignored.

Assertions of poor service delivery in the CTMM are irrefutable, considering that respondents from both the multiparty coalition and opposition gave the municipality 35% on service delivery ratings.

**Objective 2: to explore factors influencing the effectiveness of the CTMM coalition.**

**Coalition agreement**

Research results indicated 54% of respondents maintained the existence of a coalition agreement as a bond keeping the CTMM coalition intact. A coalition agreement is generally considered a point of departure in establishing and maintaining a working relationship between political parties. The CTMM coalition government is underpinned by an agreement signed by all political parties forming part of the government. Coalition agreements are a pre-commitment, by which the negotiating parties 'bind themselves to the mast' in such a way that when they go through unpleasant situations, party leaders have a mechanism by which they can resist temptation or intra-party pressure to renege on their commitments (Moury, 2010:388). However, the binding effect of coalitions is technically non-existent, as coalition partners can deviate from the agreement anytime without caution. Coalition agreements are generally not enforceable; hence, coalitions often collapse before end of term. Coalition agreements are important policy platforms that determine policy-making during the legislative term (Klüver & Bäck, 2019:1995).

The purpose of coalition agreements goes beyond policy determination; it may include aspects of conduct by coalition partners. Coalition agreements, to a varying degree, constrain the behaviour of coalition partners (Christiansen & Pedersen, 2014:214). Coalition partners in the CTMM deviated from the agreement, resulting in motions proposed in council without the consent of other coalition partners. Research results revealed that the rigidity of the coalition agreement in the CTMM preserved the sustenance of the coalition, as coalition partners did not display questionable loyalty to the coalition arrangement. However, it takes away the discretion of partners when circumstances dictate otherwise. The COG, which is a platform for oversight and dispute resolution in the CTMM coalition, is used for escalating issues to national structures when local leaders reach an impasse. Coalition agreements remain contracts that

specify to varying degrees the procedures and policies of the coalition (Christiansen & Pedersen, 2012;942).

### **Municipal Council**

The Municipal Council has an obligation to ensure that local government imperatives as enshrined in the Constitution are implemented. The results of the study indicated that the Municipal Council received 40% rating pertaining to assessment on effectiveness. This implies that the Municipal Council is less effective in executing its functions as mandated by law. The results of the study indicated that the Municipal Council is subject to constant instability, which negatively affects good governance in the municipality. Zulu (2023) maintained that the absence of the multiparty caucus in the CTMM Council meetings meant the work of the municipality could not proceed because councillors were boycotting council meetings at the time and were needed the most. The absence of the multiparty caucus technically meant the caucus from the opposition cannot effectively proceed with the meetings and take decisions that are legal to deliver services to residents.

Goba (2023) reported that opposition parties complained, indicating *Party X* has been planning to collapse the meetings by breaking the quorum. Research results show council meetings are constantly disrupted by the opposition to prevent important items and motions from serving before the Municipal Council. Mloi (2023) highlighted that chaos frequently erupted in the ordinary council meetings in Tshwane, where councillors assaulted each other following high levels of physical aggression. The sentiments expressed by the respondents, which resonate with the research results, affirmed that the CTMM Council is in a precarious state that requires good governance intervention measures.

### **Mayoral office**

The office of the executive mayor is key to guiding the political direction of the coalition and exercising good governance in the municipality. Research results found that respondents are dissatisfied with the performance of the mayor, considering the 35% rating. An ineffective mayor can lead to mismanagement, stagnation and missed opportunities for growth and progress (Astbury, 2023). It is significant for executive mayors to demonstrate impeccable conduct and

character in the execution of their duties as political leaders of their organisations. Research results indicated that respondents consider the executive mayor obstinate and not open to advice, which is not good for effective coalition. Khumalo (2023) asserted that the mayor utilized an arrogant approach to the struggles of CTMM employees, who are predominantly black and are being punished for the bad administration attributable to the municipality. The conduct of the political head in this context does not bode well for good governance, even more especially in a coalition like the CTMM. People will only trust local government if they experience their councillors as competent and ethical (Rawat & Dobie, 2022:01).

Research results suggested that the mayor's handling of the bargaining council processes denotes misjudgement and incomprehension of the law. Goba (2023) maintained the mayor said the municipality will approach the Labour Court to review the decision of the bargaining council. According to respondents, this indicated a lack of understanding by the mayor on the basic laws governing bargaining processes in the municipality. Research results further indicated that respondents disapproved of the mayor's unilateral resolve in addressing power challenges in the municipality, which they perceive as mischievous and not properly consulted. Moatshe (2023) maintained councillors in Tshwane council argued against proposed leasing of Rooiwal and Pretoria West power stations to independent power producers. Developments in the CTMM regarding complications of the bargaining council processes and overturned attempts to change electoral rules affirm respondents' argument of mayoral incomprehension, regarding certain aspects of local government legislation.

### **Speaker's office**

Research results indicated that the speaker acquired 54% pertaining to effectiveness in discharging responsibilities delegated under legislation. The function of the speaker deals explicitly with the Municipal Council differentiating the speaker from the executive and administrative systems of the municipality (Kraai, 2018:96). The rating obtained does not indicate overwhelming approval, however, suggests that more than half the respondents approved the work of the speaker. Research results further indicated that the speaker is compromised due to a lack of sufficient numbers in the Municipal Council to constitute a

majority. Mbolekwa (2023) argued Tshwane speaker was accused of ascending to the position on the back of a dodgy agreement to vote for minority parties to destabilize coalition governments ahead of the 2024 national and provincial elections. Mahlati (2023) hinted that the multiparty coalition believes the speaker is not fit for the job and wants him removed.

Research results further indicated that the speaker has no voice in the Municipal Council but takes instructions from outside the Municipal Council. Respondents acknowledged the personal capacity of the speaker to lead the council but nevertheless highlighted that the speaker comes from a minority party that does not wield power in the council. Research results indicated efficiency in discharging responsibilities as conferred by legislation, notwithstanding debilitating factors negating the speaker's ability to function at maximum capacity. The Speaker plays a coordination and management role with respect to the section 79 oversight committees (Kraai, 2018:95). This is crucial for ensuring accountability from the executive in response to various obligations and commitments contained in the service delivery implementation plan. Speakers are custodians of good governance which encompasses upholding high ethical standards; therefore, the conduct of the speakers should be beyond reproach (Madus, 2017:131).

### **Chief Whip office**

The chief whip obtained the highest rating of 70% based on data collected from respondents. This reflected the highest rating given to a political head by respondents across all political parties represented in this study. Moche (2023) contends that consultation and consensus are critical elements necessary to regulate a coalition. There is consensus, which suggests the chief whip is effective in executing responsibilities assigned by the Municipal Council. The Chief Whip of Council has a duty to ensure the effective political management of all councillors ([www.tshwane.gov.za](http://www.tshwane.gov.za)). Political management in this context supports sound, open, transparent, and accountable decision-making, which enables councillors to effectively discharge their duties as elected members of Council in their community service and representational roles ([www.tshwane.gov.za](http://www.tshwane.gov.za)) Research results further indicated that the whip is consultative in working with political parties represented in the Municipal

Council. The Municipal Council Chief Whip's primary responsibilities are to ensure agreement between the executive and municipal legislature (Kraai, 2018:97). Research results further indicated the chief whip is experienced in executing his functions because he served as chief whip in the 2016 administration. Respondents attributed the success of the chief to his ability to work with the collective across the political divide in the Municipal Council.

### **Oversight committees**

Oversight committees play a critical role in monitoring the performance of the administration and reporting back to the Municipal Council. When establishing committees, municipalities must take into cognizance the scope of its functions, the necessity for delegation of authority as well as availability of financial and administrative resources (Kraai, 2018:75). Oversight committees are perceived to be ineffective, considering the 34% given by the respondents. If oversight is flawed or weak, accountability and responsiveness are significantly weakened (Fourie & Van der Walt, 2018:10). This implies more 50% of the respondents are not satisfied with the performance of the committees. Research results revealed that committees are used to cushion politicians from the accountability required by the committee. Public accountability is, to an increasing extent, is becoming one of the main requirements of good governance in all spheres of government (Dalton-Brits & Van Niekerk, 2016:117). To this end, this calls for effective oversight committees capable of ensuring that mechanisms promotion accountability is fully maximised in municipalities.

Respondents indicated that the coalition uses its majority to stifle transparency and accountability in the committees. A Municipal Council may establish committees necessary for the effective performance of its functions or exercise its powers (Napier, 2018:179). Oversight committees naturally promote effective accountability by the administration for the work done. However, under circumstances of inefficiency, their existence defies the logic for effective accountability essential for the proper functioning of the municipal government. The significance of effective accountability by oversight committees cannot be understated; it is pivotal, as revealed by research results, that intervention measures are developed to improve the effectiveness of committees. The powers vested in the committees by the rules include the power to monitor,



investigate, enquire, make recommendations of departments and affairs consigned to the committee (Matebese-NoTshulwana, 2019:105). To ensure accountability, the powers conferred on the committees should be exercised unhindered. Notwithstanding this principle, oversight committees simply exist for compliance purposes without significantly improving the state of governance or the delivery of services to residents in a municipality.

**Objective 3: to investigate measures to improve the CTMM coalition.**

Merten (2023) indicates that the Constitution 19th Amendment Bill intends to bring stability to coalitions by pre-emptively limiting motions of no confidence to once a year. Both the *Party X* and *Party Y* have suggested that legislation is necessary to manage unstable coalitions and ensure coalition governments deliver services to Coalition legislation.

Legislation forms a basis for compliance and establishes a framework for common action. Research results revealed that 64% of the respondents indicated that promulgating legislation to govern the coalitions will improve their effectiveness. Respondents indicated legislation will create restrictions for managing disagreements or foul attempts by the opposition to collapse the municipal government. Research results further revealed respondents proposed that national legislation should be amended for coalitions to be effective. There are growing calls for legislation that will ensure the stability of local governments in the coalition era of South African politics (Mafisa, 2023). This narrative affirms the views of the respondents, which resonates with voices across the political, social, and economic landscapes of South Africa.

Nevertheless, this on face value seems to suggest the exclusion of small parties, which is not compatible with the ideals of a representative and inclusive democracy. The proposal, according to these two political parties, will ensure that measures are put in place to provide a framework for effective coalition management. These proposals are not meant to prop up the failing parties. however, they will be designed to protect the citizens of South Africa (Maqhina, 2023). In a nutshell, respondents in the CTMM supported the promulgation of legislation to improve the management of coalitions.

**Objective 4: to present a coalition model to improve service delivery in the CTMM.**

This objective is further discussed in detail under section 7.6

**7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS**

The following recommendations are suggested based on the findings in the previous section:

**Objective 1: to examine whether political conditions have an impact on the CTMM coalition:**

**Preventing bullying through inclusive leadership**

Bullying was identified as one of the main challenges experienced in the coalition. It is recommended that the leading party desists from adopting a hard-handed approach by allowing minority parties to sponsor motions in the Municipal Council and take independent action without fear of reprisal. Furthermore, all minority parties forming the coalition should be included in the portfolios of the Mayoral Committee. Party X, as the leading party, should respect the views of minority parties raised in the multiparty caucus. The leading party in the coalition should be sensitive to the objections of coalition partners in the mayoral committees to prevent reports from being unilaterally pushed to the Municipal Council against the wishes of coalition partners.

**Eliminating financial loss in the city**

Financial distress came up as one of the major challenges facing the municipality. It is recommended that the CTMM maximise its revenue collection through a programme of disconnecting private businesses collectively owing the city billions of rands, instead of selectively pursuing residents in townships who are economically incapacitated. While revenue collection should be maximized from both residents and businesses, it is prudent that “*TshwaneYaTima*” prioritize tough action collecting revenue from private businesses. Furthermore, the CTMM must strengthen internal audit systems to detect corruption at early stages, to prevent high levels of wasteful and irregular expenditure in the city. The CTMM should ensure full implementation of corrective measures highlighted by external audits which, include preventing water losses through

proper maintenance and upgrading of the infrastructure. The CTMM have an obligation to decisively initiate effective consequence management against officials promoting unethical conduct in supply chain management processes.

### **Improve service delivery.**

The study revealed high levels of disparity in service delivery standards in the municipality. It is recommended the CTMM improve service delivery in the townships through increased capital spending and upgrading existing services in the townships. Municipal services such as waste management, water provision and electricity supply should be extended to informal areas, through an intensified programme of formalisation. The coalition should develop a monitoring system to ensure that all grants coming from national and provincial departments are utilised to improve service delivery. The CTMM should ensure compliance to municipal by-laws through regular monitoring of municipal services standards in township and informal areas to improve service delivery.

### **Objective 2: To explore factors influencing the effectiveness of the CTMM coalition:**

#### **Subject coalition agreement to legislative compliance**

It is recommended that coalition agreements be aligned with national legislation, to give effect to local government imperatives. Irreconcilable differences in the CTMM such as the decision on the bargaining council are restrained by the inflexible coalition agreement, which obstructs effective decision-making between coalition partners. The salary increment dispute is contested based on coalition agreement clauses rather than merits of the bargaining council decision. This creates a situation where coalition agreements supersede municipal legislation guiding local government. Compliance with municipal legislation should take precedence over perspectives of contradiction between coalition agreements and the legislation.

#### **Promulgate code of conduct bylaw in Municipal Council**

Challenges pertaining to chaotic Municipal Council meetings are more questions of moral conduct than procedural shortcomings. It is recommended that the Municipal Council promulgate a by-law to give effect to the code of

conduct in Schedule 4 of the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, as this will allow the Municipal Council to develop various sanctions for deviant conduct. Section 156 of the Constitution stipulates that a municipality may make and administer by-laws for the effective administration of the matters that it has the right to administer. The by-law will ensure maximum discipline and act as a deterrent against deviant conduct by members of the Municipal Council. The by-law will impose sanctions on different aspects associated with offenses by councillors in the municipal chamber. Operating within the parameters of the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, the by-law will regulate the conduct of councillors inside the municipal chamber until the promulgation or amendment of national legislation to regulate coalitions.

#### **Enhance mayoral assessments.**

Instability in the mayoral office as highlighted by the respondents has been a challenge since the inception of the coalition and that has derailed the objective of effective political leadership in the municipality. It is recommended that the coalition acquire professional services in the assessments of mayoral candidates prior to deployment. Furthermore, the coalition should require verifiable competency in municipal legislation at a basic level that can be used for the selection and deployment of mayoral candidates.

#### **Support minority speakers**

The Speaker received a significant level of approval from respondents participating in the study. It is recommended that the Speaker's role in holding the executive accountable be enhanced by expediting the election of ward committees which are crucial to facilitate democracy at the local level. Furthermore, the governing coalition should uphold the rules and orders of council and desist from the breaking of the quorum in the Municipal Council on meetings called by the speaker.

#### **Support chief whip councillor programmes**

The study results indicated that the Chief Whip accommodated all political parties represented in Council when dealing with the affairs of his office. This was achieved through the "whippery" forum, where every leader of a political party elected to council sits. It is recommended that partnership with academic

institutions be initiated by the Office of the Chief Whip to improve councillor training programmes to resolve the governance and leadership crisis in the city. This will further enhance the Office of the Chief Whip, which according to respondents is effective.

### **Constitute minority-led oversight committees.**

The existence of oversight committees should enhance the accountability of the executive to the Municipal Council. It is recommended that CTMM oversight committees be dissolved and reconstituted under the leadership of chairpersons from minority parties in the coalition. This will ensure credibility and promote objectivity in performing oversight of the executive, as councillors in charge of committees will come from a different political party.

### **Objective 3: to investigate measures to improve the CTMM coalition.**

#### **Coalition improvement through executive committee system**

Amendments to national legislation are exclusively the competence of the national government. The Municipal Council is regulated within the provisions of the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. The amendment or promulgation of national legislation falls outside the scope of the Municipal Council. It is recommended to improve the coalition that CTMM switch from the Mayoral Executive to executive committee under Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, because there is more stability in municipalities run by the collective executive system than a mayoral system. The endorsement of a motion of no confidence in the mayor under the executive committee system does not automatically change the configuration of the municipal executive, as may be the case in the executive mayoral system, which is constituted at the discretion of the executive mayor. This implies that parties will be represented proportionally according to their seats in the Municipal Council.

## **7.5 CONTRIBUTION TO THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE**

A total of 81 municipalities had no political party, which achieved a majority, after 2021 local elections thus resulting in hung councils (Nkosi, 2021). There have been several hung Municipal Councils over the last two local elections making coalition an absolute norm in South Africa. Coalitions are the future of the country, otherwise, a one-party state would further entrench corruption

(Malefane, 2019:04). This is expressed in the context of endemic corruption and maladministration witnessed in several government institutions associated with the government of the day under the ruling party. This calls for the ruling party parties and all opposition to put their differences aside and work together when the situation dictates otherwise.

The DA has firmly rejected entering a coalition with the EFF, stating party ideologies that are fundamentally misaligned (Zulu,2023). Nevertheless, leaders of opposition parties have at the same time expressed different views on how they see opposition party politics concerning coalitions. The ActionSA on the other hand has rejected suggestions of forming coalitions with the ANC, at least after hundreds of years. According to the president of the EFF, they are willing to work with the DA and believe in the coming together of opposition parties to give the people an alternative as its first option (Ditabo, 2023). To enhance the effectiveness of the CTMM coalition, it is essential that the legislative, minority government and minimal winning coalitions that occurred in the CTMM be prevented from recurring. This calls for the establishment of a coalition government, based on a tripartite coalition” and a “50/30/20” formula for sharing portfolios, to strengthen the working relationship. Figure 7.1 present a coalition governance model proposed for the CTMM:




Figure 7.1: Coalition governance model for the CTMM

Figure 7.1 reflects the proposal of a Coalition Governance Model for the CTMM. The model is made up of critical components such as leadership, organisational culture, coalition management process and legislative framework.

### **7.5.1 Legislative framework**

Legislative frameworks are pivotal to determining the parameters within which governance matters can be administered. The legislative framework in South Africa rests on the Constitution which is the overarching law on which every piece of legislation hinges. In this context, any legislation that is not consistent with the legislation is invalid. South Africa does not have clear-cut legislation on coalitions, and this phenomenon of governance is relatively new. However, there has been a persistent call from various sectors of society to promulgate legislation to be used for regulating coalitions. This coincidental finding found resonance in this study, as respondents strongly postulated the need to promulgate coalition legislation. Notwithstanding the absence of clear legislation of coalitions, the following are pieces of legislation fundamental to coalition governance in the present circumstances of municipal coalition in South Africa:

#### **Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996**

Section 157(2) of the Constitution stipulates that the election of members to a Municipal Council must be in accordance with national legislation, which must prescribe a system of proportional representation based on that municipality's segment of the national common voter roll and which provides for the election of members from lists of party candidates drawn up in a party's order of preference. Section 157(2)(b) maintains that the proportional representation as described must be combined with a system of ward representation based on that municipality's segment of the national common voter roll. This is a fundamental basis for the constitutional terms that are used for the configuration of coalition government in the South African local government sphere.

#### **Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998**

The Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 is a key piece of legislation in determining the configuration of governance structures in municipalities. Section 20 stipulates that the number of councillors of a municipal council must be determined in accordance with a formula determined by the Minister by notice in the Government Gazette, which formula must be based on the number of voters registered on that municipality's segment of the national common voters roll. Section 20(1)(b) further stipulates the number of councillors may not be fewer than three or more than 90 councillors, if it is a local or 20 district municipality and may not be more than 270 councillors if it is a metropolitan municipality. This legislation plays a critical role in applying formulae required for the composition of municipal council according to their categories.

### **Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000**

There are various aspects of coalition governance which are regulated under the Municipal System Act 32 of 2000. This ranges from aspects dealing with the powers and functions of municipalities, community participation, integrated development plan processes, municipal services, local public administration and performance management. However, one of the most outstanding section of the act pertains to Schedule 1: code of conduct for municipal councillors, which is important to regulate the ethical and moral conduct of councillors in discharging their responsibilities.

### **Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003**

Coalition governments, like majority-party-ruled municipalities, are subject to the prescripts of the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 to manage their budget process in a manner that is prudent and compliant with the legislation. In this context, recommendations made in this study must be aligned with this legislation for accountability and transparency. Section 2 of the Act stipulates that the object of this Act is to secure sound and sustainable management of the fiscal and financial affairs of municipalities and municipal entities by establishing norms, standards, and other requirements. There is presently no legislation dealing with coalition governance in South Africa, as political parties initiate coalition arrangements voluntarily. The Municipal Council should pass resolutions or by-laws giving effect to effective coalition governance in the current legal framework of local government.



### 7.5.2 Leadership

Good governance and effective service delivery in local government is synonymous. The concept of ethical propriety is underpinned by the moral conduct of public representatives, as espoused in the code of conduct for councillors. Effective government requires public representatives in and those elected to positions of leadership in the municipal council to be above board in discharging responsibilities bestowed upon them by the electorate. Different types of leadership styles exist such as transformational, transactional, and African leadership. Regardless of the style of leadership, what is key in local government is service delivery that meets the needs and expectations of residents. Political leaders such as the executive mayor, speaker, chief whip of council and committee chairperson should provide ethical leadership that inspires confidence in the electorate.

Leadership is crucial for organisations to foster success and accomplish organisational objectives, increase productivity, a healthy work culture, and increase employee (Hailu, 2024:28). Traces of political bullying by *Party X* and the protracted nature of labour protests which collapsed service delivery for months on end in the CTMM speaks volume about the quality of political leadership. There appears to be no voice for coalition partners, as much as the employees who are still aggrieved by their lack of salary increases. In essence, democratic expression is deficient in the style of leadership adopted by the political leaders. Democratic leaders are interactive, helpful, friendly and encourage input from group members, accordingly, subordinates respect orders more readily and are willingly to accept responsibilities, maximise their efforts to achieve organisational goals (Hailu, 2024:34). It is incumbent that political leaders in coalition governance maximize democratic participation of coalition partners and employees to optimally achieve their goals and objectives. This is firm and solid foundation required to build an effective and efficient coalition government. When leaders balance their self-interests with the interests of greater society, as demonstrated through character they strengthen their perceived integrity and shape the quality of relationships and trust that others and their teams have in them (Rogatschnig, 2023:98). Despite preferences on democratic leadership, political leaders in whatever style of leadership adopted

by the coalition government, they be driven by interest of residents than political interest of their individual parties and associates.

### **7.5.3 Organisational culture**

The concept of organisational culture is crucial to promote an environment where public representatives can advocate for norms and values conducive to effective coalition governance and service delivery. The prevailing culture in the CTMM is that of political parties at odds with each other and against employees in the municipality. This produces a negative atmosphere and give rise to ineffective governance and poor service delivery by the municipality. Organization culture can make or break an organisation because the essence of organizational culture constitutes beliefs and behaviours that permeate an organisation (Pillay, 2021:38). A relationship of violence and mistrust between political leaders and employees naturally translate into poor service delivery. The Constitution in Chapter 10 outlines principles of public administration essential for creating a political atmosphere that can progressively advance the objectives and goals of the organization. Furthermore, Batho Pele principles as a program of government advocated in all spheres of government is aimed at enhancing the delivery of services, premised on the approach which puts residents in the centre of government services.

Firstly, this calls for a change in the organizational culture of municipal employees to improve service delivery. This should be done by addressing the grievances municipal employees have against the employer. As employee motivation is a critical workplace determinant that directly impacts the economic strength of an organization, it is in the organization's best interest to motivate employees to be engaged at work (Pillay, 2021:67). A fundamental proposition concerning job satisfaction theory supported by researchers is that employees who experience high and sustained levels of job satisfaction also make contributions to organizational effectiveness through engagement (Gallenti, 2021:105). This is a fundamental building block in the model that must not be considered insignificant. To maintain a highly effective and efficient coalition government that delivers services to residents, a good organizational culture is pivotal, as coalitions are a product of collaborative politics, which requires maintaining a good balance between political leaders and the administration.

Secondly, political leaders have a responsibility to maintain high ethical standards and moral leadership in the organization. The culture of collapsing council meetings and random frivolous motions of no confidence require serious consideration to move the municipality forward and deliver services to residents. The development and sustainability of a desired organizational culture go far beyond leaders announcing desired values and placing them on the walls of the organization; leaders ought to be judicious about desired organizational behaviors (Matotwe, 2021:28). Principals have a responsibility to create a moral institution as they are public officials who are often perceived as “moral agents” (Madiga, 2022:52). This exemplifies the role political leaders have in shaping organizational culture through demonstrating a level of ethicality and propriety that inspires the workforce.

#### **7.5.4 Coalition management process**

The coalition management process is anchored on the eight process steps, which include coalition agreement, government program, municipal structure configuration, municipal configuration, bureaucratic clusterisation, service delivery model, coalition governance professionalization, civic oversight, monitoring, and evaluation and leadership training.

##### **7.5.4.1 Coalition agreement**

Coalition agreements are drafted and signed at the beginning of a coalition term of governance. When ministers enter office after an election, they are often heard in the media, frequently referring to coalition agreements (Nyane, 2019:106). This is attributable to the fact that coalition agreements are perceived as a point of departure in policy programs of incoming governments. The CTMM coalition government has an existing coalition agreement, which is acceptable according to the norms and standards of coalition governance around the world. Coalition agreements are widely considered critical to provide stable coalitions, however must at the same time promote service delivery to communities. There must be a fair balance between a stable government and effective service delivery to the residents.

The existing coalition agreement in the CTMM should be reviewed for improved service delivery to ensure resonance with socio-economic dynamics in the city

which are changing on a constant basis. This became evident in the contradictions that existed when coalition partners encounter polarizing policy positions in addressing challenging situations in the municipality. *Party A* sponsored a critical motion before the municipal council, which was not supported by *Party X*, on the basis that it was considered a deviation from the coalition agreement. In this context, the coalition agreement superseded the tabling of a motion before council, which is a matter of constitutional obligation conferred to political parties. This calls for the review of the coalition agreement to ensure that it accommodates diverse views in the coalition government. Reviewing the coalition agreement would allow all parties to include their policy positions on matters of ideological importance that may affect the coalition government in the future. The coalition agreement should undergo a review process of negotiation, revision, and execution. A revised coalition agreement will create an opportunity for the reconfiguration of political structures critical for the survival of the coalition government.

#### **7.5.4.2 Government program**

At the inception of a coalition government, it is pivotal that political parties develop a clear program of action that can be used to pursue the goals and objectives of the government of the day, improving the quality of life of the residents. A common program defines what each party aspires to achieve towards commitments made in the manifestos or strategic plans. A government program provides for compromises between political parties on what can be considered achievable or not. Political parties in the CTMM should develop and publish a government program the coalition will follow to address the concerns of residents, as highlighted in the IPD consultation process. This will assist residents in raising awareness pertaining to what the coalition government seeks to achieve. Organizations that develop and execute on their program of action enjoy significant benefits, and often make the most of the budget and resources afforded to them by their residents or key stakeholders (Elyea, 2022).

### 7.5.4.3 Municipal structure configuration

Political structures in the Municipal Council include the mayoral office, legislature, and chief whip of council. The executive mayor is responsible for overseeing the administration of the municipality to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in service delivery (Sebakamotse & Van Niekerk, 2021:06). The coalition government should ensure that the functions, powers, and duties of the Executive Mayor as conferred in the legislation are carried out without hindrance. The speaker serves an important function in the cohesive functioning of the Municipal Council. The power to prescribe the voting procedure in a motion of no confidence rests with the Speaker (Slade, 2020:05).

In presiding over the meetings of the Municipal Council, the coalition government should give effect to the rules and orders of Council as prescribed in the rule book of the municipality. Equally, the chief whip of the council plays a crucial role in the effective and efficient functioning of the Municipal Council. The Chief Whip meets directly preceding council meetings to plan the ordering of business for the ensuing council meeting (Napier, 2018:181). The coalition government should create an enabling environment for the Chief Whip to maintain a political climate in the council which promotes cordial relations between political parties.

A grand coalition approach on the 60/40 principle can be used for the configuration of political structures and the executive in the coalition government. However, this path becomes unfavourable as *Party X* and *Party Y* may fear losing a significant part of their constituencies by coalescing with their traditional political opponents. This calls for the establishment of a tripartite coalition based on a 50/30/20 formula to be adopted by the coalition government. The electoral performance can be used as a baseline to manage power dynamics in the coalition government. For instance, between *Party X* or *Party Y* one can be allocated the mayoral office, *Party Z* takes the legislature, and *Party A* take over the office of the chief whip. This ensures all three parties in the coalition lead political structures crucial for the running of the municipal government, purely based on their number of seats in the municipal council.

#### **7.5.4.4 Municipal executive configuration**

The CTMM coalition in its current state is precarious because of the minimal coalition which can easily collapse when one party pulls out. This renders the municipal government susceptible to collapse whenever two minority parties' desires to pull out of the coalition government at any given time. Whenever necessary, it is crucial that a mayoral committee be reconfigured to suit the dynamics of volatile government conditions. It is important that when mayoral committees are established fulfil the expertise and experience dynamics of a capable and effective team. The new 10-member mayoral committee is fit-for-purpose and would come up with a financial recovery plan to address the metro's cash flow challenges (Mketane, 2023). This reflect the statement of former mayor Solly Msimanga in his consolidation of the mayoral committee in the CTMM. His remarks indicated that mayoral committees should not exist for legislative purposes; however, they should fulfil governance obligation to the residents. This ironically becomes a reflection of the present situation, where a strong mayoral committee exist but does not fulfil service delivery expectations of the residents, hence this study recommends a change in line with the political party configuration proposed in the study. Moreover, the change should take into consideration the capabilities that members of the committee would bring to the table to advance the programme of government in the municipal executive. The new mayoral committee team was chosen for their combination of experience, skills, fresh energy, and thinking, as well as their commitment to making the municipality functional (Payne, 2021).

In this context, the configuration of the municipal executive, comprising a solid block of opposition parties in the CTMM, is required. The configuration can follow the tripartite coalition approach based on the 50/30/20 formula. This implies *Party X* or *Party Y* can get 5 portfolios, *Party Z* 3 portfolios and *Party A* 2 portfolios. The allocation of seats, proportional to the contribution that coalition parties made to the overall coalition, is very important (Labuschagne, 2018:103). The outcome of a properly configured municipal executive would enhance the process of sharing departments in the coalition government, which can further be implemented under the principles of tripartite coalition approach.

#### **7.5.4.5 Bureaucratic clusterisation**

Sharing government departments equitably is a critical factor in the survival of a coalition government. Political parties tend to seek partners with the minimum number of members needed to create a majority, influenced by the ease of sharing government posts, the fewer the members, the easier sharing of offices proportionate members' percentage representation (Khumalo & Netswera, 2020:174). Office-seeking motives overwhelmingly explain the goals of political parties forming coalitions (Resnick, 2014:46). Therefore, this process requires a degree of meticulous approach for it to be executed in a proper manner. Effective departmentalization, which is properly aligned with the municipal executive, is critical for service delivery in communities. Misalignment of administration with the executive brings potential conflicts into the running of coalition governments. The CTMM administration should be managed based on a "clusterisation" approach to consolidate related departments in a single domain under the control of one political party. In essence, coalition parties may be assigned administration clusters based on a tripartite coalition formula, designated under the governance, infrastructure, and social services clusters.

Subsequently, *Party X* or *Party Y* may manage departments such as human resources, finance, communications, corporate legal services, and executive support. The *Party Z* as the second biggest party in the coalition can be assigned departments such as energy, water, environment and transportation, and human settlements. The *Party A* as the third biggest party in the coalition can be assigned community-based departments such as health, social development, sports and recreation, safety, and economic development. This would ensure proper management of the administration that prevents cross-departmentalization by members of the executive, creating unhealthy competition amongst them. The lines of accountability are enhanced based on the overarching responsibilities allocated per cluster to each coalition partner.

#### **7.5.4.6 Service delivery model**

The mandate of local government institutions, such as municipalities, is the delivery of services to local communities. Approaches to the delivery of services to communities utilize various models preferred by the government of the day. Delivery of services can take a centralized approach, where command of the

operations is maintained from a central point. Alternatively, control can be devolved to the lower structures for improved management and efficiency. The current approach in the CTMM is built around a centralized approach to service delivery. Due to the geographical size of the CTMM, it is desirable that decentralized service delivery method be utilized by the city to provide services to all residents.

Decentralization in the CTMM would devolve resources such as personnel, human resources, and financial resources to all regions of the city on an equal basis. The potential of decentralization to improve service delivery is contingent on the appropriate transfer of functions to the district, which requires the appropriate transfer of financial resources to follow the devolved functions (Msiska, Chiweza & Chirwa, 2018:15). It is important to note that the administrative, fiscal, and political dimensions of decentralization are complementary and mutually reinforcing in creating sound local governance (Vyas-doorgapersad & Nyikadzino, 2022:216). The demarcation of areas into regions in the CTMM while maintaining centralized approach to service delivery resulted in the prioritization of suburban areas over townships and informal areas.

To expedite service delivery, the CTMM should adopt a dual approach to service delivery by applying the 60/40 rule in allocating resources between townships and urban areas. In this context, 60% of resources should be directed to townships and 40% to the suburbs. In this context, the development gap between suburbs and townships would be minimized and provision of services to under-privileged areas be improved. In the long term, the quality of life in the township and informal areas would improve.

#### **7.5.4.7 Monitoring and evaluation**

Coalition governance results in political parties assuming the player-referee role at the same time as political parties are accountable to themselves. This is compounded by the fact that political parties are not held to any standards in the running of the coalition government. The CTMM can effectively manage its coalition government through an effective process on monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring is the performance tracking process against set targets and the use of collected data to timeously correct any deviations from the set targets



(Govender & Ready, 2014:161). This entails constantly scrutinizing a process to correct variations and achieve planned results. Evaluation is considered the worth or merit of the intervention to the beneficiaries when compared against the strategic objectives of the intervention (Govender & Ready, 2014:161). Monitoring and evaluation are performance management tools that promote accountability through knowledge generation and learning (Ba, 2021:3).

The CTMM tripartite coalition may achieve this goal through the involvement of research, audits, and academic institutions to conduct intensive analysis of the coalition and produce timely reports on the efficiency of government. This approach would assist in obtaining an independent view of the performance of the coalition government rather than generating reports from within the coalition that are biased and do not produce a realistic diagnosis of the problem. The report would be utilized to develop a strategy to mitigate gaps existing in the coalition government. Furthermore, the tripartite coalition may assemble a team of experts in coalition governance to provide consultation services required for the strategic management of coalition governance. This would provide expert services that is required for proper decision-making in the management of the coalition government on a day-to-day basis.

#### **7.5.4.8 Civic oversight**

The management of a coalition government lies in the structures constituted by coalition partners. However, these structures do not express the views of the community, which is an essential part of a municipality. Subsequently, political parties end up running the entire term of administration without the involvement of a community. Processes designed for the participation of the community are conducted for compliance purposes, as they tend to degenerate into municipal talk-shops during which the communities are treated as passive participants (Mautjana, 2014:51). This denies the community a legitimate opportunity to express their views to ensure their aspirations inform the policy imperatives of the government.

The CTMM tripartite coalition can ensure effective participation through the development of community-based oversight structures grounded in community activism for purposes of democracy and good governance. The tripartite coalition government in the CTMM can establish an external structure consisting

of the business sector, civic organizations, and residents to conduct voluntary oversight of the effectiveness of the coalition government. This provides the coalition government with an opportunity for genuine outcome-based service delivery and coalition governance evaluation by the community.

#### **7.5.4.9 Leadership training**

Governance challenges in the CTMM throughout the different administrations were more personal than systematic in terms of the grievance raised by the opposition or some members of the governing coalition. The exit from office of some of the executive mayors as revealed in the study was linked to ethical concerns and integrity questions. This points to a serious leadership crisis that calls for leaders to pass the integrity test and have demonstrable competence and capacity to lead the municipality on a strong base of moral command. This would go a long way to ensure that the image of the municipality is not tarnished unnecessarily. Furthermore, political leaders provide the kind of leadership that is inspirational and deliver services to committees effectively and efficiently.

Ineffective and dysfunctional leadership can be extremely catastrophic to the organisation in all multiple respects, and ultimately the organisation can be declared insolvent and/or liquidated and/or dysfunctional (Manganye, 2019:23). This in the context of municipalities expresses itself in the form of service delivery breakdown. Ineffective and dysfunctional leadership will mislead the organisation to such that all these four pillars of vision, mission, goals and objectives which underpin the future and existence of the organisation are compromised and disintegrated (Manganye, 2019:24). The problem of poor service delivery will remain with the local people if there is no political will on the part of public leadership, the absence of genuine political will on the part of the leadership of the municipalities, the trend has been to exploit service delivery problems as a political game played during the local government elections campaigns to garner support of the local people (Moila, 2021:170).

### **7.6 CONCLUSION**

Chapter seven outlined the findings, recommendations, and conclusions of the study. The chapter began by providing a summary of previous chapters in their chronological order. Coalition governance is crucial for the effective

management of the local government sphere. It is an opportune time to improve coalition governance relations for effective service delivery. The thematic analysis utilized in the study gave rise to critical findings entail legislating coalitions, upholding coalition agreements, bullying, bankruptcy, poor service delivery, Municipal Council, mayoral office, speaker, chief whip, and oversight committees. Various recommendations for the study emanated from these themes. The improvement and contribution to the study of coalition governance were made through a model proposed for coalition governance by the official opposition in the CTMM. The model proposes a tailored approach to improve governance in the CTMM through coalition agreement reviews, political structure redesign, municipal executive configuration, bureaucratic clusterisation, service delivery remodelling, monitoring, and evaluation, as well as oversight structure diversification.

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## **APPENDIX 1: GENERAL RULES**

Research title: **Municipal government coalitions: a case study of the city of Tshwane Municipality**

1. This is a voluntary consent to take part in the interview with no personal gain from this exercise and agreed that the response provided will be used for research purposes only.
2. You were selected and invited to participate in this study because, you are a politician and exposed to the topic under study and may provide valuable insight.
3. You are kindly requested to answer the questions as honestly and completely as possible.
4. The interview will take a maximum of 30 minutes to complete.
5. Participation is anonymous: You are not requested to disclose your identity. Your privacy will be respected.
6. No one will be able to connect you to the answers you give.
7. The information collected from you will be treated with strict confidentiality and used for research purposes only.
8. You have the right to withdraw your participation at any time, hence your participation is regarded as voluntarily.
9. You will not receive any payment or reward, financial or otherwise, and the study will not incur undue costs to you.
10. The interview data will be stored in a locked cupboard and a password protected computer.
11. A copy of the thesis will be available in the library at the Muckleneuk Ridge Campus of the University of South Africa (Unisa), Pretoria.

**PLEASE TICK THE FOLLOWING BOX IF YOU CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE:**

I hereby consent and understand that my participation is voluntary and anonymous, and that the information will be kept strictly confidential.

## APPENDIX 2

### SECTION 1: General questions

#### SECTION A: BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(Indicate your choice at each of the statements listed below with an **X**)

1. Indicate your gender.

1	Male	
2	Female	

qualification.

2. Indicate your age.

1	Under 30	
2	31-40	
3	41-55	
4	56-65	
5	66 +	

3. Indicate your highest

1	Doctorate	
2	Masters' degree	
3	Honours' degree	
4	Bachelor's degree	
5	Diploma	
6	Certificate	
7	Matric/Grade 12	

4. Indicate your race.

1	African Black	
2	Coloured	
3	Indian / Asian	
4	White	

5. Indicate your level of office.  
service.

1	Councillor	
2	Regional official	
3	Provincial official	
4	National office	

6. Indicate your years of

1	0-3	
2	4-6	
3	7-9	
4	10 years and above	

#### SECTION B: QUESTIONS

Question 1: What do you consider the weakness of the CTMM coalition?

Question 2: What are the challenges facing the CTMM coalition?

Question 3: What is your view about the standard of service delivery in the CTMM?

Question 4: What rating out of 10 would you give for service delivery and why?

Question 5: What do you consider the strengths of the CTMM coalition?

Question 6: How effective is the Municipal Council in discharging its responsibilities?

Question 7: What rating would you give the Municipal Council and why?

Question 8: How effective is the executive mayor in leading the coalition?

Question 9: What rating will you give to the executive mayor and why?

Question 10: How effective is the speaker of the council under coalition?

Question 11: What rating will you give to the speaker of the council and why?

Question 13: How effective is the Chief Whip under coalitions?

Question 14: What rating will you give to Chief Whip, and why?

Question 15: How effective are oversight committees under coalition governance?

Question 16: What rating will you give to oversight committees and why?

Question 17: What can be done to improve the coalition in the CTMM?

## APPENDIX 3: PERMISSION LETTER



### Office of the Chief Whip

Chief Whip Suite | West Wing 1 2<sup>nd</sup> Floor | Tshwane House | 320 Madiba Street |  
Pretoria | 0002 P O Box 440 | Pretoria | 0001

CUIN OF

Tel: 012 358 4624 |

TSHWANE Email. [SandraO@tshwane.gov.za](mailto:SandraO@tshwane.gov.za) | [www.tshwane.gov.za](http://www.tshwane.gov.za) | [www.facebook.com/CityOfTshwane](https://www.facebook.com/CityOfTshwane)

IGNITING EXCELLENCE

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My ref: 04/2018 Your ref.

19 April 2018

#### Letter of Permission

To Whom It May Concern

The Office of the Chief Whip, City of Tshwane, hereby grants permission to Mr Given Maluleke, the Functional Head: MHS Information Management to conduct a research study in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality as part of his Public Administration PHD studies at Unisa entitled "Analysis of metropolitan municipal coalition governments in South Africa".

As such, Mr Maluleke is granted permission to gather appropriate data from public representatives across the political coalition spectrum in the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality on the efficiency of governance systems and processes.

It must be noted that participation by public representatives is completely voluntary and those who do consent to participate must complete a written Informed Consent Form to this effect. Furthermore, the anonymity of participants and the confidentiality of all data must be strictly always maintained.

Kind regards,



Cllr Christo Van Den Heever

Kantoro ya Sefepi Segolo Kantoor van die HoofswEEP • Kantoro ya Semesegolo Hofisi  
ya N'waximokonkulu • IHhovisi LikaSotshwebhu Omkhulu

OÆce of the Chief Whip + Ofisi ya Tshimebi Tshihulwane • I-Ofisi lakaSosibebhe  
omKhulu

**APPENDIX 4**



**APPENDIX 4: CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY**

I, \_\_\_\_\_ (participant name), confirm that the person asking my consent to take part in this research has told me about the nature, procedure, potential benefits and anticipated inconvenience of participation.

- I have read (or had explained to me) and understood the study as explained in the information sheet.
- I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and am prepared to participate in the study.
- I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without penalty (if applicable).
- I am aware that the findings of this study will be processed into a research report, journal publications and/or conference proceedings , but that my participation will be kept confidential unless otherwise specified.
- I agree to the recording of the interview and/or completing of the questionnaire.
- I have received a signed copy of the informed consent agreement.

Participant Name & Surname..... (please print)

Participant Signature.....Date.....

Researcher's Name & Surname.....(please print)

Researcher's signature.....Date.....





## APPENDIX 5 - PARTICIPANT INFORMATION

30 June 2020

Title: **Municipal government coalitions: case study of the City of Tshwane Municipality**

Dear Prospective Participant

My name Given Maluleke and I am doing research with Prof Sinval Kahn, a professor, in the Department of Public Administration and Management, towards a PhD in Public Administration at the University of South Africa. We have funding from NFSAS (Awaiting for approval) we are inviting you to participate in a study entitled: **municipal government governance coalitions: a case of the City of Tshwane Municipality.**

### WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY?

I am conducting this research to find out about governance challenges facing the coalition government in the City of Tshwane Municipality.

### WHY AM I BEING INVITED TO PARTICIPATE?

The research is investigating governance challenges in the City of Tshwane Municipality with special focus on all the parties represented in the municipal council. Participants from different political parties represented in council will be able to provide data required to complete the study. Permission is sort from the Research Permission Subcommittee, [RPSC@unisa.ac.za](mailto:RPSC@unisa.ac.za).

### WHAT IS THE NATURE OF MY PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY?

The study involves a personal interview. A standards open -ended interview that takes 15-20 minutes to complete will be used.

**CAN I WITHDRAW FROM THIS STUDY  
PARTICIPATE?**

**EVEN AFTER HAVING AGREED TO**



Thank you for taking time to read this information sheet and for participating in this study.

Thank you,

Mr. G Maluleke



## APPENDIX 6: LANGUAGE EDITING CERTIFICATE

### EDITING AND PROOFREADING CERTIFICATE

22 Osche Street

The Rees

Centurion

0157

08 February 2024

#### TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This certificate serves to confirm that I have edited G Maluleka's thesis entitled, **"MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT COALITIONS: A CASE OF THE CITY OF TSHWANE MUNICIPALITY."**

I found the work easy and intriguing to read. Much of my editing basically dealt with obstructionist technical aspects of language, which could have otherwise compromised smooth reading as well as the sense of the information being conveyed. I hope that the work will be found to be of an acceptable standard. I am a member of Professional Editors' Guild.

Hereunder are my contact details:



Jack Chokwe (PhD – University of Leicester (United Kingdom))

Contact numbers: 072 214 5489

[jackchokwe@gmail.com](mailto:jackchokwe@gmail.com)

Professional  
**EDITORS**  
Guild

