AN INVESTIGATION OF THE EXPERIENCES OF NON-MUSLIM COMMUNITIES OF SOUTHERN BORNO UNDER THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN BORNO STATE OF NIGERIA

by

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Date: 31 March 2023

DECLARATION

I, Samaila Ziradzo (Student Number: 68965605) declare that:

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE EXPERIENCES OF NON-MUSLIM COMMUNITIES OF SOUTHERN BORNO UNDER THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN BORNO STATE OF NIGERIA is my own work, that it has not previously been submitted for any degree or examination purposes at any other university, and that all the sources I have consulted or quoted have been disclosed and duly acknowledged by means of complete referencing.

Name: Samaila Ziradzo Signature:

Date: __31 March 2023_____

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

AI	Amnesty International
AU	African Union
AQAP	Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BH	Boko Haram
CC	Congressional Committee
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
EU	European Union
FGN	Federal Government of Nigeria
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDPs	Internal Displaced Persons
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
ISWAP	Islamic State West Africa Province
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMCSB	Non-Muslim Community of Southern Borno
PTE	Potential Traumatic Event
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
SIT	Social Identity Theory
TTP	Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNISA	University of South Africa
USA	United States of America

ABSTRACT

The investigation on the experiences of non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno in the Federal Republic of Nigeria under the Boko Haram insurgency is inevitable, considering the dire humanitarian situation that has since prevailed. The openly orchestrated mass atrocities against non-Muslim Nigerians are intended to instil maximum fear, as demonstrated by the gory, if not macabre crimes against humanity seen from live online footage of mutilation of corpses, enslavements, and the continuing widespread looting. Against this background, the purpose of this study is to explore, describe and analyse the Boko Haram insurgency in North-Eastern Nigeria against non-Muslim communities, as well as implications of the humanitarian crisis this unprecedented insurgency has created

A predominantly exploratory and descriptive qualitative research design approach was adopted in this study, with a total of 80 participants who were sampled through the snowball method among the indigenous Kibaku-speaking ethnic group in Southern Borno State, North-Eastern Nigeria. Of these, 46 participated in semi-structured interviews, while 34 were involved in seven focus group discussions. In both these data collection initiatives, the purpose was to obtain the common and shared (reported and unreported) experiences of the victims of the insurgency. All the collected data was manually transcribed and coded by means of thematic analysis.

The findings generated five thematically coherent perspectives and associated categories, all of which are in response to the research problem and research questions. Overall, these themes reveal an orchestrated ethno-religious dilemma in which non-Muslims in Borno State are the lethargic denigrated victims whose rights and dignity as human beings have been brutalised in the most odious and barbaric ways ever imagined.

The study recommends, among others, that the international community should decidedly support the Nigerian government's efforts to completely obliterate the Boko Haram menace and its threat to regional peace and stability.

Key terms: Boko Haram, Maitatsine, Insurgency, terrorism, non-Muslim, religious fundamentalism, southern Borno, Kibaku, ethnic minorities, north-eastern Nigeria, human rights abuse, trauma, slavery, indoctrination, child soldiering, conversion, genocide.

iv

Table of Contents

DECLARATION	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS used	iii
ABSTRACT	
CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY	9
!Unexpected End of Formula	
1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY	.43
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT	
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY	
1.4.1 Epistemological/ Discipline-specific Contribution or Relevance	
1.4.2 Institutional/ Organisational Contribution or Relevance	
1.4.3 Socioeconomic Contribution or Relevance	
1.5 SCOPE OF THE STUDY	
1.6 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS	
1.6.1 Almajiri	
1.6.2 Boko Haram	
1.6.3 Experience	
1.6.4 Insurgency	
1.6.5 Investigation	
1.6.6 Jama'atul Alhulsunnah Lidda'wati wal Jihad	
1.6.7 Kibaku	.19
1.6.8 Non-Muslim	.19
1.6.9 Wilayat Gharb Ifrigiyyah	.19
1.7 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY	
1.8 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES	.20
1.9 RESEARCH QUESTIONS	
1.11 STUDY SETTING	.21
1.12 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION	
1.13 CONCLUSION	
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW	
2.1 INTRODUCTION	
2.2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF BOKO HARAM'S EXISTENCE	
2.2.1 Forcible Conversion to Islam in a Historical Context	
2.2.2 The Maitatsine Revolt in Northern Nigeria	
2.2.3 Boko Haram Renascence for Completion of Jihad and Islamic State	
2.3 BOKO HARAM MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS	
2.3.1 Poverty as a Motivational Factor	
2.3.2 Religious Fundamentalism/ Radicalisation as a Motivational Factor	
2.3.3 Nationalistic Identity/ Separation as a Motivational Factor	
2.4 BOKO HARAM LINKS WITH OTHER ISLAMIC JIHADIST GROUPS	
2.5 CONCLUSION	.47
CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	
3.1 INTROCUCTION	
3.1.1 The Identity Concept	
3.2 THE SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY (SIT)	.52
3.2.1 Personal Identity	.53
3.2.2 Social Identity	
3.3 APPLICABILITY/ RELEVANCE OF THE SIT TO THE STUDY	
3.3.1 Religious Applicability	
3.3.2 Social Applicability	
3.3.3 Cultural Applicability	
3.4 FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ATTENDANT TO THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	
3.3 CONCLUSION	
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY	
4.1 INTRODUCTION	
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND APPROACH	.00 60
4.2.1 Research Approach	.04

4.3 STUDY SETTING	
4.4 STUDY POPULATION AND SAMPLING PROCEDURES	66
4.4.1 Sampling Procedures	
4.4.1.1 Sample Size	
4.4.1.2 Sampling Method/ Technique	
4.4.1.3 Sampling Criteria	
4.5 DATA COLLECTION	
4.5.1 Semi-structured Interviews	
4.5.2 Focus Groups Discussions/ FGDs	
4.6 DATA ANALYSIS	13
4.6.1 Thematic Data Analysis4.7 MEASURES TO ENSURE TRUSTWORTHINESS	73
4.7.1 Credibility	
4.7.2 Dependability	
4.7.3 Confirmability	
4.7.4 Authenticity	75
4.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS	
4.8.1 Informed Consent	76
4.8.2 Voluntary Participation	76
4.8.3 Protection from Harm	77
4.8.4 Privacy and Confidentiality	
4.8.5 Deceiving Participants	
4.8.6 Debriefing of Participants	
4.9 CONCLUSION	70
CHAPTER FIVE: PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS	79
5.1 INTRODUCTION	
5.2 PARTICIPANTS' DEMOGRAPHIC/ BIBLIOGRAPHIC PROFILES	
5.2.1 Interviewed Participants' Demographic Profiles	
5.2.2. Focus Group Participants' Demographic Profiles	
5.2.2.1 Focus Group Distribution	
5.3 KEY FINDINGS AND THEMATIC CATEGORISATION	
5.3.1 Theme One: Religious Context and Ramifications of the Boko Haram Insurgenc 85	су
5.3.1.1 Sub-theme 1: Religious Intolerance and Coercion/ Forced Conversior Islam	
5.3.1.2 Sub-theme 2: Targeted Mass Killing of, and Genocide Against non-Musl	
5.3.1.3 Sub-theme 3: Gender-based Violation (Sexual Slavery) of Non-Mus	slim
Women and Girls	
5.3.2 Theme Two: Socio-cultural Disruptions and Injustice	
5.3.2.1 Sub-theme 1: Dislocation of Cultural Ties	
5.3.2.2 Sub-theme 2: Orchestrated Social Profiling and Disempowerment	
5.3.2.3 Sub-theme 3: Systematic Displacement	
5.3.2.4 Sub-theme 4: Child Soldiering, Indoctrination and Deluded Martyrdom	 80
5.3.2.5 Sub-theme 5: Abduction of Non-Muslims	100
5.3.2.6 Sub-theme 6: Forced Marriages of Non-Muslim Women and Girls	
5.3.3 Theme Three: Socio-economic Disenfranchisement/ Disempowerment	
5.3.3.1 Sub-theme 1: Loss of Families and Livelihoods	
5.3.3.2 Sub-theme 2: Selective Social Relief Support	
5.3.4 Theme Four: Psychological Devastation of Non-Muslims	
5.3.4.1 Sub-theme 1: Powerlessness and Despondency	
5.3.4.2 Sub-theme 2: Stigmatisation and Rejection/ Marginalisation of the N	
Muslim Survivors	
5.3.4.3 Sub-theme 3: Trauma and Re-traumatisation	
5.3.5 Theme Five: Current State/ Recovery and Coping from Psychological Devastati	ion
115	
5.4 CONCLUSION	118
	ND
RECOMMENDATIONS	
6.1 INTRODUCTION	

6.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND THEIR ATTAINMENT	.120
6.2.1 Attainment of Objective 1	
6.2.2 Attainment of Objective 2	
6.2.3 Attainment of Objective 3	
6.2.4 Attainment of Objective 4	
6.2.5 Attainment of Objective 5	
6.3 MAIN CONCLUSIONS	
6.3.1 Religious Context and Ramifications of Boko Haram Insurgency	.125
6.3.1.1 Genocide Against Non-Muslims	
6.3.1.2 Gender-based Violation of Non-Muslim Women and Girls	.126
6.3.2 Socio-cultural Disruptions and Injustices	.127
6.3.2.1 Systematic Displacement and Dislocation of Cultural Ties	.127
6.3.2.2 Forced Marriages of Non-Muslim Women and Girls	.128
6.3.3 Socio-economic Disenfranchisement/ Disempowerment	.129
6.3.4 Psychological Devastation on the Non-Muslim Victims and Survivors	.129
6.3.5 Current state/ Recovery and Coping Mechanisms of the non-Muslim Survivors	
6.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY	.134
6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS	
6.5.1 Recommendations for the Government of Nigeria (FRN)	.139
6.5.2 Recommendations for the International Community	
6.5.3 Recommendations for Further Study	
6.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY	
6.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS	
REFERENCE LIST	
APPENDIX A: UNISA ETHICS CLEARANCE	
APPENDIX B: Letter to Chairman of Chibok Local Government Area, Borno State	
APPENDIX C: Approval from Chibok Local Government to Conduct the Study	
APPENDIX D: Letter to Kibaku Chiefs/ Community Leaders in Southern Borno Senat	
District, Borno State	
APPENDIX E: Approval from Kibaku Area Development Association to Conduct the S	tudy
173	
APPENDIX F: Letter to Humanitarian Organisations (UN, ICRC, IR, ALIMA)	
APPENDIX G: Informed Consent for Participating in the Study	
APPENDIX H: Consent to Participate in the Study	
APPENDIX I: Interview Guide	
APPENDIX J: Focus Group Discussions	
APPENDIX K: Sample Interview Transcript	.182

List of Figures

Figure 1.1: Map of Borno State, North-Eastern Nigeria	. 21
Figure 4.1: Map of Northern Nigeria showing location of Chibok in Southern Borno State .	. 65
Figure 5.4: Focus group site distribution	. 83

List of Tables

Table 5.1: Interviewed participants' age, gender and ethnic profile	80
Table 5.2: Focus group participants' gender profiles and place of focus group	82
Table 5.3: Main themes and sub-themes/ categories	84
Table 6.1: Thematic link to attainment of study objectives	121

CHAPTER ONE OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Different forms of domestic and international terrorism have engulfed communities worldwide since the beginning of the millennium (Egbue, Uche & Alichie, 2015). The Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN) is currently experiencing a raging and unprecedented Boko Haram (BH) insurgency that is a threat to the very human rights and democratic values of Nigerian society that advocate for the right to life and protection of human dignity and property (Cook, 2012; Obafemi & Galadima as cited in Akubo & Okolo, 2019).

The ceaseless Boko Haram incursions in North-Eastern Nigeria and Southern Borno district seems to be a daily occurrence, despite contrary claims by the current Nigerian President (Nnaem, 2021). Incessant attacks by these Boko Haram extremists are a depiction of orchestrated physical and gender identity violence against non-Muslim indigenous women and children and other Muslims of other sects whom they declare as apostates to Islam and its fundamental religious tenets (Zenn & Pearson, 2014; UNICEF Nigeria, 2018; CFR, 2022).

Most discourses on the Boko Haram insurgency have been political and neglected the brutal experiences and dire humanitarian situation of the victims. This has been clearly demonstrated in the human rights abuses, population displacements and casualties to the dignity of those who have been rendered refugees unnecessarily, and whose livelihoods have been brutally disrupted by the marauding Boko Haram militants (Council on Foreign Relation, 2019). According to Gundiri (2022), therefore it is important to investigate the sequel of Boko Haram's genocidal violations on the victims themselves. The counter- terrorism context does not accentuate such genocidal factors to the required levels, despite that the primary objective of the counter-terrorism initiatives is based on the rule of law and its emphasis on preventing victimization (Abdulla, Robinson-Dogo, 2021).

To fully provide access to justice for the Non-Muslim Communities of Southern Borno (NMCSB) victims, it is essential to first understand the extent of their harm and daily needs arising from such harm. Violent conflict of the scale inflicted by Boko Haram may affects human life in many ways. For instance, household and community

resources may dwindle as funds are redirected away from the basic social services provided by government, private and public non-profit organizations. Furthermore, increases in food prices, commodities and fear restrain citizens from pursuing their usual livelihood activities. Other facilities such as health, marketplaces, water systems, and roads are either destroyed or otherwise rendered inaccessible (OCHA, 2018; Gundiri, 2022).

Similarly, the non-Muslim communities of North-Eastern Nigeria are constantly dehumanized and murdered, only because they are non-Muslim (CFR, 2019). Since 2009, Boko Haram insurgents have demonized, burnt down thousands of non-Muslim places of worship in the North-Eastern section of Nigeria, threatened, abducted and persecuted them inclemently. According to a report by the non-profit organization, 'Aid to the Church in Need' (2017), Boko Haram seems to have targeted non-Muslims within its controlled territory, and propagates for attacks against its so-called apostates, Americans and Jews worldwide (Aid to the Church in Need, 2017; Damaturu, 2021).

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The problem of the study is centrally located in the extent of engineered or orchestrated human suffering and its consequences meted systematically by the Boko Haram militia and Fulani-Hausa herdsmen against indigenous non-Muslim communities in the North-Eastern region of Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2013; Onuoha, 2014). Nigeria is Africa's most populous country, and is currently confronted with many profound difficulties, including the Boko Haram terrorist insurgency and its threat to the country's political and socio-economic stability and livelihoods, especially in North-Eastern Nigeria and beyond (Akubo & Okolo, 2019; Okoli, 2022).

Osumah (2013) asserts that the anxiety created by the Boko Haram insurgency has caused a mass stampede of people leaving the northern areas of the country to their places of origin. The fear that the situation could descend to religious conflict is fuelled by the unsavoury Boko Haram guerrilla war declared against non-Muslims Nigerians. During 2011/2012, the sectarian Boko Haram issued a threat and ultimatum to all non-northerners to leave the region. The consequent mass exodus of non-Muslim Nigerians from the strife-torn north-eastern region tends to confirm the view that the country called Nigeria is devoid of a base structure due to colonial machinations.

According to Otoghile and Igbafe (2014), the merging of the Southern and Northern Nigerian provinces in 1914 was only a joining without integration because the basis for amalgamation in unity (i.e., tribe, culture, religion and language) in unity were never considered. It is in this regard that the Federal Republic of Nigeria has consistently and unsuccessfully searched for answers to the ethno-religious dichotomy. Therefore, Boko Haram's Islamization clamour is reflective of a long-standing ethno-religious dichotomy perpetrated in earlier years by British colonialists in Northern Nigeria (Gundiri, 2022:17). Preventing and countering the Boko Haram insurgency and all its fraternal violent extremists such as the Fulani-herdsmen and bandits in Nigeria requires sustained momentum and collective actions in unity.

The government of the United Kingdom (UK) has acknowledged the murder of thousands of unarmed Nigerian civilians by the Boko Haram militias and Fulani herdsmen, and some complicit elements within the Nigeria government (House of Lords, 2020). The UK legislators subsequently recommended an investigation into the genocide, ensure protection of civil rights, and aid with victims suffering the loss of relatives and the destruction of their livelihoods. The UK government's formal response in this regard will emphasise approaches to supporting solutions that address the causes of conflict and reducing violence affecting both non-Muslim and Muslim communities.

In April 2018, President Donald Trump asked the President of Nigeria to explain his perceived indifference to the plight of persecuted non-Muslim Nigerians. To a great extent, this demonstrates the concerns of the international community with the Nigerian conflict, with the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) classifying Nigeria as one of sixteen countries about which serious concern was raised regarding religious intolerance and violence (Shellnutt, 2018; International Christians Concern, 2022).

Religious violence amongst the Muslim Fulani-herders and non-Muslim farmers are increasing, and efforts by the Nigerian government appear to be ineffective since the perpetrators of this sectarian violence are sparsely held accountable (USCIRF, 2018). In fact, the conflict had assumed the proportions of a "deliberate genocide" with Nigeria becoming the "biggest killing ground of Christians in the world" (Conger, 2020:1).

While the socio-economic disparities and poverty levels between the northern and the more developed southern state of Nigeria is attributable to the divisive colonial (preindependence) system, there is a further problem of the real or actual motivational factors for Boko Haram's existence (Agbiboa, 2013; Onuoha, 2014). Clearly, Boko Haram thrives on the poverty and fear of its defenceless victims. However, such a proposition alone (by itself) does not sufficiently explain the group's methodical campaign of violence and pogrom against the non-Muslims communities, and the Federal Republic of Nigerian in general. Hence, it would be problematic at the theoretical level to allocate the Boko Haram phenomenon to only political and ethno-religious factors (lwuchukwu, 2013; Aina, 2022). It is in this regard that the study's theoretical framework in Chapter Three accentuates the social identity theory (SIT) as an attempt to find a broader or more comprehensive approach to understanding of the Boko Haram insurgency or phenomenon and its antithetical tendencies in a post-modern era.

The devastating and traumatic effects of the Boko Haram insurgency may be experienced at several interrelated levels (e.g., individual, collective and social (Hagen & Yohani, 2010). The experiences among the primary victims could manifest through personal injury, loss or death; family members, relatives or friends of primary victims; while the experiences of those who observed the victimization are expressed and documented in the visual and print media (Erez, 2006). Furthermore, the health consequences of Boko Haram inspired victimization (e.g., rape of non-Muslim women and girls) include sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV and chronic infections, unwanted pregnancy, forced mass abortion, miscarriage and other reproduction problems (Bell, 2005; Joachim, 2005; Akinyemi, 2022).

The psycho-emotional effects of the Boko Haram insurgency are both incalculable and unquantifiable. non-Muslim communities in the affected areas continue to experience shock, which is compounded by grief for the loss of victims through either abduction or even death. One of the most devastating impacts of Boko Haram is the abduction and forceful conversion of 276 Chibok school girls in the non- Islamic community of Southern Borno on14 April 2014. This was an extremely shocking and traumatic experience to the non-Muslim indigenous parents and the world at large (Ziradzo, 2016; Onah, 2022). According to Barkindo et al. (2013), the illegal abduction of non-

Muslim women and girls by Boko Haram is both calculated and appears first and foremost punitive. The list of atrocities includes the attack of a non-Muslim student by Boko Haram at her university accommodation in August 2013; the murder of non-Muslim men and systematic rape of non-Muslim women merely on account of their religious identity (Barkindo et al., 2013). Such attacks on non-Muslim women by Boko Haram can be regarded as an extension of deep hatred and long-term discriminatory practices against them in northern regions (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012; Damaturu, 2021).

The problem of the Boko Haram insurgency seems to have caused non-Muslim women in Borno State in particular, unprecedented suffering and a range of intense discrimination in both the professional and domestic spheres. For instance, they have been subjected to acid-attacks for 'un-Islamic' practices, such as a failure to wear the 'hijab', or for taking a job for survival (Turaki, 2010:76). Generally, survivors of these terrorist attacks are known to have suffered post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which happens at double the level in survivors of terrorist attacks than in survivors of motor accidents (Shaley & Freedman, 2005). Amongst previously captured women and girls, perceived social rejection in their community conciliate the relationship between traumatic enslavement events, as well as depression symptoms such as replay of carnage, flashback, and nightmares, which may persist for months or even years (Kohli et al., 2014; Shapland & Hall, 2007:178; Ebim et al., 2023).

The most recurrent psychological problems developing from war events are posttraumatic stress disorders (PTSD) and depressive disorders (Morina, et al., 2013). Still, there is a lack of data with regards to the generality of mental health disorders among the non-Muslim victims' populations which find themselves in lasting and continuing displacement situations, in north-eastern Nigeria (Gundiri, 2022). In the case of people who are forced to flee from their homeland due to natural disasters or persecution, one in ten people suffers from PTSD and one in twenty suffers from depression (Fazel, et al. 2015). Rates of prevalence are estimated at even higher numbers among survivors of rape, military action, captivity, internment for ethnic or political reasons or genocide (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).

Socio-economic and demographic features of displaced populations have shown to be determinants of mental health. Internal displacement, continuing conflict situations, and economic instability are strongly associated with poor mental health outcomes

(UNHCR Global trends, 2017). Whether people develop a mental disorder after a potential traumatic event (PTE) depends, among other things, on various risk factors (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Risk factors that show a link between PTSD and depression are individual characteristics (Farhood, et al. 2016). But the type of the traumatic event plays the most significant role (Deering, et al. 1996). In the context of war-related experiences, experiencing violent attacks, the death of loved ones, torture, rape, abductions, captivity and being a victim of enslavement, forceful conversion and indoctrination which the BH victims experienced (Maiangwa, 2014; Akinyemi, 2022), indicates a connection with depression and PTSD.

In addition, the feeling of guilt following a traumatic experience seems to be a determinant of both PTSD and depression. Experiencing abuse in a violent relationship has shown to be a determinant of low self-esteem and severe symptoms of depression (Hagen & Yohani, 2010). Kukah in his message 'people are dying...' mention the alleged effects that Boko Haram and other sister's terrorist group violence can have on self-confidence, self-esteem, and self-efficacy expectations (Nnaem, 2021). In this study, non-Muslims women and girls who were exposed to multiple PTEs would be investigated with regards to the consequences of BH slavery and the perceived social rejections in their communities.

1.3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The significance of the study is a demonstration or indication of the study's value, relevance or worth insofar as it significantly contributes to the epistemological development of knowledge in a particular field of study or discipline; to institutions or organisations mostly affected by the study being undertaken; as well as to society's benefit (Scotland, 2012; Thanh & Thanh, 2015). However, it is not always the case that all three significance factors will apply in the same study (Thomas, 2016).

1.3.1 Epistemological/ Discipline-specific Contribution or Relevance

An investigation into the experiences of the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno State in North-Eastern Nigeria is vitally important, considering the magnitude (scale) and implications (scope) of the genocidal violence meted by a motley of sectarian malcontents (Boko Haram and Fulani-Hausa herdsmen) propagating some illogical, unscientific, and historically false ideologies bothering on a combination of racial bigotry, ethnicity, and religious intolerance. It is apparent that a study of this nature is both inter- and multi-disciplinary, straddling across, and integrating disciplines and fields of study, such as sociology, psychology, history, politics, religion, culture, and education. As such, this study will contribute to the national and international knowledge base of what could be termed, 'the nature or anatomy of mass violence'. The researcher considers that, 'the sociology of mass-based violence' would be even more appropriate for purposes of this study, given the levels and fallacious justifications of violence of one social group against another (Thompson & Hickey, 2016:48; Florquin, et al. 2022).

Accordingly, the study will provide a unique opportunity to enhance informed and impartial understanding concerning the experiences of non-Muslim minority communities in Southern Borno and their daily challenges as they unfairly and unnecessarily strive to maintain the little of their human dignity they still have left.

The BH attacks within the non-Muslims communities of southern Borno has been observed to be an identity-based violence. The sect utilizes identity that incorporates shared beliefs, experiences, attitudes, missions and common interests of in-group members. Which is defined by the attainment of the group professed aim to rid Nigeria of infidels (out-group), its unwanted democracy, apostates and establish an Islamic State with tenets central to Islam (Shekau, 2014).

Therefore, the study will contribute to a large body of current knowledge and scientific evidence focusing on the experiences of the voiceless and under-researched victims, inform other tangible subjects in the future and reaches out to a broader scholarly and non-scholarly audience that includes educators, international organizations, and other professional bodies whose core activities include human rights advocacy (Brown, 2000; Wilson, 2013).

1.3.2 Institutional/ Organisational Contribution or Relevance

Based on its 'sociological' and/ or human rights inclination, the study will be of benefit to relevant institutions and organisations that profoundly advocate for the protection of human rights. As such, the study will provide a real opportunity at the local (Nigerian) level for new government policies, non-governmental organisations, and conflict resolution experts and practitioners in fragile and conflict-affected states to address specific needs of non-Muslim communities in North-Eastern Nigeria (Salih, Slye, Freeman, Revkin & Felbab-Brown, 2018). Accordingly, the study contributes to the

body of knowledge from which continental institutions such as the African Union (AU) could actualise its mission to "silence the guns" and end all forms of conflict on the African continent (Institute for Security Studies/ ISS, 2020:1).

Furthermore, international institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and International Court of Justice (ICJ), Amnesty International and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) could benefit immensely from the study's first-hand account of the man-made humanitarian crisis and atrocities experienced by innocent civilians at the hands of terrorists and war criminals whose only fate lies in the appropriately constituted international bodies with jurisprudential might to end the scourge of the Boko Haram insurgency against non-Muslim Nigerians (Jones, M. 2020).

Within the context of this study, the experiences of non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno are considered as the profoundly reliable voices of the human pain and consequences of violent extremism executed with deliberate ideological intent. The victims are ambassadors for the immortalization of public memory. This study will offer a detailed account and thereby create awareness of the NMCSB experiences under the Boko Haram insurgency. Testimonies of victims can provoke exchanges and give the target audience the opportunity to reflect on and relate to the experiences of the victims (Frechette et al., 2020; Honey et al., 2020).

1.3.3 Socioeconomic Contribution or Relevance

The study further contributes to social justice initiatives by systematically exploring the extent and implications of State funds devoted to fighting a terrorist war, to the detriment of low-income and suffering masses of people whose lives and livelihoods have been severely disrupted by the savage war against them (Vaughan, 2017). Like any other Nigerian citizen, the non-Muslim communities in North-Eastern Nigeria depend on State-sponsored social programmes and resource funding (Vaughan, 2017; Robinson-Dogo, 2021).

The destruction of property and infrastructure (e.g., marketplaces, water systems, and roads) by the Boko Haram militants constitutes a serious dent to the country's national budget. Therefore, the increasing military and infrastructure refurbishment budget (let alone the incalculable loss of human life) induces a redirection of the much-needed

social spending because the barbaric onslaught against civilians is increasing as well (Danjibo, 2009; OCHA, 2018;). Therefore, the study-s exploration of the socioeconomic damage caused by Boko Haram is of practical consequence to policy and decision makers to take appropriate steps commensurate with the ultra-urgent situation in the country.

1.4. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The researcher intends to represent the experiences of survivors of the Boko Haram insurgency, and to explore these range of responses by the NMCSB. Therefore, the study's geographical focus is mostly on North-Eastern Nigeria, where the Boko Haram terrorists are mostly active, and from where the study's sought "lived experiences" of the participants are prominently demonstrable (Okoli & Iortyer, 2014; Perry, 2014; Siedman, 2013). However, this does not attenuate the sporadic trend of Boko Haram attacks in the urban areas and cities in different parts of Nigeria.

From a methodological perspective, the study's preferred data collection was largely applied through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions for purposes of infusing a profoundly qualitative "lived experience" perspective which could not necessarily be achieved by quantitative means (Frechette et al., 2020; Honey et al., 2020). Accordingly, the responses will differ amongst the survivors, and may be determined by other factors such as the age, gender and perceived religious affiliations of the victims (Marchal, 2012; Kassim, 2015).

1.5 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

The below-cited terms are defined for the purpose of clarifying their lexical (denotative), contextual (implied or connotative), discipline-specific and every day or colloquial meaning, usage, or application (Khaldi, 2017; Saldanha & O'Brien, 2013). Furthermore, it is worth stating that these key terms are chosen for definition due to their pivotal and thematic link to the research topic and the study's investigated problem (Ruppel & Mey, 2017). It is worth mentioning also that some of the non-English terms have been included in order to convey their undiluted meanings, especially that they further derive from some of the critical aspects of both the research topic and participants' indigenously inspired worldviews from which these terms are cognate (Punch, 2014). The terms below are sequentially arranged in terms of their

alphabetic order, which does not in any way signify the importance of one term over another (Mouton, 2014).

1.5.1 Almajiri

Refers to a system of Islamic education practiced in northern Nigeria, the male gender seeking Islam knowledge is called Almajiri, female gender is Almajira, and the plural is Almajirai. The term is mostly used to identify students of the Quran in Northern Nigeria (Udounwa,2013). 'Almajiri' is an Arabic derivative of 'al-Muhajirun' and refers to a person who leaves his/ her home to search for Islamic knowledge (Agbiboa, 2015).

1.5.2 Boko Haram

'Boko' means secular Western education, and 'Haram' is Arabic in origin and means something that is prohibited or forbidden (Gundiri, 2022). Therefore, the term in its fullest translates as "Western education is forbidden".

1.5.3 Experience

The totality of events, knowledge, and feelings that make up someone's life or character. It also means something that happens to you that affects how you feel (Frechette, Bitzas, Aubry, Kilpatrick & Lavoie-Tremblay, 2020; Honey, Boydell, Coniglio et al., 2020).

1.5.4 Insurgency

A clandestinely organized movement or organisation whose aim is a violent overthrow or destruction of an elected or democratically constituted government using methods or tactics that involve subversion, armed conflict, espionage and terrorism (Hayden, 2017).

1.5.5 Investigation

In this study (and as opposed to police or criminal investigation), it relates to systematic techniques or methods by whose means (processes, procedures and strategies) researchers explore various forms and sources of information to convert or translate into meaningful or relevant knowledge for resolving existing problems in a specific field or socially problematic issue (Machi & McEvoy, 2020; Scotland, 2012; Singh, 2019).

1.5.6 Jama'atul Alhulsunnah Lidda'wati wal Jihad

People committed to propagating their ethnic-religious ideological views through a protracted 'jihad', what is known as a 'holy war' or crusade against those termed as apostates or infidels (lwuchukwu, 2010; 2013).

1.5.7. Jihad

Jihad is rooted in the Quran's command to Muslims to "struggle or exert" (the literal meaning of the word jihad) oneself in the path of Allah. The Quranic teachings have been of general important to Muslim self- understanding, piety, mobilization, expansion, and defense (Robinson-Dogo 2021; Gundiri, 2022).

1.5.8 Kibaku

The indigenous or native language spoken predominantly by the Kibaku people living in the Chibok region of Borno State, North-Eastern Nigeria (Achodo, 2019; Allen, 2020: 7).

1.5.9 non-Muslim

A non-adherent to the Muslim religion of Islam (Human Rights Watch, 2012; Umejesi, 1992).

1.5.10. Wilayat Gharb Ifrigiyyah

This refers to Islamic State, West Africa Province. In the view of the Boko Haram adherents, West Africa is viewed as both an enclave and extension of the internationalistic Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) movement of which Boko Haram is an offshoot (Majangwa, 2014; US Government, 2016).

1.6 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The main purpose of this study is to explore, describe and analyse the Boko Haram insurgency in North-Eastern Nigeria against non-Muslim communities, as well as implications of the humanitarian crisis this unprecedented insurgency has created.

Notwithstanding the overall aim or purpose of the study, also entailed therein are the inevitable manifestations and implications of the Boko Haram, since an understanding of the lived experiences of the non-Muslims do not exist by themselves but linked to the holistic daily encounters of victims in war-torn communities. In that regard, the below-mentioned research objectives articulate or 'unpack' the inextricability of the

victims as human sufferers from the experiences as the catalysts of the holistic understanding (Padgett, 2014).

1.7 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

As opposed to the more generalistic research aim, the research objectives on the other hand, are more specific and articulate the particular activities, processes and/ or procedures undertaken by the researcher to actualise the research aim within a particular time frame (Babbie, 2020). It is in the latter regard that the following research objectives are reflective of the actual activities and processes the researcher undertook to dissemble (unpack) the previously cited research aim:

- To explore, describe and analyse the levels of the Boko Haram's religiously inspired genocide and brutality against the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno State.
- To explore and describe the socio-cultural context and disruptive effects of Boko Haram's violence against the non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State.
- To explore and describe the socio-economic ramifications and humanitarian impacts of the genocidal attacks by Boko Haram against the non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State.
- To explore, describe and analyse the psycho-social manifestation and impact of the Boko Haram attacks on the non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State; and
- To explore and describe possible future scenarios for the Boko Haram survivors' Muslim and non-Muslim relationships in Southern Borno.

1.8 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research questions are interstitial to both the research problem and the research aim and objectives, while also providing the structure of the study insofar as it responds to the core issues entailed in the research topic (Babbie, 2012; Whitley, 2012). According to Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2012), a response to the core issues of the study is also a determinant of the type and nature of the data collection instrumentation preferred by the researcher. In that regard, the below-cited research questions are indicative of an affinity with the research aim and objectives, as well as the logically structured sequence of discussions (i.e., chapters) throughout the study.

- What are the observed levels of the Boko Haram religiously inspired genocide and brutality against the non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State?
- What are the socio-cultural factors and implications of the Boko Haram violence against non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State?
- What are the known socio-economic ramifications and humanitarian impacts of the genocidal attacks by Boko Haram against the non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State?
- What is the psycho-social manifestation and ramifications of the Boko Haram attacks on the nom-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State?
- Which are the possible future scenarios for the Boko Haram survivors' Muslim and non-Muslim relationships in Southern Borno?

1.9. STUDY SETTING

The semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with the selected participants were held among the non-Muslim communities of the Chibok local government areas of Southern Senatorial District in Borno State, North-Eastern Nigeria. Figure 1.1 below illustrates the geographic location of this study setting.



Figure 1.1: Map of Borno State, North-Eastern Nigeria Source: Centanni, E. (<u>https://correspondent.afp.com/chibok-two-years</u>)

The Chibok local government area's land mass is 1350 km², with a population of about 93,200 at the time of conducting the study (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020;

National Population Commission of Nigeria, 2020). The dominant language spoken is Kibaku, one of the Biu-Mandara group of languages (Central Chadic) spoken today from Lake Chad to the valley of the river Benue (Hickey, 1984).

Thematic data analysis was employed to collate all the information accrued from both the semi-structured interviews and the focus group interviews. Ultimately, the findings from both data sets were converged for the purpose of generating global themes of the study, rather than loosely connected themes that could render the findings disjointed (Bernard, 2013; Van Manen, 2015; Konecki, 2021).

1.10. OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION

This thesis is delineated into six chapters as reflected below:

Chapter One: Overview of the Study

This chapter presents the introduction and background of the study, statement of the problem and significant of the study, the scope of the study and definition of key terms, the research purpose, objectives, and questions, as well as the research setting.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

The chapter presents the relevant literature reviewed in respect of a historical context and background of the Boko Haram sectarian movement, the experiences of non-Muslims under the Boko Haram insurgency, as well as the overall effects of the insurgency.

Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework

This chapter presents the social identity theory as the foundational theory guiding the study. The theory's basic principles and concepts are referred to as the building blocks on whose basis the strengths and weakness of the theory are identified insofar as they apply to the current study.

Chapter Four: Research Design and Methodology

This chapter mainly presents the research design and methodology, data collection, sampling procedures, data analysis, and ethical considerations, as well as the trustworthiness measures.

Chapter Five: Presentation of Findings

This chapter basically presents the converged findings accruing from the semistructured interviews and focus group discussions, as well as the themes generated from these findings.

Chapter Six: Summary of Main Findings, Contributions, Conclusions and Recommendations

This concluding chapter of the study presents a summary of the main findings generated in the previous chapter, the conclusions drawn from these findings and their implications, recommendations and implications, possible limitations of the study, as well as the researcher's own concluding remarks concerning this research study.

1.11. CONCLUSION

In essence, this chapter has presented an overview or general perspective of the various aspects of the whole study, which are addressed in varying levels of detail throughout the study.

The next chapter presents the literature review pertinent to the core issues or aspects entailed in the research topic.

CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

A review of the literature pertinent to the subject of investigation provided an opportunity to systematically search, process and ultimately identify secondary data sources or existing body of reading material for the enhancement of the researcher's knowledge and understanding of the research topic and its context (Whitley & Kite, 2012; Zulawski & Wicklander, 2016; Konecki, 2021). Most original research is viewed as an extension of what has previously been learnt about a particular topic. Therefore, a review of the existing literatures is reflective of the way we learn about both the known and unknown (Babbie, 2012, 2020). Accordingly, this chapter focuses essentially on reviewing the written work and multiple perspectives of other academics, scholars, experts, professional researchers and practitioners in various disciplines in which Boko Haram and its other *jihadist* fraternal movements are the core phenomena of their investigations or studies. It is in this regard that reference to the original research or scholarly work by others also presents an opportunity from

which lessons could be learnt for the betterment of human society and its living conditions, if not for posterity's sake.

Given the above, the current chapter entails three fundamental aspects entailed in the research topic. Firstly, the historical overview or perspective provides a context of the role and effects of some past events that presaged the existence of Boko Haram in later years. Secondly, the Boko-Haram motivational factors transcend history and include an eclectic range of factors that transfuse and sustain the lifeblood of Boko Haram from its inception to date. Thirdly, the chapter outlines the links that Boko Haram has with other organisations sharing its divisive sectarian orientation.

2.2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF BOKO HARAM'S EXISTENCE

Nigeria has witnessed some of the worst civil and sectarian crises in its history, even during the pre-independence era. Notwithstanding, the post-independence period has witnessed upheavals such as the Maitatsine sect riots, starting in Kano and spreading to most parts of Northern Nigeria in the 1980s, the ethno-religious crises in Kafanchan and Zango Kataf in Southern Kaduna in 1987 and 1992 respectively. There has also been the uncontrollable ethno-religious crisis in Jos since early 2001 to date, and the 1993, 2007 and 2011 post-election crises that spread across the country, most particularly in the northern parts of Nigeria (Akubo & Okolo, 2019). In this regard, Durotoye (2015) asserts that the Nigerian State has experienced attacks from 'above' and from 'below' by ethnic, religious and regional groups, and by the State elite itself. Accordingly, the Boko Haram insurgency has variously created dire humanitarian situations and have threatened Nigeria's efforts towards achieving sustainable political and economic developments (Durotoye, 2015; MURIC, 2022).

Boko Haram's mission to restore a conservative version of Islam follows a long history which is traceable back to the 19th century when Uthman Dan Fodio (1754-1817) a Fulani scholar, launched a *jihad* ('holy war') to establish a stricter Islamic version in Northern Nigeria (Hiskett, 1993:76). This historical background and perspective enable proper understanding of the identity confrontation within the indigenous communities of Southern Borno in particular. Therefore, the barriers faced by the non-Muslim communities today are connected to these early contacts with the Islamic *jihads*.

In the second half of the 18th century, an Islamic resurgence took place in Western Africa, with Islamic Fulani cattle-herders playing a major role (Abar, 2019; Africa Studies Centre, 2002). In Northern Nigeria, Uthman embarked on a *jihad* in from 1804 to1810 with the intention to revive and purify Islam in addition to converting the non-Muslims (Pilaszewicz, 1991:35). The resurgence was another revelation of how the weaker Chadic clans suffered in the upheaval (Hickey, 1984:87; Ziradzo, 2009:53). Uthman was a Sufi-Sunni Muslim, despite that Islam had already been embraced in the North-Eastern Nigeria before Uthman's (1804-1810) *jihad* (Africa Studies Centre, 2002).

The history of Islam in Nigeria dates to the 11th century when it first appeared and was practised in Borno the stronghold of the Boko Haram group in Nigeria (Umejesi, 1992:92). Sheikh El-Kanemi of Borno, a Sufi- Muslim was Islamic leader before the dominance of the Sokoto caliphate *jihad* (Brenner, 1979:133). Apart from the partially successful Uthman *jihad*, all regions that form present-day Nigeria of today practised the non-violent traditional form or brand of Islam (Campbell 2011; Harnischfeger, 2008). However, the Salafiyya, Wahabis, and Tablighi movements of Sunni Islam activism began to gain traction in Nigeria when Islamic scholars who went to study at the religious Al-Azhar University in Egypt and in Saudi Arabia returned to Nigeria (Campbell, 2011; Gundiri, 2022).

Ensconced by the Saudi petrol-dollars, these returning clerics began to assert themselves through activities that profoundly changed the non-violent Sufi order traditional form of Islam (Qadiriyya, Tijaniyya & Mouridiyya) that was prevalent in the Northern part of Nigeria (Quadri, 1984). The foreign-trained clerics became confrontational towards the orthodox Islamic clerics, criticizing their modes of worship as a heretic innovation (Campbell 2011; Robinson-Dogo, 2021). Thus, the Fulani of Borno were outclassed and defeated by the brilliant leadership of Muhammed El-Kanemi (the first Shehu of Borno). In the south, the new Fulani Emirate of Yola quickly consolidated its base and engaged the non-Muslim communities north of the river Benue (Hickey, 1984).

Having subdued the Batta, the confrontational clerics extended their *jihad* holy war to the non-Muslim communities of Mandara Mountain' further north (Green, 1958:45). Subsequently, they had established outposts at Gombi, Mubi, Uba, Michika, and

Madagali by 1830. The country of Fombina now became known as Adamawa, named after Modibbo Adama the first Lamido or Emir of Yola (1806-48). The Emir is known as the Lamido, a Fulani term for 'ruler'. At first, the description of the title was restricted to a governor, who was initially appointed as a lieutenant of the Sokoto caliphate, but the term quickly assumed the nuance of absolute sovereignty (Greene, 1958:135). The full title of 'Lamido Fombina' (meaning, 'Lord of the South') was conferred on Modibbo Adama (from whom the Emirate derives its name) by the Sultan of Sokoto during the *jihad* at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The Sokoto caliphate established by Usman (1804-1903) the Fulani Islamic ruler, governed parts of present-day Northern Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger. The collapse of the Sokoto caliphate under British colonial rule in 1903, coincided with the northern Hausa-Fulani Muslims on-going resistance to Western education (Marchal, 2012). Hence, the Boko Haram insurgency should be reasoned as "a reform movement for restoration" (Marchal, 2012: 3). Such "restoration", according to the Fulbe Muslims, upholds the claim that only Islam proffered a 'superior' God whom everyone should accept and surrender to, and that submission to Allah's Messenger was obligatory (Njeuma, 2000; Gundiri, 2022).

Thus, the *jihad* marked the first major religious conflict in pre-colonial Mandara communities and Cameroon, with whole non-Muslims communities suffering defeat and forceful conversion to an exclusivist version of Islam (Abar, 2019; Njeuma, 1978). Since then, intolerance and divisions have characterized the religious scenery of the Mandara and Cameroonian communities (Schilder, 1993:68). In fact, the path to Muslim and non-Muslim cohabitation in the region is beleaguered by bigotry and susceptibility to religious brutality in the region; and the global occurrence of present-day Islamic movements has propelled the resurgence of violent forms of Islam (Esposito, 2002).

Among other factors, the above-mentioned resurgence has been catered for by Muslim traditions that require reformation of their societies in every age (Fonge, 2015). Boko Haram is one of such revivalist movements, with Nigeria as its place of origin, providing a fruitful ground for the consequent religious upheaval. According to Adesoji (2010: 95), the subtle Boko Haram sectarian revolt represented an attempt by Islamic right-wing components at imposing a form of "Islamic religious ideology". Its leaders

capitalized on the religious sensitivities of the people of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, turning these countries into fruitful environment for the breeding of extreme sectarianism (Onuoha, 2014). Therefore, the 19th century *jihads* in West Africa communities should be understood in this sectarian context.

Furthermore, the religiously fuelled enmity continued until the advent of colonial rule that paved ways for the Christian missionaries in North-Eastern Nigeria. The non-Muslim communities of the Mandara Mountain have resisted forceful conversion and were never fully subjugated by the Muslim-Fulani emirate (Green, 1958:90; Hickey, 1984:56, Ziradzo, 2004:77). As the distinction between the Muslim Fulani and the non-Muslims became more pronounced, Christian missionary evangelism escalated among the non-Muslim communities from the 1930s to the 1950s (Vaughan, 2017). However, the general language of Christianity gradually served as a vital weapon for politico- religious mobilization against Hausa-Fulani Muslim hegemony during the 1950s decolonization era.

The pre-independence (late colonial period) divisions further permeated into the postcolonial era and inadvertently controlled the processes of concerted political action in Northern Nigeria, with its state of incompatibility of ingrained ethno- religious identity and conflict (Vaughan, 2017). In this regard, Boko Haram could be viewed as building on deep pre-colonial prejudices, regarding non-Muslims as not infidels and pagans whose existence would not be tolerated in their 'caliphate' (Je'Adayibe, 2018; Ziradzo, 2016:2; Robinson-Dogo, 2021). Meanwhile, Okoli and Iortyer (2014) assert that Nigeria has increasingly found it strenuous to overcome the fundamental security challenges that have persisted since Nigeria separated from the manacles of British colonial rule in 1960. Insecurity have been the major question in the nation's political history, marked by periods of varied misfortunes of discreditable incidents.

2.2.1 Forcible Conversion to Islam in a Historical Context

The Fulani herdsmen were already settled in the Katsina region by the 15th century when Uthman Dan Fadio led a Fulani *jihadistic* rebellion against the existing Habe dynasties in 1804v, beginning in Gobir against the Hausa overlords and replaced them with Fulani emirs (EEB, 2019; Nwabara, 1963:84). Consequently, the Hausas were forcibly Islamized and subjected to the caliphate regime's supposedly purer form of Islam in a predominantly non-Muslim community (Afigbo, 1999; Middle Belt Dialogue,

2018). The Fulani *jihad* and Islam made inroads into other areas not inhabited by the Fulani or Hausas but were successfully resisted in much of the middle belt region (Middle Belt Dialogue, 2018; Gundiri, 2022).

The British colonialists' indirect rule brought non-Hausa/Fulani peoples (whom they never conquered) in Northern Nigeria under the relatively developed emirate system for the purposes of maintaining law and order, recruitment for forced labour and exacting taxes to run the colony (Reynolds, 2001; Robinson-Dogo, 2021). Moreover, the Usman *jihad* stimulated the emergence of several religious extremist movements, the most notable of which are the Maitatsine, Shiites and Sharia warlords, Boko Haram, as well as the Fulani-Hausa herdsmen. All these militant variants were bound in common by their forceful occupation of the conquered territories of those Northern Nigerian non-Muslims regarded as infidels by the faithful-Dar al-Islam adherents (Omolewa, 2008:64; Turaki, 2010:55; Nmah & Amanambu 2017; Gundiri, 2022).

After Nigerian independence in 1960, Sir Ahmadu Bello (erstwhile Sardauna of Sokoto) became premier of the Northern region following the transfer of power by the British. non-Muslim communities were denied social amenities and forcibly converted to the Muslim religion with renewed momentum under Ahmadu Bello's Islamization programme that led to the conversion of over 100,000 people in the provinces of Zaria and Niger (African Studies Centre Leiden, 2002; Intersociety, 2020). Between 1961 and 1966 (the year of Ahmadu's death), he conducted annual Islamisation campaigns throughout the northern region (Hickey, 1984).

During the premiership of Sir Ahmadu Bello in the northern region traditional leadership roles became a preserve of only Muslims. As a vice president of the World Muslim League, he fervently attempted to convert Northern Nigeria into mainstream or orthodox Islam (Hickey, 1984). The resistance against forceful conversion and imposition of Fulani-Muslim traditional rulers led to the Tiv riots of 1960-64, and restiveness in defunct Gongola (Adamawa & Taraba States), Southern Kaduna (Kafanchan), Tafawa Belawa in Bauchi State and Plateau State. Such was the vigour of Ahmadu's promise to "dip the Quran into the sea," meaning that he would spread Islam from the far north across the country to the Atlantic Ocean in the south in his lifetime (Abiola cited in Nmah & Amanambu, 2017:1; Intersociety, 2020).

The agenda of "dipping the Quran into the sea" continued unabated, with increasing terror attacks and killings of non-Muslims in Northern Nigeria region, followed by the exodus of the Fulani herdsmen and ISIS to the southern states near the Atlantic Ocean (US Department of State, 2020; Oladimeji, 2021). The southward expansion was further testimony of Ahmadu Bello's vision of entrenching a ruthless form of 'regime change' with the Northern minorities used as compliant instruments and the South of Nigeria as a vanquished jurisdiction denied any control of their future. Furthermore, in response to a letter from the UK-based West African Students Union (WASU) to the northern emirs asking them to support the evolution of Nigeria into an independent nation, the Northern chiefs declared that "the religion of the prophet [Muhammad]" was the only means by which Nigeria could become a politically united country (Awolowo, 1947:51). There is historical evidence attesting that Islamization was easily enforced and spread quicker in a military dictatorship under a military president, Ibrahim Babangida (African Studies Centre, 2002; Intersociety, 2020).

During General Babangida's military rule (1985-1993), Nigeria was surreptitiously registered as a member state of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986 without tabling such a momentous issue before the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). Then second-in-command, Real Admiral Ebitu Ukiwe was summarily retired from the service after publicly stating that he heard about Nigeria's IOC membership from the media and not through official channels, confirming Babangida's unilateral decision (Middle Belt Dialogue, 2018). It is apparent that the establishment of the Sharia law by twelve Northern states between 1999 and 2001, in conjunction with the effects of numerous crises spearheaded by Muslim extremists in Northern Nigeria are visible reasons other ethnic group and religion usually point out as the Muslims master plan of Islamizing Nigeria to realize the unfinished *jihad* dreams of Usman dan Fodio (Ziradzo, 2020; Robinson-Dogo, 2021).

In addition, at the beginning of this millennium, the sharia code of Islamic law was introduced in the northern region in an expanded format. Islamic police (Hisbah) were introduced in Bauchi, Kaduna, Niger and Zamfara states where non-Muslim girls were abducted, forcibly converted and married out to Muslim men with the faked parental consent of these girls (Olaniyi, 2020). The Boko Haram insurgency is only the latest in the history of Islamist jihadist in the north and they have vowed to drive away, if unable

to kill, all the non-Muslims from northern part of Nigeria (Al-barnawi, 2016; Gundiri 2022; Shekau, 2014).

Further, each time something irks the Muslim world anywhere in the world, Nigerian non-Muslims are made to pay for it. In 2003, for example, a Danish newspaper lampooned the iconic Muslim prophet, Mohammed. As a result, non-Muslim Nigerians were slaughtered in cold blood in Maiduguri, Kano and Bauchi, and their properties looted and destroyed. Also, after US war planes attacked Tripoli in Libya in the 1990s, Nigerian non-Muslims were attacked and murdered in retribution in Northern Nigeria. However, Muslims in Northern Nigeria celebrated the bombing of the Twin Towers in New York City on September 11, 2001 (Middle Belt Dialogue, 2018). It is the researcher's view that, for this study's purpose, it is worthwhile to briefly highlight a historical event (the Maitatsine Revolt) to shed some light and understanding on the experiences of the non-Muslim Communities in Northern Nigeria. This event presages the examination of Boko Haram's motivational factors in Northern Nigeria.

2.2.2 The Maitatsine Revolt in Northern Nigeria

Falola (1998) considers the Maitatsine sect revolts as the first of religious extremism and militancy in post-colonial Nigerian history. The Maitatsine sect was established by an Islamic revivalist named Muhammadu Marwa from Cameroon (Pham, 2012). After Nigeria's independence in 1960, the first grievous experience of coordinated religious hostility against non-Muslims and other religious communities in Northern Nigeria was demonstrated by the Maitatsine revolts, which some researchers have linked to the 19th century *jihad* of Usman Dan Fodio, founder of the famous Sokoto caliphate and its stringent Sharia law (Adesoji 2011; Hickey 1984; Maiangwa 2014; Reynolds, 2001).

Marwa migrated from Cameroon to Northern Nigeria in 1945 (Pham, 2012). His hostility towards Islamic authorities in Kano state were noted and condemned by the British colonialists, who termed him an extremist religious teacher. However, Marwa became an Islamic fanatic preoccupied with the refinement of Islam. He believed that Islam was contaminated by the West (Danjibo 2009). Marwa's ideology attracted the urban poor individuals (almajiris) and religious zealots in the northern city of Kano with his message that the wealthy elites were Western stooges and infidels. As such, he opposed Westernization and refused to recognize secular authority and its ethical

standards (HRW, 2012). Some were attracted to the Islamic movements because of Marwa's castigation of the rich elites and promised salvation to "Allah's good people" (Hickey, 1984:255).

In December 1980, the Maitatsine rebellion led to eleven days of brutal clashes with security forces in Kano, with. non-Muslims maimed and killed, churches burnt, and more than 4000 people altogether killed in the violence (Iheanacho, 2016), excluding members of the securities who lost their lives trying to contain the excesses of the Maitatsine sect. Although the armed forces successfully suppressed the revolts and killed its leader, the following years (1981–85) experienced the deaths of hundreds of non-Muslims in reprisal attacks and further clashes between the remnants of the sect and the state security forces in Northern Nigeria (Ross, 2014).

In all its ramifications, the Maitatsine revolt is the first religious crisis in Nigeria to demonstrate how religious belief could connect extremist groups from two separate countries. In this instance, Muhammadu Marwa was a Cameroonian national who orchestrated the killing of non-Muslim Nigerians with the support of a section of the Nigerian population citizens in the name of religion. Further, the Maitatsine revolt in the 1980s is arguably the first main demonstration of violent Islamic extremism against non-Muslims upholding Western culture in Nigeria. Its perpetrators built on the pattern established by the Shiite Islamic movement in the late 1970s and 1980s, where Mohammed Yusuf, the deceased Boko Haram leader, played a vital role (Mohammed, 2010).

Following in the footsteps of the Maitatsine sect, the Boko Haram rebellion of the 21st century illustrated the growing Islamic extremists' violence within the NMCs of Southern Borno and Nigeria in general, evidently against the backdrop of the Nigerian government's perceived unwillingness to address the threat posed by the insurgent (Ndume, 2020). Although the Maitatsine revolts supposedly ended in 1985, the successive violent Islamic attacks engulfed Northern Nigeria from the 1990s onward (Adesoji, 2011). From their very beginning in 2009, the violent activities of Boko Haram demonstrated yet another brutal form of Islamic religious violence against non-Muslims in the northern section of Nigeria, with over 34,400 non-Muslim deaths recorded (Intersociety, 2020).

2.2.3 Boko Haram Renascence for Completion of Jihad and Islamic State

Boko Haram (an Arabic term meaning "Western education is forbidden") was formally known as Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad, which translates as, "people committed to the propagation of the prophet's [Muhammad's] teachings and jihad" (American Foreign Policy Council, 2013:1). The Islamic movement now calls itself "Wilayat Gharb Ifrigiyyah" (Islamic State, West Africa Province). The sect started in 2002 as a secluded Islamic reformist group in Yobe State, Nigeria under the leadership of a Salafist preacher, Mohamed Yusuf (Agbiboa, 2013a; Maianguwa et al., 2012).

At the onset, Boko Haram emulated the earlier Islamist 'reform' groups in the northern section of Nigeria by propagating religious restoration and a return to what they believed to be the true tenets of Islam as a remedy to corruption, unemployment, bad governance, poverty and other (mainly Western-imported) social ills in the northern section of Nigerian (Agbiboa & Maiangwa, 2014). In 2009, after a brutal clash with the security forces, the sect's leader was arrested by the Nigerian army and later killed by the police in 2009 while in custody. Following the extrajudicial killing of the founder (Mohamed Yusuf) by the government, the scale and brutality of Boko Haram's violence escalated under the leadership of the second-in-command, Abubakar Shekau (Adesoji, 2010).

The sect began by targeting those they considered complicit in Yusuf's killing, which includes the Nigerian military and the police, as well as the defenceless non-Muslims, who were perceived as the custodians of Western culture and modernizations in Nigeria (Comolli, 2015). The destruction and burning down of public structures and churches by the extremists has led some scholars and policy makers to believe that Boko Haram seeks to replace Nigeria's secular state with a strict Islamic system (Adesoji, 2010; Comolli, 2015; Gundiri, 2022; Iheanacho, 2016; Ziradzo, 2016). However, Boko Haram's violent campaign has not been confined to Nigeria; it has also spilled over to neighbouring countries such as Chad, Niger and Cameroon.

From 2011, BH has escalated its campaigns to high-profile attacks, such as the August 26 bombing of the United Nations (UN) headquarters in Abuja that killed at least 24 people, due to the UN's development support to the government of 'infidels' (BBC News, 2011; Reuters, 2011). Boko Haram has continued to be expanded in size and strength and was regarded as the world deadliest terrorist movements by the Global

Terrorism Index/ GTI in 2015 (GTI, 2015). They targeted Muslim civilians, regarded as 'apostates' and traitors within Islam for associating with infidels and participating in democratic citizenship practices (Council on Foreign Relation, 2019); which was opposed by other splinter groups that were against targeting of Muslim civilians and mosques (Al-barnawi, 2016).

The group used women and child suicide bombers and mass abductions, with the the biggest single and most well-known case of the 2014 kidnapping of the 276 Chibok girls from their school in a rural town in Borno state for more than 2,549 days. In November 2014, the bombing of the Central Mosque in Kano once more attracted international attention and worry on the scale of the group's strength outside its stronghold of the Sambisa Forest (BBC News, 2014; Gundiri, 2022). Abducted women and girls seem to have been subjected to forced marriages and religious conversion, as well as psychological and physical abuse (e.g., rape and forced labor while in captivity (Human Rights Watch/ HRW, 2014).

In 2015, Boko Haram openly pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and support to Islamic State (Daesh). In 2016, Abu Musab al-barnawi became the new leader, and the group changed its name to Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP). The new ISWAP leader openly declared that his fighters would only kill non-Muslims until they accepted Allah and converted to Islam (Oladimeji, 2021). He accused Christians of seeking to Christianize Nigeria through charitable non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who were allegedly exploiting those displaced by war (AL-barnawi, 2016). On 26 December 2019, ISWAP) released a macabre video showing its fighters purportedly beheading 10 male Christian's men and shooting one of them, which followed a Christmas Eve attack by Boko Haram in which seven non-Muslims were killed (Opera News, 2020). The Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) justified these gruesome deeds by stating it was a campaign to avenge the deaths of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Daesh (ISIS) leader and its spokesperson who were both killed by the U.S Special Forces in October that year (Reuters, 2020).

The Nigerian government under President Muhammadu Buhari is accused by some commentators of perpetrating "the supremacy of Islam by parking key government positions with hard-line Muslims, and the only thing preventing Nigeria from being engulfed in civil war was the peaceful tenets of Christianity" (Elombah News, 2020:1).

The Boko Haram militants have carried out their non-Muslim onslaught even outside Nigeria with executions, abductions, burning of homes and villages, and looted shops and foodstuffs, indicating their toxic hatred of Christians (AMAQ News Agency, 2020). In one incident, the victims gave their names and died saying: "I am a Christian" before their execution (Morning Star News, 2021:1).

In Nigeria, religion stands at the intersection of a divisive colonial history. For instance, a recent report by the International Christian Concern (ICC, 2020) found that between 50,000 and 70,000 non-Muslim Nigerians were cold bloodedly murdered in the last decade by the Boko Haram and its other fraternal *jihadists*, its offshoot ISWAP, and the deadliest heavily armed Fulani herdsmen militia who were forcefully taking over farmland from mainly non-Muslim farmers and occupying their villages. In recent years, the spate of non-Muslim abductions and beheadings or execution videos have increased around the Middle Belt (Elombah News, 2020). The Fulani Muslims also face some acrimonious threats, which strengthens the view that it is impossible to discuss nearly any topic in Nigeria without also discussing faith or religious issues (Moore & Cooper, 2020; Ziradzo, 2020).

In early 2019 for instance, just weeks before the Coronavirus, Christian Solidarity International (CSI) averred on the possibility of genocide and a religious 'cleansing' pogrom in West Africa aimed at Christians, traditionalists and non-violent Muslims (McKay, 2020; Release International Report, 2020). A state of hopelessness engulfed the non-Muslim victims because the arrest of the perpetrators did not translate into serious judicial consequences (McKay, 2020; Moore & Cooper, 2020:56). The growing maltreatment of non-Muslims as second-class citizens in Shariah law governed states was visible in Muslims receiving greater government financial support and university admissions

Boko Haram nurtures and spreads the ideology of segregation planted in the philosophy of hatred, intolerance, prejudice and sectarianism against non-Muslim cultures and Muslim traditions that are at disagreement with their own interpretation of Islam. The sect activities are also extended to the security apparatus seeking to diminish the counter terrorism intensity and power of law enforcement institutions that would neutralize and bring them to justice (Iheanacho, 2016; Ebim, et al.,2023).

However, there are concerns of nepotism and Islamisation of state institutions and officials (Chandler, 2018).

To date, there is no end of the insurgency in sight. While the present-day Nigerian government is dithering about a cease-fire negotiations and dialogue, the *jihadist* militia has continued its genocide and wanton destruction of properties in Southern Borno Senatorial District (Ndume, 2020). Notwithstanding, the non-Muslim responses to the unprovoked attacks have now complicated the situation, making it dangerous not just for non-Muslims, but for every unidentified people (Chandler, 2018).

It is arguable that the aim of Boko Haram seems to aim at completing the earliest practices of Islam as envisioned by the 19th century *jihad* of Uthman Dan Fodio and establish an Islamic state in the multi-cultural Nigerian societies, which are now firmly rooted on secularism, rule of law and human rights (Agbiboa, 2016; Kassim, 2015). Currently, Islamic fundamentalism is mainly confined to Northern Nigeria, which could largely be ascribed to the dominance of Islam and its devotees in the core North. However, this seems to suggest the generality of factors and conditions that have rendered the region susceptible to extremism (Nmah & Amanambu 2017; Omolewa, 2008:37; Okoli, 2022).

2.3 BOKO HARAM MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS

Section 2.2 mainly presented a historical context of Boko Haram's existence. Meanwhile, current section focuses on an eclectic range of factors underlying the militia's existence beyond historical development alone. These factors include poverty, fundamentalism (religious ideology), and the age long, north-south identity separation in Nigeria as motivational factors (Aikunwotu, 2016; Akinola, 2015; Gundiri, 2022:46).

2.3.1 Corruption and Misappropriation

According to world Bank (2001), corruption is the misappropriation or diversion of public funds into a private account for personal gain. Corruption seems to be a new phenomenon globally, most especially in the African continent, where it is pervasive (Robinson-Dogo, 2021). Studies on corruption indicate that it is one of the sources of conflict in most underdeveloped states. According to the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences Act (ICPC), corruption comprises inducement, swindle, and other interrelated wrongdoings (ICPC, 2000:6). Corruption and insecurity

deny a good life for most Nigerians by public officials entrusted with public funds since independent due to embezzlement resulting from abuse of power with impunity (Nwolise, 2013).

To Onouha (2014), Nigeria high rate of corruption and segregation of the citizenry is one of the BH insurgency's preconditions. According to Tukur (2015), Dasuki misappropriated N13.6 billion funds to purchase military equipment to fight against the BH extremist jihadists by distributing the said funds among politicians, friends, allies and family members. These are many or more reported cases of corruption among politicians and the military leadership led to the degrading and humiliation of the Nigerian armed forces by the BH Islamic extremist jihadists.

The BH extremists had on many occasions cited corruption among the ruling class as a reference to make a point that the socio-economic malaise of the country is because of the failure of democracy and western education coupled with the vicious circle of poverty and unemployment, thereby using them as viable avenue for enlisting young men into the sect (Gundiri, 2022). The inability of the ruling class to provide public goods to the young populace while serving their selfish interest has created a feeling of deprivation, frustrations, animosity, and disenchantment on the part of the people due to their marginalisation and social exclusion. This situation has fuelled the rise of violent extremism, armed robbery, political thuggery, kidnaping, and other criminal activities, such as the Niger-Delta militancy, Fulani herdsmen, banditry and the BH insurgency among many others.

2.3.2. Poverty as a Motivational Factor

The importance of poverty has been recognized, as it makes greater opportunity for recruitment of members for an insurgency (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Likewise, the economic breakdown of Nigeria, which is clearly seen in the level of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and economic backwardness, rendered recruitment and membership of the sect feasible (Onuoha, 2014). Therefore, Boko Haram emerges from the north because of its poor economic situation, in contrast with the south.

Dapel (2018:1), a top political leader from Northern Nigerian once observed: "In Nigeria, poverty wears a northern cap; if you are looking for a poor man, get somebody wearing a northern cap". The Governor of Borno State mentioned in a meeting with the UK government that the maladies of unemployment, hunger and illiteracy were the

causal factors of insurgency, and required durable and sustainable solutions (Zulum, 2020). According to Kwanashie (2013), the current insurgency problem in Nigeria is driven by local and external economic issues. On the national front, the economy has over the years promoted the marginalization of a sizeable proportion of the populations who benefit little from the natural resources of the country.

A few socio-political events have coalesced with other economic factors that rendered this part of society peripheral to the mainstream economic system. At the same time, poverty and economic marginalization do not automatically result in insurgency, but this marginalized part provides more than adequate manpower for insurgency (Kwanashie 2013; UK Home Office, 2016). Accordingly, the conflict situation in Nigeria is obvious as people wrestle with claims to status, value, relevance, power and insufficient resources. It has been proven that insurgencies are not only common in poor states, but it is also more likely in an affluent society where the larger part of society is systematically kept away from the available wealth and resources (Koubi & Bohmelt, 2014:129).

The age-old continuity of poverty, backwardness and unemployment renders the Northern Nigerian populations destitute and frustrated, and then leads to deviant behaviour as manifested in the Boko Haram recruits and their attitude and behaviour (Ayegba, 2015). From the researcher's viewpoint, the latter argument is tenable, but does not fully address the motivational aspects and tenets of the Boko Haram extremism as experienced by the victims.

Jihadism is the pivotal religious ideology that propels groups such as Boko Haram sect (Afigbo, 1999; Moore & Cooper, 2020). In that respect, the relative social identity theory (discussed in Chapter 3) cannot be simply relegated in discussions concerning the history of Boko Haram. To start with, northern Nigeria, is vividly characterized by impoverishment as indicated by widespread poverty, unemployment, and a difficult environment (Ya'u, 2000; Ayegba, 2015). These elements may not directly be the cause of Boko Haram insurgency, but they provoke militancy and create a non-restrictive environment for the sects' operations.

From an economic point of view, Islamic organizations outside of Nigeria and Boko Haram use religion to attract and enlist poor and illiterate individuals as fighters

(Reeve, 2014). To examine the introduction of international terrorism to Nigeria, Onapajo et al. 2012 (cited in Anjide, 2018) assert that Boko Haram developed due to worldwide jihadist uprisings and soared due to internal elements such as unemployment, ethnicity and state failure to delegate authority, as well as power tussle amongst political gladiators. However, contrary to the views that unemployment and illiteracy are the major tools of Boko Haram's attractiveness to its members, the findings by Nigerian forces revealed that people above the average national income voluntarily joined Boko Haram (Hart, 2015). Relative deprivation, frustration and a fight for identity can be pertinent to numerous Nigerian Muslims, but only a small number engaged in violence acts.

2.3.3 Religious Fundamentalism/ Radicalisation as a Motivational Factor

Fundamentalism is one major factor that propels militancy and insurgency (Adesoji, 2011; Danjibo, 2009). The connection between insurgency and fundamentalism has progressed in two ways. Firstly, it is a method of training that internalizes the norms and ideologies for insurgents who are a diverse sect, into an orderly one embracing the same goal. However, it may not be same with Boko Haram as its members are mostly 'Almajiri' Muslims of the Kanuri ethnic identity (Post, 2005). The second is the normative approach deriving from a standard or norm, especially of behaviour which views ideology as a source of commitment to insurgents' intent, strategy, motivation and limitations (Sanin & Wood, 2014). This is applicable to the Boko Haram insurgency's location in the ideology of Islamising Nigeria (Akinola, 2015; Gundiri, 2022; Nmah & Amanambu, 2017).

Azumah (2015) traces the Islamisation impulse for radicalization in Nigeria to the 1970s Salafi-Wahhabi group called Izala in Nigeria. It is to be noted that Adesoji (2010) is a scholar who laid the basis for other studies on Boko Haram, whose emergence and radicalization he attributes to ethno-religious crises, militant Islamism, and the Maitasine sect uprising of 1980. He observes the 2009 Boko Haram rebellion as an important event by Islamic conservatives at imposing an unconventional religious belief on the Nigerian secular societies. Eze (2014) assert that, one noticeable feature in today's insurgencies throughout Africa is their numerical growth and grounding on fundamentalist ideology, frequent brutal attacks, sophistication and their prowess that has even astounded African security forces.

The immanent militancy of the religious fundamentalist organisations seems to have caused community displacements, destruction of property, aggravated poverty, and brought massive human suffering that has caused society to lose confidence in the system (Danjibo, 2009). In fact, Boko Haram clearly demonstrate practices and the desire to impose and assert its perspective on Nigerian non-Muslims and the country's political agenda (Rasheed, 2008; Ziradzo, 2016). Although the goals of Boko Haram are undeniable, the violence and bloodshed it perpetuates clarifies the complex interactions between the Islamic extremist group and conflict (Azumah 2014; Blanchard, 2016). The desire to make Islam subdue every other religion is seen as the major motivating reason for their jihads (Nmah & Amanambu, 2017). Other researchers argue that the intentions to make Nigeria an Islamic state propels a radicalization course which was historically characterized by conflict and disagreement (Intersociety, 2021). Therefore, Boko Haram can be viewed as propelling the course against the secular of governance by subjugation of non-Muslims and establishing the Sharia system and its radicalized form (Deckard, Barkindo and Jacobson, 2015:510-28; Gundiri, 2022).

The ideological campaign of Boko Haram's Islamic fundamentalism was firstly entrenched with the strict interpretation of scripture and presenting Western culture, Christianity and democracy as something forbidden and heretic (Forest, 2012). Kpughe (2017) asserts that non-Muslims have realised the fallacious justification and distortion of Quranic verses for religious violence, while most orthodox Muslims do not concur with Boko Haram's version of explaining the Quran. Therefore, latter Boko Haram's ideological base expresses their opposition to participation in un-Islamic politics (Adesoji, 2010; Ekanem, Dada, and Ejue, 2012; Forest, 2012; Onuoha, 2012; Robinso-Dogo, 2021).

Other researchers contend that Boko Haram openly embraces and violently supports the propagation and strict adherence to Islam and Shariah law by all people and at whatever human cost, irrespective of individual belief and personal wishes (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012; Asfura-Heim & MaQuaid 2015; Burmah, 2009; Walker 2012; Ebim, 2023). The Boko Haram strategy has also involved the victimization of those they regarded as "traitors" and atrocities against non-Muslim, such as: bombing of non-

Muslim places of worship, genocide suicide bombings, gun attacks against the clergy, abductions, kidnappings, and rape (Kpughe, 2017). Akinbi (2015) noted that with the incessant bombings of churches in the north, particularly in the most affected states of Bornu, Yobe and Adamawa, the insurgency has triggered non- Muslims and Muslims against each other.

The violent activities of the sect have also assumed an international dimension with the kidnappings and brutal killings in neighbouring countries such as Chad and Cameroon (Windsor, 2018). According to Billy (2020), the Church of the Brethren alone has lost more than 8,370 members and eight ordained pastors, with the number increasing every day. More than 700,000 members have been internally displaced and around 25,000 are currently seeking refuge in Cameroon and Chad. Within the international community, the United States has been one of the countries that have consistently condemned Boko Haram and other terrorist organisations internationally. To this effect, the United States has also classified Nigeria amongst the Countries of Particular Concern (CPC) for the second time in a row following the spate of Boko Haram atrocities (United States Commission for International Religious Freedom/ USCIRF, 2019). This is unsurprising, considering that it (the US) is a nation founded on protecting those fleeing religious persecution and determined to defend those whose profound desire is to exercise this extremely sacrosanct right (Premium Times, 2020).

It is implausible to believe that the major motivational factors of the Boko Haram insurgents in Northern Nigeria are religious only. Their constant onslaught on non-Muslims and their places of worship is symptomatic that the country is on the verge of a religious war (Danjibo, 2009). To that effect, this study is of the view that Boko Haram is purely motivated by anti-Western hatred and as such, perceive non-Muslims and non-Boko Haram Muslims as subordinate stooges and tools of the West.

2.3.4 Nationalistic Identity/ Separation as a Motivational Factor

Identity analyses in literature for the most part, pertain to a state of belonging to social group and religion, or ethno-religious identity (Langer, Godefroidt & Meuleman 2016). According to Huntington (1993), an emphasis on identity reflects the traditional intense conflict and injustice that lie between distinct identities and therefore makes violence

unavoidable. Identity underlines the origin of conflict, not as a main cause but by promoting the emergence of grievances over the main causes of conflicts (Fox, 1999). However, the concept could be viewed as 'identity outbidding' the same way 'religious outbidding' (Toft, 2007) and 'ethnic outbidding' (Wilson, 2013).

Identity separation has been linked to the Boko Haram insurgency from its establishment, fuelled by Nigeria's political history, geopolitical structure, ethnoreligious composition and socio-economic disparities (Udounwa 2013). With over 350 ethnic groups and diverse population of over 180 million people, the generalizations of the north and south divide and the six geopolitical zones seem tedious (Aikunwotu, 2016). Within those zones, however, the manifestation of ethno-religion identity is still highly pronounced. In analysing the impact of identity on the development of the Boko Haram insurgency, the ethnic and religious divide has seemed to have been the focal point (Perry, 2014).

Boko Haram has brought to light the relevance of the historic north-south ethnoreligious divides in Nigeria (Aikunwotu, 2016). These divides also project the insurgency to the British's creation of Nigeria with diverse ethnicities without the necessary dialogue with over 350 tribes (Perry, 2014). As such, Boko Haram's jihad in Northern Nigeria is emblematic of entrenchment of a stratified system (Ziradzo, 2020). Therefore, the jihad in Northern Nigeria has exposed the prevalence of the Core North and the Other North. The Core North is populated by the comfortably secured Hausa-Fulani Muslims forming themselves as an upper-class stratum of society. The Other North on the other hand, consists of the non-Muslim Christian or traditionalist lower-class northerners of Middle Belt origin (Ibid). The consequences of the jihad in respect of social stratification are fundamental to masterminding the current violence and atrocities committed against the non-Muslim of the Middle Belt and southern parts Nigeria, where some people believed, they were born to control or determine events while others are meant to follow as willing tools and suffer in penury and die (Gundiri, 2022).

According to Nwanaju (2008), the northern hegemony and the 'Kaduna Mafia' are political heirs of the late premier of Northern Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello. This mindset has established suspicion among south and northern Nigeria and as a matter of fact, Christians and Muslims in Nigeria. Aremu (2011 cited in Nmah & Amanambu 2017)

declares that the early jihad set up the basis for the foundation of the north-south dichotomy in Nigeria, which is threatening the national unity and political stability of the country. Islamic movements, especially Boko Haram, have sought to dethrone every leadership not instituted by them in the same manner as the 1804 Fulani jihad had overthrown pre-independence traditional political kingdoms of cities beyond Hausa land and replaced it with Fulani emirs (Iwuchukwu, 2010). Boko Haram's intentions are not clearly deciphered out of this complicated situation of potential consequences (Reuters, 2011). It is not at all clear whether they really want to split the country into two, or just threaten, kill and embarrass the secular government and its leadership by a Christian Southerner (Reuter, 2011).

The growing evident strategy of the Boko Haram attacks have led Nigerian authorities and some Western security experts to suspect increasing connections to wider Islamic jihadist groupings, such as Al Qaeda's North African wing and AQIM (Reuter, 2011). However, there is some doubt about the extent of Boko Haram's connections to AQIM. National factors and injustice inside Nigeria alone are insufficient to explain and overcome the Boko Haram insurgency. For instance, Langer et al. (2016) found several interpretations along ethno-religious identities, while lyekekpolo (2018) also relates the Boko Haram insurgency to the age-old schism between Islam and Christianity, which is known to have persistently caused animosity. Other scholars have declared that insurgency may not necessarily cause animosity between distinct groups and the consequences of alienating politically relevant ethnic identities access to central executive power (Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch, 2011).

The jobless youths and gangs in Northern Nigeria seem to have rendered some parts of the north of Nigeria, such as Kano and Maiduguri, prone to violence. Such gangs are mainly the product of a desire to resort to violence whenever something irks the Muslim world, or alleged blasphemy used usually as a defender of the Muslim faith (Adesoji, 2011). Other scholars observed that the 'Yan Tauri' (for long described as economic opportunists and professional mercenaries) are always ready to offer their services to whoever engages them. They could be used by anyone to start a civil unrest (Albert, 1997:44; Dawha, 1996; Ya'u, 2000). Their existence in the north, particularly the 'Almajirai', fuels religious fundamentalism significantly, which aptly positions them as a potential Boko Haram in waiting (Monguno, 2020; Zulum, 2020).

Allen (2020) contends that the path of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria is reflective of the collective outcome of factors such as: unyielding positions on religious ideologies, applications, and doctrines; economic and social breakdown; and the pragmatic religious politics exercised in Nigeria. Furthermore, the ill definition of national identity and culture between the southern and northern Nigerians, given the generality of divisive inclinations, has not prepared a foundation on which to develop a coherent national identity and pride as a backbone for opposing devastating ethnoreligious conflicts in the rest of Nigeria. Hence, the growing trend of global Islamic fundamentalism displayed by groups such as ISIS, AQIM, and Al-shabaad has provided an avenue for the speedy development and ideological support and motivation to the Boko Haram and other jihadist movements in Nigeria.

2.4. CONSEQUENCES OF BOKO HARAM ATROCITIES ON THE NON-MUSLIMS

The non-Muslim communities of the Chibok local government area are ethnic minority groups, living in Southern Senatorial District of Borno State in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. They are adherents of Christianity, African traditional religion and a few are Muslims. Following the upheaval in North-Eastern Nigeria, an Islamic fundamentalist militant group (also known as Boko Haram), declared an Islamic caliphate in North-Eastern Nigeria (Comolli, 2015). On 24 August 2014, Boko Haram fighters captured Gwoza, a town in Southern Borno and declared it the headquarters of their nascent Islamic caliphate, and publicly announced that they would purify or cleanse their caliphate of any non-Muslims and non-Sunni Muslim "apostates" (Allen, 2020:77).

This harrowing message exacerbated the Muslim and non-Muslim tensions in the north-eastern region, where numerous atrocities and human rights violations seems to have been committed against the civilian population based on their identity (Onapajo & Usman, 2015). In this regard, the non-Muslim communities were regarded as the most severely affected and targeted communities within the region (Barkindo et al. 2013). In September 2014, Boko Haram attacked the non-Muslim ancestral homelands of Chibok, during which the Boko Haram militants freely and openly mutilated, murdered, abducted, and enslaved hundreds of men, women, and children, displacing entire communities to refugee camps in the process (Aid to the Church in Need, 2017; Damaturu, 2021).

According to Akhubo and Okolo (2019), Boko Haram has accounted for 1639 violent attacks, 14436 fatalities, 6051 injured victims, and 2063 hostages throughout North-Eastern Nigeria. According to Okoli and Lortyer (2014) the faceless and intransigent leadership of the sectarian Boko Haram insurgency has rendered any end to the malignant conflict to be unpredictable due to their amorphous operations and tactics (Achodo, 2019; Pricopi, 2016). The inherent difficulty in counter-terrorism calls for more collaborative action and assistance between governments to restrain the threat posed by insurgents (Marchal, 2012). Nevertheless, the NMCSB have suffered centuries of discrimination, marginalization, and persecutions through *jihadist* persecutions at various points in history (Hiskett, 1993:89; Hickey, 1984:34).

The problem of religious fundamentalism experienced within the NMCSB needs to be responded to raise awareness regarding the root causes of insurgency and its catastrophic acts of violence. Boko Haram's claim to traditional Islamic values is traceable to the 19th century when Uthman Dan Fodio embarked on a Jihad to implement a stricter version of Islam in Northern Nigeria (Hiskett, 1993:101). In Nigeria's northern emirates where the Sokoto Jihad had significantly altered State and society relations in the nineteenth century, Islam proved itself censorious to the British colonial system in local communities (Vaughan, 2017). Eventually, Islam provided the essential ideological and structural parameters according to which colonial society was eventually organized (Vaughan, 2017).

Reynolds (2001) alludes that the promotion of Islam through the Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria helped the British colonialists to maintain the pre-existing Islamic political structures under the Sokoto caliphate and to hold the diverse inhabitants of Northern Protectorate together. However, the self-same British administrators strengthened the Hausa-Fulani conquerors to impose their Islamic political dominance on the non-Muslims of the region. However, the very British colonial administrators strengthened the powers of the Muslim rulers as legitimate traditional rulers by accepting caliphate rulers as junior partners, while politically marginalizing the non-Muslims counterparts (Vaughan, 2017).

This crucial period undermined the non-Muslim autonomy in the Northern Nigerian Provinces. Inevitably, the non-Muslim communities resisted the gradually increasing Fulani Muslim influence orchestrated through British colonial policy (Abar, 2019;). The

implementation of the Cameron reform policy widened the fault lines of intra- Muslim relations in the region, and between Hausa-Fulani Muslim rulers and the groups considered as "pagan tribes" by British authorities (Vaughan, 2017). These differences escalated and became more pronounced from the 1930s to the 1950s, with the advent of Christian evangelism by missionaries among the non- Muslim communities. When decolonization gained its impetus in the 1950s, the general language of Christianity gradually served to weaponize the politico-religious mobilization against Hausa-Fulani Muslim hegemony (Turaki, 2010:94; Ziradzo, 2004:70; Abar, 2019).

This pre-independence development established the bedrock for major divisive issues dominating the collaborative political processes in the Northern Provinces in the waning colonial period, and eventually in the post-colonial period, with its state of incompatibility of ingrained ethnic and religious identity (Abar, 2019; Vaughan, 2017). It is against such background that Boko Haram seems to be building on deeply rooted pre-colonial prejudices by regarding the non-Muslims as infidels and pagans whose existence would not be tolerated in their self-proclaimed 'caliphate' (Allen, 2020:22). It is somewhat erroneous to categorize Boko Haram actions as merely criminal or antisocial behaviour. Their form of pogrom is not the first attempt to eliminate non-Muslim communities in North-Eastern Nigeria. However, it has been the most brutal to date.

Notwithstanding their terroristic actions, Boko Haram militants view these as legitimate and heavenly sanctioned by religious authorities (Shekau, 2012; 2019). A clear distinction between terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and criminals is that they (Boko Haram) view themselves as altruistic (Stevens, 2005). Duyvesteyn (2004) and Jenkins (2020) avers that terrorists usually engage in violence to promote the goals or agenda of their group or collective. The terrorists then view such engagement as a fulfilment of duty to express the identity they have previously adopted, or have been assigned (Arena & Arrigo, 2005; Malachy, 2019).

2.5. BOKO HARAM LINKS WITH OTHER ISLAMIC JIHADIST GROUPS

Adesoji (2010), Marchal (2012) and Rasheed (2013) are among many experts and observers who affirm that the extent of Boko Haram's violence is influenced both by the nature of Nigeria's counter terrorism (CT) and the connections and networks of

Boko Haram with other Islamist movements across the Nigerian states and beyond. To that effect, it has been established that:

- Boko Haram is developing the capability to coordinate with Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab) on a rhetorical and operational level.
- Boko Haram is quickly developing a significant threat capacity to the United States itself and its interests.
- Boko Haram has developed the capacity and tactics of other Al Qaeda fraternal affiliates, most notably Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP) that have continuously targeted the United States, whose intelligence community had underestimated and wrongly assessed the Al Qaeda affiliate groups and its potential threat to the U.S, and not only aspirational regional ambitions.
- The United States should work with the Nigerian government for counterterrorism and intelligence capability to effectively counter Boko Haram.

Boko Haram features among the world's deadliest terrorist organizations that include the Taliban, ISIS and Al-Shabaab (GTI, 2020). Boko Haram has been operating in Nigeria since 2009, and ISIS created a splinter group in 2015 called Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Al-Shabaab operates out of Somalia and mainly in East Africa. Only the Taliban have not been irrefutably linked to Boko Haram, whose initial base in Yobe State was called "Afghanistan" and their followers referred to as "Talibans" by the locals (Umar, 2013).

The Muslim-Fulani herdsmen are also another lesser-known hostile militia known for attacking non-Muslim farming communities throughout the Middle Belt of Nigeria. An estimated 50,000 to 70,000 non-Muslims have been killed in Nigeria since 2010 (Crux.com News, 2020). The Boko Haram terrorists have related to the global jihad being undertaking by foreign Islamic jihadist groups like the Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In fact, AQIM has operational bases in parts of West Africa, and has built strategic alliances with terrorist groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), and Ansar Eddine in Mali and Niger (Gundiri, 2022).

The inter-organisational relationships have enabled AQIM to provide training and logistical support to Boko Haram in Nigeria and other Islamic terrorist groups in the West African region (Chothia, 2011). These fraternal terrorist groups now support each other in attacks against their own governments and compatriots. Al-Shabaab in Somalia has intervened repeatedly in inter-religious conflicts in Mali, supporting the local Muslim populations against their non-Muslim compatriots (Olaide, 2013 cited in Gundiri, 2022).

Boko Haram has previously affirmed that some of its fighters have acquired their suicide bombing and sabotage skills in Somalia (Agbiboa & Maiangwa, 2014; Thurston, 2011). According to Zenn (2013), the suicide bomber (Mamman Nur) who attacked the United Nations headquarters on 26 August 2011 in Abuja was a jihadist from Cameroon and had travelled to Somalia to undergo explosives training from Al-Shabaab terrorist group, before returning to Nigeria and executing his deadly mission.

The afore-stated contextual factors indicate that the Boko Haram sectarian organisation is allied with other jihadist groups in Africa for many reasons, such as: financial support, tactical training, accommodation/ refuge and logistics. Above all, it is their strong religious ideology of exterminating the 'infidels' that unifies the jihadist groups.

2.6 GAPS IN THE LITERATURE

From the reviewed literature, the following are the identified gaps that the research seeks to fill:

- There are a few studies that investigate the experiences of non-Muslim under the BH insurgency in North-eastern Nigeria. The few studies on the non-Muslims concentrated on the political activities of BH without paying much attention to the violent experiences of the innocent non-Muslim victims in the region. As to the best of my knowledge, there was no attempt to explore the need for the unprovoked attacks and its consequences on the non-Muslims communities of southern Borno.
- A sizeable proportion of empirical studies on BH experiences conducted by other researchers centred on second hand information by religious leaders and elites (Gundiri, 2022), who have not directly experienced the onslaughts in

Northern Nigeria; neglecting the identity implications and brutal experiences and atrocities committed against the non-Muslims as primary targets, in the region.

 A sizeable proportion of studies on insurgency as experienced by the victims utilized basically quantitative studies. This study utilized both the focus group and interviews with survivors, thereby obtaining first-hand information from the survivors.

The aforementioned are the existing gaps that this study attempts to fill by contributing to the debate on BH insurgency, regarding their enslavement and mass atrocities, the dire humanitarian situations of the victims and the perceived social rejection in their communities.

2.7 CONCLUSION

The historical review of the Boko Haram militia illuminates that a broader understanding of the insurgents is better achieved with a review of the multifactorial contextual factors that precipitated the avalanche of atrocities in Northern Nigeria in particular, and other Nigerian regions in general. From the viewpoint of this research study, while the historical perspectives are helpful in this regard, it is the human dimensions (e.g., socio-economic, cultural and psycho-social aspects) that underly the gore and brutality of the insurgence masquerading itself as a 'holy' crusade to 'save the 'infidel' from the perceived 'decadence' of Western civilisation and its proselytising contribution to human (i.e., Muslim and non-Muslim) development.

It is specifically in the latter regard that the next chapter situates the social identity theory as the most pivotal means to locate relevant abstract conceptualisations in understanding deviant behaviours linked to some aspect/s of society's functioning.

CHAPTER THREE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 INTROCUCTION

A theoretical framework or grounding of the study pertains to "the structure that can hold or support a theory of a research study. It introduces and describes the theory that explains why the research problem under study exists" (Swanson, 2013: 1). From the literature, poverty has been recognized, as it makes greater opportunity for recruitment of members for an insurgency (Fearon & Laitin, 2003:75; Robinson-Dogo, 2021). Likewise, the economic breakdown of Nigeria, which is clearly seen in the level of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and economic backwardness, made the sect feasible (Onuoha, 2014; Intersociety, 2021). Boko Haram comes out in the north because of its poor economic situation in contrast to southern part of Nigeria. According to Dapel, a top political leader from northern Nigerian once observed: "In Nigeria, poverty wears a northern cap; if you are looking for a poor man, get somebody wearing a northern cap" (Dapel, 2018).

Kwanashie (2013) argued that the current insurgency problem in Nigeria seems to be driven by local and external economic forces. According to him the economy has over the years promoted the marginalization of large populations who benefit little from the natural resources of the country. Ayegba (2015) argues that the age- old continuity of poverty, backwardness and unemployment makes the northern population feel a sense destitution which frustrates them, and then causes deviant behaviour as manifested in the Boko Haram insurgency.

Obiajulu & Biereenu-Nnabugwu (2016) observes that, such conflict situation of affairs in Nigeria is obvious as people wrestle with claims to status, value, relevance, power and insufficient resources. However, it has been proven that insurgencies are not only common in poor states as it could be more likely in an affluent society with larger part kept out from the wealth (Koubi & Bohmelt, 2014:19-33; Robinson-Dogo, 2021). At the same time, poverty and economic marginalization do not automatically result in insurgency, however, evidence from past suggests that the existence of this marginalized part provides more than adequate workforce for insurgency (Kwanashie 2013:146; Robinson-Dogo, 2021).

All These arguments are tenable; however, it does not address the motivational views and tenet of the Boko Haram extremists, as experienced by the survivors. These elements may not directly be the cause of Boko Haram insurgency but provoke militancy and create a non-restrictive environment for the sects' operations.

The over a decade long insurgency of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria has elicited numerous publications in the literature; however, there is yet to be a more positive analysis that explain the group barbaric behaviour towards the non-Muslims.

The paramount is that BH is an Islamic movement with a set political goal. The main goal was to rid the north of infidels and apostates, by polarizing Muslim against Muslim, and Muslim against non-Muslim. Now, this movement is extremely proficient, as we have noted in the literature at using the Al'majiris' as foot soldiers of the caliphate (Post, 2005), to carry-out brutality and sanctification of violence against the non-Muslims and apostates.

The Boko Haram first leader, Mohammed Yusuf, declared: 'Our land was an Islamic state before the British colonial experts turned it to a 'kafir' (secular) land. The secular system is contrary to the true tenets of Islam' (Daily Trust 27 July 2009; Gundiri, 2022). This intention to put an end to a secular system of governance, by subjecting the non-Muslim and promote the 'Sharia' system gave birth to radicalization course that produced the Boko Haram set (Deckard, Barkindo and Jacobson, 2015:510-28; Ebim, et al., 2023). The second leader of the group once declare that violence is the only means to address the weaknesses and injustice against Muslims (Shekau, 2012; Robinson-Dogo, 2021). As an "in-group" they target an extensive list of enemies, mainly Christians, Traditionalist, and of recent, Shiites, as well as other Sunni Muslims who disagree with their teachings; anyone who believes in democracy, or any of the modern ideologies are regarded as "out-group" (Comolli, 2015; International Christians Concern, 2022).

Furthermore, the theoretical framework combines some specific abstract ideas or assumptions, as well as the dominant philosophical orientation or tradition in the field of study, together with an analytic understanding of the collected data and its analysis. To this effect, Kivunja (2018) adds that the theoretical framework is drawn upon to provide a conceptual basis understanding the research problem and interpretation of results related to the self-same problem. According to Polit and Beck (2022), a theoretical framework provides a context for narrating the existing relationships between the selected key concepts, assumptions and the research topic or field of study.

Based on the assertions by the above-cited authors, it is evident that there exists an affinity between a theory, a concept and the field of study in which the research problem is located. Hence, Creswell (2014; Konecki, 2021) declares that theories explain or predict the nature of relationship between conceptual constructions and the phenomenon that is being studied. In addition, Grove, Burns and Gray (2013: 117)

clarify that: "theories consist of concepts and relational statements which explain, describe, predict or control phenomenon being investigated and discussed. These constructs and principles and shared relationships are also helpful for describing and explaining the *why* and *how* certain concepts are linked to the theory or theories embraced by the researcher in approaching the identified research problem and the procedures for resolving it."

Given the above, the current chapter then presents and discusses how the social identity theory is perceived, constructed and translated to the context of Boko Haram as an aberrant social construct with multiple effects on conceptualisations about individuals and group values, belief systems and standards considered and accepted in normal or everyday life (Agbiboa & Okem, 2011; Duriez & Soenens, 2006; Hagen & Yohani, 2010; Kassim, 2015; Hogg, 2021).

3.1.1 The Identity Concept

The concept of *identity* is pivotal to the building blocks that constitute the framework of the social identity theory. In this research study, the identity concept clarifies the functioning of Boko Haram, which seems to have positioned itself as epitomising a delusional form of purity or superiority identity in the form of ethno-religious and socio-political chauvinism that can only be championed within the cocoons of Islamic exclusivism (Kassim ,2015; Kwanashie, 2013). For Dim (2017), identity is located within the socio-cultural synthesis and personal attributes which people share or are assumed to share with others and on whose basis one social category or group may accentuate and construct its 'different-ness' or 'exclusive-ness' from others.

In his perspectives on religion as defining boundaries of identity in Northern Nigeria, Blanco-Mancilla (2003 cited in Gundiri, 2022) asserts that identity is "an ensemble of subject positions (e.g., Muslim Hausa, Christian female, Northern Nigerian) each representing the individual's identification with a particular group, such as ethnicity, religion or gender". This definition depicts the way people regard or look at themselves in Nigeria, a state where identity is defined by individuals' connections to ethnoreligious groups, rather than their nationality (Agbiboa & Okem, 2011; Gundiri, 2022). For instance, it is erroneous to believe that all Northern Nigerians are Hausas, and that a Hausa man is a Muslim, merely because of his ethnicity. Such a stereotypical view is utterly untrue. Northern Nigeria is inhabited by many ethnic and religious (Ziradzo, 2020). Likewise, Southern Nigeria is not necessarily Igbo populated. Such a propensity erroneously assumes the non-existence of minority ethnic groups such as the Ijaws, Ibibios, Efiks, and many others (Ikelegbe, 2005).

Evidently, identity establishes a sense of enduring survival and belonging to a group (social, cultural, political, religious, etc.). Therefore, 'identity' becomes more meaningful when applied as the only fundamental consideration for the formation and expressions of mutual or common interests and beliefs (Ikelegbe, 2005; Intersociety, 2021). In this way, culture, ethnicity and religion are all essential aspects of social identity. In the context of this study, therefore, it is important to advance theories that can explain some aspects or forms of terrorism in a social context (Merari & Friedland, 1985; Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2020).

It is instructive that the term "identity" could relate to many "identities" depending on the propensities of the interpreters. According to Schwartz et al. (2009), the foremost conceptual construct of the term exists at three critical levels: personal, social and cultural.

3.2 THE SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY (SIT)

Social identity theory (SIT) emanates from Henri Tajfel's earlier (1978) work, which premised on applying the *gestalt* phenomena to social groups or contexts (Hogg & Williams, 2000). In its fundamental construction, the theory proposes the incompatibility of the contrasting disadvantages between or among groups in society (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The SIT initially placed emphasis on how individuals carve or define their own identity in social contexts, and that such emphasised identifications protect and sustain their self-identity in respect of an 'in-group' (viewed positively by the individual) or class vis-à-vis an 'out-group' or class (viewed negatively by the self-conscious individual). The consequence of the negative-positive propensity then leads to an undivided, depersonalized recognition or identity based on group membership (Tajfel & Turner, 2004; Strindberg, 2020).

The identity approach focuses on attributes within the individual person such as values, personality traits, and identity dynamics that help explain violent extremism. A focus on these factors allows us to sharpen in on why individual actors can come to be radicalized or come to engage in violent extremism. For example, the uncertainty-

identity theory account of violent extremism (Hogg, 2021) explains how identity-related self-uncertainty can propel people to identify strongly with highly distinctive groups that have populist identities and autocratic leaders, and to have stronger intentions to engage in violence in defence of the ingroup (Hogg et al., 2013; Van den Bos, 2018; Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2019, 2020).

3.2.1 Personal Identity

The SIT posits further that a person has several 'selves' in relation to the broad circles of group membership (Agbiboa, 2015; Turner, 1982). As such, different social contexts may propel an individual to feel, think and act according to her/ his personal, familial or community-based levels of the self. In this regard, Erickson (1985) refers to the individual's unique self-definition in the course of time, especially regarding those values, beliefs, anxieties and goals that are closely beholden to them, such as in politics, religion, education, ethnicity, as well as family and gender roles. Within this pattern, two potential outcomes have relevance, namely: foreclosure and aimless diffusion.

Foreclosure is associated with embracing of commitments without considering other options, whereas diffusion involves detachment (unattached) and engaging in little, or no systematic exploration (Marcia, 1967). In many instances, foreclosed commitments are held in a rigid and inflexible manner that creates adversarial platforms for "us" versus "them" mentalities (Marcia, 1967). The foreclosed and diffused positions commonly share the element of group ideals that are unquestioningly embraced and internalized, either actively or by default, and without due consideration to alternative possibilities (Archer & Waterman, 1990; Strindberg, 2020). For instance, foreclosed or diffused individuals are known to be less religiously inclined, and actively interpret their faith to a lesser extent, compared to those who are actively conscious of their identity commitments (Sanders, 1998; Robinson-Dogo, 2021).

Therefore, to acquire some sense of purpose, aimless-diffuse individuals may commit themselves intensely to some group, showing some willingness to do whatever the group leader asks or prescribes (Schwartz et al., 2009; Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2020). Such individuals are particularly vulnerable to manipulation, willing to die for a cause acquired from others without independent/ objective thoughtfulness or a scrutiny (Duriez & Soenens, 2006; Gundiri,2022). It has been proved that authoritarian

individuals, especially those who consider themselves as outside the mainstream, may be dangerous to society because they have the potential, single-mindedness and unconcerned imagination and the wish to draw or recruit acolytes and form groups based on dangerous principles (Altemeyer, 2004).

The foreclosure process requires the development of personal identity with others regarded as important or exemplary, and usually leads to the espousal of untested normative values and suppositions grasp within the community (Berzonsky, 1989; Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2020). As such, the possibilities of an authoritarian-foreclosed individuals to take part in, or even lead destructive organisations are great, especially in parts of the world where hatred of 'out-groups' is 'bred to the bone' beginning in early childhood, and where independent personal identity exploration is not encouraged as in the case of the Boko Haram die-hard Kanuri jihadist (Post, 2005; Robinson-Dogo,2021), which is central to this study.

3.2.2 Social Identity

Tajfel and Turner (2004:276) aver further that a group is "a collection of individuals who recognize themselves to be members of the same social category, share some inner participation in this usual definition of themselves, and attain some level of social equilibrium about the assessment of their group and membership of it". Therefore, social identity emphasises the importance of the group to which one belongs, above the self or individual importance (Brown, 2000; Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2019). Displaying a critical or disrespectful attitude or opposition towards one's own group, are attributes developed through a diversity of interpersonal communication between people. Accordingly, the pursuits and ideals of the group to which one is directly or indirectly connected, are viewed as sacrosanct. Hence, other groups are viewed with suspicion as threatening and hostile to one's own group (Akinsuyi, 2020; Tajfel & Turner, 2004). The major values in social identity are based on loyalty and allegiance to the interests of the larger social group.

In all cases, the actors believe they are promoting the religion, ideology, or world view of a victimized group they belong to (De Graaf & Van Den Bos, 2020), and are doing so directly or indirectly against the victimizing, and often dehumanized, outgroup and/or its ideology. Whether supported by a small group of like-minded individuals or by a looser and larger socio-political, ethnic, or religious faction within or across their nation, group processes and intergroup relations play a central role (Gøtzsche-Astrup et al. 2020).

A social group provides a cohesive self-reference structure and unit to the members' identity (Brown, 2000). Accordingly, the group identity dynamic constitutes the main topical issue in the peer group and family, through teachers' classroom statements, or from textbooks in school curricula (Korostelina, 2008). These attributes could even be developed in religious sermons, evangelisms, prayers and religiously funded activities. Furthermore, the media may (in)advertently also perpetuate or create a crisis of social identities that advance the "us" versus "them" mentalities, including radio, TV, newspapers, cinema, and even art and music. In this regard, social and cultural identities could find common spaces and expression. However, it is at the social identity level that such polarisation may directly impact on individuals' daily lives, where limited or superficial opportunities exist for direct interaction with members of the 'out-group' or 'them' class (Tajfel & Turner, 2004; Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2020).

One's own group (the 'in-group') could regularly feel endangered when oppositional 'out-groups' are viewed as trespassing on the material and non-material boundaries of the 'in-group (Brown, 2000; Strindberg, 2020). On the other hand, Woolf and Hulsizer (2005) propose that to some extent, violence was likely to occur in groups and societies that are distinctly characterised by profound or imagined contrasts between an 'in-group' and the 'out-group', and where 'out-group' members are relegated to the periphery of mainstream (in-group) society. Such groups may encourage their members to displace their grievances and anger on the out-group. Nonetheless, it is still worthwhile to consider and understand the extent of the superficial, imaginary or real schisms that exist between in-groups and out-groups (Abdel-Khalek, 2004; Arena & Arrigo, 2005; Orbach, 2004; Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2020).

3.3 APPLICABILITY/ RELEVANCE OF THE SIT TO THE STUDY

Whereas the social identity in its typical form is characterised by the personal/ individual, cultural and social components and aspects of belonging (Schwartz et al., 2009; Strindberg, 2020), its applicability or relevance to this study is further characterised by religious factors as well. Such an assertion premises on the proposition by Schartz et al. (2009), who declare further that the identity theory proposes that terrorism represents the confluence of a cultural identity strongly based

on collectivism and in fundamentalist adherence to religious or cultural principles, a social identity based in sharp contrast between an own group and groups perceived as threats, and a foreclosed and authoritarian sense of personal identity or, less often, a diffused and aimless personal identity (Schwartz et al. 2009; Strindberg, 2020).

3.3.1 Religious Applicability

Violent extremism and terrorism connected with radicalizing religious groups seems to have been mainstream in the past two decades (Van den Bos, 2018). For instance, Islamist radicalization and terrorism are believed to have been behind the coordinated attacks by al-Qaeda on the United States on 9/11 (2001), the assault on the offices of the French satirical weekly newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* in Paris (January 2015), the killing of film-maker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam (2004), the bomb attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), and the violent behaviour by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (since 2014). Besides, there have been many more large-scale religion- and ethnicity-based attacks in Afghanistan, Yemen, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, Syria, Kenya etc (Gøtzsche-Astrup et al. 2020).

Religious doctrines (or indoctrination?) that categorise people into believers on the one hand; and unbelievers, sinners, infidels, apostates or heretics on the other, can provide justification for attacking out-group members (Langer et al., 2017; Gundiri, 2022). The non-Muslim survivors have experienced dreadful situations; their lives have been under attack and communities turned upside down. They have endured intense pain and violation, loss of family members and their faith. The Non-Muslims communities of southern Borno (NMCSB), have many losses to mourn, and emotions to manage; legal and social recognition, and emotional and practical support and information are sorely needed. All of these, merely because they do not belong or subscribe to Islam.

Shekau (2019) aptly propounds that dominant religions are absolutist insofar as unilaterally laying claim to hegemony and monopoly concerning knowledge of the truth, and that all other religious beliefs are inferior in that regard. Such absolutist claims promote dichotomous "us" versus "them" thinking in terms of which the Boko Haram revivalist movement views the world only in terms of Muslim believers and non-Muslim 'infidels' whom they brutally convert to Islam. Such thinking has developed an

intellectual rationale for the efforts to attack, conquer, convert, subjugate, or eliminate those identified as non-believers (Intersociety, 2020; Kpughe, 2017; Shekau, 2019).

Whereas previous religious conflicts were characteristically between Christians and non-Christians (e.g., the Crusades), most known religiously perpetrated conflict and violence in contemporary times are by terrorist Muslim organisations such as Boko Haram against non-Muslims (Ciampi, 2005; Mohammed, 2004). Therefore, if such premise is true the more rigid and radical the existing regulatory framework of religious beliefs, the higher the possibility that the adherents will participate in terrorist attacks (Silberman, Higgins & Dweck, 2005).

Furthermore, certain sects within Islam uphold that self-sacrifice, usually in the form of suicide attacks, will attract God's favour and redemption from transgression against His divine law (Hafez, 2006; Shekau, 2014; Robinson-Dogo, 2021). At the minimum then, it appears that the cultural-religious intersection may lead to participation in terrorist activities; thus, promoting the polarizing "us" (the believers) against "them" (the unbelievers, heretics or infidels) on the false pretences of the promise of redemption for obeying God's commandment to 'protect' the faith (Schwartz et al., 2009; Mckay, 2020).

It is to be noted that Boko Haram as a self-declared 'in-group' also has a long list of targets or enemies, mainly Christians, traditionalists, and recently, Shiites; as well as other Sunni Muslims who disagree with their doctrines. Anyone who believes in democracy, or any of the modern Western ideology is regarded as an 'out-group' (Comolli, 2015; Shekau, 2012; Ebim, et al., 2023). The study argues that Boko Haram has established a collective structure which produce a social reality that grants the group the rationale for action. Boko Haram's ideology, derived from Islamic symbolism, presents an explanatory lens which assigns meaning to their aggressive vision and mission. Within this framework, violence is justified as essential to defend religion (Islam), viewed as an "obligation for all true Muslim faithful all over the world" (Shekau, 2019).

3.3.2 Social Applicability

In the recent past, ideological extremists' violence seems to be increased worldwide (Institute for Economics and peace, 2018), specifically due to increased activity from

far right and White supremacist extremist groups encouraged by populism and dissatisfaction with the traditional political class (AON, 2018). For instance, the year (2020) has served up the normal diet of terrorist attacks, such as the White supremacist violence which has been on the rise in the United States; and the neo-Nazi car attack in Charlottesville, Virginia, and ten (10) people were killed in Hanau in Germany by a neo-Nazi who hated immigrants. Social protests around the globe seems to attract violent subgroups and provoke violent response on the part of the authorities, for example, the Black Lives Matter demonstrations in the United States of America (Gøtzsche-Astrup et al. 2020).

The social identity theory applies to the Boko Haram Islamist movement and its group or collective identity by incorporating shared beliefs, experiences, attitudes, missions and common interests of "in-group" members, and is defined by the attainment of the "in-group's" professed aim to rid Nigeria of the so-called apostate infidels and their unwanted democracy, and establish a fundamentalist Islamic State (Shekau, 2019).

Lester, Yang and Lindsay (2004) point out that terrorists involved in suicidal attacks, often display a more intense sense of self-proclaimed social cohesion, group allegiance, purpose and task oriented-ness for the benefit of the group's ideals, often viewed as sacrosanct and "holy" as in the case of the *jihadist* movements. On the other end, Woolf and Hulsizer (2005) and Strindberg (2020) propose that terrorism is likely to be embraced by groups and societies that draw sharp contrasts between an 'in-group' and an 'out-group', and where out-group members are unilaterally declared worthless infidels and categorized into a single enemy group. For example, in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, numerous types of political, physical and ideological threats were identifiable as emanating from the 'enemy camp' (Abdel-Khalek, 2004; Orbach, 2004; Amnesty International, 2022).

The above assertions are unsurprising, considering that terrorist groups thrive on their sense of collectivism social identity, which is the first prerequisite for terrorism (Durotoye, 2015; Erez, 2006; GTI, 2015), of which Boko Haram is the foremost exponent in this study. Such a prerequisite for collectivism is induced by the need to prioritize the group's ideals and interests over those of the individual (Hagen & Yohani, 2010; Post, 2005; Robinson-Dogo, 2021). It is apparent that people who value themselves above the cultural and social groups to which they belong, were most

unlikely to sacrifice themselves for the advancement of the agendas of such groups. It is therefore no coincidence that most suicide attackers are strongly bonded and reside in regions characterized by a strong sense of collectivism (Akinsuyi, 2020). Such social cohesiveness is propelled by the terrorists' strategy of dividing individuals and communities into those who support their cause ("us") and others whose opposition to such a cause ('them") renders them to labels such as arch enemies (Hiskett, 1993:30; ISS, 2020).

3.3.3 Cultural Applicability

The most influential cultural forces contributing to "us versus them" thinking are the absolutist religious belief systems. Barber (1995) and Gundiri (2022) argue that the conflict between fundamentalist Islam and the Western world, or the Boko Haram and the non-Muslim communities is ideological, and identity based. For example, Boko Haram and other fundamentalist Islamic groups frequently regard the prevalent influence of Western culture as a threat to their way of life, and then seems to claim to be compelled to end the existence of Western influences that threaten their sacred faith (Shekau, 2019).

The higher the level to which cultural factors impact or encourage dichotomous thinking, the less eager and ready members of the culture may be to perceiving the world from the point of view of others. This is a process that Erikson termed "pseudo speciation" (Erikson, 1985).

3.4 FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ATTENDANT TO THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section juxtaposes the researcher's own perspectives by fusing both the SIT's salient foundational tenets and their applicability to the study. This researcher has observed from both the literature and the findings that religion is the major factor that propels the Boko Haram insurgency. The connection between insurgency and religion has proved to be the binding motivational force of Boko Haram's collectivism, which is the first prerequisite for terrorist groups; that is, prioritizing the group over the individual (Abdullah, 2011; Deckard et al., 2015; Strindberg, 2020). Furthermore, people who value themselves more than the cultural and social groups to which they belong are unlikely to sacrifice themselves to advance the agendas of such groups. It is therefore no coincidence that most suicide attackers are strongly together as a collective group.

The findings also reveal identity as a 'surviving sense of fitting in and belonging to BH as a group (sub-theme one, of Theme Three). Therefore, 'identity' derives meaning when it is utilized as the only ground for the formation and expression of mutual interests, or the pursuits of common beliefs and civilization (GTI, 2015; Nmah & Amanambu, 2017; Strindberg, 2020). In this way, religion remains the major factor of Boko Haram social identity, which is further considered as personal attributes which people share, or are assumed to share, with others against the background of one social category or group differing with others (Okoli & Lortyer. 2014; Gundiri, 2022).

Boko Haram membership consists of men and women, teenagers, university graduates, students, fundamentalists and criminals, as well as people born as Muslims and converts. It is improbable for people with such diverse identity backgrounds to be motivated by the same factors, interests or ideals. The group has expanded its propaganda machinery to generate strong feelings of empathy for the perceived harm of Muslims in Nigeria (Adesoji, 2011; Shekau, 2019).

Religious and political motivations of the group have been noted to override the personal, as evidenced from the survivor testimonies. The voracious quest for unlimited membership, power, and identity proved to be major motivators for many Muslim fundamentalists and collaborators who embraced Boko Haram's ideology within the non-Muslim communities. More importantly, to the 'rijale', there are aspirations to reinvent themselves and the Muslim world in the medieval period, and to search for a new and clear Islamic identity (sub-theme two, of theme 3). This has also been observed by other scholars to be the motivational factor of the Boko Haram insurgency, located in the ideology of Islamising Nigeria (Akinola, 2015; Nmah & Amanambu, 2017; Gundiri, 2022). Furthermore, Adesoji (2010) has laid the basis for other scholarly work on Boko Haram. He observes the 2009 Boko Haram rebellion as an important event by Islamic conservatives at imposing an unconventional religious belief on Nigerian secular societies.

The Boko Haram attacks in the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno have proved to be an identity-based form of violence (Gundiri, 2022; Udounwa, 2013). An extremist group needs to bond its members by any possible means and guarantee a constant supply of recruits, as the group will become involved in lethal pursuits that

could potentially reduce its ranks (Adesoji, 2010). Hence, religion is the very successful bond which Boko Haram utilizes to enlist and sustain its 'in-group' identity by sanctioning a radical interpretation that underscores the group's feelings of isolation. It also cements identities by supplying constant background ideas of oneness to foster its mission of ridding the north of infidels (out-group); emphasizes spiritual obligations and making huge demands as a way of realizing its dream of establishing an Islamic caliphate (Shekau, 2014; Silberman et al., 2005).

The social identity theory stresses the importance of the social environmental or contextual factors, the group's inward established collective identity, and the condition in which unified group awareness is formed in the minds and hearts of the members (Tajfel & Turner, 2004). Accordingly, Boko Haram promotes its distinctive social status with the 'rijale' and its martyrdom status, ready to sacrifice themselves for the greater good of reinstating the caliphate in Northern Nigeria, even if it means the mass killing of innocent people. Therefore, the killings are an important part of the Islamic terrorist group to attract Muslim sympathizers (as part of "us") and instill fear in the hearts and minds of the non-Muslims (the out-group' or "them").

3.3 CONCLUSION

This chapter focused on situating the social identity theory within the framework of Boko Haram's functioning and centralisation of collectivism as the cementing force for its religiously induced group identity. In that regard, the social identity theory provides a holistic and systematically informed approach to a deeper and more meaningful understanding of what could plainly be regarded as the anatomy of mass violence and the inflammable issue of ethno-religious identity in a pluralistic and secular society like Nigeria. It is the researcher's contention that Boko Haram's ideology permits, and permeates the very notion of group violence, and conceals the group's atrocious designs for corporeal (worldly) power, territory and affluence masquerading as divine authority. It is in that context that Boko Haram has become a symptom of deep structural problems in Northern Nigeria.

The researcher makes no claim to any religious standing to speak confidently on what constitutes or does not constitute the noble principles and doctrines of Islam as originally propounded by its founder, Prophet Muhammad. However, empirical evidence to establish the emergence and motivating factors for social groups such as

Boko Haram is what is necessary for sociologists, which may take a generation to achieve. The social identity theory is not the only theory to provide incisive and critical exploration in this regard. Nonetheless, it is relevant for the continuation of scholarly initiatives whose core focus is to provide more illumination on the human condition.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter mainly provided a theoretical framework or grounding of the study in terms of which the theory of social identity is referred to explain Boko Haram's functioning and existence. The current chapter on the other hand, provides a context in terms of which the both the relevant literature perspectives and core theoretical metaphors and conceptual abstractions are collated, juxtaposed and translated into a systematically coordinated research design and methodological context (Mouton, 2014; Punch, 2012; Babbie, 2020).

The structure of the current chapter is predicated by research variables indicating the different, but interrelated pre-implementation aspects of the study, without which the trustworthiness of the research process and its consequent findings could be rendered questionable or invalid (Scotland, 2012; Singh, 2019). Accordingly, the main structural aspects of the current chapter include: the research design; research approach; study setting and population; sampling procedures; data collection and analysis; as well as the ethical and trustworthiness issues inherent in the study as whole. Such a symmetrical presentation of the above-stated research variables also outlines the logic according to which this study on violence and human atrocities proceeds from a theoretical or abstract terrain to the very practical domain which posits the study as firmly rooted on real-life situations (Thomas, 2016; Tsiolis & Christodoulou, 2022).

4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND APPROACH

The research design is the overall strategy or systematic techniques, approaches and plans chosen by a researcher to integrate the various components of research into a coherent and logical manner so that the research problem and the research questions are addressed appropriately (Igwenagu, 2016; Scotland, 2012; Singh, 2019). Furthermore, the research design articulates the methods by which the data will be collected and analysed, while also shedding lighter on limitations and resources, clarifying pre-suppositions and consequences, and relating possibilities at the frontiers of knowledge.

In this study, the researcher opted for an exploratory and descriptive research design. According to Kumar (2019), and Denscombe (2017), exploratory research designs seek to investigate a problem that has not been thoroughly investigated in the past; that is, when the objective of the study is to explore a phenomenon about which not much is known. Therefore, exploratory research fits into the current study since little is known about the gruesome experiences of the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno under the Boko Haram insurgency. Meanwhile, the descriptive aspect entails that more in-depth details are provided concerning the very situation or phenomenon collective structure whose manifestation is being explored (Sirisilla, 2023). As Denscombe (2017) illuminates that exploration precedes description, because in the process of finding out more details, the very details ought to be described or explained, lest both processes are rendered futile or worthless.

4.2.1 Research Approach

The researcher adopted a qualitative research design approach in his exploration, description and analysis of the experiences of non-Muslim survivors of the Boko Haram insurgency in the Southern Borno Senatorial District of Borno State, Northern Nigeria. The qualitative research method was adopted because of its naturalistic approach that seeks to unearth the opinions, thoughts, experiences and feelings of respondents in their own environment, and according to their perceptions rather than the researcher's own interpretative predilections (Bless, Higson-Smith & Sithole, 2013; Carey, 2015; Cardano, 2020).

The qualitative research approach has often been used to identify and explore the major concerns in a topic that are either novel or not well understood, taking into consideration the main rationale of this study (Ruppel & Mey, 2017). In this study, the ability of qualitative methods to fully explore a phenomenon is an important consideration in investigating the experiences of non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno. In this regard, the qualitative approach coheres with the constructivist-phenomenological research paradigm that elevates the centrality of research participants in the articulation of their own subjective experiences in their own words, and in their own naturalistic environment - whose dynamics they fully understand better than the researcher (Ruppel & Mey, 2017; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Walliman, 2022).

4.3 STUDY SETTING

The data for this study was collected in the non-Muslim communities of Chibok local government areas of Southern Senatorial District in Borno State, Nigeria. The local government area covers a land mass of 1,350 km², with a population of about 93,200 citizens (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020; National Population Commission of Nigeria, 2020). The predominant language spoken in this area is 'Kibaku' one of the Biu-Mandara languages (Central Chadic) spoken today from the island of Lake Chad to the valley of the river Benue (Hickey, 1984).

Figure 4.1 below depicts the research setting/ geographic location of the Chibok area in Southern Borno State, Nigeria, where the research was undertaken among non-Muslim victims of Boko Haram's mayhem.



Figure 4.1: Map of Northern Nigeria showing location of Chibok in Southern Borno State

Source: <u>https://www.polgeonow.com/2015/10/map-of-boko-haram-islamic-state-</u> control.html

4.4 STUDY POPULATION AND SAMPLING PROCEDURES

The study population relates to the aggregated group of individuals about whom the researcher is interested on account of their distinct affinity with, experience of, and sufficient or detailed knowledge of the phenomenon under investigation (Ruppel & Mey, 2017; Silverman, 2011; Sirisilla, 2023). In this study, the population of interest are the entire Chibok residents, which numbers about 93,200 members.

However, it is logistically and financially impractical to involve all population members in a research investigation (Maggie, 2019). Therefore, the researcher targeted a specific and manageable number of participants as mentioned in sub-section 4.4.1.1. This group was targeted by the researcher based on the criteria specified in subsection 4.4.1.3, which the researcher had determined prior to the actual study being undertaken (Tobin & Begley, 2004; Maggie, 2019).

4.4.1 Sampling Procedures

Sampling is the selection of a representative or sub-group of the main study population (Neuman, 2011; Babbie, 2020). In essence, sampling is necessitated by the fact that wholesale involvement of participants is impossible in research (Neuman, 2011). According to (Saldanha & O'Brien (2013), the process of sampling a representative group is also necessitated by the ethical requirement to respect both the integrity and privacy of every population member, since the representative group would have been fully informed about all aspects of a study before their voluntary involvement and informed consent as the basis for participation in the study.

Sampling is also viewed as advantageous for enabling inferences about the larger group, which also enables the researcher to draw conclusions or make certain relevant generalisations (Bernard, 2013; Neuman, 2011; Polit & Beck, 2022). Accordingly, the sampled participants in this study were drawn from the non-Muslim communities in Chibok who survived the macabre onslaught of the Boko Haram insurgents.

4.4.1.1 Sample Size

According to Maggie (2019), a sample size relates to the participants' numerical presence or representativity in respect of the prevalent population categories. On the other hand, Bouma and Ling (2004) assert that sample size is essentially the actual or total number of participants who were eventually selected for inclusion in the study.

However, Saldanha and O'Brien (2013) and Scotland (2012) posit that data saturation in qualitative studies is viewed as more important to a sample size, since it is the quality of the information required, rather than the number (quantity) of participants involved in the study. It is in this regard that Bouma and Ling (2004) declared that large samples are not necessarily better or qualitatively superior to smaller ones.

Furthermore, a sample size is determined by the kind of data required, which simultaneously determines the tools of acquiring and analysing the very data (Scotland, 2012; Babbie, 2020). In this study, the sample size consisted of 80 participants whose characterisation is in tandem with the researcher's pre-determined selection criteria (Scotland, 2012; Singh, 2019). Of these, 46 participated in semi-structured interviews, while 34 were involved in seven focus group discussions.

4.4.1.2 Sampling Method/ Technique

A sampling method relates to the technique or strategy used or preferred by the researcher in the selection of the participants who volunteered to take part in the study's empirical processes (Bless et al., 2013; Walliman, 2022). Virtually all the Indigenous communities of Southern Borno in north-eastern Nigeria have experienced the aftermaths of the Boko Haram massacres in Northern Nigeria simply by virtue of being non-Muslims or declared apostate in the country of their birth.

For reasons that are congenial to this study, the researcher preferred the nonprobability snowball or chain sampling strategy. Such a method is considered very convenient for its simplicity in that, one member of the community who has been recruited for inclusion in a study automatically informs and recruits someone else (e.g., friend, family or community member), who also informs someone else (Creswell, 2014; Thomas, 2016; Sirisilla, 2023). Eventually, there is a chain-like spread of information that is advantageous to the researcher's 'recruitment drive' for the many participants 'scrambling' to be included in the study as a cathartic moment to share their traumatic experiences at the hands of Boko Haram.

For Thomas (2016) and Maggie (2019), the snowball sampling method is appropriate to use when the members of a population are difficult to locate. Therefore, such a method was considered most appropriate for selecting the homeless and 'stateless' victims of Boko Haram terrorism who were subjected to nomadic lifestyles as they fled

from one area to another and becoming undocumented and disenfranchised migrants in the process.

The fact that the snowball sampling method is an offshoot of the non-probability sampling methods, implies that the chances of participants' inclusion in a study are uncertain (non-probable) and cannot be pre-determined by the researcher ahead of the empirical process itself (Silverman, 2011; Polit & Beck, 2022). In that regard, snowballing is incremental, and makes use of the initially identified participants to find other potential participants. In this study, some participants were utilized to locate other survivors of the Boko Haram insurgency who would ordinarily not be traced.

4.4.1.3 Sampling Criteria

The sampling criteria relates to the considerations or requirements determined by the researcher regarding the choice of participants for either inclusion or exclusion in the study (Creswell, 2014; Thanh & Thanh, 2015; Rubin, 2022). Accordingly, the following core criteria applied to this study:

- both male and female participants who were resident in the Chibok area and were survivors of Boko Haram's atrocities.
- individuals whose friends, family or any next-of-kin was a survivor of Boko Haram's despicable and barbaric deeds.
- non-Muslim survivors who were aged 18 years and above; and
- participants who were willing to voluntarily share their traumatic experiences at the hands of Boko Haram.

Conversely, any aspiring or prospective participant who did not meet all the abovestated criteria was considered ineligible for any consideration or inclusion in the study.

4.5 DATA COLLECTION

Whether it is theoretical (abstract) or secondary, empirical or secondary, data collection is an indispensable aspect of research, because it is on account of the systematic gathering of credible information from a variety of sources that the findings of a study could be regarded as believable and trustworthy (Thompson & Hickey, 2016:32; Walliman, 2022). Furthermore, data enables the researcher to answer the research questions, evaluate outcomes and make predictions about future probable

occurrences, developments and trends with a semblance of confidence (Gray, 2014; Welman et al., 2012:146; Sirisilla, 2023).

In this study, the researcher collected qualitative data from the sampled non-Muslim Chibok community members with the use of both in-depth interviews and focus group discussions as primary instruments for data collection. Qualitative data refers to collected non-numeric or non-statistical information emanating from the participants' narrated responses and the researcher's on-the-scene observations, rather than through measured or quantifiable responses. Examples of qualitative data instruments include interview transcripts, audio recordings, field notes, video recordings, images or pictures and a range of text-based documents (Berg & Lune, 2012; Denscombe, 2017; Polit & Beck, 2022).

The data was collected in the Chibok region as part of a large-scale study on the mass atrocities committed against the non-Muslim communities by the Boko Haram insurgents. All research tools were developed in English, with the Kibaku indigenous ethnic teachers serving as translators, after which the self-same data was then reviewed during post-interview sessions for corroboration, authentication and ensuring the researcher's proper interpretation of the participants' original responses.

4.5.1 Semi-structured Interviews

The study utilized semi-structured interviews as the primary source of data with 46 participants chosen through the snowball/ chain sampling technique. The interviews were conducted in March, April and May 2021. The semi-structured interview is a qualitative data collection instrument though which the researcher engages the participant (interviewee) in a verbal dialogue or conversation for the specific purpose of acquiring pertinent information from the interviewee in the quest to resolve the research problem and its attendant research questions (Gray, 2014; Padget, 2014; Cardano, 2020; Sirisilla, 2023).

Therefore, the semi-structured interview was preferable for its facilitation of less formal (therefore, flexible and less rigid) conversations or dialogues between the interviewer (i.e., researcher) and interviewee (i.e., sampled participant) in the process of obtaining reliable and first-hand information concerning the interviewee's experiences, opinions, attitudes, perceptions and the meanings that underpin these life experiences (Gray,

2014; Padgett, 2014; Rubin, 2022). Individual participants are interviewed for purposes of discovering aspects of the interviewees' personalities and the investigated phenomenon which the researcher does not easily observe or know about, such as the thoughts, feelings and intentions or motives of the interviewed individuals (Bernard, 2013). In that regard, the rationale of an interview premises on the need to obtain information that enhances deeper understanding of the meaning and experiences of the participants concerning a phenomenon; that is, the anatomy of Boko Haram's mass violence as unveiled by the participants who directly experienced and survived it, or indirectly suffered its aftermaths.

Notwithstanding the positive attributes of interviews, researchers are cautioned against over-reliance on their utilitarian value because some participants could (intentionally or unintentionally) derail the process with their subjective and sometimes irrelevant responses (De Vos et al., 2012; Padgett, 2014). Such a situation would require the researcher's creativity (e.g., probing questions) for the purpose of advancing the point of saturation (Padget, 2014; Rubin, 2022).

Prior to the interviews, the researcher ensured that he obtained permission from the local traditional leaders and authorities to demonstrate his *bona fide* intentions of not intending to do or inflict any harm on the participants (see Appendices B, C, D and E). Like the focus group discussions, the researcher adhered to the Covid-19 compliance regulations as also prescribed by the UNISA research ethical compliance requirements (UNISA, 2016; 2020a; 2020b). An interview guide (see Appendix I) was used to direct the proceedings in a focused and constructive manner (Bernard, 2013). Given the sensitivities around the Boko Haram atrocities, the researcher ensured that each semi-structured interview session did not exceed an hour to also avoid a retraumatisation of the interviewees. In this regard, the researcher had duly requested the participants' permission to record their verbal responses on an audio recorder (Berg & Lune, 2012; Durrheim & Painter, 2014; Sirisilla, 2023).

All ethical and Covid-19 compliance protocols outlined in the ensuing sub-section 4.5.2, were equally applicable to the semi-structured interviews. In one instance, it was not possible to meet participants face-to-face for data collection, and arrangements were made for interviews to be conducted telephonically to minimize contact with the interviewees. At the very beginning of each interview, the researcher introduced

himself, made a full disclosure of the research study's purpose, and specifically declared that the study was only for his academic qualifications and not for any other reason that could further imperil their lives after their harrowing Boko Haram experiences (Durrheim & Painter, 2014; Forest, 2012). Throughout the interviews, all ethical requirements were observed as detailed further in Section 4.6b in this study.

Field notes were taken to give effect to the qualitative observations of the participants' behaviour and non-verbal communication that could not be captured on audio (Berg & Lune, 2012; Forest, 2012; Babbie, 2020).

4.5.2 Focus Groups Discussions/ FGDs

A focus group is an arranged discussion between a group of eligible participants and the researcher, whose main aim is to elicit relevant responses or answers about an issue in which the researcher is interested (Durrheim & Painter, 2014; Gray, 2014). In contrast with the individual semi-structured interviews, information in a focus group context is gathered within a group context, which produces large volumes of data from a variety of views. Kumar (2019) intimates that a focus group discussion is also a rich supplementary source of data to one-on-one interviews. In addition, the FGD mode of data collection is advantageous for its allowance of participants to be relaxed in a group setting if they were averse to expressing their views in a one-on-one interview encounters) could not be blamed on the participants in the case of this study. They had suffered the worst of animalistic treatment by the Boko Haram insurgents.

Accordingly, the FGDs could be viewed as a form of group therapy sessions, which coheres with aspects of the social identity theory propounded by scholars such as Hogg and Williams (2000), Tajfel and Turner (2004), Woolf and Hulsizer (2005), and others in Chapter 3 of this study. Most importantly, FGDs present an opportunity for participants to agree or disagree with each other on certain issues, provide insight into group dynamics, as well as the unpredictability and variation that exists communities regarding their beliefs, values, experiences and practices (Gravetter & Forzano, 2012; Kumar, 2019). Some of the complications associated with focus group dynamics. Also, the commonly and publicly shared information places further constraints on the anonymity and confidentiality of the participants. Nonetheless, all the participants were

informed to treat the discussions as confidential, despite that they knew each other's horrific experiences from the Boko Haram mayhem.

A total of 34 participants (Boko Haram survivors) in seven (7) separate groups were included in the FGDs. The process of both the FGDs and the semi-structured interviews included an introduction to the research, providing reasons for the study, as well as explanation of the research ethics and the Covid-19 guidelines regarding social distancing, sanitisation of hands, and the participation pre-condition of wearing a mask during the focus groups; as well as a request for audio-recording the proceedings (De Vos et al., 2012; Sirisilla, 2023).

A focus group interview guide was used for the FGDs, which included workshop-like activities (Van Manen, 2015). Like the interviews, the FGD questions were predominantly open-ended (see Appendices I and H), and the FGD sessions were concluded with the researcher's request for additional questions, comments or remarks from the participants – all of whom males and females from the Kibakuj ethnic group were, and aged 18 years and above. On average, the focus groups were of about 65 minutes' duration. An interview guide was used to direct the conversations and for reminding the researcher on the major themes (as evidential burden) during the conversations (Van Manen, 2015; Konecki, 2021).

Like most qualitative studies, this research study considers the research participants as survivors whose thoughts and contributions could help in the re-enactment of their experiences as endangered members of society. As social actors, survivors' personal accounts of their experiences, as well as their views on durable solutions in the aftermath of Boko Haram insurgency are critical to understanding the intersection between Muslim and non-Muslim relationships within the communities of Southern Borno in particular, and Northern Nigeria in general (Victoroff, 2005; Konecki, 2021).

Where it was not possible to reach the participants through community gatherings due to the Covid-19 restrictions, the services of community leaders or elders were utilized to reach out to survivors in accordance with the criteria for inclusion as well. The researcher scheduled appointments with participants at two-hour intervals per day for both the interviews and the focus groups; the venue was well sanitized and ventilated, and social distancing was strictly adhered to. However, some of the interviews and

72

FGDs were conducted in open spaces for those survivors who were rendered homeless and displaced by the rampaging Boko Haram insurgents. Where there were situations of someone's body temperature registering above 37.5°Celsius, he/she would be excluded from participation in the FGDs, and interviews scheduled for that day.

4.6 DATA ANALYSIS

Xia and Gong (2015) explain that data analysis is a process of systematically "inspecting, cleansing, transforming and modelling data with the goal of discovering useful information, informing conclusions and supporting decision-making". Mills and Ratcliffe (2012) on the other hand, proffer that data analysis in qualitative research is an ongoing, emerging, iterative and non-linear process. By implication of the above-stated assertions by Mills and Ratcliffe (2012) and Xia and Gong (2015), it is apparent that it is possible to conduct the analysis and collection of data concurrently, since the objective is to convert or transform participants' statements from ordinary information to cogent statements on whose basis or framework the evidence and findings of the study could be established. Accordingly, thematic data analysis was employed in this study.

4.6.1 Thematic Data Analysis

Both Gray (2014) and Zulawski and Wicklander (2016) concur that thematic analysis is a method of organising, identifying and processing data according to its patterns of frequent occurrence and interrelatedness. As further inferred from Maggie (2019) and Silverman (2011), thematic data analysis is achieved by developing and applying codes, grouping and categorising themes, patterns and their relationships. In the context of the study, thematic data analysis was a critical mechanism for the methodical exploration and translation of the experiences and views of Boko Haram survivors on, amongst others: durable solutions, their preferences and desires, as well as the reasons they gave to support their views and prospects for the future. Ultimately, it was based on the thematically analysed data that the researcher was able to develop a convincing and reliable framework for the findings of the study (Gravetter & Forzano, 2012; Khaldi, 2017; Tsiolis & Christodoulou, 2022).

The researcher digitally downloaded the audio-recorded statements of the participants, after which he manually transcribed them into Excel sheets using a word

processor. Similar and frequently emerging statements from both the interviews and focus groups were organised or segmented into themes or codes that were consonant with the research questions and objectives of the study (Neuman, 2011; Walliman, 2022). Both similar and dissimilar statements were grouped into separate categories for comparison with prevalent perspectives in literature.

During the data analysis process, the researcher wrote notes for clarification of any developing trends and concepts that are grounded in the data (Gray, 2014). In fact, concept formation is an important part of the data analysis and starts during data collection (Neuman, 2011). A specified coding was created for similar themes and sub-themes of the study, based on the order of evidence emanating from the participants' statements or responses. Finally, the thematically coded statements were then translated into findings of the study against a framework of the sequence and focus areas of the research questions and objectives as pivotally conjoined by the research problem (Henning et al., 2004; Walliman, 2022).

4.7 MEASURES TO ENSURE TRUSTWORTHINESS

Trustworthiness refers to the degree of the study's acceptability and believability to the extent that researcher is ultimately confident of the quality of the findings as a product of rigorous research processes (Khaldi, 2017; Polit & Beck, 2022). In qualitative research, the measure of trustworthiness is determined in terms of the credibility, dependability, confirmability and authenticity criteria (Kumar, 2019).

4.7.1 Credibility

Credibility implies the truthfulness and authenticity of the findings as a genuine representation or reflection of the participants' views, and not the researcher's preferred analysis and interpretation of the facts (Frechette et al., 2020; Polit & Beck, 2022). Therefore, a qualitative study's findings are thought to be credible if the descriptions of human experiences are immediately acknowledged by individuals who shared their excruciating Boko Haram experience in this study. This qualitative research investigates the experience of non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno State under the Boko Haram reign of terror. It is certain that the participants in this study are the best judges to decide whether the research findings have reflected their experiences, opinions and feelings accurately or not (Frechette et al., 2020). The

preliminary research finding was presented to the participants for confirmation of their views.

4.7.2 Dependability

Dependability implies the consistency of the data over the same circumstances (Polit & Beck, 2022; Tobin & Begley, 2004). Based on the research process and its descriptive inclinations, the findings would then be deemed to be dependable if the study findings were reproduced the same with different participants in the same circumstances (Koch, 2006; Williams & Keady, 2022).

However, Kumar (2019) argues that qualitative research advocates flexibility and freedom. Therefore, it may be strenuous to achieve a semblance of dependability, unless the researcher kept a detailed record (audit trail) of the research process for others to replicate, and to ascertain the extent of dependability. The researcher believes and holds firmly that the results of this research study are very dependable in that regard.

4.7.3 Confirmability

Confirmability in qualitative research refers to the researcher's capacity to prove that the data represent the participants' responses, and not the researcher's biases or viewpoints, as well as the level at which the results can also be confirmed by others (Kumar, 2019; Maggie, 2019). The researcher also proved confirmability of the study by consultations with his supervisor to ensure that the interview guide was consistent with the fundamental intentions of the study. In addition, the researcher consulted with experienced researchers for their input in relation to the structure of the study, thus ensuring that it does not become a treatise in the history of Boko Haram, but a systematic investigation on the underlying psycho-social effects of the violence meted by this militia on non-Muslims and Western culture and civilisation (Forest, 2012; Hagen & Yohani, 2010; Robinson-Dogo, 2021).

4.7.4 Authenticity

Authenticity refers to the capacity and the extent to which the researcher fairly communicates the emotional state of the participant's experiences (Hagen & Yohani, 2010; Polit & Beck, 2022). In describing the experiences of the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno under the Boko Haram insurgency, readers seize and hold firm the embodiment of the encounter through the lens of the participants

themselves, which projects a cornucopia of realities (Gravetter & Forzano, 2012; Leedy & Ormrod, 2015; Williams & Keady, 2022).

4.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

According to De Vos et al. (2012) and Leedy and Ormrod (2015), ethics defines the moral, professional and legal obligations on the part of researchers to always treat their research subjects with dignity, and in accordance with protocols pertaining to human rights. In tandem with the established ethical requirements of the University of South Africa and the Covid-19 guidelines, the study was only commenced after the granting of due approval (ethical clearance by the UNISA Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix A).

In addition, ethical considerations were applied by means of informed consent, voluntary participation, protection from harm, privacy and confidentiality, as well as addressing the issue of deception.

4.8.1 Informed Consent

Babbie (2020) observed that the ethical norms of participating voluntary without being paid, and no harm to participants have been validated in the concept of informed consent. However, the researcher should first ensure that a full disclosure of the study is made to the participants, including the fact that they were free to withdraw from the study at any point during the interviews and focus group discussions (Dudovskiy, 2018).

In this research study, the researcher treated the participants with dignity and did not if their experiences rendered them as denigrated sub-human beings in a state of despondent victimhood. In addition, the researcher informed them that they had the right to ask their own questions before, and during the FGDs and interviews. The researcher also ensured to openly state to the participants that the study was only for the researcher's doctoral studies, and not for any purposes unrelated to their excruciating experiences (Frechette et al., 2020; Leedy & Ormrod, 2015).

4.8.2 Voluntary Participation

Babbie (2020) asserts once more that social research sometimes represents an intrusion into people's lives and disrupts their regular activities. However, the principle

of voluntary participation requires that people should not be coerced into participating in research. This is essentially relevant where researchers had previously relied on 'captive audiences' for their subjects – particularly in institutions such as prisons and universities (William, 2020). In the same vein, this research study is concerned primarily with investigating the experiences of survivors of Boko Haram massacres among the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno, viewed as former Boko Haram captives in the context of kidnappings as observed by William (2020) above.

Acknowledging the aspect of intrusion, the researcher neither compelled nor induced anyone to participate in this research study. The researcher also did not make false claims about the study, or empty promises that would accrue from their participation (Dudovskiy, 2018). The researcher outrightly stated to the participants that none of them would face any reprisals or punitive actions from anyone because of their involvement in the study (Marshall & Rossman, 2016; Rubin, 2022).

4.8.3 Protection from Harm

It is a fundamental research ethical protocol that no harm of any form should befall any participant because of their involvement in the study (William, 2020). This study focuses on personal experiences of participants, thus rendering the study more sensitive and increasing the risk of emotional and/ or psychological harm. Ethical standards also require that researchers do not put participants in a situation where they might be at risk of harm (Marshall & Rossman, 2016; Konecki,2021). The sensitivity of this study on the emotional state of participants was observed during the empirical data gathering process. To some unintentional extent, the study reminded the participants of their traumatic experiences, such as enslavement, rape, violenceattacks, mutilation, and torture, conversion at gun point and beheadings of their fellow victims at the Boko Haram captivity sites. Hence, the service of a counsellor was arranged for debriefing of the participants before the interviews and focus groups (Denscome, 2014; Leedy & Ormrod, 2015).

4.8.4 Privacy and Confidentiality

The principles of privacy and confidentiality are premised on the non-divulgence of any of the participants' identities and personal information during, and after their involvement in the study (Creswell, 2014; Gravetter & Forzano, 2012; Konecki, 2021). To a larger extent, this could also be construed as protecting them against any possible exposure to or risk of harm. Particularly in a study of this nature, it is possible that Boko Haram militants or sympathisers could attempt to pursue the participants for divulging all the gory details of the militia's deeds.

Therefore, none of the participants were mentioned by name, and the places of residence and next-of-kin were also not required as a condition for inclusion in the study. The researcher safely kept all hard copy and digital evidence of their involvement in a place only known by him, with the researcher and only authorized members of the university having access to the data. Also, the researcher will shred all such evidence after five years of the study to ensure that there is no link to trace the evidence of the study to participants at any point in the future (Babbie, 2012; Marshall & Rossman, 2016; Williams & Keady, 2022). The researcher further used pseudonyms in the relevant chapter of this study to ensure that the participants remained anonymous.

4.8.5 Deceiving Participants

Deceiving participants refers to the researcher's deliberate or intentional misrepresentation or distortion of the truth about the purpose of the study or withholding crucial information from the participants in that regard (Berg & Lune, 2012; Durrheim & Painter, 2014). In this study, the researcher fully informed the participants about all the details of the study through their community elders/ leaders, local authority, and the gatekeepers, that the study is only for a PhD in Sociology degree at the University of South Africa. The participant consent form further provided all the necessary information needed. Furthermore, the researcher did not offer or promise any monetary inducement or incentives to deceive or lure the participants.

4.8.6 Debriefing of Participants

Debriefing relates to the sessions or opportunities provided to the participants by the researcher to heal as they reflect on the hurtful and devastating experiences and aftermaths of their respective ordeals, and to ask any questions still embedded in their memories for therapeutic purposes (Babbie, 2012; Kumar, 2019; Babbie, 2020). In this research study, participants were debriefed at the end of each session, and were asked about their views and experiences for additional comments or suggestions related to the study. The participants openly declared that they have accepted and

reconciled with the reality of what has happened to them to the glory of God. In this regard, they derived succour from their faith as their forte for survival into the future.

4.9 CONCLUSION

The chapter provided the abstract premises of the actual pre-data collection phase. The research design and methodology outlined in this chapter articulates the processes and logic or rationale according to which the ensuing data collection in Chapter Five was applied. In that regard, the essential aspects of the current chapter pertain to the nature, type and purpose of the data collection instruments, justification for their use, as well as the anticipated outcomes (Bernard, 2013; Williams & Keady, 2022).

In the next chapter, the actual data accruing from the interviews and focus group discussions is presented.

CHAPTER FIVE PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Whereas the previous chapter essentially outlined the abstract research design and methodology processes by which data was to be collected and analysed, the current chapter presents the actual data in practical terms from both the 46 interviewees and 34 focus group participants whose statements and responses provide the evidential basis of the study (Bernard, 2013; Denscombe, 2017; Babbie, 2020).

The main purpose of the study was to explore, describe and analyse the Boko Haram insurgency in North-Eastern Nigeria against non-Muslim communities, as well as the humanitarian implications of the unprecedented crisis created by this insurgency. In this regard, the experiences of the survivors of the Boko Haram massacre are detailed verbatim in Section 3 of this chapter insofar as they (experiences) were recorded during both the in-depth interview sessions and the focus group discussions.

Meanwhile, Section 2 of the chapter provides the demographic/ bibliographic profiles or details of both the in-depth interview and focus group discussion participants. It is worth noting that in compliance with the ethical requirements for privacy, confidentiality and anonymity, no participant is mentioned or referred to by their real names (De Vos et al., 2012; Maggie, 2019; Saldanha & O'Brien, 2013). Instead, pseudonyms were used, such as "P1", "P2" and so on for the in-depth interview participants, and "FGD4 Maiduguri" or "FGD2 Chibok Town" and so on for the focus group participants in Maidiguri and Chibok Town respectively. Most importantly, it is also to be noted that the views of both the in-depth and focus group participants are integrated (merged or converged) under relevant themes, rather than presenting separate themes for each of these two sample categories. Such an approach strengthens the triangulation and saturation of data, while also demonstrating that the generated themes were the product of multiple empirical research process and approaches (Ruppel & Mey, 2017; Walliman, 2022).

Due to the sheer number of participants (80 in total), not all participant views or perspectives in each theme are cited. Rather, the researcher has ensured a degree of representativity by allocating different participants under each theme. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the ellipsis was applied in many instances to shorten the long participant excerpts without diminishing the essential aspects or elements of the participants' statements (Scotland, 2012; Silverman, 2011; Singh, 2019). Furthermore, a literature-based perspective is also added after each category of participant statements for purposes of comparability and 'testing' the veracity or otherwise of those statements in relation to the dominant perspectives in respect to the overall manifestations and effects of the Boko Haram mass violence.

5.2 PARTICIPANTS' DEMOGRAPHIC/ BIBLIOGRAPHIC PROFILES

The participants' demographic profiles in this section emanate from both the in-depth interviews and the FGDs respectively. Different numbers from 1-46 were sequentially assigned to each interview participant and the allocation of numbers was conducted in a chronological sequence.

5.2.1 Interviewed Participants' Demographic Profiles

Table 5.1 below depicts the age, gender and ethnic profiles of the 46 interviewed participants.

Participant	Age	Gender	Ethnic Group	Participant	Age	Gender	Ethnic Group
P01	24 years	Female	*Kibaku	P24	23 years	Male	

Table 5.1: Interviewed participants' age, gender and ethnic profile

Participant	Age	Gender	Ethnic Group	Participant	Age	Gender	Ethnic Group
P02	60 years	Male		P25	49 years	Female	
P03	31 years	Female		P26	30 years	Female	
P04	23 years	Female		P27	22 years	Male	
P05	32 years	Female		P28	38 years	Female	
P06	29 years	Male		P29	28 years	Male	
P07	26 years	Female		P30	23 years	Female	
P08	27 years	Female		P31	24 years	Female	
P09	38 years	Male		P32	30 years	Female	
P10	29 years	Female		P33	28 years	Female	
P11	25 years	Male		P34	65 years	Male	
P12	61 years	Male		P35	23 years	Female	
P13	26 years	Female		P36	32 years	Female	
P14	69 years	Male		P37	33 years	Female	
P15	51 years	Male		P38	29 years	Female	
P16	40 years	Female		P39	34 years	Female	
P17	44 years	Female		P40	47 years	Female	
P18	59 years	Male		P41	24 years	Female	
P19	43 years	Male		P42	63 years	Male	
P20	, 18 years	Female		P43	38 years	Male	
P21	29 years	Female		P44	42 years	Female	
P22	44 years	Female		P45	34 years	Female	
P23	24 years	Female		P46	34 years	Female	

*All participants are Kibaku in their ethnicity (ethnic origin)

Extrapolated from Table 5.1 above is that the gender distribution of the interviewed participants (Boko Haram survivors) depicts female survivors in the majority (n=31, 67%), with male survivors in the minority (n=15, 33%). Such a situation provides credence to the view that non-Muslim men were mostly killed or recruited into the *rijale* fighters, more than their women counterparts, who were largely raped and subjected to forced marriages (Toft, 2007; Zenn & Pearson, 2014).

From the female participants, (n=16, 52%) were aged between 26-35 years, followed by female participants whose ages ranged between 18-25 years (n=8, 26%). Those who were between 36-45 years of age were 5 (five, 16%, and those whose age was between 46-50 years were only two (n=2, 6%) and none (0%) between the ages of 51 and 69 years.

5.2.2. Focus Group Participants' Demographic Profiles

Table 5.2 below depicts the focus group discussion participants' profile in respect of their gender and place at which the focus group discussion was held.

SERIES NO:	GENDER	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS	PLACE OF FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS	ETHNIC GROUP
01	Male	5	Chibok Town	*KIBAKU
02	Male	4	IDPs Camp 1 (Chibok)	
03	Male	6	IDPs Camp 2 (Chibok)	
04	Male	6	Maiduguri	
05	Female	4	Jerusalem-Maiduguri	
06	Female	4	IDPs Camp 2 (Chibok)	
07	Female	5	Mbalala	

Table 5.2: Focus group participants' gender profiles and place of focus group

Table 5.2 above mainly depicts the gender and places of the focus groups in which the 34 participant survivors were involved. Accordingly, the majority of the FGD participants (n=21, 62%) were males, with a minority of females (n=13, 38%). Interestingly, there were more females (n=31, 67%) than males (n=15, 33%) participating in the in-depth interviews. A possible explanation for the latter development could be that the females were more at ease with the one-on-one in-depth interviews - in which more privacy and confidentiality prevails than in the open focus group discussions where they are easily visible to other FGD participants – although no threat was posed by such exposure in this study.

5.2.2.1 Focus Group Distribution

Figure 5.1 (overleaf) depicts the various places at which the focus group discussions were conducted. Extrapolated from Figure 5.1 (overleaf) is that seven (7) focus group discussions were conducted, consisting of four (4) (male only) groups as well as three (3) (female only) groups. The male only focus group has the majority (n=6, 17%) of Maiduguri participants as well as (n=6, 17%) IDPs Camp2 Chibok participants, followed by 5 (five, 15%) participants of Chibok Town; and the least number of participants (n=4, 12%) from the internally displaced persons (IDPs) Camp1 Chibok.




Figure 5.4: Focus group site distribution

Furthermore, the Mbalala focus group had most female-only participants (n=5, 15%), followed by 4 (four, 12%) participants from both the Jerusalem Maiduguri focus group and the IDPs Camp2 Chibok with another minority (n=4, 12%) of participants.

5.3 KEY FINDINGS AND THEMATIC CATEGORISATION

Boko Haram and its unprecedented mayhem constitutes a pivotal aspect of this study. Also, the undeniable fact that the venomous effects of the militia's actions were largely directed at the non-Muslim communities renders the findings to correspondingly assume a variety of non-Muslim attributes from the perspective of both Boko Haram functionaries and their defenceless victims. Such a situation is induced entirely by the reciprocity of the actions of the perpetrators who view themselves as the 'in-group' on the victims/ survivors as the 'out-group' that singularly bore the brunt of Boko Haram's horrendous actions (Marcia, 1967; Erikson, 1985). Therefore, the researcher intimates that every aspect of the themes presented and discussed in this section, would

inevitably entail the non-Muslim element as both the foundational tenet of Boko Haram's genesis, and therefore, 'outward' effect and expression of the insurgency on the mass exodus and displacement of the victims and survivors.

Boko Haram has perpetrated genocidal war crimes against the humanity of the non-Muslims communities of Southern Borno (Chandler, 2018; McKay, 2020). Hundreds of innocent civilians are still held captive in the Sambisa Forest and the Republic of Cameroon, where they are subjugated and rendered hopeless, powerless and defenceless. The research findings seem to agree that Boko Haram may be committing genocide by carrying out its horrific acts on the grounds of identity, particularly targeting the non-Muslim religious populations for perceived ideological crimes, to destroy them as a group (Abar, 2019). The first step to establish whether genocide had taken place is to recognise the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a "protected group" (a national, ethnic, racial or religious group). This genocidal intention can be deduced from various factors, which includes the acts committed, the general circumstances in which the acts occurred, and the perpetrators' declarations (Ademola, 2009).

Collectively, both the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with survivors of the Boko Haram mayhem yielded the following main themes and their related categories, as depicted in Table 5.1 (overleaf). In fact, it is the researcher's view that the following excerpt from one of the participants captures the overall tenor and 'mood' in the study's findings:

P02: Mass executions, abductions, displacement, sexual slavery, crimes against children that are horrific and touching, leading to a dire humanitarian condition. Of all these sufferings, the non-Muslims have not been regarded by this government as they do in Muslim areas.

Table 5.3 below captures the four themes generated during the processing and analysis of both the interview-based and focus group data from the eight (80) participants.

Themes	Sub-themes/ Categories		
	Religious intolerance and coercion/ Forced conversion to Islam		

1. Religious Context and Ramifications of Boko Haram Insurgency	Targeted mass killing of, and genocide against non- Muslims Gender-based violation (sexual slavery) of non-Muslim women and girls
2. Socio-cultural Disruptions and Injustices	Dislocation of cultural ties Orchestrated social profiling and disempowerment Systematic displacement Child soldiering, indoctrination and deluded martyrdom Abduction of non-Muslims Forced marriages of non-Muslim women and girls
3. Socio-economic Disenfranchisement/ Disempowerment (Dire Humanitarian Situations of Non- Muslims)	Loss of families and livelihoods Selective social relief support Present situation
4. Psychological Devastation	Powerlessness and despondency among the non-Muslim survivors Stigmatisation and rejection/ marginalisation of the non- Muslim survivors Trauma and re-traumatisation of the non-Muslim survivors Current state/ Recovery and coping mechanisms of the non-Muslim survivors

5.3.1 Theme One: Religious Context and Ramifications of the Boko Haram Insurgency

As indicated in Table 5.3. above, three sub-themes (categories) emerged in respect of the religious context and ramifications of the Boko Haram insurgency, namely:

- religious intolerance and coercion/ forced conversion to Islam.
- targeted mass killing of, and genocide against non-Muslims; and
- gender-based violation (sexual slavery) of non-Muslim women and girls.

5.3.1.1 Sub-theme 1: Religious Intolerance and Coercion/ Forced Conversion to Islam Boko Haram's genesis is situated within in an extremist religious fundamentalism context, according to which non-adherence is counteracted with coercion and intolerance. To that extent, Boko Haram established itself largely as a religious organisation, which is proved by the fact that they were known as people committed to the propagation of the prophet's teaching and jihad (*jama'atul alhulsunnah lidda'wati wal jihad*). As such, the abducted non-Muslim women, and girls in particular, were subjected to a range of abuses. For instance, religiously perpetrated discriminatory

measures were meted against non-Muslims, such as children in government schools in the Borno State being forced to have Islamic classes.

Such a situation reflects that victims and survivors were confronted with the choice of coerced conversion and/ or death for refusing such coercion (*pra alukwa adinir dar ko aga ti*). It is in this context that the range of excerpts below demonstrate the extent of such intolerance and coercion during the Boko Haram insurgency.

P03: We were asked to attend Islamic classes in government schools in Maiduguri. That is where I learnt the prayers and some Quranic verses. In one private school owned by a Yoruba man from the South, my sister was forced to attend Islamic classes; this prompted some parents to resist by withdrawing their children before the owner employed Christian religious teachers. Most government schools do not have that except Islamic religion studies teachers, especially in Borno North, and this has been the unpronounced tradition in some parts of Northern Nigeria.

P05: In all Muslims strongholds in Maiduguri, non-Muslim women and girls face constant molestation and pressure by extremist 'Al'majiris' to adhere to strict Islamic dress 'hijab' and 'niqap' to cover themselves, I was surrounded and molested by almajiri, when they saw me wore a trouser in Maiduguri.

P21: I was beaten for days for not obeying the Imam. He slapped me when I told him that I was menstruating and unable to perform Islamic prayers. The fighters had given me a new name. I was raised in a Christian family and refused to follow the Islamic faith in captivity. Although we were forced to collectively pronounce the 'Kalma Shahada' but never practice it.

P02: Christian programmes are barely allowed to be aired on Borno State television ...

P15: The Boko Haram reign of terror has been widely experienced within the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno. Boko Haram rejected 50 million Naira ransom and beheaded a Kibaku-clergy on 21 of January 2020, whom they abducted in church during a raid at Michika, a local government in Adamawa State. The group's plans to exterminate non-Muslims ethnic minorities is not hidden; it is what we have been experiencing for centuries.

FGD4 IDPs Camp2: How on earth could such things be allowed to take place in a secular society like ours? ... Accepting Islam was necessary for survival as Boko Haram captive. They killed our village chief along Chilari in the company of other Muslims because he refused conversion.

P04: They forced us to recite the Kalmar shahada (Islamic creed) three times. Little children were compelled to recite it, as people were crying and scared. They enquired if there's any person who does not want to convert to Islam? We all stayed quiet, because if anyone refused, he or she would be executed.

It is evident from the above excerpts that moral principles did not apply to Boko Haram's treatment of non-Muslims in captivity. They faced the choice of refusing to be forcibly converted to Islam and being killed or complying involuntarily to such conversion to live and be subjected to a life of excruciating experiences, as shown by other survivors' experiences below.

P13: One of our tormentors, a Fulani that works as a cattle rustler once told us that it is just and righteous that non-Muslims should convert to Islam and that the single women and girls should be forced to marry Muslim men according to Islamic doctrines. And those who refused to, should be trapped in bomb and send on suicide mission or become permanent slave, until they repented and do the necessary

P35: Boko Haram views Christians and other religion as infidels and considers non-Muslims as unclean and unworthy of existing. We were also asked by insurgents to forget about any of our past religion and non-Muslim relatives, that all are considered unclean before Allah. The 'amir' said that non-Muslims are not allowed to visit the Islamic holy land because they are unclean.

P14: ... The sect has utilized and maintained its reputation as a merciless and bloodthirsty movement terrorizing non-Muslims and any opposition in its way.

P28: In all the community's they captured, women and girls were harassed, men were ordered to cut their trouser legs above the ankle and grow their beards. They monitored our movements, killed people without any reason and implement strict Islamic shariah law. They told us that we were insane to be living in Nigeria, that we can stay peacefully in their daulah (Islamic caliphate) if we pay jizya.

It is evident from the above statements that coercion, rather than persuasion, was the most prominent instrument used against the powerless non-Muslim victims in captivity. It is also evident from the above-stated participant testimonies that discrimination and hatred for the non-Muslims in Borno State predates the insurgency, which is corroborated by the historical context of Boko Haram as outlined in Section 2.2 of this study.

5.3.1.2 Sub-theme 2: Targeted Mass Killing of, and Genocide Against non-Muslims The researcher states forthwith, that Boko Haram's genocide against the defenceless non-Muslim communities warranted some more extended deliberation, compared to other sub-themes in this chapter. The rationale emanates from the very premise that the religious justifications by Boko Haram was/ is eventually expressed by the proportion of violence and murder committed. In other words, the scale of the violence is viewed as the depth of the hatred, since there can be no justification for violence and genocide as the means to resolve any form of disagreement or conflicting ideas (Danjibo, 2009; Iyekekpolo, 2020). The Boko Haram terrorists took over Chibok on 13 November 2014, after which unprecedented mayhem followed. The following series of the Boko Haram survivors' statements depict the extent to which the insurgency was imbued with a sense of a genocidal onslaught against the non-Muslims in Northern Nigeria.

P07: At the beginning of insurgency, in Maiduguri, non-Muslims were targeted and killed at home, on the way, or at the places of worships. Their bakery, shops selling provision, alcohol, became the target for bomb attacks, looting or assassinations.

P03: In 2014, 7 female students left University of Maiduguri to avoid increasing persecutions and threats directed against non-Muslims, including through flyer campaigns. They killed lots of non-Muslims student on their ways to school or traveling back home from Maiduguri. Some students adopted wearing 'hijap' whenever they go to town, to avoid molestation or being targeted by Al'majiris.

P04: I can recall, the first non-Muslim victims of Boko Haram beside security forces in Maiduguri, was a Kibaku; former local government Chairman of Chibok, who was followed and killed at his residence when he returned from church on Sunday.

P14: Calculated and orchestrated intent to exterminate non-Muslim nationalities in the country (Kurta-nja nam kura mslum). Almost all the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno are deserted. There is no Church standing, and the Boko Haram are the ones patrolling the places looking for people to kill. Between 2019 to date, hundreds Kibaku's were killed on their farm very close from here, and the government is doing nothing for the past 8 years. Only the local government headquarters in Southern Borno are accessible. Most of the communities are deserted, especially Chibok with weekly recorded killings.

P16: ... hundreds of Kibaku people were trapped and beheaded along Danboa on their way escaping from Maiduguri. That was my first traumatic shock experiences, seeing non-Muslim corpses littered everywhere, while the Muslims were separated.

Non-Muslim women were ordered to bury the corpses, which included those of children in the bush. As they said, it is un-Islamic to bury 'kirdi' non-Muslims.

The participants' statements above clearly allude to Boko Haram's orchestrated and indiscriminate pattern of systematically inflicting maximum physical, emotional, and psychological damage to the captured victims. Such a situation coheres with the assertions made by Agbiboa (2015), Barkindo et al. (2013), Zenn and Pearson (20140) and others. The following statements further attest to Boko Haram's systematically executed gory deeds meted against non-Muslim women, men and children.

FGD1 IDPs Camp2: It horrified our conscience as human beings ... in the awful mass killing of the non-Muslim community of Chibok by Boko Haram terrorists

FGD6 IDPs Camp2. They distributed flyer at Kuburivu community, that before the comeback we should all repent and serve one Allah. After a week they came back and shot anyone at sight, shouting Allah-Akbar, calling us 'kirdi' (infidels), that we refused their instructions. The killed 26 men and four women injured, carted away our cattle's and food stuffs and displaced the community for 8 years now.

FGD3 IDPs Camp2 Chibok: We can't give the number of people killed exactly, because none of the physically challenged and aged parents made it alive. Some were burnt inside their houses ... some Muslims from within were seen moving freely leading the terrorists to our houses at Kuburivu.

FGD2 IDPs Camp2). If really, all these killings are for God, then let the spirits of my ancestors save my generation from such religion: Our entire village (Bwarakila) bordering Sambisa Forest is deserted to-date, 18 elders and hundreds of young people murdered; four male children were killed as their mothers were arrested while trying to escape ... They beheaded three men and shot all the remaining people. To my surprised, a military fighter jet was roaming around in the air. I don't know how I survived, I found myself underneath dead bodies, though I was shot in my hand, can you see the bullet scar?

FGD31 IDPs Camp2: *Kill the infidels, wherever you see them, the command given by BH 'amir' at Kwada community here in Chibok. We were in hiding inside our backyard farm. Four aged men and three boys were beheaded for rejecting the offer to join the sect; we were later captured and forced to bury our dead. Miraculously, we escaped*

Irrefutably, the above-cited statements continue to demonstrate that the Boko Haram militia's actions were well-considered, and neither random nor accidental. The emerging pattern is that they were pre-meditated, demonstrated an element of bigoted hatred, and designed to instil maximum fear and obedience amongst the powerless

and defenceless victims (Brannan et al., 2001). All these are the desirable factors in favour of the militants, who thrive on minimal resistance (Cederman et al., 2013; Dim, 2017).

5.3.1.3 Sub-theme 3: Gender-based Violation (Sexual Slavery) of Non-Muslim Women and Girls

As indicated earlier, the non-Muslim factor constitutes the core determinant of Boko Haram's attitude and expression of its unilateral *jihadist* beliefs. Therefore, in addition to the religious intolerance and targeted mass killings, gender-based violence augmented to the various aspects and components of the religious context and ramifications of the Boko Haram insurgency. The bodies of the non-Muslim women and girls were the unreported 'crime scene' of Boko Haram's perversion for over a decade.

The Islamic group deliberately and strategically targeted non-Muslim women and girls for abductions *(suwati nkwai kaka mwahi nam kura mslum)* and other atrocious misdeeds, falsely convinced that they were immune from prosecution and justice (Duyvesteyn, 2004). Survivors revealed that the sexual violence and torture began before they even reached the Boko Haram camps in the Sambisa Forest. The Kibaku women and girls who survived carry detailed accounts of the worst of Boko Haram's heinous crimes. In this regard, the following participant statements attest to the gender-based violation (sexual slavery) of non-Muslim women and girls.

P42: Boko Haram systematically attempted to wipe out the non-Muslims communities of Northern Nigeria and the mass enslavement of its women and girls. The insurgents interpret Islamic texts literally, using it to justify the mass murder and sexual enslavement of non-Muslims, who are traditionalists or Christians, Regarded as 'kafir' or second-class citizens by virtue of their non-Muslim identity. In the same vein, other non-Sunni Muslims are regarded as 'takfir' apostate who were also killed by the insurgents. I can never forget how Boko Haram raped 3 teenage girls at Sabon gari in Madagali. I could see the pain on the girls' faces. One of them ... was bleeding and her private parts were swollen. I understood it was a gang rape. I felt her suffering and consoled her.

P44: A girl was tortured and raped by a gang of the Boko Haram fighters; after she was raped, she took the fighters knife and committed suicide by cutting her wrists and pierced her stomach. Many non-Muslim girls took their lives in captivity to avoid force marriage with the insurgents.

P46: The women, girls and children were flogged, tortured, insulted, and starved. Then, after six months of distress, many were exhausted by starvation and illness, we were moved to Gwoza Boko Haram headquarters and stronghold. I was raped and tortured many times and married to four different fighters. We all had scars on our bodies, as punishment for any perceived offence was torture.

P41: A man in his 40s pull me out to another apartment. He was tying me on the bed and beating me hard with an electric wire because I refused to submit to his sexual advances; so, he called on other fighters who fastened me to a bed and raped me. He later called another fighter ... from Mali ... in his 30s. He raped me many times, and then he left me tied on the bed for others to rape me. The apartment was designed strictly for rape and tortures, as lots of teenage girls were brought in and raped constantly in my presence. They were calling us 'kirdi' infidels and telling us we deserve nothing but execution and being treated like the slaves we are.

The following excerpt depicts one of the very rare incidents of a very few Boko Haram insurgents who were momentarily conscientious and risked their own lives by coming to the rescue of the rape victims:

P08: ... For three years, I was tortured, beaten with an iron pipe, and tied up on a tree, raped multiple times. The unforgettable experience is the one of two Muslim fighters from my community. Those boys tied me up and held me down for a dirty fighter to rape me, while watching and laughing. They said to me, "you will remain here and never escape" ... They also tortured and raped other women and girls despite forced conversion. They were mostly Kanuri-Muslims and former Al'majiri's. They brought a girl of 12 years to our place and molested her; they wanted her to marry a man of more than 50 years, but at the end, he was killed in one of their attacks. They beat her to a pulp, saying that she is possessed with evil spirits; she is the cause of his death. They dug a hole and buried her leaving only her head above the ground and left her. They said at evening time, she would be stoned to death by midnight, one of the Muslims fighters from my community came and untied me and pulled out the girl from the grave. He said this may lead to his death, but I must leave the place. **That is how he saved us, and we escaped [researcher's own emphasis].**

Other rape and sexual violation victims and survivors further expressed their harrowing ordeals thus:

P21: Singles non-Muslim women and girls were separated from older ones and those with children. They concentrated initial on the teenage girls, the beautiful ones. They were always the first victims to be taken away for sexual slavery. I even told them I was married but they said my former husband is an infidel, and am now a Muslim, and that he doesn't have any right over me They took the girls to an isolated place and

raped them constantly before assaulting and throwing them inside a hut. They were bleeding and weeping as the terrorists further invited other men over. They see women as properties to their husbands, through whom you will make heaven.

P20: Later, one of the terrorists told us that one of the raped girls was dead. They don't even feel remorse or pity for non-Muslims. For five years I have been through hell of torture and sexual violations. My first husband tortured me constantly for a week for failing to attend 'Islamia' (Islamic teaching sessions) ...

The totality of the above participants' experiences exemplifies the absolute denigration of the bodies of the non-Muslim women and girls by Boko Haram. These survivors were exposed to the worst forms of gender-based violence and sub-human enslavement (Albert, 1997:13; Wellman Jr, 2007). In this condition, they were commodified sexual objects whose only sin was being 'infidel' non-Muslim and "beautiful". They were first physically tortured and brutalised psychologically to inflict maximum subjugation and dehumanisation, with multiple rape or sexual violations amounting to re-traumatisation (see sub-heading 5.3.4.3).

The three sub-themes depicted in this section are reflective of extreme religiously inspired hatred, intolerance, perverted sexual violations and femicide that even brings to the fore issues or questions of morality, war crimes and the state of mind of the Boko Haram insurgents. Based on this, the researcher contends that deeper understanding of the insurgents' barbaric behaviour and Neanderthal motivations require entirely extra-religious perspectives that also encapsulate aspects of abnormal behaviour.

5.3.2 Theme Two: Socio-cultural Disruptions and Injustice

Gripped with fear of the worst and unimaginable kind, the Boko Haram survivors' citizenship rights were abruptly uprooted. The ensuing mayhem and exodus of people - especially non-Muslims - inevitably resulted in socio-cultural disruptions and the injustice of government's lack of strategically effective mechanisms to protect citizens in the affected areas, particularly in Southern Borno State, Northern Nigeria. The following six sub-themes encapsulate the Boko Haram survivors' reflections on the overall social and cultural disruptions and the injustice of victimhood and vulnerability.

- Dislocation of cultural ties.
- Orchestrated social profiling and disempowerment.

- Systematic displacement.
- Child soldiering, indoctrination, and deluded martyrdom.
- Abduction of non-Muslims; and
- Forced marriages of non-Muslim women and girls.

5.3.2.1 Sub-theme 1: Dislocation of Cultural Ties

From the researcher's viewpoint, the element of dislocation is indicative of abruptness and systematic upheaval perpetrated over a significant period of time through the agency of mass violence by Boko Haram. Loss of cultural ties or connections and normal community networking (Shanta-jir djugti whalur njai and sur iya kadubar lukumar shanga nja) were expressed by several survivors as a significant disruptive factor caused by the Boko Haram insurgency. In the ensuing exodus of fleeing from their communities to safety, people were internally displaced, and others exiled. In the process, their social cohesion, ethnic 'sovereignty' and group identity were disorganised as they scattered to different parts of the country and neighbouring states for almost a decade (Windsor, 2018; Zeller, 2020). To that effect, the FGD participants expressed their viewed thus:

FGD1, Mbalala: Not only has the Boko Haram war crippled the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno, but on a deeper level, it taints our community's cultures and forever alters the cultural identity of Kibaku (Chibok) people. We were forced to migrate for the sake of safety and surviving, carrying our culture along, but in the process altering it. It's not about ethnic identity now, but it's between Muslim and non-Muslim ... even some of the host communities in Northern Nigeria today ... so what will be the future of such communities, if, they ever return?

Other participants added:

FGD3, Mbalala: As ethnic minorities group, we no longer celebrate any rites, be it marriage ceremony, children born, or religious as we use to ... this is what they wanted ... but we celebrate deeper into the heart of darkness.

FGD3, IDPs Camp2 Chibok: We prefer local resettlement among our Kibaku kinsmen here in Chibok. Defencelessness was echoed as one factor that may stop them from returning to 'Kwamgilari' their place of origin. If we ever go back, we may be attacked, we want border adjustment from Danboa. We do not belong there. We are Kibaku speaking ethnic group and minority in Borno, and mostly non-Muslims. Ethnic and religious factors were never considered before merging us with the Danboa, who are mostly Muslims with a different ethnic identity from us. The Muslims amongst us have relocated back to Danboa and are being taken care of by the government; but as non-Muslims we must stay here with our kinsmen to save our lives, because the Boko Haram onslaught was aimed against the non-Muslims. Our condition is bad ...

FGD2 Maiduguri: The BH captured large area in the North-Eastern Nigeria and northern Cameroon and abducted thousands of non-Muslims. The minority communities of southern Borno who lived in villages fled in fear of the BH terror reign and designed onslaught

P02: If the war ends, and peace returns, it would be necessary for Kibaku communities' leaders/elders to come back home, and rebuild relationships, traditions and values, and new strategies on how to reconstruct practices and beliefs on the broader cultural implications that comes with these new experiences.

P15: I am a native hunter, but I can't match the weapons in Boko Haram's possessions. My wife and children need a father and protection, my priority was to take them to safety before the insurgents attacked our community, which they did. I could not put my family at risk to be taken hostage or slaughtered by terrorists; so, I moved them far away, before I came back and fought the insurgents.

The early return of survivors to their homes was viewed as a cultural necessity and sustainable solution, as it would offer the survivors and victims' the opportunity to restore their erstwhile family ties, reconnect with the loved ones and rebuild their sociocultural and community networks. The cultural rootedness of the participants could be seen as a form of identity that separates them from their Muslim compatriots, to whom the indigenous practices and customs were obviously in conflict with theirs (Arena et al., 2005; Hafez, 2006; Hagen & Yohani, 2010). True to the notion that, "home is home", the participants display an attitude of optimism and never losing hope to return to their cultural roots despite the inclement environment of captivity.

5.3.2.2 Sub-theme 2: Orchestrated Social Profiling and Disempowerment

Despite the social divisions that Boko Haram sought to perpetrate among Nigerians in general, Muslims, Christians and traditionalists have always lived together as neighbours, business partners and friends in the area under study. Most non-Muslims had a Muslim who was like a brother, sister or as part of their own families. They feasted together and attended each other's weddings and burials. However, Boko Haram sought to disrupt such social cohesion and perpetrate its divisive and hegemonic agenda/ ideology by profiling the non-Muslims as a threatening 'out-group' that needed to be disempowered (Abar, 2019; Brown, 2000). The following range of

statements illustrate the extent of Boko Haram's orchestrated social profiling and disempowerment.

FGD2 Maiduguri: The majority Muslims 'Kanuri' of Borno state, never considered the non-Muslim communities of Chibok worth of decisions making and of power, such as tribal law.

FGD3 Maiduguri: On many occasions now, a Muslim from different traditional and cultural background is imported and imposed on Kibaku-Chibok (Non-Muslim dominated community) as traditional chiefs, to propagate the dominance of Islam.

FGD, Maiduguri: Harmony was common in the diverse and multi-ethnic, northeastern region of Nigeria, where Christians, pagans and other Muslims have lived side by side for many years. The Borno State capital, Maiduguri, was the cosmopolitan trading centre. However, despite attempts to dominate; each group upholds to its religious identity and traditional values until recently ...

Boko Haram began a campaign of ethnic cleansing to exterminate or exile non-Muslims living in the regions it called the Islamic caliphate. Several Kibaku survivors revealed during focus group that:

FGD6 Maiduguri: The Non-Muslims community of Chibok often do not have access to such traditional mechanisms, as they do not necessarily belong to the eight (8) traditional tribal grouping of the Borno Emirate Council.

FGD, Maiduguri Local Muslims have sided with Boko Haram, betraying their kinsmen for once Boko Haram attacked, and some even colluded in advance with BH to deceive and lure non-Muslims into staying until the jihadist attacks and take over (Bwa Kugivir Mlsum akwa giwa). there were situations where Muslims hide and help non-Muslims to escape the invasion.

P02: To be betrayed by your own neighbour is terrible, but many of our surrounding community Muslims are with Boko Haram; the question is whether the local Muslims who chose to side with the onslaught of the Boko Haram will continue to identify with the sect or come back to the communities they helped to destroy.

FGD4 Jerusalem-Maiduguri: We had to leave our community and became internally displaced for two years in Yola, because of continued violence. After the Bidagu attacks, they attacked and slaughtered 18 non-Muslims. At our village Kumamza, they burnt down churches and destroyed graves marked with Christian crosses telling us to vacate the community as we shall never come back again. My husband's motorcycle was taken by our Muslim neighbour who joined the Boko Haram group. I

find it difficult to believe that the terrorists that burnt down our homes and killed some people have been released by the government of Nigeria ...

The non-Muslims were an unarmed civilian population but were the primary target of the dreadful 2014 Boko Haram conflict and onslaught in the North-Eastern region of Nigeria. They were attacked only because Boko Haram regarded them as infidels who were unworthy of living (Adesoji, 2010). The findings evidently show that Boko Haram has committed dreadful acts of violence particularly against non-Muslim men, women and girls, who have been consistently captured, killed, separated from their love ones and families, forcibly transferred and displaced, gifted, raped, tortured and sexually enslave, forcibly married and forcibly converted to Islam without their consent (Agbiboa, 2015; Anyadike, 2013). From the researcher's viewpoint, such characterisation of the victims' experiences is undeniably linked to the orchestrated social profiling (characterisation) of the self-same and survivors to disempower them and effectively label them as an 'out-group.'

5.3.2.3 Sub-theme 3: Systematic Displacement

The findings reveal an organised pattern of not only subjugating the victims bodily and mentally through torture and rape, but also ensuring that their social patterns and organisation, and way of life are disrupted and thus prevent them from any meaningful resistance and cohesive retaliation. Such treatment of the victims and survivors was also intended to completely remove any hope of returning to their ancestral homes (*u nam nji tara wula akwa giwa*). The insurgents killed many people in Kagilmari, burning houses and churches all over Chibok communities. Recurrent Boko Haram attacks on villages, abduction and relocation of non-Muslim women and girls to different locations within their controlled areas ensured that the project of systematic displacement was orchestrated without any coordinated retaliation by the Nigerian government (Umar, 2013; Zenn & Pearson, 2014). Some female survivors have disclosed that they were transferred to more than 20 places within a short period of time.

Similar to the dislocation of cultural ties and orchestrated social profiling and disempowerment factors, the aspect of systematic displacement is mostly 'genderless'; both women, girls, men, and children are affected with more or less similar effects or consequences. The following statements depict various aspects of the systematic displacement perpetrated by Boko Haram.

96

P29: Boko Haram fighters led the non-Muslim men and older boys away in two truckloads to Sambisa Forest. I was 16 years old and was with my mother and two sisters trapped in the centre of Chibok, after escaping from Kumamza. We heard thundering barrage of gunfire in the distance. The women were scared that their husbands, brothers and sons had just been killed by the insurgents. That day I learnt to hide my anger and fear. I was taken to the forest with my mother and my younger sister. I was immediately sent to an Islamist school to study the Quran from sunrise to sometimes after sunset in a place called Ajigul in Southern Borno.

P32: ... I seek justice for the innocent violated non-Muslim girls. I seek only justice for my aged father, cousins, and uncle, and finally for those that remains in captivity with the Islamic sect all over.

FGD5 IDPs Camp2 Chibok: ... every family has lost track of some of their relatives, as they are constantly moved from place to place between Sambisa and the Republic of Cameroon.

P32: I saw them [Boko Haram insurgents] taking all of them, about a dozen young women and girls on different occasions. Some of the girls were as young as 9 or 11, and up to age 19 ... by force. Days later, the captors allowed the newly married women and girls to return to the women-prison. They married us by force; we had no choice.

FGD4 Chibok Town: After some days, the headquarter was reclaimed by the locals and the military leaving the surrounding villages/communities that have been earlier displaced at the mercy of Boko Haram terrorists, until now.

FGD6 Chibok Town: On 24 August 2014, Boko Haram fighters captured Gwoza, a town in Southern Borno and declared it the headquarters of the new Islamic caliphate. Subsequently, Chibok communities were overrun, conquered and displaced people as captives ...

From the afore-cited statements, it is clear that Boko Haram perpetrated its systematic displacement project by ensuring that families were broken apart and simultaneously inflicting physical torture and rape. Other participants reflected on this aspect as follows:

P19: In a short space of time in 2014, the Boko Haram took over territories and carried out a deliberate act of ethnic cleansing in North-Eastern Nigeria. They forced thousands of civilians and non-Muslims ethnic minorities who had lived in this region for centuries to abandon their ancestral homes and communities.

FGD4 Maiduguri: The ... Nigerian and neighbouring countries' security forces had fled in the face of the Boko Haram advanced troops, making it easier for the sect to

overrun and take over territories of Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad and leaving innocent residents from minority communities vulnerable.

P27: The terrorists separated us non-Muslim children from our families after killing them. They said we are the future generation of Boko Haram' rijale, brainwashed and told us, we are the 'conquerors for Allah' ...

It is the researcher's view that the following excerpt provides an apt synopsis of the systematic displacement factor.

P38: These frequent changes of locations are directly aimed to scare girls from escaping, by implanting fear, insecurity, and hopelessness. The way in which they move is systematic and intentional. From Nigeria to Cameroon and sometimes to Chad.

P40: ... By separating us from our men and forcibly marrying and impregnating women, Boko Haram makes it clear that the child of the rijale Boko Haram has the status of the 'faithful's' and cannot be non-Muslim. The only way you can re-unite with your husband is by converting to Islam and recruitment into the caliphate fighters. Boko Haram terrorists are preventing another generation of non-Muslims from being born. I had no option than to marry them, I had no choice

It is clear from the above-cited range of participant statements that the simultaneous strategy of separating and traumatising the victims was perpetually carried out by the Boko Haram insurgents in order to displace their victims geographically, while also systematically dislodging them as family units and communities. The researcher is of the view that, to a larger extent, the militia succeeded mostly because of the failure of the security forces, and not because of the victimhood of the captured communities.

5.3.2.4 Sub-theme 4: Child Soldiering, Indoctrination and Deluded Martyrdom

The following excerpts aptly demonstrate the 'weaponisation' of children as soldiers by indoctrinating them into believing that their criminal and barbaric actions were heavenly inspired.

P09: We're being put in there like flock of sheep. Not knowing what tomorrow will be like All is in Sharia. Though, as non-Muslim captive, I don't have that much knowledge, as others. But we fully supported Sharia! blindly. Whatever they said there, we support it, to live.

P27: Many things were given to us to dull our fear, and some were trained as suicide bombers. Many Non-Muslims children converts were sent to the front lines, that when

you're killed at the frontline, you are going to paradise. Martyrs were not afraid of death as they would go to heaven and get 72 virgins.

P08: Most of the insurgents were between the age of 17 to 30, and few were considerably in their 50s. Some of the fighters were captured, converted and compelled to join the group. Lots of them could be considered novice who don't even know the basic tenets of the religion they are defending.

P28: They were pressurized and brainwashed by the insurgents with a combination of barbaric cruelty and lionizing praise as rijale (strongest men) whenever he visited me at Njimiya in Cameroon. He tried repeatedly to run back to his captors, saying he was not really for Nigeria, that he will facilitate my escape with his siblings. The younger ones were taken as 'Al'majiri', living under one Mallam and surviving as beggars on the street and firmly attending Islamic schools as the future generation of jihadist fighters.

P13: Children were taught the meaning of 'No God but Allah' (al-Wala' wal-Bara), which is loyalty and disavowal, and the Takfir (a Muslim who is declared impure, guilty of apostasy) of taghut (tyrant). Children were also taught how 'al'jana' (heaven) will be for faithfuls, who engaged in martyrdom operations. Children were instructed, sent to spy on people and security of target communities. I recall a boy proudly telling me at Bita, that they wanted sending them to a place in Mubi to spy on the civilians and security.

P43: Many non-Muslims boys and girls received detailed lessons and physical training on how to kill. In some camps, the child soldiers were compelled to watch practical videos on beheading, from lifting the victim's head and where to cut their throats ... Learning how to flog or cutting hands, legs or arms as punishment for crimes like theft, betrayals, gossip, adultery or trying to escape from the daular. Some child soldiers were taught how to mercilessly punish those found guilty of disobeying amir's order. Judgement and punishment of offender's usual take place once a week, on Saturdays. If a man is caught having sex with an unmarried girl, the girl would be flogged 100 times, while the man would be buried alive by leaving only the head above the ground. They would then blind fold him and stone him to death. If a woman refused to attend Islamic classes, she will be given 50 lashes. ... common amongst non-Muslim, were refusal to carry guns against their kinsmen, conversion and marrying caliphate fighters.

According to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), the involvement of children in warfare, like child labour, is a violation of both their rights and conventional warfare statutes and protocols. Deluded with a sense of martyrdom and hegemonic religious zeal, the Boko Haram militia obviously regarded such protocols not binding since they were framed by Western 'infidels' and their 'acolytes'. As indicated in the above excerpts, child soldiers were made to believe that the Boko

Haram course was most supreme and higher than any non-Muslim's life. It is unsurprising therefore, that these child soldiers did not disobey immoral and heinous instructions to even murder their own friends, parents, families, and community members they knew in pursuit of a so-called 'higher' purpose for Allah (Abar, 2009; Esposito, 2002; Maiangwa, 2014).

The following participant statements further attest to the role of indoctrination in the creation of child soldiers:

P24: We were indoctrinated in a police training camp at Gwoza. They said is a special training ground for special generation of jihadists. It was tough as it affected our mindset. I remember telling my family after I escaped that they needed to convert and become Muslim too, like me.

P07: Many of the children captured by the BH were trained to become fighters, others serve as spies, scouts, gatemen, and bodyguards. The insurgents also forced us to convert to Islam, in a mass ceremony, involving more than 100 non-Muslim men, women, and children whom the insurgent had taken to Sambisa Forest.

P06: At one side, some teenage girls were forcefully focusing on Islamic studies, while others are receiving training as fighters, to attack women. Because rijale are not permitted to fight with women. And they could as well be sent back as suicide bombers or spies to the very places they were brought up or have sought refuge in.

Rather than serving an entirely military purpose, it is clear that the child soldiers were used as cannon fodder and instruments or weapons of mass destruction of a different type in that, their indoctrinated training enabled relative ease of participation in suicide bombing attacks against civilians. The current reintegration programme by the Nigerian government is a complete demonstration of the fact that these child soldiers ought to be desentisised from their blind allegiance and loyalty to the fallacious religious supremacy propagated by their Boko Haram masters and leaders (Brechenmacher, 2022).

5.3.2.5 Sub-theme 5: Abduction of Non-Muslims

While Boko Haram has taken some victims indiscriminately, other survivors saw it as largely targeting non-Muslim women, girls, and students for abductions, even though the abductions were carried out at different locations. Boko Haram has consistently abducted non-Muslim women and girls and subjecting them to unthinkable horrors, which includes sexual slavery and torture. Thousands of non-Muslims worships centres have been destroyed, children killed, clergies beheaded, villages and fields set on fire by the tens of thousands, with individuals being targeted for their Christian faith alone (Moore & Cooper, 2020:18).

The following statements attest to the fact that abductions were pivotal to Boko Haram's strategy of inflicting maximum pain against those who were not Muslims, while also attempting to suppress freedom of choice.

P31: Mass abductions of school children in this country have been making international headlines lately. It has been very hard for me to watch the news, remembering our abduction at a government school in Chibok, April 2014. It makes me remember how I survived one of the most tormenting experiences a teenager could undergo.

P20: *I, my children and husband, who was a butcher were followed and abducted at Uba town in Southern Borno. They beheaded him immediately so that he can't run away from them. They took me and after a day they went back; burnt down the houses that hosted us and brought my children. They took us to the Islamic caliphate, which according to them is not part of Nigeria, but Islamic country. My children were forced to become Al'majiris and the older one became a caliphate soldier. We were moved to different places within the caliphate.*

P36: They were in hundreds on motorcycles and gun trucks loaded with women and children. The abducted my younger sister and two of her friends and some women and pushed them into the trucks like bags of corn and drove into the forest till date ... They killed the men and ordered us to bury the dead bodies, it is un-Islamic to bury 'kirdi' infidels.

The mere fact of abductions denotes a combination of criminality, coerced conversion, and absence of freewill or freedom of choice to join, or not to join the Boko Haram militia (Kassim, 2015; Nmah & Amanambu, 2017). Boko Haram's resort to such force and coercion also resonates with the aspect of forced marriages highlighted in the nest sub-section.

5.3.2.6 Sub-theme 6: Forced Marriages of Non-Muslim Women and Girls Forced marriages by Boko Haram are further demonstration of the complete disregard of non-Muslims as human beings with rights. This is confirmed by the following participant statements. **P25:** Women and girls who arrived unmarried or who were widowed were not allowed to live independently as single ... young girls, on reaching the age of seven, are taken from their mothers, and were generally forced to live in a place under the custodian of Mallam (Mustadafin), where fighters usually come and choose brides of their choice.

P29: I and my children were forcefully converted to Islam, after they beheaded my husband and put his head on his chest. I refused to marry the killers of my husband for three years. I was under the protection of my nephew (Kibaku-Muslim) who joined the sect with his family and mother. I attempted to escape with my children to avoid a forced marriage at Hau, but we were caught and beaten ... They finally transferred me to Cameroon to a community named Alaba ...

Some of the situations and experiences were paradoxica, such as some survivors who later married their former tormentors:

FGD3, Chibok town: A lot of girls who were engaged or single at the time of abductions still married their suitors, after they returned from captivity. That God has given them the spirits to console and encourage each other. That the only trauma parents and other immediate families of the victims are going through now, are the women and children that are still missing, who have no one they can turn to for comfort and support.

P26: We were brought into a single room forced to repeat the Kalmar sha'hada (Islamic creed) from the Quran, and collectively, we were told that we were converted to Islam and were given the choice of getting married or serve as domestics slaves. Many chose to serve as slaves but that did not stop the insurgents from raping and torturing them. I was forced to marry a fighter before I escaped.

P08: They abducted young girls and forcibly married them I saw them kill people from my village.

The above participant statements amplify the assertion that the commodification of defenceless (and 'choiceless') women and girls - which is not very different from gender-based violence - was a weapon of choice for Boko Haram's immoral conduct. Such practice is diametrically opposed to the notion of religion as an instrument for morality and ethical behaviour. Therefore, forced marriages by Boko Haram should be viewed for what they actually are - a perversion of religion!

Other participants also shared the following views on forced marriages to the Boko Haram insurgents: **P 21:** They forced us to convert to Islam. We couldn't do anything. But while forced marriages and rape have been committed by the insurgent group in Sambisa Forest and Cameroon, they have been less reported in Nigeria's media. And that is the reason why the government don't seem to completely destroy those evil sect members. Women who rejected the Imam's instructions to marry were also ill-treated. The insurgents took some girls to Madagali town, to a place they referred to as a prison. When they eventually brought the girls back after three days, they girls were all traumatized with scars all over their bodies and they became more submissive and married the fighters.

P30: On many occasions, 'amirs' instruct BH fighters to choose girls for marriage, or the fighters forcibly marry the non-Muslim captives to avoid having to pay her dowry. I was taken to Madagali from Sambisa Forest and kept there for two months. We were about 50 girls and three women. A fighter called Gana took me from there to an abandoned compound. He also took another girl, who was around 12 years old; we resisted but they beat us. He took me as his wife by force and was supported by the other fighters. I told him I did not want to marry and tried to resist but they stabbed me with a knife. I was bleeding, I could not do anything to stop him ...

P35: They [captured victims] are the immediate wives of BH fighters. Some Muslims women treated us worse than their husbands did to us. Those women were holding non-Muslim girls for their husbands to assault, rape and torture them. They shall not escape justice. We all wanted them punished too.

Clearly, physical pain and mental torture were once again applied to break the victims will power and capacity to resist. In addition, there is also evidence of collusion by some Muslim women who enabled the beatings and rape to occur. There is also an observation that the paucity of media coverage of these horrific occurrences also became an indirect enabling factor for the Boko Haram malpractices to take place unabated and unknown to the civilized world outside of the forests at which the victims were kept.

Based on the collective impetus of the six sub-themes in this section of the chapter, the researcher concurs that Boko Haram's perpetration of socio-cultural disruptions and injustices were neither accidental nor random (Esposito, 2002; Mohammed, 2010; Okoli & Lortyer, 2014). Rather, these were systematically designed and executed barbarous acts intended to break the defenceless victims in the entirety of their human value system. Weakened thus, the victims were then individually and collectively rendered hopeless and subsequently too weak to resist or fight back in any meaningful manner. While masquerading their Neanderthal murderous instincts as a holy crusade

103

against the non-Muslim 'infidels', the Boko Haram militia demonstrated their purpose to exterminate whole villages through their scorched earth tactics against unarmed and defenceless citizens.

To this end, the next theme refers to socio-economic disenfranchisement or disempowerment as an extension of the extermination motive.

5.3.3 Theme Three: Socio-economic Disenfranchisement/ Disempowerment (Dire Humanitarian Situations of Non-Muslims)

Humanitarian emergencies remain one of the biggest contemporary challenges of the twenty-first century, as it represents a critical threat to the security, health, safety or wellbeing of individuals, community or large group of people:

As indicated earlier in Section 2.2 of this study, attempts to establish an Islamic caliphate in Nigeria are both legendary and historical. Therefore, as an offshoot of the caliphate ideology, Boko Haram merely perpetuates a barbaric attempt to subjugate non-Muslims out of existence. It is in this regard that loss of (non-Muslim) families and unequal social support were identified as another of Boko Haram's scorched earth strategies to deprive the non-Muslim 'out-group' of even the most fundamental aspect of human survival, which is, socio-economic empowerment and access to means of production.

5.3.3.1 Sub-theme 1: Loss of Families and Livelihoods

The collective impetus of both themes 1 and 2 clearly demonstrate the systematic intention to exterminate the non-Muslim section of the Nigerian population. The extermination (genocide or pogrom) is euphemistically disguised as a 'cleansing' by Boko Haram (McKay, 2020; Gundiri, 2022). The following participant statements are indicative of the extent of Boko Haram's agenda of destroying the family system of the non-Muslim communities and even dislodge them from basic survival means such as farming (*shanta-jir yalirki aka sur-njai*).

FGD3, IDPs Camp2 Chibok: ...our situations are very bad; the government gave deaf ear to our pleas, and the enemies [Boko Haram] are looking for us.

FGD1, IDPs Camp 2 Chibok: Years after settling in this IDPs camp, here in Chibok, we have still not received any assistance, including food, clothes or health care. In early March, this year, 2021, a young child died, because of malnourishment.

FGD3 IDPs Camp 1: All that we had is gone. Even before we escaped the onslaught, everything we worked for in life was burnt or carted away. My three children and relatives, my farm, my house, my cattle, and my properties; now I don't have anything as mine. Even if Boko Haram are defeated and we go back, where will I start? No children and no livelihood.

FGD5 IDPs Camp2 Chibok: They have blocked all the chances of the Borno State government and others to give assistance to us. And going back to their ancestral home, Kwamgilari at Danboa, to them is like suicide. It will be a deliberate suicide to go and live in the same place with those Muslims who rejected their kinsmen and embraced strangers just because of religion identity. It is easier to settle in our places of displacement and rebuild our livelihoods than living in the mix of an enemy who is not happy seeing you alive in the war villages and communities they fled ...

FGD4 IDPs Camp2 Chibok: The interventions by humanitarian organisations in areas affected by the Boko Haram insurgency tend to prioritise saving lives, reducing stress and providing relief materials, but ours is the opposite. The violence, persecution and displacement have deprived us of food, health, safety, education and other resources.

FGD3, IDPs Camp2 Chibok: All of us were self-sustained, we never knew anything called begging, and we did not depend on anybody to help us with food, clothes or even land to farm or anything. It was after this Boko Haram onslaught on our communities, and we found ourselves in this condition that we began to realise that a human being can be so helpless and dependent on other people for survival. We never knew anything like this. We are traditionally independent and hardworking ethic communities. For us, if we can have a place to farm, we will be grateful to God, before our return soon.

Undoubtedly, the social upheaval caused by the Boko Haram has excessively robbed the survivors of a peaceful environment in which they were self-reliant people involved in various forms of subsistence farming to earn a living. The lament for effective government intervention against the Boko Haram insurgents is also indicative of the extent of the carnage that engulfed villagers and their mostly agrarian way of life that they were used to. It is also instructive that, while the survivors longed to be return to their former dwellings, there was also a great desire to be separated or placed far away from the former Muslim neighbours whom they now perceived as hostile and complicit in the pogrom against the non-Muslims.

Dapel (2018) and Onuoha (2014) assert that poverty and illiteracy combined, were instrumental and indirect 'recruitment' factors for Boko Haram. In this regard, the researcher concurs that the disintegration of family structures inevitably translates into

the serious collapse of the socio-economic self-reliance accruing from the communal and subsistence ways of living – which Boko Haram sought to annihilate.

5.3.3.2 Sub-theme 2: Selective Social Relief Support

This sub-theme is closely linked to the previous. Socio-economically disadvantaged people are largely dependent on social relief support by government and the non-governmental sector to make ends meet (Kwanashie, 2013). That social relief support was provided selectively, is viewed by the researcher as an indictment on social justice. If anything, social relief constitutes the very form of assistance the survivors required as part of the rebuilding their lives to the pre-Boko Haram era.

The following excerpts reveal the participants' various experiences in the context of social relief support for reviving their previous peace-time lifestyles.

FGD2, IDPs Camp 2 Chibok: The non-Muslim communities have been abandoned by the security forces that were meant to protect them, and people have been struggling to gain any identification or response to the horrors that befell them. As a matter of fact, Nigerian authorities must urgently address this situation. The government is aware of our present situation, **but nothing has been done till now**. For the past 8 years, no political representatives have visited us here in this camp. But during elections the normally asked us to go and cast our votes for them, but they don't assist us as internally displaced persons. Just like you enjoy sleeping with a woman without loving or caring for her.

FGD1 IDPs Camp 2 Chibok: As you can see, we need food assistance. All around us are malnourished children. Some of the women and children go to the town looking for manual jobs of all kinds, some are begging. Some are hawking or selling pure waters to survive. This is a humanitarian situation that is getting worse day-by-day in the whole of Southern Borno. The Nigerian authorities and partners are playing games with people's lives by releasing the terrorist into society ... to continue from where they stopped. It is unfortunate. The humanitarian organizations must act now to support those most in need and ensure this dreadful situation doesn't continue to deteriorate.

FGD5, IDPs Camp 2 Chibok: It Is only 'Osborne' NGO that once visited and distributed these small bags for us. Yes, I can recall clearly, how Dr Manasseh Allen, an indigene, was frustrated by the community elites when he brought a trailer of different foodstuffs and utensils for us here. A group of peoples within the community wanted the foodstuffs channelled through them but he brought it straight to us. Since then, nothing more comes our way.

The participants continued:

P07: People may be afraid to say, but even in camps, in Maiduguri, we were treated differently based on ethnicity and religious identity. Because the moment we enter the camp, all of us started singing worships songs to the glory of Almighty...I believed it was because of our worships song they transferred us to CAN Centre ...

FGD2 IDPs Camp 1: The government takes care of internally displaced persons and survivors at Danboa. In addition, there are a lot of NGO office there, **but nothing here in Chibok**. The whole world knows that the abduction of Chibok school girls in 2014 played a role in luring NGOs to Borno State, but this same community is the least considered when it comes to humanitarian assistance or government intervention, just because of identity.

FGD2, IDPs Camp 2 Chibok: ... we are Kibaku and have been here for eight years as internally displaced persons and survivors of the onslaught, but no government, state or local official has identified or come to our aid. A lot of NGOs are bringing relief materials to people in Danboa, not too far from here, along Sambisa axis, but they denied us here. In places like Ran, NGOs use helicopters to drop foodstuffs to IDPs, but when it comes to Chibok, they will find excuses because we are believed to be the majority infidels. I swear to Almighty God; we are never getting assistance from either our local government or the Borno State government. Even the NGOs will come and speak their grammar and disappear without coming back... some group came and gave us bags and small utensils without food ... We are not receiving assistance as the Muslims in the nearby Danboa communities. And no matter how long we live here, the hosts will continue to treat us as Danboa people, that is our positions as non-Muslims

The participants' statements clearly demonstrate the centrality of 'the non-Muslim factor' even where it was least expected in terms of social relief support to victims of the Boko Haram insurgent. The Chibok non-Muslim communities were subjected to discriminatory provision of social relief merely based on their ethnic identity as well, which allegedly renders them as infidels who are not worthy of even food, the most basic human need. In addition to such denigration and victimisation, they were further re-victimised and taken advantage of by national, state and local politicians and government officials who merely saw them as 'voting fodder'. The fact that government is viewed as 'playing to the gallery' of terrorists by prioritising their release from custody and reintegration to society over the equitable provision of social relief support, could – wrongly or rightfully - be viewed as succumbing to the blackmail and threats of Boko Haram to carry out more massacres if their fighters are not released from custody by the government (Brechemacher, 2018).

With hundreds of non-Muslim men killed or missing, the Kibaku women face uncertainty living in a patrilineal society dominated by men who have not encouraged them politically or economically (Durotoye, 2015). Non-Muslim women need economic support, skills and empowerment training if they are to sustain themselves and their families. This development will make certain that any future marriages union entered are product of choice, rather than a compromise.

Present situations of the minorities in North-East

Long-lasting solutions, peace and security: the major repeated views expressed by all survivors, besides liking the long-lasting solution, is the idea of peace, security and an end to the insurgency. Both encamped and self-settled survivors acknowledged insecurity and the constant onslaught of non-Muslims as the major obstacle to the actualisation of their dream of returning to their ancestral home:

FGD, **Chibok town**: *our worrying mystery is that; extremists are still in control of much* of the territory of southern Borno, particularly Chibok. Most of the communities outside of the town of Chibok are still under BH, no go areas. The extremist could be seen patrolling everywhere within the deserted communities, killing anyone on sight. You cannot even go to farm outside the nearby town or to get firewood. Sometimes the services of Boys (local security network) are required. They are the reason some people go to the farm. We cannot say soldiers do not patrol but people have confidence in the Boys than the soldiers. Even with the 'boys' escort, people must be extremely fast, otherwise they could be attack. More than one hundred people have been killed from 2020 to present, on their farm or while fetching firewood's within the Kibaku-Chibok communities

FGDs, Mbalala ...The surrounding environment is still unsafe. Just two weeks ago a hunter was killed at Kautikari, while on visit and two people were also killed at Komdi on their way to Gwaragulum. Lots of our women were also abducted on the farm or while fetching firewood's." He says, pointing at some IDPs, "those two women with little children recently escaped from the Boko Haram. They are from Chileri, and now here, praying for God intervention, looking for help

Another survivor in the FGD added:

The military conducted a patrol once in almost two months outside the town and pushed the extremist further from Komdi and Kautikari communities' border.

Thenceforth, they did not make any attempt to patrol deeply or extend their operations outside the town to other communities. Is only the Boys (local vigilantes) who usually go out on a routine patrol; they even ambush some BH of recent and recovered some AK47 and other weapons after engaging them, and rescued some villagers," he said "within the town of Chibok, there is peace. But outside the main town, there is no security at all, and the communities deserted" (ibid).

In addition to repeating the views that extremists still control much of the territories, the Nigerian military asserted to have liberated Borno State. All the survivors in this group disclosed that,

FGD, Chibok town ...they do not think the military could end the insurgency and restore normalcy in the area anytime soon

Some encamped survivors said hunger and poverty had taken many lives in their camp:

FGD, Camp 2 Chibok ... A lot of our children died here because we do not have money to take them to hospital. This year (2021) alone, we have buried eight people in this camp resulting from hunger and other health issues. We arrived at this camp with more than fifty aged parents, but only two survived to date. We watched as they died here, because we do not have money to take them to the hospital. Some died out of frustrations and anger. Every sickness that requires more than ten thousand Naira as treatment has led to a lot of people deaths

Another survivor said in the group:

Just last month, one of the dilapidated buildings collapsed and killed a boy instantly. These houses are just like a trap now. And during raining season, we usually sleep standing in this camp as all the building are seriously linking. That is the reason we build these thatched small huts for our children to stay when it is raining. Many of our children are out of school for so long... most of the ones you are seeing goes to the bush and fetch firewood's for sale to acquire uniforms (ibid).

One survivor re-affirmed in the group that...we are Kibaku from different communities, our main problem is that the war is still going on. The military are here within Chibok town, and our villages are far from here and deserted for 9 years now...not even the military had ever attempted going there... the place is dangerous for the them as we are; the war is far from over... and we cannot risk to return by our self to be abducted, or even got killed, by the BH

These views revealed that achieving long-lasting solutions to the problem of insurgency in the north-eastern section of Nigeria would be determined by the practical resolution of the conflict and end of all armed hostilities in the region. As pointed out by a female survivor,

BH had followed and traced a woman to her place as a resident near Madagali in Adamawa and got her killed for taking her children to church after escaping from Sambisa. Based on her narration, even after returning to their ancestral home or local integration, survivors still have concerns over the capability or willingness of the government to prevent future onslaught and displacement and keep the ethnic minorities safe from extremist attacks.

In summation, the repeated occurrences of religious intolerance and extremist violence in North-Eastern Nigeria have been the plague of each ethnic minority community for centuries, causing uncertainty, feeling unsafe, and discrimination. All non-Muslim communities have suffered discrimination in the North-East, as their lives and community's culture and religion face the threat of extinction. One of the most severe effects of this humanitarian crisis, observed, is that *it has redesigned the social geography of the country, making people choose to live in places where their religion constitutes the majority, creating minorities in their turn, with an endless and nurturing idea of we versus them consequential effect. Minorities stays together to become majorities and vice versa. This makes the definition of 'minority' in Nigeria context complex.*

5.3.4 Theme Four: Psychological Devastation of Non-Muslims

Like the previously cited three themes generated in this study, the current (fourth) theme is also characterised by the 'non-Muslim factor' which signifies the relative 'immunity' of the Muslims from the barbaric acts of Boko Haram. Based on the participants' responses to the relevant questions by the researcher, the main theme of the psychological devastation of non-Muslims, the following three sub-themes:

- powerlessness and despondency among the non-Muslim survivors.
- stigmatisation and rejection/ marginalisation of the non-Muslim survivors; and
- traumatisation of the non-Muslim survivors.

5.3.4.1 Sub-theme 1: Powerlessness and Despondency

The state of powerlessness and despondency (*njai akwa bara, kuradunakur, aka kalkuta*) is reflective of the extent to which Boko Haram wielded its (one-sided) power to decide *who* lives and *who* dies, *how* they lived and *how* they died (Okoli & Lortyer, 2014). Such a situation was enabled by the victims' reluctant/ involuntary acceptance of defeat and subjugation by the Boko Haram militia who had instilled extraordinary fear and paranoia among the captured and those not yet captured. Physical torture, orgies of rape, forced marriages, brutal murders, destruction of infrastructure, and burning of buildings and homesteads were some of the methods used to keep people in a perpetual state of the unknown, which is a conducive atmosphere for psychological devastation Gardner, 2011).

The following statement represents the extent and state of fear that characterised Boko Haram's reign of terror.

P29: ... Many people have resettled somewhere far, for fear of being abducted.

The following participant statements allude to the state of powerlessness and despondency (hopelessness) experienced by the Boko Haram victims and survivors:

FGD6, IDPs Camp 2 Chibok: There is one thing, Nigerian government is always good at, 'empty promises; whether we later go back home or stayed here and integrate is all unconditional. If we may even go back to our ancestral home, we will remain homeless and unsafe; if we stay here, for how long would that be?

P41: Three weeks after my abduction, I was compelled to married one of the insurgent's top commanders. I accepted because I have no choice, after going through hell of tortures. As a commander's wife, sometimes he will go to war with the rijale frontline fighters and when he comes back at night, he will narrate the stories of the mission to me. Whenever, the mission was successful, they usually distribute money to the fighters as bonus besides salaries to boost their morale ...

P32: I spent 11 months in one of the BH camps inside Sambisa Forest ...Lots of us were in severe physical pain, sexually transmitted diseases, pregnancies, and unhealthy conditions. Women who declined to marry fighters were humiliated and beaten while others were compelled and deployed with improvised explosive device (IEDs) on suicide missions against their will as punishment for their action. A lot of girls are kept as sex slaves, and many became pregnant.

P35: I don't know what hell fire is like, but a day in Boko Haram captivity may be worse than hundred days there for a non-Muslims captive.

The consequent fatalistic attitudes among many of the survivors (as exemplified above) emphasized the risk of governmental failures such as corruption, bigotry, nepotism on humanitarian assistance and infrastructural development within the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno State (Durotoye, 2015; Koubi & Bohmelt, 2014; Kwanashie, 2013).

5.3.4.2 Sub-theme 2: Stigmatisation and Rejection/ Marginalisation of the Non-Muslim Survivors

There was commonplace stigma associated with rape within the non-Muslim communities, and the fear of being rejected by families and communities for women and girls who disclosed the sexual abuses suffered (*nglaji, sur silai, ba bwanai ban tun ji kura mslum tara ada wula*). To that extent, this sub-theme is viewed as having a close link to the sub-theme discussed in sub-section 5.3.1.3 (gender-based violation or sexual slavery of non-Muslim women and girls.

The following participant statements are reflective of the stigmatisation and rejection/ marginalisation experienced by the non-Muslim survivors:

P02: Our situation has been annoying because of marginalization and social injustice; in practice however, freedom of religion is severely impeded by intolerance (Su nam tu nji kura-mslum ada wula akwa Borno).

P09: There has been an increasing trend of embracing stricter Islamic values in Borno for long; non-Muslims, who are regarded as second-class citizens by the majority Muslim 'Kanuri's' faced increased pressure and social marginalization. They told us while, in captivity that, sharia is bigger than the constitution [of Nigeria].

P03: Particularly in Maiduguri, the capital city, with substantial number of non-Muslim in schools, however, the government do not seem to employ Christian religion teachers in schools.

P12: Non-Muslims candidates are denied professional courses of their choices despite meeting up the expected academic qualifications. It is by God's grace for a non-Muslim to have admission in desired professional courses:

P20: I spent weeks in camp after our escape, but the most disturbing thought was how I would be received by my family or community. The fear of being rejected initially stopped me from talking about my experiences and other non-Muslim women and girls. But cautiously, as I heard about the stories of other Boko Haram survivors, I began to open up. I always recall how my village was burnt down, the slaughtering of men, and putting their heads on the chest, and the nightmares of hundreds of innocent women and girls who have been abducted by those devils, could not get out of my head.

In the context of the participants' statements, stigmatisation generally reflected the projection of the shame and disgrace of sexually perpetrated violence against the non-Muslim women and girls. As such, the stigma was both internal and external in its manifestation. Internal stigmatisation reflected the inward shame the victims felt for themselves from the heinous acts of gang rapes and subsequent childbirths of 'fatherless' children. The external stigmatisation could be viewed as the shame the communities felt for itself for the violation or 'rape' of its age-old mores and values relating to sexual intercourse. It was as though the Boko Haram bandits had literally spit on these time-honoured norms.

Some participants concealed the abuses they suffered and were 'dying' a slow death for fear of the negative social consequences for revealing the actual identities of some of the Boko Haram rapists whom they knew.

5.3.4.3 Sub-theme 3: Trauma and Re-traumatisation

According to the data from the interviews, the situation of non-Muslim communities in Borno state has been noticeably traumatic since the Boko Haram insurrection. In fact, the survivors collectively revealed that the Boko Haram insurgents have instilled so much paranoia, defeatism (hopelessness)and distrust in the hearts of non-Muslims, that they no longer even trusted their own fellow Muslim compatriots, let alone the government and its state and local apparatus.

The following participant statements demonstrate the extent of emotional distress and suffering experienced, whose re-occurrence or repetition also signifies the heartlessness of the Boko Haram perpetrators.

FGD3, Maiduguri: My children were so afraid whenever the hear Muslims call to prayers at Jos, they slept with their hands over their ears. Even now, some of my children still run to me whenever they hear a "bang" sound.

P41: The Boko Haram forcefully took us, kept us as captives, and forcibly married us against our will. What pained me the most is seeing my own daughter also being sexually violated and married, and I couldn't do anything to help her out. Consoling her was even hard for me. I didn't know how to encourage her because I'm undergoing same as well. I also went through such a horrible experience and we both have babies for Boko Haram fighters.

P31: I could not sleep for a week when I heard about what happen to Leah, because I didn't want her to go through what we went through at the hands of those wicked souls. I always panic and get scared whenever I hear gunshots, even from afar.

FGD2 Chibok Town: Most of the Chibok school girl's parents are traumatised; others were forced to withdraw their children from schools at a time.

FGD6 Chibok Town: 57 of the schoolgirls immediately escaped from the terrorists by jumping out of the trucks on which they were conveyed to the forest ... the experience was devastating and traumatic to the entire students and our people; my father was admitted in the hospital. After my escape from the truck, I spent some days in the bush without eating, with a broken hand and twisted ankle.

The above statements show that traumatization was neither accidental nor isolated. In fact, it is represented as the ultimate and consequent expression of the suffering alternative to death. Both young and old, male, and female victims were subjected to a process of physically inflicted pain, followed by emotional trauma triggered by the visualisation of all known forms of destruction of the human body and rendering the soul lifeless even before the actual death. The following statements further illustrate the manifestation and effects of the Boko Haram induced trauma:

FGD1, IDPs Camp2 Chibok: ...how can you easily forget someone that led an enemy to you? Killed your husband, burnt down the houses, carted away food stuffs and valuables, and abducted your women, girls and children for religious reasons?

P21: ... I can't sleep at night because I remember how Boko Haram were beheading those that refused conversion to Islam, and how they were raping me and other girls. I want to forget about it, but I can't, the memories always come. I want to travel far until things get better; I don't want to be abducted again.

P13: A pregnant woman was forced to marry a fighter in a village near Gwoza; she pleaded, as her pregnancy was clearly obvious. She then spit in the face of the fighters, which is usual for pregnant women but was punished by BH fighters One of the foreign fighters was angry with the incident, he became overwhelmingly disgusted and decided to flee the group. He opposed the leader, that the act was un-Islamic. When BH 'amir' asked me to marry one of them, I refused and told them that as now a convert, I must mourn my parents and siblings, whom they killed with all the other men in my community and on the way to Sambisa. I sound worthless, how could I imagine marrying any of such wicked men, killers of my parents and siblings? However, I saw the preferential treatment the Boko Haram wives received, no tortures and abuses. My life experiences in captivity were hell!

From the above-cited participant statements, it is evident that the survivors' recollection of mainly the sexual violations and brutalization constituted a major cause of traumatization. The fact that such memories were recurrent, also caused re-traumatisation as the memories did not simply 'evaporate' or fade away. Barkindo et al. (2013), Human Rights Watch (2014) and Joachim (2005), all attest to the fact that the traumatisation of survivors - especially the women and girls - was a distinct reminder of the extent of Boko Haram's denigration, dehumanisation, brutalisation, and sexual violence meted against these defenceless members of society.

5.3.5 Theme Five: Current State/ Recovery and Coping from Psychological Devastation

This last sub-theme emanates from the previous three psychological devastation subthemes (i.e., powerlessness, stigmatisation, and traumatisation). In that regard, the current state and recovery sub-theme is prognostic and is intended to reveal the survivors' and victims' worldview. That is, whether their experiences have changed their view of life and humanity (Frechette et al. 2020). Survivors usually underwent medical examinations and mental (psychological)_evaluation after an escape or rescue from the Boko Haram camps. Following their recovery, they were then released by the military to join other internally displaced persons in the designated camps.

Accordingly, the following statements by the participants reflect their current (posttraumatic) state and coping from the psychological devastation induced by Boko Haram's inhumane strategies and tactics:

P26: Even those who were not captured during the onslaught of BH, are still suffering from the carnage. I still cannot believe that I am alive. My family said they were afraid of me when I first came back from Boko Haram captivity. They told me I often woke up the family in the middle of the night screaming ...

It is most instructive from the above statement that post-traumatic behaviours and disorders were experienced by both the survivors and their next-of-kin who were not captured at all. Such a state of affairs is also testimony to the disruptive effect and consequence of the Boko Haram mayhem on family units and structures because those who were captured could only long for those left behind. Similarly, those left behind always worried about the wellbeing of their captured loved ones (Barkindo et al., 2013; Bell, 2005; Kohli et al., 2014).

Other participants contributed thus:

P10: Meeting my family at Jos, reminded me of the old feelings as they received me with open arms. A lot of people came from different churches and prayed for me. That changed my thought very much. This is what you can't get in camps at Maiduguri. It reminded me of love and my life at Kwada before the Boko Haram attacks. We used to play with friends and go with my parents to the farms.

P13: All I hope for and believe in is that one day I will be able to give evidence to the authorities about what I and others like me experienced. Sometimes I think as if my life has long ended.

P28: After the first abducted girls escaped from Boko Haram captivity in 2014, the church and community leaders called on members of the community not to reject or de-associate themselves from women and girls who had been victims of abduction and other violations at the hands of the insurgents ... that they should welcome them [survivors] back, care and support them.

P11: A certain international non-governmental organisation invited some survivors to participate in a project and become a community peacebuilder... to reduce stigmatisation against women and girls and to work towards greater social cohesion and re-integration. After the second day of training session, my father's brother deeply regretted his actions and reconcile with me. The training sessions obviously served as an eye opener for him and others who rejected their own for something, he had no control over.

P21: Women and girls are still struggling to forget the stigma they face from their time in BH captivity, but they are now hopeful about re-building a peaceful future. I'm beginning to see changes already in my life, because of the workshops, International Alert has done. I believe with more of such, the stigma towards women who experienced Boko Haram atrocities and violations will completely vanish and someday our lives will become normal again. The counselling session we have been provided by the International Alert had really helped me to have an inner peace.

Extrapolated from the above excerpts is that the participants display some residual effects of the psychological devastation they suffered. However, there is recognition of the need to be hopeful of a better future. Such hope is inspired and reinvigorated by the warm welcome and reunification efforts by their respective communities, as well as the reintegration efforts of the non-governmental sector. Notwithstanding, the following participant's statement indicates the difficulty of forgiveness, but acceptance of coping strategies provided:

P28: I want my voice to be heard all over the world. Do not blame me and other survivors for what we been through, as what I went through is the most unforgettable experience of my life. I thank God that, sharing my experience with my people here in Chibok, the way they respond and support me, keeps me stronger" she said. "But deep down am not happy spiritually, because I expected more from the Church, in times of counselling and divine forgiveness.

P26: I attended a UNICEF supported peer to peer support group where survivors of gender-based violence undergoes psychosocial and emotional support session to cope with the trauma they went through, but most significantly, today I have a reason to smile again as a human being. I can now joke and smile, I can even boldly and fearlessly, pass a group of men coming my way without running away or panicking at their sight. What a new beginning. I want the world to know about the atrocities, trafficking and torment, hoping my story will help bring about the actions that might save others who were captured by Boko Haram and whose whereabouts are still unknown.

The following participant's statement captures the wherewithal for the survivors' recovery and coping mechanisms:

P28: My major needs are divine prayers, to free my guilt of forcefully converting to Islam; food and farmland to take care of my fatherless children and if possible, a house to live in.

The unprecedented scale and scope of the Boko Haram violence against non-Muslim Nigerians was economically ruinous and socio-culturally divisive (Brannan et al., 2001; Dapel, 2018; Intersociety, 2020). Several non-Muslim women and girls who were held captive in the Boko Haram *daulars* killed themselves by swallowing poison before they could be forcibly married to the Boko Haram militia in the Sambisa Forest, where Kibaku women and girls were gathered, tortured, raped and forcibly married off. As such, the physical, emotional and psychological scars on both the survivors and communities at large are indelible. Based on the above-cited excerpts, it is evident that the social cohesion and national reconciliation project requires protracted interventions that are of individual, familial, community, and national benefit (Cocks, 2011).

Therefore, it is the researcher's contention that any 'piecemeal approach' to the mammoth task of healing the Nigerian nation would be inimical to addressing the current recovery state and coping mechanisms by the victims and survivors to heal from the untold psychological devastation that has been unleashed by Boko Haram.

5.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter largely expounded on the four themes derived from the analysed findings of the study. The first 3 (three) themes could be viewed in this study as diagnostically associated with the research problem (see Section 1.3). Similarly, the fourth and final theme could be viewed as prognostic insofar as it integrates the religious, sociocultural and socio-economic aspects of the Boko Haram genocidal violence against non-Muslim Southern Borno as part of charting viable options for both individual and national healing and reconciliation (Cocks, 2011).

Evidence of the cornucopia of Boko Haram crimes against the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno was empirically obtained and profiled in this chapter, while more voluminous first-hand details by the participants is kept safely due to limitations of space. All the sub-themes reflected in Table 5.1 constitute war crimes. Virtually all the atrocities and violations documented in various parts of this study constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity, which includes sexual slavery, torture, and rape. Moreover, Boko Haram abducted and enslaved hundreds of non-Muslims, which includes children and the aged (Jones, 2020).

In addition to sharing their experiences, the Boko Haram survivors also provided crucial information relating to fundamental humanitarian aspects; namely, their inhuman treatment in the Boko Haram camps, as well as relevant reconnaissance information for the Nigerian government and its security apparatus to pursue in actual military engagements against the Boko Haram insurgents. It is not far-fetched to deduce that the current rescue and social relief efforts are insufficient from the participants' (survivors') viewpoints.

The researcher concludes that the Boko Haram survivors' fortitude provides the most fundamental lesson of the indefatigable human spirit to prevail against the most formidable of obstacles and challenges. It is through their fortitude that they had to overcome the state and condition of victimhood, stigmatisation, rejection and marginalisation to let the whole world know about the darkest places the human soul can inhabit as represented by Boko Haram. To this end, the Nigerian government owes it to these victims and survivors, and to humanity by seriously and unpretentiously destroying the darkest places of the human soul as inhabited by Boko Haram and its pretentious and fanatical religious hallucinations.

The next chapter concludes the study by summarising the main findings, conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter presented the converged actual findings emanating from both the interviews and focus group discussions between the researcher and his participants. It is precisely in the context of these findings that the evidential basis or framework of the study was developed (Blaxter, Hughes, & Tight, 2008; Fink, 201). Meanwhile, the current chapter essentially presents a synopsis of the very findings insofar as they relate directly to the main purpose and questions that the researcher initially sought to answer. In this regard, the first part of this chapter a synopsis of the findings is integrated in accordance with the 4 (four) main thematic areas of discussion generated through a protracted analysis of the findings presented in the preceding chapter (Chapter Five).

Following thereafter is the contribution of this research, an outline of a range of recommendations proposed by the researcher, as well as the implications of the findings to the study, and the researcher's own concluding remarks.

6.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND THEIR ATTAINMENT

The main purpose of the study is:

To explore, describe and analyse the Boko Haram insurgency in North-Eastern Nigeria against non-Muslim communities, as well as implications of the humanitarian crisis this unprecedented insurgency has created.

The concomitant research objectives are (see Section 1.8):

- To explore, describe and analyse the levels of the Boko Haram's religiously inspired genocide and brutality against the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno State.
- To explore and describe the socio-cultural context and disruptive effects of Boko Haram's violence against the non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State.
- To explore and describe the socio-economic ramifications and humanitarian impacts of the genocidal attacks by Boko Haram against the non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State.

- To explore, describe and analyse the psycho-social manifestation and impact of the Boko Haram attacks on the non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State; and
- To explore and describe possible future scenarios for the Boko Haram survivors' Muslim and non-Muslim relationships in Southern Borno.

Pursuant to the above objectives, the research questions were concomitantly articulated thus (see Section 1.9):

- What are the observed levels of the Boko Haram religiously inspired genocide and brutality against the non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State?
- What are the socio-cultural factors and implications of the Boko Haram violence against non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State?
- What are the known socio-economic ramifications and humanitarian impacts of the genocidal attacks by Boko Haram against the non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State?
- What is the psycho-social manifestation and ramifications of the Boko Haram attacks on the nom-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State?
- Which are the possible future scenarios for the Boko Haram survivors' Muslim and non-Muslim relationships in Southern Borno?

Table 6.1 below is a depiction of the relevant research objective (RO) and its associated research question (RQ), as well as the themes and sub-themes or categories to which they relate or are as far as they serve as indications of the extent to which each of the study's objectives were attained or achieved.

Research Objectives & Associated Research Questions	Associated Themes	Sub-themes/ Categories
RO1: To explore, describe and analyse the levels of the Boko Haram's religiously inspired genocide and brutality against the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno State. RQ1: What are the observed levels of the Boko Haram religiously inspired genocide and brutality against the non-Muslim	Religious Context and Ramifications of Boko Haram Insurgency	Religious intolerance and coercion/ Forced conversion to Islam Targeted mass killing of, and genocide against non- Muslims Gender-based violation (sexual slavery) of non- Muslim women and girls

 Table 6.1: Thematic link to attainment of study objectives

Research Objectives &	Associated	Sub-themes/ Categories
Associated	Themes	
Research Questions		
communities in Southern Borno		
State?		
RO2: To explore and describe	Socio-cultural	Dislocation of cultural ties
the socio-cultural context and	Disruptions and Injustices	Orchestrated social profiling
disruptive effects of Boko		and disempowerment
Haram's violence against the	-	Systematic displacement
non-Muslim communities in		Child soldiering,
Southern Borno State.		indoctrination, and deluded
RQ2: What are the socio-cultural		martyrdom
factors and implications of the		Abduction of non-Muslims
Boko Haram violence against		Forced marriages of non-
non-Muslim communities in		Muslim women and girls
Southern Borno State?		
RO3: To explore and describe	Socio-economic	Loss of families and
the socio-economic ramifications	Disenfranchisem	livelihoods
and humanitarian impacts of the	ent/	Selective social relief support
genocidal attacks by Boko Haram	Disempowermen	
against the non-Muslim	t	
communities in Southern Borno		
State.		
RQ3: What are the known socio-		
economic ramifications and humanitarian impacts of the		
genocidal attacks by Boko Haram		
against the non-Muslim		
communities in Southern Borno		
State?		
RO4: To explore, describe and	Psychological	Powerlessness and
analyse the psycho-social	Devastation	despondency among the non-
manifestation and impact of the	Derdetation	Muslim survivors
Boko Haram attacks on the non-		Stigmatisation and rejection/
Muslim communities in Southern		marginalisation of the non-
Borno State; and		Muslim survivors
To explore and describe possible		Trauma and re-traumatisation
future scenarios for the Boko		of the non-Muslim survivors
Haram survivors'		
RQ4: What is the psycho-social		
manifestation and ramifications of		
the Boko Haram attacks on the		
nom-Muslim communities in		
Southern Borno State?	_	
RO5: To explore and describe	Current state/ Recovery and coping mechanisms of the non-Muslim survivors	
possible future scenarios for the		
Boko Haram survivors' Muslim		
and non-Muslim relationships in		
Southern Borno.		

Research Objectives & Associated Research Questions	Associated Themes	Sub-themes/ Categories
RQ5: Which are the probable future scenarios for the Boko Haram survivors' Muslim and non-Muslim relationships in Southern Borno?		

6.2.1 Attainment of Objective 1

As indicated in Table 6.1, the first research objective and its associated research question are:

RO1: To explore, describe and analyse the levels of the Boko Haram's religiously inspired genocide and brutality against the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno State.

RQ1: What are the observed levels of the Boko Haram religiously inspired genocide and brutality against the non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State?

The first objective was attained, as demonstrated in sub-sections 5.3.1.1 to 5.3.1.3; that is, in respect of the religious intolerance and coercion/ forced conversion to Islam, targeted mass killing of, and genocide against non-Muslims, as well as Gender-based violation (sexual slavery) of non-Muslim women and girls.

6.2.2 Attainment of Objective 2

As depicted in Table 6.1, the second research objective and its associated research question are:

RO2: To explore and describe the socio-cultural context and disruptive effects of Boko Haram's violence against the non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State.

RQ2: What are the socio-cultural factors and implications of the Boko Haram violence against non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State?

The second objective was achieved, as demonstrated in sub-sections 5.3.2.1 to 5.3.2.6; that is, in respect of dislocation of cultural ties; orchestrated social profiling and disempowerment; systematic displacement; child soldiering, indoctrination, and deluded martyrdom; abduction of non-Muslims; and forced marriages of non-Muslim women and girls.

6.2.3 Attainment of Objective 3

As shown in Table 6.1, the third research objective and its associated research question are:

RO3: To explore and describe the socio-economic ramifications and humanitarian impacts of the genocidal attacks by Boko Haram against the non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State.

RQ3: What are the known socio-economic ramifications and humanitarian impacts of the genocidal attacks by Boko Haram against the non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State?

This third objective was optimally achieved, as demonstrated in sub-sections 5.3.3.1 to 5.3.3.2; that is, in respect of loss of families and livelihoods; and selective social relief support.

6.2.4 Attainment of Objective 4

As shown in Table 6.1, the fourth research objective and its associated research question are:

RO4: To explore, describe and analyse the psycho-social manifestation and impact of the Boko Haram attacks on the non-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State

RQ4: What is the psycho-social manifestation and ramifications of the Boko Haram attacks on the nom-Muslim communities in Southern Borno State?

This fourth objective was sufficiently achieved, as demonstrated in sub-sections 5.3.4.1 to 5.3.4.3; that is, with ample indications of powerlessness and despondency among the non-Muslim survivors, stigmatisation and rejection/ marginalisation of the non-Muslim survivors; as well as trauma and re-traumatisation of the non-Muslim survivors.

6.2.5 Attainment of Objective 5

As indicated in Table 6.1, the fifth and final research objective and its associated research question are:

RO5: To explore and describe possible future scenarios for the Boko Haram survivors' Muslim and non-Muslim relationships in Southern Borno.

RQ5: Which are the probable future scenarios for the Boko Haram survivors' Muslim and non-Muslim relationships in Southern Borno?

This fifth objective was satisfactorily achieved, as demonstrated in sub-section 5.3.5; that is, with sufficient proof or evidence of experiences relating to the current state of recovery and coping mechanisms of the non-Muslim survivors.

6.3 MAIN CONCLUSIONS

The main conclusions in this chapter accrue from both the study objectives and main themes of the findings as cogently established and synoptically presented in Table 6.1. Furthermore, it is based on these below-stated main conclusions that the researcher's own framework of the recommendations was developed (Creswell, 2014; Matua & Van Der Wal, 2015).

6.3.1 Religious Context and Ramifications of Boko Haram Insurgency

As indicated earlier, the main conclusions arrived at by the researcher demonstrate the symbiotic link of the research objectives and questions with the main findings as presented in Chapter Five. Therefore, the main conclusions herein are neither a restatement nor a rehash of the already mentioned findings, but an emphasis of the core messages entailed in each of the main findings and their corresponding themes (Matua & Van Der Wal, 2015).

6.3.1.1 Genocide Against Non-Muslims

In terms of the Rome Statute (1988), "genocide" is situated within the intentional mass murder or killing of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, resulting in serious bodily or mental harm to the particular group; intentionally inflicting life conditions calculated to induce large-scale physical destruction; (d) imposing measures that are intended to prevent births from occurring within the targeted group; or enforced transference of children of the targeted group to another group.

The findings of the study also established clearly and convincingly that genocide was committed by Boko Haram insurgents against the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno state in Northern Nigeria. It is obvious that Boko Haram has intentionally killed hundreds of non-Muslims as part of its campaign to rid the Northern Nigeria of the so-called infidels (Mohammed, 2004; 2010). As it is, the International Christian Concern (2020:1) revealed that, "between 50,000 and 70,000 non-Muslims have been murdered in cold blood, in the last decade in Nigeria, the

most populous Black nation on the continent by the Boko Haram and other jihadists".

Non-Muslims were executed on sight or capture in Chibok by Boko Haram insurgents shouting "Allah-Akbar", their corpses strewn everywhere. In 2014, the Boko Haram 'rijale' summarily shot, stoned or burnt alive hundreds of non-Muslim men and teenage boys when the victims refused to convert to Islam in places such as Bwarakila, Kuburmbula, Kwada, Gatamarwa, Kagilmari, Kwatiya, Bwaftari, Kautikari, Kuburivu, and Bulakar. Furthermore, nothing was ever heard of the non-Muslim males who were captured and led away in 2014. Also, the researcher was told by the participants about large mass graves in Madagali, where over four thousand non-Muslims were said to have been buried in 2014. Many of the non-Muslim residential areas are still deserted to date. Many more gory details could be discovered after the Boko Haram war on civilians.

6.3.1.2 Gender-based Violation of Non-Muslim Women and Girls

Women and girls have been particularly selected for sexual violence and abuses, based solely on the fact that they were non-Muslims. The brutality, magnitude and devastating effects of these acts, as well as the level at which they are inflicted on non-Muslim women and girls shows Boko Haram's hatred and clear intentions of destroying the non-Muslim communities. The crimes committed against non-Muslim women and girls are perpetrated largely based on their religious identity, which the insurgents regarded as 'kirdi' (infidels). As such, Boko Haram allocated itself the 'holy' mission of proselytising the non-Muslims forcefully convert them to Islam (Okoli & Lortyer, 2014). Consequently, the women and girls should be forced to marry Muslim men according to Islamic doctrines. Those who refused were subjected to chilling forms of 'punishment', including being sent on suicide missions with incendiary devices and explosives strapped to their bodies.

The systematic sexual enslavement and violations against the non-Muslim women and girls later resulted in sexual dysfunctionality, such as indifference in sexual relationships and any contact with men. For the younger females (girls) to whom rape was their first experience of sex; where the traumatic sexual violence occurred over a long period at the hands of multiple men, it is not inconceivable that difficulties would be experienced in future sexual relations and general issues concerning sex (Joachim,

2005). For instance, a participant disclosed that some non-Muslim women and girls under treatment did not want to marry, or even consider relationships with men anymore, and at any point in their lives, based on the impression that they had lost their honour and virginity.

Therefore, the rapes being committed by the Boko Haram insurgents constituted calculated measures to prevent procreation within the Southern Borno non-Muslim communities. The ICTR (1999) intimated that systematic measures put in place to prevent births within a national, religious, ethnic or racial group (e.g., separation of the genders, rape and impregnation of a woman to prevent distinct group identity or lineage, sexual mutilation, coerced sterilisation for birth control, prohibition of marriages; do constitute genocide.

6.3.2 Socio-cultural Disruptions and Injustices

6.3.2.1 Systematic Displacement and Dislocation of Cultural Ties

Generally, Boko Haram's worldview is situated within the extreme hatred of non-Muslims (Je'Adayibe, 2018; Kassim, 2015; Langer et al., 2017). As such, the disruption of the social cohesion of those they hated served the purpose of not recognising their existence. Unsurprisingly, the first act of Boko Haram on abducting non-Muslims in 2014 was to separate women from their men. It seems most of the abducted non-Muslim Nigerians were taken to countries such as Cameroon and Chad, where they were forcefully married off to the foreign 'rijale' (Opera News, 2019).

Before these abductions, hundreds of non-Muslim men and boys were killed on capture. Non-Muslim women who were once under the control of Boko Haram, are kept separately from their husbands and other non-Muslim men. The only exception to this permanent separation has been through reunion of 'converted/recruited' non-Muslim men and their wives in Sambisa Forest. Boko Haram forcibly transfers non-Muslim children in two ways, depending on their gender. Young girls, on reaching the age of seven, are forcefully taken away from their mothers and placed under the custody of Mallam 'Mustadafin', where some would be married off or sold as sex slaves to foreign Boko Haram fighters in Cameroon of Chad.

Non-Muslim boys, once they reach the age of three, are also taken forcibly from their mothers and groomed for Boko Haram training bases in the Sambisa Forest or

Cameroon. They are indoctrinated on Islam from the perspectives of the Boko Haram Imams. They also receive training on how to fight, behead and mutilate, after which these 'converted' non-Muslim boys fight in the frontlines as part of the Boko Haram 'rijale' forces. Through such 'religious domestication', Boko Haram deliberately intends to systematically destroy non-Muslim children's concept of themselves, and to completely 'wipe off' any sense of themselves as Christians and traditionalists (Maiangwa, 2014; Malachy, 2014). The term 'forcibly' is not confined to physical force, but includes threats of force or coercion, such as by fear of violence, detention, duress, psychological oppression, or abuse of power and coercion (ICC, 2011; Olaniyi, 2020).

Captured non-Muslim women, girls and children (including infants), were systematically afforded little sleep, food and water, do not receive medical care, and are seriously beaten if they failed to obey rules. Boko Haram and its 'rijale' (fighters) intentionally impose these conditions with a designed outcome that such conditions, especially when inflicted constantly over a long period of time, would eventually lead to the slow deaths of non-Muslim women, girls and children.

6.3.2.2 Forced Marriages of Non-Muslim Women and Girls

The severity of forced marriages of non-Muslim women and girls held captive by Boko Haram in their 'daular' is amply demonstrated by the fact that many of these non-Muslim women and girls killed themselves before they could be forcibly married to the Boko Haram fighters. Some ingested poison to commit suicide than face the daunting spectre of involuntarily entering such a 'marital' arrangement. Boko Haram's consistent rape, sexual slavery and forced marriages of the non-Muslim women and girls also constitute genocide by intentionally inflicting conditions of life designed to bring about the destruction of non-Muslims communities as ethnic minority groups (Olaniyi, 2020.

The consequences of rape and other sexual violations committed by Boko Haram are particularly damaging in non-Muslim cultures, where a female could be considered unsuitable for marriage if she has been raped or is pregnant with a child by another man. Virginity and celibacy before marriage are crucial cultural and religious factors in these communities.

6.3.3 Socio-economic Disenfranchisement/ Disempowerment

Durotoye (2015) asserts that the Boko Haram insurgency has introduced dire humanitarian situations which threaten Nigeria's efforts towards achieving sustainable political and economic development and sustainability. Through the assertions made by several participants, this study has determined that Boko Haram has perpetrated, and continues to commit morally prohibited acts of intentionally denying and/ or preventing in whole or in part, non-Muslims' socio-economic progress and development with the destruction of their family systems and structures as the core and centre of such development. By abducting and separating families and destroying their property and livelihoods, Boko Haram is necessarily involved in a scorched-earth pogrom designed to annihilate any possible means of communities rebuilding their lives in the foreseeable future (Abar, 2019; Kpughe, 2017).

By systematically beating, torturing and forcing the non-Muslim men and boys to labour in pain, the Boko Haram machinery was also ensuring that the backbone of socio-economic recovery was incapacitated because the maimed bodies of the male victims (if they survived death) would not be of any significant value for agrarian lifestyles and livelihoods that depended on the physical labour and strength of those who lives and livelihoods relied on subsistence farming (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012; Pricopi, 2016). Non-Muslim women need socio-economic support and other empowerment skills training if they are to sustain themselves and their children. This development will make certain that any future marriage union entered are a product of choice, rather than a compromise arrangement to pacify the male chauvinistic ego feeding on unilaterally imposed cultural and traditional protectionism.

6.3.4 Psychological Devastation on the Non-Muslim Victims and Survivors

Boko Haram has been known for consistently capturing, raping and sexually violating women and girls whom they considered to be disposable property. The experiences of the participants from the findings show that the massive atrocities committed by Boko Haram in its array of brutality included (but not limited to) physical tortures, forced displacement, gang rape and forced marriages, as well as forced conversion to Islam. Such practices against non-Muslim women and girls, causing serious psychological devastation or mental harm. Such harm and mental grief were aggravated by torturous tactics such as systematically separating wives from their husbands, children from their mothers, forcefully taking their daughters into sexual slavery, male children

forcefully indoctrinated and enlisted into Boko Haram frontline fighting units; as well as being forced either to witness their executions or to watch them being mistreated and taken to unknown destinations. Boko Haram fighters systematically raped and sexually abused non-Muslim women and girls as young as ten.

The ensuing trauma was even exacerbated by actions such as mothers being raped in front of their daughters, and vice versa. In the long-term, the bodily and sexual violence, along with the serious mental wounds which non-Muslim women and girls over the age of seven endured at the hands of Boko Haram, inflicted severe bodily and mental suffering on the survivors. One of the participants gave a chilling account of the ordeals they were forced to endure and stated: "It is also permissible to have intercourse with a female slave who hasn't reached puberty stage, if she is fit for intercourse; but if she is not clearly fit for sexual relationships, then it is alright to enjoy her without sex". The consequences of physical and mental wounds that Boko Haram inflicted on captured non-Muslim females surpassed the act of rape itself. From the views of the survivors and perpetrators, captured non-Muslim women and girls are subjected to unabated sexual violence in a climate of impunity and judicial dysfunctionality (Reeve, 2014; Gundiri, 2022).

The usual threats executions, being beaten, assaulted and tied to a tree, and the unbated denigration of non-Muslims as 'kirdi' (dirty infidels,) amount to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. Furthermore, Boko Haram sought to extend its 'psychological cleansing' and totally rid the Northern Nigeria non-Muslims of any perceivable sense of identity as a distinct ethnic and religious (non-Muslim) group through war crimes such as: forced conversions and indoctrination; training and watching videos containing inhuman war practices such as beheading and suicide bombings. By intentionally inflicting serious pain and mental suffering on the non-Muslim women and girls they held in captivity, all of whom were civilians, Boko Haram has perpetrated the war crimes of torture, harsh treatment, and upon infringements on personal liberty and freedom (Bensuda, 2020; Jones, 2021; Rome Statute, 1988).

In addition to the Boko Haram orgies of rape, the atrocious and rampant impregnation caused serious psychological damage to the non-Muslim women and girls who were compelled to give birth and bear children of their ruthless assailants (Shekau, 2012). For instance, the non-Muslim survivors and victims were psychologically scarred by

the very idea of single-handedly parenting children whose fathers are known but unknown at the same time; that they are unable to build up normal sexual relationships or families with partners and spouses of their own personal choice. Additionally, the forced pregnancies exposed them to sexually transmitted infections and serious bodily wounds due to inadequate medical care (Bell, 2005; Kohli et al., 2014). Some of the young captives, were said to have experienced health complications, which led to their deaths.

Non-Muslim female survivor's dreams have been shattered, with several experiencing suicidal ideation, and severe feelings of anger were exacerbated by a sense of intense depression and ennui. Many of the women and girl's survivors have not undergone psychosocial support and services, which are available, albeit in limited or short supply.

6.3.5 Current state/ Recovery and Coping Mechanisms of the non-Muslim Survivors

The recovery and coping mechanisms and survival strategies of the non-Muslim victims and survivors stems from both the therapeutic and cathartic processes required to enhance their recovery from the psychological devastation (i.e., stigmatisation, rejection, marginalisation, and castigation) experienced during the reign of terror unleashed by the Boko Haram insurgents. As such, the coping strategies inherently reflect the current state of their adjustment, reflection and focus on the post-traumatisation and daily travails they have had to navigate (ACNUK, 2017; Kpughe, 2017).

Many of the female survivors expressed their distrust of people around them, particularly men, and there is a real nervousness around any contact with men. However, they were extremely grateful for the respective roles of the Chibok elders, religious leaders and NGO's who called on community members to desist from rejecting or ostracising the Boko Haram survivors of sexual violence or forced conversion as this would derail their reintegration to the society and reunification with their next of kin. Notwithstanding such noble and well-intended initiatives and attitudes, there are still instances of a complete breakdown of trust between the displaced members of the non-Muslim community and their Muslim neighbours. While some

Muslims helped non-Muslims to escape from captivity, there were still episodes of unforgiveness as survivors often remembered and recounted the betrayal of those Muslim collaborators who conscientiously assisted Boko Haram in executing their crimes against non-Muslims.

Amongst other impediments and obstacles, the current state of Northern Nigeria's much-needed national reconciliation and social cohesion could be marred by the fact that there are no realistic attempts to bring about reconciliation amongst the deserted survivors by neutralising the identity-based effects of Boko Haram's onslaught (Boyd, 2019). A case in point relates to the Islamic Fulani-militias who have forcefully grabbed non-Muslim farmland and villages. To some internally displaced survivors from Danboa, cohabitation with the erstwhile Muslim collaborators and reconciliation is almost impossible when considering their role in the massacre of their villages, the killing of their men, and abduction of thousands of women, girls, and children for eight years.

There is brewing anger within the non-Muslim community directed towards the State and Federal governments (Eze, 2014). While non-Muslims are cautiously, and nervously, returning to the re-captured local government headquarters, most of the Southern Borno communities still live in destitute in IDP camps scattered all over the north-eastern region of Nigeria and Cameroon. There are also concerns with the efficacy of the screening processes for the vulnerable non-Muslim survivors who are mostly in dire humanitarian situations in Chibok. To date, multitudes are still in camps in Cameroon and awaiting their return home. Moreover, little progress has been made in re-taking Chibok communities and clearing villages of improvised explosive devices deliberately planted by the Boko Haram insurgents. In addition, participants remarked that humanitarian interventions in areas affected by Boko Haram insurgency tended to prioritise saving lives, reducing stress and providing relief materials, but they mostly needed food, health, safety, education and other resources (Shapland & Hall, 2007).

The total of the participants' above-cited views is that they heighten the perception that the non-Muslim survivors of Boko Haram's worst atrocities are still the victims of lack of government support and continue to suffer even after the brutality of the initial persecution by the Islamic sect. In respect of young female survivors of sexual violence, some of the families have difficulties recognizing the crimes perpetrated against them. Borne out of their own hurt and anguish, this has also restricted the survivors' preparedness to access therapy sessions. Non-Muslim children, abducted with their mothers, are also traumatised but many have not, to date, undergone trauma therapy.

At the macrocosmic level, survivors have raised serious concerns with national government investing billions of naira in rehabilitating and reintegrating so-called repentant Boko Haram members than ensuring succour to the victims. While most of the survivors indicated their desire for the Boko Haram insurgents to be brought to justice for their crimes, few believed that the Nigeria government or international criminal justice will make it possible, citing centuries of jihads and impunity in relation to BH decade onslaught on the non-Muslims (Eze 2014; Intersociety, 2012). It is in the latter regard that survivors vehemently call for the genocidal Boko Haram war crimes to be tried and prosecuted by an international tribunal set up in Nigeria, and life in prison for the perpetrators (Bensuda, 2020 Jones, 2021). On the other hand, there are serious doubts among the participants regarding the international community's readiness to protect the human rights of non-Muslims in Northern Nigeria.

This research study maintained that Boko Haram is just the latest, and not the last, in a sequence of jihads adopted by groups against the non-Muslims in northern Nigeria. So, the defeat of BH will not stop the violence. Only the defeat of the 'jihadist ideology' will, therefore, the problem is much bigger than Boko Haram.

This group consists of people, teenagers, university graduates, students, fundamentalists and criminal elements, people born as Muslims and converts. people with such diverse identity backgrounds are improbably seems to be motivated by the same factors. The most exploited by the group in its propaganda, is that there seems to have strong feelings of empathy for the harm of Muslims in Nigeria (Adesoji, 2011; Shekau, 2019), as the defendant of Islam. And this seems to have been openly declared at the beginning of the conflict in Maiduguri. However, at the time BH formally declared its caliphate in Gwoza, August 2014, the motivations for enrolment became more arounds fulfilling religious obligations (Robinson-Dogo, 2021; Gundiri, 2022). Today, uncontestably and as shown in the findings, the main motivation is to live in a pure Islamic state with tenets authentic to Sharia law, as its faithfuls believed the caliphate as declared by its leader (Abubakar Shekau).

Further, as revealed during investigation by the survivors and rijale converts, the belief of living in utopian Islamic state is mentioned by most participants. Which is empirically, of an ideology that combines religion and politics; connects the obligation for joining and to defend the Islamic caliphate.

Religious and political motivations of the group override personal ones, as deduce from the testimonies of survivors. A hunt for membership, power, and identity proved to be major motivators for many Muslims fundamentalists and collaborators who embraced BH ideology within the non-Muslim communities. More importantly, to the 'rijale,' there is aspiration to reinvent themselves, reinvent the Muslims world in the medieval period, and to search for a new and clear Islamic identity.

This has also been observed by scholars, to be the motivational factor to Boko Haram insurgency, located in the ideology of Islamising Nigeria (Akinola, 2015; Nmah & Amanambu, 2017; Gundiri, 2022). Further, Adesoji (2010,11) is a scholar who laid the basis for other studies on Boko Haram. He observes the 2009 Boko Haram rebellion as an important event by Islamic conservatives at imposing an unconventional religious belief on the Nigerian secular societies.

This study has revealed from its findings and literature that, religion is the major factor that propels BH insurgency. The connection between insurgency and religion bond has proven to be the binding motivational force of collectivism, which is the first prerequisite for terrorism; that is, prioritizing the group over the individual (Post, 2005:615-636). In this vein, people who value themselves more than the cultural and social groups to which they belong are unlikely to sacrifice themselves to advance the agendas of such groups. It is therefore no coincidence that the large majorities of suicide attackers are strongly together as a collective identity group mission.

The findings also revealed identity as a 'surviving sense of fitting in and belonging to BH as a group. Therefore, 'identity' obtains meaning when it is utilized as the only ground for the formation and expressions of mutual interests or the pursuits of common beliefs and civilization. In this way, religion remain the major factor of BH social identity. Is further considered as personal attributes which people share, or are assumed to share, with others on the background of which one social category or group may differ and makes them hostile to others.

6.4 CONTRIBUTIONS

The study will aid new and established scholars to gain further insight on the activities of Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria. As previous literature has not explored the researched area, this study has contributed with information regarding the mass atrocities suffered by the non-Muslim communities of southern Borno. The study has provided knowledge and generates specified information for researchers in the subject of insurgency.

The qualitative approach applied in this thesis has identify and explore the major concerns in the topic and its context that is new or not well understood from the previous studies. Even though the findings of BH experiences cannot be generalised but, this study has justified on the grounds that it unearths the opinion, thoughts, experiences and feelings of survivors in their own situation and according to their perception. Taking into consideration that, this is the first methodical study to investigate the mass atrocity committed against the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno by the BH in Borno State, Nigeria.

Furthermore, because victim's experiences of terrorist group are dynamic, it needs to be studied at different interrelated levels such as individual, collective, and social. This study analysis offers important perspectives that can inform future research, as pointed out that, BH activities are clandestine and unpredictable in nature and their behaviours and mission varies among the Muslims and non-Muslims communities. Therefore, using the identity analysis gives an in-depth explanation about the Islamic sect and its uniqueness. In addition, the study of BH over time can be used to understand the reasons for deep hatred towards the non-Muslims and other Muslims declared as apostate.

From the viewpoint of this research study, while the historical perspectives are helpful in this regard, it is the human dimensions (e.g., socio-economic, cultural and psychosocial aspects) that underly the gore and brutality of the insurgence masquerading itself as a 'holy' crusade to 'save the 'infidel' from the perceived 'decadence' of Western civilisation and its proselytising contribution to human (i.e., Muslim and non-Muslim) development. The study has put to light the magnitude of what BH has done to non-Muslims, particularly, women and girls, as it goes unreported. The real facts about their time and experiences in Boko Haram captivity in Sambisa, Cameroon, and other places that the public has yet to know. Evidence of the cornucopia of Boko Haram crimes against the non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno was empirically obtained and profiled, virtually all the atrocities and violations documented in various parts of this study constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.

This study shows that, BH genocidal acts, is brought out of a distorted thinking that the globe, as the insurgents understand it, would be better without non-Muslim in it and that by doing the work of destroying what they regarded as unclean, they are establishing a more save and perfect world. Of the women, girls and children violated and locked in chain, beaten and starved to death; of the little boys indoctrinated, trained to kill their kinsmen, each of these boys could grow up to become a threat to thousands. They believe by perpetrating some of the most dreadful crimes thinkable, they are improving lives and securing the society in which they live. The non-Muslims experiences, provides the most fundamental lesson of the untiring human spirit to prevail against the most formidable of obstacles and challenges. It was through their fortitude that they had to overcome the state and condition of victimhood, stigmatisation, rejection and marginalisation to let the entire world know about the darkest places the human soul can inhabit as represented by Boko Haram.

The Social Identity Theory (SIT) has provided a comprehensive approach into understanding deeply the inflammable issue of ethno-religious identity in a pluralistic society like Nigeria. It stresses the importance of the matter's social situation, the group's inward established social identity, and the condition in which a unified group awareness is formed in the minds and hearts of the members. Theory applied elucidates that, the Boko Haram Islamist movement has a group identity that incorporated shared beliefs, experiences, attitudes, missions and common interests of in-group members. Therefore, this fact underscores the importance of theoretical analysis at different interrelated levels. Accordingly, the individual level highlights the inter-personal relationships of individuals that form the bed rock for collective action, and these was understood from the leadership/follower relationships, and how it determines the intensity of violence against targeted out-group. Although, the study makes clear that individual does not work independently but depends on its group collectively for operation and the furtherance of common goals with clear social and cultural identity. A combination of all these factors determines BH tactics, target selection, difference in target choice and collaborators.

Appropriately, an extremists group needs a bond to bind its members and guarantee a constant supply of recruits, as the group will become involved in pursuits that could reduce its ranks, by any possible means. Hence, religion is the very successful bond, that Boko Haram's utilizes to enlist and sustained its 'in-group' identity, by sanctioning a radical interpretation that emphasise the group's feelings of isolation. It's also cementing identities by supplying constant background ideas of oneness to foster its mission of ridding the north of infidels (out-group); accentuates spiritual obligations and making huge demands, as a way of realizing its dream of establishing an Islamic caliphate. This research illuminates that, religion is absolutist in BH missions as the leader promote the idea that they have precise and complete understanding of the truth, and he is doing exactly what Allah, directed all true Muslims to do; therefore, all other religious beliefs are in error. Such absolutism promotes dichotomous "us versus them" thinking in which the Boko Haram reformists movement is separated into believers and non-believers. Such thinking, therefore, in turn, developed an intellectual rationale for the efforts to attack, conquer, convert, subjugate, or eliminate those identified as non-believers.

The study shed light on how BH treats the whole region as a battleground, rejecting national boundary as well as differences between combatants and civilian populations. Perceived non-Muslims as kirdi (infidels) and Muslims who reject its ideology and its implementation as takfiri (apostates) who are by definition relegated to death. However, the research maintains that, even within the circumstances of its violence, Boko Haram sect has single out non-Muslims, in particular its females, for specific savagery and barbaric treatments throughout the findings. A major contribution from the research was that the insurgents tried to wipe out non-Muslims to destroy northern Nigeria diversity and of the recent peaceful coexistence which is guaranteed by the constitution. The government reluctancy; doing little is not only against the law, but it is dangerous because these fighters are not brought to justice, they are integrated into that very society they destroyed, at the expense of same victims of their atrocities, and their venomous ideology thereby, continues to spread unabated.

This thesis shows that, qualitative approach allows for a rigorous and systematic investigation of the experiences of non-Muslims under BH insurgency. Investigating terrorist sect like BH is a challenging task given the security risks and surreptitious nature of such groups. High level analysis and a number of sources is required to understand the atrocities committed against the non-Muslims as primary victims in north-eastern section of Nigeria.

This study will add to the body of knowledge considering the magnitude (scale) and implications (scope) of the genocidal violence meted by a motley of sectarian

malcontents propagating some illogical, unscientific, and historically ideologies bothering on a combination of racial bigotry, ethnicity and religious intolerance in northern Nigeria. It will provide a real opportunity for new government policies, nongovernmental organisations, and conflict experts and practitioners to address specific needs for non-Muslim communities in the north-eastern section of Nigeria.

6.5 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

The qualitative design approach used in this thesis provides a broad perspective for policy intervention. Boko Haram is a symptom of deep structural problems in northern Nigeria. Although, the researcher does not have the religious standing to speak confidently on what is or is not Islamic. But empirically addressing the motivation behind the emergence of social groups like BH is what is necessary for Sociologists; and this may take a generation to achieve. Appropriately, most of the effort must be done by people in northern Nigeria, primarily, by Muslims. Though, the vast majority of northern Nigeria Muslims later rejected it, as we often hear, the Boko Haram's stories and activities are criticised by former sympathisers. However, they are the best line of defence against this movement. The Muslims clergies to counter their radical views through carefully imparting the peaceful and truthful tenets to them.

The study provided crucial information relating to fundamental humanitarian aspects; namely, their inhuman treatment in the Boko Haram camps, as well as relevant reconnaissance information for the Nigerian government and its security apparatus to pursue in actual military engagements against the Boko Haram insurgents.

This study could potentially contribute to the body of knowledge and discourse concerning the study of mass-based violence and the role of perceived hegemonic ideologies in shaping socio-economic constructions in developing societies. To a larger extent, issues of human rights and law are directly explored in the study, which allocates some degree of trans-disciplinary focus.

Based on the copious mounds of evidence regarding post-traumatic stresses and disorders experienced by the victims and survivors of the Boko Haram insurgency, the study also has the potential to contribute towards studies on the psychology of mass violence. Furthermore, and to the researcher's knowledge, this study is arguably the first methodical effort to utilize the Social Identity Theory (SIT) to advance a conceptual discourse that makes clear the connection between religion as an identity indicator

and a force of mobilization within "in-groups" against the non-Muslims as "out-groups" in Nigeria. This, however, has severe implications in a pluralist and multicultural country like Nigeria where citizenship is attached to social group entitlements and inevitably linked to religious identity, which tends to supersede Nigerian national consensus (Agbiboa & Okem, 2011; Anyadike, 2013; Cederman et al., 2011; Wilson, 2013).

6.6 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations reflect the researcher's considered propositions for improvement in some identified area/s of the study accruing from the research findings (Polikt & Beck, 2012; William, 2020). In that regard, the researcher's recommendations are focused on the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as the fiduciary custodian of all Nigerian citizens irrespective of their socio-cultural, age, gender or economic status in the country; the international community, against whose standards and declarations the barbaric and inhuman acts of terrorism are judged and prosecuted; as well further research or studies to intensify awareness on the Boko Haram acts of criminality in particular, and crimes against humanity in general.

6.6.1 Recommendations for the Government of Nigeria (FRN)

Based on the findings and practical logic of the thematic areas of the study, the researcher recommends that the government of Nigeria should:

- (a) Religious Context and Ramifications of Boko Haram Insurgency: As a matter of urgency, the establishment of a victim-centred scheme to address the right of survivors to religious freedom, justice and reparations. The fundamental political and social conditions that permitted Boko Haram to exploit religious and ethnic break-ups in North-eastern Nigeria should be challenged. Failure to do so risks repetition.
- (b) Socio-cultural Disruptions and Injustices suffered by non-Muslim survivors: The Nigeria government to establish a trustworthy and transparent legal mechanism to subject Boko Haram fighters to trial and hold them responsible for their crimes in front of the survivors and the world at large.
- (c) Ensure the systematic collection of information on missing and deceased persons, including the development of a database of victims.

- (d) Psychological Devastation experienced by the Non-Muslim victims: Provide remedies for women and girls whose human rights have been violated, which includes sexual violence, full access to psychosocial counselling, rehabilitation and social reintegration, provisions of sexual and reproductive health services, including HIV therapy, and to safeguard the life and health of the woman or girl, and measures to address stigma against women and girl survivors of sexual violence and their children.
- (e) Develop and enforce rules of engagement and course of action for the protection of children to halt the enlistment and use of child soldier in hostilities by the Boko Haram.
- (f) Recovery and Coping Mechanisms of non-Muslim survivors: Reinstitute affected children's access to education, which includes girls, and specifically those children displaced by the unprovoked attacks; and rebuild schools destroyed during conflicts, while making certain the protection of pupils, students and the teachers.
- (g) Encourage social understanding and unity, and reconciliation strategies to address the tensions and animosity between Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants.
- (h) Ensure that the provisions of the Genocide Convention are copied in Nigerian national legislation, as per its obligations under Article V of the Rome Statute.

6.6.2 Recommendations for the International Community

The researcher recommends the following for international community:

- (a) Acknowledge Boko Haram has committed the crimes of genocide, crime against humanity, war crimes and ethnic exterminations against the non-Muslims in Southern Borno and North-Eastern Nigeria in general, to ensure justice for the non-Muslim.
- (b) Strengthen the human rights capacity in Nigeria to respond more effectively to allegations of human rights abuses and violations.
- (c) Support the Nigerian government to implement its international obligations, which includes making certain the accountability for violations and abuses of international human rights and international humanitarian law.
- (d) Provide humanitarian aid to the non-Muslim communities who were unjustifiably denied assistance based on identity. Specifically, by addressing the urgent needs of food insecurity, and assistance to aid their willingness to return home after eight years of suffering as internally displaced persons and refugees.

(e) Refer the non-Muslims conditions in North-Eastern Nigeria to the International Criminal Court and hold the perpetrators accountable.

It is the researcher's anticipation that the above range of recommendations will change the perception of what occurred eight years ago in North-Eastern Nigeria in particular, and it will mark a new era for justice and religious freedom. This will fortify the belief and resilience of the non-Muslims in Northern Nigeria.

6.6.3 Recommendations for Further Study

Whereas the previously stated recommendations are institutionally directed, the below-cited recommendations are mostly knowledge-centred for the benefit of further study in the specific area of research. Accordingly, the following are recommended for further investigation:

- Examination of the effects of the immediate re-integration of captured and surrendered Boko Haram insurgents into the societies they destroyed.
- Examination of the stained relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims for peaceful co-existence.
- Critical study of the non-Muslim children who were forcibly indoctrinated and trained as brutal killing machines by their caliphate instructors and commanders.

6.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

A study undertaken in a volatile environment is likely to face a number of ethical issues and functional challenges (Musa, 2018). Hence, security consideration was an obvious challenge working in hazardous, remote, and complex environment like Chibok, and bearing in mind that, the surrounding communities were deserted for almost a decade and remained a no-go zone to even the military as of the time of the study. In this regard, the researcher experienced emotional discomfort and fear, as situations can deter into instability within period of days.

There was also lack of archival materials on the experiences of non-Muslims under the Boko Haram insurgency in North-Eastern Nigeria. This limitation emerging from the lack of prior studies and poor literature support tended to limit a broader engagement of relevant stakeholders. The research study employed qualitative research design; the findings cannot be generalised to all Boko Haram survivors as it covers specific area. The fact that the participants were from southern Borno, in Borno state; and Boko Haram activities occurred in all the north-eastern states of Nigeria, Nassarawa and Abuja (north central), and affected 3.7 million Nigerians (Gundiri, 2022). It is not clear whether the experiences of these study participants in southern Borno reflects the lived experiences of other people affected by BH in Nigeria, and as such it may not be possible to generalize the lived experience of the study participants.

In addition, the participants were presumed to be able to articulate their feelings freely. However, some participants, especially, women found it difficult to express themselves well because the mode of conversation used during the interview was English. Their limited communication skills affected the outcome of their expressed experiences, given the fact that the researcher had to hire research assistants proficient in the local Kibaku language to administer the interview guide. The study participants responses to the research questions were based on their interpretations of them. To address this challenge, the researcher conducted a pilot study to understand the capability of the respondents to answer the research questions and to determine if any changes to the interview schedule were required (Gil et al., 2008). Moreover, the questions did not point to specific government programs. The study participants identified a series of short resiliency programs designed to help them cope with their trauma. Because the few programs available to the participants were scattered without any form of cohesion between the government and non-governmental organizations. The study participants could not distinguish support programs provided by the government from those provided by non-governmental organizations. The pilot study was used to determine which non-governmental programs and services were available to the study participants to help them cope with their trauma.

Another ethical task was the perception that their voices will not be heard that the study is all politics, and would only enhance the *status quo*, only because they are non-Muslims. A major functional challenge experienced was that the researcher could not collect data in some unsafe communities. At a point during data collection, just 500 metres away, Boko Haram attacked and abducted some women while fetching firewood. Consequently, a vigilante was killed on a rescue operation.

In addition, most of the indigenous non-Muslim survivors are scattered and reclusive, which required the researcher to travel extensively, which is in itself time-consuming and costly. Finally, high-profile non-Muslim survivors (e.g., clergy and senior government officials) were not easily accessible. These were important to the study, especially that they attracted media attention while in Boko Haram captivity.

In response to these challenges, the researcher exercised maximum transparency throughout the study, including full disclosure of the study and other ethical concerns as articulated in Appendix G.

6.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The researcher's main purpose for conducting the study was to explore the experiences of Non-Muslims under BH insurgency. To that effect, the current chapter sought to provide a synopsis of the extent to which this aim was achieved in the context of both the research objectives and the study's findings. In this regard, both the research objectives and main findings provided a context for establishing the main conclusions outlined in this chapter (Blaxter et al., 2008; Fink, 201). It is worth restating that the main conclusions in this chapter are not a repetition of the thematically presented findings in the previous chapter (Chapter Five).

The researcher recognizes and fully acknowledges the academic purposes of the current study. However, it is worth also stating that, it was virtually impossible to wholly and successfully preclude the realisation of the brutality of the dark places to which the human soul can traverse (Huntington, 1993). The unjustifiable mass violence against non-Muslim Nigerians in North-Eastern Nigeria may (from a historical viewpoint) be neither novel nor comparatively 'spectacular' by the sheer extent of brutality. However, the suffering of humans at the hands of other 'humans' introduced more questions than answers to this study. Therefore, the researcher reiterates that all the issues recommended for further study in sub-section 6.5.3 are not merely academic but should further serve and advance all initiatives in the civilized world to thwart the spectre of Neanderthal anti-civilisation from depriving future generations in Nigeria, Africa, and the world at large, their right to live peacefully and harmoniously - regardless of religious and other differences.

As this conclusion is written, another form of genocide is looming large in Ukraine, Eastern Europe!

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APPENDIX A: UNISA ETHICS CLEARANCE



COLLEGE OF HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE

19 January 2021

Dear Mr Ziradzo Samaila

NHREC Registration # : Rec-240816-052 CREC Reference # : 2021-CHS - 68965605

Decision: Ethics Approval from 19 January 2021 to 19 January 2024

Researcher(s): Mr Ziradzo Samaila

Email: 68965605@mylife.unisa.ac.za

Supervisor: Dr T.R. Netangaheni

Contact: +27828483153

Title: An investigation of the experiences of non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno under the Boko Haram insurgency in Borno State of Nigeria

Degree Purpose: Doctor of Philosophy

Thank you for the application for research ethics clearance by the Unisa College of Human Science Ethics Committee. Ethics approval is granted for three years.

The medium risk application was reviewed by College of Human Sciences Research Ethics Committee, on 19 January 2021 in compliance with the Unisa Policy on Research Ethics and the Standard Operating Procedure on Research Ethics Risk Assessment.

The proposed research may now commence with the provisions that:

- The researcher(s) will ensure that the research project adheres to the values and principles expressed in the UNISA Policy on Research Ethics.
- Any adverse circumstance arising in the undertaking of the research project that is relevant to the ethicality of the study should be communicated in writing to the College Ethics Review Committee.
- The researcher(s) will conduct the study according to the methods and procedures set out in the approved application.



University of South Africa Prefer Street, Muckleneuk Ridge, City of Tshwane PO Box 392 UMSA 0003 South Africa Telephone: +27 12 429 3111 Facilmite: +27 12 429 4150 www.umbia.ac.ac.

- 4. Any changes that can affect the study-related risks for the research participants, particularly in terms of assurances made with regards to the protection of participants' privacy and the confidentiality of the data, should be reported to the Committee in writing, accompanied by a progress report.
- 5. The researcher will ensure that the research project adheres to any applicable national legislation, professional codes of conduct, institutional guidelines and scientific standards relevant to the specific field of study. Adherence to the following South African legislation is important, if applicable: Protection of Personal Information Act, no 4 of 2013; Children's act no 38 of 2005 and the National Health Act, no 61 of 2003.
- 6. Only de-identified research data may be used for secondary research purposes in future on condition that the research objectives are similar to those of the original research. Secondary use of identifiable human research data require additional ethics clearance.
- No fieldwork activities may continue after the expiry date (19 January 2024). Submission
 of a completed research ethics progress report will constitute an application for renewal of
 Ethics Research Committee approval.

Note:

The reference number 2020-CHS- 68965605 should be clearly indicated on all forms of communication with the intended research participants, as well as with the Committee.

Yours sincerely,

Signature :

Dr. K.J. Malesa CHS Ethics Chairperson Email: <u>maleski@unisa.ac.za</u> Tel: (012) 429 4780

Signature : PP AHM wefers;

Prof K. Masemola Executive Dean : CHS E-mall: masemk@unisa.ac.za Tel: (012) 429 2298



APPENDIX B: Letter to Chairman of Chibok Local Government Area, Borno State

Mr. Ziradzo, Samaila TudunWada-Bazza Michika-Adamawa State.

The Chairman, Chibok Local Government Council, Chibok-Borno State

Dear Sir

My name is Ziradzo, Samaila. I have registered for PhD (Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology), Department of Sociology, University of South Africa. I hereby cordially apply for your permission to conduct interviews with survivors of the Boko Haram insurgency in your community. Part of this study includes the process of sampling; whereby relevant participants are chosen in relation to the research topic regarding core variables.

The research topic is titled, 'An investigation of the experiences of non-Muslim Communities of Southern Borno under the Boko Haram Insurgency in Borno State of Nigeria'. A Case study of Chibok LGA:

The fieldwork aspect of my study entails the identification and selection of six to twelve (6-10) participants.

I am kindly requesting for your assistance in recruiting potential participants.

Inclusion criteria

- The inclusion criteria will be:
- The participants should be survivors identified by the Chairman/stakeholders of the NMCs.

Exclusion Criteria

• Indigenes that have not experience Boko Haram intrusion.

The 6-10 chosen participants will be made up of men, women, boys and girls. They will need to take part in 2 to 3 hours, face to face interviews. The data collection instrument includes an interview that will be recorded. All rights relating to research participants in the study will be thoroughly explained to the participants and strictly maintained by the researcher. Any unprofessional conduct by the researcher can be reported to my supervisor.

• As a result of the Covid-19 outbreak the following measures will be establish as a way of preventing the pandemics.

- Where is not possible to reach the participants through community gatherings due to the restrictions, the services of community's leaders/gatekeepers will be needed to reach out to the clients who meet the criteria of inclusion.
- During the data collection, the recommended social distancing of 1.5 meter the between researcher and the participants will be upholding to.
- Facial mask will be a pre-requisite for participating in the study.
- Before interviews could begin, the researcher will sanitize his hands and that of the participant.
- Doing so will reduce the chances of the spread of the Covid-19 infection to both the participant and the researcher.
- The researcher will make appointments with 2 to 4 participants per day for the interviews and the focus group, and the venue will be well sanitized and ventilated, upholding to social distancing.
- The researcher will be screening the participant in respect to the Covid-19 UNISA guidelines.
- In an unfortunate event that one is tested positive for Covid-19; all those involved or exposed to the research team will be informed, to ensure precautionary measures of avoiding contact with other people and to monitor themselves.
- The researcher will monitor his body temperature daily before going to the field to collect data to protect the participants from infections.
- If the body temperature is above 37.5 the interview for that day will be rescheduled to a later date.
- In situations where is not possible to meet the participants face-to-face for data collection, then, arrangements will be made for interviews to be conducted using Telephones, Skype, Zoom Meeting and WhatsApp as a way of minimizing contact.
- Verbal consent through an audio recording will be considered when face-to-face interviews are not possible. Therefore, the researcher will ensure that he follows covid-19 guidelines, as outlined by the University of South Africa.

Should you have any questions or concerns regarding the interview process and the study or if any problems arise from this study- please feel free to contact the researcher on the provided details below:

Mobile Number: +2348062452924, E-mail me <u>68965605@mylife.unisa.ac.za</u>


If requested, a bound copy of the dissertation will be made available to you. Your permission to conduct this study will be greatly appreciated and any further clarification will be granted by me if needed.

Thanking you in anticipation.

Kind regards,

Mr. Ziradzo, Samaila.

APPENDIX C: Approval from Chibok Local Government to Conduct the Study



APPENDIX D: Letter to Kibaku Chiefs/ Community Leaders in Southern Borno Senatorial District, Borno State

Mr. Ziradzo, Samaila TudunWada-Bazza Michika-Adamawa State.

The Kibaku Community Leaders Chibok Local Council, Chibok-Borno State

Dear Sir,

My names are Ziradzo, Samaila. I have registered for PhD (Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology), Department of Sociology, University of South Africa. I hereby cordially apply for your permission to conduct interviews with survivors of the Boko Haram insurgency in your community. Part of this study includes the process of sampling; whereby relevant participants are chosen in relation to the research topic regarding core variables.

The research topic is titled, 'An investigation of the experiences of non-Muslim Communities of Southern Borno under the Boko Haram Insurgency in Borno State of Nigeria'. A Case study of Chibok LGA:

The fieldwork aspect of my study entails the identification and selection of six to ten (6-10) participants.

I am kindly requesting for your assistance in recruiting potential participants.

Inclusion criteria

- The inclusion criteria will be:
- The participants should be survivors identified by the chief's/community leaders of the NMCSB.

Exclusion Criteria

- The exclusion criteria will be:
- Indigenes that have not experience Boko Haram intrusion.

The 6-10 chosen participants will be made up of men, women, boys and girls. They will need to take part in 2 to 3 hours, face to face interviews. The data collection instrument includes an interview that will be recorded. All rights relating to research participants in the study will be thoroughly explained to the participants and strictly maintained by the researcher. Any unprofessional conduct by the researcher can be reported to my supervisor.

As a result of the Covid-19 outbreak the following measures will be establish as a way of preventing the pandemics.

- Where is not possible to reach the participants through community gatherings due to the restrictions, the services of community's leaders/gatekeepers will be needed to reach out to the clients who meet the criteria of inclusion.
- During the data collection, the recommended social distancing of 1.5 meter the between researcher and the participants will be upholding to.
- Facial mask will be a pre-requisite for participating in the study.
- Before interviews could begin, the researcher will sanitize his hands and that of the participant. Doing so will reduce the chances of the spread of the covid-19 infection to both the participant and the researcher.
- The researcher will make appointments with 2 to 4 participants per day for the interviews and the focus group, and the venue will be well sanitized and ventilated, upholding to social distancing.
- The researcher will be screening the participant in respect to the Covid-19 UNISA guidelines.
- In an unfortunate event that one is tested positive for Covid-19; all those involved or exposed to the research team will be informed, to ensure precautionary measures of avoiding contact with other people and to monitor themselves.
- The researcher will monitor his body temperature daily before going to the field to collect data to protect the participants from infections.
- If the body temperature is above 37.5 the interview for that day will be rescheduled to a later date.
- In situations where is not possible to meet the participants face-to-face for data collection, then, arrangements will be made for interviews to be conducted using Telephones, Skype, Zoom Meeting and WhatsApp as a way of minimizing contact.
- Verbal consent through an audio recording will be considered when face-to-face interviews are not possible.

Therefore, the researcher will ensure that he follows covid-19 guidelines, as outlined by the University of South Africa. Should you have any questions or concerns regarding the interview process and the study or if any problems arise from this studyplease feel free to contact the researcher on the provided details below:

Mobile Number: +2348062452924 E-mail address: <u>68965605@mylife.unisa.ac.za</u>

If requested, a bound copy of the dissertation will be made available to you. Your permission to conduct this study will be greatly appreciated and any further clarification will be granted by me if needed.

Thanking you in anticipation.

Mr. Ziradzo, Samaila.

APPENDIX E: Approval from Kibaku Area Development Association to Conduct

the Study



APPENDIX F: Letter to Humanitarian Organisations (UN, ICRC, IR, ALIMA)

Mr. Ziradzo Samaila TudunWada- Bazza Michika-AdamawaState

OCHA Maiduguri No. 4 Gombole Road Opposite Capital Primary School Maiduguri Borno State.

Dear Sir/Madam,

My names are Ziradzo, Samaila. I have registered for PhD (Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology), Department of Sociology, University of South Africa. I hereby cordially apply for your permission to conduct interviews with survivors of the Boko Haram insurgency in your community. Part of this study includes the process of sampling; whereby relevant participants are chosen in relation to the research topic regarding core variables.

The research topic is titled, 'An investigation of the experiences of non-Muslim Communities of Southern Borno under the Boko Haram Insurgency in Borno State of Nigeria'. A Case study of Chibok LGA: The fieldwork aspect of my study entails the identification and selection of six to twelve (6-10) participants.

I am kindly requesting for your assistance in recruiting potential participants in your organizations in Chibok.

The 6-10 chosen participants will be expected to take part in 2 to 3 hours, face to face interviews. The data collection instrument includes an interview that will be recorded. All rights relating to research participants in the study will be thoroughly explained to the participants and strictly maintained by the researcher. Any unprofessional conduct by the researcher can be reported to my supervisor.

- As a result of the covid-19 outbreak the following measures will be establish as a way of preventing the pandemics.
- Where is not possible to reach the participants through community gatherings due to the restrictions, the services of community's leaders/gatekeepers will be needed to reach out to the clients who meet the criteria of inclusion.
- During the data collection, the recommended social distancing of 1.5 meter the between researcher and the participants will be upholding to.
- Facial mask will be a pre-requisite for participating in the study.
- Before interviews could begin, the researcher will sanitize his hands and that of the participant.
- Doing so will reduce the chances of the spread of the covid-19 infection to both the participant and the researcher.

- The researcher will make appointments with 2 to 4 participants per day for the interviews and the focus group, and the venue will be well sanitized and ventilated, upholding to social distancing.
- The researcher will be screening the participant in respect to the Covid-19 UNISA guidelines.
- In an unfortunate event that one is tested positive for Covid-19; all those involved or exposed to the research team will be informed, to ensure precautionary measures of avoiding contact with other people and to monitor themselves.
- The researcher will monitor his body temperature daily before going to the field to collect data to protect the participants from infections. If the body temperature is above 37.5 the interview for that day will be rescheduled to a later date.
- In situations where is not possible to meet the participants face-to-face for data collection, then, arrangements will be made for interviews to be conducted using Telephones, Skype, Zoom Meeting and WhatsApp as a way of minimizing contact.
- Verbal consent through an audio recording will be considered when face-to-face interviews are not possible.
- Therefore, the researcher will ensure that he follows covid-19 guidelines, as outlined by the University of South Africa.

Should you have any questions or concerns regarding the interview process and the study or if any problems arise from this study- please feel free to contact the researcher on the provided details below:

Mobile Number: +2348062452924 E-mail me <u>68965605@mylife.unisa.ac.za</u>

If requested, a bound copy of the dissertation will be made available to you. Your permission to conduct this study will be greatly appreciated and any further clarification will be granted by me if needed.

Thanking you in anticipation.

Kind regards,

Mr. Ziradzo, Samaila.

APPENDIX G: Informed Consent for Participating in the Study

Research topic: An investigation of the experiences of the non-Muslim Communities of Southern Borno under the Boko Haram Insurgency in Borno State of Nigeria.

Good day

You are invited to participate in a research study to be conducted by Ziradzo, Samaila in fulfilment of a PhD (Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology), in the Department of Sociology, University of South Africa. The focus of the study is to investigate the experiences of non-Muslim communities of Southern Borno under the Boko Haram Insurgency in Borno State.

I am conducting qualitative research, which means I chose to use individual or focus group interviews as an information gathering tool. Your participation will involve an interview which will be recorded. The reason for recording the interview is that the researcher would be able to transcribe and analyses the data. There will also be followup questions during the interviews. The University of South Africa had granted the research ethical approval, which means the study will comply with the code of ethics of scientific research on human participants

There are no physical risks involved in conducting the research. Although there might be some topics that will be discussed during the interview that might be emotionally sensitive or recall the traumatic experiences of Boko Haram insurgency to the participant. This will be noted by the researcher and the necessary precautions will be applied to avoid any harm. The study does not involve monetary compensation for participating.

At no time, however, will your name and personal details be mentioned within this study. Hard copies of your answers will be stored by the researcher for a period of five years in a locked cupboard at Unisa for future research or academic purposes; electronic information will be stored on a password protected computer. Future use of the stored data will be subject to further Research Ethics Review and approval if applicable. Hard copies will be shredded and electronic copies will be permanently deleted from the hard driver of the computer.

Your participation in this research study is voluntary. This means that you have the right to choose if you want to partake in this study, and that you may withdraw your consent to participate at any stage during the interview process. You will not be penalized in any way if you decide that you no longer want to participate or withdraw in the interview process.

As a result of the covid-19 outbreak the following measures will be establish as a way of preventing the pandemics.

- Where is not possible to reach the participants through community gatherings due to the restrictions, the services of community's leaders/gatekeepers will be needed to reach out to the clients who meet the criteria of inclusion.
- During the data collection, the recommended social distancing of 1.5 meter the between researcher and the participants will be upholding to. Facial mask will be a pre-requisite for participating in the study.
- Before interviews could begin, the researcher will sanitize his hands and that of the participant. Doing so will reduce the chances of the spread of the covid-19 infection to both the participant and the researcher.
- The researcher will make appointments with 2 to 4 participants per day for the interviews and the focus group, and the venue will be well sanitized and ventilated, upholding to social distancing.
- The researcher will be screening the participant in respect to the Covid-19 UNISA guidelines.
- In an unfortunate event that one is tested positive for Covid-19; all those involved or exposed to the research team will be informed, to ensure precautionary measures of avoiding contact with other people and to monitor themselves.
- The researcher will monitor his body temperature daily before going to the field to collect data to protect the participants from infections.
- If the body temperature is above 37.5 the interview for that day will be rescheduled to a later date.
- In situations where is not possible to meet the participants face-to-face for data collection, then, arrangements will be made for interviews to be conducted using Telephones, Skype, Zoom Meeting and WhatsApp as a way of minimizing contact.
- Verbal consent through an audio recording will be considered when face-to-face interviews are not possible. Therefore, the researcher will ensure that he follows covid-19 guidelines, as outlined by the University of South Africa.

If you have any questions or concerns regarding the interview process and the study or if any problems arise from this study- please feel free to contact the researcher on the provided details below:

Cell No: +2348062452924 E-mail address: <u>68965605@mylife.unisa.ac.za</u>

Research Supervisor: Dr. T.R Netangaheni Mobile Number: +2776 189 5087 E-mail address: <u>robert.netangahe@gmail.com</u>

Thank you for taking time to read this information sheet and for participating in this study.

Ziradzo, Samaila

APPENDIX H: Consent to Participate in the Study

I have been informed by the researcher, Mr. Ziradzo, Samaila, about the nature, procedure, potential benefits and anticipated inconvenience of participation.

I have received, read (or had explained to me) and understood the study as explained in the information sheet. I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and am prepared to participate in the study. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without penalty.

I am aware that the findings of this study will be processed into a research report, journal publications and/or conference proceedings, but that my participation will be kept confidential unless otherwise specified.

I may, at any stage without prejudice, withdraw my consent and participation in this study. I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and (of my own free will) declare myself prepared to participate in this study.

I have received a signed copy of the informed consent agreement.

Researcher: (Ziradzo, Samaila): (Please print)

Researcher: Signature...... Date

APPENDIX I: Interview Guide

The first 2 questions are for background information purposes. Once again, you are assured that your responses will remain confidential. Your cooperation is appreciated. The researcher will spend two to three hours with the participant during the interview.

Gender	Age
--------	-----

Ethnicity_____

Local Government Area_____

- 1. What have been your experiences as non-Muslims in Borno State?
- 2. According to your understanding, what were the reasons for the BH envisioned caliphate within the NMCSB?
- 3. What are your experiences regarding the genocide by BH?
- 4. What are the violations and atrocities committed against the non-Muslim women and girls in Southern Borno?
- 5. How were the non-Muslim men and boys treated as captives?
- 6. How were you rescued from the Boko Haram?
- 7. What are the consequences of BH violations on your behaviour, health and emotions?
- 8. How does the perceived social rejection impart your lives?
- 9. What are the direct effects of BH insurgency on your families?
- 10. What are its effects on the community culture?
- 11. What are the impacts of Boko Haram insurgency on your belief system?
- 12. What are your experiences regarding participation in the war?
- 13. According to your knowledge and experience how was your community recaptured?
- 14. What are your post caliphate experiences?
- 15. How does the insurgency affect Muslim and non-Muslims relationship?
- 16. What have you learned as a survivor?

This is the end of the interview. Thank you for participating in the study, your time is highly appreciated.

APPENDIX J: Focus Group Discussions

Let us discuss the threat pose by the Boko Haram within the non-Muslims communities of Southern Borno in Borno State.

Let us now discuss your ideas in more details.

- 1. How do you perceive the Boko Haram insurgency?
- 2. What are your views about the experiences of the Chibok communities?
- 3. What do you like / dislike about the government handling of the situations?
- 4. What are your opinions in respect of the roles played by the humanitarian organization?
- 5. From your experiences, how could the BH issues be tackled?

APPENDIX K: Sample Interview Transcript INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT AND CODING

In-depth interviews and focus group were conducted from March, April and May 2021, to obtain the common and shared experiences of 46 participants and 7 focus group discussions in Chibok local government area (Kibaku speaking ethnic group). Of the 46 interviews conducted, 31 were with female survivors, while 15 were with male survivors, and the 7-focus group discussion (four men-only and three women-only), numbering (4-6) participants within the non-Muslims communities of southern Borno (NMCSB) in Borno State of Nigeria.

The composition of the interviews and focus group included an introduction to the research, reason for the study and explanation of the research ethics and COVID '19 guidelines, explaining to participants the purpose of audio recording, beginning with comprehensive research questions, based on the objectives and purpose of the research study.

The participants were encouraged to express their views freely, to feel at home, also to agree or disagree with each other opinions during focus group, so that it provides an insight into how they group thinks about the Boko Haram insurgency as experienced within the non-Muslims communities of southern Borno. The participants were always reminded that, they have the right to partake in the study, or to withdraw consent of participation at any stage during the interview process and that the service of a Counsellor was arranged to give guidance.

INTERVIEW SESSION

Researcher: Thank you for voluntarily accepting to participate in this research study, which seeks to explore your experiences as Non-Muslim under the Boko Haram insurgency, in the North-eastern section of Nigeria.

What have been your experiences as non-Muslims in Borno State?

"Our situation has been annoying because of marginalization and social injustice; in practice however, freedom of religion is severely impeded by intolerance" (male participant, **02**).

"...Particularly in Maiduguri, the capital city, with substantial number of non-Muslim in schools ...my sister was forced to attend Islamic classes; this prompted some parents to resists by withdrawing their children before the proprietor employed Christian religious teacher" (female participant, **03**).

"At the University...non-Muslims candidates are denied professional courses of their choices despite meeting up the expected academy qualification. It takes by God grace for a non-Muslim to have admission in desired professional courses" (female participant, **05**).

"Non-Muslims, who are regarded as second-class citizens by the majority Muslim 'Kanuri's' faced increased pressure and social marginalization. They told us while, in captivity that, sharia is bigger than constitution" (male participant, **09**).

What are your experiences regarding the genocide by BH?

"I have seen more than four (4) thousand non-Muslims prisoners and converts killed in Madagali school camp, in 2014. They dug more than five large mass graves with bulldozer. My then husband, BH commander, disclosed to me that, the locals fighting them alongside military are infidels from Chibok and other ready to die 'kafir' from within" (female participant, **10**).

"Boko Haram attacks are...calculated and orchestrated intent to exterminate non-Muslims ethnics nationalities in the country...there is no Church standing [in all the communities they attacked]. Only the local government headquarters in southern Borno are accessible; most of the communities are deserted especially Chibok with weekly recorded killings" (male participant, **14**).

"The terrorists took over Chibok on November 13, 2014, before then, hundreds of Kibaku people were trapped and beheaded along Danboa on their way escaping from Maiduguri. That was my first traumatic shock experiences, seeing non-Muslims corpses littering everywhere, while the Muslims were separated". (Female participant, **16**).

"At the time the insurgents took over Chibok...corpses everywhere, they were killing anybody on sight; shouting 'Allah-Akbar' as the pursued and shooting people. A lot of people severely injured; cars and motorcycles had accidents some people even died by it" (female participant, **17**).

"The mass execution was designed strictly for non-Muslims as demonstrated by the sect earlier, targeting only Non-Muslims in Maiduguri... we all knew how it started, they were killing non-Muslims in their shops, houses, and other business places and burning down Churches in Maiduguri. It was not hidden...they were supported by the [Muslim] populace and hid them from the soldiers, when they were followed...some were praised and celebrated for killing the security forces, their mission was crystal clear" (male participant, **19**).

"I am a Clergy, they have killed a lot of my members, we know they don't like to see us Christians, especially 'Pastors'...before the total displacements of Chibok in November, they have abducted my two daughters among the [276] Chibok school girls in February, 2014...as I escaped through the hell, by His Grace, I saw more than a thousand dead bodies of our people, they want to kill all Christians, but it's impossible" (male participant, **14**).

"I was abducted at 13 and spent 4 years in captivity...thousands of non-Muslims men and boys were killed in our presents, during the 'welcoming' at the gate or the border line with Nigeria. Precisely, approaching a check point gate of the Headquarter in Sambisa forest" (female participant, **20**).

Researcher: "Probing...Participant **20** response of the 'border line' the participants say:

"Once you are in Sambisa forest, you are out of Nigeria; that is for sure, 'daular' (Islamic caliphate) is strictly ruled based on sharia law and tenets of Islam"

"Bulakar my village is deserted for eight years now at least 200 Kibaku's have been executed and others were abducted in our community at the peak of BH, for refusing conversion to Islam, in 2014" (male participant, **24**).

What are the violations and atrocities committed against the non-Muslim women and girls in captivity?

"I can never imagine that I will one day be free to sing praises and worship songs, recalling the hell I have been through for over two years...that Allah, handed us over to them, that we are not supposed to be in school because is a sin...they killed some girls that resisted and abused them. One was even buried alive and stones her head till death in the forest".

Researcher: "Probing...Participant **30** what Boko Haram's were like? She answered: "they are not humans, and can never be one" (female participant, **30**).

"I don't know what hell fire is like, but a day in Boko Haram captivity may be worse than hundred days there for a Non-Muslims captive".

Researcher: "Probing...Participant **31** regarding treatments of Muslims girls' captives? She said:

"They are separated and treated differently; they know everything that is required to be in the caliphate. The Islamic prayers, and reciting Quran...sometimes they forced us as slaves to serve them...some Muslims women treated us worse than their husbands did to us. Those women were holding non-Muslims girls for their husbands to assault, rape and torture them. They shall not escape justice. We all wanted them punished too" (female participant, **31**).

"The group threatens non-Muslims captives with flogging, beating, or death unless they convert to Islam, stop attending schools, and wear traditional Islamic dresses and hijab. We were forced to profess Islam, immediately after our abduction at school in Chibok in 2014. They forced us to wear Islamic dresses and hijab. We were thought what to say as they record it on video.

"...we were transferred continuously to avoid detection by the securities looking for us. Movement from place to place in the Sambisa forest and briefly at Gwoza, the attempted Boko Haram caliphate headquarters" (female participant, **35**).

"We were cut off from the outside world for two months. It is true that the hell called Islamic caliphate can only reflect on our time in Sambisa and experiences. They treat women as cloths. Those dirty things called us names and they knew we hated it, as well as they dislike Non-Muslims. We passed through hell; forced conversion, attempted force marriage and tortures. We wanted to get out at all costs, and we did... the world seems incapable of understanding the true magnitude of what BH has done to non-Muslims women and girls, as it goes unreported..." (female participant, **38**).

"The BH forcefully took us, kept us as captives, and forcibly married us against our will. What pained me the most is seeing my own daughter also being sexually violated and married, and I could not do anything to help her out...consoling her was even hard for me... I'm undergoing same as well. I also went through such a horrible experience and we both have babies for Boko Haram fighters.

...By separating us from our men and forcibly marrying and impregnating women...Boko Haram terrorists are preventing another generation of non-Muslims from being born" (female participant, **40**).

Researcher: How were you treated as non-Muslim woman?

"By virtue of your identity as non-Muslims and unwillingness to convert, a lot of girls were tortured to death in different places to scare us... they took us first to a town called Gulak; they tied and put my father and two brothers in a place like prison. That was the last time I saw them... after 10 days in that hell, a selected group of girls were taken, to be presented as a 'gift' to 'amir' in Gwoza. I was not initially selected but when a masked fighter saw me, he exclaimed! And said is your type we want for the 'amir'. In Gwoza, the 'amir' distributed us to some strange fighters with long hair. I openly rejected his proposal, and I was beaten to pulp, and tied up on a tree for two

days without food. The dug a hole where they normally put women who resisted them to be stone to date" (female participant, **07**).

Researcher: "Probing...Participant **07**... on any recent contact with a member of her family? She cried and said, "you are the one talking to me you are the family I know, my family for now are unknown, whether alive or death, and my whole village is deserted there is no single Soul".

"They did to me what they did to many Kibaku girls. For three years, I was tortured, beaten with iron pipe, and tied up on a tree, raped multiple times. The unforgettable, is the one aided by two Muslim fighters from my community. Those boys tied me up and held me down for a dirty fighter to rape me, while watching and laughing...I rejected conversion and forceful marriage, but I paid dearly with constant rape, beaten and left me unconscious many times. Before my escape I was tied on a fallen tree beaten and left to die, all these scars on my body, is what I went through" (female participant, **08**).

"...the BH fighters came several times to take away some of the girls who were locked up in a room at Uba in southern Borno; when they took over the town and held us captives. Any female captive who resisted were beaten and pulled on the ground, holding their hair. Some girls were beaten and tied on the electrical poles without food. A girl was forced by BH to walk on fire at Uba. They said, she wanted to escape, and what we saw, should be a lesson to all of us.

...All Non-Muslims girls were always told that, we would be forced to marry some BH fighters or be killed" (female participant, **20**).

"Singles Non-Muslim women and girls were separated from older ones, and those with children from the onset. They concentrate initial on the teenage girls, the beautiful ones. They were always the first victims to be taken away for sexual slavery... I even told them I was married but they said my former husband is an infidel, and am now a Muslims, he doesn't have any right over me...they don't even feel remorse or pity, for non-Muslims. For five years I have been through hell of tortures and violations...there was punishment for everything under Sharia law. If you fail to attend [Islamic] school, they Mallam (teacher) will order the police to flog you 50 times and sometimes 10 to 20 flog if you come late or slightly uncover your hair. A lot of things had happened to us and is still happening to our brothers and sisters in captivity, unreported" (female participant, **21**).

"We usually spoke Kibabu in Sambisa and Alaba in Cameroon, as if we were at home because we were too many with children...I was forced to marry four different fighters and had two children for one of the death terrorists' husbands. I was raped times without numbers. I cannot ascertain how many men raped and tortured me.

My elderly, son is now a fighter with the group after being captured and threatening to kill us if he did not join the sect. In 2015, some eleven non-Muslim women were thrown into burning fire...they were video recording and promised to send it to the kingdoms of infidels (American, Israel and Europe)" female participant, **28**.

"Often times fighters would come to pick girls to rape them. In our presence, BH soldiers was pulling hair, flogging girls, and slamming the heads of non-Muslim girls who resisted their advances. We were like animals, treated without human considerations. Once they pick any girl out, they would rape her and bring her back to exchange with new girls. Most victims were within the ages ranged from 7 to 20 and I wonder if this atrocities against women are really part of the religion they claimed to be purifying" (female participant, **31**).

.... "They were very savagely towards us: despite the fact that my pregnancy was very visible, some of the fighters hit me and raped me constantly. If I refused their advances, to have sex with them. I will be forced to serve their wives as slave and also put through tortures and raped. I was a slave for months in one of the BH commander's house. I do all the domestic works and repeatedly raped in the presence of the wives. I was moved again to another camp in Cameroon, where I gave birth to my child, there also, I was tortured and raped, in spite of the fact that, I just gave birth few days earlier" (female participant, **32**).

"A man in his 40s pull me out to another apartment...he called on other fighters who fasten me to a bed and raped me...he raped me many times, and then he left me tied on the bed for others to rape me.

They were calling us 'kirdi' (infidels)...and telling us 'We deserve nothing but execution and being treated like the slaves we are' all the time" (female participant, **41**).

"A girl was tortured and raped by gang of fighters; after she was raped, she took the fighters knife and committed suicide by cutting her wrists and pierced into stomach. Many Non-Muslim girls took their lives in captivity to avoid force marriage with the insurgents" (female participant, **46**).

Researcher: what can you say about freedom of belief and of choice in captivity?

"Conversion to Islam was a pre-requisite for survival as a female captive. I was living in fear that I would be forced to marry one of the fighters...the fighters told me and the other women captives and girls, that we would all be married off to *rijale* (fighters) within a week. I was terrified and pleaded, considering my age. The 'Amir' responded, are you better than the schoolgirls we abducted and married from Chibok? The Chibok girls have now understood the religion, and can beheads or cut off the throats of their parents, if, they ever see them... He immediately married me off to one of the foreign fighters from Mali" (female participant, **07**).

"Women who rejected the Imam's instructions to marry were also ill-treated. the insurgents took some girls to Madagali town, to a place they referred to as a prison. When they eventually brought the girls back after three days, they girls were all traumatized with scar all over their body and they became more submissive and married the fighters" (female participant, **08**).

"Boko Haram views Christians and other religion as infidels and considers non-Muslims unkempt unclean and unworthy of existing...Insurgents also asked us to forget about any of our past religion and non-Muslim relatives, that all are considered unclean before Allah. The 'amir' said that non-Muslims are not allowed to visit Islamic Holy land [Mecca] because they are untidy.

we were brought into a single room with the BH Imam, hearing we are 'kirdi' infidels, were forced to repeat the Kalmar sha'hada (Islamic creed) recite from the Quran, and collectively, we are told that were converted to Islam." And were given the choice of getting marry or serve as domestics slave to any fighter wife. Many chose to serve as slave but that does not stop the insurgents from raping and torturing them. I was forced to marry a fighter before I escaped" (female participant, **26**).

"I had no option than to marry them, I had no choice.

... Many women were forced to marry and sexually assaulted by the captors under brutal, inhumane situations. Lots of us were in severe physical pain, sexually transmitted diseases, pregnancies, and desolate conditions...women who declined to marry fighters were humiliated and beaten while others were compelled and deployed with Improvised explosive device (IEDs) on a suicide mission against their wish as punishment for their action. A lot of girls are kept as sex slaves, and many became pregnant for their rapist.

"Three weeks after my abduction, I was compelled to married one of the insurgents' top commanders. I must accept because, I have no choice, after going through hell of tortures" (female participant, **41**).

"During one of Shekau visits to Cameroon he announced that, their target... are those who do not believe in Sunni Ideology, people of the 'Cross' (Christians) and even Muslims who do not believe in our teachings of Islam? Any Muslim who is not supporting the caliphate and empire of Islam is our target all over. Anyone who comes to us and stop identifying with infidels will be exempted from attacks" (female participants, **28**).

Researcher: Who are the Boko Harams, and how will you describe their activities?

"...the majority of the *rijale* (fighters)...who abducted, converted, transferred, imprisoned, maltreated, tortured and abused [us in captivity] were mostly Kanuri's; indigenous Muslims collaborators and few foreign fighters, and some were Hausa-Fulani faithfuls.

Most of the insurgents were between the age of 17 to 30, and few were in their fifties. Some of the fighters were captured, converted and compelled to join the group. Lots of them could be considered novice who do not even know the basic tenets of the religion they are defending" (female participant, **08**).

"The Boko Haram has not even attempted to deny or hide its atrocities against the non-Muslims. The Islamic sect has taken a bold step to publicize frightful details of its act of barbarism and wickedness against the non-Muslims clergies, civilians and captured soldiers, by displaying through videos and the victim's assertion widely read on social media. Often in an Arabic and Hausa languages. The sect has utilized and maintained its reputation as a merciless and bloodthirsty movement terrorizing non-Muslims and any opposition in its way" (male participant, **14**).

"The BH reign of terror has been empirical and widely experienced within the non-Muslims communities of southern Borno. Boko Haram rejected fifty million Naira ransom and beheaded a Kibaku-clergy [Pastor] on 21 of January 2020, whom they abducted in Church during raid at Michika, a local government council in Adamawa state.

The group plans to exterminate non-Muslim ethnic minorities is not hidden; is what we have been experiencing for centuries" (male participant, **15**).

"During its few days reign of terror here in Chibok, 2014, Boko Haram killed uncounted number of people mostly men, captured and executed as punishment for the Indigenous resistance to Islamic influence and the town's local boys (vigilante and hunters) who had put up even as the army fled" (female participant, **17**).

"...a Boko Haram leader, while in captivity, has always boasted about abducting, subjecting non-Muslims women and girls to sexual violence and slavery; scripturally legitimized these hatreds against the non-Muslims, and savagery practices according to their own explanation of the Quran. They said, the fear of the *rijale*, (caliphate fighter) and ruled according to Islamic doctrine is the only option for the captured unbelievers" (female participant, **21**).

"The BH leader regards everyone living outside its territory a legitimate target. Shekau's approach's is unpredictable, his treatment of civilians, and the non-selective bombings and shootings...the terror reign is justified with the throat-slitting execution as a deserved and normal punishment for unbelievers caught trying to escape the daulah" (female participant, **32**).

Researcher: what can you say about child radicalization by the group?

"In northern Nigeria, the preparations for the violent extreme ideological indoctrination of children predates Boko Haram and preceding organization, like the 'maitatsine sect' of the 20th century... the forceful indoctrination and training of children in the BH war has certainly been noted in the past. But it has been given little media and academic attention, particularly, the 'Al'majiri system' which is obviously utilized as the breeding ground, for the sect. I can still remember vividly, when the BH started...they were identified as 'Yara Mallam' (children of Islamic teacher) in Maiduguri.

Boko Haram abductions, indoctrination and weaponization of non-Muslim children is clearly to provide the sect with transgenerational fighters; trained...future jihadist soldiers that will upholds and extend its violent approach to the non-Muslim communities, and ensure its survival" (male participant, **02**).

"...in a large open room described as a prison. We're being put in there like flock of sheep. Not knowing what tomorrow will be like".

Researcher: "Probing...Participant **06**, what was it [the prison] all about? He replied: All is in sharia. Though, as non-Muslim captive, I don't have that much knowledge, as others. But we fully supported sharia! blindly. Whatever they said there, we support it, to live". **Researcher:** How could you blindly follow something you don't really understand? "They said, you don't need to know something before you believe, just follow what the sharia says", I can't be an exception.

... some teenage girls were forcefully focusing on Islamic studies, while others are receiving training as fighters, to attack women. Because *rijale* are not permitted to fight with women." And they could as well be sent back as suicide bombers or spies to the very places they were brought up or have sought refuge" (male participant, **06**)

"Many of the children captured by the BH were trained to become fighters, others serve as spies, scouts, gatemen, and bodyguards for the sect. The insurgents also forced us to convert to Islam, in a mass ceremony, involving more than 100 non-Muslim men, women, and children whom the insurgent had taken to Sambisa Forest.

They forced us to recite the Kalmar shahada (Islamic creed) three times. little children were compelled to recite it, as people were crying and scared. They queried...is there any person who does not want to convert to Islam?... we all stayed quiet, because if anyone decline, he or she would be executed" (male participant, **09**).

"Every Non-Muslim...were singled out and forcefully taken away with other children for religious indoctrination and military training...mostly around the ages of 12 to 17, the unlucky ones were sometimes sent straight to the war to load magazines or fight. Girls in BH 'daular' are trained as fighters, learned to handle machine guns, grenades, and IEDs. I have stayed with one of the abducted schoolgirls from Chibok who used to wear a suicide vest at all times and handles sophisticated weapons. They are also trained as spies and carried money and messages from daular (Islamic caliphate) to Nigeria, and vice versa" (female participant, **10**).

"Non-Muslim' children are shown that they are special to the caliphate and their role is utmost in their parent's land (communities outside BH controlled territories), regarded as communities of infidels. Non-Muslim children receives intensive indoctrination and subjections in BH Islamic schools, combined with physical endurance training in camps. If they resist or unwilling to do so, forceful methods are utilized, until they cooperate.

Children were taught the meaning of 'No god but Allah', al-Wala' wal-Bara (loyalty and disavowal), and the Takfir (A Muslim who is declared impure, guilty of apostasy) of taghut (tyrant). Children were also taught how 'AL 'Janna' (heaven) will be for faithful's, who engaged in martyrdom operations" (female participant, **13**).

"BH told us that our non-Muslim background and families were destined for 'Jahannam' (hell fire), that we are lucky to be part of the righteous ones who would inherit the Islamic caliphate. They spoked to us about paradise, that we are on the right path.

We were indoctrinated in a police training camp at Gwoza. They said is a special training ground for special generation of jihadists. It was tough as it affected our mindset. I remember telling my family after I escaped that they needed to convert and become Muslim too, like me" (male participant, **24**)

"The terrorists separated us (non-Muslim children) from our families, after killing them. They said we are the future generation of Boko Haram' *rijale*, brainwashed and told us, we are the 'conquerors for Allah'. I have taken a lot of black ink, in the name of prayers written on the 'allo' (plate board) during the indoctrination and training. Many things were given to us, too dull our fear and some were trained as suicide bombers. Many Non-Muslims children converts were sent to the front lines, that when you are killed at the frontline, you are going to paradise. Martyrs were not afraid of death as they would go to heaven and "get 72 virgins" (male participant, **27**).

"...We converted to Islam, and we promised to be loyal to the caliphate regime. I made that commitment to save and protect my mother, myself and siblings. I do not feel guilty for all that happened. Recalling the wicket acts means facing sorrow over the loved ones killed, guilt over people... massacred or whatever ... to survive" (male participant, **29**).

"...many non-Muslims boys and girls received detailed lessons and physical training on how to kill. In some camps, the child soldiers were compelled to watch practical videos on beheading, from lifting the victims head to where to cut their throat. Learning how to flogs or cutting hands, legs or arms as punishment for crimes like theft, betrayals, gossips, adultery or trying to escape from the daular (Islamic state).

Some child soldiers were taught how to mercilessly punishes those found guilty of disobeying *amir*'s order. Judgement and punishment of offender's usual take place ones a week, precisely on Saturdays.

... "if a man is cut having sex with an unmarried girl. The girl would be flogged one hundred times; while the man would be buried, living only the head outside blind folded and stoned to death. If a woman refused to attend Islamic class...she will be giving fifty lashes. In the case of theft, if a person still something that worth ten thousand naira...they will cut off, one of his hands. After judgements, the dead bodies of the

guilt, were left wearing a symbol describing their crimes; common amongst non-Muslim, were refusal to carry guns against their kinsmen, conversion and marrying caliphate fighters" (male participant, **43**).

Researcher: what are the traumatic effects of what you have experienced and suffered?

"When we were brought to the camp at Maiduguri, we received all sorts of insults, some even called us Boko Haram wives. They even accused us of being spies. One elderly woman told me that, she is always scared whenever new people arrived at the camp, because what follow next is bomb blast.

They thought we had control over what we have been through in captivity. How can a woman say such things to fellow women? They have no idea of the magnitude of violation and tortures we had survived or went through. We were turned into an object of mockery and topics for discussions. people in the camp were not helping us at all. They made our lives even worst. We felt bad, without peace of mind in the camp. Later, we were taken out of the camp to another, that was being under the control of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN Centre) ...People may be afraid to say, but even in camps, in Maiduguri, we were treated differently based on ethnicity and religious identity. Because the moment we enter the camp, all of us started singing worships songs to the glory of Almighty...I believed it was because of our worships song they transferred us to CAN Centre. There, we were not abused, they only showed us love" (female participant, **07**).

"life is always very difficult for the female survivors of Boko Haram. Women are the ones that suffers more. Often described and stigmatized as BH wives. The most traumatic is watching some of my fellow survivors rejected by their bloods and loved ones, who supposed to comfort them and give solace.

"Meeting my family at Jos, reminded me of the old feelings as they received me with open arms. A lot of people came from different churches and prayed for me. That changes my thought very much. This is what you can't get in camps at Maiduguri. Such remained me of love and my life at Kwada before Boko Haram attack. We played with friends and go with my parents to the farms" (female participant, **10**).

"I lived in constant fear and experiences lots of nightmares, like being dragged away with many non-Muslims girls. I am troubled by an anxiety and fear whenever I recalled my times in BH captivity. The panic, feeling and shortness of breath that go with these memories worsen when I share my traumatic experiences with other survivors from my community, who are also scattered, homeless, since 2014.

Sometimes I wonder how a whole community will be able to survive and living like this on exile...all I hope for, and belief is that one day I will be able to give evidence to the authorities about what I and others like me experienced. Sometimes I think as if my life is ended" (female participant, **13**).

"I always recall how my village was burnt down, the slaughtering of men, and putting their heads on the chest, and the nightmares of hundreds innocent women and girls who have been abducted by those devils, could not get out of my head" (female participant, **20**).

"Even those who were not captured during the onslaught of BH, are still suffering from the carnage...I still cannot believe that I am alive. My family said they were afraid of me when I first came back from Boko Haram. They told me; I often wake up the family in the middle of the night screaming. I was forced to watch as Boko Haram fighters killed lots of people when they took over Chibok and was threatened when I cried over the deaths. The violation... is something I do not want to remember or share, because of the stigma and shame, but thank God for my family" (female participant, **26**).

"I am haunted by the memories of tortures, beatings, rape, and frequent killings of non-Muslims, who refused to join the insurgent group...the Islamic group still abducted over 100 schoolgirls from the town of Dapchi, in Yobe state. A month later all were freed except one (Leah Sharibu), the only Christian girl among the abductees, who reportedly refused to convert to Islam. That news of Leah, who was denied freedom because of her Christian faith brings back terrible memories...is a fact that, BH wants to convert or exterminate non-Muslims from the region, but Jehovah, would not make that happen.

I could not sleep for a week when I heard about what happen to Leah, because I didn't want her to go through what we went through in the hands of those wicket souls. I always panic and get scared whenever I hear gunshots, even from a far" (female participant, **31**).

"...I hate to see every man and could not sleep both day and night. Whenever, I saw men in a group, I got panic and scared" (female participant, **07**).

"My father younger brother and community members struggled to accept me when I arrived internally displaced persons (IDPs) camp in Maiduguri. They did not want to

associate with me after I returned from BH captivity...people in the camp called me Boko Haram wife...they did not sit with me nor eat with me in the camp.

I understood they were frightened by my existence. I really felt bad when I was labelled dangerous, and I had no one beside me, no one to talk or share my feeling with. I felt disappointed, I could not understand why people I hoped would take me in and support me totally disassociated themselves from me. I Felt isolated and alone, from being rejected and stigmatised by my own relative and other community members. I even thought of returning to the insurgents...this was how bad I felt hopeless..." (female participant, **13**).

FOCUS GROUP SESSION

FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEW -SESSION

The Focus Group Discussions took place at various locations in Borno state as the survivors are scattered within the north-eastern region. The session was designed in a circular seating to enable the researcher, participants and the language interpreter to be able to see one another during the focus group discussion. The researcher and the interpreter introduced themselves and the intention of the focus group discussion. All participants introduced themselves to the rest of the group. The researcher and the interpreter encouraged them to feel free and express their pains for the world to know what really happen to them and what others are still experiencing in captivity.

The discussion went on smoothly but the idea of being rejected by their own relatives and the unacceptable role of the government became thorn for the session and that led to emotional breakdown of some survivors. Other participants belief that such research project being its first will tell the world the true face of the Boko Haram war against the non-Muslims, hoping that the intended results will yield more fruits and bring solace to the survivors.

Researcher: "Thank you for participating in this focus group session. I would like us to begin with the focus group interview; the first question for the discussion is as follow: **Researcher: What are your opinions in respect of the roles played by the humanitarian organization?**

"Humanitarian interventions in areas affected by BH insurgency tend to prioritise saving lives, reducing stress and providing relief materials, but ours is the opposites. The violence, persecution and displacement, has deprives us of food, health, safety, education and other resources" (male FGD, IDPs **camp 2 Chibok**).

"We remain frustrated that no-one from the government or the humanitarian community has spoken with us to understand our situation during and after surviving the onslaught and what assistance is needed now. We have been here for almost 8 years...no support from either the government or the NGOs. Why are the non-Muslims treated differently? [we wish] the government would recognize and apologize for what happened and bring the perpetrators to justice. Boko Haram has also frequently targeted indigenous aid workers trying to respond to the crisis within the non-Muslim communities" (female FGD, IDPs camp 2 Chibok).

"...years after settling in this IDPs camp, here in Chibok, we have still not received any assistance, including food, clothes or health care. In early March, this year (2021), a young child died, because of malnourished". (**Female FGD**, IDPs camp 2 Chibok).

"The government takes care of IDPs/survivors at Danboa...they are a Lot of NGOs office there, but nothing here in Chibok. The entire world knows that the abduction of Chibok school girls in 2014, played a role in luring NGOs to Borno state, but this same communities is the least considered when it comes to humanitarian assistance or government intervention, just because of [religious] identity" (male FGD, **IDPs camp 1**).

... we are Kibaku and had been here for eight years, as IDPs/Survivors of the onslaught. But no government official either the local or the state have identified or come to our aid. A lot of NGOs are bringing relief materials to people in Danboa...along Sambisa axis, but they denied us here. In places like Ran, NGOs uses Helicopter to drop foodstuffs to IDPs, but when it comes to Chibok, they will find excuses because we are believed to be majority infidels (male FGD, **IDPs camp 2 Chibok**).

"I swear to Almighty God; we have never got assistance from either our local government or the Borno state government. Even the NGOs will come and speak their grammar and disappear without coming back...though, some group came and gave us bags and small utensils without food...We are not receiving assistance as the Muslims in the nearby Danboa communities... that is our positions as non-Muslims" (female FGD, IDPs camp 2).

"As you can see, we need food assistance. All around us are malnourished children. Some of the women and children go to the town looking for manual jobs of all kinds, some are begging. Some are hawking or selling pure waters to survive.

This is a humanitarian situation that is getting worse day-by-day in the whole of southern Borno. The Nigerian authorities and partners are playing games with people

lives...by releasing the terrorist into the societies...to continue from where they stop, is unfortunate. The humanitarian [international] organizations must act now to support those most in need and ensure this dreadful situation does not continue to deteriorate" (female FGD, IDPs camp 2).

"...our situations are very bad; the government gave deaf ear to our plead and the enemies are looking for us to kill...what can be worse than this situation?" (Male FGD, IDPs **camp 2 Chibok**).

Researcher: What are the direct effects of the insurgency on your families?

"All that we had is gone. Even before we escaped the onslaught, everything we worked for in life was burnt or carted away. My three children and relatives, my farm, my house, my cattle's, and my properties; now I do not have anything as mine. Even if BH are defeated and we go back, where will I start? No children and no livelihood" (male FGD, **IDPs camp 1**).

"The where about of many women and children being held by the Boko Haram are unknown, but for men survival means conversion and accepting the Boko Haram brand of Islam. Virtually every family has lost track of some of their relatives, as they are constantly moved from place to place between Sambisa and the Republic of Cameroon... we are on our knees praying for God intervention, is beyond Men" (male FGD, **IDPs camp 2 Chibok**).

"Farming was our major source of incomes and occupation that sustained us in the past. We used to survive and clothe ourselves from what we realised from our farms. Even our marriage ceremonies and child upbringing were being funded from the proceeds of farming. Farming was our major source of income. Before we were displaced and came here. All of us were self-sustained, we never knew anything called begging, neither did we depend on anybody to help us with food, clothes or even land to farm or anything. It was after the BH onslaught on our communities, and we found ourselves I this condition that we began to realise that a human can be so helpless and dependent on other people for survival. We never knew anything like this. We are traditionally independent and hardworking ethic communities. For us, if we can have a place to farm, we will be grateful to God, before our return soon." (Male FGD, IDPs **camp 1 Chibok**).

"A lot of our children died here because we do not have money to take them to hospital. This year (2021) alone we have buried eight people in this camp resulting from hunger and other health issues. We arrived at this camp with more than fifty aged parents, but

only two survived to date. We watched as they died here, because we do not have money to take them to the hospital. Some died out of frustrations and anger. Every sickness that requires more than ten thousand Naira (R 350), as treatment has led to a lot of people deaths" (male FGD, **camp 2 Chibok)**.

Researcher: will you prefer going back to your ancestral home or resettlement after the war?

"It will be a deliberate suicide to go and live in the same place with those [indigenous] Muslims who rejected their kinsmen and embrace stranger just because of religion identity...living in the mix of an enemy who is not happy seeing you alive within the war-torn villages and communities..." (male FGD, **IDPs camp 2 Chibok**).

"We prefer local resettlement among our Kibaku kinsmen here in Chibok...said collectively" (male FGD, **IDPs Camp 2 Chibok**).

"If we ever go back, we may be attacked, we want border adjustment from Danboa. We do not belong there. We are Kibaku minority speaking ethnic group there, and mostly non-Muslim. Ethno-religious factors were never considered before merging us with Danboa, who are mostly Muslims with different ethnic identity from us. The Muslims amongst us have relocated back to Danboa and are being taken care of by the government; but as non-Muslim we must stay here with our kinsmen to save our lives. Because the genesis of the onslaught was designed for the non-Muslim. Our condition is bad, were just surviving by grace and nothing more" (female FGD, IDPs Camp 2 Chibok).

"Is not about ethnic identity now, but is between Muslims and Non-Muslims [coexistence]...even some of the hosts communities in northern Nigeria today, asked of people religion before they accommodate IDPs/survivors...so what will be the future of such communities, if, they ever return?...some Muslims Kibaku are now living at [our place of origin] knowing nothing shall happen to them, because of their Islamic background, and today we are hosting some Non-Muslims from Danboa who escaped for their life...this is the situations we found ourselves in today" (female FGD, **Mbalala**).

"There is one thing, Nigerian government is always good at, 'empty promises; whether we later go back home or stayed here and integrate is all unconditional. If we may even go back to our ancestral home, we will remain homeless and unsafe; if we stay here, for how long would that be? (Male FGD, IDPs **camp 1 Chibok**).

Researcher: what can you say about your present situation?

"Our worrying mystery is that insurgents are still in control of much of the territory around Chibok. Most of the communities outside of the town of Chibok are still under Boko Haram, no go areas. They insurgent could be seen patrolling everywhere within the deserted communities, killing anyone on sight. You cannot even go to farm outside the nearby town or to get firewood. Sometimes the services of Boys (local security network) are required. They are the reason some people go to the farm. We cannot say soldiers do not patrol but people have confidence in the 'Boys' than the soldiers. Even with the 'boys' escort, people must be extremely fast, otherwise they could be attack. More than fifty people have been killed from 2020 to present, on their farm or while fetching firewood's within the Kibaku-Chibok communities" (male FGD, **Chibok town**).

"The surrounding environment is still unsafe. Just two weeks ago a hunter was killed at Kautikari, while on visit and two people were also killed at Komdi on their way to Gwaragulum. Lots of our women were also abducted on the farm or while fetching firewood's...those two women with little children recently escaped from the Boko Haram. They are from Chileri, and now here, praying for God intervention, looking for help" (male FGD, **Chibok town**)

"We are Kibaku from different communities, our main problem is that the war is still going on. The military are here within Chibok town, and our villages are far from here and deserted for 8 years now...not even the military had ever attempted going there...the place is dangerous for them as we are; the war is far from over... and we cannot risk returning by our self to be abducted, or even got killed, by the Boko Haram" (male FGD, **camp 2 Chibok**).

"The government is aware of our present situation, but nothing has been done till now. For the past 8 years, no political representatives have visited us here in this camp. But during elections they normally asked us to go and cast our votes for them, but they do not assist us as IDPs...Just like you enjoy sleeping with a woman without loving or caring for the woman" (male FGD, IDPs **camp 1 Chibok**).