Inaugural Lecture

Respect: The ultimate basis of morality

- Ilse Ferns

Throughout my academic career I have been, and still am, primarily interested and involved in a field of Psychology called Developmental Psychology. This is a rather vast study field – one that looks at the normal development of humans from conception to death – and one that can easily overwhelm researchers and students alike. But it surely is an interesting field that offers many research possibilities. The vastness of the field often steers one in a certain direction or topic. So, it happened that I am especially interested in one specific area of human development namely moral development or morality as a human characteristic – which can also be approached and studied from a moral philosophical viewpoint. My doctoral research covered an aspect of moral development where I investigated the moral developmental patterns of South African adolescents.

Today, however, I want to approach the topic of morality from a different angle, that is a more philosophical argument – one that fascinates me and the more I read about it the more I become intrigued.

When thinking about morality we are confronted with many questions, like: "What is morality exactly and how does it develop? Why do some people function on higher levels of morality than others? Do we need to have a good upbringing or education to display high levels of morality?"

In its basic form, morality refers to the set of standards that enable people to live cooperatively in groups. It therefore entails the principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behavior. And sometimes, acting in a moral manner means individuals must sacrifice their own short-term interests to benefit society. With this in mind, I often wonder how morality comes into being – in other words, what is the ultimate basis for morality.

Today, I argue that the ultimate basis for morality is 'respect': self-respect, respect for fellow human beings, respect for nature, respect for the law. Confucius, a Chinese philosopher said: "Without feelings of respect, what is there to distinguish Men from beasts?" According to some experts, respect can simply be described as a basic moral value or need which makes us aware that we are human beings and it is related to happiness, productivity and success. In addition, when people respect each other, there are less conflict and less fighting.

Having said this and in as much as 'respect' is a catchword (catch phrase) in modern society, the conceptualization thereof is not a straightforward matter. In this regard I borrow from insights in recent research on respect. According to De Cremer (2002; 2003) respect implies complete

recognition as a person – and this includes the assumption that respect provides information about a person's status, prestige and a feeling of being accepted in specific groups and communities. According to Simon, Lücken and Stürmer (2006) respect among members of a group indicates that a person is regarded as an equal to others. This then renders the view that feeling an equal in terms of belonginess and status indicates that a person is treated with the same dignity and moral worth as any other member of the group. On this basis the concept of respect can be regarded as something that every human being has a claim to – as it makes us all dignified humans living in a moral community.

To understand what morality truly entails we need to visit the concepts *'values'* and *'virtues'*. *Values* inspire, motivate and engage people to perform obligations or duties. Many important documents which promote a better world include a prologue that refers to values. For instance, the United Nations' "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" drafted in 1948 (UN, 1948) lists four values in the first sentence: dignity, freedom, justice and peace in the world. Values permeate human experiences (Ogletree, 2004), and references to "values" are unrelenting in our lives. Many articles, books and internet sites offer advice on matters such as values that are important for achieving a successful life, values we should live by, discovering our own values, and changing our core values, and it is therefore obvious that values are important to people. Three primary meanings of "value" can be distinguished – not all of which are relevant to morality, though. But for the sake of clarity, I will briefly refer to all three meanings of 'value'. First, values can refer to measurability. Mathematics operates with values, which can, for example, be discrete or continuous. Artists may refer to colours as having values, meaning the relative lightness or darkness of a colour. In music, a note value determines the duration of a musical note. Economists or art dealers may measure value in monetary terms; a company or an artwork may be valued at a certain price. Value, in this sense of the word, clearly has no relationship to values such as dignity, honesty, or freedom.

Secondly, people can value certain features or entities. For instance, someone may value reputation, money or security. For values to exist, there must be an agent (a person) who is doing the valuation, and the feature or entity must be worth something to this agent. The values of one individual can be very different from those of another person. For instance, a regular income is worth a lot to a person who values routine and security and it can contribute to their wellbeing and happiness. Others, who value personal freedom more than routine and security, may be happy with an occasional income, as long as they are not bound to nine-to-five office hours. If most humans around the world value something, it can be described as a **universal value**.

Thirdly, values can refer to goals and ambitions, with a moral connotation. In business literature, for example, one often finds reference to value-led management or organizational values, and

many institutions make a point of establishing and promoting their values. For instance, the stated values of the University of South Africa are: *Ethical and collective responsibility, Integrity, Innovation and excellence, Responsive student-centredness, and Dignity in diversity.* These values are morally positive, and they are intended to guide the actions of students, staff and the institution itself. In this sense of the word, moral values "will enable us to determine what is morally right or what is valuable in particular circumstances" (Raz, 2009, p. 208). If most humans around the world share a specific moral value, it can be described as a **universal moral value**.

Values can serve as motivating factors in promoting or inhibiting human behaviour (Locke, 1991; Marcum, 2008; Ogletree, 2004). The influence of personal values on behaviour has become a subject of extensive research in the social sciences and also in psychology, particularly over the past fifty years or so, with just about every area of life being examined through the lens of personal values – for example, business decisions (Barnett & Karson, 1987), travel decisions (Pitts & Woodside, 1986), core political values (Schwartz, Capara, & Vecchione, 2010), leadership effectiveness (Bruno & Lay, 2008), teaching and learning (Waite, 2011) social entrepreneurship (Hemingway, 2005), psychological stress responses (Creswell & Taylor, 2005), sport supplement use and doping (Hurst et al., 2022; Ring et al., 2022), values and artificial intelligence (Rodrigues-Soto et al., 2022) to name but a few.

Ethical values give direction but are not necessarily enough to make people ethical individuals. One can hold the value of honesty and yet fail to be an honest person. One can hold the value of respect and yet cause harm when disrespecting for example local customs when doing research. Values can motivate and they can help to establish moral goals, but they do not explain how to achieve moral goals. Famously, Aristotle (384–322 BC), a Greek philosopher, linked human "happiness and wellbeing" to "leading an ethical life", guided by the cardinal values of courage, justice, modesty and wisdom (Aristotle, 2004).

In addition, there are *virtues* which are beneficial character traits that humans need to flourish. Pelser and Jensen (2022, p. 47) refer to virtues as "habits of moral excellence". One can note virtues in real people or in fictional characters. For example, Sherlock Holmes, an eccentric fictional detective who is known for his proficiency with observation and logical reasoning in solving mystery cases; and the semi-mythical character, Robin Hood who is seen as courageous and benevolent when he fights a David-and-Goliath battle against the Sheriff of Nottingham (courage) so that the poor have food (benevolence).

Like values, for virtues to exist, there must be an agent (a person) who is being righteous/virtuous; virtues focus on the moral agent rather than on the standard or principle that underlies behaviour. Virtues are found both historically and internationally in many documents

of insight, judgment and wisdom and according to Confucianism, an ancient Chinese belief system, the most important virtues are benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, trustworthiness, filial piety, loyalty and reciprocity (Wang et al., 2018). Virtues can be regarded as personified ethical values because they are manifested in persons. One can learn a lot about virtues by observing real people such as Mother Theresa or Nelson Mandela and by following the example they set.

Daniel Russell (2015, p. 37f) illustrates the challenge for virtue ethics in guiding specific behaviour when he says the following about generosity as a virtue: "Sometimes helping means giving a little, sometimes it means giving a lot; sometimes it means giving money, sometimes it means giving time, or just a sympathetic ear; sometimes it means offering advice, sometimes it means minding one's own business; and which of these it might mean will depend on such different things as relationships between individuals, what actually can be offered to offer, and so on".

From a traditional African perspective the most important virtues, as indicated by a number of authors (e.g. Gelfand, 1987; Gyekye, 1998, Kinoti, 1992) are amongst others: respect for nature, elders and God, compassion, kindness, generosity, truth, humility, self-discipline, mercy, repentance, trust, patience, courage, unselfishness and the willingness to share whatever one has, no matter how little it may be – in short "any action or behavior that is conducive to the promotion of the welfare of others" (van der Walt, 2004, p. 52).

Now, coming back to the central matter/aspect of this lecture, namely **respect**. The concept of respect emerges in two major forms which can be referred to as 'respect (lite)' and 'respect (full)'. Respect (lite) is seen when one person is being polite, considerate and mindful of another person. It can also be demanded from another person as consideration of their rank, seniority, experience or standing in the world. This can be seen in statements like: "respect your elders", "show a little respect", or "with all due respect". It tends to be associated with the claim that respect is earned rather than demanded. However, the idea that respect (lite) needs to be earned is one of the most important ways of distinguishing the 'lite' concept from the 'full' form.

Respect (full) requires us to respect the intrinsic dignity of all people. If something is intrinsic to humans, it is essential to our being and therefore cannot be earned. It is an attribute of being a person. The source of intrinsic dignity has varied over time and also across cultures. For example, within Judaism, Christianity and Islam to name a few religions, the intrinsic dignity of persons comes from being made in the image of God. In each of these religions, the image is not literal, though. Rather, it refers to the 'moral image' of God – and most importantly, being blessed with free will. Respect (full) is what we count on as the source of principled opposition to all forms of

discrimination against anyone – whether it be because of age, gender, sexuality, race, religion and so on.

These two versions of respect are clearly related. But we often tend to lose sight of the connection. For example, polite, respectful debate about controversial issues is not just about avoiding harmful consequences. It can (and should) go much further – right to the recognition of the intrinsic dignity of other people. That is ultimately the reason why people should listen to the opinions of others. It is why, when debating an issue, the arguments must be attacked and not the person. It is why we must refrain from insulting, bullying, or silencing others even if we fundamentally disagree with them. Of course, civilised and principled disagreement can help avoid matters to get out of hand when tempers wear thin. But safer, better forms of deliberation are added benefits of acting on the principle of respect for persons – and acknowledging the intrinsic dignity – even of opponents.

As already also said, respect is a "buzz" word in our contemporary society. And is it then not true that every human being has a valid claim to respect (as it makes us all dignified humans living in a moral community). As Emmanuel Kant (Hill, 2000, p. 64) noted, "it is a duty to respect others as human beings", so all human beings are equal in the sense that all have equal worth and deserve equal respect. In the same way, the issue of feeling recognized (as a function of respect) can be seen as reflecting two views of respect that provide justification for why respect is valued so much. It is therefore important to note that respect is a concept that has the potential to: (a) fulfil the needs of the person (such as belongingness and reputation) in his or her social life therefore "respect is a means to an end", and (b) affirm the moral values that people wish to live by and which constitutes our moral community, therefore "respect as an end in itself".

Before I attend to respect being 'a means to an end' or 'an end in itself' I want to take a closer look at some of Immanuel Kant's views, especially his influential account of 'respect for persons'. In doing so, I will present some researchers' interpretation of Kant's fundamental opinions and views.

Central to Kant's moral theory is the claim that **all persons, regardless of personal qualities or achievements, social position, or moral track-record, are owed respect just because they are persons**, that is, beings with rational and autonomous wills. He said: "All human beings are equal to one another, and only he who is morally good has an inner worth superior to the rest" (Kant, 1785/1997, p. 277).

According to Kant, to be a person is to have a status and worth unlike that of any other kind of being: it is to be an end in itself with dignity. And the only appropriate response to such a being is respect. Furthermore, he believed that respect for persons is not only appropriate but also unconditionally required: people must always be respected. I previously referred to respect as 'a means to an end' and respect as 'a means in itself'. Kant indicated that 'an end' is anything for the sake of which we act – he identified two kinds of ends. The first are **subjective ends**, which are things we want and which we pursue or promote through means we think will help us to get or facilitate them. The value of subjective ends is conditional on, or relative to, the desires or interests of the individual who values them. The other kind of end identified by Kant is an **objective end**. These are ends in themselves whose value is not dependent on any interests or desires but is absolute and unconditional, grounded entirely in what they are. Kant maintains that all and only rational beings are ends in themselves. The technical term "persons" represents the category of beings whose rational nature "already marks them out as ends in themselves … and an object of respect" (Kant, 1785/1997, p. 428).

To act for the sake of persons as ends in themselves, in other words to respect them, is not to promote them, but to value them as the unconditionally valuable beings they are. It also acknowledges that there are limitations to our treatment of persons, for to be an end in itself is also to be a limit -- just as the end of the road puts a limit on travel, so an end in itself puts a limit on the subjective ends we set, the means we use to pursue them, and, very importantly, on how we treat ends in themselves. Such beings must never be used as if they were merely means to an end – as if they were nothing more than tools that are used to advance our own ends. However, it is not wrong to treat persons as means to our ends; indeed, we could not get along in life if we could not make use of the talents, abilities, and services of other people. What we must never do is treat persons as *mere* means to our ends, to treat them as if the only value they have is what we get from their usefulness to us. Rather, we must always treat them "at the same time as an end."

Wood (1999) interpreted Kant's view by saying that it is our fundamental moral obligation to respect all persons, including ourselves – and respect defines morally right actions as those that express respect for persons as ends in themselves and morally wrong actions as those that express disrespect for persons. In addition to this general rule, Kant argued that there are also more specific duties of respect for other persons and self-respect. For now, however, we must address the question: 'What is it to be an end in itself and to possess dignity that deserves respect?'

Kant (1797/1996) holds that persons, as ends in themselves, have dignity. Until the last century or so, "dignity" (from the Latin word, *dignitas*, worthiness) however referred to a high social status associated with the elite and upper class, offices of power, and high church positions. In this sense, dignity thus distinguished socially important people from the *hoi polloi*, who had no

dignity (Debes, 2017). Kant's view that every person has dignity thus marks a revolution in valuation. It is however to be expected that critics will disagree about how to understand what Kant means by dignity (Cureton, 2013; Darwall, 2008; Sensen, 2011; 2017). But the most common interpretation of Kant's view of dignity seems to be that dignity is a distinctive objective worth that is absolute (not conditional to anyone's needs, desires, or interests, and a value that everyone must acknowledge); dignity is intrinsic or inherent (not bestowed or earned and not subject to being lost); and dignity is incomparable and the highest form of worth (a being with dignity cannot rationally be exchanged for or replaced by any other valued object).

In arguing for respect for the dignity of persons, Kant explicitly rejects other conceptions of human value such as the aristocratic idea of credit that individuals differentially deserve according to their social rank, individual accomplishments, or moral virtues. Kant argues against the aristocratic view as follows: although individuals as members of a social community may have or lack commendable accomplishments or status or may deserve credit or respect to certain degrees or not at all, or that some people deserve social recognition respect based on their socially significant attributes or positions, all persons as members of the moral community are owed the same moral recognition respect, for the dignity that they possess as rational beings is unconditional and independent of all anticipated facts about them or of their characteristics.

There are several important consequences of the Kantian view of the scope of moral recognition respect for persons as persons. First, while all normally functioning human beings possess the rational capacities that ground recognition respect, there can be humans in whom these capacities are altogether absent and who therefore are not persons and are not worthy of respect. Second, these capacities could, in principle, be possessed by beings who are not biologically human, and such beings would also be persons with dignity whom we are morally obligated to respect. Third, because dignity does not depend on how well or badly the abilities for moral concerns are exercised, or on whether a person acts morally or has a morally good character or not, dignity is not a matter of degree and cannot be diminished or lost through wrongdoing or morally bad actions or increased through virtue or morally correct actions. Thus, the morally worst person has the same dignity as the morally best, although the former can be said to fail to live up to their dignity. Likewise, moral recognition respect is not something individuals have to earn or might fail to earn, so even the morally worst individuals must still be regarded as ends in themselves and treated with respect. Of course, wrongdoing may call for punishment and may be grounds for losing certain rights, but it is not grounds for losing dignity, for being regarded as worthless beings, or denied all respect (Hill, 2000b). **Dignity is grounded in exactly that which all persons have in common, and not in something that distinguishes one individual from another.** Thus, each person is to be respected as an equal among equals, without consideration of individual achievements or failures, social rank, moral merit or demerit. However, the equality of all rational beings does not entail that persons cannot also be

differentially evaluated and valued in other ways for their particular qualities, accomplishments, or usefulness, although such valuing and treatment must always be restricted by the moral requirement to show recognition respect to persons as ends in themselves.

Now, let's get back to respect as a **Means to an End**: The "Respect as Intragroup Status" model was developed by De Cremer and Tyler in 2005. This model poses that feeling recognized by others includes receiving an appreciation from others. This may happen in two ways. First, respect can be seen as a sign that one belongs to the group or community and second, that one is evaluated positively and has a positive status or reputation within the group or community. In other words, respect indicates that one is included in the group and that one has a good reputation in the eyes of other group members. With regard to the issue of respect, De Cremer and Tyler (2005) indicated that people's reputation concerns affect the impact of receiving respect. When concerns for reputation are strong, respect affects people's emotional response and their self-esteem to a large extent. This supports the notion that people value respect because respect satisfy reputational concerns. This perspective therefore supports the use of respect as an important means to satisfy needs that help people to evaluate their position within a group or community that one is a member of. However, this perspective also implies that respect addresses the satisfaction of an individual need and not necessarily a collective need. Indeed, it is the individual drive for need to belong and the need for a good reputation that makes people prone to information about respect. Therefore, respect can be seen as an important indicator of intragroup status. In line with this assumption, research by Boeckman and Tyler (2002) and Tyler, Degoey, and Smith (1996) indeed indicated that people's judgments about their status within a group, and their associated feelings of self-regard, are enhanced when they receive respectful treatment by the group. This then indicates clearly that respect is considered not as something that people simply earn by themselves, but rather as a judgment that appear from the treatment people receive from others. Thus, respect informs people that they have a valued status in a relationship. As such, it seems like individuals value respect within groups merely to fulfill their own individual needs rather than those of the group. Indeed, Heuer and colleagues (2002) noted that "people care about respect because of what it conveys about others' valuation of their worth as individuals rather than its group-based connotations". That is, group members seem to be active participants that contribute to group life and productivity as a function of how they have been treated by the group. However, it can be said that this individualistic view of why people value respect does not necessarily tell the whole story. Respect does not only have to be looked upon as an individual-based driven concept.

The second perspective of "respect as an end in itself" makes it clear that respect is also something that can be endorsed out of collective values. Respect as an **End in Itself** can be regarded as: **Respect as a Gatekeeper of the Moral Community**. This second perspective

suggests that respect can be seen as a value that people strive for, regardless of any individual benefits. It implies that people like to be respected because they feel that they should or ought to respect other people, because it is an innate human value (and is thus not driven primarily by personal desires). This idea aligns well with Kant's ideas and his categorical imperative (Hill, 2000, p. 39), which holds that moral behaviour is an end in itself because of "a rational moral requirement for everyone that is not based or conditional on it serving one's contingent personal ends". This perspective seems to suggest that respect is not valued because of personal needs that must be satisfied, but because it is a universal law prescribing that respect is a moral duty. In this way, respect can be seen as a moral building block or gatekeeper for a moral and altruistic community and therefore, from this point of view, respect can be regarded as a community or collective-based value. And, as we know, communities and groups do well when it has values and principles guiding social behaviour. One such important class of principles are those addressing ethical and moral issues. Ethical principles tell us what is important and how we ought to treat other human beings – one such important principle being to approach others in respectful ways (Miller, 2001). Thus, as ethical individuals people often consider respect as something that is a duty and therefore they automatically yield to this ethical principle. This then implies that, giving respect to others is something that should happen without any hesitation and cognitive reflection. It may even be argued that respect as an important ethical principle is 'designed' in such a way that we can live in a moral and humanitarian world. It appears that the perspective "respect as an end in itself" suggests that the act of giving respect is a basic and moral effort that allows people to develop sympathetic and dignified social relationships, ultimately acknowledging the existence of a moral community. Because each person, independent of talents, accomplishments, and social status is regarded as having special worth, such a moral community tends to be relatively cohesive. This perspective then shows that respect can serve as the "social glue" in communities and groups. If respect helps to strengthen a moral and compassionate community, a further assumption is that respect should be internalized in such a way that people are willing to relinquish their own interests to ensure that respect is maintained and also strengthened. Thus, respect can represent an important value in itself because respect as an end in itself makes all of us dignified and ethical human beings. Interestingly, if people can value respect because of its moral connotations, then it may be very likely that respect as an end in itself will impact upon people's self-esteem as well. Recent theoretical perspectives on self-esteem argue that self-esteem reflects, at least in part, perspectives of validation (Pyszcynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). As respect can also be seen as a confirmation of the moral community in which we live, it may thus also raise our self-esteem as authentic and dignified human beings.

Thus, this approach supposes that the perspective "respect as a means to an end" may be something that is very much arising from people's individual needs, whereas the perspective

"respect as an end in itself" represents a signal from society as a whole to ensure the morality of the community people live in.

As we are considering respect as possibly the ultimate basis of morality, I want to refer to Kant's 'Categorical imperative again.

Kant (Corporate Finance Institute, 2022) argued that the supreme principle of morality is a principle of practical rationality that he termed the 'Categorical Imperative' (CI) (which I already referred to earlier). Kant characterized the Categorical Imperative as an objective and rationally necessary and unconditional principle that people must follow despite any natural desires they may have to the contrary. All specific moral requirements, according to Kant, are justified by this principle, which means that all immoral actions are irrational because they violate the Categorical Imperative. Kant wrote that "without rationality, the universe would be a waste, in vain, and without purpose" (Corporate Finance Institute, 2022, n.p.). The only way to safeguard such consciousness, which is unique to the universe or at least the earth, is by treating all humans as ends in and of themselves. Kant understood that for civilization to exist the idea of respect being essential to humanity is non-negotiable – and it is different from sentiments like love, sympathy, or altruism. Respect does not discriminate like love. One is human and, therefore, one deserves respect. Kant called it the 'Formula for Humanity', which is his least controversial conceptualisation. Kant reasoned that rationality is universal, regardless of one's personal experiences and circumstances. And as long as morality is acquired from reason, people will have a reasonable objective sense of what is virtuous and what is not.

Central to Kant's ethical moral theory is the claim that all persons are owed respect just because they are persons, that is, free rational beings. To be a person is to have a status and worth that is unlike that of any other kind of being: it is to be an end in itself with dignity.

To conclude: Unfortunately, there is widespread acceptance of moral skepticism in many societies today and many people are uncomfortable claiming to possess any moral knowledge – even moral knowledge as basic and fundamental as what Kant's view includes namely that all people share equal human dignity and human rights and must be respected accordingly. Furthermore, and closer to home, as Mugambi and Nasimiyu-Waskie (1992) indicate, traditional African virtues are no longer upheld in modern society as sexual immorality, dishonesty, corruption, crime, and violence are rife in today's world – and this may be characterized as an absence of respect as a factor to guide behaviour. Chimbundu and Kgari-Masondo (2020) call for a rekindling of the Ubuntu spirit that captures traditional African values and virtues. Perhaps if respect, that is respect for the self, other human beings, nature, the law is re-instilled in our being there will be a felt appreciation for the basic, equal worth of all people and a commitment to treat the self, others, nature, the law accordingly by showing due respect.

And, dare I say, in the end, may be, just may be, respect ís the ultimate basis of morality.

References

Aristotle (2004). *Nicomachean Ethics* (Trans: JAK Thomas) (2nd Ed.) Penguin Classics.

Aristotle (1999). *Nicomachean Ethics* (Trans: M. Ostwald, Trans.) Prentice Hall.

Barnett, J. H. & Karson, M. J. (1987). Personal values and business decisions: An exploratory investigation. *Journal of Business Ethics, 6*, 371-382.

Boeckman, R. J., & Tyler, T. R. (2000). Trust, respect and the psychology of political engagement. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 32*, 2067-2088.

Bruno, L. F., & Lay, E. G. (2008). Personal values and leadership effectiveness. *Journal of Business Research*, *61*(6), 678-683.

Chimbundu, P. & Kgari-Masondo, M. C. (2020). Representation of the Zimbabwean 2015-2022 Social Studies Curriculum: Teachers' perspectives on challenges and 'Ubuntulising' curriculum change and implementation. *Perspectives in Education, 38*(1). https://hdl.handle.net/10520/ejc-persed-v38-n1-a20

Creswell, J. D., Welch, W. T., Taylor, S. E., Sherman, D. K., Gruenewald, T. L., & Mann, T. (2005). Affirmation of personal values buffers neuroendocrine and psychological stress responses. *Psychological Science, 16*(1), 846-851.

Corporate Finance Institute (2022). *Kantian Ethics*.

Darwall, S. L. (1977). Two Kinds of Respect. *Ethics, 88*(1), 36–49.

Darwall, S. (2013). *Morality, authority, and law: Essays in second-personal ethics I*. OUP Oxford.

Debes, R. (Ed.). (2017). *Dignity: A history*. Oxford University Press.

De Cremer, D. (2002). Respect and cooperation in social dilemmas: The importance of feeling included. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28*(10), 1335-1341.

De Cremer, D. (2003). Non-economic motives predicting cooperation in public good dilemmas: The effect of received respect on contributions. *Social Justice Research, 16*, 367-377.

De Cremer, D. & Mulder, L. B. (2007). A Passion for Respect: On Understanding the Role of Human Needs and Morality. *Gruppendynamik,* **38,** 439–449 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11612-007-0036-1

De Cremer, D. & Tyler, T. R. (2005). A matter of intragroup status: The importance of respect for the viability of groups. In Thomas, M.C. (Ed.). *Status and Group (Research on Managing groups and Teams, Vol 7*), Emerald Group Publising Limited.

Gelfand, M. (1987). *The genuine Shona: Survival values of an African culture*. Mambo.

Gyekye, K. (1998). Person and community in African thought. In P.H Coetzee, P.H. and A.P.J (Eds.), *Philosophy from Africa*. International Thompson Publishing

Hemingway, C. A. (2005). Personal values as a catalyst for corporate social entrepreneurship. *Journal of business ethics*, *60*(3), 233-249.

Heuer, L., Penrod, S., Hafer, C. L., & Cohn, I. (2002). The role of resource and relational concerns for procedural justice. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28*, 1468-1482.

Hill, T. E. (2000). *Respect, pluralism, and justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Johnson, R. & Cureton, A. (2022). Kant's moral Philosophy. In N. Edward (Ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/kant-moral/

Kinoti, H. W. (1992). *African Morality: Past and present*. In J.N.K Mugambi and A. Nasimiyu-Wasike (Eds.), *Moral and Ethical Issues in African Christianity*. Initiatives.

Kant, I. (1785/1997). *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. (Trans: M. Gregor, Ed.). Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (1797/1996). *The metaphysics of morals*. Cambridge University Press.

Locke, J. (1991). The motivation sequence, the motivation hub and the motivation core. *Organisational Behaviour and Human Decision processes, 50*(2), 288-299.

Marcum, J. A. (2008). Medical axiology and values. In An introductory philosophy of medicine: Humanising modern medicine. *Philosophy and medicine 99*. Springer Science and Business Media.

Miller, D. T. (2001). Disrespect and the experience of injustice. *Annual Review of Psychology, 130*, 435-468.

Mugambi, J. K., & Nasimiyu-Wasike, A. (1992). Moral and ethical issues in African Christianity: Exploratory essays in moral theology.

Ogletree, T. W. (2004). Value and valuation. In S.G. Post (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Bioethics* (3rd ed.). MacMillan.

Pelser, A., & Jensen, M. (2022). Ethics and Respect for Human Dignity: Understanding and Assessing the USAFA Ethics Outcome. *The Journal of Character & Leadership Development*, *9*(1), 46-55.

Pitts, R. E., & Woodside, A. G. (1986). Personal values and travel decisions. *Journal of Travel Research*, *25*(1), 20-25.

Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Arndt, J., & Schimel, J. (2004). Why do people need self-esteem? A theoretical and empirical review. *Psychological bulletin*, *130*(3), 435.

Raz, J. (2009). *The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality* (2nd ed.). Oxford.

Ring, C., Kavussanu, M., Gürpınar, B., Whitehead, J., & Mortimer, H. (2022). Basic values predict unethical behavior in sport: The case of athletes' doping likelihood. *Ethics & Behavior*, *32*(1), 90-98.

Rodriguez-Soto, M., Serramia, M., Lopez-Sanchez, M., & Rodriguez-Aguilar, J. A. (2022). Instilling moral value alignment by means of multi-objective reinforcement learning. *Ethics and Information Technology*, *24*(1), 1-17.

Russel, D. (2015). Aristotle on cultivating virtue. In N Snow (Ed.), *Cultivating virtue: perspectives from philosophy, theology, and psychology*. Oxford University Press.

Sensen, O. (2009). Dignity and the Formula of Humanity. Jens Timmerman (Ed.). *Kant's groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A critical Guide*, pp. 102-118. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sensen, O. (2011). Kant on human dignity. In *Kant on Human Dignity*. de Gruyter.

Simon, B., & Stürmer, S. (2005). In search of the active ingredient of respect: A closer look at the role of acceptance. *European journal of social psychology*, *35*(6), 809-818.

Simon, B., Lücken M,. & Stümer, S. (2006). The added value of respect: Reaching across inequality. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 45* (3), 535-546.

Schwartz, S. H., Caprara, G. V., & Vecchione, M. (2010). Basic personal values, core political values, and voting: A longitudinal analysis. *Political psychology*, *31*(3), 421-452.

Skinner, Q. (1996). *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes*. Cambridge University Press.

Tyler, T., Degoey, P., & Smith, H. (1996). Understanding why the justice of group procedures matters: A test of the psychological dynamics of the group-value model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *70*(5), 913.

United Nations (1948). *Universal Declaration of Human rights*. https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/

Van der Walt, B. J. (2003). Morality in Africa: Yesterday and today. The reasons for the contemporary crisis. *In die Skriflig, 37*(1), 51-71.

Waite, S. (2011). Teaching and learning outside the classroom: personal values, alternative pedagogies and standards. *Education 3–13*, *39*(1), 65-82.

Wang, X., Li, F., & Sun, Q. (2018). Confucian ethics, moral foundations, and shareholder value perspective: An exploratory study. *Business Ethics: A European View, 27*(3), 260-271.

Wood, A. (1999). *Kant's Ethical Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wood, A. W. (1998). Kant on duties regarding nonrational nature: Allen W. Wood. In *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* (Vol. 72, No. 1, pp. 189-210). University College London: The Aristotelian Society.