

**THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERI-URBAN  
TRANSFORMATIONS IN ZIMBABWE UNDER GLOBALISATION  
- A CASE STUDY OF HARARE**

by

**Elias Mazhindu**

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**Supervisor**

**Dr. Beacon Mbiba**

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## Declaration


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## Abstract

The bulk of urban studies in sub-Saharan Africa has, hitherto, focused on the impacts of structural adjustment programmes on urban productivity and citizen welfare. However, little is known about the dynamics (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 114) of the structural gaps between the stated policy prescriptions and implementation practices, on one hand, and on the other, between the policy practices and lived experiences of ordinary residents in the marginalised urban spaces in developing countries that neoliberal economic structural reforms have engendered. Meanwhile the dominant perspectives on the nature and meaning of “peri-urban” have intensified instead of stemming the crises of managing increasingly contested urban frontiers in the poorer countries (Mbiba & Huchermeyer, 2002: 114; Simon, *et al.*, 2004; Lombard, 2016). Using Harvey’s (2003) revised and extended Marxist perspective of “primitive accumulation by dispossession” on *jambanja*, the study critically engages with the “multiple realities” (Giddens, 1984) of radically transformed peri-urban landscapes in a case study of Harare. The study deploys a mixed method strategy to capture multiple data sets through semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and biographical accounts (Creswell & Brown, 1992; Mouton, 2003: 196) across different contexts of the ‘peri-urban’ in Harare. These contexts range from Zimbabwe’s abandoned neoliberal structural reform programme (Bond & Manyanya, 2003; Mbiba, 2017a: 8-9) to the country’s elitist policy projects of *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina* (Moyo, 2013a; 2013b) post-2000. Drawing on the lived experiences of purposively selected town planners and ordinary peri-urban residents, the study builds conceptual blocks to bridge the gaps between the official policy prescriptions and the everyday life experiences of intended beneficiary ordinary residents. The study concludes that the emerging palimpsest peri-urban interface in sub-Saharan Africa can be productive sites for understanding the dynamics of informalised party-state institutions, political patronage and violence in reproducing urban space. Thus, a reimagining of the peri-urban interface in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa should harness the multiple voices, struggles and experiences in everyday life of residents towards broadening urban theory.

**Keywords:** restructuring, dynamics, palimpsest, peri-urban interface, urban theory

## **Dedication**

I dedicate this thesis to my beloved wife Zodwa, daughter Penelope and son, Anesu, sister Tobolina, nephews Roy, Brighton and niece, Dorcas Chawatama - each one of you played your own part like a perfect symphony.

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## **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

BSAC	British South Africa Company
CBD	Central Business District
DFID	Department for International Development
DPP	Department of Physical Planning
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FTLRP	“Fast Track” Land Resettlement Programme
GWE	GrowthWith Equity
ICED	Infrastructure and Cities for Economic Development
IGNU	Inclusive Government of National Unity
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MPs	Members of Parliament
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
PUI	Peri-urban interface
RDC	Rural District Council
RTCPA	Regional, Town and Country Planning Act
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SIUCs	Small and Intermediate Urban Centres
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
UCA	Urban Councils Act
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States of America International Development
WB	World Bank
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZIMPLATS	Zimbabwe Platinum Mining Company
ZIMSTAT	Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency

# CHAPTER 1: NEOLIBERAL RESTRUCTURING AND THE PERI-URBAN INTERFACE

## 1.1 Setting the scene: from neoliberal restructuring to *jambanja* political economy

The study anchors on the problematic of conceptualising the peri-urban interface (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 113; Allen, 2003; Kombe, 2005) in the context of contemporary global urban policy debates on inclusive cities (Roy, 2005: 1; Davis, 2016: 3). A markedly changed peri-urban interface in the tidal waves of neoliberal restructuring<sup>1</sup> (Soja, 1987: 178) in the sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries (Bayat, 2000: 534; Briggs & Yeboah, 2001: 18; Carmody & Owusu, 2016: 62) has renewed interest in a search for urban policy models (Amin & Graham, 1997: 412) that can capture the socio-spatial gaps characterising urban land governance policy landscapes in the cities of these developing countries. Thus, the study sets out specifically to explain the forces and processes underlying the “unprecedented” land governance policy “transformations” (Brenner & Theodore, 2005: 101; Carmody & Owusu, 2016: 63; Mbiba, 2017a: 8-9, 2017c: 7) that are playing out the emerging palimpsest peri-urban landscapes in Zimbabwe - using a case study of Harare.

The entry point of this study are the contradictions and antagonisms of socio-spatial development policy prescriptions and implementation practices reproducing structural gaps in the urban land governance spaces of many sub-Saharan African countries, mainly due to the shifting terrains of “failed politics” there (Moyo & Skalness 1990: 201; Moyo & Yeros, 2005). Recent urban scholarships have observed that although the stated policy intentions of many African governments have been designed to benefit the majority ordinary citizens living in poverty, in practice, however, the intended beneficiaries have usually ended up being marginalised (De Boeck, *et al.*, 2013: 1; Moyo & Skalness 1990: 201; Moyo & Yeros, 2005) or excluded (Roy 2009a: 81, 82;

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<sup>1</sup> In this work, Soja’s (1987) formulation of restructuring postulates “contentious social-spatial transformations [transfigurations] as outcomes of market-driven systemic breakdowns in the established forms of urban life concomitant with anti-global capital policy realignments due to contested regulatory frameworks (Brenner & Theodore 2005: 101).

Yiftachel 2009a, 2009b). The main focus of this study is that a key policy objective of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government's "fast track" land reform programme (*jambanja*<sup>2</sup>) was to dispossess the minority White commercial farmers of their large farming estates and in order to more equitably redistribute them to a hitherto landless black majority of peasant farmers (Moyo & Skalness, 1990: 202-203). However, during the implementation of an intentionally egalitarian land reform policy, only loyalist members of the incumbent ZANU-PF party and allied businessmen accessed most of the dispossessed White commercial farms. To that end, an array of *jambanja* land reform policy implementation strategies, unleashed by the increasingly militarised ZANU-PF party-state machinery, galvanised the ensuing fraudulent "land grabs" (McGregor, 2013a, 2013b; Alexander & McGregor, 2013; Mbiba 2017c), orgies of "violence"<sup>3</sup> (Chaumba, *et al.*, 2003; Scarnecchia, 2006; Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 359; Magure, 2012: 72; Mbiba, 2017a: 3) and politicised "instrumentalisation of disorder (Chabal & Daloz, 1999: 144).

Ultimately, the cumulative impacts of these land reform policy strategies on Zimbabwean society have tended to reproduce the structural gaps between the country's ruling black elite class and a majority of marginalised citizens (see Chapters 5 and 6). As demonstrated by the evidence in chapters 5 and 6, the "big winners" of the heavily politicised and exclusivist land reform terrains have been "the ruling ZANU-PF party executives", recognised (Mujere, *et al.*, 2017) in the country's liberation war records, and their business allies while the "big losers" have comprised the majority of landless citizens (Mhanda, 2011: 229; Shumba, 2016: 191). It is little wonder that some scholars note that neo-liberal policies may use processes of "symbolic inclusion" (Porter & Craig, 2004) yet, at the same time, these policies thrive on processes of material exclusion (Miraftab, 2004).

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<sup>2</sup> *Jambanja* is a local vernacular Shona colloquial term denoting the chaos and violence directed against the white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe during the "fast track" land reform programme (FLTRP), spearheaded by the country's liberation war veterans and patronized by an increasingly permissive ZANU-PF party-state in early 2000. The metaphor "*jambanja*" literally means "turning the table upside down or rejection of existing order or rebellion" (Mbiba, 2017a: 3).

<sup>3</sup> The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines "violence as the intentional use of physical force or power, resulting in injury or harm" (WHO, 2002). Moser suggests that "while both conflict and violence are concerned with power, the former does not necessarily inflict physical harm, but the latter characteristically does" (Moser, 2004 cited in Lombard & Rakodi, 2016: 2688).

Clearly, the major impacts of the *jambanja* policy “contradictions”<sup>4</sup> and antagonisms fuelling the gaps in the architecture of Zimbabwe’s peri-urban land governance practices seem to be reproducing structural gaps between a “new comprador ruling black elite class of political and military executives, that occupies the apex of society, and a subdued majority of ordinary citizens, its bottom” (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 369; Dawson & Kelsall, 2012; Shumba, 2016: 191). In all this, the key question of this study is: How can the structural gaps between the Zimbabwe government’s stated land policy prescriptions of *jambanja*<sup>5</sup> and implementation practices on one hand, and on the other, between these practices (strategies, laws, planning regulations) versus the experiences of the ordinary residents living in the contested peri-urban spaces, be understood in reconstructing a radically changed peri-urban interface in Harare?

## 1.2 Contextualising the key question in the study

Addressing the key question of this study, Bayat (2000) points out the structural gaps between the haves and have-nots in cities of the global South since implementation of structural adjustment programmes (SAPS) in the 1980s. Bayat observes that the structural impacts of capital’s “double process of integration, on the one hand and social exclusion and informalisation, on the other” has propelled a further growth of the excluded and marginalised subaltern in cities of the poor countries (Bayat, 2000: 533). In Harvey’s (2003) eyes, the undying socio-economic inequalities between the new comprador elites (now galvanised by the capitalist interests of a new Black bourgeoisie) and an underprivileged majority in the neoliberalizing African countries serve as important signals for sustainable structural policy readjustments. Harvey points out that

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<sup>4</sup> Mbiba and Huchzermeyer portray “contradictions as the perceived inconsistencies in the system of social organization in terms of analytical expectations and material conditions” (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 114-115). In the latter case, contradictions relate to “unintended material conditions arising from human action” (Giddens, 1984). Analytical contradictions relate to “perverse outcomes” where “things are worse than they were before in circumstances in which all or the majority of those involved expected them to be better” (Giddens, 1984: 317). Both “analytical and material contradictions are likely to cause antagonisms that, if pursued actively, lead to conflict” (Giddens, 1984: 311).

<sup>5</sup> For many, *jambanja* was radical rather than neoliberal. By nature, *jambanja* veered away from the systematic neoliberal land policies as practised in Kenya in the early 1980s. In Zimbabwe, by contrast, the ZANU-PF government openly refused to take the neoliberal road and instead orchestrated *jambanja* land reforms in a populist protest against the neoliberal world that has responded with a heavy hand leading to the country’s “unrelenting economic and financial crises and undying political tensions since 2000” (Mbiba, 2017a: 2).

the growing inequalities in the production of urban spaces should be recognised as the “decisive moments in the historical career of capitalism as each [socio-economic] crisis creates opportunities for destruction and accumulation for some while subjecting others to extreme poverty” (Harvey, 2003: 146-147, 2005a; 2005b) [own emphasis].

After Harvey’s (2003) revised and extended Marxist concept of “primitive accumulation by dispossession”, Figure 1.1 shows some of the major impacts of Zimbabwe’s economic structural programme (ESAP) in the mid-1990s. The impacts of the Zimbabwe’s failed structural policy experiments, since the turn of the new millennium, continue to “dominate the political agenda of opposition political parties and broader sections of civil




Figure 1.1- Neoliberalism, the state and ‘jambanja’ in Zimbabwe (Adopted drawing by Mbiba, 2020).

society” (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 322) in the country. From this scenario, emerge the following questions pivotal to the study:

What policy strategies has the ruling ZANU-PF party and government pursued in creating wealth opportunities to benefit its supporters in the informalised peri-urban land spaces in Harare?



What policy strategies has the ruling ZANU-PF party and government pursued in creating wealth opportunities to benefit its supporters in the informalised peri-urban land spaces in Harare?

In what ways have ordinary residents responded to the impacts of government land use planning policy actions in peri-urban Harare?

To answer these questions, the study uses a critical political economy analytical<sup>6</sup>




Figure 1.2. Location of Harare, Administrative Map of Zimbabwe (Google Map, 2018)

<sup>6</sup> A political economy analysis is “concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society, in particular, the distribution of power and wealth resources between different groups and individuals and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time” (OECD DAC, 2003 in DFID, 2009: 4). This definition draws particular attention to politics, understood in terms of contestation and bargaining between interest groups with competing claims over rights and resources. However, it is equally concerned with the economic processes that generate wealth, and that influence how political choices are made. In reality these processes are closely inter-related and part of a unified set of dynamics which influence development outcomes (ibid).

framework. This framework can help reconstruct why and how Zimbabwe's ZANU-PF-led government abandoned its avowed neoliberal experiment (ESAP) in the mid-1990s (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 335). Why, for instance, did the ZANU-PF government opt to implement a series of anti-global capital neoliberal projects, notably, the "fast-track" land reform programme (code-named in local Shona lexicon "*jambanja*"<sup>7</sup>) in 2000 (Chaumba, Scoones & Wolmer, 2003; Moyo, 2013a; 2013b; Matondi, 2012) and Operation *Murambatsvina* ("drive out the filth/dirt/rubbish") in 2005 (IDMC, 2006; UN-Habitat, 2005; Kamete, 2006; Sadomba, 2011)? For with Operation *Murambatsvina*, the ZANU-PF party-state targeted all the country's main urban centres (see Figure 1.1 above), where the ruling party had lost the vote, harping on a number of reasons to conceal its real intentions. An incensed ZANU-PF party-state went all out to "discipline" what it concocted as "an unruly populace" in order to justify the state-led demolitions of property and evictions under the pretexts of "restoring order" (Kamete, 2006: 259; Morreira, 2010: 352). Given the ever-expanding and shifting socio-economic policy orientations in the country, the thesis specifically confines itself to Zimbabwe's state-society engagements in peri-urban land governance in the political economy contexts of *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina*. In the section below, the chapter explains the main reasons that motivated the study to engage a political economy analysis of the gaps between official urban land governance and policy practices and between the latter and lived experiences of ordinary residents at the margins of Harare.

### **1.3 Additional concepts for theorising palimpsest peri-urban interface**

A political economy approach, based on Harvey's (2003) revised Marxist concept of "accumulation by dispossession", offers critical resources for tracing out how the contradictions and conflicts<sup>8</sup> underlying the vested capitalist interests of "the ruling ZANU-PF party-state elites" and allied business networks (Alexander & McGregor,

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<sup>7</sup> Leaning on Harvey (2004: 74), the crises of "primitive accumulation by dispossession" during *jambanja* in Zimbabwe witnessed "the forceful expulsion of white farm owners and resident populations of farm workers from the invaded farms by the state-sponsored militias; the compulsory conversion of various forms of property rights – common, collective and state into exclusive private property rights to benefit ZANU-PF party executives and loyalists (Mbiba, 2017c: 1-2; Scoones, *et al.*, 2010; Marongwe, 2003, 2011; Tekere, 2007: 11).

<sup>8</sup> Conflict may be defined as "a disagreement, contest or struggle between people with opposing beliefs, concerns, goals, interests, needs or values" (Serrat, 2010: 2).

2013: 750; Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 343; Kriger, 2012: 15; Bratton, 2014; Shumba, 2016: 11) have played out in Zimbabwe's radically changed peri-urban interface. Clearly, this analytical stance stands in contrast with the bulk of urban studies where populist protests against undesirable spatial outcomes have shunned the enduring political contradictions embedded in "colonial institutional frameworks and regulatory practices" (Peck, *et al.*, 2009: 50) enduringly unchallenged in many sub-Saharan African countries. Drawing parallels with other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the study points out some of the contradictions between official policy intentions and practices fuelling socially inequitable land use practices in a restructuring peri-urban Zimbabwe. In all this, it is tempting to hold responsible the political power plays between a hegemonic ZANU-PF party-state and resistance social movements for the conflicts underlying the enduring modernist urban development policy practices in Harare. Put differently, the question is: why have past colonial urban land development policy practices, despite the contradictions in reproducing socio-spatial gaps between the state and marginalised ordinary residents, remained unchallenged in both the dominant urban studies and policy implementation practices in many African countries?

There seems to be a widespread reluctance in both urban theory and practice to challenge the contradictions and antagonisms underlying the characteristic failures of policy intentions and implementation practices in many African countries let alone questioning the forms and contents of the dominant African urban and peri-urban research projects "sponsored by international development agencies" (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 114). A possible explanation for the reluctance can be located in the vested political economy interests of these international development funding agencies dictating policy choices of bankable projects. Little wonder that the mainstream urban studies in most African countries have traditionally "insisted on the normative (material, concrete) questions of urban economic growth and development patterns along western lines" while filtering out the dialectical (subjective) processes that have mainly re-shaped "neoliberal urban space" since the early 1970s (Peck & Tickell, 2002: 380; Brenner & Theodore, 2005: 101). Yet, the reality is that urban change, together with the underpinning policy orientations, has largely been "volatile and uncertain in nature, representing multiple struggles and ever-mutating processes over time and space" (Brenner & Theodore, 2005: 100; Harvey, 2003; Pinson & Journal

2016: 137). The socio-spatial contradictions and antagonisms accompanying urban change have often witnessed “the destruction of previous institutions and artefacts while creating or imposing new ones in their place” (Pinson & Journel, 2016: 139; Harvey, 2003; Bayat, 2000: 533).

But there is yet “another important political dynamic worth noting; one that relates to an ideological role of discourse in shaping the ideas (as opposed to interests) of political actors” (Fox, 2014: 198;) involved in the multiple struggles and complex processes of urban change. Hence, an express concern of the enquiry is to point out how the dominant Western discourses of “modernity” (Robinson, 2006; Roy, 2009a, 2009b; Pieterse, 2008) have been held responsible for the flawed policy orientations (Harris & Todaro, 1970: 137; Lipton, 1977: 1) ill-suited to the contexts in the developing countries. Pointing out some of the blindspots in dominant Western discourses of the peri-urban in Africa, the following section sheds light on how a re-casting of “peri-urban” phenomena can and should accommodate the vibrant “life-worlds” that have long since travelled beyond the rural-urban frontier in sub-Saharan Africa (Hahn & Kastner, 2014: 12) in a worlding of cities.

#### **1.4 Re-imagining the “peri-urban” through “life-worlds in motion”**

Many southern scholars have accused the “situated discourses and theoretical engagements” in the North of “othering” cities in the global South as “backward” (Robinson, 2002; 2006; 2013: 660; Parnell & Robinson, 2012; Myers, 2010; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012). Universal modernist perspectives have been found to be the leading culprits in a wholesale “downgrading” of cities in the developing countries and conspiring in “primitive accumulation with dispossession” (Harvey, 2012; 2003) policy schemes to exploit the backward regions – all in the name of modernising progress (Nash, 2002: 224). Unsurprisingly, simplistic transfers of dualistic urban policy concepts from Western into complex cultural contexts in the global South (Ward, 2002; Watson, 2009b: 172) have often ignored the “misconceptions” (Brook, *et al.*, 2003; Tait & Jensen, 2007: 107) that have produced damaging “development policy trends” in the receiving countries (Fox, 2014: 199) at the expense of endogenous development interests. Meanwhile, the generic urban development policy misconceptions have often

tended to equate the rural sector “with marginality, poverty, illegitimacy, and disorder” (Adell, 1999: 36; Allen, 2003; Lombard, 2009: 1) and abjection (McGregor, 2008). The underpinning urban policy constructs have valorised the city as a motor of economic growth. However, despite these epistemic biases, the ruling elites in the cities of the global South continue to obsess with modernist policy practices. Understandably in many parts of the world, urban modernism has been associated with being modern, development and “catching up with the West’ has been attractive to governments and elites who wish to be viewed in this way (Watson 2009b: 174). The irony is that the same modernist elites often turn around to accuse capitalist neoliberal reform policy prescriptions of marginalising millions of the poor by subjecting (Lombard, 2014; Djurfeldt, 2017: 137) them to economic deprivation through austerity measures. Nevertheless, the weaknesses and dilemmas of dualistic policy practices in the developing countries have attracted a variety of criticisms.

Firstly, despite the widespread experiences with regional development policy practices that underline the importance of rural-urban interactions in the social, economic and cultural processes of change, some empirical findings suggest that the scale and nature of these interactions “still have a relatively limited impact on development policy readjustments in the developing countries” (Tacoli, 1998: 3). Arguably, sustainable regional development through integrative planning policies has not lived up to its promises and intentions mainly owing to the “structural rigidities” (Todes & Turok, 2018: 4) and predatory power interests of the new ruling elites (Chabal & Daloz, 1999; McGregor, 2013a, 2013b; Mbiba, 2017c). To be certain, the main beneficiaries of regional development policy interventions have been “alliances of ruling party executives, the wealthy and internationally well-connected business executives” (Roitman, 2005). Sometimes, the relatively high failure rate of integrative policy strategies is often due to “the lack of recognising [and understanding] the complexity of the rural-urban dynamics of the complex power-laden processes” (Tacoli, 1998: 3; Todes & Turok, 2018: 4) rather than a lack of resources. At other times, the ruling elites deliberately initiate periodic crises as pretexts for “expropriating public resources for personal gains and political profiteering over people” (Magure, 2014; Shumba, 2016: 71; Mbiba, 2017c: 31) thereby stalling equitable development.

Secondly, a purely geographical separation of “the rural” from “the urban” has been rejected for diluting the vibrant “life-worlds” (Tacoli, 1998: 3; Simone, 2001; Potts, 2007: 2; Hahn & Kastner, 2014: 12) that blur a discrete rural-urban divide through small and intermediate towns (Scoones, 2016a). The flows of people (Potts, 2010), “entrepreneurial, transport and electronic networks connecting rural and urban communities have virtually erased the assumed spatial, temporal and symbolic differences between rural and urban ways of life” (Simone, 2001; Mayer, *et al.*, 2016: 2; Hatcher, 2017: 9). As discussed in more detail in chapter 6, recent studies on the impacts of land reforms on the small intermediate towns of Mvurwi, Maphisa and Chatsworth in Zimbabwe indicate that “urban residents are better able to make links with the rural hinterlands offering them cheap land resources and new income-earning opportunities” (Scoones, 2016a; ICED, 2017: 16; Scoones & Murimbarimba 2020). The rapid sprawl of metropolitan Harare and Bulawayo as well as the medium-size cities of Mutare, Masvingo and Kadoma through informal settlements has been associated with the internal dynamic of patronage politics that have blossomed to speculative peri-urban land markets (Alexander & McGregor, 2013) since *jambanja* in 2000.

Recalling their experience in West Africa, Hahn and Kastner (2014: 212) have questioned the silence of Northern discourses on the “migratory trends of people across the physical boundaries between, within and beyond the rural and urban life-worlds”<sup>9</sup> in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Globally, a perspective that depicts cities as socio-spatially separate from villages in Africa is both simplistic and misleading. Such a trajectory simply overlooks the complex ways rural and urban spaces enmesh with each other and beyond international boundaries through travel and connectivity (Kane, 2014 in Hahn & Kastner, 2014: 189). The reality is that millions of people daily weave between the different modes of rural or urban life that suit them (Duminy, 2011: 3) over time and space. Put differently, there are “no boundaries between the rural and urban spaces nor

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<sup>9</sup>Habermas’s (1987 [1981]) “lifeworld” (*Lebenswelt* in German) constitutes “the lived space within a person’s reach.” Theoretically, Habermas’s life-world system stretches from one’s allocation of time to the performance of activities in everyday life starting with one’s interactions with family members, peers extending to the community, the nation, and world society. In reality, Habermas’s lifeworld is shaped by regulatory constraints stemming from private life, the family, and intimate relations. The structural dynamics of this lifeworld system are also influenced by the “rules imposed by the expanding power of bureaucracy, the influence of corporate capitalism and mass consumption” (Habermas, 1987 [1981]).

is there a linear movement into or out of them: rather, these are interlocking spaces and movement is in multiple directions” (Mbiba, 2011: 54).

Thirdly, the Northern discourses of a “discrete rural-urban divide” seem to have been overtaken by a “deepening informalisation of urban economies” in the South (Watson, 2009a: 157; Carmody & Owusu, 2016: 61). A pervasive informal economy has helped “diasporic middle-class migrants” (Myers, 2011) and other informal entrepreneurs to capture opportunities of wealth accumulation in the global market economy in “crisis contexts” (Brinkerhoff, 2008). Dreading to be overtaken in the contest for global markets, some African urban governments have commissioned new financial architectures, high-tech industrial parks, glass tower buildings and elite residential areas (Carmody & Owusu, 2016: 62) in order to lure diasporic investments (Watson, 2014a: 216). Ironically, the modernisation of urban space in sub-Saharan Africa seems to have deepened social inequality and overlooked the needs of the urban poor, in the production of cities.

Confronted by the failures in managing its own brand of neoliberal structural reforms (ESAP) and its “crumbling popularity” (Dawson & Kelsall, 2012: 55), the then Mugabe-led government of Zimbabwe resorted to an “accelerated” land reform programme (*jambanja*) (Mbiba, 2018: 3) to regain its lost political influence in the opposition MDC-dominated urban centres (McGregor, 2013b: 783; Gwekwerere, *et al.*, 2017: 7). With *jambanja* came spatial development policy challenges in peri-urban land governance in Zimbabwe. These challenges marked a resurgent interest in re-engaging with the dynamics of the rapid and unprecedented land use transformations taking place in the country’s peri-urban areas.

### **1.5 *Jambanja* and dynamics of the changed peri-urban land use governance**

The socio-spatial dynamics of Zimbabwe’s peri-urban land use governance terrain can be understood through an analysis of the increasingly “authoritarian populist<sup>10</sup> policy

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<sup>10</sup> Explaining the concept of authoritarian populism Stuart Hall (1979), in his celebrated essay “*The Great Moving Right Show*”, argues that an authoritarian populist regime cultivates its popularity through “weakening democratic forms and initiatives but without suspending them.” In populist stance, economic projects are based upon personal ties between leader and masses, clientelism is a hallmark, there is a robust

tactics of the ZANU-PF party-state when resorted to a ‘fast track’ land reform programme” (*jambanja*) (Chaumba, *et al.*, 2003: 7; Sachikonye, 2004: 9; Moyo, 2013a; 2013b; Mudimu & Kurima, 2018: 1) in order to regain the popularity that it had lost to the opposition MDC party in all the country’s urban centres. The main vehicle of *jambanja* political strategy was “causing [outrageous] violence through chaos with impunity” (Matondi 2012: xi) through trashing the existing law and order” (Mbiba, 2017a: 3). As revealed in Chapter 5, Zimbabwe’s wily populist ZANU-PF party commissioned its agents to “bypass the regulatory procedures of layout planning, surveying, servicing and occupation” (Muchadenyika and Williams, 2016a: 34). Thus, in “a highly contested political environment, any form of legitimate planning objection was thwarted with the threat of physical violence (Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016a). To be blunt, orderly “town planning was criminalised as it became difficult to stand in the way of *jambanja* with rational arguments without being abused both professionally and physically” (ibid.: 34).

But soon the authoritarian manner in which *jambanja* was orchestrated through militarised and state-sanctioned violence increased disaffection with the depredations under an increasingly repressive ZANU-PF government (Dawson & Kelsall, 2012: 55; ICED, 2017: 17; Mujere, *et al.*, 2017: 87). The widespread protests of disaffection, spearheaded by an urban-centred opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), derided a hegemonic<sup>11</sup> ZANU-PF party-state for presiding over deteriorating conditions in everyday life (Matondi, 2012: 13; Mudimu & Kurima, 2018: 9) and mismanagement of the country’s deepening economic crises (Matondi, 2012: 15). Notwithstanding the growing protests at the worsening economic challenges, the government proceeded with “its avowed policies of indigenisation and empowerment” (Magure, 2014).

The operational dynamics of *jambanja* offered modalities for “patronage and entitlement” and the “stripping of state resources” (Mandaza, 2016) through “black

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implementation of policies of redistribution, disregard for the constitution and illegal influences on the judiciary (Scoones, *et al.*, 2017).

<sup>11</sup> Hegemony refers to a “social and cultural consensus, albeit shifting, contested, and underpinned by coercion, which allows for the dominance of a ruling class” (Jones, 2006:3).



economic empowerment” (Shumba, 2016: 72; UNDP, 2008: 211; Sachikonye, 2012: 89; Dawson & Kelsall, 2012: 54). Thus, *jambanja* set in motion a transformation of the large-scale peri-urban farms and open spaces into sporadic sites of shacks and preemptive signposts proclaiming “No go area – war veterans inside” (Chaumba, *et al.*, 2003: 10). *Jambanja* converted peri-urban farms into a highly politicised and militarised landscape (Raftopoulos & Eppel, 2008; Mudimu & Kurima, 2018: 10; Raftopoulos, 2019: 6). Zimbabwean national flags planted on anthills or hung on trees and ZANU-PF posters proclaimed that “land is the economy, the economy is land” and “Zimbabwe will never be a colony again” were plastered on trees and farmgate posts (Chaumba, *et al.*, 2003: 10).

Meanwhile, the country’s “polarised politics over the control of urban centres” (Madebwe & Madebwe, 2005; Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016b) have often meant that changing boundaries or not has become a question of “political expediency rather than a response to urgent urban management demands” (Mbiba, 2017b: 12). Moreover, the political infighting for survival within both the ruling ZANU-PF party and its rival urban-based MDC party has “undermined urban service delivery” (Resnick, 2014: 3; McGregor, 2013b: 783). These struggles for power have exposed peri-urban marginalised communities to “patronage politics in dictating the distribution of public land resources and services along partisan lines” (McGregor, 2013b: 784; Muchadenyika, 2015a: 1221; Magure, 2014). Patronage,<sup>12</sup> “has become a currency with which to purchase political support” (Sorauf 1960: 28) and this has important implications for inclusive urban development. For this reason, the study draws heavily on a highly contested *jambanja* political economy trajectory to bridge the gaps between the stated policy intentions of an increasingly militarised authoritarian ZANU-PF party-state and the experiences of subdued majority ordinary citizens living in informal settlements that are often marginalised in national development policy schemes.

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<sup>12</sup> The chief functions of political patronage are maintaining an active party organisation through “the use of public resources to reward individuals for their electoral support” (Sorauf, 1960: 28).

## **1.6 Gaps between state and ordinary residents in peri-urban abject spaces**

As demonstrated in chapter 5, the structural gaps in the accessing and use of land resources seem to have triggered multi-layered, fragmented and rapidly sprawling developments in peri-urban Harare. These gaps, identified in interviews with urban planners in stakeholder planning authorities (discussed in Chapters 5, 7), morphed into regulatory challenges of compliance with the country's modernist planning system (Regional Town and Country Planning Act, 1996; Wekwete, 1988: 57, 1989: 7; Mbiba 2017a: 1). In particular, the provisions of a restrictive and technocratic planning law (Potts, 2011; Kamete, 2013a; 2013b, Muchadenyika, 2015a, 2017; Watson, 2009b), enshrined in Zimbabwe's planning law, on one hand, and a selective adherence to the planning regulatory instruments by political 'big wigs' and well-connected, on the other hand (Mbiba, 2017c: 10) seem to have reinforced the gap between the vested interests in wealth accumulation of the rulers and the experiences. The unfinished business of state-sponsored demolitions of housing and retail trade structures, deemed to be "spatially unruly" (Kamete, 2008) in the informal peri-urban settlement enclaves, has become the norm rather than an exception. Due to the internal dynamics of failed power politics, in Watson's words, "the planned city [keeps] sweeping the poor away" (Watson, 2009b: 177) [own emphasis].

To sum up, it is clear from above and the empirical evidence presented in chapters 5 to 7 that through orchestrated "politics of patronage" (McGregor, 2002, 2013: 783; Alexander & McGregor, 2013: 749), selective "entitlements" to state assets (Mandaza, 2016), informalisation of "planning power" (Kamete, 2011; Muchadenyika & Williams, 2017) and "accumulation by dispossession" (Harvey, 2003: 147), the ZANU-PF party-state has virtually captured all the key control sites of peri-urban land resources in Zimbabwe. These control sites present new theoretical beacons for re-mapping a peri-urban interface where gaps between state-party policy prescriptions and its actions on one side, and on the other, between the latter and lived experiences of ordinary residents have been reproduced in the country's post 2000 era. Based on this narrative, the questions listed in the next section guided the study to flesh out the forces and vested interests reproducing the gaps between government peri-urban land policy practice and the lived experiences of citizens living in contested peri-urban spaces.

## **1.7 Underlying research questions**

1. What dynamics explain the structural gaps between government's stated public land policy intentions and practice, on one hand, and on the other, between practice and the lived experiences of ordinary residents in peri-urban Harare?
2. How can the dynamics of these structural policy gaps help to recapture a changed peri-urban interface in Harare since *jambanja*?
3. In what ways can the viewpoints of marginalised peri-urban ordinary residents meaningfully help to reimagine a peri-urban interface in conditions of a neoliberal restructuring in SSA?

## **1.8 Aim**

To explain the forces and processes underlying the structural gaps between government stated policy intentions and implementation practices, on one hand, and on the other, between practice and the lived experiences of marginalised ordinary residents in peri-urban Harare during *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina* towards recapturing a peri-urban interface.

### ***1.8.1 Key objective***

The research sought to construct additional theoretical blocks on the peri-urban interface using the lived experiences of residents in the informal settlements in peri-urban Harare in the contexts of Zimbabwe's "fast track" land reform project (*jambanja*) and Operation *Murambatsvina*.

### ***1.8.2 Specific objectives***

To conceptualise the structural gaps between state-policy intentions and practice, on one hand, and between practice and lived experiences of ordinary residents during *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina* using the "viewpoints of the participants" (Schwandt,

1994: 118, 2000; Guba & Lincoln, 1989), the study collected quantitative and qualitative data on:

1. The experiences of town planning officers in stakeholder government agencies relating to party-state engagements in peri-urban land use in Harare during *jambanja*.
2. The lived experiences of ordinary residents in the peri-urban informal settlements of Harare relating to their engagements with party-state institutions during implementation of *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina*.
3. The experiences of town planning practitioners concerning their role in land development planning engagements and impacts on the peri-urban interface in Harare during *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina*.

## **1.9 Spatial delimitations and design of the study**

The study conducted a multi-site survey straddling three concurrent phases (see Figure 4.1 in chapter 4). The phases were so designed to facilitate a dialogue across the household interviews, focus group discussions and biographical interviews, concurrently. The research particularly targeted peri-urban communal villages in Domboshava and *jambanja* informal settlements in Solomio in Ruwa, Caledonia on the eastern edge of Harare city and Saturday Retreat in Harare South (see Figure 1.3).

Domboshava is situated 20 kilometres north-east of Harare, whereas Caledonia and Solomio in Ruwa lie 25 kilometres eastwards of Harare city centre. A recent study (Hungwe, 2014) estimated Domboshava to have 7 123 households – an estimated 42 700 people on an average of six members per household. Solomio informal settlement, named after Solomon Mujuru, a former ZANU-PF liberation war commander, has become a political punchbag between Ruwa Local Board and Goromonzi Rural District Council over the administrative control of the area. Saturday Retreat, in Harare South, sits on a peri-urban farm that was compulsorily acquired by the state from Crest Breeders International in 2013. Thereafter, the state subdivided it and reallocated the

plots to ZANU-PF aligned housing cooperatives to erect houses for home seekers affiliated to the ruling party. However, as pointed out in the next chapter, the residents live there at the pleasure of the ruling ZANU-PF party because they are frequently engaged in legal battles with the former land-owners who are constantly threatening to evict them.




Figure 1.3 - Locality of the study areas in peri-urban Harare (Author, 2018)

For the purposes of the study, clusters of informal settlements in these localities were purposively selected using the criteria of proximity to Harare central business district, housing land accessing strategies, layout and types of existing settlement structures, and deficits in public goods service delivery. To complement the spatial units of analysis,

mixed systematic, cluster<sup>13</sup> and snowball<sup>14</sup> sampling techniques were used to identify the respondents

The initial phase of the research involved semi-structured interviews held with the chief planners in the Department of Physical Planning, Harare City Council and Ruwa Local Board. In dialogue with the institutional survey, similar interviews held with peri-urban residents in the target informal settlements intended to capture their experiences within the socio-spatial contexts of ESAP, *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina*. Specifically, the interviews anchored on state-society engagements in peri-urban land use governance. Concurrent focus group discussions with selected local community leaders sought to distill additional insights into the experiences covered during the earlier baseline surveys. Embedded in the interviewer-administered questionnaire guides, were open and closed-ended questions designed to track the biographical trails of the participants over space time (see Appendix C).

### **1.10 Cultivating insider perspectives on the peri-urban interface in SSA**

The research was motivated by a desire to understand the forces underlying the structural gaps between government's urban land policy intentions and practices as well as between these practices and everyday urban life in SSA by cultivating insider perspectives of ordinary residents in peri-urban Harare. Firstly, the study acknowledges that hegemonic Western geopolitical concepts embedded in African urban knowledge production (Robinson, 2002, 2013; Pieterse, 2008; Myers, 2014, 2018; Parnell & Pieterse, 2014) have continued to influence the welfare of millions of poor citizens living in abject rural-urban space. This concern is not so much with the productivity of Western concepts in modernising the global South, as Roy (2009b: 820) observes, but "rather with the limited sites at which the city has been constructed and the misconceptions about cities in the

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<sup>13</sup> Because the sampling frame (all elements) of the target peri-urban areas (clusters) was not known, the researcher used a cluster sampling technique. A cluster is a "mixed aggregate of elements of the population in which each element occurs just once" (Schutt, 2012: 152).

<sup>14</sup> A snowball method involves non-probability sampling, where the sample elements are selected as they are identified by successive informants or interviewees. Because of the rising political tensions preceding the 2018 parliamentary and presidential polls in Zimbabwe, this study engaged a snowball sampling method to find the "hard-to-reach and hard-to-identify populations" (Schutt, 2012: 157) in the peri-urban communal land of Domboshava.

global South that these situated views have propagated.” On these grounds, Roy (2009b: 820) asserts that “theorisations of the city should be specific to diverse contexts before they can be applied to other places and generalised”.

Secondly, the challenge of opening up alternative theoretical avenues using insider perspectives on urban life in the developing countries must contend with a number of epistemological and methodological barriers in the mainstream urban studies to be legitimate (Smith, 2012; Clement, 2017). For this reason, the study used the context-dependent experiences of people living in peri-urban Harare to cultivate local theoretical resources for re-constructing the PUI in grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1994; Charmaz, 1990, 2003; Engward, 2013).

Thirdly, although most urban studies in Southern Africa have focused on the “colonial imbalances of land ownership and dispossession of White commercial farmers” (Scoones, *et al.*, 2010), the political dynamics of the structural “inequalities in the powers and resources of those competing for entitlements to urban land” (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 122) remain understudied. What is new in this research is a critical political economy engagement with the contradictions and antagonisms of elitist party-state policy practices in Zimbabwe’s politicised peri-urban land spaces and the socio-spatial structural gaps they have reproduced. The study considered the extractive policy dynamics of a permissive party-state in the context of neoliberalising peri-urban land governance relevant for dismantling the emerging “multiplex” (Amin & Graham, 1997: 412) peri-urban fringes in neoliberal Southern Africa.

### **1.11 Overview of the research strategy used: concurrent mixed methods**

Using a concurrent mixed-method research strategy (Wolley, 2006, 2009; Driscoll, *et al.*, 2007), the study maps out the major political economy processes of *jambanja* in contested peri-urban land spaces of Harare. The strategy informs a comparative dialogue between the interviews held with purposively identified planning practitioners in the relevant stakeholder agencies and residents in peri-urban informal settlements. The study triangulates different sets of data gathered from “in-depth semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and personal observations” (Kelle, 2001; Gorard &

Taylor, 2004 in Cresswell, 2009: 8) in Harare’s peri-urban informal settlements (transient poor neighbourhoods<sup>15</sup>) to capture the “multiple realities (Habermas, 1972: 118) of the life-worlds at the peri-urban interface. The insights gained from the narrative experiences can be used to theorize the existing gap between conventional urban policy perspectives and the lived experiences of ordinary citizens (Giddens, 1984) living in abject urban space.

A Statistical Package of Social Sciences (SPSS Versions 10 and 11) has been used to process the data collected in order to identify the emerging social regularities and perspectives for theory building. Archival research documents including interview transcripts, local development plans, planning directives in government publications and legal notices posted in the media by local authorities were evaluated through narrative analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Miles & Huberman, 1994: 436; Riessman, 2002: 218) as reflected in more detail in chapter 4.

## 1.12 Synopsis of the thesis

This chapter has presented the research problem and question reflecting the contexts of why and how a radical political economy of *jambanja* has given birth to an emerging palimpsest peri-urban interface in Zimbabwe. The research question at the centre of the study directs attention why and how gaps between stated policy intentions and practice, on one side, and on the other, between state policy actions and the daily life experiences of citizens living in peri-urban Harare. A critical political economy analytical framework, addressing this question, is further developed in Chapter 2. This strategy relies on Harvey’s (2003) revised and extended concept of “primitive accumulation by dispossession” (Mbiba, 2017c: 3) to diagnose the relatively new idioms of peri-urbanisation expressed through fraudulent (McGregor, 2013a & 2013b; Alexander & McGregor, 2013; Mbiba 2017c), violence (Chaumba, *et al.*, 2003; Scarnecchia, 2006;

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<sup>15</sup> These areas are defined as “transient” in that “they look poor, but are moving up, are transient and have different demography [predominantly children and young households] from those older residential and innercity areas”; in other words, reflecting a pattern of circular migration (ICED, 2017: 13). Of major interest in this case study is the proliferation of informal settlements in peri-urban agricultural lands, triggered and fashioned by *jambanja* since 2005. The new and emerging land use forms and contents beckon an analysis of the actors involved in peri-urban land markets and those social institutions facilitating the process of informalised urban development.



Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 359; Magure, 2012: 72; Mbiba, 2017a: 3) and instrumentalised disorder (Chabal & Daloz, 1999: 144).

Chapter 3 demonstrates why and how the political economy of Anglophone imperialist capital has reproduced itself by (re)shaping urban space in Zimbabwe. The chapter explains why a retracing of the country's historical "particularities" (Simone, 2004: 15,16; Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2004: 354) is essential for understanding the "state-capital-society relations" (Roy, 2009a; Harvey, 1985: 7, 2003, 2014; Watson, 2013; Mbiba, 2017c) still dominate urban design policy orientations in Zimbabwe. Chapter 4 explains why and how the study considered a mixed method research design (De Vos, 2002: 365; Wolley, 2009; Driscoll, *et al.*, 2007) relevant for conceptualising the dynamics of Harare's changed peri-urban interface since mid-1990. The study findings are presented and discussed in two interrelated chapters 5 and 6, respectively. Chapter 5 presents the research findings showing the diverse "life-worlds in motion" (Hahn, 2010; Hahn & Kastner, 2014) and "multiple realities" (Giddens, 1984: 137; Habermas, 1972) playing out at the peri-urban interface of Harare. Chapter 6 provides "conceptual analytical blocks" (Mouton, 1996: 181; Botes, 2002: 23) that can contribute towards re-imagining a peri-urban interface in contemporary SSA. Finally, Chapter 7 captures the major highlights of the study from the exploratory findings through to the building of conceptual blocks for re-constructing a peri-urban interface contingent on the local socio-spatial contexts of Harare.

### **1.13 Complementing modernist worldviews in peri-urban studies**

The chapter has pointed out the key limitations of European and North American modernist worldviews in the mainstream urban studies. These worldviews have tended to downplay the multiple realities of diversity in the histories and experiences in the myriad spaces of cities in the world (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012; Watson, 2009a, 2009b, 2014; Roy, 2009b: 820, 2011: 224; Parnell & Oldfield 2014: 1; Robinson, 2002; 2013). Of special concern to the study, however, is the endurance of modernist worldviews in dictating the geography of urban policy prescriptions and practices in a restructuring sub-Saharan Africa (Smith, 2012). Nevertheless, despite the fact that "the most marked socio-economic and political transformations are taking place in the global

South” (Hall & Pfeiffer, 2000; Watson, 2009a), relatively little is known of the causes (Roy, 2005: 147; 2009b) of the unjust urban and peri-urban development policy practices and social injustices (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 116) that have become the norm in the everyday life of ordinary citizens.

Drawing on ontological and epistemological weaknesses of modernist urban theory, the chapter makes a case for re-calibrating the “peri-urban” pivoted on analytical concepts and rooted in the “everyday life” experiences (Botes, 2002: 23; Mouton, 1996: 181; Thomas, *et al.*, 2008) of insiders in the global South (Lombard, 2014). Such in situ research experiences can more productively tap into the various layers of inequalities and the systemic changes shaping the life there (McNay, 2014: 4). To that end, the concern is not so much about the relevance of Western concepts in modernising the global South (Roy, 2009b: 820) but rather with the limited sites at which the city has been constructed together with the misconceptions about cities outside the global North espoused in the dominant modernist models. Crucially, therefore, a critical political economy analysis of modernist discourses can yield urban policy ideas attuned to sub-Saharan Africa contexts. These ideas will use local evidence-based resources as opposed to ideas drawing on the vested interests of the dominant political actors (Fox, 2014: 199).

Addressing these theoretical concerns about policy costumes, the next Chapter (2) traces out how an array of concepts on the “peri-urban” has evolved in different rural and urban development contexts since the 1950s to date. The bulk of the chapter centres on the soundness of a political economy analytical framework for deconstructing the peri-urban interface (PUI) in the uneven geography of global restructuring. Crucially, the chapter explains why blending a political economy analytical framework with Giddens’s (1984: 25, 1999) “structure-agency theory” and Habermas’s (1972) “multiple-realities” can be best suited to critically engaging with the power plays between a permissive party-state and its subjects in shaping the margins of a postcolonial African city – using the experiences in Harare post-2000.

## **CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE PERI-URBAN INTERFACE**

### **2.1 Revisiting the peri-urban interface in neoliberal restructuring terrains**

The previous chapter has emphasised a need for revisiting an increasingly “contested peri-urban interface” in the context of neoliberal restructuring (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 122). This need has been triggered by a renewed interest in a search for urban policy concepts that can address the unprecedented transformations that have reshaped the peri-urban fringe in SSA since adoption of SAPs in the 1980s. Contributing to this search, this case study seeks to re-model a radically changed peri-urban landscape in Harare based on the experiences of marginalised ordinary residents that live there (discussed in Chapters 4 to 7).

This chapter presents additional scholarships on why the study found a critical political economy analytical framework, based on Harvey’s (2003) re-adjusted and extended Marxian concept of “accumulation by dispossession”, suitable for rebuilding a peri-urban interface using the everyday experiences of ordinary residents with government’s socio-spatial policy engagements in the peri-urban areas. The bulk of the chapter examines the multilayered forces and processes behind the “socio-spatial transformations” that have re-configured peri-urban areas in Zimbabwe since 1980. As expounded throughout the thesis, the study assumes that these forces and processes can be meaningfully held responsible for the enduring policy gaps in Zimbabwe’s peri-urban land policy architecture. The major drivers of the forces and processes examined in the study include:

- Circular migration trends at local level (Potts, 2010),
- Flows of people, goods, money and information traversing rural-urban boundaries to link up formerly remote villages with global networks (Hahn & Kastner, 2014: 211).
- Socio-economic crises (Raftopoulos, 1994, 2014; Hammar & Raftopoulos, 2003: 1; Alexander & McGregor, 2013), worsened by longstanding polarisation

of the ruling ZANU-PF party and opposition political parties in Zimbabwe (Moore, 2012) since early 2000.

- Debilitating socio-spatial impacts of ESAP (Bond & Manyanya, 2002; Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2004), the “fast-track” land reform programme (*jambanja*) on the socio-spatial and economic landscapes in Zimbabwe (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 347).

The question posed by the drivers of these forces and processes is: In what specific ways can the associated peri-urban land policy implementation experiences of ordinary peri-urban residents explain the emerging structural policy gaps for the gaps to be understood?

Answering that question, firstly, the chapter questions the persistent Western thesis on cities in the global South as “backward” cities and expecting them to “catch up” with their EuroAmerican counterparts (Robinson, 2002, 2006, 2013: 660; Myers, 2014; Parnell & Robinson, 2012, Hahn & Kastner, 2012: 7). Secondly, the chapter argues that orthodox Western equations of cities in the South with “underdevelopment” provoke a need for rethinking the “peri-urban” through questioning the claims that valorise cities as “insular centres of economic growth” (Boeke, 1961 cited in Tong, 2010:2; Lewis, 1954) surrounded by seas of rural poverty. Thirdly, notwithstanding the merits of rational models in producing quantitative knowledge truths, the chapter laments the weaknesses of these models in articulating the internal dynamics (Simone, 2003; Roy, 2011: 224; Storper & Scott, 2016:4) of “place-making” in terrains of conflicts (Lombard, 2014: 40). To begin in the next section, the chapter points out the key “blind spots” (Storper & Scott, 2016: 4) in the urban studies on cities in the global South. A main theoretical concern is that these blind spots have largely been tracked to the negative peri-urban land policy outcomes affecting ordinary citizens living in abject urban spaces in the developing countries.

## **2.2 “Blind spots” in urban knowledge production for the global South**

Many urban geographers in the global South have blamed the undying urban land policy crises in the poor countries on ontological and epistemological “blind spots” in urban

“knowledge” produced in the global North (Storper & Scott, 2016:4). In particular, these scholars have firmly located these policy shortcomings in a “simplistic transfer of related modernising concepts” from the Euro-American into Southern urban contexts (Roy, 2005: 147, 2011: 224; Tait & Jensen, 2007: 114; Watson, 2009b: 172, 2014a, 2014b; Satge & Watson, 2018: 2) without weighing the different cultural value systems of the receiving countries. Some of the “blind spots” (discussed in section 2.3) have stemmed from traditional “developmentalist” policy logframes that Western-based international development agencies propagate through urban research projects under the umbrella of improved urban lifestyles (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 115).

However, while elevating the productivity of peri-urban areas, most externally funded urban research projects have tended to shun “the policy contradictions and conflicts underlying the growing social injustices in African peri-urban areas” since adoption of SAPs in the 1980s (ibid. 115). Instead, the international development agencies have “become obsessed with international trade and competitiveness” (Gilbert, 1998: 76) in pursuit of “modernity and economic progress” (Pye, 1969: 401). Thus, most African urban studies lagged behind in space-time; overtaken by the fact that “cities everywhere are outcomes of contentious processes” (Robinson, 2002: 546, 2013: 660). However, the “blind spots” in the urban and peri-urban accounts of sub-Saharan Africa have not escaped a number of criticisms.

Firstly, many Southern urban theorists (Robinson, 2002, 2013; Pieterse, 2008; Myers, 2014; Parnell & Pieterse, 2014) have argued that EuroAmerican modernist “one size fits all” developmentalist policy models simply ignore the different historical and geopolitical peculiarities of diversity in the myriad “ordinary cities” (Robinson, 2002: 531-533). This is understandable because modernist policies are modelled after the advanced EuroAmerican cities while ordinary cities in the poor countries remain “off-the world map” of urban theory (Robinson, 2002: 531, 2006). Despite compelling evidence of “unprecedented urban transformations” (Hall & Pfeiffer, 2000; Watson, 2009b: 154) and “twilight struggles” (Davis, 2004: 13; Roy, 2009a: 78; 2009b: 820) of urban life in the global South, most writings on how cities function still remain stuck with the “canonical urban experience” of the North (Roy, 2009b: 147). Ultimately, post-colonial urban scholars feel that, in order to fully redress the gaps in Western urban

knowledge production, alternative urban policy practices in the developing countries should largely emanate from the global South (Watson, 2009a, 2009b, 2014, 2016; Myers, 2014).

Secondly, some scholars have cautioned against “the biases of situatedness in formal comparative research” (Robinson, 2016: 187). They have accused this situatedness of causing “serious problems of international comparison and policy relevance” (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 114). Others (Roy, 2009b; Watson, 2009a; MacFarlane, 2010; Myers, 2011, 2014) have cautioned for restraint when generalising across different urban contexts. For this reason, Watson (2014b: 23) has emphasised the need to specify the “limitations of comparative urban studies in order to avoid reinventing theoretical binaries”. McCann (2011) has also warned against a generalisation of urban policy ideas across different contexts. Ultimately, these urban scholars (Amin & Graham, 1997: 417; Robinson, 2002: 532; Davis, 2016: 3) recommend that inclusive urban policy trajectories should bring into focus the multiple voices, inspirations and meanings of the everyday life struggles in order to forge an urban theory that embraces all the spaces across cities and cultural contexts.

Despite these criticisms, however, “modernist planning tools (master planning and land registration procedures, building codes and density requirements)” (Fox, 2014: 197) safeguarding the “primitive accumulation” (Harvey, 2003) motives of the new ruling elites in many sub-Saharan African countries, still remain in force (Dawson & Kelsall, 2012: 52; Fox, 2013: 107; Watson, 2013: 217). A possible explanation for this entanglement is that “some post-colonial government leaders now find themselves in the ideal extractive and commanding positions of exploiting existing local planning rules to their advantage. Sometimes, as discussed in more detail in chapters 5 and 6, the new elites do so either by ignoring or “re-drawing” the rules to fulfill their hidden political agendas (Magobunje, 1990; McGregor, 2013b: 787; Muchadenyika & Williams, 2017: 34). At other times, as in the cases of India (Roy 2009a: 78), the Middle East (Bayat & Biekart, 2009: 819-820), Latin America (Beall, 2007: 5; Lombard & Rakodi, 2016) and many countries in Africa (Lindell, 2010), there are openly violent conflicts between “government plans and the interests of residents” (De Sagte & Watson, 2018: 3; Edelman, *et al.*, 2013). Considering all the above points, the question

that arises is: how has the “peri-urban” evolved in the developing countries since the 1950s to date?

### **2.3 Contested dualisms inherent in policy approaches to the PUI**

A major contention with the conceptualisation of the “peri-urban” sprang from the 1960s’ Chicago School of Urban Sociology concept of a “folk-urban continuum” (Redfield, 1947: 235 - 245) associated with Burgess’s concentric model (Nottingham & Liverpool Universities, 1999: 6; Potts, 2008a: 152-153). This sociological conceptualisation envisioned a trajectory of “primitive” idealised “non-urban social formations”, on one side of the continuum, and the advanced “urbanised formations”, on the other (Storper & Scott, 2016:12).

Drawing on Redfield’s (1947) simplistic folk-urban construct of a “rural-urban fringe” (Lewis, 1954; Boeke, 1953, 1961 in Tong 2010:2), many international and bilateral development agencies in the USA and UK<sup>16</sup> popularised the poor “peri-urban” areas as eminently dependent on the “trickle-down impulses” (Douglass, 1998) of the city. In the context of modernist positivist narratives, the “urban” or “modernising sector” was typically considered “separate” from a primitive rural agricultural hinterland (the “marginal” sector) in order to justify development policy realignments specifically designed for two different societies (Boeke, 1953, 1961 cited in Tong, 2010:2 and in Potts, 2008a: 151). Boeke (1961) was adamant that the two separate urban and rural societies embodied in dualistic models could not mix successfully or positively and urged governments to pursue separate policies for them.

Although helpful with a geographical visualisation of the “peri-urban”, modernist dualist planning models, as argued above, are problematic when translated into policies that “treat the rural and urban as operationally two distinct sectors” (Potts, 2008a: 153). In the real world, a spatially distinct rural-urban divide has been found to be illusory (Baker & Pederson, 1992: 11-12). Firstly, the reasoning that because urban and rural sectors manifest different characteristics, and therefore these sectors are separate, is

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<sup>16</sup> UK development agencies used the terms “urban fringe” or “recently urbanised areas” (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 118-119).

simplistic. This thinking stands in sharp contrast with a macro viewpoint which maintains that on the basis of rural-urban synergies the fortunes of the two sectors are intertwined and thus both actually benefit from the same underlying economic forces (Potts, 2008a: 152; Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 114). It would be simply illogical to assign distinct spatial boundaries to economic, social and cultural processes that are constantly interpenetrating at the peri-urban interface (Watson, 2009b: 174).

Secondly, dualist rural-urban approaches have been implicated in fuelling subjectivities<sup>17</sup> among the poor living in marginal spaces of cities (Garnett, 2017: 53). In the less developed (formerly colonised) economies and societies, the influential dual-sector development models precipitated “primacy<sup>18</sup> and economic concentration in the urban centres” (Djurfeldt, 2017: 137). The racialised separate development policy regimes in settler colonial Rhodesia (Stoneman & Cliffe, 1989: 16) and Apartheid South Africa confined the subjects to impoverished rural reserves from where they were routinely “proletarianized”<sup>19</sup> (Arrighi, 1967: 22) in the towns and mines (Rakodi, 1995: 4; Potts, 2010, 2013; Shumba, 2016: 85). The “disconnection” between the urban and rural sectors was politically motivated and “greatly exaggerated” (Potts, 2007: 2) with the white settlers “explicitly reluctant to share the national space economy benefits with the blacks equally, although most blacks subsisted in the backward rural reserves” (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 324). In colonial Rhodesia (discussed in the next chapter), the rural and urban (black and white settlement areas) boundaries were legally sanctioned to promote the dualistic (black-white) policies of racialised separate development (Potts, 2007: 2, 2008: 152; Shumba, 2016: 85).

Thirdly, the goals of sustainable economic growth through integrative rural development policy models proved elusive, and even harmful, in many Southern

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<sup>17</sup> Hall (2004) considers “subjectivity” to be a broad term “embracing the beliefs, outlooks, convictions, subconscious tendencies, orientations and understandings that people may hold.” Bazzul (2016: 8) observes that “subjectivities are ever changing” albeit those entrapped by these subjectivities “have no hope of thinking or acting differently”.

<sup>18</sup> “Primacy”, according to Johnston (2009: 580) refers to “the dominance of a city that is disproportionately large in terms of population size relative to other cities contained within the space economy of a region or a country”.

<sup>19</sup> Arrighi (1967: 22) defines “proletariat” is a “class of modern wage labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour power in order to live”.



African countries. The growing primate cities of these countries were soon confronted by the challenges of overpopulation, unemployment and poverty (Fox, 2013: 12-13). The diseconomies<sup>20</sup> of primacy and growing rural-urban disparities in settler colonial Rhodesia (Potts, 2013: 271) inspired a spatial planning focus on controlling black population movements to the urban centres where most Europeans lived. Nevertheless, the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a growing interest in balanced regional development to contain rural-urban population movements (Harris & Todaro, 1970) and to address the challenges of worsening economic crises of rapid urban growth. This containment policy thrust was forged through Rondinelli's (1988) spatial development framework of small and intermediate-sized towns. Although Rondinelli's (1988) "Urban Functions in Rural Development" (UFRD) model intended to link rural and urban areas through integrated spatial development strategies, the associated policy approaches seriously failed to factor in the differential development potentials of urban and rural areas.

Finally, in the 1990s, Douglass's seminal work on regional networks demanded a spatially balanced growth strategy to replace a largely mechanistic view of rural and urban with "a more nuanced view of rural-urban interactions" (Douglass, 1998 in Djurfeldt, 2017: 137-138). An emphasis on balanced regional growth renewed an interest in promoting small and intermediate-sized urban centres (SIUCs) based on their social and economic development potentials. However, Satterthwaite and Tacoli (2003) warned that there was as yet "no empirical evidence to confirm or dispute the role of small urban centres as engines of balanced development." Nevertheless, the focus of most rural households in terms of consumption and marketing of agricultural and urban-based goods and services is the small- and medium-sized town serving as an internode of rural-urban linkages (Simone, 2001; Satterthwaite & Tacoli, 2013; Calin & Menon, 2013; Poulsen & Spiker, 2014; Akkoyunlu, 2015: 29; Scoones & Murimbarimba 2020). In what ways, then, can different interpretations of the rural-urban interactions influencing regional development policy orientations and practices in a post-colonial Africa help to improve the mapping of a shifting and radically changed peri-urban interface in conditions of urban restructuring? The possible

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<sup>20</sup> Mayhew's (2009) "urban diseconomies are the financial and social burdens arising from an urban location". These diseconomies "include constricted sites, high land prices/local taxation/commuting costs, traffic congestion and pollution" (ibid.).

answers to these questions can be located in the diverse, albeit conflicting, definitions and interpretations of the peri-urban interface – to which the chapter now turns.

## **2.4 Diverse definitions of ‘peri-urban’ and emerging questions**

In their recent review of the scanty peri-urban literature on sub-Saharan Africa, Mbiba and Huchzermeyer (2002: 121) locate the problem of fully understanding the “peri-urban” interface in the enduring conflicting, fragmented definitions and interpretations of the PUI across space over time. The majority of the proponents have attributed these conflicts mainly to the existence of an illulsory boundary between “city” and “rural” - blaming its elusive nature for rationalising the divergent urban development policy perspectives on the PUI (Woods & Heley, 2017: 2). In the real world, however, the “peri-urban interface” is a “diverse and dynamic phenomenon” that cannot be explained using one view, but, instead, requires multiple perspectives (Woods & Heley, 2017). To be exact:

There is no universal definition of the PUI. Instead, different definitions will apply in different circumstances and may even change in the same location over time; for example, as a medium-size city becomes a large one (Brook, *et al.*, 2003: 2).

Thus, Mbiba (2001) has offered the following conceptual dimensions of a PUI:

- Spatial/locational – based on distance from the city, land use value and administrative boundaries;
- Temporal – those areas recently absorbed into a city;
- Functional – those areas outside the city boundary but linked to the city by flows and interactions;
- Social exclusion – inhabitants of informal settlements, or poorly served by infrastructure services and so cannot truly be considered as urban; and
- Conflict – where two or more systems clash instead of converging and harmonising, such as agriculture versus built development, modern versus subsistence economies, formal versus informal.

Each of these dimensions attempts to capture the diverse but related socio-economic, political and cultural processes shaping a rural-urban fringe and livelihoods that is always in flux (Allen, 2003: 135; Brook, *et al.*, 2003: 2; Simon, *et al.*, 2006: 4-5; Woods, 2006: 581; Thuo, 2013: 1-2). Picking on Mbiba's (2002) model of a peri-urban interface, for instance, a production and natural resources systems perspective views the "peri-urban" as an outcome of flows and interactions between discrete urban, agricultural and environmental elements at the city edge (Rondinelli, 1985 in Nottingham & Liverpool Universities, 1999: 9-10). Whereas a neo-classical economic optic reifies the lower value land uses and the different degrees of opportunity costs associated with the marginal spaces at the peri-urban fringe. A serious flaw in the economic conditions-based perspective is that it is "limited in explaining the role of agency and contingency in shaping rural-urban fringe land uses" (Thuo, 2013: 1). Viewed through a Marxist structure-agency sociological lens (Lefebvre, 1991: 170; Giddens, 1984), the peri-urban interface represents an "intersection of power relations bound up with the control of critical resources, stakeholders' interests and governance" (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 121; Brenner, 2009) (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2 below). Crucially, a Giddensian structure-agency (Giddens, 1993) perspective allows an understanding of the importance of human action in the everyday life struggles of citizens for survival in marginalised spaces and in negotiating claims to entitlements and access to resources at the peri-urban interface.

Thus, a Giddensian optic can shed light on the ruling elites' strategies of power and wealth accumulation in the contemporary peri-urban space in sub-Saharan Africa (Chabal & Daloz, 1999: 144, Beresford, 2014: 2; Bayart, 2009: 222). As revealed in chapters 5 and 6, Giddens's trajectory of power politics helped the study to identify an array of actors beyond the ruling ZANU-PF who were involved in land-grabbing. Leading members of the urban-based main opposition MDC political party, who accused their counterparts in the ruling ZANU-PF party of the "land-grabbing", clandestinely used their extractive positions in the City of Harare to accumulate public assets including peri-urban farms (City of Harare, 2010; McGregor, 2013b). In the proliferating corridors of "political patronage" (Alexander & McGregor, 2013: 785; McGregor, 2013b) that *jambanja* created, the governing ZANU-PF political party recruited large numbers of

activists among both urban and peri-urban populations to actively participate in the networks of accumulation by dispossession.

Clearly, graphic modernist imageries of the peri-urban interface have tended to conceal the contradictions embedded in the complex processes and networks that capitalism's structural inequalities in the developing countries reproduce (Serrat, 2010: 2; Tacoli, 1998: 3). For this reason, Mbiba and Huchzermeyer have aptly pointed out that the “contradictions entailed in entitlements to peri-urban land and infrastructure services between the local elites and poor should be exposed and reduced, or even eliminated, where possible” (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 115).

To explain the dynamics of the structural gaps between peri-urban land policy practice and the realities of everyday life of marginalised peri-urban residents, the chapter considers the questions cited in Chapter 1 (Sections 1.2, pages 4,5 and 1.7, page 15). Bearing these questions in mind, the next sections reflect why the study adopted a political economy analytical framework to navigate the peri-urban interface in Harare.

## **2.5 Theorising peri-urban transformations in sub-Saharan Africa**

### ***2.5.1 Critical political economy of peri-urban transformation***

As indicated in the preceding chapter, the mainly donor-driven and prominent studies on peri-urban Africa have been fixated on the positivist and constructivist interpretations of the social, economic and ecological transformations at the periphery (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 115). However, these quantitative empirical studies have “neither emphasised nor theorised the causes of the peri-urban transformations” (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 115) together with “the regulatory failures of unequal urban restructuring” (Brenner, *et al.*, 2010a) in SSA. Evidently, the subjects of most donor-driven research projects have often avoided<sup>21</sup> the contradictions and tensions entailed in

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<sup>21</sup> According to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 “the mandates of bilateral and multilateral development agencies explicitly preclude them from engaging in politics”. However, “it is common sense they must understand political economy contexts from a diagnostic – not prescriptive – perspective if they are to successfully help design and implement development policies and strategies in the “real world” (Serrat, 2010: 3).

the implementation processes of restructuring policy projects (Menocal, 2014). Thus, the fashionable logical frameworks that have dominated African urban research projects (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 119; Watson, 2016: 33) have also “avoided challenging the ways resource scarcities are created and contested”, particularly in the contexts of “unequal access, poverty and social exclusion” (UN-Habitat, 2016: 89).

For Zimbabwe, broadly speaking, the challenge of defining the peri-urban interface is tantamount to confronting the dynamics of the country’s neoliberal projects *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina* and structural linkages with rapid urban sprawl (Mbiba, 2017a: 2). Undoubtedly, urban expansion in Zimbabwe, especially marked in the case of Harare, has been largely driven by a stream of mutating forces and processes. The key interlocking forces of peri-urban change in Zimbabwe have included “elitist politics of power and wealth accumulation” (Moore, 2002; Mbiba, 2017c: 4), the “economies of patronage and clientelism” (Marongwe, 2003; Marongwe, *et al.*, 2011; Sadomba, 2011, McGregor, 2013) and “informalised land use governance” (Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016a) - to mention but a few. Using a *jambanja* political economy, as its analytical framework, the study engages with the forces and processes underlying the structural gaps between the government’s stated *jambanja* land reform policy intentions and practice as well as between practice and the the experiences of the intended beneficiary residents towards building additional conceptual perspectives on a changed peri-urban interface. To begin with, the next section explains how a systems model of urban development can help the study look at the interplay of the interlocking forces and processes underlying the deviations between the stated policy intentions and implementation practices of *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina* in peri-urban Harare.

### **2.5.2 Systems model of a political economy analytical framework**

A political economy analytical framework offers considerable authoritative resources for understanding how the “interactions between political and economic processes” (DFID, 2009: 4) of *jambanja* fuelled a radical change from commercial farmlands to a peri-urban landscape that features multilayered clusters of mixed housing densities, shopping malls and arable lots (see Appendix A). A political economy prism inheres critical strands that

helped the study to peer into how “incentives, relationships, the distribution and contestation of power resources between different groups and individuals” (DFID, 2009: 4; McLoughlin, 2014: 2) played a pivotal role in reshaping urban land governance spaces. Leaning on Lombard and Rakodi’s political economy analytical guidelines, the study:

- Firstly, considered the additional definitive categories of “peri-urban”, including the material and emotional dimensions of access to land, conflict and violence.
- Secondly, the study identified and examines the interests and behaviour of the many actors involved in urban land contestations.
- Thirdly, the research analysed the interactions and relationships between those involved at different levels, from the individual/household, through the local to the citywide, national and international (Lombard & Rakodi, 2016: 2683).

To deepen an understanding of the structures of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003) or “land grabbing” (Mbiba, 2017c: 2) during *jambanja*, the study was guided by sets of re-distributional questions about who gained, lost, how and why they gained or lost during the implementation of the land reform programme (see Appendix C). The political economy analytical route taken also sought to track down the strategies and tactics that individuals and groups used in negotiating access to urban land and services where the existing regulatory arrangements are often inadequate (Lombard & Rakodi, 2016: 2684; Mbiba, 2001: 170). Arguably, these interactive processes and actions associated with the various forms of “spatial unruliness” (Kamete, 2008) and “gray-spacing” (Yiftachel, 2009a; 2009b) cannot be fully grasped in isolation. Thus, the study sought to map out the interrelationships between the political decisions and actions of players involved in peri-urban change. Such an understanding demanded a systems perspective. A simple systems model of a political economy of urban development (Fox, 2013: 104) is useful for understanding the synergies of political patronage practices, land distribution patterns and impacts on peri-urban life-worlds (Figure 2.1). As understood in this thesis, this model helped to unpack the institutional forces (town planning interventions, land use planning procedures and regulations) and

structure-agency interests shaping land use governance practice in the abject spaces.

This model was useful for teasing out the nuanced mechanisms of “path dependency” (Brenner & Theodore, 2005: 102), in particular why colonial



*Figure 2.1. A systems model of a political economy analysis of urban development (Adapted from Fox, 2013: 107).*

institutional practices in land use planning still endure in contemporary urban conditions of southern, central and east Africa well after independence (Rakodi, 1995: 5; Fox, 2013: 102). Before Zimbabwe’s independence on 18 April 1980, the administrative control over land was vested in the hands of a colonial governor with discretionary powers over the allocation of land. But faced with rapid population expansion since independence, “such centralised powers have proved to be overwhelming and contributed to a proliferation of unplanned, informal settlements” (Fox, 2013: 117) where an exploitation of “the discretionary powers” of eminent domain by ruling elites has served to retain political support and control (Fox, 2014: 197).

Drawing on comparative urban experiences in sub-Saharan Africa, this thesis examines how the interests and motives of political and institutional structure-agency in peri-urban Harare inform interactions between state and society in different land use contexts. Furthermore, a political economy collaborative analysis of structure-agency (Giddens, 1984) relationships and Yiftachel's (2009a; 2009b) "gray-spacing" helped to thicken understandings of the complex and shifting relationships shaping peri-urban space.

### ***2.5.3 Structuration and human-agency theory***

A structuration social theory (Giddens, 1984:25) helped the study to conceptualize the experience-based narratives of ordinary citizens relating to their interactions with state and party institutions in accessing and using land resources. The social structure models directed the study to focus on the "forces [agencies] that shaped the development processes of the built environment" (Healey, 1991: 221- 232) based on the power relations of capital, labour and landowner (Harvey, 1985: 96). Thus, the study considered the importance of structural relationships of individuals in society in explaining the social and institutional interactions in peri-urban land markets (Moos & Dear, 1986: 231-232).

The semi-structured questionnaires (see Appendix C) sought to rehearse the political, social and organising structures (rules and regulations) and agency (active, knowledgeable and reasoning individuals) at play in the different land use governance sites (Giddens, 1984, 1999; Blaikie, 2010) in the areas studied. The interrelationships between structure (economic, political and legal arrangements) and agency (local planning authorities, peri-urban residents, land barons and political elites acting on their free choices) helped to expose the different modes of written and un-written "languages" used to articulate agency interests, strategies and tactics in negotiating space (Roseberry, 1994: 361; Flowerdew & Martin, 2005: 27). The narrative analyses of the "languages" used to conceptualise and propagate the "peri-urban" in different places by different actors in one city were intended to illuminate the processes of place-making (Kadenge, 2012: 143).



Harvey (1989: 3) stresses that the dialectical processes of space production and underlying political economy relations are inextricably linked. In these processes, Shatkin (2007) has identified human agency as “the negotiated manner in which global and local actors influence the construction of the built environment”. Healey’s (1991: 224) agency models identify the primary actors, their roles, interests and strategies in producing an urban built environment. Bryant Russworm and McLellan (1982) recognise that a wider range of agents and roles may be involved in the development of the built environment (Figure 2.2). This model identifies the agency networks in the urban fringe land markets




Figure 2.2. Agency and the urban fringe land markets (Bryant, et al., 1982: 53).

under focus in the study. The systemic interactions reflected by this model informed the study’s semi-structured questions to probe peri-urban residents, both as individuals and groups, to relate the strategies they used to engage with the emerging political and regulatory planning structures during *jambanja*. As discussed in more detail in chapters 4, 5 and 6, the study cultivated these experiences as resources for building narrative maps on the interactions of residents with state agencies in the different peri-urban daily life

contexts. The following key themes informed the conceptual analysis of the observations in “grounded theory<sup>22</sup>” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1994, 1998; Charmaz, 2003, 2006; Engward, 2013: 37):

- How local authority planners engaged with the major actors involved in the distribution of land and related resources in abject spaces;
- How ordinary residents negotiated access to land and related resources in peri-urban abject spaces during *jambanja*.

Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate how the interests and motives of major actors (government officials, the youth, ordinary residents) involved in community development in the informal settlements contributed to re-imagining a peri-urban interface deficient in essential infrastructure and services. The next section reflects how “spoils politics and patronage” (Alexander & McGregor, 2013: 758; McGregor, 2013) and the abuse of the prerogative power of the eminent domain of the state (Roy, 2009a: 76) viewed through Yiftachel’s “gray-spacing” (Yiftachel, 2009a: 243, 2009b: 92) can help unearth the underlying causes of such deficits. In particular, the section explains why contradictions and conflicts increasingly fuel the “parasitic accumulation interests of a politically connected elite” through the creation of peripheral spaces, exclusive residential enclaves and new subjectivities linked to the centres of power in “predatory states such as Zimbabwe” (Shumba, 2016: 2-3).

#### ***2.5.4 Spoils politics and “gray spacing” in neoliberal peri-urban space***

Yiftachel’s (2009a: 243) concept of “gray spacing” is particularly attuned to exposing the struggles and planning irregularities in the terrain of spoils politics and instrumental

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<sup>22</sup> Grounded theory is a systematic research approach involving the discovery of theory through data collection and analysis. In particular, the focus is on uncovering patterns in social life that individuals might or might not be aware of (Engward, 2013: 37). Grounded theory is a systematic theory developed inductively, based on observations that are summarized into conceptual categories, re-evaluated in the research setting and gradually refined and linked to other conceptual categories (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996: 23). The conceptual categories are tested directly in the research setting with more observations. Over time, as the conceptual categories are refined and linked, a theory evolves (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Huberman & Miles, 1994: 436).

patronage in neoliberal urban space. The concept defines certain developments, enclaves, populations, land tenure systems and transactions as acceptable or exceptionable (“whitening”) while criminalising (“blackening”) those of disapproved individuals or groups (ibid.). Moreover, “gray spaces, enclaves or populations are neither integrated nor eliminated, and constitute the shifting boundaries of today’s urban regions, that exist partially outside direct control by either the city or the state” (Yiftachel, 2009b: 88).

In many post-colonial sub-Saharan African urban contexts (discussed in further detail in chapters 3, 5 and 6), connections with the political bourgeoisie have mainly “benefitted local elites, notably, officials, politicians and headmen who exploit their extractive ability to dictate over land entitlements” (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 121). In some cases, subdividing and selling off public land has depended on what the local leaders’ motives are, either self-enrichment or to secure the benefits of increased property values and urban infrastructure for their constituencies (Rakodi, 2008: 19). However, “the motives are often contradictory” (Fox, 2013). Theoretically, the products of “whitening” (meaning approving) and “blackening” (disapproving) processes are what Yiftachel (2009a: 243) terms “gray spaces” or “gray cities”. In practice, some developments and land occupations deemed by authorities to be “unauthorised” can be demolished or prohibited (“blackened”) while other equally illegal developments are granted legal status (“whitened”) (ibid.: 243). Thus, as Yiftachel states bluntly, “the informality<sup>23</sup> of the powerful” or the “state” is often “whitened” (or condoned) while other forms of informality remain indefinitely “blackened” (Roy, 2009b: 11).

In the real world “gray-spacing”, as a process of “mapping and unmapping” social relations, has diluted modernist boundaries between “legal” and “illegal”, “authorised” and “unauthorised”, “fixed” and “temporary”, “legitimate” and “illegitimate” (Roy, 2009a: 243) let alone “urban” and “rural”. Yet, this is a process presenting the state (itself a deeply informalized entity) with options to engage new tactics of power and

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<sup>23</sup> In the context of this study, “informality” according to Roy (2009a: 80) “...is a state of deregulation and un-mapping, one where the ownership, use, and purpose of land cannot be fixed and mapped according to any prescribed set of regulations or the law.” In an informal state, “the law itself, ‘as a social process’ is open-ended, fickle and subject to multiple interpretations and interests” (Holston, 2007).

violence using its prerogative power of eminent domain under the pretext of “public purpose” (Roy, 2009b: 79, 80). This means that the state can wield its powers of eminent domain to re-interpret the distinctions between what is legal/illegal and legitimate/illegitimate to suit its own purposes. In this sense, the study finds Yiftachel’s (2009a: 243) “gray-spacing” strand appropriate for strengthening a political economy analysis of power-laden contexts. Yitachel’s (2009a) “gray-spacing” optic can trail “ever-shifting relationships between between what is legitimate and illegitimate, authorized and unauthorized” (Roy, 2009a: 80) in today’s society of intensified political uncertainty.

## **2.6 Explanatory advantages of critical political economy prisms on the PUI**

To complement the dominant modernist worldviews in urban studies, the chapter has pointed out the explanatory advantages of critical political economy analytical prisms in unlocking deeper understandings of the underlying forces and interests that have reshaped the peri-urban interface in Africa since the early 1980s. The study uses a range of Marxian perspectives on primitive accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003, 2006) of ruling elites in urban Africa as strong enough candidates that can engage with these underlying forces and interests. In particular, the study has suggested “spoils politics of patronage” (Alexander & McGregor, 2013; McGregor, 2013b), “gray-spacing” (Yiftachel, 2009a, 2009b) and “informal planning” strategies (Roy, 2009a, 2009b) as robust enough to converse with the contemporary modes of rapid peri-urban change in the global South.

In building a case for a deeper understanding of the forces playing out the peri-urban transformations in Zimbabwe, the next chapter examines a history of the country’s urban context since the early 1890s. The chapter sheds light on how the colonial-settler political economy of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe today) produced and shaped the segregated urban centres as the processes of black participation were suppressed (Rakodi, 2008; Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011). Despite majority rule in April 1980, however, since the crises of transition since then (Mamdani, 1996) – those of contemporary primitive accumulation by dispossession (Marx, 1977; Harvey, 2003, 2006), the debilitating structural adjustment programmes (Bond & Manyanya, 2003; Mbiba, 2017c: 6) and futile attempts at democratization (Dawson & Kelsall, 2012: 52; Fox, 2013: 107;

Shumba, 2016: 2-3) – have profoundly re-configured the form and fabric of peri-urban space in Zimbabwe. How an understanding of the future of a post-colonial city can benefit from a trajectory of its past and present realities is the central theme of the next chapter.

## **CHAPTER 3: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE URBAN CONTEXT IN ZIMBABWE**

*“The sequence of different periods gives rise to a historical layering of space ...”*  
(Kesteloot & Meert, 1999: 233).

### **3.1 Recapturing a political economy of Zimbabwe’s urban history**

The preceding chapters have considered the theoretical attributes of political economy analytical approaches to be robust enough to capture the forces and processes (Amin & Graham, 1997: 411) underlying the structural gaps characterising the urban policy practices of many governments in sub-Saharan Africa since neoliberal restructuring. This chapter examines why urban centres in Zimbabwe, and Harare in particular, remain captive to “dual-city”<sup>24</sup> planning concepts (Abu-Lughod, 1965: 420; Potts, 2008a) despite an overturning of separate development policy practices in racist Rhodesia at independence in 1980 (Patel, 1988; Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 322). Firstly, the chapter unravels an interplay of the political economy forces that have shaped the urban contexts of Zimbabwe since the founding of Rhodesia in the early 1890s. Secondly, the chapter examines the dynamics of urban governance in Zimbabwe following majority rule in 1980 (Wekwete, 1989; Kamete, 2002, Hammer & Dansereau, 2003: 42; Raftopoulos & Jensen, 2003; McGregor, 2002, 2012). Finally, the chapter critically examines how *jambanja* has mediated political economy intersections between the ZANU-PF ruling party-state and society in reproducing Zimbabwean urban space. The chapter addresses the following emerging themes:

- evolution of Zimbabwe’s urban space economy;
- legacies of racialized urban development policy practices;
- spatial development system in Zimbabwe; and
- the main drivers of the changed urban governance dynamics.

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<sup>24</sup> “The dual city”, in Abu-Lughod’s (1965: 420) readings on Cairo, “was usually the major metropolis in almost every newly-industrialising country.” It was not a single unified city, but, in fact, two quite different cities, physically juxtaposed but architecturally and socially distinct. These dual cities have usually been a legacy from the colonial past.

The chapter falls into five main sections. In the next section 3.2, the chapter examines how Harare dominated the evolution of Zimbabwe's urban space economy in the early 1890s (Vambe, 1972; Yoshikuni, 2006). In section 3.3, the chapter traces out how and why the political economy of racially dualised urban policy practices produced and shaped the form (morphology) and content (nature) of urban centres in settler Rhodesia through the erection of regulatory barriers between the ruling Whites and black majority population. Despite majority rule in 1980, section 3.4 takes issue with some of the reasons underlying continuities of dualist city building policy orientations in Zimbabwe (Shumba, 2016; Mbiba, 2017c; Muchadenyika & Williams, 2014). To shed light on these policy continuities in section 3.6, the chapter uses Harvey's (2003) revised and extended Marxist notion of "primitive accumulation by dispossession" strategies that the country's new ruling elite class has mastered for "capturing and reproducing its resources of political hegemony" (Arrighi, 2002; Harvey, 2003; Raftopoulos, 1994, 2014; Alexander & McGregor, 2013; Mbiba, 2017c).

Transitioning to section 3.6, section 3.5 traces out some of the key demographic trends in Zimbabwe's urbanisation, especially the shifts in the composition, economic activity and distribution of an urbanising population (Potts, 2010, 2012a: 1, 2012b: v). The section explores the key drivers of these trends, in particular, the deindustrialisation, mineral resource development and circular migration patterns. Section 3.6 projects the results discussed in Chapter 5 – by highlighting the complex processes and forces that have shaped neoliberal urban space in Zimbabwe post-2000. In conclusion, section 3.7 presents the major highlights of how the settler colonial modernist planning policies that evolved and shaped the development of Harare resulted in a polarised and segregated racialised city (Rakodi, 1995). The section explains why and how the study used a mixed method design to cultivate theoretical resources for understanding the dynamics of the radically changed peri-urban landscapes in Harare post-2000.

### **3.2 Harare and evolution of the national urban space economy**

The city of Harare evolved from Fort Salisbury, the pioneer capital city of Rhodesia (Bull, 1967). Fort Salisbury was situated in Chief Zharara's territory (Vambe, 1972), the

name of the then local Shona chief. The chief's name "Zharara" was later corrupted by the European settlers to "Harare" today. Fort Salisbury shared its boundaries with surrounding Shona tribal homelands. Salisbury became an economic, social, political and administrative hub for settler activity in Rhodesia (Kay & Smout, 1977; Musemwa, 2010). Well after independence in 1980, Salisbury reverted to its original name "Harare". The city has since grown to be the largest commercial hub of Zimbabwe and remains the country's capital (Mbiba, 2000: 285).

From its establishment in 1890, "Salisbury experienced a steady population growth such that by 1961 it had a population of 310 360 that rose to 386 040 in 1969" (Zinyama, *et al.*, 1993). In 2012, Harare had a total population of 2 123 132 that comprised 1 025 516 males and 1 097 536 females (ZimStat, 2012: 12). Bulawayo, the country's second largest city, had a total population of 653 337, comprising 303 346 males and 34 991 females. Even though both Harare and Bulawayo remain the largest urban centres in Zimbabwe, according to Rakodi (1995), the two urban centres are not as overly dominant in the settlement size distribution relative to the largest cities elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. Based on central place functions, both Harare and Bulawayo occupy leading positions trailed by Mutare, Gweru, Kadoma, Kwekwe, Masvingo, Hwange and Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe's national settlement hierarchy. Crucially, a wide range of large, intermediate and small urban settlements in Zimbabwe (Figure 3.1) has diverse histories dating back to the 1890s when Europeans led by the British South Africa Company established a colony, Rhodesia - present day Zimbabwe (ICED, 2017: 40-41).

The Europeans were lured by the prospects of mineral fortunes (especially gold and diamonds). As a result, military forts (such as Fort Victoria or present day Masvingo) and mining extraction centres developed into fledging settlements (such as Kadoma, Kwekwe and Chegutu), with the bulk in and around Zimbabwe's mineral rich Great Dyke extending from southwest to the north and northeast of the country.

Bryceson and MacKinnon's (2012) feel that "mineralised urbanisation" is an apt description of Zimbabwe's history of urbanisation. This describes the changing patterns of urban settlements and urban profiles arising directly from production cycles and related investments and commodity cycles at local, national, regional and global levels



(ICED, 2017: 41). Some urban centres diversified to have agro-processing industries (such as Chegutu) while others like Mhangura (copper) and Hwange (coal) remained




Figure 3.1. Map of the Great Dyke and mining regions in Zimbabwe (ICED, 2017: 42).

dependent on the extraction of a single commodity. Diversified urban settlements have been resilient to economic shocks (ibid. 41). Large-scale mining operations evolved involving some multinationals such as De Beers, Anglo American, Lonrho, Union Carbide, and Anglo Platinum, Metallon and more recently ZIMPLATS and Chinese firms such as Anjin. As shown later, Zimbabwe’s “mineralised urbanisation<sup>25</sup> was mediated by the political economy of a racially separate development; both structures have an enduring legacy” (Bryceson & MacKinnon (2012) cited in ICED, 2017: 41). Thus, the planning of cities and the delivery of infrastructure and basic services in

<sup>25</sup> Bryceson and MacKinnon’s “mineralised urbanisation” is an apt description of Zimbabwe’s history of urbanisation. This mode of urbanisation represents “the changing patterns of urban settlements and urban profiles arising directly and indirectly from mineral production cycles as well as related investments and commodity cycles at local, national, regional and global levels” (Bryceson & MacKinnon (2012) cited in ICED, 2017: 41).

Zimbabwe cannot be divorced from either the enduring historical structures or from the prevailing political disaffection and unfolding contemporary power and political dynamics – to be sketched in the section on governance.

### **3.3 Urban policy practices and morphology of the settler-colonial city**

The morphology<sup>26</sup> of urban centres in Zimbabwe, including in the rest of Anglophone and Francophone Africa, attaches the restrictive, racialized laws and planning mechanisms (Rakodi, 1995) fashioned by the wider interests of the colonial governments and their domestic agents, the European settlers (Freund, 2007, Njoh, 2004, 2009, 2010; Cirolia & Berrisford, 2017; Mbiba, 2017a). In contrast to West Africa and East Africa, where there was significant indigenous urbanisation before colonisation (Patel, 1988: 18; Okpala, 2009: 10; Njoh, 2004), the morphology of Zimbabwe’s urban centres was largely determined by the incoming settlers because indigenous participation in their planning and design was limited (Wekwete, 1988: 57). African participation was confined to advising the racist white supremacist government on African affairs (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991). For this reason, urban centres in Zimbabwe were primarily designed for permanent European settlement (Patel, 1988: 20; Fox 2013: 101) as some of them reflected European town planning ideas more vividly than many towns in Europe (O’Connor, 1986; Njoh, 2010: 372).

Ebenzer Howard’s vision of a “garden city inspired colonial urban planners to transplant his spatial design ideas verbatim in acculturating ‘racial others’” (Njoh, 2010: 373). Accordingly, the development layout plan for Salisbury, modelled on garden cities in the “parent country” of Britain, served as the archetype for the rest of the towns and cities in Rhodesia (Rakodi, 1995; Muronda, 2008). The urban layout plans were based on “a grid of streets aligned to the magnetic north” (Christopher, 1977 cited in Wekwete, 1988: 57) characteristic of the Eurocentric modern city. As Figure 3.2 shows, the British pioneer

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<sup>26</sup>According to Calhoun (2002) morphology represents the shape of a city including its architecture, layout of streets and the different densities of land uses and buildings as an “outcome of the socio-economic planning processes” (Topcu, 2012).

settlement of Fort Salisbury was situated near the Kopje that provided a panoramic view of the plains below (Chirisa & Matamanda, 2019: 7). Incipient racially segregated (dual



Figure 3.2. The first town planning scheme of Salisbury showing small blocks extending and concentrated around the Kopje area in the background and large expanses of land reserved for gardens and parks (Hardwick, 1974: 181).

city) urban environments were created early on when sanitary boards promulgated regulations in 1894 to establish “native locations” or “African townships” in the main towns of Bulawayo, Mutare and Gweru (Rakodi, 1995; Patel, 1988: 21; Matumbike and Muchadenyika, 2012). The planning laws and standards promulgated in 1933 and 1945 served to reinforce the racial divide between the colonial-settler minority of Europeans and the African majority (Brown, 2001). The regulatory measures were designed to safeguard the “health and security interests of the European population” (Patel 1988: 21) as well as residential differentiation based on race. Thus, the high-density African townships, planned for the low-income black communities, were completely set apart from the low-density European suburbs reserved for white-settler communities. Since all urban areas were exclusively for European settlement, all the black Africans living in the townships inside European areas lived there not by right but as “sojourners” (Fox, 2013: 101).

Evidently, racially segregationist development policies, embedding dualist (black-white) planning processes, polarised the socio-spatial settings of cities in colonial Zimbabwe (Brown, 2001). The dualistic segregatory nature of the urban centres cascaded into the settler-colonial policies of separate development and buffered European against the “overcrowded and impoverished” (Shumba, 2016: 87) Native Reserves (Arrighi, 1966: 19). The Rhodesian space economy was racially organised mainly “to facilitate the extraction of primary commodities and to protect the interests and lifestyles of a European minority” (Fox, 2013: 85, 2014: 191) represented by less than 3.5% of the country’s total population (Patel, 1988: 20). These whites controlled over 90% of the economy while the blacks who accounted for 96% of the population controlled only 10% of the economy (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 323). The Rhodesian economy interests vested in the major cities and towns of Harare, Bulawayo, Gweru, Kwekwe, Kadoma, Chinhoyi, Marondera, Mutare and Masvingo, along the line of rail<sup>27</sup> for marketing, industrial, administrative, communication and security purposes. The mining extraction points of Hwange, Bindura and Zvishavane were developed at the head of the railway lines. The two main axes of urban development were established between Harare and Bulawayo and between Harare and Mutare. As Teedon and Drakakis-Smith observe:

The urban system as such was a creation of settler colonialism. The [urban system] functioned primarily in a comprador capacity to facilitate the export of various primary commodities and the import of consumer goods. The [settler colonial urban system] always accommodated the majority of the white population (Teedon & Drakakis-Smith, 1986: 311).

Despite the “growing demands for land, housing and essential service delivery” (Zinyama, *et al.*, 1993) since 1980, Harare has “continued as a settler-colonial city with no structural changes to its economy and institutions” (Mbiba, 2017a: 1). As Figure 3.3 shows, Harare is a rapidly sprawling city based on a radial road network with the central business district (CBD) at its core and industrial areas to the east and south (Mbiba, 2001:

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<sup>27</sup> The colonial settlers transformed [structurally] the traditional political and economic system and made investments in Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare and Gweru (Ranger, 2004; Raftopoulos, 2006). The fixed physical infrastructures (such as railroads, power lines and dams) were put in place as a basis for future capital accumulation with the proceeds going to the receiving country (Harvey, 2003).

285). Until independence in 1980, Harare evolved along racialised grid lines with significantly large *vlei* tracts reserved as buffer zones between the European suburbs (low




Figure 3.3. Major land uses of Harare and surroundings, 1989 (Adopted from Zinyama, *et al.*, 1993: 10).

density high income residential enclaves) and the African (high density low income residential) townships. European suburbs, on lot sizes of a minimum of 4000m<sup>2</sup>, were located to the north and northeast of the CBD while the African population was confined to the southwest (downwind of the industrial zones) on housing plot sizes of 300m<sup>2</sup> per household (Figure 3.3). Harare is “well planned, pleasant and orderly with colonial vestiges intact” (Wekwete, 1989; Mbiba, 2017a: 1). This is understandable because colonial towns “were managed to benefit the European populations in providing a healthy environment” (Rakodi, 1995: 32; Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 323). However, urban development was discriminatory and racially driven in favour of the white settler

communities. Asian and Coloured communities accessed the medium-range services (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 323). Unlike in the cities elsewhere in Southern Africa, illegal developments and informality in colonial Rhodesia were outlawed, infrastructure and services were maintained and wage employment was intact (Mbiba, 2017a: 1).

Evidently, modernist land use regulatory controls, infrastructure investment and land governance tools were strictly adhered to in order to achieve pleasant living urban environments (Ciriola & Berrisford, 2017: 72; Njoh, 2009) for the Europeans. Driven by a number of underlying reasons discussed in the next section, “disjointed modernization”<sup>28</sup> (Fox, 2014: 193) and discriminatory urban development and regulatory practices have remained in force. It seems these practices continue to be “instrumentalised” (Chabal & Daloz, 1999) by government in its efforts to safeguard the power and wealth accumulation interests of the new ruling elite classes.

### **3.4 Reasons behind enduring unequal urban development policy practices**

At independence in 1980, “the Zimbabwe government’s promise to forge a socialist society” (Zamponi, 2005: 30) centred on a “one city” policy strategy to “de-racialize” all the country’s cities (Muchadenyika and Williams, 2016a). However, the entrenched legacies of racialised urban development policy practices in Rhodesia (Arrighi, 1967; Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2004; Bond, 2007a: 200; Meredith, 2007; Mbiba, 2017c: 6) together with the unresolved socio-economic crises in Zimbabwe have undercut this strategy (Kamete, 2002; Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011; Raftopoulos, 1994, 2014; Hammar & Raftopoulos, 2003: 1; Alexander & McGregor, 2013). Instead, these challenges have added to the heavily “contested political landscape” in Zimbabwe (Raftopoulos, 2004) featuring “new enclaves filled with socio-spatial contradictions” (Carmody & Owusu, 2016: 61). Some explanations for these challenges point to the contradictions and causal factors shaping the country’s “trajectory of economic implosion and intractable mass impoverishment” (McGregor, 2013a) since independence in 1980.

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<sup>28</sup> According to Fox (2014: 193) “disjointed modernization” is a phenomenon “marked by urban population growth outpacing urban economic and institutional development.”

Firstly, almost four decades of Zimbabwean majority rule have witnessed continuities of crass economic and socio-spatial imbalances inherited from Rhodesia (Zamponi, 2005: 30; Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 369). Although the newly independent state gained control of a significant section of the national economy, a highly protected private sector largely owned by white Zimbabweans and international companies remained intact (Zamponi, 2005: 30; Shumba, 2016: 61). The country lumbered on a deeply divided and “unequal society relying on an import substitution-driven capitalist economy with an infrastructure base that had been destroyed by a decade of civil war” (Mbiba, 2017c: 7). Even though Zimbabwe’s economy was the most advanced in sub-Saharan Africa, it was overburdened with “debts, limited local markets, outdated technology and production systems that reduced its capacity for value creation and manufacturing productivity” (Mbiba, 2017c: 7).

Secondly, following its Growth with Equity (GWE) policy statement in 1981, the ZANU-PF party-state engaged redistributive policy practices (free education, health and infrastructure) to improve the living conditions of the majority Africans – “marginalised under previous white regimes” (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 329). The political motive of the government’s GWE economic restructuring policy project was really to capture votes for the ruling party. The success of this policy relied on the inherent “mutual indebtedness” and binding obligations (Magure, 2014: 22) between a new comprador ruling elite class and the ruled. However, the “excessive extractivism”<sup>29</sup> (Verdun, 2010: 1) on the fiscus by ZANU-PF’s redistributive (in the form of centralised patronage gifts) rather than growth policy projects triggered and fuelled a series of dire socio-economic crises (Raftopoulos & Savage, 2004: 23) that have haunted Zimbabwean society to this day (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011). Manufacturing stagnated as capital flows shifted into speculative stock markets and real estate projects to benefit mainly the key members of the ruling elite and business allies. The inherited contradictions of the settler economy persisted as European settlers and foreign institutions continued to control the land and benefited most from the economic status quo. For instance, 97% of bank loans in 1980 went to White-owned firms while the indigenous black Africans remained marginal to the economy.

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<sup>29</sup> Meaning that the exploitation of resources is in the hands of a small number of big companies or people as a model for economic development (Verdun, 2010: 1).

Thirdly, feeling threatened by structural socio-economic problems (Moore, 2003), the then Mugabe-led ZANU-PF government adopted a neoliberal export-oriented IMF/World Bank-driven economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) in 1991 (Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2004). The austerity measures included “deregulation of the financial markets and privatization, reduction in public expenditure, labour retrenchments, removal of subsidies and import barriers, all of which accelerated de-industrialization and led to a rapid decline in living standards of most ordinary citizens” (Shumba, 2016: 23-24). To facilitate economic participation for the black majority in a neoliberal environment, the Zimbabwean government promoted “affirmative action” and “indigenisation” (GoZ, 1993, 1994, 2008). The intertwined policies of affirmative action and indigenisation were essentially crafted to benefit, primarily, a complex network of ruling elite patrons in alliance with crony businessmen clients. Affirmative action and indigenisation policies primarily served to “convert political power and position into economic wealth creation for the benefit of a clique of commandist ruling patrons and aligned businessmen at the expense of many” (Callaghy, 1984: 191; GoZ, 2007, 2011; Handley, 2008: 5; Magure, 2012: 68).

Fourthly, despite the location of Zimbabwe and other poor African countries on the “outer-periphery of the world economy” (Wallerstein, 1979; Bond, 2007a: 154), majority rule has failed to “dislodge the post-colonial African city from the tentacles of capitalist dependent urbanisation” (Patel, 1988: 19; Harvey, 2004, 2005: 56). In other words, the external factors of capitalist reproduction still shape African cities despite the removal of colonial barriers. Instead, incentives of “wealth accumulation” (Davies, 1997: 32 cited in Bond 2007a: 150) motivate “new ruling executives to use their positions to capture and use state organs, including the military, judiciary and society, to build good lives for themselves” (Harvey, 2005: 56; Bond, 2007a: 154; Southall, 2013; Bond & Ruiters, 2017: 175; Shumba, 2016: 34). A hegemonic ZANU-PF party elite class in Zimbabwe mirrors the relics of the settler colonial Rhodesia that it replaced (Mbiba 2017c: 20). This has now become the trend in Africa. Chabal and Daloz (1999: 158) observe that “the aim of political elites in post-colonial Africa is not only to get into power but to retain their extractive positions through appeasing their supporters” and abuse of public resources.



Endemic socio-economic inequalities, a defining feature of neoliberalism (Bayat, 2000: 534), have presented the political hurdles of maintaining legitimacy especially in the capital cities that serve as the transnational centres of global capital (Carmody & Owusu, 2016: 61-62) and private wealth accumulation (Moore, 2012: 4; Shumba, 2016: 33; Mbiba, 2017c: 7). In such a terrain, as discussed in more detail below, cyclical relationships have emerged in which political resources (power, wealth, status) circulate within patronage networks to retain the power of “big men” (Beresford, 2014: 1). In such contexts where meanings of “development” have been “perverted” (Mazingi & Kamidza, 369), patron-clientage relationships compromise the “capacity of the state to undertake meaningful economic reforms that can spur inclusive economic growth” (Shumba, 2016: 33).

Fifthly, “the decolonisation of African countries has not equated with repealing European planning ideologies (Cirolia & Berrisford, 2017: 73) so long these ideologies have bolstered the political power retention and personal wealth accumulation strategies of the ruling elites. For this reason, despite the “changed socio-spatial needs and terrains of a post-colonial city” (Watson, 2009b: 162; 2014), many colonial planning institutions, legislation and regulatory instruments have remained intact and “centralised within the newly formed African states” (Todes, *et al.*, 2010; Watson, 2011; Wekwete, 1989: 7, 1995). In Tanzania, according to Stren, “those who have political connections, education and wealth have almost certainly been able to take advantage of the plot allocation system and various other state-supported institutions in the upscale urban areas” (Stren, 1994). Several decades after the removal of settlerist White rule, urban planning in independent Zimbabwe has retained the former Rhodesian government’s preoccupation with controlling urban development through land use zoning systems. Even though past racialised residential barriers were set aside nearly forty years ago, a small residual European population is now confined to highly secured upscale suburbs such as Borrowdale, Highlands and Glen Lorne in Harare.

Finally, the political struggles over control of the opposition dominated cities and access to political resources in most of sub-Saharan Africa (Resnick, 2014; Alexander & McGregor, 2013; McGregor, 2013b) continue to disrupt the delivery of basic infrastructure and essential services (Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016). Disenchanted

with the rising popularity of the main opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party in Zimbabwe's major cities (Muchadenyika and Williams, 2016a; McGregor, 2013b; Mbiba, 2017c: 1), the ZANU-PF ruling party-state has often deployed "a labyrinth of strategies with the primary goal of wresting power from the responsible urban local authorities" (Madebwe & Madebwe, 2005: 2; Kriger, 2005). The strategies have included the militarisation and informalisation of the key nation-state institutions, partisan application of town planning standards, "instrumentalised disorder"<sup>30</sup> and patronage along political partisan and ethnic lines (Chabal & Daloz, 1999: 144; Madebwe & Madebwe, 2002: 2; Ndlovu, 2007; McGregor, 2013b; Alexander & McGregor, 2013). These strategies became the central mode of state operations during *jambanja* in driving the changed peri-urban land use governance practices in Zimbabwe.

### **3.5 Co-drivers of the changed urban land governance dynamics**

A number of salient points emerge from recent studies on the co-drivers of the changed urban land governance dynamics in Zimbabwe (ICED, 2017, Mbiba, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c; Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016, 2017). Firstly, although Zimbabwe seems to have slightly de-urbanised in the intercensal period between 2002 and 2012, the headline statistics conceal a rapid population growth of intermediate towns and sprawl (Mbiba, 2017b). Secondly, the ascendancy of the main opposition populist MDC party in Zimbabwe's largest urban constituencies of Harare and Bulawayo, threatening the dominance of a hegemonic ZANU-PF party, motivated the latter to "fiddle with the urban constituencies to strengthen the ruling ZANU-PF's hand ahead of the July 2018 national elections" (The Financial Gazette, 2018). Intent on ensuring its re-election in its traditional rural constituencies, the ZANU-PF party government selectively re-designated swathes of peri-urban land as rural in order to augment its electoral mainstay as a rural-based party since independence in 1980. Thus, the rapid growth of major cities such as Harare and Bulawayo may suggest that urban to peri-urban migration has been a trend in reducing the urbanisation rate (percentage of the nation's population living in

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<sup>30</sup> Chabal and Daloz (1999) define "the new forms and content of development in Africa" through an optic of "instrumentalization of disorder". These scholars note that Africa's institutions appear to be in a state of "disorder" because of "the apparently ineffective institutions and corruption". However, the state of "disorder", using Western criteria of bureaucracy, "is functional and indicative of a uniquely African developmental path where everyone is a participant and everyone has something to gain through corrupt practices" (Hungwe & Hungwe, 2000: 277).

urban areas) as a result. Yet, Zimbabwe's actual urban population could exceed 40% if the urban-rural boundary designations were readjusted (ICED, 2017: 6; Mbiba, 2017b).

Therefore, to fully grasp the transformations in post-independence Zimbabwe, the section suggests a retracing of the wider socio-economic forces that have refashioned the lives and spaces in these cities over time and space (Harvey, 2004). In so doing, the chapter sheds light on how the dialectical processes underlying ESAP triggered *jambanja* and other forces (circular migration, cross border transport links) that have markedly transformed the country's urban landscapes. The next sections interrogate the demographic trends in Zimbabwe and implications for urban growth<sup>31</sup> and urbanisation.

### ***3.5.1 Urban demographic growth and urbanisation trends in SSA***

A number of studies on the trends of urban population growth in sub-Saharan Africa by Potts (2000, 2010, 2012a: 1, 2013a) reveal a number of intriguing patterns. Firstly, a widespread claim that the level (degree) of urbanisation<sup>32</sup> in Africa is higher than anywhere else in the world is not valid (Potts, 2012a: 1). Potts noted, for example, that Kenya's urban population had dropped 34% of the total population in 2001 to 22% in 2010. Elsewhere, the Kenyan experience was repeated in Tanzania that registered a decline from 33% down to 26%, Mauritania (59% to 41%) and Senegal (48% to 43%) (ibid. 1). The scenario for Zimbabwe was similar during the intercensal period 2002 to 2012. The Zimbabwe population census of 2012 reported that the country's urban population was 33% down from 35% in 2002 (ZimStat, 2012: 25). These figures imply that Zimbabwe had de-urbanised during the 2002 to 2012 decade – a position that was also supported by some international organisations (ICED, 2017: 6).

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<sup>31</sup> According to the UN-Habitat (2014) and Potts (2012) "urban growth" refers to "an increase in the urban population that occurs as a result of either a combination of rural-to-urban migration, natural increases, boundary changes or reclassification of rural territories into urban areas."

<sup>32</sup> Levels of urbanisation are measured crudely by the percentage (proportion) of population residing in urban areas in relation to the national population of the country, and the rate of urbanisation as the percentage increase in urban population (UNDESA, 2014) across space through time. However, national definitions of urban areas in terms of boundaries and statistical indices are too different to be used for international let alone global comparisons (Dijkstra, *et al.*, 2018: 26).

Secondly, despite a decline in the urbanisation rate of Zimbabwe (ICED, 2017: 6), the country's urban population grew slowly from 4 029 707 to 4 284 145 (0.46% per annum) between 2002 and 2012. Both the International Office of Migration (IOM) and ZimStat (2009: 68) attributed the country's sluggish urban growth rate chiefly to the outward migration of mainly highly skilled urban dwellers. The net outward migration of an estimated 527 572 (World Bank cited in ICED Report, 2017: 11) people was largely fuelled by the Zimbabwe's deepening economic crises since ESAP in mid-1990. Crush and Tevera (2010) observed that, after the first ten years of ESAP, a third of the national population of Zimbabwe had left home. These two geographers noted that although 1.5 million Zimbabweans migrated to South Africa and 300,000 relocated to the UK, the population at home largely remained unchanged. However, "there were signs of counter-urbanization as desperate urban dwellers either returned to their rural homes or migrated across regional borders" (Hammar, *et al.*, 2010: 265).

Thirdly, other recent studies in urban Zimbabwe have been concerned that "the headline census figures mask the diversity and complexity in population movements at regional and local levels" (ICED, 2017: 6; Mbiba, 2017b). Mbiba (2017b) notes that "the unadjusted urban boundaries suggest that demographic growth associated with urban sprawl [in the metropolitan cities of Harare and Bulawayo] in Zimbabwe has not been captured". A review of the main 2012 census report indicates that in many instances, boundary changes led to urban populations of many small settlements and undesignated urban areas being counted and reported as rural, even though their population may have been above the official 2,500 - the threshold population of an urban centre in the country (ICED, 2017: 4). Clearly, the "absence of in-depth analytical studies on the rapid population growth trends encompassing peri-urban areas, with small and intermediate settlements considered urban" (Mbiba, 2017b), remains a major policy concern with Zimbabwe's demographic growth and urbanisation trends. This concern is important defining rural from urban constituencies in the provision of public goods and infrastructure.

This section has refuted claims that sub-Saharan Africa's level of urbanisation has become the highest worldwide. In reality, however, the demographic growth trends of cities vary within and among the African countries, cities and city spaces. Although some

countries have actually de-urbanised, including Zimbabwe, “the extent of this slowdown seems somewhat exaggerated and likely to be reversed if the relevant boundary changes are made” (Mbiba, 2017b). Clearly, it is still possible that the country will have achieved its own urban majority relative to the rural population by 2050. How, then, have these demographic trends varied across peri-urban zones, the small and intermediate towns in Zimbabwe?

### ***3.5.2 Local level demographic dynamics of growth and mobility***

Recent urban studies in Zimbabwe (Chirisa and Chaeruka, 2012; Scoones, 2016a, 2016b; IOM & ZIMSTAT, 2009; ICED, 2017) draw attention to the rapid population growth that has occurred in the country’s small and intermediate towns of Ruwa, Beitbridge, Norton, Chinhoyi, Gwanda, Chipinge, Gokwe and Harare’s largest and oldest peri-urban informal settlement of Epworth. Although the contributions of these studies to a full understanding of the complex migration and mobility trends of all urban and peri-urban areas in Zimbabwe are still thin on the ground, a number of key demographic features stand out.

Firstly, Potts (2000: 879-880) notes that the migration patterns and urban development trends in Zimbabwe have continued to shift since 1980 when legal and institutional barriers to the rural-urban movements of black Africans were removed. Evidently, one of the key drivers of a surge in population growth in the peri-urban areas and small towns have been massive job retrenchments wrought by the neoliberal reform crises. Potts aptly observes that:

...urban residents in Zimbabwe have experienced significant losses of incomes and negative changes to their consumption and livelihood patterns since 1990. These changes have taken a turn for the worse since 2000 (Potts, 2006: 547).

Since 2000, Zimbabwe’s economy has experienced an unprecedented freefall marked by inflation rates beyond 100 million percent (Jones, 2010: 285; Morreira, 2010: 354). The effects of hyperinflation, the deteriorating economic conditions countrywide, capital flight, deindustrialisation and massive retrenchments and the violence of the militarised

Operation *Murambatsvina* (“clean-out the filth”) provoked massive structural and physical displacements (Hammar, 2008: 417) within Zimbabwe forcing many of the urban poor and unemployed into the neighbouring countries in search of livelihoods to protect themselves and their families (Morreira, 2010: 354).

Secondly, Potts (2010 cited in ICED, 2017: 12) views the surge in the population growth of peri-urban areas (especially around Harare and Bulawayo) and small towns as a feature of increased “multi-sited mobility” or “circular migration<sup>33</sup>” arising from the impacts of undying economic crises in Zimbabwe. Circularity features prominently in countries with elevated rural population growth rates but limited livelihood opportunities and the rate of urbanisation is inversely related to declining economic growth. According to Potts (2010) the countries that were experiencing marked circularity features in sub-Saharan African included Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire and the Central African Republic.

Thirdly, further structural changes in Zimbabwe have taken place since the abortive neoliberal reforms experiment (ESAP) in the mid-1990s (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 335). The rise in small-scale and artisanal mining activities in the “*jambanja* political economy” (Chirimambowa and Chimedza, 2017), precipitated a decline in corporate-based mining and the closure of some mines. The urban centres that had relied on iron ore production, such as Kadoma and Redcliff, continued to stagnate. Crucially, the “fast track” land reform programme (*jambanja*) quickened the switch from corporate mining to small scale mining (ICED, 2017: 41). *Jambanja* opened up access to more land that had previously been controlled by a few thousand European farmers making it available for artisanal mining by both newly resettled farmers and the displaced farm workers. Consequently, thousands of displaced farm workers, deprived of livelihood and home during the violence of *jambanja*, ended up in the peri-urban areas of nearby urban centres – where they survived on the informal economy (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2005). How,

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<sup>33</sup> “Multi-sited mobility” or “circular migration” describes a process where individuals and families are circulating between rural and urban areas, mainly for purposes of engaging in seasonal variable economic activities. This pattern of circular migration is a common feature of urbanising societies, as new urban workers move back and forth between cities and their villages and towns during harvest seasons, periods of climate pressure, political turmoil, or urban economic downturns (such as that experienced by Zimbabwe) (Potts, 2010; Saunders, 2011: 38).

then, did the shifting socio-spatial and institutional factors shape the political economy of urban governance<sup>34</sup> space in Zimbabwe?

### **3.6 The political economy of urban governance through ‘irregularities’**

The demographic shifts and radically changed land uses highlighted earlier can be better understood under a political economy analytical lens of urban governance mediated through “patronage, violence and decaying state institutions” in Zimbabwe (Kriger, 2003a; Southall, 2013; Kamete, 2006, 2007, 2011; Goodfellow, 2013; McGregor 2013a; 2013b; ICED, 2017: 17). Meanwhile, the country remains captive to current political battles over control of the country’s national political space between a ruling ZANU-PF militarised party-state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007: 50), that “systematically combines coercive violence with patronage to regenerate its political power” (Shumba, 2016: 11), and the increasingly weakened opposition MDC party. The country’s “political impasse” (Moore 2012: 4) is worsened by a militarisation and restructuring of “party-state institutions” (Zamponi, 2005: 27; McGregor, 2013b; Kriger, 2003a) into “combative units of the ruling party” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007: 50-51) and “predatory state”<sup>35</sup> (Shumba, 2016: 32). Aggravating these challenges are the unresolved “irregularities” of the partisan “fast track” land reforms and redistribution processes, and the dominance of a small ruling elite in the wealth accumulation networks “tied to the ZANU-PF party-state structures” (Ratfopoulos & Phimister, 2004: 374). In what specific ways, then, have these multilayered forces and militarised power-laden processes reshaped the spaces of governance in Zimbabwe?

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<sup>34</sup> In Lindell’s (2008: 1880) view “urban governance encompasses ways individuals and institutions, public and private, plan and manage the common affairs of the city involving various layers of relations and modes of power at different scales and multiple sites”.

<sup>35</sup> Shumba (2016: 32) observes that the “predatory state as an analytic paradigm arose from the continued search to make sense of what explains the failure of economic transformation in the developing African countries”. Drawing on their observations in Cameroon, *et al.* (1999:2) argued that “because the state is poorly institutionalised, the ruling elites were able to instrumentalise disorder and chaos for their personal gain”. “Such a state of disorder,” Shumba (2016: 32) concludes, “induces corruption and reinforces continued informalisation that, in turn, undermines prospects for economic transformation”.

### *3.6.1 Neopatrimonialism and 'jambanja' politics of patronage*

Recent studies on urban planning in Zimbabwe (Muchadenyika & Williams, 2017: 33-34; Kamete, 2007, 2011, 2017; Chirisa & Bandaiko, 2014) blame the “political impasse” and ruling elite’s “propensity for acquisitiveness” (Moore, 2012: 4) for “virtually eroding, if not eliminating, an efficient planning system” in the country (Muchadenyika & Williams, 2017: 33). The impact of neopatrimonial politics on urban governance in Zimbabwe has resulted in the fragmentation of urban land uses (MLGPWNH, 2015), “conflicting rationalities” (Sagte & Watson, 2018: 3) and rapid sprawl. In spirited efforts to wrestle control from the opposition MDC-run urban councils (Madebwe & Madebwe, 2005), the ZANU-PF party-state has engaged a bewildering array of strategies and tactics to reclaim the lost urban constituencies and to carve out new political territories “even by violating existing law and practice” (Moore, 2012: 4).

In some cases, by fomenting urban management crises of “vulnerability, marginality and abjection” in local communities (Brown, 2014), the ZANU-PF ruling party-state elites and business allies invade economic spaces to wealth creation opportunities for themselves by “privatising and selling off public urban land” (Mbiba, 2017c: 3). Taking advantage of *jambanja*, ZANU-PF elites and self-styled “land barons” deliberately ignored statutory procedures on change of use and converted public urban land spaces into zones of accumulation in which “power was consolidated through “gray-spacing” (Yiftachel, 2009a) strategies to reward their supporters. Since opposition MDC-run councils experienced acute shortages of serviced land and housing, the ruling ZANU-PF party exploited these deficits by “offering informal housing plots” (Brown, 2014) to those who pledged political support.

As discussed in the next section, these neo-patrimonial political strategies are not unique to African countries because they are commonly practised by all layers of society worldwide albeit in different forms (Hungwe & Hungwe, 2000: 279). Therefore, these “strategies are “neither ‘African’ institutional practices nor ‘European’ impositions but products of a peculiar Euro-African history” (Cooper, 2002). The ZANU-PF party-state in Zimbabwe has engaged similar strategies through “instrumentalised disorder” (Chabal & Daloz 1999). The instrumentalised disorder has often used the media of “state-



sponsored violence and patronage” (Chaumba, *et al.*, 2003: 7; Sachikonye, 2004: 9; Moyo, 2013a; 2013b; Mudimu & Kurima, 2018:1; McGregor, 2013b; Alexander & McGregor, 2013) and a “gray spacing” (Yiftachel, 2009a, 2009b) of institutional practices. In order to survive, ordinary people resort to tactics of “*kujingirisa* or *kukikiya*” (Shona for “improvising and making do”) (Jones, 2010).

Similarly, as noted by Roy (2009a: 79) in “*Why India cannot plan its cities*”, the ruling elites or state and the ZANU-PF party aligned business networks in Zimbabwe operate informally. With its “propensity for acquisitiveness” and “regression to coercion, brazen expropriation and extortion of property in breach of existing law” (Moore, 2012: 4), the ZANU-PF ruling party-state “routinely suspends the law and operates outside written rules and regulations in order to achieve its objectives” (Kamete, 2008). In the conflicting rationalities between the state visions and plans and the everyday lives of ordinary people during the *jambanja* episode, the question discussed in the next section is: How, then, did the socio-spatial strategies of the ZANU-PF party-state play out a rapidly changed peri-urban landscape in Zimbabwe?

### ***3.6.2 Jambanja and the dynamics of urban sprawl***

The dynamics of urban sprawl in post-2000 Zimbabwe can be understood by tracking the “forces that have shaped the structural development of the country’s urban centres prior to and since majority rule in 1980” (ICED, 2017; Mbiba, 2017b, 2017c; Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016a, 2017, 2018). The overturning of legal and institutional controls on rural African migration to town fuelled a mounting backlog in urban housing in Zimbabwe that existing unrealistic building standards and later the economic crises of the 1990s worsened until *jambanja* in early 2000. The housing backlog was estimated to have exceeded one million by 2004 (MNHSA, 2010). Before 1980, extreme congestion in existing urban housing for the majority black population had become tradition. Although the ZANU-PF party-state launched Operation *Murambatsvina* in 2005, ostensibly, to remove illegal developments in urban centres (Chipungu, 2011; Tibaijuka, 2005); with *jambanja* all that was reversed as ZANU-PF land barons deployed “gray-spacing” (Yiftachel, 2009a) tactics to allocate contested peri-urban land parcels to loyalist supporters (Mbiba, 2017a: 10).

The political patronage system gave birth to politically aligned ZANU-PF “housing co-operatives” (Chirisa, *et al.*, 2015) and a politicised marginalisation of global neoliberal actors through “affirmative action” and “indigenisation policies” (GoZ, 1993; 1994; 2008) to generate rents for ruling party executives and loyalists (Moyo & Yeros, 2009; Mbiba, 2017c: 8). During *jambanja*, all privately White owned peri-urban farms were declared public urban land (McGregor, 2013b). In practice, however, large chunks of fraudulently grabbed public urban land were secretly privatised to benefit a “wealthy indigenous elite capitalist class sponsored by the ruling ZANU-PF party” (Mbiba, 2017a: 8). This trend of land grabs did not only benefit ZANU-PF party loyalists but soon leading members of opposition MDC party were embroiled in urban land accumulation scandals and litigations in Harare” (ibid.).

Ultimately, the conspicuous and rampant conversion of vast tracts of previously White owned farmland around all Zimbabwean cities to public urban land opened the floodgates to “a plethora of land dealers who grabbed and allocated plots for housing development” (Mbiba, 2017b: 10) intently enriching themselves. The land dealers included “political elites, corrupt state officials...church and traditional leaders in peri-urban areas” (Mbiba, 2017b: 10 - 11). Meanwhile, private land owners in peri-urban rural areas subdivided their plots for sale. Some villagers in peri-urban rural Domboshava, Seke and Goromonzi converted their small landholdings to residential use to accommodate urban dwellers for rents. Other villagers “fenced off adjacent public land in a *jambanja* peri-urban spin-off process that became popularly known as Operation *Garawadya* (“eat first then answer questions later”)” (Mbiba, 2017b: 11). The rapid sprawl has led to the formulation of Harare Combination Master Plan (1996) engulfing the satellite towns of Chitungwiza, Ruwa, Norton, Darwendale and Mazowe and emerging townships of Epworth, Seke and Domboshava.

Figure 3.4 shows that Harare city is within the Harare Combination Master Plan Boundary reflecting how the city is connected with the satellite towns. Currently, most of these towns are connected with Harare city. Ruwa, Epworth and Chitungwiza depend on Harare for their water supply. Harare city is expanding rapidly outwards and over time the city region will become a metropolis attributing to the large network of roads

that makes it easier for people to commute from various places around Harare to the city centre. The intensified mobility and booming “*kiya-kiya*” (Shona lexicon for “improvising just to get by”) (Morreira, 2010: 355) cross-border retail economy has triggered the rapid growth of border towns such as Kotwa, Beitbridge and Plumtree and




Figure 3.4. Boundaries of Harare City and Harare Combination Master Plan Authority, 1996 (Chirisa & Matamanda, 2019).

the highway settlements, most of them small rural service centres such as Ngundu and Mhandamabgwe, both in Chivi District en route to South Africa.

The primary targets of urban patronage in the form of housing perks are “mainly ZANU-PF clients, military officers, civil servants and liberation war veterans” (McGregor, 2013a: 25). A rebuilding programme, code-named “Operation *Garikayi*” (*Hlalani Kuhle* or “stay well”) in 2006, for example, “was a government-funded housing construction programme” (Mpofu, 2011). The programme had been “intended to compensate those who lost homes during the demolitions, but in practice new homes and stands were allocated to ZANU-PF clients and civil servants” (Mpofu, 2011; McGregor, 2013a: 25).

Following “the demolition of informal dwellings during Operation *Murambatsvina* in 2005 (Watson, 2009b: 177), access to housing cooperatives, licences for vending and industry were increasingly politicized for the sole benefit of ZANU-PF party loyalists. Urban councils, controlled by the opposition MDC party since 2009, were politically excluded from allocations of public land by central government such that expanding urban populations on city peripheries had to live on land controlled by ZANU-PF war veterans, where the allocation of plots and access to building programmes was contingent on demonstrable party loyalty. However, the reality is that some leading members of the opposition MDC party have “abused the local government system for wealth accumulation” (Mbiba 2017c: 3) and fraudulently allocated themselves stands on prime land owned by municipalities.

### ***3.6.3 Emerging new urban forms at the peri-urban fringe***

The peri-urban landscapes of Harare and satellite towns of Ruwa, Chitungwiza, Norton and Beatrice, reveal markedly new urban forms. Some of the new housing architectures reflect diasporic investments (McGregor, 2013a). To be sure, Harare’s peri-urban landscape is rapidly filling up with mosaics of diasporic suburbs, fortified enclaves and gated community homes, shopping malls and state-funded housing schemes interspersed with informal settlements (see Appendix A). New middle income and high income “diaspora suburbs” have taken root in the satellite towns of Ruwa and Norton where land is cheaper than in innercity Harare (McGregor, 2013a: 6).

Evidently, diasporic investments in real estate development have not been confined to Harare’s satellite towns but dispersed throughout the country. However, the majority urban poor live in the overcrowded low-income residential neighbourhoods situated at the edge of cities and in informal settlements that emerged from *jambanja*. The informal settlements areas are increasingly interspersed with sprawling and un-serviced middle-income residential infill suburbs – “flaunting regulations over service provision” (Mbiba, 2017c). Many informal settlements are located further away from the main centres of formal employment and commercial business where the commuter transport fares are prohibiting. Thus, some foreign investors have taken interest in building one-stop shopping malls, such as Mbudzi Shopping Mall on the Harare-Masvingo-Beitbridge

Road Corridor (Appendix A), to serve residents from the surrounding informal settlements of Hopley and Ushewokunze as well as the regional traffic connecting Zambia, South Africa and Malawi.

### **3.7 From compact dual city-scapes to rapidly sprawling urban landscapes**

The chapter has examined why urban centres in Zimbabwe remain captive to “dual-city” visions (Abu-Lughod, 1965: 420; Potts, 2008a) despite the admonition of separate development policy practices (Patel, 1988; Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 322) by the new leadership at independence in 1980. The chapter has demonstrated how the settler-colonial modernist planning policies that spearheaded and shaped the development of Harare resulted in a polarised and racially segregated city (Rakodi, 1995). As in all former British territories in Anglophone sub-Saharan Africa, the interests of the incoming European settler population produced Zimbabwe’s dualistic space economy aligned with modernist policy blueprints.

Since majority rule in Zimbabwe in 1980, a two-pyramid racial-spatial structure of the country’s urban centres has been dislodged by one based on “economic status instead of race” (Brown, 2000). Many urban studies in sub-Saharan Africa point out how modernist land markets have “swept away the urban poor” (Watson, 2009b: 177) forcing them into areas “where marginality has flourished and informality tolerated” (Davis, 2016: 5). In opportunistic processes (Watson, 2009b: 177), urban planning (Kamete, 2011: 66, 2013) has been profoundly implicated as the handmaiden of “graying spaces” (Yiftachel, 2009a, 2009b) for elitist consumption and a “surveillance tool” (McGregor, 2013b) for monitoring and preventing ordinary people from accessing urban state land parcels reserved for the ruling elites and business allies (Mbiba, 2017c: 8).

As discussed in further detail in chapters 5 and 6, loyalist members of the new black ruling elite class have carved out spaces on prime public urban land in a plunder of state resources through “patronage politics” (Magure, 2012: 67) and the intertwined policy strategies. To ensure the success and continuity of these policy strategies, “beneficiaries of the chaotic land reforms (*jambanja*), indigenisation and empowerment deals have

served as vital cogs in the re-election bids of the ruling ZANU-PF party since 2000” (Magure, 2014: 23).

The next chapter tracks how the study navigated the socio-spatial contours that have transfigured Harare’s peri-urban landscape post-2000. To start with, the chapter explains the usefulness of Habermas’ (1972) “multiple realities” and Giddens’s (1984) critical “social constructivist-hermeneutic” considerations that informed the concurrent design (De Vos, 2002: 365; Wolley, 2009; Driscoll *et al.*, 2007) strategies used in the study.

## **CHAPTER 4: OPERATIONALISING RESEARCH ON THE “PERI-URBAN” INTERFACE**

### **4.1 Major thematic questions of the research on reconstructing the PUI**

The preceding chapter has recaptured a historical political economy of Zimbabwe’s urban context serving as a structural framework of the state-society relations shaping the country’s urban and peri-urban policy landscapes. This chapter describes how and why the study opted for a mixed-methods design (De Vos, 2002: 365; Wolley, 2009; Driscoll, *et al.*, 2007) to explain how ZANU-PF’s party-state policy strategies of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2003) have transfigured Harare’s peri-urban landscapes post-2000.

The study triangulated (Creswell, 1994: 177-178; Mouton & Marais, 1996; De Vos, 2002: 365) different sets of data on the lived experiences (Gorard & Taylor, 2004 in Cresswell, 2009: 8) of ordinary residents in Harare’s transient poor neighbourhoods<sup>36</sup>. The rationale for integrating the different sets of data anchored on the need for understanding the forces that have fuelled Harare’s changed peri-urban landscapes by building a “broad picture” (De Vos, 2002: 365). The study used the following questions to collect data for mapping out conceptual thematic categories of the emerging palimpsest peri-urban landscapes in Harare:

- What are the main demographic characteristics of the residents living in marginalised peri-urban spaces?
- What have been the main major economic and socio-spatial forces and processes behind the changed landscapes through rapid sprawling in Harare?

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<sup>36</sup> “Transient poor neighbourhoods”, according to the ICED (2017: 13), “are poor, in transition and have different demographic features [predominantly children and young households] from the older residential and innercity areas”. In other words, transient areas are the intersection of circular migration where the flow of people, goods, information takes all directions.

- In what specific ways have ordinary residents responded to the ZANU-PF party-state policy practices in the distribution of public land resources in the contested peri-urban spaces of the newly acquired stateland farms?

The study conducted multi-site semi-structured interviews to help the participants, both as individuals and groups, narrate their experiences during *jambanja* in 2000 and Operation *Murambatsvina* in 2005, respectively. The strategies that respondents used to access and use acquired land resources in this study are considered pivotal to understanding the increasingly politicised and chaotic land grabs that led to a leapfrog sprawling of informal settlements at the fringe of major urban centres in Zimbabwe.

The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section 4.2 explains why the study used a mixed-methods design, methods and techniques to unravel the land use dynamics of the changed peri-urban landscape in Harare during *jambanja*. Section 4.2.1 analyses the sampling procedures used for identifying the study population and calibrating the different sample sizes. Under the research methodology in section 4.2.2, the chapter presents the sampling and data collection methods and techniques used during the fieldwork. Section 4.3 describes the rationale of the data analysis procedures and techniques used. This section also describes the instruments that the study used to measure the variables. In section 4.4, the chapter evaluates the quality of the findings in light of the data analysis techniques used. Section 4.5 describes how the researcher administered the ethical guidelines. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.

#### **4.2 Relevance of mixed methods design from four major vantage points**

The research considered a mixed-methods design (Woolley, 2002: 12; Cresswell, 2010: 157) relevant by proceeding from four vantage points. Firstly, the design enabled the study to unpack a chest of different tools to collect, analyse and interpret the different data sets. This unpacking involved a comprehensive analysis of the “interrelated social processes and human experiences” that the study (Sale, *et al.*, 2002: 46; Cresswell, 2010: 157) captured and used for theory building.



Secondly, the mixed methods design helped to deconstruct the multilayered “form and contents” (Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000: 37) of the peri-urban fringe over time and space. The findings discussed in chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate how the interviews, focus group discussions and biographical narrations helped to flesh out the major institutional, regulatory and political processes (Schutt, 2012: 347) underlying the emerging palimpsest peri-urban landscapes in Harare. The mixed method strategy made this possible through “integrating the quantitative and qualitative materials” (Bryman, 2007; O’Cathain, *et al.*, 2007) depicted in the research design (Figure 4.1).

Thirdly, the epistemological components of this mixed design subsisted heavily on Giddens’s structure-agency and political economy perspectives of the study in order to peer into the contemporary “life-worlds” (*‘Lebenswelt’* in German) (Giddens 1984) of residents in the new and emerging peri-urban informal settlements in Harare. The semi-structured in-depth interviewer-administered questionnaire guides (see Appendix C) assisted the respondents to reflexively narrate their experiences in navigating the local and national neoliberal terrains of Zimbabwe’s political projects – *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina* (discussed in the preceding chapters 1 to 3).

Fourthly, the study resolved that an eclectic political economy analysis of *jambanja* infused with Giddens’s structure agency, Habermas’s (1972) “multiple realities” and Yiftachel’s “gray-spacing” strategies would enable it to confront the complex forces behind the changed peri-urban governance landscapes in Harare. The quantitative and qualitative socio-spatial patterns distilled from the collected data materials helped to mount conceptual blocks on the peri-urban interface using “grounded theory” building techniques (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1999; Charmaz, 2003; 2014; Engward, 2013: 37). In the next section, the chapter turns to how the study organised and conducted the fieldwork corroborating the quantitative and qualitative data sets across different institutional and household contexts.

#### ***4.2.1 Operationalising fieldwork to corroborate different data sets on the PUI***

To operationalise the study, the researcher conducted a “pilot study” (De Vos, Strydom, *et al.*, 2011: 237) in the informal settlements that emerged in peri-urban Masvingo during *jambanja* (Appendix B). The pilot study intended to assess the ability of




Figure 4.1. Mixed methods research design (Adopted from Woolley, 2002: 12).

respondents “to remember, process and evaluate geographic information” (Kitchin & Tate, 2000: 9; MacMillan & Schumacher, 2001: 166; Durrheim, 2004: 29) in anticipation of the fieldwork in Harare. The initial study experience in peri-urban Masvingo enhanced the validity of the data collection instruments in order to yield “reasonable and unbiased data” (Neuman & Kreuger, 2003: 179-180; Salkind, 2009: 112) in peri-urban Harare. The literature review in chapters 1 to 3 provided materials for the variables determining the contents and structuring of the data collection instruments. “Standardising the semi-structured” interview guides (Babbie & Mouton, 2006: 233) used during the fieldwork ensured that the individual questions were integrated into intertwined thematic categories – indicated in section 4.1 above.

As Figure 4.1 above shows, the study proceeded along two concurrent phases (Creswell, 2009: 212) to facilitate a triangulation of the different data sets. The fieldwork started with a survey of the key stakeholder urban planning institutions directly involved in the formulation and supervision of government urban land development policy related to the “fast track” land reforms (*jambanja*). The institutions visited are mainly the Department of Physical Planning in the Ministry of Local Government, Harare City Council and Ruwa Local Board. The Department of Physical Planning supervises all local planning authorities in Zimbabwe to comply with the physical planning and legal provisions of the Regional and Town Country Planning Act of 1996 to ensure an orderly development of areas within their administrative boundaries. The institutional survey covered semi-structured interviews with gatekeeper town planning officers in local government. The survey focused on the central and local government planning policy interventions in the study areas shown in Figure 1.3, chapter 1. After interviews with town planning officers in the Department of Physical Planning in Harare, the researcher engaged the chief planning officers of Harare City Council and Ruwa Local Board in a similar exercise. Thereafter, the researcher carried out a fully fledged multisite survey of residents in the rural villages of peri-urban communal land Domboshawa and informal settlements in peri-urban Caledonia, Solomio in Ruwa and Saturday Retreat.

The data sets were combined to explore and compare variations at different levels of everyday life of peri-urban residents across the following political economy structuring contexts:

- Gender
- Age group
- Education
- Locality
- Motive of relocating to peri-urban settlement
- Impact of ESAP and *jambanja* on everyday life
- Coping strategies in marginalised urban space
- Participation in community development in the context of public goods and service delivery

The study used a biographical approach to help participants “narrate their personal experiences” (Hammersley, 1992) during *jambanja*. The biographical interviews were based on earlier peri-urban household interviews and focus group experiences. Thirty biographical interviewees comprised household questionnaire respondents and 10 of them also took part in focus group discussions. The interplay of structure-agency in the individual lives of respondents was explored through the multilayered interviews across different socio-economic contexts in the informal settlements.

In sum, the study firstly conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with chief planning practitioners in the stakeholder local government planning authorities of Harare City Council and Ruwa Local Board. The institutional survey shed light on the official planning experiences concerning the ZANU-PF ruling party-state policy practices in peri-urban abject spaces during *jambanja*. Secondly, based on the local planning experiences, the study conducted semi-structured interviews (Appendix A) with residents in the targeted informal settlements on their experiences in the contexts of *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina*. To wrap up the household survey, the biographical thrust of the research focused on the structure-agency engagements of residents with the ZANU-PF party-state and stakeholder local authorities in the delivery of peri-urban land resources and related services. In the next section, this discussion defines the sampling plan and techniques, the data collection methods used and how the raw data was processed, analysed and interpreted.

## ***4.2.2 Implementation of the research plan: logistics and activities***

Although the study was operationalised using concurrent design, the extended fieldwork permitted follow-up visits that afforded the study additional opportunities for reconciling potential discrepancies between “the meanings the researcher had presumed” and those “understood by the participants” (Kirk & Miller, 1986: 30-31). The prolonged field engagements also allowed more time for concepts to emerge through paying more attention to the dominant characteristics under study (Guba & Lincoln, 1989: 237).

### ***4.2.2.1 Defining the sampling area and units of analysis for the survey***

Extreme caution must be taken when considering the “representativeness and generalizability” of the entire population (Scott & Morrison, 2007: 219; Neuman, 2011: 246) because it was not possible to compile lists of all the key variables in the “source population”<sup>37</sup>. This was mainly because of the extensively haphazard layout and shifting nature of the informal settlements in the study area. However, the study assumed that trade-offs could be achieved through the generally homogeneous characteristics of informal households by targeting the largest sample sizes possible, maximising stratified variations within the sample frame in different informal settlement contexts and corroborating the different data collection techniques (Scott & Morrison, 2007: 219; Cozby, 2009: 139-140).

Firstly, during preliminary site visits in the targeted peri-urban neighbourhoods, the study identified the primary units (ordinary residents in informal settlements) of analysis using the following characteristics:

- Age of resident (18 years or older).
- Tenure of residence in the study area.
- Ownership of either land or housing or both, in the neighbourhood.

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<sup>37</sup> Sheskin (1985) considers “a source population” as “the universe to which inference is made because it contains all the sampling units”. Thus, it is not possible to trace out, virtually, a sampling frame that captures all the elements in a population except in a census.

- Lived experiences of identified participants during *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina*.

Secondly, the envisaged household survey was confronted by political tensions in peri-urban Harare in the run-up to the July 2018 general elections. Furthermore, Goromonzi Rural District Council was unable to provide a written permission for the survey in Domboshava. Thus, wary of these tensions, the research proceeded to snowball for




Figure 4.2 - Locality map of study area in Domboshava Communal Land (Author, 2018)

participants, targeting those who readily consented to the interviews in the villages of Parirehwa, Gukwe and Murape in communal land Domboshava. As Figure 4.2 shows, the targeted villages, constituting the sampling frame, lay within safe walking distances from the Harare-Domboshava highway that links peri-urban communal land Domboshava to Harare city. A sub-sample of 60 heads of households in Domboshava participated in the interviewer-administered household survey (see Appendix C).

After the Domboshava household survey, the research team proceeded to conduct extensive multi-site visits in the informal settlement communities of Caledonia and




Figure 4.3 - Locality map of Ruwa satellite town showing Caledonia and Solomio (Author, 2018).

Solomio-Ruwa, concluding with Saturday Retreat in Harare South (see Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4). The sprawling informal settlement of Caledonia accommodates over an estimated 100,000 residents living in mixed densities of shacks and modern houses (see Figure 5.8).

To ensure personal safety, the study resorted to a two-strand snowball and purposeful sampling strategy to yield participants in peri-urban communal villages of Domboshava. In the other tension-filled research areas of Caledonia, Ruwa-Solomio and Saturday Retreat, the project used purposeful sampling to identify the respondents (Neuman, 2003: 211, 223).




Figure 4.4 - Locality map of Saturday Retreat (Author, 2018).

To achieve representative coverage of each of the informal settlements, the research used a one-stage quota sampling technique within randomly selected clusters of informal households in Caledonia, Solomio-Ruwa and Saturday Retreat. To avoid duplicating responses, the researcher ensured that the study sites were mutually exclusive in terms of territorial boundaries (Rogerson, 2010: 136). Therefore, the research used a simple random spatial sampling technique to identify households spread across each of the targeted peri-urban neighbourhoods whereas within each neighbourhood the study used a quota sampling to balance the spatial distribution of the respondents. Undoubtedly, the biases inherent in purposefully identifying the participants compromised the generalizability of the findings (De Vos, 1998: 199; Welman, *et al.*, 2005: 69) of the study. To improve chances of the generalizability of findings, the researcher increased the sample size through extensive household surveys



and variation of the sites visited within the spatial sampling frames (Sarantakos, 2000: 154).

#### ***4.2.2.2 Sample sizes of respondents in planning agencies and peri-urban areas***

The institutional sample comprised eight senior town planning officers and two deputy directors in the Department of Physical Planning, Ministry of Local Government and Public Works, a principal town planning officer in Harare City Council responsible for research on local development planning and a town planning officer for Ruwa Local Board. The interviewer-administered questionnaire guides were designed to reflect the personal experiences and opinions of the government town planning officers during *jambanja*.

After the semi-structured interviews with the chief planners in the Department of Physical Planning, Harare City Council and Ruwa Local Board, the survey proceeded to villages in the peri-urban communal land<sup>38</sup> of Domboshava followed by Ruwa town (Industrial, paGeorge, Damofalls), Solomio, Caledonia and Saturday Retreat. Table 4.1 below shows that 205 respondents were successfully interviewed in the peri-urban study areas. A quota of 60 respondents was drawn from Domboshava, 24 from Parirehwa Village, 22 from Gukwe Village, 14 from Mungate village and 60 from Caledonia. The participants in Caledonia were drawn from phases 1, 2, 5, 7, 11 and 21. In Ruwa town, five participants were interviewed in Damofalls low density residential suburb and 10 at 'paGeorge' business centre. The study interviewed a total of 20 respondents in Solomio comprising 10 participants from the 300m<sup>2</sup> stands area and 10 from the 1000 m<sup>2</sup> stands area. In Harare South 35 participants were interviewed in Saturday Retreat. The sixty (60) participants, purposively identified in Mungate, Gukwe, Parirehwa

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<sup>38</sup> The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Number 20 Act of 2013 Section 332 (b) (iii) defines communal land, previously called "native reserve" (in Shona "*ruzevha*"), as "land set aside under an Act of Parliament and held in accordance with customary law by members of a community under the leadership of a Chief" (Ingwani, 2015: 380). The Rural District Councils (RDCs) as the local authorities administer the Act on behalf of the state on one hand, together with traditional authorities (Chiefs, Headmen and Village Heads (VHs) on the other hand (CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006). Both the state and traditional authorities play important roles in the administration of communal land in Zimbabwe (Hungwe, 2014: 2).

villages, recounted their personal experiences with “planning’s power handling the violations of spatial controls” (Kamete, 2011: 76) during *Garawadya*. To curb the

Table 4.1. *Study area by sample size*

Study area	Sample size
Domboshava	60
Ruwa Industrial Area	5
‘paGeorge’ Business Centre in Ruwa town	10
Damofalls Ruwa town	5
Solomio	20
Caledonia, Harare East	60
Gazebo in Caledonia	10
Saturday Retreat, Harare South	35
<b>Total</b>	<b>205</b>

Source: Author, 2018

proliferating open-air informal retail trading activities in Ruwa town, Ruwa Local Board reserved an open space at “paGeorge” shopping centre to accommodate an estimated 100 informal market stalls. Ten randomly selected participants who owned marketing stalls at “paGeorge” related their coping strategies during ESAP. Some industrial firms relocated from Harare to Ruwa when the booming satellite town rolled palatable incentives including free land and relief on electricity and water charges. Five managers of both large small firms that migrated from Harare to Ruwa during ESAP were interviewed using semi-structured questionnaires.

#### ***4.2.2.3 Data collection on jambanja land governance experiences***

The fieldwork employed data collection methods relevant for both quantitative and qualitative research paradigms (Bless & Higson-Smith, 1995: 113; Rubin & Rubin in Mouton, 2003: 196). All the respondents were asked to answer the questions in interview-guides on a proviso of informed consent. The semi-structured interview guides were used to track the “experiences, perceptions and insights” (Smith, *et al.*,

1995: 9-26) of the town planning officers in order to unpack official policy practices of “land grabbing, patronage and disorder during *jambanja*” (McGregor, 2013b; Alexander & McGregor, 2013; Mbiba 2017c: 3). Concurrent with the multi-site field surveys, the raw data collected through the questionnaire-interview guides, focus group scripts and photographs were cleaned and edited.

The semi-structured interviews helped the investigation to “situate the participants’ life styles in the different socio-spatial and historical contexts” (Burawoy, 1998: 4) of informality. The patterns emerging from the institutional and household surveys served as the roadmap for “the building of knowledge” (Burawoy, 1998; Verma & Mallick, 1999: 6; Blumberg, *et al.*, 2011: 36) using the lived experiences of socio-spatial inequalities of ordinary residents at the peri-urban interface. Drawing on the regularities in the experiences and perspectives of participants, the research followed up particularly interesting avenues that emerged from the dominant policy discourses to construct a bigger picture of the peri-urban fringe. As reflected below, the study used statistical and thematic analytical tools to consolidate the knowledge maps in a trajectory of the “peri-urban” fringe. These conceptual knowledge maps were based on the substantive theoretical discourses on the peri-urban interface (PUI) discussed in chapters 1, 2 and 3 and the whole data set (Mouton, 2005: 167).

#### ***4.2.2.3.1 Conceptual categories of questionnaire interview guides***

The study completed 205 semi-structured interviewer-administered questionnaire guides with purposively selected participants in peri-urban Domboshava, Caledonia, Solomio in Ruwa and Saturday Retreat in Harare South (Figure 1.3, page 17). The contents of the interviews were transcribed and additional notes made for easy retrieval. The structured questions were useful for mapping out the demographic profiles of respondents (discussed in detail in Chapter 5). The follow-up open-ended questions enabled the study to tap into “the experiences, feelings and opinions that structured questions could not” (Kitchin & Tate, 2000: 213). Personal interviews with the respondents were conducted, as far as personal safety circumstances allowed, in homes, work and public places. The average time taken by the interviews ranged from 30 minutes to one hour - allowing for biographical narrations. The interview questions

were ordered to start with the demographic details before probing respondents for sensitive political, economic and place-making experiences during the *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina* episodes.

The personal interviews with peri-urban residents provided materials for the following conceptual categories: demographic details, marginalisation of the residents in informal settlements, circular migration trends, engagements with party-state in land allocation, contingent livelihood and housing strategies and participation in community development initiatives. The additional information gathered through focus group discussions and additional follow-up visits was used to construct the “big picture” (Creswell & Brown, 1992) of a peri-urban interface.

#### ***4.2.2.3.2 Focus group discussions to construct the “big picture”***

The study conducted two focus group discussions with ten informants at the “Gazebo” war veterans’ office in Caledonia and six at Saturday Retreat business centre, respectively. The 16 informants were peer leaders randomly sampled from the local informal settlement communities. The semi-structured focus group discussions (see Appendix C) anchored on the experiences, opinions and perspectives captured in the institutional and household interviews towards constructing the “big picture” (Creswell & Brown, 1992) of a peri-urban interface.

#### ***4.2.3.3.3 Prolonged involvement in marginal peri-urban space***

Subscribing to Kirk and Miller’s (1986: 30-31) suggestion, the researcher paid frequent visits to the neighbourhoods under study to reconcile “discrepancies between the meanings” the researcher had presumed and those “understood by the respondents” through follow-up site visits. In other words, handy with the interview scripts and texts of experiential accounts, the researcher cross-checked what participants had “said” during the interviews with what they “thought” (Denscombe, 2010, 2012: 194). Being immersed in the community allowed more time for emerging concepts to develop while paying more attention to the dominant characteristics under study (Guba & Lincoln, 1989: 237).

During the follow-up site visits, the researcher took photographs of land use changes in the peri-urban abject spaces (see Appendix A) keeping an eye for diversity. In some cases, the business profiles of local companies in the study areas were obtained from billboards and signposts. Notable from the information on the billboards in Ruwa, was that most of the companies were flourishing in the upscale housing construction industry. The findings in chapters 5 and 6 suggest that a surge in peri-urban housing developments was triggered by a deregulation of building standards (GoZ, 1994) that had spiralled out of control.

### **4.3 Conceptual analyses of different data sets for theory building**

The study analysed the different sets of raw data into “salient themes and recurring ideas” (De Vos, 2002: 344, 2005: 338) for the construction of theory on the peri-urban interface. The analysis entailed “engaging” with both “qualitative and quantitative patterns in the data while keeping the data intact, complete, organised and accessible” (Oakley, 1999: 252).

The analyses of the raw data, however, did not provide answers to all the research questions, therefore, interpreting the data was necessary. Subscribing to Bless and Higson-Smith’s (1995: 143) suggestions, “statistical analyses were performed to infer the peri-urban lifestyle characteristics of the population from the sample results”. While “interpreting and analysing” (De Vos, 2005: 335; Denzin, 1989) the contents of the interview scripts, the theoretical constructs in the literature review and findings from earlier peri-urban studies were kept in constant orbit throughout the study.

#### ***4.3.1 Comparative analytical tools for reading contours of the peri-urban interface***

The study used comparative analytical tools to read the contours of the changed peri-urban interface by tracking the lived experiences of inequality of ordinary residents *in situ*. The conceptual themes and sub-themes emerging from the literature review conducted during the research “were progressively brought to bear on the data analytical process” (Charmaz, 2014; Corbin & Strauss, 2008: 96). The rationale for so

doing was to enrich earlier findings and to demonstrate the comparative nature of the mixed methods research design depicted in Figure 4.1.

The investigation was designed to search across the different data sets and repeated patterns of meanings to allow new features to emerge. Although there were different methods of generating the data sets, the research considered it essential to “present clear explanations of the approaches and stages that the study used in order to provide transparency and a complete picture of the study to the reader” (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The researcher used a Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) software to process and interpret the raw data.

#### *4.3.2 Quantitative and qualitative analyses of PE thematic categories*

The researcher used a Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) software to sort, code and analyse the data collected during the fieldwork in order to capitalise on recency. The permutations of raw data involved analysing and “coding raw data into meaningful thematic categories” (Tuckett, 2005: 75) by drawing on the viewpoints of the participants. These thematic strands represented “the conceptual foundations for analysis” (Lowton & Gabe, 2003: 293) and theory building. The exercise involved “labelling statements, memos and sets of data related to particular themes with codes” (Charmaz, 2006: 43). The statistical package used descriptive statistics to analyse and visualise quantitative relationships (Unwin 1992: 31) among the key variables that characterised the changed landscapes of Harare’s peri-urban areas. The software used the mean, the median and mode to demonstrate the configuration of statistics in relation to the centrality of the distributions and interval classes to communicate information on the frequency of values within the data sets (Kitchin & Tate, 2000: 83).

To bring order, structure and meaning to the mass of collected data (De Vos, 2002: 339) for the qualitative analytical part of the study, the researcher searched “for general statements about relationships among categories of data using grounded theory” (Marshall & Rossman, 1995: 111). Using “narrative analysis”<sup>39</sup> (Riessman, 2002: 218),

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<sup>39</sup> According to Riessman (2002) “narrative analysis is a form of qualitative analysis in which the analyst focuses on how respondents impose order on the flow of experiences in their lives and so make sense of events and actions in which they have participated”. Narrative analysis involves deconstructing “the story

the researcher reflected on “the words, the contexts, texts, photographs to verify the internal consistency and frequency of what was said to yield the ‘big picture’” (Morgan & Krueger, 1998: 31; Creswell, 1998: 142-145).

Coding the narrations of participants involved mapping out common regularities and patterns in their experiences to theorise the peri-urban interface “inductively” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Huberman & Miles, 1994). Put differently, theorising the processes that transformed the peri-urban interface entailed identifying (through iteration) the emerging thematic variations in structural contexts across the following political economy categories:

- Demographic characteristics of households.
- Coping strategies in response to structural adjustment policy reforms.
- Experiences and feelings in the different contexts of political patronage.
- New urban land use forms and practices at the peri-urban fringe.
- Future policy strategies towards managing urban sprawl.

Following Strauss and Corbin (1998), Charmaz (2003) and Glaser (1999), the qualitative analysis of the study relied on the following procedural steps necessary for theory building: the concurrent data collection and analysis (Ezzy, 2002; Wilson & Hutchinson, 1996) enabling constant comparison for checking theory development throughout the course of the research (Strauss & Corbin, 1994; Ezzy, 2002). The comparative analyses of the data sets involved memorandum writing and the drawing of conclusions (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 10-11; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).

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itself” while retaining the essence of personal biographies or a series of events that cannot adequately be understood in terms of their discrete elements (ibid.: 218).

#### **4.4 Enhancing the quality of fieldwork and findings**

The study sought to achieve “reliable”<sup>40</sup> (Lobiondo-Wood & Haber, 1998: 558; Hammersley, 1992: 67) and valid<sup>41</sup> results by “linking ordinary (everyday life), scientific (knowledge truths) and meta-scientific knowledge worlds (critical reflections)” (Babbie & Mouton, 2008: 6; Mouton, 2001: 141) throughout the study. To attain credible levels of reliable and valid fieldwork findings, the researcher engaged two research assistants who specialised in urban planning studies at university level. At recruitment stage and during the fieldwork, the researcher briefed the assistants on the purpose of the study and need for precision, accuracy and consistency during data collection and analysis. At the start of every field visit, the researcher conducted brief training sessions for the research assistants on data collection techniques to minimize “researcher biases and errors that might compromise the findings” (Schaeffer, *et al.*, 2010).

##### ***4.4.1 Measures increasing the reliability of research instruments***

Although perfect reliability is rarely achievable, Neuman & Kreuger (2003: 179,180), and Salkind (2006: 108; 2009: 112) suggest procedures to increase the reliability of measures. Leaning on the suggested procedures, the researcher formulated the questions in the interview guide based on the key themes and sub-themes discussed in chapters 1, 2 and 3 in accordance with the research aim and objectives of the study.

The pilot study (Bless, *et al.*, 2006: 184) on the political economy of the changed peri-urban landscape in Masvingo helped with standardising the interviewer-administered guides used during fieldwork in Harare. The standardisation of the data collection tools involved the ordering and wording of the questions, instructions for interviewers, consistency of scoring procedures, writing of the transcripts, the elimination of ambiguous words and mistakes.

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<sup>40</sup> Reliability “refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions” (Hammersley, 1992: 67).

<sup>41</sup> Validity “refers to the extent to which an empirical measure adequately reflects the real meaning of the concept under consideration” (Babbie, 1990).



#### ***4.4.2 Measures to safeguard the validity of research instruments***

To safeguard the validity of the interviewer-administered and focus group discussion guides (Appendix C) used during fieldwork, the researcher ensured “logical links between the individual question items and themes” (Kumar, 2011: 180) by anchoring them on the theoretical categories (Chapters 1 to 3).

A triangulation of the data sets across the questions reflected in research instruments in Appendix C, helped the researcher map out the key thematic patterns (Cohen, *et al.*, 2011) of the multilayered processes underlying the emerging palimpsests of landscapes in peri-urban Harare (Chapters 5 and 6).

#### **4.5 Legal, administrative and ethical considerations**

The research was conducted in compliance with the University of South Africa “Policy on Research Ethics” (UNISA, 2012: 1 - 38) after the relevant approval was granted (see Appendix B, page 180). The study encountered a number of legal, administrative and ethical challenges during the fieldwork as reflected below.

##### ***4.5.1 Administrative and legal considerations and measures***

The in-depth interviews with town planning practitioners in the Department of Physical Planning proceeded without a hitch after the researcher had made advance appointments with the relevant officers. However, this was not the case with Harare City Council that did not respond to a written request for permission to conduct the survey in the target peri-urban areas. Through assertive public relations, however, the researcher managed to interview the gatekeeper of the town planning division of Harare City Council.

Similarly, the researcher submitted a letter requesting approval from Goromonzi Rural District Council (GRDC) to conduct a survey in peri-urban communal Domboshava. The researcher’s follow-up visits to the GRDC headquarters in Ruwa were in vain. The

administrative gatekeeper of GRDC advised the researcher that the local authority would not be willing to offer assistance because previous researchers in the area had not shared their research outcomes with the local authority as promised. However, the researcher used a snowball sampling technique and successfully surveyed four villages in Domboshava.

As reflected in Appendix B (page 181), the researcher applied for and received written approval to conduct the pilot study in peri-urban Masvingo. However, despite presenting approval letter from Masvingo City, one leader of a ZANU-PF party aligned housing cooperative in peri-urban Masvingo refused to engage with the research questions on the political economy of *jambanja*. This leader argued that the researcher could be masquerading as a researcher but an undercover agent of the opposition MDC party. The researcher replaced the unwilling housing cooperative leader with the leader of a similar housing cooperative in the area.

The researcher obtained a letter of approval for conducting the household survey in Ruwa from Ruwa Local Board (Appendix B, page 182). The field survey in Caledonia proceeded well until an encounter with the gatekeeper of the ZANU-PF “Gazebo” base camp who expressed his reservations about the political economy nature of the research despite evidence of the letter of approval from UNISA. However, after clarifying that the survey would be confined to study purposes only and explaining the letter of approval from Ruwa Local Board, the gatekeeper readily dispatched his subordinates to assist with the survey. As shown in the next section, the majority of peri-urban household respondents consented to the interviews individually.

#### ***4.5.2 Ethical considerations in the field***

Armed with copies of the research approval letters in Appendix B, national identity cards and interviewer-administered questionnaires, each site visit proceeded after the research team discussion of the daily work programme and logistics. At the start of each interview, an introductory note of every questionnaire would be explained to each respondent to obtain their consent (Keeves, 1997: 257-260; Busher, 2002: 81) before the interview. The research team members were advised to ensure that the names of

the interviewees would not be revealed and their contributions would remain confidential.

The household survey experienced ethical difficulties pertaining to protecting the privacy and confidentiality of participants (Mitchell & Jolley, 2007: 36, 38; Strydom 2011: 113, 115). In some cases, female participants refused to participate in the interviews without prior approval of their spouses. The researcher sought the consent of the spouses in follow-up visits. Alternatively, the researcher substituted the refusals with purposively selected participants in comparatively similar neighbourhoods. In other cases, particularly in the ZANU-PF political strongholds of Caledonia, some participants flatly refused to be involved in fear of political reprisals, including possible demolition of property. In such cases, the researcher helped the participants to decide whether it would suit them to carry out the interviews in the privacy of their homes. To avoid unduly traumatising the refusals, the researcher opted for similar informants either in the same or similar neighbourhoods to augment the sample size.

#### **4.6 Forging comparative theoretical dimensions of a peri-urban interface**

The chapter has presented the concurrent mixed methods design and methodology that the study considered appropriate for cultivating theoretical resources to explain the gap between official policy practice and the experiences of residents at the periphery of Harare. The chapter has demonstrated how the study collected, analysed and triangulated different data sets to forge comparative theoretical dimensions of a contemporary peri-urban interface. The next chapter 5 presents the findings on the demographic characteristics of residents and “life-worlds” (Hahn, 2010; Hahn & Kastner, 2014; Potts, 2010, 2011) in peri-urban Harare.

## CHAPTER 5: DIVERSITY IN MOTION: FEATURES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF ‘PERI-URBAN’ PARTICIPANTS

### 5.1 Introducing the findings on the diverse “life-worlds in motion”

The previous chapter has explained how the study used a mixed-methods design to interrogate government’s engagements with ordinary residents during *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina* across different socio-spatial contexts in peri-urban Harare. This chapter presents the findings of the study by drawing on “the multiple realities” (Habermas, 1972; Anderson 2003: 235-236) that have played out a profoundly changed peri-urban interface in Harare since the advent of Zimbabwe’s restructuring policy projects in mid-1990. The main analytical themes of the findings encompass the lived experiences of peri-urban ordinary residents during the economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) and *jambanja*; circular migration trends across the peri-urban interface and beyond; and the ZANU-PF party-state engagements with residents in informal settlements during *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina*. The main analytical themes that emerged from the findings relate to:

- Experiences of peri-urban residents during the economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) and *jambanja*.
- Circular migration trends and the intensified rural-urban networks and beyond.
- Contingent responses of the party-state and ordinary citizens to underlying forces of ESAP, *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina*.

The chapter covers seven main sections. In the next section 5.2, the chapter evaluates the significance level of the results using statistical evidence based on the response rate frequencies in the different study areas (see Figure 1.3 in chapter 1). Section 5.3 reflects the emerging demographic trends in peri-urban Harare since ESAP. Section 5.4 captures the underlying socio-economic drivers of the proliferating consumptive land use patterns at the periphery, the intensified rural-urban linkages and beyond into the diaspora. Section 5.5 collates the findings of this study with similar land use experiences in the peri-urban areas of other sub-Saharan African countries since adoption of SAPs. Section 5.6 examines the role of structure-agency in the interplay between *jambanja* and service delivery in marginalised peri-urban neighbourhoods. To

conclude the chapter, section 5.7 explains how experiences during Zimbabwe’s backlash political projects of *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina* offer conceptual resources for re-theorising a peri-urban interface.

## 5.2 Overview of response rate

Table 5.1 shows that 78.5% (205) of the study population (261) responded to the semi-structured interviews whereas 21.5% did not. The respondents were drawn from the villages in Domboshava and selected informal settlements in peri-urban Harare. Caledonia, Solomio and Saturday Retreat were some of the major flashpoints of *jambanja*. Despite acknowledging the confidentiality of the survey, some of the

Table 5.1- *Study area by response and non-response rates*

Study-area (Households)	Survey site	Responses	Non- responses	Total
<b>Domboshava (7123)</b>	Parirehwa Village	22	5	27
	Gukwe Village	24	5	29
	Murape Village	14	3	17
<b>Caledonia (100 000)</b>	“Gazebo” Business Centre	5	8	13
	Chareka Business Centre	5	-	5
	Phase 1	5	2	7
	Phase 2	10	-	10
	Phase 4	5	1	6
	Phase 7	5	3	8
	Phase 11	5	2	7
	Phase 12	10	1	11
	Phase 15	10	2	12
<b>Ruwa Town (13 898)</b>	Phase 21	10	2	12
	“pa” George Business Centre	10	4	14
	Damofalls Surburb	5	-	5
	Industrial Area	5	12	20
<b>Harare South (10 500)</b>	Saturday Retreat	35	3	38
<b>Total</b>		205	56	261

Source: Author, 2018

participants openly refused to take part citing their fears of political reprisals in the form of evictions and the vandalism of their properties by rivals, including some that were masquerading as state agents. To offset a potential non-response bias in the survey, the researcher replaced the refusals with similar participants in similar neighbourhoods. In cases where no substitutes were found, the researcher made repeated visits to the participants that would have earlier refused to take part. However, since the researcher anticipated possible refusals due to political intimidation in the run-up to the national polls end of July in 2018, the research team avoided raising politically sensitive questions and advised participants to freely withdraw from the interview as they wished.

As Table 5.1 shows, 205 residents out of 261, almost 80% of the target population, took part in the household survey. In the next section, the chapter describes the major demographic characteristics and composition of the population investigated in peri-urban Harare. Of special interest, is an increasingly highly educated young population establishing home in the peri-urban informal settlements where a few own upscale housing properties. Others, however, manage to just get by.

### **5.3 Demographic profile of peri-urban population**

The demographic profile of the target population reveals a differentiation by age-group, gender and highest level of formal education acquired. A median age of 18.7 years suggests that most inhabitants of peri-urban Harare are relatively young. The livelihood sources of most of these young citizens reside in a “largely informalised peri-urban economy” (Bryceson & Potts, 2006) dictated by “the production and consumption of housing products” (Potts, 2013a: 9). As the mainstay of rent-seeking entrepreneurs, the informal economy has become increasingly dominated by comprador “elites and state [bourgeoisie] operating jointly and informally” (Dawson & Kelsall, 2012: 52) – a dimension discussed in further detail in the next chapter.

#### ***5.3.1 Population composition and distribution***

The observation that a growing urban majority in sub-Saharan Africa is young and better skilled is scarcely surprising. Evidently, the population growth trends of urban

Southern Africa point to a rapidly bulging youthful upward curve (Siba, 2019: 12). A recent study by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2018: 19) has noted that Zimbabwe is increasingly a youthful country, with 67.7 per cent of its 14 million people below the age of 18.7 years. A largely youthful urban population, comprising mainly formally unemployed albeit better educated youths, is thriving on informal trading in the major urban centres in both Zimbabwe and South Africa (Moyo, Nicolau and Gumbo, 2016). As Table 5.2 shows, most of the respondents in the survey fell in the

Table 5.2. *Composition and distribution of peri-urban population by age-group*

Study Area	Composition of peri-urban population by age-group (intervals in years)				
	18-25 (%)	26-31 (%)	32-39 (%)	40-50 (%)	>50 (%)
<b>Domboshava</b>	5	12	18	40	25
<b>Solomio</b>	5	10	50	35	-
<b>Caledonia</b>	5.7	20	38.6	21.4	14.3
<b>Saturday Retreat</b>	2.8	25.7	40	20	11.5

Source: Author, 2018.

32-39 age-group. This finding is consistent with a growing majority population of the youth in many sub-Saharan African cities today (Williams, 2012: 30).

Confirming a prevailing youthful African urban majority trend, Solomio registered the highest proportion (50%) of respondents in the 32-39 age group followed by Saturday Retreat (40%) and Caledonia (38.6%). In contrast, Domboshava had the biggest ageing population (40%) in the 40-50 age group and older than 50 years (25%). The high incidence of an ageing population in Domboshava correlates with the historical dependency of Harare city on Domboshava's thriving agricultural market gardening supply of fresh vegetables. Domboshava is part of Chinamhora Communal Land and the oldest peri-urban area of Harare under the most contingent influence of the capital city since the early 1950s. In contrast, none of the respondents in Ruwa was older than 50 years. Equally interesting, was the gender composition of population relative to the higher female to male ratio in the country's national population (Zimstat, 2012, 2015).

### 5.3.2 Gender composition of peri-urban population

Figure 5.1 shows that there were more males (59%) than females (41%) in the study areas. However, this gender bias would logically correlate with a higher response rate of the males than females. This pattern would also coincide with a “patriarchal” practice in Zimbabwean society (Mazingi, 2011: 361; Hungwe, 2014). Patriarchy in Zimbabwe largely reserves the right of political representation to males. This finding lends support to Tacoli’s (2012: 11-12) earlier observation that in most African countries, where population census data were available, “men tended to outnumber women in the urban centres”. Tacoli’s observation can be a plausible explanation for the lower response




Figure 5.1 Proportion of participants by sex (Author, 2018).

rate of the female than male-headed households (see Figure 5.1). Perhaps, for the same reasons of “patriarchal domination” (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 361 - 2), most of the married female respondents in Caledonia, Domboshava and Solomio refused to participate in the survey without the support of their husbands. The females who responded to the questionnaire survey were divorcees, single or widows. The research replaced the non-responses with the similar respondents within the same neighbourhood to counteract a non-response bias.



A male dominance of African urban populations noted by Tacoli (2012: 11-12) was consistent with the response rates at “paGeorge” in Ruwa, Gazebo Business Centre in Caledonia, the Showgrounds and Mafuta business centres in Domboshava. Most (66%) of the respondents at all these centres were males and 34% of them were female. Surprisingly, however, females were in the majority (60%) of respondents in Solomio. A possible explanation for this is that female heads (65%) of the respondents in Solomio also owned the housing stands there. These females revealed that they had been allocated the stands on grounds that they were registered members of the “*Shingiro Yemadzimai*” (Shona lexicon for “desire and endurance of women”) housing cooperative in Solomio. The research team followed up the male not-at homes during weekends when they happened to be at home or by telephone as the last resort.

### ***5.3.3 Educational profile of participants and shifting housing trends***

One of the most striking features to emerge from the study was that comparatively highly educated people – including university college graduates – have purchased or built new homes including modern villas in informal settlements within Harare and its rural outskirts – notably, in peri-urban communal Domboshava, Goromonzi and Seke Communal Lands (see Appendix A). The study attests to an increasingly literate and wealthier population marking a reversal of local social stigma that conflates peri-urban areas with abject poverty and illiteracy. Figure 5.2 (below) shows that a significant proportion of the respondents had completed secondary school (44.05%) followed by university graduates (37.98%). Curiously, however, both Solomio (36.67%) in Ruwa and Caledonia (26.67%) recorded the highest number of respondents that had acquired a university education. Evidently, this demographic trend resonates with Bayat’s “increasing numbers of young educated and those in the middle classes, including civil servants” (Bayat, 2000: 535) who have accelerated a rapid growth of the “new urban poor” (Minujin, 1995: 154) in the informal housing markets (Bayat, 2000: 534). A significant population in Solomio (58%) with a university education background indicated that the upscale housing development policy thrust of Ruwa Local Board mainly targeting medium income earners paid off. Confirming this exclusionary




Figure 5.2 Academic qualifications of participants by study area (Author, 2018).

approach to housing, the town planning officer for Ruwa pointed out that “Ruwa Local Board is pursuing an aggressive housing policy to lure investments in housing for high income earners”. The town planner acknowledged that most of the developers in Ruwa middle income housing schemes were rural secondary school teachers who plan to settle in the satellite town on retirement.

As noted in previous studies on urban and peri-urban Zimbabwe (Gumbo, 2013: 177; Chirisa 2009, 2010), the study also observed that highly educated urbanites depend on the informal economy (ICED, 2017: 15) for income generation, especially in the retail trade sector. Zimbabwe’s deepening economic crises since mid-1990 have fuelled rural-urban networks as hardpressed households “spread the risks” (Mbiba, 2017b: 10) through a reliance on multi-spatial sources of livelihoods (Potts, 2013a). In the next section, the study findings point to the impacts of Zimbabwe’s conjunctural anti-global capital political projects, *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina*, on an increasingly impoverished and marginalised majority urban populace. Crucially, these political projects precipitated circular migration and displacement within and beyond the country’s borders (McGregor, 2008; McGregor & Primorac, 2010; Mbiba, 2011: 51; Potts, 2008b: 4, 2010; Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2015; ICED, 2017: 11-12). In

contradistinction, those who now live it well on their newly acquired large estates and in the upscale suburbs of the large cities increasingly distance themselves from the excluded poor urbanites living in the informal settlements.

#### **5.4 Circular migration and intensifying rural-urban networks**

The research established that nearly a third of the respondents (30%) evicted from the expropriated White commercial farms during *jambanja* had sheltered, despite persistent political harassment and looming evictions, in peri-urban Harare. Comparatively more (40%) were internally displaced persons from Mabvuku and Tafara as well as Chitungwiza – 30 kilometres south-east of Harare.

As some of the epicentres of Operation *Murambatsvina*, Mabvuku and Tafara experienced traumatising violence and internal displacement orchestrated by the state (IDMC, 2006: 7; Potts, 2008: 2; Hammar, 2008: 418). To be sure, properties considered illegal in all high-density suburbs in the major urban centres of Zimbabwe were targeted by the ZANU-PF ruling party-state for demolition by the military and police. Most peri-urban high-density suburbs throughout the country were suspected of harbouring the disgruntled urbanites who had consistently voted in favour of the main opposition MDC party (McGregor, 2013b: 783). Some of the victims were forcibly trucked off to their original homes in the rural areas while others crossed borders into neighbouring South Africa and Botswana or further abroad to the Diaspora (Potts, 2008: 4). The longterm aim of the state-sponsored internal displacement project was to marginalise urban constituencies in the country's electoral terrain and thereby bolster the longevity of ZANU-PF in power through eroding the electoral base of the opposition MDC party in the urban centres.

Meanwhile, the impacts of worsening socio-economic crises and drying up of livelihood sources in the country justified the back-and-forth movements of informal traders who purchased wares (including groceries) in the neighbouring SADC countries either for domestic consumption or resale back home (Muzvidziwa, 2001). As revealed in the next section, to Caledonia. in exchange for the new housing plots allocated to them by the ZANU-PF housing cooperatives these movements constituted a significant

layer (Hahn & Kastner, 2014: 212; Simon, *et al.*, 2004: 235) of “circularity” in the intensified rural-urban networks (Potts, 2010, 2011) and beyond the country’s borders.

#### ***5.4.1 Drivers of circular migration and peri-urbanisation***

The evidence from the study showed that half of the participants in Caledonia was displaced during Operation *Murambatsvina* in 2005 (Potts, 2006; Mbiba, 2017a). These participants blamed Operation *Murambatsvina* for making them homeless after their lodgings had been erased to the ground (see Appendix A). Some respondents recalled how the state police and the military had “carted them off in trucks” from an overcrowded holding camp at Porta Farm, 20 kilometres west of Harare to Caledonia farm. Others revealed that they had been secretly advised to reciprocate with their vote for the ruling ZANU-PF party in exchange for the new housing plots allocated to them.

Since 2000, when the first informal settlements mushroomed on Caledonia farm (see Appendix A), some of the respondents (30%) confirmed Mbiba’s (2017a: 10) earlier assertion that “their numbers were swelled by an exodus of former employees who lived on European farms who were evicted from the farm compounds and forced to shelter in the peri-urban settlements during *jambanja*”. The violent evictions and demolitions of illegal housing structures in “the nearby low-income suburbs of Mabvuku, Tafara and Chitungwiza” during Operation *Murambatsvina* compelled 40% of the respondents to seek refuge in the mushrooming informal settlements around the urban centres (see Appendix A). Domboshava was also a safe haven for the victims displaced by Operation *Murambatsvina* in Hatcliffe, a new low-income suburb on the northeastern edge of Harare near Domboshava. Some of the internally displaced persons that settled in Domboshava, however, came from other communal areas in search of plots for small-holder farms and new homes. Apart from the reasons of political harassment, there were other pressures that pushed people to join in a scramble for the emerging peri-urban land markets.

#### ***5.4.2 Impacts of jambanja and absence of development control***

The study filtered out a number of reasons for the “steady movement” into peri-urban areas as “landless” urbanites joined in a scramble for the opportunities that *jambanja* created (Marongwe, 2003: 2; Matondi, 2012: 20). Firstly, over half of the respondents claimed that they decided to abandon rented accommodation in the low-income suburbs of Mbare, Mabvuku, Tafara, Chitungwiza, Epworth and Ruwa to exploit the “political spoils” (McGregor, 2013b) that *jambanja* offered. These respondents had followed the lure of cheap, albeit unserviced, residential plots on the vacated peri-urban farms. The sprouting home ownership schemes also enticed them to evade the soaring costs of rented accommodation as the deepening economic crises took their toll. One respondent in Caledonia said:

I first came to Caledonia from Mabvuku looking for an affordable room to rent but later I realised that there was an opportunity for me to buy a cheap residential stand. I liked this place because it is not very far the city for business. This area also plays an important role in easing the housing problem since it is home to more than 25 000 residents who were supposed to be on the Harare municipality waiting list by now.

Secondly, the *jambanja* land markets in the peri-urban enclaves also presented wealth creation opportunities for “robber barons” (Otieno, 2009) who subdivided coveted public urban land parcels for personal gain (City of Harare, 2010; GoZ, 1999, 2013). These land barons, who included both ZANU-PF and opposition party political executives, briefcase and shelf company executives aligned with the major political parties, corrupt party-state officials, church and traditional leaders (McGregor, 2002, 2013b: 783; Alexander & McGregor, 2013: 749; Mbiba, 2017c: 1-2) often “posed as middlemen of the ruling ZANU-PF party and local authorities” (Mbiba, 2017c: 1-2) to fast-track the land deals.

In a related project, code-named Operation *Garawadya* (“eat first then answer questions later”) (GoZ, 2013a), tribal chiefs and villagers in adjoining Seke, Goromonzi and Domboshava communal lands subdivided agricultural land for resale to clients from

Harare (Hungwe, 2014). Corrupt local councillors “illegally approved” (GoZ, 2010: 3) layouts of housing stands that they later either resold to desperate home-seekers at a profit or dolled out to reward political supporters for their votes as “kickbacks” (Magure, 2012: 68). A setting aside of development control measures encouraged some residents to venture into building their homes along ZESA power servitudes, in wetlands and open spaces adjoining with unkempt graveyards and on land reserved for future development (see Figure 5.3). The “*garawadya*” syndrome stocked a desire to



*Figure 5.3-Housing structures built along ZESA power servitudes in Caledonia (Author, 2018).*

acquire multiple homes to let as a hedge against the country’s unyielding economic crises (Zhou & Zvoushe, 2012; Kanyenze, 2014).

#### ***5.4.3 Proliferation of multiple home-ownership schemes***

Figure 5.4 shows that more than 50% of the respondents owned only one home in Harare. Caledonia registered the highest proportion of respondents (80%) that owned only one home in Harare followed by Solomio (62%) and the least Domboshava (60%). In Zimbabwean cities, owning a house or housing stand is a nightmare to the majority of the urban population (Muchadenyika, 2015b: 7). Thus, the main motive for settling in the peri-urban areas, despite the “environmental health threats” (Chirisa, 2013: 132; WHO, 2012: 1), seemed to be a desire to own an urban home as a social status symbol

of the good life. Figure 5.4 depicts an evident trend of multiple home-ownership in Ruwa-Solomio (37%) and Domboshava (25%). This trend also resonated with diasporic investments in real estate development to hedge against the hyperinflationary




Figure 5.4. Home ownership pattern of participants by location (Author, 2018).

risks of Zimbabwe’s “casino economy” (Gono, 2008: 80-81) under the Mugabe-led ZANU-PF government. The trend also confirmed earlier studies that attest to a positive correlation between multiple home-ownership and “circularity<sup>42</sup> within metropolitan regions in sub-Saharan Africa” (Potts, 2010, 2012; Simone, 2011: 380).

#### 5.4.4 *Jambanja as a co-driver of circularity in Zimbabwe*

The study established that some causal links between *jambanja* and circular migration in Zimbabwe clustered around the political tensions involving the ruling ZANU-PF party and urban-based opposition MDC party (Madebwe & Madebwe, 2005; McGregor, 2013b: 783; Muchadenyika & Williams, 2017). The extremely violent

<sup>42</sup> The term “circularity” describes a process where individuals and families are moving in and out of rural and urban areas and circulating between different sites mainly for purposes of pursuing alternative livelihood sources in the urban centres (ICED, 2017: 12). The trend also captures migrant citizens in other countries who have acquired more than one home locally to sustain their kin networks through property rents.

militarised evictions during *jambanja* displaced thousands of former commercial farm workers suspected by the ruling ZANU-PF party-state to be supporters of the Western aligned MDC party. At different moments, people accused of being “enemies of the state” – mostly for being, or assumed to be opposition party supporters – were forcibly and often brutally removed from farms, rural villages, informal urban housing and business enterprises, churches and NGOs (Hammar, 2008: 421). These practices of criminalising “dangerous others” strategically combined physical and symbolic removals of bodies (individuals, groups, institutions) from spaces that the party-state and its allies wanted to reclaim, purify and occupy (ibid.: 421, 424).

Fearing for their lives, therefore, most of the desperate displaced took shelter in nearby urban and peri-urban areas (Kamete, 2012; Marongwe, 2003). Then came Operation *Murambatsvina* / Restore Order (IDMC, 2006: 6; Potts, 2006; Mbiba, 2017a) (or ‘*tsunami*’ as it was popularly called) when the state military machinery bulldozed low-income houses and informal enterprises deemed “illegal” (Tjibaijuka, 2005 in Kamete, 2011: 67). An estimated 700,000 people were displaced by the violent state campaigns (IDMC, 2006: 6). Because the neoliberal political economy of “crises in Zimbabwe had many faces” (Mbiba 2017c: 6), the study sought to understand the combined impacts of the interlocked forces underlying ESAP and *jambanja* on everyday urban life, particularly, in the marginal spaces of Harare.

### **5.5 Impacts of ESAP and *jambanja* on everyday life**

The impacts of economic restructuring and *jambanja* produced different socio-economic and spatial outcomes with important implications for the survival of residents in their everyday life. The study noted that the socio-economic crises of ESAP (Rukuni and Jensen, 2003) and *jambanja* spawned widespread corruption and partisan practices in the distribution and allocation of state land resources and welfare provisions in a struggle for survival (McGregor, 2013b: 787). The section reveals how these crises played out in the everyday lives of peri-urban residents starting with their contingent responses.



### 5.5.1 Local responses to socio-economic impacts of ESAP and jambanja

As Figure 5.5 shows, the study found no trace of political violence in Saturday Retreat during *jambanja* while it was minimal in Solomio (5%). Clearly, Caledonia (25%) and Domboshava (20%) were notorious during *jambanja*. Both Domboshava and Caledonia were haunted by violent outbreaks between the ruling ZANU-PF party and opposition MDC party in the run-up to the July 2018 national polls. Evidently, political patronage (corruption) dominated Saturday Retreat (70%) where the ruling ZANU-PF party mobilised a *Yevaduku* (Shona lexicon for “belonging to the youths”) housing




Figure 5.5. Socio-economic impacts of ESAP and jambanja (Author, 2018)

cooperative to ‘grab’ most of the residential plots specifically for registered members of its youth militias. The study identified similar practices in Domboshava (20%), Caledonia (25%) and Solomio (25%) where the ruling ZANU-PF party militias and rival MDC party activists tussled for dominance.

The biographical accounts of the participants established that over half of them were in primary school during ESAP. The rest, who were already adults, recalled the “hardships” during ESAP. Reasserting Bond and Manyanya’s (2003) earlier findings, most respondents in Solomio (70%), Domboshava (60%) and Caledonia (50%) attributed the country’s entrenched economic hardships to company closures during

ESAP. However, some of these respondents submitted that the widespread company closures pushed many to jump onto the informal economy bandwagon.

### 5.5.2 A diversified peri-urban informal space economy

Figure 5.6 demonstrates that “unrelenting economic crises in Zimbabwe” since 1990(Bond & Manyanya, 2003; Mbiba, 2017c; Muchadenyika & Williams, 2018) may account for some 60% of respondents who now depend on a diversifying informal economy for income generation and development of entrepreneurial know-how. A




Figure 5.6. Occupations of the participants by political economy sector (Author, 2018).

quarter of the respondents, including civil servants and industrial workers, indicated that they were formally employed while the rest (15%) depended on remittances from relatives in the Diaspora and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Over the years, however, the informal economy of peri-urban Harare has gradually diversified into carpentry, home industries, stone crushing and street vending as shown in Figure 5.7. A flea market at ‘pa George’ business centre, comprising small shops and stalls, specialises in the sale of textiles and electronic wares imported from China,

Dubai, and neighbouring South Africa, Zambia and Botswana. Broadly speaking, the study deductively and inductively reasoned that, over time, an assembly of forces and



Figure 5.7 - Informal traders in Domboshava; Stone crushing vending site in Caledonia; Wooden house construction at “paGeorge” in Ruwa; Livelihood Training Centre in Hopley Estate (clockwise) (Author, 2018).

interests underlying ESAP and *jambanja* has produced the emerging palimpsests peri-urban landscapes in Harare (See Appendix A).

### **5.5.3 Multiple land use practices and forms in palimpsest peri-urban landscapes**

The evidence from the research points to *jambanja* as one of the main co-drivers of the emerging palimpsest peri-urban landscapes in Harare. These landscapes manifest

multilayered land use forms and the practices of different actors that have evolved over time and space. Some scholars intimate that the “overturning of planning standards by errant real estate developers” at the behest of ZANU-PF party-state predation was “chiefly responsible for a proliferation of mixed peri-urban land uses throughout the country” (ICED, 2017: 13; Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016a, 2016b). As Figure 5.8 shows, Caledonia’s emerging landscape (Appendix A) is strewn with clusters of different housing types where informal structures are juxtaposed with modern houses.



*Figure 5.8. Mixed housing structures in Caledonia (Author, 2018).*

Nevertheless, these variegated peri-urban landscapes are not confined to Harare. Similar landscapes engulf many African cities including Kumasi in Ghana and feature “mosaics of formal houses, shanties and rural dwellings” (Simon, *et al.*, 2004: 236). However, urban sprawl spilling over unclear administrative boundaries has courted urban development policy dilemmas for some local planning authorities as discussed in the next section.

### ***5.6 Participation in community development activities***

Table 5.3 shows that on average most (60%) of the respondents did not take part in the community development activities shown. The study noted that (40%) of the respondents were not interested citing the absence of neighbourhood coordinating committees as a reason for not playing their part. According to 35% of the informants, political rivalries simmering in the community discouraged them from taking part in the development activities and as a result most residents (77.25%) resorted to sinking

their own deep wells and boreholes without seeking assistance from the community. Barely 13% of the respondents participated in the maintenance of stand access roads in the neighbourhood. In contrast to the low levels of attendance at community development meetings in Solomio-Ruwa (50%), Caledonia (15%) and Saturday Retreat (5%), Domboshava registered the highest attributed the high attendance at the community development meetings to their respect for the traditional leaders who usually invited them to the gatherings.

Table 5.3. *Participation in community development activities by percentage*

Activities	Study area	Participated (%)	Did not participate (%)
<b>Road maintenance</b>	Domboshava	10	90
	Solomio-Ruwa	20	80
	Caledonia	10	90
	Saturday Retreat	6	94
<b>Development meetings</b>	Domboshava	65	35
	Solomio-Ruwa	50	50
	Caledonia	15	85
	Saturday Retreat	5	95
<b>Borehole sinking</b>	Domboshava	90	10
	Solomio	35	65
	Caledonia	90	10
	Saturday Retreat	94	6
<b>Mean</b>		40.83	59.17

Source: Author, 2018

In another remarkable revelation, the town planner for Ruwa Local Board was concerned about the poor provision and maintenance of essential services in Ruwa and neighbouring informal township of Caledonia. The town planner blamed the poor service delivery on:

...a conflict between central government, Ruwa Town Local Board and Goromonzi Rural District Council over delineation of administrative boundaries to decide which local authority would be accountable for the provision and maintenance of essential services in Caledonia and Solomio, respectively.

Furthermore, according to the town planner, Ruwa local board was still wrangling with Goromonzi Rural District over the reservation of land for the siting and development of Ruwa Town Centre. Since Ruwa town is situated on land within the administrative jurisdiction of Goromonzi Rural District Council, the ZANU-PF-led central government is responsible for resolving the boundary dilemma in the interest of the disadvantaged local residents. The “gray-spacing” (Roy 2009a: 81, 82; Yiftachel 2009a, 2009b; Manda 2019: 14) of an elusive rural-urban boundary has contributed to fragmented land uses and public goods service delivery in peri-urban Caledonia and Solomio as the underlying crevices in state policy engagements remain unyielding.

### **5.7 Re-capturing the emerging palimpsest peri-urban interface**

The chapter has presented key findings of the study. The findings have revealed a diversity of “life-worlds in motion” (Hahn, 2010; Hahn & Kastner, 2014; Potts, 2010, 2011) and “multiple [socio-spatial] realities” (Giddens, 1984: 137; Habermas, 1994) featuring the emerging palimpsest interface in Harare. The presentation of the findings has mainly centred on the lived experiences of ordinary residents during the implementation of Zimbabwe’s neoliberal land policy projects of *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina*. Drawing on “the multiple realities” (Habermas, 1972; Anderson, 2003: 235-236) of Harare’s shifting peri-urban landscapes, a number of conceptual abstractions have emerged.

Firstly, the study has demonstrated how, contrary to government’s declared policy intentions of equitable land redistribution to a majority landless population, the peri-urban landscape has instead presented productive sites of accumulation and wealth creation to benefit the new ruling elites (Marongwe, 2009; Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 343; Shumba, 2016: 105; Mbiba, 2017c: 1-2) at the expense of a marginalised urban poor majority. Thus, the peri-urban landscape has been subjected to multiple mutations

vis-à-vis the land reform “policy reorientations and planning regulatory directives” (Pinson & Journel, 2016: 137) as well as the nature of actors and sites in the theatre of multiple struggles between the ruling ZANU-PF party and opposition MDC-led resistance movements on one hand, and, on the other hand, between the ZANU-PF party-state policy implementing institutions (local planning authorities, the militarised demolition troops, militia) and ordinary residents in informal settlements. Secondly, the findings have shown how the anti-global political forces and vested capital interests of the ruling elites in a predatory state have converged and precipitated circular migration within and beyond the borders of Zimbabwe with significant policy ramifications for sustainable urban development. Thirdly, a deployment of the intertwined strategies of political patronage, violence and development control irregularities through the informalisation of party-state institutional practices has continued to fuel rapid urban sprawl, a fragmentation of peri-urban landscapes and distortion of peri-urban land markets in space over time.

The failed politics of restructuring Zimbabwe seem to militate against harmonised city-wide development by reinforcing structural gaps between the “symbolically inclusive” (Porter & Craig 2004) policy intentions of government and practice, on one hand, and on the other, between the policy implementation practices of government and the lived experiences of the excluded ordinary citizens. In other words, although the ZANU-PF government openly intended the ‘fast-track’ land reform (*jambanja*) policy to dispossess a White minority of its farmlands and redistribute them to a majority of landless peasants, in the final analysis, the big winners have been members of the new ruling elite class and allied businessmen at the expense of the majority ordinary citizens. With this in mind, the next chapter discusses how these experiences have provided helpful analytical conceptual blocks for reconstructing a peri-urban interface in a conversation with the prevailing local contexts.

## **CHAPTER 6: PALIMPSEST LANDSCAPE AND THE MULTIPLE PERI-URBAN REALITIES**

“...there is no such thing as a single correct view of any subject under study but that there are many correct views, each requiring its own style of interpretation.” (White, 1978: 47).

### **6.1 Theorising the “multiple realities” of a palimpsest peri-urban interface**

The findings presented in the previous chapter demonstrate how a peri-urban interface has morphed into a site of contradictory power plays generating gaps between the stated policy intentions of a hegemonic party-state and the implementation of its vested interests, on one hand, and on the other, between policy practice and the lived experiences of ordinary residents. The findings have featured a diversity of “life-worlds in motion” (Hahn 2010; Hahn & Kastner 2014; Potts 2010, 2011) and “multiple realities” (Giddens 1984: 137; Habermas 1994) manifesting the contradictions between government’s stated land reform policy intentions and its actions giving rise to the emerging palimpsest peri-urban landscapes in Harare. Drawing on these study findings, this chapter rebuilds a peri-urban interface using the conceptual blocks based on the following analytical thematic categories:

- Peri-urban experiences during ESAP and *jambanja*;
- ESAP, *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina* as co-drivers of circularity in Zimbabwe;
- Socio-spatial impacts of neoliberal reforms on the peri-urban space economy;
- Impacts of *jambanja* on peri-urban land markets;
- Marginalisation of peri-urban communities in public goods service delivery.



The next section unpacks the “analytical thematic categories” (Maxwell, 2005; Schwandt, 1994: 118, 2000; Guba & Lincoln, 1989) developed throughout the chapter.

## **6.2. Unpacking analytical categories for theorising the PUI**

Although “conflicts over land use and tenure rights, informal settlements and intensified rural-urban flows” characterise the peri-urban interface in the global South (Mbiba, 2001; Allen, 2003: 135; Brook, *et al.*, 2003: 2; Simon, *et al.*, 2006: 4-5; Woods, 2006: 581), their form and content vary with changing local contexts in space over time. The planning and regulatory policy practices of managing the contradicting land use and tenure rights in peri-urban sub-Saharan Africa have often generated interest in studies on the “conflicting rationalities between the state and residents of informal settlements” (Manda, 2016: 23). Watson (2003 in Manda, 2016: 23) developed the concept of “conflicting rationalities” to describe a context in the global South where the aims of planning held by the state are very different from, if not inimical to, the interests of various actors in informal settlements, to the extent of impacting planning aims and processes. Thus, it is essential to capture these mutations in the form and contents of specific peri-urban contexts in constructing conceptual blocks for reimagining and managing a peri-urban interface.

For this reason, the conceptual analytical categories discussed in this chapter mainly draw on the lived experiences of peri-urban citizens in Harare in the context of ESAP and the Zimbabwe government’s “backlash political projects of *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina*” (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 342). These categories reflect on the utility of a critical political economy approach in engaging with the contradictions and conflicts (Alexander & McGregor 2013: 750; Kriger 2012: 15; Bratton 2014; Shumba 2016: 11) prevailing in Harare’s peri-urban areas since *jambanja* in 2000. Moreover, a political economy analytical framework does sit well with a concurrent design (De Vos 2002: 365; Wolley 2009; Driscoll *et al.*, 2007) in cultivating suitable conceptual materials for theorising the lived experiences of residents and corollary land use configurations of contemporary peri-urban landscapes in many parts of SSA. As its first analytical category, in the next section, the chapter theorises the

experiences of peri-urban residents in the country's neoliberal restructuring terrains during ESAP and *jambanja*.

### **6.3 Peri-urban residents' experiences during ESAP and *jambanja***

As stated in chapter 1, the study has posited that the forces of global neoliberal restructuring since the 1980s (Briggs & Yeboah, 2001: 18; De Boeck, *et al.*, 2013: 1) have given rise to policy formulation and implementation challenges of achieving equitable development in the sub-Saharan Africa (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 115) due to the failed politics of governance (Moyo & Skalness, 1990: 201; Moyo & Yeros, 2005). Undoubtedly, these unprecedented socio-spatial transformations underlying these challenges have been power-laden with critical urban development policy considerations for managing the deepening structural inequalities in marginalised peri-urban communities. The study has noted that the initial impacts of Zimbabwe's failed neoliberal experiment (ESAP) (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 336) marginalised millions of ordinary citizens in abject poverty through massive layoffs. The massive retrenchments were compounded by a "withdrawal of state welfare provisions" (Bayat, 2000: 534) in health, education and housing. Consonant with previous findings on the impacts of the country's failed neoliberal reforms project (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 336), the study has revealed that most of the participants in Ruwa (70%), Domboshava (60%) and Caledonia (50%) attributed a substantial loss of their livelihoods to the widespread company closures (see Figure 5.5). The trends in company closures and job losses have dragged well to the present day as the majority of a rapidly bulging youthful population in Zimbabwe faces an insecure future.

In hindsight, the widespread structural urban poverty in Zimbabwe deepened when the Brettonwoods Institutions (Briggs & Mwamfupe, 2000: 797) forced a begrudging ZANU-PF government to allow market forces to spearhead economic growth. A prescriptive deregulation of prices on housing, rent and utilities subjected most of the retrenched to homelessness (Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2004) with many of them opting to revive their rural networks to spread the risks (Potts, 2007; Morreira, 2010: 361). A deregulation of prices on housing and rents actually encouraged property owners to raise prices and rents to "poor-unfriendly" levels in the name of competition (Kamete,

2013: 1). The unaffordable housing rents, propelled by the destruction of thousands of dwelling units during Operation *Murambatsvina* (UN-Habitat, 2005: 85; Potts, 2008b: 1), compelled some of the displaced households to shelter in the peri-urban areas and rural outskirts of the major urban centres. Over time the informal settlement townships have developed in leaps and bounds with accompanying mixed land use types and superstructures (see Figure 5.8, Appendix A) often subjected to demolition in frequent clean-ups orchestrated by modernising state authorities.

Evidently, the *jambanja* “planning irregularities” (Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016: 33) “failed to protect the poor from exploitation” (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 120) by the ruling elites and cohorts in business (McGregor, 2013b: 787; Mbiba, 2017c: 1-2). These irregularities (including the flouting and/or reversal of planning standards, use group regulations and building by-laws) in public land use involved corrupt government officials, political loyalists and illicit land barons masquerading as “big men” (Kelsall, *et al.*, 2013, Beresford, 2014: 1). These robber land barons enriched themselves through fraudulent land deals at the expense of unsuspecting victims – usually the desperate homeseekers who readily parted with their hardearned cash to facilitate the underhand deals.

In spirited efforts to hedge against the misfortunes of hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, some diasporans invested in diverse upscale peri-urban (McGregor, 2013a) real estate markets (see Figure 5.4). A nationwide boom in the housing construction industry has virtually used up most prime land within the built-up spaces in Harare. The housing construction trend colonised the peri-urban areas where the “absence of formal planning” (Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016: 33) has fuelled a mushrooming of housing structures on high voltage power servitudes and in the wetlands (Appendix A). Meanwhile, it has also been debated “whether *jambanja* can be held to account for conspiring the intensifying urban-rural migration trends around the country’s major urban centres” (Mbiba, 2017b: 5) - implicit in some peri-urban studies in Africa (Hahn, 2010; Hahn & Kastner, 2014; Potts, 2010, 2011).

## **6.4 Co-drivers of circularity: ESAP, *jambanja* and Operation**

### ***Murambatsvina***

Firstly, Zimbabwe's economic decline, since ESAP in the mid-1990s, compelled millions of hardpressed Zimbabweans to emigrate into neighbouring countries and the Diaspora. The main driver was a "search for alternative survival opportunities" (Mbiba, 2017b: 10) and thereafter to send remittances (food and money) back home (Morreira, 2010: 355). Secondly, after occupying the farms acquired during *jambanja*, some urban and rural citizens in Zimbabwe frequently travel in and out of their rural and urban homes to tend their crops on the farms. These households occasionally leave behind family members to monitor developments on the new farms. As highlighted in the preceding section, *jambanja* opened up resettlement opportunities in the peri-urban areas for those displaced by ESAP. These economic refugees were joined by the workers who were evicted from the former White farms and forced to shelter in the peri-urban areas during the chaotic land reforms.

Thirdly, a militarised Operation *Murambatsvina* (UN-Habitat, 2005; Kamete, 2006) displaced hundreds of thousands of citizens that an embattled ZANU-PF party-state suspected to be opposition MDC party supporters (Morreira, 2010: 361). Under the pretext of "cleaning out filth/rubbish" (*Murambatsvina*), an increasingly authoritarian ZANU-PF party-state instructed its military and police to demolish the homes of "suspected opposition MDC party supporters" in efforts to dislodge them from all the urban centres (IDMC, 2006: 7; Hammar, 2008: 418; Potts, 2008b: 2, 2010, 2013a). The aim of the violent political campaign was, as highlighted in the preceding chapter, to marginalise all the opposition MDC-controlled urban constituencies in the country's electoral process in order to tighten ZANU-PF's "vice grip on power" (Mbiba, 2017c). In these processes, the peri-urban areas became the sites of refuge for workers evicted from the expropriated White farms and spaces for "disciplining an unruly urban populace" (Kamete, 2006) that "disagreed with what the ZANU-PF government was doing" (Morreira, 2010: 360). To be sure, the peri-urban interface equated with dispensing the state powers of eminent domain through the "creative destruction" (Harvey, 2006) of structures deemed as "matters out of place" (Douglas, 2002: 36).

Recalling the political reprisals during Operation *Murambatsvina*, some participants who had been victims of the violent demolitions of property on grounds of being suspected of supporting the opposition MDC party refused to voice their personal opinions (see Table 5.1). The study has confirmed a positive correlation between the high incidence of violence in Domboshava, Caledonia and Saturday Retreat in the period leading up to the elections (Figure 5.5). These experiences help to recapture the peri-urban interface as a site of “creative destruction” (Harvey, 2006) control of dissenting voices through the “prerogative powers of the state” (Mbiba, 2017c: 2) to use coercive force. The evidence produced in recurrent court litigations on corrupt public land deals in urban Zimbabwe clearly indicates that the real motives of some members of the ruling ZANU-PF and opposition MDC parties were more inclined to use their official positions for extracting public resources instead of serving the public (Dumba Report, City of Harare, 2010).

Despite the realities of primitive accumulation and wealth creation alluded to above, Scoones (2016) has asserted that Zimbabwe’s “fast track” land reforms mastered “a boom in the growth of intermediate towns” such as Chatsworth, Mvurwi and Glendale. These small towns were important outposts in the former European large-scale farms surrounding the main urban centres. As Figure 1.2 in chapter 1 shows, an array of intermediate towns links the “life-worlds” (Hahn & Kastner, 2016; Lombard & Rakodi, 2016: 2683) of the major cities to myriad small business centres in the hinterland communal lands. After *jambanja* in 2000, when the large-scale White commercial farms were expropriated and subdivided into small-holdings to resettle some of the landless peasants affiliated to the governing ZANU-PF party, these small intermediate towns serve larger catchment communities of the new farmers. The small towns now accommodate more retail shops, bars, butcheries and public transport termini for commuter omnibuses connecting the larger urban centres with rural communities. Evidently, the intensified rural-urban flows of people, services and information since *jambanja* demonstrate a wider peri-urban interface in flux. The question that arises from all this is: In what specific ways, has a predatory ZANU-PF party-state directly or indirectly contributed towards transforming the peri-urban economy space?

## 6.5 Interrogating a permissive state at the urban frontier

As highlighted in the preceding chapters, the study has relied extensively on both literature and empirical evidence to demonstrate how Zimbabwe has “informalised”<sup>43</sup> its space economy to mediate the impacts of economic decline since mid-1990 when the “ZANU-PF-led government resolved to abandon ESAP” (Mbiba, 2017c: 6). After deserting ESAP, chapters 1 and 2 have shown how the hardpressed ZANU-PF party-state expediently embarked on *jambanja* to open up “new political avenues for the creation and accumulation of wealth” specifically to benefit the new ruling black elite class (Mbiba, 2017c: 1; Gwekwerere, *et al.*, 2017: 7).

The country’s new black ruling elite class embarked on a mission to plunder state resources through rampant land grabs, evictions, destruction of property and informalisation of state institutions “as combative strategies of accumulation and patronage” (Alexander & McGregor, 2013: 749; Raftopoulos, 2014: 93). The stripping of land and other state resources seems to have become the norm rather than an exception. But in what ways have the “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003) strategies of the ZANU-PF party-state executives and aligned businessmen impacted on the peri-urban space economy in Harare?

### 6.5.1 Socio-spatial impacts of restructuring on a “peri-urban” space economy

In their individual and collective responses to the harsh conditions of economic decline since ESAP in mid-1990 (Morreira, 2010; ICED, 2017), many peri-urban households have engaged in diverse strategies to sustain their livelihoods (Alwang, *et al.*, 2001; Mbiba, 2017b: 10). The study has revealed that most (60%) of the respondents in the peri-urban areas of Harare were either self-employed in home-based industrial enterprises or informal retail trading. A quarter (25%) of the respondents – mainly civil

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<sup>43</sup> Unlike elsewhere in Africa, in settler capitalist Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) there was strict control over illegal developments and informality while infrastructure and services were maintained and wage employment remained dominant (Mbiba 2017a: 1,2). However, with *jambanja* (vernacular for ‘impunity’) and other forces, the ZANU-PF government policies spearheaded the “processes of annihilation of the rule of law, as well as the trashing and rejection of norms that guide global, community and personal relations” (ibid.: 3) in all sectors of the economy. *Jambanja* still remains largely a central mode of statecraft and everyday life everywhere in the countryside including in urban and peri-urban areas.

servants and workers in industrial firms, were formally employed whereas 15% relied on remittances from relatives working outside the country (Morreira, 2010: 357). The country's informal economy witnessed a proliferation of flea markets in all urban centres. These flea markets sold textile clothes ("*mabhanduru*", Shona lexicon for assorted bundles of clothes) and electronic wares imported from Dubai, South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana.

The study confirmed earlier findings (Mucharambeyi, 2001) that pointed to a boom in the housing construction industry in Harare since ESAP. As Figure 5.7 shows, this boom has intensified and diversified into carpentry, home-based welding industries, brick moulding, sand quarrying and stone crushing. Furthermore, photographs taken during transect walks and random site visits show ostentatious houses in Harare's satellite towns of Ruwa, Chitungwiza, Norton and in the modernised villages of communal Dema in Seke and Domboshava (Appendix A). However, a proliferation of upscale houses – to demonstrate 'how well others live' – is not confined to Zimbabwe. In Nigeria (Osili, 2004), Ghana (Smith & Mazuccato, 2009; Akeampong, 2000) and Madagascar (Thomas, 1998) migrant communities in the Diaspora have invested in real estate property development "chiefly inspired by the desire to return home successfully" (McGregor, 2013a).

Fearing a return to "Gono's hyperinflationary 'casino' economy" (Gono, 2008) and resurgence of profiteering mobile money markets (Mbiba, 2017c:10), more than half of respondents in Caledonia had invested in the purchase or construction of modern houses to avoid government swooping on their hardearned savings in banks overnight. As governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Gideon Gono impounded all personal savings in banks without advance notice. Since then, a deep-seated public mistrust of finance houses in Zimbabwe has fuelled private ownership of cheap cars and interest in acquiring multiple housing properties as safer forms of investing personal savings. A widespread car ownership has contributed to an unprecedented sprawling of the country's major urban centres coupled with expansive real estate developments in the small towns of Norton, Beatrice, Glendale and Bindura. Meanwhile, the hardpressed ZANU-PF party-state has also capitalised on rents by creating chaotic peri-urban land

markets to sustain its political reproduction project of hegemony. The impacts of *jambanja* peri-urban land markets are briefly rehearsed in the next section.

### ***6.5.2 Impacts of jambanja on the peri-urban land and agricultural markets***

The study has shed light on the rapid transformation of hitherto White owned commercial farmlands into public land carpeted with mushrooming informal settlements engulfed by swathes of open maize fields on which the new resident households subsist for their domestic consumption. The findings have confirmed that the occupation of the compulsorily dispossessed peri-urban farms has been contested (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer (2002:115) marked by structural “conflicts between the divergent land tenure and administrative interests in fuelling formal and informal land uses” (Lombard, 2014: 5, 2016: 2701). Figure 5.5 has shown that the *jambanja* land grabs, that became the vehicle of the punitive “fast track” land reforms (Mbiba 2017a: 3,4), have taken place in all the four peri-urban communities studied. Saturday Retreat registered the highest proportion of the *jambanja* land grabs (70%) followed by both Solomio (25%) and Caledonia (25%) while Domboshava experienced the least (20%). The cumulative effect of the peri-urban land grabs on livelihoods first came into sharp relief when “commercial agriculture export earnings fell drastically as the wider Zimbabwean economy collapsed and society suffered commensurate damage” (Magure, 2012: 71) post-2000.

Another intriguing finding was a proliferation of insurgent “agent-centric planning actions” (Giddens, 1984: 317) spearheaded by “tribal chiefs who worked in cahoots with villagers to subdivide peri-urban communal land and sold the resulting stands to speculative real estate agents” (Hungwe, 2014: 160-165). The subdivisions were carried out in the peri-urban communal lands of Seke, Goromonzi and Domboshava without the approval of the responsible local planning authorities (DFID, 2009: 2). This tribal land use planning practice is not surprising. Traditional leaders sell public land to avoid losing it to government without any compensation. In cases like this, it seems to them waiting for public land to be planned in accordance with the existing planning laws, is viewed as a loss because the state, using its prerogative powers of eminent



domain, then simply allocates the plots or stands to people from elsewhere thereby sidelining the deserving locals.

Similarly, the “*garawadya*” mode of “deurbanization”<sup>44</sup> (Mbiba, 2017b: 11) is not unique to Zimbabwe (see Chapter 3 above). An earlier study in peri-urban Tamale, Ghana, observed traditional leaders conniving with corrupt government officials to sell public land without consulting their subjects (Yaro, 2012). These subversive acts of land use reveal how state institutions and markets in some Southern countries fail to address rapid growth and inequality, particularly in housing (Lombard & Rakodi, 2016: 2684). In paternalistic African states, such corrupt practices continue to undermine the sustainable public goods service delivery in marginalised peri-urban spaces. Closely associated with irregularities in peri-urban land governance is a persistent threat of political gerrymandering.

The reluctance of the ZANU-PF central government to use its prerogative powers of eminent domain to resolve the stalemate over defining the relevant administrative boundaries between Ruwa, Goromonzi Rural District Council and Harare municipality points to the dilemma of territorial ordering in contested peri-urban space where intermingling life-worlds are in constant motion. Although Caledonia was incorporated into Harare municipality through a Presidential Proclamation (Statutory Instrument SI 119/2012), the residents there still owe their political allegiance to Goromonzi RDC because Caledonia is situated within the administrative boundaries of Goromonzi (ICED, 2017: 5). The ruling ZANU-PF party is mainly a rural-based party owing its resilient political career to rural constituencies where the majority population lives and is home of its power base since Zimbabwe’s war of independence from Britain. However, what is not so conspicuous in all this is that a lack of political will on the part of rural-based ruling ZANU-PF party-state to clearly define the administrative boundaries of responsible local authority jurisdictions can be used by contending

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<sup>44</sup> Evidently, the “*garawadya*” (Mbiba, 2017b: 11) “mode of urbanisation defines urban spatial growth in peri-urban rural areas through the construction of houses on land without approved land-use layout plan, no cadastral surveys and no infrastructure. In effect, “*garawadya* contributed to deurbanisation in the sense of loss of urban character, notably, urban expansion lacking ancillary infrastructure, services and institutions” (ibid.:11).

political parties, when in power, to marginalise dissenting communities in public goods service delivery.

### ***6.5.3 Marginalising peri-urban abject communities in infrastructure***

Lending support to earlier findings on the “double process of inclusion and exclusion” (Bayat, 2000: 534) in Indian peri-urban spaces (Brook, *et al.*, 2003), Magure (2013) has observed similar urban policy strategies of the ruling party elites targeting marginalised communities for political profit. The infrastructure provision and maintenance deficits characteristic of many African cities still “bear the footprint of colonial attempts to systematically exclude certain populations from accessing basic services” (Beresford, 2014: 4). A recent study in Kampala has observed that “curry-favouring” commercial and upper-class residential suburbs of the city with essential infrastructure services has “marginalised the majority poor urbanites” (Beresford, 2014: 4) through a capitalisation of “rent-seeking opportunities to maintain the status quo” (Fox, 2013: 117). Such official policy practices demonstrate how “power is shored up through exclusion and exemption” (*ibid.*: 5) as deficiencies in service delivery furnish political entrepreneurs with “pretexts for punishing political rivals” (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2006).

Since losing power to the opposition MDC party in all the cities during the national elections of March 2008, Zimbabwe’s “ruling ZANU-PF party has used both formal and informal means to undermine the MDC-run councils” (McGregor, 2013b: 784) through a “rule of fear and force” (Hammar, 2008: 426). The study established that, in the peri-urban areas, where government suspected those who had “voted incorrectly” (Hammar, 2008: 31) against it to have been sheltering, the ruling ZANU-PF party-state sanctioned its militias to create chaos and destitution as they wielded their coercive violence to assert their own authority. The abjection of the residents was further complicated by corrupt opposition MDC councillors and senior council officials who joined the ZANU-PF “gravy train” interested in accessing official incentives such as luxury vehicles and residential stands instead of service delivery (Muchadenyika, 2015a: 8; Mbiba, 2017c: 11-12).

## 6.6 Consolidating thematic categories for re-imagining the “peri-urban”

The study findings have illustrated how the vested wealth creation and accumulation interests and policy actions of the ZANU-PF party-state have reproduced structural gaps in the restructuring peri-urban land governance processes in Harare post-2000. In other words, there is a difference between policy prescription and practice and this gap leads to problems of marginalising ordinary residents in Harare’s peri-urban areas. The “spatially unruly” (Kamete 2008) land use practices (such as the violent and fraudulent land grabs, informalised land uses) militated against the prescribed urban planning policy intentions, during *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina*. These practices have evidently been marked in widening the gaps between the government’s stated policy prescriptions of orderly land use and implementation practice, on one side, and on the other side, between policy practice and everyday experiences of ordinary residents desirous of sustainable urban land development.

These policy contradictions have reconfigured the peri-urban interface into a “contentious” (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002, 115) site of “conflicts between divergent land tenure and administrative interests fuelling arrays of formal and informal uses” (Lombard, 2014: 5, 2016: 2701). Consolidating the analytical thematic categories for reconceptualising the peri-urban interface, this chapter points to a number of essential dimensions that should be articulated and the related policy mixes specific to local conditions in space over time.

Firstly, re-visiting a peri-urban interface should involve a critical analytical engagement with the “unprecedented socio-economic transformations” (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 115) that have reshaped the city in the specific contexts of neoliberal restructuring. This is because these transformations have been laden with the failure to understand and manage the interplay of forces underlying the structural gaps between policy prescriptions and practice on one hand, and between policy practice and experiences of the intended beneficiary ordinary residents in marginalised urban space.

Secondly, it should be noted that the socio-spatial impacts of neoliberal restructuring on city making have given rise to new forms and contents (both qualitative and

quantitative) of peri-urbanisation in the (re) production of urban space. These new urban forms and contents have encompassed “circular movements” (Potts, 2010, 2012; ICED, 2017: 12), multiple “life-worlds in motion” (Hahn, 2010; Hahn & Kastner, 2014; Potts, 2010, 2011), permissive “land grabs” (Mbiba, 2017a: 3), “patronage politics of accumulation” and violence (Alexander & McGregor, 2013: 749; McGregor, 2013b; Raftopoulos, 2014: 93) leading to multiple and mixed urban land uses.

Thirdly, the double process of inclusion and exclusion (Bayat, 2000: 534) has converted the peri-urban interface to contested and power-laden sites for the cultivation of political voting banks by contestants through, for instance, selective public goods service delivery. In the realm of policy prescription and implementation practice, this double process has been held responsible for a widespread failure of the ruling parties in many African countries have lost power to manage the persistent and worsening structural policy gaps, particularly in public goods and services delivery. These policy failures have shifted decision-making power from the dominant ruling parties to populist urban based opposition political parties (Resnick 2014). In attempts to weaken the urban based opposition political parties, incumbent political parties have resorted to byzantine strategies, including the withdrawal of financial support for public goods service delivery in the marginalised peri-urban areas suspected of harbouring anti-government elements, to manipulate electoral outcomes.

The final chapter consolidates the main highlights of the study and features additional conceptual categories towards reimagining the peri-urban interface in a contemporary sub-Saharan Africa.

## **CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: TOWARDS REIMAGINING THE ‘PERI-URBAN’ IN AN ERA OF RAPID TRANSFORMATIONS**

### **7.1 Overview of the thesis**

The last six chapters have presented a political economy of Zimbabwe’s evolving urban contexts (Chapter 3), research methodology (Chapter 4), the characteristics of the study areas in peri-urban Harare (Chapter 4), the findings of the study (Chapter 5) and proposed conceptual blocks for reimagining a peri-urban interface based on the lived experiences of ordinary residents that live there (Chapter 6). These chapters have dissected the “life-worlds in motion” (Hahn 2010; Hahn & Kastner 2014; Potts 2010, 2011) and “multiple realities” (Giddens 1984: 137; Habermas 1994) reproducing the shifting urban socio-spatial spaces in Zimbabwe since the turn of the new millennium.

The discussions have unravelled the multi-layered forces and processes underlying the structural gaps between government’s stated land reform policy prescriptions and practice, on one hand, and on the other, between practice and the everyday life experiences of marginalised ordinary residents living in peri-urban informal settlements – in this case study of Harare. However, the impacts of the structural policy gaps in urban land governance revealed in the study have not only affected peri-urban residents but also other population groups in the wider Zimbabwean society. The other population groups affected by failed government policy practices have included ordinary citizens living in overcrowded low income or high-density suburbs, in the mining and impoverished rural areas where a subdued majority of peasants eke out a living. The study has demonstrated how a critical political economy analytical framework, after Harvey’s (2003) readjusted and extended Marxist concept of “accumulation by dispossession”, can meaningfully peer into the dynamics of the structural the gaps between government’s policy intentions and prescriptions, on one hand, and, on the other, between practice and the lived experiences of intended beneficiaries.

This chapter consolidates the main take-aways of the study linked to the aim of the study in section 1.8 of Chapter 1. To that end, the chapter retraces how the socio-spatial

gaps in urban land policy engagements in peri-urban Harare played out during *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina*. Specifically, the chapter explains how the persistent knowledge gaps in mainstream urban studies have generated and reinforced structural gaps in urban land policy formulation and implementation practice in SSA, despite the prevailing and “changed socio-spatial circumstances” there (Watson, 2009b: 162; 2014). Using the conceptual materials already presented in chapter 6 that have been anchored on the lived experiences of peri-urban residents in Harare during *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina*, this chapter explains how these materials can be useful for reconstructing a changed peri-urban interface in the different contexts of urban restructuring in SSA. The differentiated socio-spatial contexts prevailing in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa have been discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. Beginning with the highlights of the findings presented in Chapter 5, the next section of this chapter recaptures the impact of contemporary neoliberal policy processes on an evolving peri-urban interface.

## **7.2 Re-capturing the “peri-urban” through neoliberal governance processes**

The study has proceeded from a widespread concern that although the stated policy intentions in many African countries have been “symbolically inclusive” (Porter & Craig, 2004) of the majority poor residents, however, due to the internal dynamics of “failed politics” (Moyo & Skalness 1990: 201; Moyo & Yeros, 2005) in these countries, most of the intended beneficiary citizens end up being marginalised (De Boeck, *et al.*, 2013: 1). As revealed in the case study, to weaken the electoral bases of opposition political parties, some of the intended beneficiary communities suspected of sheltering political rivals in peri-urban informal settlements are excluded from accessing public land resources and urban services. Thus, a preoccupation with an enduring marginalisation of the majority citizens living in peri-urban Zimbabwe, contrary to the declared policy intentions of a populist and authoritarian ZANU-PF party-state, inspired this study to interrogate the causes of the structural gaps between the government’s “fast track” land reform (*jambanja*) policy objectives and implementation practice, on one side, and on the other, between practice versus the lived experiences of some residents in the targeted communities. The results presented in Chapter 5 have shown how the gaps between government’s stated policy intentions and implementation practice, on one side, and on

the other, between practice and the lived experiences of the intended beneficiaries, have reshaped the peri-urban landscapes in Harare. The findings have located the underlying causes of these structural land reform policy gaps in the hegemonic interests of the emerging black ruling elite classes (Shumba, 2016; Manda, 2019: 14) in the African cities that are increasingly more interested in retaining and recycling their incumbent power than in constructing inclusive urban governance spaces.

Alluding to chapters 5 and 6 above, the empirical evidence of this study has identified socio-spatial gaps between official policy practice and everyday life experiences of residents in the increasingly uneven and mutating policy terrains of Zimbabwe's neoliberal policy projects of *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina* during implementation. The evidence has demonstrated how a permissive ZANU-PF party-state has dispensed with its prerogative powers of "eminent domain" (Roy, 2009b: 79, 80; Fox, 2014: 197) and allied institutions in combating and re-ordering peri-urban spaces through the "politics of patronage" (Alexander & McGregor, 2013: 758; McGregor, 2013), violence (IDMC, 2006: 7; Potts, 2008: 2; Hammar, 2008: 418) and "political instrumentalisation of disorder" (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 144). Despite the resistance politics of opposition social movements and civil society, overriding state policy actions - through the militarised and informalised land use planning practices by the state, selective demolitions (Kamete, 2006: 259; Morreira, 2010: 352) and evictions of those suspected of voting against the ruling ZANU-PF party - have given rise to unsustainable land uses leading to the sprawling palimpsest peri-urban landscapes in Harare (see Appendix A). Thus, a critical political economy analytical engagement with the power-laden strategies of a neoliberalising state in urban space production has helped this enquiry to dislodge some of the enduring urban knowledge gaps in the urban studies that have fuelled policy practices further marginalising the majority urban poor in the receiving countries (Tait & Jensen, 2007: 114; Watson, 2009b: 172, 2014a, 2014b; Satge & Watson, 2018: 2, 3). How a political economy analytical prism has unpacked these gaps, is the subject of discussion in the next section.

### ***7.2.1 Unpacking dominant knowledge gaps in discourses on urban and ‘peri-urban’***

The study has identified some of the persistent urban knowledge gaps in the mainly descriptive urban studies in Africa that have propagated skewed discourses on what constitutes the “urban” and “peri-urban” by conflating development policy approaches and practices in sub-Saharan African contexts (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer 2002: 118).

Firstly, the study has noted that a fixation with the trappings of modernity (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 118) still maintains its vice grip on urban policy orientations that have promoted “dual-city” models (Abu-Lughod, 1965: 420; Potts, 2008a) in Zimbabwe. Thus, blueprint policy models and structure urban development plans, deeply entrenched in the country’s modernist planning system, have relentlessly subdued urban poor majority households and confining them to peri-urban informal settlements – where they live out of sight of the central business district.

The informal settlements of interest in the case study included Caledonia, Solomio and Saturday Retreat (see Figure 1.3, page 17). These rapidly sprawling informal settlements are extensions of the older African townships of Mbare, Mabvuku, Highfields and Glen Norah to which the subject African households were restricted in colonial settler Rhodesia. Buffered away from these overcrowded black townships, the emerging and new black comprador bourgeoisie class of political and allied business elites now resides in the securitised upscale leafy suburbs of Borrowdale, Glen Lorne, Highlands and Shawasha. Since independence in 1980, this black bourgeoisie class, that has replaced the former racist Rhodesian supremacists (Shumba, 2016: 9-10; Gwekwerere, *et al.*, 2017: 10), has used income and political recognition for policing where one lives instead of race (Mazingi and Kamidza, 2011). Evidently, the ordering of post-colonial urban territory and life is an outcome of enduring Western modernist worldviews (Robinson, 2002, 2006; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2010; Myers, 2014; Roy, 2009a, 2009b) that reserved modernist housing conditions and better infrastructure services for the powerful and wealthy expecting the majority poor to catch up through “*kiya-kiya*” (Shona lexicon for “improvising just to get by”) (Morreira, 2010: 355, Jones 2010 in Mbiba 2017c: 9) in the often neglected and marginalised peri-urban spaces.



Secondly, the literatures experiences highlighted in Chapter 1 of this thesis point out that although “unprecedented socio-spatial and economic transformations have been most marked in the peri-urban areas of the global South” (Hall and Pfeiffer 2000; Watson, 2009a), relatively little is known of the underlying causes (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002; Roy 2005: 147). This is not surprising. Hitherto, the “bulk of urban studies has avoided the causal processes underlying the intensified and messy inequalities in the developing countries” (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 116; Mbiba, 2017c: 6). Instead, the political economy of the Western-based international development agencies that have commissioned most urban studies in Africa has decisively preferred a focus on economic outcomes of improved living conditions of in the poor urban communities while filtering out the underlying “dialectical processes of capitalist urban space production” (Peck & Tickell, 2002: 380; Brenner & Theodore, 2005: 101). Thus, the research has sought to contribute towards filling these urban knowledge gaps with an understanding of the *jambanja* land reform policy contradictions and antagonisms that have deeply transfigured the peri-urban governance terrain in Harare since the turn of the new millennium. In confronting the persistent urban knowledge gaps in the dominant policy framings that obscure the vested interests of ruling elites in urban policy prescriptions and practices, the study has proposed possible theoretical innovations for ‘signposting’ and narrowing these gaps so that the underlying contradictions and antagonisms can be addressed, and where possible, eliminated.

### ***7.2.2 Theorising the structural gaps between official urban land policy practice and everyday life***

The enquiry has offered alternative theoretical resources for realigning urban policy orientations with the lived experiences of intended beneficiary communities themselves in order to bridge the structural gaps that have contributed to a high failure of peri-urban development policies in a restructuring urban sub-Saharan Africa. For bridging the structural policy gaps in Harare’s peri-urban land governance space, the study has used the following questions to tap the lived experiences of peri-urban residents during the implementation of Zimbabwe’s neoliberal policy projects – *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina*:

- How do ordinary residents in contested peri-urban space respond to their marginalisation during land use policy reorientations and implementation?
- What strategies do marginalised communities engage in order to improve their living conditions where permissive forms of the state actions impact adversely on their everyday life in contested peri-urban space?

As discussed in Chapter 4, the study has used a mixed-methods design (De Vos, 2002: 365; Wolley, 2009; Driscoll, *et al.*, 2007) (see Figure 4.1, page 70) to capture the state-society actions during *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina* and to collect conceptual materials for mounting a big picture of the peri-urban interface. The main government actors interviewed during the study included 10 town planning officials in the stakeholder urban planning agencies and 250 ordinary residents in peri-urban Harare who experienced the “unending crises” (Mlambo & Raftopoulos 2010) unleashed by Zimbabwe’s neoliberal policy projects.

As its main conceptual organising structure, the study used Harvey’s (2003) readjusted and extended Marxist idea of “accumulation by dispossession” to dislodge the forces that have transformed Zimbabwe’s peri-urban landscapes from commercial farmland into largely mixed informal residential uses strewn with residual farming estates and *vlei* (see Appendix A). This critical analytical concept has helped the study to cultivate insights into the “contingent and comparative linkages with urban governance and the postcolonial African city and state” (Mbiba, 2017c: 3) in the different peri-urban informal settlements of Harare. How all this has played out a deeply transformed Harare ‘peri-urban’, is recaptured in section 7.3 below.

### **7.3 Deconstructing accumulation by dispossession processes in urban Zimbabwe**

Retracing the historical political economy of settler colonial Rhodesia (Arrighi, 1967; Rakodi, 1995; Muronda, 2008; Dawson & Kelsall, 2012), the study has identified some residual influences of the country’s dualistic (black-white) urban planning ideas since the hoisting of the Union Jack at Fort Salisbury (Harare) in 1890 (Patel, 1988; Wekwete, 1989, 1995). The study has noted that ad hoc urban governance structures of colonial settler Rhodesia were chiefly designed to serve the capitalist accumulation and wealth

creation interests of incoming European settlers in behalf of the parent country at the expense of the indigenous black majority population (Arrighi, 1967; Stoneman & Cliffe, 1989: 16).

To achieve the settler-colonial capitalist accumulation policy objectives, a range of racial laws – ranging from the Land Apportionment Act (1930) to various Industrial Conciliation Acts, drew clear boundaries between the black majority and established whites, “with white rural capital, clearly in the ascendancy” (Dawson & Kelsall, 2012: 51). The paradox is that the residual legacies of a political economy landscape of “primitive accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003) carved out during settler-colonial Rhodesia (Rakodi, 2008; Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011; Mpofu, 2010; Chirisa, 2011; Gumbo, 2013: 19) are still manifest in independent Zimbabwe. Some of the institutional legacies continue to perpetuate the “voracious primitive accumulation” (Tekere, 2007: 11) and wealth creation interests of comprador black elite and business classes aligned with the ruling ZANU-PF party while subjecting the urban majority to abjection (Dawson & Kelsall, 2012: 53).

In all this, the study has located unyielding crises of transition since majority rule – those of “primitive accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003, 2006; De Angelis, 1999, 2001) and the debilitating structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and abortive attempts at democratization, in a “radical reshaping of the form and content of state institutions in Zimbabwe post-2000 to retain the political power of the ruling elite” (Shumba, 2016: 9-10). However, fearing its loss of policy decision-making power and the erosion of its “rent allocation opportunities” through the prescriptive neoliberal reform policy demands of global capital (Dawson & Kelsall, 2012: 55-56), a hegemonic ruling ZANU-PF party has consistently reincarnated itself. The incumbent ZANU-PF party has engaged a combination of strategies both to replenish its dwindling legitimacy resources and weaken its rival urban-based MDC party that nearly swept it out of power in early 2000 (McGregor, 2013b: 783).

Since early 2000, as socio-spatial structural “gaps between the haves (both whites and blacks) and have-nots (mainly blacks)” (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 344) have become increasingly untenable, Zimbabwe’s urban centres have transformed into “populist

strongholds for the main opposition party, the MDC” (McGregor, 2013b: 783). Responding to its diminished popularity in all the country’s urban centres, a hegemonic ZANU-PF party has deployed byzantine strategies (mastery of political patronage, violence and creative destruction) to recover its lost legitimacy in the urban areas including “undermining the capacity of the opposition MDC-run councils to deliver public goods and services” (McGregor, 2013b: 783). To be blunt, “the ZANU-PF party-state has effectively manipulated local governments to promote its interests” (Muchadenyika and Williams, 2016b: 269; Dawson & Kelsall, 2012: 58) with remarkable success. A “re-construction of state institutions” (McGregor, 2013b: 787), through a tripartite “political-military-security complex” (Shumba, 2016: 192-194), has become the mode of statecraft in Zimbabwe. Meanwhile the country grapples with unrelenting socio-economic crises that have become deeply rooted in the governance of its cities (Dawson & Kelsall, 2012: 52; Scoones, 2019). To all intents and purposes, Zanu-PF’s elitist accumulation and political power regeneration continue to thrive on a partisan orchestration of patronage, violence, disorder and “rent seeking relations between the electorate and those elected into positions of power” (Kelsall, 2013; Shumba, 2016: 192) through systemic patron-clientage networks (Dawson & Kelsall, 2012: 57).

The political-cum-business clientage networks of the ZANU-PF party-state machinery have systematically marginalised the majority of ordinary citizens that do not have demonstrable “links with it” through the ruling party organs (Shumba, 2016: 192). In practice, the ZANU-PF party-state has relied on overt violence to plunder state resources and to control the opposition urban strongholds by placing the military and security elites in commanding positions of politics and the economy. A political economy dominated by the ZANU-PF party and military has thus produced, at the very top of society, a predatory power elite (ibid.: 191). The apex of this predatory party-state comprises “the ruling ZANU-PF political elites, military executives and politically aligned parasitic businessmen, cordoned off from the reach of the people at the bottom” (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011: 369; Dawson & Kelsall, 2012; Shumba, 2016: 191). This scheme of things has important implications for peri-urban land use governance.

As the findings of the study have clearly hinted, an “overturning of regulatory planning frameworks and procedures” (Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016a: 34, 2016b: 269) in peri-

urban Harare has opened the floodgates of informalised land use practices at various levels of society. These practices and underpinning fraudulent land deals have mainly embroiled incumbent political executives including leaders of opposition parties, and influential state officials. Consequently, the “poorly managed contradictions in the land use planning system” (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 120) of a *jambanja* political economy have produced widespread palimpsest peri-urban landscapes in Zimbabwe. The landscapes reflect multiple layers of mixed rural and urban land forms that have profoundly reconfigured the country’s peri-urban areas since *jambanja* in 2000. The informalised peri-urban land use practices have spilled into the rural outskirts where rapid urbanisation trends have converted some of the rural villages at the urban fringe into modern residential enclaves. Drawing on these insights, a number of conceptual blocks towards rebuilding a peri-urban interface in conditions of globalisation in sub-Saharan Africa have emerged.

#### **7.4 Emerging conceptual blocks for rebuilding the peri-urban interface**

Essentially, many of the suggested analytical conceptual categories for rebuilding the peri-urban interface specific to the socio-spatial contexts in Harare resonate with similar contexts and daily life experiences elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. The characteristic experiences involve intensified rural-urban life-worlds at the peri-urban interface and inadequacies in the provision and management of public goods and services due to failed oppositional politics. This case study elevates the dominant role of a combative party-state and allied institutions in ordering peri-urban territory through policy practices of political patronage, violence and instrumentalised disorder.

##### **7.4.1 Intensified rural-urban life-worlds at the peri-urban interface and beyond**

The study has corroborated a number of similarities with earlier findings on “conflicting positions relating what the “peri-urban” is or should be, and the nature and meaning of the processes taking place there” (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002: 114; Simon, *et al.*, 2004: 235). Undoubtedly, “the fortunes of rural and urban socio-spatial spheres are inextricably linked” (Simon, *et al.*, 2004: 235) through flows of resources and interactions (Rakodi, 1983: 3). Through intensified rural-urban flows in the neoliberalising sub-

Saharan urban contexts, the assumptions orbiting a discrete spatial rural-urban divide are both fallacious and outdated. Illustrating these viewpoints, the photographic findings of the research (see Appendix A) attest to mixed rural land use practices such as goat-rearing juxtaposed to industrial complexes. These intensified mixes of rural and urban forms and lifestyles have in recent years witnessed the emerging securitised upscale residential communities in Seke and Goromonzi – in the eastern rural outskirts of Harare.

Thus, the study has underlined the urgency of policy architectures that can align the multilayered regional and international life-worlds of people with the multi-directional flows of goods, money and information in reconstructing the peri-urban interface (Simon, *et al.*, 2004: 235; Potts, 2007:2, 2008: 153, 2010; Hahn & Kastner, 2014: 212; Woods & Heley, 2017: 1). Admittedly, the momentum and intensification of mobilities within the globalising economic networks have transfigured the interface between “urban” and “rural” places (Simon, *et al.*, 2004: 235) as well as beyond it (Hahn & Kastner, 2014: 212). The pictures showing Mbudzi Shopping Mall and Sunway City Special Economic Zone (Appendix A), demonstrate another paradox arising from policy antagonisms raging between global and local capitalist interests. Although Zimbabwe “remains a pariah state” (Mlambo & Raftopoulos, 2010: 1), mainly due to its intransigent anti-global capital elitist policies, the country’s peri-urban land markets have attracted international investment from neighbouring South Africa and China in the Far East.

A rapid spatial growth of the satellite towns of Ruwa, Chitungwiza, Norton, Bindura, Chegutu and Darwendale (Figure 3.4, page 63) and the proliferation of shopping malls in peri-urban Harare (Appendix A) points to the envisaged “polycentric growth” (Gilbert, 1993) of the city to an extensively built-up city region. Despite earlier claims that SAPs slowed urban growth in SSA through spatial de-concentration of economic activity (Briggs & Yeboah, 2001: 18, 23), the sub-continent’s rapidly growing cities have expanded mainly through peri-urban developments buttressed by diasporic investments in real estate. This study has noted that a boom in the housing construction industry, driven by diasporic joint ventures in the aftermath of Zimbabwe’s economic meltdown in the 1990s, has contributed to rapid sprawl in in peri-urban Harare (McGregor, 2013a). However, rapid urban sprawl has often contributed to conflicts in the democratising the ordering of administrative boundaries and policy “failures in public goods delivery

service thereby exposing vulnerable communities to political patronage” (Fox, 2014: 198).

#### ***7.4.2 Democratising peri-urban governance space for service delivery***

Yiftachel’s (2009a, 2009b) “gray-spacing strategy” reveals that although planning concepts from the global North expound the importance of active participation and involvement of beneficiary communities to improve service delivery, these ideas have lacked practical relevance to local African contexts. This is largely due to subaltern relationships and political power shifts during policy implementation – in particular, the decisive influence of “big men” in related policy and decision-making processes (Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Mkandawire, 2013; Kelsall, *et al.*, 2013; Beresford, 2014). The study has implicated the ZANU-PF party-state in the gerrymandering of electoral boundaries between Goromonzi Rural District and Caledonia-Ruwa urban constituencies that has resulted in stalling public goods service delivery in Caledonia and Solomio informal settlements (see Figure 5.3). Arguably, the blame revolves around the conflicting claims, overlapping legal and governance frameworks and conflicts in a stand-off (Lombard & Rakodi, 2016) between the ZANU-PF run Goromonzi RDC and the rival urban-based MDC party dominating Ruwa Local Board. Both main political parties, the governing ZANU-PF party versus the MDC party, continue to battle for political control over Caledonia and Solomio resulting in urban development policy implementation log jams. Ultimately, it is marginalised residents who experience the downstream effects including deficient road and sanitation networks as contending parties engage political blame games for personal gain.

Thus, a reimagining of the peri-urban interface in contemporary conditions of neoliberal restructuring should also recognize that most peri-urban residents are not involved in the local community development activities, even though this is essential. This recognition draws attention to internal conflicts and external interference by the “big men” (Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Mkandawire, 2013; Kelsall, *et al.*, 2013; Beresford, 2014) bent on exploiting deficiencies in infrastructure provisions in marginalised spaces for personal gain. However, public participation can be improved through the creation of multi-

stakeholder initiatives that bring together peri-urban residents into dialogue with planning authorities on local development needs. Without doubt, such initiatives demand “new planning institutions and priorities capable of generating social and spatial inclusion, greater political respect for community autonomy, and more legitimate methods of policing” (Davis, 2016: 4) public goods delivery service. A privileging of social over physical planning will, perhaps, motivate beneficiary communities to participate in the construction and actioning of policies for land delivery that responds to their everyday socio-spatial concerns.

### **7.5 Limitations of the study: incomplete institutional survey**

The study was conducted in a tension-filled environment of the peri-urban areas that were political flashpoints during *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina*. The household survey was carried out in the few months before the country’s last national polls of 31 July 2018. The leadership members of ZANU-PF’s party-state and the main opposition MDC party that benefitted from a plunder of state resources during the *jambanja* episode were not interviewed during the study. These key members included cabinet ministers, members of government policy making and implementing stakeholder institutions including as MPs, permanent secretaries and directors, leaders of housing cooperatives, political activists aligned with the ruling ZANU-PF party and opposition MDC party as well as the robber land barons. To offset this glut in sample, some traditional village headmen in communal Domboshava and local leaders of the ZANU-PF party in Caledonia were interviewed.

Moreover, in a number of politically tension-filled survey instances, the research garnered fewer responses than had initially been targeted. The household survey conducted in some villages in the peri-urban communal land of Domboshava was fraught with fears of political intimidation and reprisals because some respondents were reluctant to address politically sensitive questions in the interview guide. The non-respondents were clearly concerned about their personal safety because they suspected the household survey to be a political ploy. The researcher, however; tried to allay such fears by repeatedly stating that the interviews were intended for study purposes only and that their responses would be treated anonymously.



These limitations suggest important considerations concerning the representativeness of the study population and cascading the study findings to other cities. There are, however, some takeaways of peri-urban land reform policy prescriptions and practices that apply to similar contexts in the peri-urban areas in SSA with with comparatively similar socio-spatial characteristics. At best, the conceptual blocks extracted from the findings of this case study are context-specific and can be generalised internally.

### **7.6 Generalisability of study findings to other peri-urban areas in SSA**

The study has captured peri-urban Domboshava, Caledonia, Solomio in Ruwa and Saturday Retreat in one sampling frame to allow for the integration of data and comprehensive analysis of the findings presented in chapters 5 and 6. However, cascading the generalizations about these peri-urban areas should recognise the analytical pitfalls in the findings of the study in light of different spatial and temporal contexts. Domboshava is not a prototype of all communal lands in Zimbabwe because cities and peri-urban areas are always changing (Robinson, 2006; Parnell & Robinson, 2013). However, some of the generalisations (Lewis & Ritchie, 2003) in the study findings can be useful as learning experiences considering the socio-spatial limitations when applied to other peri-urban contexts that cannot be predetermined. In particular, the different cultural and political contexts that attracted refusals in Domboshava and tension filled Caledonia and Saturday Retreat during the visits leave space for further study – as indicated below. Moreover, a number of gatekeepers in related stakeholder agencies – political executives, executive employees in international and bilateral development agencies, and representatives of community-based organisations who had first-hand experience of *jambanja* and Operation *Murambatsvina* were not interviewed. With these exceptions in mind, the next section discusses suggested for future on peri-urban change in SSA.

### **7.7 Suggestions for future research on peri-urban change in SSA**

As highlighted in the study, the bulk of urban studies in sub-Saharan Africa has given prominence to the “survivalist or coping strategies of a hardpressed urban majority poor

in conditions of structural adjustments” (Briggs & Yeboah, 2001) since early 1980. However, these African studies have “avoided critical engagements with the causes” of undying socio-economic crises fuelling the socio-spatial divides between the haves (white and black elites) and have-nots (mainly black majority) (Gwekwerere, *et al.*, 2017). Equally, the cause-effect analytical frameworks dominating these studies have generally ignored the contradictions and conflicts fuelling the structural gaps and related policy practices in the distribution of resources (Ferguson, 2010: 116) in the hardpressed African economies. Explicit answers to questions on “spoils politics” (Moore, 2012), the dynamics of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003), political patron-client networks of those who have power and authority (Alexander & McGregor 2013: 758) in the cities of SSA still remain (Mbiba, 2017c: 3). By critically engaging directly with marginalised residents *in situ*, the study has unravelled some of the nuances characterising the failure rate of prescriptive urban development policy regimes and allied practices in many African countries. Thus, given the intensifying structural gaps between neoliberalising urban development policy prescriptions and practices, on the one hand, and on the other, between practice and the lived experiences of the intended beneficiaries, a retheorising of the peri-urban interface in sub-Saharan African contexts seems long overdue. For further research drawing on the findings of this study, the following areas are suggested:

- Peri-urban interface revisited in conditions of COVID-19 lockdowns – WHO is to blame?
- Satellite towns driving rapid sprawl in Harare – future-proofing an ordinary city.
- Failed politics threatening inclusive urban development at the periphery – a revisit in sub-Saharan Africa?
- Conducting research in tension-filled peri-urban contexts – Ethics under surveillance.

The results of a multi-layered political economy prism shedding light on the forces and interests fuelling conflicts and antagonisms in the implementation of stated policy intentions at play in peri-urban Harare can deepen an understanding of state-society engagements in informal settlements beyond one city.

## 7.8 Concluding remarks on the study

The entry point of the study has drawn attention to the renewed interest in the search for additional policy concepts that can address the “unprecedented transformations” (land policy regimes, regulations, increased claims of entitlements to land) in the peri-urban areas of a restructuring sub-Saharan Africa (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer 2002: 115). Prominent among the concerns driving this renewed interest is a cardinal weakness of the mainstream urban studies to capture and diagnose the causes of the unprecedented transformations that have taken shape in the peri-urban areas of developing countries since neoliberal restructuring in the 1980s. Despite an equal failure rate of Western policy constructs in sub-Saharan African urban contexts (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012; Watson, 2009a, 2009b, 2014; Roy, 2009b: 820, 2011: 224; Parnell & Oldfield, 2014: 1; Robinson, 2002; 2013), however, these constructs continue to dominate policy orientations and practices that push the majority urban poor to live at the margins of many rapidly sprawling cities in SSA.

In urban Zimbabwe, this marginalisation, which originally took root through racialised urban planning models in colonial settler Rhodesia, has especially been marked by the contradictory policy orientations and practices of a permissive ZANU-PF party-state since implementation of the country’s neoliberal policy projects – *jambanja* in 2000 and Operation *Murambatsvina* in 2005. Motivating the study has been a concern to explain why, despite its symbolically inclusive land policy objective to dispossess a White minority of the bulk ownership of commercial farms and redistribute the land to the majority landless citizens, only loyalist members of the incumbent ZANU-PF party elite and allied businessmen turned out the big winners. The majority landless ordinary citizens have been the main losers. A concurrent design has helped the study to interrogate the forces (ZANU-PF militia, militarised government institutions) and processes (reversal of land use planning laws, demolition of structures suspected to belong to opposition movements) that have fuelled the gaps between policy prescriptions and practices, on the one hand, and on the other, between policy practices and the everyday life experiences of ordinary residents during *jambanja*.

This thesis has demonstrated how a hegemonic and permissive party-state can dispense with its powers of eminent domain to order peri-urban territory using its combative resources of political patronage, violence and instrumentalised disorder. Therefore, comparative research

efforts in rebuilding the “peri-urban” should harness the multiple voices, pictures and meanings of the twilight life struggles of residents living in ordinary cities Africa to broaden urban theory.

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**Appendix A: Mixed land use typologies in peri-urban Harare**



Mushroom informal settlement in Caledonia Council demolishing informal settlement



Modern villa in peri-urban communal Domboshava Goat rearing at Saturday Retreat (Author, 2018)



Precarious footpath across a stream in Caledonia

New Caledonia Highway (Source: Author, 2018)



Sunway City (Pvt) Ltd, an Export Promotion Zone (EPZ) complex in Ruwa, was established in 1996 by the Industrial Development Corporation of Zimbabwe Limited (IDCZ) jointly with Sunway of Malaysia (Source: Author, 2018).



Despite the boom in the production of building materials, mainly for the export market, these houses in Sunway City Park near Ruwa were built close to high voltage pylons that endanger residents from collapsing power lines and lightning strikes (Source: Author, 2018).



Mbudzi People's Market (a hybrid retail centre) is a premier one-stop shopping destination. It features over 88 shops of formal and 380 informal vendors that include an anchor Meikles Mega Market, a variety of shops and informal stalls offering a diverse range of goods and services including clothing shops, beauty salons, grocery retailers and wholesalers, a pharmacy, hardware stores, butcheries, dairy products and a fresh fruit and vegetable market. This shopping mall property is owned by Sunshine Development (Pvt) Ltd, a company jointly owned by the City of Harare and Sharpe's Augur Investments (Source: Author, 2018).



Mbudzi (local Shona lexicon for “goat”) Roundabout (named after the nearby goat sales market) and public transport pick-and-drop point in peri-urban Harare South. This roundabout intersection connects Zimbabwe with the Democratic Republic of Congo through Zambia and South Africa through the Beitbridge-Musina Border Post (Source: Author, 2018).



## Appendix B: Study Approval Letters

2014-02-25

Ref. Nr.: 2014/CAES/009

To:  
Student: F Mazhinda  
Supervisor: Dr B Mbiba  
Department of Geography  
College of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences

Student nr: 49024124

Dear Dr Mbiba and Mr Mazhinda

Request for Ethical approval for the following research project:

*The political economy of peri-urban transformations in Zimbabwe under globalization – a case study of Harare*

The application for ethical clearance in respect of the above mentioned research has been reviewed by the Research Ethics Review Committee of the College of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences, Unisa. Ethics clearance for the above mentioned project (Ref. Nr.: 2014/CAES/009) approved after careful consideration of all documentation submitted to the CAES Ethics committee. Approval is given for the duration of the research project.


Please be advised that should any part of the research methodology change in any way as outlined in the Ethics application (Ref. Nr.: 2014/CAES/009), it is the responsibility of the researcher to inform the CAES Ethics committee. In this instance a memo should be submitted to the Ethics Committee in which the changes are identified and fully explained.

The Ethics Committee wishes you all the best with this research undertaking.

Kind regards,



Prof E Kempen,  
CAES Ethics Review Committee Chair



Prof MJ Linington  
Executive Dean: College of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences



## City Of Masvingo

Tel: 263 39 262431/4  
Fax No - 263 39 262257

[townclerk@masvingo.gov.zw](mailto:townclerk@masvingo.gov.zw)

All Communications Should Be  
Addressed to  
THE TOWN CLERK  
P O Box 17  
MASVINGO



*Town Clerk's Office  
City Council Offices  
Civic Centre  
Masvingo  
Zimbabwe*

Our Ref MM/gj/research

16 January 2018

Mr Elias Mazhinda  
2494 Newbluffhill Area C  
Westgate  
**HARARE**

Dear Sir

**RE: PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERI-  
URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS IN ZIMBABWE UNDER GLOBALISATION: A CASE STUDY OF  
CITIES AND TOWNS IN ZIMBABWE**

Reference is made to your letter dated 05 January 2018 requesting permission to undertake an academic research on "*The political economy of peri-urban transformations in Zimbabwe under globalization: A case study of cities and towns in Zimbabwe*" in partial fulfillment of a Degree in Natural Resources.

I am pleased to inform you that Masvingo City Council has granted you the permission to undertake your research. However your research findings shall not be for publication and *you are also required to present a copy of your final project to the Town Clerk.*

May I take this opportunity to thank you for the interest you have shown in our organization and wish you well in your research.

Yours faithfully

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'M. Shonhai'.

M. Shonhai  
**Acting Chamber Secretary**  
Cc: file



# RUWA LOCAL BOARD

P.O.Box 153  
Ruwa

Telephone: 0273 2132638, 2132639, 2133205  
2132597

Fax: 0273 - 2132838

Email: ruwatown@gmail.com

Website: www.ruwatownzw.com

All correspondence to be  
addressed to the Secretary

13<sup>th</sup> March 2018

Ruwa A /14/4

Mr. Elias Mazhindu  
7691 Dawnview Park  
P. O. Kambuzuma  
Harare

Dear Sir

Re: Research study on the Political Economy of Peri-urban Transformations in Zimbabwe  
under Globalization: Case study of Ruwa Local Board.

The above matter refers.

We acknowledge receipt of your application dated 25<sup>th</sup> February 2018 were you want to carry out a research on the above referred item.

Note, we have no objections in you to carry out your research in Ruwa and we will be free to supply you with all the relevant information which you might want to use for this research.

It is also expected that in your effort to achieve your research endeavors you should not violate the Council's operations and its integrity. You and your team of Data collectors are therefore expected to sign the Official Secrecy Act which you should comply with.

You are therefore expected to sign the Official Secrecy Act which you should comply with.

We will also be interested to share with you, your research outputs.

Yours faithfully

K.M. Madanhi  
Administration Manager

INVESTING INTO THE FUTURE

## Appendix C: Data collection tools

### Interviewer-administered Questionnaire Guides for Town Planning Officials in Stakeholder Local Government Authorities



*My name is Elias Mazhindu (+263734241699). I am studying with the University of South Africa. This survey examines the major land use changes that have taken place in the peri-urban areas of Harare since ESAP and subsequently jambanja ('Fast Track' Land Reform Programme) in the year 2000. Your observations, comments and any information you may consider useful for this interview will be used for study purposes only. Please feel free to withdraw from this exercise as you wish.*

1. Name of your organisation

.....

2. Sector: Government [ ] Private [ ] NGO [ ] Other [ ] (*Please*

*specify*).....

3. Position: Director [ ] Deputy Director [ ] Manager [ ]

Chief Executive Officer [ ] Other (*Please specify*). .....

4. Please rank the following in terms of most frequent land use in Harare's peri-urban areas by indicating the numbers 1 for most frequent to 6 for least frequent in the appropriate box.

Middle income housing [ ]

- Informal or low income housing [ ]
- Religious open spaces [ ]
- Manufacturing and warehousing firms [ ]
- Commercial business centres [ ]
- Agriculture [ ]

5. Please rank the following investment types in the following land use groups in peri-urban Harare beginning with 5 (*most frequent*) to 1 (*least frequent*) in the corresponding box.

Retail businesses	
Middle income housing	
Textile manufacturing	
Telecommunication and information centres	
Foreign direct investments ( <i>Please specify</i> )	

6. Indicate the land use that you consider as the most visible development in Harare peri-urban areas since the *jambanja* in 2000 reflecting the latest global development trends.

- Upper-market Housing Complexes [ ]                      Gated Shopping Malls [ ]
- Safari Game Parks [ ]      Sports stadiums [ ]                      Internet cafes [ ]

7. What do you consider to be the major causal factor of the land use type with the highest number of facilities in question 6 (*Please tick only one of the causes stated below*).

- 1. Favourable development opportunities in the neighbourhood such as serviced land [ ]
- 2. Increased foreign investments [ ]
- 3. Increased investment home by Zimbabweans in the diaspora [ ]
- 4. Other (*Please specify*) .....

8. Please enter the number indicating the most important cause behind the most frequent land use conflicts in Harare's peri-urban areas starting with 5 (*the most important*) down to 1(*least important*) in the relevant box provided.

- Informal land invasions [ ]
- Use of land resources for vote buying [ ]
- Lack of community consultation during plan preparation [ ]
- Poor enforcement of planning regulations [ ]
- Allocation of land to foreign companies without consulting local residents [ ]

Other (*Please specify below*)  
.....  
.....

9. Briefly state how your organisation helped residents in the peri-urban areas of Harare concerning:

1. Demolition of illegal housing structures by Council  
.....  
.....

2. Acquisition of land for housing construction  
.....  
.....

3. Providing essential infrastructure and services  
.....  
.....

4. Other challenges (*Please specify*)  
.....  
.....

11. Please indicate the control of development or planning measures that your organisation has taken to address the following land use challenges in your area:

1. Land boundary ownership conflicts between adjoining local authorities

.....  
.....

2. State-led regularisation of community-initiated land use plans by housing co-operatives

.....  
.....

3. Understanding and applying development control regulations

.....  
.....

4. Building on wetlands

.....  
.....

12. Briefly explain what you imagine Harare to look like at the current rate of peri-urban land use changes in 30 years from now.

.....  
.....

What planning recommendations would you suggest concerning your views in question 12 above.

.....  
.....

What future land development plans or projects does Harare or your own organisation plan to implement in the next five to ten years?

.....  
.....

13. In what ways will these land development plans change the landscape of Harare's peri-urban areas?

.....  
.....

14. What urban planning recommendations would you suggest for improved service delivery in your community?

.....  
.....

**Thank you for the contributions.**



**Interviewer-administered Questionnaire Guides for Peri-urban Households in Informal Settlements and Peri-urban Communal Villages**



*My name is Elias Mazhindu (+263734241699). I am studying with the University of South Africa. This survey examines the major land use changes that have taken place in the peri-urban areas of Harare since ESAP and subsequently 'jambanja' ('Fast Track' Land Reform Programme) in the year 2000. Your observations, comments and any information you may consider useful for this interview will be used strictly for study purposes. Please feel free to withdraw from this exercise as you wish.*

**Please tick in the appropriate box and/or write the answers on the dotted lines in the spaces provided as applicable.**

1. Sex: Female [  ]      Male [  ]
2. Age-group: 18 – 25 [  ]    26 – 31 [  ]    32 - 39 [  ]    40 - 50 [  ]    Above 50 [  ]
3. Marital status: Single [  ]    Married [  ]    Widower [  ]    Widowed [  ]
4. Number of members of household (*Please state the number*) .....
5. Household head [  ]    Dependent [  ]
6. Name of locality of this home:  
    Village.....  
    Housing cooperative .....
- Local authority.....

7. Have lived here for .....years .....months or since .....(state the year).
8. Name of place where you were staying before relocating to this place.....
9. Reason for coming to settle in this place .....
- .....
10. This home is in a low income [  ] Middle income [  ] High income [  ] suburb.
11. The plot size of this home is .....square metres. I don't know [  ]
12. I am the owner of this home [  ] Renting [  ] Visitor [  ] Caretaker [  ]
13. My original home is in ..... Unknown [  ]
14. I completed primary school [  ]
- I completed secondary school [  ]
- I graduated at university level [  ]
15. My source of income is (*Please specify*).....
16. That of following challenges affected your daily life during ESAP?
- a. Loss of sources of livelihoods as industry and companies shut down. [  ]
- b. Corruption in obtaining a house, job, market stall or  
acquiring land for building. [  ]
- c. Other challenges (*Please specify*)  
.....
17. What arrangements did you make to address the challenge you have stated in item 16  
above? (*Please tick the applicable below*):
- a) Migrated to peri-urban areas within the city or another town [  ]
- b) Joined housing cooperatives in order to be allocated a piece of land [  ]
- c) Befriended influential local political leaders, chiefs, headmen or land dealers [  ]
- d) Obtained a bank loan to buy land to build house [  ]
- e) Other arrangements (*Please specify*)

.....  
.....

18. Since ESAP, have your conditions improved? Yes [ ] No [ ]

a) If yes, explain how?

.....  
.....  
..

b) If your answer is no, please explain why you not.

.....  
.....

19. In the context of *jambanja* since 2000, which of the following experiences largely caused major changes in the governance of land in your area?

- a) Political patronage by activists in the allocation of land to party loyalists [ ]
- b) Political violence concerning disputed claims to land and property [ ]
- c) Both (a) and (b) above [ ]
- d) Sub-division of public open spaces such as land for grazing or recreation [ ]
- e) Other (*Please specify*)

.....  
.....

20. From your experience during *jambanja*, that one of the following practices was the leading cause of the rapid spreading of informal settlements in your area?

- a) Unplanned settlements initiated by ZANU-PF party militias and land barons [ ]
- b) Political harassment of government planning officials by political activists [ ]
- c) Struggles between members of opposing political parties over the control of land distribution on former commercial farmlands taken over by the state [ ]

d) Other challenge (*Please specify*)

.....  
.....  
.....

21. Please tell me in what ways the major cause you have stated above affected your life and future plans in this area since then.

22. Which of the following essential urban services are not present in your neighbourhood?

- a) Water supply and sanitation [ ]
- b) Storm drainage and culverts [ ]
- c) Clinics [ ]
- d) Schools [ ]
- e) Other (*Please specify*)

.....

23. What is your contribution to your neighbourhood concerning the essential services you have mentioned in 22 above? (*Please specify*)

.....  
.....

24. In what particular ways do you, as an individual or as a group, contribute to the orderly land use development of your area (*Please tick the applicable*).

- a) The construction and maintenance of stand access roads and bridges [ ]
- b) Attending meetings with government officials concerning land use layout for neighbourhood. [ ]
- c) Taking part in the installation and maintenance of boreholes [ ]
- d) All in (a), (b) and (c) [ ]

e) If not, please state the reason/s.

.....

.....

25. Please add any comments that you consider useful for the study.

.....

.....

**Thank you very much for taking part in this study.**

## **Focus Group Discussion Guide for Representatives of Neighbourhoods in Peri-urban Informal Settlements**



*My name is Elias Mazhindu (+263734241699). I am studying with the University of South Africa. This discussion looks at the major land use changes that have taken place in the peri-urban areas of Harare since ESAP and subsequently jambanja (“Fast Track” Land Reform Programme) in the year 2000. Your observations, comments and any information you may consider useful for this interview will be used for study purposes only. Please feel free to withdraw from this exercise as you wish.*

1. What do you consider as the major causes of the rapid land use changes in your area?
2. In what specific ways do you feel that government and local residents have contributed towards the changed land uses in your area?
3. What were your major experiences and contributions to the management of land and related services in your area?
4. In what specific ways can you be involved in the development of your area?
5. Please suggest additional information that you feel may be useful for this study.

**Thank you very much for your contributions.**