

COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA

A CASE STUDY

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by

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


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To my parents

I declare that: COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA - A CASE STUDY, is my own work, that all the sources used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references, and that this dissertation was not previously submitted by me for a degree at another university.

M.P. Mokhahlane



A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

I am grateful to many people for helping me with this study. I extend warm thanks to my supervisor, Prof. M.E. Close, from whose help and encouragement I greatly benefitted. During the laborious phases of assembling and organizing the background research necessary for this study, I relied heavily on the first class service rendered by Vista University's library (the Soweto and East Rand campuses). I am also greatly indebted to Zodwa Dlamini for the cheerfulness with which she executed the demanding typing task. Many thanks to Caswell Matima for showing me around Soweto. I am also grateful to the university for financial assistance. Last, but not least, many thanks to my children for their understanding.

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S U M M A R Y

An attempt was made to use N. Smelser's seminal work, "Theory of Collective Behaviour", in analyzing the collective behavioural episodes of the Soweto 1976 youth rebellion.¹

Smelser describes six determinants of collective behaviour and works on the presumption that collective behavioural episodes cannot ultimately be expressed unless all the conditions occur.

The following is a brief presentation of these determinants and the questions which were raised during the study for examination:

1. Structural Conduciveness and Structural Strain.

Under these first two determinants, factors which may possibly have contributed to the Soweto uprising were examined: the development of the Black Consciousness philosophy, renewed interest in the Freedom Charter, the struggle against colonial rule in Southern Africa, the housing situation in Soweto, the pass laws and homeland citizenship.

2. The Creation of a Generalized Belief.

Here the generalized belief that Bantu Education is inferior was examined, as well as the educational system's possible contribution to the Soweto uprisings.

3. Precipitating Factors.

Attention was focussed on the protest march by Soweto students after the introduction of Afrikaans as a compulsory medium of instruction in certain subjects.

4. Mobilization of Participants for Action.

This section focussed on the formation of student organizations, the leadership structure in such organizations, and how they managed to mobilize so many students for participation.

5. Mechanisms of Social Control.

In this final chapter, the role played by agencies of social control was examined.

1. Neil J. Smelser: Theory of Collective Behaviour, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1962.

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

	PAGE
1. ACRONYMS	1
2. INTRODUCTION	2
3. STRUCTURAL CONDUCTIVENESS AND STRUCTURAL STRAIN	27
3.1 The development of the Black Consciousness philosophy	28
3.2 The struggle against colonial rule in Southern Africa	40
3.3 The Freedom Charter	43
3.4 Housing in Soweto	51
3.5 The application of the pass laws	55
3.6 Compulsory homeland citizenship.	61
4. THE CREATION OF A GENERALIZED BELIEF	68
4.1 The ideological underpinnings of Bantu Education	68
4.2 The control of African education by the State	71
4.3 The drop-out rate	73
4.4 Matriculation results	76
4.5 State expenditure in education	77
4.6 The teacher:pupil ratio	77
4.7 The shortage of classrooms and the introduction of the double session system.	78
5. PRECIPITATING FACTORS	83
5.1 The language medium issue	83
5.2 The protest march.	91
6. MOBILIZATION OF PARTICIPANTS FOR ACTION	95
7. MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL CONTROL	108
8. CONCLUSION	122
9. APPENDIX	126
10. BIBLIOGRAPHY	131

1. ACRONYMS

ANC	-	The African National Congress
ATASA	-	The African Teachers Association of South Africa
BC	-	Black Consciousness
BCP	-	The Black Community Projects
BPA	-	The Black Parents' Association
BPC	-	Black People's Convention
MPLA	-	The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NUSAS	-	The National Union of South African Students
OFS	-	The Orange Free State
PWV	-	Pretoria - Witwatersrand - Vereeniging
SADF	-	The South African Defence Force
SAIRR	-	The South African Institute of Race Relations
SAP	-	The South African Police
SASM	-	The South African Students Movement
SASO	-	The South African Students Organization
SOWETO	-	South Western Townships
SSRC	-	The Soweto Students' Representative Council
UBC	-	The Urban Bantu Council
WRAB	-	The West Rand Administration Board
YWCA	-	Young Women's Christian Association

2. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history of mankind, people have thrown themselves into dramatic episodes of collective action - such as revolutions, panics, riots, fashions and fads. Such behaviour has been studied by social scientists throughout the world. However, the study of collective behaviour is neglected in South Africa. South Africa has experienced repeated episodes of politically based collective action in its turbulent history, but seemingly these events have been largely ignored by sociologists.

In this study, an attempt is made to use Smelser's "Theory of Collective Behaviour" to analyze the collective behavioural episodes of the Soweto 1976 youth rebellion.¹

Many theories of collective behaviour position themselves in the middle range of the theoretical debate on social change and tend to be psychologically and psychoanalytically founded. However, a few of them are sociologically based. A comparative review of these theories and Smelser's macrosociological approach to collective behaviour is necessary.

CONTAGION THEORIES

1. Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931)

Gustave Le Bon was an important French social thinker and is best known for his theory of crowd behaviour - the contagion theory.² He suggested that people engaging in episodes of collective behaviour are overcome, at least temporarily, by irrational impulses. For him, people undergo a dramatic personality change when they become part of a crowd. People give up their rational values and adopt a contagious emotional fervour that transforms them into violent, crazed animals capable of committing acts they would otherwise never think of:

Whoever be the individuals that compose [a crowd], however like or unlike be their mode of life, their occupations, their character, or their intelligence, the fact that they have been transformed into a crowd puts them in possession of a sort of collective mind which makes them

feel, think and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation In the collective mind the intellectual aptitudes of the individuals, and in consequence their individuality, are weakened. The heterogenous is swamped by the homogeneous, and the unconscious qualities obtain the upper hand.³

Basically, this personality transformation springs from three sources:

- A. A sense of anonymity gives a person in a crowd a sense of invincibility:

... the individual forming part of a crowd acquires, solely from numerical considerations, a sentiment of invincible power which allows him to yield to instincts which, had he been alone, he would perforce have kept under restraint. He will be the less disposed to check himself from the consideration that, a crowd being anonymous, and in consequence irresponsible, the sentiment of responsibility which always controls individuals disappears entirely.⁴

- B. Secondly, a contagion, the rapid spread of new ways of thinking analogous to the spread of a disease in an epidemic, sweeps through the crowd from one person to another:

In a crowd every sentiment and act is contagious, and contagious to such a degree that an individual readily sacrifices his personal interest to the collective interest. This is an aptitude very contrary to his nature, and of which a man is scarcely capable, except when he makes a part of a crowd.⁵

- C. Suggestibility - this is a state of fascination experienced by members of the crowd who accept and obey suggestions of fanatical leaders without questioning them:

[An individual in a crowd] is no longer conscious of his acts. In his case, as in the case of the hypnotized subject, at the same time that certain faculties are destroyed, others may be brought to a high degree of exaltation. Under the influence of a suggestion, he will undertake the accomplishment of certain acts with irresistible impetuosity. This impetuosity is the more irresistible in the case of crowds than in that of the hypnotized subject, from the fact that, the suggestion being the same for all the individuals of the crowd, it gains in strength by reciprocity. The individualities in the crowd who might possess a personality sufficiently strong to resist the suggestion are too few in number to struggle against the current.⁶

Thus, Le Bon perceives the crowd engaging in episodes of collective behaviour as a single organism with one collective mind capable of "hypnotizing" the individual. People start acting at a primitive mental level. They are perceived as irrational animals:

... by the mere fact that he forms part of an organized crowd, a man descends several rungs in the ladder of civilization. Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian - that is, a creature acting by instinct. He possesses the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity and also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings, whom he further tends to resemble by the facility with which he allows himself to be impressed by words and images - which would be entirely without action on each of the isolated individuals composing the crowd - and to be induced to commit acts contrary to his most obvious interests and his best-known habits. An individual in a crowd is a grain of sand amid other grains of sand, which the wind stirs up at will.⁷

There are several problems with Le Bon's contagion theory. The idea of a collective mind cannot be taken very seriously because people in a crowd situation are not uniform in their behaviour. Also, Le Bon fails to spell out clearly the conditions which facilitate the spread of contagious emotions through a crowd. For Milgram and Toch, the contagion is normally confined to a small part of the group that could have been affected.⁸ Thus Le Bon failed to specify the limits to the spread of contagion.

However, it is fair to point out that ideas like Le Bon's are still being re-echoed. It was common during the Soweto 1976 youth rebellion to hear law and norm enforcement agencies referring to crowds in such negative epithets as "senseless mobs", "irrational animals."

2. Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)

Le Bon's theory dominated ideas about collective behaviour for quite some time. His ideas were re-echoed by Freud who asserted that crowd members are childish and even animalistic.⁹ Freud accepted Le Bon's belief that people in crowds lose their self-control and rationality (an assumption not shared by all sociologists today, as we shall see when reviewing Smelser's work). Freud believed that people's early childhood is an important factor in shaping their behaviour as adults. People wish to go back to an earlier stage, to be taken care of by a parent. The leader in a crowd creates the impression of a strong parental figure looking after children. This for Freud satisfies people's desires to be selfish and dependent.

Freud also explains episodes of collective behaviour by arguing that people have a strong urge to identify with others. The psychological impact of identification with others in a crowd is that people experience a profound feeling of togetherness and solidarity - a feeling similar to that experienced by siblings because they share the same parent.

Milgram and Toch criticize Freud for placing too much emphasis on the role of hypnotic leaders.¹⁰ They point out that there are many instances of collective behaviour where there is very little, if any, leadership involved, or in which leaders exercise no control over the actions of the group. With reference to Soweto 1976, leaders were very easily replaceable.¹¹ Freud can also be criticized for focussing narrowly on psychological factors only. He fails to highlight the role played by social conditions in explaining episodes of collective behaviour.

3. Herbert Blumer

Blumer's views on collective behaviour are based on the symbolic interactionist perspective. Like Le Bon, he also perceives acting crowds as irrational, but his explanation of the contagion that purportedly passes through the crowd is different.

According to the symbolic interactionist perspective, under normal circumstances, a person generally interprets the communications of others before responding to them. This interpretation occurs between the time we are confronted with a stimulus and the time we respond to the stimulus. Our shared understanding of symbols allows for rationality in our actions. Blumer explains it thus:

Human beings in interacting with one another have to take account of what each is doing or is about to do; they are forced to direct their own conduct or handle their situations in terms of what they take into account. Thus, the activities of others enter as positive factors in the formation of their own conduct; in the face of actions of others one may abandon an action on purpose, revise it, check or suspend it, intensify it, or replace it. The actions of others enter to set what one plans to do, may oppose or prevent such plans, may require a revision of such plans, and may demand a very different set of such plans. One has to fit one's own line of activity in some manner to the actions of others.¹²

However, Blumer explains that in crowd situations, the element of rationality disappears and a chain reaction sets in. He uses the analogy of the excitement that sometimes occur within a herd of cattle to explain this "circular reaction". One animal may become restless and the rest of the herd, seeing it bellowing, running around frantically anxious, breathing rapidly and exhibiting wild bodily movements, may become infected by this and start behaving in a similar fashion. In a circular manner this excitement eventually reverts to the animal that started the whole stampede. Blumer argues that people, like these animals, may become frightened or excited by the behaviour of others. When this happens, they may respond to

this excitement directly, without subjecting it to any conscious thought process, and their subsequent actions may build up into a general state of hysteria. According to him, in collective behavioural situations, people are influenced by one another's strong feelings and the result is a state of collective excitement. Such circular reactions must be preceded by some precipitating event that draws people together and heightens their emotions - a concept borrowed later by Smelser.

A major weakness in Blumer's work on collective behaviour is that acting crowds are not as unified in their behaviour as his theory suggests. If we were to accept his theory of "circular reaction", the actions of all the participants in collective behavioural episodes would be the same. This is clearly not the case. In the Soweto 1976 upheavals, for instance, there was some kind of division of labour that was not necessarily irrational. Some were distributing pamphlets, others were setting up roadblocks while yet others looted beerhalls. In other words, in a riotous situation different people execute different tasks.

Furthermore, the concept of "circular reaction" is debatable. If one stands at a street corner crying hysterically, one may attract the attention of some sympathetic passersby. However much one may arouse their sympathy, it is unlikely that they would start behaving like oneself and lose their rationality, like stampeding cattle.

Also, there seems to be no difference between the thinking of crowd members and ordinary thinking. It would seem that Blumer erred by treating the "circular reaction" as a crowd phenomenon characteristic of collective behavioural episodes differently from ordinary individual thinking. These criticisms against Blumer's theory are also indictments against Le Bon's and Freud's theories which advocate the tenet that crowds are irrational entities with uncontrollable and homogenous impulses.

CONVERGENCE THEORY

Another offshoot of Le Bon's theory of collective behaviour is known as the convergence theory. According to this theory, a crowd does not produce unusual collective behavioural episodes, but rather attracts certain types of people and thus produces a kind of behaviour to which these people are predisposed.

The similarity between this theory and Freud's psychoanalytical approach is that it also stresses personality traits, the only difference being that it does not stress conflicts and unconscious impulses as much as Freud does. According to the convergence theory, if people with the same hidden wish gather together and one person starts acting out that wish, the others are likely to do likewise. These theorists concur that "a crowd is a device for indulging ourselves in a kind of temporary insanity by all going crazy together."¹³ Their argument is that collective behaviour is not something that is suddenly "caught" through contagion.

The major problem with convergence theory is it fails to explain the way collective behaviour sometimes shifts during its course. Why does a riot sometimes suddenly fail to develop? Part of the answer is supplied by Smelser's value-added theory of collective behaviour.

THE EMERGENT NORM THEORY

The theories reviewed above imply that crowds are ungovernable. The emergent norm theory assumes that there are expectations of proper behaviour among participants in episodes of collective behaviour - in short, a collective definition of appropriate and inappropriate behaviour emerges during such episodes. These emergent norms reflect the shared convictions held by members of the group and are enforced through sanctions.

According to this theory, most episodes of collective behaviour can be understood by reference to people's tendency to conform. In a crowd situation people tend to align themselves

with what they perceive to be the general consensus of the crowd.

This theory attempts to explain episodes of collective behaviour without attributing them to personal predispositions, as convergence theory does, or to some irrational crowd mentality, as Le Bon and Freud do. The major weakness of this approach is that it fails to show us the mechanisms involved in the emergence of norms that guide behaviour in crowd situations.

The above three theories of collective behaviour may be summarized as follows:

Theories of Collective Behaviour¹⁴

<u>Theory</u>	<u>Main Idea</u>
Contagion	Irrational behaviour develops in a crowd situation.
Convergence	Participants gather and act on the basis of existing predispositions.
Emergent Norm	Norms and definitions emerge to guide collective behaviour.

Smelser's Theory of Collective Behaviour

The theories reviewed above created a clear need for a sociologically based explanation of collective behaviour. Psychologists and social psychologists simply regarded the character of the crowd as a magnification of the individual personality characteristics of its members.

The major strength of Smelser's theory of collective behaviour as political protest is that it is sociologically based. In this respect it differs from the psychological and psychoanalytical theories of Le Bon and Freud. Its major

thrust is that collective behaviour arises mainly from social conditions rather than psychological factors.

Smelser defines collective behaviour as "mobilization on the basis of a belief which redefines social action."¹⁵ This implies a collective redefinition of an unstructured situation followed by mobilization for participation in collective action. He adds that collective behaviour is "the relatively spontaneous and unstructured behavior of a group of people who are reacting to a common influence in an ambiguous situation."¹⁶

Smelser calls his approach the value-added theory. He borrowed the concept of value-addition from the discipline of economics. According to this concept, each step in the social action process, which eventually manifests itself in some form of collective action, "adds value" to the preceding step, and is a prerequisite for the next step. He draws an analogy between this process and a vehicle production line where value is added with successive stages to the finished product. An example of the use of value-addition

... is the conversion of iron ore into finished automobiles by a number of stages of processing. Relevant stages would be mining, smelting, tempering, shaping and combining the steel with other parts, painting, delivering to retailer, and selling. Each stage "adds its value" to the final cost of the finished product.¹⁷

Further, the different steps must combine in a certain way with previous steps in order to manifest themselves in episodes of collective action:

... earlier stages must combine according to a certain pattern before the next stage can contribute to the desired final product, an automobile. Painting, in order to be effective as a "determinant" in shaping the product, has to "wait" for the completion of the earlier processes. Every stage in the value-added

process, therefore, is a necessary condition for the appropriate and effective addition of value in the next stage. The sufficient condition for final production, moreover, is the combination of every necessary condition, according to a definite pattern.¹⁸

Smelser further argues that this logic of value-addition can be applied to explain episodes of collective behaviour. He identified six determinants, or necessary conditions which must be present for any kind of collective episode to occur. Furthermore, these necessary conditions must occur in a definite pattern. Spencer refers to these determinants as "if's" and if they are all met, the outcome is collective behavioural episodes:

 If structural conduciveness exists,
and if structural strain exists,
and if an appropriate generalized belief exists,
and if precipitating factors occur,
and if the participants can be mobilized for
 action,
and if social control fails to stop the event,
 then collective behavior will occur.¹⁹

Here it is important to discuss each determinant.

1. Structural Conduciveness

Spencer would refer to structural conduciveness as the first "if." It simply refers to basic social conditions that make collective behaviour possible, for instance, race riots can only take place where two or more races inhabit one area.

For Jakkie Cilliers, structural conduciveness simply refers to

... opportunity structures for collective behaviour in a community. These not only refer to the racial/ethnic/class composition of that society, but may also refer to situational conditions such as the geographical location and outlay of the particular area, the composition of the inhabitant population, the extent of unemployment, the season, and time of the day/night, etc.²⁰

The questions we addressed in the present study with regard to structural conduciveness are:

- (a) Are there general types of social conditions that lead to a high or low probability that collective behaviour may occur?
- (b) Was the 1976 youth rebellion in Soweto and throughout the nation merely an irrational outburst (as Le Bon and Blumer would argue) or a response to the social conditions of the participants?

An answer to the latter question would enable us to evaluate Smelser's theory. Structural conduciveness constitutes only one stage in the value-added process by which we explain the manifestation of episodes of collective behaviour - structural strain and other determinants must also be present. The second determinant, structural strain, must "add value" to the first determinant. These first two determinants are very closely intertwined. Smelser argues that

In explaining any case of collective behavior (a panic, for instance) we must consider the structural strain (the threat of economic deprivation, for instance) as falling within the scope established by the condition of conduciveness. Otherwise this strain cannot be a determinant of panic, however important it may be as a determinant of some kind of behavior. It is the combination of conduciveness and strain, and not the separate existence of either, that radically reduces the range of possibilities of behavior other than panic.²¹

It is for this reason that we have considered structural conduciveness and structural strain in one chapter, with the following three factors possibly contributing to structural conduciveness:

- (a) The development of the Black Consciousness philosophy and the effect it had on students;

- (b) The struggle against colonial rule in Southern Africa and its impact on Soweto;
- (c) Renewed interest in the Freedom Charter with its approaching twentieth anniversary.

The following three factors, also discussed in the first chapter, we regard as indicators of structural strain:

- (d) The housing situation in Soweto;
- (e) The application of pass laws and influx control measures; and
- (f) Compulsory homeland citizenship.

As Smelser has already pointed out, structural strain falls within the scope established by structural conduciveness. The above six factors are not mutually exclusive and could be regarded as indicators of both structural conduciveness and structural strain. The two concepts are very closely intertwined.

How then, does Smelser explain this second "if"?

II. Structural Strain

Smelser's theory, unlike the other theories already discussed, is sociologically based. People enter episodes of collective behaviour because something is wrong in their social milieu:

People panic, for instance, because they face some extreme danger. They take up fads and crazes because they are bored with their surroundings. They riot because they have experienced a sharp deprivation such as an inflationary price rise. They join reform and revolutionary movements because they suffer from the injustices of existing social arrangements.²²

It is clear that the source of structural strain has to be sought in the social environment of the participants of collective action.

Structural strain has been variously referred to in a plethora of words such as "disequilibrium", "disorganization", "conflict", "malintegration", "pressure", "anomie", "disintegration", and "imbalance".²³ To lessen the inconsistency in meanings attached to these words, Smelser defined strain as

... an impairment of the relations among and consequently inadequate functioning of the components of action.²⁴

In a later publication he explained that this simply means that structural strain occurs when the various parts of a social system are "out of joint".²⁵

Jakkie Cilliers interprets Smelser thus:

Strain ... can most easily be defined as deprivation of whatever nature, thereby including both systemic (i.e. collective) frustration and individual stress.²⁶

Smelser further argues that for an episode of collective behaviour to occur, some form of strain must be present. The more aggravated the strain, the more likely is such an episode to occur. However, Smelser was careful to point out that no causal nexus exists between a particular kind of strain and a particular kind of collective behaviour. In support of this viewpoint, he argues that

.... Hostile outbursts may develop from conflicts of interest, normative malintegration, and differences in values, as well as other kinds of strain. Therefore, we should not search for specific causal laws such as "economic deprivation gives rise to hostile outbursts".... Any kind of strain may be a determinant of any

kind of collective behavior.... Some structural strain must be present for one or more types of collective behavior to appear. Which type or types depend on the progressive accumulation of the other determinants in the value-added process. We should not attempt to establish particular causal connections between a single kind of strain and a single kind of collective behavior.²⁷

Smelser points out that before we can classify any situation as a source of strain, we must assess this situation with reference to personal expectations, because some people are more sensitive to possibly threatening situations than others.

To sum up, any episode of collective behaviour can be explained in terms of some structural strain in the background. This structural strain must not be seen in isolation, we must also explore the other determinants of collective behaviour because structural strain is a necessary, but not sufficient determinant for an episode of collective behaviour.

III The Growth and Spread of a Generalized Belief

This is Smelser's third determinant of collective behaviour. He argues that episodes of collective behaviour are governed by various kinds of beliefs - expectations, wishes and an assessment of the situation. In other words, participants in collective action must be able to identify their problem and diagnose their situation before they can act to correct the source of structural strain. For Smelser

This ... generalized belief ... identifies the source of strain, attributes certain characteristics to this source, and specifies certain responses to the strain as possible or appropriate.²⁸

The basis of the generalized belief is that people will participate in collective behavioural episodes if they are faced with an ambiguous and unstable social environment, and attempt to construct a new and more favourable social reality.

It is generalized beliefs that prepare people for participation in collective action. These beliefs create "a common culture within which leadership, mobilization and concerted action can take place".²⁹ Turning to rioting as a form of collective behaviour, Smelser identifies hostile generalized beliefs as necessary conditions. These hostile generalized beliefs are accompanied by the desire to destroy, injure, remove, or restrict a person or class of persons considered responsible for the evils at hand. This goes a long way towards explaining the destruction that took place in Soweto and throughout the nation from the 16th June 1976. We can state without any fear of contradiction that the education offered to Soweto youth as well as the bureaucratic machinery enforcing it were viewed in extremely negative terms and generated a great deal of hostile generalized beliefs. The educational system and the people enforcing it were generally regarded as enemies:

The enemy [in such cases] is conceived of not as a group that stands in the way of achieving a certain objective, but as a super-oppressor, a quasi-biological archdevil of absolute evil and destructiveness. He is irreconcilable, an alien body in society which has no useful productive function. Not even in theory is he amenable to persuasion. There is no bridge which the enemy can cross for repentance. He is there - forever, evil for the sake of evil.³⁰

A lot of the pain and anguish of Soweto could have been avoided if the authorities were not perceived as "enemies" of the people with their ideologically pregnant educational system. The educational system "was pictured as frustrating, hostile, and conspiratorial", as Smelser would put it.³¹

According to Smelser, hostility arising from generalized beliefs manifests itself in generalized aggression aimed at punishing someone or something perceived to be responsible for an unwanted state of affairs - thus the attacks on authority figures, schools and other symbols of apartheid during the 1976 youth rebellion. The intent behind these destructive actions

was to destroy the forces perceived to be responsible for the generalized belief and anxiety, and thereby to reconstitute social reality. In a comparable situation, Smelser points out that many lynchings of blacks in America were generally preceded by a build up of righteous feelings among the white citizens.

The gist of this third determinant is that people will take collective action in an attempt to reconstitute social reality when they are faced with an unstable, ambiguous and anxiety arousing social environment.

For the purposes of this analysis, we shall examine why the generalized belief has arisen that Bantu education is inferior, and examine the possible value-addition of this determinant to the Soweto 1976 collective behavioural episodes.

IV Precipitating Factors

It must again be stressed that generalized beliefs and the first two determinants are not enough to cause episodes of collective behaviour:

Conduciveness, strain and a generalized belief - even when combined - do not by themselves produce an episode of collective behavior in a specific time and place.³²

Smelser also points out that a precipitating factor on its own is not necessarily a cause or determinant of anything in particular:

The place of a precipitating factor in the value added process is that it "confirms" the generalized suspicions and uneasiness of anxious people.³³

For example, in a case of panic, the first three determinants establish an inclination to flee, but it is usually a specific event which sets the flight in motion. In the case of Soweto, we may point to the death of Hector Peterson through a police bullet as the major precipitating factor.³⁴ Precipitating factors are normally a dramatic event and give a concrete setting towards which collective action can be aimed.

Smelser further argues that precipitating factors confirm the existence, sharpen the definition of, exaggerate the effect of one of the first three determinants of collective behaviour, i.e. structural conduciveness, strain and generalized beliefs.

One of the effects of a precipitating factor is that it may suddenly close off an opportunity for peaceful protest. In the case of Soweto, an apparently peaceful demonstration march was cut off with the death of Hector Peterson. Smelser points out that when this happens, it may trigger off hostility and even violence - exactly what happened in Soweto. Such hostile outbursts may become precipitating factors for further outbursts in another locale - this may be used to explain the spread of the 1976 upheavals from Soweto to the other parts of the country.

V Mobilization of Participants for Action

Once the first four determinants of collective behaviour have been established, the only remaining condition is to bring the group into action - and in this respect the role and behaviour of leadership is crucial. In a rather short treatise, Smelser argues that leadership of collective action may occur in the following manner; an organization may move in and assume leadership of hostile outbursts. In the Soweto case, the leadership of the collective action was made up of members of the Soweto Students' Representative Council:

Student organizations, veterans' organizations, nativistic organizations, as well as revolutionary organizations have figured historically as engineers and mobilizers of [collective behaviour].³⁵

In chapter four we shall concentrate on the role played by the leadership in the Soweto 1976 youth rebellion.

VI Social Control

In Smelser's value-added approach, social control is the last determinant of collective behaviour:

The study of social control is the study of those counter-determinants which prevent, interrupt, deflect, or inhibit the accumulation of the [first five determinants].³⁶

In chapter seven the role played by agencies of social control will be examined in order to determine whether the social control measures that were implemented were intended to stop and deflect the collective behaviour or to eliminate its major causes.

Smelser has identified two categories of social control measures:

- (a) Those measures which attempt to minimize structural conduciveness and strain. These kinds of measures were not very evident during the Soweto disturbances. Various representations by community leaders and organizations were ignored by the authorities - representations made in order to try to minimize or even eliminate structural conduciveness and strain. According to Smelser, if these controls are implemented, they can prevent the occurrence of an episode of collective behaviour.
- (b) The second category of social control measures are those that are implemented only after a collective behavioural episode has manifested itself. These controls are very crucial because they determine the direction that the episode will follow:

These determine how fast, how far, and in what direction the episode will develop.³⁷

In order to assess the effectiveness of these control measures, chapter seven will focus on how the agencies of social control - the authorities and the police - behaved during the Soweto 1976 episodes of collective behaviour:

Do they adopt a rigid, uncompromising attitude? Do they vacillate? Do they themselves take sides in the disturbance?³⁸

are important questions.

In conclusion, Smelser believes that social control measures block the attempts of collective behavioural episodes to attain quick results; also, if mechanisms of social control are effective, they channel the collective outbursts into more modest kinds of behaviour. The role played by agencies of social control also determines the duration and severity of episodes of collective behaviour.

According to Smelser

.... Social control involves the institutionalizing of respect for law and for orderly means of expressing grievances. It involves the alleviating of conditions of strain which generate dissatisfactions. It involves the softening of prejudice and discrimination which deepen social cleavages.³⁹

The empirical material examined with regard to social control will attempt to establish the validity of Smelser's assertions in the case of Soweto. We shall focus our attention on the behaviour of the authorities who are charged with law and norm enforcement, and secondly, on the behaviour of those who implement the decisions on the spot, i.e. the police, as Smelser would urge us to.

A Note on Methodology

We first presented a comparative study of theoretical stances with regard to collective behaviour - focussing on the theories of Le Bon, Freud and Blumer - exposing their weaknesses and attempting to show why Smelser's theory is more acceptable in explaining episodes of collective behaviour. Original sources were consulted, where possible, in order to gain better insight into the theorists' thinking.

Our major research tool was the analysis of documents. A great variety of documents were analyzed. Soweto 1976 has generated interest both nationally and internationally, but unfortunately most of the events during that period were documented by people other than sociologists.⁴⁰ Collective behaviour seems to be neglected in South African sociology.

We also had access to some primary sources, i.e. eye-witness accounts written by newspaper reporters not specifically trained in the methods of social scientific enquiry. The printed mass media - specifically newspapers - was thus another major source of information. We must point out in all fairness that most of the newspaper reporters whose work was consulted proved to be very astute social commentators. Working under very perilous conditions, they told the story of what happened in Soweto. Most of their comments have been corroborated in interviews we conducted with Soweto's opinion leaders fourteen years later.

While there were many newspapers to sample from, our focus was mainly on The World, The Weekend World and The Rand Daily Mail. The reason for this is that these newspapers had black reporters, who could cover events on the spot in Soweto. Understandably, white journalists did not enter Soweto freely, especially after the tragic death of Dr Melville Edelstein, a white social worker doing community work in Soweto:

Edelstein had done years of service as a welfare officer in Soweto; in a bitter twist of fate, he was one of the two whites killed by enraged students in Soweto on 16 June 1976.⁴¹

White journalists avoided Soweto after Andre de Kock, a photographer for Beeld, was hit on the head with a stone and his car windscreen smashed.⁴²

The major advantage we derive from document analysis is that we can reconstruct social phenomena and events which occurred a long time ago. Because of the passage of time, important and emotive issues such as Soweto 1976 can be studied with greater objectivity. We have thus attempted to be true to the facts in the documents analyzed and to treat this highly controversial topic as dispassionately and objectively as possible. Although difficult, if not impossible to be completely unbiased, an effort was made to achieve this ideal.

One of the problems experienced is the lack of availability of documents confiscated by law and norm enforcement agencies during the Soweto 1976 upheavals. In numerous raids on individuals and organizations many valuable documents were confiscated. Because of the repressive political atmosphere prevailing in the country in 1989, we did not feel free to ask for access to such documentary evidence.

Another research strategy employed in the study is the in-depth interview. We interviewed Soweto's opinion leaders, headmasters and students of "the class of '76" and captured their responses on tape recordings. Soweto's opinion leaders are generally well known and we experienced no difficulties in identifying them for inclusion in our sample. We drew our sample from the leadership and prominent membership of organizations that were involved in one way or another during Soweto 1976.⁴³

We conducted all the interviews in March 1990. All the respondents were very cooperative after we had explained the purpose of our study and produced the Vista University identification cards. Another factor which elicited their cooperation was the political

climate that was created in the country after the 2nd of February 1990, when political organizations were unbanned and restrictions on individuals lifted. This helped in creating an atmosphere conducive to a free expression of ideas. The cumulative impact of the new mood prevailing in the country was that the respondents were willing to express themselves freely on very sensitive empirical data handled in the study.

Our interview schedule was printed on the university's letterhead. A covering letter with an introductory statement legitimizing the study accompanied our data collection instrument.

In our interview schedule, a fixed set of questions on issues encompassing the whole study was used. (See Appendix 1). In order to ensure the relevance of the interview schedule administered, we had to make sure that the questions posed matched and were in the same sequence as Smelser's value-added theory. It took the following form:

<u>Questions</u>	<u>Determinants Addressed</u>
1 - 4	Structural conduciveness and structural strain.
5	Generalized beliefs.
6	Precipitating factors.
7	Mobilization of participants.
8	The role of agencies of social control.

Question 9 is a generally stated question which allowed the respondents to express themselves freely on any issue related to Soweto 1976.

All of the questions in our interview schedule are of an open-ended nature, and allowed the respondents to answer comprehensively, in all the detail they liked, and to elaborate, clarify and qualify their responses. The advantage of this approach vis-a-vis the close ended questions is that no artificial structures are imposed on the data by putting words in the mouths of respondents - rather the respondents' freedom of expression is encouraged.

Bearing in mind that there might be a difference between an average person's written and spoken language, the respondents were given a choice between oral presentations which we captured on tape recording, and written responses. Many of the respondents, because of time pressures, preferred to respond conversationally and we tape-recorded their responses.

The wording of the interview schedule, including such concerns as the difficulty of the words used, and the degree of formality of the language, did not present any impediment to the respondents, who are all from good educational backgrounds. All their responses have been built into the study itself. One response, because of the clarity of its expression, has been kept as an appendix.

The study involves a time limitation from 1948 to 1980, that is, from the time that the policy of apartheid was introduced and Bantu Education conceived, to the time the youth rebellion ebbed in its intensity in 1980. However, most of the events recorded occurred during the period 1976 to 1977, when the Soweto youth rebellion was at its height.

Finally, most of the events studied occurred in the geographical locality of Soweto, a giant black residential area adjacent to Johannesburg.

Notes

1. Smelser, N.J. 1962.
2. Le Bon, G. 1909.
3. *ibid.*: 29-32.
4. *ibid.*: 33.
5. *ibid.*: 34.
6. *ibid.*: 35.
7. *ibid.*: 36.
8. Milgram, S. and Toch, H. 1969.
9. Freud, S. 1964:144-207.
10. Milgram, S. and Toch, H. 1969.
11. See chapter on Mobilization of Participants for Action.
12. Blumer, H. 1969:50.
13. Martin, E.D. 1920:37.
14. Adapted from Smelser N.J. 1981:439.
15. Smelser, N.J. 1962:8.
16. Smelser, N.J. 1981:431.
17. Smelser, N.J. 1962:13-14.
18. *ibid.*:8.
19. Spencer, H. 1982:491.
20. Cilliers, J. in South African Journal of Sociology. Vol. 20
Number 3 August 1989:177.
21. Smelser, N.J. 1962:16.
22. *ibid.*:47.
23. Lindesque, A.R. and Strauss, A.L. 1957:615-627.
24. Smelser, N.J. 1962:47.
25. Smelser, N.J. 1981:443.
26. Smelser, N.J. *op. cit.*
27. Smelser, N.J. 1962:48-49.
28. Smelser, N.J. 1976:16.
29. Smelser, N.J. 1962:82.
30. Lowenthal and Guterman in Smelser, N.J. 1962:106.
31. Smelser, N.J. 1962:106.
32. *ibid.*:16.

33. *ibid.*:147.
34. See chapters on Precipitating Factors and Mechanisms of Social Control.
35. Smelser, N.J. 1962:255.
36. *ibid.*:17.
37. *Loc. cit.*
38. *Loc. cit.*
39. Smelser, N.J. 1962:261.
40. Vide Mashabela, 1987; Kane-Berman, 1978; Johnson, 1977; Hitchcock, 1977; Callinicos and Rogers, 1977.
41. Kane-Berman, J. 1978:15.
42. The Rand Daily Mail 17/6/1976.
43. For a list of these organizations see chapter 7.

CHAPTER ONE

3. STRUCTURAL CONDUCTIVENESS AND STRUCTURAL STRAIN

According to Smelser the social structure must be conducive to certain types of collective behaviour, and some form of strain must manifest itself if collective behavioural episodes are to occur.¹

Thus structural conduciveness must combine with structural strain and the other determinants in order to lead to episodes of collective behaviour. The two determinants are very closely intertwined. Strain may be conceptualized as deprivation of whatever nature, including both collective frustration and individual stress.²

In attempting to determine the presence of structural conduciveness and strain and their possible contributions to the events of Soweto 1976, the following factors will be examined:

- 3.1 The development of the Black Consciousness philosophy and the effect it had on students;
- 3.2 The struggle against colonial rule in Southern Africa and its impact on Soweto;
- 3.3 Renewed interest in the Freedom Charter with its approaching twentieth anniversary;
- 3.4 The housing situation in Soweto;
- 3.5 The application of pass laws and influx control measures; and
- 3.6 Compulsory homeland citizenship.

3.1 Black Consciousness

In this section we intend to examine the development of the Black Consciousness philosophy (hereafter abbreviated B-C) and its possible contribution to the Soweto upheavals.

Black dissatisfaction and disenchantment with the multi-racial but white dominated National Union of South African Students (Nusas), led to the formation of the South African Students Organization (SASO) in 1968. Black students were disillusioned with their white counterparts when they attended a Nusas conference in Grahamstown in 1967. White students were accommodated on the conference grounds while their black colleagues were accommodated separately in a church, far away from the conference venue. What annoyed some of the black students is that the white students seemed to accept this arrangement without question. The black students regarded this attitude by the white students as tacit acceptance of the status quo (including the Group Areas Act). Black students felt that they could never find an outlet "for the aspirations foremost in their minds" in the constitutions and principles of multi-ethnic but white-dominated organizations such as Nusas.³ Justifying the formation of SASO, Steve Biko wrote:

While, as a much stronger principle we would reject separation in a normal society, we have to take cognizance of the fact that ours is far from a normal society. It is difficult not to look at white society as a group of people bent on perpetuating the status quo. The situation is not made easier by the non acceptance that Black students have met with in all so-called open organizations, both religious and secular. All suffer from the same fault basically of accepting as a fact that there shall be white leadership and even worse, that they shall occupy themselves predominantly with problems affecting white society first.⁴

After its formation in 1968, SASO became the main proponent of the B-C philosophy. For John Kane-Berman "... one of the principal factors explaining the new mood of assertiveness so evident among black youth in many parts of the country is the growth of the 'Black

Consciousness' philosophy."⁵ It is necessary to analyze the aims and policies of the B-C philosophy before looking at its possible contribution to the "new mood of assertiveness" sweeping through the townships in the build up to Soweto 1976.

According to the SASO Manifesto:

- i. B-C is an attitude of mind, a way of life.
- ii. The basic tenet of B-C is that the black man must reject all value systems that seek to make him a foreigner in the country of his birth - and reduce his basic human dignity.
- iii. The black man must build up his own value system, see himself as self-defined and not defined by others.
- iv. The concept of B-C implies that the awareness by the black people of power they wield as a group, both economically and politically, and hence group cohesion and solidarity are important facets of B-C.
- v. B-C will always be enhanced by the totality of involvement of the oppressed people, hence the message of B-C has to be spread to reach all sections of the black community.⁶

B-C has 3 important components:

- 3.1.1 The first component of B-C is psychological liberation. John Kane-Berman articulates this notion in the following terms:

Because whites preached their own superiority and controlled all political, economic and social institutions, blacks developed feelings of inferiority and sought to emulate their white masters (for instance, by using skin-lightening creams). Their internalized feelings of inferiority were reinforced by their legal status as second class citizens.

Bantu Education as conceived by Verwoerd, with its emphasis on preparing blacks mainly for manual labour and denying them equality, was also calculated to reinforce these feelings of inferiority. Psychological liberation means enabling blacks to purge themselves of negative conceptions of themselves ... and replace them with positive self-awareness: pride in black culture, history and achievements, and pride in being black (symbolized by the use of the positive term 'black' and slogans like 'black is beautiful').⁷

Steve Biko, the father of B-C in South Africa, wrote that

... the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed. Once the latter has been so effectively manipulated and controlled by the oppressor so as to make the oppressed believe that he is a liability to the white man, then there is nothing the oppressed can do that will really scare the powerful masters. Hence thinking along B-C lines makes the black man see himself as a being, entire in himself and not as an extension of a broom or additional leverage to some machine ... the various black groups (i.e. African, Indian and Coloured) are becoming more and more conscious of the self. They are beginning to rid their minds of imprisoning notions which are largely the legacy of the control of their attitudes by whites.⁸

B-C taught its followers that blacks were also created in the image of God, that they have to fight for their rights and retrieve black humanity. So, the first priority of B-C was to liberate the black man psychologically, to rid him of his second-class citizen mentality and to restore to him his basic humanity.

3.1.2 Secondly, B-C intends to wean blacks away from dependence on whites. B-C constantly reminds blacks that they are on their own, and this helps the process of psychological liberation.

Adherents of B-C saw blacks' dependence on white liberals as retarding progress towards the liberation of blacks, thus links with liberal, but white dominated Nusas were severed, and SASO was born.

Steve Biko answered the question "Who are the liberals in South Africa?" in the following terms:

It is that curious bunch of non-conformists who explain their participation in negative terms; that bunch of do-gooders that goes under all sorts of names - liberals, leftists etc. These are people who argue that they are not responsible for white racism and the country's inhumanity to the black man. These are the people who claim that they too feel the oppression just as acutely as the blacks and should therefore be jointly involved in the black man's struggle for a place under the sun; in short, these are the people who say that they have black souls wrapped up in white skins.⁹

Biko goes on to explain that liberals made it a political dogma that all groups opposing the status quo must necessarily be multiracial in composition - they even define what black people should fight for. As a result of this, black leadership tended to rely too much on the advice of liberals - it became the occupation of such leadership to "calm the masses down" while they engaged in fruitless negotiation with the status quo.

However, a new breed of black leadership started emerging from the black universities (Fort Hare, Turfloop, Zululand, the University of Natal's medical school for blacks), and took a dim view of the participation of liberals in a struggle that they regarded as essentially theirs. Biko argued that

The myth of integration as propounded under the banner of the liberal ideology must be cracked and killed because it makes people believe that something is being done when in reality the artificially integrated circles are a soporific to the blacks while salving the consciences of the guilt stricken whites.¹⁰

So in order to lessen this soporific effect of white liberal participation on blacks, B-C taught its followers to build up

their own organizations so as to negotiate with whites from a position of strength, and also exhorted them to realize that they are on their own.

Barney Pitso, President of SASO, in re-echoing Biko, decried the involvement of white liberals in the following terms:

A multiracial society has always been the objective of all liberal political groups in South Africa. This led to the conviction that in order to achieve that kind of society all racial groups must work together towards a common aim. Ironically this turned out to be one of the reasons why none of the groups became effective politically. They were controlled by arrogant liberals and all blacks in these organizations were effectively patronized and paternalized to the extent that they came to be used by those whites who still felt a need to ease their consciences. The blacks respected the superior knowledge of their white friends, who provided the funds while blacks maintained a token leadership. The interests of blacks and whites could not be reconciled. This approach appealed to all idealists with no exception. The fruits of this unholy association were not forthcoming and increasing numbers of blacks were disillusioned.¹¹

Blacks were exhorted to sever the umbilical cord with white liberals and realize that they are on their own, that their destiny lies in their own hands.

Barney Pitso earnestly urged blacks to

... see themselves as a unit. They must realize that they are on their own. Their destiny lies in their hands. No amount of intervention will give them salvation The first step, therefore, is to make the black man see himself, to pump life into his empty shell; to infuse him with pride and dignity, to remind him of his complicity in allowing himself to be misused and therefore letting evil reign supreme in the country of his birth. This is what we mean by an inward looking process.¹²

The SASO Policy Manifesto justified the exclusion of whites from the struggle for political freedom in the following terms:

SASO believes that:

- (a) South Africa is a country in which both black and white live and shall continue to live together.
- (b) That the white man must be aware that one is either part of the solution or part of the problem.
- (c) That, in this context, because of the privileges accorded to them by legislation and because of their continual maintenance of an oppressive regime, whites have defined themselves as part of the problem.
- (d) That, therefore, we believe that in all matters relating to the struggle towards realizing our aspirations, whites must be excluded.
- (e) That this attitude must not be interpreted by blacks to imply "anti-whitism" but merely a more positive way of attaining a normal situation in South Africa.
- (f) That in pursuit of this direction therefore, personal contact with whites, though it should not be legislated against, must be discouraged, especially where it tends to militate against the beliefs we hold dear.¹³

3.1.3 The third goal of B-C is to unite all black people in South Africa, including Indians and Coloureds. SASO defines black people as

... those who are by law or tradition, politically, economically and socially discriminated against as a group in the South African society and identifying themselves as a unit in the struggle towards the realization of their aspirations.¹⁴

SASO rejects the ethnic institutionalization of blacks as a divide and rule strategy designed to perpetuate racial discrimination. Steve Biko and his colleagues, realizing the divisive effects of apartheid, and its fragmentation of the African people into several tribal cocoons which eventually would manifest itself in tribal animosity, used a much broader concept in defining the term black:

[The call for Black Consciousness] is more than just a reactionary rejection of Whites by Blacks. The quintessence of it is the realization by the Blacks that, in order to feature well in this game of power politics, they have to use the concept of group power and to build a strong foundation for this. Being an historically, politically, socially and economically disinherited and dispossessed group, they have the strongest foundation from which to operate.¹⁵

Thus B-C made concerted efforts to present a united front and included Coloureds and Indians in their definition of blacks.

Barney Pitsoana summarized the aims of B-C, stressing the need for unity, independence from white liberals and psychological liberation. He strongly feels that

... before any meaningful and just change of status quo takes place, the black people must reassess their values and standards. They must be deeply rooted in their own being and see themselves as a functional monolithic structure. In this way they can better assess and crystallize their goals and aspirations and articulate these in terms of what is best for themselves. This means that black people must build themselves into a position of non-dependence upon whites. They must work towards a self-sufficient political, social and economic unit. In this manner they will help themselves towards a deeper realization of their potential and worth as self-respecting people. The confidence thus generated will give them a sense of pride and awareness. This is all that we need in South Africa for a meaningful change of the status quo.¹⁶

In 1971 SASO increased its membership and gradually consolidated its position in the townships, as shown by the establishment of the following affiliated centres and branches:

Affiliated Centres

The University of Zululand
The University of Natal (black section)
The Federal Theological Seminary
The Lutheran Theological College
The Transvaal College of Education
The University of the North.

Branches

SASO local branch (Reeso)
The University of the Western Cape
Durban-Westville University
The University of Fort Hare.

Then, city branches were being formed at Kimberley, Umtata, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth and Pietermaritzburg. From the university campuses and other tertiary educational institutions, SASO spread into a more general political movement firmly entrenched in the black townships. Many community organizations were set up which reflected B-C views. B-C enjoyed considerable support from cultural and community groups, educational groups, theologians and journalists.

The following year, 1972, three important B-C organizations were established:

BPC (Black People's Convention), a political party.
BCP (Black Community Projects).
SASM (South African Students' Movement).

These B-C organizations were formed in order to fill the political hiatus in black politics left by the banning of the ANC and PAC in the early 1960s.

SASO, BCP and BPC became involved in literacy campaigns, the erection of schools, clinics, community centres and the establishment of health projects, home education, drama and poetry aimed at the psychological liberation of township residents.

SASM was the equivalent of SASO among school children and formed a very important constituent part of the B-C movement. In addition it was the driving force behind the establishment of the Soweto Students' Representative Council in August 1976.

Having set out the aims and policies of B-C, an important question arises: To what extent did B-C change people's self images and what was its contribution to the 1976 upheavals? Could we, in 1976, still agree with Barney Pitso, who wrote in 1972 that

... the bulk of the black people, however, have accepted their degenerate status. The pride of peoplehood in them has been shattered. They have more than accepted their lot, for some even help to destroy their worth as human beings.¹⁷

B-C infused the youngsters of South Africa with novel powerful ideas and instilled in them a profound sense of pride and peoplehood.¹⁸

SASM, the school-student wing of SASO, was very active in spreading B-C teachings amongst high school pupils in the build-up to the events of June 16th, 1976.

Due to the influence of B-C, young people in the early 1970s started to grasp the uniqueness of the situation in which they found themselves and were eager to define themselves and their situation. Blacks started showing new thinking since their political parties were banned in the early 1960s. B-C ushered in a new era in which blacks were beginning to take care of their situation and perceive with greater clarity the immensity of their socio-political situation. Although B-C could not be readily perceived at the time, it is true that various black groups and organizations were becoming more and more conscious of the self in the build-up to the upheavals of 1976.

John Kane-Berman is of the opinion that the B-C drive for unity has been very considerable. Black people's self-images have been changing, accompanied by a growing readiness to act. To support this he states that in November 1976 Coloured students at a Cape high school tore up and burned copies of F.A. Venter's "Swart Pelgrim" during the examination. Whereas in the past they did not object to this book, they felt that it was racist and showed blacks as inferior beings. They further felt that the only thing positive about it was that it showed how exploitative whites had been towards blacks.¹⁹

Perhaps not misplaced for, almost a decade later, Jan Esterhuysen dismisses "Swart Pelgrim" as "'n literêr ingeklede propaganda-stuk."²⁰ (A dressed up piece of literary propaganda). A close look at the novel is necessary here. "Swart Pelgrim" is a novel about a black man, Kolisile, who migrates to the city:

Hy kry 'n denkbeeld van wat op hom wag, as hy familie en kennisse in 'n verwarde toestand aantref. Na vele ontnugteringe keer hy fisies en gebroke terug na sy landelike paradys - 'a sadder and a wiser man'. Die morele les is onmiskenbaar: Die swartman kan homself nie handhaaf in 'n Westerse stedelike omgewing nie; daarom is die blanke [Verwoerdiaanse] tuislandbeleid 'n logiese, simpatieke oplossing vir sy dilemma.²¹

(He gets a picture of what awaits him, as he finds his family and acquaintances in a confused state. After a lot of disillusionment/disenchantment, he returns to his rural paradise physically and broken-hearted- 'a sadder and wiser man.' The moral lesson is unmistakable; The black man cannot adapt himself to a Western urban environment; that is why the white [Verwoerdian] homeland policy is a logical, sympathetic solution for his dilemma.)

Jan Esterhuysen further argues that if Venter had allowed the Kolisile character to urbanize successfully - like millions of other Kolisiles had - then his novel would never have been prescribed as compulsory literature in schools, because it would go against the National Party's Verwoerdian beliefs.

In explaining Venter's popularity with committees that prescribe high school literature, Esterhyse explains that

... sy gewildheid lê daarin dat sy romans of 'n vervloë werklikheidsweergawe bied, waarin die gemiddelde Afrikaner ontvluggend terughunker, of 'n gewenste boereparadys skep waarbinne die leser geborge kan droom - al is dit dan ook 'n gekkeparadys. Sy romans is valsgerusstellend deurdat hulle 'n Afrikaner geskepte werklikheidsdroom bevestig en versterk. Haas geen ander Afrikaanse skrywer van redelike formaat skryf so volkome binne die Christelik-Nasionale apartheids - paradigma nie.²²

(... he is popular because his novels either offer a rendering of reality of bygone times which the average Afrikaner can longingly escape back to, or they produce a desired "boere" paradise in which the reader can safely dream - albeit a fool's paradise. These novels are falsely reassuring by reinforcing and strengthening a dream of reality created by the Afrikaner. Nearly no other Afrikaans writer of reasonable format writes so completely within the Christian National apartheidsparadigm.)

The students who tore up and burned copies of Venter's "Swart Pelgrim" must have had the same sentiments as Hein Willemsse in "Angsland":

Ons moet hierdie ruimland
waar mensheid verwar word
opbreek en van nuuts af oopbou.²³

(We must destroy this land in which people are
being confused and build it up anew).

Perhaps the last word should go to the father of the B-C himself. Before his untimely death, Steve Biko was asked if there was any support for the B-C philosophy among township youngsters. He replied:

In one word: Soweto! The boldness, dedication, sense of purpose, and clarity of analysis of the situation - all these things are a direct result of Black Consciousness ideas among the young in Soweto and elsewhere. This is not quantitatively analyzable, for the power of a movement lies in the fact that it can indeed change the habit of people. This change is not the result of force but of dedication, or moral persuasion.²⁴

As already stated, structural conduciveness simply refers to basic social conditions that make collective behaviour possible. The development, and the direction taken by B-C, may be regarded as one of the "opportunity structures" for collective behaviour in the Soweto community. However, this factor should not be viewed in isolation. The social environment should be searched for other possible explanations for the episodes of collective behaviour which engulfed Soweto in 1976. Such episodes cannot merely be treated as "irrational outbursts" - it is essential to search the social environment, including the world of ideas, in our attempt to explain such behaviour. It is for this reason that we now consider the struggle against colonial rule in Southern Africa and its possible "value-addition" to the events of Soweto 1976.

3.2 The Struggle Against Colonial Rule in Southern Africa

In 1974 a military coup toppled the Portuguese dictatorship of Marcello Caetano in Portugal. Encouraged by this event, guerilla armies in the nearby colonies of Angola and Mozambique made concerted efforts to topple Portuguese colonialism and dictatorship in Africa.

In October 1975 the South African Defence Force intervened in the Angolan war - a South African armoured column between 2000 and 3000 in number invaded Southern Angola. The Observer reported that this contingent was joined later by 2000 to 3000 mechanized South African cavalry, and two wings of South African fighter bombers²⁵.

South Africa intervened in order to prevent accession to power by the MPLA (The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola):

The invaders were banking on a quick kill. They hoped to cut Luanda off from its food and water supplies, calculating that the city, its population swollen to a million by refugees, could not hold out for long. The strategy failed. A major reason was the military aid the MPLA received from the Soviet Union²⁶.

It would seem the SADF was defeated and had to withdraw as no Western powers would come to its aid. The South African defeat and subsequent withdrawal was reported in the Financial Mail in the following terms:

[South African] involvement has been a military miscalculation and a diplomatic disaster for which the country may have to pay a very high price indeed.²⁷

The subsequent fall of Portuguese colonialism in Southern Africa was perceived by South African blacks as a decisive blow against white minority rule in Southern Africa. Rallies and demonstrations in solidarity with Frelimo were organized by SASO and the BPC after the coup in Portugal - the "Viva Frelimo" rallies. The South African intervention in Angola was unequivocally condemned at these rallies.

Callinicos and Rogers, because of the clarity of their expression, are worth quoting in full in explaining the impact that the South African "defeat" in Angola had on the thinking of black South Africans:

There was a direct relation between the Angolan war and black revolt. The South African intervention had led to the largest military mobilization since the second world war At the end of it there was nothing but humiliation. White South African prisoners of war were displayed at press conferences in various black African capitals. The invading troops had to pull out: The most powerful machine in Africa south of the Sahara had been bested by black fighters.... The message of the South African defeat spread among black people like wildfire. An eyewitness explained to us how in Cape Town huge black audiences would watch television news in Coloured hotels and cheer every report of South African casualties in the operational zone. The MPLA victory in Angola, along with Frelimo's victory in Mozambique ... helped to instill in black South Africans the confidence that their white rulers could be taken on and beaten.²⁸

Perhaps we should indicate that we are aware of an alternative perception of the Angolan episode among white South Africans. However, irrespective of what really happened in Angola, what is important is the perception among black youth in South Africa and its consequent influence on their behaviour.

It would seem that the victories of Frelimo (in Mozambique) and the MPLA (in Angola) convinced black people in South Africa that white minority regimes could be tackled head-on and overcome. The myth of the invincibility of white colonizers had been exposed.

The young Soweto students were encouraged by these events in the neighbouring countries and the conditions were right for a revolt: only a trigger was needed.

Mrs Helen Suzman, then a member of Parliament, testified to the government appointed Cillié Commission of Inquiry into the Soweto disturbances that

... [those] parents now find themselves in the process of being brushed aside by the far more militant younger generation. The days of patient submission are over for them. The occurrences beyond our borders in Mozambique and Angola and Rhodesia have not escaped their notice.²⁹

In trying to answer the question

... whether the black man in the RSA did not regard the black man who had fought for freedom in other parts of Southern Africa as an ally in the struggle against the white oppressor and whether that idea did not contribute to the outbreak of riots,³⁰

the Cilliè Commission found that

... although political and military events in Southern Africa were not a direct cause of the riots and disturbances, they were undoubtedly a factor which, together with so many others helped to create a state of mind in which rebelliousness could easily be stirred up.³¹

It is clear from the above quote that Justice Cilliè would go along with Smelser's value-added theory in explaining the events of Soweto 1976. The military events in Southern Africa were on their own not adequate explanations of Soweto 1976 - we now examine the Freedom Charter and its possible "value-addition" to the 1976 youth rebellion.

3.3 The Freedom Charter³²

The approaching twentieth anniversary of the Freedom Charter in 1976 fuelled the imagination of township residents, especially the youth. It created amongst them a yearning for political freedom and a quest for better educational opportunities.

A brief examination of the history of the Freedom Charter is appropriate here. The idea of convening a congress of the people to draw up a freedom charter was formally suggested at the annual congress of the ANC in 1953 by Professor Z.K. Matthews. The following year, 1954, a National Action Council was established in collaboration with the South African Coloured People's Organization, the South African Indian Congress, and the South African Congress of Democrats (consisting of white membership) to execute the idea. The main task of the National Action Council was to collect people's demands for the Freedom Charter and to eventually call a mass assembly:

Ten thousands volunteers (sic) carried the Freedom Charter campaign into the homes, factories, compounds, farms and villages of South Africa.³³

These volunteers were charged with the collection of people's demands for the Freedom Charter.

In explaining the nature of the Freedom Charter, the following circular was addressed to volunteers in January 1955:

The Freedom Charter will be the charter of the demands of all the South African people for the things they want to make their work, but it will be written by the ordinary people themselves, through the demands that they themselves send in. It is hoped that thousands and thousands of gatherings, some small, some large, will be held where people can speak freely of their own lives, what changes they want in their way of life, in the laws they live under and in their conditions. Look at the "call" - in it are the kinds of things that people will talk about - the land, wages, taxes, education, health, recreation, laws, food

and peace. From these meetings, no matter how small they are, will come the demands of the people for the changes they want.

All those demands of the people must be noted on, recorded and sent in for inclusion in the Freedom Charter. When all these demands are received, they will be put together, carefully, to make a single charter which will truly be the voice of the people of this country. And this charter - the Freedom Charter - will then be put to the elected delegates of the nation at the Congress of the People, so that they can dilute it, discuss it and adopt it as a guide for all those who wish for and work for freedom.³⁴

The nature of the Freedom Charter is further elucidated in another document, "Call to the Congress of the People" that was circulated during the call for demands:

This charter will express all the demands of all the people for the good life that they seek for themselves and their children. The freedom charter will be our guide for those "singing tomorrows" when all South Africans will live and work together, without racial bitterness and fear of misery, in peace and harmony.

.... We invite all South African men and women of every race and creed to take part as organizers of the CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE and awaken others to its message. Those who are prepared to work together for freedom and the Freedom Charter will join us. We will welcome them, and go forward with them to freedom.³⁵

The campaigning took months to complete and an attempt was made to reach each and every factory and remote rural areas in order to canvass people's opinions. The volunteers worked under consistent harassment by the authorities.

The campaign resulted in the Congress of the People being held in Kliptown (a slum area adjacent to Soweto) on June 25th and 26th, 1955. There were 2 884 delegates and 700 observers from all the corners of South Africa.

In the words of Suttner & Cronin,

This was certainly the most representative gathering there has been in South Africa. It was a real people's parliament, with one difference. It was not, of course, sovereign. The first demand of the charter that was to be adopted that weekend read: "The people shall govern". But in June 1955 the people did not (as they still do not) govern. The Congress of the People had to meet under the hostile shadow of the apartheid government's guns.³⁶

The Freedom Charter was to capture the imagination of thousands of school children in Soweto 20 years later and propel them towards political activism in their quest for socio-political freedom. Evidence of this is to be found in the messages inscribed on the posters of the students during their numerous protest marches, containing clauses of the Freedom Charter. Some of the posters read: "We want free and compulsory education", "We demand free books." The Freedom Charter was adopted at the Congress of the People with the following provisions:

THE FREEDOM CHARTER

PREAMBLE

We, the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know:

That South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the people;

That our people have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty and peace by a form of government founded on injustice and inequality;

That our country will never be prosperous or free until all our people live in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities;

That only a democratic state, based on the will of the people, can secure to all their birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief;

And therefore, we the people of South Africa, black and white, together equals, countrymen and brothers adopt this FREEDOM CHARTER. And we pledge ourselves to strive together, sparing nothing of our strength and courage, until the democratic changes here set out have been won.

THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN!

Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and stand as a candidate for all bodies which make laws;

All the people shall be entitled to take part in the administration of the country;

The rights of the people shall be the same regardless of race, colour or sex;

All bodies of minority rule, advisory boards, councils and authorities shall be replaced by democratic organs of self-government.

ALL NATIONAL GROUPS SHALL HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS!

There shall be equal status in the bodies of state, in the courts and in the schools for all national groups and races;

All national groups shall be protected by law against insults to their race and national pride;

All people shall have equal rights to use their own language and to develop their own folk culture and customs;

The preaching and practice of national, race or colour discrimination and contempt shall be a punishable crime.

THE PEOPLE SHALL SHARE IN THE COUNTRY'S WEALTH!

The national wealth of our country, the heritage of all South Africans, shall be restored to the people;

The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole;

All other industries and trades shall be controlled to assist the well-being of the people;

All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions.

THE LAND SHALL BE SHARED AMONG THOSE WHO WORK IT!

Distribution of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land redivided amongst those who work it, to banish famine and land hunger;

The state shall help the peasants with implements, seeds, tractors and dams to save the soil and assist the tillers;

Freedom of movement shall be guaranteed to all who work the land;

All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose;

People shall not be robbed of their cattle, and forced labour and farm prisons shall be abolished.

ALL SHALL BE EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW!

No one shall be imprisoned, deported or restricted without fair trial;

No one shall be condemned by the order of any government official;

The courts shall be representative of all the people;

Imprisonment shall be only for serious crimes against the people, and shall aim at re-education, not vengeance;

The police force and army shall be open to all on an equal basis and shall be the helpers and protectors of the people;

All laws which discriminate on the grounds of race, colour or belief shall be repealed.

ALL SHALL ENJOY HUMAN RIGHTS!

The law shall guarantee to all their right to speak, to organize, to meet together, to publish, to preach, to worship and to educate their children;

The privacy of the house from police raids shall be protected by law;

All shall be free to travel without restriction from country side to town, from province to province, and from South Africa abroad;

Pass laws, permits and all other laws restricting these freedoms shall be abolished.

THERE SHALL BE WORK AND SECURITY!

All those who work shall be free to form trade unions, to elect their officers and to make wage agreements with their employers;
The state shall recognize the right and duty of all to work, and to draw full unemployment benefits;
Men and women of all races shall receive equal pay for equal work;
There shall be a forty hour working week, a national minimum wage and maternity leave on full pay for all working mothers;
Miners, domestic workers, farm workers and civil servants shall have the same rights as all others who work;
Child labour, compound labour, the tot system and contract labour shall be abolished.³⁷

THE DOORS OF LEARNING AND CULTURE SHALL BE OPENED!

The government shall discover, develop and encourage national talent for the enhancement of our cultural life;
All the cultural treasures of mankind shall be open to all, by free exchange of books, ideas and contact with other lands;
The aim of education shall be to teach the youth to love their people and their culture, to honour human brotherhood, liberty and peace;
Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and equal for all by means of state allowances and scholarships awarded on the basis of merit;
Adult illiteracy shall be ended by a mass state education plan;
Teachers shall have the rights of other citizens;
The colour-bar in cultural life, in sport and in education shall be abolished.

In emphasizing the educational and cultural aspects of the Freedom Charter, Steve Tshwete asserts that

... the Nats and their supporters have taken education as a weapon in their hands to maintain the relations of domination at all levels. They had to devise a system of education to de-educate the majority of the oppressed and exploited so as to maintain the myth of white superiority In Verwoerd's words we were to be life-long hewers of wood and drawers of water. Bantu Education would prepare blacks for the positions of "thatha-lapha ubeke lapha."³⁸ [manual labour]

Similar sentiments were expressed by Soweto students leader, Khotso Seatlholo (see the chapter on Generalized Beliefs for a comprehensive treatise of Bantu Education). One of the major demands of Soweto 1976 was for "free, compulsory, universal and equal education for all children". They carried these demands on their posters.

Soweto school-children were aware of the existence of the Freedom Charter - a document that the government tried to remove from the people's memory through the banning of its possession, publication and circulation. The students, as can be seen from the thousands and thousands of posters that they were carrying in their numerous protest marches, were demanding a charterist education.

This view is supported by Steve Tshwete who wrote 10 years after Soweto 1976:

The present education crisis vindicates the relevant clause of the Freedom Charter, which completely destroys the myths of racist education as we see it today. The charter says education shall be integrated, free and compulsory. It will be used as a means to advance the material and spiritual content of life in a country whose people shall have been re-united. The education of the child shall be the responsibility of the state, for how can we speak of "compulsory" education ... when the entire expense of taking the child to school remains the task of the parent?³⁹

THERE SHALL BE HOUSES, SECURITY AND COMFORT!

All people shall have the right to live where they choose, to be decently housed, and to bring up their families in comfort and security;

Unused housing space to be made available to the people;

Rent and prices shall be lowered, food made plentiful and no one shall go hungry;

A preventive health scheme shall be run by the government;

Slums shall be demolished and new suburbs built where all shall have transport, roads, lighting, playing fields, creches and social centres;

The aged, the orphans, the disabled and the sick shall be cared for by the state;

Rest, leisure and entertainment shall be the right of all;

Fenced locations and ghettos shall be abolished and laws which break up families shall be replaced.

THERE SHALL BE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP!

South Africa shall be a fully independent state, which respects the rights and sovereignty of all nations;

South Africa shall strive to maintain world peace and the settlement of all international disputes by negotiation not war;

Peace and friendship among all our people shall be secured by upholding the equal rights, opportunities and status of all;

The people of the Protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland shall be free to decide for themselves their own future;

The right of people of Africa to independence and self-government shall be recognized, and shall be the basis of close cooperation.

Let all who love their people and their country now say, as we say here:

"These freedoms we will fight for, side by side throughout our lives, until we have won our liberty."

3.4 Housing

For Smelser, people enter episodes of collective behaviour because something is wrong in their social environment. For any episode of collective behaviour, there must be some kind of structural strain in the background. In this section we are going to examine the housing situation in Soweto, the application of pass laws and influx control measures, compulsory homeland citizenship and their possible contribution of stress to the lives of Soweto residents.

Although there is general consensus that the language medium issue and the resultant shootings were the immediate precipitating factors which led to the June 16 upheavals (see chapter on Precipitating Factors), we hereby wish to submit that the authorities' imposition of Afrikaans on the Soweto students, although very serious, was on its own unlikely to lead to such large scale involvement and activism in Soweto and throughout the nation. The other factors influencing the Soweto upheavals must be located in the people's daily lives. Here our focus is on the housing situation in Soweto.

Soweto in 1976 was very overcrowded. There were 22 131 families on the waiting list for houses, yet the number of houses provided in the 1974-1975 financial year was only 798.⁴⁰ The number of people without housing is likely to have been much higher than the figure quoted above for two reasons: Many Soweto residents were afraid to put their names on the official waiting list because they were regarded as "illegals" by the authorities and would face deportation to the "homelands" if identified. Also in 1967

... the government ordered that widows, deserted wives, unmarried mothers and divorced women were to be removed from the waiting-lists. Such women, if they had the requisite pass qualifications, would have to become lodgers in the houses of other people.⁴⁰

The housing shortage in Soweto and other townships was exacerbated mainly by the government's discriminatory expenditure on housing for the different population groups, as shown by the following statistics;

Table 1: Expenditure on housing units (X R1 000)⁴²

Year	White	Coloured	Asian	African	Total
1. 1.75- 1.12.75	78 798	70 406	13 672	10 966	173 838
1. 1.76-31.12.76	48 879	86 574	16 213	7 423	159 089
1. 1.77-31.12.77	38 445	108 236	21 056	12 303	180 040
1.10.77-30. 9.78	35 470	112 425	27 082	20 386	195 363
1.10.78-30. 9.79	77 320	163 356	59 341	50 574	350 591

The discriminatory nature of the expenditure on housing becomes even clearer when we consider South Africa's population distribution:

Table 2: Estimated Size of the Population of South Africa (mid - 1975)⁴³

Whites	4 240 000
Coloureds	2 368 000
Asians	727 000
Africans	18 136 000

During the period January 1975 to September 1979, the government spent a massive 278 million rands on housing for whites, and a meagre 101 million rands for African housing, where the greatest need for housing was felt most acutely because of the large numbers of people involved.

This discriminatory expenditure on housing resulted in very poor quality housing for township residents - most of the houses in Soweto are made of hollow cement blocks, and have a diningroom-cum-livingroom, 2 bedrooms and a kitchen, with no ceilings or internal doors. Their total surface area is approximately 37m². However, most of the residents brought about improvements in these properties, although they could not own them. Most of the residents used candles and paraffin lamps for lighting their houses, as electricity was not available. Members of the Paediatrics Department of the University of Witwatersrand Medical School carried out a survey in 1975 in Diepkloof (a part of Soweto) and found that

... of the families surveyed 97.3% rented, and the remainder owned their homes. Half of the houses were detached and the other half were semi-detached. The majority (63.2%) were 4-roomed, i.e. kitchen, dining-room and two bedrooms, whereas 35.7% were one-bedroomed units. Only two families had more than 4 rooms. In 63 families, with an average of 5 people per household, only the bedroom was used for sleeping. In the remaining 123 families, with an average of 7.3 people per house, rooms other than the bedroom were used for sleeping. In the whole group surveyed, an average of 2.5 beds was available per family.⁴⁴

Families were also asked if they would like to make improvements to these houses, if it were possible. 36% had a desire to improve their homes, but only 25% of them felt that they could afford to do so.

Restrictions on ownership/tenure was one of the factors causing most structural strain in the lives of township residents in the build up to the events of 16 June 1976. With the accession to power of the National Party Government in 1948, there were increased attempts to enforce the segregation of urban Africans. Africans were forcibly removed from areas where they had freehold tenure rights, e.g. Cato Manor near Durban, Lady Selbourne (Pretoria) and Sophiatown (Johannesburg). These households lost their freehold rights and suffered extreme social disruption. Many older Soweto residents speak nostalgically about Sophiatown, now a white suburb named Triomf. The Institute of Race Relations told the Cillié Commission;

There are many Africans in Soweto who have never forgotten nor forgiven the mass removals of the mid-fifties when, together with their homes in Sophiatown, they lost their right to freehold ownership of land. They do not pass the white suburb named Triomf, which now stands where Sophiatown once stood, without bitterly recalling their own loss.⁴⁵

P. Morris and S.T. van der Horst report that in the mid-fifties Africans were allowed to own their homes on a 30-year lease in certain towns:

In 1968, however, a directive was sent to local authorities stating that in future houses could only be rented and that those already owned (approximately 10 000 in Soweto) could not be bequeathed to heirs.⁴⁶

This directive prohibited the building of houses under the 30 years leasehold scheme and prohibited Africans from buying houses from the local authority. Township residents could not bequeath their homes to their heirs if they died, or if for any reason they had to sell their homes, such houses could only be sold to the Bantu Administration Boards. The Institute of Race Relations, in its evidence to the Cillié Commission, criticized these measures, which caused a lot of resentment amongst Soweto residents and destroyed the basic fabric of family life and stability:

The Institute is not aware of any motivation for this measure, which at one and the same time dealt a crushing blow to the aspirations of potential home owners and destroyed one of the few forces making for family thrift and family stability. It seems clear that the only reason for this mistaken policy was the ideological obsession which denies the African in the towns any role but that of the temporary migrant and any attribute that does not accord absolutely with such temporary presence The Institute considers that few of the many discriminatory restrictions to which Africans are subject cause the depth of resentment that this denial of freehold evokes.⁴⁷

The ban on ownership of land caused a lot of bitterness and frustration and is one of the factors that greatly contributed to an atmosphere which was conducive to riotous behaviour. However, this factor should not be seen in isolation in attempting to determine the presence of structural strain. Of equal importance is the application of pass laws and influx control measures.

3.5 The Pass Laws and Influx Control

When the National Party assumed power in 1948, it attempted to arrest the townward movement of Africans and their families.

The Stallard Commission of 1936 had earlier recommended that the only justification for the black man's presence in the cities was to administer to the needs of the white man. The African could only be tolerated in the cities and industrial areas if he came to sell his labour power, not for permanent settlement.

With the progressive tightening of influx control measures during this century, it became virtually impossible for an African born in an African controlled area to acquire the right to settle permanently in urban areas, (Section 10 of the Group Areas Act of 1945). This led to feelings of resentment and frustration among thousands of township dwellers who were declared "illegals" in the "white" urban areas, and forever had to dodge the police.

One of the measures adopted by the state to frustrate the urbanization of Africans was the stringent application of pass laws. Thousands and thousands of law-abiding citizens were arrested, prosecuted and convicted for pass law contraventions. The number of Africans stigmatized with criminal records in this manner rose sharply during the 1970s, as shown by the following figures:

Table 3: Pass Law Contraventions 1921-1975⁴⁸

Decade	Average annual no. of contraventions (X1000)
1921-29	54.7
1930-39	110.8
1940-49	157.7
1950-59	318.7
1960-69	469.1
1970-75	541.5

The vigour with which pass laws were enforced by the state is captured by F. Wilson and M. Ramphele in the following words:

Over the seventy years from 1916 when the first statistics were recorded until 1986 when the pass laws were formally abolished, the total number of people prosecuted in South Africa for being in some place (generally an urban area) without official permission was well over 17 000 000. All of them were African. This means that one person was arrested on average once every two minutes, day and night, for the entire period from the year before the Russian Revolution until the time of President Reagan's second term of office. At their peak, during the decade from 1965 to 1975, the number of arrests averaged more than one every minute.⁴⁹

Influx control prosecutions diminished respect for the law among an increasing proportion of otherwise law-abiding Africans, and might have compounded the rebellious atmosphere which prevailed in Soweto in the build-up to the events of 16 June 1976. The Commissioner of Police reported the following information regarding the laws restricting the movement of Africans:

Table 4: Prosecutions under the Pass laws 1976-1977⁵⁰

<u>Cases reported</u>	<u>1975-1976</u>	<u>1976-1977</u>
Curfew regulations	58 022	37 370
Foreign Africans entering urban areas	13 304	12 494
Registration & production of documents	150 411	122 216
Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act	160 121	115 294

Even a year after Soweto 1976, 173 571 Africans were arrested under influx control measures restricting movement in a country which they regard as their fatherland. Even foreigners, (if they are white) had more freedom of movement compared to the indigenous African population of this country. In the PWV area alone 153 797 African men and women were arrested under these laws, as shown by the following statistics:

Table 5: Arrests for offences relating to reference books and influx control in 1977:⁵¹

	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
Pretoria	43 066	2 330
Johannesburg	39 921	6 109
Soweto	1 191	48
East Rand	40 617	7 298
West Rand	11 554	1 663
Durban	3 610	723
Pietermaritzburg	330	32
East London	1 520	339
Port Elizabeth	1 147	193
Bloemfontein	2 238	797
Cape Peninsula	5 422	3 423

The indignity of arrest, coupled with the ever-present fear of police raids and the resultant strain can clearly be seen in the case of Sazi Veldtman, who "always had to run from the police because [he] had no pass". He made the following statement from the dock of the Supreme Court:

In my childhood I saw many people arrested for passes and taken to police stations. But my aunt was very careful to keep her pass with her so when she was stopped, she always had it. She taught me that when I was 16 I would need a pass. Unfortunately I was again arrested. That was in 1972. I was in Goodwood [Cape Town] and when I was asked for this pass (which I then already regarded as a badge of slavery) I did not have one. I told the policeman I was only 14 years old but I was not believed and I was locked up. This time I was locked up with drunk people. In the cell they took my money away from me. Fortunately for me after a few hours I was again released. Because of my aunt I continued with my schooling. When I turned 16 years old [August 1973] I went to apply for my reference book. I was refused many times and told to go back to the Transkei. When I went to the head office of the Bantu Affairs Administration Board, Mr Fourie told me that I do not belong to the Western Cape and told me to leave. I explained to him the death of my mother and family. He told me he was not interested in my stories. He had heard enough lies from us Bantu.⁵²

Sazi Veldtman only got his pass in 1981, at the age of 24. For 10 years, he lived in perpetual fear of arrest, despite his many attempts to regularize his status. There are thousands of other Sazi Veldtmans who were exposed to this kind of structural strain.

A 1952 amendment to the Natives (Urban Areas) Act put almost insurmountable stumbling blocks in the way of black South Africans who were eager to settle in urban areas. It defined, in section 10(1), the conditions required to remain permanently in "white" South Africa. These are

- (a) continuous residence in that area since birth;
- (b) continuous legal residence there for at least fifteen years, or continuous service with the same employer for at least 10 years
- (c) being a dependent (a son under 18 years of age, a wife, or an unmarried daughter) of a person qualifying under (a) or (b) and at the same time being ordinarily resident with the person after lawful entry into the area;
- (d) having been given permission by a labour bureau to remain in the area.

One of the most serious consequences of these laws is the detrimental effect they have on family life. It was impossible for a man without Section 10 rights to have his wife and children with him in urban areas. Also, only if a woman was herself qualified to live in town could she join her husband. The position of African women was especially difficult, as shown by the following case study from the files of the Black Sash:⁵³

The story of Mrs E.N. was recorded in 1971 She was born in Nqutu, an area of Natal now designated KwaZulu. In 1961 she married a man who qualified to live in the prescribed area of Johannesburg in terms of the legislation. In 1963 she came to Johannesburg to live with her husband who applied for permission for her to remain with him in his brother's house in Soweto. This was refused, and in May of that year her reference book was stamped that she was not permitted to remain in or to work in Johannesburg. She returned to Nqutu for a short visit where she was told that she could no longer live there and that she should return to her husband. She went back

to Johannesburg and lived, unlawfully, with her husband who, in 1968, applied for a house of his own. This was refused because his wife did not have permission to live in Johannesburg. Her reference book was stamped to that effect and she was 'warned to leave the prescribed area of Johannesburg within 72 hours'. But she remained in Johannesburg with her husband, continuing to be daily in danger, as she had been for five years, of arrest. In 1970 her husband went to Ngutu to see the Bantu Affairs Commissioner and was told that his wife and children could not live there. Mrs N. and her children were thus displaced people. There was nowhere for them to go. Although all three children were born in Johannesburg, their father could not put their names down on a house permit nor could he get a house of his own because the presence of his wife in Johannesburg was not legally recognized.

Moreover if she had then applied to be resettled somewhere in KwaZulu or any other reserve her children would then have to forfeit their birth-right, in terms of the law, to be in Johannesburg. And even if she did remain in Johannesburg the children would find it difficult to prove that they had resided in the city since their birth as their names did not appear on any housing permit.⁵⁴

In its evidence to the Cillié Commission, the South African Institute of Race Relations stated that

... amongst the laws which cause the greatest friction are the pass laws and the operation of influx control. Not only do they apply exclusively to Africans, but it appears beyond doubt that their administration is harsh and inhumane to an extreme. [Most pass raids were executed in the early morning hours when township residents were still asleep] The Institute draws attention to the fact that even if an African qualifies in terms of Section 10(1)(a) or (b) to remain in an urban area, he may become disqualified if he is unemployed for thirty days continuously or cannot find accommodation for himself and his family. If a local authority finds the presence of a particular African detrimental to the maintenance of peace and order, that African can be required to leave the town.⁵⁵

Archbishop Desmond Tutu articulates the pain, suffering and structural strain caused by these arbitrary removals in the following terms:

All blacks live in a constant state of uncertainty. It is not just "illegals" - every black - even a "section-tenner" has no real security of tenure. Even I, a Bishop in the Church of God and General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, have no security. The township manager could in his wisdom decide that my continued presence in Soweto was detrimental to its good ordering and peace, and by the stroke of his pen he could withdraw my permission to reside there, just like that. We each have a sword of Damocles hanging over our heads.⁵⁶

3.6 Compulsory Homeland Citizenship

The impending independence of Transkei and Bophuthatswana was one of the most frustrating aspects of township life in the build-up to the events of Soweto 1976. The acquisition of independence by these two "homelands" and others to follow would rob thousands of blacks of their South African citizenship. The automatic acquisition of homeland citizenship on independence antagonized and alienated thousands of township residents, many of whom had never ever set foot in such territories, which were generally regarded as islands of poverty. The survey "Quotso" conducted in Soweto by Quadrant International S.A. in 1973 states that "three-quarters of Sowetans consider Soweto their home until they die, and two-thirds most definitely refuse to look at a homeland as a home".⁵⁷

There were clumsy attempts by the government to link every African in "white" South Africa to a "homeland" from which they are said to have departed temporarily in order to render service in South Africa. The attempts were carried out in a most inhumane manner and

... involved the retro-active and unilateral superimposition of a citizenship which had never before existed. Its purpose was to legitimate the denial of the franchise to urban Africans by a simple legislative device - translating them into foreigners in 86 percent of the country. The turning of the reserves into 'homelands' upon which constitutional independence could be conferred laid the foundation for the government's being able to claim that Africans in the 'white' 86 per cent of the country were not only 'temporary sojourners' but foreigners - regardless of the fact that the vast majority of those who had settled in the towns had done so at a time when no such differential citizenship existed.⁵⁸

The superimposition of 'homeland' citizenship on residents would be on a tribal/ethnic basis - thus Xhosa-speaking Sowetans would be given either Transkeian or Ciskeian citizenship, Tswana-speakers would get Bophuthatswana citizenship, Venda-speakers would get Venda citizenship etc. - an attempt at divide and rule. Ethnic segregation was resented by Soweto residents. As Mayer observed after a study of 'class, status and ethnicity as perceived by Johannesburg Africans,'

black town-dwellers are perhaps the most westernized black population in Africa, and the most highly-tuned to the institutions of an advanced industrial society ... exclusive tribal patriotism seems to have almost died in Soweto.⁵⁹

On the 26th October 1976, 1.3 million Xhosa-speakers would lose their South African citizenship, followed by 1.1 million Tswana speakers living in 'white' South Africa on 6 December 1977. There was no avenue of escaping the homeland citizenship issue, even for the urban black petite bourgeoisie. At first sight, the government appeared to repent - homeownership would be restored to urban Africans, they would be able to build their homes under the 30 years lease-hold scheme. Business would be liberalized - businessmen would be able to operate from their own premises, sell a wider range of commodities and operate more than one type of business. Previously, African traders were allowed to deal only in daily domestic essentials, they could not form partnerships or companies and were not allowed to have more than one business. Restrictions on professional people (medical practitioners, lawyers and so on) would be lifted. Previously, blacks rendering professional services were not granted consulting room and office accommodation in the black residential areas but were encouraged to establish themselves in the "homelands". Blacks would for the first time be allowed to form partnerships and companies.

However, there was a catch to these new-found freedoms. A Government Gazette spelled out very clearly that

no site in the Bantu residential areas shall qualify for trading, business or professional purposes except: in the case of a person in possession of a citizenship certificate; (b) in the case of a partnership if all partners are in possession of citizenship certificates; and (c) in the case of a company if all the shareholders are in possession of citizenship certificates.⁶⁰

The citizenship referred to is that of a "homeland". The cumulative frustrating impact of these measures on urban Africans was presented to the Cillié Commission by the South African Institute of Race Relations;

The Institute believes that if the government had deliberately sought a means to alienate and antagonize the most educated and economically advanced section of the urban African population, it could not have succeeded better. This new and utterly unacceptable condition forcing Africans to forfeit their South African citizenship is the naked equivalent of the total rejection of those Africans most committed to permanent urban settlement.... The Institute cannot emphasize too strongly that the denial of the rightfulness of the urban African presence is one of the settled African townsman's most bitter grievances.... The Institute directs itself towards the commission with the earnest plea that it bring to official attention the imperative need to revoke this pernicious citizenship ruling.⁶¹

The citizenship ruling played a definite role in exacerbating the tension prevailing in Soweto before the June 16 1976 upheavals, and it was resisted by both the younger and elderly residents of Soweto. The Anglican Dean of Johannesburg, Desmond Tutu, warned of the "highly explosive" situation caused by the citizenship ruling and made an impassioned plea for rationality from the authorities. He wrote that

Xhosa-speaking township dwellers will become foreigners in the land of their birth and be forced to adopt the citizenship of a country that many do not know at all and in whose creation they have played no part at all. They have contributed in various ways to the prosperity of this beloved South Africa and now it seems at the stroke of a pen they will forfeit a cherished birthright. My white fellow-citizens of South Africa, we have believed you when you said you wanted peaceful change. Perhaps we have been naive and gullible. Through the government that you have elected you have demonstrated that you did not really mean what you said and continue to declare day in and day out. [Reference to Pik Botha's-South African Ambassador to the United Nations - statement that South African was moving away from apartheid]. I speak with words I hope I have chosen carefully - the issue of Transkeian citizenship is highly explosive. Blacks are being provoked beyond human endurance. Do you really want peaceful change or does the fact that you have so much military power and so many sophisticated arms mean that you don't care what the black man's reaction will be? Do you want to make us really desperate? Dear white South Africans we want you to have a stake in South Africa and to remain here so that we can

go forward together in a united South Africa, not one that is balkanized into unvariable bits of things that are the figment of somebody's imagination Please do not provoke us into despair and helplessness. Please for God's sake.⁶²

Unfortunately, Archbishop Tutu's and other community leaders' representations fell on deaf ears, and Soweto went up in flames.

Notes

1. Smelser, N.J. 1962.
2. Blerk, R.A. 1974:41.
3. Gerhart, G.M. 1978:262.
4. Biko, S. in ed. Stubbs 1978:12.
5. Kane-Berman, J. 1978:103.
6. S.A.I.R.R. Turmoil at Turfloop 1976.
7. Kane-Berman, J. 1978:103-104.
8. Biko, S. in eds. Van der Merwe, H. and Welsh, D. 1972: 197-198.
9. *ibid.*: 192.
10. *ibid.*: 193.
11. *ibid.*: 186.
12. *ibid.*: 180 and 185.
13. S.A.I.R.R.: Turmoil at Turfloop 1976:49.
14. *Loc. cit.*
15. Biko, S. in Van der Merwe, H. and Welsh, D. (eds) 1972:197.
16. Pityana, B. in eds. Van der Merwe, H. and Welsh, D. 1972:189.
17. *ibid.*: 175.
18. B-C is sometimes condemned as a plagiarized form of the American Black Power movement. Mokgethi Motlhabi (1984:115) argues that "such criticism amounts almost to an accusation, since the government associates black power with violence. Being able to link B-C successfully with Black Power would, therefore, give it the excuse to take drastic measures against the BCM when deemed necessary. Herstein has rejected such equation, arguing that it ignores the basically 'made in South Africa' element of B-C B-C leaders themselves repudiated the allegation and always made it clear that they stood for Black Consciousness, not black power. The latter was understood as a minority philosophy through which black Americans formed themselves into a pressure group for bargaining purposes. Such bargaining, it was thought, occurred essentially through the ballot box B-C did envision some kind of ultimate bargaining - but of a different nature, since Black South Africans do not have the franchise." In 1975, the BPC issued the following policy statement: "We reject the equation of B-C with Black Power. We believe that Black Power is applicable in an already open society where Blacks constitute a minority and can only 'impinge their wishes on the

dominant groups through total harnessing of their number ..."
(Cillie Commission 1980:507).

19. Kane-Berman, J. 1978:105.
20. Esterhuyse, J. 1986:86.
21. Loc. cit.
22. Loc. cit.
23. Willemse, H. 1984: "Afrikaanse taal is myne, diè lettere nie", in Rapport, 26 August 1984.
24. Woods, D. 1978:98.
25. The Observer 11 January 1976.
26. Callinicos, A. and Rogers, J. 1977:152.
27. The Financial Mail 30 January 1976.
28. Callinicos, A. and Rogers, J. 1977:157.
29. Cillie Commission 1980:580.
30. *ibid.*:578.
31. *ibid.*:580.
32. For this section on the Freedom Charter we are greatly indebted to Suttner, R. and Cronin, J. 1986.
33. Suttner, R. and Cronin, J. 1986:12.
34. *ibid.*: 14.
35. *ibid.*: 66.
36. *ibid.*: 86.
37. Compound labour refers to the migratory labour system. Under this system black male workers were prohibited by legislation from staying with their families in the so-called "white" South Africa where they worked. Thousands and thousands of male workers were housed in single sex hostels. The tot system refers to the practice that was rife on some Western Cape vineyards earlier this century, whereby workers were paid with liquor in exchange for their labour.
38. *ibid.*: 217.
39. Loc. cit.
40. Hansard 1976 No.8 Col. 482.
41. Kane-Berman, J. 1978:59.
42. Report of the Secretary for Community Development, 1/01/78-30/09/78 RP28-1980.
43. S.A.I.R.R. Annual Survey 1976.
44. Shuenyane, E., Mashigo, S., Eyberg, C. et al: April 1977:496.
45. S.A. in Travail 1978:38.

46. Morris, P. and Van der Horst, S.T. in Van der Horst, S.T. and Reid, J. 1981: 94-95.
47. S.A. in Travail 1978:38.
48. Wilson, F. 1984:30 in Wilson, F. and Ramphela, M. 1989:209.
49. Wilson, F. and Ramphele, M. 1989:208-209.
50. S.A.I.R.R. : Annual Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1978:323.
51. Loc. cit.
52. in Wilson, F. and Ramphele, M. 1989: 211-212.
53. The Black Sash is a white women's anti-apartheid organization.
54. Wilson, F. 1972b:236 in Wilson, F. and Ramphele, M. 1989: 210-211.
55. S.A. in Travail 1978: 35-36.
56. in Giliomee, H. and Schlemmer, L. (eds) 1985:280.
57. Cited in S.A. in Travail 1978:34.
58. Kane-Berman, J. 1978:93.
59. Cited in Kane-Berman, J. 1978:95.
60. Government Gazette Number 5108 of May 1976.
61. S.A. in Travail 1978:39-42.
62. The Rand Daily Mail, 30 April 1976.

4. CHAPTER TWO

GENERALIZED BELIEFS

For Smelser (1962:79) present in all episodes of collective behaviour is some kind of belief that prepares the participants for action.

The following brief history of Bantu Education will demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt why the generalized belief has arisen that Bantu Education is inferior. The following issues will be examined:

- 4.1 The ideological underpinnings of Bantu Education.
- 4.2 The control of African education by the state.
- 4.3 The drop-out rate.
- 4.4 Matriculation results.
- 4.5 State expenditure on education.
- 4.6 The teacher:pupil ratio.
- 4.7 The shortage of classrooms and the introduction of the double-session system.

4.1 The Ideological Underpinnings of Bantu Education

When the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948, one of its first tasks was to gain control of the education for Africans. Previously, African education fell under the jurisdiction of provincial administrations, and the missionaries also played an important role in African education. Under these provincial administrations,

... although the educational facilities available to Africans were on the whole inferior, the type

of education offered was the same as that in the White schools, and this was something the government could not tolerate.¹

A Bantu Education Act (No. 47 of 1953) was passed, withdrawing the control and administration of Bantu Education from the provincial administrations and entrusting it to the Department of Native Affairs. It would seem that the main aim of the Bantu Education Act (No. 47 of 1953 as amended), was to put the African in his place - he should never have any grand illusions about educational, social, economical and political progress outside of his immediate surroundings. Thus when Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, the main architect of apartheid, introduced the Bantu Education Act in Parliament, he stated categorically that there was no place for Africans in "white" South Africa above the level of certain forms of labour. Verwoerd said grimly:

I just want to remind hon. members that if the Native in South Africa today in any kind of school in existence is being taught to expect that he will live his adult life under a policy of equal rights, he is making a big mistake.²

It is these kinds of ideological goals that discredited Bantu Education from the beginning and stigmatized it as an inferior educational system designed to keep Africans subjugated. Dr Verwoerd provided another example of the philosophical underpinnings of Bantu Education, when he stated during the debate on the Bantu Education Bill that:

Racial relations cannot improve if the wrong type of education is given to Natives. They cannot improve if the result of Native education is the creation of a frustrated people, who, as a result of the education they receive, have expectations in life which circumstances in South Africa do not allow to be fulfilled immediately, when it creates people who are trained for professions not open to them, when there are people who have received a form of cultural training which strengthens their desire for white collar occupations to such an extent that there are more such people than openings available. Therefore, good race relations are spoiled when the correct education is

not given. Above all, good racial relations cannot exist when the education is given under the control of people who create wrong expectations on the part of the native himself, if such people believe in a policy of equality, if, let me say, for example, a Communist gives this training to the Natives. Such a person will by the very nature of the education he gives, both as regards the content of that education and as regards its spirit, create expectations in the minds of the Bantu which clash with the possibilities of this country. It is therefore necessary that Bantu Education should be controlled in such a way that it should be in accord with the policy of the state.³

Bantu Education was intended to limit the world view of the African. Horrell interpreted Verwoerd thus:

... education should train people in accordance with their opportunities in life; should not create false expectations of unlimited opportunities for the Bantu in "white" areas; and should thus stand with both feet in the Reserves. The Bantu, it was stated, should not want to become imitators of Whites, but should remain essentially Bantu.⁴

We have to return to Dr Verwoerd's views again in our attempt to find one of the sources of the generalized belief that Bantu Education is inferior:

The general aims of the Bantu Education Act are to transform education for Natives into Bantu Education There is no place for him (the Bantu) in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour ... for that reason it is of no avail for him to receive a training which has as its aim absorption in the European community Until now he has been subject to a school system which drew him away from his own community and misled him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he is not allowed to graze.⁵

4.2 The Control of African Education by the State

Draconian powers were given to the Minister of Native Affairs to prevent any individual or institution from establishing a school outside the government system, and the participation and influence of missionaries in African education was rendered ineffective.

Thompson and Prior state that

... the other problem the Afrikaners saw in Native Education was that the missionaries taught a larger student population than government run schools. This meant that larger numbers of African children were in the hands of missionaries - the people the racist Afrikaners saw as teaching the wrong kind of expectations.⁶

The following figures were reported by the Department of Bantu Affairs in 1953:

Table 6: Number of African pupils Attending School⁷

Province	<u>Number of Pupils</u>			<u>% of School Age Population</u>
	<u>Government Schools</u>	<u>Missionary Schools</u>	<u>Total Enrolment</u>	
Cape	12 656	305 846	315 502	53
Natal	56 652	134 009	190 661	35
O.F.S.	-	84 545	84 545	51
Transvaal	140 608	152 580	293 188	33
Total	209 916	673 890	883 896	41

The above figures show very clearly the importance of missionaries' involvement in African education - a situation which the government could not tolerate, for the reasons cited.

Norman Atkinson states that after monopolizing the control of African education, the government compelled African students to

receive their instruction in both official languages, i.e. Afrikaans and English. The government felt that the teaching of Afrikaans - neglected in most African schools - must occupy a strong position in the curriculum.

In this way Bantu Education was being expected to play a part in achieving the overall Nationalist aim of supremacy within the South African community - a situation which could hardly fail to strengthen the resistance of those who were opposed to the Bantu education policy on sociological or educational grounds.⁸

For Ernest Dube, Verwoerd had perceived that Native Education was not doing what it ought to have done,

which for him was to lower the African's expectations. There can be no clearer racist statement than Verwoerd's declaration of the aims of Bantu Education: Bantu Education was designed to meet the labour demands of the growing secondary industries in South Africa. While Africans were needed for their labour, they were nonetheless made aware that they should aim no higher than certain forms of labour.⁹

Ernest Dube offers the following explanation as to why the Afrikaners thought it necessary to introduce Bantu Education at all, and what Bantu Education was to achieve which Native Education had not. For him, as far as Afrikaner nationalists were concerned, there were loopholes in Native Education which could be exploited to the advantage of the Africans. One of these loopholes was that from Form II, African children used the same syllabus as white children. The missionary schools, in their competition for higher results, recruited highly knowledgeable and experienced teachers mainly from abroad but also from Fort Hare University.

As a result of this, African institutions in Natal (Marianhill, Inkamana, Inanda Seminary, Adams College and Pholela Institution) began to produce good matriculation results during the period 1945 to 1950. Similar trends were noticeable in the Transvaal and the Cape Province.

Since the examination for all students - Whites, Africans, Coloured and Indians was the same, taken at the same time, with the results published alphabetically by the school in the same newspapers all over South Africa, it was possible to compare not only the schools but also the grades. Furthermore, since schools such as Marianhill, Inkamana, Inanda, St Peters, Lovedale and Healdtown were not only competing very well with top white schools but were actually surpassing many of them, the African school success challenged the whites' image of superiority. In order to prevent these embarrassing comparisons, the overtly racist system of Bantu Education was introduced.¹⁰

What is of importance here is that Dube is articulating the generally held perception among blacks, irrespective of what the real situation was, regarding the reasons for the introduction of Bantu Education.

In 1972, Brian Bunting wrote that

Today the aim of the government is not to give the non-white child an equal opportunity of acquiring knowledge and developing his talent to the utmost for the benefit of the entire South African community and, indeed, of humanity at large. The purpose of Bantu Education is to train African students only so far as is necessary to enable them to serve 'their own' community.¹¹

4.3 The Drop-out Rate

The following table supports the above assertion that most African children receive only the minimum education to enable them to function in the economy. Even six years after the upheavals of Soweto 1976, the situation had not changed much.

Table 7: School Enrolment for Africans and Whites, 1982¹²

School Grades	AFRICANS		WHITES	
	Number	%	Number	%
Sub A	1 008 939	19.0	84 969	8.7
Sub B	768 298	14.0	84 626	8.6
Std 1	690 240	13.0	84 818	8.7
Std 2	574 604	10.8	87 770	9.0
Total Lower Primary	3 042 080	57.3	342 181	35.0
Std 3	526 363	9.9	89 517	9.2
Std 4	441 205	8.3	88 206	9.0
Std 5	381 441	7.2	83 442	8.6
Special Classes			10 113	1.0
Auxiliary Classes			1 244	0.1
Total Primary	4 391 089	82.7	614 703	63.0
Std 6	295 326	5.6	85 913	8.8
Std 7	237 660	4.5	81 339	8.3
Std 8	194 583	3.7	74 925	7.7
Std 9	112 383	2.1	63 288	6.5
Std 10	72 501	1.4	55 216	5.7
Unclassified			30	0.0
Total Secondary	912 453	17.3	360 711	37.0
Total	5 303 542	100.0	975 414	100.0

In 1982, 19% of African children who were in school were in Sub A, 14.4% were in Sub B; 13% were in Std 1; 10.8% were in Std 2 and so on.

The above table clearly shows the drop-out rate for black and white children year by year.

The percentage of white children in school does not change much from Sub A to Std 8. Education for white children is compulsory up to Std 8.

Whereas there is a low drop-out rate for white children, there is a high drop-out rate for African children.

There is a concentration of African children at lower levels of schooling - more than half (57.3%) are in the lower primary school, and very few African children reach Matriculation.

There is a big drop-out rate after Sub-standard A (from 19% to 14.4%). This means that many African children receive only one year of formal schooling.

It is important to note that the above table does not reflect the thousands and thousands of African children who are of school-going age but are not attending school. School attendance is still not compulsory for African children.

Table 7 clearly shows the inequalities in our educational system which is one factor leading to the generalized belief that Bantu Education is inferior.

Most of the African children who go to school drop-out after 4 years of school, (During these 4 years they learn some rudimentary English, Afrikaans and arithmetic) whereas most white children have 10 years of schooling and gain a good foundation in English, Afrikaans, science, biology, geography, history and many other subjects.

4.4 Matriculation Results


The generalized belief that Bantu Education is inferior is also supported by statistics showing African matriculation results.

The introduction of Bantu Education lowered the matriculation results, as shown clearly by the following statistics for matriculation passes given by the Minister of Bantu Education in the Assembly on the 14th of February 1961, in respect of schools for which the State was responsible.

Table 8: Matriculation Results 1953-1960¹³

Year	Total Candidates	Total Passes	% Passes
1953	547	259	47.3
1954	523	234	44.7
1955	595	230	38.7
1956	768	354	46.1
1957	745	292	39.2
1958	660	248	37.6
1959	629	118	18.8
1960	716	128	17.9

Table 9: Matric results in South Africa, 1976 - 1982¹⁴



The graph above shows the dramatic increase in the number of African pupils reaching Matric (from slightly less than 12 000 in 1976 to more than 48 000 in 1981). The bottom line of the graph shows the number of pupils who get a matriculation exemption, i.e. a university pass.

Thus there is a glaring disparity between the number of candidates and those who get a matric exemption. This dismally low exemption rate is one of the factors that cements the generalized belief that Bantu Education is inferior. Only a minority of African children passing standard 10 obtain a matriculation exemption, entitling them to study at a university.

4.5 State Expenditure in Education

The stigmatization of Bantu Education as an inferior system is reinforced by the pattern of state spending for the various education departments. During the financial year 1974-1975, per capita state expenditure was R605-00 for white children, whereas for African school children the corresponding figure was a meagre R39.53 per year.¹⁵

The situation was equally gloomy the following financial year (1975-1976). Whereas the capita state expenditure on every African child was R42-00, the corresponding per capita expenditure on white school children was R644-00 - more than 15 times higher.¹⁶ Bantu Education is sadly underfinanced.

4.6 The Teacher:Pupil Ratio

This pattern of state expenditure on the education of African children has had dire consequences:

One of these consequences is the unacceptably high teacher:pupil ratio. The teacher:pupil ratio grew from 1 teacher per 46 pupils in 1955 to 1 teacher for 60 pupils in 1970.¹⁷

Five years later, the situation had not improved much. The teacher:pupil ratios for the various groups in 1975 were as follows:

Table 10: Teacher:Pupil Ratios¹⁸

White	1:20,1
Coloured	1:30,6
Asian	1:26,9
African	1:54,1

Murphy E.J. expressed the following sentiments:

Bantu Education has thus failed to improve either the proportion of well-educated, professionally qualified teachers or the teacher-pupil ratio, which implies that the larger number of African children in school is receiving either a poorer or unimproved quality of instruction.¹⁹

4.7 The Shortage of Classrooms and the Double-Session System

Another consequence of the pattern of state expenditure on African education is the shortage of classrooms, overcrowding and the introduction of the double-session system - whereby teachers are expected to give tuition to two groups of children, one group during the first part of normal school hours and the other group during the second part. In 1966, The Johannesburg Star reported that: "Soweto primary schools are bursting at the seams with classes in some cases as large as 500 pupils, according to some principals."²⁰

The only way in which the Department of Bantu Education could accommodate the large numbers was the introduction of the double-session system - the department did not seem prepared to finance the erection of additional classrooms and schools for Africans in "white" South Africa.

Double-session teaching has an effect of lowering the standards of education - the educand receives only half the tuition he would normally receive, and has to spend the other half of the school day on his own, without any supervision.

The double-session system is also burdensome on the teaching personnel, who have to repeat their morning lessons in the afternoon.

In March 1975, double-sessions were still operative in 43,03% of all schools under the Department of Bantu Education.²¹

The Minister of Bantu Education provided the following statistics regarding the double-session system:

Table 11: Double-Session System²²

<u>Double-Session</u>	<u>Sub-Standards</u>
No. of teachers involved	10 661
No. of pupils involved	976 492
% of all pupils in classes involved in the system	69,42

Double-session schooling has a distinct advantage for the Government - a larger number of children can be taught without a proportionate increase in costs. It is a cost-saving measure which is detrimental to the educational well being of the pupils and has also contributed to the generalized belief that Bantu Education is inferior. For instance, in 1976, Soweto, with a population of more than one million, had only 42 secondary schools, of which only 11 were senior secondaries (catering for the last two years of schooling).²³ There was a backlog of 70 schools (800 classrooms) in Soweto alone.

The view that the introduction of the double-session system was a cost-saving measure for the government is further strengthened by the following statistics, which show that there was a reduction in the % of the net national income spent on African education.

Table 12: The % of Net National Income Spent on African Education 1953-1963²⁴

1953 - 54	0.57%
1958 - 59	0.49%
1961 - 62	0.42%
1963 - 64	0.396%

Verwoerd's speeches, reported earlier, were still quoted by many Soweto students in 1976.

Khotso Seatlholo, a president of the Soweto Students' Representative Council, articulated the generally held perception of Bantu Education in the following terms:

We shall reject the whole system of Bantu Education whose aim is to reduce us, mentally and physically, into "hewers of wood and drawers of water" for the white racist masters. Our whole "being" rebels against the whole South African system of existence, the system of apartheid that is killing us psychologically and physically. The type of education we receive is like poison that is destroying our minds. It is reducing us to intellectual cripples that cannot take a seat within the world community of academics. It is killing the inherent sense of creation in us and thus it is frustrating us.

Twenty years ago, when Bantu Education was introduced, our fathers, said: "Half a loaf is better than no loaf." But we say: "Half a gram of poison is just as killing as the whole gram." Thus we strongly refuse to swallow this type of education that is designed to make us slaves in the country of our birth.²⁵

Verwoerd's machinations and the stated aims of Bantu Education were vigorously resisted by the recipients of this type of education. John Kane-Berman asserts that

... whatever ills Bantu Education might have wrought, destroy the minds of students is one thing it did not do. Time and again in their statements and their actions they revealed an intelligence, a clear-sightedness, a reasonableness, an awareness of responsibility to the community, a morality and an integrity that are little short of astonishing in view of the social, educational, and economic deprivations under which black South Africans live. Not only would they shame many white children; they are a tribute to the capacity of the human spirit to survive intact in circumstances which one would expect to destroy it. One can justifiably conjecture that apartheid is more defiling of the whites who practice it than of the blacks who endure it.²⁶

It is clear from this statement that the "generalized belief identifies the source of strain [Bantu Education in this case] attributes certain characteristics to this source, and specifies certain responses to the strain as possible or appropriate."²⁷ Thus the students of Soweto decided on a protest march in order to register their feelings about the educational system - one of the issues on which we focus our attention in the next chapter.

Notes

1. Bunting, B. 1972:3.
2. Hansard 17 September 1953, col. 3586.
3. *ibid.*: col. 3576.
4. Horrell, M. 1968: 1365.
5. Bantu Education, Policy for the Immediate Future, Native Affairs Department, 1954.
6. in Dube, L. 1985:96.
7. Horrell, M. 1963 in Dube, E. 1985:96.
8. Atkinson, N. 1978:14.
9. Dube, L. 1985:95.
10. *Loc. cit.*
11. Bunting, B. 1972: 5-6.
12. S.A.I.R.R. Survey 1982.
13. Bunting, B. 1972:15.
14. Schindler 1984; Hartshorne 1983 in Christie, P. 1985:109.
15. S.A.I.R.R. A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1976:321
16. The Financial Mail 7 January 1977.
17. Department of Bantu Education, Annual Report 1970:25.
18. S.A.I.R.R. Survey 1976:321.
19. Murphy, E.J. 1973:129.
20. The Johannesburg Star, 20th January 1966.
21. Report of the Department of Bantu Education, RP 36 1976.
22. *ibid.*
23. Department of Education and Training, Annual Report 1977.
24. Survey of Race Relations 1965.
25. In Kane-Berman, J. 1978:24.
26. *ibid.*:132.
27. Smelser, N.J. 1976:16.

5. CHAPTER THREE

PRECIPITATING FACTORS

Smelser postulates that it is precipitating factors that ignite collective action. These factors are usually a dramatic event and create a concrete setting for collective action.¹

In this chapter attention will be focussed on the language medium issue and the protest march by Soweto students after the announcement of Afrikaans as a compulsory medium of instruction - the Soweto pupils' march on June 16, 1976 was organized specifically to demonstrate opposition to the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in schools within the complex.

5.1 The language-medium issue

Some background information on the language medium issue as a precipitating factor in the Soweto disturbances is necessary here.

Before the introduction of Bantu Education, English was the medium of instruction from Std. 3 in African schools. And then in 1958, five years after the introduction of Bantu Education, the language policy for secondary schools was outlined as follows:

The principle of mother-tongue instruction will ... also be applied at the Junior Certificate level of the secondary school, but the Bantu languages as media of instruction will be introduced progressively as the technical difficulties which render their effective use impracticable are overcome.

Religious instruction is already given in the mother tongue, also physical education and music if the teachers are qualified to do so.

Half the subjects which are not taught through the medium of the mother tongue must be taught through the medium of English and the other half through

the medium of Afrikaans. If this rule cannot be carried out because of lack of textbooks or of teachers proficient in one or other of the official languages, permission to depart from it must be obtained from the Department.²

In 1962 only 76 (30%) of 252 secondary schools were able to follow what had been laid down as policy for the secondary schools.³

Because there were practical difficulties like the shortage of textbooks in Afrikaans in some subjects, the shortage of proficient teaching personnel in both official languages, and the difficulties some pupils would have in coping with the triple medium rules, the Department of Bantu Education exercised a laissez-faire policy and did not enforce the English-Afrikaans "50-50" policy rigidly. Most schools chose English as the medium of instruction.

The situation changed dramatically when Dr Andries Treurnicht assumed duty as Deputy Minister of Bantu Education. The Acting Secretary of Bantu Education, Mr G.J. Rousseau issued the following circular on the 17th April 1974.⁴ It states that

.... The Honourable the Minister has decided as follows for all secondary classes in white regions:

a. That the status quo in the use of both official languages, on a 50-50 basis, for the purpose of instruction at the secondary level, will be maintained.

b. Should practical difficulties arise in giving instruction in half of the subjects through the medium of one or other of the official languages, departmental approval must be obtained for any deviation from the above decision. Departmental approval in such cases will be dependent largely upon the availability or nonavailability of teachers competent to teach the particular subject through the official language concerned.

c. Schools which in the past have already received approval to deviate from the laid-down policy need not apply again.

d. Should practical difficulties be experienced in future at new schools or where new courses/subjects are introduced, the necessary application requesting permission to deviate from the established policy must be submitted.

e. Applications from schools must be submitted to Head Office through the normal channels, and must bear the recommendations of the Circuit Inspector and Regional Director.⁵

On 29 August 1974 the Southern Transvaal Regional Director issued a circular to the effect that in Std. 5, Form I and Form II, Mathematics and Social Studies must be taught through the medium of Afrikaans, General Science and Practical Subjects must be taught through the medium of English, and Music, Singing, Physical Education and Religious Instruction through a vernacular medium.

The circular ended on a rather dictatorial note: "Schools which are not teaching on a "50-50" basis must do so from 1976."⁶

Theoretically, schools which had difficulties implementing the 50-50 ruling could apply to the Department for deviation from such policy, but in practice the Department turned down such applications for exemption from the 50-50 rule. John Kane-Berman reports that applications for exemption from the 50-50 rule from 17 school boards covering more than 100 schools were brushed aside or ignored.⁷

The Department's argument was that it was an entrenched clause of South Africa's constitution that "English and Afrikaans shall be the official languages of the Republic, and shall be treated on a footing of equality, and possess and enjoy equal freedom, rights and privileges." The Department further argued the education of African children was being financed by English and Afrikaans speaking whites, therefore their interests had to be catered for.

Dr Andries Treurnicht, Deputy Minister of Bantu Education, insisted on the strict application of the Afrikaans part of the 50-50 rule, arguing that the government should have the right to decide the medium of instruction since it subsidised the schools and provided the equipment and buildings.

According to R.W. Johnson

Treurnicht was determined to show that no Afrikaner nationalist was more zealous than he in the advancement of the precious taal (language) and that he fully deserved his steely ruthlessness. African children would have to learn their maths and history in Afrikaans even if virtually none of their teachers in these subjects were themselves proficient in the language. The principle was more important than whether they liked it or not It was overwhelmingly clear that there was no real or educational point in the usage being enforced by Treurnicht. It was simply a doctrinaire assertion of Afrikaans linguistic nationalism by an unbending Calvinist preacher-turned-politician. The words of Treurnicht's mentor, Verwoerd, were remembered: "There is no place for him (the black) in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour. What is the use of teaching a Bantu child mathematics when it cannot use it in practice?"⁸

John Kane-Berman exposes the weakness in Treurnicht's and the Department of Bantu Education's arguments. He argues that

... no such rigid interpretation of the constitution has ever been enforced in white, coloured, or Indian schools. Indeed the government's general policy is that English and Afrikaans speaking children should be educated separately at single-medium schools.... Even if it did confer a right to dictate, which it does not, financial assistance by the government to African school buildings in 'white' areas is extremely limited Nor is it correct to suggest that whites exclusively finance education in the 'white' areas, since Africans not only pay indirect as well as direct taxes, but also generate an enormous portion of corporate profits and therefore corporate taxes by virtue of the fact that they constitute nearly three-quarters of the country's workforce.⁹

Soweto residents were dissatisfied with the Government's language medium policy - especially the triple-medium policy in secondary schools.

ATASA (the African Teachers' Association of South Africa) sent a memorandum to the Department on the 3rd of January 1975, urging the abandonment of the 50-50 policy. They described the regulation as "cruel and shortsighted."¹⁰

Various community organizations (individual school boards, the Federated School Boards, the Institute of Race Relations, The Progressive Reform Party) made numerous representations to the Government which fell on deaf ears.

The Soweto school children decided to take steps when they perceived that there were no positive results from parental and teacher representations to the Department.

Dr M.L. Edelstein (1972) in an interesting sociological study, "What Do Young Africans Think?", carried out a survey of high school children in Soweto. He asked his respondents what language they would prefer their child to be educated in: Afrikaans, English, Vernacular. An overwhelming majority (88.5%) indicated a preference for English.¹¹

It was in 1976 that the Soweto pupils began to bear the full brunt of Afrikaans medium tuition in Maths and Social Studies. They had a month left before the winter examinations, when for the first time they would have to write some examinations in Afrikaans. The rejection of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction was felt so intensely that a teacher who was complying with departmental regulations and giving tuition in Afrikaans at Pimville Higher Primary School was stabbed with a screwdriver by one of her pupils.

Students made an attempt without success to meet the circuit inspector, Mr De Beer.¹² Most of the schools in the Soweto complex became involved in the dispute.

Leonard Mosala, a councillor in the Urban Bantu Council (popularly referred to as the Useless Boys' Club by Sowetans) warned two days before the eruption of June 16th, that if the authorities did not reconsider their language medium policy, Soweto would be engulfed by civil disorder that would make Sharpeville look like a Sunday picnic. Mosala warned that

They won't take anything we say because they think we have neglected them. We have failed to help them in their struggle for change in schools. They are now angry and prepared to fight and we are afraid the situation may become chaotic at any time.¹³

After the Department's insistence that the 50-50 language policy should be applied, 2000 students from seven Soweto schools boycotted classes for a month.

More than 500 pupils at the Phefeni Junior Secondary School boycotted classes on May 17 in protest at the 50-50 regulation. They stoned the principal's car. They were later joined by pupils from Belle Higher Primary School at Orlando West. More Soweto schools joined in the strike.

In mid-May, the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr Willem Cruywagen, said that 5 Soweto schools had applied for permission to deviate from the Afrikaans medium of instruction regulation, but the applications had been turned down.¹⁴ He argued that

After inspection, it was found that all teachers concerned were competent to give instruction in both official languages.¹⁵

The way in which teachers' competence to use both official languages has been assessed has been a source of much concern.

John Kane-Berman reports that

... proficiency tests were conducted in the most cursory fashion: it was reported, for instance that tests carried out on African teachers in Soweto sometimes consisted of little more than inspectors exchanging two or three sentences in Afrikaans with them.¹⁶

The S.A.I.R.R. pointed out this unprofessional practice to the Cilliè Commission,

... that such testing of professional people is unprofessional is true but possibly not relevant to the disturbances: that it caused resentment is relevant, and the effects on pupils of being compelled to be taught by teachers who cannot communicate effectively in the language they are using may well be a prime cause that impelled pupils to seek redress when parental and teacher representations failed to remedy a situation in which pupils were those mainly at a disadvantage - and facing mid-year examinations.¹⁷

The Star warned in an editorial in May 1976 that

The men who made the ruling that some subjects in black schools be taught in English and Afrikaans are a menace to South Africa's security, to racial peace, and to the Afrikaans language. What they have done would cause an uproar if it were done in White schools.... It is a cold-blooded, ideological regulation which could not do more to downgrade black education if it were designed for that purpose.¹⁸

Professor Andre Brink, of Rhodes University's Afrikaans department, warned that it was "iniquitous" to force a strange language on anyone. He pointed out that for some time Afrikaans writers had tried to make it clear to the world that Afrikaans could be used to communicate a whole spectrum of experience and now "in one brutal blow the authorities reconfirm Afrikaans as the oppressor's language."¹⁹

Dr Neville Alexander, of the University of Cape Town's Institute for the Study of Public Policy, argues that the Broederbond used the entrenched equality of Afrikaans and English to promote fully the class and sectional interests of Afrikanerdom. For him, there was an attempt to "Afrikanerise" all aspects of South African life. He argued that the systematic promotion of Afrikaans against English, especially through the formal education system, was an attempt to try to heal the pathological feelings of inferiority which most Afrikaners felt towards "the English" and which arose from the humiliation their forebears had suffered during the ruthless exploitation by British imperialism. He adds that the Broederbond's policy was that

The role of the English language was to be downgraded and that of Afrikaans enhanced in all spheres of life, while the indigenous African languages were to be developed systematically to imprison blacks in ethnic cultures and curb the growth of black nationalism.²⁰

He quotes the then Prime-Minister J.G. Strydom who reportedly said:

Every Afrikaner who is worthy of the name cherishes the idea that South Africa will ultimately have only one language and that language must be Afrikaans.²¹

He saw the language policy as "Milnerism in reverse" - an instrument of political control to be utilized "deliberately and recklessly by the children and grandchildren of the [Afrikaners] who had rejected Lord Milner's anglicisation schemes by establishing their own Christian National Schools."²² On this point, the Very Reverend Desmond Tutu added that

The Afrikaner has struggled for recognition of his language and he of all people should know the anguish and suffering caused by enforcing a language on someone who does not want it.²³

5.2 The Protest March

When further appeals to the authorities failed, the students considered a protest march as a means of registering their opposition. Some pupils at Naledi High School initiated such a march on the morning of 16 June. They met at Orlando West Junior Secondary School and were joined by pupils from other schools. They intended marching peacefully to Orlando Stadium to register their feelings about the educational system and the language medium policy.

From the various accounts it is not very clear who cast the first stone that would precipitate the kind of violence and destruction that this country had never experienced before.

According to an eye-witness, Harry Mashabela, when the student masses attempted to pass the police, who had erected a road block on the way to Orlando Stadium, a

.... White officer on the extreme right quickly stepped to the side, stooped down and picked what seemed to be a stone. Then he hurled the object into the huge crowd. Instantly the kids in the front column scattered to the sides. They picked up stones, then hurriedly surged back into the street. Power! Power! they screamed, hesitantly advancing towards the police. Bang, a shot rang out; then another and yet another. In rapid succession A kid and a man lay dead with several others wounded.²⁴

Nat Serache, a reporter on the Rand Daily Mail, reports that he did not hear the police give any order to disperse before they threw teargas canisters into the crowd of singing school-children:

The children scattered in all directions while some were dazed and blinded by the teargas The police fired a few shots, some in the air and others into the crowd. I saw four school-children fall to the ground.²⁵

Another eye-witness, Jan Tugwana, of the Rand Daily Mail, reports that at first the pupils' march was peaceful, and stone-throwing on the part of students was in self-defence.²⁶

The South African Institute of Race Relations reports that the police tried to remove placards from the marching students:

The 10 000 marchers were confronted by the police and ... tension increased, especially when police fired teargas into the crowd. The children retaliated by throwing stones at the police who opened fire, apparently first firing warning shots and then into the advancing children, killing at least one child, Hector Petersen.²⁷

John Kane-Berman strongly believes that

... the behaviour of the police appears to have been a crucially important determination of whether an initially more or less orderly demonstration remained peaceful or became violent ... the shootings seem to have triggered off the rampage of destruction on 16 June 1976.²⁸

John Brewer articulates the same sentiments as Kane-Berman. He views the major precipitating factor as the provocative action the police took

... leaving a young African dead and thousands smarting from teargas. The children retaliated and the participants swelled in number to 30 000 within a few hours. Had the police not opened fire the students might have dispersed after their meeting.²⁹

In support of their view-points, John Brewer and John Kane-Berman point out that when Soweto students marched into Johannesburg on 23 September 1976, there was no teargas or shooting. The student masses remained orderly. The situation would probably have been very different had there been shooting.³⁰

The Cillié Commission accepted the viewpoint that police were firing at agitators who had incited the students to throw stones at the police. According to the Cillié Commission the police were outnumbered and feared for their lives, and they only shot at the agitators after they had fired warning shots. Perhaps we should point out that a high-ranking police officer pointed out at the time that no warning shots were fired.³¹

From the above reports, it is clear that the sequence of events in Soweto on 16 June is confusing and interpreted differently. Many claim that conflict began when the police tried to confiscate the students' placards and stop the march. The students are said to have provoked the police and they retaliated with teargas. Some witnesses claim that the police opened fire before students started throwing stones, while others assert that the shootings only started after stones were thrown.

This debate is of no consequence. What is of importance is that the events of that day are perceived to be the precipitators of collective behavioural episodes that would engulf this nation in an orgy of unprecedented wanton destruction and very tragic losses of human lives.

Once the first four determinants of collective behaviour have been established, the only remaining condition is to bring the group into action - and in this respect the role played by leadership is crucial. In chapter four we shall concentrate on the role played by the leadership of the Soweto 1976 youth rebellion.

Notes

1. Smelser, N.J. 1962:17.
2. Horrell, M. 1964:72.
3. S.A. in Travail 1978:51.
4. Departmental Circular 6 of 1974.
5. S.A. in Travail 1978:57.
6. *ibid.*:58.
7. Kane-Berman, J. 1978:14.
8. Johnson, R.W. 1977: 178 and 191.
9. Kane-Berman, J. 1978:13.
10. The Rand Daily Mail 17-6-1976.
11. Edelstein, M.L. 1972: 114.
12. The Rand Daily Mail 20-05-1976.
13. S.A. in Travail 1978: 66-67.
14. The Rand Daily Mail 17-06-1976.
15. *Loc. cit.*
16. Kane-Berman, J. 1978:13.
17. S.A. in Travail 1978:60.
18. The Star 15-05-1976.
19. The Rand Daily Mail 17-06-1976.
20. The Sowetan 15-05-1989.
21. *Loc. cit.*
22. *Loc. cit.*
23. The Rand Daily Mail 17-06-1976.
24. Mashabela, H. 1987: 19-20.
25. The Rand Daily Mail 17-06-1976.
26. *Loc. cit.*
27. S.A. in Travail 1978:7.
28. Kane-Berman, J. 1978:17.
29. Brewer, J. 1986:77.
30. *Loc. cit.*; Kane-Berman, J. 1978:17.
31. The Rand Daily Mail 17-06-1976.

6. CHAPTER FOUR

MOBILIZATION OF PARTICIPANTS FOR ACTION¹

Smelser (1962) has identified the mobilization of participants for action as the fifth step in his value-added approach to collective behaviour.

This chapter will focus on the formation of student organizations, the leadership structure in such organizations and the roles they played in mobilizing students for participation in the 1976 collective behavioural episodes. As already pointed out in the introduction, Smelser's theory is that it is normally an organization that moves in and assumes leadership of collective behavioural episodes.

The most important student organization during the 1976 revolt was the Soweto Students' Representative Council (hereafter abbreviated the SSRC). The SSRC was formed at the beginning of August 1976. It was an off-shoot of the South African Students Movement (SASM) - the school pupils' equivalent of South African Students' Organization (SASO) - thus it was basically a Black Consciousness organization. The SSRC was only formed 6 weeks after the explosion of the youth rebellion:

Even though students already had SASM in existence, the leadership knew it did not enjoy the support of all high school children. Also it had been inactive and had never really concerned itself with matters outside school. They felt there was a need for a new body for them to be able to utilize all the manpower at their disposal. Thus the SSRC was formed to formulate and direct and articulate students' demands and grievances. Not only were they mad with Afrikaans They now wanted the Verwoerdian system of education scrapped....²

Each school sent two representatives to the SSRC's inaugural meeting. The SSRC used classrooms in organizing its various campaigns and in keeping communication lines open with its constituents. For mobilization purposes extensive use was also made of press releases.

Tsietsi Mashinini, a 19 year old Morris Isaacson High School pupil, was its first president - he had also played a major role in organizing the march earlier on. The SSRC was formed in order to ward off criticism from the community. Some conservative parents complained that the students wasted human lives unnecessarily, and that such wastage of human lives could under no circumstances be justified, and that the only justification for people's deaths was total liberation. Instead, these parents claimed, what the students had gained was a trivial concession in return for the lost lives - the abolition of Afrikaans as a compulsory medium of instruction in certain subjects in secondary schools.

Faced with these criticisms, the SSRC tried to justify its position and came up with this slogan, which became its trademark:

The blood of the martyrs will nurture the tree of liberation.

To identify more closely with the aspirations of the community and to win its support, the SSRC, after its launch, assumed larger socio-political roles and did not concentrate only on immediate educational issues. It called a general strike for the 5th and 6th August 1976. The SSRC started mobilizing students for action - roadblocks were set up, students toured railway stations warning workers not to go to work, a railway signal installation was sabotaged and Johannesburg businesses reported huge (50%-60%) absenteeism.

The Weekend World reports that some workers were clearly intimidated not to go to work, whereas others stayed away in sympathy with the aims of students.³ Their huge number ensured that students were a force to be reckoned with in the township. Their persuasive influence is captured by Nimrod Mkele in the following terms:

We adults have very little to do with what is going on The children tell their parents when they must stay at home. You'd be amazed to hear a thirteen-year old saying: "Daddy on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, you are staying away from work. Just to ensure that you do, will you please see to it that your car stays in the yard?"

No teacher or principal dares order the students around anymore. One principal started telling off the kids. They heard him out and then told him: "You know, we've always known you were a sell-out." They beat him up and kicked him around and they put him in his car and told him he must not come back. Then they told the assistant principal, "Hey, you are now the principal". When the 'mayor' of Soweto held a meeting (on 1 August 1976) to report back on his talks with the government, he could only do so with the express permission of the students. Three young girls at the meeting (in Jabulani Stadium) wanted to know from him, "Who authorized you to go to Pretoria? On whose behalf were you talking?"⁴

After the August stay-away, the SSRC's president, Tsietsi Mashinini, became a much sought-after person, by both the world media and the South African Police. Before the formation of the SSRC, Mashinini had been the president of the local branch of SASM - a junior division of SASO.

Mashinini was held in high esteem by his fellow students and distinguished himself as a gifted orator and conscientious student at Morris Isaacson High School. He was one of the main actors in mobilizing the students for the march of June the 16th, 1976. Mashinini had

.... become a figure of international renown in less time than it normally takes a political leader to get his first mention in a two-inch 'filler' buried in the local newspaper. The Council itself had become the country's biggest talking point in a shorter period than most organizations take to get their letterheads printed.⁵

Because of the constant harassment of the SSRC by the authorities, Tsietsi Mashinini fled the country. A day after he skipped South Africa, a new leader emerged - Khotso Seatlholo.

Khotso Seatlholo, 18 years old, was a matric pupil at Naledi High School. He neither possessed Tsietsi Mashinini's charisma, nor his captivating oratory skills. However, he proved himself a cunning strategist and a very influential leader. Like his predecessor, he

did not confine himself to immediate educational matters but became involved in a broad spectrum of civic and political issues. Khotso Seatlholo was readily accepted by the student masses because there was a leadership vacuum after Mashinini's departure and a strong need for organization and mobilization.

Khotso immediately called for a return to the schools and for a national period of mourning. He had realized that students could be better mobilized and communication facilitated when they are at schools. The return to school was effected immediately - this provides evidence of the popular support enjoyed by the SSRC among Soweto pupils. His next move was to call for a boycott of the examinations. This call divided the student masses.

There were thousands of students who wanted to write the examinations. What irked some of these students even more were rumours that the first president of the SSRC, Tsietsi Mashinini, was pursuing his studies at a prestigious institution in Europe. Students at Naledi High School, who featured prominently in the protest march on the 16th June, felt that they should continue protesting against Bantu Education, but that the boycott of examinations would be almost suicidal:

It is our sincere wish that Bantu Education should be totally scrapped, but we cannot afford to forsake Bantu Education and be left with no relevant alternative at all When we boycott examinations we are not pleasing anybody, but gambling into the hands of the "enemy". It is really frustrating to find ourselves in this type of educational crisis What quality of politics are we going to involve ourselves in if we forsake the little we have acquired in education and just sit back doing nothing? The struggle is on and we will continue fighting the Bantu Education system. But we feel we must also equip ourselves with the little that is offered The boycott of classes and exams does not affect the oppressor. Instead he rejoices that we are defeating our own ends. The blacks ought to equip themselves educationally so as to have a better understanding and insight of the powers that be.⁶

The examination boycott lobby felt that if examinations were written, Bantu Education would have triumphed, it would have demonstrated the system's power over the students. Even the SSRC itself was divided on the examination issue. Some members of the SSRC felt that

If we write, it will mean we have accepted Bantu Education and this was what the struggle was all about in the first place. Also, it means that more students with Bantu Education certificates will be turned out. We say let the students go to school until a new system is evolved, and not write any examinations.⁷

Noting the potential divisive effects of the examination debate, the SSRC resolved that the question of writing or not writing the examination should be left to the individual. One of the reasons it advanced for this decision was that it had been weakened by the exile and detentions of some of its members, and once properly constituted it would again give guidance on all important issues.

On the 23rd September 1976 the SSRC mobilized students and staged a protest march right in the citadel of white authority - Johannesburg. The main demands during this protest march were the release of detained students as well as the total abolition of Bantu Education. Three hundred students were arrested. Some students felt that the march had been a failure because of the large number of detained students, whereas others felt that it was a major victory. They argued that the dramatic, headline making nature of the protest march had shown both blacks and whites that the students meant business. R.W. Johnson argues that

.... The emergence of non-white protest in the heart of the White city centre was a new and wholly alarming nightmare. The police could spend all day shooting at children inside Soweto and it might not matter very much. Few Whites or journalists would know, and nothing very important to the White Establishment was threatened.⁸

Shortly after the September protest march in Johannesburg, 16 year old Dumisani Mbatha died in detention. His untimely death ushered in a new phase in the SSRC campaigns - the mass funerals. Thousands of Soweto residents attended the Mbatha funeral - the first of many funerals to assume a unique and unconventional character. The dead were exalted as martyrs and the normally rather sad and subdued funeral dirges were replaced by spirited and hearty renditions of freedom songs. Sadly, these mass funerals were characterized by tough police actions and deaths, which in turn necessitated further mass funerals and heightened bitterness in the community.

Towards the end of 1976, the SSRC called for a period of mourning for the people who had lost their lives. They issued a leaflet which read:

A Z I K H W E L W A⁹

1. From Monday 1st-5th November, 1976.
2. INSTRUCTIONS:
 - (a) All workers stay at home for 5 days.
 - (b) Nurses and doctors to go on with their daily routine work.
 - (c) Black provision stores (grocers, butcheries, dairies) open from 8 am to 12 noon daily during the stay-at-home.
 - (d) No shebeen drinking - ALL shebeens should close down.
 - (e) No purchase from white shops for the whole week.
 - (f) Parents, workers and all school-children must remain indoors, and avoid standing in groups on the streets.
 - (g) Workers should do their best to obey this call, so as to avoid violence and bloodshed.
 - (h) Hostel residents should also stay in their hostels - Be careful of police agitators. Do not be incited into fighting your people.
 - (i) Tsotsis please do not rob people (Geen Bulvangery).
 - (j) Churches and families should hold prayers in commemoration of black children who have been shot and killed by police all over the country (31.10.76).

- (k) The Stay-at-Home shall be non-violent and peaceful.
NO CHRISTMAS SHOPPING OF ANY KIND
NO CHRISTMAS CARDS AND DECORATIONS
NO CHRISTMAS PARTIES
BLACKS ARE GOING INTO MOURNING FOR THEIR DEAD

3. VORSTER & KRUGER:

- (a) Resign, you have mismanaged Azania. You have plunged the country into violence and loss of human life.
- (b) Release all detainees.
- (c) Police, remain in your barracks and please behave.

We are determined to free ourselves from the shackles of the oppressor.

THE STRUGGLE IS ON!

N.B. This call is National,
BLACK PEOPLE LET US BE ONE!

UNITED WE STAND!

VICTORY IS OURS!

(Issued by: Soweto Students' Representative Council).

This call for a stay-away did not materialize, but the mourning, as suggested by the SSRC was observed. "Those who had lost relatives and friends - and there were many of them - were in full agreement with the general proposal for a mourning period."¹⁰ However, some people were very unhappy about having to buy in township shops, which are generally perceived to charge highly inflated prices. Some unhappiness was also expressed at the complete ban on joie de vivre which is an intrinsic characteristic of Christmas in the townships. The shebeens heeded the students' call and closed their operations on the 31st October 1976.

In the early hours of New Year's Day, 1977, four members of the SSRC were detained. "Prof" Morobe, former deputy president of the SSRC, and Tieho Masinga, were charged with terrorism. The deputy president, Issy Gxuluwe, fled to Swaziland. Khotso Seatlholo was shot at and wounded in a car-chase in January 1977. He lamented that

"[the police] terrorise the streets of my ghetto and I can find no place to rest my head",¹¹ and fled the country. He resurfaced in Botswana. He later joined the first president of the SSRC, Tsietsi Mashinini, on a speaking tour of American university campuses.

In Soweto, the SSRC seemed to be dead - but it would emerge again.

After Seatlholo's departure, Daniel Sechaba Montsitsi (20), a matric pupil at Sekano Ntoane High School, took over the reins as president of the SSRC. He also involved the SSRC in community affairs and his first major victory was in April. He successfully mobilized students and the community against proposed rent increases in Soweto.

The West Rand Administration Board, in collaboration with the Urban Bantu Council (variously referred to by Sowetans as the Useless Boys' Club or United Black Crooks) proposed to increase rents and service charges on the 1st of May 1977, in some cases they were to rise as steeply as 80%.

Montsitsi organized a very successful protest march against the rent increases - the rent increases were shelved indefinitely by the authorities. It was also the first violence free demonstration in the history of the SSRC. During this march the police utilized only teargas and no one was shot. The status of the SSRC was elevated in the eyes of the community and Montsitsi was regarded as "the darling of the people."¹²

Montsitsi enjoyed even greater prestige when he hijacked a sod-turning ceremony at a new school in Diepkloof where Mr Manie Mulder, chief of the West Rand Administration Board, was about to address students. He launched a scathing attack which put a spanner in the works and led to a walkout by Manie Mulder, and Brigadier Visser, chief of the police in Soweto.

At the end of May 1977, Sechaba Montsitsi called on all members of the Urban Bantu Council to resign. A brief look at the history of the UBC shows why it was a discredited organization among Sowetans.

It was established in 1968. John Kane-Berman reports that at its inception in 1968 it only drew a poll of 32 percent, 21 percent in 1971 and only 14 percent in 1974.¹³ Its powers were extremely limited. It had neither authority nor the funds to make an impact on issues which really affected people's daily lives - housing, electrification, schools, roads, hospitals, pass raids and arrests, and the migratory labour system. The final nail in the coffin of the UBC came when it sanctioned the rent increases proposed by the West Rand Administration Board.

The West Rand Administration Board rationalized that it had to increase the rents because its main source of revenue - Soweto's liquor outlets, had been destroyed during the upheavals on June 16. Harry Mashabela reflects that

Urban Africans in South Africa must be the only people in the world who have to drink in order to maintain services within their own areas.¹⁴

The UBC stubbornly refused to resign and its former 'mayor', T.J. Makhaya asked for a meeting with the students, "We want to meet the students first and hear what their plight is before we could decide on what to do".¹⁵ The SSRC sent two delegates to the UBC on condition that the UBC ensure they are not harassed by Brigadier Visser. The two delegates, Khotso Lengane and Thabo Ndabeni, were arrested in the presence of the members of the UBC as they entered the UBC's chambers. This infuriated the student masses and Sechaba Montsitsi issued an ultimatum to the councillors to resign. The councillors resigned and the UBC collapsed. It was yet another major victory for the SSRC which boosted its standing in the community. The collapse of the UBC occurred in early June 1977. The first anniversary of the Soweto upheavals was just a few days away. The SSRC started expending its energies on the arrangements for commemorating the dead. It called on people to observe a commemoration period from the 15th to the 19th of June 1977. This call stepped up police activity and roadblocks were set up at all entrances to Soweto.

Sechaba Montsitsi, who was not as lucky as Mashinini and Seatlholo before him, was arrested on the 10th of June 1977 when members of the security branch, who are reported to have been travelling in more than 12 cars, surrounded a house in Diepkloof and arrested more than 21 people. All but two of the members of the SSRC were also arrested. Trofomo Somo took over from Montsitsi on the eve of a student's funeral.

Unlike his predecessors, Trofomo Somo concentrated only on educational issues. The Weekend World described him as "a missionary with an impassioned zeal directed at what appears to be only one object - the total abolition of Bantu Education."¹⁶ His aim was the immediate and total abolition of Bantu Education, which he perceived as a schooling system whose manifest and latent functions were to turn out slaves. For him

Bantu Education was introduced only to keep blacks on the level of slaves. We have heard some say that this education is better than nothing - that half-a-loaf is better than no bread. We prefer to have no bread than to be given half that has no quality.¹⁷

He lamented that when they are in class

Slavery smells from all the corners of the classroom. We don't want to dig trenches so as to fill them up again. We want to dig them so as to plant something useful in them. When I think of the time wasted studying hard, knowing fully well I am studying only to be a better slave, then I feel¹⁸

Students were frustrated by the lack of educational opportunities and statutory job discrimination after completing their matriculation. Trofomo Somo argued that

It is strange that a black man should be given this kind of education and when he leaves school, he is told about qualifications and posts. When he manages to get those he is told about job reservation and that every white man is his superior.¹⁹

Trofomo Somo's counterparts in Cape Town reechoed his sentiments in a statement dated 5 September 1976:

Opportunities for African school-leavers in the Cape are virtually NIL. The widest possible choice is open to white school leavers for their future careers, Coloured people enjoy the benefits of the Cape being a Coloured preferential area. African scholars tend to drop out of school early because further education, besides being expensive, does not improve their chances of employment. There is no point in passing J.C. (junior certificate) or matric to do a labourer's job. For the past twenty years or more, the problems of African school-leavers have grown, employment except as a labourer is hard to find; state policy does not motivate them to seek the rare chances which do exist. At the end of this year another crop of approximately 200 school-leavers will have nothing to do. This will add to the present number of active young people who are becoming progressively more asocial, rebellious and ripe for trouble.²⁰

Trofomo Somo adopted a non-violent leadership style because he believed that

... no guns, force or death struggle can solve educational problems. We are not going to be violent against the police or against those in the system of education. But we will be strict. We are going to press on until they listen to us about this education It is time they gave us a chance to demonstrate the talents God gave us.²¹

For Somo, there was an urgent need for the total and immediate abolition of Bantu Education in its entirety. He issued a warning to the authorities that

if they do not scrap this education, then there will be no schooling. All the schools at present will be turned into hostels to house the thousands of people on the waiting list for homes in Soweto.²²

Somo successfully organized commemoration services throughout Soweto on the first anniversary of the 1976 upheavals. Commemoration

services, which were well attended, were held at Regina Mundi Hall in Rockville, Sefikeng Church in Meadowlands, the Anglican Church in Diepkloof as well as at the DOCC in Orlando. The services were conducted by members of the SSRC, with representatives from other black consciousness organizations participating.

Trofomo enjoyed considerable support among Soweto pupils. When he issued an edict that Bantu Education must be scrapped, students burnt books issued by the Department of Bantu Education in March 1977.

His next move was to call for the resignation of members of schoolboards. He regarded schoolboard members as "... collaborators and the tools of the government used to enforce this rotten system of education on us. They must go."²³ There were 19 school boards in Soweto then. More than half of them resigned immediately, whereas others held tenaciously to their positions.

However, Somo's reign was short lived. On the 19th October 1977 the government banned the SSRC and a number of other black organizations.

Notes

1. This chapter draws on press reports, especially the following article: "Amandla! The Story of the Soweto Students' Representative Council", which appeared in the Weekend World on 31 July, 7 August, 14 August, 21 August and 28 August 1977.
2. Mashabela, H. 1987:68.
3. Weekend World 17 August 1977.
4. in Kane-Berman, J. 1978:11.
5. Weekend World 7 August 1977.
6. in Kane-Berman, J. 1978:135.
7. Loc. cit.
8. Johnson, R.W. 1977:199.
9. in Kane-Berman, J. 1978:135.
10. The Weekend World 7 August 1977.
11. in Kane-Berman, J. 1978:143.
12. Weekend World 14 August 1977.
13. Kane-Berman, J. 1978:206.
14. Mashabela, H. 1978:78.
15. Weekend World 14 August 1977.
16. Weekend World 28 August 1977.
17. Loc. cit.
18. Loc. cit.
19. Loc. cit.
20. in Kane-Berman, J. 1978:23-24.
21. Weekend World 28 August 1977.
22. Loc. cit.
23. Weekend World 21 August 1977.

7. CHAPTER FIVE

MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

For Smelser mechanisms of social control are intended to prevent, inhibit or channel the accumulation of the first five determinants of collective behaviour.¹

In this final chapter, the role played by agencies of social control will be examined, in order to determine whether the social control measures that were implemented were intended to stop and deflect the collective behaviour or to eliminate its major causes.

As already noted in an earlier chapter, it is not very clear what the exact sequence of events was during the protest march on the 16th of June 1976 when the marching students first encountered the police.² However, what is indisputable is that the police did open fire and the first victim, Hector Petersen, died. He died gruesomely:

... the Government-appointed Cillie Commission of Enquiry into the Soweto riots was told by Dr Hans Bukhofze, chief district surgeon of Johannesburg, that young Petersen had been standing with his back to the firearm when he was hit 'by a very long angled shot'. Dr Bukhofze said that the bullet struck the boy at the right side of his back, mutilated his kidney and liver and passed through his lung before coming out at the neck 'through a very large exit wound.'³

There are allegations that many students, like Hector Petersen, were shot in the back. In an interview, Mr Tamsanga Kambule, a prominent educationist and former principal of Orlando High School and Wits University mathematics lecturer, adds that "you can shoot a trouble maker who comes directly towards you in self-defence because your life is in danger. But to shoot a child who is running away is unforgivable". A frightening picture of a fleeing person about to be shot in the back was published in The Star.⁴

Pam Christie sums up the Soweto students' reaction to Hector Petersen's death in the following terms:

The students responded with violence. They attacked WRAB [the West Rand Administration Board], burned its offices and destroyed its vehicles Within a day unrest had spread throughout Soweto.⁵

However, it would seem that this was not just senseless violence. Targets were well chosen. Mrs Sally Motlana, a prominent civic leader in Soweto, explained in an interview that only symbols of oppression and that were identified with apartheid were attacked - administration offices, vehicles and liquor outlets.

And how did the police react?

They used dogs, guns, teargas, armoured cars (hippos) and helicopters. They raided houses and searched people at roadblocks. They prohibited gatherings. They detained without trial. And they shot.⁶

Mr T.W. Webber asked the Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons, Jimmy Kruger, whether there were specially trained riot squads in the South African Police and whether members of the force were equipped with water cannons and ammunition firing rubber bullets. The minister's reply was that special riot squads existed in the S.A.P. but that the police were not equipped with such weapons because of what he called their "ineffectiveness".⁷

The methods used by the police in quelling the youth rebellion were justifiably criticised by Soweto's opinion leaders. Mrs Sally Motlana feels that during the protest march, the police "should have taken into consideration that they were dealing with children and not adults. Instead of answering them with sjamboks, whips and water cannons, they used the gun and the first child was shot - Hector Petersen". This issue is further pursued by Archbishop Desmond Tutu

But I and others would like to know why the police should have tried to quell with guns a riot by school children. Could they not have used water hoses to drive them back and dampen their enthusiasm? Would they have used guns and dogs on a similar group of white school children?⁸

The answer is obviously no. When white University of Witwatersrand students held protest marches in Johannesburg on the 17th June 1976 in sympathy with their Soweto counterparts, Mr Kruger did not answer with guns and teargas. Instead he gave "them two days in which to express their feelings in the streets."⁹ One of their poster messages to their Soweto counterparts read: "Don't start the revolution without us."¹⁰

Mr Kambule criticizes the methods used by the police in quelling the youth rebellion as "absolutely tardy". He goes on to suggest that the South African Police could learn valuable lessons by going overseas and observing how violent European soccer crowds are handled. He said "The Vloks have failed - all of them, from the Krugers," in crowd control.

The overkill accusation and the methods used by the police are further pursued by Bob Hitchcock who adds that South African

... riot squads carry lethal automatic weapons, and use them at the throwing of the first few stones, and are provocatively dressed in camouflage gear more befitting an army in a bush-war situation.... I and other observers were amazed that in 1976 the 'kill 'em if they step out of line' philosophy was still being practised in South Africa. Where were the American - designed stun-guns which incapacitate without killing or disabling permanently?

.... where were the visor-fitted helmets and the transparent shields for policemen facing stone-throwers and stick fighters? Where was the 'Talk Squad', highly trained plain clothes policemen of high intelligence, balanced emotions and an understanding of the social plight and psychology of the provocateurs and rioters ... a squad used before sending in armed uniformed police?¹¹

Although the following incident did not occur in Soweto, the hardline policy and policing adopted by the authorities is reflected by Mr Jimmy Kruger, who said of Steve Biko's death, "Dit laat my koud." Steve Biko, the intellectual father of Black Consciousness in South Africa, was arrested and beaten senseless by the police.

In hand and foot fetters, he was driven in freezing temperatures in the back of a Land Rover 1280km to Pretoria, where he died in police custody. A reasonable man could be forgiven for interpreting Kruger's phrase in its ordinary grammatical sense, "It leaves me cold", although Kruger himself interpreted the words less cruelly.

It seems the attitude of the minister to police brutality was not condemnatory but rather supportive. He excused the assault on Biko as "following automatically from an arrest with a stropky person."¹² He also felt that the violence against Biko "was hardly enough to justify a charge before a police court."¹³

Mr Kruger, described by Mrs Motlana as "a vicious man who did not know the meaning of the word tact," asked an amusingly simple question in the House of Assembly on the 17th June 1976, which revealed the ignorance of some people in high positions of authority:

The other question one has to ask oneself, is why the young people walk with their fists in the air. Why do they walk with upraised fists? Surely this is the sign of the Communist Party. I do not want to accuse them of being communists, but where does this walking with upraised fists come from? Why do they walk through the streets shouting the word 'power'? Where do these things among the young people come from? ... and I now want to say that it is enough. We will go so far and no further. It is my task to preserve law and order.¹⁴

The Rand Daily Mail commented "... South Africans will do themselves a grave disservice and perhaps a disastrous one, if they deliberately fail to understand why [the protest] took place at all".¹⁵

After the shootings and the violence on the first day of the uprisings, Mr Colin Eglin, of the Progressive Reform Party, suggested a very rational course of action to the Prime Minister. He urged him to

... remove the Minister and the Deputy Minister of Bantu Education [from their positions]. Secondly he should order an immediate enquiry into the functioning of the Bantu Education system and, pending that enquiry, he should suspend the instructions relating to the language medium applicable to the schools. Furthermore he should suspend Mr Ackerman, the Regional Director of Bantu Education, until the inquiry has been completed. Finally, I believe that the hon. the Prime Minister, in the light of the anguish of Soweto and what has happened, should, as a matter of urgency, appoint at top level a multiracial commission ... to consider the social, economic and political reforms that are going to be essential if we are going to avoid conflict, if we are going to live in peace, not in the homelands, not in the rural areas, but in the urban areas of South Africa where Blacks and Whites are living together today. For as long as we can see into the future these people will have to live and work together.

If the hon. the Prime Minister can do these things, if the hon. the Minister of Justice would contain the situation, then I believe that out of the horror, out of the anguish and out of the turmoil of Soweto of the last few days something worthwhile could emerge for South Africa.¹⁶

During this snap debate in the House of Assembly, Mr Jimmy Kruger announced that he had appointed Mr Justice Cillie, the Judge President of the Transvaal, as a one-man commission - he also expressed the feeling that the language medium issue was not the real cause of the youth rebellion.¹⁷

Dr Andries Treurnicht argued that in any case it was the government's prerogative to determine the medium of instruction in African schools in the urban areas of South Africa, since the government provided school buildings and subsidies.¹⁸

On the 18th of June 1976, Manie Mulder, chief executive of WRAB, convened a meeting with some of Soweto's civic leaders to try to diffuse the situation. The meeting, which was characterised by a lot of haranguing, ended on a rather sour note for Manie Mulder. The black leaders laid down these conditions before they could consider cooperating with him;

1. The withdrawal of police from schools.
2. The abolition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in African schools.
3. The appointment of Africans to the commission of inquiry into the upheavals.¹⁹

After a lot of pressure from community organizations and individuals, the Minister of Bantu Education announced on the 6th of July 1976 that principals would be able to choose the medium of instruction in their schools instead of teaching through the mediums of English and Afrikaans on a 50-50 basis.

Mr Kruger's hardline attitude was passed on to the policemen in Soweto. The role they played, especially at mass funerals, exacerbated the violence and necessitated further mass funerals, as shown by the following incidents. A reporter of Die Beeld who was covering a mass funeral in Soweto had his body riddled with bullets. "I had a wound on my shoulder, one in my left arm, two in the stomach, one in the back, two in the chest, one in the thigh, and one in the buttocks."²⁰ It is miraculous how he survived to tell this story.

There are reports of unprovoked shootings by apparently trigger-happy policemen at mass funerals. John Kane-Berman, executive director of the South African Institute of Race Relations, reports in gruesome detail the funeral of 22 year-old Jacob Mashabane, who was said to have hanged himself in a police cell:

Seven people died and 51 were injured when the police opened fire at the funeral. The police said 'black power' salutes had been given, 'subversive' leaflets urging people to boycott white businesses distributed, and stones thrown. They claim they had ordered the crowd to disperse and then fired. Newspaper reporters present at the funeral confirmed that salutes were given and leaflets handed out, but denied that there were warnings to disperse and that stones were thrown

... they had 'watched incredulously as police systematically gunned down schoolchildren and parents as they entered the cemetery gates' The coffin was already at the grave when shooting started at the entrance Cemetery workers had to duck for their lives as the shooting went wild [There was] general panic as the police opened fire, and ... scores of screaming people scurried through the fence to the veld for safety while others battled through a swamp just outside the cemetery. Only about 10 people remained, transfixed at the graveside, while the family of the dead student huddled together in the mourners' car, sobbing bitterly.²¹

Mr Kruger was one of the staunchest supporters of his subordinates. He felt that they executed their duties with the "greatest measure of patience in the face of the greatest measure of provocation."²² He added that he would not deny that "there has not been a constable here and there who pulled a trigger too soon in a moment of over-hastiness".²³

Mr Kruger could not "tolerate the spread of [the] riots and ... the police will have to adopt very serious measures to deal with this matter".²⁴ He read an anonymous letter to the House of Assembly which was purportedly written to him by an English-speaking person, and which he regarded as representing the general feeling of the public:

Dear Sir

Through you I would like to convey my thanks to the South African Police for the way they are handling a dangerous situation. It is the bravery and dedication to duty of these men that makes the rest of us go about their daily work unhindered. I think they deserve the highest praise and not the criticism they have received from the Press and other liberal elements. I think it would be a good idea to round up the critics and newspaper editor supporters and Wits students and drop them in a mat and leave them up there where they can find all the answers. In conclusion I would like to express my confidence in you and your department and think that you are all handling a difficult task admirably. As a token of my appreciation I have pleasure in enclosing a donation to the S.A. Police Widows and Orphans Fund of R25.²⁵

Kruger did follow the advice given to him in this letter and rounded up his critics, but unfortunately he did not "drop them in a mat", he detained them.

Kruger's enthusiasm and his handling of the situation was not shared by all his parliamentary colleagues, who viewed the actions of the police as extremely provocative and counter productive. Addressing Parliament on the 25th January 1977, Mrs Helen Suzman reported that she had been told

... a great many ugly stories about unprovoked violence in almost every township where there were disturbances. I have statements and affidavits which make one's hair stand up. Of course, the police have denied all charges of unprovoked violence. They say they shoot only when their lives are endangered, and I have no doubt that in some cases this is certainly true, but equally in some cases it is manifestly untrue Africans say to me: 'The police can say what they like. We saw what happened and we know what happened; we don't care how many denials are made.' As I say, I have no doubt, from what I have heard, that there were many cases of unprovoked violence I believe that the allegation that the riot police used arms indiscriminately is borne out by numerous eye-witnesses. I myself have a number of statements and affidavits.²⁶

Brewer commented: "It would seem the police have no compunction in using a great deal of violence in the execution of their duties."²⁷

Another method used by law and norm enforcement agencies was to round up people and detain them. Harry Mashabela, a prominent journalist who was working for the Rand Daily Mail at the time, describes in horrifying details his spell in detention. We quote him fully:

He slapped me on the side of the face and, as my spectacles flew off, followed with a stiff punch on the chest. And, as I staggered back, Morsdood, [not his interrogators' real names] standing up on the side, chopped me with a solid stiffer karate punch on the back of the neck. I folded up instantly.

When I eventually came round (I don't know after how long), strangely enough I was thinking about Joseph Mdluli (he died on March 19 1976 soon after his detention), the head racked with pain; water had been poured over me, my pockets emptied (I could see all my things lying on the desk). This is how Mdluli died, I was thinking 'Get this straight' said another. 'We'll not take any of your communist We want the truth, nothing but facts, hear?' Never had I felt so lonely, so helpless before.

Where were the pamphlets; did I belong to any political movements; know Abram Fischer, Helen Joseph; what was black consciousness; did I know Winnie Mandela, Joe Slovo, Margaret Smith, Sheila Weinberg? The questions came fast and in quick succession. They were hurled at me from all over the room. And they were mingled with solid claps, kicks and shouts of 'can't you stand properly, bloody communist?' Never before had I come across such an over-zealous mob. They were not even interested in the answers to the very questions they asked! I was baffled to no end 'Why don't you give me a chance to answer your questions, officer?' I cried out, not referring to anyone in particular. 'Who's officer?' a man slapped me, 'don't officer me, bastard.' 'See, he writes good stories about Winnie Mandela, but calls us pigs' Moved and beaten, I felt weary and in deep despair. And it was not until midnight that the viciousness slightly abated The gaunt white officer, perched on the table before me with his legs dangling, still awed me. While striking me with a ruler on the neck, he warned me he would give me three minutes to tell him the truth. Otherwise he would kill me. He said he knew everything but wanted me to say it voluntarily. And he hoped, he said, I understood what he meant. I felt utterly helpless, but cried, rather like an automaton, that I understood him. A movement outside. Apparently from another room along the passage. But I was too weary, beat up and drained to pay any particular attention. The door opened and someone said: 'How you faring?' The officer in front of me shook his head. 'It looks like our man is letting us down', he said. The short officer, who had just entered the room, then said: 'My man is already writing his statement.' Then he went out, closing the door behind him, to whoever he was interrogating.

... the security officer ordered me to half-squat, with arms raised and open hands touching each other above the head (detainees call it sitting on an imaginary chair). In that condition, I soon discovered, the weight of the body rested on the knees. Within barely 15 minutes the whole body sweated. A trickle of sweat flowed from armpits on either side of the body, which felt as if it had been immersed in steam. Though somewhat taught (sic), the body also quivered. Boom, I collapsed on my back on the concrete floor. He kicked and shouted at me to get up. So did the African. I stretched my legs a little as I got up, getting back into position. From about three in the morning up till eight o'clock, I half-squatted, collapsed, was kicked, stretched legs, got into position. Only to fall down again and again and again. The agony was killing me and, some moments, I even regretted ever having regained consciousness in Vista's office at Protea. I reckoned then I would have died peacefully for the karate blow and its effect had been instantaneous. Except for a strange sensation during which I felt neither suspended nor hung on anything, but simply floated in space, everything had become painlessly still all at once. For more than twelve hours, I had been standing; had had nothing to eat, but felt no hunger. Only the body ached, terribly. All illusions that they would not kill me had evaporated; thought of the outside world, including my own family, had vanished.²⁸

Mashabane was released from the detention barracks in a neck brace four months later.

In 1977, the government passed the Indemnity Act No. 13, which specifically exonerated the Minister of Police or any other officer of the government from liability for felonies committed by the police or armed forces. This Act seems to have encouraged a lot of violent behaviour on the part of the police, as shown by the following statistics reflecting the damages paid by the police for assault:

Table 13: Police Assaults²⁹

<u>Year</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Accepted</u>	<u>Compensation (R)</u>
1975	-	34	30 888
1976	312	39	33 666
1977	392	69	87 184
1978	-	78	178 725
1979	-	144	295 551
1980	-	173	370 000
1981	-	150	488 888
1982	-	190	418 914
1983	-	166	492 234

From the above figures it is clear that the damages paid for assaults by the police rose very steeply after the passing of the Indemnity Act No.13 of 1977.

A spate of detentions began in August 1976. Mrs Sally Motlana attributes this to the frustrations experienced by the police, resulting from the unity of the students:

... the gun was failing, teargas was failing, so they had no other means but to try to round up the leaders whom they didn't even know at the time ... they started arresting leaders of organizations, people of high standing in the community. This started on the 13th of August 1976. They picked up Dr Motlana and Winnie Mandela and leaders of organizations like the YWCA, the National Council of African Women, the Black Housewives' League.

Mrs Motlana added that the police tried to justify this spate of detentions by claiming that the children's activities were encouraged by community leaders.

The state resorted to other legislative measures as well in order to contain the 1976 youth rebellion, especially the Terrorism Act of 1967 and the Internal Security Act of 1976.³⁰ The Terrorism Act

created the statutory crime of "participating in terroristic activities". Section 6 of this Act empowers a commissioned police officer of or above the rank of lieutenant-colonel to detain a person if such officer has reason to believe that he is a terrorist, or that he is withholding information about terrorists or terroristic activities. A person detained under this Act may be held indefinitely until the Minister or the Commissioner of Police is satisfied that all questions have been answered to his satisfaction. The Act also explicitly excludes all court power to order release. One of the effects of Section 6 is that the police or the Minister of Justice is under no obligation to tell the detainee's family, his lawyer or doctor of his detention. Thus detainees under this Act are completely at the mercy of authorities:

Once detained, he can be held indefinitely and in solitary confinement. Nor need he ever be brought before a court. Moreover, the scope of what the Act regards as terrorism is very broad, going far beyond what that word would ordinarily be understood to mean. For instance, embarrassing 'the administration of the affairs of the State' could be construed as an act of terrorism, and a senior police officer would be entitled under the Act to detain anyone he suspected having done anything which might have so embarrassed the state.³¹

Another legislative measure used by the state to quell the youth rebellion was the Internal Security Act of 1976. It also provides for detention without trial - thus the detainee has no chance to challenge his incarceration in court and defend himself. The Internal Security Act also empowers the Minister to impose banning orders.

It is difficult to determine exactly how many people were detained under these legislative enactments, since these measures empower the police to detain people without publicly acknowledging that they have done so.

In October 1976, the Weekend World reported that 360 people were in detention. It also provided their names.

... in October [1976] Justice Minister Kruger confirmed that 123 people were being held under the Internal Security Act with no charges against them being contemplated, 217 under the Terrorism Act, and 34 at the instance of the provincial attorneys-general to protect them as potential witnesses. This made a total of 374 detainees. By mid December ... 433 people were in detention. Of this number, 135 were being held under the preventive detention clause of the Internal Security Act, and they were released by the end of the month.³²

According to the Institute of Race Relations, 778 people were in detention in October 1976.³³ On the 19th October 1977 there was a massive crackdown on anti-apartheid organizations.

The following organizations and individuals were banned:

The Soweto Students' Representative Council, the Black Parents' Association, the Black Peoples' Convention, the South African Students' Organization, the South African Students Movement, the Black Community Projects, the Black Women's Federation, the Union of Black Journalists, the multiracial Christian-Institute, the Committee of Ten, the Association for the Educational and Cultural Advancement of the African People of South Africa (Asseca), Border Youth Organization/Union, Eastern Province/Cape Youth Organization, Medupe Writers' Association, Transvaal Youth Organization, Western Cape Youth Organization, Zimele Trust Fund, Natal Youth Organization and the National Youth Organization.

Among the individuals banned were Beyers Naude and other officials of the Christian Institute, Peter Randall, director of Ravan Press, Donald Woods, friend of Steve Biko and editor of the East London newspaper, the Daily Dispatch, and Percy Qoboza, editor of the World and The Weekend World. These two newspapers were also banned, as well as the Christian Institute's mouthpiece, Pro Veritate. Its editor Cedric Mayson was also banned. The following individuals were raided at dawn and detained on that fateful day: Messrs Lolwane, Motlana, Mathabathe, Ramokgopa, Mayathula, Mazibuko, Kraai, Mosala, Rachidi and Aubrey Mokoena - all prominent community leaders in Soweto.

The government seemed to have dealt a final blow to the episodes of collective behaviour that were so evident in the townships. However new bodies would arise to carry on the work of these organizations.

For Smelser, there are two types of social control measures. The first type attempts to minimize structural conduciveness and structural strain. Unfortunately these measures were not favoured by law and norm enforcement agencies during the Soweto youth rebellion. Despite early representations to the Department of Bantu Education about the structural strain caused by the imposition of Afrikaans as a compulsory medium of instruction in certain subjects within the complex, the "50-50" ruling was abolished by the authorities only on the 6th of July 1976. Most of the pain and anguish of Soweto could have been avoided had the authorities reacted timeously on the language-medium issue.

The second type of social control measures are those that are implemented only after collective behavioural episodes have manifested themselves. This seems to be the approach that was favoured by the authorities. The latent effect of this approach was to prolong and exacerbate the intensity of the Soweto youth rebellion, since many people lost their lives. In the case of Soweto, social control did not involve "the institutionalizing of respect for law and for orderly means of expressing grievances,"³⁴ since peaceful means of protest were regarded as anathema by law and norm enforcement agencies.

8. CONCLUSION

Smelser's theory has been fairly successful in explaining episodes of collective behaviour. Its major strength is its combination of psychological orientations (generalized beliefs) and its macro sociological search for the other determinants of collective behaviour in the social environment of the participants.

Smelser's theory can best be utilized to explain episodes of collective behaviour ex-post facto, because it is extremely difficult to verify causal arguments empirically. His hypothetical "if - then" statements about collective behaviour are inherently untestable. Orenstein and Phillips argue that

There is no direct way to demonstrate that a relationship is causal. Nothing we can see, smell, or perceive in any way "proves" that one thing caused another.³⁵

Thus we cannot argue beyond any absolute doubt that a combination of Smelser's determinants of collective behaviour will always lead to episodes of collective behaviour.

However, in addition to being able to explain an event ex-post facto, we would also like to be able to predict when the event is likely to occur. Not only that, we would also like to control, if possible, its occurrence. It is a moot point whether Smelser's theory can be utilized to predict episodes of such behaviour. The real test for Smelser's theory in this regard would be to create a laboratory situation in which all the relevant variables/determinants except one would be held constant, and then to manipulate this one determinant systematically. In the case of a riot, for instance, we would vary one determinant - conduciveness - systematically in one set of experiments, test structural strain in another set, and so on with the other determinants, and determine whether each determinant is a necessary condition for a riot. It would also be necessary to determine what combination of the determinants has to be present in order to produce riotous behaviour.

However, such experiments would be extremely unethical. Smelser himself acknowledges this fact. Referring to panics as a form of collective behaviour, he argues that

.... Experimentation, however, is virtually impossible in the study of collective behaviour. Ethical prohibitions prevent investigators from literally creating a panic, and practical difficulties in establishing a genuine panic in a laboratory setting are almost overwhelming.³⁶

Conducting such experimentation would be unethical in that it does not conform to accepted professional practices. Collective behaviour sometimes manifests itself violently and irreparable physical harm and emotional turmoil may be inflicted upon the subjects. Under no circumstances should research subjects be exposed to substantial risk or personal harm.

In conclusion, Smelser's theory seems the most comprehensive theoretical approach in the study of collective behaviour today.

Notes

1. Smelser, N.J. 1962.
2. See chapter on Precipitating Factors.
3. Hitchcock, B. 1977:189.
4. The Star, 19 June 1976.
5. Christie, P. 1985:238.
6. *ibid*:239.
7. Hansard, 22 June 1976; col. 1279.
8. The Rand Daily Mail, 17 June 1976.
9. Hansard, 17 June 1976; col. 9642.
10. *Loc. cit.*
11. Hitchcock, B. 1977:191.
12. The Daily News, 18 May 1978.
13. The Daily News, 22 October 1977.
14. Hansard, 17 June 1976; col. 9641.
15. The Rand Daily Mail, 17 June 1976.
16. Hansard, 17 June 1976; col. 9637.
17. *ibid.*; cols. 9639-9640.
18. Die Beeld, 17 June 1976. (John Kane-Berman has exposed the fallacy of this argument - see chapter on Precipitating Factors).
19. The Star, 19 June 1976; The Rand Daily Mail, 19 June 1976.
20. Kane-Berman, J. 1978:33.
21. *Loc. cit.*
22. Hansard (1) 1977; cols. 147-148.
23. *Loc. cit.*
24. Hansard, 21 June 1976; col. 10043.
25. *ibid.*; cols. 10043-10044.
26. Hansard (1) 1977; cols. 136-140.
27. Brewer, J. 1986:119.
28. Mashabela, H. 1987:47-50.
29. Brewer, J. *op. cit.*
30. See De Villiers, D.P. "Change in Respect of Security Legislation" in Van Vuuren, D.J. et al. (eds). Change in South Africa, 1983, Butterworth Publishers (Pty) Ltd. Durban, for an excellent exposition of the Terrorism Act of 1967.

31. Kane-Berman, J. 1978:37.
32. The Weekend World, 8 October 1976.
33. Race Relations News, November 1977.
34. Smelser, N.J. 1962:261.
35. Orenstein, A. and Phillips, W.R. 1978:129.
36. Smelser, N.J. 1962:386.

9. APPENDIX

The following is an interview schedule administered to Mr Aggrey Klaaste, editor of The Sowetan, and some of Soweto's opinion leaders.

1. Would you agree that the fall of Portuguese colonialism in Southern Africa was perceived by South African Blacks as a decisive blow against white minority rule in Southern Africa? Was there any relationship between the Angolan war and the Soweto 1976 upheavals?
2. According to John Kane-Berman of the South African Institute of Race Relations, "one of the principal factors explaining the new mood of assertiveness so evident among Black youth in many parts of the country [was] the growth of the Black Consciousness philosophy". Would you regard Black Consciousness as one of the main factors that contributed to the explosion of a youth rebellion in the townships of South Africa in 1976?
3. The approaching 20th anniversary of the Freedom Charter in 1976 fuelled the imagination of township residents, especially the youth. It created amongst them a yearning for political freedom and a quest for better educational opportunities. Comment please.
4. Did the housing situation in Soweto prior to 1976, the application of the pass laws and the impending "independence" of the Transkei possibly contribute to the Soweto 1976 upheavals?
5. What were the general beliefs that activated students for participation in episodes of collective behaviour - the belief that Bantu Education is inferior?
6. From various reports, it is clear that the sequence of events in Soweto on 16 June is confusing and interpreted differently. What actually happened during the protest march to precipitate the upheavals?

7. What was the standing of students' organizations (especially the SSRC) in the community?
8. What role did the agents of social control (parents, the government, the police, the courts etc.) play? Were the social control measures that were implemented intended to stop and deflect the collective behaviour or to eliminate its major causes?
9. Were there general types of social structural conditions in Soweto that led to a high probability of collective behaviour? In other words, were the 1976 upheavals in Soweto and throughout the nation merely an irrational outburst or a response to the socio-economic conditions of the participants?

Mr Aggrey Klaaste, editor of the Sowetan's response:

1. The fall of Portuguese colonialism was most definitely perceived by black South Africans as a blow against white minority rule in Southern Africa. In fact supporters of SASO were charged and jailed on what was termed the Frelimo trial. Black South Africans generally felt that if the Mozambicans could unseat the oppressors just to our north, this could and should happen in South Africa.
2. Black Consciousness did contribute to political activism of the 70s and onward. As the two major political organisations, the ANC and the PAC, had disappeared from the debate and the general consciousness, Steve Biko and his BC followers had an effect on creating a new assertiveness amongst black youth. This contributed to the explosive situation from June 16, 1976 onwards. Other political influences after June 16 and the formation of the so-called "progressive" forces (Freedom Charter believers under the UDF etc) contributed. What must be underlined is, blacks in general and perhaps the young in particular were thirsting for political leadership to express and articulate their deteriorating social and economic conditions.
3. As a follow-up to the above the re-emergence of the so called "Charterism", as it is called, fueled the new spirit of defiance. Any attack on the oppressive system, including the influence from BC and the Freedom Charter followers had an effect on the youth particularly.
4. Yes. The 1970s had a series of crisis situations that led to upheavals post 1976. All the "apartheid" laws seriously affected blacks in general. In 1977 Steve Biko's death fueled the crisis. The independence of homelands, like Bophuthatswana, made things worse and the festering sore about Transkei's independence had its effects. It was the combination of these specific factors plus the apartheid laws (passes etc) in general that created the disenchantment.

5. The first mistake was for everybody to damn Bantu Education as bad and then send the kids to Bantu Education schools. The second mistake was the resignation of some of the good black teachers who simply refused to be involved in this type of education. The third one was to give the children a sense that they had "power", a dangerous thing they either used or abused as the circumstances presented themselves. School children having become a power bloc also lost the respect they had for everybody. They bucked the system in the home, in the school and in general. Until Bantu Education is removed and until education becomes a venture affecting all people, children and adults included, the children will always exercise their political right to be heard.

6. Black scholars had boycotted classes for several months in 1976, specifically against the introduction of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. This was the last straw to general anger against Bantu Education and its obvious weaknesses. There were class boycotts and marches. The march that led to the tragedy happened in Orlando West when the children came face-to-face with the police. The facts are not entirely clear as to what happened next. It is easy to see that a mistake, a tragic one for that matter, was just waiting to happen. The police could have panicked. They (the police) claim they were stoned. The children said a shot was fired without warning, the truth will perhaps never be completely known. The first casualty in such situations is the truth. It is quite possible that a shot was fired in panic, followed by other shots. It is not beyond speculation to say some stones could have been thrown. Up to this point the students and their leaders had, however, shown a remarkable sense of caution. This was not the first confrontation they had had with the police. At some stages I personally saw them get onto police vehicles and waving after the confrontations which happened frequently. It was touch and go and something was bound to go wrong.

7. The SSRC in Soweto had become very powerful. They had immense influence and at one stage frog-marched the Urban Bantu Council out of their jobs.
8. The role of the parents was ambivalent. They had a secret respect for the courage shown by the children who died, were detained or those who fled. They felt rather ashamed that they had pushed the children to the forefront of the struggle. The police, the government and the courts were generally perceived to be the enemies of the people. The reasons for this are obvious, I think.

The control measures from the police and the various governmental authorities, which were in general repressive, exacerbated the situation. There was very little social control from parents who were caught in the embarrassing condition of seeing their "battles" fought for them by the children.

9. The social conditions were mostly negative. Most people felt the oppressive system and its laws harshly on them. There was anger, a growing anger that there would never be peace in the country. There was a desire therefore to get rid of the burdens regardless of the cost. The cost was heavy. Most of the time the people used their anger, and their collective numbers to try and crush the System. There was political mobilisation which was met by severe government repression - people jailed, killed and exiled. There was most significantly the declining economy in the 70s leading to unemployment and poverty. The 1976 outbursts were not irrational but caused by a systematic deprivation that the people felt heavily on themselves. They had become emboldened to challenge this for historical and political reasons.

PS: These answers are a general picture of what is obviously a deeper sequence of socio-economic and political factors impacting on the lives of blacks. The historical perspective from 1948 to 1960 Sharpeville, through to 1976 cannot be disregarded in evaluating what did or did not happen those days.

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