

**AN EXPLORATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY VETTING OF
PERSONNEL IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE ARMY
SUPPORT BASES**

By

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DECLARATION

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I, **ALUFHELI LOVEMORE MAKATU**, declare that this dissertation:

AN EXPLORATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY VETTING OF PERSONNEL IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE ARMY SUPPORT BASES,

is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.



SIGNATURE
(AL MAKATU)

27 November 2020

DATE

DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to my late grandmother Vho – Matamela Tshifhumulo Ramabulana – Makatu, who passed away in January 2018. She always encouraged me to study. “Makhulu, I wish you were still alive to witness this moment, may your soul rest in eternal peace”.

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Summary

This study was attempted in order to explore the implementation of security vetting processes in the SANDF and to determine the possibility for establishing new strategies that will address the current implementation problems. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data from the ASBs, Defence Intelligence and selected managers in the SANDF. Vetting proved to be a “foreign” word among junior ranking participants at the ASBs, which create a big challenge in the security environment. Lack of knowledge and information always create problems within an organisation. The findings indicate factors other than security vetting processes, which includes non-adherence and attitudes towards security vetting by members, is impacting vetting at ASBs. Lack of personnel was found to be hindering security vetting implementation throughout the DOD. The recommendations are outlined in an acronym PEOPLE-D representing partnership, environment, population-based intervention, life course security, awareness, empowerment and decentralization to enhance the implementation of security vetting.

Key terms

Code of conduct, Constitution, Legislation, Polygraph, Security competence, Security measures, Security risks, Security Vetting, Vetting aftercare and Vetting process.

List of acronyms

AFRC	: Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
APLA	: Azanian People's Liberation Army
ARMSCOR	: Armaments Procurement and Development Corporation of South Africa
ASB	: Army Support Bases
CDCI	: Chief Director Counter Intelligence
CDI	: Chief of Defence Intelligence
CEO	: Chief Executive Officer
CID	: Criminal Investigations Department
CIO	: Central intelligence organisations
CSANDF	: Chief of the South African National Defence Force
CSBD	: Criminal Data Service Bureau
DBS	: Defence Business Service
DC	: Defence Community
DD1050	: Security clearance form
DI	: Defence Intelligence
DIMC	: Defence Intelligence Management Council
DOD	: Department of Defence
DODI	: Department of Defence Instruction
DSV	: Department of Security Vetting
FCOS	: Foreign and Commonwealth Office Service
FUV	: Force Unit Vetting
GSB	: General support base
ICPC	: International Centre for Policy and Conflict
ID	: Identity Document

IFP	: Inkatha Freedom Party
IG	: Inspector General
IGI	: Inspector General of Intelligence
JSCD	: Joint Standing Committee on Defence
KFOR	: Kosovo Force
KIA	: Kosovo Intelligence Agency
KSV	: Kosovo Security Force
LNP	: Liberian National Police
MCA	: Military Civil Advisory
Mil Vets	: Military Veterans
MK	: Umkhonto we Sizwe
MOD	: Minister of Defence
MSDS	: Military Skills Development System
MZ	: Member zone
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO	: Non Commissioned Officer
NPP	: New Patriotic Party
NZSIS	: New Zealand Security Services
OC	: Officer Commanding
PNDC	: Provisional National Defence Council
PSAP	: Public Service Administration Position
PSRB	: Personnel Security Review Board
RSA	: Republic of South Africa
SAAF	: South African Air Force
SA Army	: South African Army
SAASF	: South African Army Support Formation
SADF	: South African Defence Force

SAMHS	: South African Military Health Services
SA Navy	: South African Navy
SANDF	: South African National Defence Force
SAPS	: South African Police Service
SB	: Support bases
SITA	: State Information Technology Agency
SOEs	: State owned enterprises
SPU	: Self-Protection Unit
SSR	: Security Sector Reforms
TBVC	: Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei
TIE	: Tanzania Institute of Education
UK	: United Kingdom
UKSV	: United Kingdom Security Vetting
UMSO	: Unit Military Security Officer
UNAMIL	: United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia
VO	: Vetting Officer

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CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL ORIENTATION

1. 1. Introduction

South African National Defence Force (SANDF) members at all levels must maintain high moral and professional norms and act with utmost integrity. These standards encompass trustworthiness and security consciousness within individual members. In assessing and strengthening integrity, thorough and compelling security vetting is a key measure. Security vetting identifies the areas of vulnerability which can damage global confidence within an organisation.

This dissertation is organised in seven chapters aimed at unpacking security vetting in a logical manner. This chapter provides a general orientation which introduces the background of the study, stating the research problem and describing the value of the study. It also highlights the aim and objectives of the study and provides; an overview of the key concepts, the highlights and the challenges encountered during the study.

1.2. Background of the study

Evaluating individuals before you invest in them is not just smart, but critical in a world where one social media posting, can make or break a reputation. The South African state's security is reliant on the ability to maintain the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity which includes human security. Security at the individual level is related to that of the organisation and the state (Mongwaketse, 2016:29; Baldwin, 1997:7). Public confidence is built upon various blocks. Imende (2012:12) believes these building blocks are human attributes and their attainment when conducting responsibilities in the workplace. Imende (2012:9) further states that among the building blocks is the competitiveness of state organs in conducting security matters. The Department of Defence (DOD), its arms of services and Defence Intelligence, through reliable procedures and processes, preside over the reasonable and fair administration of security matters. One of the SANDF's values is to commit to ethics, guided by the code of conduct. This commitment is carried out

through accountability, responsiveness and openness which underpin public interests.

Generally, in all organisations, employees with natural aptitude are rare (Qi, Su, Shen, Wu, & Dou, 2015:353). Thus, organisations experience vulnerability to internal fraud, theft and espionage. Undeniably, a huge number of security incidents are perpetrated by both employees and employers in the organisation. The anthropogenic incidents according to Qi *et al* (2015:253) caused by one employee can potentially be devastating and damage the organisation's reputation. For an organisation to protect its resources and assets, strict security policies must be formulated. However, policies are only effective when employees comply with them (Qi *et al*, 2015:254). Similarly, Snene (2012:108) states that both employees and an employer often fail security policies and measures compliance in an organisational setting. This leads to organisations continuously experiencing losses in the midst of non-compliance (Snene, 2012:101). Furthermore, security managers should understand and prevent threats that come from employees' non-compliance to the policies (Qi *et al*, 2015:353). Topi and Tucker (2014:55) believe that organisations should be responsible for the employment of security policies in order to protect the organisation's assets. Although non-compliance with these policies will always be a concern, organisations should enforce and revisit policies at all times (Topi & Tucker, 2014:55).

During South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy, 1990 – 1996, the political choice was made, that institutions should not practice security vetting (Klaaren, 2007:147). This was clearly stipulated in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report of South Africa, Volume 5, published in 1998. The Goldstone Commission, a judicial commission of inquiry established during the transition period, was seen as the closest to security vetting for transitional processes (Klaaren, 2007:147). It was declared that the use of security vetting to deal with those who were responsible for human rights violations would be inappropriate in the South African transitional context (Klaaren, 2007:148: 150; Mdluli, 2011: 8). This political compromise was agreed upon by political parties and through doctrines of law; which led to the birth of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108, of 1996 and its preamble (Klaaren, 2007:149).

During integration, transformation and democratisation, various challenges became eminent in both the public and private sectors. The integration of the South African Defence Force (SADF), with the forces, of the former states of, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC), as well as Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the Self-Protection Units (SPU) of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and Azania People's Liberation Army (APLA) forces into the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) from 16 May 1994 to 31 March 1998, introduced different shortcomings (Republic of South Africa (RSA), 2004:100). These shortcomings included integrated members who did not have educational skills, whilst others had limited military skills from their previous institutions and structures (Klaaren, 2007: 148). This resulted in circumstances where the SANDF structure was made up of a number of officers placed on different ranks and assigned to different levels of duties that needed responsibility and commitment (Masiapata, 2007:4).

Democratisation also brought incorporated military and police personnel with criminal records into the SANDF and SAPS (Williams 2002:18). The key pointers of the challenges are found in the official records of members found to have committed crimes that include fraud, corruption, theft and numerous others in the SAPS and SANDF. It can therefore be speculated that the SANDF's members' many criminal activities were brought into the department during the integration of forces. However, according to Masiapata (2007:5), not all members from integration are criminals. Yet, there are some defence employees who might take part in criminal activities more than others. In 2000, the DOD developed a new recruitment strategy, the Military Skills Development System (MSDS) programme, whereby members are screened before being employed in the defence force. The MSDS programme was developed to ensure that every member's security position is scrutinised before being employed in the defence force. The system sought to gradually decrease the number of military personnel with criminal records recruited into the SANDF.

1.3. Statement of the problem

The SANDF is faced with criminal challenges ranging from theft, housebreaking, and corruption of all sorts to fraud and nepotism by some of its members. In 2017/18, the Chief of Military Policy, Strategy and Planning in the SANDF, Major General (Maj

Gen) Michael Ramantswana gave a presentation to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD). His presentation covered the state of security measures at SANDF military bases and criminal activities taking place. The presentation was given following an incident at 9 South African Infantry Battalion (SAI Bn) in Cape Town on 14 April 2017, where five armed suspects broke into the unit and stole six weapons. He outlined security challenges such as the theft of firearms, rations, diesel and petrol. He also mentioned the challenge of military court sentences and fines that do not deter the perpetrators and that they do not have jurisdiction over civilians employed by the SANDF (Martin, 2018:1). The table below outlines the crimes committed on military bases over the past five years as presented by Maj Gen Ramantswana.

Table1.1. Reflection of criminal activities that were committed at military bases in the last five years

Criminal activity	Cases 2014/15	Cases 2015/16	Cases 2016/17	Cases 2017/18	Cases 2018/19
1. Possession of stolen property	39	20	28	10	13
2. Housebreaking and theft	73	108	90	39	65
3. Theft of state property	243	229	182	69	132
4. Theft of state vehicles	13	11	06	02	10
5. Negligent loss of state property	16	11	10	04	19
6. Theft from/ out of state vehicles	34	20	17	13	16

7. Theft of pistols	02	05	08	02	03
8. Theft of rifles	04	11	05	10	02
9. Ammunition	07	26	1436	12	05
Totals	428	441	1782	161	265

Source: Maj Gen Ramantswana presentation

The criminal activities outlined in table 1.1 amounted to the following financial losses over the last five years:

Table 1.2. Reflection of financial losses over the last five years

2014/2015	2015/2016	2016/2017	2017/2018	2018/2019
Not available	R7.7 million	R10.8 million	R4.3 million	Not available

Source: Maj Gen Ramantswana presentation

These losses affect ASBs directly, as the SANDF cannot tolerate losses due to its budget constraints and the downsizing the department is faced with. The sharp decrease in losses from the 2016/2017 financial year is a result of more deliberation on the crime prevention operations conducted by the Military Police in an increased effort to reduce crime and enforce discipline.

In FY 2018/19, the Military Police investigated more than 475 cases of 1542 crimes ranging from dealing in drugs, fraud, corruption, possession of drugs, drunkenness trespassing, theft, assault GBH, burglary, loss of firearms, robbery and common assault to possession of stolen goods (RSA, 2019). The Legal Services Division of the DOD has attended to cases, ranging from theft and fraud to corruption. The DOD Anti-Corruption and Anti-Fraud Unit also detected cases and received reported cases (DOD Annual Reports). The table below indicate the cases:

Table 1.3. Reflection of Cases attended by DOD Legal Services Division and Anti – corruption unit in the last three years

Division/Unit	2016/2017	2017/2018	2018/2019
Legal ices division	785 finalised	704 finalised	1460 finalised
Anti-corruption unit	178 cases detected	287 cases detected	57 cases reported

Source: DOD Annual Reports 2016/2017, 2017/2018 & 2018/2019

This study seeks to address whether security vetting is being utilised effectively as a security measure to address the problems of corruption, fraud, nepotism and incompetence at SANDF military bases. Identified criminal activities and incompetence are taking place on SANDF Army Support Bases and other units around the Republic (Defence Web: 2016). This is creating such serious security challenges that one can question the effectiveness of the security measures in place. The question to be asked is: Is security vetting playing a role at Army Support Bases (ASBs)? Generally speaking, this shows that the security measures in place cannot deal with criminal activities on the ASBs. Why is security vetting being chosen for this study? According to Duthie (2007:18), vetting describes a screening process of employees that focuses on security matters of the state. Therefore, vetting can be referred to as a formal process of identifying and removing members responsible for corrupt and criminal activities in the defence force, police, prisons and judiciary (Duthie: 2007:18). In order to restore the positive reflection of the DOD's commitment, challenges at ASBs should be identified and corrective measures must be put in place in order to ensure confidence across the DOD and SANDF.

Criminal activities committed by personnel in the SANDF, may be referred to as a criminal crisis among members and civilian staff. Crisis is defined as a crucial state of affairs where a sequence of bad events takes place within an organisation. In order to correct the critical state of ASBs, a crisis should be managed (Smith & Brooks, 2013:200). Just to mention one incident, a crime allegedly committed by a SANDF Warrant Officer arrested by military MPs for "cash- for- jobs scams" (Petersen: 2019). Other news headlines appearing in the media include; "three members arrested for fraud at SA army base" 2 August 2016 (African News Agency: 2016); "27 SANDF Members charged with fraud" 19 August 2016 (Defence Web: 2016); and "Brig Gen Leon Eggars arrested for fraud and corruption in the support

base, Senior SANDF Officer held for fraud”, 7 July 2016 (Defence Web: 2016). Yet other news headlines read “SANDF confirms weapons stolen over a period of 80 days” (Ngatane, 2019); “Three SANDF Members arrested for fraud amounting R1.1 million” (SANDF media release). The criminal activities mentioned and the numbers given in the presentation by Maj Gen Ramantswana attest to the criminal crisis at SANDF military bases. Criminal activities in the military sector infringe upon the integrity of the state, which undermines its sovereignty. This includes the loss of public trust which creates insecurity among citizens (Cohen, 2017:6). In essence, crime threatens the legitimacy and integrity of the state and its military forces (RSA, 2015: 87).

1.4. Aim and objectives of the study

The aim of the study is to advance and contribute to the understanding of the learning ability in order to address, resolve and manage the problem, by answering questions why, what and how (Doody & Bailey, 2016:19 – 23). It also gives a researcher an opportunity to demonstrate familiarity with the literature, which in turn will assist in grabbing the reader’s attention (Monsen & Van Horn, 2008:42). This study aims to explore the implementation of security vetting at SANDF support bases and get answers to the questions raised. This will make a professional contribution to developing a debate on the issues surrounding security vetting in support of physical security measures.

Research objectives serve as the guide to answering the intentions of the researcher and the purpose of conducting the study (Walliman, 2014). Duthie (2007:20) refers to the vetting process as a one-size-fits-all approach for achieving an objective in the organisation. This study will attempt to:

- describe the legislative mandate of the SANDF in terms of security vetting;
- examine the provision of effective security vetting for members deployed to ASBs;
- explore the challenges encountered by vetting officers in conducting their duties;
- explore the attitudes of members at ASBs towards security vetting;

- describe the importance of using security vetting as a primary security risk control measure and the impact thereof; and
- make recommendations to the executives for improvements to security clearance arrangements and the implementation strategies to enhance the effectiveness of security vetting at SANDF ASBs.

This dissertation seeks to achieve these objectives and is expected to bring about the development of knowledge to assist on the implementation of security vetting, which is critical in ensuring efficiency and effective security control at military support bases. However, it is imperative to encourage a collective effort by all stakeholders for successful implementation. In turn, this will give the DOD a positive security image from an international relations perspective.

1.5. Value of the study

This study will contribute to the academic body of knowledge as well as the welfare of the citizens of South Africa. It is also significant for the SANDF since it will capture the views of employees on the vetting process at ASBs. The information from this study will add value to the SANDF management's evaluation and monitoring of security vetting processes and the effectiveness thereof. The findings of this research will also contribute to changing the way members in the defence force perform their duties and their attitudes towards security vetting. The study will also inform policy for DOD decision makers to add to and to review the existing guidelines. Furthermore, a contribution to the academic body of knowledge will also be made, since the recommendations for further research will be put forward. This study will also inform the DOD about the perceptions of its members towards security measures and security vetting in particular.

1.6 Conceptual overview

This dissertation outlines different concepts which relate to the improvement of the implementation of security vetting at ASBs, which include Security risks, Integrity and security vetting

1.6.1 Security risks

Security risks in the vetting context are all those attitudes, behaviours and vulnerabilities which may intentionally or unintentionally undermine, harm, diminish or jeopardise the organisation's interest or competitive advantage (Attorney General's Department: 2010). Kole (2015:12) defines security risks as the likelihood of suffering harm or loss or exposure to the possibility of any type of loss which affects the victim or an organisation exposed to the risk. Talbot and Jakeman (2009) also define security risk as the activities that can endanger the security of the resources and assets of an organisation. Organisational assets may include profits of the organisation, structures and personnel. Security risks can therefore be described as a situation where the security of an organisation may be exposed to vulnerability or losses due to negligence or unacceptable behaviour of individual employees.

1.6.2 Integrity

Integrity is a complex concept and actually means that a total person is integrated and balanced. Integrity implies adherence to the moral values that are acceptable to the society, be it public or private (Mdluli, 2011: 199). In vetting a context integrity is defined as a range of character traits that a member must possess and demonstrate for the employer, to have trust and confidence in the member's ability to protect the assets of the organisation. This includes a member's adherence to relevant security standards and professional conduct (Duthie: 2007: 17). A person with integrity will present as having a sense of duty and loyalty at all times; being dedicated and trustworthy; virtuousness and obedient; honest and responsible and non-corruptible. In Mdluli (2011:199) it is further stated that the moral perspective of security vetting implies that all employees should maintain consistency in moral values and norms. Moral values are important elements for employees to be able to distinguish between right and wrong behaviour. The researcher believes the integrity of personnel in the SANDF ASB setup should be equated to all the qualities that enable individual members, irrespective of rank, to fulfil the organisational security mandate professionally and in accordance with rule of law standards. Individual integrity refers

to the members' adherence to the international standard of human rights, which includes professional conduct and personal financial propriety (UNDP: 2006).

1.6.3 Security vetting

Mdluli (2011:3) refers to vetting as a careful examination of a human being or something, especially a person prior to employment. The process includes examining and evaluating by performing background checks on a person before offering them a job. RSA (1996:13) defines security vetting as an execution of a policy whereby an investigation is conducted on people in order to determine their security competency. An investigation refers to checking, while security competence refers to the ability of a person to behave in an uncompromised manner. The definitions above complement each other to a certain degree, with the common denominator being that an evaluation should be conducted on a person before they are employed. This implies that an employer and employee context should be considered to be significant in order for a security vetting to be successful in determining security competency. Security competency is measured by considering factors such as integrity, loyalty, corruptibility, susceptibility to extortion, influenceability and acts endangering security (Mdluli: 2011:3). Matakata (2011:2) argues that the reason employers conduct security vetting is in order to understand their employees in totality. However, the researcher believes security vetting is mainly based on the assessment of individual conduct, rather than on the organisational context. Therefore, individuals with integrity deficits are often reluctant to be subjected to the vetting process; which excludes them in the organisational setting, by either denying them security clearance or employing them.

1.7 Challenges encountered during the study

This study was focused on ASBs within the SANDF. The researcher only selected three ASBs for data collection and conducted the study successfully. However, some participants were reluctant to give information because they did not trust that the researcher was conducting research for academic purposes, because of the researcher's working environment in DI. Members in the defence department have a

view that DI employees are always undercover, either collecting information or conducting investigations. The researcher managed to overcome the challenge by spending time with the participants in their units, trying to explain that she is conducting research until she won their trust (see section 4.3.2). The unavailability of some participants due to their busy schedule and commitments outside RSA was also a challenge, for example, the researcher could not interview the military security officer from some units, due to their external deployments. The researcher also failed to conduct interviews with the Chief of the SA Army due to his busy schedule. While the researcher was still trying to secure an appointment, the new Chief of the SA Army was appointed and unfortunately passed away before an appointment for an interview was secured (African News Agency, 2019). This robbed this dissertation of the valuable information that could have come from the Chief of the Army's knowledge. It also became a challenge for the researcher to get crime statistics from the Military Police in time, it took the researcher more than two months which delayed some research processes. Lack of books for referral was also a big challenge since limited research has been conducted on the concept of vetting, especially from a military perspective.

1.8 Summary

This chapter outlined the background of security vetting as a security measure, as well as the concepts of security vetting. The problem statement identifies the challenges encountered by the SANDF after security vetting was not considered during integration processes. The value of the study is expressed in the aim and the objectives the research wants to achieve; this will be determined by the answers to the questions asked. These questions will only be answered after exploration at identified military bases.

CHAPTER 2

AN OVERVIEW OF SECURITY VETTING AND INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES

2.1. Introduction

The current understanding of security measures at the SANDF ASBs may not encompass the security concerns of soldiers, going forward a new concept is needed to take these concerns into account. The concept of security vetting has been established to broaden the idea of security measures in an unprecedented way. In essence, security vetting is an effort to instil integrity and security competence at the ASBs where the trustworthiness of members is central priority. In reviewing literature, the researcher used official documentation such as the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Defence Act, 1995 (Act 68 of 1995); SANDF Code of Conduct; DOD Journals and DOD Annual Reports. The researcher also used Auditor- General Reports; Military Police presentations; White Paper on Defence (1998); White Paper on the Transformation of Public Service Delivery (Batho Pele Principles, 18340 of 1997). The documentation gives a clear indication of the meaning of vetting from a security perspective.

This chapter provides an overview of security vetting, an overview of SANDF ASBs and the supporting structure. The concept of security vetting in the SANDF and an international perspective on security vetting will also be presented. The chapter further outlines the guiding principles of a security vetting system and of security vetting officers, security vetting processes, including polygraph examination, security vetting aftercare and security clearance.

2.2. An overview of security vetting

To date, security vetting has not received much attention from researchers. Therefore, not much is known about security vetting except the processes. Its origins are from the British slang “vet”, for thoroughly vetting horses by a veterinarian before being allowed to race, just like a patient going to a medical doctor for examination.

Lapidos (2008) refers to “vet” as a fancy word for animal doctor, and its origin dates back to the mid-17th and 18th centuries and became popular in Britain in 20th century (Lapidos, 2008). It gave rise to a verb “vet” meaning giving an animal a medical examination. This gave birth to vetting that comes from the process that was conducted in horse-racing, whereby horses had to be checked for fitness and soundness before being permitted to take part in the race (Lapidos, 2008). The examination was then referred to as a “vet”, generally meaning to check or physical examination. The verb gradually gained popularity and started to be applied to human beings broadening the sense of performing medical examinations (Molapo, 2017). The British used it to examine the candidates for military positions, as well as the inspection of manuscript and public speeches prior delivery. In the 21th century vetting is a familiar word used in the government departments, private institutions and state owned enterprises (SOEs). It is used as an evaluation process to subject a person to scrutiny and to examine any possible deficiency.

The researcher holds the same view on the origin of vetting. For a long time, security vetting was practised informally; it just lacked a suitable name until it became popular in the 17th and 18th centuries. In rural areas of Limpopo, from where the researcher originates, vetting has been practiced for centuries. It is also regarded as an ethical process that is practised by communities in African villages. In rural communities, when a family moves from their original village to another village, the family will be put under thorough scrutiny. The process will be done by the headman and the council of the new village; they will seek a testimony document from the previous village. The headman will also send members of his council to get more information about the family from the previous village including the reasons for them considering moving to another village. This will cascade down to the community members who will voluntarily give any available information about members of that family. This, together with testimony and other available information, will form the basis for the acceptance of the family in a new village. Once the village council accepts the credentials, the family will be allowed to stay in the village and within the community. This also extended to matrimonial practices in rural communities. Senior members of the families would intervene in their offspring’s marriages; by either denying or allowing their children to get married to a certain family based on their

background. According to Matakata (2011), the unstructured and structured interviews by council members, community members and the headman shows a traditional way of conducting security vetting.

Recently security vetting has become very popular with businesses that are using it as an examination instrument to determine a person's soundness and integrity. Different authors talk to vetting in a similar way. Matakata (2011:2) and Kopp (2019) refer to vetting as due diligence with many organisations using it when considering employing a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Board of Directors. Other companies will also vet potential goods suppliers to their company in order to determine whether they are entering into business with a credible company which has a good track record (Kopp, 2019). Security vetting is also a process of performing historical background checks on individuals before and after employing them (Mdluli, 2011:2). Security vetting can be used for multiple purposes and not only for employment as perceived by others (Molapo, 2017:7). In Kenya, for example, security vetting measures were used to correct corrupt activities in the judiciary. In Albania the vetting of judges and prosecutors emerged as a measure that eradicated corruption and restored Albanians' faith in the system. The voluntary resignations by Albanian officials became an indication that the vetting process was bearing fruit (Maxhuni & Cucchi, 2017:3).

Security vetting is used as an administrative measure and not as a criminal or accountability measure, it does not subject anyone to imprisonment, but may prohibit one from being employed in an organisation. Some employers take security vetting findings seriously; where the repercussions may be removal or denial of certain positions, depending on the classification of the job (United States Department of State: 2016). Security vetting goes across all levels of an institution and its processes involve verifying all historical events of an individuals' circumstances and behaviour, to ensure the integrity of the public institutions and their members. In general, the security vetting concept is used as a microscopic tool for the determination of integrity and security competence (Rusere, 2013:1). Matakata (2011:2) refers to vetting as a process of public power which involves an examination of previous and current employment and other records of individuals for

hiring purposes. Security vetting can also be regarded as a process of conducting due diligence, because of its deep searching of an individual's integrity nature (Matakata, 2011:4).

Security vetting has always been indirectly practised in all spheres of the world. Communities' efforts to exclude people they do not know much about from their midst explain their security consciousness. Communities also exclude members whose lifestyles are compromised from staying in their villages. This practice encourages communities to adhere to ethical practices, which becomes a lifestyle. Security vetting has been an evolving system to prevent the development of security loopholes (Matakata. 2011). It is a systematic procedure of searching which is conducted to determine an individual's security competence. Vetting of potential employees can assist in protecting the integrity of an organisation, which assists in reducing losses due to criminal activities. The integrity of a public official and public job seeker refers to the person's adherence to the prescribed organisational norms of human rights and professional conduct, including their financial propriety (UNDP, 2006:20). The objective of conducting security vetting at ASBs is to safeguard intelligence, operational equipment and financial assets and to preserve the safety and well-being of employees and their partners. The level of security clearance is given to an individual according to their access to confidential information or according to their area of responsibility. The decision to grant security clearance for access or to be deployed to a higher-level of national security is based on the outcome of the security vetting process (Rusere, 2011).

2.3 An overview of SANDF Army Support Bases

The vision of SA Army is to keep a professional and dynamic force at all times. This force must always make preparations to provide for sustained landward capabilities by the Chief (C) of the SANDF in order to fulfil the DOD mandate. The mandate of South African Army is to provide combat ready land forces for the pursuance of the landward defence capability in order to achieve the national security goal. This includes promoting peace and stability internally, and externally in execution of international obligations. The SA Army also forms part of the development and upliftment of South Africa, the community and the African continent (RSA, 1996). For

example, the current emerging continental threat environment needs the SA Army to be prepared and equipped to conduct simultaneous, geographically dispersed operations across the spectrum of the conflicts.

The SANDF came into being on the eve of the 1994 democratic elections and thereafter on the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, following the decision to integrate non-statutory forces (Stott, 2002). The SANDF took and integrated all SADF personnel, Ciskei Defence Force, Venda Defence Force, Bophuthatswana Defence Force and Transkei Defence Force, from the former Bantustan homelands with their equipment's. The incorporation also included the former non-statutory forces of political parties including, MK, APLA and the Self-Protection Units of the IFP (Stott, 2002). The process was tremendously entangled and marred by strain and disappointments, with some members of MK and APLA feeling excluded. Since integration, the SANDF has undergone processes of restructuring, downsizing and transformation. Integration is a process of merging armed forces and military traditions into one defence force after the end of a war or conflicts. In the case of South African, integration mean transforming from an apartheid government force to one for a democratic dispensation (Frankel, 2000:197).

The SANDF is a unique component of the DOD and an important lever of power at the disposal of the state and is at the core of national security. It is also responsible for protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, its people and resources through its different armed forces (RSA 2015:95). Section 202 (1) of the Constitution of South Africa identifies that the President of the state is the Commander in Chief of the SANDF. The Commander of the SANDF (CSANDF) is appointed by the President of South Africa from one of the Arms of Services, preferably from the SA Army (RSA, 1996). The CSANDF then reports to the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans (MOD & Vets) (Defence web: 2013). The CSANDF is a primary adviser to the Minister on military matters and capabilities (Bester & Du Plessis, 2015:209; RSA, 2015:105).

The SA Army like most armies of the world has gone numerous changes over time. The political situation within the country always played a major role in the direction

the SANDF took. It started off in 1910 by amalgamating enemies from the Afrikaner and British sides of the Anglo Boer War into a unified Union Defence Force (UDF) in 1910. The UDF was not a unified force and faced a number of challenges in terms of political unrest and even survived open rebellion in 1914 (Martin & Orpen; 1979). Even with all this political upheaval, the UDF showed its ability to contribute positively in providing forces during the First and Second World Wars (Dorning, 1987).

The SA Army was the first service arm to be formed on June 14, 1912; after the Union of South Africa was created in 1910 under the command of General J.C. Smuts. The South African military has the traditions of the Boer War, waged by the forces of the Boer Command (Militia), and the historical mistrust of the Afrikaners over large standing armies (Dorning, 1987: 2). It was part of the largest British effort in World War I and World War II. On the 31st May 1961, South Africa became a Republic, the dream that many Afrikaners and during that time, apartheid was implemented and repression of internal opposition continued (Williams, Worger and Byrnes, 2010). Between 1966 and 1990, the army was involved in a long and unpleasant counter-revolt campaign in Namibia. It also played a role in controlling political violence within South Africa during the late 1980s and in the early 1990s.

The mandate of the SA Army has changed fundamentally since the early 1990s and after 1994 to become part of the new SANDF (RSA, 2015). This saw a merging of old racially segregated structures and the introduction of a new democratic structure that works with the explicit values of good governance, transparency, and accountability (Masiapata, 2007:3). The fundamental change brought about a drastic improvement in the strategic environment at all levels, which saw the unrepresentative government and the war against its own people and neighbouring states in the SADC region come to an end (RSA, 2006:4). The SANDF is now increasingly focusing on peacekeeping efforts in the SADC region, often as part of broader African Union operations. The SA Army is composed of approximately 42100 regular uniformed personnel, increased by approximately 41000 reserve force employees (RSA, 2018/19). The army's age rating structure, which deteriorated during the 1990s after transformation, is gradually improving through the MSDS voluntary service system that has been introduced in the military (see sec 1.3).

According to Dorning (1987), the SA Army was originally divided into 14 military districts and reorganised into 15 districts in July 1914. The then headquarters was based in East London and consisted of the 2nd Infantry Brigade and 5 and 6 Batteries of the Permanent Garrison Artillery. The SADF, Northern Transvaal Command was originally divided into eastern and western sectors, while the Northern Cape had to be formed from the scratch and the Southern Cape Command was merged with the Western Cape to form one command. The officers who commanded the new Commandos were usually Brigadiers (Dorning, 1987). Training, housing, administration, discipline, and counter insurgency were all commanded by the Brigadiers (Lillie, 2012:8). Prior to the reinstatement of the Transkei Defence Force into the SANDF, the Eastern Province was commanded by Chief Brigadier T.T. Matanzima. Today, the Commandos have been redesignated as Army Support Bases (ASBs) (Lillie, 2012:8).

Chapter 11 of the Constitution provides that the main objective of the SANDF is to protect and defend the country, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the constitution (South Africa, 2002; Le Roux, 2005 240). This includes improving and maintaining comprehensive defence capabilities such as peace, internal political stability, and security in the republic, region, and continent (DOD 94/95 Annual Report). The SA Army as a SANDF component needs to adhere to the supply chain of resources and communication lines that bring stocks of military equipment to operational areas through the ASBs. ASBs ensure the availability of material, facilities and services, as well as the logistical movement of materials in support of military operations. The DOD's logistics division supports ASBs and as described in the SANDF doctrine and Defence Review, military logistics is the first line of logistical support and services for all operations (South African Defence Review: 2015).

After the closing of the Provincial Commands Units, the South African Army Support Formation was established with the command of ASBs in all nine provinces; in the towns and cities of Potchefstroom (ASB), Johannesburg (ASB), Polokwane (ASB), Nelspruit (ASB), Durban (ASB), Port Elizabeth (ASB), Cape Town (ASB), Bloemfontein (ASB) and Kimberly (ASB). The aim of the ASBs is to bring logistical supplies closer to nearby units instead of drawing logistics from depots that are far

from the units. Most of the army units are not given self-accounting status therefore if they need stocks they have to request and procure stocks from an ASB.

The other reason for the establishment of ASBs was to reinforce units that did not have facilities to store logistical stock. Units can request stocks for specific operations, training or exercises that will then be distributed to the different sections of the units. Different ASBs in the respective provinces have the following structure of units and depots under their support.

Table: 2.1: ASBs supporting structure

SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY SUPPORT FORMATION	
ASBs	Depots and units
Garrison GSB	Pretoria is home to a large joint service base called Thaba Tshwane (GSB Garrison), which also supports the South African Army College, the National Ceremonial Guard and Band, the Military Police School, 1 Military Hospital, 2 Parachute Battalion, 44 Parachute Engineers, 44 Parachute Anti-Aircraft Regiment, 1 Military Printing Regiment, Tshwane Regiment, 18 Rules of Light and 4 Regiment of Research and Map. The Dequar Road Base in Pretoria houses the Transvaalse Staats artilarie and the Pretoria Regiment; The Joint Support Base in Wonderboom houses the Signal School, 1 Signal Regiment, 2 Signal Regiment, 3 Electronic Workshop, 4 Signal Regiment and 5 Signal Regiment. Technical-based complex Centurion; the Training of Army Engineers and a general support base; Wallmansthal, 43 SA Brigade Headquarters; Centurion Battalion 3 parachute.
Eastern Cape ASB	Gives support to the the Grahamstown City Army Base; 6 South African; Infantry Battalion and the First City Regiment; Port Elizabeth Prince Alfred's Guard; Mthatha Army Base; 14 South African Infantry Battalion; Greenacres Piet Retief Regiment.

Free State ASB	One of the largest bases in the country is the Tempe base which is located in Bloemfontein and gives support to the 1st South African Tank Regiment; 1 Special Service Battalion; South African School of Armour; 44 Parachute Regiment and 1 South African Infantry Battalion; the parachute training wing; the Bloemspruit Regiment; Vrystaatse Artillerie Regiment and Regiment President Steynas; 3 Military Hospital; De Brug Mobilisation Centre; Kroonstad School of Engineers, and an army band; and Bethlehem Field Engineers Regiment 2.
Johannesburg ASB	Johannesburg gives support to and houses the 21st South African Battalion; 46 South African Brigade headquarters; 6th Regiment of Field Engineers; 1 Building Regiment; 35th Engineering Supplies Regiment; Rand Light Infantry; the Johannesburg Rules of Procedure; Transvaal Scottish Regiment; East Rand Regiment; Irish Regiment President Kruger; Transvaal Artillery House and Light Horse Regiment; Benoni East Transvaal Regiment; Springs 6 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment; the Heidelberg Army Gymnasium SA; Germiston Army Base; the Witwatersrand Rifles Regiment; Vereeniging Regiment Vaal River.
Kimberly ASB	Kimberley supports the Air Defence Artillery School; 10 Anti-Aircraft Regiment; 3 South African Infantry Battalions, Kimberley Regiment and 44 Anti-Aircraft Regiment; and Lohatla's SA Army Combat Training Centre, where large army field exercises take place. It also gives support to the 101 Field workshop and the 16 Maintenance Unit; and an army base in Upington houses eight South African infantry battalions.
Kwa-Zulu Natal ASB	Gives support to the Army Band, Durban Natal Light Infantry Field Artillery; Rifles Mounted in Natal; Umvoti Mounted Rifles; the Durban Regiment; and the 19th Regiment of Field Engineers; in Pietermaritzburg, it supports the Christmas Carbineers; Mtubatuba Army Base, 121 South African Infantry

	Battalion; the Ladysmith Army Base, 5 South African Infantry Battalion
Limpopo ASB	Gives support to the Polokwane Army Base, Army Band and Regiment Christiaan Beyers; Phalaborwa Army Base which includes 7 South African Infantry Battalion and 5 Special Forces Regiments; and Thohoyandou Army Base with 15 South African Infantry Battalion (Thohoyandou).
Mpumalanga ASB	Provides support to ASB Middelburg Army Base, South African Infantry Battalion and Barberton Botha Regiment.
Potchefstroom (NW) ASB	Provides support to ASB Potchefstroom Army Base, Artillery School, 4 Artillery Regiment, Mobile Artillery; Regiment (Artillery), School of Tactical Intelligence, 1 Tactical Intelligence Regiment, De La Rey Regiment, Potchefstroom University Regiment and Moorivier Regiment, Mahikeng's Army Base; the Zeerust Army Base.
Western Cape ASB	It supports ASB Cape Town; the Army Band, the Cape Town Highlander Regiment; Cape Town Rifles; Artillery Cape Garrison; Youngs Field Regiment Western Province; Orange River Regiment and 3 Regiment of Field Engineers; Wingfield Airfield, the Cape Field Artillery; 9th South African Infantry Battalion; the Oudtshoorn Army Base.

Figure 2.1: Adapted from South African Army

The ASBs personnel are logistic heavy due to the nature of their operations. The ASBs were integrated under the command and control of SA Army Support Formation which supports military units with combat and mission readiness commodities. The SA Army Support Formation supports the management of equipment, human resources, gives strategic direction and commands all force structures within the SA Army.

2.4. The concept of security vetting in the SANDF

DI is committed to good administration of all assets in the DOD, which amongst others includes using any mechanism which is able to detect and deter criminal activities by its members in their areas of responsibility. This includes the maintenance and enforcement of discipline as regulated by Section 200 (1) of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa, which requires the SANDF to be managed as a disciplined military force. The office of the Chief of the SANDF provides continued military direction through instructions and directives to the functional divisions to ensure security, integrity and the execution of the Constitutional mandate by its members. This includes proper administration at all military bases in the Republic and the safeguarding of assets by the soldiers deployed. The current security developments at ASBs and other bases are clearly reaching a point where collective engagement by DI and the SA Army to demand more consideration of the security vetting principles is needed. In as much as it is important for employers to understand why the employees commit fraudulent activities, it is also important that the SANDF prevents these criminal activities by strengthening security measures at all their military bases. This can be done by continuously conducting security vetting at the military bases. Security vetting catches out members who give false information to the employer (Rusere, 2013:1)

The SANDF regards security vetting as a specialised and integrated function which resides within the Defence Intelligence (DI) Division, counter-intelligence is their responsibility. Counter-intelligence is an intelligence discipline and security mission which is involved in controlling the breach of security of the state (Van Cleave, 2013: 1). It extends beyond the recruitment function, which is aimed at ensuring that suitable and reliable personnel are accepted into the DOD. Instead, it has a long term responsibility; with a primary focus on ensuring a pervasive state of personnel security within the area of responsibility. This primary focus is a continuous responsibility of the Minister of Defence, DOD as well as the Armaments Procurement and Development Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) and its affiliates. In the SANDF the security vetting system is of importance with its main function to safeguard the integrity of its members (Inspector General of Intelligence

(IGI), 2005). The security vetting process is conducted to protect the country against threats. Meloy and Hoffmann (2014:3) define a threat as anything that can cause harm or that has potential danger to an organisation. Crimes that are committed by soldiers at military bases have the potential of bringing the organisation to its knees. Security vetting is also a form of personnel security which is developed within an overall security framework that ensures SANDF members are not a security risk. This includes the evaluation of individual's character, attributes, background and lifestyle (Brooks, Corkill, Pooley, Cohen & Ferguson, 2010: 36).

DI, through Directorate Vetting, is therefore responsible for identifying and understanding threats from foreign powers and more importantly from within the DOD. In essence, Directorate Vetting is responsible for ensuring that personnel employed within their area of responsibility adhere to the mandate of defence. Directorate Vetting also appoints both soldiers and civilians as vetting officers to conduct security vetting processes and they report directly to Director Vetting. The mandated responsibility of DI is stipulated in Section 37(2) of the Defence Act (Act 42 of 2002). The Act states that all employees in the DOD should be appointed and retained as employees, provided they have been issued with a grade of security clearance by DI. The Act further states that security vetting should remain a continuous exercise to counter criminal elements in the SANDF (RSA, 1996).

In view of this and related legislation, security vetting in the DOD involves a systematic investigative process aimed at determining security competence and calculating security risk (Matakata, 2011:16). It is also used to evaluate the suitability of members to be issued with clearance that is determined by indicators which includes maturity, responsibility, honesty and loyalty (Brooks *et al*, 2010: 36). To achieve this, a combination of screening, fieldwork (data collection), polygraph examination and psychological evaluation should take place (Matakata, 2011:16). This is done to assess the applicant's trustworthiness, reliability and fitness for the responsibilities stemming from their area of responsibility. Security vetting is an open network that operates in a dynamic, ever-changing environment in the Directorate Vetting. Together with other counter intelligence functions, such as Departmental Security Directorate, it forms a protective security network, which protects the departmental assets against counter intelligence threats that may

manifest in the form of acts endangering security (RSA, 2012).

Mdluli (2011:7) argues that security vetting in the apartheid era (SADF) was more politically orientated than now. For example, security vetting would concentrate more on determining whether people were spies, previously referred to as terrorists. All the South African intelligence services pre-1994 derived their mandate from apartheid prescripts. Racial discrimination pre-1994 was institutionalised and race laws allowing certain jobs to be reserved for whites and others for non-whites (Mdluli, 2011:7). Security vetting was not considered for human rights violations, but to continuously use as a tool to enhance apartheid laws. However, during the period of cold war and apartheid the incorporated organisations also used vetting to their benefit. The ANC and APLA camps in exile had the security departments of their political organisations to conduct security vetting for individuals joining their camps (Matakata, 2011:2). Members were asked to provide their biographies to the authorities to prevent infiltration. The previous regime also vetted people in prisons. For example, unstructured interviews would be conducted with people visiting political prisoners to prevent infiltration and the continuous coordination of information (Matakata, 2011:2).

Security vetting establishes the level of trust the institution should have in its members, determining the level of access to classified documents, the area of responsibility and any other security related matters (Kumar, 2017:443). All members of the SANDF must be in possession of a confidential security clearance before being considered for any other security clearance prescribed by the type of the responsibility the member is to undertake. Security vetting in the SANDF is of importance and its effective conduct underpins the work of every service division in the SANDF (RSA, 2012). The MOD through the SANDF protects the security, independence and interests of RSA at home and during operations abroad. DI provides security vetting to SANDF members identified by the Officer Commanding of the Unit. This includes members intending to go on official visits to foreign countries for conferences, workgroups, course attendance, projects and liaison purposes. They should all be in possession of the prescribed grade of security clearance and should adhere to the grade requirements of the host country (RSA, 2012).

2.5 General security vetting processes

Security vetting is regarded as the first line of defence in the SANDF. Therefore, it is conducted at the recruitment phase and subsequently when responsibilities of the subject changes, in order to validate an identity and ensure the integrity of members. Integrity ensures the honesty of an individual and determines vulnerabilities (Brooks *et al*, 2010). No person is indebted or can be forced to participate in security vetting processes, especially a reference. However, some departments and positions will need a person to be vetted depending on the nature of the responsibilities of a post (Cabinet Office, 2010:7). For example, a member who is recruited in the intelligence environment and works with sensitive information or at a national key point should possess a valid security clearance. The security vetting framework in the SANDF is tailored according to organisational needs. These needs include initial vetting for the employees who have not gone through the process before; continuous vetting and periodic reviews which is ongoing; upgrading a clearance to the higher risk level and re-establishing a clearance after a lapse in continuous vetting (Boyd, 2019:1). Security vetting in the SANDF is conducted to ensure that members who are in certain positions are fit and proper to be placed with such responsibilities and are unlikely to be vulnerable or compromised (Cabinet Office, 2010:7). Processes of security vetting are divided into three phases, namely: administration, investigation and adjudication. Figure 2.1 below shows a vetting cycle which explains the steps of security vetting.

Figure 2.1 Diagram of Vetting Cycle




Figure 2.1. Vetting cycle: adapted from RSA 2011

A security vetting process is carried out to investigate the person’s life in order to determine eligibility for the issuing of security clearance and to provide at the level of assurance to their trustworthiness, integrity and reliability (RSA, 2011:12). The process takes the “whole person concept” to determine the security competency and risk potential which includes all favourable mitigating and aggravating factors embedded in the relevant context (UNDP, 2006:31). The security vetting cycle (Fig 2.1) above indicates the phases of the vetting process and how they are divided into steps that are interdependent on each other (RSA, 2011:13). Security vetting officers conduct vetting through interviews and other methods of investigation such as overt and covert sources. The references listed on forms, and other names that may surface during vetting processes, are the main sources of valuable information that

vetting officers will use (Matakata, 2011:42). A detailed discussion of the security vetting process follows.

2.5.1 Administration phase and pre-security vetting

In the SANDF, the security vetting process starts with the OCs of the units who are in charge of the administrative support of the unit or division. Their responsibilities include ensuring that every member in the unit possesses a security clearance depending on their area of the responsibility. An OC in the SANDF is the administrator of all personnel processes in the unit or division. The administration phase is helpful for both interviewee and the interviewer to adjust clearly prior to the actual vetting process. During this phase, members are advised to complete a DD1052 form that is filled in by DOD members for vetting purposes and to submit supporting documents to the vetting administrators. In other departments, a Z204 security clearance form is completed. The forms are forwarded to the vetting directorate (RSA, 2011:13).

- **Vetting problem**

The vetting is instituted by the OC, whether the application is for the member to be issued with a new clearance or for other reasons such as special projects. The application will also determine the grade of the clearance a member is applying for; and whether the grade complies with the post and policy requirements. The OC sends the request to the Directorate Vetting, to conduct security vetting. The types of vetting requests are urgent, which is conducted on a member who has commenced employment without a clearance; routine, is conducted when an employee is already working; and ad-hoc, which is conducted for contractors and contract workers, which are a normal day-to-day vetting processes conducted by the Directorate Vetting (Matakata:2011:23). Essential Elements of Information (EEI) are always determined by the Vetting Officer after going through the application forms (RSA, 2011:13). EEI are all those elements of information that are important and accurate in order to achieve the vetting process objective.

- **Vetting appreciation and planning**

Vetting appreciation is a survey process that answers to the vetting problem. Vetting Officers work through all relevant available documents to identify the right path they have to take to guide an investigation. Appreciation means to understand a situation and realise what is important and the recognition and enjoyment of such good qualities. This includes proposed developments conforming to vetting requirements (Acheampong, 2019:123). Vetting appreciation is important in giving guidance to the whole process with an emphasis on the significance of EEI (RSA, 2011:13).

2.5.2 Vetting investigation and collection phase

The vetting investigation phase is the actual security vetting itself, where the Vetting Officer correlates information and fills in the gaps. It includes interviews, report writing and recommendations. This exercise requires an officer to use diary notes more often in order to record important information related to this phase.

- **Collection**

After receiving a file and an appreciation is completed, a Vetting Officer will start planning for the collection of information and data which is carried out systematically. Data collection methods include available documents such as divorce files and work enquiries, interviews of informants from different backgrounds and any other information which officers can come across when the process is ongoing. The Vetting Officer must update the collection plan on a continuous basis (RSA, 2011:13). This process helps a Vetting Officer to get answers to all questions during data collection and to ensure that other available information is captured during the collection process. A vetting officer should document all activities and including kilometres travelled in the execution of tasks in their diary (Matakata, 2011:21).

- **Polygraph examination**

Polygraph testing is an integral part of the security vetting investigation process for both military and civilian employees in the investigation process. Commonly

referred to as a lie detector, a polygraph does not recognise lies but it measures the response of deception. Deception is a frequent essential feature in human behaviour that may be expressed in different situations (Paltmier & Rovner, 2015:1). Nelson (2014:45) argues that it is called a lie detector because of its convenient nature. Polygraph examiners strive to establish psychological sets in the subject that will detect any response to specific questions as a result of deceptive answers (Grubin, 2010:447). Ben-Shakar (2012:1) also refers to the polygraph as a system designed to detect memory traces that connect a criminal to a crime. Paltmier & Rovner (2015) define polygraph testing as diagnostic procedure of using instruments to assess credibility of information given as statements. All the above authors refer to polygraphs as a method to establish the truth from an interviewee. This implies that when the adjudicators refer a file for polygraph examination, the main objective is to quantify the information given in other vetting steps.

The SANDF only uses polygraph examinations for Top Secret security clearances. However, the adjudication panel may refer a secret file for polygraph examination to confirm the reliability of the information provided by the interviewee. There are some instances where the SANDF legal team may ask for a member to undergo polygraph testing without even undergoing the security vetting process. This mostly happens in cases where the court wants to prove the evidence given to court. Many researchers including the National Research Council concluded that polygraph accuracy is between 81% and 91% (Grubin, 2010). Polygraphs are also employed with success in the United States and other countries in criminal justice systems and national security settings. Nelson (2014:46) indicates that polygraph techniques are capable with an average over 90%, with a confidence range from 86% to 96%. In essence, the test accuracy depends on effective interviews, test administration and data analysis of the whole process by the polygraph examiner. On a practical level, a polygraph is used to measure physiological responses involving the respiratory, cardiovascular and integumentary systems including somatic activity in the skeletal muscles (Nelson, 2014:42).

The Constitution of RSA 1996 protects an applicant or a subject to undergoing a polygraph test. A Vetting Officer may request an applicant to undergo a polygraph test which the applicant can refuse. Regulation 6 of the Intelligence Regulations, 2003 stipulates that such refusal does not constitute a reason for the refusal of a security clearance. In cases where an applicant refuses to undergo a polygraph test, the vetting authority should use other investigative tools in order to test the reliability of the information provided by the subject (Mdluli, 2011: 149). The regulation further protects the subject from being drawn into negative inference by the vetting authority.

The main objective of conducting polygraph examination in the security vetting process is to confirm or refute information collected during the investigation step of security vetting. A negative polygraph result alone cannot justify the refusal of security clearance (Lucas, 2018: 21). However, the adjudication team considers the merits of all the collected information, the recommendations by the evaluators and the polygraph results and recommendations in order to issue or refute a security clearance.

- **Psychometric evaluation.**

Within the security vetting process, psychometric evaluation involves the application of a number of psychological tests also called standardised self-report measures. These measures determine an applicant's personality profile and the extent to which positive and negative character traits could impact on their security competence. In determining those traits, personality, integrity and emotional intelligence assessment are conducted. Psychometric evaluation is a mandatory requirement for top secret security clearances, as well as for other grades of clearance if deemed necessary by the Security Vetting Panel. All psychometric activities in Directorate Vetting which includes the acquisition of instruments, as well as testing, scoring and interpretation, are executed in accordance with guidelines as stipulated in the legislation.

The polygraph and psychometric structured data collection efforts are regarded as an ad hoc collection due to the nature of their influence on the

outcome of security clearance. It is normally influenced by the information or insights gained through behavioural observation, during interviews, and liaison with the other counter-intelligence functions that are included to produce a rich data set. This data set is subjected to a logical sequence of analytical activities to extract meaningful counter-intelligence focused results.

- **Processing and evaluation**

Security vetting officers evaluate, paste and interpret the information or data collected to produce intelligence at the processing stage. The process of evaluation can be carried out by either vetting officers or by the designated evaluation team. Gardner (1999) defines intelligence as a human's ability to learn from experience, to solve problems using knowledge and generating new ideas.

The evaluation implies the evaluation of all information collected with respect to the applicability, value, accuracy, credibility and reliability of the sources (Mdluli, 2011:118). In the evaluation phase, data is collated. Collation in the evaluation phase implies a systematic screening and annotation of all information to ensure that the maximum value is obtained (RSA, 2011:13). Interpretation talks to the information in intelligence. This determines the meaning of the information collected and its relationship to existing or known information. During the interpretation of the data collation occurs. Collation also implies writing reports, making deductions and writing conclusions. Therefore, any serious deviations will make it difficult to interpret the findings of the interviews and in this case, to finalise reports (RSA, 2011:13).

2.5.3. Vetting adjudication phase

Vetting adjudication is a final step in which a vetting file is submitted to the panel of decision makers to give a judgment based on the findings of all vetting cases (Sakuwa:ny).

- **Vetting panel and adjudication**

The adjudication panel makes the decision to grant or deny clearance, depending on the information provided by the subject and the results of the interviews

(Sakuwa:ny). The panel assesses the suitability of the member to maintain a security clearance, considering their integrity according to the information in the vetting file. For security vetting purposes, integrity is defined as the character traits of honesty, reliability, maturity, tolerance, resilience, and loyalty. At adjudication, depending on the information presented to the panel, some files may be sent for polygraph testing in cases where a member is being examined for a secret security clearance (RSA, 2011:13). In some cases, a file may be redirected to the vetting official for further investigation if the adjudication panel is not satisfied with the information at hand. In terms of judgment, the panel always judges depending on the information presented. This is applicable even if the panel wants to downgrade or upgrade an individual's security clearance (RSA, 2011:13). For example, if a member is to be issued with Secret clearance, the panel may recommend that such a subject should undergo a polygraph test depending on their area of responsibility and the kind of information that the subject will access (Sakuwa:ny).

- **Dissemination**

Dissemination is the final step of vetting process. After the panel has taken a decision and issued a security clearance, the OC is informed of the outcome of the requested release. The dissemination of information refers to the distribution of information to the relevant actors, which includes the issuance of a security clearance to the subject. A vetting panel may refer a file back to the Vetting Officer if there are discrepancies. In cases where a member needs further scrutiny before a security clearance is issued, the vetting panel will send a member for polygraph tests (RSA, 2011:13).

OCs and managers at all levels of the SANDF are encouraged to ensure that all members are always in possession of a valid security clearance issued by Defence Intelligence. The CSANDF directives instruct the OCs to take the responsibility for submitting vetting applications for their members. There is an obligation on Generals to ensure that their subordinates' degree of security release corresponds to the security classification of the information and duties to be performed. A security clearance in the SANDF is not coupled to an

employee's rank or position, but to the access that a post requires. The security check aims to establish the safety competence of an individual concerned, which is their integrity and reliability in handling classified information and performing classified operations (Mdluli, 2011:79).

Bearing in mind the discussion of the processes above, security vetting is a complex and sensitive procedure that cannot be conducted by a simple box ticking exercise. Thorough investigation and evaluation of a person based on true objective and unbiased judgement should be conducted, in order to reach an accurate conclusion, which indicates that a person is loyal to the DOD and not a security risk.

2.6 Security clearance

Matakata (2011:45) refers to a security clearance as an authentic document that is issued by the authorities to the member, which confirms that they can be entrusted with handling sensitive information. It also confirms the trustworthiness and reliability of a subject in the organisation (Matakata, 2011). Sensitive information is information that should not be disclosed to irrelevant individuals and should be protected from unauthorised access (Colby College: 2015). Security vetting is a process by which processes are conducted in order to reach a final decision on issuing a security clearance. The main goal of conducting security vetting in an organisation is to determine whether past behaviour can be a negative effect or complicate the future reliability of that individual. Security clearances in the SANDF and DOD are issued to ensure that employees can be entrusted with accessing classified information and are not vulnerable to blackmail and criminal activities. The vetting process requires information to be provided to the Directorate Vetting according to the specification. Details of the required information stretch from previous years to the present. A security clearance is the result of a positive security vetting investigation that indicates that a member has been investigated. It also provides the reasonable assurance of the suitability of that individual to access classified information and to be trusted in handling assets. However, security clearance does not guarantee that the same individual can be reliable in future.

One of the SANDF's chief responsibilities is to protect national security, personnel and DOD assets; that includes safeguarding the country against threats. The level of security clearance for SANDF members depends on the level of the information a member will be required to regularly and routinely access in their position. In the DOD security clearance is issued on the following levels: Confidential (C) is issued to persons who will have access to confidential information; Secret (S) is issued to persons who will have access to secret information and Top Secret (TS) is issued to persons who will access top secret information (MISS, 1996). In countries such as Australia, security clearance is issued to the level of Top-Top secret (TTS) which is issued to the highest offices of the land (Qi *et al*, 2014:353). The information that is required for security clearance may vary according to the clearance classification. It should be able to allow the assessment of whether members who are to be employed might represent a security risk indirectly or directly (Cabinet Office, 2010:15).

Security clearance is subject to renewal. A member who is issued with S and TS security clearance should renew their security clearance periodically. S and TS clearances are valid for five years, whereas confidential clearance is valid for 10 years. Security clearance cannot be transferred either. Every security clearance is attached to the particular institution and not transferrable to a new organisation (Matakata, 2011:50). When members are transferred or employed by another organisation, their security clearance lapses and they must apply for a new security clearance with the new organisation (MISS, 1996:45). However, there are exceptions where security clearance can be transferred if a member is changing jobs in the same workplace (Matakata, 2011: 51).

It is imperative for members and vetting officials to renew security clearances regularly to reflect changes in circumstances. As a result, individuals are asked to complete the DD1057 form to renew the clearance. This includes the rechecking of information held by the vetting authorities. The process of review is ongoing, and can be carried out any time new information such as matrimonial, academic and many other circumstance changes occur. It is the duty of a security vetted staff member to declare all changes in personal circumstances or any other matters that could be relevant to their continued retention of the security clearance (Cabinet

Office, 2018:13).

2.7. Disapproval of security clearance

Security clearance is not a right, but a privilege. Therefore, the vetting panel may decide whether to grant or not to grant a security clearance based on an assessment against adjudicative guidelines (Whakamarumarū: nd). The adjudicative process is the careful examination of the whole person concept, which includes sufficient evidence in a person's life which proves a condition of acceptable security risk (US Department of State, 2019: 1). The adjudicative guidelines may include criminal offences and misconduct; the use of substances; financial consideration; behavioural disorders; citizenship and foreign influence and loyalty to the Constitution of the Republic (Mdluli, 2011:102). When a person's historical background does not meet the requirements of adjudicative guidelines, questions may arise as to whether that individual can be relied upon and trusted where security is paramount. Therefore, the answers to these questions determine whether an individual can be issued with security clearance or not.

Section 39 of the Constitution gives a mandate to the Secretary for Defence to issue a written notice to members who have undergone security vetting processes regarding the outcome of the security clearance application (Mdluli, 2011:77). If members have been denied a security clearance, Section 39(4) (c) of the Constitution of South Africa provides that members should be afforded an opportunity to lodge an objection by submitting their written submissions, supported by any available necessary documents to the Secretary for Defence and the Review Board.

2.8 The guiding principles of the security vetting system

The aim of security vetting is to ensure the character and individual conditions of an employee are such that they can be trusted by government with information and resources (UK House of Parliament, 2017: 5). Guiding principles are norms or ideas that reflect an approach that dictates or influences the implementation of the core mission in making decisions in order to achieve an organisational objective. The significance of these guiding principles of security vetting provides a blueprint for

action. They also define the parameters within which security vetting officers should consider the information to ensure the implementation of security vetting within the security framework. The guiding principles provide that a security vetting concept should be conducted according to the global standard framework (United Nations Human Rights, 2014: 6). The Inspector General of Intelligence's (IGI) guiding principles of security vetting revolves around security competence and security risks (IGI, 2005).

2.8.1. Security competence

Security competence is measured by amenability to bribes or corruptibility; blackmail or susceptibility to extortion, open to influence and acts endangering security. The concept of security competence and its reciprocal relationship with security risk guides the energy contained within the security vetting system. This energy is channelled into the processes and the outcome that helps vetting officers, to determine security competence and enables them to calculate the risk within the whole process. Security competence is defined as the credibility afforded to members as a result of their potential to demonstrate integrity and reliability in the treatment of security issues (IGI, 2005).

A wide and impressive range of behavioural issues and other contextual issues that are evaluated within the "whole person concept" informs security competency (IGI, 2005). The whole person concept means that an applicant and interviewee is judged on the basis of all available information stating their security competence and risk potential, including all favourable, mitigating, and unfavourable, aggravating factors are incorporated into the relevant context (US Department of State, 2019: 1). For example, a security-competent person is expected to demonstrate personality, behavioural and moral tendencies that show an inclination to handling sensitive issues responsibly, reliably, and ethically (see section 2.7). According to Berry and Berry (2017: np), under the whole person concept, the adjudicator should assess a subject's eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of their circumstances. An adjudicator is a person who evaluates documents for security vetting and gives judgement of security eligibility for the security clearance. In the case of DI, adjudicators comprise of a team led by a Maj Gen. This team is guided

by the information provided by evaluation officers and in cases of a Top Secret security clearance, by the results of polygraph tests. The whole person concept is useful in describing the individual's character to show that the individual's conduct - be it in the community or workplace is good (Berry & Berry, 2017). The positive recommendations by vetting officers and evaluators to the adjudicators should be informed by the subject's loyalty, maturity, integrity, honesty, tolerance, resilience and trustworthiness (Matakata, 2011:55). These character traits are assessed in order to determine with confidence that the subject possess a sound and a stable character which cannot influence their area of responsibility (AGSVA, 2018:21).

2.8.2. Security risk

Security risk is defined as those actions by an organisation or individual that aim to undermine state security and are not in the interest of the government (See section 1.6.1). This may include espionage, sabotage, subversion and acts endangering security (IGI, 2005). From security vetting perspective, Matakata (2011: 49) states that security risk is determined on the basis of the degree of the vulnerability of a person and how extreme the potential impact of such a threat is. For example, a person who has access to sensitive matters on a regular basis stands a greater risk of being targeted for criminal activities than someone who does not have that access. By implication, a person may potentially pose a security risk. Security risk extends beyond a reactive perspective to a more proactive perspective. Matakata (2011) further explains that non- adherence to basic security policies and procedures of office security and directives also poses a security risk to the organisation. For example, a person who is not involved in actions that may jeopardise security, may still pose a security risk if there is a reason to believe that their security competence is questionable (US Department of State, 2019:1; Vetting DODI, 2012).

Therefore, it is evident that security risk is mediated by a person's security competence. For example, a security competent person is expected to pose less of a security risk, while a person whose security competence is under question is also likely to pose a security risk. Logic would therefore dictate that as a person's security competence declines, their security risk potential increases and vice versa.

Furthermore, security risk potential is expected to play a defining role in determining a person's security competence (US Department of State, 2019). In this regard, regular access to classified information and frequent contact with adversarial individuals should be taken into account when determining a person's security competence (IGI, 2005). However, security competence and security risk may not necessarily always be equated. By virtue of their access and contacts, a person may be considered a security risk, while their personality, behavioural tendencies and moral demeanour may point to a high level of security competence (Vetting DODI: 2012).

Security risk potential therefore does not necessarily imply a lower security competence. This relationship between security risk and security competence underscores the need to consider all relevant factors within the "whole person" concept perspective (IGI, 2005). This can only be achieved by arriving at a clear and comprehensive picture of the individual person - in all their contextual complexity (Vetting DODI, 2012). To this end, Directorate Vetting has adopted a rigorous methodology to ensure that well-informed vetting decisions are made on the basis of security competence and security risk. It can therefore, be concluded that a security competent subject in security vetting is a security risk free subject (US Department of State, 2019: 1). The next item discusses how security vetting officers should conduct themselves when they execute security vetting processes.

2.9 Guiding principles for security vetting officers

The overarching objective of security vetting is to create security conditions that enable the DOD and other government entities to do their work by neutralising and impeding threats. Security vetting is a profession. As a result, security vetting officers (VOs) should demonstrate professionalism and good ethics when carrying out their duties (Matakata, 2011:17). This professionalism should be guided by the following:

- **Understanding and upholding the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996**

The Constitution of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, is the supreme law that guides all citizens on how to live side by side with their compatriots. It safeguards the interests of the country and its citizens. VOs should conduct themselves in line with the constitution (Matakata, 2011: 17).

- **Upholding human rights**

As stated in the Constitution, every citizen has a right to be respected. VOs are duty bound to respect and apply the same values. They cannot violate human rights laws and they must always strive to promote the human dignity of their interviewees.

- **Respecting the rule of law**

Respect for the rule of laws is an important point of departure for all VOs when conducting security vetting. The law is there to protect those who abide by the law and punishes those who transgress it. VOs must ensure that they stay on the right side of the law in order to avoid legal consequences for their organisation (Matakata, 2011).

- **Acceptance of the legitimate government**

VOs must respect and support the legitimate governments by protecting it. A change in government can happen overnight; it is therefore encouraged that VOs remain neutral and maintain the same standards.

- **Patriotism**

Patriotism is the love for the country that individual members have for the RSA. VOs must ensure that they protect the sovereignty of their country against access to classified information by the foreign intelligence services. A patriotic VO will defend and execute their duties diligently and truthfully.

- **Non- partisan**

VOs are not expected to practice discrimination while executing their duties. They must put aside their loyalties to their individual institutions which could otherwise influence their professional conduct. Neutrality is always encouraged in VOs in the execution of their duties.

- **Confidentiality**

VOs are not expected to disclose any confidential information, even if they are writing columns in their personal capacity. They are expected to hold everything that revolves around their profession in the strictest confidence.

2.10 Security vetting: a personal responsibility

One of the chief responsibilities of the SANDF is to safeguard the nation's security by protecting the community and national assets. To achieve that, the SANDF must have a range of security measures in place, including personnel who defend the country (Cabinet Office, 2010:4). Security vetting does not provide a guarantee for an individual's security competence and security risk. Circumstances and behaviours that may change overtime means security vetting cannot provide a guarantee of an individual's integrity, trustworthiness and reliability (UK Navy, 2016:3). It is vital that security measures are continuously maintained after security clearance has been granted. This is in order for the new information about an individual to be collated, analysed and tested by the authorities on a continuous basis. Members of ASBs have a responsibility to maintain the appropriate level of security clearance by engaging in the continuous maintenance of their security clearance status. It is a duty of the management to always remind members that failure by a member to satisfy the commitment to security competence, may lead to drastic measures being taken in the military. This should be emphasised by encouraging members to always adhere to military security policies applicable to ASBs. All members serving on ASBs are also obliged to make applications for security clearance and renewal. Members are also expected and encouraged to provide the authorities with information as honestly and expeditiously as possible. Directorate Vetting should continuously encourage members to conduct security vetting within the ambit of transparency,

proportionality, confidentiality and timeliness. These principles assist in determining the whole person concept below is a brief discussion.

- **Transparency**

The effectiveness of security vetting procedures depends upon honest, transparent communication between the interviewer and interviewee involved in the vetting process (UK Navy, 2016). The most essential commodity in human nature is trust. Trust is created when both members involved in the security vetting process become transparent, which in turn will make the vetting process legitimate (Laurens, 2013: np). In essence transparency should be the means of creating trust between the vetting official and an interviewee. The most common problem in the vetting process is the subject's non-disclosure of information (Whakamarumarū: nd). It is the subject's responsibility to reveal all information required by the vetting officers. This ensures smooth engagement between the vetting officer and the subject (Matakata, 2011:33).

- **Proportionality**

Vetting procedures provide credible information regarding integrity, reliability and trustworthiness of the vetted individuals. When conducting security vetting, it is imperative that the interviewer apply proportionality. Proportionality is a general principle of law that is used as a criterion of fairness and justness. It assists in discerning the appropriate balance between the restrictions imposed by a corrective measure and severity of the nature of a prohibited act. The process also assists in security risk assessments. However, the assessment and recommendations must be presented proportionately to ensure legitimacy and to protect sensitive information and assets (UK Navy, 2016).

- **Confidentiality**

Appropriate security measures should be taken to ensure that security vetting confidentiality is adhered to at all times. The members participating in the security vetting process should take into consideration that the information provided is for security clearance only (Matakata, 2011: 19; NITA Uganda, 2014: 18). This principle ensures that all information regarding security vetting processes should

be treated on a strict “need-to-know” principle, in order to protect the subject. All vetting correspondence should receive classified treatment and their access should always be classified to a relevant classification (UK Navy, 2016:8). Information security principles should always be applied from the beginning of the interviews to their conclusion (Matakata, 2011:37).

- **Timeliness**

All participants in a security vetting process should ensure no unnecessary delays. Timeliness is very important when a security vetting process is underway. This is to prevent cases from becoming protracted and causing undue pressure on the participants (UK Navy, 2016:8). All subjects of security vetting should be encouraged to be open and honest and to not withhold any information during interviews (Matakata, 2011:33). This ensures a smooth vetting process, without consulting more individuals for information verification (UKSV, nd).

Security vetting is a personal responsibility. The importance of conducting security vetting is to validate a person’s identity and ensure the integrity of the person and determine any security vulnerabilities (Kumar, 2017:443). Security vetting may identify the unexplained gaps in employment. The process also helps to establish confidence in the employee being vetted. The verification of an individual’s information during the security vetting process ensures the legitimacy of all the information provided. Therefore, employees should always be encouraged to comply with vetting processes, and also to report any changes that may occur while vetting processes are underway to the vetting officer to avoid conducting the same process several times.

2.11 Security vetting aftercare and renewal of security clearance

Following-up on security clearance is arguably the most important part of the security vetting process. Security vetting is based on a “snapshot in time” and personal circumstances are always subject to change overtime. These changes may affect the suitability of individuals to maintain their security clearance (Alba, 2018:17). Changes in personal circumstances may also affect the suitability of the clearance holder to perform their duties diligently. It is therefore imperative that this suitability

is continuously assessed and monitored after security clearance has been issued. Renewal of security clearance should be a priority as after a set time it will lapse. Members should also be encouraged to report and update any relevant changes such as change in marital status, co-residents, change of addresses and of any criminal associations. All this should be done in writing to the Chief Defence Counter-Intelligence (CDCI), who will refer the correspondence to Directorate Vetting. It is the responsibility of management and all other stakeholders to ensure renewals of security clearances and assessments. Directorate Vetting must always remind members through UMSO of the relevant changes in connection with their clearance coming to their attention (Alba, 2018).

The security vetting aftercare process reveals and enhances information related to the breach of SANDF policies, legislation, integrity, standards of behaviour which the DOD is unaware of. In such a case where discrepancies are revealed during the monitoring process, the matter is immediately referred to DI counter - intelligence for appropriate action (Alba, 2018:18). During the aftercare process, changes in circumstances may be revealed which may have a prejudicial effect on the subject's suitability to maintain the level of security clearance. In that case, withdrawal or downgrading of security clearance must be considered by the adjudicating panel, on advice by the VO. However, security clearances can only be withdrawn if the subject has been involved in the most serious of cases that have a serious integrity effect. The decision on withdrawal of security clearance following adverse information is documented and kept in the subject's vetting file (Alba, 2018).

From the above discussion, one can conclude that security competence and security risk calculation rely on behavioural factors from different perspectives. These factors are informed by the impressive range of individual relevant values and cultural dispositions of an individual. The next section discusses the international perspective of security vetting.

2.12. An international perspective on security vetting

Security vetting is practised in different parts of the world, with each country conducting it according to their own specific needs (Lucas, 2002). It is a feasible institutional mechanism for transitional democracies to assess suitability for

employment and related security matters (Maxhuni & Cucchi, 2017: 2). For example, in Northern Ireland security vetting is about confirming the previous records of individuals with the sole purpose of excluding unfaithful people and those susceptible to committing criminal activities from employment in government (McEvoy & White, 1998: 341). In the United States of America, security vetting is conducted to check if an individual's past criminal conduct can influence their future reliability and trustworthiness (Moynihan & Combest, 1997). Generally, security vetting tries to comprehend whether an individual's past can influence the future conduct of the person in an organisation.

In some countries, security vetting is used to discriminate against those that cannot be incorporated when government transits from war to democracy. In countries such as Belgium, Rwanda and Yugoslavia, who emerged from periods of armed conflict, security vetting is conducted to exclude those who were involved in human rights violations (Duthie, 2007:19; Molapo, 2017:7). In order to assess the integrity of people in the security environment, whether they adhere to human rights standards, professional conduct and whether they will be able to handle finances in their areas of responsibilities, security vetting is used (Duthie, 2007: 17). Duthie (2007:17) further states that other countries conduct security vetting in order to check whether people considered for employment are suitable candidates that the state can utilise. The candidates are screened to determine their background history and to check whether their behaviour warrants them to be included in public institutions or not (Duthie, 2007:18).

Security vetting always entails an in-depth search process for identifying and the removing of security incompetent persons involved in abuses from the army, prison services, the police and judiciary. Although, it was not considered in the South African transition to democracy in 1994, vetting remains a larger process that cuts across institutions for identifying suitable employees in the public sector (Halmai, 2016: 26). Though the continent is riddled with conflicts, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Nigeria are some of the few counties where security vetting is practised. A discussion on how the United Kingdom, Kosovo and Serbia conduct security vetting is also part of this study.

2.12.1 Ghana

The 1992 Ghana Constitution is the fundamental law which represents the best effort to codify the country's aspiration for democratic governance (Gyimah-Boadi, 2005:1). Introduced in 1992 after the adoption of the constitution, security vetting is practiced differently in Ghana compared to South Africa. Members who occupy senior positions in the public sector appear before a parliamentary committee to answer questions for vetting purposes. In Ghana, the word vetting (approval) carries negative political historical baggage with negative connotations. The parliament of the then Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) era had an inquisitorial and repressive vetting process, which undermined the constitution (Gyimah-Boadi, Iddrisu & South, 2005:5; Gyimah-Boadi, 2005:1).

The current vetting system is a revised process as a result of a lawsuit from the NPP opposition which demanded that vetting should be conducted on all ministerial nominees. This was regardless of whether they were suspended or continuing to serve in the parliament. Such a call by the NPP was to expose wrongdoing disqualifying unsuitable candidates from being part of the government. This has, however, been questioned by many because there is no clarity as to whether the parliament as the committee which conducts vetting has the authority to reject the president's nominees, especially if the majority in parliament belongs to the ruling party. The authors refer to the first parliament of the Fourth Republic vetting process as ceremonial. They further stated that it began to be taken seriously during the second parliament. Unlike other states that keep security vetting processes confidential, Ghana prefers a transparent publicised vetting process; especially when conducting appointments for parliamentary members. This is in order to accommodate opinions by members of the public. Despite the scarcity of resources, vetting remains a highly recognised resource for the healthy growth of democracy in Ghana (Gyimah-Boadi, Iddrisu & South, 2005:5; Gyimah-Boadi, 2005:1).

Security vetting is also part of recruitment for public employees in Ghana. Tenge (2014) states that in Ghana, a police security clearance certificate is issued by a designated security agency, the Criminal Data Service Bureau (CSBD) of the Police

Criminal Investigations Department (CID). The agency carries out three types of security vetting, namely, vetting of new employees, vetting of those people who apply for firearm licences and people who wish to obtain visas for travel purposes. Other designated security agencies conduct nominal vetting which is conducted on all public servants whose positions involve handling of classified information (Human Resource Management Policy Framework and Manual for the Ghana Public Services, 2015: 31; Tenge, 2014). In Ghana, security vetting forms part of the recruitment process for military personnel and civilian employees in the armed forces. In February 2014, Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) announced that it had intensified security vetting in the country due to criminal activities that took place at their Naval Training School and Infantry Base. GAF extended its effort to intensify vetting processes by also weeding out all corrupt serving military and civilian employees in the armed forces (Republic of Ghana, 2014).

2.12.2 Kenya

Kenya is not a post- conflict country and did not go through transitional processes (UNDP, 2010:5). The country adopted vetting as a mechanism to reform institutions and to address governance deficits. In Kenya, security vetting is at an evolution stage, where the government continuously signs new vetting bills into acts. Security vetting is not centralised in Kenya, all departments conduct their own security vetting, including the judiciary. Though their vetting criteria is the same, the Kenyans' vetting practice differs from South Africa. In South Africa all departments except the military and police, conduct the administration and investigation part of the vetting while the adjudication and issuing of security clearance is done by State Security. The Kenyan vetting strategy is different, most of the departments and institutions conduct their own security vetting which is guided by Section 9(2) of the Kenya Public Appointments (Parliamentary Approval) Act no 33 of 2011 (Republic of Kenya, 2011). Security vetting is conducted according to the constitutional and legal requirements including the established procedures.

The government of Kenya takes security vetting very seriously which can be seen in the amendments of the security laws and the publishing of Vetting of Judges and Magistrate Bill in 2010 which became an Act in 2011 (UNDP Kenya: 2010:3). After the act was passed in parliament, the judiciary in Kenya underwent institutional

reform that included security vetting which commenced in 2012. The long term objectives of security vetting were to address inefficiency, incompetence and corruption, and establish public trust in the judiciary (McAllum, 2016:171). All senior public appointments including parliamentary members in Kenya are guided by security vetting. Members of public participate in the vetting process through the submission of an affidavit to support or deny the nomination. The public's submissions must be in accordance with Kenya's section 7(10) of the Public Appointments (Country Assemblies Approval) Act No. 5 of 2017 (Republic of Kenya, 2017b).

National Security Intelligence (NSIS) in Kenya is the central organ of state responsible for security vetting. The organ has been governed by military personnel such as brigadier and major generals. The Kenyan Defence Force (KDF) conducts security vetting for its personnel at the recruitment phase before military basic training (Republic of Kenya, 2017a: np). More information is not provided about the maintenance of vetting in the military. However, the researcher believes that security is an ongoing process in the KDF. This is because Kenya Military is regarded as the best in Africa and the rest of the world (Megged, 2015).

2.12.3 Nigeria

Nigeria gained independence from the United Kingdom on 1 October 1960 and changed to a democracy in 1999. The democracy occurred against a backdrop of a serious problems faced in the country. The military imposed an illegitimate constitution on the people of Nigeria (Mustapha & Whitfield: 2009: 73). All vetting and screening processes are conducted by the State Security Services (SSS) of Nigeria, according to Instrument No. 1 of 1999; Section 2-(3) of Decree 1 of Nigeria Constitution (Ajani, 2011). The Nigerian government practices security vetting processes in a similar way to South Africans and the objectives are the same. Both countries conduct vetting in order to detect espionage, subversion, sabotage, economic crimes and terrorist activities threatening law and order (Babalola, 2016). However, no further indication was given as to whether security vetting is centralised or not (Molapo, 2017:14). The Nigerian Army also conducts its security vetting.

The Nigeria Defence Intelligence Agency conducts an efficient system of obtaining

military intelligence for the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence. Nigeria's Military Intelligence was first established on 1 November 1962 as a Field Security Section of the Royal Nigerian Army (RNA). The RNA later emerged as Directorate Military Intelligence (DMI) and the groups are collectively known as the Nigerian Intelligence Agency (NIAC) (Omobuwajo, 2013:33). The primary functions of the DMI are to conduct security duties which include vetting of army personnel. Most of the activities are shrouded in secrecy, which is the nature of most intelligence components across the globe (Omobuwajo, 2013:33). According to the above author, since Nigeria is a developing democracy, most of the information regarding security matters has been classified which makes it difficult to access more information regarding security vetting in the military. However, every defence force that has counter intelligence in the military has a section to regulate the integrity of the security forces in order to prevent and detect espionage, subversion, sabotage and terrorist activities (Omobuwajo, 2013:33).

2.12.4 Liberia

Security vetting has been conducted in Liberia since 2004 after the establishment of security sector reforms (SSR) programmes by the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission (UNAMIL) of the Liberian National Police (LNP) (Africa Report No. 148, 2009; International Centre for Policy and Conflict (ICPC)). During the time of the SSR programmes, the security vetting process had been conducted by the United Nations mission team with the involvement of the Liberian police and military. Some LNP officers were recruited and vetted to assist the team with the assessments. The recruitment included applicants who wanted to join the newly established police force (Malan, 2008:x; Malan & Besada, 2009: 220).

The interesting part in Liberia is that the whole SSR programme in the country is informed by security vetting process. This includes the military sector reform (Malan, 2008: xi). One of Liberia's resolutions after its war was to vigorously vet all candidates in the force. This was to ensure a non-resistant force and to prevent violence within communities. According to McFate (2008:65), failure to vet indigenous security forces would lead to infiltration and corruption of the security sector. The author further states that infiltration is an endemic factor that the country would find difficult to correct (McFate, 2008:65).

In Liberia, the public is also consulted and participates in vetting processes by, if possible, lodging complaints against candidates not fit to be employed in the police service. The process was conducted for two years and afterwards major problems were observed. The problems included prevalent corruption, poor leadership and lack of knowledge on how operations should be conducted based on human rights requirements and Liberian legislation. However, reform in the army seemed to be somewhat successful. The soldiers underwent a rigorous vetting process which experts indicated was successful when compared to international standards (Africa Report No 148, 2009). The process of involving the public in the vetting processes of the country is similar to the one of Ghana where communities are also involved to ensure transparency.

2.12.5 Tanzania

Security vetting in Tanzania is conducted by the Ethics Committee, thereafter it gives the recommendations and opinions on the outcome of the process to the Central Committee (CC). The CC is the third organ of the party which is responsible for vetting candidates after members of the secretariat and the ethics committee have done their job (Saikobo, 2012). The Tanzanians take vetting very seriously to the extent that their department of education, through the Tanzania Institute of Education (TIE), also conducts vetting on textbooks that are supplied by publishers. Their objective with textbook vetting is to ensure that the publishers provide relevant materials that are suitable to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in their education system. The publishers submit the dummy copies that must meet the Ministerial Textbook Vetting Committee's minimum technical specification (Rotich, Kogos and Geuza, 2018: 97). Tanzanian Defence Intelligence conducts security vetting of its members. Hence security vetting in the military is classified and is not discussed.

2.12.6 Zimbabwe

Security vetting in Zimbabwe is centralised. The Central Intelligence Organisations (CIO) is the most powerful arm of the Zimbabwean security apparatus, it oversees how the organs of state conduct their security issues. Both the military and police intelligence structures link directly to the CIO which is represented down to the lowest administrative structure of the government (Southern Africa Report, 2011:11).

In Zimbabwe, people seeking jobs, applying for visas to travel abroad and to obtain work and study permits have the responsibility of producing police clearance, which attests to their previous criminal records. The above-mentioned security vetting is conducted by the police and is called police clearance (Zimbabwe Republic Police). Their way of conducting security vetting is quite different from the South African system. This is because every public servant has a security clearance in Zimbabwe, which is not the case in South Africa.

Zimbabwe conducts security vetting on the whole population. Unlike Zimbabwe, in South Africa, only those who occupy sensitive positions or access classified information are vetted. This attests to the seriousness of the government of Zimbabwe towards the security of the country. After the 2002 elections, Zimbabwe public servants had to be vetted to establish the political organisation they belong to. New security forms were designed in order to cleanse the unwanted from the regime (Mutambara, 2002). Zimbabwe also conducts security vetting in the private security industry for security guard employment. Zimbabwe keeps their vetting processes confidential, not much is said about it in open source documents. Security vetting of Zimbabwe military forces is also conducted by the CIO which is the central entity of intelligence which conducts intelligence for the Zimbabwean government.

2.12.7 United Kingdom (UK)

In the UK, security vetting is of national importance and it underpins the functions of armed forces, police and government departments. Security vetting in the UK is centralised and conducted by United Kingdom Security Vetting (UKSV), which was formed from the amalgamation of Defence Business Service (DBS) and National Security Vetting and Foreign and Commonwealth Office Service (FCOC). The UKSV was established in January 2017 by the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Their objective is to vet individuals to allow them to access sensitive information, locations and equipment (Auditor General, 2018). Though the operating model for UKSV has not been fully established, the UK prides itself on the modern, professional, high quality, customer focused, cost effective and timely services which meet their requirements.

Security vetting policy is created and vetting standards are set by the Cabinet Office, and the UKSV is responsible for the implementation. As its umbrella department,

MOD is responsible for monitoring performance and has oversight of UKSV. Security vetting is mainly carried out at the recruitment phase and subsequently when a member changes their area of responsibility (Cabinet Office 2018:9). In the UK, security clearance is issued at different levels, namely: Counter Terrorist Check (CTC) which does not permit access to international information and only allows individual's access to departmental confidential information; Developed Vetting (DV), which permits the individual access to international classified information to the level of Top Secret (TS); Security Check (SC), which allows access of a person to international classifieds at the level of Secret and Positive Vetting (Top Secret); and Reliability and Counter-Terrorism Checks that are configured to provide the appropriate level of assurance (Cabinet Office, 2016:12). Enhanced Positive Vetting (EPV) is restricted to intelligence and security services and is conducted under the Security Services Act 1984 by MI5 (British Domestic Intelligence). The EPV consists of departmental, criminal, security and credit checks, including in-depth interviews with the subject, colleagues and relatives. The process includes completing a questionnaire, interview with the candidate, interviews with arbitrators and after the investigation a recommendation is made to the Permanent Head of the Department. Vetting factors that are considered at this level typically include criminal or discredited personal conduct, great debt, family members living in a foreign country, psychological inadequacies and political attitudes. Positive Vetting (Top Secret) is conducted by the Ministry of Defence's Personal Security Investigation Unit and is used in the case of diplomats and police members and those requiring access to secret documents. The checks are the same as the EPV, but in less depth (Lukas, 2018:38; UK Cabinet Office, 2010:9).

The Reliability and Counter-Terrorist Checks are not intensive and focus mainly on criminal record checks and dishonesty. The checks are mainly conducted for the service providers and for individuals with access to little confidential information (Lucas, 2018). With the Counter-Terrorist Checks, the purpose is to establish if there are connections to terrorist organisations. Under normal circumstances, the decision regarding security vetting of this nature is made by the Permanent Head of a Department (Lucas, 2018:39). The Cabinet Office is planning to reform their security vetting processes to including IT systems and third party checks (Auditor General,

2018:5). Security vetting in the UK regulates employment of individuals according to the statutory right, this includes the exclusion of disloyal members and those considered to prone to be disloyalty for various reasons (Lucas, 2018:37).

2.12.8 Kosovo

Security vetting in Kosovo is conducted to ensure an effective security vetting system that protects the interests of the republic. The aim is to thoroughly evaluate a person. Vetting in Kosovo is regulated by Law no. 03/L–178 on Classification of Information and Security Clearance (Peci, Agani, Gjokolli, Zyrapi and Xhoi, 2016: 34). The Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA) is the custodian of security vetting procedures for all public institutions of the Republic of Kosovo (Muharremi, 2015:5). It was established by the Kosovo Assembly on 21 May 2008 (Peci et al, 2016:34). KIA is obliged to form a special vetting department which is responsible for the implementation of security vetting procedures. The Department of Security Vetting (DSV) and its personnel ensure professionalism by not engaging themselves in politics and they are non-judgemental when they conduct vetting proceedings (Muharremi, 2015). The population addresses their applications for vetting procedures to the DSV; the DSV reports directly to KIA and security clearance is issued to the individuals by KIA (Peci *et al*, 2016). In Kosovo, security clearance is a precondition for access to classified information and a person also signs a confidentiality declaration. Persons who can have access to classified information without a valid security clearance are the President, Head of Assembly and the Prime Minister, but on condition that they need to be aware of that information (Muharremi, 2015). Security clearances are issued at C, S as well as TS depending on the application of clearance.

However, the conducting of security vetting is different with the Kosovo Armed Forces which are controlled by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation). NATO/KFOR Military Civil Advisory division (MCA) through its Force Unit Vetting (FUV), has conducted the security vetting process for Kosovo Security Force (KSF) members since 2008. KFOR is responsible for conducting the vetting process of NATO members and all the procedures and standards are the same procedures

applicable in all NATO countries for the vetting of armed forces. Vetting conducted on KSF members is more of a background check. Secret and Top Secret security clearances and security vetting procedures are conducted on all middle and senior management including uniform and civilians (Muharremi, 2015: 9). Security vetting processes in the Kosovo Police started in 2013 by KIA after a request from the Kosovo Police Director. Also vetted are members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kosovo (Muharremi, 2015: 8). Though KIA conducts security vetting for Kosovo security institutions, the government is intending to establish an office within the prime minister's office to conduct security vetting procedures for the security sector. This is in order to protect security vetting processes from political, administrative and personal influence (Muharremi, 2015: 8).

2.12.9 Serbia

In Serbia, the law on police, classified information, Armed Forces, Military Security Agency (MSA) and Military Intelligence, Security Information Agency of Weapons and many others regulate how security vetting should be conducted. The main objective of conducting security vetting in Serbia is to assess security risks for accessing classified information. The government has also adopted individual by-laws to thoroughly regulate the process of security vetting (Rizmal & Vijnovic, 2015:18). Security vetting in Serbia is not centralised, as a result different agencies and departments conduct security vetting according to departmental needs. Security vetting for individuals to access classified documents in the army is conducted by the MSA. The same applies to individuals who want to access Security Information Agency documents. Cooperation is encouraged between all authorities who conduct security vetting in the country (Rizmal & Vijnovic, 2015:25).

The Ministry of Police conducts their own vetting as a pre-employment condition for individuals who are seeking employment in the ministry. The police conduct security vetting in order to establish the existence or non-existence of security impediments. In December 2013, Serbia passed a law that prescribes that every security officer must receive security clearance before employment. All professional military personnel are subject to security vetting. Their vetting is conducted by MIA. In May

2016, Serbia also applied security vetting to individuals who want to acquire a licence to carry a weapon and ammunition (Rizmal and Vijonovic, 2015:29).

The international community continues to improve their ability to detect the insider threat by assessing identity, integrity and character of their personnel through the use of security vetting. The African tradition of conducting security vetting differs from country to country, though the process remains uniform. All countries, except Kenya and Ghana on the African continent keep security vetting details confidential. The main objective of all countries that conduct vetting is to combat crime and to defend the sovereignty of the country. The UK, Kosovo and Serbia are transparent in conducting security vetting, unlike most African countries where vetting is treated as a confidential or secret process. Kenya and Ghana are the only countries on the continent who are open about their security vetting processes. Transparency in security vetting processes can help other countries who want to establish or improve vetting standards to benchmark on such countries. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for example, does not practise security vetting due to the continuous political instability. However, security vetting mechanisms will be established soon, as a central component in bringing stability to the country. The DRC can succeed efficiently if all African countries can be transparent about their security vetting processes so that it will be able to benchmark on the African perspective of conducting security vetting.

Security vetting processes in many countries remains the responsibility of different, relevant intelligence or outsourced agencies. However, it is not clearly identified who refuses or grants security clearances. This also applies to the duration the vetting process take.

2.13 Summary

This chapter discussed the purpose of security vetting in the SANDF and the provision of security to the republic. The history of SA Army and the formation of the ASBs and their functions in supporting different military units have also been discussed. The chapter also outlined the guiding principles of security vetting

systems and security vetting officers, and security vetting as a personal responsibility. The chapter also gave an overview of security vetting processes which included best international society practice on security vetting. The process of security vetting and maintenance of security clearance on a continuous basis is encouraged to safeguard the sovereignty of the country. The following chapter discusses legal frameworks which outlines the regulation of security vetting in the SANDF.

CHAPTER 3

LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON SECURITY VETTING IN THE SANDF

3.1 Introduction

The importance of the legislative framework in the democratic dispensation is to ensure that organisations comply with relevant legislation that governs their conduct in the execution of their security duties. The SANDF has upheld the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, security and the rule of law since its inception in 1994. Security vetting in the SANDF is the first line of defence and a security risk mitigating tool which excludes certain individuals who are security incompetent and a security risk from forming part of the organisation. Security vetting meddles with the privacy of individuals and their immediate environment, to the extent that it is of utmost importance that it be regulated thoroughly when it comes to the manner in which it is conducted, and to establish redress mechanisms in instances of maltreatment (Jankovic, 2015).

The Department of Defence determines its security vetting mandate under the National Strategic Intelligence and Defence Act 42 of 2002. Fundamentally, the use of security vetting as a safety tool is lawful and regulated in South Africa. The Directorate Vetting in DI, derives its vetting mandate from the Constitution of South Africa, 1996, Defence Act 42 of 2002 and is further informed by the Public Service Act 103 of 1994, the National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994, MISS Document of 1996, The Bill Rights, Public Service Regulations of 2001, the SANDF Security Vetting Policy, as well as the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. The Code of Conduct also controls what is expected of individual SANDF members. This chapter gives an overview of the legislation mentioned.

3.2 The Regulatory Framework on security vetting in the SANDF

Hoggart (2013:4) defines legislation as a set of laws produced by the state regulatory body in order to regulate, authorise, sanction, grant, declare, or restrict. The legislation defines the legal principles governing the responsibilities of event

organisers and other stakeholders, such as authorities, in order to protect the safety of citizens and organisations (Hoggart, 2013:4). Legislation often determines integrity principles and the broader outcomes within which security vetting processes are to be administered, this includes structures and functions that must be implemented during the process. The approach should ensure that integrity, equity and security vetting principles are adhered to. In the SANDF, security is a command responsibility which every Commanding Officer of the divisions and arms of services is accountable to, for the maintenance of all security matters in their area of responsibilities. This command should be communicated to all subordinates in their duty sheets or a general command directive by their managers. A directive is a written document in the SANDF which is used for communication purposes (DODI/000132).

3.3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996)

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa determines that the SANDF is the only legal military force in the country, which must protect the country, its sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interests and persons in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and a framework of international law for the use of force (South African Defence Review, 2015: 42). The Constitution of South Africa is a legal system that regulates every South African and from which the government derives its powers. The structure of the constitution provides the principles of the separation of powers as stipulated in the Bill of Rights. The Constitution also outlines legislation that provides for how security vetting should be conducted in the mandated organisation (Lucas, 2018:7). Section 14 of the Constitution provides that every person has a right to privacy which includes protection from the searching of their residential areas and properties and seizing of their possessions including infringement of their communications. The same section 14 (d) applies to security vetting processes. Section 36, also provides for the limitation of rights.

The SANDF performs security vetting functions on members in order to protect national security from espionage and other intelligence activities. All intelligence activities are conducted under the auspices of the Joint Standing Committee on

Intelligence (JSCI). The JSCI was established in terms of the Intelligence Services Oversight Act 40 of 1994 to monitor counter-intelligence matters, including security vetting functions in the security cluster (Lucas, 2018:16).

3.4 Defence Act No 42 of 2002

The Constitution of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) mandates the DOD through DI to conduct counter-intelligence within MOD and ARMSCOR. Section (36) subjects DI through NSIA to conduct and institute counter-intelligence measures and activities in the DOD and ARMSCOR. A Service Legal Agreement (SLA) signed between the two institutions regulates the conduct of CI matters at ARMSCOR. Chapter 8 of the Defence Act, section 50(2) also notes that to maintain security in the DOD, every employee and member of the SANDF may undergo searches, inspections and screening of all types including intercepting their communication devices and check who they communicate with. Section 34 of the Act further empowers DI to perform intelligence functions and to use strategic intelligence to ensure security of defence assets.

Section 37 stipulates that DI conducts security vetting and continuous screening of SANDF members. However, other state departments continue to provide DI with information and data to conduct effective vetting and screening. Continuous vetting and screening remain an effective security counter measure to detect and identify members who get involved in criminal activities. It also deters criminals from committing crimes and detects those that would be employed with links to criminal elements. Section 37 (2) prohibits the enrolment, appointment, promotion, commission or retainment of a member of the SANDF if that person has not been issued with a valid security clearance by DI (South Africa, 2002 (a)).

Section 50 (2) provides for security vetting processes to probe into the private lives of members. Members applying for TS security clearance undergo compulsory psychometric or polygraph testing (South Africa, 2002). It also states that if members fail to comply with all necessary provisions, the outcome of their security clearance may be affected. According to section 50, a security clearance may be downgraded if an OC can make a submission to the relevant authorities stating the

facts for such. Section 50 further stipulates that a security clearance is not transferrable, hence it is terminated immediately when a member leaves the DOD. Other factors that affect termination of security clearance include pending criminal and civilian cases against a member. In a case where contravention of the Military Disciplinary Code (MDC) is pending, DI can postpone the issuing of security clearance. In other words, security trustworthiness indicators include loyalty and commitment to the SANDF. The indicators include association with extremist groups, personality behavioural patterns and vulnerability to coercion, blackmail and extortion (Wellington, 2010:8).

3.4.1 SANDF's Code of Conduct

The White Paper on Defence (1997) established parameters for the operation of the SANDF. This was also supported by the launch of the Code of Conduct for uniformed SANDF members by the then Defence Minister Mr Mosiua Lekota, to commit uniformed members to be consistent with SANDF objectives (Stott, 2002:np). The SANDF's Code of Conduct guidelines are directional and command what should be done by members of the organisation. The Code of Conduct is a living document that must remain in the hearts and minds of soldiers to value (Cole, 2000). The Code of Conduct is defined as a set of principles that are adopted by an organisation in order to define specific principles for which such an organisation stands and employees must respect. The SANDF Code of Conduct refers to established standards, policies and practices that aim to guide members in terms of right and wrong behaviour. It is also a visible public statement of organisational values, duties, and obligations (Bester & Du Plessis. 2015:214).

Chapman (1993:18) refers to a Code of Conduct as principles and norms on the correct conduct of political office holders and civil servants. According to Kganyago (2008:6), the SANDF Code of Conduct is an ethical canon, not a mere rhetorical injunction that articulates a restriction on a soldier's conduct. It also serves as a guiding document in terms of determining what is good or bad behaviour for performing duties with integrity. The researcher refers to the SANDF's Code of Conduct as a "Bible" that should be taken wherever members go and always be

referred to. To emphasise this, it was printed on pocket-sized paper and laminated to fit in each soldier's pocket. This code encapsulates the core values of the SANDF, providing a vision of military professionalism to improve democracy and build discipline within members of the force (Cole, 2000). This includes the administration of security management that contributes to the alignment of the SANDF to the Constitution, creating military personnel who deserve the trust and admiration of the population (Ndungu, 2017: 1). The then Secretary of Defence, the late Mr. January Masilela accepted the code of conduct as a guideline for SANDF members from an ethical point of view (Bester & du Plessis, 2015:215).

Figure 3.1 Code of Conduct for uniformed members in the SANDF

I pledge to serve and defend my country and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the law and with honour, courage dignity and integrity
I serve in the SANDF with loyalty and pride, as a citizen and a volunteer.
I respect the democratic political process and the civil control of SANDF.
I will not advance or harm the interests of any political party or organisation.
I accept personal responsibility for my actions.
I will obey all legal commands and respect all superiors.
I will refuse to obey an obviously order.
I will fulfil my mission with courage and help my comrades in arms, even risking my own life.
I will treat all people fairly and respect their rights and dignity at all times, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, culture, language or sexual orientation.
I will respect and support the subordinates and treat them fairly.
I will not abuse my authority, position or public funds for personal gain, political motive or any other reason.
I will report criminal activity, corruption and misconduct to the appropriate authority.
I will strive to improve SANDF's capabilities by maintaining discipline, safeguarding ownership, developing skills and knowledge, and performing my duties diligently and professionally

Source: Extracted from South African Soldier October 2008

The Code of Conduct has a significant role in the SANDF for uniformed members, to translate the Constitution's legal framework which may complicate the instructions and directives by the CSANDF. This includes proper management of discipline. The concept of military professionalism in the democratic South Africa is understood as the interaction of factors of military traditions and the adherence to the Code of Conduct (Bester & du Plessis, 2015:215).

3.4.2 Department of Defence Instruction Int/ 000132 (Counter Intelligence (CI) DODI)

The origin of this policy is MODD/DI/00005/2008, Management and Conduct of Intelligence in the MOD, the DOD and ARMSCOR. This policy document supersedes the previous security order, SANDF Order 2/97 (SANDFO 2/97) which originated from the Minimum Information Security Standard (MISS) and Military Instruction No 5/96, Security Locks in the SANDF of 1996. Section 36 of Defence Act mandates the DOD Intelligence Division to comply with any policy, procedure or standard determined by the Minister and in consultation with the National Intelligence Agency to conduct and institute counter-intelligence measures and activities within the Defence Community. DODI/00132 as approved by the SANDF on 28 March 2013, distributed to all Chiefs of Services and Divisions and enforced by DI, IG as well as counter-intelligence of services and divisions by means of investigations, assessments and audits.

The policy stipulates that security is a management responsibility and every Commander of a unit is accountable for security in their units. This implies that every DOD member will always be responsible for maintaining the security of information, personnel and material within their area of responsibility. DI will screen and select suitable officials as Unit Military Security Officers (UMSOs) for appointment in the unit's posts. The UMSO must at least have a Secret security clearance and must be a permanent member in terms of the Defence Act and the Public Service Act for the civilians.

Managers at all levels must ensure that every subordinate official is notified of their responsibility in this regard through their duty sheets or command directives. This

policy includes the Minimum Physical Security Standards issued by DI as guidelines for financial expenditure in the DOD and is applicable to the DC as well as Reserve Force members. This policy enforces that managers must ensure that every official is briefed on security matters including how classified information should be handled in their area of responsibility. The briefing should take place at regular intervals to ensure that members do not disclose confidential matters and are accurately informed. Members should also be made aware that they are contractually obliged to protect such information. Managers should also ensure that training and safety awareness programmes are implemented in their units to raise awareness among members of, security policy and DOD measures, and the need to protect valuable or sensitive information. Individuals who have specific security roles should receive relevant related training. The managers should also ensure that a breach of security in their units is dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the policy. This policy ensures that placement of personnel, assets and functions in existing facilities is done in a manner that is conducive to the provision of effective and efficient security measures as prescribed in policies and regulations (DODI Int/000132).

3.4.3 Department of Defence Instruction Int/ 00013/2012 (Vetting DODI)

Vetting DODI is a new Defence Intelligence policy which will be fully implemented soon and is currently not a classified document. Vetting DODI is a draft DOD policy on the conduct of security vetting in the Defence Community (DC), whose custodian is the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) supported by the Defence Intelligence Management Council (DIMC). Vetting DODI is guided by Defence Act, 2002, Section 36 (see section 3.4.2). Counter-intelligence is an entity in DI under which Directorate Vetting falls. Vetting DODI is a uniform system governing the conduct of security vetting that is developed and maintained to ensure all officials of the MOD, DOD, and ARMSCOR are security vetted. This does not exclude the officials at State Information Technology Agency (SITA) who provide information technology services to the DOD (Vetting DODI, 2012:2).

The Chiefs of Services and Divisions are to ensure the execution, monitoring and evaluation and implementation of Vetting DODI. This includes reporting, investigating and providing resources required to implement the policy. Though services and

divisions will avail the resources for the implementation, cooperation with DI is encouraged at all times. Most importantly, the compliance of services and divisions with regards to auditing and compiling audit findings is encouraged (Vetting DODI, 2012: 6). In essence, the Defence Community should always be encouraged to comply with the policy. The Vetting DODI policy is mandatory to the DC, and should be complied with as the draft was circulated to the DC for inputs and critiques before its implementation.

3.5 Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS), 1996 (Cabinet Memorandum No 4 of 1996)

The Minimum Information Security Standard (MISS) is a policy document which outlines a standard to which security measures in organisations must be put in place to protect national security. The DOD vetting policy is derived from chapter five of the MISS approved by the Cabinet Security and Intelligence Committee. In the interests of national security, safeguarding the Constitution and maintaining adequate security of the government's essential activities, this is imperative. The DOD should not employ a person who has been associated with espionage, terrorism, sabotage and actions aimed at overthrowing and undermining parliamentary democracy and the government. MISS refers to classified information as sensitive information of the state which should be protected at all times. Therefore, security vetting should be a continuous process which adjusts to any political or socio economic changes. Members who have been issued with a security clearance should always be monitored since human beings of natural aptitude are rare. This implies that among the vetted members, some may get involved in illegal deeds which can compromise security. The procedure must also provide for the different nature of individuals in the organisation. Security vetting criteria must focus more on the member's vulnerability to blackmail, bribery, subversion and their loyalty to the State and the organisation they serve (MISS, 1996:41).

In accordance with the statement of vetting policy, DI must carry out security vetting procedures for all DOD members, according to the classification of the information to which their post entitles them. It is therefore provided that security vetting be performed as follows:

- **Confidential clearance**

The clearance provides for the verifying of the applicant's fingerprint records and that they are not in SAPS records in connection with any crime that the member may have committed. It may also ask questions in some circumstances, especially where financial problems are indicated, possibly including an interview with the subject.

- **Secret clearance**

It includes the processes that are conducted in confidential clearance. Interviews are conducted with selected references given by the subjects who know them well, both in the social and work environment. Interviews will not necessarily be limited to past and current employers and named references. The process includes a personal interview with the subject; and other investigations in some circumstances, including psychometric tests and a polygraph test, depending on the adjudication.

- **Top Secret clearance**

This consists of all the aspects discussed about Confidential and Secret clearance, as well as psychometric tests and a polygraph test as a general rule.

The completion of the application form for vetting and the submission of fingerprints are essential in the vetting process. No member may be compelled to undergo psychometric testing or a polygraph test. However, members are encouraged to disclose relevant circumstances or information that can be regarded as evidence of unreliability in assessing their suitability for security clearance.

3.6 National Strategic Intelligence Act (NSIA), 1994 (Act No 39 of 1994 as amended Act 67 of 2002)

Section 2a of NSIA stipulates that SSA is responsible for security vetting of all organs of state excluding SAPS and DOD. DI is mandated to conduct security vetting to all DOD employees as well as ARMSCOR, whereas SAPS Crime Intelligence conducts security vetting for all SAPS employees (Lucas, 2018:10). SANDF is mandated by Section 2(4) (c) of NSIA as amended through DI to institute

counter-intelligence measures in the entire DOD. This section further provides the duties of SANDF DI to gather, correlate, evaluate and the use of foreign military intelligence relating to national strategic and operational intelligence to the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC). This includes instituting counter intelligence measures for security vetting within the SANDF. The SANDF's mandate further provides for taking steps and measures that neutralises foreign intelligence operations including protecting sensitive information (Mdluli, 2011:74). NICOC is a committee which integrates intelligence from SAPS, DOD and State Security Agency (SSA).

3.7. Defence Act 42 of 2002, Labour Relations Act (LRA) 66 of 1995, Public Service Act 103 of 2001 and Employment Equity Act (EEA) of 1998.

The LRA 66 of 1995 and Defence Act 42 of 2002, is legislation endorsed and passed by Parliament. Section 37 (2) of Defence Act states that a member or employee may not be registered, appointed or promoted, receive a commission or be held as a member unless such member has been issued with a security clearance by DI (see section 2). Section 189 of LRA gives permission to the employer to dismiss employees for operational requirements purposes. However, section 189 does not apply to security cluster employees. Section 37 is supported by section 38 of the same Act which gives the Minister of Defence the power to discharge members without a valid security clearance due to unfitness. Unfitness is determined by many factors which in other sectors may be regarded by the legislation as discriminatory. It is therefore stated in the LRA that relevant procedures should be undertaken in order for such decisions to be taken by employer. According to Mdluli (2011) employees are protected from any unfair dismissal or discrimination by the employer. This applies when a member has been denied security clearance due to the adjudicative processes. The LRA provides that an employer should take employees through all relevant processes before their dismissal. This Act, however, does not supersede the limitation of rights under the general law of application, taking into account all relevant factors that include the nature of the right; the importance and purpose of limitation and the relationship thereof.

Section 17(2) of the Public Service Act 103 of 2001 states that an employee may be relieved of their duties if they are seen as a security risk to the organisation. In terms

of the section, such a member may be discharged for operational reasons. One of the operational needs in the SANDF is to be physically fit. Some operations in the organisation cannot be performed by a person whose health is not satisfactory. However, all necessary procedure and legislative guidance should be taken into consideration when implementing the Act including the limitation of rights.

Section 6 of the EEA prohibits unfair discrimination in the workplace. The EEA protects both employees and candidates for employment against any form of discrimination based on the ground of race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, social status, colour, sexual orientation, age religion, disability, HIV status culture language and birth. Unless the discrimination is based on the inherent requirements of the post or affirmative action measures, a vetting authority may not unfairly discriminate against a subject.

3.8 The Bill of Rights and security vetting

The security of the country and the protection of human rights are significant as stipulated in the Constitution of RSA, 1996. The Constitution of South Africa describes the “Bill of Rights” as a cornerstone of the democratic South Africa which protects the rights of the people in the democratic dispensation. This includes the right of privacy as stipulated in Section 14 of the Constitution. This right extends to the person’s properties not to be searched and their possessions seized including the infringement of the privacy of their communication. Members of the SANDF as citizens also enjoy fundamental human rights, however certain exceptions are necessary because of the unique nature of the military. The limitation has been covered in the SANDF legislation framework (RSA, 1995). The Constitution also talks to vetting investigation processes. The issue of security vetting and the human rights of an individual are challenging because of its intrusiveness nature. It challenges how best to safeguard the security of the country and democracy. This is the challenge that will always exist in the democratic dispensation. Security vetting interrogates everything about a member, its objective is to ensure that employees are security competent and not a security risk (Lucas, 2018:19). Anyone who engages in security vetting and human rights is immediately confronted with this problem (Lazarus & Goold, 2007:3), for example, security vetting is compulsory for members who need to occupy certain positions in the security cluster. On the other

hand, some processes of security vetting infringe on the rights of a person, for example, access to a member's personal details such as financial records and other related matters. However, for the purposes of security vetting, the right of privacy is limited as stipulated in Section 14 (d) of the Constitution. Section 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa has a limitation clause which explains where the rights of an individual may be limited. It states that for the purpose of limitation, the nature of rights and their relationship should be considered (Constitution of RSA, 1996). Lucas (2018:19) states that if the breach of security which results from the balance between human rights and national security can lead to the country's economic loss or instability, it is accepted that security vetting processes be preferred by the Constitution. The author further states that in spite of the fact that there are limitations to privacy of an individual in security vetting, the state is still obliged to respect the rule by honouring the security of the affected person by utilising the individual data for the purpose of vetting processes and for that purpose only (Lucas, 2018:19).

3.8.1 The right to privacy, Regulation of Interception of Communication Act 70 of 2002 and security vetting

Privacy is one of the rights in the Constitution that is often infringed unlawfully or lawfully when security vetting processes are executed. However, in terms of the limitation clause, that does not affect the process. The right to privacy includes the right not to search a home or a property and possessions seized of a person or the privacy of their communication to be invaded. In the instances where vetting officers desire to obtain personal and other information from a subject and that information is not accessible, a search has to be conducted in order to obtain the information (Mdluli, 2011:166). Section 2 (Prohibition of Interception of Communication) states that subject to the RICA, persons should not intentionally or illegally intercept another person's communication. Communication is the other vulnerable area that may be open to abuse by vetting officials. Information technology makes it possible that a person's communication be intercepted using telephone, cell phone and other devices without the knowledge of the member. However, that interception may be rendered illegal if there is no valid warrant to intercept. Section 2A (5) of the NSIA provides that the relevant members of the National Intelligence Structures of the

Republic may, using the prescribed manner, gather information that relates to a person for security vetting purposes. When this happens, relevant members shall perform such interception in accordance with RICA.

3.8.2 Protection of Personal Information Act 14 of 2013 and security vetting

Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA No 14 of 2013) is the legislation proclaimed to protect people's personal information and protects information from being given out for unconstitutional reasons. There are some prohibitions in the Act for national security purposes. In Section 6(1) (c) of POPIA it is stated that the Act does not make a difference to the handling of personal information by or in the interest of the open body which includes national security. The Act in section 12(2) (d)(iv) of POPIA further stipulates that personal data must be gathered legitimately from the information subject with an exception in case of a legitimate concern for national security. In both provisions, there is avoidance with regards to consistency with POPIA. Therefore, Director Vetting is mandated by the Constitution to process the subject's personal information. This includes obtaining personal data with respect to the subject from the references interviewed vetting fieldwork process (Lucas, 2018: 21).

Mdluli (2011: 163) states that it may be an infringement of an individual's sacred rights when the person in question is required to provide data with regards to their financial records, well-being status, past marriages and legitimate activities. In any case, coupled with the way that members have assented to security screening, the infringement of their rights is reasonable and furthermore legitimate as far as Section 36 of the Constitution is concerned.

3.8.3 Promotion of Access of Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA) and Security vetting

Promotion of Access to Information Act No 2 of 2000 came into effect in 2001 to affect the right of every South African to have access to information. The Constitution makes a provision for every individual to have access to information held by the state (Kaka, 2016:28). PAIA relates to all and any information that is held by the state and any other person for the protection of rights. Section 36 of the Constitution also

ensures that there are limitations that are reasonable and justifiable to access the information.

Section 32 and 33 of the Constitution also provides the right of a person to access information held by the state. PAIA overrides any legislation that stops or restricts the disclosure of any information which makes it the supreme law in the country relating to access to information (Nelson Mandela Foundation, 2011:np). PAIA is a good tool for democratic society when it comes to the accountability by the government. However, when it comes to the provision of information collected during security vetting, it cannot be possible due to its security nature. As far as Section 44 (2) (b) subsection 4 is concerned, it is stated that the information officer of an open body may reject the solicitation for access to the records of the body if the record contains evaluative material, or where the individual who provided it is recognised in the record. The disclosure of the material would break an inferred guarantee which was made to the individual who provided the material, and the character of the person who provided it, that it will be held in certainty.

Although PAIA forms the basis of the constitutional right to access to information, there is a clear indication that data collected during the security vetting process falls within the abovementioned clause (Lucas, 2018; Kaka, 2016:30). The security vetting process is conducted in the strictest confidence in order to establish security competency and security risk and information collected cannot be shared with a person who was not part of the process, inclusive of the subject to such clause. Defence Intelligence should never divulge such information and it must adhere to the confidentiality clause.

The main purpose of the security vetting function is to determine the employees' risk profile in order to ascertain the security competence of a subject. The vetting assessments attempt to understand the individual's character and behaviours which in turn gives a clear view on either, the trustworthiness or vulnerability of that individual. It is therefore important that all processes and procedures regarding security vetting are regulated in the DC.

3.9 Limitation of rights

The fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights are not absolute and may in some instances be limited. Such limitations must be done in accordance with Section 36 of the Constitution, referred to as the limitation clause. However, the infringement is not unconstitutional if it takes place for a reason that is accepted as a justification of infringement of a right in a democratic society. In fact, not all infringements of rights are unconstitutional and it will be justified by Section 36. Section 36 states that the rights may be limited in terms of the law of general application, if it is for a reasonable and justifiable nature, based on human dignity, equality and freedom. However, it may be argued that Section 2A of the NSIA infringes the right to privacy by assessing the security risk of an employee or potential employee by requesting the applicant to provide their financial statements, fingerprints and any other personal documentation (Mdluli, 2011:161). Though the exercise may appear to be the infringement of personal rights, Section 36 is applicable in such a case.

3.10 Summary

Security vetting is a constitutional process which aims to validate identity, ensuring the integrity of a person, which ensures honesty. This chapter discussed the Constitution and the regulation of security vetting, the limitation of rights when it comes to security vetting and the relationship between POPIA, PAIA and the Bill of Rights. The next chapter will discuss the methods the researcher followed to conduct this study.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

Research methodology is a process whereby researchers collect information and data to make meaningful decisions including the publication of a research paper. The procedure helps researchers to explain and describe trying to predict a phenomenon. Using research methods, researchers generate and organise their ideas into a concept, gaining more knowledge in the process. The process includes analysis of ideas for the advancement of knowledge in the subject of study.

This research methodology chapter encompasses the worldview of the study, the approach the researcher will follow and the relevant population and sampling. Data collection, data analysis and trustworthiness of the study will also be briefly discussed.

4.2 Worldview of the study

Creswell and Creswell (2017: np) define worldview as the orientation of beliefs about the fundamental part of reality that impacts on how one sees, knows or does certain things. Beliefs help the researcher in realising the significance of their research approach (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). This study followed a pragmatic worldview with a historical origin that dates back to 1907 and Charles Sanders Pierce, William James, Wendell, Holmes and John Dewey. Creswell (2009:10) refers to pragmatism as a worldview that arises from actions, situations and consequences rather than extracted from pre-existing conditions. This implies that problems are solved in a way that suits the existing conditions. The researcher depended on what worked at the time in trying to identify and track the evidence needed from the participants, critically appraising and reflecting on the evidence provided in order to solve a problem the department is facing (Suter & Cormier, 2012:182). This included formalised answers and conclusions reached without general assumption (Suter & Cormier, 2012:181 - 184).

4.3. Research approach

This study followed a qualitative research approach, as it suited the nature of the problem researched. Qualitative research is an in-depth systematic investigation of social phenomena and human conduct and interaction (Lichtman, 2013: 4). Similarly, Creswell and Creswell (2017:np) define qualitative research as an explorative method to understand how people attribute to the social and human problem. Exploration details an in-depth data collection and involves different sources of information and strategies (Creswell, 2017). It also involves careful listening to people as well as observing their behaviours (Lichtman, 2013: 4; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016: 137). The qualitative research entails, researchers studying things in their natural settings, attempting to interpret phenomena and making sense in terms of the meanings from the participants (Yin, 2015:9). Qualitative approach focusses on people and their experiences, behaviours and opinions. It assists the researcher in answering the “what” and “how”, providing detailed insight and understanding (Gill & Baillie, 2018:669). This study is explorative because the researcher wanted to determine the implementation of security vetting on personnel at SANDF Army Support Bases (refer to section 1.4).

4.3.1 Population and sampling

Denscombe (2014:21) refers to the population in research as a collection of objects or group of individuals with similar characteristics. Population as a complete set of objects, which may be participants, groups, organisations, human products or events. It is the group on which the study outcome will be extrapolated (Garg, 2016: 640 – 645). It plays a pivotal role in the study as their availability, willingness and ability to participate in the study is of importance (Denscombe, 2014).

The target population for the purpose of this study were members of the DOD deployed at identified ASBs and VOs at DI (see section 2.3). Members have experienced the phenomena of security vetting as a VO, an interviewer, a subject, an interviewee as well as a manager. The participants reflect the full range of individuals partaking in the vetting process. The total population from the identified ASBs and vetting officers comprised approximately 1800 members. A sample is a group of selected people, objects or items taken from a larger population for

measurement and sampling and process of selecting participants from a population with direct reference to the research question to take part in research (Bryman, 2016: 323). Oppong (2013:203) states that a sample is selected to provide rich and deep data which is relevant to answer the research question. Purposive sampling was used in this study to generate a greater understanding of what is being studied, as participants were relevant to the questions posed (Bryman, 2016).

Purposive sampling is a non-probability procedure which deliberately decides on the unit of analysis (Bryman, 2016; Roller & Lavrakas, 2015:196). It is meant for a particular purpose, where chosen units or people are a typical group who represent a diverse view (Forrester, 2010:237). The researcher made the selection of participants based on the judgement that they held knowledge on the research problem (Forrester, 2010:237; Roller & Lavrakas, 2015; Holloway & Wheeler, 2013:142; Pacho, 2015: 46). This study relied on the interaction between the researcher and participants and comprised of VOs of all races and gender in the DI (see annexure L), members from the Johannesburg, Potchefstroom and Limpopo ASBs (See annexures I, J & K) and selected senior managers (Generals) in the army.

Inclusion criteria for this study were soldiers and civilians with the most experience in security vetting, and those who have served at ASBs for at least five years or more. The researcher wrote letters to the Chief of SA Army to request permission to interview the identified members as the ASBs fall under the command of Chief SA Army (see annexures E, F & G). The researcher also wrote letters to the Director Vetting (annexure L) and GOC GSB Garrison where the preliminary study was conducted (see annexure H and N). The preliminary study was conducted in order to test the instrument of research. The researcher also visited the mentioned commanders and discussed the programme of the research with them. All participants in this research did so voluntarily after the researcher explained and gave clarity on the importance of their contributing to the research. The researcher also protected the identity of all participants by not mentioning their names and used "participant" to identify all members who took part in this study. Assurance was also given that their participation would remain confidential and their right to privacy was explained to them. The Unisa Ethical Clearance certificate and informed consent

forms are attached as annexures A and U. Purposive sampling has been used in order to answer the questions posed as the participants are most relevant to answer them (Bryman, 2016:323). All participants are most congruent to the conceptual framework and generated rich and focused information on the research question (Cleary, Horsfall & Hayter, 2014: 473 – 475).

4.3.2 Data collection

The researcher conducted a pilot study to test the research instrument in General Support Base (GSB) Garrison in Gauteng Province. A pilot study is a mini version of full- scale research or a trial run done when preparing a complete study (Calitz, 2009: 256). Other researchers call it a feasibility study or a pre-testing of the research instrument, interview schedule and assists in estimating the time and costs of the study as well (De Vos *et al*, 2011:394). The researcher was able to identify potential pitfalls, and limitations of the chosen instrument before going for actual data collection (Calitz, 2009:258). The supervisor and co-supervisor listened to the audio-recording and compared the transcriptions to ensure the quality of the interviews.

As a qualitative study, the data was collected through interviews with 23 research participants who are members of the DOD, with the use of an interview schedule as per annexure T (see section 4.4.1). All interviews were conducted at the participants' workplaces. The researcher became detached to the ASBs where she became part of the environment for the duration of data collection at the units (annexures O, P & Q). The researcher spent one week at each identified ASB. The researcher also slept in messes, military residential areas, ate daily meals with soldiers in their dining halls and would sometimes go to their bars while doing data collection at the ASBs. This exercise developed the trust between the participants and the researcher which was an essential advantage when it came to the interviews. On the other hand, the researcher works in the same building as VOs and manager participants, which made it convenient for the researcher to get hold of them. The researcher could not get hold of some managers who could have made a meaningful contribution to the study due to their official commitments (see section 1.7). The researcher was able to source rich and deep information because the participants became comfortable in expressing their views about the vetting concept (Boyce & Neale, 2006:3; Gill &

Baillie, 2018:669). Interview questions were developed and structured to encourage asking various participants similar questions in order to reach data saturation (Fusch & Ness, 2015:1409) (Interview schedule is attached as an annexure T).

All interviews with participants were recorded with a voice recorder. Field notes were also taken to serve as a back-up and transcription took place during and after the interviews were completed. Interviews were transcribed word for word in the manner in which the interviews took place. All the participants were asked the same questions and provided individual responses. The duration of each interview conducted ranged between 45 minutes and 1 hour 40 minutes. The advantage of using a voice recorder is that data can be recorded, and reviewed several times by the researcher in order to produce accurate transcriptions (Gill & Baillie, 2018:669).

The researcher was more concerned with understanding participants' views and experiences on security vetting issues including the implementation thereof at their military bases. This included developing concepts, insights and understanding from patterns while collecting data (Taylor, Bogdan & De Vault, 2016:8). Conducting interviews is a valuable method of exploring the construction and negotiation of meanings in a natural setting. Alshenqeeti (2014:39) states that the value of interviewing enables the participants to speak with their own voice and express their own thoughts and feelings. Although interviewing is time consuming method of collecting data and sometimes has potential inconsistencies, its advantages are more rewarding to the study than any other instrument (Alshenqeeti, 2014: 43). The return rate in conducting interviews is very high as there will be few incomplete responses. It is also a relatively flexible instrument which involves reality in controlled answering order (Gill & Baillie, 2018:669; Alshenqeeti, 2014).

4.3.3 Data analysis

Data analysis is the process of reducing, organising and giving a meaning to data in order to determine results which includes drawing out patterns from concepts and insights (Jonker & Pennink, 2010:142). Flick (2014:5) defines qualitative data analysis as classifying and interpreting the collected material to make statements about explicit and implicit structures of meaning. The collected data was analysed in order to generalise statements from the participants by comparing materials and

texts of several cases (Flick, 2014). Creswell (2009:184) states that qualitative data analysis is an ongoing process that may be conducted concurrently while collecting data, making interpretations and writing a report. The researcher managed this exercise by identifying themes while conducting interviews and making notes thereof. The researcher used Tesch's analytical technique to analyse data because it can be used to identify word analysis, reading large units, intentional analysis of linguistic features, physical manipulation of text and secondary data analysis (Tesch, 1990). In interpretation, the researcher overlaid a structure of her own making on the data rendering for an easier grasp of the phenomena under study.

The researcher chose to do thematic analysis because of her interests which involved identifying patterns before starting with actual analysis. This assisted the researcher in making sense of data, working with a set of relationships that were well established (Tesch, 1990). Thematic analysis is a flexible method of analysis which is not tied to a particular epistemology or theory (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017:1). It manages more discrete units such as words, expressions and sentences where boundaries have limits to overlapping (Tesch, 1990).

4.4 The ethical dimension of the study and bracketing of the researcher

It is the responsibility of the researcher to conduct research in an ethical manner (Brink, Van der Walt & Van Rensburg, 2006:30). Ethics is a set of moral principles which is suggested by groups or individuals conducting themselves in a certain manner that is acceptable to the study (De Vos, Strydom, Fouche & Delport, 2011:114). Ethical research depends on the integrity of the individual researchers and their values. The research ethics include complying with the mandate to protect the dignity of respondents (Bryman *et al*, 2014:120). Ethical principles that guide the researcher include respect for persons, beneficence and social justice. Miller, Birch, Mauthner and Jessop (2012:1) state that ethical endorsement examines familiar moral standards. The problems that are raised about informed consent, boundaries and participation are more important in qualitative research as it provides ways to measure integrity and quality in social research (Miller *et al*, 2012: 1; Wiles, 2013:3).

The researcher adhered to the principles of protection of the right to self-determination, to informed consent, to privacy, to anonymity and confidentiality, to

fair treatment and to be protected from discomfort and harm (Miller *et al*, 2012). The principle of respect of persons implies that a participant has the right to withdraw or refuse to participate in research at any time. For example, some of the participants at ASBs, refused to take part in the study, therefore the researcher had to respect their decision and never questioned it (Miler *et al*, 2012). The researcher also adhered to the principle of beneficence and ensured security of well-being for the participants and protection from discomfort and harm (Brink *et al*, 2006:32). The researcher ensured anonymity of all participants by keeping their names and identities secret (see section 4.3.1).

The researcher explained to the participants that their participation in the study was voluntary. Participants were also informed about the necessity and significance of the research to be conducted. Participants were also provided with the Informed Consent Form (ICF) (annexure U), which upon its completion, indicates that the participants took part in the research of their own free will (see section 4.3.1). The participants were further informed that the study will not have any derogatory statements towards other individuals. The researcher strictly adhered to the DOD's Code of Conduct and ethics as well as the University of South Africa's Research Ethics (Unisa:2016). The researcher was guided by ethics, professional guidelines, and moral acts and was within the law. The researcher has been granted permission to conduct the research by the gatekeepers including the Unisa Ethics Committee (annexures A,D & G). This ensured responsibility towards the research.

- Bracketing

Bracketing of the researcher is applied in research to mitigate the conceivable malicious impacts of previously established inclinations that may taint the research (Tufford & Newman, 2010: 80- 96). It is a phenomenological request that requires the researcher to deliberately set aside their convictions about the phenomena being studied (Chan, Fung & Chien, 2013:1- 9). The researcher is an employee of DOD, DI, and has been working as a secretary in the Intelligence for Operations Directorate from 2008 to date and has experience of security matters. The researcher held all those elements that characterise the limits of her experience and knowledge in security vetting in suspense. This was achieved by demonstrating the validity of data collection and analysis processes by putting

aside her knowledge, beliefs, values and experiences (Chan *et al*, 2013). The researcher has been vetted and was issued with a Top Secret security clearance in March 2016. The researcher is experienced in security matters which includes security vetting, acquired through developmental courses and academic studies. Cerbin (2015:np) states that prior knowledge of the topic is the first approach towards solving challenges as it has a positive impact on the learning process.

4.5 Establishing trustworthiness of the study

Trustworthiness is the way researchers can persuade themselves and readers that their findings are worthy of attention (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The procedures for fulfilling the criteria are not different from others as they rely on methodological arguments and techniques. Trustworthiness of a qualitative study is in the consistency of the findings which is determined by the researcher's ability to establish the following (Kumar, 2014: 219):

- **Credibility**

Credibility is how confident the researcher is, the truth of the research findings and identifying that the methods that were used are accurately identified and described (De Vos *et al*, 2011:419). Kumar (2014) also believe that credibility is the establishment of the truth and believable results by the researcher. Credibility in this study was addressed by prolonged engagement, triangulation and referential adequacy (De Vos *et al*, 2011:419). The researcher gained credibility when conducting interviews, by asking the same questions to all the participants throughout the study. The researcher conducted her study at ASBs in different provinces and all participants responded to the same questions. This exercise ensured the credibility of data collected by the researcher. Guba and Lincoln (1989) believe that credibility is determined when other readers are confronted with the same experience and recognise it.

- **Transferability**

Transferability refers to the demonstration by the researcher that the study findings are applicable to other contexts such as population, situations and

phenomena sharing the same characteristics (De Vos *et al*, 2011:420; Kumar, 2014). Qualitative researchers are encouraged to produce thick description which is a true reflection of what has been said during interviews and which can act as a database to making judgements about the transferability of findings. The researcher made use of an audio recorder during interviews and notes were drafted in order to ask follow up questions. The researcher produced the thick description of the details of security culture making use of quotes to show that the findings can be applicable to other contexts and situations (Bryman, 2016:303).

- **Confirmability**

Confirmability is neutrality in the research findings which clarifies that the researcher acted in good faith, was not biased and that data is based only on participants' responses. The researcher provides an audit trail in order to establish confirmability of the findings for future researchers to further explore the study (De Vos *et al* 2011:421). The researcher has shown that the research findings are neutral and the same results can be found depending on the response of the participants (Kumar, 2014:219).

- **Dependability**

Dependability is the extent to which the researcher can establish that if the study can be repeatedly conducted by other researchers that the findings will be consistent (Kumar, 2014). The researcher can prove that other researchers could repeat the study and that the findings would be the same. The researcher made use of inquiry audit in order to establish dependability. The researcher conducted interviews herself which assisted in observing the gestures of participants when answering some questions. On many occasions the researcher made notes while conducting interviews. Other researchers should have more data to get the same findings.

4.6 Summary

This chapter outlined the research methods followed in this study. The qualitative methods which suit the nature of the problem that has been researched were used.

The chapter also discussed how population and sample were selected. In-depth interviews were used to collect data from the participants. Data has been analysed using the Tesch technique which enhanced content analysis. This section also discussed how the researcher established credibility, transferability, confirmability and dependability to determine trustworthiness and consistency of the study.

CHAPTER FIVE PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the research findings. Data collection was based on purposive sampling and an inductive approach was used. The researcher became detached to the identified ASBs and became part of the participants' environment (see section 4.3.2). The data was collected through interviews with research participants who are members of the defence force (see section 4.3.2) with the use of an interview schedule as per Annexure T. The researcher familiarised herself with data by repeatedly listening to the recordings while reviewing notes and transcriptions.

Core themes were identified and analysed for the interpretation of data. The presentation of data from ASBs coded as P1 - P 15, VOs coded from P 16 - P20, and senior managers coded P21 - P 23, (see section 4.3.1) will be presented according to their opinions in different sections namely, themes emanating from members in the ASBs, themes emanating from vetting officers, and the managers according to their views of the study.

5.2 Themes emanating from members at ASBs

Members at ASBs conduct military duties on their bases on a daily basis. Their duties include guarding services, procurement services and other sensitive duties that may be allocated to them. This section will discuss the understanding of security vetting by ASB members, the provision of effective security vetting at ASBs, attitudes of employees towards security vetting at ASBs, challenges that members at the ASBs face, the importance of security vetting as a security measure and additional inputs on security vetting by participants at ASBs.

5.2.1 ASB members' understanding of security vetting

This section serves as a point of departure for this study, as it tries to establish if members at ASBs understand what security vetting is. During interviews at ASBs, it became clear that the participants hold different views on security vetting and others did not even have an idea of what security vetting is.

There were 15 ASB participants interviewed, the majority have an idea of what security vetting is, and they responded like this:

Participant 1 Johannesburg responded...

"...Because in the organisation we get vetted of we need to know what type of person are you. That's what your personal profile it can be financial is. Now they have upped the vetting process as well, to say bring in the bank statement. They want to know what type of the members those are within the organisation..."

Participant 8 Potchefstroom said that...

"...It is this, I have picked up in the military when I have applied for a certain security clearance. That was in the old days, there was still vetting done and it was people usually from military intelligence are doing the vetting. It was a time when I was at it applied for my secret clearance they were vetting done on me. Only certain questions and they usually with letting their digging in your background with regards to yeah. That is well what I understand about vetting. It is more like an interview that you have with someone, to see if you are on par or in par with security. This question is a questionnaire that they usually handle with you that's how I see vetting..."

Participant 14 Limpopo responded that...

"...ok the vetting part, is getting a background on a person trying to get a in-depth understanding of where are they from what activities they do maybe in their spare time. So that if for example, if myself I'm put in a position where I deal with security I mustn't be a security risk. I must be on the safe side, so that they know that whoever is dealing with a vetting, security vetting is the rightful person and wont damage the unit or security in anyhow..."

In contrast, some members at the same ASBs do not have any idea of what security vetting is and some admitted that it was the first time they had come across the concept of security vetting and they responded as follows:

Participant 6 Potchefstroom responded ...

“...with security vetting actually is the first time I hear about that...”

Participant 9 Potchefstroom said...

“...I think, yeah, I think the thing is I was in training I think they taught us about that but honestly I “a ke sa gopola” (I do not remember)...”

Participant 10 Potchefstroom responded...

“...Look security vetting; I do not even have a clue of what it is....”

Participant 11 Limpopo responded....

“...what is the word vetting actually referring to...”

“...I just heard of something like vetting like....”

However, all the participants who do not know about security vetting indicated that they know what security clearance is. When the researcher explained to the same participants that security vetting is the process that produces security clearance, they all said:

Participant 6 Potchefstroom responded

“...Yes, I know security clearance yes...”

“...No, when I was doing my security clearance I still remember it was in 2011, It was in 2011 when I did my security clearance I was still in Nelspruit, I was working in Nelspruit, I was in MSD when I was doing my security clearance for the first time. I was given that big document and they told me that I must go and fill it and I must be truthful when I'm doing it, so yes...”

Participant 9 Potchefstroom said...

“...Go na le this papiri” (there is this other paper) when I arrived here. There was this paper I had to fill it in, it was for security clearance....”

“...Because I fill in all my things on that, all the people who know me and all that, my background....”

Participant 10 Potchefstroom responded...

“...Security clearance is the one that we do currently now, that the guys who are from within the Department of Defence....”

“...Security clearances are done in the unit surely, yes by every, because it's now sections. So, it will be done per section, per member and then it will be submitted to the (Military Security) UMSO, and then they will go through it and then should there be something unclear; that will be sent back again; to specific section to the specific member to again complete the outstanding or submit outstanding information....”

Participant 11 Limpopo said...

“...Yes, I have I did security clearance.....”

“...Yes, I know about security clearance”

It is evident that security vetting in the units is conducted on every employee, though the majority of members only know it as a security clearance and do not know the process. Members at the ASBs are not told the importance of security vetting when they arrive at the units. The military security officer gives them a security clearance form to fill in. It seems as if members are lazy to fill in the form or they just take security vetting for granted.

Participant 9 Potchefstroom said...

“...Somebody said when I arrived here, I got this security clearance book, they said I must fill it, I have been thinking that I will fill it in and all that but I have never filled it in....”

Another aspect that emerged is that after people have filled in the security clearance form, they get different responses from UMSO. Most of the participants indicated that

they fill in the security clearance form, but they do not get feedback. This came from most of the members who have an understanding of security vetting.

Participant 1 Johannesburg said...

"...I think last month feedback that I got from my member is that they are still facing a backlog at DI. It's gonna take time before they renew..."

Participant 5 Potchefstroom also said...

"...I asked military security officer, he said there is a backlog. There is a backlog with regard to that people..."

Participant 7 Potchefstroom responded...

"...As I said, I can advise you but on that side, the backlogs that are talking about and then that understaffed and inside with the one that is not on my control..."

Participant 13 Limpopo said...

"...And then they will respond by saying that you are not the only one who is asking about the security. They are dealing with other. They indicated like for example if they are dealing with so much many of the..."

It emerged that there are different understandings of security vetting among the members at ASBs. Some know what security vetting is, whereas others know it as security clearance. Mostly, those who know what security vetting is are the people in senior ranks who have participated in security vetting processes themselves. For them it either took place in other units or because they were being appointed to a certain position that needed security clearance. However, all the members indicated that although they apply for security clearances, DI does not give feedback about the clearances timeously. A minority does not understand what security vetting is about.

5.2.2 The provision of effective security vetting at ASBs

The provision of effective security vetting to the units includes educating members in the unit about the concept. ASB members adhere to security vetting processes after

they have been taught what the significance of acquiring security clearances through the vetting process is.

Most participants think that the provision of effective security vetting at ASB is not sufficient. Responding to the question “what in your view should be in place for security vetting to be effective in ASBs?”, most participants said:

Participant 13 Limpopo responded like this...

“...I think they must firstly the people who are supporting this vetting is military security people yeah. And military security people they are very few, the structure is very few is composed of only three people...”

“...Yeah my own view is that if maybe they can delegate the Arms of Services like Chief Army. To say Chief Army yes your Military Security personnel, can be trained by DI and then deal with this lower security clearances like confidential. Maybe can be dealt with by the Chief of the Army Security Personnel or Chief Air Force or Navy or SAHMS, whatever something. Then the top the security clearance of the secret and top secret, they can be dealt with by DI. Then to just elevate, I think that can be good because they are dealing with everything even of troop and a (Public Service Administration Position) PSAP the whole defence force...”

Participant 7 Potchefstroom said...

“...I think if they can staff manpower in order to fast-track the process of the clearances...”

Participant 3 Johannesburg responded like this...

“...If the process can be fast tracked, If I submit my documents today it must just be like, how long does it take to have an Identity Document (ID)?”...

“...So, if the process can be fast tracked, then we have a system where now it can accommodate just to, not have pile of documentations that are lying at the DI. The process whereby people need to be vetted, you need to be fast track. Then it will make the security vetting to be very much effective. Then we will

know if I completed it within this week by Monday next week it's in, a week after for the defence force for that matter must take only a week, if you submitted Monday, the next Monday everything is cleared..."

Participant 5 Potchefstroom said...

"...I think the Intelligence people must have enough people to do vetting and they must keep on giving us feedback, whether is still in process and is there something wrong that they picked up with the with the booklet; they must bring it back with immediate effect. Secondly, the intelligence officers were also following up in this presentation quarterly to inform people about the securities is or security threat and how the analysis is done..."

The majority of members in the units blame DI for not giving them feedback which leads to the ineffectiveness of security vetting in the units. The majority of participants indicated that they want to adhere to security vetting. However, the process which includes the movement of security document files from the units to DI for security vetting is also a contributing factor. Some of the participants think that security vetting can be more effective if DI can decentralise the processes and detach members to work with UMSO in the units.

Participant 10 Potchefstroom said that...

"...I think the other thing that delays that (Member Zone) MZ number or clearing of the people, is the movement of security clearance to the office up there. Where it's causing a gap. Someone is busy there and you must take your stuff there then who must clear who. But I think like you say you should if the office can be here and the office of people doing the vetting here, then yes I think that one will be effective..."

"...Yes, sub-offices. I think they will be effective the military security's role, I personally do not understand it, is too complex for me. So, I really do not follow it, these people are all over, they are expected to hunt, to look for what to look for. What they are all over now you see. Some of the jobs that needs to be done in the office itself, it won't be effective because they must go there.

So, I think if the office can be brought down here, yes it will be of use because...

Participant 13 Limpopo said...

“...Like I’m indicating; to say if ever they detach some people for a week from DI or decentralize their issues to arms of services; but the one of decentralizing to arms of services, I think is the best one according to me. Yeah, they can circulate some of their members to arms of services and then those members can be the one to see the unit. If they are not having members that can come directly from Defence Intelligence they can utilise those they can detach members to the services...”

It also emerged that most of the members are not given sufficient information about the importance of security vetting.

Participant 5 Potchefstroom said...

“...Ok it's only my military security who used to present, but we never touched on vetting. So we must have more insight about vetting so that our presentations must also include vetting...”

“...The importance of vetting, you know everybody do something if he knows the purpose of that. Our people want to know why they must do that but if it can be explained. I think that maybe can be better...”

In light of the above, security vetting can be effectively implemented if all DOD role players can commit on the best methods for providing effective security vetting at the ASBs. ASBs like other units in the DOD are faced with serious challenges that need to be addressed accordingly. The next item discusses the attitude of employees towards security vetting in the units.

5.2.3. Attitudes of employees towards security vetting at ASBs

Attitude involves emotions and behaviours towards a concept or tasks which can have a powerful influence over the behaviour of employees. Attitudes of employees towards anything in an organisational context play a big role in the execution of

every task. Employees' attitudes are dampened and lifted by many factors which are out of their control. This includes the general working conditions and how members react to security vetting processes.

In the same question "what in your view should be in place for security vetting to be effective in ASBs?" the attitudes and morale of the employees at ASBs emerged as a factor as well. It also emerged that the other contributing factor to making security vetting processes ineffective, is the fact that most of the members at ASBs are demoralised. Most of the participants indicated that the majority of members in the units are not happy, especially the older members.

Participant 3 Johannesburg revealed...

"...Who can do that for us, education per se, members are old and are not educated. They are lazy now he becomes now a burden, he becomes as if he's not looked after that's the complaint that we are having people become negative and he's no more as willingly as he started. When they see the privileges that are being given to those that are seen as our future leaders' maybe they look at that and they become negative..."

Participant 4 Johannesburg responded...

"...The thing is you know what is happening because neh, this people they are old and if I come here as I am and get a rank of let's say maybe Lieutenant at the end when they were here for quite some time, I think they just came here, they never worked anywhere, they know everything the respect, the more you spend time like when you by the bars, like people will start to tell you do not call me by staff or what, just call me "Dumisani" or "Maria" something like that..."

Participant 13 Limpopo said...

"...Like I indicated some of them it is a problem. Like I indicated some of them are demoralised by the fact that their peers' members, they are saying I will apply for my security clearance last year, but if even now I have not received it, so why must I do that. But the MS is trying the level best to inform them during the conference to say "please guys come and do the security

clearance” then you find that they are 2, 3, 4. Then they give it to him then, he sends them to Pretoria but to receive it is a problem...”

“...More especially the senior people they're the ones that are, there's other ones. The protection element and all those other ones. They do not worry about the security clearance you give the form you will not get it back...”

Participant 14 Limpopo responded...

“...No, because I remember there was a list was done so that people can go onto the security clearances but not everyone was there's. A couple of people called over and over and over again, but they didn't they didn't complete those forms. Some they complete them, some they do not return them, some they have a lot of mistakes and discrepancies on the forms. So it's a process that goes on the whole year person trying to do the security clearance...”

The other issue that emerged from the responses is that many people are lazy to fill in the security clearance form because of its length and the many questions a person has to answer. The other thing is that members at the ASBs are old and have lost hope for many reasons such as favouritism and lack of career management. This makes members reluctant to complete the security clearance form and if they do complete it, they make repeated mistakes.

After the question was asked about the adherence of members to security vetting, a few members responded that some members still adhere to security vetting processes and they said:

Participant 3 Johannesburg said...

“...From my point of view ma'am in the unit it is totally effective. However, even if it has its own shortcomings; here now the people who are more brilliant can understand. Can I upgrade it? But to me it makes life easier for us members that are now in command and to ensure that we are now being appointed according to that...”

Participant 5 Potchefstroom said...

"...I do not think they are feeling better or feeling happy because some of them I have to drag them in order to fill the security clearance. They say it's a lot of job because there's a lot of information. So, let me just be honest and say their negative because is a lot of information..."

It was also revealed that when some of the members are given the security clearance questionnaire to complete, it takes a long time for them to complete and return. It also emerged that enforcement is a problem because military disciplinary procedures cannot be applied to such matters. The next item discusses the general challenges members face at ASBs

5.2.4 The importance of security vetting as a security measure

Security vetting in general has different functions related to counter-intelligence measures. In essence, this refers to the protective measures applied to prevent any person from committing criminal activities in an organisation. A process for assessing the members in the organisation is imperative.

It became clear during the interviews that the majority of the participants view security vetting as a tool that can minimise and address the problems that the units are facing. Responding to the question "do you support the process of the proposed vetting of every member in the ASBs", the majority of the participants believe that security vetting, if conducted properly, can assist in solving all the challenges.

Participant 15 Limpopo responded...

"...Yes, but I think if what we've identified in terms of you know the security vetting, as it is thorough security vetting and also maybe minimising the period of validity of security vetting. Yes, I believe it will address the challenges that we currently experiencing if those are there..."

Participant 10 Potchefstroom said...

"...I think it's very important that you know what you're working with or who you are working with in the ASBs. In the ASBs we have money that is

brought in this unit daily. The money used to be here then something happened and the money went missing so by who you wonder..."

Participant 7 Potchefstroom responded...

"...Yes they will see the seriousness of the questionnaire or whatever these people that went there for told to do this thing the impotency of it. They will not just underestimate it for know whether someone have clearance or is not having a clearance is just the same..."

"...I think that is that pertaining, because I think that is injection that can give life to our organisation. There when it said is not only for certain members are for each and every member in this organisation. The seriousness of it when they implemented it then that's where now it will be an eye opener..."

Participant 13 Limpopo said...

"...Because remember, if this individual is now vetted and must be security vetted, you can see that he knows or she knows exactly what is expected of her, what they think that arise he needs or she needs to be doing, What are the things that she or he must not do? It can assist a lot..."

Participant 14 Limpopo responded...

"...For example, we've got weapons in the unit; we've got rations in the unit; we've got very important documents, and hence why I'm saying that I think it depends on the unit. But at the end of the day, those documents that say ok today will be transporting ammunition to Messina. If somebody else sees that information; they can, what do you call that ambush you on the road and take those weapons everyone must be security conscious and yeah..."

It is important to note that the majority of participants believe that if security vetting can be fully implemented as a security measure, it can be a good deterrent to criminal activities at ASBs. Most of them are in support of full vetting to being conducted on all members in the units due to the fact that they house weapons and other important materials. Participants indicated that it will also assist the

management to know all employees better, rather than housing people that they do not know.

Participant 8 Potchefstroom indicated ...

“...Vetting pick up corrupt officials, that is identified, that is made known to management. Management output in plans and plans and measures to eliminate the risk, or to counter this risk you understand. What plans or measurements to put in place to eliminate or to minimise the risk is dependable of what is the risk do you understand...”

Participant 10 Potchefstroom emphasised...

“...The criminal do not just come from the sky, identity and go and break from within our backyard. Does this person really is it suitable person to be here or must we shift this person to this unit, so that this person stays there based on what. We are doing and what is history says he is, because we will definitely be the same people in the same backyard...”

Most of the participants believe that security vetting can assist by identifying the corrupt officials and eliminating the risk of having criminals in the units. Participants believe security vetting together with other strategic plans can solve the problem that management has at the ASBs.

5.2.5 Additional inputs on security vetting by participants at the ASBs

All participants were asked for the additional inputs at the end of the interviews. Most of the ASBs participants showed interest in security vetting and responded by saying that they think they have given enough during the conversation. However, a few gave inputs on the concept as follows:

Participant 6 Potchefstroom added that...

“...The only thing that I can say about vetting is if ever vetting is being conducted thoroughly, I believe that are a lot of things they can do change. Because like you said that you do check the background of members is and then you will really...”

Participant 12 Limpopo suggested that...

"...I really do believe that if DI decentralises some of their responsibilities, but only maybe decentralised some of their members to provincial offices, it if they can establish that, I really believe they can achieve more..."

Participant 13 Limpopo added that...

"...if these delegation can be given to Chief Army for example to do this then more people will have the. Turnaround time will be shorter for members to receive the clearances. Maybe within three months we will be finished with the ASB..."

It is impossible to have a workplace where employees' roles and expectations work perfectly together; as a result, members in every workplace have challenges that affect their wellbeing at work. Most participants expressed their feelings about the organisation. Participants also emphasised that they have challenges at the ASBs, which may be some of the reasons for the members' reaction to security vetting. They revealed that:-

Participant 15 Limpopo said that...

"...Yes, the challenge that I normally found is with the younger generation. Let me say why do I say that they, I feel somehow you know. The younger generation is a little bit off the track in terms of expectation; they are not being realistic in their expectations..."

"...I think firstly, the times that we live in; the time that we live in is a bit different. I think the age plays a role and also. What they see out in the world currently what they see out in the media currently makes them to be prone to be drawn into many things because they want everything at the same time..."

Participant 14 Limpopo said...

"...I think the salary obviously it's not enough to start off with. And yeah basically the salary is not enough people are having so much responsibility at home. Hence while they feel like they need an extra income. They find a

loophole, they find an opportunity, and use that and then in the end it causes corruption...”

It is evident that members' expectations from the organisation are not being met. Some feel that they are being greedy and have limited income. Others feel that their income is not enough. One participant referred to it as living beyond your means and said the following:

Participant 1 Johannesburg said...

“...People are living beyond their means that is the challenge, people are living beyond their means, and hence they are using public funds to enrich themselves of their lives...”

It also emerged during interviews that most members at ASBs find it challenging that they have been on the same rank for a long time and are not empowered or given opportunities like other members.

Participant 9 Potchefstroom revealed that...

“...Challenges nkare eng (what can I say) nna (me) for example we are doing Duty Go na le protection, (There is protection and) go na le rena (there is) us that the support people. During the day protection ke bona ba eleng gore (they are the ones) is doing the duty and us from other section ke rena re takeng over bosigo (We take over at night). Some other challenges that outlines all the challenges I think ke tsa batho ba ko (is for the people at) protection it's for people from protection. They do not have port opportunities like opportunities like going to courses because they are regarded as guards, since they arrived they know that they are the guards “ba ye filo”, (They do not go anywhere) they do not have the opportunities “tsa go ya dicorsong” (do not do courses) they do not do anything. I think it's a bit painful bona intake ya bona key a 2016” (because they are 2016 intake) and I am the 2017 intake. I think if they had a system that would say ok these people they are 2016 intake I'm not sure when they came but why do not they create a system that will make them go because we did HR training in 2017 and 2018 “nne re dira in-training” (we were doing in training). So why do not they say they must go at do causes and us who came now in 2019 e nne bona baye ko dikosong (let

them be the ones who attend courses) we become guard. Like me now, I'm from training 2017, 2018. After 2017 I was in Pretoria, I was working at 7 maintenance, I came here, I work at facility, Ke rotiwa mmereko (I'm being taught my work). If a person comes I must do this and that. But they have been here the whole year doing nothing only being just guards, this year still they are there, you see, so I do not think it's fair..."

Participant 3 Johannesburg added...

"...Ma'am we have a member that has been in the organisation for long. They couldn't be promoted. So they become negative. Not because of the organisation, but because of the budget cuts. And the chances that has to be given the members are not being promoted; the member stay long in a post; the members are not being exposed as others. You find that as we are now trying to renovate the defence force..."

In light of the above, one can say that if members are not being promoted and are not being taken care of in terms of incentives and being appreciated for a job well done, it may lead to members resorting to behaviours such as enriching themselves through corrupt activities within the organisation.

It is evident from the above themes that emanated from ASB members that little is being done by DI with regards to the processes of security vetting. Most of the members at ASBs showed more interest in the concept, though they hold different feelings about the approach of security vetting at the ASBs. The next item discusses themes emanating from vetting officers.

5.3 Themes emanating from vetting officers

Vetting Officers (VOs) at Defence Intelligence (DI) are the only members who conduct security vetting, which includes the collecting of information and conducting interviews throughout the entire DOD. Five VOs, well represented in gender and race and including civilians, were interviewed (see section 4.3.1). They all participated voluntarily, giving all information professionally.

5.3.1 Understanding of security vetting

Security vetting of members includes checking documentary sources and conducting interviews with both the subject and the references provided to the VOs. When the members were asked about their personal understanding of security vetting, they responded in the following way:

Participant 16 VO responded...

"...Security vetting is a way of screening the individuals or companies that have to be employed in a specific environment so that we can determine if they are actually suitable to be granted permission to do so..."

Participant 17 VO said...

"...Security vetting, it's a measure that is taken to ensure that you employ the relevant people to relevant posts. Like alright, different posts are classified differently, so you find that, alright. You find that we used to have four different classifications but currently we are only left with three; confidential, secret and top secret. Each and every post, the posts are graded according to those security classifications. It's used as a first line of defence for personnel who are working in the sensitive posts, posts that are graded..."

Participant 18 VO responded...

"...Security vetting is a process where we can conduct and protect the access of information in terms of, in terms of personnel material and in terms of all the state property that is supposed to be protected by the DOD..."

Participant 19 VO indicated...

"...My personal understanding is that it is the first line of defence against any corruption in the first place. Because when dealing with vetting you try to prevent corruption, you try to get rid of criminality, trying to have to test people's integrity. Security vetting is there to determine all those things..."

Participant 20 VO responded...

"...Security vetting, it is measurement that is first so that we can prevent what is called criminal activities, for acts endangering security to happen..."

Participants indicated that security vetting is a measure that is used as the first line of defence before a person can be employed in the DOD or placed in a certain post. Integrity of a person is seen as coupled with a position. However, the understanding of security vetting by the VOs appears a bit different from the understanding at ASBs because of their exposure to security vetting matters. For them, security vetting is conducted in order to appoint relevant persons to the relevant positions, which also includes leaving incriminated members out of the system.

Participant 19 VO further said...

“... It does not mean that you have people to be loyal or to be security conscious. You just know that the people that if they have all those things; so that we place them according to their security classification. You do not want to give access to the person who you know have criminal behaviour or psychological behaviour, is not right, we just want to put people according to their classification, is what security vetting means to me...”

This implies that when vetting is conducted, the criminal and psychological behaviours of members are looked into by VOs and are taken into account when placing members in positions. The following section discusses the provision of effective security vetting at ASBs

5.3.2 The provision of effective security vetting at ASBs

VOs are fieldworkers responsible for activating security vetting investigations and thereafter conducting evaluations. They also deal directly with the subjects and references in the process. Their level of responsibility reveals everything about the processes in security vetting. Responding to the question of the “provision of effective security vetting to the ASBs”, participants expressed their views in the following manner:

Participant 16 VO responded...

“...It is supposed to be carried out in that way, but because of the number of General Support Bases that we have in the South African National Defence

Force and the people that comprise that base, it becomes impossible for the vetting officers to do it in exactly that way, because we have a limited number of people, of vetting officers who are actually qualified to do that job...

Participant 17 VO indicated...

...It is supposed to be like that, but unfortunately due to personnel; lack of personnel in vetting, that's why it's not being done according to that...

...Yes it is not being conducted the way it should be done. Because what's happening, before you are employed, you should be vetted first, before you get a post. But currently we use screening and which screening is not full proof. Because you can say a person is not a thief, but only to find that the person has committed theft somewhere. Just because that person has never been arrested for that crime, so the fingerprints won't be a hit, But if we go on the ground and interview the people around, the people they might tell me that you once stole whatever, but that was never reported to the police, he was never arrested...

Participant 18 VO revealed...

...secondly the members apply for the clearance and it delays at vetting because of the shortage of personnel in order to conduct vetting...

...The reason why there's a lot of backlog and the members are trying to put effort. Like for example the DOD is almost 77 000 plus neh, then only members that are here in all at Directorate Vetting including crypto we are 54. Therefore, in that 54 not all of them are doing vetting; others administrators; we've got administration members; we've got evaluators; only two evaluators that are evaluating all that 77 000, we've got only 20 plus field workers. Therefore, it really has an impact in the backlog of the DOD, MOD and ARMSCOR. They are also vetting ARMSCOR personnel, DENEL personnel so we really in a dire stress...

Participant 19 VO said...

...Security vetting, if it's done right in most cases. We miss doing it right because of capacity problems and backlogs that is now. Before people enter

the system, at least they should have preliminary or what we call pre-screening, that we screen a person, so that we know that what kind of personnel. Once you get that because in the employment application, you indicate, that your employment will be fully confirmed once your security vetting is done or you agree that your security vetting must be done..."

Participant 20 VO added...

"...Our own challenge is that we have really have not enough of personnel, which is our first challenge and main problem. We are unable to deal with huge, huge, huge work load..."

"...We work in each and security clearance that comes in, I can as a human being, I can do so much, then the hours in a day is finished. So we are only few, I think we are only ten on the floor. And we have to serve the whole of defence force, then for ten people to be able to do all of that. We have a lot of work..."

It is evident from the responses above that personnel and backlog problems are the main cause for VOs not being able to provide effective security vetting of personnel at the ASBs and the entire DOD. However, another participant also revealed some of the other problems that are contributing to delays and explained as follows:

Participant 18 VO revealed...

"...The reason why members some members do not have clearance in the units is because some members does not apply for the clearance..."

All participants revealed that a lack of personnel at Directorate Vetting is the problem that they face, which also affects the processes. It is evident from the above responses that the backlog at DI has a negative impact on the provision of security vetting. This is because of the delays that take place as a result of a lack of personnel. The lack of personnel in the vetting environment has been quoted several times by all the participants. They all indicated that it is a contributing factor to them failing to provide effective security vetting in the DOD. The next item reveals the challenges that VOs face when conducting their processes at ASBs

5.3.3. Challenges that vetting officers face when conducting security vetting at ASBs

Security vetting is regarded as complete when elements such as VOs, subject, references and a report are present. The subjects' cooperation is of vital importance in the vetting process. VOs face different challenges when they conduct their day-to-day activities. To the question "what are the challenges that VOs face in the ASBs", all participants come across different challenges at ASBs that depend on individual subjects. They responded as follows:

Participant 16 VO said...

"...That is true partially. We must remember that first and foremost, the members at the bases sometimes they do not submit the necessary documentation as they are supposed to. And now when you talk vetting everything, there is guidelines actually to stipulate the way we should conduct this vetting issue. If all the documents are not there, we cannot continue with the process..."

Participant 17 VO responded...

"...Laughter! People tend to think when you come to conduct security vetting interviews; they think you are in the unit to spy. Because Defence Intelligence is the only, alright, whoever works at Defence Intelligence you are a spy. You tend to get resistance. People tend not to comply, adhere, alright when you make an appointment with a person..."

"...It affects, like what. Alright, I wouldn't have gone to a unit, let's say go to a unit for two weeks to do security vetting for six members. So now, I am able to complete on three files, for three members. The other three members are incomplete due these people who disappear into the thin air. I come back to the shelves. Then backlog comes in. That's why we continuously have this backlog unnecessarily so."

Participant 18 VO indicated...

“...the challenges that the field workers are facing in the units and they are facing are if for example, if the references are in the area of the size of the South African intelligence formation; where there are deployments they do not get the members in that areas; because they are deployed. And the other challenge is the referees, sometimes the members put references that are not willing to give information to the fieldworkers and sometimes the higher level...”

“...then the references will say come, and then when you are there, some give excuses. Therefore, you can do nothing about it is just to go back and redo the appointment...”

Participant 19 VO added...

“...Most common one is that the UMSOs there, they do not check these applications that, because an applications is supposed to be signed and filled in all the sections, with the right answers. If the thing that is not applicable they should write that, and attachments should be there all of them. I think it is because they themselves, some of them are not security aware what security vetting is about. They just accept these forms without checking, for compliances sake, the members has attached everything signed and everything. We get those applications which are not fully completed, what happens is that we cannot process a lot of them they delay, some of them we return them, we request for more documents from them. That is the most common problems that we get from these guys and then now. We have to communicate back to them and it takes time for the formation to communicate the information back again from them.”

Participant 20 VO indicated...

“...First of all, people do not take our interviews seriously; they do not pitch for the interviews, they cancel on the last moment, they do not answer their telephones. It shows that they are not available...”

It is clear that VOs experience different challenges than at the ASBs which include, amongst others, resistance, non-compliance and non-adherence to the processes of

security vetting by subjects and references. One participant further stated that individual subjects sometimes sabotage the process and said that:-

Participant 17 VO said...

"... Is both ways, because some subjects, some applicants you will find that, that applicants will call him, to say you have been listed by who or who that you know him better, so I am coming to see you? You tell the person that this is between me and you. They will tell the subjects what is going on, and the subjects will tell him that, so don't meet these people."

It is also evident that another problem come from the officers who are deployed in the units as IOs to perform security duties. This includes no guidance to members at ASBs on how to complete a security clearance form. The next item discusses the importance of security vetting as a security measure.

5.3.4 The importance of security vetting as a security measure

Security vetting can also be regarded as "due diligence" on personnel by checking their credibility in an employment situation and in order to instil discipline and adherence to command and control in the military. When asked about their support for the proposed vetting of every member at ASBs, the majority of VO participants showed their support and said:

Participant 16 VO responded...

"...Because when we talk about an Army Support Base, we talk about equipment, we talk about money, we talk the HR are there, the financial resources are there, and everything. Because the powers are delegated to those members who are there; in the hope that they will support the members at unit level, as the bases and now if for example, we talk about the 100% budget that has been handed to the DOD. 90% of that budget goes to the support bases. Then the people who work there must actually undergo some sort of vetting so that we can be sure that equipment and everything that is there, is in the safe hands."

Participant 17 VO indicated...

“...I do not think it can happen, but it can be a deterrent for any criminal elements or any criminality to happen and I think 80% of the problem can be solved. I do not think a person who wants to steal will just arrive today and start stealing today, He will first get used to the environment. After that you start exploiting the loopholes you see...”

Participant 18 VO added...

“...I support the process so that each and every unit must be able to put, to staff their members in the right post and also the members must be able to understand the vetters; that need an impact they are both in terms of the clearances that have been given and the post thereof and the sensitivity of the post...”

Participant 19 VO indicated...

“...because we deal with the whole person concept, if we detect and combine with other issues then we can really get to the bottom, why this person is, could be. A criminal record could be a result of something else, or maybe financial issues, or a person divorced or under stress, his other affairs and things like that. If we can get that we would be able to get, what is the problem, it's just detection of that.”

Participants support the full implementation of security vetting for every member at ASBs. They also believe that if every member at the ASBs can be fully vetted, the DOD will be able to deal with the current challenges because security vetting deals with the whole person concept.

5.3.5 Additional inputs on security vetting by VO participants

After the interviews all VO participants were asked if there was any input or suggestion regarding security vetting matters they would like to make. Some members felt that they had said it all during the interviews, whereas others gave the following inputs:

Participant 16 VO said...

“...Another thing that needs to be sorted out is the issue of centralisation of security vetting. This needs to be decentralised. For an example, there must be provincial. If you talk about KwaZulu Natal (KZN), there must be an area that operates just the same manner that DI operates. It must be in all the provinces, the other one in KZN there, there must be a point identified that can operate the same way like DI operates. In Limpopo it must be the case, in North West and all this areas. So it must be decentralised.”

Participant 17 VO suggested...

“...If the defence force security vetting department is being taken seriously like the security vetting outside, that was going to be different. If you can look at SASS, they have placed personnel in all the departments. Then in the headquarters they only do the evaluation, but still the workload is still heavy for them. If we have the same structure here, I think we will do much better...”

Participant 18 VO added...

“...what can we do like for example we must work together with all the state departments to get information, like for example Home Affairs, SAPS, DTI, SAPS, Department of Justice so that we can get in. There are lot of things that we can get from them so that we can get information that will makes us easy to do that can informed us about it but about not about the processor about an individual. Yes because now you've got information from SAPS there are some information from Home Affairs but that information is not completed.”

In light of the above, it is evident that VOs also face challenges when conducting security vetting processes. Their inputs which include the involvement of other departments and decentralisation clearly indicate that something needs to be done to conduct effective security vetting in the DOD.

It is evident from the participants that they feel that if security vetting can be fully implemented as a security measure, it will detect and deter criminal activities at ASBs. This is because members will be cleared according to their post classification.

Some participants also believe that if security vetting is decentralised, it can bear fruit. They also think that working with other departments may further deter criminal activities. The next discussion outlines themes emanating from the managers

5.4 Themes emanating from managers

Managers in the DOD should ensure that security vetting principles are applied from the beginning to conclusion. Where possible, it is imperative to command and control all the security processes in order to manage its effectiveness.

5.4.1 Understanding of security vetting

Security vetting is the process of public power that involves the examination of employment and other records of individuals for the purpose of hiring and security control within the organisation. To the question regarding their understanding of security vetting, participants responded as follows:

Participant 21 manager said...

“...Security vetting I think is another tool to be used by institutions, to ensure specifically human resources. Those who are coming in the department, some coming as employment, some coming as leadership, to ensure that all those people are vetted. To look at history of terms of criminality and other Issues that may have impact in future of the department...”

Participant 22 manager said...

“...the security vetting is the process, the analytical processes which need to be followed in order to determine the integrity of the employees; before they could be placed in a certain position...”

Participant 23; manager said...

“...Security vetting is a process where you, to how clear a member or a person; that is relating to the type of a job that is going, he or she is going to do. Because when you vet the person, that’s when you want to find them; prove whether this person is reliable enough. And then after that you then

classify a member according to the classification. You can therefore determine whether this person can either be trusted or cannot be trusted with certain things like information as I indicated, being a part of security to guard the place, you know can I trust this person? Is he not a criminal? So you trying to clarify or to trying to clean him in terms of those risks that are related to security. Is he or she what is a standpoint or eastern point..."

During interviews it became clear that all managers have a clear understanding of security vetting and the importance thereof. Participants further explained that the process should be conducted on every employee at ASBs. They also have a common understanding of the importance of conducting security vetting at ASBs. Participants further said:

Participant 22 manager said...

"...Before they can be placed into certain position, I will just give you example, because it applies all over the place. A guard will need to for example, we need to do to work at the access area. I will prefer to start at the entrance; they need to have like for example the confidential. In the finance department for example, we cannot employ someone who have got, whom we not sure as to whether you won't be able to handle the finance properly. The other area is where by there are there are areas where by the people will be dealing with the very sensitive matters; so they need to be vetted, as to whether they are the right people to be placed in that position..."

Participant 23 manager added...

"...It is a normal administrative process, so in our unit that's what happens every member is signs that declaration form. Remember every person must fill in a security clearance form, yes every member must be security cleared. For the reasons that because there are some sensitive information that cannot be divulged. Every member must be cleared in terms of that form. So in this form that's when we the person that form sent over to DI, Defence Intelligence; who will then classify the member either you are restricted, confidential or you are secret; depending on how they do it. Every member is to go through that exercise then; once that is done and we have we have we

have identified with this person belongs; then were able to use a member in the platform....”

All participants indicated that security vetting is conducted according to the position in which members will be placed. According to the majority of the managerial participants, security clearance is coupled to a post. The next item discusses the provision of effective security vetting at ASBs.

5.4.2 The provision of effective security vetting at ASBs

Participants have different views regarding the provision of security vetting at ASBs and within the DOD at large. Responding to the question about the provision of effective security vetting at ASBs, all participants responded as follows:

Participant 21 manager said...

“...Currently, I can't tell you that, the reality of the matter is because of those who are supposed to apply these measures, they are will always going to say that they have no manpower. For that reason reality is not to everybody; sometimes it depends to who you are and where you come from...”

“...actually you will do all your power to make sure that your people are vetted, because of manpower; they will tell you that there is no manpower...”

“...You may find he is vetted, but vetting process was not appropriately done...”

Participant 22 manager said...

“...I think it is lack of personnel that is the main thing; we do not have enough personnel that can able to monitor the clearance that have been issued...”

“...In short I can say there are not enough vetting members within the SANDF, who can do the monitoring...”

“...The difference is that, things that is lacking currently is that there is no continuous vetting process which is done after the clearances are issued to members. I will just give you example that's when they are issued to the members; they've got a time frame. But what is lacking currently is that in that time frame where by the members are given; is there any follow-up which is done when they are issued until the time when they expire. Because a human being something that can change overnight. So when clearance are issued they need to be monitored so that they can be revoked...”

Participant 23 manager said...

“...Currently you know I won't say it is effective. But it needs support especially from, another element to understand especially from DI environment, I can tell you people apply for the security classification. Remember you still have to use them but that waiting period is too, the turnaround time to get feedback about the whole security process it takes time...”

It is evident from all participants in management that the provision of security vetting at ASBs is not effective. The feedback problem from the DI is another contributing factor. It also emerged that currently there are no continuous vetting processes and monitoring within the DOD. One participant further said:

Participant 22 manager said...

“...As I mentioned previously there is something that is running short, is that when issued, the monitoring process is lacking as to make sure that they are still living according to the norms that we expect them to be doing, yes...”

The managers also find it difficult to command and control because members are demoralised. One participant added:

Participant 21 Manager said....

“...It affects a lot, even if am honest, seeing all that is happening, I am demoralised, I say hai, fuck, go a tswana (it's the same). That is our situation;

I am not trying to be unrealistic although maybe some of the questions I'm not working at vetting since I am a manager but I don't understand most of the things at vetting.

It is imperative that managers at different levels in the DOD engage DI regarding the continuous provision and monitoring of security vetting. It is also significant that all personnel should be vetted before being placed to encourage good governance in the department.

5.4.3 The importance of security vetting as a security measure

Security measures are all those measures that can prevent members from committing criminal activities. It is imperative that managers in the workplace put all the available security measures in place in order to solve problems at the ASBs. Responding to the question about the importance of security vetting as a security measure, participants responded as follows:

Participant 21 manager said...

"...Security vetting is a tool that can enforce discipline and good conduct. But I can be vetted and they find I am a good person..."

"...Yes, it can be addressed, you vet the people and you monitor them, and we are strict in terms of policies, actions must be taken against the perpetrators..."

Participant 22 manager said...

"...there are times where by it can solve; there are times whereby things emanate after the member shows like good can I say good qualities and remember these issues with the clearance ..."

Participant 23 manager said...

"...The problem or it can. However, remember some of the things they also depend on the need. Remember in the military, before class we are not forced and then people have that can also be part of plan to resolve the problem. If it is identified and where it has an impact that particular parties addressed

immediately you understand and timeously like I indicated. But if you identify it and it's just a matter of who will see and then when you try to do that, because the question is that. The personnel involved, they must also see the seriousness of what is taking place, is like you ask me about disclosure..."

Participants are concerned about the lack of monitoring after vetting has been conducted. They also point out that discipline should be enforced to ensure members adhere to the policies.

5.4.4 Additional inputs on security vetting by manager participants

All manager participants volunteered to give inputs at the end of interviews. The different inputs included suggestions and recommendations as follows:

Participant 21 manager said....

"...I am saying, is it the only way we go for vetting to confirm the issue of person? Confirm the history of a person, the history of a company. I think now we must go beyond that, the world is changing. You must realise that this thing of vetting, it didn't start now with this generation, 21st century, it started long time ago. I think people are in terms of systematic wisdom. They are becoming more talented because of this technology people are becoming so. You look at crime today is not like that of yesterday..."

Participant 22 manager said...

"...In general we are living in can I say ever-changing world. As vetting officers we must always be you must be always be ahead of their supposed to be always been ahead of what is happening. Yeah because the situation which is the current situation if things they are the way we see like today; it does it mean that tomorrow it can be like that. So there are number of things that we have to can I do, like research. For example in the olden days we didn't have what is all the social media and currently by using what is all the social media..."

Participant 23 manager said...

“...I am saying, and review the whole process, find out if it's still relevant you understand. If it's not relevant consider what need to be relevant write bring into it into effect you understand. And make it compulsory you understand. And then where there's it's possibly put some timelines you know; put some timelines. Once it's compulsory, it means if something didn't happen like, because the thing is it must be clear and people must understand what's going to happen. And I can tell you everybody will then, now these guys are becoming serious because otherwise we are not going anywhere. Like I said it's killing small fires will not help us...”

All participants indicated that in an evolving world where everything is ever-changing, policies and instructions should also be revisited in order to adjust with the current circumstances. Managers should intervene where members have problems and work hand in hand with vetting officials in order to conduct successful implementation.

Workplace challenges have a negative effect on every person in an organisational setup. Challenges create an atmosphere of distrust amongst employees, management and clients. Managers are good in identifying attitudes amongst individual employees in the workplace because it affects their work, either positively or negatively. Participants have different views on the challenges that ASBs members face and which can lead them to engaging in criminal activities. One participant believes members are unethical and said the following about members at ASBs:

Participant 21 manager said...

“...Unethical! You know is our weaknesses in our policies and control measures and leadership, because they do not want to take actions against the perpetrators. Everyone wants to pass the buck, when you as a commander, when someone commits a crime and there are ill-discipline issues, you must immediately directly take a stance, from that point. But they are not doing it, they want to pass the buck Chief Inspector General (IG), ey! Chief, ey!. That's where the problem is. Our internal control measures are very weak, and the system is very weak. That's why people are have realised

that they can do something for their own, taking something from the coffers of the state because there is nobody who cares..."

Participants are also of the opinion that commanders in the defence force are not implementing policies and consequence management which contributes to the commission of criminal activities by personnel. Another participant believes that members at ASBs lack discipline and responded as follows:

Participant 22 manager said...

"...It starts from being not disciplined, for me I would advise the higher echelon to be very strict in terms of discipline that is number one..."

Another participant identified career management as a serious problem that contributes to the behaviour of members at ASBs. The participant also highlighted the "do not care attitude" as a serious challenge and responded as follows:

Participant 23 manager said...

"...I think or challenges as part of the main challenges, I think career management is one of the biggest problem. Because in the sense that it creates a lot of expectations you know and then when those expectations are not met' what do you regress..."

Participants identify career management, ill- discipline and ethics as challenges. One of the participants added that:

Participant 23 manager added...

"...you understand the people are careless, there's that do not care attitude. It indicates to you either it's a visible problem or it's a subtle problem, which maybe through some kind of research, one can find out what exactly is it, so yeah these are some of the challenges..."

It is imperative to note that all participants have identified the challenges that lead to members at ASBs partaking in criminal activities. Management should address the

problems ranging from discipline and ethics to career management in order to solve the challenges that employees are facing.

A dysfunctional security vetting system hinders the level of production and is also detrimental to effective and good management within the organisation. Failing to exercise security vetting is like intentionally leaving the house door wide open, which can give criminals an opportunity to steal.

5.5 Summary

This chapter presented data collected from members of the SANDF who are actively involved in security vetting processes. Several themes were identified and discussed. The majority of the participants have a clear understanding of security vetting, making it easy to explore the phenomena. Findings from the interviews indicate that there are many problems around the implementation of security vetting that are contributing to its ineffectiveness at ASBs. The next chapter discusses the interpretation of the research findings.

CHAPTER 6

INTERPRETATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

6.1. Introduction

This chapter interprets and discusses the findings of the collected data in order to answer the questions and objectives of this study (see section 1.4). Meanings will be assigned to the analysed data in order to determine their implications and significance. The interpretation involves deduction of data in order to come to a meaningful conclusion. Security vetting is regarded as the first line of defence in the DOD and also a monitoring tool in the SANDF.

The previous chapter identified various themes that emanated from the data collected from the semi-structured interviews conducted with the participants. The different themes that emanated from all participants in this study will be grouped and discussed in this chapter. The objectives this study wanted to achieve were drawn from the first chapter (see section 1.4) and this chapter will provide a discussion of the findings.

6.2 Interpretation of findings

This section will provide the findings by situating them with the major problems that the SANDF is facing. It also attempts to determine whether the identified challenges can address the research problem.

6.2.1 Understanding of security vetting

All participants in this study have a different understanding of security vetting. Security cluster institutions engage in security vetting exercises mainly to ensure the first line of defence, control and monitoring. This exercise is done to encourage adherence and confidentiality with regard to security matters within the organisation.

The purpose of including a question on the understanding of the concept of security vetting in the interviews was to establish a starting point to engaging participants in the study. When conducting research, it is difficult to get answers from participants who do not understand the phenomena. All participants responded to the question according to their views of security vetting. The majority of participants at the ASBs

showed a lack of knowledge with regards to the security vetting concept, especially those of junior rank. Some participants confessed that it was the first time they had heard the word “vetting”.

Though the majority of members at ASBs lack an understanding of security vetting, most of them are familiar with security clearance. Most participants only know that a form is completed in order to be issued with security clearance. However, what they do not know is that after completing the security clearance application form (DD1057), it undergoes a process of scrutiny in order to issue or decline the security clearance. The senior ranking participants showed more knowledge of security vetting due to their experience either as a reference or a subject when security vetting is conducted. The majority of senior ranking officials revealed that they participated in vetting processes during pre-deployment and retraining due to the post that they occupied in mission areas.

The researcher also found out from the ASBs’ junior ranking participants that some do not take security vetting seriously. They only comply because they have to follow instructions and follow the procedures of completing the security clearance form. The SANDF Code of Conduct is a set of the established norms, policies and practises that is meant to guide personnel in terms of right or wrong. It encapsulates the core values of the SANDF in order to provide the vision for military professionalism. Security vetting is one of the policies in the SANDF that members must adhere to (see section 3.2). In essence, a security vetting policy paves the way for the interaction which leads to the smooth completion of the security vetting processes required by law for the public sector (Matakata, 2011:40).

The limited understanding of security vetting by the junior ranking participants at ASBs poses a serious concern. Participants also indicated that security clearance is issued in order for them to have access to computers. For the researcher, this creates an idea that if a member, for example works as a security guard, who does not have access to the computer, they will not be cleared to a certain level. One participant 9 from Potchefstroom, also said that her colleague told her that since arriving at the ASB he had been given the DD1057 form to fill in, but has never completed it (see section 5.2.1). This practice in the SANDF is against the Defence Act No 42 of 2002. Section 37 (2) of the Defence Act prohibits appointments,

promotions of a member to be retained in the DC if they are not security vetted. It is also against the SANDF Code of Conduct for members not to adhere to instructions.

It also emerged that the only participants who understand security vetting at ASBs are senior ranking officials and UMISO, who participate in the security vetting processes either as a subject or a reference. An UMISO should have a Secret security clearance as he is the nodal point between members at ASBs and DI, who coordinates all security matters on the base. All members of the DC only occupy a senior position when they have been security vetted. It is evident that DI through their UMISOs is not conducting security vetting awareness among members at units. This emerged as most participants at ASBs do not understand the concept of security vetting, some indicated that it was the first time they heard the word “vetting”.

Security vetting is conducted to provide a level of assurance to trustworthiness, integrity resilience and reliability of an individual to handle classified information and the assets of the organisation (United Kingdom House of Parliament: 2017:13). Security clearance allows members of the SANDF to work in posts which involve close proximity to public figures perceived to be of particular risk to any form of attack. Members at ASBs are also regarded as those people who may work in close proximity with the public because at any given time, they may be called upon to respond to critical issues of the state, for example, assisting SAPS during service delivery protests and the current Operation LOCKDOWN (OP LOCKDOWN) in Cape Town. OP LOCKDOWN is a joint operation launched by the SAPS in 2018 where the SANDF has been requested to assist in fighting gangsters in Cape Town. Members from different units are deployed on constant basis and rotated to assist in the operation (Defence Web, 2019). The SANDF is currently also working with the SAPS on Operation NOTLELA (OP NOTLELA) Covid-19 lockdown, which was announced by the State President Cyril Ramaphosa to fight Covid-19, a global pandemic. During March 2020 all SANDF members were instructed by their Commander in Chief to cancel their leave, in order to be deployed in different places around the country, to prevent the spread of the coronavirus by enforcing the general lockdown order and compliance in communities.

Security vetting is a systematic process of investigation followed to determine the security competence of a member (MISS, 2006). The majority of participants understand what security vetting is, VO participants understand security vetting as a first line of defence security measure, which is conducted in order to employ people to relevant positions such as classified positions. The senior ranking officials' participating hold the same view as VOs about security vetting. As with the VOs, the majority of senior ranking participants showed a clear understanding of security vetting and its importance. They believe security vetting should be conducted on every unit member. The aim of security vetting is to ensure that the character and personal circumstances of an individual are such that they can be trusted with sensitive SANDF information and assets.

This implies that certain positions are coupled to the integrity of a person which is determined by the security risk and competence of an individual. VOs believe that psychological and criminal behaviour of a member are also elements that should be looked into when conducting security vetting. It is evident that security risk is mediated by a person's security competence (see section 2.8). It can therefore be concluded that a security clearance is issued to the vetted person to indicate that they are deserving individuals who can be utilised at work (Matakata, 2011:5). A security competent person is expected to pose less of a security risk and vice versa. Logic would dictate that when a person's security competence declines, their risk potential increases, and vice versa (see section 2.8). Matakata (2011:4) regards security vetting as the process that is conducted to understand a particular person with the intention to determine their credibility in an employment situation. This definition of security vetting indicates the relationship between security vetting and employment. At a more concrete level, security clearance ensures that a person employed within their area of responsibility, has access to classified information and the access is determined by their level of clearance. The relationship between security risk and security competence underscores the need to consider all factors in the whole person concept.

Security vetting constitutes a primary defensive measure to safeguard the interests of the country, which demands personnel commitment from the defence department. Information management is essential in a security environment where members

should always be security conscious. Koenig (2018:1) defines knowledge management as the promotion of identifying, capturing, evaluating, retrieving and sharing information within an organisational setting. From the discussion above, it can be deduced that the lack of knowledge about security vetting and the lack of cooperation by members at ASBs are factors that should be looked into. According to Matakata (2011:8), the relevant implementation of security vetting within the department can fully contribute to deterring, detecting and managing compromised individuals. Management should ensure the collaboration of different stakeholders within the department in order to solve the problem at hand. This will also assist in uprooting and ejecting all the rotten apples before they can exercise their destructive actions within the department. The next section discusses the provision of effective security vetting at ASBs.

6.2.2 The provision of effective security vetting at ASBs

The basic role of security vetting is to ensure that the people who are staffed in positions in the department are trustworthy and meet the requirements set out and endorsed by superiors, in the case of SANDF, Generals (Mdluli, 2011). The aim of asking the question about the provision of security vetting at ASBs was to get members' views in order to shed light on the current state of affairs.

The majority of ASBs participants indicated that the most pressing causes of ineffectiveness in the security vetting processes is the lack of personnel in the DI environment. This includes the UMSO structures deployed at ASBs, which are also not effective due to personnel shortages. They indicated that the lack of manpower in the DI environment makes it difficult for them to give timeous feedback. Security vetting is important in every organisation because it detects, prevents or mitigates risks, which are inherent in the security cluster (Mdluli, 2011:39). A member's trustworthiness and weaknesses can be determined during security vetting processes, which makes feedback a very important element of the process. According to the majority of participants, they get feedback from DI late or sometimes not at all. The majority of ASB participants also identified the processes for the of movement of documents to DI as another problem.

During interviews, the majority of ASB participants suggested the decentralisation of security vetting systems in the form of sub-offices in units in order to fast-track the backlog DI is currently experiencing. Decentralisation is defined as the reorganisation or transfer of competencies originally owned and control by the central or main office of the organisation with corresponding resources to the sub offices of such organisations (UNDP Germany, 1999: 2). Participants also suggested the delegation of some vetting processes. Delegation is an administrative decentralisation that refers to the redistribution of responsibilities towards units, but maintaining accountability to the central department (UNDP Germany, 1999:2). Decentralisation may create more effective open and responsive results to enhance security vetting processes.

It also emerged from the majority of ASB participants that they are not given sufficient information about the importance of security vetting by their units. The majority of participants indicated that DI is not open about security vetting processes, which also instils fear in members because they do not know the purpose of security vetting. Most participants indicated that when UMSO in the units present security matters, they do not include security vetting. Dissemination is part of information management in the security cluster. It enables people in the organisational setting to use their time, resources and expertise effectively to fulfil their roles. Dissemination is defined as the process of communication that happens with the broadcasting of information without feedback. Properly communicated information is critical to the successful implementation and management of any operation (Zhang, Huang, Su, Zhao and Zhang, 2014)

In the case of VO participants, the majority indicated that security vetting is not being conducted according to standard because of the number of units they have to offer services to. Most VO participants identified the delays that are experienced in units to the shortage of personnel in DI, a problem that hinders effective security vetting in the entire DOD. The majority of participants indicated back-logs in security vetting processes is a burning issue at Directorate Vetting. The participants indicated that all the problems that Directorate Vetting is experiencing emanate from a massive shortage of personnel.

It also emerged from VO participants that some members at ASBs do not apply for security clearance, which makes it obvious that those who do not apply will never be issued with clearance. This again speaks to the issue of the SANDF Code of Conduct, which members should comply with at all times (see section 6.2).

From the senior ranking participants, it emerged that a lack of personnel at Directorate Vetting is a major problem. The majority of the participants indicated that the shortage of personnel is also affecting the monitoring of the security vetting process. This further indicates that there is no continuous security vetting aftercare, an exercise that is conducted after security clearances have been issued to members. Human beings can change overnight, therefore continuous monitoring is recommended for all members who have been issued with clearance. Directorate Vetting is also failing to review security clearances, which should be done after a time frame given according to the classification has expired (see section 2.11). According to RSA (1996), there are three classifications of security clearance which should be issued to SANDF members according to their line of duties (see section 2.6). The majority of participants indicated that this is not happening because of the lack of security personnel at Directorate Vetting, which leads to vetting processes not being conducted on every employee.

The dysfunctionality of security vetting within an organisation is counter-productive and can affect good governance (Matakata, 2011). It emerged from senior ranking participants that most members, especially at management level, are also demoralised because of what is happening in terms of security vetting. They further stated that the situation at vetting is unbearable as senior ranking officials they end up losing hope over whether it will ever come right. The lack of good practice in security vetting, may lead to reputational damage for an organisation. Security vetting may protect and minimise this and protect the assets of the organisation (Matakata, 2011: 7).

It can be deduced that a lack of personnel at DI's Directorate Vetting is causing delays in executing security vetting processes. This is a problem that most participants are very concerned about. The more DI uses the problem of a lack of personnel to carry out security vetting as an excuse, the more SANDF members will not take security vetting seriously, which will lead to non-compliance to vetting

processes. The other contributing factor to ineffective security vetting is a lack of knowledge with the majority of participants at ASBs indicating that UMISOs are not sharing the importance of security vetting with military units. Security vetting education can be a lasting investment (Matakata, 2011). Information management in any system helps people in an organisation to share and update knowledge and information. Coupled with the potential of employees' skills, competitiveness and innovative ideas, knowledge management creates efficiency and effectiveness in an organisational setting. Organisations that apply successful knowledge management improve the effectiveness of the processes and are able to make good quality decisions which benefit an organisation (Mohajan, 2017).

It must be noted that for security vetting to be effective, the use of a transparent culture is important. A culture for improvement in the organisational setting involves, listening to everyone who is involved in the processes. Providing feedback to the members who are involved is equally important. To improve the experience of people, members should always be given updates on the status of their clearances. The problem of a shortage of personnel to conduct vetting processes should be looked into and the training of more vetting officers should be prioritised.

Carpenter (2019: xxiv) states that "a transformational security awareness programme proactively accounts for the knowledge-intention-behaviour gap" Effective security training is the foundation for the employees who are aware of and follow the directives of an organisation. Without training and knowledge, employees could be making mistakes in the realm of security. Continuous security vetting awareness and training allows for an organisation to influence the behaviours of employees, mitigate the risks that come with behaviour and ensure compliance of every member in the organisational setting (Corda, 2016:np; Carpenter, 2019: 12). Employees also gain adequate knowledge about security matters through security awareness programmes (Chen, Medlin & Shaw, 2008: 3). Raising security awareness through training and educating people about the significance of security vetting processes, should be encouraged in the department. The next section discusses attitudes of members towards security vetting.

6.2.3 Attitudes of members towards security vetting

Security vetting is an integral part of the military framework of ethics and professional conduct within the defence department. Therefore, it is imperative to know the behavioural attitude of employees towards security measures in a security cluster environment. This plays an important role in identifying shortcomings in order to institute measures that can bridge the gaps. Security vetting should be carried out by all intelligence structures in order to test members' security competence and security risk (see section 2.8). Members at ASBs play an important role in supporting military units located close to them, bringing services closer to units and minimising costs. Their integrity cannot be questionable, since they deal with different classified issues. Section 37 of the Defence Act no 42 of 2002 gives power to VOs to conduct security vetting and continuous screening of SANDF members.

Government regulations have brought drastic changes which impact the working environment, for example, more competitions, lengthy work hours, multiculturalism and an increase in the stress levels of the employees, which affects their attitudes towards activities (Santhosh & Baral, 2015:127). Employees' attitudes are dampened and lifted by many factors which cannot be controlled by human nature. This may include general working conditions which influences how members may react to security measures and all the processes that come with them. Moreover, positive employee behaviour can influence colleagues to adhere to security vetting policies and security behaviours in an organisational setting (Santhosh & Baral, 2015:127).

During interviews, the majority of participants revealed that morale among members in the units is low due to working conditions (see section 5.2.3). The participants further indicated that most unit members are old, lazy and not well educated, which makes them a burden to the units because of their illiterate nature. The behaviour of other members is also influenced by these elements. They indicated that members feel they are not looked after in terms of promotions and other opportunities that are available in the military. These factors, according to the participants instil negative attitudes in them. An organisation can also contribute to employees' attitudes and behaviour through organisational social responsibilities. It is clear that if members are negative in the workplace, it is difficult for management to command and control such employees.

It also emerged from the majority of participants that members in the units are demoralised due to the fact that after applying for security clearances they do not get feedback. Participants indicated that the older members do not fully complete and return the DD1057 form to UMSOs, which confirms their negative attitude towards vetting. Participants also indicated that managers fail to force members to complete the security clearance forms because of legislation that sometimes protects them. They further indicated that they cannot enforce military disciplinary procedures as they cannot be applied to such matters. Everyone in the SANDF must maintain high ethical and professional standards and act with the utmost integrity in order to maintain public confidence. Section 37 (A) of the Defence Act prohibits the enrolment, appointment to a commission or for a person to be retained as a member of the SANDF if the person has not been issued with security clearance. The SANDF is responsible for protecting territorial integrity, the national interest and the people of South Africa by laying a solid foundation based on the Constitution of RSA (see section 3.3).

The SANDF Code of Conduct has been developed to define principles and norms that should guide personnel to be consistent in maintaining standards in the defence force. The code applies to SANDF uniform members and together with Vetting DODI are standard documents guided by the Constitution of RSA. Security vetting processes are regarded as key indicators in assessing a member's integrity in the SANDF. It also emerged from most participants that many members fail to complete the DD1057 form because of its length and the many questions they have to answer. Older members do not see the importance of filling out such a long form when they will not receive feedback. They also pointed out that the mistakes that members make while completing the DD1050 form is another problem. The SANDF is faced with a problem of illiterate members in their structures since the integration of forces in 1994. After the introduction of the MSDS programme, the SANDF still has more than 40 percent of personnel from the integration processes in their structures, which is a contributing factor to the non-adherence to policies (See section 1.2). Due to the current economic situation, it is easy for the older people from the previous forces to influence the MSDS members, which in turn contributes to their non-adherence to policies.

It can be deduced that management does not consider members from previous forces when applying policies. As a result, assistance is not being given to those employees who do not understand the security clearance form. Effective measures are required to assist those ASB members with whatever problem they come across regarding security vetting. Attitudes can be changed through persuasion as a communication response (Ahlan, Lubis & Lubis, 2015: 361). Equally important, an organisation can change negative attitude towards behavioural change if the driving forces are greater than resisting forces. Employees may start showing positive attitudes towards various security measures which may lead to rewards (Ahlan *et al*, 2015: 363).

In contrast, some participants indicated that members believe that security vetting is effective. However, they also indicate that it has its shortcomings. Some have a clear understanding and are highly supportive of security vetting processes. They further stated that sometimes members at the ASBs require follow-ups on the renewal of their clearance. It is imperative that the SANDF contributes to ensuring that public has confidence in the effectiveness of security vetting in identifying members who pose a risk to the organisational setting. Attitudes of employees towards a concept can contribute to its ineffectiveness within the organisation.

Employees' attitudes can have a huge impact on the achievement of the strategic goals of an organisation, if they are negative, they can lead to the failure of its mission (Amusam & Ajubola, 2017:1). The main objective of this section was to establish the attitudes of participants to security vetting and the reasons for such attitudes. Amusam and Ajubola (2017:2) define an attitude as a psychological tendency that is expressed when an entity is evaluated to a degree of favour or disfavour. Attitude is relative to an individual's beliefs about an object which can be seen as favourable or unfavourable. According to the Amusam & Ajubola (2017:2), employees have attitudes towards everything whether positive, negative or neutral. It is important that the issue of the attitudes of employees towards security measures at ASBs be corrected and addressed in order to promote compliance with security vetting processes and to avoid reputational damage to the SANDF. The next section discusses the challenges that VOs face at ASBs.

6.2.4 The challenges encountered by vetting officers in conducting their duties

Support for the Constitution of RSA in the military is strongly associated with adherence to security measures. According to Smith (1994: 5), those who value obedience highly, tend to favour both security vetting and counter- espionage measures. The strongest association of the two comes with obedience and respect for authority as the foundation of security measures in an organisation. The two are supported and associated with patriotism and integrity. Patriotism in the military is the ability to sacrifice your being in serving your country. A member of the SANDF should always be willing to sacrifice, to voluntarily protect and defend the values of independence, sovereignty and security of the state as per the Constitution of the RSA. It is important to understand that among the challenges faced by VOs in conducting their duties is identifying where problems can arise during security vetting processes. Challenges are all those problems and limitations that put an individual to the test. Challenges normally happen when there is an objective to be attained. While conducting security vetting processes. VOs face various challenges from the subjects and their references that interfere with their work.

It was established during the interviews that most VO participants are not happy about the security vetting response rate. It appears that subjects at military bases do not submit all the necessary documents they are supposed to, which makes it difficult for VOs to complete their tasks. Though some vetting officials try to visit units to highlight the vetting guidelines timeously, the *status quo* remains. There are stipulated guidelines on how security vetting processes should be conducted. If members do not submit all the required documents, the process cannot continue, which leads to the continuous backlog. This attitude of non-compliance by the members has a negative financial impact on Directorate Vetting.

It also emerged from the participants that members in units tend to think that VOs are spies, coming to conduct counter- intelligence duties. This is because members who work at DI are regarded as spies and tend to get resistance and non-compliance when securing an appointment for vetting processes. In most cases, VOs will manage to secure an appointment with members, but the response rate from subjects will be poor. This leads to files that were scheduled to be completed to going back to DI incomplete, which leads to DI continuously having a backlog. For

example, a VO can go to the unit with six files and leave having completed only three due to the non-compliance of members.

Members either do not give full information or do not avail themselves for interviews. Some members will also tell references not to comply, which also has a negative impact on vetting processes. Section 34 of the Defence Act empowers DI to perform intelligence functions and to use strategic intelligence to ensure security of DOD assets. Section 37 further states that DI should conduct security vetting and continuous screening of SANDF members. VO participants also indicated that in some units, members will not be available due to operational matters, as they will be executing their duties in various operational areas, internally or externally. However, this can be solved by rescheduling appointments and revisiting the units.

The majority of VO participants indicated that in most cases they do not get support from (Unit Military Security Officers) UMISOs, who do not check the applications before they are submitted to DI. They accept the DD1057 forms for compliance purposes without doing thorough checking. UMISOs still send applications without checking and DI receives the incomplete application forms which cannot be processed due to the missing information and other related matters. Communicating the problems back to the unit also takes time as they have to contact the Army Support Formation Office in order to liaise back with the units. According to Matakata (2011:42) security vetting should take six weeks to complete. However, there are no guarantees that target are met due to the identified challenges. It is taking VOs forever to process and complete a file, which leads to a backlog and security clearances not being issued on time.

There were concerns that members in units do not take their interviews seriously. Some of them do not report for interviews; other members cancel appointments for interviews at the last minute. It was also indicated that some do not answer their telephones, after appointments have been secured. Most of them indicated that subjects sabotage the process and tell their references not to respond to the VOs. The SANDF Code of Conduct is designed for all soldiers to translate the Constitutional legal framework which may complicate instructions and directives by the CSANDF (see section 3.4.1).

There were also concerns about the names for the references that subjects give in clearance forms. VOs conduct security vetting through interviews and document analysis depending on the class of security clearance (Matakata, 2011). It was established that when VOs conduct vetting processes, they normally consider references from the security clearance form. This becomes a challenge when references that have been used are not reachable due to reasons ranging from promotions, movement of members between units and external deployments. This leads to VOs resorting to recruiting new references which further prolongs vetting processes. This challenge also contributes to VOs failing to get previous information about the subject.

When employees in the organisational setup understand the concept of living a clean life and creating the balance between financial obligations and salaries, security vetting can be partly realised. Providing security vetting education and awareness will enable members and lay the foundation for exceptional conduct within an organisation. Creating awareness campaigns will demystify security vetting and hopefully change the general negative perception (Matakata, 2011). The next section discusses the importance of security vetting as a security measure.

6.2.5 The importance of security vetting as a security measure

Security measures are aimed at safeguarding the organisation's physical, financial and information, assets, continuously preserving the safety and welfare of employees against security threats. While security vetting is an important tool for enhancing the integrity of an individual person, it cannot be isolated from security measures. As a result, security vetting becomes an integral part of an organisation's security measures. The purpose of security vetting is to give assurance to a reasonable degree of trustworthiness; integrity and reliability of individuals in terms of conducting their duties diligently in their areas of responsibilities (see sections 2.2 and 2.4).

The majority of participants from ASBs have a view that security vetting can minimise and address the criminal activity in units. They indicated that it is imperative that security vetting be conducted and used as a security measure so that employees and employers will know who they will be working with. According to

Mdluli (2011:193), most applicants or employees misrepresent or provide false information in their CVs and when completing security vetting forms. For example, a member can exaggerate previous experience or qualifications. The full implementation of security vetting will also address the challenges that DOD is facing especially in the units. Others indicated that security vetting is an injection which can give life to the organisation. Security vetting is committed to the continuous maintenance of the highest levels of honesty and integrity and to prevent corruption, dishonest, unethical or unprofessional behaviour (Alba, 2018:5). The breach of security measures through the deliberate actions of SANDF members has serious implications for the mandate of safeguarding the sovereignty of the RSA (see section 3.3).

Security vetting according to the majority of participants at ASBs, identifies corrupt officials. They also mentioned that it will enable the management of criminals who are within the organisation, since most of the criminals operate from inside the organisation. Security vetting focuses on identification analysis and evaluation of the security risk that malicious insiders can pose to the organisation. A malicious insider is a current or former employee, contractor or business partner who is authorised to access the assets of the organisation (NITA- U, 2014:np). An employee becomes malicious when they intentionally misuse the legitimate access in a manner that negatively impacts or threatens the security of the country.

Authentication is a pre-requisite for all levels in the DOD, and security vetting is the first line of defence for the employment screening process. Both ASB and VOs participants have indicated that weapons are housed in the ASBs stores in order to support bases near to them. This includes financial resources and human resources, which indicates that more powers are delegated to the units than other places in the military (see fig 2.1). It is imperative for the DOD recruitment and selection processes to establish the correct identification of an employee from the start.

Defence Intelligence through its VOs is responsible for carrying out the security vetting processes in DOD to the best of their abilities. However, VOs do not make decisions on security clearances. It is the duty of the adjudicating panel to decide who to issue security clearance to (see section 2.5.3). The majority of VO participants indicated that security vetting if conducted on everyone, can be a

deterrent for any criminal activity and can decrease the problems the DOD is currently facing by 80%.

SANDF Order 2/97, now to be substituted by Vetting DODI instructs all Generals in the DOD to ensure that their subordinates are in possession of a valid security clearance issued by DI at all times (SANDFO, 1997). The majority of participants from management indicated that the full implementation of security vetting as a security measure can also assist in enforcing discipline among the DOD members, since they will also be monitored. Ill-discipline by groups or individuals is not tolerated in the SANDF. Therefore, the Code of Conduct is the guideline for soldiers on how they should conduct themselves in the military (see section 3.4.1).

Security vetting can give assurance of integrity, trustworthiness and reliability to a certain degree. Due to the circumstantial changes of the environment, organisations must strive to ensure that their personnel are less exposed to security risks. Security vetting should be an ongoing process that monitors the integrity and trustworthiness of employees (Matakata, 2011). Security vetting also requires strong management and a vetting processing system. Management must have a mission, vision and creativity that together with policies and procedures drives strategy aggressively. Security vetting officers are desperate for uncomplicated and user-friendly systems that can be implemented with consistent quality control (Matakata, 2011:105).

Kole (2008:88) defines security measures as all those measures that security managers can put in place in order to protect the organisational assets. Security measures are used to detect, deter, detain and limit criminal activities (Kole, 2008). It should be strongly encouraged that security vetting be used to enhance other security measures in the DOD. The next section discusses additional inputs by the participants.

6.2.6 Additional inputs on security vetting by all participants

Members in an organisation have insights and come up with solutions which can make improvements happen. Additional inputs by the participants are of significance, especially in this study, where there is a problem to be solved.

- It emerged from the majority of VO participants that the decentralisation of security vetting could be more effective for implementation. Decentralisation is always referred to as the transfer of powers from central governing body to lower levels (Petrus, 2014: 29). It reduces the workload of officials in the central body. Administrative centralisation refers to the conduct of security vetting in the provinces or units, and the decisions for the approval of security clearance to be made by DI as the custodian of security vetting. Decentralisation is a common and variable tool which assists government departments in achieving a diverse array of governance and management in order to achieve objectives (UNDP, 1999: 1).
- It also emerged that DI does not work hand in hand with other governments departments such as Home Affairs, Department of Trade and Industry, SAPS, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and others. There is a lot of information available from other departments that can assist in vetting processes. A partnership or collaboration between DI and other departments should always be encouraged. In fact, security vetting should be used as a risk management tool to discourage employees that may have something to hide and limit uncertainty in the hiring process. It also assists in encouraging employees to be sincere and forthcoming during security vetting processes, and gives the employer substantial legal protection in the case of lawsuits (Mdluli, 2011:192). In principle, all departments should assist each other in terms of the required information for security vetting processes; for example, Home Affairs should assist with all immigration information of a member, SAPS with all criminal records, DTI with all business interests and DOJ with all previous convictions.

It is important for employers to understand the needs of their employees in order to create a conducive working environment for both parties. Bad situations can lead to bad behaviour and employees in stressful situations can see crime as an easy way to eliminate their problems. Members at ASBs, like other members in society are not immune to challenges. It also emerged that ASB members experience various problems at their workplaces. In essence, most problems ASB members experience may be due to issues that have been left unsolved.

- The majority of ASB participants indicated that one of the problems is that the majority of unit members have been at the same rank for a long time. Members are not being promoted, there is no career development for members in units, and some of them are kept as guards in the protection sections and not given opportunities or introduced to other responsibilities. Participants indicated that uniform members are the most disadvantaged in the DOD. Participants also mentioned favouritism as another problem, for example, a member joins the military and within a short period of time a member is being considered for career development and is being promoted to a higher rank before long serving members. This demoralises members which may lead to them becoming negative and eventually engaging in criminal activities and non- adherence to the processes of security vetting.

Members are the most important assets of the organisation who must be taken care of and treated with utmost respect. Members need certain motivations in order to resist committing criminal activities within the organisation. Recognising their important contribution is imperative to the manager who wants to see the organisation succeed.

- The salary problem was also mentioned as problematic and most members have responsibilities to their families. The majority of participants said members commit these crimes because they need extra income. ASB members are not given a chance to deploy. The deployment of members in mission areas assists them with financial gains. In most cases, they depend on deployments to better their salaries. When they do not deploy to external missions or departmental exercises, it becomes difficult for members to sustain their wellbeing and living standards with their basic salaries. Military members are volunteers and employed in accordance with the Defence Act. As a result, their salary levels are lower than other public servants from other departments. Members commit criminal activities within an organisation for reasons such as greed, rationalisation which is influenced by them not being recognised as employees and pressure from friends and colleagues in the workplace. They need certain motivations and internal controls to drive from

committing criminal activities within the organisation. Management should take corrective measures in order to support protective measures at ASBs.

- Most participants indicated that another challenge is that people live beyond their means, hence they use public funds to enrich themselves whenever they find a loophole, and they find opportunities to steal. Participants also indicated that this happens especially with the younger generation who expect too much and like to show off. They also said that the younger generation is easily influenced, making them susceptible to be drawn into criminal activities because they want everything at once.
- The majority of management participants revealed that members at ASBs are just unethical and individual soldiers lack discipline. The policies and control measures are in place, leadership not wanting to take action against the perpetrators is the problem. The other problem identified is money, soldiers enriching themselves and no action is taken against them because of their relations with the hierarchy in the SANDF. Inappropriate behaviour by employees can embarrass and make them vulnerable to blackmail and undue influence (Matakata, 2011). The existence of security vetting in the security cluster is an attempt to address the risk of employing members who can compromise the security of the state.
- The majority of management participants suggested that there should be new systematic ways of conducting security vetting since the world is evolving. New technologies are leading to new solutions and services, and Directorate Vetting simply needs to employ them. Though there is a small number of people developing practices around this technology, it is becoming imperative to develop ideas that will enable the review of the security vetting concept. Therefore, security vetting cannot be effective if there is a lack of continuous innovation in the processes.
- Another problem identified is the lack of educational qualifications of commanders in the units. Lack of career management, which includes hiring someone without scrutinising them has been identified as one of the biggest

problems that is faced by the ASBs. The problems of carelessness and “do not care” attitudes which have developed among members and their attitude towards their careers are not being addressed. From definitions given in this study, security vetting normally takes place when individuals are employed and brought into the defence department (see section 1.6.3). It can either be conducted on individuals before they get hired, after they commenced with employment or getting promotion (Matakata, 2011).

Security vetting is an ongoing process which should always be implemented even after an individual has been appointed to a position (see section 2.11). This according to Matakata (2011), assists an organisation in establishing the security competence of an individual. In order to continue to provide a crucial service to stakeholders, DI should take cognisance of innovative ideas and cannot be seen to be waiting for the inevitable to happen, it has to be proactive in revamping the manner in which security vetting is being conducted (Matakata, 2011).

6.3 Summary

This chapter presented the themes identified during interviews with participants from ASBs, VOs and managers who are actively involved in security vetting processes. The participants’ responses and comments revealed many problems regarding the conducting of security vetting within the DOD. Action by all stakeholders must be taken to solve the identified problems in order to meet the current demand for security vetting. The next chapter will present the summary, recommendations and conclusion.

CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

7.1. Introduction

This study was directed at exploring the implementation of security vetting of personnel at the SANDF Army Support Bases in the DOD. This chapter provides a summary of the previous chapters, recommendations, and offers a conclusion of the dissertation in terms of the aim and the objectives of the study, which will have a direct impact on the conducting of security vetting processes in the SANDF. The aim of this dissertation is to advance and contribute to the understanding of the learning ability of security vetting as a security measure in order to resolve and manage the problem in question (see section 1.4).

This research was conducted to explore the implementation of security vetting at the SANDF's Army Support Bases. The qualitative research methodology ensured that the research question to be answered fitted the aim of the study. When collecting data, the researcher established that there are many factors that contribute to the commission of most of the criminal activities, and that the non-adherence to security vetting processes at ASBs should be addressed.

The recommendations have the potential to enhance the potential for security vetting processes to be more functional. This chapter draws conclusions from the recommendations based on the interpretation of the collected data and the objectives of the study.

7.2 Chapter overview

Chapter one outlined the background of the study, the problem statement where problems were identified, and the reasons this research was conducted. The criminal activities outlined in the problem statement are an itch that required an investigation and diagnoses. A security measure, in particular security vetting, was identified as a measure to be explored in the SANDF (ASBs). The aim of this study was to explore the implementation of security vetting at ASBs where most of the criminal activity is taking place. The study also seeks to

- describe the constitutional and legislative mandate of the SANDF in terms of security vetting;
- examine the provision of effective security vetting to the members deployed at ASBs;
- explore the challenges encountered by vetting officers in conducting their duties;
- explore the attitudes of members at ASBs towards security vetting;
- describe the importance of using security vetting as a primary security risk control measure, and the impact thereof; and
- make recommendations to the executive for the improvement of security clearance arrangements and the implementation of strategies to enhance the effectiveness of security vetting at the SANDF's ASBs.

The second chapter talks to an overview of security vetting, SANDF ASBs, security vetting in the SANDF, security vetting processes and the guiding principles of security vetting. International best practise outlines how other countries around the world are conducting security vetting.

Chapter three provided the legal framework on security vetting in the SANDF, outlining the Constitution of RSA (Act 108 of 1996), the SANDF's Code of Conduct, Draft Vetting DODI (Int/00013/2012), Counter Intelligence DODI (Int/000132), MISS (No 4 of 1996), NSIA (Act No 39 of 1994), the Defence Act (Act 42 of 2002) Labour Relations Act (Act 66 of 1995) and the Bill of Rights.

The methodological approach of this study was outlined in chapter four. The researcher identified a qualitative study wherein the pragmatism paradigm has been identified as suitable for the research to be conducted. The problem identified is to be solved based on practical judgements and not on principles. This was achieved by the researcher conducting semi-structured interviews with the participants and collecting data.

The findings of the study were presented in chapter five, where core themes were identified from the in-depth interviews and analysed. Chapter six discussed and

interpreted the findings of the data collected from all the participants and contextualised it with the literature review in chapters 1, 2 and 3.

7.3 Recommendations

Every group of participants in this study raised factors that are contributing to the failure of the implementation of security vetting at ASBs and the DOD at large. It emerged that some participants at ASBs have no idea of what security vetting is, especially junior ranking participants. Some said it was the first time they had heard of the word “vetting” and the processes. This indicates that junior ranking participants lack knowledge of security vetting, which can contribute to the behaviour of members towards the vetting concept itself. Feedback from DI to ASBs regarding security vetting outcomes is also a problem, and ASBs, managers and VO participants also identified the lack of personnel in the Directorate Vetting and vetting follow up as pressing issues.

In the process of data collection, unexpected insights from the participants arose. The majority of participants indicated that junior ranking members in units are not being taken care of in terms of incentives, career development and serve under poor working conditions which also contributes negatively to the morale of members. One of the problems indicated by the majority of VOs was the attitude of non-compliance by members. Lack of discipline and unethical behaviours are some of the problems identified by VOs and senior ranking participants. It also emerged from the majority of participants that if security vetting is conducted on everyone in the DOD, it can be a deterrent for criminal activities. The findings of this study would indicate that security vetting is not being conducted on everyone in the SANDF due to a lack of personnel. This includes the level of security clearance awarded according to the level of access to the information that members have. In other instances, members are being utilised in the posts without valid security clearances.

Security vetting should be perceived as an intervention to proactively minimise risks and a tool that can enforce discipline and sound conduct in the organisation. Together with other security measures, security vetting will minimise the criminal activity the SANDF is experiencing.

The recommendations of this study will be discussed based on the acronym PEOPLE-D, representing partnership, environment, population-based intervention, life course security, awareness, empowerment and decentralisation. This acronym reflects the key elements of the implementation of security vetting at ASBs that will assist in achieving the objectives of the study.

7.3.1 Partnership

Partnership includes collaboration and alliance to shape a partnership. The determinants of security vetting are inescapable and it requires all DOD partners including those extending beyond the scope of military bases to be included. A partnership should be a consistent working method, engaging representatives with different backgrounds, culture and encounters across the SANDF arms of service. For successful actions and purpose, there is a need for concerted and joint efforts across the SANDF front. Security personnel who have worked in a military counter-intelligence environment, understand the security vetting concept. The said members should be detached for days, depending on demand, to military bases to induct security members in the units about security matters. The internal collaboration of the OCs, UMSOs and Directorate Vetting personnel will maximise strengths and minimise weaknesses within security vetting processes. Furthermore, the implementation of security vetting can be conducted successfully if senior management gets fully involved in, supporting the processes. Every manager's communication period should include an item in which security vetting processes are discussed.

7.3.2 Environment

Linking departmental Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and operational issues with the total working environment is imperative to resolving the security problem within the DOD. An environment means everything that revolves around members and their circumstances, whether positive or negative. This is a stated fact to which other factors also contribute. The work environment can contribute towards the behaviour of employees. The collaboration of DOD stakeholders should create and develop a culture at ASBs where members adopt the work environment as their own,

a place where they will be protected and feel safe. They also need to cultivate a sense of ownership when it comes to members and their bases. During interviews, participants indicated that some members are not treated fairly and it affects their morale, which leads to them not adhering to security matters. This can be turned around by improving the working conditions of members and addressing inequalities in the DOD. It can also be achieved through the DOD's commitment to openness, transparency and learning. Career management of all members should be looked into, and the problems around it should be prioritised. Unit OCs should create a supportive environment that allows employees to make choices that support their working conditions. The approach should support awareness actions by pooling policy support, which includes providing feedback on all security vetting processes to members.

7.3.3 Outcome-focused approach

The importance and objectives of an outcome focused approach to solving the problem is to ensure that the department provides services that are assessed according to members' needs. This includes the changes and improvements that members in the department seek to achieve in order to maximise the effectiveness of security vetting at ASBs. It is recommended that continuous communication and education about security vetting be conducted every two weeks ASBs for a certain period and thereafter on a monthly basis until members are familiar with the security vetting concept. This will help members gain a clearer understanding of the contribution they make by participating in security vetting processes. Feedback on the security vetting process and its results should be communicated to members. This is to ensure the investment of resources in security vetting is monitored and evaluated for best results. OCs, VOs and management need to document and demonstrate how crime has been reduced by implementing security vetting. Furthermore, all departmental stakeholders should be able to see changes and improvements due to the support and intervention they will be providing. Through an outcome-focused approach, members will feel confident, valued and respected, which will encourage them to conform to all security vetting processes.

7.3.4. Population (inter-departmental) based intervention

Management should emphasise that all members at military bases undergo vetting for collective security control measures for specific security verification benefits. Population-based interventions encompass the involvement of other departments, systems and members and other interventions. Since the world is evolving, Directorate Vetting must adapt to what is happening in order to conduct security vetting successfully. In order to achieve this, DI should work together with other departments such as the Department of Education, Trade and Industry, Justice, DIRCO, South African Revenue Services, SAPS, State Security, SITA, Home Affairs and municipalities to collect more information about a subject undergoing the security vetting process. Modest changes in risk factor levels of members after security clearance has been issued can be revealed through inter-departmental-based interventions, thereby yielding improvements to security vetting processes. The introduction of electronic security vetting systems and the upgrading of security clearance for the majority of positions from Confidential to Secret, depending on the duties of the members, is also recommended. The electronic vetting system will improve the foundation phase of the security vetting process, which will also assist in confidential security clearances being issued on time.

7.3.5 Life-course security awareness approach

Member training interventions within DOD units about the significance of taking part in security vetting processes can help prevent crimes and avoid implementation barriers in the future. A life-course approach will recognise the importance of time in casual links between exposure to security vetting processes and outcomes as members arrive at DOD ASBs. Addressing the effects by implementing security awareness with regard to member-to-member safety and, to prevent threats that can complicate security vetting processes is imperative. It is essential to address the effects and promote awareness of member-to-member safety. Those who become aware of security issues are important to reducing the risk of crime, thereby reducing costs. DI needs to design a security awareness and verification programme, which is continuously updated. The provision of adequate security vetting to prevent security breaches and fraudulent activities at DOD ASBs is urgently required. Continuous

security vetting awareness is required until members at ASBs can adopt the concept of security vetting and live with it without fear. The use of security vetting as a continuous developmental tool will also be a lasting investment in the ASBs and other units.

7.3.6 Empowerment for all members across the DOD

Giving members at ASBs and Directorate Vetting the opportunity to achieve their full potential is imperative. The interviews revealed that the lack of personnel contributes to the backlog that the Directorate Vetting is facing. Empowering and appreciating employees through commendation and incentives will retain employees in Directorate Vetting. Employees who are taken care of, will not seek greener pastures outside the department. Considering the results of the study, empowerment is a central method for promoting security and crime prevention in all organisations. It is a process by which people gain control over decisions and actions that influence crime. Therefore, members must be trained and equipped with appropriate skills so that they can make sober behavioural choices to effectively interact with their OCs and other managerial structures. This can be achieved by offering ASB members opportunities to take responsibility and participate in workshops and skills developmental courses. In this case, it is essential that those who work in security must possess knowledge and skills in promoting security and crime prevention. This will include early threat detection, and for security officials to continuously adhere to security issues. Members who are empowered will most likely comply with the rules and policies, which will provide smooth compliance to security vetting processes by members.

7.3.7 Decentralisation of security vetting functions

Decentralisation involves the transfer of certain capacities in the planning and management of concrete matters from the central state's responsibilities to its local administrative extensions, without losing the fundamental accountability (see section 6.3). It is recommended that DI consider administrative decentralisation and delegate the administrative phase of the security vetting processes to the units/ASBs. This

can be achieved by utilising members who have undergone security vetting course in the units. After the administration phase, Directorate Vetting will get involved in the psychometric, polygraph evaluation and the adjudication phase (see section 2.5). The use of members who have been already trained, will not put additional strain on the budget, an issue the department may raise.

7.4 Summary

This chapter presented a summary of the chapters, the recommendations of the study based on the findings derived from the semi-structured interviews conducted and the conclusion.

7.5 Conclusion

This study aimed to explore the implementation of security vetting at the SANDF's ASBs. It emerged during the data collection exercise that factors such as career management, lack of knowledge about the concept, lack of cooperation by members and other problems prohibits the effective implementation of security vetting at ASBs (see chapter six). Security vetting should not be perceived as something punitive, but should be regarded as a concept that will continuously assist in the development of members within the DOD. The internal stakeholders should exploit the existing departmental programmes to eliminate some of the discrepancies found to be hindering the implementation of security vetting processes at ASBs. It is imperative for Directorate Vetting to establish partnerships with both internal and external stakeholders in order to overcome the challenges they face. Senior management should commit PEOPLE-D in order to implement security vetting effectively at ASBs and across the DOD at large.

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LIST OF ANNEXURES

ANNEXURE A



UNISA CLAW ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE

Date 20190325

Reference: ST14 of 2019

Applicant: AL Makatu

Dear AL Makatu

Decision: ETHICS APPROVAL

FROM 01 March 2019

TO 31 January 2022

Researcher: Alufheli Lovemore Makatu

Supervisor: Prof R Snyman

Exploration of the Implementation of Security Vetting of Personnel in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) Army Support Bases

Qualification: MA-Criminal Justice

Thank you for the application for research ethics clearance by the Unisa CLAW Ethics Review Committee for the above mentioned research. Ethics approval is granted for 3 years.

*The CLAW Ethics Review Committee reviewed the **low risk application** on 25 March 2019 in compliance with the Unisa Policy on Research Ethics and the Standard Operating Procedure on Research Ethics Risk Assessment. The decision was ratified by the committee.*

The proposed research may now commence with the provisions that:

1. The researcher(s) will ensure that the research project adheres to the values and principles expressed in the UNISA Policy on Research Ethics.
2. Any adverse circumstance arising in the undertaking of the research project that is relevant to the ethicality of the study should be communicated in writing to the CLAW Committee.



University of South Africa
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge, City of Tshwane
PO Box 392 UNISA 0003 South Africa
Telephone: +27 12 429 3111 Facsimile: +27 12 429 4150
www.unisa.ac.za

3. The researcher(s) will conduct the study according to the methods and procedures set out in the approved application.
4. Any changes that can affect the study-related risks for the research participants, particularly in terms of assurances made with regards to the protection of participants' privacy and the confidentiality of the data, should be reported to the Committee in writing, accompanied by a progress report.
5. The researcher will ensure that the research project adheres to any applicable national legislation, professional codes of conduct, institutional guidelines and scientific standards relevant to the specific field of study. Adherence to the following South African legislation is important, if applicable: Protection of Personal Information Act, no 4 of 2013; Children's act no 38 of 2005 and the National Health Act, no 61 of 2003.
6. Only de-identified research data may be used for secondary research purposes in future on condition that the research objectives are similar to those of the original research. Secondary use of identifiable human research data require additional ethics clearance.
7. No research activities may continue after the expiry date 31 January 2022. Submission of a completed research ethics progress report will constitute an application for renewal of Ethics Research Committee approval.


Note:

The reference number ST14 of 2019 should be clearly indicated on all forms of communication with the intended research participants, as well as with the Committee.

Yours sincerely,



PROF T BUDHRAM
 Chair of CLAW ERC
 E-mail: budhrt@unisa.ac.za
 Tel: (012) 433-9462



PROF M BASDEO
 Executive Dean : CLAW

E-mail: MBasdeo@unisa.ac.za
 Tel: (012) 429-8603.....
 PROF V BASDEO
 2019 -03- 2 8
 COLLEGE OF LAW
 OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DEAN
 UNISA

ANNEXURE B

Date: 12 May 2020

PROOF OF EDITING

This is to confirm that I have edited the dissertation, *An exploration of the implementation of security vetting of personnel in the South African National Defence Force Army Support Bases*, submitted by Alufheli Lovemore Makatu in terms of language usage, style, expression and consistency. I focused on grammar, tense, consistency, sentence construction and logical flow. I inserted comments and suggestions for the attention of the student where meaning needed to be clarified, or where points of confusion could arise for the reader.

I wish the candidate all success with her submission and trust it will be of value to the South African National Defence Force and the community at large.

Yours faithfully

Tania Stapelberg

Contacts

Landline: 012 331 1243 Mobile: 083 442 5841

E-mail: tania.stapelberg@gmail.com

ANNEXURE C

CONFIDENTIAL



defence intelligence

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Private Bag X367, Pretoria, 0001. Liberty Building, 278 Madiba Street, Pretoria.

MEMORANDUM

DIO/SDIP/85003424CA

06 September 2018

Telephone: (012) 315 0339
Fax: 012 315 0317
Cell: 082 391 7506
Enquiries: Ms A.L. Makatu

From: DIO Secretary
To: Director Departmental Security

REQUEST TO CONDUCT AN ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE: 85003424CA, MS A.L. MAKATU

1. I 85003424CA, Ms A.L. Makatu hereby request an authority to conduct a research in the Department of Defence (DOD) on part time basis for a period of three years, starting from 2018 with an intention to complete in 2020.
2. I am currently studying Masters of Arts in Criminal Justice in the College of Law at the University of South Africa (UNISA). My research topic is "Exploring the Implementation Security Vetting in the South African Army Support Bases". The research topic relates directly to the functions of the DOD, Defence Intelligence in particular.
3. Your consideration is highly appreciated


(A.L. MAKATU)
DIO SECRETARY: MS



Lefapha la Boiphemelo. Umnyango wezokuVikela. Kgoro ya Tshireletso. iSebe lezoKhuselo. Department of Defence. Muhasho wa Tshirileldzo.
UmNyango WezokuVikela. Nizawulo ya swa Vusireheleni. Lehapha la Tshireletso. Departement van Verdediging. LTiko le Tekuvikela



CONFIDENTIAL

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REQUEST TO CONDUCT AN ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENCE: 85003424CA, MS A.L. MAKATU

Recommended/ not recommended



(M.E. GCAZA) *MoD*

DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE FOR OPERATIONS: BRIG GEN

06/09/18

DATE

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEXURE D

RESTRICTED



Defence intelligence

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

DI/DDS/R/202/3/7

Telephone: (012) 315-0216
Fax: (012) 326-3246
Enquiries: Brig Gen T.G. Baloyi

Defence Intelligence
Private Bag X367
Pretoria
0001
13 September 2018

AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE: MS ALUFHELI LOVEMORE MAKATU

1. Telephonic communication between Ms A.L. Makatu of the Directorate Intelligence for Operations in the Defence Intelligence (DI) and WO1 K. Skweyiya of the Directorate Departmental Security (DDS) in the Defence Intelligence (DI) on the 06 September 2018 and the receipt of a request letter dd 06 August 2018 to conduct research in the DOD, as well as a Research Proposal attached has reference.
2. Ms A.L. Makatu is hereby granted permission from a security perspective to conduct research in the DOD on the topic entitled "**Exploration of the Implementation of Security Vetting of Personnel in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) Army Support Bases,**" as a precondition for an attainment of a Masters Degree in Criminal Justice under the auspices of the University of South Africa (UNISA) as per request.
3. After the completion of the research, the final research product must be forwarded to Defence Intelligence (DI), Sub-Division Counter Intelligence (SDCI) for a final authorisation before it may be published or distributed to any entity outside the DOD.
4. Approval is however granted on condition that there is compliance with inter alia Section 104 of the Defence Act (Act 42 of 2002) pertaining to Protection of DOD Classified Information and the consequences of non-adherence.
5. For your attention.

(G.S. SIZANI)
CHIEF DIRECTOR COUNTER INTELLIGENCE: MAJ GEN
KS/KS (Ms A.L. Makatu)

DISTR

For Action

Director Intelligence for Operations

(Attention: Ms A.L. Makatu)

File: DI/DDS/R/202/3/7

RESTRICTED

ANNEXURE E

CONFIDENTIAL



defence intelligence

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

DIO/SDIP/DI/85003424CA

Telephone: (012) 315 0339
Fax: 012 315 0317
Cell: 082 391 7506
E-mail: alufhelim977@gmail.com.
al.makatu@di.mil.za.
Enquiries: Ms A.L Makatu

Department of Defence
Defence Intelligence
Private bag X 367
Pretoria
0001
20 January 2019

Lt Gen L. Yam
Chief of the South African Army
South African Army Headquarters
Private bag X 981
Pretoria
0001

General,

**PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN THE ARMY SUPPORT BASES: 85003424CA,
MS A.L. MAKATU**

Appendix A: Approval letter to conduct Research in the Department of Defence (DOD)

1. I am currently employed as a Secretary at Defence Intelligence and studying Masters of Arts in Criminal Justice in the College of Law at the University of South Africa (UNISA). I am conducting a research on: "**An Exploration of the Implementation of Security Vetting of personnel in the South African National Defence Force Army Support Bases**". The research title relates directly to the functions of the Defence Intelligence and South African Army Support Bases.

2. I therefore request for your authorisation to conduct a study at three Army Support Bases in different Provinces. The study identifies Limpopo, Potchefstroom and Johannesburg ASBs. Data will be collected in the respective ASBs in 2019 on the dates to be communicated.



Lefapha la Boiphemelo. Umnyango wezokuVikela. Kgoro ya Tshireletso. iSebe lezoKhuselo. Department of Defence. Muhasho wa Tshirlidzo.
UmNyango WezokuVikela. Ndzawulo ya swa Vusireheleni. Lehapha la Tshireletso. Departement van Verdediging. LITiko le Tekuvikela



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3. My Supervisor is Prof Rika Snyman, who is at the Department of Police Practice at the School of Criminal Justice, UNISA. Her contact particulars are as follows:

Tel: 012 433 9496

Cell: 082 559 7705

E-mail: rsnyman@unisa.ac.za

4. Your consideration regarding this request is highly appreciated.



(A.L. MAKATU)

DIRECTORATE INTELLIGENCE FOR OPERATIONS SECRETARY: MS

DISTR

For Action

Chief of the South African Army

(Attention : Col L. Nontshinga)

Internal

FILE : 85003424CA



Lefapha la Boiphemelo. Umnyango wezokuVikela. Kgoro ya Tshireletso. ISebe lezoKhuselo. Department of Defence. Muhasho wa Tshirledzo.
Umkyango WezokuVikela. Ndzawulo ya swa Vusireheleni. Lehapha la Tshireletso. Departement van Verdediging. LI'itiko le Tekuvikela



ANNEXURE F

CONFIDENTIAL



defence intelligence

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

DIO/SDIP/DI/85003424CA

Telephone: (012) 315 0339
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E-mail: alufhelim977@gmail.com.
al.makatu@di.mil.za.
Enquiries: Ms A.L Makatu

Department of Defence
Defence Intelligence
Private bag X 367
Pretoria
0001
06 May 2019

Lt Gen L. Yam
Chief of the South African Army
South African Army Headquarters
Private bag X 981
Pretoria
0001

General,

PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN THE ARMY SUPPORT BASES: 85003424CA, MS A.L. MAKATU

Appendix A: Approval letter to conduct Research in the Department of Defence (DOD) Appendix B: UNISA Ethical Clearance Letter

1. The letter dated 21 January 2019, Permission to conduct research in the Army Support Bases: 85003424CA, Ms A.L. Makatu has a reference.
2. The said letter to the Chief Army office on January 2019, did not include the dates for the conduct of the said research due to the unavailability of Unisa ethical clearance letter. I therefore request to conduct research on the following dates:
 - a. Pilot study at JSB Garrison (Thaba Tshwane) over the period 12 – 17 May 2019.
 - b. The actual research at Johannesburg ASB over the period 10 – 14 June 2019,
 - c. Potchefstroom ASB over the period 17 – 21 June 2019 and
 - d. Limpopo ASB over the period 24 – 28 June 2019



Lefapha la Boiphemelo. Umnyango wazokuVikela. Kgoro ya Tshireletso. ISebe lezoKhuselo. Department of Defence. Muhasho wa Tshiriledzo.
UmNyango WezokuVikela. Ndzawulo ya swa Vusireheleli. Lehapha la Tshireletso. Departement van Verdediging. LiTiko le Tekuvikela



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2

3. My Supervisor is Prof Rika Snyman, who is at the Department of Police Practice at the School of Criminal Justice, UNISA. Her contact particulars are as follows:

Tel: 012 433 9496

Cell: 082 559 7705

E-mail: rsnyman@unisa.ac.za

4. Your consideration regarding this request is highly appreciated.



(A.L. MAKATU)

DIRECTORATE INTELLIGENCE FOR OPERATIONS SECRETARY: MS

DISTR

For Action

Chief of the South African Army

(Attention : Col N.P Skritshi)

Internal

FILE : 85003424CA



Lefapha la Boiphemelo. Umnyango wazokuVikela. Kgoro ya Tshireletso. iSebe lezoKhuselo. Department of Defence. Muhasho wa Tshiriledzo. UmNyango WazokuVikela. Ndzawulo ya swa Vusireheleri. Lehapha la Tshireletso. Departement van Verdediging. LiTiko le Tekuvikela



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ANNEXURE G

RECEIVED 22/11/2016 02:35

RESTRICTED



sa army

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA


SA ARMY HQ/C ARMY CORP SVC/
DIR ARMY HR/R/512/2/1/6

Telephone: (012) 355 -1770/1693
SSN: 810 -1770/1693
Facsimile: (012) 355 -1495
Enquiries: Brig Gen N.E. Mkhize

SA Army Headquarters
Chief Army Corporate Services
(Directorate Army Human Resources)
Private Bag X172
Pretoria
0001 -
() May 2019

AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT AN ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN THE ARMY SUPPORT BASES: 85003424CA MS A.L. MAKATU

1. Letter DIO/SDIP/DI/85003424CA dated 06 May 2019 refers.
2. Authority is hereby granted for the above mentioned member to conduct an academic research on "An Exploration of the Implementation of Security Vetting of personnel in the South African National Defence Force Army Support Bases" at the SA Army Support Bases (JSB Garrison and ASBs: Johannesburg, Potchefstroom and Limpopo over the following dates:
 - a. Pilot study at JSB Garrison 13 – 17 May 2019.
 - b. The actual research at ASB Johannesburg 10 – 14 June 2019.
 - c. ASB Potchefstroom 17 – 21 June 2019.
 - d. ASB Limpopo 24 – 28 June 2019.
3. Ms A.L. Makatu must, however take note of the Joint Defence Publication: Pol and Plan No 00007/2003 para 57 which states that, "The authorisation for the use and retrieval of military information for the writing of a thesis or treatise must be obtained via the Chief of Command and Management Information System Division (CMIS Div) and Chief of Defence Intelligence".
4. All the requirements by Chief CMIS Div and Chief DI Div wrt conducting research at the Military Institutions must be met before the research is conducted at the SA Army Bases.
5. It is the employee's responsibility to make prior arrangements with the specific unit.


(L. YAM)
CHIEF OF THE SA ARMY: LT GEN

77525764 PE
Maj Gen M.J. de Goede



Lefapha la Boiphetolelo / Uninyango wezokuVikela - Kgoro ya Tshireletso / Sebe letekhuzela / Department of Defence, Multatlashe wa Turidatso
Uninyango WezokuVikela / Ndzawulo ya swa Yuzweletso / Langata la Tshireletso / Departement van Verdediging, LITiko leTokwizela

RESTRICTED
CPD:35- 14/5/19



RECEIVED 22/11/2016 02:35

RESTRICTED

2

**AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT AN ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN THE ARMY SUPPORT
BASES: 85003424CA MS A.L. MAKATU**

DISTR

For Action

GOC SA Army Support Formation
Director Intelligence for Operations

(Attention: Ms A.L. Makatu)

For Info

GOC JSB Garrison

OC:

ASB Johannesburg
ASB Potchefstroom
ASB Limpopo

For Internal

File: SA ARMY HQ/D A HR/R/103/23/1

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ANNEXURE H

CONFIDENTIAL



defence intelligence

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

DIO/SDIP/DI/85003424CA

Telephone: (012) 315 0339
Fax: 012 315 0317
Cell: 082 391 7506
E-mail: alufhelim977@gmail.com.
al.makatu@di.mil.za.
Enquiries: Ms A.L Makatu

Department of Defence
Defence Intelligence
Private bag X 367
Pretoria
0001

4 April 2019

Brig Gen N.A Ndou
GOC Joint Support Base Garrison
Private bag X 1001
Thaba Tshwane
0143

General,

PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH DATA COLLECTION (PILOT STUDY) AT JSB GARRISON FROM 13 – 17 MAY 2019: 85003424CA, MS A.L. MAKATU

Appendix A: Approval letter to conduct Research in the Department of Defence (DOD)

- B: Permission to conduct research in the Army Support Bases.**
- C: Research Ethics Clearance correspondence**

1. Currently employed as a Secretary at Defence Intelligence, I am studying Masters of Arts in Criminal Justice in the College of Law at the University of South Africa (UNISA). My research title is: **"An Exploration of the Implementation of Security Vetting of personnel in the South African National Defence Force Army Support Bases"**. The research title relates directly to the functions of the Defence Intelligence and South African Army Support Bases.

2. My study will be conducted at three Army Support bases in different provinces. The study identified Limpopo, Potchefstroom and Johannesburg ASBs. Data will be collected in the respective ASBs on June 2019 on the dates to be communicated.



Lefapha la Boiphemelo. Umnyango wezokuVikela. Kgoro ya Tshireletso. ISebe lezoKhuselo. Department of Defence. Mhasho wa Tshirledzo. UmNyango WezokuVikela. Ndzawulo ya swa Vusireheleli. Lehapha la Tshireletso. Departement van Verdediging. LITiko le Tekuvikela



CONFIDENTIAL

3. I hereby request to conduct a pilot study at JSB Garrison over the period 13 – 17 May 2019.
4. My Supervisor is Prof Rika Snyman, who is available at the Department of Police Practice at the School of Criminal Justice, UNISA. Her contact particulars are as follows:
Tel: 012 433 9496
Cell: 082 559 7705
E-mail: rsnyman@unisa.ac.za
5. Your consideration regarding this request is highly appreciated.



(A.L. MAKATU)

DIRECTORATE INTELLIGENCE FOR OPERATIONS SECRETARY: MS

DISTR

For Action

GOC JSB Garrison

(Attention : Brig Gen N. A. Ndou)

Internal

FILE : 85003424CA



Lefapha la Boiphemelo, Umnyango wezokuVikela, Kgoro ya Tshireletso, iSebe lezoKhusele, Department of Defence, Muhasho wa Tshiriedzo, UmNyango WezokuVikela, Ndzawulo ya swa Vusireheleni, Lehapha la Tshireletso, Departement van Verdediging, LiTiko le Tekuvikela



ANNEXURE I

CONFIDENTIAL



defence intelligence

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

DIO/SDIP/DI/85003424CA

Telephone: (012) 315 0339
Fax: 012 315 0317
Cell: 082 391 7506
E-mail: alufhelim977@gmail.com
al.makatu@di.mil.za
Enquiries: Ms A.L Makatu

Department of Defence
Defence Intelligence
Private bag X 367
Pretoria
0001
21 May 2019

Col M.R. Mkhize
Officer Commanding
Army Support Base Johannesburg
Private bag X 19
Lenasia
1820

Col,

**PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH DATA COLLECTION AT JOHANNESBURG ASB
FROM 10 – 14 JUNE 2019: 85003424CA, MS A.L. MAKATU**

Appendix A: Approval letter to conduct Research in the Department of Defence (DOD)

- B: Authority to conduct research in the Army Support Bases.**
- C: UNISA Research Ethics Clearance correspondence**

1. Currently employed as a Secretary at Defence Intelligence, I am studying Masters of Arts in Criminal Justice in the College of Law at the University of South Africa (UNISA). My research title is: "**An Exploration of the Implementation of Security Vetting of personnel in the South African National Defence Force Army Support Bases**". The research title relates directly to the functions of the Defence Intelligence and South African Army Support Bases.
2. My study will be conducted at three Army Support bases in different provinces. The study identified Limpopo, Potchefstroom and Johannesburg ASBs. Pilot study has already been conducted at Joint Support Base Garrison.



Lefapha la Boiphemelo. Umnyango wezokuVikelela. Kgoro ya Tshireletso. iSebe lezoKhuselo. Department of Defence. Muhasho wa Tshirledzo.
UmNyango WezokuVikelela. Ndzawulo ya swa Vusireheleri. Lefapha la Tshireletso. Departement van Verdediging. LTiko le Tekuvikela



CONFIDENTIAL

3. I hereby request to conduct a research data collection at ASB Johannesburg over the period 10 – 14 June 2019.
4. Your consideration regarding this request is highly appreciated.



(A.L. MAKATU)

DIRECTORATE INTELLIGENCE FOR OPERATIONS SECRETARY: MS

DISTR

For Action

OC ASB Johannesburg

(Attention : Col M.R. Mkhize)

Internal

FILE : 85003424CA



Lefapha la Boiphemelo. Umnnyango wezokuVikela. Kgoro ya Tshireletso. iSebe lezoKhuselo. Department of Defence. Muhasho wa Tshiriledzo. UmNyango WezokuVikela. Ndzawulo ya swa Vusireheleri. Lehapha la Tshireletso. Departement van Verdediging. LiTiko le Tekuvikela



ANNEXURE J

RESTRICTED



defence intelligence

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

DIO/SDIP/DI/85003424CA

Telephone: (012) 315 0339
Fax: 012 315 0317
Cell: 082 391 7506
E-mail: alufhelim977@gmail.com.
al.makatu@di.mil.za.
Enquiries: Ms A.L Makatu

Department of Defence
Defence Intelligence
Private bag X 367
Pretoria
0001

21 May 2019

Col T.A. Mukwevho
Officer Commanding
Army Support Base Limpopo
Private bag X 9304
Polokwane
0094

Col,

PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH DATA COLLECTION AT LIMPOPO ASB FROM 24 – 28 JUNE 2019: 85003424CA, MS A.L. MAKATU

Appendix A: Approval letter to conduct Research in the Department of Defence (DOD)

B: Permission to conduct research in the Army Support Bases.

C: UNISA Research Ethics Clearance correspondence

1. Currently employed at Defence Intelligence, I am studying Masters of Arts in Criminal Justice in the College of Law at the University of South Africa (UNISA). My research title is: **“An Exploration of the Implementation of Security Vetting of personnel in the South African National Defence Force Army Support Bases”**. The research title relates directly to the functions of the Defence Intelligence and South African Army Support Bases.

2. My study will be conducted at three Army Support bases in different provinces. The study identified Limpopo, Potchefstroom and Johannesburg ASBs. Pilot study has already been conducted at Joint Support Base Garrison.



Lefapha la Boiphemelo. Umnyango wezokuVikela. Kgoro ya Tshireletso. ISebe lezoKhuselo. Department of Defence. Muhasho wa Tshirledzo. UmNyango WezokuVikela. Ndzawulo ya swa Vusireheleni. Lenapha la Tshireletso. Departement van Verdediging. LITiko le Tekuvikela



RESTRICTED

3. I hereby request to conduct a research data collection at ASB Limpopo over the period 24 – 28 June 2019.
4. Your consideration regarding this request is highly appreciated.


(A.L. MAKATU)

DIRECTORATE INTELLIGENCE FOR OPERATIONS SECRETARY: MS

DISTR

For Action

OC ASB Limpopo

(Attention : Col T.A Mukwevho)

Internal

FILE : 85003424CA



Lefapha la Boiphemelo, Umyango wezokuVikela, Kgoro ya Tshireletso, ISebe lezoKhuselo, Department of Defence, Muhasho wa Tshinledzo,
UmNyngo WezokuVikela, Ndzawulo ya swa Vusireheleri, Lehapha la Tshireletso, Departement van Verdediging, LI'itiko le Tekuvikela



ANNEXURE K

CONFIDENTIAL



defence intelligence

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

DIO/SDIP/DI/85003424CA

Telephone: (012) 315 0339
Fax: 012 315 0317
Cell: 082 391 7506
E-mail: alufhelim977@gmail.com.
al.makatu@di.mil.za.
Enquiries: Ms A.L Makatu

Department of Defence
Defence Intelligence
Private bag X 367
Pretoria
0001

21 May 2019

Col M.J. Moralo
Officer Commanding ASB Potchefstroom
Private bag X 2012
Noordbrug
Potchefstroom
2522

Col,

**PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH DATA COLLECTION AT ASB POTCHEFSTROOM
FROM 10 – 14 JUNE 2019: 85003424CA, MS A.L. MAKATU**

Appendix A: Approval letter to conduct Research in the Department of Defence (DOD)

B: Authority to conduct research in the Army Support Bases.

C: UNISA Research Ethics Clearance correspondence

1. Currently employed as a Secretary at Defence Intelligence, I am studying Masters of Arts in Criminal Justice in the College of Law at the University of South Africa (UNISA). My research title is: **"An Exploration of the Implementation of Security Vetting of personnel in the South African National Defence Force Army Support Bases"**. The research title relates directly to the functions of the Defence Intelligence and South African Army Support Bases.

2. My study will be conducted at three Army Support bases in different provinces. The study identified Limpopo, Potchefstroom and Johannesburg ASBs. Pilot study has already been conducted at Joint Support Base Garrison.



Lefapha la Boiphemeiso, Umnyango wezokuVikela, Kgoro ya Tshireletso, ISebe lezoKhuselo, Department of Defence, Muhashe wa Tshiriledzo, UmNyango WezokuVikela, Ndzawulo ya swa Vusireheleni, Lefapha la Tshireletso, Departement van Verdediging, LITiko le Tekuvikela



CONFIDENTIAL

3. I hereby request to conduct a research data collection at ASB Potchefstroom over the period 10 – 14 June 2019.
4. Your consideration regarding this request is highly appreciated.



(A.L. MAKATU)
DIRECTORATE INTELLIGENCE FOR OPERATIONS SECRETARY: MS

DISTR

For Action

OC ASB Potchefstroom

(Attention : Col M.J. Moralo)

Internal

FILE : 85003424CA



Lefapha la Boiphemelo. Umnyango wezokuVikela. Kgoro ya Tshireletso. iSebe lezoKhuselo. Department of Defence. Muhasho wa Tshirledzo.
UmNyango WezokuVikela. Ndzawulo ya swa Vusireheleni. Lehapha la Tshireletso. Departement van Verdediging. LITiko le Tekuvikela



ANNEXURE L

CONFIDENTIAL



defence intelligence

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEMORANDUM

DIO/SDIP/85003424CA

Telephone: (012) 315 0339
Fax: 012 315 0317
Cell: 082 391 7506
E-mail: alufhelim977@gmail.com
al.makatu@di.mil.za
Enquiries: Ms A.L Makatu

Department of Defence
Defence Intelligence
Private bag X 367
Pretoria
0001
18 December 2018

From: DIO Secretary

To: Director Vetting

PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH DATA COLLECTION INTERVIEWS AT DIRECTORATE VETTING: 85003424CA, MS A.L. MAKATU

Appendix A: Approval letter to conduct Research in the Department of Defence (DOD)

1. I am currently employed as a Secretary at Directorate Intelligence for Operations and studying Masters of Arts in Criminal Justice in the College of Law at the University of South Africa (UNISA). I am conducting a research on: "**An Exploration of the Implementation of Security Vetting of personnel in the South African National Defence Force Army Support Bases**". The research title relates directly to the functions of the Defence Intelligence, Directorate vetting in particular and South African Army Support Bases.
2. During my research project, part of data will be collected from vetting officers and I may also seek clarity of other vetting matters from members in the Directorate Vetting.
3. I therefore request for your authorisation to conduct interviews with vetting members, who will randomly be selected as required by the sample. Data will be collected on the respective members in 2019 on the dates to be communicated.
4. My Supervisor is Prof Rika Snyman, who is at the Department of Police Practice at the School of Criminal Justice, UNISA. Her contact particulars are as follows:



Lefapha la Boiphemelo. Umnyango wezokuVikela. Kgoro ya Tshireletso. ISebe lezoKhuselo. Department of Defence. Muhasho we Tshirledzo. UmNyango WezokuVikela. Ndzawulo ya swa Vusireheleni. Lehapha la Tshireletso. Departament van Verdediging. LITiko le Tekuvikela



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2

**PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH DATA COLLECTION INTERVIEWS AT
DIRECTORATE VETTING: 85003424CA, MS A.L. MAKATU**

Tel: 012 433 9496

Cell: 082 559 7705

E-mail: rsnyman@unisa.ac.za

5. Your consideration regarding this request is highly appreciated.



**(A.L. MAKATU)
DIRECTORATE INTELLIGENCE FOR OPERATIONS SECRETARY: MS**

Recommended/ not recommended



**(M.E. GCAZA)
DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE FOR OPERATIONS: BRIG GEN**

DISTR

For Action

Director Vetting

(Attention : Brig Gen M.D Sambo)

Internal

FILE : 85003424CA



Lefapha la Boiphemelo. Umnyango wezokuVikela. Kgoro ya Tshireletso. iSebe lezoKhuselo. Department of Defence. Muhasho wa Tshiriledzo.
UmNyango WezokuVikela. Ndzawulo ya swa Vusireheleni. Lehapha la Tshireletso. Departement van Verdediging. LTiko le Tekuvikela



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ANNEXURE M

CONFIDENTIAL



defence intelligence

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Private Bag X367, Pretoria, 0001. Liberty Building, 278 Madiba Street, Pretoria.

MEMORANDUM

DIO/SDIP/85003424CA

Telephone: (012) 315 0339
Fax: 012 315 0317
Cell: 082 391 7506
Enquiries: Ms A.L. Makatu

10 May 2019

From: DIO Secretary
To: Director Intelligence for Operations

REQUEST TO BE DETACHED TO CONDUCT AN ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN THE SANDF ARMY SUPPORT BASES: 85003424CA, MS A.L. MAKATU

1. I 85003424CA, Ms A.L. Makatu hereby request an authority to be detached to conduct research in the SANDF Army support Bases as stipulated in my study. Necessary communication documents to conduct such process have been processed with the office of CDCI and The Chief Army office. The nature of data collection requires me to report to the respective unit every morning for the duration of the identified dates.

2. I will be collecting data in May and June 2019 in the following Army Support bases:

- a. Pilot study at JSB Garrison (Thaba Tshwane) over the period 13 – 17 May 2019.
- b. The actual research at Johannesburg ASB over the period 10 – 14 June 2019,
- c. Potchefstroom ASB over the period 17 – 21 June 2019 and
- d. Limpopo ASB over the period 24 – 28 June 2019



Lefapha la Boiphemelo. Umnyango wezokuVikela. Kgoro ya Tshireletso. ISebe lezoKhuselo. Department of Defence. Muhasho wa Tshinledzo.
UmNyango WezokuVikela. Ndzawulo ya swa Vusireheleni. Lehapha la Tshireletso. Departement van Verdediging. LITiko le Tekuvikela



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**REQUEST TO BE DETACHED TO CONDUCT AN ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN THE
SANDF ARMY SUPPORT BASES: 85003424CA, MS A.L. MAKATU**

3. Your consideration regarding this request is highly appreciated



(A.L. MAKATU)

DIRECTORATE INTELLIGENCE FOR OPERATIONS SECRETARY: MS

Approved/ ~~Not approved~~



(M.E. GCAZA)

DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE FOR OPERATIONS: BRIG GEN

10/5/19
DATE

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ANNEXURE N

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sa army

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

JSB GAR/PSAP/R/105/7/4

Telephone: (012) 684 2189
Extension: 2189
SSN: 803 2189
Facsimile: (012) 684 2709
Enquiries: Maj L. Mogashoa
Ms M.T.P. Lekgetho

Department of Defence
Joint Support Base Garrison
Private Bag X 1001
Thaba Tshwane
0143
17 May 2019

REQUEST TO BE DETACHED TO CONDUCT AN ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN THE SANDF ARMY SUPPORT BASES: 85003424CA MS A.L. MAKATU PSAP

1. Letter DI/DDS/R/202/3/7 dated 13 September 2018 refers.
2. Ms A.L. Makatu conducted her studies at JSB Garrison.
3. The member arrived at JSB Garrison and she conducted her studies from 13 May 2019 and finished on the 17 May 2019.
4. Ms Makatu will be returning to her mother unit on the 20 May 2019.
5. For your further attention.

pp/EL/col
(N.A. NDOU)

GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING JSB GARRISON: BRIG GEN

DISTR

For Action

Director Intelligence For Operations

(Attention: Brig Gen M.E. Gcaza)

Internal

File: JSB GAR/PSAP/R/105/7/4



Letapha la Boriphemelo Umnyango wezokuVivela Kgoro ya Tshireletso, Sebe lezoKhuselo Department of Defence Muziso wa Tshintsho
UmNyango WezokuVivela, Ndzawulo ya swa Vusirendiem Letapha la Tshireletso Department van Verdediging LITso leTekuvikela

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ANNEXURE O

RESTRICTED



sa army

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

ARMY SUP BASE JHB/R/507/3/1

Telephone: 011 212 5702
SSN: 860 5702
Fax: 011 212 5777
Enquiries: Maj S.R. Nene

Army Support Base Johannesburg
Private Bag X19
Lenasia
1820

14 June 2019

DETACHED DUTY: 85003424CA MS A.L. MAKATU

1. Army Support Base Johannesburg hereby confirms that 85003424CA Ms A.L. Makatu from Defence Intelligence was in the base conducting academic research related to security from the 10th until 14th of June 2019
2. For your attention.

(LT COL P.J. MAHLO)

OFFICER COMMANDING ARMY SUPPORT BASE JOHANNESBURG: COL



Lefapha la Boiphemelo. Umnyango wezokuVikela. Kgoro ya Tshireletso iSebe lezoKhuselo. Department of Defence. Muhasho wa TsiriledzoUmnyango WezokuVikela. Ndzawulo ya swa Vusirheleri. Lehapha la Tshireletso. Departement van Verdediging. LITiko I Tekuvikela

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ANNEXURE P

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sa army
Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

DIO/SDIP/85003424CA

Telephone: 018 289 3301
Facsimile: 018 289 3313
Enquiries: Col M.J. Moralo

Army Support Base Potchefstroom
Private Bag x2012
Noordbrug
2522
19 June 2019

CONFIRMATION OF DETACHED DUTY AT ASB POTCHEFSTROOM

1. Officer Commanding ASB Potchefstroom hereby wish to confirm that 85003424CA. Ms A.L. Makatu of DIO arrived at ASB Potchefstroom on the 18 June 2019 till 21 June 2019.
2. The above mentioned member was afforded opportunity to conduct research with some of the unit members.
3. Hope you find this in order.

(M.J. MORALO)
OFFICER COMMANDING ASB POTCHEFSTROOM: COL



Isigaba Isigaba... Department of Defence, Pretoria

RESTRICTED

P.001/001

(FAX) 0182893313

Registratio

20/06/2019 07:24 ASB Potch

RECEIVED 22/12/2016 21:29

ANNEXURE Q

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sa army

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Telephone: (015) 2993480
Fax: (015) 2993473
Enquiries: Maj R.C. Dzaga

ASB LP/R/105/7/2

ASB Limpopo
Private Bag X9304
Polokwane
0700

28 June 2019

CONDUCTING AN ACADEMIC RESEARCH AT ASB LIMPOPO: 85003424CA MS A.L. MAKATU, PSAP

1. Memorandum DIO/SDIP/85003424CA dated 10 May 2019 has reference.
2. This is to confirm that the above-named member was on detached duty in our unit wef 24-28 June 2019 to conduct academic research.
3. For your further action.

(I.G. MTTI)

ACTING OFFICER COMMANDING ARMY SUPPORT BASE LIMPOPO: LT COL

DISTR

For action

Director Intelligence for operations (Attention: Brig Gen M.E. Gcaza)

Internal

File: ASB LP/R/105/7/2



Letshaba: Republikeni, Umrhanyo wasekuWakho, Kqubo zeTshwarikeko, Saka Inxakaxhele, Department of Defence, Mkhosha we Tsoelikeko
Umkhosi weSizwe, Umrhanyo we Republikeni, Ikhosi zeTshwarikeko, Department of Defence, I-Tshwarikeko



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ANNEXURE R

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ANNEXURE R



defence intelligence

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Private Bag X367, Pretoria, 0001. Liberty Building, 278 Madiba Street, Pretoria.

MEMORANDUM

DIO/SDIP/85003424CA

Telephone: (012) 315 0339
Fax: 012 315 0317
Cell: 082 391 7506
Enquiries: Ms A.L. Makatu

// May 2020

From: DIO Secretary
To: Director Departmental Security

REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE TO PUBLISH A DISSERTATION FOR AN ACADEMIC RESEARCH: 85003424CA, MS A.L. MAKATU

1. I 85003424CA, Ms A.L. Makatu hereby request a clearance to publish research paper for academic purposes in June 2020.
2. I am studying Masters of Arts in Criminal Justice at the University of South Africa (UNISA). My research topic is "Exploring the Implementation Security Vetting of personnel in the South African Army Support Bases". The research topic relates directly to the functions of the DOD, Defence Intelligence and Army Support Bases.
3. Your consideration is highly appreciated

(A.L. MAKATU)
DIO SECRETARY: MS



Lefapha la Boiphemelo, Umnyango wezokuVikela. Kgoro ya Tshireletso, iSebe lezoKhuselo, Department of Defence, Muhasho wa Tshiriedzo.
UmNyango WezokuVikela, Ndzawulo ya swa Vusireheleli, Lehapha la Tshireletso, Departement van Verdediging, LITiko le Tekuvikela



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

**REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE TO PUBLISH A DISSERTATION FOR AN ACADEMIC
RESEARCH: 85003424CA, MS A.L. MAKATU**

DISTR

For Action

DDS

(Attention : Brig Gen T.G Baloyi)

Internal

FILE : 85003424CA

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ANNEXURE S

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defence intelligence
Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Telephone: (012) 315-0215
Fax: (012) 326-3246
Enquiries: Col J. van Wyk

DI/DDS/R/202/3/7

Defence Intelligence
Private Bag X337
Pretoria
0001
15 May 2020

AUTHORISATION TO SUBMIT A DISSERTATION FOR AN ACADEMIC RESEARCH: MS A.L. MAKATU

1. A discussion between Ms A.L. Makatu of the Directorate for Intelligence Operations (DIO) and WO1 K. Skweyiya of the Directorate Departmental Security (DDS) on 13 May 2020 as well as a request letter DIO/SDIP/85003424CA dd 11 May 2020 to publish A Dissertation with a Dissertation attached is acknowledged.
2. Ms A.L. Makatu is hereby granted permission from a security perspective to publish a Dissertation on the topic entitled **"An Exploration of the Implementation of Security Vetting of Personnel in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) Army Support Bases,"** as a precondition for an attainment of a Master's Degree in Criminal Justice under the auspices of the University of South Africa as requested.
3. Approval is however granted after having taken into cognisance inter alia Section 104 of the Defence Act (Act 42 of 2002) pertaining to protection of DOD Classified Information and the consequences of noncompliance.
4. For your attention.


(T.G. BALOYI)

ACTING CHIEF DIRECTOR COUNTER INTELLIGENCE: BRIG GEN
KS/KS (MS A.L. Makatu)

DSTR

For Action

Director DIO

(Attention: MS A.L. Makatul)

File: DI/DDS/R/202/3/7



Lefapha la Boiphemelo . Umnyango wezokuVikela . Kgoro ya Tshireletso . iSebe lezoKhuselo . Department of Defence . Mahasho wa Tsairiledzo
UmNyango WezokuVikela . Ndzawulo ya swa Yusireheferi . Lefapha la Tshireletso . Departement van Verdediging . LiTiko leTekuvikela

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ANNEXURE T

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Interviewed:

One-on-one interviews with:-

- SA Army directors
- Vetting officials
- Officer commanding (Johannesburg, Limpopo and Potchefstroom ASBs)
- Deputy officer commanding (per army base identified)
- Unit Military security Officer (per army base identified)
- Chairmen of the troops (per army base identified)
- Chairmen of non-commissioned officers' forum (per army base identified)

Interview questions

1. General questions on knowledge of Security Vetting

1.1 What is your understanding of security measures?

1.2 What is your understanding of Security Vetting?

1.3 Is vetting conducted in every employee?

1.4 What in your view is the role of security vetting?

1.5 What in your view should be in place for security vetting to be effective?

2. Perceptions of employees on Security vetting

2.1 Before the promulgation of the constitution of South Africa in 1996, do you think defence Intelligence was conducting their mandate of security vetting?

2.2. Do you think that defence Intelligence was impartial in conducting their duties when it comes to vetting of personnel?

2.3 Do you think there was corruption in the Army Support bases (ASBs)?

2.4 What challenges in your view do you think members of ASBS face?

2.5 What proposals would you make towards addressing these challenges?

3. The influence the effectiveness of responding to security vetting challenges in the ASBS

3.1 What is your opinion on the effectiveness of security vetting on personnel in the ASBs?

3.2 What do you think can be done better to effect security vetting to personnel?

4. Adherence to security measures by personnel

4.1 What is your understanding on the purpose of security measures?

4.2 What informs adherence to security vetting by personnel?

5. Addressing corruption, fraud and nepotism through vetting process

5.1 Are you aware of the proposed vetting of every member in the ASBS?

5.2 Do you support the process of vetting of every member?

5.3 What attribute do you think make a good member of ASBS?

5.4 Do you think these attributes would be easily found in the personnel?

5.5 Will the process of security vetting be able to identify and solve the problem in the ASBS?

5.6 Do you think corruption problem in the ASBs will be addressed in the SANDF?

5.7 Do you think after the conclusions of vetting process, members will have been transformed to your expectation?

5.8 Is there anything else you would like to add?

Thank you for the contribution to this study

ANNEXURE U

CONSENT FORM

INFORMED CONSENT

I am Alufheli Lovemore Makatu, a registered Masters' student at the University of South Africa. I am conducting a research for my Master's Degree in Criminal Justice.

The title of my research project is: -

“AN EXPLORATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY VETTING OF PERSONNEL IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE ARMY SUPPORT BASES”

I have been employed by the Department of Defence, Defence Intelligence Division since 2008 to date. This study aims is to establish how security vetting is conducted in the ASBs and furthermore, exploration on the study can lead to recommendations that will improve the implementation of security vetting in the entire DOD.

Each participant will be interviewed for approximately 30 minutes. All personal information will remain confidential and coding will be used, at no time will their personal identity be revealed. The decision to participate is voluntary, there will be no compensation. Participation may be terminated by the researcher at any point of the interview due to none adherence to conditions or risks being identified.

CONSENT AGREEMENT FORM

Between the interviewer and the respondent

(Ms Alufheli Makatu and _____)

I hereby consent to participate and being interviewed on the research title “ **AN EXPLORATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY VETTING OF PERSONNEL IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE ARMY SUPPORT BASES**”

The use of data derived from these interviews by the interviewer

I agree to my interview being recorded in writing and voice recorder

I agree that follow up interviews be conducted if necessary

I understand that even if I agree to participate now, I can withdraw at any time or refuse to answer any question without any consequences of any kind.

I understand that I can withdraw permission to use data from my interview within two weeks after the interview, in which case the material will be deleted.

I have had the purpose and nature of the study explained to me in writing and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study.

I understand that participation involves engaging in questions that will be asked by the interviewer and interviewee

I understand that I will not benefit directly from participating in this research.

I understand that all information I provide for this study will be treated confidentially.

I understand that disguised extracts from my interview may be quoted in the dissertation.

I understand that if I inform the researcher that myself or someone else is at risk of harm they may have to report this to the relevant authorities - they will discuss this with me first but may be required to report with or without my permission.

I understand that signed consent forms and original audio recordings will be retained by the researcher until the exam board confirms the results of their dissertation.

I understand that a transcript of my interview in which all identifying information has been removed will be retained for two years from the date of the exam board.

I understand that under freedom of information legislation I am entitled to access the information I have provided at any time while it is in storage as specified above.

I understand that I am free to contact any of the people involved in the research to seek further clarification and information.

Names, degrees, affiliations and contact details of researchers and academic supervisors when relevant.

Signature of participant

Date

I believe the participant is giving informed consent to participate in this study

Signature of researcher

Date

ANNEXURE V

Turnitin results

An exploration of the implementation of security vetting of personnel in the South African National Defence Force Army Support Bases

ORIGINALITY REPORT

17 %

SIMILARITY INDEX

12 %

INTERNET SOURCES

5 %

PUBLICATIONS

14 %

STUDENT PAPERS
