

**FRANTZ FANON'S CONCEPTION OF DECOLONISATION: VIOLENCE, *TABULA RASA*, AND NEW HUMANISM**

by

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submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of

**Master of Arts**

in the subject

**African Politics**

at the

**UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA**

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September 2021

## DECLARATION

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## ABSTRACT

This study uses Africana existential phenomenology as the theoretical foundation to comprehend Frantz Fanon's conception of decolonisation. His conception of decolonisation is respectively and tri-dimensionally based on the concepts, namely violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism. While Africana existential phenomenology is concerned with the lived experience of black subjects, the concept of violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism chart the way out for the critical situation of being-black-in-the-world. The study exposes how colonialism is a *longue-durée* project that continues to animate the practice of dehumanisation. Consequently, black subjects are deprived of their humanity and privileges in their everyday lives. An assessment of violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism, reveals how black subjects can therefore create other true modes of existential life. These curative modes result from engaging in an enduring struggle as an imperative way for black subjects to defeat the perpetual colonialism, recover their humanity and reach self-determination.

**Key terms:** Fanon, violence, *tabula rasa*, new humanism, Africana existential phenomenology, colonialism, colonisation, dehumanisation, black subjects, self-determination.

## DEDICATION

In memory of my grandfather, Nkinahamira Juvénal (1921–2010). Thank you for your words of encouragement. I will always remember how you trained me to understand what life is about.

To my parents, Nkinahamira Charles and Ndoricimpa Anastasie, thank you very much for giving me the foundation of life.

To my siblings, Habimana Daphrose, Habonimana Gérard (1988–2015), Hakizimana Astère, Major Manirakiza Evode, Nduwimana Mamerthe, Nininahazwe Jean-François Régis and Havyarimana Fébronie (1977–2000); to all of you, I say thank you very much for what you have contributed in my life.

To my wife, Alice Nduwimana, thank you for your persistence while I was occupied with this dissertation. A special thanks to my firstborn (daughter) Muntu Africa, who will soon celebrate her first birthday.

To all my teachers from primary school, high school, and university – without you, I would not have been able to reach here.

Respect is given as well to all my previous colleagues and the soldiers of FDN (*Force de la Défense Nationale*) who I spent time with in the Burundian National Army Defence.

To all political prisoners who were together with me in Mpimba Central Prison in Bujumbura (Burundi), thank you for your support during the time I was a political prisoner (2010–2011).

Again, to all asylum seekers and refugees who are here in South Africa, and others who we were together in Nairobi, Kakuma Refugee Camp, Tongogara Refugee Camp (in Zimbabwe); thank you for your words of encouragement.

Finally, to all of you: car guards, security guards and delivery experts (using motorbikes) in South Africa, I was with you a few years ago, and particular thanks to you who agreed to cover my place the time I was going to write exams. *En grosso-modo*, to all black subjects – regardless of wherever you are located in this antiblack world, this work is for you.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

*Mana rugira vyose, warakoze cane kunguma hafi igihe nariko nandika ubu bushakashatsi. Nagomba ndagusabe ngo impamyabushobozi mpawe kubera ubu bushakashatsi, izobe ikigwanisho kigwanira abana bawe ngaha kw'isi. Ndabisavye mw'izina rya Yezu-kristu we yemeye kutubambigwa kugira ngo natwe tubone kurokoka—Merci beaucoup à mon Dieu créateur de la terre et de l'Univers—Asante sana.*

Special thanks are given to my supervisor Prof. T. Sithole. Since 2014 when you were my lecturer in the undergraduate level of studies, it is now that I understand that your objective was to direct me in the right way to self-determination. Thank you very much for your guidance, comments, and referral during the period that I wrote this dissertation. You have been my supervisor as well for my honours degree in African politics, and with courage, you carried on supervising me for this dissertation. Sometimes you were so strict with me, but it is now that I understand why you were doing that to me: to be well trained and to know that this journey requires students who engage their time fully in the critical reading of the ongoing project of colonialism. Such a critical reading facilitates a good understanding of decolonisation. Thank you very much again and again. *Ngiyabonga kakhulu ngesiqondiso sakho.*

To my co-supervisor Dr. L. Motsomotso, I came to your office almost every day to consult with you, especially in the first days of my registration. Your first comments on my first draft of the topic proposal have obliged me to revise and revisit my topic proposal. It has been significant and fruitful as my topic proposal passed at its first submission attempt, the same as it has been for my research proposal. Thank you very much for providing me with a list of books to read. Thanking you for calling me when I was not there to come and collect feedback from you. I say again thank you. *Asante sana, tena ubarikiwe na Mungu wetu.*

To Dr. Klaas J. Joseph, thank you for your support and comments on my work.

To Dr. Chisita T. Collence and Mr. Sydney Seshibedi, thank you for reading and commenting on my work at the time I was starting this dissertation.

To Mrs. Marike V. Rensburg, thank you very much for editing this dissertation.

A final specific thanks to all Unisa librarians, especially Ms. Napaai Hleziphi.

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Study's background

This study applies Africana existential phenomenology, which is concerned with the lived experiences of black subjects to examine Frantz Fanon's conception of decolonisation. This is based on his three pillars of decolonisation, namely violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism. This study rearranges those three pillars in a tri-dimensional and inseparable manner that articulates violence as the central element of decolonisation. The lived experience of being black in the colonial condition is what necessitates Fanon's advocacy for decolonisation.

From that perspective, the study engages in meditation of Africana existential phenomenology as the remedy for the colonial condition from which Fanon's decolonial thought originated. Thus, Gordon (2000) approves that Africana existential phenomenology refers to the social and political meditations that grapple with the lived experience of racialised subjects, who have been, and continue to be oppressed, alienated, and exploited.

Uniquely, this study encompasses Fanon's conception of decolonisation that explores how black subjects should become free. Fanon's decolonial schema illustrates how black subjects should reach self-determination. About that schematic plan, there must be a time that the violence reaches a culminant point and, during that period, black subjects have to engage in a terrifying war with their oppressor. Within such a struggle, black subjects have to destroy the existing law to overpower their oppressor to realise another world without protocol. Importantly, it is through this extreme period characterised by total disorder, killing and a new beginning of everything—*tabula rasa*—that, new real independent black subjects originate. Therefore, genuine decolonisation emanates through violence that escalates in the form of *tabula rasa*. It is that *tabula rasa* that later permits the beginning of new humanism.

### 1.2 Problem statement

This study aims to account for what decolonisation of the black subject fundamentally is, by locating Fanon's political thought of decolonisation within the tradition of Africana existential phenomenology. The study states that Fanon's conception of decolonisation is three-dimensionally composed of three elements namely violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism, hence such themes possess the content of what (genuine) decolonisation requires. More



fundamentally, the study advances that Fanon's conception of decolonisation should not be interpreted in absence of the interpretation of violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism hence they are the constitutive and interrelated elements that make Fanon's conception of decolonisation to be read from afresh perspective.

### 1.3 Objectives

The three objectives of this study are as follows:

- To illuminate Fanon's relevance in terms of the conception of decolonisation.
- To demonstrate how violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism are the constitutive elements of Fanon's conception of decolonisation.
- To locate Fanon as an African existentialist philosopher to understand the lived experiences of black subjects and their descendants in the diaspora.

### 1.4 Key concepts

The key concepts of this study are as follows:

**Colonialism:** According to Maldonado-Torres (2007:3), "colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such nation an empire." In this study, colonialism means a perpetual and violent system that allows a white master to subjugate black subjects in their everyday lives.

**Coloniality:** There are three forms of coloniality, namely coloniality of power, knowledge, and being. For Maldonado-Torres (2007:3), "coloniality means the long-standing power patterns that originate from colonialism and that are currently exercised in the absence of the colonial administration." In this study, coloniality should not be confused with colonialism above, as coloniality focuses on the nature of the regime and, currently, coloniality exercises domination as a mask of colonialism.

**Colonisation:** For Fanon ([1964] 1967:114), "men enslaved and oppressed by foreign nations are invited today to participate totally in the work of demolition of the colonial system." Colonisation means a foreign power country is dominating another country. In this research, colonisation means the strategy employed by imperial rule to enforce and practise colonialism.

**Conquest:** Conquest denotes the illegal occupation by using military power. For Fanon ([1959] 1965:122), “colonisation has been built on military conquest and the police system.” In this study, conquest relates to a period during which the black subjects were subjugated by settlers using heavy European military power.

**Dehumanisation:** By exposing the reality, Fanon ([1961] 1990:201) reveals that colonialism is a systematic negation of the other person and a furious determination to deny the other person all attributes of humanity. In this study, dehumanisation refers to the negation and rejection of all black subjects’ attributes of humanity as orchestrated by perpetual colonialism.

**New humanism:** While clarifying the meaning of new humanism, Schwartz (1974:35) states: “Through a rejection of what men have come to regard as normal, the humanist creates the avenue for acceptance of new values.” New humanism means the starting of a new human being. In this study, new humanism refers to recreating new black subjects through their engagement in the endless decolonial struggle.

**Self-determination:** The purest form of self-determination and the experience of greatest freedom only happen when the unobstructed action of people is guided by their rational thought and judgment (Schouls 1992:155). Self-determination means a point of arrival or goal accomplishment. In the context of this research, self-determination is considered to be the total end of colonisation.

**Tabula rasa:** *Tabula rasa* is defined as the new beginning of everything. For Marriott (2018:2), “*tabula rasa* is a paradoxical suspension of time which is also radically new beginning.” In this study, *tabula rasa* means the potentiality of the zero point of everything that permits black subjects to restart their new lives afresh.

**Violence:** According to Fanon ([1961] 1990:31), “the violence which has ruled over the ordering of the colonial world, is the same violence which will be claimed and taken over by the native.” Violence should generally be defined as the physical force that intends to offend or harm another person. In this study, violence refers to ongoing colonialism (colonisation that continues in a new form of the current coloniality) that is violent by nature and that black subjects have to use the same violence to reclaim their dispossessed humanity.

## **1.5 Delimitation**

This research is strictly studied in three main pillars as parameters derived as one major concept of decolonisation. The study is originally based on Fanon's black radical thought with a critique from other scholars. Fanon's conception of decolonisation is discussed and assessed by using one theory of Africana existential phenomenology and only focusing on his three main pillars of decolonisation, namely violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism considered by this study as the route to self-determination.

## **1.6 The rationale of the study**

The study seeks to generate knowledge on decolonisation to add to the existing corpus of knowledge on decolonisation in Africa. Although several studies and investigations have been done on Fanon's conception of decolonisation, this study intervenes differently as it singularly engages Fanon's conception of decolonisation by examining violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism as a site of forms of inquiry.

In essence, the world has a high number of decolonial conflicts as the causes and consequences of perpetual colonialism. As a result, such decolonial conflicts open the doors to decolonial debates and issues, which are caused by colonial legacies and encountered by black subjects searching to reach self-determination. Such issues have spurred the researcher to undertake this study on Fanon's conception of decolonisation. In response to these issues, the foregrounding of Fanon's conception of decolonisation remains unavoidable. Thus, to comprehend and apprehend current decolonial movements, the study seeks to demonstrate that Fanon's decolonisation is still persistent and useful in contemporary African politics.

It is from the aforementioned persistence and usefulness that the research seeks to illuminate Fanon's relevance in terms of his conception of decolonisation; to demonstrate how violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism are the constitutive elements of Fanon's conception of decolonisation; and to illuminate Fanon's conception of decolonisation to understand colonialism as a fundamental problem of existence.

The application of this study allows the colonised to become true human beings. Importantly, it is only by engaging violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism as a tri-dimensional tool of the black subject, that decolonisation is possible. The colonised want to be free—this freedom has to be defined according to their way of understanding, but not the freedom dictated and

defined by the oppressor. This study further reveals that black subjects have to use the same violence as their oppressor to become new human beings in a new world.

## 1.7 Literature review

According to Fanon ([1961] 1990:27), “decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon.” Here, Fanon expresses an uncertainty on how it seems impossible to reach self-determination without a violent trajectory. Fanon clarifies that colonialism itself is violent by nature, which means that decolonisation has to take the same way of applying violence. Negotiation between the coloniser and the colonised cannot be applied for a better solution because the coloniser conquered the land illegally and dominated black subjects. Based on different scholars’ unclear interpretations of decolonisation, Fanon’s aforementioned definition of decolonisation exposes his conception of decolonisation, which is revealed through violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism, to be engaged in a conversation.

As Fanon mentioned above, an understanding of decolonisation appeals that violence be applied. Colonialism itself is characterised by violence as a penalty to black subjects; therefore, for Fanon, decolonisation has to employ the same framework of using violence. Strengthening Fanon’s argument, Springhall (2001:7) states, “decolonisation in nearly all cases required first the growth of anti-colonial nationalist sentiments and nationalist forces within a colonial territory itself.” This growth of anti-colonial nationalist sentiments proposed by Springhall, can be motivated by the struggle between the *colons* and the colonised. The same struggle would unify and intensify the nationalist forces which are required for black subjects to reach to self-determination.

Maldonado-Torres (2004:36) agrees with both Fanon and Springhall that “decolonisation is about the creation of a new symbolic and material order that takes the full spectrum of human history, its achievements and its failures, into view.” Maldonado-Torres explains how decolonisation has a high potentiality of transforming human beings from the zone of non-being to the zone of humanity. Concerning this study, the decolonisation of black subjects has to go hand in hand with the revival of their history, myths, and traditions. Fanon, Springhall, and Maldonado-Torres agree that black subjects cannot reach self-determination without employing violence. This is a fact because the violence discussed here is the arbitrator between the coloniser and colonised in the sense that both parties rely on violence. Violence has to be

served for people to realise their objectives, either for dominating or for the colonised to reach self-determination.

However, Arendt (1970:30) refutes Fanon's conception of violence by indicating that "if only the practice of violence would make it possible to interrupt automatic processes in the realm of human affairs, the preachers of violence would have won an important point." Arendt's argument does not value violence in an attempt to change the community. She nullifies and declares Fanon's conception of violence (for the oppressed to use violence against the colonialists) as illegal. However, Arendt's position is biased by the fact that she recognises that colonialism itself is violent, but she fails to recognise that black subjects must apply the same violence for them to resist colonisation. Thus, it is evident why Arendt's position is biased and supportive of colonialists. She fails to demonstrate that colonial violence needs to be confronted by the violence of the colonised. The concern here is, that as Fanon reveals, Arendt needs to understand that decolonisation is a process that does not need negotiation, but only the violence against violence through combat should be able to re-establish the order that has been disregarded by the colonialism.

Agreeing with Fanon as well, Sartre ([1961] 1990:18) confirms that the oppressed do not condemn their revolt, knowing full well that white people have done everything to provoke it. From his view, Sartre clarifies that white masters are the sources of the violence that black subjects are called to use in their journey to self-determination. At this point, with Sartre and Fanon in mind, it means that the violence employed by black subjects is a derivation and projection of colonial violence because the colonisers used violence from the first day, they encountered black subjects.

In contrast, Blackey (1974:206) states that Fanon's insistence on violence is conditioned strongly by his involvement in Algeria's struggle for independence. Blackey does not consider Fanon's apostolic conception of violence as his idea but rather views Fanon as being influenced by his life's experience. Being in the same category as Arendt who disagrees with Fanon's conception of violence, Blackey analyses Fanon's thought of violence as being the conditional and influential thought. However, there is a disaccord with Blackey that Fanon's idea of violence was conditioned. For the most part, Fanon's thought was existential through his demonstration concerning colonialism as a violent and continual system that needs to be confronted by another counter-violence.

Bravely, as he is concrete in his commitment, Fanon ([1952] 2008:202) continues to demonstrate his accord to defeat colonialism, “I was committed to myself and my fellow man, to fight with all life and all my strength so that never again would people be enslaved on this earth.” The enslavement of black subjects on this earth means that there is violence or crime against black humanity. Fanon was devoted to fighting colonisation so that no black subjects should ever suffer colonial violence, such as dehumanisation, racism, and discrimination, again. This call from Fanon reminds us that everyone is condemned to defend their rights, humanity, and freedom. Hence, black subjects in the world have to fight against colonial violence.

In addition, while justifying Fanon’s argument above and demonstrating that the rebel’s weapon is the proof of his humanity, Sartre ([1961] 1990:19) emphasises that in the first days of the revolt, the oppressed must kill as for them to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone—to destroy the oppressor and free the oppressed at the same time. In other words, after the revolt and the elimination of the oppressor, there will be a dead man and a free man who for the first time will feel transformed as a lawful human being. At this point, Sartre should be echoed as he clarifies that to shoot a colonialist down is to remove an obstacle in the terrain of combat. There is uncertainty whether black subjects can be fully independent without engaging in enduring combat with their oppressors.

Again, with the courage to convince his opponents, Fanon ([1961] 1990:47) upholds that only peasants in colonial countries are revolutionary because they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. Here, Fanon ([1961] 1990) demonstrates how without the masses of people, it does not seem easy to reach self-determination. A point to be highlighted together with Fanon is that the response of the masses is the key to the success of decolonisation. When the masses stand up and say no to colonialism, it shows that black subjects as a whole understand that applying violence is the only response to colonialism—a problem for existence.

Unsatisfied, Jinadu (1980:7) argues that Fanon is not a post-colonial African political thinker because Fanon’s field experiences in Africa were limited to North Africa and West Africa. However, there is a disaccord with Jinadu at this point because by not denying Jinadu’s argument, there are many picturesque works that identify Fanon in African high conferences, which means that he was trusted by several African leaders. Contra Jinadu, there is therefore confirmation that Fanon was a black subject and thinker whose decolonial work was and is still relevant to post-colonial studies in the world. In disaccord with Jinadu, Cherki (2011:132)

states “reading Fanon helps us to ‘resist the air of our present time’ in the fields of politics, culture, and individual becoming, with his quest to join everything human, every relationship of the singular to the collective in the ordeal of alienation.” This means that despite his death, Fanon is still relevant in the current period; he is still a relevant scholar who is discussed when it comes to decolonisation.

Fanon ([1961] 1990:27) highlights that decolonisation, which sets out to change the order of the world, is a programme of complete disorder. Fanon’s philosophy of decolonisation emphasises the role of violence and *tabula rasa* in a decolonial project. In Fanon’s sense, violence is curative because all black subjects must employ violence to shift from non-humanity to the new humanism. However, for this to happen, there is *tabula rasa* as the period that has to come to remove colonialism and chart a way for black subjects to reach self-determination.

As a result, *tabula rasa*, as the second among the three elements of Fanon’s conception of decolonisation, should not be confused with chaos. Fanon clarifies what *tabula rasa* means by putting it into these words:

But we have precisely chosen to speak of that kind of *tabula rasa* which characterizes at the outset all [kind of] decolonisation. Its unusual importance is that it constitutes, from the first day, the minimum demands of the colonized. To tell the truth, the proof of success lies in a whole social structure being changed from the bottom up. (Fanon [1961] 1990:27)

Therefore, Fanon observes *tabula rasa* as the only hope and foundation of the true life of the black subjects. *Tabula rasa* fulfils the minimum of what the black subjects demand in their everyday life. Fanon describes *tabula rasa* not as chaos, but rather as it results from chaos. *Tabula rasa* as a zero-ground point is difficult to reach during a colonial period as everything has been touched by colonialism. As a scary period, *tabula rasa* is a space that none wants to get because within *tabula rasa*, there is nothing and all human beings must restart their lives from having nothing. Because *tabula rasa* is a new beginning, it is extremely relevant for black subjects who want to chart a way to self-determination. Within *tabula rasa*, there is no oppressor and oppressed—all human beings are equal as they possess the same potentiality to life. Therefore, *tabula rasa* is the important element that is needed for decolonisation as it fundamentally changes the poor and the rich into a neutral and absolute situation of dis/possession. Decolonisation cancels the complexes of superiority and inferiority as through *tabula rasa*, without exception, all human beings start a new life in the new world.

Sharing the same vision with Fanon, Marriott (2018:72) states, “in the decolonial struggle; violence has a regulatory function insofar as it is detoxifying and destructive, creative and reinventing.” This means that without violence, black subjects cannot reach self-determination that allows them to the invention of new modes of life. Marriott (2018:228) adds that “such a decolonial violence leads to a *tabula rasa* bringing a judgment into play, but one without jurisdiction.” *Tabula rasa* cancels the law and exposes reality. *Tabula rasa* creates something from nothing; it is a period in which no one desires to be. With the absence of *tabula rasa*, there is a presence of domination, dehumanisation, and racialisation. *Tabula rasa* breaks all the pillars of colonialism and allows everyone to be wherever they want to be, to think as they want, to travel without guidance, and finally, to live a life based on self-control.

Also, in support of Fanon’s thought, Mbembe (2012:20) agrees that Fanon’s thinking drew the colonised into a fight to the death—a fight that the oppressed were called upon to assume as their duty, which could not be delegated to others. Mbembe highlights that by following Fanon’s steps, violence is a necessity for the oppressed in their *voyage* to self-determination. The fight to death as underlined by Mbembe requires the application of violence that tends to *tabula rasa*. With Mbembe’s argument, all black subjects have to consider that it is their responsibility to fight against the enduring project of colonialism.

In addition, Fanon ([1964] 1967:105) highlights that decolonisation is the total destruction of the colonial system from the pre-eminence of the language of the oppressor. Sithole’s (2016) position reflected in Fanon’s favour by completing his argument. Sithole (2016:49) reaffirms, “in true liberation, the oppressed are infused with a new sense of consciousness in which self-determination and revolution are wedded to realise their being as they transcend the state of non-being.” Here, Sithole exposes the role of true decolonisation that appears as the phase of human fundamental change. In consideration of Sithole’s position, black subjects who are truly liberated, change their status of being. They move from being objectified to repossessing their humanity.

Again, Gordon (2015:97) affirms as well that although one’s liberty, licence or absence of constraints could be handed over to another, it is the struggle for liberation that engenders freedom. Gordon highlights the necessity of combat for black subjects to reach self-determination. Another important reminder is that, the nature of decolonisation is to get rid of foreign values as this process produces the new humanity (Blackey 2007:81). Even though Blackey was against Fanon’s argument, at this concern, Blackey agrees that a new black subject



should be the result of decolonisation. Relevantly, it is my concern to affirm that the struggle for liberation mentioned by Gordon is the key here to true freedom that differs from flag freedom. Such a struggle for liberation uses violence as the framework to claim back the true humanity that has been rendered nothing by the white master. The death and cancellation of the law during that period of this struggle demonstrate that *tabula rasa* is in action and gives notice to the oppressor that change is compulsory in the black community.

Thus, supportive of Fanon, Wa Thiong'o (1993:76) declares that the decolonisation of South Africa is the key to the social liberation of the African continent. As on the time of his writing, South Africa was under violence caused by apartheid rule, which still has legacies in South African society. Wa Thiong'o is concerned with the decolonisation of the whole of Africa without exception. In this regard, decolonising black subjects is not an individual task or success but requires that all black subjects be fully decolonised. Wa Thiong'o is apprehensive that the delay of South Africa becoming fully and economically decolonised affects the whole continent to take a step further.

In addition, Fanon's conception of decolonisation is in accord with Sharpe's writings on decolonising archives, which are important for decolonising education. Sharpe (2016:13) advises that the works of black scholars require "new modes and methods of research and teaching; new ways of entering and leaving the archives of slavery." As Maldonado-Torres (2007:23) argues, decolonisation aspires to break with modernity, which is built on one logic. Such one-sided archives mislead black intellectuals who are engaged in dealing with the question of coloniality. Agreeing with Sharpe and Maldonado-Torres in this regard, European epistemology should be fundamentally criticised as well. Colonialism has obliged the world to turn in one and compulsory way of life orientation, knowledge, and politics that are based on Euro-North America. Decolonisation appeals to the destruction of one-side-one-knowledge and permits the acknowledgment of the other side of the world that has been hidden previously by the enterprise of colonialism.

In addition, Fanon ([1961] 1990) reveals the new black subjects are not *posteriori* products of (a new) nation, but they rather coexist with the world and triumph with it. As a typical example, Fanon ([1959] 1965:64) adds that it was the necessities of combat that gave rise to new attitudes, new modes of action, and new ways in Algerian society. Fanon ([1959] 1965) demonstrates that the creation of the new black subject comes from serious combat that opposes the concept of the black subject and white master. There is no need for Fanon to discuss that

the new human results from combat. Without a war, the oppressed remain in their oppression and cannot compare themselves to Others in the world. This new humanity is relevant to the study of decolonisation as the new human is the result of full freedom and independence. The new black subjects are new humans in the sense that after the liberation struggle, they think of new people who live in another new world that is different from their previous world dominated by discrimination and dehumanisation.

Onwuanibe (1983:1) welcomes Fanon's new humanism argument by exposing that the term 'humanism' is a slippery word that today covers a watershed of opinions, attitudes, outlooks, and movements centering on people. Onwuanibe explains how humanism is inherent to every individual. At this point, there is an accord with Onwuanibe that every human being needs to reach new humanism. Colonialism does not allow black subjects to find out that their humanity is considered less than human. Relevantly, this study introduces the incorporation of new humanism as the third element after the violence, which is the first, and *tabula rasa*, which is the second. These three elements are needed for black subjects to be decolonised fully. A decolonised black subject is one whose life differs from a subject who lives under colonial conditions.

Supportive to Fanon, Ahluwalia (2010:66) explains, "this new humanism was to be achieved through violence—a violence that brought to an end the very process of colonialism." Ahluwalia's argument doubts the possibility of the black subject reaching self-determination in the absence of employing violence. In respect to Ahluwalia's argument, for black subjects to be decolonised fully, there must be a violent phase during which they must risk death to save themselves and their community, society, nation, and country. Violence is the key to new humanism in a journey to decolonisation.

In the same perspective, Gibson (2003:194) underlines, "Fanon's new humanism develops during the struggle for freedom, beginning as a reaction to the Manichean status quo, with the native 'vomiting up' the Western values force-fed by the colonialists." Thus, this shows that without the engagement in struggle, black subjects are not able to become new men. Maldonado-Torres (2008:123) clarifies that the struggle for recognition is a theme that Hegel introduced in his Jena writings and that later found a place in the influential *Phenomenology of Spirit*. For Maldonado-Torres's suggestion, coloniality has affected the society of black subjects because through the force of colonialism, they have lost their values, which have to be claimed back through decolonial opposing forces.

In addition, concerning the coloniality of knowledge and with current globalisation, black scholars are misled because black researchers encounter difficulties in using globalised data which do not recognise any record of the black subject's history. Here, Schwartz (1974:16) states that humanism affirms that people may live differently. Thus, black subjects have the right to contribute their ideas to develop the world and they do not have to fear defending their qualities by participating in the creation of a world that accommodates and values everyone.

Contributing as a neutral voice in the conversation, Lee (2015:188) clarifies that Fanon is not a one-dimensional advocate of violence. Although Fanon condemns acts of violence committed by the French, he equally condemns violence committed by the oppressed. Normally, Fanon's violence should be analysed from two sides. Firstly, there is the colonial violence manifested by the coloniser, and secondly, the counter-violence manifested by the black subject. This means that for Fanon, this second form of violence originates from colonial violence. Therefore, Fanon ([1961] 1990:27) elucidates that decolonisation is the meeting of two forces that oppose each other by their very nature; the first encounter was marked by violence and their existence together. Fanon tries to trace the origin of violence that black subjects use when searching for their humanity. In this concern, Fanon justifies the counter-violence manifested by the black subjects as a duplicate of colonial violence. It shows that the violence of black subjects could not exist or happen without colonial violence. Colonialists used violence to destroy the values, traditions, and cultures of black subjects. Restoring their identities cannot happen by negotiating, but only by applying the same violence.

By attempting to explain how decolonisation should proceed, Gibson (2011a:9) echoes Fanon's decolonial direction by confirming that new dimensions emerge from the thoughts and actions of live human beings. Gibson calls the oppressed to increase their capacity of thinking as a way to escape colonialism. Gibson's analysis reinforces the idea that black subjects have to be human beings who think brilliantly to act properly on how to decolonise themselves. To an extent, this means that the black subjects have to plan and think about how to overcome the continual oppression. It means as well that decolonisation must be a well-planned project, similar to colonialism.

By supporting Fanon's conception of decolonisation as well, Zahar ([1969] 1974:76) accords that oppression and brutality finally reach a point where there the only one way out for black subjects, is by opposing the violence of the coloniser by using their violence aimed at liberation. For Zahar ([1969] 1974), violence is an essential tool for black subjects. Violence is further an

act of emancipation for black subjects to justify their existence in the presence of the coloniser who always denies their humanity.

Before concluding, as the debate approaches its end, it should be assessed that despite the different views from different scholars, the singular remark noticed by this study is that any scholar from both rival groups was not able to demonstrate that Fanon's conception of decolonisation can only be comprehended by respectively deploying violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism as the compatible elements adequate for successful decolonisation, a fact that this study has engaged to illuminate and demonstrate.

In conclusion, despite all the controversial views, this study demonstrates how violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism remain the critical three pillars to be considered to gain an understanding of Fanon's decolonial revelation. In Fanon's black radical thought, decolonisation results from the interrelation of violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism as a three-dimensional concept of decolonisation. Although it has become difficult to study decoloniality without consulting Fanon's work, it should be understood that his work does not provide a complete solution insofar as decolonial work is concerned.

Unfortunately, there is a lacuna that has been noticed in the debate above. Scholars, including Fanon himself, have not been able to explain that decolonisation has respectively followed the three elements, namely violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism. Although Fanon has provided all those elements, literature has shown that he was not specific regarding the elements' specific arrangement. It has been noticed as well that several scholars in the discussion even focused radically on one element among the three.

Therefore, this study seeks to fill that gap left by the scholars above in reorganising all three elements in chronological order (violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism). The study's goal is to illuminate and arrange the elements as harmonised and inseparable pillars of decolonisation.

## **1.8 Methodology**

Yin (2014:11) asserts that qualitative data is a non-numerical data because it is the categorical information presented in a narrative form. Therefore, for Yin's (2014) argument, this study has to use the qualitative method by nature. A qualitative research approach should be assessed and explained as a method of exploring the meaning of concepts, conceptualisation theories, and

the occurrence in their original setting. Qualitative research involves the researcher making several types of inference grounded on theoretical disciplines. Furthermore, qualitative research entails researchers examining texts to achieve a conclusion and to make their results available to everyone so that the research can be scrutinised and reassessed by others.

Banister, Burman and Parker (1994:2) highlight that qualitative research is the interpretative study of a specified issue or problem in which the researcher is central to the sense that is made. Therefore, in this study, the researcher is central in interpreting the collected data. Coincidentally, the researcher of this study starts by interpreting Fanon's conception of decolonisation by using Fanon's written texts concerning decolonisation. The same method will be applied to the other scholars present in the conversation.

Qualitative research does not require any statistics and mathematical formulas. From that perspective, the analysis of decolonisation will be mainly based on the following concepts, namely violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism, which the research requires to interpret for the study's clarification.

Basically, with qualitative research, Jackson (2011:95) adds that most data collected are nominal in scale and are collected via extensive note-taking. Qualitative research relies on the collection of data that require further analysis and interpretation at a later stage. At this point, this study will use the analysis of themes followed by their interpretation in paragraphs. If necessary, the researcher will give a typical example at the end of a paragraph to clarify the theme analysed and interpreted.

This study will use thematic analysis as a research technique that focuses to examine the themes of the data collected. Aveyard (2010:57) recommends that there is no use for statistics in qualitative research as the results are descriptive and interpretative. Therefore, as researching Fanon's conception of decolonisation requires an extensive interpretation of the concepts and themes, this recalls the unavoidability of thematic analysis to understand Fanon's conception of decolonisation. The study will be arranged thematically in a manner of having the chapters, headings, and subheadings that need to be explicated and interpreted accordingly.

The chapters will mainly be structured as main headings followed by numbered subheadings concerning decolonisation as the main concept of the study to be discussed in paragraphs, with violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism. Chapter 2 will be explained as the theoretical

framework, but it will follow the same schema of explanation by how its themes have been arranged and ordered or codified.

Relevantly, Flick (2011:152) affirms that in thematic coding, a researcher first analyses the cases of the study in many case studies. For an account of Fanon's conception of decolonisation, using the thematic analysis is still adequate as the research will rely on intensive reading and explanation of the phenomenon structured in themes. Those themes will have to be arranged in proper chapters, and the chapters will be explained by the use of the subheadings. Each subheading will essentially have to be explained in well-arranged paragraphs, followed by the typical examples in case needed. The numbering of those subheadings will justify why the use of thematic analysis was unavoidable in this study.

## **1.9 Limitations**

There are many fields under Fanon's political thought and work. Fanon has played a major role in Marxism, post-colonial studies, cultural studies, black studies, to mention but a few. However, as Fanon's whole work cannot be included in this single study, it is a constraint of this study to only focus on Fanon's conception of decolonisation within Africana existential phenomenology as the main tool that will help to understand Fanon's existentialist philosophy regarding his conception of decolonisation.

Thereby, among many of Fanon's decolonial concepts, this study will only focus on violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism. The reader is further alerted that this study focuses on colonialism, which is interpreted as a perpetual problem. An understanding of the colonial question permits a way to self-determination to be charted. However, the decolonisation that this study engages in differs from the decolonisation of the independence period of the 1960s, which most African countries have claimed to have reached. The decolonisation engaged in this study is marked by the continual struggle as the great force that confronts the perpetual project of colonialism.

The above alert regarding the differentiation of current decolonisation and the decolonisation of the 1960s places focus on Ekeocha (2018:195) who confirms that the decolonisation movement was as powerful as it was courageous. It was propelled by African leaders who were not afraid to lead their people towards freedom. Here, Ekeocha's statement mainly focuses on the struggle for African independence in the 1960s. She considers that period unfortunately as the final stage of colonialism—an argument that this study disregards. This study considers

that the freedom gained during that period was flag freedom. Colonialism is still regarded as a problem of existence.

### **1.10 Chapter outline**

This study is comprised of six chapters:

Chapter 1 outlines the entire study. It draws the picture of the study concerning the background, problem statement, objectives, key concepts, delimitation, rationale, literature overview, theoretical framework, methodology, limitations, and chapter outline.

Chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework for this study by using Africana existential phenomenology theory as the foundation.

Chapter 3 examines Fanon's conception of violence and Sartre's position concerning the explanation of the concept of violence and Arendt's criticism of violence.

Chapter 4 discusses Fanon's thoughts on *tabula rasa* as the new beginning or the zero point of beginning of everything.

Chapter 5 engages with Fanon's conception of a new humanism, which is essentially a critique of false humanism, flag freedom, and a critique of Europe.

Finally, Chapter 6 provides a general conclusion that combines all the previous different discussions of decolonisation and the entire role of Fanon's decolonial work in general.

## CHAPTER 2

### AFRICANA EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter deploys Africana existential phenomenology as a theoretical framework to comprehend Fanon's conception of decolonisation. The chapter illuminates the conception of decolonisation by focusing on three concepts, namely: violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism. The chapter's main attempt is to demonstrate how Fanon's Africana existential philosophies are grounded on decolonisation. The three concepts are examined through Africana existential phenomenology that intervenes as a tool of explanation. Mainly, Africana existential phenomenology anchors the lived experience of the black subject. It is as well a way of charting a discourse that confronts the colonial modes of knowledge.

Firstly, the chapter examines the contours of Africana existential phenomenology that have different trajectories, but the same presentation parts. Secondly, the chapter will discuss what being-black-in-the-world means, namely: focusing on the politics of being where the black subject as a being, is analysed particularly through blackness and whiteness as the major features and the creation of enduring colonialism. Thirdly, the chapter exposes the colonial hidden agenda that is underdriven by the colonial apparatus. Before the conclusion, the chapter is going to debate the politics of critique, which allows criticism of the intellectual contributions of black subjects in the world.

#### 2.2 Mapping the contours of Africana existential phenomenology

Taking consideration into Outlaw's (1997) definition of Africana philosophy, Africana existential phenomenology is classified as the subfield of Africana philosophy thus:

A 'gathering' notion under which to situate the articulations (writings, speeches, etc.) and traditions of the same, of Africans and peoples of African descent collectively, as well as a sub-discipline—or field-forming, tradition-forming, tradition-organizing reconstructive efforts which are (to be) regarded as philosophy. (Outlaw 1997:267)

Outlaw's definition above helps one to comprehend that Africana existential phenomenology is a philosophical tradition that originates from Africana philosophy. The phenomenology has arisen to expose the relevant issues relating to the existential situations and lived experiences



of black subjects. As a result, Africana existential phenomenology advances that black subjects are beings who encounter strict and wretched conditions of colonisation and other vulnerabilities during their experienced lives. Although Africana existential phenomenology cannot be divorced from the Africana philosophy from which it originates, Africana philosophy should intervene to obtain a clear explication of Africana existential phenomenology.

In amplification, for Gordon's (2000) explication of Africana philosophy, Africana existential phenomenology is articulated to refer to the politics of identity and liberation that informs the lived reality of black subjects. From this perspective, Africana existential phenomenology stands for rejected black subjects in the world. It defends as well the dehumanised black subjects who perpetually suffer the prejudice of their colour. This corporeal problem of existence was fabricated and constructed through the colonial mechanisms of oppression, alienation, and exploitation. The end of these mechanisms means that decolonisation will be successful and black people as a collective will realise self-determination. The main goal of Africana existential phenomenology is to revive the rejected and forgotten experiences that have been lived by black Africans wherever they are in the world. The colonial system favoured white people and deplorably destroyed black human beings morally, mentally, and physically.

Agreeing with Outlaw, Gordon (2000:5) enforces to say, "Africana existential philosophy is a branch of Africana philosophy and black philosophies of existence". This demonstrates that Africana existential phenomenology connects with Africana existential philosophy as both concepts originate from the same concept of Africana philosophy. Based on the analysis and explication above, it is further important to clarify how Africana existential phenomenology corresponds with Africana thought. Gordon (2000:1) adds that Africana thought refers to the set of questions raised by the historical project of conquest and colonisation that has emerged since 1492 and the subsequent struggles for emancipation that continue to this day. Compulsorily, for black subjects to demonstrate their capacity of thinking—their lived experience—the employment of Africana existential phenomenology serves as the impetus for the regeneration of liberated black subjects. The continuation of the struggle has to be set as the mechanism to confront colonialism.

Africana existential phenomenology intervenes as the remedy and the answer to the unending struggle of oppressed black subjects. It aims to expose the greatest appropriate problems that negatively touched on the existential situations and lived experiences of black subjects. This exposition of the problems is also concerned with the black subjects' descendants subjected to

colonialism in the diaspora. Consequently, using Africana existential phenomenology detects colonial violence and traces a way for decolonial violence that acknowledges black subjects as real humanity that accounts for their reason and agency. It further provides them with an adequate primitive identification that is concerned with their humanity.

According to More (2008:47), “the raising and articulation of the existential questions of identity and liberation within the context and framework of the situation of black people, constitutes what has recently come to be known as ‘Africana existential philosophy’”. The later phenomenon highlights an ontological and fundamental phenomenon that justifies the sufferings affected by being the black subject in the world. This critical phenomenon of being the black subject requires deep analysis. However, black subjects have to demonstrate their existence and reclaim their humanity by exposing themselves to the terrain of mortal and mental combat.

Africana existential phenomenology links well to Fanon’s conception of decolonisation and his black radical thought tri-dimensioned in violence, tabula rasa, and new humanism. Those concepts are the foremost impetus for interrogation (of identity and liberation) for black subjects to wake up and claim their rejected lived experiences. Therefore, concerning black subjects’ trajectory to decolonisation, while simultaneously locating Fanon, Sithole (2015) describes the role and importance of the invocation of Africana existential phenomenology:

It is the philosophy that is enunciated from the lived experience of being black in the anti-black world and to chart a way for liberation. Fanon fits squarely within Africana existential philosophy tradition as he engaged in philosophical mediations that are concerned with the lived experience of black subjects in the colonial condition, and how they should militate against such an existential condition. (Sithole 2015:3)

Sithole (2015) highlights the major role of Africana existential phenomenology, which he considers as the main tool for charting a new trajectory of liberation. It should be regarded as an umbrella of forgotten and rejected black subjects. Apart from Africana existential phenomenology being regarded as an umbrella, it is linked closely to Africana philosophy. Such an argument holds its origin in the fact that Africana philosophy gave birth to Africana existential phenomenology.

In extension and by sharing the same view as Outlaw, Henry (2006:1) states, “Africana phenomenology, (is) an emerging subfield within the larger discursive terrain of Africana philosophy”. Thus, Africana existential phenomenology emphasises the refutation of

colonialism and gives the *naissance* to the decolonisation of oppressed black subjects and alienated subjects in all facets of life. Africana existential phenomenology is regarded as an adequate theory applicable to Fanon's meditations regarding decolonisation because Africana existential phenomenology serves as the bedrock that allows the gathering of dispersed black subjects all over the world. Additionally, it helps to unpack and understand why black subjects have been conquered and dehumanised as a cause. It furthers lead to an understanding of the consequence thereof from which self-determination arises.

As a major decolonial framework tool, Africana existential phenomenology appeals for the colonial apparatus to be exposed. From this point, Africana existential phenomenology elucidates on the understanding of conquest, dehumanisation and self-determination. Such an understanding facilitates the progress of a decolonial trajectory related to the lived experience of black subjects. It also exposes the misery of the black lives matters in the world. Such a misery started with conquest and the related continual consequences of domination such as psychological power, coloniality of being, power, and knowledge. Africana existential phenomenology intervenes with this start-up of colonialism as a problem of existence to uncover its nefarious *manoeuvres*.

Africana existential phenomenology permits an understanding of the dehumanisation which is manifested by the colonialists. Since dehumanisation refers to the undermining and rejection of black subjects as human beings and the dispossession of their human qualities and privileges, Africana existential phenomenology intervenes by rehumanising black subjects, who have been excluded from the world system, as a whole. Sithole (2015:3) adds: "Africana existential philosophy rests on the lived experiences engaging in the epistemic rupture of silenced and marginalised discourses, which are concerned with fighting epistemological violence and accounting for the subjectivity of the black subject". From this standpoint, keeping in mind that Africana phenomenology coexists with Africana existential philosophy, Sithole demonstrates how due to Africana existential phenomenology, the voices of the voiceless black subjects reach far and are heard by everyone in the whole world. Thus, Africana existential phenomenology serves as the tool that saves the lives of the black subjects by preventing the continuation of colonialism.

Essentially, because of Africana existential phenomenology, black subjects raise their consciousness and discover and invent how to reach self-determination. By implementing Africana existential phenomenology, black subjects reach for self-determination. In this

context, self-determination is synonymous with the total end of colonisation, conquest, dehumanisation, anti-black world, combat, and finally, by arriving at the destination of the reclaimed true life—the entrance to the new world without subjugation. Hence, Bassey (2007:3) affirms, “Africana critical theory or Black existential philosophy is therefore concerned with the critique of black subjugation and dehumanisation.” Normally, Black existentialistic thought criticises the whites’ domination in the world and empowers the black subjects. From this empowerment, there must be the politics of reparations that envision re-addressing the unrecorded history of the black subjects. Therefore, there must be an establishment of similarities and differences between Africana existential philosophy and Black existentialism. At this point, Gordon (2000) declares:

I should also like to stress that not all contributors to Africana existential philosophy are black existentialists in any sense. Some of the individuals who have something to say of value on that subject may also be those who are most critical of it, or at least suspicious of an existential philosophy premised upon what Fanon calls ‘the lived experience of the black’. (Gordon 2000:33)

Essentially, it becomes clear that not all Africana existentialist philosophers are black existentialists. However, there is a link between Africana existential phenomenology and Africana existential philosophy. The same link is found between black existentialism and Africana existential phenomenology which represents the lived experience of black subjects. As a point of relevance, Africana existential phenomenology is the central point of Africana existentialist philosophers and black existentialists even though some are critical of it.

Therefore, “Africana existential phenomenology investigates black subjects in a recent condition of their lived experience and their efforts towards liberation to overcome anti-black racism”, highlights Tunstall (2008:2). In amplification, Sithole (2015) declares:

Fanon’s Africana existential philosophy is necessary to understand black existential conditions under subjection to create the possibility of another world. This possibility qua Fanon’s Africana existential philosophical intervention is the end of the anti-black world and the emergence of black subjects from the long dogmatic sleep of subjection and its dehumanising practices. (Sithole 2015:14)

The creation of the possibility of another world as predicted by Sithole relates to the fact that, on the one hand, colonialists sat down before colonialism and seriously deliberated how Africa should be conquered and colonised by using strategies that would allow colonialism to survive persistently. In contrast, by employing Africana existential phenomenology, decolonisation finds its possibilities to be a long-lasting and durable project for confronting colonialism.

Progressively, Africana existential phenomenology licenses decolonisation to be applied and evaluated continuously. It further allows black subjects to be fully decolonised and unlocks the world into a new world without subjugation. That new world simply cannot be given on a silver platter as it results from a struggle. This is the world that Fanon encourages black bodies to struggle for and the world that Africana existential phenomenology facilitates them to understand how to reach it. Essentially, Africana existential phenomenology traces and removes all obstacles that should prevent decolonisation from happening.

In addition, the exposition of Western injustice, prejudice, and inhumanity is facilitated by employing Africana existential phenomenology. That exposition enables black subjects to reclaim the unrecorded black lived experiences rejected by the world and revives the roots of their primitive lives and thoughts. Here, Gordon (2007:121) reveals: “The relationship between the West and the rest in political thought has been one of the constructions of the world in which the latter has been located outside and thus, literally, without a place on which to stand”. At this point, Gordon (2007) demonstrates how the thoughts of Western people have dominated and are still dominating as the only thinkers, worthy of consideration while thinkers from the rest of the world, including black people, are rejected as intellectual midgets. Fundamentally, Africana existential phenomenology intervenes as the main recovery of all black thinkers whose thoughts have been rejected by Western domination. In amplification, Gordon (2000) emphasises:

So, racial problems serve a dominating role. In Africana existential philosophy, this reality has meant detailed explorations of this dominating factor in the lived experience of Africana people. It has meant an exploration of their lived experience of blackness. (Gordon 2000:8)

Africana existential phenomenology, which originates from Africana philosophy, helps one to understand the construction of blackness and all the negative connotations that accompany blackness. Because of colonialism, colonisers have ingrained a spirit of bad faith and superiority in the black world where black subjects always experience a double feeling of blackness and to feel as normal to remain to beg the white master (preserving the status quo) forever. Africana existential phenomenology unearths the spirits and strengths of black subjects to redefine themselves not through their skins, but their original beings.

Concomitantly, Tunstall (2008) clarifies:

I associate Africana existential philosophy very closely with its theoretical cousin, Africana phenomenology. Moreover, since I think that human existence cannot be examined apart

from examining how the meaningfulness of that existence is constituted by humans, I often see Africana phenomenology as a sort of Africana existential philosophy. For this essay, one can think of Africana existential philosophy as being an Africana-oriented existential phenomenology ... Africana existential phenomenology is a type of phenomenology in which phenomenologists investigate those phenomena that constitute Africana existence, particularly the lived experience of antiblack racism by Africana persons (persons of African descent) and their liberatory efforts to overcome antiblack racism. Africana existential phenomenology is always already a creolized philosophical discourse. It cannot help but examine the lived experiences of Africana persons through the lens of certain concepts lifted from Europeanized philosophy and transformed in such a manner that they disclose the 'givenness' of Africana lived experiences as just that: the lived experiences of persons who happened to have been racialized many centuries ago at the dawn of Western and Central European modernity. (Tunstall 2008:2)

The white master could not recognise the lived experiences of black subjects. And, this is because the same black subjects have simultaneously been dehumanised by ongoing white mastery in the world. Africana existential phenomenology exposes the colonial violence, its apparatuses, and finally allows the black subject's oeuvre to be recorded in the world's history. As Tunstall (2008) clarifies, because of Africana existential phenomenology, phenomenologists can investigate the real lived experience of the black subjects. This is because; it permits the examination of the lived experience of blacks. And, through this examination, the black subject recuperates his real being, history, and contribution to the world. Africana existential phenomenology claims that black subjects must be recognised as full human beings who have the same qualities and intellectual capacity as white people. As a result, a decolonial project that employs Africana existential phenomenology claims that black subjects must be classified in the world's list of thinkers.

Progressively, Sithole's (2015) reveals how Africana existential philosophy diagnoses and exposes the colonial deception that has subjected black subjects to the long dogmatic sleep of subjection. Such a colonial deception was and is still manifested by the white racists who have used opium to calm black subjects to carry on sleeping and to think outside reality. In consideration of Sithole's argument, Africana existential phenomenology cannot be divorced from Africana existential philosophy. Africana existentialist philosophers are led by Africana existential phenomenology to uncover the colonial secret and make the hidden colonial manifestations visible. Within this perspective, it reinforces the reason why Fanon's exposition of decolonisation classified him within the tradition of Africana existential phenomenologists.

In essence, Africana existential phenomenology has the potentiality to arbitrate the oppressor and the oppressed with an intention to liberate the black oppressed by an endless colonial

system. In this regard, Bassey (2007:4) justifies that “Africana critical theory or black existential philosophy is predicated on the liberation of all black subjects in the world from oppression”. Thus, Africana existential phenomenology foregrounds what is needed for a black subject to get out of the eternal dark room. Furthermore, the main purpose of Africana existential phenomenology is to liberate and recognise black subjects who have been blacklisted as human beings and the salvage of all dispossessed privileges of black subjects.

In this regard, as a point of condition, an intervention of Africana existential phenomenology is an adequate condition for retrieving and recognising the lived experiences of all black subjects and their descendants who are in different places of black *worlds* of the diaspora. In addition, Gordon (2000:12) emphasises, “Africana existential philosophy has oscillated from time to time on the issue of liberation”. The decolonisation of black subjects cannot be divorced from Africana existential phenomenology because the liberation (decolonisation) of black people’s intentions among others focuses on reviving the black subject’s rejected lived experience.

However, contemplating theories’ landscape, some facts show how Africana existential phenomenology is confronted by several obstacles spread across the world. In that concern, Henry (2006:1) exposes that “like the larger terrain of which it is a part, Africana phenomenology is not very well known because it too has been forced to exist in the non-rational and a-theoretical shadow cast over it by Western philosophy in general”. Even though Africana existential phenomenology has been dominated by Western philosophy and phenomenology that spread across the world, it has possibilities to unearth the lived experience of black subjects as its main purpose has been realised as *mutatis mutandis*.

In addition, Africana existential philosophy focuses on reflections rooted in the black experience, on the boundaries of human existence, and the utilisation of such reflections to challenges confronting Africans and African-descended people in the diaspora (More 2008:47). Those reflections originate in the lived experience of black subjects in the world. The same reflections have to be used in an attempt to deal with the problems that confront black subjects in the world. Hence, the answers that come from such reflections would reveal the injustice and black attributes that have been hidden by uninterrupted colonialism. Africana existential phenomenology in that regard establishes justice, equality, and freedom to all and maps the decolonial architecture for black subjects to follow to reach self-determination.

Africana existential phenomenology revives the conquest period. During that time, colonialists denied black subjects from being qualified as human beings, who are worthy and equal to others, including their nemesis: the colonisers. Consequently, there was the scenery of the destruction of their lived experiences under colonialism. Unfortunately, the fact is:

One of the legacies of colonialism in Africa has been the development of the dichotomy relating to the body, namely, the 'bad' and 'good' bodies. The white man's body has been projected as the standard, the norm of beauty, of accomplishment. Not only the body proper but its periphery; its embellishments have been recognised as such. On the contrary, the black body, projected as the 'bad' body, has always been projected as being inferior and unwholesome. (Manganyi 1973:28)

The call for Africana existential phenomenology arose from the need to have a tool to expose that, black subjects have been and are still thinkers who have contributed to knowledge and human civilisation, since time immemorial even though their works could not appear at the scenery of expertise required to be considered in the world. Prejudicially judged by colonisers, black subjects were obliged to follow Western philosophies, which have clutched black philosophies to globally spread out. Analytically, it should be positive that Africana existential phenomenology is adequate but also a condition to decolonisation of black subjects. It fits with Fanon's black radical thought as it operates as the recovery from the objectification of the lived experience of black people shifting from being objects to black subjects recognised by their existential phenomena.

As a necessity, Africana existential phenomenology discloses that an understanding of decolonisation cannot be separated from colonialism. The application of Africana existential phenomenology attempts to reverse the perpetual and escalating colonial violence and helps as well to understand the past and current black condition. In that concern, Maldonado-Torres (2016:1) affirms, "coloniality is a problem of existence which is widespread globally and escalating." With this in mind, colonialism is assessed as a problem of existence, the reason why decolonisation has to be a project that is based on the objectives of launching an enduring struggle which confronts colonialism. Maldonado-Torres (2016:1) adds: "While colonization was supposed to be a matter of the past, more and more movements and independent intellectuals, artists, and activists are identifying the presence of coloniality everywhere." Inseparably, decolonisation and decoloniality have always to rely on the application Africana existential phenomenology to be successful. From colonialism to coloniality, black subjects have been and are still exposed to the mercy of colonial perpetuity. Africana existential



phenomenology fundamentally comes in as an unstoppable movement that denounces and reports the impact of colonial violence.

Africana existential phenomenology relevantly deals with the questions that concern the 'being'. It further makes it possible to understand how and why decolonisation intervenes to uncover colonial *manoeuvres*. Therefore, decolonisation process requires an understanding of coloniality of being. Maldonado-Torres (2007:4) posits that "while the coloniality of power referred to the interrelation among modern forms of exploitation and domination (power), and the coloniality of knowledge had to do with the impact of colonisation on the different areas of knowledge production, coloniality of being would make primary reference to the lived experience of colonisation and its impact on language." Finally, it is fundamentally important to recognise that Africana existential phenomenology exposes colonialism and its apparatuses and also makes it possible to understand what decolonisation is about.

### **2.3 Being-black-in-the-world**

Africana existential phenomenology is concerned with being-black-in-the-world in the sense that Africana existential phenomenology deals with the politics of 'being'. Through Africana existential phenomenology, such politics of being come as a standpoint of the continual life of black subjects who are denied their being. This even goes to the extent of erasing the major role played by black subjects in the universal lived experiences of humanity. Such a world injustice of categorisation of humanities called Manganyi (1973) to expose what he coins "being-black-in-the-world" in response to white people defining the role played by black subjects in the world about 'African personality.' However, Manganyi (1973:36) notes, "African personality should be nothing more or less than what Senghor has popularised as Negritude." Being a black subject has been from a long history, a stigma for prejudice condemnation due to the black's skin colour.

As a point of clarification, Manganyi (1973:36) explains further, "Senghor has defined Negritude as 'the sum of the cultural values of the black world' and this totality of cultural values is a 'certain active presence' in the world." The black subject's presence or existence is still questionable in comparison to other races. That is one of the reasons why Africana existential phenomenology comes to redress such a lacuna by exposing the struggles which have been experienced by the black subjects for them to be listed in the contributors of the world's knowledge.

Orchestrated by endless colonialism, being-black-in-the-world is regarded as an unfortunate experience for black subjects. According to More (2008:47), “This tradition deals with issues of the emergence of black selfhood, black suffering, embodied agency, freedom, bad faith, racism, and liberation; in short, it deals with *being-black-in-the-world*”. Apart from being-black-in-the-world having a negative connotation, blackness is further construction of colonisers that by subjugation dehumanises and transforms black subjects into objects. Considering their lived experiences, the study shows that black subjects have been dispossessed of all of their black attributes and privileges of being human; therefore, awkwardly, being-black-in-the-world is a self-problem and a problem to others.

As a consequence of the perpetual colonialism, black subjects do not only become a problem to themselves, but also a problem to others. Africana existential phenomenology allows black subjects to locate themselves in their proper place, which is being worthy as human beings. Thus, they shift from being-black-in-the-world to being subjects who have all human qualities and attributes.

Africana existential phenomenology elucidates an understanding of decolonisation as it appeals to the colonial situation and relies on the major tool (phenomenon), which is meant to revive the black’s life from having zero hope to changing their being. Therefore, Africana existential phenomenology has to be applied for a black subject’s fundamental change, a change that transforms him/her from nothing to a being. This means that because of Africana existential phenomenology, decolonisation creates new humanity. Relevantly, those new men who are created by decolonisation reach self-determination and can define themselves. Africana existential phenomenology intervenes as an adequate umbrella and main tool for black subjects to repossess their lived experiences that have been rejected and snatched by colonialism. Relevantly, Sithole (2015) highlights that exposing the subjection is to define it as it is, and for this to happen, it necessitates the relevance of Fanon’s Africana existential philosophies to intervene.

Africana existential phenomenology draws how during the conquest of Africa, the dehumanisation of black subjects took the whole terrain. White settlers immediately destroyed primitive black culture, knowledge, traditional leadership, and indigenous religions. The situation became critical to an unbearable point resulting in the illegal division of Africa without consulting Africans. Therefore, Africana existential phenomenology serves as a mirror of African identities which were there before colonialism. Importantly, Africana existential

phenomenology has the potentiality to analyse how the lives of black subjects have evolved in the world. Here, Tunstall (2008:4) writes: “This insight into the thoroughly historical nature of racial categories allows Africana existential phenomenologists to ‘see’ the world as a racialized one”. The categorisation of races results in colonialism. Colonialism has allowed the manifestation of racism, and this racism instigated the complexes of inferiority to the black subjects and the complexes of superiority to the white masters. Based on this categorisation of human beings in races, Africana existential phenomenologists can assess and evaluate the world as a division of races.

Thus, it is ontologically true that the prejudice of black subjects is realised because of their race. Schouls (1992:93) confirms this point by stating, “prejudice is the most serious cause of the apparent failings of reason”. Thus, the black subject is ontologically considered as being the ‘other’ and being a problem in the world. The practice of this prejudice emanates in the respect of the complexes of inferiority and superiority as the apparatuses of perpetual colonialism. It renders the black subjects’ consciousness to remain inept for decolonisation. Gordon (2007:4) states, “‘The Study of the Negro Problems’, namely, groups of people are studied as problems instead of as people with problems”. Here, while colonialism has allowed to negatively considering the black subjects as not objects or problems, Africana existential phenomenology intervenes to the salvage of the hidden truth relating to the existence and experiences of black subjects. Therefore, Africana existential phenomenology fundamentally changes the black subjects from problems to human beings with privileges. As a point clarification to the aforementioned racial and racist problems, black subjects were dispersed as a result of colonisation. Africana existential phenomenology has to play its role to unify black subjects, reclaim their identities and their histories, and be recognised as human beings who can think and produce intellectual works, which have since time immemorial contributed to human civilisation.

Concerning Africana existential phenomenology, Gordon (2000:24) insists, “it is not that Africana philosophy has been the only situated reality of blackness, but instead that it has been the only situated reality that is fundamentally conditioned by the *question* of blackness”. Colonialism has been able to create blackness by dehumanisation to the detriment of all black subjects. Black subjects with their skin colour became a problem in that they are not authors or constructors. To be black was and is still a penalty and inefaceable negative marker, which prejudicially condemns any black subject wherever located in the world. In their everyday

lives, the subjugated black bodies constitute the awareness of the existential self-reflection in the world. Because of the intervention of Africana existential phenomenology that recreates another (good) image of black subjects, therefore, the concept of being-black-in-the-world allows black subjects to know who they are and what they deserve to have as human beings. The colonial condition dehumanises and objectifies black subjects and leaves black subjects embarrassed again. Africana existential phenomenology condemns colonialism by reverting humanism.

Africana existential phenomenology is not understandable without engaging with its cousin 'Africana phenomenology'. In this regard, Henry (2006:1) proposes, "An Africana phenomenology would thus be the self-reflective descriptions of the constituting activities of the consciousness of Africana peoples after the natural attitudes of Africana egos have been displaced by (decentring) techniques practiced in these cultures". The self-reflection of black people relates to black subjects' real identification. Black subjects are then called to understand the prejudice of being marked as 'black' hence this pre-condemns them as thieves, terrorists, stupid, lazy, pecuniary beggars, inhuman, to mention a few. While travelling, black people are searched more at airports, bus stations, and are prejudged to use fake documents such as driving licences, certificates, and identification documents. By deploying Africana existential phenomenology, being-black-in-the-world reveals how such generality toward black subjects demonstrates how blackness is criticised by the white world in its presence and as much for its absence.

Africana existential phenomenology operates oppositely with the politics of imitation as it encourages and maintains black originality. Being-black-in-the-world criticises how black people have to borrow whiteness to establish who they are in the world; this consequently results in a description of eternal imitation in their daily activities. To the same point of view, there are negative effects of being a 'being-follower'—being-black-in-the-world,

To be imitative represents a desire to be white, or at least amounts to a fraudulent claim to blackness ... imitation amounts to a failure to conserve and retain one's likeness, or kind, denoting a desire to be what you are not (the least resembled). That opposition is already a fantasy about the proper boundaries between ego and alter, self and image, white and black, and one which we've seen before. (Marriott 2000:60)

Contextually to the black subject, such an imitation is a white construction—a long vision of the colonial apparatus in which all black subjects have been loaded without exception. Imitation has become normal to the black subject who is unable to overcome such deep control.

To a greater extent, imitation has become the black subject's way of life. In short, the black person's life, as Marriott (2000) clarified above, is an unlikely life that has been designed and fabricated well by colonialism for black generations to inherit a life of the 'other' forever. Left on the predicament of incompleteness and empty subjects who live ontologically under subjugation, black subjects exist in a total exclusion structure of reality. Thus, Africana existential phenomenology contributes to redressing black subjects from being excluded from the list of human beings.

At the above point, Sithole (2012) underlines how black subjects merely exist in a structural exclusion of real beings due to their skin colour. This has affected blackness and made the world disregard their history in the world of beings. Since the world has dispersed black society, Africana existential phenomenology is critical to how black subjects are disregarded and it introduces mechanisms of integrating disintegrated black subjects.

Within the colonial structure, being-black-in-the-world explains how black subjects have been obliged to live as copiers or surrogates of the master; black subjects have been discouraged to feel confident of who they are, and their lives depend on the masters as the 'printers' where everything needed by a black subject must be photocopied from. Thus, being-black-in-the-world cannot be understood without engaging with Africana existential phenomenology. Africana existential phenomenology exposes the black condition and provides the appropriate report of the black subjects' lived experiences.

Fanon's conception of decolonisation explains the concept of being-black-in-the-world as it reveals how black subjects are disregarded in the world. Furthermore, as Gordon (2000:11) explains, "Africana philosophy cannot, and should not, be reduced as well to existential philosophy because it is paradoxically the central dimension of the philosophy of existence itself: the question of existence, in itself, is empty". However, existence is empty for those who have been subjugated to continual colonialism contrarily to white masters who render themselves superiors over others. Black subjects have been rejected from the list of human beings who deserve to contribute to knowledge. In their everyday lives, black subjects depend on their white master and, consequently, become permanent objects of such a white master.

Finally, the understanding of being-black-in-the-world has two facets: on one side, for the master, the black subject has been created to be a helper of the white and to be used as an object of a white being facilitated by enduring colonialism. On the other side, by applying Africana

existential phenomenology, the black subject can be resurrected from the tomb that has been dug by colonialism. The colonial system classified the world in races: the blacks as the rejected race live in the zone dedicated to objects, while separately the white masters live in a standard and protected zone. It is only this zone lived by the white master which is considered as a zone lived by humans who have to be counted as beings with full thinking capacity.

The map of how to suppress those two zones above argued is drawn by Africana existential phenomenology. It also strengthens black thinkers to demonstrate their significant capacity, philosophies, and knowledge in the contribution to global *oeuvres*. Africana existential phenomenology allows an understanding of Fanon's ([1952] 2008) rationality of how the world rejected him due to his skin colour. The world rejected him morally and physically. Fanon was criticised as his black reason did not merit to be classified as a valid reason. Africana existential phenomenology illuminates what being-black-in-the-world means, which is the absence of being, to convert black subjects into full human beings whose qualities of life have been recovered completely. Being-black-in-the-world stands as a stigma for black subjects. Africana existential phenomenology allows evaluating how whiteness forfeits blackness—a colonial construction that Fanon's conception of decolonisation aims to eradicate.

#### **2.4 The colonial apparatus**

Africana existential phenomenology detects and exposes colonial apparatuses. It relevantly reveals all the secrets under the project of colonialism. The colonial apparatus includes all the colonial tools that were used to hide its tricky agenda and make it continual. Africana existential phenomenology alerts black subjects wherever the colonial apparatus is located and operates. Africana existential phenomenology mutes all colonial apparatuses by exposing the peril that is caused by colonisation and coloniality. Africana existential phenomenology undresses the cover of the colonial project and leaves it unhidden and known by the black subjects. For more clarification, Clark and Dear (1984:81) hypothesise that “the [state] colonial apparatus has a complex impact on the structure of everyday life”. Colonialism, which is a fundamental problem of existence by operating under its tool ‘colonial apparatus’, becomes exposed in the terrain where all black subjects discover how it operates, which is due to colonialism not falling as an improvised project. The colonialists gathered and constructed very well how colonialism would operate in former African colonies as an endless system in which the colonised should entirely remain controlled forever and dependent under white masters.

Analytically, by examining what is happening in former African colonies, there is a high possibility of confirming that the colonial system was and is still a Western project that controls the everyday lives of all black subjects. For Maldonado-Torres (2004:12), “the first point of clarification is that ‘decolonisation’ is not understood here only or principally regarding the various historical forms of colonialism, but rather concerning *coloniality*”. Tlostanova and Mignolo (2009:3) amplify, “coloniality is the darker and hidden side of modernity”. Impossibly, black subjects would not find a solution to such colonial apparatus without using Africana existential phenomenology, which operates as dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) against perpetual colonialism. Africana existential phenomenology renders the colonial apparatus immobile and allows black subjects to escape a morbid life, which is aggravated by such perpetual colonialism.

As an alert and tracing of how to reach self-determination, Sharpe (2016:13) reveals, “to be in the wake is to occupy and to be occupied by the continuous and changing present of slavery’s as yet unresolved unfolding”. Within such a discourse, colonial structure drives the colonised as colonialism destroys the colonised, morally and physically. Thus, black subjects found themselves in a structure that marked them as dehumanised. In corroboration, Mbembe (2013) will soon clarify how colonial structure dehumanised a black man to be an object and take a black body as a product to use for such a later structure to carry on functioning.

“The Negro does not exist as such, he is constantly produced and to produce a Negro is to produce a social connection of subject and a body of extraction, that is to say, a body entirely exposed to the will of a Master, and from which one strives to obtain the maximum of profitability” (Mbembe 2013:34 translated). The black subject’s life is exposed compulsorily to a white master. The white master controls whatever black subjects want to do and their daily activities must be recorded and submitted to the white master for validation. Within such a construction of colonialism, black subjects are controlled day and night. The colonial system has been built in such a way that a white master was and is still able to control black subjects with and without the master’s presence.

According to Jinadu (1980:46), “the purpose of colonialism, indeed the essence of the colonial situation, is the perpetuation of the condition of social injustice”. Here, Jinadu focuses on clarifying how the colonial project operates. It perpetually drives the colonial condition of social injustice: favouring the Western will and rejecting the black subjects’ lived experiences. Consequently, colonialism has sombrely been ingrained in the soul of black subjects who has

arrived at a level where they are no longer able to existentially differentiate between the good and bad concerning African needs for a trajectory to decolonisation. Because of Africana existential phenomenology, the black subject is filled with consciousness and able to detect wherever the colonial apparatus is hidden, located, and operating.

As long as colonialism is running, black subjects will always remain dependent on their master. Mbembe (2017:19) adds: “The slave master could deploy one form of coercion after another, create chains of dependence between him and his slaves, and alternate between terror and generosity, but his existence was always haunted by the *spectre* of extermination”. Currently, the master’s scheme controls the black subject’s salary and when it is deposited in the bank. Such a life control animated within a colonial system proves that black subjects have been taken into a direction that is different than the African contextualisation of living as they no longer have anything to hide—no private room reserved for their lives. In clarifying what decolonial turn is, Maldonado-Torres (2008:7) writes, “It seeks to open up the sources for thinking and to break up the apartheid of theoretical domains through renewed forms of critique and epistemic creolization”. Because of decolonisation, the black subject’s thought is ameliorated. Africana existential phenomenology demonstrates how to resist oppression. It cancels colonialism’s project of complexes of inferiority and superiority which disintegrate the human societies.

Africana existential phenomenology informs black subjects that decolonisation has been an unavoidable schema to recover themselves from the continual dogmatic sleep. A colonial apparatus is a tool of colonialism that is characterised by secret mechanisms of operation. Because of Africana existential phenomenology, the colonial apparatus lost all membranes that helped it to be hidden. Africana existential phenomenology destroys such a tool, breaks it into pieces, and exposes those pieces to the analytics that reveal how its components operate.

Africana existential phenomenology draws on how to recuperate and repair black subjects’ humanity, which has been taken due to colonisation. From there, all members of the society have the right to benefit from the society’s economy. Clark and Dear (1984:81) assess that with unequal distribution of economic power, the process of defining social obligations is inevitably biased in favour of the more powerful groups. This means that colonialism enriches the whites to the detriment of black subjects, a fact that Africana existential phenomenology destroys and redresses the equality for all society’s members.



Therefore, the principle of long-life servitude for black subjects was maintained by colour prejudice, which was gradually considered normal. Black subjects and their children became slaves for life, used in plantations and for other diverse forms of colonialism. According to Mbembe (2017:19), “the plantation gradually took place as an economic, disciplinary and penal institution in which blacks and their descendants could be bought for life”. Here, Mbembe shows how because of the plantation, the black subjects were considered as goods to be sold and bought for the whites to use as the bulldozers in their farms. Objectively, before the white masters left Europe and came to colonise Africa, they received instructions on how they would operate. The masters’ instructions were to shout immediately at any black subjects who seemed to resist and be an obstacle and for the masters to ensure that the situation was maintained well. Africana existential phenomenology helps the surviving black subjects to remember, count, and number the victims of colonialism, which is maintained by the colonial apparatus.

According to Nayar (2013:33), “Sartre emphasised *lived experience* as foundational to identity”. Here, it means that a human being without his own recorded lived experience, cannot be aware of his/her original identity. The loss of original African history affects the black subjects to describe or think how the lived experiences of their ancestors were looking like. Fanon’s comments on the black subjects’ past show how the black colonised have no history and no humanness left. From such a perspective, the sense of selfhood denoted as subjectivity requires interdependence in relation with others in society. A black subject finds himself objectified concerning a white person, while a white person analyses a black subject as a damaged and embarrassing image of a human being. Nayar (2013) theorises:

In the European’s non-reciprocating gaze the black man is merely an object. The black is excluded from the very category of the human. He is less-than-human, an object. Even his labour does not fetch him recognition. Due to this craving for recognition, to escape the condition of being only a negative cipher or object, the black man is forced to absorb the features of the white master. (Nayar 2013:44)

Nevertheless, the colonial manoeuvre does not grant any distinction for blackness. Black subjects are undermined and they are accelerated by strategies and mechanisms established to control black subjects wherever they are located. It cancels black people’s chances of formulating their identities and, regrettably, such identities do not exist under the presence of colonial conditions. Then, for black subjects to recognise themselves, the colonial conditions degrade them until they find it impossible to support such a macabre-critical life anymore.

It is now becoming clearer that Africana existential phenomenology is important for exposing the colonial apparatus. The colonial apparatuses are visible and invisible tools that permit the perpetuity and running of the colonial system and, objectively, the same tools are used to control black subjects permanently. Those tools applied to the black existential conditions of their everyday lives are currently driven and hidden by (under) the colonality of being, power, and knowledge. In essence, for black people to decolonise themselves, an understanding and destruction of the colonial apparatus must be a *sine qua non* condition to reach their final destination phase of self-determination. Africana existential phenomenology concerning colonial apparatus still manifests as an alarm to all black subjects to struggle to retrieve their subjugated knowledge. It becomes a barrier for black subjects to fundamentally understand the ruse of the colonial structure.

In continuation of distilling the unending colonial system, Fanon ([1961] 1990:29) criticises, “the colonial world is a world divided into compartments yet, if we examine closely this system of compartments, we will at least be able to reveal the lines of force it implies”. Such tactics of dividing the world put six feet under the lived experiences of black subjects as it places them very far from the world of white people—the latter as the only one recognised world. Black subjects are discriminated against entirely to a point that black people could no longer recover themselves. Fanon’s invitation to examine colonialism permits the black subject to understand the secret behind the project of colonialism.

Africana existential phenomenology points the finger to wherever colonial danger is located and defeats the coloniser’s main objective, which was/is to maintain an endless colonial system. On the contrary, by revealing Africana existential phenomenology, black subjects understand colonial strategies and engage in an endless struggle as a bridge to self-determination. Such a struggle is not a call to individuals, but rather to all black subjects wherever they are located in the world. It is a message to all black subjects in the world because self-determination itself is reserved for the whole black society and their descendants wherever they live in the *worlds*. Indeed, Africana existential phenomenology detects the tricks, mechanisms, strategies, and tactics of the colonial apparatus and makes them fragile, weak, exposed, and carcasses.

## **2.5 The politics of critique**

Africana existential phenomenology helps for critical analysis regarding the lived experiences of black subjects. Thus, it is linked with the politics of critique in the sense that such a criticism

is based on black subjects. Thus, Africana existential phenomenology organises a terrain for discussing the problems of black subjects through the politics of critique. By defining the concept of critique, Marriott puts it in these words:

Critique, by definition, establishes the limits of reason; it forges the laws, ends, and beginnings of thought. Critique legislates the judicious use of reason by separating it from any metaphysical or dogmatic origin so that any risk of being carried away by the fictitious or merely pleasing is curtailed by the rule of philosophical judgment. (Marriott 2018:60)

The politics of critique denounces how a black subject's death is justified by the law as the removal of a problem. The same law offers protection to whiteness and this imbalance implants social injustice even though it is regarded as the normality. However, the politics of critique invite the black subjects to expose their social injustice to the table of conversation. And from there, Africana existential phenomenology allows mutual criticism; it means that the critique shifts from the mono-critique of only one side of black subjects but also allows the critique of white masters which seemed to be limited and prohibited. Africana existential phenomenology is an extension of Africana philosophy. This invokes how the politics of critique uses philosophical analysis to clarify how black subjects fit in a list of the world's thinkers.

In clarification of the discussion above, the lived experiences of the black subject have been affected and disparaged by colonialism, and from there, black subjects lost their classification as they exist in two versions: the first as black subjects are sometimes attached to blackness and the second where their actions appear the same as the white master. It is from this earlier statement that a black subject has more critics. Its application is conditioned by European civilisation without having any choice as it is considered normal. It is from this perspective that Africana existential phenomenology becomes involved as it stands for redirecting and acknowledging the lived experiences of black subjects. Gordon (2000:15) stresses, "Anti-black racism espouses a world that will ultimately be better off without blacks. Blacks, from such a standpoint, must justify their continued presence". Only black subjects are those who become victims of anti-black racism. Blackness has been constructed by colonialism, and the white master forced the black to feel comfortable with such a construction of racism. The defending race is set naturally, and each race has to stand firm to demonstrate its existence; a point that Africana existential phenomenology highlights on how this has to be done by the black subjects.

The politics of critique obliges a re-visitation of Mbembe's critical thoughts concerning the black subject's reasoning. Mbembe himself is a black subject who has been born in Africa and attended primary school in Cameroon. From Cameroon, Mbembe went to France and from France to the United States of America. Mbembe spent more time of his intellectual life outside Africa. He came back to Africa positively critiquing the impacts of colonialism on a black subject's reasoning. Mbembe (2013) holds his criticism towards black subjects and considers them as the authors of being reasonless in the world. With a strident voice of alert, Africana existential phenomenology contradicts Mbembe's (2013) argument as far as it reveals the impact of colonisation towards black subjects. That resonates in the sense that colonialism has been the author of blackness and whiteness—a fabrication that acts to the detriment of black subjects.

Mbembe (2013) criticises:

In all of these publications, the black subject is presented not only as a child, but as a stupid child, prey to a handful of petty kings who are cruel potentates. This idiocy is the result of the congenital vice of the Black race, and colonization is a way of assistance for education and moral treatment of this idiocy. (Mbembe 2013:100 translated)

At this point above, Mbembe criticises what he calls 'black idiocy' and valorises colonisation as an intervention to eradicate any kind of such idiocy found in black behaviours and their daily activities. Mbembe minimises complaints to accuse white people to be authors of conditioning black reason. However, it is ontologically questionable how colonialism could civilise black subjects without conditioning the civilisation itself to change the black subject's mindset to a European man's thinking.

Even though in Mbembe's (2013) view, colonisation is valorised as a moral and treatment of black idiocy, the revelation of Africana existential phenomenology signals the impact of colonisation. Colonialism places Mbembe (2013) very far from reality. Africana existential phenomenology replaces displaced black subjects to their rightful place. The phenomenology depicts how colonialism affects black society negatively to a level that one and all could see and understand. From there, no argument was needed but to consider colonialism only as a bad memory to all black people in the world.

As a point of reinforcing Africana existential phenomenology as a tool for creating peace, Ekeocha (2018:137) highlights, "the influence of the Masters had faded into the memories of those who had experienced colonialism". Ekeocha's view assumes that colonialism was and is

still an incurable injury to all black subjects who experience[d] colonial subjugation and for leaving such a condition of criticism, Africana existential phenomenology dictates to black people whatever have to be done for them to be human beings with dignity in the world.

Africana existential phenomenology authorises criticism against colonialism. The politics of critique, therefore, is permitted to happen due to Africana existential phenomenology intervening. In this regard, Zahar ([1969] 1974:97) critiques, “for Fanon spontaneity is a potentially revolutionary and in Fanon’s theory there is no room for any *avant-garde*”. Fanon was called (insulted) a Negro regardless of his intellectual persona. Thus, it is true as well that calling someone a Negro is an insult interpretable in more than a multitude: a point that Mbembe himself finds difficult to disagree. “As a man subjected to the *corvée*, a Negro is also the name of an insult, the symbol of a man wrestling”, confirms (Mbembe 2013:34 translated). This indicates how being black as a figure undermines a person’s reason prejudicially and to insult a black subject seems normal. ‘Black’ is a bad connotation; an insult itself, a negative legacy of colonialism to all black subjects and their descendants wherever they are in the diaspora.

The mission of Africana existential phenomenology is to revive, revalorise and create the *terrain* (that did not exist) for discussing the lived experiences of black subjects. In contrast, Mbembe (2013) does not seriously consider a black subject as a matured person who merits possessing the qualities of a black figure and entering the terrain of discussion of the daily problems that black subjects face. For Mbembe (2013:26):

Such figures were the mark of ‘isolated and non-sociable people,’ who, in their hatred, fight (among themselves) to the death, are depraved and destroyed in the manner of animals – a species of humanity in doubtful life and which, confusing to become human and to become – animal, has a consciousness of itself finally ‘devoid of universality’. (Mbembe 2013:26 Translated)

At this concern, Mbembe focuses his attention on how black people hate themselves and are still far from fulfilling the requirements for sociability. At that point, Mbembe (2013) confuses black subjects with animals. For him, when they attack one another, it is the same as animals fighting, which means that they do not love one another. Africana existential phenomenology mutes Mbembe’s argument as it demonstrates that colonialism is the source of the conflicts (such as economic, politics, religion, self-hate, to mention but a few) that black subjects experience.

According to Schouls (1992:45), “all human beings remain responsible for their own beliefs and actions because all human beings by nature possess the power of reason which, whatever their social or political condition, they retain sufficiently to make them personally accountable for their most important concerns”. Here, Schouls argues in favour of Africana existential phenomenology that fights for the reparation of the lived experiences of black subjects. They have to be respected as full human beings responsible for their original beliefs. Intentionally, Mbembe was supposed to be aware that many disintegrative conflicts such as ethnic conflicts have been and are still the legacy of the colonisers: white masters have applied a strategy of divide-and-rule (the politics of division) among black subjects. This is one reason why such animosity still manifests on African soil. The mission of Africana existential phenomenology is to regroup, to bring together, to unify, and make all black subjects who have been divided by colonialism one—a system that intends to rule for existence. Africana existential phenomenology exposes the attentions of colonialism and facilitates decolonisation.

Africana existential phenomenology is against any kind of death related to racism. It stands up and redefines black subjects accordingly as human beings. In contrast, colonialism degrades and dehumanises them. Colonialism valorises that the death of a black subject is simply the removal of a problem. Because of colonisation, whiteness has ruled over blackness and black subjects find themselves out of the system that should grant them life as it is the same case with those who benefit from the world. At this point of view, More (2008:66) criticises, “white power in an anti-black world means that the life of a single white woman is worth more than two hundred black lives”. Here, More reveals how the monopoly of whiteness deprives the rightness of black subjects. In other words, many black subjects have less meaning in comparison to a singleton presence of one white master. Consequently, the black subjects are reduced to nothing, and their humanity is rejected by the supremacy of whiteness. Africana existential phenomenology comes as the remedy for the recovery of the black subject’s being by redressing his/her merited respect.

With Mbembe above, Rabaka (2008) rejects Mbembe’s argument by exposing that “black thinkers’ thoughts have for ages not been seriously engaged by critical pedagogues”. Therefore, according to Rabaka (2008:47), “I am highly bothered by their (critical pedagogues) consistent reference to black thinkers without critically and carefully engaging the black thinkers’ thoughts and the school of thoughts (or thought-traditions) that provide a paradigm and educational foundation for black pedagogical praxis”. At this concern, Rabaka differs from

Mbembe and agrees with the principles of Africana existential phenomenology because he demonstrates how the thoughts of black thinkers have been engaged superficially from a long time ago. Importantly, by borrowing the principles of Africana existential phenomenology in assessing black thinkers and Rabaka's (2008) thoughts, there is a resurrection of the reality of black thinkers' thoughts. If black subjects seriously engage such thoughts, they understand that colonialism is a problem of existence and must be confronted ontologically by the perpetual project (struggle) of decolonisation.

According to Marriott (2018:67), "*Critique of Black Reason* attempts to combine two methods, then, which I believe do not entirely mix: a historical genealogy of blackness, and an explanation of its continual signification in the present moment for a humanism to come which – however problematic Mbembe's appeal to the non-black meaning of black life is – cannot be said to be simply historical, and therefore cannot be said to be outside the episteme that supposedly defines it". The politics of critique is still questioned ontologically, and the main critique focuses on the black reason that reverts to the coloniality of knowledge and being. The politics of critique is grounded fundamentally on the black subject's criticism of colonial conditions. As an impact of colonialism, black subjects do not reason originally in the African context, but in referring to their imported knowledge from their master. Africana existential phenomenology clarifies how to exterminate the colonial engineering project by exposing its strategies of domination. With importance, Africana existential phenomenology reveals how colonialism has destroyed the love that was among black subjects and traces a schema on how such love should have been built.

While colonialism condemns the black subject to be penalised, Africana existential phenomenology demonstrates that a black subject is a powerful figure who has contributed to the world's knowledge since time immemorial. Africana existential phenomenology opens closed doors, sets black subjects free, and makes them able to walk in the world without any protocol. Again, Africana existential phenomenology provides a free room to discuss the politics of critique related to the being of the black subject. Fanon ([1952] 2008) stridently gives notice how 'being' should be the centre of the politics of critique, but unfortunately such being does not exist anymore under colonial conditions:

Beware, reader! There is no question of finding 'being' in Bantu thought when Bantus live at the level of nonbeing and the imponderable ... But it is precisely insofar as Bantu society is a closed society that we do not find the exploiter substituting for the ontological relations of 'force'. We know full well that Bantu society no longer exists. (Fanon [1952] 2008:162)

Mainly important to decolonial project, Fanon exposes how the politics of critique cannot happen under colonial condition. The reason of black subjects has been nullified since African society has encountered colonialism. African society has been closed by colonialism. Therefore, people without society are people without proper and original reasons. The reason produced by a black subject is forged from the pieces of Western civilisation, which is so far from the African contextualisation of the lived experiences of black people.

Rabaka (2008:166) accentuates, “in innumerable and unimaginable ways, holocaust, enslavement, colonisation, and segregation greatly hindered African people from developing and delivering their ‘great message’ to the world”. As a result, the lived experience of the black subject has been dispossessed or deeply removed and rejected indelibly. Black subjects have singularly relied on an affected oral history, but colonialism has been and is still grave to the point that an entire black subject has morally and physically been lost (misled). African existential phenomenology reclaims the proper (adequate) place of black human beings in the universe. Without applying African existential phenomenology, the politics of critique cannot take place because, under colonial conditions, there is a western epistemic hegemony.

As glanced above, Fanon further adds:

What will be the place of black genius in the universal chorus? We claim, however, that a[n] ... (original black reason) cannot be born under present conditions. Let us talk of black genius once a man has regained his true place. (Fanon [1952] 2008:163)

Various criticisms arise here. For black people to have their original reason, they must first regain their true place, which *qua* Fanon is gained and reached through a struggle, namely decolonisation. Applying African existential phenomenology procures and renews the black subject’s thought, which allows decolonisation that happens through enduring struggle. It is only after the success of a later struggle that a new black subject who has the potential for self-determination would be born.

The politics of critique is an epicentre as well as a criticism of skin colour; a colonial fact that raises many negatives impacts on blackness and that glorifies whiteness. After uncovering that blackness reveals a desire not to be a Negro and that this refusal arises out of a devotion to the institutions of anti-blackness, Marriott (2018:124) reveals, “blackness also connotes an identity that is constantly shifting, discontinuous, ungrounded; and having no stable referent, it has at once no meaning and all too much”. According to Marriott (2018), this means that black reason always appears the same without any performance of change controverted by a desire of not



having the will to become a Negro. Africana existential phenomenology imperatively commands the black subject to feel confident and to compete in the world by standing for the lived experiences of black people. Without considering skin colour, Africana existential phenomenology permits black subjects to speak and to defend themselves in a new decolonised world.

In his comprehension, Mbembe (2013) maintains that as objects of discourse and knowledge, black subjects have from the beginning of the modern age been plunged into an acute crisis both the theory of the name and the status and function of the sign and the representation. At this point, Mbembe's attention is on black subjects who have struggled since time immemorial to be redefined from objectification to humanity. However, Mbembe accuses black subjects of contributing to such a continual dogmatic condition.

Finally, Mbembe (2013:35) concludes, "the Negro (the black subject) of the plantation is socialised to the hatred of others and especially of the other Negroes (black subjects)" (translated). Here, Mbembe's argument fails to demonstrate that the hatred of black subjects is a colonial importation driven by psychological domination, which made black subjects lose their capacity of thinking. Africana existential phenomenology differs from Mbembe's argument by maintaining that the lived experiences of black subjects have been neglected and rejected by the colonial system that Mbembe glorifies above. Black subjects cannot be happy with enslavement, except that such a system has been imposed on them and their daily lives as normality. Africana existential phenomenology cuts the moral and physical chains that confine black subjects and draws a map of how to discover a new world without subjugation.

## **2.6 Conclusion**

In conclusion, this chapter deployed Africana existential phenomenology as a theoretical framework. It was further illuminated as a philosophical tradition that has arisen to depict the lived experiences concerned with black subjects and their geographically dispersed descendants in the world. Furthermore, Africana existential phenomenon retrieves the black subjects' humanity. And, this humanity has been snatched by the presumptuous and perpetual colonial system. The colonial system has by penalty rejected the philosophies of black subjects.

Through three themes, namely: being-black-in-the-world, colonial apparatus, and the politics of critique, this chapter accounted for Africana existential phenomenology. It was accounted as it exposes the lived experiences of black subjects which are not acknowledged in world's

history. It was demonstrated that black subjects are prejudicially judged based on skin colour as their identity marker. It is through such a colour prejudice that the discrimination and dehumanisation of blackness in the world originated. Black subjects have to refute the ongoing colonialism and engage in the endless struggle of decolonisation. The importance of self-recognition (blackness) was highlighted in this chapter. An understanding of Fanon's conception of decolonisation based on violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism cannot be understood without such an account of the lived experiences of black subjects.

Being-black-in-the-world was one of the themes of this chapter that facilitated understanding how black subjects are rejected and not considered as human beings in the world. Black subjects are collectively excluded from the list of thinkers and philosophers. Thus, the discussion of colonial apparatus evaluated being-black-in-the-world as the colonial tool of controlling black subjects in their everyday lives.

Lastly, through the 'politics of critique', the chapter uncovered how black subjects are literarily criticised and have to reclaim and demonstrate their contribution in the world of knowledge by using Africana existential phenomenology, which revives their buried thoughts. An understanding and explanation of all those three motifs required that Africana existential phenomenology be applied. This demonstrates how Africana existential phenomenology correlates well with Fanon's philosophies of decolonisation. The next chapter examines Fanon and his conception of violence.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **FANON ON VIOLENCE**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter reveals how Fanon's conception of violence is theorised. This revelation is based on black subjects' everyday lives, deployed as means to account for Fanon's political thought of decolonisation. Therefore, this chapter elucidates how Fanon assesses violence as an arbitrator between the whites and black subjects. However, such a manner of arbitration differs significantly from mediation. This is an arbitration that is related to an enduring struggle for the recuperation and reparation caused by theft (dispossession), racism, discrimination, and dehumanisation. Those are the main characteristics of the prejudicial lived reality that black subjects have been obliged to experience. As a result, this unforgettable and indelible lived experience was and is still a product of endless colonialism.

Firstly, this chapter accounts for the conception of colonial violence, which has fundamentally been criticised by Fanon and his supporters. Secondly, the chapter evaluates Sartre's position regarding violence. Here, the chapter shows how Fanon's conception of violence influenced Sartre's argument of violence. Thirdly, the chapter assesses Arendt's criticism of violence—a criticism that refutes Fanon's conception of counter-violence. Lastly, before the conclusion that appears as a singleton of all themes, the chapter explains as well how Fanon justifies the concept of violence, which for him, has a double meaning.

#### **3.2 On colonial violence**

According to Fanon ([1961] 1990:31), “the (colonial) violence which has ruled over the ordering of the colonial world ... same violence will be claimed and taken over by the native”. Fanon's theorising on violence has double meaning: colonial violence (violence from the coloniser towards the colonised) and counter-violence (as violence from the colonised to the coloniser); where the second violence originates from the first. Fanon's revelation exposes how an understanding of colonial violence appeals to counter-violence. However, Fanon mainly elucidated above how perpetual colonialism maintained moral and physical violence towards black subjects. Thus, in Fanon's sense, the violence that the oppressed adopt is derived from colonial violence. At this point, it is highlighted that the counter-violence emerges from colonial violence. Therefore, there should not be counter-violence without colonial violence.

Fanon's understanding of colonial violence considers how colonial violence played its role to wake black subjects up.

Fanon's reasoning on violence differs far from the Hegelian struggle, as, for Fanon, violence is good but also evil. On the one hand, violence is evil because, through its devilish and bloody acts of colonialism, it renders colonised subjects into objects. On the other hand, violence is good because violence as an arbitrator has a progressive determination in changing the black subject fundamentally into a being rather than an object. Fanon and his echoers advocate violence as a judge between the oppressors and the *damnés*. Other antagonistic scholars to Fanon's reasoning on violence, such as Arendt and Jinaras, reject the position of how Fanon theorised on [colonial] violence.

According to Fanon ([1961] 1990:237), "colonialism has not simply depersonalised the individual it has colonised; this depersonalisation is equally felt in the collective sphere, on the level of social structures". Here, Fanon indicates how colonial violence is socially structured. The black subjects are therefore physically and morally tied up. They do not have any chances on how to escape the colonial violence as this is socially structured. That is why Fanon above insists on demonstrating how colonialism depersonalises the black subjects. Such depersonalisation affects the whole environment of the black subject, without exception. This means that colonialism demoralises black subjects who attempt to decolonise themselves.

Thus, Fanon assesses that it is colonial violence and its trauma that leads to the second form of violence, namely violence from the side of the colonised (Nayar 2013:70). From the first day that Africa has been conquered, continual colonial violence has been inflicted on black subjects, which affected them on all levels of their social structure. Hence, colonialism itself is a perpetual project; its negative impacts on the colonised are formally continual.

Colonial violence has been structured to the extent that the *colonisés* have been caught in all domains of their lives. However, to another extent, understanding colonial violence must require an understanding of structural violence as well. According to Farmer's (2004) work regarding the concept of structural violence:

Structural violence is violence exerted systematically—that is, indirectly—by everyone who belongs to a certain social order: hence the discomfort these ideas provoke in a moral economy still geared to pinning praise or blame on individual actors. In short, the concept of structural violence is intended to inform the study of the social machinery of oppression.

Oppression is a result of many conditions, not the least of which reside in consciousness.  
(Farmer 2004:4)

In light of Farmer's argument above, structural violence, therefore, refers to the different forms of inequalities socially structured through the colonial apparatuses. Concerning this study, black subjects are human beings who are enduring sufferings (with a critical economic status) caused by the unequal forms of domination of colonial violence that gives the white master control of everything through his gigantesque economic status.

Therefore, colonial violence was and is still institutionalised insofar as it oversees the entrenchment of subjugation by force—the origin of which and the maintenance thereof were dependent on force (Mbembe 2012:4). The assessment of Fanon's work on decolonisation allows differentiating many forms of colonial violence. In other words, clarifying Farmer's argument, Mbembe above exposes the colonial violence as it is institutionalised. This legalisation of colonial violence, weights on the everyday lives of any black subject.

In amplification, Galtung (1987) argues that an absence of direct violence does not mean that it is a peaceful society, as he explains in the following terms:

[...] there is a difference between the violence that is already here, every day built into the social structure and requiring emergency treatment, and the violence that may come tomorrow or the day after tomorrow requiring patience and care in order not to be triggered off, to be prevented. I see the removal of gross structural violence as a necessary condition if one wants to obtain what Boulding refers to as a stable peace, precisely because structural violence not only leads to but is a strain on the system. (Galtung 1987:202)

As a point of clarification on Galtung's statement above, the colonial violence which is not visible is dangerous for the destruction of the black subjects' lives than the visible violence. Thus, an institutionalised violence operates for biased ambitions. It renders the black colonised to become the deaf-mute. And, from there, the black subject cannot be aware if he/she is living under the totalitarian conditions of colonialism. As time passes, the black subject will take this life as normal. Therefore, the black subject submits himself to the colonial world, a world which Maldonado-Torres (2008:100) defines as; "It is a context in which violence and war are no longer extraordinary, but become instead ordinary features of human existence". Here, it means that the colonial world is a world characterised by violence and war. However, the black subject is used as the object in that world, and his/her humanity is not counted by the same world dominated by the white masters. Thus, it is shown that colonialism is a perpetual violent project. The colonisers defined what black subjects had to do and imposed on them how to do

it. Due to colonial violence, black subjects are not allowed to question and their dignity is totally denied in front of the master.

It is in this perspective that with the black subject and its time condition, Manganyi (1973:32) underlines that “once the condition of freedom-in-security is not met, a disturbance of the relationship between man and time is introduced”. And, such a horror happens because the master recognised the colonised easily. However, because of continual colonialism that currently hides in colonality, there is still a gap in the reciprocity of recognition between the master and the black subject. The master has easily known the black subject; however, the black subject did not recognise the master. This *lacuna* of inter-recognition motivated the colonised to engage in enduring struggle from which the inter-recognition between the rejected black subject and the white master shall emerge.

Continuously, the colonised people find that they are reduced to a body of individuals who only find cohesion in the presence of the colonising nation (Fanon [1961] 1990:237). Thus, the colonisers divided the societies of black subjects to the point that the communities of primitive black subjects have been destroyed and rendered to individuals. Regrettably, only the colonisers have the power to unify black subjects, but black subjects cannot unify themselves anymore under perpetual colonialism.

Furthermore, keeping in mind that colonialism was and is still racist, Mbembe (2017) amplifies:

Under slavery, the plantation was the central cog in a savage order whose racial violence had three functions. First, it aimed to weaken the capacity of the enslaved to ensure their social reproduction, in the sense that they were never able to unite the means necessary to live a life worthy of the name. This brutality also had a somatic dimension. It aimed to immobilize the body and to break it if necessary. Finally, it attacked the nervous system and sought to dry up the capacities of its victims to create their symbolic world. (Mbembe 2017:153)

Regrettably, in their everyday lives, black subjects have to submit their activities to a white master. The master is the only one who has the key to open and close the world's activities and their achievements require passwords and pins to be accessed. It is questionable and surprising that colonial violence is acknowledged by the colonised and oppositely assessed by the coloniser as being normal. Mignolo (2008:41) testifies, “colonial problem is not a minor one and quantitatively there are far more people affected by colonial than the modern problems”.

Deplorably, the coloniser judged colonialism as an opportunity for black subjects to be civilised. However, colonialism is still a downfall to the livelihood of black subjects; it has reversed the world of the colonised. Consequently, the colonised found themselves outside the real world—in another world that was not created for them as it does not fit within their myths, culture, beliefs, human qualities, to mention just a few. Decolonisation requires the critical analysis of colonialism as it is difficult to be decolonised without understanding colonialism and its impact on the Black community. Because of colonialism, black humanity has been cursed as Fanon ([1952] 2008) tells:

In Europe, evil is symbolized by the black man ... The perpetrator is the black man; Satan is black; one talks of darkness; when you are filthy you are dirty—and this goes for physical dirt as well as moral dirt. If you took the trouble to note them, you would be surprised at the number of expressions that equate the black man with sin. (Fanon [1952] 2008:165)

All cursed adjectives are attributed to the black subject. Black subjects have never been categorised as human beings, which only white people deserve to be. Colonialism came as a continual machine of colonial violence that subjugated the black community as a whole. Thus, Fanon shows above how evil symbolises the black subject. This cursed objectification rejects the black subject not to register in the list of human beings. Black subjects are hated and tortured morally and physically as dirty humans whose human qualities still do not deserve to be qualified as pure human beings.

The most significant impact of colonialism was to change the souls of black subjects and to construct blackness as total discrimination of black subjects who finally found themselves out of the zone of being. According to Zahar ([1969] 1974:22), “the racial stereotype of the colonised designed by the coloniser is eventually adopted by the former”. Due to colonialism, black subjects have been dispossessed of their humanity. Colonial violence has arbitrarily won the world where black subjects are prejudicially victims. With a humble request, but also warning, Fanon says:

May man never be instrumentalized. May the subjugation of a man by man—that is to say, of me by another—cease. May I be allowed to discover and desire man wherever he may be? (Fanon [1961] 1990:206)

Black subjects are used as bulldozers by ‘Others’. It has come to the point of black subjects being sold as things or animals and going to work as instruments on the farms of white superiors who control the world’s humanity and the land simultaneously. The black community has been judged to be deleted on the commandments of the launchers of colonialism.

In addition, as presented above, colonialism as an endless project aims to control and lead the whole black livelihood without exception, with or without the master's physical presence, "in the case of colonialism, however, the repression is directed against the great majority of the population", confirms Zahar ([1969] 1974:23). Targeting the majority has disintegrated the society of black subjects. It is from this point that the practice of divide-and-rule occurred to ensure that black subjects were divided and dispersed totally. Those who denied what the master ordered them to do were consequently tortured and severely punished to death.

It is evident that without using violence, colonialism as a project should not succeed. Europe has been criticised for interfering in the affairs of black subjects by applying colonial violence seriously to enforce colonial will. According to Fanon (1961 [1990]:251), "Europe undertook the leadership of the world with ardour, cynicism, and violence", and through such colonial violence, European colonisers killed several black subjects who resisted colonial subjugation. Therefore, Fanon was concerned regarding how European leadership emerged from the bloodshed—the physical, invisible, and continual colonial violence committed against the whole black society. For colonialists, killing the black subject is/was removing an obstacle that prevents colonialism from continuing as a project. Colonialists would not negotiate with black subjects on how to cohabit with them or consider their primitive way[s] of living. Consequently, the colonisers suppressed all the propositions of the inhabitants and used their power to dictate how black subjects should live—by disregarding the black subjects' previous modes of everyday life.

To add, Nayar (2013) alerts that every aspect of the colonised's life is subject to endless violence, and all relations between the coloniser and the colonised are violent. Colonial violence has been projected to the point that it carries on running. This means that it continues to harm the lives of the oppressed daily. Consequently, black subjects find themselves enclosed in a violent system.

It is from that perspective that according to Nayar (2013) observation, Fanon perceives the colonial system of perpetuating violence on multiple levels: as a whole at all levels of black people's life structures like education, culture, economy, politics, history, to mention just a few—in all domains of their lives. As a fact, "the black subject is, in every sense of the world, a victim of white civilisation" (Fanon [1952] 2008:169). Black subjects have been forced to adopt a civilisation that denies their humanity. And, to contribute to 'civilisation and humanity', black subjects have to know not only their history, but also their culture, which



includes continental and diaspora traditions of critique, resistance, radical politics, and projects of multicultural and democratic social transformation (Rabaka 2008).

In remembrance of colonial violence and to clarify the first contact of colonial violence between the coloniser and black subjects, Fanon ([1961] 1990:28) divulges, “their first encounter was marked by violence and their existence together – that is to say the exploitation of the native by the settler – was carried on by dint of a great array of bayonets and cannon”. Here, Fanon demonstrates how since the conquest period, black subjects have been and are still exposed to human butchery; it is continual colonialism that through its colonial apparatus savagely operates as a carnivore. Thus, Fanon advances his interrogation of colonialism that exposes black subjects to the bayonets and cannon, which are tools that are used to commit crimes against black subjects who are denied by the world.

In amplification, violence is what the colonial master uses to ensure the continual obedience of the colonised (Nayar 2013:72). Colonised people are watched by violence. Whatever they refuse to do as obliged by the coloniser, violence corrects as a means of ensuring that the colonised do what the master has imposed them to do. Unfortunately, the everyday lives and relationships of the colonised, which are built on their compulsory relationships with the coloniser, are characterised by violence because the natives’ lives are determined, defined, and designed by the master.

Thus, the master remains the author of colonialism and its impact on the Black community. This explains how the masters have designed and constructed race[s] in their relationship with the *damnés*. It is from this construction that the complexes of superiority and inferiority have been created as determinants of the white master and the black subject. Césaire ([1955] 2000) criticises that the colonialists prove that colonisation dehumanises even the most civilised black subject. Césaire ([1955] 2000) elaborates that colonial activity, colonial enterprise, colonial conquest, which are based on contempt for the native and justified by that contempt, inevitably tend to change those who undertake it. Some colonisers, who to comfort their morality, opt to consider black subjects like animals. Those white masters get accustomed to treating black people like animals and tend to transform themselves objectively into animals.

The colonial violence renders black subjects as objects and alienates them in their community, as Nayar (2013) emphasises:

Colonial violence alters and even destroys the land, the individual body of the colonized, and his psyche, and eventually alienates him and his community from their history and culture in a case of cultural trauma. This is the violence that destroys the Self. (Nayar 2013:83)

From this point, Nayar demonstrates the virility of colonialism to destroy the moral and physical qualities of black subjects and their culture. Colonialism operates in the sense that it disqualifies black subjects from their fatherland and places it out of the black subjects' context of life. Such an operationalisation obliged black subjects to live a life of continual dependence. Unfortunately, they are locked morally and physically in a stillness state without having any chance to think or to question.

Regrettably, from the controversial assessment of this above colonial violence, Mbembe does not assess colonial violence similarly as Fanon. At this juncture, Marriott (2018:35) affirms, "Mbembe links the historical violence of the colony to the foundational violence of divine sovereignty". Later on, contradicting Mbembe and supporting Fanon's experience regarding the conception of colonial violence, Marriott (2018:72) asserts, "colonial violence had a major political and personal impact on Fanon's *socialthérapie*." Nevertheless, colonial violence could not only impact negatively on Fanon as one *persona*, but it has also touched the whole community of black subjects wherever they are in the sphere of the world.

Sadly, having experienced all kinds of inhumanity, the colonised are left with only two alternatives: they could either revolt openly or withdraw to their traditional institutions and values, such as the family and religion. However, they have already been divested of their former vital functions through contact with colonialism (Zahar [1969] 1974:24). At this point, Zahar highlights the way out of colonial violence—the colonised must start a revolt, and if not, they are going to disappear from the list of human beings forever. Imperatively, it is without choice that the black subject has to opt for an endless struggle to claim his humanity.

Therefore, black subjects have to wake up if they are still living the life of the dead. Under colonialism, the *damnés* are excluded from political affairs and do not have any chance of contributing to knowledge as they are considered humans without intellectual capacity. Colonialism suppresses black humanity in favour of whiteness. Black subjects are zoologically minimised as they do not merit staying in the same place as the masters.

It is from that concern that Fanon ([1961] 1990) insisted to illustrate that the colonial world is a world divided into compartments; a world cut in two and inhabited by two different species.

This division favours white people and comes to the detriment of black subjects who do not deserve to be called human beings but are categorised as animals. Fanon ([1961] 1990:33) stresses that settlers used zoological terms when mentioning natives. In the same measure as the coloniser falling into the habit of seeing the colonised as a thing (*thingification*) or treating him like an animal, he assumes inhuman features (Zahar [1969] 1974:24). Césaire ([1955] 2000) compares this *thingification* to colonisation:

Between colonizer and colonized there is room only for forced labour, intimidation, pressure, the police, taxation, theft, rape, compulsory crops, contempt, mistrust, arrogance, self-complacency, swinishness, brainless elites, degraded masses. No human contact, but relations of domination and submission turn the colonizing man into a classroom monitor, an army sergeant, a prison guard, a slave driver, and the indigenous man into an instrument of production. My turn to state an equation: colonization = ‘thingification.’ (Césaire [1955] 2000:42)

Colonialism enclosed all the possibilities of black subjects and, as a result, black subjects had to live impossible lives. Colonial violence decorates white supremacy while it simultaneously rejects and dehumanises black subjects, who live a life of mercy that is undermined in comparison to the zoological respect of the master. Because of such a critical condition, Zahar ([1969] 1974) could not delay to criticise, “colonial conquest, colonial administration, and exploitation, acts which are based on the oppression of the natives, although they tend to be justified as attempts to bring them up to the level of rational human beings, have an inherent tendency to change the exploiter himself”.

By keeping Zahar’s above argument in mind, it is critical to note that colonialism is led by pretexts and lies. Colonialists advanced that they wanted to change black subjects’ lives. But in reality, they have destroyed the lives of the colonised and imposed another kind of life that oppressed the natives’ ways of life. As the colonised had to resist colonial dehumanisation, the coloniser’s way of life and thinking have been touched as well.

Comparatively, Marriott (2018) relates colonial violence to colonial war because colonial violence does not select who to protect or who to kill. It is violence that violates human law, rapes women, kills children as it kills their parents at the same time—it targets to suppress (to remove blackness in the world of beings) black humanity and transform them into objects that have nothing and anything to question regarding being. From the trouble of the black subject’s potentiality to register as human beings, Marriott (2018:181) realises that the violence of colonial war becomes hallucinatory and spectral because it haunts everything: every intimacy

and every social relation. Even there where it is not, there is no defence against screams heard or imagined, the accusations coming from those murdered, tortured, or both. Thus, colonial violence is a continuation and lasting effect of colonial war. However, with the colonial war in mind, there is an indication that the oppressed have resisted and responded to the colonial violence by refuting its *manoeuvres*.

Finally, the colonisers discovered that the black community was built strongly. The colonisers came up with tactics to destroy such unity through disintegration using the divide-and-rule colonial strategy. Colonialists mandated themselves to control all of humanity and the world without any permission from the world's humanity. As a result, colonial violence spread over the world just because of the masters who mandated themselves as being superior to all other human beings located outside their world. This is not only confirmed by black subjects but also some white people such as Sartre who defended the reality as it would subsequently be turned to his prophecy to the colonial violence and anti-colonial struggle.

### **3.3 Sartre on violence**

Fanon ([1952] 2008:17) writes: "Whether he likes it or not, the black man has to wear the livery the white man has fabricated for him". Such a fabrication violates the psyche and physical body of the black subject. Having been supportive of Fanon and based on the assessment of his work on the concept of violence, Sartre should be categorised as one among few (white people) who recognises that colonial violence was/is an evil to the black subject. An account of Sartre on violence requires an appeal of Fanon's reasoning on violence for clarification.

On the one hand, it could be said that Sartre betrayed Europeans to expose reality. On the other hand, Europeans betrayed Fanon who fought for them in the Second World War. Later on, Fanon when was sent to Algeria, he found the same violence and injustice that he did fighting against Germany. From there, Fanon was confused about how settlers from France were oppressing and killing Algerians. It was from that time that Fanon understood that the oppressed live in a world that has been upturned. From this upturn of the world, white people have constructed unending colonial violence wherever the colonised are located. Fanon ([1961] 1990:48) warns that colonialism "is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence." Colonialism is a violent project towards black subjects, and Fanon observes that for it to touch to an end, it has to be greatly confronted by another great violence as counter-violence.

Sartre ([1961] 1990:15) echoes Fanon that “the only violence is the settler’s, but soon they will make it their own; that is to say, the same violence is thrown back upon us as when our reflection comes forward to meet us when we go towards a mirror”. Hence, it is difficult to hide reality—Sartre’s revelation cost him but it was and is still a fact. Violence has mutilated black subjects to the point that they cannot compete in the world anymore. Such a handicap resulted in the colonial violence that is currently being driven by the coloniality of power, being, and knowledge.

Burton (1987:41) suggests that “hence the fact that the facilitated process is an analytical one requires the parties concerned can move together to examine each other’s underlying motivations and goals in a direct interactive way”. Fanon rejects this suggestion because he is concerned that the only possible way out of violence is encountered violence rather than facilitation between the oppressor and black subject. Since the conquest period, colonialists could not negotiate or mediate with black subjects regarding the colonial rule. By nature, colonialism is illegal and violent, and that is one of the reasons why Fanon insists that colonialism must be confronted by encounter violence.

Agreeing with Fanon, Sartre confirms that the oppressed do not condemn their revolt, knowing full well that white people have done everything to provoke it (Sartre [1961] 1990:18). From his point of view, Sartre clarifies that white people are sources of violence that the colonised are called to use in their journey to self-determination. Sartre demonstrates his understanding and position of the reality with colonialism. His contribution and support to the anti-colonial struggle are still ineffaceable. Judaken (2008:4) posits, “As the iron curtain of the Cold War descended, Sartre became a vociferous critic of colonialism”. With this in mind, it underlines how Sartre directly intervened in the struggle against colonialism. In addition, while justifying Fanon’s theorising on violence and demonstrating that the rebels’ weapon is the proof of their humanity, Sartre ([1961] 1990:19) emphasises that in the first days of a revolt, the oppressed must kill because for them to shoot down an European, is to kill two birds with one stone—destroying the oppressor and free the oppressed at the same time. Thus, there is a dead person and a free person at the same time; the black subject, who became free for the first time, feels as a real independent person. In other words, after the revolt and killing, there will be a complete dead person and a new free person who for the first time feels transformed as a lawful human being who fulfils the requirements of being in the zone of the world of beings.

Marriott (2018:184) observes that in its origin and its end, in its foundation and its resistance, colonialism is inseparable from violence, mediate or immediate, present or represented. Thus, colonialism is inseparable from violence because colonialism itself is violent by nature. Driven by racism, colonialism violates the traditional myths, cultures, and ways of life of black subjects by replacing them by force with European civilisation. Black subjects were and are still violated because of their black skins; consequently, the black subject is considered evil in this anti-black world.

Because of such ongoing defamation of black subjects, Judaken (2008:24) testifies that Sartre was intransigent until his last days in his impassioned remonstrations against racism. This reality reveals how racism was and is still driving colonialism. Consequently, the black skin automatises the pain of black subjects wherever they are located in the world. Mainly, this highlights how racism is an ongoing [colonial] violence, which Sartre engaged with as well. Colonial violence is built on racism that dehumanises blackness. That blackness was constructed by colonialism, which glorifies the superiority of whiteness. In contrast, decolonial violence destroys blackness and whiteness at the same time to reach self-determination.

To another extent, blackness can operate as a tool to confront whiteness that decorates the white masters and prejudicially positions them as being superior to black subjects. That blackness reminds [us] that colonial violence was criticised by black people and Sartre as a singularity among other white people. Judaken (2008:33) affirms, “Sartre’s depiction of blackness as the negation of white supremacy serves to destabilize white, European, bourgeois hegemony.” And, this negation of white supremacy by Sartre has particularly motivated the black subjects who were surprised to see that Sartre could as a white was against white domination. It has demotivated the speed of the white oppression, especially after Sartre’s alert that potentially the same violence should be thrown back to them.

Sharing same vision with both Fanon and Sartre, Marriott (2018:72) writes: “In the decolonial struggle, violence has a regulatory function insofar as it is detoxifying and destructive, creative and reinventing”. This point of decolonial violence is reached after a moment of bloodshed. Human beings have to die as it opposes the unending colonial violence that disfavours African states. White people called these states the Third World—a world that is voiceless because of the enslavement caused by colonialism, such as Sartre posits:

The Third World finds *itself* and speaks to *itself* through his voice. We know that it is not a homogeneous world; we know too that enslaved peoples are still to be found there, together

with some who have achieved a simulacrum of phoney independence, others who are still fighting to attain sovereignty, and others again who have obtained complete freedom but who live under the constant menace of imperialist aggression. These differences are born of colonial history, in other words of oppression. (Sartre [1961] 1990:9–10)

As Sartre advanced here, no one listens to black subjects when they cry, no one responds, no one wants to take care of them. Black subjects are orphans of their land, their families, and emptied from their society. Consequently, they are trembling humans on their own; the world does not care for them. Sartre attacked Europeans as they are the authors of the constant menace of ongoing imperialist aggression. Bernasconi (2008:113) declares that “Sartre, of course, is famous for championing the cause of the oppressed”. Sartre was not in support of one side of the black subject but, a real true man and a man of the truth who dared to illuminate the reality between the coloniser and the colonised, which is hidden by colonialism.

Sartre ([1961] 1990) clarifies further that African states have “pseudo-independence”. The proclamation of independence of African countries in the 1960s, should be observed as an open secret as it has been revealed by Sartre and Fanon himself that in reality, African states are obligatory still dependent on Europe due to an unending colonial system. Black subjects living in those states are neither independent nor free.

In this regard, Sartre tries to advise and get the attention of his European brothers and sisters to recognise what they have done and are still doing in the colonial world. They must not neglect Fanon’s decolonial writings as it is so important for the white community to recognise how its relationship with the colonised society is assessed, but Sartre’s voice has been rejected and muted. Audaciously, Sartre advises Europeans:

Europeans, you must open this book, and enter into it. After a few steps in the darkness you will see strangers gathered around a fire; come close, and listen, for they are talking of the destiny they will mete out to your trading centres and to the hired soldiers who defend them. (Sartre [1961]1990:11)

Sartre expresses how he was shocked about the negligent behaviour of Europeans regarding Fanon’s writings of colonialism and decolonisation of black subjects. Europeans took it simple and easy because Fanon’s messianic message of decolonisation was not valid and null. For Sartre, Fanon’s message was an alert that was supposed to be read meticulously and reread by all Europeans. Sartre reveals how neglecting Fanon’s writings concerning colonialism and decolonisation will result in the failure and collapse of Europe. Sartre’s radical thought about

anti-colonialism and justification of the violence of the coloniser and colonised encouraged Gordon (2008) to classify Sartre as an insider to black existential philosophy:

His understanding of the struggle for freedom and what it means to be historical while engaged in socially transformative projects were coterminous. This made him (Sartre) a constant ally of black existential thought and black liberation struggles throughout most of the twentieth century since his emphasis on what it means to be a human being was a shared interest of people whose humanity has been denigrated in the modern world. (Gordon 2008:157)

Having exposed the secret behind colonial violence, Sartre's work on violence made his name indelible. He is recognised because of his exposition of the critical conditions of the oppressed, and this cost him his life. The 'Others' could not understand why Sartre could not stop revealing colonial secrets. He openly supported Fanon's reasoning on how to confront perpetual colonialism. For haunting this colonialism, black subjects have to be conditioned by the use of another counter-violence to halt the colonial system.

Sartre himself agreed with Fanon that colonial manifestation cannot happen in absence of violence—justified by one major factor that colonialism itself is violent by nature. Sartre cried to himself as the world did not want to listen to him; he was received and deceived by the same rejection as Fanon in front of the master.

For the colonial system as a project that benefits Europeans, Sartre and Fanon deserved to be killed so that they would obscure the colonialism and frustrate the tactics and strategies of decolonisation. After the 1960s, with their political ruse, Europeans benefitted more in what Ekeocha (2018:164) calls “the politics of aid with strings attached”, in which they tried to show that they cared for African states by lending them significant amounts of money. After the countries not being able to repay the heavy debts, they would have to exchange natural sources or any other valuable things that the country possessed.

Tenaciously, Sartre could not cease to demonstrate that white people are *provocateurs* of violence—the same violence that must be turned back to white people. Again, for such colonial violence, Sartre stresses:

Violence in the colonies does not only have for its aim the keeping of these enslaved men at arm's length; it seeks to dehumanize them. Everything will be done to wipe out their traditions, to substitute our language for theirs, and to destroy their culture without giving them ours. (Sartre [1961] 1990:13)



Therefore, apart from colonial violence violating black humanity, it also removes everything as human attributes from black subjects. The myths of the black subject are destroyed and, to another extent, stolen and stocked in colonial countries. Black subjects had to be bilingual and speak their mother tongue and their official language: the colonial language. All of this shows that black subjects have been buried while they were still alive.

Continuously, Sartre ([1961] 1990:23) warns Europeans that violence has changed its direction. Nevertheless, as explanation Sartre ([1961] 1990:22) highlights, “with us there is nothing more consistent than a racist humanism since the European has only been able to become a man through creating slaves and monsters”. Here, he declares that Europe has been built on the blood of black subjects. Colonialists are carnivores by nature with their continual system of colonialism, and it is still difficult for them to abandon being flesh eaters. Such behaviour of cannibalism allowed Europeans to continue running the enterprise of colonialism. It was declared that Europe is a bomb that could explode anytime as it has enough pressure and fire that have accumulated, which have been created in and out of itself.

One among the few who dare to reveal the truth, Sartre has left indelible traces in clarifying the colonial impact on the coloniser and the colonised, but especially by pointing the finger to the right people who caused the violence, namely white Europeans, the colonialists. Exceptionally, Sartre ([1961] 1990:21–22) agrees: “With us, to be a man is to be an accomplice of colonialism, since all of us without exception have profited by colonial exploitation”. Here, Sartre is a white man who dares to expose reality through his words of exception. He accuses (agrees) himself among others who deny being colonial exploiters, as he confirms again, “you know well enough that we are exploiters” (Sartre [1961] 1990:21). Exploiters should be synonymous with oppressors. Sartre admits to exposing that, white masters enjoy their lives because of the exploitation conducted through their acts of colonialism.

In addition, Sartre confirms that the counter-violence played a major the role to change not only the colonised but mainly the coloniser as well. Here, Sartre ([1961] 1990:20) states, “Thus, there is a fresh moment of violence; and this time we are involved, for its nature this violence is changing us, accordingly as the ‘half-native is changed’”. This is because the violence is a ‘fire’ that affects sides—both the colonised and the coloniser are changed by decolonial war. Through counter-violence, the coloniser starts to recognise for the first time that the violence, which the colonised have been complaining about since the time of the conquest, exists.

In amplification, Sartre ([1961] 1990:19) warns that when peasants take guns into their hands, the old myths grow dim and prohibitions are forgotten one by one; the rebels' weapons are the proof of their humanity. As long the word rebel is pronounced, this means that some persons are against something bad which deprives their lives. Colonialism denies the black subjects' being, and the same black subjects have to prove to the oppressors that they are rebels, dedicated to confronting colonialism. And, this is caused by the fact that "if the white man challenges my humanity, I will show him by weighing down on his life with all my weight of a man that I am not this grinning *Y a bon Banania* figure that he persists in imagining I am" (Fanon [1961] 1990:203). Reinforced by Fanon at this point, Sartre validates that the rebel violent acts justify their existence and recuperate their old myths by rejecting colonial laws.

Thus, Sartre ([1961] 1990:18) argues, "There is one duty to be done, one end to achieve: to thrust out colonialism by every means in their power". Here, in other words, Sartre meant that colonialism has to be destroyed regardless of whatever it should cost. This means as well that confronting colonialism requires sacrifices. Some of the black subjects have to fight to the death, to recuperate the humanity which has been rejected by the colonisers. At the same point, Butler (2008:222) amplifies, "Sartre's portrayal of insurgent violence is meant to provide insight into the person who lives under such oppression". Sartre's explanation of the anti-colonial struggle beautifies Fanon's conception of decolonisation. Sartre's feeling about colonial violence is that the colonised were and are still suffering, while 'Others' are in their free world. The 'Others' are the white masters who have proclaimed themselves to be superior to black subjects. Those self-proclaimed superior beings benefit from their project of colonialism—a project that harvests from violence.

Simultaneously, Sartre ([1961] 1990:18) counsels: "I think we understand this truth at one time, but we have forgotten it – that no gentleness can efface the marks of violence; only violence itself can destroy them". At this concern, Sartre traces the origin of continual colonialism and proposes how to challenge it. Sartre insists that colonial violence is careless towards black subjects, and he reveals that it could be effaced and destroyed by another encounter of great violence by the colonised in search of their humanity and their land.

Again, Sartre demonstrates that when violence starts, the laws and barriers are cancelled totally and that the violence turns back to its creator:

When the rising birth rate brings wider famine in its wake, when these newcomers have life to fear rather more than death, the torrent of violence sweeps away all barriers. In Algeria

and Angola, Europeans are massacred at sight. It is the moment of the boomerang; it is the third phase of violence; it comes back on us, it strikes us, and we do not realize any more than we did the other times that it's we (who) have launched it. (Sartre [1961] 1990:17)

When violence worsens, it becomes a boomerang moment as the violence turns back to the coloniser. From that time, the masters feel confused as it becomes difficult to recognise that they launched the violence first that has now turned back to them. Butler (2008) posits that Sartre focused on the violence of the coloniser and neglected what would happen if the colonised attacked the coloniser violently. Her interpretation of Sartre's conception of violence requires a serious assessment as her comprehension regarding violence is doubtful. Butler (2008) hypothesises:

It would seem to be fundamentally transferable. But this is not the Sartrean view. Indeed, his view makes the colonizer into the only subject of violence. And, this claim seems to contradict his other claim; namely, that under these conditions, violence can be understood to bring the human into being. (Butler 2008:220)

Here, Butler's transferability of violence does not fit with Sartre's interpretation of Fanon's theorising on the concept of violence. Butler was supposed to think on the fact that violence cannot be transferred by agreement. A unique possibility of transferring something peacefully should be based on agreement, but the coloniser did not agree with the colonised about such violence. Butler does not deny that white people are the source of violence. Sartre's position is to bring the violence back to where it came from but not to transfer it back. Transferability means that the coloniser and colonised agreed that they could resend and receive such violence, but Sartre ([1961] 1990) advances that the violence is the settler's creation, and the colonised has to bring back violently and forever.

Butler's understanding of Sartre is similar to Arendt's interpretation of Fanon's thoughts regarding violence. This is a point that surprises Marriott (2018:153), who retorts: "Arendt, far from erasing violence from the political, renders it immanently facetious to modern racial statehood, thereby putting the very separation of means and ends under erasure". Normally, taking into consideration how Fanon explains the link between violence and politics, there is a high risk which shows that violence cannot be separated from politics, the same as it cannot be separated from economy and culture. This is because violence to some extent creates politics, the same as politics creates violence and *vice-versa*. Arendt does not use the same glasses as Fanon in this regard; she separates violence of politics, as it is going soon to be detailed in the next subheading.

### 3.4 Arendt's criticism of violence

According to Fanon ([1959] 1965:31), “colonialism shuts its eyes to the real facts of the problem”. This demonstrates how colonialists and their supporters do not want to focus on reality, and they fail to recognise that colonisation is a serious problem from which the roots of the anti-colonial struggles originate. They only deal with decolonisation superficially. In light of this, Fanon insists that violence needs to be assessed from two angles. Firstly, the violence of the coloniser must be assessed together with the violence of the colonised. An evaluation of both sides of violence permits one to understand that the violence of the black colonised is derived from the violence of the coloniser—a sophisticated analysis that scholars do not understand easily.

Therefore, Fanon's great work of decolonisation to his conception of violence challenges colonialism as a problem of existence that needs to be confronted seriously by another great force. However, to allow different ideas in the debate, Fanon's conception of violence needs to be critically analysed. Unfortunately, Fanon's conception of violence is not welcomed and appreciated by all scholars. Arendt (1970) leads the campaign that challenges Fanon's political thought, which reveals that the black subject's violence is a derivation of the white master's violence.

Therefore, condescendingly, Arendt (1970:30) contends, “if only the practice of violence would make it possible to interrupt automatic processes in the realm of human affairs, the preachers of violence would have won an important point”. Here, Arendt's argument does not value violence of the colonised as a tool to be used in an attempt to change the humanity of black subjects. Her interrogation points the finger at the black subjects who believe that only violence can reach them to self-determination. Arendt's assessment exposes that the use of violence shall destroy politics, and this shall weigh to the governments. She agrees that colonialists used violence to conquer other countries, but for her, the same violence cannot be used for the black subjects to confront perpetual colonialism. She continues that violence should lead the world to eternal violence, instigated by vengeance.

At the same point of the argument above, Moten (2018) clarifies how technically, Arendt insists on the sacrifice of the non-citizen, the non-full citizen, the non-naturalised, and the unnatural who gain honour in the polity by accepting her exclusion from it. Moten disagrees with Arendt's argument and alerts that Arendt advances racism than reality. This is the racism that

rejects the black subject to being outside the world. Even if Fanon's reasoning on the concept of violence was criticised and undermined by Arendt, Moten accuses Arendt of being biased and racist. Biased because she wants to sacrifice the black subjects who are considered as non-full citizens. Arendt is also racist, because, in her argument, she conceives violence as an element to be used by whites to oppress the blacks but not as a tool to be used by black subjects in their journey of decolonisation.

Alas, Arendt (1970) insists that not many authors of rank glorified violence for violence's sake. She blames Sorel, Pareto, and Fanon as few scholars less ranked who were self-encouraged by a much deeper hatred of the bourgeois society. This led them to make a more drastic radical break with its moral standards than the conventional left, which was chiefly inspired by compassion and a burning desire for justice (Arendt 1970). Arendt rejects any form of anti-colonial violence; she does not concur with anti-colonial struggles. She is concerned with civilisation by supporting the colonial violence that animates the Western civilisation. Arendt strictly rejects any form of decolonial struggle employed by black subjects. Here, the major misunderstanding between Fanon and Arendt is based on Arendt criticising Fanon regarding violence, but Arendt was not attentive to what Fanon's conception of violence is really about. While Arendt was supportive of the bourgeoisie class, Fanon was critical of it. Arendt could not be aware that colonial violence caused inequality in the societies. Colonial violence is socially structured in the world. This authorises the institutionalisation of violence. While Arendt accuses Fanon, Sorel, and Pareto to decorate violence, she could not clear on how this institutionalisation of violence should be confronted. Fanon, followed by Sartre has proposed that there is no other way to be used by the black subjects for their decolonisation, except the application of the same violence employed by the white masters.

Fanon is concerned with the colonial question as to the serious and existential problem while Arendt was strictly concerned with the question of civilisation. In light of this, Arendt wants to deny Fanon's pain caused by endless colonialism. The conversation became stagnant when Arendt was asked whether she had a solution to the colonial question. Here, Arendt completely fails to provide the answer to the colonial question, as Farred reinforces:

However, the political question is much more urgent, and Arendt, in this instance, fails to address it: what to act for since the struggle against colonization or the history of racism (in the United States) will not, by itself, suffice? ... This is, in reading Arendt with Fanon, the question that *Wretched* provokes; the question leads, in all probability, to the demand that

thinking politically guarantee, at the very least, a certain interrogative efficacy; the question must give political substance to the demand for interrogative integrity. (Farred 2011:165)

Farred shows how Arendt fails to answer the fundamental question of colonisation. Having failed, another question that should arise is, therefore: Why should Fanon not see violence for what it is? In consideration of this, it remarks that the colonial violence that Arendt stands for or her critique of violence is what Sartre ([1943] 1956) defined as 'bad faith'. In Sartre's ([1943] 1956), bad faith is one of the most philosophical concepts that has been engaged importantly as a refusal to confront facts or reality of the argument in a discussion. In this regard, Sithole (2016:79) accentuates that "subjection, which has befallen black people, continues to exist precisely because of bad faith, which is maintained through the suspension of consciousness and existing outside one's bodily existence" because Arendt's bad faith encourages and animates domination of the white master. She closes her eyes to the question of colonisation and its impact on the black subject's everyday life. In other words, Arendt's bad faith was justified by how she supported the colonial violence and less consider any form of decolonial struggle.

In addition, Farred (2011) acknowledges that in Arendt's argument, violence is always a threat to power. This means that for Arendt, power and violence cannot co-exist, and violence would destroy power. Arendt could not assess that power can instigate violence. Fanon was concerned that in this current world, power is a result of violence; he meant that without using violence, the black subjects cannot reach power. If Arendt was asked to demonstrate the origin of power, maybe she could see that since immemorial time, for themselves to keep on power, the kings used violence to destroy whoever was against their kingdoms. Fanon's reasoning on violence was that the black subjects have to use violence for them to destroy the continual colonialism. Fanon did not advance that this violence to be used is for vengeance, but violence as an element of arbitration between the black subject and the white master. This means that for Fanon even if violence was used by the white masters to oppress the black subjects, the same violence has to be used as an element of peace-building, nation-building, and world-peace restoration.

As a point of fact, that is the reason why Farred (2011) observes that for Fanon, of course, violence plays an entirely different role—it is central to the constitution of the identity of the colonised in the face of colonial radical denial of black subjectivity. Therefore, violence should be psychic or physical force that permits the black colonised to regain their humanity that has been rendered nothing. Farred continues to judge Arendt for being racial with the student

movement that happened in the United States. Arendt's critique towards black students who were in the above-given movement was partial and racist. This is because Arendt used words like 'lower academic standards' and 'admission without academic qualification' while describing the black students who were fighting for their rights in the United States of America. Arendt's position, which is steeped in a kind of racially 'blind' universalism, does not pay attention to the long history of racial inequality, discrimination, and laws that impeded the ability of black subjects to gain access to institutions of higher learning in the United States (Farred 2011:160). Arendt could also know that the access to education for the black subjects was a long and difficult journey. Black subjects were and are still discriminated against by the continual colonial violence wherever they are located in the world.

However, according to Farred's (2011:172) observation, "It becomes necessary to heed Arendt's call for the interruption that is judgment, because, should it not be given proper attention, 'wretchedness' will not only proceed 'automatically' and 'predictably', but with a 'compulsive, symmetrical' violence". Farred intends to behave as missing one side to stand for judging Arendt. He has both ways by criticising Arendt and at the same time ordering people to follow Arendt's conception of justice. Continuing his oscillation, Farred criticises Fanon as well—an action that seems to be his attempt to narrate as a self-appointed mediator between Fanon and Arendt. With Fanon's thinking, Farred (2011:168) criticises, "Fanon is apt to, if not contradict himself, undermine his capacity for deftness". However, it seems that Farred could not understand well that Fanon's reasoning on the concept of violence was having a double meaning. Farred understands well that the coloniser used violence to reach power. Complicated was to understand as well that the black subject's violence is the violence for peace restoration between the black subject and the white master. The black subject's violence aims to suppress all complexes like the inferiority and superiority which have been implanted by colonialists; a point that Fanon advances.

In addition, Farred (2011:168) insists: "However, his subtle moments reveal not only an intellectual nuance but articulate as a provocative uncertainty". Nevertheless, Farred must understand that Fanon did not contradict himself as Fanon had to explain violence by using two angles: the violence of the black subject originated from colonial violence. Consequently, Gines (2014:93) acknowledges that Arendt presents an uncritical view of the violence against black subjects who were deployed by white masters. And Gines' (2014) argument is what Fanon was concerned with. On the same point, Kipfer (2011:102) affirms that "one of Fanon's

most important contributions was to show how the standardization peculiar to colonial rule can be understood fully only when taking into account its spatial organization". Biased, Arendt fails to recognise such a fact. She supports colonial violence and refuses to understand the roots of decolonial movements.

Ironically, Marriott (2018:153) reveals, "In Arendt's *On Violence*, Fanon is condemned for going too far in his 'glorification of violence and for not going far enough in his defense of politics as the legitimate sphere of social antagonism". This condemnation is caused by Fanon's violence being linked to politics while Arendt's violence is separated by politics. Therefore, Arendt accuses Fanon of being self-glorifying for his conception of violence. For Fanon, politics and violence are neither separate nor parallel elements, but politics is completely linked to violence, the same as violence represents the presence of politics. Thus, for decolonisation to be a political and fundamental action needed for black subjects to reach self-determination, "Fanon's claim is unambiguous: without violence, no decolonization; without violence, no subjectivation of the decolonized" (Farred 2011:160). Thus, violence is the key for black subjects to arrive at the mapped destination where freedom is not a gift, but an element that the two forces fight over.

Thereby, according to Arendt (1970:41), "one of the most obvious distinctions between power and violence is that power always requires numbers, whereas violence up to a point can manage without them because it relies on implements". The given Arendt's statement above applies to democratic power but not a colonial power. With colonial power, one police settler who holds one gun leads a large number of black subjects using force. Regardless of their number, the black subjects are powerless, meaningless, or nothing in front of one white master. This justifies how colonial power is not based on the number, but mainly on its violence towards black subjects. Colonial violence allows white masters to strengthen their power over many powerless black subjects.

In proceeding, this shows how the white master was/is still relying on colonial violence; the same violence that Arendt did not understand. Hence, she could not demonstrate how the first encounters of colonialism should govern without using violence while holding guns [weapons]. Fanon ([1961] 1990:48) explains, "Colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties ... it is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence". To this point, Fanon clarifies that power is a system that has tools to drive it, such as violence is a compulsory apparatus of continual colonialism. Therefore,



for Fanon, colonialism is a violent project that has been set to an undefined time. Its power is manifested through the daily subjugation towards the black subjects and it is only realised by applying violence. Thus, underlying that power and violence are inseparable.

Yet, Arendt (1970) criticises and demonstrates that there is no way that violence and power can be the same:

A legally unrestricted majority rule, that is, a democracy without a constitution, can be very formidable in the suppression of the rights of minorities and very effective in the suffocation of dissent without any use of violence. But that does not mean that violence and power are the same. (Arendt 1970:42)

Here, Arendt neglects to comprehend that democracy without a constitution is itself violent. A democratic government in power without a constitution stands for a totalitarian government driven by violence. Arendt must recognise that colonialism is a continual oppression system that must be encountered by another violent system. Therefore, Fanon ([1961] 1990:200) declares, “the defensive attitudes created by this violent bringing together of the colonized man and the colonial system form themselves into a structure which then reveals the colonized personality”. Without colonial violence, it is difficult to understand what colonialism is about, but as colonialism exposes itself through its visible manifestation of violence, it unveils that, black subjects should analyse it deeper until they find its invisible violence such as the one currently driven by coloniality of power, being and knowledge. Analysing such consequences of colonialism was Fanon’s concern, while Arendt was preoccupied with civilisation.

Despite being the champion to refute Fanon’s argumentation of decolonial violence, Arendt (1970) struggles to find a solution for the colonial question. Arendt (1970:4) insists that “violence harbours within itself an additional element of arbitrariness”. While Arendt maintains violence as it hides the fundamental element of arbitrariness, on the contrary, Fanon’s core conception of violence reveals that violence is an ‘arbitrator’ factor between the coloniser and colonised. Arendt’s argument of advancing that violence hides the element of arbitration is based on the fact that violence does not require mediation while the mediator was supposed to be there to find a solution between the confronted parties. Here, Fanon’s argument recognises violence as the arbitrator between the coloniser and the black subject. Fanon reveals how the absence of violence engenders an absence of truth. Fanon’s theorising on the counter-violence is the true projection of the black subject’s pain, cries, condition, and death.

Contentiously, Arendt's (1970) critique of violence complains that violence has brought death to politics. Hence, the need for political life, after all, is born from the unique features of what it is and means to be human (Gordon 2014:96). The question of death is related to being human. The being of black beings is related to such a projection of their pain, cries, condition, and death.

Therefore, Gines (2014) points out:

[In] *On Violence*, she (Arendt) condemns the violence of the Black Power movement and of anti-colonialism ... in *On Revolution* Arendt attempts to situate violence outside of the political realm even while acknowledging the constitutive role of violence in the creation of a political realm ... yet in *On Violence* Arendt critiques Fanon and Sartre for their stances on anti-colonial violence. Arendt, Fanon, (and) Sartre are each clear that European expansion in Africa was violent. But Arendt presents an uncritical view of the violence against Africans deployed by Europeans (in *Origins*), while Fanon and Sartre critique the violent colonial system, taking into account the role of violence in establishing the colonial and the corresponding role of revolutionary counter-violence against this system. (Gines 2014:93)

This point clarifies how Arendt was apologetic for the European violence used to enter the political space to establish the colonial system. And her critiques to Fanon and Sartre come back to herself because Arendt recognises that the European expansion into Africa was violent. However, she fails to demonstrate, as Fanon or Sartre did, that the European conquest (occupation) in Africa was violent. In contrast, her failure (Arendt) to trace where the counter-violence originates, manifests itself in her rejecting the violence of the colonised and recognising the coloniser's violence. Importantly, Fanon and Sartre reveal that the counter-violence which is employed by the black subject is derived from colonial violence.

In consideration of her critique of violence, Arendt supports colonial violence and rejects any form of transitivity of the same violence. Supportive arguments about Europeans facing violence as it happened for black subjects are rejected automatically by Arendt; she does not tolerate any comment to the white master's violence confronted by the black subject's counter-violence. Gines (2014:97) affirms that Arendt is clear that violence is necessary to subjugate some so that others may be free. With the above testament in mind, it is therefore understandable why Arendt's credibility as a thinker was diminished due to her disequilibrium on the judgment of colonial violence and counter-violence.

Normally, no human being is supposed to face any kind of violence from another human being no matter how, even if Arendt (1970:52) comes up with a motive, "the violence can be

justifiable, but it never will be legitimate”. Here, it seems not easy to convince someone that colonial violence is justifiable, while Arendt confirms herself that (colonial) violence is illegitimate. How it is possible to justify illegitimate violence—in Arendt’s justification of violence—if there is still a *lacuna* that needs to be reassessed and reanalysed. Structural violence as the most colonial violence does not only dispossess black subjects’ rights to the economy in the society but also expels their humanity.

As a point of intervention, Moten (2018:92) emphasises, “to be expelled from humanity is to be reduced to the bar nakedness of being human”. Being expelled blasts the dispossession of humanity that renders black subjects out of the zone of beings and facilitates one kind of species to ‘be’ at the expense of others. Arendt does not consider being expelled as an injury to the black subject, “perhaps Arendt doesn’t understand what is to have rather been expelled, to have rather been displaced or to claim and own an already imposed displacement and dispossession” (Moten 2018:92). Not that Arendt was unaware of the racial issues caused by colonialism and addressed by the black subjects, but she has never been touched by colonial violence. Thus, Arendt denies this expelling of humanity, which justifies that colonialism was a threat only fabricated for black subjects.

Arendt (1970:13) warns Fanon and Sartre, “This new shift toward violence in the thinking of revolutionaries can remain unnoticed even by one of their most representative and articulate spokesmen”. Arendt’s limited reservation of analysis to the coloniser’s violence judges her as being unjust, racist, and a discriminator. Scholars who contributed to decolonial studies consider her credibility null. What they share in common is that Arendt herself admits that the coloniser used violence for conquering the colonised countries. That has been a similarity between both Fanon and Arendt. The scandal comes when it is the time to assess how the black subject has to come over this oppression. Fanon demonstrates that only violence can lead black subjects to be free, while Arendt considers this counter-violence as a peril to power.

Arendt should be exposed of being racist as she even accused black American students of being stupid and hiding behind their interest groups to be admitted without knowledge:

Negro students, the majority of them admitted without academic qualification, regarded and organized themselves as an interest group, the representatives of the black community. Their interest was to lower academic standards. They were more cautious than the white rebels, but it was clear from the beginning that violence with them was not a matter of theory and rhetoric. (Arendt 1970:18)

In the statement above, Arendt generally criticises that, black students in the United States of America were admitted without complying with whatever was required for students to be academically qualified. She contends that the admission of black students at universities was a serious negative for the academic standards. Arendt does not value any contribution that should come from the black students who were fighting for their rights to education. Blacks were fighting as they were suffering for the continuity of their exclusion in the academic knowledge. To another extent, as black subjects, it was their duty to fight for whatever they must get from society. They have to struggle for the protection of their black community which later becomes the umbrella of their humanity.

Arendt's criticism of violence shows that she was not able to differentiate violence and vengeance. Arendt was supposed to acknowledge what Rousseau (1762) called "the general will" of the citizens, which describes freedom and authority as the same. As, Gordon (2014:120) underlines, "here I have contended that the general will can do far more than tolerate and accommodate the most politically relevant of differences". With this in mind, shows then that the students were fighting for whatever the society has to give to them, among others, the right to education for all without exception. They fought so that education could not continue to be for the bourgeoisie class which is dominated by the whites to the detriment of the continual sufferings of the blacks.

Unsatisfied, Arendt does not agree with Sartre's felicity with words that advance the role of violence for both colonialism and decolonisation. She attacks Sartre more than Fanon due to Sartre's position of exposing that Europeans are the first launchers of the violence and that anytime the same violence has to be projected back to them. Arendt is in disaccord with Sartre's preface—a preface that might have discouraged Arendt to read the remaining chapters as it is suspected that she only read the preface and the first chapter. She contends:

Sartre with his great felicity with words has given expression to the new faith. 'Violence,' he now believes, on the strength of Fanon's book, 'like Achilles' lance, can heal the wounds it has inflicted.' If this were true, revenge would be the cure-all for most of our ills. (Arendt 1970:20)

From this, it helps to understand that Arendt's interpretation of Fanon and Sartre's violence showed her confusion with being able to differentiate between violence and vengeance. Fanon and Sartre clearly explain that the violence of the colonised emerges from colonial violence.

Sartre's emphasis focuses on the fact that the white masters created violence, and such violence will cost them as it is going to be thrown back to them.

Therefore, Fanon's violence is regarded as 'an arbitrator' between the coloniser and the colonised but not as Arendt emphasises because violence is vengeance. Although Arendt is aware of all forms of violence, she focuses only on the violence that accompanies or creates power. Arendt is aware of the violence used to establish and maintain what she calls imperialism, and yet she is not as critical of the oppressors' violence as she is of the revolutionary counter-violence of the colonised (Gines 2014:99). However, this demonstrates Arendt's downfall in her understanding of violence. But Gines (2014) exposes that Arendt understands the origin of the anti-colonial struggles very well, but her main problem is being a 'racist' who hates black humanity and regards them not as human beings who can reason, but as animals:

Arendt also suggests that such violent forms of racism (genocidal massacres) are acceptable instruments to use against Africans, but not against Asians and other groups, particularly Jews. She states that these instruments of violence and racism were first used against Africans and then spread to Asians and others. But for Arendt, the crime was not what was done to Africans, because that was natural and comprehensible. What was incomprehensible to her was the same methods could be extended toward non-Africans—because in the latter case Europeans should have known better. (Gines 2014:90)

After explaining Gines's view, it should be declared that Arendt was tenaciously racist, which is racism based on hating and rejecting black people and their lived experiences. Furthermore, it automatically makes Arendt anti-Fanon. This is because; Fanon is against any form intended to black discrimination and any other forms of racism. Fanon, who advances colonial violence as illegal and a burden to black subjects, is critically denied by Arendt who struggles impossibly to demonstrate why black subjects should be dehumanised and oppressed by white masters who mandated themselves as being superior human to others.

According to Fanon, the fact is that colonisation, having been built on military conquest and the police system, sought justification for its existence and the legitimisation of its persistence in its works (Fanon [1969] 1965:122). Both Arendt and Fanon recognise that colonisation survived because of violence, but the misunderstanding between Fanon and Arendt arises when it comes to the question of how those who have been forcibly colonised will break away from this colonial condition. Fanon is clear that the black subject has to employ the same route as

the oppressor, namely, violence, but here, at this fundamental question, Arendt becomes the blind and deaf mute.

For Arendt's point, in the interest of its preservation, the rule of law insists precisely on sacrificing the non-citizen (Moten 2018:111). Arendt (1970:22) persistently questions, "The question remains why so many of the new preachers of violence are unaware of their decisive disagreement with Karl Marx's teachings". Arendt does not believe in the scholars who preach violence as a tool to be used by the movements that strive for genuine liberation. She even accuses such scholars to disagree with Karl Mar's teachings. Here, she means that the preachers of violence misinterpreted the original concept of Karl Marx's conception of violence.

While the above quotation by Arendt criticises Sartre's work about violence, with a particular appreciation, Gordon (2008) finds Sartre an audacious figure who exposes colonial violence committed by Europeans:

I would love to have had a cup of coffee with Jean-Paul Sartre. Had I the opportunity, I would first thank him for his courage. He fought not only the antihuman forces of antisemitism and antiblack racism in French and American society but also those vices within him that always offered the seduction of an easy way out. (Gordon 2008:157)

This shows how Gordon understands Sartre, which contradicts Arendt's judgment of Sartre's explanation of violence. Although Sartre is a white philosopher, he is a defender of the truth. In contrast, Arendt is a philosopher whose analysis of violence fails to convince the world whether colonial violence is condemnable or not. Therefore, Arendt is incapable to recognize Fanon's distinctiveness in his justification of violence that reproduces racism as capital and the fugitive, less determinate violence that ruins law and the whole administration of the state precisely because it begins by ruining black guilt and indebtedness (Marriott 2018:153).

Arendt's strictness remains on the fact that she views violence as a tool for power to be manifested:

I mentioned the general reluctance to deal with violence as a phenomenon in its own right, and I must now qualify this statement. If we turn to discussions of the phenomenon of power, we soon find that there exists a consensus among political theorists from Left to Right to effect that violence is nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of power. (Arendt 1970:35)

Here, Arendt explains how a state needs violence to function, but that such violence does not necessarily need the power to manifest. Thus, she takes violence as a manifestation of power. Arendt remains contentious for anyone who advances that power is linked with violence. She

considers violence as an element that is used by people who are still under the level of full humanity. That is the reason why she contends that black subjects who want to use violence to reach power are mindless. She does not see any role which should be played but violence in a state which holds its power. However, Arendt seems to forget the long history of the black subjects, who from centuries were exchanged as goods because of slavery. That was extreme violence, and black subjects cannot reach power without being radical and extreme by employing the same violence to halt slavery forever.

In this regard, Moten (2018:90) acknowledges, “In *On Violence*, Arendt recognises and mobilises against a perceived danger and the ambivalence or nuance that marks her understanding and strictly limited defence of civil disobedience”. Tenaciously, Arendt comes to a conclusion that rejects violence as a tool of government:

To switch for a moment to conceptual language: power is indeed of the essence of all government, but violence is not. Violence is by nature instrumental; like all means, it always requires guidance and justification through the end it pursues. And what needs justification by something else cannot be the essence of anything. (Arendt 1970:51)

With a colonial system, violence is the essence because, without violence, the unending colonial system should stop immediately. Violence is an obvious tool for a government to function; the same it is for colonialism. The decolonisation has to incorporate the same violence and decorate it for being used in the anti-colonial struggle. Zahar ([1969] 1974: 76) observes “the colonizer bases his violence ideologically on the, initially, passive resistance of the colonized, which is a consequence of the former’s violence and serves in turn as its justification”. Thus, Arendt’s view differs significantly from Zahar’s observation. While Zahar assesses the violence of the coloniser as a tool that has misdirected the conscious and mind of the black subject, Arendt assesses this violence as a necessity for the civilisation of the black subjects.

In continuation of analysing Arendt’s criticism on violence, without meandering, Marriott (2018:154) easily finds that “what goes missing in *On Violence* is any sophisticated reading of how violence, *qua* states of emergence and historical crises in capital, ontologically grounds the wretched”. In seconding Marriott, Gines (2014:102) criticises that Arendt misses the nuance and insight of Fanon’s analysis of violence, brotherhood, and the formation of the new humanity. Again, racism is one of the impacts of colonial violence, and with racism in mind, this leads Wa Thiong’o to remember how racism destroyed the black subject’s society to the

extent that “colonialism through racism tried to turn us into societies without heads” (Wa Thiong’o 1993:77). This is an impact of colonial violence that Arendt herself was supposed to recognise because, as long as she recognises colonialism, the impact was that colonialism was not only about civilisation as she thought, but also about the destruction of the black subject’s society.

Again, in keeping with the same notion of violence, Gines (2014:107) concludes, “what is striking about Arendt’s account is that she does not endorse rebellion or revolution in a form (violent or otherwise) against colonization”. Simultaneously, at this concern, Arendt (1970:79) responds, “violence does not promote causes, neither history nor revolution, neither progress nor reaction; but it can serve to dramatize grievances and bring them to public attention”. Here, Arendt assures that violence is not able to promotion of causes, but what has to be remembered is that for the power to keep itself running; it has to use violence against those who oppose the governments.

At a glance, Fanon’s conception of violence does not separate power and violence because colonialists used to power and violence to colonise and control black subjects by applying violence as their connected tool to their colonial government. Colonialists maintained power in their colonies because of colonial violence, which is the violence that Arendt suppresses. Arendt (1970) resists in declaring that violence and power are two elements working separately. She ends by contradicting herself that violence can destroy power while she mentioned that violence is not the essence of anything as it needs to be justified.

To sum up: politically speaking, it is insufficient to say that power and violence are not the same. Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent ... Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it. (Arendt 1970:56)

Arendt herself recognises here that violence can destroy power, and she maintains that power and violence are two opposite elements. Arendt was concerned with the question of civilisation—a civilisation that originates from violence and establishes power. Civilisation originates from violence in the sense that the white masters claimed to justify colonisation as civilisation. Arendt fails to justify how to exit the colonial question; she maintains colonisation as civilisation. With resistance, Arendt above admits that violence and power are two opposite elements; however, most of the governments have been built on violence. Without the employment of violence, colonialists themselves could not be able to conquer other countries.



That is the reason why Fanon's concern was to reveal how violence is the only tool that can save the black subjects.

Finally, Fanon ([1961] 1990) declares that colonial violence was a justification of the white master's power and that black subjects are powerless because they have not applied the same violence yet to reach self-determination. Black subjects suffer unending colonialism. The only way forward is to engage in serious combat to confront the white master so that they gain power through violence as the colonialists did in their first encounter in the colonies. Arendt recognises that violence destroys power; therefore, based on Fanon's view, violence is an essential tool for black subjects to chart a way to self-determination.

### **3.5 On Fanon's justification of violence**

Fanon has to appeal and justify the arbitrariness of his conception of violence again. This appeal has to account for the impact of colonial violence on black subjects. Fanon declares and strengthens:

The violence of the colonial regime and the counter-violence of the natives balance each other and respond to each other in an extraordinary reciprocal homogeneity. This reign of violence will be the more terrible in proportion to the size of the implantation from the mother country. The development of violence among the colonized people will be proportionate to the violence exercised by the threatened colonial regime. (Fanon [1961] 1990:69)

From this point, Fanon clearly explains that there is equilibrium between colonial violence and counter-violence, and he simultaneously proposes that there is no other way out than by applying greater violence to liberate black subjects. The farmer harvests what he has planted; in this case, it is through the negative consequences of launching more intensified violence than the first launchers. The violence of the colonised towards the colonisers is a radial projection of the colonial violence that proportionally ravages the side of the first launchers of violence.

Consequently, not only that colonialism transformed black subjects into machine-man, but also colonialists used heavy machine guns to defeat the traditional leadership of black subjects and to install their power gotten through colonial violence. According to Mbembe (2012), in Fanon violence is both a political and a clinical concept. Violence is a political concept as for Fanon violence is linked to politics. Politics cannot be separated from violence. Violence is also clinical as it is the only element that those who are oppressed have to employ for them to regain their rejected being.

It is, therefore, necessary for Fanon to justify the conception of violence that he reclaims to have a double meaning. For the coloniser, violence is the main element that helped the master to the success of the conquest and the maintenance of the project of colonialism. And, for the colonised, it is the main tool to be used to regain their humanity and to become truly decolonised. Both Fanon and Sartre understand that not only is colonial violence condemnable, but also that counter-violence is derived from colonial violence. Fanon's understanding of his conception of violence proves that violence and power are inseparable elements.

In contrast, Arendt disagrees with both Fanon and Sartre's arguments of justification of violence. As detailed above in her criticism of violence, Arendt condemns any form of anti-colonial struggles and singly recognises that power and violence are separable elements. Both Fanon and Sartre's critiques towards Arendt were based on her failure to justify that colonial violence haunts the lives of the oppressed while she acknowledges that she recognises colonial imperialism. Therefore, the decolonisation of the world in the mid-twentieth century was at first built into the existing system of two modernities (Tlosatnova & Mignolo 2009:16).

Sartre ([1961] 1990) has to advise the Europeans even though Arendt is supporting them in their project of colonialism, driven by the colonial violence. Sartre ([1961] 1990), alerts to the Europeans (colonialists) that the same violence has to be thrown back upon them. For Sartre ([1961] 1990:15), "the only violence is the settler's ... but the same violence is thrown back upon us as when our reflection comes forward to meet us when we go toward a mirror". Both Fanon and Sartre's arguments on violence trace violence as being the product of colonial power. They indicate the original point of violence starts. In essence, both Fanon and Sartre recognise that the violence of the colonised emanates from colonial violence.

Concerning the argument above, Arendt's arguments above fail to demonstrate the root of colonial violence despite her tenacity. Turning his back on Arendt, Nayar (2013) joins Sartre and Fanon's supporters due to Fanon's justification of his conception of violence. Nayar elucidates:

Fanon proposes that it is colonial violence and its trauma that leads to the second form of violence – that from the colonized's side. The second is the *violence of the colonized*. This violence is an attempt on the part of the desperate, frustrated, and alienated colonized subject to retrieve a certain dignity and sense of the Self that colonial violence had destroyed. It takes the form of anti-colonial struggles. (Nayar 2013:70)

Nayar above echoes Fanon by demonstrating that the counter-violence as a result of the frustration of the black subjects under colonial violence. Black subjects are alienated and refused to be counted in the list of human beings. They, therefore, have to claim their Self through anti-colonial combat, with a vision to reach a level where they can define themselves. Thus, Nayar exposes the same as Fanon has done how the counter-violence cannot emerge in a place that does not have colonial violence. Therefore, counter-violence is the implantation of colonial violence. From the first time that the white masters launched the colonial violence through colonialism, it was the same time the black subjects had to resist the colonial violence, and this will be a continual fight as colonialism itself continues.

In amplification, Sithole (2015:6) asserts that “the philosophical intervention of Fanon is the exposé of subjection in its institutionalisation, naturalisation, and normalisation of subjection that militates against the existence of the black subject”. Therefore, Fanon’s main task is to uncover the colonialism that currently operates as coloniality. Fanon has located colonialism wherever it has hidden and made it visible to the public. The decolonial project has to be a well-planned and recommending programme. It cannot be taken as a joke, but a serious task that each black subject is called to accomplish as its duty.

Courageously, Fanon ([1961] 1990:237) advances, “armed conflict alone can drive out these falsehoods created in man which force into inferiority the most lively minds among us and which mutilate us”. Here, Fanon proposes that the colonised have to wake up and audaciously combat (use weapons) to affront the endless colonialism that uses the same weapons to oppress the colonised. Fanon cannot advance that such colonial violence should be ended by mediation or negotiation but be applied back to the same settler’s violence. Nayar (2013:83) concurs that colonial violence destroys the ‘self’; however, Fanon’s critique of violence does not end with this component of violence as he is also interested in how the colonised have to employ violence as a means of the recuperation of their rejected ‘self.’

However, engaging in enduring decolonial struggle requires audacity. It requires well-being as determinant and this is what is called for the colonised who engage in combat against colonialism. Colonial violence needs to be challenged by the same violence than produced by colonialists. According to Fanon ([1961] 1990:70), “In all armed struggle, there exists what we might call the point of no return ... they have decided to reply by violence, they, therefore, are ready to take all its consequence”. Fanon’s conception of violence insists that natives understand that colonialists applied violence to conquer and control the oppressed endlessly. It

further reveals that natives must take the same violence and apply it in order to confront the colonial disorder to reach self-determination.

Sharing the same view as Arendt, Jinadu (1980:229) contends that Fanon is controversial and the general criticism is that Fanon is neither systematic nor coherent. However, Fanon's writings are clear, and all his propositions and arguments are clear. This criticism may be focused on Fanon's writings being too sophisticated to understand easily, which fails some scholars to interpret Fanon's oeuvres. In addition to his justification, Fanon ([1959] 1965:179) mentions in clear words, "the same time that the colonized man braces himself to reject oppression, a radical transformation takes place within him which makes any attempt to maintain the colonial system impossible and shocking". When black subjects decide to reject the oppression through armed force, this allows the fundamental change that black subjects fought for the salvage of any black in the world.

In so doing, the criticism addressed to Fanon invokes the necessity of what should be rethought; some critiques should be based on Fanon being clear about his discovery of the ongoing colonial violence that engenders anti-colonial violence. This requires an understanding of how Fanon experienced his black being. In the same regard, reading and comprehending Fanon depend on the lived experience of the reader of his writings as well. Those who have suffered racialism and discrimination during their lived experiences have affection for Fanon's great work on decolonisation as opposed to those who easily inherited richness from their rich families. According to Fanon ([1961] 1990:28), "the naked truth of decolonization evokes for us the searing bullets and blood-stained knives which emanate from it ... for if the last shall be first, this will only come to pass after a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists". For the decolonised to arrive at their destination, combat that causes many colonisers and colonised to both die is compulsory.

Hitherto, Jinadu (1980) accuses Fanon of being controversial and not mincing words in expressing his views; however, maybe his assessment of Fanon's writings is more complicated than he initially thought. But Fanon was clear, especially in his words about decolonisation where violence was clarified well and traced its origin before it enters into play. Meanwhile, Ciccariello-Maher (2017:83) reminds us that violence becomes 'atmospheric' and every effort to deploy brute force only heightens tensions, reminding the colonised who their real enemy is. The intensification of violence by colonisers has been a stimulant for the colonised to

discover very well how evil colonialists are. The colonised decided to plan their way out of such an oppression, which increases the puzzle between the coloniser and the wretched.

Although Fanon was radical in his concern of colonial violence, his radicalism was understandable by everyone who recognises that colonialism was and is still illegal. Fanon clarifies the extent to which colonial violence must be confronted and thrown it back to colonialists. Fanon ([1961] 1990) does not propose any way for the colonised and the coloniser to negotiate and mediate by the fact that colonialism itself is violence. Fanon could not see any other alternative solution except for applying such violence to itself for liberation.

In so doing, Fanon calls the oppressed to radically refuse any European model (especially colonial apparatus). Sartre ([1961] 1990):15 elucidates, “We only become what we are by the radical and deep-seated refusal of that which others have made of us”. The categorical refusal of blackness is what all black subjects are encouraged to respect. As human beings, black subjects must not dedicate their struggle to anyone else, but a compulsory work which they have to manifest and a sign of the refusal of oppression. From this point, black subjects as a whole are called to be human beings who think and question. From questioning, the thought develops itself and charts a way to self-determination.

Bravely, Fanon calls black subjects to stop swimming in the history of colonisation because such a colonisation is there for colonisers to rob and dehumanise natives endlessly. Therefore, the immobility to which the native is condemned can only be called into question if the natives decide to put an end to the history of colonisation—the history of pillage—and to bring the history of the nation into existence—the history of decolonisation (Fanon [1961] 1990:40). If the history of decolonisation is brought into existence, the dehumanisation of the oppressed falls back on the oppressor, thus finally leading to “their alienation, caused by the fact that colonial conquest, colonial administration, and exploitation are acts that are based on the oppression of the natives” (Zahar [1969] 1974:24).

Zahar’s analysis of the impact of colonial violence projects to the same point of indication as Fanon because, according to Zahar ([1969] 1974:76), “racism and its practical manifestations—the escalating brutality of oppression—are meant to obviate the counter-violence of the colonized”. Colonialism is characterised by racism, domination, dehumanisation, oppression, injustice, just to mention a few. Maldonado-Torres (2016:8) uncovers that colonialism, decolonisation, and related concepts generate anxiety and fear.

Thus, colonialism itself reproduces violence and tries to stop any form of violence applied by the colonised, but Fanon ([1952] 2008:14) declares that “what we are striving for is to liberate the black man from the arsenal of complexes that germinated in a colonial situation”. Here, Fanon explains the reason for his dedication to struggle, which is to free the black subject who has completely lost and directed by the complexes. The black subject’s soul has to be reborn as it has been buried colonialism in assistance by its colonial apparatuses. Gibson (2003:104) asserts: “In other words, it should be noted that Fanon predicted the new society on a long struggle which prefigures a new humanism”. This new humanism results from a bloodshed period in which black subjects are called to sacrifice themselves to achieve new humanity. It means that the struggle which the black subjects are called to respond to; is an anti-fear and anti-death struggle. It is an anti-fear and anti-death struggle as their everyday lives; black subjects are intimidated by fear and death which are the white master’s strategies of domination. Compulsorily, “every society, every collectivity, Fanon insists, must find a channel, an outlet, through which the forces accumulated in the form of aggression can be released”, Marriott (2000:67) exposes.

In increasing number of supporters, Fanon’s justification of violence attracts Marriott (2018:72) to reinforce: “In the decolonial struggle; violence has a regulatory function insofar as it is detoxifying and destructive, creative and reinventing”. It is creative and reinventing for the wretched for whom their violence is not violent, but rather the bringing into being of justice since it alone defines the people’s wish to go beyond the violence it represents (Marriott 2018:152). Gines (2014:102) completes Marriott’s arguments in reminding [us] that violence becomes a unifying agent for the colonised when they all take hold of that violence as a tool against their oppressors instead of one another. Thus, it is evident that Fanon’s work invites black subjects to explore the many ways in which the violence of the political shapes the ordinary lives in colonial, imperial, and allegedly post-colonial conditions (Maldonado-Torres 2008:95).

Furthermore, Fanon ([1964] 1967:54) wakes black subjects up, “There comes a time when silence becomes dishonesty”. To remain silent in front of the colonial problem is a peril that Fanon could not tolerate. As soon as the problem is exposed, the black subjects do not have another time to lose, but they are called to struggle for preventing the expansion of the problem. Thus, Fanon alerts the black subjects not to wait as the time has arrived to struggle for confronting colonialism. Sharpe (2016:22) reinforces “and we might use these ways of being

in the wake in our responses to terror and the varied and various ways that our Black lives are lived under occupation”. Finally, in Fanon’s assessment, black subjects have to be ready for violence anytime. For them to be decolonised, they have to practise the same violence which has been imposed on them. Fear and death should no longer be obstacles to struggle, but what is needed from them is to be determinant. From death, it is clear to them that this narrow world, strewn with prohibitions, can only be called in question by absolute violence (Fanon [1961] 1990:29). The absolute violence renders null the white master’s strategies of fear and death used for the continual colonial violence.

### **3.6 Conclusion**

By analysing the lived experience of black subjects, this chapter elucidated how Fanon explain the concept of violence. Fanon explicated violence by appropriating it to a double meaning: the violence of the white master and the counter-violence of the black subject. The violence of the coloniser was referred to as colonial violence while the violence of the colonised was connoted as counter-violence (anti-colonial violence or struggle). This chapter illuminated how counter-violence is derived from colonial violence because colonialists used violence to conquer and occupy the land of black subjects. The chapter demonstrated how the intensification of colonial violence engendered the violence that allows the colonised to set the order of the world in colonial disorder.

The thematic of colonial violence was explicated based on Fanon’s writing on colonial violence that was supported and denied by different works of literature from various scholars. *On Colonial Violence* demonstrated how since the first day of conquest, colonialists applied violence to maintain the colonialism system. It was clarified that colonialism is violent by nature and that colonialists illegally led the black subjects in the use of such violence. Colonial violence destroyed the black community and their traditional leadership, culture, economy, to mention just a few.

This chapter discussed Sartre’s pro-Fanon view on violence. It was from his view that Sartre advised Europeans to read *The Wretched of the Earth*. Despite his advice, Sartre’s prophecy was denied and rejected by Europeans—the same as they rejected Fanon’s books. His (Sartre) preface mainly focused on agreeing with Fanon’s conception of violence in which Europeans have been accused of being the first launchers of violence. Audaciously, Sartre alerted

Europeans that the same violence used by colonialists is going (has started) to be thrown back at Europeans and it will cost them to stop it.

The chapter debated Arendt's criticism of violence. It was through this thematic that both Fanon and Sartre were condemned of being self-glorified of violence. Arendt severely criticised Fanon and Sartre that the anti-colonial violence they preach cannot contribute to the resolution of decolonisation, but can only aggravate the situation. Arendt clearly understood that colonialists used violence to civilise black subjects who were not counted as human beings. It has been exposed that because of colonialism, black subjects have been deprived of their human privileges. Arendt received significant critiques from Fanon and his supporters that she was biased as she was aware that colonialists used violence to conquer and occupy Africa. However, she closed her eyes and became so strict on counter-violence that she strongly refuted and condemned whoever acted as anti-colonialist. Both Fanon and Sartre advanced and justified that colonial violence is illegal and it is through such violence that counter-violence emerges; in contrast, Arendt firmly defended colonial violence as legitimate while she refuted any form of counter-violence.

Before this conclusion, the chapter allowed Fanon to justify the grievances received from his antagonist group led by Arendt. Through this thematic, Fanon's appeal permitted him to re-explicate and justifies his conception of violence. From there, Fanon re-elucidated that violence should be analysed by using a double sense of signification. Firstly, the violence that allowed the colonialists to conquer and occupy the colonies, which is still ongoing through colonialism. Secondly, the violence of the colonised appears as a derivation of colonial violence and is taken with a key that opens for the fundamental change of the colonised. Fanon justified that there is no other alternative way of ending the colonial violence of the endless colonialism, except for applying the same violence to itself for the *naissance* of genuine liberation. Therefore, Fanon concurred that the colonised has to use the same violence that he has received from his master to engage in an enduring struggle for self-determination. The next Chapter is soon going to deal with Fanon on the conception of *tabula rasa*.



## CHAPTER 4

### FANON ON *TABULA RASA*

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter accounts for Fanon's conception of *tabula rasa*. It reveals how Fanon marshals *tabula rasa* as the second pillar of his conception of decolonisation, which has to be undertaken by black subjects to reach self-determination. *Tabula rasa* should be defined conceptually as the creation of being from non-being because the colonial system dehumanises the colonised and considers black subjects as objects. *Tabula rasa* restores and reinvents different possibilities to life. Apart from that *tabula rasa* creates new humanity; black subjects are also permitted to the reinvention of new modes of life.

First, this chapter thematically discusses the disorder of things as a terrible and bloodshed period when everything is destroyed. It cancels the law as it is a moment characterised by the protocol or guidance of black subjects being absent in the programmes of their everyday lives. Second, the chapter explicates the thematic of political imagination as a period of invention and discovery of the new modes of life, which is characterised by a radical reimagination of how to recreate new humanity. Third, the chapter embarks on the thematic of Fanon's old and new dialectics. In that sub-section, the uniqueness is that Fanon's theorising on dialectics is assessed as the dialectics of existence. Fourth, before the conclusion, the chapter is going to discuss the thematic of nothingness in ontological terms; hence the being of the black subject has been rendered to nothing.

#### 4.2 The disorder of things

The recovery of the black subject's lived experience should be restored by applying what should scientifically be defined as the common denominator. The application of this permits all human beings to share the absenteeism of their existence and status—*tabula rasa*. *Tabula rasa* permits the reinvention and reimagination of the existential conditions that emerged through a terrifying renewing struggle. As the second among three major pillars of his conception of decolonisation, Fanon ([1961] 1990) points out what *tabula rasa* means and entails:

But we have precisely chosen to speak of that kind of *tabula rasa* that characterizes at the outset all decolonization. Its unusual importance is that it constitutes, from the very first

day, the minimum demands of the colonized. To tell the truth, the proof of success lies in a whole social structure being changed from the bottom up. The extraordinary importance of this change is that it is willed, called for, demanded. (Fanon [1961] 1990:27)

For Fanon above, imperatively, genuine decolonisation cannot happen without the intervention of *tabula rasa*. Importantly, since its beginning, *tabula rasa* fulfils the minimum demands of black subjects in their painful struggle and journey to self-determination. *Tabula rasa* reverses the world and renders all human beings equal by changing everything from the bottom up and responding positively to those calling for it. However, the trajectory to self-determination requires courage as it is a painful journey that the majority do not wish to embrace. Having been denied and rejected by recurrent colonialism, black subjects have been collectively obliged to travel through the flames of fire with all their means, to refute the perpetual colonialism and reclaim their lived experiences that have been disregarded in the world.

Fanon ([1961] 1990) states that *tabula rasa* should be connoted as the beginning (the zero point) of everything. *Tabula rasa* that is the second among the three elements of Fanon's conception of decolonisation should not be confused with chaos, but rather results from chaos. *Tabula rasa* should be explained as a fundamental change that results in a decolonial turn, and therefore, simultaneously considered as the beginning of life and the loss of fugitive life lived under colonialism. In amplification, according to Marriott (2018:2), "*tabula rasa* is a paradoxical suspension of time which is also radically new beginning". Here, Marriott testifies how *tabula rasa* cancels the recorded history and invents a possible new time that benefits all, which is characterised by the colonised and colonisers restarting new lives.

Maldonado-Torres (2008:7) introduces, "decolonial turn highlights the epistemic relevance of the enslaved and colonized search for humanity". Therefore, there is no potentiality of reaching *tabula rasa* during perpetual colonialism. It cannot coexist with colonialism as it determines the conditions of existence for both the black colonised and the coloniser. *Tabula rasa* is a frightening moment but it potentially re-renders the colonised pure. During *tabula rasa*, no human being possesses anything but has to restart their lives from nothing as *tabula rasa* is the creation of the being from non-being.

Relevantly, Fanon's conception of *tabula rasa* introduces the necessary conditions of different conceptions of existential life. Marriott (2000:67) approves that Fanon's oeuvre contributed to the construction of another Self to reflect on the one that had been lost. Fanon contributed with extensive work in different domains; however, he played a major role in the exposition of the

problems caused by the black subject's skin colour. According to Mbembe (2012:22), "every single word of Fanon was a deposition in favour of this damaged and ruined existence". In other words, Fanon was preoccupied with the restoration of the existence of the black subject. This existence has been crumbled by the white master who created another false existence to be vested by blacks. Fanon's preoccupation was also to convince the black subject that *tabula rasa* characterises all decolonisation at the outset. This means that Fanon encourages the black subject to any circumstance that should provoke the *tabula rasa* to start. And, for *tabula rasa* to happen, there must be a decolonial struggle that opens the doors to it. And it is through such a struggle that the minimum of demands stipulated by Fanon above are presented.

In support of Fanon's idea on *tabula rasa* described as the beginning of the world's impartial, automatic and untouchable judge; according to Marriott (2018:228), "a decolonial violence leads to a *tabula rasa* bringing judgment into a play, but one without jurisdiction". *Tabula rasa* cancels the law and exposes the reality hidden in the structure of law society. *Tabula rasa* regulates the abnormalities caused by colonialism and directs misdirected and subjugated human beings. Apart from that *tabula rasa* is a terrifying moment, it is the only form supported by the element of violence, which can lead the black subject to a new humanism.

Consequently, from such perpetual colonialism, the *damnés* have been inflicted with heavy moral and physical punishment. They become dead beings with nothing as Warren (2019:39) declares: "the black subjects are improper bodies *and* the black subjects are *not* world poor but *without* a world". Black subjects are human beings without a world insofar as they are living in a world that has been fabricated by endless colonialism.

Therefore, the endless colonialism needs to be challenged and confronted violently by an enduring decolonial project that manifests in a terrible war. This call is obligatory and dedicated to all the oppressed, black subjects included. Maldonado-Torres (2016:28) reveals that decoloniality is a collective project that all the oppressed are called to respond to. This response does require preparation to reorder the disordered world through disorder caused by decolonial combat.

Normally, decolonisation that sets out to change the order of the world is, obviously, a programme of complete disorder (Fanon [1961] 1990:27). For black subjects to restore their beings, Fanon clarified above how decolonisation results from complete disorder to reorder the anti-black world. This reordering permits the resurrection of black subjects, who were

objectified by colonialism, by reattributing their lost human qualities and privileges. Maldonado-Torres (2008:100) stresses that colonialism is a world turned upside down. Thus, colonialism itself is a disorder that has completely reversed the world and humanity. The turning upside down of the world was rooted in the conquest that allowed the white master to illegally occupy the black subjects' territory without consulting them. Such a colonial condition needs to be met with another greater endless force, to be destroyed and brought back to the original world lived before colonialism. It is through such greater decolonial violence that emerges an outlawed society—*tabula rasa*.

In proceeding, Marriott (2018) reinforces:

In these situations said to found law or state, the category of *tabula rasa* all too well describes that moment when the order of things is changing from top to bottom ... these moments are terrifying... That is what Fanon is calling the *tabula rasa*. (Marriott 2018:176)

Marriott elucidates *tabula rasa* as the moment when the existing order of things changes from top to bottom; it takes a new direction where those who were excluded by colonialism regain their status as human beings who qualify to be registered in the world. Marriott above alerts as well that *tabula rasa* is characterised by terrifying moments because everyone suffers and encounters crimes and tortures they have never seen. The black subjects who pass into this period become other human beings who are fundamentally changed and trained because their existing knowledge is erased. They receive true knowledge that authorises them to rethink their true being, which was previously covered by colonialism.

Conditionally, the destruction of such concrete colonialism, which has dehumanised black subjects and negated them to international recognition, has only to pass through the enduring struggle as the way out, but not any other kind of negotiation, facilitation, or mediation. For black subjects to decolonise themselves, they need to restore their lived experiences fully. Marriott (2018:177) underlines again that *tabula rasa* signifies a moment of existential symbolic violence—psycho-political violence at the heart of social being and meaning, and one that turns the world upside down. *Tabula rasa* turns the pre-existing world upside down and creates a new world that registers all human beings without discrimination. *Tabula rasa* appears is an adequate and imperative conception for the restoration and reparation of the black subjects' lived experiences. Such a restoration is a necessity for the black subjects who have been excluded and rejected ontologically by the project of colonialism. *Tabula rasa* does not

intervene as a way of negotiating with the holders of colonialism, but as the main conception of life that differs from the previous life under colonialism.

Regrettably, the world is subjected to endless colonialism. Fanon ([1952]2008) declares that life is exposed to risks and pains. In light of this, Fanon ([1952] 2008:203) asserts: “I find myself one day in a world where things are hurtful; a world where I am required to fight; a world where it is always a question of defeat or victory”. For more concerns in this regard, Fanon laments about the colonial absurdity towards the world itself and humanity. When he says that he found himself in a world where things are hurtful and that required him to fight, he means that he lived under colonial conditions that obliged him to fight to justify his existence denied by the world. This is a world with two options: to be defeated or to fight until victory. Black subjects are invited to fight with all their means until they win the victory, namely self-determination. Lee (2015:117) witnesses that Fanon eventually received anonymous death threats and survived a bomb explosion outside his home. As a result, the colonial conditions obliged Fanon to stand up and fight against perpetual and painful colonialism to the point that he engaged in a merciless war.

In essence, colonial violence hurts the hearts of the oppressed, and from there, the oppressed have no option than to engage in an enduring serious struggle for life where the oppressed are ready for defeat or victory. About the anti-colonial Algerian War, Fanon ([1959] 1965:179) affirms that the same colonialism allowed the tight meshes of the police and the army to hold people and to wound them to death. Here, Springhall (2001:156) affirms that when the French government surrendered in Algeria, there was a mass exodus of one million four hundred and fifty thousand people. These people were mostly *colons*, but also many loyalist Arabs who left Algerian ports on the way to southern France or elsewhere, carrying only the permitted two suitcases per person. At this stage, it was lamentable to see the masters forced to leave the country that they easily took as their own and being chased away forever without almost anything. They left the land to the *damnés* who then became the owners of the land robbed from them. That was the result of the collective intervention of all the oppressed as a whole attacking the colonialists. This was assessed as a good step to *tabula rasa*.

Such an intervention is anticipated by heavy and terrifying chaos that destroys all structures and forms of colonialism and regulates everything to the zero point through total disorder. Marriott (2018:259) writes: “For Fanon, the mobilization of the wretched is an event or a decision that is radically unpredictable and entails a beginning that is irreducibly violent, and

one that leads to a ‘total, complete and absolute substitution’, or *tabula rasa*.” Hence, the colonial disorder can only be resolved greatly by another violent disorder in the field of combat and all domain structures of life. *Tabula rasa* substitutes the existing world, which denies black subjects, with another world that accommodates black subjects as humans who have recovered all of their human qualities.

Such a total disorder aims to restructure the social structure and to recognise the humanity of black subjects. The basis of the conditions of *tabula rasa* is the absolute restructuring of life as the state becomes stateless and reversed. Thus, according to Fanon ([1961] 1990), a society must disappear and be replaced by another new form of society. This society originated through a struggle created by the condition of life under colonialism, which is a problem of existence that dehumanises black subjects. In support of Fanon’s revelation, Marriott (2018:72) states, “From social death to *tabula rasa*, for Fanon, destructive violence is the process through which the socially dead acquire a new symbolic form”. Here, society dies so that another new society has *naissance*. It is from the complete disorder of everything and the cessation of human existence that a new society for life originates, but it is started and lived with a perpetual struggle just to dismantle and guard the enduring colonialism.

According to Fanon ([1959] 1965:87), “we must remember that colonialism has often strengthened or established its domination by organizing ‘the petrification of the country districts’” Here, Fanon is concerned about how colonialism as a violent project has used all means of terror to render the citizen as stone—an object that is not able to move anymore. Consequently, black subjects end up agreeing to something without knowing its consequences. For instance, they are always told, “if you do this, you will be killed or jailed”. This means that the citizens live under the enduring terror of colonialism with the law as its apparatus of terror. To clarify the meaning of petrification, Ficek puts it in these words:

‘Petrification’ also evokes the monstrosity of colonialism. When we are terrified, horrified, or frightened, we sometimes become ‘petrified with fear.’ We cannot move; we cannot scream. Agency abandons us—or is taken from us—and for a few moments, we are stuck in time. (Ficek 2011:77)

Therefore, the fact that they have lost hope of escaping this ongoing petrifying moment linked to everyday life encourages black subjects to engage in a terrifying struggle characterised by a tumult of war and a noise of cries. This is a *tabula rasa* that results from pain and a critical situation. At the beginning of *tabula rasa*, the thoughts and feelings of victory are boosted by

combat because there is a permanent joy that emerges from the cries of the struggle that destroys the existing world. That destruction of existing things by a total disorder is the final and last step that leads to the creation of the beginning of another new world which has never existed. It is such a kind of new world that recognises and redresses the privileges of black subjects taken under colonialism. In addition, Fanon views the revolution as a moment of tumult and ecstasy in which depetrification allows the discharge of entirely new libidinal expenditure that further allows new relations of love, pleasure, and new forms of aesthetic culture to appear (Marriott 2018:72). It is a period of the invention since everyone is supposed to live their lives without copying or being obliged to copy any other reference[s]. With *tabula rasa*, everything starts afresh with new modalities of life.

Relevantly, Ficek (2011:75) mentions, “shortly before his death, for example, Fanon regretted not being able to die on the battlefield, a risk with which he was more familiar”. Fanon was a questioning body who was exposed morally and physically to the cause of human liberation—a real and determinant fight. Fanon thought that he would die on the battlefield. Regrettably, he died because of illness—something that he complained about until his death as his wish was to die on the battlefield. Dying on the battlefield for liberation as Fanon’s wish would be a typical example that each black subject should see himself/herself as the mirror of encouragement.

Furthermore, perpetual colonialism needs to end by the destruction of the complexes and the restoration of the black subject’s new humanity. For Fanon ([1961] 1990:31), “the destruction of the colonial world is more and no less than the abolition of one zone, its burial in the depths of the earth or its expulsion from the country”. Therefore, the zone of being, as the zone of the masters in the colonial situation, has to be abolished and buried to resurrect those who are in the zone of non-being to appear at the scenery of life with good conditions of existence. To a high extent, such a zone of being of the ‘Other’ must be expelled and deported back to its origin. This means that it requires a total suspension of colonialism confronted by a terrible and violent war.

As introduced above, colonialism itself is characterised by total disorder, lawlessness, inequality, discrimination, racialism, dehumanisation, undermining, to cite just a few. Fanon ([1961] 1990:32) demonstrates, “As if to show the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation, the settler paints the native as a sort of quintessence of evil”. The settler’s exploitation cancels the values of the natives and obliges black subjects to adopt Western

civilisation, which is totally against African culture. Consequently, black subjects had to live with double-doubted values. As human beings who have been dehumanised and who have become tired of the colonial situation, their conscience invoked them to reclaim the roots of their origin and kill all parasites in search of their original being. From this imagination, recall that black subjects are human beings who think and question as Fanon did. Tlostanova and Mignolo (2009) witness that decolonial thinking and decolonial option are projects led and created by the social actor Fanon.

Bravely, it was teleological that a response of the colonial disorder could also be confronted by another decolonial disorder that employs the violence and massacre towards the coloniser—a potential point of starting *tabula rasa*. To find a solution to such a colonial condition that buried the myths of black subjects, Fanon ([1961] 1990) continues to demonstrate a way out and recommends:

All values, in fact, are irrevocably poisoned and diseased as soon as they are allowed in contact with the colonized race. The customs of the colonized people, their traditions, their myths – above all, their myths – are the very sign of that poverty of spirit and their constitutional depravity. That is why we must put the DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) which destroys parasites, the bearers of disease, on the same level as the Christian religion which wages war on embryonic heresies and instincts, and on evil as yet unborn. (Fanon [1961] 1990:32)

Unfortunately, after the conquest period, the values, privileges, and human attributes of black subjects were rejected. They were dehumanised and obliged to turn into a (unique) Eurocentric direction. Colonial parasites infected the values of black subjects and the black subjects themselves. Their myths terrified the colonisers; the same myths were destroyed and judged unreal to human beings while such myths were adequate for black subject's self-recognition through their culture.

Therefore, Fanon ([1961] 1990) exposes that all the values of black subjects were poisoned by colonialism. Consequently, Fanon proposes that another chemical poison, namely DDT, must respond to colonialism to dismantle, destroy and erase it and its apparatus strategies. This means that colonialism is the poison itself, which must be cured by applying another poison, the DDT, to intervene as a vigorous anti-colonial tool of decolonisation. The application of DDT is manifested through a decolonisation struggle. When the time arrives and the black subject decides to take part in the struggle, the same black need to know that decolonisation is the period of harvest. Fanon ([1961] 1990:33) assumes, “He is offered definite values, he is



told frequently that decolonization need not mean regression, and that he must put his trust in qualities which are well-tried, solid, and highly esteemed”. This shows that decolonisation is an unavoidable transformation phase of the black subject in his journey to self-determination.

In addition, the explosion of murderous violence, or desire, during the war of liberation is not due to drive or degeneration, but to an atmosphere that has no objective other than to show itself in its fever-inducing brilliance (Marriott 2018:188). Such an atmosphere cannot be found in a colonial situation, but only after combat that leads to *tabula rasa*. Thus, *tabula rasa* is equal to such an atmosphere that has no object. Then, an explosion of murderous violence occurs to destroy colonialism and save the fraternity of subjugated human beings. It is that fraternity that should encourage and animate a feeling of love among black subjects. For Fanon ([1952] 2008:201), “Every time a man has brought victory to the dignity of the spirit, every time a man has said no to an attempt to enslave his fellow man, I have felt a sense of solidarity with his act”. Fanon shows that decolonisation is not the duty of a single black subject for himself. Fanon encourages that attempting to enslave another black subject, proves that only solidarity among black subjects can defeat colonialism. As a sign of solidarity in practice, Fanon devoted himself to struggle to save all the oppressed. This solidarity is a collective response that concerns all the dehumanised and wretched black subjects as a whole.

Agreeing with Marriott above, Fanon ([1961] 1990) reveals that as soon as natives begin to pull on their moorings and the settlers become anxious, the natives are handed over to well-meaning souls who point out the specificity and wealth of Western values in cultural congresses. For black subjects to cause the settlers’ anxiety, the chain and the relation that exists between the subject and the settler have to be cut. Such a cutting of relationship is only possible through the struggle between the two. The black subjects have to create how to come over the critical conditions of colonialism. And, this has not to be any other option, except for engagement in the endless struggle of decolonisation.

As a point of clarification to the overhead discussion, Marriott (2018:188) elucidates “The appeal here is not to a retributive or distributive justice, but to the dark chaos of *tabula rasa*, which Fanon evokes as a ‘dialectic requirement’”. Marriott advances that for Fanon *tabula rasa* has to be a required dialectic because it is a chaos that intervenes with a motive of creating another place that comes in favour of the black subjects. Thereby, what is important to both Fanon and Marriott is cancelling the false relationship between the black colonised and coloniser. Stopping such a relationship means ‘decolonisation’ and it is through that

cancellation of the colonial relationship that the beginning of *tabula rasa* as a required dialectic is established.

Significantly, Ficek (2011) demonstrates how in the colonial world, black subjects are denied the freedom that they deserve, as the main target for the coloniser is to petrify the black subjects completely. The coloniser would like to create a world so saturated with the seriousness that its opposite—*playfulness*—would be nowhere to be found (Ficek 2011:80). Such a petrified world needs to be confronted by black subjects who have decided to escape the terror of colonialism. They have to engage in an enduring struggle to cut the existing colonial relationship. This relationship is not reciprocal as the master knows well black subjects, but black subjects do not know their master as they are always morally and physically petrified. According to Gibson (2011:101), “the colonial social relation was characterized by a combination of superexploitation and everyday humiliation that reduced the colonized to not-quite-human and subhistorical status”. This everyday humiliation is extreme in the sense that there is a subordination of mastery in society. The relationship between the black subject and the coloniser created by colonialism empowers the white master to exploit the black subject for the rest of his life. In that social relation born in colonialism, the black subject is rendered as a spectator of what is going on in the world, and he/she does not have any right to question.

Marriott is clear that the dialectic requirement evoked by Fanon is the conception of *tabula rasa*. Marriott adds:

It is in response to this ecstatic revolutionary movement toward liberation, where the whole relationship to the colony is reinvented, where every social relation enters into crisis and disorder, where the space and time of the new nation produce both asceticism *and* excess, that the socially dead are meant to rejoin the ranks of the living ... th[e]ir changing relationship to the disorder from which a *tabula rasa* emerges. (Marriott 2018:191)

In essence, Marriott’s (2018) quotation above explains how the *colon* and black subjects’ changing the relationship to disorder affects society to complete death insofar as the same society will be changed fundamentally to a new society that is not imposed on law or any state’s authority. It is a society that results from a total disorder. However, such a disorder is judged to be good as it creates possibilities. It is good for those who were subjugated and dehumanised by the colonial system as they acquire enjoyment at this time, which resulted from that violent disorder.

Continuously, Fanon's conception of *tabula rasa* reveals to black subjects that their recovery has to originate through a total disorder that intends to reorder the world. Fanon encourages them to embrace this route of the endless struggle to reach self-determination. However, because decolonisation is an endless project, the subjugated and dehumanised black subjects have been imposed to enter into an endless war of decolonisation. In addition, Fanon ([1961] 1990:200) accentuates, "but the war goes on, and we will have to bind up for years to come the many, sometimes ineffaceable, wounds that the colonialist onslaught has inflicted on our people". Here, Fanon reveals how since the conquest period, it has been obligatory for black subjects to fight against the illegal Western invasion of their political, economic, cultural, educational, and justice affairs, to name only but a few.

As a point of amplification, Fanon's revelation of a continual war of decolonisation depicts decolonisation as a project that deals with the *longue-durée* of colonialism, because the decolonial goals intend to expose colonial *manoeuvres* and apparatuses so that it can be visible to everyone. Thus, after exposing colonialism, it becomes easy to destroy completely, and from there, black subjects reach self-determination, which requires the massacre and destruction of the world so that another new world can start. Gibson (2003) explains colonial exploitation of black subjects as follows:

The colonialists expressed an inferiority complex exhibited through domination and superiority. The few Europeans unaffected by the contagion understood that their power lay not with force alone but in exploiting a certain weakness of personality on the part of the Malagasies which put Europeans in roughly the same position as dead ancestors. (Gibson 2003:56)

The exploitation of the black subject by the white master can only cease after the meeting of two forces—an enduring decolonial war. There, dying on the field of combat of decolonisation does not mean a sacrifice because the war continues; dying is one among other things that might happen—bloody struggle. The subjugated black subjects have to respond massively (collectively) to such a war. The masters do not select the subjects when they oppress them, which is why they have to respond collectively in solidarity without exception when attacking to defeat the enemy. This does not need any kind of negotiation or mediation in an attempt to resolve the matter between the white masters and the *damnés*, but only an engagement of the enduring struggle by black subjects.

Two parties in conflict can opt for negotiation or mediation. Mediation could be successful depending on the ability of the mediator. Harigopal (1995:48) points out that a mediator

facilitates communication and tries to create a better climate between the two parties to facilitate integrative problem-solving. In contrast, Marriott (2018) who interprets Fanon's conception of *tabula rasa* rejects Harigopal's (1995) mediation as a problem-solving tactic between conflicting parties. Regarding negotiation, mediation, or facilitation, like Fanon, Marriott firmly does not believe that decolonisation should be the result of a compromise:

The infusing power of the revolutionary demand for a *tabula rasa* without mediation ... is a demand that intervenes in a general state of disorder and one that in the pursuit of liberation acts without guarantees. There is no state of preparedness here or mass mobilization of opinion: the people's radical decision involves a refusal (of the traditional forms of mobilization) and a risk (to existence) as they struggle to abolish the colonial system by turning its violence against itself. (Marriott 2018:152)

According to the etymological meaning of *tabula rasa*, amplified by its conceptual meaning for Fanon's sense, *tabula rasa* differs far from mediation. *Tabula rasa* results from the chaos where two forces use the power for the oppressing state to remain and the oppressed to fight back with all their means to destroy the state and to render the society outlawed. *Tabula rasa* does not have its own time set to prepare and it operates without commandment. *Tabula rasa* arrives as a surprising bomb, which results in the long accumulation of illogical colonialism.

In addition, as there is no state of preparedness for *tabula rasa*, it does not have any head of instruction. As a scary moment, *tabula rasa* automatically cancels the domination caused by endless colonialism. Every action between the master and black subjects is accomplished without asking the *mea culpa* of the previous master anymore. All survivors of the total disorder are the new-borns of such a total disorder, which suspends superiority and renders the people of the society equal by suppressing imperialism. Therefore, colonial imperialism needs to be suspended by a total disorder as it is characterised as a disorder. According to Fanon ([1961] 1990:200), "that imperialism which today is fighting against a true liberation of mankind leaves in its wake here and their tinctures of decay which we must search out and mercilessly expel from our land and our spirits". This means that black subjects have to be ready to fight back to a point that colonialism is expelled from wherever it is located and still operating.

Relevantly, black subjects are called to remain vigilant against colonialism. Regarding that vigilance, Marriott (2018:176–177) alerts, "the moment of *tabula rasa* is transcendent, violent, and nonviolent in a similar way because it depends on the one who is already on guard against it—and so on the one who preserves it, or produces it, founds it, authorizes it as it is immanent

but who finds that its presence always escapes him”. Thus, *tabula rasa* is transcendent as it is a period that has never been and that has never been seen; it reverses the colonial conditions of life. The absence or the delay of *tabula rasa* causes madness for a number of the oppressed. Such ‘a madness’ becomes complicated to cure. It is only the intervention of *tabula rasa* that renders the mental disorders to order (cured), as Fanon ([1961] 1990:200) reminds us: “We shall deal here with the problem of mental disorders which arise from the war of national liberation which the Algerian people are carrying on”. During and after a liberation struggle, there is an increase of losing control of the brain caused by the tensions and terrifying moments that black subjects have to transcend. This means that the war causes mental sickness. However, for the black subjects to reach self-determination, they need to sacrifice themselves in continual combat.

The war of national liberation is a good step for the war of decolonisation. There are psychological disorders that originate from the combat of liberation: as it is terrifying, it is also first seen by the oppressed. As the colonialists could not have any pity to use the colonial violence, black subjects as a whole have to be aware that the same violence has to be launched back to the colonisers. Therefore, while trying to launch back violence, it is from this confrontation where the mental disorders emerge.

At this moment of absolute disorder, the past life that has hardened due to continuous persecution is rejected; indeed, the colonised no longer seeks to conserve that which inhibits it but becomes restless, animated, and creative. From the top downwards, its being acquires a new disposition because its piety withers away alongside its reverence for the old order (Marriott 2018:243). *Tabula rasa* rejects history, and all human beings restart their new lives for existence. *Tabula rasa* rejects the persecution of black subjects as they now follow self-direction without being mentored on how to do any activity related to their everyday lives.

Finally, because of *tabula rasa*, which is the result of a terrible war, black subjects revert to their values and attributes and redefine themselves. During colonialism, the same black subjects were followers who did not make any decisions or contributed to society. It is during this total war where everything is in disorder that the colonial apparatus, which was as a scarecrow, is abolished.

### 4.3 On political imagination

The thematic of political imagination is defined as a period of invention and discovery of the new modes of life, which is characterised by a radical reimagination of how to recreate a new society, built on ontological and fundamental change. The black subjects of action sometimes have the exhausting impression that they must restore the whole of their people; that they must bring everyone up out of the pit and out of the shadows (Fanon [1961] 1990:237).

In Fanon's understanding of the concept of political imagination, colonialism deprives black subjects of the right to contribute to the politics of the world. Colonialism excludes the black subjects' political imagination because they are not allowed to invent and are not considered human beings who possess knowledge. Black subjects depend on Euro-North American knowledge, which is considered as the model for the entire world. This dependence is still a serious problem for their lives wherever they are located in the world. In light thereof, Fanon ([1952] 2008:90) observes: "In the twentieth century the black man on his home territory is oblivious of the moment when his inferiority is determined by the other". Thus, for Fanon, the oppressors have proclaimed themselves to be superior society. However, they have to be challenged by black subjects, to cancel the complexes of inferiority and superiority. Those complexes have been implanted by colonialists as their major strategies to dominate the blacks' souls.

Black subjects have to confront the idea that because of colonialism, they lost their identities and direction, as Fanon underlines:

There is nothing comparable when it comes to the black man. He has no culture, no civilization, and no 'long historical past.' Perhaps that is why today's blacks want desperately to prove to the white world the existence of a black civilization. (Fanon [1952] 2008:17)

Having been obliged to adopt European culture and civilisation, black subjects found themselves as human beings without history. Thus, in Fanon's political imagination, black subjects have to engage in a struggle that claims their culture, history, and own civilisation. Fanon further shows how the oppressed (black subjects) are not able to determine their role in world politics while they do not possess their own culture, history, and civilisation.

Fanon's political imagination demonstrates how racism and power are essential elements that affect the political domination. At this point, Farred (2011) reveals that impact in these words:

Fanon, whose extreme regard for the 'wretched' derives, more than anything, from his commitment to the rural colonized, 'these restless, instinctively rebellious masses', sees in this constituency a group bound together by alienation from the urban polis (both colonized and colonizer), though/because of both geography and radical political sensibility. Following Fanon's description of how the urban colonized intellectual encounters his rural peers (always as a male intellectual), we might name it a romanticized political construction. (Farred 2011:161)

Farred explains how for Fanon, wretchedness is a construction that permits the white master to continue oppressing black subjects. However, such masses of people are those who have to be patient and destroy the wretchedness that violent colonialism has imposed on them. The absence of that wretchedness will occur when the masses or the black subjects as a whole organise themselves and fight endlessly with the subordination of the mastery found in society.

It is within such subordination of mastery in society that the complexes of domination are animated. Those complexes are the result of the fear and fear of death that the white master uses to maintain that the black subjects are well monitored and controlled. Those complexes minimise the black subject and elevate the status of the white master, as Gordon comments as it is found in the world:

Affirming one's link to one's blackness is, however, a complex affirmation under the dual significance of blackness as both sin and suffering. To choose blackness when one could whiteness seems to take the form of a sacrifice that carries complex ethical questions of its own. (Gordon 2000:98)

Gordon's (2000) political imagination sees race as a tool that includes and excludes the world's beings. The colonised are prejudicially disqualified because of their skin colour, while the white masters are considered and registered highly at the expense of black subjects. Black subject suffers due to their skins but also for their inner beings, which are rendered nothing because of their skin colour. In this world, neither black subjects nor the white master can choose blackness, as Gordon above states that choosing blackness is choosing sin but also suffering. This construction of races can only be nullified by starting *tabula rasa*.

Simultaneously, Marriott's (2018:176) thinking on political imagination points out that *tabula rasa* is a period of invention and the category of *tabula rasa* consists, precisely, in a moment of radical reimagining. Marriott echoes Fanon by insisting that *tabula rasa* permits black subjects to invent new modes of life. In addition, he exposes how *tabula rasa* appears as an important potential time for black subjects to radically reimagine how to establish the conditions of their existential lives. Regarding reimagination, Lee (2015:169) highlights: "Yet

cultural politics must still be oriented toward the present and the future”, as this should not only be the cultural politics but the politics of reparation in general.

Thereby, establishing these conditions of existential life is only possible when the politics which have been created by the oppressors are abolished: “the ‘political creature’ invoked here is, naturally, that key, evocative term that Fanon bequeathed the lexicon of the anticolonial movement and its postcolonial or antiglobalization successors” (Farred 2011:161). Here, this expands and stimulates an understanding of the Fanonian phrase, “the wretched of the earth”, which has a deeper and lasting meaning concerning the masses of people damned or thrown apart by political affairs. Fanon’s ([1961] 1990) political imagination alerts that the same damned black subjects are those who are ready for the revolution as even they do not have anything to lose but potentially to gain the maximum of their demands.

As an instance of directing the political imagination concerning *tabula rasa*, follows a scenario. Such an imaginary scenario is analysed using an ache, a patient, a doctor, and medicines (tablets). When someone has a body ache, the person will be advised to go to the hospital. The patient will respectively have to see and explain to the doctor if such an ache is felt over a part of the entire body. Then, after a deep examination of the patient, the doctor has to identify the symptoms and causes of the ache (illness). Thereafter, the doctor will have to cure such an illness by prescribing tablets or medicines (depending on the gravity of the situation, the doctor could even decide to inject the patient).

Let us derive the above scenario and apply it to the context of this study. Now, the analysis is respectively going to use the subsequent elements: colonialism (an ache), the black subject (the patient), the *tabula rasa* (doctor), and, lastly, the disorder of things (medicines/tablets or injection) in which *tabula rasa* emerges. In their everyday lives, black subjects as a whole suffer endless colonialism, which currently hides itself into coloniality. Therefore, Fanon’s conception of decolonisation obliges black subjects to use violent disorder to establish a new order in a new stateless society. Such a disorder plays the same role as the medicines/tablets or injections of the imagined patient above.

Reasonably, Fanon’s political imagination focuses on the thoughts of how to create a new society without domination and race discrimination. Thus, Fanon’s conception of decolonisation intends not only to save the individual but mainly also the whole society. This revolution is changing humanity because, in the revolutionary struggle, the immense,



oppressed masses of the colonies and semi-colonies feel that they are a part of life for the first time (Fanon [1959] 1965:1). For this to happen, colonial violence needs to be ruined by a great decolonial force. Nayar (2013:96) agrees with Fanon that decolonisation is an attempt to reverse colonial conditions. It is from this reversal of colonial conditions that an independent society of existence originates. A foundation of such a glorious society results in the engagement of bloody renewal combat which ravages, kills many, and saves the rest forever. With the same opinion, Fanon ([1964] 1967:114) underlines, “Men enslaved and oppressed by foreign nations today are invited to participate totally in the work of demolition of the colonial system”. To destroy colonialism has to be well planned and black subjects have to take part in this honour work which intends to bring back the new humanity which has been rejected. This demolition of the colonial system must be a duty delegated to the black subjects themselves and not to anyone else.

Therefore, Marriott (2018:10) elucidates, “the opposition between space and time simplifies what Fanon says about the experience of space and time in the colony (as a kind of dead, petrified spacing of time), and the postcolony (as the moment of *tabula rasa* where thinking is recalled to time and the becoming time of the nation transforms the space of ethical and political life)”. It is only within *tabula rasa* that thoughts are updated to time and the subjugated dress their ethical plan concerning political thought. *Tabula rasa* intervenes as the new beginning of the new life despite its terrifying moments. However, it is through this terrifying moment that the black subjects are fundamentally changed into other strong and audacious human beings.

According to Fanon ([1961] 1990: 237), “a people’s victorious fight not only consecrates the triumph of its rights; it also gives to that people consistency, coherence, and homogeneity”. In Fanon’s political imagination, it is through the decolonisation battle that harmony and unity result from the subjugated. Fanon insists that only fighting for the rights of black subjects does not fulfil the requirements of true liberated black subjects who can live with new modes of life. However, the homogeneity evoked by Fanon above is reached in a society without racism.

According to Bernasconi (2011:85), “race was always for Fanon more about the future than the past and more about how to stop people from being exploited than about combating whatever theories were used to justify their exploitation”. What is important here is that Fanon, who has even criticised the negritude, considers race more as an element of unification than any other thing. This unification will therefore have to unite all black subjects as one who then fights colonialism together. Fanon’s political imagination on race encourages black subjects to

be happy and confident of their skin—a skin that may help all black subjects wherever they are located in the world to fight as one until self-determination. Here, concerning racial issues, Gibson and Beneduce (2017:245) reinforce that “for Fanon, the situation of black people and the persistence of racism and colonialism spurred social and political reflection, casting light on the specificity of suffering that most contemporary writers on psychiatry were ignoring”. Racism influences political reflection, political behaviour, and imagination. The blackness constructed by colonialism affects the immobility of black reason and their contribution to political affairs. The black subject can only reach self-determination where their political imagination can be considered if they engage in the war that cuts blackness.

According to Fanon ([1964] 1967:111), “it is the desperate, stubborn, heroic struggle of the Algerian people which makes apparent new meanings, overcomes certain contradictions, makes possible what yesterday was unthinkable”. Here, Fanon insists that without black subjects engaging in war, the possibilities of creating the conditions of existential life cannot be, except through a terrifying struggle. Marriott (2018) leads the front line as the disciple of Fanon’s conception of *tabula rasa*, which is only able to grant a new way of existence to the black subjects under the sufferings caused by discrimination. Based on his thought, Fanon alerts the black subject not only to be limited to a political forum but to refute any other forms of oppression found in the society. That is why, for spontaneity of the black subject’s rebelliousness to be precisely that which resists organisation (in the sense of being a copy of the colonial power or administered as such by the party), its emerging can scarcely be a sovereign activity (Marriott 2018:257). Copying the models of life from the master means to lose direction and to be lost—to be out of the primitive of the black subject’s myths, this is a scandal to the political imagination that allows existential life.

In addition, Fanon ([1961] 1990:249) asserts: “To live means to keep on existing ... Every date is a victory: not the result of work, but a victory felt like a triumph for life”. Black subjects are encouraged to keep in mind that life is about struggle, as Fanon reminds that life is a sign that there is a continuity of existence. There is no time to lose, black subjects are called to use the present time as the opportunity to struggle. This struggle will help the oppressed to overcome dehumanisation and to triumph forever.

In addition, to attain such a triumph of life, Fanon ([1961] 1990) stridently calls for the oppressed to change direction:

Come, then, comrades; it would be as well to decide at once to change our ways. We must shake off the heavy darkness in which we were plunged, and leave it behind. The new day which is already at hand must find us firm, prudent and resolute. (Fanon [1961] 1990:251)

Thereby, the political thought of Fanon for decolonisation obliges the *damnés* to change their modes of life and to think about the existence of life—an interminable life. He recommends that black subjects remain careful and ready at any time to erase the perpetual colonial violence which dehumanises black subjects' values and personalities. Changing the modes of life is not an individual project, but rather a decolonial project that concerns the whole oppressed black community. Schwartz (1974:16) confirms that the humanist insists on social change and participates in the creation of a system that offers greater sanity, humanity, and justice. Thus, black subjects have to follow the argument of the humanist that calls them to politically imagine how to radically change their society.

Deplorably, colonialism is the dehumanisation of the black subject as it dispossesses all the human attributes that were uniquely possessed as their natural inherent attributes. Consequently, black subjects who are oppressed by colonialism have to search for a way out to retrieve their original status before encountering colonialism. Any human being can agree to eternal domination that does not have any justification, and it requires the colonised to be human beings who think and question. At this point in their everyday lives, the black subjects ask themselves a series of questions but answer in vain. Here, Kristeva ([1980] 1982:209) is relevant to say: “In short, who, I ask you, would agree to call himself abject, subject of or subject to abjection?” Colonialism was imposed on black subjects; therefore, it is still confusing for black subjects to answer questions while they are out of the zone of human beings. The first question that a black subject has to ask is who they are in reality. It is by discovering who they are in this colonial world that black subjects can expand and answer other fundamental questions. Answering is currently still impossible because “with juridical-political decolonization, we moved from a period of ‘global colonialism’ to the current period of ‘global coloniality’” (Grosfoguel 2007:219). In this regard, black subjects continue to live under the same colonialism that has only changed names; and current colonialism is too destructive and physically invisible.

Normally, the better human beings think, the better they progress and succeed. However, the thoughts of the oppressed must focus on the original of the effect, and not follow the master's thought of domination as it cannot lead the oppressed to self-determination. Our thinking must be original because Fanon ([1959] 1965:47) criticised that although the white man created the

Negro, it was also the Negro who created negritude. Thinking should develop the mind of the oppressed as their key to escape the arsenal of colonialism that has collectively contaminated the political thoughts of the collective black subjects. Fanon ([1961] 1990:251) asks, “So, my brothers, how is that we do not understand that we have better things to do than to follow that same Europe?” He intends to encourage black subjects to rethink their original models of life that differ from Western models, which positioned itself to the originality of knowledge. At the same point of imitation, Fanon ([1961] 1990:251–252) warns: “The European game has finally ended; we must find something different. We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe”. Imitation cannot lead to discovery and it prevents people from thinking about originality. Black subjects have to think about how to render such absurdity of imitation null. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2016:70) writes: “Indeed the African decolonial struggle is still on course mainly because the post-1945 decolonization project failed to deliver a genuinely decolonized and deimperialized world”. This shows how black subjects are still under the same project of colonialism that haunts their ordinary lives. The decolonisation which has been proclaimed by most of the African countries was not able to satisfy the black subjects’ minimum needs. Thus, the black subjects have to continue to fight until they reach a decolonisation that offers them the maximum of what they deserve.

It is finally evident that at the moment at which the colonial state is renewed by the people’s commitment, Fanon sees an oscillation not between sovereignty and politics, but between politics that produce vertigo and politics that remain indebted—strategically and methodologically—to the European model, an opposition that, ultimately, differs from invention (Marriott 2018:276). At this point, both Fanon and Marriott recognise that following the European models will render the black subjects to remain without invention. Therefore, Fanon proposed not only to imitate Europe but also to leave it since colonialism is a violent project that needs to be confronted with greater decolonial violence.

However, Jinadu (1980:89) refutes Fanon’s justification of decolonial violence by stating that Fanon is not concerned with the question of whether any government can sustain itself without some form of physical violence. Jinadu’s criticism of Fanon could be interrogated that Jinadu failed to demonstrate whether those governments used violence at the time they took power. Jinadu is supposed to be aware that there were typical cases of *coup d’états* that have been taken by some military cadres as a way of gaining power. These cadres are using the same

violence that Jinadu defends and positions that he is against Fanon's conception of counter-violence. To another extent, Jinadu may understand that decolonisation differs greatly from independence. To reach self-determination, it is therefore obvious that black subjects need to challenge politics that originated from Europe by demonstrating that they can contribute distinctively to human knowledge and civilisation.

Finally, the possibility of Fanon's conception of political imagination has the potentiality to emanate from the valorisation of the black subjects' engagement in an endless struggle, which can redefine black subjects and recover their lost humanity. The black subjects as a whole, wherever they are located in the world, are the keys that open doors and reclaim their own culture, civilisation, and history, as suggested by Fanon's political imagination.

#### **4.4 Fanon's old and new dialectics**

According to Fanon ([1952] 2008:191), "Man is human only to the extent to which he tries to impose himself on another man to be recognized by him". Fanon's ([1952] 2008) concern is that as long as black subjects are not recognised effectively by their master, the master continues to control all actions of black subjects. Consequently, the lives of black subjects are defined by their master as the subjects always depend on their master's recognition.

Relevantly, Fanon's conception of dialectics is unique insofar as Fanon thinks about the dialectics of existence that confront the endless dehumanisation caused by colonialism. Under colonialism, the master cannot be recognised by the black subject, but the reciprocity of recognition between the master and black subject can only happen in absence of colonialism. However, the master does not want to relinquish the project of perpetual colonialism, while that reciprocity of recognition is by emergency fundamentally needed by the black subject. Fanon's dialectics of existence is therefore demonstrated in his distinctive analysis that calls black subjects to force the master so that the reciprocal recognition between the black subject and the master can happen. In this regard, Fanon alerts in clear terms:

But the former slave wants to *have himself recognized*. There is at the basis of Hegelian dialectic absolute reciprocity that must be highlighted. It is when I go beyond my immediate existential being that I apprehend the being of the other as a natural reality and more than that. If I shut off the circuit, if I make the two-way movement unachievable, I keep the other within himself. To an extreme degree, I deprive him even of this being-for-self. (Fanon [1952] 2008:191–192)

The reciprocal recognition cannot fall as manna; it comes from a struggle that will cost the head of the black subject. While Hegelian's dialectics were only concerned with freedom of the black subject, however, Fanon needs to shut the circuit down or cut the relation with its group, which is led by the master. As a point of importance, this cutting requires asking a question, but the same question is turned on its head. "Fanon thus turned the question on its head, showing that it was impossible to talk about a group" (Gibson & Beneduce 2017:248). This shows how black subjects have many questions, but they live with those questions without asking the master because the same questions are returned to their heads immediately (returned unanswered). However, Fanon's conception of dialectics is maintained in his determination of the creation of the conditions of existential life. His objective was to encourage black subjects to be human beings who go forward all the time—each day and night—humans for existence whose intention is to reach in a world without questions—self-determination:

What we want to do is to go forward all the time, night and day, in the company of Man, in the company of all men. The caravan should not be stretched out, for in that case, each line will hardly see those who precede it; and men who no longer recognize each other meet less and less together, and talk to each other less and less. (Fanon [1961] 1990:254)

Fanon declares above that with a decolonised society, the caravan should not be stretched out. With the presence of decolonisation, white people who have declared themselves masters will therefore have to recognise black subjects; the same as black subjects who from then know the ones who have self-appointed them as their previous masters. What is important is that a decolonised society permits the reciprocity of the black subject and the master, but the master does not have the power to oppress the black subject anymore, which means that within a decolonised society, there is no slave or master.

At this point, Mbembe (2010) agrees with Fanon that a decolonised community is a community on the march, a community of walkers, a vast universal caravan (Mbembe 2010:17 translated). Although a decolonised society must be active, mobile, and movable, it must also grow. Sharpe (2016:13–14) proposes, "to be in the wake is to occupy and to be occupied by the continuous and changing present of slavery's as yet unresolved unfolding". Here, Sharpe encourages the black subjects that they have to be ready for the struggle. They have to make sure that they are occupied and preoccupied with the struggle which shall change their presence in the good future. The changing of black slavery into human beings with respect is what Sharpe is proposing to all black subjects. This proposition recalls Fanon's conception of dialectics. For that reason, firstly to understand Fanon's conception of dialectics; requires a deep

understanding of how Fanon justifies the concept of violence. For Fanon, violence should be assessed as the arbitrator between the coloniser and the colonised.

In amplification, Sekyi-Otu (1996:26) declares, “I, too, will go along with Hegel and call Fanon’s account of this movement a *dialectic* of experience”. Fanon’s dialectics are the dialectics of existence as such dialectics create the necessary conditions of life in continuity. Thus, Fanon’s dialectics are dialectics of experience by the fact that his arguments chart a way to eternal life and to a world where there is no subjugation—a subjugation that Fanon himself has experienced in his life. In the same context, Sekyi-Otu (1996:237) adds that Fanon’s texts speak to us with immensely complex and compelling force when we read its contents as speech acts in the moving body of a dramatic narrative. Fanon’s conception of decolonisation reveals that both the coloniser and the colonised rely on the applicability of violence.

Therefore, the coloniser’s violence started with conquest and was socially structured by colonialism in Africa. Zahar ([1969] 1974) agrees with Fanon that the colonial system is based on violence. Hence, violence of the colonised (counter-violence) is a derivation of colonial violence. As a paraphraser of Fanon’s justification of counter-violence, Marriott (2018:228) illuminates that decolonial violence leads to *tabula rasa* that brings judgment into play, but one without jurisdiction. This counter-violence which is from the black subject differs from the one for Hegel despite that it originated from him. This is because it refers to a fight that is not to the death, however, it is with and from death itself. This combat intends to go beyond the status of death in creating a new life. The counter-violence seeks to recuperate the self of the black subject. Therefore, using missing what to choose, the black subject has to adopt the application of the same violence which has been applied by the master. It is from the struggle where the black subject becomes a new-born. Zahar ([1969] 1974) clarifies that through the act of violence, the colonised are capable of freeing themselves from their reified status and becoming human beings once again.

Fanon’s explication advances the necessity of a struggle for a human being to escape colonial principles is further important. Black subjects have to recognise themselves and reach self-determination where they are permitted to apply the new modes of life for existence. Here, Fanon ([1959] 1965:64) divulges, “It is the necessities of combat that give rise in Algerian society to new attitudes, to new modes of action, and new ways”. Without combat, Fanon explicated, the black subjects will never be able to create the possibilities of new ways of life.

According to Fanon's position of explication, the struggle engaged by the colonised is the only key that opens the new chapter of life for both white master and black subject at the same time.

To complete Fanon's argument, Ciccariello-Maher (2017) posits:

Whereas Hegel presumed a shared basis for reciprocity and ultimately recognition, Fanon diagnoses the existence of a 'zone of nonbeing' inhabited by the racialized, which prevents the dialectic from entering into motion, to begin with. Second, confronted with this absence of reciprocity—and lack of dialectical motion—Fanon turns to the one-sided subjective combat set into motion by those disqualified nonbeings. This combat takes the precise form of the 'violent' self-assertion of Black identity, a 'making oneself known' that prepares the basis for further dialectical movement. (Ciccariello-Maher 2017:53–54)

Ciccariello-Maher above assesses Hegel's dialectic, as the dialectic incomplete as it is based on one side of recognition, where the master knows well the black subject. Therefore, Ciccariello-Maher differentiates Hegel from Fanon, as according to him, Fanon's dialectic has gone beyond the recognition of one side and insisted that there must be recognition from both sides. Ciccariello-Maher (2017) explains that Fanon's dialectic assessed that what is stopping the recognition from both sides is that the world is divided into two zones: one zone for the oppressor and another zone for the oppressed. The zone of the oppressor is well equipped and protected, while the zone for the racialised is hellish. Fanon's dialectic insists on how those two zones have to be abolished for the reciprocal recognition between the white master and the black subject to be realised. Ciccariello-Maher (2017) interprets that Fanon's dialectic on how to allow reciprocal recognition is only when the black subject decides to take part in the endless struggle against continual colonialism. This struggle is therefore a regulatory element of human society.

Relevantly, the whole oppressed society has to be transformed and create itself into a new society without the subjugation caused by colonialism. All black subjects have to respond as a collective and not as individuals because they seek success for a whole society. Mbembe (2017) also witnesses Fanon's conception of the uniqueness of dialectics as he confirms that Fanon's project of the collective rise of humanity will never die—it is for existence:

If there is one thing that will never die in Fanon, it is the project of the collective rise of humanity ... Each human subject, and each people, was to engage in a grand project of self-transformation, in a struggle to the death, without reserve. They had to take it on as their own. They could not delegate it to others. (Mbembe 2017:162)

This invitation to struggle obliges black subjects as a whole to take part in it and to be proud of it. They have to be proud of it as it comes as an opportunity for them to be fundamentally



changed. It is a struggle for creation. Such a creation permits the new modes of life, new humanity, and new phase of life—the beginning of existential life. Normally, Fanon’s conception of dialectics is strengthened by the fact that he was concerned with the enduring struggle that creates the conditions of existence to defeat the perpetuity of colonialism, which is currently hidden into the coloniality of power, being, and knowledge. At this concern, Marriott supports Mbembe, hence for him Fanonism is best known for the seeking for new sovereignty; nothing could be more Fanonian than affirming the coming revolution whose proud claim is to redeem the colonised humanity (Marriott 2018:2).

Fanon’s argument of decolonisation pushes the oppressed to *tabula rasa*. However, it does not mean that nothing has happened or that this is the nature of things. Colonialism tainted and stunted everything: African values, culture, beliefs, and myths, to name a few. Therefore, the *tabula rasa* that has been engaged upon in Fanon’s sense is the one that is created through political will. So, *tabula rasa* is not the nature of things. A deep analysis of Fanon’s call and writings about decolonisation proves that Fanon created *tabula rasa* even if *tabula rasa* still fails to be realised. However, there is no timetable in the concern of *tabula rasa*—it can happen anywhere and anytime. Marriott (2018:189) reveals that at the original revolutionary moment, there was no proper time and place, but only a generalised state of impropriety, which is what, is the most proper about its desire and its law.

Therefore, Fanon created *tabula rasa* by creating the necessary conditions of different conceptions of enduring life. According to Fanon ([1961] 1990:252), “the human condition, plans for mankind and collaboration between men in those tasks which increase the total of humanity are new problems, which demand true inventions”. In addition, to the point of similarities and differences, the dialectics of Hegel are more about recognising the master through work. The dialectics of Marx were more concerned about changing the order of the world. Both Hegel and Marx’s conceptions of dialectics have a trilogy—their dialectics have an end. Fanon realises that this limit should not be; it should rather be an enduring struggle. Fanon ([1952] 2008:204) avows, “I must constantly remind myself that the real *leap* consists of introducing invention into life ... in the world, I am heading for, I am endlessly creating myself”. Subsequently, Marriott (2018) intervenes as Fanon’s supporter:

For this radical disarticulation is the moment when all the received and contrived principles of colonialism, which had kept the people within their proper limits, become reversed or are rendered unreliable, and the existing basis of knowledge teems with errors. (Marriott 2018:243–244)

In Fanon's conception of dialectics, there is no pause and the struggle continues despite some who may say that, for instance, there is no war anymore and people must start to enjoy the outcome of being happy and that they must relax. Fanon denies such arguments as for him there is an enduring existential struggle. Because of the different set of conditions, Fanon gets frustrated by colonialism—any other thing is a barbaric plan. From the creation of different sets of conditions of life, Gilly ([1959] 1965:1) assumes that revolution is mankind's way of living today. Therefore, Fanon's dialectics are dialectics of existence and these dialectics are fashioned through freedom practices. Hegel and Marx are only concerned with creating the freedom that Fanon has interrogated and suspended.

Gibson (2003:34) asserts: "Though Fanon returns to the issues of freedom and independence, he believes that any chance for reciprocity is utterly ruptured when colour is introduced because there is absolutely no recognition of the slave by the master". Because of colonialism, the master easily recognised the black subject. The same colonialism prevents the black subject to recognise his master. Therefore, as Gibson observes, the reciprocity of recognition is still pending, and it can only be complete when the black subject recognises the master. Following Fanon's advice, for the black subject to fully recognise the master, there must be great violence that confronts colonial violence. This means that the only time when the black subject will be able to recognise the master is when he/she reaches self-determination. And, for the black subject to reach this self-determination, as Fanon has revealed, is through the endless struggle.

It is in such a perspective that Fanon's thought is concerned by the fact that the oppressed have to think differently as they are not recognised by the master while the master easily recognises them. Therefore, the disaccord with Fanon rooted that Hegel's dialectics is more about recognition (as a synthesis) while Marx's synthesis is utopia. Fanon highlights:

One day the white master recognized *without a struggle* the black slave. But the former slave wants *to have himself recognized*. There is at the basis of Hegelian dialectic absolute reciprocity that must be highlighted. (Fanon [1952] 2008:191)

In clarification of Fanon's statement above, due to colonialism, the black subject is living the life for another. The black subject cannot be able to describe who he/she is as such a description requires incorporation of white elements. This means that for the black subject to define himself/herself, he/she must borrow from whiteness. It is therefore difficult for the black subject to recognise the white master as long as there is still colonial violence. The only period for the black subject to recognise his/her master is when the struggle is engaged, and this

struggle does not necessitate any kind of mercy to the white master, it is a struggle to death and the death for itself.

In addition, Fanon suspends the dialectics of both Hegel and Marx by declaring, “We must leave our dreams and abandon our old beliefs and friendships of the time before life began” (Fanon [1961] 1990:251). Here, the life that Fanon is revealing to begin is the difficult period of struggle that will demand more from black subjects since there is no way to return but to progress so that black subjects can know the master. The only way of breaking this vicious cycle is to return the human reality of masters, which differs from his ordinary reality, through mediation and recognition (Fanon [1952] 2008:192). Fanon’s new dialectics are more concerned with the existential struggle, which is set as a caravan in continuation. His new dialectics are described as the dialectics that have been born in struggle, but not a struggle for recognition or utopia, but for being—*tabula rasa*, creation of a human being again. This is for society as a whole, as for Fanon, attention was launched since the Algeria struggle affected the entire continent. Gordon (2015:94) stated that by 1955, Fanon began to devote attention to the impact of the Algerian War on other colonial and post-colonial states in Africa.

Therefore, as an unavoidable source of *tabula rasa*, which was orchestrated by the tenacity of colonialism, black subjects were obliged to fight to the death to be transformed into other new beings. Fanon ([1964] 1967:103) shows, “the Algeria combatant is not only up in arms against the torturing parachutists ... most of the time he has to face problems of building, of organizing, of inventing the new society that must come into being”. Finally, these created beings must necessitate and actualise the conditions of their existence. It is through self-consciousness, renunciation, and permanent tension of their freedom, that people can create the ideal conditions of existing in a human world (Fanon [1952] 2008:206). Those conditions break the colonial relationship between the master and the black subject and essentially allow the black subject and master to recognise each other: reciprocal recognition.

Therefore, in the progress made by a fighting unity over a piece of ground, the end of an ambush does not mean rest, but is rather a signal for consciousness to take another step forward, for everything ought to keep pace together (Fanon [1961] 1990:246). This means that the decolonial struggle is like a caravan—it is a struggle that continues. Black subjects engaged in this struggle do not have to fear but consider the period as a moment of peril when some have to die while others continue the struggle. In this regard, Fanon states:

I am not only here-now, locked in thinghood. I desire somewhere else and something else. I demand that an account be taken of my contradictory activity insofar as I pursue something other than life, insofar as I am fighting for the birth of a human world, in other words, a world of reciprocal recognitions. He who is reluctant to recognize me is against me. In a fierce struggle, I am willing to feel the shudder of death, the irreversible extinction, but also the possibility of impossibility. (Fanon [1952] 2008:193)

Engaging in combat to death requires an understanding of colonial violence that must be confronted by a violent struggle to the death. Therefore, the colonised expose themselves to death, and such a struggle to death transforms them into new human beings. According to Gilly ([1959] 1965:1), “In the revolutionary struggle, the immense, oppressed masses of the colonies and semi-colonies feel that they are a part of life for the first time”. The absence of the delay of the struggle is what colonialism targets, but the black subjects have to know that their real humanity can only be recovered through struggle.

The importance of that struggle is that it establishes a new way of thinking and permits them to feel as they belong to society. In Fanon’s conception of decolonisation, people must fight and negate ongoing colonialism. It is their duty and not a task for someone else. Mbembe (2017) reveals that the acts of human beings are normally the self-projection of their thoughts. Fanon ([1959] 1965:101) assumes, “The person is born, assumes his autonomy, and becomes the creator of his values”. The lives of the black subjects have to be controlled by themselves and not by the master. And, if the black subject fails to claim what the society has to offer for him/her, this failure cannot be attributed to the white master but the black subject himself/herself.

Before the study explains the subsequent subheading, namely ‘On nothingness’, it is evident that Fanon’s old and new dialectics reveal to black subjects how to stand firm and be able to negate the colonial oppression to live for existence. Hence, George (2018:9) insists that colonialism did not end for the people of Africa and other places, or, if it did end, it has been reinstated. This reinstatement of perpetual colonialism indicates that our daily lives are exposed to peril and this should be given serious attention.

#### **4.5 On nothingness**

The thematic of nothingness has to be discussed mainly and necessarily in ontological terms; hence, the being of the black being has been rendered nothing. Ontologically, Fanon reveals how the black subject’s being has been rendered nothing (with no value) when he confirms that

“the black man is a toy in the hands of the white man” (Fanon [1952] 2008:119). Under the violent project of colonialism, the black subject is called many names such as instrument, object, stupid, lazy, a problem, various zoological terms (such as a monkey), follower, dark and dirty. All these terms show how the beings of black subjects are prejudicially dispossessed—their beings are rendered nothing. However, Fanon’s conception of *tabula rasa* is linked to nothingness. *Tabula rasa* defeats this nothingness caused by colonialism in creating the being from this nothingness.

In essence, this continual rejection of black people’s being renders them as they are nothing. All these witnesses how black subjects as a whole suffer in their everyday lives since this is the reality that has been manifested to Fanon himself as an eyewitness as proven by the following scenario:

‘Look! A Negro!’ It was a passing sting. I attempted a smile. ‘Look! A Negro!’ Absolutely. I was beginning to enjoy myself. ‘Look! A Negro!’ The circle was gradually getting smaller. I was enjoying myself. ‘Maman, look, a Negro; I’m scared!’ Scared! Scared! Now they were beginning to be scared of me. I wanted to kill myself laughing, but laughter had become out of the question. (Fanon [1952] 2008:91)

This shows the reality regarding Fanon’s being rendered nothing among beings. It demonstrates how Fanon has by penalty lost his being as he was considered an animal and not a human being. His being has been rendered empty—nothing, despite the presence of a child and her mother, who consider themselves as the only human beings. Fanon’s lived experience witnessed his being, being rendered nothing and being disqualified from the list of human beings because of his black skin.

Unfortunately, this dispossession of Fanon’s being is a problematic issue that shows up to nothingness, as well as to the question of being and its unmasking of the one who frames it (Moten 2018:228). Ontologically, concerning being black, nothingness means the deprivation of the black’s being to a lesser meaning and especially to nothing—to zero—as More (2008:66) states that “white power in an anti-black world means that the life of a single white woman is worth more than two hundred black lives”. In other words, More’s argument shows how the value of two hundred black subjects is equal to a single white woman. This extreme devaluation of the human being demonstrates how the being of the black subject does not have value in the world—the being of the black being is nothing. The being of the black being is meaningless or incomplete compared with the being of the white master.

Therefore, outside ontological terms, it is important to highlight that nothingness should also mean priceless. It is total absenteeism of what it was supposed to be since it has been taken out of contents and is now found outside its inner. Nothingness denotes the absence of what existed somewhere. *Tabula rasa* reinstalls that nothingness to the original element that was there before it was degraded by colonialism. According to Moten (2018:243), “Everything I love is an effect of an already given dispossession and of another dispossession to come”. Here, Moten encourages black subjects. If they want (like) to be decolonised, they have to abandon whatever they have (even abandon themselves) to reach self-determination. Decolonisation requires black subjects to engage in a terrible war that dispossesses their lives for other new lives to come.

Therefore, a good a desired result emerges from a difficult task. Everything we like comes from something else. Thus, for black subjects to reach self-determination, they have to pass through a bloodshed moment and lose everything they have to get something they want—to be decolonised, as Moten puts it:

We protect the old thing by leaving it for the new thing. Refusal is only possible for the ones who have something, who have a form, to give away—the ones who ain’t got no home anymore in this world ... (Moten 2018:243)

Here Moten clarifies that to reach self-determination, black subjects have to leave the humanity that they pretend to have; the humanity that the master has rendered nothing. Abandoning this humanity is only possible through a war that will transform them into other new human beings who are qualified to have their own homes in the world. In general, black subjects do not have anything and have nothing to lose. Firstly, returning to the ontological meaning, their humanity has been denied because they do not register as human beings. Secondly, regarding possessing materials, black subjects are dispossessed of whatever they owned due to colonialism as they are nothing; therefore, black subjects do not deserve to possess anything. Lastly, black subjects are considered as objects—instruments of the white master—and as objects, all of their human attributes have been taken, and they remain with nothing as a characteristic of the human being. However, Moten motivates black subjects that they have to lose everything for them to repossess their humanity.

In addition, nothingness should be the absence of things, which is somewhere ‘there’, and people found later that there is nothing out ‘there’, as Fanon ([1952] 2008:204) proclaims: “there is no white world; there is no white ethic—any more than there is a white intelligence

... there are from one end of the world to the other men who are searching”. The cancellation of white ethics and white intelligence can only result from serious decolonial violence in which *tabula rasa* arises. But nothingness does not originate from dispossessing something to another; this is theft and whoever is the master or oppressor who dispossesses another—that is a radical theft, an ontological violation of the otherness.

Concerning nothingness, Gordon (2000) intervenes by elucidating the confusion concerning the interrogation that states, “if the black subjects are problematic people or people with problems?” Without hesitation, Gordon judges (2000:69), “In cases of a problematic people, the result is straightforward: They cease to be people who might face, signify, or be associated with a set of problems: they become those problems.” Here, Gordon clarifies how black subjects daily carry problems that they did not create. White masters created those problems and black subjects have to carry those problems that they even end up becoming. Thus, black subjects become the problems of their (white masters’) problems. This means that since they are the problems, they are nothing because they carry the problems that they are not able to resolve themselves except if the white master, who has created those problems, intervenes. However, black people are not problematic people, but people who experience problems in their everyday lives. The most problem that they are carrying is the continual colonial violence which leads them to trouble or mental sickness.

According to Sartre ([1943] 1956:49), “‘nothingness’ or ‘non-being’ is to be viewed as something outside being, something separated from being”. Sartre clarifies that nothingness is outside being; it means that the black subject whose being is denied is a died-living being; a human without humanity. Black subjects are died-living beings because, under colonialism, their beings are not accepted—they are beings who do not have value in the presence of the master as they are denied and rejected totally. Philosophically, in consideration of Sartre’s explanation, an explanation of nothingness cannot be divorced from being. Nothingness is the inverse of being and the absence of one term between the two terms fulfills the total meaning of another: on one side, if the being is absent (the being, being taken), it means that that being has been fully rendered nothing, and to another side, if there is an absence of nothingness, it means that the being is fully recognised. This relates with Sartre ([1943] 1956) who argues that freedom isolates nothingness in a sense that free black subjects cannot be taken as nothingness as there is no relationship between them and the master—free black subjects have to cut the colonial chain. Sartre ([1943] 1956:57–58) writes: “The being by which Nothingness comes to

the world must be its Nothingness”. Here, Sartre shows ontologically that the white master created, and when the black subject seeks to become free, that nothingness has to be thrown back at its first launcher—the white master.

Because of the nothingness that renders the being of being black nothing, black subjects have to create a tool to restore their humanity and other human attributes that have been dispossessed. The concept of nothingness does not necessarily mean emptiness; it depends on the context since nothingness should be a creation of possibility from impossibility, a creation of humanity out of nothing, as Moten (2018) elucidates:

The memoirist, who declares himself, more or less simply, to be nothing, and who claims the right to speak for nothing everywhere, misses everything, with brilliant blinding inside ... Meanwhile, the nothing we are is alloyed in sharing. (Moten 2018:243–244)

Thus, nothingness is unavoidable for black subjects to be recognised by the master. Colonialism makes black subjects spectators of the world—non-beings who are not allowed to be in the true terrain of players. The black subjects’ being means nothing in the anti-black world, except if they engage in the enduring struggle that permits them to no longer depend on the master and recover their beings that have been rendered nothing.

Manganyi (1973:33) explicates, “The white-dominant cultures have enshrined freedom-insecurity for members of their kind while ensuring the maximum absence for this condition for blacks”. Here, the maximum absence of black culture equals the death of black human beings since they remain with nothing as their identity or presence. Colonial violation differs from nothingness. Violation is similar to a robbery that uses power while with nothingness, the black subject is excluded from the list of human beings. Through nothingness, colonialists have been able to proclaim themselves as the only human beings who possess all the attributes required for humans to be beings. This has affected the beings of black subjects who define themselves through whiteness, which prevents black subjects from bringing back their beings that have been rendered null.

Fanon ([1952] 2008) clarifies that during nothingness, no one is responsible for their acts. It is impossible to control one’s mind during nothingness. What happens when the being of the black being is nullified? It seems to be indescribable as Fanon cautions:

I tried to get up but the eviscerated silence surged toward me with paralyzed wings. Not responsible for my acts, at the crossroads between Nothingness and Infinity, I began to weep. (Fanon [1952] 2008:119)



In addition, the nothingness concerning *tabula rasa* does not perform as the restoration of politics but intervenes as the ‘reparative politics’. Everything starts afresh like the time of the first creation of the world. Then, in another sense, nothingness is linked with the beginning of another new world since it cancels the being for the creation of another new being. The recovery of the being of the black being has to come back only if the same black subject engages in a war that throws back the nothingness to the white master. As a point of importance, Fanon is concerned regarding how his inner is ontologically denied and taken as an object:

I have no intention of revealing my nakedness when confronted with the object. The object is denied its individuality and liberty. The object is an instrument. Its role is to allow me to achieve my subjective security. (Fanon [1952] 2008:187)

Fanon’s lamentation shows how his body is considered as an instrument or object. However, his wish is that its major role is to be used so that he reaches self-determination. Fanon knows that he is a full black subject, but his fullness is nothing in front of the master. The master who objectifies Fanon still has the right to make Fanon’s being to be rendered nothing. Here, Gordon (2015:48) highlights that Fanon announces the experience of a world that denies his inner life. The reason for Fanon, the same as for all black subjects, is that they have to embrace the war that forces the master not to be able anymore of dividing or rendering their beings to nothing. This process requires black subjects to be on their own (*en-soi* and *pour-soi*) and allows them to recuperate their beings thrown by the master. *En-soi* is the state of being on your own and not depending on anyone else and not having anyone depending on you as well. When black subjects reach that stage, their beings for themselves (*pour-soi*) allow them to live their own lives without any demand from the master; therefore, *pour-soi* deceives the principles of colonialism due to its exigency of own activity but not dependency.

This stage is not a stage where the oppressed need to negotiate, to beg, to kindly demand the master to give back the being of the being black that has been dispossessed, but a stage where radicalism leads the oppressed in their everyday lives. At this point, Moten (2018:237) posits that “blackness, which is to say black radicalism, is not the property of black people”. This means that, as it has been fabricated by the oppressors, blackness has to be taken and used by the black subjects as an element of unification. Through blackness, black subjects are supposed to be unified to confront the continual colonialism. Blacks have to radically search for their solidarity. Together, they will be able to deracinate all roots and apparatuses of colonialism.

Normally, the oppressed need to trouble the situation and recover their humanity as the utmost by engaging in endless combat of life that requires their lives to be taken by the 'Others' for them to save their humanity. From here, Maldonado-Torres (2008:156) writes: "Life and death acquire new meaning under the paradox of substitution. Risking one's life surpasses the economy of recognition". In other words, for the black subjects to reach self-determination, they have not to fear death but to see death as the bridge to life. Maldonado-Torres (2008) above explains that death and life are two elements that substitute each other for the reciprocal recognition to be realised between the black subject and the self-appointed white oppressor.

The stage of nothingness constructs the complexes of subordination structured by colonialists to the detriment of black subjects. As a point of clarification regarding these complexes that originate in the different appearance of skins, Fanon ([1952] 2008:206) refutes such colonial construction: "the black man is not ... no more than the white man". Nothingness establishes all forms of colonial structures that focus on denying the being of humans—especially the beings of black subjects. It is at this stage of nothingness that Maldonado-Torres' (2018) explanation of 'the phenomenology of the cry' with Fanon attempts to fit. "The cry does not emerge out of any particular unsatisfied demand, but from the impossibility of demanding anything whatsoever" (Maldonado-Torres 2008:136). This means that Fanon's cry was a sign that his life was imposed to impossibility. The cry is a sign that alerts that someone is exposed to a danger that is difficult to escape using the force of self.

Therefore, crying is a sign of existence and a demonstration that the being is being taken out, the human being is being tortured, ceasing to breathe, to mention only a few. It is the last sign of asking whatever help that is possible to other (closer) human beings when people feel that their existence is approaching an end, and has nothing of their own that can save them from such suffering. The major problem is that the cries of black subjects are denied together with their beings. In consideration of Fanon's concern of black suffering, Fanon ([1952] 2008) showed how in the anti-black world, black subjects cry alone (as they are a typical example), while the master enjoys the cries of black subjects by robbing them of their humanity—their being.

Mandela (1994:611) partly agrees with this argument above by saying that "the oppressed and the oppressor alike are robbed their humanity". In other words, Mandela justifies that oppression is temporal and projectable to where it originated. When the black subjects engage in a struggle, the oppressor loses his status of humanity and obtains another new being that is

not characterised by the complexes of inferiority or superiority. That is why Mandela above asserts that he cannot proclaim to be free if his freedom takes someone else's freedom away. Here, Mandela forgets that the preachers of freedom are those who imposed on the black subject that they must fight to be free—Mandela's argument of freedom relates to negotiated freedom. Fanon rejects such freedom because it is a given or negotiated freedom.

In addition, this dispossession of humanity corresponds with the fullest possible understanding of what Fanon refers to as 'absolutely nothing'—a nothingness that is without reserve and independent of the desire to show up towards everyone (Moten 2018:217). It is difficult to describe the state of nothingness, but what is remarkable is that the masters, who dispossess the humanity of black subjects, do not take their humanity only, but intend to delete their originality completely. Thus, having discovered that the being of their beings has been rendered nothing, nullified, rejected, objectified, and compared zoologically, and half-recognised, black subjects, therefore, retain none of their privileges and become the state of nothingness. To escape from this state of nothingness, they must embrace the enduring struggle that alerts the master that nothingness was/is still construction of colonialism. It is currently operating under the coloniality of being. It has to disappear together with any other form of colonialism that denies the being of the black being because decolonisation positions the being of the black being to the alter of being.

#### **4.6 Conclusion**

This chapter has distinctively accounted for Fanon's conception of *tabula rasa*. To an extent, it engaged in the thematic of the disorder of things. The chapter demonstrated that colonialism is characterised by a complete disorder (violence) by nature that has to be confronted by a great counter-violence (encountered complete disorder) in which *tabula rasa* emerges. The chapter further explicated the thematic of *tabula rasa* that is grounded on political imagination. It explained how black subjects must deliberate their original plans of escaping the arsenal of colonialism that remains manifested in their community in the world.

Again, the chapter greatly assessed Fanon's old and news dialectics. The study demonstrated that Fanon's conception of dialectics is unique as it is the dialectics of existence, while the Hegelian and Marxist dialectics were limited to an end. The chapter revealed how freedom for Fanon did not mean that the oppressed arrived at self-determination, but that inter-recognition is still needed. Although the 'Others' recognised the oppressed easily, in contrast, the oppressed

have been contested by endless colonialism to recognise the 'Others'. Fanon's distinctiveness in his accounting of dialectics was validated by Fanon revealing that colonialism is still a problem for existence. It needs to be confronted by an enduring struggle and war for life for the oppressed to reach self-determination.

The chapter engaged with the thematic of nothingness. The chapter illuminated nothingness through ontological terms, where the being of being black has been rendered nothing by the masters. Again, it was explicated as a stage where everyone has nothing, which is a violation of black humanity. Nothingness is therefore a stage of being a body like being a mannequin without an inner core. With nothingness, the black subject's being has been rendered nothing.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **FANON ON NEW HUMANISM**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter aims to critically examine the lived experience of black subjects to explicate Fanon's conception of a new humanism. This conception is fundamentally counted as the last of Fanon's three pillars of decolonisation. Having paralysed black subjects, colonialism needs to be confronted through new humanism as therapeutic response. However, new humanism does not only emerge through such a paralysis, but also through combat between the coloniser and the black subject.

Firstly, this chapter thematically criticises the difference between the given humanism, namely a humanism that has been given but not fought for, and the real humanism, namely real freedom. This chapter discusses the given humanism as false humanism. Secondly, the chapter provides a critique of flag freedoms. Through this, the chapter analyses the pseudo-independences in which the given freedoms—freedoms that black subjects did not fight for—have been a landscape debate of African countries since the 1960s. Thirdly, the chapter finds it necessary to thematically criticise Europe as the factor element of the macabre lives experienced by black subjects because of the ongoing colonialism that Europeans remain the authors. Lastly, before the chapter concludes, there is a discussion on Fanon and the 'after man', which assesses the role played by Fanon during the intense struggle for creating real humanity.

#### **5.2 A critique of false humanism**

New humanism, as the politics of becoming, is the fundamental transformation of paralysed black subjects into new human beings who are no longer exposed to daily torture, dehumanisation, discrimination, to mention but a few. Such a fundamental change from inhumanity to new humanity of the black subject is explained as the phase of newborns who travel from the 'old' world to a radically different world. At this concern, Fanon ([1961] 1990:251) writes: "come, then, comrades, it would be as well to decide at once to change our ways". Fanon invites the black subjects as a whole to change modes of life. And, this change is only possible for the new men who resulted from the war. This new humanity differs significantly from the given humanity. It is the humanity that the colonised fight for to chart a

way to a durable humanism without oppression. Fanon reveals that new humanity has to be emergent. On the same point, Fanon ([1961] 1990:198) acknowledges, “This new humanity cannot do otherwise than define a new humanism both for itself and for others”. Both the black colonised and the white masters are converted into new bodies. It is this new humanity that recovers the black subjects’ human qualities that have been damaged by dehumanisation.

The perpetual colonial system has not yet ceased to mutilate the being of the black subject. Consequently, because of endless colonialism, black subjects arrived at a point at which they are no longer able to differentiate their true beings from their false beings. Since the conquest period, black subjects have by default accepted imported humanity to replace their humanity. Imported humanity is humanity without humanity, considering that in an African context, humanity is primarily attached to a black subject’s lived experience, a fact which is absent in the Western’s conception of humanity. Colonialism has rejected the black subject’s humanity in the list of the world’s human beings. It later inflicted black humanism to carry the name of pseudo-humanism. Although black subjects exist physically, they are half-died because of the physical and moral tortures caused by ‘Others’ negating their existence.

Attesting to pseudo-humanism, Fanon ([1952] 2008:195) writes: “He went from one way of life to another, but not from one life to another”. Here, Fanon explains how the black subject has been obliged to change his/her mode of life because of colonialism. And, traveling from one life to another, has to result from the combat that confronts colonialism. To another extent, Fanon’s criticism above about the new life of a new man shows that because of colonialism, black subjects have changed how they live from an African traditional life to Western civilisation. This change has been a dramatic fabrication in the sense that it has worsened the lives of black subjects. This is the reason why Fanon disparages that the lives of black subjects have changed because the colonised’s inner being is still no longer attached to African myths.

Therefore, black subjects are advised to change their directions and invent new concepts to be used for new lives that differ from their lives under the ruse of colonialism. Fanon ([1961] 1990:255) recommends: “For Europe, for ourselves and humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man”. Fanon’s recommendation became a messianic call that traces a map for moving from pseudo-humanism to true and new humanism. The creation of the new humanism is in the hands of the black subjects, and it is up to them to fight for it. Fanon assesses that the invention of the new concepts, would map the proper ideology to be used for all blacks wherever they are in the

different continents. Simultaneously, Kipfer (2011:96) rapidly completes Fanon's revelation that "contrary to this false colonial humanism, the liberating horizon of counter-colonialism was a *new humanism*". This new humanism concerns the whole of humanity—black subjects included. It seeks to remove the categorisation of the colonised and colonisers by fundamentally changing them into new absolute subjectivities.

In amplification, Schwartz (1974:35) states, "through a rejection of what men have come to regard as normal, the humanist creates the avenue for acceptance of new values". The rejection of what men have come to regard as normal while it is not is a way to the creation of the true human. Such a rejection is manifested through a violent struggle from which a new man emerges. That enduring struggle confronts the colonialism that survives because of operating as a mannequin. There is a time that the colonised come to realise that such colonial tactics and *manoeuvres* have to come to an end. From that time, the colonised think and question. After understanding, they start to discover that the lives they have been obliged to live contrast with the real lives they were supposed to live. The war in the search for new humanity escalates, "there must be no waiting until the nation has produced new man; there must be no waiting until men are imperceptibly transformed by revolutionary processes in a perpetual renewal", declares Fanon ([1961] 1990:246). Fanon calls for the colonised to be ready and engage in a perpetual face-to-face struggle that must be renewed to defeat the endless system of colonialism from which a new man emerges.

Colonial conditions dehumanise black subjects. Ironically, black subjects are told that they are listed and registered as human beings, but in reality, they do not qualify to be registered in the world's humanity as their humanity has been taken. They are obliged to live lives where they cannot differentiate the difference between themselves and their master. As a point of fact, Fanon ([1952] 2008:196) concretises, "when the black man happens to cast a savage look at the white man, the white man says to him: 'Brother, there is no difference between us'". However, in reality, even if the white master is hiding such a difference, black subjects are aware of it. The colonised know and see in their daily lives that their status differs from the status of their master. However, there is a red line: the time that the colonised make a decision and practise the same racism of the colonisers because "decolonization unites the people by a decision to 'remove from it its heterogeneity'" (Gordon 2014:140). Here, Gordon justifies how decolonisation plays a major role in unifying the nation or races. During the time of decolonisation, black subjects as a whole are supposed to be united to challenge colonialism.

When black subjects discover that they do not live their supposed true lives, they will have to purge their master's fabrication of life and engage in continual war. At this point, Fanon ([1952] 2008:196) alerts: "the former slave wants his humanity to be challenged; he is looking for a fight; he wants a brawl". This engagement of black subjects comes from the fact that having made the contours and evaluations of their humanity; black subjects expose their humanity to the trial of a war from which the original humanity shall occur. At this point of evaluating the difference between black and white existence in the world, without any necessity of arguing the reality, Fanon ([1952] 2008:202) repeats, "a long time ago the black man acknowledged the undeniable superiority of the white man, and all his endeavours aim at achieving a white existence". For the black subject to achieve a white existence, he/she first has to reach new humanity. And, the latter can only happen through an endless decolonial struggle that does not only target to liberate the black subject politically through independence, but also mainly focuses on the creation of a new man.

As a point of clarification to Fanon's argument above, Lee (2015:178) writes, "decolonisation in its total form offers far more than political independence, but it mainly promises the establishment of a new humanity, liberated from the constraints of Western imperialism and its political, intellectual, and ontological legacies". Through decolonisation, the black subjects become real independent human beings—new people who have the right to think and suggest the principles on which to build society. As Lee above states, decolonisation fully frees the black subject politically and establishes a new humanism from its first day of achievement.

Therefore, as a necessity, black subjects have a compulsory duty to fight against the world's racism that prejudicially alienates them. As Fanon ([1952] 2008:199) clarifies, "the alienation develops because a black man is a victim to a system based on the exploitation of one race by another and the contempt for one branch of humanity by civilization that considers itself superior". With colonialism, all human beings are imposed to adopt one 'branch of humanity' as Fanon ([1952] 2008) above reveals that the branch of humanity obliges the colonised to follow one Western civilisation. This civilisation should be described as a civilisation of death because it destroys African myths. The result is that black subjects find themselves living lives that do not correspond with their traditional commands and obligations.

In addition, as a black human being who experienced such a false humanism as an argument on the table, Fanon regrets his humanity. He later decides that being acknowledged is the way out for his humanity:



I start suffering from not being a white man insofar as the white man discriminates against me; turns me into a colonized subject; robs me of any value or originality; tells me I am a parasite in the world ... I will force the white man to acknowledge my humanity. (Fanon [1952] 2008:78)

Here, Fanon explicates how black subjects are prejudicially exposed to physical and moral punishment due to their black skins. Black subjects live lives that are out of the registration of the world's humanity. When Fanon above discovers that his black skin automatically renders him a parasite. This draws a picture of how black humanity is false humanity; the opposite to the true humanity of the white master. Fanon laments how he could cease to be treated as an object and register himself in the zone of beings. Conditionally, Fanon reveals that for any black subject to come out of the being of non-being and reach the well-deserved humanity, they will have to use force for the colonised to be registered successfully in the zone of beings—in a world without slavery and mastery.

In essence, Judaken (2008) explains that Sartre joined Fanon by coming up with a new decolonial conception that relates existentialism to humanism. As a point of fact, “the phase of anti-colonialist existential humanism was based primarily on developing a key axiom in *L'existentialisme est un humanisme*” (Judaken 2008:29). For Judaken, he wanted to interpret that Sartre's existentialist humanism, stands for freedom for both the oppressor and the black subject. All members of society need to share the same rights to freedom without exception. The freedom of all is a freedom for the whole society, in which the black subject has the right to freedom of expression and equality, liberty and justice, defined by themselves.

However, “if nationalism is not made explicit, if it is not enriched and deepened by a very rapid transformation into a consciousness of social and political needs, in other words into humanism, it leads up a blind alley” (Fanon [1961] 1990). Black subjects who have been decolonised, have to be fundamentally changed and possess the right to contribute to social and political affairs. A new person is a person who thinks and questions his/her social life and integration, nationally and internationally.

Regrettably, colonialism has obliged all human beings to live one common life for people who differ in their myths, culture, beliefs, and traditions. And, this false humanism that wakes Fanon up must immediately be confronted, “let us try to create the whole man, whom Europe has been incapable of bringing to triumphant birth” (Fanon [1961] 1990:252). At this concern, Fanon attempts to trace the trajectory of the creation of a true new human being. Here, he encourages

black subjects to abandon any acts of imitation and go for discovery. At this concern, Marriott (2000) is concerned with black subjects' imitation of everybody except themselves.

False humanism is such an imitation that employs false history. It further imposes the colonised to live a history that they never experienced: a European history or a history of crimes. The most horrible of these crimes were committed in the hearts of people and tore their functions pathologically apart and crumbled their unity away (Fanon [1961] 1990:254). Fanon's intention appeals to the true (new) humanity because there is no humanity in the black community. This is due to many factors, but mainly, because there is no humanity without unity. Aggravated by its radical racism towards black subjects, colonialism has destroyed the black community so that black unity should be destroyed as well. The principal point of Fanon's analysis seems to be that racism is always humanism. Therefore, it is necessary to see how, such as all world views that are defensive or supportive (of difference), humanism also relies on subterfuge in trying to justify itself. This justification is based on false certainties and spurious objectivity, be they religious or biological (Marriott 2018:81–82).

During endless colonialism, the colonised who are rejected human beings cannot invent or discover because colonialism disposes them to everlasting sleep. Fanon ([1961] 1990:254) warns that humanity is waiting for something else from black subjects than such an imitation, which would be almost an obscene caricature. This shows that black subjects are living lives that were not supposed to be theirs. They are still on a marathon to search for the right humanism. From the beginning of colonialism, black subjects have started to walk by reversing. Black subjects have been obliged to embrace lives that negate their experiences and encourage the Western civilisation to be imitated.

Fanon ([1961] 1990:254) elucidates the direction that the colonised who are dehumanised should take: "but if we want humanity to advance a step further, if we want to bring it up to a different level than that which Europe has shown it, then we must invent and we must make discoveries". This clarifies how black subjects' humanity under colonialism, is a humanity that is critical in a way in that they cannot invent or discover anything under the pressure of colonial oppression. That pressure obliges the colonised to imitate the master's *oeuvres* and does not allow the colonised to live as thinkers or questioners. As a result, it prevents the black subject from acts of inventions and discoveries.

Fanon seems to say to everybody, black subjects included, “that without remembering the possibility of that human face, we are condemned to renounce our capacity to make the most compelling distinctions, beginning with the distinction between true and false decolonization, the distinction between what is and what might have been” (Sekyi-Otu 1996:240). Here, true independence is real independence that is achieved by black subjects engaging in the struggle and the independence that they fight for. It differs from false decolonisation, which is offered by the master on a silver platter. It is further a negotiated decolonisation between the coloniser and colonised. Such false decolonisation is therefore synonymous with flag decolonisation—flag freedom.

### **5.3 A critique of flag freedom**

As a necessity for every human being, freedom is the key to black subjects’ drive to self-determination. However, black subjects who reach self-determination are those who are self-motivated to fight but not those who have been given freedom without struggling for it, as has been the case for independence negotiated and granted to most African states in the 1960s. As a point of clarification, Fanon posits:

As a master, the white man told the black man: ‘You are now free.’ But the black man does not know the price of freedom because he has never fought for it. (Fanon [1952] 2008:195)

Therefore, the freedom that is given to black subjects, as Fanon says, is not their freedom but freedom for white people. Black subjects spent time advancing that they are fighting for justice, liberty and equality. However, whatever the black subject had as justice or liberty, is a secretion from the oppressor. The black subject each day celebrates false freedom as he/she is not aware that he/she is decorating freedom which is defined as whiteness’ benefit.

Consequently, it is still difficult for black subjects to challenge neo-slavery because “black humanity is not fought for by the black person but is conferred upon him/her through the mercy and generosity of the white master” (More 2011:174). For black subjects, real freedom is fought for; it is not the flag freedom that the master gives to black subjects without any confrontation between the two. More (2011:177) interprets, “true liberation for Fanon can be achieved only when one fights for it”. It is a freedom that emerges from the bloodshed period in an enduring war opposing the master and the colonised. If not, the colonised will always believe that they are free while they are not.

The freedom of the oppressed is a freedom that allows them to decide everything concerning their lives. It is a freedom that from that point onwards ensures that they live in a society without mastery, slavery, domination, dehumanisation, discrimination, undermining gaze, insults, to mention but a few. Here, More (2011:175) echoes Fanon when he asserts, “one can be free where there is no liberty at all or one can enjoy liberty without being free”. This means that the black subject is living the freedom which has been accorded to him/her. It characterised by liberty which is dictated by the white master. However, the black subject is the one who must fight for his real freedom.

As a point of fact, black subjects fight for liberty, equality, and justice on their terms and not the terms imposed by the coloniser. With freedom and liberty in mind and based on Fanon’s original distinction between external freedom and internal freedom, More (2011:175) recognises that “there is a freedom (as internal freedom) and liberty (as external freedom)”. However, it is only through combat that black subjects will feel integrated into the world with liberty, equality, and justice for both the white master and the colonised. Having the goodwill of the society is to live in a society without oppression. Such a society is possible when freedom is applied to both the master and the colonised; in other words, it cancels the colonial categorisation of zones of being and non-being.

According to Fanon ([1952] 2008:195), “the former slave who has no memory of the struggle for freedom or that anguish of liberty of which ... speaks, draws a blank when confronted with this young white man singing and dancing on the tightrope of existence”. Here, Fanon’s insistence is regarding black subjects who have been proclaimed by the master as free, but they cannot remember anything concerning the struggle for freedom, and the absence of their existence will always assist the master’s existence; the only that is one valid and original. While generally, the literature from different scholars views the concept of independence as the period of freedom, Marriott (2018:2) observes it as, “the time for a new humanity, the colonized whose time has come”. If there is true independence, there must be new humanity as the outcome of the engaged fight for independence. Independence is the time for a new humanism and a period when the black subject has the right to himself/herself, characterised with the self-direction of the black subject.

Meanwhile, through his explication, Fanon exposes how the under-developed middle class who (have been given) took power over from the master are economically powerless because they rely on their mother country. Practically, the middle class is not economically free and is still

dependent, even though they do not cease to sing and celebrate independence. Fanon ([1961] 1990:120) criticises that the same independence that drives it into a corner will give rise within to catastrophic reactions in its ranks, which will oblige them to send out frenzied appeals to the former mother country for help. Regrettable is that these nations, which celebrate their pseudo-independences each year, carry on asking the accused oppressor country for help. Those states do not have real independence because the justice, liberty, and equality that their citizens were supposed to have, have been retransferred to the white master.

With pseudo-independence, Fanon ([1964] 1967:105) condemns, “true liberation is not that pseudo-independence in which ministers having a limited responsibility hobnob with an economy dominated by the colonial pact”. Pseudo-independence does not require any struggle; it is a gift from the master to the colonised. Genuine independence emerges from serious combat in which the colonised appears as the champion at the end. Concerning genuine independence, Fanon ([1959] 1965:31) exemplifies that “Algerians who were lost to history, once again find a flag, a government already recognized by many States, and it can now no longer draw back”. With courage to fight for real freedom, Algerians decided to start a war that confronted colonialism intending to form their government grounded on fundamental change.

As a point of agreement with Fanon, More (2011:173) argues that “for Fanon, ‘pseudo’ or ‘flag’ independence is the product of a negotiated settlement between the nationalist leaders of the colonised and the colonisers”. With this in mind, although African states had independence in the 1960s, several did not fight for it as it was supposed to be. That clarifies why More interprets Fanon’s comments regarding flag independence, which results from the negotiation. The real independence does not emerge from the negotiation between the white master and the black subject. It is an independence that could look like ‘one’ Fanon fought for in Algeria. Flag independence could be interchangeably used as flag freedom, which is the result of a negotiation between the master and the colonised. Fanon’s conception of decolonisation disagrees with such a process, as for him, no change has been done yet if the colonised has to submit to the master who has only changed the costume.

Shamelessly, “the gift of human-hood without a struggle still constitutes the slave as a slave since he/she has not attained independent self-consciousness and thus remains dominated by the master” (More 2011:174). This happened to African states, where the so-called independent countries have to carry on paying taxes to their former masters who promoted and proclaimed their independence and the states have to rule like the former demands. This is not a freedom

but a double oppression of the master to the black subjects without being physically present. The colonial rule was and is still illegal and it needs to be confronted by an enduring counter-colonialism project as Kipfer assesses:

If the colonial rule was beyond reform, full decolonization required *liberating* the colonized populations from all dimensions of colonial rule. Formal independence would not suffice. Base-democratic self-government and a transformation of colonial political economies were considered indispensable for counter-colonialism projects of liberation. (Kipfer 2011:96)

With flag freedom, the master leads almost all the domains of life indirectly. Formerly colonised people do not have any power to question the fundamental issues faced by their society. A country's independence is not only necessarily symbolised by its flag, but also by the citizens' full success to access whatever they deserve to have in their community. It is equality to all, where even the poor (colonised) have the right to share the country's richness. However, before the master gives the colonised freedom, the master has to select whom to offer power. This same trusted person will carry on ruling by the will of the master—what Fanon called the 'national bourgeoisie', trusted by the master and on the other hand considered by the natives as the betrayer of the nations in the sense that "the national bourgeoisie of the under-developed countries is not engaged in production, nor in the invention, nor building, nor labour; it is completely canalised into activities of intermediary type" (Fanon [1961] 1990:120). Taking into consideration of Fanon's analysis of the bourgeoisie, this mafia type of middle class is seen by black subjects as the capitalist tool. The bourgeoisie class betrays its nation by disregarding the citizens' interests and works for the former country which colonised them.

Black subjects were not created for eternal suffering, but were and are still human beings who deserve dignity and humanity and to be counted in the zone of being, who are not given and defined by their masters but by themselves. But this cannot be exposed on a silver platter, because, as a whole and in solidarity, black subjects must fight for freedom and not expect their master to position them. By employing the following words, Fanon observes:

Historically, the black man, steeped in the inessentiality of servitude, was set free by the master. He did not fight for his freedom. Out of slavery, the black man burst into the lists where his masters stood. Like those servants who are allowed to dance in the drawing-room once a year, the black man looked for support. (Fanon [1952] 2008:194)

Flag independence is the independence that shines outside; the flag is seen as a symbol of real independence while it is not. From this, Fanon ([1961] 1990:134) signals, "after having been given the pseudo-independence, the people stagnate deplorably in unbearable poverty". In most

of the African countries which were praising independence in the 1960s, a few years after, the quasi-totality of those countries were classed as poor countries in the world. The mass people are them who are exposed to this critical situation than their leaders who always continue to sit at the same table with their former colonisers. Leaders prove their status or profile by behaving as managers of the former master but not as real leaders who have gained their freedom through struggle.

Flag freedom caused many negative impacts. It is a freedom that black subjects received without knowing where it came from—like *manna*. Consequently, black subjects are like toys in front of their master and look to the master for support. Because of flag freedom, white people could not empower black people as they wanted easy lives with their complexes of becoming white. However, black subjects were supposed to be aware that liberation differs far from a gift. The masses have to plan on how to seize it with their own hands, and this will permit them to feel like new human beings for the first time and forever. They gain confidence in experience the tasks of building, governing, and choosing their own lives for themselves (Gilly [1959] 1965:2). The gain of such a fundamental change allows black subjects to live their own defined lives without any consultation from their previous master.

Therefore, real independent black subjects do not receive any commandment from anybody except themselves. Independent black subjects are free human beings who live and travel in a new world without protocol or guidance. They are real human beings who do not need to depend on their master. They live new lives by deciding for themselves where to live and what to do. More (2011:173) confirms that “‘real’ or authentic independence emerges not from a negotiated settlement but the appropriation of power and the land through violent struggle”. Here, More’s explanation of real independence reflects Fanon’s understanding of the same concept. It is a form of independence that opens horizons for the black subjects to discover and invent new theories for existential life.

For black subjects to reach this form of independence, it has to cost them life but also death. This shows that genuine independence can only be achieved after conflict, a battle, and a life-and-death struggle (More 2011:174). Therefore, genuine independence results from death, bloodshed moment, antagonist war, risky and terrified combat where the outcome of such moments reports the former oppressed as the war champions—the winners of the combat who from now deserve to sing with a loud voice that they are now free (they reached self-determination). In absence of this, the formerly colonised will be disappointed insofar as Fanon

([1961] 1990:121) states, “after independence this under-developed middle class, reduced in numbers and without capital, which refuses to follow the path of revolution, will fall into deplorable stagnation”. This is what happened in most of the African countries when the white masters decided to go back to Europe and continue to control the same countries with their absence-presence.

Seriously, black subjects have only one route to reach self-determination. It can only be reached by challenging the ‘Other’ who has cut the reciprocity of recognition. Black subjects engaging in a durable struggle leads to their dignity of mind as it harms the oppressor’s physical being. Based on how Fanon explicated new humanism, freedom occurs when black subjects engage in an enduring struggle that challenges the oppressor. This combat qualifies black subjects to be in the place where they were supposed to be, to cease being being-followers and, lastly, to register as full and free human beings whose real freedom has been achieved after murders. They recognise how much it costs to become free and confidently holds it as a pillar of their being. At this point, Fanon synthesises:

Only conflict and the risk it implies can, therefore, make a human reality, in-itself-for-itself, come true. This risk implies that I go beyond life toward an ideal which is the transformation of subjective certainty of my worth into a universally valid objective truth. (Fanon [1952] 2008:193)

But this transformation cannot happen in a state where the middle class leads. For the black subject to be universally registered, this has to cost him/her. It means that he/she must work for it, willingly participating in the struggle for life. The black subject has not to trust the bourgeoisie as it works as a club that clandestinely operates for the benefit of capitalists. Fanon ([1961] 1990:122) assesses bourgeoisie, “seen through its eyes, its mission has nothing to do with transforming the nation; it consists, prosaically, of being the transmission line between the nation and capitalism, rampant through camouflaged, which today put on the mask of neo-colonialism”. Here, Fanon considers bourgeoisie as a physical apparatus of colonialism which however operates as the chameleon. They hide behind the positions that they occupy and protectively continue to represent the absence of the white master.

Critically, the reality is that the freedom that has been given to black subjects is not real freedom. Their freedom came from a decision during a meeting of white masters to include black people in humanity:



One day, a good white master, who exercised a lot of influence, said to his friends: 'Let's be kind to the niggers.' So the white masters grudgingly decided to raise the animal-machine man to the supreme rank of *man*, although it wasn't easy. (Fanon [1952] 2008:194)

Unfortunately, the black subject's humanity has been a creation of the white masters' meeting and willingness; the masters decided to elevate the humanity of the black subject which, according to the white masters, was not registered. From then onwards, black subjects carried humanity that did not know where it originated from—false humanity. As defamation, black subjects fugitively hold the humanity that contradicts Fanon's conception of a new humanism. Fanon ([1952] 2008:197) observes that black subjects have to stand compulsorily in a firm position of negation to create their humanity. To claim back their honourable humanity, black subjects have to refuse the mastery and fight for their real freedom.

Thus, Fanon's new humanism is not an abstract humanism that interferes with the activity of humanisation, but the humanism of the ethical suspension (with a decolonial intent) whereby the universal is suspended in favour of a high telos (Maldonado-Torres 2008:158). Importantly, Fanon's conception of new humanism is grounded on love, one of the reasons why the *damnés* have to adopt it compulsorily to challenge the objectification of black subjects, which enhances them to chart a way to self-determination.

In Fanon's analysis, it is critical for black subjects insofar as their humanity (life) is a daily recommendation led by white masters. White masters still have the right to mute the existence of black subjects at any time because the masters are the authors of the creation of the humanity of the black subjects; the same as they remain the founder of the cities, "in newly independent under-developed countries, the whole of the ruling class swarms in the towns built by colonialism" (Fanon [1961] 1990:143). This shows the self-disintegration of the people who were supposed to be unified and struggle together endlessly against colonialism. Tenaciously, being the 'remote' for black humanity, the white master accordingly stops and turns the black subject anyway, any time and in any direction. Because, for Fanon ([1952] 2008:194), "the black man is a slave who was allowed to assume a master's attitude". The master holds the power of any kind of permission for the black subject. The black subject is not responsible for his life, as the white master controls all of his/her everyday programmes.

According to Fanon ([1959] 1965:63), "colonialism wants everything to come from it". However, colonialism operates on behalf of those who launched it and carries on operating without the master's presence. The master has blocked all means for the colonised. The

colonised have no option but to engage seriously in combat to defeat colonial power and take the direction without guidance to self-determination. In most former colonised states, there has been an absence of such a struggle—a failure for real freedom. Former slaves, for Fanon, have been robbed of the chance to fight for and win their equality, lest things get out of hand as they did in Haiti (Ciccariello-Maher 2017:65). The world continues to be plunged into wars, due to the impacts of the colonial violence that affects the lives of everyone, except the Euro-North America side. They encouraged fighting for their freedom, as Fanon does not validate freedom that is not the result of a struggle.

Indeed, Fanon ([1959] 1965:64) assesses that it is the necessity of combat that gives rise to new attitudes, new modes of action, and new ways in Algerian society. Compared with other colonised African states, the Algerian War is a typical example of Fanon's conception of new humanism being practised. Algerians prevented their country from ending up having freedom from the master; they had to fight for it. It required men who understood that colonialism had to be uprooted and destroyed to make sure that colonialism was defeated.

Normally, an in-depth revolution is a true revolution; it transforms the impossibilities into new options of life for existence. It has reached an advanced stage. The Algerian revolution was the oxygen that created and shaped new humanity (Fanon [1959] 1965:181). The struggle that Fanon took part in it in Algeria has made history, and opened the eyes for Algerians but also all black subjects wherever they are in the world. Finally, Fanon ([1961] 1990:254) recommends not to pay tribute to Europe by creating states, institutions, and societies that draw their inspiration from same Europe.

#### **5.4 A critique of Europe**

The uninterrupted colonial violence in the world has traced/marked a red line between Europe and any of its former colonies, in Africa and elsewhere in the world. During the conquest period, Europe invaded Africa illegally and destroyed all traditional leaderships. Europe continuously degraded Africa's economy by exporting its natural sources illegally, engaging in human trafficking, and severely torturing, killing, dehumanising, and prejudicially discriminating the black subjects in the zone of being. In remembrance of the all cited bad memories of black subjects, it has been late but from now, it is time to "leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their streets, in all the corners of the globe" (Fanon [1961] 1990:251).

Fanon further criticises:

Europe undertook the leadership of the world with ardour; cynicism and violence. Look at how the shadow of her palaces stretches out ever farther! (Fanon [1961] 1990:251)

Colonialism does not recognise that it has oppressed black subjects. Colonialists positioned themselves as if they were/are legal and deserve to civilise the black subjects who were/are not registered in the list of human beings. The master has to use violence to conquer black subjects and their land, which has to follow the master's will with imposition.

Thereby, a critical assessment of what colonialism has done and is still doing in Africa, is appreciable by European history but rigorously critical of black subjects' lived experience in all globe's continents. Yes, the decolonial journey is dedicated to black subjects, but Fanon ([1961] 1990:84) advises that "European peoples must decide to wake up as well and shake themselves, use their brains, and stop playing the stupid game of the sleeping beauty". With the depth analysis of this argument above, it only was not a message, but also a warning to the Europeans who took black subjects as being compost.

Inopportunately, black subjects have prejudicially been victims of their skin colour and, as a consequence, the mastery excluded blackness and dominated the world's terrain of being. Fanon was not the only one to advise and warn; Sartre ([1961] 1990:18) seconds with a regression that "Our worthiest souls contain racial prejudice." Whatever action the black subject does as opposition to the white master, is an indication of how colonialism has been for long a burden of his inner and skin. Because of decolonisation, black subjects create themselves as new human beings who possess all human qualities and attributes.

Furthermore, for centuries, Europeans have stifled almost the whole of humanity in the name of a so-called spiritual experience, but look at them swaying today between atomic and spiritual disintegration (Fanon [1961] 1990:251). From the first day, Europeans launched colonialism. Until today, Europeans have enjoyed the success of the colonial project as it has been successful as wished by the masters. Any attempt to confront colonialism is judged as illegal and rebellious while colonialism itself unlawfully dominated the world and imposed black subjects to live in one-world-one civilisation—an imposition that African myths reject and from which the decolonial turn emerges. Meanwhile, decolonial turn should be explained as "an expression or a particular manifestation of scepticism towards Western theodicy" (Maldonado-Torres 2008:7). Through that form of theodicy, the white masters oblige the blacks to abandon any

other kinds of gods and to only follow the God taught by Europeans as the only one and real God.

The Western domination and imposition of one-world-one-civilization were speeded up in the world by colonialism; it has made Europe consider itself as being the animal king (lion) of the bush. However, Césaire ([1955] 2000) criticises that Western civilisation is a decadent, stricken, and dying civilisation, which for him, indicates that Europe is indefensible. Europe is unable to justify either before the bar of 'reason' or before the bar of 'conscience'; increasingly, it takes refuge in hypocrisy that is all the more odious because it is less and less likely to deceive (Césaire [1955] 2000:31). Thus, the European civilisation should not be taken as the model, as it lacks the originality for itself and in itself.

Importantly, except the globalisation of European civilisation criticised above, Fanon insists in exposing how Europe has chosen to be a flesh-eater and has practised animosity in the world without contradiction of their satanic and sadistic practices: "Europe has declined all humility and all modesty, but she has also set her face against all solicitude and all tenderness" (Fanon [1961] 1990:251). The black subject is condemned to be a European despite his/her skin colour. And, with the strategies of colonialism imposed on the world, the black subject whether he/she likes it or not, must adopt the Western civilisation. It is this civilisation of death, that the black subject has to reject through the means of decolonial struggle.

As long as it benefits, Europe does not care that, black subjects are being killed. Europe is what it is today because of its killings, tortures, and pillage and she has closed on herself in a sense that it considers herself as the alpha of the whole world—no one has the right to judge Europe. Europe will immediately impose heavy sanctions on any state that opposes European will. Rabaka's (2008) intervention lights that the overarching aims of black subjects are geared toward protest against European imperial aggression, which affirms the humanity of Africans in the face of this dehumanising onslaught. These overarching aims appear as a response to the enduring colonialism that has successfully won the black subjects' souls and land that currently applies the coloniality of power, being, and knowledge. Europe leads the world arbitrarily and dictates the world on whatever has to be done in the other countries.

Consequently, Fanon ([1961] 1990:251) observes, "That same Europe where they were never done talking of Man, and where they never stopped proclaiming that they were only anxious for the welfare of Man: today we know with what sufferings humanity has paid for every one

of their triumphs of the mind”. Here, the ‘man’ that is always talked about is a Negro man, one who is always caricatured in public, accused of being lazy, stupid, called by zoological names, and denied of his being-in-the-world. Because of Europe, the black subject’s body is always a candidate for death. Europe has established many ways of tying up the black subject who should attempt to resist Europe’s obligations, for those who live in it and outside of it.

Manganyi (1973:20) declares that “nobody should ever have had any right to tell anybody else that he should not be aware of himself as being”. The European success resulted in the control of black subjects’ minds; Europe has won entire black subjects, their souls, and their bodies. It is critical how as Fanon ([1952] 2008:166) observes, “In Europe, the black man, whether physically or symbolically, represents the dark side of the personality”. In other words, the black subject does not have any definition which is related to humanity but the object. It means as well that the black subject is not counted as a human being. Europe is aware of their population; the rest are like reservists to be used for hard work whenever it is needed. Gordon (2015) echoes Fanon in alarming that the black soldiers found themselves mistreated in Europe not only by the white soldiers who they fought alongside but also by the white people who they liberated from village to village, town to town. It is disappointing to fight for European interests while being black. Not only Fanon himself but also black community members witnessed such disillusionment.

According to Fanon ([1961] 1990:252), “Europe has made her encroachments, that she has justified her crimes and legitimized the slavery in which she holds four-fifths of humanity”. Europe dominated the world because of its strategy of respect and valorisation of its spirit. Thus, this spirit is a combination: white people recognise black subjects easily, but until now, black people have not recognised the master. Europe always justifies colonialism by insisting that it was a necessity while its influence caused African development to go backward. At this point, Césaire ([1955] 2000) highlights that colonialist Europe is dishonest in trying to justify its colonizing. Accelerated by heavy machine guns, Europeans had to rule by terror, intimidation, and fear as the major weapons that rendered black subjects blindly apply whatever the master commanded them to do. With this in mind, for all black subjects as a whole, Fanon ([1961] 1990:254) declares: “If we wish to live up to our people’s expectations, we must seek the response elsewhere than in Europe. He states “elsewhere than in Europe” because Europe has become a slaughterhouse for black humanity. It is simply a place where black subjects are

insulted and humiliated day and night. Therefore, in understandable phrases, Fanon puts his pen to paper:

As long as the black child remains on his home ground his life follows more or less the same course as that of the white child. But if he goes to Europe he will have to rethink his life, for in France, his country, he will feel different from the rest. (Fanon [1952] 2008:127)

Usually, as in most of his criticisms about Europe, Fanon criticises but simultaneously proposes a way out. He insists on preventing the imitation of Europe, but rather to think about the discovery, invention, changing direction, and how to create a new humanity. To this point, Fanon ([1961] 1990:252) argues that “let us decide not to imitate Europe; let us combine our muscles and our brains in a new direction”. Based on this radical proposition, Fanon is concerned for any black subject who thinks that Africa should be developed the same as Europe by using the same European model of life. For Africa to be developed, European civilisation must not be applied to an African context.

In addition, Fanon ([1961] 1990:79) feels shame for how “the young independent nation sees itself obliged to use the economic channels created by the colonial regime”. Taking Europe’s ways for development should not be as compulsory for other countries. Problem is that most of the African countries blindly adopt the European way of development. Fanon above insists that African countries are obliged to follow the European channel of development which has been created by the colonial regime. This is because those countries find themselves planning for their way of development. After all, no way can happen, as colonialism is still continual.

However, following the European legacy has misled black subjects in their daily lives because as Fanon ([1952] 2008:128) validates, “the black man realizes that many of the assertions he had adopted regarding the subjective attitude of the white man are unreal”. Fanon ([1961] 1990:251) stridently calls, “We must shake the heavy darkness in which we were plunged, and leave it behind”. Black subjects are advised to penetrate in the darkness so that they arrive in a clear place for existence.

From all the criticisms above, with all his efforts, the arguments of Fanon and other scholars stimulate the minds of the black subject to meditate on how to endlessly challenge the ongoing colonialism that ravages Africans and African land. Europe inappropriately used violence to conquer Africa; the noise arises if Africans in search of being decolonised opt for using the same trajectory of violence. However, as Fanon revealed, there is no choice: European violence

needs to be challenged by a mass struggle of black subjects (violence) to deracinate colonial violence and European colonialism itself.

## 5.5 Fanon and after man

Fanon's ([1952] 2008:206) final prayer is: "O my body, always make me a man who questions!" Here, Fanon reveals that colonised are humans who are not able to question anything because they have to follow whatever is dictated, given, and designed by the white master. Fanon requests his body to make him a black subject who questions, namely a decolonised black subject. Apart from that, adopting Western modes of rendering the black being's ontology empty because it suppresses the black subject's lived experience.

Thereby, the ontology does not allow black subjects to understand the being of black people since it ignores the lived experience (Fanon [1952] 2008:90). The existence of black subjects has to be explained by white people. Black subjects live confused lives because they do not have anything original that remained. Colonialism has imposed new lives on black subjects, which are not traditionally related to their myths, beliefs, and culture. Black subjects are derived from white people who enjoy their originality at expense of the blackness that has been created to dismiss black figures (black bodies) in the world. Fanon clearly explains why black subjects become weak in front of white people:

The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man. From one day to the next, the Blacks have had to deal with two systems of reference ... they were in contradiction with a new civilization that imposed its own. (Fanon [1952] 2008:90)

The Western civilisation imposed on black subjects has objectified their being. Black people now define themselves from the being of white people and not from their ontology anymore as a consequence that their ontology is not found in the list of beings. The lives of black subjects, therefore, are included in Western civilisation. It should be said that black subjects do not exist themselves, but rather exist as false derived people who live according to the will of Western civilisation—the lived reality of black subjects. Wynter (1999:13–14) posits that Euro-North America's civilisation and culture have forced "an existential deviation on the Negro". Fanon's point of departure enables him to expose the numerous behaviours that the Negro adopts if contacted with Western civilisation.

Systematically, Fanon cannot cease to advise oppressed black subjects. Gordon (2015:12) acknowledges that "Fanon's service in the Second World War was a rude awakening". Jinadu

(1980) offers surprise support. He contradicts Fanon's work many times but for now, agrees that "Fanon was a highly programmatic and didactic writer who explicitly disdained objectivity and sought instead to project the subjective aspects of the colonial experience from the perspective of the victim of the colonial order" (Jinadu 1980:230). Having discovered and demonstrated that white oppressors planned in the sense that black subjects could not discover the pin and password to decolonise themselves, Fanon insists on the white gaze that cuts the reality of black subjects. He encourages them to only engage through an enduring struggle, which could have *naissance* of another new kind of black subject, new men who deserve to be counted in the lived experience of the world's humanity. Hence Fanon exposes:

The white gaze, the only valid one is already dissecting me ... the Whites objectively cut sections of my reality. I have been betrayed. I sense, I see in this white gaze that it's the arrival not of new man, but a new type of man, a new species. (Fanon [1952] 2008:95)

At this point, Fanon alerts people and demonstrates that gaze from the white master shows that the black subject's life is exposed to continual discrimination. It is through such discrimination that the concerned need to challenge conflict by engaging in a continuous and terrible war to reclaim their being. Wynter (1999:13) declares, "The black will therefore be able to 'cure' himself/herself only if he/she is prepared to wage a war at both levels—at that of the socioeconomic, and that of the sociogenic". At this point, Wynter explains that the black subject has to fight for more reasons: his/her liberation seeks to liberate all the domains of life that he/she has been excluded. Thus, she continues to alerts that only waging a war can lead the black subject to the recapture of his/her status.

Courageously, having lived through the experience of anti-colonial struggle, Fanon has increased his level of understanding of new humanism, due to his physical participation in the combat for liberation. It begins as a reaction to the Manichean status quo with the native 'vomiting up' the Western values force-fed by colonialists (Gibson 2003:191–192). Such a war experience made Fanon an audacious figure who decided to be a man by force, as he replicates:

I wanted quite simply to be a man among men. I would have liked to enter our world young and sleek, a world we could build together. I refused, however, any effective tetanization. I wanted to be a man and nothing but a man. (Fanon [1952] 2008:92)

Fanon's willingness to be transformed into a new human being signaled that his life was exposed to colonial violence daily. His registration among blackness was captured and rejected by the white oppressor. He found himself out of existence and wanted to seek a way to return to his original humanity that has been snatched by the endless colonialism, since "colonialism



is inhuman” (Fanon [1964] 1967:83). Therefore, for Fanon to refuse such a critical anti-black world, means that he decided to engage in the enduring struggle from which he will emerge as another transformed human being—a new man. Hence, the central question for Fanon has always been that of releasing possibilities of human existence and history imprisoned by the colonisation of experience and the racialisation of consciousness (Sekyi-Otu 1996:16). Fanon’s targets are encouraged and motivated by his goals of creating the existential possibilities of humanism that have been banned by colonialism.

As said above, imposing one civilisation on people affected blackness and especially black culture in the form of suppressing local culture and replacing it with one European culture. To this regard, Wynter (1999:3) underlines, “Western culture was to become one unique in human history, because of its epochal decoding or secularization of our human modes of identities, from the sixteenth century onwards, *pari passu* with its global imperial expansion”. Europe’s culture subordinates due to the continuation of colonialism which is somehow internationally institutionalised in all continents of the globe. For more than five centuries, Europe’s culture was unique and it is still running and learned by force through education. The culture cannot be detached from knowledge, and the current learned knowledge is mono-Euro-North-America.

In so doing, Europe used colonial violence, and for the black subject, “violence, therefore, becomes the preliminary to a new subjectivity and cultural identity for the black/colonized, and a new humanism” (Nayar 2013:84). In addition, decolonisation is not only the rejection of colonialism, but also the serious destruction and rejection of Western humanism. Nayar (2013:93) highlights that Fanon’s conception of new humanism is more inclusive and collective and it rejects the individualist humanism advanced by Europeans.

In addition, it is unfortunate that such a unique European culture (civilisation) remained long and misled the black humanity, as pointed out by Fanon:

Two centuries ago, I was lost to humanity; I was a slave forever. And then along came to a group of men and declared that enough was enough. My tenacity did the rest; I was rescued from the civilizing deluge. I moved forward. (Fanon [1952] 2008:100)

As a black subject, Fanon refers to himself just to explain how the black community has been excluded from humanity since time immemorial. However, the time has come and the black community decided to warn people of their existence. Audaciously, they have to engage in combat without knowing when it will end but instead knowing that it will lead them to self-

determination. Such combat causes many deaths as Schwartz (1974:34) reinforces that the humanist believes that one must see a metaphorical death before one can imagine rebirth.

According to Wynter (1999:10), “what Fanon’s exploration has made possible ... the uniquely hybrid level of human forms of life”. Fanon’s explanation of the concept of new humanism addresses how the possibilities of the creation of new men, originate through endless combat. Normally, people differ in terms of their nationalities, areas, cultures, to name but a few, which further indicates that they have to differ in their forms of life. They must not live a unique life imposed by colonialism that ravages and destroys diversity; and similarly, it carries on with neo-colonialism through capitalism and globalisation.

Fanon’s conception of new humanism relates to sociogeny or what it is like to be human, which is explained via a society but mainly the members of such a society who stand and fight for their lost humanity. Fanon ([1964] 1967:102) states that “it is a liberated individual who undertakes to build the new society”. A new society does not precede the new individual—there must first be a new individual who will then establish the new society. Thus, the liberation progresses from the individual to society, but not the inverse. Remaining at the same argument, while explaining the new man, Zahar ([1969] 1974:113) echoes Fanon that “the ‘new man’ is both a result and a pre-condition of the new society”. Thus, Fanon insists that a real society originates from the combat of decisive black subjects. And, it is from such a serious war that a new human emerges. Fanon’s conception of decolonisation advances that the same violence used by the white masters must be used by black subjects to reclaim their real and true humanism.

Wynter (1999:10) argues that Fanon indicates that his exploration of ‘the lived experience of the black’ is not only linked to ‘the lived experiences’ of all the colonised non-white ‘natives’, but that it will also be explored as an experience that has a specific historical origin. Fanon wants to be clear that the black subject’s lived experience is to an extent incomparable to the lived experiences of other races in the world. While other races were colonised, they did not suffer the prejudiced discrimination of their skin as it was/is the case for black subjects. At least other races were considered as second human beings after white people while a total and arbitrary negation of blackness was and still is manifested in the world.

Consequently, what it's like to be or not to be human, in the effect of human identity, was, however, to be gradually imposed on the rest of the peoples of the world (Wynter 1999). This

imposition of how human beings have to live was a penalty to blacks, as they are those who suffer the consequences of colonialism more than other races that are in the world. Marriott (2018:289) assesses that Wynter would address why Fanon turns to psychoanalysis when he thinks that sociogeny is beyond the causality of natural sciences. However, Fanon's concern was the liberation of the self as a priority, and if the self is regained, the same self will permit the black subjects to redress whatever colonialism has damaged. The one's self which one's soul is the major element needed for demonstrating that a human being is continuing to exist.

Tenaciously, Fanon has to demonstrate the black subject's humanity before colonialism and reveals the colonial lies and ruse:

In frenzy, I excavated black antiquity. What I discovered left me speechless ... Once this had been dug up, displayed, and exposed to the elements; it allowed me to regain a valid historic category. The white man was wrong, I was not a primitive or a subhuman; I belonged to a race that had already been working silver and gold 2,000 years ago. (Fanon [1952] 2008:109)

Wynter (1999) explains how from the fifteenth century onwards, black subjects became trade goods and were labelled as Negroes at the same time as Europeans coming to believe themselves to be; therefore, identifying themselves as being naturally free. Black subjects were ostensibly identified as usual slaves. Wynter (1999) observes that the fact of the juxtaposition of the two races had come to create a massive psycho-existential complex.

Colonial oppression and dehumanisation took the black selves. Fanon invites black subjects to retrieve their selves taken or rejected by colonial violence. This colonial violence is only recognised by the oppressed whereas the oppressor assesses it as being normal. Therefore, colonialists believe that they are naturally to the detriment of black subjects who are natural slaves. Black subjects have to learn that they have their past; a past in whose relation to the self, Fanon deduces a universal human duty, a necessity to act and to take responsibility for a transformation of the self and the world (Marriott 2018:204).

It is from this perspective that Wynter (1999:11) reassumes that Fanon's goal is to affect black people's extrication from their very sense of self, from their 'identity. According to Marriott's (2018:279–280) comments, "in Wynter's reading of Fanon, what Fanon's sociogeny finds in the last instance is a new history of the human, as a new object for theory". Wynter expresses that the black identity was created through colonial imposition and it has to be removed through decolonial war. Black subjects not only have to demonstrate to the coloniser that the colonial

ruse is no longer applicable in the black society and in the whole world, but also that the world belongs to all races, black people included. Colonialists thought that the world was created for one race, the 'other', and consider black subjects as reservists. Fanon's conception of new humanism focuses on destroying such a thought of the oneness of the world.

Before concluding, for a new being to be, the black community as a whole have to stand firm while confronting white people's willingness to delay the black subject's true freedom, "it is not true that this confrontation can cease by magic" (Fanon [1964] 1967:112), because, "in a war of liberation, the colonized people must-win, but they must do so cleanly, without 'barbarity'" (Fanon [1959] 1965:24). Black subjects must engage seriously in acts that destroy colonialism to the death and make sure that it is uprooted. By giving a typical example of himself, in this concern Fanon stresses:

I put the white man back in his place; emboldened, I jostled him and hurled in his face: accommodate me as I am, I am not accommodating anyone. I snickered to my heart's delight. The white man was visibly growling. His reaction was a long time coming. I had won. I was overjoyed. (Fanon [1952] 2008:110)

In reinforcing Fanon's exposition, Wynter (1999:12) notifies that it is a human itself who "brings society into being". Black subjects as a whole are reminded that the creation of their new society has to be accomplished by themselves and for themselves. Such a social transformation is the result of the decolonial agenda. It does not come from barbaric acts but from a well-planned war to the death, a bloodshed moment when black subjects emerge as new individuals who created a new and transformed society as Fanon ([1959] 1965) highlights that the true revolution changes a man and renews society. With tenacity, Fanon uses all his efforts to make sure that the new humanism that he tried to create was complete; nevertheless, "even though Fanon did not give up on the task, his attempt to forge a new humanism remained incomplete at the time of his death" (Marriott 2018:244).

Finally, Marriott (2018:280) hurries to conclude that for Wynter, the invention is located not in the natural sciences, least of all in biology, but in the empirical study of human consciousness, which, unlike history, has an indispensable opacity to it. This shows that Fanon's conception of new humanism continuity differs from Wynter's conception based on the discontinuity found in Fanon's conception of breakthrough. What Fanon wants is to make sure that colonialism is abolished and that a new humanism is established. This new humanism is not the one that creates positions like the bourgeoisie, but a new humanism for all individuals

as a whole. For Fanon, the essence of this humanism is the task of endless self-creation without status, rule, or protocol (Marriott 2018:286).

## **5.6 Conclusion**

By analysing the lived experience of black subjects, this chapter explicated Fanon's conception of a new humanism. The chapter illuminated new humanism as a stage of transformation insofar as it results from an engaged and enduring struggle from which the new people emerge. While some scholars disagreed with Fanon that a new man does not necessarily result from the war between the oppressed and oppressor, Fanon and his disciples maintained that any other option except for engaging in decolonial combat is not necessary for the decolonial journey; it would be a loss of time.

The said enduring struggle does not only transform black subjects who were oppressed by colonialism for a long period but also changes society completely. The new people live in a transformed society that does not recognise dehumanisation, mastery and slavery, oppression, and domination anymore. It is a society that is not built on the prejudice of racism, but a society where black people are marked as full human beings with the capacity to think and question.

Importantly, the chapter engaged the thematic of critique of flag freedoms. Fanon's literature championed to reveal how the formerly colonised countries possess the given and negotiated freedom of their former colonisers. Consequently, their so-called citizens celebrate their [pseudo-]independence each year. The study demonstrated that flag/pseudo-freedoms, are freedoms that have been given and not freedoms that the oppressed have fought for. Fanon called these freedoms pseudo-freedoms, which are unreal freedoms that differ from genuine freedoms. Through this subheading, Fanon called the oppressed to fight for real freedom and to be transformed into new people who fundamentally precede and find a new society.

This chapter further discussed a critique of Europe, which focused on Fanon's writings that criticised European colonialism. Fanon revealed how Europe created the unending problem (colonialism). The same problem in action is still maintained through the colonality of being, power, and knowledge. Fanon's insights focused on revealing that colonialism is a European project that could only end if confronted by a serious and enduring decolonial struggle. Europe was criticised as being the major cause of world trouble, discrimination, dehumanisation, and, shamelessly, the fabricator of blackness that disqualifies black figures from registering in the world's humanity.

Before this conclusion, the chapter debated Fanon and after man as the penultimate subheading to be illuminated. To clarify this subheading, the chapter borrowed Fanon's literature to explicate new humanism. By interpreting the concept of a new humanism, Wynter discussed Fanon's explanations. Marriott's interpretation of Wynter posited that Wynter differed from Fanon concerning the creation of the possibilities of new beings. This chapter elucidated the concept of sociogeny and the role played by society as a whole in search of the black subject reaching self-determination.

Finally, the chapter terminated its elucidation with the conclusion. The conclusion gathered all the subheadings into one idea, namely that new beings result from the terrible struggle that opposes the white master and the black subject. The colonised engage in this war by deciding to die to save themselves and create a new society that does not recognise discrimination or oppression.

## CHAPTER 6

### BY WAY OF CONCLUSION

This study revealed how Fanon's conception of decolonisation coincidentally speaks to our current time. As Cherki (2011:134) affirms, "Fanon's progressive ideas are less visible but still present". Thus, exposing Fanon's conception of decolonisation facilitated an understanding of colonialism as a *longue-durée* project. It has to be confronted by an enduring decolonial struggle through a respective order of Fanon's three elements of decolonisation, namely violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism.

By clarifying these three elements, the study highlighted Fanon's interventions and relevance in the decolonial project and the study itself. Regarding his relevance at the current time, Cherki (2001) considers Fanon as today's growing child:

Too culturalist for some, too Universalist for others! In the sense of this double movement to open up points of reference and move to something that has the potential to become universal, Fanon is a child of today. (Cherki 2011:138)

With Fanon's intervention and relevance in mind, there have been many decolonial temptations to completely mute colonialism; however, it is still a *longue-durée* project that is covered and operational under the current forms (apparatuses) of coloniality. Therefore, no fundamental change has happened, which significantly motivates Fanon's call for decolonising the world. Importantly, appreciable decolonial movements using Fanon's *oeuvres* have been remarkable in different parts of the world. Cherki (2011) considers Fanon as a child of today, in the sense that it is still difficult to study decolonial study without employing Fanon's work on decolonisation. Therefore, in a decolonial journey; Fanon becomes an unavoidable mentor for the past, present, and future. Fanon's reasoning on decolonisation is comprehensible and recommending: only violence can destroy colonialism, as colonialism itself has been and is still built on violence.

According to Fanon ([1961] 1990:48), colonialism "is violence in its natural state, [and] it will only yield when confronted with greater violence". Therefore, based on this analysis provided by Fanon, decolonial project compulsorily requires that violence is employed. This is a derivation of the colonial violence that the colonised accumulated through their colonial life experiences. It becomes the core element for resolving conflict between the master and oppressed black subject.

This study reached four sets of conclusions that underline Fanon's discernment regarding his conception of decolonisation. As a necessity, the conclusions had to be combined to have one general conclusion to consider. Therefore, this study generally concluded that Fanon is the Africana existential philosopher (Sithole 2015). His radical engagement regarding decolonisation permits the black subject to map out his/her plan of action against colonialism. Therefore, Fanon's political thought cannot be taken as insignificant thought as it uncovers the hidden realities of the hellish conditions of continual colonialism that weigh on the black subject's everyday life.

Another point of importance is that this study has explicated how Fanon's imagination on decolonisation does not only exposes the danger of ongoing colonialism but also allows the creation of the existential conditions of life. The study uniquely explicated how Fanon's reasoning on decolonisation is based on the three inseparable and harmonic pillars, namely violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism.

The first set of conclusions is that the study showed that Africana existential phenomenology remains the major tool for unearthing the disregarded black subject's lived experience in all continents of the globe. Africana existential phenomenology explained the theoretical framework of the whole study. Africana existential phenomenology was further illuminated as a philosophical tradition that arose to depict the lived experiences that concern black subjects and their geographically dispersed descendants in the world.

Furthermore, Africana existential phenomenology reclaims the authentic position of black subjects' existence, which the world has snatched through a presumptuous and perpetual colonial system. This colonial system has by penalty rejected black people's philosophies, which were supposed to be recorded in the world's knowledge and experiences. Africana existential phenomenology has been regarded as the main tool that exposes the politics of identity—blackness as the identification of all black subjects to be regarded as human beings but not as compost or reservist human beings in the world.

Importantly, the study accounted for blackness by exposing that the black subject's lived experience has been not recorded due to colonialism. It was demonstrated that black people are prejudicially judged based on their skin colour as an identity marker. Black people are prejudicially victims of the politics of identification, as Cornell (2015) reviews:



[...] blacks are forced into a kind of condition or zone of nonbeing. They exist as a thing, or even, as Gordon reminds us, as a monster ... the black experience is constantly negated by the racism that blacks must endure, by pointing out how this negation takes the form of denying to blacks anything like a subjective life. (Cornell 2015:143)

It is through such a colour prejudice that discrimination and dehumanisation of blackness originated in the world. Black subjects have no choice but to refute the ongoing colonialism and engage in the endless struggle of decolonisation. The study assessed the importance of self-recognition while facing the colonial situation as the black subject. An understanding of Fanon's conception of decolonisation, which was emphasised through violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism, cannot be understood without accounting for the black subjects' lived experiences.

Importantly, the thematic of being-black-in-the-world facilitated to comprehension of how black subjects have been/are rejected to be recognised as human beings in the world. Black subjects are collectively excluded from being listed as thinkers and philosophers. The 'critique of black reason' uncovered how black subjects are criticised literarily. By applying Africana existential phenomenology that revives their buried thoughts, black subjects have to reclaim and demonstrate their contribution in the world of knowledge. Of importance, the study discussed and evaluated colonial apparatus as the colonial tool of controlling all black bodies in their everyday lives.

An understanding and explanation of all three themes above required an application of Africana existential phenomenology. This demonstrated how it ties in well with Fanon's philosophies of decolonisation. Fanon as an existential philosopher once again states that black subjects could be restored as human beings who contribute to the lived experiences in the world; the world that arbitrarily does not recognise any record of the black subjects' lived experiences. It is in that sense that Africana existential phenomenology has to intervene as it deals with the lived experience of the black subjects. Its intervention allows black subjects' thoughts, knowledge, political affairs, economy, culture, and identification to be resurrected.

The second set of conclusions of this study reveals how the violence, which used by the white master to conquer and dominate, has to be the same violence that the colonised use to recreate themselves. By analysing the lived experience of black subjects, the study elucidated Fanon's philosophy on violence. In essence, the violence explicated by Fanon has a double meaning:

the colonial violence launched by the coloniser and the counter-violence as a replication of the same violence thrown back to the coloniser by the black subject.

Therefore, it was important to illuminate that Fanon's conception of counter-violence is a derivation of colonial violence. His arguments advanced that colonialists used violence to conquer and occupy the land of the black subjects. As a result, the study demonstrated how the escalation of colonial violence has engendered the violence that stimulated black subjects to set themselves free.

Colonial violence was clarified in the text and context based on Fanon's writing on colonial violence, which is supported and denied by different works of literature. The study demonstrated how since the first day of conquest, colonialists applied violence to keep the colonialism system continually active. The study clarified that colonialism is violent by nature and that colonialists illegally led black subjects by using such violence. Colonial violence destroyed the black community, traditional leadership, culture, and economy, to mention just a few. By confronting such destruction, black subjects without choice are called to engage in an enduring struggle to encounter the colonial destruction of the black subject's myths, culture, political affairs, economy, and knowledge. The success of this struggle will set black subjects free and give them a key to a world with true liberty, equality, and justice.

The study discussed Sartre as Fanon's disciple of [arbitrary] violence. Sartre's concern was that the Europeans neglected to read Fanon's message on the impact of colonialism and decolonisation process to follow. Consequently, such a message should be read as Europeans sit on a bomb that can explode at any time. Sartre's prophecy revealed that reading Fanon was the only option of preventing such a bomb ready to explode. Indeed, Sartre's preface in *The Wretched of the Earth* mainly focused on agreeing with Fanon's reasoning that identified Europeans as the first launchers of violence. Audaciously, Sartre alerted Europeans that the same violence used by colonialists has been started to being thrown back at them. An explosion of such violence will damage Europe and Europeans themselves. This can only be prevented if Europeans read Fanon and listen to what this brother advises them.

In balancing the views of this study, the study opened the door for Arendt's criticism of violence. Without turning right or left, Arendt (1970) rebuked both Fanon and Sartre of being self-glorifying on violence. Arendt (1970) severely criticised Fanon and Sartre that the anti-colonial violence that they preach cannot contribute to resolving any conflict or the project of

decolonisation, but aggravates the situation. Arendt clearly understood that colonialists could use violence to civilise the black subjects who were prejudicially judged not be enough yet to be considered on the level of human beings who possess knowledge. Arendt's arguments have disagreed with Fanon and his supporters. They accused her of being biased because she was aware that colonialists used violence to conquer and occupy Africa, but she closed her eyes to their concern. She became so strict on decolonial violence that she strongly refuted and condemned whoever acted as a forefront anti-colonialist by starting to reject both Fanon and Sartre as thinkers. While commenting on the influences and engagements of Fanon, Nayar (2013) changed the melody to Arendt's favour and attempted to destroy Sartre and Fanon's same (sharing) understandings on the black condition. He put it in the subsequent terms:

What must be kept in mind is that Fanon never accepted any philosophical thought or thinker uncritically ... This is precisely why 'Fanon's influences' become such a difficult subject—we do not see Fanon's appropriation of a thinker, what we see is a critical engagement, an engagement that very often indicts the shortcomings and politics of the thinker and extends the ideas into a whole other dimension. (Nayar 2013:28)

By following Arendt's steps, Nayar (2013) did not recognise Fanon as a thinker. Nayar only admired that Fanon was prominent in the critical engagement. It was complicated for Nayar to classify Fanon because Fanon was tenacious to agree with any philosophical thought from other scholars and the closer scholars themselves. Despite Nayar's interference in their sharing of (the same) understanding, both Fanon and Sartre advanced and justified that colonial violence was illegal and, as a result, it is through such violence that counter-violence emerged. In contrast, Arendt firmly defended such colonial violence as being legitimate but refuted any form of counter-violence. Remaining on Fanon's relevance in the contemporary time, Cherki (2011:138) disagreed with both Nayar and Arendt who did not recognise Fanon as a thinker, "Fanon's trajectory—from the liberation of the individual to a political interrogation—is a question that has not ceased to prey on our so-called modern societies". Cherki (2011) evaluated Fanon's work fifty years later as he still resists the air of our present time.

This study allowed Fanon to justify himself to the grievances received from his rival group led by Arendt. From there, Fanon's appeal permitted him to restructure, clarify and justify his messianic thought of violence. Therefore, Fanon has re-elucidated that violence should be analysed by using a double sense of signification. Firstly, colonial violence has allowed the colonisers to conquer and occupy the colonies. Secondly, the violence of the colonised appears as a derivation or reflection of colonial violence. Applying the same violence permits the

transformation of the colonised from objectification to humanity. Fanon justified that there is no other alternative to end the endless colonial violence except for applying the same violence to itself. Therefore, Fanon concurred that the colonised have to use the same violence that they have received from their master to engage in an enduring struggle for self-determination.

The third collection of conclusions emerging from this investigation is related to Fanon's conception of *tabula rasa*. The study demonstrated the role of the concept of *tabula rasa* in Fanon's project of decolonisation. In this regard, Fanon ([1961] 1990:27) essentially describes *tabula rasa*, "Its unusual importance is that it constitutes, from the very first day, the minimum demands of the colonized". This reaffirms that the absence of *tabula rasa* renders the absence of full decolonisation; likewise, its presence enables people's real freedom and a new humanity. Fanon's conception of *tabula rasa* was unique in the understanding of decolonisation.

To an extent, the study engaged with the thematic of a disorder of things as a prerequisite to *tabula rasa*. The study demonstrated that by nature, colonialism is characterised by complete disorder (violence) that needs to be confronted by great decolonial violence (encountered complete disorder) from which *tabula rasa* emerges. Therefore, the study explicated the thematic of *tabula rasa* grounded on political imagination as well. The political imagination detailed how black subjects need to create their original plans to emerge from arsenal colonialism, which remains manifested in Africa and elsewhere in the world.

The study demonstrated that Fanon's conception of dialectics is unique because it is the dialectics of existence, while the Hegelian and Marxist dialectics are temporarily limited to an end. It was revealed how for Fanon, freedom does not mean that the oppressed has arrived at self-determination, but that inter-recognition is still needed. The 'Others' have easily recognised the oppressed but, in contrast, the oppressed have been obstructed by the endless colonialism for them to recognise the 'Others'. The black subject has to fight for him to allow the reciprocal recognition which is still a lacuna between Negros and the white master. As it has been demonstrated, what is decisive for the absence of reciprocal recognition is that no struggle has taken place between white people and Negros (Zahar [1969] 1974:16). Fanon's distinctiveness on his accounting of dialectics was validated by his revelation that stated that colonialism is still a problem for existence, which needs to be confronted by an enduring struggle for all black subjects as a whole to reach self-determination.

The study further explicated the thematic of nothingness. Nothingness has ontologically been explained as the fact that the being of the black being has been rendered nothing—it has no value. Nothingness has therefore mainly been clarified as the rejection of the black subject's humanity. In terms of material things, nothingness was superficially explained as a particular object or material being 'priceless' or having 'no value'. However, the main discussion of nothingness was based on ontological terms through which the lived experiences of black subjects have been demonstrated to be in endless critical conditions in their everyday lives because the world continues to deny their humanity.

The fourth set of conclusions of this study concerned Fanon's conception of new humanism as a phase of transformation that permits the black subject to have another new humanity. By analysing the black subjects' lived experiences, the study explicated Fanon's conception of a new humanism. The concept of a new humanism was illuminated like a stage of total change because it results from the engaged and enduring struggle from which new people emerge. Some scholars such as Arendt (1970) disagreed with Fanon that a new man must not necessarily result from the war between the oppressed and the oppressor. However, Fanon and his supporters remained firm in preaching that only the engagement in an endless war is the remedy to the colonial condition that deteriorates the black community's existence and denies the lived experience of black subjects.

The recommended enduring struggle does not only transform the black subjects who were oppressed by colonialism for a long period but also completely changes society and the black subjects who from then onwards have to live in a transformed society that does not recognise dehumanisation, mastery, and slavery, oppression and domination anymore. It is a society that is not built on prejudice or racism. This is a society where black people are recovered with another new humanity with a total absence of dehumanisation. Within such a society, black subjects self-travel without any symbols of directions. In addition, Fanon clarified that black subjects live forged humanism, which is not related to African myths and does not apply to an African context at all. Such humanism disqualifies the black subjects' lived experience by glorifying whiteness to the detriment of blackness.

Importantly, the study engaged with Fanon's revelation of how formerly colonised countries possess the given and negotiated freedoms of their former colonisers. Consequently, the so-called citizens celebrate their (pseudo-) independence each year. The study demonstrated that flag/pseudo-freedom is a freedom that has been given, but not a freedom that the oppressed

fought for. Fanon calls this type of freedom “pseudo-freedom” or unreal freedom, which differs from genuine freedom. This has been one among reasons why Gordon states it as:

[...] it is the struggle for liberation that engenders one’s freedom. Active involvement in such struggles is psychologically healthy. It covers various encumbrances, especially those imposed by a false sense of limits. (Gordon 2015:97)

Gordon’s call echoed Fanon who persistently and stridently called for the oppressed to fight for the real freedom to be transformed as new men who fundamentally precede and find a new society. The study detailed as well that humanists express both the desperation of the human situation and their assertion of freedom (Schwartz 1974). The real freedom results from terrible engagements that cost deaths on the side of the black subjects the same as for white masters.

Again, the study discussed how Europe created the unending problem of colonialism. The same problem is still maintained through a multitude of ways of domination. In a sense, Europe created a problem that she is no longer able to resolve. Any attempt to resolve the colonial problem shall provoke the demolition of Europe itself. However, Fanon’s insights reveal that colonialism is a European project that could only end if confronted by a serious and enduring decolonial struggle. Europe has been criticised as being the major cause of world trouble, discrimination, and dehumanisation; and shamelessly as the fabricator of blackness that disqualifies black subjects from being registered as humans.

Essentially, as a tool of clarification, Africana existential phenomenology was employed to discuss new humanism taking into consideration of black subjects and their society. Fanon’s ([1952] 2008:206) final prayer humbly demands that his body always makes him a man who questions. Therefore, black subjects have the right to question their new humanism. They are human beings who feel confident about their registration in society. By interpreting the concept of a new humanism, it was shown how Wynter contended with Fanon’s explanations regarding the concept of a new humanism. Marriott’s (2018) interpretation of Wynter posits that Wynter differs from Fanon insofar as Fanon’s imagination on new humanism reveals the possibilities of the creation of the existential conditions of life, while Wynter’s (1999) conception of new humanism is fixed to temporality. The concept of sociogeny, or what to be, and the role played by society as a whole in search for the black subject to be fully set free were elucidated.

As the study is touching to its end, it has been elucidated as well that through Fanon’s conception of decolonisation, the study explicated that the new humanity of black subjects results from the terrible and enduring struggle that opposes the coloniser and black subject. It

is by engaging in such a war, that black subjects decide to die so that they can save their new selves. Interestingly, it has been explicated that Fanon is still a relevant thinker of revolutionary transformation in our contemporary time, which is why his work continues to inspire all of those who continue to seek to rebuild a more just world (Cornell 2015). Finally, with Fanon's conception of decolonisation built on three-dimensionality, namely: violence, *tabula rasa*, and new humanism; the acquisition of another new world is still possible.

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