

**THE ZIMBABWE DEFENCE FORCE'S MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN
WAR (MOOTW) IN THE POST-2000 PERIOD**

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examined the non-military contributions of the Zimbabwe military to development in the period from 2000 to 2020. At the core of the thesis is the novel concept of 'Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)' in a highly polarised Zimbabwean society. Within this context, it presents a historical analysis of the origin of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF). This historical background is a useful foundation to analyse civil-military relations in contemporary Zimbabwe. The key proposition is that political party polarisation provided for the justification of mixed feelings and perceptions towards the ZDF to the extent that their MOOTW are overlooked. What is emerging from this thesis is that social and political cleavages resulting from the competitive multi-party system impinged and impacted on development process and affected civil-military relations. The increased military interventions in civilian aspects of life, of the state and nation were perceived by some sections of the polarised society as partisan. The thesis reveals that a multi-party system where political parties cooperate, as opposed to competition in the arenas of political, social, and economic development opens the space for MOOTW to compliment long-term national aims and objectives of attainment of peace and development for the people of Zimbabwe. Military studies in a polarised nation characterised by severe development challenges tend to be very sensitive. The thesis, therefore, adopted research approach, design and methods that were most suitable to produce credible research findings. The qualitative research approach, and the snowball sampling method enabled the researcher to gather the meaning the people of Zimbabwe both civilians and military personnel attach to their experiences as they relate with the ZDF work towards national development.

Key Words: civil-military relations, development, Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), military operations other than war (MOOTW), ZIPRA Forces, ZANLA Forces, Rhodesian Security Forces, commandism, militarisation.

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DECLARATION

I, Godwin **VHUMBA**, do hereby declare that the work presented in this document entitled: *THE ZIMBABWE DEFENCE FORCE'S MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW) IN THE POST-2000 PERIOD* is my own work and that all the sources that I quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

I further declare that I submitted the thesis to originality checking software and that it falls within the accepted requirements for originality.

I further declare that I have not previously submitted this work, or part of it, for examination at UNISA for another qualification or at any other higher education institution.

Student Number: 53676335

...G VHUMBA.....

.....December 2020

Signature

Date

DEDICATION

Dedicated to my father Mr. W.T. Vumba, my wife S. Vumba, my son Godwin Munashe , and my daughters Margret Rejoice, Nokutenda Olivia and Rumbidzai Juliet with a special dedication to my late mother Mrs. M.Vumba (nee Zimunya) (MHSRIP) whose self-sacrifice, wisdom and courage inspired me to go beyond my limits. I salute you all, God bless my family and Zimbabwe!

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFZ	Air Force of Zimbabwe
AFZ HQ	Air Force of Zimbabwe Headquarters
BMATT	British Military Advisory and Training Team
CAFZCF	Commander Air Force of Zimbabwe Charity Fund
CMR	Civil-Military Relations
GMB	Grain Marketing Board
MBC	Military Business Complex
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
NDP	National Democratic Party
NOCZIM	National Oil Company of Zimbabwe
NRZ	National Railways of Zimbabwe
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAIT	People's Liberation Army Instructors' Team
RF	Rhodesian Front
RSF	Rhodesian Security Forces
UN	United Nations
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union

ZDF	Zimbabwe Defence Forces
ZIPA	Zimbabwe People`s Army
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People`s Revolutionary Army
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZNDU	Zimbabwe National Defence University

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides the introduction to the study consisting of the background to the study, the problem statement, theoretical framework, objectives of the study, rationale of the study, the research methodology and all the other introductory aspects of the study. The military's involvement in governance and development issues of post-colonial Africa is always a debatable issue with theoretical and practical underpinnings. The Zimbabwe Defence Forces' (ZDF) involvement in political, social and economic activities in Zimbabwe through military operations other than war (MOOTW) is the main subject under analysis in this study.

1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

African militaries have influenced development and governance in many post-colonial countries. They either have a positive or negative influence. Some have, fought liberation wars that ended colonialism and others heavily participated in the promotion of authoritarian rule. The military, therefore, has become a very important institution in Africa. The western concept that the military should be under civilian control was adopted by many countries for various reasons. However, the civil-military relations that developed in post-colonial Africa naturally became different from those of the western countries. Ngoma (2006) observes that the socio-political history and the unstable environment created a special context which affected all actors in civil-military relations. Civil-military relations have become vital in the study of post-colonial African governance and development challenges. The analysis of governance and development challenges in post-independence Zimbabwe cannot be complete without a deeper analysis of non-combat military operations.

The Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) is formed by Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and the Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ). These two services were formed from the amalgamation of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) in 1980 at the independence of Zimbabwe. The uniqueness of the Zimbabwean military is that ZANLA and

ZIPRA were the fighting wings of the major two nationalists' parties, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) respectively that fought for independence. ZANU and ZAPU later joined in 1987 to form ZANU-Patriotic Front (PF). This historical link of the ZDF to ZANU-PF is a very important factor in the study of ZDF civil-military relations and all ZDF operations.

Since the late 1990s, Zimbabwe's socio-economic and political structures have drastically deteriorated, invoking debate among individuals, regional countries and international organisations. Zimbabweans suffered deteriorating economic environment, unstable political environment, deteriorating human rights record, and western isolation and sanctions. Pressure mounted on the Zimbabwe government for political and economic reforms as well as security sector reforms. This study aims to explain and explore the post-2000 Zimbabwean development challenges by focusing on the impact of ZDF military operations other than war (MOOTW) on the country's development trajectory.

From 2000 up to the formation of the inclusive government in 2009, Zimbabwe's political and economic environment was characterised by inter-party conflicts and economic instability. Hanke (2009) discerns that, Zimbabwe is the first country in the 21st century to experience extreme hyperinflation. He points out that the country's inflation reached the minimum hyperinflation rate of 50% in February 2007. Since then, inflation soared until the adoption of the multi-currency in 2009. A positive change was then recorded. Mandaza (2014) observes that Zimbabwe's industrial index of the country's stock exchange in 2009 increased by 160% and the economic growth rate increased by 10% in 2010.

In order to survive the Zimbabwean Government adopted various methods. One of the most controversial government reactions was the clean-up campaign of towns and cities in May 2005 which was dubbed 'Operation Murambatsvina'. This exercise was locally and internationally criticised, for instance, the then U.S Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, citing human rights violations, raised the issue in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). However, citing reasons of non-interference in internal affairs of Zimbabwe, China and Russia opposed discussion of the subject in the UN Security Council (Norwegian Refugee Council Report: Africa Report, No. 97, 2005).

In the midst of economic and political instability in Zimbabwe, western governments imposed sanctions on the country. Efforts were made to isolate President Mugabe's ZANU-PF Government, including campaigns for a regime change. The U.S Congress passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) in December 2001 to provide a transition to democracy and to promote economic recovery in Zimbabwe (US Congress. S.494 (107th), 2001). In support of the US Congress motives, the European Union imposed targeted sanctions in 2002 on key personnel in ZANU PF and in government.

The effects of the sanctions have, however, been contested. For instance, Mandaza (2014) argues that between 2009 and 2013 Zimbabwe's gross domestic product averaged 7% per annum, a record last achieved in the 1970s. He concludes his argument by declaring that neither ZIDERA nor the US targeted sanctions were not entirely responsible for the country's poor economic performance. In contrast, the ZANU PF 2013 Election Manifesto highlights that, the US and EU 2001 illegal sanctions on Zimbabwe were negatively affecting the country's economic performance and this had "negative downstream effects on vulnerable groups, communities and civil society".

The actual causes of various challenges to the country for the period under review are difficult to underpin and justify. However, generally speaking, in many African states bad governance has retarded development. With the high demand for democratisation and good governance African military activities have come under heavy scrutiny. For instance, the deployment of ZDF into the Democratic Republic of Congo is often cited as one of the major causes of the drastic downfall of the Zimbabwean economy. ZIDERA S(4)(1) states that:

Through economic mismanagement, undemocratic practices, and the costly deployment of troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Government of Zimbabwe has rendered itself ineligible to participate in International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Monetary Fund programs.

The high demand for good governance, social and economic development in many African communities forces many actors to analyse the role of African militaries' involvement in states' development agenda. African militaries' contribution to 'bad governance' became a concern to the international donor community. For instance the World Bank's (WB) Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) which called for reductions in defence budget

was presumed as a concern by International donor community to the bad governance as a result of the involvement of African militaries in state development. Again these calls failed to solve African development challenges related to the military.

For the Zimbabwean case, the US Congress through ZIDERA in 2001 S (4)(d)(5), went further to prescribe that “The Zimbabwean Armed Forces, the National Police of Zimbabwe, and other state security forces are responsible to and serve the elected civilian government”. It is important to note that under the Chinese Socialist Democracy, loyalty to the party is of paramount importance. Addressing the PLA troops, China’s President and military leader, Xi Jinping, in December 2012 clearly articulated that “top priority” was for the military to win battles, and “the soul of the military” was obeying the Party’s command (Xinhua News Agency, 2012).

These differences in how the government should engage the military in development issues is a real challenge in many developing countries. Many countries are guided by Western democracy in their policy formulation but in practice they do it the Chinese way. Policy and practice are in divergence. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2010) argues that, *Maoism* had a strange conception of political power as coming from the barrel of the gun. The military and the party are one thing. The contradiction between this Maoist thinking and western concept of civil-military relations makes the conduct of MOOTW very difficult and questionable in many African developing countries.

It is therefore, arguably wrong to associate all the human security issues and bad governance in post-independence African states with military’s involvement governance. In most cases, especially in Southern Africa where there have been no coups, this military’s involvement in national development issues has been in the form of MOOTW. These MOOTW are a developmental issue since they affect the governments’ ability or perceived ability to deal with development issues such as human security and political stability. The challenge for many African states, therefore, is to determine ways and strategies to effectively employ the military in developmental roles through MOOTW.

There is no clear consensus when it comes to defining the concept of MOOTW as a number of authors and nations have defined the concept from their own perspectives and this has resulted in abundant definitions of the concept (Ayers (1996). Each of the various definitions

is set to meet the broad objectives of particular country or organisation. According to the United States Doctrine for Joint Operations (2001), MOOTW encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war. In MOOTW, focus is on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995:1-1). The wide definition does not explicitly explain the difference between war and MOOTW. Ayers (1996:9), points out that one way to further understand the differences between war and MOOTW is to check on MOOTW principles, and MOOTW models.

MOOTW have a very wide range of activities. According to the Joint Pub 3-07 (1995:1-5), these operations include humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, some nation assistance, foreign internal defense, most support to counterdrug operations, arms control, support to civil authorities, evacuation of noncombatants in a permissive environment, and peacekeeping. The major challenge in trying to define MOOTW is that there is no single definition. There are political as well doctrinal differences. Joint Pub 3-07 (1995) points out that in MOOTW, political considerations have the highest priority such that the military may not be the key actors. Detailed explanations of the MOOTW concept are in chapter 4.

The conduct of MOOTW in Zimbabwe raised mixed feelings. The post-2000 period was characterised by political and economic crisis. National security and development became core issues on party politics. The ZDF's involvement in MOOTW became a national and international subject. Reactions of people to MOOTW always vary. For instance, in the US, Foster (1993:27) points out that, "The primary purpose of the military must change demonstrably and fundamentally-from war fighting to nation building, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance". On the other hand, Huntington (1957), cited by Ayers (1996:4) argues that, "The military should not be organised or prepared or trained to perform such (noncombat) roles". Nonetheless, the US military doctrine embraces the idea of conducting MOOTW. The Joint Pub 3-07 (1995:1) states, "while we have historically focused on war fighting, our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations-other than war". The Government of Zimbabwe has faced several socio-economic and political challenges in the post-2000 era. The military as a state organ played its role in maintaining peace and stability, an environment conducive for development, in a background where some individuals and organisations are calling for security sector reforms.

For instance Bangidza (2016) raises critical issues for security sector reforms in the ZDF which are in chapters 6 and 7.

The secondment of military personnel to parastatals and ministries is regarded as militarisation of state enterprises, the military involvement in voter education was viewed as partisan, the involvement in housing construction of schools, houses and roads in support of civil ministries was also received with mixed feelings and the involvement of the military in Marange diamonds resulted in Zimbabwe diamonds being labeled bloody diamonds. All these mixed feelings and different perceptions on military operations affected national security, democracy and development.

The post-2000 era is a special period in Zimbabwe. Since the ZDF withdrawal from the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2001 the military operations became internally focused. The formation of the MDC in 1999 changed the political landscape and perceptions on national threats in Zimbabwe. National security issues became partisan. The democratic processes came under heavy scrutiny as there was a shift from a multiparty system with a single major party to a multi-party system with a strong opposition party. Calls for security sector reform, the economic decline and imposition of sanctions or travel bans are covered in this period. The thesis posits that a situational analysis of the ZDF MOOTW can help not only the military to have self-evaluation of its operations, but for all Zimbabweans to work towards peace and development together with their defence forces. This study seeks to explore and describe the perceptions of a wide range of Zimbabweans on MOOTW. The overall goal of the study is to determine the impact of MOOTW implementation on national security and development in Zimbabwe

1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The problem statement for the research was postulated as follows:

Modern militaries are no longer focusing on war only. Militaries are now involved in nation building activities. The ZDF is one such military which has been modernising its operations through MOOTW. But the involvement of the military in these activities short of war has raised mixed feelings. Some believe the military is inappropriately being used by the state while others believe it is an anchor for sovereignty and national development. The thesis aims

to examine these perceptions and assess the impact of MOOTW on social, political and economic arenas in Zimbabwe. Then the question is; what is the impact of MOOTW on national security and development in Zimbabwe?

1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study aims to assess the impact of MOOTW on development and security in post-2000 Zimbabwe under the prism of civil-military relations. Some of the important issues covered under civil-military relations include colonial background, human security and state security as important determinants of political, social and economic development of a nation.

Ebo (2008) has refers to civil-military relations as the web of relations that connects the military and its society. Similarly, Rupiya (2003:252) refers to civil-military relations as “a complex set of interrelationships, established norms and practices between the triad – the state, society and the armed forces”. Ngoma (2004) argues that civil-military relations are a critical subject in the development discourse in Africa, where military involvement in development is always a challenge. These arguments and assertions highlight that civil-military relations involve a number of issues pertaining to the state, the military and the society.

Prominent scholars like Samuel P. Huntington’s work reveal the place of the military profession in the US society. Goodpaster and Huntington (1977) cited by Rupiya (2003) argue that American peoples only came to have interests in military affairs after the end of Second World War. Ngoma (2006) examines African civil-military relations trends focusing on the nexus between military, democracy and politics. He concludes that there was a general acceptance that western countries have relative longer history of mature politics and democratic civil-military relations than the African countries. The US society used to ignore the importance of military professionalism, power and culture. This could have been due to the fact that the analyses of military operations are commonly characterised by secrecy and the issues are then clouded by myths and realities. The military normally deals with issues of national security which are normally a domain of the elite.

Similarly, the activities of the ZDF were not under scrutiny soon after independence especially by the western countries. Post-2000 marks the era of constant surveillance and close monitoring of civil-military relations, human rights and human security issues in politically, socially and economically disturbed Zimbabwe. This can be attributed to the changes in the political landscape. A strong opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formed in 1999. Unlike ZAPU, the MDC has no strong links with the nationalist forces and therefore its formation changed the political landscape. Huntington (1957) warns that, nations will squanders resources and encounter uncalculated risks as a result of failure to work out balanced civil-military relations. This is a strong warning not only to Zimbabwe but to many African countries were the military is often controversially blamed for bad governance and human rights abuse.

Rupiya (2003) argues that, the African continent because of its colonial history has interesting and complex innovations in its civil-military relations. He further comments that the continent still has undefined roles and complexities in the military operations. Civil-military relations are therefore an issue that needs serious attention if Africa is to solve its development challenges.

The importance of civil-military relations on international development and politics cannot be underrated when analysing Zimbabwe`s development path. For instance ZIDERA, which was passed by the US Congress in 2001, has a section on the expected behaviour and conduct of the ZDF. Civil-military relations are generally used by the international players to critically analyse, especially for developing nations, governance systems and development practices. This study reviews founding works on civil-military relations, and then focuses more intensely on ZDF. The contributions of scholars like Williams (2010); Rupiya (2001, 2003 & 2005), Chitiyo (2006 &2009), Chitiyo & Rupiya (2005), Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2003, 2006 & 2010), Bangidza (2016) and Nyakudya (2019) among others on ZDF post-2000 activities were reviewed. It is true that military involvement in political matters in Zimbabwe got the attention of a number of authors in a variety of ways. However, the ZDF`s involvement in development matters through MOOTW remains a profitable area for further research. There are changes and challenges in civil-military relations such that each situation, country or region ought to have unique solutions. Zimbabwe and the ZDF therefore ought to have its unique way to balance civil-military relations to solve national developmental challenges.

Although there are principles to civil-military relations, it is not always easy to adhere to them. Several African militaries engage in operations that exhibit their failure to adhere to key principles of civil-military relations. These key principles include accountability to civil authorities, adherence to rule of law, transparency, respect for human rights and professionalism among others (Ball and Fayemi, 2004). Rupiya (2003) argues that in the practical conduct of civil-military relations misunderstandings always arise and these creates sources of conflict and non-adherence to the principles will result. Areas of conflict include: 1) misunderstandings in the tasks and responsibilities of key actors; 2) overstepping of set boundaries by key actors; and 3) failure to set effective policies.

Civil-military relations observe traditions, values and practices between the state, society and the armed forces. Many developing countries especially those in Africa, who got their independence through liberation movements, have certain traditions, values and practices which are often viewed differently by citizens. But surprisingly, a country like China has maintained structures and traditions were the military conducts their operations under the leadership of the ruling party yet it is able to achieve development. From this perspective, this study effectively adopts civil-military relations as the strongest conceptual framework to analyses state activities through military operations in Zimbabwe's development challenges in the last two decades.

1.5 RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH

The ZDF has been involved in various MOOTW that positively or negatively affected the political, social and economic fronts of national development. An analysis of these operations in this thesis, hopefully, would widen boundaries of knowledge on how policy makers ensure military interventions on political, social, and economic issues in Zimbabwe to promote peace and development. Can the ZDF work to change the perception that the military is a tool of repression as has been the case in colonial period?

The ZDF members' invigorated engagement in development issues; mainly political, social and economic since the late 1990s attracted extensive academic and political interest.

Interests in this area developed because of personal experience as a military officer in the ZDF. As a military officer in the Air Force of Zimbabwe, with some educational experience, a master degree in military science and leadership, from Air Force Command College, in China, the brains behind the thesis settled to focus on the novel concept of MOOTW. The thesis seeks to advance the state of knowledge in MOOTW from a Zimbabwean and African perspective. Gathering original data, evaluating civil-military relations practices and generating original arguments regarding MOOTW and development issues in Zimbabwe was presumed to be able to significantly contribute to the field of development studies. Several factors contribute to the development challenges in Zimbabwe; the involvement of ZDF in civilian affairs included. Generally, MOOTW are conducted to promote national development and security. However, the conduct of MOOTW in Zimbabwe raised mixed feelings. The desire to find out the overall impact of MOOTW on the national development and national security in Zimbabwe triggered thoughts to deeply examine the conduct of MOOTW by the ZDF. There is no doubt that a situational analysis of the ZDF MOOTW can help not only the military to have self-evaluation of its MOOTW, but for all Zimbabweans together with their defence forces to work towards peace and development.

1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS, PRIMARY GOAL AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

1.6.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The central research question is: How do Zimbabweans perceive the impact of ZDF MOOTW in the post-2000 national development challenges?

A number of questions guided the study; the most important are posed below:

- 1) What is the origin of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces?
- 2) What are the new trends in civil-military relations and military operations other than war?
- 3) What are the Zimbabwean civilians and military personnel perceptions about the ZDF MOOTW?
- 4) How are MOOTW related to political, social and economic development in Zimbabwe?

1.6.2 AIM

To explore and describe the perceptions, attitudes and practices relating to the impact of MOOTW on development and security, from the perspective of both the military and the civilians.

1.6.3 OBJECTIVES

The general objective of the study was to determine the impact of MOOTW implementation on national development and security in the post-2000 period. In order to realise the above-mentioned aim the following specific objectives were stated:

- 1) To understand the origin of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces by means of reviewing literature and oral interviews.
- 2) To gain a thorough understanding from literature regarding civil-military relations, MOOTW and MOOTW practices in other countries.
- 3) To examine the Zimbabwean civilians and military personnel perceptions about the ZDF MOOTW.
- 4) To analyse the complex relationship of MOOTW and political work, social development and economic development in Zimbabwe.

1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Military studies in a polarised nation characterised by severe development challenges tend to be very sensitive. The thesis, therefore, adopted research approach, design and methods that were most suitable to produce credible research findings. For instance, on many issues the researcher quoted the comments of several writers and research participants when just one or two would suffice. The intention was to make certain that no one should ever claim that the research was biased towards a certain pole or group. In the analysis, the thesis therefore presents both primary and secondary data gathered for the reader to appreciate and make own deductions on certain controversial issues raised by research participants and scholars. The researcher laboured to truly document his findings, conclusions and recommendations by exposing the views of research participants that included both civilians and soldiers, as well

as the writings of several scholars who had independently studied the ZDF. The various sections of the overall research plan were covered in the following sections:

1.7.1 RESEARCH APPROACH

This research adopted a qualitative approach. Rubin and Babbie (2011:26) define qualitative research as an approach that emphasises depth of understanding the deeper meanings of human experience that are used with the aim of generating theoretically richer observations.

According to Creswell (2009), some of the characteristics of the qualitative approach are as follows:

- a. Qualitative researchers are interested in meaning, that is; how people make sense of their lives, experiences, and their structures of the world. In this study, the researcher was mainly interested in the meaning the people of Zimbabwe both civilians and military personnel attach to their experiences as they relate with the ZDF work towards national development.
- b. The qualitative researcher is the primary instrument for data collection and analysis. In this study the researcher conducted interviews and document analysis to obtain data.
- c. Qualitative research involves field work. In the study data was gathered through visits to the people, disaster sites, constructions sites, lectures/presentations venues and cultural gatherings to observe and understand behaviour and practices in their natural setting.
- d. Qualitative research is explorative in nature. The researcher wanted to get a deeper understanding of the ZDF non-military operations.
- e. Qualitative research is descriptive. The researcher was interested in the process, meaning and understanding of ZDF MOOTW and civil-military relations practices gained through interviews.

The researcher wanted a deeper understanding of the nature of civil-military relations and the impact of ZDF MOOTW on the Zimbabwean development crisis. The qualitative approach

has unique characteristics that it concerns itself with natural settings of people and their environment. How they define life and what captivates and distresses them, the researcher concluded that this approach was very appropriate to answer the research questions, to have a deeper understanding of the nature of civil-military relations and on the perceptions of Zimbabweans on the impact of military operations on development.

1.7.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

Neuman (2011) defines research design as “the strategy and plan of conducting a research project”. Creswell & Plano Clark (2011) points out that research design is a programme to guide the researcher in collecting, analysing and interpreting observed facts. The implications are that the research design helps researchers to lay out their research questions, methodology, implementation procedures, and data collection and analyses for the conduct of a research project. The research design is the overall plan of how the research will be conducted.

In this study the researcher explored and described the experiences relating to military operations from the perspectives of military personnel and civilians under the qualitative approach, using an explorative, descriptive and contextual research designs.

Neuman (2011) suggests that *exploratory research* is most appropriate when our understandings of identified problems are limited. Exploratory research design aim to build knowledge about an identified problem. The study incorporated the explorative strategy of inquiry in order to explore the experiences surrounding the conduct of MOOTW by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. The exploration will hopefully lead to the development of new ways of conducting MOOTW in Zimbabwe.

Yin (2003) indicates that *descriptive research design* makes it possible for researchers to use qualitative and quantitative data to describe the identified population or phenomena. Descriptive research aims to describe and does not to seek to establish or explain relationships. The descriptive research design has a number of advantages: 1) the researcher can adopt a multifaceted approach; 2) case studies and observations can be used to obtain data; 3) it enables the researcher to obtain statistical information and people’s experience on a

given phenomenon. The advantages enable descriptive research to provide an insight into life experiences in a way better than other research methods (Yin, 2003). This study sought perceptions of people on MOOTW. The descriptive research gave the researcher the opportunity to use both qualitative and quantitative data in order to find data on and characteristics of the impact of MOOTW on national development and security. MOOTW focuses on a number of cases; therefore, the descriptive design was an appropriate method to look at the various operations conducted by the ZDF.

On the other hand, Babbie (1997) argues that the major disadvantage of descriptive research design is that it can only describe current situations yet fails to predict or forecast “what will be”. The challenges were overcome through the use of various methods of data collection. Observations, interviews and document analysis methods were employed in this study to meet the objectives of the study. Ezeani (1998) posits that descriptive design enables the researcher to gather detailed and factual information on any existing phenomena. Accordingly, this study adopted the descriptive design to gather detailed and factual information on the involvement of the ZDF in civilian affairs through MOOTW.

Contextual studies helps not to separate research participants from the context to which they be related (Nueman, 2011). The researcher’s intention was to explore and describe the experiences relating to the conduct of MOOTW in the context of civil-military relations guided by historical political struggles and achievements. The senior ZDF members fought the liberation war, politicised and mobilised the masses to fight colonialism. The British Army through the BMATT was engaged by post-colonial Zimbabwe Government to professionalise the former guerrilla forces and to integrate them with the Rhodesian Forces to form the ZDF. This is the historical context in which the ZDF operations and civil-military relations are conducted and analysed. The impact of the operations were also analysed in the context of a polarised society, multiparty political system where national development has become a national crisis; the post-2000 period context.

Content analysis. As Babbie (2011) observes, content analysis is a systematic research technique that focuses on the analysis of both quantitative and qualitative manifest or latent meanings of words, ideas, phrases, postures, objectives and artifacts. It is from this observed strength that content analysis enabled the researcher to obtain and analyse natural data. The

method also has the advantage of saving money and time. The method also provides the researcher with an opportunity to interact with printed material to counter the negative effects of interacting with human nature (Merriam, 2009). Taking into account these advantages, MOOTW ideas and practices were scholarly scrutinised in an effort to assess its impact on development in Zimbabwe.

1.7.3 RESEARCH METHOD

1.7.3.1 Population and Sampling

Population

Bless and Higson-Smith (2000) define population as the entire set of objects or group of people which the researcher wants to determine some characteristics. The population for this study was defined as all influential Zimbabweans; civilians and military personnel. The study included a significant and broadly representative sample of civilian citizens in the form of academics, political leaders, business people, community leaders, civic organisations, and youth among other members of society.

Sampling

A sample is subset of the population. Qualitative studies tend to have smaller sample size than quantitative studies. Qualitative studies aim to make an in-depth analysis of the chosen subject matter. The researcher needed data rich participants and not necessarily a representative sample of the population. Merriam (2009) argue that qualitative sampling is concerned with information-richness, for which two key considerations should guide the sampling methods: appropriateness and adequacy. For that reason, qualitative research needs data rich participants who are able to provide adequate information to cover all the research questions.

In this study due to the nature of the research questions and objectives, as well as choice of research strategy, nonprobability sampling methods were used. Data rich participants were sought. The research focused on data rich civilians and military personnel to obtain their

points of view on MOOTW; there was secrecy and confidentiality as such the snowball sampling method was used.

Snowball Sampling

Snowball sampling is a non-probability sampling method in which the researcher begins with one case, and then based on information from the first case goes on to identify other cases and repeats the process until the required sample size was achieved. As such the researcher started with one data rich person who referred him to the next data rich person. For the Snowball sampling method, Neuman (2011) posits that the interviewer stops at repetition or data saturation point. In line with these guidelines the researcher stopped when no new cases were emerging from the participants.

The researcher interviewed twenty three (23) key participants to reach data saturation point. They were selected using the purposive and snowball sampling methods. The major problem with the method is that there was no randomisation in the selection of the sample frame. This may affect the accuracy and trustworthiness of the findings. Lee (1995) argues for such samples the problems of bias are huge, as respondents are most likely to identify other potential respondents who are similar to themselves, resulting in a homogeneous sample. The researcher made efforts to get a balanced sample by interviewing people from various sectors but of different political perspectives. The total number of key participants in the study came out as follows: three (3) military personnel, three (3) politicians, four (4) academics , three (3) trade unionists , one (1) person from business sector, three (3) community leaders , one(1) person from the war veterans , two (2) church leaders , one (1) NGO programme officer and two (2) members from youth organisations among other members of society. In all the interviews the researcher was referred to data rich participants. The main problem was establishing initial contact. However, the researcher started with key figures in one of the identified sectors. See Appendix 11, Key Research Participants.

1.7.3.2 Methods of Data Collection

Preparation for data collection

After the initial research participant who was purposefully identified, the researcher started

the process of data collection by making contact with the referred participants: individually, at their homes or work place. All the interviews were conducted by the researcher; he had no resources to engage research assistance that were prepared to tackle sensitive matters in the study. The purpose of an initial visit or telephone call by the researcher was to request the participants to voluntarily participate in the study. During these visits, the selection criteria for inclusion in the study were explained and it was always emphasised that participation was voluntary. Follow-up appointments would be scheduled for an interview at a date and time most convenient to them. All those who volunteered to participate in the study signed consent forms and confidentiality on all matters of the study was re-emphasised. The data in this study was mainly gathered through interviews and document analysis. For the observations and document analysis the researcher got permissioned from the head of various sections of the ZDF departments using the letter that was given the researcher by the ZDF representative. See Appendix V: Introduction Letter from the Zimbabwe National Defence University then NDC. The researcher was therefore able to visit and observe many ZDF MOOTW related activities, as well as to attend certain gatherings, meetings, parades, and training exercises for MOOTW among other activities.

In-depth Unstructured Interviews

In this study, in-depth unstructured interviews were used to gather data. Interviews are generally the most commonly used qualitative techniques to gather data (Merriam, 2009). Neuman (2011) precisely presents that an interview is a planned and guided conversation. In this respect, the researcher drew out questions that sought appropriate responses and perceptions towards the nature of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe and the impact of MOOTW on development in Zimbabwe.

The discussions were highly controlled by the researcher. A series of unstructured open-ended questions were raised. Open-ended questions meant that the participants were not limited to the researcher's categories and guide lines; respondents were free to give whatever responses they liked. It was thought that open-ended questions better reflect the own thinking of an individual. The interview approach was ideally suited to the study because most of the participants had the opportunity to share their opinions, feelings and experiences about the post-2000 ZDF MOOTW. The use of unstructured interviews also helped to improve response comparability.

The interview method offers a number of advantages: 1) it offers both the interviewer and interviewee the chance to clarify issues discussed (Leedy , 2003); 2) it is a flexible technique that allows the adoption of probing techniques to gain deeper understanding of facts, perceptions and opinions (Babbie, 2011); 3) it allows the interviewer an opportunity to interpret meanings and attach subjective conclusions (Creswell, 2009) ; and 4) it allows the interviewer to record verbatim answers from the interviewee. In terms of these merits, the researcher was able to gather quality data that was supported by detailed explanations. The researcher probe participants to get their perceptions and opinions on sensitive issues on ZDF MOOTW. The method allowed the researcher to interpret meanings and offer subjective conclusions on the issues raised by the participants. Some of the participants` responses were recorded verbatim to promote that independent and subjective analysis by the reader.

The adopted unstructured interview had its own limitations. Participants tended to provide unnecessary information. The researcher remained focused under the guidance of the research questions. The unstructured interview guide used in this study allowed for more flexibility, naturalness and openness in responses from respondents since security issues are always sensitive and shrouded in secrecy.

Participant Observations

Observational schedules are perceived as natural ways of gathering data (Creswell, 2009). In this regard, they fall under the qualitative research paradigm. The researcher was the main instrument of data generation. However, the researcher also observed trends and patterns of issues raised in literature and by participants during interviews. The researcher, being a member of the ZDF, had privileges to attend lectures and presentations from both civilian and military lecturers/presenters at Zimbabwe National Defence University, Zimbabwe Staff College and other training institutions within the ZDF. The researcher also attended several formal and informal gatherings within the military culture. It is also important to note that during the period of his study, the researcher rose from junior officer category to senior officer category. He held several appointments with the ZDF structures. The rich exposure and experience gained by the researcher gave him an added advantage to gather and critically analyse data for the study. However, the use of interview and document analysis methods helped the researcher to guard against biases as a participant observer in the study. The use of the qualitative approach therefore enabled the researcher to learn, participate and be involved in the study (Merriam, 2009). The thesis has therefore some experiential knowledge.

Documents Analysis

Neuman (2011) explains that document analysis is an essential element of the research process that helps to produce reliable findings. Documentary evidence was examined and this included; governments reports, press cuttings, public pronouncements, and ZDF publications relevant to civil-military relations and MOOTW literature. The researcher also used secondary data sourced from the ZDF archives, ZANU PF library, journals, internet sources, textbooks, published and unpublished researches. Primary data sources were also considered. The researcher considered the following advantages of the secondary data: it was not as expensive and time consuming as primary data and often it was easy to be verified. Due to sensitivity of security matters the study utilised various sources, particularly press reports and public lectures by some officials to capture and present certain issues.

1.7.3.3 Method of Data Analysis

Data analysis is a process where the researcher systematically search and arrange the interview transcripts and other materials accumulated to increase his/ her understanding of the subject before he/she presents what he/she would have discovered (Neuman, 2011).

Qualitative data gathered from interviews, observations and content analysis was analysed through identifying emerging and recurring themes according to recommendations by Neuman (2011). According to Rubin and Rubin (2005:226) interview data can be analysed as follows;

Data analysis begins while the interview is still underway...After interviewing is complete, you begin a more detailed and fine-grained analysis, you discover additional themes and concepts and build toward an overall explanation. To begin the final analysis, putt into one category all the material from your interviews and that speaks to one theme or concept ...Compare across categories to discover connections between themes and concepts ...that offers an accurate , detailed , yet subtle interpretation of your research arena. The analysis is complete when you feel that you can share with others what your interpretation means for policy making, for theory, and for understanding the social and political world.

This approach was intensively used in this thesis to identify and categorise the emerging themes and concepts related to civil-military relations in Zimbabwe and the conduct of ZDF MOOTW and finally to offer recommendations on these issues. During the interview process,

it was established that the society was polarised, after the interview the detailed analysis of the pattern of emerging themes indicated that people perception towards the ZDF MOOTW revolves on party affiliations. Basing on the theory of civil-military relations, MOOTW principles and the actual conduct of MOOTW in other countries and on the analysis of the emerging themes on people perceptions towards the ZDF MOOTW it is clear that ZDF MOOTW are overlooked.

1.8 DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study was restricted to the ZDF non-combat operations and their impact on the dimensions of development in Zimbabwe. The study focused on ZDF MOOTW from 2000 to the present (2020) - the development crisis period in Zimbabwe.

1.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Access to information pertaining security and obtaining research participants willing to critically analyse MOOTW for a defence force regarded by some sections of the society as part of the development crisis were the greatest limitations of the study. Both the military and civilian personnel were only willing to participate in formal interviews anonymously due to the sensitive nature of subject. Access to official documents, gatherings and public lectures and presentations were some of the limitations. All the limitations did not stop the researcher neither did they compromise on the quality of the research output. The researcher being a member of the ZDF with some knowledge on the military ethics and etiquettes first applied for permission to conduct the study. With full organisational support to conduct the study, it was relatively easy to access some official documents, conduct interviews, attend and participate in some military activities of significance to the study. The researcher tactfully used his over fifteen years of military experience to identify gaps in the theory and practice of the ZDF MOOTW, to gather sound data for reliable academic work through interactions with both civilians and military personnel. For the civilian personnel, the researcher used his background. He grew up in three separate provinces of the ten provinces in Zimbabwe; Masvingo, Midlands, and Manicaland. The researcher also made use of his colleagues at college. He joined the military after graduating from University of Zimbabwe. After military

training he pursued post graduate studies at a number of universities across the country: Midlands State University, Chinhoyi University of Technology, Women University in Africa and Air Force Command College in China. The experience in China was a turning point in the academic career of the researcher. In China the military takes a leading role in the national development agenda. The experience forced the researcher to conduct this study against all the stated limitations. The civilian colleagues as well as the military ones were afraid to be associated with negative criticism of the ZDF. The researcher then employed methods like observation and informal interviews and most importantly he attended several military and public lectures, seminars or presentations where people shared information freely. Snowball sampling was used for formal interviews. Under all the circumstances the researcher promised to maintain the anonymity of the research participants. Hence the research was successfully done.

1.10 CLARIFICATION OF KEY CONCEPTS

The researcher thought it appropriate to delimit the following terms:

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

MOOTW are those operations undertaken by military forces to safeguard their country's national security and developmental interests, that do not constitute a war (Gaoyue and James, 2019). MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995:1-1).

War

War refers to the intense military confrontations between hostile parties, in which armed forces are systematically and designedly used to realise certain political and economic purposes. It is the highest form of confrontation to solve contradictions between different classes, ethnic groups, political groups and states (PLA Military Terms, 2011).

Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations refer to a continuum of decision-making power distributed between civilians and the military (Croissant, Kuehn and Lorenz, 2012:4).

Development

Development is a process which enables human beings to realize their potential, build self-confidence, and lead lives of dignity and fulfillment. It is a process which frees people from the fear of want and exploitation. It is a movement away from political, economic or social oppression (South Commission 1990:10).

Military personnel

Military personnel refer to both commissioned and non-commissioned members of the regular force of the Zimbabwe Defence Force.

Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF)

Refers to Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and the Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ).

1.11 THESIS STRUCTURE

The thesis has 8 chapters. Chapter 1 provides the introduction and general orientation of the research study. Chapter 2 examines the transition of the partisan freedom fighters to become elements of the national defence force under the western ideology of civil-military relations and its impact on the people's perceptions towards the ZDF. The central idea of this chapter was to answer the question: In what ways does the ZDF origin affects its roles and perceptions about it in the national development matrix? Chapter 3 covers civil-military relations theory as the basis to understand military operations in Zimbabwe. Chapter 4 details the conduct of MOOTW in other countries namely, the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. The actual MOOTW conducted by the ZDF, as well as, the people's perceptions towards ZDF MOOTW are in chapter 5. Chapter 6 examines the impact of the ZDF MOOTW on the Zimbabwean political, social and economic arenas. Chapter 7 then unpacks the challenges and successes of ZDF MOOTW under the prevailing civil-military relations. Chapter 8 concludes and highlights further tasks for researchers and policy makers regarding MOOTW and civil-military relations in Zimbabwe. The thesis is divided into the following chapters:

- a. Chapter 1 Introduction;
- b. Chapter 2 Historical Origin of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces;
- c. Chapter 3 Conceptual Framework: Understanding Civil-Military Relations in

- Zimbabwe;
- d. Chapter 4 Military Operations Other Than War;
 - e. Chapter 5 The Zimbabwe Defence Forces MOOTW and Public Perceptions;
 - f. Chapter 6 The Impact of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces Military Operations Other Than War on National Security and Development;
 - g. Chapter 7 The Zimbabwe Defence Forces Military Operations Other Than War Successes, Challenges and Way Forward ; and
 - h. Chapter 8 Conclusion and Recommendations.

1.12 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Bless and Higson-Smith (2000:103) point out that generally accepted ethical rights of participants which a social scientist should respect includes voluntary participation, protection of anonymity and confidentiality. Accordingly, in this study the researcher made efforts to uphold these ethical considerations:

Voluntary Participation

According to Mark (1996:40) the principle of informed consent is at the heart of efforts to ensure that all participation is truly voluntary. This researcher ensured that participants gave informed consent. Participants were provided with sufficient information on the importance of study to allow them to make informed decisions regarding their participation. The importance of widening the scope of understanding and perfecting the conduct of MOOTW in Zimbabwe was highlighted to identified participants. The participants were not coerced to participate in the study. Informed consent forms were given to all the selected members to express their willingness to voluntarily participate in the study.

Protection of Anonymity and Confidentiality

The researcher ensured that confidentiality was maintained by adhering to the following as outlined by Mark (1996:48):

- a) By keeping all the information of key research participants confidential;
- b) By soliciting and recording only personal information that was necessary for the study to achieve its purpose;
- c) By storing all study information, and raw data that was likely to expose research

participants` identity in a safe place. The information was accessible only to the researcher, and the supervisor.

After completing the analysis, tapes, original data and hard copies were stored in a safe place and on completion of the study they were destroyed. Therefore, in this study the researcher adhered to the principles of:

- a) Preservation of participants` anonymity.
- b) Voluntary informant participation.
- c) Respect for participants` dignity.
- d) A commitment to minimise risk associated with research and maximise the benefits that accrue to research participants.

1.13 SUMMARY

This chapter has presented the basic sections which are introduction to the analysis of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces` military operations other than war in post-2000. These comprises the Introduction, Background to the study, Problem statement, Theoretical framework, Rationale for the research, Research questions and objectives, Research methodology, Clarification of key concepts and terms, Thesis structure and Ethical considerations for the study. It was highlighted that several factors have contributed to the development challenges in Zimbabwe in the post-2000 period. As the case in other post-colonial African states the role of the military in development and governance still need academic attention. To achieve this goal, this study focuses on the novel concept of MOOTW. In the next chapter a historical background of the origin of the ZDF is presented.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE ZIMBABWE DEFENCE FORCES

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter provided the introductory remarks to the whole thesis by presenting an overview of the ground to be covered. This chapter examines the transition of the partisan nationalists and colonialists forces to become elements of the national defence force under the western ideology of civil-military relations. In order to have a clear understanding and better interpretation of military operations other than war (MOOTW) by the ZDF in post-2000, there was need to trace back and reflect on the 1970s Zimbabwean liberation war. The liberation war is the foundation of the origin of the ZDF. The core of this chapter was to answer the question, in what ways does the ZDF origins affect its roles and perceptions in the national development matrix?

The thesis analyses the links between freedom fighters and their political parties ZANU/ZAPU, recruitment and mass mobilisation tactics and strategies, liberation war operations, demobilisation and integration of nationalist forces and the Rhodesian forces to form the national defence force, the ZDF. The data was obtained from oral interviews with former guerrillas and wartime civilians, archival as well as published and unpublished sources.

Liberation wars were a means to end colonialism in many African countries. Independence came through protracted guerrilla wars in countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe among other countries in Southern Africa. Underdevelopment, mainly hunger and poverty, forced Africans to resort to armed struggles through the formation of various fighting units. It is sad to point out that, in order for the fighting formations to get assistance from African leaders and other supporting nations from the east they were supposed to have political parties as opposed to the idea of working with traditional structures which were in place.

Traditionally, in Zimbabwe people were organised and controlled by Chiefs. The traditional structures, chiefs and headmen, played a significant role in mass mobilisation during the

liberation struggle yet more public attention was given to political parties. Under this distorted mass organisation, the people of Zimbabwe are assumed to have fought for independence from British colonial rule under the leadership of two main political parties, namely; ZANU and ZAPU. This partisanship has permanently divided the Zimbabwean society. Zimbabwe should be a better society if our paramount chiefs had maintained their leadership role of the liberation war.

However, it is often ignored that the power struggle between political parties had worked in the favour of the oppressor in many occasions. Most important to be highlighted was the power struggle between political parties to control the fighting groups, that derailed the war momentum and even caused unwarranted death among Zimbabweans. The freedom fighters at various stages of the armed struggle were forced to belong to a political party. At independence, the former coloniser through the British Military Assistance and Training Team (BMATT) assisted Zimbabwe to form a national defence force through the integration of Rhodesian Forces and nationalist forces. Party politics have continued to decelerate development rate in post independent Zimbabwe particularly post-2000 period. The control of the ZDF is still being contested by political parties.

2.2 REFLECTIONS ON THE SECOND LIBERATION WAR

Studies on the Second Liberation War/Second Chimurenga and the military in Zimbabwe remain scattered and heavily polarised. Some scholars praise African nationalism whilst others attack African nationalism for continued violence and authoritarianism in post-colonial governments. Scholars such as Ranger (1985), as well as Martin and Johnson (1981) produced African nationalist history that became the foundation of the official accounts of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. Martin and Johnson's *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: the Chimurenga War*, provides a heroic narrative that was incorporated into school text books. However, other writers produced a different version of the Second Chimurenga. Werbner (1991)'s *Tears of the Dead* is another book that falls on the same side of Kriger's writing in that they both did not just shower praises to nationalists. Werbner addresses human rights violations in Matabeleland in the 1980s. Kriger (1995) focused on coercive peasant

mobilisation by the guerrilla armies. This divergence on perceptions on African nationalism makes the study on organisations like the ZDF a bit challenging.

There are many factors that account for varying perceptions. Part of the problem is the difficulty of researching on security and military issues on African countries. Another reason given by Matlosa (1998) is self-censorship by African researchers. He further argues that the African researchers have not made effort to break the national security mythology and subject the military to critical scrutiny and analysis. One of these researchers, Robins (1996), in his review of Kriger's (1995) *Peasant Voices*, observes that history is written with political, intellectual and ethical considerations of the present in mind. This could be a strong reason why many authors are reluctant to analyse the ZDF. Anyway, it is now forty years after the liberation war and the freedom fighters are still with us and those who are willing to search for information to support any of the earlier versions creates valuable investments for future generations.

2.2.1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INEQUALITIES IN COLONIAL GOVERNMENT

The first wars of resistance to British rule were given the name Chimurenga. The Zimbabwean war of liberation fought between 1966 and 1979 was named after the first resistance war, hence the term Second Chimurenga. Chimurenga is a Shona word that has a long tradition spanning more than 500 years, inspiring nationalists and freedom fighters to oppose the colonial regime and fight it. Most historians explore this historical continuity (Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 2000; Bhebe and Ranger, 1995; Bhebe, 1999 and Pfukwa, 2011) associating the word with the wars in Zimbabwe. Some authors refer to this war as the Terrorist War (Smith, 2008). This term gave the impression that it was a senseless war without any moral values or clear political goals (Pfukwa, 2011). He further argues that the word reflects passion and intensity of feelings by Zimbabweans towards the liberation wars. Against all these arguments, the Second Chimurenga is the war that ended colonial rule in Zimbabwe and gave birth to the integrated Zimbabwe Defence Forces.

The actual causes of the Second Chimurenga were structural inequalities between the white minority and the black majority. Chung (2007) observes that the causes of the conflict between blacks and whites lie in their inequality which led to separate social facilities for the two races. Blacks experienced bad socio-political-economic conditions. The colonial regime believed blacks were children who needed adults to think and speak for them as such their “political participation was severely limited” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2004: 2). A black person was a garden boy, a factory hand, a messenger and not as an equal human being with rights and freedoms to enjoy (Interview with ex- freedom fighter, Zimbabwe Staff College, 22 June 2016). Blacks and whites had different schools, hospitals, residential places both in the urban and the rural areas. Blacks were pushed to dry areas with low rainfall pattern, poor soils for agricultural production and were not allowed to grow certain crops like tobacco without a licence. The Rhodesian settler government imposed harsh laws such as the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Native Land Husbandry Act which restricted Africans to certain areas which were not agriculturally productive.

The experiences of the liberation struggle differed according to various factors that include political environment and the degree of incorporation into the colonial political economy (Raftopoulos, 2009). However, blacks generally suffered political, social and economic oppression. The colonial political economy favoured the white interests and blacks were to continue to be at the periphery of political and socio-economic developmental activities. They had no right to vote, only a few under certain conditions were allowed to vote, yet for whites there were no set conditions for one to exercise the right to vote in any election. The working conditions for blacks were poor. In both the private and public sectors dual pay scales existed. Blacks and whites doing the same job had different pay scales even if they had same qualification and same job description. Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005) lament that able-bodied Africans were engaged into forced labour for no payment, and were politically marginalised based on race and property ownership in the new cash economy.

Tungamirai (1995) also observed three socio-economic and political disadvantages suffered by Africans in Rhodesia that forced them to join the liberation war. First, it was land hunger. He argues that the unequal distribution of land made many rural Africans fertile ground for recruitment by the guerillas. Second, was unemployment and lack of accommodation in urban environs. He states that statistics for 1976 indicates that 926 000 Africans (14.6 per

cent of total African population) were employed in the cash economy. The unemployed suffered food and accommodation shortages. Third was the disruption of service because of war. The guerrilla war intensified from 1976 to 1979 such that commercial farms and mines were abandoned while clinics, business centres and rural schools were closed. He argues that the exodus of refugees into Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia and neighbouring countries made many Africans to be recruited by the guerrillas.

These various internal factors pushed many Zimbabweans to join the Second Chimurenga either as freedom fighters or supporters of the freedom fighters in the guerrilla warfare. The attainment of independence in other African countries such as Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia among others also influenced and motivated the oppressed black Africans in Rhodesia to end colonial rule and all forms of structural inequalities. Blacks wanted development for all; social, political and economic freedoms for all. They wanted to participate in the national struggles to end poverty and hunger as equal partners and shareholders in the national development dynamics. Therefore, the Second Chimurenga was as a result of a collective need by the black Zimbabweans to get equal participation in political, social and economic arenas. Unfortunately post-independence leadership failed to create new systems and policies to fulfill the aspirations of the masses.

2.2.2 *ACTORS IN THE WAR*

Many individuals, organisations and nations made sacrifices to end colonial rule in Zimbabwe. However, disunity among political parties and competition for military control decelerated the momentum towards independence.

During the liberation war against the Rhodesian Front Government under Ian Smith, a number of political parties were involved. The African National Congress in the 1950s was one of the earliest parties to be founded by Africans. The National Democratic Party (NDP) was founded in 1959, led by Joshua Nkomo, Father Zimbabwe. ZAPU factions resulted in the birth of ZANU in 1963 led by Herbert Chitepo. ZAPU and ZANU formed ZIPRA and ZANLA as their military wings respectively. These two major political parties waged the

liberation war in Zimbabwe. After the ban of political activities by the colonial regime ZAPU and ZANU formed bases in neighbouring countries. ZANLA had most of its bases in Mozambique where the freedom fighters were trained in areas such as Tete, Chimoio and Nyadzonia. ZIPRA was headquartered in Zambia. However, as the war progresses the training bases for the freedom fighters of the two parties also changed. It is important to note that many countries supported the liberation war.

The Zimbabwean masses participated in the war from various perspectives. Some were forced by circumstances, the harsh social and economic conditions made them to sacrifice their lives and be ready to die for freedom and equal opportunity. By this perspective the masses became motivated to join hands with the freedom fighters. One of the unique characteristics of the liberation parties` ZANLA and ZIPRA forces was their reliance on the peasant communities for both material and moral support. This was called the "fish and water" strategy adopted from Chinese Communists led by Mao (Mhanda, 2011). This strategy promoted mass mobilisation through political consciousness and outstretched the economic capacity of the colonial regime to sustain the war.

Traditional leaders played an important role in the liberation war. It is interesting to note that traditional religious leaders had power to control politicians, freedom fighters and the masses. They held a special position in the psyche of the freedom fighters, particularly the peasant soldiers who constituted about half of the freedom fighters.

As far back as the 1890s, traditional religious leaders opposed colonialism and were instrumental in organising opposition to it. Ambuya Nehanda and Sekuru Kaguvi the main leaders in the First *Chimurenga* in the 1890s were outstanding religious and political leaders who have a great influence in the mass mobilisation to fight all colonial injustices in Zimbabwe. According to Tungamirai (1995) ZANLA commanders always first persuaded traditional leaders to support the struggle before they conduct mass mobilisation rallies in targeted areas. Mhanda (2011) also observe that key religious leaders were persuaded by the guerrillas to cross the border into Mozambique to spiritually and ideologically motivate the freedom fighters.

International support was given to both freedom fighters and the colonialists. Foreign aid helped the nationalists to advance their goals. Freedom fighters were trained in Algeria, China, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Russia, Zambia and in some other countries. The ideological split between Russia and China aggravated ZANU and ZAPU differences and other African nationalist movements in the 1970s. Russia mainly supported ZAPU, African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the South West African People Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia and the Movimento Popular para a Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) of Angola whilst China backed ZANU which adopted Marxism-Leninism that stressed the role of the peasantry (Henriksen and Gann, 1981). However, Mhanda (2011) comments that the Chinese support was always inadequate and ZANLA had to rely on political mobilisation to create and sustain grass-roots party structures that supported the freedom fighters. ZIPRA was heavily dependent on the Soviet Union which kept it well supplied with arms and equipment and influenced its emphasis on conventional training (Chung, 2006). The ZANU and ZAPU differences ended in 1987 when the two parties signed the Unity Accord. However, Rupiya (2004) in *A Survey of Civil-Military Relations in SADC* observes that these African nationalist movements share common similarities in post 2000 civil-military relations challenges in Southern Africa.

The support of the colonial government by western countries started as far back as 1965. Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005) observe that Smith's 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) enjoyed the support of USA and Great Britain. Western countries made efforts to support the colonial rule and stop the country from being taken by freedom fighters that had communists thinking. Chung (2007) argues that allowing Rhodesia to be controlled by forces hostile to the West would have threatened Western economic interests in the region as well as negatively affects the balance of political power worldwide. Mtisi *et al* (2009) echoed the same observation that United States and its allies supported white Rhodesia as strategic resource. The West wanted to stop a further growth of communist influence in the region. After the war the ZDF was then formed under the western concepts mainly guided by the BMATT. This became the root cause of continued colonial influence and national destabilisation.

The continued efforts by western countries to stop the spread of communism resulted in attempts by the British Government, assisted by the United States, South Africa and the Front

Line States (FLS) (Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique, and Tanzania) Governments to make peace settlements especially in the mid to late 1970s. The continued war efforts and rapid recruitment of freedom fighters under the Zimbabwe People`s Army (ZIPA) after the arrest or self-imposed retirement of many politicians made colonial government sympathisers to panic and come up with several strategies to end the war. For instance, Sweden offered to host the Geneva Conference that was financially and diplomatically supported by many western countries. Mhanda (2011) argues that the strong western countries support was in a bid to stop Southern Africa coming under the control of the communists. Chung (2006) observes ZIPA commanders regarded Geneva talks as a form of capitulation to colonialism. Chung further laments that ZIPA was unable to see the reality that outside forces such as Frontline States, South Africa, Britain, and the United States were interested parties capable to play a decisive role in liberation war. The likelihood of military victory by ZIPA was real since they had unequivocal support of ordinary Zimbabweans. However, ZIPA was regarded as a military force that was not under civilian control this explains why it was quickly banned and some of its commanders were detained until independence. Mtisi *et al* (2009) observe the young cadres who spearheaded ZIPA were ‘eliminated’ by the senior nationalists leaders in a typically authoritarian manner. Chung (2007) states that it was to the credit of the leadership of Mugabe and Muzenda that the ZIPA commanders were not executed like the Nhari group, instead they were handed over to the custody of the Mozambique Government till independence of Zimbabwe.

After 1975, independent African countries made efforts to bring unity among the nationalist parties. Mtisi *et al* (2009) argue that the Front Line States leaders felt that the ZANU and ZAPU disunity was an obstacle to the achievement of peace settlement as the two parties constantly sought to out-manoeuvre each other. Their effort to bring unity among ZANU and ZAPU resulted in the formation of ZIPA in November 1975, a joint military force between ZANLA and ZIPRA forces. The post-2000 Zimbabwean challenges and the civil-military relations skirmishes in the country all have roots in the political party conflicts. Post-2000 Zimbabwe has ZANU PF versus MDC. ZANU PF having turned towards support from China and other eastern countries whilst MDC has US and other western countries support. Similar to what happened in Rhodesia in the 1970s when FLS advocated for unity of ZANU and ZAPU through ZIPA formation, in post-2000 Zimbabwe, SADC also pushed and facilitated for the formation of Government of National Unity (GNU) and some reforms on governance

that include security sector reform. Security sector reform was being pushed to from an apolitical ZDF.

Under the GNU, the issue of partisan military force was expected to automatically fall out. ZIPA failed because politicians were losing mass attention to the freedom fighters and the much needed political power to replace the white regime. As a result of this power struggle unity between ZANU and ZAPU was not easy to achieve during the war. In the post-2000 era, history repeated itself GNU success was short lived, it failed to bring the much awaited sustainable development to the Zimbabweans. It failed to end the political party competition to control the military. Politicians pursued fulfilment of personal egos at the expense of national development agenda. During the war, in the 1970s Zimbabweans believed in individuals who led political parties. Similarly, in post-2000 Zimbabweans continue to believe in individuals who led political parties and forget to craft policies and reforms for national development. Now there is need to unite the political parties to end political polarisation that has derailed the attainment of independence and national development in post-independence. The analysis showed that since the liberation war, political party polarisation always over shadows the good efforts of the military to advance development in Zimbabwe.

2.3 MASS MOBILISATION AND RECRUITMENT

Smith`s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 and the banning of political parties changed the course of political consciousness among the black people of colonial Zimbabwe. After the ban of political parties in Rhodesia, ZANU and ZAPU formed bases in 1964 in Tanzania and Zambia respectively from which political activities were to be coordinated. Politicians were not able to work freely with the masses for mass mobilisation to wage the armed struggle. New strategies were adopted that resulted in political consciousness of the freedom fighters. Freedom fighters became political commissars; dual structures were set that gave birth to posts of political commissars and military commanders within the military structures. The structures are similar to those in the Chinese military. The strategy and culture of having political commissars that was ingrained in the military personnel of nationalist forces were ignored by the BMATT at independence when they integrated the three forces to

form the national defence force. Did they really manage to form an apolitical military free from political commissars' influence?

2.3.1 ZANLA AND ZIPRA MEMBERS AS POLITICAL COMMISSARS

The term Commissariat was popular in the Eastern nations and eventually some African countries which got support from the East during the revolutionary wars of independence. In Zimbabwe the formation of the revolutionary armies (ZANU and ZAPU) was mainly based on the Soviet Union and Chinese influence. The revolutionary armies had the Commissariat department charged with the socio-political training of the revolutionary cadres and the mobilisation of the masses (Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2005). This was done during the selection and recruitment process. Remember recruitment was from the same masses the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) was recruiting from. Cognisant of this, the recruitment process became very strict for fear of infiltration. As for the masses the relationship was shaped by the Maoist doctrine of the fish and water where the masses were the water and the guerrillas were the fish. The commissars would mobilise the masses at the popular *pungwes* (mass gatherings that were done at night to conscientise the masses on the reason for the war). It is also pertinent to highlight that during the liberation war such training and mobilisation took the form of national history, the cause or reasons behind the prosecution of the war. Moreso, the programmes were punctuated by current affairs to counter the subversive and propagandist information spread by the Rhodesian Security Forces. The commissars, as they were called, would go at length to explain the nationalist party ideology. The nationalist parties constructed a pattern of party control of the army which would characterise their relationship in decades to follow. In order to ensure that the gun always remained under control, a relationship was forged between the party and the revolutionary army which endured and stretched to the post- independence era. President Mugabe used to constantly remind the military that, "it is our ideology that the party controls the gun". Whilst death and demobilisation exercise reduced the number of guerrillas, those who survived formed insoluble bonds which shaped the civil-military relations in the Zimbabwe.

The second Chimurenga was a guerrilla warfare based on Maoist thinking that is the guerrillas had to work with the masses, feed from the masses, and gets material support from

the masses. The success of the warfare became heavily mass depended. The role played by the guerrillas on mass mobilisation was greater than that of the politicians. Politicians were well known by the enemies and it was difficult for them to carry out mass mobilisation without being harassed, detained or jailed by the colonial regime. It was the work of the guerrillas that spread nationalism and the urge to fight for freedom.

The nationalist forces adopted people`s war strategy in order to mobilise masses from industry, business and agriculture. This was also a way to frustrate the colonial government since their involvement in war destroyed the economy. To spread war campaign, the guerrillas used an `oil-patch` approach (Tungamirai, 1995). In this approach the ZANLA guerrillas were able to infiltrate and spread political influence slowly through the Tribal Trust lands of the north-east towards the capital. ZAPU had little support among the Shona people of north-east and the predominantly Ndebele guerrillas would not have managed to effect political influence. The fishes were of the wrong tribal background to operate in the “Shona sea” (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 2010).

The competition for recruits between the revolutionary parties can easily be observed through *The Sunday Mail* interview on how General Chiwenga joined the Second Chimurenga. Again, from the same interview one can easily conclude that there was no party influence on the individual choice to join a political party, but only the determination to join the liberation struggle. General Chiwenga states “When we got to Lusaka there was a big fight”. Zvinavashe representing ZANLA and Mangena representing ZIPRA each claimed the new arrivals were his men. Zvinavashe won the battle and Chiwenga, Chikerema (Air Marshal Perence Shiri, Air Force of Zimbabwe Commander 1994-2017) and the other boys joined the liberation struggle under ZANLA.

The recruitment of guerrillas for the liberation war was not an easy task. Some joined the liberation war willingly and others were forced. Smith argued during and after the war that black nationalists were terrorists who killed and intimidated their own people. In post-independence, in the eve of the 1998 Heroes’ Day celebrations Smith insisted terrorists “were people who were involved in the killing of black people. And my government jailed these people” (Ray Choto of the *Zimbabwe Standard*, 1998). The mass mobilisations and

recruitment by the guerrillas were viewed differently by many people because various means and approaches were employed in these processes.

The roles played by guerrillas as political commissars during the liberation war shaped the nature of civil-military relations in post-independence Zimbabwe. They had to fight and mobilise the masses to support the politicians in their struggles. These roles of the guerrillas received widespread attention among scholars. Kriger (1995) focuses on coercive peasant mobilisation by the guerrillas. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003:102) observes that “the quasi-military tendencies and populist tendencies” seen in post-independence Zimbabwe has its roots in the guerrilla warfare. The nationalist forces adopted such tendencies for the survival of their political parties. Against all the accusations and heroisms, the guerrillas were key assets in their respective parties in the struggle to end colonial rule. In the post-2000 were ZANU PF and MDC are competing for space in the national development agenda what is the nature of civil-military relations and how is the military perceived?

2.3.2 DUAL STRUCTURES: COMMANDERS AND COMMISSARS

Political parties adopted dual structures in order to effectively direct the guerrillas to carry out mass mobilisation. Guerrillas were divided into commanders and political commissars. This is often argued the genesis of violence, intimidation and authoritarianism of the military in Zimbabwe (Kriger, 2003 and Mhanda, 2011). Kriger (2003) observes that the ruling party used ZANLA forces to win support of the rural majority in 1980 and then to consolidate its power in the army, the bureaucracy, and among urban workers in post- independence.

It is important to note that the mass mobilisation structures had dual structures of commanders and political commissars. The dual structure existed at various levels from provincial level to section level (Interview with ex-freedom fighter, 2016 Mutare). Each province had a provincial field operations commander deputised by provincial political commissar. Below them were sector commanders and sector political commissars, then detachment commanders and detachment commissars who controlled 100 to 200 men, who in turn controlled section commanders and commissars who had 10 to 15 men each.

Out of the dual structures both ZANU and ZAPU had military zones, specific areas of operation assigned to the various commanders and commissars. ZANU had military zones divided into three provinces namely Tete Province, Manica Province and Gaza Province (Mhanda, 2011). Tete Province had four sectors; Nehanda, Chaminuka, Takawira and Chitepo Sectors. Manica Province had three sectors; Tangwena, Monomatapa and Musikavanhu Sectors. Gaza Province had four sectors named Sector 1 up to Sector 4. ZIPRA had Northern Front and Southern Front. Under post-independence boundaries the ZANLA military zones became Mashonaland, Manicaland, Masvingo and part of Midlands Province whilst ZIPRA areas of operation are now Matabeleland and part of Midlands Province.

The first interesting observation attributable to liberation war structure is post-independence election results. The election results at independence and post-2000 tend to reflect colonial legacies, and liberation war influences. Alexander (2006) observes that the country's first elections voting pattern tended to show a strong association between the liberation movements and their operational area. ZAPU dominated Matabeleland regions and ZANU dominated all the other regions. The contest for political power in post-2000 between the MDC and ZANU PF still shows a pattern in which ZANU PF still dominates the ZANLA forces strong holds (Chung, 2007). Manungo (2007) also explains that the majority of the rural people where most of the war of liberation was fought remained firm supporters of ZANU PF. ZANU PF dominated in Mashonaland and Manicaland whilst opposition parties dominated in Matabeleland provinces. A critical observation on the voting pattern at independence and post-2000 indicates military political influence in Zimbabwe inherited from the colonial area. The successes of the liberation political parties hinges on the military power and military political work, freedom fighters were both military commanders and political commissars. The thesis therefore argues that, the strategy by the BMATT of appointing former military commanders and political commissars during the liberation war as commanders in the ZDF tend to influence the behavior of the ZDF in its approach towards social, political and economic issues in post-2000 Zimbabwe. All the senior officers in the new military forces were the Sector Commanders and Political Commissars during the war.

It is also important to note that the liberation war command and control structures are similar to the current ZDF command control structure. The national President is the ruling party president and commander-in-chief of the ZDF. During the war, the President of the Party,

(ZANU or ZAPU) was also the commander-in-chief of ZANLA/ZIPRA force. The Central Committee elected the President. The ZANU Secretary General, former President Mugabe took over from Ndabaningi Sithole as Party President after the 1974 -76 ZANU internal conflicts. Again the ZANLA forces played an important role in this political leadership change through the Mgagao Declaration (Mhanda, 2011). ZANU created Dare reChimurenga, the Revolutionary War Council that linked the ZANLA forces to the political leadership.

In the early stages of the struggle Dare reChimurenga was dominated by civilians elected by the central committee. As from 1973 Dare reChimurenga structure changed, a military commander Tongogara, was appointed Secretary of Defence in the Dare and became chairman of ZANLA High Command (Mhanda, 2011). The ZANLA High Command comprised the senior military officers who were to implement the Dare`s strategies in the war front.

On the other hand, ZIPRA had similar structures. Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005) observe that the *War Council* had direct links to ZIPRA High Command and was the executive body responsible for implementing all decisions of the Revolutionary Council. They further point out that the Revolutionary Council was a representative body of party officials and military personnel. Tongogara chaired the ZANLA High Command till the time of his death in 1979 and Rex Nhongo succeeded Tongogara after his death.

Similarly, Alfred Nikita Mangena, ZIPRA commander died before independence and was succeeded by his deputy, Lookout Masuku. Under the BMATT, both commanders Rex Nhongo (Solomon Mujuru) and Lookout Masuku were appointed Generals in the national army at independence. They were Generals nurtured by their political parties. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003) argues that the ideological bonding that was formed during the liberation war has formed the politico-military synergies that characterise the nature of civil-military relations in post independent Zimbabwe.

2.4 INTEGRATION OF RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES, ZANLA AND ZIPRA FORCES

To understand the complex nature of the socio-political and socio-economic dynamics of post-colonial Zimbabwe, a deeper analysis is necessary. For instance, it is important first to understand, why there was no complete demobilisation of the guerillas after the war? Could it be that political parties wanted gun support? There could be many reasons to justify the scenario but the documented one comes from the 1979 Lancaster House Conference agreement that stipulated that freedom fighters were to be integrated into the national defence force. This strategy worked to stop the war. However, it created the post-2000 civil-military relations challenges in Zimbabwe.

By the end of 1979, it was estimated that ZANLA only had over 40,000 members and at least a third were active in the country (Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2005). The national army had to absorb 35 000 the rest had to live a civilian life. They were expecting to see a better Zimbabwe. Many joined the various government departments to build a new nation under majority rule. ZANU PF has been in power since 1980 and over the years the highly politicised ex-freedom fighters in various government departments naturally rose to positions of influence. This strengthened ZANU PF party over opposition parties. However, some of the ex-freedom fighters also joined opposition parties.

The 1979 Lancaster House Agreement negotiated in the United Kingdom ushered in the independence of Zimbabwe and set the provision for the formation of the integrated Zimbabwe military force. The post-independence military force drew its membership from three former partisan military forces, namely; the Rhodesian Security Forces, ZANLA and ZIPRA forces. There was fusion of nationalist and colonialist thinking in an environment that was assumedly controlled by the nationalists but systematically controlled by the colonialists. A professional military was formed under the BMATT. The situation has presented real challenges: First, is how to nurture a non-partisan and an apolitical military force from such a combination? Second, is how to decolonise such an institution? The results have some impact on the post -2000 Zimbabwe crisis.

The formation of the defence force in independent Zimbabwe was a cumulative process and not an event. It happened in phases each with specific political and socio-economic goals. The first objective was to consolidate political power and in line with this there was inherent need to seriously consider the welfare of ex-combatants and to focus on national development objectives. Social services provision was the main development agenda; with rapid expansion of education system, expansion of public services, health services, and less attention on the production sectors (Chung, 2007). The most important point is that there were no attempts to decolonise and dismantle the colonial set-up. Rather, the British sought to maintain their influence through setting up a military system that was to follow western style (Whitaker, 2014). Offering military assistance was a deliberate effort by the former coloniser to ensure that Zimbabwe would continue to depend on the British.

Against this background, integrating the three forces was not an easy task. Kriger (2003) observes that soon after the election results were announced, General Ken Perkins, Assistant Chief of Britain's Defence Staff came to Zimbabwe for exploratory talks about integrating and training the new Zimbabwean defence force. The then Prime Minister RG Mugabe assigned Lieutenant General Peter Walls from the Rhodesian Security Forces to supervise the integration process. However, his assignment was short-lived. The Joint High Command (JHC) was then established in March 1980 to spearhead the integration process. The then Minister of State Security, ED Mwangwa, was appointed its Chairman. Key members of the JHC were drawn from the three military forces and these were Rhodesian Army Commander Lieutenant General LC Maclean, ZANLA Commander General TRS Mujuru and ZIPRA Commander General L Masuku.

The three commanders of the JHC were assumed to have equal powers, due to the strategy of *de facto* equality of the three armies which was set by the Lancaster House Agreement. *De facto* equality meant not only treating the guerrillas as the equals of Rhodesian soldiers but also observing the principle of equality between ZIPRA and ZANLA (Kriger, 2003). The strategy of *de facto* equality of the three armies made the ruling party maintain power. The strategy appeased the guerrillas who had aspirations to form the new army. If ZIPRA forces were left out in the new army, civil war was likely to break out. Besides efforts to prevent civil war, the *de facto* equality strategy on integration neutralised the Rhodesian forces and it also made it simple for the freedom fighters especially those who were given high ranks to

assume duties under the guidance and mentorship of the Rhodesian officers. The freedom fighters inherited a system which they fought during the war, a system which was being used to counter 'terrorism'. This made the decolonisation of the new military force a difficult process.

During the integration process, efforts were made to promote the interests of all parties concerned. Standardisation training programmes conducted by the BMATT were set to balance force composition by political affiliation. Senior freedom fighters, namely; commanders, from the level of colonel equivalent and upwards, were exempted from the aptitude and standardisation tests, they were attested as senior officers in the new defence force. In ZANLA, they were called members of the General Staff to High Command; in ZIPRA, the heads of departments and headquarters staff were called regional or zone commanders (Chung, 2007). To guarantee continuity of leadership between the guerrilla armies and the new army, the JHC protected the top guerrilla leaders. However, Kriger (2003) argues this was a way to reward war service and to legitimise the war.

In contrast, guerrillas aspiring to be non-commissioned officers, junior officers (captains, lieutenants, and second lieutenants), and middle management officers (majors and lieutenant-colonels) had to pass aptitude tests in English, Mathematics and short courses. The BMATT staff and Rhodesian Instructors taught tactics, drill, field craft, military law and leadership. They went through rigorous training and selection. By its nature the military structure is never democratic; even if the boss is less knowledgeable the orders must be obeyed. Kriger (2003) argues the incorporation of senior guerrilla commanders into senior ranks in the new army without the rigorous training resulted in a more professional rank at middle management than at very senior levels in the ZDF. However, the ZDF made efforts to upgrade the professional and academic levels of the senior officers through the attendance of military courses in colleges and military institutions locally and abroad. The establishment of the Zimbabwe Staff College and the Zimbabwe National Defence University aimed to advance both academic and professional qualifications of the senior officers.

From 1980 to date, limited structural changes that bear political influences took place in the ZDF formation. In August 1980, after his retirement as the Zimbabwe National Army Commander, General P. Walls told BBC that an estimated 60 per cent of the white officers

and NCOs had resigned because “they don’t want to stay under present political conditions” (Kriger 2003). To date the majority of officers from the former Rhodesian Force had left the ZDF. However, a significant number of officers from ZIPRA and ZANLA rose to become Generals in the ZDF.

The integration process is also often marred by the parallel formation of “politically correct” units. Besides this parallel formation, Kriger (2003) observes that it was the BMATT efforts to ensure that all politically important freedom fighters were attested into the officer corp. Mazarire and Rupiya (2000) have a different version of “politically correct” units. They argue that parallel to the national integration of ZANLA, ZIPRA and Rhodesian Forces “politically correct” units such as the North Korean trained Presidential Guard , the Artillery Regiment, the People`s Militia and the Fifth Brigade were formed. However, the present composition of these units shows some changes. The new situation demanded that all recruited ZDF members receive same training to be randomly posted to the various units such as the Infantry Battalions, Artillery Brigade, Presidential Guard and Commando Regiment among other units.

2.4.1 RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES

The Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) was the colonialist’s force, a force nurtured to advance and uphold colonialism; and “by its definition and design this was autocratic system of governance” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:102). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003), furthers observes that the RSF were indoctrinated to believe that freedom fighters were terrorists. It is often argued that the genealogy of the ZDF has roots in such a colonial military force.

There was a rich military tradition in Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Armed Forces were active in internal security campaigns and in World War II operations. The genealogy of the Rhodesian forces can be traced to the occupation of Zimbabwe in 1890 by the pioneer column. However, the foundation of the formation of Rhodesian Army and Air Force that resisted nationalist forces was set during and after the Second World War.

The Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) was formed in 1961 as a counter-balance to the four regular African battalions of the Federal Army to maintain White supremacy in Rhodesia. Recruiting was carried out principally in South Africa and Britain, with the smallest contingent coming from the Federation itself. Bond (1977) describes the rationale for the formation of the RLI as a way to strike the balance between the European and African units. The same justification was given for the formation of other all-White units such as the Special Air Service, Para Troop Squadron, Selous Scouts, and an Armoured Car unit. The increasing political instability prompted for the formation of the White regular units to provide national security if ever the African units prove disloyal due to political influence.

The intensification of the war and the proliferation of war zones in the early 1970s led to the massive expansion of the Rhodesian military establishment and defence budget. The existing regular units were expanded and new units were created specifically in response to the liberation war and these units include the Selous Scouts for tracking and clandestine operations, the Rhodesian Intelligence Corps, and the Grey`s Scouts Mounted infantry unit. It is important to note that, the ZDF still have the Grey`s Scouts renamed Mountain Battalion and has changed Rhodesian Intelligence Corps to Zimbabwe Intelligence Corps a direct inheritance of the colonial system. The Rhodesian military system was set to maintain White supremacy.

Besides the expansion of military establishments as a response to the intensification of the war, there was involvement of many ministries in the politico-military strategy of the Rhodesians. The coordination of operations became increasingly difficult. To improve efficiency in coordination of all operations in the field a Joint Operations Command (JOC) with representatives from all services was created. The set-up worked well in the fight against freedom fighters. JOC was created to improve coordination of national activities. In post-2000 Zimbabwe JOC structure and roles are still in place. Basically, the structure of the RSF was not significantly changed; it formed the foundation on which the ZDF was built by the BMATT. However, some argue that this was an autocratic and colonial system. The thesis posits that, the JOC system needs to be refined to address national development challenges under MOOTW. Just as it worked to fight against freedom fighters, it should be modified to work against poverty, natural disasters management, terrorism, corruption, political and social injustices.

2.4.2 ZANLA AND ZIPRA FORCES

The ZANLA and ZIPRA fought a common enemy, the RSF under the Rhodesian Front. After the Lancaster House Agreement and the subsequent Zimbabwe Independence, the two parties agreed to merge their armed wings to form the new national defence force. However, since the split of ZANU from ZAPU in 1963, the two parties did not trust each other and this made the integration process a monumental task. Jackson (2010) argues that former guerrillas were probably less prone to party or ethnic sectarianism than some of their political leaders. Against such a background of mistrust, a cold war existed that came to an end with the Unity Accord of 1987 between the two political parties after conflict such as what had erupted at the *Entumbane* Uprising and the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces disturbances (*Gukurahundi* Disturbances).

In 1980, the combined guerrilla forces were estimated to be 65,000. As at the Lancaster House settlement, each army refused to disclose its total strength (Kriger, 2003). All the freedom fighters were eager to form the new national defence force and so often there was competition for posts and power. Violent clashes between the former ZANLA and ZIPRA forces in the assembly points and in the integrated national army resulted in the desertion of ZIPRA members. Political problems that resulted in the expulsion of ZAPU leaders, Joshua Nkomo and others from government also affected the integration process. ZIPRA Commander, General Lookout Masuku was charged with treason. All these clashes made many ZIPRA forces to flee the army and were called dissidents and deserters.

Political differences and clashes between ZIPRA and ZANLA forces during and after integration emanated from political differences. The two forces were highly politicised such that the preservation and consolidation of party power took centre stage. For instance, freedom fighters who were political commissars easily took high posts on the new military force. Josiah Tungamirai former ZANLA's Chief Political Commissar, who spearheaded the army's political education became the first black AFZ Commander and Constantine Guveya Dominic Chiwenga, former Gaza Province Commander and Political Commissar in the ZANLA High Command from 1978, became the Army Commander in 1994. General Chiwenga was appointed Commander Zimbabwe Defence Forces in 2004 and he retired into politics to become the Vice President of Zimbabwe in 2017. It is crystal clear that those who

became senior commanders in the ZDF were politicians. This was created by the British through the BMATT activities although military politician was started by the Chinese during the liberation war.

There are two important observations worth highlighting. First, the dominance of former ZIPRA and ZANLA forces over the former Rhodesian Security Forces in the ZDF structures in post-2000 clearly shows the continuous link between the military and politicians. The fact that the former RSF left the ZDF can be attributed to political influence, their political party, RF, last existed in the 1980s. Second, the politico-military bond of ZANU PF and ZDF and the subsequent rise of former Commander ZDF General Chiwenga to Vice-President cast bad blood between ZDF and other political parties in post-2000 era. Many people will always associate ZDF MOOTW with one political party. The thesis has the opinion that the politico-military structure in Zimbabwe does not support what is in the 2013 Constitution, having an apolitical military. The military structure that was created by the BMATT in Zimbabwe does not support the western style of the military control and civil-military relations. This variance of the politico-military structure and Constitution is likely to cause continuous conflict between the military and political parties.

In terms of military relations, it is important to note that both the colonialists (RSF) forces and the nationalist (ZIPRA and ZANLA) forces were both under civilian control but they strongly participated in the national development issues. The RSF participated in national development issues through the JOC. The military commanders in both ZANLA and ZIPRA were members of the Revolutionary War Council and War Council, respectively. Such links between the military and the politicians were overlooked at the integration phase by the BMATT but later manifest in post-2000 after the formation of a strong opposition party MDC.

2.5 THE ZDF AND ITS SOCIETY

The ZDF has a long history of societal attachments. The ZANLA and ZIPRA forces waged guerrilla warfare against the Rhodesian forces being supported by the civilians. The nationalist's forces recruited their soldiers from their society. This created a strong bond between the ZDF members and the villagers in many communal areas of Zimbabwe. Post -

2000 ZDF continues to attract with the rural masses through MOOTW and activities such as the Traditional Leaders Day on the ZDF calendar. However, there are laws, guidelines and virtues that define the scope of engagements between the ZDF and the society.

2.5.1 CONDUCT OF MEMBERS OF THE ZIMBABWE DEFENCE FORCES

The civil-military relations of a nation suffer if the conduct of the military force is not clearly defined (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). However, its common practice that militaries tend to violate some guidelines, rules and laws and this gave rise to coups. The conduct of the ZDF is guided by the Constitution of Zimbabwe. The following sections may need some highlighting:

Section 212 of the Constitution states; “The function of the Defence Force is to protect Zimbabwe, its people, its national security and interests and its territorial integrity and to uphold the Constitution”

The ZDF role of providing assistance to other government ministries/departments through secondment and attachment is supported by the Defence Act. The *Defence Act, S209 Attachment and Secondment of Members to Public Service* states that; the Minister may attach or second to Public Service any member of the Regular Force under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the involvement of the ZDF in MOOTW, or the secondment of officers has legal cover.

2.5.2 ROLE OF MILITARY VIRTUES IN SOCIETY

In an attempt to strengthen the moral conduct of troops, long-established military ideals such as honour, courage, discipline and loyalty is what most armed forces still use today as guiding principles. How far do these virtues meet MOOTW demands in today's military forces? During the liberation struggle the beneficiaries of these military virtues were the guerrillas, and the political parties with little or no benefits to civilian population. Nonetheless, the civilian population had no option but to support the revolution. In independent Zimbabwe, ex-combatants in civilian life and soldiers in the defence forces experienced difficulties in adjusting to the less aggressive ways to win the hearts and minds of the population. Ex-combatants in civilian life still believe they are the vanguard of the party ZANU PF. The period after 2000 was the most difficult year for the ZANU PF political

commissars especially those with military background. Twenty (20) years after independence, a significant number of youth without war experience were now eligible to vote. It was difficult for the political commissars, mainly ex-combats, to use same aggressive tactics on the new generation without being accused of human rights abuse.

The military's involvement in mass mobilisation during the liberation struggle and in some developmental projects in post-independence Zimbabwe had some accrual benefits to the society. For instance, former AFZ Commander Air Chief Marshal P Shiri in an interview pointed out that, the ZDF chose to construct a primary school, secondary school and hospital at Murongwe, a village in a remote place in Mashonaland East Province that borders with Mozambique because he once operated in that area during the liberation war.

The military has certain attributes that make it better positioned than other civilian institutions when it comes to service provision. Finer, cited by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2005:53), points out the three main advantages of the military over the civilians are: 1) superiority in organisational unity, 2) a highly emotional symbolic status, and 3) superiority in the means of applying force. Baynham (1992) also emphasised that the powerful monopoly of the military in the controlled use of force should be used responsibly for the good of society. However, post-independence Africa tends to suffer from many challenges emanating from the liberation struggle ideologies. According to Mair and Sithole (2002) in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003:103), the authoritarianism of the colonial era reproduced itself within the nationalist political movements. In the case of Zimbabwe, the ZDF came as a hybrid of colonial systems and African nationalism whose characteristics and operations are often confused by many people. This study therefore aims to establish whether the involvement of the ZDF in MOOTW in post-2000 was of any benefit to its society.

2.6 SUMMARY

This chapter traced the origins and formation of the ZDF. The ZDF came as a result of integration of nationalist forces (ZANLA and ZIPRA) and a colonial force (RSF). The chapter gave some reflections of the Zimbabwe liberation war, in equalities in colonial government that fueled uprisings and nationalism among the oppressed. The mass mobilisation activities by nationalist forces as well as the RSF activities to counter freedom

fighters` effort to end colonial rule were covered. The British`s influences on the professionalisation of military forces in post-independence Zimbabwe through the BMATT which was seconded to Zimbabwe during the integration process was also covered. In short, the chapter revealed the legacies of colonialism, and the liberation struggle driven by African nationalism and how they can be used in support for or against the conduct of the ZDF in the post-2000 Zimbabwe development trajectory. In both the colonial force and the nationalist forces the military was under political leadership. However, they were not apolitical they actively participated in politics and in solving national challenges. Rhodesian forces participated through JOC and in fighting the war.

In the post-2000 era, Zimbabwe still needs Afrocentric approaches to fight neo-colonialism. Former colonisers and those with colonial mentality seek to promote divisions, conflicts, corruption and non-productivity in Zimbabwe to reverse the gains of independence and retard development. Drawing lessons from the liberation war, Zimbabwe needs a strategic development plan that is supported by all political parties. The military through MOOTW under a strong civil-military relations model will support, coordinate and supervise the development plan. The thesis argues that, this approach is similar to Afrocentric approaches that were adopted in colonial Rhodesia to fight colonialism. The Rhodesian Security Forces through JOC had similar roles to fight various negative forces that were set to destabilise the nation. On the other hand, nationalist forces also successfully coordinate and implement the liberation war. The ZDF being a hybrid force inherited all the characteristics, therefore ZDF MOOTW if properly coordinated and implemented may promote national development. In the next chapter, existing literature on civil-military relations is reviewed.

CHAPTER 3

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: UNDERSTANDING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN ZIMBABWE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines civil-military relations practices with bias towards the Zimbabwe Defence Forces' Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and their impact on the country's development trajectory. The chapter sets out the conceptual framework of the thesis by examining existing relevant literature on the theory of civil-military relations as well as their relevance to MOOTW in the development matrix in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Civil-military relations form an important component of the complex national development matrix as it always has a strong influence on the internal stability of a nation. Zimbabwe's outcome of the liberation war and the post-2000 economic crisis, internal political and socio-economic instabilities were greatly influenced by several factors that include the military.

On the western civil-military relations, Samuel Huntington long observed that military organisations are always subjected to two forces, namely:

1. *A functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security ; and*
2. *A societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society (Huntington1957:2).*

Huntington also raises the following pertinent questions:

1. *What pattern of civil-military relations is most compatible with American liberal democratic values? ; and*
2. *What pattern of civil-military relations will best maintain the security of the American nation?*

In attempting to understand the nature and pattern of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe, the thesis tried to contextualise the observations and questions of the civil-military relations theorist, Samuel Huntington. The Zimbabwean society has its threats, social forces, ideologies and institutions which all gives rise to functional and social imperatives. The ZDF is one such institution.

This thesis aims to analyse military influence on development in Zimbabwe. The relationship between the military, political leadership and society is as old as humanity itself and has been subjected to several studies. However, with the prevailing challenges in Zimbabwe there has been a general acknowledgement that the relationship requires further studies. The study of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe does not imply that there are conflicts or near conflicts. Hans Born cited in Ngoma (2004:4) argues that “even stable democracies have to grapple with civil-military relations, transforming and managing them to keep peace with the changing security environment”. Ngoma (2004:8) observes that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) requires “a much more open, inclusive and transparent debate of defence and security needs at national and regional levels”.

Similarly, Moyo (2015) partitioned African civil-military relations and advanced that the existing body of literature on civil-military relations of many countries that gained their independence through an armed liberation struggle has given insufficient knowledge on how to promote democracy and development. In response to these and other similar sentiments the chapter focuses on the impact of civil-military relations on the modern roles of the military as depicted by MOOTW in Zimbabwe. To gain a deeper understanding of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe, founding works in civil-military relations, recent contributions, and challenges in civil military relations were reviewed. The chapter contains: Civil-Military Relations Concepts and Theories, Civil-Military Relations Issues, Nature of Civil-Military Relations in Zimbabwe and Civil-Military Relations and Colonial Legacies. Within these main headings there are sub-headings.

3.2 CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS CONCEPTS

3.2.1 DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

Samuel P Huntington’s academic work continues to have significant impact on the conduct and state of civil-military relations on many nations. Huntington’s theory of civil-military relations has become the standard in professional and academic discourse. Nix (2012) observes that when Huntington suggests the theory of civil-military relations he outlined the historical development of military professionalism in Europe and the US with some emphasis on the constitutional requirements and intentions of America’s Founding fathers. Nix further

observes that Huntington theory is caught between the variables of military professionalism and the military's participation in the political process.

Civil-military relations as a concept has been predominant in the western nations while the term commissariat was popular in the eastern nations and eventually some African countries which got support from the east during the revolutionary wars of independence. The main objectives of these concepts are to promote good relations between the military and civil authorities in order to advance peace, good governance and sustainable development.

Civil-military relations can simply be defined as the relationship between the military and the society. Although the concept in practice has been with the society for a very long period, it was Huntington who made a very serious attempt to theorise the relationship between the military and the society. In so doing, he laid the foundation for this scholarly field which came to be termed civil- military relations. He argued that the military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces, namely, the functional imperative which stems from the threats to the society's security and the social imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies and institutions dominant within the society (Huntington, 1957). From Huntington's submissions, it is necessary that the relationship between the two institutions be further explored.

Great efforts were made to understand civil-military relations and many researchers have made their mark on the subject. However, there is general acknowledgment that the subject especially in Southern Africa needs further study (Ngoma (2004), Rupiya (2003, 2015), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003b, 2015), Williams (1998) among others).

Huntington (1957) identifies civil-military relations as a military security policy, which together with internal and situational security policies is an aspect of national security policy working at both the operational and institutional levels. Huntington further explains that the military security policy's role is in minimising or neutralising efforts to weaken or destroy the nation by armed forces operating outside its institutional and territorial confines. It is therefore always important to have checks and balances to control the military's powers.

From a similar perspective Feaver (1999:228) submits that the heart of traditional civil-military relations is a social contract between civilians and the military, maintained in a

proper division of labour. His submission draws strength from highlighting that it is a social contract that binds on proper division of labour. The two parties need to clearly define their roles. Any failure to separate the two institutions creates problems such as militarisation of institutions, an issue which was raised by many scholars that include Moyo (2015), Alexander (2013) and Chitiyo (2009) on ZDF operations.

Williams (1988) posits that the term civil-military relations is used in the descriptive sense of the word to illustrate the nature of relations between the military and the civilian authorities. It is clear from his observation that each particular society has certain core values that determines the nature of its civil-military relations.

Similarly, Cottey, Edmunds and Foster (1999:4) submit that the term civil-military relations cover all characteristics of relations between armed forces and the society. They posit that political role and the position of the military in its society heavily determines the nature of civil-military relations. What is most relevant to this study is their argument that: civil-military relations also involve issues such as the broader attitude of the military towards civilian society; civilian society's perceptions of and attitudes to the military; and the military's ethos and understanding as to what its role should be (Cottey *et al* ,1999:4). It is in line with this thinking that the study aims to establish the perceptions of the Zimbabweans towards their military and the impact of MOOT on society.

Civil-military relations have been defined as representing a complex set of interrelationships, established norms and practices between the triad – the state, society and the armed forces (Rupiya 2003:252). Similarly, Owens (2013:3) echoed that US civil-military relations constitute a bargain, and there are three parties to the bargain: the American people; the government; and the military establishment. The bargain must be periodically re-negotiated to take account of political, social, technological, or geopolitical changes. From this assertion by Owens, it is apparent that civil-military relations are dynamic hence changes in the political, social, technology or geopolitical setup results in civil-military relations challenges that require contemporary solutions. The nature of civil-military relations in colonial and post-colonial conditions and in multi-party state conditions is also bound to change. Such a trend analysis might be useful in the study of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe.

Croissant, Kuehn, and Lorenz, (2012:4) observes that “civil-military relations should be seen as a continuum of decision making power distributed between civilians and the military.” They define civilian control as “that distribution of decision-making power in which civilians have exclusive authority to decide on national politics and their implementation. They further argue that only the civilians must determine the policies to be implemented as well as the boundaries between policy making and policy implementation.

Another interesting observation from Croissant *et al* (2012:5) is the conceptualisation of civilian control as a set of rules, norms, and institutions that sets power boundaries between the military and civilian structures. They identified five areas namely: elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defence and military organisation.

Elite Recruitment. This defines the rules and criteria of recruiting, selecting and legitimising political office holders. Croissant *et al* (2012) cited Dahl (1971) who argues that this elite recruitment reflects the degree to which political processes are open to all members of the society to compete for political posts. Civilian control is undermined when public offices are excluded from open competition and when the military influences electoral procedures. They also argue that, when an active-duty officer serves on national security, or is appointed as defence minister, this constrains civilian authority but does not call into the civilian nature of the government as long as the military influence is contained within the defence sphere. Citing Pion-Berlin (2003) they pointed out that the civilian nature of the government becomes questionable when the military personnel are appointed in large numbers to hold non-defence cabinet or legislative portfolios.

In Zimbabwe, the appointment of serving and retired military officers to key local government, foreign services positions, Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC), National Railways, Grain Marketing Board and other departments has been heavily criticised and debated (Rupiya, 2004, 2006; Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2005; Raftopoulos, 2009 and Moyo, 2015). Raftopoulos (2009: 201)), who points out that from the late 1990s, Zimbabwe entered a period that has come to be known generally as the “Crisis in Zimbabwe”, laments the appointments of military personnel in various government departments. Citing Rupiya (2006), he observes that “the violence and irregularities from the elections (2000, 2002 and 2005) were implemented by a state whose key positions Mugabe had filled with military

personnel. The key positions were Election Directorate, Attorney-General's Office, Grain Marketing Board, Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority and National Railways of Zimbabwe" (Raftopoulos 2009: 215). Cawthra (2010:32) also suggested that to end crisis in Zimbabwe the militarisation of the government should be reversed.

Public policy. This comprises the rules and processes of policymaking and policy implementation. Military influence over these procedures and processes empowers military to directly or indirectly control political and socio-economic activities. The ZDF has been involved in social, economic and political activities in both government and parastatals and some have considered this as military influence or interference. In Zimbabwe, Moyo (2015:169) observes that the military has become engaged in political decision-making, commercial activities, social development and civic projects. True to the observations, the ZDF adopted MOOTW as part of its contribution to national security and development and this study aims to establish the impact of these engagements on people's lives.

Internal Security. This entails all the deployment of military personnel to maintain internal peace, order and security. Internal security activities include border control, riot control, counter-terrorism and domestic law enforcement. It is further argued that, in this area the military can operate under the control of civilian authorities, in support of their operations. In Zimbabwe, according to the National Constitution (2013) Section 213 (2) the ZDF may be deployed in Zimbabwe;

- a. in defence of Zimbabwe;
- b. in support of the Police Service in the maintenance of public order; or
- c. in support of the Police Service and other civilian authorities in the event of an emergency or disaster.

The ZDF conducted several non-military operations to promote internal security. Some of the operations become controversial and were regarded as partisan and patronage operations as well as opportunities to loot national resources (Alexander, 2013). These internal security operations include Operation Maguta, Search and Rescue Operations, and Operation Restore Legitimacy among others. A detailed analysis of the ZDF non-military operations are covered in Chapter 5.

National defence and military organisation. It is historically, logically and morally understood that the main function for the military is to fight and win wars. Modern scholars have alternative views. Foster (2005:3) suggests the purpose of the military is not only to fight wars but also to prevent war, give security and safe guard peace. He further proposes that the military that is structured, skilled and equipped first and foremost for peacekeeping, nation building, humanitarian support and disaster response is more willing to be controlled than a conventional war fighting military. The arguments are super valid. This has been practised by both ZANLA forces in the liberation war as covered in Chapter 2 and by the ZDF in post-2000 development challenges in Zimbabwe. The ZDF has been involved in various activities through MOOTW to prevent war, give security and safeguard peace. Zimbabwe in particular and Africa in general does not in need purely conventional war fighting militaries. Western countries especially former colonisers manipulate these armies to causes wars, coups and political party polarisation. They achieve this through calls for multiparty democracy and democratic control of the military.

Almann (2003) suggests that democratic control of the armed forces requires that the citizens of the country support the activities of the military. Almann (2003:34) defines democratic control of armed forces as a situation, where democratically elected civilians are in charge of national defence. This democratic control is always a challenge for military personnel. Politicians always come and go. But military officers are in office for decades. Worse for Africa and Zimbabwe were formation of political parties is a gate way to western sponsorship and riches. Political party polarisation causes divisions in both the military and the general society.

On the issue of national defence the state manly relies on the military. Chuter (2000) argues that the state has a number of instruments at its disposal and the military is one such instrument. The military should therefore be under the total control of the civilians. In order to promote peace and development the government requires total control of the military.

Huntington (1957:83) posits that professionalism holds the key to civilian control over the armed forces. Finer (1962) cited by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003) also emphasises that military interventions are minimum when the political system is able to efficiently manage the civil-military relations. Welch (1976) cited by Mwangi (2009) suggests three ways to control the

military namely: (1) Ascriptive factors such as class and ethnicity that may affect the relationship between civilian and military leaders; (2) Utilisation of party controls, possibly through the creation of parallel hierarchies of commands; and (3) Constitutional constraints in the political impact of the military. Huntington also presents three factors that shape civil-military relations, namely: the constitution, external threat levels and national ideology.

In Zimbabwe, there are both party and constitutional controls on the military and the above sentiments from Huntington and Finer that professionalism and the availability of an efficient and influential political party respectively promotes civilian control have been practised. For instance, the politicians always remind the military that “politics commands the gun and not the other way round”. A historical concept that was mooted from the teachings of Mao Zedong and has been practised since the liberation struggle. Former President Mugabe points out that;

The military yese (whole of it) has no right, you know, to be interfering with the political processes; theirs is to support. They can give their own views according to the constitution and also the principle that politics shall always lead the gun and not the gun to lead politics.” (The Independent, 28 July 2017).

Mechanisms to ensure civilian oversight and public accountability of security agencies are established by the current national legal system. For instance, the National Defence Policy respects the supremacy of the Constitution, elected civilian authority, and Parliament. The Zimbabwe National Defence Policy (1997) states, “Civil military relations refer to the hierarchy of authority between the Executive, Parliament and the Defence Forces.” A cardinal principle is that the Defence Forces are subordinate to the civilian authority. In Zimbabwe, the Constitution clearly spells out in Section 218 the Functions of Defence Service Commission which include; (1d.) to ensure that members of the Defence Forces comply with section 208; (1e.) to foster harmony and understanding between the Defence Forces and civilians. Section 208 focuses on the conduct of the members of the security services.

The US experience in the theory and practice of civil-military relations has been universalised. For the Zimbabwean case, it seems the US has taken active measures to punish those countries that do not follow its practices. Any other models of civil-military relations are regarded as autocratic rule and military rule, characterised by human rights violation,

regime protection and all other negatives of military governance. For instance, Zimbabwe is a very good example to illustrate this point. In 2001 US enacted ZIDERA (Public Law 107-99, Dec 21, 2001) that had several sections that had direct implications on ZDF operations and activities as contained in *Section 4 (d) Presidential certification that certain conditions are satisfied*. Special attention to Section 4 (d) (1) which states that;

Restoration of the rule of law; ... and an end to the lawlessness, violence, and intimidation sponsored, condoned, or tolerated by the Government of Zimbabwe, the ruling party, and their supporters or entities.

The ZDF by its origin and formation as shown in Chapter 2 has all the attributes of being a supporter and entity of the ruling party. Similarly, in China the Peoples` Liberation Army is an entity of the Chinese Community Party. Therefore for another country to impose its experience and practice on smaller nations is a bit unfair. Let the smaller and developing countries find their own suitable form and models of military control.

This thesis acknowledges that there is no universal definition of civil military relations. It therefore adopts the definition of Croissant, Kuehn and Lorenz (2012:4) who opine that “civil-military relations should be seen as a continuum of decision-making power distributed between civilians and the military.” A cardinal principle is that the defence forces are subordinate to the civilian authority. However, the decision-making process must be considered as a continuum, shifting position depending on the national needs.

3.2.2 CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS MODELS

Civil-military relations have many variables and views hence authors have attempted to come up with various models. The predominant scholar in the field, Huntington suggests subjective control and objective control of the military by the political leaders. In the subjective control model, the military participates in political and social systems. The military, political and social systems are integrated. Under this model the professionalism of the military is minimised. The objective control model has differentiated military and political systems. The military remains separate from the political system and focus on developing expertise and skills in war. Senior military officers serve as military advisors to politicians who are the experts in politics and national strategy.

On the other hand, under the objective model military professionalism is maximised. Huntington prefers the objective model, however when he published *The Soldier and the State*, he clearly demonstrated that even the US civil-military relations do not follow the dictates of his objective model but was somewhere on the continuum between the subjective and the objective model.

Objective Civil Control

In the objective civil-control model, Huntington (1957) emphasises maximum military professionalism and political neutrality of the military personnel and institutions. He argues that military leadership is driven by professionalism and the most important aspect is giving service to the nation. He concludes that the more professional an army is, the more it takes on the task of serving society. This objective model is well suited for the western parliamentary democracies and for the control of mercenaries or purely conventional militaries. It's not suitable for Africa and particularly Zimbabwe. African militaries should be managed and controlled for both conventional and non-conventional wars. As long as Africa and Zimbabwe have multiparty democracies with overnight political parties the temptation for politicians to meddle in military affairs is high. The nature of African politics does not allow politicians to respect the professional autonomy of the military. They will always manipulate it to further personnel or partisan interests.

It is important to note that Objective civil control mechanism is based on formal and legal control mechanisms. Parliamentary oversight committees which controls and monitors defence activities including budgets are part of the formal mechanisms. Constitutional restraints form the legal control mechanisms. These mechanisms will not work when the political system is wrong. Finer cited in Williams (2003), rightly observes that the success of these mechanisms depend on the level and legitimacy of political culture in a given country. The political culture in Zimbabwe and other African countries needs a review if development and political stability is to be achieved.

The objective model clearly separates responsibilities of the state and the armed forces. However, in most African countries the model has been applied with little success. The model has several limitations on its application on the post-colonial African countries like Zimbabwe. For instance, effective control of the military forces in the former liberation movements in Southern Africa resulted from the strong historical ties that existed between

the political elites and the top commanders of the military. Under such circumstances the expected separation of responsibilities between top military commanders and top politicians is blurred. For example, the constitutional role that the military is required to defend the constitution of the country and to serve the government of the day indirectly forces the military into politics or partisan politics in the form of regime protection. The ZDF as a case in point has been involved in both inter-party and intra-party politics. First, it was the controversial statement by Gen Zvinvashe in 2002 when the military announced the credentials of those who aspire to be the president of Zimbabwe. Secondly, the military in 2017 under Operation Restore Legacy intervened to stop the purging of party members with liberation war credentials from the ruling party ZANU PF that resulted in the end of the 37 year rule of President Mugabe. The other non-military operations by the ZDF are covered in detail in chapter 5.

Subjective Civil Control

Under the Subjective civil control, Huntington (1957:351) emphasises maximising civil power by both civilising and politicising the military. Under this model, civil supremacy is achieved through the integration of the military, political and social systems. Under the subjective model, although the military is subordinate, it becomes an integral part of the political authority and is inculcated with civil political values, ideology and interests.

Subjective control is aimed at maximising the political power of the ruling party. Political leaders control the military by appointing senior officers who are political friends. The criterion for promotion into high ranks is not military professionalism but loyalty to the ruling party. Typical of the Chinese military system, loyalty in the military is defined by loyalty to the ruling Chinese Communist Party (Hu & Wei, 2005). Huntington discredited the subjective control because he believed it tends to corrupt the professionalism in the military.

The validity of the claim that objective civilian control is the only proper way of controlling democratically the military is open to debate. The first argument is that some successful countries do practise a model close to the subjective. A typical example is China. In China, the military participates in politics and in social and economic systems yet it has stable and sustainable development. The integration and not the separation of the military and the political system guarantee the promotion of unity, peace and development. The military and

political leaders decide together on the direction and implementation of national development goals. In this view the involvement of the military in political, social and economic activities becomes a positive model for national development. Therefore, it makes sense for all developing nations to question the general applicability of the objective civilian control and to search for suitable alternative models that fit the unique situations.

For instance, powerful nations always have greater appetite for African resources. The objective model makes Africa vulnerable to these former colonisers. The military and politicians are always manipulated by the powerful nations and this has resulted in perennial wars, coups and conflicts in Africa. More of subjective model jointly forces the military and politicians to focus on national development thereby eliminating foreign influence.

Post-2000 military control in Zimbabwe is neither objective nor subjective. It is a hybrid model with objective and subjective characteristics. Therefore, the most applicable definition of civil-military relations in this case is that of Welch (1976:35) who defines it as a 'continuum of interactions that exists between civilians and members of the armed forces, with the result that civilian control of the military is never absolute, nor military control of politics ever total'. Welch's definition suggests a relationship that is neither extremely objective nor subjective and static but one that is situational. This tends to aptly describe the Zimbabwean situation where power controls shifts between politicians and the military personnel, thus creating a continuum of interactions.

3.3 TRENDS AND CHALLENGES IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

A decline in the number of coups in the 21st century in the world and in Africa suggests a positive shift in the nature of civil-military relations. However, increasing cases of poverty, bad governance, human rights abuse, regime protection, life presidency (*handiendism*), hunger, state sponsored violence, unbalanced military hardware trade among other developmental issues are clear indicators of civil-military relations challenges in developing countries, Zimbabwe included .

There are variations in regional and specific countries growth strategies therefore, it is necessary to establish specific strategies for particular nations. Military professionalism has been defined differently, armed forces are constant political actors, and threats to national security are ever changing. Subsequently, military role is also changing and MOOTW are gradually becoming more dominant. All these changes demand the inclusion of appropriate civil-military relations model in the developing nations' development agenda and strategy formulation.

The broad roles armed forces play has not always been formally integrated into development strategies for the developing nations. Military forces in Africa are often used by politicians to advance personal interests, promote political and ethnic differences. Military leaders and politicians in Africa equally suffer manipulation from rich countries in a bid to advance their national interests. Mashingaidze (2010) observes that Africa's post-colonial nation building processes have been marred by the failure to tolerate political differences. For the Zimbabwe case Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012) argues that Zimbabwean nationalism just like colonialism re-tribalised politics and fragmented the masses on ethnic basis. There are several factors related to civil-military relations that can be proffered to have contributed to development challenges in post-colonial Africa. However, the observations highlighted above cannot be ignored if development challenges in Zimbabwe are to be analysed.

3.3.1 CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

Civil-military relations are a challenge to many developing nations. In general, comparatively little effort was made to understand the complex political, social and economic dynamics that shaped the relationships between civilian and security elites in Southern Africa. This was observed to affect the capacity of states to provide the broad-based security needed for sustainable political and socio-economic development (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006; Ngoma, 2004; and Lungu & Ngoma, 2005). The challenge of many developing countries on civil-military relations is their desire to be associated with the developed nations particularly their former colonisers. Many countries have skillfully produced mechanisms on civilian control of the military which tends to be totally different from what is practiced. William (1998) observes that virtually all African countries possess, on paper at least, a battery of formal mechanisms via which, it is claimed, civil control over the armed forces is ensured. However,

there is very little cooperation by Africans themselves to critically analyse and correlate the theoretical military civilian control on each country and what the country practices. Many nations claim stable civil-military relations under Samuel Huntington's objective model yet the model is far from their practices and ironically conflicts will always arise especially when the opposition parties start questioning, for instance the idea of the military being apolitical.

In Southern Africa, although there are no high records of coups it is not an indication that civil-military relations are perfect. The Zimbabwe and Lesotho military intervention in politics are the most recent ones. The former liberations movements in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe have tried, on paper at least, to have constitutional mechanisms to control their militaries but have encountered several challenges especially on civil-military relations critics from the opposition parties. The reality is that in (Southern) Africa, the armed forces have remained under civil authorities because of a wide range of subjective interfaces and partnerships (Williams, 1998).

As a result of these subjective interfaces and partnerships the African civil-military relations have suffered many issues that include the following:

1. *Lack of African Civil-Military Relations*

Tired of the hypocrisy, many analysts have contributed towards the creation of African civil-military relations and alternatives to the old western civil-military relations with such names as Williams (1998, 2003), Rupiya, Moyo and Laugesen (2015), Schiff (1995) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003b and 2013) leading the pack. Williams (1998) argues that this is an ambitious project that requires time and ongoing research but it does have great practical consequences on peace and development of the region. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:11) also posits that "What Africans must be vigilant against is the trap of ending up normalising and universalising coloniality as a natural state of the world". He argues that the western civil-military relations in Africa must be unmasked and destroyed because it has produced a world order sustained through a combination of violence, deceit, hypocrisy and lies.

African civil-military relations issues need critical analysis if ever the role of the military will be to enhance peace, democracy and development. There is consensus in some researchers that civil-military relations in Africa affect development and democratisation. Prof. Mulaudzi in the preface to the book , *The New African Civil-Military Relations* edited by Rupiya, Moyo and Laugensen (2015), observes that inter-relationships between civil-military relations and democratisation in Africa remain under-researched or under emphasised, yet civil-military relations in Africa affect the continent`s democratisation and development processes. Ngoma (2004) and Williams (2003) both point out that Southern African Development Community (SADC), has been found to require “a much more open, inclusive and transparent debate of defence and security needs, at national and regional levels, than [has] hitherto been the case”.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003a: 108) laments that “African nationalism privatised politics as a preserve of only those who participated in the liberation struggle”. He further observes that the liberation struggle instilled in many political leaders and their supporters militaristic conceptions and perceptions of politics and political processes. This could be the root cause of violence in African politics. Evidence from Zimbabwe`s development challenges in post-2000 clearly shows that civil-military relations do not only affect national democratisation processes, but international relations, as well as national development strategies.

The post-2000 Zimbabwe was viewed by the international community as violating human rights and the US and EU changed their stance on Zimbabwe. The US passed the ZIDERA in 2001. In response to these measures which were set to effect a regime change in Zimbabwe to restore democracy or rather western democracy and human rights strictly white man protection. It seems the Zimbabwe government responded by adopting a military strategy to achieve development. This came in the form of MOOTW in which military personnel were seconded to key sectors of the economy. Moyo (2015:173) observes that “Over 4 000 of the ZDF members were absorbed by the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) as part of Operation Maguta between 2002 and 2006”. The ZDF members were tasked to carry out various missions in the national food distribution chain and in other needy departments. However, considering the ZDF strength the quoted figure tend to be exaggerated.

2. *African Politics, particularly in Southern Africa, is characterised by civil-military relations which are now hostage to partisan militaries*

Mulaudzi (2015) laments the emergency of politico-military elite that lacked a national vision. This challenge is really a direct contradiction to the post-Cold War era expectation where African nations have to focus on sustainable development. A number of factors trigger military intervention into civilian affairs and vice versa. Perlmutter (1969) cited by Fraenkel, Firth and Lal (2009), found that in most cases civilians turn to the military for political support when civilian political structures and institutions fail or when constitutional means for the conduct of political action are lacking. The civilians begin to form interventionist coalitions or indoctrinate the military with their political ideologies. Finer (1988) also has a theory to examine the existence of politico-military groupings. He argues that there are push and pull factors in the politico-military systems. Military disposition is referred to as a push factor. Pull factor is the opportunity that arises as a result of a political crisis. Another explanation according to Fraenkel, Firth and Lal (2009) is that in many developing countries military professionalism is now totally different from that of Huntington that emphasised external defence. They argue that the new professionalism in developing countries is shown by the eagerness and readiness of the military to assume politicised roles. This new professional role has resulted in many coups, wars and conflicts across the regions as political parties compete for state power.

These factors and many others have affected development trajectories in many African countries including Zimbabwe. For instance, political crisis in ZANU PF could be described as the pull factor that necessitated military intervention in 2017 in Zimbabwe.

3. *Long reigning regimes protected by the military*

The constitutions of many African states, Zimbabwe included, are similar to that of the United States in the sense that the president is the commander-in-chief of the military.

Mwange (2009) argues that the incorporation of such provision in the constitution was to prevent the military from exercising undue power and influence. However, this set up has been abused by many African Presidents who unjustifiably use the military to promote personnel interests. The multi-party democracy era in Africa has witnessed the emergency of military coups or refusal by the incumbent president to leave office after the term of office expires. Rupiya (2015) describes this new trend of coups as “stable coup systems” when the military and politicians form an alliance to support a regime, changing constitution to seek Presidential third terms and beyond and this has resulted in long reigning regimes.

Sadly, for Africa such a system is gradually becoming acceptable nationally, regionally and at the continental level. National constitutions are changed overnight to just suit the aspirations of power hungry politicians and partisan generals. For example, in Togo, Faure Gnassingbe changed the Constitution to run for a third term. He was supported by the Togolese military which shot and killed over 1 000 people while 40 000 fled for their lives into neighboring Benin and Ghana (Rupiya, 2015). This new trend adversely affects development and democracy and has to be checked and stopped if Africa is to achieve development and peace in line with the Africa Union`s (AU) Agenda 2063.

There is an urgent need to promote civil-military relations through parliamentary oversight of the military and to enact laws that prohibit the use of quasi-military bodies, gangs, militias and youth employed by parties to advance the interests of greedy politicians. African politicians should learn to seek power through democratic elections and now depart from the colonial political legacies of African Nationalists who came into power through the barrel of the gun. The new era now demands free, fair and nationally accepted election processes with no international influences to avoid the imperialist tendencies of former colonisers.

4. *Why should Africa`s military build-up continue to benefit other continents?*

The tragedy of the current African civil-military relations is that it is politicians based; it is a politicians-military relation that focuses only on the subjective or objective control of the military by politicians. In the civil–military relations literature, Sarigil

(2015) observes that there is dominance of dichotomous approaches, where studies on civil–military relations focus only on political and military elites and their interactions, disregarding the fact that civil-military relations refer broadly to interactions between armed forces as institutions and the sectors of society in which they are embedded. African civil-military relations therefore should be broad: industrialists, economists, development practitioners, parliamentarians and civic organisations among other groups should all be free to work with the military for political, social and economic development.

The dominance of the dichotomous approaches to civil-military relations is likely to influence the continuous importation of military hardware and logistical supplies. Why should Africa`s military buildup continues to benefit other continents especially the former colonisers? A call for Africa to revisit its civil-military relations is the only logical answer to this question.

In contrast to the dichotomous approach, Schiff (1995) proposes the Concordance Theory, which treats the citizenry as a third and important partner in civil–military relations. Concordance Theory simply expects concordance or harmony among the military, the political elite, and the citizenry.

However, there is always stiff resistance from the beneficiaries of the dichotomous exploitative relationship. This remark tallies with Rupiya`s (2015) assertion that civil-military relations is a subject deliberately placed in the ghetto, denied resources and due academic attention by occupying powers.

To this end, the African civil-military relations should go beyond politico-military relations; it is only socio-economic goals that can promote development in Africa through the intra-trade in military hardware business. Poor civil-military relations have continued to contribute to the development crisis in Africa in the post-Cold War era. African politicians have been using the military which thrives on importing all its equipment to prolong their corrupt and often poor leadership styles. The African military budgets are ever ballooning because they rely on quick importation of hardware and all logistical support. The introduction of MOOTW will widen the

military interaction with the wider society. In China, Pakistan and other countries, the military participation in socio-economic activities promotes national development.

African politicians and militaries go for quick importations of military hardware simply because, in most cases, their legitimacy as leaders is always under attack from opposition parties. There is no time to strategically plan and invest to build manufacturing industries for military hardware. MOOTW planning in military hardware manufacturing can save Africa by reducing imports of military hardware. In South Africa Denel is a good example, where the military and its civilian companies work together in military hardware provision. Such links cut on imports. Truly, this is a less expensive way to sustain African militaries and promote industrial development. African leaders need to develop and promote win-win strategies in the African civil-military relations and weaponry trade with socio-economic goals that will not only favour the developed nations.

5. *Lack of a foundation in the fundamentals of African political system and norms of civil-military relations for development and democracy*

In many post-colonial states, civil supremacy is often threatened by the military's colonially-inherited legacies. In Southern Africa, the activities of former liberation movements are gradually becoming dominant as they share a common history. The nationalist militaries acquired a unifying role and have given themselves self-images as leading nationalists and vanguards of the ruling political parties. Such militaries are identified with liberation-inherited legacy which they quickly take advantage of to claim that their personnel or partisan interests are good for the country. Such behaviour by military personnel is often viewed by many opposition party leaders as being partisan. The source of conflict is lack of common national interest between those who fought the liberation war and those who believe in modern trends of development that are being driven by western countries through models like democracy. Criticisms of the nationalist military thinking are often based on western principles and professional ethics such as Huntington's principle that "the military commander must never allow his military judgment to be warped by political expediency" (Huntington 1957:71). However, the emphasis on some western

principles without due attention to national history has brought development challenges to Africa particularly to Zimbabwe.

In many African countries including Zimbabwe, civil-military relations have roots in revolutionary armies that waged the liberation war with the Soviet Union and Chinese influences and support. The revolutionary armies, both ZANLA and ZIPRA, had their Commissariat Departments charged with the socio-political training of the revolutionary cadres and the mobilisation of the masses. As for the masses, the relationship was shaped by the Maoist doctrine of the fish and water concept, where the masses were the water and the guerrillas were the fish. The commissars, the likes of now Vice President General (retired) Chiwenga former and post-2000 ZDF Commander, would mobilise the masses at the popular *pungwes* (mass gathering that were done at night to enlighten the masses on the reasons for the war). It is also pertinent to highlight that during the liberation war such training and mobilisation took the form of national history, the cause or reasons behind the prosecution of the war. This was the kind of training which was given to the freedom fighters during the liberation struggle and in post-2000 multiparty Zimbabwe; the ZDF is still being commanded by the same politically conscious officers. How applicable is the concept of having an apolitical military when the ZDF commanders are guided by revolutionary foundations and norms? Truly, this should not be a problem for Africa or Zimbabwe alone.

Bland (1999) observes that many North American scholars have taken a legalistic approach to civil-military relations, whilst in the UK the tendency is to think in terms of governance practices. As a result of the 1997 Strategic Defence Review, the UK government developed the Defence Diplomacy (DD) Mission aiming to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratic civilian controlled armed forces of many developing countries.

The Swiss Government established the Geneva based Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces and this is another example of the importance attached to the transfer of models of civil-military relations by developed nations. Similarly, African governments and scholars for civil-military relations need different theoretical grounds and focus of interest. Africa need peace, democracy and development yet the

political military system is divisive. The current legalistic approach to civil-military relations in Zimbabwe has proved problematic. Therefore, the political military system in Africa, particularly in Zimbabwe needs to be realigned to the national history and culture that unites the Zimbabweans.

3.3.2 CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IN ZIMBABWE

Civil-military relations is viewed as a fundamental component in Zimbabwe's stabilisation and reconstruction strategies. Raftopoulos (2009) observes that from the late 1990s Zimbabwe entered a period that has come to be known generally as the "Crisis in Zimbabwe". After 2000, the Zimbabwean economy spiralled rapidly into a world decline, by 2006 GDP per capita was 47 percent lower than it was in 1980 and 53 percent below its 1991 peak (Robinson, 2007). Chitiyo & Rupiya, (2005) argue the post-2000 national crisis has given rise to the interpretation of national defence policy as the preservation of the ZANU PF party and government. Raftopoulos (2009: 215) also reveals that "The violence and irregularities from the elections in 2000, 2002 and 2005 were implemented by a state whose key positions Mugabe had filled with military personnel". However, some argue that the illegal sanctions on Zimbabwe by the US and EU in post-2000 have paralysed the national economy and significantly contributed to the development challenges.

Against this background, this section examines the nature of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe in two broad categories namely: 1) the colonial and liberation war period and 2) the post-independence era. A third category, the multi-party system, exists within the post-independence era. An examination of civil-military relations in these categories helps in the understanding of the current and future civil-military relations in the country. The nature of civil-military relations has strong linkages on the transitions that took place in Zimbabwe. First, it was the transition from colonial government to democratic government, which marked the end of colonial rule in Zimbabwe. Second, was the transition of the partisan military forces to national defence force?

There are several significant issues to be interrogated; 1) were there real change in terms of

civil-military relations during these transitions? 2) Was the democratic government able to introduce new civil-military relations or it simply used the colonial template? 3) Were the partisan military forces able to change their allegiance to partisan politics and politicians? Real and proper transitions were necessary for the shaping of civil-military relations in the new environment as Feaver (1999) argues that the nature of transitions to democracy may also contribute to the nature of civil-military relations.

3.3.2.1 *Colonial Period*

This section examines the colonial period to help understand how colonial government established and maintained civil-military relations in colonial Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) paying attention to Berchir (1997) who observes that scholars have tended to ignore the effect of the colonial legacy as a possible cause for African patterns of military interventions and political instability.

Governments in colonial Africa were strongly supported by the military establishment. However, many African post-independence states are modelled on the colonial structures that existed before independence. In many cases structures remained the same only office bearers changed. In colonial Africa, the military was regarded as an instrument of oppression serving the interests of the white minority. Colonial government denied Africans several rights such as the right to own land, vote and strike. All these oppressive policies and laws by the government were heavily supported by the military and this did not encourage harmonious civil-military relations between the oppressed Africans and the colonial military.

Similarly, in Zimbabwe, during the colonial period civil-military relations were introduced to ensure political control over the military and at the same time educating military personnel as to why they should fight. ZANLA and ZIPRA were politicised to become military-cum political cadres who apart from waging the war, they recruited and mobilised the masses to wage guerrilla warfare (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003a). On the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) side, he observes that, the military was given a lot of power through the Commander of the Combined Operations, General Peter Walls. The guerrillas' relations with the civilians were largely positive as given by Ranger (1985) in his book *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe*. On the other hand, Kriger (1995) emphasises that force, intimidation and violence characterises the relationship between the guerrillas and the civilians. Generally, the

attainment of independence brought a wave of jubilation that made guerrillas heroes of the masses. They became the liberators and champions of peace and pioneers of the socio-economic developments of the black indigenous Zimbabweans. Manungo (1991) observes that guerrillas were seen by peasants as their children who had a role to assist them in removing the burden of colonialism. This role gave the guerrillas the privileges similar to those of Kings in the pre-colonial era and that of white colonialists in colonial era, to the extent that they were not accountable to anyone except to their commanders and politicians. They were very powerful people in the family, community, society and in government departments. In the military they were given equal status with the members of the Rhodesian Forces. Such privileges gave the military in post-independence state the powers to intervene in development and political activities. Berchir (1997) argues the liberation wars privileges encouraged military coups in post-colonial Africa which were often supported by the poor masses, those with less opportunities in a stratified society.

The military always has some influence on political structures. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003a) observes that, the ZANLA forces were actively involved in the construction of ZANU political structures. The nationalists' forces had commissars, who would go at length to explain the nationalist party ideology. Measures were always in place to ensure that the gun always remained under control; a relationship was forged between the party and the revolutionary armies which endured till independence. He further highlights that the ZIPRA forces, being highly trained remained under civilian control and were not doubling as party political commissars.

It is important to note that, the Rhodesian forces often used dirty tactics to win the hearts and minds of rural people from the nationalists' forces. The Rhodesian Forces would tarnish the image of the freedom fighters through the use of Selous Scouts who were deployed as pseudo groups posing as freedom fighters. Moorcraft & McLaughlin (2008) argue that these groups committed acts of banditry, rape, reckless murders of civilians, closure of schools, clinics and shops just to tarnish the image of nationalists' forces.

3.3.2.2 Post-Independence Period

After attaining independence in 1980 the Zimbabwe government made efforts to reshape the

nature of civil-military relations. The composition and structure of new military force was changed through the integration process that was covered in Chapter 2. The formation of the new military forces that incorporated the former guerrillas gave a positive impression especially to the Africans who came to believe in the liberation work of the nationalists' forces. The period 1980 to late 1990s was a jubilation phase in terms of civil-military relations less the Matabeleland and Midlands disturbances which was later described by President Mugabe as "a moment of madness". This incident dented the civil-military relations of the new military in post-independence Zimbabwe. However, some note that "the North Korean trained Firth Brigade is argued to have been largely comprised of Shona speaking soldiers that operated outside of the army chain of command and was answerable only to Mugabe" (Munemo 2016:171).

The *de facto* one party state that came after the Unity Accord of 1987 that ended the Matabeleland disturbances created a situation in which military forces were no longer divided on partisan lines. However, the *de facto* one party system did not last. The creation of the opposition party Zimbabwe Unity Movement challenged the one party state system. The opposition party that significantly challenged the ZANU PF hegemony and also publicly changed the nature of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe was the formation of MDC in 1999.

Generally, the post-independence Zimbabwe civil-military relations are characterised by controversies as both politicians and academics have raised their concern. Opposition politicians believe the military has become an instrument to protect ZANU PF regime as opposed to its national role to safe guard, promote and protect human security allegations being denied by both the military and the ruling party, ZANU PF politicians. Academics and researchers such as Doro (2011), Cawthra (1997), Moyo (2015), Ndlovu- Gatsheni (2003b), Kriger (2003), Williamson (2010) and Rupiya (2003, 2013 and 2015) always come to mind.

For instance, the Commander ZDF General Chiwenga in 2017 pointed out that, their role as the veterans of the liberation struggle was to continue it and being the custodians of the revolution that was undertaken by ZANU PF. The People`s Democratic Party spokesperson, Jacob Mafume points out that, "Chiwenga is a partisan general and wants to turn the Zimbabwe Defence Forces into a ZANU PF youth wing."(Newsday, 13 April 2017). For the

same case, the newspaper also quotes MDC-T spokesperson, Obert Gutu who comments that, “securocrats were hugely compromised” (Newsday, 13 April 2017).

An interesting observation is the shift in approaches to civil-military relations in post-independence period. At the integration of the two liberation armies and the Rhodesian Security Forces, the civic education programme was discontinued for various reasons. One of the reasons was to give a chance to the smooth process of integrating the three armies of diverse backgrounds. Furthermore, the responsibility of integration was given to the BMATT who emphasised the idea of a professional and apolitical army. The idea is likely to have been influenced by Huntington (1957) who argues that professionalising the military make it “politically sterile and neutral”.

Whether the BMATT idea of producing a professional and apolitical army was genuine or not, the motive cannot be adequately supported. However, what clearly came out of the ZDF towards the end of the 1990s was a high rate of military involvement in developmental issues through MOOTW. The Director General Civil-Military Relations at the ZDF Headquarters also points out that towards the end of 1990s there was resurfacing of the socio-political training programme in the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. However, officially the Department of CMR was established at Zimbabwe Defence Forces in 2003 and in 2006, it was decentralised down to the Zimbabwe National Army and Air Force of Zimbabwe (Interview with the Director General CMR, ZDF Headquarters, 12 July 2017).

A study was conducted by the late and former Director of Civil-Military Relations in the ZDF Colonel Cain Matema who observes that;

The CMR in Zimbabwe between 1980 up to around 2000 appeared to be stable. However as from 2000, calls for security sector reform (SSR) and accusations of military intervention in the politics of the country started to gain prominence in national debates (Matema 2015:2).

The resurfacing of socio-political training programmes in the post 2000 period coincided with the calls for security sector reforms. It seems the training in civil-military relations helped the ZDF to handle the pressure for security sector reform.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003a) examines civil-military relations in Matabeleland in the period 1980-2002 from a historical perspective. The study is largely based on oral testimonies collected from the Ndebele themselves and it is a fertile ground for all those who are interested in understanding the nature of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe from the 1980s to the post-2000 political-military issues. He concluded that the military intervention in police and civilian operations in Matabeleland in the early 1980s had devastating implications for the country's civil-military relations. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003a:28) observes that "This move not only alienated the Matabeleland constituency, it also ushered in a wave of militarisation of politics that continues to negatively affect democratic governance in Zimbabwe today". In his study Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003a:28-30) made the following key observations:

1. It was via the use of the military by the ruling elite in a political power game that the army lost much of its credibility among the Ndebele. In Matabeleland the existing perception of the army is that it is a coercive arm not only of the state, but specifically of the ruling ZANU-PF party.
2. The other dominant perception is that the army is above the law and stands as an institution of violence and death. Many people interviewed emphasised that *amasotsha ngiyawesaba ngoba ayabulala* (I fear the soldiers because they kill).
3. Matabeleland regional perception of the military is dominated by fear, mistrust, suspicion, alienation, exclusion and long-lasting bitterness. Of all the people who were interviewed none saw the military in positive terms as necessary protectors of life and people's general security.
4. Negative civil-military relations have generated two contradictory political behaviours among civilians in general. On the one hand, there is the fatalistic and helpless compliance with the government and the ruling party, derived from excessive fear of the repetition of the terror of the 1980s. On the other hand there are urbanised and educated youths who are willing to risk everything to join hands with other democratic national forces such as the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the opposition Movement for Democratic

Change (MDC), to work to change the status quo dominated by fear of ZANUPF and the threat of a repetition of the tragedies of the 1980s.

5. In Zimbabwe, the military itself has developed a subculture of relating to the civilians in an intimidating manner. They know that the civilians fear them and they enjoy that relationship.

6. Very little effort has been made by the military to cultivate cordial relations with civil society. It seems they see themselves as hired to protect the regime in power rather than the population of Zimbabwe. One young man said 'soldiers are simply not with the people, they are with the ruling party'.

7. Thus the legacy of the violence of the 1980s continues to shape politics in Zimbabwe today.

The observations, although being regional, form a strong basis of any analysis on people's perceptions of the ZDF, the role of the ZDF in peace, democracy and development and finally the nature of the ZDF's MOOTW in post-2000. The ZDF has a duty to change the perceptions of the people of the Matabeleland region and the entire country in order for its contributions to national development through MOOTW to be widely appreciated.

The argument stresses that poor civil-military relations gave rise to the post-2000 Zimbabwean crisis and hence the need to critically examine MOOTW in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has experienced the devastating effects of the politicisation of the military in the form of the highly political stance taken by the armed forces prior to the March 2002 Presidential elections when the then Commander Defence Forces, General Zvinvashe flanked by Service Chiefs declared in a public televised speech that they would never salute anyone as President of Zimbabwe if they had no liberation war credentials.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003b) observes that the public declaration by the military on political issues elicited profound indignation throughout Zimbabwe and even outside the borders of the country as many people concluded that the army was trying to determine the political pace of change in the country. He regards this as the highest level of involvement of the military in

the democratic process. This was regarded as an attempt by the military to choose for the people the person to rule Zimbabwe. An insider perspective from Colonel Cain Matema pointed out that accusations of political interference by the military and calls for security sector reform in Zimbabwe suggest the existence of challenges in civil-military relations in Zimbabwe (Matema , 2015).

The Matabeleland disturbances resulted in changes in civil-military relations in the country. The emergence of dissidents and subsequent arrest of senior army officers who were former ZIPRA members gave rise to some restructuring of the military force. The formation or the establishment of the Korean trained Fifth- Brigade gave birth to a new military force that was truly subordinate and loyal to the party, ZANU PF. Former ZAPU leader and Vice President of Zimbabwe, Father Zimbabwe Nkomo lamented the formation of Fifth -Brigade. In fact he accused President Mugabe of forming a partisan army as opposed to a national army .The military structure changed, many senior officers ex-ZIPRA left the military. The situation only changed when ZANU and ZAPU signed the Unity Accord in 1987. However, the damage was already done ex-ZIPRA members were significantly reduced.

More than two decades later, the ZDF still have challenges in recruiting members from the Matabeleland Provinces. Again post-2000 elections indicate that opposition parties command a greater following in Matabeleland Provinces. In the 2000 parliamentary elections the opposition party, MDC won all the seats. All council elections were won by opposition and socio- economic development policies were opposition driven. The people in the Matabeleland regions became the hardest hit by the post-2000 Zimbabwe economic challenges. Service delivery in cities and towns deteriorated. Many companies in Bulawayo, the national industrial hub, closed and forced thousands to migrate to neighbouring Botswana and South Africa to seek employment. Only properly designed military interventions through MOOTW can change the development challenges that affect the region.

It is important to point out that the employment of many Zimbabweans in Botswana, South Africa and other Southern African countries had great social development impact in Zimbabwe and the region. Health and educational services greatly deteriorated exposing local people to many hazards. Child mortality and school dropout rates increased. Families broke down as those went outside to seek employed find it difficult to return home and even

to some money back home. As a result, the number of child-headed families and child marriages increased dramatically. In 2015, government passed laws to stop child marriages. Regionally, Molomo (2001) points out that during the late 1980s and 1990s Botswana experienced a dramatic increase in criminal activities that involved carjacking, armed bank robberies cattle rustling and illegal immigrants. The military had to assist the police by setting up roadblocks and patrols to maintain law and order. In South Africa, the post-2000 period is characterised by strikes, demonstrations, xenophobia attacks among other social ills. No doubt civil-military relations affected political stability and socio-economic development in the whole region.

3.3.2.3 Multi-party Political System with Opposition Parties

A multi-party political system in which there are opposition parties is a great challenge not only to civil-military relations but also to national development. Post-2000 Zimbabwe is characterised by such a political system. Why should a nation have fellow citizens that oppose an elected governance system? Such organisations should exist as political parties that exist to strengthen, support, critique and enhance efficiency of the ruling party. The term opposition creates antagonism and polarisation among citizens. Under such a polarised political system how can the military remain apolitical? All government employees will be default enemies to the opposition parties. The use of terms such as minority parties and other parties by independent newspapers/parties tend to promote national unity. The use of such terms and change of behaviour by such organisations can help to ease tension between military and other political parties. Political parties in a multi-party political system should not exist to counter national development strategies of the ruling party; they should enhance efficiency on national policies.

3.4 CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND COLONIAL LEGACY

The colonial legacy is one factor that played a major role in shaping civil-military relations in post-colonial Africa. Bechir (1997) observes that colonial rule played a significant role in shaping civil-military relations in Africa into complex and chronic problems. Munemo (2016) also noted that Zimbabwe experienced political conflicts because of the colonial past, the continuation of colonial situations and their reincarnation under a different political

dispensation. To support the argument, Rupiya (2006) highlights that after the year 2000 conflicts and cases of state or political party sponsored violence increased just like in the colonial period. Bechir (1997) further argues that the first generation of African leaders were taught the methods of military and personal rule during the colonial period, while at the same time, African people became accustomed to military regimes. The post-2000 civil-military relations in Zimbabwe strongly suffer from such colonial practices.

Bechir (ibid) identified four major colonial legacies that still affect Africa: 1) a political culture of authoritarian rule, 2) a new shape of class structure, 3) deepened ethnic tensions, and 4) artificial nation-states. This thesis focused on the first two because of their applicability to the issues under discussion.

3. 4.1 POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AUTHORITARIAN COLONIAL RULE

A significant number of African countries were conquered militarily and were ruled for several decades under colonial military rule. The political culture that emerged in the post-independence has its roots in the colonial settings. For instance, in the British colonies, the colonial military was the command of the Governor General who had the total power to run the affairs of the colony. The Governor General was mainly assisted by military officers. This was the case in Rhodesia, colonial Zimbabwe. Therefore, the colonial administration system which was set by the colonisers is still being practiced in many countries in Africa. The Governor General was just replaced by the President, who in most cases represents the interests of the super powers or the former colonisers. Through a competitive multiparty system the former colonizers sponsor and support candidates for presidential post. Then, is it possible to expect Africa, particularly Zimbabwe, to change military participation or dominance in national development matrix when the colonial socio-economic systems and structures are not changed?

In fact, the colonial officials misused the power they had and treated the natives as animals, not as equal human beings. It can thus be argued that the human rights abuses in post-independence Africa are a continuation of the same political culture that existed in the colonial period. It is a pity that the African administrators, politicians and military elites were trained and commissioned according to the colonial standards. The same people who would

always want to preach the gospel of maintaining “standards” and very eager to practice what they saw the colonialists doing to fellow Africans. Surprisingly, the politicians and the military commanders who ill-treat fellow Africans face no resistance because they have become accustomed to generational inhumane treatment. To achieve development for Africans and never to be manipulated by the powerful nations African political-military systems need a review. The politicians and the military must save their people not to advance the interests of the powerful nations. A review of civil-military relations and the introduction or improvement of MOOTW can be a good starting point.

3.4.2 COLONIAL CLASS STRUCTURE

Colonial rule depended upon the military personnel to oppress the poor and the lower class. At independence, African political leaders got the opportunities to occupy administrative posts, and better economic statuses. They formed the upper class of society, having the monopoly on political power, financial means and higher social positions. Military commanders also formed part of the upper class whilst the majority of military personnel joined the lower class who continued to suffer in post-independence era.

Unfortunately, the post-colonial state systems of Africa have failed to provide an equal distribution of political power and economic resources, so military actions have become the only way of obtaining political power and economic resources. In the post-colonial period, whenever there were political crises, security problems or economic decline in the country, Bechir (1997) observes that the ordinary people supported military interventions to free them from the poor, oppressive and corrupt civilian regimes. This is a plausible explanation to understand why most military coups have been embraced by the poor people who believe that the military are the saviours. For instance, the November 2017 operation by the ZDF, Operation Restore Legacy, in Zimbabwe to support ZANU PF to end the 37-year rule of President Mugabe was supported by all political parties, civic organisations, peasants, workers and all common people. Other political parties only cried foul when they realised it was a ZANU PF affair. The circle of political conflicts that characterises African politics started again.

The two observations (political culture and class structure) provided a basis to explain the perceptions of the Zimbabweans on their military's involvement in social, economic and political activities in post-2000, decades after independence. An analysis of such activities also provides an opportunity to assess whether the British effort to restore military professionalism through the secondment of the BMATT to Zimbabwe in the early 1980s yielded the intended results.

From this colonial background, Zimbabwe's civil-military relations became a hybrid between the nationalist forces and colonialist forces. Initially, this hybrid pattern presented no major challenges except the Matabeleland and Midlands disturbances (Gukurahundi) issue which was resolved in the formation of ZANU PF and the creation of a state with one dominant political party. In terms of civil-military relations, the system worked well up until the formation of the MDC in 1999 and the subsequent splinter opposition parties. Zimbabwe entered a multi-party phase that gave a litmus test to the nature of the country's hybrid civil-military relations.

In this post-independence and polarised era, the ZDF conducted several nonmilitary operations and activities that had implications on political, social and economic trajectories of the country. For instance, the declaration prior to the presidential elections in March 2002 by the army chiefs in a public televised speech that they would never salute anyone as president of Zimbabwe who had no liberation war credentials marked a turning point in the perceptions of the people on nature of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe as well as the professionalism of the ZDF. Opposition parties, civic organisations that supported opposition parties and some international organisations viewed the ZDF as being partisan, and the calls for security sector reforms became louder. Zimbabwe has been in a crisis for two decades now; is there now a common vision for development between the military and the politicians in Zimbabwe?

3.5 SUMMARY

Effort was made to compile literature on one of the most difficult and contentious issues in military studies, that is; civil-military relations in a multiparty system. Several challenges that include historical, cultural, political, social and economic factors make it difficult for

both practitioners and academics to arrive at a consensual definition or view point on civil-military relations suitable theories, models and practices. The chapter intends to expose the complex nature of the issues around civil-military relations in developing countries with liberation war history by citing concepts, theories, models and viewpoints and assess their applicability using practical cases from Zimbabwe.

The political-military system in Zimbabwe is affected by both colonial settings and contemporary imperatives. ZANU PF as the liberation movement party and the ruling party since independence tends to enjoy its control over the ZDF and the professionalism of the force; prompting the opposition parties to accuse the ZDF of being partisan in its operations. The ZDF having roots in the war of liberation feels it has the duty to continue the struggle for the socio-economic development of the Zimbabwean masses. The war of liberation was supported by many African countries including some countries beyond Africa; they all wished to advance African human security.

After political independence, the ZDF, through MOOTW, aims to participate in the national socio-economic development issues. The move is viewed by some scholars and politicians as being partisan and regime protection. They believe the military should remain in the barracks loyal to serve the government of the day, which argument is supported by some scholars and western governments in particular. However, in China and other Communist countries, the military can freely participate in national development issues. Therefore, the nature of civil-military relations in the western and the eastern/communist perspectives are completely different. The thesis established that in many African countries, particularly in Zimbabwe, the nature of civil-military relations is ever contested depending on one`s worldview. The thesis concludes that, so far in Zimbabwe, the legal approach to civil-military relations has been overpowered by political-military systems that have roots in African nationalism.

The review forms the basis of the analysis of the ZDF`s military operations other than war. If the masses are divided on the nature of civil-military relations, how then will they perceive the role of the military on developmental non-combat roles? The next chapter examines the contact of MOOTW in other countries, mainly the United States of America and the People`s Republic of China.

CHAPTER 4

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is set to review and analyse MOOTW in other countries, namely; the Peoples` Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (US). These countries were selected because they are the largest economies and happen to have different political systems. The nature of civil-military relations and the conduct of MOOTW in these countries are also different. Consequently, the review makes it possible to situate ZDF MOOTW in that continuum. The rest of the discussion shows that MOOTW encompasses a broad range of military activities supporting a variety of purposes. The chapter addressed many aspects of MOOTW including the definitions, principles, the development of MOOTW, types and characteristics of MOOTW and finally assessed MOOTW contributions to national security and development.

The changes on the international scale of the nature of threats to national peace and development have transformed the operations of military forces to focus beyond war. This necessitated the introduction of MOOTW which encompasses the use of a wide range of military capabilities. MOOTW centre on deterring war, promoting peace, resolving conflict, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. For most types of MOOTW, military personnel simply adapt their war fighting to the situation. However, for some MOOTW, like humanitarian assistance, war fighting skills are not always appropriate then the focus of MOOTW education would be to ensure that leaders at all levels understand the objectives, principles, and characteristics of MOOTW and can plan and conduct these operations (JP 3-07, Chapter 3).

Some believe the rising tide of MOOTW marks a change in military focus, away from war fighting skills towards more non-combat skills. Foster (1993) cited by Ayers (1996) observes that the primary purpose of the military must change demonstrably and fundamentally from war fighting to nation-building, peacekeeping and human assistance. Therefore, the purposes for conducting MOOTW may be multiple, with the importance of such purposes changing according to prevailing conditions. These include; 1) to protect national interests, 2) to deter

potential aggressors, 3) to provide humanitarian assistance or 4) to support the United Nations missions.

4.2 MOOTW AND RELATED CONCEPTS

4.2.1 DEFINITIONS

One major challenge in studying MOOTW is defining the term itself as there are as many definitions as there are authors. The acronym MOOTW was introduced in the United States military during the 1990s. Lieutenant Colonel John R. Hunt USAF, in *Emerging Doctrine for Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)*, states that LIC was the term first coined by the Reagan Administration to describe operations other than war (Hunt, (1991) cited by Ayers (1996:10)). He argues the term LIC was cast aside for a more neutral nomenclature; *Military Operations Other Than War*. The Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* of the US states that, MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crisis.

The Chinese People`s Liberation Army (PLA) published that MOOTW indicates the military operations to realise certain political, economic, social or military purposes with armed forces that do not have the nature of war (Zhang, 2014). The PLA describes MOOTW as consisting of non-war activities, and defines it by the military activities it conducts, such as peacekeeping, domestic disaster relief, regional medical support, counter-terrorism and domestic security for big events such as the 2008 Olympics and 2010 Shanghai World Expo (<http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/MOOTW/index.htm>).

The above definitions all agree that MOOTW are different from war. The initial American definition of such operations is based on the intensity of confrontation whilst the UK definition is a peace derivative, an operation to support peace. The Chinese perspective has broader scope, where the military can openly be engaged to achieve a wide range of developmental goals.


The most recent definition from Gaoyue and James was considered more appropriate for this study. MOOTW are those operations undertaken by military forces to safeguard their country`s national security and developmental interests, that do not constitute a war (Gaoyue and James, 2019:3). The ZDF MOOTW must focus on safeguarding national security and promoting national development.

4.2.2 PRINCIPLES OF MOOTW

The Joint Publication 3-07, US Joint Doctrine for MOOTW , identifies six (6) fundamental principles believed to apply in all MOOTW tasks; objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. The first three (3) were derived from the principles of war. The big question is the applicability of these principles in different nations other than the US. See figure below, **Fig 4.1 The Common Six Principles of MOOTW.**

In China, Gaoyue and James (2019) reports six MOOTW Principles are as follows: acting according to laws and regulations, rapid response and deployment, joint command to unify efforts, effective organisation and civil-military coordination, managing publicity and boosting morale and adhering to United Nations principles.

Figure 4.1 The Six Common Principles of MOOTW



Source: Adapted from JP 3-07. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.

War Principles that apply to MOOTW

The following war principles apply to MOOTW:

1. *Objective.* The principle directs all military operations towards the achievement of a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective. The exact end state can be difficult to define in MOOTW missions and this can compromise legitimacy.
2. *Unity of effort.* Seek unity of effort in every operation. Commanders are expected to ensure that all means are directed toward a common objective. This is difficult to achieve in MOOTW due to a high number of stakeholders involved. To achieve unity of effort in MOOTW continuous liaison and coordination among stakeholders must be maintained.
3. *Security.* Never permit hostile factions to acquire military, political or information advantage. However, during MOOTW the environment often makes forces to be complacent especially in situations where the threat is not clearly defined.

MOOTW Specific Principles

The following principles are specific to MOOTW:

4. *Restraint.* Apply appropriate military capability prudently. MOOTW commanders must ensure their personnel fully understands and apply the established rules of engagement.
5. *Perseverance.* Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. MOOTW missions may take years to achieve the desired results because causes of the crises maybe difficult to detect.
6. *Legitimacy.* The deployed forces must endure the legitimacy of the operation and of the host country. Legitimacy in MOOTW is the perception that an action is grounded in legal or moral principles. The Joint Pub 3-07 states that legitimacy may

depend on actions sanctioned by the UN, restraint in the force employed, or the disciplined conduct of forces involved.

4.3 TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF MOOTW

There are several types of MOOTW that are appropriate for different countries and different situations. The historical development of MOOTW and country conditions contribute to the types of MOOTW common in a particular country. Against such a background, the study focuses on MOOTW in the US Armed Forces and the Chinese People`s Liberation Army. A historical review and trend analysis of the development of MOOTW in these two countries can help in the understanding of the various aspects of MOOTW.

4.3.1 TYPES OF MOOTW IN USA

In the US military history, the concept “Military Operation Other Than War” was put forward in the Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States in November 1991. In 1993, the US Doctrine for Joint Operations listed war and operations other than war as the two basic military categories for the first time. In the subsequent year, the Joint Staff Course recognised the importance of MOOTW, “while we have historically focused on war fighting, our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations other than war” (Joint Publication 3-07, 1995:1). The Joint Publication further states that; MOOTW contribute to the attainment of national security objectives by supporting deterrence, forward presence and crisis response operations. Brief explanations of what is involved in each of these activities:

Deterrence. This stems from the belief that the potential aggressor will be reluctant to act for fear of failure, cost or consequences. Deterrence operations create belief in the potential enemy`s mind that a credible threat of retaliation exists and that the enemy would suffer as a consequence. Threats directed against United States, allies, or other friendly nations require the maintenance of response capabilities. Therefore, MOOTW types like peace enforcement, peacekeeping and deterrence by demonstrating national determination to use force when required.

Forward Presence. These activities include use of forces stationed overseas, periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, port visits and foreign community support; to mention a few. The activities demonstrate US commitment to enhance regional stability, provide crisis response capability and promote influence and access.

Crisis Response. This involves rapid deployment of US forces either unilaterally or as part of a multinational effort to respond to emergencies. Examples of such MOOTW operations include emergency support to civil authorities.

The above historical development of MOOTW in the US Defence Forces has resulted in 16 types of MOOTW, namely:

- a. Arms control
- b. Combating terrorism
- c. Support to counter drug operations
- d. Enforcement of sanctions and /or maritime intercept operations
- e. Enforcing exclusion zones
- f. Ensuring freedom from navigation and over flight
- g. Humanitarian assistance
- h. Military support of civil authorities
- i. Nation assistance and /or support to counter insurgency
- j. Noncombat evacuation operations
- k. Peace operations
- l. Protection of shipping
- m. Recovery operations
- n. Show of force operations
- o. Strikes and raids
- p. Support to insurgency

However, the MOOTW types can be classified into three (3) categories or ranges of MOOTW as follows:

1). **MOOTW involving the use or threat of force.** The purpose of these operations is to support national/regional objectives, to deter war and return to a sustainable state of peace by involving the use or threat of force. These operations are usually employed when other

instruments of national power are unable to influence and contain a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation. With these operations, the forces have a threshold which is not to be crossed by use or threat of force. This threshold marks the distinction between combat and non-combat operations. These operations include;

Strikes and raids. A strike is an offensive operation conducted to damage, seize, or destroy an objective for political purpose. Strikes may be used to punish offending nations or groups, upholding international law, or preventing those nations or groups from launching their own offensive actions. A raid is swift small scale operation to penetrate hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations.

Protection of shipping. Protection of shipping includes coastal sea control, harbour defence, port security and environmental security.

2). **MOOTW not involving the use or threat of force.** These operations are inherently joint in nature. Such operations include humanitarian assistance, military support to US civil authorities and show of force operations;

Humanitarian assistance (HA). The HA operations relieve, or reduce the effects of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as hunger and diseases. Operations include medical care, construction of infrastructure, search and rescue among others.

Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). These operations provide support to domestic civil authorities when permitted by law. Operations are normally undertaken when an emergency overtakes civil authorities' capabilities. The operations include temporary augmentation of air traffic controllers or other civil departments during strikes, demonstrations and stay-aways, life and property protection as well as relief operations during natural disasters.

Show of Force. Show of force operations are designed to demonstrate US resolve to use military force if necessary, and to show increased visibility in an attempt to defuse a threatening situation to national interests and objectives.

3). **Overlapping Operations.** MOOTW often involve simultaneous operations.

MOOTW in the two (2) categories already stated can be conducted simultaneously. For example, the HA operations can be conducted in conjunction with peace enforcement or strikes and raids operations. Overlapping operations include recovery operations, peace operations, combating terrorism and non-combat evacuation operations;

Recovery Operations. These operations are conducted to search, locate, identify, rescue and return personnel or human remains and equipment. These operations require detailed planning; they may be clandestine, covert or overt.

Peace Operations. Military Peace Operations are divided into peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO). PKO are undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, with a view to reaching a long-term political settlement. PEO are the application of military force, usually with international authority, to force compliance with resolutions to maintain or restore peace and order. Unlike PKO, PEO does not require the consent of the states or groups involved in the conflict. The US military peace operations support both political and diplomatic objectives.

Combating Terrorism. These are operations to oppose terrorism and they include antiterrorism and counter terrorism. Antiterrorism programmes are defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorists' attacks. Counterterrorism is an offensive measure to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism and response measures include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations.

Noncombat Evacuation Operations. These *Noncombat Evacuation Operations* (NEO) usually relocate threatened noncombatants from a foreign country to their country of origin. A good example of NEO is Operation EASTERN EXIT conducted in Somalia in 1991 by the US military force.

4.3.2 MOOTW DEVELOPMENT AND MOOTW TYPES IN CHINA

According to Bifeng (2013) the concept of “military operations other than war” was first introduced in the PLA Training Doctrine version of 2001. Gaoyue and James (2019) posit that the PLA has conducted MOOTW since its inception. However, it was in 2006 that it

adopted the term MOOTW. Since the introduction of MOOTW, PLA academic institutions such as Academy of Military Science (AMS) National Defence University (NDU), Army Command College (ACC) and Air Force Command College (AFCC) among others introduced the concept in their study packages. To date the PLA has produced its own MOOTW reading material. This researcher studied for a master degree at AFCC in 2013/4 and went through the MOOTW module. The PLA produced legal documents, manuals, textbooks and researchers contributed large volumes of literature on MOOTW. Several books and articles were produced by researchers at NDU, ACC and AFCC, but the greater part was in Chinese. The PLA produced legal documents and manuals to guide the conduct of MOOTW and these include *Doctrine for Preventing Riots, Regulations for Joint Peacekeeping Operations, Regulations for Participations in Disaster Rescue and Relief and Financial Support for MOOTW* among others. Gaoyue and James (2019) report that teaching and research offices were established in the PLA academic institutions to conduct research and education on non-traditional security (NTS) threats, develop MOOTW theories and to provide consultation for China's key civil and military decision making.

China is a country with frequent natural disasters. It is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. There are various types of disasters in different regions of China with high frequency. Bifeng (2013) describes the 1987 forest fires, the 1998 floods and the 2008 Wen Chuan earthquake to illustrate the extent of natural disasters in China. In May 1987, a catastrophic forest fire in the Greater Khingan Mountains, destroyed 700,000 hectares of forests, 56,092 people were left homeless, 211 people lost their lives, and the direct economic loss was 500 million RMB. The 1998 heavy floods affected 223 million people and 3004 were recorded dead and the direct economic loss was 166.6 billion RMB.

When an earthquake hit Wen Chuan in 2008, the Chinese military was quickly deployed and rescued over 1.4 million people. In this operation, the Air Force employed more than 100 aircraft and helicopters; they flew totally 850 sorties, 14,700 people and over 3,020 tons of supplies were delivered. It is the largest scale air lift operation in PLA's history of disaster relief (Bifeng 2013). Wei (2012) observed that the army and civilians in China breathe the same air, share their common fate and join their hearts as one as they respond to natural disasters.

The Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC) states that, "The armed forces of the PRC belong to the people. Its missions are: consolidating national defense, resisting invasion, protecting motherland, defending people's peaceful work, participating in the construction of the country and serving the people with all efforts." In line with this constitutional requirement the concept of MOOTW was then first introduced in the 2001 version of the Training Doctrine of the PLA. The New Ordinance of Military Training published in September 2002 lists the contents of MOOTW as floods fighting, emergency rescue, disaster relief and other emergencies.

The UN Committee of Science and Technology on Disaster Reduction issued a report, in which China was recorded as one of the few countries which suffer from the most severe natural disasters in both mountain areas and coastal regions every year since the time when there is earliest record of human beings. With regards to the 2008 Wen Chuan Earthquake in China, Wei, Dingxin, Zhiyu, Cunhua, Zhenduo, and Chao (2012) conclude that among all observers, Austria's Die Presse newspaper gave the highest marks to the Chinese Army, by commenting that there was no nation in the world that can do so well as China when facing disasters.

Former President Hu Jintao: Military Operations Other Than War is becoming an important employment method of military force, we should therefore put the building of MOOTW capability into the overall situation of military modernization and military preparation, to plan and implement it in the scientific way (Bifeng, 2013)

It is important to note that in China, as the former President Hu Jintao explains, MOOTW are becoming an important method of employing the military. They are striving to make scientific ways to prepare and modernise their military through MOOTW. Why not for the Zimbabwean leadership to adopt similar thinking as they use MOOTW to employ the ZDF in the political, social and economic dimensions of national development?

Supporting Economic Construction

According to Wei *et al* (2012) all things in the Chinese army are based on the principle of "To serve the people". He further argues that since the PLA was nurtured and supported by the people, the soldiers are supposed to make contribution to people's living standards. It is

believed that only with the national economic growth and improvements of people's living standards can China spare more resources on national defence construction. This philosophy guides the PLA to contribute a lot to national economy construction. The PLA has, therefore, a long history of providing human, material, and financial support for transportation and infrastructure construction. Wei *et al* (2012) observed that in China it is conventional for the army to do the most difficult job, such as the Qinghai-Tibet and Sichuan-Tibet Highway Construction to link Tibet and mainland.

The PLA soldiers also take part in many key national construction projects that includes transportation and engineering constructions. In order for the PLA to contribute to needs of China's national development, the PLA has established special arms such infrastructure corps and railway corps. The infrastructure corps has completed thousands of national large and medium-sized construction projects and key projects like highways, factories, mines and reservoirs, set up large quantities of buildings for education, scientific research and accommodation for people in Beijing and other big and medium-sized cities. Besides the special arms, other arms like infantry, artillery, armoured force, communication unit special troops, and reconnaissance troops and so on, all make their contribution to economic development without pay.

The PLA soldiers are always playing an important role in China's social and economic development:

- a. Construction in the field of industry, transportation, hydroelectric and telecommunication
- b. Expansion of railways and highways
- c. Reconstruction of airports, harbours and docks
- d. Supported agriculture constructions and improve production conditions
- e. Assist in poverty relief and developments efforts
- f. Public construction in urban and rural areas.

Bifeng (2013) states that new recruits in the PLA receive teachings that the only principle of PLA is; "To serve people wholeheartedly". The idea and value penetrate into every field of the Chinese Army and guide the behaviour of Chinese military men.

The above historical development of MOOTW in the PLA has resulted in several operations that were classified according to Bifeng (2013) into four (4) types, namely:

1) **Operations for Safeguarding Rights and Interest.** These are protective operations to defend sovereignty. The primary missions are:

- a. To patrol the border, territorial air and territorial sea,
- b. To protect fishery and energy exploration,
- c. To prevent and defend enemy`s infiltration and sabotage activities that harms China`s sovereignty,
- d. To defend the network and electromagnetic space and
- e. To deal with military emergencies in the border region.

2). **Operations for Counter-terrorism and Stability Maintaining.** These are operations to fight against terrorism and to maintain the normal social order. The primary missions are:

- a. To stop terrorists` atrocities, rescue hostage and process the scene of terrorism event;
- b. To annihilate terrorists, destroy their bases;
- c. To secure and guard the vital targets continuously during major occasions;
- d. To deal with group events, put down riots, disturbance and violence and to enforce law and order.

3). **Operations for Emergency Rescue and Disaster Relief**

These are operations to deal with natural disasters, major disasters and serious accidents. The primary missions are:

- a. To deal with flood disaster, wind disaster, snow disaster, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption and aviation disaster;
- b. To prevent infectious diseases from spreading, deal with nuclear, chemical and biological (NCB) accident, maritime distress and aviation disaster and
- c. To rescue and help disaster affected people, transport personnel and materials, repair infrastructure, maintain order in disaster area, eliminate disaster consequences, and assist the post disaster reconstruction.

4). **Operations for Protecting Overseas Interests**

These are operations to support the expansion of national interests, mainly conducted in relevant areas and spaces outside the border. Primary missions are:

- a. To conduct joint training and joint exercise with foreign military;
- b. To employ forces and assets to carry out tasks of rescue, medical treatment and transportation when major crisis occurred;
- c. To escort China`s ocean-going ships, safeguard strategic maritime passages, protect foreign trade and energy import; and
- d. To evacuate the Chinese nationals, overseas residents and materials from disaster areas.

It is important to note that the types of MOOTW vary according to the classification system. Gaoyue and James (2019:4) observe that there are three view points in the classification of MOOTW in the PLA namely:

- a. The 12-type classification system mostly held by professors at NDU which categorises MOOTW into 12 types; deterrence, counter-terrorism , riot suppression, mass event management, border blockage, disaster rescue and relief, nuclear, biological and chemical rescue and relief, air and sea security , air and sea and control, protection of maritime strategic communication lines, international peacekeeping, and overseas rescue and relief.
- b. The 6-type classification system more popular among researchers and active duty personnel at various PLA headquarters which categorises MOOTW into 6 types; counter -terrorism and stability maintenance, operations to safe guard sovereignty and national interests, safety and security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, international peace keeping, and international rescue and relief.
- c. The 7-type classification system more popular in the Academy of Military Sciences categorises MOOTW into 7 types; counter-terrorism, stability maintenance, disaster rescue and relief, operations to safeguard sovereignty and national interests, safety and rescue operations, international peacekeeping, and overseas rescue and relief.

Employment of Air Force in the Operations of Emergency Rescue and Disaster Relief

The Air Force (AF) carries major tasks in the operations of emergency rescue and disaster relief that includes the following:

1. To eliminate, contain or control the sources of disasters

These operations include spraying of fire extinguishing agents, ice breaking in large rivers, and protection of major targets such as large reservoirs, important bridges, lines of communication, large projects and military bases.

2. To rescue, transfer and evacuate trapped persons

These operations include rescuing and evacuating trapped people in disaster-hit area within the shortest possible time; setting up air medical aid station with medical equipment and personnel on board, and transferring the injured and the sick to safe areas for timely treatment and proper settlement.

3. To rescue critical materials, and to deliver the rescue personnel, relief supplies and equipment

The AF uses its transport platforms to deliver rescue personnel, relief supplies and equipment, and to recover and evacuate important materials and equipment through air-landing or parachuting within the shortest possible time.

4. To provide support operations

The AF can conduct several support operations that include; to control and coordinate rescue forces; to conduct reconnaissance, early warning, air command and control, air communication; to guide the ground troops; and to stabilise the area through air radio broadcasting.

5. To participate in recovery and reconstruction of disaster area

If necessary, the Air Force can provide air support to the local government on recovery and reconstruction. For example, it can help to deal with public health incidents by spreading pesticides, assist engineers on air hoisting work, and provide support in disaster control by monitoring flood flow and protection of water environment.

4.3.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF MOOTW

Patterns of MOOTW are dynamic; they change along with the expansion of national interests and requirements of national security. MOOTW have the following basic characteristics:

1. **Prominent Political Nature**

MOOTW are similar to war operations, both are reflections of the strategic interests and political will of the state and both are important means to realise national political objective. But in comparison with war operations, the restriction of politics to the operation process of MOOTW is stricter; the time, method, means, intensity and scale of operations are all strictly restricted under political requirements.

For example, there are strict rules for the scale of armed forces to be used in pacifying riots, the situation under which arms can be used, the degree of use of arms and the levels with authority to approve the use of arms. Upon these issues, incautiousness may lead to disastrous political consequences.

2. **Prominent Emergency Responding Nature**

MOOTW are divided into two kinds of situations: the first is the security threat that has a process of fermentation, outbreak and escalation. For such kind of threats, there are usually counter plans and operations are carried out according to plans. The second is major emergent event that happens abruptly and is hard to anticipate, this kind of threats are difficult to cope with and are the key issues for the military in their preparations for the MOOTW.

Such kind of events usually has the following characteristics:

a. **Abrupt and emergent.** For example, terrorist attack or natural disasters like earthquake, flood, fire and tsunami, they usually appear abruptly with unexpected time, location and degree.

b. **Quick in development, spreading and escalation.** For example, large scale social riots or insurgencies or infectious epidemics.

c. **Limited favourable time for controlling escalation.** Terrorist events, abrupt natural disasters, massive social riots need to be disposed resolutely, otherwise, favourable chances for control of situation will quickly run away, situation will escalate and bring about disastrous consequences for the national security and lives and properties of the people.

3. Increasingly Normalised Operations

In the present era, wars are more and more restricted by various factors, while non-traditional security threats are on the rise, hence, MOOTW are sharply increased and becoming normalised. Situations in which we have to cope with such security threats are on the increase. As the military is a highly organised armed group, it is an important force of the state in safeguarding national security and dealing with various major events in peace time.

4. Flexible Employment of Forces and Means

These characteristics determine that the employment of forces and means of MOOTW is different from that of war, much more flexible than that. For example, emergency rescue and disaster relief and humanitarian aid operations requires no use of violent means. However, MOOTW to counter terrorism and insurgency pacification fairly violent means are needed. The flexibility is reflected in the following aspects:

- a. As MOOTW are carried out in different forms to cope with diversified threats, corresponding forces and means are required to be used flexibly according to the different features and demands of the missions.
- b. In MOOTW, military forces serve as the complement of other national instruments; the subordinate position determines that there must be flexibility in the intensity, scale and time of employment of military forces.
- c. Frequent interagency coordination and operations are needed in MOOTW, the positions of different forces determine that the commanding relations should be established with flexibility. For example, in missions of counter terrorism, insurgency pacification and forceful establishment of isolation zones, operations are usually commanded by the military, other social instruments cooperate; in missions of emergency rescue and disaster relief, operations are usually commanded by government departments, the military cooperate; while in international MOOTW, joint command with foreign militaries are needed.

5. High Operation Transparency

The wide spread development of internet, television and cell phone communication, demand high social transparency. Military operations and even wars can often be broadcasted. MOOTW are mainly used to cope with non-traditional security threats which are highly

transparent, therefore, most of MOOTW are carried out under supervision of public media and public voices. It is therefore of great significance to ensure that MOOTW are carried out in a reasonable and legal way in order to achieve the political objectives.

4.4 THE MILITARY-CIVILIAN COORDINATED APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT

The section focuses on the use of MOOTW in national security, economic, political and social development. This can be regarded as a Military-Civilian Coordinated Approach to development since the military factor through MOOTW becomes visible in the national development matrix. According to the White Paper 2014 on China's Military Strategy, the country encourages joint building and utilisation of military and civilian infrastructure, joint exploration of the sea, outer space and air, and shared use of resources in national development projects. From the Chinese perspective, military and civilian resources can be more compatible and complementary in the national development issues once strong national policy support systems are in place. The same White Paper states that military-civilian coordinated development is necessary to push forward the shared utilisation of military capabilities and those of the civilian sectors to accelerate socio-economic development, and to meet the requirements of winning informationised wars.

In Africa, bad governance and political intervention are often associated with the military. Harris (2004) categorises and summarises potential benefits of the military to its society, see table below, **Table 4.1: Potential Benefits of the Military and MOOTW**. In his argument Harris presents two important points. First, there is no doubt that some countries at some periods in time benefited from the military. Second, he argues, it is possible to organise a military in ways which increase the benefits. The points are important in that Zimbabweans in general and the liberation movements in particular ZANU and ZAPU benefited the independence through war fought by political part armies. Therefore, this past success story should be a wakening call to all especially the Zimbabweans of all political affiliations, religions, race, tribe or whatever grouping that there is room to (re)organise the ZDF to increase the benefits derived from its contribution in the security and development matrix.

Table 4.1: Potential Benefits of the Military and MOOTW

Potential Benefits of the Military		Means to Achieve
Security Benefits	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provides security from external attack 2. Provides security from internal attack 3. Reduces the likelihood of war 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. War 2. MOOTW 3. MOOTW
Economic Benefits	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Provides an environment which will encourage investment, domestic and foreign, and thereby economic growth 5. Provides employment 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. MOOTW 5. MOOTW
Attitudinal Benefits	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Encourages modernisation by exposing individuals to discipline and training 7. Builds national pride 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. MOOTW 7. MOOTW
Broader National Benefits	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Provides civil defence/disaster relief functions 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. MOOTW
International Benefits	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 9. Provides capacity for international peacekeeping operations 10. Enhance international prestige 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 9. MOOTW 10. MOOTW

Source: Adapted from Harris (2004: 5)

Table 4.1 indicates that the potential benefits from the military given by Harris can all, except number one (1), be achieved through MOOTW. Only benefit number one (1) can be achieved through war. The conduct of MOOTW by the ZDF was expected to bring such benefits to the Zimbabwean society. Through chapter 6, the study intends to establish whether ZDF MOOTW had brought any benefits to its society.

4.4.1 MOOTW IN NATIONAL SECURITY

It is a traditional role for the military to be the key player on national security issues. Winning wars is traditionally the only mission of any defence force. In the contemporary world, war is

no longer an end or an effective counter measure to national threats. National security therefore now calls for change in military strategies to encompass a wider perception of the term security.

Harris (2004) argues the traditional definition of security that focuses on protection against external military threats to nation states has become less relevant. Consistent with this view, the UNDP (1994) definition of security centres on human security and identifies seven aspects which are food, health, environment, personal, economic, community and political security. From these views, it is clear that the sources of threats to nation states have become wider and more complex. Security is now, therefore, regarded as a broad term that encompasses human security and human development. These new dimension forces nations to move away from emphasising territorial security based on a strong military towards human security based on improving human development (Harris, 2004). Therefore a modern military should not only focus on its core functions of fighting and winning wars.

Further, Du Pisani (2007) observes that both terms “human security” and “development” address freedom from fear and freedom from want. Human development is defined by the UNDP as the process of widening the range of people`s choices while human security is defined by the UN Commission on Human Security (2003:4) as to “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment”. The Commission further advances that human security seeks to protect people against a broad range of threats to individuals and communities, and further to empower them to act on their own behalf. Then simply stated the relationship can be illustrated by stating that; human development is widening the range of peoples’ choices, and human security can be seen as the pursuit of those choices in a safe environment.

The close link between security and development makes MOOTW a useful and modern attempt to integrate the military in national developmental roles due to changes in the nature of threats. The military through MOOTW types such as humanitarian assistance, searches and rescues, assistance to civil authorities, quick responses to national disasters among other operations can significantly contribute to provide human security and human development. Citizens need a safe environment to pursue their dreams.

According to the US Joint Publication 3-07 (1995), Joint Doctrine for MOOTW, MOOTW contribute to the attainment of national security objectives by supporting deterrence, forward

presence and crisis response options. In peace time, the Armed forces of the United States help to deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims.

Kent cited by Ayers (1996) observed a close relationship between US MOOTW under the Clinton Administration and the national military strategy derived from the National Security Strategy authored by the President. In a review of the President Clinton's National Security Policy, four (4) categories of threats were identified, namely; 1) Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; 2) Regional threats; 3) Threats to democracy and reform; and 4) Economic threats. In his analysis of the importance of MOOTW in national security Ayers (1996) quoted the then Secretary of Defence Les Aspin who strongly assured that "Our armed forces are central to the first two dangers and can play a significant role in meeting the second two." Ayers (1996) further presents the national military strategy that came from such a threat assessment. It had three (3) components:

1. Peace-time engagements;
2. Deterrence and conflict prevention ; and
3. Fighting and winning the nation's wars.

It is clear from the former US Secretary of defence that the military through MOOTW can counter threats to democracy and economic threats. It is also important to note that the first two components of the national military strategy are directly related to MOOTW. MOOTW missions such as humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and disaster relief are peacetime engagements. Similarly, some MOOTW missions deter war and conflict by convincing the aggressor that the costs of engagement outweigh any possible gains.

4.4.2 MOOTW IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Military involvement in national economic development activities has a long history and many authors have contributed on the subject. James Mulvenon used the Military Business Complex (MBC) model to study the PLA's involvement in national economic projects from 1978 to 1998. Mulvenon (2001) presents that China, Cuba and Vietnam increased their military revenues and contribution to the national revenues through military involvement in large economic projects. Aranda (2010) also observes that the use of military in the national economic sectors is a well-established protocol in communist regimes. He argues that the

practice promotes self-sufficiency of military institutions and expands the services of the military to its people when it produces for the wider population. Therefore, the involvement of the military through MOOTW in national economic activities tends to lessen the burden of already financially struggling governments to support their military institutions. Another important factor is that military involvement in large scale economic projects can be a strong and effective response to the threats of national economic crisis.

However, Mulvenon (2001) warns that once the military gets involved in large scale national business ventures like mining, industrial manufacturing, telecommunications, tourism, public transportation and other key sectors of the economy it will become an important decision maker on national matters. A good example to illustrate the above arguments is the involvement of the ZDF in the agriculture sector, land reform, diamonds, and state enterprises among other sectors. The benefits and weaknesses of the involvement of the ZDF in these economic sectors were discussed in other sections of this thesis.

4.4.3 MOOTW IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Political considerations drive all military operations. All military operations are driven by political considerations. Unlike war, MOOTW tend to be more sensitive to political considerations since they predominantly aim to prevent, pre-empt or limit potential hostilities. Consequently, MOOTW usually require extra restrictive rules of engagement. However, in both war and MOOTW the ultimate aim is to achieve national security objectives and create conditions conducive for national development. Political power in post independent Africa used to change hands through military coups. Military intervention in politics was very common in the 1960s in many post-independence countries. The economic dependence of African countries on their former colonial masters indirectly forces them to adopt western political and military systems that gave rise to complex civil- military relations. For instance, former British colonies have interesting but complex post-independence civil-military relations. In Uganda, the military dictator, Idi Amin, remained in power until he was violently overthrown. Nigeria and Ghana experienced continuous military coups. In Zimbabwe, the military had to intervene in support of a political party, ZANU PF, to end the late President Mugabe's 37 years rule. No doubt, there are challenges in the civil-

military relations of many developing countries which are aggressively advancing the scope of poverty in Africa.

Studies on civil-military relations in the West, East and Africa have mainly focused on the question of civilian control (Huntington (1957), Rupiya (2003) and Ngoma (2004)). In reality, the underpinning of Southern Africa civil-military relations is the subordination of military forces by complex systems. Rupiya (2003) and Ngoma (2004) both suggested that the prescribed and adopted western civil-military relations models and theories have limitations to solve African problems. Therefore, a rigorous and radical critique of the complex systems adopted by countries in Africa is required. Finer (1988:10) posits that the study of civil-military relations should look at the reasons for military coups and intervention in politics. The study of civil-military relations therefore, should be wider in its scope. The ZDF intervenes in national political and socio- economic development issue; it therefore deserves the attention of scholars who have interests in military affairs in Africa.

4.4.4 MOOTW IN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Many developing nations have distorted development mainly due to lack of attention to social development. Midgley (1995:1) defines social development as an approach for promoting human welfare. He further advances the point that in many countries, the problem is not an absence of economic development but rather a failure to harmonise economic and social development objectives, and to ensure that the benefits of economic progress reach the population as a whole.

By extending Midgley's concept of distorted development one can conclude that Zimbabwean society is characterised by distorted development. The rural population in the country suffer most due to lack of food, electricity, clean water, transport, health services, school drop outs, and shortage of accommodation for rural civil servants, such as teachers, nurses and agricultural extension workers. Midgley (1995:4) argues that distorted development is manifested not only in poverty, deprivation, low health status and inadequate housing but in the exclusion of sections of the population from full participation in development. The indigenous Zimbabweans under colonial rule and up to the late 1990s were deprived of their rights to own the means of production, that is; land, and to utilise opportunities that could improve their livelihoods. The minority whites had high standards of

living through utilisation of the country's fertile land and the country's extensive mineral wealth. The black indigenous people lived in conditions of poverty and deprivation due to racism, discrimination and low social position in the colonial and post-independence society up to the late 1990s. However, these rural people were promised better life by the freedom fighters during the liberation war. Failure by the new black government to address their poverty is a great betrayal.

The problems that arose from the post-independence distorted development attracted attention of various sectors in Zimbabwe. It resulted in the formation of opposition parties that led to political violence and polarisation. Trade Unions, youth movements and civil society, together with the international community, reacted to the social challenges experienced in Zimbabwe. The developments complicated the Zimbabwean development crisis in post 2000. Consequently, the involvement of the ZDF in various capacities of socio-economic to restore normalcy was perceived differently. For instance, the ZDF constructed schools, clinics, bridges and accommodation for government workers in the rural and marginalised areas of the country. In most cases the areas were created by the colonial regimes for the black people. One villager in the communal areas of Gweru in Midlands Province argues that, the ZDF was performing community work in order to cover up the failures of the ruling party (Research participant, 18/12/2018 Gweru).

In order to address the problem of distorted development, measures are needed that promote economic development at the same time, deliberate efforts have to be taken to prioritise social development. Social development thus is an approach to promote human welfare that is well suited not only to enhance the quality of life for all citizens but to respond to the problems of distorted development.

Midgley (1995:125) contends that government also have the authority to ensure that social development policies are implemented, and that social and economic policies are harmonised. The state has the responsibility to promote the well-being of citizens and is capable to mobilise resources to achieve the desired goals. The use of the military is one such option for the state.

The military can equally play a significant role in promoting social development as exemplified by Mao's speech, cited in Wei *et al* (2012), at the funeral of a courageous soldier who died during disaster operations;

Chinese people are suffering; it is our duty to save them and fight for them. Wherever there is struggle, there is sacrifice. Death is a common occurrence. But taking into consideration our peoples` interest and pain, we will find out that it is a worthy death when we die for the people

Expansion of military expenditures are also argued to jeopardise investments in productive enterprises, education, health, social services and forms of human social needs (Midgley,1995). The use of the military to promote social development is often blamed for increasing military expenditure. Such concerns tend to affect the civil-military relations of a country. Therefore, there is always a need to strike a balance in the use of military in MOOTW.

4.5 SUMMARY

The chapter has sought to widen the understanding of the concept of MOOTW. The aim was to determine how modern militaries of great economies such as the USA and the PRC are employed in development roles under MOOTW. It covers definitions of MOOTW, principles, types and characteristics of MOOTW as in both the USA and PRC. A comparative analysis approach was adopted since the two countries have different models of civil-military relations.

The USA adopted the use of the term MOOTW much earlier than China. There were no much differences observed on definitions, principles, types and characteristics of MOOTW between the two nations. However, it was noted that there are several types of MOOTW that are appropriate for a country and its situations. The historical development of MOOTW and country conditions contributes to the types of MOOTW emphasised in a particular country.

The chapter also covered the use of military through MOOTW in national security, political, social and economic developments efforts. The conclusion is that the USA and the PRC despite being the greatest economies of the world they use their military forces in developmental roles according to their traditions, cultures, and socio-economic imperatives. Therefore, developing nations such as Zimbabwe need to employ their militaries in developmental roles under MOOTW and peaceful civil-military relations. Zimbabweans are free to choose either the western (as represented by the US) or the eastern (as represented by PRC) models of military control and engagements in developmental roles. However,

whatever model adopted it has to be in the Afrocentric approach guided by Zimbabwean central and enduring traditions, cultures and socio-economic imperatives. The next chapter contains ZDF MOOTW and public perceptions about the ZDF.

CHAPTER 5

THE ZIMBABWE DEFENCE FORCES MOOTW AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS

Besides fighting roles, the ZDF is always ready to participate in various programmes aimed at advancing socio-economic development in the country (Hon. Opah Muchinguri, Zimbabwe Minister of Defence and War Veterans Affairs, 2018).

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter 5 focuses on the ZDF MOOTW activities in detail as well as attitudes and public perceptions towards MOOTW and civil-military relations issues in Zimbabwe. The chapter starts with a scan of the national environment and development challenges. The ZDF conducted several operations that were categorised under five types, namely: operations for safeguarding rights and interests, operations for counter-terrorism and stability maintaining, operations for emergency rescue and disaster relief, operations for protecting national interests outside the borders and community assistance programmes. These operations raised mixed feeling. One of the objectives of the study is to examine the Zimbabwean civilians and military personnel perceptions about the ZDF MOOTW. The chapter therefore, also contains perceptions of the Zimbabweans about ZDF MOOTW. Some of the ZDF MOOTW are shown in pictures in Appendix I.

5.2 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

This section provides a brief description of the national environment. The section tries to link the origin of the ZDF (Chapter 2), civil military relations in Zimbabwe (Chapter 3) and the national development challenges in the post-2000 Zimbabwe. The section on environmental scanning tries to link historical evolution and military settings as far back as the liberation struggle to the post-2000 development challenges. The study is under the discipline of Development Studies; therefore it also seeks to establish the root causes of the development challenges from the military perspective. One of the major developments in the global military environment is the expansion of the concept of security from the traditional narrow definitions that perceive national threat as only coming from invading foreign forces. Modern

theorists and strategists view threats from multiple perspectives such that all factors that degrade the quality of life of citizens are perceived as threats to national security. The adoption of MOOTW should be regarded as an attempt to widen the scope of counter measures to the threats to national security.

The ZDF MOOTW has historical linkages with national events that need to be critically analysed. The former President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, ruled for 37 years. He was leader of the liberation movement (ZANU) that won elections in 1980, and the current ruling party. He came into the leadership position through a declaration (the Mgago Declaration) in 1975 by the freedom fighters long before the country's independence. The same freedom fighters form the bulk of the senior officers in the post-2000 ZDF. The post-2000 era saw the emergence of opposition parties that upset the political landscape in Zimbabwe. Several changes were also noted in the socio-economic environment and civil-military relations. Hence, the environment in which the military operated in the post-2000 period need to be seriously considered when analysing ZDF MOOTW.

According to the US Army FM 100-5 (1993) military operations are often conducted in a continuum that has three (3) environmental states, namely; war, conflict and peace. MOOTW are conducted in both conflict and peace environments. This contradiction is a reality in MOOTW and has often resulted in violation of MOOTW principles (Chapter 4). Any violation of MOOTW principles gives rise to mixed reactions by the people. People's perceptions will greatly vary. An instructive example was given by Ayers (1996) who cited the US Forces' Operation Restore Hope in Somalia which began as a humanitarian mission but later degenerated into a combat search for Somali warlord Mohammed Farad Aidid.

Similarly, post-2000 Zimbabwean environment can be described as both conflict and peace zones. The ZDF MOOTW in these different zones raised questions among many Zimbabweans. For instance, political scientists and military scholars are yet to reach consensus on the way the ZDF was involved in the Operation Restore Legacy, an operation that ended Mugabe's 37 year rule, and operations that are alleged to have stopped the late opposition party leader Morgan Tsvangirai to move into state house among other controversial ZDF MOOTW.

In the period under review, there is no war but there is both conflict and peace. There is poverty, hunger, legitimacy issues, contested elections, call for military reforms, sanctions, human right issues, high inflation, high unemployment, call for regime changes, society polarisation, low productivity, low capacity utilisation, collapsed social services, among other challenges. Remarkably important to highlight that there has been no war in Zimbabwe, but the environmental conditions almost epitomised war situations. Mlambo (2014) notes that the country has been suffering 80 percent unemployment, severe shortages of basic commodities, cholera outbreaks that killed no less than 4000 people and a collapsing social services sector. The situation has been bad.

Clearly, the national environmental conditions demands bold steps to develop and proffer political and socio-economic interventions to stop intra-state war. The principal goals of MOOTW are to deter war and promote peace. Therefore, the ZDF MOOTW in post -2000 should be viewed and analysed in the context of a continuum of a national environmental state that requires extra-ordinary solutions to the problems. Zimbabwe needs peace, security and development. Real security involves much more than having a standing army and it can be achieved through an array of strategies. However, some scholars (Rupiya, 2003; Williams, 2010; Nyakudya, 2019) argue President Mugabe misused the military to protect his corrupt regime in power. The increased militarisation of the state led the military to take control of an expanded range of decisions and actions, from political strategy to formulation and implementation of agrarian and economic policy (Alexander & Tendi, 2008). Though the county was in a development crisis, the UNDP Report shows there was an increase in the Human Development Index (HDI) from 1990 to 2018. The HDI is a summary of measures for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions that is long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living (UNDP Report, 2019). See Table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1: Zimbabwe`s Human Development Index (HDI) Value and Rank 1990 -2018

Year	Life Expectancy at Birth	Expected Years of Schooling	Mean Years of Schooling	GNI Per Capita (2011 PPP\$)	HDI Value
1990	58.1	9.8	4.5	2,693	0.498
1995	50.1	9.8	5.5	2,574	0.472
2000	44.6	9.8	6.5	2,747	0.452
2005	43.2	9.5	6.8	1,853	0.425
2010	50.6	10.1	7.3	1,689	0.472
2015	59.5	10.3	8.3	2,226	0.543
2016	60.3	10.4	8.3	2,246	0.549
2017	60.8	10.5	8.3	2,318	0.553
2018	61.2	10.5	8.3	2,661	0.563

Source: UNDP Zimbabwe Human Development Report, 2019

Table 5.1 shows Zimbabwe`s progress in each of the HDI indicators between 1990 and 2018. The life expectancy at birth increased by 3.1 years, mean years of schooling increased by 3.8 years and expected years of schooling increased by 0.7years, while GNI per capita decreased by about 1.2 percent. Zimbabwe`s HDI value increased from 0.498 to 0.563, an increase of about 1.2 percent. Zimbabwe`s HDI value for 2018 was 0.563 and this put the country in the medium human development category at position 150 out of 189 countries and territories (UNDP Report, 2019). Smith (2007) argues that, unlike economic growth indicators like GDP and GNP, HDI is based on the conviction that people and their capabilities are the ultimate criteria for assessing development. Post-independence Zimbabwe might have scored very low in terms of economic growth, but its HDI has generally increased over the years as shown in the Table 5.1.

The above scenario shows that **development** continues to be problematic in its definition. Development in economic terms refers to growth in wealth of countries as measured by indicators such as gross national product (GNP) and gross domestic product (GDP) (Smith, 2007:12). Economic growth centred approaches tend to focus less on social development. Human or social development focuses on indicators such as life expectancy, literacy levels, gender inequality, and human deprivation. UNDP (2003) defines human development as creating an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their needs and interests ...building human capabilities. A similar definition is that of South Commission (1990:10);

Development is a process which enables human beings to realize their potential, build self-confidence, and lead lives of dignity and fulfillment. It is a process which frees people from the fear of want and exploitation. It is a movement away from political, economic and social oppression.

The last two definitions are of greater relevance to this study. Development should create the environment for the politically, economically and socially oppressed to lead lives of dignity free from the fear of want and exploitation. Colonial Zimbabwe suffered exploitation and oppression. In post-independent Zimbabwe the majority still suffer economic and social oppression to lead a productive and creative life, consistent with their needs and available resources. The use of military institutions through MOOTW can liberate the oppressed minds and promote that kind of development. Individuals and political parties have failed to bring the required development for Zimbabwe and Africa as a whole.

5.3 THE ZDF MOOTW

According to the Zimbabwe National Defence Policy (1997), it is Government's strong view that the Defence Forces make an indispensable contribution to socio-economic development, stability and prosperity of both the country and region. It is from this policy that the involvement of the ZDF in socio-economic development activities covers a wide range of operations. In an interview with The Herald Reporter, the Minister of Defence and War Veterans, Oppah Muchinguri Kashiri points out that;

Besides fighting roles, the ZDF is always ready to participate in various programmes aimed at advancing socio-economic development in the country. Since its formation, the ZDF prioritised the need to build strong civil-military relations with the people because the Constitution of Zimbabwe mandates the ZDF to protect its people (The Herald, 13 August 2018).

The Commander of the AFZ, Air Marshal Elson Moyo also, states that;

Outside the traditional roles of the AFZ and the ZDF at large, we have recognised that we have a role to play in responding to the people`s needs. The AFZ has prioritised community assistance projects to improve the quality of life of disadvantaged people and communities in different parts of Zimbabwe (The Herald, 14 August 2018).

Therefore, the ZDF MOOTW covers a wide range of activities to serve the people. Chapter 4 reveals that in the PLA, the several MOOTW operations were divided into four (4) types, namely:

- 1) Operations for Safeguarding Rights and Interests;
- 2) Operations for Counter-terrorism and Stability Maintaining;
- 3) Operations for Emergency Rescue and Disaster Relief; and
- 4) Operations for Protecting Overseas Interests

The US military force MOOTW are divided into sixteen (16) types as covered in chapter 4. For the purposes of presenting and analysing ZDF MOOTW in this chapter, the thesis adopts the Chinese type of classifying MOOTW activities.

5.3.1 OPERATIONS FOR SAFEGUARDING RIGHTS AND INTERESTS

According to the Zimbabwe National Defence Policy (1997: 6), there has been reorientation of thinking on “security” and “threats to security”. The non-combat dimensions to promote human security become a national priority. Wei *et al* (2012) argue that the involvement of the military in MOOTW is no longer an issue of winning wars, but safeguarding peace and security.

Operations for Safeguarding Rights and Interests are protective operations to defend sovereignty. The primary missions of these operations are: 1) to patrol the border, territorial air and territorial sea, 2) to protect fishery and energy exploration, 3) to prevent and defend enemy's infiltration and sabotage activities that harms China's sovereignty, 4) to defend the network and electromagnetic space and 5) to deal with military emergencies in the border region. Similarly, the ZDF has been conducting the following operations:

1. Customs, Immigration and Border Surveillance

The ZDF collaborates with ZRP, Immigration Authorities and Zimbabwe Revenue Authority to conduct border patrols and surveillance activities. The ZDF assists in containing and curbing illicit activities such as smuggling of goods, precious minerals, drugs, vehicles, human trafficking and illegal border crossing. The smuggling of minerals and animal products is usually conducted by dangerous and armed criminals. The border operations protect the country's industries from cheap smuggled goods and enhance revenue collection. There is need to have an adequately equipped force for effective border operations. In Zimbabwe it is a national policy that, "while other Government agencies are responsible for customs, immigration and border surveillance, the ZDF will provide significant support for these activities" (The Zimbabwe National Defence Policy, 1997:45).

2. Prevention of sabotage activities

The ZDF deploys its members to all strategic installations at the borders to prevent sabotage activities. For instance, the ZDF deploys its members to protect the oil -pipeline and the railway line that links Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The ZDF members are also deployed to protect centres and institutions of national strategic importance such as the electrical power generation plants.

3. Demining Activities

The Rhodesian Forces planted landmines along the common border with Mozambique during the liberation war. The ZDF has so far cleared and destroyed 209 430 landmines and managed to hand over more than 400 square kilometers of cleared land to various local authorities (The Herald, 13 august 2019). In an interview, the Officer Commanding the demining activities reports that the demining exercise unlocked value of the affected areas; it freed grazing and mining land for the local communities(13/6/2018, Mutoko

Baracks). He further explains that since independence in 1980, the mines were still wreaking havoc on civilian populations, livestock and wildlife. A research participant in Mashonaland Central Province pointed out that we lost both human and domestic animals lives due to landmines before ZDF demining activities. The NGO programme officer expressed that, “We greatly thank the ZDF and all those who support the good work of clearing off the landmines in our area” (Research participant, 02/09/2018 Mount Darwin).

Again in this operation, the ZDF provided assistance on the National Mine Clearance exercise. Among all the MOOTW, demining was the most dangerous task. The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, cited by Wei *et al* (2012), points out that mines are the wars` marks which are most difficult to remove, but to remove a single mine it`s a step closer to a better condition for enduring and prosperous peace.

To sum it up on ZDF demining activities the Commander ZNA points out that;

Demining activities availed land for agriculture, grazing pastures, mining, tourism and infrastructure development and access to essential services. However, the organisation needs adequate equipment and cooperation with local and international stakeholders to effectively carry out the activities (Interview with Commander ZNA, 8 April 2020, ZNDU).

4. Anti-Poaching Activities

The ZDF carries anti-poaching activities in conjunction with the Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority in the country`s major national parks and game reserves namely; Hwange, Nyanga, Gonarezhou, Mana Pools, Matusadona, Matobo, Chizarira and Zambezi National Parks. ZDF members are often called to support the civilians in the protection of wildlife and the illegal activities in wildlife trade. Zimbabwe is proud of having successfully conserved her wildlife especially the elephant population.

5.3.2 OPERATIONS FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM AND STABILITY MAINTAINING

These are operations to fight against terrorism and to maintain the normal social order. The primary missions are 1) to stop terrorists` atrocities, rescue hostage and process the scene of terrorism event, 2) to annihilate terrorists and destroy their bases, 3) to secure and guard the vital targets continuously during major occasions and 4) to deal with group events, put down

riots, disturbance and violence and to enforce law and order. Under this type the ZDF conducted the following operations:

1. Counter Terrorism

Zimbabwe, like many parts of the world, has not been and may not be spared from acts of terrorism. A reasonable number of acts of terrorism were recorded in Zimbabwe. The ZDF was efficient and effective in countering all terrorists' efforts. The Special Air Services Regiment will continue to prepare for counter-terrorist operations. The ZDF has a rich track record of counter insurgency operations gained over the liberation war period as the Rhodesian Security Forces fought the nationalist forces.

2. Strikes and Demonstrations

The ZDF managed to provide support to the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) during strikes and demonstrations and this has often raised issues with the public, especially opposition parties who felt the security forces were being partisan and were protecting the ZANU PF regime. A research participant (2018, Harare) revealed that soldiers were being used by ZANU PF to prevent strikes. However, another research participant explained that "Soldiers were deployed to stop the demonstrators from looting and vandalising private and state property" (Research participant, 2018 Harare). Even the international community especially western countries US (through ZIDERA) and her allies attacked the ZDF for human rights abuse when they assisted ZRP in strikes and demonstrations. The Herald once quoted Foreign Affairs and International Trade Minister, Dr Sibusiso Moyo as having said;

We once again note with regret the inclusion of Honourable Minister Owen Ncube and Ambassador Anselem Sanyatwe as specially designated nationals on the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) US Treasury Sanctions list... In both cases, the US cited human rights abuses and political repression as the reasons for imposing the sanctions (The Herald, 23 April 2020).

Dr Moyo is further quoted to have continued;

As I have said previously, regardless of these negative developments and the lack of even-handedness in the US approach to Zimbabwe, my Government will continue to engage in meaningful dialogue with the United States. In parallel, we will continue to travel the path of reform for the benefit of our people (ibid).

Ambassador Sanyatwe was the commander of the troops who together with the police participated in controlling strikes and demonstrations in Zimbabwe. Consequently, the US put him under sanctions. The Foreign Affairs Minister's response that he will continue to engage in meaningful dialogue with the US might mean calling the US to reflect on whether the involvement of the ZDF was really human rights abuse or it was meant to protect lives and property. The Minister promised reforms for the benefit of the Zimbabweans.

3. Chiadzwa Diamond Fields

The ZRP also called the ZDF to assist in the maintenance of order in the Chiadzwa Diamond Fields. The ZRP were overpowered by the large numbers of people who flooded the newly discovered diamonds in Chiadzwa to try their fortunes in a nation punctuated by high unemployment, inflation and poverty levels. The ZDF restored order and paved way for organised and controlled mining activities which were to benefit the entire nation. The involvement of the ZDF stopped the chaotic diamond mining, killings and illegal trading activities which were now characterising the area.

However, the operation was not supported by all Zimbabweans some thought it was a way to allow soldiers to loot the diamonds. Besides the call to aid the ZRP, the Zimbabwe National Defence Policy (1997: 41) empowers the ZDF "to protect the environment against disturbances, deterioration, poisoning or destruction as a result of human activity or structures." In Chiadzwa human life and the environment were under threat from the uncontrolled masses who were searching for diamonds.

4. Assistance to Local Authorities

As pointed out earlier, the ZDF has legal obligation to assist civil authorities in their activities. The controversial Operation Murambatsvina (Operation Restore Order) was one such civilian activity. The Zimbabwe Government critics portrayed that it was a military operation. One research participant commented that, *such ill-advised accusations on the ZDF soiled the image of the force to the public both locally and internationally* (2019, Harare) Deliberations on the human nature of the operation were beyond the scope of this study. The study gathered that the ZDF was involved in the Operation in support of civil authorities.

According to the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe Report (2005) the operation was launched by the Chairperson of the Harare Commission as a programme that was adopted to enforce laws;

In a speech by the Chairperson of Harare Commission Ms S. Makwavarara on the occasion of the official launch of Operation Murambatsvina at the Town House on 19 May 2005, she stated that; The City of Harare wishes to advise the public that in its effort to improve service delivery within the city, it will embark on Op Murambatsvina in conjunction with the Zimbabwe Republic Police. This is a programme to enforce by-laws to stop all forms of illegal activities.

The Report clearly shows that this was a civilian activity, launched at Town House, the Harare City Council headquarters. The Chairperson of the Harare Commission gave clear objectives and intentions of the whole programme. The involvement of the military could have been to assist the civilian authorities.

The UN Report (2005) further indicates that the motivations behind Operation Murambatsvina as explained by the Government of Zimbabwe were to arrest disorderly or chaotic urbanisation, stop illegal, parallel market transactions and reverse environmental damage caused by inappropriate urban agriculture practices. The same UN Report also gave a number of alleged motivations including that the operation was a pre-emptive strategy to stop food riots which were likely to be triggered by economic hardships. In another similar version, the International Crisis Group Africa Report Number 97 (2005) reports that Murambatsvina was coined by ZANU-PF as an exhortation to reject the dirty and chaos associated with slums, shacks and informal markets. The same Report (2005:4) further argues that the other less important motivations were suggested and included the view that, “The MDC leadership viewed Operation Murambatsvina as primary retribution against its urban support base. ZANU-PF sought to weaken the MDC by punishing its support base”. These partisan arguments are weak because nowhere, even in the UN Report was it recorded that the Operation was selective, targeting slums or illegal activities on partisan basis.

The arguments show the degree of party polarisation in the country. Government development programmes were always viewed and analysed on party-lines. The involvement of the ZDF in government development programmes under such an environment became

equally affected. This has contributed to the worsening of the Zimbabwean development crisis.

From both perspectives, government and anti-government perspectives, Operations Murambatsvina was a civilian activity to achieve human security. According to the UN Report (2005:58), there were three main pieces of national legislation to justify the Operation. Therefore, the involvement of police and military was in support of civilian authorities as per national legal requirements.

5.3.3 OPERATIONS FOR EMERGENCY RESCUE AND DISASTER RELIEF

These are operations to deal with natural disasters, major disasters and serious accidents. The primary missions are 1) to deal with flood disaster, wind disaster, snow disaster, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption and aviation disaster, 2) to prevent infectious diseases from spreading, deal with nuclear, chemical and biological (NCB) accident, maritime distress and aviation disaster and 3) to rescue and help disaster affected people, transport personnel and materials, repair infrastructure, maintain order in disaster area, eliminate disaster consequences, and assist the post disaster reconstruction. Zimbabwe is prone to a high number of disasters and the ZDF conducts various operations that include those shown in **Table 5.2 below**.

1. Disaster Management

The Zimbabwe National Defence Policy (1997:44) states that the ZDF capabilities are an important element of the national search and rescue effort. The Defence Forces have the capacity for sustained long range air patrols, surveillance and rescue activity in difficult and remote areas. Basing on such unique capabilities, the ZDF assists in civilian search and rescue, both in Zimbabwe and in the SADC region. The Commander ZNA Lt General Chimonyo (Interview, 8 April 2020, ZNDU) explained that the involvement of ZDF members in mitigating emergencies contribute immensely towards nation building and the focus was to build capacities and to have strategies to minimise the impact of natural disasters on the population.

As such, the ZDF has been working with the Civil Protection Unit which operates under the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing in disaster management

programmes such as *search and rescue operations, casualty evacuation in road traffic accidents, food aid distribution during droughts, roads and bridges rehabilitation during floods*. During Cyclone Idai, ZDF acted on calls from the Civil Protection Unit. Air Commodore Chiganze was deployed to command air assets provided by the AFZ and other organisations. In an interview with the Air Commodore, it was revealed that the ZDF coordinated and facilitated the distribution of food, tents, shelter, blankets, solar lamps, drinking water and ferried the injured to Mutambara and Mutare general hospitals.

The AFZ helicopters and ZDF personnel have a record of assisting communities affected by disasters in areas such as Muzarabani in Mashonaland Central Province, Gutu in Masvingo Province and Tsholotsho in Matabeleland North Province, among other places across the country as shown in **Table 5.2 below**.

2. Food Security

The ZDF involvement in Command Agriculture in the 2018-2019 agriculture season, improved maize productivity and food security. The ZNA embarked on a pilot project at Battlefields in the production of maize, wheat and other horticulture produce. The AZF runs cattle breeding, piggery, poultry and horticulture projects to feed the soldiers and for commercial purposes. The ZDF members were also deployed to monitor and supervise the importation and distribution of maize, rice, sugar beans and other food stuff. The Grain Marketing Board personnel that are mandated to carry out those duties were reported to be heavily involved in corrupt deals and resource mismanagement.

Food production and distribution became a national issue in the post-2000 period after the land redistribution. During the post-2000 period the country experienced food shortages as a result of the land redistribution programmes and frequent droughts.

3. ZDF Construction Regiment

The ZDF engineers have special roles during war times. However, the regiment has made tremendous contributions in national development projects under MOOTW. They have been participating in the construction of roads, bridges, clinics and schools throughout the country (See Table 5.2 below.) For instance, in Mt Darwin District, Mashonaland Central Province Murongwe clinic, primary and secondary schools were constructed by the ZDF using resources donated by the private companies under the Commander Air Force of Zimbabwe Charity Fund. In Matabeleland North province ZDF provided construction assistance for the

Gwelutshena Vocational Training Centre. The ZDF combat operations depend on civil infrastructure such as roads, airfields, communication networks, and people who manage and operate them. Therefore, close interaction between the ZDF and key transport and communication organisations during peace times provide the basis for a successful partnership in a time of conflict or in emergencies.

Table 5.2: ZDF Disaster Management Operations

Serial	Operation	Area of Operation
1	Search and rescue	Muzarabani, Gutu, Nyanga, Zaka, Chipinge and Chimanimani areas.
2	Casualty evacuation	Along the major highways of the country and high accident zones especially in Mutare , Beitbridge and Masvingo towns.
3	Food aid distribution	Mainly in the natural dry regions of the country: Masvingo, Matabeleland, Manicaland , Midlands.
4	Roads and bridges rehabilitation	Areas open to floods like Muzarabani in Mashonaland and recently in 2019 Cyclone Idai affected Chimanimani, Nyanga ,Chipinge in Manicaland.

Source: Air Force Headquarters, Operations Department

5.3.4 OPERATIONS FOR PROTECTING NATIONAL INTERESTS OUTSIDE THE BORDERS

These are operations to support the expansion of national interests, mainly conducted in relevant areas and spaces outside the border. Primary missions are 1) to conduct joint training and joint exercise with foreign military, 2) to employ forces and assets to carry out tasks of

rescue, medical treatment and transportation when major crisis occurred, and 3) to evacuate the Chinese nationals, overseas residents and materials from disaster areas. Similarly, the ZDF has been participating in the following:

1. Joint training and joint exercise with foreign militaries

The ZDF always participates in joint training and joint exercise with foreign militaries. It participated in Joint Training Exercises in Angola, Namibia, Lesotho and South Africa, among other countries. These joint operations strengthen regional capabilities to deal with regional threats such as natural disasters for example the recent Cyclone Idai that caused serious damage to the Southern African countries and resulted in loss of lives to thousands of people. The South African Defence Force assisted the ZDF during operations under Cyclone Idai.

2. Employment of forces and assets

The ZDF like other forces in the SADC region employ its forces and assets to carry out tasks of search and rescue, medical treatment and transportation when major crisis occurs. The ZDF deployed forces and AFZ air assets to carry out search and rescue operations in Mozambique and Namibia during cyclone induced floods.

5.3.5 THE ZDF AND COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES

The post-2000 Zimbabwe development challenges affected service delivery in various sectors of the nation. The country's public health sector was heavily affected. USAID (2010) report that life expectancy declined from 62 to 48 years between 1990 and 2008; maternal mortality increased from 168 per 100 000 live birth in 1990 to 188 per 100 000 live birth in 2005 and infant mortality rose from 53 in 1995 to 60 per 1000 live birth in 2009. These are indicators for a severe development challenge during peace time.

The country's education system was not spared by this crisis. It came to be characterised by low enrolment and completion rates, low transition rate to secondary and tertiary levels, insufficient learning material and insufficient and inexperienced teachers and lecturers. Mlambo (2014) argues that government interference in university matters and academic freedom reduced the once acclaimed higher education system to lower levels. The education

system was therefore greatly affected. Transport and communication sector as well as public works projects were equally affected by the post 2000 crisis.

The Zimbabwe National Defence Policy (1997:42) clearly states that successful management of our defence effort requires harmonious relations with the Zimbabwean community through committed support of the Zimbabwean people in peace and more so in times of emergency. In line with this policy requirement the ZDF created platforms for its members to contribute in assisting vulnerable communities and deal with all the challenges which were becoming threats to national security. The Service Commanders, both ZNA and AFZ created Charity Funds which became very useful vehicles in promoting community development work. In an interview with the Director of Civil Military Relations at Air Force Headquarters (10 July 2018, Harare), it was established that through the Charity Funds, the ZDF made community interventions programmes in health services provision, educational assistance, public works and infrastructure development, social welfare services, entertainment services by the ZDF Military Band and assistance in the transport and communication sectors.

1. Health Services Provision

The Commander AFZ Charity Fund (CAFZCF) successfully constructed Murongwe Clinic and Primary School in Mashonaland Central Province, Rutanhire Clinic in Hwedza, Negove Clinic in Mberengwa among other similar projects across the country. All these projects were handed over to the communities, in some cases, as shown by attached pictures (Appendix 1), the Minister of Defence and War Veterans Affairs, the Commander Defence Forces and Service Commanders officiate during the handover ceremonies.

Apart from constructing and rehabilitating health centres, the ZDF medical personnel also provide medical cover in various communities across the country. The ZDF doctors, nurses, dentists, dieticians, health technicians among other professions provide services in civilian hospitals and clinics to complement the existing staff. This always comes as a great relief to the communities because these services are in short supply.

2. Educational Assistance

In order to complement government efforts in the provision of basic services such as primary and secondary education, the former Commander AFZ, Air Vice Marshal P. Shiri targeted to assist the most disadvantaged schools. Two schools along the Zimbabwe border with

Mozambique were first identified. The development of these areas was heavily retarded by the war of liberation. By 2011 Murongwe Primary School in Mt Darwin Mashonaland Central Province, pupils were still conducting lessons under a tree and the best buildings at the school were grassed thatched pole and dagga structures. Mazunga Primary School Matepatepa area in Mashonaland province, which had lost its Grade Seven Examination Centre status due to lack of furniture, got a donation of 120 desks and chairs from the CAFZCF. The Centre was reopened and this was a great relief to parents and pupils of the Matetepa Area. For the construction at Murongwe, in an interview with the Director General Administration at Air Force Headquarters (16 July 2018, Harare) the thesis gathered that the ZDF was supported by willing individuals and companies, to source material to construct classroom blocks, administration block, computer laboratory, school staff accommodation, blocks of blair toilets and an Early Childhood Development centre. The ZDF partnerships also constructed a clinic, drilled water boreholes and installed solar plant to electrify the school and clinic. Pictures attached in Appendix I.

The CAFZCF also provided educational scholarships to gifted but disadvantaged students. In 2008 two beneficiaries Kudzai Chifamba (Actuarial Science at the National University of Science and Technology (NUST)) and Tererai Moyo (Medical School at the University of Zimbabwe (UZ)), graduated from NUST and UZ, respectively (The Herald, 13 August 2019). The interview with Director General Administration revealed that the Fund also sourced and donated computers, school furniture and books to disadvantaged schools. A summary of community assistance projects by the ZDF in the various provinces is as shown in **Table 5.3 below**.

Table 5.3: Community Assistance Projects by the ZDF

Serial	Name of Project	Province
1	Katema Clinic	Midlands
2	Negove Clinic,	
3	Simchemu Clinic	
4	Neromwe Clinic	Masvingo
5	Honde Valley Water Project	Manicaland
6	Gwelutshena Vocational Technical Centre	Matabeleland North
7	Murongwe Primary	Mashonaland Central
8	Murongwe Secondary	
9	Murongwe Clinic	
10	Rusununguko High school	
11	St Marry`s High School	Mashonaland East
12	Rutanhira Clinic	

Source: ZDF CMR Department

3. Public Works and Infrastructure Development

The ZDF has assisted various communities in public works and infrastructure development. It constructed several public works projects even outside disaster periods. The organisation constructed schools, dams, hospitals and clinics, cattle deep tanks in the rural areas, community halls and libraries, roads and bridges, vocational training centres and boreholes among other community projects. The capacity, coordination levels and material provisions all differed in these projects depending on the needs of the community. Some of the projects were very simple projects. However, the Murongwe Project was a very big project that resulted in the construction of primary and secondary schools, a clinic, a vocational training centre, solar installations and drilling of boreholes. Several fundraising activities were conducted by the ZDF to raise the funds from well-wishers in the form of individuals and civilian companies to complete the project. It was gathered that in all these projects, the ZDF worked together with the community and the Ministry of Local Government and Public Works. In an interview with the Director of Civil Military Relations (10 July 2018, Harare), it was highlighted that the ZDF supports national development projects to empower the communities to be self-reliant and to promote better living conditions for the people. A research participant in Mushangwe Village of Gutu District in Masvingo Province could not hide his joy after the ZDF sunk a borehole in their communal area, the Chief explained that;

We grew up drinking water straight from the river where we used to share it with our cattle, goats and donkeys. We thank the soldiers because we now have clean water from a borehole they drilled in our village (Research participant, 21 August 2018, Masvingo).

4. Social Welfare Services

As from 2008, the AFZ used funds and donations acquired through the CAFZCF and donated wheel chairs to physically challenged and disadvantaged people in Harare, Bulawayo, Mberengwa, Gokwe, Chegutu, Chivhu, Mutare among other districts. The AFZ identified the beneficiaries with the assistance of the Disability Affairs Department in the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare. In an interview with the Director General Administration at Air Force Headquarters (16/07/2018, Harare) it was revealed that the organisation uses funds donated through the CAFZCF by the corporate world to buy wheel chairs for the underprivileged members of the society. In an interview with a senior officer in

Disability Affairs Department in the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare it was highlighted that a number of families with disabled persons across the country were benefiting from the ZDF initiative to donate wheel chairs (Research participant, 20/08/2018 Harare). The number of beneficiaries and their provinces of origin are as shown in **Table 5.4** below.

Table 5.4: Social Welfare Beneficiaries: The ZDF wheelchair donations to individuals through the Disability Affairs Department in the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare.

Serial	Province	Number of Beneficiaries
1	Harare	4
2	Bulawayo	2
3	Midlands	2
4	Masvingo	1
5	Mashonaland Central	2
6	Matabeleland South	2
7	Matabeleland North	1
8	Mashonaland East	1
9	Mashonaland West	2
10	Manicaland	4
	Total	21

Source: AFZ Headquarters CMR Department.

5. Entertainment services by the ZDF Military Band

Entertainment is a key component of any society. It promotes unity and peace. For instance, music has no age, race, profession and boundaries. In the ZDF both services, AFZ and ZNA have Military Squadrons which were established long back during the colonial period. A military band is composed of performers of brass wind, wood wind, drums and percussion instruments, whose primary mission is to stage musical performance in nation's and ZDF's major ceremonies like Independence Day and ZDF Day celebrations respectively. Post -2000 saw the fusion of colonial military band with traditional band squadron. The AFZ traditional band squadron has since established itself to claim large followers in its local and international performances. They perform in both private functions like weddings and public functions like university graduation ceremonies. According to an interview with the Staff Officer Grade 2 responsible for Music, the squadron has performed and won medals in China in 2013 and 2017, Russia in 2018 and in South Africa in 2016, among other several local awards. The Chinhoyi University of Technology Public Relations Officer revealed that the AFZ Band Squadron was now a permanent feature on their graduation ceremonies.

6. Assistance in the Transport and Communication Sectors

The transport and communication sectors were not spared by the post -2000 development challenges that characterised the Zimbabwean state. These sectors are critical sectors for national security. The ZDF seconded its pilots, technicians, engineers, drivers and air traffic controllers among other trades to the transport and communication sectors to cover the gaps created by those who had left the country for greener pastures. The worst affected state enterprises were Air Zimbabwe (national airline), National Railways of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (public road transport) and Tel One (telecommunication services). The ZDF members who were seconded in these companies helped the remaining skeletal staff to continue provide the critical services to the public. With the assistance from the ZDF, these companies were given enough time to recruit, train, maintain positive cash flow accounts and became operational again.

Military assistance in the transport and communication sectors is not unique to Zimbabwe and the ZDF. In China, the PLA has established special arms such as infrastructure corps and railway corps. The infrastructure corps has completed thousands of national large and medium-sized construction projects and key projects like highways, factories, mines and reservoirs, set up large quantities of buildings for education, scientific research and

accommodation for people in Beijing and other big and medium-sized cities. In Zimbabwe, the ZDF is yet to be fully utilised to match such standards of the PLA. If the ZDF is to make significant impact on developing the *Transport and Communication Sectors* just like the PLA it has to establish such corps within its structures and empowers the members to implement large national projects. Equally important to the ZDF is to work on the civil-military relations so that the public appreciates and support the military involvement in such development roles.

5.4 ATTITUDES AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS ZDF MOOTW

From the perceptions gathered from the various sections of the Zimbabwean population, it has emerged that people perceived military involvement in MOOTW from two angles, namely; 1) political and socio-economic development and 2) support to civil authorities and communities. The first category was viewed as political and socio-economic functions set by the government for the military as a response to specific identified threats. These were the most controversial operations. The second category, support to civil community and authority, was viewed as a civil-military relations function with national security and development implications. This was viewed less controversial since the operations tend to have clear objectives and rules of engagement.

The perceptions were analysed from two broad perspectives; the internal and external perspectives. The internal perspective focuses on the perceptions of the military personnel on their actions. External perspective covers the views and attitudes of the civilian sectors towards ZDF MOOTW and CMR issues in Zimbabwe.

5.4.1 ZDF MOOTW IN POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

MOOTW for political and socio-economic development comprise a development role by the ZDF. These operations were viewed as political and socio-economic functions set by the government for the military as a response to specifically identified threats. These are the most controversial operations.

In a public lecture at the Zimbabwe National Defence University (2018), the Commander ZNA, Lt General Chimonyo pointed out that Zimbabwe has been exposed to various forms of regime change machinations the most recent being asymmetric warfare. On Asymmetric warfare, the Commander ZNA observed that;

From around 1990 up to the advent of the land reform programme in 2000, the British, the Americans and their European Union partners and the white commonwealth in general, took over the destabilisation of Zimbabwe after majority rule came to South Africa in 1994. On the political front anti-revolutionary elements, masquerading as merchants of democracy mushroomed during this period and a relatively new form of warfare called Asymmetric warfare came into being. Asymmetric warfare involves an attack on all facets of human endeavour using various mediums (Chimonyo, 2018 ZNDU).

He further declared and prescribed that;

The ZNA should therefore understand this type of warfare, prepare for it and together with the citizenry minimise its effects on the wellbeing of our country. My view is that these threats will persist upto 2025 and beyond (Chimonyo, 2018 ZNDU).

From the General's perspective on national challenges, the study concludes that the preparation by ZNA to mitigate asymmetric warfare can only be adequately achieved through MOOTW. Asymmetric warfare by its nature involves an attack on all facets of human endeavor. Under asymmetric warfare the destabilisation of the country takes various forms and national development cannot be achieved through a regime change agenda, security sector reform, foreign investment or donor aid. Only MOOTW can effectively counter such attacks.

Another political statement from one senior officer that sparked debate is:

Professionalism is over and many of you are wondering what is happening in the country. I do not want you to hear (it) through grapevine or read (it) in the newspapers, but the animal called ZANU PF shall rule forever and that is the reason I am saying forward with ZANU PF! Forward with President Robert Mugabe! (Brigadier General A Sanyatwe, The Zimbabwe Independent, 9 October 2015).

The statement by the General that professionalism was over clearly indicates deviation by the leaders from the norm. This means that under normal circumstances, the ZDF was (is) a professional force. However, circumstances forced the General to utter the slogan. Probably,

he felt the civilians in ZANU PF were not vocal enough to send the message to those who were calling for regime change in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 2 notes that, during the liberation struggle, Smith's 1965 UDI enjoyed the support of US, UK and other western countries (Chung, 2007; Chitiyo & Rupiya, 2005 and Mtisi et al, 2009). The same governments imposed sanctions (or restrictions) on Zimbabwe post-2000, these actions by the former colonisers and their allies are likely to have forced the ZDF leadership in the likes of General Sanyatwe and others to publicly pronounce that, *Professionalism is over! Forward with ZANU PF!*

On the other hand, Brigadier General Sanyatwe's statement, that *professionalism is over*, can be considered in the context given by Chitiyo & Rupiya (2005:351):

The post-2000 national crisis has resulted in national defence policy essentially being defined as the preservation of the ZANU -PF party and government, with the part and the state/nation often being perceived as one and the same.

The national crisis and the western pressures for regime change could have forced the General to stand to defend the part and the government which were under western attack. The study in Chapter 2 reveals that ZDF was formed from a combination of nationalist and colonialist forces. General Sanyatwe being a former fighter in the nationalist forces, his political consciousness is beyond that of mere 'professional' soldiers. Nationalist forces fought for independence and development. Calling for professionalism at the expense of national development interests can only be for mercenaries and never for patriots. Therefore, when the BMATT retained ZIPRA and ZANLA forces in the ZDF formation they created a nationalist force in Zimbabwe. The attack on ZDF by US, UK and EU through the imposition of sanctions clearly indicates that the BMATT later came to realise that the military force they created in Zimbabwe was a proper nationalist force. The ZDF in terms of its ideological positions prove that it's a force to promote African development and not British interests.

Discipline and Control within the ZDF

In an interview with The Herald on 1 May 2017, the former Zimbabwe Defence Forces Commander, General Constantino Chiwenga warns that;

I am talking on behalf of the Defence and Security Services of the country; and besides that, on the ZANLA side, I am the surviving most senior commander. If they

understood the political teachings - that the party commands the gun and not vice versa, that everyone must respect the leadership -they should know that today in Independent Zimbabwe we must all respect the leadership both in Government and in the party . . . If they want to remain as part and parcel of those disciplined, loyal, patriotic cadres, they must now understand that it is the party, it is the Government that sets the direction (The Herald, 1 May 2017).

Another voice from the Commander ZNA promises that;

Discipline is the hallmark of all soldiering. I am generally proud of the disciplinary record of the ZNA, although there are a few cases of indiscipline that will always be found in any military organisation. But it is my intention to reduce these through policy interventions and improved training of our members (Chimonyo, 2018).

General Chiwenga made his statement in 2017, during the Mugabe regime. Lt General Chimonyo is the current Commander of ZNA under President Mnangagwa. Both Commanders stressed the importance of discipline, loyalty and patriotism in the ZDF. The new regime believes policy intervention and improved training will help to further reduce indiscipline in the organisation.

ZDF Involvement in Politics

Research participants revealed factors that compelled the military to get involved in party politics. Three prominent factors emerged. First was sponsored regime change agenda, an academic and publisher pointed out that;

The military feels duty bound to control the political parties because forming a political party that opposes the ZANU PF government has been rewarding in Zimbabwe. That is why you have seen the main opposition MDC splitting into MDC-T (T for Tsvangirai), MDC-M (M for Mutambara), MDC-1999, MDC-A (A for Alliance) and other names. They are being funded by those who want regime change in Zimbabwe (Research participant 06/07/2018, Harare).

The second factor was lack of internal democracy in political parties. A former member of the main opposition party MDC explained that;

The main opposition party lacks what they purport to deliver once in power. There is no democracy. Former leader Tsvangirai appointed a third Vice President who had lost a Secretary General post. This was against the party constitution. Secondly, the ascendancy to party presidency of the current leader Chamisa was ruled

unconstitutional by the court and it led to a further split of the main opposition. Therefore, for the military to expect them to democratically run the country is expecting too much from them (Research participant 13/07/2018, Masvingo Province).

From these two factors, it is clear that the military and its supporters consider military involvement in party politics as a noble idea. This could also justify why many people in Zimbabwe including those from the opposition parties supported the ZDF and ZANU PF when they jointly facilitated the retirement of former President Mugabe.

The factor of sponsored opposition parties was also observed by Sithole (1997) who states that Zimbabwe is a country of political entrepreneurs who calculate to form opposition political parties under the funding of international NGOs. Such trends are threat to national security and development. Sponsored politicians will always work under the guidance of their sponsors and they will never work to serve the masses. This is a major challenge to development strategies that are driven by politicians in the Zimbabwean situation.

The third factor was greediness among the military officers. In an interview, a member of the opposition party pointed out that;

Mugabe regime benefited from military support. Some greedy military officers used that weakness of the regime to publicly denounce the opposition parties in order to be rewarded by the Commander-in-Chief (Research participant 23/07/2018, Harare).

The statement clearly indicates that the ZDF, like any other organisation has some bad elements, greedy and crafty officers. However, it is important to note that the current Commander of the ZNA promised to make policy interventions and train the officers to make a better organisation. Institutionalisation of MOOTW and the production of guidelines and procedures on the conduct of MOOTW will help to reduce such cases.

Partisan or apolitical behaviour by the ZDF?

There were mixed reactions by research participants. Some based their arguments on the national Constitution that the military should not be partisan; they should remain apolitical and support an elected government. However, some argued that only mercenaries can be apolitical. A third group argued that peace and development should be the national objective.

The Standard newspaper reports that, Army Chief of Staff, Major General Chedondo at an army shooting championship in Harare, told soldiers that;

We should, therefore, stand behind our Commander-in-Chief. Soldiers are not apolitical. Only mercenaries are apolitical. We have signed and agreed to fight and protect the ruling party`s principles of defending the revolution (The Standard, 31 May 2008).

What was raised by some participants during interviews resonate well with the quoted statement from the Army Chief of Staff. However, some research participants argued in line with the constitution and maintained that, “Our defence forces should remain non-partisan and apolitical as per our constitution” (Research participant 10/07/2018, Harare).

An alternative thinker, a church leader in the Midlands Province also raised that;

Whether partisan or apolitical behaviour, it doesn`t matter. What is important is an environment that is conducive for peaceful development initiatives by our citizens. Our military should be there to guarantee a safe environment for peace and development. For too long political violence and competition has destabilised the political and socio-economic development efforts (Research participant 20/08/2018, Midlands Province).

The arguments raised are all valid, what is important is not historical and ideological attachments or constitutionalism. What is important is national development, poverty reduction, self-reliance and increased choices and freedoms for the common people. These were the objectives of the revolution. However, some are now putting more weight on constitutionalism or revolutionary heroism under their political parties MDC or ZANU PF respectively. Therefore, a system that destroys partisan polarisation is a must if development is to be achieved.

Violence and the ZDF

The ZDF has been heavily attacked by the public for perpetrating violence in the country. Munemo (2012:317) observes that a number of NGOs and political parties always forward reports claiming that organisations such as the central intelligence, army, and the criminal investigation department conduct joint operations with ZANU PF youth and militia to violently ill treat opposition supporters.

In contrast to the above observation, Muzondidya (2009) posits that between 4 April and 20 June 2008, ZANU PF supporters launched Operation Makavhoterapapi (Operation where did you put your vote?). He argues ZANU PF youths and militia harassed, murdered, abducted and tortured members of the opposition in a terror and intimidation campaign. These assertions indicate that there is lack of separation of ZDF operations and those of political parties. The violence perpetrated by ZANU PF youth and militia is always associated with ZDF operations. Former President Mugabe, at an Extraordinary ZANU PF Congress in December 2000, declared that “our party must strike fear into the heart of the white man. They must tremble.” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009:71).

On violence that has characterised elections in Zimbabwe; a research participant, a lecturer at a university in Masvingo Province explained that;

The public should learn to distinguish the ZDF members from ZANU PF militias, war veterans and youth from the Youth Training Services or the Green Bombers. All these entities have been playing active roles in the Zimbabwean politics. However, they are not as disciplined as the ZDF members. Our national enemies are always quick to prematurely associate violence with the security sector (Research participant 11/09/2018, Masvingo Province).

The use of war veterans by politicians in violence and human rights abuse is also supported by Mhanda who attributed the violent behavior of some war veterans to lack of adequate training during the war. Mhanda (2011:179) observe that;

Mugabe leadership banned the basic political orientation and education programmes and replaced them with lectures on party history and party leadership... One of the consequences of this was the loss of discipline among ZANLA fighters which showed itself in their harassment of peasants in the war. The full effects were to manifest themselves much later, from 2000 onwards, during fast track land reform and the bloody election campaigns conducted by ZANU-PF.

Mhanda argues that the bulk of the war veterans associated with human rights abuses related to the post-2000 were trained during post-ZIPA period; they lacked deep political consciousness stemming from political education. Manson (2010:19) also posits that the violence that was recorded in post-2000 elections was perpetrated by ZANU PF, the intelligence organization, and veterans, rather than the security forces.

Cawthra (2010:25) also passes an interesting observation that Mugabe resorted to Maoist type of tactics of creating militia, first the 'war veterans' and then youthful 'Green Bombers'. The use of ZANU PF core supporters in the form of these Green Bombers and war veterans sort of militarised the Zimbabwean society, as the opposition party MDC also came up with its fighting youth to counter the ZANU PF militia. These civilian militarised operations resulted in wide spread violence across all the political parties.

In an interview with a journalist in Gweru, in the Midlands Province it was revealed that, it was dangerous, inappropriate and unprofessional for military officers to be actively involved in politics, criticising opponents to the extent of issuing threats or engaging in violent activities. "Serving military personnel must desist from openly sharing their political party affiliation. It is dangerous, inappropriate and unprofessional" (Research participant 15/10/2018, Gweru).

On the nature of civil-military relations, a significant number of participants expressed their concern on the declarations made by the late Commander ZDF, General Vitalis Zvinvashe. One of the research participants a teacher and trade unionists pointed out that;

Civil-military relations became non-existent when the military Commander, General Zvinvashe, together with other security leaders started to openly dictate to the masses characteristics of presidential candidates. Mugabe allowed our military to dictate those who are to occupy the top post for our country. I am happy that he tasted his own medicine and died a bitter man. The military facilitated the end of his 37 years rule (Research participant, 11/09/2018 Masvingo).

General Chiwenga, then ZDF Commander, Air Marshal P Shiri, then AFZ Commander, Commissioner General Chihuri, then ZRP boss, Commissioner General Zimondi, then ZPS boss, Major Generals D. Nyikaramba, M. Chedondo, and T. Mugova all made political statements while declaring their loyalty to ZANU PF (The Zimbabwe Independent, 9 October 2015). It is important to note that all the ZDF officers who were accused of being loyal to ZANU PF have since left the organisation, some taking up civilian appointments and others going into politics under the new regime of President ED Mnangagwa.

Alao (2013:18) comments on the involvement of the ZDF in political and socio-economic issues by pointing out that, the Zimbabwe defence and security institutions found the

distinction between 'regime' security and 'national' security blurred. This is possibly because of the nature of liberation war that made the separation of the 'military' from the 'political organ' particularly difficult. The comment by Alao, reflects the reality for the ZDF mainly because of the historical bonding. Mugabe's regime that ruled the country for 37 years used the military to fight the colonialists. The same Mugabe and his nationalist military officers, who fought white oppression, are now being expected to separate politics and military. Naturally, this is an almost impossible task. It would be wrong timing for those who are pushing such an agenda. The nationalists and the freedom fighters should have been separated at integration in 1980 when Zimbabwe formed a new military force. Trying it now or any time in the near future is disastrous. A military system by its nature is very solid and difficult to penetrate or manipulate. In the military, soldiers are recruited, appointed and promoted by the senior officers, unlike in the political party where members voluntarily join the party and compete for positions. Therefore, the separation of the ZDF from the political system might not happen overnight. What people should aim to work on is to have common strategy for national peace and development supported by the military and politicians from all political parties.

Bangidza (2016:160) observes that ZDF Senior officers aged 40-49 years (71%) and 50 years and above (54%) felt that the ZDF should be aligned to a particular party and ideological orientation. He further argues that;

Those who said the ZDF should be political and partisan participated in the struggle for independence of Zimbabwe; an experience that imbued them with a strong partisan-cum-nationalist sensibility which explains why they continue to play a role within the ruling party ZANU PF and government (Bangidza, 2016:160).

Another scholar, Williams (2010:403) points out that the ZDF is a well-trained, educated and professional army whose image suffered because of political abuse. He further posits that relative to most African militaries, Zimbabwe's armed forces are generally well trained, professional and educated soldiers. Years of continuous attack by western countries and political polarisation have undoubtedly jaded the civilian view of the military in Zimbabwe.

ZDF Involvement in Economic Affairs

The involvement of the ZDF in economic affairs is supported by many people. However, some points out that there is room to improve the operations. For instance, Nyakudya (2019:133) argues that;

The challenge , however is that this military involvement moved from the institutional to the personalised level where the military elites individually and collectively entered into economic ventures on the basis of their position in the military and their relations with the ruling party. The critical question, therefore, is why the ZANU PF government allowed the securocrats to personally benefit from economic enterprises at the expense of the fiscus? I argue that this was all part of the politics of patronage borne out of Robert Mugabe`s reliance on the security for political survival which began in the mid to the late 1970s and intensified from the late 1990s.

Research participants also raised similar sentiments on regime protection and politics of patronage as they argue that, military involvement in economic affairs was designed by Mugabe to deliberately empower his supporters economically. The observations were that politics of patronage distorted the whole system and spoiled a theoretically noble idea.

There was great consensus that the idea of military involvement in economic affairs was good for national development. Many people wanted the operations to be at institutional level and to benefit the nation and not individuals. To perfect the MOOTW and stop the politics of patronage and regime protection research participants suggested some possible solutions. A prominent businessman in Harare suggested that;

All civil-servants including the security services should not be allowed to engage in personal businesses or any other income generating projects (Research participant 23/07/2018, Harare).

This is a sure way to stop patronage and corruption in the public sector including in the ZDF. Such regulations had been in place since the colonial period, it was only relaxed in post-2000 when many civil-servants together with politicians get involved in personnel business. Even in China where the military heavily gets involved in economic affairs through MOOTW, serving members are prohibited to engage in personal business until they retire. Therefore enforcement of such laws in Zimbabwe is necessary if MOOTW are to gain popular support.

Afrobarometer Paper Number 27 (2006) reports that military rule was rejected in Zimbabwe but it was quick to posit that the military attracts public trust far much better than the other state institutions. The 2006 report states that;

It is vital to note that Zimbabweans are not anti-military per se. Zimbabweans accept and even appreciate the military's constitutional role but do not encourage military role expansion or its excursion into the political arena as a ruler. This explains why the military as an institution still attracts considerable public trust compared with other state institutions. Thus exactly half of adult Zimbabweans said they trust the military.

Clearly, the ZDF is not free from public attacks and negative perceptions but relative to other state institutions it commands great respect and trust from the public.

5.4.2 ZDF MOOTW IN SUPPORTING CIVIL AUTHORITIES AND COMMUNITIES

The ZDF MOOTW to support civil authorities and communities tends to focus more on the civil- military relations role. However, they also have an impact on national security and development. These operations were viewed less controversial since they have clear objectives and rules of engagement. However, MOOTW, such as Operation Maguta/Sisithu and Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle, got the attention of many people who passed both negative and positive comments.

During a lecture at the ZNDU, the Commander ZNA articulated that;

Although the Zimbabwe National Army may undertake military assistance tasks in support of various government departments, the main task of the Zimbabwe National Army remains that of defending Zimbabwe's sovereignty, territorial integrity and the safeguarding of national interests (Lt Gen Chimonyo, 2018)

The AFZ Commander, Air Vice Marshal (AVM) E. Moyo during a public lecture at the ZNDU commented that;

In the past we have readily performed casualty evacuation and, search and rescue roles to assist people in times of disaster such as floods and traffic accidents. However, Cyclone Idai was unlike other previous operations. Weather conditions were not conducive, but our air crew remained determined to save the lives of many people who were affected by the disaster (AVM E. Moyo, 2020 ZNDU).

The Minister of Defence and War Veterans expressed gratitude for the support rendered by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to the ZDF during its operation to assist Cyclone Idai victims in Zimbabwe;

The assistance of SANDF to Cyclone Idai affected communities is highly commendable as it demonstrates strong bilateral defence and security cooperation in MOOTW in the region (The Herald, 13 August 2019).

Regional cooperation in MOOTW is important since it enables defence forces to concentrate their efforts during disaster management operations. Unity of effort is one of the principles of both war and MOOTW. Therefore the cooperation of the ZDF and the SADC forces in MOOTW is highly recommended.

Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle

In an interview with the Director of Civil-military relations it was revealed that ZDF participates in national housing projects to provide accommodation to the citizens;

Zimbabwe is a signatory to the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, endorsed by the United Nations, under that states have the responsibility to protect its people. Therefore, our aim to launch Operation Garikai was to provide accommodation to citizens of Zimbabwe (Director CMR AFZ Headquarters 10/07/2018, Harare).

He further explained that;

The ZDF was engaged to work with relevant Ministries. The involvement of the ZDF in construction work started far back in the 1980s. ZDF constructed schools, bridges, dip tanks, clinics among other facilities in the communal areas around the country (ibid).

The practice of using the military in national construction projects is not unique to Zimbabwe. In China, the People's Liberation Army carries construction projects under MOOTW as already demonstrated in chapter 4 of this study.

MOOTW aimed for Support to the Civil Community were supported by many people. A Ward Councilor, Mr Ananias Mubutwa, of Bikita South Constituency, commented that; "We salute the ZDF for the patriotic and professional service it displayed during the operation to assist victims of Cyclone Idai" (Research participant, 23/08/2018 Bikita Masvingo Province).

The Manicaland Provincial Administrator, Mr E. Seenza, said that; “Our operations were made effective by the coming of the ZDF. The AFZ helicopters allowed us to quickly access all needy areas in Manicaland Province”.

An officer from the Civil Protection Unit of Zimbabwe also commented that;

The ZDF is a key player in disaster management programmes in Zimbabwe. They assist in transportation of drought relief food, casualty evacuation, search and rescue operations during floods and other national disasters. In all these operations they professionally served lives of both humans and livestock in the affected areas (Research participant, 03/11/2018 Harare).

Food Security through Command Agriculture Programme

The involvement of the ZDF in Food Security was also supported by then Commander of the ZDF who declared that;

“And programme iyi (Command Agriculture) tichaitisigira and tinoitsigira tichitsigira Commander-in-Chief wedu kuti inotofanirwa kutoti iitike kusvika yapera.” (We are going to support this programme in support of our Commander-in-Chief (then President Mugabe) so that it occurs to its end) (The Herald, 27 June 2017).

General Chiwenga, the then Commander ZDF further points out that, “The military was part of Command Agriculture’s implementation by virtue of Air Marshall Perrance Shiri’s, the then AFZ Commander, vice-chairmanship of a subcommittee involved in steering the programme” (ibid).

The public announcement of the involvement of the ZDF in food security programmes shows high degree of transparency in the ZDF MOOTW. Transparency is one of the key characteristics in the conduct of MOOTW. Again, the involvement of the ZDF leadership through Air Marshall Perrance Shiri, then Commander of the AFZ, indicates a commitment at the highest level by the ZDF to promote human security through food provision.

ZDF MOOTW in Supporting Civil Authorities and Communities in Post-Mugabe Era

The ZDF has a record of being a professional force. Against all accusations of being a tool of protecting former President Mugabe’s regime, the post-Mugabe force wishes to maintain its

professionalism and serve its society. The Commander ZNA in a public lecture at the Zimbabwe National Defence Course acknowledged changes in world system and assured that ZNA should equally be flexible and adopt ways beneficial to itself and its society;

The world is very dynamic and the ZNA should be dynamic as well. In this regard, I foresee an organisation that is flexible enough to embrace new ways of doing things that are beneficial to it and the society at large. Such changes should be a product of thorough research and well thought out actions to avoid making arbitrary changes that may harm the smooth functioning of the organisation (Lt Gen Chimonyo, 2018 ZNDU).

During Operation Restore Legacy, Major General SB Moyo promised Zimbabweans to enjoy their rights in an environment that promotes development in line with liberation war aspirations. He posits that;

The ZDF wishes that, you enjoy your rights and freedoms and that we return our country to a dispensation that allows for investment, development and prosperity that we all fought for, and for which many of our citizens paid their supreme sacrifice (The Herald, 15 November 2017).

The MDC national Spokesperson, Mr O.C Gutu, a day after President Mnangagwa was sworn in, called for the military to return to the barracks. He requests and warns that;

The MDC also needs a firm and unequivocal re-assurance that security services, particularly the Zimbabwe National Army shall promptly be returning to their barracks and never again will they play an active role in determining who rules the country...Put bluntly, the security services should never, ever be active political players going forward (The Zimbabwean Mail, 25 November 2017).

The statements from the ZDF leadership and main opposition political party seem to have some resonance. They are all willing to have a new system that promotes development. However, the opposition is not offering any alternative way of engaging the military in the national development matrix. They continue to sing the old song - military must remain in the barrack.

The Commander of the AFZ in a presentation at ZNDU pointed out that;

The AFZ seeks to continue to perform four key missions as follows: 1) Defending Zimbabwe's airspace, 2) Providing an effective counter-strike force, 3) Providing air support to the ZNA and other arms of Government, and 4) Supporting the Civil Powers (AVM E. Moyo, 2020).

The four key missions of the AFZ include support to civil powers and this involves MOOTW. Therefore for anyone to assume that the ZDF will remain in the barracks might be a wrong assumption. Better to craft strategic policies and models where political parties and the military will harmoniously work together for national development.

Generally, there is lack of appreciation of the good works of the ZDF due to lack of comprehensive data and absence of conscious information dissemination on ZDF MOOTW. Significant scholarly work on security services and not the ZDF was produced (Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003, 2006), Rupiya (2006, 2013) Nyakudya (2019), Williamson (2010), Afrobarometer Report 27 (2006)). Those who studied the ZDF tend to focus on particular cases, events or single operations and what they present tend to lack trend analysis and holistic contextualised view. For instance, one may study the ZDF focusing on Gukurahundi (an operation conducted by the Fifth Brigade in the Midlands and Matebeleland provinces in the early 1980s), election skirmishes and violence 2008, rule of law and democracy, military rule among other issues. Judging citizens perceptions on such a narrow front may not give true picture of the national challenges. By looking at the ZDF non-combat roles through MOOTW, the study tried to cover the identified gaps in civil military relations and MOOTW literature as well as gaps in their practical implementation in Zimbabwe.

Sentiments were raised about the bad habits of the ZDF in their non-combat operations over the years. Galtung (1996) observes that the military has developed a range of very bad habits but it has virtues such as good organisation, courage and willingness to sacrifice. He further argues that there is no need to abolish the military but to give it new tasks. In the Zimbabwean context, the new tasks can be achieved through MOOTW. There is room to further refine and focus the conduct of MOOTW to promote human security and development (Nyakudya, 2019). Refinements to MOOTW can be achieved through amendments to the Constitution and Defence Act as well as in the promotion of teaching good civil-military relations and professional practices to politicians and military personnel.

Legal guidelines on military can be based on historical and cultural factors among other factors. For instance, it is very difficult to try to break the bond between ZANU PF and the military through legal guidelines. The BBC news (15 November 2017) notes that all of Zimbabwe's security chiefs have worked with Mr Mugabe since the 1970s war of

independence and the bonds formed in that struggle are difficult to break. Historical and cultural factors cannot be ignored in the Zimbabwean context when people are considering reforming civil-military relations and the conduct of MOOTW by the ZDF.

5.5 SUMMARY

Chapter 5 has presented the ZDF MOOTW operations in detail. The chapter started with a scan of the national environment and development challenges. The study reveals that the ZDF conducted several operations that were categorised under five types, namely: operations for safeguarding rights and interest, operations for counter-terrorism and stability maintaining, operations for emergency rescue and disaster relief, operations for protecting national interests outside the borders and operations for community assistance programmes.

The chapter also contains gathered perceptions of the Zimbabweans on ZDF MOOTW since one of the study objectives is to examine the Zimbabwean civilians and military personnel perceptions about the ZDF MOOTW. The study established that different perceptions were raised. Political party polarisation provided for the justification for the mixed feelings. The thesis reveals that there are core supporters of ZDF MOOTW who draw the basis of their support from 1) the historical origins of the ZDF, 2) the changing nature of threats to national security, 3) the human security protection perspective and 4) the sanctions and regime change agenda. On the other hand, some research participants raised 1) lack of military professionalism, 2) failed regime protection, 3) human rights abuse, and 4) constitutionalism to maintain that the military should remain in the barracks and never to participate in national development issues through MOOTW.

Apart from the above polarisation challenges, there is evidence that:

1) The ZDF MOOTW mainly focuses on the human aspects of development. It promotes the provision of medical care, education, housing, livestock and crop production, food distribution, search and rescues services, demining operations, disaster relief services and other social programmes. These operations benefit the population, especially the rural poor. The disadvantaged and the rural poor people are empowered to develop their potential.

2) The significant different perceptions towards ZDF MOOTW are pointers that there are challenges in the nature of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe that have potential to escalate the polarisation into conflicts.

The next chapter examines the impact of the ZDF MOOTW on national security and development.

CHAPTER 6

THE IMPACT OF THE ZIMBABWE DEFENCE FORCES MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the impact of the ZDF MOOTW on national security and development. The aim of the study is to explore and describe the perceptions, attitudes and practices relating to the impact of MOOTW on development and security, from the perspective of both the military and the civilians. The chapter focuses on: the impact of ZDF MOOTW on national objectives; credibility of the role of the ZDF in national development; militarism, professionalism and development in Zimbabwe; ZDF MOOTW and political development and the post-2000 national challenges. The ZDF's participation in national development agenda through MOOTW has political and socio-economic benefits to the society. However, the involvement also has some negative implications.

6.2 IMPACT OF THE ZDF MOOTW ON NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

National security and development are key objectives on the Zimbabwean Constitution. Chapter 2, National Objectives, Section 13 (1) of the Constitution states that, "The State and all institutions and agencies of government at every level must endeavor to facilitate rapid and equitable development..." The Section further stipulates the promotion of self-reliance, fostering agriculture and bringing balanced development between rural and urban areas of Zimbabwe. Section 206(1) of the same Chapter of the Constitution also state that, "The National Security objectives of Zimbabwe must reflect the resolve of Zimbabweans to live as equals in liberty, peace and harmony, free from fear, and in prosperity."

The ZDF MOOTW, as covered in Chapter 5, have a wide range of activities that have impacted on national security and development. The organisation, as per Constitution endeavored to facilitate national security and development through:

1. Promoting self-reliance on the disadvantaged members of the society by assisting in the establishment of educational facilities such as vocational training centres and schools;

2. Promoting food security by participation in food production and distribution first under Operation Maguta which was up-scaled to national programme code named Command Agriculture;
3. Promoting balanced development through focusing MOOTW on rural areas. The ZDF constructed schools, clinics, community halls, deep tanks, roads, bridges and solar systems across the rural areas of the country ; and
4. Promoting peace and harmony, post-2000 Zimbabwe was politically unstable.

The above list is not exhaustive; some of the ZDF struggles in the national security and development matrix will be covered in subsequent sections of this chapter. From the previous chapter, the study detailed ZDF MOOTW as well as the attitudes and public perceptions towards the military and civil-military relations issues in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabweans and those beyond its borders raised mixed feelings towards the non-combat role of the ZDF. Traditionally, the role of the military is to fight wars to protect citizens. Chapter 4 detailed MOOTW in the USA and in the PRC. It was revealed that in the contemporary world, national security has broadened, and the military has assumed new roles. Therefore, it is expected that people react differently to the new roles of the military. However, the different perceptions towards ZDF MOOTW are mainly based on political party polarisation. This trend has negatively affected the employment of militaries in many developing nations. Many African societies use the military only for wars and coups yet the military can be positively employed for national development through MOOTW.

6.2.1 THE POSITIVE IMPACT: MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL POWERS, COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

The Zimbabwe National Defence Policy (1997:26) empowers the defence forces to undertake Military Aid to the Civil Powers in Zimbabwe. The ZDF conducts operations to assist the police with maintenance of law and order, riot and mass movement control, and protection of vital installations. The ZDF also works with Civil Protection Unit in disaster management, causality evacuation and, search and rescue operations. It also worked with the ZRP to bring sanity in the Chiadzwa Diamond fields. The Zimbabwe Parks and Wild Life Authority always need the ZDF assistance in its anti-poaching activities in the major national parks and

game reserves. The ZDF also collaborates with ZRP, Immigration Authorities and Zimbabwe Revenue Authority to conduct border patrols and surveillance activities.

The Minister of Defence and War Veterans Affairs has since declared that;

The ZDF is always ready to participate in various programmes aimed at advancing socio-economic development in the country. For instance demining activities, community assistance programmes aimed at assisting disadvantaged communities. Several communities benefited in the bridges, schools, and hospitals constructed by the ZDF. Recent beneficiaries are Katema community in Gokwe, Negove in Mberengwa, Rusununguko High school in Goromonzi and Murongwe in Dande (The Herald, 13 August 2018).

The involvement of the ZDF in the demining activities, construction of hospitals, clinics and schools, donation of computers to rural schools to promote e-Learning and donation of books and school furniture promote development and empowers the disadvantaged communities.

The ZDF also participates in government attempts to solve management challenges in the, National Oil Company, Grain Marketing Board, National Railways of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Electricity Supply, Water Supply and other state enterprises that provides basic supplies to the masses. The post-2000 economic challenges affected the management of government enterprises, low salaries and high inflation forced many employees to resign in these enterprises. Generally, there was poor service delivery and frequent strikes and demonstrations. The involvement of the ZDF in economic activities elicited a sharp rebuke from some sectors of the population. However, some sectors of the population maintain that the ZDF was involved in MOOTW to solve a national crisis. In an interview with one of the military commanders who participated in these operations, it was revealed that;

We were called to restore normalcy and save the lives of fellow citizens who were being threatened by riots, demonstrations and uprisings. The opposition parties and some of their supporters in these State Enterprises intend to use mass uprisings to effect regime change and national instability (Research participant, 12/05/2017 ZDF Headquarters, Harare).

Involvement in Traditional Leaders' Day Initiatives. The Zimbabwean society is deeply divided on political grounds and such political polarisation is greater in rural areas than in urban areas. In the rural areas villages and wards characterise themselves by their political party orientation. The Commander ZNA in a public lecture to the Zimbabwe National Defence University participants of Course Number 8 of 2020 pointed out that;

The ZDF has adopted a strategy to unite our people through its involvement in Traditional Leaders' Day. Our Traditional Leaders, unlike politicians they work with all people within their communities (Lt General Chimonyo, 2020 ZNDU).

The Traditional Leaders are believed to be neutral in their dealings with the society and they are respected by all members of the society regardless of political orientation. Traditional Leaders include Chiefs and Headmen. These are not elected or appointed leaders, but leadership is through traditional practices and norms. It is a hereditary leadership. The ZDF, therefore, aim to work with them in the various MOOTW programmes in order to reduce poverty and promote social integration. Overall, the initiative aim to promote localised participation in development work by the rural and underprivileged members of the society. Such attempts aim to promote equal development and access of resources to all the people regardless of their race, region or political inclination. Most importantly, to promote good civil-military relations and remove negative perceptions that, "I fear soldiers because they kill" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003b). The aim is consistent with Harris (2004) 's observation that MOOTW has security, economic and attitudinal benefits to the nation.

The thesis established that in the rural areas of Zimbabwe, it is difficult for the ZDF MOOTW to be conducted in conjunction with politically elected leaders. The politically elected leaders are the Councilors, Members of Parliament and Senators. These are always a vehicle of societal division and hindrance to national development. In an interview, in the Communal Areas of Chief Zimunya in Manicaland Province it was revealed that;

I would rather work with my local Headman (a traditional leader) who is politically neutral than with the Councillor (a politician) who forces me to buy a party card and join his political party (Research participant, 09/08/2018 Zimunya Manicaland Province)

Politicians in this case are a threat to national development and peace. They divide society on political party lines.

During the liberation struggle the guerrillas never worked with such leaders, one wonders why ZANU PF in post-independence adopted the dual administration system. Currently, the parallel structure, that is; the Politically Elected Leaders and the Traditional Leaders, besides causing societal division, is a burden to national budget. They both draw resources from the taxpayer's money for the same developmental goals. Such weaknesses in the national

administrative system need attention if social and economic development is to be achieved. Development failures normally lead to military interventions in civilian affairs. The most important consideration is a revisit to the Zimbabwean multiparty political system in order to come up with one that promotes non-frictional civil-military relations with all political parties.

In summary, through MOOTW the ZDF provides military aid to the civil powers, provides community assistance to the disadvantaged people and promotes social integration in the politically polarised society. The ZDF MOOTW benefits include:

1. Disaster relief functions, the ZDF always work with Civil Protection Unit in disaster management, causality evacuation and, search and rescue operations;
2. Building national pride, in performing in national and international events, graduation ceremonies, and protections of vital installations;
3. Providing employment, in all the major public constructions the ZDF got support from civilians employed by the parent ministries;
4. Modernisation of communities, achieved through provision of services in education, health, social welfare, training and assistance in transport and communication sectors;
5. Provision of an environment suitable for political and socio-economic development; through MOOTW the ZDF maintained peace to encourage domestic and foreign investment in Zimbabwe regardless of the emergence of several challenges in post-2000;
6. Provision of human security, the ZDF provides both national and state security. It maintains peace, together with the police, during political skirmishes, demonstrations, food distribution, and in national gatherings;

7. Reduction of the likelihood of war and terrorists activities, the existence of an active military force through MOOTW deters potential aggressors. Post-2000 Zimbabwe was politically charged but relative peace has been maintained; and

8. Provision of regional and international benefits, through MOOTW the ZDF participated regional and international games, combined training sessions and peacekeeping operations.

6.2.2 *THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE ZDF MOOTW*

Militarisation, Commandism and authoritarianism in Zimbabwe

The ZDF MOOTW and the secondment of the ZDF members to revive and expedite cases of serious maladministration in various state and non-state organisations have been termed ‘military approach’. The approach has negatively affected the nature of civil-military relations in the country as perceived by the other sectors of the society. Such a negative perception has resulted in arguments that commandism and authoritarianism through the military approach are the major causes of the Zimbabwean development crisis. The arguments raise civil-military relations and MOOTW concerns that need serious attention.

The adoption of the military approach to management of these state enterprises reveals two important dimensions in the national security and development agenda. First it was threat identification. An increase in the number of corruption cases, mismanagement of resources, and general institutional flaws in many state institutions was perceived a regime change agenda strategy by opposition party members in these organisations. It was believed that poor service delivery, shortages and all the other challenges were to cause socio-economic problems to the masses. The opposition political parties will get any opportunity to mobilise the angry and hungry masses to rise against the government to effect regime change.

Second it was a counter measure to the regime change strategy. The counter strategy was developed basing on the chemistry between the political leaders of the ruling party and the military chiefs. The two groups have complete confidence in each other that has its roots in the liberation struggle. The ruling party had no doubts that ZDF was a willing and genuine partner to solve the country`s problems in the management of state institutions and

enterprises and ultimately to counter the regime change agenda. The ZDF then started to second its qualified and retired members to some state enterprises on these grounds and some other considerations highlighted in some sections of this thesis.

As a counter-counter strategy the opposition political parties regard the secondment of ZDF personnel to the state institutions and enterprises as militarisation. The involvement of the ZDF in any civilian affairs is considered as partisan and unprofessional conduct of the military.

The perpetuation of commandism and authoritarianism have drawn the attention of many scholars in Zimbabwe (Sithole (1997), Raftopoulos & Mlambo (2008), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003b), (2010), Sachikonye (2011), Chitiyo & Rupiya (2005) and Rupiya (2013)). They all argue that commandism and authoritarianism are some of the factors that contributed to the multi-layered nature of the post-2000 crisis in Zimbabwean. Kriger (1995) strongly presented the matter in her critique of the conduct of the liberation war by arguing that force and intimidation were used on civilians by freedom fighters. Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005) also argue that the strained civil-military relations in post-2000 need attention if the involvement of the ZDF in national affairs is to gain national character.

In Zimbabwe, post-2000 is characterised by demonstrations, strikes, political violence, armed robberies, carjacking, cattle rustling, illegal mining activities, and poaching among other anti-social activities. The military involvement in assisting police in maintaining law and order raised authoritarian issues from the public who felt they were denied their freedoms.

The believes that the Commandist and military oriented development approaches were perceived negatively simply because Zimbabwe adopted a constitution, administration system, civil-military relations and a multi-party political system that were all inconsistent with her history, geographical position and political orientation. The thesis argues that the adopted systems made it almost difficult for the leaders to end the African poverty cycle. Zimbabweans need food, health, education and other basics; just provide the basics to broaden the people`s choices, the freedoms shall be inherently added.

The Commandist Approach to development is not always a disaster or authoritarian oriented. Libya under President Kaddafi was accused of commandism and authoritarian but the Libyans never experienced hunger and poverty. Currently, the Asian giant, the People's Republic of China, is always accused of commandism and authoritarianism, yet it is becoming the world's biggest economy. Our experiences since the adoption of western systems post-independence and experiences elsewhere should force all Zimbabweans and poor Africans to revisit their systems. Changing political parties without introducing Afrocentric development approaches will not end poverty for Africa. Africa will continuously be exploited by the developed nations under the new strategic plan of democratic governance where political parties are sponsored by the imperialists to destabilise a nation. A political-military system that will protect the exploitation of Africans by powerful nations is long overdue.

The Commandist Approach was employed during the liberation war and colonialism ended in Rhodesia. The nationalist commanded the masses to fight the colonialists. However, only political office bearers were changed little was done to change the socio-economic system. No wonder why in the post-2000 new crop of politicians also want to enjoy the benefits that accrues to political participation in African politics. Changing leaders or political parties without changing the colonial systems will not end the poverty cycle.

Post-2000 Zimbabwe is under USA and western countries sanctions. A form of asymmetric warfare aimed to effect a regime change. The ZDF is being forced to remain in the barrack and never to participate in the development agenda. The western countries want to perpetuate their dominance through neo-liberal policies agitated by opposition political parties and civil society groups. The Commandist Approach to development became the only viable option to protect Zimbabwe. If the ZDF is to adopt the western model of civil-military relations and attempt to fight the regime change agenda under that western military professionalism they will definitely lose the liberation war legacy of ending colonialism, promoting self-reliance and saying no exploitation. The military is the only government institution with the highest potential to effectively implement or support the Commandist Approach to development. However, there is need for the ZDF to perfect its MOOTW in order to promote national development. No doubt, if MOOTW are to be successfully implemented in Zimbabwe, other weaker nations suffering from similar development challenges can draw lessons. Against all odds, China adopted a unique development strategy

where the military actively participates, and it will soon achieve its vision. This could justify why western countries are against the Afrocentric Military Based and the Commandist Approaches to development.

From another perspective, the Commandist Approach has to promote human dignity if national security objective is to be achieved. The Zimbabwean Constitution (S206) states, “The National Security objectives of Zimbabwe must reflect the resolve of Zimbabweans to live as equals in liberty, peace and harmony, free from fear, and in prosperity”. The Approach has to ensure that Zimbabweans live as equals, no upper class or privileged groups who will unfairly get access to national resources disadvantaging other members. Such structures existed in the colonial period, and it continued in many post-independent African states. The Commandist Approach if adopted must ensure that all human beings are free from fear and have freedom of choice for goods and services. Therefore, the military in its endeavors to achieve national security and development has to priorities human dignity and never to promote and safeguard the interests of the minority groupings.

Mismanagement and Lack of Transparency

Mismanagement and corruption are serious challenges in Zimbabwe. These challenges remained high on score board even after the involvement of the ZDF in national socio-economic activities. The thesis gathered that some progress was recorded in the performance of some organisation where ZDF members were seconded. However, the mismanagement and corruption in some organisations such as the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), National Oil Company of Zimbabwe and Chiadzwa Diamonds in Marange area continued. In an interview, it was revealed that the ZDF involvement in parastatal like NRZ and in the Diamond Companies in Chiadza failed to yield the intended results as the organisations continued to downsize and close operations (Research participant, 2018 Mutare).

It was also gathered that the involvement of the military in socio-economic activities lacked clear rationale for military involvement and exit strategy. The populace needed a clear exit strategy and rationale for military involvement in MOOTW.

Some sectors of the population consulted in this study wanted the budget for MOOTW to be openly debated. Openness was pointed out as one of the MOOTW characteristic in chapter 4. Furthermore, the research participants wanted costs related to the funding of MOOTW to be widely debated by the intended beneficiaries or parliament where possible.

6.3 THE ZDF MOOTW AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The involvement of the military in civilian operations is likely to undermine its image and credibility (Molomo, 2001). Equally, the involvement of the ZDF in MOOTW was perceived by some sectors of the community as the key driver of the authoritarian tendencies of the Mugabe regime since the formation of the MDC in 1999. It was perceived that the Mugabe regime was not ruling by consent of the people and by law, but have used the military to employ oppressive measures like what used to happen in the colonial period. In an interview, a National Youth Council official of the MDC commented that;

“Mugabe used the Smith`s template to use the military to oppress and ill-treat Zimbabweans for 37 years. Therefore, our civil-military relations should not promote the competition for political parties to own the military in order to use it to oppress the masses (Research participant, 29/03/2019 Harare).”

Molomo (2001) laments that authoritarian tendencies in many African governments have not only alienated constituencies, but have also ushered in militarism in politics. The military is seen historically and internationally as a weapon of the state that is used to provide state security. Relevant to this study was the use of the military by the state in its secondary roles; the use of the military in developmental affairs through MOOTW. However, the use of the military in these civilian operations has presented challenges on the image and credibility of ZDF. Zimbabwe became to be known as a military state. *Mugabe militarised our country-* was a common response among the research participants. Then the key question becomes how to harmonise MOOTW and development work in Zimbabwe?

Militarism in Zimbabwean politics has its roots in the colonial period. Nyakudya (2019) and Rupiya (2003; 2005) both argue that the military and ZANU PF have a complex symbiotic relationship that was established long back during the liberation war. Both the nationalist and colonialist political manouvres were strongly backed by the gun. At independence, the military groups were integrated by the BMATT to form the new defence force (details covered earlier in chapter 3). Hence, militarism in Zimbabwean politics is a culture that politicians, scholars and policymakers should never pretend to ignore in favour of the traditions and civil-military relations practices of western countries. It is important to highlight that some scholars, for instance, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2004:11) recommends that;

The country is in a very deep crisis and needs immediate change of ideology as well as a leadership reorientation in line with the prevailing local, regional and international trends.

Surely, a change in civil-military relations ideology is a requirement for national development. The practice of preaching western ideologies, adopting western military control practices, western biased constitutions and other western leadership values has to be challenged. One research participant strongly argued that, “There is need to align our history and our practice with the legal instruments used to control the military if Zimbabwe is to achieve sustainable development”. These sentiments are similar to what Benyera (2017) observes for Lesotho. He argues that the trend of adhering to constitutionalism at the expense of the role played by historical factors that still haunt nation building was flawed. Clearly these are indicators that the control of the military and its involvement in MOOTW for development in multi-party democracies needs further scholarly attention.

The study gathered that the use of the military and war veterans under the Commandist Approach in development was wrongly perceived by the agents of western practices as Mugabe regime protection. It was suggested that this was likely to have been caused by the late introduction of MOOTW in the Zimbabwean development efforts. A political scientist with one of the leading universities in Zimbabwe explained that;

We made an error as far back as 1980 when we got our independence by having war veterans in the security sector only. We let the western educated civilians who were employed in the civilian sectors to mess up our liberation movement agenda. War veterans who were the real politicians and development conscious sector of our population were deployed to the village or to the barrack far away from politics and development. So by adopting the military approach or commandism approach

together with MOOTW we are doing the right thing, only that it is coming too late (Research participant 04/03/2019, Gweru).

6.4 MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE

There are various theories on military professionalism and causes of military interventions in politics. Huntington (1968) observes that military intervention is likely to occur in states lacking institutionalised political cultures, which also suffer economic hardships and social division. Donasco (2015) states that military intervention in politics is very common in democratic or totalitarian regimes and there are various theories on the causes of military intervention, among them; the historical theory, the custodian theory and social economic development theory. Dike (2003) cited by Rupiya (2015) argues that, the custodian theory places the military as the ultimate custodian of the nation`s constitution and intervenes when the pillars of the same are openly violated. In line with these theories and arguments, the Zimbabwe Constitution provides the legal functions of the ZDF. The Commander of the ZNA, Lt Gen EAC Chimonyo warned agents of regime change agenda and promised that the military will remain professional;

As security forces and guarantors of peace and security, we realise that stability of the nation needs to be safeguarded from proponents of the regime change who pride themselves in sowing seeds of disharmony and anger among our people. ...we will not be deterred from our constitutional mandate of defending Zimbabweans from both local and external forces of negativity (The Herald, 27 August 2019).

Therefore, the intervention by the ZDF in political and socio-economic development destabilisation by those aiming regime change were set to be in the confines of the constitution. Therefore, the sentiments of the General can be viewed and interpreted from the historical theory, the custodian theory and social economic development theory perspectives.

The ZDF is a professional force that was created under the watchful eye of the British (Sithole, 1997; Alao, 2013; Bangidza, 2016). British Military Assistance Training Team played a key role in the integration of the colonial Rhodesian Security Forces and the nationalist forces ZANLA and ZIPRA forces (covered in chapter 2). The Rhodesian Security Forces had standards, values and cultures of the British Forces. However, it was a colonial force and by that nature it had some oppressive characteristics. For that reason, in terms of military professionalism the ZDF got the best exposure since its formation. The fact that

nationalist forces, guerrilla forces were turned into professional soldiers indicates that ZDF is a disciplined force with great malleability. Former guerrilla commanders were turned into professional soldiers and attended military courses and got awards at prestigious UK and US military colleges. For instance, former ZDF commanders General SG Zvinwashe, General CGDN Chiwenga, Chief Air Marshal P Shiri and the current commanders General PV Sibanda (ZDF Commander), Lieutenant General EAC Chimonyo (Army Commander) and Air Vice Marshal E Moyo (Air Force Commander), all attended several military courses in top military academies, including the UK and the USA. The ZDF leadership and members are adequately trained and exposed to international standards. The local training military institutions were set by the Rhodesians and some were established post-independence under the BMATT mentorship. It is because of their high good reputation within the region and beyond that Zimbabwe has become a training hub for other regional defence forces. Through such high training standards the ZDF has acquired high skill levels in both combat and non-combat operations to become a disciplined and professional force. However, the discipline and malleability can be abused by politicians. Politicians always have limited term of office therefore they can manipulate a force to suit their personal demands. It was against such background that the study sought views and perceptions of the masses on ZDF roles in development issues.

6.5 THE ZDF MOOTW AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Benyera (2017) observes that the control of the military is the ultimate political goal in African politics. In Zimbabwe ruling party is keen to be regarded as the rightful owner of the military while the leading opposition party positions itself as the future master of the military. Such a charged and polarised security environment requires military officers with expertise and skills in political, economic and social development thinking to guard against abuse by politicians.

The nature of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe became a focal point of concern in post-2000. In this period scholars described the military as being used by the ruling party to protect President Mugabe's regime that has been in power for nearly four decades (Rupiya (2015), Williamson (2010)). However, some (Ndlovu-Gatheni (2003), Bangidza (2016) and Nyakudya (2019) have maintained the stance that the ZDF is a professional army that was

built under the BMATT and is widely respected nationally and internationally. Sithole (1997) observes that ZANLA forces that formed the new army were influenced by the British Army to act professionally. He further argues that the ZNA continued to cultivate professionalism to a degree that cannot be matched by many African militaries (Sithole 1997:133). The historical involvement of the ZDF in national politics makes the nature of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe a unique case. The failure of political leaders, academics and society in general to recognize, adapt and train for political and socio-economic roles of the military as inherently required by the current global security environment threatens Zimbabwe's development and human security grand strategy.

The approaches used by civilians to control the ZDF were influenced by three sets of structural strategic action factors. First, the legacies of colonial authoritarian rule provided conditions conducive for civilian control. The colonial regime had systems in place to monitor and control the behaviour of the military. Second, it is the freedom fighters' tradition of collusion with politicians which was enforced during the liberation war. The nationalist ideological indoctrination set the freedom fighters to be under civilian control. The military's ability to work independent of politicians with total political power was eliminated during the war. For instance, ZIPA, a joint military force between ZANLA and ZIPRA forces with potential to wage the war independent of political parties was disbanded and some of its leaders were detained in prisons until independence in 1980 (Mhanda, 2011). Third, the Matabeleland uprisings threatened the ZANU PF rule and this shifted the government's attention from the newly integrated forces to the Korean trained force (Fifth Brigade) that was used against disgruntled ex-freedom fighters and their supporters in Matabeleland. The Fifth Brigade was believed to be loyal to the ruling party and its creation was described by Nkomo the late Vice President and founder of ZIPRA as the formation of a political military as opposed to the creation of a national army (Nkomo's Letter to Mugabe). Sithole (1997) also says President Mugabe created the Fifth Brigade because the professional ZNA army was not going to perform such operations in Matabeleland. This increased the reliance of the state, the Mugabe regime, on military support to retain political power. However, it must be clear that the image of the ZDF MOOTW in post-2000 should not be linked to past incidences such as the Matabeleland dissident issues. Further, it must be known that the Fifth Brigade was long dissolved, an indicator that the regime realised and corrected its tactical error.

The involvement of the military in such political work reflects the nature of civilian political institutions. Weak civilian political institutions, divided civilian elites and civic organisations created the environment for state military collusion. Social and political tensions have provided a strong foundation for the military's involvement in governance. The economic crisis that resulted because of these tensions further created a conducive environment for the military's involvement in economic development in support of the government. The ZDF increased the scope and dimension of its involvement in politics, social and economic activities through military operations other than war. This consequently raised mixed feelings among the Zimbabweans on their perceptions of their military.

The unique nature of the ZDF and the contemporary security environment demands that both military and political leaders aim to work towards national development. First there is need to redefine and widen the scope of military professionalism to embrace political awareness and get rid of the principle of having an apolitical military. Secondly, the military should get heavily involved in nation building, those who are against the involvement of the military in MOOTW, need to appreciate the new roles of the military in post-cold war era where environmental security is the key to national development. National threat to human and state security is no longer invasion by tanks, bombers and troops but is now nontraditional threats like terrorism, hunger and unemployment among others. The post-2000 development crisis in Zimbabwe is really a political struggle that was partially resolved by the military through MOOTW.

6.6 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE ZDF MOOTW AND THE POST-2000 CHALLENGES IN ZIMBABWE

The post-2000 Zimbabwean development challenges resulted from a set of multiple factors. The ZDF's involvement in civilian affairs being one of the factors. Mlambo (2014:238) posits that "The post-2000 Zimbabwe crisis, by all accounts was the worst peace time decline of any economy". No doubt, the magnitude of the crisis drew international attention. However, the international reactions to the Zimbabwean crisis were mixed. Taylor and Williams (2002) cited by Mlambo (2014) argue that western countries responded to the

Zimbabwean crisis by public denunciation of President Mugabe's leadership styles, imposition of international sanctions and calling for regime change. In line with their argument, Britain and the European Union imposed travel bans, financial sanctions, arms embargoes and commodity boycotts.

In 2001, the US passed ZEDRA that set the steps that were to be followed by US and international financial institutions to put severe economic pressure on Zimbabwe. The US further imposed sanctions and travel bans on government officials including some members of the ZDF.

Raftopoulos (2009) gave the interpretation of these sanctions from two perspectives, the MDC and the ZANU PF perspectives. He observed that for the opposition MDC the measures were a just response to the repressive and authoritarian policies of the Mugabe regime. For ZANU PF, sanctions affected not only targeted individuals but the entire country's economy and military. He argues that ZANU PF's argument is based on terms of US Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Act of 2001 under which the US set to oppose any new loan, credit facilities or debt reduction extended by International Financial Institutions to Zimbabwe. The move prevented any meaningful investment and development taking off in the beleaguered country. During a lecture at the ZNDU Commander AFZ informed that, "The AFZ is operating in a constrained environment due to sanctions imposed by the USA and its allies" (Moyo, 2020). Zimbabwean political parties viewed the sanction issue differently. Such political differences between ZANU-PF and MDC on perceptions towards sanctions on Zimbabwe further strengthen the bond between the military and ZANU-PF.

It is important to note that western countries' reaction to the Zimbabwean crisis failed to resonate with many African leaders' positionalities. Africans perceived Mugabe as a hero, hence they admired him. Many African leaders did not take a hard stance on Mugabe (BBC News, 2005). Porto (2013) opines that Mugabe and ZANU PF tactfully and successfully turned sanctions issue into a *badge of honour* that portrayed him a victim among Pan Africanists. Similarly, Mlambo (2014) observes that Mugabe raised the Pan-Africanism banner to gain support from some developing nations that continued to support him. Porto (2013) further notes that action by the USA, Canada, Australia and the EU did not find favour with AU or the SADC and this diluted the sanction effect. The observation sounds logical;

many African leaders remained silent on alleged human rights abuses perpetrated by Mugabe. For instance, at various meetings of the AU or UN some leaders openly support the Zimbabwean Government's policies, against the widespread western media attack on Zimbabwe.

Interesting to note was the “quiet diplomacy” strategy that was adopted by South Africa under President Mbeki; not forgetting the all-weather friendship that was pronounced between Zimbabwe and China. Zimbabwe through the Look-East Policy deepened friendship with Asian countries, Malaysia and Pakistan, among others. In post-2000, many ZDF officers got their military training in these Asian countries.

Another important factor to the Zimbabwe crisis was the promise of American aid to the envisioned MDC government in post-Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe under ZEDRA. The MDC leaders used to boast that they have money from western friends to rebuild Zimbabwe. Such open attacks to the Mugabe regime might have prompted extraordinary activities by the military through MOOTW. Nyakudya (2019) also added that changes in political circumstances forced the security sector's engagement in the socio-economy affairs to be more aggressive and visible in the post-2000.

Even though there were different responses from the international community regarding the Zimbabwean crisis in general and the ZDF MOOTW in particular, the Commander ZNA warned that;

Conduct of the ZNA in the discharge of its duties has a bearing on the country's re-engagement drive. How the international community perceive the ZNA is important in international relations. A highly trained, disciplined and professional force that perceives such threat is required (Lt General EAC Chimonyo, 2020 ZNDU).

The statement clearly indicates that in the post-Mugabe era the ZDF leadership was extra careful on the way it discharge its duties, and was more concerned to have a highly trained , disciplined and professional force.

Overall, the Zimbabwean crisis and the subsequent military involvement in development matrix divided the international community. The Pan Africanists, Russia, China, and India

among other key international players sided Zimbabwe against western and former colonial detractors (Rupiya, 2013).

6.7 SUMMARY

Professional modern militaries participate in national development issues through MOOTW. These military ventures have potential to make positive or negative contributions to national security and development. In line with the objective of the study to examine the impact of ZDF MOOTW, this chapter has revealed that ZDF MOOTW in Zimbabwe have both negative and positive impact on the national security and development path. The positive impacts include military aid to the civil powers, community assistance and social integration. The military assists the local authorities in maintaining law and order, the police during demonstrations and strikes, the department of wildlife in preventing poaching, the immigration department in border controls, and other government departments such as health and education in service provision. The military together with local leaderships also works with vulnerable communities in food production, construction and infrastructure development projects especially when disasters strike. The majority of the activities aim to improve the living conditions of the poor and the vulnerable.

On the other hand, the chapter has revealed that the negative impact centres on regime protection, commandism and authoritarianism. The military intervention in political and socio-economic activities in post-2000 period is viewed as protecting ZANU PF regime that has failed to come up with sustainable development policies. It therefore relies on the military to extend its leadership through commandism and authoritarianism. Zimbabwean political parties also responded differently to the ZDF MOOTW. The argument by opposition political parties is that the military is being partisan. The ruling party maintains the liberation war principle that, the gun should remain subordinate to its politics. The international community also responded differently, some countries such as USA attacked President Mugabe and ZANU-PF regime, closed links with the ZDF and supports the opposition parties. However, some countries like China continued to support Mugabe and the new regime.

The thesis concludes that, firstly, ZDF MOOTW have positive impact on national security and development. Secondly, the ZDF is strongly under the influence of liberation war

principles that it has to participate in the national development agenda, serve the people and to let the people develop their potential as was the aim of the liberation war. However, the ZDF commitment and efforts to serve the people is being affected by politics. Political parties compete to control the military. The Zimbabwean society is deeply divided politically such that developments efforts through ZDF MOOTW are perceived partisan. The nature of civil-military relations is problematic. If the country is to achieve sustainable peace and development, a new governance system that reviews the current political-military system is required. The next chapter summarises the ZDF MOOTW successes and challenges.

CHAPTER 7

THE ZIMBABWE DEFENCE FORCES MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR SUCCESSES, CHALLENGES AND WAY FORWARD

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter has summarised the key issues that emerged from the whole study by stating the ZDF successes, challenges and recommends a way forward in order to solve some military related issues in the Zimbabwean development challenges. Several issues emerged that depicts ZDF successes and challenges that need further interrogation. Issues on the ZDF origin, attitudes and perceptions towards the ZDF, justification for MOOTW, nature of civil-military relations, social polarisation, manpower development in the ZDF and lastly the future of MOOTW and military professionalism are covered in this chapter.

The structure of the analysis in this chapter was guided by the following four considerations that formed the basis of the research questions: 1) origin of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces; 2) new trends in civil-military relations and military operations other than war; 3) perceptions of the people about the Zimbabwe Defence Forces and 4) the impact of MOOTW on political, social and economic development in Zimbabwe.

What kind of an army is the ZDF? How did the ZDF originate? Where are its origins? What is the nature of the civil-military relations in Zimbabwe? How and why does the ZDF conduct MOOTW? This thesis was framed on these questions. It was assumed that by presenting a background of the ZDF, it's MOOTW in post-2000, gathering perceptions about the ZDF and by providing an analysis of all these issues under the civil-military relations conceptual framework the nature of the ZDF MOOTW would be depicted from various multiple angles.

The interpreted findings of the study reveal successes and challenges of the ZDF from which a number of suggestions are proffered as a way forward. The post-2000 Zimbabwean development challenges are synonymous with the rise of the former President Mugabe's dictatorial western perspective and the popularisation of the opposition political party, MDC.

The ZDF MOOTW drew the attention of local and international analysts who strongly debated on the militarisation of the Zimbabwean state. Due to lack of first-hand accurate information or deliberate efforts to discredit the Mugabe regime, many authors published somewhat debatable issues on ZDF's involvement in the national security and development matrix.

7.2 THE ZDF ORIGIN: WHERE IS THE ZDF COMING FROM?

The original intention of forming the liberation party armies, ZANLA and ZIPRA was to set up a new independent and prosperous nation. Africans in Rhodesia were suffering; it was the duty of the enlightened soldiers in these liberation movement armies to serve them, to fight for them and to create a regime that was to empower the hungry, unemployed and disadvantaged Africans. Thus, they sacrificed their lives and freedom during the war for the peoples' fundamental interests and not for the interests of greed politicians who want to manipulate the gun for self-interests.

During the war, both military commanders and political leaders across all levels strictly abided by the mass rule of discipline. Discipline was enforced through cultural values and traditions of the masses whom they were serving. Could it be now true that the liberators have now turned against the same masses?

ZANLA and ZIPRA seized power and built a new Zimbabwe. The greatest error that was made mainly due to the British influence was to combine or integrate ZANLA, ZIPRA and Rhodesian Forces to form the ZDF. The Zimbabwean crisis has its roots in the origin of the ZDF which was badly influenced and created by the BMATT.

First, the split of some former ZIPRA forces from the ZDF in early 1980s resulted in atrocities in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces (Gukurahundi). These Gukurahundi issues are still unresolved and this was the first military related incident to divide the nation. This negatively affected the development trajectory of the Matabeleland region. Civil-military relations were badly set from as early as that time. In an interview with a war veteran from Gwanda, Matabeleland Province the research participant passed a very important point; "*We*

(from Matabeleland) don't join a Shona army" (Research participant, 09/08/2017 Gwanda). The ZDF was then perceived as a Shona (tribal) army. Ironically, the international community led by the UK, US and their allies paid no attention to the mess they had created unlike what they did in post-2000 disturbances when whites lost land to the land hungry Zimbabweans. Anorld (2005) in Manson (2010) summed it up when he concluded that, only rarely has Britain shown real concern about black against black violence.

The ZIPRA split and the subsequent social and political disturbances are not yet fully accounted for to date. However, Alao (1995) argues that the integration process in Zimbabwe was unique because there were three opposing military forces with considerable political and military differences whereas in other situations only two forces were integrated. Dabengwa (1995) also observed that the conversion of guerrillas into conventional soldiers was not an easy task. Several scholars can present their views on the issue but the reality is that the British idea and initiative in the formation of the ZDF through integration of the three forces was disastrous.

Secondly, the Rhodesian Security Forces were not apolitical, they worked to promote the interests of the white minority political party. The newly formed ZDF was professionalised by the BMATT through adopting the Rhodesian Forces' colonial and oppressive system. The adopted system was purported to have an apolitical military yet in real terms it was serving the interests of colonial government which was there to protect minority interests. In an interview with a ZDF member and former freedom fighter it was gathered that some freedom fighters felt cheated during the integration process: *We realised that the BMATT cheated us to be apolitical, yet the RSF fought for their political party* (Research participant, 23/04/2019 Harare). The interviewee's statement has similar connotations to what was openly declared by the ZDF leadership under General Vitalis Zvinavashe (2000) that;

To this end, let it be known that the highest office of the land is a 'straightjacket' whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will, therefore, not accept, let alone support or salute anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people.

Since then, General Constantino Chiwenga, Major-Generals Douglas Nyikayaramba, Martin Chedondo, Trust Mugova have all made political statements while declaring their loyalty to ZANU PF (The Independent, 9 October 2015).

This was a clear indication that the British imposed system of an integrated apolitical defence force had failed. The ZDF leadership adopted the Chinese style. Whitaker (2014) also points out that the ZNA ended up a political army. One wonders how the British expected the ZDF to be apolitical when they combined military generals from highly politicised fighting forces to form the new national military force.

The failure gave rise to a polarised and divided nation which is characterised by conflicts, human rights abuse by hungry politicians, hunger, unemployment, sanctions, poverty, inflation, and lack of service provision across the country (schools without teachers, hospitals without nurses, doctors and drugs). The Mugabe regime adopted several strategies to restore normalcy as was discussed in earlier chapters. The military through MOOTW made several contributions (covered in Chapter 5) which were interpreted differently by both locals and the international community.

Again, the involvement of the ZDF in civilian affairs can be traced back to the BMATT training phase and professionalisation era. Whitaker (2014:328) observes that “from the beginning of the integration exercise the military was involved in military affairs”. Under the BMATT mentorships in the early 1980s the ZDF, then, was heavily involved in civilian affairs namely: 1) Operation SEED, an operation that allowed soldiers to work economic development of the nation. 2) Gukurahundi (Matabeleland Province and Midlands Province Disturbances), the then ZDF was used to squash political disputes in Matabeleland region and several thousands were killed under the operation. It is therefore, hypocritical for western countries, especially the UK to impose sanctions on ZDF and Zimbabwe for human rights abuse in post-2000.

The open declaration by ZDF Generals of their loyalty to ZANU PF was what was deliberately prevented by the British through the integration process. Since independence, the winning party should have formed its national defence force which was to be loyal to the Party and Government. The tragedy of post-independence African states is the formation of apolitical militaries that can be easily manipulated by powerful nations. Under these

apolitical settings African militaries, through dubious national constitutions, are instructed to be loyal to the government of the day. The imperialists will always act to change these governments at any time by sponsoring opposition parties.

It is important to note that in many African countries powerful nations destabilise the peaceful environment conducive for development through creation of opposition parties. Opposition politics has derailed development in Africa, as exemplified by the Zimbabwean case. The pressure from western countries for African countries to form apolitical militaries needs thorough and logical debates by all progressive minds.

In Zimbabwe, the thrust for the liberation armies, ZANLA and ZIPRA to serve the masses was totally removed and they were to adopt the Rhodesian Forces` thrust to oppress the masses. By design, the organisational structure of the ZDF favoured the propagation of Rhodesian Security Forces` values and principles. The RSF personnel were made to retain their colonial ranks such that they occupied almost all command and administrative posts. The few lucky senior officers from the liberation armies who had distinguished themselves as commanders were given high ranks. The unlucky ones, especially those who displayed guerrilla traits, were reduced to low ranks. They were regarded as recruits. The BMATT together with RSF used selection tests to admit desirable elements into the officer corps and appoint the fighters into command posts. Alao (1995) laments that, the set-up created a superior-inferior relationship between the guerrillas and the RSF. By so doing the BMATT clandestinely rebuilt a Rhodesian Force using the ZANLA and ZIPRA forces. Ironically, former Prime Minister Mugabe gave the BMATT the mandate to professionalise the new military organisation. This professionalisation removed the core principles of having fighters who were to serve the masses. It is important to mention that this error was realised late by the ZDF leadership. It was in the early 2000 that they established the Civil-Military Relations Department that was to rekindle the spirit to serve the masses among the ZDF members.

The BMATT further westernised the former ZANLA and ZIPRA fighters by sending potential future commanders to attend military courses in British Military Academies. Locally, they opened military schools for grooming and professionalising the guerrillas to become conventional soldiers. To further neutralise the desire for military men to serve his fellow comrades, the BMATT demobilised the liberation fighters and recruited new members who were presumed easy to turn into professional soldiers. Again, in post-2000, ZDF

leadership increased the number of its officers who were attending courses in eastern countries such as China, Malaysia and Pakistan. Locally, civil-military relations education was introduced in all military schools and participation in MOOTW activities increased.

7.3 MOOTW AND DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE: WHY MOOTW?

Not everyone has embraced the revolutionary ideas in military roles that allows military to conduct MOOTW. Samuel Huntington is one among the vocal critics of standing peacekeeping and humanitarian force. Huntington (1957:43) argues that, “a military force is fundamentally anti-humanitarian: its purpose is to kill people”. Huntington clearly argues that the purpose of the military is war. However, he believes that military should have primary and secondary roles. “All such roles should be spill-over uses of the Armed Forces which can be performed because the services possess the organisation, training and equipment that are only maintained to defend the nation” (Huntington, 1957:43). Therefore, the secondary roles, which are the non-combat roles, should be performed because the military possesses equipment and certain virtues that must help its society. Similarly, Foster (1993:27) posits that, “The primary purpose of the military must change demonstrably and fundamentally from war fighting to nation-building, peace-keeping and humanitarian assistance”. The ZDF is structured and mandated by the constitution to perform the secondary roles.

MOOTW are those operations undertaken by military forces to safeguard their country`s national security and developmental interests, that do not constitute a war (Gaoyue and James, 2019). MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995:1-1).

As by definition, MOOTW are conducted in response to identified specific issues in the national security threat matrix. MOOTW are responses to changes in: 1) the nature of warfare from inter to intra state war; and 2) the meaning of security from territorial security to human security. The intra-state war involves the government forces versus sponsored groups in the form of political parties and or civil society. These wars aim to destabilise and effect regime change. Territorial security is based on stronger military capable to defeat military invaders whereas human security is based on having national development conscious military

personnel capable to counter threats to human security. The thesis established that constitutional and professional limitations on the part of ZDF officers and Zimbabwean Government officials bound them not to openly declare strategic goals of the ZDF MOOTW. However, from experience and analysis of pattern, nature, and types of ZDF MOOTW as well as national history and contemporary national threats, one was tempted to make an argument.

The temptation was to argue that ZDF MOOTW strategic goal was continuation and restoration of the liberation war objectives: national development, self-reliance, political, social and economic independence of the previously oppressed Africans. President Mugabe`s government felt that it was being threatened by former colonisers and their friends who called for regime change. Opposition political parties and civil society supported by the former colonisers adopted soft strategies like mass demonstrations, riots, political violence, maladministration practices in government departments and state enterprises, calls for security sector reforms, debates on presidential legitimacy, exchange rate manipulation among other activities. Some members of the society argue that all these activities were calculated to cause human suffering and pressure on the government. The thesis concluded that this was viewed as intra state asymmetric warfare and threat to human security. The Government of Zimbabwe and ZANU PF party fought this war through ZDF MOOTW. Therefore, thesis logical analysis points that ZDF MOOTW was set to strategically fight regime change agenda in order to maintain and restore liberation war legacy and to promote Afrocentric political and socio-economic development.

Another important reason to support the ZDF MOOTW is stated in the national constitution. The Constitution of Zimbabwe through Section 213 empowers the ZDF to participate in MOOTW. Section 213 (2) states that;

With the authority of the President, the Defence Forces may be deployed in Zimbabwe a) in defence of Zimbabwe b) in support of the Police Service in the maintenance of public order; or c) in support of the Police Service and other civilian authorities in the event of an emergency or disaster.

The study gathered that MOOTW provide several benefits that include; security benefits, economic benefits, modernisation, builds national pride, civil/disaster relief functions,

enhances capacity for international peacekeeping operations and international pride among other benefits.

The conduct of MOOTW in other nations enables governments to work harmoniously with their population for political reconciliation, economic revival, social cohesion and effective use of external non-governmental assistance. Chapter 4 covers MOOTW in the USA and the People`s Republic of China. The US and UK increasingly see development and post-war reconstruction as key means of winning “hearts and minds” in the support of their conquest of Iraq and Afghanistan (Mac Ginty & Williams 2009).

Similarly, the Chinese military is involved in a wide range of national development projects. Thus, we have seen the securitisation of development in major economies of the world. The involvement of the military of developing nations should therefore never be discouraged; rather it should be perfected to address national interests and challenges. Military involvement in development should be in line with the national level of development or national interests just like in the case of the USA and the PRC. The USA aims to maintain international dominance; China aims to grow its economy to surpass the USA hence the differences in terms of MOOTW focus and prioritisation.

On the other hand, Zimbabwe aims to achieve political and socio-economic stability hence the ZDF MOOTW tends to focus more on such areas. However, it is important to note that the same western countries tend to interfere when militaries of developing nations participate in national development issues, especially when the military is against their favourite candidate or political party. A significant number of ZDF officers were placed under US, UK and EU sanctions for participation in MOOTW which they perceived as protecting Mugabe`s regime.

The ZDF MOOTW supporters also allege that the former colonisers together with political parties with an anti-revolutionary agenda are working against peace and development in Zimbabwe and that has resulted in the crisis that calls for extraordinary measures by the state. The state had the privilege to use one of its trusted institutions the ZDF. The Commander ZNA in a public lecture at the ZNDU in 2020 explained the military attributes that makes it a

unique institution that can be employed by the state to carry out civilian operations. He explained that;

Intrinsic attributes in armies that include a symbolic status of nationalism, military virtues of sacrifice, organisational superiority, loyalty and discipline leverage them to be critical components in nation building. Changes to modern threats as well as professionalisation of the military and its changing role in society has now resulted in armed forces increasingly being called upon to assist in civilian operations (Lt General EAC Chimonyo, 2020 ZNDU).

Molomo (2001) observes that military involvement in civilian operations is likely to undermine its image and credibility. Pertinent to this study, is the use of the ZDF by the state in its secondary roles. The use of the military in developmental affairs is mainly achieved through MOOTW. Conversely, the use of the military in other civilian operations has presented challenges on the image and credibility of the military in Zimbabwe.

To this end, the country needs a comprehensive development policy framework supported by all political parties. Without such a policy the involvement of the ZDF in MOOTW will continue to undermine its image and credibility. Consequently, the involvement of military in secondary roles or developmental roles in multi-party democracies needs considerable scholarly attention.

The involvement of the military in developmental activities was perceived as a key driver of the authoritarian tendencies of the Zimbabwean Government since the formation of the main opposition, MDC in 1999. It was pointed out that the Mugabe regime, just like the colonial regime used the military to employ oppressive measures. However, the Minister of Defence and War Veterans Affairs Hon. O Muchinguri in the post President Mugabe era promised that;

Under the New Dispensation, the ZDF has adopted an Inter-sectional Approach towards management of defence and security issues. The ZDF is now giving more attention to activities that aim at improving the livelihoods of our people through community assistance projects (The Herald, 13 August 2018).

The other reason why the ZDF engaged in MOOTW was to counter external pressures; sanctions and regime change agenda. The Mugabe regime rightly responded to such pressures by engaging an organised and loyal institution. First, sanctions were imposed by the US and

western allies on the ZDF for its involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo war, yet Ugandan, Burundian and Rwandan forces who also participated in the war were not sanctioned. On the issue of regime change agenda, some blame Mugabe for using the military in developmental roles that may be considered to be anti-democratic, but Rupiya (2013:3) warns that;

Although we may argue that Africa is entering a new phase, the residual effects of former colonial and imperial machinations seeking to re-engineer a comeback through other means has not been discounted. Hence, in the complex, multi-layered and multifaceted Zimbabwean debates, the charge against Western powers seeking regime change fall into this rationale and is accepted as one of the challenging realities that has continued to colour the crisis.

President Mugabe might have abused the military but the above observation must awaken Zimbabweans. The former colonisers were using Mugabe's perceived weaknesses on military management to effect a regime change through calls for democracy and alleged human rights abuse. The probability is high that Mugabe became a victim of former colonisers because he successfully used the same military under ZANLA to end colonial rule. Subsequently, in post-2000 he used the ZDF which is heavily dominated by ZANLA elements to stop the *re-engineered comeback* strategy of the imperialists. A significant number of African militaries including the ZDF fought for their people's independence, and that independence should translate into locally driven development; better life for Africans. Therefore, the thesis argues that, military intervention in development should not be abused by politicians for personal gains, and should never be condemned by those with imperialists' motive.

Finally, ZANU and its military wing, ZANLA, together with ZIPRA, waged a war against poverty and oppression in Rhodesia. They won the war to establish and create a nation Zimbabwe with the professional military now called ZDF. It was indeed a partial victory of the war because Zimbabweans are still in poverty; a deep developmental crisis characterises the post-2000 period. Therefore, one may logically argue that, the involvement of the ZDF in MOOTW is a continuation of the original objective to end poverty in Zimbabwe. The issues of professionalism, human rights abuse, security sector reform, corruption, nepotism among other ills against the ZDF should never be used to obstruct the original purpose of forming political parties and their military wings in Rhodesia now Zimbabwe. The country continued to sink in poverty after political independence. Imperialists continue to side focus the masses

by raising human rights flag issues. There is need for Zimbabweans to continue the fight against poverty and capitalist oppression. Therefore, the argument is that; the only organised force or institution with history, experience, cohesion, determination, accountability, and discipline to advance that agenda in Zimbabwe is the military through MOOTW and not political party Y or X neither donor funds nor country Z. However, it needs strong civil-military relations that promote accountability and national development.

There is no doubt, over the years the institution has been adulterated and diluted by some greedy and irresponsible elements. The elements, that only focuses on personal interests and not on institutional and national interests. Therefore, the calls by some civilians and some military officers to perfect the conduct of MOOTW should not be considered lightly. There is need to perfect MOOTW and never to abandon it. Military officers should work for development and peace instead of being permanently confined to the barracks. Why wasting the taxpayer`s money on people who are not working for their incomes? Whilst they are ‘waiting’ for war to defend the territory let them fight war against poverty. Human security is now the core of establishing national security systems and institutions. The Commission of Human Security Report (2003), clearly states that, without human security, state security cannot be sustained and vice versa.

7.4 THE NATURE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN ZIMBABWE

In terms of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe there are three issues that affect ZDF MOOTW. The three main issues are; disparity between theory and reality, leadership through political-military bonds and use of wrong manual. These issues need attention.

7.4.1 THEORY AND REALITY IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Alao (2013:20) observes that, “Although in theory the Constitution is supposed to handle all issues relating to defence...the situation in Zimbabwe, as indeed, in many African states, highlights a major gap between these ideals and reality”. In line with this observation, the thesis established that the central issue regarding the nature of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe was the disparity between theory and reality. The thesis identified Zimbabweans

who are civil-military relations theorists, some who are civil-military relations realists and some who were forced by circumstances to be civil-military relations hypocrites. The theorists believe the military should be apolitical, non-partisan and loyal to an elected government. This group has the majority of those who have the ambitions to be in position of authority in public and non-public offices. They feel the ZDF is being used to block their freedom and access to national opportunities probably to loot resources. The extremists in this group have voiced their concern, arguing that, *“The military is partisan and pro-ZANU PF and was being used to protect Mugabe’s regime”* The group’s thinking is generally guided by the western neo-liberal democratic systems. The thesis argues that, this was wrongly applied as far back as at the ZDF formation during the integration period. The guerrilla warfare and the nationalist ideology could not be sustained by the formation of a non-partisan military.

On the other extreme end, there are civil-military relations realists. These believe the military should be partisan, and loyal to the ruling party. In an interview with a former Minister and strong ZANU-PF member and an extremist in this group of civil-military relations realists it was declared that, *“All government employees, including the security services must support and be loyal to the ruling party”* (Research participant, 13/07/2018 Masvingo). The civil-military relations realists believe that the western style of civil-military relations is not in sync with national history and the national political military ideology; they want the perpetuation of the strong politico-military bond for sustainable peace and development. The majority of those who subscribed to this thinking had some nationalist thinking influenced by eastern ideologies. Their thinking should have been guided by the liberation war experiences where politicians and military wing were one thing (covered in Chapter 2).

In the researcher’s point of view, these two groups are not in any form a threat to development in Zimbabwe because their views are possible options that are being practised in some well developed nations like the US and the PRC. The greatest challenge for the country was the third group; civil-military relations hypocrites. They do not practice what they preach. Many African nations have a constitution and legal instruments that states that the military should be apolitical, non-partisan and must be loyal to an elected government. However, they adopt and preach this just to please the western democratic countries to gain their political and financial support. In real terms, for instance in this study, scholars argue

that, “The Zimbabwean defence institutions were the greatest tool subsequently used by Mugabe to ensure his effective hold onto power” Alao (2013:18). Research participants passed similar sentiments. The subsequent unconstitutional use of the military on some instances gives the western countries an opportunity to impose sanctions and effect regime changes.

From the above analysis, a deeper understanding of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe becomes imperative. Civil-military relations are society based, therefore Zimbabweans need to identify common societal values, norms and practices that best support national development agenda. From this perspective, civil-military relations theorists and realists in Zimbabwe need to find a common ground to form a political-military system that promotes sustainable national security and development. There is no need to have Constitutional requirements just to pretend to be in sync with western practices or the so called international best practices.

The Zimbabwe Constitution through S208 prohibits the military personnel to actively participate in politics. They are not allowed to act in a partisan manner, or further the interests of any political party. The study gathered that this Constitutional requirement is the root cause of polarisation and development crisis in Zimbabwe. Militarism and perceived regime protectionism are derived and defined according to this section of the Constitution. Some participants in this study argue that political polarisation, human rights abuses, sanctions, international isolation and underdevelopment are revolving around this section.

On the other hand, some participants argued that the Constitutional requirement that prohibits military participation in politics is a foreign culture, inconsistent with both Zimbabwean historical and contemporary practices. Historically, colonial regimes used the military in both political and developmental activities. Joint Operation Command (JOC) was established in 1977 in Rhodesia for the military to jointly coordinate civil-military activities (Chitiyo & Rupiya, 2005). On the other side, the nationalist operations were military driven, guided by ideology and principles that political power comes from the barrel of the gun. One research participant, a National Youth Council member of ZANU-PF in Harare stated that;

All Zimbabweans believed that there was no political party without a gun, and there was no power without a gun. Therefore, the Constitutional requirement to separate

the two (military and party) was pre-maturely and erroneously introduced in Zimbabwe (Research participant, 26/03/2019 Harare).

It was a surprise to get such a statement from a ZANU-PF National Youth Council member; many people would think that statement came from a war veteran. This is a clear indicator that the party has managed to pass its ideology to the young generation.

The view has some logical backing if one considers that the contemporary Zimbabwe Government was formed by nationalists who adopted the colonial governance system, and to make matters worse, the current ZDF leadership was formed from an integration process of the colonial and nationalist military forces. These military officers were political activists during the liberation struggle and acted in various capacities to promote human development and human security among the masses of colonial Zimbabwe. Therefore, to some extent some of the military personnel still feel it is their duty to participate in the national development activities.

Contrary to this view, some consider political-military relations beyond what is prescribed by the Constitution as violation of national laws. The majority of those who supported the view that the military should not participate in development and political activities do not believe in the historical bond between the military and political powers during the liberation struggle. This group believes in the Constitution and the western practices. They have the legal support and western support to advance their perceptions towards the nature of civil-military relations in the country. However, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:11) warns that;

What Africans must be vigilant against is the trap of ending up normalising and universalising coloniality as a natural state of the world. It must be unmasked, resisted, and destroyed because it produced a world order that can only be sustained through a combination of violence, deceit hypocrisy and lies.

No doubt, the political-military structure prescribed by the Zimbabwean Constitution is at variance with historical colonial system and post-independence practices as well as African traditions. This divergence has resulted in polarised society, violence, underdevelopment and divergences in citizens perceptions towards the ZDF. This has also negatively affected the role of military in its contribution to national development. Such conflicts and polarisations

need serious consideration. A significant number of conflicts and coups in Africa emerged as a result of political parties conflicts with military backings.

The key question to policy-makers, scholars, development practitioners, politicians and all concerned people of the region and beyond is: should Zimbabwe change its constitutional and legal requirements on political-military relations or it has to force the military and politicians to conform to the constitutional requirements?

The answer to the above question needs wide consideration of several factors. An attempt is to consider local and some international practices. Participants in the study proposed the consideration to adapt the Chinese military control system. The ideology that political power comes from the barrel of the gun; and the gun is subordinate to the political organisation, has proved an effective ideology for military control in Zimbabwe. However, with the formation of the main opposition party MDC, gun control became contested. Undoubtedly, this has turned to be the perennial source of conflict in the Zimbabwean developmental landscape. The November 2017 incident where ZANU PF used the ZDF through Operation Restore Legacy to change its leadership from Mugabe to Mnangagwa was a case example to illustrate that the gun was subordinate to politics in Zimbabwe. A relatively smooth change of political leadership and national presidency occurred in the country that shocked many politicians, scholars, military leaders and observers. Many people failed to fully comprehend whether the whole exercise was a coup or not a coup. This military manoeuvre which was celebrated even by the opposition parties and their western supporters, was described by one research participant as a complex puzzle: *it's always difficult to separate the ZDF and ZANU PF, and also to separate the ZDF and the masses of Zimbabwe* (Research participant, 23/04/2019 Harare).

The study therefore posits that the same ideology be adopted and effected at national level such that one political party becomes the major national political party that controls the gun and all the other political parties becomes minor parties that will work with the major political party that controls the military. Changing political parties that controls the gun has resulted in coups in Africa (recently in Lesotho) and has negatively affected national development in many countries. The suggested democratic and developmental system has worked for China which has a population of over one billion people, how can it fail in

Zimbabwe with population of around 14 million people? Zimbabwe needs civil-military relations systems that promote peace and sustainable development.

The thesis is supported by the fact that, originally ZDF formation and the national constitution were modelled on the British style. But over the years, specifically post -2000 Mugabe shifted towards the eastern style of leadership and military control. However, the constitution and administration structures were not changed to suit the new model. Hence Zimbabwe started to experience the crisis, polarisation, and the attacks from western countries. The western countries use the imposed constitution to attack the Zimbabwean leadership. A constitution and military management model that had expired since Mugabe looked east in post-2000.

7.4.2 A SHIFT IN MILITARY ROLE FROM POLITICAL -MILITARY BOND TO CIVIL-MILITARY FUSED SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The second critical factor identified through the study, on the nature of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe was and still is leadership legitimacy. Political-military bond has been the center of gravity for African leadership. However, in modern societies the center has shifted to socio-economic development. For instance in Zimbabwe, the leadership legitimacy challenge started far back during the liberation war, as covered in Chapter 2, ZANU PF leaders are ever installed by the military. Mugabe took over from Sithole through the military support, the Mgagao Declaration of 1975. President ED Mnangagwa was reinstated as the Vice President and later President of the Party through a Military Operation Restore Legacy. Over the forty years of Mugabe`s leadership of the party, some argues he used political-military bond to sustain his rule. So the nature of civil-military relations revolves around the political-military chemical bond. The thesis discerns that in modern societies like China, leadership legitimacy hinges on civil-military integration for socio-economic development. Regimes supported by sustainable socio-economic development are stronger than those supported by political-military links only. It was further established that the nature of MOOTW conducted by the ZDF is similar to that of the PLA. However, there is stability in China simply because of socio-economic development.

From the above observations, it is not surprising to note that the promotion of civil-military relations that enhances civil-military integration in socio-economic development is the new trend in military revolutionary affairs. For instance, in China, Kania (2019) rightly observe that;

Building upon earlier policies aiming to promote civil-military integration, a new national strategy for military-civil fusion, sometimes characterised as a grand strategy for China, was formally launched in 2015. The subsequent establishment of the Central Commission for the Development of Military-Civil Fusion in January 2017 has provided top-level design and mechanisms to implement the plans and policies intended to foster military-civil fusion, ... to realise this agenda. Since then, new plans and programs have highlighted certain dual-use and emerging technologies, including the Science and Technology Military-Civil Fusion Special Projects Plan released in August 2017, which emphasised priorities of biology, artificial intelligence, and quantum technology.

It is clear from Kania`s interpretation that, new trends in civil-military relations show civil-military *fusion* as a national grand strategy for development. The strategy is supported at the highest level and aims to use emerging scientific technologies for national development.

Kania (2019) further argues that;

For Chinese leaders, economic development has remained the urgent imperative for national legitimacy, and these increasing economic capabilities and attendant technological advancements have created a foundation for continued military modernization.

It is important to note that, the new trend and concept in civil-military relations primarily intend to reorient the use of military resources towards economic development. Therefore, academics and policy makers in Zimbabwe have to reorient their approach to civil-military relations and MOOTW towards national development as opposed to fostering civil-military relations for political and individual gains. Civil-military relations that revolve around politics have proved to be a threat to human security.

7.4.3 WHAT SHAPES CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS?

The western civil-military relations models adopted by many African countries including Zimbabwe might be a wrong manual to end development crisis. On the western civil-military

relations, Huntington long observed that the military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces namely:

1. *A functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security; and*
2. *A societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society (Huntington1957:2).*

Huntington (ibid) also questioned that:

1. *What pattern of civil-military relations is most compatible with American liberal democratic values? ; and*
2. *What pattern of civil-military relations will best maintain the security of the American nation?*

Huntington warns that it is necessary to define the nature of the officer corps when analysing civil-military relations of any country. Huntington's observations and questions are clear guidelines to assess the adoption of western civil-military relations by countries like Zimbabwe. Those were the considerations by the western military theorists when they crafted the US civil-military relations; what were the considerations when Zimbabwe adopted the western civil-military relations? Probably, it was only the British influence which lasted up to early 2000.

Threats to African societies are mainly political party conflict. In Zimbabwe, the dominant social forces, ideologies and institutions hinges on the military and the liberation war. The continuous trend of political party conflict dating back to ZANU versus ZAPU that resulted in the Matabeleland's over 20 000 deaths and the current ZANU-PF versus MDC that paralysed development have strong links with military operations. The officer corps of the ZDF is dominated by former guerrillas who mobilised the masses to end colonialism. They are development oriented. However, the political system which was adopted by early national leaders promotes conflicts and polarisation. These are rich indicators that the western civil-military relations models adopted by Zimbabwe might be a wrong manual to end the Zimbabwe development crisis.

7.5 POLARISED SOCIETY AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

The study revealed that Zimbabweans are heavily divided on political lines and their choice of development model, values and measures. The polarisation is based on political party affiliation, basically society is divided between the ruling ZANU PF and the main opposition party MDC. The politicians, scholars, journalists, peasants, youth organisations, workers and other members of the society are all divided on party lines. For instance, the scholars are divided into regime and non-regime scholars (Tendi, 2008 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Regime scholars are perceived as supporters of ZANU PF who regurgitates its nationalist agenda, whilst the non-regime scholars are perceived to advance the MDC regime change and western democracy agenda.

The ruling party inherited a colonial system that was autocratic and heavily supported by the military. The development model adopted since the 1970s is state centred. Rhodesia adopted this model because it was under sanctions. As from the 1980s, independent Zimbabwe enjoyed donor aid for developmental projects as well as funds from World Bank and IMF but this was short lived. Post-2000 Zimbabwe suffered lack of such financial support due to sanctions and international isolation through ZIDERA and other measures passed by the international community on Zimbabwe. Information gathered for this thesis indicates that the former President Robert Mugabe reintroduced the colonial system developmental model where the state becomes the main actor. Under that model, Mugabe regime nationalised land through the controversial land reform programmes and increased role of the state in directing national development. In order to achieve development just like in the colonial system it was argued that Mugabe regime militarised all state institutions. However, some pointed out that it was a survival strategy to protect his autocratic rule which was now being challenged by the MDC.

For instance, the involvement of the ZDF in economic affairs through State Enterprises and Parastatals (SEPs) got divided support. In 1980 Zimbabwe inherited 20 SEPs that contributed 40% to the GDP. However, in 2014 there were 179 SEPs contributing 13.4% to the GDP (Chiwenga, 2020 ZNDU Vice President Presentation). This is an indicator that the economy's capacity to produce affordable goods and services for the general public was

severely depleted. This had potential to cause civil disobedience, strikes, demonstrations and uprisings, thereby threatening national security.

The concept of SEPs originated as part of the socialist ideology to address market failures in the capitalist economic system. SEPs were set to provide affordable essential goods and services such as transport, water, electricity, grains, and fuel among other services. Over reliance on private companies alone that often creates monopolies and often overprices goods and services is always a threat to national security. Citizens may organise themselves for demonstrations and uprisings against the government. In 1998, Harare experienced food riots following increase in the prices of meal-meal by private companies, also in 2017 there were fuel demonstrations following increase in fuel prices. In North Africa, the Arab Springs were experienced in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt because of economic hardships. Therefore, poor economic performance can trigger social unrest and political instability. Vice president and former Commander ZDF General (retired) Chiwenga aptly observe that poor economic performance of SEPs in Zimbabwe was recipe for social and political instability (ibid). Therefore the involvement of the military in SEPs was viewed by some research participants as an essential way of achieving national socio-economic growth and development.

On the other hand, the MDC proposed a different development model. The main opposition party MDC was formed in 1999 as championing democracy, rule of law, promotion of human rights and all the other tenets of western democratic society. The MDC party promised Zimbabweans that the country will get funds from the western countries mainly US to end all the development challenges faced by the country. Western funds and aid from developed nations were expected to drive national development. The opposition party has the neo-liberal perspective or western perspective where development is regarded as a complex project that requires free trade, aid regimes, privatisation of public goods and services, and interactions at global scale with minimum government interventions. Development redefined as a private undertaking. The type of development model described by McMichael (2012) as global context development as opposed to the state-centred development that Mugabe and the former colonialist wanted. Some Zimbabweans especially the war veterans and ZANU-PF supporters indicated that they are not free to adopt the MDC model of development. They are still being hounded by the fears, pains and wounds of colonial white rule. They believe the MDC people are being used and funded by the former colonisers to reverse the gains of the

liberation. A research participant pointed out that, MDC is not an indigenous party, it is a west sponsored party to reverse the gains of our independence (Research participant, 2018, Gweru). Mlambo (2014) also echoed that, since 2000 there was a campaign to vilify the MDC as a puppet of the western countries. Such political accusations and divisions on party lines have also forcefully divided the population on the development model, values and measures. Hence, Zimbabwe becomes a nation which has to rethink its development path.

How a nation perceive development is very important in solving development crisis. McMichael (2012; 291) observes two important considerations when there is development crisis;

To say development is in crisis has perhaps a double meaning. On the one hand, that pain of financial adjustment register in the widespread rollback of public goods (education, welfare, health care, infrastructure, affordable housing), shrinking employment, and degraded environments. On the other hand, how we understand, and measure development (and what we value) is in disarray.

The pain of financial adjustments to improve provision of public goods was observed in national budgets and programmes in Zimbabwe. However, the political and institutional will to implement projects and programmes that benefit the masses to end all the national challenges have been continuously lacking. This might have forced former President Mugabe to use the military to plan and implement socio-economic programmes of the country such as Operation Maguta, Garikai among others. Nyakudya (2019:133) observes that there was increased militarisation of the state as “military intervened to provide lasting solutions to the endemic socio-economic and political difficulties”.

Secondly, on how people understand, value and measure development there is real crisis in Zimbabwe and in Africa. There is need for academics, policy makers, politicians and all development conscious citizens to focus on limits of conventional peace and development practices that had been dominant in Zimbabwe. It merged that the national crisis is due to lack of common values and appropriate measures for development yet Benyera (2017) suggests that political parties need to play complementary and not competing roles on national peace and development issues. The research participants also recommended that all political parties need to have common core values for development and acceptable general guidelines for implementation of national policies and programmes. Therefore the

Zimbabwean citizens especially politicians and scholars need to have a common development agenda. However, the scholars in Zimbabwe have been categorised as regime and non-regime scholars.

On measurement of development, the focus should be on human security, the well-being of all citizens. McMichael (2012) argues that decolonisation gave development a new meaning, where subjects are converted into citizens. In 2009 the Commission on Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress cited by McMichael (2012:225) reports that;

The time is ripe for our measurement to shift emphasis from measuring economic production to measuring people`s well-being. And measure of well-being should be put in the context of sustainability.

The above observation and recommendation should also awaken developing nations like Zimbabwe. Our development models should be focused on people`s well-being and be driven by context based sustainable practices. A research participant from an academic institution in Zimbabwe explained that national development should be guided by national development values and never to allow foreign players and agents to direct development goals. The research participant argued that;

Once our development model is state oriented it will be easy to measure national development in line with national development values. Measuring development in the context of global players such as NGOs, former colonisers, WB, IMF or any development agents will not bring the social, economic, political and military change we want (Research participant, 10/07/2018 Harare).

The greatest challenge is that Zimbabweans have perceived development as a political intervention and not as the improvement of humankind. Development has to be understood philosophically as the improvement of humankind (McMichael, 2012). In this context all citizens will work together to achieve a common development goal. Naqvis (2015) observe that development efforts must be inclusive in nature and only inclusive growth is sustainable in the long-run. Therefore, all political parties need a common vision for development. A common vision for national development will solve civil-military relations and ZDF MOOTW challenges.

7.6 MANPOWER AND PROFESSIONAL TRAINING IN THE ZDF AS A KEY FACTOR FOR MOOTW

One of the challenges many African militaries face is lack of academic qualifications and combat training consideration for promotion (Ouedraogo, 2014). In the ZDF, it is compulsory for all commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers to undergo the tough and rigorous initial training phases. These are the Regular Officer Cadet Course (ROCC) and recruit training for commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers respectively. These courses include modules on weapon handling, socialisation, civil-military relations among other modules. After the initial training one has to undergo several specialisation courses to be promoted to the ranks of up to Major/Squadron Leader. Platoon and Company Commander's Courses are compulsory courses. Once one becomes a Captain s/he must attend and pass Junior Staff Course (JSC) to be promoted to become a Major/Squadron Leader. Major/Squadron Leader should attend and pass Joint Command and Staff Course (JCSC) in order for one to become a Lieutenant Colonel/Wing Commander. All senior officers in the ZDF have passed the JCSC. The majority of Colonels/Group Captains need to attend and pass National Defence Course (**ndc**) to be promoted to the rank of Brigadier General/Air Commodore. Therefore, ROCC, JSC, JCSC and **ndc** are all compulsory courses for the commissioned officers in the ZDF. Key curriculum components for senior officers' courses are military management, civil-military relations, research among other contemporary and combat courses. The highest course, the **ndc**, for the Generals is at strategic level and it has a wide curriculum that focuses on national policy; politico-military, socio-economic, environmental, defence and security issues among other contemporary issues. The courses are directed by Generals and Professors from various military and civilian universities.

Civil-military relations education is offered across all levels in the ZDF. Army (1987) cited by Crittenden (2008) describes political education as the cultivation of virtues, knowledge, and skills necessary for political participation. It therefore, prepares people of a country, mostly the young, to carry out their role as responsible citizens. No doubt, in the ZDF this political education is fused in the broad civil-military relations package which was tailored to meet organisational and national interests to promote national security and development. **Table 7:1** below shows the compulsory military and academic courses for the corresponding ranks in the ZDF.

Table 7.1: Manpower and Professional Training in the ZDF

Rank	Military Courses	Academic Courses
	Compulsory for one to attain the corresponding rank	
Cadet	Regular Officer Cadet Course (ROCC)	Diploma
Captain/ Flight Lieutenant	Platoon Commander`s Course	Nil
Major / Squadron Leader	Company Commander`s Course and Junior Staff Course (JSC)	Nil
Lieutenant Colonel/ Wing Commander	Joint Command Staff Course (JCSC) plus Law of Armed Conflict	Diploma or BSc. in Defence and Security Studies
Brigadier General / Air Commodore	National Defence Course (NDC)	MSc in International Studies

Source: Compiled from ZDF Files by the author

These courses are offered locally as well as in other countries. Members of the ZDF used to attend courses at military institutions in countries like US, Russia, UK, China, Pakistan, Malaysia, South Africa, Zambia, Botswana, Nigeria and Kenya among other countries in Africa and beyond. The members stopped attending courses in US, UK and other western countries when the US and EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe. The local courses and military schools were set, first with the British assistance through the BMATT from early 1980s to the early 2000 when sanctions were imposed. The country benefited a lot from that long period of military support. The majority of the early local instructors and now commanders in the ZDF were trained in UK and were mentored by the BMATT.

Later the Chinese instructors, People`s Liberation Army Instructors Team (PLAIT) and Pakistan Instructors assisted in various training programmes across the ZDF military schools in the country. The withdrawal of the BMATT gave the ZDF a good chance to interact and get exposed to other military cultures and traditions. For instance, the Chinese military thinking is very different from the British. Therefore, the ZDF has both the western and eastern military characteristics.

This exposure and hybridisation process can help to interpret the involvement of the ZDF in national politics and socio-economic issues in post-2000 Zimbabwe. For example, in the western practice, military is expected to be apolitical and be loyal to the elected government but in the eastern practice specifically China the military is political, it even has Political Commissariat Department and is loyal to the ruling party. This variance together with other factors can be assumed to have influenced the nature of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe. The opposition parties and western countries heavily attacked Mugabe`s regime and the ZDF in displaying some Chinese characteristics in its MOOTW. Vhumba (2014) observes that significant differences in political party perceptions towards the ZDF affected military development and the overall peace and national development in Zimbabwe. Political parties in Zimbabwe have different perceptions towards the ZDF.

Besides the heavy investment in professional courses, the country also made efforts to enrol its officers in various academic institutions for civilian courses. Investing in military training started as far back in the 1980s during the formation of the ZDF. According to Alao (2013), the demobilisation package for the liberation fighters had four considerations and options: 1) further education, 2) technical training, 3) business advice and 4) demobilisation allowance. The liberation war fighters some of whom remained in the military were given the opportunity to further their education. The majority of those who furthered their education are still in the ZDF and they form its top echelon. Some have retired and joined various sectors in the country and beyond. Notably, former Commander Zimbabwe Defence Forces, General Chiwenga (retired) has a doctorate degree and former Commander Air Force of Zimbabwe, Air Chief Marshal P Shiri (retired) a holder of two master degrees programmes both joined politics and became vice president and minister respectively.

The above historical analysis of the ZDF education and training trajectory aims to enlighten those who lack knowledge on the appointment of ZDF officers during and after military service. The narration shows that the ZDF has well trained officers who can effectively participate in MOOTW. Williamson (2010:403) also noted that “Relative to most African militaries, Zimbabwe`s armed forces are generally well trained, professional and educated soldiers”.

During interviews and literature review it emerged that many people wrongly assumed that appointments and promotions of ZDF members were based on partisan, nepotism and other considerations far from meritocracy. Some even thought that soldiers were appointed to head parastatals simply because they had military ranks as their qualifications. Chitiyo (2009:9-10) tabulated retired military personnel who were working in the civilian sector;

A number of Zimbabwe`s key institutions were, and still are, `policed` by the military. Table 1 shows some of the state institutions which or had military personnel. This table is by no means exhaustive, but it does give an idea of the extent to which the military is embedded within Zimbabwe`s political economy.

Such publications tend to portray that the seconded military officers had no academic qualifications to hold the posts. Their roles were perceived as to ‘police’ forgetting that they were qualified to work and provide a service just like any other employees. The thesis established that some of the listed officers were retired and qualified to hold the posts and some were seconded to fill the vacant posts basing on their qualifications.

Another important factor that was ignored by scholars but was raised by research participants over the militarisation of state institutions issue was the fact that military life has service limitations. In the ZDF, one is expected to serve for 20 years thereafter one is free to join civilian life. For one to join the ZDF one should be between 18 and 22 years of age. Therefore, the majority of them retire in their early 40s. What then stops those with academic qualifications to be employed in the civilian sector? The employment of retired military personnel in the civilian sector is standard practice even in developed nations. The thesis established that, in Zimbabwe the practice of employing retired military personnel was not readily welcome. The researcher argues, instead of Zimbabweans fighting over the retired military officers who join the civilian sector, why are they not devising ways to employ them effectively to overcome the national challenges? The thesis concludes that, the challenge is that when the retired military officers join the civilian sector they are perceived as ZANU PF members, deployed to protect and promote ZANU PF interests. As long as the society is polarised on party lines, this challenge is likely to continue.

An analysis of the challenges and successes of the ZDF MOOTW has revealed that a draft of measures needs to be adopted if Zimbabwe is to achieve peace and development and these include;

1. Increasing military activities in MOOTW. However, military involvement should be at institutional level. No individuals or groups to improperly benefit from military involvement in national development affairs.
2. In terms of civil-military relations, a review of the existing structure is needed. Partisan polarised society compromises military control. A new political-military system is required. A multi-party system where the military is controlled by the dominant ruling party is suggested. It can be structured similar to the Chinese model. Under such a system the military will be openly political, loyal and supportive to the dominant and ruling political party. All political parties will support national development projects under common civil-military relations. Minority political parties will play complementary roles and not opposition role as if they are not Zimbabweans. Opposition politics has resulted in violent elections, human rights abuses and societal divisions and all these have affected civil-military relations and MOOTW in Zimbabwe.

7:7 THE FUTURE OF MOOTW AND MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

Over the last several decades Southern Africa and Africa as a whole experienced low figures of interstate wars. Ouedraogo (2014) rightfully observes that African governments face the challenge of not knowing what to do with their militaries when there is no war. It is sad that African leaders have limited roles for their military; that is either war or coup. This is a mismatch of the challenges that face African nations. Africa faces more internal conflicts than interstate wars. These internal conflicts have derailed development in Africa. The goal of any military organisation is to prevent national threats and build capabilities to respond effectively to emerging threats to protect its society and state. MOOTW can be used to achieve this goal.

The greatest challenge for MOOTW is the political system. In many African countries, including Zimbabwe, the government is subservient to the political party. The political party

therefore identifies national security threats and indirectly dictates military strategies and tactics to the government and directly to the military in extreme cases. The military is therefore ever under the control of political parties; a situation being construed by many opposition parties to destabilise nations. The thesis, therefore, argues that political party competition for military control has negatively impacted on non-combat roles of the ZDF's social, political and economic developmental roles in Zimbabwe. All non-combat roles of the military became viewed as partisan. Therefore, the competitive political party systems need to be reviewed; 1) if MOOTW are to achieve peace and development and 2) if a professional nonpartisan military is to exist in Zimbabwe and generally in Africa. However, those who wish wars, poverty, conflicts and underdevelopment for Africa in order to loot its resources will continue to support and fund the competitive political party systems under the elusive concept of democracy. Yet no African country has been considered democratic.

From the above observation and arguments, Zimbabwe and Africa in general need strategic planning processes in MOOTW to enable the military to understand the current and future security challenges. MOOTW therefore, becomes the only viable option to reconcile the mismatch between African security challenges and the perceived military roles. The future role of the military will be more defined by capabilities to provide human security needs than to fight and win wars. This can be achieved through adequate training in MOOTW.

Equally outside Africa, Gaoyue and James (2019) observe that, in the foreseeable future the PLA shall continue to use MOOTW for deterrence, considering the number of non-traditional threats that have occurred in recent decades. In 2006, the US Doctrine for Joint Operations replaced the concept of "military operations other than war" with "crisis response and limited contingency operation". China has intensified its focus on MOOTW and intends to continue to engage its force in MOOTW whilst the US has dropped the use of the term MOOTW, it will continue to engage its forces in crisis response and limited contingency operations. Non-traditional security threats are likely to increase in the future, therefore there is need for all military forces to perfect MOOTW.

During the development of MOOTW in China, the PLA introduced the study of MOOTW in its academic institutions like the National Defence University, Army Command College and

the Air Force Command College among others. The PLA also produced legal documents and manuals to guide the conduct of MOOTW and these include *Doctrine for Preventing Riots, Regulations for Joint Peacekeeping Operations, Regulations Participations in Disaster Rescue and Relief, Financial Support for MOOTW* among others (Gaoyue and James, 2019). The ZDF has recently introduced the study of MOOTW in its training institutions and is yet to be fully covered. Apart from, the Constitution, Defence Act and Defence Policy, there are no manuals and textbooks specifically designed for the conduct of ZDF MOOTW. Therefore, the ZDF needs to intensify its MOOTW training, and the production of manuals, regulations and textbooks on the conduct of MOOTW.

7.8 SUMMARY

The chapter has revealed that it is natural that some time is required to elapse before the actual activities of the organisation can be openly discussed and debated. The researcher's attempt was therefore, to present the available information and known military activities as a build up to the understanding of the ZDF MOOTW, which he hopes in due course will attract the attention of many scholars. The ZDF origin, attitudes and perceptions towards the ZDF, justification for MOOTW, nature of civil-military relations, social polarisation, manpower development, and the future of MOOTW and military professionalism were covered in this chapter and recommendations gathered as possible solutions were presented.

The thesis recommends increasing MOOTW as a way to promote political and socio-economic development in Zimbabwe. However, the thesis warned that MOOTW should be perfected and institutionalised to benefit the nation and not individuals. The thesis also revealed that a partisan and highly polarised society compromises military control and negatively affects civil-military relations. The thesis concludes that a new political-military system is required, where the military will be openly political, loyal and supportive to the dominant and ruling political party. All political parties will support national development projects under common civil-military relations. The next chapter contains conclusions and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter concludes the study. The Zimbabwe Defence Force's involvement in political, social, and economic activities in Zimbabwe through military operations other than war (MOOTW) was the main subject under analysis in this study. The thesis reviewed MOOTW conducted by the ZDF in post-2000 in order to assess acceptability and suitability of such operations under the prevailing civil-military relations in Zimbabwe.

The chapter summarises the key findings from the thesis and provides the conclusion and recommendations. The thesis has 8 chapters. The Introduction Chapter covers background and methodology. Chapter 2 seeks to understand the origin of the ZDF by examining the formation of the military force that dates back to the colonial period. Chapter 3 covers civil-military relations theory as the basis to understand civil-military relations in Zimbabwe. Chapter 4, details the conduct of MOOTW in other countries namely the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. The actual MOOTW conducted by the ZDF as well as the perceptions of the various sectors of Zimbabweans towards the ZDF MOOTW are in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 examines the ZDF MOOTW impact on political and socio-economic arena in Zimbabwe. Chapter 7 continues to unpack the challenges and successes of ZDF MOOTW under the prevailing civil-military relations. Chapter 8 concludes and highlights further tasks for researchers and policy makers regarding MOOTW and civil-military relations in Zimbabwe.

8.2 KEY FINDINGS

Key findings of the study:

1. The thesis established that the ZDF came about as a result of integration of nationalist forces (ZANLA and ZIPRA) and a colonial force (RSF). The ZANLA and ZIPRA forces played dual roles as fighters and as politicians. The same officers form the core of the ZDF leadership in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe got assistance from the British through the

BMATT for the integration and professionalisation process which lasted up to early 2000. The new professional force was supposed to be apolitical, non-partisan and loyal to the government of the day. It was established that the western style of civil-military relations introduced to the ZDF of being apolitical, non-partisan and loyal to the government of the day has several challenges to national security and development in Zimbabwe.

2. The ZDF formation, civil-military relations model and the national constitution were modelled on the British style. But over the years, specifically post-2000, President Mugabe shifted towards the eastern style of leadership and military control. However, the constitution and administration structures were not changed to suit the new model. Henceforth, Zimbabwe started to experience the development challenges, polarisation, and the attacks from western countries. The western countries use the controversial constitution to attack the Zimbabwean leadership including imposition of sanctions on the military.

3. The study traced the formation of the ZDF back to the liberation war. The thesis established that, since its formation ZDF prioritised to create good civil-military relations with the masses. However, there are continuous challenges in the nature of civil-military relations. Firstly, during the war of liberation, the masses were divided some supporting colonial forces whilst others were for the liberation forces. The liberation forces had to use various means, sometimes resorting to force to win the support of the masses to fight the colonialists. Secondly, an almost similar situation arises in post-2000, under a multiparty system the same masses are politically polarised and the ZDF used various means including MOOTW to bring peace and sustainable development. The study revealed that the post-2000 ZDF was perceived by some sectors in the Zimbabwean population as partisan and political.

4. The study established that civil-military relations in developing countries with liberation war history such as Zimbabwe are a challenge to both practitioners and scholars. It is a difficult task to balance colonial settings with contemporary imperatives. The ZDF being rooted in the war of liberation under the liberation political parties feels it has the duty to continue the struggle for the socio-economic development of the Zimbabwean masses through MOOTW. This historical and colonial setting is contested by some sectors in the Zimbabwean population who argues the military should remain in the barracks and remain non-partisan. The thesis concludes that, so far in Zimbabwe, the western legal approach to

civil-military relations has been over powered by political-military systems that have roots in African nationalism.

5. The thesis found out that manpower development in the ZDF is a critical component that dates back to the formation stage. The British assisted in the professionalisation of the ZDF up to early 2000. Several training centres were established and the British standards were set. The withdrawal of the BMATT gave the full engagement of the Chinese and Pakistan instructors by the ZDF. Apart from the service of these foreign instructors, the ZDF also sends its members to attend courses in several countries across the world. Before 2000 because of the British influence a greater number of senior officers attended courses at top military academies in the UK and US. Post-2000 external training in the ZDF shifted towards the eastern countries like China, Pakistan, and Malaysia among others. Apart from professional training ZDF members also attends academic courses in civilian colleges and universities. The thesis also established that promotions and appointments in the ZDF are merit based. The ZDF has set criterion for its officers appointed to perform duties in the various MOOTW activities.

6. It was established that modern militaries such as the PLA have diversified their operations to cover MOOTW. Security is now defined by a broader concept of human security and this has necessitated the adoption of MOOTW by modern militaries. During the development of MOOTW in China, the PLA produced legal documents, textbooks and manuals to guide the conduct of MOOTW. Teaching and research offices were established to conduct research and training on non-traditional security threats, to develop MOOTW theories and to provide consultations services for civilian and military decision makers. The study gathered that, the ZDF has recently introduced the study of MOOTW in its training institutions and is yet to be fully covered. It was also established that, apart from the Constitution, Defence Act and Defence Policy, there are no manuals and textbooks specifically designed for the conduct of ZDF MOOTW.

7. The thesis established that a number of factors stimulated or triggered military participation in national developmental issues through MOOTW in Zimbabwe. The factors were historical links between the ZDF and colonial structures, regime protection, poor economic performance, legal obligations through the fulfilment of secondary roles of the

ZDF, eastern countries (China, Pakistan and Malaysia) influence on national security ideology after post-2000 Look East policy announced by former President Mugabe. This was a qualitative study, and no percentages were ascribed to the significance of these factors. Individuals attached importance to these factors according to their own perceptions, values and perceived impact of MOOTW on national security and development. For instance, politicians tended to emphasise regime protection, academics and development workers tended to focus more on poor economic performance related factors.

8. The thesis established that for the period under review, Zimbabwe was under sanctions/restrictions imposed by US, EU and some western countries. The Mugabe regime with support from a number of developing nations used various means, sometimes contrary to the westernised constitution to resist and counter what it termed western countries` regime change agenda on Zimbabwe. Former President Mugabe was accused of using the military to protect his regime. Ultimately, civil-military relations and MOOTW start to be viewed through political party lens.

9. It was also established that, the ZDF has played a critical role in mitigating the negative impact of natural disasters through search and rescues operations, casualty evacuation, food and drug distribution, construction of bridges, roads and temporary shelter. The ZDF participated in various programmes aimed at advancing political and socio-economic development in the country. For instance, food production, food distribution, demining, computers and stationery donations to schools, construction of hospitals and schools, participation in traditional leaders seminars and workshops, participation in party politics, assisting civil authorities (Police, Civil Protection Unit and Local Authorities among other ministries) among other non-combat activities.

10. It was established that there are several types of MOOTW that are appropriate for different countries and different situations. The historical development of MOOTW and country conditions contributes to the types of MOOTW common in a particular country. The study revealed that the ZDF conducted several operations that were categorised under five types namely: operations for safeguarding rights and interest, operations for counter-terrorism and stability maintaining, operations for emergency rescue and disaster relief, operations for protecting national interests outside the borders and community assistance programmes.

These operations had both negative and positive impact on the national security and development path. The positive impacts include military aid to the civil powers, community assistance and social integration. On the other hand, the negative impact centres on regime protection, lack of transparency, militarism, commandism and authoritarianism. Concerns were raised by some sectors that MOOTW were benefiting certain individuals or groups and not the majority.

11. Modern militaries like that of the US and the PRC conduct MOOTW. The study established that although the conduct of MOOTW in these countries has similar general principles and models, each country conducts MOOTW according to its political and national interests. MOOTW operations in these countries are supported by all political parties. The conduct of MOOTW by the ZDF raised mixed feelings because the society has been politically divided. There is no common national agenda for development, common political system where political parties play complementary role to achieve peace and national development. The Zimbabwean society support MOOTW but the national political and social environment does not fully support such operations. Some of the operations were regarded as being partisan. Political parties compete to own the military. The ruling party is keen to be seen to be the rightful owners of the armed forces while the leading opposition party is openly positioning itself as the future partner. This was really a great challenge for the ZDF contrary to the cases in the Chinese military forces where MOOTW are fully supported by the political-military system.

8.3 CONCLUSION

From the findings of the study, the thesis advances the following conclusions:

1. The ZDF conducts MOOTW for safeguarding rights and interest, for counter-terrorism and stability maintaining, for emergency rescue and disaster relief, operations for protecting national interests outside the borders and community assistance programmes. These operations have positive impact on the national security and development path. The thesis concludes that the ZDF MOOTW mainly focuses on the human security aspects of development. It promotes the provision of medical care, education, housing, livestock and crop production, food distribution, search and rescue services, demining operations, disaster

relief services and other social programmes. These operations benefit the poor population, especially the rural poor. The disadvantage and the rural poor people are empowered to develop their potential. However, the conduct of MOOTW has to be guided by MOOTW principles and characteristics to achieve national development without discrediting the image of the ZDF. Any deviation from the cardinal principles will expose the military to manipulation and abuse by greedy politicians who seeks to advance personal interests.

2. The thesis advances that Zimbabweans failed to create a new political system and civil-military relations model based on contextual, cultural, historical and ideological values for national development. This national blunder exposed the Mugabe regime to western attack in the form of regime change, sanctions and human rights abuses. The former colonisers got an ever sought opportunity to mediate in the Zimbabwe`s internal affairs. However, President Mugabe also took advantage of being a victim of former colonisers. He then used the military to protect his 37 year regime. His regime was then ended by the same military and ZANU PF. The move was supported by opposition parties and the same western countries. It is therefore clear that a discordant civil-military relations model, political and administrative systems will always expose the nation to the former colonisers and capitalists who always targets African resources. In light of these findings, neither regime change nor the targeted security sector reform will resolve the Zimbabwean crisis.

3. The thesis concludes that ZDF is a professional force that emerged from hybridisation of ideologies and was exposed to opposing civil-military relations. First, the guerrillas- cum -politicians were professionalised by the British to become non-partisan and loyal to the government of the day up to 2000. Second, the post-2000 Chinese influence and the western sanctions resulted in a military force that is development conscious. The thesis concludes that, this gave rise to the high involvement of the ZDF in political, social and economic activities through MOOTW. It was very easy for the ZDF to perfectly adopt and assume political work, social and economic developmental activities under MOOTW because they were guerrillas and politicians who were fighting colonial oppression to develop Zimbabwe. The Chinese influence of having a military force that is dedicated to serve the people prevailed over the British influence of creating a force that is barrack bound. These changes on military orientation over a very short space of time (1980-2020) have resulted in a polarised society and mixed feelings towards the conduct of MOOTW by the ZDF.

4. There is need for academics in particular military scholars together with the ZDF personnel to produce legal documents, manuals and textbooks on MOOTW to guide the conduct of MOOTW in Zimbabwe. The ZDF should consider intensifying the study of MOOTW in its academic institutions to promote the generation of literature on the subject and advance general understanding of such operations for the good of its society.

5. The Zimbabwean society is highly politically polarised. Resultantly, the Zimbabwean political and socio-economic crisis cannot be resolved by the military or political parties alone. Neither by investors nor by reengagements with the west or east. MOOTW can be used as a tool to unite the masses. The crisis needs a complete overhaul of the political and administrative system. The crisis has politico-military complexities. Therefore, in all efforts to end the development challenges in Zimbabwe the military factor should be seriously considered. Ideological and historical factors that link the military and the political system need attention. A political system, preferably a Commandist Approach in the first phase, that unites a polarised society and subsequently focuses all political parties and the military on national development challenges. There is no need to have constitutional reforms, competitive multiparty systems, security sector reforms just to pretend to be in sync with western practices or the so called international best practices. A common ground to form a political-military system that promotes sustainable national security and development has to be established in Zimbabwe.

8.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

The study recommends that academics and policymakers focus on creating a better political-military administrative system: 1) where no individuals use the military or politics for personal gain, 2) where the military will be openly political, loyal and supportive to the dominant and ruling political party in a multi-party system, 3) where all political parties will have a common goal for national development , and 4) whose public office bearers must compete individually for positions and never as a group or an organisation. It is a system that must force individuals to serve humanity and never to assume that office bearers will voluntarily work for the common good. Civil-military relations in Zimbabwe needs a new system that creates a neutral environment to replace the current charged and polarised

environment where all MOOTW are perceived as being partisan, and where political parties compete to own and control the military. In addition, policy makers need to create a system that institutionalises MOOTW to stop corruption and mismanagement of resources.

The study also recommends the establishment of teaching and research office for the production of legal documents, manuals and textbooks on MOOTW to guide the conduct of MOOTW in the country; and the intensification of the study of MOOTW in the ZDF academic institutions to advance general understanding of such operations.

The study further recommends academic work to; establish the form and structure of a new administrative/ governance structure that will unite political parties and the military; a centralised system, which will promote the participation of the military in national development agenda.

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LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: THE ZDF MOOTW IN PICTURES



ZDF in Demining Operations, landmines were planted mainly along the borders of the country during the liberation war



ZDF in Disaster Relief Operations: ZDF helicopter in Chimanimani Area distributing food and other essentials



Community Assistance; AFZ Commander, ZDF officers, local leadership and school children in front of classroom block constructed by the ZDF



AFZ Chief of Staff Supporting Services handing over Negove Clinic, in the Midlands Province constructed by the AFZ to the community and Local



ZDF in Disaster Relief Operations: ZDF helicopter in Chimanimani Area distributing food and other essentials



ZDF Agriculture Projects: Maize Field under ZDF



ZDF Construction Projects: Murongwe Primary School Constructions.
Thatched structures are the old classrooms



ZDF Agriculture Projects: AFZ Commander, Air Marshal E. Moyo and his staff visit the project site



ZDF in Disaster Relief Operations: Soldiers with civilians in Chimanimani Area after Cyclone Idai disaster



Zimbabwe National Defence University 2018 Graduation:
National Defence Course and Master of Arts in International
Studies Graduation



The Commander ZDF , Gen PV Sibanda clarifying a point in the presence of President ED Mnangagwa during a public lecture to students of National Defence Course Number 7 at the Zimbabwe National Defence University



Group Photo, President ED Mnangagwa, VP Gen (rtd) CG Chiwenga, students and invited guests after a public lecture at the Zimbabwe National Defence University

APPENDIX II: KEY RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS

	DATE	DESIGNATION OF PARTICIPANT	PLACE OF INTERVIEW
1	12/05/2017	ZDF Member	Harare
2	09/08/2017	War Veteran	Gwanda , Matabeleland Province
3	06/07/2018	Academic and Publisher	Harare
4	10/07/2018	Academic	Harare
5	13/07/2018	Former Minister (ZANU PF)	Masvingo Province
6	23/07/2018	MDC Official	Harare
7	23/07/2018	Business Community	Harare
8 9	09/08/2018	a. Church Leader b. Villager	Mutare , Manicaland Province
10	20/08/2018	Disability Affairs Department	Harare
11	20/08/2018	Church Leader	Midlands Province
12	21/08/2018	Chief (Community Leader)	Gutu, Masvingo Province
13	23/08/2018	Ward Councillor (Community Leader)	Bikita , Masvingo Province
14	02/09/2018	NGO Programme Officer	Mashonaland Central Province
15	11/09/2018	Academic	Masvingo Province
16	11/09/2018	Trade Unionist and Teacher	Masvingo Province
17	15/10/2018	Journalist	Gweru, Midlands Province
18	03/11/2018	Civil Protection Unity Department	Harare
19	18/12/2018	Opposition Party member	Gweru, Midlands Province
20	04/03/2019	Academic	Gweru
21	26/03/2019	National Youth Council official (ZANU PF)	Harare
22	29/03/2019	National Youth Council official (MDC)	Harare
23	23/04/2019	ZDF Member	Harare

APPENDIX 111: QUESTIONS THAT GUIDED THE UNSTRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

My name is Godwin **VHUMBA**. I am a member of the ZDF and a PhD Candidate at the University of South Africa (UNISA). My research is titled: *THE ZIMBABWE DEFENCE FORCE'S MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW) IN THE POST-2000 PERIOD*.

Please assist me by answering the following questions. Again, I re-emphasise that your identity will remain confidential and your responses will only be used for the purposes of this study.

1. What do you know about the origin of the ZDF?
2. What prompted or triggered military participation in national developmental issues through MOOTW? (Historical links between military and ZANU PF? Regime protection? Poor economic performance? Is it a legal obligation – secondary roles of the military? Eastern countries (China, Pakistan and Malaysia) influence on national ideology after post 2000 Look East policy? Or any other factors which you may have?)
3. What is the nature of **civil military relations (CMR)** in Zimbabwe? In terms of **CMR**, what is wrong/right in Zimbabwe? What are your recommendations?
4. What are the effects of the ZDF military operations other than war (**MOOTW**) on political, social and economic development activities in Zimbabwe? What are your recommendations?
5. With particular reference to CMR and MOOTW in Zimbabwe, what is your **attitude/perception** towards the ZDF's involvement in national development (political, social and economic) issues? How do you perceive the ZDF MOOTW and the nature of CMR in Zimbabwe?
6. What are the **fundamental** strengths and weaknesses of the ZDF in its participation in national development activities through MOOTW? What measures should be adopted to overcome the challenges/weaknesses?

I thank you Sir /Madam, God bless Zimbabwe!

APPENDIX IV: INTRODUCTORY LETTER FROM THE RESEACHER

Tel No: 850008

Fax : 8500083135



Zimbabwe National Defence University
Private Bag CY1534
Causeway
Harare
Zimbabwe

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Dear

REQUEST FOR INTERVIEWS

I am writing this letter requesting your permission to conduct face-to-face interviews with you. I am a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) candidate of Development Studies at the University of South Africa (UNISA). My research is on *THE ZIMBABWE DEFENCE FORCE'S OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR IN THE POST-2000 PERIOD*. I therefore, have some questions for you in order to answer the research questions.

Firstly, I need to emphasise the importance of the study in trying to widen the scope of knowledge in the involvement of the Zimbabwe Defence Force in its country's internal affairs. The study will focus on the ZDF's non-combat operations: military operations other than war (MOOTW). The study will be framed under civil-military relations theory. These concepts together with your contributions I have, no doubt, will change the way military involvement in development and governance issues is practiced and perceived in Zimbabwe and subsequently in Africa and other developing nations. Secondly, the study will maintain confidentiality of research participants and the information supplied will be used only for the purpose of this study. Attached is an introductory letter from my employer and sponsor and an interview guide for your perusal and consideration.

Thank you for your favourable cooperation. I can be contacted through +263 716248291.

Yours sincerely,
Godwin Vhumba

**APPENDIX V: INTRODUCTORY LETTER FROM THE ZIMBABWE NATIONAL
DEFENCE UNIVERSITY THEN NDC**

From the National Defence College

Telephone: 850008 Ext 1002

Fax : 850008



National Defence College

**Private Bag 7769
Causeway, Harare**

Zimbabwe

To Whom It May Concern

I am writing to introduce Squadron Leader Godwin VHUMBA, who is a senior officer in the ZDF and is a Researcher at the Institute of Strategic Research and Analysis at the Zimbabwe National Defence College. Squadron Leader VHUMBA is a PhD Candidate at the University of South Africa (UNISA). His research is titled: *THE ZIMBABWE DEFENCE FORCES` MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR: POST 2000*. He has been cleared by the ZDF to carry out the study. To successfully complete the study, Squadron Leader VHUMBA requires access to relevant individuals, officials, organisations, gatherings / meetings that might help to meet the objectives of his study.

The Air Force of Zimbabwe kindly asks for your cooperation and support during Squadron Leader VHUMBA`s research. I would be very grateful for all your support.

.....

Group Captain

for Commander Air Force of Zimbabwe