I FEEL FOR YOU. THEREFORE, I RESPOND ON YOUR BEHALF. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES LEADING TO AND CONSEQUENCES OF VICARIOUS HUMILIATION

by

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DECLARATION

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I feel for you. Therefore, I respond on your behalf. Social psychological processes leading to and consequences of vicarious humiliation.

I declare that the above thesis is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

I further declare that I submitted the thesis to originality checking software and that it falls within the accepted requirements for originality.

I further declare that I have not previously submitted this work, or part of it, for examination at Unisa for another qualification or at any other higher education institution.

22 October 2020

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SIGNATURE DATE

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ABSTRACT

Vicarious humiliation as a devaluing intergroup event is a rather common experience, which has the potential to adversely influence present and future intergroup relations. Based on an extensive literature review and previous research, we hypothesised that highly identified group members experience an intensified feeling of humiliation after witnessing an ingroup member being humiliated when compared to low identifiers (Hypothesis 1), that the role of visual exposure as situational determinant of humiliating events, the appraisals, and the emotional patterns elicited, differ between personally and vicariously humiliating events (Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 3 and 4), and lastly, that vicarious humiliation regulated through emotional blends leads to behavioural intentions that influence future intergroup relations (Hypotheses 5a to 5c). Evidence for our hypotheses was exploratively and experimentally provided in six studies. Results implied that vicarious humiliation is a common experience, that visual exposure as situational determinant is more important for personally than vicariously humiliating events, and that humiliation is indeed a blended emotion (Study 1, N = 1048). Moreover, results showed that highly identified group member feel relatively stronger humiliated (Study 2, N = 175), that the appraisal and emotional patterns are related to identity processes (i.e., personal and vicarious humiliation) (Study 3, N = 74; Study 4, N = 359; Study 5 = 376), and that the feeling of humiliation and accompanying emotions regulate the relationship between vicariously humiliating events and the intentional responses such as avoidance, non-normative approach, dehumanisation and social exclusion (Study 6, N = 998). Overall, our results imply that vicarious humiliation as an emotional experience has the potential to provoke intergroup conflict.

SUMMARY

The present research studied a phenomenon that we are all familiar with – being humiliated. Unfortunately, this is an experience that is rather common as we might not only experience to be humiliated personally but also to be humiliated on behalf of others. It is this *vicarious* experience of humiliation that the present research aimed at studying. We firstly explored people's experiences with and understandings of humiliation through a cross-sectional survey (Study 1). Results indicated that vicarious humiliation is indeed a rather common experience, that personally and vicariously humiliating events differ in terms of the situational determinants that characterise these events, and that the feeling of humiliation is experienced as a blended emotion. We furthermore tested experimentally the effects of ingroup identification, identity processes and the presence of an audience on the appraisal processes of and the emotional and motivational responses to vicarious humiliation. We found that people who highly identified with the group they share with the humiliated person, experienced stronger feelings of humiliation (Study 2), and that being personally humiliated and being vicariously humiliated resulted in different appraisal patterns, which consequently elicited the different emotional blends of humiliation with self-focused and other-focused emotions, respectively (Studies 3 to 5). We were, however, unable to provide evidence that the presence of an audience aggravated the appraisal processes and the feeling of humiliation (which we attributed to methodological limitations of our studies). That the emotional blends of humiliation regulate the behavioural intentions, that people engage in as a result of being vicariously humiliated, was demonstrated in our last study (Study 6). More specifically, we found that humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions was related to intentions to avoid, to non-normatively approach, and/or to socially exclude the humiliator(s) through dehumanising them. It is this latter finding that provides evidence for both the role of the social context that might determine the appropriateness of certain behaviours (e.g., social

norms) and for the proposed *cycle of humiliation* in that humiliated persons are often believed to retaliate by humiliating the humiliator(s) in return, which has the potential to provoke intergroup conflicts.

Keywords: vicariously humiliating events, the feeling of humiliation, self-focused emotions, other-focused emotions, avoidance, approach, dehumanisation, social exclusion, intergroup conflict, social media

INTRODUCTION

Humiliation is an intensely negative experience that undermines the positive view that people have or wish to have about themselves. It occurs when people experience a discrepancy between how they perceive others as seeing or treating them and how they view themselves (Miller, 1993). The experience of humiliation is widely acknowledged to lead to psychological distress and weakened social relatedness (Atran & Stern, 2005; Farmer & McGuffin, 2003; Gasanabo, 2006; Hartling et al., 2013; Kaufmann et al., 2011; Klein, 1991; Lindner, 2006b; Muenster & Lotto, 2010). Distress-related consequences include depression (Farmer & McGuffin, 2003), lowered self-esteem and general anxiety (Klein, 2005; McCarley, 2009), and suicide (Klein, 1991), whereas weakened social relatedness might express itself in domestic violence (Farmer & McGuffin, 2003), shooting rampages (Muenster & Lotto, 2010), human-rights abuses (Kaufmann et al., 2011), terrorism (Atran & Stern, 2005), wars (Lindner, 2006a; 2006b) and genocides (Gasanabo, 2006; Lindner, 2006a).

Different from other negative emotions such as shame and guilt, *humiliation is brought upon us* (Klein, 1991). We experience this negative feeling because somebody devalues us for who we are, what we represent or what we share with others. Thus, humiliation is an interaction-oriented emotion (Coleman et al., 2007) that occurs on interpersonal level targeting the *personal self*, and on intergroup level targeting the *social self*. Intergroup humiliation might result from being humiliated by an outgroup because of one's group membership (i.e., group-membership-based humiliation, see Veldhuis et al., 2014, p. 2) or from witnessing a fellow ingroup member being humiliated by an outgroup (i.e., vicarious humiliation).

Intergroup humiliation is often referred to as the emotional link between degrading events and intergroup conflicts (Atran & Stern, 2005; Kaufmann et al., 2011; Lindner, 2006b). Not surprisingly, social scientists have been referring to the role of humiliation in

their theorising of intergroup relations (Elison & Harter, 2007; Hartling et al., 2013; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Lindner, 2002; Saurette, 2005) and in their analyses of real intergroup conflicts such as the genocide in Rwanda (Gasanabo, 2006; Lindner, 2001), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza (Ginges & Atran, 2008), the Holocaust of the second world war (Lindner, 2001), or the unrests in Northern Ireland (Stokes, 2006).

Witnessing a fellow ingroup member being humiliated by an outgroup might be a more common experience that people are exposed to in their everyday lives than one would assume. Whether we read headlines such as "Trump humiliates CNN reporter" or "South Africa suffered a humiliating 3-0 home defeat by Lesotho", those of us who feel close to journalists or who are supporters of the South African national soccer team Bafana Bafana, respectively, might feel vicariously humiliated. Or whether we witness "online" humiliation (Salter, 2016) on Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter where a person is "doxed" (i.e., the broadcasting of personally identifiable information about an individual or group, often with the intention to harm that person or group; see Douglas, 2016), or where non-consensual pornography is published (i.e., the online publication of nude/semi-nude images and/or videos of an individual without their consent; see Bates, 2017) by an outgroup, those of us who share an ingroup membership with this person might feel vicariously humiliated and our relationship to the outgroup will change – often for the worse.

Vicarious humiliation does not only alienate social groups from each other but also has the potential to lead to intergroup conflicts. Given these negative implications for intergroup relations and the fact that studies on vicarious humiliation are limited (except for the research by Veldhuis et al., 2014), the present research aimed at extending our understanding of the *why*, *how* and *when* vicarious humiliation might play a role in intergroup conflicts as it has the potential to elicit a variety of negative emotions that regulate responses ranging from avoidance to behavioural intentions that violate social norms. More specifically,

the present research studied the interplay between the situational determinants of humiliating events, the appraisals of those situational determinants, the resulting emotional blends of feeling vicariously humiliated, and the behavioural intentions to avoid, to normatively and non-normatively approach, and to dehumanise and socially exclude the humiliator. Consequently, the present research does not only contribute to the knowledge of humiliation and the psychological processes that foster or hamper intergroup conflicts but also contributes to research on vicarious emotions, which has so far mainly focussed on the emotions of empathy and sympathy (Miller et al., 1996), guilt (Lickel et al., 2005), shame (Welten et al., 2012), and anger (Yzerbyt et al., 2003).

Organisation of the Thesis

The present thesis consists of four major parts: the literature review, the current research, the studies and the general discussion. The literature review firstly outlines the intergroup emotion theory (Smith et al., 2007) as it provides us with a theoretical framework to understand why people can experience emotions on behalf of ingroup members. Particularly, the role of ingroup identification in the experience of group-level emotions will be addressed. The literature review discusses the conceptualisation of humiliation focusing on the situational determinants that characterise humiliating events, how these events are appraised (i.e., the appraisals of humiliation), and the emotions that accompany the feeling of humiliation. The final part of the literature review outlines the possible behavioural tendencies that people intend to engage in as a result of witnessing an ingroup member being humiliated, and the emotional blends that are assumed to regulate these behavioural tendencies.

The second part of the thesis provides an overview of the current research by summarising the main arguments and presenting the aims and the hypotheses developed in

the literature review. Each study and its design, that will address the different aims and hypotheses, are briefly discussed. Participants and the overall procedure of the studies as well as the ethical considerations of the current research, are lastly outlined.

The third part of the thesis reports six studies that addressed the concept of humiliation, and the relationships between humiliating events, emotional blends and behavioural intentions. Study 1 explored people's understandings about and experiences with *humiliation* (Study 1). Study 2 tested experimentally the role of ingroup identification in the elicitation of humiliation. Studies 3 to 5 tested the appraisal and emotional patterns evoked following a humiliating event, and whether these patterns differ as a result of identity processes (i.e., whether a person is personally targeted in a humiliating event or whether a person witnesses the humiliation of an ingroup member). Lastly, Study 6 tested experimentally the interplay between the emotional blends elicited through vicarious humiliation and the behaviours that people intend to engage in.

The final part of the thesis contains the general discussion. This section starts with summarising the general aims of the present research followed by discussing the findings of the various studies in relation to previous research. Next, the original contributions that the research makes to the knowledge and understanding of vicarious humiliation are discussed. More specifically, we discuss how the results of the present research contribute firstly, to the conceptualisation of humiliation, secondly, to the understanding of the situational determinants of humiliating events, thirdly, to the importance of ingroup identification in the elicitation of vicarious humiliation, fourthly, to the association between the appraisal and emotional patterns, and humiliation and how these patterns differ between being personally and vicariously humiliated, and lastly, to the understanding of the interplay between the emotional blends elicited through vicarious humiliation and behavioural tendencies that increase the likelihood for intergroup conflicts. We further discuss in detail various social and

methodological implications of the present research. Lastly, the limitations with regards to our participants, the used research designs and measurements as well as the approach applied to manipulate the independent variables in the experimental studies are outlined. Based on the implications and limitations, recommendations for future research are proposed.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Most research has studied humiliation on the interpersonal level (e.g., Elison & Harter, 2007; Farmer & McGuffin, 2003; Fernández et al., 2015; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Negrao et al., 2005; Pulham, 2009). Personal humiliation is most likely elicited when events are appraised as lowering one's self-esteem (Fernández et al., 2015), as being the fault of someone else (Klein, 1991), as being unfair and unjust (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999) and/or as being out of the control of the humiliated person (Elison & Harter, 2007). Moreover, research on personal humiliation has demonstrated that this emotion is accompanied by other emotions such as anger and shame and often results in the contradicting responses of avoidance and approach (Fernández et al., 2015). However, research exploring humiliation as an intergroup emotion, and in particular the experience of *vicarious* humiliation (i.e., humiliation on behalf of an ingroup member), is rather scarce.

One exception is the experimental research conducted by Veldhuis et al. (2014), which tested whether individuals can experience humiliation, powerlessness, and anger vicariously when they observe other ingroup members being ostracised. The results revealed that witnessing another ingroup member being socially excluded elicited indeed the feelings of humiliation, anger and powerlessness, which did not differ from being personally excluded (Veldhuis et al., 2014; Study 2). Yet, witnessing a member of the outgroup being socially excluded did not elicit the same degree of humiliation, which suggests that feeling humiliated on behalf of others is limited to ingroup members (Veldhuis et al., 2014; Study 3). Moreover, the studies of Veldhuis et al. (2014) demonstrated that observing an ingroup member being socially excluded did not only elicit the feeling of humiliation but also the feeling of anger, thereby stressing that feeling vicariously humiliated blends with other emotions, as it has been shown for personal humiliation (Fernández et al., 2015).

Although the studies of Veldhuis et al. (2014) demonstrate how social exclusion as situational determinant elicits both personal and vicarious humiliation (Studies 2 and 3) and that vicarious humiliation, similar to personal humiliation, is a blended emotion (e.g., blended with anger, Studies 1, 2 and 3), further research is necessary to extend our understanding of vicarious humiliation and its implications for intergroup relations and conflicts. Consequently, the present research provides additional insights by exploring (1) the role of ingroup identification in vicarious humiliation, (2) the situational determinants of vicarious humiliation, (3) whether situational determinants are specific for personal or vicarious humiliation, (4) appraisals, (5) emotional blends, and whether personal or vicarious humiliation evoke different emotional patterns, and (6) the responses to the humiliation that are critical for current and future intergroup relations.

To elaborate in detail on these research objectives, we first need to unpack what enables people to experience emotions on behalf of others? Most explanations on why people can vicariously experience group-based emotions depart from the social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). For instance, Lickel et al. (2005) demonstrated that participants felt vicarious shame because of the social identity shared with a wrongdoer (see also Welten et al., 2012), whereas emotional closeness with the wrongdoer predicted vicarious guilt. Different from vicarious shame and vicarious guilt, which result from witnessing an ingroup member doing something wrong, vicarious humiliation results from observing an ingroup member being wronged by an outgroup member. Despite these differences, the experience of vicarious humiliation – similar to any other intergroup emotion – requires that the person who witnesses the other person being humiliated by an outgroup member shares the same group membership with this person and that this group membership is essential for her or his self-concept. *Why*, *how* and *when* self-categorisation and social

identification processes lead to people's experience of group-based emotions has been conceptualised by the intergroup emotion theory (Seger et al., 2009; Smith & Mackie, 2015).

The Role of Ingroup Identification in Vicarious Humiliation

The intergroup emotion theory, which builds on the social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987), proposes that self-categorisation and social identification processes evoke emotions in people in response to events that are appraised as affecting their ingroup, even if the individual is not personally involved in these events (Seger et al., 2009; Smith & Mackie, 2015). Therefore, the elicitation of group-based emotions requires that individuals identify with a social group, which is most likely when contextual factors shift social relations from being interpersonal to intergroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In fact, the intergroup emotion theory proposes that group-based emotions differ from personal emotions (Smith & Mackie, 2015) as they are determined by respective social categories that are socially shared (Ray et al., 2008; Seger et al., 2009; Smith & Mackie, 2015). For instance, comparing emotions felt by participants when thinking of themselves as members of a particular social group with emotions felt by the same participants when thinking about themselves as unique individuals showed that the profiles of emotions differed (Seger et al., 2009).

Moreover, group-based emotions do not only depend on *whether* individuals identify with a social group but also *what* social group they identify with. For instance, Ray et al. (2008) showed that participants who were led to think of themselves as Americans showed more respect and less anger towards police compared to participants who were made to think of themselves as students. Therefore, making salient one or another group membership changes emotional reactions to the same event (Mackie & Smith, 2015).

Furthermore, group-based emotions are shared emotions among ingroup members (Seger et al., 2009; Smith & Mackie, 2015). When self-categorising as a group member, people tend to feel the way they perceive or expect their group to feel (Smith & Mackie, 2015; Turner et al., 1987). For example, when university students think about an upcoming increase of study fees they may react emotionally with anxiety and anger towards the university management even though some of these students might not have a problem (or rather their parents) to pay the university fees.

The intensity of group-based emotions depends on the intensity with which people identify with the group (i.e., ingroup identification; see Seger et al., 2009). Although individuals might belong to the same social group, they differ in the degree to which they identify with this group. This is because for some group members self-categorisation is more central to their *self* as compared to other group members, and therefore, they gain stronger cognitive and emotional significance from being a group member (Smith & Mackie, 2015). For these group members, the experience of group-based emotions should be intensified as they are more likely to engage in intergroup appraisals and hence experience the elicited emotions stronger (Smith & Mackie, 2015). Similarly, it is the high identifiers who are more likely to match their own emotions with those that they believe are, or expect to be, typically experienced and shared by other ingroup members (Moons et al., 2009).

The positive relationship between ingroup identification and the experience of group-based emotions has been shown in several studies for positive emotions such as joy and pride (Combs et al., 2009). It has also been demonstrated for negative emotions, such as other-focused anger, particularly after an unfair treatment of a fellow ingroup member, which did not only intensify this negative feeling but also the identification with the ingroup (Gordijn et al., 2006; Yzerbyt et al., 2003).

It is, however, not always the case that ingroup identification and group-based emotions are positively related. For instance, research has shown that highly identified group members reported less group-based guilt as compared to low identifiers (Doosje et al., 2006; Maitner et al., 2006). Following their ingroup's transgression, highly identified group members tend to appraise the transgression as more justified and positive, and therefore, feel less group-based guilt about what their group has done to others (Doosje et al., 2006; Maitner et al., 2006). Defending the transgressions of the ingroup might be an identity management strategy in that high identifiers are more defensive and more willing to protect the ingroup when their ingroup's unfavourable behaviour is made salient to them, thereby protecting their positive social identity by feeling less guilty (Doosje et al., 1998).

A similar trend could be assumed for group-based humiliation in that individuals who identify strongly with their ingroup reject this feeling because they want to protect their ingroup and keep their social identity positively distinct (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, humiliation does not only differ from guilt because it results from others' actions (similar to anger) but also because it affects the essence of the *self* (Wagner et al., 2009). More specifically, highly identified group members who belong to a group that transgressed against an outgroup, for instance in the past, might not experience these norm violations as an attack on the essence of their *social self* because they can singularise these transgressions as an exception from the norm and thus maintain their positive distinctiveness (therefore the negative relationship between ingroup identification and group-based guilt; see Doosje et al., 2006; Dumont & Waldzus, 2014). Highly identified group members who experience group-based humiliation, on the other hand, might not be able to apply such identity management strategies because the experienced discrepancy between how they perceive others as seeing or treating (members of) their ingroup and how they view their ingroup (Miller, 1993) affects their essence of being. Therefore, we firstly hypothesised a positive relationship between

ingroup identification and vicarious humiliation, in that highly identified group members experience an intensified feeling of humiliation after witnessing an ingroup member being devalued by an outgroup than low identified ingroup members.

Most research on humiliation distinguishes between humiliation as an *event* (as described above) and humiliation as a *feeling* (e.g., Lindner, 2007). Humiliation as an *event* refers to situations where a person experiences a *discrepancy* between how she or he perceives others as viewing or treating her or him and how she or he views her- or himself (Lindner, 2007; Miller, 1993), whereas humiliation as a feeling is defined as a negative, self-conscious emotion (Elison & Harter, 2007). Although the term *humiliation* is interchangeably used to describe an *event* and the *feeling* (Elshout et al., 2017), humiliation as event and humiliation as feeling refer to distinct – yet interrelated - psychological processes.

Humiliation as Event: The Situational Determinants

There are different *situational determinants* (i.e., features) in a humiliating event that evoke the above-mentioned cognitive discrepancy as these determinants lead to a violation in how a person wants to be *treated*, how a person defines her or his *position or status* that she or he perceives to occupy, how a person outlines her or his social context of which she or he believes to *be part of*, and how a person describes the *knowledge or competencies* that she or he believes to have. Klein (1991) and Lazare (1987) suggested that the situational determinants of humiliation can be grouped as follows: (1) being attacked, (2) being reduced in size, (3) social rejection or exclusion, (4) being found or made deficient, and (5) being visually exposed.

Being attacked refers to negative treatments, another person's attempt to inflict hurt and act in an aggressive and hostile manner, either verbally or physically. It transgresses the expectations that one has of how a person should be treated (Lindner, 2007). Thus,

humiliation due to attack results from the discrepancy between how a person is treated by others and how she or he expects to be treated. Being ridiculed, scorned, insulted, mocked, harassed, criticised and bullied are examples of behaviours that can be perceived as *an attack* as they refer to negative and aggressive actions (Elison & Harter, 2007; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Klein, 1991; Lazare, 1987).

Any event where a person's position is *reduced in size* is another situational determinant (Klein, 1991). It includes any act of degradation or disrespect where one is belittled, devalued or made to feel inferior (Elison & Harter, 2007; Elshout et al., 2017). Humiliation results in this case from the discrepancy between the position (or status) that the person is placed in by someone else and the position that she or he perceives to hold. Examples include situations where a person's self-esteem, social status, dignity, pride or confidence are lowered or made inferior (Gilbert, 1997; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Klein, 1991; Lazare, 1987; Lindner, 2016).

Humiliation may also be the result of *social rejection* or *exclusion* (Jonas et al., 2014; Veldhuis et al., 2014). Humans are social beings and readily form relationships with others as social connectedness is important to our well-being (Putnam, 2001). The need for belonging, acceptance and love are essential human motivations (Baumeister et al., 2005). When social connections are broken or denied, a person suffers deep and painful emotional harm (Claypool & Bernstein, 2014; Uskul & Over, 2014) such as humiliation (Jonas et al., 2014). Social rejection or exclusion causes a discrepancy between the person's belief of being part of a group and realising that she or he is not part of the group. For instance, the results of the studies conducted by Veldhuis and colleagues (2014) showed that both being socially excluded and witnessing somebody else being socially excluded, elicited humiliation.

Another situational determinant is *being found or made deficient* (i.e., incompetency) (Klein, 1991). The experience of deficiency results from the discrepancy between being not

recognised by another person as competent and perceiving oneself as being adequate or competent in a certain domain. Previous research studying personal accounts of humiliation found that participants often reported being humiliated by others as a result of perceived inadequacy in a certain domain (Elison & Harter, 2007). For instance, an analysis of media accounts of high-profile school-shooting cases revealed that the shooters reported that they constantly experienced to be humiliated by their peers because of their inadequate appearances, social or athletic behaviour (Elison & Harter, 2007).

Lastly, being *visually exposed* (i.e., the *publicity* of the humiliating event) is considered another situational determinant for humiliation (i.e., the presence of other people who either witness the event or the humiliated person perceives that others will find out about the event; Klein, 1991). Important to note is that visual exposure is also considered as an *aggravator* of the previously outlined situational determinants. In other words, visual exposure can also be a *condition* under which the experience of humiliation is intensified. For instance, when people perceive themselves *publicly* attacked, reduced, excluded or made deficient, they report stronger feelings of humiliation compared to being *privately* attacked, excluded, etc. (Fernández et al., 2015). On the other hand, a person does not need to share the values or beliefs that the humiliator is using to devalue her or him, the fact that the devaluation is in front of others who are now seeing the person as *less* is what provokes the humiliation (Hall, 2013). For example, a person might be humiliated in front of others for not being able to speak English fluently. Simply being publicly demeaned might be sufficient to elicit humiliation, regardless of whether or not the humiliated person thinks that there is anything wrong at all with not being able to speak a certain (and often second) language fluently. It is, however, not only the presence of others that elicits or intensifies the experience of humiliation but it is a *laughing* audience that seems to increase the humiliation

compared to an audience without laughter, following the same insult (Mann et al., 2017; Otten et al., 2017).

We speculate that these outlined situational determinants characterise humiliating events irrespective of whether these events are experienced as personal humiliation or as vicarious humiliation. That is, the composition of a personally humiliating event does not differ from the composition of a vicariously humiliating event in that it requires the humiliator to attack, to reduce, to exclude or to make the humiliated person or group feel deficient or incompetent. For example, as shown in the studies of Veldhuis et al. (2014), regardless of whether participants were personally or vicariously excluded, in both events the situational determinant of exclusion prompted humiliation. However, we would propose that the aggravating influence of visual exposure on these situational determinants differs between personally and vicariously humiliating events. This is because the composition of a personally humiliating event differs from the composition of a vicariously humiliating event with regards to the audience who is witnessing the event. In a personally humiliating event, the audience is independent of the humiliated person, whereas in a vicariously humiliating event the audience and the person who feels humiliated on behalf of the humiliated person, are the same. Consequently, we hypothesised that individuals will attribute more importance to the situational determinant visual exposure when they experience personal humiliation than when they experience vicarious humiliation.

To sum up, humiliating events are characterised by situational determinants of being attacked, or being reduced in size, being rejected or excluded, or being found or made deficient. These determinants evoke a discrepancy between how a person experiences to be viewed or treated by others and how she or he wants to be viewed or treated by others. Lastly, the humiliating event is *public* where others witness or know about this event. It is

this publicity of the humiliating event that is assumed to aggravate the experience of humiliation in personally humiliating events more so than in vicariously humiliating events.

If an event is characterised by the above outlined situational determinants, the *feeling of humiliation* is likely to be elicited. Yet, according to the appraisal theories of emotions, it is not the event itself that leads to an internal feeling but rather *how* the event, and the associated situational determinants, are appraised or evaluated (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1997).

Appraisals of Humiliation

When are situational determinants, such as being attacked, being reduced in size, being excluded and being made deficient, appraised as humiliating? According to appraisal theories of emotions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1997), an emotion is elicited not just through the sensing of an environmental event but by the interpretation of the event. To put it differently, it is not the situational determinants of an event that directly elicit emotional responses but rather indirectly through the appraisal of the event (e.g., is this event *desirable*, who *caused* it, what *power* do I have over this event) (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Marsella & Gratch, 2009; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1997).

How people interpret events are called *appraisal*s and it is these appraisals of the event that determine emotional responses (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1991). Although appraisal theorists tend to differ in which appraisals elicit which emotions, they agree that a person's appraisal of an event, whether it is immediate, imagined or remembered, plays a vital role not only for the elicitation of emotions but also for the differentiation between emotions (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Or to put it differently,

even when exposed to the very same, or a very similar event, people might respond with different emotions depending on how they appraise the event.

When it comes to the elicitation of the feeling of humiliation, it is important to keep in mind that humiliation has been described as a self-conscious (or self-focused) emotion (Elison & Harter, 2007). Therefore, to experience humiliation, a person needs to reflect on her or his self-representations and to evaluate how the emotion-eliciting event is relevant to those representations of the *self* (Lewis, 2019). Although appraisal theories of emotions have proposed various appraisal patterns that allow for the differentiation among emotions, these theories do not provide a clear and consensual set of appraisals that elicit only self-conscious emotions (Tracy et al., 2007). Most of the appraisal theories include appraisals of whether the event is relevant and congruent with a person's goals and needs, and whether these goals/needs are generally viewed as survival or reproduction goals/needs. As Tracy and Robins (2004, p. 109) argue, appraisal theories that include appraisals of self-relevance tend to combine them with appraisals of general goal relevance and therefore imply a very basic notion of the *self* (i.e., the ability to differentiate between *self* and *other*). General goal relevance is, however, not the same as self-awareness and self-representation that are necessary for the elicitation of self-conscious emotions. For self-conscious emotions to occur there must be ongoing self-evaluative processes within the individual, which include both a continuing sense of self-awareness (i.e., the *I* or *We*) and the ability for more complex self-representations (i.e., the mental representations of one's personal and/or social identity) (Tracy et al., 2007).

To address self-awareness and self-representations in the formation of a set of appraisals that would elicit different self-conscious emotions, Tracy and Robins (2004, p. 109) added an appraisal-based model of self-conscious emotions to the appraisal theories of emotion. The model makes the following predictions: (1) if appraisals of the event are

relevant for survival and reproduction, basic emotions, but not self-conscious emotions, are likely to be elicited, (2) for a self-conscious emotion to be elicited the event must be appraised as activating self-representations of the person, (3) when the attentional focus is on a person's self-representations, events need to be appraised as relevant to the identity goals of the person, (4) when an event has been appraised for its relevance to identity goals, then the event needs to be appraised as congruent or incongruent with these identity goals, and (5) the elicitation of self-conscious emotions requires attributions to internal causes (i.e., the *self*) (Tracy & Robins, 2004, pp. 109-114).

The predictions of the model by Tracy and Robins (2004), particularly the assumption that the elicitation of self-conscious emotions requires attributions to internal causes, might apply to self-conscious emotions such as shame, guilt and embarrassment, but we would argue that blaming oneself for the event is not necessarily an appraisal associated with humiliation. This assumption is based on the observation that humiliated persons do not feel that they deserve this negative feeling (Fernández et al., 2015); or as Klein (1991, p. 117) noted, "people believe that they deserve their shame; they do not believe they deserve their humiliation". Therefore, we proposed that people who blame themselves as being responsible for the humiliating event (i.e., *internal blame*) might feel ashamed, embarrassed or guilty but not necessarily humiliated. Instead, a humiliated person might attribute the blame to the humiliator(s) (i.e., *external blame*) and/or appraise the devaluation of the *self* as unfair and unjust (i.e., *injustice*) (Fernández et al., 2015).

Perceiving oneself *powerless*, and thus not in control of the situation, has been described as another appraisal in the elicitation of humiliation (Elshout et al., 2017; Hartling et al., 2013; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Klein, 2005; Lacey, 2011; Otten & Jonas, 2014; Torres & Bergner, 2010). According to the attribution-based theory of motivation, people appraise emotion-eliciting events as either being controllable or uncontrollable (i.e., causal

control; see Weiner, 2010). For example, if a person fails at a task and attributes it internally to a lack of effort from her or his side, then the person perceives the event as controllable. But if the person attributes the event internally due to a lack of competence, then the person perceives the event as uncontrollable (Weiner, 2010).

Another appraisal identified to elicit humiliation is *internalising* the devaluation that is imposed on the person (Fernández et al., 2015, 2018). *Internalisation* results in a loss in self-value and the lowering of a person's self-esteem (Fernández et al., 2015, 2018). Fernández et al. (2018) found that contextual factors, such as the status and the hostility of the humiliator, played a role in whether a humiliated person *internalises* the devaluation imposed on her or him. More specifically, they showed that participants internalised the humiliating event significantly more when the humiliator was hostile and of higher status (Fernández et al., 2018). They attributed these findings to the perception that if the humiliated person evaluates the humiliator as having higher status, the humiliator is likely to have power or influence over the humiliated person's *self* and consequently, a stronger ability to compel the humiliated person to internalise the devaluation (Fernández et al., 2018).

According to the appraisal-based model of self-conscious emotions (Tracy et al., 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2004) and previous studies on humiliation (Elison & Harter, 2007; Elshout et al., 2017; Fernández et al., 2015; Hartling et al., 2013; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Klein, 1991; Otten & Jonas, 2013; Silver et al., 1986; Torres & Bergner, 2010), we proposed that for the feeling of humiliation to be elicited, the appraising of a situational determinant has to activate a self-representation and should be relevant and incongruent with the identity goals of the humiliated person(s). More specifically, situational determinants need to be appraised as being the result of someone else's actions (i.e., externally blamed), and/or appraised as undeserved and unjust (i.e., injustice) (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999), and/or

appraised as something that lowers the self-esteem of the humiliated person (i.e., internalised); and/or appraised as something uncontrollable (i.e., powerlessness).

As various emotions share the same appraisals, one appraisal can elicit different emotions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). For instance, blaming someone else for an unjust devaluation is not only likely to elicit humiliation but also anger, while internalising the devaluation elicits, besides humiliation, also shame and/or embarrassment (Fernández et al., 2015). Therefore, appraising a humiliating event elicits emotional blends consisting of humiliation accompanied by different self-focused emotions such as shame and/or embarrassment, or other-focused emotions such as anger, depending on which appraisals are prompted (Elison & Harter, 2007; Jonas et al., 2014; Klein, 1991).

Humiliation as a Blended Emotion

According to appraisal theories of emotions (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), emotional blends result from the fact that different emotions share core appraisals. For example, humiliation might be blended with shame as they share the appraisal of internalisation (Fernández et al., 2015) and powerlessness (Elshout et al., 2017; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Tangney et al., 1996). Shame is also associated with internal attributions of blame in that people who experience shame usually appraise the situation as being their fault and that they brought about this negative feeling (Tracy et al., 2007). A humiliated person, on the other hand, does not feel that she or he deserves this negative feeling (Fernández et al., 2015; Klein, 1991) and is, therefore, less likely to internally blame her- or himself. Thus, when a situational determinant is internalised and the humiliated person perceives her- or himself powerless, humiliation and shame are likely to be elicited as an emotional blend, but if the situational determinant is appraised as internal blame, humiliation is unlikely to be elicited as part of the blend.

Guilt has also been associated with humiliation (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999). Both of these emotions are elicited following a transgression. With guilt, the transgression is committed by the person, while with humiliation the humiliated person(s) perceive(s) themselves as having done nothing wrong (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999). Therefore, guilt is usually elicited after internally blaming an emotion-inducing event, while it is assumed that humiliation is not (Neumann, 2000). Yet, it is likely that humiliation will be accompanied by guilt when the humiliated person perceives her- or himself powerless because of her or his inability to protect her- or himself from the humiliating event (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999). Therefore, when humiliated persons perceive that they are unable to protect themselves from the event (i.e., powerlessness), then guilt might probably be elicited as part of the emotional blend of humiliation.

Another emotion associated with humiliation is embarrassment (Elison & Harter, 2007; Elshout et al., 2017; Fernández et al., 2015). As with humiliation and shame, embarrassment is associated with powerlessness and the internalisation of a devalued *self* (Fernández et al., 2015; Pulham, 2009). Different from shame but similar to humiliation, embarrassment is a *public emotion* in that being devalued in front of others is an appraisal that might elicit both humiliation and embarrassment (Fernández et al., 2015; Tangney et al., 1996). Similar to shame and guilt, embarrassment is also associated with internal blaming and the experience of powerlessness (Lewis, 1995; Tracy & Robins, 2004) as it is often elicited after social blunders such as spilling or tripping where the individual might feel she or he has little control over (i.e., powerlessness) (Pulham, 2009). Therefore, when a situational determinant is internalised, as being public knowledge, and the humiliated person perceives her- or himself powerless and thus not in control, then embarrassment is likely to accompany humiliation, but when the event is blamed internally, humiliation might not be

part of the blend, and instead, shame and guilt are likely to accompany the feeling of embarrassment.

The emotions of shame, guilt and embarrassment are also defined as self-focused moral emotions because they all involve ongoing assessments of moral worth and whether the *personal self* fits within a community (Rozin et al., 1999, p. 574). More specifically, the emotions of shame, guilt and embarrassment signal that the individual does not only want to "fit in" by behaving appropriately but also that the individual does not want to harm anybody (not even the humiliator). Although these self-focused moral emotions can be distinguished from each other, they are interrelated (Rozin et al., 1999). Humiliation is, however, not only accompanied by self-focused moral emotions but also by other-focused moral emotions such as anger (Elison & Harter, 2007; Fernández et al., 2015; Leidner et al., 2012; Veldhuis et al., 2014). Anger and humiliation differ from each other in that the former might be elicited as a result of a blocked goal, while the latter requires self-evaluative processes (Tracy et al., 2007). Yet, other-focused anger and humiliation share the appraisals of injustice and externally blaming others for the event (Fernández et al., 2015).

Other-focused anger is part of a cluster of distinguishable, yet strongly related emotional reactions to the moral violations of others, namely contempt and disgust (Rozin et al., 1999). Contempt and disgust, similar to anger and humiliation, are associated with external blaming an unfair act that was committed by another person (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Anger, contempt and disgust are other-focused moral emotions, in that they are elicited following the violation of shared moral codes (Rozin et al., 1999; Russell et al., 2013). More specifically, anger is elicited in reaction to a violation of autonomy where individuals feel that their rights or freedom have been violated by others (Russell et al., 2013). Contempt, on the other hand, is elicited when the violation refers to moral codes that are related to hierarchy in a community or society (Rozin et al., 1999). For example, when

members of an outgroup, that is perceived as low-status in society, devalue members of one's ingroup, that is perceived as having high-status, one might feel contempt towards members of the outgroup because they have violated moral codes related to the hierarchy (Rozin et al., 1999). It is also suggested that contempt is related to appraisals of *competence* in that people might feel contempt for individuals who are perceived as being less competent and who are perceived as not being able to contribute meaningfully to a group (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011).

Disgust is assumed to be elicited following the violation of a purity sanction (i.e., regulation of bodily functions, such as eating, defecation, and hygiene that are integrated into the moral codes of cultures; see Rozin et al., 1999). Yet, disgust is also assumed to be elicited following situations where people violate the dignity of others through their behaviour (Haidt et al., 1994, 1997; Rozin et al., 2008; Steiger & Reyna, 2017). Rozin et al. (1999) define it as *socio-moral disgust.* It is most often triggered when people behave socially immoral and/or act against others by violating their human dignity, as it is the case with racism, child abuse, cruelty and rape (Rozin et al., 1999). In line with this, participants who recalled past experiences associated with disgust reported feelings of disgust for others whom they perceived as having "unacceptable" sexist or racist attitudes (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).

Consequently, we proposed that the emotional blend of humiliation and other-focused moral emotions is likely to be elicited when situational determinants are appraised as being the result of someone else's actions and perceived as unfair or undeserved. The interplay between shared appraisals and emotional responses are visualised in Figure 1.



Figure 1. Appraisals of humiliation and the associated emotional responses.

Blended emotional responses to humiliating events do not only depend on the shared appraisals but also on the identity processes involved (i.e., personal or self-related; and social or other-related). According to the intergroup emotion theory, depending on whether an event is evaluated as affecting the individual personally or the ingroup determines the appraisals and thus, the emotional patterns (Smith et al., 2007). Consequently, we proposed that the same situational determinants would be differently appraised when a person is personally humiliated compared to being vicariously humiliated, which will result in different emotional patterns. Or to put it differently, under the condition that a humiliating event is evaluated as affecting the *personal self*, situational determinants are likely to be appraised from a self-focused perspective (i.e., aiming at appropriate responses to restore self-worth and to remain a part of the community), which makes the appraisals of internalisation and powerlessness most likely, and consequently, the elicitation of the feeling of humiliation accompanied by the self-focused emotions such as shame, embarrassment and guilt. In contrast, when a

humiliating event is evaluated as affecting the ingroup (i.e., social self), situational determinants are likely to be appraised from the other-focused perspective (i.e., aiming at appropriate responses to restore or maintain positive intergroup distinctiveness), which makes the appraisals of external blame and perceived injustice more likely, and consequently, the elicitation of the feeling of humiliation and other-focused emotions such as anger, contempt and disgust. The assumption that the two latter emotions are elicited, is supported by various studies showing that not only anger but also contempt and disgust, are emotions typically experienced when a salient social identity is threatened (Gordijn et al., 2006; Reicher et al., 2016; Tagar et al., 2011; Tausch et al., 2011; Taylor, 2007; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). For instance, it was found that anger was more prevalent when participants were prompted to see themselves and the victims of unfair treatment as part of the same group, especially when they identified strongly with this group (Gordijn et al., 2006; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Likewise, another study that analysed the written language used by perpetrators of hate crimes found that the emotion of disgust was most frequently used as a means of discriminating against the outgroup (Taylor, 2007). Reicher and colleagues (2016) also showed that behaviour associated with disgust (i.e., eagerness to wash hands) was significantly less if participants perceived touching an ingroup member's belongings (i.e., a t-shirt) as compared to touching an outgroup member's t-shirt.

We, therefore, hypothesised that personally humiliating events (i.e., situational determinants) are likely to be appraised as internalising the devaluation and/or as uncontrollable (i.e., internalisation and powerlessness), which in turn will elicit humiliation blended with self-focused emotions (i.e., self-conscious emotions such as shame, embarrassment and guilt), whereas vicariously humiliating events are likely to be appraised as something unjust and/or something to be externally blamed, which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions (i.e., anger, contempt and disgust).

The present research further proposes that not only identity processes influence appraisals and consequent emotional patterns but also the presence of an audience (i.e., visual exposure). As outlined elsewhere, visual exposure is a situational determinant that aggravates the appraisals of the other situational determinants (i.e., attack, reduction in size, social exclusion and being made deficient) and therefore, increases the experience of humiliation (Mann et al., 2017; Otten et al., 2017). Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the aggravating influence of visual exposure is assumed to differ between personally and vicariously humiliating events because in the former visual exposure refers to the distinctiveness between the humiliated person and the audience, whereas in the latter it refers to the indistinctiveness between the (vicariously) humiliated person and the audience. Consequently, we assumed that visual exposure influences the intensity of appraisals and emotions, and that this effect will be stronger in personally humiliating events when compared to vicariously humiliating events.

The appraisal theories of emotions argue that the emotions elicited as a result of appraisals regulate people's responses to events (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1997). Therefore, emotions do not only correspond to a certain pattern of appraisals, but also to a pattern of behavioural tendencies (Roseman et al., 1994) that have different social functions (Fischer & Roseman, 2007).

Responses to Humiliating Events

Responses to humiliation are associated with both avoidance and approach tendencies (Fernández et al., 2015; Jonas et al., 2014; Leidner et al., 2012). These avoidance and approach tendencies correspond with the aversive and appetitive motivational systems, respectively, which represent the core elements in the organisation of human behaviour (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009, p. 184). The aversive motivational system refers to people's

needs for protection and security, whereas the appetitive motivational system refers to people's needs for distinctiveness by, for instance, achieving a more positive goal and seeking different (usually more positive) outcomes (i.e., approach; Elliot & Church, 1997).

The reasons for these rather contradicting responses to a humiliating event are due to the appraisals that humiliation shares with other emotions and therefore, resulting in different emotional blends (e.g., Fernández et al., 2015; Goldman, 2008; Jonas et al., 2014). It is because of these different blends of emotions that humiliation can simultaneously lead to both avoidance tendencies typically associated with self-focused emotions, such as shame and embarrassment, and approach tendencies typically associated with other-focused emotions, such as anger (Fernández et al., 2015; Jonas et al., 2014; Leidner et al., 2012). More specifically, humiliation blended with shame and embarrassment will likely result in avoidance tendencies such as aiming to get to a safe place, a desire to do nothing, escaping, and/or hiding and withdrawing from the situation (Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 2007). On the other hand, when humiliation is blended with anger then approach tendencies, such as removing an obstacle, hurting or hitting someone, opposing or resisting, screaming, complaining about someone, or getting back at someone (Frijda, 1987; Roseman et al., 1994), are most likely.

Both avoidance and approach tendencies do not only help to cope and deal with an event, but they also determine the future relationships by either increasing or decreasing the social and psychological distance between the *self* and the *other*, or between the ingroup and the outgroup (Fischer & Manstead, 2008). How emotions are expressed (i.e., behavioural tendencies) help people to form and maintain positive relationships with others, and/or they help people to preserve their self-esteem, identity or power over others (Fischer & Manstead, 2008). Because humiliation is defined as an interaction-oriented emotion that is elicited following an event that involves the humiliated person(s), the humiliator(s) and sometimes an

audience (Coleman et al., 2007; Klein, 1991), the responses to humiliation always refers to the relationship between these role players. More specifically, avoidance-oriented tendencies, such as getting to a safe place (e.g., escaping) and/or withdrawing from the situation aim at temporarily escaping from the interaction with the humiliator. This means, although the humiliated person avoids any future contact with the humiliator, the relationship remains unchanged. On the other hand, normative approach tendencies, such as opposing the humiliator or complaining about the humiliator to a third party aim in most cases at correcting or changing the relationship with the humiliator and thus, maintaining a future (although different) relationship between the parties involved. Relationships might also be changed and thus maintained when people respond to humiliating events with non-normative tendencies that often violate laws and social norms. We would argue that normative as well as non-normative approach tendencies serve to maintain - although a changed - relationship between the humiliated person(s) and the humiliator(s) as the associated actions are directed at the humiliator(s) through which her or his, or their existence, is recognised.

There might, however, be situations where the very existence of the other (i.e., humiliator) is contested. In this case, the humiliated person(s) are likely to engage in responses that signal the end of the relationship. For instance, the humiliated person(s) might opt to socially exclude the humiliator. Socially excluding and ostracising another person(s) or group is equivalent to "the silent treatment" by which either the mere existence of the other is denied or by which the worth of the other is contested (Fischer & Roseman, 2007, p. 104). Both social exclusion and ostracism can occur on different levels. For instance, a student from University A who humiliates a student from University B might be excluded from the social category of students or even excluded from the category of humans. The reasoning that social exclusion occurs on different levels is informed by self-categorisation theory, which proposes that people's identities operate at different levels of inclusiveness (Turner et al.,

1987). The most inclusive social category refers to the *self* as being human (i.e., the human identity), the intermediate level of inclusiveness refers to the *self* as a member of a social group in comparison to other groups (i.e., the social identity), whereas the least inclusive category refers to the *self* as a unique being (i.e., personal identity).

Ignoring others and treating them with indifference is also central to dehumanisation, which refers to the denial of being part of the human community (Bastian & Haslam, 2010; Oliver, 2011). The exclusion from the human community legitimises the indifference to the suffering and unjust treatment of the excluded others (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). A subtler form of dehumanisation is *infrahumanisation* by which, for instance, moral emotions are less attributed to the other (Vaes et al., 2003), and therefore, the other is seen as less human. Both dehumanising the humiliator or seeing the humiliator as lacking human attributes (i.e., infrahumanising), and therefore, as lacking the capacity to evoke compassion (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014), have the potential to change one humiliating relationship into another humiliating relationship. This shift has been coined as the *cycle of humiliation*, which refers to the changing roles of the humiliated person, and is portrayed as the underlying mechanism that describes the interplay between vicarious humiliation and intergroup conflict (Lindner, 2016).

In line with our reasoning, we would argue that the emotional blends of self-focused emotions and other-focused emotions regulate the responses to a humiliating event. More specifically, we proposed that when shame and embarrassment as self-focused emotions blend with humiliation, people will be motivated to withdraw from the humiliator(s). On the other hand, when anger as other-focused emotion is blended with humiliation, people will be motivated to engage in behavioural tendencies that are aimed at changing the behaviour of the humiliator(s), which should result in an improved relationship (i.e., normative or non-normative approach tendencies) (Tausch et al., 2011). It is furthermore assumed that

contempt and disgust as other-focused emotions regulate the relationship between a humiliating event and social exclusion. This reasoning is informed by previous research that demonstrated the different effects of the other-focused emotions of anger, contempt and disgust (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Tausch et al., 2011; Taylor, 2007). For instance, Tausch et al. (2011), who studied the interplay between moral emotions and collective action, showed that group-based anger results in normative (i.e., actions that conform to the norms of the wider social system) and non-violent non-normative responses, whereas group-based contempt is likely to result in violent non-normative responses. Likewise, Taylor (2007) showed in her analysis of anti-group texts that words related to disgust were more prevalent than words related to anger, which made her conclude that disgust is crucial in understanding discrimination and prejudice. Contempt, like disgust, differs also from anger according to Fischer and Roseman (2007), who showed that although anger and contempt can occur together, they result in different motivational tendencies. More specifically, they showed that anger provokes short-term attack responses towards others, whereas contempt provokes rejection and social exclusion (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). Intergroup disgust has also been linked to dehumanisation and social exclusion (Harris & Fiske, 2006; Haslam, 2006). For instance, Harris and Fiske (2006) provided evidence that outgroups perceived as low in competence and low in warmth are often dehumanised by ingroup members and that this process is associated with the feeling of disgust. Haslam (2006) also proposed that dehumanisation involving the denial of uniquely humanistic attributes in outgroups are associated with the emotions of contempt and disgust. Moreover, one could assume that dehumanising the humiliator provides legitimacy to exclude her or him from the most inclusive category. We, therefore, proposed that when humiliation is blended with the feeling of contempt and/or disgust individuals will be motivated to engage in social exclusion by dehumanising them.

To conclude, humiliation is associated with more than one behavioural response – either the humiliated person(s) are motivated to respond by avoiding or by approaching the humiliator(s) (Fernández et al., 2015; Jonas et al., 2014; Leidner et al., 2012). These contradicting behavioural responses are the result of the emotional blends of humiliation (i.e., shame, embarrassment and anger) that are elicited following a humiliating event. Humiliation blended with shame and embarrassment is likely to be associated with avoidance (Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 2007), while humiliation blended with anger is associated with approach tendencies that either do or do not conform to social norms (Fernández et al., 2015). Moreover, the present research proposes that humiliation blended with contempt and/or disgust is likely to result in dehumanisation and the tendency to socially exclude.

In the following section, we will provide an overview about the current research by presenting our main arguments as outlined in the literature review and derived hypotheses that will be tested in the present research.

THE CURRENT RESEARCH

The overall aim of the present research is to extend our understanding about the psychological processes of vicarious humiliation that either prevent or foster intergroup conflicts. More specifically, because our research was not only based on the premise that people can indeed feel humiliated on behalf of somebody they share a social identity with but also that the experience of vicarious humiliation is rather common, our first aim was to explore the *commonness* of the experience of vicarious humiliation relative to personal humiliation. Moreover, that people can feel humiliated requires that they first appraise an event as humiliating, which means that they recognise *situational determinants* of the event such as (1) being attacked, (2) being reduced in size, (3) being socially rejected or excluded, and (4) being found or made deficient. We argued elsewhere that these situational determinants characterise humiliating events irrespective of whether these events are experienced as personal or as vicarious humiliation. However, we also argued that the role of visual exposure as situational determinant differs between personally and vicariously humiliating events. In the former, the audience is independent from the humiliated person, whereas in the latter, the audience and the person who feels humiliated on behalf of the other, are often one and the same. Therefore, our second aim was to provide evidence that personally and vicariously humiliating events differ with regards to the situational determinant of visual exposure but not necessarily with regards to the situational determinants of (1) being attacked, (2) being reduced in size, (3) being socially rejected or excluded, or (4) being found or made deficient. Also, we argued that humiliation is a blended emotion as it shares core appraisals with other emotions such as shame, embarrassment, guilt, anger, contempt and/or disgust (Elison & Harter, 2007; Elshout et al., 2017; Fernández et al., 2015; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Klein, 1991; Veldhuis et al., 2014). Thus, our third aim was to explore whether people experience humiliation as a blended emotion. These three aims,

which were explorative in nature, were addressed in Study 1 (N = 1048) using a cross-sectional survey design.

The role of ingroup identification in experiencing vicarious humiliation was addressed in Study 2 (N = 175). More specifically, we argued that highly identified group members who experience vicarious humiliation experience a discrepancy between how they perceive others as seeing or treating members of their ingroup and how they view their ingroup (Miller, 1993), which affects the essence of their social identity. We, therefore, proposed a positive relationship between ingroup identification and vicarious humiliation, in that highly identified group members experience an intensified feeling of humiliation after witnessing an ingroup member being devalued by an outgroup. Consequently, Study 2 tested the hypothesis that:

Hypothesis 1. After witnessing an ingroup member being humiliated, highly identified ingroup members experience a stronger feeling of humiliation compared to low identified ingroup members.

We further argued that the different identity processes involved in personal and vicarious humiliation determine the appraisal processes and thus the profile of emotions. Because situational determinants of a personally humiliating event are appraised with regard to the *personal self,* self-focused emotions are likely to dominate the emotional responses. On the other hand, because situational determinants of a vicariously humiliating event are appraised with regard to their relevance to the *social self,* other-focused emotions are likely to dominate the emotional responses. More specifically, we hypothesised that:

Hypothesis 2a. Personally humiliating events (i.e., the situational determinants) are likely to be appraised as internalising the devaluation and/or as uncontrollable (i.e., internalisation and powerlessness), which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions such as shame, embarrassment and guilt.

Hypothesis 2b. Vicariously humiliating events (i.e., the situational determinants) are likely to be appraised as something unjust and externally blamed, which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions such as anger, contempt and disgust.

Moreover, we reasoned that there might be situations where humiliated people appraise a humiliating event as caused by themselves (i.e., internal blame). However, because the feeling of humiliation is considered as undeserved (Klein, 1991; Fernández et al., 2015), we hypothesised that:

Hypothesis 3. If a humiliating event (i.e., situational determinants) is appraised as internal blame then the emotional responses of shame, embarrassment and/or guilt are likely to be elicited but not as blends of humiliation.

We further argued that appraisals and emotional patterns are not only influenced by identity processes (i.e., whether it is a personally or a vicariously humiliating event) but also by the presence or absence of others witnessing the humiliation. As outlined elsewhere, the situational determinant visual exposure is an aggravator of the other situational determinants, and thus, is assumed to intensify the experience of humiliation, which was assumed to be stronger in personally humiliating events compared to vicariously humiliating events. Consequently, we hypothesised:

Hypothesis 4. The aggravating effect of visual exposure will be stronger in personally humiliating events when compared to vicariously humiliating events.

Hypotheses 2a/b, 3 and 4 were tested in three experimental studies (Study 3, Study 4 and Study 5) using different social contexts and different approaches to manipulate personal and vicarious humiliation. Study 3 (N = 74) used as manipulation strategy the personal recall approach, whereas Study 4 (N = 359) and Study 5 (N = 376) manipulated personal and

vicarious humiliation by providing participants with a scenario, while controlling for the presence of an audience within the contexts of gender and university students, respectively.

We also argued that emotions are not only related to a pattern of appraisals but also to a pattern of behavioural intentions (Roseman et al., 1994). In fact, emotions are *regulators* between emotion-eliciting events and the behaviours that people intend to engage in as a response to these events. With regard to humiliation, we argued that it is the emotions that accompany the feeling of humiliation (rather than humiliation on its own), that regulate which behavioural tendency the humiliated person(s) opt(s) for. When humiliated person(s) tend(s) to engage in avoidance, they are likely trying to escape from the relationship with the humiliator(s), while when they tend to approach the humiliator(s), they are likely trying to correct or change the relationship with the humiliator(s). On the other hand, the humiliated person(s) might also want to end the relationship with the humiliator(s) by socially excluding them. Socially excluding people is legitimised by the process of dehumanisation (Harris & Fiske, 2006; Haslam, 2006) as it becomes easier to exclude people from one's social network when they are seen as *less human*. We proposed that the processes of dehumanisation and/or social exclusion facilitate the conflict associated with intergroup humiliation. Consequently, we hypothesised that:

Hypothesis 5a. Humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions, such as shame and embarrassment, will provoke avoidance tendencies.

Hypothesis 5b. Humiliation accompanied by anger will provoke normative and non-normative approach tendencies.

Hypothesis 5c. Humiliation accompanied by disgust will provoke indirectly social exclusion through dehumanisation.

We tested these hypotheses within the intergroup contexts of gender with females as the humiliated ingroup (n = 998) using an experimental design (Study 6).

In our explorative and experimental studies, we used undergraduate university students registered with the University of South Africa as research participants. We invited for each study different students to participate in order to avoid multiple participation in the different studies. Data for all studies was collected through internet-based research designs, which were uploaded on the online platform, *Qualtrics*. Approval to conduct the studies and the use of Unisa students as research participants was granted by the Ethical Research Committee at the College of Human Sciences (REC-240816-052; 2018-CHS-004) and the Senate of Research and Innovation and Higher Degrees Committee at the University of South Africa (2018_RPSC_007_RS), respectively.

In all studies, participants received an email inviting them to participate in the study. In the email, and on the first page of the internet-based studies, participants were informed about the nature of the respective study. It was also stipulated that we were interested in the participants' honest opinion and that there would be no right or wrong answers. It was furthermore stipulated that participation in the study was voluntary, that they could withdraw at any time without consequences, and that all answers are made anonymously. The participants were notified about the estimated duration of the respective study and they were requested to follow a link that would direct them to the study. Participants were further informed that they provide consent to participate in the study by selecting the *I agree* option which took them to the study.

After participants completed (or withdraw from) each study, they were thanked for taking the time and effort to participate. In Studies 2 to 6, where we adopted experimental designs, participants were debriefed as to the real purpose of the respective study and they were provided with an explanation as to why the researchers were not able to be upfront about the real purpose of the study. In all studies, participants' anonymity and confidentiality

were again assured. Furthermore, we assured the participants that the results would only be analysed at a group level for scientific purposes.

STUDY 1

Overall, Study 1 focused on participants' understandings about and experiences with humiliation. The study addressed various aims using an explorative approach (i.e., cross-sectional survey design). Firstly, the study aimed at exploring the *commonness* of vicarious humiliation. The second aim was to explore the *situational determinants* of personal and vicarious humiliation with a particular focus on the role of visual exposure. Lastly, we aimed at exploring the emotional implications of humiliation. More specifically, we aimed at showing that humiliation as a feeling is experienced as a blended emotion rather than as a unique emotion.

Sample

One thousand and forty-eight participants started the study. However, only half of the sample answered all questions (n = 758). Of those 465 participants indicated that they were female, 291 indicated that they were male and two selected 'other' as describing their gender. Participants' age ranged from 18 to 66 years with a mean age of 29.57 (*SD* = 9.54).

Procedure and Measurements

Participants were informed in an email that the study aimed at understanding emotions that we experience in our daily lives. Participants were asked to complete several questions that were presented in the same order as described below. Firstly, participants were asked to define *humiliation* providing them with the following instruction: "In this part of our survey, we will ask you about your experience with the term *humiliation*. We all have experienced and felt it. If asked by somebody, how would you define humiliation?" Participants were provided with a box in which they could write their definitions (n = 1048).

Next, we asked participants to describe in detail a situation that made them *feel* humiliated. Because we aimed at exploring the commonness of vicarious humiliation, we did not specify the target of humiliating (e.g., personal or vicarious). Again, participants were provided with a box in which they could describe this situation (n = 819).

After participants provided their narratives about situations that made them feel humiliated, they were provided with a list of emotions and asked whether they felt these emotions too in the situation that made them feel humiliated? The following emotions were listed: *angry*, *outraged*, *annoyed*, *disgust*, *dislike*, *distaste*, *shame*, *small*, *ashamed*, *embarrassed*, *guilty*, *contempt*, *indifference* and *disregard*. Participants answered on a scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*a great deal*). *Angry*, *outraged* and *annoyed* were combined into the anger measure (α = .77); *disgust*, *dislike* and *distaste* were combined into the disgust measure (α = .77); *shame*, *small*, *ashamed* were combined into the shame measure (α = .82) and *contempt*, *indifference* and *disregard* were combined into the contempt measure (α = .63). Embarrassment and guilt were treated as one-item measures.

Next, we asked participants to describe a situation in the box provided, where they have experienced vicarious humiliation (n = 764) because they witnessed or heard about the humiliation of somebody with whom they have something in common (e.g., gender, age, nationality, etc.) (n = 764). This question was followed by asking participants how often they have been experiencing humiliation where they were personally targeted and how often they experienced humiliation because they witnessed the humiliation of someone with whom they have something in common (i.e., vicarious humiliation). These two items were answered on a scale ranging from 0 (*never*) to 100 (*always*). Lastly, participants were asked to indicate their age and gender.

Data Analysis

The data retrieved from the open-end questions (i.e., *the definition of humiliation*, *humiliating event*, and *vicariously humiliating events*) were analysed using content analysis (by using *Atlas.ti*, 2019). A coding scheme for each open-ended question was developed by creating an initial list of coding categories (including definitions) deductively from previous research as outlined in the literature review. The respective coding schemes will be outlined in the following result section.

Results

Before we directly addressed our three aims of Study 1, we explored our participants' understanding of humiliation. More specifically, we explored whether individuals tend to define humiliation as an *event* or as a *feeling* by assessing the narratives provided by participants when they were asked *to define humiliation* (n = 1048). Three primary categories were used: (1) event; (2) feeling and (3) event and feeling. Content was coded as *an event* when humiliation was defined in terms of its causes (e.g., "*An event in which someone or a group of persons degrade one another in an inhumane manner*"), whereas content was coded as *a feeling* when humiliation was defined in terms of its emotional implications (e.g., "*Feeling embarrassed, or ashamed, or stupid, because of something that you have done"*). Content was coded as *event and feeling* when humiliation was defined as being both an event and a feeling (e.g., "*the worst possible feeling ever and it is degrading someone's humanity*"). Sixteen participants' definitions were not coded with any of the three primary codes as none of the features of these codes were evident (e.g., "*I would simply say Ubuntu a person is a person because of another person"*).

The frequencies of the primary codes, which are depicted in Table 1, suggest that the majority of the participants defined humiliation as an event rather than a feeling.

Table 1

Frequencies of humiliation as event and feeling, Study 1.

Primary Code	Frequencies	Cumulative percentage
An event	708	68.60
A feeling	249	24.13
An event and a feeling	75	7.27

Commonness of vicarious humiliation

To explore the commonness of vicarious humiliation we used the narratives provided by our participants to our request *to describe a situation that made them feel humiliated* (n = 819). As mentioned above, we intentionally did not specify the target of the humiliation. Thus, we first assessed the target of the humiliation in the descriptions, in other words, was the participant *personally* targeted or did she or he witness the humiliation of someone else (i.e., vicarious humiliation). We coded the target of humiliation as (1) personal humiliation and (2) vicarious humiliation. Content was coded as personal humiliation when the described situation referred to personal identity, i.e., a personal trait of the humiliated person is devalued by the event (e.g., "*Often my mother would comment, in front of people, on the size of my nose*"). On the other hand, content was coded as vicarious humiliation when the described situation portrayed the humiliation of another person(s) (e.g., "*As a gay man I hear a lot of instances where gay men and women are made to feel less than human just because of who we love"*). Forty-nine participants described an event where they were personally humiliated because of their group membership; in other words, the humiliated person's social identity was targeted by the humiliating event (e.g., "*A conversation with a male figure where he stated that he does not want to discuss rugby with a female*"). As the participants were personally targeted in the humiliating event instead of witnessing the humiliation of another

person, we decided to code these descriptions as personal humiliation. Furthermore, 37 participants' narratives were not included in the analysis as the target of the humiliation was not identifiable (e.g., "*I'm quite headstrong so I'll never allow individuals to toy around with my being"*). Table 2 shows the frequencies of narratives coded as personal and vicarious humiliation.

Table 2

Frequencies of personal versus vicarious humiliation, Study 1.

Code	Frequencies of narratives	Cumulative percentage
Personal humiliation	771	98.59
Vicarious humiliation	11	1.41

Apparent from the results is that when participants were asked to think about and describe an event where they felt humiliated without prompting the target in the instruction, the vast majority referred to interpersonal humiliating events where their personal *self* was targeted. Interestingly, when participants were asked to compare the commonness of personal versus vicarious humiliation, they reported to experience vicarious humiliation significantly more often (M = 49.60, SE = 28.68) than personal humiliation (M = 40.85, SE = 28.95), $t(760) = -8.05$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.28$. This result implies that when participants were asked at which level they mostly experience humiliation, they reported vicarious humiliation more often than personal humiliation.

Overall, our results so far imply firstly, that the majority of our participants conceptualised humiliation as an event rather than as a feeling; and secondly, that the majority of our participants described a humiliating situation as personal humiliation. Yet, when participants were asked *directly* about their experience of personal versus vicarious

humiliation, they reported to experience significantly more vicarious humiliation than personal humiliation.

Situational determinants of humiliation

To explore the situational determinants of personal and vicarious humiliation, two kinds of narratives were considered. Firstly, the descriptions of a humiliating situation whereby only the descriptions coded as personal humiliation were considered for further analysis (n = 771) (see Table 2). The second kind of narratives refer to the descriptions given by participants when they were asked to describe a vicariously humiliating event (n = 764). These two sources allowed us to compare the situational determinants used to describe personally and vicariously humiliating events, which we assumed would not differ, except for *visual exposure*. More specifically, we assumed that the presence of others will be more prevalent in personally humiliating events (i.e., more frequently mentioned) than in vicariously humiliating events as the audience and the person who feels humiliated on behalf of the other are the same person(s).

Five sub-codes were distinguished for situational determinants which correspond to the conceptualisations of humiliating events (Klein, 1991; Lazare, 1987): (1) attack (e.g., ridicule, scorn, insult, bullying, reprimand, criticise, assault, being laughed at), (2) reduced in size (e.g., disrespect, lowered pride and self-esteem, lowered dignity and status, belittlement, dishonoured, made worthless or insignificant, stigmatisation, discredit, devalue, name calling), (3) social rejection and exclusion (e.g., ostracism, dehumanisation, discrimination, discounted, cheated on, betrayal), (4) being made or found deficient (e.g., failure, deficiency), and (5) visual exposure (e.g., in front of others, exposure, privacy or secrets are revealed). In the descriptions of personally humiliating events, the content of 24 participants was not included as no situational determinants were mentioned in their descriptions (e.g., "*Too*

personal to discuss"; "*I don't recall a time where I can honestly say I felt humiliated*"), while in the descriptions of vicarious humiliation, the content of 104 participants was not coded as, once more, none of the features of the five determinants were mentioned (e.g., "*I cannot recall an incident where I could relate to someone else being humiliated"*). Twenty participants described a personally humiliating event, instead of a vicariously humiliating event and were therefore, not included in the analysis. As each description could be characterised by more than one of the situational determinants, the coding strategy allowed again that each separate description could be coded with more than one of the five codes.

Content was coded as attack when an event (irrespective of whether it was a personally or a vicariously humiliating event) was described as a discrepancy between how the humiliated person is treated by another person and how she or he expects to be treated. This included any event of ridicule, scorn, being laughed at, insult, bullying, being reprimanded, criticism, harassment and assault such as rape (e.g., "*when a person is making jokes about me or when a person criticise what I say and do*"). Content was coded as reduced in size when the situational determinants of the event referred to any form of being lowered or downgraded (i.e., being reduced in size); in other words, there was a discrepancy in position (or status) that the person was placed in by the humiliator and the position that she or he perceived to hold. These included events where the humiliated person was disrespected, had her or his pride and self-esteem lowered, dignity was violated, dishonored, 'badmouthed', discredited, devalued and/or derogatory names were used (e.g., "*when my high school teacher called me stupid just because I was not good with mathematics*"). Content was coded as social rejection and exclusion when the participant described an event where she or he was not included in a group or was rejected by another person. This included any situation of discrimination, being treated differently, not being considered, being discounted, not being included, rejected by a romantic partner or being cheated on or being

lied to (e.g., "*Rejection and a walk over like a door mat, being told I am not wanted*"). Content was coded as being made or found deficient when the event described an inadequacy or a shortcoming of the humiliated person in a certain domain such as failing a test, losing a job, not being able to answer a question, failed bodily function (e.g., urinating on oneself) or falling down (e.g., "*When I thought I knew the answer, but then completely gave the wrong answer*"). Lastly, content was coded as visual exposure when others witnessed the humiliating event or had the potential of finding out about the humiliation. This included any situation described as happening in front of others, publicly, on social media, or situations where the person felt exposed as something was revealed about her or him that nobody should know about (e.g., "*When in front of people someone singles you out and talks about your personal life*"). Table 3 reports on the frequencies of the five situational determinants as described by the participants for personally and vicariously humiliating events.

Table 3

Frequencies of situational determinants of personal versus vicarious humiliation, Study 1.

	Personal humiliation		Vicarious humiliation	
Situational determinants	Frequency	Cumulative percentage	Frequency	Cumulative percentage
Attack	277	24	253	32.44
Reduced in size	115	9.97	208	26.67
Social rejection and exclusion	145	12.56	133	17.05
Being found or made deficient	267	23.14	58	7.44
Visual exposure	350	30.33	128	16.41

The frequencies imply that our participants' descriptions of both personally and vicariously humiliating events were characterised by all five situational determinants of

humiliation. However, some determinants played a more substantial role in personally humiliating events and others more in the vicariously humiliating events. As we assumed, personally humiliating events were more often characterised by the presence of an audience (i.e., visual exposure) than vicariously humiliating events. Being found or made deficient was more important in personally humiliating events, while being reduced in size was more important in vicariously humiliating events (see Table 3).

Emotional blends of humiliation

To explore whether participants experience humiliation as emotional blend, two kinds of data were analysed. The first kind of data refers to the *definitions of humiliation* that were coded as *a feeling* or as an *event and feeling* (n = 324) (see Table 1). The second kind refers to the measurements of emotions that were presented to participants (n = 813).

We created sub-codes under the primary codes *feeling* and *event and feeling* to determine whether or not participants refer to other emotions (i.e., emotional blends) when they describe humiliation as a feeling. The following sub-codes were created: (1) a unique feeling if participants referred to humiliation as a distinctive feeling where no mention is made of any other emotion (e.g., "*A state of feeling that attacks one's character negatively*"); and (2) as a blended emotion if participants referred to other emotions (e.g., "*Strong feelings of embarrassment*"*).* Further sub-codes were introduced under the category of blended emotions: (2.1) embarrassment, (2.2) shame, (2.3) guilt, (2.4) anger, (2.5) contempt, and (2.6) disgust.

Table 4

Frequencies of humiliation as unique feeling versus blended with other feelings, Study 1.

Sub-codes	Frequencies	Cumulative percentage
Unique feeling	79	24.38
Blended feeling	245	75.62
Sub-codes of blended feeling		
Embarrassment	187	66.55
Shame	87	30.96
Guilt	3	1.07
Anger	4	1.42
Contempt	0	0
Disgust	0	0

Note. Because participants named multiple blended emotions, the sum of the frequency of sub-codes for blended emotions differs from the frequency of blended emotions as reported in the upper part of the table.

Considering the results depicted in Table 4, it is evident that the majority of participants, who described humiliation as a feeling, described it as a blended emotion. Furthermore, the majority of participants who defined humiliation as blended emotion referred to the feelings of embarrassment, followed by shame. Interestingly, the feelings of guilt and anger were rarely used, and the feelings of contempt and disgust were not used at all to describe humiliation as blended emotion.

Figure 2 shows the means of the measure of emotions as reported by the participants (i.e., the list of emotions where participants indicated how likely they were to also feel any of those emotions in a situation that made them feel humiliated). The results showed a similar

pattern to the previous findings as embarrassment was the emotion that was most strongly felt by our participants as an accommodating emotion, followed by shame. Likewise, the emotions of guilt and contempt were reported as less relevant. Results of the repeated-measures ANOVA, $F(3.60, 2925.07) = 301.78$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .27$, and the Bonferroni post hoc test revealed significant differences between all emotions ($ps < .001$), except between the feelings of contempt and guilt ($p = .32$). These results imply that participants reported significantly stronger embarrassment ($M = 4.10$, $SD = 1.07$) as blended emotion followed by shame ($M = 3.56$, $SD = 1.12$), anger ($M = 3.30$, $SD = 1.05$), disgust ($M = 3.10$, $SD = 1.07$), contempt ($M = 2.76$, $SD = 0.97$) and guilt ($M = 2.63$, $SD = 1.40$).



Figure 2. Means and error bars (95% confidence interval) of blended emotions, Study 1.

Discussion

Study 1 focused on people's understandings of humiliation and their experiences with this emotion. More specifically, the study first aimed at exploring how often individuals experience humiliation on behalf of ingroup members compared to how often they

experience it on a personal level (i.e., the commonness of humiliation). The second aim of Study 1 was to explore the situational determinants of humiliation and whether they differed in personally versus vicariously humiliating events. Lastly, the study aimed at exploring whether humiliation as a feeling is experienced as a blended emotion, as suggested by previous research (Elison & Harter, 2007; Jonas et al., 2014; Klein, 1991), or rather as an emotion on its own.

Our results firstly imply that the majority of our participants conceptualised humiliation in terms of its causes (i.e., as an event) rather than its emotional implications (i.e., as feeling). Furthermore, the majority of our participants conceptualised humiliation as personal humiliation. Only when we asked whether they experience more often personal relative to vicarious humiliation, did participants report vicarious humiliation as a more common experience relative to personal humiliation. One reason for these seemingly contradicting results might be that participants tended to conceptualise humiliation by default as personal humiliation. They only differentiated between personal and vicarious humiliation, after they were prompted to do so.

In line with our proposed assumption, participants' descriptions of personally and vicariously humiliating events referred to the proposed situational determinants of being attacked, being reduced in size, social rejection and exclusion, being found or made deficient and visual exposure. Also, in line with our assumption, the presence of an audience (i.e., visual exposure) played a more substantial role in personally humiliating events compared to vicariously humiliating events. An interesting finding was that participants more frequently reported to be reduced in size when they were vicariously targeted, whereas being found or made deficient was more frequently reported as a situational determinant for personally humiliating events. However, the finding might not be surprising if we take the current dominant public discourses about inequality in South Africa into consideration. For instance,

status differences are discussed with regard to the persisting inequalities in household incomes, which are substantially lower for black South Africans relative to white South Africans (Maluleke, 2019), and the still unresolved educational inequality affects black South Africans and white South Africans differently (Roodt, 2018). Although both inequalities are caused by structural barriers, it seems that the associated beliefs about these inequalities differ in that status inequality (i.e., reduced in size) is perceived as an intergroup phenomenon, whereas educational inequality is perceived as an intra-individual phenomenon, that is from the perspective of the "ideology of merit" (Piff et al., 2018). The latter refers to the dominant belief that people can escape their low social-economic status through education, which is propagated as individual rather than collective mobility.

Our assumption that humiliation is experienced as a blended emotion was supported by the results of Study 1. Participants reported in their narratives and in the measures of emotions to experience humiliation to be accompanied by the self-focused emotions of embarrassment and shame. Interestingly, other-focused emotions such as anger, contempt and disgust were less reported to blend with humiliation. The latter might be influenced by the fact that the majority of participants defined and conceptualised a humiliating event as personal humiliation. Therefore, the results of Study 1 provide first empirical evidence that personally humiliating events are more likely to provoke humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions as proposed in Hypothesis 2a.

Although our results provide insights into people's understanding of and experiences with humiliation, Study 1 had various limitations. Firstly, we did neither assess nor control for social identity. Therefore, Study 2 tested the effect of ingroup identification on the experience of vicarious humiliation by manipulating its salience. Furthermore, Study 1 did not assess blended emotions resulting from vicarious humiliation. Thus, to test our assumption that personally humiliating events elicit humiliation accompanied by self-focused

emotions (Hypothesis 2a), whereas vicariously humiliating events elicit humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2b) requires a more controlled methodological design. We, therefore, conducted a range of experimental studies which systematically controlled the target of humiliation (personal versus an ingroup member) and tested its effects on appraisal processes and emotional responses within different social contexts (Studies 3 to 5).

Although Study 1 provided first empirical evidence that the presence of an audience seems to be more important for personal humiliation compared to vicarious humiliation, its methodological design did not allow to explore whether the visual exposure of humiliating events aggravates the experience of humiliation more in a personally humiliating event than in a vicariously humiliating event. In order to overcome this limitation, we systematically controlled for visual exposure in personally and vicariously humiliating events and tested its effects on appraisals and emotional responses in two experimental studies (Studies 4 and 5).

Overall, the results of our first study showed that vicarious humiliation is a phenomenon that is indeed regularly experienced by individuals, thereby validating the claim of the present research that vicarious humiliation is important to be studied. Moreover, the results confirm that personally and vicariously humiliating events are characterised by our proposed situational determinants and that the presence of others who witness the humiliation is more important when individuals are personally targeted. Lastly, our results show that as a feeling, humiliation is perceived and experienced to be blended with other emotions.

STUDY 2

We hypothesised that the intensity of the experience of vicarious humiliation depends on how much the person who observes another person being humiliated identifies with the shared social group. More precisely, we hypothesised that after witnessing an ingroup member being devalued by member(s) of an outgroup highly identified ingroup members will experience a stronger feeling of humiliation compared to low identified ingroup members (Hypothesis 1). We tested our hypothesis experimentally using a within-subjects factorial design by manipulating ingroup identification (i.e., high identification vs. low identification) and assessing its effect on appraisals and the feeling of humiliation. Every participant was exposed to both the high ingroup identification and the low ingroup identification conditions. The order of the experimental conditions was counterbalanced.

Sample

One hundred and seventy-five participants completed Study 2. The age of participants ranged from 19 to 75 years (M_{age} = 31.65, *SD* = 9.45, missing: 6). Seventy-one participants indicated that they are male, and 104 participants indicated that they are female. One hundred and sixty-one participants indicated being South African, while 14 participants indicated belonging to other nationalities.

Procedure

Participants were informed that we live in a society where sharing our stories and experiences have become easier than ever with technologies such as social media, and that some stories and experiences are more important to us than others. They were further informed that the study is interested in understanding how we perceive and experience these stories when we share or experience them.

Firstly, participants were asked to complete demographic questions related to their gender, age and nationality. Participants were then randomly allocated to either the high ingroup identification condition followed by the low ingroup identification condition, or to the low ingroup identification condition followed by the high ingroup identification condition.

Participants were provided with a list of five social groups (South Africans, gender, University of South Africa students, their neighbourhood, taxpayers). In the high ingroup identification condition participants had to select the social group with whom they strongly identify, and in the low ingroup identification condition they selected the group with whom they least identify. More specifically, in the high ingroup identification condition, participants were informed that we belong to different social categories (e.g., nationality, university etc.) and that some of these social categories give us meaning, provoke positive emotions and they give us a sense of belonging, while others do not. Participants were told that they will be provided with a list of such social categories and that they had to select one of these categories that gives them a sense of belonging, that represents an essential part of them and with which they associate positive emotions such as being proud. In the low ingroup identification condition, participants were presented with similar information except that they were reminded that some social categories *do not* really give us meaning, they *do not* provoke positive emotions, and they *do not* give us a sense of belonging. Participants were asked to select a social category that is *not* important or significant to them.

In both conditions, participants were then asked how much they identify with the group that they selected. Following this, participants were informed that we are also interested in finding out how much more [less] they identify with the selected social category relative to each of the non-selected categories. These two measures were used as manipulation checks.

In order to further strengthen [weaken] ingroup identification, participants were reminded that being South African/female/male/a Unisa student/a resident from my neighbourhood/a taxpayer is [not] an important part of how they see themselves. After this reminder, they were asked to take a minute and name three reasons why their selected social category makes them feel good [does not make them feel good].

After participants completed the above-mentioned questions, they were provided with a bogus Facebook post exposing them to a vicariously humiliating event. Irrespective of whether participants were in the low or the high ingroup identification condition, but depending on which social category they selected, they were asked to read the Facebook post outlining an interaction between an ingroup member and outgroup members. It is important to note, that if participants selected gender as social category they do [not] identify with, they were allocated to the gender group that they indicated to belong to when we assessed the demographic information.

Each Facebook post referred to an ingroup member sharing a post commenting on an issue related to the selected category. For instance, the South African ingroup member shared a post related to the possible downgrading of South Africa to Junk Status; the female ingroup member, as well as the male ingroup member, posted posts commenting on possible strategies to stop gender-based violence; the Unisa student shared a post commenting on possible ideas on how to improve the study conditions of students; the resident from the neighbourhood shared a post related to possible ideas on improving the safety in the neighbourhood; and the taxpayer shared a post on possible ideas on how to improve the transparency of the national tax office (see Annexure 1).

Each Facebook post included negative comments made by outgroup members (see Annexure 1). In this way our participants witnessed the humiliation of an ingroup member by reading these negative comments made by outgroup members. These comments were

characterised by the situational determinants of humiliation (i.e., being attacked, being reduced in size, social rejection and exclusion, being made or found deficient). After the manipulations, participants were asked to complete the outcome measurements (i.e., appraisals of humiliation and humiliation).

Measurements

The measures were presented in the order as outlined below. All items of the respective measures were randomly presented to the participants. If not differently stated, the measures were assessed using an answering format ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

Appraisals of humiliation

The first measure presented after each manipulation was appraisals of humiliation. The instruction and the two items for the appraisal of internalisation (adapted from Fernández et al., 2018) were as follows: *Now you will be presented with a range of statements that address the interaction on Facebook. Think about the post again, the comments made by the others and the thoughts and feelings you had while reading these comments. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements*: "The idea I have of myself is negatively affected" and "My self-esteem is reduced" ($r_{\textit{low ingroup identification}} = .79$, $p < .001$; $r_{\textit{high ingroup identification}} = .70$, $p < .001$). The following instruction was provided for the appraisal of injustice (adapted from Fernández et al., 2018). *The comments made by the others were:* "unjust", "unethical", "unfair", and "biased" ($\alpha_{\textit{low ingroup identification}} = .92$; $\alpha_{\textit{high ingroup identification}} = .89$). For the appraisal of powerlessness (adapted from Ellsworth & Smith, 1988), the participants were instructed as follows: *The comments made by the others made me feel*: "out of control", "powerless" and "helpless" ($\alpha_{\textit{low ingroup identification}} = .91$; $\alpha_{\textit{high ingroup identification}} = .93$).

The appraisal of external and internal blame was measured by the following instruction and items: *The comments made by the others made me blame, "*myself" and "someone else" (adapted from Ellsworth & Smith, 1988).

Humiliation

Humiliation was measured by the following instruction and items: *To what extent do you feel each of the following*: "insulted", "demeaned", "humiliated", "belittled" and "degraded" (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999). The answering format ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*a great deal*). These five items formed reliable scales for participants in the low and the high ingroup identification conditions ($\alpha_{low\ ingroup\ identification}$ = .95; $\alpha_{high\ ingroup\ identification}$ = .95).

Manipulation check measures

For the first manipulation check measure participants had to indicate how much they identify with their selected category using the one-item approach (Postmes et al., 2013): "I identify with South Africans/females/males/Unisa students/residents from my neighbourhood/tax-payers".

How much more [less] participants identified with their selected group relative to the not selected categories, were used as a second manipulation check measure. Instructions for this measure were: *Please select the most appropriate answer ranging from 1 (about the same) to 5 (very much more [less]) indicating how much more [less] you identify with your selected social category in comparison to each of the other four social categories*. The answers were combined for the high ingroup identification condition (i.e., positive comparison) and the low ingroup identification condition (i.e., negative comparison).

Results

Preliminary analyses

Manipulation checks

To check whether the ingroup identification manipulation was successful, scores on the first manipulation check item ("I identify with [selected category]"; Postmes et al., 2013) were compared for the two identification conditions. The result of the paired samples t-test showed that being in the high ingroup identification condition (M = 4.29, SD = 0.90) elicited significantly stronger ingroup identification with the selected group than being in the low ingroup identification condition (M = 3.01, SD = 1.31; $t(171) = 11.46$, $p < .001$, $d = .87$).

We further assessed the combined answers to the question "how much more [less] they identified with their selected group compared to the other four categories", for each identification condition. First, a one sample t-test was conducted to determine if participants in the high ingroup identification condition identified stronger with their selected group relative to other non-selected groups by comparing the mean scores with the reference score (1) that indicated no identification difference (i.e., *about the same)*. Results show that the mean score (M = 2.73; SD = 1.13) differed significantly from the reference score (1), $t(174) = 20.21$, $p < .001$, indicating that overall our participants identified significantly more with their selected group compared to the other categories they did not select. The result of the one sample t-test determining whether participants in the low ingroup identification condition identified less with the selected group relative to the other (non-selective groups) revealed a significant difference between the mean score (M = 2.76; SD = 1.22) and the reference score (1), $t(174) = 19.18$, $p < .001$, implying that our participants identified significantly less with their selected group compared to the other categories that they did not select.

Overall, the results of our two manipulation checks imply that the manipulation of high and low ingroup identification was successful in that participants identified (relatively)

stronger with the selected group in the high ingroup identification condition than with the selected group in the low ingroup identification condition.

Descriptive statistics

Table 5 reports the means, standard deviations and the inter-correlations of the principal variables for the high ingroup identification and the low ingroup identification conditions, separately. Results of the inter-correlations indicate that the feeling of humiliation correlated moderately and strongly with the appraisals of internalisation, injustice and powerlessness, respectively, when participants completed these measures in the high ingroup identification condition. Although humiliation correlated strongly with internalisation and powerlessness when participants completed these measures in the low ingroup identification condition, the appraisal of injustice did not correlate statistically significantly with humiliation. Blaming oneself (i.e., internal blame) for the humiliating event also moderately correlated with humiliation in the low ingroup identification condition, while internal blame correlated weakly with humiliation in the high ingroup identification condition. Interestingly, blaming others for the humiliating event correlated weakly, although significantly, with humiliation, regardless of the experimental condition.

Table 5

Means, standard deviations and inter-correlations of the principal variables for high ingroup identification and low ingroup identification conditions, Study 2 (N = 175).

		1	2	3	4	5	6
Mean	High ingroup identification	2.11	3.89	2.54	2.59	1.67	2.29
	Low ingroup identification	2.28	3.47	2.52	2.70	1.83	2.16
SD	High ingroup identification	1.26	1.11	1.41	1.49	1.10	1.34
	Low ingroup identification	1.32	1.22	1.33	1.46	1.21	1.30
1 Internalisation		---	.17*	.57***	.23**	.47***	.49***
2 Injustice		.19**	---	.21**	.23**	-.00	.42***
3 Powerlessness		.54***	27***	---	.27***	.33***	.50***
4 External blame		.12	-.10	.27***	---	.14	.22**
5 Internal blame		.52***	.07	.43***	.28***	---	.21**
6 Humiliation		.53***	.23	.53***	.22**	.43***	---

Note. ***$p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$ (two-tailed). Correlation coefficients for high ingroup identification condition are reported in the upper right part of the table and for low ingroup identification condition in the lower left part of the table.

Hypothesis testing

To test Hypothesis 1 that after witnessing an ingroup member being devalued by member(s) of an outgroup highly identified ingroup members experience a stronger feeling of humiliation when compared to low identified ingroup members, we conducted firstly, a paired samples t-test to compare the mean scores of humiliation when participants were in the high ingroup identification condition and when they were in the low ingroup identification

condition. The results showed that although the mean scores on humiliation pointed to the expected direction, the difference between high ingroup identification condition (M = 2.29, SD = 1.34) and low ingroup identification condition (M = 2.15, SD = 1.30; $t(174) = -1.50$, p = .14, d = .11, did not reach statistical significance.

As the manipulation of high ingroup identification and low ingroup identification were counterbalanced, a mixed between-within subject analysis of variance was conducted to compare humiliation depending on ingroup identification and the order of conditions. The order of conditions was entered as a dummy variable (receiving the low ingroup identification manipulation first was coded as 0 and receiving the high ingroup identification manipulation first was coded as 1). The results showed neither a significant main effect of ingroup identification conditions, $F(1, 173) = 1.35$, p = .25, η_p^2= .01, nor of the order of conditions, $F(1, 173) = 0.15$, p = .70, η_p^2= .00, on humiliation. However, the two-way interaction between ingroup identification conditions and the order of conditions was statistically significant, $F(1, 173) = 9.15$, $p < .01$, η_p^2= .05. This interaction effect indicates that the effect of ingroup identification on the feelings of humiliation depended on whether participants received the low or the high ingroup identification manipulation first. The interaction graph in Figure 3 suggests that participants felt more humiliated in the high ingroup identification condition (M = 2.44, SD = 1.28) than in the low ingroup identification condition (M = 2.10, SD = 1.41) when they received the high ingroup identification manipulation first. When they received the low ingroup identification manipulation first, they felt slightly more humiliated in the low ingroup identification condition (M = 2.27, SD = 1.27) than in the high ingroup identification condition (M = 2.07, SD = 1.32).

Overall, our results suggest that high identifiers felt more humiliated than low identifiers, but that the order in which participants received the manipulation played a role in

that this relationship was only valid if participants received the high ingroup identification manipulation first.



Figure 3. Interaction graph between the feelings of humiliation in the experimental conditions (low vs. high ingroup identification) and the order in which the manipulations were presented, Study 2.

We further conducted paired-samples t-tests comparing the appraisals of humiliation (i.e., internalisation, injustice, powerlessness, external and internal blame) for the high ingroup identification and the low ingroup identification conditions. The results showed that participants appraised the event as significantly more unjust (M = 3.90, SD = 1.12) in the high ingroup identification condition than in the low ingroup identification condition, (M = 3.47, SD = 1.22; $t(174) = -3.88$, $p < .001$, $d = -0.29$). There were, however, no significant differences between any of the other appraisals, $t(174)_{internalisation} = 1.60$, $p_{internalisation} = .11$, $d_{internalisation} = 0.12$; $t(174)_{powerlessness} = -0.27$, $p_{powerlessness} = .79$, $d_{powerlessness} = -0.02$; $t(174)_{external} = 0.84$, $p_{external} = .40$, $d_{external} = 0.06$; $t(174)_{internal} = 1.75$, $p_{internal} = .08$, $d_{internal} = 0.13$. To check whether the order of the manipulations played a role, we also conducted a mixed between-

within subject analysis of variance to compare scores on each appraisal at low ingroup identification and high ingroup identification, entering the order of conditions as a between-subjects factor. Results showed that there were no significant effects of the interaction between the ingroup identification conditions and the order of the conditions on any of the appraisals, $F_{internalisation}(1, 173) = 1.71$, $p_{internalisation} = .19$, $\eta_{p\ internalisation}^2 = .01$; $F_{injustice}(1, 173) = 1.80$, $p_{injustice} = .18$, $\eta_{p\ injustice}^2 = .01$; $F_{powerlessness}(1, 173) = 0.18$, $p_{powerlessness} = .67$, $\eta_{p\ powerlessness}^2 = .00$; $F_{external}(1, 173) = 0.85$, $p_{external} = .36$, $\eta_{p\ external}^2 = .01$; $F_{internal}(1, 173) = 0.30$, $p_{internal} = .59$, $\eta_{p\ internal}^2 = .00$.

Overall, our results indicate that perceiving the vicariously humiliating event as unjust is influenced by the degree to which participants identify with the group they share with the target of the humiliation. How much participants internalised the event, how powerless they perceived themselves and whether they blamed others or themselves for the event, did not differ depending on participants' degree of identification with the shared group.

Discussion

The aim of Study 2 was to test whether individuals who highly identify with the ingroup would feel more humiliated when they witness (or read about) the humiliation of an ingroup member compared to individuals who do not highly identify with the ingroup. According to the appraisal theories of emotions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1997), how we appraise the event influences the emotional responses. Therefore, we did not only test participants' level of humiliation, but also the levels of appraisals. We used a within-subjects design where we manipulated participants' level of ingroup identification (low versus high ingroup identification). As we assumed that the participants' responses might be affected by the order in which they received the manipulation, we counterbalanced the order of the conditions.

Results supported our Hypothesis 1 that high identifiers feel more humiliated than low identifiers when witnessing (or reading about) the humiliation of an ingroup member. However, this effect reached only statistical significance when the order in which the manipulations were presented was controlled for. We speculate that the reason for the order effect might be that having as reference an ingroup that is highly significant for oneself relative to an ingroup that is less significant for oneself creates more psychological distance between these two groups than having as reference an ingroup that is less significant for oneself relative to an ingroup that is highly significant for oneself.

We were also interested in whether participants appraised the humiliating event differently depending on whether they identified strongly or weakly with the social group that she or he shared with the humiliated person. Results showed that participants perceived the humiliating event as significantly more unjust when they highly identified with the ingroup. How much they internalised, how powerless they perceived themselves and whether they blamed the humiliating event internally or externally, was not conditional on the degree of ingroup identification.

The result that the appraisal of injustice is stronger when an ingroup is more significant to the vicariously humiliated person indicates that perceiving the devaluation of an ingroup member as unjust is an appraisal that plays an important role in intergroup situations. As mentioned elsewhere, the appraisal of injustice is associated with the other-focused emotions of anger, contempt and disgust, which are emotions that are regularly experienced in intergroup situations (Gordijn et al., 2006; Reicher et al., 2016; Tagar et al., 2011; Tausch et al., 2011; Taylor, 2007; Veldhuis et al., 2014; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Therefore, the importance of the appraisal of injustice in intergroup devaluing events might explain why these other-focused emotions are often associated with intergroup events. To assess whether this appraisal and other-focused emotions are indeed more relevant in intergroup situations,

where a person highly identifies with a social group and where she or he is vicariously humiliated, we conducted follow-up studies (Studies 3 to 5) where we experimentally manipulated personal and vicarious humiliation and assessed its effects on the consequent appraisals and emotions. More specifically, following the intergroup emotion theory (Smith et al., 2007), we argued that whether a person is personally humiliated or vicariously humiliated, will lead to different appraisals of humiliation and consequently to different emotional patterns.

STUDY 3

The overall aim of Study 3 was to test the hypotheses that a personally humiliating event is likely to be appraised as internalising the devaluation and/or as uncontrollable (i.e., internalisation and powerlessness), which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2a), whereas a humiliating event where the social self is targeted (i.e., vicarious humiliation) is likely to be appraised as injustice and externally blamed, which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2b). Moreover, we tested Hypothesis 3 stating that if a situational determinant is appraised as internal blame then the emotional responses of shame, embarrasment and/or guilt will be elicited but not as blends of humiliation.

Study 3 applied a between-subjects design with one factor (target of humiliation) manipulated on two levels (personal vs. vicarious humiliation). Target of humiliation was manipulated using the personal recall approach. Participants were randomly allocated to either the condition where they were asked to recall and describe situations where they were personally humiliated or to the condition where they were asked to recall and describe

situations where they witnessed the humiliation of someone else with whom they shared a group membership. The outcome variables were appraisals and emotional responses.

Sample

Seventy-four participants completed all measurements. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 49 years (M_{age} = 30.43, *SD* = 6.69, missing: 6). Forty-eight participants indicated that they are male, and 26 participants indicated that they are female. None of the participants identified the true aim of the study and were therefore all included in the data analyses.

Procedure

In the opening paragraph of the email, participants were informed that our emotions, thoughts and behaviours are often influenced by our perceptions, beliefs, memories and interactions with others, and that the study is interested in how interactions with others influence our emotions. To manipulate the target of humiliation, we asked participants to recall either a personally humiliating event or a vicariously humiliating event. This manipulation is based on the established Relived-Emotion Task, which has been found to manipulate emotional experiences and elicit emotion-typical subjective feelings successfully (Ekman et al., 1983).

After participants were randomly allocated to one of the two *target of humiliation* conditions, we aimed to increase the salience of either their personal identity or social identity. In the personal humiliation condition the instruction was as follows: *As we are part of various social groups that are related to our gender, age, race, occupations, political orientation, party affiliations, university etc; we are mostly unique human beings with particular characteristics. As the members of your family or your friends are unique persons*

– so are you. We would like to ask you to take a minute and recall an incident where you were personally insulted by somebody else. Could you briefly describe the insult?

The instruction in the vicarious humiliation condition was: *We are all part of various social groups that are related to our gender, age, race, occupations, political orientation, party affiliations, university. etc. These social groups are sometimes more or less important to us and so are the people who are also part of these social groups. In some situations, we feel for somebody, not because we know the person very well, but because we share something with the person – for instance attending the same university or sharing the same gender. We would like to ask you to take a minute and recall an incident you heard about or witnessed where a person you did not personally know but with whom you have something in common (e.g., gender, university etc.) was insulted by someone else. Could you please describe the insult?*

After participants recalled a personally or vicariously humiliating event, they were asked to complete the measurements, followed by a suspicion check (i.e., where they were asked to recall the aim of this study as it was described in the introduction) and demographic questions (i.e., gender and age).

Measurements

The following measurements were presented to participants in the same order as outlined below. All items of the respective measures were randomly presented to the participants. If not differently stated, participants were requested to indicate their agreement on an answer format ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

Appraisals of humiliation

The appraisals of humiliation were assessed as in Study 2: appraisal of internalisation (r = .75, p < .001), appraisal of injustice (α = .87) and appraisal of powerlessness (α = .92). The appraisals of external and internal blame were measured by the same single items as in Study 2. However, the instructions for the appraisal measures differed as they referred to the self-reported humiliating incidents.

Emotions

Emotions were measured by asking participants to what extent they feel each of the following emotions right now on an answer format ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*a great deal*): humiliation, shame, embarrassment, guilt, anger, contempt and disgust. Shame, embarrassment and guilt were combined into the self-focused emotions measure (α = .87), and anger, contempt and disgust were combined into other-focused emotions measure (α = .79).

Manipulation check measures

Two items served as manipulation check measures: "I was personally insulted" and "I witnessed the insult".

Results

Preliminary analyses

Manipulation checks

Participants in the personal humiliation condition (M = 4.19, SD = 1.35) scored statistically significantly higher on the personal humiliation manipulation check ("I was personally insulted") compared to participants in the vicarious humiliation condition, M =

2.84, *SD* = 1.71), *t*(72) = 3.80, *p* < .001, *d* = 0.88. Although the means of the vicarious humiliation manipulation check item ("I witnessed the insult") pointed to the expected direction, the difference between vicarious humiliation (*M* = 3.88, *SD* = 1.56) and personal humiliation conditions (*M* = 3.38, *SD* = 1.51) did not reach statistical significance, *t*(72) = -1.37, *p* = .17. *d* = 0.33). As intended, participants in the personal humiliation condition experienced their recalled personal humiliation as personally insulting; whereas participants who recalled a vicariously humiliating event did not experience the event as a personal insult. However, participants in the personal humiliation condition seemed to be less able to differentiate between being the target of humiliation from being the witness of humiliation compared to participants in the vicarious humiliation condition.

Descriptive statistics

Means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-correlations are reported in Table 6 for each condition, separately. Overall, results of the inter-correlations of the principal variables imply that the feeling of humiliation correlated moderately and strongly with self-focused and other-focused emotions which was expected as these emotions are considered as emotional blends. Moreover, the appraisals of internalisation, powerlessness and injustice correlated strongly and moderately with humiliation, respectively, independent from the experimental conditions. However, the appraisal injustice correlated only with other-focused emotions but not with self-focused emotions, whereas internalisation and powerlessness correlated with both self-focused and other-focused emotions independent from the experimental conditions. Interestingly, no correlations were found for external blame and any emotions. However, as expected, internal blame correlated strongly with self-focused emotions.

Table 6

The means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-correlations of the principal variables for personal and vicarious humiliation conditions, Study 3.

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Mean	Personal humiliation	3.08	4.15	3.02	2.50	2.88	3.19	2.62	3.05
	Vicarious humiliation	3.05	4.19	3.14	3.16	2.25	2.78	2.17	3.35
SD	Personal humiliation	1.46	0.98	1.48	1.29	1.64	1.58	1.37	1.26
	Vicarious humiliation	1.46	1.15	1.40	1.57	1.48	1.48	1.04	1.18
n	Personal humiliation	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42
	Vicarious humiliation	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
1 Internalisation		---	.20	.63***	.15	.57***	.59***	.71***	.47***
2 Injustice		.31	---	.07	.09	-.10	.37*	.23	.59***
3 Powerlessness		.44*	.23	---	.04	.66***	.56***	.69***	.47***
4 External blame		.20	.25	.09	---	.23	.14	.08	.18
5 Internal blame		.22	-20	.44**	.09	---	.52***	.74***	.37*
6 Humiliation		.65***	.39*	.43**	.29	.28	---	.83***	.66***
7 Self-focused emotions		.36*	.09	.52**	.21	.46**	.44**	---	.70***
8 Other-focused emotions		.48**	.75***	.39*	.31	-.08	.56**	.13	---

Note. ***$p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$ (two-tailed). Correlation coefficients for personal humiliation condition are reported in the upper right part of the table and for vicarious humiliation condition in the lower left part of the table.

Hypotheses testing

To test our hypotheses, that a personally humiliating event is likely to be appraised as internalising the devaluation and/or as uncontrollable (i.e., internalisation and powerlessness), which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2a); whereas a vicariously humiliating event is likely to be appraised as unjust and externally blamed, which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2b), and that a humiliating event appraised as internal blame results in emotional responses of shame, embarrasment and/or guilt that are not blended with the feeling of humiliation (Hypothesis 3), we estimated the indirect effects of target of humiliation (personal humiliation coded as 0 and vicarious humiliation coded as 1) on self-focused emotions and other-focused emotions through appraisals and humiliation in two separate analyses using SPSS PROCESS Macro (#Model 80, Hayes, 2018) (see Figure 4). In both models we used bootstrapping with 10000 iterations.



Figure 4. Conceptual diagram of the model testing for the indirect effects of target of humiliation on the emotions through appraisals and through humiliation, Study 3.

Indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions

Firstly, we estimated the indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through appraisals and through humiliation (see Figure 4), while including other-focused emotions as a covariate. The overall model was statistically significant, $R^2 = .6750$, $F(8, 65) = 16.88$, $p < .001$. Table 7 reports the direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on appraisals, humiliation and self-focused emotions. The analyses of the direct effects revealed that target of humiliation only affected marginally external and internal blame as appraisals but neither injustice and powerlessness as appraisals, nor humiliation and self-focused emotions. Self-focused emotions were only directly affected by humiliation and internal blame (see Table 7).

The analyses of the indirect effects revealed only one significant negative indirect effect, namely from target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through internal blame[1]. More specifically, the result implies that participants in the personal humiliation condition were more likely to appraise the event as one's own fault (i.e., internal blame) which in turn elicited self-focused emotions without the feeling of humiliation (Hypothesis 3). All other indirect effects did not reach statistical significance (see Table 7). Thus, our results did not support our hypothesis that a personally humiliating event is likely to be appraised as something to be internalised and uncontrollable (i.e., internalisation and powerlessness), which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2a). However, they support our Hypothesis 3 that a humiliating event appraised as one's own fault (i.e., internal blame) elicits self-focused emotions without being accompanied by the feeling of humiliation.

Table 7

Direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through appraisals and humiliation, Study 3.

Effects on appraisals						
Internalisation						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.400	0.420	3.337	< .01	0.700	2.100
Target of humiliation	-0.206	0.305	-0.675	.50	-0.715	0.303
Other-focused emotions	0.553	0.121	4.571	< .001	0.351	0.754

[1] The ***negative*** indirect effect results from how we coded the target of humiliation conditions: personal humiliation condition coded as 0 and vicarious humiliation condition coded as 1.

Injustice						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	2.479	0.260	9.524	< .001	2.046	2.913
Target of humiliation	-0.121	0.190	-0.641	.52	-0.437	0.195
Other-focused emotions	0.548	0.075	7.29	< .001	0.423	0.673
Powerlessness						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.473	0.425	3.470	< .01	0.766	2.181
Target of humiliation	-0.036	0.309	-0.115	.909	-0.551	0.480
Other-focused emotions	0.506	0.123	4.131	< .01	0.302	0.711
External blame						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.691	0.450	3.755	< .01	0.941	2.442
Target of humiliation	0.575	0.328	1.753	.08	0.028	1.122
Other-focused emotions	0.265	0.1300	2.041	.05	0.050	0.482
Internal blame						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	2.121	0.504	4.206	< .001	1.281	2.961
Target of humiliation	-0.707	0.367	-1.926	.06	-1.320	-0.095
Other-focused emotions	0.250	0.146	1.713	.09	0.007	0.492
Effects on humiliation						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	-0.430	0.640	-0.670	.51	-1.500	0.639
Target of humiliation	-0.440	0.275	-1.600	.12	-0.900	0.020

Internalisation	0.322	0.112	2.872	< .01	1.135	0.510
Injustice	0.128	0.172	0.746	.46	-0.158	0.414
Powerlessness	0.074	0.123	0.603	.55	-0.131	0.279
External blame	0.029	0.094	0.309	.76	-0.129	0.186
Internal blame	0.188	0.107	1.755	.08	0.009	0.367
Other-focused emotions	0.413	0.157	2.636	.01	0.152	0.674

Effects on self-focused emotions

	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	0.182	0.453	0.402	.69	-0.574	0.939
Target of humiliation	-0.190	0.198	-0.958	.34	-0.520	0.141
Internalisation	0.071	0.084	0.845	.40	-0.069	0.211
Injustice	-0.045	0.123	0.373	.71	-0.249	0.158
Powerlessness	0.132	0.087	1.521	.13	-0.013	0.277
External blame	-0.047	0.067	-0.709	.48	-0.158	0.064
Internal blame	0.273	0.077	3.533	< .01	0.144	0.403
Humiliation	0.281	0.087	3.226	< .01	0.135	0.426
Other-focused emotions	0.145	0.116	1.250	.22	-0.049	0.339

Indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions

	Effect	*Boot SE*	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
Target*Internalisation	-0.015	0.039	-0.086	0.037
Target*Injustice	0.006	0.027	-0.032	0.053
Target*Powerlessness	-0.005	0.048	-0.083	0.073
Target*External blame	-0.027	0.063	-0.147	0.058
Target*Internal blame	-0.193	0.133	-0.448	-0.016
Target*Humiliation	-0.123	0.089	-0.276	0.006
Target*Internalisation*Humiliation	-0.019	0.033	-0.078	0.024
Target*Injustice*Humiliation	-0.004	0.011	-0.021	0.014

Target*Powerlessness*Humiliation	-0.001	0.016	-0.026	0.024
Target*External blame*Humiliation	0.005	0.020	-0.030	0.034
Target*Internal blame*Humiliation	-0.037	0.036	-0.108	0.003

Indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions

In the second model, we assessed the indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions through appraisals and through humiliation, while controlling for self-focused emotions. Similar to the previous analysis, the model was statistically significant, R^2 = .6403, F (8. 65) = 14.47, $p < .001$. The direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on appraisals, humiliation and other-focused emotions are reported in Table 8. The analyses of the direct effects revealed that target of humiliation only affected significantly the appraisal of external blame but neither humiliation nor other-focused emotions. Other-focused emotions were affected significantly by the appraisal of injustice and marginally by humiliation (see Table 8).

Our analysis revealed no significant indirect effects of target of humiliation neither on humiliation through appraisals nor on other-focused emotions through appraisals and/or humiliation (see Table 8). Thus, we were not able to provide any empirical evidence supporting our hypothesis that vicariously humiliating events are likely to be appraised as something unjust and/or externally blamed, which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2b).

Table 8

Direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions through appraisals and humiliation, Study 3.

Effects on appraisals						
Effects on internalisation						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.303	0.350	3.729	< .01	0.721	1.886
Target of humiliation	0.271	0.285	0.949	.35	-0.205	0.747
Self-focused emotions	0.680	0.113	6.000	< .001	0.491	0.869
Effects on injustice						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	3.765	0.305	12.338	< .001	3.256	4.273
Target of humiliation	0.113	0.249	0.453	.65	-0.302	0.528
Self-focused emotions	0.147	0.100	1.482	.14	-0.018	0.312
Effects on powerlessness						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.103	0.331	3.331	< .01	0.551	1.654
Target of humiliation	0.450	0.270	1.665	.10	-0.000	0.900
Self-focused emotions	0.731	0.107	6.807	< .001	0.552	0.909
Effects on external blame						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	2.112	0.414	5.108	< .001	1.423	2.802
Target of humiliation	0.723	0.338	2.142	.04	0.161	1.286
Self-focused emotions	0.148	0.134	1.104	.27	-0.075	0.372

Effects on internal blame						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	0.756	0.355	2.128	.04	0.164	1.348
Target of humiliation	-0.264	0.290	-0.910	.37	-0.748	0.220
Self-focused emotions	0.811	0.115	7.042	< .001	0.619	1.003
Effects on humiliation						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	-0.773	0.586	-1.320	.19	-1.750	0.204
Target of humiliation	-0.198	0.263	-0.754	.45	-0.636	0.240
Internalisation	0.268	0.109	2.458	.02	0.086	0.449
Injustice	0.316	0.130	2.427	.02	0.099	0.532
Powerlessness	0.040	0.117	0.338	.74	-0.156	0.235
External blame	0.070	0.089	0.791	.43	-0.078	0.219
Internal blame	0.017	0.114	0.149	.88	-0.173	0.207
Self-focused emotions	0.567	0.150	3.781	.01	0.317	0.817
Effects on other-focused emotions						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	-0.964	0.463	-2.080	.04	-1.737	-0.191
Target of humiliation	0.343	0.206	1.665	.10	-0.001	0.687
Internalisation	0.040	0.089	0.450	.65	-0.108	0.188
Injustice	0.586	0.106	5.529	< .001	0.409	0.763
Powerlessness	0.137	0.092	1.490	.14	-0.016	0.290
External blame	0.066	0.070	0.940	.35	-0.051	0.182
Internal blame	-0.040	0.090	-0.450	.65	-0.188	0.108

Humiliation	0.180	0.096	1.873	.06	0.020	0.341
Self-focused emotions	0.162	0.129	1.250	.22	-0.054	0.377

Indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions

	Effect	*Boot SE*	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
Target*Internalisation	0.011	0.036	-0.037	0.077
Target*Injustice	0.066	0.151	-0.165	0.332
Target*Powerlessness	0.062	0.072	-0.015	0.206
Target*External blame	0.047	0.060	-0.024	0.162
Target*Internal blame	0.011	0.040	-0.033	0.091
Target*Humiliation	-0.036	0.059	-0.145	0.041
Target*Internalisation*Humiliation	0.013	0.019	-0.011	0.047
Target*Injustice*Humiliation	0.006	0.018	-0.016	0.042
Target*Powerlessness*Humiliation	0.003	0.016	-0.015	0.032
Target*External blame*Humiliation	0.009	0.018	-0.012	0.042
Target*Internal blame*Humiliation	-0.001	0.012	-0.019	0.018

Discussion

Overall, our results of Study 3 did not support Hypotheses 2a and 2b as there was no empirical evidence that personal and vicarious humiliation influenced differently the emotional patterns (self-focused versus other-focused emotions) through appraisal processes and the feeling of humiliation. Results did, however, support Hypothesis 3 as participants who appraised a humiliating event as their fault (i.e., internal blame) experienced self-focused emotions without necessarily feeling humiliated. More specifically, we found this effect for personally humiliating events.

Apart from the fact that Hypotheses 2a and 2b could not be supported, another limitation of Study 3 was that the results of the manipulation checks were rather ambiguous.

The possible reasons for the ambiguous results might be that participants in the personal humiliation condition experienced difficulties to differentiate between being personally humiliated and witnessing a humiliating event. This might be caused by the fact that recalling a past event does not only activate memories about the concrete event but also memories on how the participants might have dealt with the event. The latter might have increased the psychological distance to the event which in turn made the boundaries between being the target and being a witness of humiliation less distinct. Another limitation of Study 3 refers to the approach we used to increase the salience of either personal or social identity. We aimed in our instruction for participants in the personal humiliation condition to increase the awareness about their personal identity by contrasting personal with social identity. However, we did not control whether they actually thought about themselves as unique persons. Lastly, the rather small sample size of Study 3 represents another limitation, which might have influenced the statistical analyses as small sample sizes reduce the likelihood to detect statistically significant effects (Erdfelder et al., 1996; Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007).

To overcome these limitations, we conducted two follow-up studies (Studies 4 and 5) where we re-tested Hypotheses 2a and 2b, and Hypothesis 3 by exposing participants directly to different humiliating events (i.e., target of humiliation) by applying a different approach to increase the salience of either personal or social identities, by using distinct and different intergroup contexts to manipulate vicarious humiliation (Study 4: gender; Study 5: university students) and by increasing the sample sizes.

In the following two studies, we furthermore controlled for the presence of an audience by manipulating the visual exposure of personal and vicarious humiliating events and assessed its influence on appraisals and emotional patterns. More specifically, we tested the hypothesis that the aggravating effect of visual exposure will be stronger in personally humiliating events when compared to vicariously humiliating events (Hypothesis 4).

STUDY 4

The aim of Study 4 was to re-test the hypotheses that a personally humiliating event is likely to be appraised as internalising the devaluation and/or as uncontrollable (i.e., internalisation and powerlessness), which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2a), whereas a vicariously humiliating event is likely to be appraised as something unjust and externally blamed, which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2b). We further tested Hypothesis 3 that appraising a humiliating event as internal blame elicits self-focused emotions without being accompanied by humiliation. Additionally, we assessed the role of visual exposure by testing the hypothesis that the aggravating effect of visual exposure will be stronger in personally humiliating events compared to vicariously humiliating events (Hypothesis 4).

Different to Study 3, we used a more direct approach to increase the salience of either personal or social identity and participants had to read a bogus Facebook post as a means of manipulating humiliation rather than recall their own experiences. A 2 (target of the humiliating: personal vs. vicarious) x 3 (visual exposure: laughing vs. silent vs. no audience) between-subjects factorial design was adopted. The intergroup context was gender with females as the ingroup.

It was assumed that exposing participants to a scenario where they had to imagine that the incident is happening to them personally (i.e., personal humiliation conditions) will be experienced as personal humiliation, whereas it was assumed that exposing participants to a scenario where they are witness to the humiliation of a fellow ingroup member will be experienced as vicarious humiliation (i.e., vicarious humiliation conditions). Furthermore, it was assumed that making participants aware of the presence of an audience, whether this audience is laughing (or silent instead), or whether no audience is present, will influence appraisals and emotional responses.

Sample

A total of 359 female participants completed Study 4. The age of participants ranged from 19 to 63 years (M_{age} = 31.00, *SD* = 9.20, missing: 98). None of the participants identified the true aim of the study and were therefore all included in the data analyses.

Procedure

In the opening paragraph of the email, participants were informed that we live in a society where sharing our stories and experiences have become easier than ever with technology such as social media. They were furthermore informed that the present study aims at understanding how we perceive and experience these stories. After providing consent to participate in the study, participants were randomly allocated to one of six experimental conditions: (1) personal humiliation and laughing audience, (2) vicarious humiliation and laughing audience, (3) personal humiliation and silent audience, (4) vicarious humiliation and silent audience, (5) personal humiliation and no salient audience, and (6) vicarious humiliation and no salient audience.

If allocated to the personal humiliation conditions, the participant was first asked to think about herself as a unique person and to think what she can do better than others, and what makes her different from most of her friends and family. She was furthermore asked to name three characteristics that distinguish her from others that are important to her. If allocated to the vicarious humiliation conditions, the participant was first asked to think of herself as a woman. She was further asked to think about what women can do better than men, and what makes women different from men. She was furthermore asked to name three characteristics that distinguish women from men.

Afterwards, participants were asked to read a bogus Facebook post about an incident that happened during a discussion (see Figure 5). The content of the post made use of the

situational determinants of being attacked and being made or found deficient as means of devaluating the humiliated person.

Depending on the experimental conditions, participants were asked to imagine that the incident has actually happened to her and that she is the author of the post (personal humiliation conditions), or participants were asked to imagine that this happened to another woman and that this woman is the author of the post (vicarious humiliation conditions). In all six experimental conditions the first part of the Facebook post consisted of the text as depicted in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Facebook post used as manipulation in experimental conditions, Study 4.

In the vicarious humiliation conditions, the intergroup context was made salient by specifying that "the *man* (instead of the *person*) next to me said in a mocking tone". Subsequently, in the laughing audience conditions the following sentence was added at the end of the post: "The others started to laugh and nodded their heads in agreement", while in the silent audience conditions the following sentence was added: "The others did not say

anything and just kept quiet". In the no audience conditions, no reference was made to others that were present at the event.

Measurements

After exposure to the different experimental conditions, the participants were asked to complete the same measurements as in Study 3 using the same answer format: appraisal of internalisation ($r = .68$, $p < .01$), appraisal of injustice ($\alpha = .84$), appraisal of powerlessness ($\alpha = .83$), self-focused emotions ($\alpha = .80$) and other-focused emotions ($\alpha = .73$). Internal and external blame were assessed using the same single items as in Study 3. Again, all items of the respective measures were randomly presented to the participants. The measures were followed by a suspicion check (i.e., they asked to recall the aim of this study as it was described in the introduction) and demographic questions (i.e., gender and age).

Manipulation check measures

The following manipulation check items measured target of humiliation: "You were degraded personally in the event" and "Women were degraded in the event", and visual exposure: "The others who witnessed the event, were laughing" and "The others who witnessed the event, were quiet".

Results

Preliminary analyses

Manipulation checks

In a first step, we assessed the manipulations of the target of humiliation on the manipulation check items "You were degraded personally in the event"; and "Women were degraded in the event" using a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). We entered

target of humiliation as dummy variable (personal humiliation conditions were coded as 0 and the vicarious humiliation conditions were coded as 1). Additionally, we controlled for possible effects of visual exposure by entering visual exposure conditions as a second independent variable (laughing audience coded as 1, silent audience as 2, and no audience as 3).

The Pillai's trace estimate showed a significant main effect of target of humiliation on the manipulation check items, $V = 0.20$, $F(2, 308) = 38.92$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.20$; but no main effect of visual exposure, $V = 0.02$, $F(4, 618) = 1.14$, $p = .34$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.01$; and no significant effect of the two-way interaction between target of humiliation and visual exposure, $V = 0.02$, $F(4, 618) = 1.43$, $p = .22$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.01$.

Results of the separate univariate analyses of target of humiliation on the items "You were degraded personally in the event" and "Women were degraded in the event" revealed a non-significant main effect on the former item ($M_{personal} = 3.39$, $SD_{personal} = 1.48$; $M_{vicarious} = 3.47$, $SD_{vicarious} = 1.53$), $F(1, 313) = 0.186$. $p = .67$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.00$, but a significant effect on the latter ($M_{personal} = 2.65$, $SD_{personal} = 1.32$; $M_{vicarious} = 3.88$, $SD_{vicarious} = 1.29$, $F(1, 313) = 69.935$, $p < .000$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.18$. The means indicated that participants in the vicarious humiliation conditions felt similarly personally devalued as participants in personal humiliation conditions. However, as expected only participants in the vicarious humiliation conditions perceived women devalued.

In a second step, we assessed the manipulations of visual exposure on the manipulation check items "The others who witnessed the event, were laughing" and "The others who witnessed the event, were quiet" using again a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). The visual exposure conditions were entered as first independent variable (laughing audience coded as 1, silent audience as 2, and no audience as 3) and target of humiliation was entered as second independent variable (personal humiliation conditions

were coded as 0 and the vicarious humiliation conditions were coded as 1). The Pillai's trace estimate showed a significant main effect of visual exposure on the manipulation check items, $V = 0.33$, $F(4, 618) = 30.69$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.17$; but no main effect of target of humiliation, $V = 0.01$, $F(2, 308) = 1.79$, $p = .17$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.01$; and no significant effect, $V = 0.01$, $F(4, 618) = 0.95$, $p = .43$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.01$.

The results of the separate univariate analyses on the two visual exposure manipulation check items "The other who witnessed the event, were laughing" and "The other who witnessed the event were quiet" revealed for the former ($M_{laughing} = 4.20$, $SD_{laughing} = 1.13$; $M_{silent} = 2.45$, $SD_{silent} = 1.32$, $M_{no\ audience} = 3.30$, $SD_{no\ auiience} = 1.30$), $F(2, 312) = 59.70$, $p = < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.25$, and for the latter ($M_{laughing} = 2.55$, $SD_{laughing} = 1.40$; $M_{silent} = 4.06$, $SD_{silent} = 1.29$, $M_{no\ audience} = 3.32$, $SD_{no\ audience} = 1.31$), $F(2, 312) = 32.72$, $p = < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.17$, significant effects. Bonferroni *post hoc* tests revealed that participants in the laughing audience conditions scored significantly higher on the item "The other who witnessed the event, were laughing" than participants in the other two conditions (*ps* < .001), whereas participants in the silent audience conditions scored significantly higher on the item "The other who witnessed the event were quiet" than participants in the laughing audience and no audience conditions (*ps* < .001). These results imply that participants in the laughing audience conditions indeed perceived the audience in the Facebook post as laughing, while participants in the silent audience conditions perceived indeed the audience as being quiet.

Descriptive statistics

Table 9 reports the means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-correlations of our principal variables for the six experimental conditions, separately. As found in Study 3, humiliation correlated moderately with self-focused emotions in the vicarious humiliation conditions and strongly with both self-focused and other-focused

emotions in the other conditions. Similar to Study 3, the correlations between the appraisals of internalisation and powerlessness, and humiliation ranged from moderate to strong in all experimental conditions. Different to Study 3, the appraisal of injustice correlated strongly with humiliation in the personal humiliation conditions irrespective of audience, whereas its association with humiliation was only moderately significant in the vicarious humiliation and laughing audience condition. Also different to Study 3, the appraisals of internalisation, powerlessness and injustice correlated significantly with both self-focused and other-focused emotions in the personal humiliation conditions irrespective of audience, whereas only the appraisals of internalisation and powerlessness – although rather moderately – correlated with self-focused emotions and other-focused emotions in the vicarious humiliation conditions irrespective of audience. The appraisal injustice correlated only significantly with self-focused emotions and other-focused emotions in the condition *vicarious humiliation and laughing audience*. Similar to Study 3, internal blame correlated strongest with self-focused emotions irrespective of the experimental conditions. Also similar to the previous study, external blame did not correlate with humiliation except for the condition personal humiliation and silent audience. Different to the previous study, correlations between external blame and other-focused emotions were found in both personal and vicarious humiliation conditions and between external blame and self-focused emotions in the personal humiliation condition.

Table 9

Means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-correlations of the principal variables in the six experimental conditions, Study 4.

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Mean	Personal humiliation	2.81/2.62/ 2.90	3.60/3.29/ 3.75	2.64/2.63/ 2.77	2.61/2.31/ 2.72	2.32/2.27/ 2.49	2.61/2.57/ 2.77	2.18/2.26/ 2.39	2.47/2.38/ 2.55
	Vicarious humiliation	2.77/2.85/ 2.65	3.92/3.78/ 4.12	2.52/2.46/ 2.87	2.81/2.85/ 2.63	1.91/2.27/ 2.30	2.84/3.00/ 3.09	2.12/2.22/ 2.42	2.68/3.21/ 2.91
SD	Personal humiliation	1.43/1.28/ 1.58	1.12/1.22/ 1.10	1.33/1.37/ 1.31	1.52/1.36/ 1.59	1.45/1.48/ 1.50	1.34/1.52/ 1.54	1.10/1.06/ 1.17	1.12/1.06/ 1.07
	Vicarious humiliation	1.46/1.46/ 1.43	1.07/1.27/ 0.92	1.29/1.28/ 1.32	1.53/1.51/ 1.50	1.20/1.44/ 1.63	1.40/1.53/ 1.52	1.01/1.12/ 1.13	1.13/1.01/ 1.07
n	Personal humiliation	62/53/57	60/50/57	59/49/57	56/48/57	56/48/57	54/46/56	54/46/56	54/46/56
	Vicarious humiliation	63/65/59	60/60/56	58/57/56	58/55/56	58/55/56	57/54/57	57/54/57	57/54/57
1 Internalisation		---	.27*/.52***/ .35**	.53***/.51***/. 51***	.23/.35*/.16	.48***/.19/ .28*	.37**/.48**/ .64***	.54***/.48**/ .62***	.33*/.44**/ .44**
2 Injustice		.27*/.24/.05	---	.46***/.40**/ .46***	.13/.47**/.09	.28*/.04/.25	.53***/.53***/. 36**	.50***/.43**/ .31*	.51***/.41**/ .45**

3 Powerlessness	.45***/.38**/.56***	.15/.06/.19	---	.30*/.54***/.26*	.30*/.38**/.34*	.50***/.53***/.63***	.64***/.59***/.63***	.46***/.57***/.50***
4 External blame	.22/.01/.01	.21/-.14/.08	.29*/.16/.17	---	-.01/.23/-.20	.10/.60***/.25	.09/.55***/.28*	.29*/54***/.30**
5 Internal blame	.27*/.30*/.47***	-.09/-.05/-.05	.31*/.25/.43**	.09/.10/.00	---	.49***/.37*/.12	.52***/.53***/.30*	.40**/.45**/.10
6 Humiliation	.38**/.38**/.52***	.37**/.02/.05	.47***/.40**/.47***	.20/.13/.15	.28*/.18/.52***	---	.84***/.82***/.86***	.78***/.63***/.56***
7 Self-focused emotions	.37**/.33*/.53***	.29*/-.02/-.16	.62***/.34*/.52***	.15/.16/.21	.43**/.40**/.57***	.67***/.82***/.68***	---	.73***/.62***/.60***
8 Other-focused emotions	.27*/.24/.36**	.39**/.08/.13	.50***/.15/.42***	.43**/.36**/.39**	.24/.04/.31*	.55***/.44**/.53***	.50***/.34**/.55***	---

Note. ***$p < .001$. ** $p < .01$. * $p < .05$ (two-tailed). Correlation coefficients of the personal humiliation conditions are reported in the upper right part of the table where the first coefficient refers to the laughing audience, the second coefficient to the silent audience and the third coefficient to the no audience condition. Correlation coefficients of the vicarious humiliation conditions are reported in the lower left part of the table where the first coefficient refers to the laughing audience, the second coefficient to the silent audience and the third coefficient to the no audience condition.

Hypotheses testing

In a first step, we again tested our hypothesis that a personally humiliating event is likely to be appraised as internalising the devaluation and powerlessness, which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2a), whereas a vicariously humiliating event is likely to be appraised as something unjust and externally blamed, which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2b). We further tested Hypothesis 3 that appraising a humiliating event as internal blame elicits self-focused emotions without being accompanied by humiliation. The same models (see Figure 4) were tested using the same analysis procedures as in Study 3.

Indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions

Firstly, we estimated the indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through appraisals and through humiliation (see Figure 4), while controlling for *other-focused emotions*. The overall model was statistically significant, $R^2 = .6874$, $F(8, 314) = 86.29$, $p < .001$. Table 10 reports the direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on the appraisals, humiliation and self-focused emotions. The analyses of the direct effects revealed that target of humiliation affected the appraisals of injustice, powerlessness, internal blame and self-focused emotions but not the feeling of humiliation. Self-focused emotions were directly affected by target of humiliation, the appraisals of injustice, powerlessness and internal blame, humiliation and other-focused emotions (see Table 10).

In line with our Hypothesis 2a, we found a negative indirect effect[2] between target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through powerlessness and humiliation (see Table 10). However, we also found a negative indirect effect of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through internal blame and humiliation. More specifically, the former implies that

[2] The ***negative*** indirect effect results from how we coded the target of humiliation conditions: personal humiliation condition coded as 0 and vicarious humiliation condition coded as 1.

participants in the personal humiliation conditions were more likely to appraise the event as something they cannot control which made them feel humiliated accompanied by self-focused emotions, while the latter indirect effect implies that participants in the personal humiliation conditions were more likely to blame themselves for the event which in turn elicited humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions. Moreover, the indirect effects indicating that participants in the personal humiliation condition responded with self-focused emotions because they appraised the event as being out of their control or as being their own fault without feeling humiliated were significant too (see Table 10).

The contrast analyses of the statistically significant indirect effects revealed firstly, that the indirect effect of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through powerlessness and humiliation (*effect* = -0.030) was not significantly different from the indirect effect of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through powerlessness without being mediated through humiliation (*effect* = -0.042), $effect_{contrast}$ = -0.012, $bootSE_{contrast}$ = .019, $CI_{contrast}$[-0.044, 0.016]. Secondly, the indirect effect of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through internal blame (without feeling humiliated) (*effect* = -0.050) was however, significantly stronger than the indirect effect of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through internal blame and humiliation (*effect* = -0.015), $effect_{contrast}$ = -0.035, $bootSE_{contrast}$ = .022, $CI_{contrast}$[-0.80, -0.005].

Supporting Hypothesis 2a, our findings showed that personal humiliation indirectly effected self-focused emotions through the appraisal of powerlessness and through the feeling of humiliation. However, not in line with our Hypothesis 3 was the finding that personally humiliated participants who internally blame the event responded with self-focused emotions that were blended with the feeling of humiliation. However, our results also implied that some participants who internally blamed the personally humiliating event felt self-focused

emotions without feeling humiliated. This indirect effect was significantly stronger than the indirect effect through both internal blame and humiliation.

Table 10

Direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through appraisals and humiliation, Study 4.

Effects on appraisals						
Internalisation						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.628	0.206	7.911	< .001	1.288	1.970
Target of humiliation	-0.196	0.156	-1.258	.21	-0.453	0.061
Other-focused emotions	0.463	0.070	6.578	< .001	0.347	0.579
Injustice						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	2.783	0.155	17.992	< .001	2.527	3.038
Target of humiliation	0.271	0.117	2.310	.02	0.077	0.464
Other-focused emotions	0.329	0.053	6.206	< .001	0.241	0.416
Powerlessness						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.393	0.179	7.798	< .001	1.099	1.688
Target of humiliation	-0.316	0.135	-2.337	.02	-0.540	-0.093
Other-focused emotions	0.521	0.061	8.524	< .001	0.420	0.622

External blame						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.285	0.209	6.150	< .001	0.941	1.630
Target of humiliation	-0.062	0.158	-0.393	.69	-0.324	0.199
Other-focused emotions	0.525	0.072	7.340	< .001	0.407	0.643
Internal blame						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.507	0.210	7.163	< .001	1.160	1.854
Target of humiliation	-0.374	0.159	-2.347	.02	-0.637	-0.111
Other-focused emotions	0.347	0.072	4.826	< .001	0.229	0.466
Effects on humiliation						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	-0.201	0.250	-0.803	.42	-0.613	0.212
Target of humiliation	0.090	0.128	0.702	.48	-0.121	0.301
Internalisation	0.188	0.051	3.717	< .01	0.105	0.272
Injustice	0.070	0.062	1.134	.25	-0.032	0.172
Powerlessness	0.223	0.058	3.829	< .01	0.127	0.318
External blame	-0.012	0.045	-0.276	.78	-0086	0.061
Internal blame	0092	0.047	1.957	.05	0.014	0.169
Other-focused emotions	0525	.067	7.670	< .001	0412	0.638
Effects on self-focused emotions						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	0.316	0.142	2.237	.03	0.083	0.550
Target of humiliation	-0.157	0.073	-2.169	.03	-0.277	-0.038

Internalisation	0.042	0.029	1.424	.15	-0.007	0.090
Injustice	-0.068	0.035	-1.931	.05	-0.125	-0.010
Powerlessness	0.134	0.034	3.973	< .01	0.078	0.189
External blame	0.004	0.025	0.161	.87	-0.038	0.046
Internal blame	0.132	0.027	4.936	< .001	0.088	0.176
Humiliation	0.425	0.032	13.350	< .001	0.373	0.478
Other-focused emotions	0.114	0.042	2.700	< .01	0.044	0.183

Indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions

	Effect	*Boot SE*	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
Target*Internalisation	-0.008	0.011	-0.028	0.004
Target*Injustice	-0.018	0.014	-0.044	0.001
Target*Powerlessness	-0.042	0.023	-0.083	-0.010
Target*External blame	-0.000	0.004	-0.007	0.006
Target*Internal blame	-0.049	0.025	-0.093	-0.013
Target*Humiliation	0.038	0.052	-0.047	0.125
Target*Internalisation*Humiliation	-0.016	0.014	-0.040	0.005
Target*Injustice*Humiliation	0.008	0.008	-0.003	0.024
Target*Powerlessness*Humiliation	-0.030	0.016	-0.060	-0.007
Target*External blame*Humiliation	0.003	0.004	-0.005	0.007
Target*Internal blame*Humiliation	-0.015	0.010	-0.033	-0.001

Indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions

In the second model, we assessed the indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions through appraisals and through humiliation, while controlling for self-focused emotions. The model was statistically significant, $R^2 = .4649$, $F\ (8, 304) = 34.10$, $p < .001$. The direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on appraisals, humiliation and other-focused emotions are reported in Table 11. The analyses of the direct effects revealed that target of humiliation effected significantly the appraisal of injustice, humiliation and

other-focused emotions. Other-focused emotions were affected by target of humiliation, the appraisals of injustice and external blame, humiliation and self-focused emotions.

The analyses of the indirect effects revealed a significant indirect effect of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions through injustice and humiliation (see Table 11). We also found indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused moral emotions through injustice only and through humiliation only. Interestingly, the contrast analyses revealed firstly, that the indirect effect of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions only through injustice (*effect* = 0.060) was statistically stronger than the indirect effect through both injustice and humiliation (*effect* = 0.013), $effect_{contrast}$ = 0.042, $bootSE_{contrast}$ = .025, $CI_{contrast}$[0.009, 0.090]. A similar result was found for the indirect effect of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions through humiliation only (*effect* = 0.058) which was significantly stronger than the indirect effect of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions through both injustice and humiliation (*effect* = 0.013), $effect_{contrast}$ = 0.046, $bootSE_{contrast}$ = .028, $CI_{contrast}$[0.006, 0.095].

Although our results support Hypothesis 2b that participants who were vicariously humiliated were more likely to appraise the humiliating event as unjust which resulted in feelings of humiliation and other-focused emotions, they also imply that vicariously humiliating events resulted in other-focused emotions because they were appraised as unjust or because they directly elicited the feeling of humiliation.

Table 11

Direct and indirect effects on other-focused emotions through appraisals and humiliation, Study 4.

Effects on appraisals						
Effects on internalisation						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.329	0.181	7.357	< .001	1.031	1.627
Target of humiliation	0.037	0.143	0.257	.80	-0.200	0.272
Self-focused emotions	0.633	0.065	9.710	< .001	0.526	0.741
Effects on injustice						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	3.080	0.150	20.606	< .001	2.834	3.327
Target of humiliation	0.428	0.118	3.622	< .01	0.233	0.623
Self-focused emotions	0.226	0.054	4.181	< .001	0137	0.315
Effects on powerlessness						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.149	0.154	7.480	< .001	0.900	1.403
Target of humiliation	-0.056	0.122	-0.459	.65	-0.256	0.145
Self-focused emotions	0.672	0.055	12.124	< .001	0.581	0.764
Effects on external blame						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.885	0.207	9.127	< .001	1.544	2.225
Target of humiliation	0.188	0.163	1.150	.25	-0.082	0.457
Self-focused emotions	0.307	0.075	4.113	< .001	0.184	0.429

Effects on internal blame						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	0.981	0.181	5.407	< .001	0.681	1.280
Target of humiliation	-0.195	0.143	-1.358	.17	-0.431	0.042
Self-focused emotions	0.607	0.065	9.284	< .001	0.500	0.715
Effects on humiliation						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	-0.333	0.205	-1.625	.11	-0.670	0.005
Target of humiliation	0.281	0.103	2.731	< .01	0.111	0.450
Internalisation	0.088	0.042	2.087	.04	0.019	0.158
Injustice	0.143	0.050	2.871	< .01	0.061	0.224
Powerlessness	0.043	0.050	0.858	.39	-0.039	0.125
External blame	0.030	0.035	0.863	.39	-0.028	0.088
Internal blame	-0.050	0.040	-1.249	.21	-0.116	0.016
Self-focused emotions	0.945	0.061	15.554	< .001	0.845	1.046
Effects on other-focused emotions						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	0.341	0.188	1.821	.07	0.032	0.651
Target of humiliation	0.317	0.095	3.339	< .01	0.160	0.474
Internalisation	-0.003	0.039	-0.089	.92	-0.068	0.060
Injustice	0.139	0.046	3.037	< .01	0.064	0.215
Powerlessness	0.052	0.045	1.137	.26	-0.023	0.127
External blame	0.168	0.032	5.250	< .001	0.115	0.221
Internal blame	0.026	0.037	0.700	.48	-0.035	0.086

Humiliation	0.208	0.051	4.049	< .01	0.123	0.293
Self-focused emotions	0.199	0.074	2.695	< .01	0.077	0.320

Indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions

	Effect	*Boot SE*	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
Target*Internalisation	-0.000	0.006	-0.008	0.011
Target*Injustice	0.060	0.029	0.019	0.115
Target*Powerlessness	-0.003	0.009	-0.018	0.010
Target*External blame	0.032	0.029	-0.015	0.081
Target*Internal blame	-0.005	0.009	-0.022	0.007
Target*Humiliation	0.058	0.027	0.019	0.107
Target*Internalisation* Humiliation	0.001	0.003	-0.004	0.006
Target*Injustice*Humiliation	0.013	0.007	0.004	0.026
Target*Powerlessness* Humiliation	-0.001	0.002	-0.004	0.003
Target*External blame* Humiliation	0.001	0.002	-0.002	0.005
Target*Internal blame* Humiliation	0.002	0.003	-0.001	0.008

The role of visual exposure

The assumption that the aggravating effect visual exposure will be stronger in personally humiliating events than in vicariously humiliating events (Hypothesis 4) was tested using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). We included the appraisals (i.e., internalisation, injustice, powerlessness, external and internal blame) and the emotions (i.e., humiliation, self-focused and other-focused emotions) as dependent variables and the conditions of visual exposure and target of humiliation (coding as in the manipulation check

analysis) as independent variables. To support our hypothesis, we would have expected a significant interaction effect between visual exposure and target of humiliation.

The Pillai's trace estimate revealed neither a significant main effect of visual exposure, $V = 0.05$, $F(16, 622) = 1.05$, $p = .41$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$, nor a significant two-way interaction effect between target of humiliation and visual exposure, $V = 0.05$, $F(16, 622) = 0.92$, $p = .55$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$, on the appraisals and emotions. The main effect of target of humiliation, $V = 0.11$, $F(8, 310) = 4.71$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .11$; was significant as expected by the results of our previous analysis.

In sum, we were neither able to show that the presence of an audience (whether this audience is laughing or silent) elicit stronger appraisals and emotional responses as the main effect of visual exposure was not significant; nor that effects would be stronger when participants were personally humiliated relative to being vicariously humiliated as the interaction between target of humiliation and visual exposure was not statistically significant either.

Discussion

The results of Study 4 provide first empirical evidence, that depending on whether a person is personally or vicariously humiliated, different emotional patterns through different patterns of appraisals are indeed elicited. Firstly, we found that participants appraised a personally humiliating event as something they do not have power over (i.e., powerlessness), which elicited the feeling of humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions, and secondly, that participants appraised a vicariously humiliating event as unjust, which elicited the feeling of humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions. As we found these assumed effects in Study 4 but not in Study 3, we replicated Study 4 using a different

intergroup context for vicarious humiliation in Study 5 to increase the internal validity of our results.

We also found that participants appraised a personally humiliating event by blaming themselves, which did not only elicit self-focused emotions but also the feeling of humiliation. Yet, personally humiliated participants felt also self-focused emotions through the appraisal of internal blame without feeling humiliated, and this indirect effect was significantly stronger than the indirect effect on self-focused emotions through both internal blame and humiliation. Nevertheless, the former finding was not in line with our Hypothesis 3 that internal blame elicits self-focused emotions without being blended with humiliation, which was based on the prepositions of Fernández et al. (2015) and Klein (1991) who stated that humiliation is considered as undeserved. However, before dismissing our reasoning it is necessary to replicate these findings. Therefore, we re-assessed the role of the appraisal of internal blame in the interplay between personally humiliating events, humiliation and self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 3) in the following Study 5.

Moreover, our results concerning the visual exposure of events did not support our assumption that the presence of an audience leads to stronger appraisals and emotions when a person is personally humiliated (Hypothesis 4). To exclude possible methodological effects, we differently manipulate visual exposure in Study 5, which aimed at re-testing the effect of this independent variable. Another limitation of Study 4 was that the results of the personal humiliation manipulation check did not show a significant difference between the personal and the vicarious humiliation conditions. It might be that it was difficult for participants to imagine themselves having posted the story on Facebook. Therefore, in the follow-up study, we adjusted the instruction of the personal humiliation manipulation by asking participants to *vividly* imagine that the story described in the post *really* happened to them and to imagine the thoughts and feelings that they would have.

STUDY 5

The aim of Study 5 was to replicate the results found in the previous study relating to the interplay between personally and vicariously humiliating events, appraisals of humiliation and the associated emotional patterns (Hypotheses 2a and 2b) using a different intergroup context. Moreover, we re-tested our hypothesis that appraising a humiliating event as internal blame evokes self-focused emotions without being blended with the feeling of humiliation (Hypothesis 3). Finally, Study 5 aimed at re-testing the effect of audience on the intensity of appraisals and emotions, which were assumed be stronger for participants who are personally humiliated compared to participants who are vicariously humiliated (Hypothesis 4).

In the present study, we again used a bogus Facebook post as a means of manipulating humiliation. Different to Study 4, Study 5 used a 2 (target of humiliation: personal vs. vicarious humiliation) x 2 (visual exposure: laughing audience vs. no audience) between-subject factorial design. Also different to Study 4, the manipulation of audience applied a different approach. While in Study 4, the presence of audience was indicated as part of the message posted on Facebook, in Study 5, the presence of audience was indicated through comments made by other Facebook users about the respective message posted on Facebook. The intergroup context referred to Unisa students relative to students from other South African universities.

Similar to the previous two studies, the outcome variables were appraisals of humiliation and emotional responses. Demographic information related to age and gender were again assessed at the end of the study, as well as a suspicion check (i.e., whether participants recognised the true aim of the study).

Sample

Three hundred and seventy-six participants completed Study 5. The age of the participants ranged from 19 to 65 years (M = 32.33, SD = 9.71, missing: 94). Of the 312 participants who indicated their gender, 67 were males and 244 were females. Again, none of the participants identified the true aim of the study and were therefore all included in the data analyses.

Procedure

In the opening paragraph of the email, participants were given the same information as in Study 4. After providing consent to participate in the study, participants were randomly allocated to one of the four experimental conditions: (1) personal humiliation and laughing audience, (2) vicarious humiliation and laughing audience, (3) personal humiliation and no salient audience, and (4) vicarious humiliation and no salient audience.

Similar to Study 4, participants were asked to name three characteristics that distinguish her or him from others that are important to her or him if they were allocated to the personal humiliation conditions, or they were asked to name three characteristics that distinguish Unisa students from students from other universities if they were in the vicarious humiliation conditions. Afterwards, participants were asked to read a bogus Facebook post about an incident that happened during a discussion (see Figures 6 and 7). The situational determinants of being attacked, being made or found deficient, and social exclusion were used as means of devaluating the humiliated person.

Participants in the personal humiliation [and in the vicarious humiliation] conditions were asked to imagine that they themselves [another Unisa student] posted the following story on Facebook. They were asked to furthermore imagine that the incident described really happened to her or him [to another Unisa student] and to imagine it as vividly as possible.

They were asked to imagine the thoughts that they would have and the emotions they would feel and to imagine the state of mind in which they would be if this happened to them [if this happened to another Unisa student].

Participants in the personal humiliation and laughing audience condition were provided with the Facebook post depicted in Figure 6. Comments made by other Facebook users were used to manipulate a laughing audience.

Figure 6. Facebook post used as manipulation for personal humiliation with a laughing audience condition, Study 5.

In the personal humiliation and no audience condition, participants were provided with the same Facebook post as in Figure 6 except that no comments by others were shown.

In the vicarious humiliation conditions participants were provided with the Facebook post as depicted in Figure 7. In the laughing audience condition, the same comments that

were used in the personal humiliation and laughing audience condition, were added at the bottom; while these comments were omitted in the condition of no audience present.



Figure 7. Facebook post used as manipulation in the vicarious humiliation conditions, Study 5.

Measurements

After reading the Facebook post, participants received the same instruction as in Study 4 and were asked to complete the same measures as in Studies 3 and 4: appraisal of internalisation (r = .71, p < .001), appraisal of injustice (α = .83), appraisal of powerlessness (α = .84), self-focused emotions (α = .81), and other-focused emotions (α = .73). Again, external and internal blame were measured using the same single items used as in the previous two studies. Like in the previous two studies, all items of the respective scales were randomly presented to the participants and the same answer formats were used.

Manipulation check measures

The following items were used for as manipulation checks for target of humiliation: "I feel personally degraded by the incident described in the Facebook post I was asked to imagine having posted myself" and "I feel degraded on behalf of the Unisa student who experienced the incident as described in the Facebook post", and for visual exposure: "Others were laughing about the incident as described in the Facebook post".

Results

Preliminary analyses

Manipulation checks

We first assessed the manipulation of the target of humiliation on the manipulation check items: "I feel personally degraded by the incident described in the Facebook post I was asked to imagine having posted myself" and "I feel degraded on behalf of the Unisa student who experienced the incident as described in the Facebook post", using a multivariate and univariate analyses of variance, respectively. We entered target of humiliation as dummy variable (personal humiliation conditions coded as 0 and the vicarious humiliation conditions were coded as 1), and we controlled for visual exposure by entering it as a second dummy variable (no audience conditions coded as 0 and laughing audience conditions coded as 1).

The Pillai's trace estimate showed no significant main effect of target of humiliation on the manipulation check items, $V = 0.00$, $F(2, 327) = 0.51$, $p = .60$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.00$; no main effect of visual exposure, $V = 0.00$, $F(2, 327) = 0.60$, $p = .55$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.00$; and no significant effect of the two-way interaction between target of humiliation and visual exposure, $V = 0.00$, $F(2, 327) = 0.91$, $p = .41$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.01$. No further separate univariate analyses were performed due to the non-significant main effect of target of humiliation. It seems that irrespective of whether participants were in the personal ($M_{personal\ humiliation\ manipulation\ check} = 2.88$, $SD_{personal}$

$_{humiliation\ manipulation\ check}$ = 1.44 ; $M_{vicarious\ humiliation\ manipulation\ check}$ = 3.04, $SD_{vicarious\ humiliation\ manipulation\ check}$ = 1.56) or in the vicarious humiliation conditions ($M_{personal\ humiliation\ manipulation\ check}$ = 3.21, $SD_{personal\ humiliation\ manipulation\ check}$ = 1.49 ; $M_{vicarious\ humiliation\ manipulation\ check}$ = 3.35, $SD_{vicarious\ humiliation\ manipulation\ check}$ = 1.55), they perceived themselves relatively equally personally and vicariously humiliated.

Next, we assessed the manipulation of visual exposure on the manipulation check item "Others were laughing about the incident as described in the Facebook post", using a univariate analysis of variance. Visual exposure was entered as first independent variable (no audience conditions coded as 0 and laughing audience conditions coded as) and target of humiliation was entered as second independent variable (personal humiliation conditions were coded as 0 and the vicarious humiliation conditions were coded as 1). Results showed that visual exposure had a significant main effect on the manipulation check item ($M_{laughing}$ = 3.84, $SD_{laughing}$ = 1.31; $M_{no\ audience}$ = 3.36, $SD_{no\ auiience}$ = 1.24), $F(1, 328) = 11.78$, $p = .01$, η_p^2 = 0.04. These results imply that participants in the laughing audience conditions indeed perceived the audience in the Facebook post as laughing compared to the participants in the no audience conditions. This effect was not conditional on target of humiliation as there was no significant two-way interaction, $F(1, 328) = 0.01$, $p = .92$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.00$. There was also no significant main effect of target of humiliation on the visual exposure manipulation check item, $F(1, 328) = 0.07$, $p = .79$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.00$.

Overall, these results supported our certainty that the manipulation of visual exposure was successful in Study 5. However, we could not be completely certain with regards to the manipulation of the target of humiliation.

Descriptive statistics

Table 12 reports the means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-correlations of the principal variables as measured in the four experimental conditions. Similar to Studies 3 and 4, humiliation correlated strongly with both self-focused and other-focused emotions, irrespective of the experimental conditions. Similar to Study 4, the appraisals of internalisation and powerlessness correlated moderately and strongly with humiliation, self-focused and other-focused emotions in all four conditions. The appraisal of injustice correlated weakly with humiliation in the personal humiliation and laughing audience condition; and in the vicarious humiliation and no audience condition. As expected, the appraisal of injustice only correlated strongly with the other-focused emotions (although only in the personal humiliation and laughing audience condition; and the vicarious humiliation and no audience condition) but did not correlate with self-focused emotions regardless of the experimental group. As expected, external blame correlated significantly, although weakly, with the other-focused emotions in the personal humiliation conditions (irrespective of audience) and in the vicarious humiliation and no audience condition. External blame was also weakly correlated with the self-focused emotions in this latter condition. The appraisal of internal blame correlated moderately to strongly with humiliation and expectedly with self-focused emotions in all four experimental conditions; and only correlated weakly with the other-focused emotions in the personal humiliation conditions.

Table 12

Means, standard deviations. number of participants and inter-correlations of principal variables in the four experimental conditions, Study 5

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Mean	Personal humiliation	2.62/2.84	3.61/3.68	2.32/2.47	2.09/2.54	2.51/2.33	2.67/2.73	2.34/2.29	2.32/2.40
	Vicarious humiliation	2.83/2.88	4.03/3.96	2.61/2.59	2.44/2.60	2.25/2.16	3.16/2.87	2.43/2.26	2.61/2.87
SD	Personal humiliation	1.30/1.49	1.20/1.08	1.20/1.29	1.34/1.49	1.57/1.57	1.36/1.47	1.00/1.13	1.00/1.00
	Vicarious humiliation	1.45/1.48	1.00/1.03	1.27/1.36	1.42/1.48	1.50/1.43	1.56/1.45	1.21/1.19	1.08/1.09
n	Personal humiliation	97/95	93/91	91/88	89/87	89/87	87/85	87/85	87/85
	Vicarious humiliation	85/99	81/98	80/98	79/98	79/98	79/97	79/97	79/97
1 Internalisation		---	.14/.20	.50***/.49***	.19/.20	.36**/.57***	.49***/.58***	.54***/.59***	.34**/.41***
2 Injustice		.27*/.11	---	.11/.27*	.23$^{*/}$.20	-.13/-.04	.23*/.30	.16/.16	.40***/.23*
3 Powerlessness		.29*/.49^{**8}	.19/.10	---	.17/.18	.25*/.34**	.39***/.50***	.49***/.39***	.34**/.32**
4 External blame		.13/.22	.05/.13	.03/.19	---	-.11/-.07	.19/21	.22*/10	.29*/25*
5 Internal blame		.31**/.25*	.00/-.11	.43***/.39	-.05/-.08	---	.37***/.33**	.41***/.47***	.25**/.28**
6 Humiliation		.48***/.52***	.17/.22*	.33*/.61***	.16/20*	.49***/.32**	---	.79***/.82***	.59***/.65***

7 Self-focused emotions	.43***/.53***	.13/.21*	.46***/.61***	.03/23*	.52***/.42***	.81***/.74***	---	.55***/67***
8 Other-focused emotions	.30*/.37***	.20/.36***	.30***/.40***	.20/21*	.15/.13	.51***/.65**	.47***/57***	---

Note. ***$p < .001$. ** $p < .01$. * $p < .05$ (two-tailed). Correlation coefficients of the personal humiliation conditions are reported in the upper right part of the table where the first coefficient refers to the laughing audience and the second coefficient to the no audience condition. Correlation coefficients of the vicarious humiliation conditions are reported in the lower left part of the table where the first coefficient refers to the laughing audience and the second coefficient to the no audience condition.

Hypotheses testing

To test our hypotheses that personally humiliating events are likely to be appraised as internalising the devaluation and/or and powerlessness, which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2a), whereas vicariously humiliating events are likely to be appraised as something unjust and externally blamed, which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by other-focused moral emotions (Hypothesis 2b), and that appraising a humiliating event as internal blame elicits self-focused emotions without being accompanied by humiliation (Hypothesis 3), we tested the same models using the analysis procedure as in Studies 3 and 4.

Indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions

Firstly, we estimated the indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through appraisals and through humiliation (see Figure 4), while controlling for other-related emotions. The overall model was statistically significant, $R^2 = .6724$, $F(8, 339) = 86.29$, $p < .001$. Table 13 reports the direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on the appraisals, humiliation and self-focused emotions. The analyses of the direct effects revealed that target of humiliation affected only the appraisal of internal blame and self-focused emotions but not humiliation. Self-focused emotions were directly affected by target of humiliation, the appraisals of powerlessness and internal blame, humiliation and other-focused emotions (see Table 13).

Similar to Study 4, we found a negative indirect effect[3] of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through internal blame and humiliation (see Table 13). Also, we found a negative indirect effect of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through internal blame but not through humiliation. The former indirect effect implies that participants in the

[3] The ***negative*** indirect effect results from how we coded the target of humiliation conditions: personal humiliation condition coded as 0 and vicarious humiliation condition coded as 1.

personal humiliation conditions appraised the event by blaming themselves which in turn made them feel humiliated accompanied by self-focused emotions. Yet, the latter indirect effect also implies that some participants also blamed themselves and felt self-focused emotions without feeling humiliated. Different to the previous study, the contrast analyses of indirect effects revealed that the indirect effect of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through internal blame and humiliation (*effect* = -0.021) was not significantly different from the indirect effect of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through internal blame without being mediated through humiliation (*effect* = -0.035), $effect_{contrast}$ = -0.013, $bootSE_{contrast}$ = 0.015, $CI_{contrast}$[-0.041, 0.007]. However, different to Study 4 no other indirect effects reached statistical significance.

Table 13

Direct and indirect effects on self-focused emotions through appraisals and humiliation, Study 5.

Effects on appraisals						
Internalisation						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.534	0.195	7.882	< .001	1.213	1.860
Target of humiliation	-0.013	0.147	-0.091	.93	-0.256	0.230
Other-focused emotions	0.490	0.070	7.002	< .001	0.375	0.605
Injustice						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	2.948	0.149	19.850	< .001	2.703	3.192
Target of humiliation	0.176	0.112	1.568	.12	-0.009	0.361
Other-focused emotions	0.314	0.053	5.880	< .001	0.226	0.402

Powerlessness						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.348	0.173	7.798	< .001	1.063	1.634
Target of humiliation	0.088	0.131	0.674	.50	-0128	0.304
Other-focused emotions	0.420	0.062	6.760	< .001	0.318	0.523
External blame						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.563	0.204	7.671	< .001	1.227	1.900
Target of humiliation	0.090	0.154	0.581	.56	-0.164	0.343
Other-focused emotions	0.321	0.073	4.377	< .001	0.200	0.441
Internal blame						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.737	0.214	8.120	< .001	1.385	2.090
Target of humiliation	-0.320	0.1617	-1.976	.05	-0.586	-0.053
Other-focused emotions	0.286	0.077	3.718	< .01	0.159	0.413
Effects on humiliation						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	-0.365	0.242	-1.508	.13	-0.765	0.034
Target of humiliation	0.001	0.113	0.012	.99	-0.186	0.188
Internalisation	0.240	0.046	5.239	< .001	0.165	0.316
Injustice	0.058	0.055	1.056	.29	-0.033	0.149
Powerlessness	0.185	0.051	3.636	< .01	0.101	0.269
External blame	-0.028	0.040	0.683	.50	-0.039	0.094
Internal blame	0.153	0.042	3.647	< .01	0.084	0.222

Other-focused emotions	0.565	.061	9.235	< .001	0.464	0.666

Effects on self-focused emotions

	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	0.242	0.155	1.557	.12	-0.014	0.498
Target of humiliation	-0.170	0.072	-2.350	.02	-0.290	-0.051
Internalisation	0.073	0.031	2.390	.10	0.023	0.123
Injustice	-0.028	0.035	-0.797	.43	-0.087	0.030
Powerlessness	0.088	0.033	2.653	< .01	0.033	0.143
External blame	-0.012	0.026	-0.462	.64	-0.055	0.031
Internal blame	0.108	0.027	3.972	< .01	0.063	0.153
Humiliation	0.439	0.035	12.676	< .001	0.382	0.500
Other-focused emotions	0.151	0.044	3.458	< .01	0.079	0.223

Indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions

	Effect	*Boot SE*	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
Target*Internalisation	-0.001	0.012	-0.020	0.018
Target*Injustice	-0.005	0.009	-0.021	0.006
Target*Powerlessness	0.008	0.013	-0.011	0.031
Target*External blame	-0.001	0.005	-0.009	0.006
Target*Internal blame	-0.035	0.020	-0.071	-0.005
Target*Humiliation	0.001	0.051	-0.082	0.085
Target*Internalisation*Humiliation	-0.001	0.016	-0.028	0.025
Target*Injustice*Humiliation	0.004	0.006	-0.003	0.015
Target*Powerlessness*Humiliation	0.007	0.011	-0.010	0.025
Target*External blame* Humiliation	0.011	0.004	-0.004	0.008
Target*Internal blame* Humiliation	-0.021	0.013	-0.044	-0.034

Indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions

The model was statistically significant, $R^2 = .4332$, $F\ (8, 339) = 32.39$, $p < .001$. The direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on appraisals, humiliation and other-focused emotions are reported in Table 14. The analyses of the direct effects revealed that target of humiliation affected significantly the appraisal of injustice, powerlessness, humiliation and other-focused emotions. Other-focused emotions were affected by target of humiliation, the appraisals of injustice and external blame, humiliation and self-focused emotions (see Table 14).

In line with our Hypothesis 2b, and replicating the findings of Study 4, the analyses of the indirect effects revealed a significant indirect effect of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions through injustice and humiliation (see Table 14). We also found the indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions through injustice only and through humiliation only. Again, the contrast analyses of indirect effects revealed that the indirect effect of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions only through injustice (*effect* = 0.045) was significantly stronger than the indirect effect through injustice and humiliation (*effect* = 0.008), $effect_{contrast} = 0.038$, $bootSE_{contrast} = 0.019$, $CI_{contrast}$[0.010, 0.072]. A similar result was found for the indirect effect of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions through humiliation only (*effect* = 0.050) which was significantly stronger than the indirect effect of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions through injustice and humiliation (*effect* = 0.008), $effect_{contrast} = 0.042$, $bootSE_{contrast} = 0.026$, $CI_{contrast}$[0.002, 0.090].

Table 14

Direct and indirect effects on other-focused emotions through appraisals and humiliation, Study 5.

Effects on appraisals						
Effects on internalisation						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.169	0.164	7.109	< .001	0.898	1.440
Target of humiliation	0.162	0.132	1.229	.22	-0.056	0.380
Self-focused emotions	0.658	0.058	11.287	< .001	0.562	0.754
Effects on injustice						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	3.327	0.142	23.421	< .001	3.093	3.561
Target of humiliation	0.295	0.114	2.582	.01	0.107	0.483
Self-focused emotions	0.156	0.050	3.104	< .01	0.073	0.239
Effects on powerlessness						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.065	0.148	7.188	< .001	0.821	1.309
Target of humiliation	0.239	0.119	2.008	.05	0.043	0.435
Self-focused emotions	0.551	0.053	10.494	< .001	0.464	0.638
Effects on external blame						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.910	0.192	9.970	< .001	1.594	2.226
Target of humiliation	0.210	0.154	1.366	.17	-0.044	0.464
Self-focused emotions	0.177	0.070	2.606	< .01	0.065	0.289

Effects on internal blame						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.025	0.180	5.694	< .001	0.728	1.322
Target of humiliation	-0.222	0.145	-1.535	.13	-0.461	0.017
Self-focused emotions	0.599	0.064	9.387	< .001	0.494	0.704
Effects on humiliation						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	-0.322	0.205	-1.570	.12	-0.661	0.016
Target of humiliation	0.204	0.096	2.136	.03	0.047	0.362
Internalisation	0.117	0.041	2.884	< .01	0.050	0.184
Injustice	0.110	0.046	2.383	.02	0.034	0.185
Powerlessness	0.075	0.045	1.628	.10	-0.001	0.146
External blame	0.050	0.034	1.473	.14	-0.006	0.107
Internal blame	0.020	0.037	0.530	.60	-0.042	0.081
Self-focused emotions	0.850	0.054	15.658	< .001	0.760	0.939
Effects on other-focused emotions						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	0.454	0.189	2.407	.02	0.143	0.765
Target of humiliation	0.239	0.088	2.716	< .01	0.094	0.385
Internalisation	-0.003	0.038	-0.071	.94	-0.065	0.059
Injustice	0.154	0.042	3.634	< .01	0.084	0.224
Powerlessness	0.024	0.041	0.574	.57	-0.044	0.091
External blame	0.071	0.031	2.276	.02	0.020	0.123
Internal blame	-0.022	0.034	-0.636	.52	-0.078	0.034

Humiliation	0.244	0.050	4.913	< .001	0.162	0.326
Self-focused emotions	0.225	0.065	3.458	< .01	0.118	0.333

Indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions

	Effect	*Boot SE*	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
Target*Internalisation	-0.000	0.008	-0.013	0.013
Target*Injustice	0.045	0.021	0.014	0.083
Target*Powerlessness	0.006	0.013	-0.011	0.029
Target*External blame	0.015	0.014	-0.003	0.040
Target*Internal blame	0.005	0.009	-0.008	0.021
Target*Humiliation	0.050	0.026	0.010	0.095
Target*Internalisation* Humiliation	0.005	0.005	-0.001	0.013
Target*Injustice* Humiliation	0.008	0.006	0.001	0.018
Target*Powerlessness* Humiliation	0.004	0.004	-0.007	0.013
Target*External blame* Humiliation	0.003	0.003	-0.001	0.007
Target*Internal blame* Humiliation	-0.001	0.003	-0.006	0.003

The role of visual exposure

The hypothesis that the aggravating effect of visual exposure will be stronger in personally humiliating events than vicariously humiliating events (Hypothesis 4) was tested using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). Like in Study 4, we included the appraisal variables (i.e., internalisation, injustice, powerlessness, external and internal blame) and the emotions (i.e., humiliation, self-focused and other-focused emotions) as dependent variables and the conditions of visual exposure and target of humiliation (coding as in the manipulation check analysis) as independent variables.

Replicating the findings of Study 4, the Pillai's trace estimate revealed neither a significant main effect of visual exposure, $V = 0.04$, $F(8,337) = 1.58$, $p = .13$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, nor a significant two-way interaction effect between visual exposure and target of humiliation, $V = 0.02$, $F(16, 622) = 0.90$, $p = .52$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$, on the appraisals and emotions. The main effect of target of humiliation, $V = 0.07$, $F(8, 310) = 3.00$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$, was significant as expected by the results of the previous analysis. In sum, we were again unable to show that the presence of an audience (whether this audience is laughing or absent) elicit stronger appraisals or emotional responses in participants who were personally humiliated compared to those who were vicariously humiliated.

Discussion

The results of Study 5 supported our Hypothesis 2b that a vicariously humiliating event is likely to be appraised as unjust, which in turn elicited humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions. Our results, however, did not replicate the results of Study 4 and thus, did not support our assumption that a personally humiliating event was likely to be appraised as internalisation and/or powerlessness, which in turn would elicit humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2a). Instead, results showed that the personally humiliating event was appraised as internal blame which elicited humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions. This finding contradicted Hypothesis 3. Moreover, similar to Study 4, the results of Study 5 did not provide any evidence for the aggravating effects of visual exposure on the appraisals or emotions in personally humiliating events.

Although not consistently, the results of Studies 3 to 5 implied that identity processes (i.e., personal or the social identity) determine the different appraisals, by which the same situational determinants are assessed, which leads to different emotional patterns as predicted in Hypotheses 2a and 2b. For instance, our results showed firstly, that personally humiliating

events resulted in humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions through the appraisal of powerlessness (Study 4), secondly, that the appraisal of injustice and the feeling of humiliation regulated the relationship between vicarious humiliation and other-focused emotions (Studies 4 and 5), and finally, although not in line with our prediction (Hypothesis 3), and only found for personal humiliation, that the appraisal of internal blame (Studies 3, 4 and 5) elicited self-focused emotions blended with the feeling of humiliation (Studies 4 and 5). Some of the identity effects on the appraisal and emotional patterns are seemingly context invariant as we found them in different studies, which did not only vary concerning the approaches to manipulate the independent variable *target of humiliation* but also with regard to the intergroup contexts. For instance, Study 3 applied the personal recall approach as a means of manipulating the target of humiliation, whereas Studies 4 and 5 used the scenario-based approach (Facebook) and distinct intergroup contexts for vicarious humiliation (Study 4: gender, Study 5: university students). However, it is important to note that irrespective of whether indirect effects were statistically significant, the target of humiliation, the appraisals and the feeling of humiliation explained a similar amount of variance of self-focused and other-focused emotions when participants recalled incidents (explained variance was 68% for self-focused emotions and 64% for other-focused emotions in Study 3), but not when they were exposed to the scenario-based (Facebook) approach (Study 4 and Study 5). More specifically, the target of humiliation, appraisals and the feeling of humiliation explained more variance of self-focused emotions (Study 4: 68.7% explained variance and Study 5: 67% explained variance) than of other-focused emotions (Study 4: 46% explained variance and Study 5: 43% explained variance). We would speculate that the differences in the explained variances of self-focused and other-focused emotions in Studies 4 and 5 result from the fact that Facebook affects more the *personal* than the *social self*, which is also suggested

by the results of the manipulation checks of Study 4 implying that participants construed the humiliating event as personal humiliation irrespective of the experimental conditions.

It is important to stress that the effect of personal humiliation on self-focused emotions through the appraisals of powerlessness and through humiliation was only found in one of three studies (Study 4). Although Study 4 and Study 5 used the same scenario-based approach (i.e., Facebook posts) to manipulate the target of humiliation, which differed from Study 3, both the social context and the situational determinants of the humiliating event varied. Study 4 used females and the situational determinants characterising the humiliating event were limited to being reduced in size and being made deficient, as compared to Study 5, which used university students and additionally included the situational determinant of social exclusion. These differences in the two studies and the inconsistent findings concerning the effects of personal humiliating events suggest that not only do identity processes influence how the event is appraised and consequently which emotions are felt but that the social context in which the personally humiliating event occurs, also plays an influential role. One could speculate that being treated as small and incompetent (in the personal humiliation conditions) might confirm the powerless position in which many individual South African women find themselves (Study 4), a reference which will be less applicable to any university student at a South African university since the advent of the "Fees/Rhodes Must Fall" movements (Study 5).

As mentioned above, we found that participants in the personal humiliation conditions appraised the event as being their fault (i.e., internal blame), which made them feel ashamed, embarrassed and guilty (i.e., self-focused moral emotions) whether they felt humiliated (Studies 4 and 5) or not (Study 3). Although we did not rule out the possibility that people might blame themselves when they are attacked, reduced in size, socially excluded and/or made deficient by others and feel self-focused emotions, we did, however, assume that the

self-focused emotions are not blended with the feeling of humiliation (Hypothesis 3). Yet, our results suggest that there are instances, particularly when one is personally targeted, that lead to both the feeling of humiliation and self-focused emotions because the event is appraised as being one's fault. These consistent findings related to the appraisal of internal blame question the previous observations that humiliation is appraised as undeserved (Fernández et al., 2015; Klein, 1991).

Moreover, the present research assumed that not only identity processes but also the presence of an audience influence the appraisals and emotional patterns (and more so when an individual is personally humiliated). Although the analysis of participants' narratives in Study 1 indicated that the presence of others was more important for individuals who were personally humiliated compared to being vicariously humiliated, we were unable in Studies 4 and 5 to empirically support our Hypothesis 4 that the presence of an audience aggravates appraisals and emotions, and more so depending on whether they were personally or vicariously humiliated. These results were rather unexpected because the role of the audience for the experience of humiliation has been shown in previous studies (Fernández et al., 2015; Mann et al., 2017). However, different to these studies, which also used scenario-based manipulations, our scenarios were embedded in and presented as a social media exchange (Facebook), which was selected as means of creating a more authentic context for our participants. Moreover, because our manipulation checks for visual exposure focused on the actions of the audience rather than whether an audience was experienced as present or not present, we can only speculate that our manipulation of visual exposure might have been confounded by the fact that any actions on social media are by definition visually exposed. Or to put it differently, our attempt to manipulate the non-existence of an audience in both Study 4 and Study 5 might have been confounded by our participants' beliefs about social media as a public platform. Likewise, our attempts to increase the awareness of a laughing

audience, which has been shown to aggravate humiliation (Mann et al., 2017), might have also been confounded by participants' experiences with their "friends" on Facebook, which is more intimidating as compared to how "friends" engage in the "real-world" (Lapidot-Lefler & Barak, 2012).

Relevant for the overall aim to extend our understanding of vicarious humiliation for intergroup relations was the consistent findings related to the appraisal of injustice. More specifically, we found that participants tended to appraise vicariously humiliating events as unjust, which elicited the feeling of humiliation (Study 2, Study 4 and Study 5) accompanied by other-focused emotions (Study 4 and Study 5). It is these other-focused emotions that are assumed to play a role in the escalation of intergroup conflicts. As other-focused emotions consist of anger, contempt and disgust, and because each of these emotions is assumed to be related to different behavioural tendencies, we aimed in Study 6 to manipulate these emotions separately to assess the associated behavioural tendencies of avoidance, normative and non-normative approach, dehumanisation and social exclusion. As similar behavioural intentions are expected in response to contempt and disgust, we focused only on disgust (besides anger) as blended emotion of humiliation. Specifically, we tested in Study 6 the hypotheses that humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions (i.e., shame and embarrassment) will provoke avoidance tendencies (i.e., escaping from the relationship with the humiliator(s); Hypothesis 5a), that humiliation accompanied by anger will provoke normative and non-normative approach tendencies (i.e., aiming at changing the relationship with the humiliator(s); Hypothesis 5b), whereas humiliation accompanied by disgust will provoke social exclusion through dehumanisation (i.e., ending the relationship with the humiliator(s); Hypothesis 5c).

STUDY 6

The aim of Study 6 was to test the hypotheses that humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions, such as shame and embarrassment, will provoke avoidance tendencies (Hypothesis 5a); whereas humiliation accompanied by anger will provoke normative and non-normative approach tendencies (Hypothesis 5b); and that humiliation accompanied by disgust will provoke social exclusion through dehumanisation (Hypothesis 5c). We tested our hypotheses experimentally by manipulating the blended emotions of humiliation (i.e., anger and disgust). Participants were exposed to a vicariously humiliating event where they were prompted to feel anger, or disgust as blended emotions (i.e., humiliation and anger condition; humiliation and disgust condition), or they were not prompted into feeling any specific emotion (i.e., control condition). We tested our hypotheses using the intergroup context of gender (i.e., females relative to violent males).

In all conditions, participants were asked to read a bogus Facebook post that was supposedly posted by an ingroup member (i.e., another female). Again, we assumed that exposing participants to a Facebook post where an ingroup member describes being humiliated by outgroup members, would elicit feelings of vicarious humiliation in our participants. Additionally, participants in the humiliation and anger condition and in the humiliation and disgust condition were exposed to comments made by other ingroup members about the post that expressed either their anger or their disgust. In line with the intergroup emotion theory, which states that group-based emotions are socially shared as group members tend to feel the same way that they perceive other ingroup members to feel (Smith & Mackie, 2015; Turner et al., 1987), we expected that the shared emotional Facebook comments would elicit feelings of anger or disgust in our participants, respectively.

Sample

Nine hundred and ninety-eight female students participated in Study 6. Only black students were invited to participate in Study 6 as we wanted to avoid that the gender context is confounded by possible ethnicity effects. The age of the participants ranged from 19 to 60 years (M = 29.68, SD = 7.00, missing: 0). None of the participants identified the true aim of the study and were therefore all included in the following analyses.

Procedure

In the opening paragraph of the email, participants were informed that we live in a society where sharing our stories and experiences have become easier than ever with technologies such as social media. They were furthermore informed that these stories shared on social media can elicit strong feelings as they are either very positive and uplifting or very negative and upsetting, but that (un)fortunately they are still part of our daily lives as we read or hear about such stories in news reports. Participants were told that the present study aims at understanding how we perceive and experience these stories when we share or read about them on social media. After providing consent to participate in the study, participants were asked to answer demographic questions (i.e., age and gender).

Irrespective to what condition participants were allocated, they were first asked to think about themselves as women and to think about what women can *do* better than men and what *makes* women different from men. Participants were provided with a space where they had to name three characteristics that distinguish women from men. Similar to the previous four studies, this question aided in making the ingroup salient. Afterwards, participants were asked to complete the ingroup identification measure.

Next, participants were allocated to one of three experimental conditions: (1) humiliation and anger condition; (2) humiliation and disgust condition, and (3) control

condition. All participants were asked to read an incident that was posted on Facebook by another woman (see Figures 8 and 9). The incidents used as humiliating event referred to the main discourse related to gender violence within the South African public since the country was declared a "State of Disaster" in March 2020 because of the Covid-19 pandemic. The situational determinant of being attacked was used as means of devaluating the humiliated person. The comments made by fellow ingroup members (i.e., other females) contained labels and characteristics associated with anger (e.g., fury and violation of autonomy; see Figure 8); or with disgust (e.g., revolt and violation of dignity; see Figure 9). The Facebook post used in the control condition did not include any comments and the last sentence of the post where the humiliated ingroup member expresses either her anger or disgust, was omitted.

Figure 8. Facebook post used as manipulation in the humiliation and anger condition, Study 6.

Figure 9. Facebook post used as manipulation in the humiliation and disgust condition, Study 6.

After being exposed to the manipulation, participants were asked to complete the measures of emotions (i.e., humiliation, self-focused emotions, anger and disgust) followed by the measures of behavioural intentions (i.e., avoidance, normative and non-normative approach and social exclusion). Lastly, participants were asked to complete the measure of dehumanisation, followed by the suspicion check.

Measurements

The four measures of emotion and the four behavioural intentions measures were randomly presented to participants. The items within each measure were also randomised. If not differently stated, participants were requested to indicate their agreement on an answer format ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

Ingroup identification was measured by the following five items (selected from Leach et al., 2008): "I feel strong bonds with women", "I feel committed to women", "I am glad to be a woman", "I think that women have a lot to be proud of" and "Being a woman is an important part of how I see myself" (α = .87).

The emotions of humiliation, self-focused emotions, anger and disgust were measured by asking participants to what extent they feel each of the following emotions right now on an answer format ranging from 1 (*Not at all*) to 5 (*A great deal*): "demeaned", "humiliated", "belittled", "degraded" and "insulted" (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999) combined into the humiliation measure (α = .94); "ashamed", "embarrassed", "small", "shy" and "discomfort" were the items combined as self-focused emotions measure (α = .87); "angry", "furious", "annoyed", "enraged" and "irritated" (adapted from Tausch et al., 2011) were used as anger measure (α = .93); and lastly, "disgusted", "revolted", "sickened", "repulsed" and "stomach-turning" (adapted from Skarlicki et al., 2013) were combined as disgust measure (α = .92). These emotion measures served as manipulation check measures where it was expected that participants in the humiliation and anger condition would score higher on the anger measure compared to the other two conditions, that participants in the humiliation and disgust condition would score higher on the disgust measure compared to the other two conditions, and that in the control condition the participants' scores on the emotions would vary freely.

Behavioural intentions were measured by first asking participants to think about the incident reported in the Facebook post and to indicate on an answer format from 1 (*Extremely*

unlikely) to 5 (*Extremely likely*) to what extent they are motivated to engage in the following actions right now. Avoidance was measured using five items (adapted from Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 2007): "Hiding from violent men", "Escaping from violent men", "Avoiding violent men", Turning away from violent men" and "Running away from violent men" (α = .88). Normative and non-normative approach as behavioural intentions were assessed by five items, respectively, and were adapted from the research of Tausch et al. (2011). For normative approach the items were: "Setting up a petition against violent men", "Participating in a protest against male violence", "Distributing flyers against violent men", "Filing a complaint against violent men" and "Participating in a public discussion about male violence" (α = .89). For non-normative approach the items were: "Disturb events that are male dominated (e.g., soccer matches)", "Interrupting male dominated board meetings", "Participating in flash mobs to interrupt public life", "Blocking males from malls" and "Blocking streets to protest" (α = .88). Items to assess social exclusion (adapted from (Ferris et al., 2008; Roseman et al., 1994) were: "Removing violent men from the country", "Ignoring violent men/the police", "Shaming violent men", "Preventing violent men", and "Excluding violent men from the community" (α = .76).

The five items used as the measure of dehumanisation were adapted from Bastian and Haslam (2010): "Violent men are mechanical and cold, like robots", "Violent men are objects, not humans", "Violent men are not able to feel human emotions, like shame and guilt", "Violent men are superficial" and "Violent men have warmth and depth" (reversed). As the reversed item did not correlate well with the other four items (Corrected Item Total Correlation = -.15), we omitted it. The four remaining items, however, formed a reliable scale of dehumanisation (α = .77).

Results

Preliminary analyses

Manipulation checks

A multivariate analysis of variance was conducted entering the experimental conditions as independent variable and the emotions of humiliation, self-focused emotions, anger and disgust, as dependent variables. The Pillai's trace estimate showed no significant main effects of the experimental conditions on the emotions, $V = 0.02$, $F\ (8, 1080) = 1.27$, $p = .25$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.01$. Consequently, no further univariate analyses were performed. It seems that irrespective of whether participants were in the humiliation and anger or humiliation and disgust or in the control condition, they perceived themselves equally humiliated, ashamed, angered and disgusted. Moreover, on face-value it seemed that participants felt all emotions rather strongly as all means were above the scale center (see Table 15). One sample t-tests were conducted to determine if participants felt each emotion significantly stronger compared to the scale centre (3). Results showed that the mean scores of each of the four measured emotions (see Table 15) differed significantly from the reference score (3), $t_{humiliation}(731) = 23.70$, $p_{humiliation} < .001$; $t_{self\text{-}focused\ emotions}\ (563) = 2.96$, $p_{self\text{-}focused\ emotions} < .01$; $t_{anger}(746) = 30.07$, $p_{anger} < .001$; $t_{disgust}(745) = 18.66$, $p_{humiliation} < .001$. These results confirm that although participants did not distinguish between the intensity that they felt each emotion, they nonetheless felt each emotion strongly.

Overall, the results of the manipulation check indicate that there were no increases of the expected feelings in the participants in the different experimental conditions. We therefore concluded that our strategy to manipulate these emotions was not successful. Given that our manipulations were not successful, we could not test for causal effects. We, therefore, opted to treat the measures of emotions and behavioural intentions as correlative data and reformulated our hypotheses stressing the indirect effects between the measured

emotions and behavioural tendencies. More specifically, we assumed that the feeling of humiliation will explain variances in the different behavioural tendencies through self-focused emotions, anger and disgust, respectively. Consequently, we hypothesised that humiliation is indirectly related to avoidance through self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 5a), that humiliation is indirectly related to normative and non-normative approach through anger (Hypothesis 5b), and that humiliation is indirectly related to social exclusion through disgust and through dehumanisation (Hypothesis 5c).

Descriptive statistics

Table 15 reports the means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-correlations of the principal variables. The feeling of humiliation correlated significantly with the behavioural intentions of avoidance, normative and non-normative approach and social exclusion. Self-focused emotions and anger correlated significantly with all the behavioural intentions, while disgust was only significantly related to normative and non-normative approach and social exclusion. The four measured emotions correlated significantly and strongly with each other. The behavioural intentions correlated significantly, but relatively weakly, with each other.

Table 15

Means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-correlations of principal variables, Study 6.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Mean	4.32	3.90	3.14	4.02	3.72	4.13	4.37	2.76	3.66	3.72
SD	0.81	1.03	1.16	0.92	1.06	1.05	0.90	1.22	1.02	1.06
n	998	732	564	747	746	488	663	661	568	674
1 Ingroup identification	---	.09*	.00	.11	.11**	.04	.09*	.04	.09*	.11**
2 Humiliation		---	.56***	.69***	.62***	.10*	.25***	.10*	.03	.14***
3 Self-focused emotions			---	.50***	.48***	.17***	.14**	.30***	.20***	.15**
4 Anger				---	.75***	.11*	.29***	.10**	.09*	.19***
5 Disgust					---	.08	.30**	.13**	.07	.19***
6 Avoidance						---	.17***	.14**	.16***	.36***
7 Normative approach							---	.21***	.10*	.35**
8 Non-normative approach								---	.30***	.31***
9 De-									---	.23***

humanisation										
10 Social exclusion										---

Note. ***$p < .001$. ** $p < .01$. * $p < .05$ (two-tailed)

Hypotheses testing

To test Hypotheses 5a and 5b which stated that humiliation is indirectly related with avoidance through self-focused emotions; and that humiliation is indirectly related to normative and non-normative behaviour through anger, we estimated the indirect effects of humiliation on behavioural intentions through the emotional blends of self-focused emotions, anger and disgust for each behavioural intention separately using SPSS PROCESS Macro (#Model 4,. Hayes, 2018) (see Figure 10). In order to test Hypothesis 5c, which stated that the feeling of humiliation is indirectly related to social exclusion through the feelings of disgust and through dehumanisation, we estimated the indirect effects of humiliation on the behavioural intention to socially exclude through self-focused emotions, anger and disgust, and dehumanisation which were entered as serial using SPSS PROCESS Macro (#Model 80, Hayes, 2018) (see Figure 11). Similar to the previous studies, we used bootstrapping with 10000 iterations.



Figure 10. Conceptual diagram of the model testing for the indirect effects of humiliation on the behavioural intentions through emotional blends, Study 6.



Figure 11. Conceptual diagram of the model testing for the indirect effects of humiliation on the behavioural intentions through emotional blends and through dehumanisation, Study 6.

Indirect effects of humiliation on avoidance

First, we estimated the indirect effects of humiliation on avoidance through self-focused emotions, anger and disgust (see Figure 10), while normative approach, non-normative approach, dehumanisation and social exclusion were entered as covariates for effects on the dependent variable. The overall model was statistically significant, $R^2 = .1541$, $F(8, 455) = 10.36$, $p < .001$. The analyses of the direct effects revealed that humiliation was significantly related with self-focused emotions, anger and disgust but not avoidance (see Table 16).

The analyses of the indirect effects supported Hypothesis 5a as results revealed a significant indirect effect from humiliation on avoidance through self-focused emotions. More specifically, the result implied that participants who felt humiliated accompanied by feelings of shame and embarrassment (i.e., self-focused emotions) reported a stronger

tendency to avoid the outgroup. All other indirect effects did not reach statistical significance (see Table 16). The contrast analyses of indirect effects revealed that the indirect effect of humiliation on avoidance through self-focused emotions (*effect* = 0.070) was significantly stronger than the non-significant indirect effect through disgust (*effect* = -0.052), $effect_{contrast}$ = 0.122, $bootSE_{contrast}$ = 0.058, $CI_{contrast}$[0.015, 0.243], but it was not significantly stronger that the non-significant indirect effect through anger (*effect* = 0.029), $effect_{contrast}$ = 0.042, $bootSE_{contrast}$ = 0.061, $CI_{contrast}$[-0.079, 0.159].

Table 16

Direct and indirect effects of humiliation on the tendency to avoid through the emotional blends, Study 6.

Effects on emotional blends						
Self-focused emotions						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	0.791	0.195	4.056	< .01	0.408	1.175
Humiliation	0.598	0.047	12.657	< .001	0.505	0.694
Anger						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.831	0.123	14.867	< .001	1.589	2.073
Humiliation	0.577	0.030	19.358	< .001	0.519	0.636
Disgust						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.157	0.154	7.515	< .001	0.854	1.459
Humiliation	0.677	0.037	18.180	< .001	0.604	0.751

Effects on avoidance						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	2.179	0.338	6.438	< .001	1.514	2.845
Humiliation	-0.025	0.068	-0.370	.71	-0.160	0.109
Self-focused emotions	0.118	0.048	2.436	.02	0.023	0.212
Anger	0.049	0.087	0.571	.57	-0.121	0.219
Disgust	-0.076	0.070	-1.100	.27	-0.213	0.060
Normative approach	0.045	0.062	0.736	.46	-0.076	0.166
Non-normative approach	0.007	0.042	0.162	.87	-0.076	0.090
Dehumanisation	0.027	0.048	0.548	.58	-0.068	0.121
Social exclusion	0.369	0.053	6.904	< .001	0.264	0.474

Indirect effects of humiliation on avoidance				
	Effect	*Boot SE*	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
Feeling*Self-focused emotions	0.070	0.030	0.014	0.133
Feeling*Anger	0.029	0.052	-0.071	0.135
Feeling*Disgust	-0.052	0.045	-0.145	0.031

Indirect effects of humiliation on normative approach

The overall model was statistically significant, $R^2 = .1734$, $F(8, 455) = 11.930$, $p < .001$. The analyses of the indirect effects revealed no significant indirect effects (see Table 17). We were, therefore, unable to support Hypothesis 5b as none of the emotional blends regulated the relationship between the feeling of humiliation and normative approach[4].

[4] When the other behavioural intentions were not controlled for, results showed a significant indirect effect of the humiliation on normative approach through anger, *effect* = 0.095, *bootSE* = 0.044, *bootCI* [0.027, 0.170]. The contrast analysis of indirect effects showed that this indirect effect was significantly stronger than the non-significant indirect effect through self-focused emotions (*effect* = 0.003), $effect_{contrast} = 0.093$, $bootSE_{contrast} = 0.048$, $CI_{contrast}$[-0.174, -0.016], but not significantly stronger than the non-significant effect through disgust, (*effect* = 0.051), $effect_{contrast} = 0.044$, $bootSE_{contrast} = 0.078$, $CI_{contrast}$[-0.086, 0.173].

Table 17

Direct and indirect effects of humiliation on the tendency to normatively approach through the emotional blends, Study 6.

Effects on emotional blends						
Self-focused emotions						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	0.791	0.195	4.056	< .01	0.408	1.175
Humiliation	0.598	0.047	12.657	< .001	0.505	0.694
Anger						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.831	0.123	14.867	< .001	1.589	2.073
Humiliation	0.577	0.030	19.358	< .001	0.519	0.636
Disgust						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.157	0.154	7.515	< .001	0.854	1.459
Humiliation	0.677	0.037	18.180	< .001	0.604	0.750
Effects on normative approach						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	2.562	0.241	10.649	< .001	2.089	3.035
Humiliation	0.006	0.052	0.111	.91	-0.096	0.108
Self-focused emotions	-0.033	0.037	-0.893	.37	-0.106	0.040
Anger	0.140	0.066	2.133	.03	0.011	0.268
Disgust	0.058	0.053	1.095	.27	-0.046	0.162
Avoidance	0.026	0.036	0.736	.46	-0.044	0.096

Non-normative approach	0.074	0.032	2.309	.02	0.011	0.137
Dehumanisation	-0.010	0.037	-0.280	.78	-0.083	0.062
Social exclusion	0.236	0.041	5.723	< .001	0.155	0.317

Indirect effects of humiliation on normative approach

	Effect	*Boot SE*	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
Feeling*Self-focused emotions	-0.020	0.023	-0.063	0.025
Feeling*Anger	0.081	0.045	-0.007	0.171
Feeling*Disgust	0.039	0.045	-0.049	0.128

Indirect effects humiliation on non-normative approach

The model was statistically significant, $R^2 = .1778$, $F(8, 455) = 12.30$, $p < .001$. The results revealed a significant indirect effect of humiliation on non-normative approach through self-focused emotions (see Table 18). This result did not support Hypothesis 5b as we hypothesised that anger would regulate the relationship between humiliation and non-normative approach, but not self-focused emotions. The significant indirect effect implies that participants who felt humiliation accompanied by the feelings of shame and embarrassment (i.e., self-focused emotions) reported a stronger tendency to approach the outgroup with behaviour that violates laws or social norms (i.e., non-normative approach). All other indirect effects did not reach statistical significance (see Table 18). The contrast analyses of indirect effects revealed that the indirect effect of humiliation on non-normative approach through self-focused emotions (*effect* = 0.120) was significantly stronger than the non-significant indirect effect through anger (*effect* = -0.035), $effect_{contrast} = 0.155$, $bootSE_{contrast} = 0.072$, $CI_{contrast}[0.012, 0.290]$, but not significantly stronger than the non-significant indirect effect through disgust (*effect* = 0.049), $effect_{contrast} = 0.071$, $bootSE_{contrast} = 0.071$, $CI_{contrast}[-0.075, 0.205]$.

Table 18

Direct and indirect effects humiliation on the tendency to approach non-normatively through the emotional blends, Study 6.

Effects on emotional blends						
Self-focused emotions						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	0.791	0.195	4.056	< .01	0.408	1.175
Humiliation	0.598	0.047	12.657	< .001	0.505	0.694
Anger						
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.831	0.123	14.867	< .001	1.589	2.073
Humiliation	0.577	0.030	19.358	< .001	0.519	0.636
Disgust						
	Beta	SE	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.157	0.154	7.515	< .001	0.854	1.459
Humiliation	0.677	0.037	18.180	< .001	0.604	0.750
Effects on non-normative approach						
	Beta	SE	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	-0.027	0.393	-0.070	.95	-0.800	0.744
Humiliation	-0.050	0.076	-0.758	.51	-0.199	0.100
Self-focused emotions	0.201	0.053	3.780	< .01	0.096	0.305
Anger	-0.061	0.096	-0.630	.53	-0.249	0.128
Disgust	0.072	0.077	0.939	.35	-0.079	0.224
Avoidance	0.008	0.052	0.162	.87	-0.094	0.112

Normative approach	0.157	0.068	2.309	.02	0.023	0.291
Dehumanisation	0.224	0.053	4.259	< .001	0.121	0.327
Social exclusion	0.198	0.062	3.209	< .01	0.077	0.319

Indirect effects of humiliation on non-normative approach

	Effect	*Boot SE*	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
Feeling*Self-focused emotions	0.120	0.032	0.059	0.184
Feeling*Anger	-0.035	0.062	-0.151	0.091
Feeling*Disgust	0.049	0.062	-0.064	0.180

Indirect effects of humiliation on social exclusion

The indirect effects of humiliation on social exclusion through disgust and through dehumanisation (see Figure 11) was tested, while controlling for the other emotions and the other behavioural tendencies. The overall model was statistically significant, $R^2 = .2984$, $F(8, 455) = 24.185$, $p < .001$. The analyses of the direct effects indicated that humiliation did not have a significant direct effect on dehumanisation nor on social exclusion, but that the relationship between humiliation and social exclusion was indirectly influenced through self-focused emotions and dehumanisation (see Table 19). This result did not support Hypothesis 5c as it was assumed that humiliation would be accompanied by disgust which would be related to a stronger tendency to dehumanise and exclude the humiliator(s). Instead, the results revealed that it was self-focused emotions that indirectly influenced the relationship between humiliation, dehumanisation and social exclusion. The contrast analyses of indirect effects revealed that the significant indirect effect of humiliation on social exclusion through self-focused emotions and dehumanisation (*effect* = 0.026) was significantly stronger than the non-significant indirect effect through only the self-focused emotions (*effect* = -0.029), $effect_{contrast} = -0.055$, $bootSE_{contrast} = 0.027$, $CI_{contrast}[-0.109, -0.002]$, and the non-significant indirect effect through only dehumanisation (*effect* = -0.023), $effect_{contrast} = -0.048$,

bootSE$_{contrast}$ = 0.020, CI$_{contrast}$[-0.091, -0.015], and the non-significant indirect effect through disgust and dehumanisation (*effect* = -0.001), *effect*$_{contrast}$ = 0.026, *bootSE*$_{contrast}$ = 0.015, CI$_{contrast}$[0.002, 0.058]. The significant indirect effect of humiliation on social exclusion through self-focused emotions and dehumanisation was not significantly different from the non-significant indirect effect through anger (*effect* = 0.019) only, *effect*$_{contrast}$ = -0.007, *bootSE*$_{contrast}$ = 0.049, CI$_{contrast}$[-0.101, 0.093] or the non-significant indirect effect through anger and dehumanisation (*effect* = 0.003), *effect*$_{contrast}$ = 0.022, *bootSE*$_{contrast}$ = 0.014, CI$_{contrast}$[-0.001, 0.054].

Table 19

Direct and indirect effects of humiliation on the tendency to socially exclude through the emotional blends and through dehumanisation, Study 6.

Effects on emotional blends and dehumanisation						
	Self-focused emotions					
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	0.791	0.195	4.056	< .01	0.408	1.175
Humiliation	0.598	0.047	12.657	< .001	0.505	0.694
	Anger					
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.831	0.123	14.867	< .001	1.589	2.073
Humiliation	0.577	0.030	19.358	< .001	0.519	0.636
	Disgust					
	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.157	0.154	7.515	< .001	0.854	1.459

Humiliation	0.677	0.037	18.180	< .001	0.604	0.750

Dehumanisation

	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	3.284	0.241	13.623	< .001	2.810	3.757
Feeling of humiliation	-0.118	0.070	-1.683	.09	-0.257	0.020
Self-focused emotions	0.222	0.048	4.630	< .001	0.128	0.317
Anger	0.030	0.090	0.340	.73	-0.144	0.205
Disgust	0.006	0.072	-0.080	.94	-0.147	0.135

Effects on social exclusion

	Beta	*SE*	*t*	*p*	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	0.346	0.295	1.175	.25	-0.233	0.926
Humiliation	0.039	0.057	0.684	.49	-0.073	0.151
Self-focused emotions	0.048	0.041	-1.196	.23	-0.128	0.031
Anger	0.032	0.072	0.448	.65	-0.110	0.174
Disgust	0.031	0.058	0.530	.60	-0.083	0.145
Dehumanisation	0.193	0.039	4.907	< .001	0.116	0.270
Avoidance	0.257	0.037	6.904	< .001	0.184	0.330
Normative approach	0.285	0.050	5.723	< .001	0.187	0.382
Non-normative approach	0.112	0.035	3.209	< .01	0.043	0.180

Indirect effects of humiliation on social exclusion

	Effect	*Boot SE*	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
Humiliation*Self-focused emotions	-0.029	0.025	-0.078	0.021
Humiliation*Anger	0.019	0.048	-0.071	0.117
Humiliation*Disgust	0.021	0.042	-0.063	0.106
Humiliation*Dehumanisation	-0.023	0.015	-0.053	0.003
Humiliation*Self-focused	0.026	0.009	0.010	0.046

emotions*Dehumanisation				
Humiliation*Anger*Dehumanisation	0.003	0.011	-0.018	0.024
Humiliation*Disgust*Dehumanisation	-0.001	0.010	-0.021	0.019

Discussion

The initial aim of Study 6 was to test the causal relationships between the elicited emotional blends resulting from a vicariously humiliating event and the consequent behavioural tendencies of humiliation, which we assumed would vary between avoiding the humiliator(s), approaching the humiliator(s) or excluding the humiliator(s). We aimed at testing our hypotheses by manipulating humiliation together with anger, and humiliation together with disgust. Yet, the results of the manipulation checks showed that although our manipulations indeed provoked the feelings of humiliation, shame, embarrassment, anger and disgust (i.e., as means were significantly different from the scale center for all measured emotions), participants, however, felt equally humiliated, ashamed, angered and disgusted, regardless to which experimental condition they were exposed to. We speculate that the event that was used in the Facebook post (i.e., gender-based violence) was a situation that our female participants appraised in a manner that evoked all four of the measured emotions equally. As we did not control for the appraisals in Study 6, we were unable to comprehend *how* participants appraised the humiliating event used as manipulation and thus *why* they felt equally humiliated, ashamed, angry and disgusted.

As our participants did not discriminate between humiliation and anger, and humiliation and disgust as a result of the experimental manipulation they were exposed to, we were unable to test for causal effects between humiliating events, emotional blends and behavioural tendencies. Consequently, we decided to use the measurements of emotions and behavioural intentions as correlative data and reformulated our hypotheses stressing the

relatedness between the measured feeling of humiliation, the measured self- and other-focused emotions and the measured behavioural intentions. The reformulated hypotheses stated that humiliation is indirectly related to avoidance through self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 5a), that humiliation is indirectly related to normative and non-normative behaviour through anger (Hypothesis 5b), and that humiliation is indirectly related to social exclusion through disgust and through dehumanisation (Hypothesis 5c).

Results related to the relationship between humiliation and the avoidance tendency supported Hypothesis 5a as we found a significant indirect effect of humiliation on avoidance through self-focused emotions. As predicted, participants who felt humiliated accompanied by feelings of shame and embarrassment had a stronger tendency to avoid the humiliator outgroup. Our results did not support Hypothesis 5b, though. We could not find any empirical evidence that the relationship between the feeling of humiliation and normative or non-normative approach was indirectly influenced by anger. Instead, we found a non-predicted indirect effect of humiliation on non-normative approach through self-focused emotions. Therefore, our female participants did not intend to approach the humiliator group normatively, but rather non-normatively through feelings of shame and embarrassment.

We furthermore could not find evidence in support of Hypothesis 5c as disgust did not regulate the relationship between humiliation and social exclusion through dehumanisation. Again, it was the feelings of shame and embarrassment (i.e., self-focused emotions) through which humiliation indirectly influenced dehumanisation and social exclusion. This non-predicted significant indirect effect was significantly stronger than the predicted, yet non-significant indirect effect of humiliation on social exclusion through disgust and through dehumanisation.

The three significant indirect effects found in Study 6 imply that some female participants opted for the tendency to avoid the humiliator(s), some female participants opted

for the tendency to engage in behaviour that violates social norms and the law (i.e., non-normative approach), and some female participants opted for the tendency to end the relationship with the humiliator(s) (i.e., social exclusion) through dehumanising them - but all did it through self-focused emotions. Although the last two indirect effects were unexpected, our results nevertheless suggest that feeling humiliated is related to different behavioural tendencies through emotional blends, albeit not the emotional blends expected. The findings, that self-focused emotions did not only play a regulatory role in the relationship between humiliation and avoidance but also in the relationships between humiliation and non-normative approach and social exclusion, suggest that when vicarious humiliation is accompanied by a certain emotion it does not necessarily mean that a specific behavioural tendency is by default associated with this emotional blend. But instead, other factors, such as the intergroup context and social norms attached to this context, might be at play in determining which behavioural tendency is deemed appropriate by the ingroup when responding to the feeling of humiliation when blended with self-focused emotions.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The overall aim of the present research was to extend our understanding of the psychological processes involved in the experience of vicarious humiliation. More specifically, we aimed at exploring people's experience of vicarious relative to personal humiliation (Studies 1, 3, 4 and 5), the role of ingroup identification (Study 2), the interplay between the appraisal processes of personally and vicariously humiliating events and humiliation as a blended emotion (Studies 1, 3, 4, and 5), and the behaviours that people intend to engage in as a result of vicarious humiliation (Study 6).

We focused firstly on people's understanding of humiliation and their experiences with this emotion by exploring how often individuals experience humiliation on behalf of ingroup members compared to how often they experience this emotion on a personal level (i.e., the commonness of vicarious humiliation), the different situational determinants that are recognised by people in vicariously and personally humiliating events (and whether these are variant or invariant across these two contexts), and whether the feeling of humiliation is conceptualised as a blended emotion (Elison & Harter, 2007; Elshout et al., 2017; Fernández et al., 2015; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Klein, 1991; Veldhuis et al., 2014), or rather as a unique emotion (Study 1).

Secondly, we systematically tested the hypotheses that individuals who strongly identify with their ingroup experience a stronger feeling of humiliation after witnessing an ingroup being humiliated than compared to low identifiers (Hypothesis 1, Study 2), that personally humiliating events (or rather the situational determinants that characterise the events) are likely to be appraised as something that lowers the individual's self-esteem (i.e., internalisation) and is perceived as uncontrollable (i.e., powerlessness), which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions such as shame, embarrassment and guilt (Hypothesis 2a, Studies 3, 4 and 5), whereas vicariously humiliating events are likely to

be appraised as unjust and externally blamed, which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions such as anger, disgust and contempt (Hypothesis 2b, Studies 3, 4 and 5), that a situational determinant appraised as internal blame will result in self-focused emotions (i.e., shame, embarrassment and guilt), but that the feeling of humiliation will not be part of this blend (Hypothesis 3, Studies 3, 4 and 5), that visual exposure as a situational determinant of humiliation mainly aggravates the appraisals and the elicited emotional blends in personally humiliating events (Hypothesis 4, Studies 4 and 5), that humiliation accompanied by shame and embarrassment, provokes avoidance tendencies (Hypothesis 5b), whereas humiliation accompanied by anger provokes normative and non-normative approach tendencies (Hypothesis 5b), and that humiliation accompanied by disgust provokes social exclusion through the tendency to dehumanise the humiliator outgroup (Hypothesis 5c, Study 6).

Overall, our results revealed that participants construed humiliation in their memories mainly as personally humiliating events than as vicariously humiliating events, although they reported experiencing more often vicarious humiliation than personal humiliation when asked more directly (Study 1). The latter result confirmed our assumption that experiencing humiliation vicariously is indeed regularly experienced by people. The former is an interesting finding because it suggests that participants tend to construe a humiliating event by default as *personal* and that only by *directly* asking them to distinguish between personal and vicarious humiliation, do they distinguish between these two contexts. Results of the manipulation checks in Studies 3 and 4 further added evidence to this observation. In Study 3, the participants allocated to the personal humiliation condition experienced difficulties in differentiating between being personally humiliated and witnessing a humiliating event, while results of the manipulation check in Study 4 showed that participants allocated to the vicarious humiliation condition felt similarly *personally* devalued as compared to participants

who were personally humiliated. It might be that people construe a vicariously humiliating event on a more abstract level as the psychological distance is larger, which might in turn make the humiliation more personal (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Correspondingly, it might be that as the feeling of humiliation is experienced on a personal level, participants experienced difficulties distinguishing between the appraising of a personal event from the appraising of a vicarious event.

Our results related to the situational determinants of humiliating events (i.e., being attacked, being socially excluded, being reduced in size, being found or made deficient and visual exposure) showed that participants used the proposed situational determinants when they described personally and vicariously humiliating events. Also, in line with our reasoning is the finding that visual exposure as situational determinant was more important in personally compared to vicariously humiliating events when participants were asked to *remember* humiliating events (Study 1). This finding could, however, not be replicated in the experimental studies (Studies 4 and 5) when participants were *exposed* to humiliating events as we were not able to provide empirical evidence that the presence of an audience *aggravated* the appraisals and consequent emotional responses to humiliating events, and more so in personally humiliating events. One could argue that we were unable to replicate the findings of the explorative study (Study 1) in the experimental studies (Studies 4 and 5) because of our methodological approach to use social media (i.e., Facebook) as a context to manipulate visual exposure. Although the manipulation checks for visual exposure were successful, our manipulation check items did not focus on whether an audience was present or not, but only on the actions of the audience (i.e., whether the audience was laughing or not). It might be that the use of Facebook was confounded by the fact that activities on social media are by default public and therefore, we actually did not manipulate the 'non-existence' of an audience.

Furthermore, our results related to the emotional blends of humiliation supported our reasoning that humiliation is indeed experienced as a blended emotion. We found that when participants defined humiliation as a feeling, they mostly described it as a blended emotion as compared to a unique feeling (Study 1). Moreover, our findings indicated that participants did not only mostly refer to the feelings of embarrassment, followed by shame, when describing the feeling of humiliation, but that they also felt these emotions significantly stronger compared to the other emotions (i.e., guilt, anger, disgust and contempt) when they were asked to indicate which emotions they felt as a result of humiliation. In line with this, the feeling of anger was rarely used when humiliation was described by our participants in terms of its emotional implications, and disgust and contempt were not mentioned at all. The latter finding might be because most of our participants defined and conceptualised a humiliating event as personal, and, in line with our assumption, being personally humiliated is more likely to result in the self-focused emotions such as shame and embarrassment. This assumption was supported by the experimental studies as results showed that being personally humiliated led to humiliation accompanied by the self-focused emotions (Studies 3 to 5). As hypothesised, the appraisal of powerlessness played a regulatory role in this relationship (Study 4). An unexpected finding was, however, that personal humiliation led to feelings of humiliation and the self-focused emotions through the appraisal of internal blame (Studies 4 and 5). Although we would assume that participants would feel ashamed and/or embarrassed when they blamed themselves for the humiliating event (as was found in Study 3), we did not assume that the feeling of humiliation would be part of this emotional blend (as it was found in Studies 4 and 5). Our findings suggest that, although previous studies suggest that people perceive humiliating events as undeserved (Fernández et al., 2015; Klein, 1991), there are actually situations, particularly when one is personally humiliated, where people do not perceive the event as undeserved. Different to Study 3, where the personal

recall approach was used, Studies 4 and 5 exposed participants to a humiliating event where they had to imagine that they themselves posted the story on Facebook. The use of the latter approach in manipulating personal humiliation might have influenced our participants into perceiving the event as more deserved (i.e., blame oneself) and as humiliating because they were made to believe that *they* actually shared it with the public.

Our results further supported our assumption that vicariously humiliating events result in a different pattern of emotions (i.e., humiliation and the other-focused emotions of anger, contempt and disgust). More specifically, results showed that participants tended to appraise vicariously humiliating events as unjust (and more so when they highly identified with the ingroup, Study 2), which elicited the feeling of humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions (Study 4 and Study 5). Results further supported our Hypothesis 1 that high identifiers experience a stronger feeling of humiliation as compared to low identifiers as we found that high identifiers not only perceived the vicariously humiliating event as more unjust but that they also reported significantly stronger feelings of humiliation as compared to low identifiers (Study 2). However, this effect only reached statistical significance when the order in which the manipulations were presented was controlled for, in that only the high identifiers who received the high ingroup identification manipulation *first* felt more humiliated on behalf of the devalued ingroup member. Despite the order effect of our manipulations, the significant effect found supports the assumption made by the intergroup emotion theory (Smith et al., 2007) that individuals' level of identification with the ingroup plays an important role in the elicitation of group-based emotions.

Results related to the behavioural intentions of vicarious humiliation (Study 6) were rather ambiguous. We exposed our participants to a vicariously humiliating event and prompted them into feeling either anger or disgust as blended emotion, respectively, or they were not prompted into feeling any blended emotion. As the results of the manipulation

checks showed, these manipulations were not successful as participants reported to feel all emotions equally (i.e., humiliation, self-focused emotions, anger and disgust). We decided, therefore, to treat our measurements of emotions and behavioural intentions as correlative data and instead tested for interrelatedness. The reformulated hypotheses stated that humiliation indirectly relates to avoidance through the self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 5a), that humiliation indirectly relates to normative and non-normative approach through anger (Hypothesis 5b), and that humiliation is indirectly related to social exclusion through disgust and through dehumanisation (Hypothesis 5c). Our results supported Hypothesis 5a as we found a significant indirect effect of humiliation on avoidance through the self-focused emotions, thereby confirming that participants who felt humiliated, ashamed and embarrassed had a stronger intention to avoid the humiliator outgroup. Results pertaining to Hypotheses 5b and 5c were, however, unexpected. Firstly, we were unable to find any evidence for the indirect relationship between humiliation and normative or non-normative behaviour through anger. We found a non-predicted effect, though, in that humiliation was indirectly related to non-normative approach through self-focused emotions. Therefore, some participants who felt humiliated accompanied by the self-focused emotions had a stronger tendency to approach the humiliator outgroup with behaviour that violates social norms or even break the law (i.e., non-normative approach). Secondly, our results showed that the indirect relationship between humiliation, dehumanisation and social exclusion was not influenced by disgust as hypothesised. Again, it was the self-focused emotions that regulated this relationship. To put it differently, our findings indicated that some of our participants who felt humiliated, ashamed and embarrassed had a stronger tendency to dehumanise the humiliator outgroup and intended to end the relationship by socially excluding them. We speculate that the regulatory role that the self-focused emotions played between humiliation and all the measured behavioural intentions (except for normative approach) suggest that

feelings of shame and embarrassment are not exclusively linked to avoidance, as suggested by previous research (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2008), but that other factors might influence the relationship between emotions and the behaviours that people opt for. As we only measured the emotions and the behavioural intentions in Study 6, we can only assume that other factors such as appraisals, social norms and the context also influenced the behavioural intentions deemed appropriate by our female participants in the context of gender-based violence.

The findings of our six studies make several contributions to existing research. Firstly, our findings contribute to the research on vicarious emotions. Our results support the assumption that shared social identity is necessary for a person to experience an emotion vicariously, as suggested by Lickel et al. (2005). As mentioned elsewhere, research on vicarious emotions has mainly focused on the emotions of empathy and sympathy (Miller et al., 1996), guilt (Lickel et al., 2005), shame (Welten et al., 2012) and anger (Yzerbyt et al., 2003), but not on vicarious humiliation (with the exception of Veldhuis et al., 2014). The present research, therefore, contributes to the scarce literature on vicarious humiliation and showed, in line with the research by Veldhuis et al. (2014), that feeling humiliated on behalf of an ingroup member (i.e., vicarious humiliation) is indeed possible. However, our findings make several additions to the findings of Veldhuis et al. (2014) as our research showed that being humiliated on behalf of a humiliated ingroup member is a phenomenon that is actually *commonly* experienced by people (Study 1), and thereby, confirming that vicarious humiliation is important to be studied.

Secondly, our research contributes to the conceptualisation of humiliation by showing that people define humiliation as both an *event* and as a *feeling* (Study 1), and thus showing that humiliation should also be studied in terms of its causes and not only in terms of its emotional implications, as most studies on humiliation have done thus far (Elshout et al.,

2017; Farmer & McGuffin, 2003; Fernández et al., 2015, 2018; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Klein, 1991; Mann et al., 2017; McCarley, 2009; Negrao et al., 2005; Silver et al., 1986; Thomaes et al., 2011; Torres & Bergner, 2012). More specifically, the present research provides novel insights into the research on humiliation as an *event* as we studied the situational determinants that characterise humiliating events. For instance, our results imply that both personally or vicariously humiliating events are not only characterised by social exclusion, as shown in the studies of Veldhuis et al., (2014), but that they are also characterised by a range of situational determinants as proposed by Klein, 1991 (i.e., being attacked, being lowered in size, being socially excluded and/or being made or found deficient; Studies 1 to 6). Moreover, we showed that the importance of some situational determinants was invariant, and the importance of others was variant in personally and vicariously humiliating events (Study 1). For example, visual exposure, as well as being found or made deficient, are situational determinants that were deemed to be more important in personally humiliating events, while being reduced in size was seemingly considered to be more important in vicariously humiliating events. On the other hand, it seems that being ostracised, dehumanised, discriminated against, cheated on and/or betrayed by others (i.e., social exclusion) and being ridiculed, insulted, bullied, reprimanded, criticised and or assaulted (i.e., being attacked) played an equally important role as situational determinants in both personally and vicariously humiliating events. We would, however, argue that whether particular situational determinants are deemed to be more relevant in particular humiliating events, is less determined by the target of humiliation but rather by the dominating social discourses and related beliefs people share in certain social contexts. Future research should, therefore, clarify whether the importance of situational determinants depends on the target of the humiliating event (i.e., personal versus intergroup) or on the social context (e.g., social norms, public narratives).

A third contribution of the present research related to the experience of vicarious humiliation, and different to the studies by Veldhuis et al. (2014), is that we showed that it is not only a shared social identity but also the *significance* of the social identity (Study 2). Moreover, the positive relationship found between ingroup identification and humiliation contributes to the literature on the role of ingroup identification in the elicitation of negative group-based emotions. Research on group-based guilt found a negative relationship between ingroup identification and the elicitation of group-based guilt (Doosje et al., 2006; Maitner et al., 2006) and speculated that this negative relationship was as a result of identity management strategies (Doosje et al., 1998). Yet different to guilt, humiliated people externally blame the event which, we speculate, might render identity management strategies unnecessary when people do not feel that they have done anything to cause this negative feeling.

Fourthly, findings of the present studies (Study 1 and Studies 3 to 6) also contribute to the research on humiliation as blended emotion and confirm that humiliation is indeed experienced as a blended emotion as suggested by Jonas et al. (2014) and Negrao et al. (2005). Different to the findings of Veldhuis et al. (2014), where it was found that humiliation blended with anger and powerlessness, humiliation in our studies not only blended with the self-focused emotions of shame, embarrassment and guilt but also with the other-focused emotions of anger, disgust and contempt (Studies 3 to 6). The findings related to the other-focused emotions is a pioneering contribution to the understanding of humiliation as previous research mainly studied humiliation associated with shame (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Klein, 1991), embarrassment (Elison & Harter, 2007), guilt (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999) and anger (Elison & Harter, 2007; Veldhuis et al., 2014), but less with contempt and disgust.

Fifthly, our results contribute to the knowledge on *appraisals* of humiliation as we showed that the various emotional blends are elicited not *directly* as a result of the humiliating events, but rather *indirectly* through how these events are *appraised* - from being perceived as uncontrollable, on the one hand (i.e., powerlessness) to being perceived as unjust (i.e., injustice), on the other. As proposed by the appraisal theories of emotions (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), the very same event can be differently evaluated by people and therefore, leading to different emotional patterns. Our results contribute to the understanding of *why* people would appraise the same humiliating event differently as we showed that, in line with the intergroup emotion theory (Smith et al., 2007), these different appraisal patterns are due to *identity processes*. More specifically, our results showed that humiliating events where a person is personally humiliated are likely to be appraised in terms of its relevance to the *personal self*, whereas a humiliating event targeting an ingroup member (i.e., vicariously humiliating event) are likely to be appraised in terms of its relevance to the *social self* (Studies 4 and 5). Linked to the contributions made to the knowledge on the appraisals of humiliation, is that we found that it is not always the case that people externally blame an event when they *feel* humiliated (Fernández et al., 2015; Klein, 1991), but that they might also perceive certain humiliating events as deserved and consequently blame themselves, especially when they are personally humiliated.

Lastly, a contribution made by the present research relates to the behavioural intentions of vicarious humiliation. Different from previous studies on vicarious humiliation (Veldhuis et al., 2014), our results showed that people who were vicariously humiliated intended to respond with contradicting behaviours. For instance, our participants intended to avoid, and they intended to approach the humiliator(s). This result replicated previous findings on interpersonal humiliation where humiliation has been associated with both

avoidance and approach (Fernández et al., 2015). However, different from previous research on humiliation, our results found that participants who were vicariously humiliated also intended to socially exclude the humiliator outgroup through dehumanising them. This is an important result as it offers an empirical explanation to the proposed *cycle of humiliation* (Lindner, 2002), in that humiliated individuals might humiliate others in return by dehumanising and socially excluding them. We furthermore contributed to the knowledge on behavioural intentions of vicarious humiliation by showing that it is the emotions that accompany humiliation (i.e., emotional blends) that regulate the relationship between feeling humiliated on behalf of an ingroup member and having intentions to avoid, or to approach, and/or to socially exclude the humiliator(s). Showing that the humiliation of one ingroup member can elicit humiliation in other ingroup members (especially the high identifiers) and that consequently, vicarious humiliation can result in tendencies to avoid, to approach non-normatively, to dehumanise and to socially exclude, are important for understanding why humiliation does not always lead to intergroup conflicts. This is because these behavioural intentions found to be associated with vicarious humiliation have the potential to both repair and harm intergroup relations and therefore, facilitate both the restoration of intergroup harmony and the onset of intergroup conflicts.

Our research has also various implications for our current understanding of (vicarious) humiliation and future research. One implication of the present research is that although previous literature on humiliation has suggested that humiliation is part of our daily lives (Elison & Harter, 2007), our results indicated that humiliation might actually be *more* part of our daily lives than we would wish for. It seems that we are constantly exposed to the humiliation of others through reading or watching the news, through reading posts on social media or through watching reality shows where the "contestants" in these shows are regularly humiliated by being criticised and/or by being made deficient. A humiliator might not be

aware that when she or he demeans somebody in front of others, that she or he is actually vicariously humiliating every person that identifies with the humiliated person, and as our results indicated, vicariously humiliated people tend to respond in ways that might have damaging consequences for the social relations. In line with this, the manipulation of the degree of humiliation in our participants through the use of social media posts in Studies 2 to 6 (i.e., Facebook) showed that people do not only need to *witness* and be present at the humiliating event, as was shown in the studies by Veldhuis et al. (2014) but that *reading* about it on a social media platform is sufficient to elicit feelings of humiliation on behalf of others. These findings imply that the psychological distance to humiliation (i.e., reading about it) does not lessen the experience of humiliation.

Further, our results that participants conceptualised humiliation mostly in terms of its causes as compared to its emotional implications, and that when humiliation was conceptualised as a feeling it was defined as a blended emotion (e.g., as a feeling of embarrassment or shame), raises the fundamental question whether humiliation is an emotion or an event that elicits other emotional blends? For instance, Negrao et al. (2005) argued that humiliation is, in fact, a 'hybrid emotion' that consists of a mixture of self-focused (e.g., shame) and other-focused emotions (e.g., anger) (see also Coleman et al., 2007), which actually suggests the latter. However, future research is necessary to provide appropriate answers to this question.

Another implication of our research is that the interplay between emotions and behavioural intentions is not as straightforward as assumed. For instance, in Study 6 (females as target group), the self-focused emotions of shame and embarrassment were not only positively related to avoidance but also to non-normative approach, dehumanisation and social exclusion. As we assume different emotions are elicited because they share the same appraisals, our results suggest that the same emotions elicit different behavioural intentions.

The question is what determines whether humiliation accompanied by, for instance, self-focused emotions results in avoidance, normative or non-normative approach or social exclusion? We would argue that social group and social context-specific factors play a role. For instance, the perceived ingroup efficacy and/or the status relationship between the humiliated ingroup and the humiliator outgroup might influence that the same emotional blends result in different behavioural intentions. For instance, Tausch et al. (2011) suggest that groups with a perceived low group efficacy are more likely to respond with aggression as they have nothing to lose. If this is the case, then our female participants in Study 6 might have perceived themselves as having less efficacy in relation to the humiliator outgroup of males, and therefore, responded with non-normative approach (despite their feelings of shame and embarrassment). It might, however, also be the case that our female participants felt actually ashamed by the gender-based violence as depicted in the Facebook story, which elicited the feeling of humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions. Future research should, therefore, not only identify and control for contextual factors when studying the interplay between emotions and behavioural intentions in response to vicarious humiliation, but also the possibility of dual emotional processes.

Finally, an implication worth mentioning relates to our findings of the role of the audience in personally and vicariously humiliating events. More specifically, our findings suggest that studying the role of the audience in vicarious humiliation requires that both the differences between and the similarities of the audience and the vicariously humiliated person are theoretically clarified. For instance, it might be that when the audience is defined as belonging to the group of the humiliator(s) (i.e., outgroup), and not as belonging to the group of the humiliated person (i.e., ingroup), visual exposure will indeed aggravate the feeling of humiliation, as was suggested by the present research. Future research should therefore be precise in defining the audience when studying vicarious humiliation.

Related to this is the methodological implication of using a social media context (e.g., Facebook posts) when studying the effect of an audience. More specifically, we need to ask the question of whether this research context is actually appropriate when studying audience effects? As mentioned before, information posted on social media is seemingly by default public, thereby, making the manipulation of 'an absent' audience less likely. However, the social media context might raise a different question about the role of the audience as aggravating factor of humiliation, namely, when the personally or vicariously humiliated person does not have any control about the scope of the audience (because others can share or re-tweet a post) or does not even know who the audience is. Thus, one could argue that a limitation of the present research was to use Facebook posts in most of our experimental studies as a means of manipulating the presence of an audience as part of the humiliating events.

Apart from this limitation, the present studies have several other limitations that we will outline in the following and that need to be overcome in future research. Firstly, although we used content analysis in Study 1, we did not make use of independent raters to code the qualitative data due to a lack of resources available. Therefore, we were not able to estimate the inter-reliability, which would have increased the trustworthiness of our results. Secondly, there were important variables that were not measured in our studies. For example, in Study 1, we did not assess the participants' feelings after they were required to describe a vicariously humiliating event, and in Study 6, we did not measure the participants' appraisals of the vicariously humiliating event, which, therefore, limited our understanding of why all measured emotions were equally felt. Moreover, we did not control for participants' moods and feelings prior to the manipulations, which can be assumed to influence the appraisal processes (Siemer, 2001). Lastly, we did not control for participants' susceptibility to feelings of humiliation, which might be influenced by a person's self-esteem (McCarley, 2009). A

third limitation refers to the manipulation checks in Studies 3 to 5, where we were unable to find a significant difference between the personal and vicarious humiliation conditions on the vicarious (Studies 3 and 5) and on the personal humiliation manipulation check measures (Studies 4 and 5). Although we used different methods to manipulate personal and vicarious humiliation (i.e., personal-recall approach in Study 3; scenario-based approach in Studies 4 and 5), the results of the manipulation checks implied that participants in the personal humiliation conditions (Studies 3 and 5) were less able to differentiate between a personally and vicariously humiliating event, while participants in the vicariously humiliating conditions felt equally personally humiliated compared to the participants in the personally humiliating conditions (Studies 4 and 5). Future research should test for the success of the manipulation between personal and vicarious humiliation by making use of manipulation check items that enable participants to clearly distinguish between being *personally* targeted and being *witness* to someone else's humiliation.

A fourth limitation of the present research is that we applied a *measurement of mediation design* (Pirlott & McKinnon, 2016) in Studies 2 to 5, which does not account for the causal chain between the humiliating event, the appraisals of humiliation, the feeling of humiliation and the emotional blends (as we did not experimentally manipulate the appraisals of humiliation). To overcome this limitation, future research should therefore opt for a *manipulation of mediation design* (Pirlott & McKinnon, 2016). In line with this, the fifth limitation of our research is that we were unable to successfully manipulate the emotional blends of humiliation (i.e., anger and disgust; Study 6) and therefore, we were unable to test the assumed causal relationships between emotions and behavioural intentions. Future research should address this limitation by adopting a methodological approach where for instance, the situational determinants of anger (i.e., violation of autonomy) and disgust (i.e., violation of human dignity) are stressed in the manipulation or where bogus feedback about

participants' physiological parameters (e.g., anger as increased adrenaline and cortisone) or facial expressions (e.g., disgust) are provided.

Another limitation is that we used self-reported behavioural intentions that are of course only an approximation of participants' true intentions and consequent behaviour. A limitation also worth mentioning refers to the use of only one intergroup context in Study 6, which left us unable to establish whether our results are variant or invariant across different contexts. Future research should, therefore, use more than one intergroup context when addressing the relationships between vicarious humiliation and behavioural intentions so that group differences can be identified. The last limitation of our research is that we used convenience sampling in all our studies. Although the use of Unisa students accelerated us in reaching our sample sizes in a limited time frame, the disadvantages of this sample and the sampling method are that using only one group of people might lead to its over-representation and it does not allow us to generalise our findings beyond our samples used in the studies (i.e., no external validity).

Irrespective of the outlined limitations, the present research contributes to the understanding of the psychological processes of humiliation and its role in intergroup relations. Although, of course, numerous factors would contribute to the onset of intergroup conflicts, negative group-based emotions are certainly key role-players (Tausch et al., 2011). Results of the present research support the assumption that humiliation is indeed related to emotional blends and behavioural consequences that can be damaging to intergroup relations. Furthermore, our research implies that one does not even need to be present at the humiliating event to feel humiliated and to respond in a harmful manner – a shared social identity, which is meaningful to one's self-concept, is sufficient in setting the implications of humiliation in motion.

In recent years social media platforms have become increasingly popular and, therefore, we are more often than ever before part of or exposed to "unfiltered" opinions and information that do not comply with the professional code of, for instance, journalists as they devalue, belittle and insult similar others, different others and ourselves. It is, therefore, important that active participants of these platforms understand that when they devalue a person in their Facebook posts or Twitter tweets, they are potentially eliciting negative emotions in their followers who might respond in a manner that will turn a platform that intends to connect people into a battlefield. However, vicarious humiliation seems not only to be an increasing problem in the digital but also in the analogue world. More specifically, it seems that "identity politics" are actually superseded by the "politics of humiliation". For instance, the humiliating remarks about others regularly posted on social media (e.g., Twitter) by the current president of the United States (Shear et al., 2019) do not only antagonise the social cohesion in the United States but have the potential to polarise between different groups worldwide. As politics of humiliation undermine the right of every individual human to be recognised and respected, they do not only challenge universal accomplishments but require a unified effort to ensure the dignity of every human being.

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ANNEXURE

Annexure 1

Instructions and different Facebook posts presented to participants in Study 2

For the participants who selected South African nationality, the instruction and Facebook post (see Figure 1) were as follows: “In the following we want you to read an interaction between a South African and people from other countries who belong to the Facebook group "Economic Future of Africa". The **South African** posted a post commenting on the possible downgrading of South Africa to Junk Status; which triggered comments particularly from non-South Africans”.



Figure 1. Facebook post used as ingroup identification manipulation with a South African as humiliated ingroup member.

For our female participants who selected gender, the instruction and Facebook post (see Figure 2) were as follows: “In the following we want you to read an interaction between a woman and other people, especially men, who belong to the Facebook group "Gender-based violence". The **woman** posted a post commenting on possible strategies to stop gender-based violence; which triggered comments particularly from men”.



Figure 2. Facebook post used as ingroup identification manipulation with a female as humiliated ingroup member.

For the male participants who selected gender, the instruction and Facebook post (see Figure 3) were as follows: “In the following we want you to read an interaction between a man and other people, especially women, who belong to the Facebook group "Gender-based violence". The **man** posted a post commenting on possible strategies to stop gender-based violence; which triggered comments particularly from women”.



Figure 3. Facebook post used as ingroup identification manipulation with a male as humiliated ingroup member.

For participants who selected Unisa students, the instruction and Facebook post (see Figure 4) were as follows: “In the following we want you to read an interaction between a Unisa student and students from other universities, who belong to the Facebook group "Improving study conditions for students". The **Unisa student** posted a post commenting on possible ideas to improve the study conditions of students; which triggered comments particularly from students from other universities”.



Figure 4. Facebook post used as ingroup identification manipulation with a Unisa student as humiliated ingroup member.

For participants who selected neighbourhood, the instruction and Facebook post (see Figure 5) were as follows: “In the following we want you to read an interaction between a resident from your neighbourhood and residents from other neighbourhoods, who belong to the Facebook group "Safer Neighbourhoods". The **resident from your neighbourhood** posted a post commenting on possible ideas to improve the safety in neighbourhoods; which triggered **comments from residents from other neighbourhoods**”.

Figure 5. Facebook post used as ingroup identification manipulation with a resident from the participant’s neighbourhood as humiliated ingroup member.

For participants who selected taxpayers, the instruction and Facebook post (see Figure 6) were as follows: “In the following we want you to read an interaction between a taxpayer and non-taxpayers, who belong to the Facebook group "Taxes in South Africa". The **tax payer** posted post commenting on possible ideas to improve the transparency in the tax office; which triggered **comments from non-taxpayers**”.

Figure 6. Facebook post used as ingroup identification manipulation with a taxpayer as humiliated ingroup member.