

**A STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR
INTRAGOVERNMENTAL COLLABORATIONS**

By

LEBOGANG MPHAHLELE-NTSASA

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Supervisor: Prof Mari Jansen van Rensburg

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DECLARATION

I declare that “A Strategic Management Framework for Intragovernmental Collaborations” is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

I further declare that I submitted the thesis to originality checking software and that it falls within the accepted requirements for originality.

I further declare that I have not previously submitted this work, or part of it, for examination at Unisa for another qualification or at any other higher education institution.



Ms Lebogang Legobole Mphahlele-Ntsasa

Date: 25 May 2021

Student number: 79220916

DEDICATION

To my 96-year-old grandmother, Moepeng 'MoNchabi' Nthathe (née Motsepe), who taught me how to read and write at the age of four.

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ABSTRACT

Management tools and solutions are largely conceptualised through well-defined and well-understood problems. However, management often encounter problems that are neither well defined nor straightforward. These problems are labelled wicked problems and require a different management approach to solve. Many of these wicked problems fall within the public service delivery sector, of which the criminal justice system is part. The current study argues that crime in South Africa is a wicked problem because it portrays characteristics such as persistence and pervasiveness and does not have obvious causal relationships. Despite collaboration across several organisations and substantial resource investment, crime remains 'untamed' in South Africa.

This study responded to calls in the literature for further research into collaborations that are mandated and directed. Given that wicked problems are unique and require unique solutions, this research proposed a framework that applies to South Africa and its historical context and is applicable in the governance context under which crime is addressed. This presented a compelling reason to undertake the current research and use the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster as a case to study intragovernmental collaboration.

The objective of the research is threefold: first, to gain an in-depth explanation of intragovernmental collaboration within the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster from people who take part in the collaboration; second, to identify the dimensions of the collaboration and the interrelationships between them; and third, to develop a strategic framework for intragovernmental collaborations.

Interactive Qualitative Analysis was used as a research method with ten Senior Managers participating in a focus group and semi-structured interviews and five Top Managers participating in semi-structured interviews. In-depth descriptions of the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security collaboration were captured through Interactive Qualitative Analysis in line with the qualitative research approach and eight key dimensions of the collaboration were identified.

The research proposed a Strategic Framework for Intragovernmental Collaboration that takes into account the findings of the research and a literature-based conceptual framework underpinned by the Resource Dependency Theory, the Resource-Based View and the Complexity Theory.

Findings from the study demonstrate that eight dimensions are key in the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security collaboration, and these dimensions are ranked in order of importance. The presented framework also highlights several differences from reported studies in this field. The contribution of this study not only extends the literature on intragovernmental collaborations but also sets clear guidelines for managers and policy makers to establish and direct intragovernmental collaborations. The chosen methodology and insider access to senior management ultimately produced rich descriptions not previously available.

Two key recommendations are identified for the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster. Firstly, addressing the wicked problem of crime requires active participation of stakeholders beyond the Cluster and secondly, it must include active citizenship that is instrumental in contributing knowledge and learning as part of a feedback loop into the criminal justice system. Within the Justice, Crime

Prevention and Security Cluster, the study identified three drivers of the collaboration that need to be addressed to enable the Cluster to work towards a goal consensus of addressing crime. These are leadership, culture and governance arrangements. Models of leadership and governance are included to guide the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster in this regard.

Keywords: interorganisational collaboration, interorganizational collaboration, intragovernmental collaboration, interorganisational networks, interorganizational networks, Interactive Qualitative Analysis, IQA, collaborative governance, wicked problem, criminal justice system, Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster, JCPS Cluster

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

APP	Annual Performance Plan
ART	Affinity Relationship Table
BAC	Business Against Crime
CAS	Case Administration System (for the SAPS)
CSIR	Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research
CSVR	Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
DCS	Department of Correctional Services
DG	Director-General
DGG	Deputy-Director General
DOD	Department of Defence
DOJCD	Department of Justice and Constitutional Development
DPCI	Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations (Hawks)
ECMS	Electronic Case Management System (for the NPA)
GST	General Systems Theory
ICMS	Integrated Case Management System (for the DOJCD)
IQA	Interactive Qualitative Analysis
IRD	Interrelationship diagram
JCPS	Justice, Crime Prevention and Security
MinMEC	Minister-MEC (forum)
MTSF	Medium Term Strategic Framework
NATJOINTS	National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure
NDPP	National Director of Public Prosecutions
NPA	National Prosecuting Authority
RBV	Resource-Based View
RDT	Resource Dependency Theory

SAPS	South African Police Service
SID	Systems Influence Diagram
TCE	Transaction Cost Economics

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Chief Director: A Senior Management rank that is higher than a Director.

Collaboration: Two or more independent organisations sharing their resources (knowledge, people, finances) towards identifying and achieving a substantial common goal. Refer to Section 3.5.

Conceptual framework: A depiction or structure that a researcher compiles using literature to explain a phenomenon.

Department: Administrative components that constitute the government in South Africa. Examples are the Department of Health, the Department of Education and the South African Police Service. Within this document, the word “Department” refers specifically to the national government department unless otherwise specified.

Director: The first-level senior Management rank in the South African public service responsible for implementation of government programmes.

Director-General: An administrative head of a governmental department and highest-ranking civil servant. (A Director-General reports to a Minister).

Framework: A depiction or representation of ideas that explain a phenomenon.

Intragovernmental collaboration: Collaboration undertaken within national government departments and entities associated with national departments. Refer to Section 3.5.

Minister: A member of the Executive (one of the three arms of state) who serves as a Member of Parliament. Ministers are elected by the State President and are usually members of the ruling party.

Strategic management: A discipline within organisations that includes analysing the environment, identifying priorities, planning, monitoring and reporting.

Senior Managers: Directors (Level 13) and Chief Directors (Level 14) or the equivalent in public service in South Africa. These managers are responsible for the implementation of government programmes.

Top Managers: Deputy Directors-General (Level 15) and Directors-General (Level 16) or the equivalent within the public service. These managers provide strategic direction and assume accountability for government programmes.

CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Management tools and solutions are largely conceptualised through well-defined and well-understood problems. However, management often encounters problems that are neither well defined nor straightforward to solve. These are labelled wicked problems and require a different management approach (Beinecke, 2009; McMillan and Overall, 2016; Van Bueren *et al.*, 2003). Many of these wicked problems fall within the public service delivery sector, of which the criminal justice system is a part.

The New Public Management approach that was adopted by governments in the 1980s enforced strategic management and other administrative approaches to improve the effectiveness of government (Hood and Dixon, 2013).

Within South Africa, regulations of the Public Finance Management Act (South Africa, 1999), include clauses on strategic management. Furthermore, in 2010, an outcomes approach was introduced through the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) for interdepartmental coordination of programmes and government-wide outcomes (South Africa, 2010). In total, 12 government outcomes were identified, and the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster was tasked with achievement of Outcome 3: All People in South Africa Are and Feel Safe. The focus of this research study is on the JCPS Cluster's coordination and implementation of Outcome 3 and its approach in addressing crime.

Despite clear policy guidelines and the allocation of resources, the effectiveness of this outcome's approach within the JCPS Cluster is in question. For example, the murder rate has been increasing annually for more than seven years and was reported by the South African Police Service (SAPS) in 2019 to be 36.4 people per 100 000, which is more than six times the rate recorded in the USA (Vecchiatto and Cohen, 2019). Other serious crimes such as gender-based violence, housebreaking, hijacking and business crimes also showed an increase in the 2019 annual crime statistics (Vecchiatto and Cohen, 2019). This is despite an annual expenditure of over R73 billion by the SAPS and a further R14 billion by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJCD) (South Africa, 2018a) to reduce crime levels. On a separate but related matter, the SAPS led an intradepartmental implementation of an integrated IT system, which after 10 years and an investment of R7 billion resulted in little progress against agreed milestones (Mawson, 2015). Intragovernmental issues were identified as some of the key reasons for the lack of progress in the early days of the programme (Mawson, 2015).

The current study argues that crime in South Africa is a wicked problem because it portrays characteristics such as persistence and pervasiveness and does not have obvious causal relationships (Van Bueren *et al.*, 2003; Head, 2019). An alternative approach with appropriate collaborative effort is, therefore, needed at both the planning and the implementation phases of key strategies and programmes in order to achieve objectives.

Crime cuts across a number of organisations and requires collaboration at all levels. For example, at a strategic level, planning regarding resource allocation to

courts, police stations and correctional centres in addition to the human resources thereof is critical. These organisations are led by different Members of Cabinet and require effective interorganisational partnerships.

Interorganisational networks are not only difficult to implement but are also time consuming and require combined human and other resources (Ansell and Gash, 2008). A large number of factors such as leadership and trust affect the functionality and outcomes of these collaborative efforts, and some of these factors could be more significant than others (Kozuch and Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek, 2016). The aim of this research was to uncover the key dimensions of collaboration through the experiences of managers who are participating in intragovernmental collaborations within the JCPS Cluster. This effort produced a framework of intragovernmental collaboration that considers theories of interorganisational networks and complexity.

Interorganisational networks exhibit a wide variety of forms and levels of complexities, some of which are mandated by a sponsor or public policy and some of which are formed by voluntary participants. Of particular interest to the current study are the mandated networks that are compiled through legislation or by a public authority. These efforts of partnership formation, although challenging, are often unavoidable (Keast and Mandell, 2012). The current study responded to a call by scholars to make contributions towards a better understanding of context-specific networks (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011; Putansu, 2015; Gil-Garcia, Guler, Pardo and Burke, 2019; Gazley and Guo, 2020) and public sector networks that are both mandated and directed (McNamara, 2012; O'Leary and Vij, 2012).

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The problem investigated by this study is the ineffective intragovernmental collaborations that address wicked problems. Following an extensive literature review, the researcher was unable to find a comprehensive framework that is relevant to the South African crime situation and that guides parties in intragovernmental collaborations to address wicked problems within the context of a developing country.

Generally, governments tend to be structured for coordination rather than collaboration. In this regard, problems that require government departments to work together in a much tighter formation tend to falter. For example, the JCPS Cluster has been relatively successful in coordination projects such the implementation of the Child Justice Act, the hosting of the FIFA World Cup and many others. However, for implementations such as the Integrated Criminal Justice System (systems, processes and ICT implementation for the end-to-end criminal justice system), these have been a major challenge. These become even more difficult where the problems being addressed are wicked and require more intensive collaborative efforts.

This thesis acknowledges the widely accepted challenge of inconsistent use of constructs and definitions within interorganisational networks (Provan, Fish and Sydow, 2007; McNamara, 2016; Castañer and Oliveira, 2020; Stout and Keast, 2021). It is not the objective of the current research to make a contribution

regarding this matter; however, definitions adopted for the research are discussed under Section 3.5.

1.3 RESEARCH PURPOSE

The purpose of this research is threefold:

1. To uncover the key dimensions affecting efforts in addressing crime as a wicked problem through the experiences of managers involved in intragovernmental collaborations at a strategic level
2. To develop a better understanding of how dimensions linked to intragovernmental collaborations interrelate
3. To produce a framework that will guide intragovernmental collaborations in addressing crime

Senior Managers (responsible for implementing government programmes in South Africa) and Top Managers (responsible for strategic direction and government programmes) were identified as key participants due to their influence on the outcome of the JCPS Cluster collaboration. The framework created in the current research will assist both sets of managers in addressing the shortcomings identified in this study and in implementing an improved framework for the JCPS Cluster.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following are the research questions for the study.

Key question:

How can intragovernmental collaborations at a strategic level be improved to help address crime as a wicked problem?

Sub-questions:

1. Which dimensions do managers identify as important in intragovernmental collaborations for addressing crime?
2. What are the interrelationships between the dimensions identified under (1)?
3. How can identified dimensions and interrelationships be used to produce an intragovernmental framework that will help address wicked problems?

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

This research contributes knowledge through a deeper understanding of interorganisational networks in general and of mandated and directed collaborations in particular. Furthermore, a key contribution to the field is expected to be made in the intragovernmental collaborations that are called upon to address wicked societal problems.

A framework for intragovernmental collaborations requires an understanding of the dimensions affecting collaborations and the interrelationships between these

dimensions. To date, this has not been established for collaborations that are mandated and directed.

The JCPS Cluster is an ideal case due to the following:

- The collaboration focuses on crime, which is understood to be a particularly difficult and pervasive social and complex problem that is experienced in South Africa and many parts of the world.
- The case is based in South Africa, a developing country with limited resources but with a functioning infrastructure. In addition, as a multilingual and multicultural country, South Africa presents an opportunity to contribute an even broader view.
- The JCPS Cluster is a mandated and directed collaboration and falls within areas of scholarly development.
- The Cluster has been in place for over two decades and, therefore, represents an ideal opportunity to gather experiences and insights.

This research was undertaken in a developing country within a well-established intragovernmental network and addressed a key societal problem. It thus presents an ideal case for the development of theory.

1.6 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY

In line with the research objective of an in-depth understanding of the JCPS Cluster, a constructivist paradigm was adopted. This paradigm recognises an ontological stance of multiple realities presented by people who experience a

phenomenon (Bogna, Raineri & Dell, 2020). Because of its exploratory nature, qualitative research was deemed the most appropriate.

From the epistemological point of view, knowledge and a deeper understanding was created through the descriptions from managers who participate in the JCPS collaboration.

The constructivist approach appreciates the close connection between a researcher and the research being undertaken. This means that researchers' values and the lens from which they view the world (axiology) need to be understood and acknowledged. For most of the current research, the researcher was a practitioner and participated in the JCPS Cluster. It is this participation that inspired the research study.

1.7 RESEARCH OVERVIEW

Qualitative research methods focus on studying the complexity of phenomena in their natural environment (Leedy and Ormrod, 2013). The current research sought to uncover experiences and explanations through detailed narratives of both Senior Managers and Top Managers. The in-depth exploration of the phenomenon of intragovernmental collaboration experienced by these managers represented a constructivist approach.

Interactive Qualitative Analysis (IQA) was selected as a research method because it aligns with the constructivist philosophy of seeking multiple realities in understanding a problem. Interactive Qualitative Analysis involves working

interactively with participants in identifying key dimensions and how these dimensions interrelate. This is in line with the current research questions.

The research followed both an inductive and a deductive approach. The dimensions and interrelationships identified by the participants in the research followed an inductive approach. Using a deductive approach, the results from the research were compared with the conceptual framework identified in the literature in order to arrive at a framework for the JCPS Cluster.

Top Managers were identified as a constituency deemed to have power over the JCPS collaboration and Senior Managers were identified as a constituency that best lives the collaborative experience. Senior Managers participated in a focus group to identify affinities (precursors of dimensions of collaboration), and this list was used by both Senior Managers and Top Managers to identify interrelationships.

The dimensions and their interrelations identified through this research and in literature were used to construct the strategic management framework for the JCPS Cluster.

1.8 DELIMITATIONS

Intragovernmental collaborations refer to collaborations that take place within one sphere of government. The current research was undertaken for the JCPS Cluster, which is a collaboration consisting of National Departments and their related entities.

The current research was not undertaken in provincial or local governments and the findings can, therefore, not be extended to these spheres.

1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

Chapter 1 introduces to the research.

Chapter 2 forms part of the literature review and discusses theories that are relevant in explaining intragovernmental collaborations, namely the Resource Dependency Theory (RDT), Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Complexity Theory.

Chapter 3 explains key concepts of interorganisational networks. Explanations regarding types of partnerships and the relevance of different models of interorganisational collaboration in the current research are included. Models of interorganisational networks that have been identified by different scholars and the researcher's conceptual framework for intragovernmental collaborations are discussed.

Chapter 4 provides background on the South African criminal justice system using concepts that have been explained through literature. This includes explanations for crime as a wicked problem and the current structure and governance arrangements within the JCPS collaboration.

Chapter 5 provides a detailed discussion on IQA and how the process was undertaken in the current study.

Chapter 6 details the research results from Senior Managers and Top Managers.

Chapter 7 provides an interpretation of the research results.

Chapter 8 presents the conclusion and the contribution of the research. In addition, recommendations for further research are offered.

CHAPTER 2: THEORIES UNDERPINNING THE CURRENT RESEARCH

2.1 INTRODUCTION

There is a substantial body of knowledge on a broad scope of interorganisational networks and much of it focuses on dimensions of networks. It was deemed appropriate to approach the literature survey for this research through a theoretical lens and identify dimensions of intragovernmental collaborations that are anchored in theory. The objective of this chapter is to discuss the theories that underpinned the current research.

The three theories discussed in this chapter are the RDT, which explains the need of an organisation to rely on other organisations in order to reach some of its organisational goals; TCE, which explains cost considerations for interorganisational networks; and the Complexity Theory, which provides guidance in addressing wicked problems.

2.2 RESOURCE DEPENDENCY THEORY

An organisation, as defined by Selznick (1948), is the arrangement of people and other resources towards the achievement of an agreed purpose. This definition stays true for all organisations, be they business corporations, governments or political parties. Furthermore, there is recognition that organisations are economic

arrangements that allocate resources for efficiency and effectiveness in achieving goals (Selznick, 1948).

As organisations grow, institutionalisation occurs. Institutional Theory describes the process that an organisation undertakes as it grows. This includes the formation of structures, rules, norms, routines and processes through which organisations are created (Scott, 2005). Selznick (1996) describes this process as the emergence of a well-organised and stable social system and explains the need to maintain this social structure through formal institutional rules.

As organisations flourish, deviations from formal rules and procedures result in a parallel existence of unwritten rules that are exercised by and for a clique of members within the organisation (Selznick, 1948). This social structure consisting of individual human beings is unique in every organisation. Any attempt to disturb this informal social structure is met with resistance (Selznick, 1948). Equally, any threats or perceived threats levelled at the organisations are met with resistance from individuals within the organisation (Selznick, 1948).

In any type of interorganisational network, it is important to acknowledge that each participating entity consists of individuals and groups who are part of the formal and informal structures within their organisation and are, therefore, part of the dynamics that are associated with these organisations. An interorganisational network, although important, is thus overshadowed by the individual and the organisation from which he/she originates.

The RDT provides a basis for understanding interorganisational relations and collaborations in the broad sense. Organisations operate in an external

environment that is uncertain and unpredictable (Hillman, Withers & Collins, 2009). Resources that are needed by an organisation to achieve its goals are often sourced outside the confines of the organisation (Nienhüser, 2008; Tehseen and Sajilan, 2016). These resources could include people, raw material, technologies, goods and services.

In response to uncertainty, organisations form interorganisational relationships (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; Hillman *et al.*, 2009; Reddy and Park, 2019). A meta-analytical study by Drees and Heugens (2013) confirmed that the key factor in seeking interorganisational relationships is resource dependence (i.e. either seeking stability of resource availability or seeking access to scarce resources). For the current research, access to resources is one of the key drivers of intragovernmental collaborations within the criminal justice system. Several key concepts associated with the RDT are described below.

2.2.1 Social Exchange

Central to the RDT is the concept of exchange. Social Exchange is itself not a theory but a framework that supports other theories (Emerson, 1976; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). Within the current research, Social Exchange is, therefore, a framework that is linked to the RDT to explain concepts of exchange within the theory.

Although exchange takes place between individuals, groups and institutions, in the current research, discussions are limited to the interorganisational perspective. Existing definitions of 'an exchange' have been found to be inadequate in addressing a wide range of interorganisational relationships. For example, Cook's

(1977) definition is oversimplified because it refers to dyadic relationships and Levine and White's (1961) definition excludes mandated relationships. Mandated interorganisational relationships are not as widely studied as voluntary relationships due to the complications that are brought about by a mandate (Keast and Mandell, 2012); however, exchange as a concept includes mandated relationships.

2.2.2 Goal clarity

Every exchange relationship exists to meet an objective or is established with an objective in mind. Before arriving at this objective, the domain of each organisation should be well defined. The domain of an organisation is a statement of their objectives and the functions that they will undertake to attain those objectives (Levine and White, 1961). For an exchange to be negotiated, participants must arrive at a domain consensus (i.e. clarity regarding the goals and objectives of each organisation and how the collaboration will assist in achieving these goals). Domain consensus is a main prerequisite for exchange and may be subject to a lengthy negotiation (Levine and White, 1961; Biermann, 2017). It is argued that the domain consensus is itself an interorganisational exchange due to the intensity and often prolonged interactions required (Levine and White, 1961).

Levine and White (1961) further described an exchange in terms of four dimensions: (i) the parties to the exchange; (ii) the elements being exchanged; (iii) the agreement underlying the exchange, which can range from a legal agreement to an informal agreement; and (iv) the direction of the exchange (either unilateral, reciprocal or joint). This framework is useful in assisting parties to arrive

at a common understanding regarding the nature of the exchange relationship and can be used in facilitating deeper discussions within the interorganisational arrangement. In addition, this framework provides perspective for existing exchange arrangements.

Within the current research, the extent of the understanding of domains by the managers of the different entities within the JCPS Cluster and their understanding of the nature of the exchange is part of the investigation.

2.2.3 Power

The second concept associated with the RDT and Social Exchange is Power. Organisations that have resources that are regarded to be in short supply are deemed more powerful than those who do not (Drees and Heugens, 2013; Malatesta and Smith, 2014; McCarthy and Rhodes, 2018). Hence, gaining power over resources means that an organisation has more control over their objectives (Hillman *et al.*, 2009; Reddy and Park, 2019). It should, however, be borne in mind that organisations do not seek power for the sake of power but seek it to reduce the dependence and risks associated with the external environment.

At an individual level, power as a social relationship is characterised by one person having an influence over the aspirations of another (Emerson, 1962; McCarthy and Rhodes, 2018). Power is a relationship that is not characterised by elements such as a person's wealth or profession. For example, persons who have power over others may be overpowered themselves by different individuals in a different context. This introduces the concept of dependence. In other words, in a particular

context where X has power over Y, then Y is reliant on X to realise the objectives over which X has the power.

In an exchange, the relationship is said to be balanced if actors have equal power within the context and, therefore, equal levels of dependence. There is a tendency for actors to prefer exchange with equally powerful actors. Where power is balanced, both parties tend to have equal negotiating strength (Emerson, 1976). Where Player A has power over Player B, the more powerful Player A will continue to use the power to his/her advantage and accrue benefits (Mizruchi and Yoo, 2017). However, over time, the more powerful player develops dependence on the less powerful player and the relationship tends to balance the exchange ratio (R. M. Emerson, 1976).

Studies of power dependence have been primarily conceptualised within dyadic relationships (i.e. only two organisations are involved). However, resource dependence and power dependence can take place in arrangements of more than two parties; this is termed an exchange network. Studies such as those by Cook and Whitmeyer (1992) and Low and Li (2019) extended the RDT and power dependence to interorganisational exchange networks. By definition, an exchange network is three or more parties who provide opportunities for exchange between one or more parties within the group (Cook, 1977; Chang, 2018).

A key concept of power that emanates from the network environment is centrality. Centrality refers to a more powerful exchange position that one participant has compared with other participants within the network (Cook, 1977; Cook, Emerson and Gillmore, 1983; Baek and Bae, 2019). This elevated power position could be

due to the control of resources that the network requires or to decision-making privileges. Participants with positional power are expected to use this power to their advantage. For example, they can use their power to exclude other participants within the field from the network.

In addressing power deficiencies in general and centrality within an interorganisational network in particular, participants tend to adopt one or more of the mechanisms described by Emerson (1962) and Huo, Tiang, Tiang and Zhan (2019). The first involves withdrawal from the network by a dissatisfied participant. This approach depends on whether the environment has shifted sufficiently to render withdrawal a viable option (i.e. the participant is confident of survival outside the exchange relationship).

The second approach is an extension of the network. A level of dissatisfaction in one member of the network may lead this individual to consider a relationship with a different member, thereby extending the network. The third approach is status elevation, which occurs when one of the participants introduces new resources that are of value to the network. This brings about a shift in the power balance. Lastly, the mechanism of coalition formation involves two or more participants joining forces against the powerful participant of the network.

The above mechanisms are possibilities that are available for reformulation of a wide range of exchange relationships. However, in mandated exchange networks, withdrawal or extension may not be straightforward. Coalition formation and status elevations are more viable strategies to address power imbalance within such exchange relationships.

In addition to the influence of power, the sources of power have been studied. Within an interorganisational network environment, three sources of power have been identified, namely formal authority (widely accepted decision-making influence), control over critical resources, and discursive legitimacy (ability of an organisation to speak as an authority on an issue) (Hardy and Phillips, 1998; Rodriguez, Langley, Béland & Denis, 2007).

The main source of power within the criminal justice system and the South African public service in general, is political. Administrative departments such as the DOJCD, the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) and the SAPS are headed by Ministers who are members of the Cabinet and are appointed by the State President of the country. The National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) is appointed by the President even though his/her prosecutorial decisions are not directed by the Executive. The Head of the Judiciary (Chief Justice) and other Superior Court judges are appointed by the State President following recommendations of the Judicial Service Commission consisting of members of the Executive, the Judiciary and the Legislature.

Cabinet Ministers are the most powerful politically; however, the strength of their powers is not equal. The source of power for Ministers who are politicians lies in the strength of their constituencies or the complex social relationships within their political organisations. The agenda of the organisations within the criminal justice system is thus affected by the power play within the political environment.

The second source of power within the criminal justice system lies in the relative size and control of resources. Throughout the years, different organisations have

acquired control of resources and used this control as a tool for negotiation within the collaboration. For example, because of its large size, the SAPS tends to set the pace for modernisation and implementation of technological initiatives.

The Judiciary has a high discursive authority due to its status as an independent arm of state and its authority on the law of the country. Members of the Executive are subject to the authority of the Judiciary as are all other citizens of the country.

Although several scholars have made contributions regarding power in interorganisational networks, limited contributions have been made in relation to collaborations within the political-administrative landscape. For example, Moe (1991) offered a descriptive narrative of the landscape without offering any solutions; Keller (1984) proposed a solution to a political-administrative problem without a theoretical basis; and the focus of Benson's (1975) article on the political economy is far removed from the political-administrative interface discussed. Therefore, a generic framework of power is discussed.

A framework developed by Purdy (2012) offers a basis for assessing power within interorganisational networks and how power is used or abused within governance processes. This framework determines the effect of participants, processes and content on the three themes associated with power, namely official authority, resources and discursive legitimacy. This framework (shown in Table 2.1) assisted in unpacking power-related conversations with managers in the course of the current research.

Table 2.1 Framework for assessing power in collaborative processes

ARENAS OF POWER				
		Formal Authority	Resources	Discursive Legitimacy
PROCESS ELEMENTS	Participants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selection of participants • Limits placed on participants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of representatives • Expertise of representatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Status of representatives • Use of coalitions
	Process Design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ownership of the process • Interaction expectations for the process • Number, length and location of meetings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How the process is paid for 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Frequency of voice • Methods of voice • Communication about the process
	Content	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Setting the agenda • Outcomes and expectations for the process • Use of indirect authority such as legal rights 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distribution of information • Understanding and analysing the issues • Production of meeting records 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prioritisation of issues • Framing of issues to be addressed

Source: Purdy, 2012

2.2.4 Trust

The RDT stipulates that organisations undertake interorganisational relationships to address the uncertainty associated with availability of resources. To address this uncertainty, organisations identify parties that can help stabilise the supply of their resource needs (Williamson, 1981).

Exchange relationships have elements of risk and trust (Molm, Takahashi & Peterson, 2000; Latusek and Vlaar, 2018). On the one hand, there is a risk that the exchange relationship may not yield the expected results and on the other

hand, participants must trust the intentions of other parties to deliver according to promises.

Trust is a complex concept that has been defined by many scholars in different fields of study. Within the context of this research, the simplified definition of trust by Henderson and Smith-King (2015) as one party's expectation that another can be depended upon to carry out obligations, to behave in a predictable manner and to act fairly was adopted. This definition is in line with the widely accepted definition of interorganisational trust that is presented in the literature by authors such as Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone (1998), Gulati and Nickerson (2008), Klijn, Edelenbos and Steijn (2010) and Oomsels, Callens, Vanschoenwinkel and Bouckaert (2019).

Edelenbos and Klijn (2007) identified three characteristics of trust, namely vulnerability to opportunistic behaviour from others, risk due to unpredictable behaviour, and expectations that the motives of others are good. Oomsels and Bouckaert (2014) developed a framework on sources of interorganisational trust and distrust based on the three characteristics of trust identified by Edelenbos and Klijn (2007) (See Table 2.2). This framework measures the extent to which rules, roles, routines and relations assist or impede the building of trust.

Within the context of this research, this framework was used to determine the extent to which trust is a factor within the JCPS cluster under study and how managers deal with issues of trust. Of interest is the issue of trust within the JCPS Cluster as a public-sector mandated collaboration.

Table 2.2 Simplified framework for sources of interorganisational trust

	Rule	Role	Routine	Normative Framework	Calculus	Relations	Disposition
Perceived Trustworthiness	How do rules promote positive expectations?	How do roles promote positive expectations?	How do routines promote positive expectations?	How do normative frameworks promote positive expectations?	How does utility maximisation promote positive expectations?	How do relations promote positive expectations?	How do dispositions promote positive expectations?
Intended Suspension of Vulnerability	How do rules promote actors' willingness to be vulnerable?	How do roles promote actors' willingness to be vulnerable?	How do routines promote actors' willingness to be vulnerable?	How do normative frameworks promote actors' willingness to be vulnerable?	How do utility maximisation rules promote actors' willingness to be vulnerable?	How do relations promote actors' willingness to be vulnerable?	How do dispositions promote actors' willingness to be vulnerable?
Behavioural Trust	How do rules promote actors' risk-taking behaviour?	How do roles promote actors' risk-taking behaviour?	How do routines promote actors' risk-taking behaviour?	How do normative frameworks promote actors' risk-taking behaviour?	How does utility promote actors' risk-taking behaviour?	How do relations promote actors' risk-taking behaviour?	How do dispositions promote actors' risk-taking behaviour?

Source: Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014

2.3 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS

Transaction Cost Economics is concerned with economic decisions on sourcing goods and services outside the organisation (Williamson, 2008). A transaction takes place when goods or services are transferred through a separable interface or entity (e.g. from buyer to seller) (Williamson, 1981). Transaction Cost Economics is used as the basis of a wide range of interorganisational networks such as strategic alliances, consortiums and joint ventures (Dyer, 1997; Parkhe, 1993; Ring and Van De Ven, 1994; Roberts and Greenwood, 1997).

Transaction costs are the sum of the production costs and the governance costs (Williamson, 1981, 2005; De Waard, De Bock & Beeres, 2019). Transaction costs

are said to be economical if the sum of the production costs and the governance costs are less than the costs incurred by the organisation in producing the goods/services (Williamson, 1998). This theory finds resonance with the current research since the challenge of intragovernmental collaborations is not only a sociological problem of coordination but also an economic problem of efficiency. Intragovernmental collaborations, therefore, need to address coordination in delivering public services and ensure that the collaboration lowers the transaction costs in order to achieve efficiencies from working collaboratively.

A key application of TCE is the Resource-Based View (RBV) of a firm. This emphasises the thorough analysis of internal resources and capabilities of a firm (competitive advantage) before collaborating with others on the resources and capabilities that it does not possess. An organisation's resources are both tangible and intangible assets that are tied to the organisation on a short- to long-term basis (Wernerfelt, 1984, 2015; Klier, Schwens, Zapkau and Dikova, 2017).

Examples of resources are brand names, information, knowledge, technologies, skilled personnel, trade contacts, machinery, efficient procedures and capital, among others (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Alexy, West, Klapper & Reitzig, 2018). These assets can be broadly classified as physical capital, human capital and organisational capital resources (Barney, 1991). Physical capital assets include technology, access to raw material, and equipment. Human capital includes the expertise of employees, relationships, intelligence and insights. Organisational capital includes systems for planning and coordination, organisational structure and informal relationships within and outside the organisation.

The essence of the RBV is identifying and developing capabilities in resource types that other organisations are not able to replicate (Sullivan, Barnes & Matka, 2006; Barney and Mackey, 2016). A sustained competitive advantage of an organisation thus entails implementing a value-creating capability that other competing organisations are not simultaneously implementing and which is difficult for competitors to emulate (Mitra, O'Regan & Sarpong, 2018). In essence, the RBV emphasises the importance of the internal resources of an organisation.

Extension of the RBV led to two additional areas of emphasis: the relational view and the knowledge-based view of the organisation (Acedo, Barroso & Galan, 2006).

2.3.1 Relational view of a firm

The relational view of the firm identifies the ability to build interorganisational relationships as the source of a sustained competitive advantage for the organisation. In other words, organisations that initiate and successfully sustain strategic alliances are more successful than those that do not (Dyer and Singh, 1998).

In their seminal article on the relational view, Dyer and Singh (1998) identified four sources of sustained competitive advantage in building interorganisational relationships. These are (i) relation-specific assets such as specific and exclusive supplier relationships, colocation, and co-development of hi-tech software and other technologies; (ii) knowledge-sharing practices between participants, (iii) complementary capabilities; and (iv) effective governance arrangements.

Authors such as Arya and Lin (2007), Bryson, Ackermann and Eden (2007) and Hansen and Ferlie (2016) investigated and confirmed the applicability of the RBV of the firm to non-profit organisations. In their study, Arya and Lyn (2007) posit that such organisations compete against each other for the resources within their environment (funding, human resources, etc.) and at the same time, collaborate in meeting their common objectives, which are usually for the public good. For example, groups of non-profit organisations that protect the rights of children compete for resources while collaborating with others within their immediate environment. For the JCPS Cluster, collaborative advantage means winning the war against crime.

A comparison between the application of RBV by profit and not-for-profit organisations in Table 2.3 illustrates the close similarities between RBV in the two sectors.

Table 2.3 Resource-Based View for profit vs. not-for-profit organisations

Profit-making entities	Non-profit-making entities
Identify resources of the firm	Identify resources of the firm
Determine capabilities of the firm	Determine capabilities of the firm
Identify competitive advantage	Identify traits that lead to a collaborative advantage (Value-creation; addressing public good / addressing public problem)
Possible capabilities for use in interorganisational networks: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific assets (human resources, patents, distribution networks, etc.) • Relationship-building • Collaborative capability • Knowledge • Governance arrangements (to lower transaction costs) 	Possible capabilities for use in interorganisational networks: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific assets (human resources, distribution networks, etc.) • Relationship-building • Collaborative capability • Knowledge • Governance arrangements (Dyer and Singh, 1998)

Source: Author

2.3.2 Collaborative advantage

Collaborative advantage applies to the success that an interorganisational network achieves regarding the situation or problem that is being addressed (Huxham and Macdonald, 1992).

In order to sustain a collaborative advantage at an interorganisational level, organisations need to have collaborative capability. This is defined as the readiness of an organisation to participate in a successful interorganisational network (Huxham, 1993a). It is expected that a well-functioning organisation with an enabling culture should be able to begin to collaborate with others. Conversely, an organisation with low levels of maturity in terms of internal organisational

capabilities has a lower probability of successfully engaging in an interorganisational network.

Huxham (1993a) proposes six elements of collaborative capability: (i) extent of organisational independence; (ii) extent of the autonomy of individuals; (iii) cohesiveness in the structure of the organisation; (iv) level of maturity in organisation's strategic processes; (v) level of sophistication of the organisation's strategy statement; and (vi) degree to which collaboration remains a challenge.

This collaborative capability model is helpful in assessing the readiness of organisations to collaborate. However, where long-standing collaborations are not yielding expected results, this model can be useful in assessing the health of the collaboration. In the context of this research, collaborative capability can be used to uncover attitudes of managers towards the collaborative effort and the levels of maturity at which the collaboration is being approached by stakeholders.

2.3.3 Collaborative strategic management

The RBV provides a framework for firms to identify the capabilities and resource types that other organisations are not able to replicate (Klier *et al.*, 2017; Wernerfelt, 2015). This framework forms the basis of strategic management, which involves a conscious process that organisations undertake to identify their internal capabilities in order to sustain a competitive advantage in the market. As already discussed, for public services, the collaborative advantage involves the organisation of resources within a collaborative effort in order to address public problems (Huxham, 1993b). A collaborative strategy, therefore, is the joint formulation of the vision and the long-term goals for addressing a given social

problem, and this includes both organisational and joint courses of action for implementation (Clarke and Fuller, 2011).

A meta-strategy is defined by Huxham (1993b) as a high-level statement of the meta-mission and the meta-objectives of a collaborative effort. An improved formulation of a collaborative strategy by Clarke and Fuller (2011) includes a joint course of action and implementation. A collaborative strategy or meta-strategy should include an implementation plan.

Three factors need to be taken into consideration in the conceptualisation of a meta-strategy:

1. Level of interdependence

The level of interdependence or interconnectedness determines the level at which planning should be undertaken. A meta-strategy is recommended for organisations with high levels of interconnectedness since organisations with low levels of interconnectedness participate at a level of coordination or cooperation (Huxham and Macdonald, 1992).

2. Level of planning

For high levels of interdependence, the strategic plans of participating organisations should include strategic plans of the collaboration. Conversely, organisations with low levels of interconnectedness will maintain their independent strategic plans but put measures in place to perform the actions expected from their participation (McGuire, 2006).

3. Resource allocation

Joint resource allocation is important due to the level of interconnectedness of the organisations and the impact that they each have on the joint problem (McGuire, 2006). This resource allocation should take place at a strategic rather than an implementation or operational level. Synchronisation of strategic management processes becomes important to ensure proper alignment between the different organisations that are working within the interorganisational network.

Considering the level of interconnectedness of intragovernmental collaborations, a meta-strategy for such a collaborative effort should, therefore, consist of a meta-mission (joint mission statement), meta-goals, meta-objectives and joint action plans that include joint resource plans.

2.3.4 Governance

Governance costs comprise one of the two key drivers of transactional costs incurred by organisations in interorganisational relationships (Oliver E. Williamson, 2008). Therefore, lowering these costs can be a source of sustained interorganisational competitiveness if managed effectively (Dyer and Singh, 1998).

Dyer and Singh (1998) identified two broad classes of governance mechanisms: (i) third-party enforcement of agreements (e.g. legal contracts and statutory structures); and (ii) self-enforcing agreements. In practice, interorganisational networks may employ a number of governance mechanisms simultaneously in line with practical considerations (Dyer and Singh, 1998) and in some instances, employ informal governance structures developed over time as the level of trust increases.

The model by Provan and Kenis (2008) identified three methods of governance within networks: (i) the Self-Governed Network in which participating organisations jointly coordinate the activities without a hierarchy between them; (ii) the Lead Organisation Model in which one identified organisation governs the network; and (iii) the Network Administration Model in which a separate organisation is established to coordinate the activities of the network. Provan and Kenis (2008) propose that a decision on a governance structure should be based on four contingencies, namely level of trust, number of participants, degree of consensus on goals, and nature of the task. However, in line with TCE, the cost of the governance arrangement is significant and should be included. Table 2.4 illustrates the relative importance of these factors in each type of governance structure.

Table 2.4 Key predictors of effectiveness of forms of network governance

Forms of Governance	Trust	Number of Participants	Consensus on Goals	Competencies at the Network Level	Cost
Shared Governance	Widely distributed	Few	High	Low	Low
Lead Organisation	Narrowly distributed	Moderate	Moderately low	Moderate	Moderate
Network Administration Organization (NAO)	Moderately distributed	Moderate to many	Moderately high	High	High

Source: Adapted from Provan and Kenis (2008)

Although a number of network structures were found to be possible within mandated relationships, Alexander (1998) and McGuire (2006) found a lead organisation or a lead agency to be more common and appropriate. A possible concern with lead organisations, particularly in intragovernmental collaborations,

is that these organisations may be seen as being in a more powerful position than their peers (Huxham, 1993b).

In the public sector, managers within these interorganisational networks oversee relationships that cut across levels of government (Mandell, 1988; Koffijberg, De Bruijn and Priemus, 2012). Multiple governance structures are, therefore, expected to be identified for each collaborative effort in which the organisation is involved.

This research examined governance structures and the extent to which these structures assist or impede the JCPS collaboration. In addition, the research identified suitable governance arrangements for the JCPS Cluster where necessary.

2.3.5 Knowledge-Based View

Advocates of the Knowledge-Based View such as Grant (1996), Schütz, Kässer, Blome and Foerstl (2019) and Caputo, Garcia-Perez, Cillo and Giacosa (2019) assert that knowledge is the most important resource of an organisation if managed appropriately. More importantly, it is the combination of different areas of knowledge and the manner in which an organisation expands its knowledge that provides a sustained competitive advantage (Grant, 1996). Grant and Baden-Fuller (1995) present the following regarding knowledge:

- Knowledge is a key productive resource of an organisation and has the potential to make a significant contribution.
- Knowledge comprises information, skills, technology and expertise.

- Explicit knowledge can be verbalised and, therefore, communicated, whereas tacit knowledge stays within individuals and cannot be easily communicated.
- Both tacit and explicit knowledge are acquired by individuals; however, tacit knowledge is acquired and then stored by individuals.

Knowledge management involves the effective dissemination, receipt and integration of knowledge across organisations and participants (Weber and Khademian, 2008), which is required for the effective integration of different perspectives from different organisations.

It, therefore, follows that an effective interorganisational network needs effective management of knowledge. Within the context of the current research, knowledge management and its related practices among participating organisations were investigated. Knowledge management is reviewed in Chapter 3.

2.4 GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY AND COMPLEXITY

While the theories of organisations and interorganisational networks discussed in Chapter 2 provided a foundation to understand collaborations, the theoretical basis of wicked problems needs to be explored because of the context of the current research. The Complexity Theory and the GST was identified as appropriate for the research. This means that in addition to crime being addressed in an intragovernmental collaboration, it is important to recognise the pervasive and aggressive nature of crime as a wicked problem.

The criminal justice system in South Africa consists of several governmental departments and agencies that operate through different mandates, objectives and political leadership. These organisations form part of a criminal justice value chain from reporting of the crime to incarceration and are part of the larger socio-economic environment of the country. It is for this reason that systems and the Complexity Theory are deemed applicable in this context.

This chapter reviews the GST and the key principles that underpin the theory. This is followed by the application of this theory within the management field through the Complexity Theory and thereafter, by application of this theory as it related to the topic under study.

2.4.1 General Systems Theory

The GST was developed in the 1950s through the work of Von Bertalanffy (1954, 1972) with a background in biological sciences and Boulding (1956) with an economics background. The theory comfortably cuts across a wide range of fields (e.g. biological, mechanical and social).

A system, in its simplest definition, is a number of interdependent parts that function together as a unit and work towards a common goal (Von Bertalanffy, 1972; Caws, 2015; McMahon and Patton, 2018; Hofkirchner, 2019). The unit consists of inputs, a transformation process, outputs, feedback, and the environment (Von Bertalanffy, 1972). The key principles of the GST are as follows:

- **Interconnectedness and Holism:** Every system has at least two subsystems that are interconnected. The system cannot be simplified as a sum of the individual subsystems and should instead be analysed holistically.

- Hierarchy: Systems-thinking recognises a hierarchical relationship between itself and its subsystems. In addition, higher-order systems (suprasystem) exist of which the system is a component.
- Open/Closed Systems View: Open systems exchange information, energy or any other material within the environment in which they operate whereas closed systems do not. For example, a biological cell and a machine are classified as closed systems because they function without interaction with their environment. Conversely, social systems are classified as open because they interact with the environment. It is important to note that systems usually have varying degrees of openness and closeness (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972) rather than being strictly open or closed.
- System Boundaries: A boundary is used first, to establish a separation between a system and its environment, and second, to establish whether a system is closed or open. For example, a human cell is a closed system because of the microscopic environment under which the cell operates, whereas a human body is an open system because it interacts with the environment in which it functions (atmosphere). Within social systems, boundaries are difficult to establish because they extend beyond the immediate obvious environments.
- Negative vs. Positive Entropy: Entropy refers to the tendency of systems to move towards disorder and destruction (highest level of entropy). For example, a machine, which is a closed system, will run until resources are depleted or until it fails. This is in line with the second law of thermodynamics in physics (Von Bertalanffy, 1950). On the contrary, open systems possess negative entropy because they can draw resources and

other input from the environment and have the ability to progress towards improved levels of performance.

- **Steady State, Dynamic Equilibrium:** A closed system eventually must attain an equilibrium state with maximum entropy – death or disorganisation. For example, a machine, which represents a closed system, will continue to run until it breaks down. However, a machine in an open system can continue to run through infusion of energy sources and revitalisation.
- **Goals:** Within social systems, the subsystems pursue their own goals in line with the broad values and objectives of the individual entities whereas mechanical systems are designed to address a single issue or challenge.
- **Equifinality of Open Systems:** Equifinality suggests that certain results may be achieved with different initial conditions and in different ways. This view suggests that social organisations can realise their objectives with an assortment of inputs and with varying internal activities or processes.

Based on the principles above, systems are generally classified as simple or complex. A simple system consists of hierarchical relationships between subsystems. It is governed by simple rules and does not evolve but tends to destruct over time. In addition, its subsystems do not pursue their own individual goals and none are influenced by the environment (e.g. as in the case of mechanical systems). An example of a simple system is a traffic light system that is operated in a small town using simple timer-based rules. Systems classified as complicated are merely more sophisticated simple systems. Using the same example, a traffic light system in a large city with built-in rules to assist traffic flow

may be classified as a complicated system. Similarly, a large airport is complicated but not complex.

Complex systems are on the opposite end of the systems spectrum relative to simple systems. They are not governed by straightforward rules, they evolve over time through interaction with other subsystems and they interact with the environment. Their subsystems often work towards achieving their own goals. For example, social systems such as the criminal justice system fall within this classification.

2.4.2 Complexity Theory

The Complexity Theory builds on the GST through the development of additional concepts within the social sciences field. Buckley (2008) describes society as a complex adaptive system and recommends further development of models for sociocultural systems. Social structures such as organisations and interorganisational arrangements are classified as complex adaptive systems because they possess the following basic characteristics of complexity:

- They are open systems that interact with their immediate environment.
- They consist of a suprasystem (whole) and subsystems that operate interactively.
- The sum of the outputs of subsystems is larger than the whole (Gestalt Principle).
- They are dynamic systems that draw from their immediate environment (material, feedback, etc.).
- There are multiple routes towards the achievement of goals.

Following the understanding of complexity within social and organisational fields, several characteristics have been identified. These include non-linearity, co-evolution, emergence and self-organisation.

Non-linearity refers to the disproportionate results that can be attained following the introduced intervention (Cilliers, 2000; De Coning, 2016; Williams, 2020). This implies that in some instances, major efforts made on the system might not yield any results, and in other instances, a minor input might result in a disproportionate effect on the system. For example, in one instance, an elaborately planned intervention or project may yield unsatisfactory results whereas in another instance, a minor initiative may result in major unintended consequences.

Co-evolution refers to the changes that take place within the elements of a complex adaptive system due to continuous interaction between the elements and its environment. In other words, co-evolution involves interactions between two or more interdependent systems that result in changes in the course of their development (Rammel, Stagl & Wilfing, 2007).

Emergence refers to the processes whereby the actions and interactions of elements of a system result in changes in the entire behaviour of the system (Stacey, 1995; Williams, 2020). Emergent phenomena are not possible to anticipate fully or predict and simply run their course (Goldstein, 1999, 2016). In addition, it is important to emphasise that the emergent phenomena of the system are not predictable even if the phenomenon within the individual elements is well understood (Goldstein, 1999).

Self-organisation is a process in which overall direction arises from interactions between elements of a system towards order (Dekkers, 2017; Wheatley and Kellner-Rogers, 1996). The process is spontaneous without the need for control by an external agent. An alternative definition by Bovaird (2008) describes self-organisation as a process in which elements of a system instinctively communicate with each other and cooperate towards a common behaviour. Organisations themselves are complex adaptive systems because of their ability to organise without external leadership. Similarly, teams within organisations can self-organise towards the achievement of agreed goals.

The GST and the Complexity Theory, therefore, provide a good theoretical background on complexity and offer good descriptions of the complexity phenomena.

2.4.3 Application of Complexity Theory (Systems Thinking)

As described earlier, organisations are complex adaptive systems because they demonstrate characteristics such as self-organisation, co-evolution, emergence and non-linearity. Based on 'Hierarchy' as one of the key principles of systems theory, intragovernmental collaborations are on a higher level of complexity, with organisations within the collaboration described as subsystems. From a systems boundary point of view, intragovernmental collaborations that extend to a broader range of stakeholders such as political and social are, therefore, on a higher level of hierarchy than other interorganisational networks in general.

Criminal justice systems consist mainly of three key functions: police services, courts and correctional services (Bernard and Engel, 2001; Bernard, Paoline &

Pare, 2005). Identification as a system dates back to the 1950s in studies conducted by the American Bar Association at the time when the GST was an emerging concept (Walker, 1992; Bernard *et al.*, 2005). The emphasis of the systems approach was on crime control in addition to the coordination of government agencies.

The application of the GST was questioned by a number of scholars who indicated discomfort with the extent to which the criminal justice system mirrored the GST. Two schools of thought identified by Kraska (2006) showed diverging views regarding the application of the GST. The 'closed-system' approach places emphasis on the effectiveness of the criminal justice system through better coordination and minor adjustments in the rules and regulations within the system. Conversely, the 'open-system' approach emphasises socio-economic and other environmental factors associated with criminal justice. Other areas of emphasis within the open-system approach include effective rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders back into society.

The South African criminal justice system can be described as an open-system. The criminal justice system consists of police services, court services and correctional services as core functions. Court services in terms of facilities, court staff, infrastructure and systems are provided by the DOJCD, while Legal Aid South Africa provides legal assistance to indigent members of the public. Subsystems are interrelated and interconnected.

In line with descriptions of systems, the criminal justice system has inputs (criminal cases recorded), transformation (investigation, prosecution, adjudication), outputs

(case outcomes) and feedback (crime statistics, case analysis, etc.) and operates within a wider economic, social and political environment, which in turn, provides feedback to the system. Figure 3.1 provides a broad overview of the criminal justice system.




Figure 2.1 Overview of the criminal justice system

Source: Author

The criminal justice system can also be described as a complex adaptive system. There is a hierarchical arrangement of system and subsystems. The criminal justice system has subsystems (as described), and these subsystems are themselves complex systems. For example, the police service is a single organisation; however, it is in itself complex. This is because first, it consists of core policing and support functions that should work towards a common goal; it interacts and is affected by external factors; and it has characteristics of complex systems such as co-evolution and emergence that have been described.

Second, the subsystems of the criminal justice system pursue their own goals and objectives. All these subsystems are governed by different sets of legislation and mandates, which may often be conflicting. For example, the high conviction rates and the long prison sentences pursued by prosecutors tend to overstress the correctional facilities. However, the early release of inmates tends to upset crime victims and other stakeholders within communities. In addition, the system is complicated further by the level of independence that is accorded to different subsystems. For example, prosecutorial and judicial independence enshrined in the South African Constitution can present practical challenges of coordination.

Third, the system and its subsystems interact and receive feedback from the environment. The environment consists of a broad range of stakeholders that includes members of the community, non-governmental institutions and other governmental institutions.

Principles of complexity, namely self-organisation, emergence and co-evolution apply to the South African criminal justice system. Self-organisation refers to a process in which some form of order arises from interactions between elements of the system towards more complexity or order depending on the need (Wheatley and Kellner-Rogers, 1996). Over 400 Magistrates' Courts operate daily in South Africa. Within each courtroom, cases are heard in the presence of prosecutors, magistrates, the accused, witnesses and legal representatives. Other support functions involve transportation of awaiting trial detainees from correctional centres by the police, interpreting services during the trial, recording of proceedings and safe storage of records, among many others.

At a local level, the criminal justice system functions without major intervention from top government leadership. Magistrates, and in some cases prosecutors, tend to assume the informal leadership role and use their influence to support their local court administration machinery. This shows the self-organisational nature of the system.

Co-evolution involves dynamic interactions between two or more elements of a system that account mutually for each other's development (Rammel, Stagl & Wilfing, 2007; Foster and Pyka, 2014). The criminal justice system as a whole co-evolves with the evolution of criminals. The level of sophistication of criminals forces the system to respond appropriately, although in most cases, the response is slower than expected. For example, the long-standing issue of jurisdiction needs to be reconceptualised following the growing scourge of cybercrime that involves criminals from different jurisdictions and different countries than the crime victim. In addition, the level of technological sophistication of such crimes requires non-traditional approaches.

Emergence refers to the processes whereby changes within the entire system are the result of actions and interactions of agents (Goldstein, 2016; Werder and Maedche, 2018). The changes are emergent because they are not predictable and can be pervasive. For example, tightening of bail procedures because of public pressure to act tough on crime may seem sensible from a political point of view. However, an increase in the number of awaiting-trial detainees has a major impact on correctional centres and the criminal justice system as a whole. First, the state needs to safeguard suspects in custody, and this places strain on public funds; second, overcrowding results in health hazards and difficult working conditions for

staff; third, the escape rate tends to increase; and finally, litigation cases against the state for loss of income may increase. The snowball effect of these issues and the impact of the decision on the system may not be understood even when the individual impact on each subsystem is well understood.

The most critical implication of the criminal justice system as a complex adaptive system is the Gestalt Principle (system as a whole) (Von Bertalanffy and Rapoport, 1956). The principle stipulates that a system is not merely the sum of all the subsystems within it but includes the interactions and interconnections within these subsystems. This implies that the system is larger than the sum of its subsystems. For this reason, analysis should be primarily undertaken at the level of the system rather than the subsystems. Any tampering with one subsystem might influence the entire system, often in unpredictable ways (non-linearity principle).

Although the concepts are well understood and applicable to the criminal justice system, some scholars have raised concerns regarding the relevance of the approach. In their article on the GST, Bernard *et al.* (2005) mention a number of reasons for the despondency that some authors have regarding the GST.

First, the three key systems of the criminal justice system (policing, courts and corrections) seem to have different and often conflicting objectives, which is in contrast with the idea of a system working towards a common goal. Bernard *et al.* (2005) argue that the common goal of the criminal justice system is in the main, the processing of offenders into non-offenders. However, the tactics employed may be found to be in conflict. For example, in processing offenders, police officers might feel aggrieved that the time and effort invested in tracking a suspect is

wasted when the suspect is released on bail and possibly, may not be found again. In other instances, correctional supervision could be frequently recommended by correctional officials in situations where the police would prefer incarceration as a deterrent. However, some may argue that a clearer goal articulation is needed because the criminal justice system is indeed a system of interdependencies and agencies that should work together (Bernard *et al.*, 2005).

Second, there is an unusually high level of inefficiency associated with the criminal justice system. Although the police arrest criminals, the rate of processing these cases by prosecutors, followed by a trial and judgement is decreasing (Bernard *et al.*, 2005). This significant portion of overlooked cases could lead to reoffending. The very nature of the criminal justice system in which many investigations do not lead to an arrest raises suspicion regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of the system.

Third, professionals within the criminal justice system exercise a high level of discretion within their daily activities. For example, a police officer's discretion to arrest and his/her attitude and capability to investigate and finalise an investigation are a series of educated guesses and discretion (Walker, 1992). The study by the American Bar Foundation in the 1970s uncovered pervasive "lawlessness, racism and casual unprofessionalism" in the United States in the previous decade (Walker, 1992:57), particularly when dealing with offenders from particular classes and backgrounds. Cases of police brutality, particularly linked to racism, continue to be reported, and these sparked the formation of the Black Lives Matter movement in 2013 (Hartfield, Griffith & Bruce, 2018; Williamson, Trump and Einstein, 2018; Pierson *et al.*, 2020). In May 2020, this grew to a worldwide

phenomenon after the brutal killing of George Floyd by police in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Similarly, interactions between prosecutors and legal practitioners result in a series of negotiations, delays and tactics that are accepted as 'due process'. These interactions give rise to a level of discomfort for some scholars (Ciocchini, 2014; Dandurand, 2014; Karpin, 1990). This discretion presents a chaotic arrangement rather than a proper processing system.

The approach of treating the subsystems of the criminal justice system independently does not solve the problems mentioned and may possibly exacerbate them. At the outset, it is important to acknowledge the interdependencies and interrelations that point to the need to treat the criminal justice system as a single system. Furthermore, it should be noted that theory is not considered a perfect fit within all applications but rather guides the understanding of the application. It is for this reason that the GST remains applicable within the criminal justice system despite these imperfections. These identified challenges emphasise the need to adopt a systems approach in order to address the challenges rather than highlight the reasons not to adopt the approach.

Having described the criminal justice system in terms of the Complexity Theory, it is important to determine how to apply this theory practically in order to make improvements within the system.

The first and most important proposal is to gain an overall performance view of the criminal justice system. For example, we need to ask, how do we know that the

criminal justice system is working? What are the key measurements? How do we know that it is working better than five years ago? Measurements such as case throughput and end-to-end conviction rates can assist. Once system-view data are understood, it would be easy to see how the different parts of the criminal justice system contribute towards these numbers and how different subsystems can contribute towards addressing the identified weaknesses. The crime statistics shared by the South African Police system do not reflect a system approach and do not assist in addressing the silo mentality.

The next step is to assign the overall performance of the criminal justice system. Until 2020, different ministers and administrative heads were accountable for their own departments (subsystems). The result has been a silo approach that makes participants implement their own plans and use their resources to address their issues on their own.

Merely setting up a cluster such as the JCPS Cluster does not yield results if the systems approach and the systems thinking do not take root. A major transformation is required to prepare the criminal justice system for information sharing, joint accountability, etc. The objective of this research is to propose an enabling framework that will assist the JCPS Cluster in progressing towards collaborating better in addressing crime.

Further contributions connected to the Complexity Theory have been made by scholars through the identification of leadership dimensions that assist in addressing wicked problems. These are described under Section 3.5.

2.4.3 Complexity Theory and taming of Wicked Problems

The Complexity Theory in general and the systems approach in particular are considered essential in understanding and addressing wicked problems (Head and Alford, 2015; Termeer, Dewulf, Breeman and Stiller, 2015; McMillan and Overall, 2016). Wicked problems are problems that are pervasive and multidimensional; they involve diverse stakeholders and require considerable interorganisational effort to tame. These problems have been described by authors as incomprehensible and resistant to solution (Alford and Head, 2017; Head, 2019; Rittel and Webber, 1973).

Rittel and Webber (1973) present ten characteristics of wicked problems:

1. There is no clear definition of the problem.
2. There is no obvious solution or solutions to the problem.
3. Proposed solutions are not absolute and can be assessed as good enough, better or worse, etc.
4. There is no definitive test for a solution.
5. Attempted solutions cannot be readily undone, and there is not enough time to learn by trial and error.
6. There is no measurable set of potential solutions or an exact set of actions that may be incorporated into the plan. Some actions could be contradictory.
7. Every wicked problem is fundamentally unique. A proposed solution to a wicked problem does not necessarily apply to a class of similar wicked problems.
8. Every wicked problem can be a symptom of another problem.

9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in several ways.

10. There is no tolerance by members of the public for experiments that fail.

Although not all problems are wicked, those that are wicked are not always on the same spectrum of wickedness. The degree of wickedness ranges from Type 1 to Type 3 (Head and Alford, 2015). Type 1 problems are simple because there is consensus on both the definition of the problem and the solution to the problem. Classic strategic management approaches of cause and effect would therefore apply.

Type 2 problems are complex because there is agreement on the problem definition but disagreement on the solution to the problem. Type 3 problems are wicked because there is no agreement on the definition of either the problem or the solution to the problem. In addition, it is possible for a problem that is initially a Type 1 problem to become a Type 3 problem due to pervasive policy failures (Head and Alford, 2015).

In their article titled "Wicked problems: Turning Strategic Management Upside Down", McMillan and Overall (2016) assert that traditional strategic planning processes and tools will not work for wicked problems. They argue that wicked problems require a different mindset and different performance systems than standard problems. The Complexity Theory, a systems theory-based approach, has been identified as appropriate for addressing or taming wicked problems (Head and Alford, 2015; Zivkovic, 2015; Fischbacher-Smith, 2016).

Although crime in a different context would not be classified as wicked, in South Africa, the persistence and pervasiveness of the problem renders it as such. First, socio-economic factors that either exacerbate or cause the problem lie outside the criminal justice system itself, and this further complicates the problem. For example, South Africa has one of the highest Gini Coefficients in the world, which means the income gap between the richest and poorest portions of the population is one of the largest (OECD, 2017). Second, solutions are multidimensional and cannot be prioritised easily. More than 20 years after the formation of a JCPS Cluster, issues pertaining to high crime rates persist. This could point to pervasive policy challenges.

By way of example, such problems cut across authority between governmental departments and across policy domains, political and administrative jurisdictions, and social interest groups (Weber and Khademian, 2008; Piatak, Romzek, LeRoux & Johnston *et al.*, 2018). Although each wicked problem is unique, several scholars have proposed frameworks and approaches to tame wicked problems.

Scholars such as Bovaird (2008) and Eshuis and Gerrits (2019) describe the new concept of strategic management for wicked problems as a set of reactions that are expected to have a positive impact on the problem and simultaneously change the principles that shape the changing environment. Strategic management as a function needs a major transformation in order to fulfil the rigorous requirements of interorganisational networks in general and to solve wicked problems in particular (McMillan and Overall, 2016). Head and Alford (2015) called on public-sector management to contribute solutions to the wicked problems that are prevalent in public service.

The following are approaches that have been identified in literature to address wicked problems.

Knowledge management

The first key insight regarding a complex problem is the approach towards the understanding of the problem. Complex systems must be approached from a pluralist point of view by synthesising perspectives from many angles through a number of stakeholders in order to understand the problem better (Eppel, 2017; Richardson, 2008).

In line with resource-based theory, knowledge is one of the key resources for exchange within an interorganisational network (Weber and Khademian, 2008; Eppel, 2017). The ability to synthesise perspectives from a wide range of stakeholders requires effective knowledge management and this entails effective transfer, receipt, and integration of knowledge across participants (Weber and Khademian, 2008). In this regard, Weber and Khademian (2008) identified three dimensions of knowledge sharing, transfer and dissemination. In the first instance, where the problem being addressed in an interorganisational setting is simple or where there is consensus regarding the problem, the straightforward 'syntactic' knowledge transfer usually works. This approach requires common computer programmes, compatible systems and common guidelines and procedures.

Where the first approach emphasises transfer of information (syntactic), the second approach emphasises receipt of information (semantic) (Weber and Khademian, 2008). In situations where there is no consensus on the problem, such information could be open to misinterpretation and misunderstandings due to the

wide and often diverse worldviews and cultures of the participants. It is, therefore, as important to focus on the interpretation as it is to transmit.

The third approach, a 'pragmatic view of knowledge' (Weber and Khademian, 2008) emphasises the integration of knowledge. This is applicable to wicked problems and entails a process of synthesising divergent views and producing new knowledge that is applicable to the context of the wicked problem being tamed. In these instances, participants must be willing to relinquish their long-standing views and alter their thinking. Building a contextual new knowledge set for a wicked problem is, therefore, one of key steps towards taming the identified problem.

As part of the current research, the practices and attitudes of managers towards knowledge sharing in the context of wicked problems were investigated.

Organisational learning and mental models

Challenging long-standing knowledge generated by teams and professionals within organisations is admittedly difficult, particularly in dynamic complex environments where cause and effect do not neatly follow each other (Kim and Senge, 1994; Rangone and Mella, 2019). In their work on organisational learning, Kim and Senge (1994) described a concept of 'shared mental models' that can assist in the process towards challenging prevailing thoughts. A mental model is internalised images, beliefs, assumptions and stories that influence perception and action. Individuals are often not aware of deeply held mental models that affect their thinking and impede their problem-solving capacities. Mental models are held by individuals; however, in a social set-up, they are often shared. Shared mental models influence individual mental models and vice versa.

Learning takes place when individuals adjust their actions based on feedback from the environment, which in turn, adjusts their individual mental models. Individual learning leads to organisational action, which in turn, results in adjustment of shared mental models. Within the context of a wicked problem, it is very important to create an environment in which mental models are identified and challenged in order to allow new thinking and a deeper understanding of the wicked problem.

The criminal justice system is made up of vastly different people with different backgrounds and outlooks. For example, leaders in the SAPS are long-serving civil servants who have trained and served within a hierarchical and military-style environment. On the contrary, prosecutors are legally qualified civil servants and magistrates and judges are independent members of the Judiciary. Within this diverse group of people are administrators whose functions are to offer support within the different subsystems. It is, therefore, important to facilitate the exploration of the different mental models and where necessary, to facilitate the shifting of mental models in order to assist in the taming of the wicked problem.

Active citizenship

Public-service challenges in general and wicked problems in particular mainly affect citizens or members of the public. Managers are, therefore, caught between addressing wicked problems within a challenging bureaucratic environment and citizenry who often perceive such problems differently (Meek and Newell, 2005; Rangone and Mella, 2019). It is, therefore, important to ensure that any attempt at taming a wicked problem that affects citizens includes the citizens.

Where active citizenship is not well established, ground rules need to be laid. The five focus areas that build the adaptive capacity of communities are create a disequilibrium state, amplify action, encourage self-organisation, stabilise feedback, and enable information flows (Zivkovic, 2015).

Interactions between a system and its surroundings result in states of equilibrium and disequilibrium. A disequilibrium state is brought about by a disruption in existing patterns of engagement. In South Africa, #FeesMustFall in tertiary institutions or service-delivery protests could serve as examples. It is through this disequilibrium and crises that organisations innovate and adapt towards a new state of equilibrium (Boyatzis, 2008; Garud, Gehman & Giuliani, 2014; Zivkovic, 2015) Feedback and the interactions between external players (active citizens) enable the criminal justice system to innovate and move towards a new state of equilibria. This state is one of constant renewal through feedback from the external environment.

Leadership capabilities

Addressing wicked problems requires leadership that appreciates complexity in addition to leadership that can tackle such challenges. Leadership can be considered from different angles. For the current research, two key attributes are important. First, a leader is expected to steer conversations and to coordinate stakeholders towards taming a wicked problem and second, a leader needs to possess skills to lead and implement systems to enable achievement of goals (Beinecke, 2009, 2016).

In addition to these attributes, it is essential that leaders possess an appropriate attitude for taming wicked problems (Termeer *et al.*, 2015; Craps, Vermeesch, Dewulf, Sips, Termeer & Bouwen, 2019). Termeer *et al.* (2015) identified four attitudes that leaders needed to adopt to deal with wicked problems – reflexivity, resilience, responsiveness, and revitalisation.

Reflexivity refers to the ability to deal with problems within an unstructured and constantly changing environment. Wicked problems require a curious attitude, an open mind and the ability to connect and integrate conflicting ideas. Resilience is the attitude to adapt to a changing environment while following the intended course and staying focused on the challenges at hand. Responsiveness is the ability to respond to the changing demands of the wicked problem in addition to responding appropriately to a broad range of stakeholders (Termeer *et al.*, 2015). Revitalisation refers to the ability of maintaining momentum through courses of action to address the wicked problem.

The leader should be able to identify blockages and stagnation and put measures in place to address these (Termeer *et al.*, 2015). This capability is necessary to unblock unproductive patterns in the governance process. Table 3.1 summarises the described leadership attitudes.

Table 2.5 Leadership attitudes to address wicked problems

Leadership Capability	Definition	Aspect of the Wicked Problem to be Addressed	Effects or Deficit
Reflexivity	The ability to recognise and handle unstructured problems and numerous realities	Unstructured problems; Multiple realities and viewpoints	Possibility of tunnel vision or pervasive controversies
Resilience	The ability to adapt in response to uncertain and recurrent changes without losing identity	Interconnectedness challenges; Unpredictable results; Uncertainties	Risk of failure in accomplishing basic functions
Responsiveness	The ability to respond reasonably to unlimited demands and challenges	'No stopping rule'; Unlimited number of challenges and pressure; Moral obligations	Risk of losing trust and legitimacy in citizens
Revitalising	The ability to unblock and rekindle processes in times of stagnation	Stagnating; Interaction	Risk of regression and deterioration

Source: Termeer, Dewulf, Breeman and Stiller, 2015

Each of the four dimensions requires a leader to act, observe and enable in every situation when dealing with wicked problems (Termeer *et al.*, 2015). By way of illustration, a leader should demonstrate the ability to act reflexively, observe reflexively and enable reflexivity within the context of the problem being addressed.

It is important to note that the profile of the leader described contravenes some of the leadership roles that are needed in traditional organisations. For example, transformational leadership that requires a leader who can envision, excite and organise a team towards the achievement of a vision will not succeed (Head and Alford, 2015). Similarly, transactional leadership that stresses efficiency, structure and performance is inappropriate (Beinecke, 2009). Instead, to tame wicked problems, a collaborative leadership approach is needed for complex systems. This involves leadership across organisations, the building of trust, persuasion and strong communication skills (Head, 2019; Head and Alford, 2015).

In addition to attitude, leaders need technical skills to implement and manage the task at hand. Vangen and Huxham (2000) identified three pillars of leadership in public interorganisational networks, namely structures, processes and participants. They noted that none of these is within the control of members of the collaboration and identified activities that leadership needs to undertake to counteract the effect of these constraints. These include managing power and controlling the agenda, representing and mobilising member organisations, and enthusing and empowering those who can deliver collaboration objectives (Vangen and Huxham, 2000) .

It, therefore, follows that there are three focal areas when dealing with leadership for interorganisational networks that solve wicked problems, namely the attitude of the leader, the behaviours of the leader that will help push the collaboration forward, and leadership skills. Figure 3.2 presents a summary of the leadership model.

At an analytical level, the three leadership models are used to observe and assess leadership personalities in the context of strategic management within intragovernmental collaborations.




Table 2.6 Leadership for taming wicked problems

Source: Termeer, Dewulf, Breeman and Stiller, 2015; Vangen and Huxham (2000)

Consensus building

Wicked problems are described as Type 3 problems by Head and Alford (2015) because of the lack of agreement regarding the definition of the problem and the solutions to the problem. However, to begin to tame a wicked problem, a consensus on the way forward needs to be established. Consensus does not necessarily mean agreement with either the problem or the solution thereof but agreement on the approaches that will be taken to move forward.

Consensus building can be described as a range of practices in which stakeholders representing different interest groups come together in dialogue to address a policy issue or a common challenge through a mediated process (Innes and Booher, 1999, 2016; Diaz, Webb, Warner & Monaghan, 2018).

The consensus-building exercise is a continuous reiterative process that is cumbersome and may take significant time to complete. This process cannot be rushed (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Lahat and Sher-Hadar, 2020). In addition, consensus building does not necessarily take place during a formal facilitated process. Mandell (1988) recognised the importance of the informal networks that managers within interorganisational networks use to shape conversations.

It is not enough to engage with a broad range of stakeholders, including citizens, without a concerted effort to integrate all the insights and establish consensus towards addressing these problems. Three key insights from the Integrative Theory are useful in this regard.

The first is creating common ground between participants. Next is drawing insights from different disciplines and exposing the commonalities and the contradictions between the different disciplinary insights into the problem being addressed (Meek and Newell, 2005). It is important to note that common ground in many complex problems needs to be created because it is not inevitably there (Meek and Newell, 2005; Edelenbos and van Meerkerk, 2017; Klijn, van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2020).

The second insight involves embracing differences. This approach emphasises the importance of not only celebrating the different points of view and approaches but also facilitating new thinking due to different input. The third is the importance of assessing the extent of the differences ('assess the distance') between the various fields that are providing insights. For example, in problems such as air pollution or climate change, the problem could require insights from the natural sciences with

a scientific approach to problem-solving and at the same time, the problem might include human and morality issues from the humanities discipline (Meek and Newell, 2005). It is this contradiction that needs to be anticipated and dealt with. It is these three conditions that promote continuous interaction and harmonisation between vastly different worldviews.

Innes and Booher (1999, 2016) developed tools to assess the outcomes of consensus building grounded on the Complexity Theory. The approach assesses both the process and outcome issues. The two most critical inputs for consensus building based on the Complexity Theory are inclusion of all stakeholders and the ability for all participants to deal with a broad range of inputs. From an outcomes point of view, it is important to note that consensus-building outcomes are not limited to high quality agreements. Table 2.7 shows the criteria used to assess the quality of the process and outcome criteria. Although not all criteria need to be met, the fewer that are met, the lower the quality of the outcome (Innes and Booher, 1999). These approaches have been used in studies such as those of Calderon and Westin (2019) and Oliver and Pearl (2018).

Table 2.7 Process and outcome criteria for consensus building

Process Criteria	Outcome Criteria
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Includes representatives of all appropriate and diverse interest groups 2. Is motivated by a purpose shared by the collective 3. Is self-organising, enabling participants to agree on ground rules, tasks, task teams, objectives and topics of discussion 4. Engages participants, keeping them interested, and learning through in-depth engagements and informal interactions 5. Encourages challenges to the prevailing ideas and enables creative thinking 6. Incorporates a wide range of good quality information and builds consensus on its meaning around its meaning 7. Seeks consensus only after discussions have fully considered the interests and issues and after significant effort has been made in responding creatively to differences 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Generates a high-quality agreement 2. Ends deadlocks 3. Compares well with other planning approaches in terms of benefits and costs 4. Harvests creative ideas 5. Results in learning and change that is not confined to the group 6. Builds political and social capital 7. Produces information that is acceptable and understood by stakeholders 8. Initiates a wave of change in attitudes, actions and behaviours, partnerships and new institutional practices 9. Gives rise to institutions and practices that are networked, in touch with communities, responsive to change and manage conflict

Source: Innes and Booher, 1999

Hardy, Lawrence and Grant (2005) developed a comprehensive framework for the role of conversations in interorganisational networks. They argue that the first critical step is the establishment of a common identity where participants consider the common good of the collaboration. This enables the participants to begin to consider the interests of the collaborative before those of their individual organisations.

Hardy, Lawrence and Grant (2005:66) further propose that members' conversations regarding "Common Construction of Key Issues" include agreement on the definition of the problem, the depth and complexity thereof and possible solutions. Within this conversation, common constructions in addition to private constructions (views of one organisation that differ from the other organisations) should be entertained. Both these constructions need to be understood in order to begin a process towards innovative solutions.

Finally, Hardy *et al.* (2005) emphasise the appreciation of two styles of talk throughout the collaboration, namely collaborative talk, which ensures that the voices of the weakest organisations are heard, and assertive talk, which ensures that the interests of all participant organisations are considered. This approach aligns with the approach of Innes and Booher (1999) in ensuring involvement of all stakeholders.

2.5 CONCLUSION

Interorganisational networks can be explained through several theories, two of which are the RDT and TCE. In addition, the Social Exchange framework explains the nature of the relationships within resource dependency and identifies three key dimensions. These are goal clarity, which is critical to the definition and boundaries of the interorganisational relationship; power; and trust within the relationship.

Regarding TCE, two frameworks explain the cost of establishing interorganisational networks. The first is the relational view of the firm, which entails readiness and the capability to work collaboratively with other firms. The

second is the knowledge view of a firm, which entails the effective management of the knowledge-based resources of the firm.

It should be noted that a shortcoming associated with the two theories lies in the fact that they address objectives at organisational level. That is, the decision to form partnerships lies in the benefits for the organisation and not on the benefits that accrue at the level of the partnership. The dimensions are nonetheless useful in understanding the decision to form and remain in a partnership.

The seven dimensions affecting interorganisational networks that were identified through the RDT and the TCE were (i) goal clarity, (ii) power, (iii) trust, (iv) collaborative advantage, (v) collaborative strategic management, (vi) governance, and (vii) knowledge management. These dimensions provide a basis for further research into interorganisational networks and its emphasis in the South African context.

Figure 2.1 presents the theoretical considerations adopted to investigate interorganisational collaborations. This framework illustrates a holistic and integrated view of interorganisational networks not found elsewhere in the existing body of literature.




Figure 2.2 Theoretical framework for interorganisational networks using Resource Dependency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics

Source: Author

The GST and the Complexity Theory provide another dimension in the understanding of the criminal justice system and the wickedness of crime in South Africa. The practical application of the GST to management studies was illustrated through principles of complex adaptive systems.

Working through the Complexity Theory and its application in complex adaptive systems, several dimensions relevant to addressing crime as a wicked problem were identified. These are as follows:

- Implementing appropriate knowledge management systems for the collaboration
- Adopting appropriate organisational learning principles to shape mental models
- Building active citizenship and encouraging interaction

- Identifying appropriate leadership

Therefore, the key dimensions identified through literature that are appropriate in addressing wicked problems are (i) knowledge management, (ii) organisational learning, (iii) active citizenship, and (iv) leadership capabilities. Figure 2.2 demonstrates the dimensions of collaborations as derived from the GST.




Figure 2.3 Second theoretical framework for interorganisational networks

Source: Author

CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND ON INTRAGOVERNMENTAL COLLABORATION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The theoretical background on resource dependence and TCE provided explanations for the basis of interorganisational relationships, while the GST provided explanations for criminal justice in South Africa as a system.

The current chapter provides a deeper understanding of interorganisational networks in general and intragovernmental collaborations in particular to provide specific insights for the research context. The chapter presents details on the classification of collaborations and a discussion on intragovernmental collaborations. Relevant models of interorganisational networks that are useful as points of departure for intragovernmental collaborations are reviewed and a conceptual framework for the research is prepared.

3.2 CLASSIFICATION OF INTERORGANISATIONAL NETWORKS USING THE 3Cs FRAMEWORK

Resource dependence provides reasons for organisations to enter into interorganisational relationships. However, it is TCE that clarifies the economic reasons for choosing either the 'market' (outside the organisation) or the 'hierarchy' (within the organisation) to provide the resources that the organisation needs (Lacoste, 2016; Pahl-Wostl, 2019; Thorelli, 1986). However, between the two

extremes, other relationships have been identified as neither purely market nor purely hierarchy.

The first approach in the classification of these relationships is based on horizontal integration using the 3Cs model of Keast, Brown and Mandell (2007). With this model, relationships are classified as cooperation, coordination and collaboration based on the objectives and intensity of interactions between organisations as indicated in Table 3.2. Cooperation represents the lowest level within the continuum where organisations maintain full autonomy and interactions are not formalised. Collaboration is on the highest level of the continuum where organisations work jointly to implement systematic changes with a high level of interdependence.

Keast, Brown and Mandell (2007) identified four attributes, namely goal alignment, level of autonomy, structural linkages and levels of formality to illustrate the strength of the 3Cs model. For example, in collaborations, goals are deeper and include interventions within the entire system/industry whereas cooperation, may be limited to information sharing. In regard to structural linkages, collaborations may result in changes within structures of organisations, whereas no changes are expected in cooperations. Lastly, cooperation takes place on an informal basis whereas collaboration requires a formal approach that may include appointing a lead organisation or establishing an agency (Provan and Kenis, 2008).

McNamara (2012) extended the four attributes of Provan and Kenis (2008) to include information-sharing, decision-making, resolution of turf issues, resource

allocation, systems thinking and trust. The 3Cs framework based on extended attributes of integration is detailed in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 The 3Cs framework and attributes of integration

<i>Integration</i>	Cooperation	Coordination	Collaboration
Time taken to establish	Short term	Medium term	Longer term
Goals	Information-sharing; base of support	Align organisational resources to meet a predetermined goal	Synergise to create something new or promote system change
Autonomy	Independence/ autonomy	Retains autonomy but gives some element to joint effort; joint programme planning	Highly interdependent with sharing of power
Structural Linkages	Loose links/low intensity level	Some level of stability of membership; medium links	Members move outside traditional functional areas; dense links
Formality	Informal	Informal/medium links	Formal
Information-Sharing	Basic information shared through informal channels	Information is exchanged through more formal channels	Open and frequent communications through formal and informal channels
Decision-Making	Independent decision-making	Centralised decision-making	Participative decision-making
Resolution of Turf Issues	Conflicts avoided through independence	A neutral facilitator may help resolve conflicts	Participants work together to resolve conflicts
Resource Allocation	Information is exchanged	Physical and non-physical resources are exchanged to achieve individual goals	Physical and non-physical resources are pooled in support of collective goals
Systems Thinking	System integration does not occur	System integration may occur for better achievement of individual goals	System integration occurs for better achievement of collective goals
Trust	Trust relationships are not required but may develop	Leaders work closely to create relationships based on trust	Trust between participants is needed to sustain relationships

Adapted from Keast, Brown and Mandell (2007) and McNamara (2012)

It is important to acknowledge that the complexity of wicked problems, which to a large extent require system-level engagement, cannot be approached by way of cooperation and coordination (Keast, Brown & Mandell, 2007; Mandell, Keast &

Chamberlain, 2017). In addition, key insights developed from this framework are the intensity of participation in collaborations; the pooling of physical and non-physical resources (McNamara, 2012, 2016); interdependence and the level of trust needed to meet collective goals.

A similar framework by Huxham and Macdonald (1992) was developed within the context of local government and the public sector. Similar to other authors, Huxham and Macdonald (1992) adopted definitions that recognise the level of participation in the achievement of common goals.

Within the ambit of collaboration, the authors defined a meta-strategy as a statement of the joint goals that participating organisations are pursuing. Participating organisations would thus be expected to align the strategies of their individual organisations with those of the collaboration. Furthermore, these organisations would pool resources to ensure that the meta-strategy is achieved (Huxham and Macdonald, 1992). Trist (1983) explained that for this meta-strategy and meta-objectives to be achieved, a referent (regulatory) organisation would need to lead, particularly for wicked problems or multidisciplinary public services. However, within the context of the current research, the referent organisation does not necessarily extend to regulation of industries. In other words, the referent organisation can be a simple structure based on the governance needs and cost implications. It is, nevertheless, accepted that a referent organisation is best suited in collaborations with high levels of interdependence and a need to pool resources.

It is important for managers, particularly those involved in wicked problems, to avoid the pitfall of employing cooperative or coordinative approaches to instances

where collaborative efforts are needed. Keast, Brown and Mandell (2007) and Mandell, Keast and Chamberlain (2017) found that managers often use the words interchangeably and apply them loosely. It is important to ensure that where collaboration is identified as an appropriate mode of interaction, that it is implemented appropriately. It is also important to note that in long-term collaborations, particularly in the public sector, all three modes can be undertaken to a different extent by the same public sector organisation (Mandell, Keast & Chamberlain, 2017).

Within the concept of this research, the 3Cs framework is accepted as the initial basis of classification for interorganisational relationships. Reasons for the formation of these interorganisational relationships can be attributed to either resource dependency or TCE. In practical terms, reasons for the formation of such relationships can be summarised into five generic needs: cash injection, scale (growth), skill acquisition, access to resources, or a combination of these (Todeva and Knoke, 2005; Stuart, 2013). These relationships, identified by Todeva and Knoke (2005), Bastida, Marimon and Tanganelli (2017) and Shijaku, Larrazakintana and Urtasun-Alonso (2018), can be broadly classified as strategic alliances and as organisations that share benefits and managerial control and contribute to strategic business areas such as technology, product and distribution while remaining independent. This definition excludes relationships such as mergers and acquisitions that result in the formation of a singular organisation (a hierarchy).

Public sector organisations, particularly government, do not consistently 'fit the mould' of strategic alliances, particularly where the relationships are formed within

a government (local, provincial or national). This is because from a governance point of view, two government departments cannot strictly maintain the same level and type of independence as two private sector organisations. Strategic alliances can, however, be formed by a combination of private and public sector organisations. Table 3.2 shows types of private and public sector networks mapped within the 3Cs framework. The 3Cs model can, therefore, be applied to public sector organisations based on the same principles that are applied in the private sector.

Table 3.2 Mapping of private and public sector interorganisational relationships within the 3Cs framework

	Private Sector	Public Sector
Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suppliers • Subcontractors (short-term) • Licensing (fee-based) • Action sets (lobby groups) • Affiliate marketing • Industry Standard Groups (adoption of technical standards) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suppliers • Subcontractors (short-term) • Joint project implementation
Coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperatives • Cartels (e.g. Organisation of Petroleum Producing Countries) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inter-ministerial committees • Joint programmes • Policy coordination
Collaboration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • R&D Consortia • Franchising • Subcontractors (long-term) • Joint ventures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public-private partnerships • Intragovernmental collaborations • Intergovernmental collaborations • Government outcomes

Adapted from Todeva and Knoke (2005)

The inconsistent use of the 3C terminologies throughout literature initiated the call for scholars to develop widely acceptable definitions that could be understood and used consistently. Castañer and Oliveira (2020) responded to the call and

undertook a meta-analytical study of definitions of the 3Cs. Three dimensions, namely actions, behaviours and outcomes, were used as a basis to define the 3Cs.

Castañer and Oliveira (2020) define coordination as a joint determination of common goals, while cooperation refers to the implementation of these goals. Regarding collaboration, the authors defined it as the act of voluntarily helping other partners to achieve common goals (Castañer and Oliveira, 2020). These definitions were deemed too generic and not useful for the broad spectrum of interorganisational relationships. In particular, the close association of collaboration and cooperation overly simplifies the spectrum of relationships.

In contrast, Stout and Keast (2021) recognise the differences between coordination and cooperation as they relate to the public service. The authors clarify the role of coordination in the implementation of a large portion of government programmes and identify cooperation simply as an exchange relationship. For example, financial institutions sharing financial transaction data with law enforcement agencies represents a cooperation effort in which the exchange relationship is mutually beneficial. In a situation where law enforcement agencies work with the Department of Home Affairs in addressing human trafficking, this would be deemed a coordination effort because this partnership involves working together on a narrow, clearly defined goal while maintaining separate organisations, resources and activities.

The approach of Stout and Keast (2021) emphasises the importance of power, human interactions and interrelatedness in interorganisational relationships. Regarding collaboration, the authors argue that an important factor in the network

is that participants hold equal status without perceived power over one another (Stout and Keast, 2021). This approach places the emphasis on power as a differentiator between cooperation/coordination and collaboration. However, this does not align with the current research. The key determinants of collaboration are deemed to be interconnectedness and goal complexity, and these largely align with the definitions of Huxham and MacDonald (1992b) and Keast *et al.* (2007).

It is apparent that definitions will continue to emerge with further research. For the purposes of the current research, definitions are adopted in line with these merging understandings.

3.3 CLASSIFICATION OF INTERORGANISATIONAL NETWORKS – SCHOPLER'S MODEL

Whereas the 3Cs framework classified interorganisational relationships in terms of the intensity of interactions and level of autonomy, Schopler's (1987) contribution lies in the classification of groups in terms of the origin of the group and the task structure.

Schopler (1987) classified origins as either mandated or voluntary. Group origin refers to the way a group or interorganisational relationship was originally conceived. A group is mandated when an external body, agent or legislation creates such a group to carry out a legislative mandate, to enforce a regulation or to implement a political mandate, whereas a voluntary group is initiated by participants in response to a challenge or market forces.

Task structure refers to the extent to which such groups determine their task. A high external task structure means the groups have authority to determine their purpose, structures and tasks, whereas a low external task structure refers to a situation where the purpose, tasks and structures are determined outside the group.

Using a 2 x 2 matrix, four types of groups based on group origin and task structure were identified through Schopler's Model and are detailed in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3 Classification of interorganisational networks using Schopler's Model

	Directed	Self-Directed
Mandated	<p>Type I: Reliable Compliance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brief formative phase • Low level of overt problems in group • Decision-making: Efficient participation • Low member satisfaction • Minimal quality of output • High compliance with external demands 	<p>Type II: Frustrated vs. Responsive</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brief/moderate formative phase • Low/moderate level of problems in group decision-making: Confusion, covert conflict • Minimal/moderate quality of output • Low/moderate member satisfaction • High/moderate compliance with external demands • High/moderate compliance with external demands
Voluntary	<p>Type III: Directed vs. Inner Conflict</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moderate/longer formative phase • Moderate/high level of problems in group decision-making: Manipulation, open conflict • Moderate/high member satisfaction • Moderate/high quality of output • Moderate/low compliance with external demands 	<p>Type IV: Creative Commitment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Longer formative phase • High level of problems in group decision-making • Open conflict over specific ends and most appropriate means • High member satisfaction • High quality of output • Low compliance with external demands

Source: Schopler (1987, 1994)

Type I relates to groups that are both mandated and directed. It is not difficult to form such a group because the mandating authority identifies participants and tasks for the team. However, compared with other groups, the quality of output is expected to be the lowest due to enforced compliance of directives, which could lead to low morale. The functionality of Type I groups is not expected to be high due to differing opinions, differing interests and the process of establishing trusting relationships. Mandates from legislation or political directives are often difficult to bypass, and participants tend to comply with the directive. It is for this reason that conflict is avoided, while the level of satisfaction is low. Schopler (1987:704) labelled this group “Reliable Compliance”. Intragovernmental collaborations fall within this category in which groups and their tasks are fully mandated and closely directed by such a mandate. It should be noted that one of the reasons for dysfunction is the absence of a profit motive, which is usually a strong driving force of voluntary private-sector-based networks.

Type II groups are also formed through a mandate. However, these teams are self-directed (i.e. their tasks and functions are directed in line with the received broad mandate). The group takes longer to form and function due to the discretion afforded to the members during the initiation phase. This discretion makes their output better than the output expected for mandated and directed groups. Examples of Type II networks are interagency agreements mandated by government and partnerships between government and NGOs.

Participation in Type III groups is voluntary; however, the tasks are directed. For example, individuals may voluntarily become part of a lobby group with a specific means to achieve objectives. The voluntary nature of such groups requires a broad

consensus to stay intact. Conflict, accompanied by power play, is more likely in such groups, and output is expected to be superior to both mandated groups.

Type IV groups are voluntary and have internal determination of tasks and structures. The groups take the most time to form due to efforts in building consensus on both the objectives and the tasks. However, once formed, the group is expected to provide the most satisfaction for members and the outputs are expected to be of high quality.

It is evident from Schopler (1987) and Schopler (1994) that a mandate for any interorganisational group or network affects the formation and interactions that take place within the network. It is noted that although a Type 1 network is the easiest and quickest to form, it is the most challenging regarding achievement of results. This peculiarity is identified by scholars such as Levine and White (1961), Aldrich (1976) and Gray (1985).

In addition to acknowledging the disparity, Rodriguez *et al.* (2007), O'Leary and Vij (2012), McNamara (2012, 2016) and others admit that insufficient studies of mandated networks have been undertaken. There are, however, authors who have responded to the call for more research and to date, selected studies specifically focusing on mandated networks have been undertaken. The current research also responds to this call and provides an understanding of intragovernmental collaborations that are both mandated and directed and that help in solving wicked problems.

3.4 MANDATED INTRAGOVERNMENTAL COLLABORATIONS

Intragovernmental collaborations have been described by different scholars using different terminology, and this has resulted in fragmentation in an environment with inadequate research content. Furthermore, public-sector-type networks take different forms such as mandated or voluntary, and these networks are often discussed without a clear distinction between the two. The findings of such research efforts are, therefore, too general and too simplistic to apply to the complexities and challenges of the mandate. For example, the model of Ansell and Gash (2008) does not differentiate between findings drawn from mandated and voluntary networks. Some networks such as those studied by Lee (2015) and Gerber, Henry and Lubell (2013) are not mandated and others, such as, mandated networks studies by Rodriguez *et al.* (2007) and Muir and Mullins (2015) are self-directed.

Another area of conceptual confusion lies in the definitions of intragovernmental and intergovernmental networks. Within the fields of intergovernmental relations and political studies, intergovernmental relations refer to coordination between three spheres of government, namely local, state/provincial and national. Intergovernmental relations are classified as horizontal when they involve participation by players from one sphere of government and as vertical when referring to participation by players from two or three spheres (Smith, 2002). Relations within one sphere of government are denoted intergovernmental if the participation entities originate from different municipalities or counties (in terms of local government) or different provinces or states (in cases of provincial or state). This is based on the principle that these separate municipalities and states are

legislatures within their own right (Smith, 2002). Where relationships involve governmental entities from Members of Cabinet within the same legislature, these relationships are intragovernmental (Smith, 2002). It should be further noted that intragovernmental relations could exist within one local or one provincial government (Fischbacher-Smith, 2016).

In South Africa, the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (South Africa, 2005) stipulates the governance arrangements between local, provincial and national governments and sets out appropriate structures to deal with the interface. The objective of the Act was to enable the three spheres of government to integrate and work together in delivering services and addressing the major challenges facing the country. An example of a governance structure is the MinMEC in which a Cabinet Minister from National Government interacts with provincial Members of the Executive Committee within a functional area. Another example defined in the Act is the Premier's Intergovernmental Forum where the Premier (political head of a province) interacts with mayors of municipalities and a relevant member of the Provincial Executive Council. Hence, this Act provides structures and guidance on how different spheres of government relate to each other (South Africa, 2005).

While interorganisational relations identify actors and interactions between these actors, there are managerial and other implementation practicalities that managers must address. Mandell (1988) recognised intergovernmental management as a means of understanding how the layers of government interact and how to cope with management challenges stemming from these interrelationships. From this perspective, intergovernmental collaboration is an entire field rather than a layered organisation (Mandell, 1988).

From the two perspectives, there appears to be a spectrum of intergovernmental partnerships that is dependent on the nature of the interorganisational relationship. For example, at a level of cooperation, inter-ministerial committees can be clearly classified as intragovernmental (i.e. several government departments under the leadership of a Cabinet Minister cooperating on a specific plan of action). However, in the context of collaborations, particularly those addressing wicked problems, intragovernmental collaborations require deeper levels of interaction, resource sharing, knowledge management and interaction.

Similarly, intergovernmental interactions can take the form of cooperation, coordination and collaboration with provincial, local and national government organisations. For example, within the criminal justice system, the Child Justice Act (South Africa, 2008), which guides the criminal justice process for children allegedly in conflict with the law, requires the involvement of social workers from the Department of Social Development at national level and implementation by provincial legislature. Although the coordination's epicentre is at National Government level in this instance, the interactions spread much wider.

Within the context of this research, an intragovernmental network is, therefore, defined as a mandated partnership of one sphere of government (local, provincial or national) to identify and address a pervasive public policy problem through the participation of government departments and entities and the sharing of resources (e.g. financial, human and knowledge-based resources). Other types of mandated government-led partnerships include interagency collaborations (Hudson, Hardy, Henwood & Wistow, 2006; Conteh, 2013), which involve entities mandated and directed by government to assist in the delivery of services.

Collaborative governance was defined by Ansell and Gash (2008) as collaboration that involves joint decision-making between government agencies and non-governmental stakeholders working on public policy or public management. The definition emphasises the presence of both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders as key in effective public policy and management.

The meta-analytical study of 137 articles by Ansell and Gash (2008) revealed a large number of single-case studies and single-issue investigations. Based on these articles, a framework for collaborative governance was developed, as shown in Figure 3.1. Although primarily based on voluntary networks, this framework provides a foundation on which to build a framework for mandated collaborations.




Figure 3.1 Generic framework for collaborative governance
 (Source: Ansell and Gash (2008))

The study of Ansell and Gash (2008) identified three starting conditions that either encourage or frustrate the onset of the collaborative effort. First, participation of players perceived to be powerful and highly influential might discourage the participation of players who are less influential. The second is the strength of the incentive to participate. In cases where there is not much to gain, participation is less enthusiastic. Finally, pre-existing conflict and trust issues could discourage new efforts to collaborate (Ansell and Gash, 2008). Although these starting conditions are applicable to voluntary networks, the issues have not been ruled out for mandated networks.

Institutional design identifies not only the members of a collaboration but also the institutional arrangements that are most appropriate to facilitate the collaboration. It is important that these structures consider efficiency from an economic point of view together with effectiveness and quality of outcomes. In line with studies by Provan and Kenis (2008), these approaches include the formation of a coordinating organisation (network administration organisation) or designation of a lead organisation among participating entities.

The collaborative process by its nature is a strategic management process. The model of Ansell and Gash (2008) consists of themes that were identified from the research, and these encompass shared understanding, which includes a clear mission and common understanding of the problem that leads to a joint strategic plan and the implementation thereof. Scholars that have undertaken substantial work in this area include Huxham and Macdonald (1992) in their article regarding the development of a meta-strategy, Gray (1985), Hood, Logsdon and Thompson

(1993) on their work on collaborative process, and Clarke and Fuller (2011) on collaborative strategic management.

A meta-strategy was defined by Huxham (1993b) as a high-level statement of the meta-mission and meta-objectives of a collaborative effort. With this background, a meta-mission represents the reason for an existence (or purpose) of an interorganisational network and provides a joint sense of meaning for stakeholders. Huxham (1993a) refers to meta-objectives as the highest level at which objectives of a network are expressed. In contrast to voluntary networks, the interconnectedness of intragovernmental collaborations requires a joint understanding of what needs to be achieved in the short term (meta-objectives) and the long term (meta-goals). In addition to the statements of meta-goals and meta-objectives, a Joint Action Plan should be included. This plan should include resource sharing, which is prevalent and typical in the highly interdependent and interconnected collaborations within government (McGuire, 2006).

The collaborative strategic management framework proposed by Clarke and Fuller (2011) is based on a model for interorganisational networks proposed by Hood, Logsdon and Thompson (1993). This model includes critical steps of problem-setting (common understanding of the problem being solved), direction-setting and implementation. An additional contribution of Clarke and Fuller (2011) includes implementation steps within the network and within individual organisations. In addition, they identified a broad range of outcomes of the network, which is beyond the achievement of planned outcomes. These include process-centric outcomes that lead to changes in how network processes are undertaken, environmental-centric outcomes that lead to unexpected outcomes of the network,

and partner-centric outcomes that lead to the impact made on individual partner organisations (Clarke and Fuller, 2011). Hence, this means that an outcome of a partnership is not merely addressing a problem but addressing how the solution can be achieved in the long term. This is particularly applicable to wicked problems.

Although Clark and Fuller's (2011) contribution is significant, it has its limitations. First, the networks that were studied were voluntary and the authors admitted that it could not be assumed that the framework would perform in other types of networks. Secondly, the research study was undertaken within the sustainable development sector, which typically has clear goals that participants enthusiastically aspire towards (Clarke and Fuller, 2011). For mandated and directed interorganisational networks, that is, Schopler's (1987) Type I partnerships, the dynamics are different and thus may require a customised conceptualisation of collaborative strategic management.

The model of Ansell and Gash (2008) identified three key contingencies that need to be carefully considered before collaborative governance can be pursued: "Time, Trust and Interdependence" (Ansell and Gash, 2008:561, 2018). First, there needs to be sufficient time to reach consensus because bringing parties together with limited time to achieve tangible results is disingenuous. Consensus is, therefore, a function of time. Second, trust is another obstruction for collaborative governance. Where levels of trust are low, it is imperative to undergo a trust-building process. A third contingency is the level of interdependence between participant organisations. If the interdependence is high, then the collaborative governance effort can be undertaken even when trust is low. However, if parties do not need

each other to achieve their goals (low interdependence), then the collaborative effort, which includes trust building and consensus building, is worthless.

Although this model involved governmental agencies as collaborators, Ansell and Gash (2008) disclosed that the participation of non-governmental agencies was largely voluntary. Thus, this model does not fully address mandated collaboration. In addition to their disclosure, the 137 articles showed a bias towards American case studies. Similarly, other studies such as those of Clarke and Fuller (2011) and Hood, Logsdon and Thompson (1993) were not undertaken specifically for mandated collaborations.

The collaborative governance model developed by Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011) provides a more comprehensive approach, particularly for networks that include governmental institutions (Bryson, Crosby & Stone, 2015). This model is based on a broader definition of collaborative governance. The definition included government-government, government-private sector and a broad range of cooperation, collaboration and coordination efforts. The model of Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011) is shown in Figure 3.2.




Figure 3.2 Framework for collaborative governance

Source: Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011)

Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011) challenged scholars to use the framework to extend theories of interorganisational networks by studying different relationship contexts. It is, therefore, the intention of the current research to contribute towards mandated and directed networks in response to this call.

3.5 DEFINITION OF KEY CONSTRUCTS USED WITHIN THE CURRENT RESEARCH

Following the in-depth discussion of the 3Cs and models of interorganisational network, definitions of key constructs used in the current research are discussed.

i. Cooperation, Coordination and Collaboration

The current research recognises coordination and collaboration as separate constructs, which is in line with definitions presented by Huxham and MacDonald

(1992b), Keast *et al.* (2007) and Stout and Keast (2021). The definitions adopted for the three terms are, therefore, as follows:

Cooperation: A partnership in which participating organisations are in an exchange relationship that is of mutual benefit but without substantial commitment and use of resources or participation in resourcing, planning and implementation, for example, the exchange of data.

Coordination: A partnership in which participating organisations work jointly towards the achievement of a well-defined goal while using their own resources towards achievement of the goal, for example, the implementation of the Trafficking in Persons Act by different government departments.

Collaboration: A partnership in which participating organisations work together towards the identification of substantial goals and jointly identify and share resources towards the achievement of goals. This partnership is characterised by interdependence between participating organisations and a long-term outlook towards the achievement of goals. Collaborations are needed to address pervasive service-delivery failures and wicked problems. Within the current research, the JCPS Cluster is referred to as an intragovernmental collaboration because it is addressing crime as a wicked problem and requires substantial effort in goal identification and problem implementation. Care has been taken within the current research to avoid the use of the word 'collaboration' to represent generic interorganisational partnerships that do not fit the strict definition of a collaboration.

ii. Interorganisational Networks:

A generic partnership of two or more organisations that work towards achieving a common goal. These partnerships include private, public and non-governmental organisations and any combinations thereof. Within the current research, the term network is used for a generic interorganisational partnership and a synonym that is used for network is partnership.

iii. Collaborative Governance:

This refers to all public sector-based partnerships that broadly include collaboration, coordination and cooperation together with voluntary, mandated, directed and self-directed partnerships. In addition, participating organisations include all spheres of government, non-governmental organisations and private-sector organisations. Research in collaborative governance is helpful for intragovernmental collaborations but is often found to be generalised and focused on voluntary collaborations.

iv. Intergovernmental Collaboration:

This involves partnerships that span two or three spheres of government (local, provincial, national) to address major service-delivery challenges.

v. Intragovernmental Collaborations:

This is the subject of the current research and refers to partnerships that are mandated, led and directed within one sphere of government to address major government programmes and goals. Within the current research, participating

organisations are led primarily by one sphere of government, with limited or no participation from NGOs.

vi. Mandated Networks:

These are partnerships that are established by way of legislation, regulation or by any party such as parliament or individuals empowered to issue a directive. The same mandate often includes instructions on the governance of the network and identification of participating organisations/parties/individuals.

vii. Voluntary Networks:

These are partnerships in which organisations willingly participate for the time that the parties work towards a common goal and derive mutual benefit.

viii. Directed Collaborations:

These are partnerships in which participation and focus areas are indicated through a mandate. These are largely within the public service and are directed towards the implementation of major government programmes.

ix. Self-Directed Collaborations

These are partnerships in which membership, goals and efforts are directed by participants or participating organisations.

As has already been indicated, research within interorganisational networks has largely been generic and has focused predominantly on voluntary networks. Most of the discussions on the topic are drawn from generic interorganisational network research. The intention of the current research is to contribute an understanding

of the networks through the analysis of a specific type of network that is understudied (mandated and directed).

3.6 THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTRAGOVERNMENTAL COLLABORATIONS

Developing a conceptual framework involves identifying concepts within a phenomenon, defining them and thereafter linking them to form a coherent structure or outline (Berman and Smyth, 2015). A framework is useful as a starting point for thinking about the research and the context under which it is undertaken (Smyth, 2004).

A conceptual framework can be compiled in two ways. In the first instance, it can be constructed inductively following a literature survey (Leshem and Trafford, 2007; Berman and Smyth, 2015; Wald and Daniel, 2019). Alternatively, it can be constructed following field work or a research process as a means of building theory (Wald and Daniel, 2020). The former approach was adopted for this research.

Although a number of collaborative models such as those of Wood and Gray (1991) and Ansell and Gash (2008) take the form of input-process-output or antecedent-process-outcome, a different approach was proposed in line with the mandatory nature of the JCPS collaboration. Through literature, the following themes were identified:

- Antecedents of intragovernmental collaboration that represent dimensions that need to be in place prior to implementing a collaborative effort.
- Governance arrangements for intragovernmental collaboration, that are critical for addressing wicked problems require an extensive range of stakeholders.
- Intragovernmental collaborations as an on-going process.
- Feedback loops that must enable stakeholders to appraise, regroup and interact with active citizenry.

3.6.1 Antecedents of intragovernmental collaborations

Interorganisational partnerships are time consuming (Ansell and Gash, 2008, 2018). Before efforts to establish a network are undertaken, a few critical antecedents need to be in place. For intragovernmental collaborations, the proposed antecedents are goal clarity, trust and leadership.

- **Goal clarity**

The RDT stipulates that organisations identify interorganisational partnerships in order to access the resources needed to achieve their own goals (Hillman *et al.*, 2009; Gaffney, Kedia and Clampit, 2013; Escobar and Deshpande, 2018). Central to the interorganisational relationship is an exchange framework that should stipulate the goals and include role clarity. For example, the mandate should clearly articulate to participants the larger goal that is being addressed. Although it may not be clear at the start, a sense of direction needs to be created for stakeholders. Within the JCPS Cluster, it is important for each participating organisation to recognise that resources are being brought together to address

crime as a greater goal, not to create an environment where individual organisations lobby others to help address their own goals.

Organisations themselves are abstract and do not participate in interorganisational networks. It is individuals who participate. Vangen and Huxham (2011) caution against the disjuncture between collaborative goals, organisational goals and individual goals. Intragovernmental goals, with the additional dimension of a political environment, need special attention to ensure that the network is not doomed to failure due to this issue.

- **Trust**

Another antecedent for interorganisational networks based on the exchange framework is trust. For voluntary relationships, trust is central to the formation of the network, and breakdown in trust will likely spell the demise of any voluntary network that is underway. For mandated networks, trust will severely affect the functionality of the network, even if the network remains intact due to the mandate. It is, therefore, important in mandated networks to ensure that appropriate rules, routines and roles within the collaboration build trust (Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014). Trust can be both an antecedent and a process issue. If trust cannot be established, then collaboration should not be attempted. However, where trust can be built over time, then this should form part of the collaborative process (Ansell and Gash, 2008).

- **Leadership**

Leadership is critical to the success or failure of collaborative efforts. For addressing wicked problems, three leadership attributes are required. These are facilitation and skills management; ability to take appropriate actions (act, enable, observe); and attributes of reflexivity, resilience, responsiveness and revitalisation (Termeer *et al.*, 2015). In the context of addressing wicked problems, it is critical that a leader has an appropriate balance between transformation leadership that can excite and inspire action and collaborative leadership that is persuasive, builds trust and communicates effectively (Beinecke, 2009; Alford and Head, 2017; Kramer, Day, Nguyen, Hoelscher & Cooper, 2019).

Intragovernmental collaborations are generally mandated, and this often means that leaders who champion or participate in such collaborations are mandated. These leaders are often participants of collaborations due to the offices that they occupy. In some instances, participants and champions are rotated after a few years without careful consideration of the appropriate leadership needed to drive the collaboration forward. It is critical for high-ranking politicians, who often lead and mandate participants in intragovernmental collaborations, to identify leadership attributes and leadership styles that are appropriate for an intragovernmental collaboration.

3.6.2 Governance arrangements

Intragovernmental collaborations have a high level of interdependence and require the joint sharing of resources. It is, therefore, imperative to have formal and elaborate governance arrangements that will ensure appropriate management of

the collaboration (Rodriguez *et al.*, 2007). It is recommended that these should include governance structures, appropriate identification of participants, and mechanisms for resource sharing.

Institutional arrangements

It is understood through TCE that the effort to collaborate in order to improve efficiencies towards addressing a goal is offset by the governance cost of the collaboration (Oliver E. Williamson, 2008). It is, therefore, important to ensure that the governance arrangement assists the collaboration in meeting its objectives at an appropriate cost.

With reference to the Provan and Kenis (2008) model, wicked problems with large stakeholders and poor goal consensus point to the establishment of a Network Administration Office, which involves officials focusing almost exclusively on the management of the collaboration. Despite being costly, authors such as McGuire (2006) found this appropriate. Although it is tempting to use other approaches such as Lead Organisation, mandating authorities should carefully weigh the costs and benefits.

Appropriate rules of engagement between participants should be included in governance arrangements. This engagement moves beyond governmental agencies and involves engagements with citizens and entities not linked to government.

Appropriate participating organisations

A key feature of intragovernmental collaborations is that they have more than one organisation participating in a number of collaborations at different levels simultaneously. Managers within these networks manage relations that cut across levels of government (Edelenbos, Klijn and Steijn, 2011; Mandell, Keast and Chamberlain, 2017; Klijn, van Meerkerk and Edelenbos, 2020) The JCPS Cluster structures shown in Figure 6.2 illustrate this point and range from inter-ministerial committees at strategic levels to project teams and implementation committees at operational levels.

Mandating authorities should not only ensure that governance structures are in place to manage such interactions but also, and more importantly, that appropriate individuals are recruited to participate.

Mechanisms for resource sharing

The RBV of a firm emphasises the importance of organisations evaluating their resources in anticipation of identifying partnerships with other organisations. Sharing of resources is, therefore, an important factor in the decision to form interorganisational relationships (Julkunen, 2016; Klier *et al.*, 2017; Mischen, 2015).

It is critical for intragovernmental collaborations with high levels of interdependence to identify governance arrangements that will enable them to use the available resources efficiently. This means that intragovernmental collaborations should not only work towards a common goal but should also have the maturity to pool budget and human resources.

Knowledge is one of the key resources of exchange (Hardy *et al.*, 2003; Witherspoon, Bergner, Cockrell & Stone, 2013; Klier *et al.*, 2017; Caputo *et al.*, 2019). This means that the strength of the intragovernmental collaboration also lies in effective knowledge management, which entails effective transfer, receipt, and integration of knowledge across organisations and participants (Weber and Khademian, 2008; Mischen, 2015). Therefore, knowledge sharing as a strong consideration for mandatory collaborations needs to have proper governance arrangements.

3.6.3 Process of Intragovernmental Collaborations

The collaborative process is an iterative process of consensus building, planning, joint implementation and progress assessment. For intragovernmental collaborations, this is usually a long-term engagement through generations of participants. Key issues that need to be included in the on-going process of collaboration are presented.

Trust building

Mandated networks need to continue even in incidences where trust could be a problem. Leadership should, therefore, ensure that activities and decisions of the collaboration build trust rather than erode it by establishing appropriate rules, roles and routines (Klijn, Edelenbos & Steijn, 2010; Willem and Lucidarme, 2013; Muir and Mullins, 2015).

Management of power relations

The RDT stipulates that organisations with resources that are in short supply are deemed more powerful than those without resources (Drees and Heugens, 2013; Malatesta and Smith, 2014; Henderson and Smith-King, 2015). Issues of power in intragovernmental collaboration involve both unequal relationships based on resources and political power to influence decisions (Keller, 1984). Participants will, therefore, attempt to use their position of power to their advantage (Emerson, 1962). Other tactics that could be used by participants include coalition formations and threats of withdrawals (Emerson, 1962). The possible use and misuse of power by mandated authorities and participants within intragovernmental collaborations is, therefore, an issue that needs to be carefully managed.

Collaborative capability

Participants in intragovernmental collaborations are members of organisations with their own cultures, processes, systems and social structures (Selznick, 1948). Some of these organisations may display tendencies of immaturity regarding collaboration, which include underdeveloped strategic management processes, incoherent organisational structures, high individual versus organisational autonomy and poor management (Huxham and Macdonald, 1992).

Part of the collaborative processes should, therefore, include building collaborative capacity in the organisations that are critical to the success of the intragovernmental collaboration.

Collaborative strategic management

Intragovernmental collaborations should possess a framework that involves appropriate planning, implementation and evaluation of progress towards addressing wicked problems. Due to the level of interconnectedness between participating organisations of intragovernmental collaborations, a meta-strategy (joint strategy) consisting of meta-objectives, meta-resourcing and joint action plans is appropriate.

3.6.4 Feedback loops

Although most frameworks of interorganisational networks refer to 'outcomes' as a key component (Wood and Gray, 1991; Ansell and Gash, 2008; Clarke and Fuller, 2011), this is not the case with wicked problems. Because of the complexity and pervasiveness of wicked problems, problems cannot be tamed in the short to medium term (Termeer *et al.*, 2015). The success of taming wicked problems lies in the on-going process of engagement. In line with the Complexity Theory, feedback regarding the wicked problem being addressed is critical. This is necessary for both participants and the citizens at large. Because of the complexity, consensus regarding the feedback itself may be a challenge.

Dimensions aligned with feedback that have been identified through the Complexity Theory are as follows:

- Knowledge management
- Organisational learning and mental models
- Active citizenry

3.6.5 The Conceptual Framework Diagram

The proposed conceptual Framework for Intragovernmental Collaboration for addressing wicked problems considers antecedents, governance, collaborative framework and feedback loops. Figure 3.3 indicates the proposed framework.




Figure 3.3 Conceptual Framework for Intragovernmental Collaborations

3.7 CONCLUSION

Two approaches for the classification of interorganisational relationships were identified. The first was the 3Cs model of Keast, Brown and Mandell (2007) and the second was Schopler's (1987) four-quadrant model. These two models

provided the basis for the classification and understanding of interorganisational networks in general and intragovernmental collaborations in particular.

The 3Cs model of Keast, Brown and Mandell (2007) classifies relationships in terms of the nature of the network (i.e. cooperation, coordination and collaboration). It is important for leadership to apply the 3Cs appropriately. For example, where collaboration is the solution to a public problem, managers should not apply tactics fit for coordination or cooperation and vice versa.

The second and most important classification of interorganisational networks was through Schopler's (1987) model. Regarding groups, Type I refers to mandated and directed relationships typical of intragovernmental collaborations. Some of the characteristics include efficient participation (in line with the mandate) with a low level of member satisfaction and minimal quality of input. Intragovernmental collaborations form part of the study of collaborative governance.

A comprehensive model by Ansell and Gash (2008) presents a starting point for a framework for intragovernmental collaborations taming wicked problems. Using the Ansell and Gash (2008) model as a starting point and noting its shortcomings, the current research attempted to propose a framework for the admittedly difficult intragovernmental collaborations that were classified as both mandated and directed.

The conceptual Framework for Intragovernmental Collaborations was built using the RDT, TCE and the Complexity Theory. The dimensions that play a role in intragovernmental collaborations that were identified through literature were

arranged in a logical framework and identified as antecedents, governance, process and feedback. The arrangement is shown in Figure 5.1.

This research investigated the extent to which the JCPS collaboration and intragovernmental collaborations in general align with existing literature on interorganisational networks. A framework for intragovernmental collaborations in general, and the JCPS Cluster in particular was, therefore, the outcome of the current research.

CHAPTER 4: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a description of crime as a wicked problem in South Africa and discusses the involvement of the criminal justice system in dealing with the scourge. In line with the topic under research, intragovernmental collaborations within the criminal justice system form part of the description of the case.

4.2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Criminal justice is a collection of decisions that are made from the time crimes are committed to the time offenders have served their sentences (Walker, 1992; Feeley, 2018). Participants include the police, accused person, prosecutor, defence lawyer, magistrate or judge, other participants assisting the courts (witnesses, social workers, etc.) and administrative support (e.g. court clerks and prison officials) (Feeley, 2018; Swanepoel and Meiring, 2018).

The criminal justice system refers to government agencies that are responsible for the administration of criminal justice; these agencies are expected to work jointly to ensure the effectiveness of the system (Swanepoel and Meiring, 2018). The three key subsystems identified are policing, courts and corrections.

4.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

The three main components of the criminal justice system (police services, courts and correctional services) operate under different legislative mandates and receive separate budget allocations. The capacities and high-level output of these components are discussed herein.

The SAPS is a national government department led by a Member of Parliament (Minister of Police) appointed to this portfolio by the State President. The State President also appoints the administrative head of the institution (The National Commissioner) who in turn, appoints his/her Provincial Commissioners for the nine provinces and the heads of units in the National Office. There are over 1 138 police stations distributed throughout the country (South Africa, 2017d).

According to the SAPS Annual Report for 2018/19, there were 150 855 police officers employed, which represents a per capita headcount of 256 police officers per 100 000 population based on the 2019 population estimate of 58.8 million by Statistics South Africa (South Africa, 2019e). This figure is lower than the world average of 340 and higher than the average of 220 recommended by the United Nations (BusinessTech, 2015). Large cities such as Durban, Johannesburg, Cape Town and Pretoria have their own metropolitan police services, but these have limited jurisdiction (law enforcement and by-laws) and refer criminal cases to the SAPS. The United Nations study excluded these law enforcement agencies from their statistics. The SAPS received a budget allocation of R90.4 billion (approximately USD5 billion) for the 2018/19 financial year from the National Treasury.

Although the combined number of police at all levels of government and private security is high, the system is overburdened with a high number of reported cases of serious crimes. For the 2018/19 financial year, the SAPS recorded 1.65 million serious crimes. These included murder, rape, sexual assault, car hijackings and business and house robberies.

In 2017, the number of private security officers employed by security companies was 534 289 (South Africa, 2019d). This is more than twice the number of police officers and the military combined. South Africa has the fourth highest number of private security officers per capita in the world (*Daily Maverick*, 2017). Unlike the police service that performs both law enforcement and criminal investigations, private security companies provide guarding services, armed response and cash-in-transit services but have no authority to arrest. Communities that can afford private security maintain that private companies provide a more reliable response than the police.

The administration of justice is headed by the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services, who is a Member of Parliament and appointed to this portfolio by the State President. The Minister oversees the daily functioning of the courts, enabling the Judiciary and prosecution to deal with cases. In addition, the Minister oversees other legal administrative services that are rendered to members of the public and the State. According to the DOJCD Annual Performance Plan 2018/19, the Court Services Branch, which forms part of a larger responsibility of the Minister, was allocated a budget of R6.5 billion for the 2018/19 financial year (South Africa, 2019b). This amount was spent on court operations, new infrastructure,

refurbishments, administrative staff and administrative processes such as court recordings.

The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) of South Africa is headed by the NDPP who is appointed by the State President. Each of the nine provincial offices is headed by a Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) appointed by the State President. Although the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa affirms the independence of prosecutorial decisions, the institution reports to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development who is a Member of Parliament.

The NPA had 4 408 prosecutors and support staff at the end of the 2018/19 financial year and spent a budgeted amount of R3.8 billion, which included witness protection services, asset forfeiture and support services. Their annual report shows that 276 309 cases were cases finalised with a verdict and 149 469 were finalised through alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms (e.g. mediation). Of the 966 474 new dockets received from the police service for prosecution in District and Magistrates' Courts, 124 654 were accepted for prosecution and 508 5545 were declined. A total of 310 980 dockets were referred for further investigation and a small percentage was dealt with through fines, diversion and informal mediation. These figures illustrate that half of the cases that the police deem investigated and trial ready have poor prospects of a successful prosecution. Within the same year, 103 760 cases that were enrolled were withdrawn from the Magistrates' Courts. Although there are often valid reasons for the withdrawals, this large number of withdrawn cases is concerning. As already mentioned, issues are systematic and not attributable to a single organ of state. In addition, the

system depends on inputs from members of the public and witnesses for successful prosecutions of crime.

The Chief Justice is the Head of the Judiciary for both lower courts (District and Magistrates' Courts) in addition to the Superior Courts (High Courts, Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court). The appointment of a Chief Justice is made by the Judicial Service Commission, which consists of legal professionals, members of the ruling party and members of the opposition parties in Parliament. This process gives effect to the Judiciary as an independent arm of State to discharge judicial functions without fear or favour. Processes are currently under way to establish a mechanism that offers administrative independence for the Judiciary. However, in 2018/19, the administrative processes of the Judiciary were still overseen by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development.

At the end of the 2018/19 financial year, there were 1 895 magistrates for the lower courts. The magistracy had 2 324 posts approved, demonstrating a vacancy rate of 19%. The Chief Justice establishes norms and standards for the performance of the magistrates and has mechanisms in place to assess their performance.

The DCS is headed by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, who is a Member of Parliament. The National Commissioner (Administrative Head) is appointed by the State President together with nine Provincial Commissioners. During the 2018/19 financial year, the department had an average prison population of 162 875 consisting of both awaiting trial inmates and sentenced offenders (South Africa, 2019a). The approved bed space of 118 572 indicates an overcrowding rate of over 37% during that year. Although overcrowding has

decreased through the involvement of the JCPS Cluster's interventions on bail and other initiatives, overcrowding remains a problem. During the same year, the department had 70 532 parolees under their care. The total budget spent during the financial year was R24 billion, with a staff complement of 38 344 responsible for incarcerations, rehabilitation, care, social integration and administration.

The capacities of the three key components reveal a largely unbalanced picture. The police service appears to be large, but it is ineffective as illustrated by the high number of cases that have no prospect of successful prosecution. Regarding prosecutions, many enrolled cases are withdrawn while offenders who are incarcerated and cared for by taxpayers' money tend to return due to the prevalent socio-economic conditions outside prison.

4.4 THE JUSTICE CRIME PREVENTION AND SECURITY CLUSTER

Recognising the complexity of the problem, the South African government put together an intragovernmental collaboration to fight crime. Cabinet approved the first National Crime Prevention Strategy for South Africa in 1996 (Rauch, 2001). This strategy was formulated through an inter-ministerial committee led by the Minister of Safety and Security with participants from the departments of Correctional Services, Defence, National Intelligence, Justice, Safety and Security and Welfare (Shaw, 1996). This was the first instance of intragovernmental collaboration on crime prevention in South Africa at a strategic level.

The strategy consisted of four pillars:

1. Pillar 1: Criminal Justice Process was meant to address process issues such as prosecutorial policies, child justice processes, criminal statistics and performance.
2. Pillar 2: Reducing crime through environmental design included the implementation of an effective national population identification system, a commercial crime strategy, and regulations for motor vehicles.
3. Pillar 3: Public Values and Education emphasised the role of the community in preventing crime and educating school-going children in addition to public relations efforts.
4. Pillar 4: Trans-national crime emphasised organised crime and border control in crime prevention.

Business Against Crime (BAC) is an organisation that was founded in 1996 by large private sector institutions in support of the implementation of government's crime prevention strategy. The collaboration was initially operated through the Network Administration Model (Provan and Kenis, 2008) where the BAC project office championed and coordinated government departments towards addressing crime. Direct participation by BAC was reduced as the formation of the JCPS Cluster took shape and developed into a Self-Governed Network.

An Integrated Justice System (IJS)-Project Office and the IJS-User Board was established in 1997 to begin the work. The recommendations of the Mulweli Consortium to the IJS Board included identification of 96 quick-fix projects, 26 fast-track projects, and six enterprise-level projects for the criminal justice

system. Key successes of the IJS Board were limited and included implementation of bail protocol to reduce the number of awaiting trial inmates in addition to implementation of alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms.

In November 2007, Cabinet approved a seven-point plan of the criminal justice system to address the blockages that have been identified within the criminal system. The points included adoption of a single mission and vision for the criminal justice system and implementation of an integrated modern information system for sharing criminal data within the criminal justice system.

The seven-point plan was an attempt to develop a meta-strategy as envisioned by Huxham and Macdonald (1992). Although several projects were identified and implemented, the meta-strategy that included a joint mission and vision and integrated planning and resourcing was never fully realised. This “collaborative inertia” (Huxham and Vangen, 2004:191) could be attributed to leadership issues together with difficulties in managing complexities and people and other dynamics within the system.

By 2017, the IJS Board was operational and to date, continues to implement an IT platform that enables the seamless monitoring of the criminal justice system. A report given to the Parliament of South Africa in 2017 indicated that the case-management systems of the DOJCD, the NPA and the SAPS were integrated and case data were being exchanged through the IJS transversal system (South Africa, 2017c)

In 2010, government, through the DPME, adopted the Outcomes Approach to service delivery and identified 13 outcomes of governments together with key

performance indicators for the monitoring thereof (South Africa, 2010). In regard to Outcome 3, 'All People in South Africa Are and Feel Safe' and in line with the outcomes guide, the JCPS Cluster needed to ensure the development of objectives and indicators that lead to achievement of the national outcome.

Outcome 3 consisted of eight outputs, with indicators and targets for specific departments and government agencies:

1. Output 1 focused on crime prevention through the reduction of serious crime, particularly contact and trio crimes.
2. Output 2 focused on establishing an effective criminal justice system by reducing case backlogs and similar initiatives.
3. Output 3 focused on addressing corruption within the JCPS Cluster to ensure its effectiveness and its ability to serve as a deterrent against crime.
4. Output 4 focused on improving and managing perceptions of crime among the population.
5. Output 5 focused on improving investor perceptions of South Africa.
6. Output 6 focused on effective border control.
7. Output 7 focused on the integrity of the national identity system.
8. Output 8 focused on combating cybercrime (South Africa, 2010).

Each cluster, through the leadership of a Minister, is responsible for quarterly or six-monthly reporting of progress to Cabinet and all are Self-Governed networks. For the JCPS Cluster, the Strategy and Performance Monitoring Committee was tasked with compiling progress reports for discussion by the Directors-General

(DGs) of the Cluster, Ministers and Cabinet. Figure 4.1 shows the cluster subcommittees active in 2018 together with the reporting lines to the Cabinet.




Figure 4.1 JCPS Cluster structures and reporting lines, 2019

In their evaluation of crime prevention, Pelser and Louw (2002) caution against the overemphasis of a multi-agency approach, which appears to be a means to an end. The JCPS Cluster with its extensive subcommittees and participants could fall into this trap. Nonetheless, some level of success has been achieved by the cluster through 20 years of collaboration.

The bail protocol that was introduced has made an impact on the number of awaiting trial prisoners within the system, which is evident in the drop in the reported awaiting-trial figures (South Africa, 2017a). Other JCPS initiatives such as the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms have enabled the system to reduce the number of cases on court rolls.

The contribution of the JCPS Cluster to the successful hosting of the FIFA World Cup 2010 through coordination between the JCPS, the Metropolitan Police Services and private security towards policing is another case in point. The work included the implementation of special purpose courts where cases related to tourists were dealt with speedily through the courts.

The case-management systems of the SAPS (Case Administration System [CAS]), the NPA (Enforcement Case Management System [ECMS]) and the Department of Justice (Integrated Case Management System [ICMS]), which were piloted in 2013, were successfully integrated (South Africa, 2017b). This initiative reduced the amount of data capturing between departments and enabled sharing of basic case information such as details of suspects and charges.

The finalisation of key legislation such as the Child Justice Act and the Trafficking in Persons Act, which involved the coordination of different Cluster departments, were successful. However, full implementation and effectiveness of such laws remain a challenge.

Challenges still remain within the collaboration at a strategic level. For example, joint resource planning remains a challenge, that is, different departments still work with individual budgets and negotiate these as individual departments. As a result,

capacity planning and implementation issues remain. System-wide performance indicators for cluster-level monitoring are still not finalised. Experiences and issues regarding the challenges are a subject of the current research.

4.5 CRIME AS A WICKED PROBLEM

In simple terms, crime is the perpetration of an act that is known to be unlawful and punishable by identified organs of state (Collins, 2020). Although there is commonly understood crime such as murder and theft, different countries and different jurisdictions within countries identify crimes differently; this is largely affected by underlying values and norms. For example, crimes such as prostitution and drug possession are treated differently in different environments. Within the context of the current research, crime refers to crime against property and persons (e.g. theft, rape, murder, assault) and includes business-related crime. These crimes are widely reported, easily understood and can present reasonably acceptable comparisons between countries.

From a sociological perspective, criminality is seen as deviation from socially accepted norms and behaviour (Savage and Kanazawa, 2002; Henry, 2018). The source of the deviant behaviour is complex and can be linked to a broad range of psychological, economic and political issues. Furthermore, this behaviour can be influenced by the response and effectiveness of the criminal justice system (Jacobs and Cherbonneau, 2018).

Crime in South Africa has been a persistent problem for decades. Although the profiles of crime have been changing over time, the picture shows a persistent and a pervasive complex problem.

Although it is not accurate to classify South Africa as a murder capital of the world, the persistently high murder rate indicates the intensity of the problem. The highest murder rate of 64 per 100 000 population recorded in 1994 was largely fuelled by political violence. In the last ten years, the figure stabilised around 34 murders per 100 000 people against the recorded world average of six (UNODC, 2013) . Within the continent, the average murder rate of 14 is still less than half the South African figure.

The decrease in the number of sexual offences reported in South Africa from 64 921 in 2010/11 to 53 293 in 2019/20 (South Africa, 2020) is comforting when population growth is taken into consideration. While the SAPS reports sexual offences in the magnitude of 50 000 a year, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) finalises approximately 6 000 cases per year, with a conviction rate of 70% (South Africa, 2019c).

In many instances, these convictions are for lesser charges. For example, a study conducted by the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa found that on average, 4% of reported rape cases have rape convictions at the end of the court processes (Vetten, 2014). The study concludes that the criminal justice system is not an effective deterrent for sexual offences.

In regard to other violent crimes, South Africa continues to fare badly. The number of trio crimes (car hijacking, business robbery, residential robbery) reported to the

police is approximately 60 000 per year, whereas the NPA finalises approximately 1 700 of such crimes with an 85% conviction rate (South Africa, 2018b, 2019c). It should be emphasised that weaknesses are system-wide and cannot be solely attributed to the NPA.

A survey entitled *Victims of Crime* is an annual survey of 33 000 households that provides a view of the changing perception of crime and the agencies responsible for addressing it. The results of this survey demonstrate a grim picture of crime and the criminal justice system. Households who perceive violent crime to have escalated or to have remained the same increased from 57% in 2011 to 70.6% in 2017 (South Africa, 2018c). The findings further revealed that the percentage of households satisfied with the police service decreased from 64% in 2011 to 54% in 2017 (South Africa, 2018c). Similarly, satisfaction regarding courts decreased from 65% to 41%.

This survey confirms that efforts that are currently being undertaken in the criminal justice system are not felt by members of the public. This is clear from the high levels of crime, low reporting figures, inadequate responses by the police, slow and discouraging court processes and other issues.

Peculiar to South Africa is the high level of violent crime (Holtmann and Domingo-Swartz, 2008). Crime is often not an economic or a social-misfit problem but a sign of deep-rooted social problems. For example, data from the police service indicate that a large majority of offences such as assault and assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm (89%), murder (82%) and rape (76%) are perpetrated by

persons known to the victim. This indicates the extent to which people tend to settle disputes violently.

One of the studies undertaken by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) involved a series of in-depth interviews with violent crime offenders to understand the root causes of crime (CSVR, 2008). This study was conducted in a Johannesburg and a Cape Town correctional facility and involved interviews with offenders who were in their twenties and early thirties. It was found that the offenders had prior history of offending while at school. Another key factor that was identified was unstable or dysfunctional family structures, which often involved neglect and abuse. These people were often raised in households and environments characterised by neglect, alcohol and drugs. In addition, the men revealed that they understood violence to be an acceptable means of settling disputes and affirming their masculinity. Many admitted to having been accused of sexual offences in their past (CSVR, 2008).

The study drew the following conclusions regarding crime in South Africa:

- Crime has become normalised (i.e. violence is a necessary and justified means of resolving conflict).
- A substantial proportion of males believe that coercive sexual behaviour against women is legitimate.
- A prevalent subculture of violence and criminality that includes gangsterism, theft and other delinquencies exists.
- Unstable living arrangements for children who are brought up with inconsistent and inadequate parenting often lead to criminal behaviour.

- The high levels of inequality, poverty, unemployment, social exclusion and marginalisation often lead to criminality.
- Abuse of alcohol and drugs fuel crime (CSV, 2008).

South Africa has one of the highest incidences of Foetal Alcohol Syndrome, particularly in the Western Cape of South Africa. This is due to the system of paying people working on wine farms with cheap, low-grade wine instead of cash. Although outlawed in the 1960s, the legacy of this practice remains (Bowers, Rendall-Mkosi, Davids, Nel, Jacobs & London, 2014; May, Marais, De Vries, Hasken, Stegall, Hedrick *et al.*, 2019).

Another detrimental practice that encourages alcohol consumption is the decades-old *shebeen* culture that took root in South African townships where people use their own houses as drinking spots or taverns to earn an income (CSV, 2009). With very few recreational options available, people from neighbourhoods gather and consume alcohol, often in an environment with ineffective regulation and law enforcement. The police of a small town in the Karoo (less than 7 000 people) alleged that there were 64 known illegal outlets in that town (Holtmann, 2008). These illegal taverns are often found near inappropriate areas such as schools. With the high unemployment rates in townships, this is another environment dominated by poverty, alcohol and violence whose socio-economic issues are linked to crime.

The connection between alcohol and crime has been confirmed by several studies. For example, a study by Holtmann (2008) confirms that crimes involving violence are prevalent on Saturdays, followed by Fridays and thereafter, Sundays. Many

South Africans do not work on Saturdays and Sundays and, therefore, social gatherings are arranged within these days. Holtmann (2008) revealed that of the violent crimes committed in 2006, 47% of the victims of murder, 66% of the trauma victims and 44% of the rape victims had a high alcohol content in their blood during their ordeal. South African's use of alcohol for recreation coupled with poverty and a culture of violence exacerbates the crime situation.

Once incarcerated, many inmates tend to reoffend and return to prison. Accurate statistics of recidivism (reoffending) in South Africa are not available, but it is known to be very high. For example, in a study for repeat offences, it was found that 55–60% of people in the database of the Criminal Records Centre of the SAPS were repeat offenders (Murhula and Singh, 2019). This figure includes low-priority, non-custodial sentences for crimes. Statistics of recidivism from correctional centres are much higher. For example, anecdotal evidence from Pollsmoor Maximum Security Prison in Cape Town revealed that prisoners spend, on average, six weeks outside prison after their release before returning (Pelser and Rauch, 2001).

Participants often alluded to 'fear of life' after incarceration (Ngabonziza and Singh, 2012; Singh, 2016). Their fear was based on returning to a life of socio-economic issues and a hostile environment upon release. This shows that the underlying root causes of crime are not being addressed by incarceration or the attempted rehabilitation in the prisons.

It follows from these points that the South African crime situation cannot be addressed in isolation. It needs the involvement of a far greater number of

government agencies and stakeholders. The depth to which crime is entrenched shows that the problem is beyond complex and is downright wicked.

Holtmann (2008) proposed a model that would help South Africa break the cycle of poverty (Figure 4.2). From this figure, a key area of focus for breaking the cycle lies in dealing with at-risk families and communities. It starts with ensuring that no child is born under conditions of extreme poverty and/or domestic violence and focuses on the plight of the mothers. The aim is to ensure that a 15-year-old mother does not have a daughter who becomes a mother at 15 years old or a son who is in conflict with the law at the age of 15 years (CSV, 2009). Law enforcement agencies must discourage criminal behaviour, adequately deal with those who inadvertently enter the system and ensure appropriate rehabilitation programmes.




Figure 4.2 Framework for breaking the cycle of crime

Source: Holtmann (2008)

In line with the model of Head and Alford (2015) and based on the description of crime in South Africa, its wickedness can be classified as Level 3. It has been shown that, firstly, crime is pervasive. Despite crime being a major area of strategic focus for government, a series of strategic and implementation plans over a 20-year period have not delivered substantial improvement.

Secondly, crime has a major socio-economic background that can be traced to challenges within family structures, which are fuelled by behaviours such as the distractive alcohol drinking culture and toxic masculinity issues. The problem is, therefore, multidisciplinary.

Thirdly, attempts to solve crime have not indicated a clearly defined road map on what the key focus areas are and how crime should be approached. For example, the extent to which the country focuses on commercial crimes vs. social crimes vs. contact crimes does not indicate clear focus areas or approach. There is also no clearly understood and communicated strategy to the public and other stakeholders on the approach to addressing crime.

4.6 CONCLUSION

South Africa's murder rate was shown to be much higher than the global and African rates. Peculiar to the country is the extent and persistence of violent crime.

The pervasiveness and challenges of crime have received a fair amount of attention from different sectors. Extensive research has been presented by a wide

variety of non-governmental organisations such as the Institute for Security Studies, the Centre for the Study of Crime and Violence and state entities such as the Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), Stats SA and various academic institutions. The crime statistics are extensively analysed by criminologists and journalists.

Possible root causes of crime have been identified and modelled. The framework provided through the CSIR study of 2006 clarifies the source of violent crime and identifies risk factors such as dysfunctional families, alcohol abuse, culture of violence and toxic masculinity as risk factors and how to address them. Implementation of crime prevention strategies have been formulated and implemented at local level (e.g. the Karoo study by Holtmann, 2008).

Furthermore, it has been shown that the criminal justice system itself is not severely under-resourced by world standards, but the system has inefficiencies and blockages that have been identified through criminal statistics. Crime was shown to go largely unpunished, with poor throughput between different subsystems of the criminal justice system. Despite additional private sector funding from organisations such as BAC, the crime rates have not significantly decreased.

Government recognised the need to bring all key governmental role players together and coordinated the JCPS Cluster. This intragovernmental collaboration has been in operation for almost 20 years and through the years, a number of subcommittees and task teams have been formed to address crime and related issues. The JCPS Cluster and its network of committees and reporting structures

illustrates the importance that government places on the criminal justice system and the willingness to commit people, time and effort to it.

Attempts have been made since 1996 to put together a meta-strategy for the JCPS Cluster. Formulation of the joint mission and vision for the cluster in addition to arriving at system-level performance standards that are acceptable to all cluster parties were not realised. Similar to other wicked problems experienced by government, this section illustrates the need for an effective strategic management framework that will enable proper planning and implementation of programmes.

The JCPS Cluster is an ideal case to study intragovernmental collaboration because of the following:

- It is a long-standing collaboration whose history can be traced to 1996.
- It consists of an extensive number of subcommittees, some operating at a collaborative level and others focusing on coordinating and cooperative efforts.
- The collaboration addresses crime, which is a major challenge facing South Africa and which has an impact on sustainability of the country in terms of loss of investments, skills flight and other consequences.
- It is a wicked problem; it is difficult to arrive at a consensus regarding solutions and it is pervasive.
- Being in South Africa, the collaboration will enable a detailed study of intragovernmental collaboration in a developing country.

The current research created a crucial opportunity to use intragovernmental collaboration and strategic management approaches to address such wicked problems.

CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Qualitative research methods focus on studying the complexity of phenomena in their natural environment (Leedy and Ormrod, 2013). The current research sought to uncover experiences and explanations through detailed narratives of Senior and Top Managers. The in-depth exploration of the phenomenon of intragovernmental collaboration experienced by these managers represented a constructivist approach.

Interactive Qualitative Analysis was adopted as the research method due to the exploratory nature of the approach and its relevance in addressing research questions. Interactive Qualitative Analysis is a qualitative method by which a systematic process of data collection, analysis and interpretation are merged as a whole through a process of interaction between the researcher and the participants (Du Preez and Du Preez, 2012).

Interactive Qualitative Analysis emphasises the development of theory through the interactions between participants who share their experiences with the researcher (Northcutt and McCoy, 2004). It is for this reason that the data collection instruments used in the current research were not based on the detailed literature research that had already been conducted. In-depth comparisons between the findings of the current research and those in literature were, therefore, made after data collection and analysis.

A key feature of the IQA lies in its emphasis on the systems approach to research. According to Northcutt and McCoy (2004), a system is a representation of any phenomenon through a specific reality or angle. For example, intragovernmental collaboration itself is a system, while the criminal justice is also a system. In line with well-established system theory, Northcutt and McCoy (2004) further describe a system as consisting of different components and having interrelationships between these components. It is, therefore, important to understand that any wicked problem cannot be addressed without understanding the individual components and the interactions between them. Interactive Qualitative Analysis as a research method is alive to the systemic nature of phenomena and was, therefore, an appropriate research design.

5.2 BACKGROUND ON INTERACTIVE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

A paradigm is a set of beliefs that define how an individual views and makes sense of the world (Abdullah Kamal, 2019; Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Khaldi, 2017). These basic beliefs are sometimes referred to as philosophical worldviews (Creswell, 2013). Paradigms in research explain how researchers view the world and explain the angle from which researchers understand and explain their research. Paradigms are explained through four dimensions.

Ontology explains the nature of the reality (Abdullah Kamal, 2019; Creswell, 2013). This refers to whether reality exists independently of individuals or whether individuals have their own reality based on their background and experience. Within intragovernmental collaboration of the JCPS Cluster, it is understood that

individual experiences are influenced by each individual's outlook and values. From an ontological point of view, there is, therefore, no universal or singular reality but a multitude, which are shared and acknowledged through the research. Interactive Qualitative Analysis as a research design is constructivist and recognises reality as socially constructed (Abdullah Kamal, 2019; Wahyuni, 2012).

In identifying people who live the experience, IQA acknowledges that people who possess intimate knowledge of a phenomenon and people with power over the phenomenon are the most relevant to produce the knowledge (Northcutt and McCoy, 2004). For the current research, the researcher identified appropriate constituents and the manner in which these constituents were to be involved in the research.

Epistemology refers to the manner in which knowledge is generated and understood (Wahyuni, 2012). In other words, epistemology refers to the extent in which a researcher finds comfort in the level of objectivity and subjectivity of the knowledge being generated. The current research focused on understanding experiences and explanations from different managers. Knowledge was, therefore, generated through the interpretation of their realities.

Within IQA, the understanding of a phenomenon is developed through both deductive and inductive processes (Davis, 2019; Marx and de Swardt, 2019; Northcutt and McCoy, 2004). The process of identification of dimensions affecting intragovernmental collaboration (affinities) by participants represented a process of induction, while establishment of interrelationships between these dimensions followed a deductive process. The objective of the research was, therefore, to

produce theory of intragovernmental collaborations built through the experiences of managers using the IQA process.

Axiology refers to the set of values that a researcher subscribes to and was brought into the research enquiry (Abdullah Kamal, 2019; Wahyuni, 2012). These values could explain the perceived biased views held by the researcher (Creswell, 2013). This means that interactions between the researcher, his/her research and the participants are expected, to some extent, to reflect the values of the researcher. The researcher is a Senior Manager in the DOJCD and is, therefore, part of the Senior Managers within the JCPS Cluster. The researcher acknowledges that her experiences may differ substantially from other Senior Managers due to her background, values and attitudes that differ from other individuals.

The role of the researcher and participants within the IQA is described as interdependent, which means that the researcher and the participants participate in data collection and analysis (Northcutt and McCoy, 2004; Cook and Geldenhuys, 2018; Du Preez and Stiglingh, 2018). This is contrary to some qualitative methods in which participants are mainly involved with data collection and the researcher performs the analysis. For the current research, managers were involved in the identification of dimensions affecting their intragovernmental collaboration and worked with the researcher to identify relationships between these dimensions.

Constructivism as a paradigm and IQA as a research design recognised the ontological stance of multiple realities, the epistemological stance of knowledge

generation through multiple realities, and the axiological angle of the interconnectedness between the values of the researcher and her research.

The four key steps that make up an IQA enquiry are research design, focus groups, interviews and reporting (Northcutt and McCoy, 2004) and are described hereunder.

5.3 INTERACTIVE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS RESEARCH DESIGN

5.3.1 Problem statement

The first step in research design for IQA is the identification of the problem or phenomenon that requires further investigation. For the current research, the problem that was investigated was the 'ineffective intragovernmental collaborations to address crime'.

5.3.2 Constituencies and participants

To understand the phenomenon, it is necessary to analyse it as a system by identifying and analysing its subsystems. Within this analysis, it is crucial to identify different constituencies (groups of people) who provide different perspectives. Two key groups were identified: (i) those who have knowledge and experience regarding a phenomenon, and (ii) those with power over it (Davis, 2019; Northcutt and McCoy, 2004).

The Distance Power Analysis (Table 5.1) was used to identify the constituencies who have knowledge and experience regarding intragovernmental collaboration within the JCPS Cluster and the constituencies with power over it.

Table 5.1 Distance Power Analysis for constituencies

Constituency	Distance	Power (Administrative)	Decision
Senior Managers	Immediate	Adequate	Convene
Top Managers	Immediate	Adequate	Convene
Government Ministers	Immediate	Inadequate	Leave out
Legislators	Removed	Inadequate	Leave out

Senior Managers

Purposive sampling was used to identify the participants of the research. A purposive sample relies on the judgement of the researcher to select participants who will provide the insights needed to address the research questions (Sharma, 2017). The researcher identified Senior Managers participating in the JCPS Cluster who have in-depth knowledge of intragovernmental collaboration within the JCPS Cluster and who fit the following criteria:

1. Levels 13–14 for government departments or the equivalent for public entities
2. At least two years of participation in one of the JCPS Cluster structures

A total of 22 Senior Managers were identified as meeting both the criteria and were invited to take part in the research. Of these, 16 Senior Managers agreed to participate and received email invitations. On the day of the focus group, ten participants managed to attend but six had to cancel at short notice due to pressing issues.

For the semi-structured interviews, ten participants were interviewed, three of whom did not participate in the focus group. A list of the 13 Senior Management participants who were involved in the focus group and the semi-structured interviews is presented in Annexure B.

Top Managers

The JCPS Cluster has a limited number of Top Managers who participate within the cluster. For example, the number of DGs of the core JCPS Cluster (Chief Executive equivalent) that is required for a quorum of the JCPS DGs meeting is eight, according to terms of reference. These include the SAPS, the DOJC, the DCS and the Department of Home Affairs. The remaining ten DGs include those from departments such as Communications, South African Revenue Services and International Relations; these DGs are not heavily immersed in the JCPS Cluster experience and only attend meetings when required.

Although eight Top Managers were targeted for participation in the semi-structured interviews, only five participated. It should be noted that two of the participants were in Top Management acting positions and had been for an extended time. Both these participants were experienced in their areas of leadership.

A list of the Top Managers who took part in the semi-structured interviews is presented in Annexure B.

5.3.3 Focus group (Senior Managers)

A focus group is a data collection method that is based on collecting information from a group rather than from one individual at a time. Focus groups are useful for

determining views and the meanings behind those views (Gill, Stewart, Treasure & Chadwick, 2008; Gill and Baillie, 2018) and provide richer and more spontaneous reactions than individual participation (Onwuegbuzie, Dickinson, Leech & Zoran, 2009; Plummer, 2017; Nyumba, Wilson, Derrick & Mukherjee, 2018). Despite little contact with the researcher, focus groups yield a relatively large amount of data (Nyumba *et al.*, 2018; Parker and Tritter, 2006). The role of focus groups in IQA is to gather key information from a group of people through a highly interactive and a consensus-driven approach.

For Senior Managers, a single focus group session was undertaken and deemed appropriate given the limited number of potential participants. First, the IQA provided in-built rigour that encouraged broad and intensive participation during data collection and analysis. Second, the researcher took special care to ensure that the invited participants could raise diverse opinions without fear (Smithson, 2000).

Although the ideal number of participants recommended for focus groups generally ranges from 6 to 12 (Nyumba *et al.*, 2018; Onwuegbuzie *et al.*, 2009), Northcutt and McCoy (2004) identify the ideal number of participants for IQA focus groups to be 12. However, they admit that this number is not prescriptive and circumstances and research questions should be considered (Northcutt and McCoy, 2004).

The focus group, therefore, proceeded with ten participants, and this was deemed sufficient for the current research for three reasons. First, further inputs were planned through semi-structured interviews and missing key participants were to

be included in the interview phase. Second, it was noted that further postponement of the focus group could discourage existing participants from committing to a later date since participation was purely voluntary. Third, there were indications that the IQA could proceed successfully with less than 12 participants, as indicated in theses by Tabane (2010), Bonthuys (2016) and Burgers (2018).

Although focus groups are recommended for identification of affinities for each constituency (Northcutt and McCoy, 2004), it was deemed that for Top Managers, a focus group was not viable and only semi-structured interviews were undertaken. This was due to the limited number of potential participants available and the difficulties in accessing them on the same day for a focus group. A focus group was, therefore, only convened for Senior Managers and the affinities identified were thereafter used in the Top Manager interviews.

A facilitator with experience in IQA was recruited for the focus group session, not only to enable the researcher to observe and take field notes but also to ensure that the researcher who is a member of the constituency did not overly influence the process.

The focus group took place on 6 November 2019 with 10 of the 13 participants taking part. The focus group was arranged in Pretoria Central, which is a convenient location for members of governmental departments. In addition, the venue was familiar to most of the participants since cluster meetings sometimes take part therein.

The objective of the focus group was twofold – identification of affinities by participants and identification of relationships between them by individual participants.

5.3.3.1 Identification of affinities

The facilitator began the focus group by laying the foundation regarding the topic under discussion. The brief included a description of the crime challenges and a high-level indication on how they have been addressed by the clusters. The facilitator was careful to avoid judgement and words that might have had an influence on the thoughts of the participants.

Thereafter, the facilitator provided participants with the following issue statement from which to share their thoughts.

“Tell me about the things that positively or negatively affect intragovernmental collaboration within the JCPS Cluster.”

Following a discussion on the issue statement, approximately 15 minutes was allocated for a silent brainstorming session in which participants could apply their minds without influence from other participants. Participants were requested to write a thought, key word, sentence, etc. on a Post-It Note and were thereafter instructed to tape the notes on the wall in rows and columns where everyone could view them. After clarification and discussion, participants took a break to attend to their mobile phones.

Inductive coding

Coding refers to the process of finding meaning in data (Charmaz and Belgrave, 2007). The Post-It Notes that were written by the participants represented the basic building blocks of the coding process. Participants took turns to arrange their notes on the board, and all the participants studied the entire wall of Post-It Notes.

During inductive coding (open coding), participants arranged the notes into clusters. This was an iterative process until all members were satisfied with the arrangement of the Post-It Notes.

Axial coding

Once the researcher and participants had completed the initial clustering process, participants were encouraged to review, extend, realign or subdivide clusters to arrive at a consensual arrangement of notes. A further five minutes were given to rethink the positioning of the notes. Thereafter, participants proceeded to give each cluster (affinity) a name.

5.3.3.2 Interrelationships (Focus group)

Theoretical coding involves identification of relationships between affinities (Northcutt and McCoy, 2004). This began with each participant completing an Affinity Relationship Table (ART) to indicate the relationship between the identified affinities. For every two affinities, there were three possible relationships: 1 influences 2 ($1 \rightarrow 2$), 2 influences 1 ($1 \leftarrow 2$) or there was no influence (1×2).

The ARTs were completed individually to enable the researcher to identify the broad range of individual responses and to facilitate discussions for the

semi-structured interviews. Participants were encouraged to explain the relationships if they believed it necessary for clarity.

To conclude the work undertaken through the focus group, descriptions of the affinities identified in the focus group were outlined. In line with recommendations of Northcutt and McCoy (2014), the write-up was grounded in the text and care was taken to use the words of the participants. These descriptions were subsequently used to provide background during the individual interviews.

5.3.4 Semi-structures interviews (Senior Managers)

The objective of the individual interview phase was to provide an opportunity for further exploration of the affinities that were identified during the Senior Management focus group session and a discussion of the relationships thereof. This initiative provided the researcher with an opportunity to contrast diverse individual views in order to develop a deeper understanding of intragovernmental collaboration.

The second objective of semi-structured interviews was triangulation, which enabled the researcher to clarify through description the interrelationships that Senior Managers identified during the focus group session (Leedy and Ormrod, 2013; Natow, 2019).

5.3.4.1 *Description of affinities*

Ten Senior Managers were available for the interviews, three of whom did not participate in the focus group. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 90 minutes and were undertaken over a one-month period.

For each affinity, the researcher read out short descriptions from the focus group and requested participants to provide their own understanding and description of the affinity. All eight affinities were thus described.

The transcripts of the Senior Manager interviews were combined into one document and loaded onto Microsoft Excel. Each paragraph of the transcript appeared on a separate row for easy identification and to create references for the quotations.

This interview process was followed for the five Top Managers who participated.

5.3.4.2 Composite Systems Influence Diagram

Section 2 of the Interview Protocol gave participants an opportunity to revisit the relationships between the affinities that they had provided during the focus group. For participants who were part of the focus group, this became a process of triangulation and confirmation on the one hand and an opportunity to provide explanation on the other hand.

The Systems Influence Diagram (SID) was composed using a number of steps. This process included compiling an ART, an Interrelationship Table and SIDs, as described hereafter.

Explanations and examples for each of the 28 relationships were requested, and these provided further descriptions of the JCPS collaboration by participants.

The transcripts of the Senior Manager interviews (including interrelationship explanations) were combined into one document and loaded onto Microsoft Excel. Each paragraph of the transcript appeared on a separate row for easy identification

and to create references for the quotations in regard to the affinities and participants.

5.3.4.3 Combined Affinity Relationship Table

The composite ART was drawn to show affinity pairs and the frequencies (individual votes from participants) from the highest to those receiving no votes.

To determine the number of these relationships that was deemed important enough to explain intragovernmental collaborations, the Pareto Principle was applied. This principle was used to determine the maximum number of relationships that best explains the variation within the system. This is because it is important to explain the system optimally, using the lowest number of affinity relationships possible.

5.3.4.4 Interrelationship Table

The theoretical coding aspect continued with the development of the interrelationship diagram (IRD) for the combined interview input. The Interrelationship Table shows a classification of affinities according to the extent to which they are drivers or outcomes of the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration. Drivers are those affinities that relatively influence intragovernmental collaboration, and outcomes are affinities that are influenced (Davis, 2019; Northcutt and McCoy, 2004).

5.3.4.5 Systems Influence Diagrams

Systems Influence Diagrams are box-and-arrow depictions of the key relationships detailed in the ART. Affinities were arranged in such a way that relative drivers

were on the left side of the page and relative outcomes on the right. All the relationships identified as key on the ART were then indicated with arrows. The box-and-arrow depiction represented the Cluttered SID.

The Cluttered SID was simplified by removing the paths that were redundant. For example, where 'a' influences 'b' and 'b' influences 'c', then the relationship 'a' influences 'c' is redundant because the path from a to c is already available. This then resulted in simplified and easy-to-explain relationship diagrams (Uncluttered SID)

5.3.4.6 Individual Systems Influence Diagrams

The IQA approach encourages examination of individual realities in addition to the combined reality of focus groups and interviews. This is in line with the objectives of the current research, which sought a deep understanding of intragovernmental collaboration through the experiences of individuals. This in-depth understanding, therefore, includes the examination of descriptions, ARTs and SIDs at an individual level.

Comparisons among individual Senior Managers and comparisons between Senior and Top Managers were made.

5.3.5 Semi-structures interviews (Top Managers)

5.3.5.1 Description of affinities

The interviews for Top Managers followed the same approach as that used for Senior Managers. Short descriptions of affinities from the focus group were read out for each of the eight affinities that were described, and the Top Managers

provided their own experiences and observations for each. Under Section 2 of the interview script, relationships between affinities were described, giving practical examples.

5.3.5.2 Systems Influence Diagram


The process to draw the composite Top Manager SID was the same as that for Senior Managers.

5.3.5.3 Individual views

Systems Influence Diagrams were drawn for each of the five participants and these were compared and contrasted.

5.3.5.4 Summary of the IQA process

The summary of the IQA process undertaken with participants is shown in Figure 5.1.



Adapted from Northcutt and McCoy (2004)

Figure 5.1 Summary of the data collection process

5.4 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

In line with best practice in qualitative research, the five appropriate measures considered for ensuring reliability and validity are discussed in the following sections.

Internal validity / Credibility

Internal validity refers to the degree to which findings of the research are well founded and accurately describe reality (Astroth and Chung, 2018; Morse, 2015). The equivalent criterion used for qualitative research is credibility (Morse, 2015).

The first approach for improving internal validity was triangulation, which refers to the use of multiple research methods to corroborate the results of a research study (Leedy and Ormrod, 2013; Natow, 2019). For the current research, focus group data were triangulated with the semi-structured interviews that were conducted with the Senior Managers who participated in the focus group.

Member checking is the practice of referring data and results to participants for confirmation (Creswell and Miller, 2000; Madill and Sullivan, 2018). Data collected through the focus group discussions were captured on paper by the participants. This in itself provided an opportunity for the researcher and participants to check the data as they emerged through the process.

The researcher collected thick, rich descriptions (Creswell and Miller, 2010) of participants' views through the semi-structured interviews with both Senior Managers and Top Managers. These descriptions were presented as quotations

to demonstrate and explain the experiences of Senior and Top Management within the JCPS collaboration.

External validity / Transferability

External validity refers to the extent to which findings of the study can be generalised (Lock and Seele, 2018; Yin, 1994). Although transferability is not the main reason for undertaking qualitative research, it remains a possibility. Transferability depends on the degree of similarity between the original situation and the situation to which it is transferred (Carminati, 2018; Hoepfl, 1997). Transferability, therefore, refers to readers finding similarities with the detail of the research and using it appropriately within their own context (Carminati, 2018; Tracy, 2010).

In order to facilitate transferability, the researcher provided detailed descriptions of the case together with detailed descriptions of the context, participants, research process and documentation.

Reliability/Dependability

Research results are said to be reliable if another researcher is able to repeat the study and arrive at the same results (Cypress, 2017). To minimise researcher bias in the coding process, the researcher used an external well-experienced facilitator for the IQA process. This gave comfort to participants of the study, particularly those who were already familiar with the researcher-practitioner.

Dependability relies largely on the researcher providing a detailed account of the process followed to conduct the research (Cypress, 2017; Krefting, 1991; Lock and

Seele, 2018). The systematic nature of IQA provides an opportunity to demonstrate reliability of the method, the descriptions and the decisions associated with the research. The researcher kept a record of mind maps, documents, transcripts and detailed analysis for future reference.

Other strategies for addressing validity such as triangulation and thick description have a positive impact on reliability.

Reflexivity

Reflexivity refers to researchers' attempts at locating themselves in the research and acknowledging their personal stance within the research (Savin-Baden, 2004). This is an acknowledgement that the approach of the researchers and their decisions regarding the research are influenced by their values, attitudes and experiences.

Initially, a researcher must reflect upon the choice of the specific topic, the personal reasons for the research and the research questions themselves (Lazard and McAvoy, 2017). Furthermore, Lazard and McAvoy (2017:9) ask a pertinent question: "What is the research process and how am I influencing it?"

These questions helped the researcher to self-manage her own thoughts and ideas and be on the lookout for closed-mindedness and preconceived ideas. Lazard and McAvoy (2017) recognise that disclosure of the researcher's lens is not only important for the readers of the final research document but may also be important for the participants who are involved in data collection, depending on ethical appropriateness. For the current research, the researcher was known to a cross-section of participants and did not need to share her background with the

participants. However, where appropriate, the researcher reflected portions of the research that had elements of her own experience.

Reflexivity becomes critical in instances where the researcher-practitioner is part of the constituency of participants of the research. The researcher was mindful of the following two important considerations. First, the researcher acknowledged that her experiences may have differed from the experiences of some of the participants and, therefore, refrained from influencing or convincing those with a different experience. Second, the researcher was careful not to speak for participants or to finish their sentences based on her knowledge of the environment (Berger, 2015).

To improve the validity of the research through reflexivity, the following steps were taken:

- The researcher used an external facilitator for the focus group to reduce bias, particularly during the crucial step of identifying affinities.
- The researcher collected and captured rich descriptions as evidence of the participants' views using direct quotations. The IQA process provided an opportunity to capture such evidence.

5.5 DELIMITATIONS

The research study was undertaken within an intragovernmental collaboration based within Central Government in South Africa. Local and provincial governmental departments and their entities were not included in the current

research. However, findings of the research could be applicable to collaborations within a local or provincial sector of government but not across subsectors.

The National Department of Defence (DOD) and the State Security Agency are part of the JCPS Cluster, but participants from these institutions were excluded due to the onerous process for approval to conduct research. Their lack of participation was not critical because they are not one of the key participants in the basic criminal justice system consisting of policing, courts and corrections. Their absence should, therefore, not have had an influence on the validity of the research.

The focus of intragovernmental collaboration is crime as a wicked problem. Every wicked problem is unique because it presents differently in different contexts. The framework that was developed addressed the specific context of crime in South Africa and advanced the body of knowledge within the broader context of wicked problems and intragovernmental collaborations.

5.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In ensuring that no person or organisation was harmed by the current research study, considerations were given to three of the principles of ethical research identified in Allmark, Boote, Chambers, Clarke, McDonnell, Thompson *et al.* (2009)

Informed consent

Participants were informed of their right to decline to participate and of their right to withdraw from the process in instances where they no longer felt comfortable to

proceed. Consent forms for participation and recording of proceedings were fully explained.

Privacy and confidentiality

Names of participants are not revealed in the research document, and special care was taken to ensure that information that directly identified participants was masked. To put the participants' minds at ease, the researcher agreed to share the contents of the research report prior to submission and publication.

Safe storage and disposal of research documentation was undertaken in line with the procedures indicated by the University of South Africa.

Politics and power

Although the researcher is a practitioner within the environment and is known to most of the participants, she held no power over the participants and their decision to take part in the research. Although the researcher obtained clearance to conduct research in the governmental departments and entities, care was taken to avoid participation enforced by Top Management or higher authorities. The researcher applied for ethical clearance in line with the policies and procedures of the University of South Africa and ensured that all undertakings adhered to these.

5.7 CONCLUSION

Interactive Qualitative Analysis is a qualitative research approach and stays true to the constructivist worldview that seeks a deeper understanding of a

phenomenon within an identified context. The use of Senior Managers who experience the JCPS intragovernmental collaborations and Top Managers who have power over them provided descriptions that were grounded in the field in which they operate.

The IQA approach responded directly to the research objectives and to the research questions, as detailed in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2 Matrix of research questions and data collection

Research Questions	Data Collection
(1) Which dimensions do managers identify as important in intragovernmental collaborations for addressing crime as a wicked problem at a strategic level?	Identification of affinities through <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Axial coding through the focus group • Axial coding through interviews
(2) What are the interrelationships between the dimensions identified under (1)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interrelationship diagrams developed through the focus group and interviews • Systems Influence Diagrams
(3) How can identified dimensions and interrelationships be used to produce an intragovernmental framework that will help address wicked problems?	Researcher relates outcomes of the research with literature to arrive at a framework for intragovernmental collaboration.

The key components of the research design are summarised in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3 Summary of the research design

Component	Decision
Research Purpose	Exploratory
Philosophical Assumptions:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Ontology• Epistemology• Methodology	Constructivism Interpretivism Qualitative
Research Approach	Inductive
Research Method	Interactive Qualitative Analysis
Participants	Senior Managers and Top Managers of the Justice Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster
Data Collection	Stage 1: Focus group Stage 2: Semi-structured Interviews: Senior Managers Stage 3: Semi-structured interviews: Top Managers

CHAPTER 6: RESULTS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the results and findings of the IQA process that was instrumental in addressing the first two research questions. The research objectives, research questions and chapter contributions are presented in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Chapter contributions to research questions

Research Objective	Research Question	Chapter Contribution
(1) To uncover the experiences of managers involved in intragovernmental collaborations at a strategic level and to understand the dimensions affecting their efforts in addressing crime as a wicked problem	(1) Which dimensions do managers identify as important in intragovernmental collaborations for addressing crime as a wicked problem at a strategic level?	<p>Within Chapter 6, the affinities described by Senior Managers in the IQA focus group are identified and described.</p> <p>In Chapter 7, these affinities are conceptualised as dimensions of intragovernmental collaboration.</p>
(2) To develop a better understanding of how dimensions linked to intragovernmental collaborations interrelate	(2) What are the interrelationships between the dimensions identified under (1)?	Interrelationships within affinities are detailed in Chapter 6.
(3) To produce a framework that will guide intragovernmental collaborations in addressing wicked problems	(3) How can identified dimensions and interrelationships be used to produce an intragovernmental framework that will help address wicked problems?	-

The process that was undertaken to identify the interrelationships between the affinities is detailed in the current chapter for Senior Managers and for Top Managers.

6.2 SENIOR MANAGERS

6.2.1 Identification of Affinities

Ten Senior Managers from five different JCPS Cluster departments and entities took part in the focus group held on 6 November 2019. Participants completed 109 data points (Post-It Notes) and grouped them into eight affinities through a process of theoretical coding.



Figure 6.1 Focus group participants



Figure 6.2 Post-It Notes completed by participants

Affinities identified by the focus group were as follows:

1. Silos
2. Red Tape
3. Resources
4. Culture
5. Leadership
6. Execution
7. Planning
8. Sharing Goals

The 109 data points that were collected in the focus group are shown in Annexure C.

6.2.2 In-depth description of Affinities

The interviews with Senior Managers served two purposes. The first was to obtain in-depth descriptions of the eight affinities that were identified. The second purpose was to obtain in-depth descriptions of the relationships between the affinities.

To gain a deeper understanding of the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration meant unpacking and acknowledging the different experiences of the officials who are immersed in the JCPS collaboration. In capturing these experiences, care was taken to describe the wide views of experiences and express the width of such experiences. The experiences that were described are followed by direct quotations from the participants.

Besides assisting the researcher in responding to the research questions, this section gives the participants voice. It is for this reason that the researcher has provided detailed quotations to capture and reflect the thoughts and experiences of the JCPS Cluster participants.

Ten Senior Managers were interviewed to confirm the relationships that they indicated during the focus group and to provide explanations for these relationships. Of the ten participants who were interviewed, seven had participated in the focus group and three had not. According to Northcutt and McCoy (2004), the inclusion of new participants is deemed acceptable if it is in the interest of the research. The three additional participants were Senior Managers from Legal Aid South Africa, the DCS and the NPA, and their voices were important for the research.

Most participants were English-second-language speakers and, therefore, minor grammatical errors were corrected in the transcript. In addition, filler words such as 'uhm' and 'ah' were removed for clarity. In other instances, certain words that were not part of the quotation were included for clarity (e.g. substituting the word 'his' for [State President] where necessary). Such words appear in square brackets.

Quotations are shown per participant and cross-referenced to the paragraph on the composite interview transcript. Where similar descriptions can be attributed to two or more participants, only one of the quotations is used to avoid repetition.

Affinity 1: Silos

Silos described an environment in which organisations of the JCPS Cluster tend to work for their own interest; this was described by participants as driving own agendas. There was an indication that some people adopt a 'my way or the highway' mentality and did not seem to work towards compromise. Another dimension of this affinity included silos within departments and entities. Participants emphasised that silos are both across and within (i.e. inside their organisations and within the cluster).

It was indicated that cluster participants tend to drive their organisational agendas that usually fall within their funded legislative mandates before the cluster objectives. Some of the descriptions given by participants follow:

At the moment, everyone is just chasing their own constitutional mandates. If that mandate is policing, then they only focus on policing. If the mandate is prosecution, they focus on prosecution. (Participant 3: 565)

Because people are not coming there with the same understanding of objectives, there is this thing of falling back to: 'At the end of the day, my Annual Performance Plan is the one that is important'. (Participant 6: 1454)

Two Senior Managers indicated that even in instances where they try to work together, they are often frustrated and tend to revert to working in silos to avoid delays:

Progress sometimes is delayed because if Department B is not performing, there's an implication for you. So we tend as [a] department to feel more comfortable to run alone because it is faster. (Participant 1: 18)

No. [I] think I can deliver on my own because these people are delaying me and are not making a decision. Or sometimes the challenges in organisations can drive other departments within the cluster to do things in silos – in their own little corners. (Participant 11: 2519)

Senior Managers have several organisational objectives that they are obligated to meet. Some of these are within their own government department to be achieved under their legislative mandates, and some support joint-cluster objectives. One Senior Manager indicated that the mandates of their departmental objectives tend to prevail. This means that even in instances where joint objectives are pursued and are useful in achieving larger objectives, they are deprioritised at some point due to departmental pressures:

Backsliding is that we work together first quarter, second quarter [but] third quarter, fourth quarter, you see people not attending meetings or working sessions that are critical because they are also under pressure to make sure that their APP [Annual Performance Plan] targets are reached because it's towards the end of the year. (Participant 6: 1398)

All participants indicated that silos and the silo mentality originated within departments and that they are not limited to the JCPS Cluster. In addition, silos extend beyond the JCPS Cluster where collaboration is needed from other clusters

such as the Economic Cluster. The following were among quotations that described the experience:

As much as government's intention is to break the silo mentality, it is so ingrained into institutions that we work for. The reason is we have hierarchies and we have leaders and managers. Let's say the planning environment. So the planning environment will work in isolation from the monitoring environment. (Participant 9: 2117)

Even intercluster. If you can look at the Economic Cluster, there are a lot of things that they must do to solve problems that downstream create work for the Security Cluster. Things like your illicit economy, fake goods coming into the country and creating security problems downstream. (Participant 3: 691)

One participant indicated that some officials push their personal interests ahead of those of their departments. For example, a person might defend or push a line of thinking that has not been sanctioned by their department or a line of thinking that aligns with their personal interests and ambitions:

It is not the institution itself, but it is personality issues. And because there are no clear accountability structures when people go back to their offices, then whatever the collective decides can be hampered by the 'my way or the highway' mentality. If I do not believe in the common agenda of the collective because there are no consequences, I either misinform the institutions about the direction to be taken or at that particular time or I disengage. (Participant 6: 1399)

One participant indicated that although there is silo behaviour within different structures of the cluster, there was an indication of it decreasing within the last ten years:

I think it is important to acknowledge that the silos that used to exist maybe ten years ago are no longer in place. They are no longer solid silos because I think across the JCPS Cluster, we are very well aware that we have to support each other if the justice system has to work. So to some extent, the silos are not solid silos. (Participant 6: 1379)

Four participants indicated that silos become even more pronounced since the budget and resources are not controlled within the cluster. This means that even on agreed joint projects, the silos result in uneven implementation. Participants identified the need for ring-fenced budgets for identified cluster projects to address silo-related problems and to avoid the issue of uneven implementation:

Because projects are allocated per department, now it becomes a problem when you have integrated projects. So it means those budgets must still be spent in that silo approach, which discourages and defeats the rationale behind collaboration and cooperation. (Participant 1: 46)

Maybe we got an increased overtime budget and [are] able to sustain and deploy more resources. Yes, we [the SAPS] have additional R10 m for overtime, but do you [the DOJCD] have enough resources to deploy more prosecutors, magistrates? You don't. So how does it impact on you to be able to meet up with our expectations of us getting additional funding? (Participant x¹)

One participant indicated that communication regarding the successes or the challenges of the cluster often follow the silo approach even when the successes are a joint-cluster effort:

But there is more of a culture of, 'If this is my mandate, I must look good for myself rather than have to work with X to make her look good or make the entire cluster look good'. The Hawks talk about this on their own rather than say [that] maybe the Hawks and the NPA should be communicating this kind of message to the country together. (Participant 13: 3700)

One participant indicated that silos are unavoidable, work undertaken at the operational level is largely adversarial, and legal decisions taken in courts by the Judiciary may not be in line with policies sanctioned by those at the top level. For example, a decision by the cluster to reduce remand detainees due to overcrowding may not be implemented because prosecutors are fighting daily to

¹ Participant ID not indicated because the quotation could reveal the identity of a participant.

deny bail for the accused. At cluster-leadership level, it was indicated that silos cannot be avoided but should be appropriately managed:

The issue of different departments working in silos – some of it is [a] natural phenomenon because they have different objectives. For example, at Legal Aid SA, work involves trying to defend people charged with criminal offences as best as we can ... whereas the NPA for instance, their main objective is to ensure that people are found guilty of offences they are charged with at all costs. So already have a sort of a conflict there. ... So what happens is sometimes the collaborative efforts are made at a higher level, but they don't always filter down to people working on the coalface. (Participant 12: 3093)

In summary, participants provided descriptions of the silos that they experience at departmental and cluster level regarding structures, processes and practices. The participants also described behaviours where individuals promoted the objectives of members' own departments ahead of the cluster and in some instances, pushed their own agendas.

Affinity 2: Protocols

This affinity was identified as 'Red Tape' by the focus group due to the bureaucratic processes that slow down decision-making processes. The word Protocols was found to fit the descriptions of participants better and was adopted post the data-gathering phase.

Participants mentioned that there are too many structures for similar objectives, with excessive meetings and little time for implementation. Non-attendance was mentioned as an issue that affects continuity and often leads to miscommunication of action points and undue duplication of structures that address similar matters. An acceptable degree of systems and structures was seen as necessary for the effective working of the cluster.

Two participants mentioned the importance of bureaucracy in safeguarding public funds in general and in keeping citizens safe within the cluster:

Unfortunately red tape is going to be there for many years into the future because you need to prevent corrupt officials and individuals that steal from the state. So there, unfortunately, as much as it's an injuring factor, unfortunately, treasury departments need to introduce red tape. (Participant 9: 2160)

Within the cluster, there were indications from six participants that Protocols overly delay decisions and slow implementation. This happens within the cluster and within governmental departments:

We fund organisations ... Each and every year, we fund them. To me, it doesn't make sense for the Department [of Social Development] to take eight months to get the contracts signed. It's because you have too many people signing [in] the Department ... Others sign without even looking at it. You can have three people signing instead of 11 people. (Participant 1: 239)

Let me just say that government is a highly regulated environment. So there's a lot of regulation that creates red tape. There are a lot of unintended consequences in a regulated environment. Take the PFMA for instance, and the procurement process that follows after that. (Participant 3: 577)

For me, how I see red tape is the loooong approval framework. It is the fact that I cannot take a decision and implement. It has to go to a committee and another committee and another committee and eventually, it must be tabled in Parliament. Or it must be approved by the DG after it went through the DDG, the Chief Director and the Director. For me, red tape is intradepartmental and not across departments. (Participant 12: 3313)

Nine participants felt that the Protocols were complicated with too many structures within the JCPS Cluster. The large number of structures means that decisions are moved across structures, and this causes unnecessary bureaucracy or Protocols.

The following are some of the descriptions that were given:

For instance, within the JCPS Cluster alone, we have more than 24 structures that are seeking to address issues of violence against women and children. There's a report to that effect. (Participant 1: 29)

Each department will have its own Manco and internal processes, governance and all that stuff. It becomes impossible to go and attend all these even if you have management. It means you must have 12 DDGs in order to fit into the cluster structures. (Participant 11: 2542)

The problem again with red tape even from the highest level, is that there's no understanding of what all these structures are supposed to be doing. All these structures – what informs their existence? (Participant 13: 3668)

Six participants indicated that due to the large number of structures, appropriate Senior Managers are not always available to attend. In some instances, low-ranking employees are sent to attend for compliance, and this slows decision-making due to unavailability of decision makers. Furthermore, this leads to miscommunications and lack of continuity in attendees:

If you have too many forums that are overlapping, you run the risk of people would be consumed by these meetings instead of implementing the resolutions. To a larger extent, they become less effective for the purpose. (Participant 1: 87)

Departments send representatives mainly for compliance purposes just to say, 'We were represented'. Nobody sits down and says, 'There's this meeting' so that a person goes there having been briefed on the issues and to make a contribution. And sometimes those people when they come back, they do not report back. (Participant 2: 363)

On the issue of structures, one participant indicated that all the structures are needed and should be upheld. This refers to the seven main governance structures rather than the many implementation-type coordinating structures. Participant 2 felt that only a few people attend and are thus overburdened:

My honest opinion is that the current structures are necessary. The current structures are absolutely necessary. If you have one-size-fits-all approach, it won't work. The structures are meant for focus! Focus on, e.g., issues of security ... People become worried about structures because departments in many instances send one person to serve in many structures. That person feels overstrained and overstretched. (Participant 2: 359)

Two participants felt very strongly that there are insufficient Protocols and that there is poor governance within the JCPS Cluster. Participant 2 emphasised that there is often poor attendance or inappropriate people attending. In addition, decisions are not followed up and enforced, making a mockery of such decisions.

Many people go there [cluster meetings] to just to sign the register, else there would be a complaint. (Participant 2: 364)

To be honest, I feel that JCPS Cluster does not have red tape. Because there are no policies and procedures that hold people accountable, which I would call red tape. Then individuals are able to backslide precisely because there is no red tape. We rely on individuals. We believe the individual is representing the organisation or the institution in good faith and they are doing everything right because there's no report back loop that is red tape related. But that is institutional responsibility. (Participant 6: 1409)

Affinity 3: Resources

Although there was an understanding that resources need to be shared to achieve joint objectives, participants instead experienced a competition for resources within the JCPS Cluster. Participants believe that budgets can only be increased at the expense of others within the cluster. Resource utilisation was identified as an important consideration.

Participants strongly expressed the issue of resourcing within the cluster. Most of the participants indicated that the number of officials in the different criminal justice service departments is not balanced, and when further resourcing is requested, this is not often considered.

Already at SAPS, they have 1 400 plus stations. They are in communities en masse. And that is a good thing; it is required. But when they channel their investigation into the NPA, check – Do we have equitable resources for the

NPA to be able to handle the number of inputs that they will be getting from SAPS? How many magistrates do we have? (Participant 6: 1433)

The resources are not evenly shared. They are not balanced. We are not getting what we are supposed to be getting. For example, police would be getting more because their work is more on practicalities but yet, they are not prioritising that to assist the cluster again. (Participant 11: 2576)

Participants indicated the lack of a coherent cluster-resourcing plan that all cluster departments could use collectively for requesting appropriate resourcing. Departments usually approach the National Treasury on their own and bid for funding against other cluster departments:

When it comes to resources, it is always a question of 'what more can I get for my department?' It is not, 'Where are the biggest collective pains in the process in the value chain'. So everyone just competes for what they can get for themselves. (Participant 3: 594)

For me, as the JCPS Cluster, we need to work together and put one concept of resourcing to say as a cluster, 'These are priorities that we have.' The other priorities need so many resources. I know that there will be budget for every department. (Participant 13: 3683)

Although there is admission that budgets are indeed increasing at a slow pace, two participants indicated that existing resources are not being used optimally for maximum impact:

People keep saying there's not enough human resources, not enough staff capacity. That could be a persistent complaint, but I tell you now, if we could do a work study on what people are doing in departments, you will find a lot of capacity available there. In all likelihood, more than what is required. (Participant 12: 3116)

I can't say the resources are limited or not, but it is the way they are being utilised. If they can be shared and used collaboratively, I don't think there would be issues of resources within the cluster. (Participant 8: 1902)

In addition to resources not being used optimally, one participant indicated that many government departments return unspent funds to the National Treasury every year:

Why are your Home Affairs, Justice and Constitutional Development, Intelligence and all of them, year after year, returning not just little but huge unspent funds? (Participant 2: 379)

Three participants emphasised concerns regarding the amount of resources spent on social crime prevention, which should be an important area of focus in the war against crime:

For instance, there's a report that we commissioned with the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation looking at resources that government deploys towards addressing violence against women and children. Only 9% is for prevention programmes. We deploy more on combating violence, on SAPS and all that. There's a lot of research, papers that have been presented by the Institute of Security Studies and other researchers that show clearly that we need to redeploy our resources on prevention. (Participant 1: 60)

Of interest to the JCPS Cluster is the promise of greater efficiencies through the use of ICT and the use of resources allocated therein. There are indications that collaborative efforts in ICT are not providing the gains expected due to delays and poor cooperation between departments. One participant eloquently expressed the integration challenges experienced within the cluster:

From arrest, a person is captured on the system. We do not know how many people are repeat offenders because systems are not talking to each other. We must do rehabilitation. But you are reading a form that is handwritten and by the time the court sentences, you do not have the form completed during arrest. The charge warrant is not there. (Participant 11: 2578)

One participant identified issues of ICT resources and poor integration as the failure of leadership to guide the identification, implementation and use of ICT systems appropriately:

The one thing that is a big gap is IT resources. But is it not because of financial resources that IT doesn't work? No. It is because of poor management that proper IT systems cannot be developed. But sometimes when IT systems are developed, the departments can't get people to use them. You find a comprehensive IT system that has been built and people still stick to old

reporting ways ... In no time, it becomes obsolete and then they start a new process to procure a new IT system. (Participant 12: 3117)

One participant questioned the rationality of allowing departments to spend budgets within departmental silos, which means agreements of the cluster are subject to people who may not have been part of the decision-making:

Again, because projects are allocated per department, now it becomes a problem when you have integrated projects. So it means those budgets must still be spent in that silo approach (Participant 1: 47)

Two participants indicated that where joint implementation is planned, it may not be possible to spend the money through the cluster because accountability rests with the Accounting Officers. However, they stressed the importance of ring-fencing the budget to enable a more coherent response to the crises:

Each department gets its own funds. Justice gets its own, Police get their own, and so on. If there was some sort of integrated financing, you see. Not for everything. You would say, for instance, gender-based violence, it's a big issue. You identify about ten issues, for example, issues of victims; there would be an integrated pool of funds. (Participant 2: 338)

Affinity 4: Culture

Culture was one of the affinities with many data points. Participants saw many of the behaviours within the cluster being the result of the cluster culture.

Two participants indicated that the JCPS Cluster does not have its own culture. This is because there has not been an attempt by leadership to build a culture outside the departments from where the participants originate:

The cluster system is not a cohesive system. It is more of a cooperation or cooperative thing. We come together to cooperate, but we do not necessarily

identify ourselves as one. Everyone comes in with their own culture and so on.
(Participant 3: 606)

We say culture, but the culture of commitment is different because we have not been able to build a JCPS culture yet. We need to develop a JCPS identity.
(Participant 6: 1453)

And I've said many, many, many times to different people in different structures that you really need to understand the complexity of JCPS interactions! It's like a maze. Different things are happening at different levels, with different intensities and different objectives because the issues are very varied. It is a collective that requires more of a cultural kind of thing, vision, understanding the vision of the JCPS cluster, and commitment at institutional and staff level because [of the] need to understand the culture that is required in JCPS. (Participant 6: 1504)

The absence of a unique JCPS Cluster means that participants present a public-service mentality and culture. This was described by two participants:

Government work has always been seen historically as a security haven. Once you are in there, you are in and you'll be out at pension age. Whether you perform or not, you can't be fired unless you do something wrong like stealing ... So it's a culture of not giving your best. It's a non-performance culture ... This is a very bad culture. There is no sense of the spirit of high performance.
(Participant 3: 613)

Participants expressed a culture of lack of compliance and lack of accountability in general and poor consequence management:

Before you get to the organisational culture, let's look at individuals. Individuals come from society. Organisations are a reflection of a society we live in. If there's a culture of non-compliance, poor compliance, we don't pay TV licence, we don't pay water and lights, we don't pay traffic fines, and we don't pay e-tolls ... So, there's non-compliance, generally. Now you take the same individuals and bring them into organisations, and now you want compliance to be 100%. ... It's [an] unrealistic expectation. (Participant 9: 2243)

Similarly, to the DGs, when they sit, we talk nicely instead of saying, 'You did not submit a report!' We put it nicely and say DG this and DG that. As long as we are doing that, we will remain problematic. The dashboard is there; people are red, people are amber, but things are put mildly and diplomatically.
(Participant 2: 405)

I think it goes back to the issue that people come to the JCPS Cluster as individuals. I wish we could go back into our institution and our institution reverberates because 'I come from the JCPS that requires this and that done.'
(Participant 6: 1589)

One participant indicated that in failing to hold leaders accountable in meetings, Secretariat and other low-ranking officials often take responsibility for areas for which they are not accountable. This is because many leaders cannot hold each other accountable and risk their relationships:

To an extent that the Secretariat can even get blamed. Whenever something goes wrong, it is the Secretariat. Similarly, with Exco, anything wrong – Secretariat. It's Secretariat; sometimes it's the Strategy Unit. (Participant 2: 407)

Attendance was seen as an ongoing and pervasive issue and participants were not held accountable even at the highest level of participation (i.e. at Director-General level). Five participants expressed this view, with two of them expressing it as follows:

Also, the issue of participation. There's that tendency of sending wrong people to these meetings. For example, the Directors-Generals' Cluster meeting, it is a DG's meeting. Expectation is that you will have high-ranking officials but instead they would send people who cannot really take decisions. It's not only the DG's cluster, it's most of the structures within the cluster ... (Participant 8: 1912)

I think there is [a] culture of certain departments wanting to play a big brother role. For instance, if Social Development is coordinating, certain departments won't take that seriously, but if it's certain, other departments, everyone, collaborates ... (Participant 1: 95)

Some of the cluster departments (e.g. the DOD, the SAPS and the DCS) are military-type environments with command and control. Officials do as they are told even if it means malicious compliance. For example, officials may attend a meeting even if they do not know what it is about. Two participants expressed this view as follows:

At the heart of the JCPS Cluster, it is hierarchical. In Defence, an order gets given; you follow. You tow the line. Similarly, in the Police, Corrections and so forth ... That command and control – it's a very serious factor. If your superior says go to that meeting, in most instances, people do not have the audacity to question. But also, they do not even ask what the meeting is about because it is disrespectful to say, "By the way, what is it about?" As Secretariat, I hear people say, "I've been sent here" (Participant 2: 368)

But obviously, the Police, because of the fact that they are command and control, whatever command comes and the control that comes with the command and control, they must just run with it, never looking at what impact that might have on any other sector within the JCPS Cluster. (Participant 13: 3654)

One participant expressed the presence of a culture of entitlement to participate in certain cluster structures. People who attend certain cluster meetings start taking ownership and do not want to relinquish the opportunity and extend it to others when it becomes necessary to do so:

Entitlement and ownership of work. Very entitled. They say, 'It's only me and I have been appointed.' (Participant 11: 2608)

You have the same people attending and if you are outside, you won't be allowed in. (Participant 11: 2611)

Three Senior Managers highlighted the problem of having to build and use informal networks to gain cooperation from cluster departments. In some instances, work that took years to achieve is neglected once an individual leaves the employment, requiring the building of relationships to start afresh. Formal structures that compel Senior Managers to participate and collaborate seem to fall apart in certain instances:

I also said earlier that coordination can be a challenge because you need to establish relationships with individuals. If you've managed to do that and people in those departments happen to leave, it takes time; it becomes a challenge to get people that would replace that space. (Participant 1: 97)

One of the problems that I think is there in the structures and the red tape is that it depends on who you know in departments. That is, if you know X, for

example, the information will go to X. And if it goes to X and X doesn't share what needs to happen, the entire structure suffers. (Participant 13: 3671)

Two participants identified the use of task teams to address failure of accountability. In some instances, task teams make the decisions that individuals are not comfortable dealing with and in others, task teams are appointed to address the failure of management to perform their management duties:

So, intersectoral teams are not there to discuss intersectoral issues only. Sometimes you discuss specific technical issues that a member department should be able to deal with themselves. You will find that the Directorate – they do not want to take decisions on their own. It would all be dealt with by the committee. And that committee you find that it forms subcommittees, then after subcommittees, you have task teams. In between, you no longer understand who is now the holder of the decision-making process. (Participant 12: 3151)

Is it the task team? Is it the subcommittee? Is it the main committee? If the committee makes the decision, who eventually must make the decision? At the end of the day, you end up with talk shops. And most importantly, those talk shops go on forever. You can go through five financial years still discussing the same thing ... (Participant 12: 3152)

Two participants indicated that part of the culture within the cluster attributes that were mentioned were perpetuated by a large cohort of managers who had worked their way to the top and were not in a position to see the faults of the culture or attempt to make any changes. There seems to be no appreciation of bringing new perspectives and broadening management input because the current approaches tend to favour bureaucratic experience ahead of management and leadership skill. With this approach, managers tend to be older and deeply entrenched in the prevailing cultures.

A career manager coming to the environment, they can make it their task to build a new culture. But if the people that are there are still heavily loaded towards technical work because they came through the ranks and are 80% technical and 20% management oriented, they may not see anything wrong with the culture, especially if they came up the ranks because that is all they know ... (Participant 12: 3142)

Affinity 5: Leadership

Participants felt that leadership is key in driving the work of the cluster and identified issues such as poor accountability, poor leadership styles, poor ethics and lack of passion associated with leadership.

Two participants emphasised the importance of having visionary leadership within the cluster. They saw Top Managers as ordinary managers who are not able to excite the cluster towards addressing the challenging issue of crime:

A lot of people are just super-managers. They don't see a role of actually leading: bringing people together, inspiring, sharing a specific vision that people will believe in and follow. Very few people actually get inspiration from their leaders. (Participant 3: 624)

You go to different types of meetings, and you get there, and we talk about the same things over and over and over again. But there is no one who says but hang on, we can't be going in that direction ... There's never a time to say, 'Ok, this issue was raised. From where it was raised, what is the action? Who is the owner of this action?' (Participant 13: 3718)

And having said that, one of the things that I've observed, not only in the JCPS from a leadership point of view, is that if you sit in many of these committees, these high structures, you find a few, two, three or four people who are vocal. Remember, as you sit in that committee, you are a leader in your own right Many come there and become spectators and if the wind goes this way, we go with the wind. If the wind goes that way, we go with the wind. (Participant 13: 3719)

Participants indicated the lack of management skills to deliver on cluster-related work at management level. Many managers were seen as capable at performing at junior levels but lacking the skills and attitude to perform at management levels.

In government departments, before we even talk about leadership, you have a paucity of management capacity. You have a big issue with having capable managers. Not even talking about leadership but having a body of capable managers is a big challenge. (Participant 12: 3162)

You have people who are technocrats, and they get promoted through the ranks. If you tell a lawyer who is now a Director to analyse numbers, it's Greek to him. (Participant 12: 3635)

Participants indicated lack of commitment to cluster-related responsibilities together with top leadership prioritising their own departments. For example, poor attendance of cluster committees by chairpersons tends to go unpunished. In addition, performance agreements tend to focus on legislative mandates and may not show the cluster as an important area of performance:

But I think generally, cluster issues are treated as 'by the way' issues for most of the departments, even at leadership level. The mere fact that there was a complaint at the JCPS DG's Cluster that DGs were not attending is an indicator of that problem. (Participant 1: 128)

I think we have good leaders, but I think it is the drive that is problematic. Like we are saying, lack of will and passion is a challenge. If we look at the leadership at the cluster, the chairs, we know there are co-chairs but most of the time, the chairs are not there. So somebody else must chair the cluster, which is a problem. (Participant 8: 1935)

I know one meeting called by the National Commissioner [SAPS], and I saw members of the PMC [Planning and Monitoring Committee] attending [lowest ranking Senior Managers] and not the Senior Executives of Forums. So you invite the DG, and the DG sends a member of the PMC. Look at the levels. How do you report back? If the DG is not there, it should be the Deputy DG. (Participant 9: 2203)

Cluster structures are normally chaired by someone from the same rank, and holding people of the same rank accountable was identified as an obstacle. In governmental departments where rank is highly regarded, this is an important matter, as explained by two participants:

The Heads of Departments are equal. The Ministers – they are all equal within the JCPS. The DG of Home Affairs is at Level 16 like the DG of Justice. See. It's a Level 16 thing, like Correctional Services. No one can instruct another one. Similarly, to the Ministers, they are all equal. (Participant 2: 335)

[T]here's this element of linking respect to the rank. Now if that person that is chairing those meetings is not respected, you won't find Senior Managers or

Director-Generals coming for those meeting, especially if it's an acting person that they do not respect. (Participant 1: 116)

A lack of zeal and energy to succeed was identified as an issue by two participants. It was suggested that the lack of zeal and energy originates at the top where leaders at both political and administrative levels are past retirement age:

Similarly, at Ministerial level, your Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, Bheki Cele, they are 67 or 68. The leadership is already out of touch. (Participant 2: 392)

Several posts of Top Management, particularly Heads of Departments, are often left vacant for a number of reasons. This leadership vacuum and frequent changes in leadership have contributed to issues of instability within departments and the JCPS Cluster:

The Security Cluster in many instances faces high turnover at DG level. At DG level! I'd like to stress that. The Economic Cluster departments are better. Dr Phil Mjwara has been there for a long time. The Statistician-General, Dr Padi Lehohla, was there for 20 years. Uninterrupted!! (Participant 2: 420)

The other is the issue of change in leadership. Now and then, we see so many changes in the leadership in the cluster and that is problematic for continuity. (Participant 8: 1937)

There was an indication of power dynamics within the JCPS Cluster committees. One participant indicated that attendance and seniority level of attendance in meetings could be linked to the level of respect accorded to the chair of the committee or the department that he/she comes from. For example, structures chaired by the SAPS Commissioner will likely have other Top Managers attending, whereas structures chaired by another Director-General are more likely to suffer poor attendance and support:

I think with the JCPS Cluster, to a larger extent, there is leadership that is provided and to a larger extent, departments respect the Secretariat and the

department responsible for coordinating. I can't say the same for the Social Cluster because there are different dynamics there. (Participant 1: 113)

Part of the reason for challenges in the leadership of the JCPS Cluster could be related to the political and administrative interface, which was mentioned as a challenge. Directors-General are appointed by Cabinet Ministers and there are often fallouts as the DGs need to balance administrative and political issues. In some cases, DGs are pressured to use their administrative powers in favour of political manoeuvres with which they may be uncomfortable:

Leadership is an even bigger challenge. At levels at which you require leadership, then you get political appointments. A political appointee comes with a political agenda. So they are not there to provide leadership just on the business of the department to move the department forward, they come with a political agenda. What's even worse is if you have political leadership that changes from time to time; sometimes within a political term of five years, you find you've got a change. (Participant 12: 3164)

If I am somebody who is in a team who knows that I worked very hard to bring this case to book and I am being stepped down by the authorities, then definitely, team spirit is going to go down. Morale is going to go down. (Participant 13: 3703)

Affinity 6: Execution

Participants identified the execution of cluster plans as crucial to the results of the cluster and indicated certain impediments. For example, the cluster often finds that the processes within departments impede the ability to execute the plans successfully. Other issues include non-adherence to deadlines by member departments and the excessive number of reports to be written. Regarding collaboration on information systems, insufficient consultation was indicated in the implementation of key projects such as ICT.

Two participants mentioned the positive developments that have become established within the cluster concerning the regular monitoring of performance against the cluster plan. There have been improvements in the development of cluster plans since 2010 when the Outcomes Approach was adopted by government. For the JCPS Cluster, the establishment of the Planning and Monitoring Committee has realised some improvement:

Yes, I'd say to a larger extent, we are trying as departments because we come up with the medium-term strategic framework-linked plans every medium-term period. If you look at the performance of the JCPS Cluster, we have done fairly well. I think it is because we have a strong coordinating body in the form of the PMC. Obviously, there have been a number of challenges. (Participant 1: 140)

Besides the high-level five-year strategic plan (Medium Term Strategic Framework [MTSF]) and one-year implementation plan, there are other plans that are created by the cluster to address specific issues within the criminal justice system. However, there are indications that these plans are not always well executed:

I think it is a challenge in the cluster, for example, if we look at how many strategies we have in the cluster. But how many of them are implemented fully? Executed? You know, there was a time when we tried to even follow up on them to say, 'How many strategic plans are we having in the cluster and how many are implemented?' It's not so many. (Participant 8: 1954)

We plan; we plan! Everybody says that. We plan; we plan! We've got beautiful documents, but we do not implement. Our implementation is not thorough. (Participant 13: 3753)

One participant expressed the fact that people who formulate the strategy are far removed and are often not aware of what needs to be executed. The reasons indicated are that some do not want to be involved in the process and some struggle with the execution thereof:

What I see as the cause of the problem is people in business that are supposed to execute the strategy, some of them were not involved in strategy

formulation or do not want to be involved in strategy formulation. So basically, when strategy is formulated, they are consulted, but I'm sure you can see a lot of resistance or indifference. (Participant 12: 3187)

If you are not involved hands-on in the formulation of the strategy you are going to execute, tomorrow someone gives you a 50-page document and says, 'This is our strategy. Go and execute'. It doesn't work that way. In most cases, you can work for years, and you do not even understand what it is you need to execute. So execution is a big problem. (Participant 12: 3188)

Execution often flounders because the cluster plans do not reflect in the departmental plans. Governance arrangements for the alignment of plans were found to be insufficient. Furthermore, plans compiled in the National Office do not necessarily cascade down to provincial, local or service-point level. In some instances, cluster departments such as Social Development have provincial departments that are overseen by the Premiers of Provinces. Implementation of some of the cluster work, therefore, requires concurrence with each provincial legislature individually.

For instance, I indicated that some of the areas that are prioritised at a cluster level are not necessarily prioritised at departmental level. If a key performance area is not in the APP in the department, it becomes a secondary issue, although it is a priority at cluster level. Those are some of the discrepancies that are there. (Participant 1: 141)

Processes within departments also contributed to some of the areas that were prioritised as key cluster projects not being executed because you find that at Social Development, that project is a project on the operational plan and the larger part of it is implemented at provincial level. Now, it is not part of the key projects of the Premier or sometimes even the department and now it becomes a problem because they prioritise and deploy resources towards cap projects. (Participant 1: 142)

So if that is not prioritised at that level, it becomes a problem for you to receive information from the grass roots and be able to report on that at a cluster level. That's one discrepancy. (1: 143)

Participants indicated the type of misalignment between plans at a high level and their execution throughout the organisations. For example, arrest targets in the

SAPS result in an overload of cases handled by Legal Aid South Africa at significant cost, only to be withdrawn. Similarly, plans to finalise certain joint systems are ultimately not executed in the respective departments due to execution that is not harmonised.

But the police still have a target to arrest so many people, and they publish in newspapers and say, 'We've arrested so many'. But it is putting pressure on the other parts of the system. Instead of us concentrating on the 30% of cases that should go through the courts, we take the additional 70%, which in a couple of months will be withdrawn ... There is no structure that can bring everyone together to foster a common goal and a common understanding. (Participant 12: 3303)

Five years or six years later, the Department of Justice is trying to do the same thing. But there was a system [initiated by Victim Empowerment, Social Development]; it was a good project that ended nowhere. Because of their personal experiences of not being supported, people go back into their silos, thinking, 'We will be doing the same thing over and over again. But now that it is DOJ, we must jump a hoop and support the same thing that was started five years ago'. (Participant 6: 1597)

Another key factor in implementation lies in organisational skills and capabilities to plan and implement large, game-changing projects. One participant indicated that many cluster departments do not have the capacity to plan and execute large projects, and some might not use rigorous project-management discipline to execute successfully.

When you start talking about game-changing plans, and I want to say transformational plans, you want to transform a business from looking like this to looking to the other. You need relevant skills to be able to do that. You need a culture of project management inculcated in the organisation at enterprise level. You need proper monitoring and evaluation of those plans at a senior level. You also need to ensure that there's adequate funding for those plans; there's adequate capacity to carry out the work. (Participant 3: 649)

Within the JCPS Cluster, a substantial amount of resources has been invested in the development of cross-cutting ICT systems for alignment of the integration of

cases through the criminal justice system. The following were observations regarding the implementation of ICT projects:

The execution of IT – it does not talk to each other. Simple. It does not talk to each other. There is no reason why Police do not have direct access to fingerprints. They must go through Home Affairs. The Home Affairs system should be directly linked to the SAPS and others and that will fast-track cases. (Participant 2: 439)

But Masters of the High Court do not have access to the GEPF [Government Employees Pension Fund] information. No access to [the] GEPF system. It's a shame. The two should be talking to each other. And that in itself perpetuates fraud and so on. It's those kinds of things that say the systems that we are developing are inward looking. They are not client or victim centric. (Participant 2: 444)

The Security Cluster is overly dependent on external service providers ... Late last year when SAPS had a contractual dispute with a service provider, the service provider shut down the system. There was a blackout. How do you outsource and even give copyrights to a private company? When there are disputes, they take them away. (Participant 2: 446)

For what I notice, SITA [State Information Technology Agency] works across environments. Maybe the intention when it was introduced [SITA] was good, but also leaves room for corruption, one. Also, they take for granted if it becomes government. We take too long to procure. We take too long to process. We take too long to approve. (Participant 9: 2329)

Three participants indicated that in some situations, poor execution points to inadequate skills for the complexity of the projects being undertaken. In others, poor execution can be attributed to low morale and practices that do not promote a high-performance culture and promote poor accountability within some governmental departments:

All of that requires solid management and leadership geared towards execution. But if you do not have the right skills and the right level of performance, you have low morale, and [if] you don't have the high-performance culture, you will find that plans are just suggestions. People are not worried when plans are not executed on time. They always find excuses that 'this was not done because of 1, 2, 3', and that's the end of the story. (Participant 3: 653)

Let's look at the IJS [Integrated Justice System] Seven-Point Plan. When it was introduced, it was for a certain period. The question is: What progress has been made with integrating systems across the justice system? We talk about e-dockets; we talk about docket scanning. As much as some would advocate that much has been done, yes, there's no two ways. (Participant 9: 2159)

When there were xenophobic attacks, the Former President ensured that committees were established in provinces between 2013 to 2015/16. The Offices of the Premiers were supposed to lead and drive these projects to ensure that there is integrated planning and ensure that there is integrated departmental involvement. Only in the beginning – the first week. Thereafter, we saw departments not participating ... People gradually stop participating for whatever reasons. (Participant 9: 2224)

One participant articulated that once projects and programmes are executed, there is no opportunity to evaluate the impact of the work. Where projects are not delivered according to plan, there is no indications of lessons learnt and, therefore, similar mistakes keep being made. Within operational environments, projects are often declared successful because the SAPS ran an operation and made a certain number of arrests. However, follow-ups on what eventually happened to those arrested are often not discussed. This was indicated as inadequate execution that does not have an impact on the overall criminal justice system. Inadequate evaluation post implementation of the project was also identified regarding ICT projects:

Another problem in government is that we like to reinvent the wheel. Where things work, we want to leave them and break them and continue on something new. We forget to say there have been things that worked. (Participant 13: 3758)

You go to NATJOINTS, it's Operation what-what, Operation what-what here. Success, success! But where's the impact? (Participant 13: 3667)

As much as Police says I've achieved, as much as Justice says I've achieved, as much as NPA has achieved, are all our achievements really making a dent and a difference in the community? The right kind of leader would be looking at that. (Participant 13: 3728)

In addressing issues related to the execution of cluster-related initiatives, two suggestions were made by two participants. First, in the absence of guidance from the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, it is suggested that each DG signs a Memorandum of Understanding through the cluster. Performance agreements for DGs are signed with their Ministers; however, these address their legislative mandates and may be inadequate in addressing cluster-related objectives. Second, the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) must enforce a set of standard key performance indicators for participation and involvement of Ministers and DGs for all clusters:

If we could have something like a service-level agreement, something like that. Maybe it could work. And then two: just robust performance. The DGs as Heads of Departments, their performance agreements are inward looking. They are not putting focus on members of the public, integration, and so forth. (Participant 2: 465)

Similarly, with DGs, their performance agreements says [*sic*], 'You are the Police Head'. If we talking about non-attendance, DGs prioritise their own. They don't get penalised for not doing the work of the cluster. (Participant 2: 468)

The third one is the lack of indicators that are talking directly to and encouraging collaboration and integration. We don't have those. (Participant 1: 186)

Affinity 7: Planning

Participants emphasised the need for an integrated planning approach, and a need for specific performance indicators on collaboration was mentioned as one of the possible solutions to address planning challenges.

Planning within the cluster is established and includes both five-year plans and a short-term one-year plan. The plans are finalised and approved in Cabinet and are monitored for implementation. This was seen as a positive development that has recently taken place:

No. For me, I will differ from that. I'd say, Planning—we do perfect planning. We do 100% perfect planning. Our plans are making sense. They are well coordinated. (Participant 11: 2679)

If I look at the planning that the DPME [Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation] unfolded for the MTSF [Medium Term Strategic Framework], I think if you look at it positively, they have started to advance. They looked at a 25-year review; they obtained information from the departments; they analysed it. They engaged with civil society, with business sector and other stakeholders. They did some analysis; they communicated. (Participant 9: 2353)

Two participants indicated that although there is a process of planning and that plans are being put together and finalised, these plans are often in compliance with administrative processes and do not reflect the necessary strategic thinking and determination to make an impact and address issues of crime:

Planning is something that is strategically led. If people are involved in a planning process but they do not believe in the outcome because they don't see the vision at all, it becomes a compliance process. It is like, 'Okay we need to sit in workshops twice a year because we are driven by compliance'. Our planning efforts are mainly driven not by changing the organisation but by complying ... That is the first wrong thing we do in government. (Participant 3: 668)

No. We are not. And one of the key examples [of] this [is] when we were doing this APP five-year and one-year strategy. I said to all my chiefs, DDG and Chief Director, 'You know what? I can see we are putting more effort trying to put these documents together – it's for compliance. None of those things that are there we are going to implement'. (Participant 5: 985)

Five participants indicated that the five-year cluster plan is merely silo-based inputs submitted to departments and does not reflect how crime will be fought differently

to achieve results. The silo plan does not demonstrate collective efforts at addressing crime in general and specific problem areas in particular. For example, if trio crimes (car hijacking, home robberies and business robberies) are a priority, the plan does not necessarily show how the rest of the cluster will align with this priority for maximum impact:

We spent most of the time implementing the Programme of Action, the MTSF, but we don't have a platform for integrated planning. The cluster does not sit down, and has never sat down, for any integrated planning. So, then if that's the case, it would mean that we become reactive. (Participant 2: 341)

We are not saying, as a cluster, this is where we want to go. So in order for us to get there, what do we need to do? We need to come up with a plan that will get us there. (Participant 3: 669)

So you see that that thing is not carried through downwards. So it's not a cohesive approach. It is a cooperative approach. It is a sum of the pieces. It is not efforts that would exceed the sum of the pieces. It is like, 'What are you going to do? Give us your inputs.' Then we put them together. (Participant 3: 674)

We all still plan. All our plans are, for all intents and purposes, silos. But we bring them together into one document. I'll give an example. With sexual offences courts, I have no idea why we are not planning together every year (Participant 6: 1411)

Even in instances where a cluster planning process was initiated to address silo-based inputs, cluster departments tended to revert back to their silo approaches. One participant indicated that instead of providing inputs and support for the top priorities identified through the planning process, departments steered away from these plans. The decision taken by the National Treasury to prioritise funding for cluster plans ahead of departmental priorities drove departments to include their own priorities in the cluster plan:

When we were working with this MTSF, the idea was to say we needed a bigger plan for the cluster. That was the whole understanding. That is why we were having meetings to have cluster inputs. But what happened? Every

department was pushing their own agendas, not wanting to input into the bigger plan. That is why when we were submitting the final MTSF to Cabinet, it was very chaotic from the JCPS Cluster. (Participant 8: 1978)

It was a problem because after we had a report that we thought was a bigger cluster plan, departments aside would still send departmental inputs, which is problematic. The JCPS is a value chain. So when we talk of the cluster plan, it must talk to all the cluster departments and not to individual departments. And that is the problem that we don't win on. (Participant 8: 1979)

So they want to use the MTSF to source funds, which is very bad. But all we needed was a whole cluster plan and the agreement that these are cluster priorities. (Participant 8: 1980)

Two participants mentioned that some of the targets in the cluster plan are easy and do not lead to the impact that the cluster should be aiming for. On the one hand, this was identified as lack of effort and determination from leadership to set targets that would make an impact. On the other hand, it was identified as Protocols and bureaucratic processes that make it difficult to implement plans:

If you look at the previous MTSF, things that we targeted to achieve at the 25-year review, we have moved. There was an impact in terms of what we've delivered in terms of plan as a cluster. But we had targeted less. (Participant 11: 2691)

Planning is not about sweetheart targets or indicators because you know you're going to achieve them. It's about fighting what needs to be fought. Whether you achieved it or not achieved it, you would give proper reasons as to why you have not achieved. And that green does even not say anything. It does not have impact in any way and doesn't satisfy the community about anything you do. That is why we lose trust in institutions. (Participant 13: 3818)

Areas of misalignment identified by participants included misalignment in the planning processes, resulting in delays and awkwardness while attempting to finalise documents. Due to these processes, departmental plans and cluster plans were ultimately misaligned.

We are still awaiting the signed-off medium-term strategic framework. We don't have that. I think the challenge is with the overlapping time frames ... Now there needs to be proper alignment of plans to administrative terms.

Currently [January 2020], we still working on the plans for the new administration. (Participant 1: 184)

If there can be a way of ensuring that what is prioritised at cluster level gets to be prioritised by departments because departments are allocating resources both human and financial for certain programmes based on their priorities within the department. (Participant 1: 185)

If we don't plan at that nitty-gritty level, if we still go back and do our own objectives for the year, apart from understanding the objectives of the NPA and seeing how objectives of SAPS will impact on the objectives of NPA. And the policies must be aligned, else you are definitely going to get what we call bottlenecks. (Participant 6: 1435)

I think planning within the cluster is also problematic because planning and monitoring parts do not talk to each other. (Participant 8: 1971)

One participant indicated that the lack of critical self-reflection of the cluster does not assist in addressing issues towards addressing crime. Instead, there is a drive to achieve targets and run a positive public-relations exercise rather than address blockages and challenges within the criminal justice system:

The issue about us not even getting to where we are, not getting from a planning point of view, is that we are not critical. We are not critical and honest. We are absolutely not critical and honest about the things that happen. We all know that the conviction rate is what looks good there. It's good statistics, but it doesn't really tell you anything. You are talking about only cases that you took to court. (Participant 13: 3804)

One participant indicated that a planning task team needs to be convened to generate proper well-thought-out plans through considering statistics, human capacities and capabilities, budget and other considerations. This task team would assist the President in making promises that are achievable and based on realities of the criminal justice system:

As much as we hate task teams, for me, from a planning point of view, before even the President comes with all these nice things and whatever political statement they will be making from their manifestos and promises made to people. But maybe there should be an advisory body first of all that sits and advises the President. I know that the President has advisers, the political

ones. There must be technical advisers, implementation advisers of most, probably each and every cluster, and of the JCPS Cluster. So that when the President starts making statements, he makes statements on the basis of advice that is evidence based. (Participant 13: 3778)

Affinity 8: Sharing Goals

Participants indicated that there was no single view regarding the problem being addressed. Issues included the lack of shared values and vision, lack of common objectives and unclear mandates.

Three participants indicated that the vision and broad high-level goals of the cluster are stipulated in South Africa's National Development Plan of 2030 and the Integrated Criminal Justice Strategy that was completed in 2019:

Yes, I think to a larger extent, the NDP is trying to give us a hymn book from which we should all be singing. But I think strides have been made within the criminal justice value chain with the development of the Integrated Criminal Justice Strategy. Everyone now is beginning to see him/herself in there, in the objectives and the pillars that have been identified. (Participant 1: 214)

We have a shared vision; we have shared goals. They are said clearly for all departments. I can't say we don't have shared goals, and they are clearly on paper – indicated. But not shared culture, shared identify, cohesive identity. (Participant 6: 1578)

I think Vision 2030 is the shared vision. It is the roadmap and direction and gives the indication that that is our vision for 2030. But how much we commit to operational it – that's where the challenge is. (Participant 9: 2376)

At the heart of the misalignment of goals lies the tension between the conflicting objectives of the JCPS Cluster entities. Participants generally felt that more work is needed to identify the goals that lead to better functioning of the criminal justice system:

It's those conflicting things or whatever. But they are conflicting because Correctional Services says we are overcrowded. But on the other hand, the Police are arresting more people ... Prosecutors, they make sure that they record high conviction rates. It is conflicting priorities ... (Participant 2: 510)

This tension also stems from members of the public. Members of the public say, 'Don't give people bail, keep them in jail'. The tension is not only within administrative function and stretches to external people who are our clients. (Participant 2: 513)

It's a problem. We need to come to a point where we talk of the whole value chain. We need to trace a case when it was opened until its finalisation. That's when we will see whether we are winning or not. I think we are still lacking in this regard. (Participant 8: 2011)

Most of the time when they talk about convictions, we ask, 'These convictions, to which arrests are they talking to?' Even the systems are failing to give us that kind of information. Until we can really work on that, we won't know whether we are winning or not. (Participant 8: 2012)

Let's look at the Department of Social Development. We are looking at crime against women and children. If one side is advocating 'report more' and the other side wants to prevent, there's a disjuncture. One is trying to prevent, to reduce the crime, whereas the other is trying to increase sensitivity and increase reporting ... The targets are working against each other. (Participant 9: 2148)

The NPA may want to have as many people as possible found guilty, with the heaviest sentences possible. Legal Aid SA would like people to not be found guilty and set free. At objective level, we will have divergent objectives. But when it comes to outcomes, we can work as a sector and identify the outcomes we would like to achieve. (Participant 12: 3271-2)

Although goals are concluded and well understood by the top levels of the cluster, the same does not always apply at operational level. Three participants indicated that all key participants of the cluster are not adequately directed to implement these goals. For example, the police tend to spend limited resources arresting people for all crimes rather than prioritising their resources on identified crimes that would bring about the impact that is envisaged:

I agree that sharing of goals is not done at an operational level. We don't share goals at operational level. They are there at the higher level and the Executive.

For example, Ministers go to Cabinet Lekgotla ... Come to operational level, police arrest; people get remanded before sentencing. They are remanded at Correctional Services for a long time – for years. (Participant 11: 2722)

Can you imagine the graph? Arrests are high. Number of prosecutions drops drastically. Why does it drop drastically? They [the SAPS] arrested prematurely for numbers. What is it that we are trying to do? (Participant 11: 2726)

The reality of the situation is that if you go at court level, you as the magistrate or prosecutor, about the seven-point plan, they don't know. If you ask the police officer, he doesn't. (Participant 12: 3287)

One participant indicated that it is in times of crisis that the cluster establishes common goals towards addressing the issue. These included attacks against foreign nationals, campaigns such as #FeesMustFall by university students and major projects such as the FIFA World Cup soccer tournament.

So what then happens is that you only see people coming together to deal with a specific goal or to work towards a specific goal if it [were] triggered by a crisis. For instance, this thing of attacks on foreign nationals, the tension between local and foreign-owned shops in the townships, the so-called xenophobic attacks and so on. Once there's a crisis, you see people coming together to come up with Operation this and Operation that. (Participant 3: 689)

A major area of misalignment within the cluster is regarding the way in which the prevention of social crime is being addressed. The study by Holtmann (2008) showed the critical importance of social services to break the cycle of criminality within the communities. However, there is overemphasis on crime combating and ICT objectives, and underemphasis on social crime prevention, as was mentioned by two participants:

Crime is always in focus and on the frontline, so there's no running away from SAPS. But crime comes in after. How is the Department of Education involved in this process? Are they part of the cluster? No. But crime starts with the grooming of a child, a teenager, or at higher education. That is not featuring in the cluster. We need to look at a bigger picture. We need to look at a 30-year plan. (Participant 9: 2140)

It's the culture within JCPS cluster. The current culture is to essentialise IT above any other. So the current culture, the 65%, essentialises ICT above social crime prevention. Social crime prevention is sitting with its back on the wall. It doesn't even have anything near what departments are getting for ICT. (Participant 6: 1745)

The Ministers are political appointees and become Executive Authorities of Departments for a period of five years. Although DGs themselves have five-year contracts, they work within administration towards achieving long-term objectives. Objectives often differ and are part of the possible reasons for the high turnover of Directors-General:

The issue of political versus administrative goals – the commitments in the leaders. Political interference I think is problematic. I think the Executive (Ministers), they don't want to respect administration. I don't know the correct word, but there is always a conflict between our political leaders and administrative leaders. Our administrative leadership – the political leadership is their masters. (Participant 8: 2018)

Not long within the cluster, there was that cry saying there is no commitment and we need leadership to be committed. The leaders were saying in their defence that other issues are out of their control because of political instructions. They say, 'We cannot fully commit because we are being controlled by the Executives. You plan to have a meeting and the political leadership says but we want you in Cape Town'. That is why it looks like they are not committed. (Participant 8: 1936)

6.2.3 Relationships between Affinities

6.2.4 Affinity Relationship Table

The eight affinities that were identified during the focus group have 56 possible relationships between them (i.e. 28 in one direction [7+6+5+4+3+2+1] and an additional 28 in the other direction). For example, in one direction, Affinity 1 would have a possible relationship with seven others, and Affinity 2 would have a

relationship with six others. All the votes for the 56 relationships were counted using Microsoft Excel.

To determine which of the 56 relationships would be useful in explaining the JCPS intragovernmental collaborations, the researcher used the Pareto Principle as described in Northcutt and McCoy (2004). This step determines the optimal number of relationships that best explains the variation within the system.

In the first step, the relationships were arranged in order of frequency with the highest relationship frequencies at the top. For example, Leadership → Execution, Leadership → Planning, and Leadership → Sharing Goals all scored 10, which means that all 13 participants denoted these relationships. The last five relationships did not receive any votes, as detailed in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: Affinity pairs and Pareto calculations

#	Relationships	Frequency	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percentage (Relation)	Cumulative Percentage (Frequency)	Power
A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1	5 → 6	13	13	1,8	4,0	2,2
2	5 → 7	13	26	3,6	8,0	4,4
3	5 → 8	13	39	5,4	12,0	6,6
4	4 → 6	12	51	7,1	15,7	8,5
5	1 ← 4	11	62	8,9	19,1	10,1
6	1 ← 5	11	73	10,7	22,5	11,7
7	4 → 8	11	84	12,5	25,8	13,3
8	6 ← 7	11	95	14,3	29,2	14,9
9	2 ← 5	10	105	16,1	32,3	16,2
10	2 → 6	10	115	17,9	35,4	17,5
11	2 → 7	10	125	19,6	38,5	18,8
12	3 → 6	10	135	21,4	41,5	20,1
13	4 ← 5	10	145	23,2	44,6	21,4
14	4 → 7	10	155	25,0	47,7	22,7
15	1 → 7	9	164	26,8	50,5	23,7
16	2 → 3	9	173	28,6	53,2	24,7
17	3 ← 5	9	182	30,4	56,0	25,6
18	6 ← 8	9	191	32,1	58,8	26,6
19	1 ← 3	8	199	33,9	61,2	27,3
20	1 → 6	8	207	35,7	63,7	28,0
21	1 → 8	8	215	37,5	66,2	28,7
22	3 ← 4	8	223	39,3	68,6	29,3
23	1 ← 2	7	230	41,1	70,8	29,7
24	2 → 8	7	237	42,9	72,9	30,1
25	3 ← 7	7	244	44,6	75,1	30,4
26	7 ← 8	7	251	46,4	77,2	30,8
27	2 ← 4	6	257	48,2	79,1	30,9
28	3 → 8	6	263	50,0	80,9	30,9

Cumulative frequency values were then calculated for all 56 relationships. These cumulative frequencies were shown as a percentage of the 56 relationships (see Column F).

Given that there are 56 relationships in the eight-affinity system, each of the relationships represent on average, 1/56 or 1.8% of the total. The cumulative percentage (Column E) was computed for each relationship.

The power of a relationship was calculated as the difference between the cumulative percentage based on frequency and the cumulative percentage based

on the number of relationships. The optimum figure meant that the cumulative frequency (Column F) needed to be maximised while the cumulative relations (Column E) was minimised. The Maximum Value of Power was found to be 30.9, and this was reached at the 28th relationship.

The analysis revealed that 28 relationships were key in explaining the JCPS collaboration, using the 80-20 principle. This means that at the 80% cumulative percentage level, 28 relationships that explained interrelations were identified.

6.2.5 Interrelationship Diagram

The theoretical coding aspect continued with the development of the IRD, which entailed classifying affinities according to the extent to which they were drivers or outcomes within the JCPS collaboration.

The 28 relationships identified following the Pareto step were tabulated on the interrelationship diagram (Table 8.3). Each relationship was shown twice on the table using arrows that pointed up and left. For example, if Affinity 2 influenced Affinity 1, then two arrows, one facing up and the other facing left, would be shown as illustrated in Table 6.3. Arrows facing up were tabulated under 'out' and those facing left were tabulated under 'in'. The difference between 'ins' and 'outs' (delta) was calculated for each row.

Table 6.3 Interrelationship diagram for the focus group

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Out	In	Δ
1		←	←	←	←	↑	↑	↑	3	4	-1
2	↑		↑	←	←	↑	↑	↑	5	2	3
3	↑	←		←	←	↑	←	↑	3	4	-1
4	↑	↑	↑		←	↑	↑	↑	6	1	5
5	↑	↑	↑	↑		↑	↑	↑	7	0	7
6	←	←	←	←	←		←	←	0	7	-7
7	←	←	↑	←	←	↑		←	2	5	-3
8	←	←	←	←	←	↑	↑		2	5	-3

6.2.6 Affinities as drivers and outcomes

The IRD was then arranged in order from the highest delta to the lowest to assist with easy classification of the eight affinities, as shown in Table 6.4.

Table 6.4 Interrelationship diagram arranged in decreasing delta values

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Out	In	Δ	Affinity	Identification
5	↑	↑	↑	↑		↑	↑	↑	7	0	7	Leadership	Primary Driver
4	↑	↑	↑		←	↑	↑	↑	6	1	5	Culture	Secondary Driver
2	↑		↑	←	←	↑	↑	↑	5	2	3	Protocols	Secondary Driver
1		←	←	←	←	↑	↑	↑	3	4	-1	Silos	Secondary Outcome
3	↑	←		←	←	↑	←	↑	3	4	-1	Resources	Secondary Outcome
7	←	←	↑	←	←	↑		←	2	5	-3	Planning	Secondary Outcome
8	←	←	←	←	←	↑	↑		2	5	-3	Sharing goals	Secondary Outcome
6	←	←	←	←	←		←	←	0	7	-7	Execution	Primary Outcome

A primary driver is an affinity that has substantial influence on the phenomenon under discussion (Northcutt and McCoy, 2004). In the context of the current research, a primary driver represents an affinity that has the most influence on the success or failure of intragovernmental collaboration. On the IRD, a primary driver

has all 'out' arrows and no 'in' arrows, which means that it influences other affinities without being affected in return.

A secondary driver is an affinity with more 'ins' than 'outs', which means that the affinity influences others but is also influenced by others. A secondary driver has relatively more affinities that it influences than affinities that influence it (positive deltas). A secondary driver has a causal relationship with the phenomenon being studied.

A secondary outcome is an affinity with more 'outs' than 'ins', which means that the affinity influences others but has more affinities that influence it (negative deltas).

A primary driver is an affinity with no 'outs', which means it does not influence any affinities but is entirely influenced by others. A primary outcome represents the effects or results of the phenomenon.

6.2.7 The Cluttered Systems Influence Diagram

The eight affinities and the 28 relationships are represented in the Cluttered SID shown in Figure 6.3.




Figure 6.3 Uncluttered Systems Influence Diagram for Senior Managers

Detailed descriptions of the interrelationships given by the Senior Managers are shown in Annexure E.

6.2.8 Uncluttered Systems Influence Diagram

The Uncluttered SID was simplified by taking out any paths that were redundant using the process described in Section 5.3.4.5. For example, in Figure 6.3, the path Protocols → Execution was removed because the path Protocols → Sharing Goals → Planning → Execution already existed.

Figure 6.4 presents the remaining relationships after removal of the redundant links.




Figure 6.4 Uncluttered Systems Influence Diagram for the focus group

The Uncluttered SID was subsequently rearranged to display a simplified diagram (Figure 6.5).




Figure 6.5 Simplified Systems Influence Diagram for the focus group

6.2.9 Individual Senior Manager interrelationships between affinities

In line with the constructivist approach that recognises multiple realities and an epistemological stance of generation of knowledge through these multiple realities,

it is imperative to present results at an individual level to capture the multiple realities. This means inclusion of a discussion on individual variances together with the discussion on the composite results. The ten participants who took part in the focus group and the additional three participants who only took part in the interviews had individual SIDs constructed.

Eight of the 13 Senior Managers indicated Leadership as a primary driver of the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration. This was followed by Culture, which was indicated by three participants. Other primary drivers designated by participants were Protocols and Silos.

Regarding outcomes, a similar pattern was observed. Eight of the 13 participants indicated Execution as a primary outcome, and this was followed by Silos and Sharing Goals.

It should be noted that some of the participants did not indicate a primary driver or a primary outcome. In these situations, the driver with the highest delta and the outcome with the lowest delta were designated primary. This allowed for the simplified summary shown in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5 Primary drivers and primary outcomes for individual Senior Managers

Participant	Primary Driver	Primary Outcome
2	Leadership	Execution
3	Leadership	Execution
12	Leadership	Execution
13	Leadership	Execution
7	Leadership	Execution
8	Leadership	Execution
4	Leadership	Sharing goals
10	Leadership	Silos
11	Culture	Silos
6	Culture	Execution
9	Culture	Execution
1	Protocols	Silos
5	Silos	Sharing goals

System Influence Diagrams for each Senior Manager, shown in Annexure G, provide a more detailed report and a pictorial view of the individual SIDs.

6.3 TOP MANAGERS

Top Managers have been identified as a different constituency from Senior Managers and, therefore, their descriptions and IRDs are discussed separately for comparison and contrast.

6.3.1 In-depth description of Affinities

This section represents the voice of the participants and in line with the constructivist approach, represents the multiple realities and explanations of the participants' experiences. Five Top Managers from five different entities and departments participated.

Most participants were English-second-language speakers and, therefore, minor grammatical errors were corrected in the transcript and filler words such as 'uhm' were removed for clarity. Some words may not have been part of the quotation but were included for clarity (e.g. substituting the word 'his' for [Director-General] where necessary). Such words appear in square brackets.

Quotations are shown per participant and are cross-referenced to the paragraph on the composite interview transcript.

Affinity 1: Silos

One participant provided a historical context on the JCPS Cluster and emphasised that the formation of the cluster was to address the issue of silos within the criminal justice system and government in general and indicated that it has been an on-going challenge ever since:

The silo system has always been difficult, and I do think that perhaps when Cabinet in the early 1990s took a decision to set up the commission that would enquire as to how we could bring about coherence, which commission came up with the proposal of clusters. It was specifically tried to address this problem of working in silos. (Participant 16: 788)

Silos were not only found in the cluster but also within the departments and entities themselves. Units expected to work closely together for the achievement of organisational goals are often found not to be working close enough. Furthermore, silos were found to be government wide and interclusteral. For example, work done through the Economic Cluster has a major influence on the work of the Security Cluster (JCPS):

Within the **** itself, very big silos. Always have been, and I don't think they're getting any better. ... I definitely find that people stick to their unit and their

group and defend that group's stance against the other groups, even though it is wrong. Even when it's clearly wrong and everybody can see it that it's not right. (Participant 18: 1410)

Once you start touching on someone else's turf, then they get very defensive and there's not really a willingness to work together or to take one step towards the next person. So, we're extremely defensive about what's wrong. (Participant 18: 1409)

I want to say that the five clusters of government actually work in silos and that is a bigger danger because we need, in actual fact, [a] collaborative approach between the various clusters, and we need bigger coordination between the various activities of the clusters ... The causes of crime have a social dimension. It's not JCPS. And if the Social Cluster don't come to the fore and assist the JCPS Cluster with dealing with the causes of crime, we can't succeed. (Participant 17: 1123)

Another participant recommended that in addition to the formal JCPS Cluster, a matrix structure of collaboration needs to be introduced. This means more formalised interactions with clear lines of responsibilities and accountability:

I think for me, the silos are generated from the perspective that we work within our departmental organisational structure. But we are big organisations and if we need [to] migrate to matrix to enhance the work of the cluster ... as branches, we must have that matrix way of working through you are communicating with another Chief Director If a person is a Deputy Director and you are a Deputy Director in another department, according to me, you have to work collaboratively because also, we have got one common goal. (Participant 14: 12)

Affinity 2: Protocols²

The general sentiment is that a certain level of bureaucracy is needed to run the cluster. The participants emphasised the need for documents to serve at

² The Affinity Red Tape was renamed Protocols after interviews were conducted.

DevComm, Cluster DGs and Cluster Ministers en route to Cabinet. For example, one participant stated:

I think it is a bureaucratic process, but I think it is a process that is necessary because it serves as a very important consultative forum because you have people from all the relevant departments in the criminal justice system sitting at that forum and very often, we get good suggestions. And very often, we get a sense of what the representatives of the Ministers express about different proposals we're taking (Participant 15: 627)

Top Managers expressed that the delays in the perceived lengthy process regarding approvals originate in two areas. The first issue lies in the quality of documents that serve at the different fora and require iterations of corrections. The second issue is the lengthy processes of approval that take place outside the cluster. The example protocols that allow changes in processes within court processes need to be signed by the individual DGs within their departments:

For me, if you look at them, these structures are not many. They are only four. The biggest problem, if people are not informed about the quality of the documents that have to go and sit in that structure ... I've read some of the documents. I would say, 'Wow, this is not even supposed to come here. It needs to be edited, even the facts, everything that has been written.' (Participant 14: 40–41)

There was an admission that there is room for improvement in the way that the subcommittees of the JCPS Cluster are structured and interact with each other. The rationalisation deals with agenda items and how they feed into the main structures of the cluster:

I think there is a challenge with the coordinating structures. For example, you come to the JCPS DG Forum and then NATJOINTS would present a report, but the report doesn't take into consideration what happens in the other committees. So, the law enforcement one is very much a purely police type of report ... So, it's not necessarily bureaucracy, etc., but it's a redefining of what the structure should be doing and making sure that they have proper terms of reference that will promote alignment and coordination and given a bigger

picture in terms of the criminal justice system and the JCPS Cluster. (Participant 17: 1155–1156)

You find that one of the challenges that we have, for example, is that how activities needed to be prefaced by proper intelligence, and there's a big gap at the moment. So, I wouldn't want to call it necessarily red tape, but there's a lack of governance and those types of activities are for me the bigger challenge. I don't think there are too many meetings necessarily, but what is a challenge is that you will have the same type of activities being dealt with in different meetings where the same people go and that creates a problem. (Participant 17: 1158)

In relation to governance, a major area of neglect seems to be with the interface between national departments and local government, as illustrated:

So, we need greater cooperation, coordination between national and provincial and local levels. For example, the JCPS DGs, etc. is a national structure. They don't have a similar structure at a provincial level and that's a big gap, and we're now looking at how do we then deal with that because now the Premiers are starting to have their own committees, etc. (Participant 17: 1160)

So you will find, for example, that the Civilian Secretariat of the Police, which drives crime prevention in terms of white paper of policing and safety and security, they propagate that we must have community safety forums in various provinces, but the community safety forum falls under the municipalities. And the municipalities just say, 'Sorry, we hear what you say; we see the need for it, but we don't have budget for it.' (Participant 17: 1128)

Affinity 3: Resources

The issue of skewed resource allocation in favour of frontline departments, particularly the SAPS, was raised. In addition, there has been a general competition for resources since departments individually have to motivate for additional resources at the National Treasury.

Although it was generally admitted that there is a need for visible policing and well-staffed police stations, other entities on the value chain do not receive an equitable share to ensure a balanced flow of cases:

I think the frontline criminal justice departments generally get a huge share of the budget By frontline, I mean SAPS and Defence, most particularly SAPS. I mean as crime increases, we want to have more police. We want to see more police, but I think the understanding of how the Courts would deal with this increasing number of cases is not always taken into consideration. (Participant 15: 634)

Yeah, the problem is, especially within our cluster, everything is a priority. The one can't work without the other one. So yes, we are competing for very scarce resources. But I do think National Treasury does play a very important role and to make sure that the resources are fairly allocated in terms of a budget perspective. (Participant 18: 1430)

There were attempts to present a holistic picture when motivating for increased budget at the National Treasury. But the efforts were not always sustained and successful:

National Treasury said, 'Why don't you as a DGs [*sic*] come out with a joint bid?' Now, that's a brilliant idea. Do you know what it means? It means you all come together, you see. These are the things that we're focusing on as a cluster. We'll reduce corruption for start. Violent and serious crimes, right? Deal with gender-based violence, for example ... So, it's a joint bid. We have all agreed this thing, and then you submit. That's what was suggested. Even last year I think it was, they tried that This thing has not become entrenched; it has not become a culture of entertaining joint bids, especially on those very strategic matters. (Participant 16: 868–869)

I think in terms of resources, there's a lack of general resources across the whole of government. But the JCPS Cluster started to deal with that, and it has started to look at things in an alignment process where you have to look at how do you share resources, how do you make sure that there's an integrated approach in dealing with it. And that slowly but surely, we're starting to move towards an integrated resource and human resource as well as [a] financial resource planning process. (Participant 17: 1164)

One participant was sceptical and believed that competition for resources is inevitable and will always be there. The participant also acknowledged the role that

the National Treasury plays in taking the final decision regarding budget based on the individual proposals of departments:

Government does not have money, so the budget for the whole criminal justice system value chain is reducing There's no department that can say, 'I'm prepared to cut'. Hence, we force National Treasury [to] tell us that they are going to cut even if we can have those discussions as a cluster. So, some of the things, the competition of the limited resources like money, it will always be there. (Participant 14: 95)

The integration of IT systems was seen as a vehicle that would enable the cluster to monitor the criminal justice system throughout the value chain. Although there have been recent developments and improvements, progress remains slower than anticipated. The views of Top Managers on IT integration were as follows:

That's a recommendation from the cluster's side, on the IJS Board activities. So that one can look at the billions of rand that have been invested – what is the value that has been added to it and is it in line with what is needed now for the current fight against crime and what is the use of technology? So, there is that challenge. (Participant 17: 1190)

When it comes to IJS, as a cluster budget, they allocate money but the delivery of services, the achievement that is really integration, it's moving very slow. (Participant 14: 77)

It's also a question of police want to have most probably about 50 or 60 different projects in terms of IT, where they want cameras for each of their police stations and for each building, etc. ... So, competition between departments is there. We're moving slowly towards greater integration. (Participant 17: 1170)

Affinity 4: Culture

One participant indicated that there is no uniform cluster culture and that individuals reflect the organisational culture from where they emanate. However, there was acknowledgement of the effect of departmental cultures that are underpinned by issues relating to public-servant mentality:

I don't know if we've got a shared culture. Let's start with that. I don't know if you can say there is one JCPS culture. There definitely is a SAPS culture, a very strong one. There's a SAPS, NPA, strong NPA one, a strong Judiciary one, and there's a strong DOJ culture. But I don't know that there is a cluster culture. I haven't personally experienced that we have a joint culture. (Participant 18: 1444–1445)

Within different cluster organisations, pockets of commitment have been recognised. These are people who work under challenging environments and consistently present their best efforts:

Look, I do think that the pockets of the commitment and passion are not confined only [to] the JCPS; it's just in the public sector in general ... Yes, there are people who are committed. You know, there's a lady that works at ****. I can tell you about ****; he's an ideal public servant. Even as he's sick, he doesn't miss meetings. So, it's those kinds of people. Even in the Police, there are lots. You know, there are people when I call, they will return my call if they can't take my call. (Participant 16: 873)

Although there are pockets of excellence, participants admitted that there are pervasive negative behaviours in many areas within the public service that demonstrate the undesirable public-service mentality. These include lack of decisive action where it is needed and lack of accountability:

Do you know what the problem is? We introduce a particular culture of being considerate. They say, if I take this kind of action against this person, it's not only he or she who's affected. There are the children, the entire family. So, we become empathetic. (Participant 16: 900-901)

So, you will find that you have to do a country report for example, with input from all the various departments, etc., but one department or sub-department will just not assist and that I think is a challenge because as a result of lack of accountability and consequence management, then the report suffers at the end of the day. (Participant 17: 1195)

Lack of accountability and decisiveness at certain times lead to situations deteriorating, which in turn, lead to the need for task teams to address such management failures. One participant felt that the use of task teams was not

negative and should be one of the instruments used to bring about change and improvement. The participant's description is as follows:

There was a newspaper article about a situation on one of [the] facilities. But through the cluster visit, we started to implement strategies to address the situation. We went there with the local team. There was NPA from Head Office; there was Court Administration from Head Office; there was Legal Aid and then there was NPA local; there was court administration local; there was Legal Aid local. We're moving around there closing our noses! And the next time we visited, the place was breathing; the place was clean; there was a lot of improvement. (Participant 14: 119-124)

Another behaviour that was identified within the cluster is the perceived gatekeeping that has developed through the years. People who have been participating in the cluster tended not to accept or allow other people to participate. This situation resulted in complacency and the lack of new thinking and approaches to address problems.

I think people have forgotten that the JCPS is a committee that was intended to improve coordination. But, I actually find that key people have stayed in all the committees for many years to the extent that their culture has become institutionalised in a committee. And a committee for me shouldn't become like an embedded department. You've got to see different people getting nominated for the cluster. (Participant 15: 636)

If you want to clean out the culture that is impeding the work, right, and I think the culture is impeding the work because you have gatekeepers within the cluster; you have people who have silo mentalities, and it has become embedded within the culture of the committee. And if you want to change it, you have got to change the representation on the committee. You've got to bring in new people. You've got to bring in fresh ideas. (Participant 15: 637)

I was sitting in another meeting that I got invited to. I won't tell you which one it is, but it's a similar – a structure similar to the cluster. And I think it actually came out of the cluster. And you can just see the gatekeepers there. And people. The new person going there, they look at you. What are you doing there? Do you have an invitation? Do you have a 'clearance' to be here? It's all these kinds of things. I think we need to clean the whole thing out. We need to take out the gatekeepers. We need to reconnect with the purpose of what the clusters were intended to do. (Participant 15: 780)

Finally, there is a perceived overemphasis on the integration of information systems and this, therefore, means constant and dominating conversations around IT, which tends to alienate some participants:

And also, you know, I find that coming out of the cluster, I'm not against IT people, but that IT language and those diagrams ...! (Participant 15: 780)

Affinity 5: Leadership

The leadership discussion was dominated by poor attendance, lack of consequence management and absence of visionary leadership where it is supposedly desperately needed:

But also, I think the whole issue of leadership is a kind of reflection of what has been happening in the JCPS Cluster It has failed because of poor leadership, and we are simply not doing anything. I mean, can we say that the criminal justice system in our country is working sufficiently? It's not because I think it is at its lowest point right now. And so, I think it has a lot to do with leadership. (Participant 15: 642)

We would try to name and shame even in Cabinet. That's what I used to say. They say, 'This target was not achieved, in quarter one.' They say it was not achieved. They give their reason, and they told us what they were going to do. Now, [it] is still not achieved. The reason that they give is the same as the one that they gave But you see, because of lack of accountability and what they call consequence management ... I think it's something that you need to focus on. (Participant 16: 925–931)

Secondly, you also find that in many instances, the meetings are not attended by the Directors-General but by representatives of them and that then has a further impact in terms of leadership, vision and continuity. And if you have that sort of challenge, then obviously, it impacts on the accountability of a cluster. (Participant 17: 1101)

Now, if the DG's cluster is not working well, then the subcommittees and task teams which fall under it, are also impacted on because they take their lead from the DGs, etc. So, you will find the same is happening at subcommittees, like, for example, NATJOINT and the Development Committee where you don't have senior representatives. DGs don't attend it. DDGs don't attend it.

You have at the most, perhaps Chief Directors or Directors and sometimes, even below that attend. (Participant 17: 1102)

Top leaders within law enforcement agencies became entangled in corruption, as has been extensively reported in the media. This has had a major impact on the work of the cluster and has affected crime-fighting activities throughout organisations:

And that has an impact in terms of having a proper accountability in terms of dealing with the government-wide priorities and the implementation of priority programmes of action. It also makes consultation difficult in terms of that. So, leadership is a big thing. We've had in the past, I think, a lack of leadership in the criminal justice system because of, to some extent, State Capture, where you've had a lack of responsibility from the NPA's side, from the DPCI ... (Participant 17: 1103)

But in a lot of our places, and *** was one of them, our leaders were fingered in the report of the *State of Capture*. There are various people that had to address State Capture. We now hear Magistrates; we knew of Judges; we know the NPA; we know the Masters are currently under a huge investigation. (Participant 18: 1457)

Besides issues of lack of accountability, there was an indication that leaders within the cluster struggle to transcend the issue of silos. Even in meetings where joint issues are discussed, participants generally do not hold each other to account and do not question the reports that are submitted. This is shown to apply not only to Top Managers within the meeting but often, also to the Senior Managers who are attending:

For us to do it, you've got to get people that can see. They have vision and do not want to just protect their own but have a common goal. And we've got this MTSF, but really, it's still very much the SAPS say what they want in there and that's it. The NPA says what they want in there and nobody challenges it. The Presidency is not pulling us together the way they should, with all due respect, to force us to have integrated things. (Participant 18: 1461)

What happens is those people are arrested. The report must say that x number are now in Court, x number we found that the case had no merit and, therefore, they've been released, right? NPA must be able to say yes, either x number

has pleaded guilty; this is the sentence. That's a complete report. But all we get is the arrests. And I say the arrests in themselves are not a success. It's a step towards success. And I kept on pleading, 'We want a report that has more information than what the Police are giving'. And you know, because of the silo thing, they would never go to find missing info. (Participant 16: 922)

One participant expressed views regarding the challenge of having the leader of the cluster being at the same level as other members of the committee. On the one hand, the participant indicated that DGs should be able to submit to the leadership that has been chosen, be it political or otherwise, irrespective of the similarity of levels. On the other hand, the participant accepts that it requires a certain type of leadership to lead heads of organisations:

And this thing that a person must be above your level for you to be able to respect that person, also it becomes a big problem. Can't you work as colleagues? And you have a chair amongst yourselves because that requires commitment. We need to revisit this thinking that a person that is a chair must be a person that is of higher authority than me. The DGs must be able to have someone that is a chair amongst them. There's nothing wrong because that, that – a position of being a chair, it rotates. (Participant 14: 216)

This is very difficult because for me, leadership in the cluster is not easy because you are leading people that are coming from different departments. So as you lead them, it becomes difficult to stand your authority with regard to anything. Yes, even if you are providing an effective leadership. But it becomes difficult to implement a disciplinary action, to enforce even the disciplinary measures for the lack of cooperation for some of the things, and for me, it's one area of the leadership that is key. (Participant 14: 197)

Views were expressed by three participants on the Chairperson of the DG being from the department with the strongest political executive. Instances where the strongest political executive was not from the core criminal justice departments of the SAPS, the DOJCD or Correctional Services were cited as a problem:

I think it's a good rule to have where they say that the most senior Minister will be the Chair of the cluster. And so, necessarily, the DG of that most senior Minister becomes the cluster Chair. So, I think from that perspective, it's a good system to have because you have leadership at the highest level and

you would expect that people will follow. But I'd been to a couple of meetings where there's been an acting Chair. So, and I think that is not good because I think cluster meetings are very important. It happens once a month and it must be chaired by the Chairperson. I think it must be prioritised. (Participant 15: 641)

I think if we look at leadership at the moment, the cluster is led by Defence. And as a result of that, there's a bit of a disjointment in terms of relevance of that leadership to the criminal justice system in particular. There's an overall greater focus on security of a country and the borders and things like that than there is on the rest of the activities that's required. But I just say that as an aside. It does not mean that the cluster is not functioning and that there's no leadership from Defence side. (Participant 17: 1100)

Defence requested DOJCD to chair DevCom (Development Committee), though [Defence] is the cluster chair because they realised that they are not content specialist. To chair something that you are not a content specialist on becomes difficult. Then how do you make a decision of the area [that] is not yours? Hence, they have requested to Justice to chair. (Participant 14: 221)

Participants recommended a type of leader that would be appropriate for the cluster given the challenges of crime in South Africa and the socio-economic issues associated with it. Descriptions included vibrancy, ethics, diplomacy and the ability to coordinate and unite the cluster:

You need vibrant leadership. You need energetic leadership. You need people who are respected, people who are from high ethical standing. And because it's a coordinating structure, that person must be able to pull people together. And you pull people together by showing that each one has a contribution to make and at the same time that the contribution is valued and ideas are shared openly. (Participant 15: 644)

If you're a leader, you need to define what leadership style you are really utilising. Because if you are using those autocratic ones, it won't work because participants don't report to you. So you really need to be very transformational because we must move from the traditional way of functioning to this matrix where you're functioning. So, the transformational type of leadership, for me, is very critical. (Participant 14: 198)

You need also to do it diplomatically. Diplomacy as well is very much important. So, for me, I think it makes – it's not easy to really provide leadership. Because also, you are a leader even if you are a chair. You are a chair of DGs and these DGs themselves are leaders. So how do you lead

them? They must also have belief in you. If they don't believe in you, it becomes a big problem. (Participant 14: 204)

Affinity 6: Execution

Execution of JCPS Cluster responsibilities takes place within governmental departments and entities. This, therefore, means budgets. Even funds ring-fenced for specific programmes such as the IJS are spent within entities, guided by legislation and approved by Accounting Officers (DGs). The cluster is responsible for the coordination and overseeing of this work, and individual departments are expected to deliver their part of the target. Two participants captured this role as follows:

For me, the execution is supposed to be done at departmental level and as long as the strategic document is clear, which is a guiding document. (Participant 14: 161)

So, where you start having your own cluster targets, then you become a structure for your own sake. And that means you're not performing that function of the collaboration and the alignment. (Participant 15: 663)

The cluster must ensure that the work gets done. That is why it is so important for DGs to get it written on their performance agreements so that the DGs sit at the meetings to ensure alignment. You need the highest-level leadership there to hold them to account to the alignment that is supposed to be taking. (Participant 15: 669)

For instance, if we say that we want to fight corruption and Justice doesn't do that legislation, they impede the Police in their investigations. The cluster must be the one to say, 'You Justice, you are impeding the work of SAPS. Give us a timeframe by when you're going to complete it'. And then our DG must go there and say, 'By this date, I'm going to this, that and the other'. And then he starts reporting, 'By that date, I didn't do this, and this is why I haven't done it yet'. (Participant 15: 670)

Concerns were raised with targets that are believed to be unachievable but are presented nonetheless. These targets do not consider issues relating to skills and

the capacity to implement. And importantly, the targets are not often discussed or agreed upon between the people who sit at the cluster and those who will be tasked with the implementation:

So our plans might be nice, and if we're not going to be able to execute, the plans are useless; they mean nothing. But I also think again, the plans are sometimes too ambitious. And then it's impossible to deliver. And we set people up for failure, so they just say, 'Agh, you know what? Never going to make it in any case, so I'm not going to even try'. That goes back to the culture. (Participant 18: 1473)

But the real problem for me is a skill. And you need skill to be able to execute. And we've had an exodus of skill in all our areas. We haven't had an effective transfer of skill programmes in any part, anywhere in government. If you look at the quality of Police investigations, you look at the quality of prosecutions; you look at the quality of a lot of our work; you compare to what people were doing, it's scary. (Participant 18: 1470)

So, inasmuch as you can participate in those plans, still you need an endorsement at the departmental level because also, when it comes to implementation, it's driven whether there is budget for that. And also, overcommitting your department without resources, it's a big problem. Those are the things that have happened previously where there will be over commitment and then there is no delivery. The functional units will be saying, 'Who committed us on this because we don't have resources to deliver on this?' (Participant 14: 264)

Another participant raised a conflicting view regarding targets and indicated that cluster departments tend to set easy targets that do not advance the work of the cluster.

Now, the problem with departments is that they don't want to be seen to have underachieved. Now, what they then do is to set themselves lower targets that is that they're easy to achieve. What is the impact? They had lots of greens, what is the impact? In fact, the number [of] people who feel unsafe has gone up. A number of crimes, I mean the murders have even gone up since around 2013 because we're now at about 22 000. And they had come down during Selebi's era to about 15 000, just under 16 000. And they started going up. Consistently, they've been going up – the murder, including attempted murders. (Participant 16: 940–946)

We say to them, drugs are one of the drivers of crime. You know what they do? They set themselves target of confiscation of drugs. It's an easy target to achieve. You know it that Nigerians are some of the major drug kingpins here. Now, just think when last you saw a major Nigerian drug lord standing trial – that's because the syndicates are never touched. And those people who run this – they're our neighbours. Some of them are here – in gated communities. (Participant 16: 948)

Within government departments in South Africa, Strategic Management units conduct support functions and are responsible for coordinating strategic and operational planning and monitoring the implementation thereof. A disconnection was identified between the role of Strategy Units and core functions where, for example, the key performance indicators and targets are often being finalised without the concurrence of both areas. These issues illustrate internal coordination issues that extend into the cluster:

Now, some of them even query some of the actions that have been identified in a joint plan because departmental, they weren't involved with it. Do you understand? That is why when we as DPME, we used to call these meetings. I used to say, we want people who are in strategic planning, people who are in budgeting; we want people in M and E – those are the critical people. And we would say to them because some of them are Deputy Directors, 'Deputy Director' – occasionally Chief Director – 'When you make this input, please make sure they go right up to the DG level. So, by the time [we] meet, we can say our department commits to this'. (Participant 16: 971)

At times also, within the cluster because there are so many structures, some of the coordinators of the structures are fighting with the core businesses. And those politics are between the coordinators of those reports and the core business areas. If the coordinators don't define their roles clearly, it becomes a big problem. (Participant 14: 169-170)

The strategic planning person who's sitting in a cluster plan cannot negotiate for the core business – he must go to this core businesses and discuss with them. You guys [Strategy Units], you don't have that picture that these people [core business] have. Remember also, as core business, we point fingers. (Participant 14: 250)

A major challenge regarding implementation was that compilation of the cluster plan is focused on Senior Managers at National Offices. This process tends to

exclude the people who must implement these strategies at service-point level and those who must oversee the implementation:

And I think there our planning is really challenging because you don't get the buy-in then from that clerk that actually needs to deal with the work and contribute to the big plan ... They don't see what the big plan is and what the impact is if they don't do it properly and things like that (Participant 17: 1235)

First of all, I think the problem is we set targets that are unrealistic. So we promise to the world and to the people and to everybody things which we know when we promise are going to be impossible to deliver. Because a lot of the institutions are huge. I mean, the Police are what? 180 000 people? To mobilise them, you've got to move slower in terms of that. (Participant 18: 1467)

One participant indicated the difficulties in holding DGs accountable for the execution of cluster-related initiatives. This lack of accountability was found to extend to Cabinet where the Ministers themselves were not always found to be accountable:

Now, execution. Once they go away to go and implement their part, when they come and report, they don't have a report. There is no information. Something they don't even submit ... Even as we took it to Cabinet, but they will not say, 'This is what should happen. Minister, we want you to do this'. Even Zuma couldn't get them to do [it]. So, we struggle with consequence management. Hopefully, the new, it's not new, but the resuscitation of the performance agreement of Ministers will enable that to happen. (Participant 16: 972)

Affinity 7: Planning

Top Managers indicated that planning remains a challenge despite the inroads that have been made through the years. Even when five key crime categories were identified for the five-year cluster plan, the issue of target setting around these was not well thought out and implementation across the value chain was not done. For

example, if illicit trade crime was identified, targets should at least involve the police, the NPA and the DOJCD:

Targets, etc. are the main worrisome problem. From the criminal justice system review side in 2017, we needed to have integrated target setting. We need to have a common vision and performance management and things like that. We're still not there in terms of that ... So, planning I think is a big problem. (Participant 17: 1232)

Yes, to bring togetherness. Joined-up action so that you together identify or actually agree on indicators and agree on targets. But even as we were doing that, still it was very difficult for them not to default into their individual mandates. (Participant 16: 802)

Secondly, I think we also, we don't plan together. All our strategy units and departments deal with their own. I mean, it's very difficult. It's only lately that we're starting to invite other role players as well. But we don't have joint sessions where we say as a cluster, 'Let us look at a cluster in terms of our strategic planning, and what we need to do, etc. before we go and have individual ones'. We don't have. (Participant 17: 1233)

But in terms of the planning, when the Police say, for example, we intend to reduce crime by x percentage, that percentage that they arrive at, it tends not to be informed by an engagement with, for example, the NPA, right? So, the NPA will set its own targets, right? Now, I think that that is for me the problem. So, realistically, by how much can we bring this crime down? (Participant 16: 797)

Absolutely. Like I said, even the MTSF. Take that document now and find me one indicator in there that forces us to work together. There isn't one. And there were meetings held and people said 'bout some of the indicators: 'This is not going to fly; it's not good enough'. But what happened? Those indicators went in. If you take the SAPS plan and you put it next to the NPA plan, you won't be able to say how we're all going to achieve something together (Participant 18: 1479)

The idea of identifying indicators to measure the extent of collaboration in order to reflect and evaluate on the work done by the cluster was presented. In addition, the need to set these indicators on the performance agreements of DGs and Ministers was identified:

And I support the view of having a goal for collaboration. How do you measure it? What should we be doing to say that the cluster is succeeding in what it was intended for? What purpose was it intended to serve? It must be written into the DG's performance agreements. (Participant 15: 648–650)

Affinity 8: Sharing Goals

One participant questioned the concept of sharing goals and indicated that members of the cluster cannot work towards a common goal due to the different mandates that they carry:

The word common goals – Let's remove it because we can never have common goals. But let's have the goals that will ensure an effective functioning criminal justice within limited resources – but not common. (Participant 14: 298)

It should be to create a well-functioning criminal justice system within limited resources; so which means we have to look at the areas that we have to deliver on. Not to say these are common because SAPS, the role of SAPS is to arrest. But we can change the model of arrest. When is it critical for me to arrest? Arrest when you have investigated, yes? Then it makes the case to move faster ... Now you arrest a person, [and] you go and dump the person in Correctional Services while you are conducting investigation. (Participant 14: 302)

Participants shared their experiences on matters related to the lack of sharing goals. These included long-standing issues that could have been addressed through the involvement of the cluster. For example, the arrest targets of the SAPS often result in wrongful arrest, which in turn, uses resources of the State through Legal Aid South Africa and results in large court rolls through which the DOJCD must work. Furthermore, wrongful arrests result in high costs of litigation against the State:

And the impact of unlawful arrest and detention across the cluster has an impact on Corrections. It has an impact on Justice and the Courts and now

civil rolls and criminal rolls, and it had an impact on civil litigation against the State. (Participant 15: 692)

It is one thing that had an impact throughout the cluster but yet, it's been going on for years, more than ten years. And no solution has come from the cluster. So, the cluster failed in addressing that very big problem? (Participant 15: 694)

Secondly, crime prevention is still a big challenge and that is where the civilian Secretariat is now coming in with their whole activities relating to the White Paper of police and safety and security to make sure that there are more crime-prevention elements. (Participant 17: 1255)

You're not going to be able to say how we're all going to achieve something together because DCS wants to reduce the number of people in jail [and] the NPA wants to increase long-term sentences because there's pressure to do that. The SAPS want[s] to send everybody to jail forever, okay. Social Development – you know, we struggle with them coming to the party in terms of their issues. (Participant 18: 1481)

Some of the recommendations proposed by participants included the importance of the cluster in addressing the key strategic issues of fighting crime. For example, the cluster should determine the extent to which social crime prevention versus all other traditional approaches of combating crime should be adopted:

The cluster should not operate at a base level where departments are. The cluster must be the one that has that umbrella view to say and to ask, to really ask, the difficult questions. Are we, like when you have the discussion on bail, how do we take that discussion forward? Do we provide more resources to build more prisons, right? Or do we do more work in the communities through social development so that we lessen the cause of the crime on the ground? So, where do we put our resources? So, those kinds of discussions are what should be happening in the cluster. (Participant 15: 682)

6.3.2 Relationships between Affinities

6.3.3 Affinity Relationship Table

For the eight affinities that were identified by the focus group, 56 possible relationships between them were noted. The process that was followed to arrive at

the critical number of relationships to explain intragovernmental collaborations is detailed in Section 5.3.4.3.

Using this process, 26 relationships were found to be responsible for 81.5% of the variation within the Top Manager system. The relationships are shown in Table 6.6.

Table 6.6 Affinity pairs and Pareto calculations for Top Manager data

#	Relationship	Frequency	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percentage (Relation)	Cumulative Percentage (Frequency)	Power
A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1	1 → 6	5	5	1.8	3.7	1.9
2	1 → 7	5	10	3.6	7.4	3.8
3	1 → 8	5	15	5.4	11.1	5.8
4	2 ← 4	5	20	7.1	14.8	7.7
5	2 ← 5	5	25	8.9	18.5	9.6
6	3 ← 5	5	30	10.7	22.2	11.5
7	3 → 6	5	35	12.5	25.9	13.4
8	4 → 6	5	40	14.3	29.6	15.3
9	4 → 7	5	45	16.1	33.3	17.3
10	5 → 6	5	50	17.9	37.0	19.2
11	5 → 7	5	55	19.6	40.7	21.1
12	5 → 8	5	60	21.4	44.4	23.0
13	6 ← 7	5	65	23.2	48.1	24.9
14	1 ← 4	4	69	25.0	51.1	26.1
15	2 → 6	4	73	26.8	54.1	27.3
16	2 → 7	4	77	28.6	57.0	28.5
17	3 ← 4	4	81	30.4	60.0	29.6
18	4 → 8	4	85	32.1	63.0	30.8
19	6 ← 8	4	89	33.9	65.9	32.0
20	1 → 2	3	92	35.7	68.1	32.4
21	1 ← 5	3	95	37.5	70.4	32.9
22	2 → 8	3	98	39.3	72.6	33.3
23	3 → 7	3	101	41.1	74.8	33.7
24	3 ← 8	3	104	42.9	77.0	34.2
25	4 ← 5	3	107	44.6	79.3	34.6
26	7 ← 8	3	110	46.4	81.5	35.1

6.3.4 Interrelationship Diagram

The theoretical coding aspect continued with the development of the IRD. This entailed classifying affinities according to the extent to which they are drivers or outcomes within intergovernmental collaborations. The identification was undertaken using the process detailed in Section 8.4.2 and the results are shown in Table 6.7.

Table 6.7 Interrelationship diagram for the Top Manager composite

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Out	In	Δ
1		↑		←	←	↑	↑	↑	4	2	2
2	←			←	←	↑	↑	↑	3	3	0
3				←	←	↑	↑	←	2	3	-1
4	↑	↑	↑		←	↑	↑	↑	6	1	5
5	↑	↑	↑	↑		↑	↑	↑	7	0	7
6	←	←	←	←	←		←	←	0	7	-7
7	←	←	←	←	←	↑		←	1	6	-5
8	←	←	↑	←	←	↑	↑		3	4	-1

6.3.5 Affinities as drivers and outcomes

The Interrelationship Table was rearranged in order of delta, with the highest delta at the top. The delta values shown in Figure 8.8 resulted in the classification of the eight affinities as drivers and outcomes using the process detailed in Section 6.2.5. Table 6.8 shows the affinities and their identification.

Table 6.8 Interrelationship diagram for Top Managers in decreasing delta

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Out	In	Δ	Identification	Affinity
5	↑	↑	↑	↑	■	↑	↑	↑	7	0	7	Primary Driver	Leadership
4	↑	↑	↑	■	←	↑	↑	↑	6	1	5	Secondary Driver	Culture
1	■	↑		←	←	↑	↑	↑	4	2	2	Secondary Driver	Silos
2	←	■		←	←	↑	↑	↑	3	3	0	Pivot	Protocols
3			■	←	←	↑	↑	←	2	3	-1	Secondary Outcome	Resources
8	←	←	↑	←	←	↑	↑	■	3	4	-1	Secondary Outcome	Sharing goals
7	←	←	←	←	←	↑	■	←	1	6	-5	Secondary Outcome	Planning
6	←	←	←	←	←	■	←	←	0	7	-7	Primary Outcome	Execution

6.3.6 Cluttered Systems Influence Diagram

All 26 relationships discussed were drawn on a Cluttered SID as shown in Figure 6.6.




Figure 6.6 Cluttered Systems Influence Diagram for Top Managers

Detailed descriptions of interrelationships provided by Senior Managers are presented in Annexure F.

6.3.7 Uncluttered Systems Influence Diagram

The Uncluttered SID was simplified by following the process detailed in Section 5.3.4.5. For example, in Figure 6.6, Protocols → Execution was removed because the Protocols → Sharing Goals → Planning → Execution route already existed.

Figure 6.7 indicates the remaining relationships after the removal of redundant links.




Figure 6.7 Uncluttered Systems Influence Diagram for Top Managers

The Uncluttered SID was then rearranged to display an easy-to-follow diagram (see Figure 6.8).




Figure 6.8 Simplified Systems Influence Diagram for the Top Manager composite

6.3.8 Individual Top Manager Interrelationships between Affinities

In line with the constructivist approach to research that recognises multiple realities and an epistemological stance of generation of knowledge through these multiple realities, the results at an individual level are presented.

Three of the five Top Managers indicated Leadership as a primary driver of the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration. The remaining two Top Managers indicated Culture as a primary driver. Regarding outcomes, four Top Managers indicated Execution as a primary outcome whereas one Top Manager indicated Protocols. The summary is presented in Table 6.9.

Table 6.9 Summary of drivers and outcomes for Top Manager participants

Participant	Primary Driver	Primary Outcome
14	Leadership	Execution
15	Leadership	Execution
18	Leadership	Execution

16	Culture	Execution
17	Culture	Protocols

Systems Influence Diagrams for each Top Manager were completed for comparison. All five are shown in Annexure H.

6.4 CONCLUSION

Senior Managers indicated the need to identify appropriate cluster leadership at Top Management level. This involves first defining the profile of the leader deemed appropriate for the difficult undertaking of addressing crime. Second, the Senior Managers expressed the need to hold leadership accountable and indicated weaknesses in the prevailing governance arrangements. It was emphasised and acknowledged that there are leaders within the cluster who are doing their best despite the challenges they are experiencing.

Regarding Culture as a secondary driver, Senior Managers described a public-sector mentality as a common threat among most of the JCPS Cluster departments and entities. This included people doing the absolute minimum and poor levels of accountability. There was a need to establish a cluster culture that would address some of the difficulties that were identified within the other affinities.

The final affinity classified as a driver was Protocols. This terminology best fits the description presented by the participants. Within this affinity, there was emphasis on the need for a strong governance framework within the JCPS Cluster. In some cases, the governance is not properly enforced and impedes the continuity and work of the cluster. In others, the governance results in many meetings and structures, creating difficulties for Senior Managers to participate and to implement the work of the cluster.

The composite SID for Senior Managers indicated a feedback loop consisting of four affinities, namely Resources, Silos, Sharing Goals and Planning as shown in Figure 6.9. According to Northcutt and McCoy (2004), a feedback loop is a subsystem and can be isolated and described within the larger system. In addition, the loop can represent a virtual cycle, and breaking the cycle requires intervention.

These four affinities are all closely linked to the process of Planning, as was described by participants. Planning in silos results in a virtual cycle that has a major impact on the execution of the objectives of the JCPS Cluster and, therefore, contributes to the difficulties in addressing crime as a wicked problem. Therefore, the feedback loop was named 'Planning in Silos'.




Figure 6.9 Systems Influence Diagram for Senior Managers indicating feedback loop

When zooming out and looking at the system, the virtual cycle collapses into an affinity labelled Strategic Planning, as shown in Figure 6.10.




Figure 6.10 Zoomed-out version of the focus group Systems Influence Diagram

In summary, the SID for Senior Managers illustrates the need to position a leadership that will be able to build a strong culture for collaboration and to develop appropriate structures and processes to address Protocols. Leadership needs to address the silo-planning approach in order to implement plans that will lead to the successful execution of the JCPS Cluster plans.

Five Top Managers were interviewed to investigate their experiences regarding the eight affinities that were identified by the Senior Managers. The aim of the exercise was to solicit a Top Manager perspective despite the non-viability of a focus group for Top Managers. These views enriched the research study.

Top Managers identified Leadership as a primary driver of the JCPS collaboration. Appropriate leadership included visionary leadership, collaborative leadership and the ability to envision and engage cluster participants. The issue of corruption was identified as a matter that the cluster had grappled with throughout the preceding five to ten years.

Culture was seen as a consequence of Leadership, and part of the solution to address leadership at all levels was through appropriate recruitment, training and accountability systems.

Some of the Top Managers were long-serving officials who were part of the establishment of the cluster. They indicated that the JCPS Cluster was created precisely to address the silo approach and foster a system that includes joint problem-solving, collaboration and implementation. Although much progress has been made in establishing cluster structures to address silos, the Top Managers indicated that much remains to be done. From the interviews with the Top Managers, the issue of Silos was considered more of an issue than Protocols.

The affinity Protocols was not identified as a driver or an outcome but as a bridge between drivers and outcomes. Top Managers indicated the need for proper governance and the need for appropriate structures to address key issues relating to crime and corruption.

Regarding outcomes, Protocols as an affinity affected Sharing Goals, which affects Resources, which in turn, affects Planning and Execution. Execution was identified by Top Managers as the primary outcome of the JCPS collaboration.

The simplified diagram is shown in Figure 6.11.




Figure 6.11 Systems influence diagram for Top Managers

CHAPTER 7: INTERPRETATION

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapters 6 provided a detailed report on results of the research. Within this chapter, the following were finalised:

- Identification of affinities for intragovernmental collaborations by a focus group of Senior Managers
- Descriptions of interrelationships between affinities provided by Senior Managers and a final SID for Senior Managers
- Descriptions of interrelationships between affinities provided by Top Managers and a final SID for Top Managers

Chapter 7 provides the interpretation of the research findings and includes comparisons and contrasts between the Senior and Top Managers' descriptions of the JCPS intragovernmental as well as comparison against literature.

7.2 AFFINITIES

Having used the same set of affinities for both Senior Managers and Top Managers, this section compares and contrasts the views of both groups.

Leadership

Leadership was identified as a primary driver by both Senior and Top Managers due to its impact on the work of the JCPS Cluster. Descriptions of shortcomings and challenges within the collaboration include the following:

- Ineffective leadership results in suboptimal functioning of some cluster committees.
- Leadership that is not efficiently focused on key cluster initiatives: In some cases, Top Managers who should be key drivers of the cluster were found to have their priorities elsewhere.
- Leadership that is not always held accountable: Both Senior and Top Managers are not sufficiently held to account for lack of participation and poor implementation of programmes.
- Both Senior and Top Managers indicated challenges relating to tensions between the political and administrative interface within the JCPS Cluster that resulted in resignations of DGs and posts remaining vacant.

Senior Managers and Top Managers assigned different levels of emphasis as follows:

- Visionary leadership and the need to inspire action tended to be emphasised by Senior Managers. This is because Senior Managers expect Top Managers to lead; however, there were situations of helplessness as they observed leadership deficits. Top Managers tended to emphasise lack of accountability frameworks and requested ways of holding cluster leaders accountable.

- Senior Managers were concerned with the age of Top Managers and Cabinet Ministers and the possible lack of zeal and energy that accompanies people nearing or exceeding retirement age.
- The issue of gatekeeping was raised by a Top Manager, suggesting the need to refresh the cluster with new thinking and a broader range of participants.
- Top Managers expressed views on the idea of the highest-ranking Cabinet Minister within the cluster chairing the Ministerial cluster and having his/her Director-General chair the DG structure. Although this was positive from an alignment point of view, there was admission that it has its shortcomings and may allow a leader with unfitting attributes to occupy the office.

It should be mentioned that although Senior Managers referred to leadership and were scathing when referring to Top Managers, they themselves are leaders of the cluster and play a crucial role in the success of the JCPS Cluster. The point was made by one of the Top Managers that all Senior Managers as participants need to be reflexive about their role in promoting collaborative goals.

Some of the leadership roles identified by both Senior and Top Managers include gatekeepers who tend to prefer to keep the same participants. Another is leadership that does not effectively deal with participants whose participation is not in line with cluster objectives. These behaviours align with those identified by Eden, Colin and Huxham (2001):

- Outlying individual episodes: When individuals push their own agendas outside those of the collaboration or of their own organisation. For example,

Participant 6 indicated that decisions taken in the cluster are often not implemented by participants for their own reasons and their organisations may not even be aware.

- Vetoing individual or vetoing organisation episodes: Where certain members frustrate participants by consistently blocking or delaying certain decisions. Participant 15 indicated that she found some of her approvals delayed due to this behaviour. It is one of the reasons that some Senior Managers attempt to implement initiatives alone where a cluster effort would be more effective.
- Sceptical group or sceptical individual episodes: These are organisations that show little interest in the cluster and often send inappropriate delegations simply for compliance. For example, Participant 9 gave an example of two government departments.

Leadership as a primary driver is at the core of transforming the JCPS Cluster into a collaboration that can address crime. It is important to recognise that the way leadership is structured needs to be reconsidered. Leadership accorded on a rotational basis or using other considerations such as alignment of political and administrative heads might not assist the cluster in obtaining the results that are required. Instead, there are attributes, personalities and behaviours that have been identified in the existing body of knowledge that are necessary to address wicked problems such as crime. This includes models by Beinecke (2009) and Termeer *et al.* (2013).

In Chapter 8, a model for leadership for the JCPS Cluster was proposed as part of the Framework for Strategic Management in Intragovernmental Collaborations.

Protocols

The extent to which Protocols was an issue differed between the two groups. Senior Managers indicated that there are too many structures, too many meetings that they must attend, and many implementation efforts that they need to lead. Many of these participants are at director level (Level 13), and there were indications that some of them have been representing seniors as high as DG (Level 16) at cluster engagements.

On the contrary, Top Managers emphasised the need for sufficient JCPS structures to address the ongoing challenge of silos. It was further emphasised that it is not the number of meetings or structures that is the issue but rather the extent to which these structures assist in collaborative efforts. An issue was raised regarding duplication of efforts where matters are raised and handled in different structures.

Another reality raised by Senior Managers was that the attendance of JCPS structure meetings generally appeared to be delegated to lower ranking Senior Managers. These managers might not be willing to support decisions that their seniors have not specifically mandated, and this could delay decision-making.

The other dimension of Protocols mentioned by Senior Managers relates to the fact that decisions are not always made by the appropriate structures. In some cases, a decision is deferred to another structure, which can cause delays. This, therefore, leads to the need to rationalise and properly define and enforce the mandates of different committees.

The solution to the dilemma lies in rationalising structures, appointing appropriate participants and building accountability frameworks that guide the conduct of participants.

Silos

Three Top Managers within the JCPS Cluster indicated that the cluster was primarily convened to address the issue of silo thinking, silo planning and silo implementation in all its manifestation.

There is realisation from Senior and Top Managers that the criminal justice system is a system that needs its individual parts to work together for an outcome that is greater than the sum of its individual efforts. It is for this reason that the silo mentality was highlighted as one of the prominent issues. This was more pronounced in Top Managers than it was in Senior Managers.

Breaking down silos means working together at a level of cooperation, coordination and collaboration. With reference to the 3Cs model of Keast, Brown and Mandell (2007), the cluster tends to do well at the level of coordination where cluster structures are used to solicit inputs on action plans and require subdued support from cluster organisations. For example, legislation en route to Parliament is considered by the Development Committee, and once all implementation issues of the legislation have been addressed, the legislation is submitted to the DG of the JCPS Cluster who will in turn, recommend it to the JCPS Ministers and finally, to Cabinet.

Where a higher level of integration is needed (i.e. collaboration), for example, in capital infrastructure projects that require an intensive effort from players, this was

found to be challenging. Capital project decisions are expected to follow rigorous and formal engagements within appropriate governance arrangements, but these engagements were found to be informal and were undertaken as an option rather than a requirement for proper planning. This issue was confirmed by one participant who stated that in identifying service points to be built, little consideration or consultation occurs with local government or other stakeholders. With the spatial planning approach adopted in 2019, it is expected that the South African government will begin addressing this shortcoming.

Participants also mentioned that the strategic plans of the JCPS Cluster reflected silo planning. Despite numerous attempts over the years to address the issue, this continues to be a problem.

A number of solutions were proposed by participants to break down silos. These included using matrix structures that enable more informal interactions between officials at different levels in different organisations. In some structures such as the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Child Justice, these matrix-like interactions are common and were described by Senior Managers within the implementation structures of the JCPS Cluster.

Sharing of Goals

Both Senior and Top Managers indicated their awareness of the vision of ensuring that all people in South Africa are and feel safe. This vision needs to be translated into shared goals, shared objectives and joint action plans. Both Senior and Top Managers identified Goal Sharing as a long-standing issue that has not been successfully addressed.

In particular, there was admission that the JCPS Cluster has not resolved the issue of conflicting objectives at operational level. Participants overwhelmingly expressed that the shared-goal paradox is one of the most difficult problems that they have grappled with and never resolved. Some of the issues that were mentioned were difficulties in defining system-wide indicators that the criminal justice system can buy into and the insistence of entities to drive their own narrow agenda in regard to performance of the entire criminal justice system. One participant referred to the shared-goal paradox as “the elephant in the room”.

The aspirant goal of ensuring that all people in South Africa feel and are safe lacks consistency in the approach to make it happen. The goal has not been analysed sufficiently to find common translation within the JCPS Cluster itself (system-wide) and within cluster organisations. Even in instances where lower level goals are shared, entities act alone and inconsistently in fulfilling these goals.

Coordination takes place but to a limited extent, for example, in drafting legislation and policies, and there is no follow-through with implementation. In addition, there is inconsistent application of the law, for example, bail and sentencing.

At operational levels, these goals do not have meaning. For example, a Legal Aid lawyer will work towards clearing their client of the criminal charge or securing the shortest sentence possible without consideration of priority crimes such as femicide. Similarly, the NPA will try to deny a suspect bail as far as possible even when overcrowding remains a problem for remand detention. It was understood that these goals at case level will continue independent of conversations and decisions at the strategic level.

Individual performance appraisals and incentives remain in opposition despite attempts to address them. For example, performance for police is still measured through the number of arrests made, regardless of whether these arrests are related to identified priority crimes. Furthermore, many of the arrests result in major legal costs for wrongful arrest, and these are borne by government.

Performance agreements of top managers and ministers should substantially include cluster-related work but often do not. In instances where they do, there appears to be little consequence for poor performance even at the highest level.

Bernard *et al.* (2005) emphasise that since the criminal justice system is a processing system, the ultimate goal consensus for this system is the efficient and effective processing of people. Peculiar to the criminal justice system is that this processing needs to be seen by stakeholders as fair and constitutional (Bernard *et al.*, 2005; Dandurand, 2014).

Within the criminal justice system, efficiency refers to the speed at which cases are processed. Although some delays are unavoidable, there are indications that laws, rules, regulations, processes and practices also play a major role in the efficiency of the system (Dandurand, 2014).

Effectiveness is the extent of success associated with the criminal justice system, which includes analysis of reported cases within the police services and those that are successfully prosecuted. It is not necessarily the objective for every act of criminality to result in a jail sentence, nor is it desirable. However, it is an important measure of how often people get away with crime and in South Africa, this is particularly problematic. Some of the issues that should be jointly addressed

include improvement in the quality of investigations, legislative reforms in the Criminal Procedure Act and amendments in the rules of court.

Planning

Regarding planning, Senior Managers and Top Managers shared similar views. There was general agreement that planning within the JCPS Cluster takes place but is inadequate.

One Senior Manager expressed quite strongly that planning has significantly advanced and that there are noteworthy successes, particularly during the 2015–2019 period. Although there were some coordination issues regarding dates and timelines of planning, a government-led planning framework is followed.

Despite reported progress, some challenges remain. First, there are indications of plans being put together for compliance purposes, and in some instances, targets are soft and do not make a meaningful impact in the fight against crime and corruption. One Top Manager indicated that plans are found to be unachievable and their complicated implementation in large organisations such as the SAPS is not considered. The level of planning in areas, including the critical area of ICT, was found to be inadequate due to poor participation of the relevant Senior and Top Managers. As mentioned previously, the level of maturity in planning within the organisations themselves was found to be inadequate.

As indicated strongly by a number of Senior and Top Managers, the understanding that the cluster plan is not an integrated plan is critical. Instead, most participants from both groups saw the cluster plan as a collection of inputs from different departments and entities. One Top Manager stated that this is improving but

admitted that even in integrated objectives, the implementation plans are still silo based.

Although the DPME attempted to facilitate an integrated plan, there was admission that the level of success was less than expected. One Top Manager suggested that departments do not want to be told by others what to do.

Consensus building towards a collaborative or joint plan is a long and challenging process (Huxham and Macdonald, 1992; Ansell and Gash, 2008). A five-year plan for the JCPS Cluster requires an appropriately facilitated process over time. The consensus building model of Innes and Booher (1999) for complex systems includes both process and outcome criteria that need to be adapted to the JCPS Cluster situation.

It should also be noted that some of the necessary factors for consensus building include data sharing and knowledge sharing, and these need to be in place to compile a well-thought-out JCPS Cluster plan.

Resources

Unbalanced resource allocation was raised as an issue brought about by the silo approach to resourcing. Some Senior Managers indicated a need for ring-fenced funds to address implementation challenges associated with cluster priorities whereas Top Managers recognised the JCPS Cluster as a collaborative body that does not have implementation responsibilities.

Mechanisms to determine resource requirements for the criminal justice system were found to be inadequate. Departments pitched for their own resources and

relied on the strength of their leaders to raise money for their own priorities. Following attempts to present a joint campaign to the National Treasury, one Top Manager felt that this is human nature and is unlikely to disappear. However, it should be noted that the success of the criminal justice system is in the sum of appropriately resourced and functional parts working interactively towards a common goal. In line with systems thinking, this approach of joint planning is necessary.

Regarding capital projects for building or establishing new facilities (courts, police stations and correctional centres), it was found that there is no joint capital budget nor is there a forum for joint planning around such facilities. Officials responsible for infrastructure spending deliver on what they have been asked by stakeholders and only coordinate with other affected entities.

Using the 3Cs continuum on cooperation, coordination and collaboration (Keast, Brown & Mandell, 2007; McNamara, 2012), it is clear that at the level of collaboration (highest level of interdependence), joint resourcing is unavoidable. Within the cluster, funding for the IJS (a transversal system that tracks cases from the police through to the correctional centres to monitor performance of the entire system) has been ring-fenced for over a decade. Once ICT integrations are identified, the funds are then transferred to the relevant departments and entities for implementation. Although this model works well, it was not implemented for all priorities.

Another critical resource for intragovernmental collaborations and the taming of wicked problems specifically is knowledge sharing. The effectiveness of the

intragovernmental collaboration also lies in effective knowledge management, which includes the transfer, receipt and integration of knowledge across organisations and participants (Weber and Khademian, 2008).

Although knowledge sharing was mentioned on one of the Post-It Notes, it was not identified as an affinity because there were no additional references to it by the other participants of the focus group. However, during the semi-structured interviews, two Senior Managers mentioned the importance of sharing and analysing data and any intelligence related to crime:

One affinity that is a driver of the process is the lack of data and business intelligence. This is one very important one. The lack of data and business intelligence! (Participant 12: 3613)

If you would have any common strategic plan across the sector, it would depend on the quality of data across different government departments. I know now that it is a challenge within departments. If it is a challenge within departments, I do not see how you can do anything across the sector in the absence of any data. (Participant 12: 3615)

Knowledge sharing is even worse. People have done things. Nobody knows what Lebo has done. We don't even have systems that put this knowledge there ... (Participant 13: 3830)

But if you don't have a super-secretariat that enables the establishment of that shared culture, shared values and even shared knowledge management, there's a huge knowledge management gap. (Participant 6: 1581)

It should be emphasised that common understanding of the problem and consensus building towards a solution relies on sharing and joint analysis of data and information.

Culture

Organisational culture is described by the way things are done in organisations and represents assumptions, behaviours and perceptions that guide thinking, decisions and behaviour within an organisation. (Longman, Daniels, Bray & Liddell, 2018; Kerns, 2020). Importantly, culture is driven by leadership and involves what is rewarded, punished, encouraged and discouraged. It is also important to note that because of the influence of leadership on culture, there are possibilities of subcultures within the organisations themselves.

Both Senior and Top Managers identified an underlying public-service culture that is characterised by poor performance and poor accountability. This was believed to be caused by the sheltered environment of public sector employment with a reluctance to discipline and dismiss poor performers. Although not prevalent in all cluster organisations, public service culture was mentioned as an issue.

One participant indicated that there is no uniform culture in the cluster and finds that the behaviour of participants mirrors their organisational cultures. It should be noted that allowing participants to behave the way they please and the absence of cohesion and discipline is itself a reflection of culture. A cluster culture exists and it is not conducive to an effective collaboration.

Although culture does not enjoy prominence in literature, an important article by Weare, Lichterman and Esparza (2014) was found to be the most appropriate in describing culture in interorganisational networks. This was explained through the Culture Theory. In the article, the authors position culture as a missing variable between structure and high performance in interorganisational networks (Weare,

Lichterman & Esparza, 2014). The current study not only confirms culture as a factor but also affirms it as a driver and important variable in intragovernmental collaboration.

Execution

It is a common criticism that the cluster plans that have been developed by the JCPS Cluster are not integrated or explicit in addressing crime. For this reason, the implementation will be inadequate even if carried out according to the plan.

Execution of the JCPS Cluster plan lies with individual departments and clusters. Therefore, all issues raised in Execution such as lack of accountability and poor alignment with cluster plans are a reflection of the capabilities and efforts of the individual departments. An accountability model to ensure appropriate execution of plans needs to be built within the cluster and within individual departments. The proposed strategic management framework for the cluster in Chapter 11 includes a governance framework.

7.3 AFFINITY RELATIONSHIPS

The interrelationship tables showed 28 significant relationships for Senior Managers and 26 relationships for Top Managers. Most relationships (23) were common to both Senior and Top Managers, with five being different. The relationship pairs are indicated in the IRD (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1 Divergent relationship pairs between Senior and Top Managers

Senior Managers	Top Managers
Contrasting relationships	
Silos ← Protocols	Silos → Protocols
Resources ← Planning	Resources → Planning
Resources → Sharing goals	Resources ← Sharing goals
Additional significant relationships	
Silos → Resources	-
Protocols → Resources	-

Silos (1) and Protocols (2)

Silos and Protocols were found to affect each other in both directions. Some participants indicated that Protocols discourage officials from pursuing or continuing with collaborative efforts. This is because once decisions are taken within the JCPS Cluster, they still follow normal governance procedures that are built within cluster organisations. For example, the DGs and other departmental officials who may not be participating in the cluster (e.g. Chief Financial Officer and Head of Human Resources) are often delegated in terms of their organisational procedures to undertake approvals, but these protocols discourage cluster representatives to work jointly due to the associated bureaucracies. Instead, projects are undertaken within their own organisations/departments to avoid delays. In the Senior Manager group, seven participants indicated this direction and five indicated the opposite.

Three Top Managers stated that the silo mentality breeds the 'Red Tape' described in Chapter 8. In other words, if there was no silo mentality within the cluster and government in general, the accompanying protocols would not be there.

Silos and Protocols presented the greatest tensions between and within constituents and led to grey areas for participants in general. Clarification of appropriate models for addressing Silos and Protocols for the JCPS Cluster would possibly make the most effective contribution to the functioning of the cluster.

Resources (3) and Planning (7)

Senior Managers mainly indicated that they compile plans and find the resources needed to achieve those plans. Seven of the ten Senior Managers who demonstrated a relationship indicated Planning to Resources. Conversely, three Top Managers indicated that realistically, limited resources drive the plans that need to be put together. In other words, mandates cannot be fully discharged and are limited to the resources that are available.

Findings suggest that Top Managers and Senior Managers do not express a decisive direction either way. This is because in an ideal situation, a plan is an expression of priorities, which should be followed by resourcing. In reality, the Government of South Africa is a service-driven industry with high fixed labour costs. For example, for the DOJCD, R11 billion is allocated for employee costs and only R5 billion for goods and services. Under these conditions, planning tends to be driven by how much money is available.

Resources (3) and Sharing goals (8)

Six of the ten Senior Managers indicated that limited resources drive the cluster to identify and achieve Shared Goals, whereas two did not indicate any relationship. This view is supported by the RDT, which stipulates that interorganisational relationships benefit organisations by enabling them to achieve goals that they would otherwise not achieve. This achievement is through the joint use of resources with other organisations. Although the majority of Senior Managers indicated this relationship (Resources → Sharing Goals), the margin was thin. Top Managers indicated that sharing goals leads to better management of resources (Sharing Goals → Resources).

The majority of the participants expressed a strong relationship between resources and the sharing of goals, which represents one of the key tenets of working within intragovernmental collaborations. However, this ideal remains to be realised, given the challenges mentioned by the participants.

Part of the reason for the disconnect between the vision and the implementation could lie in poor execution or operationalisation. It was indicated that leadership is often absent from important meetings and over delegates the critical function of leading the JCPS Cluster towards the envisioned future.

Silos (1) and Resources (8)

Senior Managers indicated overwhelmingly (eight participants) that the silo mentality within the cluster leads to the existing resource problems. This means that the silo mentality within the JCPS Cluster makes effective sharing of resources difficult. This was one of the significant relationships identified by Senior Managers.

For Top Managers, both directions of the relationship received two votes each while one participant considered it immaterial.

Protocols (2) and Resources (3)

Nine Senior Managers indicated that protocols lead to poor use of resources. In other words, there was an indication that protocols prevent the seamless and efficient sharing of resources for the benefit of the cluster. However, Top Managers demonstrated two votes for the two directions, leading to both being insignificant. This relationship expresses the importance that Senior Managers attach to Protocols as a driver within the JCPS collaboration, which is in contrast with Top Managers who did not identify it as a driver.

7.4 DRIVERS AND OUTCOMES

At composite levels, Senior and Top Managers indicated Leadership as a primary driver and Execution as a primary outcome, whereas secondary drivers show a divergent picture, as seen in Table 7.2.

Table 7.2 Drivers of the JCPS collaboration: Senior Managers vs. Top Managers

Drivers: Senior Manager SID	Drivers: Top Manager SID
Leadership (primary)	Leadership (primary)
Culture	Culture
Protocols	Silos

Senior Managers indicated that Protocols is manifested in the number of structures and the excessive number of meetings to attend. Most of the Senior Managers participate in many such structures and are often overwhelmed by the time and effort spent. There was an indication that many Senior Managers attend meetings in structures where their principals should be attending and that the load of cluster work is not equitably shared. It is, therefore, reasonable that Senior Managers indicate Protocols as a major factor influencing the work of the cluster.

Top Managers identified Silos as a driver and emphasised that the cluster exists to address the silo mentality, silo planning and silo implementation. In this regard, they tended to be in favour of having structures that enable sharing and planning and the implementation of programmes. Top Managers, therefore, tended to find the structures beneficial.

In relation to Protocols, Senior Managers identified Silos as a driver whereas Top Managers identified it as neither a driver nor an outcome, with a sum of zero for arrows indicating 'in' and 'out'.

7.5 SYSTEM INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS

The SID presented in Figure 7.1 shows that both Senior and Top Managers indicate Leadership and Execution as a primary driver and a secondary driver respectively. The next significant driver for both Top and Senior Managers is Culture. The key differences lie in four affinities.

Whereas Top Managers had a linear succession of secondary drivers, the picture for Senior Managers showed a virtual cycle of strategic planning formed by four affinities, namely Silos → Sharing Goals → Resources → Planning.

Senior Managers identified Silos as an outcome and expressed concern regarding Silos as it relates to Planning. This is because cluster planning and monitoring is led and undertaken by Senior Managers within the Strategy Units of the departments and entities. It is for this reason that Silos forms part of the virtual cycle with planning, sharing goals and resources.

Top Managers identified Silos as a driver rather than an outcome, and this shows more concern with the persistent silo mentality and less concern with the number of structures or meetings.




Figure 7.1 Senior Manager vs. Top Manager Systems Influence Diagram

Although Senior and Top Managers considered the same set of affinities, it was not advisable to construct a composite SID because of the differences in the number of participants. The SID for Senior Managers involved 13 participants whereas the SID for Top Managers was constructed with data from five participants. The composite, therefore, would present a picture skewed towards Senior Managers.

The final SID is based on the Senior Managers because these Managers represent a large portion of the participants in the intragovernmental collaboration. Figure 7.2 presents the Senior Manager SID as a final presentation of the intragovernmental collaboration. In this representation, the virtual cycle of 'Silo Planning' has been converted into a linear representation in order to present a useful diagram.




Figure 7.2 Affinities and their relationships for the JCPS collaboration

The findings of the focus group and the interviews provide the building blocks for the strategic management framework that is described in Section 7.7.

7.6 FROM AFFINITIES TO DIMENSIONS OF INTRAGOVERNMENTAL COLLABORATION

Northcutt and McCoy (2004) define affinities as categories of meaning identified by people who experience the phenomenon being studied. The naming of the affinities is usually done by participants through consensus. In the current research, an independent facilitator led the focus group session in a process that included the naming of the affinities. These affinities were, therefore, not pre-determined by the researcher through literature but were experiences described by the participants.

Within this section, descriptions and explanations from participants were matched with those in literature to contribute insights that were fully grounded in the experience of the participants. In addition to the description and naming of dimensions, the process included identification of appropriate solutions that address challenges of the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration.

Leadership

This research found that the concept of leadership, identified through the focus group, aligns with leadership described in literature. However, leadership issues within the JCPS Cluster were found to be acute and pervasive. This finding was

not unexpected due to the nature of mandated and directed collaborations that have no profit motive.

The challenges of leadership were found to originate beyond the JCPS Cluster itself. For example, one participant indicated that the issue of lack of accountability within the cluster was not resolved even when issues were escalated to Cabinet. Given the difficulties in removing underperforming leadership, it is important to develop a model that will help identify leadership that will perform and make an impact within the cluster.

The political system in South Africa makes it difficult for the State President to hold his Cabinet accountable because politically, these are the people who support and uphold his Presidency. However, the identification of strong and appropriate leadership within the cluster will likely be sufficient to ensure a well-functioning collaborative effort.

This research emphasised the importance of having a visionary and transformative leader to address crime as a wicked problem. It is important for this leader to cut across silos and bureaucratic challenges, to set out a vision and to work persistently towards the vision. This is by far the most important attribute and is considered the primary driver of intragovernmental collaborations.

Three leadership attributes (inherent characteristics) include facilitation and management skills; ability to take appropriate action (act, enable, observe); and reflexivity, resilience, responsiveness and revitalisation (Termeer *et al.*, 2015). The onus, therefore, is on the people or person selecting the leader to seek out such attributes specifically.

On issues of behaviours, the JCPS Cluster leaders should be able to lead and encourage action from people over whom they may not have full control. Leadership for wicked problems needs to demonstrate an appropriate balance between transformation leadership to excite and inspire action and a collaborative leadership style that is persuasive, builds trust and communicates effectively (Head and Alford, 2015). In addition, the leader needs to be persistent and resilient, given the persistent challenges facing the JCPS Cluster. Unlike attributes, behaviours are learnt and are, therefore, less critical than attributes. The current model of cluster leadership based solely on the position is, therefore, rejected.

Findings suggest that the highest-ranking Cabinet Minister can lead other Cabinet Ministers as the Cluster Ministerial Head. The DG reporting to the highest-ranking Minister could, therefore, head the Cluster Directors-General Forum. Although this arrangement sounds acceptable, it was found not to work well. One participant indicated that despite this model being used for some time, it did not address leadership issues within the cluster. Another participant indicated that if the Minister and the DG are not in the core entities of the criminal justice system (i.e. the policing, courts or correctional facilities), then this creates issues of inadequate focus on cluster-related responsibilities.

Based on the identified issues, this research arrives at the model shown in Figure 7.3 for the assignment of chairpersons for leadership of the cluster to assist government in addressing crime.




Figure 7.3 The Leadership Model for the JCPS Cluster

Source: Author

The base of the triangle, the most important section, indicates visionary and transformational leadership attributes. This is followed in importance by collaborative skills that inspire action and thereafter, the need to be responsive and reflexive amidst a wide range of interests, inputs and considerations. Although it is advisable for the Minister and the DG of the cluster to be from one of the key criminal justice departments, this cannot be at the expense of the attributes and behaviours needed to tame crime within the South African context.

Based on the description, the common practice of placing most emphasis on aligning the leadership of the cluster with the highest-ranking political head in the cluster is discouraged.

It should be emphasised that some of the reforms needed to support leadership within the JCPS Cluster should include an appropriate legislative framework to give

the DPME the power to support cluster collaborations and take system-wide decisions that tend to be avoided.

Culture

Some participants indicated that there is no single culture for the cluster. However, based on the concept of culture, the cluster as a social grouping has a culture. These participants, nonetheless, described behaviours that were in line with those who provided descriptions of the JCPS Cluster.

Culture, as a dimension of interorganisational networks, is not explicitly widely studied (Weare, Lichterman & Esparza, 2014). For the current research, it was found that culture was not only one of the identified dimensions but was also identified as a driver for collaboration. Participants described behaviours that indicate a poor-performance culture, lack of accountability and a public-service mentality of sheltered employment. This dimension reflects the uniqueness of the mandated and directed collaborations found to be prevalent in the public sector.

Silos and Collaborative Capability

Based on the descriptions of the participants, this affinity aligns with the description of collaborative capability of Huxham (1993a) as a key requirement when considering the readiness of an organisation to collaborate with others.

The JCPS Cluster was founded precisely to address the situation of silos within the criminal justice system. More than 20 years later, this research found that silos still persist and that the cluster has not made major strides in dealing with the persistent challenge of crime.

The silo issue was found to be prevalent at cluster level and within cluster entities.

At the highest level, the silo challenge exists due to lack of leadership. The JCPS Cluster does not have a single leader with powers and delegations to lead. This means that decisions are mere recommendations and cannot be enforced by anyone within the cluster. For example, the Minister of Justice, even as a Chair of the Cluster, is not in a position to give instructions to the Minister of Police. The DPME does not have any decision-making delegations to break stalemates and stand-offs between departments.

All decisions in government are made in line with legislation or regulations. Current regulations do not allow any Chair of the Cluster or anyone within the DPME to make decisions that will address silos. As was indicated by the participants, despite major efforts at a system-wide strategic plan, individual departments have simply abandoned the effort and reverted to their own silo-based objectives.

The key finding of this research in addressing silos is the need for a legislative instrument that will transfer powers of strategic planning from individual government departments to the DPME. This will enable the DPME to facilitate and propose system-wide planning and system-wide performance indicators for a fair and impartial evaluation of the performance of government departments and their leaders.

The second challenge with silos lies within the government departments themselves. The interconnectedness of criminal justice entities means that the JCPS Cluster cannot be abolished. This means that imperfections originating

within individual departments must be identified and dealt with in order to enable the cluster to function optimally.

To improve collaborative capability within the JCSP Cluster, it is important to assess each organisation's readiness to collaborate and where possible, to plan interventions to improve. An instrument to assess collaborative capability or readiness to collaborate has been developed by Huxham (1993a) and is shown in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3 Model for determination of maturity to collaborate

Dimension	Organisation 1	Organisation 2	Organisation 3
Degree of organisational autonomy			
Degree of individual autonomy			
Cohesiveness of organisational structure			
Development of strategic processes			
Degree of elaboration of their own strategy statement			
Degree to which collaboration is an issue			

Source: Huxham, 1993b

A full assessment is required to determine the readiness for collaboration, followed by a collaborative capacity-building strategy. Thereafter, collaborative capacity should be reviewed annually to accommodate changes in structures and strategies. Key coordinators of the cluster (i.e. the DPME or the Cluster Secretariat) should use this model to identify short-term risks that will impede the functionality of the cluster.

Protocols and Governance

Participants' descriptions of Protocols refer to governance structures, decision-making processes and practices that often impede the work of the cluster.

Within interorganisational literature, these refer to governance of an interorganisational network.

Senior Managers described protocols as 'red tape' because of the extent to which decisions are delayed and the fact that the JCPS Cluster impedes their work. This research found that one level of Senior Managers (Level 13) within the JCPS Cluster are overworked with attendance of numerous meetings and implementation of plans, and in some instances, stand in for their DGs (Heads of Government Departments), whereas there are two other levels of leadership whose participation is limited and often laissez-faire and aloof. The Governance Framework of the cluster needs to identify explicitly the levels of management for strategic thinking and those for alignment and implementation. Given the pervasive silo mentality, there is a need to rationalise and ensure appropriate alignment and broader participation rather than decrease the number of meetings.

In developing a governance model, care needs to be taken to balance the cost associated with collaboration with the value attained through the collaboration. A governance model is part of this cost and includes the human resources and the administrative costs of ensuring the smooth running of the collaboration.

The key model of Provan and Kenis (2008) is appropriate for understanding the JCPS Cluster and is shown in Table 7.4.

Table 7.4 Model for governance in interorganisational networks

Forms of Governance	Trust	Number of Participants	Consensus on Goals	Competencies at the Network Level	Cost
Participant-Governed	Widely distributed	Few	High	Low	Low
Lead Organisation	Narrowly distributed	Moderate	Moderately low	Moderate	Moderate
Network Administration Organization (NAO)	Moderately distributed	Moderate to many	Moderately high	High	High

Source: Provan and Kenis, 2008

The current governance framework within the cluster shows two approaches. The first is the Participant-Governed Network Model in which all participants of a collaboration participate on an equal footing. The cluster approach is long-standing, and the Secretariat is traditionally chosen from one of the cluster institutions. Secretariat for the Cluster would be a Senior Manager and his team from one of the key departments such as the DOJCD. This Secretariat is allocated on a five-year rotational basis, with the last two years being in the DOJCD and the DOD.

Although this model is cost effective, it is ineffective where goal consensus is low. Within the JCPS Cluster, the vision of a safe South Africa is shared. However, organisations seem to be pulling in different directions in critical areas where consensus is needed. These include strategic decisions on the approach to addressing crime and arriving at joint performance targets and budgets.

The second model, the Lead Organisation based on the model of Provan and Kenis (2008), was found most appropriate for mandated networks (Mandell, 1988). Within the JCPS Cluster, the DPME is the lead organisation. The department was established in 2010 to fulfil the function of overseeing government departments

and facilitating planning within clusters. Because the DPME is a government department that is close to the Presidency, it is in a more powerful coordinating role for Outcome 3: All People Are and Feel Safe.

Given the existing government-wide systems, two models are recommended. It should be noted that the use of more than one model is not unusual (Koffijberg, De Bruijn & Priemus, 2012) and, therefore, instead of adopting the Participant-Governed or the Lead Organisation, both are recommended.

In this scenario, it is recommended that the DPME acts as the Lead Organisation in addressing goal consensus issues that cannot be resolved by cluster departments. However, regarding government-wide accountability systems, the cluster needs to be led by one of the government ministers responsible for implementation of plans. This means that the cluster still needs a Participant-Governed model.

The main difference between this model and the current model used within the cluster lies in the role of the DPME. In its current state, the DPME tends to play only a coordinating role regarding cluster planning. This shortcoming was identified by participants as needing 'teeth' in dealing with highly contested and challenging cluster issues, which include joint budgeting and system-wide performance indicators that are often highly contested, and where cluster departments find it difficult to balance cluster and departmental priorities.

The proposed governance model distinguishes between the role of the DPME and that of the JCPS Cluster as indicated in Table 7.5.

Table 7.5 Role of DPME vs. JCPS Cluster in governance

	DPME (Lead Organisation)	JCPS Cluster (Participative Governance)
Role in terms of 3Cs	Collaboration	Coordination/Cooperation
Role	Strategic Planning Joint planning Joint budgeting.	Cluster implementation plan Reporting Policy coordination
Issue addressed	Address the issue of cluster departments lobbying for budgets on their own Address intercluster issues Address provincial and local government linkages	Address operational and implementation issues within the criminal justice system

Source: Author

In summary, a more aggressive administration of government clusters needs to be implemented and in particular, the DPME should consider playing a more formal administrative role as the Lead Organisation for government clusters. The formalities considered should include legislation, regulation or a policy that would be able to empower the DPME to make certain decisions in the interest of service delivery.

Shared Goals to Goal Consensus

Every organisation of the cluster exists to discharge its own constitutional and legislative mandates. In discharging these mandates with limited resources, organisational goals impede each other. For example, the SAPS works tirelessly on investigating and arresting suspects. The NPA routinely tries to remand suspects in detention, whereas the DCS experiences overcrowding. In addition, the SAPS may be focusing on easy crimes such as common theft and not focusing enough on difficult but impactful cases such as illicit trade. This shared goal

paradox was clearly articulated by all participants because it is at the heart of dealing with crime in South Africa.

Achieving consensus on shared goals is difficult and takes considerable time through a negotiated process. It has been stressed by scholars such as Wood and Gray (1991), Innes and Booher (1999) and Cheng (2013) that this process should not be hurried because it is the core of the collaboration. It is important to obtain the right people, adopt the right facilitative process and do whatever it takes to ensure that all participants are in agreement.

Arriving at a consensus of goals for a wicked problem is an even more difficult undertaking. Based on the Complexity Theory, the success factors that the consensus-building process should include are as follows:

- Knowledge management: Approaching crime from a pluralist point of view by synthesising as many perspectives as possible from a wide range of angles through a number of stakeholders in order to understand the problem better (Richardson, 2008). This means an obsession with data and the development and management of knowledge that assists the JCPS Cluster in understanding crime and all its manifestations.
- Active citizenship: Taming crime as a wicked problem is a societal problem that needs to involve a broad range of members of society that includes not only victims of crime but also those who work extensively within the criminal justice system. These stakeholders must include non-governmental organisations such as those dealing with crimes against vulnerable groups to help make sense of and share issues related to pervasive crimes.

- Organisational Learning and Mental Models: Driven by strong leadership, the JCPS Cluster needs participants who are able to confront long-standing assumptions and knowledge (Cassidy and Stanley, 2019; Kim and Senge, 1994). In their work on organisational learning, Kim and Senge (1994) described a concept of 'shared mental models' that can assist in the process towards confronting prevailing thoughts.

Building consensus towards a common understanding of the problem proceeds in an iterative style as follows:

1. Involve as many people as possible to understand the issue from all possible angles. This includes citizens, non-governmental organisations and academic institutions. An obsession for data and analysis is critical to the process of seeking consensus among a wide range of stakeholders. This is not a once-off process; it is iterative.
2. The common themes that assist the criminal justice system in addressing crime is approaching problems through issues of efficiency, effectiveness and fairness (Bernard *et al.*, 2005). This means that all players of the criminal justice system, regardless of the mandate, should have these three issues as common themes. Arrival at definitions, descriptions and high-level targets for an efficient, effective and fair criminal justice system would represent consensus on which crime can be addressed.
3. These themes could then be translated into objectives and targets for implementation within the different departments of the cluster.

The process is represented graphically in Figure 7.4.




Figure 7.4 Consensus-building process for the JCPS cluster

This process should ideally be led by the DPME, which has an interest in the creation of a safer South Africa. This department would not be defensive and would be more likely to make decisions in the interest of the criminal justice system as a whole.

It should be emphasised that the process is long and tedious and will most probably span more than one or two years. It should also be noted that the model is dynamic and includes feedback loops at critical areas of discussion. Some of the critical issues that require in-depth analysis include common understanding of the importance of social-crime prevention in the fight against crime; issues such as gender-based violence; economic crimes that affect the economy such as illicit trade; and balancing all of these with issues of common assault, murder and robbery.

Once a common understanding of the problem is established, a collaborative strategic management approach will address the details where specific crimes are targeted and funding is ring-fenced.

Planning and Joint Planning

A meta-strategy was defined by Huxham (1993b) as a high-level statement of the meta-mission and meta-objectives of a collaborative effort. An improved formulation of a collaborative strategy by Clarke and Fuller (2011) includes a joint course of action and implementation. A collaborative strategy or meta-strategy should include an implementation plan.

On achieving goal clarity, the next step for the JCPS Cluster would be to formulate a meta-strategy that translates the goal into a five-year operational plan that is in line with the South African Government Plan of Action. Given the level of interdependence between the entities of the JCPS Cluster, this plan should include meta-objectives. This, therefore, means that the medium-term strategic framework or five-year plan can only produce tangible results if preceded by an in-depth process of consensus building.

Resources to Joint Resourcing

For the JCPS Cluster, resourcing surpasses a five-year strategic plan and a one-year implementation plan. Resourcing also refers to the way in which the entire criminal justice system is resourced in addressing the crime situation, thus exceeding the five-year planning horizon.

Participants expressed the need for long-term, system-wide consideration of key resources. Without a well-considered and in-depth goal consensus, resourcing for the JCPS Cluster will reflect imbalance and incoherence. For example, some organisations within the cluster have staff growth that is disproportionate, thus causing backlogs in other areas.

Other key areas of resourcing that need urgent attention are capital spending and the roll-out of service points. A common approach is needed to avoid having police stations, courts and correctional centres rolled out in different directions.

Once goal consensus is achieved and key long-term resourcing is put together, the JCPS Cluster would be ready to consolidate the five-year strategic plans and the one-year implementation plans in line with a common understanding of the long-term goals.

Execution

Execution was identified as a primary outcome for the collaborative process. Although the long-term outcome of the collaboration is addressing the crime problem for a safer country, the short- to medium-term outcome is effective execution of a well-thought-out plan to address crime.

In summary, the affinities identified by the focus group are conceptualised as dimensions of collaborations for the JCPS Cluster as indicated in Table 7.6.

Table 7.6 Translation of affinities to dimensions of collaboration

#	Affinity identified by the focus group	Factor of the JCPS collaboration
1	Leadership	Leadership
2	Culture	Culture
3	Silos	Collaborative Capability
4	Protocols	Governance
5	Sharing Goals	Goal Consensus
6	Planning	Joint Planning
7	Resources	Joint Resourcing
8	Execution	Execution

7.7 FINAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTRAGOVERNMENTAL COLLABORATION

The literature review in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 identified dimensions of collaborations through the RDT, the TCE and the GST. The conceptual framework is shown in Figure 7.5.




Figure 7.5 Literature-based conceptual framework for intragovernmental collaboration

Source: Author

Participants who took part in the IQA process identified eight affinities associated with the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration. Participants did not have access to the conceptual framework beforehand, which meant that the affinities identified were grounded in their own experiences and not led by literature.

The affinities were subsequently classified in terms of the extent to which they are drivers and outcomes. The identified affinities were compared with the factors of collaboration as conceptualised in literature and the conceptual framework. Key changes made to the conceptual framework are shown in Figure 7.6.




Figure 7.6 Key changes to the literature-based conceptual framework for intragovernmental collaboration.

Source: Author

Some collaboration dimensions identified through literature were found to play a less significant role within the JCPS collaboration. The first of these was Trust. Although Trust is an important determinant in voluntary networks, it is also identified as an important consideration for mandated networks (Huxham and Vangen, 2004; McGuire, 2006). For the JCPS collaboration, Trust did not play an important role in the collaboration itself. However, rather than mentioning trust among members of the cluster, participants alluded to the issues of corruption that had been identified through the Judicial Commission of Enquiry on Allegations of State Capture.

Power is often used by participants to influence the network in different ways. For example, some influential participants can threaten to withdraw their participation from a network and others can withdraw resources that are useful for the partnership. Rodriguez *et al.* (2007) found that power plays a critical role even in mandated networks. In contrast, Gray (1985) found that power plays very little role in terms of a mandated network. Within the JCPS collaboration, power was not used to intimidate participants, to threaten withdrawal or to push certain decisions to the extent often described in literature.

Some of the issues that were vaguely mentioned in relation to power were a symptom of leadership issues rather than destructive power play. For example, one participant mentioned that importance accorded to a subcommittee of the cluster is based on how powerful its Chairperson is. For example, a forum led by the SAPS General will be well attended whereas a forum led by a different organisation may have lower-level delegates attending. Furthermore, it is worth noting that power was not one of the affinities identified by the participants in the focus group.

The researcher initially identified collaborative capability as a matter to be addressed in the process of collaboration within the cluster and not as an antecedent. In contrast, participants identified collaborative capability (referred to as Silos) as one of the drivers (antecedents) of the JCPS collaboration. Top Managers emphasised the fact that the cluster system was established primarily to address the persistent challenge of working collaboratively. The final framework, therefore, shows collaborative capability as an antecedent.

Regarding culture, this research revealed practices and norms that are prevalent in cluster entities and that impede the ability of the cluster to function. These include the lack of performance-driven culture, the lack of accountability and other behaviours associated with tendencies of sheltered employment. Although within literature, the issue did not come across as prevalent, within the JCPS Cluster, it was addressed as a driver and is included in the framework.

An important area that forms part of the conceptual framework but received little mention from participants was related to the Complexity Theory. In addressing crime as a wicked problem, these dimensions become critical and game-changing. Knowledge management, organisational learning and active citizenship exist as a feedback loop and in line with systems theory should be used continually to gather insights, to reflect and to move forward towards taming a wicked problem. The feedback and interaction with external players introduce a state of disequilibrium within the criminal justice system, which in turn, introduces the change and innovation needed to move the system back into a state of equilibrium.

The final framework is shown in Figure 7.7.




Figure 7.7 Strategic Management Framework for the JCPS Intragovernmental Collaborations

Source: Author

7.8 COMPARISON BETWEEN LITERATURE-BASED FRAMEWORKS AND MODELS

The outcome of the research is a strategic framework to assist the JCPS Cluster in addressing crime. The building blocks of the framework consist of dimensions of collaboration. The discussion on literature-based frameworks, therefore, begins with these building blocks.

Literature identifies and describes dimensions of interorganisational networks with a number of meta-analyses. For example, the study by Kozuch and Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek (2016) identifies 68 factors that determine and influence public interorganisational networks. Other studies that identified factors include those of Mattessich, Murray-Close and Monsey (2001) and Emerson *et al.* (2006).

Absent from the list of factors is interorganisational culture, which was found prominent in the JCPS collaboration. Among reasons for the strength of this factor within the JCPS network could be the difficulties associated with mandated and directed networks. Similarly, power was found to be a less important factor, and this is in line with previous studies by Gray (1985) and Hall *et al.* (1977), which found that the mandate reduces power dynamics. Trust was found to be less important, and one of the key reasons is that participants are not in a position to threaten the existence or working of the network.

With the exception of the three factors that are in contrast with those in literature, the seven remaining dimensions identified by participants in this research are included in the framework of Emerson *et al.* (2011). It should be noted that Emerson's framework considered the works of other scholars such as Ansell and Gash (2008), Thomson and Perry (2006) and Wood and Gray (1991) and is, therefore, comprehensive.

Three additional dimensions that strengthened the response to crime as a wicked problem (Active Citizenship, Knowledge Management, Organisational Learning) were sourced from the Complexity Theory and were shown explicitly on the framework as a feedback loop. Studies of the Complexity Theory and governance

networks have been undertaken in other areas associated with complexity such as game theory by scholars including Eppel (2017) and Erik-Hans Klijn (2008). However, the feedback loop was found most appropriate for the context under which the JCPS Cluster is operating.

The framework presents a practical solution to improving the JCPS Cluster network and will make it possible for leaders to begin to address systematic and deep-rooted issues relating to crime. The framework is the first step in creating an enabling environment to address the problem.

7.9 RECOMMENDATIONS

The framework presented in Figure 7.2 could be used to improve the functionality of the JCPS Cluster. In addition to implementation of the framework, the following are recommendations that could further assist in strengthening the JCPS cluster.

Key participants within the cluster tend to be Senior Managers who shoulder both planning and implementation responsibilities. It was found that most of the responsibilities of the JCPS Cluster are delegated to Senior Managers (Directors), and this over-delegation leaves two higher levels of management out of touch and Senior Managers overworked. It is therefore recommended that the terms of reference of the key cluster structures include the participation of Deputy DGs and Chief Directors as part of the quorum requirements.

Participants indicated frustration with the planning calendar that is in conflict with the realities of the cluster. This misstep was identified during both the five-year planning and the annual planning periods. It is recommended that timelines are revised and that leadership enforce the deadlines that have been agreed upon.

There is an urgent need for the cluster to use data to debate and discuss issues relating to crime in South Africa. There were indications that in some situations, data that were important in guiding better decision-making are not consistently shared. The feedback loop indicated in the framework for intragovernmental collaboration requires rigorous and honest feedback from both insiders and outsiders. It is, therefore, recommended that data become central in all cluster meetings to enable common understanding of problems, to garner support for solutions and to monitor progress. Furthermore, decisions not supported by appropriate data should be avoided.

The involvement of civil society, academia and other non-governmental role players should form part of the feedback loop shown in the Framework for Intragovernmental Collaborations. Although participation in decision-making is not necessary, reports, research and other guidance could play a critical role in broadening the knowledge base in addressing crime and could provide insights that might not be available within government.

A legislative framework needs to be developed to strengthen the role of the DPME. This includes taking decisions where members of the cluster are in conflict and tend to act in their own self-interest. Although consultation must continue, long-outstanding decisions could be made by redefining the role of the DPME in

leadership and assisting decision-making. The role of the DPME could, therefore, include coordination of the cluster outcomes and drive decisions that are crucial for improving the functionality of the cluster.

In ensuring a clear demarcation between the roles of the DPME and the JCPS Cluster, it is important to differentiate the collaborative and coordinative roles. It is recommended that the DPME play a collaborative role of joint planning and joint resourcing for the JCPS Cluster plan. This means that the DPME should receive inputs and finalise the plan for approval by the President. The final decision on the quality of the plan should lie with the DPME rather than with individual members of the cluster. This is important in avoiding a cluster plan that is silo-based and targets that are too soft. More importantly, the plan should reflect a systems-based approach to addressing identified priorities.

Responsibilities of the Chairperson of the JCPS Cluster (Director-General) could be steered towards implementation of the plan through coordination within the cluster. This could take place once the well-thought-out plan led by the DPME is finalised.

Regarding cluster leadership, the decision to appoint leaders could be centred on the attributes of the leaders and their capability to lead complex networks. A leader should be considered for his/her ability to inspire action, inculcate a performance-driven culture, address silos and produce results.

More creative communication channels within the cluster could be considered. Even where there is limited participation, the other employees in the departments

and entities need to remain informed so that they can support the work of the cluster.

Goal consensus for wicked problems is a lengthy process. For the JCPS Cluster, this process includes decisions on the relative importance of crime prevention versus crime combating. Other key decisions include consensus on the crime priorities that would make the most difference in addressing crime and on how to resource the JCPS Cluster across departments and entities. Resourcing involves consensus on the approach to service delivery, investment in service points and the appropriate capacitation thereof. A major facilitative process needs to be undertaken for this consensus-building process to ensure that all stakeholders are committed to and ready to implement the well-thought-out cluster plans.

Directors-General are an equivalent of Chief Executive Officers in the private sector and are, therefore, highly experienced administrators whose next career moves are linked to success in their current posts. Ministers are politicians with limited tenure and are linked to political dynamics within their parties. Rogue politicians have been found to interfere with the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, with Directors-General and other key leaders removed from office for allegedly refusing to take decisions that are favourable to politicians. To void the conflicts associated with this interface, it is recommended that the Public Service Commission becomes involved in both the selection of the Directors-General and any matters that may lead to their suspensions or threats to their jobs.

7.10 CONCLUSION

The focus group and interviews undertaken with Senior and Top Managers provided an in-depth understanding of intragovernmental collaboration within the JCPS Cluster. Detailed quotations demonstrated issues and challenges that are experienced by the two groups.

Within the current chapter, an in-depth discussion of the affinities was undertaken, and these were translated from affinities identified by the research participants to dimensions identified through literature.

A final system influence diagram for the research was compiled, and this was used as a precursor to the final framework for the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration. In addition to the framework, recommendations emanating from the research are discussed.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The JCPS Cluster is an intragovernmental collaboration tracing back to 1996 that was established to improve collaborative efforts in addressing crime. Although some successes have been registered through the years, there were indications that further exploration was needed to improve its functioning in addressing crime in South Africa. The key objective of the research was to consider issues within the JCPS Cluster and produce a strategic management framework that would guide the cluster towards improving the collaboration. The strategic management framework is presented in Chapter 7.

Chapter 8 outlines the research process and indicates the extent to which the research responded to the three research questions of the study. The chapter also provides a summary of the objectives of the research, the theories underpinning the research, the detailed literature review and the findings.

In addition to the summary, the chapter details the contributions made by the research to the body of knowledge within interorganisational networks in general and intragovernmental collaborations in particular. Limitations of the research and areas of future research are also identified.

In closing, the researcher presents a personal reflection and concluding remarks.

8.2 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH

8.2.1 Motivation for the study

Interorganisational partnerships vary extensively. Within the public sector, some networks are mandatory and some are voluntary, with the latter tending to include the public and the private sector on narrow policy initiatives.

Unlike voluntary networks, mandatory and directed networks are the easiest to form but are challenging in sustaining good results (Schopler, 1987). Many of these networks address wicked problems, which are long-standing, pervasive and multifaceted problems that the public sector is often called upon to solve. The lack of a profit motive is one of the key reasons that these networks are difficult. However, there is a need and a drive to improve the performance of such networks and to provide value to stakeholders. The collaboration of the JCPS Cluster for addressing crime is such a network.

Research conducted thus far does not explicitly differentiate between networks that are mandated and furthermore, does not differentiate between directed and self-directed networks. For this reason, factors of collaborations are mostly generalised. The current research focused on intragovernmental collaborations, which are both mandated and directed.

Following the development of their broad framework for collaborative governance, Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011:22) make a specific call for researchers to develop frameworks that are context-specific:

Additional research is needed to discover which relationships matter in what contexts, that is, researchers need to identify where, when, and why which components are necessary, and to what degree, for collaborative success.

Further calls to understand different forms of networks continue to be made:

Future research could further improve our understanding of different types of networks and their implications by drawing upon, extending, and refining existing typologies. (Gazley and Guo, 2020:10)

Other calls for studies in mandated networks include those by McNamara (2012), Putansu (2015) and Gil-Garcia *et al.* (2019).

Given that wicked problems are unique and require unique solutions, this research proposed a framework that applies to South Africa and its historical context and to the governance context under which crime is addressed. This presented a compelling reason to undertake the research.

The research, therefore, sought to gain an in-depth understanding of the JCPS intergovernmental collaborations and to produce a framework that provides solutions for the cluster and thus contributes to the literature of intragovernmental collaborations.

8.2.2 Developing a theoretical framework through literature

In understanding the JCPS collaboration and working towards a framework, a literature survey was undertaken to identify dimensions of collaboration and to produce a literature-based theoretical framework.

Factors of intragovernmental collaboration were identified through theories associated with interorganisational networks, and this enabled the researcher to

anchor the dimensions of collaboration in theory. The three theories that were identified were the RDT, the TCE and the Complexity Theory.

The RDT explains the reliance of organisations on other organisations to achieve some of their goals. The TCE explains costs (in all its manifestations) and expected benefits that need to be considered for participating in networks. Given that the criminal justice system consists of individual parts that need to work together towards a larger common goal, the GST and the Complexity Theory were deemed appropriate for the current research.

The dimensions of collaboration that were identified were as follows:

- The RDT: Goal Clarity; Power and Trust
- TCE: Collaborative Advantage; Collaborative Strategic Management; Governance and Knowledge Management
- Complexity Theory: Knowledge Management; Organisational Learning; Active Citizenship; and Leadership Capabilities.

A further review of the literature regarding the factors of collaboration was undertaken to describe and understand these factors and to produce a conceptual framework as detailed under Section 5.6. This framework was developed by the researcher using a body of knowledge of interorganisational networks.

8.2.3 Research design

The research was undertaken through a constructivist approach, which acknowledges the development of knowledge through multiple realities and

experiences. Qualitative research was adopted in line with the objectives of the research.

Interactive Qualitative Analysis was found to be an ideal method due to its relevance to the research being undertaken. The method allowed for identification of the dimensions of intragovernmental collaborations (Research Question 1) and the interrelationships between the dimensions (Research Question 2).

The important consideration in the use of IQA was that participants identified affinities of intragovernmental collaborations without being guided by literature studies. This meant that the affinities of the JCPS collaboration that were identified by the participants through the current research are authentic and are grounded in the environment and experiences of the participants.

Regarding the interrelationships between the affinities, the IQA allowed for a detailed investigation into all possible relationships between the affinities, which led to the identification of those that are prominent in explaining the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration.

The two constituencies that were identified for providing input into the JCPS collaboration were Senior Managers who are extensively involved in the collaborative efforts and Top Managers who have power over the workings of the collaboration. Ten Senior Managers took part in the focus group that identified affinities and ten Senior Managers and five Top Managers took part in the semi-structured interviews. Availability and access to high-ranking leadership within the criminal justice system and their willingness to share their thoughts was

facilitated by the researcher as an insider. This privilege would have been difficult for an outsider.

The participation by Senior Managers and Top Managers presented the opportunity to triangulate the research results. Furthermore, the use of the focus group and the semi-structured interviews provided an additional triangulation opportunity. Another aspect of triangulation was the heuristic framework that was developed through the literature review. Data gathering for the research was, therefore, extensive and rigorous.

8.2.4 Results

Eight dimensions that are important in the JCPS collaboration were identified. The key driver for the JCPS collaboration was found to be Leadership. This is in line with literature on interorganisational networks. The current study went further and proposed a model for leadership that is appropriate for intragovernmental collaborations in general and for the JCPS Cluster in particular.

Two key areas of divergence within the literature were identified. First, Power and Trust did not feature as key dimensions of collaboration. This study confirms that contrary to the literature for intragovernmental relationships, power as a factor was not found to be prominent in the JCPS collaboration. Power dynamics such as threats of withdrawal from participation and withdrawal of resources were not identified. Similarly, trust was not found to be a key factor; participants did not indicate any fears, doubt or uncertainties regarding ongoing participation or regarding other players.

The second area of divergence was Culture as a secondary driver. Particularly in public-service organisations, mandated networks often require members to participate and discharge the mandate as understood by the mandating authority. For the JCPS Cluster, there were indications that some members showed less interest than expected in the cluster and in the behaviours that negatively affect the collaboration. Culture was second to Leadership in importance whereas it was not found to be prominent in literature.

When comparing the results of the Senior and Top Managers, the descriptions of the different dimensions of collaboration and the interrelationships between them were similar. For this reason, the inclusion of Top Managers provided triangulation of the Senior Manager results.

The area of divergence between Senior and Top Managers was largely in their relative views of the importance of collaborative advantage (silos). Top Managers felt strongly about the importance of breaking the silos in the cluster and ensuring achievement of a collaborative advantage on addressing crime. Collaborative Capability was, therefore, identified as a driver for the JCPS collaboration. Senior Managers identified Governance as the third driver due to the challenges they experience with attendance of numerous meetings, harmonisation of decisions and inadequate participation by Top Management. A key recommendation for the JCPS Cluster is to work towards a healthy and appropriate balance between collaborative capability and an appropriate governance framework that supports this objective.

Although voluntary networks typically have clarity of goals at the beginning of the partnership, for wicked problems, this goal may not be as clear or full consensus may be difficult to obtain. For the JCPS Cluster, the vision of addressing crime in South Africa is well understood; however, participants indicate that there is no broad consensus on objectives to work towards this vision. One participant referred to this goal paradox as 'the elephant in the room' because of its complexity. For a wicked problem, arriving at goal clarity is a long, difficult and protracted process. Within the JCPS Cluster, it was found that Goal Clarity is an outcome that requires appropriate leadership, the right culture, appropriate governance and collaborative capability within all the participating organisations.

Three factors of collaborations that are associated with the Complexity Theory and that address wicked problems did not feature prominently in the research. Only four participants described issues relating to knowledge management and attitudes towards data sharing and analysis. The second factor that did not feature was active citizenry, which involves the provision of feedback, data, research and ideas through organisations that do not participate fully as members of a collaboration. The third factor, organisational learning, promotes and encourages self-reflection and open-mindedness in addressing wicked problems. All three are appropriate factors to provide ongoing feedback that is important in addressing wicked problems.

Regarding interrelationships between dimensions, the results of this research not only identify dimensions of collaboration in terms of drivers and outcomes but also presents their strengths as drivers and outcomes. The simplification process allowed for the preparation of a SID, which shows relative strengths of dimensions

as drivers and how they influence one another. For the JCPS Cluster, the SID was drawn as shown in Figure 8.1.




Figure 8.1 System Influence Diagram for JCPS Cluster

This SID can assist the JCPS collaboration in prioritising the issues that have been identified for a more effective collaboration. For example, arriving at goal consensus is important, but until issues of leadership, culture, governance and collaborative capability are dealt with, the collaboration will continue to remain a challenge.

The strategic management framework for the JCPS collaboration that was produced through the current research differs from literature in the following ways:

- Power and Trust were not identified as key dimensions and were removed.

- Culture featured prominently in the JCPS collaboration as one of the drivers of the collaboration and was thus included.
- Goal Clarity was identified as an outcome due to the nature of crime being a wicked problem.
- The JCPS framework captures the relative importance of drivers and outcomes. This standpoint provides a more refined perspective on the dimensions of collaboration.

8.2.5 Responding to research objectives

The first research objective was to uncover the lived experiences of managers involved in the JCPS Cluster in order to understand the intricacies of their intragovernmental collaboration. In understanding the nature of their collaboration, the research sought to identify the key dimensions of the collaboration. Eight dimensions were identified through the IQA process and interpretation by the researcher. See Table 8.1.

The second research objective was to explain how the identified dimensions of collaborations interrelate. This was essential to understand the relative importance of these dimensions. The SID shows the order of importance from the primary driver of the collaboration (Leadership) to the primary outcome (Execution). The SID is shown in Figure 8.1 and summarised in Table 8.1.

The third research objective was to produce a framework that can be used by the JCPS collaboration to make improvements in the functionality of the cluster as it addresses crime. Inputs from participants and the literature were combined to arrive at the framework shown in Figure 8.2. In addition, literature-based models

for Leadership, Collaborative Capability and Governance were drawn to provide further guidance on improving the JCPS collaboration.

Table 8.1 Translation of affinities to dimensions of collaboration

Research Objective	Research Question	Chapter Contribution
(1) To uncover experiences of managers involved in intragovernmental collaborations at a strategic level and to understand dimensions affecting their efforts in addressing crime as a wicked problem	(1) Which dimensions do managers identify as important in intragovernmental collaborations for addressing crime as a wicked problem at a strategic level?	The eight dimensions that were identified through this research were as follows: Leadership; Culture; Collaborative Capability; Governance; Goal Consensus; Joint Planning; Joint Resourcing; Execution
(2) To develop a better understanding of how dimensions linked to intragovernmental collaborations interrelate	(2) What are the interrelationships between the dimensions identified under (1)?	Dimensions were classified as drivers and outcomes. The Systems Influence Diagram from Primary Driver to Primary Outcome is as follows: Leadership → Culture → Governance → Collaborative Capability → Goal Consensus → Joint Resourcing → Joint Planning → Execution
(3) To produce a framework that will guide intragovernmental collaborations in addressing wicked problems	(3) How can identified dimensions and interrelationships be used to produce an intragovernmental framework that will help address wicked problems?	The Framework is shown in Figure 12.2.




Figure 8.2 Framework for Intragovernmental Collaborations for the JCPS Cluster

8.3 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY

Schopler (1987:704) described mandated and directed networks (Type I) as “Reliable Compliance” because their formation is straightforward but the level of compliance is expected to be high. The author furthermore predicted low levels of member satisfaction and minimal quality of output from such networks (Schopler, 1987).

Given the importance of such networks in the public service and in addressing wicked problems, there was a need to investigate and propose solutions that are relevant to address the shortcomings associated with these networks.

It should be noted that previous studies on mandated networks did not specifically focus on the peculiarity of networks that are both mandated and directed. For this reason, the existing body of knowledge was found to be over-generalised. The aim of the current study was to investigate the peculiar type of networks that the public service depends upon for effective service delivery.

This research study made a substantial contribution to intragovernmental collaborations, both at an academic level and for the community of practice. In broad terms, this included the theoretical background that guided the research, the research methods used and the findings that were contrary to existing literature.

8.3.1 Contribution to the body of knowledge

The theoretical background of the research study was based on the RDT, TCE and GST. The dimensions of the collaboration that were proposed for the conceptual framework were, therefore, drawn through a thorough analysis of leading theories rather than the predominance of articles based in literature. This combination of theories was not found in literature for interorganisational networks.

The research used IQA as the method to identify both the dimensions of the collaborations and the interrelationships between them. Participants identified dimensions of collaborations from first principles using an inductive approach. This meant that the dimensions of collaboration that were identified by participants were authentic and based solely on their experiences. No other interorganisational network study was found in literature that used this approach.

The research was undertaken through three different layers of triangulation. The first was a comparison between data collected from Senior Managers and data

collected from Top Managers. The second was the data collected during the focus group and the semi-structured interviews. The third was the comparison between the conceptual model developed through literature and the model developed through the current research.

Using the IQA method, the relationships between dimensions were identified and were arranged in the order of causal effect from primary driver to primary outcome. Research in interorganisational networks classifies dimensions as drivers and outcomes without indicating relative strength of these dimensions. This research has made a contribution towards a continuum of drivers and outcomes.

Seven of the eight dimensions identified in this study were found in literature. Culture was the exception, with insufficient mention in the context of interorganisational networks. This affirms the usefulness of the IQA within interorganisational network research.

A major area of contrast lies with the importance of Trust and Power. These are two of the most-studied factors due to the impact that they have on interorganisational networks. Although they were strongly associated with voluntary networks, they were also considered significant in both directed and mandated networks such as intragovernmental collaborations. However, the current research found to the contrary. Neither were part of the affinities identified by the participants and, therefore, were not substantial dimensions of the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration. Power and Trust are found to be prevalent in private sector networks. However, for public sector networks such as the JCPS Cluster, collaborating bodies do not exercise power over others in the same

manner as in private-sector-based networks and cannot withdraw participation or resources. Similarly, Trust was found not to play a substantial role because public sector participants have known mandates and the extent of participating is more predictable.

The difficulty of intragovernmental collaborations lies in participants who are mandated and directed to participate. For the JCPS Cluster, Culture was identified as a driver of the collaboration second to Leadership due to the negative behaviours associated with participation that is mandated and directed. Culture does not enjoy prominence in interorganisational network literature, whereas it was prominent in the current research and was identified as a driver.

This research identified three additional dimensions of collaboration linked to complexity and systems theory. Active Citizenship, Knowledge Management and Organisational Learning help the role and involvement of non-governmental participants who provide crucial and important feedback into the intragovernmental collaboration. The three practices guide the collaboration in becoming more reflexive and open-minded and more engaging in matters addressing crime. These dimensions were identified in literature but were not addressed as part of a holistic group of factors of interorganisational networks.

The researcher was a participant within the JCPS Cluster and, therefore, had access to the appropriate Senior and Top Managers involved in the research. Access to these participants and the rich data they provided would have otherwise been difficult.

The study was based on addressing crime as a wicked problem within a developing country and broadens the body of knowledge of interorganisational networks to non-traditional contexts. Table 8.2 shows the contribution to the body of knowledge linked to literature.

Table 8.2 Contribution of the research linked to literature

Area	Contribution	Seminal Authors
Research Questions		
(1) Which dimensions do managers identify as important in intragovernmental collaborations for addressing crime as a wicked problem at a strategic level?	Dimensions of collaboration in literature and confirmed by the current research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leadership • Governance • Collaborative Capability • Goal Consensus • Joint Planning • Resources • Execution 	Wood and Gray (1991) Huxham and Macdonald, (1992) Vangen and Huxham (2011) Provan and Kenis (2008)
	Dimensions of collaboration in literature but not prominent in the current study of intragovernmental collaboration: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trust • Power 	Gray (1985) Wood and Gray (1991) Klijn, Edelenbos & Steijn (2010) Huxham and Beech (2002) McGuire (2006)
	Factor not prominent in literature but included in the current study: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Culture 	Weare, Lichterman & Esparza (2014)
(2) What are the interrelationships between the dimensions identified under (1)?	Drivers and outcomes of collaboration identified by different authors – Models found in literature do not indicate the process of classification of drivers and outcomes.	Chen (2010) Ansell and Gash (2008) Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh (2011) Thomson and Perry (2006)
	Continuum of drivers and outcomes through the IQA process	Not found in the literature
(3) How can identified dimensions and		-

Area	Contribution	Seminal Authors
Research Questions		
interrelationships be used to produce an intragovernmental framework that will help address wicked problems?	Dimensions of collaboration arranged in order from Primary Driver to Primary Outcome	
	Dimensions identified through Systems and Complexity Theory explicitly included in the framework: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Active Citizenship • Knowledge Management • Organisational Learning 	Head and Alford (2015) Bovaird (2008) Alford and Head (2017) Senge and Sterman (1992)
Method		
Interactive Qualitative Analysis	No previous research for interorganisational networks has been done using IQA.	Northcutt and McCoy (2004)
Identification of dimensions of intragovernmental collaboration	IQA allowed for identification of dimensions by participants. Dimensions identified through this process are, therefore, authentic and not based on any available literature.	-
Quality of data	The rich descriptions collected and the availability of senior government officials would be challenging for an outsider.	-

8.3.2 Contribution within the community of practice

Senior managers in government are aware of the ongoing challenges with intragovernmental collaborations and with the implementation of the cluster approach adopted by the South African government. These issues are not uniquely South African and have been studied throughout the world.

Different solutions are often proposed and implemented. Within the context of addressing the wicked problem of crime, it is not easy to determine where to start. It is even more difficult when the strategic management area itself is a wicked problem. This research assists managers and policy makers by identifying the main dimensions that need to be addressed to improve the strategic management framework of the JCPS Cluster and other government clusters.

The interrelationships between the eight dimensions of intragovernmental collaboration provide managers a means of prioritising dimensions in the order of importance. For example, in addressing the pervasive challenge of Goal Consensus, it is evident that Leadership, Culture, Governance and Collaborative Capability need to be addressed.

To build further on the framework, literature-based models for Leadership, Governance, Consensus Building and Collaborative Advantage were developed. It was important for the research not only to identify the dimensions but also to propose solutions for improving the functionality of the JCPS collaboration in areas of importance.

The current research provides a synopsis of the JCPS collaboration in 2019. The research will inform future generations of participants about how the JCPS Cluster has changed and evolved over the years.

8.3.3 Implications

The objective of the research was to compile a strategic management framework that would help senior and top managers to improve their collaboration in

addressing crime. The contributions of this study present certain implications for theory and the community of practice.

The IQA process arrived at a set of dimensions of collaborations that have been broadly confirmed by seminal works, as well as dimensions that were not as generally discussed. The research, therefore, confirms the applicability of IQA within interorganisational network theory, and this provides researchers with a technique to progress beyond identification of dimensions and to determine the relative importance of these dimensions against each other.

Addressing wicked problems is overwhelming for managers, and this often leads to a state of paralysis and despair. In an environment where challenges are pervasive, it is often difficult to identify key dimensions confidently and to work towards addressing them. This research identified eight key dimensions affecting the JCPS collaboration and furthermore, indicated the relative importance of these in terms of drivers and outcomes. This is revolutionary because it clarifies a way towards improving the JCPS collaboration.

Although research cannot be generalised, these factors and outcomes present a framework for other government-led collaborations in South Africa and other developing countries to consider for their own networks.

8.4 LIMITATIONS

An area of concern prior to data collection was the availability of Top Managers to participate in the research given their demanding schedules and the small population size. Five Top Managers participated in the semi-structured interviews and two of them had been acting in Top Management roles for over two years.

Although the number of participants was lower than recommended, the IQA for Top Managers achieved the objective of giving voice to Top Managers as important constituents in the process. It should be noted that the purpose of the research was qualitative, and their inclusion enriched the research study.

8.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Although the research achieved a number of objectives, there are areas of further research that could extend the work that was undertaken:

- Further research should explore trust and power – these were unique findings that require additional research in order to generalise.
- Conceptualisation of culture within intragovernmental collaborations (mandated and directed collaborations) needs to be explored.
- Further research on intergovernmental collaborations should include a number of municipalities working towards a joint objective. This study could contribute to collaborations that span different legislatures in the same sphere of government.

- Additional research into intergovernmental collaborations should be done within all three spheres of government to contribute knowledge in addressing vertical policy formation and full implementation through different spheres of government.

8.6 FINAL REMARKS

As a Senior Manager and practitioner of strategic management within the JCPS Cluster, this research was part of a personal journey to understand interorganisational networks and to address a pertinent issue of which I was a part. Most of my professional life involved strategic management at an organisational level. However, within government, I understood the importance of collaborative strategic management and most importantly, the need to make collaborations work effectively.

As a practitioner, I have often heard remarks made by Senior Managers regarding the JCPS collaborations such as:

“It is poor planning that needs to be addressed”.

“It is the organisational structures that are making it difficult for us to be effective”.

“It is the political-administration interface that hampers our abilities to plan and implement”.

“It is poor integration of systems that is the problem”.

“We need a super-department to give direction and break deadlocks”.

“The only problem we have is poor implementation”.

It is these debates that prompted the research to understand the collaborations within government better and to identify a roadmap for how to build on the successes within the cluster and address some of the pervasive issues that still exist.

I am grateful to both the Senior and Top Managers within the JCPS Cluster who supported this research because they saw value in reflecting on what works and in addressing the shortcomings.

This research and the framework that was presented will hopefully respond to the question that is often asked, “Where do we start and how?”

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Annexure A : Participants' briefing and consent form

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP



REQUEST FOR FOCUS GROUP AND INTERVIEW PARTICIPATION

Dear Participant

In addition to my current role as Chief Director: Strategy, Monitoring and Evaluation at the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, I am also a UNISA student doing an academic research under the supervision of Prof Mari Jansen van Rensburg, a Professor associated with UNISA's School of Business Leadership, towards a Doctor of Business Leadership qualification.

The research topic is titled "Strategic Management Framework for Intragovernmental Collaborations" and its objectives are:

- To uncover experiences of managers involved in intragovernmental collaborations at a strategic level and to understand factors affecting their efforts in addressing crime as a wicked problem.
- To develop a better understanding of interrelationships between these factors and their influence on the success of the collaboration;
- To produce a framework that will guide intragovernmental collaborations towards addressing wicked policy problems such as crime.

Given your current role within your organisation, your participation in JCPS cluster and the seniority of your position, you have been selected to participate in a focus group discussion. Your participation and engagement with the research study will be highly appreciated as your experience and insight will help me to identify successes, issues, challenges and shortcomings relating to intragovernmental collaborations.

The research is partially funded by a Postgraduate Research Grant from UNISA; however, the funding does not come with conditions that interfere in any way with the research.

Your inputs will be treated with confidentiality and will be used solely for the research. Your name and those of other participants will not be divulged anywhere in the thesis and results will present collective or anonymised views. Confidentiality cannot be fully guaranteed during the focus groups due to the participation of larger group of people. However, views shared in this focus group are not expected to be highly confidential in nature. In an unlikely event of negative after-effect suffered as a result of participation in the research, please make me aware.

The focus group discussion will be based in a central location in Pretoria and should take approximately 4 hours on a date convenient for participants. This will entail individual reflection on themes and group participation through the use of Interactive Qualitative Analysis. The detail will be explained at the focus group session. A further individual interview lasting 1,5 hours will be scheduled with 6 - 8 participants. Refreshments will be provided for the comfort of participants during the focus group discussion. Your participation is voluntary and you can withdraw at any instance during the focus group or interview.

The discussion will be audio recorded to assist the researcher with record and for quality assurance purposes. In line with UNISA policy, focus group and interview data to be gathered will be kept for five years after publication and thereafter destroyed.

This study was approved by UNISA's School of Business Leadership Research Ethics Committee and the certificate (2019_SBL_DBL_007_FA) can be produced if required. Similarly, permission was obtained from relevant government departments and entities. Should you have concerns about the way in which the research has been conducted, you may contact Prof Mari Jansen van Rensburg, my supervisor at m.ivrensburg@mdx.ac.mu or +230 403 6400.

Your agreement to participate is highly appreciated. Kindly complete the consent form as an indication of your willingness to participate.

With much appreciation,



Researcher: Ms. Lebo Mphahlele-Ntsasa

Telephone: 082 337 7273

Email: lmphahlele@gmail.com



CONSENT FORM

By signing this document, I confirm my willingness to participate in the research titled “Strategic Management Framework for Intragovernmental Collaborations” and undertake to share fair and accurate account of my experiences.

The research study and its benefits have been explained to me and I had an opportunity to ask questions. My participation is voluntary and I understand that I can withdraw from the research study at any time.

Although the focus groups and interview transcripts will be kept for quality purposes, I understand that the information will not be made accessible to any parties without my consent and that the results of research will not in any way reveal my identify or aspects that might make it easy to identify me. I will nonetheless refrain from revealing highly confidential information or information of a sensitive during the focus group session.

I am also aware that the results of the study will be used in publications in academic and other journals and the data gathered from the research will be kept for five years.

Name of Participant: _____

Signature of Participant: _____ Date: _____

Please indicate if you are interested in receiving a copy of the research results:

Interested

Not Interested

Annexure B: List of Senior Manager and Top Manager participants

Focus group and interview participants (Senior Managers)

Participant	Organisation	Focus Group	Interview
Chair: Integrated Justice System (IJS) Programme	Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJCD)	X	X
Director: JCPS Cluster Secretariat	DOJCD	X	X
Chair: JCPS Performance Monitoring Committee	State Security Agency	X	
Senior Outcomes Coordinator: Outcome 3	Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME)	X	X
Head: Monitoring and Evaluation (Brigadier)	South African Police Service	X	X
Director: Office of the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions	National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) Gauteng Region	X	
Director: Strategic Planning	NPA National Office		X
Director: Victim Empowerment Programme	Department of Social Development	X	X
Director: Victim Support; and Chair: Intersectoral Committee on Child Justice	DOJCD	X	X
Director: Court Operations	DOJCD	X	
Director: Facilities Management	DOJCD	X	X
Chief Director: Intergovernmental Relations	Department of Correctional Services		X
National Legal Manager	Legal Aid South Africa		X

Interview participants (Top Managers)

Participant	Organisation
Deputy Director General: Legislative Development	Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJCD)
Deputy National Director of Public Prosecutions	National Prosecuting Authority (NPA)
Acting Chief Deputy Commissioner: Remand Detention	Department of Correctional Services
Acting Chair: Development Committee (DevCom)	DOJCD
Outcomes Coordinator: Safety and Security	Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME)

Annexure C: Eight affinities and their descriptions noted by focus group participants

#	Affinity	Descriptions by participants	
1	Silos	<p>Silo working mentality Silo implementation Driving own agenda Ego Eliminate Silos My way or the highway</p>	<p>No Egos (institutional) "I" mentality Poor Co-ordination Protecting turf Barriers created: Rank, Gender, Race</p>
2	Protocols	<p>Too many structures for similar objectives Many structures within the cluster Bureaucracy Too many meeting - no time for implementation Miscommunication between departments Lack of Continuity Wheels turn slowly in government</p>	<p>Poor continuity Many structures within the cluster Misunderstanding the mandate at different levels Ineffective communication Lack of Speedy decision making Non-adherence to meetings by JCPS</p>
3	Resources	<p>Lack of Resources to implement the APP Share resources = save costs Need to use IT systems in place for easy monitoring of cases Alignment of priorities Integration of budgets for JCPS projects Budget shortage Share/shared resources Need adequate resources</p>	<p>Competition between Departments and structures Reduce/Eliminate Duplication Competing priorities Resources: Financial, Human, Time Stronger together Non-filling of posts Increase efficiency</p>
4	Culture	<p>Not my problem No Zeal to compete Decreasing competitiveness Common goal setting Commitment and patience needed No joint problem ownership Team Spirit Poor Participation</p>	<p>Poor Teamwork Sending one message to clients Exclude rather than include Lack of buy-in Establish Task Teams No Big Picture Lack of mutual respect Teamwork - build</p>
5	Leadership	<p>Poor ethics Leadership-driven collaboration needed Poor accountability Need Learning opportunity/ Skills transfer</p>	<p>Improve professionalism Expose deadwoods Lack of ownership Lack of will and passion</p>
		Build capacity for coordination	Shared accountability framework

#	Affinity	Descriptions by participants	
		Sharing of skills/resources Leadership challenges Leadership and styles of leadership	Positive mind set Lack of trust Lack of cooperation (private sector)
6	Execution	Problem solving approach Too many reports Non-adherence to timeframes Agreed timeframes not kept Robust performance monitoring needed Too many service providers in place	Schedules out of sync Ad-hoc requests Departmental processes impede IT Systems not talking to each other e.g. SAPS, DCS, DOJCD Implementation of IT systems without proper consultation
7	Planning	Planning problems Project Execution Plans (Timelines) Operational Plans in place	Policy vs implementation misalignment Programme and Portfolio needs improvement Integrated planning needed
8	Sharing Goals	Common goals Shared values and vision Brainstorm common objectives Co-operation Shared passion Unclear mandates Collaboration helps people or organisations to complement each other. This enables knowledge sharing. It leads to team spirit/teamwork	Non-commitment Not understanding or valuing the value chain within JCPS Clear desired outcomes No single view of the problem Political vs. Administration Over-committed officials Understanding impact No incentive for collaboration

Annexure D: Interview protocol for Senior and Top Managers

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP (SBL)



INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR TOP MANAGEMENT

Name of Interviewee: _____

Organisation: _____

Designation: _____

Date of Interview: _____

QUESTIONS

Following the focus group workshop held earlier, the following affinities were identified for strategic management of intragovernmental collaborations:

- 1 Silos
- 2 Red Tape
- 3 Resources
- 4 Culture
- 5 Leadership
- 6 Execution
- 7 Planning
- 8 Sharing Goals

SECTION A: DESCRIPTION OF AFFINITIES

1. SILOS:

Key descriptive words: Silo working mentality; Driving own agenda; Egos; Protecting turf; Poor coordination; No joint budgets; Misalignment of goals; Wheels turn slowly in government.

Tell me about your experience with “SILOS”?

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2. RED TAPE:

Key descriptive words: Too many structures within the cluster; Poorly co-ordinating structures; Bureaucracy; Too many meetings - no time for implementation; Complex approval processes; Miscommunication between departments; Misunderstanding the mandate at different levels; Lack of continuity.

Tell me about your experience with “RED TAPE”?

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3. RESOURCES:

Key descriptive words: Lack of resources to implement programmes; Poor use of resources; Misalignment of priorities; Lack of integration of budgets for JCPS projects; Competition between Departments and structures for funds; Duplication of efforts; Poor management of IT resources.

Tell me about your experience with “RESOURCES”?

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4. CULTURE:

Key descriptive words: Public Service Mentality; Lack of accountability; Culture of non-compliance; Command and Control leading to malicious compliance; “Not my problem”; No zeal to compete; Rank issues; Poor Participation; Poor teamwork. Establish Task Teams; Exclude rather than include; Lack of buy-in; No Big Picture;

Tell me about your experience with “CULTURE”?

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5. LEADERSHIP:

Key descriptive words: Lack of accountability; Poor leadership and poor leadership styles; Poor ethics; Lack of ownership; Lack of will and passion; No shared accountability framework; Lack of cooperation; No generational mix; No visionary leadership

Tell me about your experience with “LEADERSHIP”?

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6. EXECUTION:

Key descriptive words: Too many reports; Non-adherence to timeframes; Robust performance monitoring needed; Too many service providers in place stifling execution; Planning schedules out of sync; Poor attendance by appropriate leadership; IT Systems not talking to each other e.g. SAPS, DCS, DOJCD; Implementation of IT systems without proper consultation.

Tell me about your experience with “EXECUTION”?

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7. PLANNING:

Key descriptive words: No proper cluster plan – silo plan; Lack of integrated planning; Compliance-driven planning process; Lack of vision; Silo mentality; Departments drive own agendas; Project execution plan (Timelines) needed; Policy vs. implementation misalignment; Misalignment of planning timelines; Under-targeting

Tell me about your experience with “PLANNING”?

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8. SHARING GOALS:

Key descriptive words: Need Common goals; Shared values and vision; poor cooperation; Shared passion; Need to improve knowledge sharing; Unclear mandates; Understand impact; No incentive for collaboration; Non-commitment; Not understanding or valuing the value chain within JCPS; No single view of the problem; Political vs. Administration goals; Social crime prevention not prioritised.

Tell me about your experience with “SHARING GOALS”?

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SECTION B: AFFINITY RELATIONSHIPS

- 2. Can you describe the relationship between Affinities listed below?
- 3. Can you provide examples to illustrate the relationship where necessary?

Affinity Relationships
1. Silos 2. Red Tape
1. Silos 3. Resources.
1. Silos 4. Culture
1. Silos 5. Leadership
1. Silos 6. Execution
1. Silos 7. Planning
1. Silos 8. Sharing Goals
2. Red Tape 3. Resources

Affinity Relationships
2. Red Tape 4. Culture
2. Red Tape 5. Leadership
2. Red Tape 6. Execution
2. Red Tape 7. Planning
2. Red Tape 8. Sharing Goals
3. Resources 4. Culture
3. Resources 5. Leadership
3. Resources 6. Execution

Affinity Relationships
3. Resources 7. Planning
3. Resources 8. Sharing Goals
4. Culture 5. Leadership
4. Culture 6. Execution
4. Culture 7. Planning
4. Culture 8. Sharing Goals
5. Leadership 6. Execution
5. Leadership 7. Planning

Affinity Relationships
5. Leadership 8. Sharing Goals
6. Execution 7. Planning
6. Execution 8. Sharing Goals
7. Planning 8. Sharing Goals

SECTION C: FINAL REMARKS

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SECTION D: POST INTERVIEW: NOTES BY RESEARCHER


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Annexure E: Interrelationships between affinities and explanations by Senior Manager participants

Primary Driver: Leadership (5)

Leadership (5) was classified as a primary driver by Senior Managers interviewed. As a primary driver, all relationships between Leadership and seven other affinities were essential:



Many of the relationships under leadership are straight forward and did not require any explanation from participants. Additional quotations that explain causal relationships between leadership and other affinities were the following:

Silos exist because of failure to integrate, which is one. Now, what causes as not to integrate? It can be the lack of leadership at the top, to say how do we integrate and how do we implement and how do we ensure consistency in terms of implementation. [Participant 11; 2513]

It is the leadership that enables red tape. In fact, some of the leaders that come of the ranks do not know anything else but red tape. They don't know

anything else but bureaucratic systems... Leadership is grown in a red tape environment. They cannot unravel the red tape. [Participant 12: 3439]

Good and coordinated leadership equals good execution and planning, as well. [Participant: 11 2989]

Good leadership means leads to appropriate sharing of goals. [Participant 11; 2996]


Unless we get to a point where there is real cluster leadership and the planning from the top is integrated, then the rest will fall into place. 3
566

All of that requires solid management and leadership, geared towards execution. [Participant 3: 652]

So, there was capacity to analyse budgets, because that leadership understood that we needed to create that culture where we know that our budgets impact on each other. They would cut resources or budgets based on the analysis. [Participant 6: 1786]

Secondary Driver: Culture

Culture as a secondary driver was found to be influenced by Leadership and influences all other remaining six affinities:



Quotations explaining culture as a secondary driver are discussed below:

If you have inculcated the right organisational culture, your planning would definitely improve, because then you would have brought in the leadership that says this is where we are going and people would be as excited about creating nice things. [Participant 3: 755]

But does culture land itself to creating red tape. I would say yes. Culture is red tape friendly. But this is not the only issues with culture, it is but one of the elements. Culture is very tolerant to red tape. [Participant: 12: 3433]

I think leadership is responsible, not necessarily for the culture because the leaders may have found it there. But they are unable to change the culture. I can't see them causing the culture, but they are unable to change it. [Participant: 12; 3514]

In order for the execution process to change, you need some level of culture shock in the organisation. You need leadership to ensure that the culture shock is there. Then you need to start making sure that you have the right skill to inspire people to do the things and you move on. [Participant 3: 657]

Leadership will commit time, resources and intellectual capacity to develop the culture. [Participant 6: 1782]


We set goals and reactively go back to others. And that culture makes our planning weak. [Participant 6: 1822]

It's culture resulting in silos. Culture causes us to work in silos. People want to main it. [Participant 11: 2769]

Secondary Driver: Protocols

Protocols³ was found to be one of the drivers of the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration, which is influenced by culture and leadership.

³ The Affinity Red Tape was renamed Protocols after interviews were conducted



Participants describe relationships as follows:

I think it is red tape resulting in silos. For instance, if you know that within departments it takes 8 months for you to get the actual signature. Now you won't be comfortable to take it to another department for you to do it in another 8 months. You will be discouraged from engaging other stakeholders. [Participant 1: 257]

At what levels can you plan? There are certain levels where you should be able to plan and execute. But organisational red tape requires you to go through hoops in order to execute. [Participant 6: 1708]

{Red Tape → Execution} It's a problem because of the issue of red tape. The personnel will do those reports, but they still need to go to their DG's for sign off. Maybe the DG is not even there. Now you look at your timeframes... it is problematic [Participant 8: 1957]

{Red Tape → Planning} Why people target less? It's because of red tapes. People do not want to target more because they know that red tapes are going to impede them, and they will be punished for not delivering. Yet the main challenge is the red tape: To get approval of the system and to get procurement. So those are the issues. [Participant 11: 2694]


It's red tape that pushes us to work in silos. [Participant 8: 2078]

Red tape leads to resource issues. If there was no red tape, we would all be one. [Participant 11: 2822]

Red Tape would affect your planning. But on the other hand, poor planning will lead to more red tape. Red tape will obviously affect your ability to plan, but then poor planning would result in more red tape. [Participant 12: 3464]

Secondary Outcome: Silos

Silos was identified as a secondary outcome, which influences planning, execution and sharing of goals and is influenced by leadership, culture, protocols and resources:



Participants expressed the following sentiments regarding silos:

{Silos → Execution} Now added to that, all the other issues impede the strategy execution. The fact that even people within Departments may be working in silos, never mind across departments. [Participant 12: 3189]


{Resources → Silos} When you have less resources you are forced to go out and collaborate with people. I wouldn't say silos are encouraged by the unavailability of resources. But I would say, when you have the luxury of resources, you can work in silos. [Participant 1: 230]

{Silos → Planning} Then people will start doing things on their own and say: But that thing is not working, but on my own I can be able to achieve this thing. I will continue with my own plans". [11 2512]

{Silos → Planning} We all still plan. All our plans are, for all intends and purposes, silos. But we bring them together into one document. I'll give an example. With sexual offences courts, I have no idea why we are not planning together every year. [6 1411]

Secondary Outcome: Resources

Resources was identified as a secondary outcome, which influences planning, execution and sharing of goals and is influenced by leadership, culture, protocols and protocols:



Participants shared the following explanations regarding resources:

{Planning → Resources} It's not quite joint planning. That's why we have inequitable resources across the cluster. [Participant 6: 1767]

{Planning → Resources} Poor planning leads to poor use of resources. Poor planning is leading to poor application of resources. [Participant 12: 3501]

{Planning → Resources} Whatever priority that needs to happen in this five-year period, these are the kind of resources that are needed. And with these kind of resources that are needed, in terms of human, in terms of money, in terms of tools of trade, this is how we need to then share the budget across to make sure that our priorities at the end of the day are achieved. [Participant 13: 3681]

{Sharing Goals → Resources} If we were sharing goals, we would avoid duplication, but as it is currently, as long as we have resources, we go with what we are comfortable with. It doesn't necessarily force us to share. [Participant 1: 277]

{Planning → Resources} We do integrated planning and then we can do proper allocation of resources based on common priorities. [Participant 3: 767]


Minister of Police keeps arresting but is not assisting the other one to say, at an integration level, how do arrest, how do we share resources. Sharing of

resources can also assist us to move away from silos. [Participant 11: 2526]

{Culture → Resources} For instance, the current culture within the JCPS, that is a bit cohesive, essentialises ICT. You can check within the cluster how ICT has received resources compared to Public Education and Communication and other goals that we have. [Participant 6: 1741]

Secondary Outcome: Planning

Planning was identified as a secondary outcome, which influences execution and resources and is influenced by the rest of the five affinities:



Explanations shared by participants regarding the relationship between planning and other affinities were the following:

{Culture → Planning} Culture results in the planning. Our culture determines the sort of planning that takes place [Participant 8: 2046 -7]

{Planning → Resources} I gave an example that people know that whatever they put into the MTSF will be resourced, so planning determines the budget. [Participant 8: 2040]

{Sharing Goals → Planning} Sharing of goals provide directions to our planning. [8: 2059]

{Culture → Planning} Culture affects planning. Culture is your foundation. [Participant 11: 2962]


*{Culture → Planning} I think the culture will contribute to planning issues.
[Participant 12: 3520]*

{Leadership → Planning} Good and coordinated leadership equals good execution and planning, as well. [Participant 11: 2989]

*{Planning → Resources} Poor planning leads to poor use of resources.
[Participant 12: 3501]*

Secondary Outcome: Sharing Goals

Sharing goals was identified as a secondary outcome, which influences execution and planning and is influenced by the remaining five affinities:




Participants' descriptions of the relationship between sharing goals and the rest of the affinity are the following:

{Sharing Goals → Planning} But if we can start sharing goals and having a common vision, then we can plan better, because we can have integrated planning. We can do integrated planning and we can do proper allocation of resources based on common priorities. [Participant 3: 767]

{Silos → Sharing Goals} I think it is silos that result in poor sharing of goals. [Participant 9: 2437]

Primary Outcome: Execution

Execution as a primary outcome is influenced by all seven other affinities:



Description of relationships between execution and others are described as follows:

{Red Tape → Execution} Maybe the red tape is creating a problem in terms of execution because people don't see the sentiment of a bigger goal in terms of the plans, the outcome or the impact that you will have as an individual. [Participant 11: 2648]

{Leadership → Execution} Good and coordinated leadership equals good execution and planning, as well. [Participant 11: 2989]

{Planning → Execution} Poor planning will lead to poor execution. [Participant 12: 3545]

{All Affinities → Execution} Now added to that, all the other issues impede the strategy execution! [Participant 12: 3189]


{Red Tape → Execution} Execution is influenced by the amount of red tape. It {Red Tape} slows it down. [Participant 6: 1696]

{Leadership → Execution} For argument's sake if ever leadership doesn't make time for me how do I implement what I have just shown you? [Participant 5: 1297]

Annexure F: Interrelationships between affinities and explanations by Top Manager participants

Primary Driver: Leadership (5)

Leadership (5) was classified as a primary driver by Top Managers interviewed. As a primary driver, all relationships between Leadership and other affinities were essential:



Top Managers described leadership as a primary driver as follows:


It is absolutely critical because that's where the leadership comes from the top. And the leadership drives the sharing of goals. And the leadership undoes the issues of silos. [Participant 15: 712]

I think a challenge is, I don't think there's enough teamwork in terms of the activities and that goes hand in hand with the leadership issues. So, if you've got poor leadership then it cascades down, through lack of teamwork and integration of activities, etc. and so on. [Participant 17: 1194]

The leadership influences the culture, because your leadership, it sorts of calls the shot. Yes. [Participant 14: 533]

Secondary Driver: Culture

Culture as a secondary driver was found to be influenced by leadership and influences six other affinities:




Explanations from Top Managers regarding lead Culture as a secondary driver as the following:

Yes. The culture is impacting on the planning. The current culture is impacting on the bad planning. [Participant 15: 724]

I mean, because culture will flow from the values... But you'll have to change the leadership before we get to any of that. [Participant 18: 1453]

Secondary Driver: Silos

Silos was identified as a secondary driver of the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration, which is influenced by culture and leadership and influences Protocols, Planning, Sharing Goals and Execution. Silos and Resources were considered not to have an influence on each other.



Explanation for the relationships between silos and other affinities were described as follows:

Silos lead to poor execution. Because there's limited knowledge that an individual department has. There are a lot of processes that you don't know, especially those areas that are cross-cutting. [Participant 14: 398]

Leadership, because the leadership can put an end to the silos. [Participant 15: 772]

If there are the silos, it will be difficult to come up with shared goals. [Participant 16: 1075]


Well, no, red tape will influence your resources, it won't give you people. Silos influence that. Silos influence planning. Silos influence executions. [Participant 18: 1537]

Pivot: Protocols

Protocols⁴ was influenced by three affinities, namely leadership, culture and silos, and influences three others, namely sharing goals, execution and planning. Protocols and Resources were considered not to have an influence on each other.

⁴ The Affinity Red Tape was renamed Protocols after interviews were conducted

Being a pivot means it is neither a driver nor an outcome and is the link between drivers of the JCPS cluster collaboration and outcomes thereof.



Participants provided the following description for relationships related to Protocols:


I'm not breaching the red tape because I want to. I want to improve on my execution. So, the red tape has got also an impact in the execution. [Participant 14: 442]

Yes, yes in both ways, because even if you don't want to make decision as a leader, you use red tape. [Participant 14: 430]

Red tape influences sharing goals. Because if there's a lot of red tape you're not going to share goals. [Participant 18 : 1527]

Secondary Outcome: Resources

Resources was identified as a secondary outcome, which influences Planning, Execution and is influenced by Leadership, Culture and Sharing Goals. Two affinities, Protocols and Silos, were found not to have relationships with Resources.



Participants provided the following description for relationships related to Resources:

Leadership impacts resources, because if you have got a very strong leader that is advocating for resources, you are likely to get ...
 [Participant 14: 477]

Yes, yes. Resources has got much more weight towards planning, because now, in my branch, I was discussing with people that there are so many things that I would have loved to put, but we can't do, I don't have personnel. Now we have to prioritize what we can do, because the plan is not about warm bodies. You have to look also, these bodies they attend meetings, these bodies are starting, are they going to be in the office. We have to visit regions. Is that all doable, with all these commitments? Resources influence the plan. [Participant 14: 517]


The resources, because you know, you have some departments who just have so much. So, it's definitely resources to silos. [Participant 15: 776]

Even when the resources are inadequate, as leaders you must say how we do more with the little that we have. It's a leadership decision. It's not the resources that can tell you how to do more. It's the leadership.
 [Participant 16: 1051]

Well, it can be that your resources, if you have resources your execution can work, so, let's go like that.
Leadership to resources, that way. [Participant 18: 1519]

Secondary Outcome: Planning

Planning was identified as a secondary outcome, which influences execution and sharing of goals and is influenced by the rest of the seven affinities:



The following were explanations provided by participants on the relationships between planning and other affinities:


No, it's the culture that is stronger than planning. [Participant 14: 541]

Yes. The culture impacts on the planning. The current culture is impacting on the bad planning. [Participant 15: 724]

Red Tape has a bearing on poor planning. [Participant 16:1063]

Secondary Outcome: Sharing Goals

Sharing goals was identified as a secondary outcome, which influences execution and planning and is influenced by five remaining affinities:




I think there is a need to inculcate a culture of working together, right. That you must have. The minute you have that it seems to me it becomes easier to say, these goals we're identified them jointly and therefore we share them as our common goals. [Participant 16:1027]

Culture is actually not supposed to be, but it can be about sharing goals. So, let's say, let's just say culture drives sharing goals, okay. Culture can also drive planning. [Participant 18: 1505]

Primary Outcome: Execution

Execution as a primary outcome is influenced by all seven other affinities:







Explanations for Execution as a primary outcome were as follows:





Leadership monitors executions. [Participant 15: 716]

There's definitely a link. Planning comes first and then execution. [Participant 15: 708]


Because you have the goals now, right. And you now have you execute that. So, the execution is informed by the joined determined goals. That must always be the guiding principle. [Participant 16: 1007]

Annexure G: Individual Systems Influence Diagrams: Senior Managers







Participant 6




Participant 9




Participant 11






Participant 5




Participant 1



Annexure H: Individual Systems Influence Diagrams: Top Managers



Participant 15



Participant 14

