THE BATTLE OF KADESH: ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

By

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Declaration

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I, Dorothy Natalie Witham, declare that **THE BATTLE OF KADESH: ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES** is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

D N WITHAM

Date 16/08/2020

For Dennis Witham, in memory of him

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

The Battle of Kadesh fought between the Hittites and Egyptians in Syria is one of the biggest chariot battles in ancient Near Eastern history. Previous research has shown that the significance of the Battle of Kadesh is derived predominately from a tactical and strategic level. This dissertation introduces the idea that although this is a tactical battle, its overall importance comes from applying a holistic approach, in particular, investigating the causes and consequences, alongside the battle. By extending prior work on tactics and strategy to include an identified cause, the Zannanza Affair, and the consequences, the Treaty of Kadesh and the Royal Marriages it makes allowances for a wider evaluation of the battle. Attention is paid to textual, iconographical and archaeological sources to gain a better understanding of the battle.

The findings provide support for the argument that the murder of the Hittite prince in the Zannanza Affair led to crucial military innovations and operational changes adopted by the Hittites and Egyptians, which impacted how they fought on the battlefield. While a considerable amount of research has been done on the Hittite and Egyptian military organisations, the role of the elite units on the battlefield has largely not been explored. The Treaty of Kadesh and the Royal Marriages were a critical turning point in Hittite-Egyptian relations offering a strong alliance and unprecedented peace in the ancient Near East. Traditionally, the Battle of Kadesh has been viewed as a tactical battle. However, for further advances, the contribution of this study prompts a rethinking of the latter by placing the operational details of the battle in a broader context encouraging new research on the social, cultural and political aspects, which is crucial for the understanding of the importance of the Battle of Kadesh, on and off the battlefield.

KEY TERMS

Syria; Hittites; Egyptians; Causes and consequences; Zannanza Affair; Kadesh Treaty; Royal Marriage; Military organisation; Operational changes; Innovation; Three-man chariot; Ramesses II; Muwatallis II

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ABBREVIATIONS

AM A. Goetze, Die Annalen des Mursilis, MVAG *38*, (Leipzig, 1933)

ANEP J. Pritchard, *The Ancient Near Eastern Pictures relating to the Old Testament.* 2nd ed. Princeton University Press, (Princeton, 1994)

ÄHK E. Edel, Die Ägyptish- hethitsche Korrespondenz, (Opladen, 1994)

ANET J.B. Pritchard, *The Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament.* Princeton University Press, (Princeton, 1969)

ARE J.H. Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, (London, 1988)

CoS W.W. Halo and K.L. Younger, (eds), *Context of Scripture,* (Leiden, 2004)

CTH E. Laroche, Catalogue des textes Hittites, (Paris, 1971)

DS H.G. Güterbock, "The Deeds of Suppiluliuma as Told by his Son, Mursili 11", JCS 10 (1956), 41-68, 75-98,101-30

EA Moran, W (ed), The *El-Amarna Letters.* (Baltimore, 1992)

KBo Keilschrifttexte aus Boghazkoi*,* Leipzig and Berlin

KUB Keilschrifturkunden aus Boghazkoi*,* Berlin

JCS Journal of Cuneiform Studies

PD E. F. Weidner, *Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasien* (New York, 1970)

Pal Arch Netherlands Scientific Journal of Palaeontology and Archaeology

Figure 1. Map of Kadesh, Polo (2016).

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Ancient warfare was a feature of life common to most of the ancient Near East, spanning regions, cities and different levels of society. Ancient Near Eastern history is filled with leaders who have reached the heights of their powers and subsequently lost it, along with social organisation systems that have emerged and disappeared. Generally speaking, the backdrop to the above events has involved the victories and defeats of battles (Ricart 2012:1). Even today, ancient battles capture the modern imagination and far from being forgotten, they seem to be entrenched in popular culture as evidenced by feature films such as "Troy" or "Exodus: Gods and Kings," television programmes, and books (Sabin 2015:1). One such battle that became legendry in antiquity and is arguably the most remembered in ancient Near Eastern history is the Battle of Kadesh. In ca 1274 BCE, the Battle of Kadesh was fought between the two superpowers of its day, Hatti and Egypt, at Kadesh in modern Syria, southwest of Homs, on the Orontes River.

The Battle of Kadesh was fought during the Late Bronze Age (Bryce 2003:42). During this period the ancient Near Eastern world was dominated by five powers: Hatti (the kingdom of the Hittites), with its homeland in central Anatolia (modern Turkey), the Hurrian kingdom of Mitanni in northern Mesopotamia and northern Syria, the kingdom of Assyria in northern Mesopotamia rising to power after the fall of Mitanni in the fourteenth century BCE, the Kassite kingdom of Babylon in southern Mesopotamia and Egypt. Bryce (2003:42) comments that the kings of these five powers styled themselves as "Great Kings" and formed a type of superpower club.[1] Enemies of today and friends of tomorrow revealed that the Late Bronze Age ancient Near Eastern world was a complex and continually changing one. The balances of power were constantly shifting among the major kingdoms, as they gained or lost territories, and switched allegiances and alliances as the "Great Kings" vied against each other or on occasion cooperated with one another to obtain their share of power in the ancient Near Eastern world (Bryce 2003:42).

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[1] For an extensive discussion on the "Great Kings" and the superpower club, see Bryce (2003:11-53).

In the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE, the political conditions of the day were largely shaped by the struggle between the Hittites and Egyptians for control of Syria. In ca 1274 BCE Syria[2] was the crossroads of world commerce where the trade routes of the west met those of the east (Healy 2005:9). Several studies[3] have suggested that the prolonged interest of Hatti and Egypt in Syria came from a desire to dominate and exploit the economic trade and resources in the region. Geographically, the Hittites with their homeland in Anatolia, modern Turkey lay to the north of Syria. To the south of Syria was the desert kingdom of Egypt. Both Hatti and Egypt held sway of subject territories in Syria, typically obtained through military conquest. According to Bryce (2003:42), these territories became vassal states or client kingdoms who for the most part were administered by rulers of local origin. In the matter of survival, the vassal states were notorious for shifting allegiances between Hatti and Egypt. Generally speaking, the Hittites through their vassal states dominated northern Syria, while Egypt through their vassal states dominated southern Syria. As both Hatti and Egypt sought to expand their influence in Syria, they came into contact and began a battle for regional dominance of this vitally strategic region.

The years of fighting would culminate in one of the greatest chariot battles in ancient Near Eastern history. Hatti and Egypt would pick the ancient city of Kadesh[4] as the battleground, regarded as the borderland between where the Hittite and Egyptian empires met. The Hittites were led by the Great King Muwatallis II who faced his opponent the Pharaoh, Ramesses II who led the Egyptians. Ramesses II marched against the Hittites to expel them from Syria and recapture the Hittite held city of Kadesh. After the battle, Ramesses II returned to Egypt and declared Kadesh an Egyptian victory. Despite this, the outcome of the battle remains a matter of intense debate. Even though the Battle of Kadesh is a significant battle, it is not well known outside of ancient Near Eastern circles. Hamblin (2006:1) suggests that for many historians, the study of battles begins with the classical Greeks.

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[2] For interesting background reading on the history of Syria, from Bronze Age to Imperial Rome, see Bryce (2014).
[3] See Bryce (2003), Healy (2005) and Bryce (2014).
[4] For further information and photographs on the city of Kadesh, see Appendix D.

Studies of the classical battles are well documented, which results in the Greek and Roman battles being well known on a larger scale in comparison to ancient Near Eastern battles, like that of the Battle of Kadesh. To address this problem, studies[5] have been done to try and raise awareness of the ancient Near Eastern battles among scholars and laypeople alike. Despite this, the researchers of Near Eastern battles face certain challenges. First, the amount of significant ancient Near Eastern military sources is limited, in comparison with the classical sources. Second, the available sources are sometimes written in difficult and obscure languages that are not known to many historians. For example, numerous scholarly studies published on ancient Near Eastern military matters are published in specialist journals of limited accessibility that are filled with difficult to understand technical jargon, abbreviations and unpronounceable transcriptions of ancient words (Hamblin 2006:1). In spite of these challenges, more work is necessary to show the importance of Near Eastern battles, because the reality is that years before the classical battles ancient Near Eastern armies were already waging significant battles, and fielding large armies for their time.

Healy (2005:6) explains that Kadesh is one of the earliest battles whose course can be reliably constructed in detail. There exists a considerable body of literature on the Battle of Kadesh. Over time, an extensive literature has developed which studies the traditional military[6] aspects of the battle. The results of such detailed attention have provided outstanding and penetrating work, in particular, to battle tactics and strategy. However, it has also led to an often unavoidable isolation from non-military aspects of the battle. A closer look at the literature reveals that while elements such as battle tactics have been well researched, the non-military aspects such as the causes and consequences of the battle are addressed to a limited extent. By studying the traditional military aspects alongside the non-military aspects it provides a new way of looking at the battle. Using this method, it provides the possibility of revealing lost information, examining neglected topics, and providing new interpretations for the battle (Brice and Howe 2015: xv).

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[5] See Spalinger (2003), Healy (2005), Spalinger (2005), Hamblin (2006), and Darnell and Manassa (2007).
[6] See Brice and Howe (2015: xiii, xiv, xv) for differences between traditional military and non-military methodologies.

Previous research can be considered a step towards the profound understanding of battle tactics but it is the neglected studies of the causes that provide motivations that led Hatti and Egypt to the battlefield, and the consequences that reveal its importance in history. Recently Kadesh studies[7] have seen a shift from studying the traditional military aspects of a battle only. Scholars are beginning to combine both the traditional military and non-military aspects of battle to get a fresher, newer and broader approach to battles (Fagan and Trundle 2010:6). Despite this, additional studies to understand more completely the traditional military (battle tactics) and non-military aspects (causes and consequences) of the Battle of Kadesh are required.

1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This dissertation aims to investigate the following research questions:

Research Question 1: Is the Zannanza Affair considered a cause of the Battle of Kadesh even though it happened an estimated fifty years before the battle?

Research Question 2: How did the Hittite and Egyptian armies wage war?

Research Question 3: What were the Hittite and Egyptian military innovations and changes that were introduced to try and win the battle?

Research Question 4: Was Egypt victorious after the Battle of Kadesh?

Research Question 5: Did the Kadesh Treaty serve as an eternal symbol of peace?

Research Question 6: How did the Hittite royal marriages of Ramesses II contribute to peace between Hatti and Egypt?

1.2 HYPOTHESIS

The traditional military aspects of the Battle of Kadesh must be examined alongside its causes and consequences to show the impact on and off the battlefield. The subject matter pertaining to the traditional military aspects[8] of Kadesh is well documented. There will not be a discussion on all the traditional military aspects of the battle, but enough to give an idea of the nature of the armies that fought at Kadesh.

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[7] See Bryce (2003) and Healy (2005).
[8] See Breasted (1903), Burne (1921), Goedicke (1966), Santosuosso (1996), Drews (1993), Gabriel (2002), Littauer and Crouwel (2002), Healy (2005), Spalinger (2005), and Howard (2011).

The literature pertaining to the non-military aspects, namely the causes and consequences, strongly suggests that additional studies are required as information is limited. The scope of this research will be restricted to a cause of the battle, namely the Zannanza Affair. The immediate cause of the battle, the defection of the Amurru, will only be addressed briefly. The consequences of the battle will make reference to the Kadesh Treaty, and the subsequent royal marriages of Ramesses II. The Zannanza Affair, Kadesh Treaty and royal marriages must be studied alongside the battle itself to obtain a holistic view that will enable a better understanding of the Battle of Kadesh and its significance in history. Particular attention is paid to the historical periods of the Hittite Empire Period and the Egyptian New Kingdom Period during which the battle took place.

1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study was undertaken because earlier and current works on the Battle of Kadesh focus on certain aspects like tactics and strategy while limited work has been done in areas like the causes and consequences of the battle. This has left a gap in the understanding of the battle in a wider context, and in a manner minimised the significance of the battle. This study hopes to bridge the gap by not studying the battle from a single perspective which provides a narrow perspective. Instead, by looking at the battle itself along with its causes and consequences, to obtain a holistic view of the battle in a wider context to determine its significance. As a comprehensive treatment of the Battle of Kadesh, this study will attempt to contribute to both early scholarship that focused on technical aspects, tactics and strategy, and to later scholarship which attempts to explore the non-military aspects of the battle.

Generally, this study attempts to put the current knowledge of the battle in a form that will be accessible to ancient Near Eastern scholars, as well as, scholars and laypeople who do not specialise in ancient Near Eastern studies. Hopefully, it will bring a much needed awareness to ancient Near Eastern battles, as is afforded the classical Greek and Roman battles.

1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW

The Battle of Kadesh is one of the earliest recorded battles which have more textual and visual sources than any other battle in the ancient Near East. This is in large part due to the Egyptian Pharaoh Ramesses II, who saw Kadesh as a personal victory and commemorated the battle in inscriptions, paintings, and relief carvings placed in temples throughout Egypt. Spalinger (2005:210) comments that: "much ink has been spilt analysing the battle." It has been a topic of much discussion and has also given rise to numerous disagreements amongst scholars ranging from debates about chronology to details of the battle itself. The major publications on the Battle of Kadesh started appearing in the early 1900s. The majority of prior research and some current work has studied the battle through one lens only, studying the traditional military aspects of the battle. It is only in later years that scholarly discussion and literature has gone beyond analysis and strategy of the battle. The first part of the literature review looks at the literature pertaining to certain traditional military aspects of the battle. The second part of the literature review will address the literature on the non-military aspects of the battle, namely a cause and the consequences of the battle, relevant to the dissertation.

1.4.1 Traditional military literature

One of the first studies of the Battle of Kadesh, and that upon which most other research is based, is by the noted Egyptologist Breasted (1903). Several scholars comment that Breasted's (1903) work set the course on which the battle would be assessed by future generation of historians and that his analysis reigned supreme for nearly two decades (Santosuosso 1996:2). Until Breasted's (1903) work, no scholar had treated the Egyptian sources collectively.

A closer look at Breasted's (1903) work reveals that it relies mainly on the Egyptian sources while his analysis makes mention of the military aspects of the battle such as manoeuvres and strategy. However, the publication makes limited mention of the non-traditional military aspects of the battle, the conditions leading to the battle, and the aftermath of the battle, and has an Egyptian bias. For many years after this publication, scholars took his analysis as historical truth, which promoted an Egyptian victory.

From the late 1920s onwards Breasted's (1903) interpretation of Kadesh was challenged, as a result of the discovery of Hittite documents which alluded to a Hittite victory. This discovery led to studies that would dominate research until current day, that of the winner of the battle. Despite many years of research, this continues to be debated among scholars. Based on the new Hittite evidence, several scholars drove the further development of doubting the veracity of the Egyptian documents and questioning Breasted's (1903) version on a number of points such as the size of the Egyptian army, the Hittite position before the battle, and the development of the battle.

Some scholars recognised that Breasted (1903) was wrong in detail but fundamentally correct (Kitchen 1999), while others have challenged his interpretation entirely (Santosuosso 1996). Burne (1921), a military historian published a study in which he explained that Breasted's (1903) facts should not be called into question, but rather the inferences drawn from the facts. Goedicke (1966) questioned most aspects of Breasted's (1903) interpretation, in particular, his literal reading and acceptance of the Egyptian sources. Santosuosso (1996) suggests that the challenge to early Kadesh literature regarding analysis and strategy was due to numerous scholarly opinion that was represented individually. In an effort to use the information from the early scholars, he published an article which viewed multiple opinions of the early scholars and established where a consensus has been reached, and with others where controversy still occurs on aspects of the battle. From this, Santosuosso (1996) attempted to provide a new interpretation of the battle.

The article consolidates numerous information from the early scholars and allows the reader quick reference and access to the different viewpoints of scholars, such as Breasted (1903) and Goedicke (1966) without having to do individual searches.

Research from the 1970s onwards saw new strands of scholarship beginning to emerge which moved beyond discussions of traditional military analysis and strategy as seen in previous studies (Breasted 1903; Burne 1921; Goedicke 1966). Healy (2005) builds upon Goedicke's (1966) initial study, and goes beyond discussions of analysis and strategy and takes Breasted's (1903) analysis further by providing a) detailed account of the battle itself, b) an introduction to the two military commanders,[9] and c) the organisation and weapons of the Egyptian and Hittite armies.

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[9] Muwatallis II and Ramesses II.

As far as we know the biographies of the military commanders are limited in earlier studies. Studies on the biographies provide insight on how the commanders met the challenges of their age, and how their role in battle influenced the future of their kingdoms (Gabriel 2002:1).Similar to Goedicke (1966), Healy (2005:7) argues against an almost literal reading of the Egyptian sources and their translation. Healy (2005:7) explains that the critical analysis and account of the battle will lead to a much different interpretation of the events that occurred in Syria over three thousand years ago compared to previous studies. Healy can be described as having an Egyptian bias, because of more detailed descriptions provided for the Egyptian military organisation and weapons. However, what Healy has attempted to correct is a lack of attention to the size and nature of the battle which has been missed in earlier studies (Healy 2005:7).

While previous studies in early Kadesh literature had for the most part focused on tactics and strategy, later literature shifted to include more research exclusively on the armies that fought at Kadesh and the weapons that were used, in particular the chariot. The chariot was one of the most innovative weaponry in Late Bronze Age warfare and dominated the battlefields of the ancient Near East. The Battle of Kadesh involved thousands of chariots and is one of the only battles of its time in which the tactical handling of chariots is documented in such detail, because of the Egyptian sources.

The role of the chariot at Kadesh and its effectiveness remains hotly debated. There exists a considerable body of literature on the topic. Several studies advocate that the chariot played a major role at Kadesh (Weingartner 2011), yet some claim that the chariot was of little significance (Schulman 1980). However, the latter has not produced convincing evidence to support the claim that the chariot played a minimal role at Kadesh. Additional studies highlight the different tactical roles between the Hittite three-man chariot versus the Egyptian two-man chariot.[10] For example, the Hittite chariot was sturdier, yet slower but able to carry more manpower, in comparison with the Egyptian chariot that was lighter, faster and carried less manpower. These studies explain the different style and manning of Hittite chariots compared with the Egyptians, but only address the similarities of the tactical roles briefly.

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[10] Gabriel (2009) and Shaw (2012).

Literature pertaining to the idea that the chariot played a major role at Kadesh are divided as to the function of the chariot on the battlefield. Early scholars specialising in the area of chariotry, Littauer and Crouwel (2002) support the view of the "battle-taxi" idea.[11] This theory suggests that the chariot was used to transport the warrior elite onto the battlefield but did not participate in the battle. The majority of current scholarship disagrees with the "battle-taxi" theory and supports the view that the chariots were used as mobile weapons platforms.[12] The literature pertaining to the function of the chariot on the battlefield raises the important issue of the weapons used in the chariot, specifically the Hittite chariot. The main debate centres around the predominate weapon of the chariot. Gabriel (2002), presents the theory that spear was the primary weapon of the charioteer.

Howard's (2011) study on the earliest armies, the making of chariots, and their tactical use in battles reveal that he supports Gabriel's theory. Howard (2011) bases the argument of the spear usage on the Egyptian sources.

Spalinger (2005) suggests that even in this well documented battle, it remains difficult to separate fact from fiction as the Egyptian records are mainly concerned with promoting the role played by Ramesses II. In studies on Bronze Age chariots, Drews (1993) agrees with Spalinger (2005) and explains that the predominate weapon of the Hittites was the bow and arrow. Drews (1993) explains the absence of the bow and arrow in the Hittite chariots in the Egyptian sources is more likely because of ideological and artistic reasons than historical accuracy. In early Kadesh literature, the studies on the chariot and its role were limited. In later years, chariots continue to receive more attention especially, regarding their technical aspects.[13] Despite this, additional studies on the military applications of the chariot are required. The debate of the chariot in battle has led Archer (2010:58) to comment: "that it is perplexing to think how little consensus there is in the scholarly community regarding the use of the chariot in the battle." The earlier and current works on the traditional military aspects of the Battle of Kadesh have provided a more profound understanding of the traditional military operations of the battle ranging from the way the armies fought to strategies and tactics.

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[11] The "Battle taxi-idea" is elaborated on in Chapters 3 and 4.
[12] Mobile weapons platforms are discussed further in Chapters 3 and 4.
[13] See Drews (1993), Archer (2010), Weingartner (2011), and Shaw (2012).

The disadvantage of these studies is that they cleave more to the aspects of the battle and military commanders which provides a narrow perspective of the battle. Furthermore, it neglects the study of non-military aspects of the battle such as culture, politics, technology and gender (Neiburg and Philpott 2006:43).

1.4.2 Non-traditional military literature

Previous studies have focused almost exclusively on the traditional military aspects of Kadesh literature, and it is only in later years that there has been a shift to study the non-traditional military aspects. Brand (2006:228-240) explains that modern scholarship is lacking regarding the underlying causes and motives that led to the Battle of Kadesh. This view is shared by Gabriel (2009) who argues that the Zannanza Affair was a spark that ignited and put into motion a series of events that led to Kadesh. Several studies on the Zannanza Affair have focused mainly on the identity of the main players in the Affair while neglecting the long term consequences of the event.

Although research has illuminated certain aspects of the Zannanza Affair, there is limited study in identifying it as a cause of the Battle of Kadesh. Too many scholars have overlooked it as a cause due to the fact that it took place years before the battle. Bryce's translations (2003) provides information on the surviving sources pertaining to the Zannanza Affair. This book is an important resource as it allows a glimpse of the personalities of those writing, and a picture of the Zannanza Affair, which was a significant historical event. In addition, Bryce (1990) examines the events surrounding the Zannanza Affair by looking at the sources.

Compared to the Zannanza Affair and the Royal Marriages, the Kadesh Treaty has a larger number of existing studies. The majority of prior research has applied to the background of the treaty, symbolism, signatories and the reasons for signing the treaty. Rowton (1959) published a study which examines the difficult position of both Hatti and Egypt in the aftermath of Kadesh, and cites the military and political ambitions as the main reasons that the Hittite-Egyptian alliance was formed after Kadesh. The literature on the symbolism of the Kadesh Treaty is less consistent. Some scholars argue that it is an eternal symbol of peace. Bryce (2006) disagrees and presents a controversial view that the treaty was motivated by reasons of self-interest and expediency.

There is more literature concerning Ramesses II's first Hittite marriage in the aftermath of the battle. Bryce's (2003) translations focuses on the correspondence between the Hittite and Egyptian royal courts concerning the marriage. Beal (2007) discusses the first Hittite Marriage as a tool to avoid war and restore peace. The literature pertaining to the second Hittite Marriage is limited. The challenge for scholars is that there is little correspondence regarding the second marriage. The majority of the research, in particular regarding the first marriage, has dealt with the intense marriage negotiations between the Hittite and Egyptian royal courts. Although studies have been done, the symbolism of the marriages and the fate of the two Hittite princesses are two aspects that are insufficiently explored.

Studies of the non-traditional military aspects[14] of the Battle of Kadesh have raised some critique. Some scholars have commented that these studies are not interested in explaining the victory or defeat of the battle. In this light, the events of the battlefield and performance of the military are relegated to the background. These studies also neglect the military organisation and the tactics used (Neiburg and Philpott 2006:43).

The literature review shows that the early Kadesh literature was concerned with traditional military aspects like analysis and strategy. It evolved to involve broader topics like commentaries of the military commanders, armies, equipment and weapons. While the traditional military aspects were the dominant focus of research, the studies on non-traditional military aspects like politics, culture, gender and technology were limited.

In recent years, more studies have been undertaken to highlight the often neglected non-traditional military aspects of the Battle of Kadesh. They have attracted critique and being accused of showing more concern for non-military matters than the battle itself. Current literature on Kadesh reveals that there are numerous studies on the traditional military aspects of the battle with limited literature on the non-military aspects. This gap can be addressed through studies that combine the traditional military and non-military aspects of the battle.

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[14] See Neiburg and Philpott (2006) and Beal (2007).

1.5 METHODOLOGY

Previous studies have focused exclusively on the battle itself while neglecting the causes and consequences. These studies have shown that the Battle of Kadesh cannot be studied in isolation, as aspects like the causes and consequences studied alongside the battle speak to the importance of the battle on and off the battlefield and in the wider context in the ancient Near Eastern world. The quantitative method was not applied because there is limited numerical data. Instead, a qualitative method was used for this study because it is expressed in words, and is helpful in providing detailed insights on topics that are not well understood (Streefkerk 2012). The qualitative method was applied within a historical framework to collect information leading up to the battle, the battle itself, and the aftermath of the battle.

A holistic approach was applied which included different disciplines, namely, textual, iconographical, historical, archaeological, and traditional and non-military approaches to obtain a holistic view of the battle. Having already established the approaches and methods used for the study, it is necessary to describe how the evidence will be collected to support the arguments of this study.

1.6 THE SOURCES

Although the majority of scholars have identified Tell Nebi Mend in Syria as the Kadesh battlefield, to date there are no archaeological remains from the battlefield. Information about the causes, the battle itself and the aftermath is sourced from a combination of primary and secondary sources. The primary sources range from the Kadesh Inscriptions to textual evidence which appears in numerous ancient texts. A large number of secondary sources have been used to analyse, review and summarise the information on the primary resources.[15]

1.6.1 Primary sources

Hittitology is a fairly newcomer to ancient Near Eastern studies. Bryce (2005:4) explains that numerous cuneiform tablets were discovered at Hattuša, the Hittite capital in the early 1900s. The tablets deal with different areas of Hittite life including, political, military, religious and social aspects.

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[15] This included books, Digital Versatile Discs, and journal articles (JSTOR).

Bryce (2005) uses translations from these original texts to comment on treaties, letters, prayers, and historical narratives, to name a few. Hittite treaties[16] are attested to as early as the last years of the Hittite Old Kingdom Period. Copies of the Kadesh Treaty survived in both Hatti and Egypt (Bell 2007:109). Surviving letters between the Hittites and Egyptians have proved useful in identifying the people and politics of the two royal courts.

The combined evidence of the texts and reliefs of the Kadesh Inscriptions are the primary Egyptian sources. The translations of Lichtheim (2006) were used for the translation of the Kadesh Battle Inscriptions. Furthermore, the translations from the original texts of Gardiner (1975) were consulted to describe the battle.

The reliefs provide a wealth of iconography for the Battle of Kadesh, providing information on the Hittite and Egyptian armies. Also, the reliefs provide interesting discussions on a common theme of Egyptian art. Discussions centre on the art used for propagandistic purposes to accommodate Egyptian ideology. The lost tombs, artefacts and mummified remains that were found in Egypt, as well as those yet to be discovered, provide evidence of the Egyptian preoccupation of the Egyptian afterlife. Yet despite this, there is a lack of archaeological evidence and data to support the existence of the battlefield of Kadesh. It is the Kadesh texts and reliefs that provide the majority of the information on the battle, but seemingly no weaponry or corpses which exist from the Battle of Kadesh (Gilligan 2007:220). Photographs of Kadesh were provided by Vermaak (2009).

1.6.2 Secondary sources

The secondary sources provide a useful understanding of the events leading to the battle, the battle itself and the aftermath. Background reading on Syria is important in understanding Syria's long history of being a politically volatile region in the ancient Near Eastern world. Bryce (2014) provides a comprehensive picture of the different peoples, cities and kingdoms that flourished and declined in the lands known as Syria in the modern day.[17]

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[16] For a collection of Hittite treaties, see Beckman (1999:11-118).
[17] Bryce (2014) adds perspective to the rising tensions between the Hittite and Egyptian empires, and a better understanding of why they fought over Syria.

Some books and articles provide a concise and engaging introduction to the history and society of the Hittites and Egyptians. For example, Collins (2007) while studying the various aspects of Hittite society provides information on the Hittite religion. This chapter on Hittite religion allows for an understanding of how religion and rituals played an important role in Hittite warfare. Kuhrt (1995) examines the different periods in Egyptian history. By paying attention to the changing military and political ideologies in the New Kingdom, Kuhrt (1995) provides insight into the transformation of the Egyptian army in this period.

The events leading to the battle, inclusive of the Hittite-Egyptian tensions and the Zannanza Affair are discussed with reference to Bryce (1990; 2003; 2005; 2014), Hawass (2004), and Fagan (2015). Background reading on the Pharaoh Akhenaten's reign during the Amarna Period and the subsequent reign of the Pharaoh Tutankhamun was necessary. It provided information on the chaotic internal political situation in Egyptian history that led to the Zannanza Affair. Bryce (1990; 2003; 2005) investigates various aspects of the Zannanza Affair, and his work is based on the idea that the Egyptian royal couple linked to the Zannanza Affair is Ankhesenamun and Tutankhamun.

New light is shed on the relationship between the latter as Hawass (2004) provides insight into a love connection, as opposed to an arranged marriage. Easily accessible English translations of the letters involved in the Zannanza Affair are available in Bryce (1990; 2003; 2005), Bell (2007), and Fagan (2015). Although Bryce (1990; 2003; 2005) provides the most comprehensive outline of the Zannanza Affair, there is limited research on the Zannanza Affair being identified as a cause of the Battle of Kadesh. Typically, the Zannanza Affair is acknowledged as an important isolated event, far removed from the battle. The identification of the Zannanza Affair as a possible cause of the battle comes from limited secondary sources, and tertiary sources like books that provide general information, and discussions related to topics that are indirectly linked to the Zannanza Affair. These sources for the most part infer the possibility but do not confirm it. For example, Spalinger (2005) provides an interesting discussion on the changes in the Egyptian military after the Zannanza Affair. Bryce (2005) provides an outline of the defection of Benteshina, the Amurrite king which was the immediate cause of the battle.

Resources on the military organisation of the Egyptian and Hittite armies that fought at Kadesh are Lorenz and Schrakamp (2011), Healy (2005), Spalinger (2005), and Seevers (2013) which provided invaluable information on organisation, weapons and equipment. Specialist resources such as Spalinger (2005) and Gabriel (2002; 2009) present differences between the Egyptian two-man chariot and Hittite three-man chariot which affected the battle. Healy (2005) and Singer (2006) helped discuss the differences between the military commanders, Ramesses II and Muwatallis II providing a picture of the man behind the king.

Most sources on the Special Forces within the respective armies focus on the Royal Body Guard in the Hittite army (Güterbock and van den Hout 1991; Beal 1992; Beckman 1999; Bryce 2007) and the elite Sherden in the Egyptian army (Abbas 2016). There is limited information regarding other elite units within the Hittite and Egyptian armies. Kistler (2011) provides interesting yet basic information on elite canine units in the above armies. Bryce (2005) and Spalinger (2005) highlight the tactical advantages of Hatti and Egypt moving their respective base of operations closer to Syria.

Books and articles from the earliest to the newest literature were consulted on the Battle of Kadesh, Breasted (1903), Goedicke (1966), Bryce (2005), Schulman (1981), Santosuosso (1996), and Spalinger (2005). These books and articles provide information on the course of the battle as well as different military aspects of the battle, detailing tactics, and strategy. Documentaries featuring Settle (2004) and Gabriel (2009) were consulted to examine tactics, strategies, weapons and the military commanders of the Battle of Kadesh. Breasted (1903) Murnane (1995), Kitchen (1999), Spalinger (2005), and Noij (2015) discuss the Kadesh Inscriptions which contribute to the technical aspects of the battle.

In addition, Noij (2015) investigates the role of propaganda of the Kadesh Inscriptions, by employing a methodology called, "Linguistic Landscapes." Tell Nebi Mend in Syria is widely accepted by scholars as the Kadesh battlefield.[18] More recent studies on Kadesh literature are focusing on the consequences of the battle. Bryce (2005) and Bell (2007) provide an outline of the Kadesh Treaty.

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[18] Velikovsky (2010) presents an interesting case using topography and geography to argue against the identification of Tell Nebi Mend as the Kadesh battlefield.

Wiseman (2014) contributes to the understanding of the differences between the Egyptian and Hittite versions of the Kadesh Treaty. Beal (1992) examines the similarities of the treaty format between the Kadesh and Hittites treaties. Bryce (2006) provides information on the events prior to the Kadesh treaty. This is necessary to understand the reasons behind the signing of the Kadesh Treaty.

Bryce (2003; 2005; 2006) provides an interesting commentary on how the Hittite internal politics served as one of the strong motivations for signing the treaty. Bryce (2003; 2005) presents an interesting commentary on textual evidence which supports the theory of improved relations after the Kadesh Treaty.

Bell (2007) provides useful information on the archaeological evidence that supports the theory of improved relations after the Kadesh Treaty.

Bryce (2003), Melvin (2008), and Fisher (2013) provided invaluable information regarding diplomatic marriages in the ancient Near East, which was needed to provide insight into the royal marriages in the aftermath of the Battle of Kadesh. Schulman (1979) and Bryce (2003) shed light on Egyptian diplomatic marriages with foreign powers in the context of Egyptian ideology. Bryce (2003) and Bell (2007) give a valuable perspective on the meaning of diplomatic marriages and their role within an alliance. Bryce (2003; 2005) and Collins (2007) provide textual evidence that attests to lengthy marriage negotiations and the events leading to the first Hittite marriage. Solving (2003) is an important resource for defining the role of a foreign queen in Egyptian society. Limited investigation has been undertaken into the second diplomatic marriage and its marriage negotiations due to its limited sources. A stela has survived forming the archaeological evidence. Velikovsky (2010) provides a commentary on the Egyptian ideology evidenced by the archaeological evidence. Bryce (2003), Bell (2007), Melvin (2008), and Fisher (2013) highlight the importance of the two marriages as a consequence of the Battle of Kadesh.

1.7 LIMITATIONS

As previously mentioned, there are more studies pertaining to the classical Greek and Roman battles in comparison with the ancient Near Eastern battles. One of the reasons being that the sources for ancient Near Eastern military history are written in a number of obscure and difficult languages which is seldom studied by historians that do not specialise in ancient Near Eastern studies.

Studies on ancient Near Eastern military history are written in specialist journals of limited accessibility. Moreover, there are no physical remains from Tell Nebi Mend, the site identified as the Kadesh battlefield. Until recently studies on the Battle of Kadesh focused solely on military matters, while for the most part failing to adopt an overall approach to the battle. This has resulted in the neglect in areas such as the causes and consequences of the battle. Although modern scholarly studies are attempting to address this there remains a need for further investigations.

1.8 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter explains that the investigation will focus on the Battle of Kadesh. It will examine the battle itself together with a cause and consequences to determine its significance on and off the battlefield.

Chapter 2: The Zannanza Affair

This topic addresses the Zannanza Affair which is generally discussed as an isolated event in ancient Near Eastern history, and not as a cause of the Battle of Kadesh. This chapter examines the relationship between the Zannanza Affair and the Battle of Kadesh. It provides a brief background of the events leading to the Zannanza Affair, in particular, the internal political situation in Egypt between the Middle Kingdom and New Kingdom Periods. More importantly, the Zannanza Affair's contribution to the cause of the battle is investigated, highlighting its role in causing reactions that led to the Battle of Kadesh.

Chapter 3: Muwatallis II's Army

The Hittite army was an integral part of Hittite society. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the Hittite army, paying close attention to the army of the Empire Period. This is of importance because it provides a picture of the army that fought at the Battle of Kadesh. The different aspects of the military organisation of the army are studied, with particular reference to tactics, equipment and weaponry. The military innovation of the three-man chariot and its role at the battle is described and explained.

Chapter 3 proposes that the use of Special Forces is not limited to the modern day and were already employed in ancient times. An overview will be provided on the different Special Forces within the Hittite army. Furthermore, the preparations for the battle introduced by the Hittites after the Zannanza Affair are explained.

Chapter 4: Ramesses II's Army

Generally speaking, the Egyptian armies of the Old and Middle Kingdom Periods resembled militia forces. By the time of the New Kingdom, the Egyptian army had developed into a permanent, professional army. The influence of the Hyksos foreign occupation on the transformation of the army is addressed briefly. In this chapter, the Egyptian's military organisation during the New Kingdom Period with reference to tactics, equipment and weaponry will be discussed. Special attention is paid to the Special Forces within the army. Ramesses II's operational preparations for the battle influenced by the Zannanza Affair are discussed.

Chapter 5: Showdown, Muwatallis II and Ramesses II

There was a violent struggle going on between the Hittites and Egypt over the land commonly referred to as Syria today. The culmination of this struggle was the Battle of Kadesh. In this chapter, the development of the battle is explained by using the traditional interpretations of the battle. The sources of the battle are studied with particular reference to their propagandistic nature. The immediate cause of the battle is identified and explained. Researchers are alerted to the differences regarding the outcome of the battle.

Chapter 6: Diplomacy and the Treaty of Kadesh

The Treaty of Kadesh is the earliest known international peace treaty. The aim of Chapter 6 is to discuss the Treaty of Kadesh as a consequence of the Battle of Kadesh. A discussion follows which identifies the motivations for signing the treaty. Particular attention is paid to political and military motivations. The motivations will be examined together with the improved relations and cooperation after the treaty. The purpose of which is to gain a better understanding of the significance of the treaty.

Chapter 7: The Royal Marriages

Diplomatic marriages were commonplace among ancient Near Eastern royalty. Chapter 7 proposes that in addition to the Treaty of Kadesh, the royal marriages between the Hatti and Egyptian royal houses were a further consequence of the Battle of Kadesh. In this chapter, a brief background is provided of the marriage market in the ancient Near Eastern world. Special attention is paid to the negotiations of the Hittite marriages. Chapter 7 shows that the Hittite marriages were a necessary event to safeguard the Hatti-Egyptian alliance.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

The Battle of Kadesh is an important battle but not widely known outside of ancient Near Eastern circles. In this final chapter, the motivation and consequences of the battle will be discussed to address questions about the impact of the Battle of Kadesh on and off the battlefield.

CHAPTER 2: THE ZANNANZA AFFAIR

ABSTRACT

The Zannanza Affair is often overlooked as a cause of the Battle of Kadesh. Presumably, one of the reasons being that the Zannanza Affair took place an estimated fifty years before the actual battle. The event can be seen as a backdrop to a wider political climate. There is a short consideration of the tensions between Hatti and Egypt preceding the Zannanza Affair. To understand the event textual sources must be taken into consideration to present a picture of the Zannanza Affair. Thereafter general observations are made on the event. There is a formulation of open questions of certain aspects of the Zannanza Affair which can only be resolved by future research.

The Zannanza Affair has all the makings of a Hollywood blockbuster: marriage, murder, revenge, all leading to a great chariot battle. It involved three powers, namely the Hittites and Egyptians who were fighting each other for regional dominance in Syria, and the Mitanni who occupied northern and eastern Mesopotamia who were on the verge of defeat by the Hittites. Evidence of the Zannanza Affair was discovered during the excavations at Hattuša, the Hittite capital near modern Boğazkale in Turkey. A set of tablets reveal correspondence written by a widowed Egyptian queen to a Hittite king concerning a marriage proposal upon the death of her husband. Bryce (2003:187) emphasises that the royal widow's letter and the subsequent chain of events have allowed for one of the most famous episodes in ancient Near Eastern history, albeit a controversial one.

The correspondence refers to the widowed queen as Dahamunzu. This name means "wife of the king" and does not provide the actual name. This has posed questions as to the identity of the author of the letter and her husband. The researcher follows Bryce's (2003:189) belief that the Egyptian queen was Ankhesenamun, a widow of Tutankhamun.[19] Studies on the Zannanza Affair have dealt primarily with the identity of the Egyptian queen and dead Pharaoh and the parties responsible for the events tragic outcome.

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[19] For Bryce's argument in favour of the Egyptian queen being Ankhesenamun, see Bryce (2003:188, 9).

For the most part, the existing studies have failed to identify the Zannanza Affair as a cause of the Battle of Kadesh. Although the Zannanza Affair happened years before the battle, it caused reactions that are important to the understanding of the Battle of Kadesh.

2.1 THE SOURCES

The chief source of information on the Egyptian queen's letter of marriage and its aftermath is found in the Hittite sources written a generation after the event. The *Deeds of Šuppiluliuma I*[20] is a biography written by his son Muršilis II. It is one of three annalistic works to come from the reign of Muršilis II. The *Deeds of Šuppiluliuma I serves* as a primary source for Šuppiluliuma I's reign and contains part of the text that conveys the famous scene in which the widowed queen of Egypt, requests a son from Šuppiluliuma I for marriage, upon the death of her husband. Van Seters (1997:111) explains that this part of the text differs from the rest of the *Annal* style in the text because it is more dramatic with speeches and exchanges of messages.

The *Deeds of Šuppiluliuma I* are complemented by a second source known as The *Plague Prayers of Muršilis*. Compiled in the fourteenth century BCE, Muršilis II composed four *Plague Prayers* to the gods of Hatti (Van Seters 1997:112). It concerned a deadly plague which ravaged the land of Hatti for twenty years, starting during his father's reign. Muršilis II is tasked with investigating the reasons behind the deadly plague. In the *Second Plague Prayer*, he mentions the marriage offer, the death of Zannanza (Hittite prince), and the retaliation against Egypt. Bryce (1990:99) has drawn attention to another document that needs to be taken into consideration. This is a draft of a letter sent by a Hittite king to an Egyptian king regarding the death of the son of the Hittite king. The identities of the kings are not known, but the letter deals with a formal complaint from the Hittite king to the Egyptian king regarding the death of the Hittite king's son. The circumstances match the murder of Zannanza and lead some scholars to identify the writer of the letter as the Hittite king, Šuppiluliuma I, and the recipient of the letter as the Pharaoh Ay (Freewalt 2017: 19).

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[20] One of the greatest Hittite kings, Šuppiluliuma I, is credited with being one of the founders of the Empire Period. Bryce (2005:188) explains that Šuppiluliuma I brought Hatti back from the brink of annihilation and transformed it into one of the most powerful kingdoms in the ancient Near Eastern world. He is also famous for defeating the kingdom of Mitanni, and the role he played in the Zannanza Affair.

2.2 BACKGROUND: TENSIONS BETWEEN HATTI AND EGYPT

The Zannanza Affair should be viewed against the background of the political situation in Egypt. Although friendly relations were maintained between Hatti and Egypt during the reigns of Akhenaten[21] and Tutankhamun, the Hittites and their expansionist ambitions in Syria remained a threat to Egypt. Akhenaten's counterpart on the Hittite throne, Šuppiluliuma I had acquired Egyptian subject territories through the defection of their local rulers. One of these territories was the kingdom of Kadesh. Bryce (2003:192) proposes that regaining lost territories was the reason for Akhenaten orchestrating a major campaign in Syria. It did not come to fruition as Akhenaten died leaving the throne to his successor, Tutankhamun. Tutankhamun's reign was faced with challenges and was a difficult time for Egypt. The Egyptologist Reeves (2008:14) comments that Tutankhamun would have inherited a country that was "spiritually and physically weak because of the imposition of the Aten cult, and the neglect of the traditional pantheon during Akhenaten's reign." During his reign, Tutankhamun tried to reverse the religious reforms of Akhenaten but it remained a chaotic time in Egyptian history.

Externally, the three superpowers of the day, Hatti, Mitanni, and Egypt sought to control the ancient Near East by making unstable alliances with vassal states (Bryce 2005:57). Proxy wars often broke out between the vassal states, who turned to their overlords for protection or switched alliances to the perceived stronger superpower, often causing tension (Bryce 2003:125).The friendly relations between Hatti and Egypt continued into Tutankhamun's reign. Although strained tensions are evidenced by a letter written from the Hittite king, Šuppiluliuma I to Tutankhamun on his accession: "Why, my brother, have you held back the presents that your father made to me when he was alive? Now you, my brother, have ascended the throne of your father, and, just as your father and I were desirous of peace between us, so now too should you and I be friendly with one another."[22]

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[21] Akhenaten was succeeded by Smenkhkare, and then Tutankhamun. He introduced religious reforms that elevated the cult of the sun disk Aten to pre-eminent status in Egyptian religion. This religious revolution attempted to replace Egypt's traditional polytheism with the monotheistic cult of Aten. It was a chaotic time in Egyptian history as tensions arose between the traditional polytheists and monotheists (Kuhrt 1995:194-201).
[22] EA 41, (Moran 1992).

Bryce (2005:177) believes that tensions were pushed to a boiling point when Tutankhamun ordered an attack on the city of Kadesh, which was previously allied with Egypt, but conquered by Šuppiluliuma I. As Šuppiluliuma I and his son Telipinu were celebrating religious festivals in Uda, in Northern Mesopotamia, the Egyptians attacked Kadesh. Perhaps the Egyptians sensed a weakness in the absence of the Hittite king and his son in the Syrian region and saw an opportunity to regain Egyptian vassals and Egyptian prestige.

The Egyptian attack on Kadesh was unsuccessful, and moreover, this event infuriated Šuppiluliuma I (Bryce 2005:178). He regarded this as an unprovoked act of aggression, and in retaliation sent troops under the command of the Hittite generals Lupakki and Tarhunta-zalma to attack the Egyptian subject state of Amka (Bryce 2005:178). When speaking to the Egyptian diplomat Hani at a later stage Šuppiluliuma I recalls the event:

> …You came (?) and attacked the man of Kadesh whom I had taken away (?) from the land of the king of Hurri. When I heard this I became angry, and I sent forth my own troops and chariots and the lords. So they came and attacked your territory, the land of Amka (Güterbock 1956:97, fragment. 28 E3 iv 1-8).

The Egyptian attack had been a declaration of war in the eyes of the Hittites. It was in the midst of these tensions that tragedy struck Egypt. After a short reign, in ca 1327 BCE Tutankhamun died[23] unexpectedly at the young age of eighteen or nineteen leaving a wife, Ankhesenamun.[24] Whatever the circumstances of his death, Bryce (2003:191) explains that the sudden and unexpected passing of Tutankhamun plunged his kingdom into a crisis. He had produced no heir, and therefore no one to succeed him on the Egyptian throne, leaving the country in disorder. As per Egyptian tradition, the surviving male heir would take the throne, and if there was none upon the death of the Pharaoh, it would go to the named heir (Bryce 1990:97).

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[23] Was Tutankhamun murdered, or did he succumb to illness? There are two main trains of thought regarding his death. First, that he was possibly murdered by the two main contenders to the throne, namely the powerful courtier Ay or the general Horemheb. Lastly, that Tutankhamun succumbed to illness due to frail health (Hawass 2013:59).

[24] Hawass presents a human picture of the young queen in the aftermath of Tutankhamun's death. He imagines Ankhesenamun sitting alone in the palace, weeping for the loss of her lover and king. The death of her husband would have left Ankhesenamun with an uncertain future, amid a court filled with intrigues and plotting factions and a time of political uncertainty (Hawass 2004:67).

This prompted an internal conflict, and in particular, a rivalry between two of the most powerful men of the land, the general Horemheb and the courtier Ay. At the moment of Tutankhamun's death, it was believed that Horemheb would take the throne. Ultimately, however, Ay would take the throne (Bryce 2005:182). Given the difficult political climate in Egypt, the researcher suggests it was not hard for the young queen, Ankhesenamun to believe that her husband was murdered. Hemmed in from ambitious men all around her vying for the throne, and the thought of her husband's murder, Ankhesenamun writes to the Hittite king, Šuppiluliuma I to explain her difficult situation (Bryce 1990:98).

2.3 THE MARRIAGE OFFER

At the time of Tutankhamun's death, one of the most successful Hittite kings, Šuppiluliuma I has led his forces into Syria and managed to conquer the majority of the kingdoms, including the once powerful kingdom of Mitanni (Bryce 2003:187). However, one last remaining Mitanni stronghold remains, that of Carchemish. As Šuppiluliuma I prepares for the final onslaught on Carchemish, he receives news of Egyptian messengers with an urgent letter from the Egyptian queen. The letter begins with a simple statement followed by an extraordinary request:

> For in the meantime, their Lord Nibhururiya had died, the queen of Egypt-who was Dahamunzu – sent an envoy to my father, saying: "My husband has died, but a son I do not have. But you, they say, have many sons. If you give me one of your sons, he will become my husband, I will never take a servant of mine and make him my husband "(Güterbock 1956:94, fragment. 28 A iii 11-15).

This was an extraordinary request as although there had been a tradition of intermarriage between the ruling houses of Egypt and foreign lands, it extended to the Pharaohs who took foreign wives presumably to showcase their worldwide power. On the other hand, Egyptian princesses and queens were never allowed to marry foreigners, and this was a long-standing tradition. Presumably, this was done to prevent a foreigner from laying claim to the Egyptian throne (Podany 2010: 285).

In the Hittite system, Liverani (2001:191) explains marriage was more properly political, and as such, daughters of Hittite kings were given in marriage to vassal kings to strengthen the influence of the Hittite king and the loyalty of the vassal. Textual evidence also seems to suggest that the Hittite sons of royal blood rarely featured in a union where they were married off.

They could marry foreign brides as was the case of Šuppiluliuma I who married a Babylonian princess, not usually the other way round. There is only one known case of this involving Hattušili III 's son, the prince Nerikkaili who was married off to the daughter of a Syrian vassal, the Amurrite king Benteshina (Bryce 2005:272).

Why the marriage offer? Why would Ankhesenamun offer the Egyptian throne to a foreign prince? The reasons for the extraordinary request of marriage are still a mystery to scholarship today (Bryce 2005:178). However, there are a few factors to consider. First, Ankhesenamun has been portrayed as a young and weak character. Although she was young, the tone of the letter reveals a strong-willed and determined young woman.

In writing to Šuppiluliuma I, Ankhesenamun refused to relinquish power and the title of "King's Wife," and expressed a desire to rule in her own right. Ankhesenamun would have drawn inspiration from the formidable queens before her who exerted considerable influence and power in Egypt (Bryce 2003:94). History remembers Queen Ahhotep I who fought alongside her son Ahmose against the Hyksos and Queen Hatshepsut who dared to become Pharaoh.

Second, Tutankhamun was the last male in the line of descent, which dated to the Pharaoh Ahmose, who was credited with expelling the Hyksos foreign rule from Egypt in the Second Intermediate Period. With Tutankhamun's death, this royal line came to an end (Bryce 1990:102).This would mean that whoever married Ankhesenamun would be the next Pharaoh. Upon Tutankhamun's death, the two marriage prospects for Ankhesenamun would be Ay and Horemheb. Although the two men had risen to powerful positions in the Egyptian court, Horemheb[25] was a commoner who rose through the ranks, and Ay's royal bloodline is still under debate. None of them were princes, and Ankhesenamun probably thought that there were no suitable Egyptian men of royal blood and that by marrying either of these men would be marrying below her station. Even though she would be marrying a foreigner, the Hittite prince still had royal blood in his veins, albeit foreign blood (Fagan 2015:110).

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[25] Horemheb was not related to the royal family (Hoffmeier 1994:276).

Third, Bryce (2003:187) explains that in the aftermath of Tutankhamun's death, Egypt was reeling from the effects of Akhenaten's religious reforms, and without a strong central monarchy, there was a strong possibility of Egypt becoming weak and divided, becoming prey to foreigners, as had been the case with the Hyksos before the emergence of the Eighteenth Dynasty. Only now the threat was from the land of Hatti. Ankhesenamun may have realised that an alliance with the Hittites would not only bring stability to the Egyptian throne but would preserve Egypt from conquest. If she ruled with a Hittite king she would also have the support of the military might of the Hittite empire.

The last point to consider is the relationship between Tutankhamun and Ankhesenamun. Fagan (2015:74) had drawn attention to the fact that the pictures of the royal couple were carefully choreographed to show affection, suggesting they were devoted to each other. Hawass (2004:51) is in agreement with Fagan but goes a step further claiming that they were in love which can be felt in the depictions in the art that filled Tutankhamun's tomb. The exuberance of youth must have allowed Ankhesenamun to believe that she would rule alongside Tutankhamun for the rest of their days, and we can only imagine her shock at the untimely death of Tutankhamun. The political instability of the kingdom after the Amarna Period gave rise to court intrigue and suspicion.

Unlike the modern technology of today which proves that murder was probably not the case in the death of the Pharaoh (Essam 2020:1), Ankhesenamun only had political intrigues and her institution to go on (Fagan 2015:110). For this reason, the researcher suggests that the political intrigues of the Egyptian court led Ankhesenamun to suspect that Tutankhamun was murdered. Perhaps she believed it was Ay and Horemheb who murdered Tutankhamun to claim the throne or traditionalists who may have believed that Tutankhamun was not making fast enough changes to restore the Egyptian god Amun to his former glory. As Ankhesenamun's grief turned to anger at the loss of her childhood playmate and late husband over what she perceived as murder, what better way to take revenge than making an extraordinary request to Šuppiluliuma I.

2.4 THE REACTION OF ŠUPPILULIUMA I

Muršilis II explains the reaction of his father upon hearing the queen's request: "When my father heard this, he called forth the Great ones for council (saying): "Such a thing has never happened to me in my whole life!"[26] Šuppiluliuma I's surprise turns to amazement as he realises the full implication of the request. A Hittite prince on the throne of Egypt? The possible implications of this marriage were breath-taking. If his son was installed on the throne of Egypt, it would increase his power and influence throughout the ancient Near Eastern world, and this could be accomplished without going to war. Ankhesenamun is not proposing just a marriage alliance but offering the Hittite prince the kingship of Egypt (Bryce 2003:191). This would mean that together Šuppiluliuma I and his son would hold kingship over two of the most powerful kingdoms in the ancient Near Eastern world.

Šuppiluliuma I was understandably suspicious of the request. Two pertinent questions must have come to Šuppiluliuma I. Could he risk handing his son over to Egypt who according to him had made an unprovoked attack on Kadesh? Šuppiluliuma I speaks of his fears…. "He will in some way become a hostage. You will not make him a king!" (DS P.97, Fragment. 28 E3 IV 8-2, Bryce 2005:181).If the queen's motives were true, did she wield the power to put his son on the throne? Even the Hittite king realised that there would be considerable opposition to this. After convening with his council of nobles, Šuppiluliuma I decides on a cautionary approach. Unable to decide if the queen could be trusted, Šuppiluliuma I sends his chamberlain Hattusa-ziti to Egypt to discover the truth (Bryce 2005:180). The following spring, Hattusa-ziti returned with a high ranking Egyptian diplomat named Hani and an additional letter written in Akkadian (Bryce 2005:181). It reflects the queen's anger and frustration at having being doubted:

> Why did you say, "They deceive me," in that way? If I had a son, would I have written about my own and my country's shame to another country? Never would I take a servant of mine and make him my husband. I have written to no other country, only to you. They say that you have many sons, so give me one of yours. He will be my husband. In Egypt, he will be king! (Fragment. 28 A iii 50-A iv 12, Güterbock 1956: 96,97).

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[26] Fragment. 28 A iii 12-15, (Güterbock 1956:94,5).

Šuppiluliuma I was in no mood to be reprimanded and expresses his frustration to the Egyptian diplomat, Hani. The king defends his suspicions of the queen's motives by stating that prior to the arrival of the request, Egypt and Hatti were virtually on a war footing. Šuppiluliuma I reminds Hani that it was not that long ago that two of his generals were sent to attack the Egyptian subject state of Amka in retaliation for the Egyptian attack on Kadesh during Tutankhamun's reign (Bryce 2003:192-194).

Šuppiluliuma I continues to tell Hani that he believes that fear and treachery are probably behind the queen's motives and says:

> When they (the Hittite expeditionary force) attacked Amka, which is your country, you were probably afraid; and (therefore) you keep asking me for a son of mine (as if it were my) duty. He will in some way become a hostage. You will not make him king! (Fragment. 28 E3 iv 8-12, Güterbock 1956:97).

Hani who was an experienced diplomat made an impassioned plea to Šuppiluliuma I:

> Oh my Lord! This is our country's shame! If we had a son of the king at all, would we have come to a foreign country and kept asking for a lord ourselves? Niphururiya who was our Lord is dead. He has no son. Our Lord's wife is solitary. We are seeking a son of our Lord (Suppiluliuma) for the kingship in Egypt. And for the woman, our Lady, we seek him as her husband! Furthermore, we went to no other country, only here did we come! Now, oh our Lord, give us a son of yours! (Fragment.28 E3 iv 13-25, Güterbock 1956:97, 8).

Despite his initial reservations, Muršili II says that his father is finally convinced: "Since my father was kindhearted, he complied with the word of the woman, and concerned himself with the matter of (supplying her with) a son."[27]

2.5 THE DEATH OF ZANNANZA

The next issue facing Šuppiluliuma I was which of his five sons would be sent. According to Bryce (2005:160), Šuppiluliuma I's sons provided him with constant loyal and able support. The three eldest already had obligations. Arnuwanda was crown prince, heir to the Hittite throne, and Telipinu and Sharri-Kushuh were viceroys in Syria. The fifth son Muršili was only a child which left the fourth son, Zannanza. According to Bell (2007:114), Zannanza was not the prince's name, but a Hittite understanding of the Egyptian for "king's son."

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[27] Fragment 28 A iv 13-15, (Güterbock 1956:97).

There is not much information on Zannanza except that his mother was Henti who according to the texts was banished to the land of Ahhiyawa, presumably to make way for Šuppiluliuma I's second wife, the Babylonian princess (Bryce 2005:159).Although Šuppiluliuma I realises that this diplomatic marriage could put an end to Egyptian hostilities against the Hittites, Bryce (2005:160) explains that as a father, the safety of Zannanza was his prime concern and that it was only after suitable assurances of the safety of his son, that he dispatched the prince to Egypt. Šuppiluliuma I's anxiously awaited news of his son's safe arrival in Egypt.

After a couple of weeks, a messenger arrived with the news of the death of his son, Zannanza. The messenger who arrives with news of the death of the prince tells Šuppiluliuma I that the people responsible had escaped. Bryce (2003:195) explains that the actual perpetrators remain unidentified to this day because the passage in the *Deeds* that deals with Zannanza's death is fragmentary.

The passage explains that the prince was killed on his way to Egypt, after which the text is broken at this point, and it fails to show the identity of the alleged killers. This has led to different theories about the identity of the killers.

The death of Zannanza remains a mystery until present day, but most scholars believe that he was murdered during an ambush en route to Egypt (Cline 2015:69). Hawass (2004:68) suggests that maybe it was Ay and Horemheb or a faction within the Egyptian court who had the Hittite prince killed as they were opposed to the accession of a foreigner on the throne. Another theory proposes that the prince was killed by a local group on his passage through Syria. There is also opposition to the murder theory. According to Brand (2006:288), Klengel argues that the prince possibly died from an illness, resulting from a pestilential epidemic that had spread across Egypt, the Levant, and Hatti during the Amarna Period and Šuppiluliuma I's reign.

In the wake of the Hittite prince's death, Egypt is plunged into further crisis as they have no leadership and expect an imminent attack from the Hittites. The Egyptians hastily install a new king. The walls of Tutankhamun's tomb depict the new Pharaoh Ay performing the final ceremonies before the tomb was sealed. After the death of the Hittite prince, there is little information about Ankhesenamun, making her fate unclear. According to Bryce (2003:198), in 1921, the English archaeologist, Newberry viewed an ancient ring in Cairo which bore the names of Ay and Ankhesenamun.

Bryce (2003:198) comments that this suggests the possibility of marriage. Currently, excavations are been conducted in the Valley of the Monkeys an area adjacent to the Valley of the Kings near Luxor hoping to uncover the tomb of Ankhesenamun and more information on her reign.

2.6 ŠUPPILULIUMA I'S REACTION TO HIS SON'S DEATH

It is clear from the *Deeds* that Šuppiluliuma I believes that his son has been murdered and he held the Egyptians directly responsible for the crime (Bryce 2005:182). Interestingly, he does not blame a faction within the Egyptian royal court, but blames the Egyptian people:

> When my father heard of the murder of Zannanza, he began to lament for Zannanza, and to the gods he spoke thus: "Oh Gods! I did no evil, yet the people of Egypt did this to me! They also attacked the frontier of my country. (Fragment.31 7-11,Güterbock 1956:108).

There is no direct evidence linking the murder of the Hittite prince to the Pharaoh Ay. Remains of a letter written by Šuppiluliuma I to Ay make it clear that Šuppiluliuma I believes that the new Pharaoh, was an instigator in his son's death (Bryce 2005:183). Ay denies all responsibility in Zannanza's death, and seeks to restore friendly relations with Šuppiluliuma I:

> Your accusations have no justifications… You are spoiling for a fight against me…I seek peace and brotherhood with you. As for your son's death-of that I am entirely innocent! (KUB XIX 20 (CTH 154), Hagenbuchner 1989: 304-9).

The sources indicate that Šuppiluliuma I was enraged by the death of his son, which begs the question, as to why he engaged in correspondence with Ay before retaliating? Bryce (1990:99) perceptively states that he wanted Ay to admit to the murder, and it gave Šuppiluliuma I time to launch a major offensive. Despite the protest of innocence from Ay, Šuppiluliuma I launched an attack in retaliation for the death of his son. On his orders, the Hittite army, under the command of the crown prince Arnuwanda, crossed the Egyptian frontiers in southern Syria and decimated the cities in this region. In doing this, Šuppiluliuma I violated a standing treaty, the so-called Kurushtama treaty. It was a formal pact between Hatti and Egypt which included the transfer of persons from the Hittite city of Kurushtama, north-eastern Anatolia to Egyptian subject territory in Syria (Bryce 2005:119).

The seriousness of the violation of the treaty should not be underestimated. Normally, the Hittite kings would try and avoid initiating wars, preferring to see themselves as defenders against external aggression and the breaking of treaties.

In the *Second Plague Prayers*, Muršilis II records the attack and tells of thousands of prisoners-of-war that were taken, and transported to Hatti:

> But when my father gave them one of his sons, they killed him as they led him there. My father let his anger run away with him, he went to war against Egypt and attacked Egypt. He smote the foot soldiers and charioteers of the country of Egypt…
> (KUB XIV 8, Bryce 1990:99,).

Unbeknown to the Hittites, the prisoners brought a plague with them which for the next twenty years would ravage the Hittite homeland and decimate the population (Bryce 2005:183).The devastating plague is believed to be the cause of death of Šuppiluliuma I and the crown prince Arnuwanda who died shortly after he acceded the throne (Bryce 2005:188,191). Muršilis II, the son and successor of Šuppiluliuma I considered the violation of the treaty and the attack on Egyptian territory to be a mistake and a sin. In his *Plague Prayers*, he interprets the devastation of the plague as a divine punishment for his father's actions, although Šuppiluliuma I could have argued this act was justified due to the unprovoked aggression of Egypt in the murder of his son (Bryce 2005:206). The death of Zannanza had led to what Bryce (2003:198) explains are some of the most interesting "what ifs" of history. What would have happened if Zannanza had arrived in Egypt, married Ankhesenamun, and claimed the Egyptian throne? What would have happened if Šuppiluliuma I lived? Would he have marched on Egypt?

2.7 CONCLUSION

The Zannanza Affair, so named after the son of Šuppiluliuma I that was killed, was an unusual diplomatic incident. The *Deeds of Šuppiluliuma I*, speak of a proposed marriage alliance between Hatti and Egypt. The marriage alliance was supposed to bring about the unification of two of the most powerful ancient Near Eastern kingdoms but failed. In Egyptian tradition the royal lineage was traced through the woman, so marriage to the Egyptian queen, Ankhesenamun would allow the Hittite prince, Zannanza to become Pharaoh. There is no clear explanation for Ankhesenamun's treason in proposing the marriage.

The sources infer that after Tutankhamun's death the royal bloodline had come to an end. Furthermore, Ankhesenamun wanted to rule in her own right and looked to the royal family of the Hittites for a suitable partner. There are unanswered questions regarding the death of Zannanza, such as the identity of his killers, and the reason behind his death. However, the sources are clear on the Hittite reaction to his death. The *Second Plague Prayers* provide details regarding Šuppiluliuma I's reaction to the death of his son Zannanza. Šuppiluliuma I declared war on Egyptian territories in Syria, and in doing so, violated the so-called Kurushtama Treaty. The sources suggest that a deadly plague that claimed many Hittite lives, including that of Šuppiluliuma I was divine punishment for the retaliatory attacks on Egyptian territory. If Šuppiluliuma I had lived, it is unclear from the sources if he would have had plans to march and conquer Egypt. Yet, the sources make mention of Šuppiluliuma I's anger and the attack on Egyptian territories (Bryce 2005:183).

Had Šuppiluliuma I lived, it would have been an advantageous time to attack Egypt, as it was emerging from a chaotic period in the aftermath of Akhenaten's religious reforms. Also, the Egyptian Pharaoh Ay was new to the throne and untested in battle.

Although previous studies deal with the identity of the Egyptian royal couple, most scholars have overlooked the importance of the Zannanza Affair. To the researcher's knowledge, there is limited discussion on identifying the Zannanza Affair as one of the causes of the Battle of Kadesh. It can be identified as a cause because the Zannanza Affair led to increased hostilities between Egypt and Hatti (Bryce 2005:183). The friendly relations experienced during the reigns of Akhenaten and up to a point with Tutankhamun came to an abrupt end after the Zannanza Affair. Moreover, the increased hostilities led to Egypt and Hatti making preparations and changes to their military operations which had an impact on the way they fought at Kadesh.

CHAPTER 3: MUWATALLIS II'S ARMY

ABSTRACT

This chapter attempts to outline the nature and extent of the Hittite army that fought under Muwatallis II at the Battle of Kadesh. To gain a better understanding of the Hittite military organisation, textual, iconographical and archaeological sources must be taken into consideration. The two important parts of the army, the chariotry and infantry will be examined, detailing their organisation inclusive of Special Forces, weaponry, equipment and tactics. Attention is given to important changes introduced by Muwatallis II on and off the battlefield in preparation for Kadesh.

The Hittite army played an important role throughout Hittite history. It was instrumental in the building, maintenance and defence of the Hittite empire. The many achievements of the army range from the sack of Babylon under Mursili I, bringing to an end the First Dynasty of Babylon in ca 1595 BCE, and the destruction of Mitanni by Šuppululiuma I, to its finest hours on the Kadesh battlefield (Bryce 2005:98). By the reign of Muwatallis II, the Hittite empire encompassed most of modern Turkey and the northern part of Syria. The Hittite army that fought at Kadesh led by Muwatallis II was arguably his greatest strength.

In the aftermath of the Zannanza Affair, the Hittites realised that their Syrian territories were under threat and that all-out war with Egypt was inevitable. Upon accession to the throne, Muwatallis II made preparations on and off the battlefield in hopes of securing a victory for the showdown with Egypt. Muwatallis II implemented changes to the military operations namely, moving the capital Hattuša further south, drawing additional manpower, and the introduction of the three-man chariot (Bryce 2005:230). The military organisation and changes to military operations are discussed to provide an idea of the nature of the Hittite army that fought at Kadesh.

3.1 THE SOURCES

Although there is information regarding the Hittite military from the Old Kingdom Period more extensive information is found during the Empire Period. The annalistic literature of the Hittite kings provides invaluable information about Hittite military activities (Lorenz and Schrakamp 2011:126). The annals of Šuppululiuma I and Muršilis II provide insight on detailed information regarding the composition of the Hittite army, and its weaponry, manpower, and recruitment. The treaties with the vassal kings reveal information about the composition of the army.

Raulwing (2009:4) explains that the so-called *Kikkuli text* provides valuable information regarding the training of the chariot horses, who played a crucial role at Kadesh. Lorenz and Schrakamp (2011:126) comment that in addition to the Hittite depictions of army and weaponry, there are numerous representations of Hittite infantry and chariotry on Egyptian reliefs and wall paintings dating to the New Kingdom. A few archaeological remains of weapons and equipment that have been found at Hittite sites and neighbouring regions contribute to the written and pictorial evidence.

3.2 MOTIVES AND ATTITUDES TO WAR

Hittite history is filled with constant warfare and there were different motivations for going to war. The Hittites fought regionally and internationally to further their territories and political and commercial interests. This leads Bryce to comment that "[F]ighting one's enemies was as regular and natural an activity amongst the Hittites as cultivating the soil and worshipping the gods" (Bryce 2002:99). Defence and protection of Hittite territory against attack was of vital importance.

The Hittite army was called to defend the vast empire from numerous enemies. From fighting the fearsome Kaska tribes in northern Anatolia or the Mitanni, and the Egyptians in the south-east, to the rebellious vassals in the Syrian regions. As in the modern day, warfare was for the most part a business (Bryce 2002:100). It provided an important source of revenue which came from the plunder and spoils of conquered cities and territories (Bryce 2002:105). War was viewed as a matter of law that was sanctioned by the gods. This is evidenced by the existence of important deities of the Hittite pantheon that were associated with warfare, like the goddess Ishtar. In her male aspect, she was identified as a god of war and a god of the battlefield (Bryce 2002:147).

Although Bryce (2002:100) emphasises that the Hittites viewed war as natural, inevitable, and divinely sanctioned, he comments that there are very few instances where the Hittite kings took pleasure in the destruction and cruelty of warfare. Compared to the Egyptian and Assyrian reliefs, no known Hittite reliefs depict the king destroying his enemies on the battlefield. The written sources available on a king's military successes do not gloat over victories. Rather, it is presented in a concise manner, describing the details leading up to the battle and a summary of results (Bryce 2002:101, 2).

The Hittites believed they received divine support in battle as the gods ran before them and beside them while marching into battle. Muršilis II speaks of his divine support:

> …Since Uhhaziti fell ill, he did not therefore come against me in battle. He sent forth his son Piyama-Kurunta along with infantry and chariotry against me…And my Lady, the Sun Goddess of Arinna, and my Lord, the mighty Storm God and Mezulla and all the gods supported me. I defeated Piyama-Kurunta, son of Uhhaziti…the whole land of Arzawa fled.[28]

Ultimately, the Hittite kings viewed military campaigns as a way to restore peace, order and stability to a world filled with chaos and disorder by their enemies.

3.3 THE HIERARCHY OF COMMAND

The Hittite Great King held the epithet *UR.SAG* meaning hero and was the commander-in-chief of the army. In battle, Bryce (2007:9) comments that the king was identifiable by wearing a different robe and headband from the rest of the army. His duties included determining the course of campaigns, military appointments, mobilising his subjects for war, corresponding with allies, and taking personal command of the army. This resulted in him spending the better half of almost every year on military campaigns, often in regions far from the Hatti homeland. According to Bryce (2007:8), military prowess was an important part of the ideology of Hittite kingship which the king would demonstrate to his enemies who were quick to exploit perceived weaknesses. A king was not only expected to prove himself in battle but equal, if not surpass the military exploits of his predecessors (Bryce 2005:98).

While leading the campaigns in person, the king was not only defending the empire but maintaining creditably among his subjects, as well as, the loyalty of the army by sharing the spoils of conquest with them. Beal (1995:546) points out that in certain situations there were times when the king could not take personal command of the army, such as, if he was involved in a military operation elsewhere or due to religious obligations. In these situations, the king could appoint someone else, usually a family member. Often this decision was made with the assistance of the gods who were asked through oracles which commanders to send. Even when not leading a campaign, the king monitored all aspects of the battle and frequently exchanged messages and bulletins with the field commanders.

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[28] *Ten Year Annals*, AM 46-53, (Bryce 2005:194).

The kings were trained from an early age in the techniques and skills of warfare. Some crown princes received their battlefield initiations in their early teens. Muwatallis II at an early age would probably have accompanied his father Muršilis II on his campaigns against the Kaska in Northern Anatolia. Bryce (2007:8) observes that kings may have led the charge into the heat of battle, and sometimes engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. Although the majority of the time Bryce (2007:8) remarks that the king would have directed military operations from a vantage point, or was surrounded by his bodyguard in the heat of the battle. Hittite pragmatism would ensure that the king or his heir designate would not be too closely exposed to the dangers of battle. To date, there is no known Hittite king that died in battle, though one of the early kings Hattušili I may have died from his battle wounds (Bryce 2002:109).

The Hittite sources provide evidence of different ranks of officers in the army. Beal (1995:547) explains that the Hittite word for "officer" literally translates as 'the one who runs in front,' namely the leader. The highest rank under the king consisted of officers who were appointed to lead the army in the case of the king's absence, or who could command a wing or division under the king. In order of precedence, the crown prince usually the king's eldest or favourite son, *GAL MEŠEDI*, Chief of the Royal Bodyguards, usually the king's brother and the *GAL GESTIN*, Chief of the Wine Stewards, usually the king's brother or another member of the family. Hittite sources reveal that Muwatallis II's brother Hattušili III, served as *GAL MEŠEDI* during Muwatallis II's reign (Bryce 2002:22).

At roughly the same level as the officers were the Hittite royal princes who were kings of the appanage states. The most notable were Carchemish, Tarhuntassa, Ishuwa and Tumanna. Beal (1995:546) remarks that if these appanage kings were called upon to join the Hittite armies, they probably took personal command of the troops of their respective kingdoms. The next level consisted of divisional commanders, namely the "Chief of the Chariot Warriors of the Right," the "Chief of the Chariot Warriors of the Left," the "Chief of the Standing Army troops of the Right," the "Chief of the Standing Army troops of the Left," and the "Chief of the Shepherds of the Right and Left" (Bryce 2007:9). These six officers possibly had one thousand men under their command. These high ranking officers were usually royal princes, and below them were middle ranking officers, the overseers of military heralds and dignitaries (Bryce 2007:8, 9).

Within the dignitaries' category, there were differing ranks roughly the modern equivalents of captains to sergeant. The lowest ranking officers consisted of the gentleman. Each officer's importance was determined by the number of men under his charge. For example, an officer could command as little as ten or as many as a hundred men (Bryce 2007:9).

3.4 ENLISTMENT

Fidelity to Teshub Storm God, King and Country! The Lord god Teshub and his humble servant, the king need you to help expand his domain. Join the Army today for a career filled with exciting prospects![29]

If army recruitment posters had existed in the days of old, it certainly may have resembled the above. As an able-bodied person, the chance to join the Hittite army must have held exciting prospects. If Hatti was not at war, it was certainly thinking about it, which created ample opportunities for employment. Furthermore, as a Hittite soldier, you could expect to travel at the state's expense, be well fed and in peak physical condition while using the latest in weapon technology. The Hittite soldier not only had the honour of serving their gods and their king but was also rewarded with the spoils of war. According to Lorenz and Schrakamp (2011:142), the Hittite texts do not provide much information to help calculate the size of Hittite military forces. Although the Late Bronze Age armies were larger in comparison with the earlier armies at the beginning of the Bronze Age they were still smaller in comparison with the armies of the Iron Age.

The size of the Hittite force was possibly dependent on the nature of the military operation. When the situation did not necessitate a large number of troops, or when an immediate response was needed, the king would depend on his professional full-time standing army (Beal 1995:547). These soldiers were housed in military barracks and issued direct rations from the government. If a larger number of troops was needed the Hittite king had in addition to the standing army, contingents of vassal troops provided by vassal kings, reinforcements from allies and contingents of short term conscripts, troops raised in case of immediate need. Mercenaries were also recruited if the king needed to gather a larger than normal fighting force (Lorenz and Schrakamp 2011:142,3).

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[29] Witham (2016:11).

Upon induction into the army, the soldiers had to take an elaborate oath (Bryce 2002:113). This was a sign of their loyalty, and they agreed to a series of conditional curses if they were disloyal, including blinding and turning into a woman by the oath gods:

> …Whoever breaks these oaths and does evil to the king and queen and the royal princes, let these oath-gods change him from a man into a woman. Let them change his soldiers into woman…May the oath-gods seize whoever breaks these oaths. May his innards swell. May the sons of Ishkhara [live] in him and feed on him.[30]

3.5 MILITARY BRANCHES

3.5.1 Infantry

As with most Late Bronze Age armies of the time, the infantry formed a large part of the Hittite army. According to Bryce (2002:111), they made up ninety per cent of the army. They were usually found accompanying units of chariotry, large or small. The professional infantry men were referred to as *UKU.US* or *sharikuwa*. Gabriel (2002:76) comments that "[I]n battle, the infantry were deployed in companies ten-man wide and ten-deep, with heavier battalions standing with 100 man fronts and ten-man deep." At the core of the Hittite infantry was the massive phalanx formation of spearmen. On open plains, battles were lost or won mainly due to the chariot contingents, with the role of the infantry sometimes becoming that of a subordinate backup role.

However, on rough, uneven ground, and mountainous terrain the infantry played a more active role, which included storming mountain refuges, engaging the enemy in combat on a one-to-one basis, capturing and escorting prisoners and subduing enemy or rebel towns and communities (Bryce 2007:41). Muršilis II speaks of the storming of a mountain stronghold that was inaccessible to horses:

> I, My Sun, went to Mount Arinnanda. This mountain is very steep and extends out into the sea. It is also very high, difficult to access, and rocky, and it is impossible for horses to advance up it. The transportees held it en masse and the infantry were above en masse. Since it was impossible for horses to advance up the mountain, I My Sun, went before the army on foot and went up Mount Arinnanda on foot.[31]

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[30] KBo VI 34 111, 12-19, (Beal 1995:547).
[31] *Comprehensive Annals,* AM 54-7, (Bryce 2005:194, 5).

3.5.2 Chariotry

The chariot was one of the most innovative weaponry in Late Bronze Age warfare which dominated the battlefields of the ancient Near East (Bryce 2007:31, 2). The mobility of the chariot introduced a new dimension of warfare. The chariot corps became the elite striking force of Late Bronze Age armies and created a tradition that is still seen in present day. Gabriel (2011:42) explains that the equivalent arm of the modern Israeli army is the armoured corps which is equipped with *Merkava* tanks. The Hebrew word *Merkava* is translated into "chariot."

The knowledge of Hittite chariots is limited, and numerous scholars rely on the Egyptian representations of the Hittite chariots from the depictions of the Battle of Kadesh. Material finds of Hittite chariots are rare, with only parts being found, such as traces of a spoked wheel from Lidar Höyük in Turkey (Lorenz and Schrakamp 2011:141). Although, the Hittite military texts according to Beal (1992:278) reveal the importance of chariotry throughout Hittite history. Chariot warfare appears in Hittite records even earlier than in the Egyptians records. Dating to the eighteenth century BCE, an Old Hittite *Anitta text is* thought to be the oldest evidence for the use of a large number of chariots in battle. It gives an account of the Anatolian king, ca 1750 BCE who fought an army which included forty chariots.

Later cuneiform texts show that Hattušili I commanded a large chariotry of his own, and also confronted other chariots in battle. A text reveals that two of Hattušili I's officers bore the title, "Overseer of One Thousand Chariot fighters" which suggest that Hattušili I had numerous chariots (Beal 1992:279). Another Hittite text attributed to the seventeenth century BCE, the *Siege of Urshu* records a Hittite army of "eighty chariots and eight armies" besieging the city of Urshu in southern Turkey. According to Bryce (2007:31) by ca 1650 BCE the light horse-drawn chariot was introduced into Anatolia from the Hurrian world and was present in most parts of the ancient Near East. The chariot was a light vehicle, consisting of a wooden frame with leather covering. Bryce (2007:32) explains that it was pulled by two horses that were attached to either side of a long pole that extended from the underside of the car.

In the Hittite army, the chariot was seen as a status symbol and formed the elite corps and pride of the Hittite army. A charioteer could be equated with a modern day fighter pilot who is considered among the modern military elite. Van de Mieroop (2011:158) explains that Goetze comments that the charioteers created a "profession class with its own ethos, a type of military elite, fighting around the king and supported by the state." Van de Mieroop agrees with Goetze and comments that charioteers were trained fighters who had wealth and provided their own equipment. He remarks that they were an elite class who wielded economic and political influence (Van de Mieroop 2011:158). In open battle, the Hittite successes were mostly dependant on the performance of the chariotry.

The effective use of the chariot required a rigorous training programme on the part of the men and horses (Bryce 2002:112). A Hittite literary text *KBo 3.34 11 21-35*, describes the training and manoeuvres for chariot crews under the supervision of two officers. The text suggests that training with a bow and arrow, and the training of chariot horses was an important part of training (Beal 1992:535, 6). In the two-man chariot, the driver of the chariot who also acted as the shield bearer was called the *karatappu*, and the warrior was called the *sus (*Howard 2011:59).

The chariot crews wore a short-sleeved coat of scale armour extending from the neck to ankles. Beal (1995:548) observes that the shirt had a slit possibly to assist movement. This expensive armour had a garment of linen and leather with overlapping scales of bronze sewn onto it. According to reconstructions based on finds from armour scales from different ancient Near Eastern sites, and written evidence from Nuzi, the scale armour varied in weight from 9.5 to 27 kilograms (Beal 1992:150).[32] Horses also seemed to have worn scale armour for their protection. Although Hittite horses in some Kadesh reliefs are depicted as unarmoured, the Egyptian reliefs at Abu Simbel depict scale coats over a textile trapper worn by the chariot horses (Elliot 2017, chapter 3).

Bryce (2007:41) has drawn attention to the fact that it was highly unlikely that the war chariot would have been driven from the starting point of the military expedition to the battlefield which in some cases may have been of a great distance. The Hittite armies on campaigns travelled with large baggage trains, with the larger items carried by ox-drawn carts. Bryce (2007:42) believes that these carts probably carried the chariots. Parts of the baggage train may also have included spare parts for the maintenance of the chariots whilst on campaign.

3.6 WEAPONRY

Hittite administrative documents and pictorial and archaeological evidence provide information on military weapons and equipment.[33] In reliefs depicting the Hittite king as a warrior, the king is shown to carry weapons particular to the Late Bronze Age, namely the sword, spear, and bow and arrow (Lorenz and Schrakamp 2011:136). A monument at Kings Gate, one of the most notable of the Upper city gates of Hattuša depicts a warrior figure with a crescent sword in his belt carrying an axe. The Egyptian Kadesh reliefs also depict the Hittite infantry equipped with short swords. A short stabbing sword with ribbed blade and crescent-shaped pommel was the standard Hittite weapon issued to all ranks (Lorenz and Schrakamp 2011:136). Its size allowed it to be conveniently tucked into the soldier's belt which meant that Hittite soldiers were always armed. An example of this type of sword has been discovered at Tell Atchana in Hatay's province in Turkey (Lorenz and Schrakamp 2011:136).

The shield served as an important item in the Hittite defensive equipment. It possibly covered the body from neck to thigh, although Bryce (2007:18) acknowledges that the shields depicted in the Kadesh reliefs were slightly smaller. The shields were basically rectangular in shape, with a slightly convex top and bottom and concave sides. This design afforded the advantage of a light shield and good full-length body protection.

Interestingly, Gabriel (2002:72) comments that the Hittites changed their weaponry to accommodate the nature of the terrain and the battle they expected to fight. For instance, in mountainous terrain and forested regions, the Hittite infantry was armed with sickle-swords, battle-axes, and daggers. These weapons were typical of close combat fighting.

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[33] For detailed information on weapons and equipment, see Lorenz and Schrakamp (2011).

However, when the fighting was in open terrain or static defence, the infantry was equipped with the long stabbing spear as the predominate weapon. It was used as a thrusting or throwing weapon when charging an enemy drawn up for battle.

Apart from the chariot, Beal (1995:548) contends that the composite bow was one of the most significant military technologies of the Late Bronze Age in the ancient Near East. The bow consisted of a composite of wood and horn glued together, which afforded it great strength and flexibility. The arrow shafts were made of wood or reed, and were attached by a tang to bronze arrow heads, that were sometimes barbed. A quiver which held the arrows was probably made of leather, and able to hold between 20 and 30 arrows.

In comparison with a simple bow, the composite bow was able to throw arrows at a greater distance and with much more power. It is estimated that a trained archer mounted on a chariot could fire an arrow once every six seconds with reasonable accuracy. The combination of the high rate of fire, great range and striking power of the bow, and the speed of the chariot resulted in chariots being lethal during battle (Fagan and Trundle 2010:61). There are not many references to contingents of archers in the Hittite infantry besides a brief description, *Lumes gis Ban* in a Hittite text (Beal 1992:72).

A reason for the vague references was possibly because the archers were not mentioned as distinct troops, but just referred to as troops (Lorenz and Schrakamp 2011:137). Written sources illustrate that the maintenance of archers was important and that the use of the composite bow necessitated several years of experience and training. The importance of the bow is reflected in the appearance of bows and arrows in Hittite war rituals and the Hittite administrative texts that mention large quantities of bows and arrows (Lorenz and Schrakamp 2011:137, 8). Excavations in Turkey have uncovered an interesting collection of arrowheads. Bryce (2007:20) notes that the weapons for the Hittite army were probably manufactured in government operated armament factories, and thereafter stockpiled in a baggage train that accompanied the army on the march, to be readily available for the troops in preparation for battle.

3.7 SPECIAL FORCES

Today's Special Forces are arguably some of the best trained and formidable units that a country can boast. It is generally assumed that the elite units that are known today, such as the American Navy Seals or the Polish JW Grom are primarily a modern phenomenon. This is a common misconception as ancient elite forces have played an important role throughout the history of warfare. Throughout the ages, the armies of antiquity have maintained elite units tasked with performing dangerous and specialised missions. According to Hittite sources, there were elite forces in the Hittite army. Similar to the modern day, these were probably elite warriors who were trained in every form of military skill and could be called into any situation. There are limited studies on the role of Hittite Special Forces. Many questions remain unanswered regarding training for specialised missions, and methods of obtaining tactical and strategic intelligence.

3.7.1 *Mesedi* and "Men of the Golden Spear"

From the ranks of the professional standing army came the elite units of the Hittite king's personal bodyguard. There were two groups of the Royal Body Guard namely, the *Mesedi* and the "Men of the Golden Spear" (Bryce 2002:22). The main duty of both groups was to protect the king's person and keep him safe at all times. They would have sworn an oath of allegiance to the king alone (Bryce 2007:29).

Bryce (2007:30) believes that similar to modern day elite units who have challenging selection criteria to enter their units, so too the Royal Body Guard would have had a rigorous selection process. This process would ensure that the candidates were above suspicion and had the necessary qualities to fulfil the duties of their office.

The most prestigious of the Royal Body Guard was the *Mesedi* led by the G*AL MEŠEDI*. This position carried a huge responsibility, namely that of the king's personal safety and security (Bryce 2007:9). An important source on the Royal Body Guard is a text dated to approximately the fourteenth century BCE. This Middle Hittite text (CTH 262) is sometimes referred to as a *Protocol of the Royal Body Guard*. The text provides detailed information about the conduct of the elite units in the palace courtyard, presumably the royal place at Hattuša, and during the journeys of the king.

The *Mesedi* formed an elite guard with spears as weapons and were stationed on twenty four hour guard duty. Güterbock and van den Hout (1991) have provided lengthy descriptions and discussions of the Royal Bodyguard. Forming the first line of the king's protection, they accompanied the king when he took part in religious festivals, pilgrimages to various holy cities within the empire, and on military campaigns. Sharing in the king's protection where the second group of Royal Body Guards, an elite unit called "Men of the Golden Spear." They were also twelve in number and were tasked with protecting the palace courtyard and the gates leading to and from the palace precinct (Beal 1992:212-231). Although there were twelve on a shift their total number would have been larger since the constant duties would have necessitated working in shifts (Bryce 2007:29).

The units of the Royal Body Guard advocated their symbolic bond to the king by participating in a spring celebration named the *AN.TAH.SUM* festival to honour the Sun Goddess Arinna. Under the watchful eye of the king, the body guards competed against each other in a foot race called *pittianzi*. The winner received the honour of holding the reigns of the king's horse when he dismounted and the honorary title, "he of the ass-bridal", which was a royal military appointment (Puvel 1988:27). According to Bryce (2002:22), the reason for having both the *Mesedi* and the "Men of the Golden Spear" was to ensure the loyalty of each other.

3.7.2 "Golden Chariot fighters"

Miller (2013:163) explains that within the chariotry arm, Hittite texts mention a group of elite chariot troops. In sources from the reigns of Tudhaliya I and Tudhaliya III, the so-called *Succession Protocols* (CTH 271) mention "Golden Chariot Fighters." There is also reference to the Hittite prince Kantuzzili who held the office of "Overseer of the Golden Chariot-Fighters" (Bryce 2005:421). The "Golden Chariot Fighters" were an elite unit of chariot fighters with high ranking officers that possibly functioned as protection for the king's chariot in battle (Beal 1992:410). This unit possibly entered a challenging training programme under specially appointed officers called *Uralla*, which is loosely translated as "training sergeant." A Hittite text, *KBo 3.34 ii; CTH 8A,* describes that the *Uralla* trained the charioteers in the arrow, the sharpening of the wheel and the holding of a weapon (Beal 1992:535, 6).

3.7.3 "Troops of Sutu"

According to Gabriel (2002:76), the "Troops of Sutu" were special units of light infantry that were used for quick manoeuvres, perhaps like ambush and reconnaissance.

3.7.4 Horse riders

It is the view of Beal (1992:548) that the Hittites had a small cavalry. He bases his argument on Egyptian reliefs from Thebes which depict the Egyptian Pharaoh Seti I fighting the Hittites. In the reliefs, two riders are depicted in the Hittite ranks. Although horse riders armed with bows and arrows are known throughout the Late Bronze Age ancient Near Eastern, Egyptian and Mycenaean worlds, Bryce (2007:42) cautions against thinking that the Hittites had small cavalry units, as there is neither written nor visual evidence to suggest that the Hittites used cavalry. This suggests that these horse riders were elite units of messengers and scouts. These units carried out reconnaissance missions, dispatching messages between unit leaders and their commanding officers, and conveying messages between the battlefield and base of operations or to the royal capital Hattuša (Bryce 2007:42).

3.7.5 War dogs

War dogs were an important part of ancient warfare forming part of a canine military elite. Scholars claim that because the ancient world did not have the advantage of gun powder, the war dog became an effective military weapon (Kistler 2011:3). On the other hand, arguments are made that war dogs were not used proving ineffective against the bow and arrow. Early evidence for the use of canine warriors in the ancient Near East comes from approximately ca 4000 BCE (Kistler 2011:4). Among the early references to war dogs are those recorded by Hammurabi, King of Babylonia, ca 2100 BCE. He describes dogs fighting alongside his most elite Sumerian warriors (Stobaugh 2014:173).

Kistler (2011:4) maintains that the Hittites used war dogs and points to evidence of reliefs in Alaca Höyük in Turkey depicting a man with two hunting dogs that attack a feline. Kistler (2011:4) explains that the dogs shown in the hunting scenes could also have been used in war. The Hittites could have used war dogs in several capacities like guarding, tracking and detecting enemy spies.

Despite this, little research had been conducted to show the role of war dogs accompanying the Hittite infantry or chariotry into battle.

3.8 ON CAMPAIGN

Typically, the campaign season would extend from spring to early autumn.[34] The "Temple 5" complex in Hattuša, next to the King's Gate, has tentatively been associated with a palace annexe containing three chapels (Bryce 2007:22). It is here that Bryce (2007:22) comments that the king may have spent time before departing on a military campaign. In religious rituals before the battle, the god's approval for the battle would be sought. The gods of their enemies were petitioned to come over and join them. After gaining the god's approval, the king would offer final prayers for a successful outcome. Presumably, the same rituals and prayers would have been performed at the new capital, Tarhuntassa, before Muwatallis II left for battle (Lorenz and Schrakamp 2011:131-35).

Beal (1995:550) describes the magical rituals used by the Hittites in an attempt to change the course of the battle. Chariot horses underwent a purification ritual to remove, burn away and wash evils off them. A ritual written by a Hurrian female physician involved an incantation over fine oil. It was used to anoint the king, his horses and chariot and implements of war. Thereafter the king surrounded by his bodyguard would leave the capital at the head of the army. Along the route, there was probably a major rendezvous point where the entire campaign force met. This would have included levies from the outlying regions of the empire and possibly allied contingents from elsewhere. At this point, the king would hold an inspection of the entire army, and the troops would reaffirm their oath of allegiance to their sovereign king (Bryce 2007:21).

Typically, an army on campaign marched thousands of kilometres through arid regions and territories occupied by hostile forces. One of the main logistical concerns was the provisioning of the troops (Bryce 2007:22). Basic rations of flour and bread were carried on the march. While in Hittite territory, their food was replenished as well as fodder for the horses.

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[34] For a detailed discussion about the Hittites on campaign, see Beal (1995).

Bryce (2007:23) explains that certain Hittite cities are recorded as having silos constructed primarily for storing grain and fodder for the Hittite troops, and the animals while on campaign. The Hittite army was not allowed to pillage or forage while travelling through Hittite subject states (Bryce 2007:23). However, they were permitted to do so in enemy territory or with independent states which held no agreement with the Hittite king. Bryce (2007:28) comments that at all levels of the military hierarchy, Hittite soldiers were trained to peak levels of fitness which helped them to fight battles even after long gruelling marches. When the army reached the enemy's land, a ritual and offerings were presented to the gods, along with a Hittite case for a legal justification for war. Thereafter a challenge of battle was usually sent to the enemy king (Beal 1995:551).

3.9 THE HITTITE ARMY IN BATTLE

When trying to reconstruct a typical Hittite battle on open terrain, the challenge is deriving information from sources like the *Annals* of the Hittite kings which contain formalised and stereotypical phraseology. Only single pieces of information, spread through written texts of Hittite literature provide evidence of particular aspects of warfare. This is the challenge that Lorenz and Schrakamp (2011:142) explain that make attempts to reconstruct battle tactics partly speculative.

The chariot was a supreme weapon on the battlefield. The advantages in battle were based on the speed of the horses, the remarkable firepower and long range of the composite bow, and the defence capabilities of the scale armour. The combat speed of chariots has been estimated at 16 kilometres per hour, with additional experimental archaeology based on the reconstruction of ancient Near Eastern chariots suggesting a maximum speed of 30 to 35 kilometres per hour. The opinion of Lorenz and Schrakamp (2011:144) is that chariot archers may have had 120 or 150 arrows at their disposal, which may have been fired at an estimated 6 to 10 arrows a minute. The result of a hundred chariots bearing down on a simple unit of infantry would have been devastating. Beal (1992:375,6) notes that a designation of a pair of officers in Hittite records, "Overseer of the 1000 Chariot Warriors of the Left/Right", may provide an example of chariot battle tactics. The chariot units by been placed on the left and right flanks of the army protected the centre consisting of infantry. This tactic helped destroy enemy chariots and archers.

The introduction of the three-man chariot introduced a new battle tactic which allowed the Hittites to replace the conventions that regulated the set-piece battle or parallel battle which was the standard in warfare. In set-piece battles, both armies would line up opposite or parallel to each other, and advance into the "battle space" where they would fight each other until one or both yielded. The disadvantage of this was that it eliminated tactical manoeuvre and surprise. The tactic employed by the Hittite chariotry overcame this by allowing the three-man chariot to go beyond the "battle space" which allowed the Hittites to gather a greater number of chariots for a single engagement (Gabriel 2002:78,9).

By using these large formations they were able to fight a battle of tactical manoeuvre and employ the principals of surprise and concentration (Coetzee and Eysturlid 2013:283). Although Lorenz and Schrakamp (2011:144) propose that the role of the infantry in open battle was possibly subordinate to the chariotry, they do acknowledge the importance of the infantry. Infantry would have played a more important role in a battle which was located in an area inaccessible to chariot units. Recently, scholars have suggested that the infantry had an entirely subordinate role in battle (Gurney 1979:106; Drews 1993:135-38). The argument is based on the numerous chariot texts preserved from the ancient Near East, and that there are no comparable texts for the infantry. However, Lorenz and Schrakamp (2011:144,5) do not support this view explaining that the reason for the numerous chariot texts relates to the full-scale organisation, and administration of the chariot units, which were not required as much for levies, allies, and other types of infantry. Trimm (2017:210) does not support the view that the infantry played an entirely subordinate role. He maintains that the number of infantry brought to a battle where there to fight and not remain on the side lines. Also, chariot warfare was costly, as chariots were expensive and it was a long and challenging process to train charioteers (Trimm 2017: 211).

3.10 HITTITE STRATEGY

Healy (2005:25) comments that "[T]here can be no doubting that the Hittites were masters of strategy and were prepared and able to use guile and sleight of hand if it would yield advantage." The Hittites used psychological warfare as a battle tactic to mislead, intimidate and demoralise the enemy.

At Kadesh, the Hittites mislead the Egyptian army by providing false information and were able to lure the Egyptians into an ambush. The ambush required patience and careful siting, with precise coordination of the Hittite chariotry. The successful ambush resulted in the Hittites visiting not only a physical but psychological blow to the Egyptians. Evidence suggests that wherever possible the Hittites would try and create a situation where the chariotry could be used to its greatest advantage in open battle, and subsequently allow the infantry to follow through and deliver the final blow. Typically, the Hittite strategy involved catching the enemy on the march, and rushing them with chariots before the enemy had time to get into battle fighting formation (Gabriel 2002:79).

The Hittites capitalised on this tactic at Kadesh almost destroying the Egyptian army (Gabriel 2002:79). Another important part of the Hittite strategy in warfare was diplomacy (Bryce 2007:6). The Hittites applied a system of indirect control over their vassal states by concluding treaties. In securing diplomatic agreements with other powers, the kings were able to reorganise more military power throughout the Hittite empire (Bryce 2005:48, 9).

3.11 MUWATALLIS II: MILITARY OPERATIONS

In many ways, Muwatallis II inherited from his father, Muršilis II, a strong kingdom, more secure than at the opening of previous reigns (Bryce 2005:109). However, there were constant troubles with incursions from the Kaska tribes who were situated in north Anatolia, north of the Hittite homeland, and a resurgent Egyptian threat under the energetic warrior pharaohs of the New Kingdom. In preparation for the battle, Muwatallis II adopted changes to military operations which had an impact on the way the Hittites fought at Kadesh.

3.11.1 The move of the Royal Capital to Tarhuntassa: Strategic base of operations

Muwatallis II transferred the seat of Hittite power from Hattuša to his new capital Tarhuntassa in south-central Anatolia. The Hittite source that mentions the transfer, is the *Apology of Hattušili III*. The capital has not yet been found, and its exact location remains a debate. Bryce (2005:230) emphasises that Muwatallis II did not take the move lightly, and probably faced serious opposition to the move from his countrymen. Hattuša had been the seat of power since the early days of the empire.

Home to the Temple of the Storm God, and numerous other deities. It was possibly one of the greatest Hittite cities, not only for the Hittites but also for the vassal kings who came annually to present themselves before the Hittite king. Prior investigations have implemented queries about reasons for the move. Scholars outline two main trains of thought. Singer (2006:1) proposes that Muwatallis II was attempting a religious reform. The new capital is where he would elevate the Storm-god of Lightning at the expense of the other major Hittite deities. The *Apology of Hattušili III* mentions that the move of the capital had been at the request of the Storm-god of Lightning which leads Collins (2007:54) to suggest that perhaps the reasons were religious.

Although Bryce (2005:231,2) does acknowledge the moves for religious reasons, he points out that the move further south left Muwatallis II better placed to launch a major campaign into Syria and against the Egyptians. Leaving his brother Hattušili III in charge of the troublesome Kaska borderlands in northern Anatolia, Muwatallis II was able to divert more military resources for the upcoming confrontation with Egypt. Bryce (2003:243) comments that the transfer of the capital and placing Hattušili III in charge of the northern regions ensured the security of Muwatallis II's Anatolian territories. In this way, Muwatallis II could focus solely on his Syrian objective without having to worry about enemies closer to the homeland, like the Kaska (Bryce 2005:242).

3.11.2 The Might of Hatti: Additional Manpower

The movement of the capital to Tarhuntassa as a closer base of operations for the Syrian campaign was complemented by Muwatallis II's next change to operations, that of the army numbers. Early in his reign Muwatallis II probably realised that in order to mount a successful defence against Egypt, it would require greater manpower. If the Egyptians made a serious challenge in Syria, the Hittite viceroys in Syria would not be able to mount an effective defence on their own. For this reason, Bryce (2014:72) comments that Muwatallis II bolstered the army numbers by drawing manpower from throughout the Hittite empire. Bryce (2007:10) comments that the Hittite army numbers sent against rebellious vassals or hostile states usually numbered between 5,000 and 10,000 troops. However, the army led by Muwatallis II at Kadesh was the largest that the Hittites had ever fielded in battle.

It comprised of Hittite troops, allied and vassal forces, and a large number of mercenaries. The Egyptian sources put the Hittite troop strength at 2,500 Hittite chariots divided into four units, and a further 1,000 more chariots of tributaries and allies. Besides the chariots, there were units of 18,000 and 19,000 infantry. Beal (1995:547) explains that if the numbers are correct, this would mean that Muwatallis II had 47,500 men at arms. Muwatallis II's prime objective was to stamp out the Egyptian military aggression against his Syrian territories, and he had gathered a vast army in Syria to meet this objective (Bryce 2005:234).

3.11.3 The Hittite three-man chariot

The final change that Muwatallis II introduced to the Kadesh battlefield was the military innovation of the three-man chariot. Initially, the Hittite chariot, like its Egyptian counterpart, contained two men. The battles scenes of the Pharaoh Seti I, a contemporary of Muršilis II, at Karnak, modern Luxor, depict the Hittite chariot carrying two men. By the time of Muwatallis II's reign, the Kadesh reliefs depict the Hittite chariots with a three-man crew. The Hittites modified the chariot to accommodate the additional weight of a third person. By extending the floor space in the chariot cab it permitted a third man to stand in it. Fields (2005:20) demonstrates in his studies on Bronze Age war chariots that the dimensions of the cab were 1.25 meters in width, 1 meter deep, and slightly less than 1 meter high. The spoked wheels made the chariot lighter and faster than older models, and the axle was placed in the centre of the carrying platform of the chariot. Both the axle and the centre pole were bound and reinforced with iron. This provided stability of the chariot in close quarter combat and pursuit over rough terrain (Fields 2005:20).

Some scholars argue that the larger and sturdier chariots compromised on speed and manoeuvrability. Bryce (2007:32) asserts that this disadvantage is outweighed by the advantage of adding a third warrior to the chariot. This contributed additional manpower to the battlefield quickly. Having the chariot runner in the chariot meant they did not tire as quickly and could go anywhere their chariot went. In this manner, the Hittites could increase the operating range of their chariotry (Beal 1992:145). The additional warrior's prime objective was to protect the archer in the chariot, freeing the archer to focus solely on shooting the enemy.

Being a sturdier vehicle, it did not overturn as easily when turning sharply as was the case with the lighter Egyptian two-man chariots. The sturdier three-man chariots were successful in head-to-head battle, being able to smash into enemy infantry (Gabriel 2002:79). The Hittites came up with a simple technique to pull the extra weight of the additional man in the chariot. They trained horses to pull heavier loads which was an important military innovation as it allowed for the creation of a completely new chariot and a new way to fight with the chariot (Gabriel 2009). After the defeat of their old enemy Mitanni, the Hittites gained the service of a Mitanni horse trainer, named Kikkuli (Bryce 2007:28). He devised a strict training programme which has been preserved in a document called the *Kikkuli text*. The text provided instructions on how to train horses to become stronger and pull heavier loads. It concerns all aspects of the training of chariot horses including advice on a diet and exercise regimen. Bryce (2007:28) comments that the chariot horses were trained over a period of 214 days, with some of these days being allocated to night manoeuvres. There were instances when the Hittite army travelled at night, therefore it was necessary to familiarise the horses with battle conditions during the night (Bryce 2007:28).

Current research substantiates the belief that the Hittites used the three-man chariot but dispute the role of the chariot in warfare, in particular, at the Battle of Kadesh. Two hotly debated topics revolve around the function of the chariot in battle as well as the weapons used by the chariot crew. Some scholars see the role of the Hittite three-man chariot as the rapid transport of infantry rather than archery, the so-called "battle taxi idea." This suggests that the chariots transported warriors to and from the battle but did not participate in the actual battle (Darnell and Manassa 2007; Littauer and Crouwel 2002). Other scholars dismiss the "battle taxi" idea altogether and debate whether the sturdier Hittite chariots acted as battering rams or as slower stable platforms used by archers with composite bows (Gabriel 2002:79).

Gabriel (2002:78) argues that the role of the Hittite three-man chariot was to close rapidly with enemy infantry. In open terrain, the chariots were able to use their sheer weight to deliver a maximum shock to the enemy formations and smash them. The chariot crew were armed with a six foot spear, whose function was not to be thrown, but rather used as a lance when mounted, or used as an infantry weapon when the chariot warrior dismounted and engaged in close quarter combat.

Although Gabriel does acknowledge that the composite bow was used, he argues that the spear remained the predominate weapon of the charioteer (Gabriel 2002:78, 9).Drews (1993:133), who specialises in the evolution of warfare, disagrees with Gabriel. He proposes that the role of the Hittite three-man chariot was as a stable platform used predominately by archers with composite bows. Even though it is a commonly held belief that the Hittite three-man chariots did not have archers, Drews (1993:114) believes this theory is incorrectly based on the Egyptian reliefs of the battle. The Kadesh reliefs depict Hittite chariot crew carrying spears and not bows.

Drews (1993:121, 2) points out that even though the Hittite chariot crew may have carried spears and other weapons, they are to be viewed as secondary weapons while the bow remained the predominate weapon. He refers to studies that have demonstrated through practical experimentation the ineffectiveness of a chariot warrior thrusting a spear over the heads of his own horses or out of the back of a moving chariot (Drews 1993:116).

Lorenz and Schrakamp (2011:138, 9) and Drews (1993:114) maintain that the absence of bows in the Kadesh reliefs is probably reflective of the Egyptian propaganda showing a weak enemy and victorious Pharaoh. Both claim that the archaeological evidence shows that bows and arrows were widely used in Hittite warfare. In Hittite texts, the bow is mentioned in the majority of cases, in connection with chariotry. For instance, a Hittite text from Hattuša mentions a quantity of 17,000 arrows along with other chariot parts and equipment. The Hittite king's adoption of the bow as a royal weapon is indicative of its high social factor in Hittite society. Drews (1993:117) explains that it was highly improbable that the Hittites would put themselves at a disadvantage and not make use of the bow when their neighbours and enemies were doing so. Although scholars may be divided on the role of the chariot in the Battle of Kadesh, one thing is certain, that it formed an important arm of the Hittite army.

3.12 CONCLUSION

The army that fought under Muwatallis II was the largest army ever fielded by the Hittites and was drawn from throughout the Hittite empire (Healy 2005:21). Muwatallis II realised that additional manpower would be crucial to a Hittite victory. The army had a clear command structure from the king being the commander-in-chief all the way through to the lower ranks. This allowed for a clear chain of command during battle. The Hittites fought to extend their commercial, territorial and political interests, believing that they had the divine support of their gods. Religious and magical rituals were performed to appeal for divine intervention and change the course of the battle (Lorenz and Schrakamp 2011:134).

The Hittite army was built around the infantry and the chariotry. According to Bryce (2002:11), the infantry composed ninety per cent of the army. Some scholars argue that the infantry played a subordinate role to chariotry, but acknowledge that the infantry played more active roles in areas inaccessible to chariots, and capturing and escorting prisoners, and attacking enemy held towns and communities. Trimm (2017:211) comments that the size of the infantry brought to a battle and the expense of the chariots and the lengthy training of their teams makes it difficult to think of battles as only chariot warfare and that the infantry playing a limited role. The Hittite infantry demonstrated their adaptability by changing their weaponry and dress to accommodate a specific terrain or the battle they expected to fight.

To date, no known examples of Hittite chariots have been found. Most scholars obtain information on the chariots from the Egyptian sources of the Kadesh inscriptions. The chariotry was the elite striking force of the Hittite army. It introduced a tactical ability to the battlefield, namely that of mobility. Part of the strength of the army lay in the development of a new weapon unveiled on the Kadesh battlefield. The three-man chariot was a military innovation. Driven by tactical requirement, the Hittites modified the chariot to accommodate a third man. The *Kikuli Text* reveals that a training programme involving nutrition and exercise was used to train the horses to pull heavier loads, accommodating the weight of the third man. The advantage of the three-man chariot is that it allowed for additional men and firepower to be brought onto the battlefield.

The Special Forces added to the strength of the army and played an important role at Kadesh. Intelligence gathering, feeding false information, and luring the Egyptians into an ambush were some of the missions assigned to them. Current research like Güterbock and van den Hout (1991) which discusses the Hittite Instruction of the Royal Bodyguard is one of the few studies on an elite unit within the Hittite army.

A closer look at the research reveals that there is a need for further studies regarding the different elite units within the Hittite army. Questions regarding the role of the elite units in battle, training methods and methods of intelligence gathering need to be investigated.

Archaeological and written sources provide invaluable information on military issues and suggest that the army was well trained, adaptable, and innovative. It had a well-developed organisation which was needed to support and mobilise it. The Zannanza Affair created a deep mistrust between Hatti and Egypt. It prompted Muwatallis II to make operational changes for the inevitable battle, the movement of Hattuša further south, and recruiting of additional manpower. These changes were accompanied by the adoption of the three-man chariot bringing the advantage of additional man and fire power to the battlefield. By adopting these changes to the existing military organisation Muwatallis II had bought the army to a defining moment in Hittite history, that of a well organised and efficient military machine (Beal 1995:553).

CHAPTER 4: RAMESSES II'S ARMY

ABSTRACT

The Egyptian experience of the Hyksos foreign rule had resulted in the transformation of the Egyptian army into a well organised military force. The army of the New Kingdom that fought under Ramesses II had reached its height of military organisation and preparedness. The chapter attempts to give an overview of the Egyptian army detailing its organisation inclusive of weaponry, equipment, tactics, and Special Forces. To understand Ramesses II's army, textual, iconographical and archaeological sources will be taken into consideration. Attention is given to important changes introduced by Ramesses II on and off the battlefield in preparation for Kadesh. This chapter should present a realistic picture of the Egyptian army that fought at Kadesh.

The soldiers of the Pharaoh who fought at the Battle of Kadesh during the New Kingdom were part of a professional, powerful, and well-equipped military force. The New Kingdom is frequently referred to as the Age of Conquest as it was during this period that Egypt expanded its territories and became an empire. According to Seevers (2013:13), the army of New Kingdom Egypt differed dramatically to the Egypt of the Old and Middle Kingdom Periods, because it reached a higher level of military organisation and sophistication.

After the Zannanza Affair, the increased hostilities between the Hittites and Egyptians would motivate Ramesses II to reassert Egyptian authority in Syria and deal with the Hittite threat (Bryce 2005:234). Ramesses II would look to make changes to military operations, namely building a new capital and additional manpower. The inclusion of the two-man chariot, although not a new change would form part of the military operations. The military organisation and changes to military operations are discussed to provide an idea of the nature of the Egyptian army that fought at Kadesh.

4.1 THE SOURCES

The majority of the information on Egyptian warfare comes from the New Kingdom Period's Eighteenth through Twentieth Dynasties.[35] Seevers (2013:98) identifies three types of sources: (1) the textual evidence; (2) artistic representation of battles, war and soldiers; and (3) surviving artefacts such as weapons and chariots.

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[35] For general works on warfare in Egypt, see Schulman (1995), Spalinger (2005), and Seevers (2013).

The main military texts are derived from the *Annals* of the Pharaohs, in particular those of the New Kingdom. In the 1900s, Breasted compiled a five-volume work on the *Annals* (Trimm 2017:11). Subsequently, there have been several English translations of the *Annals*, such as a comprehensive series on the Ramesside Inscriptions, mainly by Kenneth Kitchen (1999). Seevers (2013:98) identifies other relevant texts such as personal accounts of individuals from tombs, and the records of international correspondence.

Poetic material has been recovered in form of hymns which provide limited information on warfare but sheds light on the divine warriors and the role of the king in battle (Trimm 2017:12). Texts were written on perishable materials like leather or parchment, and inscriptions on the walls of temples throughout Egypt. The inscriptions on temple walls were often accompanied by pictorial reliefs of the Pharaohs and the battles that they participated in, and usually in which they claimed victory. Seevers (2013:98) comments that the various reliefs from the walls of temples provide invaluable information about warfare during the New Kingdom. Accessible collections of reliefs can be obtained from Pritchard (1994) and Spalinger (2005). The University of Chicago in America has published numerous volumes of reliefs from the Egyptian Pharaohs like Ramesses II (Bard 2015:383).

Several studies agree that although sources on Egyptian warfare have survived there is not a clear representation of how warfare was practised during its history. Seevers (2013:98) explains that this is due to the challenges in interpreting existing evidence like texts and reliefs. These sometimes held more of a propagandistic value, one of glorifying the Pharaoh, and less of providing accurate historical information. Furthermore, the sources lack important information pertinent to the size of the armies, their organisation, and appearance, the time required for troop movements or battles, and the roles of chariots and runners in battle (Seevers 2013:99).

4.2 THE HYKSOS

David (2002:227) explains that up until the New Kingdom, there was no professional standing army, only a part-time non-professional national army partly raised through conscription. Preceding the New Kingdom there was little incentive for the Egyptians to initiate wars to strengthen the economy or fight would-be conquerors, because of Egypt's natural geography and natural resources which afforded it protection and food.

This changed during the Second Intermediate Period with the arrival of the Hyksos (Shaw 2003:209). The Hyksos, who are believed to originate in Syria-Palestine, took advantage of a growing weakness and period of disunity in Egypt (Hoffmeier 1994:271). It is during this period of chaos and confusion that the Hyksos arose and conquered the north-eastern territories of Northern Egypt.

Manetho, the third century BCE historian, records that the Hyksos arrived in a whirlwind of devastation to conquer the land (Finkelstein and Silberman 2002:54). His writings record that the Hyksos established themselves in the delta at a town named Avaris, modern Tell el Dab'a, and founded a dynasty there that would rule Egypt with great cruelty for many years.[36] Excavations at Tell el Dab'a and the Turin Canon show a Hyksos Dynasty that lasted for an estimated hundred years. While the Hyksos had established their rule from Avaris to Cusae in northern Egypt, native Egyptian kings of Thebes ruled Upper Egypt from Abydos to Elephantine. Primary written sources from Thebes depict the Hyksos as hated foreign oppressors, an insult to the Egyptian concept of the right order of things. This was the first time in Egyptian history that it had come under foreign rule, and it split the country in two (David 2002:33, 4).

The Hyksos rule shook Egyptian society. In Egyptian ideology, foreigners were viewed as primitive and barbaric, and seen as inferior and the enemy, over whom the Egyptians have been given power by the deities. The foreign domination was seen as a humiliation and blow to their whole world vision. Subsequent to the foreign rule, the native Theban kings rallied against the Hyksos, and after a series of battles, the Theban king Ahmose, of the Eighteenth Dynasty, was able to end the Hyksos rule of Egypt. Ahmose reunified Upper and Lower Egypt, thereby ushering in the New Kingdom (Morkot 2010:3).The majority of scholars such as Seevers (2013) and Spalinger (2005) suggest that the transformation of the army was a consequence of Egypt's domination at the hands of the Hyksos.

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[36] The archaeological excavations in the eastern Nile delta do not support Manetho's view of a Hyksos whirlwind invasion but suggest that it was a case of a gradual process of immigration from Canaan to Egypt (Finkelstein and Silberman 2002:55).

4.3 MOTIVES AND ATTITUDES TO WAR

Hyksos foreign rule sparked significant changes in foreign policy, ideology, and military technology. Determined never again to be ruled by foreigners, the Egyptians embarked on an aggressive foreign policy. They realised that they could no longer remain in isolation, and realised that to maintain security and expand Egypt they would need to establish buffer zones between themselves and its enemies (Healy 2005:28). The New Kingdom Pharaohs sought to restore Egypt's glory and face down all foreign threats. In this light, the New Kingdom foreign policy shifted from one of previous traditional isolationism in earlier periods to aggressive expansion northward into Syria-Palestine. This foreign policy coincided with the realisation that the projection of military power far beyond Egypt's eastern frontier was the best method for ensuring the country's defence (Healy 2005:28). During the New Kingdom, Egypt would actively pursue a political and diplomatic policy that would transform it into a superpower in the ancient Near East. Subsequently, this policy brought them into conflict with the Hittites in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE (Kuhrt 1995:189).

After the Hyksos expulsion, Kuhrt (1995:211) explains that "the most emphasised aspect of kingship in the New Kingdom is that of the king as a warrior who excels in the mastery of important weapons of war, such as the light, two-wheeled chariot which was a novelty in this period." Turning to the Ramesside period, Kuhrt (1995:211-14) points out that "the image of the king as a mighty warrior in his chariot, trampling his enemies underfoot in elaborate battle scenes became a standard element in the iconography of power during the reign of the Ramesside rulers."

The traditional iconography of the Egyptian king defeating enemies was typically depicted against foreign landscapes, showing besieged cities and narrating events in specific battles. Furthermore, artworks depict the New Kingdom Pharaohs sporting a new item of royal headgear, a Blue Crown. Kuhrt (1995:190) comments that the Blue Crown was a war helmet known as the *Khepresh*, adding to the militaristic tone of the period.

The Egyptians probably had numerous and complex causes for going to war. Seevers (2013:128) identifies three main motivations for warfare namely, defence, protection against chaos, and economic/acquisition. First, after the foreign rule of the Hyksos, defence of Egypt was prioritised, and the Egyptians undertook an aggressive foreign policy transforming the New Kingdom army into an effective military fighting force, and one of the most dominant in the ancient Near East. Second, the Egyptians believed that the sun god appointed the Pharaoh to sustain order, harmony, righteousness (*ma'at*) against the threats of chaos, disorder, evil (*isef*). The traditional enemies of Egypt, such as the Nubians and Asiatics were thought to be the biggest threat against *ma'at*. A strong and secure Egypt was crucial to ensure *ma'at* which was necessary for proper relations with the gods. Lastly, in creating an empire in Syria-Palestine, Egypt would be in a position to benefit from the resources and opportunities of trade offered from this region. The economic benefits ranged from the acquisition of land to man power to exotic goods (Seevers 2013:112, 3).

4.4 THE HIERARCHY OF COMMAND

The Pharaoh was the head of the Egyptian state as well as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces (army and navy).[37] During the New Kingdom, the Pharaohs frequently planned and personally directed military campaigns and led the chariot divisions in battle (Gabriel 2002:64). Years before Kadesh the Pharaoh Tuthmosis III led his army successfully against a rebellious coalition of Syrian-Palestinian princes at Megiddo, an important town of ancient Palestine (Hoffmeier 1994:273). The sons of the Pharaohs were usually placed in offices of generals to learn the art of warfare and leadership. Preparation for the military role of the New Kingdom princes began early. From their youth, they were trained in the skills of chariotry, archery and ship handling, which were skills necessary for future kings (Seevers 2013:112).The Pharaohs boasted about their extraordinary military skills as evidence of their fitness to rule.

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[37] For a look at life inside the Egyptian army in the New Kingdom, see Elliot (2017). For discussions on Egyptian warfare, see Seevers (2013).

One of the primal responsibilities of the Pharaoh was the preservation of *ma'at*. In leading the army, the Pharaoh was in one way fulfilling this role. He undertook to uphold truth, justice and right order, in part using the country's military to defend Egypt. With Egypt's expansion in the New Kingdom, the Pharaoh had the task of preventing other nations from interfering with Egypt's imperialist ambitions. Seevers (2013:112) comments that this contributed to each Pharaoh feeling obligated to equal or surpass the deeds of their predecessor. Given the above, the Pharaohs were obligated to extend the boundaries of the empire, bring back foreign plunder to Egypt, and make sure that the Egyptian gods and people understood the extent of their deeds (Seevers 2013:113).

The second highest official in command of the army was the General, who was sometimes referred to as the "Overseer of the army" (Spalinger 2005:178). The generals served as division commanders. The majority of the time, this honourable office was held by the sons of the Pharaoh who reported directly to the king. Ramesses II in his *Great Dedicatory Inscription* at Abydos in northern Egypt, claims to have been made head of the infantry and chariotry during the reign of his father, Seti I.

Following his father's role, Amunherkhepeshef, the son of Ramesses II, became a General (Spalinger 2005:178). Beneath the Generals were a privileged officer class, the *hau, mer,* and *menh*, which possibly were the modern equivalent of lieutenant-colonel, captain and lieutenant (Wise 2010:16). The officers were part of one of the higher caste groups and were considered to be on the same level as scribes, priests and nobles. While those of noble birth were able to secure positions in the elite chariot divisions, becoming an officer was a chance for a commoner to achieve status through a military career. The Vizier acted as a modern equivalent of a prime minister in peace times took on the role of Minister of War in war time, and together with an Army council advised the Pharaoh (Gabriel 2010:56). Relief scenes of the War Council advising Ramesses II during the Hittite attack are attested on the Great Pylon at the Luxor Temple (Healy 2005:65). Besides the soldiers, scribes, skilled doctors, and priests were also recruited into the army.

4.5 ENLISTMENT

The armies of the New Kingdom differed to armies of the previous periods. In the Old and Middle Kingdom, the Pharaohs had a small standing army and would call on local rulers to assist with reserves when needed. The reserves had minimal training and reported to their local officials (Seevers 2013:99). This changed by the New Kingdom as the army consisted mostly of professional soldiers who operated within a well organised chain of command. The recruitment and training of soldiers were improved upon. During the New Kingdom freeborn native Egyptian men were drafted into military service. Royal recruiting officers were sent throughout Egypt recruiting soldiers. The conscription criteria changed with the levy being one man in ten instead of the traditional one man in hundred (Gabriel 2002:64).

The new recruits would have been sent to military training centres in Egypt, either Memphis in the north, Thebes in the south or Pi-Ramesses in the Delta region. At these centres, recruits were registered, assigned to drill companies and issued with weapons and equipment. Their training was provided by professional officers and non-commissioned officers and included learning to march within a drill company and daily drilling with weapons (Gabriel 2002:64). The training was often accompanied by harsh frequent beatings and if the recruits attempted to desert, their families were imprisoned (Seevers 2013:99). Some of the new recruits came from military families, often finding that sons would follow in their father's footsteps. These military families who produced sons for military service would receive land.

During the New Kingdom, the Pharaohs began to recruit more foreign mercenaries. At the beginning of the New Kingdom mercenaries came from Nubia and Libya but later on the Sherden and other Sea People were recruited. There are suggestions that by the end of the New Kingdom, the Egyptian army was comprised mainly of foreigners and not native Egyptians (Seevers 2013:101). Another source of manpower for the army was also in the form of prisoners of war captured during campaigns (Seevers 2013:101). The prisoners were branded with the Pharaoh's name, assigned to a military camp, assigned clothing and provisions, and reintroduced into the army as auxiliary infantry. Healy (2005:38) claims that the mercenaries were not typical mercenaries but more like impressed prisoners who preferred to be a soldier in the Egyptian army as opposed to the alternative, which was slavery.

4.6 MILITARY BRANCHES

4.6.1 Infantry

The infantry, *menfyt*, formed the largest part of the Egyptian army. According to Seevers (2013:102), certain references distinguish between infantry that was less well-trained and lightly armed recruits (draftees), and the heavy-armed troops (professionals). The weapons used by infantrymen were the spear, sword, battle-axe, throw stick, mace, and the bow and arrow. Although infantry was trained in the use of all weapons, the infantry units were frequently organised according to types of weapons. For example, spearmen carried shields and spears and were tasked with protection against the enemy and disrupting hostile attacks. The fighting formation of the infantry according to Gabriel (2002:67) was usually five-men deep, with a ten man front in a fifty man unit. This fighting style allowed the units to form marching columns ten-man wide quickly, affording a degree of flexibility in infantry deployment (Gabriel 2002:67).

Typically, the Egyptians fought their battles during summer and in hot conditions. The infantry wore a short kilt, a *shend'ot*. Depictions on some reliefs suggest that the front was possibly stiffened with flax (Shaw 2015:116). It was ridged and resistant as leather and presumably afforded more protection. In previous periods, soldiers usually wore nothing on their upper bodies. By the New Kingdom, soldiers wore a sleeveless body shirt. It consisted of several layers of flax, reinforced for protection against arrows (Ricart 2012:41).

The bronze helmet was not widely used because of the heat. Gabriel (2010:85) explains that the soldiers wore a *nemes*, or a folded cloth consisting of heavy breathable linen that could soak up water and then used to cool the head. The footwear consisted of sturdy leather-soled sandals. To keep their skin moist and stave off sunburn, the soldiers used vegetable oil and animal fat. Similar to modern soldiers, the Egyptian soldiers used a wet cloth tied around the mouth and nose to assist with dust inhalation in the desert environments. In this case, prevention was better than cure as dust inhalation caused medical conditions like chronic coughing, severe nosebleeds, and eye irritation (Gabriel 2010:85,6).

The information for the basic organisation of smaller to larger units is not clear and needs further investigation. However, Seevers (2013:102) and Gabriel (2002:65) propose that squads made up a basic fighting unit, and consisted of about ten men, inclusive of a commander and assistant. Evidence suggests that five squads made up a platoon of fifty, and four to five platoons made up a company of 200 to 250. Four or five companies made up a battalion of one-thousand, while five battalions possibly made up a division.

A well-defined officer corps drawn from the ranks of common soldiers, civil service, and members of the royal court served as primary support for the infantry. The "Captain of the Troop" led each squad, and each platoon was commanded by a "leader of fifty." A "standard bearer" commanded a company. Each battalion was led by a "Commander of a Host." The divisions were led by generals, who were often royal princes. Although the generals led the division, Gabriel (2002:66) comments that the daily workings of the division were probably handled by a senior general, known as "lieutenant commander of the army."

Scribes and quartermasters provided administrative support for the army (Gabriel 2002:65). The quartermasters were responsible for food storage and the issuing of food and supplies. The scribes were responsible for recruit registration, handling rations, and keeping records on the battlefield, inclusive of assessment of the number of enemy casualties and rewards after the battle. Scenes from Medinet Habu, a mortuary temple of Ramesses III, attest to this. The scribes are depicted recording the number of dead (Seevers 2013:137).

Typically, a company in the Egyptian infantry bore a name and standard.[38] The standards were a symbol of pride but also served as a means of communication, and keeping the soldiers organised (Ricart 2012:40). It allowed the commanders to monitor the location of the units and served as a rallying point for the soldiers of the unit. The reliefs of Ramesses III show a chariot mounted with a standard of an Egyptian god driven before the Pharaoh and the army. Similar to the Hittite belief that their gods ran before them in battle to ensure victory, the Egyptians believed that their gods led the armies into battle and victory (Seevers 2013:105).

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[38] For a detailed discussion on Egyptian Military Standards, see Faulkner (1941).

This communicated the idea that that war was divinely sanctioned, and that the Pharaoh as the gods representative was waging war on their behalf. This probably emboldened the soldiers with courage and was a boost to the morale of the army before the battle. Another means of communication on the battlefield seems to have been the trumpet. It functioned as an instrument for summoning soldiers or signalling a charge or retreat. Trumpets are attested in battle scenes such as the Kadesh reliefs which depict a trumpeter standing next to the soldiers who are beating the Hittite spies (Trimm 2017:200). Remains of trumpets believed to be war trumpets have been found in Tutankhamun's tomb.

4.6.2 Chariotry

During the New Kingdom, the two principal military arms were the infantry and chariotry (Gabriel 2002:64). Although the infantry was certainly the backbone of the army throughout Egyptian history, the chariotry was the pride of the army. The Egyptian word for chariot is *wrrt* (Hallo and Younger 2004:5). From the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Dynasties there are references to chariots in forms of pictorial and textual evidence (Seevers 2013:98).

Bard (2015:193) remarks that details of Egyptian chariots can be gathered from battle scenes, temples, and tombs. Remains of chariots have been discovered in Tutankhamun's tomb. It has been suggested that the Hyksos with their firepower and mobility, whose centre piece was a two-man chariot, overwhelmed the Egyptian army at the time which consisted of infantry, namely bowmen, spearmen, and club men (Gabriel 2001:29). By the time of the New Kingdom, the Egyptians had mastered the skill in using and producing chariots, so much so, that in later periods Egyptian chariots were in high demand in the ancient Near East.

The Egyptian chariot had a light wooden frame which was covered by a stretched fabric or hides. Gabriel (2002:65) comments that the lightness of the frame made it possible to be carried over streams or rough terrain. This is attested by wall reliefs depicting soldiers carrying them on their backs after being unassembled. The weight of the chariot is believed to not have exceeded 35 kilograms (Spalinger 2014:438). The cab of the chariot was semi-circular in shape and had an open back. The cab or enclosed platform in which the two men stood was 1 meter wide, ¾ meter high, and ½ meter deep (Ricart 2012:37).

The chariots were usually propelled by two horses. The weapons used like the bow and arrow or spear were attached to either side of the cab. The chariot driver and warrior stood on a platform comprised of stretched leather thongs covered with hide. A chariot team was usually composed of a chariot driver, *ketjen* and the warrior, *seneny* and the chariot runner, *phrr* who fought on foot flanking the chariot (Trimm 2017:214). The charioteer was responsible for driving the chariot, while the warrior was responsible for the fighting. The function of the chariot runner was probably to protect the chariot from enemy infantry. Initially, when the chariots first came into use they were possibly incorporated into the organisation of the infantry. However, with the passing of time, the chariot divisions grew in size and importance. This resulted in chariotry being separated from infantry and given its own organisation and chain of command. Subsequently, a hierarchy of officers and support staff developed for chariotry (Gabriel 2002:65).

The chariot divisions were organised into squadrons of twenty five led by the "Charioteer of the Residence." Gabriel (2002:64) comments that the numbers were flexible as larger units of fifty and one hundred chariots could be rapidly assembled if a change in mission or terrain necessitated it. The units carried names such as "Manifest in Justice" or the "Phoenix." Seevers (2013:37) explains that the names were associated with the Pharaoh's titles or the Egyptian deities. The companies were led by the "Standard Bearer of Chariot-Warriors."

The largest unit was possibly led by the "Commander of a Chariot Host." By the end of the Eighteenth Dynasty, Seevers (2013:106) states that an officer with the title "Master of the Horse" commanded the entire chariotry corps. This position was often filled by a high ranking official from the Egyptian court or a member of the royal family. The duties of this office included the training, recruitment, supply and command of the chariotry. Attached to the chariotry divisions were a variety of support staff which Gabriel (2002:65) comments included breeders, horse handlers who trained and recruited horses, as well as craftsmen who repaired chariots while the army was in the field.

Several studies (Seevers 2013:106; Feldman and Sauvage 2010:86) agree that the chariot was a symbol of status and power. The New Kingdom Pharaohs had chariot training and frequently fought at the head of a chariot division. New Kingdom reliefs of battle scenes frequently depict the Pharaoh leading a chariot charge which suggests that the chariotry were the elite striking force of the Egyptian army. Remains of chariots found in mostly royal tombs like that of Tutankhamun reveal the close connection between the chariot and the king (Feldman and Sauvage 2010:86).

The elite nature of the chariotry is perhaps one of the reasons that it drew chariot warriors from the upper classes and most powerful families in Egyptian society. The charioteers and chariot warriors often owned their own land. If the officers in charge of the chariot units proved themselves there were opportunities for promotions to diplomatic posts, like military chiefs or ambassadors (Feldman and Sauvage 2010:84).[39] Charioteers and chariot warriors became notable figures part of a privileged elite. For instance, Menna, the charioteer of Ramesses II, who was highly honoured, being mentioned in the *Poem*, one of the Kadesh textual accounts (Schulman 1963:88-89).

Drews (1993:112) proposes that there was a closely dependent relationship between the Pharaoh and his chariotry. The charioteers are believed to have provided their own chariots, and the Pharaoh provided the rest of the expensive equipment needed by the chariot crews, and they, in turn, fought for the Pharaoh to ensure Egypt's security. There was special training for the charioteers which included driving, archery and tactics. Although the life of a charioteer was one of status and power, there was also hardship. A scribal satire attests to this fact: "the miserable office, the chariot-warrior of the chariotry" (Seevers 2013:106). Chariot officers often had to endure harsh treatment from supervisors, horse bites, and faced logistical challenges of manoeuvring vehicles through difficult terrain, while keeping vehicles in top operational order.

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[39] For discussions on the diplomatic role of the charioteers, see Abbas (2012).

4.7 WEAPONRY

The armies of the Old and Middle Kingdom had relied on maces, spears, battle axes, and simple bows to fight with. Seevers (2013:119) suggests that the heavy losses encountered against the Hyksos probably forced the Egyptian to revaluate their weaponry. From the New Kingdom onwards the Egyptians were using the composite bow, the chariot, armour-penetrating axes, helmets and eventually metal body armour. Sources for the weapons include wall scenes in tombs and temples, inscriptions, and the weapons themselves (Seevers 2013:124). Generally speaking, the weapons can be divided into two classes, those used for hand-to-hand fighting (short range), and those that function at a distance (medium and long range).

According to Seevers (2013:120), the infantry and others who fought hand-to-hand required weapons that could operate well at close range. Judging by the New Kingdom reliefs, it seems that the spear and battle-axe were popular short range weapons (Gabriel 2002:67, 8). The spears consisted of a wooden shaft and metal tip. The long thrusting spear seemingly was not usually used as a missile, but more as a pike used to inflict damage on the vulnerable areas of the enemy. A common weapon of the Egyptian soldier was the battle axe which was used throughout Egyptian history (Ricart 2012:41). By the time of the New Kingdom, the shape of the axe had become narrower and longer. It could be used to cast a powerful blow that would penetrate armour. The Egyptian soldier used a bronze metal rod as a short-range weapon. The use was two-fold, for beating enemies in combat and beating their own troops in cases of discipline.

The *Khopesh* was the long-bladed weapon used by the Egyptians (Ricart 2012:41). Even though it was closely associated with the Egyptians, it probably originated in Mesopotamia. The *Khopesh* had a hooked blade which had its sharp edge on the outside (Ricart 2012:40). It had a tremendous slashing ability in hand-to-hand combat. The *Khopesh* gained in popularity and became a symbol of royal power and strength. This is evidenced in New Kingdom reliefs which depict the Pharaoh with a *Khopesh*, suggesting that it replaced the mace of earlier periods as the symbol of Egyptian authority (Seevers 2013:121). The javelin was a medium range weapon. It was a smaller version of the spear and played a role in chariot warfare.

Charioteers carried two javelins in a quiver on either side of the chariot. It was probably used if the chariot became disabled or could have been used by chariot runners to kill or maim the horses of enemy chariots (Darnell and Manassa 2007:77). Alongside the chariot, the composite bow is what many scholars feel was responsible for the transformation of warfare in the New Kingdom. The composite bow was an extraordinary piece of military hardware that the Egyptians adopted into their weaponry (Ricart 2012:40). It was a long range weapon, and one of the primary weapons of the Egyptian army. The Egyptians had a long history of bow usage, initially with the simple bow. However, by the New Kingdom, the composite bow became the bow of choice. The composite bow consisted of a wooden core which was covered with a layer of sinew on the back, and a layer of horn on the face. It was then secured with a sheath of bark (Morkot 2010:51). The tips of the arrow consisted of flint or bronze (Ricart 2012:41). The composite bow was smaller, had a lot more draw height, and was far more powerful and deadly than the simple bow. The strength and flexibility allowed archers to shoot their targets while in motion. Current research done with modern replicas generally confirms that the composite bow can shoot arrows over a distance of an estimated 230-260 meters, but in antiquity it seemingly was effective up to a distance of 175 meters (Morkot 2010:51).

The placing of the archer with the composite bow in the chariot provided the Egyptian army with mobility and firepower in the New Kingdom which it had not known in previous periods. The chariot was transformed into a swiftly moving firing platform for archers (Littauer and Crouwel 2002:92). Using a composite bow a trained archer would have been able to fire an arrow once every six seconds with reasonable accuracy. Archer (2010: 61) proposes that the high rate of fire together with the great range, and striking power of the composite bow gave it a greater killing ability than the simple bow. The speed of the chariot afforded the chariot archer a quick withdrawal, and an opportunity for the next attack. The disadvantages of the composite bow were the expense and the manufacture period with some estimates of six months (Gabriel 2007:73). The materials that the bow was composed of were susceptible to the elements, in particular humidity and moisture, which made it non-operational. Seevers (2013:123) explains to combat this, reliefs depict bows carried in bow cases functioning as protection from humidity and moisture.

The strength and endurance needed to wield the bow, also necessitated a long period of training for the archer. The Egyptian sources attest to the high value of the bow in the New Kingdom (Ricart 2012:40.) Reliefs depict the Pharaoh shooting the composite bow highlighting the importance of the weapon (Seevers 2013:123). Tomb illustrations and textual references suggest that this was a weapon produced by specialised craftsman and utilised by the upper class. International correspondence, for instance the Amarna Letters,[40] detail that the bows were part of gift exchanges between ancient Near Eastern rulers (Morkot 2010:25).

The introduction of the composite bow is what Shaw (2015:105) explains could have prompted the change in arm guards and quivers. New types of arm guards appear in the New Kingdom. Funerary depictions show arm guards which are colourful and tied to the elbow and wrist. In comparison to previous guards, they cover much of the lower arm. The majority of the New Kingdom quivers were slightly tapered leather containers with a cap replacing the Middle Kingdom tubular types (Darnell and Manassa 2007:73).

The defensive equipment given to the Egyptian soldier consisted of helmets, shields, and scale armour. The helmets were comprised of fabric, leather or metal, and assisted in protecting the soldier from skull injuries. The shields consisted of wood, and the front was reinforced with leather and a bronze plate (Ricart 2012:41). The shields size and shape differed over time. Seevers (2013:124) notes that the heavy infantry was equipped with larger shields to protect the majority of their body, while charioteers were equipped with smaller shields. The Egyptians began to use body armour in different forms during the New Kingdom. Garments of linen or leather provided some protection, but the body armour with small bronze plates riveted to linen or leather jerkins seemed to be more effective (Shaw 2015:106).

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[40] The Amarna Letters consist of fourteenth century BCE correspondence between ancient Near Eastern rulers and Egypt. They deal with subjects ranging from international diplomacy to exchanged materials (Bryce 2003:232-35).

4.8 SPECIAL FORCES

Many of antiquity's famous armies contained Special Forces. Egypt was no exception and maintained special units of highly trained elite troops (Healy 2005:38). These troops were trained and equipped for specialist tasks, like royal guards, shock troops or elite chariotry. Their specialist skills and endurance could probably rival modern Special Forces.

4.8.1 *Nakhtu-aa* or "The Strong-arm boys"

The *Nakhtu-aa* were tough disciplined shock troops within the infantry. Gabriel (2002: 67) comments that they were considered one of the toughest and most disciplined units in the infantry. The *Nakhtu-aa* fought in close combat and were often sent into the roughest part of the battle, ahead of the new raw recruits (Healy 2005:38). They were armed with shields, the *dja* or short spear, the *khopesh*, the battle axe, and the *taagsu* or dagger.

4.8.2 *Kenyt-nesu* or "Kings Braves"

The *Kenyt-nesu* was an elite special operations unit of heavy infantry. Gabriel (2002:67) compares them to the modern U.S. Army Rangers. They were ordinary soldiers who had distinguished themselves in battle. Entry into this unit was merit based (Gabriel 2010:62). The *Kenyt-nesu* were deployed when needing to overcome difficult positions.

4.8.3 Egyptian Chariotry

In the military records of the New Kingdom, Seevers (2013:104) explains that the more impressive branch of the chariotry usually appears more prominent than the infantry. The chariots became the elite striking force of the Egyptian army.

4.8.4 *Phrr* or "The Runners"

The Egyptians employed a special class of infantry who were known as the chariot runners (Drews 1993:143). They fought on foot and accompanied the chariots into the battle. The chariot runner's purpose was presumably to protect the chariots from enemy infantry, and rescue their own charioteers and horses if need be.

4.8.5 The Sherden (Elite mercenaries)

The earliest mention of the Sherden[41] occurs in the Egyptian sources, the Amarna letters. Written ca 1350 BCE it records that the Sherden belonged to an Egyptian garrison in Byblos (Abbas 2016:7). The Sherden were among the Sea Peoples who attacked Egypt during the New Kingdom. Prior to Kadesh the Sherden had attacked the Nile Delta. After the attack, the Sherden were captured and incorporated into the Egyptian army. They are identifiable in the Kadesh reliefs by their famous horned helmets, carrying swords and spears, and round shields (Wise 2010:18).The battle reliefs depict the Sherden performing different roles such as fighting in infantry units or as chariot runners. A relief at the temple of Ramesses II at Abydos depicts a Sherden warrior cutting off the hand of a dead Hittite warrior. Abbas (2016:10) comments that Spalinger (2005) has argued that the various Kadesh reliefs support the theory that the Sherden formed the majority of the royal bodyguard during the Battle of Kadesh. The Egyptian sources credit the bravery of the bodyguard in defending Ramesses II when his other soldiers have deserted him.

4.8.6 *Ne'arin*

The *Ne'arin* was an elite unit that played a crucial role at Kadesh. The Luxor camp scene of the Kadesh reliefs depicts the timely arrival of the *Ne'arin* troops. They were detached from the main body of the army but arrived just in time to save the Egyptian army from annihilation. The *Ne'arin's* heroic deeds are celebrated in the reliefs but elsewhere in the sources, their contribution to the battle is minimised in order to highlight the glory of the Pharaoh's actions (Santosuosso 1996:432). There remains a debate surrounding the identity of the *Ne'arin*.

Several studies agree (Schulman 1981) that the *Ne'arin* were Egyptian, whereas Goedicke (1966) claims that they were Canaanite soldiers from the Amurru or the Apiru, namely Semitic mercenaries. Santosuosso (1996:433) supports the view of Schulman (1981) explaining that the Kadesh reliefs depict the *Ne'arin* in Egyptian dress and equipment which would be unusual if they were foreigners.

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[41] For the military role of the Sherden in the Egyptian army during the Ramesside Period, see Abbas (2016).

4.8.7 Mounted Scouts

The Kadesh texts make no mention of mounted scouts, however three Egyptian riders are depicted as scouts on the Kadesh reliefs at Abu Simbel. The opinion of Seevers (2013:130) is that the mounted scouts were attached to the units of chariotry, serving as Egyptian intelligence. They were tasked with gathering information about enemy troops, such as numbers of infantry, chariotry, weapons, location and they went ahead of the army to assess the terrain before them.

4.8.8 Archers

The Egyptian light infantry contained an elite unit of archers referred to as *megau,* which literally means shooter (Gabriel 2002:62). With the introduction of the chariot, the bow remained the predominate weapon of the chariotry. New Kingdom reliefs depict archers shown on foot and in chariots.

4.9 ON CAMPAIGN

According to Darnell and Manassa (2007:125), every stage of Egyptian warfare had its own appropriate ritual. Temple reliefs depict a god handing a scimitar to the Pharaoh, an indication of divine justification for the battle. While setting out for war the army marched between banners and ribbons of divine standards. Some military texts hold that a deity would appear to the Pharaoh in a dream before a battle. Egypt's army usually set out on campaigns during the spring and continued them during the dry summer months. Seevers (2013:129) explains the reason being that roads were passable and food was available. It was not unheard of for the army to campaign in winter. The *Annals* of Tuthmosis III relate how he led a campaign to Palestine during winter.

The Egyptians began their campaign by assembling and departing from a central point, which served as the central military headquarters. Pi-Ramesses, located in the Nile Delta, was believed to be the staging point for Ramesses II as he departed for Kadesh (Kraus and Rauh 2018:61). At the staging point, the army would have been supplied with weapons and supplies and issued with battle orders. Thereafter a standard bearer and trumpeter would lead the army before an inspection by the Pharaoh. Ramesses II's army consisted of four divisions (Spalinger 2005:212).

The army marched in columns which were divided into their respective divisions. According to Spalinger (2005:34), the army marched approximately between 16 to 24 kilometres per day. Aside from the gruelling marches, each soldier carried his weapons, supplies, garments and staff or club. The texts speak to the hardships of the soldiers on campaign. They frequently drank poor water, ate little due to food shortages, and those that died were placed in a sack and buried in the foreign land that they were in. Food shortages were a challenge for the army. Although the army supplied some of the food, the majority came from the territories through which it marched. Local rulers under Egyptian authority were expected to provide for the army, however, in hostile territory the army took provisions by force (Seevers 2013:131).

At Kadesh, Ramesses II revolutionised Egyptian logistics with the introduction of the ox-drawn cart. According to Gabriel (2001:6), it became the standard mode of military transport used for the next thousand years. The ox-drawn carts and packed animals carried numerous supplies and equipment that accompanied the army. Scenes of the Kadesh camp show the tents that were carried for Ramesses II and the officers and other furniture, like the Pharaoh's golden throne and headrests (Healy 2005:65). Typically, after a day's march, the Egyptian soldiers camped for the night. Reliefs depict Egyptian camps as rectangular enclosures, barricaded by shields. The smaller tents of the officers are shown as surrounding the royal tent in the centre. Seevers (2013:130) explains that craftsman accompanied the army, and brought along workshops to service the equipment. These included mobile chariot workshops who were tasked with repairing and maintaining the operability of the vehicles while the army was marching.

On the march, there were often situations that necessitated war councils. It was at the war councils that the Pharaoh and his senior officers would gather to discuss intelligence and other matters. The meetings were chaired by the Pharaoh from his golden throne. The Kadesh reliefs at Luxor attest to this by showing Ramesses II sitting on his golden throne with his back to the camp surrounded by his senior officers (Healy 2005:65).

4.10 THE EGYPTIANS IN BATTLE

There is an incomplete picture concerning how the ancient Egyptians fought battles. Schulman (1995:291, 2) argues the reason being that the written material and battle art of the New Kingdom served the purpose of glorifying the Pharaoh's prowess. Although Schulman does acknowledge that the sources give some information regarding how the Egyptian troops fought, and their weapons, he explains that these details are incidental. Typically, the sources depict the Pharaoh who dominates the battle and defeats the enemy (Schulman 1995:292). If the soldiers are depicted in the battle, it is usually to deal with the fleeing enemy, whom the Pharaoh was able to defeat on his own. Seevers (2013:132) is in agreement with Schulman and comments that the military texts do not provide much information about the tactics used in battle.

The information that is recorded seems to suggest that the Egyptian army used mass infantry, which were arranged in phalanxes-rectangular formations. This is attested in the Kadesh reliefs which depict the phalanx of the Egyptian infantry. The light troops carrying the long range weapons like the archers were probably deployed to the rear of the main battle formation and the flanks. This allowed them to shower their weapons on the enemy, and provide cover for their advancing phalanxes (Schulman 1995: 294). Once the infantry made contact with the enemy, it came down to strength, skill, and discipline, until one side prevailed, and the other broke and fled. Another responsibility of the infantry was to protect and disrupt the hostile charges of the enemy against the chariot units.

The chariots served as mobile firing platforms and were used to disrupt enemy formations and engage enemy chariots (Healy 2005:39). The chariots travelled down the enemy's front, its archers firing missiles upon the enemy infantry. Screening and protecting the army on the march was also provided by the chariots.

Once the enemy infantry had broken, Seevers (2013:133) points out that a great part of the chariots lethality was to pursue and kill fleeing enemy troops. The advantage of the chariot units, according to Gabriel (2002:68), is that they were highly mobile reserves that could be committed to an opportune moment to turn a flank or take advantage of a breakthrough. If a battle plan went wrong, like with Ramesses II at Kadesh, the chariots could be used to recover a desperate situation.

The Egyptian army at Kadesh lacked cavalry formations. Gabriel (2002:69) comments that this is surprising because the Egyptians had knowledge of the horse from the Hyksos rule. Gabriel (2002:69) concludes that the reason for this was probably the horse of the period was not strong enough to carry the weight of an armoured soldier for a long period.

In the aftermath of the battle, the Egyptian armies collected plunder and prisoners of war, rewarded their troops, celebrated their success, and captured records of their victory. The Egyptian military records kept meticulous details of the plunder taken. The reason being that the Pharaohs promised to enrich the temples of the gods in return for their divine aid on the battlefield. Prisoners of war were the property of the state and were viewed as an important source of labour for Egypt (Seevers 2013:138). Some were incorporated into the military, while others served as labourers in the temple complexes and the vast land holdings of the temples.

The Egyptian soldiers, for their bravery and kills, received items made of gold, such as jewellery, golden lions, or golden flies. These were highly coveted and used as decorations of honour (Seevers 2013:138). Typically, the soldiers used severed hands of their enemy as proof of kills but also used severed genitals. In celebration of the victory, the Pharaoh would lead the army in praise in a ceremony for the Egyptians gods. Egyptian sources reveal that the army praised Ramesses II for his personal prowess after Kadesh. Seevers (2013:139) explains that on return to Egypt, the Pharaohs celebrated with the army by displaying plunder, presenting gifts to the gods, and giving elaborate "Feasts of Victory" with a variety of exotic food.

Records of their exploits were compiled thereafter. The scribes that accompanied the army on campaign kept detailed daily reports on leather scrolls. These contained information pertaining to descriptions and details of strategic operations, individual sorties, and names of commanders (Seevers 2013:140).

The information was used to provide information for the general summaries that were engraved on monumental inscriptions in the temple or on stelae. With the campaign over and the enemy defeated, Egypt was no longer on high alert and reverted to peaceable times. Texts speak of soldiers sleeping, border scouts patrolling at their leisure, and no warnings from sentinels of foreign envoys arriving (Seevers 2013:140).

Seevers (2013:140) concludes by saying that life was as it should be, thanks to Egypt's gods, Pharaoh, and army who had done their jobs, allowing Egypt to return to prosperity and safety.

4.11 RAMESSES II: MILITARY OPERATIONS

In ca 1279 BCE, Ramesses II ascended the throne after the death of his father, Seti I. Determined to follow in his father's footsteps, he wanted to restore Egypt to predominance in the ancient Near East, and restore national pride (Healy 2005:19). War with the Hittites was inevitable, and Ramesses II made changes to military operations to ensure a victory against the Hittites (Bryce 2005:233).

4.11.1 PI-Ramesses: Strategic base of operations

Ramesses II's legacy as one of the greatest builders is evidenced by his new capital Pi-Ramesses (Hoffmeier 1994:276). It is located in the north-eastern Delta, about 100 kilometres from Cairo. Identified with the modern site of Qantir, it is a site adjacent to the Hyksos capital of Avaris/Tell ed-Da'ba. Ramesses II, upon assuming power, decided to move the capital to his childhood home, a summer palace built by Seti I onsite of Pi-Ramesses. It was a city of beauty refreshed by the Waters of Ra, a Nile tributary, which housed luxurious palaces and temples.

Beyond reasons of sentimentality, Ramesses II chose the location as a strategic point of defence of Syria (Hoffmeier 1994:277). Evidence from Qantir reveals a well-developed military set up. It was a military city complete with weapon manufacturing and military training facilities. The excavations at Pi-Ramesses have uncovered a large installation associated with a chariotry garrison. It is inclusive of an armoury, stables, work stations for repairing chariots and shields, and a training and exercise ground for horses (Bell 2007:111). A garrison was permanently stationed at the capital. Spalinger (2005:228) explains that the move of the base of operations from Memphis to Pi-Ramesses was a good strategic move on Ramesses II's part. The proximity to Syria and the sea meant that a large contingent of troops could be deployed faster by land from Egypt into Syria.

4.11.2 The Power of Egypt: Additional Manpower

The Egyptians realised that in order to recover their former territories in Syria, it would be accomplished through military force and that they faced a highly effective army of the Hittites. In defending Egypt and successfully regaining Egyptian territory from the Hittites, Ramesses II would need to equip and field an army far larger than Egypt had previously done. Before the New Kingdom, Egyptian soldiers would march and fight in local contingents. In the New Kingdom, the army was organised into self-contained divisions which each consisted of approximately 5000 men. There were three divisions but Ramesses II added a fourth division in an effort to bolster the numbers (Spalinger 2005:212). Fighting with all four divisions was unique to the New Kingdom. In earlier periods short localised wars were usually fought with one division at a time, and not large pitched battles (Morkot 2010:28). The four divisions would have totalled an estimated 20,000 men at arms (Spalinger 2005:215).

4.11.3 The Egyptian two-man chariot

The Egyptian two-man chariot was not created by Ramesses II but certainly deserves a mention. It was introduced to the Egyptian military after the Hyksos domination, and one of the changes that Ramesses II kept going forward to Kadesh (Seevers 2013:125). The Egyptians had mastered the skill of chariot making, and the distinctive design of the chariot had reached the height of its development (Healy 2005:39). Unlike the heavier Hyksos and Canaanite chariots, the Egyptian chariot, made from wood and leather, was light. It was built for speed and manoeuvrability.[42]

Gabriel (2010:58) emphasises that three military innovations of the chariot can be credited to the Egyptians, namely the position of the axle, the six spoke wheel, and the U-joint connecting the yoke pole to the chariot cab. The axle was moved from the centre to the far rear of the carrying platform of the chariot (Ricart 2012:37). This provided a more stable platform for the charioteer and chariot warrior and increased the vehicles speed and manoeuvrability. The six spoke wheel was added to the chariot, replacing the four spoke wheel. The six spoke wheel was a stronger wheel and was able to withstand speeds of an estimated nineteen kilometres per hour over uneven terrain.

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[42] For differences between Hittites and Egyptian attitudes and approaches to chariot warfare, see Shaw (2012).

It also made the chariot more manoeuvrable and provided a stable platform for the chariot warrior when in motion. The creation of the U-joint is, according to Gabriel (2010:58), one of the greatest inventions by ancient engineers. This is where the pole of the chariot coming off the horses joins the cab of the chariot. Due to the fact that the movable joint is not locked in place, it is able to absorb a lot of shock. It ensures the integrity of the chariot, and makes the ride more stable for the men inside as it helped reduce the vehicles tendency to roll over in a turn. Gabriel (2010:59) comments that the Egyptians had used the above technical advances to make the chariots faster, more stable, highly manoeuvrable, and requiring less frequent repairs than previous chariots.

Previous studies have debated the role of the Egyptian chariot in battle. Drews (1993:115) explains that Schulman (1980) advocated the "battle taxi" theory which claims that the chariots are used to transport archers onto the battlefield. The archer would dismount the chariot, and fire an arrow. Thereafter, the archer would remount the chariot and be transported to another location for another shot. Drews (1993:115), challenges this theory stating that there is no archaeological or literary evidence to support this. Morkot (2010:66) also disagrees with Schulman (1980) and proposes that the chariots functioned as a mobile firing platform. Morkot (2010:66) substantiates the mobile firing platform theory by providing the example of the Kadesh reliefs which show the Egyptian chariots carrying archers who fired as the chariots were driven. On the battlefield, the chariot was typically used as screens for infantry and used to cover the movements of the troops.

The chariot archers with their long range composite bow were able to kill the enemy from a distance (Seevers 2013:123). Once the enemy was defeated, the fast moving chariots could be used in dispatching the fleeing enemy. The chariots were also accompanied by chariot runners that were effective in killing of the wounded, and rescuing the charioteers and horses if necessary (Seevers 2013:105).By the reign of Ramesses II the chariot and its crew had developed into a sophisticated and fine-tuned war machine. The adoption of the chariot in the New Kingdom was a military innovation for the Egyptian army as it introduced a level of mobility to the battlefield (Healy 2005:39). By the time of Kadesh, Healy (2005:39) explains that the Egyptian chariotry had a history of mobile warfare dating back nearly three hundred years.

4.12 CONCLUSION

The Hyksos foreign rule had changed the world-view of the Egyptians. After the successful Hyksos expulsion, the Egyptians embarked on an aggressive foreign policy to prevent future attacks, and extend the empire. By the time of the New Kingdom, the armies of the Old and Middle Kingdom had transformed from small standing armies into a professional permanent army with soldiers that operated in a well organised chain of command (Wise 2010:14-16). The Egyptians believed that the Pharaoh being the god's representative on earth waged war on their behalf. Egyptian reliefs attest to this by depicting a mounted standard in a chariot bearing the image of a god driven before the Pharaoh and the army, symbolising the god going before them in success (Seevers 2013:104).

Constituting the major parts of the army were the infantry and chariot troops (Gabriel 2010:57). The infantry formed the largest part of the army. Typically, they carried a variety of weapons, spears, swords, the battle-axe, the mace, throw stick, and bow and arrow. In battle, the more experienced soldiers would be at the front, with the raw recruits being at the back. The elite unit, the *Nakhtu-aa*, typically would spearhead the assault in battle. In the Old and Middle Kingdom Periods, the army consisted solely of infantry. This changed in the New Kingdom with the adoption of the chariot. The majority of scholars agree that the Egyptians adopted the chariot and the composite bow from the Hyksos (Wise 2010:16). Although not a military innovation of Ramesses II, the combination of the chariot and composite bow brought mobility and firepower onto the Kadesh battlefield that was unheard of in Old and Middle Kingdom Periods. In comparison with the Hittite three-man chariot, the Egyptian chariot carried two men, and was lighter in weight, manoeuvrable and fast. The chariot quickly became a symbol of status and power (Gabriel 2010:57). The men drawn to the life of chariotry were typically from the upper class of society and became part of a privileged elite class in Egyptian society.

The time period between the Zannanza Affair and the battle allowed Ramesses II to make operational changes. The Pharaoh realised that he would need additional manpower to secure a victory against the Hittites. Gabriel (2002:64) explains that the conscription criteria changed with the levy being one man in ten compared to the previous one in a hundred.

Ramesses II added an additional division to his three divisions, allowing the army to field four divisions at Kadesh. In preparation for the upcoming battle, Ramesses II made Pi-Ramesses in the Delta a forward supply base of operations for the army. The Egyptian army marched in columns which were divided into their respective divisions. The army was supported by strong logistical functions. Animals and carts were used to carry supplies including food, water, and spare weapons. Mobile chariot workshops accompanied the army to keep chariots in operational order.

The Egyptian sources do not reveal much information on the tactics used in battle. The information that is recorded suggests that the infantry, using primarily the spear and shield, were arranged in rectangular formations called phalanxes, which engaged other enemy phalanxes. The chariots served as mobile archery platforms. Their speed and manoeuvrability allowed the chariots to disrupt enemy formations, and engage enemy chariots, and pursue a fleeing enemy (Seevers 2013:132).

In this chapter, insight has been provided into the Egyptian army that fought at Kadesh by explaining the military organisation inclusive of the recruitment, training, weapons and elite units. By the time of Kadesh, the Egyptian army had evolved into a well-developed organisation supported by strong logistical functions. The operational changes implemented by Ramesses II ensured a quicker launching of the Egyptian army into Syria, and additional numbers to field one of the largest armies in Egyptian history. Ramesses II used the latest battlefield technologies which included the chariot and composite bow. The Egyptian army that fought under Ramesses II was one of the largest, well-equipped, and most successful of the ancient Near East (Gabriel 2002:69).

CHAPTER 5: SHOWDOWN, MUWATALLIS II AND RAMESSES II

Abstract

The Battle of Kadesh was arguably the most famous chariot battle in ancient Near Eastern history. The reader will be introduced to the textual, iconographical and archaeological sources for the battle. The immediate cause of the battle is addressed briefly. A discussion follows about the development of the Battle of Kadesh according to traditional interpretations of the battle. Finally, an attempt to determine the outcome will be made.

"It is a measure of the fascination exerted by the Battle of Qadesh that nearly three and a quarter millennia after the event it still excites the interest of the scholar and layman alike" (Healy 2005:6). This quote is particularly adept in its reference to the battle, as not only has it been described in numerous works on warfare and ancient history, but also aspects of the battle like the chronology, development, and outcome of the battle are still debated until the present day.

The kingdom of Kadesh on the Orontes River had become somewhat of a buffer zone between northern and southern Syria. During the Empire and New Kingdom Periods, it featured consistently in the power struggles between Hatti and Egypt. Another important region in the struggles was the Amurru.[43] Gaining control of the kingdom of the Amurru was seen as crucial as the Eleutheros Valley ran through the Amurru. The Eleutheros Valley provided a land corridor that was an important line of communication between the Mediterranean and north-eastern Syria. Healy (2005:11) explains that the city of Kadesh was strategically located because it dominated the western end of the Eleutheros Valley, and lay next to the main invasion route to the North Syrian plain.

As the Hittites expanded into Syria, they gained control of the city of Kadesh. Subsequently, the kingdoms of Kadesh and the Amurru had become Hittite vassals during the reign of Šuppiluliuma I. Thereafter, the Pharaoh Seti I, father of Ramesses II, reclaimed Kadesh and the Amurru (Healy 2005:16). However, by the time of Ramesses II's accession to the throne, Kadesh and the Amurru had reverted to Hittite control, which was an affront to Egyptian sovereignty (Bryce 2005:233).

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[43] Amurru lay south of Ugarit (northern Syria) between the Orontes River and the Mediterranean coast (Bryce 2003:138).

Bryce (2005:228, 9) proposes that Egypt and Hatti reached an agreement whereby the Egyptians would retain Canaan but relinquish control of Kadesh and the Amurru. The implications of Hittite control of Kadesh and the Amurru was the great reduction of Egypt's influence in northern Syria (Van De Mieroop 2009:37, 8).

In an effort to reassert Egyptian authority, Ramesses II embarked on a Syrian Campaign in ca 1275 BCE, a year before the Battle of Kadesh (Healy 2005:16). The source covering this campaign is the *Great Dedicatory Inscription* in the temple of Seti 1 at Abydos. It is a monument that Ramesses II completed which shows that the Syrian Campaign began in Year Four of his reign. Known as the "First Campaign of Victory," it records that Ramesses II marched along the coastal road from the Sinai Peninsula to the upper reaches of Phoenicia. He established control probably as far as Dog River, Nahr el-Kelb in modern Lebanon, and pushed further north to the Amurru, but did not reach Kadesh, a Hittite vassal farther inland. Bryce (2005:233) comments that the campaign was not only a show of Egyptian force but was done to ascertain the loyalty of the Egyptian vassals in the region, and to garner their support for the inevitable clash with the Hittites.

5.1 THE DEFECTION OF THE AMURRU

What happens next infuriates the Hittites. Benteshina, King of the Amurru, a Hittite vassal repudiated his vassal treaty and defected to Egypt (Healy 2005:16). The Hittites views this as an act of treachery, and after the Battle of Kadesh, Benteshina was deposed and taken prisoner by the Hittites (Bryce 2005:240). The increased hostilies occurring after the Zannanza Affair had prompted Muwatallis II and Ramesses II to make battle preparations for the eventual conflict. Although the Zannanza Affair could be considered as a long term cause of the battle, the immediate cause was the defection of the Amurru. Healy (2005:6) suggests that even though the Amurru had become a Hittite vassal, it was done under duress, and Benteshina still maintained loyalty to Egypt. Following the resurgence of Egyptian power under Ramesses II, Benteshina possibly felt it was to the advantage of the Amurru to return to the Egyptian fold. Van De Mieroop (2009:38) disagrees and comments that Benteshina was a loyal Hittite vassal but was forced to switch sides, at the sight of the Egyptian army on the borders of his kingdom, and no sign of immediate military support from the Hittites.

The significance of the defection of Benteshina cannot be understated (Bryce 2005:240). In the majority of cases, the Hittites preferred to rule distant lands, like Syria, through members of the dynasties of the kingdoms that they defeated (Bryce 2007:5). These kings, like Benteshina, were bound by treaty to the person of the Great Hittite King. Even though the Hittites recognised Benteshina as the Amurrite king, he was regarded as a subordinate to the Hittite king (Bryce 2007:5).

Beckman (1992:49) explains that the main duties of the treaties were the payment of tribute, the providing of military assistance when required, the renouncing of all independent foreign contacts, the extradition of fugitives from Hatti, and the guarantee of succession to the throne of the Hittite Great King's designated heir. The Hittite practise usually required vassals to swear oaths by the gods of both nations, unlike nations like Assyria who ignored the gods of the vassals. The breaking of the terms of the treaty typically resulted in Hittite military action. The defection of Benteshina was viewed as a declaration of war (Healy 2005:20). A petitional prayer speaks to Muwatallis II's outrage and tells of his intention:

> On which campaign My Majesty shall march then if you Gods, support me and I
> will conquer the lands of Amurru-whether I overcome it by force of arms, or whether
> it makes peace with me-and I seize the king of the Amurru, then…I will reward you,
> O Gods…! (Klengel 2002:213, KBo ix 96 (CTH 590) 7-9, 14).

Muwatallis II realised that Ramesses II had great ambitions of expanding Egyptian southern territories in Syria to include northern Syria. Furthermore, Ramesses II's first objective would be reclaiming the city of Kadesh. Muwatallis II knew that if this came to pass the Hittite position in northern Syria, and in particular, the strategic satellite states of Aleppo and Carchemish,[44] would be threatened by Egypt. Therefore, in this matter, Hatti would have to act. Healy (2005:16) suggests that the venue for the battle was not in doubt for either the Hittites or the Egyptians. It would take place beneath the city walls of Kadesh (Healy 2005:44, 5).

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[44] At the time of the battle, Aleppo and Carchemish were viceregal kingdoms ruled by the Hittite Great King's sons (Bryce 2005:221).

5.2 EGYPTIAN SOURCES

As mentioned Kadesh is one of the earliest recorded battles, which has more textual and visual sources than any other battle in the ancient Near East. Spalinger (2005:161) attributes this to the Egyptian monarchs of the New Kingdom Period who he explains published their military accomplishments, and heroic wartime deeds at every opportunity and in interesting detail. Ramesses II, upon his return to Egypt, commissioned an account of the battle. The problem, however, is that most of the evidence comes from one side, namely that of Ramesses II.

Breasted (1903:6) comments that the Kadesh Inscriptions[45] are unique in that they record the battle in both textual and iconographic forms. The Kadesh Inscriptions in the form of the texts and reliefs are inscribed and drawn on the walls of various temples in Abydos, Luxor, Karnak, Ramesses II's mortuary temple, the Ramesseum, and the Abu Simbel and Beit el Wali temple in Nubia. According to scholars, the literary narrative can be divided into two separate parts: the *Poem* and the *Bulletin* (Bryce 2005:234). The evidence suggests that the Battle of Kadesh was well publicised as evidenced by the eight carvings of the *Poem,* and seven carvings of the *Bulletin.* Also, the *Poem* is found on two hieratic papyri.

The *Poem*, the longer of the two consists of a first-person oration representing the king himself. The *Poem* places an emphasis on the Pharaoh's bravery and his relationship with the Egyptian god Amun[46] (Spalinger 2005:209). According to the *Poem,* Ramesses II fell into a trap at Kadesh. It was only through his personal bravery and the intervention of the god Amun that he was able to single-handedly defeat the Hittites and their allies, and destroy 100,000 charioteers. Breasted (1903:6) says that the *Poem* is invaluable in providing information on Ramesses II's departure from Egypt, his march to Kadesh, and the position of the four divisions of his army up to the moment of the Hittite attack (Breasted 1903:6, 7). The *Bulletin*, which is the shorter of the two narratives, is possibly an official report of the battle. It provides more details of the events of the day of the battle and gives information on what Breasted terms "the earliest ruse known in history," making reference to the Hittite ruse (Breasted 1903:7). After the ruse is revealed the *Bulletin* records Ramesses II holding the war council.

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[45] For further information on the Kadesh Inscriptions, see Appendix E.
[46] The Egyptian god of Sun and Air who rose to prominence during the New Kingdom Period. He was worshipped as king of the gods (Kuhrt 1995:206).

The *Bulletin* is frequently appended to a series of reliefs with the explanatory captions. Berman (2017:20) comments that at most sites the Kadesh accounts are accompanied by bas-reliefs, which depict different scenes of the battle and provide explanatory captions about the scenes. Scholars often view the reliefs as an artistic record of the battle. The famous monumental reliefs of Ramesses II undaunted, charging into the heat of the battle, and shooting arrows at the fleeing enemy are still visible at sites like Abu Simbel today. The ability to combine the pictorial relief with a full text account of the campaign was an innovation in Ramesside art in the New Kingdom (Berman 2017:20). The New Kingdom art differs from previous periods, which depict the Pharaoh's towering over all men while killing the enemy. In contrast, the New Kingdom art allows for the inclusion of fighting armies and detailed battle scenes while still depicting the Pharaoh as the central figure.

This is evidenced by the Kadesh reliefs, which provide definite information regarding the armies that fought and the operational sequence of events. For instance, Egyptian wall reliefs provide representations of the Hittite weapons, infantry and chariot troops (Lorenz and Schrakamp 2011:126). Several studies have highlighted the fact that there are numerous differences between the Egyptian sources. For example, the *Poem* emphasises the role of the god Amun and narrates that Ramesses II was only able to win the battle single-handley through the intervention of the god. On the other hand, the Bulletin does not give any credit to Amun or any other gods. The victory over the Hittites is attributed to the personal bravery and courage of Ramesses II. The reliefs, by contrast, differ from both the *Poem* and *Bulletin.* Berman (2017:21) explains that the reliefs do not mention the gods and that the bravery of Ramesses II takes a back seat to the main emphasis, which is the heroic actions of the Egyptian elite unit, the Ne'arin.

5.2.1 The role of propaganda in the Kadesh Inscriptions

The Kadesh Inscriptions are important not only for the understanding about the technical aspects of the battle but also their contribution to the role of propaganda during the reign of Ramesses II. Hasel (2009:70) explains that "[T]his most celebrated of all Egyptian military campaigns by Ramesses II against the Hittites is also one of the most successful examples of the propaganda of an event known in the ancient world." Recent studies (Kitchen 1999:47; Murnane 1995:185-220; Spalinger 2005:356) explore the propaganda value of Ramesses II's account of the battle.

The studies are important to the understanding of the Egyptian sources having a propagandistic function, used to show the Pharaoh's military exploits and emphasise his role in saving himself and his army in the battle. In a recent study Noij (2015:23) suggests an alternative theory, which advances the idea that the Kadesh Inscriptions did not hold much propagandistic value for the Egyptians. By employing a socio-linguistic method called "Linguistic Landscapes,"[47] Noij (2015:24) uses the location of the Kadesh Inscriptions in the temples to reinterpret their possible function. The method claims that the placement of the Kadesh Inscriptions emphasises they were not created for the Egyptian population but reserved for the gods who resided in the temples, who were thought to be able to read them. Furthermore, the placement of the inscriptions in the temples were in locations that the majority of Egyptians had limited access too. In addition, the majority of the Egyptians were illiterate, and Noij (2015:23) queries how much of the inscriptions could be understood if the Egyptians had access to them.

The researcher suggests that the problem with the above theory lies in the intention of Ramesses II. Military success was embedded in Egyptian royal ideology which expected the king to be strong, unfailing, and to win battles (Seevers 2013:112). In magnifying his military accomplishment at Kadesh, the Pharaoh was highlighting the glory of the gods and the greatness of Egypt (Seevers 2013:113). Admitting defeat to the Hittites was not an option for Ramesses II, and the propaganda became a necessity. Through propaganda, the Pharaoh was able to gain the people's trust and confidence in him (Seevers 2013:112).

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[47] See Noij (2015) for a detailed discussion on the methodology of "Linguistic Landscapes."

The Kadesh Inscriptions were part of a highly efficient royal propaganda machine, which by his death ensured that his monuments and images were found throughout the Egyptian kingdom (Loktionov 2016). Ramesses II may not have used propaganda in the way that it is understood in the modern sense of brain washing and bias, but rather as self-promotion and poetic license. The Pharaoh's intention was to tell the story of Kadesh and spread his tale of victory as far as possible. By carving the Inscriptions in stone, he sought to preserve them for eternity. If the Kadesh inscriptions held little propagandistic value, Ramesses II would probably have placed them at a single temple, and not several temples throughout Egypt, and as far afield as Nubia (Haywood 2012:76).

Even though arguments can be made for the accessibility of the inscriptions, the pictorial reliefs were designed with the illiterate majority in mind. Also, the *Poem* written on Papyrus was not restricted to the temples and possibly made the rounds in Egyptian court (Loktionov 2016). Together the textual material and the reliefs serve their primary purpose of communicating their intended message to Egyptian society, one of the military prowess of Ramesses II, and his victory over foreign lands that have survived hundreds of years until the modern day (Kitchen 1999:47).

5.2.2 Hittite Sources

The Hittites left no detailed account of the Battle of Kadesh. Although Hittite monumental art depicts the Hittite king carrying the traditional weapons of war namely, the sword, bow, and lance, battles are rarely depicted. Bryce (2002:100) comments that perhaps the Hittite kings did not derive 'pleasure in war or glory in its outcome' in comparison with the Egyptians. This is possibly why Kadesh is mentioned only in passing in two Hittite texts, which simply speaks of Ramesses II's defeat at the hands of Muwatallis II. The discovery of these Hittite documents in the 1930s in Hattuša, alluding to a Hittite and not an Egyptian victory, impacted Kadesh literature.

For years, early scholars had followed the lead of Breasted (1903) who interpreted the *Poem* as literal and historical truth. The Egyptian account of the battle was viewed as fact, and supportive of an Egyptian victory. To date, Muwatallis II's capital city, Tarhuntassa has not been found. There is a possibility that more texts await discovery inclusive of information on the Battle of Kadesh

5.2.3 Archaeological Sources - The Battlefield

Although the Egyptian and Hittite sources reference the battle, there is no direct archaeological evidence of the battle like weaponry, human remains and mass graves to prove that the battle took place. The archaeological site of Tell Nebi Mend next to the River Orontes on the Homs plain in modern Syria is identified as the site of the battle. It is a large mound with a few modern dwellings located on top. Tell Nebi Mend measures a kilometre in length and over thirty meters in height (Davey 1975:17). Archaeological excavations were conducted by a French expedition under the leadership of M Pezard 1921, and thereafter by PJ Parr for the University of London between 1975 and 1995. The identification of the site was confirmed in 1975 by the discovery of two cuneiform tablets written to the King of Kadesh (Davey 1975:18).

One of the cuneiform tablets is a letter from the King of Aleppo written to Ari-Teshup, thought to be the son of Aitakama. According to the letters recovered from the Tell el-Amarna, Aitakama was the king of Kadesh. Although Tell Nebi Mend has been accepted as the site of Kadesh, there are arguments made against it. The city of Kadesh, as seen in the Egyptian reliefs, is depicted as a walled city with a double set of moats around it (Davey 1975:18).

Davey (1975:17, 8) explains because Tell Nebi Mend does not have anything that resembles these type of fortifications, arguments using this point are made against the identification of Tell Nebi Mend with Kadesh. This has led Velikovsky (2010:23) to suggest that neither the geographical nor the topography of Tell Nebi Mend justifies its identification with the battle. Even though the debate continues regarding the location of the battle, Tell Nebi Mend is widely accepted by scholars (Breasted 1903:16; Goedicke 1966; Spalinger: 2005) as the site of the famous battle.

5.3 KADESH

After accepting the formal oath of submission from Benteshina, Ramesses II returned to Egypt and prepared for the upcoming hostilities with the Hittites. He issued a call to arms, assembling Egyptian forces at Pi-Ramesses in the eastern Delta (Bryce 2005:234). The army consisted of four divisions. The different divisions were based upon a temple or estate region in Egypt and named after the patron deities: the army of the god Amun from Thebes; the army of Re, the Sun God, from Heliopolis; the army of Ptah, the Creator God, from Memphis; and the army of Sutekh, the Storm God

(Seth), probably from Tanis in the Delta (Bryce 2005:235, 6). The army was primarily Egyptian but included the Sherden,[48] a group of mercenaries, serving as the Pharaoh's bodyguard, Libyans, Nubians, and Canaanites (Gardiner 1975:57-63). Each division was commanded by a general but the Pharaoh remained the overall commander. On the march, the divisions did not group together as a single army but travelled as independent units, which resulted in them being strung out over kilometres of desert. The splitting of the divisions over a wide area made it easier to forage off the land (Seevers 2013:130).

The *Bulletin* and the *Poem*, accompanied by the pictorial record, offer a uniform picture of the battle that can be summarised as follows. In the fifth year of his reign, Ramesses II marched the army to confront and dislodge the Hittites from northern Syria, and restore the vassalage of Kadesh to Egypt. Ramesses II departed Egypt marching north towards Kadesh during the season that the Egyptians called 'summer,' the end of April or end of May. There is consensus on the initial stages of the Egyptian approach to Kadesh. Ramesses II marched from Pi-Ramesses northwards to Sile where modern Gaza stands today. Sile is identified with the site of Tell el-Habua, an Egyptian fortress located on the Way of Horus road. The Karnak Temple at Luxor depicts the Way of Horus as the coastal road that once linked Egypt to Palestine/Syria (Ngo 2015). Thereafter opinion is divided on the route that Ramesses II took from Gaza onwards, as several routes lay open to him.[49] One of the routes suggested is that Ramesses II led his army through Gaza, and Canaan and into Lebanon, and then up the Beka'a Valley. At Biblos, the ancient Phoenician city on the coast of the Eastern Mediterranean, in present Lebanon, is where the Pharaoh split his army.

Ramesses II personally leads the majority of the Egyptian army up the Litani River and upon reaching the river mouth, marches north through the Litani River Valley, and onwards to the Beka'a Valley, approaching the city of Kadesh from the south (Santosuosso 1996:428-30). Ramesses II directs a small contingent force north along the Phoenician coast.

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[48] The Sherden are depicted in the reliefs depicting the Battle of Kadesh, identifiable by their horned helmets (Healy 2005:65).

[49] For further discussion on the other routes available to Ramesses 11 from Gaza, see Santosuosso (1996:429-432).

This force will cross the Lebanon Mountains and approach the city of Kadesh from the north-west (Healy 2005:44-8). By employing this tactic, Ramesses II plans to enact a pincer type movement against the city of Kadesh. The larger Egyptian force approaches from the Beka'a Valley, and the smaller Egyptian force approaches from the west (Santosuosso 1996:431). Ramesses II arrives in Shabtuna, modern Riblah, south of Kadesh after an estimated three week march after the departure from Egypt.

5.3.1 Bedouin spies relay false information: Hittite ruse

When thinking of spying and espionage in the ancient Near East, probably one of the most famous examples is the Hittite ruse at Kadesh. Healy (2005:25) remarks that the Hittites were masters of strategy, who were prepared to use guile and sleight of hand to gain an advantage over their opponents. The encounter between Ramesses II and the two Shosu Bedouin is an early example of military intelligence which played a crucial role in the story of the Battle of Kadesh. The *Bulletin* provides information on a successful enemy ruse and the unusual admission of Ramesses II's misjudgement on the campaign. In the vicinity of Shabtuna, the *Bulletin* reports that two Shosu Bedouin come before Ramesses II, claiming to be defectors from the Hittite ranks (Bryce 2005:236). They inform the Pharaoh of two points. First, the Hittite king, Muwatallis II is afraid of the Pharaoh. Second, because of this the Hittite army has not come to Kadesh, but withdrawn further north to the vicinity of Aleppo, an estimated two hundred kilometres from Kadesh:

> Then came two Shosu of the tribes of Shosu to say to his majesty, 'Our brothers
> who are chiefs of tribes with the foe of Khatti [Hittites] have sent us to his Majesty
> to say that we will be the servants of pharaoh and will abandon the Chief of Kati.'
> His Majesty said to them, 'Where are they your brothers who sent you to tell this
> matter to his Majesty?' and they said to his Majesty, 'They are where the vile Chief
> of Khatti is, for the foe of Khatti is in the land of Kaleb [that is Aleppo one hundred
> and ninety kilometres north of Kadesh], and he was too fearful of Pharaoh to come
> southward when he heard that Pharaoh had come northward' (Lichtheim 2006:60).

At this stage, the Egyptians fail to realise that the two Shosu Bedouin were agents of the Hittites. The prime objective of the agents was to deceive the Egyptians into thinking that Muwatallis II was afraid to fight the Pharaoh, and had withdrawn to the north of Aleppo. This ruse highlights the ingenuity of Muwatallis II's plan. False information was provided about the location of the Hittite army (Bryce 2005:236,7).

Muwatallis II appeals to Ramesses II's ego by relaying that he and the Hittite army are too afraid to approach Kadesh, out of fear of the Pharaoh. Healy (2005:48) points out that this ruse is used to lower the Pharaoh's guard and lull him into a false sense of security. Based on the false military intelligence Ramesses II believes that the Hittite threat is not imminent. Believing that Kadesh is defenceless, Ramesses II rushes to secure Kadesh with only his personal household, bodyguard, and the Amun division trailing behind him (Bryce 2005:236). The importance of information regarding the location of the enemy forces, their strength, and intentions are typically emphasised in Egyptian military accounts. Prior investigations (Healy 2005:49; Spalinger 2005:214,5) have implemented queries into the reasons why Ramesses II accepted the information from the Shosu Bedouin at face value.

The studies suggest that the numerous possibilities opened up by the news of Muwatallis II's location some 200 kilometres from Kadesh must have rendered the young Pharaoh's judgement temporarily impaired. Ramesses II probably believed that by securing the city of Kadesh unopposed, it could be used as a logistics base to rest and rebuild his army before facing the Hittites. Healy (2005:49) maintains that Ramesses II's limited experience as a military leader led to his decision not to send Egyptian scouts to investigate the strategic situation at Kadesh.

Spalinger (2005:213) advances the idea that the Egyptian scouts were sent, but the Hittite army arrived after the Egyptian scouts left. Both (Healy 2005:49 and Spalinger 2005:13) do agree on the point that Egyptian military intelligence failed at this point. Ramesses II arrives and starts to set up camp outside the city of Kadesh.

Spalinger (2005:209-11) explains that relief scenes of Ramesses II's military campaign against the Hittites at Luxor depict scenes of the Egyptian Camp, War Council, and the Battle of Kadesh. The Egyptian camp scenes suggest that the atmosphere of the camp was calm, evidenced by scenes of horses being fed, and soldier's relaxing.

The camp scenes also speak to the defences of the camp. A defensive perimeter and embankment were dug, and a shield wall enclosed the camp. In addition, Spalinger (2005:212,3) comments that Ramesses II also travelled with his personal household which included a number of his sons, the royal princes, along with servants and scribes of the royal household who would need to be settled (Healy 2005:45). It would have taken at least half a day to set up camp.

The calm atmosphere of the camp scenes suggests that Ramesses II believing that he had stolen a march on his opponent, had not intended to fight that day. Instead, Ramesses II awaited the arrival of the main body of the Egyptian army (Bryce 2005:236). Ramesses II accepted the information at face value, and the subsequent action taken almost brought the Egyptian army to the verge of catastrophe (Healy 2005:48-53).The next stage is told in the *Bulletin* and from the Luxor reliefs showing the so-called 'Beating of the Spies.'[50]

5.3.2 Muwatallis II springs the trap

Two enemy scouts were found near the Egyptian encampment by one of Ramesses II scouts. Refusing to talk, they were subjected to torture and brought before the Pharaoh (Healy 2005:49-50). The text associated with the scene from the so-called 'Beating of the Spies' reads: 'The coming of the Pharaoh's scout bringing two scouts of the Fallen one of Hatti into the Pharaoh's presence.' The initial line of questioning put to the prisoners shows that Ramesses II had no idea of the danger that they represented. Under interrogations, the two prisoners reveal that they belong to the King of Hatti and that the true location of the Hittite army which was not far away in Aleppo, but close by and within striking distance of the Egyptian army. The location of Muwatallis II and his army are given in both the *Poem* and *Bulletin*. The *Poem* states specifically that the Hittites were northeast of Kadesh (Bryce 2005:237).

While the *Bulletin* states on two occasions that they are located "behind" Kadesh:

> Now the two Shosu who said these words to his Majesty, said them falsely, for it was the Foe from Khatti who had sent them to observe where his Majesty was, in order to prevent his Majesty's army for making ready to fight with the Foe from Khatti. For the Foe from Khatti had come with his infantry and chariotry, and the chiefs of every land that was in the territory of the land of Khatti, and their infantry and chariotry, whom he had brought as allies to fight against the army of his Majesty, he standing equipped and ready behind the Kadesh the Old, and his majesty did not know that they were there (Lichtheim 2006:60).

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[50] The so-called "Beating of the Spies" and the subsequent extended counsel that Ramesses II has with his officers make up part of the first 75 of the *Bulletin's* 110 lines (Berman 2017:21)

According to Healy (2005:51), Ramesses II "sat incredulous and then aghast as the full implications of the information rapidly sank home." Ramesses II realises the implications of the failed military intelligence, and that he has led his army into a trap. In an attempt to secure Kadesh, Ramesses II only had an estimated quarter of his army with him. The main army was left extended behind him.

The Amun division is starting to arrive in his camp, and not battle ready. The Ra division is not in battle formation and crossing the open plain. The Seth division is somewhere along the Mediterranean coast.

The War Council relief scenes show that Ramesses II hastily summons his War Council and berates the army commanders for their failure in providing him with accurate intelligence. Ramesses II believes that the only option available is to gather the three remaining divisions to Kadesh, as quickly as a possible. Messengers were dispatched to hurry the three remaining divisions to Kadesh. This is reflected in the Abu Simbel reliefs where a mounted rider is depicted hurrying on the Ptah division. The Hittite ruse has resulted in the Pharaoh being outwitted, and the initiative lies in the hands of Muwatallis II who springs the trap (Bryce 2005:236).

Muwatallis II's initial attack is on the Re division and the Egyptian camp. It is possible that the Hittite strategy planned to attack the Re and Amun divisions first and then later attack the Ptah and Seth divisions. From orchards south of Kadesh, emerge an estimated two thousand Hittite chariots (Healy 2005:57,8). Muwatallis II has recognised the advantage of attacking the Egyptian army because the army was divided on the march.

The Hittite high-speed assault smashes into the Egyptian Re division who are crossing the open plain (Bryce 2005:237). It decimates the Re division who collapse into chaos and the surviving troops scatter. The Egyptian sources seem to indicate that the reaction of the Re division to the Hittite attack was cowardly and skittish. Healy (2005:64) disagrees and says that the ferocity and surprise of the Hittite attack caused the panic of the Egyptians who were unprepared, and subsequently unable to respond. Clark and Turner (2017:3) emphasise the success of the ambush, which has succeeded in destroying the Re division. The Amun division, still with the Pharaoh, is separated from reinforcements.

They are in danger of being destroyed, as the Hittite chariots turn their attention to what scholars believe is their primary target, the Pharaoh. The Hittite strategy of the kill or capture of the Pharaoh would deliver a psychological blow throwing the Egyptian army into disarray, and end the battle in their favour. As the Re division scatter, the Hittite chariots chase the remnants of the Re Division into Ramesses II's camp. The soldiers of the Amun division who had reached Ramesses II's camp, together with the personal bodyguard, are the only defence. The Hittites amass on the western and extreme northern end of the camp and smash through the shield wall to commence their assault (Santosuosso 1996:439).

As the Hittite chariotry sweep into the Pharaoh's camp, Healy (2005:60) suggests that the calm atmosphere depicted in the Egyptian camp scenes changes as a wave of panic spreads through the camp. Unprepared, the infantry struggles to grab weapons, and the chariot crews attempt to hitch up their teams to the chariot cabs (Healy 2005:60). Ramesses II's bodyguard was tasked with protecting the royal enclosure and blocking a Hittite advance. For their safety, Ramesses II's sons, the royal princes, move to the opposite end of the encampment and are placed under guard (Healy 2005:70).

The Hittite chariots plough into the Pharaoh's camp. Ferocious fighting breaks out in the camp, but slowly the Hittite assault starts to dissipate because their chariots crash into the tents, stores and items of the Egyptian camp. This breaks the momentum of the chariots, as they become hard to manoeuvre (Healy 2005:70). The Hittites also believing they had the upper hand stop to loot the camp for the precious silver and gold that the Egyptians were known for. Bryce (2005:239) suggests that the discipline of the Hittite regular army was good, and proposes that perhaps the discipline of the Hittite vassals and mercenary troops failed at this point.

The Egyptians take advantage of the slowing Hittite drive and begin to fight back. This is attested in the Luxor reliefs, which depict Egyptian soldiers dragging Hittite crews off their chariots and set upon them with *khopesh* swords and daggers (Healy 2005:65).

5.3.3 The stand of Ramesses II

Ramesses II, taking advantage of the slowed Hittite momentum, launches a counter-attack against the various points of the Hittite strongholds (Spalinger 2005:221). The Egyptian sources suggest that the army deserted Ramesses II. Going on the defensive Ramesses II initiates a counter-attack with only his chariot driver Menna, his horses and servants. It also depicts the god Amun responding to the Pharaoh's plea for help, by declaring that the god's own hand was with him.

The implication is that Ramesses II with the assistance of Amun defeated the Hittites single-handedly:

> Then His Majesty started forth at a gallop, and entered into the host of the fallen ones of Hatti, being alone by myself and none other with him…And he found 2,500 chariots hemming him in on his outer side, consisting of all the fallen ones of Hatti with the many foreign countries which were with them…I called to you, My Father Amun, when I was in the midst of multitudes I knew not. All foreign countries were combined against me, I being alone by myself, none other with me, my numerous infantry having abandoned me, not one looking at me of my chariotry. I kept on shouting to them, but none of them hearkened to me as I called…I found Amun come when I called him; he gave me his hand and I rejoiced…All that I did came to pass. I was like Mont. I shot on my right and captured with my left…I found the 2,500 chariots, in whose midst I was, sprawling before my horse. Not one of them found his hand to fight…I caused them to plunge into the water even as crocodiles plunge, fallen upon their faces one upon the other. I killed among them according as I willed (Gardiner 1975:9,10).

It is the contention of Healy (2005:72) that the stand of Ramesses II as portrayed in the Egyptian account, alone and abandoned by his chariotry, is an exaggeration. Although the Pharaoh undoubtedly displayed personal bravery, it was done with the assistance of the remaining Amun division and his personal bodyguard that were available for a counter-attack. Ramesses II to a certain point recovers the situation and starts to dispatch the first Hittite wave of chariotry.

Muwatallis II watching from his vantage point takes a decision to send in a further contingent of an estimated thousand chariots to take the pressure off the retreating Hittite troops and to draw Ramesses II back to the camp (Healy 2005:71).Among this contingent were the foremost men of the Hittite army including children and brothers of the king, as well as, leaders of the allied forces (Healy 2005:76). The second Hittite force had just begun to penetrate the Pharaoh's camp when they were assaulted by Egyptian and allied chariotry.

The appearance of the Ne'arin, Egyptian reinforcements who had approached Kadesh by marching across the Amurru through the Eleutheros valley just before the Pharaoh's army was completely routed (Spalinger 2005:117).According to Clark and Tuner (2017:3), the Hittites were placed under immense pressure not anticipating the resistance of the Egyptian counter-attack. Caught between the Ne'arin, the Pharaoh, and his bodyguard, the Hittites withdraw in disordered chaos back to the Orontes River. Smashed and crashed chariots and dead bodies marred the Hittite escape route (Healy 2005:76).

In an attempt to saves their lives, desperate leading Hittite charioteers jumped into the Orontes to escape the Egyptians who were chasing them (Healy 2005:78). The charioteers hope to reach the safety of the far bank of the Orontes and reconnect with other Hittite forces waiting there. Some were successful in reaching the far bank while others drowned. Many were washed away by the current or dragged down by the weight of their armour. An image with accompanying commentary at the Ramesseum attests to this. After being chased by Ramesses II, the Chief of Khaleb (Aleppo) is depicted as being dragged from the Orontes River by his soldiers (Healy 2005:78). It is also believed that towards the end of the battle, the Ptah division was able to render assistance (Santosuosso 1996:439).

With the retreat of the last Hittite chariotry, the battle was over. Ramesses II returns to the wreckage of his camp, and Muwatallis II holds his position at Kadesh. The battlefield is filled with Egyptian and Hittite dead. Spalinger (2005:226) asserts that Ramesses II released the bodies of the Hittite dead to the Hittite camp. The Egyptian sources reveal high-ranking officers among the Hittite dead. They included troop-captains, a shield bearer, and two of Muwatallis II's brothers (Healy 2005:81).

Interestingly, the *Poem* explains that after the battle Ramesses II dealt with enemies: "…My Majesty prevailed against them and I killed among them and did not relax, they sprawling before my horses and lying down in their blood in one place." Healy (2005:83) explains that the enemies are referred to as "rebels." This differs from the usual Egyptian inscriptions used to identify the Hittite enemy such as belonging to the 'the Fallen one of Hatti' which references the Hittite king, Muwatallis II.

Healy (2005:83) claims that the word "rebels" in this case does not pertain to the enemy, but to Ramesses II's own troops, that of the Amun and Re divisions who had deserted him. Some of these men were nobility from some of the most powerful families in Egypt. It was a bold move on Ramesses II's part and serves as one of the earliest documented examples of "decimation"[51] in Egyptian history (Gabriel 2009).

A great number of scholars have discussed the reasons that Muwatallis II did not commit his infantry to the chariotry. Breasted (1903:27) maintains that it was a clash of chariotry, and there was no need to commit infantry. Santosuosso (1996:41) challenges this theory stating that Ramesses II's personal bodyguard were infantry and that the Ne'arin consisted of chariotry and infantry, as well as the three Egyptian divisions, Amun, Re and Seth involved in the fight. According to Burne (1921:193), Muwatallis II from his vantage point was unable to see what was happening on the battlefield due to poor visibility from clouds of dust. Unable to see the battlefield Muwatallis II did not realise the need for infantry. Santosuosso (1996: 440,1) disputes this by explaining that if Muwatallis II was unable to see the battlefield, why did he send in the second wave of chariots when the Hittites came under attack from the counter charge of Ramesses II?

Burne (1921:194, 5) concludes that the reason that Muwatallis II did not commit his infantry points to a bigger problem, that of his leadership which lacked nerve and resolution. This failure of nerve is what Burne (1921:194, 5) argues makes Muwatallis II fall short of being a great commander. The researcher disagrees and contends that Muwatallis II was a great commander and suggests that Burne's argument fails in two points. First, Muwatallis II's nerve and resolution are demonstrated in the reorganisation of the Hittite empire, which freed up forces that allowed him to field the largest army ever raised by the Hittite empire against the Egyptians (Bryce 2005:242).

Second, in the battle itself, Muwatallis II's demonstrates nerve and resolution by executing one of the earliest ambushes in a battle in ancient Near Eastern history, which almost annihilated the Egyptian army. The researcher maintains that Muwatallis II felt that even with the Hittite losses suffered, he still had Ramesses II at a disadvantage, and felt it was not necessary to commit the infantry to the chariotry.

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[51] This was a form of discipline well known to the Roman army whose commanders used it to discipline soldiers guilty of capital offenses such as desertion or cowardice (Healy 2005:84).

5.4 WHO IS VICTORIOUS?

Several studies confirm that the battle was either a stalemate or outright Egyptian or Hittite victory. In addition, both the Egyptians and Hittite sources claim victory. According to the Egyptian account, it was a total victory for Ramesses II:

> Then my army came to praise me…my high officers having come to magnify my strong arm, and my chariotry likewise boasting of my name and saying, "…You are great of victory in the presence of your army, in the face of the entire land…You have broken the back of Hatti forever!" (Gardiner 1975:12).

In addition, the Egyptian account also claims that Muwatallis II sued for peace by acknowledging the Egyptian victory, and paying homage to Ramesses II while begging for mercy for his subjects:

> Thereupon the wretched Ruler of Hatti sent and did homage to my name like that of Re, saying "You are Sutekh, Baal in person. The dread of you is the brand in the Land of Hatti…As for the Land of Egypt and the Land of Hatti, they are yours, your servants, they are under your feet…Be not hard in your dealings, victorious king. Peace is better than fighting. Give us breath!" (Gardiner 1975:13, 4).

The Hittites claim victory in a historical account and treaty written during the reign of Hattušili III, the brother of Muwatallis II:

> Because my brother Muwatalli campaigned against the king of Egypt and the king of Amurru, when he defeated the kings of Egypt and Amurru…. (KUB XX1 17 (CTH86) I 14-21, Beal 1992:307).

> …Thereupon Muwatalli, the brother of my father of My Son, and the king of Egypt did battle with each other over the people of the Amurru. Muwatalli defeated the king of Egypt…. (Tudhaliya 1V: Shaushgamuwa Treaty (CTH 105) I 28-38, Kuhne and Otten 1971).

Bryce (2005:238) perceptively asks: "What truth is there in all this?" Both sides claim victory, but who do the overall battle honours go to? Early scholars like Breasted (1903) claim that the battle was an Egyptian victory. Bell (2007:107) disputes this claim and comments that it was a stalemate. Healy (2005:82) argues that the Egyptian recovery, personal bravery shown by Ramesses II and the tactically superior showing of the Egyptian chariotry should have won the battle, but was counteracted by the dislocation of the Pharaoh's army. In this way, he believes Ramesses II was defeated at Kadesh, but the Hittites won through default.

Bryce (2014:75) points out that only two factors saved Ramesses II and his army, namely the arrival of reinforcements, and a breakdown in discipline in the Hittite ranks. Muwatallis II was the long-term victor managing to keep Kadesh, and subsequent to that was able to regain control of the Amurru kingdom:

> When Muwatalli, the brother of the father of My Sun, became king, the people of Amurru broke faith with him, and had this to say to him: "From free individuals we have become vassals. But now we are your vassals no longer!" And they entered into the following of the king of Egypt. Thereupon Muwatalli, the brother of the father of My Sun, and the king of Egypt did battle with each other over the people of the Amurru. Muwatalli defeated the king of Egypt and destroyed the Land of Amurru with his weapons and subjugated it. (Tudhaliya 1V: Shaushgamuwa Treaty (CTH 105) I 28-38, Kuhne and Otten 1971).

The control of the Amurru was crucial for the security of Hittite rule in Syria. As long as Amurru was under Egyptian control, the Hittite vassal kingdoms in northern Syria were at risk (Bryce 2005:240). If Ramesses II had conquered Syria, it could have been used as a springboard to launch an attack as far reaching as Hattuša. For the Amurru's act of treachery, Muwatallis II deposed Benteshina and took him prisoner (Bryce 2005:240). Following the battle, Ramesses II withdrew his army far to the south. In a show of force, Muwatallis II shadowed the withdrawing Egyptian army as far as the Land of Aba, the region around Damascus (Healy 2005:88). Aba fell to the Hittites, and was placed under the control of Hattušili III:

> Because my brother Muwatalli campaigned against the king of Egypt and the king of Amurru, when he defeated the kings of Egypt and Amurru, he went back to Aba. When Muwatalli, my brother defeated Aba, he…went back to Hatti, but he left me in Aba. (KUB XX1 17 (CTH86) I 14-21, Beal 1992:307).

The failure of Ramesses II to capture Kadesh had repercussions for Egyptian prestige. Two years after Kadesh, local rulers in Syria and Palestine revolted against Egyptian authority (Bryce 2005:241).

5.5 CONCLUSION

The kingdoms of Kadesh and the Amurru had become pawns in the struggle between Hatti and Egypt who both fought for control of Syria (Bryce 2003:133). Kadesh and the Amurru during their respective histories had at some point fallen under Hittite and Egyptian rule. At the time of Ramesses II's accession, Kadesh and the Amurru were under Hittite control. Seeking to restore Egyptian sovereignty and restore the former glories of Egypt, Ramesses II led a preparatory advance in ca 1275 BCE into Syria. It is during this period that Benteshina, the Amurrite king formally a Hittite vassal defected to Egypt. This act was viewed as a declaration of war by the Hittites. In ca 1274 BCE, Ramesses II marched on Kadesh to meet the Hittites (Bryce 2005:236).

Although this was one of the biggest battles of ancient Near Eastern history, there are no physical remains like corpses and weaponry from Tell Nebi Mend, the site identified by most scholars as the Kadesh battlefield. The majority of the information about the battle stems from the Egyptian sources. After the battle, Ramesses II, who viewed the battle as a personal victory, commissioned the Kadesh inscriptions which detailed his victory over the Hittites, to be placed throughout Egypt.

Prior research has advocated an Egyptian victory because the Kadesh Inscriptions were interpreted literally. It is only in light of new evidence in later years in the form of Hittite sources uncovered at Hattuša that speak of a Hittite victory challenging the Egyptian sources (Bryce 2005:240,1). In light of the Hittite sources, several studies suggest that the Kadesh Inscriptions held more of a propagandistic function that promotes Ramesses II's personal prowess on the battlefield as opposed to the historical truth (Bryce 2005:239).

The conflicting Egyptian and Hittite sources have led to discussions that have dominated research in recent years regarding the winner of the battle. Most early studies and current work argue for a stalemate or an outright victory for the Hittites or Egyptians. Bryce (2014:74) explains that poor reconnaissance was a central theme during the Egyptian campaign.

Misled by false information by Hittite planted agents, Ramesses II separated himself from over half his army to secure Kadesh. This brilliant strategy on behalf of the Hittites led the Egyptian army into an ambush (Bryce 2005:236). The Egyptian army is saved from complete annihilation by a desperate counter attack by Ramesses II, and the assistance of the Ne'arin, Egyptian reinforcements. Unable to retake Kadesh, Ramesses II returned to Egypt.

Burney (2019:212) comments that this was a Hittite win: "Kadesh was a stunning Hittite triumph, with the main prizes being the regaining of the vassal kingdoms of Kadesh and the Amurru into the Hittite fold." The Hittites ability to retain Kadesh and recover the Amurru, and acquire subject territories from Amurru south to Aba suggests that they were long-term victors. The Egyptians on the other hand had lost over half their army. Ramesses II failed to meet the objectives of retaking Kadesh and dislodging the Hittites from northern Syria. Moreover, Ramesses II's loss of face was a serious blow for Egyptian status and authority in Syria (Bryce 2005:239). While debates continue about who won the battle, some scholars have driven the further development of what the consequences were in the aftermath of the battle.

CHAPTER 6: DIPLOMACY AND THE TREATY OF KADESH

Abstract

In the aftermath of the Battle of Kadesh, Hatti and Egypt entered into an alliance of peace. The Treaty of Kadesh was concluded and both countries maintained friendly relations, and true to the alliance until the end of the Hittite Empire in the early years of the twelfth century BCE. This chapter begins with an introduction to the sources. Thereafter the various motivations leading to the signing of the treaty are discussed. Attention is given to the improved relations and cooperation between Hatti and Egypt after signing the treaty. General observations are made concerning the symbolism of the treaty.

In the aftermath of the Battle of Kadesh, Ramesses II returned to Syria to quell the revolts led by the local rulers who openly defied Egyptian authority (Bryce 2005:241). To address the problem Ramesses II conducted a series of military operations to crush the centres of resistance which took him into Hittite subject territory during his eighth and ninth years. Ramesses II captured Dapur in northern Syria, in the territory of Tunip. The reliefs of the Ramesseum depict the attack (Morkot 2010:73). The Egyptian presence in this region once again posed a significant threat to Kadesh and the Amurru, and Muwatallis II's recently acquired subject territories from Amurru south to Aba (Bryce 2005:241). A confrontation was surely looming, yet the confrontation never happened, and in an extraordinary turn of events, an estimated fifteen years after the Battle of Kadesh a historic peace treaty was concluded bringing years of fighting to an end, and ushering in an era of peace.

If the Battle of Kadesh is regarded as one of the most famous battles of the ancient Near East, then the Treaty of Kadesh[52] can be regarded as one of the most important treaties in ancient Near Eastern history. It is the earliest known surviving peace treaty which was concluded between the Egyptian Pharaoh Ramesses II, and the Great Hittite King, Hattušili III, who had replaced Muwatallis II (Bryce 2006:1). At the time of the treaty, four major powers shared much of the rule in the ancient Near Eastern world, namely Hatti, Egypt, Babylon, and Assyria (Bryce 2003:42).

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[52] For an overview of the Treaty of Kadesh, see Bryce (2006).

Bryce (2006:1) comments that although the correspondence between the major powers reflected overt expressions of love and esteem, the underlying tone was one of deep mistrust of each other, and they bickered regularly. In the early 1900s archaeologists discovered both Hittite and Egyptian versions of the treaty. The Egyptian version places an emphasis on Ramesses II's huge role in negotiating the treaty, using it for a propagandistic effect. Warburton (2003) suggests that the reason for the propagandistic effect is that the treaties with the Hittites were unique for Egypt because they were the only known treaties connecting Egypt with a foreign power. In contrast, the Hittite version of the treaty is more of a serious legal version (Matthews and Benjamin 1997:86).

The Kadesh Treaty still bears significance in the modern day, with a reproduction that hangs in the United Nations building in New York serving as an eternal symbol of peace, goodwill and cooperation. According to Bryce (2006:1), the peace treaty was intended to establish between the two Great Kings "peace and brotherhood for all time." The treaty was an important consequence of the Battle of Kadesh. Yet, the motivations of peace and goodwill of the treaty were also accompanied by motivations of expediency and self-interest.

6.1 THE SOURCES

Copies of the Treaty of Kadesh were found in Egypt and Hatti.[53] In Egypt, copies were recovered in hieroglyphic inscriptions on a wall outside the Great Hypostyle Hall at the Karnak Temple and in the Ramesseum (Bryce 2005:277, 8). Cuneiform tablets with copies of the treaty were discovered in the state archives in Hattuša, modern Boğazköy in Turkey. The Egyptians and Hittites drafted similar but not identical treaty documents. The recording and transmission of the treaty was complicated. Bryce (2005:277) explains that after diplomats from both powers agreed on the treaty's terms, two independent versions were compiled at the respective capitals of Hattuša and Pi-Ramesses. Each version represented the terms of the treaty from the other treaty partner's perspective.

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[53] For an overview of sources on the Treaty of Kadesh, see Bell (2007:108-110).

The version drawn up by Hattuša was originally written in Akkadian,[54] inscribed on a silver tablet, and then sent to Egypt where it was translated into Egyptian. The version drawn up by Egypt was initially written in Egyptian, then translated into Akkadian on a silver tablet, and sent to Hattuša. In Hattuša the text of the treaty was copied on several clay tablets. The initial versions recorded on silver tablets have long been lost to history (Bell 2007:109).

According to Beckman (1999:2-4), the treaty format is similar to that used in Hittite vassal treaties. Typically, it consisted of a preamble, historical introduction, specific stipulations or provisions, details of depositions of copies, names of divine witnesses, and curses and blessings. Bryce (2005:278-81) explains that the main provisions of the treaty were an end to hostilities and the formation of a friendly alliance, a promise of no further aggression, a mutual defence alliance in case of attack by another power, a guarantee of succession, and an extradition agreement for the return of fugitives. Under the treaty, most of the bilateral clauses ensured that there were equal rights and responsibilities for both sides. Furthermore, Bell (2007:110) comments that a curse is placed upon any ruler who violated the treaty, whereas blessings were placed upon the ruler who honoured the treaty.

While much of the texts are similar in both versions, there are differences. Wiseman (2014:2) explains that the opening of both versions differs with reference to the kings. The Hittite version makes no distinction between Hattušili III and Ramesses II referring to them as Great Kings. In contrast, the Egyptian version refers to Ramesses II as Great King of Egypt, while referring to Hattušili III as Great Prince of Hatti. Scholars are divided as to whether this reflects the Egyptian ideology that foreigners were inferior to the Pharaoh, or if it was a practice used to distinguish the Pharaoh from the foreign ruler, namely Hattušili III.

A further difference is the Hittite clause that deals with the Egyptian acknowledgement of the legitimacy of Hattušili III's reign, and also that the Egyptians would guarantee Hattušili III's line of succession. This clause is not found in the Egyptian version, and not deemed necessary by Ramesses II.

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[54] Akkadian was the international lingua franca between the powers of the Late Bronze Age.

Wiseman (2014:2) supports the view that the idea of Rameses II needing assistance of a foreign ruler in the matter of succession went against Egyptian ideology. Possibly one of the most significant differences is that the Egyptian version says the Hittites sued for peace, whereas the Hittite version says Ramesses II sent emissaries requesting peace (Van de Mieroop 2011:221).

6.2 MOTIVATIONS FOR SIGNING THE TREATY

Recent studies have explored the reasons that Hatti and Egypt would conclude a peace treaty after years of conflict. These studies have dealt mainly with the political and military motivations for signing the treaty, while the economic reasons are briefly addressed. From the limited studies, it can be ascertained that Hatti and Egypt probably shared similar economic motivations for signing the treaty. The economic cost of weapons and warfare and the cost of human life must have been exorbitant. Another major conflict like Kadesh would have resulted in a huge financial drain for both economies. Warfare would have affected another crucial factor in the economy, namely that of trade. As Bastiat comments: "When goods do not cross borders, armies will" (Allgood 2004:191).

6.2.1 Hattušili III's reasons for signing the treaty

The motivations for Hatti were of a political and military nature. Politically Hattušili III's nephew, Uri-Teshub, had been a problem during his reign. A few years after the battle, Muwatallis II died leaving his son Uri-Teshub ruling as Mursili III on the Hittite throne. Uri-Teshub was a *pahhurzi*, the son of a secondary wife. Even though he was not a first-ranked son, according to Hittite law, he was still considered eligible according to the rules of succession. Despite this, the term *pahhurzi*, seemed to carry a negative undertone in Hittite society, and those carrying the title were not deemed worthy of the throne (Bryce 2003:213).

At the time of the accession, Uri-Teshub had the alleged support of his uncle who was the second most important man in the kingdom. Hattušili III had achieved military successes against the fearsome Kaska and fought alongside Muwatallis II at Kadesh. Ruling from his seat in Hapkis, Hattušili III ruled over the northern half of the Hittite kingdom, which included Nerik one of the Hittites holiest cities. Bryce (2003:113) suggests that Uri-Teshub felt threatened by the extensive power of his uncle, and attempted to strip his uncle's influence by taking away some of his powers.

Initially, Hattušili III did not resist, until Uri-Teshub attempted to take back the seats of political and religious power in the north, Hapkis, and Nerik (Bryce 2005:261). Tensions escalated, and Hattušili III declared war upon his nephew: "You oppose me. You (are) Great King, whereas I (am) king of the single fortress you have left me. So come! So come Istar of Samunha and the Stormgod of Nerik will judge us."[55]

Although numerous subjects in Hatti and the vassal states remained loyal to Uri-Teshub, he lost important support of the Hittite nobility and other crucial areas to his uncle (Bryce 2005:262).Ultimately, Uri-Teshub lost the battle against his uncle. Hattušili III ascended the throne of Hatti which resulted in the succession remaining in his family line. Hattušili III speaks of his alleged support for his accession:

> The kings (who were) my elders (and) who had been on good terms with me, they remained on just those good terms with me, and they began to send envoys to me. They began to send gifts to me, and the gifts they ke[ep] sending me, they never sent to any (of my) fathers and grandfathers. The king supposed to respect me, respected me, and the (countries) that had been my enemies, I conquered them. For the Hatti Lands I [a]nnexed territory upon territory. (Those) who had been my enemies in the days of my fathers (and) grandfat[her]s concluded peace with me.[56]

In his *Apology*, Hattušili III cites injustices done to him, and Uri-Teshub's fitness to rule as the reason for the usurpation. According to Bryce (2003:214), Uri-Teshub was exiled to the Nuhashshi lands in Syria, and given control over a number of cities in this region. Uri-Teshub, believing that his throne has been usurped made appeals of assistance to the Babylonian, Assyrian, and Egyptian kings (Bryce 2005:264,5). Hattušili III followed this by sending appeals to these kings demanding that they acknowledge him as the true sovereign of Hatti.

The initial appeals were met by disdain as the Assyrian and Babylonian kings snubbed him. The Assyrian king sent back his reply to Hattušili III: "you are (no more than) a substitute for the Great King!" (Bryce 2005:276). Subsequently, Hattušili III ordered that Uri-Teshub be relocated to a new place of exile to stop the challenges to the throne. Uri-Teshub escaped and fled to Egypt. In correspondence between Hattušili III and Ramesses II, the Hittite king demands the extradition of Uri-Teshub (Bryce 2005:281).

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[55] Apology of Hattušili III, CoSI, 77: 203-10, (Van den Hout 1997).
[56] Apology of Hattušili III, CoSI , 77: 204, 12b, (Van den Hout 1997).

Scholars frequently argue about when Uri-Teshub fled to Egypt. Was it before or after the treaty was signed? Bryce (2003: 216) explains there is no clear evidence either way. Despite this, he explains that Uri-Teshub probably fled to Egypt before the treaty was signed. One of the clauses of the treaty related to Ramesses II's acknowledgement of Hattušili III's legitimate rule. It would have made no sense for Uri-Teshub to go to Egypt after this (Bryce 2006:216).

Bryce (2005:280) explains that Uri-Teshub, fearing that he would be extradited after the treaty had been signed, fled Egypt initially back to Syria, and thereafter back to Hittite territory. Hattušili III is furious and in an interesting turn of events demands that Ramesses II find him and return him to Egypt, and not Hatti: "The Great King, the King of Egypt, should get his infantry and his chariotry to exert themselves, and he should expend his gold, his silver, his horses, his copper, and his garments in order to return Uri-Teshub back to Egypt" (Beckman 1999:130). In correspondence, Ramesses II explains to Hattušili III that he was unable to locate Uri-Teshub, and suggests that Hattušili III look for him in Hittite territory. Ultimately, Uri-Teshub fled to southern Anatolia where he remained defiant, but made no attempt to challenge Hattušili III militarily.

Being a shrewd politician, Hattušili III knew that as long as his nephew was alive, with his rightful claim to the throne, it would continue to make his position and that of his heirs insecure. Bryce (2014:77) and Wiseman (2014:6) agree that this was probably the main motivation for Hattušili III entering into the treaty. Bryce (2005:275) explains that a treaty helped in two ways. It endorsed the legitimacy of Hattušili III's rule among other foreign rulers and his Hittite subjects.

Despite the failed attempts to extradite Uri-Teshub from Egypt, the treaty would secure the right of succession in Hattušili III's line. In the case of an uprising from Uri-Teshub or another threat to Hattušili III's throne, the Egyptians were obliged to provide military support (Bryce 2006:4).

Militarily, Hatti faced several threats from external aggressors. The aggressive Kaska tribes continually threatened northern Anatolia. The western Anatolian subject states were under attack from an alliance of Mycenaeans and local insurgents. Yet, Bell (2007:108) suggests an even bigger threat came from the East, in particular, Assyria.

The political vacuum left by the destruction of Mitanni had to some degree attributed to Assyria's rise to becoming a major player in the ancient Near Eastern world. In terms of their continuing expansion, one of the main objectives of Assyria was to secure direct access to the Mediterranean coast (Bryce 2005:275). Seeking to control the territory between the Euphrates and the Mediterranean the Assyrians would need to gain control of territories in Syria like Aleppo and Carchemish. Being the viceregal kingdoms of Hatti, this would ultimately have led to war with Hatti. Assyria had tried some years earlier by attacking and occupying the Hittite viceregal kingdom of Carchemish during Mursili II's reign (Bryce 2005:275).

Despite this, it was a brief occupation as they were expelled by Mursili II. The possibility of it happening again was a major concern to Hattušili III. According to Bryce (2006:4), a treaty for Hattušili III would neutralise the Egyptian threat, while providing an ally against an Assyrian threat. Equally important to the Assyrian point, Wiseman (2014:4) comments that Hattušili III must have considered another dangerous possibility, that of a treaty between Egypt and Assyria. An Egyptian-Assyrian alliance would have been devastating for Hatti and provided another motivation for signing the treaty.

6.2.2 Ramesses II's reasons for signing the treaty

The motivations for Ramesses II signing the treaty may not be as apparent as the Hittites. Bryce (2005:277) considers that there is no mention of territorial matters in the treaty. Presumably, it was not for territorial gains because there was no recovery of former Egyptian territories lost to the Hittites after the battle, nor were territories gained from the treaty. Militarily, scholars suggest threats from the Sea Peoples, Libyans, and Assyrians served as a motivation. Even though this may have been a factor in Ramesses II's decision, at that point it did not pose a significant enough threat to Egypt, in the way that Hatti faced attack from foreign aggressors (Bryce 2006:4).

Bryce (2005:277) suggests that a strong motivation for the signing of the treaty is the propaganda value for the Pharaoh. Subsequent to Kadesh, Ramesses II would not fight in a battle of that magnitude again. If Ramesses II could not obtain notoriety in another major battle, he wanted a significant achievement in the international arena. What better way to bolster his image among his subjects than by concluding a treaty with their long term enemy, Hatti?

If Ramesses II presented the treaty as a settlement initiated by the Hittite king asking for peace it would showcase that under Ramesses II's rule Egypt would be recognised internationally as a world power.

6.3 IMPROVED RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AFTER THE TREATY

The Treaty of Kadesh had led to a period of cooperation called the Egypto-Hittite peace, in which intense contact took place between Egypt and Hatti. Collins (2007:62) explains that the land and sea routes that traversed through petty kingdoms lying between Egypt and Hatti were well travelled by envoys, diplomats, and merchants who journeyed back and forth between the two capitals, Pi-Ramesses and Hattuša.

A letter written from Hattušili III to Ramesses II provides insight into the improved relations and cooperation. It concerned the Maššanauzzi matter. Maššanauzzi, who is the aged sister of Hattušili III has failed to conceive a child and was beyond child-bearing age. Hattušili III presumably had consulted his medical experts who had expressed that in her later years it would be impossible to become a mother. Despite this, Bryce (2003:121) explains that Hattušili III insisted she bears a child. The Egyptian doctors were renowned for their medical expertise, and Hattušili III writes to Ramesses II appealing for assistance in helping his sister fall pregnant.

An important question associated with this matter is why it was important to Hattušili III that his sister bear a child (Bryce 2005:284). Maššanauzzi was married to Masturi, king of Mari who was a vassal ruler in western Anatolia. Under Masturi's rule, the vassal was loyal and played a valuable and strategic role in the region. Yet, with previous rules, this had not been the case, such as Masturi's father who had broken allegiance with Hatti.

Subsequently, the Hittites were able to recover the situation, and Maššanauzzi was married to Masturi to ensure the vassal's loyalty. The problem was that Maššanauzzi was unable to bear a child to succeed the vassal throne. Hattušili III feared that if Masturi died leaving no heir, the anti-Hittite elements would attempt a coup which would destabilise western Anatolia (Bryce 2003:124).

Calculations based on Hittite documents put Maššanauzzi at the age of fifty-eight if not older. Ramesses II is less than encouraging with his reply to Hattušili III. He points out that Maššanauzzi is beyond childbearing age, and this would require a miracle (Bryce 2005:284).

Nonetheless, Ramesses II consents to sending medical assistance and a priest:

> The word is that she's fifty, if not sixty years old! Look, a woman of fifty is old, to say nothing of a sixty-year old! No-one can prepare medicines to enable her to bear children! Well, the Sun God and the Storm God may give a command, and the order which they give will then be carried out continually for the sister of my Brother. And I, the king your Bother, will send an expert incantation- priest and an expert doctor in case there's any way they can assist her to become pregnant.[57]

According to Bryce (2003:123), it seems that even with medical assistance, Maššanauzzi was unable to bear a child. Upon Masturi's death, the throne was seized by Tarhunaradu who showed anti-Hittite sentiment. Ultimately the sources explain that Hittites waged a campaign against Tarhunaradu and defeated him. Subsequently Tarhunaradu and his family were taken into captivity. The vassal throne was restored to the family of Masturi (Bryce 2002:124).

Archaeological evidence also alludes to improved cooperation. Massive Egyptian facilities have been excavated at Pi-Ramesses which reveal workshops for chariotry and metalwork. It is here where moulds for the manufacture of Hittite shields were found (Bell 2007:112).This lead scholars to suggest that Hittites worked alongside Egyptians producing Hittite shields for Hittite contingents at Pi-Ramesses in this new spirit of cooperation.

Subsequent to the signing of the treaty, Ramesses II extended an invitation to Hattušili III to visit Egypt. Due to the various political, military, and religious obligations of the ancient Near Eastern rulers, visits were rare. The visitation offer and the royal visit contributed greatly towards the idea of improved cooperation. Along with the diplomacy factor, Bryce (2005:284) suggests another reason for the visit was Ramesses II s curiosity to meet Hattušili III who was a major player at Kadesh, and who had usurped the Hittite throne.

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[57] ÄHK 75 obv. 16-rev. 13:178-179, (Bryce 2003:123).

As a further enticement, Ramesses II offers to travel personally to Canaan and escort Hattušili III back to Pi-Ramesses:

> The Sun God (of Egypt) and the Storm God (of Hatti) and my gods and the gods of my Brother will cause my Brother to see his Brother-and may my Brother carry out this good suggestion to come and see me. And then we may see each other face to face at the place where the king (Ramesses) sits enthroned. So, I shall go (ahead) into Canaan, to meet my Brother and see him face to (face), and to receive him into the midst of my land! (KBo xxv III, Kitchen 1982:90).

Ramesses II purported the visit as a mission of good-will and an act of furthering good relations between the two kingdoms. Yet, Bryce (2005:285) suggests it may have served Ramesses II with a propagandistic opportunity. While showing the splendours of Egypt, Ramesses II would present the visit to the Egyptian people as the Hittite king coming before Ramesses II in an act of homage. There is no known evidence to suggest that Hattušili III came to visit Egypt (Bryce 2005:285).His initial postponements were due to a medical condition. Thereafter there is a sense that Hattušili III's unwillingness to visit was more complex. In all likelihood, Hattušili III in his many dealings with Ramesses II realised that he would have used the visitation as an opportunity to showcase Egyptian superiority over Hatti's inferiority.

The Hittite-Egyptian alliance was still honoured after the deaths of Hattušili III and Ramesses II during the reigns of their sons. Tudhaliya IV the successor of Hattušili III, inherited a throne plagued by severe famine and poverty. He requested grain from Ramesses II's son, the Pharaoh Merneptah. According to Merneptah's Karnak Inscription, he claims to have sent grain to alleviate the famine crisis in the land of Hatti (Collins: 2007:73). There is no known evidence to suggest that the terms of the treaty were ever invoked, leading Bryce (2006:10) to conclude that the treaty was never put to the test.

6.4 CONCLUSION

The Treaty of Kadesh is one of the earliest surviving treaties. Copies of the treaty were found on tablets discovered in Hattuša, and Egyptian hieroglyphics inscribed at the Karnak Temple and Ramesseum (Bryce 2005:277,8). One of the most important consequences of the Battle of Kadesh was the Treaty of Kadesh because it resulted in the Egypto-Hittite peace that lasted an estimated eighty years (Healy 2005:88). During this period, there is evidence of improved relations and cooperation between

Egypt and Hatti. For instance, Hattušili III communication with Ramesses II on the personal matter of his sister's inability to conceive. The level of trust that Hattušili III places in Ramesses II not to leak the information to the wider ancient Near Eastern world, and Ramesses II sending medical assistance shows the strength of the improved relations. Also, archaeological evidence at Pi-Ramesses reveals multifunctional workshops dealing with chariotry and metalwork. They provide evidence of Hittite workmen and soldiers living and working with Egyptians after the signing of the treaty in the spirit of cooperation (Bard 2015:648).

The motivations for signing the treaty differed between Hatti and Egypt. For Hattušili III the treaty endorsed his legitimacy among the other foreign rulers. Following that it also guaranteed his line of succession, with a promise of Egyptian military support. This in effect neutralised Uri-Teshub's claim to the Hittite throne. In signing the treaty, Hattušili also neutralised the threat from Assyria that was growing in power. The treaty neutralised any possibility of an Egyptian-Assyrian alliance (Bryce 2006:4).

The motivations for Hattušili III signing the treaty were political and defensive, whereas Ramesses II motivations seemed to have been less defensive and more political and personal. Ramesses II probably knew that in his lifetime that he would never fight in another battle of the magnitude of Kadesh. Bryce (2005:277) explains that Ramesses II wanted a significant achievement in the international arena. By concluding the treaty his legacy would include ending many years of war with Egypt's old enemy. The treaty would ensure that under his rule, Egypt would be acknowledged as an international world power. Additional studies on the economic motivations for signing the treaty are required. Despite this, literature available suggest that the cost of war, human life, and its effect on trade were strong economic motivations for both Hatti and Egypt to sign the treaty.

At the time of the treaty, Egypt, Hatti, Assyria, Babylon shared much of the rule of the ancient Near Eastern world. Their correspondence between each other reveals a brotherly friendship with an undertone of deep mistrust for one another as well as consistent squabbling. This carries similarities with the treaty. According to Bryce (2006:1), the treaty was "intended to establish between the two Great Kings peace and brotherhood for all time." Despite this, it carried undertones of expediency and self-interest.

Both Hatti and Egypt used the treaty to end years of war and prevent future conflicts. Both Hattušili III and Ramesses II had a personal stake in the treaty, Hattušili III wanted to guarantee his line of succession, while Ramesses II wanted a legacy of an international statesman.

Bryce (2006:1) explains that referring to the Treaty of Kadesh as an eternal symbol of peace is misleading. Warfare in the ancient Near Eastern world was consistent as opposed to the inconsistency of peace. As a result, Bryce (2006:1) comments that treaties were concerned more with creating strategic alliances than just the idea of achieving peace. It is in this light, that perhaps the treaty should serve more as a symbol of a successful alliance. To date, there are no known cases of the treaty being broken or the terms invoked (Bryce 2006:10). Even after the deaths of Hattušili III and Ramesses II, their sons honoured the alliance. The treaty contributed to the creation and strengthening of the alliance between Hatti and Egypt, and improved personal communications between the two royal houses. From the improved relations and communications resulted a second important consequence of the Battle of Kadesh, the royal marriages of Ramesses II.

CHAPTER 7: THE ROYAL MARRIAGES

ABSTRACT

Diplomatic marriages were commonplace between the ancient Near Eastern kings. After the famous treaty between Hatti and Egypt was concluded, Ramesses II took two Hittite brides in the interests of diplomacy. Textual and iconographic sources are referenced throughout the chapter. This overview will first deal with the marriage market in the ancient Near East. A discussion of the first royal marriage negotiations and the outcomes will follow. The second royal marriage is addressed briefly. Attention is paid to the important role played by the Hittite brides. More information gained from the first Hittite Marriage allows for some conclusions on the importance of the marriages, and their contribution to the Hittite-Egyptian alliance.

In the aftermath of the Battle of Kadesh, the improved relations between Egypt and Hatti led to an alliance resulting in the Kadesh Treaty. After the treaty, Ramesses II took not one but two Hittite brides. In addition to the Kadesh Treaty, the two Hittite marriages are an important consequence of the Battle of Kadesh. Studies on the Kadesh Treaty are well documented. Despite this, additional studies to understand more completely the importance of the Hittite marriages in the Hittite-Egyptian alliance and the role that the Hittite princesses played in the marriages are required.

Schulman (1979:188) comments that both these Hittite marriages happened in a period when Egypt was strong, politically and militarily. This was in contrast to the unsuccessful proposed marriage-alliance of Ankhesenamun in the Zannanza Affair when Egypt was weak, politically and militarily. It is probably with this confidence that Ramesses II requested not any daughter for his bride, but that of the eldest daughter. In ca 1246 BCE, Ramesses II entered into the first Hittite marriage with the eldest daughter of Hattušili III. There is little information regarding the princess. Her Hittite name is unknown. The princess is known by her Egyptian name Maat-Hor-Neferure (Healy 2005:88).

The sources for the first Hittite marriage between the Egyptian and Hittite royal courts suggests that Hattušili III made a declaration claiming to give his daughter to Ramesses II only and no other ancient Near Eastern king. Ramesses II responds to Hattušili III stating that other ancient Near Eastern kings were pressurising him to receive their daughters.

Despite this, that honour of marriage according to Rameses II was reserved for the Hittite princess. Bell (2007:110) explains that Ramesses II used both marriages to commemorate his "great victory" over the Hittites, depicting the marriage as a logical outcome. Several years after the first Hittite marriage, Ramesses II married a second Hittite bride which renewed the bond between the Hittites and Egyptians (Bryce 2005:285).

7.1 DIPLOMATIC MARRIAGES: THE MARRIAGE MARKET

Royal diplomatic marriages[58] were commonplace in the ancient Near East. Schulman (1979:179) defines this practice as an arranged marriage between the ruler of one country, and the offspring of a royal house of another. Studies suggest that these marriages were arranged for political reasons like settling treaties, enforcing alliances, and neutralising potential rivals. Bryce (2003:107) comments that this made princesses an important diplomatic asset. A king who was blessed with numerous daughters had a steady supply of brides that could be married off to other kings or vassals for political gain. Typically, concubinage helped with this supply. The majority of cases necessitated that the highest ranking daughters were reserved for the most important alliances. Many princesses were used as tools of diplomacy and sent off to foreign courts to best serve the political interests of their fathers and state (Bryce 2002:125).

The life of a princess in a foreign court was often a bleak one. Bryce (2002:125) explains that as a foreign bride in a royal court, a wife became one of the king's numerous official bed partners. Unless special status was given, the wife was viewed as a high-class nonentity. The wife was first seen as a tool of royal diplomacy, thereafter a breeding machine and an instrument for the pleasure of the king. For this reason, Bryce (2003:101) comments that love as an initial basis in marriages among ancient Near Eastern royalty was a rarity. In part Melvin (2008:219) agrees with Bryce, yet also explains that although women could not be kings, and were subordinate to kings, women played a part in political life.

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[58] For an overview of the marriage market in the ancient Near East, see (Bryce 2003:107-120).

Wives were able to exercise power on behalf of their husbands or sons and derived power from female activities like marriage, childbirth, and household management. This leads Melvin (2008:220) to conclude that royal women were not marginally isolated and were able to play important roles that were created to fulfil political needs. There are instances when the marriage links or intended marriage links between the two royal households did not have the desired, and often unfortunate, outcomes. A famous example is that of Šuppiluliuma I and his Babylonian queen. Šuppiluliuma I's known for his military shrewdness seems to have been blinded when he married a Babylonian princess. Muršilis II explains that the queen had a negative influence on the kingdom, by introducing undesirable foreign customs into the kingdom and murdering her stepson's wife (Bryce 2003:110,1). Subsequently, her reign of tyranny ended with the queen being stripped of her authority and banishment. Another example of a marriage alliance having an unfortunate outcome was the ill-fated Zannanza Affair in which the Hittite prince was murdered before the marriage to the Egyptian queen could happen.

Interestingly, Bryce (2003:108) comments that where Egypt[59] was concerned, marriage was a one-way process. The Pharaohs were willing to accept foreign brides of acceptable standing, but typically never sent Egyptian princesses to the households of other ancient Near Eastern kings. Seemingly, it was an established tradition from which the Egyptians would not waiver. There is the famous altercation between the Pharaoh Amenhotep III and the Babylonian king who had requested an Egyptian bride. Amenhotep III's blunt reply was "Never since the beginning of time has the daughter of the king of Egypt been given in marriage to anyone!"[60] (Bryce 2003:109).

Since there was no shortage of Egyptian princesses, Ramesses II himself was believed to have fathered well over fifty children, the question remains why Egypt would not export their daughters as foreign brides? Podany (2010:285) explains that this was a means of the Pharaohs showcasing their world-wide power.

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[59] For a detailed discussion on diplomatic marriages in the Egyptian New Kingdom, see Schulman (1979).

[60] There seems to have been a reversal of this policy after the Twenty-First dynasty, ca 1069-945 BCE. An Egyptian princess was sent abroad to marry a foreign king, the Israelite king Solomon (Bryce 2003:119). It was possibly the daughter of Siamun of Tanis, Dynasty 21(Hoffmeier 1994:289).

Bryce (2003:108) supports this view by explaining that if a foreign ruler sent one of his daughters to become a Pharaoh's bride, but in turn never received an Egyptian princess, it was an acknowledgement of the Pharaoh's superior status. Schulman (1979:16) continues that debate by explaining that Egypt felt it was the superior power in the ancient Near East. Also, the giving of an Egyptian bride to another ruler would mean a loss of face and prestige for Egypt. Effectively, the Egyptians were stating that no foreigner was good enough to marry an Egyptian princess. Naturally, the next question is why the other ancient Near Eastern kings put up with this? Bryce (2003:109) perceptively states that the economic, political, material, and strategic benefits of regular diplomatic relations with Egypt outweighed the export ban on Egyptian princesses.

7.2 THE SOURCES FOR THE FIRST MARRIAGE

On the first Hittite marriage, the sources are more varied and extensive in comparison to the sources on the second Hittite marriage. The availability of sources for the first Hittite marriage has propelled it to the forefront in investigations of the diplomatic marriages between Hatti and Egypt. The sources for the first Hittite marriage between Ramesses II and the Hittite princess include royal correspondence between the Egyptian and Hittite royal courts. Clay tablets discovered at Hattuša reveal the intricate details involved in planning the first royal marriage between the two royal courts. Fifteen letters survive of which four were written to Puduhepa by Ramesses II (Bryce 2003:113-115).

Monumental reliefs and inscriptions, including statuary, plaques, papyrus, and stelae found throughout Egypt and Nubia attest to the marriage. The monumental sources are a mixture of royal propaganda with actual historical events. Therefore Fisher (2013:76) proposes that the Hittite and Egyptian cuneiform tablets are seemingly more objective as they contain the correspondence between the two royal courts. In Tanis, in the north-eastern Delta, a statue was discovered in the Great Temple. The Colossus of Ramesses II has Maat-Hor-Neferure portrayed next to his leg.

Her inscription reads: "Great Royal Wife, mistress of the Two Lands, Maat-Hor-Neferure, daughter of the Great Ruler of Hatti" (Fisher 2013:100). Two white plaques found at Tel-Yahudiya and Tanis in the Delta contain the names of Ramesses II on one side and Maat-Hor-Neferure on the reverse.

Fisher (2013:95, 6) suggests this indicates the rule of the king and queen together. A papyrus found contains the name of Maat-Hor-Neferure which reveals that she lived in the Pharaoh's harem in the Fayum (Bryce 2003:119).The Marriage Stela survive in versions found at Karnak, on the isle of Elephantine at Aswan, Abu Simbel, and Amara. Only selected stelae will be discussed to avoid repetition. In the temple complex of Karnak, two stelae were discovered that contains a full version and abridged version of the Marriage Stela (Fisher 2013:75, 6). One of the best preserved is the stela at Abu Simbel which is associated with the Great Temple of Ramesses II in Nubia.

It depicts Ramesses II seated between the Hittite god Sutekh, and the Egyptian god Seth. The Hittite princess and her father stand to the right of Ramesses II. The Hittite princess has both hands raised. She wears a Nubian wig and is styled in Egyptian royal dress. Her father, Hattušili III wears a foreign crown with his hands raised in adoration. The text related to the scene portrays the subservience of the Hittite king to Ramesses II and the gods acknowledging that he is under their feet. According to Fisher (2013:86), a similar scene is depicted on the stela in Amara in upper Nubia. The Hittite princess wearing the Nubian wig and Egyptian royal dress reveals that Ramesses II wanted to portray to the Nubians that Egypt was united with the Hittites.

7.3 QUEEN PUDUHEPA: THE NEGOTIATOR

There is limited evidence to suggest who initiated contact for the marriages. As per Ramesses II's account, that the Hittites after seeing their land being continually ravaged and devastated by the Egyptians, sent their princess along with a huge tribute to Ramesses II. According to Schulman (1979:15) this is pure hyperbole. There have been suggestions that it was the Egyptian envoys that approached the Hittite court looking to secure a marriage. Nonetheless, the negotiations began.

Rameses II exchanged a number of letters with Hattušili III, but the main negotiator for the marriage was Queen Puduhepa,[61] the wife of Hattušili III [62] and mother of the bride. Puduhepa is known for her matchmaking skills arranging among others, a double marriage between the Hittite and Amurrite royal families (Bryce 2005:286).

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[61] On certain aspects of the life and reign of Puduhepa, see Van der Ryst (2016).
[62] It has been suggested that Puduhepa was not the first wife of Hattušili III, but there is no known evidence of an earlier queen that may have filled her position (Bryce 2003:120).

The rock relief at Firaktin in southern Turkey shows Hattušili III and Puduhepa offering libations together to the gods, Teshub and Hebat. This evidence suggests Puduhepa was on an equal footing with Hattušili III, and provided counsel to Hattušili III on state and judicial affairs. As Collins (2007:62) points out the respect and power afforded Puduhepa in Hatti and internationally is unparalleled in the male dominated society of the ancient Near East. Her influential role in international affairs is highlighted in the correspondence with Egypt spanning from the Kadesh treaty until the royal wedding. Puduhepa's seal is found on the Treaty of Kadesh. The four surviving letters from Ramesses II consist of nearly identical wording to those used in the correspondence with Hattušili III. Bryce (2005:286) suggests that this implies that Puduhepa was held in high regard by Ramesses II.

7.4 THE NEGOTIATIONS

According to Bryce (2003: 113), the marriage negotiations between the two royal courts were lengthy and complex. The negotiations concerned the terms of the marriage settlement, the dowry, and arrangements for the safe passage of the Hittite princess to Egypt, and assurances that members of the Hittite royal family and royal messengers from Hatti would have access to the princess after the marriage. The negotiations were not without complications. The prestige of the parties involved necessitated that the bride's dowry be unprecedented. Ramesses II made accusations against the Hittites of stalling the new bride's arrival and providing a less than substantial dowry. He wrote of his frustrations to Puduhepa: "My sister, you promised to give me your daughter. That's what you wrote. But you have withheld her and are angry with me. Why have you not given her to me?" (Bryce 2003:114).

Puduhepa wrote a reply to Ramesses II citing shortages and a fire being the reasons for the delay in sending his bride. According to Bryce (2003:114,5), Puduhepa's communications imply that Ramesses II's exorbitant dowry was inappropriate for a man of his financial wealth. The tensions increased as Puduhepa makes reference to the exiled Urhi-Teshub. The Hittites suspected that Egypt still harboured Urhi-Teshub, allegations denied by Ramesses II. Puduhepa suggests to Ramesses II, that a suitable dowry cannot be raised as Urhi-Teshub spent all the Hittite money by giving it away to the Hittite gods.

Puduhepa's letter continues to explain that the delay in his bride's arrival was due to the collection of the large dowry referring to the "House of Hatti" which was destroyed in a fire (Bryce 2005:282). Although the identity of the burnt out "house" has not been established, Bryce (2005:282) proposes that it possibly was a royal treasury or warehouse which housed items for the royal dowry. After lengthy negotiations, the dowry was agreed. Hattušili III wrote to Ramesses II to inform him that the princess was on the way. The correspondences make reference to a marriage ritual: "Let the people come in order to anoint my daughter's head with fine oil, and may one bring her into the house of the Great King, the King of the Land of Egypt, my brother!" (Bryce 2003:116).[63] Ramesses II sends back a joyful response: "Two great countries will become a single land forever!" (Polo 2016).

According to Bryce (2003:116), the lengthy negotiations and the logistics of trying to arrange the dowry must have contributed to a lengthy period of time, possibly a few years between the initial marriage proposal and the completion of all the formalities prior to the leaving of the bride and the dowry. Puduhepa's communications reveal that part of the dowry was supposed to precede the wedding party and the remainder of the dowry. Due to the famine[64] in Hatti, Puduhepa requested that Ramesses II send envoys to assist with taking an animal and slave component ahead of the wedding party, as there was no grain to feed them due to the famine. In the correspondence, Puduhepa complains to Ramesses II that her request has not been actioned.

7.5 THE JOURNEY OF THE HITTITE BRIDE

The record of the journey of the princess to Pi-Ramesses is depicted on a stela in the Great Temple in Abu Simbel. It opens with the exultations of the Pharaoh Ramesses II and the depictions of the Hittites as a subordinate power. Thereafter the stela gives an account of the journey of the princesses and her entourage (Polo 2016). Puduhepa had taken great security measures for her daughter as there was fear of attacks by bandits and thieves, and conspirators.

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[63] There is no evidence to suggest that anointing a woman before marriage was an Egyptian custom. Seemingly, Egyptian kings followed the practices of their ancient Near Eastern neighbours in this respect (Bryce 2003:119).
[64] Famine in Hatti was widespread from Hattušili III's reign onwards. Subsequently, the Hittites became dependent on Egypt and Syria for grain (Burney 2019:96).

The Hittites had not forgotten the death of their Hittite prince, Zannanza who they believed was murdered en route to Egypt. The travel arrangements of the wedding party to Egypt were detailed in the correspondence. Bell (2007:110) comments that the sight of the princess, entourage and large dowry presented clear evidence of the strength of the Hittite-Egyptian alliance to their Syrian vassals. The princess was escorted by troops under the command of a Hittite prince. Puduhepa travelled as far as the Egyptian border in southern Syria and was met by Egyptian authorities. Hattušili III did not travel with his daughter, possibly because this would imply a type of subservience to Ramesses II. From the border, a long journey followed through Canaan and across the Sinai. Bryce (2003:116) comments that the Pharaoh directs the Canaanite governors in the border region to meet every need of the party and escort and offer protection when arriving in Egyptian territory.

The journey was made during winter, and the sources contain one of the first Egyptian references to snow (Bell 2007:110). Ramesse II was worried that bad weather would delay his bride. The Marriage Stela records that Ramesses II made an offering to the god Seth for favourable weather conditions, for clear skies with no rain or snow. According to Bell (2007:111), the request was granted as there was an unprecedented period of summer weather in the winter, ensuring the safe passage of his bride to Egypt. The Marriage Stela records the perilous journey of the princess mentioning the many mountains, and difficult paths on her journey to Egypt. Ramesses II is depicted as awaiting the arrival of the princess surrounded by the gods, Ptah and Seth.

7.6 THE MARRIAGE: MAAT-HOR-NEFERURE AT PI-RAMESSES

According to Bryce (2003:117), Ramesses II had built his new bride a beautiful palace and declared that his bride-gift was more spectacular than afforded any other ruler. Finally, after months of travel, the princess arrived at Pi-Ramesses. The sources reveal that Ramesses II was pleased with his bride. The Hittite bride is described as beautiful and that Ramesses II "loved her more than anything" (Healy 2005:88). The inscriptions from Egypt provided details of all the grandeur and ceremony of the wedding. The meaning of the Egyptian name Maat-Hor-Neferure given at her marriage was, "One who sees Horus, the Visible Splendour of Re" (Bell 2007:116).

In the correspondence preceding the marriage, Puduhepa proclaimed that her daughter was superior to other princesses of foreign countries that Ramesses II had married. On this basis, Puduhepa wanted assurances that her daughter would become a ruling queen in Egypt. This was an unusual honour afforded a foreign born queen. According to Shaw (2003:27), the Hittite princess was one of seven women who was afforded the title of "great royal wife" during Ramesses II's lengthy reign. Bell (2007:116) explains that her name probably reflected her queenship, Neferure was her personal name, while Maat-Hor was an indication of her particular role as queen. Interestingly enough, Fisher (2013:88) argues that although Maat-Hor-Neferure's iconography acknowledges her queenship, she is still distinguished from the rest of the native Egyptian queens by being called "Daughter of the Great Ruler of Hatti," and a distinctive crown. Given the above, Bryce (2003:118) comments, that although she was queen, Maat-Hor-Neferure still carried the stigma of being a foreigner.

7.7 MAAT-HOR-NEFERURE AT PI-RAMESSES

The new queen would have taken up residence in a palace in Pi-Ramesses. Although the Hittite princess was officially "Egyptianised" by giving her an Egyptian name, Jakob (2006:15) suggests the queen would not have forgotten her own traditions. The huge entourage that travelled with her from Hatti to Egypt would have remained at the queen's disposal after the wedding.

Presumably, this would have included ladies-in-waiting, diplomats, and a detachment of Hittite charioteers forming an honour guard. Moulds for the production of Hittite "figure eight" style shields have been found at Pi-Ramesses. Collins (2007:103) comments that these shields were possibly used by the Hittite guard assigned to Maat-Hor-Neferure. Maat-Hor-Neferure would have had access to royal scribes and messengers, and established a Hittite side court to serve as an embassy of sorts at Pi-Ramesses. Solving (2003:26) suggests that Maat-Hor-Neferure was in a unique position to observe the activities of her husband and the Egyptian court. There is little evidence to suggest that Maat-Hor-Neferure could not communicate with her parents, so possibly she was able to communicate first-hand information from the Egyptian court to the Hittite court.

Solving (2003:26) cautions against thinking that the role of the queen was just that of spying, on the contrary, she believes it was more complex. Maat-Hor-Neferure would have been responsible for building relations between the two royal houses and applying the correct amount of attention, pressure, and counsel to the respective sides to ensure the well-being of both royal kingdoms. Additionally, the queen was responsible for her own future and the well-being of the royal houses.

Ramesses II claimed that this marriage had greatly improved the union between Egypt and Hatti. This has merit but Ramesses II possibly saw an opportunity to make political capital out of it (Bryce 2005:283).This is evidenced by the Marriage Stela in Abu Simbel. It portrays Hattušili III handing over his daughter to Ramesses II with hands raised in adoration to Ramesses II and the Egyptian gods who accompany him. Even though Ramesses II extended an invitation to visit, there is no evidence of Hattušili III visiting Egypt.

Fisher (2013:82) explains that the depiction of Hattušili III and his daughter is more symbolic of a tribute, and an act of homage performed by Hattušili III was regarded as inferior to the superior Ramesses II. On the other hand, cuneiform tablets from Boğazköy seem to suggest that the Hittites felt otherwise. The tablets convey that the Hittites viewed the realms as equal. This is evidenced in Puduhepa's correspondence when she addresses Ramesses II not as subservient but as an equal. The marriage produced a daughter much to the dismay of Hattušili III who was hoping for a son, presumably to put on the future Hittite throne.

Hattušili III wrote of his concern to Ramesses II: "I would have given the land of Hattuša to the son of my daughter, if she has borne a son. But you have sired no son for my daughter. Is it not possible, as has been said, for my brother to sire a son?"[65] Maat-Hor-Neferure never bore a son, and soon disappears from the scene (Bryce 2002:125).Some scholars propose that Maat-Hor-Neferure lost her status as "great royal wife" and was sent to a harem near Gurob at the entrance to the Fayum. This theory is based on a papyrus found at the harem detailing transactions relating to garments of the queen.

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[65] ÄHK 110 rev 4-6:230-1, (Bryce 2003:118).

Bryce (2003:118) doubts that Maat-Hor-Neferure lost her status as "great royal wife." The Hittite-Egyptian alliance was too important. This is the reason that Bryce (2003:118) argues that Maat-Hor-Neferure would not be treated in this manner and that Puduhepa would not have allowed it. It is more likely that Maat-Hor-Neferure died a few years into her marriage. Bryce (2003:119) adds that it was highly unlikely that Puduhepa would have agreed to send a second daughter, if the first daughter was stripped of her queenship and relegated to a harem.

7.8 WIFE NUMBER TWO

In the likelihood of the death of Maat-Hor-Neferure, the question that then naturally arises is why Ramesses II took a second Hittite bride. Bryce (2003:113) explains that the royal brides were in a sense like treaties who not only served as links between kingdoms but also as links between the kings. For example, in the case of a treaty, when one treaty partner dies, the surviving partner would seek a fresh treaty with the successor to re-establish the alliance. The royal bride, according to Bryce (2003:113), became the link between the king that gave her, and the king that received her. In this light, it made sense for Ramesses II to take another Hittite bride in order to reseal the bond between the Hittite and Egyptian courts.

Evidence that Ramesses II took a second Hittite bride is recorded on a Marriage stela in the Great Temple at Koptos near Luxor (Velikovsky 2010:181). It records the Hittite princess accompanied by the princes of Hatti going to Egypt for a second time:

> The Great Ruler of Hatti, sent the rich and massive spoils of Hatti…to the King of South and North Egypt, Usermaatre Setepenre, Son of Re Ramesses II, and likewise many droves of horses, many herds of cattle, many flocks of goats, and many droves of game, before his other daughter whom he sent to the King of South and North Egypt on what was the second such occasion (Kitchen 1999:110-112).

The name of the second Hittite bride is not clear, and her fate after the marriage is not known. There is no known information on the marriage negotiations for the second marriage. The Marriage Stela of the second wedding carries a similar theme to the Marriage Stela of the first Hittite wedding. It portrays that the gods have given Hatti to Ramesses II and that the Hittite king brings his daughter as a tribute, and is under the feet of the Pharaoh along with the other lands (Fisher 2013:86). Even though there is limited information on the second Hittite princess, there is a high probability that she played the same diplomatic role as Maat-Hor-Neferure.

7.9 CONCLUSION

In antiquity treaties could be regarded as the legal part of an alliance between two countries. Diplomatic marriages were seen as sealing the deal, which resulted in foreign brides being found throughout courts in the ancient Near Eastern world. The repeated marriages allowed the enforcing of alliances by providing stable secure partnerships, maintaining blood connections through offspring, and even playing a role in neighbouring dynastic succession as evidenced by the ill-fated Zannanza Affair. In a wider context, this created a perception that the ancient Near Eastern kings belonged to a common community (Kraus and Rauh 2018:74).

The life of the Hittite brides at the Egyptian court was challenging. Typically, they were viewed as one of the numerous official bed partners of the king and had the added pressure of producing the required offspring (Bryce 2002:125). They were used as tools of diplomacy and played an important role in building relations between Hatti and Egypt and ensuring the well-being of the two kingdoms. The likely death of Maat-Hor-Neferure led Ramesses II to request another Hittite bride. This demonstrates that similar to a treaty, the marriage served as a link between the two kings. When there was no longer the link, in this case believed to be the death of Maat-Hor-Neferure, a new Hittite bride is requested to reseal the bond between the Hittite and Egyptian courts (Bryce 2003:118).

The marriage correspondence between Ramesses II and Queen Puduhepa also provide an insight into cultural bias. The Egyptians believed that they were superior to the foreigner. In the marriage correspondence, Ramesses II refers to Hattušili III as an equal and held Puduhepa in high regard. Despite this, a closer look at the sources reveal Ramesses II believed this only to a certain point (Bryce 2003:113-115).The two Marriage Stelae depict the Hittites as Ramesses II subjects, who bring their daughters as a tribute to the Pharaoh. This is possibly one of the main reasons that the Pharaoh's would not provide their daughters as brides for foreign kings. In Egyptian eyes, the provision of Egyptian brides would amount to tribute, an act of homage performed by one of inferior status to one of superior status. In another bid to give the appearance of equal status, Ramesses II agrees to give Maat-Hor-Neferure the title of "great royal wife."

This was an unusual honour afforded a foreign born queen. Yet, Maat-Hor-Neferure was still distinguished as a foreigner, and inferior, by the title, "Daughter of the Great Ruler of Hatti," and being depicted wearing a distinctive crown (Bryce 2003:118). Ramesses II claimed that these marriages had greatly improved the union between Egypt and Hatti (Bryce 2003:118).The marriages of Ramesses II to the Hittite princesses served as a symbol of strength for the alliance between Hatti and Egypt. The showcase of power presented by the marriages was according to Bell (2007:110) a way to let their Syrian vassals, and the wider ancient Near Eastern world, know that opposition against either Egypt or Hatti in the future would be pointless. The two marriages were significant historical events that sealed an alliance and contributed to peace between Hatti and Egypt.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

8.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the conclusions and limitations of this study are provided. It begins with an outline of the research problem followed by a discussion of the research questions related to the cause of the Battle of Kadesh, the battle itself, and the consequences in the aftermath of the battle. The research questions are followed by a review of the limitations of the study. Finally, recommendations for future research are given.

Warfare played a huge role in the societies of the ancient Near East. Battles are one of the few cultural ties that provide the scholarly community and the layperson with opportunities to understand aspects of ancient cultures and society (Brice and Howe 2015:168). The Battle of Kadesh is one of the most celebrated chariot battles in ancient Near Eastern history. The traditional military methodology used to investigate and explore the battle in early Kadesh literature demonstrated a mastery of tactics and strategy. Despite this, by using this methodology it has produced studies that provide narrow aspects of the operational history of the battle. Consequently, the non-traditional military aspects of the battle such as the causes and consequences are understudied. The causes and consequences are crucial to understanding a battle, and the impact of the battle on the larger society. Recently scholars (Brice and Howe 2015: xv) have promoted using a combination of the traditional military and non-military aspects to study the battle. Combined studies allow for a less narrow focus on the battle which is important for developing an all-inclusive approach, and ultimately a better understanding of the battle.

This dissertation tests the hypothesis that the Battle of Kadesh must be discussed alongside its cause and consequences to determine its effects on and off the battlefield. With this background, the researcher focused on the cause, namely the Zannanza Affair, why the battle was fought, how it was fought, the outcome, and the consequences, which was the Treaty of Kadesh and the Royal Marriages, and what happened next.

8.2 DISCUSSION

8.2.1 Is the Zannanza Affair considered a cause of the Battle of Kadesh even though it happened an estimated fifty years before the battle?

According to Bryce (2005:178) the Zannanza Affair which happened some fifty years before the Battle of Kadesh is one of the most extraordinary and puzzling episodes of ancient Near Eastern history. Although the defection of the Amurru under the leadership of Benteshina is viewed as the immediate cause of the battle, a long term cause is one that started with the Zannanza Affair. The findings in the current literature on the Zannanza Affair reveal that the scholars are concerned predominately with the identity of the Egyptian royal couple as well as murderers of the Hittite prince in the affair. The main conclusions that can be drawn are that the Zannanza Affair is usually treated as an isolated event, and not a contributing factor to the battle. Typically it is not identified as a cause because it happened years before the battle. This dissertation started with an attempt to identify the Zannanza Affair as a cause of the Battle of Kadesh.

The murder of the Hittite prince, Zannanza, en route to marry the Egyptian queen cannot be viewed as an isolated event in history. The murder of the prince was the spark that would ignite the ancient Near Eastern world that was already filled with tensions. Prior to the Zannanza Affair, the strained relations between Hatti and Egypt are highlighted by the unsuccessful attack of the Pharaoh Tutankhamun on Kadesh. However, the murder of Zannanza was the turning point in history because it set off a chain of events that ended in the Battle of Kadesh.

The analysis of the Hittite sources, namely the *Deeds of Šuppiluliuma I* and the *Second Plague Prayers* lead to the following conclusions: First, Šuppiluliuma I is outraged over the death of his son, and second, Šuppiluliuma I not only holds the Egyptian leadership responsible for his son's death but also the Egyptian people (Bryce 2003:197.8). The diplomatic overtures of Tutankhamun's successor, the Pharaoh Ay, were dismissed by Šuppiluliuma I as all-out war is inevitable between Hatti and Egypt. Shortly thereafter, in retaliation for his son's death, Šuppiluliuma I attacked Egyptian territories in southern Syria (Bryce 1990:99). The campaign yielded numerous prisoners of war who carried a plague back to Hatti claiming the lives of Šuppiluliuma I and his son, the crown prince Arnuwanda.

It is difficult to speculate if Šuppiluliuma I would have marched on Egypt if he lived. The sources make no mention of his future plans. Despite this, the marriage of the Hittite prince and the Egyptian queen which was supposed to unite two of the most powerful kingdoms of the ancient Near East had the opposite effect. The Zannanza Affair led to the Hittite attack on Egyptian territory after the death of the Hittite prince which led to increased hostilities between Hatti and Egypt. Subsequently both Hatti and Egypt abandoned their policies of previous friendly relations and adopted a more aggressive stance. The Zannanza Affair helped set the stage for increased militarism of both Hatti and Egypt which gave rise to preparations and changes to their military operations which impacted the way they fought at Kadesh.

8.2.2 How did the Hittite and Egyptian armies wage war?

The Zannanza Affair was a pivotal point in ancient Near Eastern history because it would lead to an inevitable clash between the Hittites and Egyptians. For the Hittites it was about protecting their interests in Syria, preventing a possible Egyptian invasion of their homeland. For the Egyptians it was about regaining the lost Egyptian prestige through the complete domination of Syria, and permanently dispelling the Hittites from Syria. The Zannanza Affair gave both the Hittites and Egyptians a significant period of time to make preparations for the upcoming battle. Chapters 3 and 4 explored the makeup of the Hittite and Egyptian armies to provide insight into the armies that fought at Kadesh. The literature on both the Hittite and Egyptian armies relied predominately on the Hittite Empire and Egyptian New Kingdom sources. The numerous sources provide valuable insight into the composition of the Hittite and Egyptian armies as well as their weaponry, manpower, and recruitment.

Of the numerous reasons that the Hittites and Egyptians waged war, the defence and expansion of their respective kingdoms were among the most important (Seevers 2013:128). Similar to the Egyptians, the Hittite army reached its peak during the Empire Period. A highly efficient fighting force was needed for the defence and expansion needs of the Empire. The professional Hittite army was led by the Great King who waged war on the behalf of their gods, who the Hittite's believed ran before them in battle. The Hittite army consisted of a professional force loyal to the king. Also, additional forces were provided by the king's vassals.

The Hittite military organisation supported a clear command structure and supplied the army with a large number of weaponry. Furthermore, it supplied the army with the latest battlefield technologies such as the three-man chariot. At Kadesh the Hittite army comprised of the infantry and the chariotry, with the chariotry being considered as the elite force of the army. The implications of the present research on the Hittite army that fought at Kadesh confirm that it was well organised. It was an efficient military machine not averse to using psychological tactics or diplomacy to achieve a successful outcome (Beal 1995:553).

The Egyptian army that fought at Kadesh did not leave a manual detailing how they waged war. Despite this limitation Seevers (2013:98) explains that numerous Egyptian sources like textual evidence and artistic representations of the battle help build a picture of the army. Research on the army during the New Kingdom Period reveals that Egypt reached not only its commercial but military peak after the expulsion of the Hyksos foreigners.

The military organisation of the army ensured a command structure from the gods to the Pharaohs and down to the common soldiers providing simple and effective ways of communication and assuming responsibility. The fully fledged standing army was maintained and supported with the latest military technology by the Egyptian state. Recent studies (Bard 2015:193) suggest that the chariotry were a symbol of power in society and on the battlefield. Remains of chariots found in the Pharaoh Tutankhamun's tomb may be considered as further validation of the chariot's status in Egyptian society. At Kadesh, the infantry and the chariotry were the main military arms used. Overall the literature on the Egyptian army that fought at Kadesh suggests that it was one of the largest, well equipped and most successful in the ancient Near East (Gabriel 2002:69).

8.2.3 What were the Hittite and Egyptian military innovations and changes that were introduced to try and win the battle?

The Hittite and Egyptian armies made use of selected military innovations on the Kadesh battlefield. Recent studies (Lorenz and Schrakamp 2011) suggest that flexibility and adaptability of the respective military organisations were a contributing factor for adopting the innovations. The majority of ancient Near Eastern literature concludes that the mobility of the chariot made it one of the most innovative weaponry of the Late Bronze Age.

Current scholars (Gabriel 2009) confirm that the Egyptians did not invent their two-man chariot previously as it was used by the Hyksos. However, by applying certain innovations like the six spoke wheel, the placement of the axle and the u-joint to the two-man chariot it was transformed into a fast paced mobile platform. Ramesses II's introduction of the ox-drawn cart as a mode of military transport was an innovation at Kadesh, and years to come (Gabriel 2001:6). Similar to the Egyptians, the Hittites also fielded two-man chariots, but by the time of Kadesh, they unveiled a three-man chariot. The tactical genius of Muwatallis II is recognised as he built chariots to bring additional manpower onto the battlefield at a rapid pace. The *Kikuli t*ext serves as further validation of another military innovation employed by the Hittites. It outlines an equine management programme which enabled horses to pull heavier loads to accommodate the weight of the third chariot warrior (Bryce 2002:112).

Studies have concluded that the success on the Kadesh battlefield is not due solely to the chariot, but also due to the use of another military innovation, the composite bow. The bow was highly regarded in the New Kingdom and Empire Periods. The combination of the chariot and bow produced a fast paced mobile killing platform. Experimental archaeology based on reconstructions of ancient Near Eastern chariots has confirmed findings that are consistent with research showing that the combat speed of a chariot is estimated at 16 km/h and that the composite bow could be fired at an estimated 6-10 arrows a minute. Each chariot warrior is believed to have had between 120-150 arrows (Lorenz and Schrakamp 2011:143, 4). The chariot and bow combination provided lethal speed and firepower on the battlefield.

Research on the chariots and the composite bow has provided information on a lesser known military innovation, namely that of scale armour. Archaeological findings reveal scales from ancient Near Eastern sites. Used in reconstructions, they appear to weigh between 9.5-27 kg, and were effective in protection against arrows (Lorenz and Schrakamp: 2011:136). Evidence suggests that both the Hittites and Egyptians used scale armour. Equally important to the military innovations were that Muwatallis II and Ramesses II made operational changes. The chariot has already been discussed above as a military innovation but can also be viewed as an operational change. Therefore, the discussion continues with two additional operational changes, namely the strategic base of operations and additional manpower.

Both Hatti and Egypt made changes involving the movement of the base of operations closer to Syria. Muwatallis II moved the Hittite capital from Hattuša to Tarhuntassa further south in Anatolia and closer to Syria. Some scholars have concluded that this was a religious move, through which Muwatallis II could elevate the worship of the Storm-God of Lightening over other Hittite deities. Yet, Bryce (2005:232) comments that this was a political move used to better place the Hittite army closer to Syria to launch a major campaign against the Egyptians. Before the battle Muwatallis II reorganised the kingdom leaving his brother, Hattušili III in charge of the northern half of the Hittite kingdom, with Muwatallis II controlling the south. Bryce (2005:233) explains that leaving his brother in charge of the north may be considered as further validation of the operational change that would allow Muwatallis II to focus solely on the impending battle with the Egyptians.

Archaeological evidence discovered at Pi-Ramesses in the delta identified it as the capital and military base of operations of Ramesses II. The finds, inclusive of chariotry and weaponry workshops, have provided additional insight into the workings of the Egyptian military organisation during the New Kingdom. The military potential of Pi-Ramesses was realised by Ramesses II because of its close proximity to Syria and the sea. Ramesses II was able to launch a major military offensive which allowed for the faster movement of large contingents of troops between Egypt and Syria (Spalinger 2005:228).

Current research on the maintenance and composition of the Hittite and Egyptian military organisations reveal a need for additional research into recruitment. Prior to Kadesh, studies suggest that manpower was based on operational necessity. To quell a disobedient vassal, a Hittite king would not deploy the entire army, but a smaller fighting force (Beal 1995:547).The Egyptians, prior to Kadesh usually fought short localised wars with one section of the army at a time (Morkot 2010: 28-30). In their preparations for battle, Muwatallis II and Ramesses II must have recognised that additional manpower was crucial to winning the battle.

The numbers added to the Hittite army came from Hittite vassals, allies and mercenaries. The Egyptian sources claim that the Hittite forces at Kadesh numbered 47,500 men, one of the largest armies fielded by the Hittites (Beal 1995:547). Prior to the New Kingdom the recruitment criteria was one man conscripted out of a hundred. Changes in the New Kingdom resulted in one man out of ten being conscripted. Through this change, Ramesses II added a fourth division to his already existing three divisions. Additional manpower was sourced from mercenaries and prisoners of war. The Egyptian sources estimated that Ramesses II had 20,000 men at Kadesh (Spalinger 2005:215).

The discussions of the Hittite and Egyptian armies lead to the following conclusions. Realising the scale of the battle to come, Muwatallis II and Ramesses II made operational changes and use of military innovations to ensure their respective success on the battlefield. Both armies that fought at Kadesh were well organised and well equipped, and arguably the best in their era. The unexpected outcomes from the research were the lack of consensus on the role of the chariot in battle and the neglected area of the role of the elite units within the Hittite and Egyptian armies in battle.

8.2.4 Was Egypt victorious after the Battle of Kadesh?

Syria had become the battleground between Hatti and Egypt with Kadesh and the Amurru becoming pawns in the power struggle. After the defection of the Amurru into the Egyptian fold, Ramesses II marched on Syria to reclaim Kadesh from the Hittites. After the battle Ramesses II declared Kadesh a personal victory and commissioned an account of the battle to be displayed throughout Egypt. The site of Tell Nebi Mend in Syria is widely accepted as the site of the Kadesh battlefield, even though no physical remains have been recovered there.

For years, the Kadesh inscriptions commissioned by Ramesses II were interpreted literally and favoured an Egyptian victory (Santosuosso 1996:424). This was challenged by the later discovery of Hittite sources which alluded to a Hittite victory (Bryce 2005:240). The winner of the battle is still debated as evidenced by the numerous aspects of research on this topic. The implication of early Kadesh literature was that Ramesses II had marched on Kadesh and was drawn into a Hittite ambush. Thereafter, it was only through the personal valour of Ramesses II who launched a counterattack that the Egyptians defeated the Hittites (Breasted 1903:6, 7). Recently aspects of research on the Kadesh inscriptions have suggested that the inscriptions served more of a propagandistic function than historical truth, thereby casting doubt on an Egyptian victory (Bryce 2005:241). Despite this limitation, the inscriptions are valuable in light of the information provided on the armies that fought and the operational sequence of events. Overall, current studies do acknowledge Ramesses II's bravery for launching a counter attack, but credit the Egyptian reinforcements with saving Ramesses II and his army from annihilation (Spalinger 2005:117). The Hittite sources are consistent with the research suggesting that this was a Hittite victory. Muwatallis II was able to retain Kadesh and recapture the Amurru, and recover territories from Amurru south to Aba. Ramesses II was unable to reach his objectives of the dominance of Syria, reclaiming Kadesh and dispelling the Hittites permanently from Syria, making the Hittites the long-term victors (Burney 2019:212).

8.2.5 Did the Kadesh Treaty serve as an eternal symbol of peace?

Tablets in Hattusa and hieroglyphics in Egypt revealed an important consequence of the Battle of Kadesh. This was the Treaty of Kadesh concluded between Ramesses II and Hattušili III in the aftermath of the battle. Being one of the earliest surviving treaties, it is an important finding in the understanding of the diplomacy between Hatti and Egypt. Aspects of research on the Treaty of Kadesh suggest that it increased levels of improved relations and cooperation (Collins 2007:62). Communication of a personal matter between Hattušili III and Ramesses II regarding Hattušili III's sister may be considered a further validation of this (Bryce 2003:121). Equally important findings of archaeological evidence at Pi-Ramesses provide evidence of Egyptian-Hittite workshops highlighting the spirit of cooperation. The broad implication of present research is that the Treaty of Kadesh is regarded as an eternal symbol of peace. Despite this, Bryce (2006:1) suggests that the treaty was more of a strategic alliance between Hatti and Egypt, linked to reasons of expediency and self-interest, not eternal peace.

This conclusion follows from the fact that Ramesses II used the treaty to leave an international legacy, and Hattušili III used it to guarantee his line of succession. Overall, the research demonstrates that this theory has merit. In addition, the Treaty of Kadesh increased levels of cooperation and ushered in years of peace that previously was not thought possible. To our knowledge, the treaty was never broken or the terms invoked (Bryce 2006:10). This may be considered as promising aspects towards its cause for an eternal symbol of peace supported by its representation in modern day at the United Nations in New York.

8.2.6 How did the royal marriages of Ramesses II contribute to peace between Hatti and Egypt?

The failed marriage attempt of the ill-fated Zannanza Affair seemingly did not serve as a deterrent from the idea between Hatti and Egypt. The Treaty of Kadesh signed in the aftermath of the Battle of Kadesh was cemented by another consequence of the battle, the royal marriages. Ramesses II married two Hittite brides to seal the peace Treaty of Kadesh. The arrangement was not just between two royal families but between two kingdoms for immediate political gains (Bryce 2003:118, 9).

The objectives of the Hittite royal marriages were to protect the Treaty of Kadesh and guarantee peace. By imposing a relationship of obligation on both sides, the marriages served as a contributing factor to peace between Hatti and Egypt. The broad implication of present research is that the royal brides were tools of diplomacy, entering into often loveless marriages while pressurised to produce the required offspring. Despite this, Melvin (2008:219) advances the idea that the Hittite royal brides, similar to other royal brides, would have played an important role at the Egyptian court. By wielding power on behalf of their husband, Ramesses II, they were ideally placed to build and strengthen relationships between the Hittite and Egyptian royal courts. The researcher suggests that in the aftermath of the Battle of Kadesh that the Treaty of Kadesh was the first part of the peace process, followed by the second part, the marriages. The purposes of marriages were to reinforce the Hatti-Egyptian alliance, avoid war, and promote the international prestige of Hatti and Egypt through the marriage union.

8.3 LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The main objective of this research was to study the cause, and consequences alongside the battle to determine its impact on and off the battlefield. The limitations of the research were two-fold. First, the broad implications of current research on ancient warfare suggest that one of the most published and popular areas of ancient history is afforded the warfare and battles of the Greeks and Romans. In comparison, there is less extensive literature published on ancient Near Eastern battles hampered by accessibility to sources, and studies that are published by ancient Near Eastern scholars in specialist journals of limited accessibility.

Second, the literature on Kadesh reveals that its focus on the battle was predominately traditional, concerned with battle tactics while neglecting the non-traditional military aspects of the battle such as causes and consequences.

Given the above, several recommendations for future research are given. More studies on ancient Near Eastern battles are required as they are the key component in future attempts to overcome the great divide of the more popular classical Greek and Roman battles. Future research should be devoted to the development of studies on ancient Near Eastern battles being presented in a form that is not only limited to ancient Near Eastern specialists but accessible also to non-Near Eastern specialists and laypeople alike.

Future research should consider the potential effects of the causes and consequences of the Battle of Kadesh more carefully, for example, the Zannanza Affair discussed in Chapter 2 is often overlooked as an isolated international incident, yet was responsible for events that led to the Battle of Kadesh. Further studies could fruitfully explore this issue using a combination of traditional and non-traditional military approaches to study the battle. The results of which would not be limited to narrow aspects of the battle. It will provide a new method of relooking at old and new evidence which could assist in discovering information previously overlooked. This will provide a better understanding of the battle.

The Battle of the Kadesh was one of the biggest chariots battles in ancient Near Eastern history. Despite this, there remain differing views in studies on the chariot at the Battle of Kadesh. Regardless, future research should further explore the functional role of the chariot and weapons used. Future research on this issue could be done by using battlefield simulations of Kadesh, and using experimental archaeology to analyse the reconstructions of the Kadesh chariots and the weapons used.

The elite units within the Hittite and Egyptian armies are an interesting topic for future work. Due to time constraints, this study provided a basic overview of the different elite units in Chapter 3 and 4. It does, however, provide a good starting point for more in-depth discussions on the role of the elite units in the battle. Also, comparisons of the ancient elite units with elite units of modern armies could prove quite beneficial to Kadesh literature, as there are limited studies on this subject.

8.4 SUMMATION

Kadesh can arguably lay claim to being one of the biggest chariot battles in ancient Near Eastern history. The history of warfare reveals that no battle is fought in isolation. There are always causes leading up to the battle and consequences in its aftermath. Employing a combination of traditional (battle tactics) and non-traditional military (causes and consequences) aspects when studying the Battle of Kadesh allows for a holistic view of the battle which is important for a better understanding of the battle, and ultimately its importance. The Zannanza Affair was identified as a cause of the battle as it led to the increased militarism of Hatti and Egypt. Furthermore, the Zannanza Affair inspired changes which impacted the way that Hatti and Egypt waged war. The results of which are evidenced in the changes to their respective military operations in terms of strategic bases and manpower, while using new and improved military innovations, in particular, the chariot on the battlefield. In the aftermath of the battle, the Treaty of Kadesh and the royal marriages are two events that constitute as the biggest impact off the battlefield. The Hittite-Egyptian alliance reinforced by the royal marriages demonstrate high levels of diplomacy which introduced an unprecedented period of peace in the ancient Near East. Studying the cause and consequences alongside the Battle of Kadesh demonstrates its importance on and off the battlefield, a battle of military innovation and an eternal symbol of a peaceful Hittite-Egyptian alliance.

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APPENDIX A. CHRONOLOGY

A brief chronological chart for the sake of clarity. Only selected Kings, Queens and Periods are listed, and the dates are approximate.

<u>Hatti</u>

OLD KINGDOM (ca 1680-1460 BCE)

Hattušili I (ca 1650-1620 BCE)

Mursilis I（ca 1620-1590 BCE)

EMPIRE PERIOD (ca 1460-1200 BCE)

Muršilis II (ca 1321-1295 BCE)

Šuppiluliuma I (ca 1321-1295 BCE)

Puduhepa (ca 1290-1215 BCE)

Muwatallis II (ca 1295-1272 BCE)

Urhi-Teshub/ Mursili III (ca 1272-1267 BCE)

Hattušili III (ca 1267-1237 BCE)

Tudhaliya I /Tudhaliya III (ca 1400-1350 BCE)

Tudhaliya IV (ca 1237-1209 BCE)

<u>Amurru</u>

Benteshina (ca 1290/80-1235 BCE)

Late Bronze Age (ca 1500-1200 BCE)

<u>After *The Kingdom of the Hittites*, Trevor Bryce, New York (2005).</u>

Egypt

OLD KINGDOM (ca 2686-2181 BCE)

MIDDLE KINGDOM (ca 2040-1720 BCE)

Second Intermediate Period (ca 1720-1550 BCE)

NEW KINGDOM (ca 1552/1550-1069 BCE)

Ahmose (ca 1552-1527 BCE)

Queen Ahhotep (ca 1560-1530 BCE)

Tuthmosis III   (ca 1490-1436 BCE)

Hatshepsut (ca 1490-1469 BCE)

Amenhotep III (ca 1403-1364 BCE)

Akhenaten (ca 1364-1347 BCE)

Smenkhare (ca 1438-1345 BCE)

Tutankhamun (ca 1345-1335 BCE)

Ankhesenamun (ca 1348-1322 BCE)

Ay (ca 1335-1332 BCE).

Horemheb (ca 1332-1306 BCE)

Seti I (ca 1305-1290 BCE)

Ramesses II (ca 1290-1224 BCE)

Merneptah (ca 1224-1204 BCE)

Ramesses III (ca 1184-1152 BCE)

After *The Ancient Near East c.3000-330 BC*, Volume 1, Amelie Kuhrt, New York (1995)

APPENDIX B. HITTITE TERMINOLOGY

GAL MEŠEDI	Chief of the Royal Bodyguards
GAL GESTIN	Chief of the Wine Stewards
UR.SAG	Hero
UKU.US or sharikuwa	Professional infantry men
merkava	chariots (Hebrew word)
karatappu	chariot driver
sus	chariot warrior
lumes gis Ban	archers
Mesedi	Royal Body Guard
AN.TAH.SUM	festival of the sun goddess Arinna
pittianzi	foot race
Uralla	training sergeant
pahhurzi	son of secondary wife

APPENDIX C. EGYPTIAN TERMINOLOGY

khepresh   blue/ war crown

ma'at   order, harmony, righteousness

isef   chaos, disorder, evil

hau   lieutenant-colonel

mer   captain

menh   lieutenant

menfyt   infantry

megau   shooter/elite unit of archers

wrrt   chariot

shend'ot   short kilt

nemes   folded cloth

ketjen   chariot driver

seneny   chariot warrior

phrr   chariot runner

khopesh   long-bladed sword

Nakhtu-aa   "The strong-arm boys"

Kenyt-nesu   "Kings Braves"

Ne'arin   elite unit

dja   short spear

taagsu   dagger

Vizier   Prime Minister

APPENDIX D. KADESH

Kadesh is also referred to as Qadesh, Kinza and the Hittite name, Kadeš. The city of Kadesh was situated in the region of Syria. According to Bryce (2003:142) it formed a type of frontier zone between northern and southern Syria. This ancient city is identified with the modern Tell Nebi Mend on the Orontes River, and is located south-west of Homs in Syria. Kadesh was an important city of commerce. The first references in the sources to the city are as an ally of Mitanni. During the Battle of Megiddo, Bryce (2005: 162) explains that the prince of Kadesh had joined a coalition of Syrian forces who rose against Egypt, but were defeated by the Pharaoh Tuthmosis III. Kadesh was not only an important city of commerce but its strategic location in the Eleutheros valley was important to access the Amurru territory and provided entry into the Syrian plain (Healy 2005:11). The possession of Kadesh for both the Egyptians and the Hittites was important which according to Bryce (2003:142) made it figure frequently in clashes between Egypt and Hatti. For the Egyptians, control of Kadesh was crucial because it was positioned on the main Egyptian invasion route to the north Syrian plain. Healy (2005:11) explains that if the Egyptians wanted to dominate Syria they needed to take control of Kadesh. For the Hittites, control of Kadesh was a good staging point for launching an attack into southern Syria and thereafter complete dominance of Syria.

Figure 2. Photograph of Kadesh, Vermaak, P.S (2009).

Figure 3. Photograph of Kadesh taken from above the site, Vermaak, P.S (2009).

Figure 4. Photograph of Kadesh taken from below the site, Vermaak, P.S (2009).

Figure 5. Photograph of the Orontes River- Kadesh, Vermaak, P.S (2009).

APPENDIX E. THE KADESH INSCRIPTIONS

In the aftermath of the Battle of Kadesh, Ramesses II did not view the outcome as a failure. Instead, the Pharaoh commissioned an account of the battle presenting it as a great victory over the Hittites to be placed throughout Egypt. The Kadesh inscriptions consist of reliefs, and three bodies of texts namely, the *Poem*, the *Bulletin* or *Record*, and the *Captions* accompanying the reliefs (a pictorial record). Spalinger (2005:209) remarks that the pictorial record alone arguably provides the fullest visual information regarding the Egyptian military in the Nineteenth Dynasty. According to Spalinger (2005:210), Ramesses II wanted to illustrate four main events in the campaign: the camp and war council, the actual battle, the booty and captives, and the second presentation at home to the gods in the aftermath of the battle.

Copies of the Battle of Kadesh accounts are displayed on public buildings, and in temples found at Abydos, Karnak, Luxor, Abu Simbel, the Ramesseum, and Beit el-Wali (Berman 2017:20,1). The majority of the sites have the account accompanied by the reliefs that recount the different stages of the battle. At Luxor, Abydos, and the Ramesseum the reliefs together with the *Poem* and *Bulletin* reveal a similar core event. Ramesses II's army approach Kadesh, and the ambush by a large force of Hittite chariotry. The army of Ramesses II flees leaving the Pharaoh to face the Hittites alone. The courageous Ramesses II charges into the Hittite line and defeats them single-handedly (Berman 2007:21).

The Kadesh reliefs at Luxor, Abu Simbel, and the Ramesseum provide depictions of the city of Kadesh. It is portrayed as a well-fortified city on top of a high mound with rivers and a moat, with some suggestions of a second moat. The entrance and exit to the city were via two bridges spanning the moat (Healy 2005:52).

Egyptologists have acknowledged that there are differences between the accounts of the *Poem, Bulletin*, and the reliefs. Berman (2017:22) provides an example where the *Poem* narrates that Ramesses II issued two harsh rebukes to his soldiers for their cowardice, whereas the *Bulletin* makes no mention of this. Although, Van Seters (1997:157) acknowledges the differences he points out that the *Poem, Bulletin*, and the pictorial record must be viewed together to provide the whole picture.

A brief outline of some of the Kadesh inscriptions found at the various sites in Egypt is provided below:

Abydos

Ramesses II's temple at Abydos was built early during his reign and is located north of Luxor. It is a short distance away from the Temple of Seti I, and in comparison is smaller and has a less complex architectural design. Although Ramesses II's temple provides valuable insight into religious and social life in ancient Egypt, its notoriety stems from the dramatic reliefs depicting the Battle of Kadesh. The reliefs on the outside of the temple are carved in fine white limestone. According to Spalinger (2003:163), although the technique of sunken relief was applied to other Kadesh inscriptions in Egypt the details are much better rendered in the Abydos reliefs, making it one of the finest works of Ramesses II's battle against the Hittites. Famous scenes from the battle include the Attacking Hittites, Advancing chariots and the Counting hands, which refers to the Egyptian identification of enemy dead (Spalinger 2005:219,20).

Karnak

Karnak is the temple complex situated on the east bank of the Nile in Luxor. Karnak was the largest religious sanctuary in ancient Egypt and the principal religious centre of the god Amun. The development of the temple complex spanned more than a thousand years as the various Pharaohs through Egyptian history contributed to the development with their own constructions. Seti I erected the Great Hypostyle Hall in the Karnak complex. An architectural feat consisting of 134 giant sandstone columns surrounded by massive walls. After the death of Seti I, his son Ramesses II finished the southern wing. Monderson (2003:93) comments that Ramesses II commissioned the *Poem* and the Kadesh peace treaty to be placed in the rear of the hall. The Battle of Kadesh was depicted on the southern exterior wall. Subsequently, Ramesses II had his later campaigns in Syria and Palestine carved over the depictions of the Battle of Kadesh.

Luxor

The Luxor temple complex is situated in the modern city of Luxor on the east bank of the Nile. It was several New Kingdom Pharaohs such as Tutankhamun, Seti I, and Ramesses II who rebuilt and extended the complex which includes chapels, a Hypostyle Hall, and Peristyle Court, among others. The principal entrance today has one of Ramesses II's contributions, the Great Pylon. It is decorated with scenes of the depictions of Ramesses II's war against the Hittites. On the left are the well-known scenes from the Egyptian Camp and the War Council. While the right depicts the Battle of Kadesh. The *Poem* is inscribed below these scenes and narrates that the Hittites had three men in a chariot that fought as a unit (Bonechi 2011:1).

Abu Simbel

Abu Simbel is a temple complex located in southern Egypt. In ancient times, Abu Simbel was considered to be part of Nubia. Built by Ramesses II it consists of two temples carved into a mountainside. Throughout the complex, there are depictions of Ramesses II's battle scenes including his victories in Libya and Nubia. Yet, the most striking are the scenes from the Battle of Kadesh. On a wall on the northern side of the complex is a depiction of the Battle of Kadesh with a large chariot scene. There are numerous different figures in the scene inclusive of Ramesses II who is depicted in his chariot riding towards the enemy. A famous scene of the battle, the so-called Beating of the Spies, is depicted. Additionally, there are depictions of a doctor attending to a patient, and attendants caring for Ramesses II's pet lion who was believed to go into battle with Ramesses II (Smith and Turnermore 2007:8).

Ramesseum

The Ramesseum is the funerary temple of Ramesses II dedicated to the god Amun. It consists of two courts, hypostyle halls, and a sanctuary complete with chambers and storerooms. The Ramesseum is situated in the Theban Necropolis at Luxor on the west bank of the Nile. The reliefs on the walls and columns bear a central theme which represents Ramesses II's heroic and triumphant actions. A large entrance pylon in the Temple of Amun depicts scenes of Ramesses II's victory over the Hittites. Lecuyot (2000:8) explains that in the portico in the second courtyard is an image of Ramesses II occupying a high place of honour among his officers. The Ramesseum reliefs also depict the Hittites wearing scale armour (Healy 2005:62).

Beit el-Wali

The temple of Beit el-Wali was built by Ramesses II in Nubia and is located south of the Aswan Dam in the modern day. Dedicated principally to the god Amun, this rock cut ancient temple contains a deep hall, an antechamber with two columns, and a sanctuary. The deep hall contains depictions of Ramesses II's Libyan, Nubian and Syrian campaigns. One of the reliefs from the walls of Beit el-Wali depicts Ramesses II on his chariot at Kadesh (Charles and Tzu 2012: 27). The triumphant pose of the Pharaoh firing arrows and trampling enemies underfoot was according to Healy (2005:63), a common artistic intervention of the New Kingdom Period.

According to Haywood (2012:76), Ramesses II showed great skill as a propagandist and self-publicist. In his inscriptions and reliefs placed throughout Egypt, Haywood (2012:76) comments, that Ramesses II shamelessly portrayed the Battle of Kadesh as a great victory over the Hittites, instead of the narrow escape from the disaster that it was. Despite this, the importance of the Kadesh inscriptions cannot be understated.

The Kadesh inscriptions provide information on Hittite-Egyptian relations in the Late Bronze Age. Because of the inscriptions, Kadesh is one of the earliest battles in ancient Near Eastern history whose course can be reliably reconstructed in detail (Healy 2005:6). Furthermore, the inscriptions provide invaluable information on the Hittite and Egyptian armies and their weaponry. Although the importance of the Kadesh inscriptions is acknowledged, the researcher did not discuss them at length in the dissertation because the focus of the dissertation was not limited solely to the battle but included the wider focus of the cause and consequences of the battle.

APPENDIX F. THE KADESH RELIEFS

Figure 6. Scenes from the Battle of Kadesh at the Temple of Ramesses 11 at Abydos (Kairoinfo4u 2014).

Figure 7. An Egyptian counts hands with the assistance of a scribe from the Temple of Abydos (Bellviure 2018).

Figure 8. The Beating of the Spies, Stout (2015).