

Examining the Involvement of School Governing Bodies in Promoting Educators in South Africa

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The place of school governing bodies in the promotion of educators in South African public schools is crucial. This study focuses on the perspective of the school governing body as seen as the contributors to challenges that are experienced by educators during promotion processes and ineffectiveness of the school system. A quantitative method was employed to collect data from ten schools in ILembe District, South Africa. Random sampling was used to select 180 respondents. The collected data was analysed using SPSS, version 25. The findings of the study show that although there are educational policy guidelines that are made available to guide schools on how the processes of promotion are conducted, schools continue to experience challenges with some stakeholders who do not keep within their roles. Several factors such as incompetence of the school governing body, lack of training of the SGBs, illiteracy of the SGBs, political influence, and interference of the union members were found to be stumbling blocks in pursuing fair processes when dealing with promotions. The research recommends that the Department of Education (DoE) take a leading role in appointing independent bodies to deal with promotions in order to mitigate corruption and abuse of power by stakeholders.

Key words: *educators, iLembe District, promotion, School Governing Bodies (SGBs), South Africa*

Introduction

Transformation in the education system includes, among other things, the principle that collaborators, such as parents, educators, learners and communities, should partake in school management as well as governance activities. School Act No 84 of 1996' introduction, cohered with the constitution and determined that all communities had to be empowered so that they could participate in the governance of schools. This legislation stipulates that all schools should have governing bodies. The SGBs serve as the vehicle to govern and manage school activities. There is an impression that makes governing bodies regard themselves as co-responsible for effective delivery of children's education (Selamolela, 2019). Meanwhile, the administrative function and control of the schools is transferred by the Department of Education to the school governing bodies SGB and SMT (School Management Team). The SGBs comprises of representatives from four sectors namely, learners, local community parent where learners come from, school educators and non-educators. The school management team encompasses the principal, deputy principal and departmental heads (HODs). However, one such problem seems to be that these governing bodies are not adequately capacitated or do not know how to govern the schools effectively (Mestry, 2017). By implication, this suggests that education is compromised, and the objective of this analysis is to explore the effects of the discourse in the roles played by SGBs when promoting educators. This study also investigates the effects of the SGBs, and regulates the roles performed by the Department of Education (DoE) when educators are promoted. Meanwhile, before the South African Schools Act (Act, No. 84 of 1996) came into being, the educators were appointed by the education superintendent. During that time, candidates' appointments considered appropriate academic assessment ratings, adequate qualifications and years of teaching experience. Their appointments were based on merit. In the old dispensation, where the Department was racially divided, the appointment procedures and processes were centralised (Pather 1995). In the new dispensation, all racially divided departments of education were amalgamated to one basic department of education (DBE) and in this new arrangement some functions of appointment and promotions were entrusted to the school governance.

In 1996 the appointment procedure was remarkably amended as follows:

- In schools SGB were given controls on the recruitment and selection of candidates for management positions, and
- The Department of Education took over the induction and appointment of successful candidates (DoE, 1996).

The school governing bodies (SGBs) seem to demonstrate specific political, religious, cultural and racial leanings which command the selection of their managers (DoE, 1996).

Mestry (2017) holds the view that in some instances, those at the helms of affairs in schools lack the skills, experience and competence, thus, are incapable of managing education systems.

Therefore, SGBs find it challenging to keep up with the new legislation. Karlson (2002) pointed to lack of interest on the side of the governors is perpetrated by the absence of knowledge and expertise, combined with unavailability of resources, time restrictions, and disagreements about which results are achieved. According to Volmink (2016), trouble stems from the way selection, and scoring of candidates for appointment is manoeuvred to target particular individuals. The Free States Head of Department (HoD) is of the view that appointment functions should be taken away from SGB's. In Volmink's report (2016:88), the Mpumalanga HoD states that the chances of manipulation of appointments are likely to happen if the school governing bodies (SGBs) are illiterate.

Additionally, the involvement and active participation of stakeholders in school governance through fair presentation came as a result of parliamentary legislation. This created a sense of accountability, ownership and spirit of belonging to a school. When authority was transferred to the school governing body, they automatically qualified as statutory bodies. The works of Gumbi (2000) and Mestry (2013) show that education stakeholders are legal structures with powers to regulate public schools. According to the SASA Act No. 84 of 1996, they are entrusted with the responsibility for the effective school management function in the school.

The Volmink commission report (2016) maintains that the management function of schools is a responsibility, entrusted on its governing body which is entitled to exercise such rights. Therefore, SGB is expected to be held accountable, act in good faith when carrying these functions and duties on behalf of the school. The SASA, Act No.84 of 1996, (section 20 (1) (f) and (g), stipulates that a governing body has the function of recommending educators and no-educator staff for appointment.

The Employment of Educators Act, Act No. 76 of 1998 and Volmink Commission Report (2016) agree that the SGB is accountable for shortlisting and interviewing the candidates. Hence the District office is responsible for recruiting and sifting. It also states that the SGB, after having consulted with the HoD, be permitted to submit less than three names to the Department of Education. The common goal of the governing body is to efficiently execute its functions in support of the school for the benefit of the community as a whole, as prescribed in the South African School Act No 84 of 1996 (DoE 1997:14). Therefore, the school governing body is set in a position of trust favouring the school (Ndelu, 1999). All schools should conceive their functions and duties and how they connect to the duties of the principal. The same responsibilities should also apply to the learners serving in the school governing body.

The SGBs is entitled to form interview committees to conduct recruitment and selection procedures to fill vacant positions. The degrees of subjectivity, levels of competency and aspirations of the committee members have worsened expectations on the recruitment and selection process. Naledi Pandor, former Minister of Education and campaigner for licensing of educators announced that principalship is permissible to any candidate possesses an

advanced certificate (ACE) (Pandor, 2007). The Employment of Educators Act, (Act No.76 of 1998) states that, cadres are positioned concerning levels varying from post level 1 to post level 4. The new school act realistically allows every educator to apply for promotion to a post level of their own choice provided that the individual possesses the minimum qualifications and the required minimum years of experience.

Thody (1994) stressed that the SGB performed a range of tasks such as “advisors, supporters, watchdogs, moderators, facilitators, guardians, managers, directors and trustees”. Bush and Hystek (2003) cited in Mncube, Harber, and du Plessis (2011) hold the view that the professional management functions of the school are undertaken by School Management Team (SMT) and educators.

Review of the work of Mestry (2017) suggests that governance posts are occupied by people who are inexperienced and lack understanding of educational systems management. Therefore, some school governing bodies (SGBs) seem to wrestle to uphold new challenging legislation. Meanwhile, Karlson (2002) opines that lack of interest on the side of the governors is perpetrated by the absence of knowledge and expertise, combined with unavailability of resources, time restrictions, disagreements about which results are achieved. Therefore, the possibility of selling and purchasing of post at the school governing body level is likely to occur.

Volmink (2016) maintains that due to powerful and political influence of the unions, disagreements between circuit managers, unions and school governing bodies are likely to occur. He further states that usurping of powers by the unions has an impact on the school governing bodies' preferences. He continues that SGBs tend to have more interest on funds than governance. Suffice to state that if the power of the SGBs, especially those that are overpowered by unions due to lack of policy understanding were removed, most people would no longer be interested in becoming members.

Furthermore, there are allegations that in some public schools in South Africa there is continuous incompetence, incapacity and corruption of some school governing bodies. Hence, using the ILembe District as a case study, the researchers undertook this study. It is also alleged that unions manipulate the decisions made by the SGBs, which eventually results in the reduced performance of the entire school due to poor management. The study examines the effectiveness of the school governing body in playing their roles, regarding the promotion of educators. In order to achieve the aim of the study, attempts are made to proffer answers to the two identified research questions: What effects does the involvement of the school governing body have in the promotion of educators? What are the roles played by the school governing body in the promotion of educators?

Research Methodology

The study examined the effect of the involvement of school governing bodies in the promotion of educators in South Africa, using iLembe District as a case study. Simple random sampling was employed for selecting 200 respondents. However, only 180 out of the completed and retrieved questionnaires were considered useful by the researchers. Simple random sampling was employed for data collection in order to avoid bias and give all who qualify to participate the opportunity to do so. The respondents in this study comprise educators, principals and chairpersons because they make-up the SGBs of schools. The respondents were selected from 22 public schools. Data was collected through the use of a self-designed questionnaire. The questionnaire had three sections: Section A which was designed to collect biographic data of respondents, and this information enabled the researchers to establish the trend of a specific group of people. The researchers also sought to establish whether respondents qualify for a promotion or not. The gender and age assisted in determining the behaviour of the respondents, whether they were construed to a particular gender group or not. Section B was arranged in five (5) like scales which had the following possible responses: Strongly Agree (SA); Agree (A); Uncertain (U); Disagree (D) and Strongly Disagree (SD). Section C was arranged in four (4) Likert scales which had the following possible responses: Extremely Sure (ES); Yes (Y); Uncertain (U) and No (N). The collected data were analysed using a Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), version 25.

Results and Discussions

The result of the analysed data are as presented below.

Table 1: Frequency distribution according to the gender of the respondents

GENDER	NO	%
Male	84	47
Female	96	53
TOTAL	180	100

Table 1 indicates that the research specimen consists of fifty-three percent (53%) female respondents and forty-seven percent (47%) male respondents. The table reflects that there are more females compared to males, and it also reveals that female educators dominate schools.

Table 2: Frequency distribution according to the age of respondents

AGE	NO	%
25-34	35	19
35-44	38	21
45-54	94	52
55-65	13	8
TOTAL	180	100

Table 2 indicates that a more significant percentage (52%) highest percentage of the respondents are at the age group of 45 to 54 years constituted the highest percentage. In contrast, a smaller percentage (8%) of respondents who participated in the research are in the age group of 55 to 65 years. Respondents who are in the age group of 35 to 44 only constituted (21%) percent, as well as the age group of 25-34, constituted 19%. The result also indicates that 19% of the respondents constitute young educators.

Table 3: Frequency distribution according to the highest qualification of respondents

QUALIFICATION	NO	%
BELOW REQV 13 (M+3)	4	2
REQV 13(M+3)	41	23
ABOVE REQV 13(M+3)	135	75
TOTAL	180	100

Table 3 reflects a significantly high percentage (75%) of the respondents whose sample is above REQV 13 (M+3) which is generally perceived as the requirement for promotion in terms of HRM 59 of 2017. However, the great concern is the low percentage (23%) of (M+3) because in some schools, there are principals and deputy principals who are still in that category and that might cause discontent among educators who are experienced and above M+3; those educators are still not promoted (still in PL1).

Table 4: Frequency distribution according to the teaching experience of the respondents

TEACHING EXPERIENCE	NO	%
0 - 5 years	13	7
6 – 15 years	16	9
16 – 25 years	35	19
26 years and above	116	65
TOTAL	180	100

Table 4 indicates that the highest percentage (65%) of respondents in this sample are above 26 years. This also indicates that respondents of 26 years and above have been teaching for more years than other respondents. The table also reflects nineteen percent (19%) of those who have taught from 16 to 25 years as well as nine percent (9%) for 6 to 15 years, lastly seven percent (7%) have five (5) years' experience.

Table 5: Frequency distribution according to the rank of respondents

RANKS	NO	%
SGB chairperson	5	3
Post level one	94	52
(HODs)	70	39
Principal	11	6
TOTAL	180	100

According to the frequency distribution, Table, 5 reflects that fifty-two percent (52%) of the respondents that participated in the sample are ranked in post level 1. This percentage can be explained by the staff composition of schools, which consist mainly of post level 1 educators while promotion posts (management posts) form the minority of the staff. Generally, post level one educators comprise seventy percent (70%) of schools teaching staff (DoE 2002).

The table reflects that three percent (3%) of respondents who participated in the research are SGB chairpersons (parent component). The table also indicates very little, four percent (4%) of respondents are principals as well as two percent (2%) are deputy principals.

Table 6: Frequency distribution according to the type of post held by respondents

TYPE OF POST HELD	NO	%
Permanent	174	97
Temporary	6	3
TOTAL	180	100

Table 6 reflects that the majority (97%) of respondents that partook in the sample area are employed permanently, while a small percentage (3%) of respondents are temporarily employed.

Research question 1: What effects does the involvement of the school governing body have in the promotion of educators?

Table 7: Frequency distribution according to the effects of the SGB's involvement in the promotion of educators

NO	STATEMENT		SA	A	U	D	SD	TOTAL
1	The interview results do not always reflect the performance of candidates	N	105	39	11	20	5	180
		%	58	22	6	11	3	100
2	Panel members ask questions that they do not understand during the interview.	N	35	77	16	39	13	180
		%	19	43	9	22	7	100
3	Panel members do not pay attention to certain interviewees during the interview.	N	66	71	12	12	19	180
		%	37	39	7	7	11	100
4	The candidate who is well known to the panel has better chances for promotion.	N	112	44	3	16	5	180
		%	62	24	2	9	3	100
5	Some SGB panel members are incompetent, illiterate, and they put predetermined scores for particular candidates.	N	82	73	6	10	9	180
		%	46	41	3	7	5	100
6	Candidates are given equal time to showcase their abilities during the interview.	N	26	127	10	5	12	180
		%	14	70	6	3	7	100
7	The union members play an integral role during the promotion	N	87	60	19	7	7	180
		%	48	33	11	4	4	100

8	Corruption prevails during selection for school based promotion	N	62	79	16	7	16	180
		%	34	44	9	4	9	100
9	Some governing bodies and party politics influence the promotion process.	N	74	89	5	7	5	180
		%	41	49	3	3	3	100

Table 7 shows that following the statement: the interview results do not always reflect the performance of candidates indicates there is a high split between those who strongly agree with (58%) respondents strongly agree that interview results do not reflect the performance of the candidates, twenty-two percent (22%) respondents agree with the statement. A small percentage (6%) of respondents indicated that they are unsure about the statement.

Eleven percent (11%) disagree, and three percent (3%) of respondents strongly disagree with the statement, that the interview does not always reflect the performance of the candidates. The responses indicate that respondents considered the possibility that the panels' scores have to be given to the independent body in order to reach a final recommendation.

This raises concerns that the SGB could recommend someone who did not qualify for a high score in the interview if the difference was not more than five. It also indicates that the SGB panel could have disregarded the policies. The policy states that the purpose of the governing body is to perform its functions efficiently in terms of the South African School Act No 84 of 1996 (DoE, 1997) and to benefit the community at large. Continuing misuse of authority compels educators to feel cynical about the involvement of the School governing body in recommending the appointment of educators.

Table 7 shows that 42% agree that the questions asked by panel are without comprehension and relevancy for the position applied for. (36%) of the respondents decided to abstain from responding. However, (22%) pointed out that they were aggrieved by the phrasing of the questions and said that they need to be attended to. Hence productive leaders among them may be compromised due to negligence. This also challenges the DoE's involvement in the school governing bodies (SGB) in the promotion of educators. It also indicates that a lot is at stake and much work needs to be done in order to reform attitude in some governing bodies.

Table 7 further shows that there is a split between those who strongly agree that some candidates use connections to get posts. As a result, the panel does not pay attention to certain interviewees during the interview (37%) and those who agree (39%), and the (24%) respondents who decided to abstain, and this could stem from educator's experiences.

The small numbers of those who differ from those who agree with the statement reflect the great concern that thorough investigation needs to be conducted. The responses could imply

that the availability of union members does not help some of them to mitigate the disinterest of the panel during the interview and keep the panel member's alert.

Union representatives, however, seldom visit schools because the areas in which they are located are politically inclined and unions are easily associated with political organisations. This could compromise the quality of education and attention needs to be paid to this type of victimisation. Which means that processes and procedures agreed upon should be observed by all players in order to ensure credibility for the benefit of the learning environment as well as the smooth running of school governance.

Furthermore, table 7 shows that 62% of respondents strongly agree with this statement, whereas three 3% strongly disagree with the statement. This implies that a known candidate has a better chance of getting a promotion. This prompts panel members to hesitate to recommend someone whom they do not know, even though the candidate has answered their questions according to the expectations. The table also reflects that twenty-four percent (24%) agree with the statement, whereas nine percent (9%) disagree with the statement. Lastly, two percent (2%) of respondents seem to be uncertain with the statement. This could tempt educators to visit governing bodies privately, and they can do so in order to influence individual members and use their connections and influences to gain promotion. Some candidates in their statements pointed out that school governing bodies sometimes appoint educators from post level one to principal-ship who have no experience in management. Since they are new and inexperienced, they lack the skills to fulfil the function that are entrusted to them.

The 3% of respondents who strongly disagree may base their conclusions on their own experiences or could be part of the corruption. A large majority of educators realise the failure of promotions to achieve what the education system has attempted to achieve by introducing a school-based promotion strategy. School conditions and human relations could improve if the school governing body selects educators on merit, but if the basis for selection is not work-related the entire plan becomes a total fiasco. Educators are maybe aware of the fact that school governing bodies, including school management team relatives, sometimes allow promotion due to nepotism that excludes selection based on merit.

Table 7 further shows the level of incompetence and ambitions of the interview committee, the degrees of subjectivity, the lost hope in recruitment and selection processes', and the functions and performances of interview committees are questionable. The statistics reflect that 46% of respondents strongly agree with the statement that some SGB members are incompetent, and they put predetermined scores for particular candidates. The respondents confirm that the unions capitalise on the illiteracy of the SGB to manipulate the scores according to their terms and conditions, which confirms that SASA Act No 84 of 1996 presumes that governing bodies of all South African Schools are competent, knowledgeable, and committed to performing duties according to the expectations of the State whereas they still lack expertise. The responses confirm that experienced and qualified educators are side-lined in favour of young, powerful

educators who are also union activists. The question of responsibility requires to be communicated as the governing body's execution of a task is not observed, and they can leave at any time.

Consequently, the presented analysis on table 7, reflects that a vast majority (70%) of respondents agree that sufficient time is given for interviewees to showcase their abilities which denote that selection committees are doing well. This favourable response would indicate that most educators are content with the time allocated to interviewees because they appreciate the fact that the selection panel members do not interrupt the interviewees when their time runs out and allow them to complete the interview.

Some respondents pointed out that in some schools they attended time constraints were applied during the interview that is when they realised that the post could have been reserved for someone else. According to their perceptions, the interview was just a formality. However, the percentage of disagree and strongly disagree reflect the individual educator experience in their schools. The percentage of those who disagree raise concerns that some unions are not invited whereas the PAM document recommends that union representatives may attend these meetings.

Table 7 also shows that union membership plays an integral role during the promotion. For instance, Statistics reflect that 48% strongly agree that union membership has a tremendous role in the promotion of educators. This also creates 15% difference between those who strongly agree and those who disagree. However, 20% of those who disagree and are undecided, raised concerns because their responses do not indicate their contentment about the unions. Some educators prefer to join unions that they believe could create chances for their promotion.

The report presented in table 7 shows that corruption prevails during selection procedures for school-based promotion. For instance, statistics reflect that 44% of respondents agree while 34% strongly agree that corruption is escalating in school-based promotion selection procedures. Following the responses, the criterion used by selection committee is not fair, non-discriminating, not in line with the SASA Act, (Act No. 84 of 1996) and needs of the school are not considered. Therefore, the objectives of the interview are not meant to be achieved.

Table 7 also indicates that 48% agree some governing bodies and party politics influence the promotion process. According to Wood and Lindoff (2001), the study indicates that people who are politically inclined, have better opportunities than those with the appropriate skills and qualifications and are unpopular. Meanwhile, the duty of the school governing body is to execute its functions efficiently as stipulated (South African Schools Act 1996) (DoE, 1997). The union representatives of educators in discussion with employer affiliates to political parties. The respondents pointed out that the system of education is politically inclined since the highest authority in the department is a politician. However, 7% disagree that some

governing bodies and party politics influence the promotion process. This activity of the SGBs and party politics depresses the educators who are not politically inclined because some educators feel that politics dismantled the education system. As a result, they quit the system before reaching retirement hoping for a better future.

Research question 2: What are the roles played by the School Governing Body in the promotion of educators?

Table 8 presents the reports of respondents on the roles played by the School Governing Body in the Promotion Process.

Table 8: Frequency distribution according to the roles played by the SGB's in promotion of educators

NO	STATEMENT		ES	Y	U	NO	TOTAL
1	Principals have influence in the selection process as to who should be promoted to senior posts.	N	52	56	29	43	180
		%	29	31	16	24	100
2	The members of the panel, in most instances, are not sure of their roles in the selection process.	N	56	86	21	17	180
		%	31	48	12	9	100
3	The results of the selection are predetermined before the processes are held.	N	62	33	57	28	180
		%	34	18	32	16	100
4	The principal employs his/her expertise to train the interview committee.	N	13	39	16	112	180
		%	7	22	9	62	100
5	The SGBs receive sufficient programmes that equip them with the expertise to govern schools.	N	6	15	3	156	180
		%	3	9	2	86	100
6	SGBs do not receive any reimbursement for performing their roles.	N	7	7	19	147	180
		%	4	4	11	81	100
7	Are the SGB members responsible for the management functions of schools?	N	21	16	7	136	180
		%	12	9	4	75	100

Table 8 shows that 60% agree that principals have influence in the selection process as to who should be promoted to senior posts. This could emanate from educators' personal experiences due to the uniqueness of each of the schools. The small number of those who reflect discrepancy from those who agree with the statement may reflect the reality that there are

schools where co-operation between the parent component and the principal does not materialise. The results on principal's influence according to the responses of the study, could be viewed in both negative and positive light. Some viewed it positively, depending on the nature of the incumbent, mainly when a promoted person performs exceptionally well in his job. Negative views may result if the school has no promotion plan that is in line with the requirement of the Education Department and those concerning the success of the school. The principal as an official represents the Head of Department in the governing body, thus their action should not be in conflict with the instruction of the HOD, and has better understanding of post establishment and personnel needed in a particular school than other educators. This is confirmed by the SASA Act [Section (16 (1)] that the principal is responsible for the professional management of the school and should perform in consultation with relevant provincial Head of Department.

Table 8 indicates that most educators (56%) are extremely sure of the statement. The educator's conclusion could be based on the continued lack of training that is given to the selection committees. Inadequate training could lure them into co-opting members that might manipulate them. However, (17%) of educators responded no to the statement, which could indicate that schools depended on their ability to organise training. Other schools could have hired consultants to conduct workshops. The DoE has not conducted training for several years, and half-day training was all that was given in recent years (from 12h00 – 15h00) if at all. Some selection committees are told by the local leaders (unions) who should be appointed; Zembylas (2004) affirms absence of professional independence and inadequate monitoring as the cause of job dissatisfaction between educators.

Table 8 also shows that sixty-two percent (62%) of the respondents are extremely sure and thirty-three percent (33%) agree with the statement that the results of the selection are predetermined before the processes are held, only twenty-eight percent (28%) respondents say no to the statement. This shows that corruption is on the extremes in iLembe district, and these processes require drastic monitoring by the DoE. The DoE should ensure that no specific union is deemed favourable. The respondents believe that promotion should be based on merit (experience, qualifications and competence) rather than deployment of members of particular unions. The respondents pointed out that the purpose of the interview is negatively affected by the interview committee disregarding the educational programmes of the school which encourages that the interview be fair and non-discriminating as opined by van Wyk (2004).

Furthermore, table 8 indicates that forty-three percent (43%) respondents say no to the statement that the principal employs their expertise to train the interview committee. Seven percent (7%) respondents who are extremely sure of this statement raise considerable concerns about the competence of the principal as well as the interview committee. This symbolises that professional expertise is lacking to almost all the members of the committee. Due to the lack of expertise and incompetence of the interview committee, the third party is likely to coerce the selection and sifting process in order to disadvantage and demoralise the suitable

incumbents and place their preferred candidates. The principal, as manager of the school, is also a prominent member of the interview committee of (SGB). The SASA, Act. No 84 of 1996, Section 23. (1b) stipulates that in a principal's capacity as an official is a prominent member in the interview committee, serves as chief of operators of the school and acts as a professional advisor to the SGB. The principal is also responsible for the effective implementation of all policies adopted by the SGB.

Additionally, Table 8 reveals that eighty-six percent (86%) of respondents do not support the statement that SGBs receive sufficient programmes that equip them with sufficient expertise to govern the schools and nine percent (9%) respondents support the statement. This evokes a vast difference of seventy-seven percent (77%) between those who say yes and those who say no to the statement. It points to a significant concern about the competency of the SGBs. This concurs with the work of Mestry (2017) who states that formal preparation for aspiring and practicing principals handling positions of management and leadership is lacking. Meanwhile, following the work of Mestry (2017), there are very few available in-service professional development programmes which can enhance SGBs to deal with governance. In this regard, school governing bodies can experience the feeling of vulnerability, especially when not knowing what to do in certain crucial situations. Suffice to state that without programmes, it will be challenging for the SGBs to meet the State's expectations.

Also, according to results presented in table 8, a majority eighty-one percent (81%) of respondents disagree with the statement that the SGBs receive reimbursement for performing their roles in schools. The respondents stated that the SASA does not stipulate that they should be reimbursed. The Department of Education expects them to volunteer, be willing, and be unpaid thus disregarding the socio-economic background they come from. Theory, (1998) asserts that they might be reluctant and unable to run the institutions because they work as volunteers without any reimbursement. Some respondents felt that is why they are tricked and tempted to accept bribes from candidates prior to the interview process.

Table 8 indicates that forty-four percent (44%) of respondents do not support the statement that SGBs are liable for the professional management of the school. At least seven percent (7%) respondents agree with the statement, which reflects that the SGBs lack training, which is why they need to be capacitated on what to do rather than interfering in professional management of the school. The research perceives that the SGB interfere in professional management of the institution, results in conflict between school governing bodies and SMT. Lack of training makes them struggle with legislation. The SASA Act (Act No. 84 of 1996) states that the governing body is responsible for shortlisting the candidates from the list interviews the candidates and liaise with the HoD to recommended candidates according to the preferences and submit preference list to Head of Department (HOD). Functions prescribed by the South African School Act, (Act No.84 1996) presumes that governing bodies of all South African schools are well informed, capable and devoted to performing according to the expectations of

the State. The research maintains that in some African schools, governing bodies still lack expertise, therefore, resulting in their inability to contribute to transformation.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The (SASA) Act No. 84 of 1996 defines the roles and responsibilities of the School Governing Body regarding the recommendation, appointment and promotion of educators and processes involved. Although the SASA has stipulated and defined the responsibilities, schools continue to experience challenges in sorting and selecting educators for promotion. The school governing body's illiteracy, incompetence, absence of capacitation is yet to be addressed. The finding of the study suggests that the unions are capitalising on the incompetence and illiteracy of the SGBs for the best interests of their members. The study also showed that the DoE has a considerable responsibility to capacitate SGBs. The DoE is blamed for shifting its responsibility to the principal, who is also a resourceful person or official for the DoE and being a unionist; therefore, loyalty to the union could not be determined. Meanwhile, principals are revealed as persons who could manipulate the process of promotion by pressurising the panel on how the processes should be conducted or who should be appointed. These challenges threatened the expected fair process. Sequel to the findings of the study, the following recommendations are made:

- SGB members should be afforded intensive training, and if they continue with their malpractices, they should be charged and sanctioned.
- The activities of SGBs should be duly monitored. The DoE should assign the duty to a person who is well informed to conduct the process to eradicate corruption and transgression of the law.
- The DoE should assign the responsibility to resolve grievances and disputes to an external body of investigators instead of unions in order to minimise policy violation.
- Politics and education should be separated because politics has a detrimental effect on education, and it will end up dismantling the entire education system if it is left unchecked.
- The DoE should ensure that no specific union is deemed favourable over another.
- Promotion of educators should be based on merit rather than deployment of members of a particular union and that the DoE needs to take a stand and monitor the processes instead of leaving everything in the hands of the SGB.
- The DBE should allow the independent body with expertise in the promotion to conduct the entire process. The researcher also suggests that this responsibility be taken away from SGBs.
- Programmes for training should be made available for stakeholders to ensure their full support and potential.

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