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ASPECTS OF PRAGMATICS IN ZULU

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by

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I declare that: ASPECTS OF PRAGMATICS IN ZULU is my own work, that all the sources used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references, and that this dissertation was not previously submitted by me for a degree at another university.

Signed: R. Mambulele

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M.A. degree

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Summary

This study is set to explore the theory of speech acts with special reference to Zulu. This is done with the motive of discovering the applicability of this theory to the utterances that are issued by the speakers of this language. Particular attention is given to the performatives as a special kind of speech act. Their examination reveals that in Zulu, there are acts, which could be performed by saying something. We distinguish between explicit and inexplicit performatives. Explicit performatives contain a verb in their main clause which names the act that is performed when a performative is issued. The inexplicit performative on the other hand does not contain this verb.

Acts that are restrained as far as the explicit performative is concerned, would rather be expressed by means of the inexplicit performative. Utterances such as those that express commands, customarily make use of the imperative, which is an inexplicit performative.

A closer examination of how performatives are realised in Zulu, reveals that in order for the performatives to be understood as intended by the speaker, the illocutionary force, of what the speaker intends or means by the issuance of the utterance in question, comes to the surface. It is the illocutionary force which connote that an utterance is a request, a command, a warning, etc.

Performatives can also be double-natured in function. One performative could be a request which is intended as an order. In this case it is the responsibility of the addressee to use contextual information in order to determine that which is the speaker's intention. In this investigation, what has surfaced as well, is that one speech act could be expressed in various different ways. For instance, a request, could be expressed by the use of a performative, an imperative, a question and a statement.

Another factor which we came across in this study, and which has a significant bearing on the performative, is that they should comply with the conditions of felicity, if they are to be successful and understood as intended by the addressee.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

1	Introduction	1
1.1	Aim	2
1.2	Theoretical background	3
1.3	Research method	4
1.4	Definition of terms	4
1.5	Scope	6

CHAPTER 2

2	The historical preamble of performatives	8
2.1	The recognition of performatives as a language phenomenon	8
2.2	Ross's Performative Hypothesis	11
2.3	Leech's Interpretation of Performatives	19

CHAPTER 3

3	Attributes of Performatives	25
3.1	Form, Nature and Function of Performatives	25
3.2	Classes of Performatives	38
3.2.1	The Performative/Constative Distinction	38
3.2.2	Primary <i>versus</i> Explicit Performatives	41

CHAPTER 4

4	The Relationships that Performatives enter into	49
4.1	Felicity Conditions	49
4.2	Performatives and Speech Acts	54
4.2.1	Rationale behind the development of Speech Act Theory	54
4.2.2	Delineation of Speech Acts	55
4.2.2.1	Classes of Illocutionary Acts	56
4.2.2.1.1	Austin's Classification	57
4.2.2.1.2	Searle's taxonomy of illocutions	59
4.3	Illocutions contrasted with Sentence Types	66

CHAPTER 5	
5	Performatives and the Illocutionary Force 70
5.1	Basic perception of Illocutionary Force 70
5.2	Sublimation of Illocutionary-Force- Indicating-Device (IFID) 73
5.3	Conventionalist versus performativist view of Illocutionary Force 74
5.4	Illocutionary Force and Implicatures 76
5.5	Indirect Speech Acts 78
CHAPTER 6	
	Conclusion 86
BIBLIOGRAPHY 94	

CHAPTER 1

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Austin (1985:115) says:

"Certainly there are a great many uses of language. It's rather a pity that people are apt to invoke a new use of language whenever they feel the need to do so inclined, to help them out of this, that, or the other well known philosophical tangle; we need more of a framework in which these uses of language; and also I think we should not despair too easily and talk, as people are apt to do, about the infinite uses of language."

On the basis of this argument, the analysis and description of the uses of language have been a bone of contention ever since man started to describe and analyse it. Since the 1950's science has seen a rapid growth in the number of researchers from a great many academic disciplines focusing on the uses of language as an object of their investigation. One such researcher of note is J.L. Austin (1962). His pioneering investigation into the variety of speech acts, paved the way for the advancement of research on how language is used in communication. He contends that for a better understanding of language we need an explanation of the way language is embedded in social institutions and of the various actions it can perform. He maintains that we have to view language as a vehicle of social action rather than that of a vehicle for thought. The presumption underlying this view is that when a speaker communicates, he communicates the fact that he is performing an act of a certain type, and communication is successful only if the addressee identifies the type of act being performed.

Blackmore (1992:39) supports this fact by indicating that for the successful interpretation of an utterance that has been issued by a speaker, both linguistic and non-linguistic properties come into play. She substantiates this by explaining that an utterance consists of a certain sentence or phrase which has a syntactic structure and which is made up of words with certain meanings. Taking these factors into consideration, the interpretation of the utterance in question will depend on the addressee's linguistic knowledge. However, since the utterance is produced by a particular speaker on a particular occasion, its interpretation will also depend on the non-linguistic knowledge that the addressee has. She substantiates her argument by indicating that there is a distinction between the addressee's knowledge of his language and his knowledge of the world, and that it is this distinction that underlies the different interpretations of meaning.

1.2 AIM

This study will reflect against this milieu of language usage and interpretation, in order to focus on the functions that utterances perform in a language. The main objectives of this investigation are:

- (1) To explicate in what manner and how adequately the speech act theory accord us a framework inside which we may characterise insightfully the performative utterances in Zulu.
- (2) To establish whether the theory of conversational implicatures is feasible for the interpretation of indirect speech acts in Zulu and;
- (3) To make an appraisal of the relationship that hold between performatives and *inter alia* the felicity conditions, illocutionary force and indirect speech acts.

1.3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

There are a number of scholars who claim that the study of speech acts has misguidedly been the object of semantics only, when in fact, speech acts should be studied in the manner that takes both their semantic and pragmatic natures into consideration.

Leech (1983:6) puts forward the notion that, the concern of both these fields is meaning, in that both work towards explaining and developing a framework to analyse meaning in language, but pragmatics goes further than semantics in the interpretation of meaning.

Another ardent scholar of pragmatics is Levinson. After reflecting upon several definitions of what pragmatics is, and what it is not (1983:12-13), he reckons that narrow semantic theories like those that are based on truth conditions, in their interpretation of meaning, leave a large residue of meaning to be studied in pragmatics. He continues to point out that broader semantic theories, like some of those that are based on components or features of meaning may leave less for pragmatics to deal with. Levinson admits that to some extent the nature of a pragmatic theory must depend crucially on the kind of semantic theory adopted, but also indicates that it will be true for any definition of pragmatics that seeks an exclusive domain, complementary and overlapping with semantics. He is prompt to point out that this dependency is only partial, for we now know enough about the nature of meaning, in the broad sense, to determine that there are substantial areas that could not be accommodated within any single semantic theory built on homogeneous principles.

In view of the view presented in the preceding discussion it is apparent that the study of speech acts, should be approached from a perspective that looks into both their

semantic and pragmatic qualities, with a little accent on the pragmatics.

The analysis and description of performative utterances and the manifestation of the verbs used within such utterances will be done within the general framework of the theory of speech acts as expounded by the philosopher, J. L. Austin (1962), and which was further developed by J. Searle.

1.4 RESEARCH METHOD

In order to reveal the form, nature and function of performative utterances and other aspects related to the performatives in Zulu, publications of renown scholars on the subject, have been consulted. The principles drawn from these documents will be used as a reflector to depict the nature of performatives in Zulu.

A corpus of Zulu utterances, drawn from the inventory of utterances used by the speakers of Zulu in their everyday life activities to express the actions they perform by issuing such utterances, will be used to illuminate the nature of the performative utterances in Zulu. This implies that language data analysis will be synchronic. We should also mention that an analysis and description of the performatives and the manifestation of the verbs with which the performative clause appears, will be done against existing structural patterns of performatives.

1.5 DEFINITION OF TERMS

It is crucially important to define how key concepts are used in this study, in order not to confuse them with their use under other circumstances.

Austin himself uses the terms 'sentence' and 'utterance' indiscriminately. He uses the term 'performative sentence' synonymously with the term 'performative utterance', which causes confusion.

In this study the concept 'performative' will be used mainly to refer to an utterance which contains a performative verb in its main clause. A performative verb will, otherwise, be referred to as such.

The term 'utterance' is used to refer to the use by a particular speaker, on a particular occasion of a piece of language such as a sequence of sentences, or a single sentence, phrase, or even a single word, to express his actions.

The term 'sentence' refers to a string of words put together by the grammatical rules of a language, expressing a complete thought.

The distinction between the latter two concepts is that utterances are physical events. Events are ephemeral. Sentences are neither physical events nor physical objects. A sentence is conceived abstractly, it could also be thought of as the ideal string of words behind various realisations in utterances and inscriptions (Hurford & Heasley, 1983:15-16).

A close examination of these expositions indicates that the two concepts are closely related. Anything that can be said of a sentence can be said about an utterance, but not necessarily *vice versa*. Levinson (1983:231) in justifying the relationship that exists between the sentence and utterance, says that it is possible to characterize performative utterances as being performed by specific types of sentences. Therefore it makes sense to talk about performative sentences. He also expresses

the opinion that this relationship is less obviously possible for implicit performatives.

1.6 SCOPE

This research consists of five chapters including the introduction and conclusion arranged as explained in the following exposition.

Chapter 1

An introduction is given of how language is used, particularly from the viewpoint of how speakers perform certain actions by their issuing of particular utterances. This forms a preface to the objectives of this study, which is to examine the nature of the performatives in Zulu, and also to bring to light how this aspect relates to felicitous, illocutionary force and indirect speech acts in Zulu. This chapter will also survey the theoretical background against which such an investigation shall be conducted. It also serves as a layout of the method that is used for investigating language use. Finally, it delimits the subject of this study.

Chapter 2

This chapter will attempt to expose and expand on the origin of speech acts, and to reflect on the different perspectives scholars regard plausible for the analysis and description of performatives. In this regard Ross's Performative Hypothesis, as well as Leech's interpretation of the performatives, will be examined. An evaluation will be made as to which of these approaches to the performative practice, is the most viable.

Chapter 3

In this chapter the form and nature of the performatives will be anatomised, and their functions brought to the surface, especially with reference to Zulu utterances. An evaluation will be made with a view of detecting whether a particular performative as a language phenomenon is available or not for use by the speakers of Zulu in the inventory that this language affords for its speakers.

Chapter 4

In this chapter the relationship that exists between the performative and other essential features necessary for a proper understanding of what is intended by the speaker's utterance, will be exposed. We will also examine how these features affect the issuing of performative utterances in Zulu.

Chapter 5

In this chapter, those factors that cause performatives to be taken and understood as intended by the speaker, will be examined; the illocutionary force of utterances will be examined. This discussion will also include an examination of how indirect speech acts are construed by the addressee as intended by the speaker.

Chapter 6

Conclusions will be drawn from observations made of how performatives are realised in Zulu.

CHAPTER 2

2 THE HISTORICAL PREAMBLE OF PERFORMATIVES

2.1 THE RECOGNITION PERFORMATIVES AS A LANGUAGE PHENOMENON

The first scholar to advance the idea that there is a difference in the use of utterances which mean to state or report what you want to say and those that mean to do what you are saying, is J.L. Austin. Austin concludes that there is a certain class of utterances that contains verbs which do not only describe the action done by the verb, but also shows that the action is being done in the issuing of that utterance. He (1962:6) first called such an utterance a 'performatory' and later a 'performative' (Austin, 1962:6). In explaining the origin of this concept, Austin states that it is derived from 'perform' which is the usual verb which means 'action'- it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action. A performative is not normally thought of as just saying something.

According to Urmson (1979:260), (one of Austin's avid students who later revised and edited Austin's work on performatives) Austin first semi-publicly divulged this doctrine in unscripted talks to philosophical societies at Oxford and Cambridge. Austin also gave a brief account of it in a paper entitled 'Other Minds' which was published in 1946. Urmson further gives a comprehensive account of how, in 1950, during his sabbatical, Austin worked out his theory of illocutionary force, and wrote the set of lecture-notes which, with alterations made by him (that is Austin) over the years, was eventually published posthumously by his students, under the title '*How to do things with Words*'.

In this publication, Austin commences with the assertion that performatives have, on their face value at least, the grammatical make-up of statements but are nevertheless seen, when more closely inspected, to be, quite plainly, not utterances which could be true or false. Yet, Austin claims, the feature for being true or false is traditionally the characteristic mark of a statement. He illustrates this notion by citing words uttered in the course of a marriage ceremony which, according to his claim, do not describe the action done by the participants but show that by the issuing of such utterances they are in fact doing something - namely marrying rather than reporting that they are marrying. Therefore, an utterance such as that in example (1) is said to be a performative.

- (1) Mina, uMandla Msibi, ngiyakuthatha, Thembi Gumede, ube ngumkami osemthethweni.
 'I, Mandla Msibi, take thee, Thembi Gumede, to be my lawful wedded wife.'

Austin assumes that since performatives cannot be evaluated by their truth value, they could be considered as happy or unhappy. He advances the notion that besides the uttering of the words of the so-called performative, a good many other things have as a general rule to be right and to go right if we are to be said to have happily brought off our action. What these are, we may hope to discover by looking at, and classifying types of cases in which something goes wrong and the act is therefore at least to some extent a failure. The utterance is then, we may say, not indeed false but in general unhappy. For this reason, as believed by Austin (1962:14), we call the doctrine of the things that can be or go wrong on the occasion of such utterances, the doctrine of infelicities.

Performatives, Austin reckons, differ from their non-performative counterparts, namely constatives, in that performative utterances do not display the performative formula in having an act-component and being inaccessible to truth-functional analysis. Performative utterances have a constant truth-value if the appropriate felicity conditions are satisfied. Additionally, in an attempt to clarify what performatives actually are, Austin (1962:169) draws a distinction between primary performatives, which he also calls inexplicit or implicit performatives. He claims that they differ from the explicit type. The explicit performatives contain in them the performative formula which makes explicit the action that is being performed in issuing the utterance. In trying to disentangle the difference Urmson (1979:261) cites an instance similar to (2).

In response to the utterance,

(2) Kunephela obisini lwakho.

'There's a cockroach in your milk.'

which is a statement; since it can be evaluated as true or false. The addressee's reply demonstrated in (3),

(3a) Ngiyabuza ukuba ngenzeni?

'I ask you what should I do?'

can be regarded as an explicit performative displaying the distinctive feature "-buza" which eliminates ambiguity and vagueness.

The possible response,

(3b) Ngenzeni?

'What should I do?'

will be inexplicit, or the primary correlate, since it does not contain that word which will disambiguate the perception of this sentence as, for instance a threat or a question.

Austin (1962:94-108) also advances the notion of the tripartite division involved in uttering a sentence.

This tripartite division is goal-oriented and implies the following:

- (a) locutionary acts - which are the acts of producing a recognized grammatical utterance in the language;
- (b) illocutionary acts - which are attempts to accomplish some communicative purpose; and
- (c) perlocutionary acts (or effects) - a term which Austin coined to justify that saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the addressee, or of the speaker or of other persons involved in the discourse.

In the end Austin (1962:150) abandons the notion of the performative/constative in favour of the more general families of related and overlapping speech acts. Urmson (1979:262) maintains that Austin's attempt to subsume a general theory of illocutionary force was a mistake. He explains that the theory of illocutionary force may well be important in the elucidation of speech acts. Why Urmson reasons this way, will not receive our attention in this discussion, because this argument falls outside the scope of this study.

The viability and practicality of the idea of performatives as a phenomenon of certain utterances in Zulu will be scrutinized in subsequent chapters.

2.2 ROSS'S PERFORMATIVE HYPOTHESIS

Ross, basing his assumption on Austin's theory, classically advances that all declarative (and surface imperative) sentences are subordinated to a higher sentence whose subject is in the first person singular, whose verb contains the feature [+ performative] and whose (direct or indirect) object is the second person singular. This higher order sentence, which functions as

the main clause, may be optionally deleted by means of the performative deletion theory (1970:249).

Ross's primary argument is that declarative sentences, similar to those in (4) can be true or false, while examples such as those in (5) cannot be judged as such.

- (4a) Intengo yehlile.
'Prices slumped.'
- (4b) Ngikuthanda uma ugigitheka.
'I like you when you giggle.'
- (4c) Ngisho nabangane bakaRodney abakhulu, bangeke bantshele.
'Even Rodney's best friends won't tell him.'
- (5a) Ngiyethembisa ukuthi ngeke ngibaleke.
'I promise that I will not run away.'
- (5b) Ngikugweba amasonto amabili ejele.
'I sentence you to two weeks in jail.'
- (5c) Ngikwetha igama likaMoses.
'I christen you Moses.'

Instead of truth-values, the examples under (5) have various conditions pertaining to appropriateness of use. Ross asserts that an example such as (5a) may be uttered by someone who intends not to do the prescribed action, but it is not false. The uttering of an example such as (5a), whatever the intentions of the uttered, can constitute a promise, whereas the action of uttering (4a) does not constitute a slump in prices.


Concerning what sentences such as those in the examples in (4) and (5) should be called, Ross (1970:222) concurs with Austin that sentences like those in (4) should be called constative sentences while those in (5) should be called performative sentences. Ross holds in high esteem, the fact that performative sentences must have first person subjects and usually have a second person as direct or indirect object. He believes that there are some performatives such as move, question, second and possibly proclaim, which exclude direct objects, and

some, such as christen and name, whose direct object can be second person, but need not be, and for some performatives, such as demand, order and promise, the second person object need not appear in surface structure, but for others it must. He maintains that these performatives must be affirmative and non-negative. They must also be in the present tense, and their main verb must be one of the large class of "true verbs" which he identifies.


Ross (1970:223) alleges that there are several facts that suggest that Austin's contention that sentences such as (6b) below, contain implicit performatives, and that this fact could be captured by postulating deep structures for them which are almost identical to the deep structure which has been assumed to underlie the superficially complex counterpart in (6a).

- (6a) Ngicela uhambe.
'I request you to go.'
- (6b) Hamba!
'Go!.'

The belief which Ross holds, is that declarative sentences, such as those in (4), must also be analysed as being implicit performatives, and must be derived from deep structures containing an explicitly represented performative main verb. Thus, for examples the deep structure of (4a) will not be that represented schematically in (7).



Rather, the deep structure of (4a) must be the more abstract structure shown in (8).



It is in view of this, that Ross endorses that every performative sentence (in the majority of cases) does not appear, because it has been deleted by means of the theory of performative deletion. He maintains that one hypothesis for which he has the least support, is that the verb of the deleted higher clause has the feature [+performative] and is in fact a performative. On this basis, Ross claims that a foundation for a pragmatic syntax has been laid and that many unresolved syntactic problems have gained solutions.

The fact that the mere uttering of (4a) constitutes an assertion, and the uttering of (5a) constitutes a promise, suggests according to Ross (1970:248) that their deep structures should not differ markedly, so that there will be a uniform deep structural configuration on which to base the semantic notion 'speech act'. Ross, further claims that it is likely that all types of sentences have exactly one performative as their highest clause in deep structure, so the deep structure of declaratives should not differ from this general scheme. He does, however, acknowledge that this claim is highly speculative. In

the same way as Austin, Ross maintains that the theory of the performative analysis, from which its name derives, must for the time being, be recognized as the most tentative claim of the whole analysis.

The information contained in the main clause of Ross's deep structure representation of a sentence could be synthesized according to the phrasal base as shown in (9).

(9) [Mina]	[ngitshela]	[wena]
NP	VP	NP
	+communicative	
	+linguistic	
	+declarative	
	+performative	

Ross (1970:261) admits that the performative analysis is only a fragment of a far more inclusive analysis which he proposes as tentative to the performative analysis. He feels that the interconnections between syntax and pragmatics should be investigated in detail.

In criticism of Ross's analysis, Partridge (1982:61) holds that it has become increasingly obvious that Ross's analysis (and also its derivations) concentrates on the "saying"-component of performatives and only touches the "doing"-component by chance and almost completely ignores the third component in the trio, namely the explicitness. Partridge's contention is that most performatives cannot be accommodated under Ross's Performative Hypothesis, and that the performative deletion must of necessity trigger many otherwise unmotivated operations in a multitude of cases, as shown in (10).

- (10a) Hamba!
 'Go!'
- (10b) Ungahamba.
 'You should go.'

If Ross maintains that (10a) is derived from the same deep structure as a sentence that contains a performative in its main clause, how does he then explain the derivation of (10b) from the same deep structure? Partridge (1982:62) advocates that it would appear most sensible to class the performative analysis as a "say"-analysis and to abandon it as an analysis of performatives. Partridge says he does not imply the automatic rejection of the numerous works which postulate abstract superordinate structures. The "say"-component referred to by the performative analysis, Partridge claims, has proved unproductive, as it lacks the explicitness component. He maintains that a performative must be explicit in order to be a performative at all. Its deletion, will result in semantic loss.

Another of Partridge's contentions is that the assumption that abstract verbs must be performative and the adoption of Ross's [+performative] feature are erroneous and misleading. It is thus conceptually contradictory to try to set up abstract performatives (which by definition Partridge maintains cannot exist) in retrospect, basing them on addressee-interpretations, which play no role in the process of generating syntax (1982:68). Partridge also maintains that such analyses ignore the explicitness component of performatives and reduce the "saying"- and "doing"-components practically to triviality. He claims that the explicitness component has the function of eliminating on the part of the speaker, given the ideal situation postulated here, any misinterpretation on the part of the addressee. Explicitness, according to Partridge is of great semantic importance, and cannot be deleted without semantic loss.

Concerning the theory of performative deletion, Partridge (1982:80) contends that if it does exist it would thus not be a meaning-preserving transformation as its adherents claim. It is also Partridge's contention that,

if, as is maintained purely syntactic transformations are meaning-preserving, then the performative analysis must fail. He bases his argument on the fact that performativeless sentences cannot be derivable from performative structures.

Although Ross was concerned with a syntactic transformation, it soon became clear to scholars like Partridge that the performative deletion is a meaning changing transformation and thus it violates a basic assumption of the transformalist position. This supports the tenet that not only syntactically but also semantically motivated transformations are meaning-preserving, and in general reinforces that pragmatic, semantic and syntactic processes do interact at a pre-surface (Partridge, 1982:149). Seen from this perspective of language investigation, it becomes clear that pragmatics and syntax/semantics meet and graphically illuminate differences in function insofar as they are determined by the speaker, and not arbitrarily interpreted by the addressee.

Leech (1983:3) considers the rise and decline of the Performative Hypothesis as particularly instructive from the point of view that the exponents thereof tried to apply the paradigm of generative grammar to problems - such as treatment of presuppositions and of illocutionary force - which most people now regard as involving pragmatics, with the result that their attempts failed. Such failure, Leech attributes not to the spectacular way in which theories are supposed to fail on account of crucial falsifying observation; but to the way in which things tend to happen in linguistics - failure through a slowly accumulating weight of adverse arguments. What Leech views as most implausible about this interpretation of performatives is the idea of what will appear in say, an encyclopaedia article, where every single sentence will have, in its underlying structure, a performative

preface such as "I state that ..." which has undergone deletion; so that a 100-sentence article will presumably have the same prefixed clause (or a similar one) repeated one hundred times. In addition, Leech maintains that this performative will include a reference to the writer (I), even in formal expository prose of the kind in which first person reference is avoided for stylistic reasons.

Giving the final reproach to the Performative Hypothesis, Leech says this doctrine is an apparently inadvertent attempt to grammaticize pragmatic phenomena, that is, illocutionary force, and this he believes could only have been entertained by those for whom the grammatical paradigm of generative grammar was considered all-sufficient. In this way, he alleges, they have tried to ignore the obvious, namely that language realises in concrete situations.

After evaluating the arguments for and against the Performative Hypothesis, the argument that carries more weight and as a result outclasses Ross's theory, is the argument against it. This is the argument that assails Ross's failure to include explicitness in his treatment of performatives and its exposition of the fact that the absence of this component renders this theory an empty base. Another shortfall of this theory which has been exposed is its overemphasis of the syntactic nature of the performative as against the semantic and pragmatic nature which it overlooks. An attempt to lay open the Performative Hypothesis as a yardstick for the purpose of examining the performatives in Zulu is futile because of the fact that this theory is found wanting and unreliable. How could we use a tool which in itself is incomplete and is without some of its crucial parts that enable it to function? Regarding transformations, there is some skepticism as to their workability in Zulu. A word in Zulu, whether it be a noun or a verb etc. is understood in terms of its constituent parts. It is not

comprised of a single meaningful unit, but by a number of these constituent parts, commonly termed morphemes. A word in Zulu, therefore, is dependent on these morphemes to shade its meaning. When transformations are projected, these morphemes tend to pose problems as to which positions they are to occupy under those NP, VP territories. To illuminate on this, we might use a verb which includes several prefixal and suffixal morphemes which in some way, will affect the meaning of the word, morphemes such as the aspectual morphemes and the negative endings. Following the Transformational framework, we know that the VP is dominated by a verb. The languages used by the transformationalists for experimenting were those languages whose words comprise mainly of free morphemes and all other aspects of the verb such as tense and aspect are projected under AUX. In Zulu the different aspectual morphemes contain additional meaning to that of the verb. How could the various meanings which these morphemes have, be represented in transformations? Another aspect which is problematic when it comes to transformations, is that of nouns which function as adverbs in Zulu. Here, the problem we face, is whether to put this type of noun under the NP which is dominated by the VP, or under the AdvP. But then, how can an NP be a node of an AdvP when we know very well that an NP that is dominated by S is the subject of the sentence and that NP which is dominated by the VP is the object of the sentence? When the Performative Hypothesis is weighed against these arguments, the viability of this analysis could be misdirecting and misleading for Zulu.

2.3 LEECH'S INTERPRETATION OF PERFORMATIVES

Leech (1983) tries to justify the approach he has taken towards illocutionary force against competing positions. This scholar advocates that his interpretation is in

opposition to what he calls the orthodox speech act theory in the mould of Austin and Searle and the Performative Hypothesis of Ross and others. He regards these as fallacies which have influenced thinking about illocutionary force.

Leech (1983:74) maintains that in the past the tendency, as has been mentioned before, has been to over-grammaticize, that is, to treat grammatical aspects of linguistic behaviour which are more suitable to pragmatic explanations. The example he gives, is that of grammatical treatment of illocutionary force by means of the Performative Hypothesis.

In adopting this diametrically opposed view, Leech puts forward a descriptive theory of performatives which he believes is not only possible but which is the only plausible interpretation there is, once one has accepted that the present tense of the performative is non-habitual. In adopting this view, Leech (1983:102) contrasts it with the non-descriptive view taken by Austin, Searle and others. He bases his argument on the fact that Austin contrasted the action-like quality of performatives with the descriptive-like quality of constatives. The descriptive view of performatives levels out this contrast in the opposite direction to that eventually taken by Austin: that performatives, like all other sentences in declarative form, are propositions (rather unusual propositions) in that they are capable of being true or false.

Leech utterly agrees that although there are circumstances in which performatives can plausibly be derived, they are very difficult to find and that the descriptivist does not dispute that fact, but rather finds a pragmatic explanation of why it is so. He reiterates the fact that the descriptive/non-descriptive argument about performatives is therefore yet another

example of archetypal debate about whether a given phenomenon should be handled by grammar or by pragmatics. This issue resulted in the descriptivists adopting a complementarist position. Their argument being that the peculiarity of performatives is predictable from their sense and the relation between this and their force; the non-descriptivists adopted a semanticist's position, maintaining that the peculiarity of performatives is a matter of their fundamental logical status.

Taking a complementarist position in the treatment of performatives, Leech (1983:189) advances that a performative utterance derives its property as a performative from pragmatics as well as from semantics. For this reason, he says, he prefers the use of the term 'performative utterance', rather than 'performative sentence'. He also alleges that this position posits that any account of meaning in language must

- (a) be faithful to the facts as we observe them; and
- (b) must be as simple and generalisable as possible.

Leech is of the opinion that if we approach meaning entirely from a pragmatic point of view, or entirely from a semantic point of view, these requirements are not met; however, if we approach meaning from the point of view which combines both semantics and pragmatics, the result can be a satisfactory explanation in terms of these two criteria. He believes that semantics and pragmatics are distinct, yet complementary and interrelated fields of study.

In an attempt to separate that which is semantic from that which is pragmatic, Leech (1983:5) takes this back to the problem of distinguishing language (*langue*) and language use (*parole*) which he maintains is a distinction of the two perspectives of the interpretation of meaning. He professes that both fields are concerned with meaning, but the difference between them can be traced to two

different uses of the verb 'to mean'. In semantics, meaning is defined relative to a speaker or user of the language, and pragmatically to a performative utterance by highlighting its force which is indicated by its main verb. Thus, Leech maintains, the performative utterance wears its illocutionary heart on its sleeve. Whereas for non-performative utterances, the illocutionary force has to be inferred pragmatically (that is, rather explicitly). Pragmatics gives attention to meaning in use, whereas in semantics, meaning is defined purely as a property of expression in a given language, in abstraction from particular situations, speakers or addressees.

The performative utterance is treated according to Leech (1983:189) as a proposition with a present tense verb, and is ambiguous between habitual and instantaneous interpretation.

We may briefly summarize the interrelatedness of pragmatics and semantics by saying that the task of pragmatics is to explain the relation between these two types of meanings: the sense, which has often been derived as the literal or face-value meaning, and the (illocutionary) force. Sense can be described by means of a semantic representation. The force will be represented as a set of implicatures. Implicature, used in a much broader sense than by Grice but following Grice in believing that the presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out, by means of the type of informal reasoning (Leech, 1983:30).

Leech believes that performatives are a part of the interpersonal rhetoric and as such the illocutionary force should be analysed in rhetorical and non-categorical terms. He maintains that when we are analysing illocutionary verbs, we are dealing with grammar, whereas when we are analysing the illocutionary

force of utterances, we are dealing with pragmatics. He says it is very easy to confuse these two, because one is part of the metalanguage for the other; that is, when we discuss or report illocutionary acts in ordinary discourse, we inevitably find ourselves doing so in terms of the illocutionary verbs which the language provides for this purpose. Leech further points out that the metalinguistic character of performatives is in fact the key to their nature because they impose a label on themselves, they do not only make clear their own (illocutionary) force, but also categorise it. Thus,

(11a) Hlala phansi.

'Sit down.'

could have a variable and partly indeterminate force which might, in different circumstances, be called an invitation or a suggestion, an offer or an order; but

(11b) Ngikucela ukuba uhlale phansi.

'I request you to sit down.'

by defining itself as a request or an order, allows no such ambivalence.

Leech (1983:175) accentuates the fact that the illocutionary force, particularly because of its indeterminacy and scalar variability, is more subtle than can be easily accommodated by our everyday vocabulary of speech act verbs. It is his contention that performatives are accorded the observation that

- (a) they are often partly equivalent to their non-performative analogues; but
- (b) they express additional meaning which if conveyed at all, is only conveyed implicitly by their non-performative analogues.

In his attempt to interpret the performative, it is apparent that Leech takes the middle course. Inferences made, indicate that Austin approaches this subject from an exclusively semantic framework, while Ross approaches performatives from a purely syntactic perspective. This

is reflected by his use of deep structure and surface structure transformations. We could conclude by saying that both Austin and Ross did what Leech condemns in the strongest possible terms; treating linguistic behaviour, which requires pragmatic interpretation, grammatically.

Leech's proposal that the most viable approach to the treatment of performatives is to employ both semantics and pragmatics as instruments of interpreting their meaning, particularly pragmatics which explains clearly the illocutionary force which is made explicit by the performative. This approach gives us the spectacle necessary for the examination of performatives in Zulu. This examination will be conducted on the basis that the very nature of a performative lies in its illocutionary force. The various configurations of the performatives with regard to Zulu will be examined and we will also examine how distinctly the illocutionary force is conveyed, from speaker to addressee, by means of explicitness of the performative.

CHAPTER 3

3 ATTRIBUTES OF PERFORMATIVES

3.1 FORM, NATURE AND FUNCTION OF PERFORMATIVES

Austin (1962:1) maintains that it was for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a statement can only be to describe some state of affairs, or to state some fact, which it must either do, either truly or falsely. He further notes that grammarians have regularly pointed out that not all sentences are (used in making) statements: that there are, traditionally besides (grammarians') statements, also questions and exclamations, and sentences expressing commands or wishes or concessions. Austin does acknowledge that it is by no means easy to distinguish even questions, commands and so on from statements by means of a few and jejune grammatical marks available, such as word order, mood and the like.

It has been commonly held that many utterances which look alike are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to report or impart straightforward information about the facts. "Ethical propositions" are cited as examples, which are regarded or perhaps intended, solely or partly, to evince emotion or to prescribe conduct or to influence it in special ways (Austin, 1962:2-3). Austin further endorses that it has come to be seen that many specially perplexing words embedded in apparently descriptive statements do not serve to indicate some special odd additional feature in the reality reported. But they are intended to indicate (not to report) the circumstances in which the statement is made or reservations to which it is subject or the way in which it is to be taken since not all true or false statements are descriptives, and for this reason, Austin uses the term 'constative'.

Austin establishes that utterances which contain verbs, that do not describe or report or constate anything at all:

- (a) are not true or false;
- (b) are in the first person singular, present tense, indicative, positive;
- (c) are all explicit performatives.

Austin originally introduced the notion of performatives to contrast them with constatives; and from this idea it was revealed that performatives are verbs which both describe and perform the act specified by the verb. These acts will include amongst others verbs such as "ngiyethembisa" in making promises, "ngiyaxolisa" in making an apology etc.; and constatives will be a class of those verbs used in making statements or in giving descriptions.

In order to be used as a performative, a verb must be analysable into three distinct components:

- (1) It must be uttered in a sentence as the main clause of that sentence.
- (2) It must be a verb of action, thus non-stative, because something must be done by its utterance,
- (3) for the same reason it must have an explicitness component which names the activity performed by the utterance of the particular performative.

Partridge (1982:135) endorses the claim that these components should be the criterion to be used in determining whether a verb belongs to the set of performatives or not. He believes the three-component test is useful to isolate performatives from other verbs which apparently could be used in a manner similar to that which is peculiar to performatives.

Leech (1983:181) conceptualises that the performative

verb construct is exceptional in that apart from being something which underlies every single utterance, (conceding with Ross), it is something highly unusual in itself in that it occurs understandably enough, when a speaker needs to define his speech act as belonging to a particular category. In this way Leech maintains that the officer who says to a soldier;

(12a) Ngikuyalela ukuba ume.

'I order you to stand up.'¹

is making clear the official definition of his illocution as an order, just as he would retrospectively if he had said;

(12b) Mana, ngumyalelo lowo.

'Stand up, that is an order.'

A further observation, which Leech brings forth, is the fact that a performative is metalinguistic, and as such, it is both syntactically and semantically a kind of a reported speech (*Oratio obliqua*) utterance. It seems as if Austin did anticipate such interpretations because his reaction to whoever interpreted performatives in this manner came long before Leech's investigation of performatives. Austin (1962:70) says that although we

1. It is important to mention that the performative verb in the example in (12a) is not pragmatically acceptable to the native speakers of Zulu. Instead of this form they would prefer the use of the imperative such as that used in the example in (12b), or a simple imperative form such as:

(12c) Sukuma!

'Stand up!' or

(12d) Ngithi (kuwe(na)) sukuma!

'I command you to stand up!'

All of which communicate the same illocutionary force as their counterpart in (12a) which contains an unacceptable performative in Zulu.

have in the performative utterance a "that"-clause following a verb, we must not allude to such utterances as indirect speech. "That"-clauses in indirect speech or *oratio obliqua*, Austin maintains, are of course cases where a person reports what someone else or himself did say, for example, typically "he said that..." but also possibly "he promised that ..." or "On page 456 I declared that" Austin is of the opinion that, if this is clear enough for us to grasp, then we may understand why the "that" of the *oratio obliqua* is not in all ways similar to the "that" in the explicit performative formulas. It is because here a person cannot report his own speech in the first person singular present, indicative, active, and incidentally, it is not in the least necessary that an explicit performative verb should be followed by "that". In important classes of cases, Austin claims that it is followed by "to..." or nothing.

Although there is a general feeling that performatives comprise a first person singular subject, Bach (1979:304) substantiates the fact that the first person plural can be used performatively for instance when a spokesman speaks for a group, and that the second person passive can also be used performatively.

When we scrutinize Zulu verbal structures according to the performative paradigm it becomes obvious that verbs used performatively appear in the indicative mood, active, present tense as illustrated by the examples in (13).

- (13a) Ngithembisa ukufika kusasa.
'I promise to come tomorrow.'
- (13b) Ngiyaxolisa uma ngikuthukuthelisile.
'I apologise if I have offended you.'
- (13c) Ngicela ukuba ngihambe kusasa.
'I request to go tomorrow.'

This axiom, will overrule (14) as a performative, on the basis that, although the verb exhibits the three components characteristic of a performative, that is, the saying, doing and explicitness components, this sentence in contrast with (13c) will not qualify as a performative because it is in the past tense

(14) Ngicele ukuba ngihambe kusasa.

'I requested to go tomorrow.'

As an action which is scheduled for a future, it also violates the nature pertinent to a performative.

A structural analysis of the performatives in Zulu will be done in comparison with the structure which their English counterparts exhibits which commonly appears in the following forms:

I *V ...
I *V you ...
I *V that ...

*V = performative verb

Light will first be thrown upon the first element of the performative, which is the first person singular subject. In Zulu, the first person singular absolute pronoun may be employed together with the performative in which the subject concord which brings about agreement between the verb and the subject, has been incorporated as in (15).

(15) Mina ngicela ukuba ngihambe kusasa.

'I request to go tomorrow.'

Much controversy has resulted among African linguistic scholars as to the real status and function of the absolute pronoun in the African languages in general, and especially in Zulu. Wilkes (1976:62-83) expresses his strongest objection to the notion set out by the traditional grammarian C.M. Doke in terms of which the absolute pronoun is regarded as a word which stands in the place of a noun, which is an assumption that the absolute pronoun substitutes a noun in discourse.

Wilkes's unreservedly harsh condemnation of Doke's approach to the role he assigns the absolute pronoun, is based on the fact that there exists a clear discernable semantic difference between the sentences in (16a) and (16b) respectively.

(16a) Uthisha ucela ubhale kahle.

'The teacher requests that you write legibly.'

(16b) Yena ucela ubhale kahle.

'He requests that you write legibly.'

Example (16b) contains an element of emphasis on the subject which is absent in example (16a). On this basis Wilkes, maintains that the difference in meaning cannot be accounted for within a substitutional approach, since it is not clear how the mere substitution of a pronoun can give rise to a semantic difference of this nature. Another bone of contention Wilkes raises against the Dokean view of pronominalisation in Zulu, is the fact that the absolute pronoun is very often used in apposition to its antecedent noun as in examples cited in (17).

(17a) Yena uthisha ucela ubhale kahle.

'The teacher in particular, requests that you write legibly.'

(17b) Uthisha yena ucela ubhale kahle.

'The teacher, on the other hand, requests that you write legibly.'

These sentences support Wilkes's position for repudiating the validity of the claim that absolute pronouns substitute nouns in discourse. He then initiates and propounds an alternative theory of pronominalisation, which he calls the "deletion hypothesis", according to which pronominalisation does not result from the substitution of a pronoun for a noun, but rather from the deletion of the antecedent noun which appears in apposition to the pronoun. The deletion of the antecedent takes place and is determined by the

pragmatics of discourse, if the referent is presupposed to be known, that is, given information (Louwrens, 1985:59).

In view of the foregoing discussion, it is difficult to accept that the status of the absolute pronoun in (15) is a result of the deletion of its antecedent noun. Reflected against the background of the deletion hypothesis, an impression is created that the antecedent noun which could be the name of the speaker, has been deleted. If this should be the case, then the so-called deleted antecedent noun could be interpreted as not referring to the first person subject, "mina" but to some other person.

It is commonplace in Zulu that if the first person singular absolute pronoun is not used in an utterance for the essential purpose of emphasis, it may be omitted, thus the first person singular subject concord "ngi-" is elevated to subject pronoun position, and in this manner it is pronominalised. This formation is illuminated by the example given in (18).

(18) Ngicela uhambe. (< Mina ngicela uhambe.)
'I request you go.'

At this stage, we could also indicate that we do in certain instances, find deviations from the norm as far as the issue of the subject of the performative is concerned. We know that the proponents of the performative practice hold that the subject of the performative is strictly confined to the first person singular. We do find instances where the first person plural occurs as subject of the performatives, for instance when a spokesman speaks on behalf of a group as it is shown in the examples in (19).

(19a) Siyacela egameni likaYise neleNdodana nelikaMoya
OyiNgcwele.

'We request in the name of the Father, the
Son and the Holy Spirit.'

(19b) Sithi duduzekani nina enilahlekelwe.

'We state that you be condoled you that have
lost.'

The second person, passive can also be used
performatively as indicated in (20):

(20a) Niyaxwayiswa ukuba ningawaphuzi amanzi omfula ongageleziyo.
'You are warned not to drink stagnant water.'

(20b) Niyakhunjuzwa ngomhlangano ozoba sehholo lomphakathi
ngeSonto.

'You are reminded about the meeting which will be held in
the Community Hall on Sunday.'

It would seem, that with other performatives, if the
normal subject concord of first person singular is not
used, only the impersonal classless subject concord "ku-"
could be used so as to render that verbal construct
grammatically acceptable as shown in the examples cited
in (21)

(21a) Kufungwa ngoba beshada.

'Vows are taken, because they are marrying.'

(21b) Kwaziswa abantu ukuba kuzoba nomhlangano.

'It is announced that there will be a meeting.'

It is interesting to note that certain performatives
could be used with a variety of subject concords and
still be grammatically acceptable as indicated in the
examples in (19),(20) and (21).

We will now attend to the verbal element of
performatives. In Zulu, verbs which qualify as
performatives, usually appear in the form of first person
singular subject concord "ngi-" plus a performative
verbal stem. It occurs in very rare cases if not in none

where we find performatives being extended by means of verbal extensions. The basic forms of performatives in Zulu would appear as shown in the examples given in (22)

(22a) Ngicela uhambe.

'I request you go.'

(22b) Ngibonga ukuba usebenze kahle

'I thank you for working well'

(22c) Ngetha lesi sikole igama likaZakheni.

'I name this school Zakheni.'

Incorporated within the verbal construct, we occasionally find the so-called present tense morpheme *-ya-*.

According to Louwrens (1985:50) this *-ya-* form plays a significant role in determining the pragmatic context of the use of the performative verb of the indicative main clause. In contrasting the examples in the sentences in (22) against examples in sentences given in (23), it becomes apparent that, although we may think that both sets imply the same actions, there is a difference in their structure - a difference which cannot easily be perceived.

(23a) Ngiyacela ukuba uhambe.

'I request that you go.'

(23b) Ngiyabonga ukuba usebenze kahle.

'I thank you for performing well.'

(23c) Lesi sikole ngiyasetha igama likaZakheni.

'I name this school Zakheni.'

The main distinction between these verbs is that the examples in (22) which have verbal constructs which do not contain the *-ya-* are not complete communicative ideas, in that in these sentences the focus is on additional information, necessary to supplement them for meaningful interpretation. Thus "ngicela" will coerce the inclusion of additional information to make it meaningful, whereas the verbs in the examples in (23), which contain the *-ya-* also do not represent a complete communicative thought, but the focus now falls on this

part of the verbal construct. This view opposes the assumption that the presence and absence of the -ya- within a verb will make it to be a complete communicative thought or not to be a complete communicative thought respectively. This view regards focus as being responsible for the difference between these two forms of the performative in Zulu. The other difference between these two sets of performative verbs could be ascribed to the semantic boundary of their existence within the sentence, which is determined by a pause after the utterance of that part on which focus falls. We could say that, in performative verbs without the -ya- this pause occurs at the end of the sentence, and in those with the -ya-, the pause is found immediately after such verbs. Examples given in (24) will reflect this difference in semantic boundaries between these sets of verbal forms.

(24a) Ngicela ukuba uhambe.#²

'I request that you go.'

(24b) Ngiyacela # ukuba uhambe.

'I request that you go.'

It is clear from these examples that the semantic pause occurs at the end of the sentence in that sentence which contains a verb without the -ya- and it occurs immediately after the verb in sentences with the -ya-.

It is interesting to observe how oddly some of the performative verbs behave in Zulu with relation to the -ya-. There are instances in Zulu where the verb will require an obligatory use thereof in order to become a pragmatically accepted form. Its absence renders such verbal constructs unacceptable. This is clearly demonstrated by the examples in (25).

(25a) Ngiyaxolisa ukungafiki.

'I apologize for not coming.'

2. The symbol # indicates a pause, marking a semantic boundary.

- *(25b) Ngixolisa ukungafiki.
 'I apologize for not coming.'

It is surprising that, with derivations, particularly those with suffixal morphemes, the absence of the -ya- does not render such constructs unacceptable, in as far as utterance meaning is concerned. Examples in (26) and (27) respectively demonstrate that the once unacceptable performative form without the -ya- is now acceptable when certain suffixal morphemes are attached.

- (26) Ngixolisela ukungafiki kwami.
 'I apologize for my not coming.'
- (27) Ngixolisana nobaba ukuze ahambe angathukuthele.
 'I apologize to my father so that he leaves with no hard feelings.'

The second person object concord "-ku-" is sometimes used with performative verbs. This concord is used in place of the second person singular absolute pronoun "wena". The incorporation of this concord within the verbal structure brings to the fore the pragmatic function of on the verb. This fact is clearly illustrated in the examples in (28).

- (28a) Ngiyakuxwayisa kuyingozi ukudlala ngomlilo.
 'I warn you, it is dangerous to play with fire.'
- (28b) Ngiyakubonga ngoba usebenze kahle.
 'I thank you for performing well.'

The claim that the performative must as a matter of fact have a second person singular object, is challenged by the notion construed in cases where the performative has been used with an object other than the second person singular. This notion is evidently illustrated in (22c) where the object concord is not that of the second person singular, but of a class 7 noun, "isikole".

We could conclude this discussion by indicating that the structural analysis of performatives in Zulu is an

interesting exercise, in that performatives in this language appear in various different ways. Although Ross's syntactic presumption, is disapproved by some scholars like Leech, there is substance in his claim that the performative is the main verb of the main clause in a performative sentence. (22a) is indicative of the fact that "ngiyacela..." 'I request...' represents the main clause of this sentence whilst the second part of the sentence "... ukuba uhambe" '...that you should go.', is the complement of the main clause, which is a subordinate clause, with a verb in the subjunctive mood. We regard it as a subordinate mood in that it accompanies the indicative or the imperative and the action it expresses, is logically "subordinate" to that of the indicative or imperative. In such uses the semantic relation between the subjunctive and the indicative is mainly of a purpose/result nature. The subjunctive does, however, in certain instances represent the main clause of sentences. This happens in cases where the hortative form of the subjunctive is used. This is clearly demonstrated by the example cited in (29) below.

(29) Ake ngibonge ngomsebenzi omuhle eniwenzile.

'Let me thank you for the wonderful work you have done.'

It is very common practice to find performatives, or the clause that contains them, being followed by the subjunctive mood. This therefore means that the example cited in (29) does not contain a performative verb. It is very common practice to find performatives, or the clause that contains them, being followed by the subjunctive mood. This is indicated by the occurrence of conjunctives "ukuba" or "ukuthi" after the main clause.

We do also find the situative form complementing the main clause that contains the performative as illustrated in the example cited in (13b). In this sentence "ngiyaxolisa..." is the main performative clause, while "... uma ngikuthukuthelisile." will be the subordinate

participial clause. The participial is problematic as far as its semantic functions are concerned, and has invoked much controversy among African linguistic scholars as to whether it is a fully-fledged mood or merely a form or a sub-mood. The reason why it is regarded as a sub-mood is that the situative is almost always used in conjunction with the indicative mood. The situative mostly signify an action that is executed at the same time as the action indicated by the indicative mood. This phenomenon is given by linguistic scholars as attributing to the status assigned to the participial. This is sometimes partially true, especially when we examine the realisation of the participial with other types of verbs such as declaratives. In these cases the participial could also indicate action that has been executed before or after the action contained in the indicative mood. This is illustrated by the examples in (30).

- (30a) UThemba ubephuzile ngenkathi ngimbona.
 'Themba was drunk when I saw him.'

This indicates that the action in the participial happened some time before the speaker saw Themba.

- (30b) UThoko uzoyiletha incwadi yami uma ngiyifuna.
 'Thoko will bring my book when I need it.'

Here the action in the participial indicates that it will happen sometime after the action in the indicative mood. But with the performative verb, since a performative is a demonstration of an action taking place at the time of the utterance, the participial is executed at the same time as the main verb of the performative.

Finally we must also mention that infinitives or gerund complementation could also follow on the performative construction. The dual nature of infinitives is also problematic, because it can on the one hand display nominal qualities and on the other hand it could display verbal qualities. In the case of a performative

construction, we might assume that it is an infinite verb which is contained in the subordinate clause that complements the sentence in question.

3.2 CLASSES OF PERFORMATIVES

3.2.1 THE PERFORMATIVE/CONSTATIVE DISTINCTION

The performative/constative dichotomy has been hinted at in the preceding discussion, but in this section its repetition will be for the exclusive purpose of elucidation and verification. The original belief which Austin held, has been that performative utterances are fundamentally different from constative (or descriptive) utterances in that performative utterances do not describe or report or constate anything at all, but rather, they are, or are part of, the doing of an action and that constative utterances could be evaluated in traditional terms of truth and falsehood. Performatives on the other hand are neither true nor false but are regarded as felicitous or non-felicitous.

This dichotomy has met with vehement criticism from most scholars of the performative practice. According to Bach (1979:203), what Austin proposes when he says the sentence uttered in a performative is grammatically a declarative, seems contradictory. He asserts that he accepts the positive side of Austin's proposal that performatives are, or are part of, the doing of an action but views the negative side of the doctrine - that performative utterances do not constate or that they are not true or false, with some doubt. He posits the position of performatives as being both doings and statings (sayings). Thus, they compose two illocutionary acts. Bach maintains that uttering a performative, is to do what one is stating one is doing; and that is what will make the uttered statement true. That performative

utterances are neither true nor false, that they are not statements, is clearly question-begging according to Bach. He admits that as orders *per se* (or as promises, apologies, etc.) performative utterances are neither true nor false, but if they are also statements, they are true or false, and if true, they are, in virtue of being made.

Searle (1989:535) reckons that the most widely accepted current view is that performative utterances are really just statements with truth value like any other statement, and that Austin was wrong to contrast performative utterances with some other kind. He holds that the only special feature of the performative statement is that the speaker can perform some other speech act indirectly by making a statement, and the task of the theory of performatives is to explain how the speaker can intend and the addressee can understand a second speech act from the making of the first speech act.

In the case of an utterance such as (31),

(31) Ngithembisa ukuhamba kusasa.

'I promise to go tomorrow.'

Kempson (1975:140) alleges that such a sentence will be true if the action prescribed, constitutes an undertaking (either verbal or written) made by the speaker to carry out the action in the future, namely going, and the conditions constitute the meaning of the sentence. If these conditions are not met, it could be that the speaker's statement did not constitute such a commitment at all, then - just as a truth-based semantic analysis predicts - the sentence, Kempson concludes, is false. He supports Bach by revealing that what is odd about performatives is that the mere fact of their utterance guarantees the fulfillment of at least part of the conditions for the truth of the proposition conveyed. Kempson believes that the idiosyncratic feature of performative statements is therefore not that they have

no truth value, but rather that their truth value is at least partially determined by their very utterance.

It would seem as if Austin had a hunch about the validity of whether his performative/constative distinction will be in a position to withstand the rigorous opposition, because he subsequently collapsed it in favour of the general theory of illocutionary acts.

It stands to reason that although Austin never came to believe that performatives can be true or false, a fact which did not result in his abandoning the distinction, the scholars who maintain that performatives can be true or false, do so on the basis of their considerations that an utterance is true by virtue of being made as illustrated in the example in (32).

(32) Ngikuxwayisa ukuba uzolimala.

'I warn you that you will get hurt.'

The utterance of such a sentence definitely confirms that what the speaker is doing is that he is warning the addressee, which could be true of course, in the sense that if the addressee is not warned trouble might befall him. In response to (32) the addressee cannot react by saying what is cited in (33).

(33) Cha, okushoyo yiphutha.

'No, what you are saying is false.'

We could sum up by saying that Austin's distinction of performative and constative utterances on the basis that performatives cannot be true or false as is the case with constatives is substantiable and not misleading.

3.2.2 PRIMARY *VERSUS* EXPLICIT PERFORMATIVES

Partridge (1982:81) claims that the explicitness component of the performative is obviously that part of

the performative structure which determines the surface morphological form of the verb in question, the designation of what the speaker of a performative does with his utterance. In order to illuminate vividly on the performative/constative distinction, Austin (1962:67) distinguishes primary from explicit performatives, a distinction which he admits to have introduced rather surreptitiously. Austin maintains that it is the explicit formula "I V..." or "I V you..." or "I V that ..." which makes explicit what action it is that is being performed by the speaker. To do and say these things is to make plain how the action, which is what is said at the same time is to be taken or understood. In the examples cited in (34), the underlined segments of these sentences represent the explicit formula referred to by Austin.

- (34a) Ngethembisa ukufika kusasa.
'I promise to come tomorrow.'
- (34b) Ngikwethembisa ukufika kusasa.
'I promise you I will come tomorrow.'
- (34c) Ngikwethembisa ukuba ngizofika kusasa.
'I promise that I will come tomorrow.'

Austin (1962:69) claims that it is the putting in of the underlined expressions that indicates that a promise has been made, and that these expressions make the utterances unambiguously promises.

Primary or inexplicit performatives differ from their explicit counterparts in that they do not contain that explicit formula which makes the action that is being performed by the speaker, explicit. On the basis of this argument, Austin alleges that sentences like the imperative in (35), may lend themselves to equivocation, vagueness of meaning and uncertainty of sure reception in that it may be an order, a permission, a demand or a request, an entreaty, a warning, etc.

- (35) Hamba!
 'Go!'

According to Austin, such structures do not make explicit the precise force of the utterance. Explicitness, therefore, he assumes, makes clearer the force of the utterance, or how it is to be taken.

Austin (1962:71) says that one thing that seems a fair guess, even from the elaborations of the linguistic construction, also from its nature in the explicit performative, is that historically from the point of view of the evolution of language, the explicit performative must be a later development than certain more primary utterances, many of which at least are included in most or many explicit performatives as parts of a whole.

He adds that it is a plausible view that explicitly distinguished different forces that an utterance might have, is also a later development of language, and a considerable one for that matter.

Partridge (1982:87) further sub-divides the explicit performative into non-institutional or natural performatives, which he maintains can be distinguished from institutional ones by citing examples such as those in (36).

- (36a) Ngikubeka induna yalesi sigodi.
 'I appoint you chief of this village.'
 (36b) Nginguma ukungabhemi kusasa.
 'I undertake not to smoke tomorrow.'

The speaker of (36a) must have been empowered to make such appointments, that is, he functions as the execution organ of a higher authority, otherwise if this condition is not met, the act of appointing will be declared void. The speaker of (36b) on the other, hand is subject only to the condition that he intends to behave as he has

indicated, his authority to act is one he and only he can exercise. This speaker has no need to have recourse to externally invested authority to justify this linguistic action, and in exercising it he is completely unbound by anyone else's influence or exhortation. Therefore, (36a) is an institutional explicit performative, whilst (36b) is a non-institutional performative.

Our examination of performatives in Zulu in this phase of our discussion, will particularly focus on how explicitness is transmitted from the speaker to the addressee and whether ambiguity and vagueness are eliminated by the use of the explicit expression. A relatively small representation of the performatives in Zulu will be used. An exhaustive examination of all the verbs which can be used performatively in this language will not only widen the scope of this discussion, but will also lead us not to realise the eventual objective. The examination will be done with the purpose of unveiling interesting areas in as far as the performatives of Zulu are concerned.

We may first distinguish a set of performatives which we might presume to be basic in that these performatives are customarily used as performatives in speech as indicated by the given set of sentences in (37).

(37a) -cela : Ngicela ukuba uhambe.

'request: I request you to go.'

(37b) -bonga : Ngiyabonga ukuba ungelekelele.

'thank : I thank you for helping me.'

(37c) -funga : Ngiyafunga angeke angithole.

'vow : I vow he will never find me.'

It is interesting to note that in these examples, the speaker is bringing off two activities simultaneously, that is, that of saying and of performing what he/she intends doing. The intention of what the speaker wants to convey to the addressee is made explicit by the

explicit formula. (37c) without the explicit formula will look like (38),

(38) Angeke angithole!

'He will never find me.'

which could be taken or understood in many different ways by the addressee depending on the context of the utterance. We do also find the interpretation varying even with performative utterances that contain the explicit formula in Zulu, as is the case with both (37a) and (37b). This variation in interpretation depends largely on the context of the utterance, the participants in the speech situation and the goal of the utterance. On the basis of these factors we could indicate that seemingly (37a) is a request wherein the speaker is genuinely appealing to the addressee for permission to go. This sentence could also be interpreted as an expression of a polite command, in which case the speaker is occupying a position of authority lower than the addressee. Commands of this nature, which take the form of requests, are common place in Zulu and they come in numerous forms. If the speaker and addressee belong to the same age group and are in the locality where there are no seniors or older members of the community, or if the speaker occupies a position of authority higher than the addressee, he could then use the direct imperative. (It could be inferred that (37a) could be interpreted as a request or as a command.) The same could also be said about (37b). Again the context plays a primary role in how this utterance is interpreted by the addressee. (37b) might be interpreted to mean that the speaker is expressing feelings of gratitude towards the addressee for lending a hand, but could also be interpreted as indicating that the speaker is politely declining the addressee's offer for help.

We could conclude that the explicit expression of performatives in Zulu cannot be taken as an accurate criterion for eliminating ambivalence, ambiguity and

vagueness, because we do still find cases where the use of this expression yields to varied interpretations under different contexts. We might assume that it is the context and not explicitness in a performative in Zulu, that directs the addressee as to how he should interpret and understand a particular utterance.

The other set of performatives, which we might distinguish in Zulu is that which permits to the performative use of non-performative verbs by means of shifts in meaning. The performative use of these non-performative verbs may sometimes be equalled to performing some non-linguistic act as denoted by the verb. This is clearly illustrated in the example in (39) below.

(39a) -esula : Ngiyesula namuhla kulo msebenzi.

'resign: I resign from this job today.'

(39b) -chitha: Ngiyawuchitha lo mthetho.

'repeal: I repeal this creed.'

It is indisputable that the verbs in (39) derive their meanings from non-performative verbs, which Austin maintains are used to report, describe or constate a state of affairs as in the examples given in (40).

(40a) -esula : Ngesula ubuso ngendwangu.

'wipe : I wipe my face with a cloth.'

(40b) -chitha : Ngichitha insila emgqomeni wezibi.

'throw-away : I throw away rubbish into the rubbish bin.'

We find many non-performative verbs being able to be used performatively by slightly shifting the original meaning of the verb. Although the two manifest the same verbal form, they are slightly different in meaning. In order to determine that the sentences in (39) are performative and those in (40) are non-performative, we have weighed both sets against the tripartite amalgamation of the saying, doing and explicitness component, to determine whether a verb qualifies as a performative, and also

whether the sentences are positive, active and present tense.

When we contrast the use of the performatives in Zulu and their English counterparts, it is important to first examine the following English sentences given in the examples in (41) and (42) respectively.

(41) I order you to leave the room.

(42) I claim that this book is mine.

We could assume that the occurrence and use of the performative that carries such an illocutionary force, that is the force of a command, is not so common in Zulu utterances. Instead we find divergent ways in which this force is expressed in this language with the result that sometimes the force is misunderstood.

The utterance of the sentence given in example (43a),

(43a) Ngiyakuyalela ukuba uphume lapha.

'I command you to leave this place.'

(which is very close in meaning to what is contained in (41)) carries far lesser commanding force than its English counterpart. With the absence of the force of what is to be understood by the addressee, it is rare in Zulu to find a speaker using intonation, facial expressions and gestures to express the intention of his utterance. There are various methods applied by the speakers of Zulu to drive home this type of illocutionary force in the addressee. The most commonly used and direct way to express a command is by using the imperative as in example (43b),

(43b) Phuma, uhambe lapha!

'Get out, and leave this place.'

or the use of another performative such as the one used in the example given in (43c).

(43c) Ngithi phuma, uhambe lapha.

'I say, get out, and leave this place.'

We could, at this stage, conclude that in Zulu we do not have a performative verb that will carry the illocutionary force of a command in the same way as its English counterpart does, when used in an utterance.

The English performative verb used in the example given in (43b) also does not presumably have a Zulu equivalent, and any formal constructions used to communicate the force that is contained by this performative will not fully do so, as is illustrated by the examples given in (43b).

If we examine the performative verb that can express the illocutionary force of claiming in Zulu, a problem arises. If we for argument's sake accept that the meaning we derive from the verb "-landa" could adequately express this force, then, we run the risk of losing the basic meaning of what claiming or the verb claim means. An examination of the examples cited in (44), proves how meaning is lost when "-landa" is used to express the force of claiming in Zulu.

(44a) Ngilanda izinkomo zamasiso ukungilobolela.

'I claim cattle which were farmed out for my drowry.'

(44b) Ngilanda izinkomo zami entabeni.

'I fetch my cattle at the mountain.'

The problem with this verb is that as it is used in (44a) it does not differ in meaning from the verb used in (44b). This makes it difficult for us to maintain that "-landa" could also be used to express the force of claiming.

It is evident that the absence of a performative verb that expresses the force of claiming in Zulu, does create a vacuum in this language. In order that vacuums are filled in languages that lack certain language concepts, these are borrowed from those languages that have the said concepts. This would therefore mean that Zulu could

borrow the concept of claiming from the language where this concept is used. Thus there exists, in Zulu, this tendency to code-switch. This implies use of a loan concept in a similar manner as it is used in the language of its origin but with the difference that the concept used now has to submit itself to the phonological and morphological system of the borrowing language. Therefore the issuing of an utterance such as that indicated in (45) will be acceptable to the speakers of Zulu.

- (45) Ngiyayikleyima le ndawo ibe ngeyami.
'I claim ownership of this place.'

In our examination of how performatives and performative verbs in particular are realised in Zulu, it dawns to us that the presence of the explicit formula does not eliminate ambivalence, ambiguity and vagueness. Rather it is the context of the speech event that plays a decisive role in eliminating vagueness and ambiguity. In Zulu, the imperative is the verbal form that precisely makes clearer the illocutionary force of commands more than explicit performatives.

CHAPTER 4

4 RELATIONSHIPS WHICH THE PERFORMATIVE CAN ENTER INTO

4.1 FELICITY CONDITIONS

Hurford and Heasley (1983:251) allege that utterances can be seen as significant acts on a social level, e.g.. accusations, confessions, denials, greetings, etc. The question we now pose is: by what system do speakers know when such social moves are appropriate? That is in what circumstances are illocutions used? In order to give a plausible answer to this question, a further technical notion, that of felicity conditions needs to be introduced.

The felicity conditions of an illocutionary act are conditions that must be fulfilled in the situation in which the act is carried out if the act is said to be carried out properly or felicitously. Austin (1962:14) maintains that unlike constatives, performatives cannot be true or false (given their special nature). The question of truth and falsity simply does not arise, yet these performatives can go wrong. Austin then set himself the task of cataloguing all ways in which they can go wrong, or be "unhappy" or infelicitous as he puts it, on the basis of their illocutionary forces.

Austin distinguishes three main categories of conditions, which are associated with the successfulness and non-defective performance of an illocutionary act. These are

- 1.(a) There must be a conventional procedure having a conventional effect;
- (b) The circumstances and person must be appropriate, as specified in the procedure;
2. The procedure must be executed correctly and completely;

3. Often, (i) the persons must have requisite thoughts, feelings and intentions as specified in the procedure, and (ii) if consequent conduct is specified, then the relevant parties must do so.

As evidence of the existence of such conditions, we could consider what happens when some of them are not fulfilled. For example, the condition that there must be a conventional procedure having a conventional effect, could be illustrated by what happens in Zulu culture when a young man, ready to take a wife, utters a sentence similar to that given in the example marked (46) below, to a woman whom he intends to marry.

(46) Ngiyakulobola namuhla.
'I "-lobola" you today.'

By the mere utterance of these words there is no way in which the speaker could have achieved the goal of his utterance. There is no such procedure in the Zulu language and culture whereby by the mere utterance of this sentence the speaker would automatically get the addressee to be his wife.

As an illustration of the failure of the conditions that prescribes that the circumstances and persons must be appropriate, as specified in the procedure, we could consider a case where an object or person has to be given a name. In naming an object or a person, that object or person should not have a recognised name which is known to the speaker. The speaker must be recognised by the community as having authority to perform the act in question. For instance, the naming of a new-born baby in any household can never be done by his siblings but must be done by both parents, or grandparents or sometimes by the person who helps to deliver the child at home or in hospital. We could also look at the use of imperatives as a means of issuing commands. It is the norm in African culture that the felicity conditions for the illocutionary act of ordering, is that the speaker must

be superior to or have authority over, the addressee. Thus if a small boy in a family, utters a sentence using the imperative to make his intentions known, such as in the example given in (47),

(47) Mama, kolobha lapha phansi ngichithe amanzi.

'Mummy, scrub the floor, I have spilled some water.'

we find it infelicitous in that the boy is not the appropriate person to address a command to people older than himself. Deviations from the norm, however, do occur.

The distinctions in these felicity conditions point to what Austin (1962:16) alleges namely that the violations of these conditions are not of equal nature. Thus, he refers to infelicities which are such that the act for the performing of which, the verbal formula in question is designed, is not achieved, as 'MISFIRES'. Austin also maintains that when the utterance is a misfire, the procedure which we purport to invoke, is disallowed or is botched, resulting in our act being void and without effect.

On the other hand, in the violation of those conditions in which the participants in the act of speech must often have the requisite thoughts, feelings, and intentions, as specified in the procedure, we speak of our infelicitous act as professed, or hollow rather than purported or empty, as not implemented or not consummated, rather than as void or without effect. Austin (1962:16) has christened these 'ABUSES'. He maintains that abuses are not easily detected at the time of the utterance in question with the consequence that the action is performed but infelicitously or insincerely. Examples of infelicities under this category will include the act of promising. The thing promised by the speaker is something the addressee wants to happen, as indicated when the speaker utters a sentence such as that which is illustrated in the example in (48).

(48) Ngiyakwethembisa ukuthi ngizohamba nawe.

'I promise that I will go with you.'

This is a pointer of insincerity in that it is not the speaker's intention to promise, therefore the issuing of such an utterance is not binding him in any way. This means that the speaker utters the sentence for a reason different from that of promising. Maybe he does it for the reason that the child should stop persterring him. In this way we cannot say that the speaker has issued a promise in the correct sense of issuing a promise, but has been insincere in his expression of this act. We could also categorise as insincerely infelicitous if the act of greeting happens when both speaker and addressee are a long way into the middle of their conversation.

Those conditions which Austin calls abuses, Hurford and Heasley refer to as 'insincerity conditions', which they describe as conditions which must be fulfilled if the act is said to be carried out sincerely, but failure to meet certain conditions does not prevent the carrying out of the act altogether. For example if a speaker does apologize for something, it must be true that the apologizer earnestly believes that what he is apologizing for, is wrong in some way. But if he does it just for the sake of perhaps pleasing somebody, then it is an abuse of the act of apologizing or insincerity.

The difference between misfires and abuses must be drawn so that the two types of infelicities are not confused, particularly with reference to utterance analysis. With misfires it is important to note that due to certain circumstances in the performance of such acts, circumstances such as, for instance, the wrong person performing an act which he does not have the authority to perform, the act does not get off. In the case of abuses, what is important is that the act performed by the speaker is achieved, although to achieve it under

such circumstances, as when we are, insincere, is an abuse of the procedure. Thus when I say "I promise" and have no intention of keeping it, I have promised but without effect (Austin, 1962:16).

We could conclude this discussion by pointing out that a critical examination of felicity conditions suggests that they are rules prescribing who should say what and when what should be said. It also measures the effect of an act performed with or without the necessary intentions. We could also remark that felicity conditions of one language and culture will not necessarily be the felicity conditions of another language and culture. All languages have their standards as to what utterances are to be used by which classes of people in society and during which circumstances particular utterances are to be used. We also assume that the abuses of utterance in the languages and cultures will not be as different as the misfires. If, in one language a speaker issues a promise without the intention of fulfilling that promise, it is an abuse which has the same effect in any other language. Levinson (1983:229) cites the following example to illustrate the notion that felicity conditions differ from language to language and from culture to culture. He says the utterance of a sentence such as "I hereby divorce you." to a wife who is a British citizen, will not achieve a divorce, because there simply is no such procedure whereby merely by uttering this sentence divorce can be achieved, but he says that in Muslim cultures there is a procedure whereby the uttering of such a sentence, three times consecutively, does thereby and *ipso facto* constitute a divorce.

Conclusions drawn from observations of how language is used in speech, points to the fact that abuses are employed more often in speech than misfires. This is illustrated, amongst the many acts of infelicities of such a nature, by my successfully requesting my young son

to go and fetch a stapler, not really that I want a stapler, but only that I want him to leave the room, and knowing that he cannot fulfil that request since the stapler is on the table behind me. Infelicities are in existence and very much operative in language.

4.2 PERFORMATIVES AND SPEECH ACTS

4.2.1 RATIONALE BEHIND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPEECH ACT THEORY

Austin's shift from the dichotomy between performatives and constatives led him to settle in favour of the view of a general full-blown theory of speech acts in which statements (and constatives in general) and the various performatives are each just particular members (Levinson, 1983:235). In this way, Austin launched his theory of speech acts which Levinson believes was systematised and in part rigidified by Searle. According to Austin (1962:61 and 70) explicit performatives have a special significance for the theory of meaning. This significance, lies in the fact that in each case the performative verb lacks descriptive meaning and that it does not contribute to a proposition with truth conditions. Its function is simply to indicate the type of speech act being performed. Putting it in Brown's words (1983:249),

" a performative verb is one which is simultaneously the means and the expression of the performance of an explicit speech act."

He further maintains that performatives carry overt signs of their speech act function whereas in non-performative sentences the speech act has to be inferred from the context.

The basic assumption of the speech act theory is that the minimal unit of human communication is not a sentence or other expression, but rather, the performance of certain kinds of acts. Searle (1971:39 -40) reckons that in a typical speech situation involving a speaker, an addressee, and an utterance by the speaker, there are many kinds of acts associated with the speaker's utterance. Among the acts performed when an utterance is issued Searle includes a class of acts performed in the making of statements, asking of questions, issuing commands, etc. This class of acts he says Austin calls illocutionary acts. Searle continues to highlight that linguistic communication involves a linguistic act. He maintains that it is not , the symbol or word or sentence, or even the token of the symbol or word or sentence, which is the unit of linguistic communication, but rather, it is the production of the token in the performance of the speech act that constitutes the basic unit of linguistic communication.

Levinson (1983:236) believes that if the notion that in uttering sentences, one is also doing things, is to be clear, then we must first clarify in what ways in uttering a sentence one might be said to be performing actions.

4.2.2 DELINEATION OF SPEECH ACTS

Austin (1962) distinguishes three different "senses" or "dimensions" of how speech is action and that language can actually be used to do things. He maintains that performing a speech act involves performing three acts, namely the (1) locutionary act, (2) illocutionary act and (3) perlocutionary act.

(1) The locutionary act - is the act of producing a recognised grammatical utterance. Within this act Austin

(1962:92 and 95) distinguishes three sub-acts, namely the phonetic act, the phatic act and the rhetic. A phonetic act is described as the act of uttering certain types of noises and the utterance is a phone. The phatic act is the act of uttering certain sounds or words which belong to a certain vocabulary and the grammar of a certain language. The uttering of the words indicated in the example that follows in (49) will demonstrate the performance of a phatic act.

(49) Kunenyoka kuleso sihlahla, yehla.

'There is a snake in that tree, get down.'

The rhetic act is the act of using the phatic act with certain more or less definite sense and reference, which together, Austin maintains, are equivalent to the traditional "meaning". Therefore, the performance of the locutionary act entails the making of the utterance itself. Some scholars regard this act as the field of phonology, syntax and semantics.

(2) The illocutionary act - which is performed while performing the locutionary act, is regarded as the focus of pragmatics. This aspect of the speech act specifies what the language is being used for on a given occasion. It is the illocutionary act or its primary intention which differentiates it from other speech acts, that is, the attempt by the speaker to accomplish some communicative purpose.

4.2.2.1 CLASSES OF ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS

Various attempts were made by several scholars to classify illocutionary acts. Among those is Austin who pioneered this undertaking and Searle another. Outlining each of these classifications here, will give us a glimpse of the differences in the work of these scholars. We believe these classifications are different because

Searle being dissatisfied with Austin's classification, came up with his, claiming that it is a more plausible one. According to Levinson (1983:236), Austin's classification is according to the illocutionary force of the utterance, while Searle's is based on felicity conditions.

4.2.2.1.1 AUSTIN'S CLASSIFICATION

Austin (1962:151) distinguishes five basic illocutionary acts, namely verdictives, exercisives, commissives, exhabitives and expositives.

- (i) Verdictives : which he claims are typified by the giving of a verdict as the name implies, they may be an estimate, reckoning or appraisal, etc.

Verbs contained in this class could both be used explicitly performative and inexplicitly performative. Explicitly used verdictives could include, for example, performatives such as those used in the example that follows in (50).

- (50) Ngicabanga ukuthi uzofika kusasa.
'I reckon he will arrive tomorrow.'

- (i) Excersives : which are the exercising of powers, rights or influence, e.g. appointing, ordering, urging, advising, warning etc.

Here we could also find the two types of performatives. Explicitly used, the act of appointing will exhibit the structure that is illustrated in (51).

- (51a) Ngikubeka induna yalesi sikwata namuhla.
'I appoint supervisor of this group from today.'

Implicitly used this act could require the use of the copulative construction such as the one used in the example given in (51b).

(51b) Uyinduna yalesi sikwata ukusukela namuhla.
 'You are supervisor of this group from today.'

(iii) Commisives : commit the speaker to do something, e.g. promises, undertakings, etc.

Similarly commissives could be both explicit and inexplicit performatives. (52) is an example indicative of this fact.

(52a) Ngikwethembisa ukukuthengela ingubo entsha.
 'I promise to buy you a new dress.'

(52b) Ngizokuthengela ingubo entsha.
 'I will buy you a new dress.'

(52a) points to an example wherein an explicit performative has been used, whereas (52b) points to the use of an inexplicit performative.

(iv) Exhabitives : Austin claims that exhabitives are a miscellaneous group and has to do with attitudes and social behaviour, e.g. apologising, congratulating, commending, etc.

Even in this class, we find performatives being used in both ways, that is, explicitly and inexplicitly. This is clearly illustrated by the following examples in (53),

(53a) Ngiyaxolisa ngokukwephula umoya.
 'I apologise for hurting your feelings.'

which is an explicit exhabitive, and the example in (53b),

(53b) Xola, bengingahlosile.
 'I am sorry, I did not mean it.'

(v) Expositives : make plain how our utterances fit into the course of an argument or conversation, e.g. affirming, denying, illustrating, etc.

It would seem as if only inexplicit performatives comprise this class of expositives. This is illustrated by the example in (54).

- (54) Yebo, ngangikhona mhla ethatha imali esitolo.
'Yes, I was with him when he took the money in the shop.'

4.2.2.2.2 SEARLE'S TAXONOMY OF ILLOCUTIONS

Searle (1969) also categorises his classes of illocutions five-fold, into representatives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations.

- (i) Representative (which Searle later changes this term to 'Assertives' (Searle, 1979)). In these acts the speaker expresses his belief that the propositional content of the utterance is true. Acts of asserting, describing, advising, certifying, admitting and agreeing are all some of the instances of the speaker expressing his attitude of belief.

It is clear that verbs which display the features of this illocutionary act, could be explicitly as well as inexplicitly employed in utterances. The examples in (55) are a demonstration of this fact.

- (55a) Ngiyavuma ukuthi ubaba uzofika kusasa.
'I agree that father will arrive tomorrow.'

This sentence contains an explicit performative, and (55b) has an inexplicit performative.

- (55b) Ubaba uzofika kusasa.
'My father will arrive tomorrow.'

- (ii) Directives : are intended to produce some effect through the action by the addressee. Ordering and questioning are the main

species of directives since they are attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to answer or to do something. Presumably only the inexplicit performatives will express the acts that are supposed to comprise this category of illocutions. Imperatives and interrogatives will play a principal role in expressing orders and questions respectively. The sentences in (56) are illustrative examples.

(56a) Order

Speaker : Sukuma uhambe lapha.

'Stand up, and leave this place.'

The response of the addressee to such a command naturally will be to stand up and leave as directed. On the other hand we do find performatives of request being used to express polite commands in Zulu. Requestive, by Searle's definition are expressives, but in this case they function as directives in the sense that they can, when uttered by the speaker, get the addressee to respond in one way or another. The sentence given below is an indication of such a case.

(56b) Ngicela ukuba usukume uhambe.

'I request you stand up and leave.'

(56c) Question

Speaker : Uhambe nini, izolo?

'When did you leave, yesterday?'

In response to such a question the addressee will give an answer which could either be convincing to the addressee or not, but the fact of the matter is that the addressee has responded.

(iii) Commisives are acts in the which speaker expresses his intentions concerning some future actions. The speaker asserts that his utterance obligates him to carry out

the action specified in the propositional content. To promise, is a paradigm case that falls under this category.

Both sentences in (57) are examples of commissives,

(57a) Ngizofika kusasa.

'I will come tomorrow.'

which are inexplicit performatives, (57b) is (57a)'s explicit correlate.

(57b) Ngikwethembisa ukuthi ngizofika kusasa.

'I promise you that I will come tomorrow.'

(iv) Expressives have the function of expressing, or making known, the speaker's psychological attitude towards a state of affairs which the illocution presupposes. Thanking and condoling are brought to the surface as typical examples in this category.

It is interesting to note how performatives function in the case of expressives. It is commonplace to hear a speaker expressing the illocution of thanking in a situation which has been favourable to him by using the Afrikaans borrowed word "Dankie" which does not make explicit the illocutionary force of the utterance, whereas in Zulu "Ngiyabonga" (I thank you), explicitly does so. In any language, we usually find other linguistic expressions expressing the illocutionary acts that are also expressed by the performatives. To express the act of thanking, we often find people using the idiomatic expression which says "Ukwanda kwaliwa umthakathi." It would appear as if the illocutionary force that is carried by this expression is even more explicit than the illocutionary force that is carried by the explicit performative which is its correlate. A different tendency arises when we apologise. The illocutionary act of apologising is realised in various ways depending on the social status of the addressee. To

an ordinary member of the Zulu community, it is easy to receive, as an addressee, the mere utterance of a sentence such as that indicated in (58),

(58) Ngiyaxolisa.

'I apologise.'

from the speaker who earnestly apologises for his wrong doing. But, to a person who holds a particular political position, as an addressee, the utterance of the above act, by a person who is an ordinary member of the community, will not be acceptable. Such an utterance, addressed to an authorized recipient, as Levinson (1983:91) calls him, will be interpreted as contempt. A form of address appropriate to his chair of office should be used. There, we normally find utterances such as those given below being used by people to express their apologies to people of authority. Utterances such as those given in the example in (59), are included amongst the utterances to be used when directing an apology to people in authority.

(59a) Shwele, Ndabezitha.

'I apologise, your Majesty.'

(59b) Ayidle izishiyele, Ndabezitha.

'Let his Majesty eat, and leave leftovers for tomorrow.'

(A free translation of the Zulu expression.)

- (v) Declarations are illocutions whose successful performance brings about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality. They effect immediate changes in the institutional state of affairs which tend to rely on elaborate extra linguistic institutions. This is rather a formal category often used by someone, especially authorized to do so within some institutional framework. Classical examples are judges

sentencing offenders, ministers of
religion christening babies, etc.

By and large, this category, uses the explicit performatives, to express declarations. The use of inexplicit performatives in this category will result in unsuccessful performance of the act that is described by the performative in question.

Apparently a close examination of both sets of illocutionary acts indicate that altogether Austin's and Searle's classifications are not the same. Their classifications display differences in as far as groupings are concerned. They have not grouped their illocutions in a similar manner. This could perhaps be attributed to the fact which Levinson (1983:236) raises that Austin based his classification on the illocutionary force of the acts while Searle had his based on felicity conditions. This could be implying that these two scholars have worked with different aspects in dividing the different groups of illocutionary acts. In the light of this argument we suppose it is misleading to say that Searle's taxonomy of illocutions is an improvement on Austin's work. According to Levinson (1983:238), Austin's characterisation of speech acts are in terms of loose "family relationships". He also observes that Searle prefers strict delimitations in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.

(3) **The perlocutionary acts** - Austin coined the term perlocutionary acts or effects arguing that saying something will often, or even normally produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons. Such effects are usually special to the circumstances of the utterance. The perlocution of an utterance is the causing of a change to be brought about, perhaps unintentionally, though, or by means of, the utterance. The point of carefully distinguishing the

perlocutionary aspect of the speech act from others is that perlocutions can often be accidental, and thus bear a relatively unsystematic relationship to any classification of sentence types (Hurford & Heasley, 1983: 243).

The issuing of the utterance given in the example in (60) in performing the illocutionary act of thanking which could be subcategorised as an expressive can invoke the feeling of happiness in the addressee, that can even cause him to smile.

(60) Ngiyakubonga ngakho konke ongenzele khona.

'I am very grateful to you for all that you have done for me.'

This could be regarded as the perlocutionary effect achieved by the given illocutionary act. The same could be said of an utterance such as the one in (61),

(61) Ngiyaxolisa ngengikwenze kuwe.

'I apologise for what I have done to you.'

which is an illocutionary of apologising and will result in the addressee not feeling as bad as he was before this illocution was uttered.

Generally speaking, the illocutionary act inherent in an utterance is intended by the speaker, and is under his full control, and if it is evident, it is as to the utterance made, whereas the perlocutionary act performed through the utterance is not always intended by the speaker, and is not under his full control, and is usually not evident until the utterance is made (Hurford & Heasley, 1983:247) Hurford and Heasley believe that it is much more usual to talk of a speaker trying to carry out an illocutionary act (e.g. apologising, offering complaining, etc.) than it is to carry out the perlocutionary act (e.g. trying to amuse, or shock or annoy someone.) They allege that illocutions depend on a

greater extent on the speaker whereas perlocutions depend on the addressee.

Among the "dimensions" of speech acts which Austin distinguishes, we could indicate that he focuses more on the illocutionary acts than on the other two types. Austin (1962:103) is cautious to argue that locutionary acts are detachable, and therefore that the study of meaning may proceed independently, supplemented by a theory of illocutionary acts. What seemed to be more troublesome to him, is the distinction between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts. For instance, the act of addressing someone is illocutionary because it is something that a speaker can decide for himself to do, and be sure of doing it when he decides to do it. The addressee in the speech situation cannot decide whether to be addressed or not (although he may ignore the fact that he is being addressed, or possibly not realize that he is being addressed). On the other hand the act of persuading someone to do something, is perlocutionary, because the speaker cannot be sure of persuading the addressee, no matter how hard he tries. The addressee can decide whether to be persuaded or not. However, cases do exist, where it becomes unclear whether an act is purely illocutionary or purely perlocutionary. But, generally, the distinction between illocution and perlocution is quite clear (Hurford and Heasley, 1983:248).

Levinson (1983:237) maintains that the illocutionary act is what is directly achieved by the conventional force associated with the issuance of a certain kind of utterance in accord with a conventional procedure, and is consequently determinate (in principle at least). In contrast, the perlocutionary act is specific to the circumstances of issuance and is therefore not conventionally achieved just by uttering that particular utterance, and includes all those effects, intended or

unintended, often indeterminate that some particular utterance in a particular situation may cause. Austin admits that the distinction between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts have loose boundaries, but as an operational test we may see whether one can paraphrase the hypothetical illocutionary force of an utterance as an explicit performative. If one can, the act performed is an illocutionary act; if not, the act performed is a perlocutionary act.

4.2.3 ILLOCUTIONS CONTRASTED WITH SENTENCE TYPES

It is interesting to note that the notion of speech acts provides a link between speech acts, particularly the illocutionary acts, and the senses of declarative and non-declarative sentences. To start with, imperatives and interrogative sentences, when uttered, clearly perform acts, just as declaratives do. Just as the linguistic act of asserting can be seen as typifying utterances of declarative nature, the linguistic act that typifies interrogative utterances is the act of asking a question, for example, in (62). In (62a) we have a declarative sentence and in (62b), we have an interrogative sentence, respectively.

- (62a) Ngiyovakashela umalume ekuvalweni kwezikole.
 'I will visit my uncle when the schools close.'
- (62b) Uhlala kuphi umalume wakho?
 'Where does your uncle live?'

Similarly, the linguistic act typical of an imperative utterance is the act of ordering someone to do something, for example as in (62c).

- (62c) Thula, usukhulume kakhulu.
 'Be quiet, you have said enough.'

This shows that the speech act approach to meaning promises a unified account of sentences of all types,

declaratives, interrogatives and imperatives. All these types of sentences perform acts of some kind or another. Furthermore, it has been observed that, sentences of each type, when uttered, tend to carry out typical linguistic acts (Hurford & Heasley, 1983:241). The link between sentence type and linguistic act could be summarised as in the chart below

Sentence type	Linguistic act performed
declarative	asserting
interrogative	asking
imperative	ordering

Hurford and Heasley believe that a straightforward matching of sentence types and acts is all that is needed to account for the aspect of meaning. They assert that when we critically examine the different acts that present themselves in a language, it becomes evident that the matching of acts with sentence types, has much more exceptions than we can imagine. They, then advance the notion that what is needed is a more subtle theory that will even account for exceptions that may come to light if we examine the following instances of utterances in the examples given in (63).

(63a) Ngicela ithikithi eliya eDumbe.

'I request a ticket to Paulpietersburg.'

Sentence type : declarative.

Act : Request or order.

(63b) Kulungile yini ukubulala abantu abangenacala?

'Is it right to kill innocent people?'

Sentence type : interrogative.

Act : Assertion. (it is not right.)

(63c) Kuyabanda lapha endlini.

'It is cold in this room.'

Sentence type : declarative

Act : Ordering (the addressee to close door.)

(63d) Bheka ukungcola okwenze lapha.

'Look at the mess you've made here.'

Sentence type : imperative

Act : Assertion. (you've made a
mess.)

Deducing from these instances, it is discernible that the scheme of matching sentence types with speech acts is not viable. Language is used in more complicated ways. Hurford and Heasley (1983:242) believe that more careful distinctions need to be made between various types of speech acts in order to begin to make generalisations in this area of meaning.

Levinson (1983:243) in an attempt to redress the confusion which has resulted in the use of the terms declarative, interrogative and imperative terms which are associated with assertions (or statements), questions and orders (or requests), respectively, claims that the first set are linguistic categories that pertain to sentences while the second set are categories that pertain only to the use of sentences (that is, to utterances and utterance types). He also maintains that the term "mood" is often used to designate the first set, and he asserts that this is inaccurate in that mood, in traditional grammar, is a category of verbal inflection, and in this dimension imperative contrasts with indicative and subjunctive rather than with declarative and imperative.

In the foregoing discussion an attempt was made to illuminate on the reason why Austin rejected the dichotomy of performative and constative utterances. We have seen that this was on the basis that Austin's claim that there are sufficient indications that unhappies (or infelicities) seemed to characterise both kinds of utterances. What we have observed, is that performatives do fall under the class of speech acts, in that a

performative utterance is one that actually describes the act that it performs. Constative utterances are also included, as types of speech acts. The major difference between these types of speech acts is that the performatives are explicit, while the constatives are inexplicit. This could also be implying that constatives, that is statements, questions and commands, are a separate group of performatives. The latter most probably differs from the former in that the latter contains a word which makes explicit that which is intended by the speaker in issuing the utterance in question. We see no link between Austin's and Searle's classifications. Their respective classes are distinctively different and do not correlate in any way. Levinson (1983:240) admits that Searle's speech act theory, though perhaps an improvement on Austin's, is a disappointment in that it lacks a principled base. It is not even built systematically on felicity conditions. He further points out that there is no reason, then, to think that it is definite and exhaustive.

It is also significant, in the comparison of Austin's and Searle's categories of illocutions, to mention that although both have commissives as their point of convergence the illocutions distinguished by one differ from the illocutions that are distinguished by the other.

CHAPTER 5

5 PERFORMATIVES AND THE ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE

5.1 BASIC PERCEPTION OF ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE

There is a basic philosophical assumption that all utterances, in addition to meaning whatever they mean, perform specific actions or do things through having specific forces. Austin (1962:100) asserts that besides the question that has been studied in depth in the past, namely what a certain utterance means, there is a further question distinct from this, namely what the force of the utterance is. Austin maintains that we might think that we know the answer to this question and we are quite clear about that until an examination of an utterance such as that illustrated in the example (64) is done.

- (64) Vala umnyango.
'Shut the door.'

Austin is of the opinion that at face-value the sentence in (64) cannot be assessed as to whether when uttered at a certain time it was an order, an entreaty or what not. He adds that what we need, besides the old doctrine about meanings is a new doctrine about all possible forces of utterances, and to move towards the discovery of how explicit performatives differ from their non-performative counterparts, with regard to their force.

In order to grapple with the notion of illocutionary force, it is vital to first examine the examples in (65)

- (65a) Asihambeni ngoba izingane zilambile.
'Let us go home, because the children are hungry.'
- (65b) Ngiyakuxwayisa ukuthi izingane zilambile.
'I warn you that the children are hungry.'

The second sentence, uttered in a situation where the addressee is not aware of the urgency and imperativeness

of the action he should take in such a situation when the children are hungry,, could be construed as a warning. Such a sentence may be said to have two distinguishable facets; its meaning and its illocutionary force, both of which are also present in the first sentence. The reason why the illocutionary force is so conspicuous in the second sentence is that, as Leech (1983:181) puts it, the metalinguistic character of performatives is in fact the key to their nature: because they impose a label on themselves, they not only make their own illocutionary force known, but they also categorise. He sums this up by saying that the performative wears its illocutionary heart on its sleeve, whereas for non-performative utterances, the illocutionary force has to be inferred pragmatically (that is, it is implicit rather than explicit).

In an attempt to distinguish between meaning and the illocutionary force, Austin (1962:100) alleges that meaning is equivalent to sense and reference. He does little to explain how illocutionary force differs from meaning, but it does appear as if he took them to be distinct.

To consolidate on the discussion on utterances such as those exemplified in (65), we must indicate that, a comparison of both sentences, reveals that both speaker and addressee know that when the children are hungry, they are possibly very disagreeable. The speaker is conveying to the addressee that it will be for their own good if they were taken home. He is therefore implicating that if his warning is not heeded, the children will throw tantrums which is, in that situation, a thing which they would rather avoid at all cost. The difference between the two sentences is that, in the first sentence, the warning is not spelled out. The addressee, has therefore, to infer from the context, what

the force of such an utterance is, and in the second, this has been eliminated by the performative expression.

According to Kempson (1975:205) there is justification for claiming that the second sentence in the examples is a specification of the illocutionary force of the first sentence rather than a specification of one part of the pragmatic meaning of that utterance, particularly since in the utterance of a full performative the specification given is unquestionably part of the meaning of that utterance. He further points out that if it is so, and the intended deduction of the illocutionary force of the speaker's utterance is merely one type of implicature, then it follows automatically that an account of the illocutionary force of an utterance is part and parcel of an account of the pragmatic properties of a language.

Leech (1983:189) advances the notion that the so-called illocutionary force indicating device (IFID for short), a concept taken over from Searle (1970), which is in actual fact what Austin calls the performative formula, constitutes elements which more or less determine the illocutionary force of the speech act in which they are used. He asserts that IFIDs are of two main types namely, those that consist of the explicit performative formulas and the second type is represented primarily by grammatical categories such as the declaratives, imperatives and interrogatives. When we observe the nature of interrogatives, it becomes difficult to clearly state as to what the speaker intends his utterance to be taken as. This can be explained by a careful examination of the following sentence in the example given in (66).

(66) Ungafika ntambama?

'Could you come this evening?'

It is not apparent whether it is a question, an invitation or a mild command. We could only assume that the addressee will infer the speaker's intention about

his utterance, from the context. With imperatives a different situation prevails. The linguistic act performed by uttering such a sentence will be taken and understood as such by the addressee. The example in (67) below is an illustration of an imperative which demands the performance of that act by the addressee.

(67) Fika ntambama!
 'Come this evening!'

This will be taken by the addressee as the force of ordering and nothing else.

5.2 THE CONVENTIONALIST VERSUS PERFORMATIVIST VIEW OF ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE

It may seem a reasonable strategy, to seek to understand the relationship between sentences and various illocutionary forces with which they may be uttered and not to begin with sentences that are more or less indeterminate with respect to force, but instead, with those sentences that are fully determinate (Stampe, 1975:1-2). Stampe maintains that such sentences include those that bear an explicit performative preface. He claims that such sentences present model cases from which it can be clearly seen what it is that determines the illocutionary force with which a sentence is uttered.

Stampe (1975:2) feels it is delusive to infer that it is the performative preface that determines that an utterance has the force it has, and that this feature is the one responsible for rendering a sentence unambiguous as to force. He maintains that the most neutral view to approach this problem would be to suppose that the function of a performative is simply to communicate something about what one is saying, specifically, to make clear what one is doing in saying what one is saying, and in that way remove any possible ambiguity as to force.

He further stresses the fact that the utterance of an expression that functions to make clear whether something is this or that kind of performative does not make that performative the kind of performative it is.

A belief that a person may perform a speech act without saying or otherwise indicating what it is he is doing, is held by Stampe (1975:2). He alleges that the fact that a person need not employ the performative preface to perform a speech act, is something wholly predictable in the natural view. He is quick to admit that it is not readily predictable and poses a problem for any view on which the explicit performative plays a central role, included amongst these, Searle's. Stampe declares that such a view must contend with the fact that the IFID is apparently quite essential. This he advances on the basis that one may perfectly well have made a promise, without having uttered the performative preface "-thembisa" (promise) or having employed any other illocutionary-force-indicating-device whatsoever. He further ratifies that in view of this fact the view in question is not discarded, but at best merely reformulated, rarefied through the process that may be called the sublimation of the IFID.

5.3 SUBLIMATION OF THE IFID

The IFID, being required by the theory to figure in every sentence, ascends to the status of a theoretical entity, so that those factors thought to determine the illocutionary force where the performative prefix occurs, may be held to operate to determine force even where no prefix or other IFIDs occur - that is, where the IFID is not overt (Stampe, 1975:3). In highlighting the considerations for justifying this position, he says:

'If we inquire what explains the capacity of "I hereby promise that I will come" to make it the case that, upon uttering it, the utterer has promised to come (and all that entails), we tend to consult our general conviction that it is owing to its meaning, fundamentally, that a sentence has such powers as it has. And no doubt it is in some sense owing to the meaning of the sentence that, upon uttering it seriously and literally, I can have performed no illocutionary act other than that of promising to come.'

Stampe, therefore, implies that it is the meaning of that sentence that gives it the force it has. The issue is further complicated by the assumption that if it is the meaning of a sentence that has been uttered with an explicit performative prefix that determines the illocutionary force of that utterance, then what can it be that determines the illocutionary force of an utterance of the IFID-less sentence, as being a promise or a warning, if these should happen to be their force? Stampe points out that we say that the illocutionary force of an utterance is determined by meaning, and he underlines that it must not be the meaning of the sentence uttered, which is indeterminate as to force, but rather what the speaker means by what he says. This view is supported by Searle (1975:59) who avers that the simplest cases of meaning are those in which the speaker utters a sentence and means exactly and literally what he says. In such cases the speaker intends to produce a certain illocutionary effect by getting the addressee to recognise his intention to produce it, and he intends to get the addressee to recognise his intentions in virtue of the addressee's knowledge of the rules that govern the utterance of the sentence. The speaker intends his actions in producing each sentence of his discourse to be

taken as executing an illocutionary act of some sort, which will give his utterance an illocutionary force. He intends to take the propositional content of the utterance in a particular way, for example a promise, an apology, etc.

It must be noted that in Zulu, several devices are employed by speakers in order to make known the force of the utterances they produce. IFIDs are employed, as indicated in the example in (68) below, when the act of apologising is expressed.

(68a) Ngiyaxolisa ngokufika emuva kwesikhathi.
'I apologise for coming late.'

This can also be expressed using a different IFID as in:

(68b) Ngicela uxolo ngokufika emuva kwesikhathi.
'I apologise for coming late.'

Sometimes speakers use IFID-less expressions such as idiomatic expressions in (68c) in expressing the same illocutionary force of apologising, which is expressed by the examples in (68a) and (68b) respectively. The use of this type of illocutionary act depends largely on the socio-political class of the participants in the speech event. An example of such an expression is illustrated in (68c).

(68c) Ayidle izishiyele, Ndabezitha.
'Let your Majesty eat, and leave something for tomorrow.'
(A free translation.)

5.4 ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE AND IMPLICATURES

There is, however, a strong claim possible which naturally accounts for the dependence of illocutionary force on the Gricean Cooperative Principle. In explicating on this link, Leech (1983:30) reiterates the claim that semantics and pragmatics describe the meaning

of an utterance from different perspectives, and that the task of pragmatics is to explain the relation between these two types of meanings: the sense and the illocutionary force. The sense can be described by means of a semantic representation in some formal language or notation and the force will be represented as a set of implicatures.

This argument suggests that illocutionary force on utterances is but one of the aspects of implicated meaning of an utterance, and is not different in kind. Grice (1975:43-44) talks about what the speaker says and what the speaker implicates, but does not mention illocutionary force. Determining what the speaker says is a preliminary step to determining what a direct illocutionary act intends. Analogously, what is implicated in Grice's terms, is what is indirectly said. It is quite reasonable to move beyond Grice's discussion and talk of what the speaker says and of what the speaker implicates and its associated indirect illocutionary force.

Brown and Yule (1983:31) maintain that Grice uses the notion of implicatures to account for what a speaker can imply, suggest or mean, as distinct from what the speaker literally says. On the other hand, Levinson (1983:97) sees implicatures as that which provides some explicit account of how it is possible to mean (in some general sense) more than what is actually said (that is, more than what is literally expressed by the conversational sense of the linguistic expression uttered).

An implicature therefore, is a pragmatic aspect of meaning, a contextual assumption or implication which necessarily lies outside what the speaker has literally said, which the addressee is expected to deduce so as to understand what is said as relevant to the discussion in progress (Grice, 1975:50). It is clear that the notion

of implicature has no bearing on the illocutionary force, but rather links up with the indirect speech acts.

What has been observed in this discussion, is that the illocutionary force is the meaning of what the speaker intends to communicate to the addressee by the utterance of a particular sentence - the meaning which, at times, could be "misunderstood". It must be mentioned that it is not only the explicit performative which contains the performative preface which is able to disclose the illocutionary force of an utterance, but also the inexplicit performative which surfaces in sentences of declarative, imperative and interrogative nature. Factually, it is the illocutionary force in the performatives that assigns the study of the former to the field of pragmatics.

5.5 INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS

A discussion of any kind of direct speech act, will of necessity lead to something being said about indirect speech acts. These aspects of linguistic acts are correlates in that in both, utterances and the acts that are performed when such utterances are issued, are the main objects of study. It is worth noting that the uttering of some particular sentence in a particular situation, could truly mean what the speaker says but could also be including something more than just what the speaker intends by the issuing of such an utterance. An illustration of this is highlighted when we closely examine the sentence used in example (69).

(69) Ngifuna ukuba uhambe nami.

'I would like that you go with me.'

This utterance could incidentally be meant as a statement (it is asserting), but again it could have been intended as a request, that is a request made by way of making a

statement (Searle, 1975:59). Searle believes that a sentence, in such cases, that contains the IFID for one kind of act, could be uttered to perform, in addition, another type of illocutionary act. He maintains that there are also cases in which the speaker may utter a sentence and mean what he says and also mean another illocution with a different propositional content. An example demonstrating this notion is cited by De Kadt (1992:101) in (70).

(70) Hawu, kuyabanda lapha.

'Goodness, it is cold in here.'

We assume that by uttering this sentence the speaker is asserting about the condition of the temperature in the room, and taking this further, inferences are made that the speaker might be requesting or commanding that something be done about that condition. This being the fact of the matter, Searle (1975:60) alleges that it is important to emphasise that the utterance is meant as an assertion, that is, the speaker intends to propose to the addressee that an assertion has been made to him, and he intends to produce knowledge by means of getting the addressee to recognise his intention to produce it. Searle maintains that such cases, in which the utterance has two illocutionary forces, are indirect speech acts - cases in which one illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of performing another.


Leech (1983:38) alleges that indirect illocutions are simply illocutions which are more indirect than others and that indirect/indirectness is a matter of degree. He believes that the scale of indirectness can be notably represented in terms of the means-ends analysis by the length of the means-ends chain connecting the speech act to the goal. In an attempt to expound on how a speaker achieves the goal of his utterance, from direct illocution to indirect illocution, Leech represents this schematically as illustrated in Figure 1.

The sentence used by the speaker is an example such as:

Hawu, kuyabanda lapha.

'Goodness, it is cold here.'

Figure 1



1. represents the initial stage (the speaker feels the cold.)

2. represents the final state (the speaker feels warm)


G. represents the goal of attaining 2. (Getting warm.)

a. represents the action (switching the heater on.)

The solid arrow represents an action taken by the speaker in order to fulfil the goal. The broken arrow represents the goal of attaining the final state.

Subsequent to this, Leech puts forward a slightly more complicated linguistic example of this analysis in which the speaker takes for granted that the addressee's understanding of his message will lead him to perform the required action. This is illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2



Sentence uttered by speaker:

Ngicela ukhanyise ihitha.

'I request you switch the heater on.'

1. represents the initial state. (speaker feels cold.)
2. represents the intermediate state. (addressee understands that the speaker wants the heater on.)
3. represents the final state. (speaker feels warm.)
- G. represents the goal of attaining state 3. (getting warm.)
 - a. represents the speaker's actions of telling the addressee to switch on the heater.
 - b. represents the addressee's action with regard to the heater.

In this case the inclusion of 2 is used to represent an intermediate state which is the fulfillment of a subsidiary goal, and which is also a condition for the attainment of the final goal.


In fact Leech claims that such illocutions as that illustrated in Figure 2 have been called direct speech acts by those who have contrasted them with indirect speech acts or indirect illocutions. Leech presents indirect illocutions schematically as in Figure 3.

Sentence uttered by speaker:

Hawu, kuyabanda lapha.

'My, it is cold here.'

Figure 3



1. represents the initial state. (speaker feels cold.)
 2. represents the intermediate state. (addressee understands that speaker is aware that it is cold.)
 3. represents the intermediate state. (addressee understands that speaker wants heater on.)
 4. represents the final state. (speaker feels warm.)
- G. represents the goal of attaining state 3. (getting warm.)
- a. represents the speaker's action of remarking that it is cold.
- [b represents the speaker's action of telling addressee to switch on the heater - see comments below]
- c. represents the addressee's action in switching the heater on.

This shows that the goal that was achieved in Fig 1 and Fig 2 can be achieved by more indirect illocution. Leech asserts that Fig. 3 represents Searle's view that an indirect speech act (action a) is a means of performing another speech act (action b).

According to Leech, Searle's claim that in uttering (71)

(71) Hawu, kuyabanda lapha.

'My, it is cold in here.'

there are two speech acts and that the one is performed by means of the other and that they take place simultaneously, both being performed in the same utterance, makes the concept of a speech act quite mystical and abstract. He postulates that a better way to interpret a diagram such as Fig. 3 would be to say that b is an action performed not by the speaker, but by the addressee, and that this action is the act of interpreting the utterance "Kuyabanda lapha" (It is cold in here.), as having the implicature that the speaker wants the addressee to switch the heater on. That is, we should replace the statement regarding b in brackets in Fig 3 by (addressee's action in inferring that speaker wants addressee to switch the heater on.)

The question Searle (1975:61) puts forth about the problem posed by indirect speech acts, is how it is possible for the speaker to say one thing and mean that but also mean something else. In trying to positively respond to that, Searle asserts that meaning consists in part in the intention to evoke understanding in the addressee. A large part of that problem is how it is possible for the addressee to understand the indirect speech act when the sentence he hears and understands, means something else. Searle is of the opinion that the problem is complicated by the fact that some sentences seem almost to be conventionally used as indirect requests, as indicated by the following examples in (72).

(72a) Ngingajabula uma ungangilethela amanzi.

'I would appreciate it if you bring me some water.'

and

(72b) Kunjani ngamanzi lapho?

'How about water there?'

Searle (1979:31) suggests that many such utterances could be explained by the fact that the sentences in question concern conditions of the felicity performance of the speech acts they are used to perform directly. These conditions include preparatory conditions, propositional content conditions and sincerity conditions, and that their use to perform, indirect speech acts consists in indicating, by means of asserting or requesting, the satisfaction of one of the other conditions.

What Levinson (1983:263) terms Thesis and Antithesis is the phenomenon of indirect speech acts (which he abbreviates as ISA). He regards this as the problem for both the theory of direct speech acts and the theory of indirect speech acts. He maintains, this notion only makes sense if one subscribes to the notion of literal force, that is, to the view that illocutionary force is built into the sentence forms. This he calls the literal force hypothesis.

Citing Gadzar (1981) Levinson asserts that the literal force hypothesis will amount to subscribing to the following:

- (i) Explicit performatives have the force named by the performative verb in the matrix clause;
- (ii) Otherwise, the three major sentence types have the forces traditionally associated with them.

Given this theory, Levinson (1983:264) advocates that any sentence that fails to have the force associated with it by (i) or (ii) above, is a problematic exception. The standard procedure is to claim that, the sentence does in fact have the rule associated force, but simply has, in addition, an indirect inferred force. Thus any usages other than those in accordance with (i) or (ii) are indirect speech acts. In Leech's view the basic problem that arises, is that most usages are indirect. The example in (73);

- (73) Vala umnyango.
'Close the door.'

is an imperative expressing a command, and this category is very rarely used as requests. The opposite thereof is true, where we find requests such as in the example in (74).

- (74) Ngicela ukuba uvale umnyango.
'I request that you close the door.'

It is of great significance to examine different formulations that show how a speaker can indirectly request the addressee to close the door. (75) is a set of examples illustrating different expressions of a request.

- (75a) Ngingajabula uma ungavala umnyango.
'I will appreciate it if you close the door.'
- (75b) Ngabe unako yini ukungivalela lowo mnyango?
'Are you in a position to close the door for me?'

- (75c) Ungawuvala lowo mnyango?
'Can you close the door?'
- (75d) Ufanele uvale umnyango.
'You are supposed to close the door.'
- (75e) Kungasiza ukuba uvale umnyango.
'It could help to close the door.' etc.

In critically scrutinizing the functions of these formulations when uttered in appropriate circumstances, we discover that they all could amount to a simple request that the door be closed. Levinson believes that the literal force hypothesis theorists have to devise some way in which their illocutionary force of requests are derived from forms that, according to (ii) above, are prototypically assertions and questions rather than requests.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In this section of the study we will give a rundown of and make general deductions on what has been presented in the preceding chapters on the performative practice and also to indicate how it impinges upon the use of certain verbs in Zulu.

The fact that language is not just used to describe the world, was the starting point of Austin's theory of speech acts. Austin's work, therefore, has provided a way of considering the actions done in speech, and it makes very distinct the fact that in almost every utterance, some speech act is made. What we also construed here is that speech acts are made only in speech and that, since it is done by means of language, speech action (unlike non-verbal action) is patterned in basic linguistic ways, for instance a speech act could be explicit or implicit depending on whether or not it is performed with a word that names it.

In order to conclude and make a presentation of our observations about the performative utterances, it is important to indicate that Austin's work is a laudable contribution to the field of language description. He presents a tentative though relatively comprehensive theory of speech acts. We find Austin's work commendable because it is intuitive discovery of conceptual patterns that are verified by empirically based linguistic theory.

Austin introduces the idea that to say something is to do something. He argues dialectically against logical positivists who hold that a sentence is meaningful only if it has a truth value. Austin shows that there are perfectly ordinary and meaningful sentences that are neither true nor false.

In his presentation of these ideas, Austin modelled and remodelled his ideas. What started off as a theory about some peculiar utterances or performatives ended up as a general theory that pertains to all kinds of acts performed in the issuance of utterances. Austin first shifted from the view that performatives are a special case of sentences with peculiar syntactic and pragmatic properties, to the view that there is a general class of performative utterances that include both explicit and implicit performatives. The class of explicit performatives has been, as we have seen, slowly extended to include the implicit performatives so that utterances that contain the imperative, for instance, may be variously performing different illocutionary acts according to the context of the utterance. Secondly, we have also seen a shift from the dichotomy of the performative and constative to a general theory of illocutionary acts of which various performatives and constatives are just special sub-classes. Austin rejects this distinction, on the grounds that there is no purely verbal criterion by which to distinguish the performative from the constative utterance, and that the constative is also liable to the same "unhappiness conditions" as the performative.

However, the way in which Austin has described and defined the nature of the performative utterance, was not exempt from all criticism. It was well criticised, but in a quite different dimension from that of truth and falsity.

It is of great significance to note that Austin's development of the speech act theory has afforded science a basis which is extremely useful for the description of the languages of the world. With regard to Zulu, we are convinced, that speakers of this language do use in their speech utterances forms which contain verbs in their main clause, that behave in a manner peculiar to

performatives. This implies that the language phenomenon, performatives is in existence in this language.

What has been observed, with relation to the addressee in the performative, that is, the second person singular object, is the fact that we do find instances where the performative is used not to address this entity, who is a participant in the speech event, but we find the direction of the address pointing outside, to somebody who is not directly involved in the speech event. We have noticed that performatives that are directed to the addressee, are mostly the so-called non-institutional performatives. With the so-called institutional performatives the person who is addressed, the object, is not the second person but a particular kind of audience, such as the congregation or an audience in a courtroom, depending on the type of performative issued. For instance, we cannot say that the performative which a minister in the process of christening a baby, is directed to the small baby, on the basis that at that stage the baby does not perceive anything meaningfully. So then, this performative, we could say is directed to the congregation as witnesses of the minister's performance of such an act. On the other hand, the issuing of a performative by a judge, is two-directional. It is directed equally to the addressee, who is the accused, and the audience. In view of this we could assume that the issuance of some institutional performatives are not addressee directed.

The examination of the tripartite nature of the performatives, particularly the explicit performative, is another intriguing part of performative utterances. This element of the performative rises as the most striking. It is expressed in the performative by the explicit expression, explicit prefix or the explicit formula as Austin suggests. We could assume that explicitness forms

the nucleus of the performative. Without it we have no explicit performative. Counted amongst its numerous functions, is the fact that it serves to make explicit, and at the same time more precise, what act it is that the speaker purports to perform in issuing his utterance. In other words, it names the illocutionary force of his utterance. Congruous with the kinds of performatives distinguished, namely the explicit and implicit, we find the same types of forces. The explicit expression plays a decisive role in their distinction. The explicit illocutionary force is on the surface and marked by means of the explicit expression, but the implicit illocutionary force is said to be below the surface and unmarked. What is remarkable about the implicit illocutionary forces is that they come in the form of assertions, imperatives and interrogatives. Customarily imperatives are used, phrased as questions and as assertions. In such cases it is up to the addressee to determine what the implicit illocutionary force of these apparent questions and statements are. It is his responsibility to deduce whether the illocutionary force of the utterance at issue is imperative and not interrogative or declarative as they appear to be. What usually happens, especially to such indirect implied commands, is that the addressee does not respond by saying "yes" or "no" as in response to typical interrogatives or queries, but does what is implicitly intended by the speaker. Sometimes, however, the implicit illocutionary force of an utterance is not so clear, for it is often distinguished by the surface structure phrasing it. For instance, seated next to an open door, the addressee's response to an utterance about how cold it is inside the room, issued by someone seated at the far end of the room, could be recognised as an implied command by the speaker to the addressee to close the door. Similarly the issuing of a statement to a driver of a car, commenting about the speed the car is travelling at, will imply a command to slow down. These

instances, show that only the context, linguistic and otherwise, will clarify the illocutionary force of such complex utterances. We have also seen the significance of context, even with the explicit performative in Zulu.

In an attempt to collate the structural patterns of performatives with other types of utterance structures, we find that the explicit performatives differ structurally from the implicit performatives in that the former contains the explicit expression which is absent in the latter. This structural difference serves as a major criterion in distinguishing the two types of performatives. This leads us to the observation that the selfsame explicit performative appears in various, not so similar forms, in Zulu. This forces us to believe that forms as well as the performatives themselves are not the same in all languages. This is explained by the fact that in a particular language, English for instance, we find certain types of performatives, such as that which express the illocutionary act of commanding, but such performatives are absent in Zulu. We might conclude that performatives are language specific while the illocutionary force, the participants in the speech event, utterances, speech contexts and speech acts, are universal entities.

Different standards hold in the application of felicitousness in different languages. What is felicitous in one language and culture, will not necessarily be a felicity condition in another language. It is common practice for felicity conditions of a particular community to be taken as the standard that is normative to all members of that speech community. This means that a set of felicity conditions, regarded by such a community as the norm, will be applied to all and be upheld by all in that community. It is common, felicitous and appropriate in Zulu culture for a mother to express the requests of other members of the household

to the father, as head of the family. It would, however, be regarded as infelicitous and inappropriate if one of the children should communicate the requests of the other children as well as the mother's to the father. This would imply that the utterance has misfired. In other words, it would mean that the requests were never made. Felicitous would then be interpreted as the criteria that measures instances such as: Are utterances made by the appropriate people? Are utterances made during appropriate times?

We could conclude by saying that felicitous tell us that certain people are not authorised to issue certain utterances, certain utterances should not be used in addressing a certain kind of people, certain utterances are only issued at certain times, when we consider institutional performatives. Felicitous are therefore connected with the norms of propriety of any given speech community.

It is also interesting to note that besides the performatives having double action, for example, that of being a request and that of being an order at the same time, they could also act differently. Different utterances, that is utterances whose phrasal structures are different, could be used to communicate one illocutionary act, e.g. a request in a given situation. We could have statements, questions, performatives, as well as imperatives, all appearing in different forms, expressing a request. Refer to the examples cited in (73), (74) and (75). We do also find instances where idiomatic expressions are used to express requests.

Levinson (1983:226) asserts that of all the issues in the general theory of language usage, the speech act theory has aroused the widest of interest. This, he maintains, is verified by the fact that, after Austin's development, research on the speech acts escalated. Searle (1979:178)

upholds the notion that speech acts (perhaps he also implies the performatives), should occupy a central place within a general account of language. He further points out that the chief purpose of language is communication. He propounds that the unit of human communication in language is the speech act, of the type called illocutionary act. Therefore, the problem of the theory of language is to provide a frame of reference within a description of how we get from the making of sounds to the making of illocutionary acts. What, so to speak, has to be added to the noises that come from the speaker's mouth in order that their production should be a performance of asking a question, or making a statement, or giving an order, etc? He further points out that rules enable us to get from the brute facts of the making of noises to the institutional facts of performance of illocutionary acts of human communication. Developing his argument further, Searle says that if this is the case, then the role of the theory of speech acts in a grammar will be quite different from what the proponents of generative syntax or even most of the proponents of generative semantics have considered. He claims that the theory of speech acts is not an adjunct to our theory of language, something to be consigned to the realm of pragmatics, or performance; rather the theory of speech acts will necessarily occupy a central role in grammar, since it will include all of what used to be called semantics as well as pragmatics.

Furthermore, Searle's believes that the theory of speech acts will provide us with a set of rules for performing illocutionary acts. Rules which may have consequences on other parts of our linguistic theory, such as syntax, because, Searle advocates, it is not at all surprising that the theory of speech acts should have syntactic consequences, since, after all, that is what sentences are for. He asserts that a sentence is a vehicle of speech.

In conclusion we wish to highlight the fact that there are scholars who viewed the theory of speech acts as not all embracing, as Searle believes. But for the purpose of this discussion we admit that this theory has served as an instrument very commendable in the analysis and description of performatives in Zulu. Among the scholars who doubt the all-embrasive feature of the speech act theory is Connor-Linton (1987:96). He believes that the theory of speech acts concentrates more on the speaker, than on the other aspects in a speech situation. He is of the opinion that the theory is capable of accounting (to some degree) for what the speaker does in making a meaningful utterance. This account, he points out, stops short of what is possible in a functional explanation of speech acts. His concern is about the illocutionary act which it is claimed, affects the interlocutor in some way. Connor-Linton contends that if the latter is to be achieved then the theory must show not only how the speaker must construct his utterance, in order that it be felicitous, but also how that utterance must be constructed to maximize the speaker's chance of creating the intended perlocutionary effect upon the interlocutor. He maintains that the theory must try to show how a speaker may best make the perlocutionary effect match, as closely as possible, the illocutionary force of his utterance. In this way, he presumes, we are reaching beyond the conditions for a felicitous and cooperative speech act to the strategies for a successful speech act, thus giving more consideration to the interlocutor in our account of the speech act.

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