

**CHANGING AGRARIAN LABOUR RELATIONS IN ZIMBABWE IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE FAST TRACK LAND REFORM**

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examined the evolution and transition of agrarian labour relations in the aftermath of Zimbabwe's radical land redistribution, which reconfigured the agrarian structure in terms of landholdings, production practices and labour markets from 2000. Despite the importance of agrarian labour as source of livelihood for the largely countryside based population, insufficient academic attention has been paid to its evolution following the land reforms. Specifically to the mobilisation, organisation and utilisation of wage and non-wage labour against background of the changed land ownership patterns, agrarian policies and macro-economic conditions.

Historical-structural approaches rooted in Marxist Political Economy informed the analysis of the new agrarian labour relations since in former Settler colonies such as Zimbabwe these were based on a historical context of specific land-labour utilisation relations created by land dispossession and discriminatory agrarian policies during the colonial and immediate independence period. Beyond this, gender issues, intra-household relations, kinship, citizenship and the agency of the workers were taken into account to understand the trajectory of labour relations.

Detailed quantitative and qualitative empirical research in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts, as well as from other sources demonstrated that a new agrarian labour regime had evolved to replace the predominant wage labour in former large-scale commercial farms. There has been a growth in the use of self-employed family farm labour alongside the differentiated use of wage labour in farming and other non-farm activities. Inequitable gender and generational tendencies were evident in the new agrarian labour regime. The new labour relations are marked by the exploitation of farm workers through wages that are below the cost of social reproduction, insecure forms of employment and poor working conditions. While their individual and collective worker agency is yet to reverse their poor socio-economic conditions. Various policy interventions to protect their land and labour rights are thus required.

The study shed light on the the conceptual understanding of agrarian labour relations in former Settler economies, including the role of land reforms in the development of employment, and how the peasantry with enlarged land access are reconstituted through repeasantisation and semi-proletarianisation processes.

Key words: redistributive land reforms, agrarian structure, agrarian labour relations, self-employment, repeasantisation, semi-proletarianisation, de-agrarianisation, farm wage labour, non-farm labour, peasantry, labour markets, agency, residential labour tenancy, social reproduction, agency, resistance, Zimbabwe.

DECLARATION

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Exact wording of the title of the thesis as appearing on the electronic copies submitted for examination:

Changing agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe in the context of the fast track land reform

I declare that the above thesis is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

I further declare that I submitted the thesis to originality checking software and that it falls within the accepted requirements for originality.

I further declare that I have not previously submitted this work, or part of it, for examination at Unisa for another qualification or at any other higher education institution.

SIGNATURE

DATE: JUNE 2019

DEDICATION

To the late Professor Sam Moyo (1954 – 2015) for your generosity and humanity

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In completing this dissertation I have incurred numerous debts. Many people have contributed immensely in the development of this work and I would not be able to mention all by name. Yet I am forever grateful for all the help that I have received. At UNISA, I would like to thank my supervisors Professors Mathukhu Thomas Mogale and Sinval Kahn for their patience and guidance in drafting this thesis. Numerous draft chapters passed through their hands, which they meticulously read and provided feedback. Their efforts are gratefully acknowledged.

There is an old adage in academia which relates to the dependency of upcoming researchers on the work of seasoned scholars to chart their own intellectual paths. This is to say upcoming scholars thrive on “standing on the shoulders of giants”. The late Professor Sam Moyo is surely one of those “giants”. I must thank him for his mentorship over many years since I met him after completing my undergraduate studies in the early 2000s and later working under his leadership at the African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS) until his untimely demise on a working visit in Delhi in November 2015. It was because of him that I actively developed an interest in understanding agrarian change that was unraveling in the countryside during the early 2000s after a chance meeting. His generosity with knowledge to me and many other young scholars was unparalleled. It is unfortunate that this thesis was too late for him and he will never be able to read it. As for me, I will never be able to express my sincere gratitude to him in person. Wherever he is, I trust and believe he must be pleased that this project has reached its conclusion.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AALR	African Agrarian Labour Regimes
ACC	Agricultural Compensation Committee
AFC	Agricultural Finance Corporation
AGRITEX	Agricultural Technical and Extension Services
AIAS	African Institute for Agrarian Studies
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ALB	Agricultural Labour Bureau
AMA	Agricultural Marketing Authority
ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
ARDA	Agricultural and Rural Development Authority
BAZ	Bankers Association of Zimbabwe
BEAM	Basic Education Assistance Module
BoP	Balance of Payment
BSAC	British South Africa Company
CA	Communal Areas
CA	Communal Areas
CBA	Collective Bargaining Agreements
CBA	Collective Bargaining Agreement
CBA	Collective Bargaining Agreements
CFU	Commercial Farmers Union
CIO	Central Intelligence Organisation
CMB	Cotton Marketing Boards
CSO	Central Statistical Organisation
DEO	District Extension Officers
EMA	Environmental Management Agency
EPZ	Export Promotion Zone
EPZ	Export Processing Zone
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FCTZ	Farmers Community Trust of Zimbabwe
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
FOST	Farm Orphan Support Trust
FPL	Food Poverty Line
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GAPWUZ	General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMB	Grain Marketing Board
GNP	Gross National Product
GoN	Government of Namibia
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
Ha	Hectare
HGAPWUZ	Horticulture Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HSCT	Harmonised Social Cash Transfers
HYVs	High Yielding Varieties
ICAs	Intensive Conservation Areas
ICFU	Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union

IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IKPA	Indigenous Kapenta Producers Association
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
JAG	Justice for Agriculture
KAWUZ	Kapenta Workers Union of Zimbabwe
KPA	Kapenta Producers Association
LEDRIZ	Labour and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe
LRRP	Land Reform and Resettlement Programme
LSCFs	Large Scale Commercial Farm(er)s
MAEMI	Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MLRR	Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MP _L	Marginal Productivity of Labour
MPSL&SW	Ministry of Public Service Labour and Social Welfare
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NEB	National Employment Boards
NEC	National Employment Councils
NECAIZ	National Employment Council for the Agricultural Industry for Zimbabwe
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NR	Natural Region
PAAWUZ	Progressive Agriculture and Allied Industries Workers' Union of Zimbabwe
PASS	Poverty Assessment Survey Study
PDL	Poverty Datum Line
PWD	Piece/Daily Workers
RA	Resettlement Areas
RAU	Research Advocacy Unit
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RC	Rural Councils
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
RNFU	Rhodesian National Farmers Union
RNLB	Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau
RNLSC	Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SLA	Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
SSA	Settler Southern Africa
SSCFs	Small Scale Commercial Farms
STERP	Short Term Economic Recovery Programme
TCPL	Total Consumption Poverty Line
TILCOR	Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation
TIMB	Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board
TNC	Transnational Corporations
TTL	Tribal Trust Lands
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VMP _L	Value Marginal Product of Labour

WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
ZAEO	Zimbabwe Agricultural Employers Organisation
ZANLA	Zimbabwe National Liberation Army
ZANU (PF)	Zimbabwe African Union Patriotic Front
ZAWU	Zimbabwe Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZESA	Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority
ZHRF	Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum
ZIAWU	Zimbabwe Agro-Industry Workers Union
ZIMASSET	Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Social-Economic Transformation
ZIMRIGHTS	Zimbabwe Human Rights Association
ZIMSTAT	Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZISCOSTEEL	Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company
ZISMIWU	Zimbabwe Sugar Milling Workers Union
ZLHR	Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights
ZPP	Zimbabwe Peace Project
ZNFU	Zimbabwe National Farmers' Union
ZTA	Zimbabwe Tobacco Association
ZTGA	Zimbabwe Tea Growers Association
ZW	Zimbabwe
ZW\$	Zimbabwean Dollar

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CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This thesis examined the evolution and transition of agrarian labour relations in the aftermath of Zimbabwe's radical land redistribution, which reconfigured the agrarian structure in terms of landholdings, production practices and labour markets from 2000. Specifically, it analysed changes in the utilisation of labour in the agricultural sector, linking the growth and differentiated use of wage labour in its varied forms to changes in the extent of self-employment on peasant farms, using various sources of family labour within the more diverse agrarian structure (including the peasantry, small to medium scale capitalist farms, and large estates) that has emerged.

After discussing the background and rationale, which is focused on Zimbabwe's land and labour questions until 1999 and the implications of land redistribution outcomes of the "Fast Track" Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) on agrarian labour relations, this chapter defines the problem statement, research objectives and the research questions. An overview of the research methodology adopted to answer the research questions is briefly outlined in section 1.6. The theoretical/conceptual framework of the study is also summarised to introduce the epistemological ground of the study. The principles adhered to in conducting the study according to the ethical clearance issued by the university are then articulated next. The following two sections cover the limitations of the study and provide definitions of some key concepts used throughout the thesis. The organisation of the thesis forms the penultimate section preceding the conclusion.

1.2 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE OF STUDY

Whereas the transformation of Zimbabwe's agrarian labour relations has been on going since colonisation in the 1890s (Arrighi 1970; Rubert 1998; Moyo & Yeros 2005a), the initiation of the FTLRP around 2000 dramatically altered the labour regime. Minimalist land redistribution up to 1999 meant that the labour reserve system generated by land dispossession during the colonial era (Moyo 2011a)

influenced the agrarian labour relations as peasants from Communal Areas with limited access to land were compelled to sell their labour to the minority 4 000 large scale commercial farm(er)s (LSCFs) who owned most of the agricultural land (Bush & Cliffe 1984; Mhone 2001). Frequently the labour supply was based on the residential labour tenancy system that tied employment to accommodation on the LSCFs (Rutherford 2001a; Amanor-Wilks 1995). Since only 3.7 million hectares were redistributed to 75,697 households between 1980 and 1999, the dual agrarian structure was marginally changed (Moyo 2011a: 498).

Agrarian wage labourers in the LSCFs, the largest section of the formal workforce nationally, however earned the least incomes compared to other segments of the formally employed and they also worked under various exploitative practices (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Moyo *et al.* 2000; Kanyenze 2001; Rutherford 2001). Whilst, the opportunities for peasants from Communal Areas to gain incomes adequate for their social reproduction through self-employment as own agricultural producers were inhibited largely due to their marginalisation in land access (Masuko 1998; Rukuni 1994; Cliffe 2000). The rise in poverty levels¹ and massive urban job retrenchments, which escorted the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) implemented from 1991 had intensely increased the demands for land redistribution by 1997 (Moyo 2000b; Yeros 2002; 2013a; Moyo & Yeros 2005b).

These inequities were challenged by the emergence of a national land movement from 1998 (Moyo 2001). Such agency culminated in the Veterans of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle leading the occupation of LSCFs alongside peasants, farm workers and urban working classes from around 1997. Land occupants escalated in the early 2000s after people voted against the draft constitution in a referendum that contained a clause on compulsory land acquisition (Musungwa 2001; Sadomba 2008; 2013). These processes pressurised the state to undertake land redistribution, which it formally initiated in 2001 by compulsorily acquiring mostly white owned LSCFs (Utete 2003).

The Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) thus undertook an extensive land redistribution to redress these inequities by compulsorily acquiring mostly white owned LSCFs through the FTLRP (Utete Report 2003). Indeed, the *Constitution of Zimbabwe*

¹By 1995, 75.6 percent of the Zimbabwean population were poor and poverty affected the largely rural inhabitants (86.4 percent) compared to the urban residents (53.4 percent) (GoZ 1998a: 30).

Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013 emphasises the need to “...to redress the unjust and unfair pattern of land ownership that was brought about by colonialism and bring about land reform and the equitable access by all Zimbabweans to the country’s natural resources” (Section 289: 113). Over 90 percent of the 11.8 million hectares formerly owned by white LSCFs was transferred to a diverse range of smaller-scale farmer beneficiaries, dominated by the peasantry (Matondi 2012: 56). The A1 and A2 settlement schemes² promoted by the FTLRP generated about 145,775 and 22,896 new farm units respectively (Moyo 2011a: 498). The land tenure relations were also substantially changed through the nationalisation of the acquired freehold LSCFs (Utete Report 2003; GoZ 2001a) to secure the rights of new landholders, while partially protecting former farm workers land rights.

This process altered the unequal land ownership in the agrarian structure and changed key agrarian relations, the production relations, market structures, and the labour relations, which existed before 2000 (Moyo & Yeros 2005; Moyo 2011a; b; c; 2013). The structure of agricultural production has shifted from the production of export commodities such as horticulture and tobacco towards the predominant production of staple food crops such as maize for own consumption, while over 300,000 out of the 1.4 million peasants produce on small-scale land units, cash and export crops, including surplus maize, for sales in domestic markets (World Bank 2012: 44). However, land utilisation is based on lower levels of productivity while replicating aspects of the LSCF export agricultural model (World Bank, 2006; Moyo, Chambati, Murisa, Siziba, Dangwa, Mujeyi & Nyoni 2009; Scoones, Marongwe, Mavedzenge, Mahenene, Murimbarimba & Sukume 2010; Matondi 2012).

As LSCFs were redistributed into smaller sized plots under state tenures that diluted the control of landholders over labour (Adam 2000; Shivji 2009; Moyo 2011a),

² Maximum farm size regulations were applied to allocate land sizes according to the agro-ecological potential of each district. Zimbabwe is partitioned into five agro-ecological zones, Natural I to V (Muir 1994). The agro-ecological potential encompassing the quality of the soils and rainfall received per year decreases as you transition from Natural Region I to V. Natural Region I and II are most suited for intensive farming (cropping and livestock), while region III can support semi-intensive agricultural production. The last two regions are more adapted to extensive farming such as cattle ranching. Between 5 and 7 hectares of arable land and 15 hectares of grazing land were to be allocated to the beneficiaries in the A1 scheme in the higher potential agro-ecological regions (I to III) (GoZ 2001a; Sukume *et al.* 2004). While those in low potential agro-ecological regions (IV and V) were earmarked to receive relatively larger land sizes of about 10 hectares of arable land and 30 hectares of grazing land. The three sub-models of A2 scheme were targeted to receive larger land sizes than those in the A1 settlement ranging from 20 to 2 000 hectares also contingent upon the agro-ecological location (see Utete 2003; Sukume & Moyo 2004; Moyo *et al.* 2009).

aggregate supplies of wage labour declined, leading to changing forms and scale of wage labour in a trajectory, which is not well documented. The impact of the FTLRP on agrarian labour relations which are now structured on more equitable land rights and property rights derived from the state (Moyo 2007; 2013) raises various questions on the future role of agriculture in employment and development. In fact the *Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013* assigns one of the functions of agricultural land as that of employment generation (Section 289[f]: 113).

The FTLRP also coincided with a changing policy context characterised by a macro-economic crisis between 2002 and 2008 (World Bank 2006; Moyo *et al.* 2009; Scoones *et al.* 2010; Moyo & Nyoni 2013). Then from 2009 onwards, economic stabilisation efforts were underway after the de-monetisation of the Zimbabwe dollar and adoption of multiple foreign currencies and re-liberalisation of the economy (World Bank 2012). These processes have also shaped the conditions for agricultural production and trajectory of agrarian labour relations.

Little research has been done so far to explain the precise nature and trajectory of these changes in the agrarian labour relations that have emerged in relation to the new patterns of access to land and tenure relations, the shifting agricultural production systems, including the forms of labour and their material conditions, as well as the transforming agrarian labour and socio-economic policies. Substantial research efforts have been focused on tracking the agricultural production declines that accompanied the FTLRP (Zikhali & Chilonda 2013; Musodza 2015; Kapuya, Meyer & Kirsten 2013; Masiwa & Chipungu 2004; Richardson 2005; Murisa & Mujeyi 2015), while the transformation of agrarian labour relations has gone unnoticed.

Existing knowledge on agrarian labour relations in former settler colonies such as Zimbabwe has mostly been framed within perspectives based on dual economy theories (Lewis 1954) and derived from empirical experiences involving dual agrarian structures, focusing on the labour relations as driven by the demands of large-scale capitalist farming (e.g. Loewenson 1992; Rutherford 2001; von Blackenburg 2003; Gibbon 2011) and peasantry (e.g. Adams 1991; Matshe 1998). Few have studied the evolving nature of labour relations during and following the transition from the dualist agrarian models of labour relations towards diverse forms of capitalist

farming. The recent redistributive land reforms in Zimbabwe thus provided the opportunity to undertake such analysis.

An assessment of agrarian labour regimes in agrarian based economies is critical to enhancing the knowledge base on economic growth, inequality and social protection policies as such labour contributes immensely to the social reproduction of the majority rural based population. In the case of Zimbabwe, the LSCF sector was the largest formal employer accounting for 26 percent (or 350,000 permanent and casual employees) of the working class and over two million people were self-employed in agriculture in the Communal Areas (CSO 2000: 11). Cumulatively, over 65 percent of the country's population is dependent on incomes from agrarian employment through various forms of self-employment and wage work in agricultural and non-agricultural activities for their social reproduction (CSO 2002: 16). The role of the agrarian labour regimes to the social reproduction of many people has also grown in importance in the context of rising poverty levels and urban unemployment in much of the countries in the Global South, including Zimbabwe (ILO 2015a; ILO 2015b; ILO 2011; International Fund for Agricultural Development [IFAD] 2011; World Bank 2008). Furthermore, the projected 70 million jobs to be generated in the urban sector between 2010 and 2020 in Africa will be inadequate for the estimated 122 million youths that will join the labour force during the same period (Jayne 2014: 9), underlining the centrality of agriculture as a provider of employment.³ Hence, the aim of the study was to understand the agrarian employment dynamics entailed by the FTLRP and other socio-economic policies affecting labour relations, which were also changing during the 2000's.

1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT

One of the shortcomings perceptible in research evaluating the outcomes of the implementation of the land reform policy relates to their negation of the interconnections between the latter and various other policies and factors influencing the agrarian change post-2000.⁴ Yet the impacts of any particular policy are not shaped by one policy but through its interactions with other policies and factors

³ Another study also indicated that about 17 million young people join the labour market annually in SSA and by 2025 they will total about 330 million (Losch 2012: unpagged).

⁴ Some of the material presented in this section builds and expands on the analysis presented in Chambati (2017).

(French Council of Economic Analysis 2013). Pursuing this route can thus result in inadequate and partial proposals for policy reforms.

For instance, the agricultural production declines that accompanied the FTLRP and by implication the agricultural employment trends and the quality of wage labour were largely attributed to singular factors such as the replacement of freehold title deeds with public land tenures, which did not offer adequate security to guarantee investment by new farmers (Richardson 2005; Tupy 2007). Others blamed the innate behavioural characteristics of the new farmers as lacking the requisite skills to engage in commercial farming (Masiwa & Chipungu 2004). The interrelationships that the land reform policy had with the wider labour and specific agricultural policies such as agrarian financing to new farms, as well as the overall macro-economic policy context to impact the social and economic outcomes of the FTLRP, were missing in these perspectives. In general, the heterogeneous causal factors, which impacted on the new sources of farm labour, nature and forms of wage employment, diversification of family labour into non-farm activities, the quality of wage labour and the responses of farm workers to their poor socio-economic conditions, were thus not widely recognised.

The redistribution of land to mainly peasant beneficiaries has largely been considered by some analysts after 2000 to have decimated agrarian labour markets and whittled down their critical position in absorbing the majority of the formal workforce. Attention was paid to the number of farm worker jobs lost from the retrenchments on the LSCFs parcelled to new land beneficiaries (see Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe [FCTZ] 2002; Hellum & Derman 2004; Magaramombe 2004; Sachikonye 2003). The number of farm workers employed in the LSCFs prior to 2000 was exaggerated in some of the assessments leading to the overestimation in the extent of loss of formal farm employment. For instance, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum [ZHRF] & Justice for Agriculture [JAG] (2007: 29) claimed the employment levels to be in excess of 600,000 workers, sharply contrasting the estimates ranging between 320,000 and 350 000 farm workers documented in official statistics (CSO 2002a: 128) and other research studies (Kanyenze 2001: 106; Moyo *et al.* 2000: 182; Sachikonye 2003: 5). An estimated 70 percent of the workers (approximately 420,000 workers) were estimated to have lost their jobs by 2003 (ZHRF & JAG 2007: 29).

Moreover, some literature tended to treat the different types of LSCF employment such as permanent, seasonal and casual farm workers as one homogenous category of wage labour (see Ridderbos 2009; JAG & Research Advocacy Unit [RAU] 2008) and that their livelihoods were only based on farm wages (LEIDRIZ 2018; Daimon 2014; Waeterloos & Rutherford 2004). Yet in reality about half of the jobs entailed lowly paid part-time work, which farm workers combined with other sources of income, including commodity production in Communal Areas (Tandon 2001; Loewenson 1992). This approach led to the neglect of critical assessment of the quality of jobs lost in comparison to new farm labour work created after 2000. It was argued that farm wages earned by workers in LSCFs "... made the difference between starvation and survival, between extreme poverty and access to basic things of life" (Sachikonye 2003: 46), despite the evidence which shows that such jobs were the basis of extreme poverty with over 70 percent of the labourers commanding incomes unable to match the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) around 1997 (Kanyenze 2001: 108; see also Amanor-Wilks 1995; Mclvor 1995).

Voices were also muted regarding the transition of peasant labour relations, particularly the character of wage and family labour utilisation and hired in wage labour was implied to be absent (Chambati & Moyo 2004). The number of jobs in the new peasant and commercial farming units and the financial returns they generated were considered to be limited by a few studies that addressed wage labour relations in the new resettlement areas (Magaramombe 2010; Sachikonye 2012; Johnson 2012; JAG & GAPWUZ 2008; Magure 2012). However, the extent to which this had resulted either from the absence of adequate farm labour protection policies or limited enforcement was not analysed. The ability of the new land beneficiaries to (re-)hire retrenched farm workers and others seeking employment was questioned since their capital and skills base was a pale shadow to that of the former LSCFs (Simpson & Hawkins 2018; Johnson 2012; Sachikonye 2012; Masiwa & Chipungu 2004). But the production capacities of the new farmers was not linked to the limitations in the post-settlement support and other wider constraints in agro-industrial input and output markets (World Bank 2012). Following the decline in the agricultural output in most commodity sectors and the subsequent snail's pace in the recovery of lost production since 2000, the optimism for agricultural growth was limited as small-scale farming, which was now dominant was not viewed favourably (Moyo *et al.* 2009). Pessimism

was thus abound regarding the trajectory of farm wage labour and possibilities of self-employed family labour to derive their livelihoods from the new landholdings.

Additionally, the analysis on the quality of employment in the new farm units emphasised mostly the monetary wages. Therefore, limited information is available on other indicators of quality of employment, including in-kind payments, terms of employment, gender dimensions of the labour force and the skills base, as well as the fate of former LSCF repressive labour management practices such as physical violence and verbal abuse (Mugwetsi & Balleis 1994; Rutherford 2001; Amanor-Wilks 1995; Loewenson 1992). The transformation of the tying of employment contracts to residency on the farms, which previously guaranteed the availability of farm labour for the LSCFs (Tandon 2001), is also not clear after the nationalisation of land tenure in redistributed farms and its consequent effects on farm labour supplies by both the retrenched farm workers and others seeking employment in the resettlement areas.

The growth in the utilisation of wage labour by the new landholders, as well the increase in the application of family labour has however been broadly captured by a few studies. Specifically, the enlargement of peasant and small capitalist farms has been associated with the increase in the number of permanent, casual and family workers (see Chambati 2013; 2009; Scoones *et al.* 2010). An important omission in these studies relates to the limited analysis of the differentiation in the new forms and material quality of agrarian labour across the agricultural production units. The understanding of the scale of hired in labour regardless of its payment in either cash or in-kind wages has also been obfuscated by the narrow conceptualisation of hired labour as those that receive monetary wages. For instance, the farm workers that remained in the farm compounds after 2000 have tended to be viewed as “displaced in situ” and “out of work” (Hartnack 2005; Hartnack 2009; Magaramombe 2010; Ridderbos 2009), notwithstanding their re-employment by the new land beneficiaries in diverse forms of farm labour (Chambati & Moyo 2004; Hanlon *et al.* 2013; Matondi 2012; Scoones *et al.* 2010; Scoones 2015b). The research attention on the new labour relations facing only the former farm workers (Scoones, Mavedzenge, Murimbarimba & Sukume 2018a) or the continued preoccupation with wage labour dynamics in remaining LSCFs (Chakanya 2016; LEIDRIZ 2018) omits the

experiences of the new farm workers and thus limits the understanding of the dynamics entailed by the entry of the new farm workers. Not only has the variegated new labour relations been concealed by the narrow equating of farm wage labour with LSCF-types of formal farm labour, the examination of the character of new agrarian labour markets, as well as the differences that exist among the diversified farm classes has also been limited (Moyo *et al.* 2009; Chambati 2013a; Chambati 2011).

The new livelihoods gained by former farm workers as independent producers, via both formal and informal access to land and non-farm rural employment whose scope has increased since the FTLRP (Mkodzongi 2013b), are hardly considered worthy of note. Instead, land redistribution tends to be wrongly associated with the disruption of wider access to food and social services (Pilossof 2012) and wage labour diversification for Communal Areas residents, which it is presumed could only arise from the LSCF economy and labour rights regime (Hellum & Derman 2004; Derman & Hellum 2007). In addition, the latter scholars also assumed that the pursuance of farm wage labour was an open ended choice, neglecting to note that such labour relations were driven by historical processes of land dispossession and wider economic policy pressures (Arrighi 1970; Arrighi, Aschoff & Scully 2010; Bush & Cliffe 1984; Clarke 1977). Nonetheless, it has been noted that peasant struggles in Zimbabwe have been marked by the quest for access to land through various strategies, including the occupation of LSCFs since the 1980s (Moyo, Jha & Yeros 2013).

A key flaw in the analysis of agrarian labour after 2000 related to neglecting that a new diversified agrarian structure had resulted from the land reforms, which not only transformed the landholding patterns, but also the land use practices, integration to markets and labour utilisation (Moyo 2011c; Moyo 2013). As such, the new forms of organisation of labour in the A1 and A2 farms have been incorrectly assumed to be similar and the latter have been particularly seen as unable to meet obligations of workers (Masiwa & Chipungu 2004; Mutangi 2010; Sachikonye 2012). Furthermore, the evolution of the new and diverse forms of agrarian labour were masked by suggestions equating the production capacities of all the new land beneficiaries.

The three farm classes, namely the peasantry, middle to large capitalist farms and agro-industrial estates that now characterise the new trimodal agrarian structure have

been noted to be to be highly differentiated according to the land use and agricultural production patterns, extent of production for the market and labour utilisation (Moyo 2011a; Moyo 2011c; Moyo & Nyoni 2013). These new dynamics implied substantial transformation of the agrarian labour markets. Altogether, the varied land sizes, land uses and access to markets was leading to the rise in social differentiation tendencies in the countryside, with wider ramifications for the diverse agrarian labour relations (Moyo 2011a; Moyo 2011c; Moyo & Nyoni 2013). The new farm classes represent the sources of wage labour for the unemployed urbanites, new peasants and the remaining land short in Communal Areas and amongst former farm workers (Chambati & Moyo 2004; Chambati 2013; Chambati 2009). Yet the narrow recognition of LSCFs as the only source of farm wage employment by some analysts (LEIDRIZ 2018; Chakanya 2016) neglected the on-going absorption of labour by the new peasantry and the new middle-to-large scale farms.

The debate on agrarian labour relations has also been distracted by a narrow focus on the human rights violations faced by former farm workers during the FTLRP, especially between 2000 and 2003 (e.g. Hartnack 2009; Hellum & Derman 2004; IDMC 2008; Mutanda 2013). Such research was engrossed with documenting the number of farm workers who were physically displaced from their farm compound residency and the physical violence (e.g. torture), death threats, political intimidation and unlawful detentions, which occurred during this period (ZHRF & JAG 2007; JAG & RAU 2008; GAPWUZ 2010)⁵ and portraying them as passive victims without any agency to improve their material conditions.

The mainstream narrative on the formal loss of farm work thus depicted the farm workers as “Zimbabwe’s New Clothes” (West & Rutherford 2005: 398), which were seen as having lost their role in mobilising (new forms of) agrarian labour for the new farmers. Farm workers have in fact been seen as “essentially squatting in their own homes [compounds] and at constant risk of forcible displacement by the new farm owners” (Ridderbos 2009: 73), and hardly capable of re-organising their livelihoods (Waeterloos & Rutherford 2004; Johnson 2012; GAPWUZ 2010; Zamchiya 2013).

⁵At least one million violations were estimated to have afflicted former farm workers (JAG & RAU 2007: 67).

However, it is true that one of the key challenges farm workers faced in claiming rights to land during the FTLRP relates to their contested citizenship status, given the colonial history of foreign migrant labour policies which initially formed the basis of labour supply in European farms until the 1960s (Arrighi 1970; Arrighi *et al.* 2010; Clarke 1977; Paton 1995). The tendency has been to view most farm workers as “foreigners” from Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia in official and public discourses, who did not deserve to be allocated land during the FTLRP (Daimon 2014; Muzondidya 2007; Rutherford 2003; Moyo *et al.* 2000).

While stripping former farm workers of their agency, most studies failed to capture how they deployed their skills and practical experience accumulated from LSCF employment to construct new livelihoods after 2000. The precise nature of the different forms of social mobilisation utilised by farm workers, including through kinship and culture, seniority at the workplace, nationality and ethnicity, and gender relations, to regain farm work and to resist the poor working conditions in the new farms, (through the procurement of various resources), is yet to be adequately examined empirically.

This study examined the quantitative and qualitative changes to the agrarian labour relations in the context of FTRLRP that increased the number of smaller-scale agricultural employers who compete for access to agrarian labour in the new diversified farming sector that is characterised by differential production capacities. It sought to understand the contemporary agrarian labour relations in their historical context, and in former Settler colonies such as Zimbabwe, as these were hinged upon inequitable land access that evolved from land dispossession and agrarian policies marginalising the peasantry during the colonial and immediate independence period. Yet the study was also attentive to the fact that the agrarian change arose not only from the land reform, but other public policies also impacted on the labour relations perceived in the new farming units.

The research tracked how the precise character of the resulting agrarian structures has shaped the agrarian labour markets. More specifically, it analysed how the differentiated access to and control of land resources, agricultural production patterns, extent of integration into the markets and access to farming inputs, influence the

scale/size of labour force used and the forms of labour mobilised between wage and self-employed labour from the family and other sources.

The key issues that the research grappled with based on field empirical work and from various other sources included the manner in which the peasantry and its differentiated forms has been reconstituted through re-peasantisation and semi-proletarianisation processes; the diverse forms of farm wage and non-wage labour use and the role of non-farm labour in the process of social reproduction, in light of the wider policy changes.

Beyond the monetary wages, the broad quality of labour and the diversity amongst the various classes of farms was uncovered by exploring the other broader issues that contribute to the material conditions of farm wage labour, including in-kind payments received, “social wages” such as access to informal land, the types of employment contracts, gender discrimination, skills, practices of labour management and methods of supervision of farm. To test the validity of claims that consider wage employment to be more important than self-employment in own farming in the sustenance of rural people, the net returns to labour amongst self-employed forms of labour, including through incomes and auto-consumption from their own agricultural production, were investigated empirically and contrasted to those of farm workers.

The study also surveyed the new forms of exploitation of agrarian labour characterising the new agrarian structure. The research paid attention to the resistance of agrarian labour to exploitation, including through individual and collective action. The research also focused on how different forms of social mobilisation, including along class identities, of kinship and culture, nationality and ethnicity and gender relations, are deployed towards resistances to poor working conditions in the farms and procurement of land and natural resources.

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The specific objectives which guided the study were to:

Explore the literature on the factors influencing the formation and character of agrarian labour markets in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in general and more specifically in former Settler-economies in Southern Africa.

Examine the sources and forms of agrarian wage labour and self-employment that are being utilised by farm households in the new agrarian structure.

Explore intra-household labour relations in terms of the allocation of farm and non-farm labour tasks by gender, age and kinship ties.

Investigate the diversification of family labour into non-farm rural activities and their importance to household incomes in relation to farm production activities.

Examine the quality of farm wage labour engaged by the farming households in relation to the monetary wages, in-kind payments and other working conditions compared to the situation in the LSCFs.

Determine the differences in the forms and scale of labour utilisation according to structural differences among farm households such as land sizes, gender dimensions, commodities produced, value of output; assets owned, inputs used and access to capital.

Explore the different ways in which farm workers are mobilising individual and collective agency to resist poor working conditions and opportunities to improve their livelihood outcomes in the context of the reformed land tenure relations.

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research questions posed concern the nature and extent to which structural change in the land ownership and property relations and the consequent changes in patterns of agricultural production and markets have reshaped the organisation of labour relations amongst the broader base of agrarian classes within the new diversified agrarian structure which has emerged since 2000. Specifically, in what forms has new agrarian labour regime evolved, and has this fully or partially replaced the labour regime that was shaped by unequal land distribution and freehold land rights?

What does the literature say regarding which factors affect the formation and character of agrarian labour markets in SSA in general and more specifically in former Settler-economies in Southern Africa?

Does the redistribution of land to mostly small-scale producers and a retention of a reduced base of large-scale capitalist farms lead to a decline in capitalist wage labour relations alongside the rise in the use of family farm labour, and/ or do new extensive forms of wage labour emerge?

To what extent is the diversification into non-farm rural labour activities replacing farm labour as an important source of income to land owning farm households domiciled in diverse locales?

Has the expansion of the number of farm households following redistributive land reforms resulted in increased competition for farm wage labour and consequently improvement in the quality of wage labour?

Has the reconstitution of the freehold land tenure into state land tenures, which compelled mandatory labour provision by labourers resident in the LSCFs' compounds, resulted in the undermining of the residential labour tenancy system and increased the autonomy of farm labourers to sell their labour and organise for favourable conditions of labour supply and/or engage in other forms of agency/resistance?

1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study relied upon a variety of data sources to answer the research questions posed above, including a review of the literature, primary research, and other secondary sources of information. The study approach involved examining the labour relations within the farming units and/or households as the principal study units alongside the farm labourers and farm compounds at different levels from the farm to the national level. At the national level, the aim was to decipher the historical and current dynamics in the relationship between the agrarian labour markets and the landholding patterns and the changing agricultural and economic policies. The local differences in agrarian restructuring entailed by the FLTRP and their implications on agrarian labour markets were traced at the district level. The research issues on the sources of farm labour and their relationship with the land utilisation patterns were captured from the farm households, as well as the role of non-farm labour activities in their sustenance.

Additionally, they provided information on their dual roles as farm wage labour and self-employed family labour in their farming units. Farm labourers elucidated the understanding of the new forms of labour and its quality, and the agency of the workers to respond to the challenges and opportunities in the new agrarian structure. Lastly, farm compounds assisted in the tracking of residential labour tenancy relationship and its impact on the labour supplies and agency of farm workers.

1.6.1 Literature review

The literature review was divided into three parts and covered in detail in Chapters Two, Four and Five. In Chapter Two, the study sought to develop the theoretical and conceptual framework to underpin the study. Three dominant theoretical frameworks utilised to understand agrarian labour relations; namely the historical structural approaches, neo-classical equilibrium models and the livelihoods approach were reviewed. The latter two approaches were found short for the purpose of the study due to their under-emphasis of the role of land ownership, the key means of production in rural Africa, in the formation of labour markets. The neo-classical equilibrium models' assumptions about the linearity in agrarian transformation anticipate the reduction in the importance of self-employed agricultural labour as economies grow through its relocation to modern urban industries was found not to be plausible in the context of SSA. Indeed, most of Africa's people are still based in rural areas and largely derive their sustenance from agriculture since many of the countries retain only limited capacities to absorb labour to the urban sector even in the most industrialised countries such as South Africa. Moreover, there is inadequate concern on the influence of various socio-economic policies in compelling self-employed labour to the markets as they largely consider migration for work as voluntary and/or rational decisions of rural people. As a result, the historical-structural approaches rooted in the Marxist political economy frameworks were chosen for the study as they emphasise the importance of the broader historical context, economic and social structures such as the distribution of land and the interactions of various policies in shaping agrarian labour relations. However, the review of literature also revealed that the class dynamics alone were inadequate to understand the contemporary agrarian labour relations and issues such as gender relations, intra-household relations, kinship, citizenship and the agency of the workers were integrated into the analysis.

The existing perspectives, knowledge and questions on agrarian labour relations were also analysed. The confinement of the existence of the agrarian labour markets to Settler Southern Africa where large-scale capitalist agriculture prevails was identified as one of the key problems in the conceptualisation of African agrarian labour relations (AALR). Contestations also revolved around the role of wage labour in capitalist farms and self-employment in the sustenance of rural people, and whether non-farm activities were part of labour relations of the peasantry. In general, it was also found that studies on labour tend to favour analysing urban labour markets primarily because they conform to the neo-classical definitions of employment.

The second part of literature review positioned in Chapter Four was geared towards understanding the evolution of agrarian labour relations relative to the macro-level changes in land access, land utilisation patterns, economic policies, labour laws and various extra-economic measures from 1890 to 1999. This analysis provided a basis to evaluate transformation induced by the FTLRP.

The main finding from this review was that the evolution of agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe since the 1900s had been shaped by a process of extensive colonial era land alienation and dispossession, as well as the use of economic and extra-economic policies and processes to subordinate self-employed peasant family labour to wage labour markets in the European LSCFs, mining and urban industrial sectors (Arrighi 1970; Clarke 1977; Mafeje 2003; Palmer 1977). There were however disagreements on the nature and extent of proletarianisation that had arisen from the agrarian change. Arrighi (1970) viewed this to have set in motion a continuing trajectory of proletarianisation. Due to the persistence of self-employed peasant family labourers engaged in petty commodity production in the Communal Areas (CAs), others considered incomplete land dispossession to have created “worker-peasants” (Bush & Cliffe 1984: 77), in a process which has been defined as a systemic 20th century trajectory of “semi-proletarianisation” (Moyo & Yeros 2005a: 26). The latter view was more persuasive to the study on account of the empirical facts, which show that the labour absorption capacity not only stalled, but even proletarianised rural people still maintained a foothold in the countryside combining both wage work and farming on small plots to survive.

As observed in the review of literature in SSA, peasant labour relations were hardly considered worthy of note in most debates on agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe, except for a few studies that examined the existence of wage labour markets in the Communal Areas (e.g. Adams 1991; Matshe 1998; Worby 1995; Cousins, Weiner & Amin 1992). Instead, research focus since independence was zoomed on LSCFs (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Loewenson 1992; McIvor 1995; Mugwetsi & Balleis 1994; Rutherford 2001). Of interest were the wage-employment trends during the early 1980s (Loewenson 1992) and the increased retrenchment and casualisation of labour (GoZ 1983; Moyo & Ngobese 1991) following the introduction of new farm labour regulations in the 1980 (Kanyenze 2001; Moyo & Ngobese 1991), and later on, due to land use changes, export production and technological advances intensified during ESAP (Amanor-Wilks 1995; 2000; Chambati & Moyo 2004; Moyo 2000). The super-exploitation of workers through the extremely low wages paid and residential labour tenancy was hardly a major research concern.

In fact, the abuse of farm labour in the LSCFs, including through physical violence, racism and unpaid overtime work, were also examined, while the gender inequalities and discrimination that were reflected by the feminisation of lowly paid and insecure part-time work only became a focus during the 1990's (Amanor-Wilks 2001; 1995; Muchena & Dzumbira 2001). From 1995, the research became more attentive to the poor socio-economic conditions of farm workers and their families, but focused on their poor and limited access to social amenities such as housing, education and health facilities (Magaramombe 2001; McIvor 1995). The nature of resistance of farm workers against their low wages and poor socio-economic conditions drew less focus (Kibble & Vanlerberghe 2000), including through union organised strikes and their own independent actions (Tandon 2001).

Rather than agrarian labour dynamics, the research outside the LSCFs sought to explain the constraints to growth of the peasant agricultural production in the 1980's (e.g. Muir 1985; Rohrbach 1988; Rukuni & Eicher 1994; Weiner, Moyo, Munslow & O'keefe 1985), and the impact of land redistribution on agriculture and social welfare (Kinsey 1983; Moyo 1995; Palmer 1990). From the mid-1990's, the subsequent effects of ESAP on agriculture, including peasant production, became the pre-occupation, (e.g. Chipika 1995; Matanda & Jeche 1998, Masuko 1998; Oni 1997;

Moyo 2000), while a few studies tracked the underperformance of land reform (Moyo 1995; 1999), again to the neglect of agrarian labour relations.

Some of the literature on agrarian labour relations generally sought to uncover the underlying gender relations of peasant labour (Batezat 1984; Gaidzanwa 1995; Muchena 1994; Mvududu & McFadden 2001). These studies observed that it was mostly women's labour that was exploited in household agricultural production, alongside their reproductive roles, by men who largely controlled the landholdings and agrarian resources in Communal Areas. The burden to provide farm labour to household agricultural production was noted to be more onerous for women *de-facto* household heads whose males had migrated to seek wage employment in the LSCFs and elsewhere (O'Laughlin 1998; Potts 2000). Overall, data gaps were apparent in the literature on the agrarian labour relations of the peasantry.

The third part of literature review discussed the extent of agrarian restructuring imposed by the FTLRP, alongside the changing agrarian labour policy regime at the national and district levels. The main finding was that a new diverse agrarian structure had emerged at the national level containing many smaller-scale farming units with implications on the sources of farm employment. At the district level, it was exposed that the agrarian structures differed in the size and composition of the agrarian classes contingent upon the nature of land redistribution at the local level, which in turn influenced the local level labour markets. The analysis showed that the decline and partial recovery of the economy and the shifts in the various public policies during the 2000's had wider ramifications on the land utilisation and farm labour demand examined by the research.

1.6.2 Primary research

It could be gleaned from the literature that the combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods not only gathers complimentary information to illuminate the picture of the phenomenon being studied (Erzeberger & Kelle 2003: 461), but can serve to triangulate research results (Bryman 2004; Greene *et al.* 1989; Mikkelsen 2005; Neuman 2006). Oya (2013; 2010) has argued in favour of combining both methods since either method used alone is not able to collect all the information required to understand agrarian labour relations in Africa. Qualitative research, the latter scholar has averred, is helpful in conceptualising the local

perception of wage employment as in many contexts they are some forms of wage labour, which are regarded lowly by rural communities. Examples cited included piecework paid in-kind that is normally associated with poor people. The understanding of the local context derived from qualitative research can therefore help researchers to design and word quantitative surveys and thus prevent the underestimation of rural wage employment. Quantitative surveys are considered useful to capture broad employment trends that this study was also interested in.

A mixed methods approach was thus chosen by the study. The quantitative method entailed separate questionnaire surveys administered to farm households and farm labourers. The former included households allocated land during the FTLRP and peasants from the Communal Areas that were randomly selected through stratified random sampling. The farm labourers included both the former farm workers previously employed in the redistributed LSCFs and new workers who were engaged in various economic activities prior the land reforms. Because of the absence of a sampling frame, respondents to farm labour questionnaire survey were purposively selected across the variegated farm units and the research strived for the representation of the different forms of labour in the survey.

The qualitative data was gathered through direct physical observations and key informant interviews that were interviewed face-to-face on aspects and experiences about the study units that they were familiar with. They included purposively selected state actors from the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement (MLRR), Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation (MAEMI), and Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare (MPSLSW). The non-state actors interviewed included senior former farm workers, local leaders, trade unions and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) dealing with farm labour issues. The direct physical observations were structured in order to investigate specific issues of interest to the study that included land and labour utilisation patterns, intra-household labour relations, working conditions of wage workers and the recruitment of labour in compounds and at different rural and urban centres.

1.6.3 Secondary sources

The primary research was supplemented by secondary data sources. Some of the useful secondary material consulted by the study included: MLRR land records,

Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency (ZIMSTAT) labour surveys, population censuses and agricultural production reports, MAEMI agricultural production reports, MPSSLW labour outlook reports, newspaper articles, court records on litigation relating to farm labour relations and district maps from the Surveyor General' Office.

1.7 ETHICAL CLEARANCE

This study was guided by the ethical clearance provided by UNISA (Annex 1.1). In particular, informed consent was sought in writing from all those who participated in research as elaborated upon in Chapter Three. No respondent was forced to participate in the study, but all did so voluntarily and were notified of their right to withdraw at any given time without any repercussions visiting them. The confidentiality of the data collected from the participants was safeguarded by relying on pseudonyms throughout the dissertation, except in cases where some public officials granted their permission for their names to be used. Permission to undertake the research was also sought and granted by government authorities in writing at national and local levels (Annex 1.2).

1.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study focused on the examination of the transition of agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe in general and more specifically in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts. Four aspects of agrarian labour relations were analysed, namely; the new sources of farm labour, role of non-farm labour activities in the sustenance of rural people, quality of wage employment and the resistance of labour to the new material conditions in the new agrarian structure. These issues were assessed for the period between 2000 and 2017. Shifts in agrarian labour regime were assessed in the A1 and A2 farming units and the Communal Areas land tenure categories, where most of the data gaps currently exist. The study did not examine the evolving patterns in the LSCFs and plantations that were not acquired for resettlement during FTLRP since the agrarian labour relations in these land tenure categories have been fairly documented prior to 2000 (Loewenson 1992; Amanor-Wilks 1995; 2000; Kanyenze 2001; Mugwetsi & Balleis 1994; Moyo, Rutherford & Amanor-Wilks 2000; Kibble & Vanleberge 2000).

Due to the highly differentiated outcomes of the FLTRP (Scoones *et al.* 2010; Scoones *et al.* 2018a; Moyo *et al.* 2009; Matondi 2012; Hanlon, Manjengwa & Smart 2012; Mutopo 2013), the study does not reflect the transformation of agrarian labour

relations nationally. However, it provides a foundation for understanding the transformation of agrarian labour relations in the context of extensive land redistribution initiated by the FTLRP in two districts with contrasting farming systems that are in general representative of the land uses and agro-ecological patterns countrywide.

1.9 TERMINOLOGY

This section provides definitions for the various concepts to illuminate their meaning in relation to the context of the study. Other definitions of key terminologies deployed by the research are detailed in Chapter Two, which outlines the conceptual and theoretical framework for understanding agrarian labour relations in Africa.

Agrarian labour relations broadly refer to the mobilisation, organisation and utilisation of wage and non-wage labour, in farm production in the context of wider agrarian transformations, involving changes in land ownership, and increasing integration into global markets (Jha 1996; Moyo 2011a; Moyo, Jha & Yeros 2013), as well as the use of self-employed family farm labour in other rural based non-farm activities that are enabled by access to land and natural resources (Ellis 1996: 7; Moyo 1995: 209).

Farm wage labour is the sell of labour to farm production, which may be paid for cash and/or in-kind. It occurs in different forms, including full- and part-time labour. In the Zimbabwean context, those employed in the LSCFs were commonly referred to as farm workers (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Rutherford 2001). The wage labourers encompass all people that are hired by farm households irrespective of the duration of employment, and availability of a written contract, and frequency of wage payments (Oya 2013; Oya & Pontara 2015).

Self-employment entails jobs where remuneration is derived from profits of the commodities produced, and consumption of food they produce constitutes a share of the profits (ILO 2015b: 32). It therefore includes the owners of the means of the production endowed with decision-making powers on the welfare of the enterprises and other unpaid members of their family who contribute labour to the household's agricultural production units (Standing 2006).

Non-farm rural labour activities are those activities where the income source originates from the value addition of agricultural output, transportation and marketing of non-value added agricultural, forest and fish items spatially located in rural areas (Barret *et al.* 2001: 3018). Incomes obtained from direct agricultural and harvesting of natural resource products (e.g. firewood and fish) without any value addition (including farm wage labour regardless of its location) are excluded (Barret, Reardon & Webb 2001: 318). Off-farm activities are not synonymous with non-farm labour as they refer to the geographical location of where the activity is performed.

Labour markets imply the existence of hiring in of labour by employers and selling of labour by employees (Ehrenberg & Smith 2006: 26). Agrarian labour markets therefore reflect the presence of this phenomenon in the agricultural sector in the rural areas.

Peasantry are rural people that own and farm small plots of land utilising mainly self-employed labour from their families, but some of them do hire wage labour to complement the family (Moyo 2014: 17; Moyo & Yeros 2005a: 25-26 Ellis 1998: 13). They produce for own consumption and are integrated into markets for surplus sales and acquisition of modern farm inputs (Mafeje 2003; Petras & Veltmeyer 2001). Indeed, agrarian labour relations among the peasantry are defined by the interdependency between farm and non-farm labour activities, which compete for the same family labour (Moyo & Yeros 2005; Petras & Veltmeyer 2001; Shivji 2009; Van der Ploeg 2010).

Agrarian structure represents the categorisation of farming units into different classes on the basis of their landholdings, land tenure, labour utilisation, access to economic and social resources, types of crops and livestock produced and market participation (derived from de Janvry 1981: 110; Moyo 2011a: 510-17). Three classes commonly found in agrarian structures are the peasantry, small-scale capitalist and large-scale capitalist farms. The capitalist farms primarily produce for the market. Large-scale capitalists usually command expansive landholdings; they are directly inserted into the global production networks and have an agro-industrial character. Moreover, they are also exclusively reliant on hired wage labour for their farm production. While small-scale capitalist farms are also dependent on hired wage

labour, they also contribute their self-employed labour to their agricultural production units, owning relatively less land and capital than the latter.

Redistributive land reform involves transferring land from large land owners such as LSCFs to mostly land short peasants and landless workers (Adam 2000: 4; Bush 2002: 4).

Residential labour tenancy is a form of tenancy that is characteristic to former-Settler Southern Africa where accommodation for farm workers in farm compounds in LSCFs was linked to their employment rights (Chambati 2011: 1048). It is different from the classical tenancy where land is provided in exchange for solely supplying labour to the landlord (Lastarria-Cornhiel & Mehmed-Sanjak 1999: 43; Gibbon, Daviron & Barral 2014: 177) in that residential labour tenants also received wages for their labour.

Social reproduction broadly implies "... the security of the conditions of life (e.g. food, education, health and clothing) and of future production from what is produced or earned now" (Bernstein 2010: 128).

Agency or resistance refers to the human actions that peasants and agrarian labourers engage in to respond to the opportunities and constraints affecting their socio-economic conditions (Paton 1995).

1.10 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

Following this **Chapter**, the discussion in **Chapter Two** details the theoretical and conceptual framework(s) used in this study and critically evaluates the existing perspectives, knowledge and questions raised on agrarian labour relations in SSA as found in the literature.

Chapter Three elaborates on the study approach and methods used, and introduces the study area to clarify the specific context in which local dynamics of agrarian labour are presented.

Chapter Four re-examines the historical evolution of agrarian labour relations at the macro level, highlighting how the changing patterns of agrarian wage labour employment relates to periodic changes in landholding patterns, agrarian labour

policy and law reforms, and outlines the national level changes in agricultural employment patterns during colonial period between 1890 and 1979 and after the country gained independence in 1980 until 1999.

Chapter Five provides the study context, highlighting the extent of agrarian restructuring in the land ownership and land tenure relations emerging from the FTLRP, as well as the shifts in the agrarian and labour policies and their implications on labour relations outcomes. The new agrarian structure is first examined at the national level and extended to the district level in order to highlight the specificities of the new agrarian labour regime and/or sources of employment at the local level.

Chapter Six presents the data analysis and interpretation of the findings based on the detailed quantitative and qualitative research undertaken in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts and from other sources. It begins by outlining the sources of farm labour for the farm households, including from their families and hired in labour, scale of utilisation, intra- and inter- household relations, gender and generational dynamics in the use of self-employed labour and proceeds to unpack the diversification of family labour in non-farm rural activities is covered. The differentiation in the wider production relations that is entailed by the extent and use of hired in labour to organise their farming is then examined. The analysis is extended to expose the precise character of the forms of full and part-time agrarian wage labour, and their distribution in the diverse range of producers. It outlines how wage labour is being procured and the organisation of work in the new small-scale capitalist farms. The quality of wage labour is also examined in terms of the monetary wages, in-kind payments and the working conditions. The mobilisation of individual and collective agency by farm workers to respond to poor working conditions and opportunities to improve their livelihoods through the procurement of land and other natural resources concludes the chapter.

Chapter Seven, the concluding chapter, presents findings, recommendations and conclusions relating to the nature and scope of the new agrarian labour markets, quality of labour and their role in employment development and livelihood outcomes and draws out their implications.

1.11 CONCLUSION

This chapter provided the reader with a general overview of the research. It presented the background and rationale of the study, centred on the land and labour questions in Zimbabwe until 1999 and the ramifications of the extensive land redistribution since 2000 on the agrarian labour relations. The other sections covered included the problem statement, research objectives, research questions, research methodology, ethical clearance, limitations of the study, terminology used and also outlined the organisation of the thesis.

In general, it was clear that agrarian labour dynamics, especially those of the peasantry, do not receive much academic attention in SSA. The situation in Zimbabwe was no different as land use and agricultural production patterns pre-occupied agrarian research before the FLTRP and investigations of agrarian labour focused on the LSCFs to the exclusion of peasant labour relations. This problem extended to the post-FTLRP period. It was apparent agrarian labour relations during the post-FTLRP period has received limited research attention, but the few that address the labour questions have directed their optics to displacement and retrenchment of farm workers from LSCFs to the exclusion of the ensuing labour relations in the new small-scale capitalist farms and the peasantry.

Quite crucially, it was also highlighted that a challenge in most studies evaluating the outcomes of FTLRP has been of over-simplification of the factors, which contributed to the agrarian change witnessed today. Specifically, there was a tendency to attribute the impacts on labour and other agrarian relations on the land reform itself to the exclusion of how the processes interacted with other public policies to shape the outcomes. As is known, the evaluation of public policies does not only need to look at the policy of interest, but also consider its interactions with other policies to influence the impacts. The study thus sought to contribute to existing knowledge by filling the data gaps on the sources of farm labour, diversification of family labour, nature and quality of the new wage labour and resistance of labour to their socio-economic conditions in the new agrarian structure on the basis of research questions defined in section 1.5, taking into cognisance how other public policies put to bear their influence on the contemporary agrarian change beyond the FTLRP induced outcomes.

The next Chapter Two, develops the theoretical and conceptual framework utilised by the study and provides a critical assessment of the viewpoints and knowledge on agrarian labour relations in the SSA literature.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND PERSPECTIVES ON AFRICAN AGRARIAN LABOUR

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter provided a general overview of the research subject. This chapter provides the conceptual framework anchoring this study and critically examines the existing perspectives, knowledge and questions raised on agrarian labour relations in SSA in general and more specifically in former Settler Southern Africa in order to inform the analysis on the new agrarian labour relations, which have accompanied the FTLRP and various changes in agrarian labour policies. The chapter is divided into five broad sections. Initially, the perspectives on agrarian labour are presented, including a review of the three dominant theoretical frameworks, which are applied to analyse agrarian labour in Africa. The historical-structural approaches were identified as being better placed to understand the new agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe compared to the livelihoods and neo-classical economic approaches since these were based on the historical context of land-labour utilisation generated by land dispossession and discriminatory agrarian policies during the colonial era and early independence period.

The next section extends the discussion by exploring the role of existing agrarian structures in shaping the agrarian labour relations. The analysis of the specificities of the agrarian wage labour and formal agricultural labour markets in the context of Settler Southern Africa then follows. Attentive to the inadequacies of the structural factors in explaining the agrarian labour relations alone, the next two sections prior to the conclusion explore the influence of gender relations and agency of the agrarian labourers, and their intersection with the class dynamics to evolve the agrarian labour relations.

2.2 PERSPECTIVES ON AFRICAN AGRARIAN LABOUR REGIMES

This section presents the perspective on African agrarian labour regimes. An overview of agrarian labour debates is first outlined, succeeded by a review of the three dominant theoretical frameworks that have informed the understanding of labour relations in the continent and beyond.

2.2.1 Overview of the African agrarian labour debate

African agrarian labour regimes (AALRs) are largely seen as devoid of (capitalist) wage labour relations, in terms of the scale or sizes of the labour employed and the quality of the employment due to the presumed absence of agrarian labour markets, contingent on the presumed absence of capitalist farms, particularly LSCFs. Peasant households that predominate the rural areas are assumed not to hire in agricultural labour and exclusively rely on self-employed labour from their families and inter-household labour exchanges (Barret *et al.* 2001; Barret *et al.* 2005; Binswanger *et al.* 1995; Griffin *et al.* 2002; Robillard, Sukume, Yanoma & Lofgren 2001). As such, the redistribution of LSCFs to peasants is largely associated with the complete reversal of wage labour relations in the countryside (see de Janvry 1981; Sender & Johnston 2004; Sender 2016).

Despite its importance in sustaining the reproduction of Africa's populace, the nature and evolution of agrarian labour in Africa is apparently not well understood due to the lack of knowledge resulting from conceptually poor and limited empirical research leading to a paucity of data on labour (Leavy & White 2003; Oya 2013; 2010). However, understanding agrarian labour relations deserves urgent attention, particularly against the backdrop of mounting poverty levels and urban unemployment in much of the countries in the Global South, including Africa (Jha 2016; Oya & Pontara 2015; IFAD 2011; ILO 2011; 2015; World Bank 2008).

The neglect of African agrarian labour is partly attributed to the complexity of the character of rural employment, as this largely falls outside of the purview of neo-classical economic definitions of employment (Leavy & White 2003; Oya 2013; 2010). In general, research emphasis has been placed on urban labour markets (Krishnan, Selassie & Dercon 1998 & Glick 1999; LEDRIZ 2016; Mengistae 1998a; 1998b; Teal 1997). Oya (2013) cites a few studies which have devoted attention to rural labour market formation (Ghai & Radwan 1983; Kitching 1980; Sender & Smith 1986; Swindell 1985) and decries the decline in agrarian labour studies in Africa since the mid-1980s in favour of smallholder farmers and economic reforms. In Settler-Southern Africa, formal farm wage labour has received the most research attention as outlined earlier.

A long standing unresolved question in contemporary SSA's predominantly agrarian economies, which are unevenly integrated into global capitalism since the colonial period (Moyo 2008; 2014), concerns the extent and nature of rural proletarianisation, in which dispossessed peasants are compelled into wage labour and whether farm and non-farm labour activities constitute a continuum of the labour processes of the peasantry. The disappearance of self-employed forms of labour through full "proletarianisation" has been postulated assuming that peasants struck by inadequate land for social reproduction would be converted into fully-fledged wage labourers in the capitalist sectors (Arrighi 1970; Arrighi & Saul 1973).

Economic theories generally posit a similar outcome, arguing that urban industrial growth will reduce the importance of agriculture and absorb peasantry into wage employment (Lewis 1954). Further reflections, however argued that since land dispossession was uneven, it produced worker-peasants (Bush & Cliffe 1994) or resulted in a process of perpetual semi-proletarianisation entailing the combination of farming on small plots and wage employment by peasants for their survival (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Neocosmos 1993). Other recent contributions (Bernstein 2014: S97; 2006) have argued that under capitalist social relations, rural Africa is permeated by a variety of "classes of labour" whose means of production are totally dispossessed or inadequate for their social reproduction. For Bernstein (2014: S97-8; *emphasis in original*), the "classes of labour" means all those "...who depend directly *and indirectly* on the sale of their labour power for their own reproduction".

For others, however, the proliferation of non-farm rural labour activities amongst the peasantry was induced by economic crises associated with Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), leading to the unravelling of new agrarian labour relations (Bryceson 2000; 2002; Bryceson, Kay & Mooij 2000; Riggs 2006). A de-agrarianisation process, entailing a permanent transformation of rural livelihoods from agriculture towards non-farm labour activities, is said to reduce the importance of agricultural labour (Bernstein 2014; Bryceson 2002; Bryceson *et al.* 2000; Riggs 2006). In similar vein, some descriptive livelihoods studies have argued that agriculture is just but one of many activities for which household labour resources are utilised in the construction of people's livelihoods (Carney 1998; Ellis 1998) through a complex set of open ended choices and its importance varies for different places and

times (Scoones 1998). This combination of a different set of activities to construct people's livelihoods is termed livelihoods diversification (Scoones 1998: 9). Overall, these perspectives undervalue the significance of self-employed agricultural labour in the social reproduction of peasants.

A key problem with the conceptualisation of AALR in the existing literature is that agrarian labour markets are largely considered to be absent in the majority of African countries, except in regions such as Settler-Southern Africa where large-scale capitalist agriculture exists (Barret, Besfuneh, Clay & Reardon 2005; Barret, Reardon & Webb *et al.* 2001; Binswanger, McIntire & Udry 1989). Thus, the different forms of agrarian labour and the diverse sources of employment that obtain among different classes of producers are understudied.

An important difference on AALR perspectives concerns the material quality of the conditions of agrarian labour in both its self-employed and wage forms. Wage labour in capitalist farms, rather than self-employment, is seen to be a more important form of agrarian labour, and more crucial to the survival of rural people (Cramer, Oya & Sender 2008; Hellum & Derman 2004; Sender & Johnston 2004; Sender Oya & Cramer 2006; Sender 2016). Yet the returns to labour amongst the peasantry through farm incomes and use values from consumption of own produce are rarely empirically measured and compared to farm wage returns (Kevane 1994).

This is one of the reasons why the focus of debate tends to be on the nature of resistance by agrarian labour to various forms of oppression and exploitation arising from their employment conditions under the evolving socio-economic contexts. However, some commentators view agrarian labourers as passive victims of structural disadvantages (such as land shortage or landlessness) (Ridderbos 2009; Mugwetsi & Balleis 2004; Waeterloos & Rutherford 2004; Zamchiya 2013). The prospects of improving the material conditions of agrarian labour have been studied in terms of individual and collective actions within the existing socio-economic framework (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; O'Laughlin 2002; Paton 1995; Petras & Veltmeyer 2001; Shivji 2009).

Current understandings of the scope of forms and agrarian labour relations in Africa are generally poorly conceptualised due to a focus on the conventional forms of wage

employment and the related inadequacy of empirical data on broader forms of labour (Leavy & White 2003; Oya 2013; 2010). The paucity of data on rural labour issues in Africa is also a result of various methodological limitations in the collection of data on labour markets amongst the peasantry on the basis of formal definitions of wage employment, which are not common in SSA (Oya 2013).

An enduring methodological challenge in former settler zones also relates to analysis of agrarian labour relations within the peasantry separately from those in capitalist farms, especially LSCFs, with a bias on the latter (e.g. Adams 1991; Amanor-Wilks 2001; 1995; Wisborg, Hall, Shirinda & Zamchiya 2013; McIvor 1995). This has tended to limit the understanding of the agrarian labour relations, due to pervasive nature of the semi-proletarian condition that entail many peasants are straddling between LSCF wage labour and petty commodity production on small plots (Moyo & Yeros 2005b; Mintz 1974). A complete understanding of labour relations within the peasantry is not possible without examining the LSCF labour relations, otherwise false dichotomies of peasant-LSCF wage relations are generated (Mintz 1974).

The literature also differs on the influence of gender relations, kinship, ethnicity, citizenship and identity on AAL. These wider factors, alongside the class dynamics, combine to shape access to and control of resources, which in turn affect the agrarian labour relations in variety of ways including the control of labour within families and wage labour hiring relations (Elson 1999; Moyo 2008; Tsikata 2009). In contrast, neo-classical economic perspectives view households as egalitarian structures and agrarian labour markets as outcomes of the interactions of demand and supply forces not amenable to these wider social factors (Binswanger, Deininger & Feder 1995; Deininger & Binswanger 1999; Dorner 1992; Griffin, Khan & Ickowitz 2002).

2.2.2 Competing theoretical frameworks on agrarian labour

Three theoretical approaches have been dominant in the analysis of labour relations since the 1960s; firstly, the neo-classical individual equilibrium approaches, that postulate agrarian labour relations as an outcome of demand and supply of labour in a “free” market. Secondly, the historical/structural approaches developed within the Marxist political economy framework, which argue that the broader historical context, economic and social structures are key in shaping labour relations. Lastly, the Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches (SLA), which analyse the labour processes in

terms of the deployment of assets/capital base in diverse agricultural and non-agricultural activities by households to realise their “livelihoods” and labour.

Neo-classical economics considers labour only as a factor of production obtained from the free market and its price (wage) and how much of it is used is determined by the demand for the final product it contributes to producing (Ehrenberg & Smith 2006; Ellis 1988). In contrast, Marxist analytical frameworks view labour as “wealth producing activity” and analytical interests include what the selling of labour contributes to its social reproduction in relation to the rates of profit extracted by capital and their consequent reinvestment to expand production (capital accumulation) (Freund 1984; Mamdani 1996a).

2.2.2.1 Neo-classical economic approaches – Equilibrium models

Neo-classical equilibrium approaches have been espoused in terms of dual economy theories pitting rural versus urban to explain the structural change in developing countries, specifically the labour phenomenon. At the forefront of these theories has been the “two sector surplus labour” or “unlimited labour supplies” model (Lewis 1954). The flow of labour or labour supply between the *traditional/subsistence/rural* and *modern/industrial/urban* sectors is determined by the differential market incentives or wages existing between the two sectors.⁶ Similar to the utility theory of consumer choice which assume the objective of individuals as the derivation of maximum satisfaction or utility from their limited purchasing power (Hill 1990; Coleman & Young 1991), labour is motivated by income maximisation and is thus influenced to migrate from low wage rural sector to higher wage modern sectors (de Haas 2008).

Marginal Productivity of Labour (MP_L)⁷ determines the demand for labour under competitive market conditions⁸ and enterprises will hire labour until the juncture

⁶The traditional sector is defined by production geared for own consumption using self-employed labour, whilst the modern sector is focused on the production of surpluses which can be re-invested to grow the enterprises using hired labour and modern technologies (Todaro 1989).

⁷The MP_L is the additional increase to total output as a result of an additional unit of labour added to the production process (Ehrenberg & Smith 2006).

⁸Competitive or free markets are those where the price is mediator of demand and supply, economic power is evenly distributed among all economic actors (thus no domination or coercion), accurate information on market prices is available to everyone who requires it and there is freedom of entry and exit into the markets (Ellis 1996).

where the Value Marginal Product of Labour (VMP_L)⁹ is equivalent to the price of labour or wage rate. At this point the total cost of hiring additional labour is equal to the additional total revenue generated by employing additional labour. Since the MP_L is assumed to be zero in rural areas, there exists “surplus” labour, which can be transferred to the high productivity modern sector without affecting the output and/or revenue. The wages in the urban industrial sector are assumed to be constant and should be higher by a minimum threshold of 30 percent than the fixed average subsistence wage levels in the traditional agricultural sector to induce worker migration from rural to urban areas (Lewis 1954: 149-50). Thus, all those in the subsistence sector are inclined to entering the wage labour market in the modern capitalist sector.

The movement of labour from surplus labour but scarce capital (rural areas) to capital abundant but scarce labour (urban areas) thus resolves the imbalances between the factors of production (land, labour, capital and natural resources) in an economy and concentrate economic activity in the modern sector (Freund 1984; de Haas 2008; Wood 1982).

The continued expansion of the modern industrial sector through capital accumulation and/or reinvestment of surplus/profit implies that all the surplus labour will be absorbed from the traditional agricultural sector, until the MP_L is no longer zero (Todaro 1989). Further extractions of labour from the traditional agricultural sector after this will thus come at higher cost specifically to food production as output will decrease with the withdrawal of labour since the MP_L is now above zero.

Various weaknesses in the two sector surplus labour model inspired further theorisation on the reallocation of labour resources from rural areas to the capitalist sector, including Todaro’s labour migration theory (Paton 1995).

Todaro (1989) critiqued the two sector surplus model, firstly for wrongly assuming that the rate of employment creation of the modern industrial sector and rate of labour transfer from the traditional agricultural sector were directly proportional to the rate of capital accumulation. Yet industrial expansion largely entails labour displacing

⁹ The VMP_L is the additional revenue generated to the enterprise as a result of an additional unit of labour in the production process (Ehrenberg & Smith 2006).

technologies rather than labour demanding technologies and profit repatriation abroad is a key feature of global capitalist transition. Secondly, rural-urban migration has been empirically shown to continue despite rising rates of urban unemployment, and surplus rural labour is largely limited to countries characterised by with unequal land ownership patterns. Lastly, rather than constant real wages in the urban sector under a competitive market, empirical observations show the tendency of absolute and real wages to increase in relation to the mean incomes in the rural areas, even under conditions of high unemployment and low marginal productivity of labour in agriculture, partly because of institutional factors such as trade unions bargaining power.

Todaro's labour migration theory thus sought to account for the continuous movement of rural labour to the urban areas regardless of rising unemployment in the *metropolis* (de Haas 2008). It modified the rural-urban wage differentials in the two sector surplus labour model to explain labour migration not only on the basis of the current income gaps, but also adjusting it with the probability of obtaining employment in the city posited as an inverse relationship to the urban unemployment rate (Todaro 1989). However, the theory still emphasised labour migration as primarily an "economic" phenomenon (Paton 1995). The basic premise underlying this model was that migration to the cities to look for wamework will continue if the rural-urban wage differentials are larger than the risk of being unemployed (Paton 1995). A decision will be made to migrate if the expected incomes in urban areas are greater than the average rural incomes over a given period of time. The equilibrating force in the Todaro model is expected rural and urban incomes rather than wages as in the Lewis model.

The underlying problem with dual economy theories pertains to their assumptions of the existence of free markets, yet the norm in the majority of the developing countries is that of market imperfections in access to capital and financial services, for instance (Leavy & White 2003). Access to information is poor and capital markets are fragmented and inaccessible to the majority of rural citizens (Leavy & White 2003) and powerful groups such as (colonial) capital manipulated the market to their own benefit (Arrighi 1970; Mhone 2001). The information on the expected incomes or wages that determine labour migration decisions is thus not easily available for the

potential migrants to make rational decisions (de Haase 2008). The dual economy theories also ignored the differentiation of various individuals by assuming homogeneity among the labour migrants (personal skills, educational background, age, gender etc.), given that urban labour markets are segmented (de Haas 2008).

2.2.2.2 Historical-structural approaches

The historical-structural approaches rooted in Marxian political economy were a response to the failure of the neo-classical economic approaches to explain labour relations in the developing world (Woods 1982; Paton 1995). Its proponents critiqued the “two sector surplus labour model” and other microeconomic equilibrium approaches for incorrectly assuming the universal applicability of the models at all times. Yet contemporary agrarian labour relations have been shaped by historical specificity, including colonial land alienation and discriminatory agrarian policies dispossessing. This in turn reduced the MP_L to zero in the rural areas for some peasants and economically compelled them to wage employment (O’Laughlin 2002; Peters 2011). Labour migration was thus key to the capital accumulation of colonial capital and continues to be critical in the post-independent period (Delgado Wise & Veltmeyer 2016; Paton 1995).

Furthermore, wage and income differentials emphasised by equilibrium models are only applicable in a capitalist mode of production (Wood 1982).¹⁰ However, the introduction of capitalism in Africa did not entirely extinguish non-capitalist labour relations (i.e. labour is not sold in the market – self-employed labour) (Woods 1982). Agricultural labour in some peasant societies continues to be provided through traditional family kinship systems and exchange is through barter trade (Phimister 1986; Amanor 2008).

The historical/structural approaches thus propose that labour relations are influenced by the wider history of the people (e.g. with colonisation and global capitalist integration) and structural factors (e.g. asset distribution) in particular economy (Wood 1982:302). The structural factors can both be internal or external to the economy (O’Laughlin 2002) and in SSA are rooted in historically specific conditions

¹⁰Capitalist agricultural production relations are those that involve the employment of hired labour that is accompanied by accumulation (reinvestment of surpluses and expansion of production) (Patnaik 1996).

such as the differentiated and uneven colonial land dispossessions and the incorporation of peasant into the global capitalist system (Arrighi 1970; Wood 1982; Neocosmos 1993; Mafeje 2003).

Rather than the “choice” for the “rational” individual decision maker to move to highly productive work, the constraints imposed by wider economic pressures and unequal distribution of means of production influence the labour supplies to the capitalist sector. For instance, the income of those entirely dispossessed of their land in the rural areas is reduced to zero, and wage labour becomes critical for their survival (Wood 1982; Moyo 2011a). Moreover, the extra-economic measures that existed during the colonial period (e.g. compulsory taxes, controls on movement of people and forced labour contributions) and still exist *albeit* in different forms in independent Africa also influenced the evolution of labour markets (Arrighi 1970; Johnston 2007; Neocosmos 1993; Mafeje 2003; Shivji 2009). As such, market incentives alone are not solely responsible for the flow of labour from the peasant sector and labour markets were not generated “in a social, cultural, political and institutional void” (de Haas 2008:6-7) as suggested by the dual economy theories.

Migration from the countryside develops the urban sector and underdevelops the rural areas (Mhone 2001), rather than reduce the disparities in economic development between the two sectors as predicted by the equilibrium approaches on the premise of higher income earnings in the capitalist sector (Paton 1995), that will be invested in the rural areas by migrants (Neocosmos 1993).

Although the historical-structural approaches have been critiqued for over-emphasising the role of economic and social structures and undermining the agency of (peasant) households to respond to the structural conditions that affect their social reproduction (de Haas 2008; Johnston 2007), their propositions largely reflect empirical realities in SSA. However, the livelihood approaches emerged to address the structure (neglected by neo-classical economists but emphasised by structural approaches) and agency of people transcending the individual level to encompass the broader social context of the households, village communities, etc (allegedly neglected by structural approaches) (Bebbington 1999; Hebinck 2002; de Haas 2008; Scoones 2015; 2009), to explain how people realise their livelihoods and evolution of agrarian labour relations.

2.2.2.3 Livelihoods analytic frameworks

The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) (Carney 1998; Ellis 1998; Scoones 2015; 2009; 1998) is the dominant approach within the livelihoods analytic frameworks that is used to analyse rural livelihoods (Niehof 2004; Chimhowu & Hulme 2006; Mutenje *et al.* 2010).¹¹ By definition, a livelihood “...compris[es] the capabilities, assets (including both the material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living” (Scoones 1998: 5) and resistance to shocks “without undermining the natural resource base” determines its sustainability (Scoones 1998: 5-6). The SLA argues that (rural) “livelihoods” are generated by what poor people have at their disposal at different places and times¹² rather than what they “need” for their sustenance commonly termed as *assets* or *capitals* (that include, natural capital; economic or financial capital; human capital and social capital) to construct their livelihoods (Farrington, Ramasut & Walker 2002).¹³

Households are said to deploy their agency in “acquiring, utilising and managing assets and resources in a more or less strategic manner” (Niehof 2004: 323) suggesting the existence of open-ended choices in realising livelihoods. Choices are made on how to combine, substitute and switch different assets/capitals in their livelihood portfolios to generate livelihoods at different places and times (Scoones 1998; 2009). The SLA acknowledges the differentiated access to assets amongst rural people, but is silent in how this very differentiation influences the livelihood patterns. The emphasis is that people are engaged in various activities for their sustenance, also

¹¹ The Capabilities and Assets framework is the other approach differing with the SLA on the conceptualisation of assets. The former attaches a broader view of assets/capitals as “... not simply *resources* [as the SLA does] that people use in building livelihoods: they are assets that give them *capability* to and to act (Bebbington 1999:2022; [emphasis in original]). The assets are in fact “...vehicles for instrumental action (making a living), hermeneutic action (making a living meaningful) and emancipatory action (challenging the structures under which one makes a living) (Bebbington 1999:2022; see also Scoones 2009:178). Furthermore, the Capabilities framework places greater importance to social capital in comparison to the rest of the capitals (Bebbington 1999).

¹² Utsa Patnaik (1996) makes the same point about resource endowments in the process of class formation. The difference between Patnaik’s formulation is that she links the resource endowments to the evolution of labour relations, whilst in the livelihood approaches these are treated as discrete categories which are not linked in the diversification process (see Tsikata 2009) as discussed later.

¹³ Natural capital includes land, water and genetic resources, while the human capital encompasses the “...skills, knowledge, and capacity to work” (Farrington *et al.* 2002: 20). Social capital describes “...the mutual support that exist within and between households, extended family and communities, which people can mobilise to access for example, loans, childcare, food, accomodation and information...” (Farrington *et al.* 2002: 24).

termed *livelihood diversification*, with the objective of attaining success in livelihood security rather than as a survival strategy (Niehof 2004: 326).

The livelihoods are shaped by five components, namely, (i) livelihood context; (ii) livelihood resources; (iii) livelihood strategies; (iv) institutions and organisation and; (v) livelihood outcomes (Scoones 1998; 2009; Carney 1998).

The livelihood context encompasses the historical, political, social and economic conditions, and its variation across time and places shapes the differentiation in the livelihoods. Access to different livelihood resources is mediated by the “institutions” that are conceptualised as “...established ways of doing things, such as social norms and belief systems” (e.g. land tenure systems, labour exchanges, market and credit relations) (Farrington *et al.* 2002: 2; Scoones 1998: 12). Consequently, the households engage in different livelihood strategies to handle short-term and long-term risks (Farrington *et al.* 2002; Niehof 2004).

In the rural areas, the strategies entail three “clusters”, which are “agricultural intensification/extensification”, “livelihood diversification” (including wage labour) and “migration” contingent upon access to different types of capitals/assets and their variation in scale, time (e.g. seasonality) and spatially (over different places) (Scoones 1998: 3; 2015; 2009). These strategies produce *livelihood outcomes* that are measured by the employment generated (wage and self-employment); poverty levels, capacities to shift livelihoods in relation to dynamic contexts, alongside their ability to withstand shocks and stresses (Scoones 1998).

Agrarian labour is thus conceptualised as one of the resources at the household disposal that could be diversified in different agricultural and non-agricultural livelihood portfolios (Bebbington 1999; Niehof 2004; de Haas 2008) rather than the fulcrum of peasant livelihoods. Wage labour relations thus emerge from the diversification of household labour resources across rural and urban locales in both farming and non-farming activities (Bebbington 1999; de Haas 2008; Niehof 2004). Labour migration is considered “... not so much... a coping strategy, but the deliberate diversification of family and household forms and sizes” (Niehof 2004: 327) that improves livelihoods, enhance financial capacity to develop other non-farm activities and curtail instability of household incomes sourced mainly from rain-fed farming,

which is increasingly strained by recurrent adverse weather patterns (de Haas 2008: 37). It is thus associated with the building of an asset base by households that serve as a buffer for future shocks and stresses in the rural areas (Scoones 1998).

The point of departure of these approaches is that agriculture is just but one of many activities in people's livelihoods and its importance varies for different places and times. The importance of land to peasants is neglected since it is seen "...as just one among several different assets/capitals required to make a living..." (Chimhowu & Hulme 2006: 729-30), despite its multiple functions that are critical to the sustenance of households (Moyo 1995).¹⁴ Consequently, the importance of self-employed agricultural labour in the livelihoods of the peasantry is also undervalued.

Analysing land and labour as disconnected entities, livelihoods approaches conceal how land access can extend self-employment in agriculture or wage labour in the case of landlessness (Amanor 2001; Tsikata 2009). Livelihood approaches are thus bereft of class analysis and class struggles, which are central in how people realise their social reproduction (Murray 2002).

Moreover, the neglect of colonial histories in SSA limits the value of livelihood approaches in understanding contemporary agrarian labour relations. Indeed, history is treated as a contextual issue rather than a central one in influencing livelihood patterns and the evolution of assets/capitals and their differentiation according to class and their importance in accumulation cannot be traced (O'Laughlin 2002; Scoones 2009). Critics have also noted that although the "context" is emphasised in the livelihood approaches, in most cases it is ignored in the analysis in favour of agency of the people to come with strategies for their living (Whitehead 2002). Livelihoods perspectives also offer less in terms of prediction of long term outcomes, which can either undermine or strengthen livelihood strategies since focus is on short term adaptation, while excluding long term variables such as demographic change, land

¹⁴Moyo (1995:49-50) lists up to six functions of land: "...(i) store-house of nature for reproduction of future generations, (ii)... an agricultural production tool for subsistence and exchange incomes, (iii)... receptacle of direct household utility needs – water, wood fuel, organic fertiliser, medicine, shade, fruit, housing and home, game meat etc., (iv)... potential investment in water development for irrigation, tourist development, woodlands enterprises, for trading specific natural resources as commodities, (v)... social and political territory of governance and community reproduction [and] (vi)...security or collateral in financial transactions".

use, migration, regional economic shifts and urbanisation, and climate that impact on the transformation of livelihoods (Scoones 2009; 1998).

Since the evolution of the agrarian labour relations in former Settler countries such as Zimbabwe were structured by a historical context of colonial land alienation and agrarian policies sidelining the peasantry, the historical-structural approaches are better placed to explain the consequences of land repossession. However, the weaknesses of these approaches is acknowledged, particularly their under emphasis of the role of individual agency and other social relations such as gender and kinship in shaping agrarian labour relations. It is for this reason that the analysis presented in this research is informed by an understanding that structural factors combine with other wider policies and social relations to generate the agrarian labour relations. The following sections elaborate on such a perspective, and begins by outlining how the specificities of the agrarian structures, including the distribution of landholdings are key in analysing the labour processes.

2.3 AGRARIAN STRUCTURE AND THE DIVERSIFICATION OF AGRARIAN LABOUR RELATIONS

Some scholars (Barret, Besfuneh, Clay & Reardon 2005; Barret, Reardon & Webb 2001; Binswanger, McIntire & Udry 1989) suggest the pervasive nature of self-employment in rural areas in Africa is due to the low population densities and abundance of land that are reflected in high land to labour ratios. The wide availability of simple technologies for production implies that both the potential employer and employee can realise almost the same amount of output (Binswanger *et al.* 1989). For hired workers, the opportunity cost of wage employment is the missed output of cultivating own plot of land given the seasonality of agriculture in SSA (Binswanger *et al.* 1989). Moreover, the inadequate capacities of small rural producers to monitor hired labour results in limited efforts by wage workers, also known as the moral hazard problem and thus family labourers who are "... residual claimants to profits and thus have higher incentives to provide effort than hired labour" (Deininger & Feder 1998:17-18) are preferred.

Accordingly, wage labour relations are largely seen as non-existent and not important for rural social reproduction in arid and semi-arid Africa (Binswanger *et al.* 1989:125-6; Barret *et al.* 2005: 5-6), as well as sub-tropical Africa (Canagarajah, Newman &

Bhattacharya 2001). However empirical evidence shows that low land and labour ratios are not peculiar to Africa, as these also exist in Latin America where higher rural wage employment rates obtains (Oya 2013). According to the latter scholar, countries such as semi-arid Botswana and tropical Gabon with the lowest land and labour ratios, and the highest rates of rural wage employment also contradict the attribution of absence of agrarian labour markets to the former.

Understanding the dynamism and specificities of the agrarian structure enables the identification of different farmer classes in a particular location, and this is key to analysing the agrarian labour relations (Moyo & Yeros 2005a).

2.3.1 Land alienation, proletarianisation and changing labour market regimes

In general, the agrarian structure in most African countries can be characterised as predominantly comprising the peasantry, and a rise in small and medium-to-large scale capitalist farms, as well as a few agro-industrial estates established since colonial times (Moyo 2008; 2011a; 2014). Within such agrarian structures are landless and/or land short people and their families who provide wage labour services across the differentiated range of producers. The farm classes differ in terms of the land sizes accessed, land tenure relations, commercial orientation of production and the extent of the use of wage labour (Moyo 2011a; Hall, Scoones & Tsikata 2017).

Thus, agrarian labour relations in African countries can be broadly differentiated according to the varying degrees of land alienation and extra-economic coercion faced by the peasantry under colonialism (Freund 1984; Mafeje 2003; Mamdani 1996b; Neocosmos 1993) with relatively distinct landholding patterns emerging in settler and non-settler Africa (Amin 1972).

In Settler-Southern Africa, uneven land dispossession resulted in dual agrarian structures composed of large-scale capitalist farms (LSCFs) existing alongside a differentiated peasantry (Bush & Cliffe 1984; Clarke 1977; Neocosmos 1993; Palmer 1977). These studies show that peasantry was generally subordinated to the wage labour markets in the LSCF farms and beyond while also farming small plots to meet their costs of social reproduction.

Under “indirect mode of colonial rule” in non-Settler Africa (e.g. Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast), where land was not expropriated from the peasantry and remained under

customary tenure except for few agricultural plantations and mining extraction enclaves (Amanor 2001; Austin 2005; Mamdani 1996b), peasant labour was not directly incorporated into the labour markets. Rather, such labour was systematically exploited through the extraction of surplus by the state and markets and through indirect taxation of production and compulsion into export/cash crops (Amanor 2005; 2001). A differentiated peasantry however emerged comprising independent lineage family producers, farming labour tenancies and share cropping arrangements, as well as small-scale agricultural estates (e.g. palm oil and cocoa) in Ghana and Ivory Coast (Amanor 2008).

These broad agrarian structures that emerged from colonialism have however been dynamic, shaped in some instances by resistance to global capitalist transformation through domestic pressures from below for more equitable land distribution. Such processes culminated in extensive redistributive land reforms of large-scale capitalist farms in some former Settler-colonial countries in Southern Africa such as Zimbabwe (Moyo & Yeros 2005a) and the demand for the same has been escalating in South Africa and Namibia (Jacobs 2018, Cousins, Dubb, Hurnby & Mtero 2018, Zhan & Scully 2018, Hendricks, Ntsebeza & Helliker 2013). The beneficiaries of land reforms are not only peasants, but include small to medium capitalist farms, while some large farms and agro-industrial estates are also retained (Moyo & Yeros 2005b; Moyo 2011a; 2011b; 2013; Scoones 2010; Matondi 2012).

Land concentration has also been underway during the 2000s in much of non-Settler Africa through acquisition of lands owned by peasants by both domestic and foreign capital and their subsequent development into middle-to-large-scale capitalist farms (Hall *et al.* 2017; Cheru & Obi 2010; Cotula 2013; Moyo 2008; 2014; Moyo, Jha & Yeros 2013; 2019, World Bank 2007). Consequently, the importance of middle and large-scale capitalist agriculture has been on the rise in non-settler Africa where they were largely absent until the post-2000 period (Moyo 2008; 2014; Oya 2013). Notwithstanding the on-going land alienation, the peasantry remains the dominant form of production in Africa (Moyo 2014).

The orientation of production is also differentiated amongst various forms of production, with the peasantry tending towards food production and the large capitalist farms and agro-industrial estates focusing on export and cash crops, such

that differentiated access to and application of farming inputs, and integration into commodity markets (e.g. contract farming, credit) (Moyo 2014) shape agrarian wage labour relations. Oya (2013: 265-266) also argues that the differentiation in agricultural productivity and technologies, as well as linkage to global commodity markets between peasants and large-scale capitalist farms (especially mono-crop plantation estates) results in “scale bias” in rural labour markets. The LSCFs, which rank highly on these indicators, are associated with superior terms of employment for farm labourers (including wage rates) compared to peasants and small to medium capitalist farms (Oya 2013).

However, the existence of labour hiring relations amongst the peasantry themselves, is understated as is the rise of wage labour among emerging capitalist farms in SSA. For instance, by associating large-scale capitalist agriculture with only Settler-Southern Africa, Bernstein (2014) neglects the growing importance of new middle-to-large farms as a source of agrarian wage labour. The increased convergence of African agrarian structures towards tri-modal landholdings (Moyo 2014; 2008) partly explains inadequate capturing of the substantially different labour relations between the peasantry and capitalist classes.

While the ownership and control of land is however not the *only* decisive factor in explaining the evolution of agrarian labour relations, it is critical in shaping who sells or hires labour in Africa (Cousins 2009; Mafeje 2003; Mamdani 1996; Moyo 2013; Moyo 2011a; Moyo & Yeros 2005a; O’Laughlin 2002). More often than not, “... property rights in land also *strongly* influence access to other productive resources, most notably credit, but sometimes water rights, grazing rights and other entitlements” (Evers & Walters 2000:1342-1343, *emphasis added*). Under capitalist social relations, “...productive assets (capital) are unequally distributed and held largely as private property, those who do not own capital must sell their labour power [for their social reproduction]” (Cousins 2010: 10-11). Meaning those deprived of autonomous means of production (including land) are induced into wage work in order to survive. The hiring in or out of labour by rural households is thus a class relation evolving from the ownership of property (Cousins 2010; O’Laughlin 2002). This proposes the need to carefully examine the distribution of landholdings and

related productive resources within a given agrarian structure in order to understand the varied forms of wage labour that exists in countryside.

Yet the significance of the ownership and control of land resources in shaping wage labour tends to be neglected in some analyses, which conceptualise wage labour largely as diversification of household labour resources (Carney 1998; Ellis 1998; Niehof 2004; Scoones 1998) as stated earlier.

The differences in land ownership also generate non-capitalist labour relations such as sharecropping and labour tenancies, as well as land rental markets (Amanor 2008; 2001). Sharecropping involves a landowner leasing out their land to another household in exchange for a portion of the harvest (Amanor 2001). Different types of sharecropping arrangements exist with some involving the complete control of land, labour and production process by the household leasing in the land or tenants, while in others, the tenant only provides the labour and the rest of the production process is controlled by the landowner (Lastarria-Cornhiel & Mehmed-Sanjak 1999). Labour tenancies, on the other hand, involve the provision of labour to land owning household's agricultural production by tenants in return for a usufruct right to a piece of agricultural land (Lastarria-Cornhiel & Mehmed-Sanjak 1999).

Empirical research in the forest region of Southern Ghana showed that sharecropping arrangements were being extended beyond migrant farmers to also include the local youths that could no longer be offered land subdivisions from family lands due to increasing land scarcity (Amanor 2001). Between 19 and 34 percent of the households sampled by Amanor (2001: 78) were using sharecropping to access land in the Dwenease and Apinaman communities respectively. Lastarria-Cornhiel & Mehmed-Sanjak (1999: 45) also observed that in Ethiopia the leasing out of land by poor land owners to rich tenants in return for a share of the crop was also common in order to resolve the imbalances in the factors of production. To avoid wage labour costs, the latter scholars note that it was common for groundnut producers in Gambia to deploy migrant labour tenancies .

By grouping African rural households who have claims to land ownership and those dispossessed of their means of production as “fragmented classes of labour” Bernstein (2014: 97-98) also understates the centrality of land for rural social reproduction and

the impact of land shortages in generating agrarian wage labour relations. More precisely, the notion of “classes of labour” is based on abstraction, rather than any linkage to the ownership of capital, which defines class formation. This conceals the class positions of the peasantry as landowning households who subsequently hire in labour power for their agricultural production units since they are grouped together with those that rely on exploiting their own labour or the landless who hire out their labour. The net result is that the substantially different labour relations between those exhibiting capitalist tendencies through hiring in labour and non-capitalist relations through the primary exploitation of self-employed labour and land leasing cannot be clearly distinguished.

In order to show that rural-urban migration to join wage labour markets is a “voluntary” choice, it is also argued that the abolishment of institutionalised and forced labour migration after the end of colonisation in Settler Southern Africa did not stem the flow of labour to towns to seek employment (Niehof 2004). This perspective, however obscures the influences of structural factors, such as the persistence of land shortages and adverse economic conditions in economically compelling peasants to wage labour markets in the post-independence period (Moyo 2008). In relation to Southern Africa, the analysis of contemporary livelihoods cannot be divorced from the “historical understanding of the proletarianisation” of peasants that evolved during the colonial period (O’Laughlin 2002: 513-4). What passes off as diversification of household labour resources is therefore rooted in the uneven distribution of means of production promoted by colonial administrations (O’ Laughlin 2002)?

Overall, these perspectives highlight the contemporary importance of agrarian wage labour among the peasantry, especially agricultural labour in the process of social reproduction in rural SSA.

2.3.2 Persistent peasantries and re-peasantisation: diverse agrarian labour relations

The peasantry has persisted to exist in the countryside, representing the *dominant* agrarian labour relation in rural Africa, centred as it is on the “ownership” and utilisation of small plots of land mainly by self-employed family labour in various

agricultural and non-farm production and exchange activities.¹⁵ Such labour relations are to a large extent shaped by their degree of access to land, and are thus modified by processes of land alienation or extension of access through land redistribution.

Various theorists have however predicted a post-peasant society due to the absorption of peasant labour into wage labour in the industrial sector and recent transition into multiple non-agricultural activities in the process of social reproduction. Economic transformation is said to reduce the importance of land and agriculture in national output since economic activity is shifted to the modern or urban industrial capitalist sector. Based on the “Unlimited labour supplies model”, it was predicted that labour would be transferred from the peasantry, which constitute reservoirs of surplus labour and scarce capital to the expanding modern capitalist sector endowed with abundant capital and scarce labour (Lewis 1954).

As stated earlier, the migration of labour out of the peasantry is attributed to higher wages and/or income offered in capitalist sectors in relation to agricultural incomes (Todaro 1989; see section 2.2.2). Consequently, this process resolves the inequities in the factors of production (land, labour, capital and natural resources) between the peasant and capitalist sectors (Todaro 1989). Capitalist wage labour relations thus replace peasant labour relations. This view remains influential in multi-lateral institutions such as the World Bank who continue to view economic development through the transfer of labour from rural areas to the industrial sectors (World Bank 2012; see also Lopes 2015).

Colonial land dispossession and the accompanying extra-economic measures in Settler-Southern Africa were also argued to have destroyed the peasantry (Arrighi 1970; Arrighi & Saul 1973; Legassick & Wolpe 1976; Wolpe 1972). A “linear process of proletarianisation” of the peasantry in the capitalist sector was predicted by these analysts as they argued that land alienation had irreversibly dented the capacity of the peasantry to survive only on the basis of farming. Proletarianisation implies the conversion of self-employed forms of farm labour into wage labour in the capitalist sector (Arrighi 1970).

¹⁵These include natural resources extraction (e.g. firewood collection, fruits, medicine, minerals etc.), petty commodity trading, rural artisans and processing of farm and non-farm produce (Ellis 1996; Moyo 1995).

Although the whole of the peasantry had not been proletarianised in the various capitalist sectors (including large-scale farming), it was inevitable that the peasantry were on their way to become proletariats in the expanding capitalist sector, since land alienation had generated an imbalance between the means of production and the peasantry's subsistence needs (Arrighi 1970). Indeed, petty commodity production on land remaining under peasant control, if any, had become insignificant for their sustenance (Arrighi 1970). Alternatively, colonial land dispossession had converted the peasantry into a labour reserve destined to be wage labourers in the capitalist sectors (Arrighi 1970).

Although the effects of land alienation were severe on the capacity of the peasantry to survive only from own farming, the unevenness and incompleteness of dispossession meant that some of them retained small pieces of land, which they continued to farm alongside selling their wage labour resulting in what has been characterised as perpetual semi-proletarianisation process (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Neocosmos 1993). In fact, the process of land alienation was differentiated by districts and local class structures, implying others were totally dispossessed, while the land sizes retained by others were variegated (Ranger 1985; Phimister 1986). During the colonial and post-independence period, semi-proletariats are seen as subsidising capital since they received low wages that are inadequate to meet the costs of social reproduction, hence their supplementation with farming on small pieces of land. This process is also known as the “subsidy thesis” (Scully 2012: 91) or “functional dualism” (de Janvry 1981: 220; Moyo & Yeros 2005a: 20) or “cheap labour system” (Bush & Cliffe 1984: 78; see also Mhone 1996; 2001).

At any rate, the industrialisation process in Settler-Southern Africa and elsewhere in SSA stalled and was unable to provide employment to the expanding labour force from the peasantry, such that unemployment and underemployment have remained chronic problems in many countries (ILO 2015; Mhone 2001; 1996). Moreover, advances in labour displacing technologies and capital flight to the investing countries in Europe during the colonial and post-colonial periods combined to deflate the labour absorptive capacities of the modern industrial sector (Mhone 2001; 1996). The balance in the distribution of factors of production did also not materialise as most rural areas in (Settler) Africa remained underdeveloped (de Haas 2008), as migrant

labour earned “subsistence wages” instead of “market wages” that were largely inadequate for re-investment in petty commodity production in the Communal Areas (Mafeje 2003).

More recently, the increases in the participation of the peasantry in non-farm labour activities over the last three decades following the implementation of SAPs in Africa has been conflated to the “end of the peasantry” or that a process of “de-agrarianisation” or “de-peasantisation” was underway in the countryside (Bernstein 2014; Bryceson 2000; 2002; Bryceson *et al.* 2000; Riggs 2006). De-agrarianisation implies a “permanent” shift from “agricultural based modes of livelihoods” in the countryside towards more non-farm activities (including migration to towns) as a result of the crisis induced on agriculture by SAPs in Africa (Bryceson 1999:192-3). This process is said to reduce agricultural labour importance in both its wage and non-wage variants to the social reproduction of rural dwellers (Jayne, Chamberlain & Benfica 2018; Bernstein 2014; Bryceson 2000; 2002; Bryceson *et al.* 2000; Riggs 2006) and replace it with non-farm labour activities. Others even go further to claim that “... an increasing number of rural households have no commitment to farming whatsoever ...” (Riggs 2006: 181-182). A key gap in the diversification literature relates to the limited examination of wage labour relations in non-farm rural labour activities as they are largely considered as an extension of self-employment outside farming (Reardon 1997).

This perspective is also akin to Bernstein’s (2014: S97-98) argument that since “petty commodity production” is not viable across most of Africa, due to limited access to finance even for those holding land, rural households pursue their reproduction through “...various and complex *combinations* of employment and self-employment” in small-scale farming and non-farm activities across rural and urban spaces . There are “... infinitely diverse combinations of elements of this or that type of labour ...” (Bernstein 2014 :S99 – 100) rendering the “identities” of “worker”, “peasant”, “trader”, “urban”, “rural”, “employed” and “self-employed” (Bernstein 2014: S98) inadequate in analysing agrarian labour relations. According to Bernstein (2014:S97-98), the countryside is instead permeated by “fragmented classes of labour” that are differentiated by resource inequalities, gender and kinship. Implicitly, non-farm rural employment opportunities are assumed to exist in perpetuity, allowing for the infinite

combinations of types of employment activities, yet there are rural households entirely disconnected from these activities.

Beyond the distress induced shift away from agriculture, defined as a “push” scenario, the diversification literature also argues that the growth of non-farm labour activities in “productive agricultural zone” characterised by egalitarian asset distribution also arise from increases in farm labour productivity (Andersson Djurfeldt & Djurfeldt 2013: 283-84). This they add in turn increases per capita food access allowing family farm labour to be deployed in non-farm labour activities. Since the rise in agricultural labour productivity also implies increases in farm income, these analysts aver it widens the capital base to invest in “pull” scenario “high return” non-farm labour activities. Thus, backward and forward linkages with small rural towns enhance the demand for goods produced in the “high return” non-farm activities. The conclusion they arrive at is that over time, these non-farm labour activities are expected to replace agriculture and/or farm labour as the main economic driver in the rural economy, while distressed driven “low return” non-farm labour activities are reduced to insignificance.

However, non-farm activities have been historically combined with farming by peasants in the process of social reproduction long before the onset of SAPs. Peasants in Southern Africa benefitted from natural resources on the lands they accessed through direct consumption and selling in the markets (Bojo 1993; Moyo 1995; Shackleton, Shackleton & Cousins 2001). Various natural resources are important to the sustenance of peasants including indigenous wood for fuel, housing construction, household utilities and fencing; fruits, herbs, plants with medical value, thatch grass, clay and sand (Bradley & Mnamara 1993; Moyo 1995; Shackleton *et al.* 2001).¹⁶ Trade in natural resources has also featured in Zimbabwe’s rural economy since the colonial period. Some scholars (Gelfand, Mavi & Ndemera 1985; Whitlow 1979) documented the collection of medicinal plants by Communal Area residents for resale to urban herbalists. In the early 1980s, as much as 10 percent of the Communal Area residents in areas with low woodland reported purchasing wood for fuel whilst in areas that were heavily deforested, as high as 50 percent of the rural households

¹⁶In Zimbabwe, in the early 1980s, for instance, wood fuel was utilised by 99 percent of the rural households for cooking, and 96 percent and 45 percent for constructing roofs and walls for their homes respectively (Campbell, Grundy & Matose 1993: 43-44).

bought firewood from neighbouring Communal Areas (Campbell, Grundy & Matose 1993: 43-44).¹⁷

Prior to the onset of ESAP in 1991, research in Zimbabwe's Communal Areas also noted that the share of households engaged in the sale of forest products ranged from two percent (ropes) to 37 percent (domestic fruits) (Bradley & Dewees 1993: 97-98). Furthermore, about 15 percent of the Communal Area residents were reportedly involved in non-farm rural enterprises such as blacksmith, pottery and construction (Bradley & Dewees 1993: 97-98).

Empirical research has shown that despite the decline in farm incomes over the last three decades, there has been an expansion of the number of African households for which farming is the centre of their social reproduction strategies (Hazell, Poulton, Wiggins, & Dorward 2010). Another study of nine countries representing 51 percent of the SSA population found that 92 percent of the rural households surveyed were involved in own farming and income from this averaged about 69 percent of the total household income (Davis, Di Giuseppe & Zezza 2017: 169).¹⁸ This points to the continued importance of agricultural labour, especially in its self-employment forms to the sustenance of rural households. In fact, the agricultural population in SSA has grown from 316.21 million in 1988 to 432.49 million in 2007 (IFAD 2011: 247-248). The rising demand for land to farm small plots is also evidenced by the re-emergence of land reclamation movements in much of the countryside in the Global South in response to the dispossession of their means of production (Edelman & Borras 2016; Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Petras & Veltmeyer 2001). These findings suggest that the peasantry is, in fact being resuscitated rather than "disappearing". Such a vision is expressed in the concept of re-peasantisation.

Re-peasantisation is a process where farming is taken up by former proletariats and semi-proletariats as a major component of their social reproduction (Bernstein 2010: 128; van der Berg, Hebinck & Roep 2018: 4). It epitomises the re-orientation from non-agricultural based social reproduction strategies towards those which are dominated by farming. This definition recognises the past linkages of these land short

¹⁷Moreover, firewood from the Communal Areas was also fed into the commercial urban markets that accounted for three percent of the total fuel wood use in Zimbabwe in the late 1980s (Bojo 1993: 231).

¹⁸The nine countries examined were Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, Tanzania and Uganda.

categories to peasant forms of production, albeit as a minor constituent to their social reproduction. Thus, re-peasantisation should not be construed to imply that the peasant option had been totally absent from the social reproduction of semi-proletariats.

At the centre of the notion of re-peasantisation is the ownership of land which "...[represents] autonomy and the opportunity to create a livelihood through often hard and bodily struggles with a hostile environment. Land access enables formerly land short people to "liv[e] from the land" through self-employed farming and exploitation of associated natural and social resources" (Van der Ploeg 2010: 4-5).

The sources of re-peasantisation are varied. The economic crisis context expressed through, for instance massive formal urban unemployment, job retrenchments and de-industrialisation, food shortages and energy crisis is accelerating re-peasantisation in the Global South (van der Berg *et al.* 2018; Moyo, Jha & Yeros 2013) and even in Europe (Van der Ploeg 2008). Many urban based social reproduction strategies are thus under threat and the countryside is increasingly becoming an option for the reconstitution of social reproduction through petty commodity production (Moyo *et al.* 2013). The quality of employment is also a major challenge, as 80 percent of the people employed in SSA are in vulnerable employment (ILO 2015b: 54).¹⁹

In Zimbabwe, the return to the countryside by retrenched mine and LSCF workers and the bidding for land under land reform programmes by urbanites represent forms of re-peasantisation or re-agrarianisation (Chigumira 2018; Mkodzongi 2013b; Moyo 2000; Yeros 2002; Moyo & Yeros 2005b). Potts (2012; 2010) showed that increasing numbers of rural migrants in Harare in the 1990s were planning to trek back to the countryside due to the SAP induced economic deprivation they faced. Furthermore, the high rates of urbanisation in SSA that are used as an indicator of de-agrarianisation are being attributed to mostly natural increases in the population rather than net in-migration from the countryside (Potts 2012).

A similar situation was also observed among retrenched copper mine workers and urban industrial workers in Zambia in the 1990s during the era of SAPs (Ferguson 1999; Hasangule, Feeney & Palmer 1998; Potts 1995; World Bank 2007). The

¹⁹Vulnerable employment includes workers that earn less than US\$2 per day (ILO 2015b: 43).

empirical evidence suggested that most of the retrenchees moved to the countryside to subsist through farming. Indeed, there was a growth in the proportion of agricultural labourers in relation to the total labour force in Zambia from 50 percent in 1990 to 72 percent in 2000 (Mususa 2014: 21). Ncapayi (2005) also observed a trend of migrants abandoning town jobs to establish themselves in farming in the economically distressed former Bantustans of Xhalingeni magisterial district in the Eastern Cape Province in South Africa. Another study also in the same province illustrated the increased investments in agricultural production activities by former urban working classes in the countryside (Fay 2015). Jacobs (2018) also illustrated that the social reproduction strategies of migrant workers in the City of Cape Town did not resemble permanent divestment from the rural areas as they continued to invest there with a hope of returning one day. A panel survey in eight African countries²⁰ between 2002 and 2008, covering 2,354 households, also showed that small producer households were abandoning their non-farm micro-business to focus on farming and dependency on non-farm incomes (rents, interest payments, remittances and pensions) and non-farm salaried employment was also on the decline (Andersson Djurfeldt, Djurfeldt, Hall, Francisca & Bustos 2018). Rather, diversification was located within the agricultural sector itself through the expansion of crop mixes, together with the intensification of grain production by applying more productivity enhancing inputs in response to producer incentives (Andersson Djurfeldt & Djurfeldt 2013: 291-2).

This evidence shows that de-agrarianisation is in fact not a permanent phenomenon, but part of the dynamism of the peasantry's labour process (Oya 2010). Redistributive land reforms that benefit formerly landless and land short peasants is theorised to open a path of re-peasantisation (van den Berg *et al.* 2018) and broaden the prospects for more stable semi-proletarianisation (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Moyo 2013; 2011a; 2011b). Extension of land access to various (land short) peasants and landless workers is therefore indicated to provide them the opportunity to exit from super-exploitation in LSCFs and engage in own petty commodity production via self-employment on redistributed lands. Furthermore, it is also said to expand the possibilities for the poor peasantry to combine independent agricultural production drawing labour from their families and farm wage labour. In addition, such land is not used solely for farming; it opens access to other non-farm sources of wage rural employment, particularly in

²⁰Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia.

trading of natural resource products such as fuel wood and alluvial gold previously monopolised by large scale capitalist farmers (Moyo *et al.* 2009).

As such, re-peasantisation does not preclude the peasantry's involvement in other non-farm based labour activities, including wage labour. Yet the predisposition by some theorists has been to view re-peasantisation and semi-proletarianisation as independent of each other, to the neglect of interactions between them. Alain de Janvry (1981), for instance, emphasises increases in semi-proletarianisation amongst the Latin America peasantry who benefit from land reform but could not fully utilise their land for farming. Neo-classical economists also implicitly focus on re-peasantisation by emphasising the increase in self-employment in farming amongst the peasantry following land reforms (e.g. Cornia 1985; Griffin *et al.* 2002; Heltberg 1998; Lipton 1977; 2005).

Re-peasantisation and semi-proletarianisation emerge side-by-side from the evolving socio-economic conditions faced by peasantry in the countryside (Moyo & Yeros 2005d). Their trajectories are partly shaped by the transformation of the agrarian structures that is underway in the countryside, including through land reforms as well as the wider shifts in the economic conditions.

2.3.3 Increasing incorporation of agriculture into world markets

More generally, capitalist transformation of SSA economies entailing the incorporation of both peasants and capitalist farmers into various global agricultural input and output markets (Clapp & Isakson 2018; Martiniello 2016; Perez Nino 2016; Shivji 2009) has been modifying African agrarian labour relations in a way that is not yet adequately understood. State intervention through providing or withdrawing input subsidies has often modified the way in which peasants are incorporated into global markets. Moreover, the expansion of capital through the increased use of out-grower and/or contract farming has also altered the conditions for peasant production.

However, the factors influencing peasant agricultural production are dynamic and unstable, such that their "...resource base and productivity can often wane or improve" (Moyo 2014:8), with critical implications for farm (wage) labour demand and supply. Yet Bernstein (2014: S98-99) has argued that the "viability or reproduction" of commodity production of the "fragmented classes of labour" in the

countryside was contingent upon the wages and salaries obtained in the labour markets. According to the latter scholar, those “classes of labour” whose wages from different markets are low and inadequate for investment into own farming are thus considered not able to “viably” participate in commodity production since credit is limited in SSA.

Indeed, the context of growing food insecurity since the SAP period, up to the 2005 to 2008 food crisis has seen increased state input subsidy programmes geared towards enlarging food production capacities (Bush & Martiniello 2017; Kherallah, Delgado, Gabre-Mauin, Minot & Johnson 2002; Dorward, Fan, Kydd, Lofgren, Morrison, Poulton & Wobst 2004). Contract farming has also been on the rise in Africa since the 1990s (Sachikonye 2016; Martiniello 2016; Watts & Little 1994), and in line with recent large-scale land “grabs” (Hall, Scoones & Tsikata 2015). These processes have changed both family farm and farm-wage labour relations in ways that are not yet quantified.

The recent transformation of agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe is closely tied to its re-integration into global capitalist markets. For example, the differentiated recovery of production of crops in Zimbabwe following output declines during the early phases of the FTLRP is largely attributed to the changes in policies on subsidies and the re-insertion of export financing arrangements (Scoones, Mavedzenge, Murimbarimba & Sukume 2018b; Moyo 2013a; 2011a; Mukwereza 2013). Tobacco output recovery entailed foreign capital leveraging domestic finance through farming contracts, which provide producers with inputs on credit in return for the sale of the product (World Bank 2012; Sakata 2017; Sachikonye 2016). By 2014, peasants from the old Communal Areas and the new A1 areas accounted for 81 percent of the tobacco contract growers while producing 76 percent of the contracted output (TIMB 2014: 24). Indeed, the demand for farm wage labour has been shown to be higher in the peasant and small capitalist farms engaged in tobacco contract farming (Chambati 2013a). However, whether and how contract farming converts peasants to “disguised wage workers” (Clapp 1994: 81) requires further investigation (Shonhe 2017; Mazwi 2015).

Agrarian labour relations in food crop production are however closely associated with state support. For instance, the maize grain surpluses obtained by peasants in Malawi

and Zambia over the last decade are largely attributed to the provision of input subsidies by the state (Dorward & Chirwa 2011; Druilhe, & Barreir-Hurle 2012). Dorward and Chirwa (2011) indicate a tightening of the farm wage labour demand and supply in Malawi as poorer households who received subsidies reduced their participation in wage piecework, while demand for labour was escalating amongst the better-off recipients. The fluctuations in maize grain production in Zimbabwe since about 2009 are also partly related to the volatile pattern of input subsidies distributed to peasants by the state and development partners (World Bank 2014).

It is evident from the preceding discussion that land occupies a critical role in structuring who hires in and who hires out farm labour in the rural areas in SSA. Yet various processes such as the increased commercialisation of agriculture through linkages of the peasantry to global agricultural markets not only alter the demand patterns land but also affect the farm labour utilisation trends. Altogether, this illustrates that understanding of the relations through the lens of the structural factors alone is inadequate without the consideration of the other wider factors that also shape access to other agrarian resources that are applied to the land. The failure to appreciate the changing nature of the agrarian structures that emerged from colonialism can lead to the neglect of the diverse sources of employment in the rural areas such as the rise of middle and large farms on lands dispossessed from the peasantry in former non-Settler economies, as well as shifting wage labour relations within the former as new inequalities arise.

2.4 AGRARIAN FAMILY LABOUR DYNAMICS WITHIN THE PEASANTRY

Agrarian labour occurs in various forms within the peasantry and within capitalist farms, as well as in various non-farm arenas. In contrast to large-scale capitalist farms, the peasantry mainly draw self-employed labour from their families and inter-household labour exchanges for their agricultural and non-agricultural production activities. The family farm labour relations are gendered and generational, entailing mostly the exploitation of the labour of women and children by older men. However, peasant differentiation is a key process that shapes various forms of agrarian labour, as some households also employ wage labour to boost self-employment while other poorer households hire out their labour for farm wages.

2.4.1 Peasant family structures, kinship relations, identity and labour

The peasant condition combines proprietorship and labour as small property or landowners, who mainly rely on family labour for their agrarian production activities, although this does not preclude hiring wage labour to augment family supplies in peak periods (Boltvinik 2016). Peasants are defined as “... small scale/ family agriculturalists operating within a generalised system of commodity production [which do] not constitute a class in itself but inherent in it are the antagonistic tendencies of proletarian and proprietor” (Moyo & Yeros 2005a:25-26). Rather than being “backward” or “traditional”, peasants are in fact modern “producing for own consumption” and integrated into markets for surplus sales and acquisition of modern farm inputs (Mafeje 2003; Petras & Veltmeyer 2001).

Differentiation tendencies are inherent among peasants due to the uneven dispersal of capital and labour within and across peasant households (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Moyo 2014). Men commonly head most peasant households and control the organisation of production and labour (Djurfeldt, Hillborn, Mulwafa, Mvula & G. Djurfeldt 2017), but the growth of female-headed households in SSA has been recently documented (SOFA & Doss 2011).

Besides peasants, various terms are used to characterise these rural people who own and use small plots of land, to include “small-scale farmers”/“smallholders”, and “communal farmers”. Additionally, the term peasant is also the subject of varied definitions and contestations in the existing literature.

Neo-classical economics conceptualise peasants as “subsistence producers” who produce entirely for their own consumption utilising “traditional methods” of farming and self-employed labour from their households (Ellis 1996). This definition views them in opposite of large-scale capitalist who produce for the market by using modern inputs and technologies (e.g. hybrid seeds, inorganic fertilisers, varied forms of machinery and irrigation) (Ellis 1996; Moyo 2014). Limiting “subsistence” as the exclusive objective of peasant households is empirically inaccurate since the evidence from several countries shows that “...virtually all small producers practiced more than subsistence production”, including during the colonial period when peasant agriculture faced repression (Mafeje 2003: 15–16).

Agricultural economists thus prefer the terms “small farmers” or “smallholders” that reinforce only their role as agricultural producers (Hazell *et al.* 2010; Rukuni & Eicher 1994; World Bank 2008). This definition is largely based on the relative size of the landholdings they operate, with some even fixing ranges of land sizes that fit within small farmers (e.g. less than three hectares of cropped land), while for others “smallness” represents a wider breadth of the resource base in terms of capital, land, skills and labour (Hazell *et al.* 2010: 1-2). Achieving uniform criteria is a major constraint, given that farm sizes are context specific and widely differentiated within and across countries, as a small farm in Africa may not be viewed as such in Asia or Latin America (Ellis 1996). The terms smallholders or small farms also imply homogeneity of their land sizes and other means of production and negates their involvement in different non-farm labour activities (Cousins 2010; Gibbon, Havenik & Hermele 1993; van der Ploeg 2008).

In some countries (e.g. Namibia and Zimbabwe), the areas inhabited by peasants are legally known as Communal Areas that are governed under customary tenure (GoZ 2013; Government of Namibia [GoN] 1990). On this basis, some scholars incorrectly perceive the inhabitants who live in these places as “communal farmers” (Rukuni 1994: 1) suggesting that agricultural production and labour is collectively organised amongst groups of households (Moyo 2014). However, empirical researches in African rural areas have consistently shown that the individual household is the unit of organisation for both agricultural production and labour processes (Mafeje 2003).

Across Settler Southern Africa in numerical terms, the peasantry represents the dominant form of organisation of production and labour, while in non-Settler Africa they not only constitute the largest share of farm households but also hold most of the land. The peasantry in Settler-Southern Africa did not disappear following colonial land dispossession and small-scale farming remains an important constituent of rural social reproduction. Since the colonial period, Zimbabwean peasants were producing food for themselves, as well as surpluses that fed the urban industrial workers (Clarke 1977; Neocosmos 1993). At independence in Zimbabwe, the majority black population controlled 16.4 million hectares at an average of two hectares of arable land per household and were engaged in mostly food production, alongside the export oriented LSCFs (UNDP 1999: 24). The 5,400 mainly white LSCFs controlled about

15.5 million hectares with farm sizes averaging over 2,000 hectares (Moyo 2011a: 512), while producing a diversified range of commodities²¹ utilising wage labour and capital-intensive technologies (Muir 1994). Moreover, about 75 percent of the urban industrial workers, a decade after independence, had a residential base in both rural and urban areas (Peta, Chibatwa, Whanya, Ngirandi & Phiri 1991: 99), while about half of those employed in the LSCFs on a part-time basis straddled between the latter and petty-commodity production in the Communal Areas (Vhurumuku *et al.* 1998).

In South Africa, the most industrialised country in SSA, 12.7 million people (representing 31.4 percent of the population) were domiciled in the former homelands around 1997 (Statistics South Africa 1999: unpagued). The population in the former homelands had access to about 17 million hectares in comparison to over 102 million hectares owned by approximately 55,000 LSCFs (Sihlongonyane 2005: 146). Access to land was limited to the 71 percent of the 2.4 million households in the former homelands, with more than 50 percent of them owning less than one hectare of arable land (Statistics South Africa 1999: unpagued). Regardless of the limited access to land, over 93 percent of the households in the former homelands were practicing subsistence agriculture using mostly their family members to provide labour (Statistics South Africa 1999: unpagued). Few of the households (six percent) were however selling surplus to the local markets (Statistics South Africa 1999: unpagued). Many of the black migrant labourers from the former homelands remain on the verges of the formal economy and reside in the slums dotted around major cities (Davis 2006; Hall & Ntsebeza 2007; Jacobs 2018, Zhan & Scully 2018).²² Chitonge (2013) also cites studies that showed households in the former homelands with migrant labourers continuing with crop and livestock production during both apartheid (May 1987) and post-apartheid periods (Makhura *et al.* 1998).

The resilience of the peasantry in the other settler-economy in Southern Africa (Namibia) is no different with about 70 percent of the black population, five years after democratic dispensation, subsisting in the Communal Areas on approximately 48 percent of the total agricultural land (33.5 million hectares), alongside about 4,200 large-scale farmers on 36.2 million hectares with an average landholding in excess of

²¹ Including sugar, cotton, wheat, soya beans, coffee, tea, beef and dairy.

²²For instance, slums in Soweto and the Cape Flats, ranked 8th and 11th in terms of population size in list of the 30 largest slums compiled by Davis (2006: 24-25). Peasant forms of production have thus remained resilient in SSA (Chitonge 2013; Mhone 2001).

8,000 hectares (GoN 1995: 1-2). Around 2003, livelihoods for approximately 50 percent of the 210,000 rural households were centred on access to land in the Communal Areas and farming was their main source of income (GoN 2003: 49).

As before, farming on small plots remains the predominant activity in countryside in non-Settler countries in Southern Africa despite the on-going waves of land alienation aimed at developing middle and large-scale capitalist farms (Moyo 2014; 2008). In Malawi, for instance, owning on average 1.2 hectares per household, 2.2 million rural households produce most of the food crops, while about 30,000 middle to large farms ranging from 10 to 500 hectares in size specialise in export production (Zuka 2013: 155). While in Mozambique, 90 percent of the rural households (translating to about 80 percent of the national population) practice farming on arable plots less than two hectares (Mucavele undated). Small-scale producers in Zambia, account for 76 percent of the estimated 600,000 farming households, while agriculture is the largest income contributor for 97.4 percent of the rural households (approximately 45 percent of the population (Mucavele n.d: 4).

However, the utilisation of family labour is also broadly shaped by the structure and demographics of peasant families, which are also closely tied to kinship structures and gendered and generational relations. Moreover, identity differences arising from kinship ties affect access to land and other resources, and consequently the inter-household labour relations.

While the term self-employment is generally utilised to characterise the labour relations of the peasantry, it has been noted that in most cases it is not adequately defined (Oya 2013). Self-employment should be associated with the ownership of the means production and include the landowners and their immediate family members who contribute unpaid labour but benefit from the profits from farming and own consumption (ILO 2015a: 32-33). Most families in rural Africa are organised as extended families, including other kin members who do not *control* the means of production (Mafeje 2003; Tsikata 2009). Yet the provision of labour by landless people tied to peasant households through kinship tends to be incorrectly conceptualised as self-employment even though it might entail the exchange of goods and services that are not entirely limited to cash payments (Mintz 1974) and involving super-exploitation practices. Inadequate attention is paid to the organisation of

families, which in turn influences land resource control and the intra-household labour relations. Such intricacies in peasant households labour relations are obscured in neo-classical economic analyses that perceive households as egalitarian structures (Binswanger *et al.* 1995; Deininger & Binswanger 1999; Griffin *et al.* 2002).

The emphasis in rural/agrarian studies on the multifaceted permutations of farm and non-farm labour activities (Bernstein 2014; Carney 1998; Niehof 2004; Scoones 1998) also tends to obfuscate understanding of the variegated forms and quantity of rural/agrarian labour within the two sectors. Reardon (1997) also observed that even non-farm rural labour activities generally tend to be considered as the extension of farm self-employment activities. Yet wage labour relations are also existent in this labour practice, under variegated arrangements including profit sharing, money wages and in-kind payments (Wuyts 2011). Oya (2013: 259-260) thus concludes, "... the distinction between self-employment and wage employment in rural settings remains one of the biggest challenges"

This proposes that research ought to examine the organisation of families and the exchange relations that exist between the landholder and the different household members in order to accurately portray the forms of labour that are being utilised by peasant households. Such an assessment will also provide information on the socio-economic characteristics of self-employed workers, as well as the differences across and within countries, that is largely absent in most research on labour (Gindling & Newhouse 2014).

Kinship or lineage ties that constitute the dominant form of organisation in rural African areas (Mafeje 2003) shape intra- and inter-household agrarian labour relations in a variety of ways. Dynamics within kinship groups, allowed (male) kin leaders such as chiefs and village headmen to mobilise their power and political influence to accumulate land for themselves and their families and friends during both the colonial and post-colonial periods (Baker 1989; Bruce 1988). Within families, kinship norms that are more often defined by men, determine who controls resources and their allocation (Evers & Waters 2000; Manji 2003; Tsikata 2015; 2012; 2009). While differential land control between ethnic groups in countries such as Kenya, Malawi and Uganda can be traced to the colonial "divide and rule" strategies (Mafeje 2003; Moyo 2008; Mamdani 1996b). This has and continues to reproduce inequalities in the

distribution of means of production within kinship groups (between families and, men and women) and across different kinship groups, which in turn shape agrarian labour relations as outlined earlier.

During the colonial and post-colonial period, kinship ties also influenced the recruitment of farm wage labour in both the peasantry (Kerr 2005) and LSCFs (Rutherford 2001a). Not only do they avail key information about labour markets, securing of a job placement sometimes depend on them (Mano, Yamano, Suzuki & Matsumoto 2011; Granovetter 1995; Scott 1994). Field based studies in Zimbabwe (Rutherford 2001a) and South Africa (Ewert & Hamman 1996) observed that permanent farm workers in the LSCFs actively mobilised their relatives for seasonal job opportunities, and promotion from part-time to full-time work sometimes depended on securing labour from their families.

The intra-household labour relations sometimes interact with inter-household labour relations through practices such as non-reciprocal and reciprocal labour exchanges between households that are normally, but not exclusively, bound by kinship ties, as they sometimes incorporate neighbours (Maast 1996; Moyo 2014; Worby 1995).

Non-reciprocal labour arrangements occasionally entail labour cooperation of groups of households to assist poor community members (Scoones *et al.* 2010) and in some places they are coordinated by traditional leaders through cultural practices such as *zunde raMambo* in Zimbabwe (Nyambara 2001).²³ Reciprocal labour exchanges are also varied in form, but mostly commonly organised either as “beer” or “food” parties served by the hosts (Worby 1995; Shiraishi 2006). These involve groups of peasant households taking turns to work on each others’ plots on various farm tasks (e.g. planting and harvesting) and the labour exchanges are gendered in nature since they commonly involve labour of women and girls (Worby 1995; Shiraishi 2006).

Nonetheless, the literature differs on the importance of reciprocal labour exchanges as a source of labour for peasants in the context of global capitalist transition in SSA. Some scholars argue that reciprocal labour exchanges are on the wane and are increasingly being replaced by money wages under capitalist transition (Berry 1993;

²³ *Zunde raMambo* is cultural practice where traditional leaders in Zimbabwe designate land as community field which all household contribute labour and inputs to build grain stocks to assist poor community members in situations of poor harvest (Nyambara 2001).

Ponte 2000), while others note their continued resilience in changed forms existing alongside wage labour and self-employed family labour (Shiraishi 2006). Further empirical research is thus required to unpack the continued utilisation of reciprocal labour exchanges among the peasantry.

Internal and cross-border labour migrations reinforce the dynamics within and across kinship groups. Migration in its different variants has been a feature of agrarian labour relations in SSA since the colonial period entailing institutionalised forms in Settler-Southern Africa (Arrighi 1973; Bush & Cliffe 1984; Mamdani 1996; Mhone 2001; O’Laughlin 2002; Paton 1995) and voluntary and involuntary migrations (Delgado Wise & Veltmeyer 2016). A key outcome of labour migration has been the generation of identity differences in the destination communities between “insiders” (local inhabitants) and “outsiders” (migrants) (Neocosmos 2008; Nyamnjoh 2006). The identity differences are based on the contestations of who qualifies for community membership according to nationality in the case of foreign migrant labour or kinship or ethnicity for in-country migrants (Neocosmos 2008; Nyamnjoh 2006). Various labels are attached to both local and foreign migrants, to include *vauyi*, *makwerere*, *mosken* and *mabwidi* in the Southern African context.²⁴

While in post-independent SSA migration is viewed as a diversification of household labour resources (Hellum & Derman 2004; Niehof 2004; Scoones 1998), its effects in shaping the agrarian labour relations in destinations of migrant labour have largely remained unattended. Attention has however been on the labour processes of the remaining female-headed households and role of remittances from migrant wages in rural differentiation (O’Laughlin 1998; Potts 2000).

Identity differences manifest in the agrarian labour relations through the intensification of competition for wage employment (Murray Li 2011; Selwyn 2014; Oya & Pontara 2015) and scarce resources such as land in which the ownership of such resources by migrants may be contested by locals, as well as state policy (Moyo 2008; Nyambara 2001). For instance, in Ivory Coast, foreign migrants were denied

²⁴*Vauyi* is local vernacular Shona word meaning those who have come to “our” place used to describe local migrants by locals from other parts of the country in Zimbabwe. While *mosken* and *mabwidi* are derogatory terms used to describe mostly farm workers of migrant origin from Mozambique and Malawi respectively. *Makwerere* is reference term for foreigners in South Africa (Neocosmos 2008; Nyamnjoh 2015; 2006).

formal land certificates during the titling programmes as they failed to produce proof of their citizenship and their land was consequently transferred to locals (Assie-Lumumba 2016) reducing them to landless labourers.

Beyond farming, agrarian labour in peasant households is also deployed in non-farm rural activities either as self-employed or wage workers. Peasant labour diversification is not only an outcome of the exploitation of the associated natural resources that accompany land ownership, since the seasonal nature of dry land agricultural production in SSA and elsewhere also opens possibilities to sell labour in the broader labour markets (Boltvinik 2016; Shivji 2009). Yet this has not translated to full wage employment outside agriculture (Chitonge 2013). Peasants should thus not be viewed only as agriculturalists as this creates a false dichotomy between farming and non-farm labour activities, which are interdependent in the process of social reproduction (Gibbon *et al.* 1993).

Van der Ploeg (2008) also argued that the peasantry enter non-farm activities (including wage labour) not only to augment their social reproduction, but also to raise incomes that are re-invested into petty commodity production. Studies on Southern Africa in the late 1970s and 1980s showed this relationship empirically as wage labour remittances to peasant households were partially influential to the social differentiation of the peasantry (Mazambani 1991; O’Laughlin 1998; Potts 2000). Moreover, despite the diversification of livelihoods into other sectors outside agriculture, “...many residents of Communal Areas [in Southern Africa] regard themselves *primarily* as agriculturalists” (Shackleton, Shackleton & Cousins 2001: 581-2, *emphasis added*).

Moyo and Yeros (2005a) further argue that these peasant farm labour diversification strategies in the post-independence period represent a spreading of risk into various economic spheres, in the context of land alienation and economic crises intensified by SAPs.²⁵ The risks and opportunities of peasant production manifest themselves through their forms of land control, integration into various markets, linkages to large

²⁵The SAPs in Africa rolled back state support to rural, agricultural and social development, and entrenched the economic distress and impoverishment of the peasantry (Mkandawire & Soludo 1996; Gibbon & Olukoshi 1996; Moyo 2000). The drastic reduction of agricultural input subsidies for instance, worsened the access to critical productivity enhancing inputs for the poor peasants and their ability to survive on petty commodity production on their small plots (Oni 1995). This perpetuated multiple occupational strategies by the peasantry (Mafeje 2003; Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Shivji 2009).

land owners and agrarian capital, external shocks (droughts and disease) and the dynamic agricultural and economic policies (Cousins 2010; Mamdani 1996b). Shivji (2009: 67-68) puts it more succinctly:

“... In the post-independence period and the neo-liberal period, the process of labour subsidising capital continues in different forms. The peasant sector is the reservoir of cheap seasonal, casual, forced, and child labour under various disguises. Unable to survive on the land peasants seek other casual activities – petty trading, craft making, construction, quarrying, gold scrapping etc. Foreign researchers document and celebrate these “multi-occupations” as diversification of incomes [livelihoods] and the “end of the peasantry”. It is nothing of the sort. These are survival strategies which at the end of the day mean that peasant labour super-exploits itself by intensifying labour in multiple occupations and cutting down on necessary consumption”.

Therefore, the concept of “semi-proletarianisation” (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Neocosmos 1993) and its variant labels such as “worker-peasant” [Bush & Cliffe 1984; Potts 2000] or “partial-proletarianisation” [Munslow & Finch 1984 [2011]] better captures the diversity of agrarian labour relations in the process of social reproduction not only in former settler colonies such as Zimbabwe, but elsewhere. This enables research to define the scope of the diversity of agrarian labour relations in the countryside.

These propositions call into question the validity of the unravelling of a de-agrarianisation process as a result of the increases in non-farm incomes (Bernstein 2014; Bryceson 2019; 2000; 2002; Bryceson *et al.* 2000; Riggs 2006) as stated earlier. As well as the livelihoods diversification processes which claim the involvement of peasants in different farm and non-farm labour (including wage employment) is a deliberate diversification strategy in relation to their labour resources (Bebbington 1999; de Haas 2008; Niehof 2004). The common thread in these perspectives relates to their relegation of farm labour practices of peasants to insignificance. Auto-consumption and income from market sales of surplus produce from their farm units on the basis of self-employed labour is no longer considered important to the survival of rural households since other non-farm sources now provide the bulk of the income.

However, challenges are also abound in the classification of non-farm labour activities, as it differs from study to study in the existing diversification literature (Barret *et al.* 2001a). Not only is there no common definition of what constitutes non-farm activities, the framework for collecting and classifying data on diversification is also largely absent (Barret *et al.* 2001a: 317-318). Accordingly, this results in limited

comparability among studies, as well as wrong conclusions on the nature and scope of diversification (Barret *et al.* 2001a). Indeed, the most common problem identified by these researchers entails the classification of farm wage employment as a non-farm activity as done by Canagarah, Newman & Bhattamishra (2001: 407-408) causing the underestimation of the scope of farm labour markets.

It has thus been suggested that classification of activities should be guided by “sectoral distinctions” of the “national accounting systems”, namely “primary (agriculture, mining and other extractives)”; “secondary (manufacturing) and tertiary (services)” (Barret *et al.* 2001: 318-319). Agricultural incomes from non-value added crop and livestock farming and harvesting of natural resource products are thus differentiated from the non-farm income that embrace all income sources originating from value addition of agricultural products, transportation and trading of non value added agricultural and natural resource products (Barret *et al.* 2001: 318 -319).

These debates however suggest that the role of non-farm labour activities in the process of social reproduction requires further empirical research including whether it is replacing self-employed labour or supplementing their agricultural production activities.

2.4.2 Peasant differentiation and agrarian labour: family and hired labour

Peasants are differentiated into various classes due to the “...historically given inequality of resource endowments” characteristic of capitalist social relations (Patnaik 1997: 209-10). Such differentiation in Africa is rooted in the historically specific conditions such as the varied and uneven colonial land dispossessions, alongside the integration of rural production into global capitalist markets (Mafeje 2003; Moyo 2011c).

As argued earlier, the production relations of the peasantry are subject to risks and opportunities regarding their land tenure and incorporation into the markets, state policies and climate variability (Cousins 2010; Mamdani 1996b; see section 2.3.2).

Differentiation arises from the variegated responses of peasants to these agrarian conditions as others are able to accumulate (land) and capital and recruit wage labour, while others struggle to meet their social reproduction needs and are compelled into

wage labour markets (Mamdani 1996b). This situation is vividly reflected in Patnaik's theorisation on rural class differentiation:

“...Marxist analyses of rural class structures ...posit a hierarchy of resource endowments relative to the production capacity and consumption needs of the peasant households, at any given point of time. This generates relations of labour hiring and land leasing in the process of production and determines the terms on which different groups of producers participate in the markets for commodities, land lease, credit or labour hire.it follows that any given point in time there will be a hierarchy of different situations with regards to the satisfaction of subsistence needs and appropriation of surplus: some “peasants” will fail to get enough to eat, other “peasants” will break even, yet other “peasants” will generate large enough surpluses not only to maintain higher –than-average consumption levels....In short the peasantry maybe expected to be highly differentiated economically into more or less distinct class” (Patnaik 1997: 209-10).

Most commonly, peasant social differentiation has been examined in terms of three (social land class) categories, namely the “rich”, “middle” and “poor” (Moyo & Yeros 2005a: 25; see also Shivji 2009). The rich peasantry endowed with more capital is able to hire labour power beyond the family, whilst the middle peasantry neither hires nor sells its labour power and relies on self-employed family labour for its social reproduction. The poor peasantry combines petty commodity production utilising its family labour and sells its surplus labour power to other households. Wage labour relations, on account of socio-economic differences, exist among the peasantry who should be viewed as both a source and employer of wage labour.

According to Patnaik (1996: 212), the labour process is a key indicator of class differentiation among the peasantry. The labour process is reflected by the degree to which they hire-in labour to contribute to their own agricultural production and hire-out their family labour to work for others, in relation to the self-employment of family workers on their own fields. Three broad classes can be discerned from Patnaik's schema, namely those that (i) are primarily exploiting others; (ii) primarily self-employed and (iii) those primarily exploited by others (see also section 3.7). Those primarily exploiting the labour of others include the landlords who rely exclusively on hired in manual labour of others to work on their holdings, while the rich peasants hire in labour almost equating to the self-employment invested by family workers. Middle and small peasants encompass those who primarily exploit self-employment. More self-employment than hired in labour is utilised by middle peasants, whilst small peasants do not hire in labour of others and hire-out small amounts of labour that is less than their self-employment. The primary labour sellers group includes poor peasants whose amount of labour hired out to others is more than self-employment,

whilst landless labourers, due to the absence of means of production, sell only their labour to others.

Apart from use of hired labour, the peasantry is also differentiated according to the production technologies utilised, the basis of scale and quality of land resources they control, financial resource base, access to capital assets (mechanisation, irrigation equipment), livestock ownership, socio-economic characteristics (gender, educational levels, employment etc.), social identities (ethnicity, religion and age), and socio-political connections (Moyo 2014). Together these factors influence the scale of farming operations and intensity of labour utilisation (Moyo 2014). The land utilisation patterns (including the variation in the areas ploughed and livestock herds), yields and quantum of harvests are an outcome of these socio-economic differences (Moyo 2014; Hall *et al.* 2017).

The empirical literature shows that the rich peasantry who employ more hired labour also tend to dominate the larger landholding sizes, ownership of capital assets, wage remittances, utilisation of modern technologies and are associated with the sale of surpluses to the market (Cousins, Weiner & Amin 1992; Moyo 1995; 2014). Middle peasants, on average, rank lower than the rich peasants in terms of the capital intensification of production, but they are largely able to produce most of their food and sell little surpluses (Moyo 2014). The poor peasantry are largely marked by ownership of small pieces of land and limited finance to invest in their agricultural production units and labour sales are key to their sustenance since they barely produce enough food to eat from their production (Moyo 2014, Moyo & Yeros 2005a). It has also been noted that most middle and rich peasants in customary areas are linked to families of traditional chiefs that are influential in allocating land rights (Worby 1995; Nyambara 2001).

Despite the fact that the peasantry are not a homogenous group, but are instead differentiated according the land sizes, access to finance and technologies among other factors, the wage labour relations which this scenario implies remain understudied. Instead, it is the self-employed forms of labour of the peasantry that receive most academic attention. Therefore, the understanding of the scale of wage labour utilisation, types of workers that are recruited and the subsequent working conditions remains a key gap in the research on agrarian labour. Whether non-farm

rural labour activities are part of the character of the peasantry remains an unresolved question in the academic debates. Specifically, whether there is permanent displacement of farm labour that has been underway in SSA induced by the SAPs, which withdrew state support to peasant agriculture or whether the situation reflects the continuation of the semi-proletarianisation process that has defined the historical character of the peasantry. Further empirical research is thus required to unravel the dynamics in the importance of agricultural labour in the rural livelihoods and how these processes evolve in the context when access to land to peasants is enhanced by land redistribution programmes.

2.5 AGRARIAN WAGE LABOUR AND FORMAL AGRICULTURAL LABOUR MARKETS

The forms of agrarian labour which obtain among the peasantry and capitalist farms are substantially different, with the former deriving most of their labour for commodity production from self-employed family members, while the latter are largely reliant on hired wage labour (da Silva 1984; Langyuito 2005).

2.5.1 Forms of capitalist agrarian wage labour

Overall, wage employment in LSCFs that is characterised by defined contractual arrangements and receives a monetary wage, qualifying its fit within the recognised neo-classical economics criteria of formal employment, tends to receive most research attention (Leavy & White 2003). The less commonly recognised forms of wage work, such as piecework, however face neglect in the agrarian labour analysis. Also the variants of wage labour are not adequately defined in most cases, yet they are context specific in nature.

Agrarian labour under capitalist agriculture, especially LSCFs, has been addressed as the full and part time wage labour that are employed on either family or private agribusiness managed farms that produce for the (export) market and are exclusively reliant on hired labour for agrarian production (du Toit & Ally 2003; Gibbon 2011; Wisborg *et al.* 2013; Visser & Ferrer 2015; Hall *et al.* 2017).

The landholding and agrarian systems in Settler Southern Africa, with a few white farmers controlling large tracts of agricultural land, generated a peculiar form of labour management system (Gibbon 2011; Gibbon *et al.* 2014) different from feudal

and tenancy system elsewhere. Farm compounds on small portions of LSCFs housed full and part-time wage labour from neighbouring Communal Areas and a few workers sometimes had access to small pieces of land for own agricultural production in these compounds (Rutherford 2018; 2001a; Scoones *et al.* 2018a; Clarke 1977; Arrighi 1970; Rubert 1997). Precarity characterised the farming land and residency rights of farm labour, which were contingent upon their continued employment engagement on the LSCFs (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Rutherford 2001a; Sachikonye 2003). As noted earlier, this scenario resembles what Moyo (2011a) has conceptualised as a “residential labour tenancy” system.

The diverse forms of wage employment in LSCFs tend to be defined in terms of the permanency (or completeness) extent of labour services; namely, terminologies that include “full-time”, “permanent”, “part-time” and “casual”, although such terms obfuscates the differentiated character of employment, particularly the varied degrees of part-time forms of labour. Permanent or full-time employment is defined as person who is engaged in a job with the “same employer” continuously, possessing either a written or verbal contract (ILO 2015: 33-34). Whilst part-time work includes those hired for a “specific period of time” for a “task-based contract” (piecework) or “...occasional[ly] or intermittent[ly]” for a “...specific number of hours, days or weeks” (also called casual work) or “fixed term contracts” for pre-defined period of time that are regulated by “...specific legal provisions on the maximum length” (also referred to as seasonal work) (ILO 2015: 33-34). Another variant of part-time work entails the use of agents by farm employers to mobilise labour on their behalf for a defined period of time (ILO 2015: 33-34). The agents remunerate the workers employed who are also known as contractors for work performed for the LSCFs who are in a contractual agreement with the agent (ILO 2015: 33-34). This is also known as labour brokering or externalisation of labour in the South African context (Wisborg *et al.* 2013; Visser & Ferrer 2015).

There are thus many variants of what is commonly referred to as part-time or casual farm wage labour such that broad references to it in terms the proportions of households using this type of labour or the number of part-time workers limits the understanding of its differentiated categories. It is also important to note that while permanent farm workers in SSA are attached to an employer continuously, they also

work for other employers on part-time basis in order to raise additional income to cover the gaps in the subsistence costs that the paltry wage are unable to procure, as well as engage in independent agricultural production. In light of this, permanent farm workers should not be viewed as tied to just one employer in order to expose the multiple jobbing character that exists in agrarian labour markets.

Permanent farm workers in Zimbabwe, for instance, also engaged in task-based part-time farm work within and outside the LSCFs during their rest days (Rutherford 2001a), and an estimated 40.5 percent were peasant producers in neighbouring Communal Areas (Vhurumuku *et al.* 1998). This was sometimes actively supported by some LSCFs in districts such as Hurungwe who provided farm inputs either for free or on credit for workers to crop their pieces of land in neighbouring Communal Areas (Rutherford 2001a).

Indeed, permanent farm wage labour does also not necessarily mean a worker is a “pure proletarian” (Oya 2013; Moyo *et al.* 2000). Indeed, Petras & Veltmeyer (2001) argue that wage workers in the developing world are different from those that emerged in Europe since the 18th and 19th century who totally severed their links to land. Even permanent employees are not just “workers”, as many of them are connected to the land both in theory and practice through their origin or family links and actually owning land respectively (Petras & Veltmeyer 2001). They are also engaged in diverse labour processes.

Piecework is the most informal type of work across the different variants of part-time farm work. It entails two broad categories, namely; time rated tasks where an employment contract is for an agreed number of hours of work or task rated which involves finishing specific quantum of work such as weeding a portion of land area or harvesting an agreed quantity of output (Chambati 2013b; Gibbon 2011). Remuneration is based on an agreed fee for the specific task for task rated piecework or daily or hourly wage rate for time rated piecework (Pérez Niño 2016; Shiraishi 2006). These piecework wage rates are sometimes standardised within a given farm community (Visser & Ferrer 2015). Piecework only survived in the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe after independence and is legally banned in all other sectors (GoZ 2001b: 12-13).

In some contexts, piecework is stigmatised or considered as demeaning by rural communities and is thus underreported in quantitative surveys causing the underrating of the scale of agrarian labour markets (Oya 2013). Derogatory terms are sometimes utilised in the local *lingua franca* to refer to piecework. For instance, a Swahili term, *kibarua* commonly used in Tanzania is associated with slave forms of labour (Mueller 2011), whilst terms such as *ganho-ganho* and *ganyu* are associated with a low social status and despair in Mozambique and Malawi respectively (Bryceson 2006; Perez Nino 2016; Kerr 2005) in the same way as *maricho* is used in Zimbabwe. It has thus been suggested that qualitative research is important to uncover the stigmas that can be deployed to carefully word questions in quantitative surveys (Oya 2013) in order to capture the full extent of the hiring in and hiring out of labour in rural areas.

Piecework is also differentiated in some contexts in relation to its purpose. In Malawi, for example, piecework referred to as *ganyu*, is distinguished between “seasonal *ganyu* for food” and “short-term *ganyu* for cash” meant to cover food and cash shortages respectively (Kerr 2005: 170-171). Seasonal *ganyu* for food occurs mostly in the midst of the rainy season when poorer households have exhausted food stocks from their harvest and are paid either in cash or in-kind (Kerr 2005: 170-171). Its primary purpose is to mobilise food resources from in-kind payments or cash to procure food (Kerr 2005: 170-171). Whilst short-term *ganyu* is done between agricultural seasons to harness cash for other household expenses as food is relatively available after the harvest period (Kerr 2005: 170-171).

The extent of inclusion of the informal variant of part-time work, piecework, in official labour statistics of LSCFs in Zimbabwe is not clear since the categories of non-permanent employees are not adequately defined but are said to include including casual, temporary, seasonal, and contract workers (ZIMSTAT 2011; 2015). In South Africa, casual and seasonal employees are grouped together in the official statistics to include occasional and day labourers, e.g. shearers, repairs and fruit pickers, but exclude contractors and their employees (Statistics South Africa 2009: 23-24). In fact, Sender and Johnston (2003) complain of the incompleteness of the official casual labour statistics, perhaps indicating the limited or non-inclusion of informal labour such as piecework. It is thus not possible to disaggregate the scope of the different

categories of part-time work in relation to the size of labour force and their distribution across the different types of LSCFs from official labour statistics.

The aggregation of the forms of wage labour in official labour statistics and studies (e.g. Chambati 2009; 2007; Mutangi 2010) also neglects the variation in the legal protection of farm jobs, especially the part time labour. In Zimbabwe, the Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA) for the agricultural sector that came into effect in 1992 protect permanent farm workers, including their wage rates and benefits (e.g. paid annual leave, sick leave, working hours, industrial holidays, and provision of protective clothing), as well as other working conditions and handling of labour grievances (GoZ 1993). Seasonal farm workers are the only part-time workers that are covered by the CBA, which legally defined them as employees who have a continuous employment lifespan of not more than eight months in a calendar year (GoZ 1993: 2-3). The working conditions of pieceworkers are not legislated in the CBA and are negotiated at the local level between employer and employee. As such they are classified by the law as contract workers (GoZ 1993: 2-3). Those employed through third party agents also known as contractors are also not catered for and the responsibility of meeting the agreed remuneration is deferred to the agents (GoZ 1993: 2-3).

Oya (2010) also observed that part time workers in Mozambique who constituted the lion's share of the agricultural wage labourers were also not covered by existing legislation that largely catered for permanent employees. As a result, a large section of the farm wage labour force is excluded from legal protection through the selective inclusion of some categories of workers. This means that nature and scope of inequality in the agrarian labour markets can be uncovered more clearly by research that disaggregates the different types of farm work.

As such, generalised references to increased "casualisation" of LSCF farm wage labour tends to be commonly used to discern the agrarian labour relations during the era of economic liberalisation in South Africa (e.g. Wisborg *et al.* 2013; Devereux & Solomon 2011)²⁶, although most studies obscure the differentiation of the precise variants of casual labour being hired in the countryside. Which variants of casual

²⁶ Casualisation is generally understood to be the displacement permanent jobs by casual jobs (Wisborg *et al.* 2013).

labour are associated with casualisation is not clarified due to a failure to explain the types of employment that are now being occupied by the former permanent employment or nature of part-time work that is being recruited by LSCFs. The complexity of part-time farm wage labour relations requires the deconstruction of the precise constitution of the form of employment in a particular locale, as this is critical in the exposition of the differentiation of this broad form of labour.

2.5.2 Trends in formal agricultural wage labour

Rather than self-employment in the peasantry, wage employment in the LSCF is considered a key source of (formal) agricultural employment for poor rural people (Hellum & Derman 2007; Palmer & Sender 2006; Sender 2016; Sender & Johnston 2003), despite declining LSCF employment trends over the last three decades (Wisborg *et al.* 2013; Kanyenze 2001; Visser & Ferrer 2015). Simultaneously, the demand for jobs is growing beyond the capacity of the industrial sectors to employ (ILO 2015a). Indeed recurring economic crises under capitalist social relations (Davis 2006; Harvey 2012; Zhan & Scully 2018) imply that wage employment is unstable and the backwards and forth movement between wage employment, reproductive labour (relating mostly to women and children), self-employment and unemployment is not uncommon (O’Laughlin 2002).

For instance, between 1993 and 2007, the number of permanent and casual farm workers in South African LSCFs declined from 1,093,265 to 796,806, but nominal gross farming income increased from R19.6 billion to R79.5 billion during the same period (Statistics South Africa 2009: 10-11). Economic crises combined with other factors, including the withdrawal of LSCF subsidies in the 1970s, the consolidation of LSCFs that was accompanied by capital intensification (Wisborg *et al.* 2013) had displaced the South African LSCF labour force, particularly the permanent labour from about 0.8 million workers in 1972 to 0.6 million in 1995. Casual farm labour also declined during the same period from just under 0.8 million to about 0.4 million workers (Aliber, Baipethi & Jacobs 2007: 135).

In Zimbabwe’s LSCFs, the number of full and part time workers grew from 270,496 in 1991 to only 314,419 in 2000 (Table 4.5) with increases largely driven by part-time workers. Between 1983 and 2000, permanent farm workers in LSCFs hovered just over 150,000 workers for most of the years (Table 4.5). However, as observed by

Loewenson (1992), technological advances in LSCFs had led to a substantial decline of farm labour from 286,513 workers in 1972 to 220,228 workers in 1982 (Table 4.5). It is permanent farm labour that was retrenched as it fell from 210,862 to 164,044 workers between 1972 and 1982 and replaced by casual farm labour that rose from 33,884 to 56,184 workers during the same period (Clarke 1977: 28). This period featured the diversification of land uses in the LSCFs away from labour intensive crops (e.g. maize and cotton) towards capital-intensive land uses (e.g. irrigated wheat and horticulture) (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Loewenson 1992) as elaborated in Chapter Four. It is perhaps important to mention that the increasing share of part-time workers is not just limited to the agriculture sector, but a key feature of the neoliberal period as employers in a wide range of sector tend towards flexible employment arrangements with lower financial implications on employee benefits (e.g. pensions and health care) and labour can be disposed of easily in relation to the changing socio-economic contexts (Jha 2016); ILO 2015a; 2015b).

2.5.3 Quality of employment of agrarian labour

The significance of various forms of (peasant) agrarian labour, particularly in terms of their importance in the process of (household) social reproduction is generally contested in the existing literature, because the “quality” of such labour in terms of wage levels, “formality” and security is considered pitiable, precisely, the treatment of agricultural wage labour in LSCFs is considered to be superior (Sender 2016; Palmer & Sender 2006; Sender & Johnston 2003).

The quality of wage labour tends to be assessed mostly in terms of the monetary wages earned by the workers (Binswanger *et al.* 1989; Magaramombe 2010; Mutangi 2010; Sachikonye 2003), as well as the formality and/or job security in relation to the nature of employment contracts (e.g. verbal or written) and the duration of employment (e.g. piecework or continuous engagement) (Visser & Ferrer 2015). However, in reality it needs to include an evaluation of other benefits (e.g. pensions, medical benefits) and in-kind payments received by workers, their working conditions (e.g. hours of work, provision of leave - annual and sick, provision of protective clothing and other requisite tools to requisite tools required to perform assignments), methods of supervision of labour (e.g. physical violence or negotiations) and gender discrimination in employment offered and remuneration (Jha 2016: 1996). The

adequacy of the wages and other benefits in meeting the social reproduction needs of wage labourers and their families (e.g. food, education, health, and clothing) is a key marker of the quality of labour (Jha 2016; 1996; Mamdani 1996a). In contrast, the quality of self-employed peasant labour tends to be measured in terms of the profits earned from the sale of agricultural commodities (Deininger, Naidoo, May, Roberts & van Zyl 1999) to the neglect of the use values derived from own consumption, as well as the uneven distribution of workloads between the different members of the household as elaborated later (see section 2.6).

In Mozambique, for instance, the monetary wages earned (Cramer, Oya & Sender 2008; Sender, Oya & Cramer 2006) in large-scale capitalist agriculture are considered better than the wages realised by wage labourers employed in other types of farms and among self-employed peasants. Indeed, it has been argued that many rural people are more inclined to low-wage work in the capitalist sectors including LSCFs than engaging in self-employment in petty commodity production that is subject to low returns (e.g. profits from surplus commodities sold) and fluctuations in the volumes of outputs produced and thus the incomes earned (Sender 2016; Palmer & Sender 2006).

Consequently, Sender and Johnston (2004: 158-159) view the increases in self-employment following land reforms in South Africa as a regression since it decimates the rural wage labour opportunities provided by LSCFs that are “... so crucial for their survival ...”.²⁷ To address the food insecurity and malnutrition in rural South Africa, Sender (2016) advocates for policies that would boost wage employment in the large-scale capitalist farms. Tellingly, the advice was that “...Policy-makers must recognise the continuing, *central importance* of waged employment for the survival and well-being of households in rural areas” (Sender 2016: 23 *emphasis added*). The fulcrum of this suggestion, according to the later commentator, should be hinged around the provision of state subsidies to a few large-scale capitalist farmers involved in labour intensive export crops. These authors (Sender & Johnston 2004; Sender 2016) thus view the formal farm wage labour economy on LSCFs as the only significant form of agrarian wage labour in terms of realising adequate incomes from wages that can

²⁷Such biases partly explain the focus of research on LSCF wage labour relations to the exclusion of self-employed labour relations amongst peasants. In the case of Southern Africa see for example (Amanor-Wilks 1995; du Toit & Alley 2003; Wisborg *et al.* 2013; Loewenson 1992; Rutherford 2001a;b; Wegerif, Russell & Grundling 2005). Casualisation is generally understood to mean the replacement of permanent workers with part-time workers.

sustain households rather than self-employed peasant labour. For instance, the empirical evidence of 87 land redistribution projects utilised to reach these conclusions suggested that the median profit per beneficiary from agricultural production amounted to R161 or US\$20 (Sender & Johnston 2004: 158-59).

However, there is no discussion on the use values derived by the beneficiaries from consumption of own commodities produced that would enable the presentation of the complete picture of the “profits” from agriculture. Despite the absence of data on wage employment in the land redistribution projects, the authors implicitly suggest its scale is limited and instead highlight the declining trends in LSCF employment since 1994 as largely responsible for the decline in the standards of living of poor rural people in South Africa (Sender & Johnston 2004: 158-59). Not only is the quality of labour in LSCFs in terms of wage rates eschewed by these authors, they also seem oblivious of the long term declining trends of LSCF employment that set in the 1970s as noted above. The self-employment prospects that could be generated through increased state support to the peasantry are also negated by Sender (2016: 23) who argues for the denial of subsidies to “...extensive rain-fed farming of low-value food and livestock for the domestic market”, which are mostly produced by the latter because it is cumbersome to coordinate such programmes for millions of small farmers.

The history of wage labour relations in large-capitalist farms in Settler-Southern Africa and elsewhere however suggests an entirely different outcome regarding the quality of the labour and its contribution to the social reproduction of agrarian labourers. The widespread super-exploitation of wage labour through wage repression and extremely poor working conditions has been reported throughout Settler-Southern Africa (Addison 2007; Amanor-Wilks 1995; Wisborg *et al.* 2013; Visser & Ferrer 2015; Loewenson 1992), Latin America (Fernandes 2005; de Janvry 1981; Mattei 2005; Pereira 1997) and some parts of Asia (Li Murray 2011; Rao 1999).

For instance, in LSCFs during the colonial period in Zimbabwe, an average monthly wage could only purchase a pair of khaki trousers in the 1930s (Arrighi 1970). More so LSCFs took a very long time to adjust wage rates as reflected by their stagnation between 1940 and 1970 (Amanor-Wilks 1995). White farmers used intimidation, racial abuse, threats of dismissal from work and indeed physical violence to manage

labour (Palmer 1977; Rutherford 1995; 2001; Rubert 1997). Unlike other sectors, farm labour was only integrated into the labour regulations in Settler-Southern Africa after the attainment of independence (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Gibbon 2011; Visser & Ferrer 2015). Instead, the labour relations were administered through the *Masters and Servants Act of 1899* that considered farm workers more or less as the property of LSCFs and excluded possibilities of collective bargaining (Clarke 1977; Jeeves & Crush 1997).

New legislation after independence, including the incorporation of farm labour in the labour regulations (e.g. minimum wages), improved the lot of farm workers (Kanyenze 2001; Visser & Ferrer 2015). Farm labourers in Zimbabwe however remained the lowest paid amongst the formal employment and the majority of them were living below the poverty datum line (over 75 percent around 1996) (Kanyenze 2001: 108-9). A similar situation is also reflected in South Africa where Wisborg *et al.* (2013: 53-54) observed that LSCF farm workers were also the poorest category of employees despite contributing 11 percent of the total formal employment. In fact, the minimum wage around 2015 (below R150 per day) of South African farm workers, twenty one years after apartheid, have been noted to be inadequate to prepare meals of "... acceptable nutritional standards for a family of four" (Visser & Ferrer 2015: vii). Since residency and employment were linked, forced evictions from residency in freehold LSCFs after loss of employment was a key challenge faced by both farm workers in South Africa (Wisborg *et al.* 2013; Visser & Ferrer 2015) and Zimbabwe (Clarke 1977; Sachikonye & Zishiri 1999) since the colonial period. For example, between 1984 and 2004, over 1.679 million farm workers and their families were forcibly evicted from the South African LSCFs after being retrenched from work (Visser & Ferrer 2015: 83-84).

As a result, the struggles of semi-proletariats and rural proletariats especially those employed in LSCFs and plantations across much of the Global South, reportedly seek to exit from super-exploitation in such workplaces through bidding for access to land to enable independent production (Bernstein 2003; Byres 2004; Wisborg *et al.* 2013; Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Moyo 2011a). Male farm workers in Zimbabwe, for instance, actively sought land in the neighbouring Communal Areas after independence, including through purchasing plots in the informal land markets and entering into

marriages with Communal Area residents that enabled them to access land (Moyo *et al.* 2000; Rutherford 2001a). Surveys also showed that most farm workers (52 percent) preferred land allocations during the FTLRP rather than continued employment (31.3 percent) (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 33-34). Research in South Africa's Communal Areas also showed that amongst most landless people, acquiring land was a key aspiration, while the majority of those with access to land were keen to expand their land access (Marcus, Eales & Wildschut 1996).

It is noteworthy that widespread resistance to the creation of large-scale capitalist farms through land dispossession in non-Settler Africa and other regions of the Global South (Cheru & Obi 2010; Cotula 2013; Moyo, Jha & Yeros 2019; 2013; World Bank 2007) emanates from historical experiences on the oppression of LSCF wage labour (Li Murray 2011). A growing corpus of literature has highlighted the displacement of self-employed peasant labour in the new wave of land dispossession (Cotula 2013; Hall, Scoones & Tsikata 2015; Torvikey, Yaro & Teye 2016; Yaro, Teye & Torvikey 2017; Nyantakyi-Frimpong & Kerr 2017) and a major concern has been the reproduction of poor working conditions in the new LSCFs being created similar to those observed in Settler-Southern Africa. For instance, the working conditions observed in foreign owned plantations in Mozambique, including their failure to satisfy the minimum wage requirements and manipulation of labour contracts to avoid regulated benefits (Oya 2013), come close to experiences of LSCFs in South Africa and Zimbabwe. According to Silver (2003), such resistance to land dispossession, including those witnessed during colonialism, represent the agency of the peasantry to protect their self-employed jobs and/or push back against proletarianisation in the emerging LSCFs and plantations. In other words, these struggles should not just be perceived as land reclamation struggles for they are also forms of labour resistance.

Additionally, the examination of the quality of labour in the LSCFs tends to be limited by reporting mostly on the monetary wages and omission of the incidence of in-kind payments and precise assessment of their value that could provide insights on the complete picture of the total wage earnings of farm workers. In-kind payments represent a wage that is not paid in cash, but is paid in terms of goods and services including land, food and residency (Gibbon 2011). Cramer *et al.* (2006) and Sender *et al.* (2006) neglect in-kind payments in LSCFs since they associate them with mostly

the poorer segments of farm labourers employed on small farms and thus potentially underestimate the total farm wage and the overall quality of labour. However, both monetary and in-kind payments combine to form the broader wage structure in LSCFs, and the latter tend also to be used as an instrument of labour control in LSCFs. The in-kind payments received by workers such as residency and land to grow crops reinforced a sense of “belonging” to the farm (Addison 2014; 2013) and allowed LSCFs to curtail labour mobility.

As observed by other researchers (Ewert & Hamman 1996; Rutherford 2008; 2001a), access to land to grow own crops and the relatively better accommodation in South African and Zimbabwean LSCFs also tended to be used in some farms to muster employee loyalty, particularly to reward the senior and/or trusted workers. The LSCFs dispersed their authority to these workers including ensuring the satisfactory performance of work by fellow farm workers and discretionary powers to discipline truant workers (Addison 2014; 2013). The senior workers also served as conduits of information for the LSCFs on the happenings beyond the work sphere to include the social lives of workers in the farm compounds (Addison 2014; 2013).

The quality of labour in LSCFs is also shaped by labour migration dynamics. Agricultural employers, including large-scale capitalist farms, can instrumentalise the presence of (foreign) migrant labour to repress wages and impose poor working conditions, which are readily accepted by migrants with limited survival options (Oya 2013; 2010; Murray Li 2011). Rather than being lazy (Breman 1990; Alatas 1977), local labour is able to resist wage repression in the LSCFs, including total disengagement from wage labour markets, due to existence of other survival possibilities especially if they retain control of some land (Murray Li 2011). This is what Silver (2003:13) has characterised as “market based bargaining power” as expounded upon later (Section 2.7).

The returns from self-employed forms of labour in the “backward” peasant sector are generally assumed to be less than those of farm wage labour (Freund 1984). Most studies which under-value the self-employed agricultural labour in petty commodity production tend to have limited empirical analysis on the value of peasant incomes in relation to wages in the capitalist farms (Sender 2016; Sender & Johnston 2003). Indeed, the use values derived from own farming and production for family

consumption are poorly quantified. Hence, Oya (2013: 256-257) notes "... it is hard to find studies that systematically and rigorously compare wage rates with net returns to labour in own account activities, especially farming". Thus, the supposed superiority of wage labour in the LSCFs compared to peasant labour returns is not empirically founded.

Assessing the quality of agrarian labour thus requires a precise understanding of broad material (and social) conditions which shape "returns" to agrarian labour and their significance in (household) social reproduction. Apart from monetary wages, the complete picture of the material conditions of LSCF wage labour has been obscured by the limited consideration of other other income receipts such in-kind payments and "social wages" such as access to land. Research efforts in this direction will enhance the comprehension of the diverse sources of income derived from LSCF wage labour, as well as the wider mechanisms of labour control and mobilisation. It is also evident that the assignment of the LSCF wage labour as being more important to the livelihoods of rural people over their self-employment in own farming in former Settler-economies is based on inadequate empirical assessment of the net returns to peasant farming derived from auto-consumption and surplus sales. Therefore, they are key gaps on the contributions that self-employed farm labour makes to the sustenance of the rural people and how that compares to the returns from wage employment in LSCFs. The material quality of labour is also an outcome of the gender relations and resistances waged by agrarian labour to poor working conditions, which are discussed next.

2.6 GENDER AND AGRARIAN LABOUR RELATIONS

Gender intersects with class dynamics, kinship and customary practices to influence agrarian labour relations in diverse ways, including the distribution of the means of production, division of labour between men and women, as well as the inter- and intra-household power relations in rural SSA (Tsikata 2016; 2015; 2009; SOFA & Doss 2011).

The families²⁸ from which self-employed labour is mobilised among the peasantry are constituted in a variety of forms, comprising nuclear families that are composed of a mother and father connected by (customary) marriage and their children and extended families that include other relatives from their kinship (Mvududu & McFadden 2001). Other families are also constituted as polygamous units, while marriage is not a prerequisite for the make-up of a family as single parented households are also common (Mvududu & McFadden 2001). Family members are not necessarily domiciled in single residential place at any given point in time, as some members are straddling between different locations in and out of jobs (Mvududu & McFadden 2001; O’Laughlin 2002; 1998; Potts 2010; 2000; Tsikata 2015).

Patriarchal customary law and practices that govern land allocation, land tenure and land use across most parts of rural SSA marginalise women in the access to and control of resources (including land) (Chiweshe, Chakona & Helliker 2014; Mafeje 2003; Tsikata 2009). Family patriarchs (who are mostly older men) in patrilineal societies monopolise the access and control of land, but women also own land under differentiated situations in SSA (Tsikata 2009). While matrilineal societies such as those in Northern parts of Malawi confer land rights to women (Moyo 2008), the control over such land is increasingly falling into the hands of men upon inheritance (A. Djurfeldt *et al.* 2018; Koopman 1997).

The peasant family or household is differentiated along gender and generational lines which shape the uneven control of capital and land resources between its male and female members (Evers, Walters & Tsikata 2009). Hierarchy in family organisation tends to be under the headship of men (Mvududu & McFadden 2001), although *de-facto* and *de-jure* female-headed households also exist in the countryside, with the latter trend considered to be dominant (SOFA & Doss 2011).²⁹

Nevertheless, neo-classical economic models on the family farm household has tended to treat the household as unitary models, neglecting internal differentiation within households, and their consequent impacts on the allocation of resources,

²⁸ The term family is narrowly utilised here to characterise the household. Social scientists sometimes deploy the term to widely imply a group of households tied by kinship ties (see Ellis 1996; Mathambo & Gibbs 2009).

²⁹ A FAO report produced in 2011 revealed that up to 25.5 percent of the rural households were led by *de-facto* and *de-jure* female heads (SOFA Team & Doss 2011: 44-45). The report argues that the majority of these households are *de-jure* female heads.

including labour (see Ellis 1996). The unitary model is premised on the fact “... that household members seek to maximise utility on the basis of a set of common preferences represented by any aggregate utility function, and a common budget constraint” (Agarwal 1997: 2-3). The economic outcomes are not only a function of the total household income, but also how it is spread among the different members that constitute the household (Doss 2013: 54-55; Nyantakyi-Frimpong & Kerr 2017).

The majority of women in SSA access land through male relatives (Evers & Walters 2000; Tsikata 2009). Women’s marginalisation in the control of land resources reproduces gender inequalities in intra-household labour relations, which men deploy to control women and children’s labour (Evers & Waters 2000; Manji 2003; Tsikata 2016; 2012; 2009). Moreover, the power derived from resource control enables men to define the social norms, including resource entitlements and the allocation of men and women’s labour in agriculture (Evers & Waters 2000; A. Djurfeldt *et al.* 2018). A combination of unequal resource control, patriarchal gender and generational relations thus enables older men to exploit the self-employed labour of women and children to work on household agricultural production and reproductive activities, largely through coercion and compulsion (Lyon, Mutersbaugh & Worthen 2017; Evers & Walters 2000; Manji 2003; Tsikata 2009).

Indeed, women tend to be prevented from leaving the household in search for wage work, and older men are also known for restricting school leavers, especially girls, from migration in order to stabilise family farm labour supplies (O’Laughlin 1998).³⁰ Such influence over the mobilisation of self-employed labour from their families is not always obvious for women landowners. For instance, women landholders growing cocoa on small plots in Ghana fared poorly in comparison to men in the mobilisation of self-employed labour, such that a disproportionate burden of farm work fell on women and children (SOFA & Doss 2011; Tsikata 2009).

While the extended family, which is culturally seen as a form of social security by helping poor members of kin, it is also used to exploit the labour of relatives that are accommodated within family farm units (Moyo 2014; Oya 2013). The ravages of the

³⁰ A 2010 World Bank database of 98 developing countries showed that the share of men “...working as non-paid employees is high for teenagers then falls sharply from after men reach 20 years old. For women, the proportion of working as non-paid employees remains high until they are about 40 years old” (Gindling & Newhouse 2013: 318-319).

HIV/AIDS pandemic, as children are increasingly accommodated within the households of relatives of their deceased parents, has widened the existence of extended family units in Africa (Mathambo & Gibbs 2009).

Beyond the household, patriarchal practices restrict women's participation in farm and non-farm wage employment (Elson 1999; Scott 1994).³¹ Surveys in post-colonial Mozambique showed that most women wage workers were "autonomous" from male domination, living in "female headed or female dominated" households (Oya 2013). At the same time, regional specificities such as farm compounds that housed workers and their families in large-scale capitalist farms in Settler-Southern Africa since the 1920s, enabled the earlier proletarianisation of women compared to other regions in SSA (Arrighi 1970; Clarke 1977; Gibbon 2011; Rutherford 2001a; Tandon 2001; Vail & White 1980). However, in a changing context, various bargaining processes within the confines of patriarchal institutions have allowed women to enter wage labour (Bryceson 1980; O'Laughlin 2002; 1998; Potts 2012). The need to widen family income to meet key needs such as children's education, especially in the context of declining agricultural incomes induced by neo-liberal reforms, is a case in point (Bryceson 1980; Shivji 2009). The avoidance of the marital institution and changing attitudes on gender equality within families has also facilitated their proletarianisation (Bryceson 1980). Consequently, the gap between wage labour force participation rates of males and females has been declining in many countries (ILO 2015a), although female participation rates in rural wage employment are differentiated.³²

Nonetheless, the entry of women into (agrarian) wage labour markets has however not necessarily translated to improvement of women's material conditions (Ghosh 2019; Tsikata 2016; Naidu & Osome 2015; Elson 1999). Gender inequalities at the workplace has also meant that women mostly access the irregular, insecure and poorly paid types of jobs at lower rung of the occupation ladder, which are also broadly defined by their low educational status and skills base in comparison to men (ILO

³¹In Southern Africa, this was reinforced by colonial policies that preferred the extraction of male labour, while restricting the movement of women from the rural areas through various pass laws (Arrighi 1970; Clarke 1977; O'Laughlin 1998; Rubert 1997).

³²A Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) report showed that in 2004, 16.6 percent and 1.4 percent of the rural women (15 – 60 years) were employed in rural labour markets in Malawi and Nigeria respectively, while in Ghana female participation rates were 3.8 percent in 1998 (SOFA Team & Doss 2011:19 -20).

2015a; SOFA Team & Doss 2011; Torvikey *et al.* 2016).³³“Gendered hierarchies” in wage payments also reinforce disparities between men and women. For example, in South Africa’s LSCFs, men reportedly earn more money than women for the same work (Devereux & Solomon 2011: 6-7). Research in Mauritania and Mozambique showed that women were restricted to the lowly skilled tasks that commanded the lowest wages (Oya 2013; 2010). The rural wage gap in Ghana and Malawi reported in 2009 was 58 and 35 percent respectively (SOFA Team & Doss 2011: 23). Up to 32 percent of the difference in wages was attributed to gender discrimination in Ghana, while it was 26 percent in the case of Malawi (SOFA Team & Doss 2011: 23).

Thus, “... labour market institutions have typically been constructed on the assumption that women employees were secondary earners who could draw upon the assets and earning of men (male partners, husbands, fathers, brothers etc.) to cushion them against risk” (Elson 1999: 616-617). Rather than assuming that labour outcomes are a result of the interactions between demand and supply (Ehrenberg & Smith 2006; Ellis 1996), research must take cognisance of the gendered nature of labour markets to avoid blurring the markedly different experiences of men and women.

The literature reviewed here reinforces the idea that a multiplicity of factors need to be incorporated in the analysis of the labour relations beyond the disproportions in the access to and control of land. Gender relations are as crucial to analysing the intra-household and inter-household labour relations, as they are to the labour markets, which also feature varied experiences between men and women.

2.7 AGENCY OF AGRARIAN LABOURERS

Agrarian labour relations are also influenced by the “agency” of the agrarian labourers and peasants themselves through individual and collective action (Paton 1995). Agency or resistance is defined as the human actions that peasants and agrarian labourers engage in to respond to the structural conditions and constraints hindering their material conditions (Paton 1995). However, structural approaches largely assign the fate of peasants and agrarian labour to the wider socio-economic structures within global capitalist system. The linear proletarianisation thesis, for

³³In 2004, only 10.9 percent of women rural wage workers in Malawi occupied full-time positions, compared to 40.7 percent in Ghana in 1998 (SOFA Team & Doss 2011: 19-20). The same study notes that Nigerian women rural wage workers fared better with 72.1 percent in full time positions in 2004.

example, forecloses the resistance of the peasantry to the conversion into fully-fledged wage workers after colonial land dispossession in Settler-Southern Africa (Arrighi 1970; Clarke 1977). The control of land by white LSCFs was assumed to entrench their total control over the landless wagers. In other words, structural approaches:

“... [give] such an overwhelming power to the economic structures of imperialism and capital that the African people seem powerless to affect their own destinies in any meaningful way. The result is that history lies beyond the control of the masses” (Neocosmos 1993: 29-30).

Peasants and agrarian labourers, within this perspective, are passive subjects of the macro-social forces or “subjects” of structural forces (de Haas 2008; Johnston 2007), who are devoid of agency. Nonetheless, peasants have a long history of resistance since the colonial period including through continued farming of areas designated as European farms in Zimbabwe and participating in the struggles for independence (Ranger 1985) and resistance to the imposition of various land and labour taxes imposed by the apartheid government in South Africa (Beinart & Bundy 1987).

Descriptive livelihood approaches, on the other hand, reduce agency to the open ended choices peasants make in realising their livelihood either in agricultural and non-agricultural activities, which is exhibited through “acquiring, utilising and managing assets and resources [at their disposal including labour]...in a more or less strategic manner” (Niehof 2004: 323-234). Individuals are endowed with causal powers to intervene to particular situations they confront in their livelihoods (Bebbington 1999; de Haas 2008; Hebinck 2002; Scoones 1998). The inadequate consideration of structural factors imply that mere survival strategies of peasants are conflated to central forms of agency, as opposed to those responses that are aimed at redressing structural conditions that lead to exploitation. In reality, some choices are constrained by structural factors and resource access is embedded with struggles between “winners and losers” of a particular livelihood strategy being pursued by certain classes (O’Laughlin 2002; 2004).

Marxian political economy, however posits that the exploitation and oppression of peasants and agrarian labourers by other classes such as large farm capitalists, through unequal control of means of production, elicits resistance from the former in a bid to improve their material conditions. The “economic and political structures”, that impinge the social reproduction of the peasantry/rural working classes at different

points in time thus shapes agency (Petras & Veltmeyer 2001: 91; see also O’Laughlin 2002; Shivji 2009). Under capitalist social relations, the question of agency is taken as a given and analysis is focused on the different ways of its expression and reaction to it (O’Laughlin 2002). Therefore as the previous scholars argues dialectical unity between structure and agency is inevitable and the two cannot be conceived of as separate from each other.

Class-consciousness, which implies how the oppressed perceive themselves in relation to the means of production, leads to action by members of a particular class in search of solutions to their problems (Petras & Veltmeyer 2001). Variations can however exist in the class-consciousness amongst members of the same class based on the “...specific conditions under which such a person lives” (Mintz 1974: 314).

Resistance of the peasantry to oppression, for instance, is coloured by dynamic and sometimes contradictory interests of various classes due to the social differentiation that pervades rural areas in SSA (Cousins 2010). As such the struggles of semi-proletariats reflect not only the grievances of land shortages and insecurity of tenure they face as petty commodity producers, but also the poor wages and working conditions in their role as wage labour (Moyo & Yeros 2005a). However, in some cases, resistance to exploitation reflects the “class for itself” tendencies, with grievances identifiable with a distinct class (Jha 1996; Petras & Veltmeyer 2001). Examples include actions by landless workers against their employers on plantation estates aimed at redressing the poor social conditions of wage labour. These actions express themselves as purely working class or proletarian struggles.

The agency of workers in the labour markets can be examined in relation to how they deploy different forms of powers to advance their material conditions (Wright 2000). By “power”, Wright (2000: 962) meant the “...capacity of individuals and organisations to realise class interests”. For the working class, this translates to secure employment, earning wage above the costs of social reproduction and good working conditions. According to Wright (2000: 962), the workers derive their power to respond to their socio-economic conditions in the labour markets from two sources, namely; “structural power” and “associational power”. Structural power “...results simply from their location in the economic system. The power of workers as

individuals... results from tight labour markets or from the strategic location of a particular group of workers within a key industrial sector...” (Wright 2000: 962).

Silver (2003: 13) extended this analysis and delineated structural power into “work place bargaining power” that arises “...directly from tight labour markets” and “market place bargaining power”, which is derived “...from the strategic location of a particular group of workers within a key industrial sector. More specifically, the “market place bargaining power” is an outcome of the “...(1) possession of scarce skills that are in demand by employers, (2) low levels of general unemployment and (3) the ability to pull out of the labour market and survive on non-wage sources of income” (Silver 2003: 13). “Associational power”, on the other hand, emerges from belonging to “collective organisations of workers” such as trade unions and political parties that act to advance the interests of the working class (Wright 2000: 962).

Actions in the labour markets by workers could be equated to what Moyo *et al.* (2000: 190) have categorised as “workerist” struggles that are mainly aimed at addressing their conditions as wage labourers. However, these authors were also clear that workers’ responses to their socio-economic conditions transcend their actions in the labour market to constitute what they termed as “transformative” struggles (Moyo *et al.* 2000: 190). The latter seeks their transition from the wage economy towards more autonomous social reproduction and for rural workers this often includes struggling for access to land to engage in independent farming. Focus on only the labour markets thus risks the danger of omitting the semi-proletarian tendencies of the struggles of the rural working classes (Moyo & Yeros 2005a) and thus limit the understanding of the different dimensions of agency in the countryside.

The forms of resistance by rural people, including the working class, are differentiated and can occur concurrently and/or spread over time (O’Laughlin 2002; Moyo & Yeros 2005a). These include deploying their universal suffrage in electoral politics, confronting agrarian capital through encroaching private property to access land and natural resources monopolised by large capitalist farms, organised land occupation movements to expand their access to land, participation in trade unions for improved working conditions and involvement in revolutions and rebellions (Jacobs 2018; Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Moyo & Matondi 2008; Peters 1994).

Absence of the commonly recognised collective actions such as labour protests (e.g. strikes) and visible organisational forms (e.g. trade unions) should, however not be misconstrued to imply non-existence of resistance (Jha 2016; 1996; Wilderman 2014; Silver 2003). Since agricultural labourers in India could not openly confront employers over poor working conditions because of the “structural disadvantages” against them, the resistance of agrarian labourers took the form of the actions described by Scott (1985: 35) including “...foot-dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson etc.” (see Jha 1996: 200-201).

In other contexts, exclusive private property rights on LSCFs can be activated to hinder collective actions by denying trade unions access to workers, leveraging legislation such as trespass laws. Such experiences were common in Zimbabwe’s LSCF’s prior to 2000 (Kibble & Vanlberghe 2000). In fact, less than a third of the LSCF workers were unionised around 2000 with most of them in the plantation estates in the lowveld (Kibble & Vanlberghe 2000: 26). Further afield in countries such as Brazil, not only are union leaders excluded from the LSCFs, they are subjected to physical violence by the landlords (Selwyn 2014; Pereira 1997).

Despite being invisible, the “weapons of the weak” have delivered social change to agricultural labourers alongside other labour policy reforms in places such as India, including the disappearance of physical assault and sexual exploitation of female workers (Jha 1996). However, others (Oya 2013) largely emphasise the role of collective action and note that the “better” working conditions enjoyed by workers in LSCFs is due to the presence of trade unions and closer labour inspections by state officials not found on small farms. As a result of the inadequate attention paid to the less visible forms of struggle by workers, a fuller understanding of workers’ influence on labour relations is incomplete.

Farm labour struggles are also affected by identity differences as migrant labourers are more prepared to accept poor working conditions than local labourers because of limited survival options as argued earlier (see sections 2.4.1 & 2.5.3). Resistance to the conditions of work by local labour thus leads to intra-class conflicts between the local farm labourers and migrant labourers with detrimental effects on collective action (Breman 1996; Standing 2006). For instance, in the Limpopo Province in South Africa, large capitalist farms deploy the illegal status of Zimbabwean migrant

farm workers to offer poor working conditions (Addison & Rutherford 2007; Wisborg *et al.* 2013), while similar situations embodied Mozambican workers in Mpumalanga Province (Sender & Johnston 1996). Such intra-class conflicts have also been observed in the rubber plantations of Malaysia (Li Murray 2011). Different circumstances such as labour and skills shortages can however have differential labour market outcomes, induced by competition for migrant labour that paves the way for improvement of wages and related conditions of work (Oya 2013).

Specific forms of social exploitation and conflict that are peculiar to Settler-Southern Africa such as the conditions of farm labour residential tenancy (Arrighi 1970; Clarke 1977; Neocosmos 1993; Rubert 1997) shape the various aspects of regionally specific agency among agricultural workers. Intertwining employment and residential rights, the scenario facing farm workers in Settler-Southern Africa on LSCFs has been characterised by some researchers as “...living on other people’s land” (Speirenborg 2019: 1). This is qualitatively different from labour tenancy found in other parts of SSA and Latin America and Asia, whereby labour tenants provide labour unpaid labour to large land owners in exchange for land access (Lasstarria-Cornhiel & Melmed-Sanjak 1999; see also section 2.3.1).

The residential labour tenancy of Settler Southern Africa, also known as “labour stabilisation”, guaranteed LSCF labour supplies from the resident workers and their families (Gibbon 2011: 29; see also Tandon 2001). The LSCFs instrumentalised the farm labour residential tenancy to control labour at the workplace and beyond in ways that were sometimes at variance with laws. It was thus characterised as a form of “domestic government” by Rutherford (2001a: 95); it was exploitative and based on dependency of employees on one farmer for both work and residency (Clarke 1977; Gibbon 2011). This arrangement impinged on the resistance to poor farm wage labour relations, including both individual and collective action as workers feared losing both residency and employment (Chambati 2013a). Recent research from South Africa has demonstrated that the possibilities for self-organisation to confront LSCFs over poor wages and working conditions are enhanced if the encumbrance of the residential labour tenancy is absent. Wilderman (2014) showed that workers who lived off-farms were crucial in organising the wildcat strike in De Doorns in the Western Cape Province that resulted in the rise in the minimum wage in 2011/12

without the active involvement of rural trade unions. Selwyn (2014) reported similar effects in export grape farms in the South-East of Brazil, as off-farm residency was associated with increased worker militancy. As a result of this, the study notes that many LSCFs have been reverting to on-farm residency to reassert their control over labour, including who visited them in the farm compounds.

Clearly, the interests of the working classes act in direct opposition to the interests of the capitalist class that are driven by maximising profits and keeping wages low is part of the cost containment strategies. It is therefore not unexpected, that the capitalist classes would respond to the actions of working in defense of their profits. Silver (2003: 39) characterises four types of responses to worker resistances in the labour markets in the United States of America and Europe in the 1960's; namely, "spatial fix", "technological fix", "product fix" and "financial fix". Migration of capital to areas of low labour resistance, which imply the possibilities to pay low wages and thus enhance their profitability is represented by the "spatial fix". Although not specifically addressed by Silver (2003), the sourcing of labour from other places should also be equally considered as a spatial fix to the resistance of local labour as seen in the early years of establishment of European mines and farms in Rhodesia (Chapter Four). In fact, as will be seen later, foreign migrant labourers from Nyasaland (now Malawi), Mozambique and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) dominated the wage labour markets until the 1960s when locals began joining as land dispossession efforts were widened by the colonial government (Chapter Four).

Technological fixes, put simply, involve the adoption of labour displacing technologies and thus reduce the costs of wages. Product fix entails the movement of capital into the production of goods characterised by less challenges in their labour markets within their original geographical spaces or relocation to other sites. Again, these tendencies were self evident in the restructuring of LSCF agriculture in Zimbabwe after the introduction of regulated labour markets after independence in 1980 through the movement away from labour intensive commodities to more capital intensive products promising more profits in the lucrative European export markets (Chapter Four). The last strategy, the financial fix, relates to the total withdrawal of capital from trade and production into finance and speculation.

This literature thus suggests that the agency of agrarian labour should be analysed not only in terms of their individual actions but also collective worker responses in order to expose the diverse struggles and their effects in improving their material conditions. The outcomes of labour resistance are not only contingent upon actions of the workers, but are mediated by the responses that they elicit from the capitalist classes. Moreover, the actions of the agrarian labourers transcend the labour markets, including their quests for autonomy through land ownership for independent farming.

2.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the theoretical and conceptual perspectives on agrarian labour relations in SSA and more specifically in former Settler-Southern Africa. The historical-structural approaches were found to be more applicable to understand the new agrarian labour relations compared to the neo-classical economic and livelihoods framework. Indeed, the agrarian labour relations in former Settler colonies such as Zimbabwe were based on a historical context of specific land-labour utilisation relations created by land dispossession and discriminatory agrarian policies during the colonial and immediate independence period. The literature review illustrated that the character of the agrarian structures, including the distribution of landholdings and land tenure relations, shaped agrarian labour markets.

However, it was also evident that the structural factors and/or class dynamics reflected in the existing agrarian structures alone were by no means the only determinant of the agrarian labour relations in Settler-Southern Africa. Specifically, these class dynamics intersected with socio-economic policies and other social relations such as gender, generational hierarchies, kinship and citizenship, for they also influence access to land and other agrarian resources and produce differences between families, men and women. Further to this, the nature of resistance by agrarian labourers to their socio-economic conditions in the labour markets and beyond impacted on the perceived labour relations, a point neglected by historical structural approaches. This framing of the intersection of structural factors and other wider social relations informs the analysis of Zimbabwe's new agrarian labour relations arising from the extensive agrarian restructuring and shifting agrarian policy dynamics presented in this research.

In general, agrarian wage labour relations have been incorrectly associated with former-Settler economies such as South Africa and Zimbabwe that have expansive large-scale capitalist farms. Alternatively, self-employed labour relations are assumed to predominate amongst the peasantry. As such, the different forms of agrarian labour and the diverse sources of employment that exist among the differentiated peasant classes are understudied. Certainly, there has been a growing body of knowledge on the farm labour relations in LSCFs in former-Settler Southern Africa but only a few studies focused on the peasantry. Also worth mentioning is that the understanding of the wider labour relations has been limited by independent assessments of the LSCF labour relations separately from those of the peasantry, resulting in the omission of the inter-linkages between these two sectors.

The literature tends to undervalue the importance of self-employed farm labour of the peasantry for their sustenance, but with inadequate examination of the net income returns from farming and use values derived from auto-consumption of food they produce in comparison to wage employment in LSCFs, which is considered superior and important for their survival. Moreover, this was against a background of overwhelming emerging evidence, which has shown the insufficiency of farm wage incomes in the costs of social reproduction, alongside the snail's pace in growth of employment in the capital intensive LSCFs. The importance of self-employed agricultural labour and by implication access to land among the peasantry has also been questioned and a permanent reallocation of labour away from farming to other non-farm activities is considered to be underway especially in the context of the SAPs experienced in SSA that reduced state support to small-scale farming. The validity of some of these assertions is tested in the analysis presented in this study.

The research methodology and study approach utilised to examine the transition of the agrarian labour relations in the context of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe is discussed next.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND STUDY APPROACH

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter outlined the theoretical and conceptual framework undergirding study, and critically reviewed the existing knowledge and perspectives on AALR. The main research question posed earlier concerns the nature and extent to which structural changes in the land ownership and property relations and the consequential shifts in agricultural production patterns and markets, and various agrarian policies have reshaped agrarian labour markets, the nature and organisation of labour relations within and among the diverse range of farming units. This chapter sets out the research methodology and approach applied to analyse the new agrarian labour relations.

The study approach adopted to address the research questions posed in Section 1.5 entailed examining labour relations within farming units and/or farm households as the principal study units and various sources of data at different levels from the farm to the national level.

Post-FTLRP agrarian labour relations were assessed at the national and/or macro-level to trace historical and contemporary dynamics of the relationships between agrarian labour markets and; land access patterns and changing agricultural and economic policies and, at the level of district through two case studies to track the differentiation in FTLRP agrarian restructuring and effects on the agrarian labour markets; at the farm household level to capture the sources and forms of labour being utilised and the influences of various socio-economic factors on labour utilisation; household structures and dynamics of intra-household labour relations in terms of gender, age and kinship; and at the level of farm labourers and their households to analyse the forms of farm labour, as well as the quality of wage labour and individual agency and farm compounds to understand the trajectory of residential labour tenancy and collective action undertaken by farm workers to improve their material conditions.

This multi-layered analysis enabled the triangulation of data sources and inclusion of diverse standpoints from different actors in the agrarian labour markets that include both the former and new farm labourers and farm households in their variegated roles as either self-employed family labourers or employers of farm wage labour or sellers of farm labour to others.

Methodological triangulation through detailed quantitative and qualitative research in the two case study districts of Goromonzi and Kwekwe and various other sources of information enabled the study to unpack the transition the agrarian labour relations that had emerged from the agrarian restructuring and dynamic agrarian and socio-economic policies. The various sources of information, which supplemented the primary data, included literature reviews of existing studies, secondary data from government reports, media articles and court records.

Following this introduction, the chapter outlines the research paradigm influencing the study. The next section defines the study units that provided information to track the new labour relations and the levels of analysis in relation to the research questions. To provide the specific level and context in which the agrarian labour relations were assessed, Section 3.5 provides a background of the study areas. The section prior to this details of why the case study approach was selected to understand the transition of agrarian labour relations since 2000.

The data collection approaches to elicit primary data on the new agrarian labour relations at the micro-level through the quantitative surveys of farm households and farm labourers and qualitative surveys, which involved key informant interviews and direct physical observations extends the discussion on the procedures followed by the study. The other issues covered in the remaining sections of the chapter encompass the sampling techniques utilised to select the study participants, and the analytical approaches employed to make sense of the information collected in field. Before concluding, reflections on the validity and reliability of the research and the ethical principles adhered to by the study are exposed.

3.2 RESEARCH PARADIGM

This research is anchored on the critical theory paradigm that is driven not only by the production of knowledge, but also to influence the transformation of societies (Howell 2013). In particular, it seeks to influence the emancipation of farm labourers, whose voices have been largely silent in the rural research following the FTLRP. They constituted a substantial section of the populace that has been historically marginalised in the ownership of land since the colonial period and eked out a precarious living from toiling in the LSCFs. Critical theory ontology assumes that the reality is an outcome of social and historical processes including political, economic, cultural, ethnic and gender dimensions (Howell 2013; Neuman 2006). Therefore, the reality is dynamic and the historical dimensions shape the social and economic phenomena, and theories are not universally applicable but are dependent on the time and place (Mwanje 2001a).

3.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DATA SOURCES: STUDY LEVELS AND UNITS

A series of sub-questions were posed to help answer the study's four broad research questions, and clarify the levels of analysis, data requirements, source of data and the data collection methods (Table 3.1). The multi-layered analysis of the new agrarian labour relations is elaborated below and the study units that included farm labourers and their families, farming units and/or households and farm compounds are also described detail and linked to the research issues explored by the thesis.

Sub-research questions

Below, the sub-questions that were asked for each research question are presented.

Does the redistribution of land to mostly small-scale producers and a retention of a reduced base of large-scale capitalist farms lead to a decline in capitalist wage labour relations alongside the rise in the use of family farm labour, and/ or do new extensive forms of wage labour emerge?

To understand the transformation of the capitalist wage labour relations and family farm labour that the research question intended to address, the following sub-questions were posed: (i) what is the structure of landholdings and/or sources farm (wage) labour that has arisen following the FTLRP at national and sub-national

levels? Tied to this were a range of questions: (i.a) What is extent of the incidence of farm wage labour utilisation among the different range of farm households? (i.b) What is the degree of formality of the farm wage employment being offered by farm households (e.g. duration of employment/extent of permanency of employment, types of contracts and mode of wage payments)? (i.c) What is the extent of the incidence of hiring out of farm wage labour to other farm households by land owning and farm labourers' households? (ii) Are other non-capitalist farm labour relations such as inter-household labour exchanges (reciprocal and non-reciprocal), sharecropping and labour tenancies associated with small-scale producers also emerging alongside family and wage labour? (iii) What is the extent of incidence of the utilisation of family farm labour among farm households? (iv) To what extent is social differentiation among farm households shaped by the use of family and wage labour and/or on the (need to) supply farm wage labour to others? Thus: (iv.a) what is the scale and proportions of family and wage labour utilisation among the different farm households? (iv.b) What are the emerging class positions of the different farm households in relation to the extent of dependence on either family or wage labour in their agricultural production enterprises? (v) What is the relationship between the emerging class position of the farming units and their size of land holdings, gender of landowners, commodities produced, and value of output, agricultural assets owned, inputs used and access to capital?

To what extent is the diversification into non-farm rural labour activities replacing farm labour as an important source of income to land owning farm households domiciled in diverse locales?

The diversification into non-farm rural labour activities was examined from the following lens: (i) What proportions of land owning farm households and land short and/or landless rural households participate in non-farm rural labour activities? (ii) To what extent does the location shape the levels of participation of households in non-farm rural labour activities? (iii) What is the proportion of family members involved in non-farm rural labour activities in relation to the total family size and what are their positions within the households? (iv) How much income is contributed by farm and non-farm rural labour activities in the total household income? (v) Are non-farm rural labour activities an avenue to mobilise finances that are invested in household

agricultural production activities or do incomes from family farm labour finance non-farm rural labour activities?

Has the expansion of the number of farm households following redistributive land reforms resulted in increased competition for farm wage labour and consequently improvement in the quality of wage labour?

Five sub-questions were asked to answer whether or not the increase in the number of farm households had led to increased competition for farm wage labour, as well as its quality. (i) What are the relative sources of farm wage labour (whether it is from other the farm households, the landless, from nearby Communal Areas or district sites; urban areas) and which sectors does farm wage labour compete with for its demand? (ii) What is the extent of the incidence in the recruitment of cheap sources of wage labour such as children, extended family relatives, women and labour migrants? Linked to this is the extent of the incidence of the exploitation of the unpaid family labour of women, children and extended family relatives in farm households' agricultural production enterprises? (iii) What proportions of farm households are not able to mobilise adequate wage labour as a result of shortages of labour and/or limited supplies of farm labour? (iv) What is the direction of change in the quality of farm wage labour in terms of the wages earned (money and in-kind) and other working conditions (e.g. working hours, provision of rest days and/ or annual leave, methods used by employers to supervise labour negotiation using physical violence; and provision of material to accomplish tasks) and do variations exist among farm households? Consequently, are farm wages adequate to meet the livelihood needs of farm workers and their families such as food, clothing, education, health and household assets? (v) Do the wages and working conditions vary according to the skills and gender of farm labourers, scale of agricultural production, commodities produced and location?

Has the reconstitution of the freehold land tenure into state land tenures, which compelled mandatory labour provision by labourers resident in the LSCFs' compounds, resulted in the undermining of the residential labour tenancy system and increased the autonomy of farm labourers to sell their labour and organise for favourable conditions of labour supply and/or engage in other forms of agency/resistance?

The above research question was divided into the following sub-questions: (i) Are the locations of farm wage and non-farm labour employment contingent upon the farm labourers' places of residency? (ii) What is the level of dependency on wage incomes among farm labourers and their families for their sustenance and/or what proportion do farm wages contribute to the total household income? (iii) How are farm workers mobilising individual agency to respond to poor wages and working conditions? (iv) What is the extent of participation of farm wage labourers in formal and informal organisations that represent their labour rights such as formal trade unions, workers committees, and informal labour groups and what roles do these organisations play in resisting poor wages and working conditions (e.g. strikes/demonstrations)? (v) Are there any other forms of social, political and economic organisations that mobilise farm wage labourers to advance their socio-economic conditions? (vi) Are farm labourers mobilising their agency to access other resources such as agricultural land to improve their socio-economic conditions?

National/Macro-level analysis

A review of the existing historical literature on the macro-level changes on the relationships between agrarian (wage) labour and land access, land utilisation patterns, economic policies, labour laws and various extra-economic measures since 1890 was undertaken to provide context to the continuities and changes arising from the FTLRP (Chapter Four). Since historical conditions were changing both nationally and internationally, in relation to the political mode of rule and economic structures, a broad periodisation approach was used to analyse agrarian labour relations. The political economy of Zimbabwe's agrarian history has tended to be periodised according to the mode of political rule (Paton 1995; Rukuni 1994), changing land distribution patterns and scale of redistributive land reforms (Moyo 1999; 2001; 2003; 2005) and the economic policy framework adopted by the state (Kanyenze 2001; World Bank 2012; Muir 1994).

Table 3.1: Linkage of research questions, data requirements, study units and levels of study

Research questions	Sub-questions	Data required	Study units	Level of study
1. Trajectory of capitalist wage labour relations and use of family farm labour	1a. Structure of landholdings and sources of farm (wage) labour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distribution of landholdings • Wage labour hiring in and out patterns • Mode of wage payments • Types of labour contracts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Households (farm & labour) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National • District • Farm households
	1b. Emergence of non-capitalist labour relations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Frequencies of reciprocal labour exchanges • Land and labour exchanges 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Households (farm and labour) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Households (farm and labour)
	1c. Extent of incidence of utilisation of family labour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proportions of households utilising family labour 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Households (farm & labour) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Households (farm and labour)
	1d. Shaping of social differentiation among farm households by use of family and wage labour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Net labour ratio • Family farm labour days worked • Hired in and out farm labour days 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farm households 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farm households
	1e. Relationship between emerging class position of labour utilisation and various socio-economic variables	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Volume and value (output produced/sold), gender of land owners, access to credit, asset endowments, inputs used (quantity and value) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farm households 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farm households
2. Replacement of farm labour by diversification into non-farm labour activities	2a. Proportions of households involved in non-farm rural labour activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of households involved in non-farm activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Households (farm & labour) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farm households
	2b. Location specificity of non-farm rural labour activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-farm labour employment opportunities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Households (farm & labour) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • District
	2c. Proportions of family members deployed in farm and non-farm rural labour activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total family sizes • No. of family members involved in farm and non-farm activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Households (farm and labour) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farm households
	2d. Farm and non-farm income contribution to total household incomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Income shares of farm and non-farm activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Households (farm & labour) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farm household
	2e. Social and economic activities farm and non-farm incomes are utilised	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expenditure patterns and their sources of incomes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Households (farm & labour) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farm household
3. Increased competition for farm wage labour and quality of wage labour	3a. Sources of farm wage labour and sectors competing with farm (wage) labour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Locations of labour recruitment • Non-farm employment opportunities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farm household 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • District • Farm household
	3b. Extent of recruitment of cheap sources of farm (wage) labour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Family and wage labour composition by gender, age and kinship 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farm household 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farm household
	3c. Proportions of farm households facing shortages of farm wage labour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of households facing shortages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farm household 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farm household
	3d. Direction of change in the quality of wage labour and adequacy of wages to meet livelihood needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trends in wage rates and in-kind payments • Labour management practices • Food consumption patterns • Access to education and health 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Households (farm and labour) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National • District • Households (farm and labour)
	3e. Variation of the quality of wage labour by skills and gender of labourers, scale of production, commodities produced and location	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wages earned by gender, skill • Land sizes cropped • Types of commodities produced 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Households (farm & labour) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farm household
4. Increased autonomy of farm labourers to sell their labour and organise for favourable labour supply	4a. Relationships between location of farm and non-farm employment and residency of farm labourers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Locations of employment • Places of residency of farm labour 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour household • Farm compound 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farm compound
	4b. Dependency of farm labourers on farm wages for sustenance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Share of wages in total household incomes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour household 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour household
	4c. Mobilisation of individual agency to resist poor wages and working conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Actions undertaken by workers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour household 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour household
	4d. Extent of participation of farm labourers in formal and informal labour rights organisations and their roles in collective action	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Membership to trade unions • Labour conflicts • Incidences of labour strikes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour household • Farm compounds 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National • Districts • Households (farm & labour)
	4e. Mobilisation of farm labourers by other social, political and economic organisations to advance their socio-economic conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participation of farm labourers in political parties, NGO activities, kinship, community groups and religious groups • Assistance received from the different groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour household 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National • District • Labour households
	4f. Mobilisation of agency by farm labourers to access land and other natural resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access to agricultural land • Ways of accessing land 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour household • Farm compound 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour households • Farm compound

Therefore, the evolution of the national agrarian labour relations was periodised into four phases, namely; 1890-1979 covering the settler-colonial labour policy regime;³⁴ 1980-1989 covers the post-independent decade characterised by state intervention in the (labour) markets (e.g. minimum wages and commodity price controls); 1990-1999 covers the neo-liberal era marked by economic liberalisation and state withdrawal from the markets and the 2000-2017 covers the FTLRP extensive state-led land redistribution period.³⁵

Data sources on colonial agrarian labour relations included Arrighi (1970), Bush and Cliffe (1984), Clarke (1977), Palmer (1977), Ranger (1985), Rubert (1997) and Phimister (1986), which provided information showing the development of wage labour in the LSCFs in relation to land alienation, the quality of wage labour, labour management practices, LSCF land utilisation trends, and declining peasant agricultural production. These studies also show how specific economic conditions and colonial policies such as semi-feudal labour laws (e.g. *Masters and Servants Act of 1899*) and extra-economic measures (e.g. hut and poll taxes imposed on peasants) impacted on the evolution of wage agrarian labour relations. Post-colonial developments on agrarian labour in the LSCFs and Communal Areas are analysed in Amanor-Wilks (1995); Kanyenze (2001); Moyo (1995; 1999; 2000); Moyo *et al.* (2000); Rukuni & Eicher (1994); Rutherford (2001) and Loewenson (1992) amongst other literature sources.

These studies were supplemented by the periodic official reports on the agricultural employment patterns, farm wages, agricultural production patterns, investment patterns, and farm technologies in the LSCFs and Communal Areas produced by the Central Statistical Office (now called Zimbabwe Statistical Agency [ZIMSTAT]) including the Labour Force Surveys; Agricultural Production Surveys and Population Census Reports. Data on gazetted farm wages and benefits since 1991 and benefits following collective bargaining agreements between trade unions and employer representatives were obtained from the National Employment Council for the Agricultural Industry in Zimbabwe

³⁴ Based on modern political rule, the colonial period is sometimes categorised into three distinct historical periods namely; British South Africa Company rule (1890 to 1923); self-governing colonial rule (1924 to 1964); and Unilateral Declaration of Independence (1965 to 1979); Independence decade (1980 to 1990) (Rukuni 1994; Paton 1995).

³⁵ Moyo (2013) has further divided the FTLRP into four phases namely; the revolutionary situation (March 2000 to June 2001); rationalisation of land reform (July 2000 to December 2003); bureaucratisation of land reform (January 2004 to June 2008); and residual land redistribution (July 2008 to December 2011) (Table 2.1: 36-37). More broadly, the degree of control of the state on the FTLRP processes following land occupations and the political and economic restructuring processes underway in the post-2000 characterise these different phases as outlined in Chapter Four.

(NECAIZ). Media articles and court records mainly provided information on farm labour disputes that were occurring in the newly resettled areas.

The examination of the agrarian labour markets that have emerged as a result of the redistribution of LSCFs required an understanding of the new agrarian structure in order to identify the sources of farm (wage) employment and/or farming classes. Drawing on previous research (Moyo & Yeros 2005b; Moyo 2011a; 2013), the new national agrarian structure and consequent shifts in production trends and markets were analysed to contextualise the post-FTLRP labour relations at the district level, as well as the implications of the various socio-economic, labour and agricultural policies that were also changing during the 2000's (Chapter Five).

District level analysis

Detailed empirical work was undertaken to construct the new agrarian structures in Goromonzi and Kwekwe with a view of characterising the broad picture of the new farming classes and consequently the potential wage labour employing farm households and/or demand patterns for farm wage labour at the district level. This process also served to identify the land short and/or landless households that formed the potential farm wage labour supply base. As elaborated below (Section 3.4), this analysis allowed the study to track the local level differentiation that arose from the agrarian restructuring between the districts and understand the new agrarian labour regimes on the basis of local specificities and illuminate similarities and differences to the situation that evolved nationally.

Data on landholding patterns and land tenure relations to compute the new agrarian structures at the district level was obtained from MLRR land records and supplemented with Population Census data from ZIMSTAT and other secondary studies. AGRITEX Annual Production reports were deployed to deduce the district production patterns and labour utilisation. District level maps on landholding patterns provided insights on the spatial dimensions of the agrarian labour market in each district through the identification of potential sites of labour recruitment and labour receiving zones. The scope of the potential labour force in the wider district labour markets was inferred from population and demographic data disaggregated by age and gender found in the Population Census and Labour Force Survey reports (ZIMSTAT various years). These reports also present data on the districts' economic activities and thus the sources and patterns of employment across spatial locations and sectors, including agriculture, manufacturing, mining and services.

Micro-level analysis: farm households, farm labourers and farm compounds

The household in many parts of rural SSA is the unit of organisation of agricultural and non-agricultural production activities, consumption and (farm) labour (Moyo 2014; Mafeje 2003), justifying it as an important unit of analysis or source of data as employers of farm wage labour, as well as being self-employed labourers in their agricultural production units or sellers of labour power to other farm households and other non-farm rural labour activities. Farm households were defined as all the members that depended on or regularly contributed to the survival of the household (Oya 2013). This enables the capturing of all members belonging to a particular households regardless of their absence from home at any given time. Importantly, this illuminates agrarian labour relations in SSA that entail some members of a household straddling between places in and out of employment, and/or temporarily accommodated in labour dormitories in farm compounds (Tsikata 2015; Potts 2012). Definitions of households, which use residency and/or eating habits as the basis of belonging to a particular household omit this character of agrarian labour relations, potentially resulting in the lower approximation of the scale and reliance of households on (farm) wage labour markets (Oya 2013).

Therefore, research issues on the sources and forms of farm labour in the new agrarian structure were captured at the farm household level, as well as the diversification of family labour into other non-farm rural activities (Table 3.1). Data to establish if wage and family labour utilisation is differentiated by the landholdings, gender of landowner, inputs utilisation, types of crops and livestock produced, access to income and market participation were also sourced at the farm household level. The farm households employing wage labour also provided data on the quality of labour (e.g. money wages, in-kind payments, duration of employment, working conditions etc.).

To understand the intra-household labour relations and their differentiation, farm households also provided information on their household structures and dynamics including their sizes and composition by gender, hierarchies, age and kinship relations, and occupations of all the household members. The labour allocation decisions, disaggregation of farm labour tasks and time contributions of the different members of the household in their agricultural production units were also captured at the farm household level.

The farm households studied encompassed FTLRP land beneficiaries and Communal Area households. The FTLRP process entailed a socially differentiated process of

allocation of land and state based tenure systems, in which the A1 beneficiaries got smaller land sizes under permit tenure than the A2 beneficiaries with leasehold tenure (see section 1.2). Moreover, within these two resettlement models land sizes redistributed also vary markedly by agro-ecological region, districts, provinces and so forth and by the variant of the specific model - villagised or self-contained in the case of A1 and small, medium or large scale in the case of A2.

The Communal Areas generated by colonial land tenure systems (renamed from Tribal Trust Lands [TTLs] after 1980) are home to the majority of the rural households owning individual small arable plots and homesteads, and share grazing land amongst several households (Moyo 1995; Rukuni & Eicher 1994). In both Goromonzi and Kwekwe, these are located in the peripheries of the districts with the lowest agricultural potential. Differentiation in terms of land access, land sizes, socio-economic characteristics, labour utilisation and resource endowments is also a characteristic of these areas (see Adams 1991; Cousins *et al.* 1992; Moyo 1995). The Communal Area households that provided information to the study were those that did not benefit from the FTLRP and still live and practice petty commodity production in these areas. Their inclusion contributed to the filling of data gaps on the scope of agrarian labour markets in this land tenure category, which has been excluded in most post-FLTRP studies focused on the new farm units in redistributed LSCFs (Matondi 2012; Moyo *et al.* 2009; Scoones *et al.* 2010) and before 2000 as well (Chapter Four). Altogether, this enhanced the understanding of labour relations within the peasantry now constituted by the new A1 farming units and the Communal Area households.

Farm labourers and their families aided the understanding of the forms of farm labour and its quality as either full- or part-time wage labourers to farm households, as well as being independent producers in the own right (Table 3.1). Data provided by farm labourers also enabled the triangulation of similar data to be elicited from farm households employing wage labour (Denzin 1989; Neuman 2006). The individual and collective action aimed at improving working and material conditions was also captured from the farm labourers themselves.

The farm labourers consist of self-employed and wage workers in farm households. Wage workers sell their labour power for cash and/or kind payments in farming and non-farming activities in the countryside (Table 3.1). The self-employed labourers (or family labour) include landowners and their families who provide unpaid labour to the household's agricultural production units and non-farm activities. Farm wage labourers

can be categorised into two broad classes on the basis of their employment history in the LSCFs before 2000, namely; former farm workers that were employed in the LSCFs before the FTLRP and new farm workers whose employment history is limited to the A1 and A2 households.

Farm compounds were also studied to examine the agency of labour, their role as a source of labour to the new A1 and A2 farming units and consequently track the trajectory of residential labour tenancy. Data on employment patterns of the farm compound residents was mobilised to gauge whether it was tied to residency within the confines of former LSCFs or new farm units in the case of new compounds.

Most LSCFs had separate sections on the farm that provided housing to full-time workers and their families and also accommodated part-time workers from Communal Areas that was tied to employment rights called farm compounds (Tandon 2001). Another dimension of the farm compound has entailed the construction of new housing units for workers by A1 and A2 households within their FTLRP subdivisions (Chambati 2013a). These are referred to as new farm compounds, while the former are termed old farm compounds in this study.

3.4 DISTRICT CASE STUDIES APPROACH

As is now apparent, a case study approach of Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts was employed to understand the transformation of agrarian labour relations after 2000. The two cases examined are defined in terms of the geographic boundaries of the districts (see Burton 2000). Although case study research is sometimes thought of as the analysis of a single “case”, the research followed the suggestions of some scholars (Platt 1988; Burton 2000) who have argued that the number of “cases” is not important, such that the analysis of multiple “cases” can also be considered to be case study research. The units of analysis in case study research can be a person, small group of people, community, event, a country or continent (Burton 2000). The latter type of case study research was employed because of the possibilities it offers in producing “more compelling and more robust” results than single case studies (Burton 2000: 14 -15). Furthermore, results of the case studies can be compared and contrasted, while “tentative generalisations” can also be made (Burton 2000). Indeed, a notable weakness of case study research relates to its limits for scientific generalisations to be made to the wider population (Burton 2000; Yin 2003). Generating an in-depth analysis of a unit to test theoretical propositions motivates

case study research (Yin 2003). Therefore, case study research is not about inference on the wider population, but about “analytical generalisations” (Burton 2000:14-15).

Through the case study approach, it was possible to decipher the depth of structural changes initiated by the FTLRP and determine the nature of their changing agrarian economies and gain insights on the new agrarian labour regime and/or markets based on the historical specificities of each district, including their varied socio-economic character, different agro-ecological zones and unique mix of farming system (Chapter Five). By examining two district case studies with contrasting socio-economic characteristics, the study managed to compare and expose the differentiated outcomes of the FTLRP on agrarian labour relations, which previous studies have noted (Moyo *et al.* 2009; Matondi 2012; Hanlon *et al.* 2013; Scoones *et al.* 2010). The approach of comparing varied districts to capture the dynamic outcomes of the FTLRP differs from the common practice of focusing only on a few farms in a single district (e.g. FTCZ 2002; Hartnack 2005; 2009; 2016; Marongwe 2009; Mandizadza 2010; Mutangi 2010; Magaramombe 2010). The next section provides detailed descriptions of the study areas and the reasons why they were chosen.

3.5 STUDY AREA AND JUSTIFICATION


A background to the study areas is provided in this section to set out the local context in which the new agrarian labour relations were examined in the two districts. An overview of the two districts and reasons why they were chosen opens the section followed by a detailed description of their socio-economic character.

3.5.1 Overview of study areas and justification of choice

Two districts with contrasting socio-economic characteristics and agricultural land uses were included in the study to elucidate the diverse effects of the FTLRP on agrarian labour relations. Goromonzi district is a peri-urban district near Harare in Natural Region II that supports intensive agricultural production. The road networks and other public and social services are relatively well developed compared to other rural areas. The district is also a frontier for urban expansion for Harare and Ruwa (Figure 3.1). Kwekwe evolved historically as a gold mining district and extensive farming predominates on account of its location in the low rainfall, Natural Regions III and IV. This variation in the character of the districts influences the differentiated land uses and consequently the farm labour relations (Figure 3.1).

Land was more unevenly distributed between the LSCFs and the Communal Areas in Goromonzi compared to Kwekwe district. Furthermore, Kwekwe district experienced land reforms in the 1980s that generated the old resettlement areas. Sharp differences also existed on the scale of wage labour engaged in the LSCFs between the provinces where these districts are located. Around 2000, over 55,606 permanent and casual farm workers constituted in the LSCF employ in Mashonaland East (location of Goromonzi) in comparison to 9,255 workers in Midlands (location of Kwekwe) (CSO 2000: 132-133).

Figure 3.1: Map showing the location of Goromonzi and Kwekwe Districts



Source: Compiled by author from MLRR data

3.5.2 Description of the study areas

This section details the socio-economic character of the study areas, covering their broad geographies, agrarian structures, local economies and administrative structures.

3.5.2.1 History and geography (agro-ecology and demography)


Goromonzi is part of the nine rural districts in Mashonaland East Province, bordering the Communal Areas of Seke district in the South-Western part and the poor semi-formal urban settlement of Epworth. The former LSCFs of Shamva district are on the Northern boundary of the district, while Murehwa and Marondera districts are on the Eastern side. The road infrastructure is composed of major highways, including the Harare-Mutare Road and the Nyampanda Highway, which both link Zimbabwe to its Eastern neighbour,

Mozambique. Another highway connects Goromonzi to Shamva district. As shown in Figure 3.2, the Communal Areas of Chikwaka and Chinhamora are located in the peripheries of the district enveloping the former LSCFs. The other Communal Area, Chinyika, is at the centre of the former LSCFs (Figure 3.2). A thin stretch of SSCFs border the Chikwaka Communal Area on the South-Western side of the district. Farm labour supplies for the former LSCFs originated from the Communal Areas within Goromonzi and its neighbouring districts.

Kwekwe district, on the other hand, is found in the Midlands Province bordering Gokwe North in the North, Gweru in the South and Chirumhanzu in the East.³⁶ The district lies approximately 212.5 kilometres in the South-East of Harare and 245 kilometres to North-East of second major city, Bulawayo. An area of 886,649 hectares is divided between urban (Kwekwe and Redcliff towns) and rural ([former] LSCFs, Communal Areas, Old Resettlement Areas and SSCFs [Small-Scale Commercial Farms]) (MLLR land records 2017). The urban areas of Kwekwe and Redcliff towns are located approximately in the centre of the LSCFs, along the Harare-Bulawayo highway traversing through the district. Old Resettlement areas lie between the former LSCFs and the Communal Lands of Zhombe and Silobela in the Western part of the district (Figure 3.3). Patches of the SSCFs are located in the South-West along the border with Gweru district. The LSCFs farm labour was mostly sourced from the Communal Areas of neighbouring Gokwe South district, as gold panning with higher wages was more attractive to the residents of Zhombe and Silobela Communal Areas (MRT 2017: Interview).

³⁶ Other districts in Midlands Province are Gokwe South, Shurugwi, Mberengwa and Zvishavane.

Figure 3.2: Map of Goromonzi District



Source: Compiled by author from MLRR data

4.5 to 4.2 persons during the same period, while a slight increase from 3.7 to 3.8 persons was recorded in the former LSCFs (CSO 2002b: 105; ZIMSTAT 2012: 39). This suggests that the potential family farm labour that could be mobilised from the Communal Area resident population was shrinking.

Kwekwe's population is split between 136,379 urban dwellers (43.7 percent) and 175,835 (53.6 percent) rural inhabitants located in 38,107 households (calculated from ZIMSTAT 2012: 84-85). In both urban (52.1 percent) and rural (56.4 percent), women accounted for slightly the larger proportion of the population in the respective regions (ZIMSTAT 2012: 84-85). Zhombe and Silobela Communal Areas contributed 76.7 percent of the total population and each of the 28,405 households had average family size of 4.7 persons (Calculated from ZIMSTAT 2012: 89-90 & Kwekwe District AGRITEX Annual Report 2016). Whilst the former LSCFs constituted 19.2 percent of the total district population resident in 8,260 households averaging about 4.09 persons per household. Family sizes in SSCFs and Old Resettlement areas averaged about 5.0 persons per household located in 384 and 1,058 households respectively (ZIMSTAT 2012: 84-85). In general, the larger family sizes in the Communal Area, Old Resettlement and SSCFs households imply that more family members were available to be mobilised as self-employed farm labour than in A1 and A2 households. Around 2002, 126,061 and 159,467 persons lived in urban and rural areas respectively in Kwekwe (CSO 2002c: 9-10).

Two intensive conservation areas (ICAs) demarcated according to the agro-ecological potential formed the Goromonzi LSCFs (Chambati 2013b; Marongwe 2008). The Acturus ICA in the Northern part of the district was home to intensive farming because of the rich clay soils and Bromely ICA in the Southern part of the district was endowed with sandy soils that were fit for tobacco and cattle production. Sandy soils also featured in the Communal Areas and SSCFs. Similarly, the Kwekwe LSCFs were also divided into three ICAs namely Bembezani, Manyati-Sebakwe and Sessombi (MRT 2017: Interview). Manyati Sebakwe ICA with its clay loam soils and home to the bulk of the dam and rivers was dominated by crop and livestock mixed farming. The major crops grown by the LSCFs included irrigated barley and wheat along the Sebakwe River, soyabeans, sugarbeans and horticulture. Dairy farming was also found in this ICA, mostly on farms that could access irrigation water from the Sebakwe and Bembezani rivers. Cattle ranching was the predominant agricultural activity in the Bembezani and Sessombi ICAs that was characterised by loam sandy soils and low rainfall veering towards Natural Region IV.

Natural Region II where Goromonzi is located receives between 900 and 1200 millimetres of rainfall per annum (Goromonzi District AGRITEX 2016). Irrigation facilities are concentrated in the Acturus ICA and seasonal rain-fed agriculture is characteristic of the production in the A1 farms and Communal Areas (MPEW 2017: Interview). Whilst in Kwekwe, about 77 percent of the district's land area falls within Natural Region III, which receives between 500 and 750 millimetres of rain per year, but spread unevenly throughout the season (Kwekwe District AGRITEX Annual Plan 2016). The remaining 23 percent of the land area, mostly in the Silobela Communal Areas lie in Natural IV characterised by sandy soils with a low annual rainfall (between 450mm and 800mm) and recurrent severe droughts (Kwekwe District AGRITEX Annual Plan 2016). Irrigation activities in the district are supported mainly by the Kwekwe River, Munyati River and Bembezani River.

3.5.2.2 Broad agrarian structures

The FTLRP increased the number of farm household units in both districts significantly. Over 2,500 new farm households had been added to the Goromonzi agrarian structure by 2012 on land previously owned by about 200 LSCFs as further discussed in Chapter Five (Chambati 2013b: 4). More FTLRP beneficiaries were however resettled in Kwekwe, amounting to 3,852 households resettled on 140 of the 291 LSCFs (MLRR land records 2014). But in terms of numbers, Goromonzi accommodated more A2 farm households (873) than Kwekwe.

About 89 and 91 black and white owned LSCFs were still operational by the end of 2014 in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts respectively. In Kwekwe, these included about 13 conservancies (Kwekwe District AGRITEX Annual Plan 2016) that were not affected by the FTLRP policy (Moyo 2011c; Scoones 2015)³⁷ The A2 farm households in both districts were mostly resettled in areas with the best agro-ecological potential, in Acturus and Munyati-Sebakwe ICA, whilst A1 farm households were settled in the former cattle ranching zones of Bromely and Sessombi ICA in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively (MPEW 2017: Interview; MRT 2017: Interview). Consequently, the agricultural employment base for both self and wage employment in both districts was radically transformed by the FTLRP.

³⁷ These include Sebakwe Recreational Park (government owned), Midlands Black Rhino Conservancy, East Range Wildlife Farm, Bemthree Wildlife Farm, Twin Springs Wildlife Farm, Chenyika Wildlife Farm, Mazuri Wildlife Farm, Pavlova Wildlife Farm, Murima Range, Circle G Wildlife Farm, Rolling River Range, among others (Agritex District Annual Plan 2016).

3.5.2.3 Broad district economies

Goromonzi's district's economy revolves around agriculture in Communal Areas and new resettlement areas. Gold mining activities also feature in the economic activities, but restricted to the Northern part of the district. Acturus Mine run by Metallon Gold company is the largest in the district. The latter operates alongside other small mines and informal alluvial gold panning along the river banks. Tourism activities on game farms in the LSCF sector, which resulted from land use changes motivated by foreign currency generation during ESAP (Moyo 2000b) have dissipated after the FTLRP. Industrial development in the district is limited to agro-industrial estates that include the state owned Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) farms.

Most people are employed in farming, but Kwekwe's economic history has revolved around mining activities. Chrome and iron ore mining mainly take place in the Eastern parts of the districts within former LSCFs, while formal and informal gold mining are pervasive in all wards. The mineral rich belt, the Great Dyke that cuts across Zimbabwe from north to south runs through the district. Overall, there were about 59 registered gold mines around 2013, most of them operating on a small-scale (Zibagwe Rural District Council undated).³⁸ As such, competition for labour between agricultural production units and informal gold mining activities is intense in Kwekwe. Various industries largely tied to the mining sector also provide employment within the district.³⁹ Other sources of rural employment include the district civil service and the two major rural service centres and 30 business centres within the Communal Lands of Kwekwe (Zibagwe Rural District Council undated). Likewise, about four rural district centres in Goromonzi district namely Juru Growth Point, Goromonzi, Zimbiru and Parirerwa Rural Service Center providing retail and agro- dealership services also provide employment to the district's populace (Makura-Paradza 2010).

The agricultural commodity base in Goromonzi is wide and incorporates most of the crops and livestock farmed in Zimbabwe (see Muir-Leresche 2006; World Bank 2012). The A1 and Communal Area households produce mostly maize and small grains to feed their families and sell surpluses in local and national market (Goromonzi District

³⁸ Existing formal large-scale mines include Globe & Phoenix, Gaika, Riverlea, Tiger Reef, Big Boom, Dendald, Techmate, Duration Gold, Mafuta 18, Indarama and Jena mines dotted around the district (Zibagwe Rural District Council undated).

³⁹ These include the steel processing company, New Zimsteel (formerly Ziscosteel), fertiliser manufacturers (Sable Chemicals and Zimbabwe Fertiliser Company) and other companies supplying an array of mining products and services (e.g. explosive dynamites, chemicals and laboratory testing) (Zibagwe Rural District Council undated).

AGRITEX Annual Report 2016). Irrigated land uses, including wheat, seed multiplication, and export horticulture were observed mainly in the A2 and remaining LSCFs in the Northern sections of the district. Increasingly many households amongst all the farm classes have been drawn into tobacco growing due to the expansion of contract farming, but the A1 accounted for the largest share of producers (Moyo Qondisile 2017; Sakata 2017).

A mix of livestock were also kept by the farmers encompassing cattle, pigs, goats and poultry. Commercial beef and dairy production featured prominently in the A2 and remaining LSCFs and the few herds in the peasant farms in the A1 and Communal Areas chiefly supplied draught power.

Fewer agricultural products are farmed in Kwekwe than in Goromonzi. Maize and groundnuts were the key agricultural products in A1 farms and cash crops such as soya beans, wheat and horticulture feature in A2 farms (Section 6.4; Chambati 2017). The LSCFs not acquired during the FTLRP in the Munyati Sebakwe ICAs were the main actors in dairy production.⁴⁰ The conservancies continue to rear wildlife and providing tourist facilities such as overnight accommodation, game viewing and trophy hunting and were largely concentrated in two wards (1 and 2) in the Eastern part of the district (Zibagwe Rural District Council undated). Analogous to Goromonzi, ownership sizeable herds of cattle chiefly characterise the large A2 land owners and LSCFs in Kwekwe.

In the Communal Areas, rain-fed crop farming is a key source of agricultural employment. Besides maize, other crop products farmed in this sector included groundnuts, rapoko, millet, and sorghum (Kwekwe District AGRITEX Annual Plan 2016). Cotton production is however largely grown in the Silobela Communal Lands located in Natural Region IV. Irrigation facilities are limited in the Communal Areas with about 454 hectares developed in nine communal schemes that benefitted about 1,391 households (about 0.07 percent of Communal Area households) when fully functional (Kwekwe District AGRITEX Annual Plan 2016).⁴¹

On average, about 10 permanent farm workers were employed in the cattle ranching farms in the Sessombi ICA compared to 30 permanent workers in the Munyati-Sebakwe

⁴⁰ Dendairy, one of the largest dairy farms and milk processors in Zimbabwe, is located in the Kwekwe district.

⁴¹ Around March 2014, only three schemes covering about 242.8 hectares were operational (Kwekwe District AGRITEX Annual Plan 2014).

ICA prior to the FTLRP (MRT 2017: Interview). The latter interviewee also revealed that majority of the farm-wage labour was located in the Munyati-Sebakwe ICA, which is most suited for crop production.

In contrast to LSCFs in the Mashonaland Provinces such as Goromonzi, small batches of workers were housed in farm compounds in Kwekwe district, especially in the cattle ranches averaging about 10 houses per farm that were not centrally located in one place but dotted around the LSCFs (NYT 2017: Interview). Moreover, multiple farm ownership and limited demand for large batches of farm wage labourers also meant that farm compounds were not found on all LSCFs (NYT 2017: Interview) as was common in Goromonzi district. Instead, the sharing of farm compound infrastructure located on one of the LSCF properties to house labour for the various LSCFs owned and operated by the same farmer was a common tendency. In Goromonzi district, farm compounds were found on almost all the LSCFs.

3.5.2.4 Local administrative structures

Local governance in the rural areas in Zimbabwe is bifurcated comprising traditional leadership and elected rural councils (Murisa 2013; 2010). Chiefs Chinhamora, Chikwaka and Chinyika administer the traditional affairs in Goromonzi (Chambati 2013b; Makura-Paradza 2010; Marongwe 2009; Murisa 2009). The jurisdiction was limited to the three Communal Areas prior to 2000, but the chieftancies were extended into the new resettlement areas, *albeit* with limited roles in land allocation and disputes thereon that they superintend in the Communal Areas (Mkodzongi 2015; Murisa 2010; Moyo 2007). Village heads or *sabhukus* appointed by the chief are the face of the traditional leadership institution and are found on almost all former LSCFs resettled under the A1 scheme (Chambati 2013b). Twenty five administrative units called wards constitute the Goromonzi Rural District Council. An elected councillor represents in each ward in the council. Twelve of the wards are located in the former LSCFs while 11 are in the Communal and SSCFs respectively (CSO 2002b: 105).

Kwekwe district, in contrast, has seven chieftanships, namely; Malisa, Govo, Ruya, Sigodo, Samamba, Gwesela and Ntabeni (Kwekwe Agritex District Annual Plan 2014). It is also divided into 33 wards, of which 24 of them are in Zhombe and Silobela Communal Areas. Returns from the recent 2018 general elections and before indicate that ZANU (PF) dominates the seats in the elected councils in both districts.

3.6 DATA COLLECTION APPROACHES AND METHODS

The data collection approaches and methods that were applied to mobilise information to decipher the new agrarian labour relations are elaborated here. An overview of the approaches is first provided prior to the detailing of the specific quantitative and qualitative methods relied upon in the field.

3.6.1 Overview of data collection approaches and methods

Primary data to understand the transformation of agrarian labour relations following the FTLRP was collected through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. Not only did this permit the study to triangulate of research results (Bryman 2016; Denzin 2012; Flick, Vjenka, Wolfram, Joachim, & Gundula. 2012), but mobilised complimentary information that "...yield[ed] a fuller and more complete picture of the phenomenon concerned [when the two methods were] brought together" (Erzeberger & Kelle 2003: 461).

This methodological triangulation approach allowed the study to collect data on some aspects on agrarian labour relations such as employment histories, kinship and family relations and cases of labour abuses that are difficult to obtain from quantitative surveys alone (Nyantakyi-Frimpong & Kerr 2017; Oya 2013). Quite crucially, qualitative surveys were important in uncovering the local conception of the different types of wage employment some of which can be despised locally as stated in Chapter Two and thus assisted in the design and wording of quantitative surveys, as well as exposing the hidden exchange relations that existed between households and extended family members in order to prevent their misclassification as self-employed labourers. Quantitative surveys on the other hand were critical in capturing the broad employment trends including the scales of wage and family labour utilisation and their relationships with other social and economic resources. Moreover, quantitative surveys targeted households and information was elicited from their representatives and/or household heads, which were usually men, the qualitative surveys purposively selected women to elucidate their perspectives that tend to be concealed in the research process (Adams 1991; Munyuki-Hungwe 2011; Makura-Paradza 2010).

The quantitative method involved questionnaire surveys of farm households and farm workers, and the qualitative methods entailed key informant interviews and direct physical observations (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Overview of data collection approaches and sources of information

Data collection approaches	Application of instruments on sources of information			
	A1, A2 and Communal Area households	Agrarian labourers	Key informants	Groups
Quantitative				
Household questionnaire surveys	√	X	X	X
Farm worker questionnaire surveys	X	√	X	X
Qualitative				
Key informant interviews	X	X	√	X
Observations	√	√	√	√
Secondary data collection	√	√	√	√

key √=yes X=no

3.6.2 Data collection phases

A two phased approach was adopted to collect the empirical data. Key informant interviews done with government officials at the national and district levels and other local leaders formed the initial phase. These interviews mobilised information to understand more broadly the district case studies selected, including their geographies, local economies, demographic patterns, overview of the labour utilisation trends, land resettlement patterns and agricultural production patterns. The process entailed visiting the districts to collect this information from government officials and inform them of the intended study. Data collected during phase also enabled the definition of the study samples, as well as assisting in the refinement of the wording used in the draft survey questionnaires to accommodate the local perceptions of wage labour as noted above.

During this phase, the study also recruited the field workers from within the district to assist the administration of the questionnaire surveys. Using the contacts gained while being part of the AIAS team that conducted surveys in the two districts in 2005 and other follow up research, 15 field workers (five in Goromonzi and ten in Kwekwe) with accumulated experience in administering questionnaire interviews were recruited. The field workers were provided detailed training on the questionnaire surveys by the researcher over a period of three days, which also included aspects on the ethical principles that guided the study such as the process of seeking informed consent from the prospective study participants (Section 3.9). Before they started work, the field workers were asked to sign confidentiality agreements that bound them not disclose the information they collected to anybody else except the researcher. After the training, a pre-test of the questionnaire survey was organised to assess the research instrument and comprehension of the field workers of the data collection process, as well as the ethical principles under the supervision of the researcher. One day follow up training was organised to correct challenges observed. This process also enabled the researcher to improve the design, particularly the sequencing and clarity of the questions, how the

questions should be asked in the interviews and restructure biased questions as recommended by Alreck and Settle (2004). Additionally, the pre-test provided an idea of the time required to complete the administration of the questionnaires and the time for undertaking the main field work was allocated accordingly.

The main field work in the study districts, through the survey questionnaire was launched in the second phase. The prospective study participants were selected according to the sampling procedures outlined in Section 3.5. The farm household survey was undertaken first before the study transitioned to the farm labour survey to enable the triangulation of information provided by the latter. Since researchers are often interested in confirming a hypothesis utilising information they obtain from participants, and this can affect they way the collect data from study participants (Sarniak 2015). The latter notes that this could involve influencing participants to answer in a particular way in order to mobilise information which they consider reliable and relevant for proving their hypothesis, while dismissing other evidence provided by participants. To avoid the researcher's bias, the field workers trained by the researcher conducted the questionnaire surveys. To guarantee quality of the data collected, the questionnaires administered by the field workers were assessed daily to detect problems of recording information, missing data and outliers (Beaman & Dillon 2012; Sue & Ritter 2012). While the survey data was being collected, the researcher focused on implementing the additional key informant interviews and the structured observations.

3.6.3 Quantitative surveys

Since the data required to investigate the research questions required establishing the “behaviours” and “experiences” of farm households and farm labourers in organisation and mobilisation of agrarian labour (Neuman 2006: 273-4; Pennings, Keman & Kleinnienhuis 2006), the questionnaire was chosen as a tool to collect information. Moreover, this data is largely measured through quantitative indicators (e.g. number of workers hired in, wages, farm sizes, land areas cropped, frequency of labour recruitment), entailing many variables that are best collected through questionnaires (Neuman 2006). The questionnaires utilised in this study were adapted from the instruments applied by the African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS) in the surveys in 2005 and the researchers was granted permission for the same (Annex 3.1). The questionnaires collected data, not only about the respondents, but also the labour activities of the individual members of their households. This elucidated the organisation of labour within households and their participation in (farm) labour markets. Differences between farm households and farm

labourers in the utilisation of the wage and family labour in relation to the land use and agricultural production patterns were best assessed by questionnaire surveys, which collected standardised data from respondents. According to Chambers (2008), one of the key limitation of questionnaires relates to the inclusion of concepts by researchers, which sometimes do not necessarily identify with participants who are in turn disempowered to articulate their experiences in the own terms. In this scholar's view, largely the researchers themselves drive the interpretation of the reality. This deficiency was addressed by the inclusion of qualitative methods to supplement the data from quantitative survey. Additionally, all the questions in the surveys that were pre-coded provided an option for the study participants to provide answers, which they consider important, thus minimising researcher's bias.

The questionnaire surveys were administered through face-to-face interviews with the farm household heads or representatives knowledgeable about the household in their absence, and farm labourers themselves. This followed a well-established research practice to ask an individual to speak on behalf of the household, when the study unit is not the individual (Pennings *et al.* 2006). However during the pre-testing of the questionnaires a common challenge in quantitative surveys (Jha 1996; Nachmias & Nachmias 1992) of recalling some historical data such as agricultural production outputs and labour utilisation from past seasons was exposed. This was remedied by asking other adult household members present to assist in the filling of these data gaps. The face-to-face administration of the interviews ensured all questionnaires administered were collected by the researcher since the field workers retained them after the interviews and provided opportunities to clarify the questions to the respondents.

3.6.3.1 Farm household questionnaire surveys

The quantitative survey for the farm households entailed a structured questionnaire administered by the trained field workers in A1 and A2 resettlement sectors and Communal Areas in Goromonzi and Kwekwe. The questionnaires elicited data on the social and economic character of farm households and their individual members (family size, gender, kinship, age, current social status, migration and employment patterns) (Annex 3.2). It took about one and half hours to administer the questionnaire and to avoid inconveniencing the farmers, appointments were set up for the interviews. One of the challenges in the implementation of the questionnaire surveys related to the distances that the field workers had to traverse from one household to the next, especially in the A2 sector. The study therefore had to incur unanticipated costs in bus fares for the field

workers to ensure time was not consumed by walking between the households. The fears by some of the targeted households that the survey was related to a planned government land audit were allayed by detailed explanations of the purpose of the survey and provision of the letters from the authorities granting permission for the study to be undertaken. To ensure accuracy in the data collected and efficiency of the research process, each field worker was assigned to do a maximum of three questionnaires per day as the pre-test revealed that fatigue crept in after the third interview and mistakes were observed in entry of responses from the study participants thereafter.

3.6.3.2 Farm labourers questionnaire surveys

New and former farm workers responded to farm labourer questionnaire survey also administered by the trained field workers. The labour survey examined the participation of farm workers and their families in the farm and non-farm sources of rural employment (Annex 3.3). The issues covered included their socio-economic character of their households, employment histories, land access, land tenure security, forms of employment and conditions and other survival strategies. Similar data on labour conditions was also triangulated with the information obtained from the farm households. The interviews with farm labourers were scheduled after their working hours and off days to avoid conflicts with their income earning opportunities. Visits were made to the farm compound residencies to introduce the study and set up appointments with the workers.

3.6.4 Qualitative surveys

A qualitative survey was developed to triangulate the results of the quantitative surveys as enunciated by Neuman (2006) and White (2002), as well as collect complimentary information on the forms of labour, kinship relations within families and its influences on labour allocations and mobilisation of farm wage labour, intra-household labour relations, labour conflicts and agency of farm labourers. The techniques that were employed to collect qualitative information are elaborated below.

3.6.4.1 Key informant interviews

Key informants are actors who possess information about the study units that can be tapped to validate findings from the subjects and triangulate data (Neuman 2006). They not only provide qualitative information on their perspectives on familiar aspects and experiences on the study units, but also quantitative information. These included the recognised “knowledge bearers” within the state bureaucracy and non-state officials that are also differentiated by the positions they occupy and their spatial location at the

national or local level. Beyond generating additional information to expose the new agrarian labour relations, the key informant interviews allowed the research to verify the data sourced from the farmers and farm labourers. In total, 22 key informant interviews were conducted by the research (Table 3.3).

Table 3.3: Summary of key informant interviews conducted

Designation of key informant	Goromonzi		Kwekwe		National		Total
	M	F	M	F	M	F	
State officials							
MLRR	0	0	1	0	1	0	2
MPSLSW	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
MAEMI	2	0	1	1	0	0	4
Non-state officials							
Trade unions	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
Former farm workers	2	1	2	2	0	0	7
NGOs	0	0	0	0	2	1	3
War veterans	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
Total	4	1	4	3	9	1	22

State officials that included national representatives of the Ministries of Lands and Rural Resettlement, Local Government, Agriculture and Rural Development and Labour and Social Welfare were approached during the exploratory field research phase. Local level key informants were composed of districts heads of Government (District Administrator, Extension Officers, and Lands Officers). Further to the background data provided by these informants in the initial phase of the data collection, the other matters pursued during the main field work included the agricultural production patterns, labour utilisation, input and output markets, incidences of farm labour disputes and implementation of existing policies on labour (wages, working conditions, residency and other social services), agriculture, economic and social protection in the new farms.

It was very difficult to secure appointments with state officials and when they were set up after repeated attempts, several officials requested postponements due to their “busy schedules”. Delays were also experienced as officials sought clearance to speak to the researcher from the head of the ministries in addition to the provision of the letters of research permission. At the district level, the main field work also coincided with the distribution of input assistance to farmers under the Presidential Inputs and Command Agriculture schemes and repeated efforts bore fruit in securing appointments. These challenges were not experienced with the other group of key informants.

Non-state category key informants included national and local trade unions and farm worker NGO officials. Trade union representatives provided information on the status of the collective worker organisations, mobilisation of farm labourers into their membership

and promotion of collective action as well as the constraints they faced in delivering their mandate. With farm worker NGOs, discussions focused on the various programmes they were running in newly redistributed areas and their effects on livelihoods of farm labourers. Liberation war veterans' leaders and political party representatives were interviewed on the mobilisation for land during the early 2000's, political organisation and conflicts in the countryside and the extent to which farm labourers were involved in these processes.

The key informant interviews with former farm workers captured the transition of their employment experiences and livelihoods of former farm workers from the LSCFs to the new farming units. The issues covered included the quality of labour, working conditions, individual and collective action undertaken, practices of labour management, residential labour tenancy and their material conditions in the LSCFs and the changes they have experienced since 2000. The respondents in this group were former senior permanent workers (usually men), middle level workers (machine operators, supervisors, tractor drivers), women labourers and general hands. This served to expose the diverse effects of the FTLRP on farm workers from different socio-economic backgrounds, and allowed voices of the weak such female farm labourers to be heard.

Information from key informants was solicited through the use semi-structured interview guides and the questions focused on their areas of familiarity and experience with the study units. Again face-to-face interviews were relied upon for this process and voice recorders were used to capture the interviews after the informants had consented to this.

3.6.4.2 Direct physical observations

Direct physical observation of various phenomena being studied provides for a strong validity (Bryman 2016). The major weakness of the observation method relates to its difficulty to replicate (Bryman 2016). Various approaches to observation include structured, non-interactive, unstructured observation of activities, conversations and other forms of communication (Mwanje 2001b). Structured observation was employed to target specific issues of interest to the research, which included land utilisation patterns of households, working conditions of agrarian labourers (e.g. hours of work, methods used in accomplishing tasks, tools and machinery at the disposal of workers), participation of individual household members in farm self-employment and recruitment of farm labour in compounds and at different rural centres.

Transect walks, which entail walking along planned routes within the study areas, were deployed to collect information on observable phenomenon that was of interest to the study (de Zeeuw & Wilbers 2004). Checklists were developed to guide the transect walks, while routes were planned with the assistance of the local extension officers to ensure adequate coverage of issues of interest. The information collected from the transect walks was recorded in transect diagrams that indicated the places visited in the columns and the issues of interest in the row (e.g. land use patterns, infrastructure use and access, sources of employment for labourers resident in the compounds) and the details of observations in each place were recorded in the cells (de Zeeuw & Wilbers 2004). Field notes were recorded in a diary kept by the researcher. Daily reflections on the observations were done to identify issues to follow up in the coming days.

3.6.5 Sampling approaches and representativity

Selection of the respondents for the quantitative and qualitative surveys was done through the application of a combination of probability and non-probability sampling techniques respectively. For the qualitative survey, “the relevance to the research topic rather than representativeness” (Flick 1998: 41) motivated the selection of respondents. Purposive and snowball sampling techniques were thus adopted to identify the key informants and the initial targets were used to refer the researcher to other informants.

The respondents for the farm households’ survey in the FTLRP areas were selected through stratified random sampling techniques. The stratified random sampling technique involves the independent selection of samples within the identified stratas that are subgroups of the survey population and do not overlap (Mwanje & Gotu 2001). Stratification enables adequate sample sizes for each of the subgroups the research intends to examine; namely, the A1 and A2 farm households to be included in the study. Stratified random sampling allows for variation in the population to be also shown in the selected sample and allows for comparisons between the different strata (Mwanje & Gotu 2001).

In each district, the original LSCFs were stratified according to the type of resettlement model to form the primary sampling units. Lists of A1 and A2 land beneficiaries, which were sourced and used with the permission of the MLRR, acted as the universal sampling frame that were used to draw the farm household sample. The overall universal sampling frame was composed of 361 original LSCFs that had been resettled under A1 (100 LSCFs) and A2 (261 LSCFs) schemes that were occupied by 5,259 A1 and 1,124 A2

farm households (Table 3.4). Disaggregated by district, the universal sampling frame in Goromonzi composed of 182 original LSCFs that were occupied by 1,673 A1 and 850 A2 farm households, whilst in Kwekwe, 179 original LSCFs were home to 3,586 A1 and 274 A2 farm households (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4: Universal sampling frame for Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts, A1 and A2 Schemes

District	Original large scale commercial farms		Total number original large scale commercial farms	Household units		Total household units
	A1	A2		A1	A2	
Goromonzi	39	143	182	1,673	850	2,523
Kwekwe	61	118	179	3,586	274	3,860
Total	100	261	361	5,259	1,124	6,383

Source: Compiled by author from MLRR excel sheets

The minimum sample sizes were then determined using an internet based sample size calculating software, RAOSOF⁴² to meet a margin of error of 10 percent and 95 percent confidence interval for each strata namely, the A1 and A2 farm households in each district (Table 3.5). Initially, the study targeted a margin of error of 5 percent but it was realised the minimum sample sizes required were beyond the scope of the budget available for the research. The lists of A1 and A2 farm households were entered into the statistical software, STATA and a random number generator was applied to select the respondents in each of the resettlement schemes in the two districts. The random number generator was instructed to select an additional 30 households in each settlement scheme, as replacements for households to cater for those that would not be located in the field. These sample sizes targeted were adequate for statistical procedures which require at least 30 observations in each of the strata studied to allow for comparisons between the A1 and A2 farm households within and across districts and constitute at least five percent of the sample population (Mwanjie & Gottu 2001). Overall, a total of 407 households were eventually sampled from the newly resettled households in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively.

Table 3.5: Targeted A1 and A2 farm household units sample frame

District	No. of farm households			Targeted households*			Actual household sampled		
	A1	A2	Total	A1	A2	Total	A1	A2	Total
Goromonzi	1,673	850	2,523	91	87	178	76	74	150
Kwekwe	3,586	274	3,860	94	72	166	194	63	257
Total	2,195	575	2,770	185	159	344	270	137	407

Source: Compiled by author

⁴² www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html

** $\alpha = 0.05$ (at 95% confidence level)

The variation in the targeted sample sizes and the actual samples achieved mainly related to the challenges encountered with the lists of land beneficiaries provided by the MLRR in all the schemes in Goromonzi and in the A2 scheme in Kwekwe. The lists were not up to date and some of the prospective participants randomly selected in the samples could not be located since they were no longer on their farms or were fully resident at homes in the urban areas. Consequently, the actual number of households sampled in the newly redistributed areas was lower than the targets. Valuable time and resources were thus lost as the field workers travelled to the farms of the selected participants and failed to find them. In Kwekwe, the study managed to oversample the A1 than the ones initially targeted as more field workers could be recruited in this district as the researcher managed to negotiate a cheaper wage rate for the administration of the questionnaire surveys and the list of beneficiaries for this group of farmers was relatively up to date.

In the Communal Areas, the farm households were randomly selected from one ward closest to the former LSCFs that was purposively selected in order to capture the dynamic labour interactions between the two areas. The households located in each of these wards constituted the primary sampling frame (Table 3.6). The minimum sample sizes were determined using similar procedures used for the newly resettled households to meet a margin of error of 10 percent and a 95 percent confidence interval in both Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts (Table 3.6). The random number generator in the statistical package, STATA was then deployed to randomly select respondents from lists of Communal Area farm households in the two districts that were obtained from the AGRITEX . A total of 163 Communal Area households were sampled during the research. The actual sampled households were slightly below the targeted samples due to the failure to locate some of the selected prospective participants.

Table 3.6: Communal Area universal sampling frame and actual samples at ward level

District	Total no. of households in ward	Targeted sampled size*	Actual sampled households
Goromonzi	768	86	78
Kwekwe	1,064	89	85
Total	1,832	175	163

Source: Compiled by author from AGRITEX excel sheets

* $\alpha = 0.05$ (at 95% confidence level)

When the population parameters are largely unknown and it is difficult to derive sampling units with a reasonable degree of accuracy, purposive sampling can be applied to select

respondents (Mwanji & Gottu 2001; Neuman 2006). After the FTLRP, there has been a movement in and out of the former LSCF by the category of farm workers, and their population figures could not be established in the absence of large-scale surveys conducted by ZIMSTAT, which disaggregate data by districts.⁴³ The study targeted to purposively sample at least 200 new and former farm worker respondents in each district to capture the diverse forms of work amongst the full and part-time workers in same former LSCFs where the new farm households were sampled. Ultimately, 199 and 208 farm workers were interviewed in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts respectively.

3.7 ANALYTICAL APPROACHES

This section discusses the data analysis approaches that were used by the study, beginning first with the quantitative methods followed by the qualitative techniques.

3.7.1 Quantitative data analysis

After the completion of the field work, four data entry clerks were recruited to assist in entering the information from questionnaire surveys. Again, the contacts provided by AIAS on the data entry clerks that had assisted them were useful. Data entry training in the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) computer software was done in two days and the clerks were assessed on their understanding of the procedures. Similar to the field workers, the data entry clerks were asked to sign confidentiality agreements for non-disclosure of information accessed during their duties. The entries recorded by the clerks were checked to make sure all the data had been correctly processed to ensure the quality of the information used to make sense of the new agrarian labour relations.

Data from the farm household and farm labourer questionnaire surveys was then analysed in SPSS by the researcher using the descriptive statistics (means, median, frequency distributions), which were generated on the key agrarian labour variables (forms of labour utilised, quality of labour, monthly wages, in-kind payments, participation in non-farm rural labour and the agency of labour. Cross tabulations were also computed to measure the association between labour utilisation and other variables such as landholdings and total land areas cultivated. As argued by Greenhoot (2005: 5), descriptive analysis “is essential in understanding the meaning of data...[It] enables important or unexpected patterns [to be brought out]....[Descriptive analysis] is as critical for drawing scientific

⁴³ This problem has also been faced by other researchers studying rural labour outcomes after the FTLRP (see Scoones *et al.* 2010).

conclusions as the formal inferential phase...”. Frequency distribution tables and graphs are utilised to illustrate the results.

Various statistical significance tests, including the Pearson Chi-Square tests, were applied to measure the association between labour utilisation within and across the farm households, as well as other variables such as gender of farm owner, landholdings and land areas cultivated. The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to test statistical significant differences of the means of various labour utilisation variables among the farm households.⁴⁴

Two Step Cluster analysis in SPSS was utilised to assess the extent the farm households were differentiated on the basis of their labour utilisation patterns. Cluster analysis is a statistical tool relied upon to separate the households into a few distinct homogenous groups or clusters, which share common socio-economic characteristics (Everitt, Landau, Leese & Stahl 2011). The households classified in a particular group should be relatively similar to others in its group and should be different from the other households in the other clusters (Everitt *et al.* 2011). Deciding what particular variables to include in the classification procedure (Crossa, Bellon & Franco 2002; Moyo *et al.* 2009) is one of the challenges confronting researchers. Since the study sought to explore the differentiation of farm households on the basis of labour utilisation, this problem did not largely affect the research. Both categorical and continuous variable that indicate the extent of reliance of hired in labour on their farming units were thus chosen to classify the households drawing from Patnaik (1996), including whether households hire in labour; whether households used family labour; whether households hire out farm labour to others; and number of labour days in each of these categorical variables.

The emerging groups of farm households from the cluster analysis were then matched to the schematic of peasant classes developed by Patnaik (1996: 236-7; Table 3.7) based on the displayed empirical character of the extent to which they relied on the exploitation of the labour others. The classes were then defined according to Patnaik’s schematic. Included within the classes conceived by Patnaik (1996) are those primarily exploiting others; primarily self-employed and those primarily exploited by others (Table 3.6; see also Section 2.4.2). Specifically, those primarily exploiting the labour of others can be

⁴⁴ The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test is a general statistical technique that can be applied to test whether there is a significant difference in the means of at least two groups assuming that the sample is from a normally distributed population (Mwanje & Gota 2001: 123). An overall conclusion about the means of a certain population under investigation can then be made.

distinguished into the landlords/ capitalist farms who rely exclusively on hired in manual labour of others to work on their holdings and the rich peasants who hired in more labour than the self-employment invested by family workers. Middle and small peasants encompass those who primarily exploit self-employment. Respectively, they use more self-employment than hired in labour and; do not hire in labour of others and hire-out small amounts of labour that is less than their self-employment. The primary labour sellers group included poor peasants whose amount of labour hired out to others is more than self-employment, whilst landless labourers, due to the absence of means of production, sold only their labour to others.

Table 3.7: Definition of peasant classes according to labour utilisation

Broad category	Class	Defining characteristic
Primarily exploiting others	1. Landlord/ Capitalist	Use only hired labour
	2. Rich peasant	Use more hired labour than family labour
Primarily exploiting own labour	3. Middle peasant	Limited use of hired labour and most labour provided by the family
	4. Small peasant	Do not hire labour. Use only family labour and hire out their labour.
Primarily exploited by others	5. Poor peasant	Hire out most of their labour and use of family labour is less than what they hire out.
	6. Landless labourer	No use of family labour. Only hire out their labour to other farming units.

Source: Adapted from Patnaik (1996: 236-7)

The farm household groups generated from the cluster analysis were then cross tabulated with various variables (e.g. landholding sizes, land areas cropped, gender of farm household head, value of crops and livestock produced, input utilisation, ownership of assets and access to capital and marketed volumes of outputs and formal employment status) to examine their influences on labour utilisation and differentiation amongst farm households. Pearson Chi-Square and comparisons of means tests were depended upon to test the statistical significance of relationships between labour utilisation and the variables noted above.

3.7.2 Qualitative data analysis

Two experienced transcribers were hired to process the recorded interviews and confidentiality agreements also applied. Thematic analysis was adopted to analyse qualitative data from the key informant, adopting a phased approach as defined by Kuckartz (2014). Initially, the transcripts from the recorded interviews were read in order to locate interesting text recurring across the interviews with a view of defining additional main thematic categories and sub-themes or topics. The core thematic categories were

derived from the research questions, to include the forms of labour, participation non-farm rural labour activities, and quality of labour and agency of labour. Following this, the text passages were then coded or assigned to the relevant main thematic categories. A second round of coding then grouped the coded text under the sub-themes. The main themes and sub-themes constituted the analytical categories (Guest, MacQueen & Namey 2012; Kuckartz 2014). To provide credibility to the qualitative research and eliminate researcher's bias as suggested by Shenton (2004), the study as much as possible used direct quotations from the interviews to present the perceptions of the participants in the discussion of the results and thus permit the readers to link the interpretation of the data to what was exactly said by the interviewees.

The conditions of farm work in the newly redistributed was thoroughly detailed from the perceptions and experiences of the agrarian labourers themselves, including their interpretation of these conditions. Narrative verbatim was used to illuminate the labour management practices, types of employment contracts, working hours, wage and benefits, strategies used by employers to control labour and the response of labour to their poor socio-economic conditions.

3.8 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE RESEARCH

Validity and reliability of research findings are central tenets of the research process and are viewed differently in quantitative and qualitative research (Newman 2006; Golafshani 2003; Mwanje 2001b). Reliability generally refers to possibilities for the research results or observations to be repeated or replicated under similar conditions (Golafshani 2003: 598-99) Reliability enables the acceptance of research findings as transcending one researcher's own opinion or observations (Bachiochi & Weiner 2004; online version). Validity, on the other hand, implies the extent to which the research results represent the "actual reality" (Neocosmos 2004: 188-9) or "how truthful the results are" (Golafshani 2003: 599). Data and methodological triangulation were made use to safeguard the validity and reliability of the research findings in this study. Quantitative survey information was cross checked with data gathered from the qualitative surveys, and comparisons were also made between similar data on wage labour collected from farm households and farm labourers. Indeed, it is argued that the validity of the findings is enhanced if it can be tested by different types of quantitative and qualitative data than those reliant on data from one single method (Bachiochi & Weiner 2004).

The provision of “untruthful responses” by respondents is a common problem in household surveys resulting in biased results (Jha 1996; Munyuki-Hungwe 2011). As such, the use of different methods and sources of data sources helped in uncovering and clearing some of the “untruths”. For instance, while interviewing LSCFs in the late 1990s, Rutherford (2001a) observed their over-exaggeration of the conditions of employment offered to farm workers during the interviews, which were in turn contested in separate interviews with the workers. Engagement in the districts, initially as part of the AIAS survey research team since 2005/06 and follow up studies entailing back and forth travel to the study districts permitted the researcher to deploy *a priori* knowledge on the transition of various phenomena to probe various responses provided during the field research. Problems of recall of time series data (e.g. output harvested in the past seasons, quantities of output sold, and number of part-time labourers hired during different months) associated with questionnaire surveys (Jha 1996; Nachmias & Nachmias 1992) that lead to biases in survey responses were resolved by probing and questioning other household members (see section 3.7.2).

The reliability of key variables assessed was ensured by the adoption of “clear” theoretical definitions that have been used to measure different types of agrarian labour in SSA by other scholars as suggested by Neuman (2006). This adoption of measures that other researchers have utilised to assess the variables, also known as the replication strategy (Neuman 2006), ensured the reliability of key variables measured by the study namely self-employment, wage employment and non-farm wage employment which were drawn from key studies on labour (e.g. Jha 2016; Oya & Pontara 2015; ILO 2015a; 2015b; Standing 2006). The applicability of these measures/definitions in the local Zimbabwean context were examined by pre-testing the questionnaires before the implementation of the final household surveys, testing for clarity and level of appreciation of the questions by the respondents as Neuman (2006) recommends.

Four approaches were utilised to check the validity of research, namely construct, internal and external validity (Neuman 2006: 193). Construct validity entailed ensuring that the measure of the different types of employment captured all aspects in the conceptual definitions adopted by the study. Knowledgeable experts in agrarian labour research were consulted to verify the adequacy of the measures and/or indicators of the key variables utilised. Construct validity was also achieved by the use of multiple sources data on agrarian labour to include farm households, farm labourers and key informants (Yin 2003).

Internal validity was established by the identification of casual relationships between labour utilisation and various variables identified in the literature that influence the latter to include landholdings area, asset endowments, types of crops and livestock produced, sale of production (cropped areas, numbers of livestock) and incomes realised (see Emory & Cooper 1991; McDaniel & Gates 1991; Miles & Huberman 1994).

External validity assesses the replicability of the research findings outside of the research case studies or generalisability (Christie, Row, Perry & Chonard 2000: 18). The findings from the two district case studies examined were compared in order to develop analytic generalisations aiming at achieving external validity. Furthermore, the findings from the study were corroborated with other key studies on the FTLRP (e.g. Moyo *et al.* 2009; Scoones *et al.* 2010; Matondi 2012) following the recommendation that “...researchers can determine validity by asking a series of questions and...look for answers in the research of others” (Golafshani 2003: 599).

Four criterion were employed to preserve the reliability and validity of qualitative data namely; transferability, dependability, conformability and credibility (Guest *et al.* 2012; Suter 2012). Transferability implies that findings can be generalised across different contexts. The “thick descriptions” of dynamic socio-economic conditions at both the national and local level present during the research provide the context to enhance the transferability of the research (Chapter Five). Indeed, thick descriptions are argued to enhance the transferability of qualitative research as they elucidate “...the actual situations that have been investigated and, to an extent, the context that surround them” (Shenton 2004: 69) for other researchers to pursue similar research in different contexts.

Detailed description of the research process from the design stage to the actual implementation in the field has been articulated in this Chapter to enable other scholars who wish to replicate the study, including the data collection plans and what was eventually achieved in practice. This availed an “audit trail” that can be used for verification by other researchers (Guest *et al.* 2012). Dependability of research, which is concerned with the possibilities of other scholars obtaining similar results if the methods are applied on the same study units (Guest *et al.* 2012; Suiter 2012) was thus addressed

The credibility of the research was bolstered by the use of multiple data sources to validate each other. Follow up probes were organised with key informants to clarify differences in data provided during the qualitative interviews. At the end of the interviews, they were also asked to verify what they would have said in order to rectify

any misunderstandings between the researcher and the informants (Shenton 2004). Again, prior knowledge gained from involvement in previous studies done by AIAS was useful in these clarification processes. After the data analysis, meetings were arranged with study participants in the two districts to validate the conclusions reached (Guest *et al.* 2012). Direct quotations from the interviews were relied upon in the text of the thesis so as to avail a link to the interpretations of the data and what the study participants said in their own words (Morse & Maddox 2014). Furthermore, debriefing with peers engaged in similar research and consultation with agrarian labour experts and the academic supervisors to review the findings and the data interpretation enhanced the research credibility.

The researcher's bias is a major concern in qualitative research and requires to be controlled in favour of objectivity, also referred to as conformability (Suter 2012). Triangulation of the qualitative with the quantitative data, as well as reference to other studies with similar findings, was thus depended upon to reinforce the study's conformability (Golfashani 2003).

3.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Research studies involving human beings as subjects of enquiry or study units raises ethical issues with respect to their rights (McGinn 2015). Ethics should be considered in all the stages of the research, including in the selection of respondents, data collection, processing and interpreting data, and dissemination of the survey results (McNabb 2014). Researchers must be cognisant of the “ethical implications and societal consequences of the research they may seek to design and implement [in order] to uphold the wellbeing, health values or dignity of the targeted communities” (Mwanje 2001b: 62). Before embarking on the data collection, the researcher applied and was given ethical clearance by the university (Annex 1.1). The study therefore adhered to ethical principles throughout the research from the field work to the writing of the thesis in accordance with university's Policy on Copyright Infringement and Plagiarism.⁴⁵ The principles of non-compulsion of respondents to participate in the study, protection of their privacy, confidentiality and ensuring that no physical or mental harm arises from their participation were strictly followed during the conducting of the research (McNabb 2014; Muzvidziwa 2006).

⁴⁵ Available at https://www.unisa.ac.za/static/corporate_web/Content/Apply%20for%20admission/Documents/Policy_copyright_infringement_plagiarism_16November2005.pdf [Accessed on 12 April 2016].

Approval to undertake the research was solicited from different levels of “gatekeepers” who are endowed “with the formal or informal authority to control access to a site” (Neuman 2006: 387-388). The researcher was granted permission in writing by the relevant government ministries at the national and local level, which encompassed MLRR, MAEMI and Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development (MLGRD) to conduct the study, which was used to seek approval from local gatekeepers at the district level (Annex 1.2). These letters of authority were very helpful in accessing the field sites and the study participants and were carried on the person of the researcher and the field workers during the entire field work period.

The respondents selected for both the quantitative and qualitative survey were given detailed explanations of the purpose and outcome of the study before they were requested to provide written informed consent of their involvement in the study. Respondents were made aware that their involvement in the study was voluntary and were free to withdraw at any point if they wished. Due effort was made to explain the independence of the study from planned government land audit that beneficiaries of land reform fear will repossess “unproductive” land (MRT 2017: Interview; MPEW 2017: Interview). To minimise inconveniences to the participants in their daily routines, appointments were set for interviews.

Throughout this study, the names of the respondents and farm names are protected through the use of pseudonyms. However, in some cases original names of the key informants that granted their consent for their names to be published are used. These included leaders of trade unions and NGOs and some public officials.

Furthermore, to guarantee the confidentiality, the questionnaire surveys were administered at private places selected by the participants where nobody else could hear their responses besides the researcher and field workers, usually at their houses. The questionnaire did also not collect personal identification information. Confidentiality agreements were signed with the field workers and data entry clerks recruited to assist in the data collection and processing respectively not to disclose the information accessed during the course of their duties to anyone except the researcher. The aggregation of responses and presentation of the survey data in tables and charts further protected the confidentiality of the study participants.

3.10 CONCLUSION

This chapter has reviewed the methodological approaches and data gathering tools that were applied to answer the study's research questions. It used an approach of understanding agrarian labour relations through a multi-layered analysis cascading from the national/macro-level, district level to micro-level (farm households and labourers). Mixed methods of data collection were chosen for their capability to provide a more complete picture of the new agrarian labour relations. The multiple data sources relied upon allowed the validation and verification of information mobilised during the research. An overview of the study areas and analytical approaches employed for the data analysis were also discussed, alongside the strategies adopted to secure the validity and reliability of the research and the ethical considerations.

CHAPTER FOUR

EVOLUTION OF AGRARIAN LABOUR RELATIONS IN ZIMBABWE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter outlined the research design and methodology adopted by the study to answer the research questions posed in Chapter One. This chapter re-examines existing literature in order to understand the evolution of agrarian labour relations relative to the macro-level changes in land access, land utilisation patterns, economic policies, labour laws and various extra-economic measures from 1890 to 1999. Such an assessment provided a context upon which the research evaluated the changes arising from the extensive land redistribution under the FTLRP. Since the historical conditions and socio-economic policies were changing both nationally and internationally, in relation to the political mode of rule and economic frameworks, a broad periodisation approach since 1890 is used to analyse the agrarian labour relations (Pamer 1977; Phimister 1986; Rukuni 1994; Moyo 2005; Paton 1995) as stated earlier (section 3.3).

These studies broadly divide the pre-1965 period into two phases; namely, Company Rule and Self-Government. The first phase, 1890 to 1923, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) established colonial rule in (Southern) Rhodesia, and the second phase, 1924 to 1965, was the period when Rhodesia was granted self governance by Britain. The post-1965 period, which followed the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain by the Rhodesian Settlers (1965-1979), was characterised by economic diversification and import substitution programmes to countervail sanctions imposed by the international community. This was followed by the Independence decade (1980 to 1990), which re-oriented the economic, social and political institutions to serve the previously marginalised African population. Next was the neoliberal reforms period (1991 to 1996/97) implemented through ESAP at the behest of the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and World Bank. This fourth period involved the state withdrawal from the markets and allowing the latter to determine prices on the basis of demand and supply.

Moyo (2003; 2005; 2013) has also periodised the post independence period based on the mode of land redistribution into two broad phases of market driven land reform between 1980 and 1996 and state driven land redistribution from 1997 onwards. The fifth phase, characterised by extensive land redistribution, alongside the economic turbulence from 2000, which led to the rapid transformation of agrarian labour relations is detailed in

Chapter Five. This chapter argues that the hegemony of the white Settlers in agricultural land control between 1890 and 1999 was instrumental in shaping the evolution of agrarian labour relations. It shows how the gradual colonial dispossession of land from the African peasants alongside other extra-economic measures subordinated blacks to the (farm) labour markets. But peasant farming on small plots in marginal areas under suppression continued to co-exist with European agriculture. Throughout the whole period, the chapter exposes how the dynamic economic and social policies affected agrarian labour in different ways, including through shaping the levels of capital, land utilisation and agricultural production patterns. The transition to majority rule, it is advanced, did not radically transform the agrarian labour relations as land access for the land short and/or landless self-employed family labour in the Communal Areas and farm wage labourers was impeded by the limited market based land redistribution until 2000.

4.2 HISTORICAL ROOTS OF AGRARIAN-WAGE LABOUR (1890–1969)

This section discusses the emergence of agrarian wage labour as a result of the peasantry's separation from their means of production after the country was colonised in 1890 until 1969, the immediate period following the UDI from Britain by the European Settlers. It will demonstrate that land dispossession together with the changing public policies and laws combined to shape the agrarian labour relations outcomes. Specifically, the initial policies were centred on development of gold mining were re-examined to promote European large-scale commercial agriculture after the envisaged mineral resources did not materialise. Altogether, the shifting colonial policies resulted in the gradual evolution of wage labour in the LSCFs, mines and beyond, as well as changes in the composition of the labour force according to its nationality dimension over time. Furthermore, the section also shows that land dispossession was incomplete and the peasantry continued to exist side-by-side with European agriculture, but facing discriminatory agricultural policies to ensure cheap labour supplies to white industries.

4.2.1 Land dispossession and evolution of agrarian wage labour

The origin of agrarian wage labour in Zimbabwe can be traced to the land alienation afflicted on the African peasantry by the Settler-colonial regime, which divorced them from their means of production. Other extra-economic measures also implemented in stages impelled the peasantry into lowly paid work in (white) owned large farms, mines and industries (Palmer 1977; Clarke 1977). Survival outside of the wage economy for the local peasants became severely constrained, but not obsolete. However, with widespread land alienation from the 1930s, the later also joined the foreign migrants who had been

the bedrock of the labour markets (Madimu 2017; Moyana 1984). Labour shortages influenced by various factors were a recurrent theme in the evolution of wage labour in the European LSCFs and industries (Rubert 1997).

Prospects of huge gold discoveries or the “Second Rand” motivated the BSAC to colonise Rhodesia in 1890. Beginning in the Matebeleland region, African peasants experienced land alienation and were transferred to Native Reserves created for their inhabitation (Palmer 1977; Phimister 1986). Many African peasants remained on alienated lands now converted to private property as tenants since most of the new landowners neither took up occupation nor commenced agricultural production (Arrighi 1970; Renne 1978; Nyambara 2005). This evolved the dual agrarian structure that lasted until the early 2000s, with European lands located areas with favourable climatic conditions and the Native Reserves in drier and remote parts of the country (Moyo 2011a; 2013; Rukuni 1994).

Since 1894, hut and poll taxes were imposed by the Department of Native Affairs to induce African peasants into cheap wage labour in the capitalist industries (Arrighi 1970; Mackenzie 1970; Phimister 1986; Mhone 2001). Taxation did not resolve the labour shortages that had surfaced in the nascent mines in Mashonaland as the peasantry met their obligations by expanding commodity production between 1896 and 1908 (Arrighi 1970; Phimister 1986; van Onselen 1976). Even the forced labour schemes did not ameliorate the labour shortages and were eventually discontinued after culminating in the 1896/7 African rebellions in Matebeleland (Ranger 1967; Steele 1970; van Onselen 1976).

Due to their nearness to markets and transportation networks and retention of land in prime agro-ecological zones, African peasants in Mashonaland were the source of much of the agricultural surplus to meet growing demand in the mines (Vambe 1970). Then European agriculture constituted only five percent of the area cultivated and 10 percent of the marketed output in Rhodesia (Arrighi 1970: 209). Peasant differentiation was thus taking root as some of them near Salisbury (renamed to Harare after independence) were hiring wage labour from fellow Africans to produce various commodities required by Settler capital (Palmer 1977; Mckenzie 1970). These peasants in Mashonaland preferred autonomous production (Palmer 1977; Neocosmos 1993) and considered farm wage labour derogatory (Vambe 1970). But proletarianisation was proceeding much faster in Matebeleland, since land alienation began there and the peasants preferred temporary wage labour on alienated land than relocating to the poor agro-ecological conditions in

the reserves (Arrighi 1970; Phimister 1978). Only 13 percent of the able-bodied men from Mashonaland were wage labourers then compared to 48 percent in Matebeleland (Arrighi 1970: 229).

Foreign labour recruitment began to be promoted by the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) initiated in 1903 by Rhodesia Land Owners and Miners Association (Clarke 1977; van Onselen 1970; Steele 1973). Migrant workers imported from British Central Africa (changed to Nyasaland and now Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique) filled the labour supply gaps (Makambe 1980; Mhone 2001). Nationally, foreign labour was estimated at 75 percent of the workforce in 1904 (Mackenzie 1970: 50) and in mines alone they were 69 percent of 15,000 workers in 1905 (Mackenzie 1974: 11-12).

Agriculture became the focus of the BSAC after 1908 when the anticipated large gold deposits did not materialise (Palmer 1977). The agricultural policy advanced the development of European Settler agriculture, while undermining of peasant agricultural production through further land alienation and other extra-economic measures (Rukuni 1994). Policy initiatives included a Land Bank formed in 1912 to offer loans for land purchases to white Settlers from Britain and South Africa (Riddell 1979; Hodder-Williams 1983). The Department of Agriculture was restructured and staffed with skilled manpower to service European farmers and the BSAC used its farms near major urban centres to train new Settler immigrants (Palmer 1977).

European agriculture thus grew dramatically between 1904 and 1911, represented by the rise in the number of white farmers over 2.4 times.⁴⁶ Absentee landlordism was also drastically reduced, as occupation of LSCFs increased from 301 to 2,042 between 1904 and 1914 (Palmer 1977: 91). Tobacco and maize production were the major focus of LSCFs in Mashonaland, while cattle ranching predominated the Matebeleland region (Rubert 1997; Hodder-Williams 1983). The production of these commodities increased by at least 20 times between 1900 and 1916.⁴⁷

The enlarging European LSCFs faced competition for labour from the local and foreign mines (Steele 1973; Madimu 2017). They also competed for land, labour and markets with the peasantry (Arrighi 1970; Paton 1995). Many migrant labourers from Northern Rhodesia only accepted farm wage labour in the absence of mine jobs (Steele 1973).

⁴⁶ Calculated from Rukuni (1994: 19).

⁴⁷ Calculated from Palmer (1977: 92-95).

Mines in the Transvaal, South Africa, which offered higher wages were the final destination for most and brief work in Rhodesia served to raise transport fares for the onward journey (Phimister 1975; Johnson 1992; Paton 1995).

From 1908 onwards, Native Reserves in the better agro-ecological zones were alienated for European settlement and pushed African peasants to remote areas (Rukuni 1994; Palmer 1977). The *Private Locations Ordinance of 1908* introduced land rentals on alienated land and tied tenants to wage work for three months (Clarke 1977). The ceilings on the number of tenants per farm and compulsory cattle dipping and grazing fees covered in this law displaced African peasants in Mashonaland to the reserves (Palmer 1977; Moyana 1984; Mackenzie 1970).

After being granted self-rule by Britain in 1924, Southern Rhodesia intensified the development of European agriculture as part of a broader industrial strategy focused on infrastructure investments in white controlled areas, while peasant agriculture remained ignored (Phimister 1986; Hanlon *et al.* 2013; Paton 1995).⁴⁸

The new Settler government, which took over from the BSAC increased the Department of Agriculture's expenditure between 1923 and 1929 in order to revitalize European farming, which had declined substantially as some LSCFs participated in World War I (Palmer 1977: 146). Recovery was also spurred by the arrival of new Settlers and the increased demand for agricultural commodities arising from the extension of the mining sector (Onselen 1976; Madimu 2017; Phimister 1975).

As the number of white LSCFs increased from 2,366 to 2,912 between 1921 and 1928 (Steele 1973: 10), so did the cropped areas and livestock herds grow (CSO 1958; Palmer 1977). The labour force followed suit and rose from 58,542 to 83,985 workers during the same period (Steele 1973: 10). European agriculture could now meet the food requirements for mines and with it the capitalist sector had become "self contained" (Arrighi 1970: 221).⁴⁹

Within a context of local labour shortages, LSCFs continued to rely on foreign labour that came voluntarily or recruited by the RNLB (Steele 1973; Rubert 1997; 1998). After the demise of the RNLB in 1933, it was succeeded by the state's migrant labour recruitment

⁴⁸ The Europeans in Rhodesia had earlier rejected to be part of the Union of South Africa as the fifth province during an election in 1922, which in turn culminated in the end of BSAC rule in 1923 (Paton 1995).

⁴⁹ Self-contained referred to the ability of the white capitalist sectors to meet their requirements independently through backward and forward linkages (Arrighi 1970: 207).

agency, the Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission (RNLSC) in 1946, which imported an average of 14,000 workers annually until 1971 (Duncan 1973: 73). The entire labour force on some tobacco farms before 1945 were entirely made up of migrant workers from Nyasaland (Rubert 1997; Vickery 1989). Overall 62 percent of the labour force in the LSCFs were foreign migrants in 1951 (Table 4.2).

Meanwhile, the African peasantry, which had benefitted from the declined production in European farms during the World War I, now faced increased competition from the subsidised European farmers and their surplus sales for maize and cattle declined substantially (Arrighi 1970). Yet their taxes and prices of the consumer goods were surging (Arrighi 1970; Sibanda 1988; Tshuma 1987). The share of the African people inhabiting in the reserves thus escalated to 63 percent in 1925, from 55 percent in 1915, since many could no longer afford the land rentals, which were also increasing (Palmer 1977: 149). There, peasants had access to small land sizes of poor quality and in remote areas (Arrighi 1970). Although these processes induced the African peasantry into wage labour, the demand for farm labour still outstripped the supply as many local peasants continued to shun wage labour (Rubert 1997).

Table 4.1: Division of the country by the Land Apportionment Act of 1930

Category	Land Area (million Ha)	% of total
European	19.9	51
Native Reserves	8.7	22
Native Purchase Areas	3.0	8
Forest Area	0.24	0.06
Unassigned	7.2	18.4
Undetermined	0.036	0.09
Total	39.1	100

Source: Moyana (1984: 44)

The *Land Apportionment Act of 1930* legally entrenched the racialised dual agrarian structure (Table 4.1) and further undermined peasant production by forcing tenants to relocate to the Native Reserves (Arrighi 1970). The Act allocated an average of 1000 acres per head to the 48,000 Europeans in Rhodesia at that time, compared to 29 acres per head for the one million Africans (Palmer 1977: 186; Moyana 1984; Machingaidze, 1991). An estimated 50,000 African peasants had been evicted to the Native Reserves by 1941 against a target of 100,000 people (Moyana 1984: 51).

Peasants who had initially been transferred to the unalienated Crown or state lands were also displaced to the Native Reserves to pave way for resettlement of World War II veterans from 1945 (Phimister 1986). This expanded the European LSCFs from 3,699 to

6,255 between 1945 and 1955 (CSO 1958). The 300,000 black tenants still on European lands around 1948 were targeted for removal and only 37,000 remained by 1961 (Moyana 1984[2002]: 93; 96).


The “good” farming methods promoted by the *Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951*, including the separation of residential areas from the arable fields failed to stem the tide of environmental degradation in the now overcrowded Native Reserves (Herbst 1990; Phimister 1986). Agricultural productivity thus declined and constrained payment of colonial taxes (Madimu 2017; Machingaidze 1991). Whereas the reorganisation of land settlements exacerbated landlessness in some reserves such as Chilimanzi where 16.7 percent were estimated to be landless in 1962 (Moyana 1984[2002]: 108).

Dual pricing of maize and cattle during the Great Depression (1931-1936) cushioned European farmers from the international price declines, but hurt the peasantry (Arrighi 1970; Keyter 1977). The *Maize Control Act of 1931* barred African peasants from selling their maize directly to the government’s Grain Marketing Board (GMB), but through white traders who later resold to the latter for a profit (Phimister 1986). While white farmers received 10 shillings per bag from the GMB, the traders paid three shillings for African maize (Herbst 1990). Despite the *Maize Control Amendment Act of 1934* enabling direct sales to the GMB, peasants with no transport to reach the far away markets, continued to be exploited by traders (Arrighi 1970; Herbst 1990). The *Cattle Levy Act of 1934* increased dramatically the slaughter fees for African owned cattle and together with depressed prices sales were compromised (Palmer, 1977). This depressed the share of African earnings from surplus sales from a high of 70 percent to 20 percent between 1903 and 1932 (Arrighi 1970: 216) and in extreme cases surplus maize sales in districts such as Belingwe (now Mberengwa) were reduced to nil by 1934 (Palmer 1977: 212). Tables had now turned, in 1961, the minority 6,000 white farmers were now generating 14.5 percent of Gross National Product (GNP) on five percent of their land area compared to 6.5 percent for the five million Africans (Moyana 1984: 63).

By then, the engagement in labour markets had become “necessary” for African peasants’ social reproduction rather than “discretionary” (Arrighi 1970). Labour supplies now tilted towards domestic internal migrants from the Native Reserves, and the share of foreign migrant farm workers in the European LSCFs declined from 60 percent in 1956 to 43 percent in 1969 (Clarke 1977: 31; Figure 4.1). As a result, the RNLSC influence in labour recruitment began to wane from the 1950s and by 1960s was only hiring for European

farmers and eventually became moribund in 1974 when Malawi stopped labour exports to Rhodesia (Clarke 1977; Paton 1995).

Figure 4.1: Declining shares of foreign workers in LSCFs, 1941-72



Source: Adapted from Clarke (1977:31)

4.2.2 Forms of agrarian-wage labour in LSCFs

Labour tenancies supplied most of the labour in the early 1890s since the undercapitalised European farmers could not afford to pay wages (Rennie 1978; Arrighi 1970). Increased availability of capital boosted land use and livestock herds in European LSCFs, as well as utilisation of modern inputs and tractors (Gibbon 2011). Wage labour thus became more prevalent after the massive expulsions of African tenants from European LSCFs between 1930 and 1960 and signaled the demise of labour tenancies (Nyambara 2005).

Agrarian wage labour, which initially took the form of circular migration, whereby workers were given between three to 12 months employment contracts after which they would return either to the reserves or their home countries (Clarke 1977). Foreign migrants took up longer-term contracts, while locals were engaged for shorter ones as they sought to return to the reserves to work on their fields (Johnson 1992).

As agricultural production capacities continued to be enhanced, including through development of irrigation for all-year round farming, labour stabilisation was introduced in LSCFs through the provision of on-farm permanent housing to the core workers from around the 1930s, while seasonal labour was recruited from the neighbouring Native Reserves (Gibbon 2011; Rutherford 2001a; Rubert 1997; Sachikonye 1986; Rennie 1978). Male permanent workers were encouraged to recruit their families to live with them in the farm compounds (Clarke 1977) and availing them for seasonal labour could earn a promotion at the workplace (Rutherford 2001a). Thus, from only a few employees around 1956, female farm workers rose to 23.3 percent of total LSCF employment by

1972, whereas male juveniles were 10.8 percent of the labour force by 1969 (Clarke 1977: 28-29).

Paltry sections of the LSCFs were occupied by farm compounds, which provided housing to permanent labour and also accommodated casual workers from the Native Reserves (Bush & Cliffe 1984). The self-constructed houses were rudimentary (Rubert 1997). The rights of farm workers to agricultural and residential land were constrained on the private propertied LSCFs and only lasted until the termination of the employment contract (Kanyenze 2001; Rutherford 2001a; Moyo 2011a). For Clarke (1977), this scenario enabled LSCFs to reinforce their control over labour beyond the employment relationship.

The *Masters and Servants Act of 1899* which accorded overwhelming authority to the white farmers legislated farm labour relations (Palmer 1977; Stoneman, 1976; Sibanda 1988). Absence from work without permission could result in imprisonment and employment desertion attracted even up to three months in prison (Rutherford 2001b). Employment contracts were based on a “gentlemen’s agreement”, but white farmers broke their commitments at will (Clarke 1977; Rubert 1997).

Since 1910, the ticket system was used to exploit farm workers by requiring the completion of a full ticket (equivalent to 30 days work) to earn a monthly wage, but in reality the tasks allocated took on average about five to six weeks to finish (Rubert 1997). The white LSCFs also delayed the payment of at least one ticket so that they could retain labour for a longer period (Arrighi 1970). Wages were so low that it required a full month’s ticket to purchase a pair of khaki trousers in the 1930s and compared poorly to those in the mines and industries (Steele 1973; Phimister 1986). Between 1940 and 1970 real wages were stagnant (Arrighi 1970). Farm wages were also divided between cash and food rations (Clarke 1977; Duncan 1973).⁵⁰

Many white farmers in districts such as Hurungwe avoided paying workers on a regular basis (Rutherford 2001a). Agrarian crisis in European farms were also accompanied by very low wages, and periods of extreme crises such as the Great Depression in the 1930s, LSCFs totally suspended wage payments and converted workers to tenants (Palmer 1977). Legal routes for workers to claim their dues such as reporting to the police, often led to reprisals by the employers (Steele 1973; Mackenzie 1970).

⁵⁰ On one farm, the £7 monthly wage was split into £3.75 cash and 4,5 kg of maize, 1.2 kg of peanuts, salt, 0.6 kg of beans and 0.75 kg of meat in 1953 (Moyana 1984 [2002]: 118).

Violence was meted to discipline farm labour transgressions and the use of the *sjambok* to manage farm labour was unexceptional and continued until the dawn of independence (Gibbon 2011; Rutherford 2001a; 2001b). State labour officials considered the use of violence as part of the measures to increase labour productivity rather than for causing harm (Rutherford 2001a; 2001b). Racial abuse and threats of dismissal from work were also everyday occurrences (Palmer 1977; Rubert 1997). Labour inspections that were present in the mines sector did not exist in the farms (Phimister 1998; Rubert 1997).

During periods of severe shortages, meat was added to the maize meal and pinch of salt food rations in Marandellas districts (now Marondera) to attract labour in the 1920s (Steele 1973). Money wages were also increased from a range of 10 to 15 shillings to about 20 to 25 shillings between 1923 and 1928 (Steele 1973: 8). Agrarian labour markets were also differentiated as European farmers in Mashonaland offered relatively better working conditions than the drier Matebeleland (Palmer 1977). Between LSCFs, capitalisation levels were uneven, with the more endowed able to attract labour by offering higher wages (Rennie 1978; Hanlon *et al.* 2013).

Scholars who exposed the existence of labour resistance as far back as the early 1890s (Phimister 1976; Rubert 1997) challenged assertions by analysts such as Clarke (1997) of white farmers having total control over farm labourers because of the residential labour tenancy. Rather than direct confrontation with LSCFs, desertion was the most common form of resistance to poor working conditions. Other documented forms of resistance, included feigning sickness, injuring livestock and foot dragging. White farmers would thus confiscate registration certificates of foreign migrant labour or pay them after harvesting to prevent desertions (Rubert 1997).

Farm labourers developed "...a highly detailed intelligence system as to good and bad employers" since the days of BSAC rule (Mckenzie 1970: 54). The bad employers were "blacklisted" and struggled to mobilise labour without the assistance of the RNLSC or its predecessor the RNLB (Madimu 2017; Steele 1973). RNLB recruited workers only received wages on their return to home countries and employers took advantage of this to offer very poor "forced labour" like working conditions and was shunned by foreign labour migrants (Steele 1973).

4.2.3 Petty commodity production and peasant differentiation

The development of the African peasantry only began to receive attention of the colonial state in the 1950s (Nyambara 2005; Rukuni 1994; Duggan 1980). Financial allocations

for the African peasantry from the state always lagged behind that of the minority European farmers. For instance, during the 1940/41 fiscal year, African agriculture received a budget vote of £14,107 compared to £208,127 for European Agriculture (Palmer 1977: 218). Much less was received by African agriculture during World War I and II, a paltry one fortieth of European Agriculture (Arrighi 1970: 220). Staff allocated to Native agricultural development was also inadequate.

Land alienation, alongside the establishment of reserves during the colonial period was incomplete and uneven (Palmer 1977; Ranger 1986). The differentiated responses of the African peasantry to land alienation and integration into the capitalist economy resulted in differing degrees of proletarianisation of male population within and across the districts (Phimister 1986). Retaining land in good agro-ecological zones, as well as the sizes of villages, closeness to employment or marketing areas, and the history of migration were key in the success of commodity production amongst the peasantry (Mamdani 1996b). For instance, the *Tonga* people in the Zambezi Valley migrated in large swathes to seek wage work in the mining sector in response to land alienation in the 1920s because they possessed little or no livestock (Mackenzie 1970). Furthermore, the native cereals, which they monocropped did not have a developed market. In contrast, their neighbours, the *Bashankwe*, instead of proletarianisation, quickly diversified their production by adding tobacco to native cereals production and integrated into tobacco markets. African peasants near mines continued to prosper in agricultural production at least until the 1940s when land dispossessions increased, while others forged income earning activities in tobacco trading, selling livestock hides and hoe manufacturing from scrap metal (Arrighi 1970). Active cattle and grain markets also provided other peasants routes to earn cash to pay colonial taxes (Mackenzie 1970).

Differentiation amongst the peasantry also proceeded apace influenced by success or lack of it in the wage labour markets (Arrighi 1970; Ranger 1986; Phimister 1986). Some earned higher wages, which they invested in peasant farming and for some the very low wages were inadequate even for their subsistence (Mafeje 2003; Neocosmos 1993). For the latter, male migration for work generated labour shortages resulting in impoverishment of women headed households in the reserves (O’Laughlin 1998).

Weinrich (1975: 11) observed in Chilimanzi and Victoria TTLs in the late 1960s that “...members of the most successful communities which [he] studied had given up labour migration”. Instead, it was what he termed “ordinary cultivators” that remained tied to

wage labour markets. Access to land in the TTLs enabled investments into agricultural production, which eventually provided the choice to disengage from the labour markets.

In Gokwe district, Nyambara (2001) notes that peasant households received an average 10 acres of land courtesy of the *Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951*, but unequal power relations in Gokwe's TTLs resulted in powerful groups such as traditional leaders and spirit mediums amassing land for themselves, their relatives and friends. This created uneven land ownership patterns and by 1980, there were some households who controlled as much as 100 acres of land while others (e.g. young households, single women and immigrants) were either land short or landless (Nyambara 2001: 256).

Rather than fully proletarianise the peasantry as Arrighi (1970) had predicted, what emerged was a semi-proletarianised labour force that combined petty commodity production in the TTLs with wage labour (Moyo & Yeros 2005b; Moyo 2011a). The local African peasants also straddled between the LSCFs and the Native Reserves to attend family rituals, funerals and weddings in order to retain membership in their villages and thus guarantee long-term security in the case of unemployment, infirmity and ill health (Chavhunduka 1971; Mackenzie 1970).

By 1958, underemployment was evident in the reserves as the capitalist industries, mines and farms had no capacity to employ all those who required jobs to subsist (Mhone 2001; Palmer 1977; Clarke 1977; Mafeje 2003). Thus, the reserve army of the unemployed that emerged served as a wage suppression tool (Arrighi 1970).

The discussion above has highlighted that loss of access to land by the peasantry because of the extensive dispossession alongside the implementation of various economic and extra-economic policies was key in evolving the agrarian labour relations. In particular, it subordinated the peasantry into the wage labour markets for their social reproduction. While the reverse is also true as maintenance of access to land by some of the peasantry enabled them resist proletarianisation since they could survive on the basis of own farming at least until land dispossession was ratcheted to expand Settler agriculture in the 1930s. Clearly, the transformation of the agrarian labour relations is not only influenced by land dispossession, but result from the dynamic interactions with other policy measures that historically have included taxation and repression of peasant agriculture and biased state support to European agriculture. The agrarian and socio-economic policies are nevertheless not static, but continuously evolving to respond to domestic and international dynamics. Policies do not produce uniform outcomes on the different

segments of the populace due to their non universal application and the responses to the impacts by the affected people. This can be perceived from the incomplete land dispossession and the diverse responses from the peasantry that led to differentiation in the countryside. Rather than a continuing trajectory of proletarianisation as Arrighi (1970) had anticipated, the uneven land alienation, self-employed peasant labour engaged in petty commodity production combined with wage labour remained a feature of the agrarian relations in a process defined as systemic 20th century semi-proletarianisation (Moyo & Yeros 2005a: 26).

4.3 SHIFTING AGRARIAN LABOUR RELATIONS UNDER CRISES: RAPID LSCF LAND USE CHANGES AND CAPITAL INTENSIFICATION, 1970-1979

Sanctions that visited Rhodesia after the UDI by the ruling Rhodesian National Front (RNF) party on 11 November 1965 prompted a variety of economic reforms, including the development of an import substitution and economic diversification programme, as well as interventions to protect key economic sectors such as agriculture (Phimister 1986; Paton 1995; Clarke 1980; Hawkins 1967). Below, the continued transformation of the agrarian labour relations under this new dynamic of enhanced state intervention by the Rhodesian government to counter the effects of sanctions on European agriculture and other industries is uncovered.

State subsidies for capital investment were channelled to the LSCFs, particularly for irrigation investment, to encourage the crop diversification, while intervening in the markets through various state marketing boards managed by the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA) (Rukuni 1994). Large estate irrigation farming in sugarcane in the Lowveld was also promoted during this period (Moyo 2011a; Mlambo & Pangeti 2002). Peasant agriculture continued to receive minimal state support and its underdevelopment was entrenched by spatial segregation policies (Weinrich 1975; Schmidt 1986). The *Land Tenure Act of 1969* buttressed the ownership of land along racial lines by allocating 15.6 million hectares to Europeans land and 16.4 million hectares to Tribal Trust Lands (formerly Native Reserves) (Moyo 1995: 83). The Native Purchase Areas, where blacks could buy freehold land (1.238 million hectares), more or less retained the allocation accorded by the *Land Apportionment Act of 1930*.

After Britain suspended tobacco trade with Rhodesia (Duncan 1973), new crops were promoted from 1967, including sugarcane, soyabeans, and wheat in Mashonaland, and emphasis was on cotton and beef in the drier Matebeleland provinces (Muir-Leresche 2006; 1994). The state, however continued to purchase tobacco for stockpiling to prevent

bankruptcy of LSCFs (Hanlon *et al.* 2013), and offered short-term loans for agricultural inputs and living expenses (Phimister 1998).

The area under irrigation swelled dramatically from 48,688 hectares in 1966 to 151,698 hectares by 1978 (Table 4.3) as LSCFs received soft loans from the Farm Irrigation Fund (FIF) (Rukuni 1994). Producer price subsidies were also offered to white farmers, including for irrigated wheat production (Takavarasha 1994). Over 70 percent of cropped area under irrigation was located in the LSCF sector between 1970 and 1980 (Rukuni, Svendsen, Meinzen-Dick & Makombe 1994). Other capital equipment such as tractors also increased from 14,585 in 1965 to 17,443 in 1975 (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2: Area under irrigation in European LSCFs and number of tractors

Year	Area under irrigation <i>hectares</i>	No. of tractors
1950	6 183	na
1951	na	5184
1960	18 133	12 115
1969	66 411	14 912
1970	78 467	na
1971	92 239	na
1972	105 060	na
1973	113 833	16 651
1974	113 332	16 878
1975	127 194	17 442
1976	130 558	17 787
1977	146 787	17 773
1978	149 377	17 412
1979	151 698	16 852
1980	154 806	16 717
1981	158 328	16 373
1982	165 405	16 240
1983	143 845	15 763
1984	135 597	15 876
1985	149 835	Na
1987	173 036	16 075
1988	178 547	15 925
1989	187 491	16 142

Sources: CSO (1958, 1950, 1961, 1962, 1980, 1983, 1989)

Over 18,000 jobs were lost between 1964 and 1969 as LSCFs responded to the crisis, especially in the tobacco LSCFs (Duncan 1973). The productivity improvements largely financed by state subsidies enabled the rise in profits from about 23 percent of the LSCF income in 1965 to 32 percent in 1974, whilst the proportion of wages declined simultaneous from 30 percent to 23 percent (Loewenson 1992: 41).⁵¹

⁵¹ Most of the major crops grown in the LSCFs experienced substantial increases in productivity during the 1970s. For instance, maize yield increased from 2,875 kilogrammes per hectare to over 4,314 kilogrammes

As the new economic strategy blossomed, demand for farm labour in the rapidly capitalising sector increased to reach a peak of 336,797 workers in 1975 (Table 4.5). The land under cultivation in the LSCFs increased from 555,593 hectares in 1964 (CSO 1969) to 699, 987 hectares in 1974 before easing to 628,406 in 1978 (Table 4.3). Beyond maize and tobacco,⁵² commodities produced in the LSCFs now included sugarcane, cotton, wheat, soyabeans, coffee, beef, dairy and horticulture (Muir 1994). The LSCFs, however reduced the area under maize by over 62,000 hectares during the 1970s (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3: Area under cultivation in LSCFs, 1970 – 1979

Year	Area under cultivation in Hectares						
	Maize	Wheat	Soyabeans	Tobacco	Cotton	Coffee	Total
1970	292010	15322	12208	43259	66226	660	549313
1971	304017	22005	7777	44667	67739	934	554449
1972	338016	22303	5724	48462	71173	1488	595300
1973	315335	21588	8407	49141	84896	1749	605361
1974	311058	26819	11427	58852	103858	2639	614085
1975	278170	31419	17898	65691	92493	2979	590595
1976	257301	33325	24776	66219	64003	3506	566435
1977	264354	42217	24474	57306	81985	3617	574780
1978	273144	45135	35218	55540	94144	3911	563500
1979	229430	34288	40142	60223	838685	3572	542169

Source: Compiled from CSO (1998:149 – 158)

The growth in the number of farm labourers mirrored the geographic uneven development of farming in European LSCFs. Over 60 percent of the labour was located in the two Mashonaland Provinces around 1971, which commanded the intensive land uses (Table 4.4). Before then, four Mashonaland districts, namely; Mazoe, Salisbury, Goromonzi, Hartley and Lomagundi, produced between 66.7 percent and 72.6 percent of the maize output in European LSCFs between 1950 and 1955 (CSO 1958), while 90 percent of the tobacco output came from eight Mashonaland districts and one Manicaland district during the same period (CSO 1958).⁵³

Capital intensification in the LSCFs increased the number of workers, but shifted the structure of employment by reducing the share of permanent workers from 92 percent to

per hectare by 1978 (CSO 1998a:151). Whilst, tobacco productivity rose from 1,251 kilogrammes per hectare in 1970 to 1,783 kilogrammes per hectare in 1979 (CSO 1998a: 158).

⁵² As a major source of foreign exchange, tobacco survived the divestment by LSCFs to less labour demanding but capital intensive commodities in the 1970s (Loewenson 1992; CSO 1998a). Data from these two later sources show a surge in the area ploughed to this crop during this period.

⁵³ The Mashonaland districts included Lomagundi; Mazoe; Salisbury and Goromonzi; Makoni; Marandellas and Wedza.

75 percent between 1969 and 1974 (Table 4.5). Thereafter, both LSCF agricultural labour force and the area under cultivation began to contract (Tables 4.3 & 4.5).

Table 4.4: Provincial distribution of LSCF permanent labour force, 1971

Province	Workers	% of Total	No. of farms	Average no. of workers
Mashonaland North	87,148	35.2	1,458	59.8
Mashonaland South	62,603	25.3	1,738	36.0
Manicaland	38,603	15.5	859	45.0
Victoria	25,532	10.3	389	65.6
Matabeleland	19,026	7.7	931	20.4
Midlands	14,925	6.0	869	17.2
Totals	247,917	100	6,244	39.2

Source: Clarke (1977:26) as at 30 September 1971

Support to the LSCFs was drastically reduced as the Rhodesian government channelled resources towards repressing the Independence movement led by Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) liberation armies (Hanlon *et al.* 2013; Lan 1985). Crisis had peaked by 1978, since 40 percent of LSCFs were technically insolvent (UNDP 1980). Furthermore, only 24 percent remitted income taxes to the exchequer in 1977 and 1978 (UNDP 1980). The burden of rising input costs and debts undercut the profitability of the LSCFs, but multinational companies that supplied inputs posted huge profits (Loewenson 1992; Rukuni 1994).

By 1979, the total number of LSCFs had declined to 6,113 from 7,116 in 1970 (Table 4.5). However, the area under the LSCFs remained largely unchanged as the remaining LSCFs consolidated land and therefore increased the average farm size from 2,080 hectares to 2,464 (Table 4.5).

Domestic internal migrants now supplied the most of the farm labour as the share of foreign migrant decreased to 33 percent by 1974 (Figure 4.1). Nevertheless, at the farm level, the proportions of foreign and domestic migrants were varied. A study by Chavhunduka (1971) showed that locals dominated some farms, while foreign migrants majored in others. This was attributed to the influence wielded by the nationality of the foremen that mediated access to employment on the European farms, as well as the existing communication channels between those already in employment and their villages of origin. Since farm jobs were not publicly advertised, potential job seekers received information from their relatives. Most foremen were found to favour their kith and kin for employment.

Conditions of LSCF employment

Agricultural workers were not cushioned from the economic crisis like their employers. The low wages were justified by some white farmers who viewed farm workers as “backward” since they came from TTLs and had therefore limited demands for money income beyond acquiring bicycles, clothes and beer (Chavhunduka 1971). Not only were food rations provided with the money from wages usually not enough, such perspectives also neglected health care and educational costs. Fears by European farmers that wages increases would be abused on beer drinking were thus unfounded. The poor living conditions in the farm compounds (Clarke 1977; Rubert 1997; 1998) were considered an improvement of TTL situation by farmers. Because foreign labour migrants accepted low wages than locals, it was common for white farmers to patronise them as “hard working and obedient people”, while locals were labeled lazy (Chavhunduka 1971: 19).

Working conditions were not helped by the absence of farm labour trade unions, which were existent for white workers since 1934 (Sachikonye 2001; Tandon 2001). Trade unionism was also present among black workers in non-agricultural sectors, but they only became legal after *Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959*. Before then, it was constrained by legislation such as the *Subversive Act of 1950* which criminalised worker mobilisation and organisation of strikes (Kanyenze 2001). Yet they organised the massive 1948 labour strikes that brought industries to a standstill and resulted in improved wages and working conditions for African workers (Raftopolous & Phimister 1997; Yeros 2013a) and later contributed to anti-colonial struggles (Freund 1984; Raftopolous 1986; Raftopolous & Yokushini 2001). Efforts by farm workers to unionise in the 1960s were thwarted by the resistance of the RNFU and the legislation equating unionisation with political disruption (Clarke 1977).

The resistance of farm workers to the poor working conditions now involved joining the liberation struggle in Mozambique and Zambia (Tandon 2001) and providing intelligence to the liberation fighters in the LSCFs and Communal Areas (Sadomba 2008). Still, a few cases of direct action through work stoppages on LSCFs during this time have been documented (Clarke 1977).

Peasantry and commodity production

Peasants were further suppressed by the spatial segregation policies, which confined the blacks to the TTLs and only allowed them in the urban areas if they were in employment (Paton 1995; Clarke 1975; Dunlop 1971). Institutions such as the Tribal Trust Land

Development Corporation (TILCOR) formed to advance peasant agriculture were severely underfunded and had minimal impact on the black rural economy (Rukuni 1994).

Moreover, in 1970, the powerful RNFU forced the Chairman of TILCOR not to promote local Africans to grow crops that directly competed with LSCFs (Weinrich 1975), reminiscent of their campaign against peasant cotton production during the 1920s (Steele 1973:9). Investment in peasant agriculture was only made to maintain subsistence levels and prevent them from becoming stiff competition to white farmers and curtail Africans from flooding the cities in search of jobs (Arrighi 1970; Moyana 2002; Duggan 1980). State investment was so disproportionate that 675,000 black farmers received only 15 percent of the ZW\$436 million spent on white LSCFs between 1954 and 1964 (Loewenson 1992: 41).

Agricultural production in the TTLs was on the decline. Per capita income from the land ploughed by peasants had shrunk by about 50 percent between 1958 and 1970 (Weinrich 1975: 8). A significant amount of maize consumed in the TTLs was now coming from LSCFs (Bratton 1979). For the majority of the peasantry, their survival on the basis of agriculture remained uncertain. By now the TTLs had become overcrowded and land sizes per household were declining due to continuous subdivision to accommodate the bulging population. Empirical surveys in Chilimanzi (now Chirumanzu) and Fort Victoria (now Masvingo) revealed rates of landlessness of around 47 percent for all men, rising to 81 percent if only males below the ages of 30 years were considered (Weinrich 1975: 8). As the war against colonisation intensified, agricultural production growth was almost stagnant in the TTLs (Paton 1995).

Notwithstanding the repressive character of agrarian labour relations under colonial rule, it can be discerned from the literature examined that more often than not, (farm) workers and the peasants are the ones adversely affected by economic crises as state policies tend to emphasise protection of the interests of capitalist enterprises, including LSCFs. The latter are perceived as producing greater economic value to the nation. In particular, effects of economic crises are transmitted to workers by LSCFs through low wages and shifts in the conditions of employment, and even job losses. In contrast, the labour force are excluded from benefitting from the increases in capitalist profits in periods of economic booms. In addition to land shortages, it is also apparent that the undermining of peasant agriculture by economic crises generates additional edge for the peasantry to enter labour markets. This results in the rise in the semi-proletarianisation conditions in

the countryside as wage labour is combined with own farming by rural households in order to meet their subsistence requirements.

The analysis above tells us that even under conditions of colonial suppression and control of labour through the residential tenancy relationship and repressive legislation such as the *Masters and Servants Act of 1899*, resistance is always an outcome of the exploitation of workers in the labour markets. Additionally, this resistance can take place with or without the presence of collective worker organisations such as trade unions, which were restricted in the LSCFs until 1980.

4.4 CHANGING AGRARIAN LABOUR POLICY REGIME UNDER LIMITED LAND REDISTRIBUTION (1980-1990)

Zimbabwe evolved from the armed struggles prosecuted by the liberation armies of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) political parties that secured independence from the British colonialists in 1980. At this juncture, the economy was diversified and agriculture (14 percent) lagged behind only manufacturing (25 percent) in the GDP contributions (Muir 1994:43). An estimated 993,000 of the 7,260,000 national population were in formal employment in 1979 (Muir, Blackie, Kinsey & de Swardt 1982: 74) and the LSCFs employed the majority of the formal labour force (25 percent) (Moyo & Ngobese 1991: 11).

The government in 1980 adopted the statist development model it inherited through the “growth with equity strategy” alongside a socialistic oriented rhetoric (GoZ 1981). The strategy entailed redressing the colonial land imbalances, as well as inequities in agricultural and labour markets. It mixed market ideology and heavy state intervention in all social and economic facets, and reversed various repressive legislature and abolished colonial institutions and extra-economic measures that channelled labour to the LSCFs, mines and industries.

Land reform was one of the policy priorities aimed at reversing the unequal agrarian structure dominated by a minority LSCFs owning 15.5 million hectares of land divided into 6,000 properties, existing alongside about one million black households occupying 16.4 million hectares in Communal Areas (Utete 2003:18; Moyo 1995; GoZ 1983). The land categories were legally reclassified – European lands to LSCFs, TTLs into Communal Areas and Native Purchase Areas into SSCFs. Next, the specific changes to the labour laws and related policies after the end of colonial rule and their repercussions on agrarian labour relations are discussed.

4.4.1 Evolving agrarian labour policies, 1980 to 1990

Labour law reforms, especially for the LSCF farm labourers, began with the removal of the *Master and Servants Act of 1899* from the statutes and introduction of a minimum wage of ZW\$20 by the 1979 short-lived coalition government of the RNF and black political parties (Kanyenze 2001; Gwisai 2006). The farm workers operating under semi-feudal relations were now formally recognised as “workers” and incorporated into the *Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959*. The extra-economic measures that regulated the movement of black workers between the towns and countryside through *Pass Laws*, forced bondage of unemployed labour found in urban areas and the compulsory hut and poll taxes also fell away after independence (Loewenson 1992).

Wage rates policy and working conditions

Economy wide labour strikes in the immediate independence period pressurised the government to radically reform the labour regulations to address workers’ colonial grievances (Sachikonye 1986; Kanyenze 2001).⁵⁴ This encompassed the *Minimum Wages Act of 1980*, which gave the Ministry of Labour authority to set the annual minimum wages for all employees (Gwisai 2006; Madhuku 2015). However, at least in the agricultural sector, the Agricultural Labour Bureau (ALB), which represented the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU)⁵⁵ on labour issues, was sometimes consulted on wage setting by the GoZ together with the Industrial Board for the Agricultural Industry (Rutherford 2001b). Minimum wage determination was bifurcated by categorising farm and domestic workers at the same level; and those from Industry and Commerce were another category (Saunders 2001; Herbst 1990). Women who were legal minors requiring permission of their husbands to enter employment contracts, were upgraded to legal majors with the same labour rights as men according to the *Legal Age Act of 1982* (McFadden & Mvududu 2001; Barnes 1992; Ncube 1987).

Worker retrenchments were controlled through the *Employment Act of 1980*, which required all employers to seek consent from the Minister of Labour, who received advice from the tripartite Retrenchment Committee (Gwisai 2006). However, employment contracts could be changed from permanent to casual without GoZ approval (Muir *et al.* 1982).

⁵⁴ Sixteen of the 150 strikes recorded between March 1980 and June 1981 were in the agricultural sector (Kanyenze 2001: 91).

⁵⁵ The RNFU was renamed to CFU after independence.

Five years after the demise of colonial rule, the three main labour statutes, namely; the *Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959*, *Minimum Wages Act of 1980* and the *Employment Act of 1980*, were harmonised and combined to form an elaborate *Labour Relations Act of 1985* (Gwisai 2006; Madhuku 2015). This introduced collective bargaining involving three layers of negotiation from the shopfloor level to the industry level (National Employment Boards and National Employment Councils) and then the national level through the tripartite, Wages and Salaries Advisory Board (Kanyenze 2001). Wage agreements were then gazetted by the Minister of Labour. After adopting the Investment Guidelines in 1989, the state reduced its intervention to resolving wage negotiation deadlocks in favour of workers (Kanyenze 2001).

Labour rights, which had not been adequately defined since the colonial period, were articulated by the *Labour Relations Act of 1985*, including cataloguing “...unfair labour practices, regulated conditions of employment and also provided for the control of wages and salaries..” (Kanyenze 2001: 96). The Act also provided for a hierarchical institutional framework for handling labour disputes and grievances encompassing Labour Relations Officers in the Ministry of Labour, the Labour Relations Board and Labour Relations Tribunal. The labour issues not resolved through the state bureaucracy could be escalated to High Court and finally to the Supreme Court. Farm workers as food producers fell in the category of “essential services” where industrial action was not allowed (Saunders 2001: 140). Post the *Labour Relations Act of 1985*, the Department of Labour was no longer legally bound to monitor the working conditions on LSCFs as was the case under the *Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959*.

Unionisation of agricultural workers

Formation of trade unions was promoted by the “One Industry, One Union” policy (Tandon 2001). The Zimbabwe Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union (ZAWU) emerged in April 1980 as the first legally recognised farm labour trade union linked to the apex union, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) (Kanyenze 2001). Internal problems and leadership struggles eventually led to the initiation of the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ) to replace ZAWU in 1985 (Kanyenze, 2001; Sachikonye 1986; 1995). At the grassroots, workers committees and Works Councils manned by equal representatives of workers and management were evolving (Kanyenze 2001; Loewenson 1992).

Access to social services to farm workers

The state largely considered the provision of social services as the responsibility of LSCFs as it was hesitant to invest on “freehold titled land” (FES 1998).⁵⁶ There was no government policy on how land could be availed to Rural Councils (RCs) to develop social services in the LSCFs similar to Communal Areas (Moyo *et al.* 2000). As such, the RCs in the LSCFs focused their activities on road maintenance and neglected the needs of farm workers (McIvor 1995; Mugwetsi & Balleis 1994). Farm workers were also marginalised in the local government system, which required ownership of property to participate in elections and was thus dominated by the LSCFs (Chambati & Magaramombe 2008). The farm workers only got universal suffrage for local government elections in 1998 after the merger of Rural Councils and District Councils in the Communal Areas in 1995 (Magaramombe 2001).

There was also a growth in NGOs on LSCFs that ran welfare improvement projects for farm workers from the mid-1980s which operated under the goodwill of the LSCFs (Moyo *et al.* 2000). NGOs were nonetheless barred on other LSCFs who feared exposure of their labour brutality to outsiders (Moyo *et al.* 2000; Helliker 2006). By the mid 1990s, there were about 12 NGOs servicing the interests of farm workers, including the Save the Children (United Kingdom) and FCTZ that ran the Farm Worker Health Programme and various literacy, hygiene and education programmes (Chambati & Magaramombe 2008: 215 ; Helliker 2006). These strategies pursued by the NGOs were classified by Moyo *et al.* (2000: 192), as “welfarist”.

Citizenship rights for foreign farm workers

Citizenship rights were extended to foreign migrant farm workers by the *Citizenship Amendment Act of 1985*. All foreigners domiciled in Rhodesia before 1980 upon payment of ZW\$1.00 could be granted citizenship and the requisite identity cards (Moyo *et al.* 2000). Various NGOs supported farm workers with the means to register their citizenship. However, the registration processes never adequately covered the rural constituencies and many remained without identity cards to prove their Zimbabwean citizenship and were excluded from benefitting from various national programmes (Magaramombe 2001).

⁵⁶ This was confirmed by then Minister of Local Government, John Nkomo during a dialogue on farm workers in 1998 hosted by the Freidrich, Ebert and Stiftung (FES 1998).

Documented citizenship enabled farm workers of foreign origin to acquire land rights in the Communal Areas, which were previously denied during the colonial period (Nyambara 2005) so as not to interfere with labour supplies. But other foreign migrant farm workers did however acquire land rights in the TTLs and were integrated into these communities by the traditional leadership (Nyambara 2005). Surveys in the late 1990s showed that between 25 to 45 percent of farm workers owned Communal Area land (Moyo *et al.* 2000: 196). Exclusion and discrimination of foreign farm workers, as noted below, continued on the basis nationalist discourses that marginalised them as “foreigners”.

Land reform and access to residential and resettlement land for farm workers

The Land Reform and Resttlement Programme Phase I (LRRP – I) planned to resettle 162,000 families by 1990 (GoZ 1982: 66), but only 71,000 households had received land by 1998 on the 3.6 million hectares redistributed (Makhadho 2006: 171). Most of the redistribution occurred in the first three years of independence and thereafter the process was reduced to a snail’s pace (Utete 2003). Therefore, the ownership of land remained largely monopolised by white LSCFs until 2000 (Moyo 2001) since only 52,000 families had benefitted from land allocation by 1995 (UNDP 1998: 32). Only the willing buyer-willing seller model could be used by the state to acquire land for redistribution (Kinsey 1983; Palmer 1991; Masoka 1994) before the legal revisions in 1990. The *Constitutional Ammendment Bill No. 11 of 1990* enabled compulsory acquisitions of LSCFs that were blocked by Section 16 of the Lancaster House Constitution for a duration of 10 years. This was then used to ammend the *Land Acquisition Act of 1985* in 1992. Yet the process remained slow partly due to high land prices and focus on the implementation of ESAP from 1991 (GoZ 2001a; Moyo 1995; 1998).

The land rights of farm workers have historically been on the periphery of land reform policy. LRRP-I omitted them from the list of beneficiaries and their aspirations for land were further dented by the characterisation as “foreigners” in nationalist discourses who could not benefit from land ahead of Zimbabweans (Moyo *et al.* 2000). Nonetheless, farm workers did exhibit agency by occupying LSCFs in the early 1980s, which had been discarded by European Settlers during the war of liberation and received backing from ZANU (PF) and were eventually formalised as land beneficiaries by the state’s Department of Resettlement (Chambati 2011; Herbst 1990; Moyo *et al.* 2000). The inception policy document of the second phase of the land reform enunciated in 1998 did

however mention them as a category to benefit from the land allocations (GoZ 1998c), but were later removed from the list during the FTLRP (GoZ 2001a).

Plans were also mooted by the GoZ in the early 1980s to provide independent houses to farm workers outside the farm compounds in “common border villages” (FES 1998; Loewenson 1992). These common border villages were to be established on public land would also avail workers other ancillary services such as schools, retail shops and health facilities (GoZ 1985; Sachikonye & Zishiri 1998). These plans floundered following resistance from the LSCFs (Loewenson 1992) as discussed later (section 4.4.2).

4.4.2 LSCF production patterns and employment trends under limited land redistribution

Averaging over 2,000 hectares in 1980, the LSCFs now had a diversified commodity base, but the monoculture agro-industrial estates and wildlife ranches commanded expansive land sizes in excess of 10,000 hectares per unit (Moyo 1998; 2011b; Muir 1994). The agro-industrial estates were mainly foreign owned and the key commodities they produced included sugarcane, tea, coffee and timber in the Eastern Highlands and Lowveld (Chambati & Moyo 2004; Mutisi 2003; Sachikonye 2016). Yet tobacco remained a key commodity and was employing 34 percent of the labour force in the 1,360 LSCFs (Muir *et al.* 1982: 75).

The LSCFs illegally retrenched their employees in response to the labour protection laws such as the *Minimum Wages Act of 1980* and incorporation of farm labour into the labour relations framework (Amanor- Wilks 1995; Kanyenze 2001; Rutherford 2001b). About 55,278 jobs were lost in the LSCFs between 1980 and 1983 of which seventy nine percent of them were permanent employees (Table 4.5). The number of LSCFs also declined from 6,034 in 1980 to 5,481 in 1983 (Table 4.5).⁵⁷ Thereafter, annual employment figures fell by less than 1,000 employees per annum until 1985 and began to increase from 1987 onwards (Table 4.5). Earlier declines affected both forms of employment, but between 1984 and 1985, permanent labourers regressed as they were converted to casual labour, which was not entitled to pension, leave and housing benefits (Sachikonye 1985). Consequently, the share of permanent workers decreased from 73 percent in 1980 to 69 percent in 1984 (Table 4.5), continuing the casualisation trends that commenced in the 1970s.

⁵⁷ The government bought some of the abandoned LSCFs for LRRP-I (Kinsey 1983; Moyo 1995; Moyo *et al.* 2000).

Table 4.5: Changing LSCF structure and employment in Zimbabwe, 1969-2000

Year	No. of farms	Total area of farms (Ha)	Average farm size (Ha)	Permanent	% of total	Casual	% of total	Total
1969	na	Na	na	208,984	81.8	46,471	18.1	225,455
1970	7116	14,800,000	2080	209,979	87.1	31,095	12.9	241,074
1971	6762	14,750,000	2181	214,033	86.3	33,884	13.7	247,917
1972	7048	14,880,000	2112	210,862	74.0	75,651	26.0	286,513
1973	6937	14,920,000	2181	228,511	75.8	73,001	24.2	301,512
1974	6938	14,840,000	2112	233,766	74.9	78,147	24.1	311,913
1975	6821	14,850,000	2178	236,542	70.2	100,255	29.8	336,797
1976	6682	14,440,000	2161	242,224	72.4	92,140	27.6	334,364
1977	6480	14,800,000	2285	245,444	74.9	82,049	25.1	327,493
1978	6337	14,820,000	2339	233,935	81.9	51,594	18.1	285,529
1979	6113	15,060,000	2464	230,523	80.4	56,302	19.6	286,825
1980	6034	14,798,302	2452	198,268	73.1	73,023	26.9	271,291
1981	6124	14,481,714	2365	191,430	74.8	64,437	25.2	255,869
1982	5915	13,516,357	2285	164,044	74	56,184	26	220,228
1983	5481	12,346,553	2253	154,738	72	61,275	28	216,013
1984	5171	12,539,970	2425	150,601	69.9	64,883	30.1	215,484
1985	5128	12,482,356	2434	147,842	69	66,399	31	214,241
1986	5129	12,145,668	2368	Na	na	na	na	na
1987	4789	11,546,848	2411	150,593	64.3	83,515	35.7	234,108
1988	5015	11,707,233	2334	150,985	61.9	92,802	38.1	243,787
1989	5062	11,707,233	2355	149,576	57.1	112,389	42.9	261,955
1990	4992	11,433,986	2290	151,512	58.8	105,956	41.2	257,468
1991	5117	11,433,986	2264	156,435	57.8	114,061	42.2	270,496
1992	5131	11,375,215	2217	160,713	59.3	110,279	40.7	270,992
1993	5132	11,340,186	2210	157,447	54.2	132,864	45.8	290,311
1994	5164	11,321,617	2192	164,748	53	146,196	47	310,944
1995	5198	11,321,617	2183	Na	na	na	na	313,796
1996	5185	11,187,348	2178	167,851	50.2	166,670	49.8	334,521
1997	5146	11,291,152	2196	172,926	51.0	166,086	49	339,012
1998	na	Na	na	171,491	52.9	152,798	47.1	324,289
1999	na	Na	na	169,257	52.5	153,423	47.5	322,680
2000	5172	11,238,600	2173	167,459	53.1	146,960	46.7	314,419

Sources: Compiled from CSO 1997 CSO (1984) from 1975 onward; CSO (1996) CSO (2001) GoZ (1997); Moyo (2011:512); Clarke (1977) up to 1974: 28; CSO (1984) from 1975 onward na – not available

The LSCFs continued to intensify their diversification into capital intensive land uses such as high value export agriculture (Heri 2006). Simultaneously, farm mechanisation, irrigable areas and modern input use were expanded, although there were foreign currency and import restrictions (Moyo 2000b). Export promotion schemes since the late 1980s provided LSCFs preferential access to the stated owned Agriculture Finance Cooperation (AFC) loans and foreign currency to import inputs (Gibbon 1995). By 1989, the area under irrigation had risen by over 32,000 hectares (Table 4.2) and labour saving combine harvesters increased from 643 in 1980 to 718 in 1989 (CSO 1990: 118). Fertiliser consumption also increased from 400,160 tonnes in 1985/86 to 473,987 tonnes in 1989/90 of which over 75 percent was applied in LSCFs (Oni 1997: 68), while pesticide usage increased by 1,000 tonnes between 1980 and 1986 (Loewenson 1992: 44).

This translated to the growth of both agricultural and labour productivity.⁵⁸ Between 1980 and 1990, real labour productivity rose by 1.8 times, but the broadening of the productivity wage gap from ZW\$76.78 to ZW\$160.06 suggests that these gains chiefly increased LSCFs profits (Kanyenze 2001: 101-101).⁵⁹ Productivity of two of the major crops, wheat and tobacco, increased by at least 1.5 times during this period (CSO 1998: 153 & 158).

The share of grain crops in the total area cultivated in the LSCFs continued to decline from 57 percent in 1982 to 45 percent in 1990, while industrial crops rose to 33 percent from 41 percent and fodder crops' share from two percent to 11 percent (CSO 1998a: 149).⁶⁰ Wheat was the only grain crop whose cultivated area expanded from 32,556 hectares to 50,071 hectares between 1980 and 1990, while maize cultivated area was reduced by over 83,000 hectares (CSO 1998a: 151-153).

Crisis in international tobacco prices lingered on and the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association (ZTA) had to impose a 30 percent production quota between 1980 and 1983 (Muir *et al.* 1982). Subsequently, the area under tobacco production slowed down to 45,552 hectares in 1983 from 63,783 hectares in 1980, before it began to recover in 1984 to reach 58,639 hectares in 1990 (CSO 1998a: 158).

These processes further entrenched the transformation of the LSCF labour force by reducing the share of full-time labour to 58.8 percent in 1990 (Table 4.5). Between 1985 and 1990, the inflation in the number of permanent labour was lacklustre, only rising by 3,670 jobs compared to an increase of 39,557 casual jobs (Table 4.5).

The recognition of women as employees in their own right did not boost their levels of participation in the farm labour markets, especially in full-time employment. Women's share of the total LSCF employment, which was 26 percent in 1980, declined to 21 percent by 1983 (Kanyenze 2001: 101). Moyo and Ngobese (1991: 8) exposed the disproportionate effects of retrenchments on male and female workers. The number of female casual labourers from a peak of 52,764 in 1980 declined to 39,438 in 1983. In contrast, the number of male casual labourers initially declined from 20,349 to 18,327 between 1980 and 1982, before recovering to 21,837 jobs in 1983, suggesting the replacement of female casual workers with male casual workers. Retrenchments of

⁵⁸ Agricultural productivity is measured in output produced per unit area (kilogrammes per hectare), while labour productivity is measured as the value of output per worker.

⁵⁹ Measured at 1980 constant prices.

⁶⁰ Grain crops includes maize, sorghum, wheat, barley, mhunga, rapoko; industrial crops include tobacco, coffee, sugar cane, coffee, cotton, groundnuts, soyabeans, sunflower; fodder crops include lucerne, legumes, hays and silage. (CSO 1998a: 149).

women in the permanent employment was even more drastic with over 50 percent of the jobs shed between 1980 and 1983 compared to a 16 percent decline amongst their male counterparts. The extent of women's discrimination in farm labour markets was such that between 1982 and 1990, they only accounted for three percent of permanent farm labour force (Kanyenze 2001: 101). Moreover, the few women who made into permanent employment were located at the bottom-end, which earned the least wages (Muchena & Dzumbira 2001; Slyvester 2000). Therefore, in terms of income security as provided by regular income from permanent employment, women continued to lag behind their male counterparts.

4.4.3 Wage rates and working conditions in LSCFs

The expansionary wage policy adopted by the state did result in the rising of both nominal and real wages for farm and mine workers (UNDP 1999; Sachikonye 1986; Sibanda 1988). Nominal agricultural wages more than doubled between 1979 and 1984, while the real wages did increase by over 34 percent during the same period (Table 4.6) after having been stagnant in the last three decades. The rate of wage increases slowed down after 1984 due to the conditionalities of the stabilisation agreement the state entered into with the IMF to manage the Balance of Payment (BOP) deficit which had set in after Global recession and the effects of three consecutive droughts (1982 to 1984) (Kanyenze 2001). This also froze wages between 1986 and 1987. However, by 1990 farm workers were earning 1.2 times in real terms the wages they earned in 1980 (Table 4.6). Because of the very low wages that farm workers received during the colonial era, they benefitted most from the minimum wage policy, which offered the least paid workers the largest annual wage increases (Saunders 2001). Their wages between 1980 and 1990 thus remained above the inflation rate, whilst those of Industry and Commerce workers began to decline after 1982 and were 14 percent lower in 1990 than they were in 1980 (Table 4.6).

Nevertheless, farm workers remained the lowest paid formal employees, with their wages 2.3 and 1.5 times lower than those of Industry and Commerce workers in 1980 and 1990 respectively (Table 4.6). Attempts to converge the minimum wages of farm workers with those of other industrial workers in 1985 floundered after heavy resistance from the LSCFs, agro-industries and multinational companies (Loewenson 1992). Instead of the proposed merged minimum wage of ZW\$143, farm workers eventually received ZW\$75 (Table 4.6).

Wage increases were met with intensive labour deployment by LSCFs (Muir, Blackie, Kinsey & de Swardt 1982). Working hours for no extra pay were also increased in some LSCFs and the management and supervision practices also shifted to extract higher levels of labour productivity (Loewenson 1992).

Farm worker wages throughout the 1980s were inadequate to meet the minimum subsistence requirements as measured by the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) (Table 4.6). But the transition to independence however saw the share of farm worker wages in relation to the PDL increasing from 29.4 percent in 1979 to 41.8 percent. The farm worker wages reached a peak of 55.7 percent of PDL in 1982 before a declining trend set in after the adoption of the wage restraint policy (Table 4.6). By 1990, farm wages had slumped to 50 percent of the PDL (Table 4.6).

Table 4.6: Nominal and Real Minimum Wages for Agricultural Workers: 1979-1999

Period	Farm Workers*				Industry and Commerce**	
	Nominal Wage (ZW\$)	Real Wage (ZW\$)	PDL (ZW\$)	Nominal Wage/ PDL (%)	Nominal Wage (ZW\$)	Real Wage (ZW\$)
1979	20.00	21.08	68.07	29.4	na	na
1980	30.00	30.00	71.73	41.8	70.00	70.00
1981	30.00	26.50	81.12	37.0	85.00	75.00
1982	50.00	39.90	89.80	55.7	105.00	83.00
1983	55.00	35.70	110.53	49.8	115.00	75.00
1984	65.00	35.10	132.84	48.9	125	67.00
1985	75.00	37.30	144.10	52.1	143	71.00
1986	85.00	37.00	164.76	51.6	158	65.00
1987	85.00	32.90	185.27	45.9	158	61.00
1988	100.00	36.00	199.05	50.2	182	65.00
1989	116.00	37.00	224.72	51.6	206	61.00
1990	133.00	36.20	263.74	50.4	na	na
1991	170.00	37.20	327.80	51.9	na	na
1992	185.00	27.87	476.06	38.9	na	na
1993	210.00	25.54	589.75	35.6	na	na
1994	241.50	24.02	721.08	33.5	na	na
1995	289.80	28.52	883.69	32.8	na	na
1996	359.35	24.02	1073.05	33.5	na	na
1997	503.09	28.30	1275.25	39.5	na	na
1998	664.08	28.81	1653.26	40.2	na	na
1999	1000.43	16.99	4224.71*	23.7	na	na

Source: *Compiled from Kanyenze (2001:99; 105-106). ** Saunders (2001:138) na – not available

Child labour continued to be enlisted to work in the LSCFs against the prohibition of employment of children below 16 years by the *Labour Relations Act of 1985*. Due to the legal ramifications, the landowners resisted providing information on child labour and researchers have largely been unable to measure its extent in the LSCFs (Tandon 2001;

UNICEF 1994). Yet at one point in the late 1980s, the Ministry of Youth recruited school children to work in the LSCFs to address labour shortages for cotton picking in the Lowveld and this move was endorsed by the Ministry of Education, which extended the school holidays by an additional week for this purpose (Loewenson 1991: 24). Underpaid children were either directly recruited by the LSCFs or mobilised by their mothers to assist in the delivery of piecework sometimes in conflict with school attendance (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Loewenson 1991; Sachikonye 1989). Schools were not a priority for LSCFs, lest they would reduce the farm labour supplies and even some beerhalls in LSCFs doubled as classrooms during the day (Loewenson 1991).⁶¹

Various studies have documented the improvement of working conditions after 1980, including in the reduction of working hours, removal of task work, provision of protective clothing and allocation of small subsistence plots for farm workers in the LSCFs (Sachikonye 1986; Loewenson 1992; Kanyenze 2001; Gibbon 2011; Rutherford 2001a;b; Moyo *et al.* 2000; Chadya & Mayavo 2002; FES 1998). According to Amanor-Wilks (1995; 2001), the changes were only “slight improvements” and not evenly distributed across all LSCFs. In fact the endurance of bad working conditions in many LSCFs was observed. Labour management practices such as use of physical violence, racism and verbal abuse, although noted to have considerably declined since independence, continued in many farms (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Tandon 2001). The extent of these practices were however not clear since the research did not quantify the share of LSCFs nor the number of farm workers involved.⁶² The white farmers continued to resolve disputes internally, through instant justice methods that were sometimes in conflict with the country’s laws and interfered with social matters beyond work such as marital affairs. Rutherford (2001a: 232) characterised this as some form of “domestic government”. Therefore, some fragments of the masters-servant relationship (Amanor-Wilks 1995) were not extinguished by their legal recognition as workers.

The effectiveness of the new labour regulations was also constrained by the high illiteracy levels among farm workers and location of government offices far away from the farms (Rutherford 2001b; 2004b; Kanyenze 2001; Tandon 2001). Moreover, farm workers that reported transgressions to the police and sought recourse from the Ministry of Labour were often victimised by their employers (Kanyenze 2001). White farmers maintained

⁶¹ Schools and clinics accounted for less than one percent of the money invested annual on buildings in the LSCFs (Calculated from CSO 1993). The LSCFs had the least per capita access to social services before 2000 with for instance registered schools found on less than 10 percent of the LSCFs (CSO 1997: 64).

⁶² The existence of physical violence on farm workers on LSCFs was also corroborated by various press reports during the 1980s and 1990s.

territorial authority on huge tracts of land, which they deployed to exploit labour (Moyo 2011a). The government neither set up the requisite infrastructure to handle labour grievances nor did it equip the few labour relations officers with adequate skills (Sachikonye 2001; Saunders 2001). Lengthy labour dispute resolutions were thus frequent, even taking more than three years in some instances (Kanyenze 2001).

Residential labour tenancy and access to agricultural land

The farm compound persisted as an institution tying residency to employment as plans to establish independent housing through the “common border” villages did not materialise as the LSCFs refused to excise their land for this purpose (Loewenson 1992; Sachikonye & Zishiri 1998). For the LSCFs, the villages implied the dissipation of the social control of labour enabled by the farm compounds (see Clarke 1977; Rubert 1998) and losing the convenience of summoning labour in case of emergencies.

Fears of eviction from the farm compound constrained the bargaining power of farm labour in the employment relationship, especially those of foreign origin with no land ties elsewhere (Tandon 2001). Retrenched and retired “foreign” migrant farm workers, after losing farm compound residency, trekked to informal settlements emerging the peripheries of the LSCFs (Magaramombe 2001; Save the Children Fund & FCTZ 2001; Herbst 1990).

Appalling living conditions were characteristic of many compounds, and the housing infrastructure was differentiated by the hierarchy at the workplace (McIvor 1995; Kibble & Vanlerbeghe 2000). Seasonal workers lived in overcrowded dormitories, where the incidences of respiratory diseases were high (Tandon 2001; USAID 1998). Although the interventions of NGOs in LSCFs did serve to improve social service provision (McIvor 1995), they were limited in scope and did not reach many workers.

The social segregation of the LSCFs from the Communal Areas also remained intact governed by private property and customary rights respectively (Scoones *et al.* 2010; Rutherford 2003; Moyo 2011a). Trespass laws on LSCF private property was deployed to exclude “outsiders” access to natural resources on farms and restrained free movement of people and livestock (Moyo 2011a; Chambati 2011), including trade union organisers (Kibble & Vanlerbeghe 2000).

Collective action and/or agency

Village committees or party cells set up by ZANU (PF) in the farm compounds, more than trade unions, led the resistance to poor working conditions in the early 1980s (Loewenson 1992; Rutherford 2001a; b). Beyond canvassing for political support, these institutions dabbled in the protection of labour rights, including establishing workers committees and mobilised workers into trade unions (Kanyenze 2001). Overt struggles by farm workers became pervasive and encompassed daily strikes, absenteeism and slow performance of tasks at least until the mid 1980s (Rutherford 2001a; b). ZANU (PF) was instrumental in evolving trade unions and ZAWU was housed at the party offices during its formative years (Tandon 2001). Such co-optation by ZANU (PF) lasted until the relations ruptured in the mid 1990s (Yeros 2013a). Unions were seen as the “labour wing” of the political party and their “dissent” against the state were not permitted (Tandon 2001).

As political party activities waned in LSCFs, so did the mobilisation of farm workers into the ranks of GAPWUZ. From a figure of 5,000 in 1985, its membership rose to only 16,000 or 6.2 percent of the total number of farm workers by 1990 (Kanyenze 2001: 102-103). Furthermore, part-time workers, which were on the increase, considered union membership to compromise their job security (Amanor-Wilks 1995). Leadership wrangles and limited organisational skills also implied that many workers remained detached from the trade unions due to their non-accountability to the rank and file (Tandon 2001; Yeros 2013a; b).

The legal restriction of labour strikes limited workers options to extract better working conditions (Gwisai 2005) and if they occurred they were met by the heavy hand of the state (Sachikonye 1995). The role of the GAPWUZ largely became a reactionary one – stepping in to resolve reported labour disputes and ensuring workers dismissed from employment received their full terminal benefits (Rutherford 2001b).

At the grassroots level, LSCFs weakened the workers committees by co-opting vocal members of the into management (e.g. foremen or senior clerks), which excluded them from worker representation at any level as enshrined in the *Labour Relations Act of 1985* (Rutherford 2001b). Many vocal members of workers committees were also retrenched and workers became afraid to assume these positions (Amanor-Wilks 1995). Moreover, as ESAP approached, the GoZ became averse to the disruption of production by labour, and blocked the promotion of labour strikes by workers committees to enforce

compliance of labour rights (Kanyenze 2001; Rutherford 2001b). By 1990, the LSCFs had regained control of the farm worker labour relations such that “...many workers ...thought farmers had greater authority to terminate employment and carry out *ad hoc* punishments (e.g., hold back wages, assign extra work, and even have workers beaten) than they had in the early 1980s” (Rutherford 2001b: 214).

4.4.4 Agrarian labour relations and the peasantry

Notwithstanding the repression of African agriculture, a differentiated peasantry emerged from colonisation (Neocosmos 1993; Cousins *et al.* 1992). By then, overcrowding was endemic (Mehretu 1994) and in as much as 66 percent of the Communal Areas the population carrying capacity had been surpassed by more than two times (Moyo 1995:129). Seventy four percent of the land was situated in the marginal areas of Natural Regions IV and V and Natural Region I and II contributed eight and nine percent of the Communal Area land respectively (Muir 1994: 45). The remaining 17 percent of the land area was found in Natural Region III (Muir 1994: 45). On average, families in these areas accessed between 0.2 and five arable hectares and grazing land shared by community members (Moyo 2011a: 512), but for over 70 percent arable land sizes were less than 2.5 hectares (Moyo 1995: 157).

Agricultural production was focused around three crops; namely maize, cotton and groundnuts (Muir 1994; Moyo 2000b), which contributed 45.7 percent, 18.8 percent and 7.5 percent of the value of agricultural production in Communal Areas between 1982 and 1993 respectively (FAO 1999: 13). Other food crops produced included sorghum, millet, and roundnuts, while cattle and goats were the most common livestock (Muir 1994). Auto-consumption was the main pre-occupation of agricultural production, but with partial integration into the domestic food markets (Mumbengegwi 1986; Moyo 1986).

Various policies were initiated to reverse the subjugation of peasant agriculture and promote its growth, alongside LSCFs (Rukuni & Eicher 1994; GoZ 1982). Direct access to markets for the key peasant commodities were enabled by the expansion of the state owned GMB and Cotton Marketing Boards into the Communal Areas (Mariga 1994; Mashingaidze 1994; Masuko 1998). AGRITEX also tremendously expanded its services, increasing the extension worker to farmer ratio from 1:1000 in 1980 to 1:800-850 in 1990 (Rukuni 1994: 32; Cliffe 1988: 7).

State subsidised agricultural loans were also extended to the Communal Areas by the AFC (Gibbon 1995), with beneficiaries rising from 18,000 in 1981 to a peak of 76,818 in

1986 (Chimedza 1994: 146). At the highpoint, loans from AFC reached only less than 10 percent of the peasantry (Chimedza 1994: 151) and were biased towards those in Mashonaland Provinces.⁶³ The LSCFs still appropriated the larger share of the AFC loans, 66 percent of the credit value in 1986 (Moyo & Ngobese 1991: 14).

Together with LSCFs, peasants also benefitted from the producer price subsidies continued from the colonial period, initially through pre-planting prices and later on pre-harvest prices (Takavarasha 1994). Universal input subsidies also enhanced the utilisation of hybrid seeds and fertiliser in the Communal Areas (Gibbon 1995).

This increased state support resulted in maize and cotton production booms (Rukuni & Eicher 1994). The area under maize production in Communal Areas increased by over 100,000 hectares between 1980 and 1985 (CSO 1998a: 151). The peasantry was thus accounting for 85 percent of the cropped area and producing 55 percent of the total output and had reversed the dominance of LSCFs in maize production.⁶⁴ Excluding the droughts between 1982 and 1984, maize productivity also increased rapidly from 667 kilogrammes per hectare in 1980 to 1,530 kilogrammes per hectare in 1985 (CSO 1998a: 151). The area under cotton production also grew at a faster pace, rising from 15,000 hectares in 1980 to 130,000 hectares in 1985 (CSO 1998a: 156). At the same time, the contribution of peasants to the total cotton output subsequently rose from 12,000 kilogrammes (7.4 percent) to 110,000 kilogrammes (38.6 percent) (CSO 1998a: 156). Altogether, the share of the peasantry in the value of sales of the major crops grew steadily from 5.9 percent in 1980 to 19.3 percent in 1989.⁶⁵

From 1986, the wheels had come off the peasant production train. The value of output generated in the Communal and Old Resettlement Areas declined by 4.8 percent between 1985 and 1990, and in contrast, LSCFs gained by 1.8 percent (Oni 1997: 7). Productivity declines were recorded in maize – from 1394 kilogrammes per hectare to 550 kilogrammes per hectare between 1985 and 1987 (Oni 1997:12). Cotton and soyabeans also registered 11.3 percent and 58.1 percent yield declines between 1985 and 1988 respectively (Oni 1997: 12). Livestock was less affected and the numbers for cattle and goats remained relatively stable (CSO 1998a). Droughts and the decline in fertiliser use were blamed for the slowdown in production (Rohrbach, 1989; Mashingaidze 1994;

⁶³ Between 25 to 39 percent of the peasants surveyed in Mashonaland districts in the 1980s were receiving loans compared to none in the low rainfall districts (Stack 1994: 263; see also Cliffe 1988).

⁶⁴ Calculated from CSO (1998: 151).

⁶⁵ Calculated from CSO (1998: 167).

Mariga 1994).⁶⁶ Additionally land shortages were biting under the weight of demographic growth (Moyo 1986; Mehretu 1991; 1994)⁶⁷ and were affecting about 50 percent of the households (Moyo 1995: 137).

Agricultural labour was mostly provided by self-employed family workers, but wage labour was also deployed by the peasantry (see Zinyama 1986; Moyo 1995; Adams 1991a, b) to support mostly weeding and harvesting activities (Worby 1995). For instance, in Masvingo Communal Areas, 39 percent and 65 percent of households hiring labour, employed permanent and casual workers respectively (Adams 1991a: 302; 311). Another survey also showed that 33 percent of the peasant households were hiring two or more casual farm workers (Moyo & Ngobese 1991: 41). However, over 90 percent of the labour for the major field operations⁶⁸ was provided by the family (Mazambani 1991; Moyo 1995; Matshe 1998). Self-employment was also via reciprocal labour arrangements in Communal Areas for labour demanding activities such as weeding or harvesting (Worby 1995).

Migration to towns, mines and LSCFs by the young and middle aged males left the self-employed labour force in the Communal Areas dominated by women, children and elderly men (Gaidzanwa 1995; Batezat 1984).⁶⁹ Women were the majority of the full time residents in Communal Areas, while for 34 percent of the male household heads, residency per annum was under three months (Moyo 1995: 135).⁷⁰ The 34 percent of the female headed households were split between *de jure* heads (16 percent) - single women who were separated, divorced or widowed and *de facto* heads (18 percent) whose husbands were migrant labourers. Some men also entered polygamous unions to increase labour supplies from their many wives (Batezat 1984; Mvududu & McFadden 2001). Therefore, women endured the burden of both providing labour for household agricultural production and reproductive roles (Potts 2000; UNICEF 1994). Labour shortages characteristic of many migrant households were eased by the hiring of piece workers or *maricho*, mobilising extended family members and from the migrants during their short time off-work (Potts & Mutambirwa 1990). Children sometimes at the expense of school

⁶⁶ Failure to repay loans was met with the confiscation of collateral tendered by peasants such as scotch carts and other farm equipment (Tandon 2001).

⁶⁷ Yet some of the expansion in cropped areas was based on encroaching on grazing lands – as much as 27 percent of the cropped area increase between 1980 and 1990 (Oni 1997: 61).

⁶⁸ Land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilisation, harvesting and threshing.

⁶⁹ Indeed, shortage of land was cited by migrants (60 percent) to Harare as the major reason for leaving the Communal Areas in the late 1980s (Potts & Mutambirwa 1990).

⁷⁰ Over 90 percent of the wives of migrant labourers surveyed in Harare in 1987 and 1988 provided farm labour to the household production in Communal Areas (Potts 2000: 817).

attendance were also co-opted to compensate for the missing migrant labour (Bourdillon 2000).

Yet not all female labour was homogenous as self-employed farm labour. Some *de-facto* female heads of households were also successful farm managers (Potts 2000), while many of them were the least paid pieceworkers (Adams 1991b). Proletarianisation of married women beyond the Communal Areas was however limited due to their wider reproductive roles and patriarchal institutions that restricted their movement (Gaidzanwa 1995; Batezat 1984; Makura-Paradza 2010). Besides the wives of male permanent workers, 85 percent of the female labour in LSCFs were single women (Adams 1991b: 170; see also Amanor-Wilks 1995).

The benefits of the growth of peasant production were unevenly spread. Various analysts attributed the dramatic expansion of maize production to between 15 and 20 percent of peasants in Mashonaland (e.g. Moyo 1986; 1995; Cousins *et al.* 1992). The two Matebeleland provinces South and North, and Masvingo did not share this growth (Stack 1994). Jackson and Collier (1988) also reached similar conclusions on peasant integration to cereal markets. District level analysis revealed even further concentration as six districts⁷¹ out of the 53 districts nationally were the source of 50 percent of the maize sales between 1980 and 1988 (Stack 1994: 261). Inorganic fertiliser use was also concentrated in the high maize producing regions (Moyo 1995: 140). Meanwhile, cotton production was more concentrated within the drier districts of Gokwe and Sanyati (Worby 1995; Mariga 1994).

Inter-household differentiation was also influenced by cattle ownership, use of other farm inputs, land sizes owned and use of hired labour. Cattle ownership, an index of draught power, was palpable in no more than 45 percent of the peasant producers (Moyo 1995; Jackson & Collier 1988; Cliffe 1988). Households utilising farm wage labour (especially permanent workers) also had the greatest wage remittances and asset endowments including land and cattle (Adams 1991a).⁷² Moyo (1995) also found that land sizes in Communal Areas within and across the five agro-ecological regions were highly variable and closely associated with cattle and farm equipment ownership. The top 20 percent of the maize producers had access to more land, cattle and labour compared to the bottom 40

⁷¹ Five of the districts, namely Hurungwe, Murewa, Guruve, Mazowe and Lomagundi, are in the three Mashonaland Provinces, while Gokwe is part of the Midlands Province.

⁷² The quantum of remittance also differed on the basis of the quality of urban wage employment (Cousins *et al.* 1992; Potts 2000) and influenced agricultural production outcomes (Mazambani 1994; Moyo 1986; 1995; Zinyama 1986).

percent (Stack 1994: 264). *De jure* female headed households were characterised by the least land sizes, limited access to farm equipment, draught power and finance to invest in production (Gaidzanwa 1995; Potts 2000). The commodification of land in Communal Areas also produced different land sizes as peasants who excelled in commodity production increased the land owned through informal land purchases (Nyambara 2001; Rukuni Commission 1994; Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2008).

Therefore, the returns from self-employed agricultural labour were positive for a few peasants in Mashonaland. In the high rainfall areas of Mashonaland, between seven percent and 22 percent of the peasant households were net purchasers of grain and in the medium and low rainfall areas of Matebeleland, Midlands and Masvingo, the proportions increased to 38 to 96 percent and 48 to 98 percent respectively (Stack 1994: 262). Many in these latter provinces were depending on state relief programmes to meet their food requirements (Cousins *et al.* 1992; Jayne, Chisvo & Rukuni 1994; Cliffe 1988).

Diverse non-farm rural labour activities predominantly in natural resource trading augmented self-employed agricultural labour (Bradley & McNamara 1993; Fortmann & Nhira 1992). Estimates of rural households involved ranged from 10.7 percent (Jackson & Collier 1988: 16) to over 20 percent (Moyo 1995: 209 – 210). According to Moyo (1995; 2006), commodification of natural resources was largely due to mounting arable land shortages. These activities gained importance in Natural Regions III to V compared to Natural Region I and II where crop incomes preponderated (Moyo 1995; Mithöfer & Waibel 2003). Women and children were over 90 percent of the labourers in the collection and trading mopane worms (Hobane 1994), while men partook in arduous activities such as hunting/fishing and gold panning (Mushongah & Scoones 2012).

In sum, poverty amongst the peasantry was not reversed by the advancement of agricultural production. On average, a peasant household of six to seven persons in the Communal Areas realised an average annual income of ZW\$840 in the late 1990s compared to the rural PDL of ZW\$2,520 (Oni 1997: 18).

On the whole, the literature tended to be pre-occupied with the agrarian labour relations in the LSCFs to the exclusion of peasant labour processes. Specifically, LSCF wage employment trends after the introduction of the farm labour regulations in the early 1980s and the retrenchment and casualisation of labour that ensued. However, the super-exploitation of the workers evident in the LSCFs through the paltry wages and residential

labour tenancy was neglected in the analysis. In the Communal Areas, the constraints to agricultural growth received wide coverage in the studies outside the LSCFs.

As the years passed, the importance of the distribution of agricultural landholdings in shaping the agrarian labour relations can not be over-emphasised. The inequalities in land ownership biased in favour of the LSCFs amidst minimal land redistribution was reflected in the dominance of the latter in the agrarian labour markets, as well as the formal wage employment nationally. The inadequacy of the majority of the land short peasantry to survive on the basis of farming alone regardless of the increased state support being channelled to small-scale agriculture further reinforces the crucial role of land access. Under conditions of inequitable land distribution, semi-proletarianisation remains a dominant livelihood strategy for the peasantry. It can also be gleaned from the above that the transition in the nature of capitalist farming, represented during this period by the intensification and diversification of land uses to respond to export market opportunities in the EU and beyond, affects the structure of the labour force, and consequentially the employment conditions especially by displacing full time labour with part-time labour.

State intervention in the labour markets can provide prospects for the protection and enhancement of the livelihoods of vulnerable working classes such as farm workers as seen through the general rise in real wages after the introduction of minimum wages in 1980 and the incorporation of rural workers in the labour relations framework. It is also apparent, however, that without adequate monitoring of the implementation and an expansive manpower infrastructure, progressive labour policies alone are not enough to translate to the improvement of labour rights and livelihoods due to the evasion of regulations by LSCFs wanting to minimise cost outlays. What is also emerging from the assessments above is that the focus of agrarian policies on particular segments of the farming units and/or agro-ecological bias produces uneven development in the utilisation of wage labour in the LSCFs and self-employed labour in the peasantry. The experiences of the Mashonaland province, which benefitted mostly from the agricultural growth between 1980 and 1990, demonstrate this phenomenon.

4.5 NEOLIBERAL REFORMS AND AGRARIAN LABOUR RELATIONS (1991-1999)

The neo-liberal Structural Adjustment policy framework adopted by Zimbabwe from 1991 was based on market ideology for the “allocation” and “efficient” utilisation of resources and perpetuated societal inequalities (Moyo 1995; 2000; Masuko 1998; Mhone

2001). More emphasis was accorded to the promotion of exports as the vehicle for economic growth and national development and less was put on the requirements of the domestic market (Chidzero 1994).

Income redistributive policies such as land reforms were postponed by these World Bank- and IMF promoted economic reforms to the detriment of the landless (Moyo 2011a; 2000b). Instead, ESAP reinforced market based land reforms, which benefitted mostly the emerging black elite that managed to buy LSCFs by 2000 (Moyo 2005; 2003). Policy transformation with gradual shifts towards dirigisme and heterodox economic policy, however started to occur around 1996/7 through the development of Land Reform and Resettlement Phase II (LRRP-II) policy involving state compulsory expropriation of LSCFs (Yeros 2013b). This replaced the “willing-buyer-willing seller” based land reform that had been in place since 1980. The policy shift was put into action by the GoZ through the gazetting of over 1,400 for compulsory acquisition in 1997, but less than a third were acquired for redistribution between 1998 and 2000 as the remainder were removed from the acquisition lists (Moyo 2000a: 25; Chambati & Moyo 2004: 5) due to the reversals at the High Court after litigation by the farmers (Utete 2003).

Agrarian labour policy reforms that escorted ESAP and their implications on the farm labour relations are first unearthed below. This is followed by the assessment of the consequences of the increased promotion of export agriculture in the LSCFs on labour utilisation and what this translated to in terms of the socio-economic conditions of farm labour. The examination of the impacts of ESAP on the peasantry in the Communal Areas wraps up the discussion.

4.5.1 Agrarian labour policy reforms under ESAP

Employment security and the livelihoods of the working classes, including farm workers were undermined labour market deregulation and trade liberalisation (Sachikonye 1995; UNDP 1998; Kanyenze 2001). The promotion of exports led to the enlargement of new land uses and restructured the demand for labour in the LSCFs (Moyo 2000b). Foreign currency generation was a key priority (GoZ 1991; Chidzero 1994).

The labour market interventions by the state in the previous decade shouldered the blame for the high unemployment rates in the economy (GoZ 1989). The deregulation of the labour market thus sought to leave the determination of prices and incomes to employers and employees. Employment security was reversed by *Statutory Instrument 404 of 1990*, which allowed employers to retrench employees without permission from the state

(Sachikonye 1995). By way of notice to the Works Council detailing the employees to be affected and the justification, employers could proceed with retrenchment. The National Employment Council (NEC) received the notice if there was no Works Council. The Retrenchment Committee also got a copy of the notice and would only intervene if the employers and the employees failed to resolve this issue within one month.

Minimum wage setting was replaced by Collective Bargaining between the employers and employees. The *Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1992* provided for the establishment of NECs, which were mandated to develop industry codes of conduct and undertake collective bargaining. The NEC for the Agricultural Industry was established in 1992 and its Employment Code was gazetted as *Statutory Instrument 323 of 1993*. It included the ALB and GAPWUZ representing employers and employees respectively. The determination of wages and working conditions now became an outcome of the Collective Bargaining process and the state through the MPSLSW was responsible for gazetting the agreed wage rates (Chambati & Moyo 2004; Kanyenze 2001; Amanor-Wilks 1995). After this, the gazetted wages legally bound all and sundry in the farming sector. Only permanent and seasonal labourers enjoyed the protection of the law since contract or pieceworkers were excluded and their conditions were negotiated between them and employers at the farm level. Seven grades were defined for farm workers in the Collective Bargaining Agreement – ranging from grade one (the least skilled general hands) to the grade seven (most skilled staff such as machine operators) (GoZ 1993).

However, GoZ policy also allowed individual farm employers, with employee consent, to be exempted from the gazetted collective bargaining agreements, if they could prove their inability to pay the agreed wages to the MPSLSW. As per *Statutory Instrument 356 of 1993*, the employment codes negotiated at the Works Council was superior to that of the NEC. Farm workers were thus severely disadvantaged since their workers committees were not capacitated to effectively negotiate with employers (Saunders 2001). The “One Industry-One Union” was rescinded by the *Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1992* to allow more than one union per industry (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Kanyenze 2001).

Neo-liberal reforms removed price controls on basic food commodities resulting in the spiralling monthly costs for the broader working class. Agricultural input subsidies and state marketing were arrested, and had negative impacts on self-employed labour in the Communal Areas as discussed later.

4.5.2 Export driven LSCF agriculture and agrarian labour relations

The LSCFs further widened export production during ESAP with horticulture targeting mainly European vegetable and flower markets (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Moyo 2000b; Heri 2006) and wildlife farming as the key sectors (Bond & Cummins 2006). New labour demand patterns emerged with the increased capital investment in LSCFs associated with these novel land uses.

Small irrigable land sizes of about 10 hectares per LSCF characterised capital intensive horticultural production and the cropped area in this sector increased substantially from 4,051 hectares in 1987 to an estimated 35,000 hectares by 1995 (Moyo 2000b: 91; 191). Investments in greenhouse technology was one of the central drivers of export horticulture growth (Heri 2006). But other enterprises such as cut-flowers, were also both capital and labour intensive, since they were employing about 27,000 workers, mostly women, on about 900 hectares – a labour intensity of 30 workers per hectare (Davies 2000:ix). The growth of export horticulture production was uneven as the Mashonaland Provinces accounted for 60 percent of the 1,600 LSCF grower base by the mid-1990s (Moyo 2000b: 91). As the number of growers and land area under horticulture increased, so did the foreign exchange receipts in this sector also quadruple to reach a high of US\$ 136 million in 2000 in relation to the levels realised in 1991 (GoZ 2001c: 68).


The large cattle ranches paved way for wildlife farming in the Natural Regions III to IV in the Matebeleland Provinces in the 1990s (Bond & Cummins 2006). Apparently, the rise of wildlife farming was spurred by the high rates of return on financial investments, which were almost double those from cattle farming and the gross earnings from safari hunting alone had jumped more than 10 times to US\$ 22 million between 1984 and 1998 (Bond & Cummins 2006: 485). Such growth was reflected in the land areas as thirty one percent of LSCF land in 1994 was under wildlife, up from three percent in 1960 (Moyo 2000b:109), including those in areas suited for intensive farming in Mashonaland Provinces who also joined to profit from the high financial returns. Beyond foreign currency generation, the adoption of wildlife farming especially in the latter provinces were meant to quell suggestions of land underutilisation in the LSCF sector as demands for land reform grew louder (Moyo 1999).

During ESAP, wage employment in the LSCFs grew from 257,468 in 1990 to 334,521 by 1996, and by 1999 there were 322,680 workers (Table 4.5). This was an exception to the massive retrenchment of workers experienced in other sectors of the economy. For instance, over 20,000 jobs disappeared in the Manufacturing sector between 1991 and

1995, whilst the public service lost over 17,000 jobs (CSO 1998a:53-54). But the tendency to casualise labour did not relent (Table 4.5).

The LSCF labour force remained unevenly distributed and closely mirroring intensive land use and agricultural production patterns. The three Mashonaland Provinces (Central, East and West) were home to the largest section of the labour force, whilst the least shares were in the drier Matebeleland and Midland Provinces (Figure 4.2). Shifts in the structure of the labour force were evident in the Mashonaland and Manicaland Provinces that dominated the export horticulture grower base. Specifically, there was a glaring decline in the proportion of permanent workers, alongside the rise in the casual workforce (Figure 4.2). Far less transformation was experienced in the Matebeleland and Midlands provinces, which traditionally had low levels of labour.

Figure 4.2: Spread of the farm workers by province, 1983-2000




Source: Compiled from Chambati & Moyo (2004:44)

Altogether, the deregulation of the labour markets and the new land uses further increased the casualisation of farm labour, which had been underway since the 1970s and 1980s when LSCFs shifted away from labour intensive grain crops. Farm workers lost job security by becoming casuals who did not receive pensions, medical aid and housing benefits (Amanor-Wilks 1995; UNDP 1999; Magaramombe 2004). Non-permanent labour, which could be easily retrenched, allowed LSCFs to adjust to global commodity price volatility and advance labour productivity demanded by export production (Amanor-Wilks 1995).

Women expanded their representation in the LSCF work force from 24 percent in 1990 (Kanyenze 2001: 106) to 31 percent in 2000 (Figure 4.3). This was occasioned by their preference in the horticultural sector where certain tasks such as picking flowers were considered to require their “nimble” hands and patience (Davies 2000: 17) as was the

case in this sector in the Global South elsewhere (Maertens & Swinnen 2012). As before, over 50 percent of the women were casual workers in the late 1990s, and under 10 percent of the permanent workers (Figure 4.3). Their share in the permanent workforce had only increased by two percent between 1972 and 1996 (Clarke 1977: 28; CSO 2001: 130).

Figure 4.3: Gender dimensions of farm wage employment, 1996 – 2000



Source: Compiled from CSO (2001: 128)

The share of foreign migrants continued to dwindle and by 1999, they were estimated to be around 10 percent of the LSCF labour force (FCTZ 2000; MPSL&SW 1998; Sachikonye 2003). Foreign workers that remained on LSCFs were born in the country and were thus citizens by birth, but many confronted impediments to access national identity documents to prove Zimbabwean citizenship (Magaramombe 2001; Chambati & Moyo 2004). In the labour intensive plantations and LSCFs in the Eastern Highlands, Mozambican migrants however remained a key labour source during the 1980s and 1990s (Amanor-Wilks 1995).⁷³ These included voluntary migrants and refugees fleeing civil war between the ruling party, FREELIMO and RENAMO insurgents (Amanor-Wilks 1995). Some war escapees also ended up as wage labourers in the Communal Areas.

This new wave of migrancy pinnacled after the 1992 devastating drought that afflicted the entire Southern Africa region, with estimates of 280,000 peasants from northern Tete Province crossing into Zimbabwe (Amanor-Wilks 1995: 52). This enlarged the farm labour supply and led to the shrinkage of wages as foreign migrants with fewer survival options accepted very low farm wages. Local labourers demanding higher wages were being replaced by refugees in the tea estates (Mutisi 2003). Although the LSCFs resisted the withdrawal of cheap labour provided by refugees, the joint GoZ and the United

⁷³ Nationally, the 1992 Population Census revealed there were 164,824 Mozambicans, 38, 203 Malawians and 10,003 Zambians resident in Zimbabwe (CSO 1992: 20).

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) programme from 1995 onwards repatriated over 100,000 refugees back to Mozambique after the return of peace (Amanor-Wilks 1995). Nonetheless, voluntary circular migration for seasonal work continued in the Eastern frontier, but at reduced levels, and LSCFs exploited their illegal immigration status to pay severely low wages (Moyo *et al.* 2000).

4.5.3 Wages and working conditions in the LSCFs in 1990s

The collapse of real wages across the board was a key feature of ESAP (Yeros 2013a). Despite the adoption of Collective Bargaining, the GoZ did continue to intervene in minimum wage setting, but this time in support of (agrarian) capital by issuing warnings to workers that annual wage increases should not stifle the economic reforms underway (Kanyenze 2001; Yeros 2013a; 2002). In the space of a decade after ESAP was implemented, real farm wages were down by over 60 percent (see Table 4.6). Real wages only increased in 1995 and then again in 1997 following the farm worker strikes that are discussed below. Now the annual wage increases farm workers obtained under Collective Bargaining were below the inflation rate.⁷⁴ Indeed, the real wage of ZW\$16.99 earned farm workers had deteriorated to below the wages they earned in 1979 (Table 4.6). Farm workers thus remained at the bottom of the wage ladder, earning a third of the lowest paid employee in all other sectors around 1999 (Chambati & Magaramombe 2008: 210).

Regardless of the equal pay legislation provided in *Labour Relations Act of 1985*, women were discriminated in the farm wage labour markets and received the least pay (Amanor-Wilks 1995, 1996; Rutherford 2001a; 2001b; Sylvester 2000). In fact, some female part-time workers resorted to prostitution to supplement low wages (Muchena & Dzumbira 2001). Thus, HIV and AIDS became a concern in the LSCFs (Mutangadura & Jackson 1999; UNICEF 1994). Wages and working conditions in general also remained differentiated regionally with those in Matebeleland and Midlands Provinces receiving the lowest wages (Amanor-Wilks 1995), continuing the trends established during the colonial times (Palmer 1977). The local peasantry from Communal Areas in these drier regions, susceptible to frequent droughts had limited survival options beyond wage employment (Moyo & Ngobese 1991). Thus, the threat of unemployment was used to impose very bad working conditions.

Although the new export land use patterns enhanced LSCF profits, their workers earned the same wages as those in other agricultural sub-sectors (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Davies

⁷⁴ The annual inflation rate increased from 15.5 percent in 1990 to 58.5 percent in 1999 (CSO 2002).

2000). This was also partly motivated by need to avoid industrial unrest from the other workers and also because there was no special category for these workers in the Collective Bargaining agreement. Many in the cut-flower sub-sector were classified as general hands (Davies 2000). The structure of functional income distribution was substantially altered during ESAP as the percentage of profits to GDP increased from 47 percent to 61 percent between 1987 and 1997 (UNDP 1999: 63). Simultaneously, the share of wages declined from 54 percent to 39 percent.

The levels of labour productivity were comparable to those experienced in the 1980s, despite the declines experienced in the 1990s, and could in fact allow wages to be increased by at least six times between 1991 and 1997 without undermining LSCF profitability (Kanyenze 2001: 107).

Demands for increased productivity under ESAP was met by the intensification of supervision of workers as LSCFs sought to extract maximum labour inputs. By the mid 1990s, 66 percent of the workers surveyed in agro-industrial estates opined that work had become tougher (Sachikonye 1995: 88). Production incentives for workers were also instituted by employers to meet productivity targets, but this resulted in the increased exploitation of women and children as unpaid LSCF labour as they would assist male (permanent) workers to achieve and exceed labour targets (Sachikonye 1995).

Farm workers' wages declined drastically to 23.7 percent of the PDL by 1999 (Table 4.6). To compress their wage bills, farmers classified the bulk of the farm workers in the lowest grade of employment that earned the minimum wages (Amanor-Wilks, 1995). Analysis by Chambati and Moyo (2004: 7) showed that around 2000, close to 82 percent of the permanent workers were classified in the unskilled and semi-skilled category (grade one) and skilled worker categories (grade three upwards) were occupied by fewer than 12 percent. Therefore, the minimum wage coincided with the wage ceiling in most instances (Loewenson 1992).

Far from being the norm, incremental improvements in working conditions were noted in export cut-flower enterprises (Davies 2000). The few LSCFs who had enrolled for the international labelling programmes for flower exporters were compelled to offer permanent written employment contracts. They were also supposed to adhere to a set of labour practices such as provision of protective clothing, maternity leave and a 48 hour working week. Female seasonal labourers were the major beneficiaries as they were converted to permanent employees. Yet, as Davies (2000) observed, LSCFs circumvented

some of these regulations by forcing women to commit in writing that they had opted to remain seasonal employees. Contradictory legislation was however introduced during this time whereby companies including LSCFs could apply for Export Promotion Zone (EPZ) status that would set aside the *Labour Relations Act of 1985* (Yeros 2013a; Gwisai 2005).

Blacks that purchased LSCFs after 1980 also did not provide any different working conditions to those found in white LSCFs (Tandon 2001). Unionisation was resisted on black owned farms as much it was on white LSCFs and living conditions in farm compounds were worse off in black LSCFs and state farms such as ARDA (Kanyenze 2001).

Poverty levels amongst farm workers

No doubt, poor people were a large fraction of the farm worker community. The poverty survey conducted by the national statistical agency illustrated that over 75 percent of the people living on LSCFs were below the PDL compared to 88.3 percent in the Communal Areas (CSO 1998b: 119). Although they seemed better off than the peasantry in the poverty rates, it is critical to point out that farm workers ranked poorly on most social indicators compared to the latter (Tandon 2001) and their narrow asset base, including landlessness meant that they depended heavily on wage incomes (Kanyenze 2001). Poverty levels were also gendered as female headed farm worker households were worst affected (CSO 1998b). The type of farm job held did not substantially influence the incidence of poverty as even those higher up the employment ladder were not immune to it. As such, by the time FTLRP land allocations unravelled, the livelihoods of most farm workers were uncertain.

Food consumption patterns also changed substantially amongst farm workers. Less than 41 percent of them could still afford basic commodities such as bread, beef and sugar around 1994, after receiving their wages and 24 percent had withdrawn children from school (Sachikonye 1995: 93). Decontrol of prices of basic commodities hurt farm workers more than other rural dwellers given their dependence on unstable food markets during ESAP. Moreover, compared to elsewhere price were always higher in the farm stores that were monopolised by the LSCFs and long distances to other alternatives limited the choices of farm labourers (Potts & Mutambirwa 1995).

Overcrowding remained a feature of farm compounds with a national sample survey in the mid 1990s showing that while there were 21,642 permanent and casual workers employed on 274 LSCFs, there were 60,180 people resident in the compounds (Tandon

2001: 239). A variety of wage augmenting productive activities were also undertaken by farm workers within the compound to include food crop production on small plots of land (ranging from 0.2 to 0.6 hectares) that were accessed by the senior members of LSCF labour force such as foremen and clerks (FCTZ 2001; Rutherford 2001a, Vhurumuku *et al.* 1998). Trading in natural resources such as firewood and alluvial gold was also documented among farm workers (FCTZ 2001). Women were mostly involved in poultry rearing for sale to the managerial employees (Tandon 2001). Food subsidies provided mainly by the grain farmers in Mashonaland West in the late 1990s also served to fill the income gaps of farm workers (FCTZ 2002).

Agency

The national labour centre, ZCTU, was opposed to ESAP and suggested policy alternatives to market liberalisation (ZCTU 1996). Increasingly, the trade union organised radical actions to express workers dissatisfaction with the economic crises induced by structural adjustment policies. This entailed mobilising urban and rural working classes to stay away from work and sponsoring food riots to respond to the rise in the cost of living amid the decline in real wages (Yeros 2013a). Tensions grew between the union and the ZANU (PF) led state and by 1998 their relationship had been severely undermined (Tandon 2001). In fact, Tandon (2001: 233) further adds that the subservient role ZCTU played as affiliate of the ruling party dealing with labour issues in 1980s had fallen away (see also Sachikonye 1995).

By 1995 and 1996, wages across the board had been eroded and labour strikes were on the increase (Yeros 2013a; b; 2002). The estimates of the number of strikes recorded annually before 1990 were generally below 50 but had peaked to over 230 in 1997 (Saunders 2001: 146). According to Yeros (2013a: 395), the number of strikes were as high as 236 in 1996 alone. More than 100,000 workers from diverse sectors participated in the extensive strikes in 1997 (Saunders 2001: 148). Farm workers numbering about 40,000 engaged in wild cat strikes for about 10 days in October 1997 without the coordination of their main union, GAPWUZ (Saunders 2001: 149). Beginning in Mutoko (some 145 kilometres East of Harare) and later spreading to various districts nationally, farm workers protested violently by blocking national road highways, burning fields and tobacco barns, destroying farming equipment and cars, looting farm stores as well as threatening violence on their employers. The impoverished families of farm workers also joined the strike and the farmers subsequently succumbed to demands for a 40 percent wage increase in 1998 (Rutherford 2001b). However, the prevailing economic conditions

implied that farm wages were only equivalent to 39.5 percent of the PDL (Kanyenze 2001: 106).

At this stage, the effectiveness of GAPWUZ in mobilising members and representing workers was further distracted by the internal leadership fights that persisted throughout the 1990s. Since the “One Industry One Union” was now redundant, GAPWUZ then splintered into several trade unions (Kanyenze 2001: 104).

The Manicaland branch of GAPWUZ formed the Zimbabwe Agro-Industry Workers Union (ZIAWU) in 1997, after its demands since 1993 for more representation of agro-industrial workers in the national executive were denied. Another union, the Zimbabwe Horticulture, Crocodile, Sugar and Allied Workers also evolved in 1997 led by a former Deputy General Secretary, who had lost elections during the 1996 congress. The sugarcane multinational companies caused further divisions when they supported their workers to form a separate union, the Zimbabwe Sugar Milling Workers Union (ZISMIWU) to spite GAPWUZ, which had partly coordinated a labour strike over retrenchment packages in 1992 by the plantation workers (Tandon 2001). By 1999, the collective voice of farm workers was therefore dispersed in four trade unions, whose disunity was displayed when they absconded the 1998 NEC wage negotiations after failing to agree to a common position (Tandon 2001).

GAPWUZ however retained the largest membership base, but with its financial resources from subscription fees reduced by union fragmentation. Increased financial support from donors had earlier enabled it to expand its membership, professionalise the bureaucracy and develop organisational skills under the tutelage of ZCTU (Yeros 2013a). At its peak around 1995, it had managed to recruit about a third of the permanent workers (65,000 members) (Kibble & Vanlerberghe 2000: 26). Amanor-Wilks (1995: 5) put the membership of GAPWUZ at 80,000, while ZISMIWU was representing 15,000 workers in the Triangle, Hippo Valley and Mkwesine sugar plantations. However, membership fluctuated owing to cyclical instability of the labour force. Circa 1999, GAPWUZ’s membership had dropped to 20,000 or only six percent of the total agricultural employment then (Kanyenze 2001: 110). Moreover, its field bureaucracy comprising of only 48 officers was severely inadequate to cover the expansive LSCFs nationally (Amanor-Wilks 1995: 5). At a rate of 50 percent, workers in agro-industrial estates, which had elaborate industrial relations frameworks were more unionised than the other LSCFs (Sachikonye 1995: 93).

Farm worker trade unions also adopted a “workerist” approach, which mainly sought to address workplace constraints (Moyo *et al.* 2000: 190). Their strategies were thus excessively focused on improving farm wages, to the neglect of structural causes of their predicament rooted in land inequalities. Gaining access to land through the impending land reforms was hardly a concern amongst the trade unions that emphasised protection of their poorly paid jobs. Following the designation of 1471 LSCFs in 1997 for resettlement, this also concerned some analysts (Mtapuri & Waeterloos 1998) and NGOs (FES 1998).

However, the coalescence of ZCTU with other civic movements and (agrarian) capital, first within the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1998, and later as an opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), compromised its mandate for worker emancipation (Yeros 2013b). Eventually, its “regime change” agenda, Yeros (2013b) argued, supported externally by donors put it into conflict with the land occupation movement led by ZANU (PF) aligned war veterans. Most union organisers, including from GAPWUZ left their positions and took up posts within the newly formed opposition party weakening the labour struggles (Magwaza 2017: Interview).

Beyond exiting to the Communal Areas, either through marriage or informal land purchases of *musha* or rural home as observed earlier (Rutherford 2001a; Vhurumuku *et al.* 1998), farm workers largely did not exhibit any land reform activism after their occupation of abandoned farms in the early 1980s (Herbst 1990). However, as ESAP and the accompanying economic crisis exposed the limits of wage employment, some farm workers began to view their future as land owners in the LRRP-II. Indeed the preference surveys sponsored by the MPSL&SW confirmed that the majority of the farm workers surveyed (73 percent) wanted to be allocated resettlement land rather than re-employment (GoZ 2005: 10).

Hence some farm workers occupied LSCFs in 1997/98, alongside peasants from Communal Areas and veterans of the liberation struggle agitating for quicker land reforms in Mashonaland districts such as Goromonzi (Sadomba & Helliker 2010). This followed hard on the heels of the 1998 Land Donors Conference’s failure to resolve the land reform issue. Some farm workers also independently led and organised land occupations (Moyo 2001). While others sought to protect their jobs and some had to be coerced, persuaded, intimidated or educated by war veterans to participate in occupations of LSCFs (Sadomba & Helliker 2010: 213; see also Helliker & Bhatasara 2018).

Options for farm workers to access land until 1999 and pursue alternative social reproduction as land owners in their own right was blocked by limited land redistribution. Close to 30 percent of the rural families were estimated to be landless in the late 1990s (UNDP 1998: 53), many of whom were farm workers. Given the unemployment problems in the country as a result of the limited absorptive capacity of the mechanised LSCFs and urban industries (Moyo & Ngobese 1991), the bargaining power of farm wage labour remained low.

4.5.4 Agrarian labour relations in the Communal Areas under neoliberal reforms

Food crops remained the focus of most peasants, although a few did take up labour intensive export production (Moyo 2000b). Cotton attracted the largest section of peasantry producing for the international markets (Mariga 1994). Air cured tobacco was another export crop farmed in the Communal Areas and its area planted grew from 3,267 hectares in 1990 to 6,497 hectares in 1995 (TIMB 1997: 13). Locally consumed vegetables were the main horticultural land use activity among peasants and more widely visible in Mashonaland East and Central Provinces (Heri 2006).

During ESAP, the state withdrew agricultural input subsidies and liberalised the marketing of previously controlled products such as maize grain and cotton (Takavarasha 1994; Chidzero 1994). By 1990, the GMB had managed to establish 78 depots and 60 crop buying inputs in the Communal Areas and two years into ESAP four depots and 51 crop buying inputs had been closed (Gibbon 1995: 12). Four years later, the GMB had been reduced into the “buyer of last resort” and could only purchase grain that private traders were unable to absorb (Matanda & Jeché 1998). Together with the drought that devastated the country in 1991/92, economic reforms impeded the social reproduction of the peasantry (Wekwete 1998).

The 300 percent increase in the price of fertiliser between 1990 and 1995 led to the fall of the share of this input consumed by the peasantry from 24 percent to 22 percent (Oni 1997: 68). Regional differentiation was also evident as the peasantry in drier areas such as Chivi district totally stopping the application of purchased fertilisers (Scoones 1997). The capacity to purchase inputs was injured by the decline in remittances as urban workers struggled with retrenchments and increased cost of living (Masuko 1998; UNDP 1999).

Resultantly, the agricultural productivity of many commodities declined during the 1990s. The average maize yield for the 1990-1995 was 13.47 percent lower than that realised between 1985-1990 period and much larger declines were recorded in cotton

seed production, 16.57 percent for the same period (Oni 1997: 68). Overall output volume also declined annually between 1990 and 1995 - two percent, 3.3 percent, 6.1 percent and 4.8 percent for maize, sorghum, groundnuts and soyabeans respectively (Oni 1997: 61). Decontrolled prices of vaccines and breeding stock damaged the quality of livestock in the Communal Areas, while the ravaging 1991/92 drought decimated stock particularly in areas characterised by overgrazing (Scoones *et al.* 1998).

Presumably to compensate for yield losses, the total area under cultivation in the Communal Areas expanded by over 200,000 hectares between 1990 and 1995 (Oni 1997:vi). The area under maize remained relatively stable, but cotton, soyabeans, and sunflower, which experienced huge producer price increases had their areas under cultivation expanded by peasants (Muir 1994). Notwithstanding the areal expansion, the number of self-employed agricultural workers in the Communal Areas declined from 2,328,222 workers in 1993 (CSO 1998a: 42) to 1,696,128 workers in 1999 (CSO 2000: 45).

Immediate cash needs after harvest exposed peasants to exploitation by middlemen (Matanda & Jeche 1998) who purchased grain at between 50 and 60 percent of the prices prevailing on the liberalised maize markets elsewhere (Oni 1997: 61). Real prices also fell as the inflation rate escalated and peasants in 1994 were receiving 30 percent less the price per tonne of maize they got in 1980 (Oni 1997: 40).

Economic distress also fuelled the outmigration of Communal Areas residents, mostly male youths in search of urban employment (Potts & Mutambirwa 1997; Potts 2000; Paradza 2010). Some studies in the Communal Areas revealed that for every seven females, there were only four males (Biljmakers, Basset & Sanders 1995: 250). Between 1992 and 2002, the proportion of the rural to national population contracted from 69 percent to 65 percent (CSO 2002: 16; CSO 1992: 24). Returns from self-employed farm labour had become even more precarious.

The return of semi-proletariats retrenched from their urban jobs intensified the pressure on the and conflicts in the Communal Areas (Oni 1997; Moyo 2000b). Around 1996, 54.7 percent of the surveyed Communal Area households in Shamwa complained of land conflicts (Moyo, Matondi & Marongwe 1998: 171). Most of the land conflicts (36.1 percent) were related to boundary disputes as a result of encroachment onto their neighbour's arable fields, ostensibly to increase production. Communal Area residents also experienced violence in the LSCFs, when they were caught trespassing in search of firewood and/or grazing their cattle to meet shortages (Marongwe 2001; Matondi 2001).

Amidst the deteriorating incomes, education and health costs previously subsidised by the state put pressure on the budgets of peasant households (Bijlmakers, Basset & Sanders 1995). Many women increasingly joined wage labour to fill these income gaps (Ruzvidzo 1999). Their existing roles as unpaid family labour on the farm and for reproductive roles (Mvududu & McFadden 2001) were thus compounded to constitute a “triple work burden” for women (Lyon *et al.* 2017: 328). Since many peasants were net purchasers of food (including maize grain), they were not immune to the price increases after the decontrol of prices on basic commodities (Potts & Mutambirwa 1998).

The poverty rates nationally had risen from 40.4 percent in 1990/91 to 63.3 percent in 1995/96 (CSO 1998b: 36) of which the majority were peasants. Altogether the deepening poverty, growing landlessness and massive retrenchment of urban workers after ESAP fuelled demands for land redistribution by 1997 (Moyo 2000; Moyo & Yeros 2005b; Sadomba 2008, Moyo *et al.* 2000).

It is evident from the above that the LSCF labour relations continued to receive the most academic attention. Now emphasis had shifted to examining the impacts of land use changes, export production and technological advances during ESAP, as well as the deregulation of the labour markets. The abuse of farm labour through physical violence, racism, unpaid overtime work and marginalisation of women at the workplace began to emerge in the studies in the 1990s. The poor socio-economic conditions of farm workers, mainly their limited access to health and education, and poor housing only emerged as an issue of concern from the mid 1990s. However, the nature of resistance by farm workers to their material conditions largely remained silent. Meanwhile, the studies on the peasantry sought to uncover mainly the effects of ESAP on agricultural production and labour relations were hardly considered worthy of note.

If state intervention in the labour relations and agrarian markets can uplift the livelihoods of the poor peasantry and farm workers, then its withdrawal will result in negative consequences to these vulnerable segments of the populace. Neoliberal economic policies thus combined with land access constraints to intensify the poverty levels and widen inequalities between the rural underclasses and LSCFs. Indeed the precarity of the livelihoods of the farm labourers and the peasantry were very vivid in the data provided in the literature. Over the long duree, the role of the LSCF model of agriculture in the generation of not only secure but quality employment able to meet the subsistence requirements of farm workers and their families is also called into question. Yet they

monopolise the ownership of agricultural landholdings and more so in a situation where labour intensive land uses are being replaced with the capital intensive land uses, which has been a key tenet in the re-organisation of capitalist agriculture since the 1970's.

4.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that agrarian labour relations have been evolving since 1890. Land alienation undermined the capacity of peasants to live off the land and subordinated them into cheap wage labour in the LSCFs and beyond for their survival. Locals who resisted wage labour in the early years of LSCF development as they retained land to continue peasant production overtook foreign migrants from present day Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia as chief suppliers of labour to LSCFs as land shortages intensified after another wave dispossession was instituted by the Rhodesian government from the 1930s onwards. Taxation was a key strategy used by the colonial state, together with legal and extra-legal mechanisms to generate wage labour. The agrarian labour regime was shaped not only by land dispossession but also the various dynamic domestic and international economic and social policies. Uneven and incomplete dispossession however implied the resilience of a differentiated peasantry, which combined the wage economy alongside farming on small plots of land.

The transition from colonial to majority rule did not radically alter the agrarian labour relations as the white LSCFs retained dominance over land ownership and subsequently their influence on agrarian labour relations (Moyo 2011a). Hence, the LSCFs monopolised the agrarian labour markets and utilised the political power conferred by land to repress farm wage labour until 1999. Adverse working conditions were commonplace for the “bonded” labour two decades after independence and many workers struggled to make a living. Structural adjustment policies reversed the minor gains (farm) labour made in the early 1980s. Persistent land shortages and widespread poverty in the context of neoliberal reforms translated to uncertainty in the social reproduction of the self-employed peasantry. Extensive redistribution of LSCFs during the FTLRP from 2000 to mostly peasants could therefore be expected to rapidly transform the inequitable agrarian (labour) relations undergirded by uneven land distribution. The extent of agrarian restructuring imposed by the FTLRP within the dynamic socio-economic environment and their ramifications on agrarian labour relations are discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

CHANGING AGRARIAN STRUCTURE, LABOUR POLICIES AND AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT, 2000-2017

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter outlined the evolution of the agrarian labour relations since the colonial era structured around peasant land dispossession and the subsequent generation of private property on European Settler LSCFs, side-by-side with other extra-economic measures. Further, it indicated the changes in the agrarian policies after the attainment of independence in 1980 until 1999. The key message emerging from the re-examination of the literature was that minimal land redistribution then had led to only minor alterations in the agrarian labour regime as the white LSCFs maintained their stranglehold on land ownership and in turn their influence on agrarian labour relations. This chapter discusses the major institutional and economic changes that contributed to the transformation of the agrarian labour relations since 2000. The purpose is to illustrate the extent of agrarian restructuring through the FTLRP, changing agrarian (labour) policies and socio-economic context between 2000 and 2017 and their implications on the reformation of labour relations in rural areas.

The pace of land redistribution was increased during the FTLRP, which was implemented from 2000 under the LRRP-II that was initiated in 1997/98. It entailed the compulsory acquisition of mostly white owned LSCFs by the state for redistribution to various population segments, including peasants, war veterans, farm workers and, middle and urban working classes. It was intended to redress the racial inequities in land ownership inherited from colonialism, decongest the overcrowded Communal Areas, reverse rural poverty and indigenise commercial farming (GoZ 2001a: 6-7). Not all land was acquired during the FTLRP, as some large scale plantation estates (coffee, sugarcane, tea, timber, citrus fruit etc.) were exempted from compulsory acquisition (Utete 2003; Moyo 2011b; Scoones *et al.* 2010; Matondi 2013; Hanlon *et al.* 2013).⁷⁵ The FTLRP coincided with deteriorating economic conditions that began during ESAP, which in turn shaped the agricultural production patterns and labour utilisation in the redistributed farms.

⁷⁵ These included agro-industrial properties involved in value addition of beef, poultry, and milk and multiplying seed; landholders possessing Export Processing Zone (EPZ) permits; church and mission owned farms; and those protected by Bilateral Investment and Protection Agreements (BIPPA) (Utete 2003: 19)

The land reform policy did not adequately address what would happen to the retrenched farm workers who lived and worked on acquired LSCF private properties with limited land tenure rights (see Magaramombe *et al.* 1998; Sachikonye & Zishiri 1998; Zimbizi 2000; Moyo *et al.* 2000; GoZ 2001a). However, various policy measures were instituted at different periods during the FTLRP to address their needs. These included the retrenchment and re-employment policy on acquired LSCFs; land access and residential tenancy reforms; amendment of the citizenship legislation and repatriation policy; social services provision; and wage determination policy. How these changes shaped agrarian labour relations culminating in a new agrarian employment structure is illuminated below. First, the extensive land redistribution occasioned by the FTLRP and the resulting diverse agrarian structure are analysed. This is followed by a discussion on the emerging agricultural production processes as the socio-economic context shifted. Before examining how FTLRP dynamics evolved at the district level leading to differentiated local agrarian employment structures, the shifts to the agrarian (labour) relations are examined.

5.2 LAND REDISTRIBUTION AND TENURE REFORM POLICY

A bifurcated approach was adopted to redistribute the LSCFs acquired during the FTLRP through the A1 and A2 models/schemes. The peasantry sector, which already incorporated the Communal and Old Resettlement Areas was aimed for extension by the A1 model and entailed two sub-models namely; the villagised and self-contained models.⁷⁶ In the A2 model which was conceptualised as the commercial farming scheme, sub models were categorised according to the physical farm size to include large; medium; and small scale. An additional variant of the A2 model was the peri-urban whose plots are located within a radius of 40 kilometres from major urban centres.

The Maximum Farm Sizes policy delineated the land sizes to be parcelled to the beneficiaries on the basis of the agro-ecological potential of a particular district (GoZ 2001a).⁷⁷ Between 5 and 7 arable hectares and grazing land of up to 15 hectares were earmarked for parcelling to A1 model recipients in the agro-ecological regions commanding good soils and rainfall (I to III) (GoZ 2001a; Sukume *et al.* 2004). While

⁷⁶ In the villagised model, beneficiaries were allocated residential land and arable and grazing land in other sections of the former LSCFs. Beneficiaries resettled in the same former LSCF share grazing land. Whilst, on the Self contained plots on the other hand, allocated both the arable and grazing land; and land for the homestead within the same subdivision.

⁷⁷ Those resettled in the higher potential agro-ecological regions (Natural Regions I to III) suited for intensive farming got smaller pieces of land compared to those in the lower potential zones (Natural Regions IV to V).

those in low potential agro-ecological regions (IV and V) were designated to benefit from relatively larger land sizes of about 10 arable hectares and grazing land to the tune of 30 hectares. The three sub-models of A2 scheme were targeted to receive larger land sizes than those in the A1 settlements starting from 20 hectares to as much as 2 000 hectares based on the Natural Region the LSCFs were found (see Utete 2003; Sukume & Moyo 2004; Moyo *et al.* 2009). Land redistribution was executed alongside the “One-Household-One farm policy” that was designed to eradicate households accessing multiple pieces of agricultural land (GoZ 2001a).

The sub-division of LSCFs into smaller sized farms implied that a broader base of potential employers were generated and/or the agrarian wage labour market was diversified. Moreover the downsized farms would imply relatively less labourers in each unit compared to the former LSCFs (Chambati 2011). Whilst in the A1 sector, the arable land sizes in better agro-ecological regions and six times higher than in the Communal Areas would necessitate hired labour to augment family labour supplies.

Constitutional Amendment No. 17 of 2006 nationalised the freehold property rights in the acquired LSCFs. Land reform beneficiaries thus derive their rights through the state in the form of perpetual permit tenure or “use rights” and 99 year legally enforceable leases for A1 and A2 households respectively. These formal tenures are however yet to be issued to most of beneficiaries and temporary land “offer letters” currently indicate their land ownership (Moyo 2007). These state tenures have reduced the authority of the new land beneficiaries to tie labour to employment in return for residency, as well as the exclusionary rights provided by freehold title. The Chapter revisits this issue in more detail (Section 5.4.2). This potentially allows wider access to natural resources in these areas and unrestrained circulation of people and goods and, thus generate non-farm employment opportunities (Mkodzongi 2013b).

The land short peasants from the Communal Areas were targeted as the main land beneficiaries, alongside other groups requiring land for their living and liberation war veterans were classified as a special category (GoZ 2001a). Various empirical studies have indeed exposed the dominance of the peasantry from Communal Areas in the FTLRP land allocations (Moyo *et al.* 2009; Scoones *et al.* 2010; Matondi 2012; Murisa 2010). National survey returns from Moyo *et al.* (2009: 22) showed that 62.1 percent of

the landholders were previously Communal Area peasants.⁷⁸ This was followed by beneficiaries from the urban areas who accounted for 22.9 percent of the land allocations. The urbanites accounted for 35 percent of the beneficiaries in the A2 scheme since they were well placed to provide proof of resources to engage in commercial farming and in close proximity of the application centres (Moyo *et al.* 2009). Evidence from three districts in Masvingo Province also reflected similar beneficiary patterns (Scoones *et al.* 2010). The receipt of land amongst these beneficiaries was spread throughout the 2000s with the A1 plot allocations commencing around 2000 and A2 allocations from 2002 onwards (Moyo & Yeros 2007; Moyo *et al.* 2009). The pace of redistribution however slowed down from 2006 onwards (Moyo *et al.* 2009; Matondi 2012; Hanlon *et al.* 2013). This differentiated access to land by the year of resettlement influenced the setting up of farming activities and hence the utilisation of farm labour.

Similar to the LRRP-I, farm workers were not specified by the FTLRP policy as part of the earmarked land recipients, notwithstanding the preference for land allocations indicated by the majority of them in a government sponsored survey (GoZ 2005).⁷⁹ During the Presidential Land Review Committee audits in 2003, enquiries by the legislature's lands committee and various advocacy initiatives by NGOs such as FCTZ, the land needs of farm workers came to the attention of policy makers (Chambati 2013b). The GoZ directed the land allocation committees to expand their accommodation of farm workers from about 2002 (Chambati & Moyo 2004) and some districts such as Mazowe and Zvimba did reserve some farms only for their resettlement (Matondi 2012; Magaramombe 2010). Prior to this, some land allocation committees were already considering applications for land by farm workers and regularising those who had received informal allocations during the land occupations in the early 2000s. Rather than total exclusion from FTLRP land allocations (Alexander 2003; ZHRF & JAG 2007), some research indicated that they accounted for about 8.1 percent of the land beneficiaries (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 22).⁸⁰ However the levels of farm worker beneficiaries also differed from district to district (Moyo *et al.* 2009; Scoones *et al.* 2010; Scoones *et al.* 2018a).

⁷⁸ This was one of the largest surveys done during the FTLRP encompassing over 2,000 A1 and A2 land beneficiaries in six districts covering six provinces (Goromonzi – Mashonaland East, Zvimba – Mashonaland West; Chipinge – Manicaland; Chiredzi – Masvingo and Mangwe – Matebeleland South).

⁷⁹ The Inception Phase Framework Plan of LRRP-II included farm workers as targets for land allocations (GoZ 1998c). Many former farm workers (73%) preferred resettlement (GoZ 2005: 16).

⁸⁰ In Masvingo Province, they were seven percent of the land beneficiaries (Scoones *et al.* 2010).

The extensive land redistribution reformed the unequal agrarian structure into one more broadly based on the 10 million hectares formerly occupied by 4 500 mainly white LSCFs (Moyo 2011a: 512; Table 5.1). Approximately 146 000 A1 farms and 22,000 A2 farms averaging 330 hectares are part of the new agrarian structure (Moyo 2011a: 512; Table 5.1). Thus, the number of farm units on the land previously occupied by 4,500 LSCFs was multiplied by over 30 times.

Table 5.1: Agrarian structure: estimated landholdings from 1980 to 2010

Farm categories	Farms/households (000's)						Area held (000 ha)						Average Farm size (ha)*		
	1980		2000		2010		1980*		2000*		2010*		1980	2000	2010
	No	%	No	%	No	%	Ha	%	ha	%	ha	%			
Peasantry	700	98	1,125	99	1,321	98	16,400	49	20,067	61	25,826	79	23	18	20
Middle farms	8.5	1	8.5	1	30.9	2	1,400	4	1,400	4	4,400	13	165	165	142
Large farms	5.4	1	4.956	0.4	1.371	0.1	13,000	39	8,691.6	27	1,156.9	4	2,407	1,754	844
Agro-Estates	0.296	0.1	0.296	0.02	0.247	0.02	2,567	8	2,567	8	1,494.6	5	8,672	8,672	6,051
Total	714	100	1,139	100	1,353	100	33,367	100	32,726	100	32,878	100	46.7	28.7	24.3

Source: Moyo (2011b: 262); *-Peasant farm sizes are inclusive of shared grazing areas.

The new trimodal agrarian structure, which evolved from the FTLRP is composed of the peasantry; small to middle capitalists; large capital and corporate capital/agro-industrial estates (Moyo & Yeros 2005b; Moyo 2011a; 2011b). According to the latter research, these farm classes are differentiated by the land sizes accessed, forms of land control, agricultural and land use patterns, relationship to the markets, access to capital and forms of labour applied. The peasantry, comprising of Communal Areas, Old Resettlement and A1 resettlement land, are largely dependent on self-employed family labour to chiefly produce to secure household food requirements and are partially inserted into the markets (Moyo & Yeros 2005; Moyo, 2011a;b; 2013). They are now the dominant category in share of the number of farm households (97.6 percent) and agricultural land held (78.6 percent) (Table 5.1). Close to six million hectares were added to the land owned by the peasantry between 2000 and 2010. New A1 peasantries are characterised by superior conditions for agricultural production due to the more land they now own in favourable agro-ecological locations compared to the old peasantry in the Communal Areas (Hanlon *et al.* 2013; Mkodzongi 2013). It therefore follows that the farm labour requirements of the new peasantry would likely outpace those of Communal Area peasants (Chambati 2017).

Both the number of farm units and total land owned by small to medium capitalist farmers increased tremendously (Moyo 2011a; Moyo & Nyoni 2013). This group that

mainly organise their farming through the use of wage labour and their agricultural output is destined for the market, includes small and large capitalist farms. The small/middle capitalists' category own between 30 and 50 hectares of land and comprise 2.6 percent of the farm households (Table 5.1). The old SSCFs that were designed in the 1930s to accommodate black commercial farmers (Moyana 1984; Riddell & Dickermann 1986) are part of this class together with the small and medium A2 farms.

The large capitalists sector includes the large A2 farms and remaining white and black LSCFs and controls more land resources ranging between 150 to 1,500 hectares per farm unit. This class represent the smallest section of the new farming units by both the numbers and land area held. Land sizes in this sector average 800 hectares and indicate a reduction in the size compared to the former LSCFs which averaged in excess of 2,000 hectares (Table 5.1). The agro-estates command large landholdings exceeding 8,000 hectares in some instances in which plantation agriculture (sugarcane, tea, coffee and forestry) is dominant. The employment per farm unit is highest in this sector and the production for the export markets and agro-industrial processing feature prominently in this sector (Moyo 2014; Hall *et al.* 2017). Altogether, the growth of the capitalist farm sector via the A2 scheme offered possibilities for the broadening of the farm labour markets (Chambati 2013a).

Differences are noticeable in the land tenure relations amongst the farm classes. The customary and state permit tenure governing land rights among the peasantry in the Communal Areas and A1 schemes respectively, are not legally tradeable and use rights are in perpetuity (Moyo 2011a; 2007; Murisa 2014; 2010). Customs mediated by traditional leaders inform the land administration in the Communal Areas, while the A1 land owners have a direct relationship with the state as the ultimate title holder and land allocating authority (Moyo 2007; Murisa 2010; 2014). Although the jurisdiction of traditional leaders was extended into the new resettlement areas, the law limits their land administration roles in these spaces (GoZ 2013a). In contrast, legally tradeable 99 year leases confer rights to the A2 farms, while freehold property remain operational for LSCFs that were not acquired during the FTLRP (Matondi 2012; Scoones *et al.* 2010; Scoones 2015b).

This new agrarian structure had resulted in the loss of about 200,000 formal farm jobs on acquired LSCFs countrywide by 2010 of which about 50 percent were part time (Chambati 2011: 1052). More jobs continued to be lost as land redistribution proceeded and less than 150 LSCFs remained in operation around 2016 (MGA 2017: Interview).

Displacements from the farm compounds affected between 30, 000 and 45, 000 to destinations including Communal Areas, urban areas and informal settlements (Chambati 2011: 1052). Others relocated to neighbouring countries and sought work in commercial farms in South Africa (Rutherford & Addison 2007; Addison 2013; Bolt 2013) and Mozambique (Hammar 2010). However, the extent of former farm worker migration to neighbouring countries is not known in the absence of systematic data collection on this.

Evidence presented by Chambati (2011: 1052) relying on national surveys conducted by AIAS showed that close to 67 percent of the former farm workers had stayed put in their farm compound residency, but the displacements also varied from district to district. These former farm workers continued to sell their labour to farm and non-farm activities (see Chapter Six). Nonetheless, it is essential to note that for those who remained, their continued residency in the compounds was insecure due to the prolongation of the residential labour tenancy in contradiction of government policy, which allows them to stay irrespective of their employment status (Chambati 2013a; 2011; Moyo *et al.* 2009 see also Section 5.4.4 & Chapter Six). Land reform did not meet the demand of all those who required land (Moyo 2011a; Scoones 2015b), some land short peasants from the Communal Areas continue to rely on the (farm) labour markets for their survival.

Beyond the official FTLRP beneficiaries, farm workers and others negotiate informal land access for own production from the new A1 and A2 land beneficiaries and thus extending the number of farm households (Moyo *et al.* 2009; Chambati 2013a; Scoones *et al.* 2014; Scoones *et al.* 2018a). Since 2015, beneficiaries have been allowed to share land with other business partners in the context of the shortages of agricultural finance following approval by the MLLR, thus altering their overall control over land (Mazwi, Tekwa, Chambati & Mudimu 2018; Chambati 2017).⁸¹ Most of the joint venture partners are former white LSCFs (MPEW 2017: Interview).⁸²

It is discernible from the above discussion that land redistribution extended the number of farming units beyond the few LSCFs that dominated the agrarian labour markets due to their control over large tracts of agricultural land. Specifically, the number of potential

⁸¹ The Sunday Mail, 4 January 2015, “Govt okays farming joint ventures”, [Accessed from www.sundaymail.co.zw/govt-okays-farming-joint-ventures on 27 September 2018].

⁸² Media reports suggested that since the ascension of the former Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa to the Presidency in November 2017, about 600 former LSCFs were back on the farms and were leasing land from resettled farmers in response to calls by the latter to come back and contribute to the country’s agricultural production. See “The return of Zim’s white farmers”, Mail & Guardian, 20 April 2018, Johannesburg, (<https://mg.co.za/article/2018-20-04-20-00-the-return-of-zims-white-farmers/> [accessed 20 April 2018]).

farm wage employers and/or capitalist farms has been widened through the A2 scheme. While the parcelling of landholdings to the peasantry previously affected by land shortages and working classes in the A1 scheme will not only see the rise of self-employment but would also be expected to free them up from the economic compulsion to partake in the wage labour markets in the LSCFs and elsewhere. The newly acquired lands would provide a means of production for them to engage in autonomous social reproduction through self-employment.

The reformation of land tenure from private property to state permits and 99-year leaseholds for A1 and A2 landholders respectively had implications on the way farm labourers supply labour post 2000. Specifically, the A1 farmers who were allocated most of the land nationally have reduced ability to control labour in the old farm compounds, which were retained as state land. Consequently, the farm workers resident in these areas likely enjoy autonomy in the sell of labour not tied to residential tenancy relationships of the past. The situation will somewhat be different in a few A2 farms that received the old compounds as part of their land subdivisions and enabling them to link work and residency and can evict those they do not employ by way of operation of *Gazetted Lands (Consequential Provisions) Act of 2006*. Yet the land utilisation challenges facing the new farmers undermine their capacity to absorb all workforce remaining in former LSCF compounds leaving many to work elsewhere. Altogether, the diversified farming structure provides the agrarian labour force and/or the remaining landless with a broader choice to seek wage work than before where the farm labour market was monopolised by a few LSCFs. The agrarian political power concentrated in the minority LSCFs has thus been diffused among many smaller employers (Moyo 2011a).

5.3 CHANGING PRODUCTION PROCESSES IN THE NEW AGRARIAN STRUCTURE

The trajectory of farming has been dynamic in tandem with rapidly changing macro-economic context since 2000. Early on, numerous court litigations opposing compulsory acquisitions, as well the setting up of the land redistribution structures (Provincial and District land committees) by the state delayed the resettlement of land beneficiaries (World Bank 2006). This introduced lags in agricultural production as the land tended to remain unused by both the land beneficiaries and LSCFs who were barred from farming after three months when the land was gazetted for acquisition (Moyo & Yeros 2007; Utete 2003).

Zimbabwe's economy that had begun to regress in the mid-1990s due to the impacts of ESAP (Bond & Manyanya 2003; Gibbon 1995) persisted to contract after 2000. Between 2002 and 2008, the economic decline was over 50 percent (World Bank 2012: 25). Hyperinflation reached an estimated peak of 231 million percent set in 2007 (Hanke 2009)⁸³ due to the poor macroeconomic management framework hinged on printing of money to sustain excessive government expenditures (Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara & Martens 2011; IMF 2005).

Non-farm formal employment continued to wane. Overall, the number of formal jobs declined from 1,866,179 in 1999 to 1,531,549 in 2012.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, the job declines were differentiated. Manufacturing and distribution sectors lost most of the jobs, 171,522 and 314,954 respectively (see also CZI 2016). Other sectors such as mining and retail sector however registered employment gains during this period, 51,869 and 86,321 respectively. Simultaneously, poorly paid jobs were on the rise in the informal sector and were employing 96 percent of the women in employment by 2016 (GoZ 2016: 10).

Fiscal space was squeezed by international isolation as multilateral and bilateral aid was withdrawn over impasse on the FTLRP implementation (Moyo & Yeros 2011; 2013; Mamdani 2008). Such funding was critical for supporting the diverse economic sectors including agriculture. Together with the dwindling export base, scarce foreign exchange affected the supply of fertilisers and agro-chemicals that require substantial imported content and were largely inaccessible to most farmers (Mudimu 2006).

The government abandoned the liberalisation framework and reintroduced interventionist agricultural policies through the control of input and output markets (World Bank 2006). Combined effects of the declining industrial capacity and price controls resulted in restricted supplies of essential agricultural inputs such as seed and fertilisers (CZI 2010; World Bank 2006). Maize and wheat grain markets were controlled through *Statutory Instrument 235A of 2001*, which reinstated the GMB as the sole legal buyer. Sub-economic prices, which followed fuelled the emergence of a black market for both outputs and inputs featuring exorbitant prices and thus out of reach for many producers (Sukume & Guveya 2009; Moyo *et al.* 2009). Nevertheless, the grain market was not guaranteed, as the GMB was increasingly not able to pay for procured output, a challenge,

⁸³ Accessed from <https://www.cato.org/Zimbabwe> on 18 March 2017.

⁸⁴ Calculated from CSO (1999: 62) and ZIMSTAT (2012).

which has bedeviled the state institution up to now.⁸⁵ Export commodities such as tobacco and horticulture were controlled through the foreign exchange regulations between 2006 and 2008, which required exporters to liquidate 60 percent of their foreign exchange receipts to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe for the equivalent Zimbabwean dollars at the depressed controlled official exchange rates (RBZ 2006).

The agricultural financing framework also faced difficulties. Private financial institutions, which heavily funded the LSCFs drastically reduced their agricultural credit facilities citing increased lending risk as they considered their tenure arrangements to be insecure (Moyo 2007; Zumbika 2006). As international lenders upgraded the country risk rating, private institutions also lost access to offshore credit facilities for onward lending (RBZ 2008). The resource-constrained state was thus left with the burden to fund the new farmers. Although new players emerged to support agriculture, these focused on specific crops such as tobacco and soyabeans through mostly contract farming and external financing for farmers was largely inadequate (USAID 2014; Binswanger-Mkhize & Moyo 2012; Mano 2004). Government agricultural financing schemes reached a few and were biased towards the medium and large-scale A2 farmers (Moyo, Chambati & Siziba 2014; Sukume & Guveya 2009). The hyperinflationary environment attracted capital to quick high reward speculative economic activities such as foreign currency trading (Chagonda 2011; Mawowa & Matongo 2011) as opposed to the slow returns from agriculture. Additionally, two severe droughts in 2001/02 and 2003/04 seasons decimated agricultural output and affected the establishment of the new land beneficiaries (Manzungu *et al.* 2018; World Bank 2012; 2006).

Agrarian labour utilisation patterns were also restructured by shift from the export land uses in the former LSCFs towards food production. Maize and small grains dominate the cropped areas planted in the redistributed lands, whilst the production of cash and export commodities for the domestic and international markets is more visible in the capitalist farms (Moyo *et al.* 2009; Scoones *et al.* 2010; Pazvakavambwa 2009). The latter include horticulture, oilseeds and tobacco. By 2006, overall agricultural production output declines were registered in many of the commodities but in a differentiated manner (Moyo & Nyoni 2013: 212). Fifty percent plus margins of decline were recorded in food production (maize, wheat and small grains) in both Communal Areas and newly resettled farms. Beef and commercial dairy production also plummeted by approximately the same

⁸⁵ See “GMB owes farmers \$37 million” Zimbabwe situation, 6 November 2014: <http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimsit-m-gmb-owes-farmers-37-million/> [Accessed 7 July 2017?

margin. Tobacco and oil seeds (soyabeans, groundnuts and sunflower) production declined by over 65 percent. Horticulture declined by much less (about 30 percent), and plantation crops (sugarcane, tea, coffee, citrus) and cotton production declined the least (about 20 percent). Production declines were therefore not uniform across the commodities, as well as the among the different farmer classes. Agricultural land use patterns were thus generally depressed and subsequently led to weakened demand for agricultural labour and the capacity of the new range of producers to pay farm wages.

The unity government formed by ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations after the 2008 election stalemate initiated policy shifts towards a market re-liberalisation under aegis of the Short Term Economic Recovery Programme (STERP) (GoZ 2009). The Zimbabwean Dollar was demonetised and multiple currencies (including United States Dollar, South African Rand and British Sterling Pound) were introduced as legal tender for economic transactions. Subsequently, inflation rates were stabilised to between 3.1 percent and 3.7 percent between 2010 and 2013 (ZIMSTAT 2017: 3), while a deflationary environment characterised the years 2014 to 2016. The agricultural markets were re-liberalised and the uncontrolled prices improved the possibilities for farmer profitability. International partners and donors were re-engaged and begun funding the provision of targeted input subsidies to peasants for food production in collaboration with the state since the 2009/10 season (Anseeuw, Kapuya & Saruchera 2012).

Overall land utilisation improved tremendously and some of the earlier agricultural production declines began to be reversed. Tobacco led the recovery spurred by increased contract farming finance to all farmer classes as international agrarian capital who had gone on strike between 2002 and 2008 returned in their numbers (Moyo & Nyoni 2013; Scoones *et al.* 2016). By 2017, tobacco output – over 80 percent produced under contracts – had surpassed the pre-2000 level (TIMB 2016: 5; see also Shonhe 2017; Sakata 2017). Food crop production also improved but remained inadequate to meet national requirements and imports continued to fill the shortfalls (Sitko *et al.* 2014).

ZANU (PF) regained full control of the state after winning the 2013 elections and prioritised agriculture in its new Zimbabwe Agenda for Social and Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET) economic plan (GoZ 2013). Since 2016, the state launched an extensive maize contract farming scheme christened “Command Agriculture” to complement the Presidential Inputs Scheme in the context of a ravaging drought in 2015/16 season. Cereal surpluses were realised for the first time since 2000. A total of 2,443,119 metric tonnes of cereals (comprising 2,155,526 metric tonnes of maize and

287,593 metric tonnes of small grain) were produced in 2016/17 season against national requirement of 1,897,376 metric tons (GoZ 2017a: 4).

Yet some economic constraints have lingered on and were recently reflected by shortage of US dollar notes for daily transactions and foreign exchange scarcity to finance critical imports. The bond notes introduced in 2016 as a surrogate currency to ease shortages of cash notes and promote exports (RBZ 2016) contributed to the return of the country to an inflationary environment.⁸⁶ Access to agricultural finance remains a key challenge and banks are still reluctant to provide loans using the existing tenures as collateral security.⁸⁷ Moreover, the liquidity challenges, which continue to characterise the banking sector, have arrested the lending capacity as savings deposits and offshore credit facilities remain very low (GoZ 2014b). Indeed, between 2011/12 and 2013/14 domestic credit growth fell from 50 percent to 8.6 percent (GoZ 2014b: 1). No doubt this is one of the reasons that has led to an increased policy thrust to attract FDI, including in the agricultural sector after President Mnangagwa assumed helm of both the ruling ZANU (PF) party and country in November 2017 after the former President Mugabe resigned at the behest of the army (GoZ 2018). Under the mantra, “Zimbabwe is Open for Business”, the new ZANU (PF) regime, which won the 2018 general elections, is set to continue with further liberalisation of agrarian markets and the wider economy. Indeed, joint ventures in farming with domestic and foreign capital were being actively encouraged to meet financing deficits.⁸⁸ Climatic conditions have also been highly variable, with droughts experienced in 2011/12; 2013/14; and 2015/16 seasons (Manzungu *et al.* 2018). Costs of agricultural inputs remain expensive due to the antiquated production models still being utilised by agro-industry (ZAE0 2014; CZI 2016).

Altogether, the changing agrarian policy context influenced the trajectory of the new agricultural production systems and agrarian labour utilisation. To be sure, the swift dynamics in the socio-economic context militated against the effective land utilisation with implications on the demand for farm labour by the new range of producers. Ultimately, this impinges on the income returns from farming and the capacity of the new small-scale capitalist farms to meet their workers’ wages and benefits obligations. On a

⁸⁶ As at August 2018, the inflation rate had peaked to 4.83 percent [Accessed from <https://www.rbz.co.zw> on 28 September 2018].

⁸⁷ The Zimbabwe Independent, 12 August 2016, “Banks reject 99-year leases”, [Accessed from <https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/08/12/banks-reject-99-year-leases-2/> on 13 July 2017].

⁸⁸ The Herald 23 July 2018, “Go into joint ventures white farmers urged” [Accessed from <https://www.herald.co.zw/go-into-joint-ventures-white-farmers-urged> on 27 September 2018].

positive note, the shift from capital intensive exports to labour intensive food production land uses provides possibilities for the extension of agricultural employment.

5.4 POLICIES AFFECTING AGRARIAN LABOUR RELATIONS

The government to support both former and new farm workers after 2000 instituted various policies gradually in relation to the changing dynamics and context during the FTLRP. The labour relations, including wage determination for those still in farm employment continued to be governed by the existing national labour laws and the specific instruments for the agricultural industry, *albeit* with various changes introduced after 2000. Policies on payment of retrenchment packages by former LSCF owners, repatriation support for farm workers of migrant and access to residential and agricultural land were introduced to cater for those that lost their employment on the compulsorily acquired LSCFs (Chambati & Moyo 2004: 7). Beyond this, farm workers also qualified to benefit from already existing social welfare services run by the state for vulnerable groups.

5.4.1 Re-employment and retrenchment of farm workers

The *Companies Act (Chapter 24:03)* stipulates that after the acquisition of an existing business, new owners also assume responsibility over labour. The applicability of this legislation was however constrained by the parcelling out of a single former LSCF into many smaller-scale farming units. It was not clear who among the many new owners of a previous single farming entity would absorb the farm labour force. Moreover, the new land beneficiaries were not immediately able to re-hire the majority of the LSCF labour force during the establishment phase of their farming operations. In the context of the FTLRP, the lags between acquisition and resettlement also meant that farm workers would be jobless since the LSCFs were required to cease production activities within 90 days on receipt of acquisition notice from the state according to the *Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000*. In the early years of the FTLRP, retrenched former farm workers faced precarious livelihoods and for their survival they competed for part time jobs in the remaining LSCFs, while relocation to Communal Areas for those with residency there was stifled by limited financial resources (FTCTZ 2001).

Statutory Instrument No. 6 of 2002 was thus introduced to cushion farm workers who lost their jobs on LSCFs compulsorily acquired during the FTRLRP to receive retrenchment packages from the former farm owners. This legal instrument established an Agricultural Compensation Committee (ACC) under the leadership of the MPSLSW and included

representatives from GAPWUZ, ALB, NECAIZ and the MLRR. In the event that farmers would not have paid retrenchment packages, the money was supposed to be deducted from the compensation due to them for land improvements on the acquired LSCFs. The MLLR was responsible for the deductions for onward submission to the MPSLSW for disbursements to farm workers through its provincial offices.

5.4.2 Maintenance of farm compound residency

The land allocation policy in the case of the A2 scheme transferred the custodianship of the infrastructure (including farm compounds) to the beneficiaries in whose plot the infrastructure falls, whereas in the A1 scheme the infrastructure is treated as state property which should be shared by all beneficiaries on that former LSCF (Sukume *et al.* 2004). The policy did not however specify the residential rights of the former farm workers in the farm compounds. In this situation, some former farm workers were displaced from farm compounds in the A1 farms by land beneficiaries who believed it was their right to occupy these houses. This also occurred in the context of the animosity that developed during the land occupations that in some places involved violent clashes between peasants and farm workers in the Mashonaland Provinces. This uneasy relationship sometimes resulted in the evictions of farm workers from farm compounds by A1 land beneficiaries (Sadomba 2008) as noted earlier. In the A2 farms, land beneficiaries interpreted the custodianship of farm compounds to mean access to labour resident in these places as well. Displacement in the A2 farms occurred in the context of labour resisting the old arrangement linking employment to residency as was the case in the former LSCFs. Those former farm workers not amenable to new employment in A2 farms faced eviction threats or were evicted from the farm compounds (see Chapter Six). Indeed, some former farm workers without residential links to the Communal Areas were displaced to rural and urban informal settlements such as Dandamera (Mazowe), Chihwiti/Gambuli (Makonde), Porta Farm (Zvimba) and Macheke (Murehwa) that emerged after the FTLRP (FCTZ 2002).

The GoZ permitted former farm workers who did not relocate elsewhere after losing their employment to continue staying in their former farm compounds residency regardless of their employment status (Chambati 2011; Magaramombe 2010; Matondi 2012; Scoones *et al.* 2018a). This change undermined the residential labour tenancy that compelled the provision of wage labour in exchange for accommodation in the former LSCF compounds (Moyo 2011a). The implication is that labour is not tied to a particular employer in whose plot the farm compounds are located but is relatively free to sell their

labour power to employers of their choice. This also potentially enhances the bargaining power of labour in wage struggles that was weakened by the residential labour tenancy in the former LSCFs. Given that farm workers' long-term tenure security in the compounds has not yet been clarified, it remains a source of contestations and struggles particularly in the A2 farms seeking a cheap source of labour amongst landless labourers in a context of labour shortages as discussed later (Chapter 6).

Nevertheless, the *Consequential Gazetted Lands Act of 2006*, which extinguished the land rights of the "...owners and other lawful occupiers" upon the gazetting of an LSCF for acquisition, provides an avenue for A2 land beneficiaries in possession of the old farm compounds in their land subdivisions to evict farm workers they are not employing from the farm compounds. *Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014* that regulates agricultural labour relations also requires an employee to vacate the residency provided by the employer within 72 hours if they are dismissed from work with immediate effect or after the expiry of a notice to terminate employment. Therefore, A2 farms in control of farm compounds can invoke this provision to evict farm workers.

5.4.3 Citizenship and repatriation of migrant farm workers

The citizenship position of farm labourers of foreign origin that was provided for in the *Citizenship Act of 1985* faced setbacks from the *Citizenship Amendment Act of 2001*, which required Zimbabweans across the board who could possibly claim citizenship elsewhere to forego it by January 2002 according to the regulations of those countries (Ridderbos 2009; Chambati & Moyo 2004; Sachikonye 2003;). Failure to do so was to result in loss of Zimbabwean citizenship. Some commentators like Raftopolous (2003) opined that white Zimbabweans (including LSCFs), some of whom also held British citizenship, were the primary targets of this law for their perceived support for the MDC. However, this legislative change also affected farm workers tracing their roots to the migrant labour supplying countries, which included Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia (Chambati & Magaramombe 2008). Beyond being the birth places of their forefathers, many of the farm workers neither had connection nor citizenship claim in these countries. They could thus not renounce non-existent citizenship. Without identity documents to prove their Zimbabwean citizenship, many of them remained stateless until the situation was rectified by an amendment of the law in 2004.

The *Citizenship Amendment Act of 2004* required those birthed in the country of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) parentage to renounce their "foreign citizenship" through a simplified procedure at the Registrar of Citizenship office to

maintain Zimbabwean citizenship (Chambati & Magaramombe 2008). Again, *Constitutional Amendment Act No. 20 of 2013* explicitly accords all those born in Zimbabwe of SADC parents before the 22nd of May 2013 Zimbabwean citizenship (see *Section 43[2a & b]:25-26*). With these legal provisions, the Zimbabwean citizenship of farm workers of foreign origin is no longer in doubt. The scarcity of the Registrar General's offices in rural areas to provide requisite citizenship documents however remains a stumbling block for the translation of these rights into reality. Indeed this has been a challenge not only for farm workers but affects various segments of the Zimbabwean society. In fact in January 2019, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission launched a national enquiry on the challenges being faced by various people in accessing identity documents and birth certificates.⁸⁹

The MPSLSW partnered the International Organisation of Migration of the United Nations (IOM) to undertake farm worker surveys before and during the FTLRP to assess the extent of those who wanted to go back to their countries of origin (GoZ 1998b; GoZ 2005a). This sought to prepare to offer repatriation support to farm workers of migrant origin (Magaramombe 2010). However, very few (one percent) preferred to return to their countries of origin prior to the FTLRP (GoZ 2005: 10).

5.4.4 Social Services Policy

Most NGOs that provided social welfare services to farm workers prior to 2000 no longer have active projects in the redistributed lands creating a gap in access to social services. The international donors such as the European Union that fund most NGOs did not support projects in newly redistributed areas as they were opposed the FTLRP process (Moyo *et al.* 2009). This policy however began to gradually shift around 2009 after the inception of the Inclusive government, as donors collaborated with the state on various development initiatives including the targeted input subsidy programmes (World Bank 2014). Few NGOs still provide welfarist services to farm workers in redistributed farms (e.g. FCTZ Kunzwana Women's Association and Farm Orphan Support Trust [FOST]) (Chimbga 2017: Interview; see also Chambati & Magaramombe 2008: 215 - 216) due to funding constraints (Moyo *et al.* 2009) and state perceptions of them being MDC supporters who utilise welfarist projects for political campaigning (Helliker 2008). Still, others shifted focus to food aid distribution in Communal Areas, which was receiving

⁸⁹ The Chronicle 19 January 2019. "Rights commission to initiate inquiry into ID challenges.[Accessed from <https://www.chronicle.co.zw/rights-commission-to-initiate-inquiry-into-id-challenges/> on 15 March 2019]

huge financial support from donors between 2002 and 2008 (Magaramombe 2017: Interview). Some human rights NGOs however expanded their terrain to new farms to address human rights violations faced by farm workers including physical violence and evictions from the farm compounds. Some of them were the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZIMRIGHTS), Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) and the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) (Chimbga 2017: Interview).

The state moved into redistributed lands to established satellite clinics and schools through conversion of former farm houses and unutilised infrastructure (e.g. tobacco barns) in A1 farms to cater for land beneficiaries and farm workers (Utete 2003; Sukume *et al.* 2004; Chibwana 2017). These were initially few and under-resourced in terms of staff, equipment, learning materials and sanitation facilities (UNICEF 2002), such that these were found on less than 30 percent of the former LSCFs surveyed (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 125). As such, the linkages to Communal Areas were crucial in accessing social services (Murisa 2014; 2009; Mkodzongi 2013b). Farm workers, in theory, could also receive assistance from the state's social welfare for vulnerable groups in society. The Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) and Harmonised Social Cash Transfers (HSCT) were the key programmes in the state's social welfare programme (UNICEF 2017). The former assists children from poor households between the ages of 6 and 19 years with school fees payments (GoZ 2005b). While the latter provides targeted poor households with a monthly basic income to meet some of their consumption needs (UNICEF 2017).

Other programmes included drought relief, food deficit mitigation strategy, Child Protection Fund, and HIV/AIDS support services that sometimes involve the collaboration with other donors such as the World Food Programme (WFP), NGOs and farmers. Not only were the fiscal contributions to these social welfare programmes limited to cover all the needy groups, farm workers were mainly excluded from the community based selection committees, which identified beneficiaries and only a few of them make it to the list of recipients (Training and Research Support Centre [TARSC] 2012; Chambati & Moyo 2004; see also Chapter Six).⁹⁰

5.4.5 Wage Rates Policy

Prior to 2004, the wages for the entire agricultural sector were negotiated at once as per *Statutory Instrument 323 of 1993*. Due to the differential agricultural performance of the

⁹⁰ For instance in the 2017 national budget, social welfare was allocated US\$27.9 million that constituted 0.7 percent of the total budget (UNICEF 2017: 1).

diverse sub-sectors and the capacities to pay wages, there were calls by employers and workers to fragment the negotiation of wages by sub-sector (Magwaza 2017: Interview). It was argued that the underperforming sectors in the general agro-sector could not keep pace with the proposed wage increases in sectors such as tea, coffee, timber, kapenta and horticulture, which were doing relatively well. For the purpose of wage negotiation, the agricultural sector was then divided into two broad groups namely; the general agriculture sector encompassing field crops and livestock production and the agro-industrial sub-sector including tea, coffee, crocodiles, meat processors and kapenta. The horticultural and timber sub-sectors, opted out of the agro-industrial sector in favour of separate negotiations at this stage. The kapenta sub-sector followed suit in 2006. Currently, five sets of annual wage negotiations/Collective Bargaining agreements are registered with the MPSLSW, namely; general agriculture, agro-industry; timber, horticulture and kapenta subsectors (Magwaza 2017: Interview). All sectors nonetheless remained bound by *Statutory Instrument 323 of 1993* governing the working conditions for the entire agro-industry.

The representation in the NECAIZ was thus altered. GAPWUZ represents members in all the sub-sectors, together with another union, Horticulture GAPWUZ (HGAPWUZ) formed as an affiliate of the state sponsored labour centre, Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU) in 2006 (Magwaza 2017: Interview). On the employers' side, the Zimbabwe Agricultural Employers Organisation (ZAEO), Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU) and Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union (ZCFU) participate in all the sub-sector negotiations.⁹¹ The CFU and the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association (ZTA) only take part on the general agriculture negotiations. For the agro-industry wage negotiations, the employer membership expanded to include the Zimbabwe Tea Growers Association (ZTGA). In the kapenta subsector, the Kapenta Producers Association (KPA) and Indigenous Kapenta Producers Association (IKPA) are the additional employer representatives and the Kapenta Workers Union of Zimbabwe (KAWUZ) acts on behalf of the employees. The voices of farm labourers have thus further disintegrated along commodity lines and reinforced the bargaining powers of employers in the negotiations.

Initially, the ALB resisted the membership of the ZCFU, which now formed the biggest base of agricultural wage employers and the ZFU into NECAIZ (Jera 2017: Interview).

⁹¹ ZCFU represents black LSCFs and A2 farmers. Before 2000, it was known as the Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union (ICFU), while ZFU is a grouping of peasants and mobilised mostly those from Communal Areas prior to the FTLRP. Its membership now includes A1 land beneficiaries. ZAEO is the employer organisation for these two farm unions.

The two farmer unions were however upgraded from being observers between 2003 and 2005 to full members in 2006 under the banner of ZAEO with the assistance of the MPSLSW. The ALB began boycotting NECAIZ meetings after losing traction in the Collective Bargaining process (Jera 2017: Interview). Although it was re-accommodated from 2008 onwards, its relationship with NECAIZ remained uneasy and even took it to the Labour Court after being excluded in the 2010 wage negotiations.⁹² These struggles around wages are elaborated in Chapter Six.

⁹² ALB vs NEC – case number LC/rev/H11/11.

Table 5.2: Changes in legal provisions on working conditions for farm workers

Key provisions	SI 323 of 1993	SI 116 of 2014
Workers not covered by instrument	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contract workers Special workers* Independent contractors** Managerial employees*** 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Special workers* Independent contractors** Managerial employees***
Types of contracts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Written contracts required specifying: a) grade, b) wage rates and dates of payment, c) provision of accommodation, d) notice period for termination, e) hours of work, f) bonus and incentives, g) vacation leave, h) benefits during sickness, i) industrial holidays; j) terms of probation and, k) code of conduct. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Written contracts still required. Only probation terms omitted in new Collective bargaining agreement.
Hours of work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not more than 299 hours per month for herdsmen, watchmen, boilermen, firetower attendants, pump attendants, guards, irrigation hand, curer, milker and caretakers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not exceed 280 hours per month for herdsmen, watchmen, boilermen, firetower attendants, pump attendants, guards, and caretakers
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not more than 221 hours per month for all other employees (including contract workers) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not exceed 208 hours per month for all other employees (including contract workers)
Overtime pay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Payable at 1.5 times of hourly wage rate during ordinary hours of work during industrial holidays 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Payable at 2.5 times of hourly wage rate during ordinary hours of work during industrial holidays
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> New Year's day and Easter Friday not considered industrial holidays for overtime purposes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> New Year's day and Easter Friday now considered industrial holiday for overtime purposes
Seasonal workers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Employed for a period of not more than eight continuous months per year 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Employed for a period of not more than six continuous months per year
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> If employed for more than eight continuous months, seasonal workers become permanent 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> If employed for more than six continuous months per year, seasonal workers become permanent
Vacation leave	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Leave days could be accumulated after serving one month probation at a rate of one working day per month worked 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Leave days accumulated after a full year worked at the rate of one twelfth for every year worked
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A maximum of 12 days of leave could be accrued without employer consent 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A maximum of 90 can now be accrued without any risk of forfeiture
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cash could be paid in lieu of leave 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No cash in lieu of leave
Maternity leave	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No paid maternity leave for female workers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Three months of maternity leave on full pay
Sick leave	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No sick leave during probation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sick leave provided at all times
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not more than 26 working days of sick leave could be granted per year on full pay 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Up to 90 days of sick leave per year on full pay
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Half pay payable during sick leave if first year of employment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Full pay payable even in first year of employment
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Employer could terminate employment if sick leave granted by a medical practitioner exceeds 26 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Employer can only terminate employment if sick leave granted by a medical practitioner exceeds 180 days (including 90 days on full pay and 90 days on half pay)
Special leave	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No special leave provided 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Special leave of up to 12 days per year for attending court cases compassionate leave, trade union activities and detention by police.
Gratuity on termination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Payable only after eight or more years of continuous services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Payable only after five or more years of continuous services

Source: Compiled by author from Statutory Instruments 323 of 1993 and 116 of

2014 *disabled, old age, chronic sickness, infirm – only able to do part of the work done by able bodied employees **Providing own labour force for work agreed with the farm employers ***

The representation of farm worker interests in the Collective Bargaining process also suffered as various GAPWUZ organisers entrenched their participation in MDC opposition politics (Yeros 2013b). Their energies were thus devoted towards mobilising support for the new political party in the numerous elections since 2000 at the expense of worker mobilisation.⁹³ State repression also visited GAPWUZ, including raids by the police at its offices. After the production of documentary in 2009 on alleged human rights abuses faced by farm workers, its leadership was summoned by the state security agents for questioning. The then Secretary General eventually fled into exile in Canada after allegedly facing death threats from operatives of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO).⁹⁴

Trade union collective action was further restricted by the *Labour Relations Amendment Act of 2002*, which now required a majority vote of workers before any strike action could proceed. Additionally, any collective action originating from the grassroots had to be sanctioned by the trade union, thus disempowering worker agency from below (Gwisai 2005). However, section 65 of the *Constitution Amendment Act No. 20 of 2013*, which is yet to be aligned with the *Labour Relations Act of 1985* provides workers with the right to strike without the need for these cumbersome procedures as long as the Minister does not designate the workers as providing an “essential service”. The recent *Labour Relations Amendment Act No. 5 of 2015* also threaten trade unions’ right to organise as it accorded the Minister of Labour jurisdiction to interfere in their operations for purposes of investigating alleged corrupt practices. Furthermore, union activities can now be undermined by the Minister who was accorded powers to refuse to register Collective Bargaining Agreements if they are “...contrary to public interest”, which is not defined. This added to the already existing powers to micro-manage unions, including through determining the number of employees for the secretariat, salaries and allowances of staff.

Statutory Instrument 323 of 1993 was repealed and replaced with *Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014* that introduced rafts of changes to the working conditions of farm

⁹³ 2000 – Constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections; 2002 – Presidential elections; 2005 – Parliamentary elections; 2008 – Presidential elections.

⁹⁴ The Newsday 23 November 2011, “Getrude Hambira’s life altering move” [Accessed from <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2011/12/23/2011-12-23-getrude-hambira-lifealtering-move/> on 26 June 2017].

workers (Table 5.2). Monthly working hours for workers such as herdsmen were reduced from 299 hours to 280 hours, while for the rest of the farm workers they are not supposed to exceed 208 hours. The latter brought farm worker working hours in line with the rest of the working class. Apparently, the disparities in the working hours are blamed on a typing error by GAPWUZ as they claimed the Collective Bargaining negotiations agreed one standard workday for farm workers (Magwaza 2017: Interview). The rate for overtime pay during industrial holidays was also increased from 1.5 times the hourly wage rate to 2.5 times and New Year's day and Easter Friday, which were not considered as industrial holidays before for the purposes of overtime payments were reclassified to qualify as such. Female workers will now benefit from the introduction of maternity leave with full pay.

Another positive key change is related to the possibility to accumulate leave days up to a maximum of 90 days from the previous 12 days. Sick leave on full pay was increased to 90 days and an additional 90 days on half pay. Before, farm employees were eligible for full pay for a maximum of 26 days sick leave if they had worked for more than one year and for less working time they only received half pay. In addition to other compassionate reasons, farm workers can now participate in trade unions without affecting their vacation leave by using the 12 days in the recently introduced special leave.

As inflation ravaged, by 2007, the Collective Bargaining agreements also transitioned to quarterly determination. They reverted back to annual determinations after the introduction of the multiple foreign currencies in 2009.

The drive to attract FDI also threatens to erode the job security of workers. ZIMASSET promotes labour market flexibility in order to remove the rigidities in hiring and firing of labour, which have been identified as impediments to FDI by various "Ease of Doing Business" surveys sponsored by the World Bank and IMF Article IV consultations (IMF 2014; World Bank 2015a). The *Labour Relations Amendment Act No. 5 of 2015* thus accorded employers the powers to fire workers on notice without following the retrenchment procedures. The *Special Economic Zones Bill*, gazetted in 2016 and aimed at facilitating foreign investment, also had a clause suspending the operation of the *Labour Relations Act of 1985* and luckily for

the workers, the President only assented to the bill after this anomaly was rectified by Parliament.

It is clear that the evolving agrarian and labour policies during the 2000's posed contradictory outcomes on the material conditions of farm workers. Agrarian labour markets remain likely key for their subsistence since both their agricultural and residential land rights were not prioritised by the land reform policies. By implication, land shortages and/or landlessness will endure as a feature of the net sellers of wage labour in the new agrarian structure. To reiterate, the changes in the land tenure relations especially in the A1 scheme possibly enhances the autonomy of farm wage labour by divorcing the linkage between residency and employment as stated earlier (Section 5.2). Positive outcomes could emerge from the shifts advanced by labour unions to the statutory instrument governing farm labour relations, if implemented, to reverse decades old inequalities between them and the rest of the working class. Yet this could be negated by the revisions in the overall labour legislation to reduce the employment security of all workers, including farm labour in line with the labour market flexibility thrust. Collective action restrictions in the *Labour Relations Amendment Act of 2015* also limit the routes that the generality of workers can deploy to redress grievances at the workplaces, not to mention the state repression of trade union leaders and organisers.

5.5 THE NEW AGRARIAN LABOUR REGIME IN GOROMONZI AND KWEKWE

That the FTLRP was not uniformly implemented across all districts nationally is widely acknowledged in the literature (Hanlon *et al.* 2013; Moyo 2013; 2011a; 2011b; Matondi 2012; Scoones *et al.* 2010).⁹⁵ It is thus imperative to decipher the extent agrarian change at the local level. This section outlines the emergent agrarian structures, including the number of farming units and the relative distribution in the size of the different land tenure categories that resulted from the FTLRP in the study districts based on local specificities.

⁹⁵ This section builds and expands on the analysis presented in Chambati (2017). Additionally, the discussion on the new agrarian structure in Goromonzi also partly draws on earlier work done by author (Chambati 2013a).

5.5.1 The agrarian structure at district level

Goromonzi district

Similar to the situation nationally, the FTLRP in Goromonzi enlarged the peasantry through the A1 resettlement scheme and the small-to-medium capitalist farms via the A2 resettlement scheme. Specifically, 1,673 and 849 new peasant and small to large capitalist farm units were generated by the land redistribution on land previously owned by 200 former LSCFs (Table 5.3). However, the patterns of land ownership that emerged in the district contrast the aggregate national level scenario as more of the land was allocated to larger-sized A2 farms than the small-scale A1 farm units. According to Chambati (2013b) this situation was attributable to greater demand for land by urban middle classes in Goromonzi than in other rural districts because of its nearness to Harare and thus major agricultural markets.

The land now under the control of the peasantry incorporating the new A1 farm units and Communal Area households was around 45 percent of the district's agricultural land compared to 79 percent at the national level (Table 5.3; Moyo 2011a: 512). The average land sizes per household (combining arable and grazing land) in the Communal Areas (3.72 hectares) were only a sixth of the land accessed by the new peasantry in the A1 scheme (Table 5.3). Communal Area peasants formed the majority of A1 beneficiaries (57.9 percent), alongside urbanites (36.8 percent) and former farm workers (3.9 percent) (Author Farm Household Survey 2017).

About 19 percent of the land was held by small capitalist farmers, which included the old SSCFs in the Eastern part of the district and the new small and medium A2 farms (Table 5.3; Figure 5.1). While the large capitalist farms comprised of the large A2 and remaining LSCFs command 29 percent of the total land in the district, which represent about 29 times the share of this group nationally (see Moyo 2011a: 512). Small-to-medium A2 farms average landholdings represent about 65 percent of those in the SSCFs. The large A2 farms are chiefly found in the Northern parts of the district in the Acturus ICA commanding the bulk of the irrigation infrastructure and clay soil that can support diverse land use patterns (see Figure 5.1). The majority of the A2 land recipients came from towns and cities (79.7 percent) and the remainder were previously Communal Area residents (16.2 percent) and former farm workers (Author Farm Household Survey 2017).

Historically, agro-estates controlled a miniscule of the total agricultural land area in the district. Additionally, their average landholdings (1,415.9 hectares) were much smaller compared to these found in other rural areas in Zimbabwe in excess of 6,000 hectares per farm unit (Moyo 2011a: 512). The situation had not changed much as the share of land controlled by agro-estates rose from about 5 percent to 8 percent (Table 5.3). The agro-industrial estate sector included state owned farms such as ARDA Nijo Estate on 1,024 hectares of land and engaged in the production and processing of horticultural crops, maize and soybeans.⁹⁶ The other agro-industrial farms include meat processor Surrey Abbatoirs, Seed Company of Zimbabwe's Rattray Arnold Research Station and the export horticulture concern, Utopia (MPEW 2017: Interview).

Beyond the FTLRP land allocations, further redistribution was occurring through informal leasing of land by landholders to former LSCFs, farm workers, relatives and friends, and agribusiness firms, and through illegal informal land markets (see Chapter Six). Non-capitalist labour relations were also observed as some farm labourers were offered land in exchange for their labour services (see Chapter Six). Cumulatively, these processes served to extend the number of peasant households that mainly use family labour to crop the small pieces of land accessed through these routes. Private agribusiness firms also accessed land in the new agrarian structure through contract farming that involved 10.5 percent, 41.9 percent of the A1 and A2 farm households respectively (Author Farm Household Survey 2017). None of the Communal Area households interviewed were participating in contract farming.

Within the new agrarian structure, there were still land short and landless people as noted earlier, especially in a district like Goromonzi, which prioritised land redistribution to the larger-sized A2 farms. Moreover, the close proximity to Harare has meant that one of the district's Communal Area, Domboshava, has transformed into a peri-urban settlement as agricultural land was being converted into residential land through "informal" land markets especially in the zones bordering the capital in the North-Eastern part (see Figure 5.1). This has further exacerbated land shortages in the district's Communal Areas. Farm labour markets were thus important for the livelihoods of the landless in Communal Areas and former farm workers (see Chapter

⁹⁶ Accessed from <http://arda.co.zw/?q=page/estates> on 17 December 2018.


Six) and suggest the continued operation of the labour reserve system in a district such as Goromonzi (Chambati 2013: 194).

Table 5.3: Emerging agrarian structure in Goromonzi district: estimated landholdings (2012)

Farm categories	Farms/households				Area held (ha)				Average Farm size (ha)	
	2000		2012		2000*		2012*		2000	2012
	No	%	No	%	ha	%	ha	%		
Peasantry										
Communal	19,976	98.6	20,975	88.8	78,066.39	31	78,066.39	31.7	3.91	3.72
A1			1,673	7.1			32,437.63	13.17		19.39
Sub-total	19,976	98.6	22,648	95.9	78,066.39	31	110,504.03	44.87	3.9	11.56
Medium										
Old SSCF	40	0.2	24	0.1	2,068.45	0.8	2,068.45	0.84	86.19	86.19
Small A2			778	3.3			43,645.80	17.72		56.1
Sub-total	40	0.2	802	3.4	2,068.45	0.8	45,714.25	18.56	86.2	71.3
Large scale										
Large A2			71	0.3			27,206.49	11.05		383.19
LSCF	240	1.2	89	0.4	155,437.00	61.8	43,948.05	17.84	647.65	493.8
Sub-total	240	1.2	160	0.7	155,437.00	61.8	71,154.54	28.89	647.7	493.8
Agro-estates										
Corporate	4	0.02	4	0.02	3,605.08	1.4	3,605.08	1.46	901.27	901.27
Parastatal	6	0.03	9	0.04	5,604.70	2.2	7,668.70	3.1	800.65	829.15
Institutions	3	0.01	3	0.01	7,637.79	3	7,637.79	3.1	2,545.93	2,545.93
Sub-total	8	0.04	16	0.07	12,042.59	4.8	18,911.57	7.67	1,415.95	1,425.45
Total	20,253	100	23,626	100	251,619.71	100	246,285.32	100	12.42	10.42

Source: Adopted from Chambati (2013a: 193) * Peasant farm sizes are inclusive of grazing land.

Figure 5.1: Goromonzi Agrarian Structure 2015



Source: Compiled by author from MLLR data sheets

Kwekwe district

Through the A1 scheme, the number of peasant farming units was extended and they now own the bulk of the land in Kwekwe (Table 5.4). Simultaneously, the FTLRP also increased the share of land controlled by medium-scale capitalist farms three fold via the A2 scheme and reduced the portion of land held by LSCFs and aggrostates in the district (Table 5.4).

Over 3,700 farming units were generated on 152 former LSCFs redistributed in Kwekwe (Table 5.4). The black LSCFs who owned about 26.8 percent of the 291

LSCFs largely retained their land ownership (MLRR land allocation Excel sheets 2014). Compared to Goromonzi which had beneficiaries from diverse ethnic origins, land allocations in Kwekwe favoured households whose Communal Area home or *kumusha* was in the district who accounted for 29 percent of the beneficiaries (Author Farm Household Survey 2017).⁹⁷ Therefore, the influence of ethno-regionalism (Moyo 2011a; 2013) in land allocations was more prevalent in Kwekwe compared to Goromonzi. However, some national surveys reflect that the marginalisation in land allocation according to Communal Area of origin was more pervasive in districts such as Mangwe and Zvimba where 49 percent and 39.3 percent of the beneficiaries originated from these districts (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 23). Ethnicity has implications in the social organisation of the new resettlement areas (Moyo 2011a; Murisa 2010; Munyuki-Hungwe 2011), as well as the inter-household labour cooperation through reciprocal and non-reciprocal labour exchanges as discussed later in Chapter Six.

More broadly, the peasantry in Kwekwe is now comprised of the new A1 farm households and the already existing Communal Area and Old Resettlement farm households (Table 5.4). In terms of geographical location, the Communal Area peasants are found in the South-Western part, which are the driest part of the district falling under Natural Region IV (Figure 5.2). While the Old Resettlement areas that were established on the former LSCFs during LRRP-I border the Communal Areas (Figure 5.2). The new A1 peasantry enjoy better agro-ecological conditions in Natural Region III, but they were largely resettled in the drier part of the former LSCFs that were mostly used for extensive livestock and game ranching (MRT 2017: Interview).

The A1 farm households increased the number of peasant households to over 33,801 by 2014 from 29,066 in 2000 and the proportion of their cumulative land size rose by 18.7 percent (Table 5.4). Unlike Goromonzi, the percentage of land owned by peasant farm households had already been increased by 10.1 percent in Kwekwe during LRRP-I in the early 1980s that was mostly implemented in the drier districts (see Moyo 1995; 1998).

Peasants upperhand in control of most of the land and accounting the lion's share of the total number of farming units in Kwekwe largely reflects the situation at the national level (Table 5.1). The land sizes controlled by the diverse types of peasant

⁹⁷ *Kumusha* is shona words which means village of origin.

households are however differentiated, with the least found in the Communal Areas (Table 5.4). Specifically, the A1 beneficiaries owned over 3.5 times larger land sizes than their counterparts in the Communal Areas.


Most A1 farm households were characterised by a peasant background and trace their origin to Communal Areas (54.9 percent), while the remainder included LSCF former farm workers (8.3 percent) and urbanites (35.2 percent) (Author Farm Household Survey 2017). The links to current non-farm formal employment were limited to only 14.1 percent of the A1 landholders.

The capitalist farmers' class in Kwekwe can be disaggregated into medium and large capitalist farms. Between 2000 and 2014, the medium capitalist farms comprising the SSCFs and small to medium A2 slightly increased their share in the total number of farm households and land area controlled by 0.36 percent and 2.71 percent respectively (Table 5.4). The average land sizes in this sector were three times more than those received by the A1 households in this district.

Whereas nationally it is the medium capitalist farms that grew dramatically in the proportion of land area they control (Table 5.1), in Kwekwe district the large capitalist farms have remained dominant within the category of capitalist farms (Table 5.4). While the SSCFs are located in the dry Natural Region IV surrounded by Silobela Communal Areas, the new A2 farms were mostly created in areas with the best agro-ecological potential and endowed with dams and rivers that served as a source of water for irrigation in the Munyati-Sebakwe ICA (MRT 2017: Interview).

Attachments to non-farm formal employment in urban areas, also noticed in Goromonzi were more common in the A2 farms. The origins of the capitalist farmers were similar to those the peasants in the A1 scheme. For instance, 38.1 percent of the A2 landholders were town residents, while the largest source of beneficiaries (50.8 percent) previously inhabited in the Communal Areas (Author Farm Household Survey 2017). Non-farm formal employment which entail access to wage-income that could be invested in farming was enjoyed by 35.5 percent of the A2 landholders.

Figure 5.2: Kwekwe Agrarian Structure 2015



Source: Compiled by the Author from MLLR data sheets

Industrial processing did not feature much in the farms classified under the agro-estate sector in Kwekwe (Chambati 2017), but they own large landholdings like the other agro-industrial farms in other parts of the country. Rather, they include conservancies and farms mostly owned by both private and public institutions such as churches (e.g. Apostolic Church), universities (e.g. Midlands State University), mining companies and the energy regulator, the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority owns a power generation facility in the district (MLRR excel data sheets 2014). An exception is the Dendairy Company (one of the largest dairy company in Zimbabwe producing over four million litres of milk per month)⁹⁸ that is involved in dairy farming and processing that currently leases about nine LSCFs in the district, totalling 2,854.7 hectares (MLRR excel data sheets 2014).

⁹⁸ See The Chronicle 13 November 2018. “Dendairy seeks to double production” <https://www.chronicle.co.zw/dendairy-seeks-to-double-production/> accessed on 19 December 2018.

Table 5.4: Emerging agrarian structure in Kwekwe district: estimated landholdings (2014)

Farm categories	Farms/households				Area held (ha)				Average Farm size (ha)	
	2000		2014		2000		2014		2000*	2014*
	No	%	No	%	ha	%	ha	%		
Peasantry										
Communal	27,584	93.6	28,733	83.80	392,536.29	42.44	392,536.29	42.73	14.23	13.66
Old resettlement	1,482	5.0	1,482	4.32	93,441.00	10.10	93,441.00	10.17	63.05	63.05
A1			3,586	10.46			173,519.65	18.89		48.39
Sub-total	29,066	98.6	33,801	98.58	485,977.29	52.54	659,496.94	71.79	16.72	19.51
Medium										
Old SSCF	108	0.4	108	0.31	12,485.33	1.35	12,485.33	1.36	115.60	115.60
Small A2			152	0.44			25,267.31	2.75		166.23
Sub-total	108	0.4	260	0.76	12,485.33	1.35	37,752.64	4.11	115.60	145.20
Large scale										
Large A2			114	0.33			61,237.88	6.67		537.17
LSCF	243	0.82	91	0.27	265192.97	28.67	85345.31	9.29	1091.33	937.86
Sub-total	243	0.82	205	0.60	265192.97	28.67	146583.19	15.96	1091.33	715.04
Agro-estates										
Institutions	19	0.1	9	0.03	42,046.48	4.55	22,308.39	2.43	2212.97	2478.71
Conservancies	28	0.1	13	0.04	116,880.26	12.64	47,883.57	5.21	4174.30	3683.35
Sub-total	47	0.2	22	0.06	158,926.74	17.18	70,191.96	7.64	3381.42	3190.54
State land					2,442.05	0.26	4,574.05	0.50		
Total	29,464	100.0	34,288	100	925,024.39	100.00	918,598.79	100.00	31.40	26.79

Source: Compiled by author from land data records provided by MLRR (2014)

*Peasant farm sizes are inclusive of shared grazing lands

The 13 conservancies that were not redistributed during the FTLRP are mostly involved in game farming and tourism through provision of hunting services, wildlife viewing and overnight accommodation facilities (Kwekwe Agritex District Annual Plan 2016). However, the land use activities in the Kwekwe agro-estates imply that they employ limited numbers of farm wage labourers in contrast to large batches of labour hired in the sugarcane estates in the lowveld, tea and forestry plantations in the Eastern Highlands (see Chambati & Moyo 2004; Mutisi 2003; Scoones *et al.* 2017).

Kwekwe redistributed 56.2 percent of the land acquired to peasants, and thus the number of land short households in Communal Areas was substantially reduced in comparison to Goromonzi that privileged capitalist farms in land allocations. The average landholdings in the Communal Areas in Kwekwe at 13.7 hectares is close to the national average of 15 hectares (Table 5.4; Moyo 2011: 512-13). The 1,000 former farm labourers who were still resident in the former farm compounds had limited access to agricultural land. Indeed about 42.3 percent of the farm labourers surveyed by the study did not own land for independent agricultural production and thus dependent on the wage economy for their survival (Author Farm Labour Survey 2017).

5.5.2 New farm labour markets

The growth of the agricultural production base through the FTLRP led to the increase in the agrarian labour force in Zimbabwe, including both self-employed family labour and wage labour from the pre-2000 level. Specifically, the labour force increased from 1,696,128 workers in 1999 (CSO 2000: 45) to 5,469,655 workers in 2015.⁹⁹ This has reversed the earlier declines experienced during ESAP as noted earlier (Section 4.5.4).

Whereas the wage labour force in the LSCFs constituted 18 percent of the total agrarian labour force before 2000, the share of the hired labour in the A1 and A2 farm units in the total labour force had declined to 5.2 percent by 2015 (Table 5.5). Therefore, self-employed family labour has extended its dominance in the share of the total number of agrarian labourers. As expected, most of the self-employed labour was found in the peasantry (97 percent). Communal Areas had the lion's share of this self-employed family labour.

⁹⁹ Calculated by summing the permanent, casual and self-employed labour in Table 5.5.

As elaborated later, intense competition exists between farm labour and alluvial gold mining in a district such as Kwekwe (see also Chigumira 2018). In fact, it has shifted the sources of farm wage labour to the neighbouring Communal Areas of Gokwe South district. Although not as fierce, agriculture faces competition from other natural resource based activities such as thatching grass and firewood trading in Goromonzi in attracting labour. Yet the potential farm labour supplies have been reduced as some peasants that were short of land and were part-time workers in the LSCFs received land, which they farm using labour from their families (Chambati 2013a; 2011; Moyo 2011a). Certainly, this is partly responsible for the labour shortages that capitalist farms sometimes face during peak seasonal periods as explored later (Section 6.6).

Differences are perceptible on the application of hired labour between the two land reform models in Goromonzi and Kwekwe. Permanent labour featured prominently in the A2 farms in Goromonzi, while casual labour was the main source of hired labour for the A1 and Communal Area farming units (Table 5.6). The situation was somewhat different in Kwekwe as the majority of the full-time workers were located in the A1 scheme rather than the A2 and LSCFs (Table 5.7). The Kwekwe A2 farms instead dominated the use of casual labour (Table 5.7).

Table 5.5: New agrarian labour force, 2015*

Farm Categories	Permanent				Casual				Self-employed			
	Males	Females	Total	%	Males	Females	Total	%	Males	Females	Total	%
Peasantry												
Communal	58339	11428	69767	32	44103	64320	108423	41	1846088	2116915	3963003	79
Old Resettlement	10243	1147	11390	5	7386	8382	15768	6	211402	214271	425673	9
A1	29421	3615	33036	15	23794	26380	50174	19	238723	239698	478421	10
Subtotal	98003	16191	114194	53	75283	99082	174365	67	2296213	2570884	4867097	97
Capitalist												
SSCF	4066	467	4533	2	3438	1913	5351	2	35073	36894	71968	1
A2	56351	20671	77022	36	25760	34959	60719	23	26844	23083	49927	1
LSCF	14399	5097	19497	9	10082	11033	21115	8	2022	1846	3869	0
Subtotal	74817	26235	101052	47	39280	47905	87185	33	63940	61823	125763	3
Total	172819	42426	215245	100	114563	146987	261550	100	2360153	2632707	4992860	100

Source: Compiled from ZIMSTAT 2015-a) A2; b) A1;c) LSCF;d) SSCF;e) Old Settlement)Communal Lands *Data as at 30 March 2015

Table 5.6: Goromonzi District Agrarian Wage Labour Force 2015

Model	Permanent labour				Casual labour				Total
	Male	Female	Sub total	% of sub total	Male	Female	Sub total	% of sub total	
CA	603	186	789	17%	2,689	3,575	6,264	38	7,053
A1	919	77	996	21%	3,744	4,421	8,165	49	9,161
Subtotal	1,522	263	1,785	38%	6,433	7,996	14,429	87	16,214
SSCF	9	0	9	0%	0	26	26	0	35
A2	1,957	409	2,366	51%	724	1212	1936	12	4,302
LSCF	348	157	505	11%	105	123	228	1	733
Total	3,836	829	4,665		7262	9357	16619		21,284

Source: Compiled by author from unpublished ZIMSTAT data

Table 5.7: Kwekwe District Agrarian Wage Labour Force 2015

Model	Permanent labour				Casual labour				Total
	Male	Female	sub total	% of sub total	Male	Female	Sub total	% of sub total	
CA	997	0	997	25%	1,468	762	2,230	10%	3,227
Old RA	156	24	180	5%	4,365	15322	19,687	85%	19,867
A1	2,051	99	2,150	55%	332	247	579	3%	2,729
Subtotal	3,204	123	3,327	85%	6,165	16331	22,496	98%	25,823
A2	369	93	463	12%	282	221	503	2%	966
LSCF	110	25	135	3%	46	25	71	0,3%	206
Total	3,683	241	3,925		6,493	16577	23,070		26,995

Source: Compiled by author from unpublished ZIMSTAT data

Part time jobs constituted the bulk of the employment in the new agrarian labour force and thus further extended the casualisation of labour trends that took root in the LSCFs since the late 1970s (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Kanyenze 2001). At least 78 percent of the farm wage labourers in both districts were casual workers.

Circa 1999, the approximately 1,900 workers that formed the Kwekwe LSCF labour force respectively (Chambati 2017: 90) were well below the situation after the FTLRP. Similar patterns were also evident in Goromonzi, which had about 10,850 workers around 2000 correspondingly (Chambati 2017: 90). Overall, recorded growth in the size of farm workforce in both districts compared to the scenario in the former LSCFs is noted. Nonetheless, as the empirical data presented in Chapter Six will show, the number of employees per household in the new smaller-scale farms was now much lower than those noted in former LSCFs.

Gender dimensions of the new agrarian labour force have not broken with past trends recorded in the former LSCFs (see Chapter Four), nationally and in both districts studied. Women lag behind men in their representation in the permanent labour force. Specifically, they occupied 17 percent and 6.1 percent of the latter category of workers in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively (Table 5.6 & 5.7). In Goromonzi, women accounted for 56.3 percent of the total number of casual workers. The same

prevailed in the overall situation nationally as women occupied the majority of the casual jobs and accounted for the least share in the permanent employment (Table 5.5). Kwekwe district, which commands 3.6 times more agricultural land area than Goromonzi, employed only 1.26 times more labour than the latter in 2015.¹⁰⁰ The labour intensity in Kwekwe across all the farming classes was 0.02 workers per hectare of agricultural land compared to 0.08 workers in Goromonzi. Indeed the primary data mobilised by this research demonstrated that farm labour utilisation was relatively higher in Goromonzi than in Kwekwe.

The discussion above highlighted that the FTLRP altered the agrarian structures in a differentiated manner in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts, with consequent outcomes on the new agrarian labour regime depending on which resettlement was promoted more than the other. In turn, this impacted the land uses and orientation of production of the emergent farm classes. Although national patterns clearly demonstrate that the A1 scheme had the largest number of farming units and land allocated, the situation differs at the local level as districts such as Goromonzi gave more land to the A2 farms. The reverse was true for Kwekwe district. The broad trends gleaned from the secondary data also imply that regional unevenness in the distribution of farm labour noted in the former LSCFs is set to continue with districts such as Goromonzi located in the high agro-ecological potential areas still dominating the incidence of labour hiring in and development of farm labour markets than in drier districts such as Kwekwe. This suggests that methodological approaches that emphasise the examination of the agrarian labour relations at the macro-level alone, while also important, risk the danger of missing on the local level differences and thus limit the understanding of the evolving trends post-2000 (see also Section 3.5).

5.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has exposed the extent to which the FTLRP altered the unequal bimodal agrarian structure, paving the way for the reconstitution of the agrarian labour relations. A diverse agrarian structure emerged comprised of the peasantry, small-to-middle capitalist farms, large capitalists and agro-estates. These modes of production are differentiated by the extent of use of hired labour, access to agrarian resources, land tenure relations and orientation of production. More broadly, the new agrarian

¹⁰⁰ Calculated from Tables 5.3 to 5.6.

structure has led to the increase in both wage labour and self employment opportunities. Land redistribution produced different outcomes regarding the size and composition of the new agrarian classes at the district level, which consequently affects the scope of the labour markets. The variegated labour utilisation patterns across districts are illuminated in Chapter Six.

Yet the demand and supply of farm (wage) labour has been affected by the evolving agrarian (labour) policies and macro-economic environment. Economic decline between 2002 and 2008 affected the overall land utilisation patterns and depressed the demand for farm labour. As the economy stabilised, the reversal of the regression in agricultural output in a differentiated fashion suggest the peaking of farm labour demand. Chapter Six, presents the data analysis and interpretation of the findings on the precise character of the new agrarian labour regime that emerged following the FTLRP on the basis of quantitative and qualitative empirical research in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts.

CHAPTER SIX

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter highlighted the in-depth structural change in the land ownership and land tenure relations resulting from the FTLRP nationally and their ramifications for the transformation of agrarian labour relations. Furthermore, the accompanying socio-economic changes, including the decline and partial recovery in the economy and shifts in the agrarian and (rural) labour policies during the 2000s were analysed. The analysis was cascaded to the district level structural changes initiated by land reform. This enabled the research to draw insights on the new agrarian labour regime and/or markets, and the nature of the changing agrarian economies based on the historical and local specificities of each district, including their varied socio-economic character, agro-ecological zones and unique mix of farming systems.

Extending the analysis to the micro-level, this chapter presents the findings on the transformation of the agrarian labour relations based on the detailed quantitative and qualitative empirical studies conducted in the two districts, as well as from other secondary sources. The ultimate objective was to answer the four research questions posed in Chapter One (Section 1.2). The results are presented thematically, more broadly, reflecting the issues each of the research questions intended to address. It begins by identifying the sources and forms of farm labour in the new agrarian structure and the on-going processes of the diversification of family labour by rural households into other non-farm activities. In doing so, the intention was to test the validity of the widely held assumptions in the literature, which associate the absence of farm labour markets in rural societies dominated by peasants and/or their decimation following land reforms that mainly allocate land to small-scale farmers.

Also under the microscope was whether the entrance into non-farm activities was leading to the decreased relevance of farming and by implication self-employed family labour. Instead of focusing only on wage labour, as others have done, the chapter provides a complete picture of the new agrarian labour regime by the

consideration of the trends in the use and differentiation of labour from within the rural families.

At this stage, the different sources of labour that characterise the rural households will be evident. Nonetheless the patterns thus far do not adequately expose the differences in extent to which the farm households depend on the exploitation of labour of others to organise their agricultural production units. The primary goal of the next section is thus to explore the role of the agricultural labour utilisation in class differentiation processes, an issue understudied in the scholarship of land reform in Zimbabwe.

Attention is then diverted towards the examination of the precise character of the new forms of hired-in farm labour being mobilised by the land beneficiaries. An important aspect considered was the direction of change in the quality of labour, specifically the wages and working conditions compared to the situation in the former LSCFs.

Beyond the class structures marked by the position of households to the key means of production, land, the gender, generational and kinship relations were examined to ascertain their influence on the intra-household labour allocations and wider agrarian labour markets post-2000. Quite lucidly, the literature reviewed in Chapter Two demonstrates that agrarian labour relations were also an outcome of the agency displayed by farm labourers in response to their material conditions within and without the workplace. To complete the analysis, the research therefore, delved into the articulation of different struggles by farm wage labourers in the new farming units. Particular attention was paid to how labour resistance is shaped by the shifts in the residential labour tenancy relationship or the attendant workers' dependency on the employers for both residency and employment. The consequential outcomes in the new resettlement areas were juxtaposed to the scenario existent in the Communal Areas throughout the analysis of the findings, with a view of understanding the changes attributable to the FTLRP. Moreover, this novel way of examining the agrarian labour relations enabled the study to fill the data gaps on the scope of the farm labour markets in the Communal Areas, and their inter-linkages with the newly redistributed areas, which has been left unattended after the year 2000.

The data analysis in this chapter is frequently presented in tabular and graphical formats, and comparing the patterns across the settlement types, which the surveyed

farm households and labourers belonged to in the study districts. To remind the reader, the rural households interviewed during the research were drawn from the two resettlement models promoted by FTLRP; namely the A1 and A2 schemes, as well as the Communal Areas (henceforth CA in the data tables). The A1 scheme was meant to extend small-scale farming units to those already existing in the Communal Areas, but under statutory tenure as opposed to customary tenure obtaining in the latter. In Goromonzi, the beneficiaries received an average of about one hectare for their homestead, six hectares for cropping, and shared grazing land to the tune of seven to 15 hectares per household (MPEW 2017: Interview).

The land sizes redistributed in the A1 scheme in Kwekwe were relatively larger averaging about 10 arable hectares and 20 hectares of grazing land per household (MRT 2017: Interview). The A2 scheme represents those who received the larger land sizes and earmarked by the policy to engage in commercial farming (GoZ 2001a). The A2 farm units combine all the land (arable, homestead and grazing) in one plot subdivision and averaged about 330 hectares nationally (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 9). Again, those in drier Kwekwe district, which can support extensive farming were allocated bigger land sizes than those in Goromonzi (Table 5.3 and Table 5.4). Beneficiaries of the FTLRP are usually termed as new farm households in the literature (Scoones *et al.* 2010; Matondi 2012; Munyuki-Hungwe 2011; Mkodzongi 2013b) and this study follows suit (see also Chapter Three). While the Communal Areas represents households in those areas where blacks were settled after being dispossessed of prime land during the colonial period and are characterised by small arable land sizes (Table 5.3 and Table 5.4).

6.2 SOURCES OF FARM LABOUR

The establishment of whether farm labour markets still exists after the redistribution of LSCFs requires an understanding of the different sources of labour being applied from within and outside the farming households. This section begins by examining the incidence of application of family labour in the new smaller-scale farming units foregrounded by the understanding of the demographic character of the sampled households, which forms the basis of the labour supplies from this source. Casting the research lens beyond the household, the existing inter-household labour cooperation is explored next to determine the wider sources of unpaid farm labour. The assessment

of the growth and differentiated use of hired in wage labour in the organisation of farming wraps up this section.

6.2.1 Supply of farm labour from within the family

This section deals with family farm labour supplies and commences by setting out the demographic character of the surveyed households and their social organisation in order to comprehend the sources of labour from within the families. In particular, the family sizes, age-sex distribution, residential status and the structure of the rural households (existing as either nuclear or extended units) provided a basis to assess the available labour supplies. The actual utilisation of self-employed family labour and its attendant gender and generation dynamics extends the analysis.

6.2.1.1 Demographic character of farming households

Many of the land beneficiaries have established permanent residential homes on the farms that they received during the FTLRP. Unpaid family labour was therefore being extracted from the resident population in new resettlement areas, and the already existing Communal Areas, including men, women and children. By 2017, the average age of the land beneficiaries of the FTLRP was 55 years in both Goromonzi and Kwekwe, whilst Communal Area landholders averaged 54 years. Predominantly married landholders and their children and/or relatives formed the potential unpaid family labour supply base in Goromonzi's resettled areas (Table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Marital status of landholders

Marital status	Goromonzi (%)				Kwekwe (%)			
	A1	A2	Total RA	CA	A1	A2	Total RA	CA
Monogamous married	72.4	90.5	81.3	55.1	82.5	77.8	81.3	67.1
Polygamous married	6.6	1.4	4	6.4	1	4.8	1.9	1.2
Subtotal married	79	91.9	85.3	61.5	83.5	82.6	83.2	68.3
Single	2.6	2.7	2.7	3.8	4.6	4.8	4.7	2.4
Divorced/separated	1.3	0	0.7	9	1.5	1.6	1.6	2.4
Widowed	17.1	5.4	11.3	25.6	10.3	11.1	10.5	27.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	76	74	150	78	194	63	257	85

In conformity with the trends in most of rural Africa (Tsikata 2015; Tsikata 2009), the majority of women landholders (61.7 percent) who controlled land in Goromonzi's farm units were not married. Specifically, they were widowed (41.9 percent); divorced (3.2 percent) or single (12.9 percent). Most male landholders (96.6 percent) in contrast were married and the remaining 3.4 percent were widowed. The

Communal Areas in this district had a relatively larger share of non-married landholders, with 25.6 percent widowed (Table 6.1). Again, most of the female landholders in the Communal Areas of Goromonzi were detached from the marital institution.

Table 6.2: Age-Sex Distribution Structure, Goromonzi District

Age	No. of persons and % of total											
	Resettled Areas						Communal Areas					
	Male		Female		Total		Male		Female		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Goromonzi												
<15	72	8.7	93	11.2	165	19.7	49	15.1	71	21.8	120	36.9
15 - 64	316	37.8	323	38.6	639	76.4	86	26.5	92	28.4	178	54.7
>65	17	2	15	1.8	32	3.9	9	2.8	18	5.5	27	8.3
Total	405	48.5	431	51.6	836	100	144	44.4	181	55.7	325	100
Kwekwe												
<15	193	13.6	196	13.9	389	27.5	99	19.9	90	18.11	189	38.1
15 - 64	524	37	444	31.3	968	68.4	134	26.8	148	29.77	282	56.6
>65	37	2.6	23	1.6	60	4.2	17	3.4	9	1.81	26	5.2
Total	754	53	663	47	1417	100	250	50	247	50	497	100


A total population of 836 persons, split between 48.4 percent and 51.6 percent males and females, respectively, were located in the surveyed Goromonzi resettled households (Table 6.2). After discounting for the economically inactive population i.e. those that are considered not capable of providing labour according to ILO guidelines because of their tender age (below 15 years old) or the old aged (above 65 years old) (CSO 2002d), 76.4 percent were economically active and could thus be called upon to provide unpaid farm labour supplies. Compared to the resettled areas, the population in the sampled Goromonzi Communal Areas households, totalling 325 persons, had a slightly higher share of economically inactive persons of 35.2 percent, comprising of 26.9 percent who were young people and 8.3 percent who were old aged (Table 6.2).

The organisation of rural families in Kwekwe was no different since most of the landholders in the resettled areas were also married (82.3 percent), (Table 6.1). Altogether, 1417 persons constituted the sampled Kwekwe resettled households, of which 53.2 percent were male and the remainder female (Table 6.2) whilst the Communal Area households represented a total population of 497 persons differentiated into 50.3 percent males and 49.7 percent females. Most Kwekwe Communal Area landholders were also married (68.3 percent), but the incidence of

widows comparable to their counterparts in Goromonzi was larger than the situation observed in resettled areas (Table 6.2). Not being married as characteristic of most female landholders was also replicated in both the resettled and Communal Areas of Kwekwe.

Similar to Goromonzi, the Kwekwe resettled areas had the larger share of the potential labour force epitomised by an economically active population of 69.3 percent compared to 59.8 percent in the Communal Areas. The large potential labour force among the resettled households arose from the significantly higher average household sizes, specifically in the case of Goromonzi district. Including both residents and non-resident members, family sizes averaged 6.08 and 5.05 for the A1 and A2 households respectively compared to 4.17 in the Communal Areas in Goromonzi. In contrast, averaging 5.8 in both the A2 and Communal Area and 5.4 members in the A1, household sizes did not significantly differ by settlement type in Kwekwe.

Figure 6.1: Structure of families in the rural areas



Goromonzi, Chi-Square=8.240, p=0.015 (significant at p < 0.05)
 Kwekwe, Chi-Square=2.634, p=0.268 (not significant at p < 0.05)

An interesting feature of the unpaid family labour supplies was linked to the structure of resettled households. Instead of the traditional family, which is composed of a husband, wife and their offspring, also known as nuclear families, “extended” families, which include additional relatives alongside the nuclear family (Mvududu & McFadden 2001) were dominant in Goromonzi (Figure. 6.1). A larger share of the A2 households (71.6 percent) were organised as such compared to the A1 households (61.8 percent). Dissimilar patterns were witnessed in the Communal Areas in this

district as the sampled households were roughly equally divided between the two family types (Figure. 6.1).

Rather than the A2 households, it was the A1 households in Kwekwe that were frequently organised as extended family units. Communal Area households there, also displayed similar distribution patterns to those of the A2. Earlier work in six districts (including Goromonzi and Kwekwe) around 2005/06 observed that 80.1 percent and 69.6 percent of the A1 and A2 households were structured as nuclear families (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 25). This suggests that as years have passed by relatives were being co-opted into the resettled areas perhaps to satisfy enlarged demand for labour as agricultural production expanded.

Women and children left behind were the active contributors of unpaid family farm labour as men migrated for employment in LSCFs, mining centres and industries in the 1980s and 1990s (Muchena 1994; O’Laughlin 1998; Potts 2000)¹⁰¹ in continuation of the colonial migrant labour systems in Southern Africa (Bush & Cliffe 1984; Cross & Cliffe 2017). However, the levels of non-residency prevailing in the resettled areas as previous studies have also revealed (Moyo *et al.* 2009; Scoones *et al.* 2010; Matondi 2012; Chigumira 2018) were far less than those seen before 2000 in the Communal Areas.

Table 6.3: Residential status of family members

Residency status	No. of persons and % of total															
	Goromonzi								Kwekwe							
	A1	%	A2	%	Subtotal	%	CA	%	A1	%	A2	%	Subtotal	%	CA	%
Non-resident	51	11	42	11	93	11	3	1	147	14	73	20	220	19	24	4.83
Resident	411	89	332	89	743	89	322	99	902	86	295	80	927	81	473	95.2
Total Population	462	100	374	100	836	100	325	100	1049	100	368	100	1147	100	497	100
N	76		74		150		78		194		63		257		85	

At least 82 percent of landholders in the resettled areas across both districts were permanently based at their farms together with their families and over 95 percent in

¹⁰¹ For instance, a trade union survey report in the 1990s suggested that as much as 75 percent of the working class had links to countryside and combined wage work in the cities with farming in the Communal Areas (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 29). Several studies by Deborah Potts have also reflected the pervasive nature of the semi-proletarian condition among urban workers in Harare in the 1990s (Potts 2000; Potts 2010).

the case of the Communal Areas. Extending to the total population in the sampled A1 and A2 households in Goromonzi, only 11 percent in each of these sectors did not stay full-time in the rural areas (Table 6.3). These “absentee” members were located in 31.6 percent of the A1 and 33.8 percent of the A2 households in this district (Table 6.4). However, this was rare in the Communal Areas of both districts as most family members lived together (Table 6.3). Reaching 14 percent and 20 percent of the total household members correspondingly, the Kwekwe A1 and A2 farms unveiled greater levels of non-residency compared to Goromonzi (Table 6.3). About 31.4 percent, 39.1 percent and 11.8 percent of the A1, A2 and Communal Area households respectively, had this characteristic in Kwekwe (Table 6.4).

Table 6.4: Scale of non-residency in the rural areas among landholders

No. of non-residents	% Of households							
	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	A1	A2	Total RA	CA	A1	A2	Total RA	CA
0	68.4	66.2	67.3	96.2	68.6	61.9	66.9	88.2
1	17.1	24.3	20.7	3.8	11.9	11.1	11.7	7.1
2	2.6	2.7	2.7	0	8.2	6.3	7.8	2.4
3	9.2	4.1	6.7	0	4.6	4.8	4.7	0
4-7	2.6	2.8	2.7	0	6.7	15.9	9	2.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	76	74	150	78	194	63	257	85

The family labour supply base was thus not severely impacted since “absentee” members were restricted to only one member in most of the households in Goromonzi district (Table 6.4). Although Kwekwe had a relatively bigger share of households that had two or more non-resident members compared to Goromonzi, still the distribution was tilted towards those with one “absentee” member.

Non-residency did not necessarily imply that household members could not be recruited into unpaid family labour, as some of them returned “home” during weekends and on public holidays to provide labour services. Most of the non-resident members (as discussed in section 6.3) were male household heads working in towns and cities, while the rest included other family members also tied to wage labour markets and students in boarding schools. Migration, which typifies the diversification of family labour, will be revisited in section 6.3. Due to its nearness to Harare, even some of those who were formally employed were permanent residents in Goromonzi’s resettled areas. Consequently, the majority of the members were

available to be enlisted into the unpaid family farm labour, including both the male and female members.

6.2.1.2 Utilisation of family labour in household agricultural production

There has been a proliferation of the use of unpaid family labour in the resettled areas, which were previously bastions of LSCF farm wage labour. Recalling the situation that existed in the capitalist LSCFs, family labour was not used to perform manual work on the farms, as is the case today (see Chapter Five). Instead, white farmers and their families largely provided managerial and supervisory inputs in the operation of the farms (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Moyo *et al.* 2000; Rutherford 2001b). Today, family farm labour characterises even some of the A2 farms that the land reform policy envisaged to expand black commercial farming and therefore mainly hire in wage labour.

Yet the patterns of unpaid family labour utilisation were differentiated amongst the settlement types. The Communal Area households in both districts, as before 2000 (Adams 1991; Moyo 1995), still largely depend on the backs of their families for farm labour supplies, followed by the A1 households (Table 6.5). As expected, the use of unpaid family labour was far less important in the A2 households than in the A1 and Communal Areas, especially in Goromonzi district. Hence, approximately 60 percent of the Goromonzi A2 households mimicked former LSCFs by depending entirely on hired in farm wage labour, albeit with reduced absolute numbers of workers per farm unit as discussed below. Their counterparts in Kwekwe however imitated patterns of family labour use similar to A1 farms in Goromonzi (Table 6.5).

Table 6.5: Scale of unpaid family labour utilisation

No. of members	% of households							
	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	A1	A2	Total RA	CA	A1	A2	Total RA	CA
0	17.1	66.2	41.3	1.3	4.6	20.6	8.6	1.2
1	3.9	0.0	2.0	3.8	4.1	1.6	3.5	0.0
2	13.2	14.9	14.0	28.2	6.2	11.1	7.4	11.8
3-5	32.9	18.9	26.0	64.1	63.9	46.0	59.5	62.4
6-7	27.6	0.0	14.0	2.6	18.0	17.5	17.9	18.8
8-9	3.9	0.0	2.0	0.0	.5	0.0	.4	3.5
10-11	1.3	0.0	0.7	0.0	2.6	3.2	2.7	2.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	76	74	150	78	194	63	257	85
Chi-Square	134.942				38.452			
p	0.00*				0.00*			

*Significant at $p < 0.05$

In the majority of A1 households in Goromonzi, between three to five and six to seven members were providing family farm labour (Table 6.5), whilst the A2 households in this district, as well as in all the settlement types in Kwekwe, most were located in the range of three to five members. Goromonzi A1 households (3.46) boasting larger family sizes also had the highest mean number of family farm labourers compared with their counterparts in the A2 (2.88) and Communal Areas (3.05).¹⁰² Contradictory configurations materialised in Kwekwe, as no significant differences were registered between the settlements.¹⁰³

Despite the Communal Areas having the highest proportion of households that used unpaid family labour, the actual time contributed as measured in labour days were less to those of the newly resettled areas, due to their inferior cultivated areas (see section 6.4.2) principally in Kwekwe (Table 6.6). In Goromonzi, the A1 households had superior family labour days compared to the A2 and Communal Areas. More unpaid family labour days were invested by Goromonzi resettled households than those of Kwekwe and the same patterns were also correct for the Communal Areas.

Table 6.6: Unpaid family labour days applied by households, 2016/17 season

Labour days	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	A1	A2	Total RA	CA	A1	A2	Total RA	CA
Mean	408.71 _a	327.36 _b	385.60	240.57 _b	320.96 _a	318.88 _a	320.51	196.20 _b
Std. Dev.	259.89	203.61	246.84	106.75	201.73	254.85	213.60	94.92
N	63	25	88	76	184	50	234	83

*There is significant difference at $p < 0.05$ if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the same row are dissimilar.

Kinship ties were an important source of unpaid family labour given most resettled households were structured as extended family units (Table 6.1). Indeed, it was mostly landless relatives from their Communal Areas of origin or *kumusha* that resettled households mobilised. Further enquiries regarding the structure of their families revealed a recurring a theme of providing “help to poor relatives” with clothing, food and accommodation. To this, the research can add to “increase the unpaid family labour supplies”, which included the relatives. By controlling land, the FTLRP beneficiaries were thus able to call on the labour of their kin from the Communal and other areas distressed by land shortages as done by other landholders

¹⁰² T-test significantly different at $p < 0.05$.

¹⁰³ T-test significantly not different at $p < 0.05$.

in Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas (Gaidzanwa 1995; Mvududu & McFadden 2001) and many rural dwellers in SSA (Nyantakyi-Frimpong & Kerr 2017; Tsikata 2015; 2009b; Oya 2013).

Despite not conforming to a capital-wage labour relation in as far as there is an exchange of labour for an agreed wage rate whether in cash or kind, these landless relatives embedded in extended family units could be argued to constitute some form of landless “rural proletariat” (Mintz 1974: 35) or what could be classified as “hidden wage workers”. For the relationship between extended family relatives and landholders involves the exchange of labour and other basic amenities such as food, housing and clothing that could be equated to wages in “kind” (Mintz 1974). Without these “hidden wage workers”, the labour supply gaps would possibly have to be plugged by hiring in wage labour.

6.2.1.3 Gender and generational dynamics in the family labour supplies

Both men and women provided unpaid family farm labour supplies to the households. Inside Goromonzi’s A1 and Communal Areas, women were only a slight majority of the entire number of the unpaid family labourers (Table 6.7). Poles apart, men were the majority in the A2 scheme in this district, as well as in all settlements in Kwekwe.

Table 6.7: Gender and generational division of unpaid family labour, Goromonzi

Age	A1				A2				CA			
	Male	Female	Total	%Female	Male	Female	Total	%Female	Male	Female	Total	%Female
No. of persons involved in providing unpaid family labour in 2016/17 season												
Minors	12	11	23	47.8	0	2	2	100.0	23	22	45	48.9
Adult	112	120	232	51.7	35	29	64	45.3	82	93	175	53.1
Total	124	131	255	51.4	35	31	66	47.0	105	115	220	52.3
No. of labour days contributed by persons in 2016/17 season												
Minor	481	380	861	44.1	0	26	26	100.0	581	823	1404	58.6
Adults	11945	11096	23041	48.2	5111	2973	8084	36.8	7255	9464	16719	56.6
Total	12426	11476	23902	48.0	5111	2999	8110	37.0	7836	10287	18123	56.8
N	76				74				78			

Despite dominating the number of workers in Goromonzi A1 farms, women were contributing fewer labour days than men. Altogether, 12,426 labour days originated from men compared to 11,467 by women in these households (Table 6.7). Goromonzi A2 households deviated from this pattern as the preponderance of the males in the unpaid family farm labour force reflected in the bulk of the time contributions, as was

also the case in all settlements in Kwekwe (Table 6.7). However, women shouldered most of the workload in the district's Communal Areas. These trends in the gender distribution of the family farm labourers were not far off from the provincial results where the study districts lie published by national statistical agency. Mashonaland East registered percent shares of female family farm labourers of 50.3 percent, 44.4 percent and 52.9 percent in the A1, A2 and Communal Areas respectively (ZIMSTAT 2015a, b, c: 6-7). Within the same settlements in Midlands Province, women accounted for 49.1 percent, 38.2 percent and 53.4 percent of the total number of family farm labourers (ZIMSTAT 2015a, b, c:6-7).

Children below the age of 16 years across genders in contravention of the law were part of the family farm labourers especially in the A1 and Communal Areas of both districts (Table 6.7 and 6.8). Small farms in the Communal Areas had the highest rates of child farm workers, accounting for at least 20.4 percent of the unpaid family workers and 8.6 percent and 10.7 percent of the total number of family labour days in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively. Seventeen percent of the summation of family workers in the Kwekwe A1 farms were children and contributed eight percent of the total number of family labour days. There was less exploitation of the labour of children in Goromonzi's A1 farms than in Kwekwe since they constituted only nine percent of the family labourers. A2 farms used the lowest share of children in their total number of unpaid family labour force - 3.0 percent and 6.0 percent in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively.

Table 6.8: Gender and generational division of unpaid family labour, Kwekwe

Age	A1				A2				CA			
	Male	Female	Total	%Female	Male	Female	Total	%Female	Male	Female	Total	%Female
No. of persons involved in providing unpaid family labour in 2016/17 season												
Minors	58	58	116	50.0	7	6	13	46.2	47	37	84	44.0
Adult	312	241	553	43.6	95	84	179	46.9	133	130	263	49.4
Total	370	299	669	44.7	102	90	192	46.9	180	167	347	48.1
No. of labour days contributed by persons in 2016/17 season												
Minor	2710	1980	4690	42.2	199	306	505	60.6	907	636	1543	41.2
Adults	30970	22278	53248	41.8	8976	6010	14986	40.1	7215	7116	14331	49.7
Total	33680	24258	57938	41.9	9175	6316	15491	40.8	8122	7752	15874	48.8
N	194				63				85			

Unpaid child labour could therefore be considered as a substitute for expensive farm wages, without which the resource constrained small farms would be expected to employ wage labour to satisfy the demand. As noted earlier in Chapter Four, child labour was also a challenge in both the former LSCF and Communal Areas (Loewenson 1991; Bourdillon 2000; Davies 2000). Whereas children of mostly farm wage labourers were exploited as underpaid workers in the former LSCFs, now resettled areas feature both unpaid and paid child labour in the A1 and A2 farms (see section 6.5). So this phenomenon persists to be an issue of concern in both resettled and Communal Areas, especially its conflict with school attendance.¹⁰⁴

Notwithstanding the participation by both men and women, the field observations illuminated the segmentation of the range of farm tasks performed by family labourers along gender and generational lines. Land clearing, ploughing, livestock herding, cattle dipping and, pest and disease control were tasks that were predominantly done by adult men in most of the households surveyed across all the settlement types in both districts. Adult women, on the other hand, were frequently engaged in planting and weeding. Male children were commonly involved in livestock herding, while female children contributed their labour inputs to weeding and planting.

Women, nonetheless, largely performed reproductive labour.¹⁰⁵ Recent surveys indicate that women in Zimbabwe spend as much 49.7 hours per week on reproductive labour activities compared to 25.8 hours for men (ZIMSTAT 2016: 48). Disparities in rural areas are more likely to be wider since women have to spend more

¹⁰⁴ Overall, 15.8 percent, 16.2 percent and 30.8 percent of the A1, A2 and Communal Area households in Goromonzi lacked the money to send all their children of school going age to school in 2017 respectively. While in Kwekwe 29.4 percent, 9.5 percent and 25.9 percent correspondingly could not do so. For instance in 11 out of the 12 A1 households in Goromonzi who could not afford to send children to school were providing unpaid family labour. So the story was also the same in other settlements in this districts as 11 out of 12 A2 households and 20 out of 24 Communal Area households enlisted their children not attending school into the family labour force. In Kwekwe, 52 out of the 57 A1 households also did the same, as well as 19 of the 22 Communal Areas households.

¹⁰⁵ For instance, amongst the A1 male landowners in Goromonzi, 24.2 percent reported performing household work such as firewood collection, cooking and fetching of water compared to 76.9 percent amongst the female landowners. 42.2 percent of the male landowners and 92 percent of the female landowners in the Communal Areas noted this. These patterns could not be discerned amongst the A2 landholders in both districts since most of them also engaged domestic labour. A1 male landholders in Kwekwe actively participated in domestic chores than their counterparts as confirmed by 65.2 percent. At 78.8 percent involved female landholders were still the main providers of domestic labour. The disparities in male and female landowners in domestic labour were wider in the Communal Areas of Kwekwe, 38.9 percent and 90 percent respectively.

time fetching water and firewood unlike their urban counterparts who have access to tapped water and electricity. Women were therefore critical in the maintenance of the unpaid farm labour as the key source of reproductive labour (Naidu & Ossome 2016; Bhattacharya 2017). The overall burden of work encompassing production and reproduction spheres therefore still falls on the back of women.

Men were omni-present in the decision-making about the allocation of family labour either independently or jointly with their spouses. In male-owned resettled farms of Goromonzi, 81.5 percent of them did so alone. In addition, male presence was felt in the combined efforts of the owners and their wives, and through their sons as indicated by 6.1 percent. All in all, men thus influenced this process in 87.7 percent of the Goromonzi resettled households compared to 12.5 percent for women divided into independent decision-makers (7.7 percent) and together with their husbands (4.6 percent). Even in female-owned land, men by themselves determined family labour allocation in 45.5 percent of the resettled households within the district, while in the equivalent share; it was the responsibility of the female landowners.

In the Kwekwe resettled areas, in 63.0 percent of the households where the land was male-owned, these men independently called the shots. Summing up the joint spousal decisions (29.7 percent) and those made through their sons (2.1 percent), male voices were recorded in 94.8 percent of these households. Women, in contrast, were the decision makers independently in 3.6 percent of the male-owned land and alongside their husbands in 29.7 percent as noted above. Though women dominated decision making on the land they controlled either independently (66.7 percent) or jointly (11.9 percent), men still single-handedly directed the process in 21.4 percent in these households.

Similar trends were repeated in the Communal Areas of both districts. In Goromonzi's Communal Areas, the decision regarding the allocation of family labour was undertaken by men alone and with their wives' participation in 58 percent and 25 percent of the male controlled lands respectively. On their own, women did so in 17.1 percent of these households. A different picture was documented in female-owned lands as male influence was reduced more than that recorded in the same category in the resettled areas in both districts, since their independent role was noted in at least 84 percent of these households in the Communal Areas of Goromonzi and Kwekwe.

Men were only involved in such decisions in 8.0 percent and 4.0 percent of female-owned lands in two districts, respectively. As seen in the resettled areas, men were once more the dominant actors on the land they owned in Kwekwe Communal Areas – 49.2 percent alone and 40.7 percent with their wives. Only in 10.2 percent of the Communal Area households of this district did women take the lead role without male participation.

By overshadowing women in the mobilisation of agricultural finance and determining the agricultural inputs used, men also influenced the quantum of unpaid family labour applied, as well as the commodities to which the labour was allocated. For instance, in 87.7 percent and 64.8 percent of households in male-owned land in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts correspondingly, males were independently responsible for the mobilisation of agricultural finance. Whilst, in the female-owned land category, men were also responsible for this task in 45.4 percent of the households in Goromonzi's resettled areas compared to 21.5 percent in Kwekwe.

Quite the opposite of “families divided” (Murray 1981), the labour contributions by both men and women observed in the resettled areas echo the reunification of families during the FTLRP represented by married spouses staying together with their children, as others have also discovered (Moyo *et al.* 2009). These tendencies were related to the contraction of the urban labour markets that pursued the economic decline after 2000 – a process associated with the deindustrialisation experienced in the country and consequent contraction of formal employment opportunities in the factories (LEDRIZ 2016; Kanyenze *et al.* 2011; see also Chapter Five).

Additionally, the findings in the resettled areas, which show that men were as much providers of agricultural labour as women, confirm emerging evidence from recent studies in Africa. Indeed, the literature has been revisiting the stylised facts about role of women in farming in SSA, particularly their labour contribution. According to FAO (2011: 11), overall women's agricultural labour contribution in selected African countries was just above 50 percent. SOFA Team & Doss. (2011: 8) found that the labour contributions of women were highly variable ranging from 30 percent in the Gambia to as high as 80 percent in Cameroon. But in most of the countries examined,

the labour supplied by women was just over 50 percent.¹⁰⁶ Another study in six African countries, namely; Ethiopia, Malawi, Tanzania, Niger, Nigeria, and Uganda estimated the average labour contribution of women at 40 percent (Palacios-Lopez, Christiansen & Kilic 2017: 56). Give and take the country variation, these studies and the findings presented herein suggest that the contribution of women to agricultural labour even when larger than that of males is not as high as the usually cited figures of between 60 to 80 percent (FAO 2011: 11).¹⁰⁷

Relatively equitable contributions of labour do not however imply that control of women's labour by men, which is occasioned by skewed access to and control of rural land by males (Tsikata 2009), has relented. If anything, the situation observed in the study sites resembles what has been typified as "...the family farms together, the decisions, however are made by man" (Djurfeldt *et al.* 2017: 601) in reference to male domination in the control of the agrarian labour processes in matrilineal land tenure systems in Malawi. The data presented above expose the overly dominant role of men in the decisions about the family labour allocation. Subsequently, the control of land by women does not automatically convert into the control of organisation of the production, including the labour processes. Since men were the major recipients of land during the FTLRP (Scoones *et al.* 2010; Moyo 2011a; Mkodzongi 2013b; Chiweshe, Chakona & Helliker 2014), it is fair to conclude that on the majority of the land being cultivated today, men control the allocation and application of unpaid family labour. No wonder, Moyo lamented the persistence of inequitable gender and land relations in aftermath of the FTLRP, "redistributive land reform", he wrote:

"...did not reverse the regressive agrarian relations evoked by patriarchal power relations. ...While more women secured their own land than in previous reforms, men and husbands still dominate agrarian transactions" (Moyo 2011b: 946).

Many other researchers have also drawn attention to these inequalities highlighting the continued hold men have on women's labour (Bhatasara & Chiweshe 2017; Chingarande 2008; Makura-Paradza 2010; Mutopo 2013; 2011). One may also recall here the situation in matrilineal societies in Malawi where land is traditionally vested

¹⁰⁶ In Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Zambia, the labour provided by women was just over 50 percent, while in Ghana, Tanzania, Niger and Togo their contribution was below 50 percent. Only in Cameroon did the contribution of women exceed 60 percent (SOFA & Doss 2011: 8).

¹⁰⁷ In Uganda, women labour contributions were above half in Uganda (56 percent), Malawi (52 percent) and Tanzania (52 percent). While in Nigeria (37 percent), Ethiopia (29 percent) and Niger (24 percent) women's labour contributions were below that of men (Palacios-Lopez *et al.* 2017: 56).

in women. Various studies there have shown how men are increasingly taking over the control of the land and the labour processes (Koopman 1997; Peters 2010; Djurfeldt *et al.* 2017). As a result, the patriarchal relations within the family privileging male authority over a whole range of intra-household decisions are not necessarily altered by the control of land by women.

6.2.2 Inter-household labour relations

This section discusses the extra-household “unpaid” farm labour that was also being mobilised through the cooperation between groups of families to exchange labour, locally known as “*humwe*”.¹⁰⁸ Invitations were sent out to the community for interested people to congregate at the plot of the one of the household members to perform farm labour tasks. In exchange the host household prepared food or traditional beer that was shared amongst the participants after finishing work in the fields. Also known as “work parties” (Shiraishi 2009), such labour arrangements benefitted households that were able to marshal resources to feed the “workers” afterwards. The relationship between the host household and the members of the community that come to work on their fields transcends that of an employer and employee (Tsikata 2015) since it is not associated with the payment of an agreed wage either in cash or kind for the performance of particular farm task.

Humwe as a source of farm labour was more pronounced in Kwekwe and was of the non-reciprocal type. About 39.7 percent, 20.6 percent and 60 percent of the A1, A2 and Communal Area households respectively reported involvement in labour cooperation as either a “host” or “supplier of labour”. This practice was not as popular in Goromonzi as it was noted in only 2.6 percent of the A1 and 1.3 percent of the Communal Area households.

Table 6.9: Activities involved in non-reciprocal labour exchanges, Kwekwe

Activity	A1		A2		Subtotal		CA	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Land clearing	3	5.0	1	10.0	4	5.7	10	23.8
Planting	22	33.8	1	11.1	23	31.1	12	28.6
Weeding	40	59.7	7	70.0	47	61.0	45	93.8
Harvesting	53	73.6	9	81.8	62	74.7	26	65.0
N	77		13		90		51	

¹⁰⁸ This is Shona word literally translating to “togetherness”.

Labour demanding activities such as harvesting and weeding mostly benefitted from *humwe* labour in Kwekwe (Table 6.9). Both men and women supplied labour to this enterprise, so did children below 16 years of age. Specifically, the labour force was distributed as follows in the A1 farms – 50 percent were adult men, 35.1 percent adult women and the remainder were male children (13 percent) and female children (1.3 percent). Male adults in the A2 farms were the main participants (78.6 percent) and the rest were equally partitioned between female adults, and male and female children. Only adults were reported in the Communal Areas of which 52.7 percent were women.

Unequal power relations that sometimes colour the inter-household labour cooperation (Tsikata 2015) played out in one case encountered in Goromonzi. There, an apostolic church leader drew upon seniority in the church to mobilise labour from his followers for his potato fields. None of the rank and file flock had this privilege to summon labour as their church leader did.

The *Zunde raMambo* projects managed by traditional leaders represented another form of labour cooperation (Worby 1995; Nyambara 2001) observed in both districts,¹⁰⁹ but not between households. The chief avails land and other agricultural inputs, and households in that particular locality are obliged to provide labour for food production to support marginal community members, including widows and child headed households. A1 households rather than the A2 households were the ones targeted for labour supplies by the village heads located on their farms who coordinate this on the behalf of the chief. Labour supplies to *Zunde raMambo* were however contested as its separation with the chief's own household production was sometimes blurred. For this reason, this practice has failed to gain traction in the resettled areas especially in Goromonzi. The tendencies of unequal power relations thus also marked *Zunde raMambo* labour cooperation.

Apart from agriculture, both resettled and Communal Areas provide communal labour in community projects, which were also led by traditional authorities. Goromonzi A1 households were not averse to this due to the immediately felt “perceived” benefits. Labour cooperation in these projects was geared towards provision of social services

¹⁰⁹ *Zunde raMambo* refers to a food reserve kept by the traditional leader to serve disadvantaged members of the community and wider community during lean agricultural seasons (Worby 1995).

and related infrastructure that was deficient in the resettled areas, including construction of schools, clinics and maintenance of roads. The beneficiaries of land reform were allocated land without the state providing these much needed social services (Chibwana 2017; Moyo *et al.* 2009; Matondi 2012). Their availability today was largely an outcome of the application of “*humwe*” type labour. The primary school at “Vana Vevhu” A1 farm in Goromonzi, for instance, was an outcome of such labour cooperation. Women were responsible for moulding the bricks and the men were largely involved in the construction activities.


These findings concur with the inverse relationship between the growth of wage labour markets and the centrality of labour cooperation in organising farm labour alluded to by some analysts in reference to Africa (Berry 1993; Ponte 2000; Mueller 2011) and Asia (Michie 1981; Murphy 2015). Goromonzi district, which had a relatively more developed farm labour market, as discussed below, *humwe* was not widespread as demonstrated in Kwekwe. Furthermore, the commercialisation of agriculture that is associated with the hiring of wage labour was also more advanced in Goromonzi than in Kwekwe (see section 6.4). Indeed, the rapid escalation of cotton production in the South Western Communal Areas of Gokwe visible by 1985 resulted in the displacement of *humwe* with wage labour (Worby 1995). Nonetheless, the evidence also reflects that the growth and presence of labour markets among the peasantry does not entirely displace non-capitalist labour relations (Amanor 2001). In sum, the incidence of labour cooperation was differentiated according to the geographical locations, which in turn influenced the land use patterns and integration of farm households in the agricultural commodity markets (see section 6.4).

6.2.3 Employment of farm wage labour

Critics of redistributive land reforms often cite the disruption of agricultural employment as the outcome of the reallocation of land from large capitalist farms to the peasantry (de Janvry 1981; Sender & Johnston 2004; Hellum & Derman 2004; Sender 2016), implying that farm wage labour markets are expected to disappear since it is assumed that the peasantry exclusively relies on family farm labour. The field data refutes these assertions. Whereas there has been a growth of the use of family farm labour in the newly resettled areas, the hiring in of wage labour was prevalent even among the smaller A1 landholdings, let alone in the larger A2 farms.

Up to 77.6 percent of the Goromonzi A1 landholders hired in wage labour to complement the family labour supplies (Figure. 6.2). The same characterised as much as 64.9 percent of the A1 households even in the dry district of Kwekwe. As expected, the recruitment of farm wage labour was more pervasive in the A2 scheme, 94.6 percent in Goromonzi and 88.9 percent in Kwekwe. A portion of the old peasantry in the Communal Areas of both districts were also wage employers (Figure 6.2), thus opposing claims that associate wage labour with large capitalist farming in Southern Africa (Barrett *et al.* 2001; Griffin *et al.* 2002; Sender & Johnston 2004; Barrett *et al.* 2005).

Figure 6.2: Hiring in of farm wage labour by rural households



Goromonzi, Chi-Square=84.367, p=0.000 (significant at p< 0.05)
 Kwekwe, Chi-Square=82.017, p=0.000 (significant at p< 0.05).

That a few of the A2 farmers also exclusively relied on family labour to organise their farming activities suggests that the land reform policy implementation did not always succeed in the selection and targeting of beneficiaries in this model. As stated earlier (Chapter Five), the A2 model was earmarked to diversify commercial farming and thus the beneficiaries were expected to hire in wage labour. Under-resourced farmers thus also made it onto the A2 beneficiary lists.

Differentiation was vivid in the use of permanent and casual forms of farm labour. The former was more widespread in the A2 scheme than in the smaller scale A1 and Communal Areas. A1 households hired in mostly part-time labour and in fact permanent labour was absent in 23 of the 59 Goromonzi A1 households (39.0 percent) that hired in wage labour (Table 6.10). Likewise, this was recorded in 49 of the 126 Kwekwe A1 households. None of the Goromonzi Communal Area's

households hired full-time workers and this was restricted to only four of the 16 households in their Kwekwe equivalents. Occurring in 92.9 percent and 76.8 percent of the Goromonzi and Kwekwe A2 households respectively, the use of permanent sharply contrasted with the small-scale landholdings.

Table 6.10: Scale of permanent farm labour utilisation (%)

No. of workers	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	A1	A2	Total RA	CA	A1	A2	Total RA	CA
0	39	7.1	21.7	100	56.3	23.2	46.2	75
1	37.3	10	22.5	0	29.4	10.7	23.6	25
2	13.6	8.6	10.9	0	9.5	25	14.3	0
3-4	10.2	18.6	14.7	0	4.8	30.4	12.6	0
5-6	0	14.3	7.8	0	0	5.4	1.6	0
7-8	0	8.6	4.7	0	0	0	0	0
9+	0	32.9	17.8	0	0	5.4	1.6	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	59	70	129	21	126	56	182	85
Chi square	113.459				65.454			
p	0.00*				0.00*			

*Significant at $p < 0.05$

When permanent labour was used in the A1 farms, the majority hired only one worker (Table 6.10) and none engaged more than four across both districts. The Goromonzi A2 farms were distributed in the various categories of the range of permanent workers hired in and up to a third employed nine or more workers (Table 6.10). Most of the Kwekwe A2 households were clustered between one and four permanent workers. That the average number of permanent workers in the smaller A1 and Communal Areas lagged behind those noted in the bigger A2 farms should not be unanticipated. Specifically, for every one permanent worker in an A1 farm in Goromonzi, 8.42 workers were employed in an A2 farm household. Kwekwe did not register these wide differences since for every one permanent worker in an A1 household, two were found in the A2.

Casual or part-time farm labour was the more popular form of hired in wage labour in A1 farms as it was perceived in 99 percent and 84.9 percent of the labour market participants in Goromonzi and Kwekwe, respectively (Table 6.11). Such high levels of use were also observed in the A2 households. The A2 households nevertheless, hired larger number of casual workers than the A1, as much as 2.84 times in Goromonzi. Only limited to 1.4 times, Kwekwe experienced much less disproportionality in the use of this labour form. Once again the Communal Areas had the least number of the casual workers hired in.

Table 6.11: Scale of part-time labourers hired in 2016/17 season (%)

No. of piece workers	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	A1	A2	Total RA	CA	A1	A2	Total RA	CA
0	1.7	7.1	4.7	0	15.1	16.1	15.4	25
1	1.7	0	0.8	14.3	2.4	0	1.6	6.3
2	10.2	1.4	5.4	42.9	10.3	7.1	9.3	12.5
3-4	10.2	0	4.7	33.3	24.6	14.3	21.4	37.5
5-6	11.9	7.1	9.3	9.5	22.2	21.4	22	12.5
7-8	8.5	2.9	5.4	0	7.1	14.3	9.3	6.3
9+	55.9	81.4	69.8	0	18.3	26.8	20.9	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	59	70	129	21	126	56	182	16
Chi-Square	85.228				15.318			
p	0.00*				0.225**			

*Significant at $p < 0.05$ **Not significant at $p < 0.05$

Due to the more common use of casual rather than permanent labour, the casualisation of farm labour that took root in the LSCFs in 1970s and intensified after 1980 have thus not abated in the new farming units (see Chapter Four and Five). Yet this was also in sync with the wider tendencies not only in the national labour markets, but globally as part-time work has increasingly become the “new normal” as employers prefer “flexible” employees easy to dispose when not needed (ILO 2015a; 2015b; Jha 2016). Moreover, this type of employment serves the profit maximisation of domestic and international capitalist firms as costs associated with full-time work such as pensions and other forms of social security fall away in part-time work.

Table 6.12: Number of farm labour days hired in by households, 2016/17 season

Labour days	Goromonzi						Kwekwe					
	A1		A2		CA		A1		A2		CA	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Casual	232.4 _a	371.7	565.4 _b	695.5	21.3 _c	16.6	78.4 _a	161.3	182.4 _b	314.1	9.9 _c	16.2
Permanent	163.2 _a	280.0	1864.4 _b	1553.9	0.0 _c	0.0	79.9 _a	160.8	480.4 _b	1100.3	28.1 _c	50.5
Total hired	395.6 _a	474.9	2429.8 _b	1902.8	21.3 _c	16.6	158.3 _a	218.3	662.8 _b	1330.6	38.1 _c	47.0
N	59.00		70.00		21.00		126.00		56.00		16.00	

*There is significant difference at $p < 0.05$ if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the same row are dissimilar.

Beyond the absolute number of workers hired in, the field research also enquired on the actual number of labour days contributed by both permanent and casual labour.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ According to ILO *Hours of Work (Industry) Convention 1919 (No. 1)*, the standard workday is designated as eight hours and weekly working hours should not exceed 48 hours. Zimbabwe Labour Laws follow the same standard, including the *Statutory Instrument No. 116 of 2014* covering the working conditions of farm workers.

Permanent workers in A2 farms in Goromonzi put in an average of 565.4 labour days, compared to 480.4 in Kwekwe in the same category. The inferior number of full-time workers also converted to fewer labour days in the A1 compared to A2 households - 163.2 in Goromonzi and 79.9 in Kwekwe. Overall, the total number of labour days hired in was higher in the A2 farms than the rest of settlements (Table 6.12). Communal Areas had the least number of labour days hired in. No variation was detected in the utilisation of wage labour between male and female land beneficiaries in FTLRP areas.

Both permanent and family labour were involved in the performance of the full range of farm tasks. Variations were however apparent in the use of casual labour. In particular, the data uncovered the concentration of its use in four activities namely; ploughing, planting, weeding and harvesting (Table 6.13). Not less than 90 percent of the resettled households in Goromonzi had hired casual labour for these activities except in ploughing. Weeding and harvesting drew a substantial proportion of households in Kwekwe resettled households comparable to those in Goromonzi. Within the Communal Areas, weeding was commonly reported in Goromonzi, while land clearing of out bushes that sprouted in their fields during the dry season impelled casual labour engagement in Kwekwe.

Table 6.13: Farm labour tasks where casual labour was utilised

Activity	Goromonzi (%)				Kwekwe (%)			
	A1	A2	Total RA	CA	A1	A2	Total RA	CA
Land clearing	11.9	53.8	33.9	0	13	42.9	22.3	80
Ploughing	54.2	70.8	62.9	60	20.4	26.5	22.3	0
Planting	94.9	93.8	94.4	55	19.4	36.7	24.8	0
Weeding	93.2	100	96.8	100	86.1	75.5	82.8	40
Harvesting	96.6	100	98.4	50	59.3	81.6	66.2	0
Pest & disease control	62.7	87.7	75.8	5	6.5	18.4	10.2	0
Marketing	0	3.1	1.6	0	3.7	2	3.2	0
Livestock herding	3.4	3.1	3.2	15	5.6	14.3	8.3	0
Farm repairs	16.9	4.6	10.5	10	5.6	16.3	8.9	0
Farm security	3.4	1.5	2.4	0	3.7	6.1	4.5	0
Cattle dipping	5.1	0	2.4	5	3.7	6.1	4.5	0
N	59	65	124	20	108	49	157	10

The number of tasks in which casual labour was used also elucidated inequalities between the resettled and Communal Area households. Table 6.13 shows that nine out of the 10 tasks investigated were using casual labour *albeit* reported by differentiated

shares of the resettled households. The Communal Areas of Kwekwe lagged behind in the number of tasks indicated and was in point limited to land clearing and weeding. While in Goromonzi Communal Areas, the scenario approximated that seen in the resettled areas, but with lower shares of households recorded except for weeding. A key difference between the resettled areas of Goromonzi and Kwekwe related to the proportions of households using casual labour outside of weeding and harvesting (Table 6.13). The concentration of the use of casual labour in these two activities structures the recruitment peaks and troughs during the agricultural season (section 6.5.2).

These variations expressed in the patterns of labour use also stretched to the distribution of work between hired in and family labour across the main farm tasks. The share of hired labour time was significantly larger in the A2 households matched to the A1 and Communal Areas across the spectrum of farm tasks in the respective districts (Table 6.14). Weeding, for instance, in the Communal Areas in both districts and the A1 farms in Kwekwe, less than 20 percent of the work was done by hired in labour. The opposite was true in the remaining settlement types as hired in labour did most of the work and its share was more pronounced in the A2 farms of Goromonzi.

Table 6.14: Shares of labour contributed by hired labour to different activities

Activity	% share of work done by hired labour							
	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	A1	A2	Total RA	CA	A1	A2	Total RA	CA
Land clearing	24	65	44	4	18	59	28	9
Ploughing	52	80	66	11	24	52	31	0
Planting	50	85	68	6	20	51	27	0
Weeding	53	87	70	17	38	66	45	7
Harvesting	55	85	70	4	29	64	37	0
Marketing	6	19	12	0	5	17	8	0
Pest/disease control	41	80	60	0	16	53	25	0
Fertiliser application	47	84	65	2	17	58	27	0
N	76	74	150	78	194	63	357	85

The gender composition of the farm wage labour force in the surveyed households displayed an imbalance between men and women (Table 6.15). Over 68 percent of the permanent workers in the resettled households of Goromonzi were men and as much as 84 percent in Kwekwe. Women's presence was higher in the casual labour component. Men occupied most of the casual jobs that were largely offered in the

Communal Areas in Goromonzi, but in contrast women held the slightly predominant position in Kwekwe.

The evidence presented herein substantiates the latest statistics published in the 2014 National Labour Force Surveys. According to this report, women held only 18.3 percent of the permanent jobs in the agricultural sector and their share in casual labour force was 39.7 percent (ZIMSTAT 2016: 40). Though still underrepresented, the emerging picture from this study and the national figures was that of substantial improvement in the accommodation of women in permanent work. Their share had remained disappointingly stuck below 10 percent of the permanent workforce in the LSCFs since the 1970s and roughly equally divided with men in the casual labour force (Clarke 1977; Amanor-Wilks 1995; Muchena & Dzumbira 2001) (see Chapter Five).

Table 6.15: Gender distribution of farm labourers hired by households

Type of workers	Goromonzi						Kwekwe				
	A1	A2	Total RA	% of Total	CA	% of Total	A1	A2	Total RA	% of Total	CA
Male permanent	46	312	358	68	0	0	72	135	207	84	4
Female permanent	10	160	170	32	0	0	8	31	39	16	0
Total Permanent	56	472	528	100	0	0	80	166	246	100	4
Male casual	269	907	1176	42	33	59	264	220	484	46	22
Female casual	402	1229	1631	58	23	41	384	180	564	54	22
Total casual workers	671	2136	2807	100	56	100	648	400	1048	100	44
N	59	70	129		21		126	56	182		16

These recruitment patterns nonetheless were still far from equitable gender distribution in the labour markets and echoes tendencies prevailing in many parts of SSA (Torvikey *et al.* 2016; Tsikata 2016; 2015; Oya 2013; 2010). Women were therefore mostly integrated in the farm labour markets as part-time workers. Even after land reform, the restriction of women to the margins of part-time farm work has thus not abated. However, it is also argued that women opt for part-time work in order to prevent conflict with patriarchal structures, which overly burden them with reproductive labour roles (SOFA & Doss 2011; Tsikata 2016).

6.2.4 Summary of main findings

The FTLRP has resulted in the widening of the farm labour sources beyond the predominant exploitation of wage labour that formed the fulcrum of the organisation of production in the former LSCFs (Loewenson 1992; Amanor-Wilks 1995;

Rutherford 2001a). The many smaller-scale farming units arising from the FTLRP utilise sources of labour that were substantially different from those used in the LSCFs. More specifically, the new labour sources were reflected by the enlarged use of self-employed or unpaid labour from within the families of the differentiated A1 and A2 resettled households. The exclusive reliance of family labour by a few A2 farmers implies that some challenges were experienced in the selection and targeting of beneficiaries in this scheme that was meant to diversify commercial farming and thus hire in wage labour. To be sure, the hiring in and hiring out of wage still persists among the new farming units in direct opposition to suggestions by some commentators. Extra-household labour through cooperative labour arrangements existed side-by-side with unpaid family and wage labour (Tsikata 2015).

Despite both men and women sharing the burden of agricultural work as unpaid family labourers, inequitable gender relations in agrarian labour persist through male control of the labour process, including the allocation of women and children's labour. Reproductive labour compounds the demands on women's time and overall thus contribute more labour to the maintenance of the households more than men (Gaidzanwa 1995; Doss *et al.* 2014; Naidu & Ossome 2016).

These findings reproduce a significant association between the settlement type (also representing the land size owned) and incidence of hiring in wage labour. The larger the land size, the more likely was it for households to hire in labour. The development of farm labour markets, similar to the trends obtaining in the former LSCFs, were uneven among the regions on account of the agro-ecological conditions and land use patterns. Districts located in better agro-ecological zones such as Goromonzi continue to dominate in the utilisation of hired in labour more than drier districts such as Kwekwe. To recapitulate, most LSCF workers prior to the FTLRP were concentrated in the high agro-ecological potential districts in the Mashonaland Provinces (CSO 2001; Chambati & Moyo 2004). Women as before continue to be neglected to the margins of farm labour markets as part-time workers.

6.3 DIVERSIFICATION OF FAMILY LABOUR

Historically, proletarianisation of peasant labour in countries such as Zimbabwe, which experienced Settler colonisation has been associated with the loss of land and erosion of survival options beyond the capital-wage labour relation (Arrighi 1970;

Clarke 1977; Palmer 1977; Moyo 2011). Access to land would therefore be expected to lessen the compulsion to seek wage employment. Nonetheless, various scholars have reminded us that proletarianisation is not *contingent* upon land access and people enter the wage economy for various reasons including to harness resource for farming, spread their risks, including to secure the location of social reproduction for the family, the young, old, ill and or to meet other household needs that are not easily met from farming under the current neoliberal economic conditions (Boltvinik 2016; O’Laughlin 2002; Moyo & Yeros 2005b; Shivji 2017; 2009). Indeed, land alone is not sufficient without other resources such as finance, seeds, fertilisers, and machinery to make it productive and consequently make a living (Cousins 2009).

The surveyed households behaved no differently to other rural households elsewhere in as far as allocation of their family labour beyond farming (Yeros 2013a; Scoones 2015a). Beyond land for farming, the FTLRP also widened access to other related natural resources that were being traded by land recipients and farm workers (Mkodzongi 2013b). These resources were previously monopolised by LSCFs which excluded other segments of the population on the strength of the freehold property rights (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Moyo 1995). Moreover, since the state tenures enable the free movement of people unlike in the past where trespass laws were heavily enforced by the LSCFs (Kanyenze 2001; Tandon 2001), they permitted land beneficiaries and others to engage in variegated trading of goods and services. Natural resource trading in Communal Areas continues as before, but due to the environmental degradation that arose from the overcrowding in these areas (Bojo 1993; Mehretu 1994) access tends to be constrained in comparison to the resettled areas.

Agricultural based social reproduction was thus either combined with urban/rural (formal) wage employment or non-farm rural based income earning activities such as natural resource trading, as well as other entrepreneurial activities in the urban and rural areas.


6.3.1 Hiring out of family labour in local farm wage labour markets

Strictly speaking, family labour hired out to other farming units falls under the realm of agricultural activities (see Chapter Two). Nonetheless, it was one source of wage employment that rural households allocated their family labour towards. Some members from within some households were thus straddling between providing

unpaid family farm labour and local farm labour markets. For women, reproductive labour adds to these forms of labour to compose their “triple work burden” (Lyon *et al.* 2017: 328).

Varied patterns of incorporation into the farm labour markets as sellers of labour power could be delineated across the two districts examined. Amongst the resettled households, the results demonstrate that only a minority sold farm labour to other households in Goromonzi compared to Kwekwe (Figure 6.3). There was significant association between the settlement type and hiring out of farm labour in Goromonzi. So it was the Communal Area households which controlled the least landholdings that were most active in hiring out farm wage labour, signifying that land shortages were still propelling participation in the local labour markets in this district. These patterns of association with the settlement did not evolve in Kwekwe. Still, the engagement in farm labour markets was frequently registered in A1 and Communal Area households compared to the A2.

Figure 6.3: Hiring out of farm labour to other farm households



Goromonzi, Chi-Square=62.058, p=0.000 (significant at p<0.05)
 Kwekwe, Chi-Square=5.009, p=0.082 (not significant at p<0.05).

Gold panning, in which a substantial proportion of the households are involved in Kwekwe, as discussed below, provides more rewarding income earnings compared to farm labour markets partly explains these trends. Moreover, the demand for hired in labour was relatively lower in this locality than in Goromonzi on account of the agro-ecological conditions and extensive land use patterns (section 6.2).

To balance with their unpaid family farm labour roles, the majority of households were inserted into local farm labour markets as part-time workers. The average number of labour days sold by A1 and A2 households, 2.8 and 0.92 respectively, was fewer than 15.2 days characterising the Communal Areas in Goromonzi.¹¹¹ The A1 were the peak of households in Kwekwe with 8.1 labour days, which was 11.6 and 1.9 times more than those enumerated in the A2 and Communal Areas respectively.¹¹² These levels of hiring out farm labour were only a small fraction when compared to those of land short and/or landless farm labourers who largely depend on selling wage labour for their sustenance (section 6.5), further reinforcing the relationship between access to land and hiring out labour.

Table 6.16: Gender distribution of household members hired out

Gender	Goromonzi						Kwekwe									
	A1		A2		Subtotal		CA		A1		A2		Subtotal		CA	
	No.		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%		
Male	2	1	3	50	22	51	24	3	27	69	8	53				
Female	2	1	3	50	21	49	11	1	12	31	7	47				
Subtotal	4	2	6	100	43	100	35	4	39	100	15	100				

Both male and female members of the household sold farm labour to other farm units. Actually, the wage labourers from within the farming households in Goromonzi district were roughly divided equally between males and females (Table 6.16). Disparate tendencies were observed in Kwekwe as males dominated part-time wage labour from the surveyed households and women were more visible in the Communal Area.

Identical to past trends, imbalance in access to land, though not the *only* factor (Jha 1996; 2016; Patnaik 1996; Cousins 2009; Moyo 2014) continue to shape the supply side in farm labour markets indicated by the preponderance of the land short Communal Area households as the main participants. Land reform did not satisfy all the land hunger as there were still many rural people in the Communal Areas and among former farm workers that were still land short (Moyo 2011c; Munyuki-

¹¹¹ Means were significantly different across the settlement types in Goromonzi. One-Way ANOVA test, $F=14.724$, 2 d.f., $p=0.000$ (significant at $p<0.05$).


¹¹² Means were not significantly different across the settlement type in Kwekwe. One-way ANOVA tests, $F=0.882$, 2 d.f., $p=0.440$ (not significant at $p<0.05$).

Hungwe 2011; Scoones *et al.* 2018a).¹¹³ Since landlessness and/or land shortages are not completely resolved by land reforms (Bush 2002; de Janvry 1981; Tabak 2000), those remaining with limited access to land constitute the majority of farm labour market participants (Cousins 2009). This issue will be revisited in section 6.5, when the character of the “new” wage labourers is explicated.

6.3.2 Non-farm rural income earning activities and labour relations

Nothing short of the character of rural landscapes seen in other parts of Africa, the gathering and trading of natural resources (Shackleton *et al.* 2001; Moyo 2008; Moyo 2014), together with other rural entrepreneurship and/or business initiatives was identified in the sampled farming units and farm workers. Clearly, the exploitation of natural resources was key for many of the rural households’ everyday needs, including accessing firewood, medicines, fruits and thatching grass (Moyo 1995; Bojo 1993; Mehretu 1994).¹¹⁴ The focus here is on the trading of the same for cash income generation since the later is classified under farming activities (see Chapter Two).

Figure 6.4: Participation in non-farm rural income earning activities



Goromonzi, Chi-Square=9.096, p=0.011 (significant at p<0.05).

Kwekwe, Chi-Square=14.025, p=0.001 (significant at p< 0.05).

Figure 6.4 illustrates the significant association between the involvement of household in non-farm activities and the settlement type. Communal Area households were the ones mostly drawn to such activities more than it did the resettled

¹¹³ One press report estimated that there were over 500,000 on the waiting lists for land allocations around 2015. See The Sunday Mail 24 August 2018. “Land reform: the work that lies ahead” accessed from <https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/land-reform-the-work-that-lies-ahead> on 4 December 2018.

¹¹⁴ For instance, firewood was a critical source of energy for cooking and heating for most of the rural households except the Goromonzi A2. Less than 30 percent of them had access to electricity compared to 77 percent in Goromonzi A2 households.

households in both districts, ostensibly because of the greater need to complement farming activities since they still face land shortages and poor agro-ecological conditions, which in turn limit the returns from farming (section 6.4.6).

Natural resource trading activities were differentiated by the occurrence of a particular resource in a locality. Alluvial gold, existing in abundance in all settlements in Kwekwe, was the most common activity amongst both the landholders and the farm workers (Table 6.17 and 6.18). But in Goromonzi, the harvesting and trading of thatching grass that was used to roof pole and dagga houses held sway among landholders. River sand trading and brick moulding were also popular among farm workers in this district. Non-farm activities attracted more casual farm labourers than their permanent colleagues (Table 6.18).

Table 6.17: Non-farm rural income activities rural households are engaged

Non-farm activities	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	A1	A2	Subtotal	CA	A1	A2	Subtotal	CA
Gold panning	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	39.2	31.6	37.6	20.4
Thatching grass	21.7	0.0	14.7	0.0	2.7	5.3	3.2	2.0
Wood carving	4.3	0.0	2.9	0.0	2.7	0.0	2.2	2.0
Tailoring	4.3	0.0	2.9	0.0	5.4	10.5	6.5	0.0
Basketry	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.6	2.7	0.0	2.2	0.0
Building	13.0	9.1	11.8	17.9	8.1	5.3	7.5	28.6
Brickmaking	13.0	0.0	8.8	21.4	1.4	0.0	1.1	32.7
Clothes vending	8.7	27.3	14.7	17.9	9.5	0.0	7.5	12.2
Carpentry	13.0	9.1	11.8	7.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.1
Transport provision	8.7	18.2	11.8	0.0	5.4	26.3	9.7	0.0
Small retail shop	8.7	18.2	11.8	7.1	10.8	15.8	11.8	4.1
Retail shop	0.0	9.1	2.9	0.0	2.7	10.5	4.3	4.1
Motor mechanics	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.1	5.3	4.3	2.0
Other activities	13.0	0.0	8.8	35.7	12.2	15.8	12.9	28.6
N	23	11	34	28	74	19	93	49

There were variances between the non-farm activities undertaken by the households across the settlement types in both districts. Fewer A1 and Communal Area households transcended natural resource trading in their non-farm activities (Table 6.7). Yet these activities were also fraught with many challenges.¹¹⁵ The A2 households were the ones mostly connected to activities that required investment of

¹¹⁵ The access to some of the natural resources such as alluvial gold and firewood are regulated by the state and requiring permits for their exploitation. Consequently, they sometimes entail skirmishes with the police and the Environmental Management Agency (EMA). Moreover informal gold mining is also a risky enterprise involving going underground in unsecured disused media and mine shafts reports of people being trapped and losing their lives are common. Violence is also common among groups competing to access alluvial gold (Mawowa 2013; Mkodzongi 2013b).

capital such as transport provision, clothes vending and operation of retail shops. This tendency unveiled by the larger farmers was not at odds with other documented observations (Reardon 1997; Hazell *et al.* 2007; Nagler & Naudé 2017), which have associated capital intensive non-farm activities to the rich class of African farmers.

Table 6.18: New non-farm livelihoods pursued by farm labourers

Non-farm labour	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	P	S	PWD	Total	P	S	PWD	Total
Gold panning	2.1	0	0	1	4.3	20	18.3	11.8
Firewood selling	1	0	2.6	1.5	1.1	0	2.8	1.5
Riversand selling	3	0	14.1	7.1	0	6.7	2.8	2.1
Wildlife harvesting	1	0	1.3	1	0	3.3	0	0.5
Wood carving	0	0	1.3	0.5	0	0	0	0
Tailoring	4	0	3.8	3.6	0	3.3	2.8	1.5
Baskerty	3	0	1.3	2	0	0	1.4	0.5
Brick moulding	3	5	19.2	9.6	1.1	0	7	3.1
Pottery	5.1	0	2.6	3.6	0	0	0	0
Beer brewing	0	0	2.6	1	0	0	0	0
Carpentry	1	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0
Handyman	14.1	0	25.6	17.3	1.1	6.7	2.8	2.6
Thatching grass	4	5	11.5	7.1	0	6.7	14.1	6.2
N	99	20	77	195	94	29	68	191

*P-permanent S-seasonal PWD – pieceworkers

Averaging between 1.3 and 2.5 persons, relatively fewer members were thus allocated to non-farm labour activities compared to farming. Women were not left out as others have intimated (Hartnack 2016), but were as much part of the non-farm labour force as men in Goromonzi resettled areas (Table 6.19). Males were the slight majority in the Communal Areas in this district. There were however striking differences in the gender distribution of non-farm family labour force in Kwekwe as women were underrepresented than in Goromonzi. As matter of fact, the gender distribution patterns in this district repeated those of hiring out farm labour. Who was involved in what activity was also gendered, as women were predominantly involved in activities such as clothes vending, tailoring, basketry and trading of thatching grass. The reverse was true for labour intensive activities such as alluvial gold mining, building, brickmaking and transport provision, which were largely the preserve of men.

The nature of gold mining, which was widespread in Kwekwe, conflicts with the reproductive roles of women since it sometimes requires temporary absence from the households for prolonged periods while “digging” for the elusive mineral. Moreover, it put women in the face of violence and sexual assault that characterise the mining

sites (Mawowa 2013; Mkodzongi 2013b). Male household heads also feared allowing their wives and daughters interacting with so many men that predominate these sites as it widens the possibilities of extra-marital relationships (EF 2017: Interview).

Table 6.19: Number of family members providing labour to non-farm activities

Gender	Goromonzi						Kwekwe										
	A1		A2		Subtotal		CA		A1		A2		Subtotal		CA		
	No. of persons		No. of persons		%		No. of persons		%		No. of persons		%		No. of persons		%
Male	25	4	29	49.2	20	54.1	80	36	116	71.2	65	65.7					
Female	23	7	30	50.8	17	45.9	35	12	47	28.8	34	34.3					
Total	48	11	59	100	37	100	115	48	163	100	99	100					
N	23	10	33		28		74		92		49						

Besides being predicated on the utilisation of only unpaid family labourers (Owusu *et al.* 2011), non-farm activities entailed wage labour relations, *albeit* observed in a limited number of households. Eight A1 households involved in non-farm activities employed wage labour for harvesting thatching grass, while four of the 11 A2 households did the same for their building and small retail shop enterprises in Goromonzi. This was counted in four A2 gold miners, two small retail shop operators and one household each in stone carving, tailoring and repair of motor vehicles in Kwekwe.¹¹⁶

6.3.3 Professional employment in towns and cities

In many parts of SSA, there has been a growing trend by the urban middle classes to invest in commercial farming on the basis of wage income from the towns and cities (Hall *et al.* 2017; Moyo 2014; Jayne, Chamberlin, Traub, Sitko, Muyanga, Yeboah, & Kachule 2016). According to the latter studies, this has given rise to the so-called “middle farms”, whose financing differ markedly from those of the peasantry (largely dependent on state subsidies and remittances) and large capitalist farms (financed from domestic and international credit). In Zimbabwe, the bidding of land by the “middle classes” employed in relatively secure and well paid civil service and private sector jobs during the FTLRP, especially in the A2 scheme, expressed this tendency. Declining conditions of work and retrenchments that coloured the urban labour

¹¹⁶ Hiring in wage labour in non-farm activities corroborates some recent research linking gold mining and farming in resettled areas (Chigumira 2018: 9). The study shows the existence of diverse forms of wage labour utilised by what are referred to as “farm-miners”, including full time and piece rate type of work remunerated either in cash or in the share of the gold mined.

markets since the late 1990s also motivated the urban working classes to seek land (Yeros 2013b; Yeros 2002; Sadomba 2008).

Moyo *et al.* (2009: 22) observed in their six district study that 19.5 percent and 34.8 percent of the land recipients in the A1 and A2 schemes respectively had their roots in the urban areas. In another study in Masvingo, urban roots were counted in 18.9 percent and 43.8 percent of the landholders of the corresponding schemes (Scoones *et al.* 2011: 976).

Table 6.20: Origins of FTLRP land beneficiaries

Origin	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	A1	A2	Total	A1	A2	Total
CA	57.9	16.2	37.3	54.9	50.8	53.9
LSCFs	3.9	1.4	2.7	8.3	4.8	7.4
Urban	36.8	79.7	58	35.2	38.1	35.9
Other*	1.3	2.7	2	1.5	6.4	2.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	76	74	150	193	63	256

*mining centres and rural growth points

This study's findings reconfirm the results of these earlier studies. Of the 76 A1 households interviewed in Goromonzi, 36.8 percent had come from urban area in contrast to 79.7 percent in the A2 sector (Table 6.20). Returns from the Kwekwe sample portrayed similar features especially in the A1 scheme. However, the overwhelming majority of the resettled households had a rural background from the Communal Areas, Old Resettlement and LSCFs, except in the A2 scheme of Goromonzi as the earlier studies cited above also showed (Table 6.20).

Wage employment in the towns and cities was maintained by some of the land beneficiaries (Table 6.21), while others also delinked from the same (section 6.3.4). The majority of the Goromonzi Communal Area landholders had the least share that held a formal job. Overall, urban employment was more common in Goromonzi compared to Kwekwe. The results did not reflect disparities between male and female landholders in formal employment patterns in the resettled areas. If anything, female landholders had a slightly higher share among their lot who were employed – 38.7 percent and 23.9 percent in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively, compared to 35.7 percent and 18.4 percent among males. Past trends of male dominated migration to urban employment (Cousins *et al.* 1992; O'Laughlin 1998; Potts 2000; Potts 2012),

were however simulated in the Communal Areas as it encompassed none of women landholders in Goromonzi and only 11.5 percent in Kwekwe.

The A2 landholders in both districts held qualitatively better managerial jobs in the private and public sectors with higher wages and benefits than the A1 landholders (Table 6.21). The majority of A1 landholders were in the lower rung of the employment ladder as junior workers in the civil and private sectors, as well as regular commissioned members of the uniformed forces (police or army).

Table 6.21: Professional employment of landholders

Current job	% of landholders							
	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	A1	A2	Total RA	CA	A1	A2	Total RA	CA
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
None	71.1	56.8	64.0	92.3	85.9	64.5	80.6	83.5
Pvt. sector managerial	3.9	20.3	12.0	1.3	0.5	9.7	2.8	0.0
Civil service managerial	7.9	18.9	13.3	0.0	2.1	19.4	6.3	4.7
Uniformed forces	5.3	1.4	3.3	1.3	2.1	1.6	2.0	1.2
Pvt. sector semi-skilled	2.6	1.4	2.0	3.8	5.2	1.6	4.3	5.9
Civil service semi-skilled	9.2	0.0	4.7	1.3	2.6	3.2	2.8	1.2
Farm worker	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.8	0.0
Other	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.4	3.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	76	74	150	78	191	62	253	85
Chi-Square	34.423				32.049			
P	0.00*				0.01*			

*Significant at $p < 0.05$

Considering the household in its entirety beyond the head, 57.3 percent of the farm units featured at least one individual in formal employment in Goromonzi. Differing patterns were evident as this characteristic was established in 66.2 percent of the A2 farms compared to 48.7 percent among the A1 landholders in this district. Fewer shares of households reported employment links in Kwekwe - 29.9 percent and 46 percent in the A1 and A2 schemes respectively. In fact, one of the major sources of employment in this district, namely the steel processing plant, ZISCOSTEEL, has been dysfunctional over the last 15 years and formal gold mining, the other dominant economic activity is capital intensive and does not absorb much labour from Kwekwe and its surrounds (MRT 2017: Interview).

No significant variation was perceptible on the number of wage employees per household across the settlement types, although the A2 farms commanded slightly higher averages of 2.1 and 1.8 members in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively

compared to 1.78 and 1.4 members in the A1 scheme. Averaging 1.76 persons, the number of wage employees in Kwekwe Communal Areas was comparable to those of the resettled areas, while a figure of 1.4 persons was recorded among the Goromonzi Communal Areas households. Except in the A1 households of Kwekwe (35.8 percent), the share of female formal employees was 42 percent or more in the remaining settlements in both district.

Table 6.22: Gender composition of formal wage employees within households

Settlement	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	No. of persons							
	Male	Female	Total	%Female	Male	Female	Total	%Female
A1	37	29	66	43.9	43	24	67	35.8
A2	43	55	98	56.1	28	27	55	49.1
Subtotal	80	84	164	51.2	71	51	122	41.8
CA	17	13	30	43.3	24	21	45	46.7

After coalescing all the (wage) labour activities (including farm, non-farm and formal), which took place beyond the household, women’s proportion of the labourers in Goromonzi were higher than in Kwekwe across all the settlement types (Table 6.23). Overall, the evidence signify a departure from the past when wage labourers were synonymous with men (O’Laughlin 1998; Potts 2000). At present, the labour markets in both town and country were populated by both sexes.

Table 6.23: Participation in all wage labour beyond the household by gender

Settlement	No. and % of persons					
	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	Male	Female	% Female	Male	Female	% Female
A1	70	66	48.5	147	70	32.3
A2	48	63	56.8	67	40	37.4
Subtotal	118	129	52.2	214	110	34.0
CA	59	51	46.4	97	62	39.0

Yet the differential levels of women’s insertion into the labour markets across the districts and within the settlement type point towards more “resistance to the proletarianisation” of women (Oya 2013: 204) in Kwekwe compared to Goromonzi. The scenario in Kwekwe echoes findings from studies conducted in Mozambique (Oya & Sender 2008) and Tanzania (Mueller 2011), which illustrate that many of the labour market participants in rural areas were men because women were blocked from leaving the household by way of operation of patriarchal relations. As such, men

wielded control over women's involvement in wider labour markets in addition to their unpaid labour (Tsikata 2009).

Stated differently, women in Goromonzi seemed to have more “bargaining power” to depart the household for the labour market than their counterparts in Kwekwe (Bryceson 1980; Torvikey *et al.* 2016). Therefore, one could argue that women in these households were increasingly capable of negotiating their way out of the household into the labour markets unlike their counterparts in the A1 and Communal Areas of Kwekwe. The greater presence of women in labour markets could be attributed to limited financial returns from farming (section 6.4.6) which demands combined efforts to meet needs such as education and health, and acquire expensive agricultural inputs, which are increasingly obtained from the markets after state subsidies were scaled down after ESAP (Mkandawire & Soludo 1999).

6.3.4 Summing up: re-peasantisation and perpetual semi-proletarianisation

In this section, a synthesis is provided on how the rural labour processes articulated above represent the reconstitution of the surveyed households through the processes of semi-proletarianisation and re-peasantisation. It is advanced that semi-proletarianisation through the combination of farming and other forms of wage labour in rural social reproduction strategies has continued in the context of the FTLRP. The discussion below illustrates that the latter, has been ongoing side-by-side to the re-peasantisation processes represented by the bidding of land by urbanites and subsequent withdrawal from the urban labour markets and centering their social reproduction around family labour based farming.

6.3.4.1 Perpetual semi-proletarianisation

Altogether, numerous combinations of farming, formal wage employment, hiring out of farm labour and non-farm rural labour activities manifested themselves in the rural households and were spread across all the settlement types in both districts (Table 6.24). Formal wage employment was frequently undertaken together with farming in the resettled areas. Goromonzi A2 households led the pack, followed by those in the same tenure category in Kwekwe. This was least encountered in the Communal Areas. Instead the hiring out of farm labour in the local markets featured more prominently in the Goromonzi Communal Areas, while non-farm rural labour activities dictated the pace in the Kwekwe. Formal wage employment and non-farm

rural labour was the second highest combination of activities reported in Goromonzi resettled areas of Goromonzi. The same position in Kwekwe was occupied by non-farm rural labour. Local rural labour markets incorporating both farming and non-farming were indicated by at least 10 percent of the Communal Area households. Many of the other combinations were cited by less than two percent of the resettled and Communal Area households in both study areas (Table 6.24).

Cumulatively, these processes were akin to the semi-proletarianisation of rural labour (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Moyo 2011a), which has continued after land reform and widely embrace a substantial number of the households. But not all the households expressed the semi-proletarian character. Besides Goromonzi A2 households, at least a third of the rest allocated family labour to farming alone (Table 6.24).

Table 6.24: Overall combinations of farming and other (wage) labour activities

Activities	Goromonzi (%)				Kwekwe (%)			
	A1	A2	Subtotal	CA	A1	A2	Subtotal	CA
FE*	30.3	54.1	42	3.8	18	33.3	21.8	15.3
NF**	9.2	2.7	6	17.9	21.1	17.5	20.2	40
HOF***	0	1.4	0.7	25.6	5.7	1.6	4.7	3.5
FE & NF	17.1	12.2	14.7	1.3	9.3	11.1	9.7	7.1
FE & HOF	0	0	0	1.3	0.5	1.6	0.8	1.2
FE, NF & HOF	1.3	0	0.7	0	0.5	0	0.4	0
HOF & NF	2.6	0	1.3	16.7	7.2	1.6	5.8	10.6
F****	39.5	29.7	34.7	33.3	37.6	33.3	36.6	22.4
Subtotal	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	76	74	150	78	194	63	257	85
Chi-Square	110.543				29.583			
p	0.000*****				0.009*****			

*FE – formal employment, **NF – non-farm activities ***HOF – hiring out farm labour ****F – farming

*****Significant at $p < 0.05$

It is however not true that diversification of family labour resources into non-farm income earning activities by these households has led to the total displacement of self-employed labour farming activities as advanced by the de-agrarianisation thesis (Bryceson 1999; Bryceson 2002; Bryceson 2000; Riggs 2006). The larger number of the household members were allocated to farming activities instead of non-farm activities and in effect provided their labour supplies in both activities, thus forming a continuum in the social reproduction of the rural households. All the households

interviewed across all the settlement models in both districts had cropped their land in the 2015/16 and 2016/17 seasons.

That non-farm incomes were increasingly occupying a significant share of the total household income was nonetheless correct, particularly for the small and poor peasants (section 6.4.6). But this has not reversed the ubiquity of the continued application of unpaid family farm labour on the small peasant plots in the A1 and Communal Areas even in the low potential agro-ecological district such as Kwekwe. There food production took place every season despite the low returns and high probabilities of crop failure (section 6.4.6). Certainly, this was related to the agrarian conditions faced by this class of farmers, with the least access to finance which in turn transformed into poor financial returns from farming inadequate to meet all their subsistence needs (section 6.4.6). In other words, the small and poor peasantries who coincidentally failed to achieve adequate financial returns from farming also had the largest share non-farm income and participants in natural resource trading. The findings, indicating a close association between the class status and non-farm rural income earning activities, imply that agrarian distress and/or risk aversion was major driver of diversification of labour resources in the sampled households (see Shivji 2017 Moyo & Yeros 2005a).

While integration in agricultural output markets was concentrated in the capitalist farms in the A2 sector, for many peasants in the A1 and Communal Areas application of family labour for own production was key for auto-consumption (section 6.4.6). These trends also submit that the classification of rural areas in Africa as littered with “fragmented classes of labour” that are “*directly or indirectly*” dependent on the wage economy for their sustenance (Bernstein 2014: S97-98; see also Bernstein 2007; 2002) could be misplaced as self-employed family labour remains key for organising social reproduction. Consequently, the conclusion that the sampled rural households were still more “*primarily agriculturalists*”, despite the diversified labour activities witnessed today (Shackleton *et al.* 2001: 34) can hardly be escaped.

Rain-fed farming predominates, since irrigation facilities were unevenly distributed amongst the surveyed households.¹¹⁷ Slack time between seasons thus availed

¹¹⁷ The average share of irrigated area to the total area cropped in the 2016/17 season, for instance was 8.48 percent, 27.1 percent and 13.51 percent among the A1, A2 and Communal Areas of Goromonzi

opportunities for the sampled households to enter non-farm labour markets (Boltvinik 2016), beyond the poor conditions of agricultural production emphasised by the deagrarianisation theorists. That non-farm rural activities attracted a substantial section of the households in the dry season should not therefore be unexpected (Table 6.25). Nearly 57 percent of the Goromonzi A1 farmers were engaged in these activities in the dry season, while the remainder were engaged throughout the year. The Goromonzi Communal Area households mirrored these patterns, so did the Kwekwe A1 and Communal areas.

Table 6.25: Time when non-farm rural income activities are done

Time	% of households							
	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	A1	A2	Total RA	CA	A1	A2	Total RA	CA
All year round	43.5	90.0	57.6	42.9	36.5	77.8	44.6	55.1
Rainy season	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.6	1.4	0.0	1.1	2.0
Dry season	56.5	10.0	42.4	60.7	67.6	33.3	60.9	59.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	23	10	33	28	74	18	92	49

Divergent patterns were noticeable from the A2 households in Goromonzi and Kwekwe through the dominance of all year round activities. Moreover, this was possible because of the dependency on hired in labour for farming activities, the allocation of labour throughout the whole year to non-farm rural activities does not conflict with their farming as it would in the A1 and Communal Areas.

6.4.3.2 Land reform and re-peasantisation

After colonial land dispossession, peasants were left with minimal room to craft their livelihoods outside of the capital-wage labour relation (Palmer 1977; Bush & Cliffe 1984; Neocosmos 1993), and this absence of alternatives for social reproduction undermined their “bargaining power” in the labour markets for better working conditions (Arrighi 1970). The latter also known as “market based bargaining power” (Silver 2003: 13) for it increases if workers have alternative non-wage forms of labour

respectively. The shares were lower in Kwekwe - 3.15 percent, 15.9 percent and 9.17 percent correspondingly. The access to irrigation was skewed towards the A2 farm households, since they are the ones who mostly inherited the infrastructure left over by the former LSCFs (Binswanger-Mkhize & Moyo 2012).

to centre their livelihoods upon. Turning this around, it could therefore be equally argued that land reform by enlarging land access has provided the peasantry with an alternative social reproduction path outside the capital-wage labour relation. Furthermore, it has thus restored the peasantry's ability to withdraw from the labour markets and increased their "market based bargaining power" in the same.

Beneath the flows of urbanites to rural areas (Table 6.20), the data revealed interesting patterns of delinking from the labour markets by some landholders after getting access to land during the FTLRP akin to the process of "re-peasantisation" (Moyo & Yeros 2005; Moyo 2011a; Moyo *et al.* 2013; van der Ploeg 2013; van den Berg *et al.* 2016; see also Chapter Two). This was more widely recognised amongst the Kwekwe A1 landholders. Out of the 86 landholders who were formally employed by the year 2000, 79 had subsequently left their jobs after receiving land allocations. On a reduced scale, 22 of the 44 A1 landholders in Goromonzi followed suit. The A2 landholders also exited the formal labour markets in a similar fashion – enumerated in 29 of the 51 Kwekwe landholders and 28 of the 59 Goromonzi landholders. Considering the average age of the landholders was around 55 years, most of them were thus below the retirement age of 65 years in most occupations in Zimbabwe as enshrined in the labour statutes. Since over 17 years has lapsed since the FTLRP unravelled, many land beneficiaries would have received land in their early 40's and had thus at least 20 years of work life left in them.

Even within the Communal Areas, as the economic decline proceeded apace, 23 of the 28 landholders in Goromonzi had also discontinued employment, and six of the 20 landholders in Kwekwe did the same. These patterns were of course influenced by the hyperinflation that had made wages worthless by 2008 (Kanyenze *et al.* 2011; Yeros 2013b), as well as retrenchments that persisted in the 2000s as institutions faltered under the weight of economic decline (Muchichwa 2016). It was also equally true that some of the disengagements from formal employment were voluntary as access to FTLRP land provided an alternative route to subsist (Moyo *et al.* 2009; Chigumira 2018).

The dynamic relationships that landholders had with the labour markets challenge widely held assumptions of the tendencies of labour to permanently divest away from farming towards other non-farm based activities, including wage employment

espoused in the de-agrarianisation thesis (Bryceson 1997; 2000; Riggs 2006). Instead of the movement of labour from “farm to factory” as the only route perceived by these studies drawing on Lewisian dual models of economic transformation (see also World Bank 2013), the field research demonstrates that the reverse is equally true, when urban labour markets become unstable, access to land provides an escape route. Rather than being “permanent” or causing total severing of links with the countryside (Petras & Veltmeyer 2001), rural-urban migration can indeed be overturned. The trajectories of semi-proletarianisation and repeasantisation, which can take place concurrently (Moyo & Yeros 2005b) as the data shows cannot be foreclosed (O’Laughlin 2002), influenced as they are by the socio-economic conditions obtaining in both town and country.

6.4 AGRICULTURAL LABOUR AND CLASS DIFFERENTIATION

The previous section outlined the different sources of farm labour which were being utilised by the A1, A2 and Communal Area landholders. It was discerned that the organisation of production around the use of family was on the rise following the FTLRP, while hired in wage labour still exists and applied in variegated combinations in the diverse farming units. Additionally, the labour from within the families of some of the landholders was also hired out to other farming units and beyond. The purpose of this section is to interrogate to what extent the use of labour amongst the farm households was fuelling class differentiation, if any, and how this translates into the various production relations.

Various criteria have been employed to gauge the incipient class differentiation in the resettled areas in the aftermath of the FTLRP. Moyo (2011a) estimated the broad agrarian class structure based on land sizes at the national level (see Chapter Five). A tri-modal agrarian structure embracing the peasantry, small-to-middle and large capitalist farms was thus conceived, differentiated by capital endowments, farm labour utilisation and other socio-economic characteristics (gender, educational levels, employment etc.) as noted earlier (Chapter Five). However, the latter did not examine the precise dynamics of how this class differentiation, especially the trajectories of agricultural production and labour relations, are articulated at the local level due to micro-level data limitations. Yet, land reform as the patterns emerging from the two districts exemplify (see Chapter Five) was not uniformly implemented

nationally and the diverse socio-economic characteristics and agro-ecological specificities at the local level suggest variation in rural class formation.

Moyo *et al.* (2009) used data from a 2089-sample household survey to attempt a multivariate classification of land reform beneficiaries. An array of socio-economic factors set apart the five classes of farmers delineated by the latter study, including size of the landholdings, access to capital, gender, marriage, commodities produced, linkage to urban wage employment and forms of labour utilised. Their analysis, as the researchers acknowledged, was weakened by income and farming outputs data constraints. Quite crucially, labour relations entailed in each of these groups were not discussed in depth beyond the broad use of either permanent and/or casual labour. The analysis did not pay attention to the family farm labour relations characterising the groups within and without their agricultural production units.

Others have also applied livelihoods diversification strategies of the farm households to classify rural households in resettled areas (Scoones *et al.* 2010; Scoones *et al.* 2011; Scoones 2015b). The various farm classes are therefore indicated by the extent to which households combine farming and the diverse local and extra-local off-farm activities. That too is incomplete to understanding of the application of the different combinations of the forms of hired in labour and family labour within and without the agricultural production units and the subsequent production relations generated.

Overall, inadequate research attention has been paid to how farm labour utilisation influences the differentiation witnessed in the countryside today. More specifically, there is limited understanding of the in-depth variations of the production relations between family labour based forms of organisation of agricultural production units and those dependent on the use of hired in labour. Yet, farm labour utilisation is a key proxy of class formation, distinguishing households into capitalist farms and differentiated peasantries according to the extent to which they exploit the labour of others in their farming units (Patnaik 1996; Jha 1996; Moyo 2014). In turn, the production relations in capitalist and peasant households are substantially different in terms of the asset endowments, land uses, farm production technologies and income returns from farming.

Against this background, a set of labour variables from the farm household survey data, which indicate the character of farm labour utilisation, were deployed to group the households into distinct groups using two-stage cluster analysis in the SPSS (see Chapter Three). The categorical variables used in the classification included whether households hired in wage labour, hired out wage labour and involvement of family labour in the household's farming unit. Additionally, the continuous variables used measured the total number of labour days hired in from both permanent and casual labourers employed by the households. Taken together, these variables indicate the extent to which the farm households relied on the labour of others from outside their families to organise their agricultural production.

The statistical analysis generated four groups of farm households, which were classified as rich peasants-to-capitalist, middle peasants, small peasants and poor peasantry approximating the character of differentiated classes defined by Patnaik (1996; see also Table 3.7). This enabled the cross-tabulation of the farm classes detected from the cluster analysis and various production relations, including land use, input utilisation, structure of agricultural productive asset endowments and returns to labour. Before discussing these results, the character of the farm classes are elaborated below.

6.4.1 Emerging farmer classes according to labour utilisation

Overall, the households from the survey sample were distributed as follows; rich peasants-to-capitalist farms (16.3 percent); middle peasants (41.2 percent), small peasants (27.7 percent) and poor peasants (14.7 percent) (Table 6.26). The labour utilisation trends inherent in these classes of farm households are discussed in what follows.

Table 6.26: Distribution of farmer classes by settlement type

Farmer class	A1		A2		CA		Total		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
rich peasants-to-capitalist	24	8.9	68	49.6	1	0.6	93	16.3	
middle peasant	150	55.6	56	40.9	29	17.8	235	41.2	
small peasants	63	23.3	9	6.6	86	52.8	158	27.7	
poor peasants	33	12.2	4	2.9	47	28.8	84	14.7	
Total	270	100	137	100	163	100	570	100.0	
Chi-Square								259.122	
p								0.000*	

*Significant at $p < 0.05$)

“Rich peasants-to-capitalist farms”

This group of rich peasants-to-capitalist farms was marked by their dependency on hired in labour for their agricultural enterprises (Table 6.27). By its definition, it was a mixture of households that exclusively relied on hired in farm wage labour, constituting the capitalist farms, and those which still depended on wage labour but also contributed family labour to their production units. To be specific, the rich peasants accounted for only 8.6 percent in this class category. Yet family labour contributions were a pale shadow in comparison to the contributions of hired labour. The quantum of wage workers recruited by this class set it apart from the remaining classes of households. The inputs of hired workers in terms of mean labour days in the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms were significantly higher than all the other groups.

Table 6.27: Characteristics of emerging farmer classes*

	rich peasants-to-capitalist	middle peasant	small peasant	poor peasants	Total
Labour days					
Permanent	1532.38 _a	148.72 _b	0 _c	2.7 _c	311.44
Casual	545.06 _a	93.27 _b	0 _c	15.35 _c	129.58
Total hired labour	2077.44 _a	241.98 _b	0 _c	18.05 _c	441.03
No. of permanent workers	5.84 _a	1.00 _b	0.0 _c	0.02 _c	1.37
No. casual workers	24.84 _a	6.45 _b	0 _c	1.46 _c	6.93
Family	38.06 _a	301.81 _b	277.73 _b	296.15 _b	251.36
Family hired out	0 _a	0 _a	0 _a	40.9 _b	6.02
N	93	236	158	84	571

*There is significant difference at $p < 0.05$ if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the same row are dissimilar.

Compared to the middle peasants, which follow after it in terms of the quantum of labour days hired in, the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms were characterised by at least 10 times more labour days hired in both permanent and casual labour. This class of farmers hired out no family labour to other farm households.

“Middle peasant farms”

Still hiring in farm wage labour, the middle peasant farms had a substantial contribution of family labour into their farming units (Table 6.27). In fact, the family labour inputs were slightly higher than the total number of labour days hired in from permanent and casual labour. Furthermore, the use of family labour, constituted a

point of difference with the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms and was significantly higher in the middle peasant farms than the later. All the households in this class utilised family labour in varying degrees on their farms. On average, middle peasant farms hired one permanent worker and 6.45 casual labourers during the 2016/17 season observed. The hired in labour differentiates it from the small and poor peasant households, as there was no significant difference with the latter in the application of family labour. Similar to the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms, this class category was not immersed into farm labour markets as sellers of labour to other farm households.

“Small peasant farms”

This class category neither hired in nor hired out of farm wage labour (Table 6.27). Family labour was solely exploited in the agricultural production units. Except for the rich peasant-to-capitalist farms, the number of family labour days utilised by the small peasant farms were not significantly different with the other class categories.

“Poor peasant farms”

The group characterised as “poor peasant farms” does not fit in neatly into the classical conceptions of those whose labour is primarily exploited by others (Patnaik 1996; Moyo & Yeros 2005). Contradicting tendencies of labour hiring in and hiring out were simultaneous observed in this class (Table 6.27). Yet a key feature of this class category was that all the households sold farm labour to other households, which is associated with the poor peasantry (Patnaik 1996; Oya & Pontara 2015; Jha 2015). This distinguished it from the rest of the classes discerned that did not hire out farm labour (Table 6.27). Nonetheless, the number of permanent and casual labour days hired in by 31 percent in this group, were so low compared to the labour hiring classes of rich peasants-to-capitalist and the middle peasant farms and were not statistically significantly different from those of the small peasant households (Table 6.27).

The patterns of hiring in and out of farm wage labour discussed above (Section 6.2) demonstrated a strong relationship precisely with the settlement type and district and/or agro-ecological location of the farm households. Consequently, the classes of farm households identified from the two-stage cluster analysis were also significantly associated with the settlement type. The A2 farm households, which were most active, in the recruitment of hired in labour, dominated the rich peasants-to-capitalist class category, while the majority of those in the A1 were located in the middle peasant

class (Table 6.26). Divergent patterns characterised the Communal Area farm households, with the majority of them located in the small and poor peasant class categories reflecting their dependency on the exploitation of the labour from within their families. This reinforces the possibilities provided by enlarged land access through the FTLRP as the new peasantries from the A1 scheme were better represented in the labour hiring classes than the old peasantry from the Communal Areas (Table 6.26). Therefore, the land tenure cum the land size is a strong determinant of labour use in the rural areas.

Table 6.28: Distribution of farmer classes by district

Farmer class	Goromonzi		Kwekwe		Total	
	No	%	No.	%	No.	%
Rich peasants-to-capitalist	68	29.7	25	7.3	93	16.3
Middle peasant	76	33.2	160	46.8	236	41.3
Small peasants	47	20.5	111	32.5	158	27.7
Poor peasants	38	16.6	46	13.5	84	14.7
Total	229	100	342	100	571	100
Chi-Square	56.309					
p	0.00*					

*Significant at $p < 0.05$.

By district, the farm households, located in Goromonzi, had the highest share of the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms compared to those in Kwekwe (Table 6.28). The latter district, had most of the landholders falling in the middle and small peasant class categories. Again, this provided further evidence of the unevenness in the development of farm labour markets according to the agro-ecological patterns, which in turn impact on the land uses and agricultural production (see Section 6.2).

Table 6.29: Distribution of farmer classes by gender of land owner

Farmer class	Male		Female		Total	
	No	%	No	%	No	%
Rich peasants-to-capitalist	77	17.4	16	12.4	93	16.3
Middle peasant	196	44.3	40	31	236	41.3
Small peasants	102	23.1	56	43.4	158	27.7
Poor peasants	67	15.2	17	13.2	84	14.7
Total	442	100	129	100	571	100
Chi-Square	21.028					
p	0.00*					

*Significant at $p < 0.05$.

Although both male and female landholders were represented in all the farm classes, the disadvantaged position of the latter was apparent in their low shares in the labour hiring classes compared to the former (Table 6.29). The largest proportion of women

was located in the small peasant class category, which neither hired in nor hired out farm wage labour. In contrast, the middle peasantry housed the majority of the male landholders (Table 6.29). Capitalist farmers, like in the former LSCFs, were mainly male landholders as females remain marginalised in accessing resources including land and finance to make the transition (Gaidzanwa 1994; Rugube *et al.* 2003). Although the FTLRP made significant strides in availing land to more women in their own right than previously existing in the Communal Areas, LSCFs and Old Resettlement Areas (Mutopo 2013; 2011; Chingarande 2008), these findings demonstrate that agricultural subsidy policies underserved them by not availing finance and other productive resources to fully utilise their land resources. As will be seen below, the class status of farm households deduced according to the labour utilisation trends were also reflected through the domination of the labour hiring classes in the production relations.

6.4.2 Land use, agricultural production and labour use

As should be clear by now, land sizes were crucial in the determination of labour hiring patterns but by no means the only factor as various inputs are required to make it productive (Cousins 2009). The arable land owned by the rich peasant-to-capitalist farms was nonetheless significantly higher compared to the rest of the classes (Table 6.30). Middle peasants owned the second largest arable land, which was significantly higher than that of the small peasantry but statistically not different from those of the poor peasantry. Small and poor peasants did not reflect any variation in the arable land sizes owned.

Table 6.30: Arable land owned and utilisation patterns

Land	rich peasants-to-capitalist	middle peasant	small peasants	poor peasants	Total
Arable (Ha)	43.57 _a	10.97 _b	4.58 _c	5.36 _{b,c}	13.68
Cropped (Ha)	23.26 _a	4.59 _b	1.80 _c	2.23 _{b,c}	6.51
Percent utilisation	60.18 _a	59.16 _a	45.20 _b	47.21 _b	53.71
N	93	236	158	84	571

*There is significant difference at $p < 0.05$ if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the same row are dissimilar.

The larger arable land sizes owned by the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms translated to larger land areas cropped when juxtaposed against the other farm classes (Table 6.30). The labour hiring classes had superior land utilisation rates, measured as the

percentage of the total area cropped in the 2016/17 season over the total arable land owned matched to those in the small and poor peasantry (Table 6.30).

The different classes produced a diverse range of food and cash and/or export crop commodities. Maize production was pervasive across all the farmer classes (Table 6.31). Put differently, the cultivation of this staple crop was not associated with the class status of the farm households. However, not unexpectedly, the production of the other food and cash crops exhibited a significant association with the class status. Rich peasants-to-capitalist farms as theoretically assigned to “capitalist farms” were dominant in the production of cash crops (Moyo 2014; Torvikey *et al.* 2017; Hall *et al.* 2017) represented here by wheat, tobacco, soyabean and sugarbeans to some extent.

Indeed, the share of the farm households involved in the production of these crops reduced significantly from the labour hiring classes to the family labour dependent categories of small and poor peasants. These commodities were also demanding in terms of the expensive input requirements and therefore also point to the variation in the access to financial resource as discussed below (section 6.4.4).

Table 6.31: Crop commodities produced

Crop	% of households					Chi-Square	p
	rich peasants-to-capitalist	middle peasant	small peasants	poor peasants	Total		
Maize	94.6	98.3	93.7	95.2	96	6.042	0.11
Wheat	5.4	1.7	0	0	1.6	12.554	0.006*
Cotton	0	0	1.3	0	0.4	5.246	0.155
Tobacco	39.8	7.2	0.6	0	9.6	122.393	0.00*
Groundnuts	34.4	53	42.4	46.4	46.1	10.466	0.015*
Millet	0	1.3	0.6	3.6	1.2	5.433	0.143
Sorghum	2.2	18.2	26.6	17.9	17.9	23.856	0.00*
Rapoko	0	1.3	3.2	0	1.4	6.106	0.107
Sunflower	1.1	5.9	3.2	4.8	4.2	4.5	0.212
Soyabeans	34.4	5.9	0.6	1.2	8.4	101.621	0.00*
Sweetpotatoes	7.5	8.5	3.8	9.5	7.2	4.015	0.26
Sugarbeans	23.7	16.5	2.5	4.8	12.1	33.914	0.00*
Cowpeas	3.2	7.6	8.2	15.5	8.2	9.036	0.029*
Roundnuts	1.1	26.3	19.6	33.3	21.4	33.617	0.00*
N	93	236	158	84	571		

*significant at 0.05 level

Food crops, which are primarily grown for own consumption, on the other hand, were more prominent outside the rich peasant-to-capitalist farms, including groundnuts,

sorghum, cowpeas and roundnuts (Table 6.31). Excluding groundnuts, less than five percent of the rich peasant-to-capitalist farms produced these commodities more commonly located in the other classes. Additionally, compared to the cash crops dominated the labour hiring classes, the formal markets for the food crops (outside of maize) are relatively underdeveloped and trading mostly occurs through the informal markets (see Sitko, Moyo, Butamauchó & Meyer 2012).¹¹⁸

As highlighted in Section 6.4.5, the level of integration into different commodity markets was differentiated and again closely related to the class status. Quite crucially, these crops were also not prioritised by the seed industry that develops high yielding seed varieties for the other “commercialised” crops and were largely produced using seed retained by the farmers (see section 6.4.3). The crop diversity index was significantly higher in the rich peasants-to-capitalist (0.41) and the poor peasants (0.42) compared to the middle (0.32) and small peasants (0.28).¹¹⁹

Table 6.32: Livestock produced

Livestock	rich peasants-to-capitalist	middle peasant	small peasants	poor peasants	Total	Chi-Square	p
Cattle	80.6	77.5	56.3	47.6	67.8	42.465	0.00*
Goats	50.5	62.7	57	64.3	59.4	5.322	0.15
Sheep	8.6	6.8	0.6	1.2	4.6	13.973	0.003*
Donkeys	0	5.9	1.9	2.4	3.3	9.415	0.024*
Pigs	1.1	0.4	0.6	0	0.5	1.063	0.786
Rabbits	1.1	3.4	2.5	0	2.3	3.921	0.27
Free range chicken	83.9	87.7	79.7	82.1	84.1	4.776	0.189
Broiler chicken	4.3	6.4	1.9	1.2	4	6.929	0.074
Layers chicken	0	1.3	1.3	0	0.9	2.266	0.519
Turkey	0	8.5	5.1	4.8	5.6	9.397	0.024*
Guinea fowls	1.1	6.4	10.8	3.6	6.3	10.677	0.014*
N	93	236	158	84	571		

*significant at 0.05 level

¹¹⁸ Estimates provided by the World Bank (2015b:14) showed that less than 12 percent of the small grains produced, for instance, were traded on both the formal and informal markets

¹¹⁹ The index provides an indication of the diversity of crop production within agricultural production units and its measurement is obtained as follows $CDI_i = 1 - \sum (a_{ij}/A_i)^2$ where CDI_i = crop diversity index; a_{ij} = area cropped to j^{th} crop in the i^{th} location; $\sum_{j=1}^n A_i$ = total area cropped for all crops (Shahidullah *et al.* 2006 cited in Chambati 2017:107). The production of a single crop returns a CDI_i of zero and with production of multiple crops the index approaches one.

Likewise, production of particular types of livestock was also coloured by the class dynamics. The share of households owning cattle, the most important livestock in rural areas in terms of its income value and wider socio-cultural functions (Sibanda & Khombe 2006), declined substantially in the small and poor peasantries to the levels observed in the rich peasants-to-capitalist and middle peasant farms (Table 6.32). Accordingly, the average number of cattle owned declined from 21 in the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms to three among the poor peasantries. Sheep production was largely confined to the labour hiring classes. Dissimilar patterns were noted with respect to donkeys, which are primarily kept for providing traction power in the farming systems of the peasantries. None of the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms kept this animal, but was seen in the remaining classes although at limited proportions of less than six percent of the households (Table 6.32). Patterns in turkeys and guinea fowls production also exhibited analogous trends to the production of donkeys and were not found in the capitalist class. Again, these types of livestock together with free-range chicken are principally produced to provide food for the farming families, notwithstanding their thin formal markets.

6.4.3 Capital intensity and labour utilisation

The relationship between capital intensity (indicated by the extent of use of modern inputs and machinery, production of cash/export commodities, as well as use of other capital demanding technologies such as irrigation) and labour utilisation preoccupies the discussion that follows. In general, the results discussed below indicate significant association between these two broad variables. Specifically, as the use of hired in labour declined, so did the application of the various capital intensive agricultural inputs.

6.4.3.1 Input utilisation

Inequalities were also apparent in the utilisation of various modern production technologies in the differentiated farming classes. Contingent upon access to capital, the application of productivity enhancing inputs such as high yielding variety (HYV) seeds, inorganic fertilisers and agro-chemicals were concentrated in the hired in labour dependent class (Table 6.33). Reduced percentage shares of the use of these inputs was evident as the dependence of hired in labour declined. The small and poor

peasants, in particular, had the lowest proportion of households that applied modern inputs to their farms.

Table 6.33: Crop input utilisation

Input	% of households					Chi-Square	p
	rich peasants-to-capitalists	middle peasant	small peasants	poor peasants	Total		
HYVs	94.6	96.6	93.7	88.1	94.2	8.378	0.039*
Fertiliser	89.2	83.9	58.9	70.2	75.8	43.776	0.00*
Manure	2.2	16.5	12	11.9	12.3	12.846	0.005*
Pesticide	68.8	22.9	3.2	2.4	21.9	171.001	0.00*
Herbicide	78.5	30.5	7.6	4.8	28.2	172.742	0.00*
N	93	236	158	84	571		

*Significant at $p < 0.05$ level

Stark differences were seen in herbicide and pesticide use. Herbicide use in crop production, which was reported by 78.5 percent of the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms, recorded a massive drop to 30.5 percent of the middle peasants (Table 6.33). These trends persisted in the small and poor peasantry since only 7.6 percent and 4.8 percent deployed this input respectively (Table 6.33). Although not as unevenly distributed like in the other input categories, the utilisation of inorganic fertiliser was still frequently visible in the rich peasants-to-capitalist and middle peasant farms than it was in the remaining classes. To the contrary, manure use way more associated with the family labour based farm classes (Table 6.33). Instead of being purchased on the market, manure was harvested from their animals and applied to the fields as a “substitute” to the expensive inorganic fertilisers. Not only did the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms have noticeably larger proportions amongst their lot who applied these modern technologies, the quantities applied were also superior and showed up in the consequent agricultural labour productivity (section 6.4.6).

Table 6.34: Areas cropped under HYV, irrigation and cash crops

Farmer class	% of total area cropped			N
	HYV	Irrigated	Cash crops	
Rich peasants-to-Capitalist	83.21 _a	28.78 _a	29.2 _a	93
Middle peasant	68.18 _b	7.08 _b	9.41 _b	236
Small peasants	71.63 _b	7.35 _b	6.62 _b	158
Poor peasants	57.18 _c	7.61 _b	8.15 _b	84
Total	69.86	10.6 _g	11.6	571

*There is significant difference at $p < 0.05$ if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the same column are dissimilar.

Notwithstanding the high adoption rates of HYV seeds in Zimbabwe (Table 6.34; see also Mashingaidze 2006), small grains (rapoko and millets) and pulses (cow peas and roundnuts) seeds lack this technology and rely on seed retained by farmers from the previous season. The production of these crops, which was frequently reported by small and poor peasants, also reflected on the percent shares of the area cropped under improved seed varieties to the total area cultivated in the season observed (Table 6.34). A gradual decline was noticeable on the average percent area planted to HYVs, from the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms to the poor peasantries (Table 6.34).

Irrigation, another capital intensive technology, featured more prominently in the rich peasants-to-capitalist farmers. In fact this class, significantly commanded up to four times the percent share of land cultivated under irrigation to the total area under crops during the 2016/17 season (Table 6.34). No significant differences were observed among the remaining classes of agricultural producers.

6.4.3.2 Structures of agricultural productive assets

The agricultural productive asset owned by the sampled farm households also displayed the expected tendencies, which characterise capitalist and peasant farms in so far as the deployment of capital and labour intensive technologies in the organisation of production. For the peasantries, productive asset ownership was skewed towards labour intensive animal drawn machinery rather than modern machinery (Table 6.35).

The opposite was true for the hired in labour reliant class, who had higher percent shares owning the capital intensive modern machinery such as tractors, motor vehicles and water pumps compared to animal drawn assets. The ownership of various farm buildings and infrastructures was also not immune to the class status. In general, the proportion of farm households possessing these assets were lowest in the poor peasants and highest in the rich peasants-to-capitalist category. Once more, the disparities in ownership between the capitalist and peasant classes were wide for capital intensive farm infrastructure such as boreholes and tobacco barns (Table 6.35).

Table 6.35: Ownership of productive agricultural assets

Asset	% of households					Chi-Square	p
	Rich peasants-to-capitalist	Middle peasant	Small peasants	Poor peasants	Total		
Animal drawn							
Scotch cart	31.2	64	39.2	34.5	47.5	45.639	0.000*
Plough	51.6	82.2	65.8	51.2	68.1	44.698	0.000*
Planter	8.6	3.4	1.9	2.4	3.7	8.232	0.041*
Ridger	5.4	5.9	1.3	0	3.7	9.945	0.019*
Cultivator	20.4	36.9	19.6	16.7	26.4	22.814	0.000*
Ripper	7.5	2.1	1.3	1.2	2.6	10.789	0.013*
Harrow	34.4	39.4	20.9	19	30.5	21.6	0.000*
Modern machinery							
Motor vehicle	79.6	38.6	7.6	3.6	31.5	177.181	0.000*
Generator	62.4	29.2	12	8.3	26.8	92.873	0.000*
Tractor	52.7	9.7	0.6	1.2	13	163.887	0.000*
Water pump	60.2	27.1	11.4	4.8	24.9	96.36	0.000*
Combine harvester	1.1	0	0	0	0.2	5.149	0.161
Farm building and infrastructure							
Borehole	47.3	15.7	1.9	2.4	15.1	107.637	0.000*
Deep well	54.8	33.1	24.7	29.8	33.8	24.937	0.000*
Cattle pens	69.9	58.1	43.7	31	52	34.691	0.000*
Pigsties	4.3	3.4	3.2	1.2	3.2	1.505	0.681
Poultry runs	82.8	72.9	65.2	73.8	72.5	9.27	0.026*
Tobacco barns	40.9	11.9	0	1.2	11.7	106.201	0.000*
Greenhouse	4.3	0.4	0	0	0.9	15.265	0.002*
N	93	236	158	84	571		

*Significant at $p < 0.05$

Given these ownership patterns, it should thus be anticipated that values of the different types of assets of the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms would significantly outpace those of the rest of the farm classes (Table 6.36). A configuration of falling values of assets was lucid as one moved from the rich peasants-to-capitalist to the poor peasantry (Table 6.36).

Table 6.36: Average value of agricultural productive assets (US\$)

Asset type	rich peasants-to-capitalist	middle peasant	small peasants	poor peasants	Total
Modern machinery	13681.44 _a	4697.50 _b	522.91 _c	217.14 _c	4346.49
Animal drawn	1523.99 _a	1038.79 _{a,b}	365.11 _b	326.62 _{b,c}	826.64
Farm buildings	5698.65 _a	2337.63 _b	162.64 _c	165.02 _c	1963.6
Livestock	11151.58 _a	5742.42 _b	2149.03 _c	1470.14 _c	5000.61
Modern machinery per Ha	932.55 _a	856.07 _a	458.03 _{a,b}	76.84 _b	643.27
Household	6126.59 _a	2361.93 _b	624.19 _c	576.10 _c	2231.53
N	93	236	158	84	571

*There is significant difference at $p < 0.05$ if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the same row are dissimilar.

More pointedly, there was a sharp decline in the asset values between the middle and small peasant classes. The values of capital intensive modern machinery, nevertheless, best exemplifies the dissimilarities between the classes on the opposite

poles. Indeed, within the hired in labour dependent class, the value of modern machinery was in excess of 62 times that of the poor peasantry (Table 6.36).

Yet it was on the structure of the agricultural productive assets or the shares of the values of the different asset type in the total value of asset that the qualitative differences between capitalist farms and the peasantry manifested vividly. Livestock appropriated over 63 percent of the total value of assets for the small and poor peasantries, while modern machinery accounted for the least percent share (Table 6.37).

Modern machinery, constituted the largest percent share of the productive assets of the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms as expected (Table 6.37). Still with livestock assets dominant, the percent share of modern machinery in middle peasants was second to that of the latter class and significantly different to those observed in small and poor peasantries (Table 6.37). While the percent share of farm buildings exhibited no significant difference across the classes, small and poor peasants had significantly higher percent shares of the ox-drawn machinery than the other two classes.

Table 6.37: Structure of productive farm assets

Asset type	% of total value of productive farm assets				
	rich peasants-to-capitalist	middle peasant	small peasants	poor peasants	Total
Modern machinery	41.1 _a	20.59 _b	7.04 _c	3.16 _c	17.62
Animal drawn machinery	5.75 _a	11 _a	13.8 _b	12.8 _b	11.19
Farm buildings	17.29 _a	13.14 _a	12.55 _a	15.98 _a	14.07
Livestock	33.7 _a	54 _b	63.44 _c	65.67 _c	55.02
N	93	236	158	84	571

*There is significant difference at $p < 0.05$ if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the same row are dissimilar.


6.4.4 Access to financial resources

Evidently, it was the access to financial resources, which originated the variances in the production relations of the farm classes considered above. After 2000, farmers accessed financial resources to invest into their agricultural production units from a variety of sources, including personal savings from wage income, state subsidy programmes, reinvestment of farm profits and private credit (Moyo *et al.* 2009; Moyo & Nyoni 2013; Scoones *et al.* 2010; Scoones 2015; Shonhe 2017; Hanlon *et al.* 2013). Because state support and private credit were limited (Mazwi & Muchetu 2015;

Binswanger-Mhkize & Moyo 2012), self-mobilised financial resources have been crucial in propelling production for most of the post-land reform years.

Consequently, it should not be unforeseen that current and past formal wage employment connections of the landholders were closely associated with class status of the farm households (Figure 6.5). Close to 55 percent of the rich peasant-to-capitalist were currently employed in non-farm professional jobs and the proportion tumbled to 21.4 percent among the middle peasants. Further declines were recorded in the small and poor peasants. The same pattern was also replicated in terms of previous professional employment amongst those who were not holding a current formal job. Rich peasants-to-capitalist farmers were more likely to have been previously employed than poor peasants (Figure 6.5).

Figure 6.5: Previous and current formal professional non-farm employment



Current formal professional non-farm employment, Chi-Square=62.077, p=0.000*

Previous formal professional non-farm employment, Chi-Square=45.326, p=0.000*


*Significant at p< 0.05

The positions held by the landholders from the different farm classes were qualitatively different and thus the wage incomes earned. Certainly, managerial jobs, which earn higher wage incomes, were pervasive amongst the rich peasants-to-capitalist farmers than all the other classes (Figure 6.6). Small and poor peasants were predominantly in self-employed and semi-skilled jobs, while the majority of middle peasants held managerial jobs.

The differentiation of production relations of semi-proletarian households on the basis of the quality of jobs held in the urban labour markets exposed in the Communal Areas in the 1990s, which in turn influenced the disposable income to invest in own farming (Mazambani 1994; O’Laughlin 1998; Potts & Mutambirwa 1990) also

characterised FTLRP land beneficiaries. As seen here, the studies cited above demonstrated that semi-proletarians in the Communal Areas who held qualitatively better jobs were characterised by hiring in of farm wage labour, superior agricultural production outcomes and asset structures than their counterparts in lower level formal employment or not connected to the urban labour markets. Recent studies in Africa have also illuminated the influence of formal employment in the transformation underway in the countryside today. Jayne *et al.* (2015) associate the growing middle capitalist farms in Ghana and Zambia with investments underwritten by urban wage income and/or pensions. In similar vein, Hall *et al.* (2017) illustrate how the diversity of scale in the middle capitalist coffee farms was contingent upon off-farm incomes and/or urban wage incomes that enabled recruitment of hired in labour.

Figure 6.6: Current types of jobs held landholders




Chi-Square=61.74, p=0.00 (significant at p<0.05).

The state land tenures offered to the land beneficiaries have not been acceptable to private financial institutions as collateral (Moyo 2007), and to access loans from banks other forms of assets were being mortgaged, including houses owned in towns or securitisation through wage income. It was not until February 2018 that an agreement between the Bankers Association of Zimbabwe (BAZ) and the state had been reached for lending to proceed on the basis of the 99-year leases issued to A2 farming units was reported in the media.¹²⁰ Together with wage employment, urban connections and/or urban assets have therefore been key in enlisting for agricultural credit facilities with various private financial institutions. Again, the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms exhibited the strongest linkage to urban areas (Figure. 6.7). Certainly, the class status was associated with the origin of the land beneficiaries, with declining proportions of urbanites and simultaneous rise of those who came from the

¹²⁰ See “99-year leases now bankable, transferable”, The Herald 8 February 2018, Harare, <https://www.herald.co.zw/99-year-leases-now-bankable-transferable/> [Accessed on 17 May 2018].

Communal Areas as the dependency on wage labour decreased amongst the farm classes (Figure 6.7).

Figure 6.7: Origin of FTLRP beneficiaries by class status




Chi-Square=97.248, p=0.00 (significant at p<0.05).

Then it also followed that rich peasants-to-capitalist farms had the majority who accessed agricultural credit from banks between 2015 and 2017 (Figure 6.8). The now familiar pattern of reduction in the percent share in the remaining farm classes was also replicated here. Access to another source of agricultural credit through contract farming schemes offered by private agribusiness companies portrayed similar trends in the distribution of beneficiaries amongst the farm classes (Figure 6.8). Though present in both the peasantry (cotton, tea and horticulture) and the LSCFs (sugarcane and horticulture) (Masakure 2003; Sachikonye 2016; World Bank 2012; Scoones 2014) prior to the FTLRP, post-2000, contract farming has experienced exponential growth in tobacco farming, which as seen above, featured prominently in the rich peasants-to-capitalist farmers.¹²¹ Not as widespread, the other crops that integrated some of the sampled farm households into private contract farming included soyabeans, sorghum and wheat. The urban connections of the capitalist class, were important not only in accessing the private domestic and international agribusiness companies who were mostly located in the major urban centres to negotiate contracts, but also in terms of possessing urban assets that some of the companies required as collateral (Mazwi & Muchetu 2015; Sakata 2017).

¹²¹ The tobacco produced under contract farming increased from nil in 2003 to 82 percent of the sales in 2016 (TIMB 2016: 5). By 2016, the 47,644 tobacco growers under contract farming schemes accounted 65 percent of the total number of growers nationally (TIMB 2016: 7).

Figure 6.8: Access to agricultural credit and contract farming



Access to agricultural credit, Chi-Square= 138.576, p=0.00*

Participation in state contract farming, Chi-Square=118.332, p=0.00*

Participation in private contract farming, Chi-Square=151.850, p=0.00*

*Significant at p<0.05

State policy and political connections were most prevalent amongst the group of rich peasants-to-capitalist farms (Moyo & Yeros 2005b; Moyo 2011a; Scoones 2015b) since they also out-competed the peasantry in the extraction of state subsidies such as the extensive maize contract farming programme titled “Special Maize Import Substitution Programme”, or “Command Agriculture” initiated in 2015.¹²² As Figure 6.8 illustrates, the beneficiaries of the state maize contract farming scheme were once again lopsided in favour of hired in labour dependent class. The other subsidy programme, which targets mostly peasants, distributes far less the amount of inputs than the Command Agriculture Programme.¹²³

6.4.5 Agricultural commodity market integration

Not producing solely for the market, but also to satisfy household consumption, is a key character of the peasantry that distinguishes it with capitalist farms whose primary purpose of production is geared for the market (Boltvinik 2016; Moyo 2014; Hall *et al.* 2017). Overall, the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms exhibited the highest

¹²² The programme distributed 6,319 metric tonnes of maize seed, 10.1 million litres of diesel, 50,150 metric tonnes of basal fertilizer and 31,465 metric tonnes of ammonium nitrate at low interest rate of four percent per annum to be paid off on delivery of targeted amounts of grain to the state run, Grain Marketing Board (Chemura 2017). The interest rates credit availed by commercial financial institutions were ranging between 12 to 18 percent per annum. Data on the herbicides and machinery distributed could not be ascertained. Altogether, the Command Agriculture targeted the production of 400,000 hectares of maize nationally in the 2016/17 season. The programme was being enlarged to cover other commodities such as wheat, soyabean and livestock from 2017 onwards.

¹²³ For instance, the Presidential Input Scheme for 2017/18 season, while targeting over 1.8 million households, its proposed budget was less than half that of the Command Agriculture scheme (GoZ 2017b). Specifically, the proposed budget for the latter was \$334.7 million compared to \$153 million for the former (GoZ 2017b: 9).

incidence of integration into the output markets for the crops produced. Except for groundnuts and sweet potatoes, at least 90 percent of the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms had marketed part of the output produced (Table 6.38). Such parallels could not be drawn from small and poor peasantries. Maize and groundnuts, which were grown by the largest segments in these classes, market participation was limited to below 42 percent and 30 percent respectively (Table 6.38). Beyond the cash crops such as tobacco and soyabeans the middle peasants were more connected to the markets than their counterparts in the small and poor peasants. However, dissimilarities were not witnessed in the participation in the livestock output markets between the farming classes.

These findings suggest that small and poor peasants prioritised food supplies to the household and only ventured into the commodity markets when surpluses dependent upon the season were realised. Yet “subsistence farming” was not the predominant phenomenon observed among the sampled households (see Mafeje 2003; World Bank 2012; Chigumira 2018; Hanlon *et al.* 2013).


Table 6.38: Participation in field crops commodity markets

Crop	No. of producers and % net sellers										Chi-Square	p
	rich peasants-to-capitalist		middle peasant		small peasants		poor peasants		Total			
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%		
Maize	88	89.8	232	73.3	148	38.5	80	41.3	548	61.9	90.47	0.00*
Wheat	5	100	4	100	0	0	0	0	9	100	**	
Cotton	0	0	0	0	2	50	0	0	2	50	**	
Tobacco	37	97.3	17	94.1	1	100	0	0	55	94.5	17.883	0.00*
Groundnuts	32	15.6	125	37.6	67	20.9	39	28.2	263	29.3	9.357	0.025*
Millet	0	0	3	33.7	1	100	3	33.3	7	28.6	0.467	0.792
Sorghum	2	0	43	25.6	42	14.3	15	20	102	19.6	2.217	0.529
Rapoko	0	0	3	100	5	100	0	0	8	100	**	
Sunflower	1	100	14	21.4	5	100	4	50	24	20.8	3.645	0.302
Soyabeans	32	100	14	85.7	1	0	1	100	48	93.8	18.74	0.00*
Sweet potatoes	7	42.9	20	40	6	66.7	8	50	41	46.3	1.397	0.706
Sugarbeans	22	90.9	39	64.1	4	75	4	100	69	69.6	14.482	0.02*
Cow peas	3	100	18	22.2	13	7.7	13	23.1	47	23.4	11.623	0.009*
Roundnuts	1	0	62	29	31	19.4	28	28.6	122	26.2	1.444	0.695

*Significant at 0.05 level **Chi-Square not computed limited observations

After considering the wide range of crops and livestock outputs produced by surveyed households, as much as 65.2 percent and 70.2 percent of the small and poor peasants had at least sold part of their output either in the formal or informal domestic markets respectively. The rich peasants-to-capitalists farmers exemplified the tenets attendant to capitalist farming since 95.7 percent were immersed into the commodity markets, followed by the middle peasants at 84.7 percent.

Figure 6.9: Value of marketed output over value of production*



*Includes imputed values of production for non-market participants. At $p < 0.05$ the percent of marketed output for capitalist-rich peasant farms was significantly different to all classes, while that of middle peasants was significantly higher than small and poor peasants. No difference was noted between small and poor peasants.

The relationship between the value of marketed output and value of production as a measure of the extent of integration into various commodity markets further elucidates the varying degrees in the purpose of production amongst the farming classes. Not unexpectedly, the rich peasant-to-capitalist farms had significantly the highest share of both crop and livestock outputs that were traded on the markets (Figure 6.9). Over two thirds of the output produced in this class was sold on the market. The percentage share of marketed output dropped substantially in the middle peasant class to almost half of that observed in latter group. As for the small and poor peasantries, further declines were recorded in the percent share of the value of output that households disposed in the commodity markets.

6.4.6 Agricultural labour productivity and farm incomes

Altogether, the variation in the production relations produced differentiated outcomes in agricultural labour productivity and farm incomes between the classes. As expected, the

labour hiring class obtained a significantly larger value of output per farming unit matched to the family labour based farms. The patterns were replicated in both crops and livestock output. Inequalities were more pronounced in crop farming where the value of output in the capitalist farms was over 10 times that of middle peasants, which followed after it (Table 6.39). Despite the capitalist farms still prevailing in the value of livestock output produced, the gap with the middle peasants was much narrower to that registered in crop farming. After accounting for the differences in land sizes, the value of output per hectare of cultivated land, still the variation persisted between the labour hiring class and family labour dependent classes. The value of output per farm unit was not significantly different between the middle peasants and the small peasants, but the opposite was true for the value of output per hectare of cropped land (Table 6.39).

Table 6.39: Value of output per farm unit and total area cropped (US\$)

Value of output	rich peasants-to-capitalist	middle peasant	small peasants	poor peasants	Total
Crops	70023.56 _a	6539.4 _b	1353.87 _b	2335.56 _b	14825.9
Livestock	11151.58 _a	5742.42 _b	2149.03 _b	1470.14 _b	5000.61
All output	81175.14 _a	12281.82 _b	3502.9 _c	3805.7 _c	19826.51
Crops per Ha	2808.48 _a	1194.01 _b	677.9 _c	697.5 _c	1235.08
All output per Ha	4034.96 _a	2596.56 _b	1780.89 _c	1557.78 _c	2446.89
Labour productivity*	32.85 _a	12.28 _b	5.08 _c	3.22 _c	12.13
N	93	236	158	84	571

*Value of output per Labour Day. There is significant difference at $p < 0.05$ if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the same row are dissimilar.

Between the opposing poles of the farm classes, differences in agricultural labour productivity were more than 10 times (Table 6.39). The rich peasants-to-capitalist farms were characterised by significantly larger levels of agricultural labour productivity than the other farm classes. Middle peasants achieved higher productivity levels, which was significantly distinct from their counterparts in the small and poor peasant classes. However, the productivity in the latter two family labour-based farms was not significantly different.

To assess the returns to labour among the different farm classes, two measures were employed, namely farm labour income and farm labour surplus. The former measures the net of the gross value of production after deducting all the input costs (including wages),

while the latter is net of the farm labour income after subtracting the imputed wages of unpaid labour contributed by the family labour (Patnaik 1996). The farm labour income across all the farming classes was positive and again a declining trend was apparent as the organisation of farming units transformed from being hired in labour reliant to the family based forms of labour (Table 6.40). Poor peasants derived the least farm labour income from their enterprises in the season observed compared to the rest of the farm classes and was in fact more than 30 times less than that enjoyed by the capitalist class (Table 6.40).

Table 6.40: Farm labour income and surplus

Farm classes	Farm labour income	Farm labour surplus*	N
rich peasants-to-capitalist	62528.09 _a	62343.86 _a	93
middle peasant	9860.9 _b	8400.15 _b	236
small peasants	3219.68 _b	1875.48 _b	158
poor peasants	2369.93 _b	931.81 _b	84
Total	15522.28	14305.4	571

*Imputed cost of family labour calculated using average sample daily wage rate of US\$4.84. There is significant difference at $p < 0.05$ if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the same column are dissimilar.

After deducting the imputed wages for work contributed by unpaid family workers, all households recorded a positive farm labour surplus. This implies that family labour invested by the peasant classes was able to generate a return, which was more than the daily wage rate earned by casual labourers, which averaged US\$4.84 per day for the survey sample. Table 6.40 indicates that among the family labour based farm classes, the middle peasants enjoyed a farm labour surplus close to ten-fold than that of the poor peasants. The farm labour income generated by all the farming classes exceeded the FPL for a household of five persons generated by the national statistical agency, which totalled US\$2,004.62 in 2017 (ZIMSTAT 2018: 3). Nonetheless, the farm labour income was inadequate for the small and poor peasantry to meet their subsistence requirements beyond food according to the PDL standard. During 2017, the PDL summed up to US\$6,113.61 for household of five persons (ZIMSTAT 2018: 5). In contrast, from farming alone, the capitalist and middle peasant farm classes were able to surpass both the FPL and PDL (Table 6.40).

Table 6.41: Total incomes from all sources in relation to poverty lines

Class	Source of income (US\$)			Deviation from poverty lines		N
	Non-farm	Farm	Total income	FPL	PDL	
capitalist	6346.7 _a	62528.09 _a	68874.79 _a	66902.25 _a	62860.99 _a	93
middle	5287.98 _a	9860.9 _b	15148.89 _b	13176.35 _b	9135.09 _b	236
small	1667.94 _b	3223.04 _b	4890.98 _c	2918.44 _c	-1122.82 _c	158
poor	891.58 _b	2518.08 _b	3391.49 _c	1418.95 _c	-2622.31 _c	84
Total	3811.97	15544.78	19359.23	17386.69	13345.43	571

*There is significant difference at $p < 0.05$ if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the same column are dissimilar.

Even the wider income sources beyond own farming to encompass wages from farm labour markets and non-farm incomes did not reverse the deviations from the PDL for the poor and small peasantry. Data presented in Table 6.41 illustrates that only the rich peasants-to-capitalist and middle peasant classes were able to subsist above the PDL during 2017.

Table 6.42: Shares of different sources of household income

% of total household income	rich peasants-to-capitalist	middle peasant	small peasants	poor peasants	Total
Farm	93.14 _a	64.50 _b	56.19 _b	58.28 _b	65.96
Formal employment	1.31 _a	19.99 _a	10.38 _a	9.44 _a	12.74
Remittance	2.91 _a	6.98 _{a,c}	18.27 _b	12.52 _{b,c}	10.26
Natural resource trading	0.36 _a	1.81 _a	3.22 _a	3.49 _a	2.21
Other non farm income	2.29 _a	6.72 _{a,b}	11.55 _b	8.55 _{a,b}	7.61
Total non-farm income	6.86 _a	35.50 _b	43.42 _b	34.31 _b	32.85
Farm wage labour	0.00 _a	0.00 _a	0.00 _a	7.32 _b	1.08
N		93	236	158	84

*There is significant difference at $p < 0.05$ if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the same row are dissimilar.

The rich peasants-to-capitalist and middle peasantry were the ones who significantly commanded higher levels of non-farm income in comparison the small and poor peasantry (Table 6.41). Yet non-farm incomes were more important to the previous class categories under circumstances where farming stopped well short of meeting their subsistence requirements through the lens of the PDL. Tellingly, the shares of non-farm income were significantly higher in the family labour based farming units than the labour hiring in dependent class (Table 6.42). These included incomes from formal employment,

remittances, natural resource trading, petty trading and farm wages that were limited to the poor peasantry.

The findings imply that the small and poor peasantries struggle to meet their subsistence requirements from farming, let alone, capacity to expand their farming activities on account of the reinvestment of surpluses. Such possibilities were however present in the rich peasants-to-capitalist and middle peasant farms, which recorded positive incomes in relation to the poverty lines. An examination of the trends since receiving land allocations through the FTLRP shows that it was indeed the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms, which have been accumulating productive agricultural assets, especially scale increasing modern machinery, at faster rate through the re-investment of farm surpluses.¹²⁴ For instance, the proportion of tractor owners in this class between year of settlement and 2017, grew from 26.9 percent to 52.7 percent, so did the installation of electric powered boreholes from 34.4 percent to 47.3 percent. In comparison, among the middle peasants the share of tractor owners only grew from 4.2 percent to 9.7 percent, while no change was registered amongst the poor peasantry. Investments in boreholes, which enable all year round farming through irrigation was limited to 15.7 percent, 1.9 percent and 2.4 percent of the middle, small and poor peasants, up from 6.8 percent, 1.3 percent and 1.2 percent respectively.

Altogether, the results on the land utilisation patterns, access to financial resources and other farming technologies reflect the deficiencies in the agricultural support framework to all farm classes and more so for female landowners. Indeed the FTLRP was not accompanied by a coherent post-settlement support policy to improve the production capacities of the land recipients. Yet this seemed particularly crucial in a context where private bank lending to agriculture had declined dramatically (World Bank 2012) and other sources of self-financing through savings from wage employment were on the wane due to the institution closures and job retrenchments persisted during the 2000's (LEDRIZ 2016). The state subsidy schemes, which emerged during the land reform tended to be reactive to droughts and food shortages and were limited in scale to cover

¹²⁴ The trends in the productive asset patterns of Communal Area landholders was tracked by the farm household survey from the year 2000 to coincide with the period the FTLRP was initiated.

the expanded base of farmers (World Bank 2014). In fact, the report notes the bias of the schemes towards serving a few male A2 farmers. These limited state support patterns thus also conditioned the existing levels of demand for farm labour in the new agrarian structure.

6.4.7 Summary of main findings

This section has analysed the differentiation of farm households arising from the use of both family and hired in labour in the organisation of agricultural production. The statistical clustering procedure applied distinguished four groups of households that contained hired in labour dependent and family labour based farming units. To be sure, the groups identified contained farm households unveiling capitalist and peasant characteristics in so far as their reliance of hired in labour in their farming. After cross tabulating the farm classes with various production relations, the empirical data confirmed the theoretical propositions advanced by various scholars (Patnaik 1996; Jha 1996; 2015; Moyo 2014; Boltvinik 2016), which suggest the use of hired in wage labour was a key indicator of class formation in rural areas. Substantial disparities were therefore observed between farm households classified as capitalist and peasants, not only in the use of hired in labour, but in the wider production relations embedded in the classes. As seen above, the application of the different factors of production declined as the utilisation of hired in labour fell among the farm classes, so did the agricultural labour productivity and income returns from farming. Yet the role of labour utilisation in fuelling class differentiation has received limited attention in the scholarship of land reform in Zimbabwe.

Seventeen years since the FLTRP began, this research confirms what other scholars have also found that a social differentiation process was unravelling in newly redistributed areas (Moyo & Nyoni 2013; Moyo *et al.* 2009; Scoones 2014; Scoones *et al.* 2010; Mkodzongi 2013; Mazwi & Muchetu 2015; Chigumira 2018; Shonhe 2017). The labour hiring in dependent class, i.e. the rich peasants-to-capitalist farm households, was associated with the production of cash and/or export crops utilising modern farm technologies (e.g. power driven machinery and productivity enhancing inputs such as fertilisers and HYV seeds) and commanded better access to financial resources (Hall *et*

al. 2017; Oya 2015; 2009). In contrast, the relatively “worse off” peasant households produce mainly food crops utilising labour intensive technologies such ox-drawn ploughs and their investment in productivity enhancing inputs is limited by access to economic resources. The output produced by this class of farmers is consumed by household and surpluses are sold in local and national markets.

Access to agricultural finance, standing in sharp contrast, between the opposite poles of the farm classes was driving the differentiation. Because of the limited availability of agricultural credit and state support, differentiation at the point of FTLRP land allocation especially, which is mirrored by incomes from past savings and current employment was propelling the imbalances witnessed in the countryside today. This perhaps suggests the need to relook at the semi-proletarianisation thesis in relation to its assigned “functional dualism” (Moyo & Yeros 2005a: 20; see also Zhan & Scully 2018; Neocosmos 1993; Bush & Cliffe 1984) and the research returns to this issue in the concluding chapter (Section 7.3.2).

The FTLRP policy implied differentiation of the production relations at the onset by designating the A1 model to expanding peasant production together with the Communal Area and the A2 scheme to amplify the share of black commercial agricultural producers (GoZ 2001a). The evidential base presented here and by others (Moyo *et al.* 2009; Scoones *et al.* 2010; Shonhe 2017) suggests that pursuing analysis juxtaposing the A1 against the A2 schemes conceals the differentiated production relations as some of the A1 farming units exhibit the same character of production regarding the utilisation of hired in labour and the orientation of production as those in the A2 model and vice versa. Hence, it also not correct to assume homogeneity in the land beneficiaries either by model or generally as some commentators have done.

Analysing the class formation at the local level brought a sharper focus to the broad macro-level analysis of national agrarian class structure estimated by Moyo (2011a; 2013) on the basis of the landholdings. Specifically, it exposed the differentiated dynamics, which are informed by the specificities of particular locality that in turn impact on the evolving farm classes post-2000. This was palpable in the distribution of farm

households from the two districts among the classes. The disproportionate development in the farm labour markets between the diverse agro-ecological zones and subsequent differences in the land use patterns in the two districts (section 6.2) reflected in the rural class formation trajectories. Very few of the farm households surveyed in Kwekwe exhibited capitalist tendencies in as far their dependency on wage labour on their farms. As a matter of fact, most of them were bundled in middle and small peasant class categories. Somewhat the opposite, Goromonzi district in a qualitatively better agro-ecological zone, contributed the most farming units in the rich peasant-to-capitalist class.

Since the Communal Area landholders constitute the majority in the small and poor peasantry, the data revealed the influence of the qualitatively better agro-ecological location and the larger land sizes of the new peasantry from the A1 scheme, most of whom were located in the middle peasant class in the use of farm labour. The subsequent income returns to farming were significantly better for the new peasantry located in the middle peasant class category and enabled the middle peasantry to escape the endemic poverty that characterise the small and poor peasantry from the Communal Areas. Recent poverty surveys confirm these patterns in both Goromonzi and Kwekwe; resettlement areas have been shown to have lower levels of the incidence of poverty compared to Communal Areas.¹²⁵ The same could be said of women, the majority of whom were also found in the small and poor peasants. Actually, these results corroborate evidence from the nationwide large-scale surveys that have signposted the unrelenting inequities, seen before in the former LSCFs and Communal Areas (Gaidzanwa 1995; Rugube *et al.* 2003; Mvududu & McFadden 2001), regarding the skewed access to agricultural productive assets in favour of men (see ZIMSTAT 2016).

Enmeshed within the new agrarian structure were the landless “proletariats” and/or land short semi-proletariats who supply different forms of labour to the new farming units. Combined with the section 6.2, the discussion thus far has indeed demonstrated that farm wage labour markets were not extinguished as some literature suggests in the event of

¹²⁵ In Goromonzi, wards in resettlement areas were characterised by poverty prevalence rate of between 61 and 72 percent, while in Communal Areas the rate was between 73 and 84 percent (ZIMSTAT 2015f: 65). Similar patterns were displayed in Kwekwe with the poverty prevalence rate in resettlement areas equaling those in the same land tenure category in Goromonzi, while for the Communal Areas; the rates were as high as 85 to 96 percent (ZIMSTAT 2015f: 165).

land reform targeting the peasantry (Sender & Johnston 2003; Sender 2016; de Janvry 1981). Instead differentiated farm labour markets endure, embracing the broad forms of hired labour beyond those found in large-scale capitalist farms. The foregoing section discusses the multi-coloured dimensions of wage labour in the new farms.

6.5 CHANGING PATTERNS OF AGRARIAN WAGE LABOUR RELATIONS

To appreciate the complete transformation of agrarian labour relations, it was imperative to analyse the expression of permanent and casual labour after redistributive land reforms taking into account the extent of formality, nature of employment contracts and the organisation and mobilisation of farm work in transformed agrarian structure.¹²⁶ The quality of labour was also considered from the optic of the wages earned, the working conditions and the division of labour along gender, kinship, commodities and skills dimensions. The labour management practices, including the procurement of labour supplies and the continued role, if any, of the residential tenancy relations in stabilising the new labour force is also important. These research issues are pursued next, starting first with the examination of the demographic and socio-economic character of the new agrarian labour force.

6.5.1 The new agrarian wage labour force: who are the workers?

The new agrarian labour force was comprised of former and new farm workers. Former farm workers, to repeat, include those that were previously employed in the redistributed LSCFs and now worked in the new farming units. They remained in the old farm compounds after some of their colleagues were displaced during the land occupations or trekked back to the Communal and other areas (Sachikonye 2003; IDMC 2008; Magaramombe 2010; Scoones *et al.* 2018a). The new farm workers, in contrast, lacked any previous employment connection to the LSCFs and were being imported mainly from various Communal Areas. All-in-all, new farm workers accounted for 74.4 percent and 76 percent of the interviewees in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts correspondingly.

Demographic patterns of farm labour households

¹²⁶Some components in this section build and further develop the analysis presented in Chambati (2017)

Over 70 percent of the farm labourers interviewed across both districts were married (Table 6.43). Corroborating previous studies, which have shown that it was mostly single women not attached to men and thus “free” from patriarchal relations who ventured into the rural labour markets (Adams 1991; Muchena & Dzumbira 2001), women in the sample had a bigger share of those not married than men. Again confirming the trends identified in the literature (Elson 1999; Sender *et al.* 2006; SOFA Team & Doss 2011; ILO 2015a), these women mostly accessed casual jobs as the recruitment patterns of landholders also demonstrated (section 6.2.4).


Table 6.43: Marital status of farm workers by gender

Marital status	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Monogamously married	69.7	59.3	66.8	73.6	60	70.7
Polygamously married	2.1	3.7	2.5	0.6	4.4	1.4
Single	17.9	3.7	14.1	18.4	4.4	15.4
Divorced/separated	4.8	20.4	9	4.9	24.4	9.1
Widowed	5.5	13	7.5	2.5	6.7	3.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	145	54	199	163	45	208
Chi-Square	20.118			25.375		
p	0.00*			0.00*		

*Significant at $p < 0.05$

New farm workers averaged 30 years old in both districts, compared to 45 and 46 years among the Goromonzi and Kwekwe former farm workers respectively. Aggregated with their families, the Goromonzi farm workers surveyed represented a total population of about 950 persons split into 56.1 percent males and 43.9 percent females (Figure 6.10). An economically active population of 64.2 percent was responsible for taking of the economically inactive population that were too young to work (34.5 percent) or too old to work (1.3 percent). With a total population of 972 persons, Kwekwe farm worker households closely resembled these demographic features. The average family sizes in these households were 4.6 in Goromonzi and 4.16 in Kwekwe.

Figure 6.10: Age-sex distribution in farm labour households



Educational levels

The majority of the farm workers had not completed secondary education that is required to proceed to Advanced Level high school and/or a chance in the urban formal jobs market, at least at the bottom-end (Table 6.44). Kwekwe had higher proportions of farm workers who had not met this standard compared to Goromonzi and in fact most who had never been to school were in this district. The educational levels were significantly associated with the work history of the farm workers. Significantly former farm workers were less educated than the new farm workers (Table 6.44).

Table 6.44: Level of education of farm workers by history of LSCF work

Level of education	Goromonzi (%)			Kwekwe (%)		
	Former	New	Total	Former	New	Total
No formal education	0	0.7	0.5	14	4.4	6.7
Some primary education	32.1	12.3	17.6	30	15.2	18.8
Completed primary education	24.5	17.1	19.1	30	23.4	25
Some secondary education	22.6	32.2	29.6	16	31.6	27.9
Completed secondary education	20.8	37	32.7	10	25.3	21.6
College education	0	0.7	0.5	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	53	146	199	50	158	208
Chi-Square	14.796			17.721		
p	0.011*			0.001*		

*Significant at $p < 0.05$

These findings were not surprising given the empirically established limited number of schools in LSCF areas before 2000 (see Chapter Four; Nyagura & Mupawaenda 1994; McIvor 1995; Amanor-Wilks 2001; Magaramombe 2001; Waeterloos & Rutherford 2004). Actually it has been argued that LSCF owners were not interested in investing in educational facilities beyond primary schools for fear of losing the potential labour force

to other sectors (Loewenson 1991; Loewenson 1992). So, intergenerational dynamics imbued farm work as children dropped out of school after primary education and joined their parents in the labour force. Stories were abound from former farm workers during the field research which echoed these trends as shown by the case of Weeru Phiri (Box 6.1).

Box 6.1: Limited access to education relegates generations to farm work

“I was born on Komuredhi Farm in 1975, when my father was employed here as permanent worker” recounted Weeru Phiri a former farm worker in Goromonzi. His father was also born on the farm from a foreign migrant labourer from Zambia who came to Zimbabwe in the 1940s. After finishing Form One in 1991, Weeru’s parents could not afford to continue paying his school fees and he dropped out of school. Soon he was employed on the farm as a seasonal labourer on an eight month contract to become the third generation of Phiri’s employed on Komuredhi Farm. After two consecutive seasons as a seasonal labourer, Weeru was promoted into permanent employment, a job held until the farm was acquired for land redistribution in 2001.

Source: Weeru Phiri (2017: Interview)

Access to education for children of farm workers remains a challenge up to today (Section 6.5.8). Armed with relatively better educational levels, new farm workers’ learning capacity to acquire new agricultural skills compares favourably to that of former farm workers. Overall, farm work therefore largely remains employment for the least educated in Zimbabwe (Loewenson 1992; McIvor 1994; Magaramombe 2000) and more so in the context of the loose industrial job markets that have prevailed since the late 1990s (Mhone 1996; Gibbon 1998).¹²⁷

Access to and ownership of land

Underlining the importance of land in structuring (farm) labour market participation, about 60 percent of the surveyed farm workers did not own this means of production. The Communal Area and the resettled areas provided routes to land ownership for farm workers. In the former ownership was registered in 38.7 percent in Goromonzi and to 25.2 percent in Kwekwe (Table 6.45) and their arable land sizes averaged 1.48 hectares and 2.78 hectares in the two districts respectively. As the data from the farm household surveys also revealed (Table 6.20), Kwekwe had a higher share (13 percent) that had received FTLRP land allocations than Goromonzi (5 percent). The average arable land

¹²⁷ Loose labour markets refers to a situation where there high unemployment levels in the country (Jha 2015)

size owned by farm workers was 5.4 and 5.3 hectares in the resettled areas in the corresponding districts.

Table 6.45: Access to land in different farm categories

Land type	% of households											
	Goromonzi				Kwekwe				Total			
	P	S	PWD	Subtotal	P	S	PWD	Subtotal	P	S	PWD	Subtotal
FTLRP	2	0	10.1	5	4.9	19.4	21.6	13	3.4	11.8	15.7	9.1
N	100	20	79	199	103	31	74	208	203	51	153	407
Beneficiaries	23	5	10.1	16.1	16.5	6.7	20.3	16.4	19.7	6	15	16.3
N	100	29	79	199	103	30	74	207	203	50	153	406
Unused in RA	1	0	3.8	2	0	0	1.4	0.5	0.5	0	2.6	1.2
N	98	20	79	197	103	30	73	206	201	50	152	403
Compound	27.3	25	39.2	31.8	5.8	12.9	11	8.7	16.3	17.6	25.7	20
N	99	20	79	198	103	31	73	207	202	51	152	405
CA	41	50	32.9	38.7	35.3	23.3	12.2	25.2	38.1	34	22.9	31.9
N	100	29	75	199	100	30	74	204	202	51	153	405

*P – permanent workers; S – seasonal workers and PWD – piece/daily workers.

Notwithstanding that many other farm workers also accessed land informally in the compounds, occupied unused resettled lands and leased from land beneficiaries (Table 6.45; see also section 6.6.5), 33.4 percent were still landless. Permanent workers (36.9 percent) more than casual labourers (29.9 percent) were separated from the means of production. Neither of the genders was shielded from landlessness and as matter of fact it was plain to see in 34.4 percent and 30.3 percent of the male and female workers correspondingly. That few farm workers benefitted from the FTLRP land allocations exhibits their limited prioritisation as category of beneficiaries targeted to receive land since they were earmarked to continue with their role as wage labourers. As indicated earlier (Chapter Five), the land reform emphasised peasants from Communal Areas as the targeted land recipients. Although they were included in the inception policy document for the LRRP-II, farm workers fell of the list of beneficiary categories in the FTLRP policy (Chapter Four & Five).

Citizenship

Former farm workers have faced many challenges due to their assumed identity as “foreigners” due to the colonial labour migrant systems that brought labour from present day Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia (Moyo *et al.* 2000; Rutherford 2001a; Daimon 2014), including being left out in the FTLRP land allocations. This occurred despite the

fact that many former farm workers at present were born in the country and qualified for citizenship according to *Citizenship Amendment Act of 1996* and the recently entrenched provisions in the 2013 Constitution (see also Chapter Five).¹²⁸

Table 6.46: Country of birth of father of farm workers by history of work

Country	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	Former	New	Total	Former	New	Total
Zimbabwe	58.5	87	79.4	82	93	90.4
Mozambique	13.2	5.5	7.5	10	1.3	3.4
Zambia	7.5	0.7	2.5	2	1.9	1.9
Malawi	20.8	6.2	10.1	6	3.8	4.3
Other	0	0.7	0.5	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	53	146	199	50	158	208
Chi-Square	22.945			9.549		
p	0.000*			0.023*		

*Significant at $p < 0.05$

This research confirms the configurations recognised in previous studies (Kanyenze 2001; Sachikonye 2003), since as much as 97 percent of the labour survey respondents in both districts were born in Zimbabwe. The few that were not birthed in the country had migrated from the same migrant sending countries of the past. However, about 20.6 percent and 9.6 percent of the workers were of “foreign migrant” origin since their fathers were born in Malawi and Mozambique (Table 6.46). Not surprisingly, it was amongst the former farm workers that foreign migrant origins were widespread than among the new farm workers. The descendants of migrant farm workers connect with their historical roots by practicing their cultural and/or religions such as *nyau* ceremonies in the farm compounds and beyond (Chambati 2013b; Daimon 2014). Quite importantly, citizenship and its associated identities, as seen later (section 6.6), affected farm worker agency in varied ways, including in the formation of labour supply groups and negotiating access to land.

Previous occupations of farm workers

Diverse previous occupations are found in the new agrarian labour force ranging from unpaid family to wage farm workers (Table 6.47). Goromonzi had a relatively larger proportion of former farm workers compared to Kwekwe. Others were also unemployed,

¹²⁸ Section 43 (2a &b) of the Zimbabwean Constitution accords citizenship to all those born of SADC parentage before 1985 (GoZ 2013:25-26).

shifting from urban employment and school leavers. The remainder mostly associated with Kwekwe were retrenched mine workers given the district's long history of mining.

Analogous to the tendencies elsewhere (Li Murray 2011; Selwyn 2014; Hall *et al.* 2017), the new farm labour markets in the resettled areas were painted by migration dynamics and/or importation of labour from varied places throughout the country. Local recruitment nonetheless, chiefly routed labour supplies to Communal Area households in both districts.

Table 6.47: Previous occupations of farm workers


Previous occupation	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	P	S	PWD	Total	P	S	PWD	Total
Permanent farm worker	32	0	34.2	29.6	21.4	16.1	13.5	17.8
Casual farm worker	6	10	11.4	8.5	4.9	12.9	9.5	7.7
Subtotal farm workers	38	10	45.6	38.1	26.3	29	23	25.5
Unpaid family farm worker	3	0	8.9	5	13.6	9.7	21.6	15.9
Unemployed	26	50	22.8	27.1	23.3	19.4	27	24
Self-employed (non-agric)	2	0	6.3	3.5	4.9	6.5	5.4	5.3
Urban employment	9	5	5.1	7	11.7	16.1	9.5	11.5
Mine worker	3	0	0	1.5	6.8	12.9	5.4	7.2
Student	19	35	11.4	17.6	13.6	3.2	5.4	9.1
Other	0	0	0	0	0	3.2	2.7	1.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	100	20	79	199	103	31	74	208
Chi-Square	29.298				17.481			
p	0.010**				0.355***			

*P-Permanent, S – Seasonal, PWD – Piece/Contract Workers

Significant at $p < 0.05$ *Not significant at $p < 0.05$

Excluding former farm workers who were already resident in the LSCFs prior to the FTLRP, over 57.6 percent of the Goromonzi workers came from rural areas, namely Communal Areas, Old Resettlement Areas and SSCFs (Figure 6.11). The children of former farm workers who were not in LSCF employment before 2000, composed the remaining workforce. Kwekwe workers frequently reported originating from other rural areas outside the LSCFs more than those from Goromonzi (Figure 6.11).

Figure 6.11: Origin of new farm workers



Chi-Square=23.337, $p=0.000$ (Significant at $p<0.05$). $N=295$.

These previous occupational patterns and residential roots of the farm workers suggest that the “new” agrarian labour force largely retains its rural character through the recruitment of mainly Communal Area residents (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Moyo *et al.* 2000; Kanyenze 2001). Nonetheless, the “new” agrarian labour force has also been “partially urbanised” (Tabak 2000) by the inclusion of urban areas as a source of labour. About 18 percent of the workers in Goromonzi traced their roots to the urban areas compared to 16 percent in Kwekwe. If mining towns were added, then those who had urban roots escalated to 20.5 percent in the latter district. Nowadays, it is not unusual to encounter job adverts looking for farm workers in the urban townships.¹²⁹ Temporary migration by some poor urban residents for farm work from nearby Mbizo Township into Kwekwe resettled areas was indeed observed during the field research. The same patterns were visible in Epworth and Ruwa townships nearby Goromonzi new farms. Furthermore, these shifting recruitment patterns were also due to the urban roots of the capitalist farmers in the A2 scheme. The new farm labour markets were thus insightful of the deteriorating macroeconomic conditions and the dwindling employment opportunities in the urban areas.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ During the field research in Kwekwe in December 2017, I saw a job advert looking for farm workers placed by an A2 farmer at one of the shopping centres in Redcliff Town.

¹³⁰ Between 2009 and 2014, the number of manufacturing jobs declined from 135,500 to 92,700 (GoZ 2014: 10). These trends were an outcome of the drop in the capacity utilisation in the manufacturing sector.

6.5.2 Character of farm wage labour in resettlement areas

The farm wage labour found in the resettled farms today does not necessarily approximate the LSCF type work. Yet this does not mean they do not constitute wage work, as others have opined (Magaramombe 2010; Ridderbos 2009). The expression of the different forms permanent and casual labour (incorporating seasonal and piece/daily work) in new agrarian structure are dealt with in this section.

6.5.2.1 Permanent labour

Permanent labour entails continuous employment with the same single employer with no specific end date. This type of employment was predominantly hired in by the larger capitalist A2 farms, and principally absent in the old peasantries in the Communal Areas (section 6.2 & 6.4). At law, the labour rights and conditions of permanent employees were protected by the Collective Bargaining agreements between the farm worker trade unions and employer organisations under the supervision of the NECAIZ. Box 6.2 summarises the basic features of the conditions of permanent labour as envisaged by the current Collective Bargaining Agreement, *Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014*.

Box 6.2: Selected features of permanent labour according Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014

Issue of employment	Legal requirement
1. Type of contract	Written
2. Hours of Work	Not exceed 208 hours per month (translating to 8 hours per day) Additional work beyond legislated time should accrue overtime pay for workers or days off should be granted in lieu of extra hours contributed
3. Rest days	One day off each week
4. Task work	Quantum of work should be such that an average employee can complete during the workday
5. Grading	All employees should be allocated a grade
6. Payment of wages	Two days of the end of week for weekly paid employees Last four days of the month for monthly paid employees Written composition of the wage
7. Benefits	Allowances for housing, light and fuel


Source: GoZ (2014)

Variation was apparent in the character of permanent employment within the settlement patterns and across the districts, but in general tended towards informality. The absence of written contracts specifying the conditions of employment, which was widely recounted by the permanent workers, illustrates this phenomenon (Figure 6.12). It was

The industrial capacity utilisation which had delined from 35.8 percent in 2005 to 18.7 percent in 2007 recovered to 57 percent in 2017 before floundering to a trough of 34.3 percent in 2015 (CZI 2015: 13-14).

ingrained in Kwekwe regardless of the settlement of employment for the permanent workers. The reverse was true in Goromonzi as a written contract was more likely to be present for a worker employed in the A2 scheme than it was for the A1 (Figure 6.12).

Figure 6.12: Types of employment contracts for permanent workers



Chi-Square=8.875, p=0.03*, N=96 - Goromonzi
 Chi-Square=0.282, p=0.595**, N=100 - Kwekwe
 *Significant at p<0.05 **Not significant at p<0.05

Arising out of this were thus possibilities for employers to alter the conditions of employment, including undefined wage payment dates and working hours as discussed below. *Statutory Instrument 323 of 1993* and its successor *Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014* requires employers to: “...to inform every employee, in writing, upon engagement, of the nature of his or her contract.....” (GoZ 2014: 1021). Thus, the specifics of the employment contracts were not only grey areas for many of the permanent workers, but their absence also meant the employers were violating the law.

All the permanent workers had been in employment for at least one year and the average period with their current employer was five years. About 26 percent and 29 percent of the full-time wage labour in Goromonzi and Kwekwe had an employment record that exceeded five years in their present jobs respectively. Across both districts, women had significantly spent more time as permanent employees compared to men - eight years in Goromonzi and nine years in Kwekwe. Their male counterparts had spent four and five years at the same place of employment in the respective districts. About 56.4 percent of the permanent workers had not changed jobs since commencement of employment in the new farm units in the resettlement areas. Given that many of the permanent labourers

were sourced from the Communal Areas (Table 6.79), this emerging stabilisation of the workforce (Gibbon & Riisgaard 2014) could be attributed to the prolongation of the residential labour tenancy relationship by the farm employers on these labourers (Section 6.5.5). Tellingly, the residential alternatives of these imported permanent workers within the resettled areas were limited.

A 26-day working month characterised most of the permanent workers, entailing a work week spanning from Monday to Saturday in both the A1 and A2 farms (Table 6.48). Sunday was offered to the workers as their rest day in accordance with the law. Yet a few of the workers were given more than four days off work. Absence of rest days represented a disturbing trend described by 6.4 percent and 23.2 percent of the workers in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively. Livestock herders in Kwekwe were most affected by this deprivation since their employers wanted cattle to graze daily.

Table 6.48: Length of working month for permanent workers

No. of rest days	No. of workdays	Goromonzi (%)			Kwekwe (%)		
		A1	A2	Total	A1	A2	Total
0	30	12.2	6.4	9.4	22.6	23.9	23.2
2	28	4.1	6.4	5.2	0	0	0
3	27	0	0	0	3.8	2.2	3
4	26	81.6	85.1	83.3	66	69.6	67.7
6-8	22-24	2	2.1	2.1	7.5	4.3	6.1
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100
N		49	47	96	53	46	99
Chi-Square		1.159			0.686		
p		0.763*			0.873*		

*Not significant $p < 0.05$

Long working hours faced by some permanent farm workers however negated the rest days offered by to their employers. The standard work day of eight hours was enjoyed by 56.7 percent and only 27.2 percent in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively (Table 6.49). The capitalist A2 farms subjected their employees to long working hours more than the A1 farms. In separate interviews, the A1 and A2 farm households also professed these tendencies, 91.0 percent and 90 percent of Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively. This included 8.1 percent and 7.5 percent in the corresponding districts that had workdays in excess of 10 hours.

Table 6.49: Length of workday for permanent workers

No. of hours	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	A1	A2	Total	A1	A2	Total
5-8	63	50	56.7	31.5	22.4	27.2
8.1-10	26.1	38.6	32.2	66.7	67.3	67
10.1 – 12	10.9	11.4	11.1	1.9	10.2	5.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	46	44	90	54	49	103
Chi-Square	1.779			3.849		
p	0.411*			0.146*		

*Not significant at $p < 0.05$

Until recently, labour statutes unfairly imposed long working hours for farm workers, compared to those of the rest of the working class. Still, the white LSCFs enforced additional work hours for the same wage (e.g. Amanor-Wilks 1995; Tandon 2001; Kanyenze 2001). GAPWUZ, the farm worker trade union managed to lobby employers to reduce the working hours from 8.5 to the standard 8.0 during the 2013 collective bargaining exercise (GoZ 2014a).¹³¹ Even on the old standards of working hours, as much as 88 percent of the A1 and A2 farm employers fell short. Since below 50 percent of those working beyond eight hours in both districts received overtime pay or extra time off as required by the law, new farm employers like they predecessors in the LSCFs were extracting unpaid labour from the permanent workers (Box 6.2; see Loewenson 1992; Amanor-Wilks 1992; Rutherford 2001a).

Although monthly wage payments predominated (over 95 percent) in both districts, 2.1 percent of A1 permanent workers in Goromonzi were being paid once per year and an equivalent 4.3 percent A2 workers in Kwekwe received wages quarterly and twice per year. Another two percent of the A1 permanent workers in the same district also noted being paid twice per year. Poor and “absentee” farmers were associated with this pattern of wage payments. These unusual frequencies of wage payments that some farm workers faced were also consistent with what Scoones *et al.* (2010) found in Masvingo Province.

By many accounts, permanent labour that currently exists on the A1 and A2 farms diverges from the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement governing their

¹³¹ Prior to gazetting of *Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014*, the previous *Statutory Instrument 323 of 1993* entrenched the working hours to 221 hours per month, which translated to 8.5 hours for all the permanent workers except for a category of workers that were not supposed to total more than 299 hours per month or 11.5 hours per day. Those on 11.5 hour workdays included herdsmen, watchmen, boilermen, firetower attendants, pump attendants, guards, irrigation hand, curer, milker and caretakers.

conditions of employment (Box 6.2). The gap between the law and practice as shall be seen later was also obvious in the wages and benefits received by permanent farm workers (section 6.5.7).

6.5.2.2 Casual labour

Casual labour was distinct from the permanent variant apropos the continuity of employment and the multiplicity of employers it entailed. Empirically, casual labour was characterised by working for many employers with the time of employment limited to a particular task in the case of piece rate and/or the completion of an agreed amount of time of work. The latter, which shall be called time rated work can be further distinguished into two variants according to the duration of time a worker was engaged by a single employer. One type was similar to daily labour, where workers were hired for a specific time duration per day (normally denoted in hours) and wages were calculated daily. Throughout the agricultural season, the casual labour not engaged in the long-term type of seasonal labour interchange between piece rate and daily type of work. Henceforth, these workers were broadly classified by the study as piece/daily labourers (PWD). The other type were seasonal labourers that were employed for a longer duration and according to the law the duration of employment ranges from three months up to a maximum of six months within a given calendar year (GoZ 2014). Altogether, these different forms of casual labour also fall under the broad category of what is termed contract workers by the law (GoZ 2014).

Seasonal labour similar to permanent labour has its employment conditions protected by law and also negotiated through the collective bargaining agreements. In contrast, piece rate and daily type work were not shielded by the law and the conditions of employment were deferred to local level negotiations between the employers and employees. Since piece rate and daily type work now constitute the largest section of the farm workforce nowadays, the labour rights of many farm workers were not safeguarded by the *Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014* and thus were vulnerable to the exploitation of the farm employers.

Table 6.50: Types of contracts offered to casual labourers

Type of contract	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	S	PWD	Total	S	PWD	Total
Verbal	73.7	82.3	80.6	87.1	93	91.2
Written	26.3	17.7	19.4	12.9	7	8.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	19	79	98	31	71	102
Chi-Square	0.724			0.921		
p	0.395**			0.337**		

*S – seasonal labourers PWD – piece/daily workers.

**Not significant at $p < 0.05$

Again, for both seasonal and piece/daily workers, contracts of employment were also oral (Table 6.50). Seasonal labour, which approximates permanent labour when they are actively employed, had the highest share with written contracts and this was more common in Goromonzi.

In the Communal Areas, piece rate work, in continuation of past trends was the pervasive form of hired in wage labour (Adams 1991a; Matshe 1998). Almost half of the former LSCF labour force were seasonal labourers, but at present this was the least visible form of labour. It was commonly employed by the larger capitalist A2 farms and remaining LSCFs. However, in the case of Kwekwe, some A1 farms were also a source of employment for the seasonal labourers. Piece/daily work was employed in all the different settlement patterns.

Colloquially, piece rates were also known as *maricho*, drawing parallels to other derogatory terminologies such as *ganho-ganho* in Mozambique (Perez Nino 2016) and *ganyu-ganyu* in Malawi (Kerr 2005; Oya 2013) to describe this type of work that chiefly attracts poor rural households (see also Chapter Two). While quantum of tasks that was allocated under piece rates was known as *mugwazo*. For various reasons, the landholders classified the different types of farm tasks into piece or time rated daily work for the purposes of engaging casual labour. More broadly, sensitive tasks, which were also difficult to supervise such as planting, fertiliser application, chemical spraying and maize threshing were set on the basis of timed rated daily work.¹³² This was meant to prevent

¹³² Depending on the agro-ecological region, the maize plant population can range anything between 36,000 and 60,000 per hectare according the recommendations of one of the largest input companies, Seed Co Zimbabwe on the seed packs. Now imagine the effort that will be entailed to verify if all the plants have been fertilised.

workers from not performing their duties diligently since they might rush to complete the task, if it was classified as *mugwazo* and move on to other jobs. For instance, if a worker were to be given the task of fertiliser application as a *mugwazo*, meaning they should perform this on a given area of land in order to finish the task in the shortest possible time some plants might not be fertilised with devastating consequences on the anticipated output and productivity. On the other hand, tasks such as land clearing and weeding, which were relatively easier to verify and supervise were issued out to hired in labour on the basis of *mugwazo*.

Piece rated work was also differentiated according to the quantity of work for a specific task across the various commodities produced by the A1 and A2 landholders, so were the wages paid. The *mugwazo* for weeding in maize for instance was 450 square metres per person, while in tobacco the area was 600 square metres for the same task. By way of another example, 0.25 hectares and 0.33 hectares were the piece rates for digging holes for planting maize and tobacco respectively. Although both men and women were engaged in the range of tasks performed under *mugwazo* and time rated daily work, some of the tasks were gender segregated. Apparently, women were preferred for planting, fertiliser application and winnowing of maize because they were "...patient and could handle delicate tasks unlike men" (MPEW 2017: Interview). At another A2 farm in Kwekwe involved in chicken broiler production, on noticing all the women piece workers who had been hired to slaughter and dress the chickens, an enquiry also returned the same answer about "women's patience". Men were targeted for tasks such as land clearing and carrying harvest from the fields considered to require their "muscular strength".

Shifting between many employers during the agricultural season and across seasons, piece/daily workers were very mobile. The same employer between seasons was found in only 27.6 percent and 24.3 in Goromonzi and Kwekwe correspondingly. Contrast this with 63.2 percent and 64.5 percent of the seasonal workers who returned to their previous employers from last season in the respective districts. To reach their employers, piece/daily workers were traversing distances of between 0.79 kilometres and 3.98 kilometres from their places of residence in Goromonzi. The radius between the nearest and furthest employers in Kwekwe was 1.83 kilometres and 6.0 kilometres.

Cumulatively, the piece/daily workers spoken to had worked an average of 133.2 days during the 2016/17 season in Goromonzi, while their seasonal counterparts clocked 156.2 days. The labour days for part-time workers were lower in Kwekwe - 139.5 and 80.9 days respectively.

Depending on the fortunes in alluvial gold mining, piece/daily workers in Kwekwe also moved between farm wage and non-farm jobs even in the midst of the agricultural season. When gold “*rikaputika*” as discoveries were referred to in the local *lingua franca*, a rush to those areas ensued attracting different people including the piece/daily workers who abandoned farm jobs for a chance to strike “instant riches” (PLB 2018: Interview).¹³³ Kwekwe piece/daily workers could thus fit what Breman (1996) termed “footloose labour” that is constantly in motion to search for work across diverse sectors. Beyond the conflicts over land use, which erupted when discoveries lie in the lands owned by resettled farmers (Chigumira 2018; Mawowa 2013; Moyo *et al.* 2009), gold mining because of the potential income returns, outcompeted farming in attracting labour.

Akin to permanent workers, all the seasonal labourers and 77.8 percent in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively received their wages on a monthly basis (Table 6.51). Daily payments or after the completion of their *mugwazo* were the most common for Goromonzi piece/daily workers (Table 6.51). Weekly runs prevailed in Kwekwe as some employers waited for the labour days to accumulate before acquitting the wage payments.

Table 6.51: Frequency of wage payments to casual labourers

Frequency	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	S	PWD	Total	S	PWD	Total
Daily	0	58.2	48.5	0	12.7	9.8
Weekly	0	20.3	16.5	22.2	50.9	41.5
Monthly	100	21.5	35.1	77.8	34.5	47.6
At the end of season	0	0	0	0	1.8	1.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	18	79	97	27	55	82
Chi-Square	34.282			11.546		
p	0.00*			0.009*		

*Significant at $p < 0.05$

¹³³ Media headlines such “Gold rush fever among poor Zimbabweans leave a trail of destruction” [www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-mining-landrights-idUSKBN17J1CJ – accessed 18 July 2017] or “Illegal gold panners descend on Kwekwe”, The Chronicle 6 January 2012 are not uncommon in reference to the situation when new “discoveries” of gold were made in Kwekwe. See also “Gold rush at Kwekwe’s Dandrum Mine”, The Herald, 21 July 2016.

Mugwazo offered by employers was overwhelming for 34 percent and 55.7 percent of piece/daily workers in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively to complete on their own in a single day. Seasonal labourers in Kwekwe (43.9 percent) also faced similar challenges. To avoid work spilling over the next day and thus contribute more labour days for a task expected to be completed the same day, family members were enlisted to help (Table 6.52), evocative of the scenario Adams (1991b) recited of women being called upon to assist their male relatives employed in the sugarcane estates in Chiredzi to complete their *mugwazo* and thus curtail excessive working hours. Parallels could drawn with the ticket system in the LSCFs that was designed to ensure workers contributed in excess of 45 days of work but only received a wage for a month (Arrighi 1970; Rubert 1997; Chapter Four).

Enlisting help from the family enabled quicker transition to new jobs, as well as widen the wages earned during the season. The family members helping piece workers, which others have called the “uninvited” labourers (Torvikey *et al.* 2016: 86), facilitate the indirect exploitation of whole families through the engagement of one worker. Again, the farm employers through this avenue were also indirectly recruiting child labour as they constituted 17.9 percent and 22.7 percent of the “uninvited” labourers in the two districts respectively. If the number of people contributing to the completion of a task were taken into account, then the piece wage rates in new farms were even more paltry than they seem.


Table 6.52: Strategies utilised to complete mugwazo by casual labourers

Strategy	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	S	PWC	Total	S	PWC	Total
Work individually and complete work	100.0	59.2	67.0	46.2	44.0	44.6
Work with family	0.0	21.1	17.0	15.4	33.3	28.7
Work individually and roll over work to next day	0.0	19.7	16.0	38.5	22.7	26.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	18	76	94	26	75	101

The seasonal nature of farming structured the hiring of casual workers (Section 6.4.2 & 6.53). It began rising with the pounding of the first rains in October and the incremental

trends persist until the last month of the year before slowing down between January and March (Figure 6.13). Thereafter the hiring begins to increase during the harvesting season between April and May. Limited farm employment opportunities existed for part-time farm labourers between June and September, which represent the dry season in the country. The demand patterns in the Communal Area were a complete replica of the situation described in the resettled areas.

Figure 6.13: Seasonality of casual labour hiring in resettled areas



*One-way ANOVA, the average number of labour days was significantly different across the model types at $p < 0.05$.

The superior number of labour days recruited by the Goromonzi farm households also draws attention to the inequalities in the labour demand patterns and consequently the development of the farm labour markets between the two districts. Even the Goromonzi A1 farms outpaced the Kwekwe A2 farms for most of the months during the season in the number of the casual labour days hired in (Figure 6.13). With this structure of uneven demand for casual during the season, opportunities were thus abundant for piece/daily workers to enter into non-farm wage labour markets, alongside the landholders (section 6.3.2).

These results partly reflect the inadequate enforcement of the existing statutory instruments governing the working conditions of (permanent) farm workers by the state NECAIZ and the MPSLSW. As will be shown later (Section 6.6.3), the NECAIZ was underresourced and its presence in the newly resettled areas was limited like that of the farm worker trade unions (section 6.6.1). This also suggests that NECAIZ has not

adequately performed its role to promote the understanding of the labour relations amongst the new set of farm employers as dictated by the *Labour Amendment Act of 2015*. Moreover, the labour regulations for farm workers now fall short of covering all the different categories of workers that characterise the new agrarian structure. Specifically, they now exclude the piece/daily workers who were the most common form of hired in labour and thus at present the majority of the agrarian labourers are not protected by the farm labour laws.

6.5.3 Kinship ties and the new agrarian labour markets

In the absence of developed labour market information, family and kinship networks contribute immensely to the recruitment of (farm) labour in SSA (Mano *et al.* 2011), including Zimbabwe. The former farm workers recommended their family and/or relatives for LSCF jobs and the farm compounds represented webs of related households tied by kinship, marriage and village of origin within and without Zimbabwe (Rutherford 2001a). According to research by the previous scholar, permanent employees were conduits for the recruitment of additional workers from their immediate family and relatives and in fact put them in good stead for job promotion. Recollections by former farm workers of how their LSCF employment was facilitated by their relatives were not unusual during field visits to the old farm compounds and this continues to today. Thirty one percent of the permanent workers in Goromonzi worked alongside other members from their family, whilst in Kwekwe; this was limited to 10.2 percent. Both adult males and females, and children members of the permanent worker households were involved in these labour supply arrangements. The 30 permanent workers in Goromonzi worked for the same employer together with 27 female adults, 8 male adults and one child from their families. The family members that accompanied the 10 Kwekwe permanent workers were disaggregated into 18 adults divided equally by gender and two children. More permanent workers employed in the A2 scheme (67.5 percent), which had many of the capitalist farms (section 6.4.1) reported this practice more than the family labour dependent A1 peasant farms (30 percent).

In the piece/daily forms of farm labour, information on job opportunities was exchanged with fellow kin and friends in old farm compounds before anyone else. The labour supply groups formed by piece/daily workers were also infused with kinship ties (section 6.6.2).

A new trend in the redistributed LSCFs, but well established in the Communal Areas relates to the recruitment of extended family relatives into the wage labour force by the new farm employers. Beyond the managerial hierarchies of the white male owner, spouse and children, familial linkages in the former LSCFs did not extend to the rank and file of the black farm labour force (Loewenson 1992; Tandon 2001).

Table 6.53: Relationship of permanent farm workers to employers

Relationship to employer	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	A1	A2	Total	A1	A2	Total
Not related	73.5	95.7	84.4	84.9	87.2	86
Distant relative	22.4	4.3	13.5	13.2	10.6	12
Same totem	0	0	0	0	2.1	1
Same <i>kumusha</i>	4.1	0	2.1	1.9	0	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	49	47	96	53	47	100
Chi-Square	9.562			2.927		
p	0.023*			0.570*		

*Significant at $p < 0.05$ **Not significant at $p < 0.05$

At least 13 percent of the permanent workers surveyed were related to their farm employers and the incidence was dissimilar across the districts (Table 6.53). These “worker-relatives” were not only distant relatives from the extended family of the farm employers bound by blood ties, but also included other relations that command currency within the African context (Mkodzongi 2013b; Mutopo 2014) such as sharing the same totem or originating from the same village in the Communal Area (Table 6.53). Worker-relatives were more common in Goromonzi than Kwekwe and associated with A1 permanent workers. No major differences were captured between A1 and A2 permanent workers in Kwekwe. Accordingly, the operation of kinship networks in the farm labour markets that previously involved mainly employees now also encompasses the employers as well.

Labour conflicts involving relatives at least in theory are expected to have wider ramifications that transcend the workplace into the wider familial relationships of the

employer and extended kin and thus favour “worker-relatives” over “non-relative-workers”. Two opposite poles were uncovered regarding the experiences of payment of wages between these two categories of permanent workers. “Worker-relatives” were sometimes the ones more affected by the problem of unpaid wages more than the “non-relative worker”. The former would be considered to understand the challenges of the employer regarding financial resource constraints more than a “*mutorwa*” as one A1 farmer from Goromonzi informed the research (JK 2017: Interview).¹³⁴ This farmer only paid his relative AK his wages after the sell of tobacco at the auction floor. At the time of the survey, in Goromonzi four of the nine “worker-relatives” were owed unpaid wages compared to 13 out of the 72 “non-relative-workers”. Thus, worker-relatives in this case enabled the constitution of a “disciplined labour force” to propel capital accumulation (Tsikata 2015). The dynamics were however different in Kwekwe where 2 out 12 of the “worker-relatives” had arrears on the wage payments compared to 20 out 68 “non-relative workers”.

6.5.4 Division of labour and organisation of farm work

Wide-ranging agricultural production systems in the former LSCFs and the large workforces (Muir 1994; 2007; Gibbon 2011) were accompanied by detailed managerial hierarchies in the organisation and division of work especially in the Mashonaland Provinces (Amanor-Wilks 2000; Loewenson 1992; Rutherford 2001a). From the owner to the least ranked position, these managerial positions were synonymous with males. At the top was the farm manager assisted by various administration officers responsible for farm record keeping. The production side depending on the enterprise diversification were led by section foremen and beneath them were supervisors and leaders of labour gangs. Mixed farming of diverse commodities led to segmentation of labour along commodity lines and by the late 1990s had extended to commodity based collective bargaining (Magwaza 2017: Interview). Such organisation of work was undone by the downsizing of the farms and subsequent land use changes that accompanied the FTLRP.

¹³⁴ *Mutorwa* is a Shona word that refers to someone whom you not related to by blood ties.

6.5.4.1 Labour management practices

Farm management structures were restricted to a small segment of the capitalist A2 farms. All of the Communal Area and A1 farms that hired in farm wage labour surveyed in both districts were directly owner managed and only 15 percent of Kwekwe A2 farms hired managers. Contrasting tendencies were perceptible in the Goromonzi A2 farms where 64.5 percent recruited farm managers. The farm managers were accountable to the LSCF owners and responsible for managing the entire farm operations, including supervising lower level managers and other tasks such as land use planning, farm budgeting, commodity marketing, maintenance of farm assets and labour scheduling. Now these responsibilities converge on the owners in the small peasant farms and were not as elaborate as they were in the capitalist farms.

Table 6.54: Work done by permanent workers

Work done	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
General hand	62.6	75	63.6	78.7	66.7	78
Tractor driver	7.7	0	7.1	6.4	0	6
Skilled work	7.7	25	9.1	3.2	0	3
Supervisor	8.8	0	8.1	1.1	0	1
Foreman	3.3	0	3	3.2	0	3
Security	9.9	0	9.1	6.4	16.7	7
Other	0	0	0	1.1	16.7	2
Subtotal	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	91	8	99	94	6	100

Only a few the farm managers in the A2 farms had formally undertaken courses in agriculture, signifying a departure with the hiring patterns in the former LSCFs. The latter mostly recruited managers trained in the public and private agricultural colleges and dotted around the country (Rukuni 1994). Sixty percent of the managers hired in A2 farms in Goromonzi had no prior formal training in agriculture. Qualifications possessed by the rest included certificate (28.6 percent), Master Farmer certificate (7.2 percent) and diploma (4.8 percent). Similarly in Kwekwe, qualified managers had obtained certificates (14.3 percent) and diplomas (28.6 percent) and the majority had no formal training.

The positions occupied by permanent workers varied from skilled workers (e.g. machinery operators) to general hands, but the latter enveloped most of them. The

Goromonzi A2 farms had the more elaborate skill segmentation of the labour force. Although differentiation of the permanent farm workforce was visible on the new farms, it was nowhere near the grading system demanded by *Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014*. The nine grades specified by this legal instrument also correspond to different wage rates.¹³⁵ Practices discriminating against women moving up the employment ladder survived the FTLRP. If women made it to the permanent workforce, they were always at the lower rung (Table 6.55). None of the few women in the permanent workforce in Goromonzi held any leadership position, while this was confined to only one of the five female permanent workers in Kwekwe. Farm managers were nearly universally men, so were the foremen and supervisors. Representation of women relatively increased in the administrative category of clerks, salespersons and accountants.

Table 6.55: Work hierarchies on the new farming units

Managerial post	Goromonzi	Kwekwe	Goromonzi	Kwekwe
	Existence of management		% of male occupants	
Manager	38.4	17	97.4	76.5
Foreman	40.4	27	100	96.3
Supervisor	35.4	13	94.3	92.3
Clerk	28.3	11	78.6	72.7
Accountant	12.1	8	84.6	100
Salesperson	15.2	7	80	85.7
Driver	43.4	19	100	100
Security	39.8	20	100	90
N	99	100	39	20

Lower level managerial workers such as foremen and supervisors (Gibbon 2011), have been substituted by the owners themselves in the allocation of labour tasks to permanent employees in all A1 and Kwekwe A2 farms. Hence the employers themselves have become the direct faces of the exploitation of the workers in the farms rather the foremen and supervisors within the LSCFs. Using their wider powers to recommend people for recruitment, for instance, these junior managers were known for harassing other workers and sexually abusing women in exchange for jobs and/or promotion (Muchena & Dzumbira 2001; Adams 1991b; Amanor-Wilks 1995).

¹³⁵ The grades are categorised as A1 to A3 (unskilled), B1 – B4 (semi-skilled) and C1 to C2 (skilled) (GoZ 2015: 1027).

Absence of these types of workers in many of the new farms could therefore be argued to have eradicated an additional layer of worker repression and the avenues to negotiate conditions of employment. Goromonzi A2 farms unveiled contradictory tendencies since the managers, supervisors and foremen performed these roles (Table 6.56).

Table 6.56: Person allocating daily tasks to permanent workers

Person	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	A1	A2	Total	A1	A2	Total
Employer	75	34	53.8	82.4	53.3	68.8
Manager	15.9	31.9	24.2	2	26.7	13.5
Supervisor	4.5	23.4	14.3	2	2.2	2.1
Foreman	0	10.6	5.5	7.8	15.6	11.5
Worker	4.5	0	2.2	5.9	2.2	4.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	44	47	91	51	45	96
Chi-square	21.963			15.721		
P	0.00*			0.003*		

*Significant at $p < 0.05$

Various machinery and agricultural chemicals, including pesticides, herbicides and livestock drugs were being utilised in both A1 and A2 farms (section 6.4.3). Yet, not all permanent workers received protective gear from farmers as mandated by the *Hazardous and Substances and Articles Act (Chapter 322)* and the *National Social Security Act (Chapter 17:04)*. This disparately affected the A1 (39.8 percent) and A2 (14.2 percent) Goromonzi permanent employees. Kwekwe farms also did not shield permanent workers from possible injuries arising from contact with harmful chemicals - 42.5 percent and 26.2 percent of the A1 and A2 permanent workers were not receiving protective clothing respectively. Piece/daily workers were also vulnerable as none were provided with the same. Lingering on from the former LSCFs, this problem was an issue of concern raised by the farm worker trade union (Magwaza 2017: Interview). It should not come as a surprise that out of the 408,257 workplace accidents captured by the 2014 Labour Force Survey, 275,542 were in the agricultural sector (ZIMSTAT 2015g: 258). Furthermore, 31.8 percent and 27.7 percent of injuries reported by men and women respectively were due to absence of protective clothing (ZIMSTAT 2015g: 259).

The physical violence and racism that coloured the labour relations in the former LSCFs (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Rutherford 2001a; Moyo *et al.* 2000) have waned in the new farming units. Farm workers were asked to report if they had suffered any form of abuse

in the last five years. A miniscule section of the permanent workers across both districts (less than one percent) and none of the casual workers had faced physical violence at work. Verbal abuse however hangs on and 18.4 percent and 9 percent of the Goromonzi and Kwekwe permanent work force highlighted it respectively. Because of the contestations on their supply of labour to the new farms, piece/daily workers experienced more levels of verbal abuse by their employers compared to the permanent workers especially in Goromonzi. Neither gender was immune to this type of abuse. Specifically, 40.5 percent of the male piece/daily workers and 7.1 percent of their female counterparts faced this problem in this district. In Kwekwe, 32.7 percent and 9.1 percent of the male and female piece/daily workers reported verbal abuse accordingly. Another form of abuse that farm workers indicated during the interviews related to humiliation in front of their colleagues, 9.2 percent and 7.0 percent in the corresponding districts.

Table 6.57: Credit received by permanent farm workers

Type of credit	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	A1	A2	Total	A1	A2	Total
Cash loan	8.2	12.8	10.4	7.5	14.9	11
Groceries from shop	7.1	11.4	9.3	0	0	0
Agricultural produce	25.5	43.2	34.1	0	19	9.8
N	49	47	96	53	47	100

Existing at the margins, but evoking practices in the old LSCFs, credit in lieu of wages was being used to tie labour to the farms (Loewenson 1992). In the former LSCFs, ubiquitous farm shops and bars in the compounds went beyond facilitating credit relations to include discouraging access to alternative services located far away and thus remain available to attend to emergencies during their off days.¹³⁶ The receipt of direct cash loans from employers was indicated by 10.4 percent and 11 percent of the Goromonzi and Kwekwe permanent workers respectively. Purchases of agricultural output from the farms on credit was reported by about 20 percent of the permanent workers. A1 and A2 permanent workers from Goromonzi more commonly described the purchase of agricultural produce than those in Kwekwe (Table 6.57). Other goods and

¹³⁶ Besides bars, many farm compounds also had football pitches to entertain the workers during their off days (see also Figure 6.22 and 6.23), while cultural activities such as *nyau* dances were also permitted in the farm compounds (Loewenson 1992; Amanor-Wilks 1995).

services were also accessed on credit by a few farm workers whose employers had on-farm shops. Specifically, such facilities were noted by 7.1 percent and 11.4 percent of the A1 and A2 permanent workers in Goromonzi. As the HRW (2018) also found, the goods in the shops owned by some of the new farm employers were overpriced, thus limiting the stretch of the wages of permanent farm workers. The farm employers therefore indirectly reduced their wage outlays through the charging of above “market” prices and/or recaptured the wages in the credit relations.

6.5.4.2 Organisation of farm work

Apart from the delivery of piece rate tasks, *mugwazo* as it did in the former LSCFs (Rutherford 2001a; Mutisi 2003), undertook the same role for permanent and seasonal labour forces. It is recognised in *Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014: 1016* as “task work” and permissible as way of allocating work to farm employees. Ostensibly to prevent work overload, the statute defines task work as an “... amount of work which an employer can expect to be completed by an average employee during the day” (GoZ 2014: 1009). In the absence of any guideline of sorts, the prerogative of what constitutes this kind of work becomes the employer’s discretion. A remnant of the colonial labour practices (Clarke 1977), *mugwazo* is still only legally permissible in the agricultural sector and entrenches inequities between farm labour relations and others.¹³⁷ As seen earlier, a number of piece workers were struggling to acquit *mugwazo* on their own and had to call on the labour from their families (section 6.5.2). Before, the work of Rutherford (2001a) shed light on the abuse of this system in tobacco LSCFs in Hurungwe district as quantum of work was unilaterally increased in relation to the pressure to meet market delivery targets for instance. To its credit, the legal statute governing the labour relations of farm workers outlaws the ticket system, which only recorded a day’s work after the completion of the task.

Mugwazo was reported to be the predominant mechanism of task allocation by Goromonzi permanent workers (Table 6.58). Kwekwe permanent workers were mainly

¹³⁷ Task work or *mugwazo* is legally banned in all other industrial sectors and persists as remnant of the colonial practices in the LSCFs. This also represents the uneven treatment of farm labour relations to the rest of the working classes.

livestock herders or “*vakomana vemombe*” and *mugwazo* was inapplicable to their work.¹³⁸ Work was reportedly organized through specific start and end time in the farms that did not deploy *mugwazo*.

Table 6.58: Issuance of daily work targets for permanent workers

Daily targets	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	A1	A2	Total	A1	A2	Total
Yes	49	55.3	52.1	9.6	14.9	12.1
No	51	44.7	47.9	90.4	85.1	87.9
Subtotal	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	49	47	96	52	47	99
Chi-Square	0.386			0.646		
p	0.534*			0.422*		

*Not significant at $p < 0.05$

Outcomes from *mugwazo* work can both be positive and negative in terms of the hours spent at work by the permanent workers, dependent as it is on the completion of the task allocated. The task for the day determined whether workers would “*chaisa*” early or finish late and workdays were thus not defined in terms of a specific number of hours.¹³⁹

Overall, the permanent workers employed on farms in Goromonzi, which organised work on *mugwazo* reported shorter working hours falling within the standard eight hour mark (68.9 percent) compared to those with defined start and end times (47.9 percent).¹⁴⁰ The flow of work for those not on *mugwazo* was such that 42.1 percent were working more than eight hours per day in this district.

Instead of division of the permanent workforce by the enterprise sections as done on the former LSCFs (Loewenson 1992; Gibbon & Risgaard 2014), work was primarily organised through the interchange of workers between the different commodities produced in many of the A1 and A2 farming units. In Goromonzi, 75.5 percent and 59.6 percent of the A1 and A2 permanent workers operated on such basis respectively (Table 6.59). While in Kwekwe the same was reported by 90.6 percent and 59.6 percent of the

¹³⁸“*Vakomana vemombe*” is vernacular Shona, which literally translates to, “cattle boys”, was used by A1 and A2 landholders to refer to male permanent workers hired in Kwekwe as livestock herders.

¹³⁹ “*Chaisa*” is a Shona term used across the working class, including farm workers, to refer to the completion of the work day.

¹⁴⁰ The length of workday was associated at $p < 0.05$ to the dominant method of work allocation. Chi-Square=7.807, $p=0.020$.

A1 and A2 permanent workers correspondingly. The remaining permanent labourers reported being grouped in various divisions on the farm (Table 6.59). While not widespread, this practice nevertheless was still visible, especially in the A2 farms, and to a lesser extent in the A1 farms (Table 6.59).

Table 6.59: Assignment of permanent workers to specific enterprises/section

Enterprise/ Section	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	A1	A2	Total	A1	A2	Total
Not assigned	75.5	59.6	67.7	90.6	59.6	76
Field crops	2.0	10.6	6.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Horticulture	0.0	2.1	1.0	1.9	2.1	2.0
Livestock	14.3	8.5	11.5	1.9	8.5	5.0
Engineering	2.0	8.5	5.2	0.0	2.1	1.0
Transport	2.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	10.6	5.0
Irrigation	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.3	2.0
Security	4.1	12.8	8.3	1.9	8.5	5.0
Oher	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	4.3	3.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	49	47	96	53	47	100
Chi-Square	10.810			17.363		
p	0.094*			0.015**		

*Not significant at $p < 0.05$ **Significant at $p < 0.05$

The few women permanent workers working on the farms that were characterised by commodity segmentation in the two districts were assigned to field crops, while livestock, irrigation, engineering and transport sections were occupied by men. This was different from the segmentation of labour along commodity lines that intersected with feminisation of labour in particular enterprises such as horticulture, not only in Zimbabwe's LSCFs (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Davies 2000), but expanding in leaps and bounds in the large farms evolving in former non-Settler countries such as Ghana and Ethiopia (Barrientos 2014; Maertens & Swinnen 2009; SOFA Team & Doss 2011). The production of a few commodities by the range of farmers partly explains the relatively underdeveloped commodity-wise segmentation of labour (see section 6.4.2).

6.5.5 Transition of the residential labour tenancy system

The residential labour tenancy through the on-farm accommodation tied to employment guaranteed farm labour supplies and entrenched control over workers by LSCFs since the colonial era in former-Settler countries (Speirenborg 2019; Arrighi 1970; Clarke 1977; Sachikonye & Zishiri 1999; Tandon 2001). After land redistribution and the consequent

nationalisation of freehold tenure in the former LSCFs, farm workers in old farm compounds were experiencing this relationship in diverse ways due to the policy variations between the A1 and A2 schemes. Old farm compounds in the A1 scheme were not redistributed to the new landholders but were retained as state land (Sukume *et al.* 2004) as noted earlier (Chapter Five) and the former farm workers were permitted to continue their residency and selling labour, *albeit* without any formal tenure stipulated.

Certainly, the infrastructure in the old farm compounds in the A1 schemes was now state property and importantly the farm workers living in these areas do not “belong” to any particular farmer in the sense discussed by Rutherford (2003). There is a separation between their residency and employment and farm workers criss-cross many former LSCFs in search of jobs. More recently, the state reinforced tenure security of farm workers during the evaluation of the various infrastructures inherited from the former LSCFs by the new landholders for the purpose of implementing the land rentals policy. The A1 land beneficiaries were informed they had no the right to evict the former farm workers from the compounds (MGA 2018: Interview). By levying a rental of US\$10 per room per month in the houses under brick and asbestos for occupants that were not originally living in the farm compound before 2000, the state legitimated the residential rights of former farm workers who were exempted from these new charges. Unlike the former LSCFs, the new A1 landholders lack the power derived from policy to control the labour supplies of farm workers living in the old compounds. If anything, the power to prolong the tying of employment to access to housing on the farms was also diffused among the multitudes of farmers who received land on the same former LSCF (see also Moyo 2011a; 2013; Scoones *et al.* 2018a).

A2 farmers, on the other hand, have rights on the farm compound if it falls in the subdivision they were allocated (Sukume *et al.* 2004). According to the *Gazetted Land (Consequential Provisions) Act of 2006:3*, A2 farmers are empowered to evict former farm workers from the old farm compounds, including for refusal to work for them via Section 3(3), which states that:

“..If a former owner or occupier [includes farm workers living in farm compound] of Gazetted land who is not lawfully authorized to occupy, hold or use that land does not cease to occupy,

hold, or use that land after [45 days of gazetting]....shall be guilty of an offence and liable to fine not exceeding level seven or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years...”.

The former farm workers in these A2 farms can therefore be subjected to the residential labour tenancy relations through the operation of the law as the precedent set by the Constitutional Court in 2016 suggests (see Section 6.6.6). The A2 farmers can therefore use the force of the law to evict former farm workers who refuse to work for them. Yet the downsized farms, especially in Goromonzi, imply that most of the A2 subdivisions were not able to hire all the workers in the farm compounds and the other A2 beneficiaries within the same old LSCF have restricted powers to enforce residential labour tenancy in the compound that does not lie in their plot.

Section 21(4) of the *Statutory 116 of 2014: 1022* also reinforces the residential labour tenancy relationship since it directs employees who are dismissed from employment to “...vacate the property of his or her employer immediately on the payment of monies due to him or her from the employer to employee within seventy two hours...” or within 30 days in the case of retrenchment.¹⁴¹ The workers residing on A2 farm compounds were the ones mostly confronted with need to secure their accommodation by selling wage labour.

Table 6.60: Residency for Farm Workers

Type of residency	Goromonzi (%)				Kwekwe (%)			
	P	S	PWD	Total	P	S	PWD	Total
Old A1 compound	18	50	35.4	28.1	2.9	12.9	4.1	4.8
Old A2 compound	23	0	24.1	21.1	21.4	45.2	28.4	27.4
LSCF compound	4	5	5.1	4.5	0	0	0	0
New A2 compound	13	10	2.5	8.5	12.6	3.2	2.7	7.7
New A1 compound	2	0	0	1	14.6	12.9	9.5	12.5
A1 homestead	28	0	3.8	15.6	32	6.5	13.5	21.6
A2 homestead	7	0	8.9	7	6.8	9.7	0	4.8
Own A1 plot	1	0	7.6	3.5	1.9	9.7	21.6	10.1
Own CA home	4	35	11.4	10.1	0	0	0	0
Same house as employer	0	0	0	0	7.8	0	8.1	6.7
Other	0	0	1.3	0.5	0	0	12.2	4.3
N	100	20	79	199	103	31	73	208

¹⁴¹ In addition, this statute sanctions the behaviour of farm workers in the farm compound beyond the work relations and “disorderly behaviour”, albeit not defined, can attract instant dismissal from work (*Statutory 116 of 2014: 1050*). However, “minor domestic” and “personal issues”, still not defined are excluded from the offences penalised under this provision.

Altogether, 12 types of residency for farm workers were discernible from the farms studied (Table 6.60). The degree of dependency on the employer for both work and residency varied between the different types of farm labourers.

Over 67 percent of piece/daily worker lived in houses that were not “owned” by their employers and/or not tied to labour supplies in the farming units and were thus relatively less encumbered by residential labour tenancy (Table 6.61).¹⁴² Totally different relations faced the permanent workers and to a lesser extent the seasonal labourers. The newly acquired autonomy of piece/daily workers in the new labour markets was manifest in their shifts between employers and fashioning diverse social reproduction strategies, including being the main actors in the trading of natural resources more than the other groups of workers (see Table 6.18).

Table 6.61: Residency linkages to employment in the resettled areas

Linked	Goromonzi (%)				Kwekwe (%)			
	P	S	PWC	Total	P	S	PWC	Total
Yes	83	50	32.9	59.8	92.2	58.1	32.4	65.9
No	17	50	67.1	40.2	7.8	41.9	67.6	34.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	100	20	79	199	103	31	74	208
Chi-Square	46.948				69.480			
p	0.000				0.000			

*Significant at $p < 0.05$

It was mostly those farm workers living in the old compounds on A2 farms, new farm compounds and homesteads of landholders (75 percent) who experienced the linkage of their residential and employment rights. This could be attributed to the higher dependency on hired farm labour in A2 farms than those in A1 farms. Indeed, lower levels of such linkages were reported by those staying on old compounds on A1 farms (40.9 percent).

¹⁴²This disconnection between residency and employment were also evident in a complaint made by the farm accountant at Hurudza A2 farm in Goromonzi in the press. He lamented that farm labourers were enjoying free housing in the farm compound yet they were working in Harare and not on the farm. See “Workers toil for nothing at Chapfika farm”, The Newsday 5 January 2013, (www.newsday.co.zw/2013/05/01/workers-toil-for-nothing-at-chapfika-farm/ [accessed 14 May 2016]).

Evidently, the new compounds being constructed on the plot subdivisions of mostly the A2 farms to provide residency for the smaller-sized permanent workforces (Section 6.2.3) reflect their limited control over labour supplies in the old compounds. They represent the desire of the new small-scale capitalist farmers to re-assert their control over workers as individual farm owners and extend the operation of the residential labour tenancy. New farm compounds were recorded in 55 percent of the A2 capitalist farms in Goromonzi and were absent in the A1 scheme. The relatively lower demand for wage labour compared to Goromonzi reflected in the investment in new farm compounds that were limited to 10.2 percent and 17.9 percent of the A1 and A2 land recipients in Kwekwe respectively. Rather than in the new compounds, all permanent labour hiring A1 landholders and 13.3 percent of A2 farms in Goromonzi were providing accommodation at their homesteads also tied to employment. A1 households (85.7 percent) also dominated this avenue paralleled to A2 (66.7 percent) in Kwekwe.

Public tenures have weakened the new landholders' capacity to link residency and employment of farm workers living in old compounds (Moyo 2011a). The partial disentanglement of the residential labour tenancy was nonetheless subject to contestations as piece/daily workers resident in both the A1 and A2 old farm compounds were sometimes pressurised to supply labour on the farms they live by the new farmers or be visited by evictions (see Section 6.6.6). Farm workers responded to eviction threats by violently confronting landholders, particularly in Goromonzi A1 farms (Section 6.6.6). The opportunity to clarify the land tenure security of farm workers was not taken up by the FLTRP policy. As discussed later (Section 6.6.6), the struggles over labour supplies from the old compounds were an outcome of this gap in the policy to accommodate the residential requirements of farm workers by assuming automatic re-absorption into wage labour by the new farming units.


6.5.6 Agrarian wages and other forms of in-kind payments

The monetary wages received by farm workers has received wide scholarly and media attention since 2000 (Chakanya 2016; LEIDRIZ 2018; Muchichwa 2016; Sachikonye

2003).¹⁴³ Quite correctly, many have pointed out that the measly wages remunerated to farm workers were inadequate to meet their social reproduction needs (Scoones *et al.* 2010; Scoones *et al.* 2018a; Hanlon *et al.* 2013; Sachikonye 2003; Magaramombe 2010). Yet limitations are abound in the analysis of the factors leading to the low wage outcomes, as well as the insufficient consideration of the “social wages”, which now constitute their remuneration.

Agrarian wages and indeed the working conditions of farm workers need to be comprehended in tandem with the wider economic situation in the country and beyond (Silver 2003; Bharadawaj 1989), as well as in their historical context (Chambati & Moyo 2004).

Figure 6.14: Real and nominal minimum wages of farm workers, 1979-2016



Source: Compiled from various sources *Kanyenze (2001) for data from 1979 to 2000; LEDRIZ Excel database of wages from 2001 to 2016. Data missing for the hyperinflationary period, 2002 to 2008.


Chapter Five chronicled the trajectory of wages and exposed how they could not meet farm labour’s social reproduction needs and the high poverty levels afflicting this segment of society. It is therefore not correct to associate the low wages in the farms at the current conjecture to the redistribution and subsequent division of LSCFs into

¹⁴³ See, for example, “Farm workers grapple with poor wages”, The Financial Gazette, 7 November 2013, Harare (www.financialgazette.co.zw/farm-workers-grapple-with-poor-wages/ accessed on 18 April 2018).

smaller-scale farm units under the A1 and A2 schemes. The low wages visible now represent a continuum of the decline of real wages of farm workers that had set in motion by 1985 and gathered pace after implementation of ESAP (Kanyenze 2001; Figure 6.14) and much earlier for the many sections of the working classes (Saunders 2001).

To set the record straight, it is not only farm workers who have faced the challenge of poor wages. In actual fact, the Zimbabwe economy descended into hyperinflationary mode by 2008 and relatively stabilised from 2009 after the demonitisation of the Zimbabwean dollar and uptake of multiple foreign currencies for trading (see Chapter Five). Yet the wages of the broader working classes remain below the PDL as the situation before the hyperinflationary phase. Around 2005, farm wages constituted an estimated 10 percent of the PDL and urban commercial sector workers then were only able to meet 33 percent of the food basket calculated by the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 109; see also Figure 6.15). Documented comparisons of the minimum wages in different sectors between 2011 and 2016 have also shown that this has persisted to be case for many industrial workers, as well as civil service workers (Chakanya 2016).

Figure 6.15: Percent share of nominal minimum farm wages to PDL



Source: Compiled from various sources *Kanyenze (2001) for data from 1979 to 2000; LEDRIZ Excel database of wages from 2001 to 2016. Data is missing for the hyperinflationary period, 2002 to 2008. PDL represent minimum consumption needs for a family of five.

It is, however, inadequate to examine the farm labourers' socio-economic position in relation to the PDL using only the monetary wage. The evidential base suggests a wider wage structure for farm workers, including the subsidies and "social wages" such as


informal land access and natural resource trading. Proceeding in this direction in what follows this section examines the broader structure of farm worker wages.

6.5.6.1 Formation of agrarian labour wages

State minimum wage setting was replaced by collective bargaining after the deregulation of the labour relations in 1991 managed by the National Employment Councils. Now the state only ratifies and gazettes the Collective Bargaining agreements between employers and trade unions to make them legally binding to all industry participants. As noted earlier, wage negotiations for full-time and seasonal labourers were supposed to be guided *Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014*. Whilst, the wages of piece/daily workers, which are not included in this law were an outcome of local level discussions between the employers and employees. Quarterly wage negotiations responded to inflationary pressures between 2000 and 2008, until they reverted to annual runs in 2009.

The ALB, which dealt with labour relations for the CFU, was overly influential in the Collective Bargaining as the repression of farm wages up until 2000 signals (Kanyenze 2001; Rutherford 2001b). Not diverging from this path, the new employer representatives namely, the ZFU, ZCFU and ZAEO continue to eclipse farm worker trade unions in the wage determination processes. Between 2009 and 2017, gazetted monthly minimum wages rose from US\$32 to US\$ 72 (Figure 6.16). With the balance of power tilted in their favour, employers have foiled trade union demands for annual increments seen in the wage freezes between 2011 and 2012 and then again 2014 and 2017 (Figure 6.16).

Figure 6.16: Minimum wages of permanent and seasonal farm workers



Source: Various NECAIZ collective bargaining agreements

The demands for wage increases by workers were met by threats of retrenchments by the employers (Magwaza 2017: Interview). "...If the workers complain about low wages at the farms." Mr. Magwaza added, "...employers tell them that there are many people who are waiting at the gate for that job...". The high unemployment rate in Zimbabwe and/or the size of surplus labour have thus been central in the formation of farm wages (Jha 1996: 230).

Various position papers by ZAE0 reflect their aversion to wage increases, fingering the unfavourable macroeconomic conditions and escalation of input costs as impairing their ability to cope with ever-rising wage bills (ZAE0 2015; 2014). ZAE0 in fact viewed farm worker minimum wages as enough to meet their costs of living. For instance in 2013, they calculated a basket of goods at US\$56.49 for a family of four, which was below the prevailing minimum wage of US\$65 then (Table 6.62). Despite facing a relatively high input cost structure, they advanced, the farm wages in Zimbabwe were competitive to the experiences obtaining in other Southern African countries of Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. The basket of goods did not only miss other critical sources of proteins such as meat and fish, it condemned farm workers to a monotonous carbohydrate filled diet. Crucially, the omission of education, clothing and health costs painted a dismal picture of their understanding of the social reproduction of farm workers and their families.

Table 6.62: Basic monthly basket of groceries

Item	Quantities	Price (US\$)
Maize Meal	5x 10 kgs	29.00
Cooking Oil	2 litres	3.79
Salt	1 kg	0.50
Sugarbeans	4x 500g	4.80
Sugar	2x2kg	4.30
Tea	100bags	1.95
Powdered milk	1kg	4.75
Peanut Butter	375 ml	1.87
Assorted Vegetables	4kgs	4.00
Green Soap	1 bar	1.53
Total		56.49

Source: ZAE0 (2014: 9)

Numerous farm employers were, however, divorced from the farmer associations that negotiate on their behalf with farm worker trade unions in the collective bargaining

process. The current membership of the ZCFU, which represents the capitalist A2 farmers on the CBA was limited.¹⁴⁴ A few have been shown to identify with local farmer groups that were not linked to the national associations (Chiweshe 2012; Munyuki-Hungwe 2011; Murisa 2010; 2011; 2013). The farm workers were also not part of the trade unions (section 6.6.1). Against this background it should not be unexpected that most of the surveyed farmers were reliant on local level negotiations to determine wages rather than the formal collective bargaining process.

Cited by over 97 percent of the Goromonzi A1 and A2 households, wages of permanent workers were based on local level negotiations in the context of the prevailing rates in surrounding farms. Kwekwe A1 farms were no different - up to 95.7 percent mentioned this route. Kwekwe A2 farms were the ones which frequently adhered to gazetted minimum wages (25 percent), but still the majority among them decided wages at the farm level. Over 90 percent of the permanent farm workers confirmed this method of wage setting. Only in a few instances, did A1 and A2 permanent employees in Goromonzi, mainly those endowed with scarce skills such as tobacco curing and grading indicate setting their wages, 6.1 percent and 8.5 percent respectively. Most employees negotiated wages individually (75.3 percent) and thus their collective voice was divided to the advantage of the employers.

6.5.6.2 Monetary farm wages

Cash and kind were combined in the payment of farm wages. Between 2015 and 2017, the actual wages received by permanent workers were significantly uneven between the A1 and A2 schemes in the two districts and grew at a snail's pace (Table 6.63). Higher wages were symptomatic of the A2 capitalist farms compared to the A1 farms and Kwekwe farms in general paid more than their corresponding counterparts in Goromonzi.

Across the three years investigated, the majority of the farmers fell behind the minimum wage especially in Goromonzi, but again unevenly distributed and featuring more in the

¹⁴⁴ Indeed, the Chief Executive Officer of NECAIZ complained that the farmer organisations had limited membership and were not represented at all in some subsectors and thus had no mandate in the Collective Bargaining process (Jera 2017: Interview).

A1 than the A2 farms (Table 6.63).¹⁴⁵ Linkages to the collective bargaining process were mirrored in the larger proportions of Kwekwe farm households that equaled or surpassed the minimum wage (Table 6.63).

Table 6.63: Mean farm wages of permanent workers *

Year	Goromonzi					Kwekwe				
	A1	% < Min. wage	A2	% < Min. wage	Total RA	A1	% < Min. wage	A2	% < Min. wage	Total RA
2017	63	3.8	70	25.8	68	71	32.7	87	57.5	78
2016	60	3.8	69	24.2	66	64	29.2	80	41	71
2015	57	3.8	66	21	63	49	14.6	71	27.5	59
N	26		62		88	49		40		89

*Wages significantly different between A1 and A2 households in each district. Min - Minimum

Throwing light to this somewhat gloomy scenario, the evidence suggests absence of gender discrimination in the payment of wages for permanent. The few women permanent workers were earning an average of US\$84 per month compared to US\$79 amongst their male counterparts in Goromonzi, while in Kwekwe males wage averaged US\$86 to US\$70 for the female permanent workers. Skilled permanent workers nonetheless earned higher wages than the unskilled general hands (Table 6.64).

Table 6.64: Differentiation of wages of farm workers by skill levels (US\$)

Skill level	Goromonzi		Kwekwe	
	Mean	No. of workers	Mean	No. of workers
General hand	73	63	81	78
Tractor driver	97	7	74	6
Skilled work*	94	9	112	3
Supervisor	104	8	120	1
Foreman	118	3	183	3
Farm security	64	9	86	7
Total	80	99	86	98

*irrigation, repairs, tobacco grading, mechanic

Around 2009, daily wage rates ranged between US\$1.00 to US\$1.50 per day in both districts. They had increased to an average of US\$4 in both districts by 2017 in tandem with rise in the wages of permanent workers and differences were not noticeable across

¹⁴⁵ This has been a persistent problem since 2000. Around 2012, the then General Secretary of GAPWUZ, Gift Muti was quoted in the press claiming that more than half of the new farmers were not meeting the minimum wage. See “New farmers fail to pay workers”, The Newsday 21 March 2012, Harare (www.newsday.co.zw/2012/03/21/2012-03-21-new-farmers-fail-to-pay-workers/ [Accessed 17 June 2016]).

the resettlement models. But, piece wage rates varied according to the crops grown and nature of the tasks. Labour demanding activities such as weeding a 0.25 hectares in maize field commanded a wage of US\$5, while digging holes for planting the same land area was paid US\$3.00 (NYT 2017: Interview). While a piece rate wage of US\$5.00 was being paid for weeding a 0.06 hectares of land in a commodity like tobacco that was destined for the international markets, so was the daily-based work. Male part-time workers realised a relatively higher monthly income during the peak seasonal period than female part-time workers in Goromonzi, US\$64 and US\$57 per month respectively. The opposite was however true in Kwekwe with women earning US\$73 per month compared to US\$65 for men.

Table 6.65: Challenges faced by permanent workers in receiving wages

Challenge	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	A1	A2	Subtotal	A1	A2	Subtotal
None	77.6	76.6	77.1	67.9	70.2	69
Not paid on time	16.3	12.8	14.6	20.8	12.8	24.6
Split payments	4.1	2.1	3.1	5.7	4.3	7.2
Irregular payments	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.7	8.5	10.1
Not paid at all	2.0	8.5	5.2	0.0	4.3	2.9
Subtotal	22.4	23.4	22.9	32.1	29.8	44.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	49	47	96	53	47	69
Chi-Square	2.432			3.597		
p	0.488*			0.463*		

*Not significant at $p < 0.05$

Compounding the low wage problem was accumulation of arrears, irregular pay dates, part payments and worryingly non-payments at all by the A1 and A2 households (Table 6.65).¹⁴⁶ The latter affected 8.5 percent and 4.3 percent of the A2 permanent workers that they were not receiving their wages at all in Goromonzi and Kwekwe correspondingly. Actually, at the time of the survey, wage arrears were pointed by 14.3 percent and 14.9 percent of the A1 and A2 permanent workers in Goromonzi respectively. This was

¹⁴⁶ Such deficits in the new farm labour relations were also confirmed by various press reports. For instance, in a case brought before the Bindura Labour Court against Pasango A2 Farm in 2012, 150 farm workers deposed an affidavit claiming they were owed over two years of wages amounting to US\$107, 250. See “Workers at Masawi farm offered \$13 wages”, The Newsday, 27 April 2012, Harare, (www.newsday.co.zw/2012/04/27/2012/04/27/workers-at-masawi-farm-offered-13-wages/ [Accessed 17 June 2016]).

experienced by 18.9 percent of the A1 and 23.4 percent of A2 permanent workers in Kwekwe.

Many farm employers thus flouted *Statutory 116 of 2014*, which stipulates that permanent and seasonal workers must be paid their dues during the last four days of the month. The wage payment problems seemed more acute for the piece/daily workers particularly in Goromonzi (Table 6.66) and as much as 30.4 percent were yet to be paid work done during the survey. Conflicting trends emerged in Kwekwe nearly resembling the situation described by permanent workers (Table 6.66).

Table 6.66: Challenges faced by casual labourers in receiving wages

Challenge	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	S	PWD	Total	S	PWD	Total
None	94.7	50.6	60.2	77.4	78.9	78.4
Not paid on time	5.3	26.6	22.4	3.2	15.5	11.8
Not paid fully at once	0.0	15.2	12.2	16.1	2.8	6.9
Irregular payments	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.2	2.8	2.9
Not paid at all	0.0	6.3	5.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Subtotal	5.3	48.1	39.8	22.6	21.1	21.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	19	79	98	31	71	102
Chi-Square	12.541			8.533		
p	0.006*			0.036*		

*Significant at $p < 0.05$

Towards the end of the first quarter of 2016, the severe shortage of cash notes in the economy had sprung up to worsen the wage problems not only for farm workers, but the wider populace (RBZ 2016). For many years, farm workers had been receiving their wages in cash and this under-banked community were now required to open bank accounts and/or mobile money accounts. They were parting with up to 10 percent of their wages to charges levied by the “cash traders” in order to access cash notes from their mobile money accounts (PLB 2018: Interview), while for piece/daily work, kind payments (mostly maize grain) displaced in 2009 after “dollarisation” were making a comeback (BLG 2017: Interview; NYT 2017: Interview). Likewise, piece/daily workers were also losing value through barter deals with urban traders referred to as “*makoronyera*” in Goromonzi and “*gandanzara*” in Kwekwe¹⁴⁷ who frequent the

¹⁴⁷ *Makoronyera* or *gandanzara* in the local lingua generally refers to people who survive on hustling

resettled areas to exchange grain with farmers and farm workers paid in kind with various goods and services, including clothes and food items.¹⁴⁸

Poor wages were etched in the minds of permanent and casual workers and over 82 percent in Goromonzi ranked them as the foremost challenge in their social reproduction, while 74.2 percent and 62.1 percent of the permanent and seasonal workers in Kwekwe communicated the same. Perhaps pointing to their diverse social reproduction strategies, 50 percent of the piece/daily workers said low wages was their biggest challenges.

6.5.6.3 Farm employment benefits

In addition to the monetary wages, permanent workers were entitled to statutory allowances in the form of housing, light, transport and fuel. Excluding transport, which was supposed to be reimbursed on a cost basis to non-resident employees, between 2009 and 2011, the allowances were pegged at US\$4.00, US\$1.50 and US\$2.00 respectively (GoZ 2011a). From 2012 onwards, the corresponding allowances were increased to US\$35, US\$8.00 and US\$10 (GoZ 2012b). Housing was accorded in the old farm compounds that some of the A2 landholders now control, at their homesteads as well as in the new farm compounds that some of them have built (section 6.5.5). No rental payments were being charged for accommodation, except for only one permanent worker from Kwekwe, against the provisions of the law. Not all permanent workers were provided accommodation directly by their employers since some were living in the old farm compounds on other farms rent-free.

More than half of the piece/daily workers surveyed (59.5 percent) in Goromonzi also continued to enjoy free accommodation in the old LSCF compounds under diluted residential tenancy relationships (see Section 6.5.6) and a lesser share (32.5 percent) in Kwekwe which did not have this infrastructure on all former LSCFs.

Notwithstanding the queries on the mode of supply in the collective bargaining process (Jera 2017: Interview), fuel provision in the form of firewood reached many permanent farm workers (Table 6.67). In place of collecting on their own on the farm they were

¹⁴⁸ For instance a two kilogramme pack of sugar, which was retailing for less than US\$2.00 in major supermarkets in urban centres was being exchanged for a bucket of maize that was pegged at the equivalent of US\$5.00 in the farm labour markets.

employed, GAPWUZ has been insisting that the employers deliver the firewood at farm workers doorsteps. Then the additional unpaid labour the workers incur on behalf of the employers during collection would be eradicated. Employers on the other hand, claim that since the firewood was being collected on the lands belonging to them, it thus qualified as provision. This impasse was yet to be resolved at the time of writing. However, non-universality of paid annual leave infringed on the labour rights of permanent workers (Table 6.67).

Table 6.67: In-kind payments received by permanent farm wage labourers

Benefit	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	Model type where permanent workers were employed					
	A1	A2	Subtotal	A1	A2	Subtotal
Housing	77.6	91.5	84.4	100	93.6	97
Firewood	75.5	97.9	86.5	75.5	57.4	67
Hospital fees	42.9	51.1	46.9	50.9	27.7	40
Grazing land	2	4.3	3.1	5.7	0	3
Annual leave	38.8	53.2	45.8	37.7	31.9	35
Protective clothing	61.2	85.1	72.9	58.5	63.8	61
Funeral assistance	4.1	25.5	14.6	26.4	19.1	23
School fees	0	6.5	3.2	3.8	8.5	6
Attendance bonus	12.2	14.9	13.5	1.9	12.8	7
Production bonus	6.1	12.8	9.4	11.3	21.3	16
N	49	47	96	53	47	84

The employment benefits nonetheless exceeded the dictates of the law. Incentives such as work attendance and production bonuses were also evolving, though covering a few permanent workers and expressed more times by those employed in the capitalist farms in the A2 scheme (Table 6.67). The other non-statutory benefits disclosed related to assistance with hospital fees that was acknowledged by at least 40 percent and funeral costs, which characterised a reduced share of permanent workers in both districts (Table 6.67). Lastly, the educational costs of the children of farm workers received the least attention and in this respect the new farm employers traced in the footsteps of their LSCF forerunners (Loewenson 1992; Mugwetsi & Balleis 1994).

6.5.6.4 Other forms of in-kind payments received by agrarian labourers

Permanent and casual workers were also receiving other social wages such as land access in the farm compounds and parcelled out from the employers allocations as part of their employment benefits in the new farming units. Additionally, the wage structure for some

permanent labourers included subsidy payments in the form of monthly food rations and meals provided during working hours. Maize grain was the most popular item revealed by 48.4 percent of the workers in Goromonzi and 65.0 percent in Kwekwe, followed by cooking oil (Table 6.68). Quantities of maize grain ranged from 10 to 50 kilogrammes and on average most received 20 kilogrammes. Other food items such as sugarbeans and beef were generally restricted to less than 36 percent, except for dried fish received by 41.5 percent in Kwekwe.

Table 6.68: Provision of monthly foodstuffs to permanent workers

Foodstuffs	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	A1	A2	Subtotal	A1	A2	Subtotal
Maize grain	49	47.8	48.4	69.8	59.6	65
Oil	34.7	30.4	32.6	54.7	21.3	39
Beans	12.2	17.4	14.7	32.1	12.8	23
Soap	30.6	30.4	30.5	35.8	10.6	24
Beef	12.2	4.3	8.4	20.8	6.4	14
Dried fish	20.4	8.7	14.7	41.5	12.8	28
N	49	46	95	53	47	72

Meals at work were also offered to at least 40.8 percent of the A1 and A2 permanent workers in Goromonzi (Table 6.69). The majority of the A2 permanent workers (27.7 percent) ate once at work compared to twice for those in the A1 farms (20.4 percent) in this district. In Kwekwe, 28 percent cited this benefit.

Table 6.69: Provision of workplace meals to permanent workers

Meals given	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	A1	A2	Subtotal	A1	A2	Subtotal
No meals	59.2	59.6	59.4	64.2	80.9	72
One meal	12.2	27.7	19.8	5.7	14.9	10.0
Two meals	20.4	12.8	16.7	9.4	2.1	6.0
Three meals	8.2	0.0	4.2	20.8	2.1	12.0
Subtotal	40.8	40.4	40.6	35.8	19.1	28.0
N	49	47	96	53	47	100
Chi-Square	7.558			12.507		
p	0.056*			0.006**		

*Not significant at $p < 0.05$ **Significant at $p < 0.05$

The piece/daily workers also received food at work and in actual fact this covered more of them than the permanent workers (Table 6.70). Beyond incentivising the workforce, meals at work also served as instrument of labour control. Delays at work were curtailed

by the supply of either breakfast and/or lunch by the employers since this avoided workers returning to their homes to eat. Therefore, labour remained relatively at the disposal of the employer during the workday. Cumulatively, the food items limited the exposure of at least a segment of the farm worker population to unstable food markets in the context of the low wages earned.

Table 6.70: Provision of workplace meals to casual workers

Meals	Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	S	PWC	Total	S	PWC	Total
No meal	5.3	31.6	26.5	61.3	42.3	48
One meal	26.3	50.6	45.9	9.7	28.2	22.5
Two meals	68.4	17.7	27.6	22.6	25.4	24.5
Three meals	0	0	0	6.5	4.2	4.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	19	79	98	31	71	102
Chi-Square	20.280			5.186		
p	0.00*			0.159**		

*Significant at $p < 0.05$ **Not significant at $p < 0.05$

Through “redistribution within redistribution”, some permanent workers were engaging in independent food production on lands excised from their employers allocations (see Table 6.45). The farm compounds were not just places of residency, but also zones of agricultural production activities and other enterprises. For 27.3 percent, 25 percent and 31.8 percent of the permanent, seasonal and piece/daily workers also informally accessed small pieces of arable land in Goromonzi in these areas respectively (see Table 6.45). New agricultural land uses have found their way in old compound to include tobacco and even cattle rearing that were not permitted in the former LSCFs (section 6.6.6). This was nonetheless restricted to less than 13 percent of the different types of farm workers in Kwekwe. Not emphasised in the literature narrowly zooming on FTLRP formal allocations, this informal land access favoured more of the A1 permanent workers and its incidence more common in Goromonzi (see Table 6.45). These small plots contributed to partially meeting some of the food requirements of the farm workers (see section 6.6.5).

Well short of being acts of benevolence, the non-statutory benefits and social wages were a result of the competition for labour and the struggles waged by farm workers to advance their socio-economic conditions. The manifestation of these struggles in the rural areas is explained in depth in section 6.6.

Taking this wider view of the wage structure, farm workers were not as poorly remunerated as the emphasis on monetary wages insinuates. Yet this does not in any way mean this fully rolled back the shortfalls of the monetary wages to meet their subsistence requirements. Again, the poor farm working conditions point to the limitations of the state to implement the existing labour laws and policies. To ascertain this, the next section assesses the material conditions of farm workers.

6.5.7 Socio-economic conditions of farm workers

Analysing the socio-economic conditions in 2006, earlier research by Chambati (2011) indicated that farm wage labourers suffered precarious living conditions within the new agrarian structure. Several other commentators also arrived at similar conclusions (Hartnack 2009; Scoones *et al.* 2010; Magaramombe 2010; Chakanya 2016; LEIDRIZ 2018). The inadequacy of their farm labour and non-farm incomes to meet their social reproduction costs, including food, clothing, education and health was vivid and that land beneficiaries had better socio-economic indicators.

Then, 53 percent of the surveyed farm labourers employed in the new farms were able to consume three meals per day (breakfast, lunch and dinner), while the remaining 4.3 percent and 42.6 percent got by with one and two meals respectively (Chambati 2011: 1061).¹⁴⁹ Contrast this with 75 percent of landholders who visited the food table three times a day (Chambati 2011: 1061). As if food shortages were not enough, nutritional deficiencies were apparent in farm worker diets filled with carbohydrates and lacking in proteins. Repeated consumption of the staple *sadza* and leafy vegetables was the order of the day.¹⁵⁰ Tandon (2001), had earlier complained of the contradiction embodying farm workers as the food producers through their wage labour efforts in LSCFs, yet they could hardly have enough to eat themselves, let alone afford clothing and educational costs.

Farm workers did not fare better either in fulfilling the educational needs for their school going age children. In fact, only 22.2 percent of the school going age children were

¹⁴⁹ This research was based on a nationwide survey data that interviewed 761 farm workers in 2006 in six districts namely; Chiredzi, Goromonzi, Chipinge, Kwekwe, Mangwe and Zvimba done by the African Institute for Agrarian Studies, where the researcher is employed.

¹⁵⁰ *Sadza* is the main food consumed in the country and is cooked frequently with maize meal. It is commonly eaten during lunch and dinner.


attending school in their households compared to 77 percent in the resettled households (Chambati 2011:1061). Instead, the children were channelled to the farm labour markets. Specifically, 30.9 percent and 15.8 percent of them were employed as permanent and casual labourers respectively (Chambati 2011: 1061).

Fast forward, 12 years later, the evidence from this study demonstrates that nothing much has changed in the key socio-economic indicators such as access to food and education. Although the macroeconomic outlook improved after 2009, its benefits have eluded farm workers and many working classes, as poverty reigns havoc with incomes well below the PDL (LEDRIZ 2016).

6.5.7.1 Food consumption patterns

The number of daily meals taken was not even amongst the different types of farm workers studied and across the districts (Figure 6.17). Food shortages afflicted more of the families of irregular wage earning piece/daily workers than those of permanent and seasonal labourers in Goromonzi. Kwekwe had a larger proportion of the farm worker households that failed to eat three meals per day compared to Goromonzi and for 6.0 percent one meal was all they could manage. Consumption patterns in Kwekwe were less balanced between the different forms of farm workers, but as seen in Goromonzi, the piece/daily workers ate fewer meals than the permanent and seasonal labourers (Figure 6.17).

Figure 6.17: Number of meals consumed by farm labour households in 2017




Goromonzi, Chi-Square=15.261, p=0.004*

Kwekwe, Chi-Square=1.585, p=0.811**

*Significant at p<0.05 **Not significant at p<0.05

As the earlier research revealed, the food consumption patterns of the A1 and A2 landholders were better off to those of farm workers (Figure 6.18). A mixed bag however emerged from the Communal Areas, with those from Goromonzi struggling with meeting all the meals like the farm worker households, if not worse as only 41 percent did so. Kwekwe Communal Areas in contrast did not parade this deficiency (Figure 6.18).

Figure 6.18: Number of meals consumed by household in 2017



Goromonzi, Chi-Square=33.211 p=0.000*

Kwekwe, Chi-Square=10.038, 4 d.f., p=0.040*

*Significant at p< 0.05

The number of meals alone conceals the quality and nutritional intake of the households. Further investigations were thus embarked to assess the consumption of different food items that are required by the human body utilising the food consumption score (FCS) (World Food Programme [WFP] 2008).¹⁵¹ The FCS also revealed the shakiness of the consumption trends of the farm workers in Goromonzi. Table 6.71 illustrates that in fact, 7.0 percent of the Goromonzi workers returned a poor food consumption score compared to 4.3 percent in Kwekwe.

¹⁵¹ The food consumption score (FCS) is an index that was designed by the World Food Programme of the United Nations to measure the acceptability of the food consumption of households (WFP 2008). It assigns weights to the different food items based on their nutritional importance, namely cereals and tubers (a_1), pulses (a_2), fruits (a_3), vegetables (a_4), proteins (a_5), milk (a_6), sugar (a_7) and cooking oil (a_8) that nourish the human body. Proteins and milk command the highest weights. The FCS is obtained by the summation of the weight of each food item multiplied by the number of days (x_i) that was consumed for all the food categories over the last seven preceding the survey. The $FCS = a_1x_1 + a_2x_2 + a_3x_3 + a_4x_4 + a_5x_5 + a_6x_6 + a_7x_7 + a_8x_8$. The FCS delineates households into three distinct groups, namely poor food consumption, borderline and acceptable consumption based on the score. The ranges of the FCS for the three categories in places such as Zimbabwe where sugar and oil are part of the daily diets are: (i) poor consumption: 0 to 28; borderline: 28.5 to 42 and acceptable: > 42.

Table 6.71: Food consumption score of farm labour households

Food Consumption Score	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	P	S	PWD	Total	P	S	PWD	Total
Poor	7	10	6.3	7	2.9	9.7	4.1	4.3
Borderline	40	30	44.3	40.7	21.4	16.1	18.9	19.7
Acceptable	53	60	49.4	52.3	75.7	74.2	77	76
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	100	20	79	199	103	31	74	208
Chi-Square	1.499				2.932			
p	0.827				0.519			

*Not significant at $p < 0.05$

Close to 41 percent and 19.7 percent of the workers fell in the borderline food consumption group in the two districts respectively. Unexpectedly, three quarters of the farm labourers in Kwekwe had acceptable food scores compared to just half of those in Goromonzi. The poor and borderline food consumption scores signify the infrequent consumption of milk and proteins (WFP 2008). Hence, a large proportion of the Goromonzi farm workers had diets missing these critical nutrients than in Kwekwe and carbohydrates predominated their consumption patterns.

Table 6.72: Food consumption score of farm households

Food Consumption Score	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	A1	A2	Total	CA	A1	A2	Total	CA
Poor	3.9	1.4	2.7	29.5	2.1	0	1.6	2.4
Borderline	13.2	5.4	9.3	41	17	6.3	14.4	14.1
Acceptable	82.9	93.2	88	29.5	80.9	93.7	84	83.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	76	74	150	78	194	63	257	85
Chi-Square	84.483				6.079			
p	0.00*				0.193**			

*Significant at $p < 0.05$ **Not significant at $p < 0.05$

Continually, land beneficiary households had healthier food consumption scores than the farm workers. Most of them had acceptable food consumption scores (Table 6.72). The unavailability of adequate meals also translated to poor and borderline food consumption scores for the Goromonzi Communal Areas (Table 6.72). The same could not be said of Kwekwe since over 83 percent enjoyed balanced diets.

It is plain to see from these results that land access distinguished households' capacities to achieve their food requirements and/or obtain incomes to acquire the same. As seen before (Section 6.4), most of the landed households were managing to attain incomes at least above the FPL. The land short households especially in Goromonzi Communal Areas and the farm workers were the ones most challenged with food shortages expressed both in the less than expected daily meals consumed and the nutritional gaps reflected by the food consumption scores. Kwekwe land short households, it seems, made up the limitations from the agricultural incomes from the non-farm labour markets, particularly in the high returns alluvial gold mining.

6.5.7.2 Access to education

Post-land reform, many new schooling facilities have been constructed in the resettled areas and thus widening access for both the land beneficiary and farm worker households (Moyo *et al.* 2009; Chibwana 2017). Yet the availability of money to pay school fees was impeding educational access for farm workers' children. All groups of farm workers were affected by this problem and was thus not related to the type of employment (Table 6.73). Overall, non-school attendance was counted in 25.4 percent and 25.8 percent who had school going age children in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively (Table 6.73). Now compare this with over 90 percent of resettled households who were managing to keep their children in school. The high rate of school attendance was also noted by 98.1 percent in Goromonzi Communal Area households, and 86.1 percent in Kwekwe.

Table 6.73: Farm labourers who afforded to send children to school

Afforded	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	P	S	PWD	Total	P	S	PWD	Total
Yes	69.1	87.5	74.5	72.5	69.5	78.9	78.3	74.2
No	30.9	12.5	25.5	27.5	30.5	21.1	21.7	25.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	68	8	55	131	59	19	46	124
Chi-Square	2.269				0.062			
p	0.322*				0.969*			

*Not significant at $p < 0.05$

As Weeru Phiri before them encountered (Box 6.1), some of the children of farm workers whose educational careers were being hindered by lack of school fees were finding their way into the labour markets, as well as unpaid farm labour on the family plots of land. Four of the 31 households in Goromonzi indicated that their children were selling farm labour in the resettled areas while they were not in school. In 11 of the 38 households in Kwekwe, the children had transitioned to providing unpaid farm labour for the family's own production.

Nevertheless, state social security programmes such as the BEAM, which pays for school fees for vulnerable households rarely covers the farm worker community. The selection of beneficiaries in this programme was decentralised to the school level and in the resettled areas the A1 landholders to the exclusion of farm workers dominated the committees. The children who tend to benefit were from the resettled households and farm workers' children rarely made it onto the beneficiary lists and their marginalisation was exacerbated by constrained fiscal space to cater for the demand.¹⁵² Similar to land allocation policies, gaps in the social protection policies in covering the vulnerable group of farm workers and their families were also evident. Concerns over educational access for farm workers' children have indeed raised eyebrows in the media and civil society as well.¹⁵³ A recent report by the Human Rights Watch focusing on the tobacco sector in the Mashonaland Provinces chronicled how the dreams of children of farm workers were being shattered as they moved on to farm labour markets after their parents failed to raise school fees (HRW 2018). It also points to the rise in the number of children who have to work to raise money for school fees alike the "earn and learn" programmes in the tea estates in Manicaland Province in the 1980s and 1990s (Loewenson 1991; Mutisi 2003).

¹⁵² An official in the MPSLSW was quoted in the press noting that the children of farm workers were being excluded from the BEAM programmes due to the emphasis on urban children as beneficiaries. See "Zimbabwe's lost generation: child labour on the rise", *The Standard* 20 March 2011, Harare, (www.thestandard.co.zw/2011/03/20/zimbabwes-lost-generation-child-labour-on-the-rise/). Accessed 13 March 2014).

¹⁵³ Apparently, an independent evaluation of the BEAM programme noted a disturbing trend on large plantation estates in the Lowveld regarding the use of child labour (TARSC 2012). There the management of the plantation estates were blocking the children of farm workers from benefitting from BEAM in order for the children to continue supplying labour to the estates in exchange for education the private school run by the agribusiness companies.

There, the children had to pick tea in the morning to earn their school fees and then attend classes in the afternoon (see also Chapter Four).

These findings continue to expose the inadequacy and precariousness of farm wage employment to meet the basic requirements, similar to the scenario documented in the former LSCFs. The small capitalist farms that resulted from the A2 scheme have therefore seen the perpetuation of the super-exploitation of farm labour perceived in the low wages that were below the cost of social reproduction.

6.5.8 Summary of main findings

The contemporary agrarian wage labour relations were marked “continuity and change” of the predispositions evident in the former LSCFs. It was also clear from the findings that the nature of capitalist agriculture has been transformed in as far as the use of radically different forms of hired in labour within the new agrarian structure. Yet the exploitation of labour, which characterises capitalism expressed in the poor wages not enough to meet basic subsistence requirements of workers (Patnaik 1996) was omnipresent and inequalities of the past were being replicated in different shades and scales.

Informal farm wage jobs predominate the new farming units despite whether it was full- or part-time employment. By all accounts, permanent and seasonal work fell short of the standards entrenched in the labour laws. Many operate without contracts of employment reduced in writing. Long working hours that were neither compensated via overtime pay nor additional rest days were experienced by a large section of the permanent workers. Practices such as *mugwazo* or task work, legal only in the agricultural sectors, not only continue to reinforce the unevenness of farm labour relations to the wider working class but subject workers to undefined times in terms of the work day. Moreover, this unfair practice opened up exploitation of whole families for the wages of a single person as workers sought help to acquit the onerous quantum of work. Advances in women’s representation in the farm labour force were apparent, in particular in the full-time labour. Yet inequitable gender relations remain alive, as men still overshadow women in the regular wage permanent work. Confirming the patterns in the literature (Tsikata 2015; 2009; SOFA Team & Doss 2011; Naidu & Ossome 2016), if women made to the full-

time work their mobility was restricted as many were stuck in the lowest ranked jobs. At the expense of their education but for the profitability of the new capitalist farms, the exploitation of children for low wages in the new capitalist farms has not abated.

A consequent outcome of the shift in the forms of labour reflected by the proliferation of piece/daily work types of employment in the new capitalist farms has been that the majority of the agricultural workers now fall outside the protection of the law. As a matter of fact the law defers their conditions of employment to local level negotiation and thus exposes them to the whims of capitalist farmers. Not that the law was serving the few permanent and seasonal labour that it embraces as seen by the gaps in the labour rights and reality experienced by the workers. As will become more lucid in the next section, both the state and the farm worker trade unions were overstretched to ensure the enforcement of labour rights for farm workers (Section 6.6).

Super-exploitation of farm labourers endures underpinned by the payment of wages well below the cost of social reproduction. Underpayments, non-payments, part-payments and irregular payment dates enlarged the problems of low wages. However, the wage structure in the new agrarian structure exceeded the monetary wages emphasised in the literature to include “social wages” such as informal access to land and subsidies such as monthly food rations. The workers who benefitted were clearly better off than their colleagues who exclusively depended on the labour market for survival. Regular wage earners in Goromonzi had superior socio-economic indicators than those in irregular and seasonal jobs. Yet the differences were not so obvious in Kwekwe as the piece/daily workers recovered lost ground from non-farm labour markets, especially in high income alluvial gold mining, an option not largely available to their counterparts in the other district. Substantial sections of the workforce remain mired in poverty, unable to provide adequate food for their households and more so keep children in school.

Although the low wages were characteristic in the wider economy, it will not be disputed too much that farm work remains one of the worst forms of wage labour. Inequalities in land access still remain central in compelling people to the farm labour markets (Cousins 2009; Jha 2016; Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Moyo 2011a) as many of the workers today like in the past were landless and originated from the land short Communal Areas.

Furthermore the low levels of education of many of the farm workers suggest their origin from poor families. Differentiation thus proceeds apace indicated here by the gaps between the landholders and farm workers and the other land short Communal Areas in key social economic indicators such as food consumption and access to education.

Not all backward agrarian labour relations and/or labour management practices associated with the LSCF employment have remained imprinted in the new farming units. Bearing in mind that wages alone do not influence the quality of farm labour. The FTLRP unraveled the freehold property rights on acquired farms and the restricted access to these areas by the public, civil society, media and trade unions via the trespass laws (Amanor-Wilks 1995; 2000). With trespass laws fully enforced, the abuse of farm labour could be “hidden” within the protected fences of the LSCFs, which were spatially separated from other population segments by huge distances (Tandon 2001). Additionally, this permitted the resolution of labour disputes through extra-legal mechanisms through what Rutherford (2001a) called the “domestic government”. The state tenures offering unrestricted movement in these areas have therefore opened up access to the labour relations of the new capitalist farms to wider media and public scrutiny.

It is perhaps reasonable to suggest that the significant decline the inhumane practices such as physical violence, racism and verbal abuse that pervaded the former LSCFs’ workspace, observed post-2000 was partly a result of this.

A segment of the capitalist A2 farms mimicks the hierarchical structuring of the labour force, including the hiring of managers, foremen, supervisors and so forth to intermediate the day to day work schedule especially in Goromonzi. Nonetheless, the management structures were not elaborate as those seen in the LSCFs, partly on account of the reduced workforce and agricultural operations that characterise many of the downsized farms. Simultaneously, another layer of repression has therefore found its way out of the farm labour relations. The foremen and supervisors that were delegated labour “disciplining” responsibilities were known for perpetrating abuses on fellow workers, including sexual harassment of women in exchange for jobs (Chakanya 2016; Muchena & Dzumbira

2000). Instead of the multiple layers of exploitation, farm workers increasingly have to engage directly with the owners in whom most of the managerial tasks now converge.

Another substantial shift relates to the partial dismantling of the residential tenancy (Moyo 2011a; 2013) that enables the now largest section of the agrarian labour force to vote with their feet in the new labour markets. Untied to a single employer, piece/daily workers were more autonomous in searching for jobs and could combine their farm wage with other non-farm employment. Modes of “belonging to the farm(er)” (Rutherford 2003: 191; 2001a), were now few and far between. If anything, the social reproduction strategies of the larger part of the farm labour force, the piece/daily workers, included struggles to access land and related natural resources. New A1 and A2 landholders have lost the stranglehold of farm compounds and accordingly the control of labour that it affords (Selwyn 2014; Tandon 2001; Loewenson 1992). Instead, some scholars see “new forms of conditional belonging” that overly assigns the new landholders the power to control labour that they do not have (Rutherford 2018; Hartnack 2016). These scholars have failed to see the link between the diversified sources of farm labour by the new landholders, including the construction of new independent farm compounds as a result of the inability to automatically convert people resident in the old farm compounds to labour supplies at ease as the former LSCFs did. Quite crucially, “labour shortages”, which have been a recurring problem for new farmers throughout the 2000, as a sign of the increased autonomy of former farm workers has been missed by these analysts (section 6.6). Worth emphasising is that “labour shortages” are unanticipated within a “loose” labour market with high unemployment levels obtaining in Zimbabwe at this juncture.

Existing on the margins of the new agrarian structure, farm workers were thus waging resistance not only in the labour market, but to access land to fulfill their aspirations to become “peasants”. Their dual struggles thus exhibiting semi-proletarian tendencies (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Mueller 2011) were aimed at advancing and protecting their material conditions and articulated through direct actions at the workplace and beyond.

6.6 AGENCY OF AGRARIAN LABOURERS

The data presented in the previous section illustrates that farm workers were confronted with various challenges in their livelihoods. Within the labour markets, low wages and poor working conditions loomed large. So did the insecure residential rights in the old farm compounds in A2 farms through evictions and/or threats for refusal to supply labour. Beyond the workplace, land shortages for own independent production undermined their access to food and other necessities for their subsistence. Consequently they wage varied resistances to advance their material conditions.

Rather than being purely proletarian, their struggles exhibited semi-proletarian politics (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Mueller 2011; Shivji 2017), incorporating both “workerist” and “transformative” type responses (Moyo *et al.* 2000:190). The former address their conditions as “wage labourers” and the latter seeks their transition towards more autonomous land based social reproduction. The resistance drew on their “structural power” and “associational power” from collective organisations such as trade unions and political parties (Silver, 2003:13; also see Chapter Two).

The political and economic power derived from monopoly control of land and spatial segregation of LSCFs were undermined by the FTLRP (Moyo 2011a). The new land ownership patterns and tenure reforms have dispersed the political power to many smaller scale farming units (Chambati 2011). Specifically, the undermining of the residential labour tenancy and its attendant exploitative relations enabled farm workers to mobilise resistance against poor socio-economic conditions in the new agrarian structure (Moyo 2011a; 2013; Scoones *et al.* 2018a).

Residential labour tenancy impinged on self-organisation, while trespass laws covering freehold properties meant rural trade unionism could not flourish (Kanyenze 2001). Even their social life, including who visited them in the farm compound and the requirements to declare sources of income on purchases of personal assets (Scoones *et al.* 2018a) were under the eagle eye of the former LSCFs. The farm workers were able to self-organise

beyond the farm-level workers' committees that predominated the former LSCFs (Loewenson 1992).¹⁵⁴

The section commences with an assessment of the role of trade unions in defending labour rights. It proceeds by analysing the agency of independent workers in reacting to the poor working conditions within and without the farm compounds, as well their utilisation of state policy and alliance with other external agents such as NGOs. The contribution of “associational power” derived from their participation in political parties extends the analysis. Last but not least, land struggles precede the discussion on the responses crafted by peasant and capitalist farms to labour resistance.

6.6.1 Farm worker trade unions and resistance: “associational power”

While trade unions are often inferred to provide “associational power”, which in turn workers draw upon to defend their labour rights (Silver 2003), this section demonstrates that this was very limited in the case of the farm workers studied in two districts. Information gathered from the leadership of the main farm worker trade union, GAPWUZ revealed the decline in the mobilisation and organisational capacity of trade unions after 2000 (Magwaza 2017: Interview). Retrenchments of farm workers from LSCFs acquired for resettlement decimated their membership base to 26,000 (of which 14 percent were women) from over 150,000 in 1999. But then again, membership figures are difficult to verify since the union did not maintain an up to date statistical database¹⁵⁵. It is quite possible for unions to overstate the membership base to show their political strength. Much lower membership figures of 7,000 were reported by another study in 2014 based on data from the national labour centre, ZCTU (Danish Trade Union Council [DTUC] 2014:4). Nonetheless, declining union density or membership also pervades the wider working class due to the extensive retrenchments, which accompanied ESAP in the

¹⁵⁴ See Selwyn 2014 for Brazil and Wilderman 2014 for South Africa (see Chapter Two). The possibilities to organise expand in the absence of residential labour tenancy relationships if the experiences of De Doorns in the Western Cape in South Africa are anything to go by. There seasonal workers not dependent on on-farm residency, but living in rural informal settlements were crucial in organising wildcat strike, which resulted in minimum wage increases in 2012/13 in LSCFs (Wieldman 2014).

¹⁵⁵ The number of members provided for 1999 was close to half of all the farm workers. But various studies have shown that union density was low (Rutherford 2001a) and did not exceed a third of the LSCF workforce (Kibble & Vanlerbheghe 2000).

1990s and continued throughout the 2000s (Yeros 2013a; b), such that only 7.2 percent of all wage workers nationally belonged to a trade union in 2014 (DTUC 2014: 14).

The farm worker survey results showed that only two male permanent workers out of the 194 respondents knew about trade union operations in their area in Goromonzi, while this was limited to only one worker in Kwekwe. However, none were trade union members among the sampled labourers. Circa 2005/06, an estimated 9.6 percent and one percent of them were bona fide union members in the two study areas respectively (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 157), implying a loss in the membership base.

Existing membership in the remaining LSCFs also raise concerns about the absence of GAPWUZ at the local level. A long standing member of the union since its inception in the mid 1980s in Goromonzi for instance, despite religiously contributing the US\$1.00 monthly membership subscriptions had not seen any union officials in over two years (Asani 2017: Interview).

The main trade union claimed the increased casualisation in the new farms (section 6.2.4) converting to irregular wages to sustain subscriptions was depriving them of potential members. Actually, the enlisting of members was concentrated in Mashonaland West, Harare, Manicaland (tea and timber sectors) and Mashonaland East (mainly in Macheke) to the exclusion of low labour force zones such Midlands. Permanent workers in the remaining LSCFs, plantations and agro-industrial enterprises rather than those in the A2 capitalist farms were being targeted. This recruitment strategy received a boost with the return of some former white commercial farmers who were leasing farms from new beneficiaries and were involved in all year round irrigated agricultural production and hired formal labour that was desired in the union rank and file.¹⁵⁶ But in the overall scheme, since they now dominate (Section 6.2.3), the informal piece/daily workers present a larger base the union could reach out to.

Multiple livelihood strategies also imply that for a substantial section of workers, farm labour was only one of the sources of income. Narrowly centred “workerist” approaches

¹⁵⁶ At the time of the interview, GAPWUZ had just recruited members from a former white farmer who is leasing 11 farms in Headlands (and 3 farms in Hwedza).

of trade unions (Moyo *et al.* 2000) were therefore deficient in representing their wider multi-occupational identities. The union for instance, still does not address their residential and agricultural land rights.

Simultaneously, trade union structures at the farm level such as workers committees have also dissipated. Furthermore, the few members employed currently do not support the establishment of such committees (section 6.2.3). Only 11 percent of the permanent workers in Goromonzi possessed these structures at their farms juxtaposed against 8.7 percent in Kwekwe. This was reported by 11.1 percent and 16.7 percent of the seasonal labourers in the corresponding districts.

Internal and external constraints converged to shape the declining influence and membership base of GAPWUZ. Its organisational capacity has dwindled post-2000, with the number of union organisers down to 20 in 2017 from 42 in 1999. The number of its decentralised offices also declined from 30 to 20 during the same period, and did not include the study districts. In fact the union organisers in Ruwa (bordering Goromonzi on the Western periphery) and Macheke in Marondera district some 93 kilometres away in the Eastern direction were expected to recruit workers and attend to labour disputes in Goromonzi. The Kwekwe office, which was closed down in 2013 was merged to the Gweru office – some 60 kilometres to the South West of the district.

Staffing in the secretariat was also not spared, as the workers declined from a peak of 60 (including the 42 area organisers) in 1999 to 32 in 2017. Following the resignation of the union's lawyer in 1997 to pursue full time opposition politics, the post was still vacant by 2017. Mobility was also a key challenge since only six of the union organisers have motorbikes, which limit their reach to the workers and altogether the union only had three motor vehicles that were allocated to its three geographic regions of operation.

As union membership plummeted, so did the financial viability of the union given its dependency on membership subscriptions.¹⁵⁷ Yet as union officials admitted, land reform

¹⁵⁷ The reduced membership subscriptions were being deployed to cover salaries of the union's bureaucracy, and other administrative costs at the main and local offices, while a few worker education and training programmes receive financial backing from the German trade union NGO, Freidrich Ebert and

had escalated the costs of workers mobilisation since few workers are now employed per farm unit. The cause of trade unions has also been setback by the loss of some experienced organisers who relocated to the Communal and other areas during the land reform (Magaramombe 2010; Hartnack 2009).

Matters were not helped by the fragmentation of the farm worker trade unions (Chapter Five). In 2015, there was a battle for the same membership at Tanganda Tea Estate in Manicaland Province between GAPWUZ and HGAPWUZ leading to double deductions on workers' salaries for membership subscriptions as both unions pressurised the company to remit dues. Another relatively new union, PAAWUZ registered in 2014 has been on an aggressive membership drive, but still targeting the same base in the remaining LSCFs as GAPWUZ and HGAPWUZ (Jera 2017: Interview). It has been de-campaigning the latter two unions by highlighting the miniscule four percent wage increase negotiated by GAPWUZ at the collective bargaining sessions in 2017 for "general agriculture sector" workers.¹⁵⁸

Affiliation to ZCTU, which founded the MDC (Yeros 2002), compounds GAPWUZ's problems to expand its membership base and monitor labour conditions in the resettled areas. The MDC was against the FTLRP and received substantial financial support from the former LSCFs, and some of them occupied key positions in the party (Sadomba 2013; 2008).¹⁵⁹ As part of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA),¹⁶⁰ the union actively campaigned for the "NO VOTE" during the referendum to approve a new Constitution in 2000 and some of its various organisers also became important figures in the MDC.¹⁶¹ Moreover, GAPWUZ opposed land reform as the MDC did and produced various documentations in 2009 alleging gross human rights violations suffered by farm workers

Stiftung (FES) and technical support from ZCTU, the Zimbabwe Labour Centre and LEDRIZ, the research arm of trade union centre.

¹⁵⁸ See "PAAWUZ, GAPWUZ fight over workers' salaries", The Newsday 5 June 2017, Harare, www.newsday.co.zw/2017/06/05/paawuz-gapwuz-fight-over-workers-salaries/ [Accessed 29 April 2018].

¹⁵⁹ e.g. the late treasurer, Roy Bennet and Ian Kay, a former Member of Parliament for Marondera constituency

¹⁶⁰ The NCA grouped many civic organisations, which led the campaign against the proposed new constitution eventually coalesced into the MDC (Yeros 2013a; 2013b).

¹⁶¹ e.g. Douglas Mwonzora, the current Secretary General of the MDC led by the late Morgan Tsvangirai and now Nelson Chamisa was previously employed as the Union's legal advisor until 1997.

in collaboration with a grouping of former white commercial farmers known as Justice for Agriculture, which had broken ranks with CFU over policy differences (see JAG & GAPWUZ 2008). In fact, the documentation led to state repression against the union several times and eventually to the fleeing of the then General Secretary of GAPWUZ, Getrude Hambira into exile to Canada as noted earlier (Chapter Five).¹⁶² Altogether, the union's functionality was negatively impacted.

Despite the rebranding exercises that GAPWUZ has been undertaking since 2013, through various educational programmes to dissociate from the MDC, the perceived linkage to opposition politics continues to impede its mandate. Recent public statements by the leadership of ZCTU offering to lead the designing of the 2018 General elections manifesto of the MDC Alliance¹⁶³ negates the union's separation from party politics.¹⁶⁴ Union organisers continued to face hurdles as the A2 farmers, with the support of local ZANU (PF) structures, pointed to GAPWUZ's alliance to the MDC to delegitimise their labour mobilisation efforts and restrict their activities:

“We are still associated with MDC and when we try to engage workers as per our mandate we are suspected of trying to canvass support for the opposition. Farmers are taking advantage of this “tag” to hide violations of labour rights by denying us access to workers. At some point we are requested to first clear with the ZANU (PF) district chairman for us to interact with workers because we are considered MDC sympathisers. ZANU (PF) functionaries who are part of workers committee alert party officials when we try to seek appointments to visit the farms. At one instance in 2016, we had to enlist the assistance of the chief in Banket, Zvimba District in order to address a workers meeting. The union had been denied permission by A2 farmers to address workers who were claiming we intended to hold an unsanctioned political rally not cleared by the police as required under the *Public Order and Security Act of 2002*” (Magwaza 2017: Interview).

The experience of a GAPWUZ union official who tried to confront A2 farmers over non-payment of wages in 2011 was also telling in this respect: “When we engage them on these issues, they say we are MDC activists”.¹⁶⁵ Thus, in place of trespass laws that were used by the former LSCFs to bar union organisers (Kanyenze 2001; Tandon 2001),

¹⁶² See “Getrude Hambira's life altering move”, The Newsday, 23 December 2011, Harare [www.newsday.co.zw/2011/12/23/2011-12-23-getrude-hambiras-life-altering-move/ [Accessed 3 July 2017].

¹⁶³ The MDC alliance is a coalition of MDC party led by Morgan Tsvangirai before his passing and other opposition parties)

¹⁶⁴ Newsday, 8 August 2017, “ZCTU pledges to craft MDC Alliance “winning” manifesto [accessed from www.newsday.co.zw/2017/08/08/zctu-pledges-craft-mdc-alliance-winning-manifesto/ on 8 August 2017].

¹⁶⁵ The Standard, 1 October 2011, “ZANU PF chefs exploiting farm workers” [accessed from www.thestandard.co.zw/2011/10/01/zanu-pf-chefs-exploiting-farm-workers/ on 15 June 2017]

GAPWUZ “alliance” to MDC was now being used to conceal labour rights violations. Alike the former LSCFs (Loewenson 1992; Amanor-Wilks 1995; Kanyenze 2001), new capitalist farmers also threaten to victimise workers linked to unions. A case in point was when GAPWUZ mobilised 47 members at an A2 farm in 2014 in Goromonzi, and the owner refused to deduct the membership subscriptions for their salaries. In the words of the union leader, the A2 farmer charged; “If any of workers were interested, they should pay their membership subscriptions directly to the union not through his salary payroll” (Magwaza 2017: Interview), and the membership bid collapsed.

At Bemba Farm (Pvt) Ltd (A2 scheme) in Marondera, by way of another example, one worker mobilising others to join GAPWUZ in January 2011 was fired from work.¹⁶⁶ Under case number HCC 155/11, the owner approached the High Court in Harare seeking relief against trade union officials to cease interacting with his workers regarding the resolution of a dispute on the classification of the farm as either “general agriculture” or “agro-industrial”. The court upheld the right of workers to belong to labour unions as guaranteed by Section 65 of *Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No. 20 of 2013* and the labour laws and the employer was ordered to provide the union unfettered access to the workers.

Additionally, some analysts (Chambati & Moyo 2004) trace GAPWUZ’s uneasy relationship with the new capitalist farms to its earlier collaboration with the LSCFs to negotiate wage increases in advance at the NECAIZ in the early 2000s before the A2 farmers were incorporated into the collective bargaining process (see also section 6.5.6).

Since 2000, GAPWUZ has not promoted radical action such as general strikes to redress poor working conditions due to the cumbersome procedures required by the law (Chapter Five). “It is almost impossible to have a legal strike nowadays” the leader of the union opined (Magwaza 2017: Interview). Without being sanctioned by the Minister of Labour, the threat of dismissal hovers over the head of the workers. The union was therefore afraid of jeopardising members’ jobs through “illegal strikes” and the pressure that emanated from the workers to get them reinstated to their positions. Indeed, state labour

¹⁶⁶ See The Standard 26 February 2011, “Farm workers accuse employers of abuse” [Accessed from www.thestandard.co.zw/2011/02/26/farm-workers-accuse-employers-of-abuse on 12 May 2017].

relations officials have stopped farm level strikes not approved by the Minister in their tracks.¹⁶⁷ Planned strikes were also thwarted by police brutality invoking the *Public Order and Security Act of 2002*, which requires the advance authority for a public gathering and occasional arrests of union leaders, is not uncommon.

The onslaught on the “right to strike” represents proliferating tendencies under neoliberalism, which has been prioritising the flexibility of labour markets in favour of employers and for production and productivity to proceed unhindered (Jha 2015) in the context of attracting FDI and rank favourably in the World Bank promoted “ease of doing business” initiatives (World Bank 2015a). No wonder in some industries, to circumvent the drawn out procedures required to prosecute an industrial action, male workers were now using their wives to protest on their behalf and thus shield themselves from repercussions of “illegal” collective action. The wives of mine workers at Hwange Colliery who have been engaged in sustained protest at the company’s premises since 2013 over their husbands’ unpaid salaries represent this strategy.¹⁶⁸ Even the wives have faced the full force of police brutality on occasions. Attempts by mine workers to strike had earlier led to the suspension of 520 workers for breaching the company’s code of conduct.

Legal action in the courts of law now represents GAPWUZ main strategy to resolve labour disputes that cannot be settled by the NECAIZ arbitration, notwithstanding the delays encountered at the Labour Court.¹⁶⁹ The union noted many pending cases at the Labour Court, but they could not provide precise figures due to poor record keeping.

¹⁶⁷ Attempts by farm workers at the farm level to engage in industrial action have led them being declared illegal by the authorities. For instance, farm workers were ordered to go back to work by the Chinhoyi Provincial Labour Office after downing tools without giving the 14 day notice of their intention as required by the law. They were pressing for the payment of their outstanding salaries. See “Zhuwawo wins case against farm workers”, *The Standard*, 12 May 2012, Harare, www.thestandard.co.zw/2012/05/12/zhuwawo-wins-case-against-farm-workers/ [Accessed 14 May 2012].

¹⁶⁸ See Colliery workers’ spouses fume over paltry salaries, *The Newsday* 8 February 2018, Harare, <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/02/colliery-workers-spouses-fume-paltry-salaries/> [Accessed on 7 May 2018].

¹⁶⁹ The Minister of Justice and Legal Affairs was reported in the press bemoaning the delays in the conclusion of labour cases at the Labour Court. The court was understaffed in 2013 with a total of 14 judges in service as opposed to the total establishment of 19 judges resulting in cases dragging on for years to the disadvantage of workers. See *The Herald* 13 March 2013, “Deal with labour cases urgently” [Accessed from <http://www.herald.co.zw/deal-with-labour-cases-urgently/> on 11 August 2017].

Costly legal fees were straining the unions' reduced budgets. The deadlock over the 2017 wages in the tea sector, for instance, which spilled into the Supreme Court, setback GAPWUZ over US\$30,000 in legal fees even before the case was finalised. This strategy was based on the cases reported to the union area organisers by workers in remaining LSCFs rather than from proactive monitoring of labour conditions. On average, at each of their 20 area offices, the union was receiving about three cases of alleged labour rights transgressions monthly.

GAPWUZ has clearly been on the back foot in the collective bargaining negotiations with employer organisations, if the sluggish rise in wages between 2009 and 2017 is anything to go by (see section 6.5.6). Rival unions such as PAAWUZ thus accused GAPWUZ of sabotaging the rural working class:

“..GAPWUZ, which is the only union negotiating for workers' salaries, is sabotaging workers. The least paid worker in the agriculture sector is getting \$72 per month and this is unsustainable. This is despite the fact that farmers are making good money out of tobacco. This is not fair at all. Workers are still living at the Rhodesia era” (Raymond Sixpence, PAAWUZ General Secretary quoted in the *Newsday*, 05 June 2017).¹⁷⁰

Despite the admissions by one representative of the employers, Ben Purcell Gilpin (President of the CFU)¹⁷¹ of the improvement of performance of farmers during the 2016/17 season, GAPWUZ was adamant to negotiate higher wages for their constituency because the “...economy was underperforming to sustain huge wage increases” (Magwaza 2017: Interview).

However, GAPWUZ managed to extract concessions from the employers regarding reduction of working hours for permanent and seasonal labourers from 8.5 hours to 8 hours putting them at par with the rest of the working class, which was *Statutory 116 of 2014*. Furthermore, the period in which a seasonal worker could be considered permanent fell from eight months of continuous work in a calendar year to six months and the annual leave days that workers could accrue to the next year increased from 12 to 90 days. Three years down the line, employers overturned some earlier gains through

¹⁷⁰ “PAAWUZ, GAPWUZ fight over worker salaries” *The Newsday*, 5 June 2017, Harare [Accessed from www.newsday.co.zw.2017/06/05/paawuz.gapwuz.fight.over.workerssalaries/ on 15 August 2017].

¹⁷¹ “PAAWUZ, GAPWUZ fight over worker salaries” *The Newsday*, 5 June 2017, Harare [Accessed from www.newsday.co.zw.2017/06/05/paawuz.gapwuz.fight.over.workerssalaries/ on 15 August 2017].

Statutory Instrument 67 of 2017, which now permits seasonal labourers to be engaged for nine months and the contracts can be renewed up to six times before an employee can qualify to become permanent. As discussed above (section 6.5), the progressive changes in the conditions of employment at law remain largely “paper rights” due to limited monitoring by the union and state.

Notwithstanding the trade union’s own internal shortcomings, their worker mobilisation efforts were clearly hamstrung by the state’s limitations in guaranteeing them access to the farm workforce to monitor working conditions and recruit new members as permitted by the *Labour Amendment Act of 2015* and Section 65 of the *Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act of 2013*. State repression of union organisers by the security infrastructure also curtailed worker mobilisation. The A2 farmers, as noted above, sometimes barred them from accessing the farms instrumentalising the union’s perceived linkage to the MDC. Furthermore, the cumbersome procedures for prosecuting strikes imposed by the overarching labour in contradiction of the supreme law closed a critical avenue that workers could deploy to extract concessions from the new small-scale capitalist farms. This could perhaps be one of the reasons that improvement in the working conditions have been slow to come for farm workers.

The influence of farm worker trade unions have thus waned after land reform and in effect have been off the radar to address labour rights deficits since 2000 (Chambati & Magaramombe 2008). Yet, it is also worth remembering that farm worker trade unionism never really took off as many workers were not linked to them nor did the unions sponsor any radical actions that shifted the material conditions in a substantial manner (see Chapter Four). The absence of trade unions thus weakens the voice of farm workers seeking the enforcement of their labour rights. Their “structural power” was thus key to organise resistance.

6.6.2 Deploying “structural bargaining power” to advance “workerist” struggles

From the discussion above, it can be discerned that farm wage labourers relied to a limited extent on the “associational power” of belonging to trade unions to resist poor working conditions in the new farms (Silver 2003: 13). Nonetheless, the existence of

trade unions is not a precondition for the expression of agency by workers in the labour markets (Jha 2015; 1996; Wilderman 2014; Silver 2003). This section exposes how farm workers drew upon their “structural power” to advance their material conditions in the new agrarian labour markets (Silver 2003:13). In particular, resistance strategies were being evolved on the basis of the skills they possessed demanded by the new capitalist farms in areas such as tobacco production and the availability of non-wage alternative forms of work in natural resource trading (e.g. gold panning) occasioned by the redistributive land reforms. The latter processes, have been characterised in the literature as “market place bargaining power” (Silver 2003: 13). In addition, “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985: 35) type modes of resistance were also observed among the behaviour of farm workers in the new labour markets.

6.6.2.1 “Weapons of the weak” resistance to poor labour conditions

Detached from trade unions, farm workers were fashioning different types of resistance to the poor working conditions. In most cases the farm compounds were the sites of organisation of resistance and past employment positions, gender and connections to different types of local organisations affected the agency of farm workers in diverse ways (Chambati 2013b).

Akin to James Scott’s “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1986: 35), the modes of resistance tended to steer away from the direct confrontation with employers. The strategies included “voting with their feet” to identify the best working conditions, theft of farm produce, absconding from work, blacklisting poor employers and incessant complains about the bad workplace situation.¹⁷² Complaints to employers about unpaid wages were a common strategy permanent farm workers across the two districts relied upon. However, this was met with threats of being fired from their jobs as employers took advantage of the increasing unemployment rate in the country to quell demands of the employees.

¹⁷² “Voting with their feet” is a phrase commonly used to reflect the search for better working conditions by labour in response to poor working conditions at their current places of employment (see Gaidzanwa 1999).

Since collective action is promoted by the concentration of workers at a particular location of production (Silver 2003), the few permanent employees that were being hired per farm unit betrayed this avenue of resistance. Moreover, eviction threats invoked by A2 farmers on workers living on their farms encumbered by the residential labour tenancy also curtailed collective action (see section 6.5.5). The capitalist A2 and remaining LSCFs, which employed large batches of workers, were the ones, which usually experienced strikes that ground production to a halt. But even there, it took a while before workers adopted this option to force concessions from the employers. Various press reports suggest outright defiance of employers through downing of tools by permanent and seasonal labourers emerged as form of resistance when workers had been pushed to corner through non-payment of wages for prolonged periods. For instance, at Hurudza A2 farm in Goromonzi, workers only refused to work after wage arrears had accumulated to 10 months.¹⁷³ In another case also reported in the media, it took about four months of unpaid wages for farm workers to engage in a work strike.¹⁷⁴

Continuing to work without being paid any wages at all or receiving partial payments, some permanent employees resorted to “moonlighting” in piece rate and/or daily work in neighbouring farms. This was reported by 16.6 percent of the permanent farm workers across the two districts. A larger proportion of Goromonzi permanent workers (29.3 percent) participated in moonlighting than those from Kwekwe (4 percent). The latter had a relatively less developed farm wage labour market than the former (Section 6.2.3). Variations in moonlighting were not evident between full-time workers in the two FTLRP models. Seventy seven percent hired out their labour on farms elsewhere on rest days and 11.4 percent did so upon acquittal of their work commitments at their place of regular employment. Additionally, others disrupted the workflows at their regular jobs through absentism to perform part-time jobs (11.4 percent). Males who are usually considered as the breadwinners within the realm of patriarchy (Potts 2012; Mvududu & McFadden 2001; O’Laughlin 1998) were more active in moonlighting (involving half of

¹⁷³ See “Workers toil for nothing at Chapfika farm”, The Newsday 5 January 2013 (www.newsday.co.zw/2013/05/01/workers-toil-for-nothing-at-chapfika-farm/ [Accessed 14 May 2016]).

¹⁷⁴ See “Zhuwawo wins case against farm workers”, The Standard, 12 May 2012, Harare, www.thestandard.co.zw/2012/05/12/zhuwawo-wins-case-against-farm-workers/ [Accessed 14 May 2012].

them) compared to females (involving just over a quarter of them) in Goromonzi. The reverse was true for Kwekwe as 7.2 percent of the male permanent workers were partaking in such endeavours compared to 16.7 percent of female workers. As highlighted earlier, the increased demands for income within households to meet various costs such as health and children's education, which are no longer subsidised by the state after ESAP help to explain the insertion of women not only in the labour market, but also in multiple-job holding (Yaro *et al.* 2016; Bryceson 1980).

As Rutherford (2001a) revealed, moonlighting was also present in LSCFs as some permanent workers sought *maricho* during their off days. However there has been no systematic documentation of its extent in terms of the shares of workers that held multiple farm jobs. The movement of workers in and out of the farm compounds was tightly monitored by the former white farmers (Loewenson 1992; Tandon 2001; Scoones *et al.* 2018a). Further, farmers also tried by all means to curtail farm workers from purchasing consumer goods and seeking entertainment outside the LSCFs by operating stores and bars in the farm compound offering credit services so that when a demand for labour arose or emergencies such as fire outbreaks, workers on their off days could easily be mobilised (Chambati 2013b). Against this background, it is perhaps fair to conclude that moonlighting was not pervasive in the former LSCFs.

Instead of the “permanent” work that the literature associates with more security and regular work, some farm workers as a strategy quit permanent work for piece/daily rate work to cut their risks of not being paid for months on end (see also HRW 2018).¹⁷⁵ Additionally, piece/daily work provides flexibility to combine different social reproduction strategies.

A1 and A2 farmers complain of thefts of farm produce and accuse former farm workers in the old compounds as the culprits (Chambati & Moyo 2004; Scoones *et al.* 2010; Moyo 2011a; Matondi 2012). The absence of detailed security infrastructure in the resettled areas such as that observed in former LSCFs increases their vulnerability to theft. Availability of security guards who tightly controlled the movement of people,

¹⁷⁵ See “Labour crisis hits new farms”, The Independent, 4 March 2005, <https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2005/03/04/labour-crisis-hits-new-farmers/> [Accessed 13 May 2018]

goods and services in the former LSCFs was reported by full-time labourers - 39.8 percent in Goromonzi and 20 percent in Kwekwe.¹⁷⁶ The Presidential Land Review Commission appointed to assess the FTLRP outcomes in 2003 thus recommended:

“...that Government urgently addresses the situation of former farm workers in the farm compounds. Their continued presence on the farms had created numerous problems arising from illegal gold panning, misuse of farm facilities and resources and general criminal activities” (Utete 2003: 6).

This was in reaction to the concerns raised by the farmers blaming former farm workers for “...contributing to activities like cattle rustling, vandalism and theft of farm machinery and equipment” (Utete 2003: 53). These findings suggested that “stealing as form of resistance” (Addison 2013: 110) had taken root in the resettled areas. A court case of two farm workers accused of stealing two herd of cattle belonging to their employer, the late Vice President, John Nkomo, lends credence to these assertions.¹⁷⁷ After being convicted of stock theft, in their mitigation, the workers noted under payment of wages and poverty: “[We stole the cattle] because the wages we were getting were not enough we were earning \$50 per month and it was not enough”.¹⁷⁸

Not entangled by the residential tenancy, piece/daily workers “vote with their feet” to identify the best employment conditions in the resettled areas. Searching for better wages, some workers in Kwekwe had to walk exacting distances of between five and eight kilometres to escape the piece rates of US\$0.50 per 100 metre line of weeding offered by A1 farmers instead of US\$1.00 for the same amount of work paid by A2 farmers (Mavhuso 2017: Interview).

After experiencing problems with wage payments with a particular employer, such information was widely shared within the confines of the old farm compounds. Quite detrimental to the labour mobilisation efforts of such employers, they were “blacklisted”.

¹⁷⁶ On purchase of goods such as bicycles, farm workers would be questioned in the former LSCFs compounds regarding the source of income (Scoones *et al.* 2018a).

¹⁷⁷ See “Unpaid workers steal from Nkomo farm”, The Newsday 1 April 2011, Harare, www.newsday.co.zw/2011/04/01/2011-04-01-unpaid-workers-steal-from-Nkomo-farm [Accessed on 1 June 2012].

¹⁷⁸ See “Unpaid workers steal from Nkomo farm”, The Newsday 1 April 2011, Harare, www.newsday.co.zw/2011/04/01/2011-04-01-unpaid-workers-steal-from-Nkomo-farm [Accessed on 1 June 2012].

In fact this tactic has endured since the colonial period, when foreign migrant workers returning home after a stint in the Rhodesian LSCFs stuck posters along the journey routes to warn their colleagues of bad employers (Rubert 1998; see also Chapter Four). Operating as “informal workers committees”, the resistance was led by former senior (male) farm workers who disseminated information on labour grievances to residents in the old farm compounds. Farm workers thus neither responded to invitations for farm jobs offered by the later nor to wages they deem too low for the task. Far from confrontational, when employers with a bad record of infringing on labour rights visit the compound in search of workers “... farm workers pretend to be busy with their domestic chores and promise to come for work once they are done and they never show up” (NYT 2017: Interview). As discussed below (Section 6.6.6), it was this kind of resistance that forced some farm employers to send trucks to nearby towns and Communal Areas to look for piece/daily workers.

New alternative livelihoods that farm workers were crafting in the context of the FTLRP such as trading of natural resource found in the resettled areas enhanced their “market place bargaining power” (Silver 2003). Hence, some farm workers delinked from the labour markets and survived on activities such as gold panning, common in Kwekwe, while firewood and thatching grass trade provided an alternative in Goromonzi. Evidently, these activities have been blamed on dwindling supplies of farm labour (see 6.6.6). Furthermore, some of the previous suppliers of farm labour were now landholders in their own right courtesy of the FTLRP, as well as other diverse sources of informal land access that they can survive on.

6.6.2.2 Self-organised “specialist” labour groups

The exponential growth in specialised crops such as tobacco in the resettled areas availed opportunities for farm workers to utilise their scarce skills as “market based bargaining power” to extract higher wages in the farm labour markets (Silver 2003). Flue cured tobacco production was the preserve of large capitalist farms and the skills to produce were largely endowed in the former farm workers (Muir 2006). As the numbers of tobacco growers rose from 8,537 in 2000 (TIMB 2001: 11) to 81,801 in 2016 (TIMB 2016: vi), so did the demand for farm labour skills in producing districts such as

Goromonzi. By 2016, the district had about 764 tobacco producers compared to only 42 in Kwekwe district (TIMB 2016: 21).

Former farm workers in Goromonzi have therefore been constituting themselves in independent specialist tobacco labour groups offering services that included curing, packing, harvesting and sorting the leaves into different grades for the market. Such forms of labour provision have also been characterised as, “consultancy” groups by others (see Matondi 2012:223). Not attached to a particular employer, they tended to consist of a group of workers under the leadership of a “contract master”, who were mostly former male senior farm workers (see also Chambati 2013b: 17). The “contract masters” were responsible for looking for jobs and negotiating the fees to be paid for a particular task. Males predominantly occupied the membership of these groups. The existence of these forms of labour supply was confirmed by 26.6 percent and 19.7 percent of the workers interviewed in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively. Instead of offering specialised skills to the new farm employers, the groups in the latter district were mainly geared towards the provision of general tasks such as weeding (Table 6.74), while in the former half of the groups identified by the farm workers were focused on skill demanding tasks in tobacco production.

Table 6.74: Activities farm labour groups sell their labour

Activity	Goromonzi		Kwekwe	
	No.	%	No.	%
Tobacco curing	0	0	1	7.1
Tobacco grading	5	23.8	0	0
Weeding	6	28.6	11	78.6
Harvesting maize	5	23.8	2	14.3
Tobacco reaping	5	23.8	0	0
Total	21	100	14	100

Former farm worker groups were thus able to avert the low wages by using their expertise to bargain for more. The wages charged by one tobacco specialist group of curers and graders in Goromonzi were about three times more than the daily rate of piece/daily workers for the same time period of work.

Kinship ties were infused in the labour supply groups. Another group of tobacco curers and graders encountered in Goromonzi, for example, was comprised of former farm

workers who used to work together before 2000 (JT 2017: Interview). The members of the group included three brothers, a son-in law and two friends who came from the same village of origin in Malawi, and thus also mobilised along “foreign migrant identity”.

6.6.2.3 Mobilisation of identity and belonging to advance material interests

Africans are tied to the land through various cultural practices, including the maintenance of the graves of their ancestors and its other attendant ceremonies (Mujere 2011). Ancestral graves, especially, represent claims to ownership of a piece of land by kinship groups and/or clansmen (Mkodzongi 2015; Moyo 2011a; Sadomba 2008). During the FTLRP, some kinship groups successfully legitimised their demands for certain farms to be allocated to them on the basis of carrying the remains of their forefathers when they were ejected by the colonialists in the 19th Century (Mkodzongi 2015; 2013; Murisa 2010).

Likewise, former farm workers also identified their “belonging” to the old farm compounds through the graves of their ancestors. They continue to bury their deceased relatives in the graveyards established by the former LSCFs even in the new A1 and A2 farms as indicated by 78.8 percent and 65.3 percent in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively. For those of foreign migrant origin, the old compounds in most instances, was their only home unlike the domestic migrants who had kinship linkages in the Communal Areas. Rather than the land owners, the granting of permission to bury their dead in A1 farms was now being mediated by the village heads similar to Communal Areas (Phiri 2017: Interview).

Burials in the old compounds were accompanied by associated traditional ceremonies such as “*kurova guva*”¹⁷⁹ that entails the appeasing of the spirit of a deceased person conducted after approximately one year after their death.¹⁸⁰ Sixty percent of the former farm workers in Goromonzi confirmed these ceremonies were taking place in the farm compounds they lived. Again, the *sabhuku* granted permission to former farm workers for this. None identified the same in Kwekwe. These cultural practices reinforced the identity

¹⁷⁹ *Kurova guva* literally translates to “beating the grave”

¹⁸⁰ Before this process is conducted, in the Shona culture it is assumed the spirit of the dead person would be lost somewhere and a *kurova guva* ceremony brings back home the spirit to be among its fellow kins.

of former farm workers, but however fell short for some to legitimating their claims of belonging to the old farm compounds. References such as “...My parents worked at Banana Groove [Farm in Goromonzi] and I was born there. They are now late and their graves are within the farm. I grew up on the farm and I know no other home”¹⁸¹ were commonly made by farm workers when faced with eviction threats or after evictions from the old farm compounds. Yet invoking belonging through ancestral graves had not stopped evictions from some A2 compounds. Different outcomes were experienced by the peasantry from the Communal Areas in mobilising for land allocations through this route as stated above.

6.6.3 The state and protection of labour rights

After the deregulation of the labour markets in 1991, the National Employment Councils (NECs) established for each industry were mandated to manage the labour relations under the supervision of the MPSLSW (see Chapter Four). According to Section 62 of the *Labour Act* (Chapter 28:08), the responsibilities of the NECs is to:

“...assist its members in the conclusion of collective bargaining agreements...[including] settling disputes that [would] have arisen or may arise between employers and employers organisations on the one hand and employee, workers committees or trade unions on the other (35)”.

The adherence of the collective bargaining agreements and any regulations and statutes that are applicable to the industry also falls on the shoulders of the NECs. To deliver on their obligations, the NECs are empowered to conduct labour inspections without any unhindered access and are in fact supposed to furnish annual reports to the Minister detailing the conditions of employment in their sector. The designated agents appointed by the NEC are empowered by the *Labour Relations Act (Chapter 28:08)* to resolve labour disputes and unfair labour practices, as well as train employers and employees on labour laws and regulations.

As specified earlier (see Chapter Five), the membership of the NECAIZ for the agricultural industry was composed of 10 seats for the employers, in which four seats were occupied by the ZNFU, while the remaining farmer organisations have one seat

¹⁸¹ See “Stranded ex-farm workers suffer three year ordeal”, The Standard 16 April 2017, Harare, www.the-standard.co.zw/2017/04/16/stranded-ex-farm-workers-suffer-three-year-ordeal [Accessed 13 March 2018].

each.¹⁸² Likewise, the employee seats were also unevenly distributed, with GAPWUZ commanding seven seats, while HGAPWUZ had two seats and the last spot was allocated to KAWUZ.

Returns from the interview with NECAIZ leadership revealed that the state labour relations framework was also under resourced (Jera 2017: Interview). The number of NECAIZ decentralised offices had been reduced from eight to six since the land reform¹⁸³ on account of financial constraints. Taking the A2 sector alone at the national level, for every designated agent there were about 6,600 A2 farming units to manage labour disputes and conduct labour inspections. The NECAIZ was therefore evidently overstretched in terms of its organisational capacity to enforce labour rights.

The financial base of NECAIZ at law originates from the Council dues of US\$2 per month for every permanent or seasonal labourer equally contributed by the employers and employees. Further highlighting the detachment from the labour relations framework, the Chief Executive Officer of the employment council noted that many of A2 farmers were neither registered nor contributing the Council dues suffocating its organisational capacity. As such, contributions from the remaining LSCFs and plantations (tea, an timber and sugarcane) currently sustained their operations. Consequently, the NECAIZ focused its services on this constituency to the exclusion of most A2 farm workers.

In particular, the members of the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association were singled out for contributing the largest share of the Council's budget due to the sector's performance.¹⁸⁴ Again, the employment council officials also mentioned the dominant presence of GAPWUZ on the membership as constraining the collection of Council dues as farmers also mobilise the rhetoric of the union's linkage to the MDC as the reason for not paying.

¹⁸² These are the CFU, ZCFU, ZFU, ZAEO, ZTA and ZTGA.


¹⁸³ The offices were in eight towns or cities servicing the LSCFs in all the country's eight rural provinces, including Bindura (Mashonaland Central Province), Bulawayo (Matebeleland North), Chiredzi (Masvingo Province), Chinhoyi (Mashonaland West), Gwanda (Matebeleland South), Gweru (Midlands Province), Marondera (Mashonaland East Province) and Mutare (Manicaland Province). The Bindura and Gwanda offices have since been closed.

¹⁸⁴ Amongst the commodities produced in the country, tobacco has been leading the recovery in terms of output after the earlier declines experienced in the early 2000's due to the contract farming financing arrangements (Binswanger- Mhkize & Moyo 2012; Sakata 2017; Shonhe 2017). Actually, by 2015, tobacco output had surpassed the previous volumes produced by the former LSCFs (TIMB 2015).

Although farmers at law can seek exemptions from the NECAIZ from meeting the collective bargaining agreements with employees' consent, few did so. Between 2015 and 2017, the designated agents responsible for the Southern regions¹⁸⁵ only handled two requests while the Mashonaland East and West offices received nine and five requests respectively, implying that the gazetted collective bargaining agreements bound the generality of farming units.

Barring the occasional deadlock, the NECAIZ has largely facilitated the successful conclusion of collective bargaining agreements. Teething problems were experienced in the initial years of land reform as mentioned earlier when the Minister of Labour refused to gazette the agreed minimum wages in 2003 and 2004 after complaints by the A2 farmers that their voices were muted in the council. This was rectified by the inclusion of A2 farmers in the NECAIZ membership since 2006 (Chapter Five).

Figure 6.19: Labour inspections conducted by selected NECAIZ offices



Source: Compiled from data provided by NECAIZ


Yet, it was on the enforcement of agreed conditions during the collective bargaining that the NECAIZ weakness stood out. Data availed to the author illustrates that between 2015 and 2017, there was a wide gap between the labour inspections conducted by the NECAIZ and the number of farming units today. The Mashonaland East office (covering

¹⁸⁵ Bulawayo, Midlands, Matebeleland South and North.

Goromonzi) did not conduct any labour inspections in 2015 because the Designated Agent post was vacant due to financial limitations, while 48 and 27 were done in 2016 and 2017 (Figure 6.19). Similar patterns were exhibited in the Mashonaland West office. The Bulawayo office outperformed its counterparts since it managed to deliver 156 inspections in 2015, but the numbers have been on the decline since then. Altogether, during 2015 when most of the inspections were conducted, they did not surpass one percent of the total A2 farms distributed nationally. This evidence confirms findings from a recent study, which showed that out of 61 farm workers interviewed in Mashonaland Central and East and, Manicaland provinces, only three workers reported labour inspections on their farms in 2017 (HRW 2018: 62).

Separate from the financial resource constraints, the NECAIZ officials also reported that the designated agents were denied entry into the farms by some A2 landholders on the grounds of their association with GAPWUZ.

Figure 6.20: Wage disputes handled by selected NECAIZ offices, 2015-2017



Source: Compiled from data provided by NECAIZ

The majority of the labour disputes that were handled by the NECAIZ related to wage disputes confirming the patterns narrated by the workers (see section 6.4). These related to non-payment and underpayment of wages and originated from mostly from the farms where the unions were present in the remaining LSCFs and agro-industrial plantations.

Reported wage labour disputes were more frequent in the Mashonaland East office compared to Mashonaland West and Bulawayo offices (Figure 6.20).

Resultantly, the limited state protection farm workers and their trade union enjoy perpetuates the violation of labour and social rights. Not to mention that the majority of the workers now, the piece/daily workers, were excluded from the cover of the law.

6.6.4 Advancing material interests through political parties

The contribution of party politics in structuring the outcomes of the FTLRP has been a contentious issue, with debates ranging from the motives of the programme itself and how party politics influenced the land and agrarian reform practices during the 2000s. On the one hand, some academics have argued that land reform was implemented to restore waning support of the ZANU (PF) upon its defeat at the Referendum to adopt a new Constitution in 2000 (Simpson & Robertson 2018; Raftopolous 2013; 2009; Sachikonye 2002; 2012). In contrast, other analysts have advanced that land reform sought to roll back the unjust land distribution inherited from colonisation (Hanlon *et al.* 2013; Mkodzongi 2013; Moyo 2013; Moyo & Yeros 2005b; 2007; Murisa 2009) and thus fulfil the objects of the liberation struggle. Land allocations and the attendant post-settlement support (e.g. input subsidies) were claimed to be partisan and it was mostly ZANU (PF) supporters who benefitted, while MDC supporters, including former farm workers were excluded (Laurie 2017; Zamchiya 2013; Marongwe 2009). Yet others have argued that beyond political party allegiance a wide array of factors influenced land allocations, including "...professional, class, and other social networks, including church membership" (Moyo 2011a: 505; see also Scoones *et al.* 2010).

Confirmation of the existence of political party structures was high across both districts Goromonzi and Kwekwe - 81.4 and 78.7 percent respectively. Both the two major parties, ZANU (PF) and MDC attracted interest of farm workers. In fact, their allegiance to either party has been dynamic over the last 17 years and conditioned by their changing material interests. In the early phases of the land occupations, alongside their union, farm workers joined the MDC, which was opposed to the land reform (Sadomba 2013; 2008) in order to protect their jobs in the LSCFs. Before, they had earlier participated in the

Constitutional Referendum under the “NO VOTE” banner to halt the clause on compulsory acquisition of LSCFs without compensation for land itself as noted above.

ZANU (PF) has dominated the elections in the countryside, including the resettled areas in both districts by applying a combination of tactics, including violence, persuasion and patronage (Moyo & Yeros 2007). The MDC has however struggled to penetrate most rural areas due to being physically barred from implementing any party activities for many years during the 2000s by ZANU (PF) activists (Raftopolous 2013). Violence has befallen its known supporters within and without electoral seasons in the post-2000, and many rural people are afraid to openly show their support of the MDC. Association with the MDC presented risks for farm workers, including threats of evictions from farm compounds and marginalisation from patronage programmes led by ZANU PF, including the distribution of agricultural input subsidies. At Chamvari Farm in Goromonzi, 50 former farm workers who openly canvassed for the MDC during the 2008 elections had their houses destroyed and were evicted from the farm compound during the “Operation *Mavhotera Papi*”¹⁸⁶ that was instituted by ZANU (PF) after the President Mugabe was defeated by Morgan Tsvangirai in the initial leg of the Presidential elections (Joseph 2017: Interview).

Yet, voting returns during the elections held over the last 15 years do indicate also shifting allegiance to ZANU (PF) in the resettled areas. During the 2008 plebiscite, the MDC-T won three local authority seats in wards in Goromonzi’s resettled areas against nine claimed by ZANU (PF).¹⁸⁷ By 2013, the election fortunes of the MDC had floundered as it failed to win a single seat local authority contest,¹⁸⁸ while in Kwekwe, it managed only one local authority seat in the Zibagwe Rural District Council in 2008. Similar to the situation in Goromonzi, the MDC could not manage a single local authority seat in 2013. In fact, ZANU (PF) won uncontested in five of the nine seats in Kwekwe resettled areas.

¹⁸⁶ Whom did you vote for?

¹⁸⁷ <https://erczim.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Midlands-2008-Local-Authorities-results.pdf>

¹⁸⁸ <https://erczim.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2013-Local-AAuthorities-Results.pdf>

Most narratives therefore see ZANU (PF) as a perpetrator of violence towards farm workers, coerces them to attend rallies and violate their human rights by forced belonging to the party (Laurie 2017; Munyuki-Hungwe, 2011; JAG, 2008; Sachikonye 2012; Hartnack 2018). But this is not the complete story of how farm workers related to the ZANU (PF) party. Analysts have also discounted the point that farm workers' association with the ZANU (PF) party could in effect represent mobilisation of the "associational power" of the political parties to advance their causes beyond furthering the agendas of the latter (e.g. Rutherford 2008; 2018).

Evidently, farm workers' agency manifested in their claims of "belonging to the party" to advance their material interests, including defending their residential rights in the compounds, searching for land and to benefit from agrarian resources parcelled through party structures. "*Tiri nhengo dzemusangano* - we are members of the party, ZANU (PF)", many farm workers remarked during the interviews.¹⁸⁹ Landless (former) farm workers in Kwekwe actively participated in *musangano* in order to improve their possibility to benefit from the land allocations that were underway after the MLRR had repossessed land from some oversized A2 farms as per the Maximum Farm Size policy in 2017 (NYT 2017: Interview). ZANU (PF) still retains a position in the District Land and Provincial Land Committees across the country. Apparently, in both Goromonzi and Kwekwe District, during every land allocation a quota was reserved for party supporters (MGA 2018: Interview). Other farm workers also enhanced their productive capacities on their small plots of land after receiving inputs subsidies distributed through the party structures such as the Presidential Inputs Scheme (NYT 2017: Interview).

When faced with eviction threats from old farm compounds in A2 farms, farm workers turned to ZANU (PF) for protection. At Matimati Farm in Goromonzi, one of the A2 beneficiaries in whose plot the old compound lies tried to evict 800 farm worker households and their families in 2016, but was stopped by the District Chairperson of

¹⁸⁹ *Musangano* is a Shona word loosely translating to congregation and is used colloquially /local lingua franca) to refer to political parties. Reference to it in most rural areas however applies to ZANU (PF).

ZANU (PF) acting on reports received from the farm workers (Gambara 2018: Interview).¹⁹⁰

“...ZANU (PF) accused me of destabilising their source of support after the workers reported my intentions to the District Chairman of the party, especially in the context of the beckoning 2018 General elections” (Gambara 2018: Interview).

The planned eviction sought to extend the arable fields into the land occupied by the old farm compound to increase both summer maize and winter wheat production and curtail thefts of farm produce attributed to the former farm workers. Instead of outright eviction, the farmer had backtracked and was now contemplating relocating the farm workers to another part of the farm only after the 2018 elections: “I don’t want to evict the farm workers totally from the farm compound, I just want them to move to the area adjacent to the compound so that we can extend our fields” (Gambara 2018: Interview).

At Bromely Farm in Goromonzi, farm workers sought refuge in ZANU (PF) after the new A2 owners wanted to evict them because they had refused to work for him.¹⁹¹ In fact, six of the former farm workers on this farm had started a company called the Mashonaland East Tobacco Graders and Contractors, which was providing grading services to the A1 and A2 farms in Goromonzi and neighbouring Marondera district. Hence, the farm workers were no longer willing to reverse the newly gained autonomy for permanent work under the new A2 owner (see also section 6.6.2). They blocked the occupation of the property between 2011 and 2015 with support of ZANU (PF) party activists. The new owner was repelled every time he tried to settle at the farm. The A2 farm owner only managed to take occupation of the farm after a High Court Order in his favour (case number 2137/14) and assistance provided by the MLRR in February 2015 to move onto the farm. The farm workers succumbed to eviction a short while later and some of them have been camped at the Bromely Shopping Centre where their belongings were dumped by trucks hired by the farm owner.

¹⁹⁰ Only 6 permanent workers on his 100 hectare plot were from the old farm compound, plus the 10 women intermittently hired for piece rate work.

¹⁹¹ See “Govt settles Bromely Farm Wrangle, The Newsday, 23 February 2015, Harare, www.newsday.co.zw/2015/02/govt-settles-bromely-farm-wrangle/ [Accessed 29 April 2018].

Not unique to the study district, media accounts on the eviction case at Sherpton Estates in Kadoma, also expose the commonality of associating with ZANU (PF) party to keep residential rights in the compounds. There two land beneficiaries had attained a court order to evict farm workers from the compound in 2014. In response, the workers wrote a petition to the then ZANU (PF) Chairman for Mashonaland West, Temba Mliswa, ZANU (PF) National Commissar – Webster Shamu, Muzvevze Member of Parliament – Peter Haritatos, Minister of Lands and the President’s Office to request the party to shield them from eviction:

“...We are not intruders but former farm workers who were promised our 10% of land portion near the farm compound of which our 10% portion was not given to us. We have clean party campaign records e.g. our former directors are the late Cde (Eddison) Zvobgo, the late Tiny Rowland during their time we campaigned for Cde (Edna) Madzongwe, Cde (Webster) Shamu, Cde (Paul) Mangwana etc. This guarantees we are party members who are in need of your help”¹⁹².

These tendencies reflect the resurgence of ZANU (PF) in safeguarding the rights of farm labourers in the LSCFs after independence until it began to fade in the mid 1990s. Recall in the early 1980s, farm workers who occupied abandoned LSCFs were regularised as official land beneficiaries of LRRP-I with the support of ZANU (PF) (Herbst 1990; Moyo *et al.* 2000). Moreover, the party structures active in the farm compounds after independence were key to the improvement of labour rights of farm workers and promoting collective action (Kanyenze 2001; Tandon 2001). What has changed now relates to its limited role in the direct protection of the working conditions since some of party members are also farmers that were infringing on labour rights.

These findings of course do not mean that farm workers necessarily vote for ZANU (PF) in all the plebiscites. As the election results in the districts since 2000 elucidate, support to any political is not permanent. If anything, it demonstrates the agency of farm workers to draw on the associational power of belonging to ZANU (PF) to advance their material conditions. It reiterates Mkodzongi’s claims that communities in redistributed areas “perform ZANU (PF)” at different times in order to extract material benefits that are

¹⁹² See “Farm workers face eviction”, *Newsday* 15 March 2014. <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2014/03/15/farm-workers-face-eviction/> [Accessed 18 July 2017].

derived through the party such as inputs even if they do not support it in elections or otherwise (Mkodzongi 2013a; 2013b).

6.6.5 Transformative struggles: negotiating access to agricultural land rights

Farm labourers were conscious of the limits of pinning their hopes on the labour markets to realise adequate incomes for their sustenance. Their struggles thus exemplified semi-proletarian tendencies, including taking action in the labour markets as noted above and struggling to access land for independent farming (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Mueller 2011). The discussion below elucidates the “transformative struggles” of farm workers represented by their quest for a post-wage economy, which more or less represents the translation into action the “transformative approach” advocated by Moyo *et al.* (2000) to improve the fortunes of farm workers (see Chapter Two). These kinds of struggles to access farming land within and outside the remit of the formal FTLRP land allocation processes have been silent in the literature, which tended to see them as passive victims of the land reform (Ridderbos 2009; West & Rutherford 2005). Farm workers prosecuted the land struggles independently and in collaboration with other actors.

6.6.5.1 Mobilisation for land during the FTLRP

Accessing land for both independent residency and agricultural production has been a key strategy of farm workers to exit from oppressive LSCF labour markets or to at least supplement their meagre wages (Rutherford 2001a; Moyo *et al.* 2000; Vhurumuku *et al.* 1998; see Chapter Four). In 2006, one national survey requested former farm workers to outline their preference before and during the land reform. Fifty two percent said they wanted to be resettled as the planning for the LRRP-II gathered momentum in the late 1990s, while 31.3 percent preferred to be re-employed by new farmers (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 33). Retrenchment packages, relocating to communal home and retirement were mentioned by the less than 10.0 percent of the former farm workers (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 33). A higher proportion of former farm workers in Kwekwe (48.7 percent) opted for land than those in Goromonzi (40.4 percent) (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 33). There was an increase in those opting for land resettlement to 57.4 percent from 52.0 percent six years after the FLTRP began (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 33). Ostensibly, the confidence about the irreversibility of land allocations had become engrained among the former farm workers.

In Goromonzi, the share rose slightly to 42.4 percent compared to 62.5 percent in Kwekwe (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 33).

Table 6.75: Aspirations of farm labourers

Aspirations	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	P	S	PWC	Total	P	S	PWC	Total
Get own piece of land	49	5	51.9	45.7	36.9	51.6	39.2	39.9
Change profession	15	45	20.3	20.1	1	3.2	5.4	2.9
Better paying farm job	13	20	12.7	13.6	27.2	6.5	14.9	19.7
Buy cattle	12	0	8.9	9.5	9.7	16.1	10.8	11.1
Start a business	11	30	6.3	11.1	25.2	22.6	29.7	26.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	100	20	79	199	103	31	74	208

By 2017, still many aspired to be land owners and/or exit farm labour markets through changing profession or starting their own businesses (Table 6.75). If cattle ownership, which is also dependent on land access, is added to those wanting land, then land based social reproduction strategies predominantly marked the future aspirations of the farm workers. Resistance to proletarianisation therefore continues to undergird the struggles of farm labourers as they largely seek autonomous social reproduction outside the wage economy.

Through participating in the land occupations and formally registering for land allocations with different authorities as per state policy, farm workers took direct action to translate their aspirations into reality (Moyo 2001; Moyo *et al.* 2000; Sadomba 2013; 2011; 2008; Sadomba & Helliker 2012; Helliker & Bhatasara 2018). One scholar, Sadomba (2011; 2008), has in fact claimed that land occupations would not have been sustained nor covered the expansive LSCFs that they did without the involvement of farm workers from the year 2000 onwards due to the few number of war veterans leading the process. Farm workers were land short and poor like their counterparts from the Communal Areas and thus identified with the agenda to redress the inequitable land distribution being advanced by the land occupation movement. Race and class grievances thus converged in the land occupation movement encompassing peasants, farm workers and others (Moyo 2011a).

The participation of farm workers in the land occupations can be captured in four dimensions. First, they either participated voluntarily or were coerced by peasants and war veterans to join the land movement (Sadomba 2011; 2008; Sadomba & Helliker 2012). Voluntary participation sometimes arose after farm workers developed “consciousness” for the need for equitable land distribution following the various “*pungwes* – re-education meetings” convened by war veterans after the occupations of each LSCF (Sadomba & Helliker 2012). A strategy deployed by farm workers in fear of reprisals from their employers entailed occupying LSCFs far away from their places of employment to avoid identification as a former tractor driver at Fodya Tisu Tinorima Farm in Goromonzi did:

“When I heard of “jambanja” I decided to join other war veterans who were leading the occupations here in Bromely Intensive Conservation Area. I participated in the occupations of LSCFs, which were far away from Fodya Tisu Tinorima Farm where I worked for fear of being fired from my job. Eventually I registered on the lists that were being compiled by war veterans for informal land they were allocating in 2000. When the FTLRP eventually came I got allocated an A1 plot by the authorities in 2001. Word eventually got to the white farmer through other employees that I was a participant in the land occupations. I got punished for it. I was asked to destump a very big section of the farm. I was demoted from my post as a tractor driver to a general hand. Life was tough in the farms. I could not do anything with the money I was earning in the farms. I was struggling to feed my family and send children to school who were resident in the Communal Areas of Rusape. Land reform provided me a chance to be independent and be a landowner” (Chitombo 2017: Interview).

At every farm occupied, temporary residential bases would be set up for the land occupiers. The war veteran leadership of the land occupations would then proceed to occupy other LSCFs in the districts and leave behind a group of land occupiers. To sustain the numbers of the land occupiers, war veterans would then recruit farm workers from the occupied LSCFs to occupy other LSCFs (WZS 2017: Interview). Farm workers, therefore, became a critical constituent in sustaining and cascading the occupations of LSCFs in the year 2000 in districts such as Goromonzi.

Second, some seasonal farm workers who split their time between work in the LSCFs and agricultural production in the Communal Areas on small arable lands were also part of the peasants from Chikwaka, Chinhamora and Chinyika in Goromonzi and Gokwe South, Silobela and Zhombe in Kwekwe that occupied neighbouring LSCFs. They were crucial

in providing information on employers with known records of worker brutality, a criterion used by war veterans to target LSCFs to be occupied (WZS 2017: Interview).

Third, farm workers were not only mobilised by war veterans and peasants, but they also articulated their land grievances through land occupations they organised on their own. Indeed former farm workers were identified by white LSCFs as the third dominant group in perpetrating “human rights” violations against land owners after liberation war veterans and ZANU (PF) members during the land occupations (ZHR & JAG 2007).

Yet others, unsure of the eventuality of the land occupations, took the side of their white employers and fought war veterans and peasants, holding out their hopes on keeping LSCF jobs and residential rights in the old farm compounds instead of a new life as independent agricultural producers. Violence thus broke out pitting former farm workers and white farmers against the peasants and war veterans. At several moments, land occupiers were outnumbered and repelled by LSCFs and their workforce and had to retreat to re-strategise the execution of the land occupations (DMT 2017: Interview). As a matter of fact, this was one of the reasons why a strategy was developed to enlist farm workers as an ally in the land occupations (Sadomba 2008). This intra-class tensions between farm workers and other land occupiers earned the former the “sell outs” label.

Fourth, some farm workers lent logistical support, intelligence information and food supplies to the land occupiers. Following the occupations of Chamvari farm in Goromonzi in 2001, war veterans relied on food supplies from farm workers to maintain the presence on the occupied farm:

“Although we did not physically join the land occupations, the agenda to reclaim land from the white farmers resonated with our aspirations. We also wanted land and these were our black brothers pursuing this cause. You know life in form had become so tough”, Joseph continued. I mobilised food contributions from the rest of the workforce during the night and gave it to the occupiers” (Joseph 2017: Interview).

Because no agricultural production was undertaken by the land occupiers between 2000 and 2002, without the support of the likes of Joseph, war veterans and peasants would have been forced to retreat to the Communal Areas to look for food. The white LSCFs scuttled efforts to establish food production by the occupiers by destroying their crops.

During the occupations, they received informal land allocations from the liberation war veterans or were registered in lists of those wanting land. When the formal FTLRP began, land occupiers received priority and some farm workers had their informal plots regularised by the District Land Committees. Receipt of the formal FTLRP allocations were noted in five percent of the Goromonzi farm workers compared to 15.7 percent in Kwekwe (see Table 6.45). Across both districts, permanent workers had the least share of the FTLRP land owners. As proportion of land beneficiaries, former farm workers constituted 3.9 percent and 8.3 percent of the A1 farmers in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively (see Table 6.20). Few had benefitted from the A2 scheme, 1.4 percent and 4.8 percent in the corresponding districts (Table 6.20). Both male and female farm workers received FTLRP land allocations. In fact, in both districts, women had higher shares that benefitted - 7.4 percent in Goromonzi and 15.6 percent in Kwekwe. In comparison, 4.1 percent and 12.3 percent of the male farm workers had gained land in the two districts respectively.

Kwekwe had relatively higher share of farm workers land beneficiaries because the District Land Committee there reserved a portion of the plots in every A1 farm to some of the farm worker resident on those farms (PLB 2018: Interview). Moreover, former farm workers in Kwekwe were active partakers in the land occupations than those in Goromonzi. Out of the 27 who got land in Kwekwe, 17 had taken part in the land occupations. In contrast, only two out of the 10 in Goromonzi had done so. District land committees were instructed by the MLRR to accommodate more farm workers in the land allocations from around 2002. Yet this could have been late as land reform now shifted focus towards resettlement in the A2 scheme (see Moyo 2013) – which many farm worker did not qualify as it required proof of financial resources to sustain a commercial farming operation during the application process.

Given that only about 20 percent of the LSCFs experienced land occupations (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 19), many farm workers who got land utilised state policy of registering for land with the District Administrator or traditional Chiefs in the Customary Areas. Land registrations by former farm workers were not free from political tensions as there was a tendency to paint them with a blanket brush as MDC supporters (Chambati 2011). This

association with white farmers and the MDC hamstrung their quest for land against the politically connected peasants from the Communal Areas (see Moyo 2011a).

Regardless of being registered on the lists compiled by war veterans during the occupations in Mazowe and Goromonzi together with other peasant occupiers, names of farm workers were removed by the land allocating authorities in the early 2000s (WSZ 2017: Interview). These assertions were also corroborated by one farm worker at Chamvari Farm, who recalled doing the same in 2001, but lost out during the formal land allocations in 2003 (Joseph 2017: Interview). Stories were also heard of how former farm workers in Goromonzi were turned away by the land allocating authorities on attempting to enlist for land, evidence also corroborated by Sadomba (2008). To dodge these challenges, some farm workers that had gained concealed their identity as former farm workers when applying for land with the authorities but instead used their connections to the Communal Areas (Moyo *et al.* 2009). Such an option was not present for farm workers of foreign migrant origin. Yet other war veterans also excluded them because they were “...sell outs who fought against the land occupiers and did not deserve to be allocated land” (DM 2017: Interview).

Farm workers also lost the struggle for land on account of being wrongly perceived as foreigners (Daimon 2014; Moyo *et al.* 2000; see also Section 6.4) not eligible for FTLRP allocations. Furthermore, farm workers of foreign origin historically faced challenges to procure Zimbabwean identity documents which were required to access land (see Magaramombe 2001). In Goromonzi, 6.7 percent and 10 percent of the interviewed former farm workers whose parents were born in Mozambique and Malawi had no identity documents and could thus not apply for land during the FTLRP, while in Kwekwe, these were 14.3 percent and 25 percent respectively. Farm workers of foreign migrant origin were thus failed by the limited accessibility of the state registration services for them to acquire national identity cards and passports to prove that they are Zimbabweans as provided for by the Section 43 of the *Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No. 20) Act 2013*.

Not all farm workers who wanted FTLRP land allocations succeeded in this enterprise and thus other avenues were thus pursued, encompassing informal land allocations within and without the resettled areas. Yet is not correct to imply that farm workers were completely marginalised from land access as some analysts do (Alexander 2003; Riderboos 2009).

6.6.5.2 Procuring land in the Communal Areas

After being displaced from the farm compounds as the occupations of LSCFs unravelled, some farm workers had trekked back to their Communal Areas of origin (Sachikonye 2003; IDMC 2008; Magaramombe 2010; Kinsey 2010). Others followed suit after missing out on FTLRP land allocations, and utilised various avenues to negotiate for land in these areas, including on places vacated by resettled farmers. As permanent workers did prior to 2000 (Vhurumuku *et al.* 1998; Moyo *et al.* 2000; Rutherford 2001a), seeking land in the Communal Areas continued to be a route towards realising a “peasant path” for farm workers (Moyo *et al.* 2013: 94). Owning a *musha* or Communal Area home was significantly associated with the current type of farm employment. Permanent workers accounted for at least 75 percent of Communal Area landholders in both districts.

Thirty two percent of the farm workers in both districts owned Communal Area land (Table 6.45). Male former farm workers had a relatively larger share of Communal Area landholders than females. In Goromonzi, 35.1 percent of the former compared to 25.0 percent of the latter were counted. Similar patterns were exhibited in Kwekwe as 35.1 percent of the male former farm workers owned plots in these rural areas compared to 23.1 percent among female former farm workers. Traditional leaders which dominate the allocation of land operate on a patriarchal plane which partly explains why women lag behind men in the ownership of land in the Communal Areas (see Bhatasara & Chiweshe 2017; Chiweshe, Chakona & Helliker 2014; Makura-Paradza 2010). Most former farm workers in Goromonzi had obtained this land after 2000 (70.5 percent), while in Kwekwe, 48.8 percent did so at this time.

Communal Area land was accessed through negotiating with traditional leaders, purchases in the informal markets, inheritance and family subdivision (Table 6.76). Farm

workers of migrant origin lacked the kinship ties that were key to accessing land in the Communal Areas and thus compared to those of Zimbabwean roots fewer of them were successful in this endeavour. Among the latter, 41.8 percent had managed to acquire land in the Communal Areas compared to 27 percent of the former in Goromonzi. The same situation prevailed in Kwekwe where 26.9 percent of the former farm workers of Zimbabwean origin now owned rural land juxtaposed to 11.1 percent of those of foreign migrant origin.

Table 6.76: Avenue utilised to access Communal Area land

Avenue used	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	P	S	PWC	Total	P	S	PWC	Total
Traditional leader	36.6	30	38.5	36.4	25	0	22.2	21.2
In-laws	0	30	3.8	5.2	11.1	0	0	7.7
Bought it	9.8	10	0	6.5	5.6	0	0	3.8
Inherited the land	14.6	0	19.2	14.3	11.1	14.3	33.3	15.4
Family	39.1	30	38.5	37.7	47.2	85.7	44.4	51.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	41	10	26	77	36	7	9	52

Similar to urban workers who held Communal Area homes as a form of long-term security (Potts 2012; 2000; Makura-Paradza 2010; Yeros 2013a; 2002) in case of unemployment, infirmity and/or sickness, farm workers actively sought land in the Communal Areas in the context of the FTLRP. Such a strategy resonated with the story presented by George, a former farm worker at Chamvari Farm (Box 6.3).

Box 6.3: Procuring a rural home in the Communal Areas

Not sure of his age, George started working in LSCFs in 1947 having migrated from Tete Province in Mozambique. Having risen through the ranks to become foremen, George unlike many of his counterparts managed to send his children to school - who later become his source of security in the advent of the FTLRP. Now in retirement, George faced the evictions from the compound in 2005 and then again in 2013 as new farmers demanded to occupy his home – brick and asbestos occupied by senior farm workers. This tenuous tenure security in the farm compound prompted George’s children, the elder a farm manager at nearby agro-industrial chicken farm to marshal resources to purchase a plot/kumusha for their father composed of half hectare for the residency and half hectare of arable land to grow crops. “At least now I have a place I call my own – independent from the threats of the of the land beneficiaries. My children will now be able to inherit this piece of land when I depart this planet unlike the case in the farm compound commented George.

Source: George (2018: Interview)

Their social reproduction now involved straddling between wage work in the resettled areas and joining other family members at weekends or month ends during the rainy

season to contribute labour supplies on their plots in the Communal Areas. Analogous to the land beneficiaries, agricultural production by farm workers in the Communal Areas was focused on food crops (see Hanlon *et al.* 2013; Matondi 2012; Moyo *et al.* 2009) for auto-consumption. Hence, savings were generated by skipping some purchases in volatile food markets. Arable land sizes owned in Communal Areas averaged 1.48 hectares in Goromonzi and 2.78 hectares in Kwekwe.

6.6.5.3 Informal land access in the resettled areas


Formal land allocations have been emphasised in the literature to signal the exclusion of former farm workers from the FTLRP (Sachikonye 2003; Ridderboos 2008; Rutherford 2008; Hartnack 2016). This underplayed the agency of farm workers to fashion other variegated channels to access land, including from the land beneficiaries and through “self-provisioning” of unused lands in the resettled areas (Moyo 1995: 17). As some analysts have argued, the beneficiaries of land reform went beyond those formally recognised and include other people whom they share their land with including farm workers (Moyo *et al.* 2009). The farm workers surveyed were able to seek informal access to land, including from their employment connections especially amongst the permanent workers (see section 6.5.6). As stated earlier, just over 16 percent of them in both districts accessed land informally in the resettled areas, which was excised from the plots of the land beneficiaries.

Loose kinship ties such as sharing the same totem with land beneficiaries was also harnessed to negotiate for access by some piece/daily workers. As noted below, the extent of success through this strategy partially depended on the countries of origin of farm workers. Instead of the capitalist oriented A2 landholders, it was mostly the A1 farmers who gave portions of their land to their workers across both districts. In Goromonzi, 62.6 percent of the farm workers that enjoyed informal land access were given by A1 households and the proportion escalated to 88.2 percent in Kwekwe. Former farm workers of foreign migrant origin were less able to connect with land beneficiaries in order to access informal land than their counterparts of Zimbabwean roots. Twenty seven of the 33 farm workers benefitting from informal land leasing in Goromonzi had

their fathers born in Zimbabwe, while only one farm worker of foreign migrant origin out of 34 did so in Kwekwe.

The land areas parcelled by land beneficiaries to workers were larger in Kwekwe, averaging 1.66 hectares matched to 0.99 hectares in Goromonzi. Food production (maize, groundnuts and vegetables) was the predominant land use again on these small plots of land, while a few also grew cash crops such as tobacco and soyabeans (Figure 6.21). Only males were producing cash crops. Informal land access, as a “social wage” contributed substantially in meeting part of the food meals of farm workers. An average of 1300 kilogrammes of maize grain was harvested by farm workers on the land leased from beneficiaries during the 2016/17 season, while in Kwekwe the mean output was 1,026 kilogrammes. This translated to annual grain requirements for 6.27 and 4.94 adults in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively.¹⁹³

Figure 6.21: Crop production on informal lands accessed by farm workers, 2016/17 season



Some senior (male) former farm workers have continued to access the land in the farm compounds, which they used to produce food before the FTLRP (Vhurumuku *et al.* 1998; FCTZ 2001). Two maps (Figure 6.22 and 6.23) of the farm compounds in Goromonzi

¹⁹³ According to World Health Organisation (WHO) guidelines, an adult requires about 207.3 kgs of maize grain or grain per year at recommended consumption rate of 568 grams per adult equivalent per day ([www.indepth-network.org/Resource/20DSS/20Resource/20kit/Measuring food security survey rounds.htm](http://www.indepth-network.org/Resource/20DSS/20Resource/20kit/Measuring%20food%20security%20survey%20rounds.htm)) [Accessed on 19 February 2018]

and Kwekwe depict the scenario found in most farm compounds visited during the research in relation to the outlay of housing infrastructure and the availability of small arable land sizes. Larger farm workforces employed in Goromonzi LSCFs, implied that compounds tended to be bigger in size than those found in Kwekwe district. Moreover, in Kwekwe, some LSCFs, especially those involved in livestock production, had no farm compounds, but shared this infrastructure with other farms (MRT 2017: Interview). Multiple farm owners also maintained compounds on one of the farms rather than on all of the farms they owned.

Figure 6.22: Map of farm compound at Komuredhi Farm in Goromonzi District





Figure 6.23: Map of farm compound at Chitoti Farm in Kwekwe District



Since almost all LSCFs in Goromonzi had a farm compound, there was a higher proportion of farm workers (31.8 percent) accessing arable land in the farm compounds in this district compared to those in Kwekwe (20.0 percent), which did not have this infrastructure on all the farms (Table 6.77). Agricultural land rights in compounds were more prevalent in former LSCFs resettled under the A1 scheme, followed by those on subdivided A2 farms (Table 6.77). New compounds constructed by land beneficiaries on their plots provided the least land access to farm workers – only 7.9 percent and 11.1 percent in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively.

Table 6.77: Type of farm compounds where farm workers are accessing land

Type of compound	Goromonzi (%)				Kwekwe (%)			
	P	S	PWC	Total	P	S	PWC	Total
Old compound on A1 farm	44.4	100	61.3	57.1	16.7	0	12.5	11.1
Old compound on A2 subdivided farm	37	0	32.3	31.7	66.7	100	25	55.6
Old compound on A2 wholesome farm	0	0	6.5	3.2	0	0	12.5	5.6
New farm compound on A2 subdivided farm	14.8	0	0	6.3	16.7	0	12.5	11.1
New farm compound on A1 farm	3.7	0	0	1.6	0	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	27	5	31	63	6	4	8	18

The plot sizes in the compound in Goromonzi ranged from 0.1 to 1.00 hectares compared to between 0.20 and 1.50 hectares in Kwekwe.

Box 6.4: Gaining land rights on lands vacated by former senior male workers

Mavhuso a female former farm worker at Chitoti Farm in Kwekwe worked as a general hand until the farm was acquired for resettlement in 2005. She did not have any piece of land to farm in the compound. Her neighbour, a male foreman owned about 0.05 hectares of land behind his house. After he left the compound to assume ownership of his new A1 plot in the district in 2006, an opportunity emerged for Mavhuso to take over the piece of land. She has been producing maize for family consumption since then, alongside piece/daily work in the new farms. During the 2016/17 season, Mavhuso had harvested four 50 kilogramme bags of maize grain. This was enough to last about 10 months for the family of three, including her mother and nephew. A similar story echoed with Sharon, former junior female farm worker at Matimati Farm in Goromonzi. She had also taken over a plot left behind by a senior male farm worker who moved back to his Communal Area home in 2007 after the redistribution of the farm to A2 landholders. Together with her husband and five children, Sharon also produces maize on the 0.08 hectare plot, while working as permanent worker at a neighbouring horticultural export farm. Others had also extended residential space as they accommodated the married children in vacant houses left by their colleagues as happened at Komuredhi and Ivhue Redu Farms in Goromonzi.

Source: Mavhuso (2017: Interview)

New and former farm workers acquired agricultural land rights in the compounds from the former LSCFs, and new land beneficiaries (Table 6.78). Moreover, the agency of farm workers was also seen from the self-allocations of land in the old farm compounds on lands vacated by their former colleagues who had left for various destinations. This involved 32.3 and 38.9 percent Goromonzi and Kwekwe labourers respectively (Table 6.78; see also Box 6.4).

Table 6.78: Who allocated farm workers land in the farm compounds

Allocated by	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	P	S	PWC	Total	P	S	PWC	Total
Former LSCF	23.1	0	38.7	29	16.7	50	25	27.8
New land beneficiary	65.4	0	22.6	38.7	50	25	25	33.3
Self-allocated	11.5	100	38.7	32.3	33.3	25	50	38.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	26	5	31	62	6	4	8	18
Chi-Square	22.540				2.250			
p	0.000*				0.690**			

*Significant at $p < 0.05$ **Not significant at $p < 0.05$

Before 2000, exploitation of fields in the compound for those who had it was constrained by the long work schedules in the LSCFs. Today, flexibility offered by piece/daily work, which many former farm workers were now mainly involved enables more latitude to apply labour from within their families to produce both food and cash crops:

“...We used to start work at 6am and finish at 4pm between Monday and Saturday. There was no time to tend your crops. Now that I don’t have a regular job, I can manage my time between tending my own small plot and selling my labour to the A1 and A2 land beneficiaries. During the season, I start to work on my small plot in the compound before I go to look for paid labour” (Mavhuso 2017: Interview).

Food crops such as maize, sweet potatoes and vegetables were popular land uses in the farm compounds before land reform. In particular reference to maize, the average harvest of 420 kgs and 662 kgs in Goromonzi and Kwekwe were adequate to feed 2.02 and 3.19 adults per year respectively.¹⁹⁴ Besides free range chicken, livestock production was largely restricted in the old farm compounds. A case study in Mazowe district documented by Scoones *et al.* (2018a: 16) is worth reciting. There one farm worker

¹⁹⁴ According to WHO guidelines (see Section 6.6.5.3).

narrated how he was ordered at the “farmers’ own court” to stop the production of chicken broilers in the compound without permission.

Figure 6.24: Thriving tobacco crop in the compound at Sandspruit farm, Goromonzi



Former farm workers were evolving a wide range of land uses, not to mention the non-farm enterprises, seen in the compound nowadays pointing to the newly acquired “freedoms” non-existent under the controls imposed by the former LSCFs. Four of the twenty-four farm workers who had access to compound arable land in Goromonzi had grown tobacco in the 2016/17 season (see Figure 6.24). These dynamics were uncommon in Kwekwe. Cattle and goats have also found their way into old farm compounds in Goromonzi (see Figure 6.25).

Figure 6.25: Goat production at Matimati Farm Compound, Goromonzi



Beyond the new agricultural land uses, an array of income generating took place in the farm compounds. Farm shops operated by LSCFs have now been replaced by informal

tuck shops and bars/sheebens, alongside those run by land beneficiaries. Other activities observed included brick making and furniture making in the compound (see Figure 6.26 and 6.27). On many former LSCFs, nobody was allowed to sell items that were found in the farm shops and bars (Sharon 2017: Interview). White farmers monopolised these income-generating activities as a way to recapture the wages paid through cash and credit purchases of the overpriced goods and services (Loewenson 1992; Gibbon 2011) as indicated earlier (Section 6.5.4.1).

Figure 6.26: Brick making and thatching grass trade, Goromonzi



This evidence shows that farm compounds were not just places of residency, but also deployed by farm workers as productive zones for both agricultural and non- agricultural activities. This contradicts claims by other scholars that farm workers who remained in the compounds were “displaced in situ” and without work (Magaramombe 2010).

Figure 6.27: Furniture making at Matimati Farm, Goromonzi



Emphasising the collapse of social services such as medical facilities, piped water and toilets (Matondi 2012; GAPWUZ 2010; Pilosoff 2012), and/or the use of the same

without compensation to landholders (Utete 2003) has thus missed the expression of farm workers' agency through the emerging forms of production relations and livelihoods in the old farm compounds. These struggles by both farmers and workers in the compounds are also omitted altogether by focusing on farm worker strategies beyond the compound (Hartnack 2016).

“Self-provisioning” of unused lands (Moyo 1995: 17) in the resettled areas outside of the compounds also provided informal land access to one percent of the permanent and 3.8 percent of piece/daily workers in Goromonzi (see Table 6.45). Such land access was reported by 1.4 percent of the piece/daily workers in Kwekwe.

6.6.6 Peasant and capitalist farmers' responses to labour struggles

The outcomes of the farm labour struggles were discernible through the “labour shortages”, which the new farm employers faced despite the availability of workers in the old farm compounds. Uncommon in the LSCFs because labour could be summoned at peak periods from the farm compounds that always housed “surplus labour” than which was required at any given point in time, including from the families of the permanent workers (Tandon 2001). Moyo *et al.* (2009: 106) exposed the severe “labour shortages” that were being experienced by 38.4 percent of the 2084 A1 and A2 households surveyed nationally. These challenges also did not go unnoticed by Utete (2003) and Matondi (2012) who assigned blame to the alternative livelihoods such artisanal gold mining, in which farm workers were now involved instead of participating in farm labour markets.

Perhaps, it is also worth retrieving the complaint made by the chairperson of the Zimbabwe Agricultural Employers Organisations in the press regarding the “shortages of labour” in 2005. The available farm labour in the old farm compounds were noted to be refusing to work because of the poor wages that were being offered by the new farm employers.¹⁹⁵ This reflected the increased bargaining power that had accrued to farm workers to “vote with their feet”, and new farmers' inability to compel labour through the residential tenancy. Challenges of labour mobilisation in the new agrarian structure

¹⁹⁵ See “Labour crisis hits new farms”, The Independent, 4 March 2005, <https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2005/03/04/labour-crisis-hits-new-farmers/> [Accessed 13 May 2018].

elicited differentiated responses from both the peasant and capitalist farms, which are uncovered below.

6.6.6.1 Improve working conditions of farm labour

An array of incentives have been introduced to attract and retain labour. To discourage non-attendance at work by permanent labourers seeking extra income in piece work and other non-farm activities work attendance bonuses had surfaced in the new resettlement areas (Table 6.67). Allocation of tasks would be affected if some workers did not report for duty and farmers feared the adverse consequences on agricultural production and productivity. The work attendance bonus were paid depending on the number of days an employee pitched up for work, unless proof of a valid reason was furnished to the employers for being absent from work. Production bonuses were also observed and represented farm employers' strategy to contain staff turnover especially amongst the skilled group of workers (Table 6.67). These responses were concentrated in the capitalist farms in the A2 sector, which relied on hired labour to organise their farming than the peasant farms in the A1 scheme.

The average wages for permanent workers were 1.4 times significantly higher in capitalist farms than those in the middle peasant farms. Some new farm employers surpassed the negotiated minimum wages to keep workers in their employ. Past the negotiated wages, the members of the ZTA for instance, were paying an additional US\$15 as part of the work retention schemes (Jera 2017: Interview). The skills in tobacco production were mostly endowed by former farm workers and were scarce on the labour markets since this commodity was largely produced in the LSCFs before the land reforms.

The provision of meals at work to piece/daily workers had become an instrument to attract labour during periods of intense competition for workers, usually between November and December (MPEW 2017: Interview). Apparently, this had transformed into a standard in the piece/daily labour markets of Goromonzi since the workers were demanding an additional US\$1.00 to cover meals if the employers did not provide food (BLG 2017: Interview). Permanent workers were also recipients of meals at their

workplaces on top of the monthly food rations provided by some employers. The issuance of meals to piece/daily workers was more common in Goromonzi than in Kwekwe (section 6.5.6).

6.6.6.2 Labour mobilisation strategies: “spatial fix”

The importation of labour as is common in contexts where large-scale farming predominates has been a common strategy adopted by both A1 and A2 farm employers to mobilise farm labour supplies (Delgado Wise & Veltmeyer 2016; Gibbon 2011; Selwyn 2014; Oya & Pontara 2015). Rather than the relocation of industries to areas where “surplus labour” exists as a “spatial fix” to respond to increased labour struggles discussed by Silver (2003) in reference to the US automobile industries shift to Europe and later to Asia in the 1960s, new farm employers were shifting from depending on the old farm compounds for farm labour supplies to include Communal and other areas.

In place of local sources of permanent labour from the old farm compounds, the A1 and A2 farm households had expanded the boundaries of recruitment. A2 farmers’ responses to why they were not hiring all their labour from the existent sources in the old farm compounds were more akin to the rhetoric of the “lazy native” (Li Murray 2011: 286). Former farm workers were often characterised as a “lazy” and “ill disciplined” lot who were refusing to work for the new farmers rather than evolving resistance to the poor wages.

The sources of permanent labour now include their Communal Area of origin or *kumusha* irrespective of the distance to their farm households. About 15.4 percent of the Goromonzi A1 households had recruited permanent labour from there (Table 6.79). None of the A2 households in this district had mobilised labour from their *kumusha*. Other Communal Areas including, Chikwaka (Western side) and Chinhamora (North-Eastern side) that are on the margins of the resettled areas, and Chinyika located at the centre of the districts provided permanent labour to 80.8 percent and 67.7 percent of the A1 and A2 farms (see Figure 3.2). Overall, permanent farm workers in the surveyed households were mobilised from over 12 districts spread in half of the eight rural provinces in the country. Only three of the districts were in Mashonaland East province where Goromonzi

is found namely Mutoko, Murehwa and Seke. The peasantry as source of permanent labour now consists of those from the Communal Areas working alongside the new peasantry from the local A1 farms that 4.8 percent of the A2 landowners in Goromonzi hired.

The recruitment from the same district was more frequent among A2 farms than it was in the A1 farms in Goromonzi (Table 6.79). Former farm workers were mentioned as a source of permanent labour by 15.4 percent and 83.9 percent of the A1 and A2 farms respectively (Table 6.79). An estimated 6.5 percent of the A2 farm households had imported former farm workers from outside Goromonzi as well. That the A2 were the ones frequently integrated into production of commodities for international markets (e.g. tobacco) and valued the skills of former farm workers thus echoed in their hiring patterns of permanent labour.

Table 6.79: Sources of permanent and casual farm labour

Source	Permanent					Casual					
	Goromonzi		Kwekwe			Goromonzi			Kwekwe		
	A1	A2	A1	A2	CA	A1	A2	CA	A1	A2	CA
Communal Area of origin	15.4	0	6.1	17.5	100	50.8	0	90	3.7	4.1	100
Other Communal Areas	80.8	67.7	71.4	72.5	0	5.1	56.9	10	2.8	14.3	0
Local A1 farmers	0	4.8	16.3	27.5	0	8.5	1.5	0	87	73.5	0
Urban Areas	0	0	0	10	0	74.6	0	0	7.4	16.3	0
Former farm workers in same district	15.4	83.9	6.1	12.5	0	0	89.2	0	4.6	16.3	0
Former farm workers in different district	0	6.5	4.1	0	0	6.8	1.5	0	0	0	0
N	26	62	49	40	4	55	65	20	108	49	10

Comparable sources of permanent labour were identified from farm households in Kwekwe, but urban areas not cited in Goromonzi featured in this district (Table 6.79). Once more, the Communal Areas was the primary source of permanent labour and was mostly from other areas not their *kumusha* (Table 6.79). Because of alternative livelihoods (Murray Li 2011), especially in gold panning, peasants from Silobela and

Zhombe Communal Areas in Kwekwe resist poorly paid farm work offered by the new range of producers, which they combine with low productivity agricultural production (see also Moyo *et al.* 2009; Chigumira 2018). Consequently, Gokwe South district, neighbouring Kwekwe on the Northern border of the district was a key source of permanent labour.¹⁹⁶ In fact, over 51 percent of the farms that had utilised Communal Areas as source of permanent labour mobilised from there compared to 18.4 percent from Zhombe and Silobela Communal Areas. The balance was spread in other districts in the Midlands, Masvingo, Mashonaland West and Manicaland provinces. Overall, permanent farm workers engaged in Kwekwe in the A1 and A2 households were traced to 16 rural districts in Zimbabwe.

Mobilisation of part-time labour was dependent mostly on local sources of labour within the redistributed farms in direct contrast to that of permanent labour. Those in Goromonzi relied mostly on old farm compounds, while the new peasantry from the A1 farms was however the main source of part-time farm labour in Kwekwe (Table 6.79). Urban areas were also supplying casual labour to all the settlements except the A2 farms in Goromonzi (Table 6.79).

A1 and A2 households on their plot subdivisions tied the importation of labour to the construction of new farm compounds (see section 6.4.6). Such tendencies have been on the rise nationally and were dominated by the Mashonaland Provinces that have the most developed labour markets.¹⁹⁷ Like the old farm compounds, the new ones simulate the

¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, Gokwe South is one of the 11 districts that did not have any LSCFs and many peasants from this area's prospects to gain land were more constrained than others belonging to districts, which implemented the FTLRP (see Mkodzongi 2013b). This was largely due to the ethno-regionalism whereby those originating from within the district were preferred for land offers than those from elsewhere (see Moyo 2011; 2013). So, compared to other Communal Areas in districts with LSCFs, land shortages were more rife and compelled residents in Gokwe South to farm labour markets in Kwekwe and beyond. Additionally, peasants in Gokwe, options to survive on the small pieces of land was severely dented by the collapse of cotton production that had been its mainstay for decades due to the challenges in contract farming and slump in international prices of cotton lint (Poulton & Hanyani-Mlambo 2009; Binswanger-Mkhize & Moyo 2012).

¹⁹⁷ This evidence is substantiated by the rise in the investment in new farm housing for workers by both A1 and A2 since 2009 captured by the national statistical agency (ZIMSTAT 2015a; 2015b). The amount of money spent on new houses for workers by A2 farmers rose from US\$702,267 in 2009 to US\$4,095,063 in 2014 (ZIMSTAT 2015a:125). On average, US\$1572,866.80 was spent per annum in the A2 scheme on new worker housing during this period. The investment in the A1 farms was much lower, but still an increase

residential labour tenancy relationship and guarantee the supply of labour from the workers and their families. The A1 farmers however were housing imported labour within their homesteads.

New farm employers also attempted to force the piece/daily workers living in the old farm compounds to channel labour to their farms in Goromonzi or be evicted from their housing. Due to the different policy relating to the farm compounds in the A1 and A2 schemes, the outcomes of eviction threats also varied. Over 31 percent of the piece/daily workers in Goromonzi A1 farms were confronted with threats of eviction from their houses in the compounds compared to 7.2 percent of the permanent labour (Table 6.80). The main reason provoking eviction threats in Goromonzi was their reluctance to sell labour to the new landholders as mentioned by over 50 percent of them. The incidence of eviction threats affected only 3.1 percent of the piece/daily workers and none of the permanent workers in Kwekwe.

Table 6.80: Residency eviction threats received by farm workers

Eviction threats	Goromonzi				Kwekwe			
	P	S	PWC	Total	P	S	PWC	Total
Yes	7.2	5.3	31.2	16.6	0	7.1	3.1	2.2
No	92.8	94.7	68.8	83.4	100	92.9	96.9	97.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	97	19	77	193	93	28	65	186
Chi-Square	19.757				5.625			
p	0.000*				0.060**			

*Significant at $p < 0.05$ **Not significant at $p < 0.05$

Goromonzi defended their residential rights by engaging in violent confrontations with the land beneficiaries that were reported by 20.3 percent of the piece/daily workers. Fewer permanent and seasonal labourers alluded to this - 8.0 percent and 5.3 percent respectively. None in Kwekwe described these trends.

Fifty farm worker families at Chamvari A1 farm in Goromonzi were evicted from the compound in 2005 after resisting to supply wage labour to the peasants whom they

from US\$112,721 to US\$372,546 was recorded between 2009 and 2014 (ZIMSTAT 2015b:138). Mashonaland Provinces, which command the highest demand for farm labour dominated the investments in new worker housing. For instance in 2014, Mashonaland East A2 farms (where Goromonzi is located) spent US\$275,260 in new worker housing compared to US\$18,746 in Midlands (where Kwekwe is located) (ZIMSTAT 2015a: 131).

accused of underpaying them (Joseph 2017: Interview). Their pole and dagga houses were razed to the ground by the A1 farms. The prospective MDC Member of Parliament for the area referred them to ZLHR, which launched an application against the farmers at Goromonzi Magistrate Court. They returned to their residency after the A1 farmers cited in the application were directed by the court to allow the former workers to return to their homes without any conditions (see Annex 6.1). So besides relying on ZANU (PF) for protection from evictions in the farm compounds (see section 6.6.4), NGOs such as ZLHR were critical allies of farm workers in blocking displacements from the compounds.

Those on A2 farm compounds were not so lucky in returning or keeping their houses after facing evictions. For instance, the farm workers at Banana Groove (an A2 settlement farm in Goromonzi) were initially protected from evictions by ZLHR at the local court around 2011 (Chimbaga 2017: Interview) were eventually evicted after the A2 farmer in possession of the compound overturned the judgement on appeal at the High Court in Harare.¹⁹⁸ Since 2015, eight families who did not have anywhere else to go of foreign migrant origin constructed makeshift houses along the road next to the farm with no resolution in sight.

Indeed, precedence was set at the Constitutional Court that farm workers living in the old farm compounds in A2 farms could be evicted if they were not employed on the farm through the *Gazetted Lands (Consequential Provisions) Act of 2006*. Forty six farm workers at Mgotu of Great B farm in Mazowe district allocated to 33 A2 farmers were charged at the Magistrates Court for illegal occupation of the farm compound since the new owner did not formally employ them. Once more, with the help of the ZLHR, the farm workers lodged an appeal at the Constitutional Court, Application Number CCZ 245/12, in 2015 arguing the impending evictions would violate their “right to life” among other constitutionally enshrined rights. The Constitutional Court upheld the judgement of

¹⁹⁸ See “Stranded ex-farm workers suffer three year ordeal”, The Standard 16 April 2017, Harare, www.the-standard.co.zw/2017/04/16/stranded-ex-farm-workers-suffer-three-year-ordeal [Accessed 13 March 2018].

the lower court that the former farm workers were contravening the *Gazetted Lands (Consequential Provisions) Act of 2006* which enjoins the:

“...former owners and occupiers [including farm workers] who ha[ve] no lawful authority [are] legally obliged to cease occupying or using such land upon the expiry of the prescribed period...By operation of law, the former owners or occupiers of acquired land loose all rights to the acquired land” (GoZ 2016a: 7).

This has now, at law, provided impetus for the A2 farmers to institute the residential labour tenancy in the farm compounds that fall under their jurisdiction. According to the ZHLR, the ruling “...put a final nail in the coffin to their advocacy work to secure the residential rights of farm workers through legal means” (Chimbga 2017: Interview).

The judgement, Mr. Chimbga added, had exposed farm workers in A2 farms to exploitation of the labour rights as farmers use eviction threats to cow farm workers into submission. Indeed, this was the case at Hurudza A2 farm in Goromonzi when the owner after accumulating huge salary arrears threatened to evict farm workers who had engaged in a strike to demand wage payments (Chimbga 2017: Interview). It was only after the intervention of ZLHR, which threatened with litigation, that the owner retreated on the planned evictions. Notwithstanding the setbacks experienced at the Constitutional Court, the example cited above represents the tactic being used by ZLHR to deter evictions as some A2 farmers were not prepared to direct scarce financial resources to legal fees to attain judgements at the Courts. The opportunity cost was of course forgone investments in agricultural production. New landholders also tried to redirect labour to their farms by imposing land use rules in the compound that only food production was permissible as cash crops were enhancing the autonomy of farm workers from the labour markets.

A third of the former farm workers possessing agricultural land in the old compounds surveyed in Goromonzi had been barred from the producing tobacco because they stopped selling labour to A1 and A2 employers. Such patterns were not observed in Kwekwe. Former farm workers growing tobacco were additionally accused of causing “environmental degradation” by cutting down trees belonging to the land beneficiaries in order to cure tobacco.

State policy and institutions, which allows farm workers to continue staying in the old farm compounds in the A1 farms regardless of their employment status was thus deployed to successful effect by farm workers. In contrast, their counterparts in A2 farms have fallen foul of state policy, which empowers their evictions in the event they were not employed by the new land beneficiaries. However, the absence of a definitive position entrenched in the laws on their residential rights beyond being allowed to remain in the compounds poses uncertainty on their long-term tenure security and fuels struggles over mandatory labour supplies on the basis of residency in the new farming units.

6.6.6.3 Adoption of labour displacing technologies: “technological fix”

At various points, the state intervened to assist the new farm employers to counter the labour shortages through various mechanisation and input distribution programmes (see Shonhe 2018; World Bank 2006; Moyo & Nyoni 2013; Scoones *et al.* 2010). A “technological fix” to the labour problems (Silver 2003) has thus been underway in the resettled areas relying on the personal savings of farmers and to a large extent on state subsidies to widen the availability of labour displacing technologies.

By 2007, as the labour shortages continued to bite, under the aegis of the central bank, the state had initiated a “Farm Mechanisation Programme” (RBZ 2008). Varied types of electric powered equipment were distributed to mostly the A2 landholders in three phases for free and on cheap credit terms. The A2 households received overall, about 2,625 tractors and 1,846 ploughs nationally by 2008 (Murisa & Mujeyi 2015: 93). The A1 and other small-scale farm households in the Communal Areas were allocated animal drawn equipment such as scotch carts, cultivators and ploughs from the second phase onwards (RBZ 2008).

Yet again, through the “Command Agriculture”, the state has been expanding access to farm machinery since 2016 to the A2 landholders. Similar machinery as that distributed during the earlier farm mechanisation programme was also allocated to some A2 farmers under this programme. Further to the machinery, other agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertiliser and labour displacing technologies such as herbicides, were given to

farmers on credit with a 12 percent annual interest rate that was supposed to be paid after they delivered the targeted maize output with the Grain Marketing Board (Chemura 2017).

Besides ownership, some A2 farmers were hiring machinery in the leasing markets evolving in the resettled areas. By way of an example, one A2 farmer had mechanised most of the farm tasks for the 50 hectares of maize produced in the 2016/17 season through the hiring of farm equipment from former LSCFs who were providing equipment services at nearby farm (Gambara 2018: Interview). Daily human labour was only used for fertiliser application, while ploughing was done with a tractor and weeding was performed using a tractor powered boom sprayer to apply herbicides. For harvesting the maize, a combine harvester, which aggregated the removal of grain from the stalks, shelling and bagging of the output ready for the market at a cost of US\$80 per hectare. Such levels of mechanisation radically reduced the demand for human labour, and with it farmers were spared the “complex negotiations” with piece/daily workers over the wage rates (Gambara 2018: Interview).

Both A1 and A2 households have also been enlisting on private agribusiness contract farming schemes to access scarce agricultural inputs and output markets (Sachikonye 2016; Mazwi & Muchetu 2015). Through these schemes, which have grown tremendously in tobacco (Sakata 2017; Shonhe 2017; see section 6.4.4), farmers have been accessing labour displacing technologies such as herbicides, as well as credit to acquire machinery such as tractors.

By and large, the adoption of herbicides has been the most pervasive strategy implemented by farmers to offset the labour shortages arising from various labour struggles in the resettled areas. AGRITEX has been at the forefront of recommending to the farmers to adopt herbicides to counter labour shortages, in addition to improving productivity.¹⁹⁹ According to AGRITEX, herbicides saves farmers labour since they are only applied once and there is no repeated weeding as is the case when manual human

¹⁹⁹ See “Calls to consider herbicides”, The Herald, 24 June 2011, Harare.

labour is used. Moreover, they argue that application of herbicides greatly enhances the yield of crops such as maize.

Examples provided by the extension workers showed that one of the herbicides used in maize production, *nicosulfran*, required 20 grammes for a hectare of land and two people using knapsack sprayers could apply the chemical over a day (MPEW 2017: Interview). Inclusive of the herbicide cost (US\$20 per 20 grammes) and the two sprayers paid US\$5.00 each for the work, the total cost for weeding hectare of land translated to US\$30. In contrast, the use of human labour would require about 20 people for the hectare, each paid US\$5.00 for *mugwazo* escalating the bill to US\$100 per hectare. Besides displacing human labour, herbicide application therefore saved the farmers substantially on the wage bill.

Compared to past surveys, the field evidence suggests that there has been a growth in the utilisation of herbicides, especially in the wetter Mashonaland districts such as Goromonzi. Round about 2006, the use of all agro-chemicals were concentrated in tobacco and cotton production, encompassing 37.1 percent and 42.5 percent of the A1 and A2 farms respectively (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 70). In other crops such as maize, wheat, soyabeans and sunflower, less than 17 percent of the farmers applied these chemicals (Moyo *et al.* 2009: 70). The evidential base from farm household surveys imply the proliferation of herbicide use in Goromonzi as it was reported in 75.7 percent and 87.8 percent of the A1 and A2 maize producing households. Because of the drier conditions, herbicide use in maize was not widely recommended in Kwekwe as it can lead to crop damage (MRT 2017: Interview). Thus, adoption rates were much lower and limited to only 3.6 percent of the A1 households and 22.2 percent in the A2 scheme.

6.6.7 State attempts to marshal labour towards farm labour markets

The land reform policy envisaged former farm workers would be absorbed as labourers by the new farming units and were thus not prioritised in the land allocations like the peasantry from the Communal Areas (see section 6.6.5). Depriving them of means of production would thus ensure their continued attachment to the labour markets for their survival. Furthermore, various initiatives to assist farmers to cope with labour shortages

such as the farm mechanisation programmes, were accompanied by wide reaching repressive programmes by the state to dismantle activities thought to be siphoning labour from agriculture. Operation *Chikorokoza Chapera*²⁰⁰ launched in 2007 targeted gold panning in order to redirect labour back to the farms since former farm workers were fingered by policy makers as one of the key actors (see Utete 2003). This targeted gold producing districts such as Kwekwe. So beyond controlling leakages of revenue through the smuggling of gold for sale in South Africa attributed to informal gold miners, which have been emphasised (Speigel 2015; Chigumira 2018), Operation *Chikorokoza Chapera* had multiple objectives, including doubling up to redress the labour shortages in districts endowed with this resource.

According to IDMC (2008:39), “tens of thousands” of illegal gold panners were violently ejected by the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) from mining sites national and 25,000 people were arrested. Many of those displaced were former farm workers (Sadomba 2013). However, the policy regarding gold panning had begun to shift from 2009 to accommodate and formalise small-scale mining as production in large mining companies floundered in a context where the government was desperate to harness the scarce foreign currency (Speigel 2015; Chigumira 2018).

Firewood trading as alternative to farm labour markets others also came under attack as former farm workers and others were increasingly being arrested from the mid 2000s for the non-possession of permits that are required for this enterprise (MPEW 2017: Interview). Due to the widespread electricity load shedding in the urban areas between 2002 and 2008, together with the rise in tobacco production (requiring firewood for curing), the demand for firewood were growing substantially (Moyo *et al.* 2009). The Environmental Management Agency (EMA) ratcheted its operations in the resettled areas during this period to halt a host of “environmental degradation” practices, including firewood trade. To avoid detection by environmental authorities, firewood was being harvested and transported in the dead of the night to nearby Seke and Epworth urban areas from Goromonzi, while in Kwekwe, Mbizo and Redcliff were the predominant

²⁰⁰ Illegal gold mining is colloquially referred to as “Chikorokoza” So the “Operation Chikorokoza Chapera” translated to “illegal gold mining has ended”.

recipients of firewood from the resettled areas. The village heads in the A1 farms were also increasingly under pressure to implement various environmental regulations in the areas under their control as chairs of sub-committees established by EMA. Nonetheless, these initiatives did not totally reverse the trading of natural resources among both farm workers and land beneficiaries (Table 6.18).

6.6.8 Summary of main findings

Evidently, (former) farm workers were far from being “passive victims” of the FTLRP, land owners and war veterans as some scholars suggested (Ridderbos 2009: 73; see also Hartnack 2005). Poor working conditions and land shortages for independent production conditioned the agency farm workers displayed in the redistributed farms. The farm labourers push back on the super-exploitation in the new capitalist farms by drawing from their individual and collective agency in order to improve their material conditions.

They were engaged in dual, if not contradictory, struggles to improve the conditions as “workers” as well as direct action to realise their aspirations to become peasants. Now this should be seen in different light from the thesis advanced by Bernstein (2014), which reduced peasants to “fragmented classes of labour” thus should be presumably pre-occupied by struggles to improve their conditions as workers. Yet, the evidence presented here suggests that both the land and labour questions remain key in rural areas of Africa. Most of the land short farm workers actually aspire for a post wage-economy for their social reproduction and actively seek land both in the formal and informal avenues.

With limited protection from their unions and the state, different strategies were being crafted including using their own structural power to force reforms of their working conditions by the new farm employers and the levels of success differs according to their gender, skill levels and the commodity focus of the new farm employers. Their labour mobilisation efforts face challenges from the cumbersome requirements to undertake collective action imposed by the labour legislation, as well as the limitations of the state to guarantee trade unions access to the workforce as required by the law. Instead of the union, associational power derived from political parties, in particular, ZANU (PF) has been key in protection of farm compound residential rights, as were their alliances with

human rights NGOs such as the ZLHR. Yet, the role of ZANU (PF) in fomenting violence in rural areas, including towards farm workers has been emphasised (see Munyuki-Hungwe 2011; Laurie 2017; GAPWUZ & JAG 2008), and this only partially reveals farm workers' relationship with political parties.

Overall, the partial dismantling of the residential labour tenancy has seen the enhancement of the agency of farm workers. New A1 and A2 farmers were neither able to convert the residential population in the old compounds into farm labour supplies at ease as the former LSCFs did nor entrench their control on the off work relations of farm workers (Chambati 2013a). The absence of excessive control of employees enabled by the residential tenancy system has seen the rise in the independent forms of self-mobilisation by farm workers beyond farm worker committees. Parallels could be drawn from Brazil and South Africa where self-mobilisation by workers has been documented when workers live off the farm (Selwyn 2014; Wilderman 2014).

Indeed, the result of the worker resistance has been the emergence of labour shortages that were being experienced by the new capitalist farms. Free from the encumbrance of dependency relations, the piece/daily workers in A1 farms assume multi-occupational identities and some delink from the farm labour markets. After failing to compel workers from the old A1 compounds, new farm employers have been forced to diversify their sources of labour and evolve new forms of labour control by building their own compounds on their subdivisions and thus also ensure adequate availability of labour. The low wages alongside the prolongation of the binding together of employment contracts and accommodation in the old farm compounds in some A2 capitalist farms represents continuation of super-exploitation in the new labour relations. As a result, spatial control of the old compounds and the workers therein was a source conflicts especially in A2 farms. The qualitative difference in the conditions farm workers face in structuring their agency has gone unnoticed by some analysts who have characterised the new situation farm workers as “conditional belonging” that overly assigns power to the new farmers in an undifferentiated manner (Rutherford 2018; Hartnack 2016). Notwithstanding the agency they exhibit, it is yet to substantially reverse the poor social reproduction conditions that many farm labourers continue to encounter.

6.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented data analysis and interpretation of the findings on the transformation of agrarian labour relations after radical land redistribution during the FTLRP based on the detailed qualitative and quantitative research undertaken in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts, as well as from other sources. It illustrated that as the domination of a few LSCFs on the agrarian structure was dented by the FTLRP and the subsequent changes in land use, agricultural production and markets under rapidly changing agrarian policies and economic contexts, the agrarian labour relations shaped by unequal land distribution and its monopolisation as freehold land were changed.

A new agrarian labour regime was now in place characterised by the rise in the use of self-employed family labour in the many smaller-scale farming units to add to that already existing in the Communal Areas, but not without farm labour markets, for they continue. Inequitable gender and generational tendencies were however not rolled back by the land reform as men (also frequently the landholders) more often than not still controlled the decisions about allocation and use of women and children's labour in both the new farms and old peasantry. Beyond own farming, family labour was also applied in other non-farm income earning activities as is common across rural areas in SSA due to the seasonality of agriculture. Yet this did not result in the permanent reallocation of family labour away from farming as anticipated by de-agrarianisation theorists (Bryceson 2002; 2000; 1997; Riggs 2006). In fact, agricultural production was universal among the interviewed households to underline the importance of land access and farm labour in both its paid and unpaid dimensions and for over a third of the farming units, agriculture was their only source of income. Rather than (rural) non-farm labour replacing farm labour, the two activities interacted in dynamic ways in the social reproduction strategies in the rural areas with either activity contributing financial resources to the other or making up the income gaps for their livelihood needs that one activity alone could not meet. Furthermore, the integration of households into rural non-farm income earning activities by peasants was contingent upon natural resource availability in a particular locality. Semi-proletarianisation, as Moyo and Yeros (2005b) have theorised, was therefore the predominant outcome of the agrarian restructuring,

alongside the process of repeasantisation through return of urbanites to rural areas via FTLRP land access.

With enlarged land access, most of the peasantry in the A1 scheme now farm on the basis of self-employed family labour and only a few of them were net sellers of farm labour to other households. It was mostly the land short Communal Area and farm worker households that hired out farm labour from their households to others, indicating the continued role of land access in shaping farm labour markets (Moyo 2011a; 2013; Cousins 2009; Shivji 2009). Agrarian labour reserve dynamics of the past thus persevere (Chambati 2013a), even though they are no longer dependent on a few LSCFs for employment since not all the landless were accommodated by the land reforms and still derive their survival from the rural labour markets. Additionally, patterns of withdrawal from the urban employment were witnessed among some of the people after obtaining access to resettlement land. Altogether, this suggests that access to land had reduced the compulsion for many poor peasants and/or semi-proletariats to enter the exploitative (agrarian) labour markets since they could now construct their livelihoods from own farming.

These agrarian labour markets previously controlled by a few LSCFs are today characterised by an expanded and diverse set of farm employers mainly located in the A2 scheme. Alternatively, the monopoly control the LSCFs had on the agrarian labour markets is now dispersed amongst the many landholders with reduced land sizes and different tenure arrangements. Nevertheless, labour hiring in also featured in the agrarian relations of the peasantry, but its incidence was at a much lower scale compared to the latter. And as expected, the new peasantry in the A1 with access to larger land sizes in better agro-ecological zones out-competed their peers in the Communal Areas in the recruitment and utilisation of wage labour. The data therefore demonstrates that the consideration of wage labour utilisation as confined to large-scale capitalist farms by some analysts (Barret *et al.* 2001; Barret *et al.* 2005; Binswanger *et al.* 1995; Griffin *et al.* 2000; Robilliard *et al.* 2001), is not correct as it exists even in agrarian structures that are dominated by the peasantry such as the one that resulted from the agrarian change imposed by the radical land reforms in Zimbabwe.

There was differentiation in the use of hired in labour amongst the farming households. Specifically, the study through statistical cluster analysis delineated the households into the capitalist class, which were reliant on hired in labour and differentiated peasantries that depended on labour supplies from within their families to organise their farming. The utilisation of hired in labour was certainly a key indicator of the perceived wider rural social differentiation as the decline in its application was associated with the reduction in farm assets owned, use of modern inputs and technologies, as well as the production of cash/export crops and the incomes realised from agriculture by the surveyed farm households. The agro-ecological location, which in turn influenced the land utilisation patterns and demand for farm labour as seen in the former LSCFs counted in the formation of rural classes as evidenced by the uneven use of hired in labour across the study districts. Goromonzi, located in a Natural Region with better soils and good rainfall, compared to the drier Kwekwe district ,dominated the use of farm wage labour and consequently the shares of capitalist farmers amongst the farm households interviewed.

Continuities and changes marked the new agrarian wage labour relations. While the jobs that farm workers now occupy were commonly informal and part-time, the payment of wages well below the cost of social reproduction resonates with the tendencies in the former LSCFs. Even with the expansion of the wage structure through the receipt of “social wages” such as access to informal land for own production provided by land beneficiaries, natural resources trading and food subsidies, the poverty afflicting most farm workers has not been substantially altered. The farm workers who received “social wages” were all the same relatively better off than their counterparts that solely depended on monetary wages for their survival. Also replicating past tendencies observed in the former LSCFs, the marginalisation of women in the labour markets as irregular wage earners has not relented.

It can thus be concluded that the super-exploitation of farm workers is scale neutral, featuring in the former LSCFs and now continuing in the new small-scale capitalist farms. Tellingly, the evidence from other countries in SSA also indicates that this is not unique to Zimbabwe but a pervasive phenomenon in the different range of capitalist

farms (Hall *et al.* 2017; Torvikey *et al.* 2016; Visser & Ferrer 2015; Oya 2013). The findings therefore validate assertions by Tsikata (2015) that farm work in its many diverse contexts in Africa is one of the worst paid forms of wage work. If this is the case, then analyses that claim that wage labour in LSCFs is crucial for the survival of rural people in Settler-Southern Africa (Sender 2016; Bernstein 2014; Sender & Johnston 2003; Hellum & Derman 2004) need to be revisited. To the contrary, it was the undervalued self-employed jobs within the peasantry that provided better prospects for the livelihoods of the rural people. Indeed, the inequalities in the material conditions of the landholders and land short farm workers were plain to see.

Yet, it is also correct that some regressive practices witnessed in the LSCFs before 2000, including physical violence and the exploitative residential labour tenancy were on the wane. A substantial change in the agrarian labour relations related to the reduced ability to control labour by the smaller-scale employers as the LSCFs did due to the reformation of freehold title deeds to state tenures in the resettled areas, which offer less exclusive land rights (Moyo 2013; 2011a; Murisa 2014; 2009) and limited control over the old farm compounds that house farm workers especially in the A1 scheme. Furthermore, the nationalised land tenures that allow for greater mobility of people in the newly resettled areas opened up access to the farm labour markets for wider public scrutiny than in the private propertied LSCFs protected by trespass laws. The latter enabled some of the labour abuses to be hidden from the public eye.

Farm labourers responded to the challenges in the labour markets and yonder in variegated ways and were by no means neither bystanders of their exploitation nor devoid of agency as some scholars have described them (Sachikonye 2012; 2004; Johnson 2012; Ridderbos 2009; West & Rutherford 2005). Not so much dependent on “associational power” of the weak rural trade unions, labour resistance drew upon their “structural power” in the labour markets to advance farm working conditions. In particular, this power was based on the scarce skills they possessed demanded by the new farming units in areas such as tobacco production and the non-wage alternatives in natural resources trading occasioned by the FTLRP that enabled them to delink from wage labour. Belonging to political parties, especially the ruling party, ZANU (PF), was

instrumentalised to defend residential land rights by farm labourers, as were their alliances with other actors such as NGOs to use state policy to protect their interests, including in the courts of law.

Somewhat contradictory, the agency of farm workers also sought to improve working conditions in the new farms, alongside resisting their “proletarianisation” by both aspiring and struggling to access land for independent farming as the basis of their livelihoods. It can thus be deduced that labour resistance can be prosecuted through various means not necessarily tied to collective worker organisations such as trade unions (Jha 2016; Wilderman 2014; Silver 2003). Moreso, in the Zimbabwean situation where the wider occupational interests portrayed by the current farm workers were not encompassed in the narrow “workerist” agendas of labour unions.

In general, the partial dismantling of the residential labour tenancy relationship provided room for workers to express their agency in both the labour markets and elsewhere less encumbered by the dependency on one farmer for both work and accommodation. The “modes of belonging to the farm(er)” characterised in the former LSCFs (Rutherford 2003: 191; 2001a) were thus few and far between. In fact, farm labourers now enjoy relative autonomy in their supply of labour to the new farms and “vote with their feet” to identify better wages and working conditions. However, the capitalist farmers pushed back on the resistance of farm labourers, including through “spatial fixes” - sourcing labour from further afield, including from their kinship networks in the Communal Areas and “technological fixes” - through adoption of labour displacing farm technologies (Silver 2003), sometimes with state support. Moreover, they contested the autonomy of farm workers in old compounds and attempted to institute the residential labour tenancy and thus turning these spaces into sites of struggle over the control of labour. Indeed, differing degrees of success in this endeavour resulted in the investment in new compounds by small-scale capitalist A2 farms on their plot subdivisions to reproduce the residential labour tenancy. This reflected the growing agency of labour to defend their newfound autonomy in the labour markets outside the previous dependency relations, which bound work to residency on the former LSCFs. However, the observed worker resistance was yet to unravel the poor socio-economic conditions of farm workers.

Overall, land reform has reduced the inequities in land ownership and in the process generated self-employed jobs for many poor peasants through which they were managed to feed their families and meet other subsistence costs. Quite crucially, access to land provided them with a non-wage alternative for their living and resultantly less obligated to enter exploitative agrarian labour markets than the land short farm labourers and other Communal Area residents. In spite of the noted progressive agrarian changes and income redistribution to a wider segment of the populace beyond the few LSCFs, the persistence of super-exploitation of the farm wage labourers whose livelihoods were far from certain remains an issue of concern. Evidently, they were inadvertently incorporated in the new agrarian structure both in terms of their land and labour rights. The final chapter presents the summary of the main findings, recommendations and conclusions.

CHAPTER SEVEN

FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapter detailed the research results on the qualitative and quantitative changes to the agrarian labour relations in the context of FTRLRP that increased the number of smaller-scale agricultural employers who compete for access to agrarian labour in the new diversified farming sector that is characterised by differential production capacities in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts. After recapitulating the discussion thus far, this concluding chapter synthesises the main research findings on the nature and scope of the new agrarian labour markets, quality of labour and resistance to the new material conditions. Policy recommendations to address the challenges identified in the agrarian labour markets follows next. The implications of the research results on the conceptual understanding of agrarian labour relations in former Settler economies and SSA in general precede the concluding remarks and further research requiring attention.

7.2 STUDY SUMMARY

Chapter One provided the background and context on the extensive agrarian restructuring prompting the study and outlined the research problem and questions investigated. In general, the research was motivated by the limited academic attention on the transformation of agrarian labour relations as most post-FTRLRP research attended to the agricultural production outcomes and extent of land allocated to “elites”. Yet agrarian labour is important in sustaining many rural lives against the background of rising urban unemployment and poverty rates. Furthermore, the studies evaluating the outcomes of the implementation of the land reform negated a key tenet in public policy evaluation by paying inadequate attention to how the agrarian restructuring interacted with the other various policies and factors to impact the agrarian change. The overarching research problem identified in the literature on agrarian labour in Zimbabwe since 2000 related to the advancement of viewpoints that agrarian labour markets have been decimated by the parcelling of land to mainly peasants and were no longer able to absorb the majority of

the formal workforce as in the past. Research optics were also not directed to the transition of peasant labour relations in their agricultural and non-agricultural endeavours, particularly the character of wage and family labour utilisation and hired in wage labour was implied to be absent (Chambati & Moyo 2004), as well as the labour relations entailed in the new small-scale capitalist sectors generated by the A2 scheme, which did not necessarily resemble LSCF type work. Quite crucially, the new diversified agrarian structure had resulted from the land reforms, which not only transformed the landholding patterns, but also the land use practices, integration to markets and labour utilisation was omitted in the analysis (Moyo 2011c; Moyo 2013).

The theoretical and conceptual frameworks, which formed the epistemological basis of the study were discussed in detail in Chapter Two. Three theoretical approaches predominantly utilised to assess agrarian labour relations, namely, the neo-classical equilibrium models, historical-structural approaches and the livelihoods analytic frameworks were reviewed. The neo-classical economic approaches were critiqued for their assumptions of linearity in agrarian transformation, emphasising the reduction in the importance of agriculture as economic growth proceeds apace. Rooted in the Lewisian dual economic models, they postulate the transfer of “unlimited labour supplies” from the peasantry to wage labour in the urban industries leading to the disappearance of (self-employed) agricultural labour. Moreover, the assumption of the existence of “free markets”, which in turn shape the demand and supply of labour negate their applicability in the “imperfect markets” characterising SSA. The livelihoods analytic frameworks were also found short in terms of their under-emphasis of the role of land ownership in the formation of labour markets in rural areas, since agriculture is considered as just but one of the activities in which people could deploy their “agency” to make a living. Altogether, these two approaches ignore the centrality of class, the role of (colonial) history in influencing the livelihood patterns today and/or the agrarian labour relations outcomes.

Against this background, the historical-structural approaches rooted in the Marxist Political Economy frameworks were favoured by the study – emphasising as they do the importance of the broader historical context, economic and social structures in shaping

labour relations. However, the study was also attentive to the fact that class dynamics alone were not enough to understand the contemporary agrarian labour relations and as such gender issues, intra-household relations, kinship, citizenship and agency of the workers themselves were taken into account. Additionally, the existing perspectives, knowledge and questions articulated on agrarian labour relations in SSA in the literature were also critically examined. A key problem identified in the conceptualisation of AALR in the existing literature related to the restriction of the existence agrarian labour markets to Settler-Southern African where large-scale capitalist agriculture prevails. Another source of divergence concerned the importance of wage labour in capitalist farms and self-employment in the subsistence of the rural inhabitants, and whether non-farm activities were part of the labour process of the peasantry.

Chapter Three set out in-depth the methodological approaches that were applied to answer the study's research questions. A multi-layered analysis cascading from the national/macro-level, district level to micro-level (farm households and labourers) was adopted to decipher the new agrarian labour relations.

A mixed methods approach informed the design of research, entailing quantitative and qualitative data collection at the micro-level. The qualitative methods were utilised mainly to mobilise complimentary information to elucidate the data gathered from the quantitative approach. The latter entailed questionnaire surveys of farm households allocated land during the FTLRP and peasants from the Communal Areas with a view of interpreting the changes in labour relations attributable to the land reform, as well as farm labourers employed in the new diverse farm units. Key informant interviews and structured physical observations formed the qualitative data gathering techniques employed by the research. Other secondary sources of data included reports from the national statistical agency, previous studies and media articles. Next was the presentation of an overview of the study areas to outline the specific context in which the local dynamics of the agrarian labour were examined. The analytical approaches deployed to make sense of the primary data were then discussed, alongside the strategies to ensure validity and reliability of the research. Various challenges encountered during the field work in the context of the sensitivity of Zimbabwe's land reform issues and how they

were remedied were noted. The chapter also outlined the ethical considerations adhered to during the study as guided by clearance provided by UNISA; including the obtaining of informed consent from the study participants, voluntary participation, guaranteeing the confidentiality of the data collected from the respondents.

The themes gleaned from the literature review in Chapter Two were applied to examine the evolution of the agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe throughout the colonial (1890-1979) and post-colonial (1980–1999) periods prior to the onset of the FTLRP in Chapter Four. It was clear that the structural factors and/or class dynamics such as the distribution of landholdings and their intersection with gender, kinship and agency contributed immensely to the formation of agrarian labour markets since 1890 and that these have been undergoing transformation from thereon. Specifically, colonial land alienation, together with other legal and extra-legal mechanisms pushed the peasantry into wage work in the LSCFs and beyond. Yet the process was not a one-off event, but had evolved gradually dependent on the pace and extent of peasant dispossession over time and shifts in various domestic and international socio-economic policies. Nevertheless, the uneven and incomplete land dispossession implied the resilience of a differentiated peasantry, which combined the wage economy and farming on small arable plots for their survival.

The minimal land redistribution after the attainment of independence in 1980 up until 1999 meant that the agrarian labour relations were not substantially reconstituted as the white LSCFs retained their dominance over land ownership and subsequently their influence on agrarian labour relations (Moyo 2011a). Evidently, adverse working conditions were commonplace for the “bonded” LSCF labour force two decades after independence and many workers struggled to make a living. The deregulation of labour markets via ESAP reversed the minor gains (farm) labour made in the early 1980s after the introduction of various state labour protection measures, including minimum wage setting. The socio-economic conditions deteriorated across town and country in the context of these neoliberal reforms, represented by rising unemployment, widespread poverty and land scarcity. Veterans of the liberation struggle, unemployed urban people and peasants thus challenged the inequitable bimodal agrarian structure through the occupations of LSCFs to access land for social reproduction from about 1997. The land

occupations escalated in 2000 and eventually forced the state to initiate radical land redistribution via the FTLRP.

Chapter Five provided the study context, highlighting the in-depth structural change in the land ownership and land tenure relations resulting from the FTLRP countrywide and the dynamic shifts in the agrarian (labour) policies and, their implications for the transformation of agrarian labour relations. A diverse agrarian structure had emerged comprised of the peasantry, small-to-middle capitalist farms, large capitalists and aggro-estates (Moyo 2011a; 2013). Differentiation was apparent across districts in the size and composition of the new agrarian classes contingent upon the nature of land redistribution experienced, which consequently shaped the structure of the local level labour markets. The consequences of the decline and partial recovery in the economy and shifts in the agrarian and (rural) labour policies during the 2000s and subsequent impacts on land utilisation and farm labour demand were also analysed.

The results of the primary study in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts were then presented in Chapter Six. The main research findings are summarised next according to the research questions posed in Chapter One relating to the: 1) the new sources of agrarian labour; 2) diversification of family labour; 3) quality of farm labour in the new labour markets and 4) resistance and/or agency of farm workers to the new material conditions.

7.3 SUMMARY OF MAIN RESEARCH FINDINGS

This section outlines the main research findings of the reconstitution of the agrarian labour relations following the FTLRP based on the detailed empirical investigations in Goromonzi and Kwekwe, as well as from other secondary sources of data.

7.3.1 New sources of agrarian labour: trajectory capitalist labour relations

The first research question focused on assessing the implications of the expansion of small-scale farming units and reduction of LSCFs arising from the extensive land redistribution during the FTLRP on the sources of farm labour:

Does the redistribution of land to mostly small-scale producers and a retention of a reduced base of large-scale capitalist farms lead to a decline in capitalist wage labour

relations alongside the rise in the use of family farm labour, and/ or do new extensive forms of wage labour emerge?

Various analysts have postulated the disruption of the farm wage employment as an outcome of the redistribution of large capitalist farms to peasants (de Janvry 1981; Sender & Johnston 2004; Hellum & Derman 2004; Sender 2016; Barrett *et al.* 2001; Griffin *et al.* 2002; Sender & Johnston 2004; Barrett *et al.* 2005). By implication, farm labour markets are expected to fade as self-employed family labour, which is assumed to be the only source of labour for the peasantry rises. The evidence from the field indeed showed that the use of self-employed family farm labour had been magnified compared to the past situation in the LSCFs where it was limited to a few of the (male) farm owners and their spouses to performing managerial functions rather than providing manual as was the case at present (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Moyo *et al.* 2000; Rutherford 2001a). To be precise, at least 82 percent of the A1 landholders drew farm labour from within their families. Even in the larger A2 farms earmarked to expand capitalist farming by the land reform policy, about 35 percent and 80.4 percent of the farming units in Goromonzi and Kwekwe utilised family labour respectively. As expected, the peasants from the Communal Areas that did not receive land dominated the use of family labour – recorded in over 98 percent of the households. Extra-household labour through cooperative labour arrangements between families represented another form of unpaid labour, which mainly operated in Kwekwe.

Men were actively involved in providing family farm labour together with women, confirming the emerging evidence from recent studies in Africa (SOFA & Doss 2011; Palacios-Lopez *et al.* 2017). The inequitable gender relations in agrarian labour associated with male stranglehold on access to and control of rural land (Tsikata 2016; 2009) was nonetheless evident through male control of the labour process, including in the decisions about the allocation of women and children's labour. It was thus akin to what has been characterised as "...the family farms together, the decisions, however are made by man" (Djurfeldt *et al.* 2017: 601). After the inclusion of reproductive labour, which is critical for the maintenance of family labour (Gaidzanwa 1995; Doss *et al.* 2014; Naidu & Ossome 2016), women shouldered more labour responsibilities than men.

The hiring of farm wage labour did not however wither away but was instead common even among the smaller A1 landholdings. As much as 77.6 percent of them in Goromonzi hired in wage labour to augment the family labour supplies and 64.9 percent in the same land tenure category in Kwekwe. The incidence of recruitment of farm wage labour was widely noted in the new smaller-scale capitalist farms in the A2 scheme - 94.6 percent in Goromonzi and 88.9 percent in Kwekwe. Though not as widespread, farm labour markets were also alive in the Communal Areas of both districts. However, the contemporary farm labour markets were pervaded by the extensive wage labour in the form of piece/daily workers locally known as *maricho*, which were engaged for short-term assignments in line with the seasonal demands. The permanent and seasonal labourers that were the cornerstone of the LSCF labour force featured prominently only in the A2 farms. These findings also revealed the shortcomings in the selection and targeting of a few A2 land beneficiaries that were exclusively reliant on self-employed family labour to organise their farming. Yet, this settlement scheme was meant to diversify commercial farming and thus a source of wage employment.

The extent to which households depended on the exploitation of the labour of others i.e. hiring in wage labour for the organisation of agricultural production was nevertheless differentiated within the new agrarian structure. Four classes were discerned from the statistical clustering procedure utilised by the research to categorise households according to their labour utilisation trends and these included farm households exhibiting capitalist and peasant tendencies. The former relied on hired in labour for their farming, while in the latter, labour supplies were built around the family.

Land sizes, which also coincided with the access to other agrarian resources, mattered in the use of hired in farm labour. The A2 farm households, which received the biggest land sizes during the FTLRP, constituted the majority of the rich peasants-to-capitalist class category that relied on hiring in labour for their farming, while the majority of those in the A1 scheme were located in the middle peasant class, which also hired in labour, although the family accounted for the bulk of the labour time contribution. Most Communal Area farm households, in contrast, were small and poor peasants who largely

exploited labour from within their families. Hiring out labour to other farm households also marked the latter class.

It was clear that the trajectory of capitalist wage labour relations was also shaped by the agro-ecological location, which in turn impacted on the land uses and agricultural production. Very few of the Kwekwe farm households displayed capitalist tendencies and indeed most of them were in the family labour farm classes of middle and small peasants. Goromonzi district in contrast contributed the most farming units in the rich peasant-to-capitalist class. Resultantly, the development of farm labour markets, similar to the trends obtaining in the former LSCFs, continued to be uneven with districts located in better agro-ecological zones, such as Goromonzi, dominant in the utilisation of hired in labour more than those in lower potential zones such as Kwekwe. Most women landholders were small and poor peasants reflecting the uneven access to and control of economic resources along gender lines.

The wider production relations also varied between the farm classes. As the utilisation of hired in labour fell among the farm classes, so did the application of different factors of production, use of modern machinery, financial resources and consequent outcomes in agricultural labour productivity and farm incomes. Cash and/or export crop production was concentrated in the capitalist class, while food production to eat within the households and surpluses to sell was the dominant land use among the peasantries. On the whole, the findings on the sub-optimal land utilisation, constraints in access to finance and other farming technologies witnessed in differing degrees amongst the farming classes and more widely recognised among female landholders, indicate the absence of a coherent post-settlement policy accompanying land reform to bolster the production capacities of the new agricultural producers. In a situation where private agricultural lending from banks and self-financing sources were under strain, the state subsidies that emerged were mostly reactive to droughts and food shortages and were inadequate to cover the diverse needs of the enlarged farming units.

To sum up, the findings certainly demonstrated that the redistribution of large capitalist farms to mostly peasants led to expanded family farming and/or the use of self-employed family labour in the organisation of agricultural production. Yet, the downsized small-

scale capitalist farms, which have been a result of the land reforms together with a section of the peasantry, have meant that differentiated farm labour markets have remained a feature of the new agrarian landscape albeit with more informal hired in labour compared to those seen in the LSCFs.

7.3.2 Replacement of farm labour with non-farm labour

The second research question addressed the claims by many theoreticians that agriculture was losing importance in the social reproduction of the peasantry and was being replaced by non-farm income earning activities in a permanent fashion. The import of these assertions was that self-employed family-farm and farm wage labour were being displaced by non-farm labour in the rural areas:

To what extent is the diversification into non-farm rural labour activities replacing farm labour as an important source of income to land owning farm households domiciled in diverse locales?

The study's findings indicated that rural households were not only involved in farming, but family labour was also being diversified into other non-farm income earning activities to constitute their social reproduction. Yet, this did not resemble the bold claims advanced by the de-agrarianisation thesis (Bryceson 1999; Bryceson 2002; Bryceson 2000; Riggs 2006) of permanent re-allocation of family labour away from farming towards non-farm activities and therefore displacement of self-employed- and farm wage labour. The application of unpaid family farm labour on the small peasant plots in the A1 and Communal Areas nonetheless remained ubiquitous even in the low potential agro-ecological district such as Kwekwe. There, food production was also being undertaken season after season despite the low income returns and high probabilities of crop failure. In fact, during the 2015/16 and 2016/17 seasons observed by the study all the households interviewed across all the settlement models in both districts had cropped their land.

Beyond farming, the family labour was being applied to a diverse set of activities, including formal wage employment in towns and non-farm rural labour activities and were indicated by rural households in all the settlement types in both districts. Nonetheless, it is also worth underlining that at least 30 percent of the households in each

of the settlements across both districts were not participants in non-farm activities. The capitalist farms in the A2 sector dominated formal wage employment, as well as the enterprises, which required capital investments, such as rural transportation and operation of retail shops, while the peasantries in the A1 and Communal Areas focused on natural resource trading.

The latter were differentiated by the occurrence of a particular resource in a locality. Alluvial gold, existing in abundance in all settlements in Kwekwe was the most common activity amongst both the landholders and the farm workers. But in Goromonzi, the harvesting and trading of thatching grass that was used to roof pole and dagga houses held sway among landholders. River sand trading and brick moulding were also popular among farm workers in this district.

Aggregate non-farm incomes were significantly higher in the rich peasants-to-capitalist and middle peasant classes compared to the small and poor peasantry. However, in terms of the share to the total household income, non-farm incomes were more salient for the small and poor peasantries than the labour hiring dependent class. Specifically, these farm classes had the least access to agricultural finance, which in turn transformed into poor financial returns, which on their own stopped well short of meeting their subsistence requirements through the lens of the PDL. Agrarian distress and/or risk aversion was thus major push for the diversification of labour resources (Jha 2016; Shivji 2017; 2009; Moyo & Yeros 2005a). Indeed, non-farm activities attracted a larger share of the land short Communal Area households facing inferior agro-ecological conditions than they did the resettled households in both districts, ostensibly because of the greater need to complement the reduced farm incomes.

It was thus correct that non-farm incomes were increasingly occupying a significant share of the total household income for peasants as intimated by the de-agrarianisation scholars. Yet the importance of family farm labour for own production was underwritten by its role in satisfying the food requirements for many peasants in the A1 and Communal Areas. Specifically, all the farming classes were able to escape the FPL unlike the land short farm labourers.

Nevertheless the nature of farming in rural Zimbabwe, dependent as it is on seasonal rainfall also meant the slack time between seasons thus availed opportunities for the sampled households to enter non-farm labour markets (Moyo 2014), beyond the poor conditions of agricultural production induced by SAPs emphasised by the de-agrarianisation theorists. Instructively, a substantial section of the peasant households in the A1 and Communal Areas inserted in non-farm rural activities for income generation did so between agricultural seasons. Moreover, some of the natural resources traded by the peasants such as thatching grass, brick moulding and firewood were mostly available during the dry season. The activities undertaken by the A2 households in both districts were however not seasonal and done throughout the whole with minimal conflict on their farming since they relied on hired in labour.

Another dimension accentuating the importance of farming in the rural areas relates to the prevalence of farm labour markets in which some of the landholders sold labour to other households especially in the land short Goromonzi Communal Areas. A few of the A1 and A2 households in this district also hired out farm labour. Variations were noted between the two districts as relatively larger shares of resettled households in Kwekwe hired out farm labour to other farming units compared to Goromonzi, while in the Communal Areas, there were fewer participants than their colleagues in the latter. In terms of labour allocation, most of the household members were assigned to farming activities rather than to non-farm activities. In addition, the non-farm labourers were also part of the farm labour supplies to link the both the agricultural and non-agricultural income earning activities in the social reproduction of the rural households.

The evidence also refutes claims of the permanency of the divestment from agriculture by the peasantry in the aftermath of SAPs propounded by the de-agrarianisation thesis. Reversals were observed as various resettled landholders had quit formal employment and/or were retrenched from their jobs after getting access to FTLRP land and were now subsisting on the basis of farming. In similar vein, those from the Communal Areas who had lost their jobs had retraced their roots back to the land. These tendencies were also reflected in the aspirations and struggles of farm labourers to obtain land for independent farming.

Instead of *permanent* de-agrarianisation and subsequent waning of farm labour in both its self-employed and wage dimensions, the study results reflect the continuation of semi-proletarianisation of rural labour through the combination of farming and non-farm wage labour as an outcome of the land reforms. This was simultaneously occurring alongside processes of re-peasantisation as former proletariats and semi-proletariats delinked from the farm labour markets to subsist on farming - further suggesting that de-agrarianisation can in effect be amenable to reversal in relation to the changing socio-economic contexts. Non-farm incomes served different purposes to the diverse farm classes. In the capitalist class, they were a key source of agricultural finance to expand production and accumulation, while in the small and poor peasantries they were important in closing the farming income deficits not enough to meet subsistence requirements. Emphasis on either farming or non-farming activities thus risks the danger of missing out on the dynamic interrelationships between the two sectors. Moreover, the seasonality of both farming and non-farm income earning activities suggest the inevitability of their co-existence among the peasantry in the countryside.

7.3.3 Quality of farm wage labour in the new labour markets

Not only do some analysts consider LSCFs as the key source of (formal) agricultural employment, the quality of employment in terms of wages earned, types of contracts and working conditions are also assumed to be superior to what would be envisaged within agrarian structures dominated by the peasantry and involving smaller-scale capitalist farms due to their limited operational scales (Hellum & Dillum 2004; Palmer & Sender 2006; Sender & Johnston 2003; Sender 2016). In fact, the LSCF jobs have been noted to be important for the sustenance of the rural folk, implying that wages earned were adequate to meet the cost of social reproduction (Sender 2016; Sender & Johnston 2003; Barret *et al.* 2001; Barret *et al.* 2005; de Janvry 1981) compared to income returns from self-employment in own farming. By implication, poor forms of wage employment and working conditions are foreseen in the context of redistributive land reforms. These issues were addressed by the study's third research question:

Has the expansion of the number of farm households following redistributive land reforms resulted in increased competition for farm wage labour and consequently improvement in the quality of wage labour?

The findings indicated that the number of farm employers has increased tremendously in the aftermath of the FTLRP and compete amongst each other to attract farm labour, as well as with other non-farm income earning activities, which siphon labour from agriculture. Where there were 253 LSCF employers in Goromonzi, 2,451 new farming units were generated by land redistribution. In similar vein, 290 LSCF employers were replaced by 3,852 new small landholdings in Kwekwe district. Notwithstanding the “continuity and change” characterising the agrarian wage labour relations today, the exploitation of the labour force through the payment of wages below the costs of social reproduction ever present under capitalism (Patnaik 1996) was vivid in the new diversified agrarian structure. The shift in the nature of agrarian capitalism was evident in the rise in the use of informal labour compared to those found in the former LSCFs, alongside changing land uses and agricultural production patterns, markets and sources of financing.

More often than not, both full- or part-time jobs in the new capitalists farms were informal, operating without written contracts and the terms of employment were thus unclear for the workers and open to abuse by the farm employers. Like before, farm workers faced long working hours that were neither compensated via overtime pay nor additional rest days. Practices such as *mugwazo* or task work, which legally survived only in the agricultural sector after the demise of colonial rule, not only entrenched the unevenness between farm labour relations and those of other industrial sectors, but also subjected workers to undefined work days in terms of hours worked. Gender disparities continue to characterise the farm wage labour relations, as most women were located in the part-time forms of labour with irregular wages. But the findings also suggest women’s representation in the permanent labour component has slightly improved compared to their position in the former LSCFs. As has been documented elsewhere in SSA (Tsikata 2015; 2009; Doss *et al.* 2014; Naidu & Ossome 2016), the few in full-time work were stuck at the bottom-end of the employment ladder earning the lowest wages.

The exploitation of children for low wages, also seen in the former LSCFs, was present in the new capitalist farms in conflict with their education but in service of farm profits.

The result of the expansion of casual labour, mainly the piece/daily workers in the new capitalist farms has been that the working conditions of the majority of the agricultural workers now fall outside the protection of the farm labour laws, focused as they are on permanent and seasonal workers. Specifically, their conditions of employment were mediated at the local level. However, it should be underscored that even for the few permanent and seasonal labour embraced by the labour laws there was a wide variation in labour rights and the situation observed from the workers in the field. This was compounded by the local absence of the state and the farm worker trade unions to enforce the farm labour rights.

Minimum farm wages negotiated through the collective bargaining process remained repressed throughout the 2000s and under attack from inflationary pressures at least until 2009. Thereafter, wage freezes beset the farm workforce between 2011 and 2012 and then again between 2014 and 2016 signalling the upper hand of the new capitalist farms in the wage negotiations. Regardless of whether they met the statutory levels, the wages received by farm workers were well below their costs of social reproduction. As if this was not enough, underpayments, non-payments, part-payments and irregular payment dates enlarged the problems of low wages. Conversely, it is notable that the wage structure in the new agrarian landscape had evolved to exceed the monetary wages partly on account of the increased competition for labour and resistance to poor employment conditions. It now included “social wages” such as informal access to land and subsidies such as monthly food rations. Recipients of these benefits clearly better off than those who exclusively depended on monetary wages for survival. Regular wage earners in Goromonzi had superior socio-economic indicators than those in the irregular and seasonal jobs. Such differences were not so obvious in Kwekwe as the piece/daily workers made up on farm wage deficits from non-farm labour markets, especially in alluvial gold mining that was not widely accessible to their colleagues in the other district. Despite the broadened wage structure, many farm workers remain mired in

poverty, unable to provide adequate food for their households and more so send children to school.

Land shortages and landlessness characterise most farm workers today like in the past, signalling the continued significance of access to land in the formation of agrarian labour markets (Cousins 2009; Jha 2017; Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Moyo 2011a). Furthermore, the low levels of education of most farm workers suggest their origin from poor Communal Area families. Differentiation thus proceeds apace manifest in the observed gaps between the landholders and farm workers and the other land short Communal Areas in key social and economic indicators such as access to food and education.

The low wages aside, it is also true that some regressive agrarian labour relations and/or labour management practices imprinted in the former LSCFs have dissipated in the new farming units. For many workers, the residential labour tenancy that bound workers to a single employer and constrained the autonomy and agency in labour markets fell away after the land redistribution and subsequent nationalisation of resettled farms. Nonetheless, their long-term tenure security in the old farm compounds still remains unresolved by the state. The unraveling of the freehold property rights on acquired farms also pried open the labour relations of the new capitalist farms to wider media and public examination, which was previously encumbered by the trespass laws enforced by the former LSCFs (Amanor-Wilks 1995; 2000). Abuse of farm labour that could be “hidden” within the protected fences of the LSCFs, including the resolution of labour disputes through extra-legal mechanisms characterised as “domestic government” (Rutherford 2001a) had slowed down dramatically. Indeed, various media reports cited by the study exposed the exploitation of farm workers even by politically connected A2 capitalist farms. Perhaps it is thus not far-fetched to suggest that the observed substantial decline the inhumane practices such as physical violence, racism and verbal abuses post-2000, which were a common feature of the LSCF work environment, was partly due to this.

The experiences of farm workers in the new labour markets were as much the outcome of the limited enforcement of the existing labour laws to protect their rights. Indeed the NECAIZ was financially constrained and maintained limited presence in the newly resettled areas. The state has also not adequately delivered on its mandate to sensitise the

new farm employers to be conversant with their legal obligations towards the agrarian labourers. The absence of a definitive position in land reform policy regarding the long-term residential and agricultural land rights is a source insecurity to the livelihoods of farm workers. Although, they could benefit from land reform in practice the findings indicate that gaps in the implementation of the *Citizenship Amendment Act of 2005*, which prevented farm workers of foreign migrant origin to access national identity documents and passports to affirm their rights as Zimbabwe. Such documentation is required to register and benefit from public programmes, including land reform and other social protection initiatives run by the state. Furthermore, the social protection policies inadequately cover farm workers and their families and reflect on their poor socio-economic conditions. Additionally the capacity of new farmers to meet their obligations to workers in terms of wages and other benefits is linked to financial constraints to fully utilise land and the consequent low productivity outcomes given that FTLRP was not accompanied by a coherent post-settlement support in context where private bank lending was declining dramatically.

To conclude, the competition for farm labour arising from the increased number of farm households has not substantially altered the quality of labour as measured by the wages earned, types of employment contracts and working conditions. Although the low wages were characteristic of the wider economy, it will not be disputed too much that farm workers receive the least wages of all Zimbabwean formal employees. The struggles by farm workers to become independent agricultural producers should thus be perceived in light of the exploitative labour markets at present.

7.3.4 Resistance of farm workers to the new material conditions

Finally, the fourth research question sought to understand how the change in the structural conditions, including the landholding patterns and land tenure relations, were shaping the way farm workers supplied labour to the new farming units and their responses to the constraints and opportunities they were facing following the land reform:

Has the reconstitution of the freehold land tenure into state land tenures, which compelled mandatory labour provision by labourers resident in the LSCFs' compounds, resulted in

the undermining of the residential labour tenancy system and increased the autonomy of farm labourers to sell their labour and organize for favourable conditions of labour supply and/or engage in other forms of agency/resistance?

The literature reviewed in Chapter Two and subsequently applied to analyse the evolution of agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe throughout the colonial and post-colonial period until 1999 in Chapters Four and Five emphasised that resistance by agrarian underclasses such as wagedworkers and peasants was always an outcome of their exploitation by agrarian capitalists and the state (Jha 2015; 2016; 1996; Shivji 2009; Moyo & Yeros 2005a; O’Laughlin 2002). Yet, the expression of the agency and/or resistance as was the reaction it elicited from the state and capitalist classes was contingent upon the economic and political structures, which constrain their social reproduction at different points in time (Petras & Veltmeyer 2001). The findings presented in Chapter Six demonstrate that the structural changes accompanying the FTLRP manifest in the many smaller-scale farming units and replacement of freehold titles with state land tenures on redistributed LSCFs altered substantially the residential labour tenancy and with that the ways in which farm workers resident in the old compounds supply labour to new farms. In the A1 farms, the old compounds where most workers live today, were not allocated to any particular landholder, but were instead retained as state land. Therefore, the new A1 landowners were not able to totally compel workers staying in compounds on the farms they were resettled into employment to work for them.

The old compounds on farms under the A2 model in contrast were redistributed to a single landholder whose was allocated the plot containing this infrastructure, while the other beneficiaries also given land within that original LSCF were not assigned rights over labour in these spatial zones. The owners with authority over the old compounds were empowered at law to institute the residential labour tenancy via the *Gazetted Lands (Consequential Provisions) Act of 2006*. It was thus mostly on the A2 farms where the residues of the residential labour tenancy relations were observed. However, the scale of operations in the downsized capitalist farms diluted the capacity of the A2 landholders allocated the compound to replicate the residential labour tenancy since they could not absorb all the labour resident in the large compounds especially in Mashonaland districts

such as Goromonzi. Many of the workers living in these old A2 compounds were thus left with latitude to sell their labour within and without the original LSCFs unrelated to their residency.

Most piece/daily workers (67 percent) lived in houses that were not “owned” by their employers and/or not tied to their supply of labour to the farming units and were thus relatively less encumbered by residential labour tenancy. These piece/daily workers were neither bound nor dependent on any single farm employer for both employment and their residency. This permitted the now largest section of the agrarian labour force to “vote with their feet” in the new labour markets. The newly acquired autonomy of piece/daily workers in the new labour markets was evident in their shifts between employers and fashioning diverse social reproduction strategies, including being the main actors in the trading of natural resources more than the other groups of workers. The permanent workers that were predominantly employed by the A2 farms were the ones that largely depended on the employers for both work and residency as indicated by up to 75 percent of them.

The new landholders were therefore unable to automatically convert people resident in the old farm compounds to labour supplies with much ease as their predecessors in the LSCFs did. Tellingly, “labour shortages”, which were uncommon in the former LSCFs (Tandon 2001) became frequent for new farmers throughout the 2000’s, despite the availability of workers in the old compounds.

Access to labour from the old farm compounds therefore entailed struggles and contestations between the new capitalist farms and former farm workers. The piece/daily workers resident in both the A1 and A2 old farm compounds were pressurised by farmers to supply labour on the farms they live or be visited by evictions. Violent confrontations with the landowners especially in the A1 farms in Goromonzi sometimes erupted during the evictions and the old farm compounds thus represented sites of contestation and resistance over the control of labour. Empowered by the law, the A2 farmers also resorted to the courts to effect evictions.

New farm employers have been forced to diversify their sources of labour and evolve new forms of labour control via the construction of new independent compounds, particularly Goromonzi A2 farmers, to guarantee their labour supplies in response to challenges in recruiting labour from old farm compounds. Their strategies also entailed the increased co-optation of landless kith and kin from the Communal Areas into their families and subsequently exploiting them as unpaid farm labour. New capitalist farmers have also been broadening access to labour displacing technologies independently and with state supported initiatives such as the Farm Mechanisation Programme between 2005 and 2007 and the Command Agriculture input subsidy programme since 2015. Over and above that, the state also intervened through repressive programmes such as *Chikorokoza Chapera* in 2007 to redirect labour back to farms in gold endowed districts such as Kwekwe and containment of other natural resource trading activities (e.g. firewood) to avert labour shortages.

Farm labourers were mobilising their autonomy in the labour markets to resist poor working conditions independently and in alliance with other actors. Nonetheless, the defense of labour rights was less dependent on “associational power” of belonging to trade unions. Very few workers knew about their existence and none retained membership in unions across both districts. While the reach in the LSCFs was very low before the FTLRP, the study results show that rural trade unions had lost further ground in terms of membership mobilisation and their organisational capacities were weak. Continued resistance for workers to unionise by the new capitalist farmers and state repression compounded the challenges of rural trade unions. Quite significant, the narrowly centred “workerist” approaches of trade unions (Moyo *et al.* 2000) were deficient in representing the wider multi-occupational identities of the new potential membership base. To make matters worse the state also maintained limited presence in newly redistributed areas to enforce labour laws.

Independent strategies advanced by farm workers included using their “structural power” to force reforms of their working conditions and the levels of success differs according to their gender, skill levels and the land use patterns. Instead of the trade unions, “associational power” derived from political parties; in particular, ZANU (PF) has been

key in protecting residential rights of former farm workers in the old farm compounds as were alliances workers forged with human rights NGOs such as the ZLHR. The struggles of farm labourers addressed both challenges in the labour market and their aspirations for a post wage-economy by accessing land for independent agricultural production.

The qualitative difference in the conditions farm workers face in structuring their agency has gone unnoticed by some analysts who have characterised the new situation farm workers as “conditional belonging” that overly assigns power to the new farmers in an undifferentiated manner (Rutherford 2018; Hartnack 2016). These scholars have indeed failed to see the link between the diversification of farm labour sources and efforts to mimick the residential labour tenancy through the construction of new independent farm compound to the increased agency of labour. Nevertheless, the poor social reproduction conditions that many farm labourers face is yet to be significantly reversed in response to their resistance.

The witnessed working conditions of farm workers were also a result of the constraints trade unions faced in worker mobilisation. Aside their internal weaknesses, the state did not adequately facilitate unfettered access to the farm workforce by the trade unions to monitor labour conditions recruit workers into their ranks as provided for in the labour laws as denials to enter some A2 farms indicate. The state itself also slowed down the work of the unions through repression of some of the organisers. Cumbersome procedures required to undertake collective action at the workplace spelt out in the *Labour Amendment Act of 2015* foreclosed a critical option, which workers and their union could effectively apply to disrupt agricultural production activities and force the improvement of their working conditions.

In summary, the absence of excessive control of employees enabled by the residential tenancy system has seen the rise in the independent forms of self-mobilisation by farm workers beyond farm worker committees to advance their material interests. Their supply of labour to the new farming units was relatively more autonomous as a result of the unraveling of the residential labour tenancy in the new agrarian structure. Modes of “belonging to the farm(er)” characterising farm workers in the LSCFs, prior to 2000 (Rutherford 2003: 191), were dissipating. The portrayal of farm workers as docile

bystanders of the land reform (Ridderbos 2009) or “Zimbabwe’s New clothes” (West & Rutherford 2005: 398) could not be further from the truth.

7.4 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

It is apparent from the evidence that farm labour markets were still important for the survival of the remaining land short and/or landless rural people. Yet, the new farm labour markets were coloured by super-exploitation of workers, whose social reproduction was far from being guaranteed. Some of the challenges arose from the inadequate capacity of the capitalist farmers to meet their obligations to workers due to land underutilisation and resultant low incomes. This section thus proffers various policy recommendations geared towards advancing the material conditions of farm labourers through the protection of their labour rights, improving access to agricultural and residential land rights, reaffirming the citizenship rights of workers of foreign migrant origin and strengthening the employment capacity of the new landholders.

7.4.1 Protection of farm labour rights

Chapters Five and Six revealed the existence of legislation and/or policy measures to safeguard the labour rights of farm workers, including the *Labour Act (Chapter 28:01)* and the specific agricultural industry agreement negotiated during the Collective Bargaining; namely the *Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014*. The findings also revealed that the state’s NECAIZ was under-resourced and maintained limited presence in the newly resettled areas to enforce the farm labour rights.

Furthermore, matters were not helped by the declining capacity of the main agricultural workers trade union; GAPWUZ whose membership has been on the wane and like the state was off the radar to ensure the protection of farm labour rights. The fragmentation of GAPWUZ into various splinter trade unions leading to conflicts over membership and undermining each other during collective bargaining reduced the effectiveness of worker organisations. The A2 farmers recorded deficits in the appreciation of the labour relations framework and most of them were neither attached to farmer organisations nor registered with the NECAIZ as dictated by law.

The state should expand the manpower and financial resources to enable it to prosecute the existing labour laws in the new farms and disseminate information to raise awareness on farm workers' rights and employer obligations, including enabling access to trade unions to recruit members and monitor labour conditions in the new farms without the observed hindrances from A2 farmers as permitted by the *Labour Amendment Act of 2015* and entrenched in section 65 of the *Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013*. Furthermore, the encumbrance in the right of workers to engage in collective action engrained in the labour laws requires urgent redress. This will allow the prosecution of worker strikes to extract concessions from (agrarian) capitalists to improve their material conditions. Then workers can enjoy this constitutionally enshrined right in Section 65, subsection 3 without fear of losing their employment. Altogether, these efforts will enhance the protection of the labour rights of farm workers.

The national farmer organisations should serve as platforms to integrate farmers into the labour relations framework, including in the Collective Bargaining process. The state through the MLRR should thus advance the enlisting of farmers into the agricultural producer unions, which was restricted to a few landholders. In turn vibrant farmer unions could be utilised by NECAIZ as conduits to provide labour relations training programmes, which was limited amongst the new small-scale capitalist A2 farmers. The farm worker trade union needs to enlarge its membership through vigorous recruitment efforts targeting both new and former farm workers across the diverse range of farms. This will expand its financial resource base and capacity to monitor the implementation of labour laws in the new farms, as well as advocate for labour policy reforms. The trade unions will also do well to unite their efforts under one umbrella union to recover the fragmented voices of labour under the many smaller trade unions.

7.4.2 Improving the agricultural and residential land rights of farm labourers

The tenure security of farm workers in the old compounds has not been addressed beyond the temporary residence permitted by state policy regardless of their employment status. The exploitative residential labour tenancy ought to have been included in the FTLRP land tenure reforms, together with the agricultural land needs of farm workers. The state should offer long-term tenure security akin to the permit tenure to farm workers resident

in the old compounds, which should be autonomous from the lands owned by the new farming units. Additional land should be excised from the landholders to expand access to agricultural land for farm workers near their residency to produce basic foods for their families. Priority should be accorded to marginalised women farm workers. The improvement of existing houses and construction of new ones could be funded by the state's National Social Security Authority to these longstanding contributors of pension funds maintained by the latter similar to what it has done to other segments of the working class. Some of the land that could be freed from multiple owners and oversized farms identified in the ongoing land audit should be availed for this purpose.

7.4.3 Access to national identity and citizenship documentation

Although the *Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No 20) Act 2013*, Section 43, subsection 2(a) recognises farm workers of foreign migrant origin as Zimbabwe citizens, many of them and their families lack requisite documentation to prove them as such. Many farm workers could not apply for land during the FTLRP, which required one to provide national identity documentation to register on the prospective beneficiary lists. Additionally, it excludes immigrant farm workers from accessing other public goods, including social welfare assistance programs for vulnerable groups run by the GoZ. More importantly, without national identity cards, farm workers cannot exercise their universal suffrage and struggle to register births of their children who cannot proceed beyond primary education without this documentation. The state should decentralise registration services normally witnessed during the election periods, including the recent 2018 plebiscite to enable farm workers to apply for identity documents through the Registrar General's Office. Perhaps worth reiterating, this issue, which has been a longstanding concern for farm workers tracing their roots from across the borders before and after the land reform (Mugwetsi & Balleis 1994; Magaramombe 2001; Rutherford 2001a; Chadya & Mayavo 2002; Chambati & Moyo 2004) requires urgent attention of the government. The *Citizenship Act (Chapter 4:01)* should be immediately realigned to the provisions in the Constitution to pave way for farm workers of foreign origin to enjoy full citizenship rights.

7.4.4 Strengthening the employment capacity of landholders

Land utilisation rates in the newly resettled areas were sub-optimal and consequently there still remains unfulfilled potential demand for both self-employed and hired in wage labour. Moreover, the seasonal rainfall dependent farming limited the recruitment of all year round full-time labour. Few A2 farmers accessed agricultural credit and many had to rely on narrow sources of self-mobilised finance, partly due to the unresolved impasse between the GoZ and financial institutions over the suitability of the A2 leasehold tenure as collateral. Inadequate access to agricultural inputs and other farming technologies thus ensued to the detriment of agricultural growth and farm labour demand.

The GoZ increased support to farmers after 2000 through input subsidies and access to agricultural machinery to address these production constraints (World Bank 2012). With the exception of the recent Command Agriculture Programme that enabled the country to produce adequate maize to meet the domestic requirements in the 2015/16 season (GoZ 2017b), state input subsidy programmes have tended to be associated only with marginal increases in the levels of maize output in the years that follow extreme droughts (World Bank 2014). Reaching a few A2 farmers, the scale of input subsidy beneficiaries has been limited (World Bank 2014) to substantially alter the demand for farm labour.

The research recommends the state to maintain and increase the input subsidies towards a more universal approach to serve the diverse needs of both the peasantry and the new small scale capitalist farmers in their agricultural production. With that, the poor peasantries will be able to engage productively in food production and to increase land utilisation rates and demand for labour as the response to the wider input supply under the Command Agriculture Programme indicated (GoZ 2017b).

The subsidy programmes should be expanded to capacitate farmers to invest in appropriate irrigation infrastructure and other farm technologies, which will also minimise the adverse effects of recurrent droughts (Manzungu *et al.* 2018). Beyond enlarging the all year-round demand for agricultural labour, this will also expand farm incomes and the ability to remunerate wage labour. Labour intensive technologies (hand tools and animal drawn equipment) utilised by peasants should form the fulcrum of future

farm mechanisation programmes instead of the labour displacing large machinery such tractors for small-scale capitalist A2 farmers emphasised by previous policies (GoZ 2007). While the evidence illustrated that access to tractors bolstered demand for farm labour and land utilisation in the A2 farms, additional investigation is required on the optimal level to avoid labour displacement as happened in the former LSCFs (Loewenson 1992). Overall, the financial sustainability of the input subsidy programmes will require further research beyond the scope of this study.

Alongside these interventions, the state should immediately conclude the negotiations with the banking sector on the use of 99-year leases as collateral by the farmers to access private credit. Recent press reports suggested an agreement between the two parties was in sight and acceptance of leases for credit relations would unlock much needed agricultural funding.²⁰¹

7.4.5 Mainstreaming gender issues in agrarian labour policies

The study results have highlighted the constraints that women face in the farm labour markets that were seen through their relegation to the irregular low wage earning work, while the few of them were lowly ranked in permanent work. The protection of their labour rights was limited. Moreover, land access was skewed in favour of men and the few independent women landholders lacked the financial resources to work the land with their families. Indeed many of the female landholders were poor peasants that obtained the least income returns from farming and hardly met their subsistence needs.

The policy recommendations proposed above should mainstream gender issues in order to advance the material conditions of women farm wage workers and those of women landholders to effectively utilise their land resources. Specifically, the objective should be to enhance the protection of the labour rights of women, including the removal of the gender discrimination in the grading, wage payments and employment contracts. The *Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013* that directs the state to ensure equitable distribution of resources across genders should be fully implemented to

²⁰¹ See <https://agrinews.co.zw/news/2018/27/bankers-happy-with-newset99yearleases/> [Accessed on 27 August 2018]

promote women's secure access to land in their own right.²⁰² This could entail setting up quotas for female beneficiaries in all future land resettlement programmes.

Public agricultural input subsidies programmes should also be implemented along the same principles to ensure fair distribution between the genders, in order capacitate the land utilisation of women. Various public services tailored to meet the needs of women should be implement to redress their precarious livelihoods, including prioritising women farm workers to obtain identity and citizenship documentation and benefit from existing state social support services such as school fees assistance through the BEAM programme and food insecurity relief schemes.

7.5 THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE


The main research question which the study sought to answer pertained to the nature and extent of structural change in land ownership and tenure reforms, and the resultant shifts in the agricultural production patterns and how markets have reshaped the organisation of labour relations amongst the broader base of agrarian classes within the new diversified agrarian structure which emerged since 2000. The findings unequivocally demonstrated that a new agrarian labour regime had evolved to replace the predominant organisation of farming activities in the former LSCFs around the exclusive use of hired in wage labour especially to perform manual labour (Figure 7.1). With the expansion of small-scale farming/peasantry through mainly the A1 resettlement schemes implemented nationally and in both districts, land redistribution expanded the use of family labour /self-employment for own farming to add to that already existing in the Communal Areas.

Yet, the hiring in of farm wage labour has continued to be pervasive through both the new peasantry in A1 schemes with enlarged land access in qualitative better agro-ecological zones, and the new small-scale capitalist farms in the A2 scheme. Quite clearly the extent of the use of hired in farm labour was a key of marker differentiation amongst the farm units and was reflected in the wider production relations. Labour markets are therefore not restricted to large-scale capitalist farms and the diversification

²⁰² Section 12, subsection 1c of the *Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013* calls for "...The state and all institutions and agencies of government at every level must take measures to ensure that women have access to resources, including land, on the basis of equality with men".

of agrarian structures from one dominated by the latter to one largely occupied by the peasantry does not extinguish wage employment opportunities.

Figure 7.1: Reformation of agrarian labour relations following land reform



This section draws out the wider implications of the research findings on the conceptual understanding of agrarian labour relations in former Settler economies and SSA in general. Specifically, the study has elucidated the role of land reforms in the development of employment under conditions of stalled agrarian transitions, the reconstitution of the peasantry through repeasantisation and semi-proletarianisation processes, and the trajectories of the social reproduction of labour under rapidly changing agrarian structures and wider-socio-economic contexts (Figure 7.1). Additionally, it shed light on the relative importance of the self-employment vis-à-vis wage employment in capitalist farms in the livelihood outcomes in rural areas.

7.5.1 Land reform is key in generating employment in contexts of stalled agrarian transitions

These findings provide important pointers regarding the role of land reform in employment development in its wider sense to incorporate both self and wage employment, especially in a context where the urban and industrial labour markets in Zimbabwe have been “loosening” or contracting over the last two decades. Land reform reversed the monopoly control over wage labour markets by a few LSCFs land and widened the potential employment base, as well as the possibilities for landholders to apply self-employment from within their families. This questions notions that view LSCFs as the key source of rural employment to the exclusion of the self and wage employment that could arise from the peasantry itself (Sender 2016; Sender & Johnston 2003), and predominant focus on the urban labour markets for the resolution of the unemployment problem (LEDRIZ 2016).

As indicated earlier (Chapters Four & Five) the outcome of the increase in capital intensity in the LSCFs was displacement of permanent labour and subsequent replacement with casual labour (see Clarke 1977; Loewenson, 1992; Amanor-Wilks 1995; Rutherford 2001a). Moreover, employment growth was further hampered by land underutilisation in the LSCFs, below 50 percent of land held (Roth 1994: 321). The LSCFs were the major source of formal employment. Sluggish employment growth in the capital intensive LSCFs for over two decades and the limited employment capacity in the urban and industrial sectors therefore meant unemployment was a key challenge in the

country (Chapters Four & Five). Additionally, of all farm classes, the LSCF has historically absorbed the least workers per unit of cropped area.

Indeed, the number of farming units in the two districts studied increased by over ten-fold. For Goromonzi, this translated into the growth of permanent and casual farm jobs from 3,900 and 6,950 in year 2000 to over 4,665 and 16,619 workers respectively. Agricultural wage employment expansion was also registered in Kwekwe district from 1100 and 800 full and part time workers to 2,613 and 1,082 workers respectively during the same period. Beyond the increase in the employment figures, workers exercised autonomy in the new farm labour markets since many were not fixed to a single employer on account of the residency.

The largest gains were however registered in the self-employment family labour which rose from 1,696,128 to 5,185,233 nationally across all the farming classes between 2000 and 2015 (Chapter Four & Five). The peasantry that originated from the land short Communal Areas was now able to utilise underemployed labour from their families on larger and better quality land provided by the FTLRP. Without land reform, the unemployment levels and the attendant social consequences would have been much higher. The importance of agriculture as a source of employment has increased as reflected by the growth in the share of people employed in agriculture as either self-employed or wage workers increased from 54.78 percent in 2002 (CSO 2002: 106) to 71.8 percent (ZIMSTAT 2013: 47) on account of the expanded number of farming units and decline in the urban and industrial employment.

Overall, the new agrarian structure has generated more employment compared to before 2000 despite the land utilisation rates being far from optimal. With the resolution of the lingering production constraints, a rise in farm labour demand should not be unexpected. Further to this, the nationalisation of land tenure has also enabled wider access to natural resources previously monopolised by the former LSCFs and in the process generated non-farm rural jobs in the trading of the same. The extent of the number of non-farm jobs requires further research, but suffice to say such non-farm rural jobs were important sources of income for the poor peasantries.

Land access is therefore a critical element in resolving the unemployment challenge, moreso in a context where the transition from farm to factory has stalled in SSA even in the most industrialised country, South Africa. The industrial base has not been able to absorb the burgeoning labour force in both town and country (Losch 2012; Lumumba-Kasongo 2015; Moyo *et al.* 2013). The rural, rather than the urban areas, are thus a key source of resolving unemployment problem. The prospects for rapid employment creation in the industrial sectors appear gloomily in Zimbabwe within the current context of poor economic performance and indeed in much of SSA (see ILO 2015a).

7.5.2 Self-employment in own farming rather than (farm) wage labour is more important in the social reproduction of the rural poor

Substantial proportions of wage employment arising from the agrarian restructuring were part time and seasonal in nature and/or *maricho* type work, further perpetuating the casualisation of labour trends that commenced in the LSCFs in the 1970s, not to mention the feminisation of the irregular wage earning part-time work. More importantly, the new agrarian capitalists like their LSCF predecessors paid wages below the costs of social reproduction and offered poor working conditions.

The gender inequalities by way of operation of patriarchal relations aside, self-employed family labour based farming households with access to more land provided by the FTLRP were relatively better off than the land short proletariats and/or semi-proletariats reliant on the wage labour markets for their living on many key socio-economic indicators, including incomes, access to food and education. Specifically, many of the farm labourers faced difficulties in providing these key requirements for their families and the opposite was true for the landholders. The findings therefore challenged conventionally held wisdom, which undervalue the importance of self-employed jobs in social reproduction, and indeed associate land redistribution with loss of wages incomes from the LSCFs for their sustenance in the rural areas (Hellum & Derman 2004; Palmer & Sender 2006; Sender 2016; de Janvry 1981).

Perhaps also worth emphasising is that super-exploitation of farm wage workers is not confined to small-scale capitalist farms and thus associated with the land redistribution in Zimbabwe. Indeed, the evidence from elsewhere in former-settler colonies such as South

Africa where large-scale capitalist farms still prevail, as well as in emerging large scale farms in former non-Settler economies, suggests that farm workers are amongst the lot of the poorest in society, without enough to eat, let alone school fees and healthcare costs for their families (see BFAP 2012; Visser & Ferrer 2015; Wisborg *et al.* 2013) and even further afield in countries such as Brazil (Selwyn 2014).

To reinforce the importance of self-employment in own farming, the aspirations of the land short and/or landless majority of the farm labourers hinged on accessing land as the basis of their future social reproduction rather than continued dependency on the labour markets. The struggles of farm labour therefore exhibited tendencies of “resistances to proletarianisation” by searching for land within and without the newly redistributed areas to explore the “peasant path” (Moyo *et al.* 2013: 94) and/or other land based non-farm activities such as alluvial gold panning in the case of Kwekwe, alongside resistance aimed to improve their conditions as workers in the new small-scale capitalist farms.

Agricultural based social reproduction organised around the use of self-employed family labour made possible by access to FTLRP land was crucial to providing access to food for the peasantry despite the diversified labour activities perceived in the countryside today. It is thus not correct that rural areas in SSA are permeated “fragmented classes of labour” that are “directly or *indirectly*” dependent on the wage economy for their survival as some scholars suggest (Bernstein 2014: S97-98 *emphasis in original*). Explicitly, the struggles in the countryside are informed by both the land and labour questions. The latter is reflected by wagedworkers striving for better working conditions, secure forms of employment and adequate wages to meet their subsistence costs, while the former, through struggles by rural inhabitants, seek land to engage in independent agricultural production and other land based non-farm activities on the basis of self-employed family labour. Self-employment in both farm and non-farm rural labour activities should thus equally be accorded attention from researchers and policy makers that urban labour markets often receive.

7.5.3 Repeasantisation as a form of labour resistance

If resistance to dispossession of their lands by the peasantry and their consequent proletarianisation in the reconstituted large-scale capitalist farms and beyond constitutes a

form of labour unrest (Silver 2003) or resistance, then the reverse could be equally considered of re-peasantisation. In the latter, the labour resistance takes the form of defense of self-employed or unpaid family agricultural labour and to continue to subsist through farming on their small pieces of lands. As is now known, the dispossession peasant lands and subsequent conversion into large-scale capitalist farms and plantations in SSA and the wider Global South has been on the rise in the 2000's (Moyo 2008; Moyo 2012; Hall *et al.* 2017), labour resistance of the type conceptualised by Silver (2003) has also been surging.

Colonial land dispossession not only eroded the capacity of the peasantry to subsist outside of the capital-wage labour relation (Palmer 1977; Bush & Cliffe 1984; Neocosmos 1993), but also undermined their “bargaining power” in the very same labour markets (Arrighi 1970). The latter, also known as “market based bargaining power” (Silver 2003: 13), increases if workers have alternative non-wage forms of labour to centre their social reproduction upon. Turning this around, it could therefore be equally argued that land reform by enlarging land access provides both urban and rural proletariats and/or semi-proletariats with an alternative social reproduction path outside wage labour and restored the ability to resist insertion into the labour markets as seen in the data, as well as strengthening their “market based bargaining power” in the same.

During the FTLRP, repeasantisation was witnessed through land bidding by the unemployed and employed urbanites, as well as the struggles to access land by the current farm labourers and subsisting on the basis of family farm labour thereafter. Furthermore, a substantial number of landholders in formal employment delinked from their jobs after getting access to FTLRP land and similar patterns of returning to full time farming in the Communal Areas after urban employment were also witnessed. The interest in land access especially by the urban working classes, it is worth stressing escalated with crisis in the labour markets originating from the ESAP induced job retrenchments in the late 1990 (Yeros 2013b; 2002) and much later as inflation wiped away wages in the 2000s (Kanyenze *et al.* 2011). The retrenchments, as noted earlier, persisted in the 2000s as institutions faltered under the weight of economic decline (Chapter Five).

Building on the arguments of the later scholar, the study avers that being more than a struggle to reclaim dispossessed land (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Moyo *et al.* 2013; Van der Ploeg 2008, 2011 van der Berg *et al.* 2016), re-peasantisation could also be seen as a type of labour resistance against the exploitation in wage labour markets in favour self-employment on (newly) acquired lands. Alternatively, it is a resistance by proletariats and/or semi-proletariats to revert back to self-employed agricultural labour on independently owned land. Repeasantisation thus represents a “resistance to proletarianisation” expressed by former proletariats and semi-proletariats through exiting from super-exploitation in the labour markets and deploying their agency to work the land together with their families for their survival.

7.5.4 De-agrarianisation is not a permanent phenomenon

The dynamic relationships that landholders had with the labour markets challenge widely held assumptions of the tendencies of labour to permanently divest away from farming towards other non-farm based activities, including wage employment espoused in the de-agrarianisation thesis (Bryceson 1997; 2000; Riggs 2006). Instead of the movement of labour from “farm to factory” as the only route perceived by these studies drawing on Lewisian dual models of economic transformation (see also World Bank 2013), the field research demonstrates that the reverse is equally true, when urban labour markets become unstable, access to land provides an escape route. Rather than being “permanent” or totally severing links to the countryside (Petras & Veltmeyer 2001), rural-urban migration can indeed be overturned. As such, it is quite possible for people to be proletarianised in the rural/urban labour markets and revert back to peasants as the socio-economic conditions in both town and country undergo transformation.

What was also clear from the findings was that the combination of farm and non-farming activities within and without rural areas was common in the social reproduction strategies of surveyed farm households. Thus, semi-proletarianisation of rural labour was the dominant phenomenon (Moyo & Yeros 2005; Moyo 2011a), and has continued to characterise a substantial number of the households even after land reform. Quite crucially, these patterns also signal that understanding agrarian labour requires the examination of both the socio-economic conditions in rural and urban areas. Confining

the analysis to rural areas as a spatial zone misses the interrelationships between the two sectors, as well as the influence of the conditions on the agrarian labour outcomes. During land reforms, semi-proletarianisation and repeasantisation, can thus take place concurrently as Moyo and Yeros (2005b) have argued.

7.5.5 Access to land leads to “stable” semi-proletarianisation

Semi-proletarianisation has been seen in Settler Southern Africa literature as performing a dual role also referred to as “functional dualism” (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Neocosmos 1993; Bush & Cliffe 1984). Due to the inadequate land for social reproduction in Communal Areas originating from colonial land dispossession, wage work was seen as a strategy to meet subsistence needs not met by farming and vice versa the latter considered petty agricultural production as subsidising capital since the meagre wages alone without being complemented by farming on small plots were not enough to support families. In this respect, semi-proletarianisation could be considered to have been unstable since rural households could not survive without income from either the wage economy or from the land.

Not to discount land shortages, for they persists among the small and poor peasantry from the Communal Areas that did not receive FLTRP land, the evidence from the resettled areas indicates metamorphoses of the process of semi-proletarianisation. Rather than only supplementing inadequate land-based social reproduction, the semi-proletarian strategy amongst the lot of rich peasants-to-capitalist farms provided an important conduit for resources to invest in farming. With enlarged land access, the family based farm labour classes perpetuate semi-proletarianisation to recover deficits in farm labour income due to the financial constraints they face to exploit newly found lands. Even for those that wage economy does not serve, the purpose of investing in farms, semi-proletarianisation now proceeds with relative autonomy provided by FTLRP land access. As seen in the data, some land beneficiaries disengaged from the labour markets after obtaining access to land.

Consequently, it could be argued that access to land provides for a more stable semi-proletarianisation since they have an alternative to subsist in the absence of wage income,

which would not be the case within a context of land shortages in poor agro-ecological zones. More than providing the means of production for farming, access to land enabled the farm households to partake in non-farm activities through exploitation of resources found on their newly found lands resulting in the intensification of the process of semi-proletarianisation reported in the findings.

7.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study has shown that the structural changes initiated by the FTLRP and the accompanying land uses, agriculture production and markets under rapidly changing socio-economic contexts, have reshaped the agrarian labour relations. Progressive changes noted include the diversification of agrarian structure to incorporate many poor peasants, who now access land of larger size in better agro-ecological zones. The peasantries work the land with their family labour to produce food for themselves and realise incomes from surplus sales to meet other subsistence requirements. Resultantly, this has seen the rise in the number of self-employed jobs to ameliorate the unemployment problem, whose origins can be traced to ESAP and insistent institution closures as the economy faltered in the 2000s. Ultimately, the agricultural incomes have been reallocated to many rural people beyond the few LSCFs. Access to land reduces their compulsion to enter exploitative (agrarian) labour markets since they can now derive their livelihoods from self-employment in own farming.

It is also clear that land reforms do not necessarily allocate land to all the land short and landless people (Borras 2005; de Janvry 1981). Consequently, the agrarian labour reserve though reduced by the allocation of land to the formerly land short peasants will continue to operate as the farm labour markets retain their relevance as a source of livelihood for those remaining landless. The reformation of land tenure relations in redistributed LSCFs in Settler-Southern Africa, by delinking the residency and employment rights in the farm compounds can enhance the autonomy of workers in the labour markets and their prospects for self-mobilisation and/or agency. But this does not, however, guarantee the reversal of the poor socio-economic conditions of farm workers. The agrarian labour relations outcomes were not just contingent upon the agrarian restructuring, but were also

as much shaped by the interaction of the land reform policy with other agricultural, economic and labour policies.

The study revealed that, as the new small-scale capitalist farmers accumulate capital at the expense of underpaid farm labourers, differentiation will proceed rapidly and deepen inequalities in the rural areas. This also signals that the scale of capitalist farming does not influence super-exploitation of farm workers, as it is common feature in its different variants ranging from to small to large capitalist farms. Overall, the study highlighted that the labour rights, socio-economic conditions and secure access to farming and housing land for farm labourers should remain a priority for research and policy discussions.

7.7 FURTHER RESEARCH

The study elucidated the new labour relations in the redistributed farms, but did not examine the remaining LSCFs and plantation estates. Further research will be required to explore the evolving agrarian labour relations in these sectors, alongside the dynamic changes in the agrarian and economic policies, including the new government's policy interest to attract foreign and domestic capital to address agrarian financing challenges through joint ventures in agricultural production with the peasantry and small-scale capitalist farms (GoZ 2018a). Moreover, a Transitional and Stabilisation Plan was also launched in October 2018, which, among other issues, proposes to reduce government expenditure (GoZ 2018b), and thus the fate of input subsidy programmes such as the Command Agriculture and Presidential Inputs Scheme is uncertain.

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LIST OF KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

Only those who gave permission are listed in their original names. All other names used are pseudonyms.

Asani, Farm Guard, Nyamayemombe Farm, Goromonzi, 25 October 2017.

BLG, Extension Officer, 19 November 2017, Goromonzi

Chitombo, Former Farm Worker, Fodya Tisu Tinorima Farm, 18 October 2017, Goromonzi.

DM, Liberation War Veteran, 30 November 2017, Harare.

EF, Former Farm Worker/Gold Miner, 30 September 2017, Kwekwe.

JK, Mari Iri Muvhu Farm, 10 October 2017, Goromonzi.

Joseph, former senior foreman at Chamwari Farm, 22 November & 21 December 2017, Goromonzi.

JT, Former Farm Worker, 10 October 2017, Goromonzi.

Mavhuso, female Former Farm Worker, Chitoti Farm, 5 December 2017, Kwekwe

PLB, Ministry of Lands Official, 8 January & 15 January 2018, Kwekwe,

MGA, MLRR official, 5 October, 7 October & 29 January 2018, Harare

Mr. Zimbabwe Chimbga, Head of Programmes, ZLHR, 4 October 2017, Harare.

Mr. Godfrey Magaramombe, Executive Director of FCTZ, 13 January 2018, Harare.

Mr. Madanha, Senior Labour Designated Agent, National Employment Council for the Agricultural Industry of Zimbabwe, 20 October 2017, Harare.

Mr. Magwaza, General Secretary, GAPWUZ, 16 October, 27 October & 13 November 2017 Harare.

MPEW, Extension Worker, 1 October 2017 & 10 November 2017, Goromonzi.

Mr. Muswere, Deputy General Secretary, GAPWUZ, 17 November 2017, Harare.

Mr. Simon Jera, Chief Executive Officer, National Employment Council for the Agricultural Industry of Zimbabwe, 16 October 2017, Harare.

NYT, Extension Worker, 3 December & 5 December 2017, Kwekwe

MRT, District Agricultural Extension Officer, 20 October, 3 December, & 8 December 2017, Kwekwe

Peter Gambara, A2 farmer & Agricultural Economist, 22 January 2018, Goromonzi

Sharon, former farm worker, Matimati Farm, 29 October 2017, Goromonzi

Weeru Phiri, Former Farm Worker, Komuredhi Farm, 17 October 2017, Goromonzi.

WZS, Liberation War Veteran, 29 November 2017, Harare.

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ANNEXURE

ANNEX 1.1: UNISA ETHICAL CLEARANCE LETTER

	
DEPARTMENT: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE	
Date: 29 September 2017	Ref #: PAM/2017/026 (Chambati)
Dear Mr Chambati	Name of applicant: Mr WSS Chambati
	Student#: 58563229
Decision: Ethics Clearance Approval 29 September 2017 to 28 September 2020	
<hr/>	
Name: Mr WSS Chambati, student#: 58563229, 58563229@mylife.unisa.ac.za, tel: +263772650199 <i>[Supervisor: Prof MT Mogale, 012 429-4805, mogalmt@unisa.ac.za]</i>	
Research project "Changing agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe in the context of the "Fast Track" Land Reform" Qualification: PhD (Public Administration)	
<hr/>	
Thank you for the application for research ethics clearance by the Department: Public Administration and Management: Research Ethics Review Committee, for the above mentioned research. Ethics approval is granted for the period 29 September 2017 to 28 September 2020 . If necessary to complete the research, you may apply for an extension of the period.	
You are, though, required to submit the letters from the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement, the Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Agricultural Extension) and the Ministry of Rural Development in which permission is granted to you to do this research, to this Ethics Committee within 30 days of the date of this letter.	
For full approval: The application was expedited and reviewed in compliance with the <i>Unisa Policy on Research Ethics</i> and the <i>Standard Operating Procedure on Research Ethics Risk Assessment</i> by the RERC on 29 September 2017. The decision will be tabled at the next College RERC meeting for notification/ratification. The proposed research may now commence with the proviso that:	
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1) The researcher will ensure that the research project adheres to the values and principles expressed in the Unisa Policy on Research Ethics.2) Any adverse circumstance arising in the undertaking of the research project that is relevant to the ethicality of the study, as well as changes in the methodology, should be communicated in writing to this Ethics Review Committee.3) The researcher will conduct the study according to the methods and procedures set out in the approved application.	
	University of South Africa Pretorius Street, Muckleneuk Ridge, City of Tshwane PO Box 190, UNISA 10003 South Africa Telephone: +27 12 429 3111 Facsimile: +27 12 429 4130 www.unisa.ac.za

- 4) Any changes that can affect the study-related risks for the research participants, particularly in terms of assurances made with regards to the protection of participants' privacy and the confidentiality of the data, should be reported to the Committee in writing, accompanied by a progress report.
- 5) The researcher will ensure that the research project adheres to any applicable national legislation, professional codes of conduct, institutional guidelines and scientific standards relevant to the specific field of study, among others, the **Protection of Personal Information Act 4/2013**; **Children's Act 38/2005** and **National Health Act 61/2003**.
- 6) Only de-identified research data may be used for secondary research purposes in future on condition that the research objectives are similar to those of the original research. Secondary use of identifiable human research data requires additional ethics clearance.
- 7) Field work activities **may not** continue after the expiry date given. Submission of a completed research ethics progress report will constitute an application for renewal of Ethics Research Committee approval.

Kind regards


Ms C Alers
Deputy Chairperson:
Research Ethics Review Committee
alersc@unisa.ac.za


Prof RT Mpofo
Acting Executive Dean: CEMS

ANNEX 1.2: LETTERS OF PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

All communications should be addressed to
**"The Provincial Administrator Mashonaland
East Province"**
Telephone: +263 24382
 +263 279 24383-4
Facsimile : +263 24358
E-mail: pamaheest@gnoll.com



Ministry of Rural Development, Promotion and
Preservation of National Culture and Heritage
One Plains Avenue/ Second Street
P. O. Box 445
Marondera
ZIMBABWE

3 October 2018

District Administrator
Goromonzi

CLEARANCE TO CONDUCT A RESEARCH: W CHAMBATI

Please be advised that Walter Chambati is a student with University of South Africa and studying for a PHD in Public Administration. He wants to conduct a research in Changing Agrarian Labor Relations in Zimbabwe in the context of fast track Land Reform in Goromonzi.

Please kindly facilitate his studies through introducing him to the relevant departments.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'T Kutamahufa', with a horizontal line extending to the right.

T Kutamahufa
Provincial Administrator
Mashonaland East Province



**Ministry of Rural Development, Promotion & Preservation
of National Culture and Heritage**

Tel: 263 (055) 23721/3, 22947
Fax: 263 (055) 23722



Office of the District Administrator
P.O Box 114
KWEKWE

ZIMBABWE

21 August 2017

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

**RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH: WALTER CHAMBATI
AFRICAN INSTITUTE FOR AGRARIAN STUDIES**

The subject matter refers.

This letter serves to grant permission to Walter Chambati a PHD student at the University of South Africa to conduct a research in rural Kwekwe.

The research is mainly for academic purposes only. May you please allow him to operate in the district.


MUPUNGU F

DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR



All correspondence should be addressed to

"THE SECRETARY"
TELEPHONE:
701310/797325-30

FAX: 792936



ZIMBABWE

REF:
MINISTRY OF LANDS AND RURAL
RESETTLEMENT
Block 2, Makombe Building
Private Bag 7779
Causeway
Harare

Ref: L/195

18/7/2017

Mr Walter Chambati
The Sam Moyo African Institute for Agrarian Studies
19 Bodle Avenue
Eastlea
P O Box CY 1909
Causeway
Harare



RE: REQUEST FOR AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH.

Your letter dated 12 July 2017 refers. You may proceed to organize to do your research and to interview Ministry staff at Head office and in Goromonzi and Kwekwe District on condition that the research is for academic purpose only. By copy of this minute the Acting Provincial Resettlement Officer for Mashonaland East and Midlands have been advised of this to alert the districts concerned. It will help if you could provide us with the questionnaire you intend to use to gather information from my officials.

I have to advise further that labour relations is the mandate of the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare and as such I suggest you also seek guidance from that Ministry.

I wish you success in your research.

M. Dzinoreva
For Secretary for Lands and Rural Resettlement



All correspondence should be addressed to the Director

Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension Services

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, MECHANISATION AND IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT

AGRITEX

Head office
No. 1 Borrowdale Road
Ngungunyana Building
Harare

P.O. Box CY 2505, Harare, Zimbabwe Tel (+263) 04-794381/2

07 September, 2017

Mr. Walter Chambati
PhD Student, Department of Public Administration
UNISA



Ref: Request for permission to use lists of farmers to recruit participants for your research

We acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 18 AUGUST, 2017 requesting to access our database on farmers for the purpose of recruiting participants, as well as data on agricultural production patterns in the district of your PhD research on "Changing Agrarian Labour Relations in Zimbabwe in the Context of the Fast Track Land Reform".

The district staff in the study areas have authority from us to allow you access to information on A1, A2 and Communal Area farmers in Goromonzi and Kwekwe Districts. We will also allow you to access our district annual agricultural production reports for your use in the study. Kindly note this information will be availed to you on condition that it should be solely used for academic purposes.

Kindly approach the respective District Crop and Livestock Officers to discuss your proposal and for facilitation with assistance from Agricultural Extension Workers on the ground.

J. Gondo **Principal Director Agritex.**

Cc. Director, Agritex

Provincial Crop and Livestock Officer (Mash East and Midlands Province)
District Crop and Livestock Officers (Goromonzi and Kwekwe)

ANNEX 3.1 PERMISSION TO USE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES



Trustees

Joshua Nyoni
ZIMBABWE

Kojo Amanor
GHANA

Themba Makuleke
SOUTH AFRICA

Michael O. Ochiamba
KENYA

Dots Sikesana
SOUTH AFRICA

Praveen Jha
INDIA

Pats Yelas
BRAZIL

Obedi Tskaka
GHANA

Issa Shivi
TANZANIA

The Sam Moyo African Institute for Agrarian Studies

19 Bodle Avenue, Eastlea, P.O Box, CY1909, Causeway, Harare, Zimbabwe. Tel +263 4 708654/ 795751/ 795754/ 2931438
email: research@akatrust.org website: www.akatrust.org

14th August 2017

Walter Chambati
457 Mhandambiri Road
New Marimba Park
Harare

RE: PERMISSION TO USE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES

Dear Mr Chambati

Following your request, I am pleased to grant you permission to use the SMAIAS farm household and labour survey questionnaires for your PhD fieldwork in Goromonzi and Kwekwe.

I wish you all the best in your studies.

Regards



Jeff Gwariva

Finance and Admin Manager



ANNEX 3.2: FARM HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE

University of South Africa

Farm Household Survey

GOROMONZI AND KWEKWE DISTRICT

Universal Codes throughout the questionnaire.

- 1 *Don't Know*
- 2 *Refused to Answer*
- 3 *Non Applicable*

Start time |_|_|_|_|_| End time |_|_|_|_|_|

Researcher	Date Checked _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Name of Data entry clerk	Date entered _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

A. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

A1. Enumerator's name _____ serial No. |_|_|_|_|
 A2. Date of interview (DD/MM/YY) |_|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|
 A3. Place of interview _____

B. LOCATION/IDENTIFICATION DETAILS

B1. Province 1. Mash East 2. Midlands |_|_|
 B2. District _____
 B3. Natural Region _____
 B4. Ward _____
 B5. FarmID _____
 B6. Household ID _____
 B7 Gender of plot owner 1=male 2=female |_|_| B9 Age |_|_|_|_|_|
 B8. Model Type
 1= A1 villagised 2=A1 self-contained 3=A2 4=A2 peri-urban 5=remaining LSCF 6=Communal Areas |_|_|

C. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC DATA (ASK OF PLOT OWNER)

NB. C1 TO C5 – NEWLY REDISTRIBUTED AREAS ONLY, COMMUNAL AREAS GO TO C6.

No.	Question	Response
C1.	What year did you settle on this farm? (YYYY)	_ _ _ _ _ _ _
C2.	Where were you before being resettled here? 1=CA in this district 2=CA in this province 3= CA from other provinces 4=LSCF in this district 5=LSCF in this province 6=LSCF in another province 7=diaspora 8=urban area 9=place of employment in another area 10=old resettlement 99=other (specify)	_ _
C3	If originated from Communal Area, what is the size of the arable plot in the Communal Area?(ha)	_ _ _ _
C4.	Are there any agricultural activities you are practicing in the CA? 1=yes 2=no	_
C5.	If yes, please specify the activities? 1=crop production only 2=livestock production only 3=crop and livestock	_
C6.	Are you in professional employment? 1=yes 2=no	_
C7.	If yes, what is your current profession? 1=private sector managerial 2=civil service managerial 3=self-employed 4=uniformed forces 5=private sector semi-skilled 6=civil service semi-skilled 7=domestic worker 8=farm worker 99=other specify	_ _
C8.	If no, were you previously employed? 1=yes 2=no	_
C9.	Are you on pension? 1=yes 2=no	_
C10.	If no longer employed year you were last in employment (YYYY)	_ _ _ _ _ _ _
C11.	Period in specified profession (years)	_ _

C12. Demographic characteristics of the household

Household Member	Sex ¹	Age	Occupation ²	Marital Status ³	Education Level Attained ⁴	Relationship to HH head ⁵	Formal Agricultural Training ⁶	Residency ⁷	If off farm specify ⁸
1	HH head								
2	Member 1								
3	Member 2								
4	Member 3								
5	Member 4								
6	Member 5								
7	Member 6								
8	Member 7								
9	Member 8								
10	Member 9								
11	Member 10								
12	Member 11								
13	Member 12								
14	Member 13								
15	Member 14								
16	Member 15								
17	Member 16								
18	Member 17								

¹1=male 2=female

²1= permanent paid employee 2= casual employee 3= employer 4= farmer 5= paid farm worker 6=unpaid family worker 7= self employed 8=student 9= housewife 10 =preschool 99=other specify

³1= monogamously married 2 polygamous married 3=single 4=divorced/separated 5=widowed

⁴1= no formal education 2= some primary education 3= completed primary education 4= some secondary education ordinary level 5=completed secondary education 6=completed advanced level 7= college education 8=university degree 9= vocational training 99=other (specify)

⁵1=self 2=son 3=daughter 4=wife 5=husband 6=relative 7=worker 8= mother 9= farmer 99=other (specify)

⁶1=no formal training 2=certificate 3=master farmer certificate 4=advanced master farmer certificate 5=diploma 6=degree 99=other (specify)

⁷1=on farm 2=off farm

⁸1=communal area 2=urban area 3=diaspora 99=other (specify)

D. LAND BASE

D1. How much land does this household own? (all in Ha)

	Holdings	Type of settlement ¹	(a) Homestead land	(b) Arable fields	(c) Wetland/ gardens (away from homestead)>>>	(d) Grazing land	Other land
1	Owned	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	Sharecropped in	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	Borrowed (for free)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	Rented out (for money)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	Rented in (for money)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
6	Sharecropped out	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
7	Lent out (for free)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

¹Type of Settlement 1= A1 villagised 2=A1 self-contained 3=A2 4=A2 peri-urban 5=remaining LSCF 6=communal areas**E. PRODUCTIVE AND OTHER ASSET OWNERSHIP, ACCESS AND INVESTMENTS**

E1. Provide the following information on agricultural production assets

	Type	Year settled	2017		
		No. owned	No. owned	Value (USD)	Main Source of income ¹
Animal drawn implements					
1	Scotch-cart	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	Plough	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	Planter	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	Ridger	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	Cultivator	_____	_____	_____	_____
6	Ripper	_____	_____	_____	_____
7	Harrow	_____	_____	_____	_____
Machinery, power-driven implements and equipment.					
1	Vehicles	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	Generator	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	Tractor	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	Water pump	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	Combine	_____	_____	_____	_____
Fixed assets.					
1	Boreholes	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	Deep wells	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	Cattle pens	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	Pig sties	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	Poultry runs	_____	_____	_____	_____
7	Tobacco barns	_____	_____	_____	_____
8	Green houses (include area covered in Ha)	_____	_____	_____	_____

1=proceeds from agric sales 2=personal savings outside agric 3=loan from bank 4=remittances from diaspora 5=local remittances 6=loan from relatives and friends 7=credit from supplier 8=contract farming 99=other specify

E2. Provide the following information on other assets

	Type	Year settled	2017		
		No. owned	No. owned	Value (USD)	Source of income ¹
1	TV	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	Decoder	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	Radio	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	Cellphone	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	Solar panel	_____	_____	_____	_____
7	Electric stove	_____	_____	_____	_____
8	Beds	_____	_____	_____	_____
9	Fridge	_____	_____	_____	_____
10	Other (specify)	_____	_____	_____	_____

1 =proceeds from agric sales 2=personal savings outside agric 3=loan from bank 4=remittances from diaspora 5=local remittances 6=loan from relatives and friends 7=credit from supplier 8=contract farming 99=other specify

No	Question	Response
E3.	Do you have access to electricity at your homestead? 1=yes 2=no	_____

F. LAND TENURE ISSUES

No	Question	Response
F1	How did you first access this piece of land? <i>1= occupation 2= formally allocated = 3=inheritance 4=traditional leader 5=family subdivision 6=bought it 99=other specify</i>	_____
F2	When you were formally allocated this piece of land? (year) (YYYY)	_____
F3	When did you start farming operations? (year) (YYYY)	_____
F4	Do you have any documentation for this piece of land? 1=yes 2=no	_____
F5	If yes what kind of documentation do you have? <i>1=99 year lease 2=offer letter 3=permit 4=none 99=other specify</i>	_____
F6	Are you sharing the land with anyone? 1=yes 2=no IF NO MOVE TO G1	_____
F7	If yes, who are you sharing your land with? <i>1=relative/friend 2=squatters 3=former farm workers 4=former LSC farmer 99=other (specify)</i>	_____
F8	How much land are you sharing out? (Ha)	_____
F9	What are they using the land for? <i>1=residency 2=crop production 3=livestock production 4=crop and livestock 99=other (specify)</i>	_____
F10	Do the people you are sharing land have any obligation towards you? 1= yes 2=no	_____
F11	If yes, what is the obligation? 1= provide paid labour 2=provide free labour 3=share harvest with land owner 4=sell harvest to land owner 99=other specify	_____

G. LAND USE, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND FOOD SECURITY

G1. Who makes the following day-to-day decisions on this farm?

	Activity	Response
1	Family labour allocation	_____
2	Hiring in wage labour	_____
3	Hiring out wage labour	_____
4	Inputs used in agricultural production	_____
5	Crops and livestock produced	_____
6	Marketing of agricultural commodities	_____
7	Use of income earned for agricultural commodities	_____
8	Mobilising financial resources for agricultural production	_____

1=male owner 2=female owner 3=husband 4=wife 5=husband & wife 6=son 7=daughter 8=manager 99=other specify

G2	Do you have irrigation on this plot? 1=yes 2=no	_____
G3	If yes, what type of irrigation infrastructure do you have? 1=drip 2=overhead 3=centre pivot 4=canal 5= hose pipes 6=bucket system 99=other specify	_____
G4	Is the irrigation infrastructure operational? 1=yes 2=no	_____

CROP PRODUCTION

G5. Which dry land and irrigated crops did you grow in these past seasons?

	Crop	2016/17						2015/16							
		Reason for growing crop ¹	Area in Ha		Output harvested (in Kgs)		Quantity Sold (Kg)	Total income realised US\$	Reason for growing crop ¹	Area in Ha		Output Harvested in Kgs		Quantity Sold (Kg)	Total income realised US\$
			Dry	Irrigated	Dry	Irrigated				Dry	Irrigated	Dry	Irrigated		
1	Maize														
2	Wheat														
3	Cotton														
4	Tobacco														
5	Groundnuts														
6	Millet														
7	Sorghum														
8	Rapoko														
9	Sunflower														
10	Soyabeans														
11	Sweet potatoes														
12	Sugarbeans														
13	Cowpeas /nyemba														
14	Roundnuts (nyimo)														
15	Other (specify)														

¹Reason 1=GoZ directive 2=own consumption 3=profitability of venture 4=compatibility with available equipment 5=influenced by past land uses 6=to ensure land sustainability 7=inputs easily available 99=other (specify)

No	Question	Response
G6	Are there any horticultural crops that you grew in the last two years? 1=yes 2=no	_

G7 If yes, provide the following details.

	Crop	2016						2015							
		Reason for growing crop ¹	Area in Ha		Output harvested in (equivalent 50Kg bags)		Quantity sold (50 Kg bags)	Total income realised US\$	Reason for growing crop ¹	Area in Ha		Output Harvested in (equivalent 50Kg bags)		Quantity sold (50 kg bags)	Total income realised US\$
			Dry	Irrigated & G/house	Dry	Irrigated & G/house				Dry	Irrigated & G/house	Dry	Irrigated & G/house		
1	Baby corn														
2	Pumpkins														
3	Watermelons														
4	Okra														
5	Tomatoes														
6	Rape														
7	Onions														
8	Peas														
9	Green beans														
10	Gen squash														
11	Cabbage														
12	Rugare/covo														
13	Butternut														
14	Potatoes														
15	Paprika														
16	Other (specify)														
17															

¹Reason 1=GoZ directive 2=food security 3=foreign currency generation 4=profitability of venture 5=compatibility with available equipment 6=influenced by past land uses 7=to ensure land sustainability 99=other (specify)

No	Question	Response
G8	Are you engaged in crop contract farming? 1=yes 2=no	_____
G9	If yes which season did you start contract farming? (YY/YY)	____/____

G10. Provide information on contract farming

Crop	2016/17				2015/16			
	Companies involved	Area (ha)	Support ¹	Value (USD)	Companies involved	Area (ha)	Support ¹	Value (USD)
1 Commercial Maize	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
2 Seed maize	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
3 Cotton	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
4 Sorghum	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
6 Tobacco	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
7 Wheat	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
10 Other (specify)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

¹Support 1=seed 2=fertilisers 3=chemicals 4= technical advice 5= seed/fert 6=seed/chemicals 7=seed/fert/chemicals/technical advice/transport 99=other (specify)

LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION

G11. How many of the following livestock types did you have during these years?

Type of livestock	Year Settled	2017				2016			
	No.	No. owned	Estimated Value (USD)	No Sold	Total income realised (USD)	No. owned	Estimated Value	No Sold	Total income realised (USD)
1 Cattle	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
2 Goats	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
3 Sheep	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
4 Donkeys	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
5 Pigs	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
6 Rabbits	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
7 Free range chicken	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
8 Broilers	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
9 Layers*	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
10 Turkey	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
1 Guinea fowls	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
12 Other (specify)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

*For layers no. sold put in crates

No	Question	Response
G12	Are there any agricultural production activities that you are undertaking jointly with others on	_____

	your plot in 2016/17? 1=yes 2=no	
G13	If yes, what agricultural production activities are you jointly undertaking? <i>1=crop production only 2=livestock production only 3=crop and livestock</i>	_____
G14	With whom are you involved in joint agricultural operations? <i>1=friend 2=relative 3=business partner 4=former LSCF owner 99=other specify</i>	_____
G15	On how much land area are the joint activities taking place? (Ha)	_____
G16	How do you share the outputs from the joint activities? <i>1=share harvest 2=share profits 99=other specify</i>	_____
G17	What is the basis on which output is shared? <i>1= based on contribution to production costs 2=on ad-hoc basis 3=land owner determines sharing 99=other specify</i>	_____
G18	Who provides the labour for the joint agriculture activities? <i>1= wage labour paid by plot owner 2= wage labour paid by plot owner and family labour 3=wage labour paid by partner 4=wage labour paid by partner and his/her family labour 5=family labour of partner 6=family labour of plot owner 99=other (specify)</i>	_____

H. AGRICULTURAL INPUTS

H1. For each of the crops that you grew during the last two seasons, what levels, where and how did you access the inputs? (SPECIFY QUANTITY OF INPUTS USED IN KGS OR LITRES)

Crop	Inputs used	Description	2016/17				2015/16			
			Qty (kg/ltr)	Area applied(ha)	Source ¹	Cost (US\$)	Qty (kg/ltr)	Area applied(ha)	Source ¹	Cost (US\$)
Maize	Seed	Improved								
		Retained								
	Agrochemicals	Herbicides								
		Pesticides								
	Fertiliser	Basal								
		Top								
manure										
Cotton	Seed	Certified								
	Agrochemicals	Herbicides								
		Pesticides								
	Fertiliser	Basal								
		Top								
manure										
Tobacco	Seedlings (no.)	Flue-cured								
		Air-cured								
	Agrochemicals	Herbicides								
		Pesticides								
	Fertiliser	Basal								
		Top								
Manure										
Soya Beans	Seed	Certified								
		Retained								
	Agrochemicals	Herbicides								
		Pesticides								
	Fertiliser	Basal								
		Top								
manure										

¹ 1=local agro-dealer/retailer 2=Govt inputs scheme 3=NGO input scheme 4=nearest town 5=Harare agro-dealer 6=given by relative/friend 7=contract scheme 99=other (specify)

Crop	Inputs used	Description	2016/17				2015/16			
			Qty (kg/lt)	Area applied to (ha)	Source ¹	Cost (US\$)	Qty (kg/lt)	Area applied to (ha)	Source ¹	Cost (US\$)
Sun Flower	Seed	Certified								
		Retained								
	Agrochemicals	Herbicides								
		Pesticides								
	Fertiliser	Basal								
		Top								
manure										
Groundnuts	Seed	Certified								
		Retained								
	Agrochemicals	Herbicides								
		Pesticides								
	Fertiliser	Basal								
		Top								
manure										
Wheat	Seed	Certified								
		Retained								
	Agrochemicals	Herbicides								
		Pesticides								
	Fertilizer	Basal								
		Top								
Manure										
Other (specify 1)	Seed	Certified								
		Retained								
	Agrochemicals	Herbicides								
		Pesticides								
	Fertiliser	Basal								
		Top								
Manure										

¹ 1=local agro-dealer/retailer 2=Govt inputs scheme 3=NGO input scheme 4=nearest town 5=Harare agro-dealer 6=given by relative/friend 7=contract scheme 99=other (specify)

Livestock Inputs:

H2. For each of the livestock enterprises, what levels, where and how did you access the inputs during the last three years? **(SPECIFY THE UNITS FOR QUANTITY OF STOCKFEEDS USED IN KGS)**

Livestock type	Inputs	2016				2015			
		Did you use it? 1=yes 2=no	Quantity (Kgs)	Source ¹	Cost (US\$)	Did you use it? 1=yes 2=no	Quantity (Kgs)	Source ¹	Cost (US\$)
Cattle	Stockfeeds	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	Vet chemicals	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Pigs	Stockfeeds	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	Vet chemicals	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Goats	Stockfeeds	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	Vet chemicals	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Free range chicken	Stockfeeds	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	Vet chemicals	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Broiler	Stockfeeds	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	Vet chemicals	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Layers	Stockfeeds	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	Vet chemicals	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Other 1	Stockfeeds	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	Vet chemicals	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Other 2	Stockfeeds	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	Vet chemicals	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

¹ 1=local agro-dealer/retailer 2=nearest town 3=Harare 99=other (specify)

No	Questions	Responses
H3	Are you involved in livestock contract farming? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="text"/>
H4	If yes, for which livestock? 1=cattle 2=pigs 3=broilers 4=layers 5=goats 99=other specify	<input type="text"/>

No	Question	Response
H5	Did you access credit for agricultural production between 2015 and 2017? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="text"/>

H6. If yes please complete the following table for these periods for the main credit received?

		2017	2016	2015
1	If yes, what activity? ¹	/____/____/	/____/____/	/____/____/
2	Source of funding ²	/____/	/____/	/____/
3	Amount (US\$) received	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/
4	Repayment period in months	/____/	/____/	/____/
5	Interest rate per annum (%)	/____/	/____/	/____/

¹Activity: 1=crop production 2=livestock production 3=infrastructure development 4=farm wage payments 5=equipment acquisition 99=other specify

²Source: 1= government scheme 2=private company 3=commercial bank 4=relatives and friends 5=cooperatives 6=savings clubs 7 microfinance institutions 8=chimbado 99= other specify

I. AGRICULTURAL LABOUR

No	Question	Response
I1	Do you hire any paid labour for agricultural activities? 1=yes 2=no IF NO GO TO I61	____

I2. If yes how many persons did you hire during the following periods?

Type of labour	No. of persons hired						
	Year settled	2016/17					
		No. of males	Ave. no. of hours worked per day	Ave. days worked per month per worker	No. of females	Ave. no. of hours worked per day	Ave. days worked per month per worker
Permanent	____	____	____	____	____	____	____
Casual							
Piecework	____	____	____	____	____	____	____
Seasonal <3 months > 8 months	____	____	____	____	____	____	____

Note one day = 8 working hours

I3 Where did you recruit your current permanent farm workers from?			
	Source	1=yes 2=no	If yes specify district/location
1	Your Communal Area of origin	____	
2	Other Communal Areas	____	
3	Urban area	____	[Indicate suburb]
4	Local AI farmers	____	
5	Former farm workers in same district	____	
6	Former farm workers in different district	____	
7	Other specify	____	

I4	Where did you recruit your current casual farm workers from?		
	Source	1=yes 2=no	If yes specify district
1	<i>Your Communal Area of origin</i>	_ _	
2	<i>Other Communal Areas</i>	_ _	
3	<i>Urban area</i>	_ _	[Indicate suburb]
4	<i>Local AI farmers</i>	_ _	
5	<i>Former farm workers in same district</i>	_ _	
6	<i>Former farm workers in different district</i>	_ _	
7	<i>Other specify</i>	_ _	

I5.	Are your permanent workers assigned to specific sections or enterprises on the farm? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	_ _
-----	---	-----

I6. If yes, how is the permanent workforce divided amongst the enterprises or sections?

	Enterprise/Section	No. of workers	
		Male	Female
1	Crop production	_ _	_ _
2	Livestock production	_ _	_ _
3	Horticulture	_ _	_ _
4	Farm engineering	_ _	_ _
5	Irrigation	_ _	_ _
6	General hands	_ _	_ _
7	Machinery operator/drivers..	_ _	_ _
8	Other specify	_ _	_ _

I7	Do your permanent workers perform the same tasks on the farms every day? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	_
----	--	---

I8. How many casual workers did you hire during these months?

	2016				2017							
	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	Jun	Jul	Aug
No. of persons	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _
Ave. no. of days* wrkd by 1 wrker	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _

- **Note one day = 8 working hours**

19. For which farming activities was casual labour hired during the last two seasons?

		2016/17	2015/16
	Farming activity	Acknowledgement <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	Acknowledgement <i>1=yes 2=no</i>
1	Land clearing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Ploughing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Planting	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Weeding	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Harvesting	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Pest and disease control	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Marketing (selling of commodities)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	Livestock herding	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	Farm repairs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	Farm Security	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	Cattle dipping	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	Other (<i>specify</i>)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

No	Question	Response
I10.	Do you employ a farm manager? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I11.	If yes what agricultural qualifications does the farm manager hold? <i>1=no formal training 2=certificate 3=master farmer certificate 4=advanced master farmer certificate 5=diploma 6= degree 99=other specify</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I12	How do you mainly determine the wages of your permanent employees? <i>1=government gazetted wages 2=local farmers agreement 3=negotiated between employee and employer 99=other (specify.....)</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I13	How do you mainly determine the wages of your casual employees? <i>1=government gazetted wages 2=local farmers agreement 3=negotiated between employee and employer 99=other (specify.....)</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I14	What kind of contracts do you have with your permanent workers? <i>1= verbal 2= written</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I15	What kind of contracts do you have with your casual workers? <i>1= verbal 2= written</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I16	How many days do your permanent workers work per month?	<input type="checkbox"/> days
I17	How many off days do you give your permanent workers per month?	<input type="checkbox"/> days
I18	What time do your permanent workers start work? [24 hour notation]	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
I19	What time do your permanent workers finish work? [24 hour notation]	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
I20	How long is your permanent workers tea break? [IN HOURS]	<input type="checkbox"/> hrs
I21	How long is your permanent workers lunch break? [IN HOURS]	<input type="checkbox"/> hrs

I22. How did you pay your workers during the following periods?

Type of labour	Mode of payment ¹			
	2008	2017	2016	2015
Permanent	_____	_____	_____	_____
Casual	_____	_____	_____	_____

¹**Mode of payment** 1=cash only 2=kind only 3=cash and kind 4=land to grow crops 5=cash and land 6=electronic payments (mobile money and bank transfers) 99=other specify

No	Question	Response
I23	How much are you paying your permanent workers in cash per-month?	US\$ _____
I24	On average what is the daily payment for casual workers	US\$ _____
I25	How often do you pay your casual workers? 1=daily 2=weekly 3=fortnightly 4=monthly 99= other specify	_____

I26. What was the average monthly monetary wage for your permanent workers during the following periods (US\$)?

Months	2017	2016	2015
January to June	_____	_____	_____
July to December	_____	_____	_____

I27. Did you provide these foodstuffs to permanent workers monthly during the following periods?

	Item	2017		2016		2015	
		Provided 1=yes 2=no	Quantity	Provided 1=yes 2=no	Quantity	Provided 1=yes 2=no	Quantity
1	Maize (kg)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	Cooking Oil (l)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	Sugar beans (kg)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	Soap (bars)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	Beef (kg)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
6	Matemba (kg)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
7	Salt (kg)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
8	Sugar (kg)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
9	Tea (kg)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

I28. What other benefits did you provide to your permanent employees during the following periods?

	Benefit	2017	2016	2015
		Did you offer? 1=yes 2=no	Did you offer? 1=yes 2=no	Did you offer? 1=yes 2=no
1	Housing	_____	_____	_____
2	Paraffin	_____	_____	_____
3	Firewood	_____	_____	_____
4	Health support	_____	_____	_____
5	Land to grow crops	_____	_____	_____
6	Land to graze animals	_____	_____	_____
7	Annual leave	_____	_____	_____
8	Protective clothing	_____	_____	_____
9	Funeral support	_____	_____	_____
10	Other specify	_____	_____	_____

I29. If you provide protective clothing what exactly do you provide?

Protective clothing	Permanent workers <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	Casual workers <i>1=yes 2=no</i>
Overalls	_____	_____
Gumboots	_____	_____
Gloves	_____	_____
Nose masks	_____	_____
Other specify	_____	_____

I30. Besides daily payments you pay to casual workers, are there any other benefits you provided during the following periods?

	Benefit	2017 Did you offer? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	2016 Did you offer? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	2015 Did you offer? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>
1	Housing	_____	_____	_____
2	Paraffin	_____	_____	_____
3	Firewood	_____	_____	_____
4	Health support	_____	_____	_____
5	Land to grow crops	_____	_____	_____
6	Land to graze animals	_____	_____	_____
7	Food at work	_____	_____	_____
8	Protective clothing	_____	_____	_____
9	Funeral support	_____	_____	_____
10	Monthly maize grain	_____	_____	_____

No	Question	Response
I31	Do you provide housing for your permanent workers? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	_____
I32	If yes, did you construct the houses for the permanent workers? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	_____
I33	If yes, what kind of housing are you providing? <i>1=pole and dagga 2=timber structure 3=brick and tin roof 4=brick and asbestos 99=other specify</i>	_____
I34	Where do you provide this housing for permanent workers? <i>1=my homestead 2=new houses built on my plot 3=old LSCF compound 99=other specify</i>	_____
I35	If you do not provide accommodation, where do your permanent workers stay? <i>1=farm compound where plot is located 2=farm compound on another farm 3=Nearby Communal Area 4=nearby town 5=A1 plot 99=other (specify)</i>	_____
I36	Do you provide housing for your casual workers? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	_____
I37	If yes, did you construct the houses for the casual workers? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	_____
I38	If yes, what kind of housing are you providing? <i>1=pole and dagga 2=timber structure 3=brick and tin roof 4=brick and asbestos 99=other specify</i>	_____
I39	Where do you provide this housing for casual workers? <i>1=my homestead 2=new houses built on my plot 3=old LSCF compound 99=other specify</i>	_____
I40	If you do not provide accommodation, where do your casual workers stay? <i>1=farm compound where plot is located 2=farm compound on another farm 3=Nearby Communal Area 4=nearby town 5=A1 plot 99=other (specify)</i>	_____

I41	Do you have an agreement to share the output from your harvest with your agricultural workers? <i>1=Yes 2=No</i>	_____
I42	If yes, what percentage of the harvest did you allocate to your workers in the 2016/17 season?	_____
I43	Have you allocated your permanent workers some pieces of land to grow their own crops on your plot? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	_____
I44	If yes, how many permanent employees did you allocate land?	_____

I45	How much land in total have you allocated to the permanent workers?	_____Ha
I46	Have you allocated your casual workers some pieces of land to grow their own crops on your plot? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	_____
I47	If yes, how many casual employees did you allocate land?	_____
I48	How much land in total have you allocated to the casual workers?	_____Ha
I49	Do you share the harvest from the plots you allocated to them? <i>1 = Yes 2 = No</i>	_____
I50	Do you offer your permanent workers free inputs to crop the pieces of land you allocated them? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	_____
I51	Do you offer your permanent workers inputs on credit to crop the pieces of land you gave them <i>1= yes 2=no</i>	_____
I52	Do you buy the harvest produced by your workers on the plots you allocated? <i>1 =yes 2=no</i>	_____

I53	Are you facing any shortages of farm wage labour? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	_____
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I54. If yes during which years did you face labour shortages and what was the most affected activity

	Years	Did you face shortage? ¹	Most affected Activity ²	Main reason for shortage ³
1	2017	_____	_____	_____
2	2016	_____	_____	_____
3	2015	_____	_____	_____

¹**Labour shortages** *1=yes 2=no*

²**Activities** *1=land clearing 2=weeding 3=harvesting 4=marketing/selling 5=livestock herding 6=planting 7=spraying/pest control 99=other specify*

³**Reasons for shortage:** *1=too many employers 2=few employees 3=low wages 4= alternative jobs available 99=other specify*

No	Question	Response
I54	Besides the labour provided by permanent and casual workers, are there any other paid labour services that you are engaging (e.g. livestock diagnosis, tractor repairs, crop marketing)? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	_____
I55	If yes, who provides these services? <i>1=former farm workers 2=new farm workers 3=other farmers 4=private companies 5=private individuals/contractors 99=other specify</i>	_____

I56	If yes, what services are you engaging?	
	Service sourced	Acknowledgement 1=ye 2=no
1	tractor repairs	_____

2	<i>tobacco grading</i>	_____
3	<i>farm planning</i>	_____
4	<i>irrigation operation</i>	_____
5	<i>livestock diagnosis</i>	_____
6	<i>crop marketing</i>	_____
7	<i>Other specify</i>	_____

I57	Are you hiring any labour groups/gangs for general tasks (weeding, harvesting, stumping etc.) 1=yes 2=no	_____
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I58	If yes, who provides these services?		Response
	1	<i>former farm workers</i>	1=yes 2=no
	2	<i>new farm workers</i>	1=yes 2=no
	3	<i>other farmers</i>	1=yes 2=no
	4	<i>Government prison workers</i>	1=yes 2=no
	5	<i>Communal area people</i>	1=yes 2=no
	6	<i>Urban area people</i>	1=yes 2=no
	7	<i>other specify</i>	1=yes 2=no

I59	Did you have any labour disputes with your workers in 2017? 1=yes 2=no	_____
I60	If yes, what was the cause of the dispute? 1= <i>late wage payments</i> 2= <i>low wages</i> 3= <i>residency in farm compound</i> 4= <i>firewood/grass cutting</i> 5= <i>theft</i> 99= <i>other (specify_____)</i>	_____
I61	Do any of your family members/ relatives provide labour for the household agricultural production activities? 1=yes 2=no	_____

I62. If yes, how many persons were involved in the agricultural production of the household and the amount of time spent during the following periods?

		2016/17			
		Gender <i>1=male 2=female</i>	Age	Ave. no. of days worked per month	No. of months worked
1	Member 1	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	Member 2	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	Member 3	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	Member 4	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	Member 5	_____	_____	_____	_____
6	Member 6	_____	_____	_____	_____

Note: One working day = 8 hours

163. Who **mainly** performed the following farm tasks within the farm households during the 2016/17 season?

	Farming activity	Response
1	Land clearing	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Ploughing	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Planting	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Weeding	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Harvesting	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Pest and disease control	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Marketing (selling of commodities)	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	Livestock herding	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	Farm repairs	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	Farm Security	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	Cattle dipping	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	Other (<i>specify</i>)	<input type="checkbox"/>
		<input type="checkbox"/>
		<input type="checkbox"/>

1 = male adult 2 = female adult (>16 years) 3 = male child (<16 years) 4 = female child (<16 years)

164. Which farm tasks were performed by family members and what percent of the work is done by hired labour in the 2016/17 season?

	Tasks	Family members do the task? 1=yes 2=no	% of work done by hired labour
1	Land clearing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Ploughing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Planting	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Weeding	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Harvesting	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Marketing of crop commodities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Pest and disease control	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	Fertiliser application	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	Other (<i>specify</i>)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

165. What kind of non-wage work is performed by all household members?

Members	Gender 1=male 2=female	Age	1= yes 2=no				
			Family farm labour on cash crops	Family farm labour on food crops	Livestock herding	Household work (including firewood collection, fetching water)	No work at all
HH Head	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Member 1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Member 2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Member 3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Member 4	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Member 5	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Member 6	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Member 7	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Member 8	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Member 9	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

I66	Do any of your family members hire out wage labour for farming activities to other households/farmers? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="text"/>
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I67. If yes, how many persons were involved during the following periods?

	2016/17						
	Gender 1=male 2=female	Age	Type of employment ¹	Where are they employed ²	Do they stay at their workplace? ³	No. of days wrkd per month	No. of months worked
Member 1	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Member 2	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Member 3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Member 4	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Member 5	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Total	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

¹ 1 = permanent 2= seasonal (>3<8 months) 3= piecework

² 1=FTLRP farm in this district 2= FTLRP farm elsewhere 3=CA in this district 4=CA elsewhere 5=LSCF in this district 6=LSCF elsewhere

³ 1 =yes 2=no

I68	Do you have any reciprocal labour arrangements with other farmers? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="text"/>
-----	---	----------------------

I69. If yes, in which activities were you practicing reciprocal labour arrangements during the last season?

	Activity	2016/17			
		Yes/No 1=yes 2=no	How many households are involved?	How many days did your hh members contribute?	Who in your household is mostly involved? ¹
1	Land clearing	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
2	Planting	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
3	Weeding	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
4	Harvesting	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
5	Marketing of crop commodities	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
6	Pest and disease control	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
7	Other (specify)	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
8		<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
9		<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

¹ 1=male adults (>16 years) 2=female adults (>16 years) 3=male child (<16 years) 4=female child (<16 years)

170. Are you involved in non-farm rural income generating activities? 1=yes 2=no | _____ |

171. If yes, what non-farm rural income generating activities are you involved in?

	Type of activity	Involved? 1=yes 2=no	Seasonality ¹	Place of activity ²	No. family members involved?		Ave. Total no. of days worked by one member in 2016	Income realized in 2016 (US\$)	Do you hire wage labour for this activity? ⁴	If yes, how many workers	What kind of workers mostly hired? ³	Total Monthly wage bill (US\$)
					Males	Females						
1	Gold panning/mining	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	Firewood	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	Collecting river/pit sand	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	Wildlife hunting	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	Thatching grass	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
6	Wood carving	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
7	Stone carving	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
8	Tailoring	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
9	Basketry	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
10	Building	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
11	Brick making	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
12	Pottery	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
13	Clothes vending	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
14	Beer brewing	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
15	Carpentry	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
16	Transport provision	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
17	Small tuck-shop	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
18	Retail shop	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
19	Motor mechanics	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
20	Others (specify)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
		_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

¹ 1=all year round 2=rainy season 3=dry season

² 1=FTLRP area in this district 2=FTLRP elsewhere 3=Communal Area in this district 4=CA elsewhere 5=urban area 6=mining area 99=other (specify)

³ 1= Permanent 2=casual

⁴ 1=yes 2=no

172. Are there any household members employed as wage labourers in a rural non-farm income generating activity? 1 =yes 2=no

173. If yes, who in the household is employed as wage labourers in a non-farm rural income generating activity?

		2016							
		Gender 1=male 2=female	Age	Type of employment 1	Name of non- farm rural activity	Where are they employed ²	Do they stay at their workplace? ³	No.. of days wrkd per month	No. of months worked
1	Member 1	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _ _ _ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _
2	Member 2	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _ _ _ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _
3	Member 3	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _ _ _ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _
4	Member 4	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _ _ _ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _
5	Member 5	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _ _ _ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _
6	Member 6	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _ _ _ _	_ _	_ _	_ _	_ _

¹ 1 = permanent 2= seasonal (>3<8 months) 3= piecemeal

² 1=FTLRP farm in this district 2= FTLRP farm elsewhere 3=CA in this district 4=CA elsewhere 5=LSCF in this district 6=LSCF elsewhere

³ 1 =yes 2=no

K. FOOD CONSUMPTION

K1. Please indicate whether your household faced food shortages, and the number of meals taken per day in the following years.

	Year	2017	2016	2015
1	Faced food shortages? 1=yes 2=no	_ _	_ _	_ _
2	No. of meals per day	_ _	_ _	_ _

K2. Indicate your sources of food and then rank the three major ones in the past year (2016). 1=major source

	Food source	Is source? Yes=1 No=2	Rank (First 3)
1	Own food production	_ _	_ _
2	Purchases	_ _	_ _
3	Food aid (free food handouts)	_ _	_ _
4	Food for work	_ _	_ _
5	Food rations from employer	_ _	_ _
6	Grain loan schemes	_ _	_ _
7	Other (specify)	_ _	_ _

K3. What kinds of foods did your household consume over the last seven days?

Food category		Item	Consumption and expenditure in previous month	
			How many days did you consume this food item in the last 7 days?	Source of food ¹
Cereals (1)	1	Maize meal	_____	_____
	2	Sorghum meal	_____	_____
	3	Bread	_____	_____
	4	Flour	_____	_____
	5	Rice	_____	_____
Tubers(2)	6	Sweet potatoes	_____	_____
	7	Irish potatoes	_____	_____
	8	Cassava	_____	_____
Pulses (3)	9	Beans	_____	_____
	10	G.nuts	_____	_____
	11	Peas	_____	_____
	12	Round nuts (nyimo)	_____	_____
Veggies(4)	13	Leafy vegetables	_____	_____
Fruits(5)	14	Fruits	_____	_____
Protein (6)	15	Fish	_____	_____
	16	Eggs	_____	_____
	17	Pork	_____	_____
	18	Beef	_____	_____
	19	Poultry	_____	_____
	20	Goats	_____	_____
Milk(7)	21	Milk	_____	_____
Sugar(8)	22	Sugar	_____	_____
Oils(9)	23	Cooking oil	_____	_____
Condiments(10)	24	Salt	_____	_____

¹Source of food 1=own production 2=purchase from local retail shop (specify area) 3=purchase from urban areas (specify area) 4=local agro-processor 5=gift/handout 6= bought from other farmers 99=other (specify)

No.	Question	Response
K4	How much money did you spend on food purchases last month? US\$	_____

K5. Did you afford to send all your children to school during these periods? 1=yes 2=no

2017	2016	2015
_____	_____	_____

K6. If no how many were supposed to be in school and how many did you send during these periods?

		2017	2016	2015
1	No. supposed to be in school	_____	_____	_____
2	No. who went to school	_____	_____	_____

No.	Question	Response
K7.	How did they spend most of their time when they were not in school? 1=paid farm labour 2=stay at home 3=assisting on own plot 99=other specify	_____

K8. Did you afford to send all your family members to clinics when they fell sick during these periods? 1=yes
2=no

2017	2016	2015
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

INCOME

L1.What are your sources of money income for the household?

	Source	Is source? 1= yes 2=no	Total income received in 2017 (US\$)	Total income received in 2016 (US\$)
1	Farming	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
2	Remittances from Diaspora	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
3	Local remittances	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
4	Pension	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
5	Formal employment	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
6	Sale of forest products	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
7	Gold panning	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
8	Hiring out farm labour (permanent)	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
9	Hiring out farm labour (casual)	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
10	Petty trading	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
11	Commercial loans	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
12	Asset sells (excluding livestock)	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
13	NGO grants	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
14	Other 1 (specify)	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
15	Other 2(specify)	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

L2.What expenditures did you incur in the following periods?

	Income/ use	2017 (US\$)	2016 (US\$)
	Uses/Expenditure	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
1	Bought agric inputs	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
2	Bought farm machinery	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
3	Bought cattle	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
4	Constructed farm infrastructure (include house repairs)	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
5	Savings at bank	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
6	Household consumption	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
7	Education expenditure	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
8	Health expenditure	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
9	Bought household assets	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
10	Bought clothing	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
11	Bought vehicles	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
12	Levies (RDC, dipping fees etc.)	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
13	Grind mill and other agro processing expenditures	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
14	Funerals	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
15	Social/cultural functions	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
16	Farm wages	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
17	Other specify	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

M. CHALLENGES FACING THE FARMERS

M1. In the following table, rank the three (3) greatest challenges your household has faced during the current and past two seasons. 1=most severe

	Challenge	2016/17	2015/16	2014/15
		Rank	Rank	Rank
1	Access to Credit	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _
2	Access to Inputs	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _
3	Access to markets	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _
4	Small land size	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _
5	Land tenure insecurity	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _
6	Draught power shortage	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _
7	Labour shortage	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _
8	High wages	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _
9	High transport costs	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _
10	Poor road networks	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _
11	HIV/AIDS	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _
12	Droughts	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _
13	Infrastructure	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _
14	Lack of working cash capital	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _
15	Other (specify)	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _
16	Other(specify)	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _

END THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME

END

ANNEX 3.3: FARM LABOURERS' QUESTIONNAIRE

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

FARM LABOUR SURVEY

GOROMONZI AND KWEKWE DISTRICT

Universal Instructions

Please use the following universal codes throughout the questionnaire.

- 1 *Don't Know*
- 2 *Refused to Answer*
- 3 *Non Applicable*

Start time |_|_|_|_| End time |_|_|_|_|

Researcher	Date Checked _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Name of Data entry clerk	Date entered _ _ _ _ _ _ _

A. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

A1. Enumerator's name _____ serial No. |_|_|_|_|
 A2. Date of interview (DD/MM/YY) |_|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|
 A3. Name of farm where interview is held _____

B. LOCATION AND IDENTIFICATION DETAILS

B1	District 1=Goromonzi 2=Kwekwe	_
B2	Natural Region 1=NRI 2=NRIIA 3=NRIIB 4=NRIV 5=NRV 6=NRIII	_ _
B3	Ward Name _____	
B4	Ward number	_
B5	Chieftainship _____	
B6	Headman _____	
B7	Type of settlement where farm worker resides 1= A1 villagised 2=A1 self-contained 3=A2 4=A2 peri-urban 5=remaining LSCF 6=Communal Areas 7=urban area 8=growth point 99=other specify	_
B8	If worker stays on farm, what is the original farm name? _____	
B9	Name of farm worker _____	
B10	Gender of farm worker 1=male 2=female _ B11. Age _ _ _	
B12	What year did you start selling labour services to new farms? (YYYY)	_ _ _
B13	What was your main type of farm employment during the 2013/14 season? 1=permanent 2=seasonal (≥ 3 months) 3=piecework/maricho 99=other (specify)	_
B14	What was your occupation before you started working in the new farms? 1= permanent paid farm worker 2=casual paid farm worker 3=unpaid family farm worker 4= unemployed 5=self-employed (non-agric) 6=urban employment 7= mine worker 8=student 99=other specify _____	_
B15	Did you work in the Large Scale Commercial Farm (LSCF) sector before the FTLRP? 1=yes 2=no	_
B16	If yes, which district where you employed? 1=Goromonzi 2=Kwekwe 3=other Mash East district 4=other Midlands district 5=Mash West 6=Mash Central 7=Mat North 8=Mat South 9=Masvingo 10=Manicaland	_
B17	When did you start work in LSCF sector before FTLRP (YYYY)	_ _ _
B18	If you did not work in the LSCF before 2000, where were you resident? 1=communal area 2=urban area 3=old resettlement 4= mining town 5= Small-scale commercial farms (SSCF) 6=LSCF 7=growth point 99=other specify _____	_

C. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

C1. Demographic characteristics of the farm worker household

Name of Household Member	Sex ¹	Age	Occupation ²	Marital Status ³	Education Level Attained ⁴	Relationship to HH head ⁵	Formal Agricultural Training ⁶	Stay at farm worker residency ⁷	If no where do they stay pecify ⁸
1	HH head								
2	Farm worker								
3									
4									
5									
6									
7									
8									
9									
10									
11									
12									
13									
14									
15									
16									
17									

¹1=male 2=female

²1= permanent paid farm employee 2= casual farm employee 3= self-employed farmer 4=unpaid family farm worker 5= self-employed (non-agric) 6=student 7= housewife 8 =preschool 9=retired/pensioner 99=other specify

³1= monogamously married 2= polygamous married 3=single 4=divorced/separated 5=widowed

⁴1= no formal education 2= some primary education 3= completed primary education 4= some secondary education ordinary level 5=completed secondary education 6=completed advanced level 7= college education 8=university degree 9= vocational training 99=other (specify)

⁵1=self 2=son 3=daughter 4=wife 5=husband 6=relative 7=worker 8= mother 9= father 99=other (specify)

⁶1=no formal training 2=certificate 3=master farmer certificate 4=advanced master farmer certificate 5=diploma 6=degree 99=other (specify)

⁷1=yes 2=no

⁸1=communal area 2=urban area 3=diaspora 4=mine5=growth point 99=other (specify)

No.	Question	Response
C2.	If married, from which country is your spouse from? 1=Zimbabwe 2=Mozambique 3=Zambia 4=Malawi 99=other specify	_____
C3.	What is your place of birth? 1=Zimbabwe 2=Mozambique 3=Zambia 4=Malawi 99=other specify	_____
C4.	Where was your father born? 1=Zimbabwe 2=Mozambique 3=Zambia 4=Malawi 99=other	_____
C5.	Is your great grandfather originally from outside Zimbabwe? 1=yes 2=no	_____
C6.	If yes, do you consider yourself a Zimbabwean? 1=yes 2=no	_____
C7.	If your great grandfather is from outside Zimbabwe , do you possess identity documents for your country of origin? 1= yes 2=no	_____
C8.	Do you possess a Zimbabwean identity card? 1= yes 2=no	_____
C9.	If no, what are the reasons for not possessing an identity card? 1=don't know where to get it 2=no documents to process it 3=application denied by RG's office/told I don't qualify 4=don't see value in possessing ID 5=application being processed 99=other specify	_____
C10	If you do not possess national ID, are there any services that you have failed to access because of that? 1= yes 2=no	_____
C11	If yes, what services have you failed to access? 1=failed to apply for land 2=children could not write public exams 3=failed to access benefits from NSSA 4=failed to get food aid 5=failed to benefit from input programmes 99=other specify	_____
C12	Do most of your children below 16 years possess Zimbabwean birth certificates? 1= yes 2=no 3=no children	_____
C13	If no, what are the reasons for children not possessing Zimbabwean birth certificates? 1=don't know where to get it 2=no documents to process it 3=application denied by RG's office/told I don't qualify 4=don't see value in possessing birth certificates 99=other specify	_____

D. PRODUCTIVE AND OTHER ASSET OWNERSHIP, ACCESS AND INVESTMENTS

D1. Provide the following information on farmworker household ownership of farm equipment.

	Type	2016				2015				2014			
		No. owned	No. bought in 2014 only	Value of tools bought only (USD)	Source of income ¹	No. owned	No. bought in 2013 only	Value of tools bought only (USD)	Source of income ¹	No. owned	No. bought in 2012 only	Value of tools bought only (USD)	Source of income ¹
1	Hoes												
2	Axes												
3	Picks												
4	Spades												
5	W/ barrows												
6	Watering cans												
7	K/ sprayers												
	Animal Drawn												
8	Scotch-cart												
9	Plough												
	Power driven												
10	Generator												

D2. Provide the following information on farmworker household ownership of other assets

	Type	2016				2015				2014			
		No. owned	No. bought in 2014 only	Value of tools bought (USD)	Source of income ¹	No. owned	No. bought in 2013 only	Value of assets bought only (USD)	Source of income ¹	No. owned	No. bought in 2012 only	Value of assets bought only (USD)	Source of income ¹
1	TV												
2	DVD player												
3	Satellite dish												
4	Radio												
5	Cell phone												
6	Solar panel												
7	Electric stove												
8	Beds												
9	Fridge												
10	Other (<i>specify</i>)												

¹ 1=proceeds from agric sales 2=personal savings outside agric 3=loan from bank 4=remittances from diaspora 5=local remittances 6=loan from relatives and friends 7=credit from supplier 8=contract farming 9=self-made 10=farm wages 11=gift 99=other specify

D3	Do you have access to electricity at your homestead? 1=yes 2=no	/___/
----	---	-------

**E. LAND ACCESS AND HOUSEHOLD AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
FAST TRACK LAND REFORM ALLOCATION**

No.	Question	Response
E1	Were you allocated land under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP)? 1=yes 2=no [IF NO MOVE TO E13.]	___
E2	If yes in which scheme where you allocated land? 1= A1 villagised 2=A1 self-contained 3=A2 4=A2 peri-urban	___
E3	How did you first access this piece of land? 1= occupation 2= formally allocated by DA 3=inheritance 4=traditional leader 5=bought it 99=other specify	___
E4	Do you have an offer letter for the FTLRP plot? 1=yes 2=no	___
E5	What is the size of your piece of land? HA E5.1. Homestead_____ E5.2. Arable_____ E5.3 Grazing_____	
E6	What year did you access this piece of land?	___
E7	What year did you start farming operations?	___

E8 .Which crops did you grow in these past seasons on your FTLRP plot?

	Crop	2015/16				2014/15				2013/14			
		Reason for growing crop ¹	Area (Ha)	Quantity harvested (Kg)	Quantity sold (Kgs)	Reason for growing crop ¹	Area (Ha)	Quantity harvested (Kgs)	Quantity sold (Kgd)	Reason for growing crop ¹	Area (Ha)	Quantity harvested (Kgs)	Quantity sold (Kgd)
1	Maize												
2	Groundnuts												
3	Tobacco												
4	Sweet potatoes												
5	Rape												
6	Covo												
6	Tomatoes												
7	Onion												
8	Soyabeans												
9	Other specify												

¹**Reason** 1=GoZ directive 2=own consumption 3=profitability of venture 4=compatibility with available equipment 5=influenced by past land uses 6=to ensure land sustainability 7=inputs easily available 99=other (specify)

No.	Question	Response
E9	Do any of your family members participate in household agricultural production activities by providing manual labour on this Fast Track plot? 1= yes 2=no	___

E10 If yes, how many members participate in household agricultural production activities? (Including yourself)

	Members	No. of members
1	Adult males (> 16 years)	___
2	Adult females (>16 years)	___
3	Children (< 16 years)	___

No.	Question	Response
E11	Do you hire paid farm labour for agricultural activities on this plot? 1=yes 2=no	___
E12	If yes, what kind of labour do you mostly hire for your own agricultural activities on FTLRP plot? 1=permanent 2=seasonal (≥ 3 months) 3=piece work/maricho 99=other specify	___

INFORMAL LAND ALLOCATIONS IN NEW RESETTLEMENT AREAS BY LAND BENEFICIARIES

No.	Question	Response
E13	Have you ever been allocated land by any FTLRP beneficiaries on their plot to grow crops? 1=yes 2=no [IF NO MOVE TO E31]	___
E14	If yes how much land have you been allocated? Ha	___

E15	Under which scheme is the land beneficiary resettled? 1= A2 subdivided 2= A2 wholesome 3= A1self-contained 4= A1villagised 99=other specify	___
E16	What year were you allocated this piece of land?	___
E17	Do you still have access to this piece of land? 1= yes 2= no [IF NO, MOVE TO E31]	___
E18	Are you supposed to provide anything to the land beneficiary in exchange for the land offer? 1=yes 2=no	___
E19	If yes, what do you provide? 1=pay rentals 2=sell crop to them 3=share the harvest 4=provide free labour 5=provide paid labour 99=other specify	___
E20	Are you employed by the land beneficiary who allocated you land? 1=yes 2=no	___
E21	Do you share the harvest from this plot with the land beneficiary? 1=yes 2=no	___
E22	If yes, who gets the larger share of the harvest? 1=self 2=land beneficiary	___
E23	Do you receive any inputs from the land beneficiary to crop this piece of land? 1=yes 2=no	___

No.	Question	Response
E24	If you received inputs, are you supposed to repay the inputs you received from the land beneficiary? 1=yes 2=no	___
E25	If yes, how do you repay the inputs? 1=cash payments for inputs after selling crop 2=sell crop to them 3=share the harvest 4=provide free labour 5=provide paid labour 99=other specify	___

E26 . Which crops did you grow in these past seasons on the piece of land allocated by land beneficiaries?

	Crop	2015/16				2014/15				2013/14			
		Reason for growing crop ¹	Area (Ha)	Quantity harvested (Kg)	Quantity sold (Kgs)	Reason for growing crop ¹	Area (Ha)	Quantity harvested (Kgs)	Quantity sold (Kgd)	Reason for growing crop ¹	Area (Ha)	Quantity harvested (Kgs)	Quantity sold (Kgd)
1	Maize												
2	Groundnuts												
3	Tobacco												
4	Sweet potatoes												
5	Rape												
6	Covo												
6	Tomatoes												
7	Onion												
8	Soyabeans												
9	Other specify												

¹Reason 1=GoZ directive 2=own consumption 3=profitability of venture 4=compatibility with available equipment 5=influenced by past land uses 6=to ensure land sustainability 7=inputs easily available 99=other (specify)

No.	Question	Response
E27	Do any of your family members participate in agricultural production activities by providing manual labour on this plot accessed from land beneficiaries? 1= yes 2=no	___

E28 . If yes, how many members participate in household agricultural production activities? (Including yourself)

	Members	No. of members
1	Adult males (> 16 years)	___
2	Adult females (>16 years)	___
3	Children (< 16 years)	___

No.	Question	Response
E29	Do you hire paid farm labour for agricultural activities on the land allocated by land beneficiaries? 1=yes 2=no	___
E30	If yes, what kind of labour do you mostly hire for your own agricultural activities? 1=permanent 2=seasonal (≥ 3 months) 3=piece work/maricho 99=other specify	___

INFORMAL LAND ALLOCATIONS IN NEW RESETTLEMENT AREAS: SELF ALLOCATIONS

No.	Question	Response
E31	Is there any land for growing crops that you allocated yourself in new resettlement areas outside of the farm compound? 1=yes 2=no [IF NO MOVE TO E40]	___

E32	If yes on which type of farm have you allocated yourself land? 1=A1 villagised 2=A1 self-contained 3=A2 subdivided 4=A2 wholesome	<input type="checkbox"/>
E33	What is the size of your piece of land?	<input type="checkbox"/>
E34	Which part of the farm have you allocated yourself land? 1=grazing land 2=occupied land beneficiary arable plot 3=unoccupied land beneficiary plot 4=state land (outside compound)	<input type="checkbox"/>
E35	What year did you access this piece of land?	<input type="checkbox"/>
E36	What year did you start farming operations?	<input type="checkbox"/>
E37	Are you practicing crop production activities on this self-allocated land? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="checkbox"/>
E38	Have land beneficiaries tried to stop you from cropping this land? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="checkbox"/>
E39	If yes, did you continue with the farming operations? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="checkbox"/>

LAND ACCESS IN THE FARM COMPOUND

No.	Question	Response
E40	Do you have access to land to grow crops in the farm compound? 1=yes 2=no [IF NO MOVE TO E54]	<input type="checkbox"/>
E41	If yes, in what type of compound do you have access to land? 1=old compound on A1 villagised 2=old compound on A2 subdivided 3=old compound on A2 wholesome 4=new farm compound on A2 subdivided 5=new farm compound on A1 villagised 6=new farm compound on A2 wholesome	<input type="checkbox"/>
E42	If yes what is the size of the land in the compound? HA	<input type="checkbox"/>
E43	Who allocated you this piece of land? 1=former LSCF 2=new land beneficiary 3=District Administrator 4=self-allocated 99=other specify _____	<input type="checkbox"/>
E44	What year did you first access this piece of land? (YYYY)	<input type="checkbox"/>

E45 . Which crops did you grow in these past seasons on your farm compound plot?

	Crop	2015/16				2014/15				2013/14			
		Reason for growing crop ¹	Area (Ha)	Quantity harvested (Kg)	Quantity sold (Kgs)	Reason for growing crop ¹	Area (Ha)	Quantity harvested (Kgs)	Quantity sold (Kgd)	Reason for growing crop ¹	Area (Ha)	Quantity harvested (Kgs)	Quantity sold (Kgd)
1	Maize												
2	Groundnuts												
3	Tobacco												
4	Sweet potatoes												
5	Rape												
6	Covo												
6	Tomatoes												
7	Onion												
8	Soyabeans												
9	Other specify												

¹Reason 1=GoZ directive 2=own consumption 3=profitability of venture 4=compatibility with available equipment 5=influenced by past land uses 6=to ensure land sustainability 7=inputs easily available 99=other (specify)

E46 . If worked in LSCFs before 2000, which crops and livestock did you produce on the farm compound plot before 2000 and what are you producing now?

Crops and livestock		Did you grow it? 1=yes 2=no	
CROPS		2015/16	Before FTRLP: 1999
1	Maize	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Tobacco	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Sweet potatoes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Groundnuts	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Sunflower	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Sugar beans	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	Vegetables	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	Tomatoes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	Onions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Other specify	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	LIVESTOCK		
1	Goats	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Cattle	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Rabbits	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Free range chickens	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Other specify	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

No.	Question	Response
E47	Are there any crops that land beneficiaries do not allow you grow on the farm compound plots? 1=yes 2=no	____
E48	If yes, mention one crop which farm workers are not allowed to grow in the farm compound? 1=tobacco 2=maize 3=paprika 99=other specify	____
E49	Why are you not allowed to grow this crop? 1= realise better yields than land beneficiaries 2=stopped selling labour to them 3=land does not belong to us 4=causing environmental degradation 99=other specify	____

E50 .	Do any of your family members participate in agricultural production activities by providing manual labour on this farm compound plot? 1= yes 2=no	____
-------	--	------

E51 . If yes, how many members participate in household agricultural production activities? (including yourself)

	Members	No. of members
1	Adult males (> 16 years)	____
2	Adult females (>16 years)	____
3	Children (< 16 years)	____

No.	Question	Response
E52	Do you hire paid farm labour for agricultural activities on the farm compound plot? 1=yes 2=no	____
E53	If yes, what kind of labour do you mostly hire for your own agricultural activities on the farm compound plot? 1=permanent 2=seasonal (≥ 3 months) 3=piece work/maricho 99=other specify	____

COMMUNAL AREAS

No.	Question	Response
E54	Do you have access to land in the Communal Area to grow crops? 1=yes 2=no [IF NO MOVE TO F1.]	____
E55	If yes, where do you have access? 1= CA in same district 2= CA in same province 3= CA in different province	____
E56	If yes, what is the size of your arable plot in the communal areas? Ha	____
E57	How did you access this piece of land? 1=allocated by traditional leader 2=allocated by in laws 3=bought it 4=inherited the land 5= informally allocated by relative/friend 6=allocated by family 99=other specify_____	____
E58	What year did you access this piece of land? (YYYY)	____ ____ ____ ____
E59	Who is living at your communal area home? 1=wife 2=husband 3=children 4=immediate family 5=extended family 6= employees 99= other specify_____	____
E60	Do you practice agricultural (crops/livestock) production activities in the communal area? 1=yes 2=no	____

IF PERMANENT FARM EMPLOYEE, MOVE TO F1

IF CASUAL FARM EMPLOYEE MOVE TO G1

F. WORKING CONDITIONS OF PERMANENT WORKERS

F1 On what kind of farm are you permanently employed?

Name of farm	Type of farm ¹	Do you live on this farm? 1=yes 2=no
_____	____	____

1= A2 subdivided 2= A2 wholesome 3= A1 self-contained 4= A1 villagised 5=LSCF 99=other specify

F2. Do you have the following types of employees at the farm you work?

	Type of employee	Do you have this employee? 1=yes 2=no	If yes, what is the gender of the current occupant? 1=male 2=female
1.	Farm manager	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2.	Foreman	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3.	Supervisor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.	Farm clerk	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5.	Farm accountant	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6.	Salespersons	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7.	Driver/messenger	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8.	Security guard	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

F2	Do you hold any leadership position at your work place? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="checkbox"/>
F3	If yes, what leadership position do you hold? 1=supervisor 2=workers committee member 3=foreman 99=other specify	<input type="checkbox"/>
F4	For how long have you been employed on this farm? (Number of Years)	<input type="checkbox"/>
F5	What work do you do at the farm? 1=general hand (multiple tasks) 2=tractor driver 3=skilled work (irrigation, repairs, tobacco grading, mechanic) 4=supervisor 5= foreman 6=farm security 99=other specify	<input type="checkbox"/>
F6	How many days do you work per month?	<input type="checkbox"/>
F7	What time do you start work? (HH/MM) [24 hour notation]	<input type="checkbox"/>
F8	What time do you finish work? (HH/MM) [24 hour notation]	<input type="checkbox"/>
F9	How long is your tea break? (Hours)	<input type="checkbox"/>
F10	How long is your lunch break? (Hours)	<input type="checkbox"/>
F11	Do you sometimes work overtime? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="checkbox"/>
F12	If yes, are you compensated for the overtime work you do? 1=yes 2= no	<input type="checkbox"/>
F13	If yes, how are you compensated for the overtime work? 1=overtime pay 2=given days off by employer 99=other specify	<input type="checkbox"/>

No.	Question	Response
F14	Are you assigned to any specific section/enterprise on the farm? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="checkbox"/>
F15	If yes, which enterprise are you assigned? 1= field crops 2= horticulture 3=livestock 4=engineering 5=transport 6=irrigation 7=security 99=other specify _____	<input type="checkbox"/>
F16	Are you given targets to accomplish on a daily basis at your workplace? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="checkbox"/>
F17	If given targets, what happens if you do not meet your target at your workplace? 1=pay deduction 2=work overtime 3=no punitive measure 99=other specify	<input type="checkbox"/>
F18	Who is responsible for allocating tasks daily? 1=employer 2=manager 3=supervisor 4=foreman 5=fellow worker 99=other specify	<input type="checkbox"/>
F19	Are you assigned work as a group at your workplace? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="checkbox"/>
F20	If yes, within the group are tasks further subdivided amongst the group members? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="checkbox"/>
F21	Whose tools and/or equipment do you mostly use to perform your duties at your workplace? 1=own tools 2=employer's tools 3=borrowed tools	<input type="checkbox"/>
F22	Do you also work for other employers? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="checkbox"/>
F23	If yes when do you work for other employers? 1=off days 2=after work 3=abscond work 99=other specify	<input type="checkbox"/>

F24	What kind of employment contracts do you have with your employer? 1=verbal 2=written	<input type="checkbox"/>
F25	Do you engage in wage negotiations with the employer? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="checkbox"/>
F26	If yes, what type of wage negotiations do you engage in? 1=individual negotiations 2=group negotiations 99=other specify	<input type="checkbox"/>
F27	What action is taken by workers if negotiations fail? 1= strike demonstrations 2=quitting 3=abscond work 4=resort to laziness at work 5= no action taken 99=other specify	<input type="checkbox"/>
F28	If no, how are your wages determined? 1=employer determined 2=government regulations 3=market rates/wages paid by other farmers 4=employee determined 99=other specify	<input type="checkbox"/>

F29	How are you paid for your labour services? 1=cash 2=food 3=clothes 4=cash and kind 99=other specify _____	<input type="text"/>
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F30 . How much was your monetary wage per month during these periods? US\$

Months	2016	2015	2014
January to May	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
June to December	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

F31 . How often did you receive wage payments during these periods?

2016	2015	2014
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

1=daily 2=weekly 3=monthly 4=bi-monthly 5= quarterly 6= twice per year 7= once per year 99=other specify

F32 . Did you encounter any problems in getting your payments during these periods?

	Year	Encountered problem? 1=yes 2=no	Major Problem encountered? ¹
1	2016	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
2	2015	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
3	2014	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

1= not paid on time 2= not paid fully at once 3= irregular payments 4=not paid at all 99=other specify

No.	Question	Response
F33	Are you currently owed any unpaid farm wages by your present employer? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="text"/>
F34	If yes how much money are you owed by your employer in unpaid wages? USD	<input type="text"/>
F35	What have you done to claim your unpaid wages from your employer? 1=work strike 2=demand payment from employer 3=confiscated employer's asset 4= opted to be paid in kind 5= sort help from labour unions 6=resort to laziness at work 7=did not do anything 99=other specify	<input type="text"/>

No.	Question	Response
F36	Are you provided meals at work during working hours? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="text"/>
F37	If yes what meals are you provided per day? 1= breakfast only 2= lunch only 3= supper only 4= breakfast & lunch 5= breakfast & supper 6= lunch & supper 7= breakfast, lunch and supper	<input type="text"/>
F38	Where do you eat during breaks at work? 1=at the workplace 2=my home 99=other specify _____	<input type="text"/>
F39	Who cooks the food you eat during the breaks at work? 1=employer 2=employees 3=wife 4=husband 5=son 6=daughter 7= self 99 =other specify _____	<input type="text"/>

F40 . Did you receive these items as part of your benefits on a monthly basis during these years?

	Item	Received 1= yes 2= no		
		2016	2015	2014
1	Maize	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
2	Cooking Oil	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
3	Sugar beans	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
4	Soap (bars)	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
5	Beef	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
6	Matemba	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
7	Other specify	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

F41 . What other benefits are you provided by your employer?

	Benefit	Received? 1= yes 2= no		
		2016	2015	2014
1	Housing	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
2	Firewood	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
3	Health insurance	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
4	Land to grow crops	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
5	Land to graze	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
6	Annual leave	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
7	Protective clothing	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
8	Funeral insurance	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
9	School fees	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
10	Work attendance bonus	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
11	Production bonus	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

No.	Question	Response
F42	Have you ever received a cash loan from your employer? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F43	If yes, what did you use the cash loan for? <i>1=buy food 2=buy clothes 3=buy household property 4=pay school fees 5=cover funeral costs 6= buy inputs 7= buy agric assets 99=other specify</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F44	Which year did you last receive the cash loan from your employer?	<input type="checkbox"/>
F45	Were you charged interest on the cash loan? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F46	Have you paid the cash loan back to your employer? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F47	Were the cash loan repayments deducted from your wages? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F48	Does your employer have a grocery shop on the farm? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F49	If yes do you buy from the shop? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F50	How do you mainly buy goods from the shop? <i>1=pay cash 2= credit in lieu of wage payments 3=exchange for labour 99=other specify</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F51	Do you buy agricultural produce from your employer? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F52	If yes, how do you mainly buy the agricultural produce from your employer? <i>1=pay cash 2= credit in lieu of wage payments 3=exchange for labour 99=other specify</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>

No.	Question	Response
F53	Are you related to your farm employer? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F54	If yes how are you related to your employer? <i>1=sibling of nuclear family of employer 2=distant relative 3= share same totem 4=same communal area of origin 99=other specify</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F55	If related to employer, are you paid a higher wage than the other employees doing the same work as yourself? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F56	If related to employer, do you live in the same house with your employer? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F57	If related to employer, do you eat the same food with your employer? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>

No.	Question	Response
F57.1	Are some of your family members also employed by the same employer you are working for? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>

F57.2 If yes how many members of your household are employed by the same employer?

	Members	No. of members
1	Adult males (> 16 years)	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Adult females (>16 years)	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Children (< 16 years)	<input type="checkbox"/>

F58 Have you been a victim of any sort of harassment at your current workplace from your employer?

	Nature of abuse	<i>1=yes 2=no</i>	What year did this occur
1	Humiliation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Verbal	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Sexual	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Physical	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

IF PERMANENT EMPLOYEE MOVE TO H1

G. WORKING CONDITIONS OF CASUAL/PART TIME WORKERS

G1 . On which farms do you provide your casual labour services?

	Type of farm	Do you provide casual labour in these farms? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	Do you live on this farm? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>
1	A2 Sub-divided	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	A2 Wholesome	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	A1 Self-contained	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	A1 Villagised	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	LSCF	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Communal Area	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

No.	Question	Response
G2	Do you work for the same employers every agricultural season? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="text"/>
G3	If yes why do you work for the same employers every season? 1=related to employer 2=offers good wages 3=pays wages on time 4=offered land to grow crops 5=offers food during working hours 6= proximity to where I live 7= trust employer 99=other specify	<input type="text"/>
G4	How many kilometres is the nearest employer you work for from the place you live? Km	<input type="text"/>
G5	How many kilometres is the furthest employer you work for from the place you live? Km	<input type="text"/>

G6 During which months did you perform paid casual farm work in the 2013/14 season?

	Month	2016		2015	
		Did you work 1=yes 2=no	No of days worked	Did you work 1=yes 2=no	No of days worked
1	January	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
2	February	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
3	March	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
4	April	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
5	May	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
6	June	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
7	July	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
8	August	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
9	September	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
10	October	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
11	November	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
12	December	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

G7 . Which farm tasks did you sell your casual labour during the 2015/16 season?

	Task	Did you sell? 1=yes 2=no	Was this based on mugwazo or hours worked? 1=mugwazo 2=hours worked
1	Land clearing	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
2	Planting	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
3	Weeding	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
4	Harvesting	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
5	Grading	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
6	Baling	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
7	Livestock herding	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
8	Fertiliser application	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
9	Operating irrigation	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
10	Tractor driving	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
11	Other work specify	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

G8	What has been the least number of days spent working for one employer during the 2015/16 season?	<input type="text"/>
G9	What main task were you performing during this time you spent the least number of days working for one employer? 1=weeding 2=harvesting 3=fertiliser application 4=land preparation 5=livestock rearing 6=tractor driving 7=operating irrigation equipment 8=planting 99=other specify	<input type="text"/>
G10	What has been the highest number of days you have spent working for one employer during the last (2015/16) season?	<input type="text"/>
G11	What main task were you performing during this time you spent the highest number of days working for one employer? 1=weeding 2=harvesting 3=fertiliser application 4=land preparation 5=livestock rearing 6=tractor driving 7=operating irrigation equipment 8=planting 9= tobacco grading 99=other specify	<input type="text"/>

G12	Is most of your work based on mugwazo/piece work? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="text"/>
G13	If yes, do you accomplish the mugwazo as an individual? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="text"/>
G14	If no, do you seek the help of your family members? 1=yes 2=no	<input type="text"/>

G15. If you seek help from family members, how many people usually assist you in accomplishing your *mugwazo*?

	Members	No. of members
1	Adult males (> 16 years)	<input type="text"/>
2	Adult females (>16 years)	<input type="text"/>
3	Children (< 16 years)	<input type="text"/>

G16	Whose tools and/or equipment do you mostly use to perform your duties where you work? <i>1=own tools 2=employer's tools 3=borrowed tools</i>	<input type="text"/>
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No.	Question	Response
G17	What kind of employment contracts do you have with most of your employers? <i>1=verbal 2=written</i>	<input type="text"/>
G18	How are the wage payments for casual farm tasks determined? <i>1=negotiated between employer and employees 2=set by employees 3=set by employers 4= market determined 99=other specify</i>	<input type="text"/>
G19	How are you paid for your labour services? <i>1=cash 2=food 3=clothes 4=cash and kind 99=other specify</i>	<input type="text"/>

G20. How often did you receive wage payments during these periods?

2016	2015	2014	2013
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

1=daily 2=weekly 3=monthly 4=bi-monthly 5= quarterly 6= twice per year 7= once per year 99=other specify

G21	How much income did you realize on a monthly basis from casual farm work during the 2015/16 season? USD	<input type="text"/>
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G22 . Did you encounter any problems in getting your payments during these periods? *1=yes 2=no*

	Year	Encountered problem? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	Major Problem encountered? ¹
1	2016	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
2	2015	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
3	2014	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

1= not paid on time 2= not paid fully at once 3= irregular payments 4=not paid at all 99=other specify

No.	Question	Response
G23	Are you currently owed any unpaid farm wages by your employers from the 2015/16 season? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="text"/>
G24	If yes how much are you owed by your employers? US\$	<input type="text"/>
G25	What have you done to claim your unpaid wages? <i>1=sought union assistance 2=confiscated employer's asset 3=physical confrontation with employer 4= did not do anything 5= opted to be paid in kind 99=other specify</i>	<input type="text"/>

No.	Question	Response
G26	Do most of the farmers you work for provide meals at work during working hours? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="text"/>
G27	If yes, what meals do they mostly provide per day? <i>1= breakfast only 2= lunch only 3= supper only 4= breakfast & lunch 5= breakfast & supper 6= lunch & supper 7= breakfast, lunch and supper</i>	<input type="text"/>
G28	Where do you eat during breaks at work? <i>1=at the workplace 2=my home 99=other specify</i>	<input type="text"/>
G29	Who cooks the food you eat during the breaks at work? <i>1=employer 2=employees 3=wife 4=husband 5=son 6=daughter 7= self 99 =other specify</i>	<input type="text"/>

No.	Question	Response
G30	Are you involved in any group that provides labour to farmers as a group? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="text"/>

G31	If yes, what main service does your group provide to new land beneficiaries? 1=tobacco curing 2=tobacco grading 3=weeding 4=building/construction 5=harvesting maize 6=tractor repairs 7= tobacco planting 8= tobacco reaping 9=irrigation operations 99=other specify	____
G32	How does your team mainly source for jobs? 1=approach farmers 2=approached by farmers 3=advertise for services 99=other specify	____
G33	How are you paid for your group labour services? 1=cash 2=food rations 3= cash and kind 99=other specify	____

G34 Have you been a victim of any sort of harassment at the workplace from your farm employers?

	Nature of abuse	1=yes 2=no	What year did this occur
1	Verbal	____	____
2	Sexual	____	____
3	Physical	____	____
4	Humiliation	____	____

H. FARM LABOUR ORGANISATION

No.	Question	Response
H1	Are you aware of any agricultural labour union operating in this area? 1=yes 2=no [IF NO MOVE TO H9]	____
H2	If yes what is the name of the union? 1=GAPWUZ 2=Horticulture GAPWUZ 3=Zimbabwe Agricultural Workers Union 99=other specify	____
H3	If yes, what major activity is the agricultural union involved in? 1=resolution of labour disputes 2=wage negotiation 3=worker education 4=assisting farm workers evicted from compounds 5= unfair dismissal 99=other specify	____
H4	Are there any disputes that the union has assisted workers resolving in this area during the 2013/14 season? 1=yes 2=no	____
H5	If yes, what were the disputes about? 1=unpaid wages 2=eviction from compound 3=long working hours 4=provision of protective clothing 5= unfair dismissal 99=other specify	____
H6	How did the union assist the workers in resolving the dispute? 1=organized strike 2=negotiated with employer 3=provided legal assistance 4= Union forced employer to comply 99=other specify	____
H7	Are you a member of any agricultural workers union? 1=yes 2=no	____
H8	If yes, which agricultural workers union are you a member of? 1=GAPWUZ 2=Horticulture GAPWUZ 3=Zimbabwe Agricultural Workers Union 99=other specify	____

No.	Question	Response
H9	Do you have a workers committee at your workplace? 1=yes 2=no	____
H10	If yes, what is the main role of the workers committee? 1=wage negotiations 2=resolve work disputes between workers 3=resolve labour disputes between employer and employee 99=other specify	____

H11 Are any of these social groups existent amongst farm workers on the farm you live?

	Group	Is it found? 1=yes 2=no	If found, are land beneficiaries also participating in this group 1=yes 2=no
1	Nyau dance group	____	____
2	Football team	____	____
3	Burial society	____	____
4	Savings club	____	____
5	Churches	____	____
6	Maricho labour groups	____	____
7	Workers committee	____	____
8	Political party structures	____	____
9	School development committees	____	____
10	Other specify	____	____

H12	Are there any NGOs operating in this area assisting farm workers? 1=yes 2=no	____
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H13. If yes, what is the name of the NGO, year they started operating here and the activities they are involved in?

	Name of NGO	Year started operations	Main Activities/Issue of concern
1		_____	_____
2		_____	_____
3		_____	_____
4		_____	_____

1=food aid 2=health services 3=water and sanitation 4=human rights 5= Labour issues 99=other specify

I. RESIDENCY AND TENURE SECURITY OF AGRARIAN LABOUR HOUSEHOLD

No.	Question	Response
I1	Where are you currently staying? 1=old farm compound on A1 self-contained 2=old farm compound on A1 villagized 3=old farm compound on A2 subdivided 4=old farm compound on A2 wholesome 5=LSCF compound 6=new compound on A2 subdivided 7=new compound on A2 wholesome 8=homestead of A1 land beneficiary 9=homestead of A2 beneficiary 10=own A1 plot 11=own Communal Area home 12= urban area 13=new A1 compound 14=live in the same house with employer 99=other specify	_____
I2	What year did you occupy your current residency? (YYYY)	_____
I3	Is your residency tied to providing labour services on this farm where you stay? 1= yes 2=no	_____
I4	Do you work for other employers outside this farm where you are staying? 1=yes 2=no	_____
I5	What kind of housing facilities do you have? 1=brick and asbestos 2=pole and dagga 3=compound dormitory 4=brick/thatch 5=brick/zinc 6= wooden/cabin 7= metal/cabin 99=other specify	_____
I6	Who is the owner of the housing facilities you are currently using? 1=self 2=employer 3=state 4= relative 99=other specify	_____
I7	Have you been threatened with eviction from your residency since the beginning of the FTLRP? 1=yes 2=no	_____
I8	If yes, by whom? 1= government 2=A1 farmers 3=A2 farmers 4=white LSCF 5= war veterans 99=other specify	_____
I9	Which year were you last threatened with eviction from your residency? (YYYY)	_____
I10	What was the reason for the eviction threats? 1=refusal to work for new farmers 2=growing crops not allowed in the compound 3=wage disputes 4=accessing beneficiaries' land 5=firewood cutting 6=grass cutting 7=brick making 8= dismissed from employment 9= not employed on the farm 10=land owners wanted the place for themselves 99=other specify	_____
I11	How were the eviction threats resolved? 1=took employment 2=stopped growing forbidden crops 3=stopped accessing land belonging to beneficiaries 4= stopped accessing natural resources 6=reported matter to police 7=got peace order from court 8=local authority intervened 9= Ministry of lands intervened 10= land owners back-tracked 99=other specify	_____
I12	Have you been actually evicted from your residency since the beginning of the FTLRP? 1=yes 2=no	_____
I13	If yes, what year were you evicted from your residency? (YYYY)	_____
I14	If yes, did you manage to get back to your residency? 1=yes 2=no	_____
I15	If yes, what year did you manage to get back to your residency? (YYYY)	_____
I16	If yes, how did you manage to get back to your residency? 1=court order 2=police order 3=government order 4=returned by force 5= local authority order 99=other specify	_____
I17	Has there been any violent confrontation between former farm workers and new farmers on this farm? 1=yes 2=no	_____
I18	If yes, what was the source of the violent confrontation? 1=farm compound residency 2=access to land 3=refusal by former farm workers to work for new farmers 4=stock theft 5=tree cutting 6=non-payment of farm wages 7= new farmer not willing to employ former farm workers 99=other specify	_____
I19	What year did this violent confrontation take place? (YYYY)	_____

I20. Do you access these natural resources on the farm where you live and what do you use them for?

	Natural resource	Do you access this natural resource <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	If yes, what do you use natural resource for? <i>1=own consumption 2=sale</i>	If you do not access, were you denied permission to harvest resource? <i>1=yes 2=no 3=resource not available on farm</i>	Who denied you the permission to access these natural resources? ¹
1	Thatching grass	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Fish	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Firewood	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Alluvial gold	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Medicines (herbs e.t.c)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Other specify	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

¹Who denied 1=land owners 2=Environmental Management Agency (EMA) 3=traditional authority 4=lands officer 5=committee of seven 99=other specify

No.	Question	Response
I21	Do farm workers hold traditional ceremonies/rituals in the farm compound? <i>1=yes 2=no [IF NO MOVE TO I30]</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I22	If yes when was the last traditional ceremony held in the compound? (MM/YY)	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
I23	What was the purpose of the traditional ceremony? <i>1=memorial service 2=appeasing dead spirit (kurova guva) 3=cleansing ceremony 4=nyau dances 5= rain making ceremony 99=other specify</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I24	Do you first seek permission to hold traditional ceremonies? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I25	If yes, from whom is permission sought? <i>1=village head 2=land owners 3=police 4=district administrator 99=other specify</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I26	Has permission ever been denied to hold a traditional ceremony? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I27	If yes, did farm workers proceed in holding traditional ceremony without the permission? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I28	If proceeded, what year did this happen? (YYYY)	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
I29	How did land owners react to farm workers proceeding with traditional ceremony without permission? <i>1=threatened to evict farm workers from compound 2=evicted some workers from the compound 3=nothing happened 4=destroyed homes of some workers 99=other specify</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I30	Are you allowed to bury your deceased relatives on the farm? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I31	If not allowed, where do people living the farm compound bury their deceased relatives? <i>1=own Communal Area 2=public cemetery shared with land beneficiaries 99=other specify</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I32	If allowed, do farm workers first seek permission to bury their deceased relatives? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I33	From whom is permission sought by farm workers to bury their deceased relatives? <i>1=village head 2=leader of the compound 3=district administrator 4=chief 5=Committee of Seven 6=land owner 99=other specify</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>

I34. Do you pay any charges for your residency and other services to land beneficiaries?

	Charges	Do they pay it? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	If yes what is the frequency of payment? ¹	How much is paid? US\$
1	Rental for accommodation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Water usage	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Electricity	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Other specify	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

1=monthly 2=weekly 3=after every three months 4=half yearly 99=other specify

J. HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY

J1. Please indicate whether your household faced food shortages, and the number of meals taken per day in the following years.

	Year	2016	2015	2014	2013
1	Faced food shortages? <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	No. of meals per day	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

J1 . If you faced any food shortage in the past 12 months, what coping strategies did you use?

	Coping mechanism	Did it happen <i>1=Yes 2=No</i>	If you used strategy, how many times per year did you use strategy? ¹
1	Borrowed money to buy food or got food on credit	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Reduced the number of meals	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Mother ate less	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Father ate less	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Children ate less	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Substituted commonly bought foods with cheaper kind	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Modified cooking method	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	Mortgaged/sold assets	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	Borrowed from neighbours	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	Went for food for work programs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	Government /NGO programs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	Begging	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

¹**How often:** Number of times per year

J2 . Indicate your sources of food and then rank the three major ones in the past year (2016).

1=major source

	Food source	Is source? <i>1= Yes 2=No</i>	Rank (First 3)
1	Own food production	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Purchases	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Food aid (free food handouts)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Food for work	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Food rations from employer	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Grain loan schemes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Other (specify)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

J3 . Did you receive food aid during the last three years?

	Year	Received <i>1=yes 2=no</i>	Frequency (times per year)	From whom ¹
1	2013	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	2012	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	2011	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

¹1=government 2=NGO 3=church 4=donors 5=community 6=relatives and friends 7=from employer 99=other specify

J4 What kinds of foods did your household consume over the last 7 days and have there been changes since 2009?

Food Category		Item	How has your consumption of food item changed since 2009?	Consumption and expenditure in previous month		
			<i>1=increase 2=decrease 0=no change</i>	How many days did you consume this food item in the last 7 days?	Source of food ¹	How much did you spend on this food item? (US\$) <i>(Sum of last 30 days)</i>
Cereals (1)	1	Maize meal	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	2	Sorghum meal	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	3	Bread	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	4	Flour	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	5	Rice	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Tubers(2)	6	Sweet potatoes	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	7	Irish potatoes	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	8	Cassava	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Pulses (3)	9	Beans	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	10	G.nuts	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	11	Peas	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	12	Round nuts (nyimo)	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Veggies(4)	13	Leafy vegetables	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Fruits(5)	14	Fruits	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Protein (6)	15	Fish	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	16	Eggs	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	17	Pork	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	18	Beef	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	20	Poultry	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	21	Goats	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Milk(7)	22	Milk	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Sugar(8)	23	Sugar	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Oils(9)	24	Cooking oil	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Condiments(10)	25	Salt	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

¹Source of food 1=own production 2=purchase from local retail shop (specify area) 3=purchase from urban areas (specify area) 4=local agro-processor 5=gift/handout 6= bought from other farmers 99=other (specify)

No.	Question	Response
J5	How much money did you spend on food purchases last month? US\$	<input type="text"/>

J6 . Did you afford to send all your children to school during these periods? 1=yes 2=no

2016	2015	2014
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

J7 . If no how many were supposed to be in school and how many did you send during these periods?

	2016	2015	2014
No. supposed to be in school	_____	_____	_____
No. who went to school	_____	_____	_____

No.	Question	Response
J8	How did they spend most of their time when they were not in school? 1= <i>paid farm labour</i> 2= <i>stay at home</i> 3= <i>assisting on own plot</i> 99= <i>other specify</i>	_____

J9 . Did you afford to send all your family members to clinics when they fell sick during these periods? 1=*yes* 2=*no*

2016	2015	2014
_____	_____	_____

K. NON FARM RURAL LABOUR/ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES

No.	Question	Response
K1	Are you involved in non-farm paid labour activities? 1= <i>yes</i> 2= <i>no</i>	_____

K2 . If yes, what non-farm paid labour activities are you involved in?

	Type of activity	Are you involved 1= <i>yes</i> 2= <i>no</i>	Reason for undertaking activity? ¹	Is activity carried all year round 1= <i>yes</i> 2= <i>no</i>	Total time spent per year on these activities (months)	Who in the household is involved? ²	No. household members involved
1	Gold panning	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	Firewood selling	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	Collecting river/pit sand	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	Wildlife harvesting	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	Wood carving	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
6	Stone carving	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
7	Tailoring	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
8	Basketry	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
9	Bricklaying	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
10	Pottery	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
11	Beer brewing	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
12	Carpentry	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
13	Repair work	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
14	Thatching grass	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
15	Others specify	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

¹1=*supplement farm wages* 2=*farm work opportunities limited* 3=*natural resource now more accessible* 99=*other specify*

²1=*male adult* 2=*female adult* 3=*male child* 4=*female child* 5=*male & female adult* 6= *male adults & children* 7= *female adults and children* 8= *males adults, females adults & children*

L. INCOME

No.	Question	Response
L1	What is your major source of income for your household? 1= <i>farm wages</i> 2= <i>non-farm activities</i> 3= <i>remittances from friends and relatives</i> 99= <i>other specify</i>	_____

L2 . What are your other sources income for the household besides farm wages?

	Income source	2016	2015	2014	2013
		1=yes 2=no	1=yes 2=no	1=yes 2=no	1=yes 2=no
1	Remittances from Diaspora	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Local remittances	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Pension	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Formal employment in town	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Sale of forest products	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Gold panning	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Petty trading	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	Commercial loans	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	NGO grants	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	Other 1 (specify)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	Other 2 (specify)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

L3 .How much income did you receive during the last three years?

	Income	2016 (USD)	2015 (USD)	2014 (USD)
1	Total income from own farming	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Farm wages	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Non-farm activities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Other income	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

M. CHALLENGES FACING FARM WORKER HOUSEHOLDS

M1 . What challenges have you faced as a farm worker household since 2000 and please rank the top three challenges you faced in the last three years

1=most severe 3=least severe

	Challenge	Did you face it since 2000? 1=yes 2=no	2016	2015	2014
1	Poor wages	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Poor working conditions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	HIV/AIDS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Insecurity of residential tenure	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Landlessness	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	In access to farm natural resources	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Land conflicts	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	Poor social relations with new farmers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	Food insecurity	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	Schools fees shortages	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	Input shortages	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	High input costs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13	Other specify	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

M2	What are your aspirations for the future? 1=get own piece of land 2=change profession 3=better paying farm job 4=buy cattle 5=start a business 99=other specify	<input type="checkbox"/>
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ANNEX 3.4: INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Study Topic: Changing agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe in the context of the “fast” track land reform

Purpose of the study: You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of this study is to examine the qualitative changes to the agrarian labour relations in the context of FTRLRP that increased the number of smaller-scale agricultural employers who compete for access to agrarian labour in the new diversified farming sector that is characterised by differential production capacities. This research is being done by myself, Walter Chambati as part of my doctoral studies at the Department of Public Administration, University of South Africa (UNISA).

Procedures: If you agree to participate, you will be asked to respond to my questionnaire survey that aims to elicit information on the transformations on agrarian labour relations brought about the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. The questionnaire survey interview will take approximately one and a half hours.

Discomforts and risks: It is possible that some of the questions may make you feel uncomfortable or cause you to think about things that are upsetting. You do not have to answer any question that makes you uncomfortable. You can choose to stop responding to a given question or end to be part of the research at any time without any consequences on your part.

Compensation and benefits: You will not be paid or compensated for participating in the focus group discussion. However, you may enjoy the experience of reflecting on how the land reform has transformed the utilisation of agrarian labour in your area.

Confidentiality: If you decide to participate, the interviewer will write down and record your answers in the initial interview. Records will have your name on it. This record will be kept in a locked place, accessible only to the researcher. No one else will be given your name or told that you participated in the study. Views of research participants may appear in a report on this research but will not be linked to individuals. During the analysis of the questionnaire surveys, the responses of all the participants will be aggregated to deduce the trends and patterns.

If you have a question or problem with the research, you can stop and ask your question to the researcher.

Right to withdraw: It is your decision whether or not to participate in this study. You may refuse to participate and can end the interview at any time if you wish. You will not be penalized in any way for this decision.

Informed consent: I have been read or read to myself this entire form in my own language or language I understand. All of my questions have been answered. I agree to participate in the study.

Concerns or Feedback

Should you have any concern about this study or wish to provide a feedback, please feel free to contact my mentors/co-investigators or me:

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Pretoria, South Africa.
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Professor S. Kahn
Department of Public Administration
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Pretoria, South Africa
Tel: +27124293913
Email: kahnsb@unisa.ac.za

HHID: _____

Signature of interviewee: _____ Age: _____

Date: _____

Signature of witness: _____

Date: _____

Signature of researcher: _____

Date: _____

ANNEX 6.1: MARGISTRATE COURT JUDGEMENT

IN THE MAGISTRATES COURT FOR THE PROVINCE OF MASHONALAND EAST HELD AT GOROMONZI	CASE NO. B36/05	
In the matter between:		
FERNANDO ALBINO AND 14 OTHERS (See Annexure "A")	APPLICANTS	
and		
ITAI NYARUNGU	1st RESPONDENT	
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR (GOROMONZI)	2ND RESPONDENT	
OFFICER IN CHARGE JURU POLICE STATION	3RD RESPONDENT	
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE	4TH RESPONDENT	

FINAL ORDER

At Goromonzi this 26th day of May 2005.


Before Her Worship Mrs Kudumba

Mr. Rangu Nyamurundira for Applicants
Mrs. Mwatse for Respondents

WHEREUPON after reading documents filed of record and hearing counsel:

IT IS ORDERED, BY CONSENT, THAT:

- (a) Respondents and all those acting through or under them, or any other person whom so ever, are barred and shall desist from evicting or threatening to evict the Applicants and all those claiming occupation through them from their homes at Chabwino Farm in Goromonzi, without due process of the law.
- (b) No order as to costs.


.....
By Magistrate

Annexure "A"

Fernando Albino

Itai Chapfika

Semeon Willard Aridi

Dick Lingson

Charles Giji

Obert Mapuranga

Edward Bakili

Elizabeth Tomboriya

Eunice Chipare

Annah Munhuvaani

Winneet Ajiji

Mercey Bere

Lawrence Chimasha

Lucia Abdulla

Norah Chirume



IN THE MAGISTRATES COURT
FOR THE PROVINCE OF MASHONALAND EAST
HELD AT GOROMONZI

CASE NO. 634/05

In the matter between:

FERNANDO ALBINO
AND 14 OTHERS (See Annexure "A")

APPLICANTS

and

ITAI NYARUNGU

1st RESPONDENT

DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR (GOROMONZI)

2nd RESPONDENT

OFFICER IN CHARGE JURU POLICE STATION

3rd RESPONDENT

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

4th RESPONDENT

DRAFT ORDER

AT Goromonzi this 5th day of May 2005.

Before the His/Her Worship.....

WHEREUPON after reading documents filed of record and hearing counsel:

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. A *rule nisi do* issue returnable to this Honourable Court on the 11th day of May 2005 calling upon the Respondents to show cause why:
 - (a) Respondents and all those acting through or under them should be ordered to desist from illegally evicting applicants and all those claiming occupation through them from their homes at Chabwinó Farm in Goromonzi.

(b) A final Order restraining and interdicting Respondents and all those acting through or under them from evicting applicants and those claiming occupation through them without a lawful order of eviction.

(c) Respondents should pay the costs of this Application.

2. Pending confirmation of the *rule nisi*, this shall serve as a Provisional Order to the following effect:

(i) Respondents and all those acting through them are hereby restrained and interdicted from evicting Applicants and all those claiming occupation through them from their homes at Chabwino Farm in Goromonzi.

(ii) That any duly attested member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police be and is hereby authorized to serve this order upon the First Respondent.

(iii) That the Messenger of Court and or Applicants' Legal Practitioner be and are hereby authorized to serve this order upon the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents.

.....
Date

.....
By the Magistrate

.....
Clerk of Court