

FEAR OF BURGLARY

IN THE HONEYDEW POLICE DISTRICT

by

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
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Dedicated to :

- * My father, the late J.D. Kotze.
- * My husband, Peter Watt.

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This research project embodies the philosophy it is "Better to attempt to light one small candle than to curse the darkness" (Confucius).

ABSTRACT

The research project investigated whether victims of housebreaking experienced motivational, cognitive and emotional deficits central to the Learned Helplessness phenomenon. In keeping with the Reformulated Learned Helplessness theory the attributional style of victims, were also assessed. The State-Trait Inventory developed by Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg and Jacobs was administered to measure the anxiety levels of victims. Sub-goals served as illustration for the learned helplessness phenomenon.

Three- hundred victims, using probability sampling techniques, were interviewed by means of an interview schedule.

Support was found for cognitive and some motivational deficits and a common range of emotions experienced by victims. The majority of victims exhibited a global attributional style. Burglary victims did not show appreciably higher trait and state scores means, except for females in the 19-39 age group, when compared to a psychological norm. Environmental factors did play a role in rendering homes vulnerable.

Recommendations addressing the fear of housebreaking were made at a therapeutic and practical level.

Key Terms

Burglary; victims; learned helplessness; attributions; motivational deficits; cognitive deficits; response-outcome noncontingency; emotions; state anxiety; trait anxiety; environmental factors.

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CHAPTER 1

GENERAL ORIENTATION

1.1. INTRODUCTION

According to the Human Sciences Research Council's Report (Die Beeld, October 25, 1996) fear of crime could be a greater enemy to the public than crime itself. In a national survey the Human Sciences Research Council found only ten per cent of 2 241 respondents had been victims of crime. High levels of fear resulted in a chain reaction. Citizens withdrew themselves from any societal activities and lost faith in official structures that had the role to protect them. This report also pointed out that according to official figures of reported crime there had been an unprecedented increase in crime from 1990 to 1995 (Die Beeld, October 25, 1996).

One in ten people living within the Gauteng area had been the victim of a break-in during 1994 (The Sunday Times Metro, January 8, 1995). Households in South African society had been not only the target of a single burglary but often a series of burglaries. According to South African law, the crime of housebreaking (burglary) consists of unlawfully and intentionally breaking into any premises which can be used for human habitation or storing goods with the intention of committing some crime in it, for example theft, rape, malicious damage to property or even an offence unknown to the prosecutor (Forsyth & Kahn, 1982:118). As Walsh (1980:43) pointed out the burglar-householder game had been played throughout recorded history and the householder always lost because it was a simple game for the burglar to win.

The assumptions and expectations victims of housebreaking held about their own safety, security and invulnerability were shattered by the incident. They were no longer safe in a benign environment. Their private territory had been deliberately and maliciously violated as well as invaded by another human being. The victim and his/her family tried to make sense why they had been singled out leading to the "Why me" syndrome. Apart from the common emotional reactions victims experienced, of more detriment was the fact that they often regarded themselves as powerless and helpless in the face of forces beyond their control.

According to Morgan (1990:21) suburban homes became fortresses because burglar alarms, high walls, burglar bars and dogs were a reality of life. Yet Morgan (1990:21) stated that few residents had been able to escape the bitter first-hand experience of a burglary. These victims were also on the brink of taking the law into their own hands or were willing to sell up to move to another country.

At best, security measures did not make people less fearful but served as a constant reminder that danger lurked outside. Living in a jail would not keep the offender out. Respondent 99 remarked: "If he wants to get in, he will find a way to get in". Victims came to accept that they could not control the situation and learnt that outcomes were independent of their responses to ensure their security and safety. Victims experienced feelings of helplessness and confusion that might be paralysing tantamount to feelings of learned helplessness demonstrated by animals in laboratory studies undertaken by Overmeier and Seligman during 1967 (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978:49).

The theory of Learned Helplessness rested on the cornerstone that organisms exposed to outcomes that were independent of all their responses learnt that these outcomes were, in fact, uncontrollable (response-outcome independence) (Alloy, 1982:445). This learning led to the expectation that outcomes would continue to be noncontingently

related to actions in the future and resulted in motivational, cognitive and emotional deficits.

1.2. RATIONALE FOR CHOICE OF THE SUBJECT

The motivation for the choice of the subject lay in the fact that burglary seemed to be synonymous with the concept of crime in today's society. According to the Star (September 29, 1994) burglary was the most common of crimes. Compared to other forms of victimisation, household burglary has been less researched. This could be due to the fact that burglary was considered to be non-violent and of the milder of the serious crimes. Yet an article in The Star (September 29, 1994) reported, "There is no place like home - that is to be attacked".

The concept of the helpless or vulnerable victim has in the past been stereotypically associated with vulnerable groups and those who were physically weak (aged and children) or were socially, economically, or politically disadvantaged (Karmen, 1984:238). Although victims of burglary who lived in the Honeydew Police District were not politically, economically or socially disadvantaged they were nevertheless vulnerable since they suffered physical harm and economic loss as well as psychological harm at the hands of the burglar. Even though victims protected their property their homes were never "thief-proof". Victims of housebreaking learned that they could not avoid having their homes burglarised which made them anxious and fearful. The assumption that victims of burglary could experience the same feelings of powerlessness and helplessness synonymous to the abused spouse, molested or battered child, or rape victim was tested during this study. The Honeydew Police District did include one disadvantaged area, the Zandspruit transit camp in Sonnedal. The researcher was advised not to include this camp in the research project since it was deemed to be unsafe.

Fear of burglary had very many negative aspects which needed attention. Victims of burglaries spent thousands of rands on securing their homes, replacing stolen goods only to have them stolen again. Because of high burglary rates, insurance premiums skyrocketed, whilst property prices in some areas slumped. In support of this statement, a neighbour of respondent 223 commented:

"This week the curtains were drawn and the furnished home stood barred and lifeless - another casualty of the growing crime wave that has been plaguing the suburb. It's just not safe anymore. We are bitter about having to leave our homes. Not a single property has been sold in the area in the past year".

Traditionally burglary has been regarded as a passive crime with the offender, at all costs, trying to avoid his victim. As cited in the Sunday Times Metro (January 8, 1995):

"As the young woman lay bleeding on her bed, prepared for the ultimate violation, she thought she would be killed for R10 - all the money she had in the house". She said "I doze off and I feel his hands round my neck again. The slightest noise wakes me".

She is one of the lucky ones to have survived assault in her own home after what experts called a disturbing trend towards malicious violence by housebreakers. Burglars were armed, extremely nervous and would easily injure or kill their victim, who were just as nervous and traumatised (The Star, September 29, 1994). People used to feel safe on their own properties, now the safe space has shrunk to the house leaving people fortifying their own bedrooms. Generally there was an increased possession of firearms by civilians (The Sunday Times Metro, January 8, 1995). This pointed to the fact that physical harm and trauma often followed the victimising event.

Mr. Klein of First Bowring (1996) reported that burglary had high reporting rates, primarily due to the fact that a case number was necessary in order to collect insurance reimbursement. The victim also entertained the vague hope that stolen goods might be recovered and the offender would be caught. Victims of burglary were, in most cases, willing to talk about the event unless they had been severely traumatised.

According to Police Officer Grobbelaar (1996) the burglary rate varied between 120 to 200 cases per month and Honeydew had one of the highest recorded housebreaking rates in Western Gauteng.

1.3 AIMS OF THE STUDY

Problem areas were identified in the research topic which narrowed it to a manageable study. These problem areas were stated in clearly defined central theoretical propositions which guided the nature of the study, sample observed and interpretation of the data.

The study firstly, aimed to identify if the learned helplessness phenomenon was active in the lives of victims of housebreaking in respect of cognitive, motivational and emotional deficits, as demonstrated in laboratory situations with dogs, and experiments examining learned helplessness in humans. This was done by means of a comparison of data in respect of certain behaviours prior to and after a burglary. The statistical dependence between questions was then calculated.

Secondly, whether victims exhibited a global, pessimistic and despondent attributional style characteristic of the learned helplessness phenomenon, as well as the general attributions victims made as to the cause of the burglary.

To measure the intensity of fear to be found among victims and adding validity to the study, anxiety levels of a sample of 100 victims of housebreaking were assessed by means of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory developed by Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg and Jacobs (1983:STAI-AD Manual 7). The differential impact in respect of age and gender of the victim were taken into consideration and compared to a psychological norm. The rationale for the choice of 100 victims to be

assessed by means of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory has been discussed under headings 1.5.6.1. and 1.5.6.2.

Additional sub-goals were:

- (i) Which type of dwelling was most vulnerable;
- (ii) Which environmental factors were instrumental in a dwelling's vulnerability;
- (iii) Why victims thought their houses were burglarised;
- (iv) How the burglary was discovered;
- (v) Whether burglars showed preference for entering unoccupied homes;
- (vi) If fear of confrontation had a basis in reality;
- (vii) If burglary was a passive crime;
- (viii) A description of the nature of the goods taken;
- (ix) The financial loss suffered by the victim;
- (x) The expectations of being a victim of another burglary;
- (xi) The mode of access of the burglar;
- (xii) Reasons why the burglary was reported to the police;
- (xiii) Whether further precautions were taken as a result of the burglary;
- (xiv) The victim's perception of the burglar as a person.

Items (i) and (ii) helped to identify the type of home most vulnerable and the environmental factors that were instrumental in a dwelling's vulnerability. Items (iv) and (v) to (ix) served as indicators of past victimisation experience to test hypothesis 1 "Fear of having one's home burglarised is related to past victimising experiences". Sub-goals (x) and (xiii) were used to test hypothesis 4 "The victim of burglary has difficulty in learning that outcomes are dependent upon responses". Items (iii), (xii) (xiv) served as indicators for the attributional style of victims of burglary when hypothesis 6 "Victims of burglary show helplessness by means of their attributional style" was tested.

1.4. CENTRAL THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS

Wimmer and Dominick (1987:248) summarised the benefits of the central theoretical proposition as providing direction for the study, eliminating trial-and-error research, ruling out intervening and confounding variables and allowing for quantification of variables.

To achieve the aims of the research project it was necessary to test the following central theoretical propositions based on the Learned Helplessness Theory:

Central Theoretical Proposition 1

Fear of having one's home burglarised is related to past victimising experiences.

Central Theoretical Proposition 2

Victims of burglary have reduced incentives for initiating voluntary responses to control outcomes.

Central Theoretical Proposition 3

Victims of burglary have the expectation that active instrumental responses will not affect outcomes.

Central Theoretical Proposition 4

The victim of burglary has difficulty in learning that outcomes are dependent upon responses.

Central Theoretical Proposition 5

Victims of burglary who have expectations of uncontrollability suffer from anxiety.

Central Theoretical Proposition 6

Victims of burglary show general helplessness by means of their attributional styles.

1.5. SCIENTIFIC PROCEDURE

In an effort to understand any phenomenon, researchers could follow several methods of inquiry. Kerlinger (1973:11) defined scientific research as a systematic, controlled, empirical, and critical investigation of hypothetical propositions about the presumed relations among natural phenomena. This presumed that the researcher worked from a specific scientific approach and made use of given scientific methods and techniques to direct the investigation.

A set of serial steps were used, which might be summarised as follows:-

- (a) theory construction;
- (b) derivation of theoretical hypotheses;
- (c) operationalization of concepts;
- (d) collection of empirical data;
- (d) empirical testing of hypotheses (Babbie, 1995:75).

1.5.1. Scientific approach used in the research project

The Positivist Approach derived from the natural sciences was utilised in this research project.

The approach rested on certain postulates. Postulates are those principles, points of departure and assumptions "... that are stated without sufficient grounds, though they are necessary for the further investigation and expansion of a given science" (Stoker in Van der Westhuizen, 1982:28).

The first postulate of the positivist approach is that a world exists in which phenomena are encountered and that the researcher can observe and come to know these phenomena. The second postulate is that various phenomena can be causatively related and can be expressed as mathematical formulae. Thirdly, researchers make use of the postulate that human behaviour is not entirely unique, but that generalisations and predictions can be made about it. The fourth postulate is that the human will is not completely free nor completely bound, because factors merely limit man. The final postulate is that people's qualities and characteristics can be quantified, that is the similarities and differences in people can be determined numerically (Van der Westhuizen, 1982:28).

The approach then determined the strategic decisions needed, as well as methods and techniques used to explain the phenomenon "Fear of Housebreaking in the Honeydew Police District".

1.5.2 The research strategy

For this research project the nomothetic research strategy was selected.

"The nomothetic model which is quantitative by nature comprises the study of a multitude of cases, events or phenomena in terms of factors or variables which possibly occur in a causal relationship to each other. Its aim is typically an attempt to determine the statistical probabilities of relationships between causes and effects" (Groenewald, 1986:9). Quantitative measuring allows for greater precision in reporting results and mathematical analysis (Wimmer & Dominick, 1987:50)

A sample of 300 victims of housebreaking was studied (refer to 1.5.6.2.) and statistical relationships between data were performed, which made this type of strategy the preferred method.

1.5.3. Validity

Hagan (1997:69) defined validity as accuracy or correctness in research. The pilot study or preliminary study was conducted with 20 subjects. Ten subjects, friends of the researcher who had been victims of burglary, and ten staff members at the University of South Africa, were asked to complete the questionnaire to determine whether the research design and methodology were relevant and effective.

1.5.4. Reliability

"A measure is reliable if it consistently gives the same answer at different points in time" (Wimmer & Dominick, 1987:59). Reliability in measurement was dependable, stable, predictable and consistent. The interview schedule allowed for a high response rate, control over the environment, control over question order and that all questions were answered (Bailey, 1982:183). As mentioned in 1.5.3, the interview schedule was tested in a pilot study for ambiguous questions.

1.5.5. Method

According to Babbie (1995:4) the deductive method began with general principles (with theory) and then turned to observation as a way of testing the validity of what was expected theoretically.

The Analytical Survey Method (as a means of observation) which statistically analysed quantitative data so that meanings might be inferred from data gathered and was

concerned primarily with problems of estimation and with testing statistically based data, was the preferred method (Leedy, 1989:174).

Babbie (1995:257) maintained that surveys might be used for descriptive, explanatory and exploratory purposes and were chiefly used in studies that had individual people as the units of analysis. It was the best method for collecting original data for describing a population too large to observe directly. The survey method collected standardised information from a sample selected as being representative of a particular group or population and generalised to the population (Haralambos, 1980:515).

1.5.6. Techniques used

Research techniques for sampling, collecting data and analysis of data were chosen and designed according to their ability to generate the desired knowledge.

1.5.6.1. Data gathering

The **Interview Schedule** taking the whole research process into account was constructed to facilitate goal attainment during research. (See Appendix A).

The interview schedule was structured and comprised ninety-two closed-ended and six open-ended questions. The advantages of a fixed set of closed-ended questions were clear categories, so that responses could be classified systematically, and quantitatively compared in order to be statistically analysed. Bailey (1982:126) pointed out that the advantage of open-ended questions were that "They allowed for more creativity or self-expression by the respondent. Respondents felt that the answers were uniquely their own instead of being forced upon them by the researcher." These questions added a richness to the data and did not impose an artificial structure on the data.

The first six questions were linked to biographic particulars, such as gender, age, vocation, income levels, type of dwelling and number of persons living in the dwelling. Race was not considered an issue since only 3,5 per cent of the total of 1 198 respondents were of other races. It was beyond the scope of this study to focus on the race of the perpetrator.

The rest of the questions dealt with the crime prevention measures taken before burglary, details regarding victimisation, crime prevention measures taken after the burglary, emotions experienced after the burglary and general attitudes of the victim after the event. Once the interview schedule was developed, a pilot survey was conducted to test it. This was then scrutinised, finalised and applied.

A sample of 300 victims of housebreaking in the Honeydew Police District was telephonically contacted to establish their willingness to cooperate in the research project. Thereafter the interviewer visited the victim at the victim's home and filled in the schedule personally.

The **State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI)** comprising separate self-report scales for measuring state and trait anxiety was administered to a sample of 100 victims of housebreaking drawn from the first sample of 300 (refer to 1.5.6.2).

According to Spielberger et al. (STAI-AD Manual 37- 8) the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) correlated relatively highly with the IPAT and was comparable to the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Correlations with the IPAT ranged between .85 to .73 (STAI-AD Manual 37). Both the IPAT and MMPI have been widely used in South Africa. Since the correlation between the IPAT and Trait- Anxiety scale approached the reliabilities of these scales, the inventories could be considered, essentially as an equivalent measure of trait anxiety. (STAI-AD Manual 37).

According to De Beer (1997) a literature search done by the Human Sciences Research Council has found 13 abstracts explaining the use of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory in South Africa. This study has been of an exploratory nature which justified the use of this test. The advantage of the Trait Inventory was that it contained only 20 items to be completed on the test form compared with the forty-three-item IPAT (STAI-AD Manual 38). Spielberger also pointed out that the IPAT contained certain items which reflected depression or anger more than anxiety, which the Trait Inventory did not.

The State-Trait Inventory has been translated in many languages for example Spanish, Dutch, Italian, and German. The State-Trait Inventory has also been translated into Zulu by the Psychology Department of the University of Natal.

To Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg and Jacobs (1983:STAI-AD Manual 7) anxiety was used to refer to two related, yet different concepts. Empirically anxiety was most often used to describe an unpleasant emotional state or condition. Anxiety was also used to describe relatively stable individual differences in anxiety proneness as a personality trait.

The S-Anxiety scale, state anxiety (STAI Form Y-1) consisted of twenty statements that evaluated how respondents felt "*right now*", at this moment. The T-Anxiety scale, trait anxiety (STAI Form Y-2) consisted of twenty statements that assessed how people "*generally feel*." In addition to assessing how people felt "*right now*", the STAI S-Anxiety scale might be used to evaluate how they had felt at a particular time in the recent past and how they anticipated they would feel either in a specific situation that was likely to be encountered in the future or in a variety of hypothetical situations. Scores on the S-anxiety scale increased in response to physical danger and psychological stress and decreased as a result of relaxation training (Spielberger et al., 1983: STAI-AD Manual 9).

The STAI has been designed to be self-administered in the presence of an examiner. The inventory has no time limits. Complete instructions for the scales have been printed on the test form. The STAI-Y S-Anxiety and T-Anxiety scales have been printed on opposite sides of a single-paper test form. It was necessary for the examiner to stress that instructions were different for the two parts of the inventory and that respondents should read both sets of instructions carefully (Spielberger et al., 1983:STAI-AD Manual 12).

Each STAI item was given a weighted score of one to four. A rating of four indicated the presence of a high level of anxiety for ten S-Anxiety items and eleven T-Anxiety items (for example, "I feel frightened", "I feel upset"). A high rating indicated the absence of anxiety for the remaining ten S-Anxiety items and nine T-anxiety items (for example, "I feel calm", "I feel relaxed"). The scoring weights for the anxiety-present items were the same as the blackened numbers on the test form. The scoring weights for the anxiety-absent items were reversed, for example, responses marked one, two, three or four were scored four, three, two or one, respectively. The anxiety-absent items for which the scoring weights were reversed on the S-Anxiety and T-anxiety scales were:

S-Anxiety: 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19, 20

T-Anxiety 21, 23, 26, 27, 30, 33, 34, 36, 39 (STAI-AD Manual 15).

Scores were obtained for the S-Anxiety and T-Anxiety scales by adding the scores for the twenty items that made up each scale. The scoring key was used for scoring the scales by hand. The score was recorded for each scale in the space that was provided on the test form (STAI-AD-AD Manual 15).

The student was assisted by Dr. Visser, RAU, when she scored the tests. The scoring procedure has been discussed in detail under heading 4.7.5.

The STAI when evaluated was judged to be the most carefully developed instrument, from both a theoretical and methodological standpoint. The test construction procedures were highly sophisticated and rigorous. The STAI has been used extensively in research and clinical practice evaluating the essential qualities of apprehension, tension, nervousness and worry and has been found to be a sensitive indicator of changes in transitory anxiety experienced by clients and patients in counselling, psychotherapy, behaviour-modification programmes and S-anxiety induced by stressful experimental procedures and by unavoidable real-life stressors.

A copy of the STAI is to be found in Appendix B.

1.5.6.2. Population sampling

The Honeydew area was chosen for research since the researcher resided there and the fact that burglary rates were significantly high (Grobbelaar, 1996).

Since it was usually impracticable to administer an interview schedule to all members of the group concerned, a sample was selected to represent the group as a whole (Haralambos, 1980:515). Babbie (1995:226) defined a sample as a special subset of a population observed for purposes of making inferences about the nature of the total population itself. An essential factor of the analytical survey method was choosing the population for study which was bound by research parameters.

After permission was granted by the Commander, Corporate Planning, Head Office of the South African Police, on the 11th April, 1994 (see appendix C) a sampling frame of 1198 victims of housebreaking was drawn up from the case-books of the Honeydew Police District for the period December, 1993 to December, 1994. This frame was assumed to be an accurate portrayal of housebreaking in the Honeydew area because

burglary was a well-reported crime. It has been a stipulation in insurance policies that burglary should be reported to the police (Klein, 1996). The unit of analysis was a household represented by an adult member of either gender, eighteen and over. The victims resorted within a lower class to upper class income bracket. They were from a diversity of professions and living in various types of dwellings for example, smallholdings, cluster homes, single family homes and retirement complexes.

Honeydew has a burglary rate that varies between 120 to 200 cases per month. In the western areas of Gauteng it has the highest rates for burglary (Grobbelaar :1996).

Probability sampling procedures were chosen to select a set of elements from the population in such a way that descriptions of those elements (statistics) accurately portrayed the parameters of the population from which the elements were selected.

Systematic sampling with a random start (a random number was drawn between one and three to determine the first case sampled) was applied to select the 300 victims from a sampling universe of 1198 victims. According to Hagan (1997:139) the size of the sample was statistically determined by the size of the sampling error to be tolerated and the larger the sample size, the smaller the sampling error. For a 95 per cent probability that a sample would have less than plus or minus five per cent error in estimating the population, a population of 500 would require a sample of 217, a population of 1,000 requires a sample of 286 and a population of 10 000 required 370 and a population over 100 000 needed a sample of roughly 400 (Hagan, 1997:139). Respondents were often burglarised more than once resulting in the fact that their names appeared in the case books more than once. When this happened the next name on the sampling frame was chosen.

A second sample, consisting of a third of victims of housebreaking from the original sample of 300 victims, was chosen by means of systematic sampling with a fixed start,

number one. The sampling interval of three allowed for a sample size of 100 victims. This number was considered by Dr. Visser, RAU, to be a representative sample. To have administered the State-Trait Inventory to three-hundred victims was considered too time-consuming and cumbersome. The State and Trait Anxiety Inventory was administered to the 100 victims.

1.5.6.3. Analysis and interpretation of the data.

The descriptive techniques used during the study were verbal-scientific, typological and statistical.

Verbal-scientific description formed the basis of all criminological description. Van der Westhuizen (1982:70) explained verbal-scientific description as a researcher's scientifically accurate and lucid verbal delineation of a phenomenon or problem.

Typological descriptions were used to describe the phenomena "by means of higher-order concepts and conceptual categories". Van der Westhuizen (1982:75) recognised two types of typological descriptions; polar descriptions by means of which ideal or abstract types were formulated, and primal descriptions by means of which classifications/extracted types were designed.

Statistical techniques could be defined as "an expert way of quantifying, processing, summing up and condensing certain qualities and traits of a phenomenon" (Van der Westhuizen, 1982:80). Statistical descriptive techniques were the logical conclusion to verbal-scientific and typological descriptions, especially where central theoretical proposition verification was needed. Statistical operations performed required four levels of measurement; nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio.

Van der Westhuizen (1982:88-109) explained these four levels as follows:

(i) Nominal measurement:

Nominal measurement could be defined as the allocation of numerical values to people, things, cases or concepts in accordance with the rule that each person, thing, et cetera, received precisely the same value rating to indicate his/its presence. Numerals were simply labels that stood for respective categories. Attributes had only the characteristics of mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness.

(ii) Ordinal measures:

By ordinal scaling/measurement we understood the allocation of numerical values to specific traits or characteristics of people, things and phenomenon so that their presence or absence and the intensity of their incidence could be registered hierarchically.

(iii) Interval measures:

Was the allocation of identical numerical values to measurable differences so that the intensity of the incidence of specific characteristics of people, things and phenomena could be described.

(iv) Ratio measures:

Referred to the allocation of numerical values to specific measurable traits of people, things and phenomena in such a way that the relationships between the various gradients were taken into consideration and the scale had a natural zero point.

The abovementioned measurement levels were used to present the data of 300 victims of housebreaking in tabular, graphic or equation form.

(a) Descriptive statistical techniques.

Descriptive statistical techniques were statistical computations describing either the characteristics of a sample or the relationship among variables in a sample. Descriptive statistics merely summarised a set of sample observations (Babbie, 1995:Glossary G3). The following depictions were used.

Tabular depictions - frequency distributions

Graphic depiction - bar graphs and pie charts

Central values - mean

Normal distribution - standard deviation

(b) Inferential statistical techniques

Inferential statistical techniques were the body of statistical computations relevant to making inferences from findings based on sample observations to some larger population (Babbie, 1995: Glossary G4).

Tests

- test of significance for independence Chi square
- analysis of variance F test
- equality of group means t test

In respect of the State-Trait Inventory (STAI) administered to 100 respondents randomly chosen from the sample of 300 victims of housebreaking in the Honeydew Police District, the following statistical operations were performed to analyse and interpret the data:

Measures of central tendency - means

Normal distribution - standard deviation

Tests of variance - F test

The mean and standard deviation in respect of gender and age of 100 victims of housebreaking were calculated. This was compared to a standard, that is normative data of working adults of the Federal Aviation Administration. The rationale for using the abovementioned normative sample was that both victims of housebreaking and working adults were heterogeneous when age and professional levels were taken into account. Both samples were tested in relatively nonstressful, neutral conditions.

Tests were performed to establish whether victims of housebreaking differed in terms of state scores with regard to certain questions posed in the interview schedule.

1.6. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

The majority of victims of housebreaking were very willing to cooperate since they felt that the study was worthwhile and in their interests. Three victims when contacted to arrange interviews, felt that it was a breach of contract on behalf of the Honeydew Police Station to allow the researcher access to information of a private nature, that is, the reported crimes reflected in case books. These three victims felt it was the duty of the police to ask their prior permission for release of information to the researcher. The Commander, Honeydew Police Station, stated firmly that the police did not have the time to undertake this task taking into consideration the heavy workload of the police and the crime situation in the area. This was overcome by assuring the three victims that all research work was carefully locked away and only the researcher had access to records. Their anonymity would at all times be protected.

Determination of income levels of victims (question 1.4., see appendix A) posed a problem. It was felt that income levels were sensitive topics and respondents could refuse to supply an answer or lie about it. This was dealt with by means of a closed-ended question, specifying three income levels, namely, lower, middle and upper.

Since the interview was conducted by the researcher personally, it was decided that certain criteria would be used to assess income levels. The presence of swimming pools, tennis courts and type of motor vehicle parked in driveways, the quality of furniture, and jewellery worn by the respondent would give an indication of upper income or middle income level. The size of the home was also a valid criterion to gauge income status. Signs of neglect of the garden and dwelling were used as indicators of lower income groups. All these were the same visible signs that burglars would use to determine the desirability of the home-to-be-burgled. Cromwell et al. (1991:33) substantiated this statement when he reported that a burglar conducted a cursory assessment of gain cues at each specific target site for example looking for satellite dishes, jeeps, type of car in driveway and not old wrecks.

Fear ranged from relatively diffuse states such as anxiety to acute states such as trauma. Fear was therefore very difficult to measure superficially. To objectively measure intensity of fear states and provide validity to the study, the State-Trait Inventory (STAI) refined by Spielberger et al. (1983: STAI-AD Manual 3) was administered to 100 victims of housebreaking. This inventory differentiated the term anxiety to refer to two related yet logically different, constructs. Anxiety was an unpleasant emotional state or condition, (S-Anxiety) and anxiety used to describe relatively stable individual differences in anxiety-proneness (T-Anxiety). A psychologist, Professor Visser of the Department of Psychology at RAU, was contracted as a consultant to train the student in the use of this test and to monitor the interpretation and application thereof.

Also apparent during the data collecting phase was the fact that there was a high rate of mobility in neighbourhoods. Many people had moved away and it was often difficult to find a forwarding address. To meet this problem, the next unit on the sampling frame was chosen and contacted.

Police records also proved to be inaccurate, since names were sometimes misspelt, addresses incomplete and telephone numbers had changed. The problem was overcome

in the following manner. Incomplete addresses were rectified when the researcher contacted the respondent telephonically to ask for directions and to arrange visits. To find the correct telephone number, the name and address of the victim was compared to printed information in appropriate telephone directories. When these methods could not be used to solve the problem the next unit on the sampling frame was chosen.

Due to the fact that homes may have been burglarised many times before the time period researched it was necessary to focus the questions determining motivational and cognitive deficits of learned helplessness during a specific time frame. The period before December, 1993 was deemed to have been the period before the first burglary, and the first and subsequent burglaries having taken place between 1st December 1993 and 31st December 1994. When the dependence between questions 2.1 and 4.2 in the questionnaire were calculated the aforementioned procedure was adopted. Questions 2.8 to 2.11 and 4.3 to 4.6 were treated in a similar fashion. Questions 2.2. and 2.3., "Were there any building operations near your dwelling at the time of the burglary/burglaries and "Were there any houses for sale near your dwelling at the time of the burglary/burglaries" were assumed to have taken place within the time period December 1993 to December 1994. Questions 3.6 and 3.7 were treated in a similar fashion.

1.7. DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY

According to Leedy (1989:58) in every research endeavour the researcher should eliminate any possibility of misunderstanding certain matters by:

- (a) *Delimiting the research* : giving a full disclosure of what he or she intended to do and, conversely did not intend to do.
- (b) *Defining the terms*: giving the meaning of all terms used in the statement of the problem or subproblems that had any possibility of being misunderstood.
- (c) *Stating the assumptions*: offering a clear statement of all assumptions upon

which the research would rest.

- (d) *Stating the central theoretical propositions:* offering a complete statement of the central theoretical propositions that were being tested.

The investigation was narrowed to a specific region and period of time, In order to facilitate understanding of the concepts used in the study the most important concepts have been defined below. The statement of the central theoretical propositions have been dealt with under heading 1.4.

1.7.1. Geographic delimitation

The study was conducted within the Honeydew Police District. This district comprises of about 168 sq. kms. Suburbs and small-holdings falling within the jurisdiction of this police district are:-

Randpark Ridge, North Riding, Little Falls, Strubensvallei, Wilgeheuwel, Weltevredenpark, Nooitgedacht, Sandspruit, Sonnedal, Harveston, Aanwins, Ruimsig, Poortview, Bromhof, Boskruin, Northwold, Strydompark, Amarosa, Ambot, Zonnehoeve, Kimbult, Haylon Hills, Glen Dayson, Golden Harvest, Bushill Estate, Sundowner, Brushwood Haugh, Sonneglans, Allensnek, Constantia Kloof and Panorama.

1.7.2. Time delimitation

The data collection took place over the time period March, 1994, to December, 1995. The data gathered from the sample selected from the Honeydew Police case books was for the period 1st December, 1993 to 31st December, 1994.

1.7.3. Definition of key concepts.

To provide clarity on the concepts used in the theory of Learned Helplessness and the central theoretical propositions as well as aiding the construction of a data gathering instrument, the following terms have been defined:-

1.7.3.1. Housebreaking (burglary) with intent to commit a crime.

Housebreaking with intent to commit a crime consists in unlawfully and intentionally breaking into and entering a building or structure, with the intention of committing some crime in it (Snyman, 1995: 507).

The law of housebreaking embraces the English law concept of burglary - breaking into a dwelling at night with the intention of committing a crime - and the wider offence of housebreaking which could be committed at any time and not only in respect of dwellings (Forsyth & Kahn, 1982:118). According to Forsyth and Kahn (1982:118) for the crime of housebreaking to take place, the following elements are necessary:

- (a) There must be breaking, the removal of some physical obstruction which forms part of the premises so that entry can be effected. There need not be any actual damage. If a closed door or window is opened or a partially open door or window is further opened, it constitutes housebreaking. The test is the removal of an obstruction impeding entry.
- (b) There must be entry which is effected when the person enters the premises any part of his body or any instrument which he intends to exercise control of anything within the house.
- (c) The word 'house' is given a wide meaning by law. Any premises which can be used for human habitation or storing goods can be broken and entered.
- (d) The intention must not only be to break and enter, there must be intention to commit some crime.

The legal definition of housebreaking was used in this study since the type of dwelling researched included the private home as well as dwellings with outbuildings that were used for storing goods.

1.7.3.2. The victim

According to Fattah (1991:88-95) it is not easy to define victims or to answer the question, "Who is a victim of crime?" For some crimes, such as rape or murder, it is quite clear who has been victimised. For other crimes such as welfare or insurance fraud, embezzlement, public corruption, or vagrancy, the victim is less defined. The illusiveness of the concept is illustrated by the following example: For crimes of property in general, the economic loss involved may be absorbed by the crime victim or may be covered partially or entirely by insurance.

(a) Victim in a literary sense

The English word "victim" is derived from the Latin word "victimia" used to signify a living being offered in sacrifice to the gods (Fattah, 1991:89).

(b) The legal conception of victim

In law the victim is the injured party, the person who suffers prejudice, damage, or loss as a result of a criminal act. The criminal law uses a purely objective criterion to determine who is the victim and who is the offender. Von Hentig (Fattah, 1991:89) adds that what the law does is to watch one who acts and the one who is acted upon.

(c) The criminological conception of victim

The criminological meaning of victim is unclear and its utility remains in doubt.

Karmen (1984:1) explains that *direct victims* of crime experience the act or its consequences first hand. *Indirect victims* share the suffering and losses but are not immediately involved or harmed.

Von Hentig (Fattah:1991: 90) makes the point that the legal designations of criminal and victim do not always correspond to the actual roles both parties play.

Labelling theorists see the concept *victim* as a term synonymous with degradation or a stigma. *Critical victimologists* on the other hand argue that the labels *criminal and victim* ignore the complementary and inter-changeability of the roles of victim and offender (Fattah, 1991:90-91).

According to Fattah (1991:92-93) not every crime has a direct, tangible, easily identifiable victim. Acts punishable by penal law may be classified according to the type of victims.

Karmen (1984: 81) also distinguishes between the degree of responsibility a victim might share with an offender, ranging from complete innocence to full responsibility through precipitation to provocation.

(d) Operational definition

A victim will be referred to as a person, eighteen years and over, who has suffered economic loss, physical injury and/or psychological harm, because of an incident of attempted housebreaking or completed house-breaking.

1.7.3.3. Fear

Fear according to Reber (1995:282) is an emotional state in the presence of or anticipation of a dangerous or noxious stimulus, and is usually characterised by an internal, subjective experience of extreme agitation, a desire to flee or to attack and by a variety of sympathetic reactions (autonomic nervous system).

Fear is treated as involving specific objects or events.

1.7.3.4. Anxiety

Anxiety is regarded as a more general emotional state; a vague, unpleasant emotional state with qualities of apprehension, dread, distress and uneasiness (Reber, 1995:282). To Freud anxiety was the "fundamental phenomenon and the central problem of neurosis", it was something felt - a specific unpleasant emotional state or condition of the human organism that included experiential,

physiological and behavioural components (Spielberger et. al., 1983:STAI-AD Manual 7).

Spielberger et. al. (1983:STAI-AD Manual 7) uses anxiety to refer to two related, yet quite different constructs, as a personality state and an emotional reaction, as the expression of the personality state. The emotional state exists at a given moment in time and at a particular level of intensity.

(a) *Trait anxiety (T-Anxiety)*

Trait anxiety refers to relatively stable individual differences in anxiety proneness, that is to differences between people in the tendency to perceive a situation as dangerous or threatening. T-Anxiety, like potential energy, refers to individual differences in reaction (Spielberger et al. 1983:STAI-AD Manual 8).

The stronger the Trait-Anxiety, the more probable that the individual will experience more intense elevations in State-Anxiety in a threatening situation (Spielberger et al. 1983:STAI-AD Manual 8).

(b) *State Anxiety (S-Anxiety)*

Is the intensity of the reaction of an individual to a dangerous or threatening situation. S-Anxiety, like kinetic energy, refers to a palpable reaction or process taking place at a given time and level of intensity (Spielberger et al., 1983:STAI-AD Manual 8).

1.7.3.5. Learned helplessness

Seligman (Miller and Norman, 1979:96) defines learned helplessness as the organism's belief or expectancy that its responses will not influence the future probability of environmental outcomes (expectation of response-outcome independence). Seligman further suggests that learned helplessness will result not only from noncontingent

aversive stimulation but from any noncontingent environmental outcomes, including positive reinforcement.

Behavioural deficits and emotional effects characteristic of learned helplessness are linked to objective experiences by means of cognitive steps, namely perception and attribution that will lead to an expectation of future response-outcome noncontingency. To aid understanding it is necessary to define the concepts cognition, perception and attribution.

1.7.3.6. Cognition

Cognition is a broad and inclusive concept that refers to the mental activities involved in the acquisition, processing, organisation and use of knowledge. The major processes subsumed under the term cognition include detecting, interpreting, classifying, and remembering information; evaluating ideas, inferring principles and deducing rules; imagining possibilities, generating strategies; fantasizing and dreaming (Mussen, Conger, Kagan & Huston, 1984:283).

1.7.3.7. Attribution

According to Mussen et al. (1984:283) attributions are inferences about the reasons for one's own or someone else's behaviour.

(i) Causal attribution

Causal attributions have been shown to mediate various emotional reactions, attitudes, and behaviour towards other people, as well as toward one's future behaviours and emotional reactions (Frieze, Bar-Tal & Carroll, 1979:2).

(ii) Attribution theory

Attribution theory deals with the loci of causality of a person's behaviour as either the actor or in the environment. Understanding the perception of causes of an event aids the individual to predict and control his environment (Frieze et al. 1979:2).

(iii) Attributional errors

Frieze et.al. (1979:332) argues that learned helplessness is an example of attribution error - attribution of an outcome to external agents when outcome is or may be self-determined.

According to Frieze et. al., (1979:2) it can be assumed that the causal attribution made about an event will affect the reactions of the individual to that event. Causal attributions have been shown to mediate various emotional reactions, attitudes and behaviour toward people as well as toward one's future behaviours and emotional reactions.

1.7.3.8. Perception.

Perception is the name given to the human ability to process, interpret and attribute meaning to the information received via the sensory systems. The perceptual process "begins" with the reception of information at the receptor level and "ends" with the formation of percepts. Hence it can be said that perception is a process characterised by a time lapse between total unawareness of the nature of impinging stimuli and total awareness of the stimuli (Jordaan & Jordaan, 1989:331-334). The percept becomes part of the individual's frame of reference.

1.8. LAYOUT OF THE PROJECT

In chapter two the nature and extent of burglary is discussed. The researcher explains in chapter three how the Learned Helplessness Theory may be applied as a theoretical framework to explain helplessness deficits (motivational, cognitive and emotional) experienced by victims of the crime housebreaking which is similar to that experienced by dogs in a laboratory and humans in test situations. Chapter four summarises the research findings in the case of a sample of 300 victims of housebreaking in the Honeydew Police District. A full discussion of the statistical analysis on the data collected in respect of the Learned Helplessness phenomena and sub-goals also follows. In chapter five an interpretation of the summarised data are undertaken and compared to previous research. Chapter six concludes the study as well as offering recommendations.

CHAPTER 2

NATURE AND EXTENT OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY

2.1. INTRODUCTION

Crime in general and the violence associated with crime has had a relentless upward trend. Crime in South Africa was well above the world average. The Nedcor Project (June, 1996:4) reported that the "crime wave" gathered strength since the 1980's. In the first eight months of 1995, 18 per cent of all South African dwellings experienced some form of crime or violence in which the property of the household or its adult inhabitants had been targets or victims.

Crimes related to the acquisition of property appeared to be a world-wide problem and should be distinguished from other crime in the sense that the primary motive of the criminal in this case was to prey on the property of the victim (South African Police Service, National Crime Information Management Centre, April, 1996:28). A by-product of burglary was physical violence, economic loss for the victim and insurance industry, as well as short-term and long-term emotional effects. In addition the victim's perception of safety was severely impacted upon.

2.2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BURGLARY AS A CRIME

According to Walsh (1980:19) the offence of burglary was commonplace and a standard reaction to it was to make the criminal pay monetary compensation, known as 'wergild', for the harm done. The word 'burglar' was not used until about the sixteenth century. Very few persons possessed much transferable private possessions at this time so that burglary was an offence perhaps committed most commonly against the very wealthy (Walsh, 1980:20).

At the beginning of the 20th century burglary was predominantly professionally dominated by the cat burglar, the creep and the country house burglar. The creep took with them an extraordinary collection of housebreaking equipment for example, pen-torch, knife, diamond glass cutter, jeweller's pliers, lock picks and skeleton keys, et cetera. During 1905 burglars began to wear gloves when fingerprint evidence was first used. The 1960's saw the average burglar no longer as an adult professional dedicated to burglary, but a child who did not always realise the full significance of what he was doing, often damaging and destroying the contents of a house (Walsh, 1980:27-38). Wright and Decker (1994:10-11) in their research in the United States of America pictured the modern burglar as being predominantly a black offender. Burglary was also a male occupation. Eighteen per cent of Wright and Decker's sample were under 18 years-of-age, 43 per cent were over 18 but under 29 years of age. Thirty-one percent of the burglars were 30 to 39 years-of-age. Only eight per cent of the sample was over 40 years-of-age. When respondents in the Honeydew Police District were asked how they pictured the burglar, they replied as follows:-

Respondent 128

"Two to three African males in their late teens, or early twenties who are too lazy to work."

Respondent 154

"There was more than one burglar. They were White and young."

Respondent 166

"They were White men in charge of Black men."

Respondent 135

"A professional type of burglar with special tools and interested only in certain things in certain homes."

Respondent 176

"I think it was an opportunist because he saw the door open and let himself in. Probably unemployed with little chance of getting work."

The above remarks made by victims of burglary in the Honeydew Police District reflected the global attributional style of victims characteristic of the Learned Helplessness phenomenon and which have been tested in this research project.

Walsh, (1980:40) stated that for many juveniles their first venture into crime consisted of shoplifting and their second into burglary. Wright and Decker (1994:14-15) pointed out that 'residential burglars' were more criminally versatile than such a label implied. They had the ability to exploit a range of semi-legal and criminal opportunities. The crimes most often reported were theft (usually shoplifting), assault, and auto theft.

2.3. SPECIFIC FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO CRIME AND BURGLARY PER SE IN SOUTH AFRICA.

In recent years there has been an escalation of social problems in South Africa that might be seen as contributing to crime and burglary per se. Glanz (1994:5) identified these as:

- (a) The world-wide economic recession, together with the prolonged drought in South Africa, which has a marked effect on the country's economy;
- (b) The protracted negotiations in the political arena and the inability of leaders to reach a settlement which has created a climate of instability and uncertainty.

In addition to the factors identified by Glanz in the previous paragraph, the National Crime Prevention Strategy, 1996 (quoted in Naude, Grobbelaar and Snyman, 1996:22-25) regarded the following factors as important in contributing to crime:

- (i) Poverty, unemployment and relative deprivation as a result of apartheid.
- (ii) Youth marginalisation, that was the experiences of powerlessness of black South Africans who were socially, economically, politically and educationally marginalised contributing to severe feelings of rejection. Youths found a new identity in gangs and other criminal activities and sub-cultures.
- (iii) Social-psychological factors, such as dramatic social and political changes in South Africa which created fear, stress, insecurity and feelings of

powerlessness and helplessness in the community. The response to these feelings were manifested in vigilantism, para-military structures and securing of firearms which reinforced the culture of violence.

- (iv) Access to firearms was facilitated as a result of the liberation struggle in South Africa and in border countries.

The Nedcor Project (June, 1996:70-71) in addition to the above factors mentioned three dynamics at work in manifesting the long build-up of rates of crime and violence, going back to, at least, the beginning of the 1980's.

- (a) The first was the historical dynamic. This was related to the disintegration of traditional values and family structures under the pressure of apartheid.
- (b) The second dynamic was the frequently occurring situation during periods of rapid transition to democracy when long-standing symbols and structures of authority were removed or undermined, which led to a new propensity for criminal risk-taking.
- (c) The third dynamic was specifically South African and quite paradoxical. The inability of the Government of National Unity, and the ANC, to think through the issue of human rights and crime. From the perspective of human rights the emphasis fell on the rights of the criminal or offender, rather than the victim and society in general.

2.4. CRIME STATISTICS

Policies of crime prevention as well as the identification, detection and conviction of criminals, relied on statistics. Statistics only reflected the crimes reported to police. What percentage was going unreported? The Nedcor Project (1996:1) estimated that underreporting of crime in South Africa could be as high as fifty per cent. The project claimed that Third World countries with reputations for staggeringly high crime rates

furnished statistics that were wholly misleading. The Nedcor Project (1996:6) stated that although it might be concluded that South Africa's overall rate of crime was probably higher than rates quoted, it could nevertheless be somewhat lower than that of developed countries with high crime rates such as Canada and New Zealand. Developed countries had excellent crime statistics and high levels of crime reporting which made comparisons to South Africa very favourable.

2.4.1. The incidence of burglary in the industrialised world

One of the few seemingly established generalisations in the social sciences was that crime rates of nearly every western industrialised nation rose dramatically between early 1960's and the late 1980's (Beirne & Perry, 1994:155). The data for the International Crime Survey for both 1989 and 1992 revealed that in terms of specific forms of victimisation both personal and property - the United States was consistently among the highest nations (Beirne & Perry, 1994:158).

The most striking observation was that Switzerland (15,0 per cent - 17,4 per cent) and Japan (under 12,4 per cent) were among the nations with the lowest overall victimisation rates for both personal and property victimisation. Also at low levels were Norway (15,0 per cent - 17,4 per cent) and Northern Ireland (12,5 per cent - 14,9 per cent) (Beirne & Perry, 1994:158).

According to the survey only 0,2 per cent of respondents in Japan and Switzerland had reported an attempted burglary. Scandinavian countries such as Norway, Finland and Sweden had a rate of less than one per cent for burglary. All three countries had almost identical low rates for attempted burglary (Beirne & Perry, 1994:159). New Zealand and Australia, stated Beirne and Perry (1994:158) vied for the title for the industrial world's leader in respect of attempted burglary. Canada was also prominent among high crime nations and was a high risk nation in terms of burglary. England and Wales ranked middle to low in terms of victimisation rates for violence but very high in terms of

victimisation for property. Amongst socialist countries Czechoslovakia had the highest rate of burglary (4,3 per cent) (Beirne & Perry, 1994:158).

According to Interpol statistics (Watermeyer:1996) the burglary ratios per 100 000 of the population for various countries for the period 1994 were:

TABLE 2.1
BURGLARY RATIOS PER 100 000 OF THE POPULATION FOR VARIOUS COUNTRIES FOR
THE PERIOD 1994.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Burglary rates per 100 000 of the population</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Burglary rates per 100 000 of the population</u>
South Africa	759,7	Ecuador	94,41
Argentina	1,53	Estonia	1160,73*
Austria	1128,23*	Ethiopia	5,59
Azerbaijan	8,44	Fiji	463,72
Bahrain	86,67	Finland	1934,90*
Bangladesh	4,64	France	839,23*
Barbados	1267,17*	Gambia	5,64
Belgium	15465,90*	Germany	1927,09*
Botswana	1,86	Georgia	40,70
Brunei	133,08	Greece	330,15
Bulgaria	1174,90*	Granada	582,22
Cameroon	1,20	Guyana	509,48
Canada	1326,16*	Honduras	1,40
Cayman Islands	1803,03*	Hong Kong	222,80
China	45,24	Hungary	767,44*
Croatia	379,83	Indonesia	24,76
Cyprus	203,34	Ireland	921,37*
Denmark	2045,28*	Israel	817,15*
Luxembourg	943,80*	Jamaica	267,69
Madagascar	0,73	Japan	198,07
Malawi	13,13	Malta	1079,17*
Mauritius	85,88	Monaco	460,00
Mongolia	204,52	Namibia	793,00*
New Zealand	2352,88*	Poland	789,48*
Portugal	186,91	Russian Federation	262,28
Rwanda	12,50	Samoa	588,00
Seychelles	1058,90*	Singapore	83,92
Spain	555,41	Swaziland	941,35*
Sweden	1610,09*	Switzerland	946,65*
Thailand	9,87	Trinidad and Tobago	566,96
Turks and Caicos	2992,86*	Venezuela	358,24
USA	1041,79*	Zimbabwe	445,28

*Indicated those countries reporting a higher ratio for burglary than South Africa. (Watermeyer, 1996:1-2).

In terms of reported burglary, South Africa found itself ranking with highly developed countries.

2.4.2. Serious crime in South Africa and Gauteng.

The South African Police Service, National Crime Information Management Centre (April, 1996:3) reported with concern a 5,8 per cent increase in the incidence of serious crime such rape, murder, child theft, hijacking, public violence and of which burglary was an example, since 1994 to 1995. This considerably outstripped both the population and economic growth figures. A comparison with international figures indicated that South Africa suffered a crime rate far exceeding the international average. In addition, there has been a 4,6 per cent increase in the number of criminals wanted for violation of parole conditions, while the number of those arrested in this connection has declined by 16,5 per cent. There has also been a rate of 43,1 per cent of recidivism. The Nedcor Project (June, 1996:5) reiterated this statement. Of 430 criminals arrested, only 77 were convicted and, despite the huge numbers of serious crimes of violence committed only eight were sentenced to two or more years of imprisonment. Further, it was estimated that South Africa had a 94 per cent recidivism rate (that is 94 per cent of all persons released after serving a sentence immediately became involved in crime again). Only one of the eight actually gave up criminal activity.

According to the 1993 census South Africa had 40,7 million inhabitants of which approximately 17 per cent resided in Gauteng. Calculations made by the South African Police estimated that there were approximately 10 million inhabitants in Gauteng (South African Police Service, National Crime Information Management Centre, Gauteng, January to December, 1995:4). The South African Police Service, National Crime Information Management Centre (April, 1996:3) explained that the average increase of 31,7 per cent of all property related crime between 1990 and 1995 could possibly be partly attributed to an estimated natural increase of 8,3 per cent in the population over the last six years.

Statistics reflected that there had been an increase in serious crimes within the Republic of South Africa and specifically Gauteng. Property related crimes accounted for 50,3 per cent of all serious crimes reported during 1995 (South African Police Service, National Crime Information Management Centre, April, 1996:28). The Human Sciences Research Council (Financial Mail, December, 1994:2) suggested that a quarter of all South Africans, or their household members might have been criminally victimised in 1992 and one in five subjected to property crimes such as housebreaking.

2.4.2.1. Rates of serious crimes for Republic of South Africa and Gauteng for the period 1994/1995.

A display and comparison of serious crimes for the Republic of South Africa and Gauteng for the period 1994/1995, appears below:

TABLE 2.2

A COMPARISON OF SERIOUS CRIMES FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND GAUTENG FOR THE PERIOD 1994/1995

	RSA		GAUTENG	
	1994	1995	1994	1995
Serious crimes	1 875 419	1 983 474	638 891	666 283

(South African Police Service, National Crime Information Management Centre, Gauteng, January to December 1995:4).

Serious crimes within the Republic of South Africa and Gauteng showed an increase for the period 1994 to 1995.

2.4.2.2 Burglary rates for 1994/1995 in Gauteng and the Republic of South Africa.

Burglary, categorised as a serious crime by the South African Police Service, National Crime Information Management Centre, Gauteng (January to December, 1995:12) reported the following statistics:

TABLE 2.3
A COMPARISON OF BURGLARY RATES FOR 1994 TO 1995 IN GAUTENG AND THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA.

	RSA		GAUTENG		
	1994	1995	1994	1995	
Residential burglary	196 146	214 854	75 627	81 711	8% increase in Gauteng

(South African Police Service, National Crime Information Management Centre, January to December, 1995:12).

The South African Police Service pointed out that factors that contributed to the increase of burglaries of private residences were (1) the profitability of the crime, (2) the lack of adequate security at private residences and (3) private homes were left unguarded for long periods of time especially in the week during normal office hours (National Crime Information Management Centre, January to December, 1995:12). Burglary usually peaked during December of each year when many people were away on holiday. The areas most affected were Johannesburg and Pretoria (South African Police Service, National Crime Information Management Centre, April 1996:28).

2.4.3. Attacks on persons in and around own homes.

Statistics regarding attacks on persons in or at their own residences indicated an increase of 11,3 per cent between 1994-1995 for the total of South African Police regions. The

focal point of these attacks during 1995 have been in the combined Northern Transvaal and Witwatersrand region with 1372 incidents (37,4 per cent of the Republic of South Africa total). One hundred and fifty elderly persons over the age of 50 years, and 468 persons under the age of 50 years were attacked in and around their homes (South African Police Service, National Crime Information Management Centre, January to December, 1995:11).

Reflected below is a comparison of attacks on persons in and around their homes for the Republic of South Africa and Gauteng.

TABLE 2.4.
A COMPARISON OF ATTACKS ON PERSONS IN AND AROUND THEIR HOMES
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND GAUTENG.

	RSA		GAUTENG		
	1994	1995	1994	1995	
Own Residence	3 296	3 668	1 831	1 372	25% decrease in attacks 1,7% decrease in attacks
Farms, smallholdings	432	551	112	110	

(South African Police Service, National Crime Information Management Centre, January to December, 1995:11)

There was a decrease of 25 per cent for the Gauteng Province in respect of persons being attacked in and around their own residences and a decrease of 1,7 per cent in the Gauteng Province for attacks on persons living on farms and small-holdings (South African Police Service, National Crime Information Management Centre, January to December, 1995:11).

Areas that reflected the highest occurrence of attacks were Johannesburg and Pretoria.

In the dwelling	-	283
In the driveway	-	122
In the garage	-	120
In front of the house		105
In the garden	-	67

Crimes that were committed were reported as follows:

Robbery	-	442
Murder	-	90
Attempted murder	-	48
Rape	-	89
Assault	-	28

(South African Police Service, National Crime Information Management Centre, January to December, 1995:11.)

The incidence of serious crime caused great concern in the Gauteng Province. The Gauteng Province with its seven areas - Johannesburg, Pretoria, Soweto, West Rand, East Rand, North Rand and the Vaal Triangle - was one of the most densely populated areas in South Africa and experienced a rise in serious crime. This impacted on the economy of development, environment and security of the country and its citizens. Property related crimes increased during the period 1994 to 1995. Violence was often associated with attacks on persons in and around their own homes. Crimes committed were robbery, murder, attempted murder, rape and assault.

2.5. THE COST OF BURGLARY

Housebreaking did not only involve the loss of material goods to a victim but often led to a potential for violence against the person, emotional trauma, loss of time off work, insurance costs and generally a fear of the likelihood that the home could be broken into again.

2.5.1. Material loss suffered by the victim of burglary

Economic losses suffered could be staggering. Losses could also include property destruction and the sentimental value of objects stolen.

Furthermore recovery of property was often rare and the poorer the person the more significant was the loss. Changes in security behaviour such as fitting new locks, and installing alarms to create a "thief-proof" house added to

the financial burden.

A desperate resident, near Zandspruit squatter camp, said they were paying R3000 a month to have an armed guard on their property. "We have no choice - every time we leave our property, we don't know whether we will make it back past the camp". They are in the process of having an electric fence erected, which will cost them R45,000 (Randburg Sun, January 12, 1995:7).

When taking into account statements such as "Police solved only one-fifth of burglaries and housebreaking is committed every one minute and thirty-five seconds" (The Sunday Times, November 6, 1994), the cost to the individual and the country was incalculable. People interviewed in the Nedcor Project (June, 1996:9) about the costs of the most recent instance of crime in which they personally had been a victim and to estimate the costs of all the other crimes committed against persons in the dwelling since the beginning of 1995, estimated that the costs amounted to R1,78 billion.

The South African Police Service, National Crime Information Management Centre (April, 1996:34) contended that the dark (unreported) figure of crime had shown a decrease since 1990. This report stated that:

- (a) people were forced to report property related crimes in order to be able to claim against insurance;
- (b) hire purchase conditions compelled the growing middle class acquiring movable goods to take out short-term insurance and to report theft;
- (c) property crimes were a loss of a personal nature and more easily reported;
- (d) the increase in the number of short-term insurance policy holders might lead to an increase in fraudulent claims against insurance companies and an increase in property related crimes reported to the police for exactly that purpose.

According to Mr. Klein, First Bowring Insurance Brokers (1996) the average household policy in Gauteng costed the homeowner R3 500 per annum. Country and coastal areas paid 20 to 30 per cent less and rural areas 50 per cent less than the homeowner in Gauteng. Pretoria and the East and West Rand paid ten per cent less.

Of the R3 500 paid by the homeowner, five per cent of the total was homeowners policy for non-bonded properties, ten per cent was all risks, 15 per cent fire and allied perils and 70 per cent was for theft/burglary.

In Gauteng, one in three clients would claim during one year. In the country areas one in six persons would claim and nationally one in four persons would claim on their insurance. Burglary/theft claims made up 40 per cent of all claims.

TABLE 2.5

THE NUMBER, SIZE AND COSTS OF CLAIMS ON HOUSEHOLD POLICIES IN GAUTENG

Size of claims	Percentage number of claims	Percentage rand value
Under R10 000	70	32
R10 000 R20 000	16	22
R20 000 R30 000	7	16
R30 000 R40 000	2,5	8
R40 000 R50 000	2,5	10
R50 000 R60 000	1,0	6
R60 000 R70 000	0,5	3
R70 000 R80 000	0,5	3
R80 000 and over	-	-

(Mr. Klein, First Bowring Insurance brokers, 1996).

The opinion of Morgan (1990:21) summed up the dilemma facing the insurance industry and the victims of housebreaking. There were limits to the extent that insurers could continue paying out on premium levels which were reaching beyond levels of affordability and there was the crisis faced by households when they found themselves inadequately compensated.

2.5.2. Physical harm suffered by the victim of burglary

Burglars have become more daring and seemingly indifferent to whether the owners were at home or not when they struck. Added to the violation of the home was an additional element of malice in the behaviour of the offender. Dr. Irma Labuschagne, a Unisa criminologist, said this was not something new or uniquely South African but "It is the result of sheer anger. It is quite simply a case of the have-not's taking from the have's in the quickest way possible" (The Sunday Times Metro, January 8, 1995). The propensity for crimes of violence in South Africa was also reflected in comparisons of rates of assault: the South African rate was 840 per 100 000, compared with an international average of only 142 (Nedcor Project, June, 1996:7).

According to The Star, (September 29, 1994) victims were overpowered in their own homes by robbers in 212 cases. Lieutenant-Colonel Eugene Opperman (The Star, September 29, 1994) said that when robbers failed to secure cooperation by threats and intimidation they could resort to violence. Lieutenant-Colonel Opperman also said (The Star, September 29, 1994) that many homeowners were attacked by gardeners or domestics employed "straight from the street".

The Randburg Sun (January 12, 1995) reported that Mr. Prukl, whose house was near Garden World Nursery, the area being researched, was brutally attacked in front of his house by three armed robbers, and a young woman

staying on Mr. Prukl's neighbour's property assaulted.

2.5.3. Emotional trauma suffered by the victim of burglary

The emotional trauma the victim suffered was least evident but might have a lasting effect on the direct victim and on the victim's family. Karmen (1984:36) stated that the psychological damage might linger and that burglaries struck victims as an invasion, intrusion, or frightening breakdown in security, regardless of how much or how little was spirited away. The long-term psychological effects experienced by women could often be described in terms of words such as "pollution", "isolation", "a presence in the house", "a dirty stranger has touched my possessions" (Maquire, 1980:265). Maquire (1980:265) goes on to say that there was a tendency for victims to ask "Why me?" This he argued was responsible for a great deal of anxiety produced by burglaries.

Dr. Paul Wilson (1986:147) described stages that victims passed through and experienced after becoming a victim of a break and enter offence. The first stage was identified as sense of personal violation followed by a defensive reaction. After six weeks there was a return of fear and after two months cynicism and adjustment set in. When the household was burglarised again the stage of partial disintegration occurred. This was generally devastating, and led to harsh attitudes to crime and towards criminals. Psychological depression was translated into physical symptoms.

2.5.4. Fear of having the home burglarised again.

When dwellings were hit more than once (Nedcor Project, June, 1996:7) victims developed the perception that the battle against crime was being lost. When people

interviewed were asked how probable they thought it was that they would become a victim of crime in the next year only 22,5 per cent thought it was very improbable to improbable, 31 per cent were uncertain and 46,4 per cent thought it probable to very probable (Nedcor Project, June, 1996:9).

Housebreaking is an uncontrollable event to the victim and it seemed futile to try to protect yourself. Respondent 36 remarked that even though he had protected himself, he was as likely to be victimised as people who did nothing to protect themselves.

2.6. SUMMARY

Crime rates and violence have increased steadily over the last twenty years. Violence associated with crime has also asserted itself in South African society. The social problems of the country have been identified as contributing to crime and burglary per se. The cost to the country in terms of the judicial process and policing necessary to contain crime and burglary cannot be easily estimated. Victims suffered from emotional trauma and feelings of helplessness because they incurred economic losses, suffered physical harm, and because of the low arrest, conviction and imprisonment rates of the offender.

Chapter three of this study explains and applies the Theory of Learned Helplessness to describe the cognitive, motivational and emotional deficits victims experience in response to the experience of housebreaking.

CHAPTER 3

THEORY OF LEARNED HELPLESSNESS

3.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter is devoted to the application of the theory of Learned Helplessness to victims of housebreaking in order to explain their expectation of response-outcome independence and the subsequent motivational, cognitive and emotional deficits experienced.

An in-depth discussion of the theory's origins, expansion and revision focuses the attention on the cognitive mediational mechanisms such as perception and attribution between the objective experience and behavioural effects of uncontrollability. This allows for individual differences in respect of controlling responses to outcomes, and generality and chronicity of learned helplessness.

The historical development of the Learned Helplessness theory is sketched providing a background to the Reformulated Learned Helplessness theory, which forms the theoretical basis of this study.

3.2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LEARNED HELPLESSNESS THEORY

Historically the theory of Learned Helplessness was formulated before helplessness experiments were performed with human subjects. Early studies of human helplessness attempted to reproduce the animal findings in humans and was less concerned with theory building. The theory was reformulated introducing two new cognitive steps to explain mediation between perception and expectation of noncontingency of response and outcome. This shifted away from the assumption that the experience of objective noncontingency led directly to the formulation of expectation of future response-outcome

noncontingency by an organism to the position that uncontrollability was not sufficient to render an organism helpless. The organism had to come to expect that outcomes were uncontrollable to exhibit helplessness (Alloy, 1982:445-6).

3.2.1. Original theory

The theory of Learned Helplessness was originally formulated on the basis of laboratory studies with dogs and other animals such as cats and rats. In 1967 Overmier and Seligman, and Seligman and Maier demonstrated that dogs exposed to electric shocks that they could neither avoid nor escape, subsequently showed deficits in acquisition of an escape response in a new situation in which shock could be terminated (Alloy, 1982:443). In contrast, dogs that experienced an equivalent number of escapable shocks or no shocks did not show such behavioural deficits (Alloy, 1982:443). The debilitating consequence of uncontrollable events was termed Learned Helplessness. Maier, Seligman and Solomon (Alloy, 1982:445) hypothesised that organisms exposed to outcomes that were independent of all their responses learned that these outcomes were, in fact, uncontrollable (response-outcome independence). This learning led to the development of an expectation that outcomes would continue to be noncontingently related to actions in the future (Alloy, 1982:445). They learned that their responses were futile. In turn three deficits were produced, namely motivational, cognitive and emotional deficits.

Frieze et al. (1979:253) pointed out that victimisation prevention was analogous to escape and avoidance learning in psychological laboratories. Therefore it might be that if some crime-prevention efforts promoted vigilance and limited the options to escape or avoid crime, they might not reduce fear (Frieze et al. 1979:258). This was tested in this thesis.

3.2.1.1. Motivational deficit

This was reduced incentive for initiating voluntary responses to control the outcome of a situation. According to Alloy (1982:445) an organism's incentive for

emitting active instrumental responses was assumed to depend on the belief that responding would affect outcomes. In the absence of this expectation, the likelihood of emitting responses decreased.

Victims increased certain behaviours after a burglary. Self-protection, general restrictions on behaviour and avoidance of the type of person who it was thought to have robbed them were evident (Burt & Katz, 1985:346). Victims bought and used more self-protective devices like locks and home security, weapons, insurance, and sometimes self-defence training (Burt & Katz, 1985:346). Yet victims reasoned that these had not safeguarded them in the first instance and had little hope that they would in the future. Characteristic of this statement is the view expressed by respondent 99 "If they want to get in they will get in". According to Bandura (Abramson, 1978:51) people could give up trying because they lacked a sense of efficacy in achieving the acquired behaviour, or could give up trying because they expected their behaviour to have no effect on an unresponsive environment or to be constantly punished.

Some of the victims interviewed by the researcher complained that they felt as if they were living in jails and irrespective of the measures taken, nothing would keep burglars out. They also felt that when you barricaded yourself it announced to thieves that you had something to steal. The Figgie Report (1983:57) suggested that victims because of the threat of crime were "prevented from going out at night to places in the neighbourhood where they used to go". They virtually placed themselves under house-arrest. Some paid more than they could afford for housing in order to live in a low crime area. Van der Wurff and Stringer (1989:471) pointed out that others thought about selling up to live in another country where they would feel safer.

In addition the opinion was held by victims interviewed during this research

project that since offenders were not easily caught they might strike again and that there was little one could do to protect oneself. There was no point in repurchasing items that were stolen since they would only be added to the criminal's shopping list. The world was ultimately experienced as a threatening place over which one had no control.

3.2.1.2. Cognitive effect

The cognitive effect consisted of a difficulty in learning that responses and outcomes were contingently related and was also the result of an expectation of response-outcome noncontingency. Alloy (1982:445-6) maintained that according to learned helplessness the expectation that an outcome would be unrelated to responses proactively interfered with future learning that the outcome was now dependent upon responses. Alloy (1982:446) further explained "Just as in verbal behaviour learning A-B interferes with the later learning A-C".

Victims of burglary in this research project felt that even though they had taken security measures to protect their homes from burglars, they still felt that if the burglar wanted to get into the dwelling he would get in. Paap (1981:300) stated that the victim became despondent, fatalistic and pessimistic. This feeling of helplessness was exacerbated by the fact that insurance companies were inept, they never paid you out for losses you suffered. Hence victims felt that there was no point in expecting the police to do anything about the matter since few criminals were brought to justice and stolen goods were rarely recovered. Respondents interviewed by the researcher replied "The cops lock guys up, and they are out tomorrow. Loopholes in the justice system allowed the criminal little time in goals and people felt that they were not safe anywhere". According to Maquire (1982:126) imaginations were given free rein, and the offender was envisaged as a terrifying stranger.

Everyone was under suspicion of being a criminal, that might border on paranoia (Maquire,1982 :127).

3.2.1.3. Emotional effect

Finally, the emotional effect of the expectation of uncontrollability was anxiety followed by depression. According to Alloy (1982:448) while positive or negative outcomes would lead to motivational and cognitive deficits, only an expectation of future response-independent aversive outcomes would lead to a depressive effect.

Cohn and Cohn (Frieze et al. 1979:258) found that individualised protective measures did not make people less fearful or more in control of crime. At best the probabilities of being burglarised might be lower, but did not offer certainty.

People experienced a gamut of emotions ranging from “anger, shock, panic, uncontrollable weeping, feelings of vulnerability and a realisation of helplessness” (Hudson, 1983:19). Hudson (1983:19) remarked that victims were afraid of going home in the evenings, coming through a front door, going into certain rooms, being alone in the house and even frightened at night. Should a household be burglarised again the effect was devastating, especially among older victims who were living alone (Wilson, 1986:147). “Deep depression often set in” (Wilson, 1986: 147).

TABLE 3.1 : ORIGINAL HELPLESSNESS THEORY

1. Objective noncontingency
2. Expectation of future noncontingency
3. Symptoms of helplessness (motivational, cognitive and emotional deficits)

(Alloy, 1982:446).

As shown in table 3.1. the original version of learned helplessness theory assumed that the experience of objective noncontingency led directly to the formulation of expectation of future response-outcome noncontingency by an organism.

The following paragraphs served to illustrate the format of early studies of human helplessness to reproduce the animal findings in humans.

Hirohoto's experiment was representative of experiments to reproduce animal findings in humans (Abramson, et al., 1978:49). A typical helplessness triadic design was used. In a typical study subjects received a training phase followed by a test phase. In the training phase subjects were exposed to a training task in which they received, (a) contingent (response-dependent) reinforcement, (b) non-contingent (response-independent) reinforcement and (c) no treatment (control). After the training phase the performance of the three groups was compared on a test task in which reinforcement was given to all groups (Miller & Norman, 1979:94).

According to Abramson et al. (1978:49) in Hirohoto's experiment (1974) college student volunteers were assigned to one of three groups. In the controllable noise group, subjects received loud noise that they could terminate by pushing a button four times. Subjects assigned to the uncontrollable noise group received noise that terminated independently of subjects responding. Finally a third group received no noise.

In the second phase of the experiment all groups were tested on a hand shuttle box. In the shuttle box noise termination was controllable for all subjects. To turn off the noise subjects merely had to move a lever from one side of the box to the other. The results of the test phase were strikingly similar to the results that were obtained with animals during laboratory tests. The group receiving prior uncontrollable noise failed to escape and listened passively to the noise (Miller & Norman, 1979:94).

Learned helplessness occurred when the subjects receiving non-contingent reinforcement in the training phase showed deficits in the test phase relative to the contingent and control groups. Learned helplessness referred to behavioural deficits produced by exposure to noncontingent outcomes (Miller & Norman, 1979:94).

3.2.2 Middle version of Learned Helplessness theory

The original version of Learned Helplessness Theory was criticised on the basis of the mechanism by which an actual experience with uncontrollability produced was never specified. Expectation was sufficient to produce behavioural debilitation. It also did not matter whether the organism's objective experience with uncontrollability involved positive or negative events.

Seligman, Maier and Alloy and Seligman (Alloy 1982:447) expanded the cognitive mediational stage between objective noncontingency and the behavioural as well as emotional effects from one to two steps. According to these theorists, when an organism encountered information about the objective noncontingency between outcomes and responses, it might register or perceive the immediately present or past contingency before it could form an expectation of future contingency. Perception of present or past uncontrollability to an expectation of future uncontrollability could be influenced by prior expectations and subsequent, new information about contingencies (Alloy, 1982:446). It was held that a person could be exposed to a situation in which outcome and response

were independent and perceived accurately yet not form an expectation of future response-outcome independence. According to Glass and Singer (Alloy, 1982:446) on the other hand a person or animal could show helplessness deficits without actually experiencing or perceiving noncontingency if they merely came to expect events were uncontrollable.

TABLE 3.2. : MIDDLE VERSION OF LEARNED HELPLESSNESS THEORY

- | |
|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Objective noncontingency 2. Perception of present and past noncontingency 3. Expectation of future noncontingency 4. Symptoms of helplessness (motivational, cognitive and emotional deficits) |
|--|

(Alloy, 1982:447)

Table 3.2. points out the cognitive mediational stage between objective noncontingency and expectation of future response-outcome noncontingency. New information, the influence of prior expectations about contingencies can influence the expectations of future independence.

3.3. REFORMULATED LEARNED HELPLESSNESS THEORY

In the most recent revision of the theory, Abramson et al. (1978) noted additional conceptual inadequacies in the helplessness model as it applied to humans. The major difficulty of the earlier versions of the theory in accounting for human helplessness stemmed from their inability to account adequately for the generality and chronicity of

helplessness deficits. That is, the theory did not explain when and where the expectation of no control was likely to occur and produce debilitation.

The major difficulty of the pre-1978 theory was:-

- (a) it did not distinguish between instances in which an individual lacked controlling responses that were available to others and instances in which all individuals lacked controlling responses;
- (b) it did not distinguish between generality and chronicity of helplessness deficits;
- (d) its lack of explanation when and where no control was likely to occur and produce debilitation (Alloy, 1982:447).

An additional cognitive step was proposed between the perception and expectation of noncontingency. When a person perceived that outcomes were uncontrollable, an attribution for the cause of helplessness was made. Victims could explain their victimisation by making causal attributions that might satisfy the need to make sense of the incomprehensibility of the event reflected in the question "Why me?". It was stressed by Alloy (1982:448) that attribution merely predicted the recurrence of the expectation but the expectation determined the occurrence of helplessness deficits.

Attributions chosen would influence whether expectation of future helplessness would be chronic or acute, broad or narrow, and whether helplessness would lower self-esteem, or not. Attributions chosen might vary over three dimensions, internal/external, stable/unstable, and global/specific. Within these three dimensions, eight kinds of attributions could be made as to the cause of an event. The properties of attributions predicted in what circumstances, and over what time span, the uncontrollability was likely to be present (Alloy 1982:447).

TABLE 3.3. REFORMULATED LEARNED HELPLESSNESS THEORY

- | |
|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Objective noncontingency 2. Perception of present and past noncontingency 3. Attribution for present and past noncontingency 4. Expectations of future noncontingency 5. Symptoms of helplessness (motivational, cognitive, emotional and self-esteem) |
|---|

(Alloy, 1982:448).

Table 3.3. illustrates that there is a cognitive step between perception and expectation of noncontingency mediated by attributions for the causes of helplessness.

3.3.1. Internal causal attributions

An attribution for perceived noncontingency to internal causes led to self-esteem deficits in addition to motivational, cognitive and emotional deficits (Alloy, 1982:448). The old Learned Helplessness theory did not distinguish between cases in which an individual lacked requisite controlling responses that were available to other people, and cases in which the individual as well as all other individuals did not possess controlling responses. Abramson et al. (1978:52) resolved this by taking the self-other dichotomy as criterion for internality.

Albert Bandura in an article (1977:191) confirmed this case against the Learned Helplessness theory when he argued that "although cognitive processes mediated change, cognitive events were induced and altered most readily by the experience of mastery which arose from effective performance". Bandura (1977:204) criticised Seligman because he failed to consider the conceptual distinction between efficacy and outcome expectations. People could give up trying because they lacked a sense

of efficacy in achieving the required behaviours. Or they might be assured of their capabilities but gave up trying because they expected their behaviour would have no effect on an unresponsive environment or to be constantly punished.

Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale's (1978:53) formulation of "internal" and "external" attributions resembled the work of Heider who made a basic distinction between factors within the person and factors within the environment as perceived determinants of outcomes. Rotter similarly distinguished between outcomes that subjects perceived as caused by external forces such as fate and outcomes that subjects perceived as causally related to their own responses and personal characteristics (Abramson, et al. 1978:51). Unlike these formulations that asked whether a factor resided "within the skin" or "outside the skin" to determine whether it was internal or external, Abramson et al. (1978: 53) used the self-other dichotomy as criterion of internality.

When people believed that outcomes were more likely or less likely to happen to themselves than to relevant others, they attributed these outcomes to internal factors which led to a sense of personal helplessness (Abramson et al. 1978:53). An attribution for perceived noncontingency to internal causes led to self-esteem deficits in addition to motivational, cognitive and emotional deficits (Alloy, 1982:448). This was because in the attribution process a social comparison to "relevant others" was made rather than random others. When using Bandura's conceptual distinction between efficacy and outcome expectancies personal helplessness entailed a low efficacy expectation coupled with a high outcome expectation the response producing outcome was unavailable to the person (Abramson et al. 1978:54). Not feeling efficacious the victims of housebreaking felt helpless and eternally vigilant.

The study found that victims of burglary made attributions as to why they had no control over the fact that they might be burglarised again. An attribution to self such as "I left the lights burning in the house whilst we were on holiday", "I employed casual labour", "I forgot to switch the alarm on", led to a sense of personal helplessness. The victim compared himself to his neighbours or friends (relevant others) and saw the cause as because of his irresponsible behaviour. Relevant others would not have behaved in such an irresponsible fashion. Similarly, "I fitted burglar bars to the house and installed an alarm system but it did not keep the offenders out", led the victim to give up trying because his behaviour had no effect on the outcome even though he demonstrated the required behaviours or precautions.

3.3.2. External causal attributions

External causal attributions were made for outcomes they believed were as likely to happen to themselves as to relevant others (Abramson et al. 1978:53). This led to cognitive and motivational deficits but not lowered self-esteem and a universal sense of helplessness. External attributions such as stated by Respondent 209, "Neighbours go out to work and leave their homes unoccupied", "Neighbours are burgled because there are builders working in the area" (Respondent 257) and "Burglars know the routines of victims" (Respondent 268), led to an expectation that the victim himself and relevant others were vulnerable and helpless in the face of victimisation.

3.3.3. Stable causal attributions

Recent attribution theorists such as Weiner (Abramson et al. 1978:56) have refined the possible attribution for outcomes by suggesting that the dimension stable/unstable were orthogonal to internal/external. Stable attributions were either long-lived or recurrent and resulted in chronicity of helplessness deficits. Stable attributions might include internal factors or external characteristics of the environment. Closely related to this dimension were the person's expectancies for future outcomes.

Attributions to internal/stable causes "I had burglar bars fitted and alarms installed yet they burgled my house" (Respondent 56), implied a grim future expectation. According to Respondent 99 "There is nothing one can do to prevent being a victim in the future" (cognitive deficit). "I simply won't do anything more to secure the house and replace anything stolen, since it will be taken anyway" (motivational deficit) was the upshot of this type of attribution. The expectation of future helplessness would be long lasting or chronic. There was little expectancy for change in the future.

3.3.4. Unstable causal attributions

Unstable causes were ones where some hope for changing or controlling existed. Helplessness in other words was transient and short-lived. If the attribution was to an unstable factor the victim might not necessarily feel helpless. Respondent 259 "The watchdog was at the vet when we were burgled" allowed the victim some hope that when the dog returned there would be less chance of being victimised again.

Janoff-Bulman (Frieze et al. 1979:241) distinguished between behavioural self-blame (something the victim did that caused him/her to be burgled) and characterological blame (event was due to some characteristic of the victim themselves, for example carelessness). Attributions involving behavioural self-blame suggested that by changing one's behaviour in the future negative events could be avoided. On the other hand attributions involving a characterological or personality factor was stable and held little opportunity for change.

3.3.5. Specific causal attributions

When deficits occurred in a narrow range of situations we called them specific. If the victim of housebreaking made attributions to specific causes such as by Respondent 54 "Builders are working in the area", Respondent 27 "My house is near a squatter camp", the helplessness deficits would not necessarily appear in a new situation. Abramson, et al. (1978:56) suggested that helplessness would not generalise from the original situation to a new similar situation.

3.3.6. Global causal attributions

These were factors that were present in many situations and symptoms of helplessness would generalise widely across situations. Helplessness was global when it depressed responses highly dissimilar to those about which the original learning had occurred or when it extended to stimuli highly dissimilar to those about which original learning had occurred (Abramson et al. 1978:56). Paap (1981:300) cited several statements in his study which reflected global attributions for example "The world is a lawless threatening place", "The police are unable to do anything about the matter".

Helplessness deficits would ensue because there would be an expectation that outcomes would be independent of responses. Helplessness would generalise from the original situation to a new similar situation.

In situations where informational cues about the causes of events were sufficiently ambiguous, individual attribution styles would influence causal attributions. The individual who generally made global attributions for negative events would show more general helplessness following experience with uncontrollable events than would the individual with a more specific attribution style (Alloy, Abramson, Peterson & Seligman, 1984:682).

The Learned Helplessness theory has both strengths and weaknesses. There has been a vast array of experimental data generated by the Learned Helplessness paradigm. Alloy (1982:444) cited that the theory has been applied to human problems such as anxiety, Coyne, Metalsky and Lavelle (1981); stress, Averill (1973); severe accidents, Bulman and Wortman (1977); crime, Tyler (1981); susceptibility to heart diseases, Krantz & Schultz (1980); and helplessness as a theory of clinical depression, Seligman, Abramson, Semmel and Von Baeyer (1978), and so on.

Initial animal studies demonstrated that dogs that were subjected to uncontrollable shock showed slower responding or even failed to respond entirely when placed in a different test situation where shock avoidance or escape was possible. Most research with human subjects confirmed the influence of uncontrollability in creating performance deficits. The work by researchers such as Hirohoto (1974) were representative and provided a human analogue to animal studies. Learned Helplessness theory provided a unitary framework integrating animal and human data.

In the original version of helplessness theory, it was assumed that the experience of objective noncontingency led directly to the formation of expectation of future response-outcome noncontingency by an organism. Expectation was a sufficient condition to produce behavioural deficits. It did not matter whether an organism's objective experience with uncontrollability involved positive or negative events. In either case, exposure to actual noncontingency led to an expectation of future noncontingency (Alloy, 1982:446).

The theory expanded the cognitive mediational stage between objective noncontingency and its behavioural and emotional effects from one to two steps. When an organism encountered information about the objective noncontingency between outcomes and its responses, it registered the immediately present or past noncontingency before it could form the expectation of future noncontingency. Cognitive processes leading from perception of present or past uncontrollability to an expectation of future uncontrollability could be influenced by prior expectations and subsequent new information about contingencies (Alloy, 1982:447).

The Reformulated Learned Helplessness theory, the most recent revision of the theory, noted additional conceptual inadequacies as it was applied to humans. Earlier versions of the theory did not account for generality and chronicity of helplessness deficits. It did not distinguish between instances in which an individual lacked controlling responses that were available to others and instances in which all individuals lacked controlling responses. An additional cognitive step was proposed between perception and expectation of noncontingency. When people perceived that outcomes were uncontrollable, they made an attribution for the cause of their helplessness. The attribution could vary over three dimensions, about oneself, or to other people, or to circumstances (internal/external dimensions); the degree to which the cause was likely to be constant, or variable over time (stable/unstable dimension); and the degree to which the cause was likely to generalise across different situations, or be specific to one situation (global/specific dimension) (Alloy, 1982:447). The properties of the attribution predicted in what

circumstances, and over what time span the expectation of uncontrollability was likely to be present. An attribution to stable factors predicted that the expectation would be chronic or recurrent over time, whereas an attribution to unstable factors predicted a relatively transient, nonrecurrent expectation. An expectation of uncontrollability in terms of global factors predicted that the expectation would occur across many situations, whereas an explanation in terms of specific factors predicted that the expectation was likely to recur only in relatively similar situations. Finally an attribution for perceived noncontingency to internal causes led to self-esteem deficits, whereas an attribution to external causes did not lead to lowered self-esteem. Only an expectation of response-independent aversive outcomes would lead to the depressed effect. In the reformulated version of the theory as well as earlier versions, it was the expectation of future response-outcome noncontingency that was the crucial determinant of behavioural and affective deficits. Attribution merely predicted the recurrence of the expectations but the expectation determined the occurrence of helplessness deficits (Alloy, 1982:448).

However according to Alloy (1982:455) numerous studies have manipulated or measured subjects' causal attributions following an experience with uncontrollable events and have generally reported results compatible with the new reformulated theory's proposition that attributions predicted the occurrence of the expectation of noncontingency and subsequent behavioural deficits. In agreement with Anderson (1983:186) it could be stated that "Yet little is known about the processes that people normally use in generating and selecting attributions when they are not being prodded, probed or manipulated by psychologists". This highlighted the fact that helplessness theory might need greater specification in respect of additional mediational processes linking objective experiences, perceptions, attributions, expectations and behavioural effects of uncontrollability.

The aversive event of burglary was not an induced laboratory situation but the "real world" out there. To support this statement Bulman and Wortman (1977), and Tyler (1981), respectively, found that the individual's perceived control over outcomes, or behavioural self-blame for these outcomes successfully predicted positive coping

behaviours. Real world uncontrollability, like being the victim of housebreaking, was an unexpected event leaving individuals no choice about participation in the experience. Outcomes tended to be more serious and dealt with over longer periods of time. This increased the likelihood that victims of burglary initiated attribution processes to explain why they had been burglarised. Attributions over the dimensions global/specific, internal/external, stable/unstable would raise expectations of uncontrollability that would finally lead to chronic and general behavioural deficits as well as loss of self-esteem followed by anxiety and eventual depression.

3.4. SUMMARY

Over the years a large number of experiments have shown that a variety of organisms exposed to uncontrollable events exhibited subsequent disruption of behaviour. The older versions of the Learned Helplessness theory failed to distinguish between cases in which outcomes were uncontrollable for all people and in cases that they were uncontrollable for some people. This theory did not explain when helplessness was general or specific, and when it was chronic or acute. The expansion of the theory to include the cognitive mechanism of perception between objective experience of noncontingency and future response-outcome independence allowed for the event of new information about contingencies playing a role in whether expectation of future noncontingency would occur. The reformulated theory based on a revision of attribution theory resolved the inadequacies with respect to personal helplessness and the generality and chronicity of helplessness. The attribution chosen could influence whether expectation of future helplessness would conform to these dimensions.

The theory of Learned Helplessness was applied to the study subject "Fear of Housebreaking in the Honeydew Police district" to explain the motivational, cognitive and affective deficits that were evident in the coping behaviours of victims of burglary.

The next chapter concentrates on the data collected from 300 victims of housebreaking in the Honeydew Police district in order to establish whether the Learned Helplessness phenomenon is operative in a motivational, cognitive and emotional context.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH FINDINGS

4.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes and illustrates data collected from a random sample of 300 victims of housebreaking in the Honeydew Police District. The data obtained will be presented as tables, percentages, graphs and pie charts to give a clear picture of research findings.

Data will be mirrored in chapter five.

A statistical analysis was carried out by a statistician using the SAS statistical software package. The State and Trait Anxiety Inventory STAI (Form Y), under supervision of a professor of psychology, was administered to 100 respondents chosen from the abovementioned sample. The standard scores, mean scores, and the standard deviation for age and gender combinations for State and Trait anxiety were obtained for the 100 respondents. These were compared to an acceptable normative sample, for example, employees of the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States of America (Spielberger, 1983:STAI-AD Manual 16-21). The conditions under which these employees were tested were relatively nonstressful (neutral). This norm could be used with validity as a standard of comparison in respect of victims of housebreaking who were tested in the neutral context of their homes. The F-test was used to test for significant differences for state scores with regard to questions asked in the interview schedule.

The interview schedule consisted of the following subsections: (1) biographical data, (2) crime prevention measures taken before the burglary, (3) details regarding the victimisation, (4) crime prevention measures taken after the burglary and (5) an analysis of dependence between questions.

4.2. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

The biographic characteristics of 300 victims of housebreaking in the Honeydew Police District are summarised below.

4.2.1. Gender of victims

The gender of victims was evenly distributed, nearly 52 per cent males and 48,2 per cent female victims.

4.2.2. Age of victims

The range of ages of respondents was collapsed into categories with intervals of ten. The highest frequencies of victims of housebreaking were found in the age categories 30 - 39 years-of-age, nearly 32 per cent, and 40 - 49 years-of-age, nearly 27 per cent. The lowest frequency was recorded in the 60 years and over age group, nearly seven per cent. Seventeen comma three per cent, of victims of housebreaking were in the 19-29 and 50-59 years -of-age ranges.

4.2.3. Employment categories of victims

Evident from the data gathered, respondents fell chiefly into the professional, about 23 per cent, and business 23,3 per cent categories. Self-employed, over 15 per cent, and clerical 12,3 per cent, made up the next highest recorded categories. Housewives comprised nearly ten per cent and other nine per cent of the respondents. The lowest recorded frequencies were teachers, five comma three per cent, artisans nearly two per cent, and students nought comma three per cent.

4.2.4. Income level

The majority of the victims were in the middle income level, nearly 76 per cent. The minority of respondents, about six per cent, fell into the lower income level and nearly 17 per cent were in the upper income level. The income levels were determined as per paragraph 1.6 in the first chapter.

4.2.5. Type of dwelling burglarised

The single-family home seemed to be victimised most frequently, over 67 per cent, followed by small-holdings, that is properties of two to three hectares in size, about 23 per cent. Cluster homes, nearly nine per cent, retirement complexes, one per cent and blocks of flats, nought comma four per cent, were not as frequently targeted by burglars as single-family homes and smallholdings.

4.2.6. Victim's living patterns

The traditional nuclear family structure, father, mother and dependent offspring living together, was most strongly represented. Eighty-two comma three per cent, of victims lived together as a nuclear family structure. Nearly seventeen per cent of the victims were living alone, either divorced, widowed or single persons.

4.3. CRIME PREVENTION MEASURES TAKEN BEFORE THE FIRST BURGLARY (BEFORE DECEMBER 1993).

The crime prevention measures taken by victims of housebreaking before the first burglary are presented below.

4.3.1. Analysis of crime prevention measures taken before the first burglary

Table 4.1. reflects an analysis of the precautionary measures taken by victims of housebreaking before the first burglary (before December, 1993) This facilitated the first step in calculating statistical dependence between measures taken before and after the burglary and to test the central theoretical proposition "Victims of housebreaking have reduced incentives for initiating voluntary responses to control outcomes".

TABLE 4.1.

**AN ANALYSIS OF THE PREVENTION MEASURES TAKEN BEFORE THE
FIRST BURGLARY (BEFORE DECEMBER 1993).**

Item	Always	Usually	Sometimes	Never
<u>Are the doors locked</u>	%	%	%	%
when someone is home during the daytime	36,1	33,8	17,7	12,4
when someone is home during the evening	63,7	23,5	9,4	3,4
when someone is asleep at night.....	97,7	0,3	1,7	0,3
when your home is left vacant for less than an hour or more.....	95,0	2,0	2,7	0,3
Do you leave at least one interior light on when no-one is home at night.....	75,9	11,0	8,4	4,7
Do you leave an outdoor light on all night.....	48,7	7,0	15,3	29,0
Do you leave your home at the same time every day.....	17,4	42,5	20,4	19,7
Do you arrive home at the same time every day.....	10,5	26,4	33,9	29,2
Do you ask repairmen, deliverymen and meter readers to provide identification ...	17,6	20,3	21,5	40,6
Do you accompany them whilst they are performing their tasks	36,5	31,2	17,3	15,0
Do you ask friends to cut grass if you are away for more than a week.....	12,4	12,8	7,4	67,4
Do you have someone stay in your home whilst you are away.....	22,9	17,8	24,0	35,3
Do you ask police to check your home periodically whilst you are away.....	12,6	8,2	10,9	68,3
Do you discuss vacation dates with strangers.....	0,7	0,3	6,9	92,1
Do you employ casual labour.....	5,0	8,7	26,7	59,6

The greater majority of respondents practised caution and vigilance in respect of **locking-up behaviours** before the first burglary had taken place. Over one-third of respondents, 36 per cent, always "locked their homes when someone was home during the daytime", and nearly 64 per cent of respondents always "locked their homes when someone was home during the evening", nearly 98 per cent always "locked their homes when they were asleep" and 95 per cent always "locked their homes when it was left vacant for a short time".

Over 12 per cent of respondents interviewed, never "locked doors during daytime". Over 3 per cent never "locked doors when someone was home during the evening", nought comma three per cent never "locked doors at night" and nought comma three per cent never "locked their doors when the home was left vacant for a short space of time".

Nearly 34 per cent of the respondents usually "locked their homes during the daytime", and over 23 per cent usually "locked their homes during the evening". A minority of respondents, nought comma three per cent, usually "locked homes when someone was asleep at night" and two per cent usually "locked doors when the home was left vacant for less than an hour or more.

Close on 18 per cent of respondents sometimes "locked homes during the daytime", over nine per cent sometimes "locked doors during the evening", about two per cent sometimes "locked doors at night" and nearly three per cent sometimes "locked doors when the home was left vacant for a short while".

Interior lights were always "left on in the home at night when no one was home" by nearly 76 per cent, and never left on by nearly five per cent of respondents. In the instance of nearly 49 per cent victims an **outdoor light** was always "left on all night" and

29 per cent never "left the light on all night". Eleven per cent of victims usually "left interior lights on at night when the home was unoccupied" and seven per cent of victims usually "left an outdoor light on all night". Over eight per cent victims sometimes "left interior lights on when no-one was home" and 15,3 per cent of victims sometimes "left outdoor lights burning at night".

More than seventeen per cent victims of housebreaking always **asked repairmen, deliverymen, et cetera for positive identification** whilst over forty per cent never "asked for identification". More than twenty per cent, 20,3 per cent, and about 22 per cent of the respondents usually and sometimes "asked for identification".

In reply to the question "Do you **accompany workmen et cetera**, whilst they are performing their tasks", over 36 per cent always "accompanied workmen involved in service jobs" and 15 per cent never "accompanied workmen". In the case of 31,2 per cent of victims, they usually "accompanied workmen" and 17,3 per cent sometimes "accompanied workmen involved in service jobs".

Over seventeen per cent victims of housebreaking always **left their home at the same time every day** and nearly eleven per cent victims always **arrived home at the same time every day**. Close on 20 per cent, of the victims never "left their home at the same time every day" and 29,2 per cent never "arrived home at the same time every day". A great majority of respondents, nearly 43 per cent, usually "left their homes at the same time every day". Over 26 per cent usually "arrived at home at the same time every day". More than 20 per cent of respondents, sometimes "left their homes at the same time" and nearly 34 per cent of victims sometimes "arrived home at the same time".

Evident was the fact that the movements of victims were reasonably routine, increasing the probability of surveillance of the comings and goings of occupants of dwellings and the vulnerability of homes.

The majority of respondents, 91 per cent, replied that they never **discussed vacation dates with strangers**. A negligible amount of victims replied that they always "discussed vacation dates with strangers", nought comma seven per cent. Only nought comma three per cent usually and nearly seven per cent sometimes "discussed vacation dates with strangers".

Nearly twenty-three per cent of the respondents always **had someone stay in their homes**, 35,3 per cent never "had anyone to stay in their homes", 24 per cent sometimes "had someone staying" and nearly 18 per cent usually "had someone staying in their homes", **when they were away**.

Over 12 per cent of the respondents always **asked the police to check their homes whilst they were away**, while 68,3 per cent never "asked the police to check their homes during their absence". Eight comma two per cent of the respondents usually "had the police check their homes" and about eleven per cent sometimes "asked the police to check their homes".

The majority of respondents, over 67 per cent, never **asked friends to cut grass when they were away for more than a week**. Over 12 per cent always, nearly 13 per cent usually and over seven per cent sometimes "asked friends to cut grass when they were away".

Over half of the victims of housebreaking, over 59 per cent, never **employed casual labour**. Only five per cent of victims always "employed casual labour", nearly nine per cent usually employed and about 27 per cent sometimes "employed casual labour".

The above analysed data has been compared with that of table 4.3 and interpreted under points 5.3.2., 5.3.2.1. and 5.3.2.2. in order to test hypothesis 2 "Victims of burglary have reduced incentives for initiating voluntary responses to control outcomes".

4.3.2. Building operations near burglarised dwelling (Between 1st December, 1993 to 31st December 1994).

Half of the respondents, 50,2 per cent, replied affirmatively to the fact that building operations had been in progress and nearly 50 per cent replied that no building operations had been in progress at the time of the burglary/burglaries. The implications of the results have been discussed under 4.7.4.

Respondent 12

"I had just moved in. Had no walls around the perimeter of the property and had open veld next door. I think it was a guard looking after an empty house in the vicinity who had a loose mouth. Three houses were burglarised."

4.3.3. Houses-for-sale near burglarised dwelling (Between 1st December 1993 to 31st December, 1994).

Over 40 per cent of victims attested to the fact that no houses were for sale near their dwellings, whereas over 59 per cent replied affirmatively that there were houses for sale near their dwellings. Properties-for-sale, next door to the homes that were burglarised, were often neglected. Long grass gave intruders the opportunity to be well shielded from the view of neighbours.

4.3.4. Prominent display of the number of dwelling and name of occupant (Between 1st December 1993 to 31st December 1994).

The majority of victims, over 81 per cent, had their house numbers prominently displayed whereas nearly 19 per cent did not have their house numbers displayed anywhere. In only 12,3 per cent of cases was the name of the occupant prominently displayed alongside the number. In the majority of cases, nearly 88 per cent, names were not displayed.

4.3.5. Surveillability of home (Between 1st December 1993 to 31st December 1994).

The house of the victim could be easily observed by their neighbours in about 53 per cent of the cases. The visibility of the home appeared to be an important factor in contributing to the vulnerability of a home since in 47,3 per cent of all cases, the dwellings were not highly visible to neighbours of victims.

4.3.6 Proximity of dwelling to footpaths, main roads or open veld (Time period


1st December 1993 to 31st December 1994).

In 51 per cent of cases there were footpaths adjoining properties. Over 54 per cent of cases main roads passed the property and in 70 per cent of cases open veld was near to or adjoining properties.

Figure 4.1 illustrates the environmental factors that have contributed to the vulnerability of the home at the time of the burglary/burglaries. The influence of surveillability of the dwelling, the proximity of footpaths, main roads and open veld to the dwelling, building operations and houses-for-sale near the dwelling is pictorially described.

FIGURE 4.1

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO VULNERABILITY OF DWELLING



Evident from the above graph is the fact that the majority of homes, 70 per cent, were near open veld and over half the dwellings, over 54 per cent, were near main roads and 51 per cent had footpaths adjoining the property. Visibility appeared to be an important factor since 47,3 per cent of dwellings were not easily visible to neighbours. In

over 59 per cent of cases victims had houses-for-sale near their dwellings and 50,2 per cent of the victims replied that building operations had taken place at the time of the burglary.


4.3.7. Insurance taken out before the first burglary (Before 1st December 1993)

The majority of respondents, 71 per cent, had taken out insurance to protect their household goods and 29 per cent had no insurance cover before the first burglary.

Figure 4.2 illustrates the percentage of victims who had taken out insurance cover before the first burglary.

FIGURE 4.2.

PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO HAD TAKEN OUT INSURANCE BEFORE THE FIRST BURGLARY (Before December, 1993)



The majority of respondents, 71 per cent, had taken out insurance cover in case of their dwelling being burglarised.


4.3.8. Ownership of watchdogs before the first burglary (Before 1st December 1993).

Sixty per cent, owned a watchdog and 40 per cent had no watchdogs to protect their property from intruders before the first burglary. In cases where victims owned dogs, but nevertheless had their homes burglarised, several reasons were cited. The dog

was still a puppy, was too old, not fierce enough or in a position where they could not get at the intruders. Often the dog was at the veterinary surgeon at the time of the burglary.

Figure 4.3 illustrates the percentage of victims who owned watchdogs before the first burglary.

FIGURE 4.3.
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO OWNED WATCHDOGS BEFORE THE FIRST BURGLARY (Before December, 1993)



Close on sixty per cent, owned watchdogs before the first burglary.


4.3.9. Houses fitted with burglar alarms and house alarms linked to security firms before the first burglary (Before 1st December 1993).

In over 34 per cent of cases houses were fitted with burglar alarms. Houses were not protected by means of burglar alarm systems in 65,3 per cent of cases. In instances where houses were fitted with burglar alarms over 24 per cent of these were linked up to a security firm and the majority of homes, over 75 per cent, were not linked to security firms. The lack of alarms and links to security firms was explained away as being too expensive. It did not fit into the household budget.

Figure 4.4 shows the percentage of houses fitted with burglar alarms before the first burglary took place.

FIGURE 4.4.

**PERCENTAGE OF HOUSES FITTED WITH BURGLAR
ALARMS BEFORE THE FIRST BURGLARY (Before 1st December 1993).**




About one-third of homes burglarised, 34,7 per cent, were fitted with burglar alarms before the first burglary.

Figure 4.5 depicts practical measures taken by victims before the burglary in respect of insurance cover, ownership of watchdogs, alarms installed and links to security firms.

FIGURE 4.5.

GRAPH OF INSURANCE TAKEN OUT, OWNERSHIP OF WATCHDOGS, INSTALLATION OF BURGLAR ALARMS AND LINKS TO SECURITY BEFORE THE FIRST BURGLARY (Before 1st December, 1993)



Over half the respondents, 60 per cent, owned watchdogs and the majority of respondents, 71 per cent, had insurance cover before the first burglary. A lesser percentage of homes, nearly 35 per cent, had fitted burglar alarms and over 75 per cent had no links to security firms.

4.4. DETAILS REGARDING VICTIMISATION

4.4.1 Type of crime the victim and his family experienced during the time period 1st December, 1993 to 31st December, 1994.

One hundred per cent were victims of property crimes, eleven per cent crime against the person and one per cent white collar crimes, either before, during or after the burglary. This question allowed for multiple answers. This question was used as an indicator of past victimising experiences (see paragraph 5.3.1.3.).

4.4.2. Number of times homes were burglarised during 1st December 1993 to 31st December 1994

Twenty-two per cent of the homes were victimised twice during 1993 and 1994 and nearly nine per cent of homes broken into three times. Over seven per cent of homes were the target of burglars four times, and nearly three per cent were broken into five times. Where multiple burglaries occurred, nought comma three per cent of dwellings were broken into six, eight, nine or more times. Homes were broken into and entered seven times in nearly two per cent of cases.

Figure 4.6. depicts the number of times dwellings were burglarised.

FIGURE 4.6.
PERCENTAGE OF TIMES HOMES WERE BURGLARISED



Homes were no longer targets of only a single burglary because multiple burglaries were increasing.

4.4.3. Why respondents thought their homes were burglarised.

By means of an open-ended question the 300 respondents interviewed gave reasons why they thought their homes had been burglarised.

Prime time for homes to be burglarised was when they were unoccupied. In 204 cases burglaries occurred when the *homes were unoccupied*. The family was away on holiday, or out for an evening's entertainment or at work and at school.

Respondent 9

"We were away on holiday. We suspect the maid and her accomplices were responsible since the burglars knew where everything of value was."

Households where both spouses worked and children were at school were often a target. Respondents felt that burglars knew the routine of the family and their predictable movements, leaving the home very vulnerable.

Respondent 89

"Somebody was watching our movements and thought it was easy as we were out all day. I think the burglar was disturbed as there was a pile of clothes on the lounge floor which had been dropped."

Public holidays appeared to be a popular time for a burglary to take place. On New Year's day five homes had been burglarised on the same day in the same street. It was thought to be a syndicate of thieves who had operated on that day.

Twenty-two respondents felt they had been *watched by gardeners, and other labourers* in the neighbourhood. These persons were acquaintances of domestic staff. Domestic staff and gardeners often unwittingly provided potential offenders with information that their employers were going away on holiday or had bought a new television set. One respondent thought it was the garden service that had committed both offences. Even technicians from the telephone department were suspect. When an extra line had been installed the technicians could acquaint themselves with the layout of the house and security measures taken.

Respondent 12

"Think it was an internal job. Guard had a loose mouth, because three houses were burglarised."

Seven respondents replied that burglars *often searched for firearms*. Beds and bedding were overturned. This was the usual place where intruders looked for weapons.

Respondent 37

"Recently received a gun licence. Within two weeks the house was burglarised"

Twenty-two victims of housebreaking had a suspicion that their homes were broken into because of *building construction taking place in their vicinity*. This allowed for plenty of labour pedestrian traffic, and unauthorised strangers in the area who could legitimately observe the routines of householders.

Forty-two victims replied that the *property next door was for sale*. Frequently these properties were neglected. Long grass gave intruders the opportunity to be well shielded from the view of neighbours. When houses were for sale and standing empty, guards living on the property were in a position to scan the area and movements of residents that could be passed on to friends.

Ten respondents thought it was a *passer-by who tried his luck*.

Respondent 145

“The voting queue during April, 1994, was passing my house which gave offenders ample opportunity to case out my house. The burglary occurred soon after the elections. They arrived equipped with a truck to move my possessions.”

The presence of *squatter camps* posed a great threat and was an emotive issue to 16 respondents. This was especially evident from the response gained in the Sonnedal area. Zimbabwean illegals and Mozambican refugees sleeping in the open veld were seen by persons who were residents of the area as contributing to a general breakdown of law and order. Because squatters were generally unemployed they resorted to theft in order to live. One respondent quoted that he lived over the road to a squatter camp and that his home had been burglarised 15 times.

Respondent 36

“Once I was attacked at a quarter to three in the morning. The chap raised a knife to stab me and hammered me on the head. I tried to shoot him. He then ran away.”

A factor thought to have contributed to the vulnerability of a dwelling was the fact that pet owners *locked their dogs up* in backyards. The dog was trapped and could not keep the intruder at bay. Watchdogs that were not vicious, too old, had died or were ill, left a dwelling a soft target for would-be-offenders. These reasons were cited in eleven cases.

One-hundred and forty-eight respondents felt that burglary was due to *unemployment and no respect for the property of others*. Much needed money was made by selling stolen items. There was not a large enough presence of police to combat the crime problem allowing thieves to walk into homes with impunity and take other peoples' things.

Respondent 28

"Done by people who don't work and have nothing of their own, so they take other's things."
 "There are too many unemployed people roaming the streets."

Respondent 2

"Burglars seem to think that people who can afford a new house are filthy rich."

In one instance a respondent replied that when her *house went on show* it afforded many the opportunity to see where the burglar proofing was and where they could get in. It also allowed the offender to see what was on offer. Her house had been well secured with heavy burglar bars on all windows and doors. Other burglaries had also occurred after houses in the same street went on show.

Failure to take precautions were tied in with the feeling expressed by eleven respondents that the incident was partly due to *negligence* that led to their homes being burglarised. Windows were left open in four cases, the security gate left unlocked, alarm not switched on or the garage door left unlocked. An obvious indication that no one was home to the burglar was lights that were left burning whilst the homeowners were on holiday.

High walls around courtyards lowered the risk of detection of burglars by neighbours. Four victims interviewed replied that their homes *could not easily be observed by their neighbours*. The homes in question were secluded, isolated and often hidden by overgrown shrubs and trees. Corner stands were mentioned as the possible reason why homes had been burglarised in four cases. Fifteen respondents mentioned that homes were near open veld, footpaths, servitudes or main roads.

Insufficient security was cited as a possible cause of break-ins in 17 instances. Alarms were not installed properly, were out of order or not switched on. Windows were without burglar bars and homes lacked safety doors. In rented homes no precautions were taken at all. Factors such as homes near *bus shelters, taxi ranks* or near a local *hotel that was a notorious hangout for drug pushers*, were also mentioned.

Thirty respondents were *uncertain* as to why their homes had been burglarised. The greater majority of respondents felt that their number was up and that all homes had a burglary sometimes.

Respondent 104

“We have no idea. We have locked doors, gates, have security lighting and a walled property. We also have two Rottweilers. You tell us!”

4.4.4. How the burglary was discovered

In answer to an open-ended question, the 300 victims of burglary described how they had discovered that their homes had been invaded by offenders.

Twenty-eight respondents replied that when they got home from work they found their homes burglarised.

Respondent 175

“I came home from work and found water pouring under the front door. I thought my husband had left a tap running when he went to work, but found when I opened the door we had been burgled.”

Forty-three victims found their home had been burglarised whilst they were out for the evening, visiting friends, going to the movies or out at a party. In eight instances the owners had been on holiday and found that their homes had been broken into. Sixteen victims replied that they had discovered it the next morning when they woke up. Twenty-seven respondents replied that they were home, asleep, and were woken up by the sound of a door being opened, windows being broken or other noises.

Respondent 127

"My mother-in-law, a cripple, was inside the house on her own. She did not respond promptly to the doorbell. The men broke the back kitchen window and tried to open the back door. She locked herself in her bedroom and said that she could hear their tackies squeaking on the floor while they were searching the house for goods."

Eighteen victims replied that they had walked into the house while the robbery was in progress and disturbed the burglars.

Respondent 39

"I was attacked in my own home. I found the burglar cooking his food on my stove. He turned and stabbed me in the back. If it was not for the thick windbreaker I was wearing I would have been paralysed today."

Respondent 208

"I came home from a late night show. I was alone and walked in on it. I was scared to hell."

Neighbours in 30 cases reported the house having been burglarised. In seven cases armed response had alerted the homeowners. In seven instances the maid either heard the burglar or found that the house had been broken into.

Respondent 41

"Neighbours alerted the police. Police discovered the burglars and caught them as they were going out of the gate. Combi was neatly loaded and everything neatly packed."

Two-hundred and seven respondents replied that household goods were left lying outside, the house left in disarray, windows broken and doors smashed. Eighteen respondents arrived home to find goods missing. They found electrical goods, video machines, hi-fi's, cars, bicycles and jewellery taken. Open refrigerator and cupboard doors alerted the respondent that someone had been in the house.

Respondent 114

"I found my washing machine lying upside down in the driveway. Saw clothes lying in the driveway."

Respondent 115

"When we arrived home, and opened the front door, we saw a jewellery case lying in the

entrance hall. The television was lying face down on the floor. The back door was open. The safe had been broken into with an angle grinder.”

Respondent 37

“The moment I saw the top of a garden pick lying on the piano stool and AWB painted in toothpaste on the bedroom carpet I knew something was wrong.”

4.4.5. House occupancy rate at the time of burglary/burglaries

At the time of the burglary/burglaries nearly 69 per cent of the homes were unoccupied.

4.4.6. Confrontation

Of the victims that were home at the time of the burglary/burglaries over eleven per cent were involved in a verbal confrontation with the burglar(s) and nearly 13 per cent of the victims were involved in a physical confrontation.

4.4.7 Armed offenders

Seventeen respondents were of the opinion that the burglars were armed with knives. Six respondents thought that the burglar(s) carried sharp objects and nine thought that they were armed with an unidentified object, and eight respondents saw burglars armed with guns. Ninety-four respondents were home at the time of the burglary/burglaries. Out of this total 54 respondents were uncertain whether the criminals were armed.

4.4.8. Type of goods stolen

High on the shopping list of the burglar was electronic goods, clothes, jewellery and electrical equipment. This type of goods had a very ready market among the acquaintances of the burglar. The type of goods taken reflected the burglar's professionalism.

Respondent 41

"They stacked the best paintings and china but were caught before they could be taken. Everything was ready outside to be taken, neatly stacked. They took only the very best. Neighbours saw them. Everything that was good and could be resold."

Common stolen items were *electronic goods* with television sets heading the list (125), followed by video recorders (116), sound systems (102) and 80 portable radios. Popular as well were video cameras, decoders, compact disc players, and music cassettes. Other sought after items were *clothes and linen* such as sheets, blankets, towels, duvets, and pillows. Ten victims had *leather jackets* stolen and two victims had *ray-bans* stolen. The above were portable and very easily fenced or enjoyed personally.

Eighty-five respondents replied that they had *jewellery* stolen. Sixteen respondents had *money* stolen. Two *coin collections* and one *stamp collection* were also taken. *Paintings* from two homes formed part of the burglar's haul.

Sports equipment received favour. Golf clubs and shoes, squash racquets, running shoes, camping equipment and a fishing rod were among the items mentioned. Twenty-five bicycles were stolen from homes.

Mechanical, electrical and gardening tools were in demand. Items such as wheelbarrows, edge trimmers, hose pipes, lawn mowers, pool cleaners and welding machines were often taken from dwellings.

Crockery, cooking utensils, cutlery, food and liquor, were other prized items. *Miscellaneous items* taken from the home were carpet cleaners, curtains, rugs and eight sewing machines.

Where homes had adjoining offices, *computers, switchboards, typewriters, fax machines, answering machines, filing boxes and even telephones had been taken.*

In two cases *two safes with guns* were stolen and in three instances houses were ransacked and vandalised whilst the burglars were searching for guns. Seven guns were stolen.

A *car* was stolen because the intruder found keys hanging from a key rack in the kitchen. The car was brand new and not insured. Where thieves failed to start a car they were attempting to steal they slashed the tyres in revenge. Nine *car radios* were stolen.

Respondent 136

"I chained my car to a pillar in the carport attached to the house. Thieves failed to remove the chains and in revenge slashed the tyres."

4.4.9 Value of property stolen

A large proportion of respondents, over 46 per cent, felt their loss had been considerable and eleven per cent of victims felt that their loss had been very extensive. Over seventeen per cent, felt their loss had been extensive. Nearly 23 per cent of victims felt their loss had been minimal and over two per cent felt uncertain about the magnitude of their loss. No monetary value was attached to the loss because the same article stolen would have substituted a greater loss to the poorer person than to the wealthy. Items of sentimental value cannot be quantified in monetary terms.

4.4.10 Degrees of worry that dwelling may be broken into again.

Nearly 41 per cent of the respondents expressed considerable fear, worrying very much that they would be burglarised again compared to over 15 per cent who worried a little. Twenty-one per cent, worried much, nearly 18 per cent worried somewhat, three per cent worried not at all, and over two per cent did not know.

4.4.11 Access point of dwellings

The window appeared to be the preferred point of entry in nearly 52 per cent of cases. In 45,1 per cent cases the burglar entered through a door and in over three per cent of times through the roof. In some instances sliding doors were lifted from the door frame or broken down and smashed by means of a heavy object. In 30 instances windows were broken either by the intruder throwing a stone at the glasspanes and then opening doors by putting their arms through the aperture. Twenty-five respondents replied that doors were broken open and wrenched off their hinges. Six respondents saw burglar bars ripped away from the wall.

4.4.12 Reasons for reporting the burglary

The responses of 300 victims of burglary to an open-ended question "Why they had reported the crime" are listed below in rank order.

TABLE 4.2

REASONS FOR REPORTING THE BURGLARY

Reasons	% of cases
Need for a case number for insurance.....	47,6%
To recover stolen goods.....	34,0%
To try catch the thief.....	20,3%
A natural response to crime.....	18,3%
Hoping that justice will be done.....	4,7%
To find fingerprints of the culprits.....	4,7%
Social duty	4,7%
For police records.....	3,0 %
To reduce crime.....	2,7%
Legal requirement in respect of a stolen gun	1,0%
Wanted a bit of action.....	1,0%
I was strangled /raped.....	1,0%
I was nearly murdered.....	0,6%
To catch the gang operating in the area.....	0,3%

The main reasons respondents called the police were the need for a case number for insurance purposes, about 48 per cent cases. Twenty comma three per cent, of the respondents were also concerned to see the offender caught and 34 per cent wanted their stolen goods recovered. About 18,3 per cent regarded it as a natural response to the experience of crime. Nearly five per cent hoped that justice would be done, and that it was a social duty and to find the fingerprints of the culprits. Three per cent thought it was necessary for police records and about three per cent thought it helped to reduce crime. One per cent of the respondents wanted a bit of action, that it was a legal requirement in respect of a stolen gun or that they were strangled and raped. Nought comma three per cent wanted to catch the gang operating in the area and nearly nought comma six per cent were nearly murdered.

4.5 CRIME PREVENTION MEASURES TAKEN AFTER BURGLARY

The following sub-section deals with changes in routine behaviour or physical structure by the respondent after the burglary/burglaries had taken place. The recall of emotional reactions of interviewees after the discovery are tabled. In addition the respondent's attribution style and his perception of the burglar as a person is summarised below.


4.5.1. Whether victims had moved away or had plans to move away.

After the burglary/burglaries over ten per cent of the victims had moved away from the neighbourhood and eight per cent had plans to move from their present home. A total of nearly 71 per cent had no plans to move whilst more than ten per cent of the respondents were not sure if they were going to move away.

Figure 4.7 describes how the event of being burglarised influenced the victim to move away or plans to move away from burglarised dwelling.

FIGURE 4.7.

WHETHER VICTIM HAD MOVED OR HAD PLANS TO MOVE AWAY FROM BURGLARISED HOME.



Evident from the above graph is that the majority of respondents had no plans to move and the minority were uncertain whether to move away, or had plans to move and had moved away.

4.5.2. An analysis of crime prevention measures taken after the last burglary

To aid the calculation of statistical dependence between points 4.3.1. (crime prevention measures taken before the burglary) and point 4.5.2. (crime prevention measures taken after the burglary/burglaries) the following analysis is done.

TABLE 4.3.

AN ANALYSIS OF CRIME PREVENTION MEASURES TAKEN AFTER THE BURGLARY**(PERIOD BETWEEN 1ST DECEMBER 1993 TO 31ST DECEMBER 1994).**

Item	Always	Usually	Sometimes	Never
<u>Are the doors locked</u>				
When someone is home during the day	52,1%	29,8%	10,7%	7,4%
When someone is home during the evening.....	76,2%	15,4%	7,4%	1,0%
When someone is asleep at night.....	98,7%	1,0%	0,3%	0,0%
When your home is left vacant for less than an hour or more.....	96,3%	1,3%	1,7%	0,7%
Do you leave at least one interior light on when no-one is home at night.....	79,2%	11,4%	5,4%	4,0%
Do you leave an outdoor light on all night.....	52,2%	8,4%	15,7	23,7%
Do you leave your home at the same time every day	17,7%	35,7%	23,8%	22,8%
Do you arrive home at the same time every day.....	10,2%	25,9%	33,3%	30,6%
Do you ask repairmen, deliverymen, meter readers to provide identification.....	31,4%	20,4%	18,0%	30,2%
Do you accompany them whilst they are performing their tasks.....	46,0%	25,0%	14,5%	14,5%
Do you ask friends to cut grass if you are away for more than a week.....	13,8%	10,6%	9,8%	65,8%
Do you ask police to check your home whilst you are away.....	21,8%	8,1%	8,8%	61,3%
Do you discuss vacation dates with strangers.....	2,1%	1,7%	4,1%	92,1%
Do you employ casual labour.....	4,1%	6,4%	20,9%	68,6%
Do you have someone to stay in your home whilst you are away.....	30,4%	15,0%	18,1%	36,5%

4.5.3. Insurance cover taken by victims of burglary after the last burglary

After the last burglary nearly 70 per cent of victims of burglary had insurance cover and 30 per cent of victims had no insurance cover.


As reported to the interviewer by respondents 75 and 87.

“Mr. D, an owner of a country-inn was informed that the insurance on his hotel had increased by 500% overnight. Another resident was told by his insurance company he had to fence off his property, install an alarm system and have his windows covered with an armourclad plastic layer, the cost of which would be more than R80 000,00 before he could be insured. The problem was that squatters had moved in nearby.”

Figure 4.8 indicates the percentage insurance cover taken out by victims after the last burglary.

FIGURE 4.8

INSURANCE COVER TAKEN BY VICTIMS AFTER THE LAST BURGLARY



Respondents had not increased insurance cover after the last burglary, about 70 per cent, when compared to percentages before the burglary/burglaries, 71 per cent.


4.5.4. Ownership of watchdogs

More victims owned watchdogs after the last burglary, nearly 65 per cent, than before the first burglary and 35,3 per cent still did not own a watchdog.

Figure 4.9 shows the percentage of respondents who owned watchdogs after the last burglary.

FIGURE 4.9.

OWNERSHIP OF WATCHDOGS AFTER LAST BURGLARY



More respondents owned watchdogs after the last burglary, about 65 per cent, when compared to before the first burglary, nearly 60 per cent.

4.5.5. Installation of burglar alarm systems and links to security firms after the last burglary had taken place.

There was an increase in the number of burglar alarm systems installed by victims after the last burglary. Fifty-three comma three per cent homes were fitted with alarm systems in contrast to about 35 per cent homes before the first burglary. After the last burglary over 39 per cent of the burglar alarms installed were linked up to security firms. Nearly 61 per cent burglar alarm systems installed were not linked to security firms.

4.5.6. Precautions taken.

Table 4.4. summarises the responses obtained by means of open-ended questions from 300 hundred victims of housebreaking in Honeydew in respect of precautions taken after the last burglary.

TABLE 4.4.
PRECAUTIONS TAKEN BY VICTIMS AFTER LAST BURGLARY

Precautions	Cases
Upgraded insurance	8
Deadbolt locks	11
Changed locks	2
More padlocks	11
Gates padlocked	6
Exterior security lights	5
Sensor lights on verandah.....	2
New walls.....	4
Spikes on walls.....	7
Heightened walls.....	2
Glass on top of walls.....	1
Electrified fences.....	10
Razor fencing	10
Installed automatic gates.....	4
Installed intercom.....	1
Installed alarm system.....	20
Infra red beam.....	4
Siren.....	1
Linked to armed response.....	21
Security gates on outside doors.....	15
Security gates on inside of the house.....	20
Trellidoors.....	10
Neighbours fitted alleyway with a security gate.....	4
External key access on all doors eliminated except for front door.....	1
Cut away bushy plants in front of a window.....	1
Burglar bars on windows.....	41
Bricked up window.....	1
New steel bar over door that was point of entry.....	1
Bought a new dog.....	7
Moved security gate so dogs were not trapped in back yards.....	3
Do not leave the house unattended.....	5
Inform the neighbours when not at home.....	9
Keep an eye open for the unusual and suspicious.....	2
Irregular times of going out.....	3
Joined neighbourhood watch.....	1
Self-defence classes.....	2
Bought shotguns.....	2
Armed at all times.....	2
Moved away.....	4
Moved to a townhouse.....	2
Leave lights burning.....	1
Dismissed staff.....	1
Leave the television switched on and washing machine working when out.....	1
Rented out rooms.....	1
Employed a maid.....	1
None	92

4.5.7. Attitudes regarding future safety

A small percentage of victims, about 17 per cent, felt that the crime prevention measures they had taken after the burglary/burglaries would ensure their safety. Most victims, about 46 per cent, felt uncertain about their safety and nearly 38 per cent had the opinion that they were not safe at all.

4.5.8. Emotions experienced by victims of housebreaking

The range of emotions experienced by victims of housebreaking are presented in tabular and graphic form.


TABLE 4.5.

EMOTIONS EXPERIENCED BY VICTIMS OF HOUSEBREAKING.

Emotions	Yes	No
Feelings of unease.....	75,6%	24,45%
Insecurity.....	66,0%	34,0%
Tendency to keep thinking about the event.....	57,7%	42,3%
Invasion of privacy	93,6%	6,4%
Vulnerability.....	75,3%	24,7%
Calm.....	28,8 %	71,25
Resignation.....	47,1%	52,9%
Anger.....	90,8%	9,2%
Shock.....	62,3%	37,7%
Outrage.....	75,3%	24,7%
Fearful of leaving the house.....	44,6%	55,4%
Fearful of being alone in the house.....	36,7%	63,3%
Unable to sleep.....	24,0%	76,0%
Nightmares.....	7,8%	92,2%
Depression.....	19,0%	81,0%

In about 94 per cent of cases victims felt that the burglar had invaded the privacy of their homes. This was closely followed by feelings of unease, about 76 per cent and anger, nearly 91 per cent and vulnerability as well as outrage 75,3 per cent. About 67 per cent of the victims felt insecure and nearly 58 per cent had the tendency to keep thinking about the event. Sixty-two comma three per cent of the victims felt shocked and over 44 per cent felt fearful of leaving the house. Only a few respondents mentioned being calm, nearly 29 per cent. Forty-seven per cent of the victims, were resigned to the fact that their house had been burglarised. Most of the respondents did not suffer from psychosomatic symptoms. Less than 93 per cent, did not suffer from nightmares, 81 per cent did not suffer depression and 76 per cent did not have sleeping problems. About 37 per cent of the victims were fearful of leaving the house. Studies supporting the above data will be discussed in chapter 5.

FIGURE 4.10
EMOTIONS EXPERIENCED BY 300 VICTIMS OF BURGLARY



Victims of burglary experienced a full range of common emotions. Psychosomatic symptoms were minimal.

4.5.9. Attribution style of victims

A layout of the global attribution style of victims is presented in table 4.6.

TABLE 4.6.

GLOBAL ATTRIBUTIONS MADE BY 300 VICTIMS OF HOUSEBREAKING

Attributions	Yes	No
1. Police are unable to do anything about the matter	83,4%	16,6%
2. Offenders will never be caught.....	78,7%	21,3%
3. Stolen goods will never be recovered.....	84,2%	15,8%
4. Live in a bad neighbourhood	18,5%	81,5%
5. The world is a lawless, threatening place	55,4%	44,6%
6. No control over destiny.....	46,8%	53,2%

Over eighty-three per cent of the respondents believed that the police were unable to do anything about the burglary and that the offenders would never be caught in nearly 79 per cent of cases. Victims in over 84 per cent of cases also felt that their goods would never be recovered. A minority of respondents, about 19 per cent, believed that they lived in a bad neighbourhood. A little more than half the respondents, about 56 per cent, thought that the world was a lawless, threatening place and nearly 47 per cent respondents felt that they had no control over their destiny.

4.5.10. Victim's image of the burglar as a person

As respondent 15 replied ;

“Traditionally the burglar was a masked gentleman dressed in black. He carried the family silver and jewels he had stolen in a big sack over his shoulder.”

The modern version mentioned by Respondent 100 was;

“Big, wearing a trench coat, carrying a tool box with a huge spanner or club in his hand. He has a scar on his face, small slanting eyes, a big nose and very thick lips. Dangerous looking.”

In many instances they were viewed as hardened, desperate and violent criminals.

Respondent 86

"A black man with dark clothes and a balaclava on, sneaking and peeking with some kind of a weapon in his hand."

An overwhelming majority of respondents pictured the burglar as a black man, between 18 to 26 years of age. The burglars were seen to operate mostly in groups of two to three persons. Sometimes a young child assisted them because they could easily climb through open windows. In many instances they were viewed as hardened, desperate and dangerous criminals. Nearly half the respondents felt that burglary was the work of the professional organised gang with their own transport. In some cases it was the work of young, poor and unemployed opportunists. There was also the image that it was the work of a white man organising a group of black men to rob homes. Only once was the female acknowledged as a burglar.

Respondent 90.

"Three, young, white teenagers, one of them is a female."

Respondent 125.

"Probably someone in desperate need because of unemployment. He feels justified and approved of by stealing. It is something he is owed by the more affluent society and burglary has become a so-called 'legitimised' activity. It is another form of redistribution of wealth."

Respondent 176

"I knew him. He was a thin, very young, black man. He threatened to kill me when he came out of jail. He had a very long record of crime."

The burglar was also conjured up to be an ordinary, everyday type.

Respondent 28.

"As a faceless, nameless person who hangs around neighbourhoods watching and waiting for a chance to break in and take whatever they want."

About 20 per cent of respondents had no idea.

Respondent 233

"I have not allowed myself to visualise the event or persons responsible."

It was beyond the scope of this study to peruse police records in order to confirm the above data.

4.6. ANALYSIS OF DEPENDENCE BETWEEN QUESTIONS

In this section the dependence between certain questions are tested. The chi-square test, a test of significance for independence is used. Normal two-way frequency tables are compiled and the Pearson chi-square test statistic is calculated with $(R-1)(C-1)$ degrees of freedom, where R and C are equal to the number of categories for the two variables in the two-way frequency table. (Let a_{ij} ; $i=1, \dots, R$; $j=1, \dots, C$) be the frequency counts in the $R \times C$ two-way frequency table. Let r_i , c_j and N represent the row totals, column totals and table total respectively. The chi-square test statistic is equal to:

$$\chi^2 = \sum_i \sum_j [(a_{ij} - e_{ij})^2 / e_{ij}]$$

where $e_{ij} = r_i c_j / N$

With the aid of SAS (a statistical software package) and the chi-square value, degrees of freedom (d.f.) and p-value are calculated for the two-way frequency tables. The p-value has to be interpreted with a hypothesis. The hypothesis can be formulated as follows:

Null hypothesis (H_0):	There is a no dependence between the two variables under consideration.
Alternative hypothesis (H_A):	There is a dependence between the two variables under consideration.

If the p-value is less than 0,05, then one can reject the null hypothesis at a 5% level of significance, or accept the alternative hypothesis. If the p-value is less than 0.01, then one can reject H_0 at a 1% level of significance. For the purpose of this study only p-values less than 0,01 are considered, since many approximations are used in the procedure.

The following paragraphs tested the dependence between two variables. In each case a two-way frequency table is given, with corresponding chi-square values, degrees of freedom (d.f.) and p-value. Only the significant dependencies between variables are

given. The insignificant dependencies should therefore be interpreted in the way it is described in sections 4.2 to 4.5 (i.e. each variable on its own).

4.6.1. Comparison of precautionary measures taken before the first and after the last burglary.

Tables 4.7 to 4.13 portray significant dependence in respect of vigilant or precautionary behaviours exercised before and after the burglary/burglaries.

The figures below are compiled using two simultaneous questions (i.e. how many respondents simultaneously answered the two questions). This will explain the slight discrepancies between tables in section 4.6, and tables 4.1 and 4.3.

4.6.1.1. Locking doors during the daytime when someone was home

TABLE 4.7
SIGNIFICANT DEPENDENCE BETWEEN "LOCKING UP DURING THE DAYTIME" BEFORE THE BURGLARY AND "LOCKING UP DURING THE DAYTIME" AFTER THE BURGLARY

	<u>Doors locked when someone was home during the daytime after burglary (Item 52)</u>				<u>Total</u>
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	
<u>Doors locked when someone was home during the daytime before the burglary (Item 7)</u>					
Always (1)	102	4	2	1	109
Usually (2)	34	64	3	0	101
Sometimes (3)	9	19	23	2	53
Never (4)	11	3	4	19	37
<u>Total</u>	156	90	32	22	300

$$\chi^2 = 311,583; \text{ d.f.} = 9 \text{ and } p\text{-value} = 0,000$$

There was a significant dependence between question 2.1. (item 7, on the interview schedule) "Are the doors locked when someone is home during the daytime" before the burglary had taken place and (item 52) "Are the doors locked when someone is home during the daytime", after the burglary had taken place. **More respondents (52 per cent)**

always locked their doors during the daytime after they had been burglarised than before the burglary (36,3 per cent).

4.6.1.2 Locking doors when at home during the evening, before and after a burglary.

TABLE 4.8.

SIGNIFICANT DEPENDENCE BETWEEN “LOCKING UP DURING THE EVENING” BEFORE THE BURGLARY AND “LOCKING UP DURING THE EVENING “AFTER THE BURGLARY

	<u>Doors locked during the evening - after the burglary (Item 53)</u>				<u>Total</u>
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	
<u>Doors locked during the evening before the burglary (Item 8)</u>					
Always (1)	183	4	2	0	189
Usually (2)	31	37	2	0	70
Sometimes (3)	7	5	16	0	28
Never (4)	5	0	2	3	10
	226	46	22	3	297

$\chi^2 = 311.051$; d.f. = 9 and p-value = 0.000

There was a significant dependence between question 2.1 (item 8) “Locking doors when someone is home during the evening” before the burglary had taken place and question 4.2 (item 53) “Locking doors when someone is home during the evening” after the burglary had taken place. **More respondents always locked their doors during the evening (76,1 per cent) after they had been burglarised than before (63,6 per cent) they had been burglarised.**

4.6.1.3. Leaving home at the same time every day

TABLE 4.9.

SIGNIFICANT DEPENDENCE BETWEEN "LEAVING HOME AT THE SAME TIME EVERY DAY" BEFORE AND AFTER THE BURGLARY.

	<u>Leaving the home at the same time every day after the burglary (Item 58)</u>				<u>Total</u>
	1	2	3	4	
<u>Leaving the home at the same time every day - before the burglary (Item 13)</u>					
Always (1)	47	3	1	0	51
Usually (2)	3	100	18	4	125
Sometimes (3)	1	1	49	7	58
Never (4)	0	1	2	55	58
	51	105	70	66	292

$$\chi^2 = 598,482; \text{ d.f.} = 9 \text{ and p-value} = 0,000$$

There was a significant dependence between question 2.1. (item 13) "Leaving the home at the same time every day" before the burglary and question 4.2. (item 58) "Leaving the home at the same time every day" after the burglary. Respondents had staggered routines after the burglary. **Before the burglary 60,28 per cent of respondents always or usually left their homes at the same time, while after the burglary only 53,43 per cent respondents left their homes at the same time every day.**

4.6.1.4. Proof of identification from meter readers, et cetera.

TABLE 4.10

DEPENDENCE BETWEEN PROOF OF IDENTIFICATION FROM METER READERS, ET CETERA, BEFORE AND AFTER THE BURGLARY

	<u>Proof of identification from meter readers, et cetera, after the burglary (Item 60)</u>				<u>Total</u>
	1	2	3	4	
<u>Proof of identification from meter readers, et cetera, before the burglary (Item 15)</u>					
Always (1)	44	0	0	1	45
Usually (2)	16	33	1	1	51
Sometimes (3)	7	8	36	1	52
Never (4)	12	11	9	73	105
Total	79	52	46	76	253

$$\chi^2 = 334,333; \text{ d.f.} = 9 \text{ and p-value} = 0,000$$

There was a significant dependence between question 2.1. (item 15) "Do you ask repairmen, deliverymen and meter readers to provide identification" before the burglary and question 4.2. (item 60) "Do you ask repairmen, deliverymen and meter readers to provide identification" after the burglary. **Before the burglary 37,95 per cent of the respondents asked for identification of repairmen, deliverymen and meter readers. After the burglary 51,78 per cent of respondents asked for identification from servicemen.**

4.6.1.5 Accompanying servicemen while they are performing their tasks

TABLE 4.11.

SIGNIFICANT DEPENDENCE BETWEEN ACCOMPANYING SERVICEMEN BEFORE AND AFTER THE BURGLARY

	<u>Accompanying servicemen, et cetera after the burglary (Item 61)</u>				Total
	1	2	3	4	
<u>Accompanying servicemen et cetera, before the burglary (Item 16)</u>					
Always (1)	84	2	4	1	91
Usually (2)	22	50	5	3	80
Sometimes (3)	7	9	26	1	43
Never (4)	4	3	2	30	39
Total	117	64	37	35	253

$$\chi^2 = 342,582; \text{ d.f.} = 9 \text{ and p-value} = 0,000$$

There was a significant dependence between question 2.1. (item 16) "Do you accompany them while they are performing their tasks" before the burglary and question 4.2. (item 61) "Do you accompany them while they are performing their tasks" after the burglary. **Before the burglary 35,97 per cent of the respondents always accompanied service people, and 46,25 per cent of respondents always accompanied them after the burglary.**

4.6.1.6. Police checking dwellings, when owner is away

TABLE 4.12

DEPENDENCE BETWEEN ASKING POLICE TO CHECK HOMES BEFORE AND AFTER THE BURGLARY.

	<u>Asking the police to check the home whilst owner was away, after burglary (Item 63)</u>				Total
	1	2	3	4	
<u>Asking the police to check the home whilst owner was away (Item 19) before the burglary</u>					
Always (1)	34	0	0	0	34
Usually (2)	8	12	1	2	23
Sometimes (3)	7	5	16	3	31
Never (4)	13	6	8	168	195
Total	62	23	25	173	283

$$\chi^2 = 342,582; \text{ d.f.} = 9 \text{ and p-value} = 0,000$$

There was a significant dependence between question 2.1. (item 19) "Asking the police to check the home whilst you are away" before the burglary and question 4.2. (item 63) "Asking the police to check the home whilst you are away" after the burglary. **Before the burglary 12,01 per cent of the respondents always asked the police to check their homes whilst they were away. After the burglary 21,91 per cent of the respondents asked the police to check their homes whilst they were away.**

4.6.1.7. Employment of casual labour

TABLE 4.13

SIGNIFICANT DEPENDENCE BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT OF CASUAL LABOUR BEFORE AND AFTER THE BURGLARY.

	<u>Employment of casual labour after a burglary (Item 65)</u>				<u>Total</u>
	1	2	3	4	
<u>Employment of casual labour before the burglary (Item 21).</u>					
Always (1)	9	2	2	1	
Usually (2)	2	14	6	4	
Sometimes (3)	0	3	52	24	
Never (4)	1	0	2	174	
Total	12	19	62	203	296

$$\chi^2 = 406,853; \text{d.f.} = 9 \text{ and } p\text{-value} = 0,000$$

There was a significant dependence between question 2.1. (item 21) "Employment of casual labour before the burglary" and question 4.2. (item 65) "Employment of casual labour after the burglary". **Before the burglary 59,8 per cent of the respondents never employed casual labour. After the burglary 68,58 per cent of the respondents never employed casual labour.**

4.6.2. Comparison of active instrumental responses taken before and after the burglary.

Comparison of questions 2.8 - 2.11 to 4.3 - 4.6 portrayed significant dependencies in respect of instrumental active responses exercised before and after the burglary. The words "after the burglary" refers to the first burglary and subsequent burglaries.

4.6.2.1. Insurance cover taken out before and after the burglary

Before the burglary 200 respondents had insurance cover and after the burglary 199 respondents had insurance cover.

4.6.2.2. Ownership of watchdogs before and after the burglary.

TABLE 4.14

SIGNIFICANT DEPENDENCE BETWEEN OWNERSHIP OF WATCHDOGS BEFORE AND AFTER THE BURGLARY.

	Ownership of watchdogs after the burglary		Total
	1 (Yes)	2 (No)	
Ownership of watchdogs before the burglary	1 (Yes)	164	176
	2 (No)	27	118
Total	191	103	294

$$\chi^2 = 153,38673; \text{ d.f.} = 1 \text{ and p-value} = 0,000$$

There was a significant dependence between question 2.9 (item 31) "Ownership of watchdogs before the burglary" and question 4.4. (item 68) "Ownership of watchdogs after the burglary". **Before the burglary 59,8 per cent respondents owned watchdogs and after the burglary 64,9 per cent respondents owned watchdogs.**

4.6.2.3. Installed alarms before and after the burglary.

TABLE 4.15

DEPENDENCE BETWEEN ALARMS INSTALLED BEFORE THE BURGLARY AND AFTER THE BURGLARY.

	Alarms installed after the burglary		Total
	1(Yes)	2 (No)	
Alarms installed before the burglary	1(Yes)	10	99
	2 (No)	127	194
Total	156	137	293

$$\chi^2 = 80,70439; \text{d.f.} = 1 \text{ and p-value} = 0,000$$

There was a significant dependence between question 2.10 (item 32) "Was your house fitted with burglar alarms" before the burglary and question 4.5 (item 69) "Has your house now been fitted with burglar alarms" after the burglary. **More respondents had installed alarms after the burglary (53,2 per cent) compared to before the burglary (33,8 per cent).**

4.6.2.4. Links to security firms before and after the burglary.

TABLE 4.16

SIGNIFICANT DEPENDENCE BETWEEN ALARMS LINKED TO SECURITY FIRMS BEFORE THE BURGLARY AND LINKS TO SECURITY FIRMS AFTER THE BURGLARY.

	Alarms linked to security firms after the burglary.		Total
	1 (Yes)	2 (No)	
Alarms linked to security firms before the burglary			
1 (Yes)	42	8	50
2 (No)	43	114	157
Total	85	122	207

$$\chi^2 = 50,70267; \text{ d.f.} = 1 \text{ and p-value} = 0,000$$

There was a significant dependence at a one per cent level between question 2.11 (item 33) "Is your alarm linked to a security firm" before the burglary and question 4.6 (item 70) "Is your alarm system now linked to a security firm". **More victims used security firms, (41,1 per cent) after the burglary than before the burglary (24,2 per cent).**

4.6.3. Relationship between fear of another burglary and if the house was occupied, whether confrontation occurred or if offenders were armed at the time of the burglary.

4.6.3.1. Relationship between fear of another burglary and if the house was occupied.

TABLE 4.17

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEAR OF ANOTHER BURGLARY AND IF THE HOUSE WAS OCCUPIED AT THE TIME OF BURGLARY.

	Occupation of home at time of burglary		Total
	1 (Yes)	2 (No)	
Worry that dwelling will be broken into again.			
(1) very much	37	83	120
(2) much	16	45	61
(3) somewhat	16	36	52
(4) a little	17	28	45
(5) not at all	4	4	8
(6) don't know	2	4	6
	92	200	292

$\chi^2 = 2,92270$; d.f. = 5 and p-value = 0,711

There was no relationship between fear of another burglary and whether the house was occupied.

4.6.3.2. Relationship between fear of another burglary and verbal confrontation

There was no relationship between fear of another burglary, question 3.12 and "verbal confrontation" question 3.7 tested with the chi-square test (similar results were obtained as described in table 4.17).

4.6.3.3. Relationship between fear of another burglary and physical confrontation

There was no relationship between "fear of another burglary", question 3.12 and "physical confrontation", question 3.7 tested with the chi-square test (similar results were obtained as described in table 4.17).

4.6.3.4. Relationship between fear of another burglary and whether offenders were armed

There was no relationship between question 3.12, "fear of another burglary", and question 3.9, "were the offenders armed?", using the chi-square test (similar results were obtained as described in table 4.17).

4.6.3.5. Relationship between fear of another burglary and category of crime

There was no relationship between question 3.12 "fear of another burglary" and "white collar crime, crime against the person, and property crime", question 3.2, using the chi-square test (similar results were obtained as described in table 4.17).

4.6.3.6. Relationship between having moved away and plans to move away and whether the house was occupied.

There was no relationship between question 4.1, "Do you have any plans to move?", and question 3.6, "Was anyone home at the time of the incident?", using the chi-square test (similar results were obtained as described in table 4.17).

4.6.3.7. Relationship between having moved away and plans to move away and whether there was a physical or verbal confrontation

There was no relationship between question 4.1, "Do you have any plans to move?", and question 3.7, "Was there a physical or verbal confrontation?", using the chi-square test (similar results were obtained as described in table 4.17).

4.6.3.8. Relationship between having moved away and plans to move away and whether the offenders were armed.

There was no relationship between question 4.1, "Do you have any plans to move?", and question 3.8, "Were the offenders armed?", using the chi-square test (similar results were obtained as described in table 4.17).

4.6.3.9. Relationship between having moved away and plans to move away and category of crime.

There was no relationship between question 4.1, "Do you have any plans to move away?" and question 3.2, "categories of crime, such as white collar crime, property crime and crime against the person", using the chi-square test (similar results were obtained as described in table 4.17).

4.6.3.10. Relationship between having moved away and plans to move away and financial loss experienced.

TABLE 4.18

DEPENDENCE BETWEEN HAVING MOVED AWAY AND PLANS TO MOVE AWAY AND FINANCIAL LOSS EXPERIENCED.

	Minimal 1	Considerable 2	Extensive 3	V. Ext. 4	Uncertain 5	Total
Moved..... 1	2	16	3	10		31
Plans to move..... 2	3	11	4	5	1	24
No plans to move..... 3	55	98	34	15	6	208
Uncertain 4	7	11	10	3		31
Total	67	136	51	33	7	294

$\chi^2 = 31,38183$; d.f. = 12 and p-value = ,00172

There was a dependence between question 4.1, "Do you plan to move because of fear of being burglarised again?" and question 3.11 "How would you describe your financial loss?". Victims who experienced the minimum financial loss had no plans to move, while more than a third of the respondents who had moved experienced extensive losses. Respondents who experienced very extensive losses were equally distributed over moving/not moving. When respondents experienced some loss (categories 2, 3, 4) there were plans to move or they had moved.

4.7. ANALYSING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEANS

In this section the interview schedule is analysed, using quantitative methods such as analysis of variance and testing for equality of means between two groups. In the testing for equality of group means, the t-test is used. In the analysis of variance, the F-test is appropriate. The t-test is a special case of the F-test used for only two groups, while the F-test is commonly used for testing equality of group means for three or more groups. The degrees of freedom (d.f.) are calculated for each t- and F-test. The results are interpreted at a specific level of significance. If the p-value is less than 0,05 the significance level is five per cent and if the p-value is less than 0,01 the significance level is one per cent. The two-sample t statistic is:

$$t = \frac{(\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x}_2)}{s_p \cdot \sqrt{\frac{1}{n_1} + \frac{1}{n_2}}}$$

where

$$s_p^2 = \frac{(n_1 - 1)s_1^2 + (n_2 - 1)s_2^2}{n_1 + n_2 - 2}$$

with degrees of freedom $n_1 + n_2 - 2$. \bar{x}_i represents the sample group mean of group i and s_i^2 the sample variance of group i.

When there are more than two groups, say g , and i represents the group number, k the number of a case within a group, n_i the number of cases in group i and N the total number of cases, then the F-test statistic is:

$$F = \frac{MS_b}{MS_e}$$

$$MS_b = \frac{\sum_i n_i (\bar{x}_i - \bar{x})^2}{g-1}$$

$$MS_e = \frac{\sum_i \sum_k (x_{ki} - \bar{x}_i)^2}{N-g}$$

with degrees of freedom $g-1$ and $N-g$. In the testing for equality of group means, the F-test is used for two groups as well, since the t-test is a special case of the F-test.

4.7.1. Analysis of the number of burglaries.

The table below summarises the type of dwelling and its propensity to number of burglaries.

TABLE 4.19
NUMBER OF BURGLARIES FOR VARIOUS CATEGORIES

Category	F-value	d.f.	p-value
Dwelling	7,95	4;294	0,0001**
Name of occupant displayed.....	16,96	1;296	0,0001**
Home easily observed	8,36	1;296	0,0041**
Footpaths near home..	9,60	1;261	0,0022**
Open veld near home.	6,04	1;282	0,146*

** - significant at a 1% level of confidence

* - significant at a 5% level of confidence

Dwellings on small holdings had on average one more burglary than both dwellings in

housing developments and family homes. When the householder's name was prominently displayed next to the street number these dwellings had on average one more burglary than when the occupant's name was not displayed. There was a tendency for a dwelling to be burglarised at least once when the home was not easily observed by neighbours. More burglaries occurred in homes that were near footpaths and open veld.

4.7.2. Relationship between number of burglaries and fear of being burglarised again.

TABLE 4.20
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NUMBER OF BURGLARIES AND FEAR OF HOME BEING BURGLARISED AGAIN.

Mean burglary	N	F-value	d.f.	p-value
Very much - 2,05	121	1,3605	5,288	0,2392
Much - 1,98	62			
Somewhat - 1,52	51			
Little - 1,80	46			
Not - 1,71	7			
Don't know -1,42	7			

There was no significant relationship between the number of burglaries and fear of the home being burglarised again at a 5% level of significance.

4.7.3. Relationship between number of burglaries and having moved away and plans to move.

TABLE 4.21
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NUMBER OF BURGLARIES AND HAVING MOVED AWAY AND PLANS TO MOVE.

Mean burglary	N	F-value	d.f.	p-value
Have moved-2,12	31	9,9375	3,386	0,000
Plans to move - 3,16***	24			
No plans -1,67	204			
Uncertain -2,09	31			

*** Differed from other categories at a 1% level of significance.

Respondents who had plans to move experienced the most burglaries (3,16) on average in comparison with other categories.

4.7.4. Relationship between number of burglaries and building operations near the home.

TABLE 4.22
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NUMBER OF BURGLARIES AND BUILDING OPERATIONS NEAR THE HOME.

Mean burglary	N	t-value	d.f.	p-value
Yes - 1, 837	148	0,59	292	0,558
No - 1,932	146			

Burglary rates did not increase when building operations had taken place in the vicinity.

4.7.5. Analysis of state and trait anxiety scores

The state and trait anxiety scores of 100 victims of housebreaking in the Honeydew Police District, randomly chosen from the original sample of 300 victims were determined.

The STAI was self-administered and had no time limits. Complete instructions were printed on the test form. The S-anxiety scale consisted of twenty items that evaluated how respondents felt "*right now, at this moment*" (Spielberger, et al. 1983:STAI-AD Manual 12). This side was administered first. The S-anxiety scale was focused on a particular time period that is the burglary experienced by the victim. The T-anxiety scale consisted of twenty statements of how respondents *generally* felt (Spielberger, et al. 1983:STAI-AD Manual 9).

In responding to the STAI S-anxiety scale the examinees blackened the number on the standard test form to the right of each item-statement that best described the intensity of their feelings: (1) not at all; (2) somewhat; (3) moderately so; (4) very much so. When responding to the T-anxiety scale, examinees were instructed to indicate how they generally felt by rating the frequency of their feelings of anxiety on the following four point scale (1) almost never; (2) sometimes; (3) often; (4) almost always (Spielberger, STAI-AD Manual 14).

Each STAI item was given a weighted score of one to four. A rating of four indicated the presence of a high level of anxiety for ten S-anxiety items and eleven T-anxiety items. A high rating indicated the absence of anxiety for the remaining ten S-anxiety items and nine T-anxiety items. The scoring weights for the anxiety-present items were the same as the blackened numbers on the test form. The scoring weights for the anxiety-absent items were reversed. The scoring key was used for scoring scales by hand. The weighted scores for the twenty items that made up each scale were added. Scores for both S-anxiety and T-anxiety scales could vary from a minimum of 20 to a maximum of 80. The scores were recorded for each scale in the space that was provided on the test form (Spielberger, et al. 1983: STAI-AD Manual 15).

When an item was omitted on the scale the mean weighted score for the scale items to which the individual responds was determined and multiplied by a value of 20, and the product was rounded off to the next higher whole number (Spielberger, et al. 1983:STAI-AD Manual 15).

4.7 5.1. Analysis of state and trait scores in respect of gender.

Reported below in table 4.23 are the mean values of trait and state anxiety scores for 100 male and female victims of housebreaking within the Honeydew Police district.

TABLE 4.23

MEAN VALUES OF STATE AND TRAIT ANXIETY SCORES FOR 100 VICTIMS OF HOUSEBREAKING IN THE HONEYDEW POLICE DISTRICT AND THE F-TEST OF GROUP MEANS IN RESPECT OF GENDER

Variable	M	F	F-value	d.f.	p-value
State anxiety	34,4	40,5	6,02	1;98	0,0159 *
Trait anxiety	34,7	39,0	5,39	1;98	0,0223 *

* - significant at a 5% level of confidence.

The mean S-anxiety score for females (40,5) was substantially higher than those for males 34,4). The mean T-anxiety score for females (39,0) was also higher than in the case of males victims (34,7).

4.7.5.2. Analysis of state and trait scores for three age groups

The mean values for three age groups, 19-39, 40-49 and 50-69 in respect of state and trait anxiety are presented below.

TABLE 4.24.

MEAN STATE AND TRAIT ANXIETY SCORES FOR 100 VICTIMS OF HOUSEBREAKING IN THE HONDEYDEW POLICE DISTRICT AND F-TEST OF GROUP MEANS IN RESPECT OF AGE GROUPS.

Variable	19-39	40-49	50-69	F-value	d.f.	p-value
State	39,1	37,2	35,9	0,57	2;97	0,5653
Trait	38,9	35,5	35,5	1,67	2;97	0,1940

There were no significant differences.

The mean state anxiety scores for the age group 19-39 (39,1) tended to be higher than the 40-49 age group (37,2) and 50-69 age group (35,9).

The mean score for trait anxiety within the 40-49 age group and 50-69 age group was similar (35,5). The mean trait anxiety score for the 19-39 age group was relatively higher than the two previously mentioned groups.

4.7.5.3. The relationship between age and gender and S-anxiety and T-anxiety scores.

To examine the relationship between age and gender and S-anxiety and T-anxiety scores,

the data for 100 victims of housebreaking in the Honeydew Police district were divided into groups, male and female. The data were then further subdivided by age categories.

TABLE 4.25

**MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS (S.D.) FOR 100 VICTIMS OF HOUSEBREAKING
ACCORDING TO GENDER AND AGE GROUPS.**

Variable	Gender	Age	Mean	s.d.	N
STATE	M	19-39	34,4	10,53	20
	M	40-49	33,8	11,58	15
	M	50-69	35,3	13,18	10
	F	19-39	42,6	14,97	27
	F	40-49	41,4	14,27	12
	F	50-69	36,3	7,75	16
TRAIT	M	19-39	34,1	8,57	20
	M	40-49	35,1	10,01	15
	M	50-69	35,4	9,59	10
	F	19-39	42,5	10,26	27
	F	40-49	36,0	8,68	12
	F	50-69	36,5	6,19	16

No significant differences existed between state and trait mean scores for each age category for either gender, except for females in the 40-49 years-of-age categories.

The mean state anxiety score for females was generally higher than those of males. Females in the 19-39 and 40-49 age groups had the highest mean values. The mean state scores for males in the three age categories were relatively similar. The mean state score for males and females in the 50-69 age group were also fairly similar.

4.7 5.4. F-test for state scores

Table 4.26 reports the results of the F-test used to test significant differences in respect of items 65-66, 72, 74, 76-77, 82-86 and 91 in the interview schedule.

TABLE 4.26

F-TEST FOR STATE SCORES FOR 300 RESPONDENTS.

Item	Variable	F-value	d.f.	p-value
65	Employment of casual labour	3,11	3;96	0,0299*
66	Have someone stay in your home.....	3,43	3;95	0,0203*
72	Feelings of unease.....	5,62	1;95	0,0197*
74	Tendency to keep thinking about the event.....	8,09	1;96	0,0054**
76	Vulnerability.....	5,79	1;96	0,0180*
77	Calm.....	7,64	1;92	0,0069**
82	Fearful of leaving the house	4,02	1;96	0,0479*
83	Fearful of being alone in the house.....	6,97	1;94	0,0097**
84	Unable to sleep.....	12,45	1;92	0,0007**
85	Nightmares	7,87	1;92	0,0061**
86	Depression.....	16,87	1;93	0,0001**
91	The world is a lawless, threatening place.....	7,54	1;97	0,0072**

** significant at a 1% level of confidence

* significant at a 5% level of confidence

No significant differences existed for state/trait scores with regard to the number of burglaries.

Item 65. Respondents who usually employed casual labour after a burglary had taken place had significantly higher state scores (51,0) than those who never employed casual labour (36,8).

Item 66. Respondents who always had someone stay in their homes when they were away, after a burglary, had significantly higher state scores (41,8) than those who sometimes let someone stay in the house when they were away (30,3).

After a burglary,

Item 72. Victims who experienced feelings of unease had higher state scores (39,3) than those who had not experienced unease (31,4).

Item 74. Victims who had a tendency to keep thinking about the event had higher state scores (40,6) than those who did not keep on thinking about the event (33,6).

Item 76. Individuals who felt vulnerable had higher state scores (39,1) than those who did not (31,2).

Item 77. Victims who felt calm had lower state scores (30,8) than those who did not feel calm (39,1).

Item 82. Respondents who were fearful of leaving the house had higher state scores (39,8) than those who were not fearful of leaving their homes (34,8).

Item 83. Respondents who were fearful of being alone in the house (41,5) had higher state scores than those who were not fearful of being alone in the house (34,9).

Item 84. Respondents who were unable to sleep had higher state scores (44,7) than those who had no trouble sleeping (34,8).

Item 85. Respondents who experienced nightmares had higher state scores (48,3) than those respondents who had no nightmares (36,4).

Item 86. Victims suffering from depression had higher state scores (46,4) than those who did not suffer from depression (34,9).

Item 91. Victims attributing their misfortune to the world being a lawless, threatening place had higher state scores (40,7) than those who did not (33,8).

4.8. SUMMARY

Data collected from 300 victims of housebreaking in Honeydew were summarised in this chapter. The biographical details, crime prevention measures taken before the burglary, details regarding victimisation and crime prevention measures taken after the burglary were described in a systematic and quantitative manner. The information gathered by means of the State and Trait Inventory STAI (Form Y) for 100 victims of burglary chosen from the original sample was statistically processed. The F-test was used to test for significant differences for state scores with regard to questions in the interview schedule. The summarised data will be interpreted in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 5

INTERPRETATION OF DATA

5.1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the summarised data obtained by means of the analytical survey method from 300 victims of housebreaking and the data obtained from the administration of the State and Trait Inventory to 100 victims are interpreted and compared to existing research in the field.

The goal, to test central theoretical propositions found on the Learned Helplessness theory is met in this chapter. The sub-goals serve as illustration for the learned helplessness phenomenon. The anxiety apparent to victims of housebreaking and emotions that are a manifestation of anxiety, is assessed by means of the State-Trait Inventory (STAI) developed by Spielberger.

5.2. INTERPRETATION

An interpretation of the biographic data and central theoretical propositions follow.

5.2.1. Biographic data

Summarised below are the biographic data in respect of 300 victims of housebreaking in the Honeydew Police district.

5.2.1.1. Gender and age.

Of the total of subjects interviewed in this study nearly 52 per cent were males and 48,2 per cent females.

The overall pattern with respect to the age structure of respondents reflected a skewed distribution with nearly 59 per cent falling into the 30 to 49 years-of-age categories. This reflected a mature population profile. The high rate of victimisation might be explained by the fact that these respondents were either in their career-building or career-consolidating years of their life. This was the time when the home would be unoccupied, when occupants were at work and their children were at school. The lowest frequency was recorded in the 60 years and over age group. These were the retirement years when more persons spent longer times at home. Welch (1993:32), however, pointed out that whether burglaries occurred or not did not appear to be significantly influenced by age of the occupants per se but rather by environmental opportunities or constraints such as geographic location, accessibility, proximity to main through roads and the incidence of extraneous movement through a zone.

5.2.1.2. Employment category of victims and income level

The professional and business person were most strongly represented in the sample. Self-employed persons and clerical workers made up a lower percentage of the respondents. Housewives and other comprised nine per cent of the respondents. The lowest frequencies were teachers, artisans, and students. The majority of victims resorted within the middle income level, the minority in the lower income level and over 18 per cent were in the upper income level.

Findings in the Honeydew research project contradicted four international studies. Waller and Okihiro, and Van Dijk and Vianen found a significant increase in risk with level of income and Chappell with rateable value (Maquire, 1982:20). The survey by Ennis (Maquire, 1982:20) found that people at either extreme of income scales were more likely to be burglarised than those in the middle range. Burglars in Bennett and Wright's study (Fattah, 1991:238) made assumptions, on the basis of cues relating to the house, garden, and immediate area, about the wealth of occupants and the likelihood of cash and goods

being in the houses. Houses that looked as if little attention had been paid to them were generally disliked. According to Cromwell et al. (1991:33) burglars tended to make assessments of individual target sites based upon their evaluation of the general affluence of the neighbourhood in which the target was located. The assumption was that residences in the neighbourhood contained essentially the same quality and quantity of stealable items. Walsh (1980:20) found no statistically significant relationship between wealth and burglary.

The findings in the Honeydew sample most closely equated Cohen and Cantor's position (Smith & Jarjoura, 1989:626) who suggested that household income was a conceptually complex variable, measuring proximity to potential offenders as well as target attractiveness and guardianship.

The Honeydew district comprised of majorly middle-class suburbs with pockets of upper income areas. These homes contained many of the consumer goods readily available to the middle-class and that might easily be disposed of by the thief. Additionally, homes were often left unoccupied during the day when occupants were at work and the children were at school. In the upper-income areas, small-holdings or estates were isolated from their neighbours and in many cases situated near squatter camps.

5.2.1.3. Type of dwelling burglarised.

The single-family home was the most frequently victimised type of dwelling followed by small-holdings. Cluster homes, retirement villages, and flats had a low representation of victimisation.

Similar to findings in Honeydew, Waller and Okihiro (1978:84) found a higher rate of burglaries for houses than apartments. According to Bennet and Wright (Fattah, 1991:243) the detached house was praised as a target because it was easy to get around to the back of it. Repetto (1974:15) also found that the single-family home was selected most often by the over-25 age group and by whites and drug users because of the appearance of apparent affluence. Carl Keane (1991:219) reiterated that, although not significant, house dwellers expected property damage and theft, while apartment dwellers were more likely to mention that they expected to be assaulted.

The strong representation of the *single family home* might be due to the fact that this was the most prevalent type of dwelling in the Honeydew Police district, and the type of dwelling where houseowners were at work and children were at school leaving the house unoccupied.

Rengert (Edmondson, 1991:14) stated that suburban two-income couples were easy marks for burglars. Both Waller and Okihiro (1978:51) and Repetto (1974:17) pointed out that where someone was home most of the time, the house was much less likely to become a target for burglars. The more families in the household, the more two-parent families, and the more persons in the family, the lower the burglary rate would be.

Respondent 61. "Crime and burglary will only be sorted out when both partners do not have to go out to work."

Characteristics that made single family dwellings and dwellings on smallholdings highly vulnerable and significant at a one per cent level of confidence were (a) the surveillability of homes (b) when the name of the occupant and street number of the house was prominently displayed and (c) situation of the houses. Dwellings on smallholdings had on average one more burglary than both dwellings in housing developments and family homes.

Houses near open veld, and footpaths, had more burglaries significant at a five per cent level of confidence. Houses were not highly visible to neighbours in 47,3 per cent instances and 12,3 per cent of dwellings had the name of the respondent as well as street number prominently displayed. When the householder's name was prominently displayed next to the street number dwellings had on average one more burglary than when the occupant's name was not displayed.

Respondent 159. "My house is very near open veld and very isolated. We received cold telephone calls to check whether we were at home."

Respondent 103. " My home has been burglarised several times. I have taken my name off the gate since I have received cold telephone calls. My telephone number is now delisted. My neighbours, have removed their names from their gates and delisted their telephone numbers as well."

Welch (1993:35) agreed stating that in 40 per cent of the burglaries that had taken place visibility was reduced by planting. Walsh (Fattah, 1991:242) reported that 44 per cent of burglarised houses in his study had passages, alleyways or footpaths abutting or adjoining the property. Cromwell et al. (1991:25) confirmed the above findings stating that several informants reported obtaining the resident's name from mailboxes or from a sign over the door. They would then look up the number and call the residence.

Repetto (1974:112), Walsh (1980:80), Waller and Okihiro (1978:17), Cromwell et al. (1991:35), and Welch (1993:35) found that environmental risk defined by Winchester and Jackson (Maquire, 1982:22) as the combination of features which affected the ease with which an offender could approach potential entry points to houses without being seen, risk was almost twice as important as occupancy and four times as important as rateable value in distinguishing between victims and non-victims.

Also suggestive, but not statistically significant, were factors such as proximity to main roads and building construction in the vicinity of the home burglarised.

Fifty-five per cent of houses victimised were near main roads and 50,2 per cent of dwellings were near to building construction sites. Nearly 60 per cent homes targeted by burglars were near homes-for-sale. Rengert and Wasilchick (Fattah, 1991:242) discovered that houses within a block or two of a major highway were more likely to be selected as burglary targets. Cromwell et al. (1991:28) confirmed that during the course of residential construction jobs, builders became aware of the habits of people living nearby. They used the knowledge later or provided inside information to other burglars for a fee or a split of the take. When houses were for sale and standing empty, guards living on the property were in a position to scan the area and movements of residents and then pass the information to their friends. Cromwell et al. (1991:25) stated that one burglar informant drove around residential neighbourhoods choosing homes next door to homes that exhibited a "For Sale" sign. She acted like a potential buyer and peered into the dwelling.

Respondent 206. "My house went on show for selling purposes. We feel this could have encouraged the burglary. The heavy burglar proofing would have to be known to anyone who tried to break in. After others in the vicinity had put their houses up for sale there were further break-ins in the area. Once offenders knew the lay of the land it was easy for them to arrive with a removal lorry and take the goods. The neighbours would not question their right to be there."

The high percentage of victimisation of *small-holdings* over 23 per cent, could be due to the fact that they were isolated from their neighbours who did not see much of each other or did not know each other. Repetto (Walsh 1980:75) agreed stating "absence of police, ease of access, relating to travel, inconspicuousness, isolated neighbourhoods and that neighbours should not know each other played a major role in the selection of the target". Winchester and Jackson's analysis (Maquire 1982:22) showed that the large high-rateable-value house in its own grounds in the country, distant from most other houses, not easily visible from public areas and frequently left unoccupied is one of the categories at highest risk. Small-holdings, especially in the Sonnedal, Sandspruit, Haylon Hills, and Nooitgedacht area, were situated near squatter camps. Homes according to Shover (1991:82) located near "dense pools of offenders" suffered from high burglary rates.

Cluster homes on the perimeter of cluster developments were more easily targeted than cluster homes in the centre of the complex. This type of dwelling was the target of burglars in over eight per cent of all cases. Often these units on the perimeter bordered on open veld, were near footpaths and overlooked main roads. It was more difficult to monitor the movements of occupants of central units than those on the perimeter of the complex.

Cluster homes were less frequently targeted because they were often surrounded by high security walls and had security guards at entrance gates. This type of dwelling was, however, left empty during the daytime when occupants were at work.

Respondent 101. " My cluster home was on the perimeter of the complex. Two panels of the concrete wall surrounding the complex was knocked out below the electric fence. There was an open stand the other side of the wall."

Retirement villages were not burglarised as often as other dwellings, one per cent of all cases. It appeared that the occupants, because of their age stayed at home more often and for longer periods. These villages had electrified fencing and security guards on duty.

Blocks of flats were only victimised in nought comma four per cent of cases. Cluster homes, retirement villages and flats lower rate of breaking and entering could be because dwellings were situated close to each other, and burglars might be seen or heard while attempting to break into intended targets. Wright and Decker (1994:98) also pointed out that ease of access was taken into account by offenders when they searched for burglary sites. The vulnerability of dwellings, specifically the single family home and the small-holding could be ascribed to the following factors:

- (a) The single family home was the most prevalent type of dwelling in Honeydew area.
- (b) It was the type of dwelling most often left unoccupied during the day and over

national holiday periods.

- (c) The high premium placed on privacy led to homes not being easily surveillable to neighbours, significant at a one per cent level.
- (d) When the name of the occupant was displayed alongside the street number of the dwelling the house was at risk, significant at a one per cent level.
- (e) Houses near open veld and footpaths were at risk, significant at a five per cent level.
- (f) Suggestive, but not statistically significant were factors such as proximity to main roads, building construction or houses-for-sale.

5.2.1.4. Victims' living patterns

The predominant family structure was the traditional nuclear family structure. Seventeen per cent of the victims were living alone, either divorced, widowed or single persons. Walsh (1980:101) substantiated this finding explaining that most victims, 76 per cent were living in one-, two- or at the most three-person households (including children). Sampson (1987:206) found that single-adult households suffered a victimisation risk higher than two-adult households regardless of community context. Welch (1993:34) argued from his findings that the presence of family members reduced the incidence of burglary, although its influence might not be as great as one might expect. It would seem that the fewer people living in a house the better from the burglar's point of view, as it was easier to know their movements and they were easier to watch.

5.3. CENTRAL THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS

The summarised data are interpreted in order to test the central theoretical propositions based on the Learned Helplessness theory. An indication will be given as to the extent the data support the central theoretical propositions.

5.3.1. Fear of having one's home burglarised is related to past victimising experiences.

Respondents and their families who repeatedly had their homes burglarised and had been victims of other crime, developed the expectation that they could neither avoid nor escape the fact that their homes might be burglarised again in the future. The resulting perception of vulnerability frequently manifested itself, in part, in the victim's preoccupation with the fear of recurrence (Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983:4).

To test the central theoretical proposition "Fear of having one's home burglarised is related to past victimising experiences", the relationship between fear and past victimisation was examined and operationalised.

5.3.1.1. Fear of burglary

Two measures of fear of burglary were constructed:-

Firstly, "*How much do you worry that your home will be broken into?*" The degree of worry was divided into five categories, very much, much, somewhat, a little and uncertain.

The majority of the respondents, 61 per cent, expressed considerable fear worrying very much, and much that their homes would be broken into again. A minority of respondents, 18 per cent worried somewhat, and only about two per cent, did not worry at all and three per cent were uncertain.

Several international studies, agreed with the above findings. Hough (1984:23)

stated that the British Crime Survey found that being burglarised caused widespread anxiety and that people worried about burglary more than any other single crime. One in six respondents said that the possibility of being burglarised was a big worry to them. Victims also thought that the chance of being burglarised again in the near future were higher than non-victims. Skogan and Giles-Sims (Smith & Glanz 1989:54) pointed out that those who had been victimised were more worried about being a victim again. The Second International Crime (Victim) Survey (Naude, Grobbelaar and Snyman, 1996:35) quoted that many respondents (47.9 per cent) felt it was likely or very likely that they would become victims of a burglary in the near future. Skogan's research (cited in Smith and Hill, 1991:226) revealed that (a) both property and personal victimisation affected worry and concern about crime and (b) that property victimisation might be more salient because of the greater frequency. Smith and Hill (1991:232) similarly found that being either a victim of property crime ($B=0.12, p<.001$) or of both property and personal crime ($B=0.07, p<.01$) were each positively associated with fear of crime. Van der Wurff and Stringer (1989:478) found that there was no strong connection between being burglarised and thinking about its possibility.

5.3.1.2. Plans to move away

Respondents were asked "Have you moved away or do you have plans to move?" The majority of the respondents, had no plans to move. Under eleven per cent were uncertain whether they wanted to move away.

In agreement with the above findings, Waller and Okihiro (1978:83) found that a relatively low percentage of persons had moved or intended to move.

Van der Wurff and Stringer (1989:477) found no evidence that victims of burglary were more likely to move away and only about nineteen per cent had plans to move. Serfaty and Bollitt (Van der Wurf and Stringer, 1989:471) observed that there was a generalisation effect among victims of burglary leading to lack of sufficient control, alienation and the wish to move.

The low percentage of persons having moved or planning to move in the Honeydew area might be a reflection of the viewpoint that there was no point in selling up and moving away to another area since crime was present everywhere.

Respondent 275. "How could I move away. Nobody wants to buy into a crime ridden area. I would only be running from one crime area to another."

Respondent 123. "I moved into a townhouse complex because of previous burglaries in our homes. Even here I am not safe."

The two measures of "fear of another burglary" were related to past victimising experiences in a two-fold way.

5.3.1.3. Past victimising experiences.

The indicators of experience of past victimisation were broken down as follows:

- (a) Whether the respondent or a close relative had been a victim of either property crime or any other crime during December 1993 to December 1994.
- (b) How many times the dwelling had been burglarised during December 1993 to December 1994.

(Past victimisation was more than a count of the number of experiences with crime which was normally used as an index of the degree and seriousness of prior victimisation (Smith & Hill, 1991:221). The factors (c) and (d) mentioned

below might play a role in the relationship between victimisation experience and fear of having one's home burglarised again and influencing plans to move away.)

- (c) The financial loss suffered by the victim.
 - (d) Occupancy patterns, confrontation and whether offenders were armed at the time of the burglary.
- (i) Type of crime the victim and his family experienced during the period December, 1993 to December, 1994.

All the respondents had been victims of property crime. In addition eleven per cent respondents replied that either their families or themselves had been victims of crime against the person, and one per cent white collar crime, for example fraud and corruption during December 1993 to December 1994.

Several studies supported the data. Reiss, Feinberg, Hindelang and Matthews and Trickey (cited in Farrell, Phillips and Pease, 1995:394) pointed out that the same people were much more likely to experience both personal and property crime. Smith and Glanz (1989:58) stated that those who had been a victim of a crime or had contact with a victim were significantly more fearful than others. In addition, Anderson, Chenery and Pease (Farrell et al. 1995:395) speculated that car crime might be more likely to follow in the wake of a burglary if car keys were taken.

Respondent 69.

"When they broke into my house, they found the car keys hanging on the keyrack in the hallway. They stole my brand new car which was not insured."

(ii) How many times the home was burglarised during December, 1993 to December 1994

Twenty-two per cent of the homes had been victimised twice, and at times homes were victimised nine times and over.

Polvi, Looman, Humpries and Pease (cited in Spelman 1995:364) claimed that when they examined the time between successive burglaries at individual locations, in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, the risk of a repeat burglary was at the highest immediately after a previous burglary - about 12 times higher than expected. Farrel and Pease (Spelman et al. 1995: 367) reported similar results in Liverpool citing that repeated victimisations involved less effort, lower risk, and equivalent reward when compared to first victimisations. In addition Wright and Decker (1994:88) stated that offenders relied on 'cognitive maps' to reduce fear when they searched for targets which allowed for predictions about the habits of the occupants of an intended target. A Dutch study (cited in Winkel, 1991:257) suggested that around one-third of domestic burglars returned to the same house to commit a further offence. This could explain why certain homes were more often the target of burglaries.

No statistical relationship was found to exist between the number of burglaries and "worry that the home would be burglarised again".

Statistically significant at a five per cent level was the fact that people who had plans to move by far experienced the most burglaries (3,16 on average).

(iii) Financial loss suffered by the victim.

The majority of victims felt that the magnitude of their financial loss had been considerable and very extensive. A lesser percentage of the victims interviewed felt

their loss had been minimal or were uncertain about the magnitude of their loss. The type of items most frequently stolen were television sets, video recorders, sound systems and portable radios. Also popular were small kitchen appliances, food, cameras, compact disc players, decoders, video cameras, and music cassettes. Burglars favoured jewellery, clothes and linen. A large percentage of power tools and garden tools were taken. These items were portable and easily fenced. The findings approximated that of Waller and Okihiro (1978:28) and Maquire (1982:17) who termed these 'middle-range' burglaries. These goods had become commonplace in ordinary homes. There was a strong second-hand market for them and they were difficult to identify. Welch (1993:30) and Morgan (1990:21) also found that the nature of goods taken, and similar to the ones mentioned above, were items readily to hand.

In addition computers, switch-boards, typewriters, fax machines, answering machines, filing boxes, safes with guns, bicycles and motor vehicles were taken.

Respondent 110. "I moved because I was left with very little except large furniture."

Respondent 41. "They stacked the best paintings and china but were caught before they could be taken."

Respondent 145 "They took everything that was not nailed down."

Often items of low cash value were taken such as Christmas lights and sunglasses which according to Walsh (1980:63) was that young burglars tended to steal less of value per burglary, and to steal odd and more unusual things. These items happened to catch their fancy - more a form of systematic looting.

The above findings in Honeydew were in direct contrast to of the results of previous studies by Hough (1984:22), and Waller and Okihiro (1978:27) who indicated that few burglaries involved high loss. Maquire (1980:269) found that the type and value of property stolen did not have any impact on a household. People who lost nothing at all were as likely to be badly affected as those losing hundreds of pounds. The high losses suffered by victims in the Honeydew area was a form of the "have not's" taking from the "have's" commonly known as "affirmative shopping". Wright and Decker (1994:75) argued that burglars were encouraged through the public's willingness to buy stolen goods.

Apart from the magnitude of the financial loss suffered by victims of burglary, stolen possessions had sentimental value. Criminal damage, theft and burglary were all likely to place heavier burdens on those with fewer financial resources, particularly because these were the groups least likely to be insured against such loss (Zedner, 1994:1224). Twenty eight per cent of people who lost possessions said that these had sentimental value for them. "The entire home provides the raw materials from which to construct a sense of order and destruction of this order can prove traumatic (Hough., 1985:491)". Kirsta (1988:26) argued that the net cost to victims who had either been burglarised or physically attacked was often impossible to calculate until long after the crime.

No statistical relationship existed in respect of "worry about another burglary" and financial loss suffered by the victim.

A dependency was found at a one per cent level of significance that people who had no plans to move experienced the minimum financial loss.

(iv) Occupancy patterns, Confrontation and Armed Offenders.

Sixty-eight per cent of the victims were not home at the time the burglary had taken place. Most victims were out at work, out for an evening or away on holiday. Thirty-one per cent of the respondents were home at the time of the burglary. Most victims discovered it the next morning when they woke up and 27 respondents were woken up by the sound of a door being opened, windows being broken or other noises. Eighteen victims walked in on the burglary and disturbed the burglars.

Maquire (1980:262) found that 16 per cent of victims had been asleep in bed and the remainder, six per cent, had been present and awake. Wright and Decker (1994:17) similarly found that a few offenders broke into places while the occupants were asleep. Neighbours, domestic servants or security companies alerted homeowners that their homes had been burglarised. In many instances household goods were left lying outside, the house left in disarray, doors and windows smashed, or goods missing.

The above findings broadly supported the findings of Maquire (1982:49) who found that three-quarters of dwellings that had been burglarised were unoccupied at the time. Cromwell et al. (1991:24), Welch (1993:30), Wright and Decker (1994:96), Fattah (1991:342) and Hurley (1995:10) stated that burglars targeted unoccupied dwellings. Edmondson (1991:14) said that the key to a successful burglary was knowing when the house was most likely to be empty. Lynch and Cantor (1992:356), however, stated that occupancy during the day (guardianship) did not influence the risk of burglary, occupancy during the night (guardianship) did reduce risk.

There was no statistical relationship between "worry about another burglary" and whether the building was "occupied at the time of the burglary". No statistical

relationship existed between " plans to move away" and whether "the house was occupied at the time of the burglary".

(v) Confrontation

In contrast to the findings by Welch (1993:30) in Stellenbosch who in no instance found that an occupant had been physically threatened, over 24 per cent of the victims of burglary in Honeydew were either physically or verbally threatened. An explanation for this contrast could be found in the fact that the Gauteng Province was one of the most densely populated areas in South Africa and was experiencing a serious rise in crime.

Maquire (1982:56), Bartol and Bartol (1986:249) and Hough (1984:22) found that offenders tended to avoid confronting victims directly. Hurley (1995:10) also mentioned that most incidents of burglary did not result in violence even when the burglar was discovered. When violence did occur it often resulted from the offender's frantic attempt to escape.

The above figure quoted in respect of Honeydew closely equated that of Waller and Okihiro (1978:1) who found that 21 per cent of respondents replied affirmatively that there had been a confrontation between offender and a person in the household. The findings of the Second International Crime Survey in Johannesburg (Naude, et al., 1996:32) stated that the majority of assault or threat cases occurred near the victim's home (over 42 per cent), or at the victim's home (22.1 per cent), or elsewhere in the city where the victim lived (29 per cent).

Wright and Decker (1994:111) argued that offenders they interviewed showed little concern for the well-being of their victims and were prepared to use violence against anyone who got in their way during the commission of an offence. It was rather a case of avoiding houses where they perceived the risk of being injured themselves as high. This would point to the fact that violence was becoming an element of burglary.

Respondents in Honeydew commented:-

Respondent 286

"I was attacked in front of my house by three armed robbers. I was hit on the head with a hammer and threatened several times to be shot and to have a hole burned into my stomach with a flat-iron. The next month a young lady living in a cottage on my neighbour's property was brutally assaulted by two intruders who hit the victim with a crowbar in the face, almost destroying one of her eyes. It took a team of doctors and nurses almost four hours to stitch the young girl up and treat her wounds."

Respondent 37

"I saw him lift the knife. He stabbed me once through my thick anorak. I screamed a lot because I had been told that the more noise you make the more likely the intruder would be to run away. The thick anorak saved me from being paralysed. "

There was, however, no statistical relationship between "worry that the home would be burglarised again", "plans to move away" and "confrontation".

(vi) Armed offenders

The offenders carried either knives, sharp objects or unidentified objects. Eight victims saw burglars armed with guns. Out of 94 persons who were home at the time of the burglary 54 were uncertain whether the offenders were armed.

Counter to previous findings by researchers such as Waller and Okihiro (1978:32), Hough (1984:15) and the opinion of Bartol and Bartol (1986:251), the findings in Honeydew were not in keeping with the typically peaceful profile of burglary.

"When we go to a house to steal in the night and somebody catches us, we must shoot. They say they will not call the police but they will, we know that, as soon as we run away they call the police. One says he has no gun but he shoots when you are running away. All whites have guns, like us. We are even. We take their things. The insurance will pay them for what we take" (Holland, 1994:36).

"Robbers are usually armed, extremely nervous and would easily injure or kill their victims, who very often are just as nervous and traumatised. Robbers who fail to secure co-operation by threats and intimidation may very well resort to violence" (Lt. Col. Opperman, cited in the Star, September 29, 1994, page 3).

The findings for Honeydew were similar to that of Repetto (1974:18) who found that a fourth of the interviewees admitted to carrying a weapon (knife, gun). The most consistently carried tool for all categories of burglars was the screwdriver. Similarly, the Second International Crime Survey (Naude, et al. 1996:33) pointed out that in assault or threat cases force was used in over 57 per cent of cases, while less than 68 per cent of incidents involving force involved a weapon. A knife was used in over 46 per cent of cases and a firearm in nearly 32 per cent of incidents.

No statistical relationship existed between whether "the offenders were armed" and "worry that the home would be broken into again" and "plans to move away".

5.3.1.4. Interpretation of first theoretical proposition.

The central theoretical proposition "Fear of having one's home burglarised is related to past victimising experiences" was regarded in a two-fold way. Firstly, fear was operationalised to tap degrees of worry that the home would be broken into again. Secondly, fear was assessed by means of plans to move away from the burglarised home.

The first central theoretical proposition was marginally supported by the data.

Although victims of burglary worried much to very much that their dwellings would be broken into again, no support could be found for a significant statistical relationship between degrees of worry and past victimising experiences.

No statistical relationship was found to exist between the number of burglaries experienced by the victim, and the magnitude of financial loss suffered, whether the house was occupied at the time of the burglary, whether a verbal or physical confrontation had taken place or the offenders were armed, and worry that dwelling would be burglarised again.

No statistical relationship existed in respect of victims planning to move after the burglary and whether the house was occupied at the time of the burglary, if there was a verbal or physical confrontation and if the offenders were armed.

Support was found at a five per cent level of significance for the influence of the number of burglaries experienced by the victim and his/her plans to move away. Victims who had experienced on average 3,16 burglaries had plans to move away. A dependence was also found at a one per cent level of significance that people who experienced more financial loss had plans to move away.

Although the first central theoretical proposition was only marginally supported certain facts were evident from the data gathered. One in nine victims and their families had been victims of property as well as personal and white collar crimes. Victims expressed considerable fear that their dwellings would be broken into again. Homes were becoming targets of multi-burglaries. Only a minority (10,5 per cent) of the victims had moved away. People who had plans to move had experienced the most burglaries. Burglary was no longer the passive crime quoted in previous research. Thirty-one per cent of homes were occupied at the time of the burglary. Victims were woken up by the sound of windows being broken, doors being opened or other noises. In some cases it was discovered the next morning. Homeowners often discovered the burglary when the house was left in disarray, goods left lying outside, or structural

damage was done to the house. In contrast to early findings and in agreement with recent studies there was little concern for the well-being of victims. The magnitude of financial loss suffered by a victim was considerable to extensive.

5.3.2. Victims of burglary have reduced incentives for initiating voluntary responses to control outcomes.

According to Maier, Seligman and Solomon (Alloy, 1982:445) organisms exposed to outcomes that were independent of all their responses learned that these outcomes were, in fact, uncontrollable. This learning led to behavioural deficits namely motivational deficits. If the probability of an outcome was the same whether or not a given response occurred - outcome was independent of response. When this was true of all voluntary responses -outcome was said to be uncontrollable. A way to make a situation controllable according to Schepperle and Bart (Janoff-Bulman and Frieze, 1983:5) was to believe that misfortune may be prevented by engaging in sufficient cautious behaviour. To a victim who had been appropriately cautious and perceived themselves as powerless and helpless in the face of forces beyond their control, the perception of vulnerability might be paralysing” (Petersen & Seligman in Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983:6).

The comparison of summarised data of vigilant behaviours victims took before the break-ins (before December 1993) and after break-ins (December 1993 and December 1994) showed significant dependencies in respect of certain questions.

5.3.2.1. Significant dependencies

There was a significant dependence in respect of “*Locking the doors when someone is home during the daytime*”, question 2.1. before the first burglary had taken place and “*Locking the doors when someone is home during the daytime*”, question 4.2. after the

last burglary had taken place. More people, 52,4 per cent always locked their doors after the burglary compared to nearly 36 per cent who always locked their doors before the burglary.

There was a significant dependence between question 2.1. (item 8) "*Locking doors when someone is home during the evening*" before the first burglary had taken place and question 4.2. (item 53) "*Locking doors when someone is home during the evening*" after the last burglary had taken place. More people, 76 per cent, always locked their doors during the evening after they had been burglarised, than before, nearly 64 per cent. This was an increase of 12,3 per cent.

The findings in Honeydew appeared to reflect increased caution in respect of locking up behaviours and broadly agreed with Maquire (1982:128) who stated that 50 per cent had fitted new locks or bolts. Skogan and Giles-Sims (Smith and Glanz, 1989:54) also argued that those who had been victimised took greater protective measures against crime than those who had not been victimised. The act of making entry more difficult increased peace of mind and helped gain a sense of lost control (Maquire, 1982:128). Yet Bartol and Bartol (1986:251) stated that approximately half of the New York metropolitan area residents questioned, admitted they did not lock all their doors when away from home, even if they had been burglarised before.

The results of past research regarding the protection offered by locks pointed out that standard locks (dead latch, dead bolt, vertical bolt) installed on standard doors did have a deterrent effect, although the sample size was too small to permit definitive conclusions (Repetto, 1974:85). In contrast, Scarr (Cromwell et al. 1991:30) and Rengert and Wasilchick (1985:90) found burglars considered the type of lock installed. Rengert and Wasilchick (1985:90) pointed out that burglary through unlocked doors was a surprisingly frequent occurrence since most burglars built their careers on the mistaken belief held by residents that 'it can't happen here' or 'I'll only be next door for a minute'.

To the extent to which burglars were primarily opportunistic, locks appeared to have deterrent value (Cromwell et al. 1991:30).

Victimised dwellings in Honeydew were accessed in 45 per cent of cases through a door. In some cases sliding doors were lifted from the door frame or broken down and smashed by means of a heavy object. Twenty-five respondents replied that doors had been broken open and wrenched off their hinges. At times stones were thrown at glasspanes and then doors were opened by putting their arms through the aperture. The window appeared to be the preferred point of entry, over 51 per cent of cases and entry through the roof in over three per cent of cases. Evident is the fact that even though victims practised more caution in respect of locking their doors, the present findings indicated that locks did not appear to be a significant factor in target selection. Maquire and Bennett, Scarr, Bennet and Wright (Fattah, 1991:242) qualified this statement reporting that ease of access influenced the choice of a particular target. Conditions of windows and door strength and the quality of locks affected ease of entry.

A significant dependence was found between question 2.1. (item 13) "*Leaving the home at the same time every day*" before the first burglary and question 4.2. (item 58) "*Leaving the home at the same time every day*" after the last burglary. Before the burglary over 60 per cent of respondents always or usually left their homes at the same time, while after the burglary over 53 per cent always or usually left their homes at the same time.

The conclusion might be drawn that the movements of victims were fairly routine increasing the probability of dwellings being watched by offenders. This was in agreement with Wright and Decker (1994:78) that almost all offenders who regularly watched potential targets beforehand said they did so to 'clock' the comings and goings of residents. Similarly, Cohen and Felson's (Cromwell et al. 1991:44) concept of 'routine activities theory' held that normal movement and activities of both potential victims and potential offenders played a role in the occurrence of a criminal event. According to Welch

(1993:34) burglary occurred when the opportunity was there with very little difference between those households with a routine and those with a variable life-style.

There was also a significant dependence between question 2.1. (item 15) "*Do you ask repairmen, deliverymen and meter readers to provide identification*" before the first burglary had taken place and question 4.2. (item 60) "*Do you ask repairmen, et cetera, to provide identification*" after the last burglary. Before the burglary close on 38 per cent of the respondents asked for identification of repairmen, et cetera. After the burglary nearly 52 per cent of respondents asked for identification from servicemen. Wright and Decker (1994:67) stated that offenders who had jobs in homes such as home decorating or remodelling allowed them a good sense of occupant's routines. They were often left unsupervised by homeowners. This gave them the chance to explore dwellings unmolested, checking security arrangements and determining where valuables were kept.

Significant dependence was also found between question 2.1. (item 16) and question 4.2. (item 61), "*Do you accompany them while they are performing their tasks*" before the first and after the last burglary. Before the burglary nearly 36 per cent of the respondents always accompanied service people and over 46 per cent of respondents always accompanied them after the burglary.

The summarised results indicated a significant dependence between question 2.1. (item 19) and question 4.2. (item 63), "*Asking the police to check the home whilst you are away*" before and after the burglary. Before the burglary over 12 per cent of the respondents always asked the police to check their homes whilst they were away and nearly 22 per cent of the respondents always asked the police to check their homes when they were away after the burglary. According to Welch (1993:32-33) it appeared that asking neighbours to keep an eye on your property and notifying the police did not effectively deter burglars.

Finally, significant dependence existed between question 2.2. (item 21) and question 4.2. (item 65) "*Employment of casual labour*" before and after the burglary. Before the burglary about 60 per cent of the respondents never employed casual labour. After the burglary over 68 per cent of the respondents never employed casual labour. Welch (1993:34) pointed out that overall it appeared that the employment of domestic help and gardeners tended to increase the chance of burglary since the presence of domestic help might introduce an element of 'reduced vigilance' that could account in part for the increase in vulnerability of a dwelling.

No significant dependence existed in respect of the following behaviours before and after the burglary:

- (a) *locking up behaviours* when someone was asleep at night, or when the home was left vacant for an hour or more;
- (b) leaving *interior lights burning* when no-one was home, and leaving an *outdoor light on all night*;
- (c) *arriving home* at the same time every day;
- (d) having friends *cut their lawns* when they were away for more than a week;''''''''''
- (e) *discussing vacation dates with strangers* and
- (f) having someone *stay in the home* when occupants were away.

Several studies supported the findings. Balkin (1979) (cited in Smith and Hill, 1991:218) and Fattah (1991:345) held that being criminally victimised would make one more wary, more cautious and more fearful. Shover (1991:95) also argued that victims might take care to simulate occupancy when the home was vacant. Their heightened security consciousness and diligence in pursuing it generally diminish over ensuing months.

On the other hand Garofalo (1979), Smith and Huff (1982) and Braungart, Braungart and Hoyer (1980) (cited in Smith and Hill, 1991:218) found the relationship between being criminally victimised and the victim becoming more wary, more cautious and more fearful, relatively weak. In a recent study, Glanz (1994:34) similarly found that fifty per cent of respondents indicated that they themselves had not changed their behaviour due to fear of crime, only 34 percent felt that members of the community had exhibited little behaviour change. Respondents who had integrated lack of control into their view of burglary would engage in less precautionary behaviour, as predicted by learned helplessness theorising.

5.3.2.2. Interpretation of the second central theoretical proposition

The second central theoretical proposition "Victims of burglary have reduced incentives for initiating voluntary responses to control outcomes" was not fully supported.

This study examined the relationship between cautionary and vigilant behaviours practised before and after the burglary and was left with the impression that the experience of burglary had increased the caution and vigilance practised by victims in respect of some behaviours.

Respondent 117 "If I go out for more than half an hour I have my television on and I do a load of washing when I go off to work."

Respondent 44 "I do not ask the police to visit my home when I am away as this is an obvious signal that the house was empty to anyone passing by at the time."

The divergent findings could be explained as follows. Victims of burglary who had increased caution and vigilance after the burglary might believe that they could prevent misfortune by being good and worthy people. According to Lerner's Just World theory (Janoff-Bulman and Frieze, 1983:5) it was believed that people got what they deserved and deserved what they got. Victims were therefore responsible for their own fate, thus restoring beliefs in personal invulnerability. As Schepperle and Bart (Janoff-Bulman and

Frieze, 1983:5) stated "a way to make a situation controllable is to believe that misfortune can be prevented by engaging in sufficiently cautious behaviour".

5.3.3. Victims of burglary have the expectation that active instrumental responses will not affect outcomes.

The process of victimisation entrapped the victim resulting in psychological paralysis. The victim worked from the assumption that altering and controlling the environment would not stop the offender entering the home again. The victim desisted in taking measures that could increase his/her protection. A mind set developed that it was impossible to create a 'thief-proof house'. The probability of having another burglary was the same whether or not active security measures were taken. At its simplest, learned helplessness here was a debilitation of instrumental responses.

To establish whether the victim of burglary had the expectation that active instrumental responses would not affect outcomes, the practical security measures taken by the victims before the first burglary (Before December, 1993 - see table 4.1.) were compared to that taken after the last burglary (From 1st December, 1993 to 31st December, 1994 see table 4.3.). Before the first burglary 71 per cent of the respondents had taken out insurance to protect their property. Over half the respondents, about 60 per cent, owned a watchdog nearly 35 per cent of houses were fitted with burglar alarms and only a quarter of dwellings were linked up to a security firm. After the last burglary nearly 70 per cent of the victims of burglary had insurance cover, about 65 per cent owned watchdogs, 53 per cent of homes were fitted with alarm systems and over 39 per cent of the alarms were linked up to security firms.

Findings revealed that there was a significant dependence at a one per cent level in respect of:

Ownership of watchdogs - More people owned a watchdog after the burglary than before the burglary (191 after and 176 before).

- Alarm systems - More people had alarms after the burglary (156) than before (99).

- Alarms linked to security firms - More people used security firms after the burglary (85) than before the burglary (50).

- Insurance - A significant number of persons had insurance before the burglary (200) and there was relatively no change (199) after the burglary.

Repetto (1974:64) pointed out that victimisation experience did appear to have some effect on security behaviour. Maquire (1980:266), Walsh and Jackson (Shover 1991:95) and Skogan (Smith and Glanz, 1989:53) argued that most victims of burglary reacted to the experience by increased use of simple precautions or by installing marginally more resistant security hardware. Sundeen and Mathieu (1976:211-219) found that fear of crime caused a number of changes in the behaviour of residents of three urban communities. These changes included self-protection, installing locks and other security devices, buying theft insurance and obtaining watchdogs and using police property identification systems. In contrast to the above findings Van der Wurff and Stringer (1989:477) found that victims of burglary did not take preventive measures to protect their property. Lynch and Cantor (1992:356) stated that taking steps to increase the security of your unit, such as having locks or alarms, did not seem to affect the risk of burglary. Their results, they suggested should be treated with caution. Having security devices was quite different from using these devices. There could also be qualitative differences in devices that could explain the fact that these measures had no effect on the risk of burglary.

Welch (1993:35) found that watchdogs, on premises, deterred burglary only if the dogs had free access to all parts of the property and were trained. Welch (1993:36) also stated that increased vigilance and more effective security measures were, however, secondary to primary factors such as location, accessibility and site configuration as a 'first line of defense'.

5.3.3.1. Interpretation of the third theoretical proposition.

The third proposition that " Victims of burglary have the expectation that active instrumental responses will not affect outcomes" was not supported by the data.

Victims had taken steps to install more alarms and had linked them to security firms as well as acquiring more watchdogs. There was no significant change in respect of insurance cover. Persons who had no insurance cover simply could not afford the costs of such. Heath and Davidson (1988:1347-8) called the high rate of insurance cover taken out before a burglary the "ceiling effect" that no significant increase was possible on this measure.

Victims of burglary, in contrast to the Learned Helplessness theory, might be helpless in preventing victimisation but powerful in coping with it.

5.3.4. The victim of burglary has difficulty in learning that outcomes are dependent upon responses.

The cognitive effect of learned helplessness was a difficulty in learning that responses and outcomes were contingently related and was also the result of an expectation of response-outcome noncontingency (Alloy, 1982:445-6). This expectation that outcomes would be unrelated to responses proactively interfered with future learning that the outcome was now dependent upon responses. Similarly victims of burglary took precautions and practised caution but did not believe that they would be any safer than before.

To operationalise the response of the victim with regard to precautions taken after the burglary the question was asked "Have you taken any other precautions as a direct result of this incident?". In turn, difficulty in learning was operationalised in the following manner "Do you think the prevention measures you took after the burglary will prevent your house being burglarised again?".

Victims of burglary had undertaken many measures to ensure their safety. Deadbolt locks were installed in eleven cases, more padlocks attached to doors in eleven cases, locks changed and gates padlocked in two and eleven instances respectively. In 20 instances alarm systems were installed and linked to security companies. Ten respondents replied that they had electrified fences and attached razor wire to their fencing. Twenty victims had installed security gates on the inside of the house and 15 on the outside doors of the house. Ten victims replied that they had attached trellidoors to cover sliding glass doors. The majority of respondents had installed burglar bars on windows. Nine respondents informed their neighbours when they were not at home, five never left the house unattended and seven bought new dogs. Other measures taken by a minority of the victims included installing intercom systems, building new walls, heightening walls and putting glass on top of the walls. Victims also resorted to extreme measures such as buying shotguns, joining self-defence classes and neighbourhood watch or moving away.

A few left lights burning, dismissing staff, renting out rooms, or leaving the television switched on and washing machine working when out. Ninety-two victims replied that they had taken no further measures at all.

In keeping with cognitive deficits experienced when learned helplessness was operative a small percentage of victims, nearly 17 per cent, felt that the crime prevention measures they had taken after the burglary would guarantee their safety. Most victims, over 45 per cent felt uncertain about their safety and close on 38 per cent had the opinion that they were not safe at all.

Respondent 16

"It is pointless trying to protect big glass windows since it would not deter future offenders."

Respondent 8.

"We have been burglarised so many times it was pointless buying any new television sets, radios or other electronic goods. Precautions taken were not enough to prevent another burglary."

Respondent 30

"We put up extensive bars on windows, but they ripped them off. Armed response is calling here up to eight times a day. I am petrified of being alone."

Respondent. 48

"I do not believe any protective measures will keep burglars out. I felt as if I was being raped. Once your stuff has gone it has gone. I feel quite paranoid."

In agreement with the Learned Helplessness theory, Mayhew (1984:30) concurred with the above statements made by victims that householders felt that burglars would get in no matter the precautions taken. Mayhew (1984:36) pointed out that conventional security might have little relevance for professionals, whereas younger more inexperienced burglars might be more swayed by conventional security.

Underpinning feelings of learned helplessness were Lynch and Cantor's (1992:356) results contributing to a growing literature that found no effect of security measures on the risk of burglary. Taking one or more steps to increase the security of your unit, such as having locks or alarms, did not seem to affect the risk of burglary but the results should be treated with some caution. Having security devices was quite different from using these devices. There could be qualitative differences in security devices, such as locks, that

could explain the fact that these measures had no effect on the risk of burglary. Welch (1993:35) augmented this argument when he stated that "electronic security systems" were not always kept functional. In many instances it might well only be the warning sign of the manufacturer, that the house was fitted with an alarm system, that was functional. Recent studies, however, by Cromwell (1991:29) and Wright and Decker (1994:125), and an earlier study by Repetto (1974:85) in general held the view that the presence of a dog or signs of an alarm was a deterrent.

5.3.4.1. Interpretation of the fourth central theoretical proposition

The fourth central theoretical proposition was fully supported by the data gathered.

Although victims had increased their security measures, the view in keeping with the Learned Helplessness theory, was expressed that it was impossible to create a 'thief-proof house'.

Respondent 34

"No alarms, no burglar bars, etc. will ever stop a burglar who watches your house. You merely have to make your house less attractive to burglars than your neighbour's house."

In general security devices did appear to deter the burglar, but only if they were kept functional, and used properly. Watchdogs, particularly, needed to have free access to all parts of the property and be properly trained to be effective.

Burglars seemed to have ways of neutralising dogs as mentioned by :

Respondent 38.

"One of my dogs had battery acid thrown in her face, an Alsation was poisoned and another dog disappeared. On Monday night my Bulldog, Churchill, died after being poisoned."

According to Maquire (1982:42) and the viewpoint of the researcher was that there was no certainty that by increasing the physical 'security' of a house significantly reduced risk of victimisation. More important factors might be the precise siting of a house in relation to local streets and footpaths, neighbouring houses, fences, hedges and so on.

It would appear that security measures and increased vigilance are secondary to primary factors such as location, accessibility and site configuration, as the first line of 'defense' (Welch, 1993:36).

5.3.5. Victims of burglary who have expectations of uncontrollability suffer from anxiety.

Burglary induced fear because of its potential for violence and because it occurred in people's homes. It was not necessarily the degree of injury but the emotional trauma and post-traumatic stress disorders that made the offence frightening. Janoff-Bulman and Frieze (1983:2) suggested that common psychological experiences might be shared by a variety of victims such as shock, confusion, helplessness, anxiety, fear and depression. The symptoms suffered were indicative of psychological distress experienced by the victims.

5.3.5.1. Emotions experienced by victims of burglary.

The emotions experienced by 300 victims within the Honeydew Police district were placed in rank order.

The worst thing about the whole burglary event appeared to be "Invasion of privacy". Macquire (1982:129) when putting the question "What had been the worst thing about the whole event" found similar results. Sixty per cent selected intrusion on their privacy as

the worst element. Karmen (1984:36) and Hudson (1983:19) similarly stated that burglary was an invasion, intrusion or frightening breakdown of security since homes were reflections and extensions of oneself.

Respondent 16.

"I threw away all my underwear. Somebody had been through my underwear."

Respondent 30.

"I felt like I had been raped."

Respondent 299.

"Some total stranger had invaded my castle and defecated in my toilet."

The majority of the victims declared that they had experienced anger, often expressed as extreme anger. Similarly Hudson (1983:19), Maquire (1980:263) and Kirsta (1988:57) found fear and anger common emotions for victims that could become quite disabling. Macquire (1982:124) also reported that the most common initial reaction by men was one of anger. Anger often underlay the desire for personal revenge.

Respondent 14.

"I was very, very angry to the extent that I would take the law into my own hands. If he did not get off my property I would shoot him. I was so angry, that when the burglar came through the window, I flew at him with my bare hands and pushed him out of the window."

A high percentage of victims expressed the view that they were not feeling calm after the burglary and over 50 per cent had not resigned themselves to the fact that they had been burglarised. This finding was congruent with Maquire (1982:125) who found that 17 per cent of the sample remained calm. Paap (1981:298) pointed out that the final stage of the victimisation process were feelings of resignation.

About two-thirds of the victims were experiencing general feelings of unease. Maquire (1982:126) and Hough (1985:494) said that victims were experiencing general feelings of unease in 75 per cent of cases.

Victims of burglary also reported feeling vulnerable in over 75 per cent of cases.

Respondent 86.

"I keep an eye open for the unusual and suspicious. I keep myself armed at all times.
Becoming more conscious of my vulnerability."

Karmen (1984:36), Hudson (1983:19), Bard and Sangrey (Janoff-Bulman and Frieze, 1983:4) and Wilson (1986:147) stated that the impact of crime was a grim reminder of one's vulnerability.

A sense of outrage, insecurity and shock was experienced by nearly two-thirds of the victims. Nearly 60 per cent of the victims had a tendency to keep thinking about the event. Maquire (1982:126) found that 65 per cent of victims found the most common persisting effects upon their lives were feelings of insecurity and a tendency to keep thinking about the event and people over 60 reacted with shock. Over 50 per cent of female victims reported shock or some form of emotional distress. Researchers such as Bard and Sangrey (Janoff-Bulman and Frieze, 1983:2), Ellis, Atkeson and Calhoun, (1981:263-266) also pointed out that shock was a common emotional reaction to victimisation.

Victims in this study were still frightened at times as a result of the burglary. The figures arrived at concerning fear of being alone in the house, nearly 37 per cent, and fearful of leaving the house over 44 per cent, were similar to those arrived at by Waller and Okihiro. Nearly 42 per cent females were fearful of being alone in the house whilst only 1.9 per cent of men were fearful of being alone in the house (Waller and Okihiro, 1978:39) These percentages were higher than those arrived at by Maquire. Macquire (1982:127)

found only 15 per cent of victims saying that they felt fearful of being alone in their homes during the hours of darkness. According to the Islington Crime Survey (Kirsta, 1988:5) over fifty per cent of women avoided going out after dark because of fear of attack. Those who stayed at home were caught up in a double bind, haunted by obsessive anxieties about being burglarised while they were out, fearful of being attacked by an intruder if they stayed in.

Respondent 16.

"I am petrified of being alone in the house."

Respondent 41.

"I fear going into an empty house and feeling that they could be there inside the house. I am worried that they will find me in the house if they should come again. Material things don't matter. They can be replaced. They must not touch me."

The psychosomatic consequences of fear were minimal when compared to the other emotional effects of fear. Victims suffered from insomnia, had nightmares, and depression in a minority of cases. Maquire (1982:127) said six per cent of respondents mentioned that their physical health had suffered as a result of the incident. According to Hough (1985:491) eight per cent of victims had difficulty in sleeping. In contrast to the findings of this study are the data from the 1983 British Crime Survey showing that one in three burglary victims suffer from depression, sleeplessness or other health problems (Hough and Mayhew, table J cited in Shover, 1991:93-94). Bard and Sangrey (Janoff-Bulman and Frieze, 1983:2) Ellis, Atkeson and Calhoun, 1981:263-266, Burgess and Holstrom, (1974:981) quoted depression as a common reaction to victimisation. Patterns of distress by victims of violent crime according to Kirsta (1988:50) were depression, nightmares, a sense of isolation, sleep disturbances, diminished self-esteem and denial of events.

5.3.5.2. Anxiety as an emotional state

A deleterious psychological effect of the arbitrariness of the criminal event combined with a partial or total loss of personal security led to "an expectation of uncontrollability is anxiety followed by depression" (Alloy, 1982:446).

The feelings of anxiety accompanying the victim's lost sense of safety and helplessness was assessed by means of the State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI).

(a) Scores for Honeydew Sample

The mean state anxiety and trait anxiety scores for females were higher than for males in the sample chosen for Honeydew Police district. When the sample was divided into subgroups, - ages 19-39, 40-49 and 50-69 and subdivided by sex, females in all three age groups had higher state and trait mean scores for anxiety. The highest state and trait mean scores were registered for females in the 19-39 age group. The mean state anxiety scores for males were fractionally higher in the 50-59 age group than the two other age groups for males. There was also a narrowing in the gap between state scores for males and females in the 50-59 years-of-age category.

Apparent from the findings (reflected in table 4.25) was the fact that there were no significant differences between trait and state mean values for either males or females except for females in the 40-49 years-of-age group. Since the state and trait inventory was administered on the same day, the effects of burglary and anxiety might have eroded over time. Hough (1985:492) stated that recent victims were more anxious than people who were victimised more than a year before the interview.

Personal characteristics such as sex and age, stated Baumer and Taylor and Hale (Smith and Glanz, 1989:54), Erskine (Toseland, 1982:200) and Sundeen and Mathieu (1976:211-219) have shown to be related to fear of crime. Evident and in agreement with Box, Hale and Andrews (1988:342), is the fact, that there was a narrowing in mean differences as one moved from the under sixty to the above sixty age group in respect of gender. Box et al. (1988:344) indicated that for those under sixty the proportion of women who were afraid was nearly five times that of men, while for the over sixty the figure was just over two. Baumgart (Smith and Hill, 1991:219) found that elderly males responded to having their residence burglarised with increased fearfulness of further victimisation, while their younger counterparts did not seem to be similarly affected, even when they were

injured during an attack. Schurink (Smith and Glanz, 1989:54) and Giles-Sims (1984:228) found that victims in the older age groups had the highest level of fear, but had a relatively low victimisation rate. This view is borne out by this research project noted under point 4.2.2. Stafford and Galle, (1984:181) argued that similarly older persons might believe they would suffer more serious harm if victimised than young persons.

The high mean state and trait anxiety scores for the feminine gender reflected the tendency for women to act with greater emotional lability. The high means for state anxiety in respect of females could be due to sex differences in physical strength that could lead to a greater sense of vulnerability among women that in turn raised their levels of anxiety. Hindelang (Stafford and Galle, 1984:181) stated that women had a greater potential for physical harm in a criminal encounter and unlike men women were subjected to the risk of rape. Women and elderly commonly expressed profound anxiety despite lower levels of risk (Zedner, 1994:1218, Hough and Mayhew, 1983:23 and Skogan 1986: 135-54).

(b) Comparison to normative sample

The data for state and trait anxiety in respect of 100 victims of burglary in the Honeydew Police District were compared to a normative standard, for example, working adults, employees of the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States of America (Spielberger, 1983: STAI-AD Manual 16).

TABLE 5.1.

**A COMPARISON OF THE MEAN VALUE OF STATE AND TRAIT SCORES/ SUBDIVIDED
INTO THE CLASSES GENDER AND AGE, FOR HONEYDEW POLICE DISTRICT AND
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA**

Variable	Gender	Age	Honeydew Mean score	Federal Aviation Mean score
STATE	M	19-39	34,4	36,54
	M	40-49	33,8	35,88
	M	50-69	35,3	34,51
	F	19-39	42,6	36,17
	F	40-49	41,4	36,03
	F	50-69	36,3	32,20

(Spielberger, 1983:STAI-AD Manual 63)

The mean values for trait and state anxiety for males in the Honeydew sample did not differ significantly from that of the normative sample. The mean state scores for females in the Honeydew sample, in all age groups, were generally higher than for females in the normative sample.

(c) F-test to test significant differences for state scores.

From research on fear and anxiety it was known that the perception of a particular situation or object as threatening might vary between individuals who were high and low in trait anxiety, depending on the type of stressful situation encountered (Bilsky, Pfeiffer and Wetzels, 1993:251).

The F-test was used to test for significant differences for state scores of victims in respect of certain questions. The degree to which stimuli reflected fear (state anxiety) was assumed to depend on the degree the person was fearful (trait anxiety). Physical factors that increased the vulnerability of the home and emotions experienced by victims who evinced high state scores are reflected over the page.

Significant at a five per cent level of confidence.

Respondents who -

employed casual labour;
 had someone stay in their home when they were away;
 felt uneasy;
 vulnerable;
 were fearful of leaving the house;
had significantly higher state scores.

Significant at a one per cent level of confidence

Respondents who -

felt calm;
had low state scores.

Respondents who-

had a tendency to keep thinking about the event;
 were fearful of being alone in the house;
 unable to sleep;
 had nightmares;
 felt the world was a lawless, threatening place;
 experienced depression;
had high state scores

Maquire (1982:127) pointed out that the 'Why me' syndrome, where people were searching for reasons why their house had been chosen among all possible targets in the area, seemed to have been responsible for a great deal of the anxiety produced by burglaries. Janoff-Bulman and Frieze (1983:4) stated that feelings of intense anxiety and helplessness accompanied a victim's lost sense of safety. Maquire (1982:133) further stated that people conjured up pictures of masked intruders, ransacked rooms and shadowy figures entering bedrooms while people slept. This explained why burglary came high on the list of crimes that caused the most apprehension.

5.3.5.3. Interpretation of the fifth theoretical proposition

The fifth theoretical proposition "Victims of burglary who have expectations of uncontrollability suffer from anxiety" was supported by the data.

Victims residing within the Honeydew Police District did not show appreciably higher mean state values than their American counterparts. The highest mean state and trait

scores were registered for females in the 19-39 age group. A plausible explanation offered is that the state and trait anxiety questionnaire was administered some time after the burglary had taken place. The effects of burglary and anxiety could have eroded over the time period.

Victims of burglary in Honeydew did show elevated state scores in respect of certain questions dealing with the vulnerability of their homes. Victims who had employed casual labour, and had someone stay in their homes while they were away, had elevated state scores. Victims who had experienced emotions such as uneasiness, vulnerability, and were fearful of leaving the house had higher state scores, significant at a five per cent level of confidence. Victims who had a tendency to keep thinking about the event, were fearful of being alone in the house, suffered from insomnia and had nightmares had high state scores, significant at a one per cent level of confidence. Persons who made the global attribution "the world is a lawless threatening place" had high state scores. Respondents who felt calm had low state scores.

The most common emotions experienced by victims were a sense of invasion of privacy, anger, feelings of unease, vulnerability, outrage, insecurity, shock, and a tendency to keep thinking about the event. To a lesser extent victims were also fearful of being alone in the house and fearful of leaving the house. Very few victims were calm and nearly half were resigned to the fact that their houses had been burglarised. There were few psychosomatic consequences of fear of burglary.

5.3.6. Victims of burglary show helplessness by means of their attributional style.

According to Seligman, et al. (Alloy, 1982:447) when a person perceived that outcomes were uncontrollable, they made an attribution for the cause of their helplessness. Attributions might be seen as a kind of ritual to help the victim come to terms with the

incident that would predict the chronicity and durability of learned helplessness and whether depression would follow.

Attributions made by victims of housebreaking were assessed by means of questions such as "Why did you report the incident to the police?", and "Why do you think your home was burglarised?". The answers were classified into various categories of attributions.

5.3.6.1. Global attributions

These factors were present in many situations and symptoms of helplessness would generalise widely across situations. Global attributions closely resembled Paap's definitions (1981:300) of pessimistic, cynical and fatalistic nature which resulted in feelings of powerlessness.

Congruent with the Helplessness theory, the analysis of question 4.10 indicated that victims of housebreaking exhibited a global attributional style. The majority of respondents, believed that police were unable to do anything about the burglary and that the offenders would never be caught. Victims also felt that their goods would never be recovered. The global attributions made in respect of the efficacy of the judicial system enhanced their sense of helplessness. Over half the respondents, felt that the world was a lawless threatening place. Nearly 47 per cent of the respondents felt they had no control over their destiny and a minority felt they lived in a bad neighbourhood.

Respondent 46. "Police do not check your home when you are away, they do not have enough staff. "

Respondent 134. "The police cannot do anything. What are they going to do. They are understaffed, avoid responsibility."

In respect of the attribution 'The world is a lawless, threatening place, the respondents felt that the question should have been reworded to read "South Africa is a lawless,

threatening place.” Bard and Sangrey (Janoff-Bulman, 1983:5) explained that malevolence had struck home and to the victim the world was a threatening place.

The low response in respect of the attribution “I live in a bad neighbourhood” might be explained by means of the “self-serving attributional bias”. Theorists such as Weary, Wortman, Costanzo and Witt (Alloy, 1982:463) argued that persons were motivated to maintain or enhance their self-esteem. The logic was that admitting to living in a bad neighbourhood was damaging to self-esteem. Van der Wurff and Stringer (1989:479) also stated that victims of burglary did not seem to experience negative reactions towards their homes and their neighbourhood.

In agreement with the global attributional style exhibited by victims in Honeydew it was found in Wales and England (Hough, 1984:17) that the inability of the police to do anything was consistently mentioned. Chang (1989:125), Siemarsko (1992:7) and Fattah (1991:44) found that respondents indicated that police could do nothing in the case of burglary. According to Maquire (1984:223) the majority of interviewees had always been pessimistic about the chances of catching the offender but felt it important that proper procedures should be carried out. Yet victims of burglary were more likely than victims of most other kinds of crime to inform the police. Most respondents, 32.4 per cent, reported burglary to the police for insurance purposes. The Second International Crime (Victim) Survey (Naude et al., 1996:33) stated that respondents were dissatisfied with the police because 32.4 per cent believed that police could do nothing for them. Burglary victims, 47.1 per cent, were dissatisfied because the police did not apprehend the perpetrator and because the police did not do enough (over 45 per cent).

The global attributional style of the victims interviewed was substantiated by the information provided by question 4.4.12 “Reasons for reporting the burglary”. When

burglaries were reported to the police, it was not because of a belief in police efficacy but because there was a need to obtain a case number for insurance purposes. A minority of victims felt it was their social duty to report the crime and the natural thing to do. Some victims thought it was necessary for police records, a legal requirement in respect of a stolen gun, some hope of the likelihood of their goods being recovered and that the thief would be caught. A few respondents wanted a bit of action and some had been raped, strangled and assaulted.

5.3.6.2. The attributions over dimensions specific, stable/unstable, internal/external.

Analysing the information provided by question 3.4. "Why victims thought their homes had been burglarised", attributions over the dimensions specific, stable/unstable, internal/external could be identified.

Specific/unstable attributions

Attributions to unstable factors predicted a relatively transient, nonrecurrent expectation. Over 60 per cent of respondents attributed the fact that their homes had been burglarised to their homes being unoccupied. Seven per cent of the respondents felt the reason why they were victimised was because gardeners and other labourers in the neighbourhood knew their routine movements. About 40 per cent had a suspicion their homes were broken into because of building construction taking place in the vicinity. Fifty per cent of the victims thought that houses-for-sale near their property were the cause of their home being chosen. Contributing to vulnerability was the fact that dogs were often trapped in backyards and could not face intruders, or they were too old, sick or had died.

Specific/stable attributions

An attribution to stable factors predicted that the expectation would be chronic or recurrent over time. Eight per cent of the victims thought it was squatter camps that posed a threat to their security. A high percentage of victims thought it was unemployment prevalent in the country that caused the high crime rate. Thirty respondents mentioned

that their homes were near open veld, footpaths, servitudes or main roads, which made the dwelling an attractive target. Fifty-two per cent felt that their homes were not easily surveillable. The dwellings were surrounded by high walls or overgrown shrubberies.

Internal/external attributions

Alloy (1982:448) stated that an attribution for perceived non-contingency to internal causes led to self-esteem deficits, in addition to motivational, cognitive, and emotional deficits, whereas an attribution to external causes did not lead to lowered self-esteem.

An attribution to uncontrollable positive or negative outcomes would lead to motivational and cognitive deficits, only an expectation of response-independent aversive outcomes would lead to depressed affect (Alloy, 1982:448).

Four per cent of the victims felt it was their own negligence that led to their homes being burglarised. Windows were left open, security gates unlocked, alarms were out of order and poorly installed or not switched on, and garage doors left open. Often lights were left on when the householder was out for the day or on holiday. Nine per cent of victims blamed themselves citing insufficient security as possible cause of break-ins. They had failed to protect their homes. Their homes had no burglar bars or safety doors. In rented homes no precautions were taken at all.

Maquire (1982:126) stated that once initial shock had worn off, most victims began to speculate about who had committed the offence. Only about 30 per cent of burglaries were cleared up by the police, the majority never found the answer to the riddle and the imagination could run riot.

Respondents replied overwhelmingly that they visualised the burglar as a black man, between 18 and 26 years of age, operating mostly in groups of two to three persons. In only one case was the burglar regarded as a female. This was in accord with FBI

statistics and other studies quoted by Repetto (1974:13). Persons arrested for burglary in Boston tended disproportionately to be young, male and non-white. The demographic characteristics of the sample of offenders interviewed by Wright and Decker (1994:10) and Shover (1991:86) found that they were predominantly black and male. They quoted the statistical rarity of "opportunistic" suggesting an offender who "just happened upon" a vulnerable target as a possible reason for the small numbers of opportunistic offenders. Thus, depending upon the definition of opportunistic, Welch (1993:30) in Stellenbosch found that most burglaries were opportunistic. Opportunistic was defined as burglaries occurring when conditions were right, where there was little chance of detection, where the target could be marked through 'casual surveillance', and where the opportunity arose.

5.3.6.3. Interpretation of the sixth theoretical proposition

The sixth central theoretical proposition "Victims of burglary show helplessness by means of their attributional style" was supported by the data.

Victims of burglary did engage in an attributional search in order to answer "Why" questions when an outcome of an event was unexpected and negative.

The majority of victims exhibited a global attributional style in respect of the efficacy of the judicial system and police services, their control over their destiny and the lawlessness of the world. Victims, however, felt the statement should have been rephrased to read that "South Africa is a lawless, threatening place". Victims, did not feel that they lived in a bad neighbourhood since this was a reflection on and damaging to their self-esteem. These victims would most likely experience a sense of general helplessness that would generalise to other non-similar situations. People with global attributional styles for negative outcomes were particularly vulnerable to debilitating behavioural and emotional responses to negative events. To test this was beyond the scope of this study.

Nearly two-third of the victims made specific/unstable attributions that would predict better prognoses in respect of helplessness feelings. These feelings would be relatively transient and augur for better coping behaviours.

Only four per cent of the victims made internal attributions citing reasons such as negligence or insufficient security. They blamed themselves for not having done more to avoid being an occasion for burglary. Victims of burglary who made internal attributions according to Janoff-Bulman (Miller and Porter, 1983:147) made behavioural and characterological attributions for self-blame. Behavioural blame, akin to external attributions, would facilitate the perception of control. Victims who saw the burglary event as due to insufficient security would feel in better control since they could do something about the matter. On the other hand, those victims who made characterological attributions for self-blame "I am so careless" undermined their self-control leading to feelings of helplessness and depression. Victims, however, did not report experiencing high levels of depression.

5.4. SUMMARY

This chapter interpreted the summarised results and tested the central theoretical propositions and compared it to existing research. The first and second central theoretical propositions were marginally supported by the data. The third central theoretical proposition was not supported by the data and the fourth, fifth and sixth central theoretical propositions were supported by the data. The findings appear to be similar to the findings in other communities both local and abroad.

Chapter 6 will put forward recommendations generated by the findings in this chapter.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a summary of the chapters and recommendations drawn from the conclusions arrived at in respect of the objectives of the study.

6.2. SUMMARY

Chapter one provided an introduction to the rationale used for the choice of the subject "Fear of Housebreaking in the Honeydew Police District". It was pointed out that the concept victim was stereotypically associated with persons who were physically, economically, socially and politically disadvantaged. Burglary had an economical, physical, and an emotional impact on its victims. It was felt that these victims could experience the same feelings of powerlessness and helplessness synonymous to the abused spouse, molested and battered child, or rape victim. Burglary had high reporting rates and victims were more willing than victims of other crimes to communicate with the researcher.

The aim of the study was to identify if the learned helplessness phenomenon was active in the lives of victims of housebreaking manifesting itself in cognitive, motivational and emotional deficits, characteristic of learned helplessness experiments done with animals and human subjects in previous studies. An attempt was made to identify the attributional style used by victims of housebreaking and to measure the intensity of fear levels of victims. Sub-goals dwelt on the vulnerability of dwelling types, the influence of environmental factors in targeting a home as a potential burglary site, and mode of access

of the burglar. In addition victims were asked why they thought their homes were burglarised, why they reported it to the police, and perception of the burglar as a person. Victims were also asked how they discovered the burglary, their expectations of being victimised again, and what precautions they had taken since the burglary. A description of the nature of the goods and financial loss was also asked for.

These sub-goals served to illustrate the central theoretical propositions.

Six central theoretical propositions were formulated to test whether victims of burglary experienced motivational, cognitive and emotional deficits and whether their attributional style was characteristic of the learned helplessness phenomenon.

The study was conducted within the Honeydew Police District, an area of 168 sq. kms. comprising suburbs, small-holdings, cluster homes and a minority of other types of dwellings. The data gathering took place over the time period March, 1994 to December, 1995.

The Positivist approach, and nomothetic strategy was used to objectively and quantitatively gather data. Three-hundred victims of housebreaking in the Honeydew Police district, using probability sampling procedures (systematic sampling with a random start) were chosen from the case books held in the Honeydew Police station. The interview schedule, comprising 92 closed-ended questions and six open-ended questions, was completed by the researcher in the presence of the victim. The State-Trait Inventory (STAI), developed by Spielberger, measuring state and trait anxiety levels was completed by 100 victims in the presence of the researcher. This sample was chosen by means of systematic sampling with the interval of three from the original sample of 300 victims. A professor of psychology, RAU, assisted the researcher with the psychological component of the study.

The contents of this chapter also spelt out the descriptive and inferential statistical techniques used to summarise and interpret the data. A consultant statistician, Unisa,

statistically analysed and interpreted the data gathered by the researcher. Even though victims were willing to cooperate in most circumstances, problems were encountered. A few victims objected to the fact that police gave "private information" to the researcher. Respondents were given the assurance that documents were carefully locked away and that their anonymity would at all times be protected. The determination of income levels proved to be a sensitive topic. It was also difficult to measure subjective emotional states superficially. These problems were overcome, in the case of a perception of a breach of confidentiality by assuring victims that information was treated with care and that prior permission was obtained from the highest source. As to income levels, the researcher used certain criteria such as the presence of swimming pools, tennis courts, type of motor vehicle parked in driveways, quality of furniture, quality of jewellery worn by the respondent as well as the size of the house as indicators of middle to higher income groups. Signs of neglect of dwelling and garden was also a criterion for gauging income status. These would presumably also be used by the burglar-to-be, to personally assess the income level of the household. The State-Trait Inventory was used to indicate anxiety levels experienced by victims. There was also a high degree of mobility in neighbourhoods. Police records were not entirely accurate. Telephone books were used to check the correct telephone number and address of the victim. Due to the fact that many homes could have been burglarised many times over time it was necessary to focus the questions determining motivational and cognitive effects of learned helplessness during a specific time frame. The period before December, 1993 was deemed to have been the period before the first burglary, and the first and subsequent burglaries having taken place between December, 1993 to December, 1995.

Finally all concepts of importance used within the study were defined.

Chapter two described the nature and extent of crime and burglary per se. Crime in South Africa owed its existence to a world-wide economic recession, drought conditions within the country, unemployment and the breakdown of traditional family values. Protracted negotiation within the political arena created instability, powerlessness and

helplessness in the community. This also led to authority structures being undermined. The response to this was vigilantism, securing of firearms and the birth of para-military structures. Paradoxically the new government, in its emphasis on human rights, emphasised the rights of the offender over that of the victim (Nedcor report, June, 1996:70-71).

Residential burglary had increased by eight per cent. Attacks on elderly people (50 years and over), and attacks on farms and smallholdings had increased as well. Attacks occurred in the dwelling, driveway, garage, garden and in front of the house. Crimes committed during burglaries, were robbery, murder, attempted murder, rape and assault.

The costs of burglary involved material loss suffered by the victim which could be staggering to the victim. Property was often destroyed and objects of sentimental value taken. Recovery of property was rare. Security measures taken added to the financial burden. Insurance companies were paying out huge sums and victims delved deeply into their pockets to meet insurance premiums so that they could be adequately compensated. Burglars were becoming more daring, striking when the house was occupied. An element of malice often accompanied the break-in. The emotional trauma suffered by the victim commonly manifested itself in a variety of emotions and anxiety that their homes would be broken into again.

Chapter three applied the theory of Learned Helplessness developed by Seligman to victims of housebreaking, in order to explain the behavioural deficits exhibited by victims similar to those demonstrated by animals during tests in laboratory situations. The theory held that an organism believed or expected that its responses would not influence the probability of environmental outcomes (expectation of response-outcome independence). The view was posited that victims of burglary could exhibit the same motivational, cognitive and emotional deficits apparent in organisms demonstrating a sense of learned helplessness. Victims of burglary might fail to increase caution and vigilance or to take security measures after the burglary since they saw no escaping their

negative situation. Similarly, victims could exhibit cognitive deficits in respect of their belief that there was nothing they could do to make their homes "thief-proof". Victims would show anxiety at the expectation of uncontrollability. The origins of the theory and its expansion to meet the problems of the chronicity and generality of learned helplessness, loss of self-esteem and development of anxiety leading to depression were also explained. The revised theory was then applied to victims of housebreaking.

Chapter four summarised the biographical data of 300 victims of housebreaking. An analysis was done to establish changes in cautious and vigilant behaviours practised by the victim before the burglary. The results were then compared to the cautious and vigilant behaviours taken after the burglary by the victim. Environmental factors which could have played a role in the vulnerability of the dwelling were also assessed. Details regarding the burglary were elicited from victims. This dealt with victim's perception as to why homes were burglarised, the number of times homes were burglarised, how the burglary was discovered, rates of occupancy, whether confrontation took place at the time of the burglary, as well as the value and type of goods stolen. Attitudes regarding future safety, emotions and anxiety levels, and attributional style of the victim were evaluated. The summarised data were presented in tabular and graphical form. The chi-square test, a test of significance for independence, was used to analyse dependence between questions, illustrated by means of two-way frequency tables. With the aid of a statistical software package (SAS) the chi-square value, and p-value were calculated for two-way frequency tables. The p-value was then interpreted with a central theoretical proposition. The t-test was used in the testing for equality of group means. In the analysis of variance, the F-test was used. The results were interpreted at a specific level of significance. The state and trait scores for 100 victims were also calculated and the mean values for gender and age were compared to a normative sample, Federal Aviation Employees of the United States of America. Finally the F-test was used to test for significant differences in respect of certain items in the questionnaire and state and trait levels of victims.

Within chapter five an interpretation of the summarised biographic data and central theoretical propositions took place. The first central theoretical proposition "Fear of having one's home burglarised is related to past victimising experiences" was marginally supported by the data. The second theoretical proposition "Victims of burglary have reduced incentives for initiating voluntary responses to control outcomes" was not fully supported. The third central theoretical proposition "Victims of burglary have the expectation that active instrumental responses will not affect outcomes" was not supported by the data. Central theoretical proposition number four "The victim of burglary has difficulty in learning that outcomes are dependent upon responses" was fully supported by the data gathered. Central theoretical proposition number five "Victims of burglary who have expectations of uncontrollability suffer from anxiety", was supported by the data. Interpretation of the sixth theoretical proposition "Victims of burglary show helplessness by means of their attributional style" was supported by the data.

6.3. RECOMMENDATIONS

When so many people are vulnerable, the question is not so much how to prevent loss, but how to most effectively minimize it. Working within the context of the Learned Helplessness theory the feelings of fear, loss of control and the sense of helplessness evident in the lives of victims of housebreaking need to be addressed at a therapeutic and practical level. Recommendations below offer some solutions.

Recommendation 1

Apparent during interviews with victims of burglary was the fact that the role of the interviewer often evolved into one of a sympathetic listener. This fulfilled a therapeutic function and helped the victim to gain a more balanced view of the burglary.

Victims need **support schemes** to allow them to talk about their victimising experience. At present there are very few victim support schemes. Psychological Services, South African Police Services, have initiated with the help of the community two victim support groups in Fourways and Tembisa. Members of the community are trained to use the

Model of Mitchell to debrief victims of crime. Volunteers are trained over a period of eight weeks.

Victims who have been in good psychological health before the traumatising incident find this method very beneficial. If the client/victim has a history of emotional instability before the traumatising event they may be referred to psychologists. The South African Police are unable to undertake this service because of a shortage of manpower. There is a critical shortage of victim support schemes. The Honeydew Police District has no such service.

The Police Community Forum should undertake to market this need, approaching organisations such as local churches and women's clubs for volunteers to be trained.

Recommendation 2

Burglary is regarded as a largely trivial and routine crime in the eyes of the law. To victims it is important that they be taken seriously by police and investigating officers. Investigations need to be prompt and thoroughly carried out. Even though the victim realises that the chance of the offender being apprehended and goods ever being found is negligible, Maquire (1980:272) states "the appropriate response to the incident is what the victim needed".

The South African public regard law enforcement with scepticism. The view is that the rights of the offender are upheld marginalising those of the victim. This negative image needs to be overcome by reviewing sentencing principles and options.

A higher presence of police is required in suburbs. **Visible street patrols** in the form of a "**Bobby on the Beat**" creates feelings of safety in suburbs. Previously Honeydew had a visible presence of police on horseback but this has been discontinued. If the administrative load is taken off the shoulders of the police by trained volunteers from the community this could contribute to a stronger presence of police on the street.

There is a need for **mobile police stations** in the area to facilitate reporting of crime. Criticism may be levelled at this type of service because police have no means of communicating telephonically and all cases needing investigating need to be referred to the main station. This can cause considerable delays in the police taking any action. Mobile police stations are funded by the state. Suburbs experiencing high burglary rates could do well to approach business in the area to fund mobile stations manned by police reservists.

Effective crime awareness campaigns are needed. Fear of burglary, often greater than the threat of actual burglary, should be addressed. The police need to expand the flow of information regarding crime and burglary per se to the media and the public. Posters and guidance booklets can offer information and advice to the public. An informed public is better able to assist the police and not take the law into their own hands.

Recommendation 3

The public should be educated on how to improve strategic responses to burglary. **The Community Police Forum** liaising with the South African Police Services and local security companies, by means of an awareness campaign, could educate the public on the subject of burglary and how to best minimize burglary in their suburbs. The Community Police Forum provides the opportunity for the public to evaluate and request more policing and protective services.

The Community Police Forum needs to advertise their existence to the public. Many individuals are not aware of the functions of this body. **Municipal newsletters** could fulfill this function.

Recommendation 4

Members of a community should be encouraged to take personal responsibility for their safety and protect their own properties, especially in the light of an already overburdened police force.

During this research project it was found that respondents who were repeatedly victimised formed a **Block Watch** system. Victims made a point of meeting their neighbours, being in possession of each others telephone numbers and advising their closest neighbour when they would be away from home. They took direct action in times of perceived threat to a home by telephoning the police. This provided these victims with a sense of environmental control and minimized perception of helplessness and vulnerability.

Recommendation 5.

Domestic staff need to be educated to look out for suspicious people loitering in the neighbourhood and report them to the police. Domestic staff should have the telephone number of the police put in a safe place for an emergency, be told not to pass out information about movements of their employers, and not to allow strangers on the property without permission. Doors and gates should be shut and locked when domestic staff were working in the house or garden.

Employers should screen prospective employees thoroughly before employing them.

Recommendation 6.

By **identifying burglary as a technological and an environmental problem to the household (target hardening)** may reduce the opportunities for a burglary and harden the target. Homeowners could make their homes more secure from burglars by following tips such as:

(a) Surveillance is a weapon that may be used against criminals. Criminals are

least likely to act if they think their actions can be witnessed. Shrubberies should be trimmed away from entrances and windows. Large plants provide a hiding place for burglars who need only a minute to break in through a door or window. Visual corridors must be maintained in open, park-like areas as well as in densely planted areas. As a rule, visual surveillance corridors can be maintained by limiting a shrubbery to a maximum of three feet and trees to a minimum height of six feet at the lowest branches. This approach ensures that visibility between three and six feet from the ground will always be relatively unimpaired. Metropolitan substructures, need to fulfill the function of maintaining and improving public and communal areas. This increases a perception of natural surveillance.

- (b) Dogs do have a deterrent value, only if they have been trained to raise the alarm and have access to all parts of the yard. Small dogs create a disturbance that burglars would prefer to avoid.
- (c) Padlocks securing garage doors and fence gates should be of the best quality. Screws installed in the track above the sliding door frame will prevent a door being lifted out of its track.
- (c) Alarms may not prevent burglaries but they do detect burglaries and can offer valuable protection if properly maintained. Electronic equipment needs to function properly to adequately raise the alarm at the crucial moment.
- (d) Quick response by a security company may prevent losses. Burglars tended to avoid houses fitted with alarms and links to response companies. Companies should be carefully selected. It is necessary to find out how long the company has been in business, if it is a member of the industry association and names of customers in the area of the potential client.

- (e) Houses that have been on show are targets for burglary. Burglars use furniture removal vans to add an air of legitimacy to their activities. Neighbours should be asked to look out for any suspicious vehicles near the dwelling and call the owners immediately.

- (f) Where new cluster homes are being built, security guards need to be rotated on a regular basis so that they do not become familiar with the movements of new residents. These premises also need a watchman with a guard dog to check the perimeter of cluster homes. Ideally, dwelling-owners should have identity cards allowing them sole access.

- (g) Owners of homes near regularly used footpaths and open veld may take several practical measures. Any obstacles, near walls, that can help would-be-intruders peer over walls need to be removed. Long grass growing outside the wall should be kept short at all times. If possible, strong lights, need to be fixed to walls facing the area which is regularly used by passers-by.

- (h) The display of street numbers next to your name in a prominent position should be discouraged. This makes it difficult for the would-be-burglar to look up the name of the resident in the telephone book and find his telephone number. The offender then cannot easily check if someone is home during the day.

- (i) For those victims who can afford it, insurance is an instance of "Forewarned is forearmed". The prime hazard of insurance is under-insurance. The compensation for stolen goods will fall far short of their replacement value. Insurance needs to be updated to include new purchases.

- (j) Note the serial and model numbers of electronic goods and mark these

same goods with some form of personal identification. Pawn-shops and second-hand shops should be investigated by the police as possible outlets of stolen goods.

- (k) Householders need to stagger their daily routines. The answer to this is flexi-time at the workplace. This is, however, not always practical. Even so there are periods that the home would be left unoccupied. Here the involvement of neighbours and domestic servants can be invaluable.
- (l) Victims of burglary need to adopt the philosophy where locking up behaviours are concerned that "I'll only be next door for a minute" but "it can happen to me". In the present criminal climate, locking all doors at all times of the day and night is becoming a necessity.
- (m) Make the home lived in. Timer lights, radio, and television left on throughout the house indicates that someone is home.

Recommendation 7.

Further research should focus on:

- (i) how the attributional style of a burglary victim plays a role in generating an expectation of helplessness;
- (ii) the role of environmental factors rendering homes vulnerable;
- (iii) how time lapse between a victimising episode and the administration of the State-Trait Inventory affects state anxiety levels;
- (iv) sentencing options used in cases of burglary.

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FEAR OF HOUSEBREAKING IN HONEYDEWQUESTIONNAIRE NO:

--

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

1.1 Your gender?

Male	1		
Female	2		1

1.2 What is your age?

Up to 18 years	1		
19-29 years	2		
30-39 years	3		
40-49 years	4		
50-59 years	5		
Over 60 years	6		2

1.3 In which vocational field are you employed?

Professional	1		
Self-employed in informal sector	2		
Business	3		
Teaching	4		
Clerical	5		
Artisan	6		
Student	7		
Housewife	8		
Other	9		
Unemployed	10		3

- 1.4 Personal classification by interviewer of household in terms of lower, middle and upper income levels.

Lower income level	1		
Middle income level	2		
Upper income level	3		4

- 1.5 Would you describe your dwelling as:-

A dwelling on a smallholding	1		
A single family home	2		
Unit in a retirement complex	3		
Dwelling in a housing development	4		
Block of flats	5		
Temporary structure in informal settlement	6		5

- 1.6 Are you living alone in your dwelling?

Yes	1		
No	2		6

**CRIME PREVENTION MEASURES TAKEN BEFORE THE FIRST BURGLARY,
THE PERIOD BEFORE 1ST DECEMBER 1993**

2.1. Had you taken any of the following prevention measures before the experience of the first burglary.

	Always	Usually	Sometimes	Never	
Are the doors locked when someone is home during the daytime?	1	2	3	4	7
when someone is home during the evening?	1	2	3	4	8
when someone is asleep at night?	1	2	3	4	9
when your home is left vacant for less than an hour or more?	1	2	3	4	10
Do you leave at least one interior light on when no-one is home at night?	1	2	3	4	11
Do you leave an outdoor light on all night?	1	2	3	4	12
Do you leave your home at the same time every day?	1	2	3	4	13
Do you arrive home at the same time every day?	1	2	3	4	14
Do you ask repairmen, deliverymen, meter readers to provide identification?	1	2	3	4	15
Do you accompany them while they are performing their tasks?	1	2	3	4	16
Do you have friends cut grass if you are away more than a week?	1	2	3	4	17
Do you have someone to stay in your home whilst you are away?	1	2	3	4	18
Do you ask police to check your home periodically whilst you are away?	1	2	3	4	19
Do you discuss vacation dates with strangers?	1	2	3	4	20
Do you employ casual labour?	1	2	3	4	21

- 2.2. At the time of the burglary/burglaries (from December 1993 to December 1994) were there any building operations near your home?

Yes	1	
No	2	22

- 2.3. At the time of the burglary/burglaries (from December 1993 to December 1994) were there any houses for sale near your dwelling?

Yes	1	
No	2	23

- 2.4. Is the number of your dwelling prominently displayed?

Yes	1	
No	2	24

- 2.5. Is the name of the occupant of the dwelling prominently displayed?

Yes	1	
No	2	25

- 2.6. Can your home be easily observed by your neighbours?

Yes	1	
No	2	26

2.7 Is your dwelling near any footpaths or main roads or open veld?

	Yes	No	
Footpaths	1	2	27
Main Roads	1	2	28
Open Veld	1	2	29

2.8. Before the first burglary (before December 1993) had you taken out any insurance to protect yourself in case of such an event?

Yes	1	
No	2	30

2.9. Did you own a watchdog before the first burglary (before December 1993)

Yes	1	
No	2	31

2.10. Was you house fitted with burglar alarms before the first burglary (before December, 1993).

Yes	1	
No	2	32

2.11 If yes, was the alarm system linked to a security firm?

Yes	1	
No	2	33

DETAILS REGARDING VICTIMIZATION

3.1. Have you or an immediate member of your family been the victim of a crime/s during December 1993 to December 1994.

Yes	1	
No	2	34

3.2 If yes, what category?

Property crime	1		35
Crime against the person	2		36
White collar crime	3		37

3.3 How many times has your home been burglarised from the 1st December 1993 to 31st December 1994?

	38
--	----

3.4 Why do you think your home was burglarised?

3.5 How did you discover the burglary?

3.6. Was anyone home at the time of the burglary/burglaries?

Yes	1		
No	2		39

If yes, proceed to question 3.7
If no, proceed to question 3.10

3.7 Was there a physical or verbal confrontation between you / member of your household and the burglar(s)?

Verbal Confrontation	Yes	1	
	No	2	40
Physical Confrontation	Yes	1	
	No	2	41

3.8 Were the offenders armed?

Yes	1	
No	2	42

3.9 If yes, were the offenders armed with a:-

Knife	1		43
Sharp Object	2		44
Any Other Object	3		45
A gun	4		46
Uncertain	5		47

3.10 What was taken?

3.11 How would you describe your financial loss?

Minimal	1		
Considerable	2		
Extensive	3		
Very extensive	4		
Uncertain	5		48

3.12 How much do you worry that your dwelling may be broken into again?

Very much	1		
Much	2		
Somewhat	3		
A little	4		
Not at all	5		
Don't know	6		49

3.13 How did the burglar actually get in?

Through the window	1	
Through the door	2	
Through the roof	3	

 50

3.14 Why did you report the housebreaking incident to the police?

CRIME PREVENTION MEASURES TAKEN AFTER THE LAST BURGLARY

4.1 Do you plan to move because of fear of being burglarised again?

Yes, have moved	1	
Yes, plan to move	2	
No, no plans to move	3	
Uncertain	4	

 51

... since the burglary/burglaries have you taken any of the following steps to prevent another incident.

	Always	Usually	Sometimes	Never	
Are the doors locked when someone is home during the daytime?	1	2	3	4	52
when someone is home during the evening?	1	2	3	4	53
when someone is asleep at night?	1	2	3	4	54
when your home is left vacant for less than an hour or more?	1	2	3	4	55
Do you leave at least one interior light on when no-one is home at night?	1	2	3	4	56
Do you leave an outdoor light on all night?	1	2	3	4	57
Do you leave your home at the same time every day?	1	2	3	4	58
Do you arrive home at the same time every day?	1	2	3	4	59
Do you ask repairmen, deliverymen, meter readers to provide identification?	1	2	3	4	60
Do you accompany them while they are performing their tasks?	1	2	3	4	61
Do you have friends cut grass if you are away for more than two-days?	1	2	3	4	62
Do you ask police to check your home whilst you are away?	1	2	3	4	63
Do you discuss vacation dates with strangers?	1	2	3	4	64
Do you employ casual labour?	1	2	3	4	65
Do you have someone to stay in your home whilst you are away?	1	2	3	4	66

4.3 Have you now taken out insurance to protect yourself against burglary?

Yes	1	
No	2	67

4.4 Do you now own a watchdog?

Yes	1	
No	2	68

4.5 Has your house now been fitted with burglar alarms?

Yes	1	
No	2	69

4.6 Is your alarm system now linked to a security firm?

Yes	1	
No	2	70

4.7 Have you taken any other precautions as a direct result of this incident? If yes, which?

4.8 Do you think that the preventive measures you took after the last burglary will prevent your house being burglarised again?

Yes	1	
No	2	
Uncertain	3	71

4.9

Which of the following feelings did you experience after the last burglary?

	Yes	No	
Feelings of unease	1	2	72
Insecurity	1	2	73
Tendency to keep thinking about the event	1	2	74
Invasion of privacy	1	2	75
Vulnerability	1	2	76
Calm	1	2	77
Resignation	1	2	78
Anger	1	2	79
Shock	1	2	80
Outrage	1	2	81
Fearful of leaving the house	1	2	82
Fearful of being alone in the house	1	2	83
Unable to sleep	1	2	84
Nightmares	1	2	85
Depression	1	2	86

4.10 Do you feel that:-

The police are unable to do anything about the matter?

Offenders will never be caught?

Stolen goods will never be recovered?

You live in a bad neighbourhood?

The world is a lawless, threatening place?

One has no control over your destiny?

Yes	No	
1	2	87
1	2	88
1	2	89
1	2	90
1	2	91
1	2	92

4.11 How do you visualise the burglar?

Developed by Charles D. Spielberger
in collaboration with
R. L. Gorsuch, R. Lushene, P. R. Vagg, and G. A. Jacobs

STAI Form Y-1

Name _____ Date _____ S _____
Age _____ Sex: M _____ F _____ T _____

DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read each statement and then blacken in the appropriate circle to the right of the statement to indicate how you feel *right now*, that is, *at this moment*. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.

VERY MUCH SO
MODERATELY SO
SOMEWHAT
NOT AT ALL

- | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|
| 1. I feel calm | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 2. I feel secure | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 3. I am tense | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 4. I feel strained | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 5. I feel at ease | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 6. I feel upset | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 7. I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 8. I feel satisfied | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 9. I feel frightened | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 10. I feel comfortable | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 11. I feel self-confident | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 12. I feel nervous | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 13. I am jittery | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 14. I feel indecisive | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 15. I am relaxed | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 16. I feel content | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 17. I am worried | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 18. I feel confused | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 19. I feel steady | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |
| 20. I feel pleasant | ① | ② | ③ | ④ |

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 Honeydew
 2040

AANSOEK VIR NAVORSING BINNE DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE:

MEV H WATT :-

A, U 4362 GEDATEER 1994-04-25

1. Goedkeuring word hiermee verleen dat Mev H Watt mag voortgaan met navorsing in die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie vir haar MA-graad in die Honeydew polisie-distrik.
2. Die goedkeuring is onderworpe aan die volgende voorwaardes:
 - 2.1 dat die stasiebevelvoerder deeglik ingelig sal word en daar nie inbreuk op die normale werksaamhede van lede gemaak sal word nie,
 - 2.2 dat toestemming om met lede te konsulteer vooraf van bevelvoerders verkry moet word,
 - 2.3 dat daar geen koste-implikasie vir die staat is nie, en
 - 2.4 dat 'n afskrif van die proefskrif aan Hoofkantoor beskikbaar gestel word.
3. Mev Watt word sterkte met haar studies toegewens.

[Handwritten Signature]
 KOLONEL
 BEVELVOERDER: KORPORATIEWE BEPLANNING