CHILE, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE GREAT POWERS 1795 - 1948

by

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SUMMARY

This work covering the period 1795 to 1948 has four main features. It firstly examines the role of international and domestic factors in determining regional interaction and cooperation between South Africa and Chile. Secondly, it documents the whims of the international community, and more particularly the world powers which was a motivating factor in Chilean and South African politics, economy, society and their bilateral relations. Thirdly it covers the period when Britain rose to world power status. Eventually, this gave way to her displacement by Germany and then ultimately the United States. This study's fourth feature is that it marks the first documented account of direct contact between the inhabitants at the Cape of Good Hope and Latin America. The period ends with a cornerstone in the history of South African-Chilean bilateral relations when direct diplomatic and consular relations were established by both South Africa and Chile in May 1948.

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I declare that CHILE, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE GREAT POWERS, 1795-1948 is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

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SIGNATURE (MISS) I S SCHELLNACK 02-11-1999. DATE

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PREFACE

The period 1795 to 1948 has been selected for this thesis as it has four notable features. Firstly, the role of international and domestic factors in determining regional interaction and cooperation between South Africa and Chile. Secondly, during this period of study, the one external factor that was decisive in Chilean and South African politics, economy, society and their bilateral relations was the whims of the international community, and more particularly the world powers. Thirdly, the period marks Britain's rise to world power status meaning her dominance of the centre stage for a time. This gave way to her displacement by Germany and then ultimately the United States. Fourthly, this study marks the first documented account of direct contact between the inhabitants at the Cape of Good Hope and Latin America. The period ends with a cornerstone in the history of South African-Chilean bilateral relations when direct diplomatic and consular relations were established by both South Africa and Chile in May 1948.

The thesis is comprised of eight chapters plus an introduction and conclusion. The introduction deals with the historiography of the topic under investigation. Chapter One deals with the interplay of international and domestic factors between South Africa and Chile between 1867 and 1948. It begins with the appointment of the first Chilean honorary consul in Cape Town and culminates with the establishment of direct diplomatic relations between Chile and South Africa in May 1948. The next three chapters deal with the impact of the industrial Revolution and Napoleonic Wars at the end of the eighteenth century until the rise of the United States, the outbreak of World War II and its aftermath. Each of these chapters deals with the effects on Chile, South Africa and their bilateral relations. Chapters Five and Seven address the role played by significant Chilean personalities and political parties in determining Chile's general relations with the international community and her particular dealings Chile's relations with South Africa from 1830 until 1948. In tandem, Chapters Six and Eight deal with the role played by South African personalities in influencing or determining South Africa's international relations along with her bilateral relations with Chile during the same period. The Introduction and Conclusion discuss the difference between my approach and that of D.C.M. Platt. His works. The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825, and a chapter entitled "Trade Competition in the Regions of Recent Settlement" in Decline and Recovery in Britain's Overseas Trade, 1873-1914 are the only works that have mentioned Chile and South Africa in the same focus. The first work recounts the experiences and problems of British officials serving in diplomatic and consular posts during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Platt's second contribution deals with Britain's trade interests and relations with countries such as South Africa, Australia, Canada and the republics of the Southern Cone of Latin America, such as Chile between 1873 and 1914. My thesis closes by highlighting how South Africa and Chile responded to the trials and tribulations presented by the international community, the whims of the super powers and the effect of these factors on their bilateral relations.

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A special word of thanks to Dr. Lucille Twyman and Dr. Philip Eidelberg for their meticulous supervision over the years.

I would also like to thank Ricardo and Jacqueline Tabilo for obtaining material in Chile. A special thanks to Malcolm Devantier for assisting me with the map work. Also to my parents, my husband Glyn, family and friends for their love and support.

Finally, I want to dedicate this work to my uncle, Eduardo Zomosa, with whom I spent many hours discussing issues, but who passed away in 1994 and so was unable to witness the completion of this thesis.

GLOSSARY

Boer/ Boers

Afrikaans term referring to white South Africans, predominantly of Dutch descent who were pastoralists.

Chili

Nineteenth and early twentieth century British records refer to the country of "Chile" by the spelling indicated. These cases have been indicated as such in the footnotes.

Junta

Spanish term which can mean to a military government in power.

Oficinas

Spanish term referring to the nitrate plants or works in Chile.

Trekker

This term refers to white South African pioneers who left the Cape settlement to establish themselves elsewhere in the interior.

Uitlander

This was a term used by the former South African Republic to refer to foreign persons living in the Transvaal who had no voting rights. These people were predominantly of British descent.





Chile, with provinces

INTRODUCTION: HISTORIOGRAPHY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CHILE AND SOUTH AFRICA, 1795-1948.

This investigation into relations between Chile and South Africa is the first of its kind. The general field of research into South African diplomatic relations with other nations is on the whole meagre. This opinion has been expressed by Christopher Saunders in 1990. He states that: "Professional historians have paid South Africa's foreign policy little attention." South African literary works on foreign relations have tended to concentrate on affairs with African nations, like J. Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa: Namibian-Angolan affairs, such as R.S. Jaster, South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy,3 and W. Steenkamp, South Africa's Border War, 1966-1988;4 the impact of apartheid on relations, such as D. Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South Africa's Foreign Policy Making: 5 and involvements with Britain, such as C.W. de Kiewiet, British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, 1848-1872;6 and P. Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy. Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980.7 Meanwhile, S. Pienaar, South Africa and International Relations between the Two World Wars. The League of Nations Dimension, has concentrated on South Africa's foreign relations with other countries through. involvement with the League of Nations.8

¹C. Saunders, 'The History of South Africa's Foreign Policy,' South African Historical Journal (henceforth SAHJ), 23, (1990), p. 147.

² J. Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa.

³ R.S. Jaster, South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy.

⁴ W. Steenkamp, South Africa's Border War, 1966-1988.

⁵ D. Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South Africa's Foreign Policy Making.

⁶ C.W. de Kiewiet, British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, 1848-1872.

⁷ P. Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy. Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980.

⁸S. Pienaar, South Africa and the International Relations between the Two World Wars. The League of Nations dimension.

During the 1990s, just prior to and particularly after South Africa's first democratic election in April 1994, a new wave of interest in South Africa's relations with other nations was crested. From the registers of researchers compiled annually by the National Archives of South Africa, there has been a growing trend of research into South Africa's relations with other nations in Europe, Africa, Australia, Asia and the Americas. However, most of these researchers are foreigners. Out of twenty-four registered researchers, nineteen are foreigners. Their topics involve investigations into South Africa's relations with nations like France, Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Britain, Finland, Russia, United States, Argentina, Brazil, Botswana, Belgian Congo and Nigeria. 10

The subject of South Africa's relations with Latin America has more recently become of interest. It is however, nevertheless still on a rather small scale in comparison to other topics of research. During the 1980s, Anthony Leysens wrote a thesis entitled *South Africa's Relations with Latin America* (1966-1988). However, it is safe to say that until the 1990s only brief investigations were done by South African scholars into Latin America. The general topic investigated was the migration of *Boers* to Argentina, with the works of D. Fig and C.J. Scheepers being good examples. More contemporary matters on South Africa-Latin American relations are being addressed by the Unisa Centre for Latin American Studies and the Society for Latin America Studies. The society attempts to bridge this gap by means of regular seminars and bi-annual publications.

⁹Rearchers' Register compiled by the National Archives of South Africa, from 13 March 1991 to the present.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ A.J. Leysens, 'South Africa's Relations with Latin America (1966-1988),' M.A. Thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1991.

¹²D. Fig, 'Proletarianisation or Patagonia: Reassessing the rationale for the Afrikaner Migration to Argentina, 1902-1906,' *Social Dynamics*, 17, 2, (1991), pp. 103-125; C.J. Scheepers Strydom, *Die Afrikaner en Sy Kultuur. Deel V: Afrikaners in die Vreemde*, (ed. P.W. Grobblaar).

The most recent trend in interest from South Africa on Latin America can be attributed to the eventual realisation of the similarities in historical, social, economic and political affairs of the two regions. In a SABC Television documentary presented by Freek Robinson on 3 December 1996, the similarities between the Chile, Argentina and South Africa in terms of their oppressive governments and periods of isolation from the international community were highlighted and discussed.

On the Chilean side, similarly there is a lack of literature on Chile's relations with Africa. Scholars investigating Chile's foreign history have tended to concentrate rather on her relations with the United States of America, Britain, but on a much smaller scale with European countries and neighbouring Latin American nations. Studies into Chile-United States relations and U.S.-Latin American relations have been conducted by several scholars such as H.C. Evans, *Chile and Its Relations with the United States*; H. Muñoz and C. Portales, *Elusive Friendship*; M.J. Francis, *The Limits of Hegemony: United States relations with Argentina and Chile during World War II*; J.S. Tulchin, *The Aftermath of War: World War I and US Policy toward Latin America*; Meanwhile, examples of the literature that exists on Chile's relations with Britain during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are Ricardo Couyoumdjian, *Chile y Gran Bretaña*

¹³South African Broadcasting Corporation Television (henceforth SABC TV) Programme Title: *Afrikaans Fokus*, Documentary Title: *Latin American Countries: Chile and Buenos Aires*, Name of Presenter: Freek Robinson, 3 December 1996.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵ H.C. Evans, Chile and Its Relations with the United States.

¹⁶ H. Muñoz and C. Portales, *Elusive Friendship*.

¹⁷ M.J. Francis, The Limits of Hegemony: United States Relations with Argentina and Chile during World War II.

¹⁸ J.S. Tulchin, The Aftermath of War: World War I and US Policy toward Latin America.

¹⁹ S. de Madariaga, Latin America Between the Eagle and the Bear.

durante la primera Guerra Mundial y pos guerra 1914-1921;²⁰ and Harold Blakemore, British Nitrates and Chilean Politics, 1886-1896: Balmaceda and North.²¹ General works on Britain's involvement with Latin America, in which Chile is mentioned, during the same period can be located. A few of the authors worth mentioning are D.C.M. Platt, Latin America and British Trade, 1806-1914;²² Rory Miller (ed.), Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries;²³ V. Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), Britain and Latin America: a changing relationship;²⁴ and D.C.M. Platt, Business Imperialism, 1840-1930: an inquiry based on British experience in Latin America.²⁵

Platt is the only author to date who has mentioned the diplomatic and commercial roles that Britain played in both Latin America and Africa, in general, and in Chile and South Africa, in particular. In Platt's work entitled *The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825* he gives a detailed analysis of the duties, functions and difficulties which British consuls experienced in different areas of the world while serving Britain. The first half of his writing describes the conditions of the British Consular Service in the nineteenth century, while the second part deals with similar issues experienced by officials in the twentieth century. The topics which are addressed include the functions, recruitment of officials, training received, service conditions, salaries, promotions and incentives, and the relationship between the consuls and the Foreign Office. Platt describes the experiences of the different British officials who occupied posts on

²⁰ R. Couyoumdjian, Chile y Gran Bretaña durante la primera Guerra Mundial y pos guerra 1914-1921.

²¹ H. Blakemore, British Nitrates and Chilean Politics, 1886-1896: Balmaceda and North.

²² D.C.M. Platt, Latin America and British Trade, 1806-1914.

²³ R. Miller, Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.

²⁴ V. Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), *Britain and Latin America*: A Changing Relationship.

²⁵ D.C.M. Platt, Business Imperialism, 1840-1930: An inquiry based on British experience in Latin America.

behalf of the British Government around the world during these periods.²⁶ It is in this context that South Africa and Chile are mentioned. However, Platt does not deal with the subject of Chilean and South African consular officials in sufficient depth. The main reason for this is that his work deals specifically with the experiences and problems of the British Consular Service in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In contrast, my work concentrates on the bilateral diplomatic and consular relations which Chile and South Africa had during the period 1795 to 1948.

Furthermore, Platt in a chapter in the combined work by D.C.M. Platt, A.J.H. Latham and R. Michie entitled Decline and Recovery in Britain's Overseas Trade, 1873-1914, has once again mentioned South Africa and Chile together. In a chapter entitled "Trade Competition in the Regions of Recent Settlement," he expands on British trade experiences and expansion with the "regions of recent settlement" which refers to the European settlements on the world's temperate latitudes namely Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, South Africa, Australia, Chile and Brazil.27 This chapter deals with the shift in Britain's trade interests towards the Southern Cone of Latin America, South Africa and Australia, once her trade commitments to India, the United States of America and Continental Europe began to decline between the period 1873 and 1914.²⁸ My work also differs from this other one of Platt's as it covers dealings specifically between Chile and South Africa in the context of the changing world power among Britain, Germany and the United States of America during the period 1795 to 1948. I have also addressed in great detail the external and internal factors in both Chile and South Africa which affected and influenced their bilateral relations. As there is no systematic treatment of

²⁶ D.C.M. Platt, The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825.

²⁷D.C.M. Platt, A.J.H. Latham and R. Michie, *Decline and Recovery in Britain's Overseas Trade, 1873-1914*, p. 91.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 91-129.

the broader historical issues involved in Chilean-South African relations. This is one of the gaps which my thesis tries to fill.

Very little literature exists on relations between Latin America and the African continent. However, one example which should be borne in mind is Frederick Cooper's, *The Confronting Historical Paradigm: Peasants, Labor, and the Capitalist World System in Africa and Latin America.*²⁹ Furthermore, there seems to be no literary work that concentrates solely on Chile's relations or involvements with the African continent. Thus, the primary purpose of this thesis is to attempt to breach an area of study that appears to have been neglected. The perspective of this thesis has been shaped from primary material located at various South African archival institutions. The author acknowledges that a similar investigation deserves to be conducted from the Chilean perspective as well. Another aim of the thesis is to illustrate the political, social and economic similarities of both Chile and South Africa, and encourage both countries to look beyond their borders to the non-European nations and forge stronger diplomatic relations with them.

Since February 1990, there has been a growing tendency by South Africa's chief political parties, those being the National Party and the African National Congress, to establish and renew diplomatic and economic relations with other nations. These ties have not only been developed and strengthened in the African continent but in the Americas Europe and Asia too.

Between 23 and 29 August 1993, F.W. de Klerk, former South African State President, and several top South African businessmen, visited four Latin American countries. The businessmen who accompanied the president were amongst others, Lesley Boyd, Deputy Chairman of *Anglo American*; Gray Mayde, *Gengold*; Willem de Kok, Chief Executive Director

²⁸ F. Cooper, The Confronting Historical Paradigm: Peasants, Labor, and the Capitalist World System in Africa and Latin America.

of *Premier Foods*; and Chris Leisewitz, Managing Director of *Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation*. The four countries visited were Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. From newspaper articles in the *Citizen* and *Pretoria News*, it appears that this visit was an attempt to extend the attainment of regional cooperation to across the Southern Atlantic Ocean to South America. Willem Mouton, spokesperson for the South African embassy in Chile said that the "President's visit would help explore new forms of economic cooperation." F.W. de Klerk was the first South African head of state to visit these four South American countries in an official capacity. This thrust into South America has economic and diplomatic implications for the southern hemisphere.

According to Johan von Gernet, former South African diplomat to South America in the late 1980s, the continent of South America has generated much interest amongst South African businesses, such as the mining giants like *Anglo American* and *De Beers* who have realised that there exist plenty of untapped resources. These entrepreneurs are eager to create favourable economic conditions and agreements to work with the South American nations.³³ This viewpoint was not only emphasized by this Foreign Affairs official, but has formed the backbone for several SABC TV documentaries produced by South Africans on South America.³⁴ On 27 February 1997, during the South African Broadcasting Centre (SABC) TV programme *Good Morning South Africa* an interview was conducted with the visiting Chilean Minister of Public Works, Dr. Ricardo Largos. The Chilean Minister's chief reason for visiting South African was to encourage

³⁰Citizen, 23-30 August 1993.

³¹lbid.

Pretoria News, 23-27 August 1993.

³²Citizen, 24 August 1993.

³³Opinion expressed by Johan von Gernet, South African Diplomat, 20 October 1997.

³⁴SABC TV, Programme: Afrikaans Fokus, Documentary Title: Emergence of Brazil as one of the Strongest Countries in the Southern Hemisphere, Presenter: Freek Robinson, Date: 26 November 1996.


the South African private sector to become involved in the Chilean exportation industry.³⁵ As is evident from the above it is clear that there is a definite interest between several of the South American nations, like Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, and South Africa for the development of stronger commercial and diplomatic relations.

As can be seen on the world map on p. 9, the geographical locations of Chile and South Africa are far from the main world economic centres of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, those being Britain, North Western Europe and United States, and lately Japan. Chile is a country that is situated between the Andes and the Pacific Ocean. It extends from Tierra del Fuego in the southernmost tip of South America to Tacna in the Atacama Desert in the north. The area from Antafogasta to Arica became part of Chile after 1886 when Chile defeated Peru and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific (1879-1886). Similarly South Africa occupies the area from the Cape of Good Hope in the south to the Limpopo River in the north. Between the 1850s and 1910, South Africa was comprised of four separate territories, those being the Cape Colony, Natal Colony, the Orange Free State and South African Republic (Transvaal). Each of these areas had separate foreign policies. In 1910 when the Union of South Africa came into being these four territories became one country.

Very little research has been done on the subject of regional interaction and cooperation between South Africa and Latin American nations. For the purpose of this thesis the author has chosen to concentrate on relations between South Africa and Chile from 1795 to 1948. During this period, the impact and effect of international and domestic factors played a significant role in determining their bilateral relations. Actually, although it goes far beyond our time span this trend continued to define their bilateral relations from 1948 until 1997. Between 1795 and 1948 the one external factor which was a decisive element in Chilean and South African politics,

³⁵SABC TV, Programme: *Good Morning South Africa*, Title: *Chile and Argentina: Growth of the Chilean Economy*, Studio Guest: Ricardo Largos, Date: 27 February 1997.

economy and society, and in their bilateral relations, was Britain. However, the other world powers increasingly Germany and the United States of America, also influenced relations between Chile and South Africa. The author will focus on the effect and impact which Britain, Germany and the United States of America had on Chile and South Africa, during this period. The study ends in May 1948 when Stephanus Francios du Toit opened the first South African Legation in Santiago and José Serrano Palma was officially recognised as the Chilean Chargé d' Affaires and a Chilean Legation was opened in Cape Town.



CHAPTER ONE: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CHILE AND SOUTH AFRICA, 1867-1948. AN OVERVIEW.

Chilean consuls were established in the Cape Colony and later in the Union of South Africa between 1867 and 1948. They complied with the duties and functions determined by Britain and her European counterparts after the Napoleonic Wars and known since 1815 as the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Their functions were primarily to protect the interests of their country. Chile, and to further the development of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations between the two nations. They were also responsible for the supervision and inspection of naval vessels registered in Chile to ensure that they complied with Chilean laws and regulations. In accordance with the 1815 Vienna Convention and Britain's 1825 Canning Consular Act, Britain was allowed, with permission from the Chilean Government, to establish consular posts for Chile in South Africa and did so, after a long wait, from 1867 to 1942. British honorary consuls were established in an effort to give diplomatic recognition to other countries but also to slash the expenditure of the Foreign Office.² Consuls can be defined as "agents of commerce in a foreign land" and Latin American consuls acted as agents for the expansion of British trade.³ Such personnel were often honorary consuls and businessmen who were from the receiving state such as the Cape Colony and later the Union of South Africa. Unlike career consuls who devoted their full time to the consular office, the honorary consuls only devoted a portion of their time to it and had other employment too.4 in the nineteenth century these Chilean consuls who were appointed by Britain

¹ M.J. Gamboa, Elements of Diplomatic and Consular Practice. A Glossary, pp. 67-68.

² D.C.M. Platt, The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825, pp. 2-3.

³ *lbid.*, p. 5.

⁴J. Barratt, 'The Development of Foreign Affairs,' in D. Worrall (ed.), Government and Politics, pp. 430-344.

received their salaries from Chile.⁵ The Chilean consuls appointed to serve in South Africa and the periods in which they served coincided with the international, domestic, political and economic factors prevailing at the time.

* * * *

The first honorary Chilean Consuls in the Cape Colony were established in August 1867 at the height of the Conservative Government under the leadership of José Peréz. As readers will see in Chapter Four, the Conservative Government respected the wishes of the Chilean bourgeois class and chose to maintain good relations with Britain and her colonies. This was one of the reasons why Chile wanted and got the establishment of a Chilean honorary consul in the Cape Colony. Secondly, enthralled by the discovery of diamonds near the Orange River in 1867, and convinced that this was the rock on which the "future success of South Africa would be built," Britain encouraged her trading partners to establish direct ties with the Cape Colony. From 1868 onwards, numerous countries, such as the United States, Germany, Italy, Austria, Venezuela, Uruguay and Peru, joined the ranks of forerunners France, Portugal, Brazil and Belgium who already had diplomatic relations with the Cape Colony. Between 1867

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁶ D.H. Houghton, 'Economic Development, 1865-1965,' in M. Wilson and L. Thompson (eds.), *The Oxford History of South Africa*, p. 11.

⁷ CAD, GH 1/315, file no.: 35: Appointment of Consul of United States at Cape Town. CAD, GH 1/320, file no.: 96: Appointment of Consul for North German Confederation at Cape Town.

CAD, GH 23/34, file no.: 64: Recognition of acting consul for Italy, Belgium, Russia and Spain.

CAD, GH 1/324, file no.: 68: Application for issue of Exequatur as Austrian Consul at Cape Town.

CAD, GH 1/323, file no.: 34: Appointment for Venezuelan Consul at the Cape.

CAD, GH 1/351, file no.: 6: Appointment of Uruguayan Consul at Port Elizabeth.

CAD, GH 1/383, file no.: 105: Application for issue of Exequatur for Consul of Peru at Port Elizabeth.

CAD, GH 1/33, file no.: 477: Appointment of Vice-Consul of France at the Cape.

GH 1/295, file no.: 26: Issue of Exequatur as Consul General for Portugal at Cape of Good Hope.

GH 23/12, file no.: 4: Appointed as Consul to the Emperon of Brazil.

GH 1/165, file no.: 2924: Appointment as Consul for Belgium at the Cape.

and 1880, the importance of the Cape Colony was also strongly evidenced in Britain by the series of Colonial Secretaries advocating that the British Crown should adopt a more aggressive role in the Cape Colony. The first consul was established in August 1867 and Guillermo Jorge Anderson filled the position. He was a citizen of the Cape Colony, a prominent businessman⁸ and regarded by Lord Granville, as a person capable of serving the commercial and diplomatic relations and interests of Chile and. more particularly Britain.9 It was a fact that candidates for consular posts were more likely to be appointed if they were recommended by a person who had some clout in the Foreign Office, and Anderson's sponsor was Granville. 10 After his resignation, William S. Anderson, a partner of the shipping company, Union and Castle Steamers renowned for transporting British goods around the globe, subsequently occupied the post of Chilean consul in Cape Town. 11 In September 1885, he resigned and the post then remained vacant. 12 In 1869 another honorary consular post for Chile was created in Port Elizabeth, David Ferguson Stewart occupied the post until late 1894 when he was declared insolvent and was relieved from his post. 13 He had been a prominent businessman of the Cape Colony and, at the time, was adjudged by Lord Granville as a person who was able to pursue favourable commercial and diplomatic relations with another nation, like Chile on behalf of Britain.

⁸ CAD, GH 1/316, file no.: 73: Issue of Exequatur to the Chilian Consul at Cape Town, October 1867.

⁹ CAD, GH 23/30, file no.: 108: Appointment of Chilian Consul at Cape Town.

¹⁰ Platt, Cinderella Service, p. 21.

¹¹ CAD, Colonial Office (henceforth CO) 4239, file no.: A30: Anderson Consul of Chili, May 1884.

¹² CAD, GH 1/434, file no.: 51: Resignation of Chilian Consul at Cape Town.

¹³ CAD, GH 1/322, file no.: 57: Issue of Exequatur to the Chilian Consul at Port Elizabeth, February 1869. CAD, GH 23/40, file no.: 83: Cancellation of Stewart's Commission as Consul for Chili, July 1894.

Once Anderson and Stewart had vacated the Chilean consular posts, no new consular relations were established between Chile and the Cape Colony. In other words, in Cape Town from 1886 and in Port Elizabeth from 1895 until 1915 no Chilean Consul existed in South Africa. There were several probable reasons for the abandonment of direct diplomatic ties between South African territories and Chile. The first reason was the anti-British policies and the attitude of the Chilean President José Balmaceda, between 1886 and 1891. Balmaceda's presidency pursued rigorous campaigns discouraging British involvement in Chile's economic and political endeavours. Thus, it was improbable that Balmaceda would consent to receiving aid from Britain by maintaining and having to finance the consular relations at the British Cape Colony. Britain no longer had the support of the Chilean Government and population which it had enjoyed during the rule of the Conservative Party between the 1820s and 1870s. Even though Balmaceda was ousted by means of a coup and replaced by a government favourable to the Chilean bourgeois class in league with British investors, there was still a large contingent of the Chilean population who resented the British stranglehold imposed on their nation. As a result, despite the efforts made by President Federico Errázuriz in 1896 when he asked Britain to assist Chile in settling a border dispute with Argentina, Britain remained reluctant to open consular relations between Chile and the British colonies in the Cape and Natal in South Africa. Also Britain harboured realistic fears that the anti-British lobby in Chile would aid the Boer republics in their struggle against British Imperialism.

Throughout the nineteenth century and even until 1910, no diplomatic relations with Chile were established by Natal, the Orange Free State, or the South African Republic (ZAR). Despite the sporadic trade of war supplies to these territories prior to and during the South African War no formal diplomatic arrangements were entered into. In 1902 the appointment of consuls by the British Foreign Office did undergo change. The Walrond Committee of 1902 recommended that the British

Government establish a well-organised consular service. Persons appointed to consular posts had to be "deserving officers." In July 1907, Lionel L. Goldsmid applied for the post of Chilean Consul in Johannesburg. He had been the Justice of the Peace for the Witwatersrand and the managing director of *De Transvaler*, a prominent newspaper of the Afrikaans community in the Transvaal. He had also been responsible for assisting with the importation of weapons in September 1896 into the Transvaal Republic. Because of his involvement in the South African War and his siding with essentially *Boer* interests, his application was turned down in 1910 by Winston Churchill, President of the Board of Trade in London and by Joseph Chamberlain, British Prime Minister. 16

After the South African Act of 1909, the way that the South African government operated and made decisions was very different to what had prevailed before. The head of the executive government was the governor-general who was the representative of the British crown. He was assisted by an Executive Council which was comprised of elected Union government officials. When diplomatic officials were appointed, it had to be done with the approval of the British Crown. As South Africa was a colony, all decisions of an international nature were decided by the governor-general, in collaboration with the Colonial Office in London and the final approval resting with the ruling British monarch. Accordingly, in the colonies officials appointed as honorary consuls had to meet and satisfy criteria laid down by Britain and act in her best interests.

¹⁴ Platt, Cinderella Service, pp. 69-70.

¹⁵ NAR, SAD, PM 17, file no.: 26/7/1907: Consuls. Chile, July 1907. NAR, SAD, GG 1012, file no.: 20/1/1910: Application re appointment of Lionel Goldsmid as Consul for Chili, 10 January 1910.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa, p. 267.

¹⁸ Ibid.

The next person to be appointed as Chilean Consul in South Africa was Arthur Dennison Hinde. He was a man who satisfied these requirements and was favoured by the Governor General of the Union of South Africa as being ableato pursue goals favourable to Britain and the Union of South Africa. Hinde served in this post for what is described as an epoch 4. stretching from 1912 to 1932. Several ventures in which he had participated helped to place him in a more favourable light than his counterpart, Lionel Goldsmid. Hinde had been Secretary of the Natal Closer Union Society, a body responsible for encouraging the expansion of Natal's maize and fruit export trade. 19 In 1910, he drew up plans to inaugurate a British steamship service between South Africa and Buenos Aires, Argentina. He believed that this shipping line would promote the coal exports from Natal to Argentina that had very little coal. Furthermore, he wanted this line to extend its services between South Africa and Buenos Aires, Argentina; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Montevideo, Uruguay; and Valparaíso, Chile. Hinde understood that these Latin American republics were favourable markets for South African coal, raising coal mining from cinderella status to more like that of the gold and diamond mining. He also believed that these were favourable markets for exporting other South African commodities to Latin, particularly South America.²⁰ Incidentally, Hinde's economic interests in Latin America were echoed as recently as 1997 by former South African diplomat Johan von Gernet.²¹ Hinde's interest in establishing a steamship line was spurred on by the fact that A. Schepper, a retired Government official from the Netherlands who had served in India, wanted the Union Government to back him in establishing a direct monthly steamship service which would operate between British South Africa and such Asiatic countries as Ceylon, Hong

¹⁹NAR, SAD, GG 1021, file no.: 20/544: A.D. Hinde appointed as Consul for Chile, 3 October 1914.

²⁰NAR, SAD, GG 1026, file no.: 20/852: Consuls. Chile. Consulate transferred from Johannesburg to Durban, 25 April 1919.

²¹ Opinion expressed by Johan von Gernet, South African diplomat, 20 October 1997.

Kong, British and Dutch East Indian Islands, China and Siam and then on to the South American nations of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.²² British officials were bewitched by Hinde's prophetic vision as they realised that this way the profits of such a venture would flow to Britain and not to European competitors.

It was towards the end of 1912 when the redoubtable Arthur Dennison Hinde applied for the position of Consul for Chile in Johannesburg thereby launching himself as a kingpin. In January 1913, Herbert Gladstone, Secretary of State, informed Hinde that he and the Governor-General in South Africa, Viscount Buxton, would provisionally recognise him as the Consul for Chile, until the King's definite exequatur came through. Because of interminable bureaucracy Hinde did not actually receive the King's Exequatur until March 1915 even though he had been serving His Majesty energetically ever since December 1912. It was finally rectified and they were lucky to have him as Chilean Consul until he resigned after twenty years of sterling service.²³ During his term he had to deal with such huge issues as World War I, during which, as we know, Chile stubbornly remained neutral; political upheavals in Chile; and exchanges of knowledge and expertise between both the Chilean and South African agricultural and mining industries.²⁴ During Hinde's term as consul, dealings between Chile and South Africa were more frequent and there

²²NAR, SAD, Customs and Excise (henceforth DEA) 314, file no.: C89: Proposed Steamship line to East Indies and South America. Correspondence between A. Schepper and the Union's Acting Secretary for Commerce and Industries, H.R. Eaton, 24 September to 3 October 1910.

²³NAR, SAD, GG 1018, file no.: 20/339: Consuls. Chile. Recognition of A.D. Hinde as Consul, 19 February 1913.

NAR, SAD, GG 1021, file no.: 20/544: Consuls. Chile. Appointment of A.D. Hinde, Correspondence between Viscount Buxton, Governor-General, and Lewis Harcourt, Secretary of State of the Colonial Office in London, 3 to 28 October 1914.

NAR, SAD, GG 1022, file no.: 20/852: Consuls. Chile. Issue of King's Exequatur for Hinde, 9 March 1915.

NAR, SAD, GG 1048, file no.: 20/1913: Consuls. Chile. Resignation as honorary consul, 16 June 1932.

²⁴NAR, SAD, K70, vol. 1. Minutes of Meetings of the Commission, 26 January 1916 to 8 December 1917.

was a realisation on both sides that the two nations had problems in common and were ideally positioned to exchange ideas.

The main reason for the involvement between Chile and South Africa arose from the numerous treaties and good relations forged between Chile and Britain during the 1920s. During that time Chile bought South African sheep and coal as well as exchanging knowledge about the production of wine. South Africa purchased wheat, maize and nitrates from Chile. Despite the contacts made, the establishment of a Chilean Consulate in South Africa and Chile's favourable relations with Britain, the commercial relations between the two nations were admittedly not on a large scale. Both Chile and South Africa preferred to look towards and rely on the markets of Britain, Western Europe and United States as their chief trading partners rather than each other.

During Hinde's term the strength of Britain's colonial power weakened as the First World War ended. The self-governing Dominions like Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa moved along towards full statehood in International Law. This came about as a result of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of the war in 1919 when the representatives of the British Dominions were allowed to participate in signing the treaty. This act in effect, meant that the dominions had achieved a higher status in the international community and were no longer considered subordinate to Britain. Although the Union was in a position to be more independent, Jan Smuts, South African Prime Minister, believed that its destiny was intimately linked to Britain and he structured

²⁵NAR, SAD, GG 1857, file no.: 54/710: Stock. Miscellaneous. Importation of stud merino from South Africa into Chile, Correspondence between J.H. Thomas, Secretary of State of the Colonial Office, and Earl Athlone, Governor-General, 12 to 19 May 1924. NAR, SAD, URU 1037, file no.: 410: Export of Fruit to South America. Minute from the Prime Minister's Office, 15 December 1928.

²⁶G.C. Olivier, 'South African Foreign Policy,' in Worrall (ed.), 'Government and Politics, pp. 288-289.

the Union's policies with Britain in mind. Although the dominions had entered a new stage as sovereign states, they could not really pursue independent foreign policies.²⁷ As a result of the 1926 Balfour Declaration, Prime Minister Hertzog established the South African Department of External Affairs on 1 June 1927. He believed that the portfolio of Minister of External Affairs was important and thus, from 1927 until 1953 it was filled by Prime Ministers.²⁸

Nevertheless, while Hertzog held the job of Minister of External Affairs from 1927 until 1939, he encouraged the general thrust of the newly established department to have South Africa acknowledged in Europe and North America. In 1929 the first South African legations were established in The Hague, Rome and Washington.²⁹ In 1931 as an extension from the Statute of Westminster of 1931 which stated Britain's acknowledgement of the 1926 Balfour Declaration, additional South African representatives were placed in Paris, Berlin, Stockholm, Brussels and Lisbon. During the same period, because of South Africa still being a member of the British allowed Commonwealth. she was to send her representatives to serve in the post of the High Commissioner stationed in London.³⁰ From 1925 until 1939 while Hertzog was Minister of External Affairs, this position was occupied by J.S. Smit, Eric Louw and Charles te Water consecutively.31

The faint interest in Chile on the part of the new South African Department of External Affairs, established in 1927, was evident in the early 1930s

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸Munger, *Notes of the Formation of South African Foreign Policy*, p. 13.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Olivier, 'South African Foreign Policy,' in Worrall (ed.), Government and Politics, p. 288.

³¹Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa and of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, No. 24 of 1948, p. 1240.

when Britain entered into a treaty and agreement with Chile, from which the Union Government decided to distance itself. Chile and Britain signed the Anglo-Chilean Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in April 1930 for the purposes of facilitating, extending and regulating trade and commercial relations between Great Britain, Ireland, the British Dominions, India and Chile.32 Then in October 1931, the Provisional Commercial Agreement was entered into by Chile and Britain under which Britain agreed to treat Chile in the same way as her most favoured foreign nation. Chile would receive favourable advantages with regard to customs duties, fiscal laws, import licenses and customs restrictions from Great Britain and her dominions. The reason for Britain's interest in establishing such an agreement was because in May 1931 Chile had signed a similar agreement with France. In her campaign to maintain her commercial power, Britain did not want her European competitor, France, obtaining a larger share of the Chilean market.33 However, this agreement in particular was rejected by the Department of External Affairs of the Union of South Africa, which in collaboration with the Department of Mines and Industries, believed that:

As far as the promotion of our export trade is concerned, Chile is of no importance whatsoever as a consumer of South African products and the Union therefore stands to gain nothing by a trade agreement with Chile.³⁴

As a result of South Africa's attitude, Britain encouraged Chile to establish individual treaties with the different dominion governments.³⁵ The Union's

³²NAR, SAD, BLO 689, file no.: PS 35/7 vol.1.: Americas. Chile. Draft Treaty sent from South African High Commissioner, Adv. Charles T. de Water to Minister of External Affairs, J. Hertzog, 11 April 1930.

³³ *Ibid.*, Copy of Provisional Commercial Agreement, 15 October 1931.

³⁴NAR, SAD, HEN 4430, file no.: 791/42: Trade Relations and Treaties. United Kingdom and Chile. Correspondence between H.D.J. Bodenstein, Secretary of External Affairs and L.P. van Zyl Ham, Secretary for Mines and Industries, 18 to 25 September 1931.

³⁵ Ibid., Correspondence between Sir Henry Getty Chilton, British Ambassador in Chile, and Luís Izquierdo, Chilean Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 15 to 28 October 1931.

attitude towards Chile was made glaringly obvious when Hinde resigned as Chilean Consulate in 1932 and his job remained vacant for five years.³⁶ The establishment of the Chilean Consulate in the Union of South Africa and the appointment of Hinde were after all on British prompting.

Besides the anti-British ventures of the Union Government under Hertzog. other reasons contributed to the break in direct diplomatic relations between the two countries, South Africa and Chile. During this period, between 1932 and 1937 South African politics were undergoing changes, with numerous domestic issues taking precedence. The Great Depression hit the Union's economic prosperity and was aggravated by a severe drought in 1932 that left many farmers destitute. There was also a general mood within the white Afrikaans-speaking population that in the 1930s Hertzog was becoming too complacent with the Union's relationship to Britain. It appeared to them as if he was becoming too accustomed to Britain while not doing enough to meet the needs of the Afrikaans community. This sector of the population actually wanted South Africa to be completely independent from Britain in all spheres of life.37 It was for this reason that Hertzog rejected the Provisional Commercial Agreement of October 1931 between Britain and Chile. Moreover, no attempts were made to re-establish consular relations with Chile. As a result in 1934 when the South African National Party, a coalition formed between Hertzog and Smuts, won the election, Hertzog on his part struggled to ensure that South Africa's policies were not seen as being pro-British. However, Hertzog had to contend with Smuts, who was still in favour of the Union remaining intimately linked to Britain. Smuts' view of South Africa having a common destiny with Britain was a motivating factor favouring the resumption of consular relations with Chile in 1937.

³⁶ SANDFA, DC group 2, 2243, file no.: 705/2, Chapter 1: Consular Representatives General List of Consuls of Foreign Countries stationed in the Union of South Africa.

³⁷ Olivier, 'South African Foreign Policy,' in Worrall (ed.), Government and Politics, p. 290.

Between 1931 and 1936 several favourable reports were compiled by Sir Henry Getty Chilton during his terms as British Ambassador in Chile (1930-1933) and Argentina (1933-1935), and distributed to the Departments of External Affairs of the various dominion governments.38 During 1931 the Prince of Wales and Prince George visited Argentina and Chile, and were particularly well received by the Chilean President Carlos Ibáñez, members of the British Chamber of Commerce and prominent Chilean businessmen. The British Ambassador also reported that the agreement signed between Britain and Chile on 15 October 1931 was well received. Furthermore, the Chilean Government agreed to give British goods the same treatment that they were giving to the commodities emanating from the modus vivendi that Chile had signed with France on 22 May 1931.39 Relations between Chile and the United Kingdom were reported by the new British Ambassador, Sir Robert Mitchell, as being "very friendly." 40 The report commented further on the economic hardships that Chile was still suffering as a result of the Depression. Mitchell commented on the growing interest of the United States in Chile but urged that because of the close relations Chile and Britain had preserved over the years, the Chileans still preferred to be involved with Britain.41 During April 1934 a mission from Chile, consisting of the Chilean Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Francisco Landerstoy and a journalist to cover the story, Oscar Cavagnaro, arrived in South Africa to investigate the possibility of strengthening trade relations between Chile and South Africa. This mission brought with them substantial cargo of nitrates and discussed the possibilities of marketing Chilean hard timber for railway sleepers in South Africa, as well as beans, sulphur, wines, beers, soft timber for furniture and grain. What Chile required was machinery, cloths,

³⁸ Who was Who, 1951-1960, p. 207.

³⁹ NAR, SAD, BTS file no.: 1/42/3: Chile Annual Foreign Office Reports, 1931.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*: Annual Report, 1934.

fine wool and minerals from South Africa.⁴² They emphasized the geographical fact that Chile was "2000 miles closer to South Africa than Europe, Australia and the United States."⁴³

To Smuts, the attraction of strengthening trading relations with Chile was Chile's favourable ties with Britain. In 1937 another favourable report on relations between Chile and Britain was delivered from the British Ambassador, Robert Mitchell which was distributed to the various dominions. In September 1937 Mrs. Dora P. Marais offered her services to the Chilean Embassy in London to serve as honorary Chilean Consul in the Union. Marais was born in Coquimbo, Chile, but at the time of her appointment she was living in Cape Town. The South African Department of External Affairs was in favour of this appointment and she occupied the post until May 1938 when there was once again a lapse in diplomatic relations between Chile and South Africa, which lasted until 1943.

The reasons for the break in relations were related both to an international factor as well as to the influence of political figures in both Chile and South Africa. The Second World War broke out in September 1939 and once again the world was split into two camps, those that were pro-Allies and those not. As with the First World War, Chile chose to remain neutral in the conflict and withstood pressure from Britain and the other Allied nations to abandon that stance. However, Chile was becoming more intimate with the United States from the 1920s onwards. It was only from December

⁴²NAR, SAD, HEN 4317, file no.: 747, vol. 1: Trade with Chile. Trade Relations and Treaties. Extract from the Cape Times, 24 April 1934.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴NAR, SAD, BTS file no.: 1/42/3; Chile, Annual Reports, Annual Report, 1936.

⁴⁵NAR, SAD, BLO 701, file no.: 38/36. Correspondence between Luis Renard, Charge d' Affaires ad-interim of the Chilean Embassy in London, E.K. Scallon, Political Secretary of the South African High Commissioner in London, and P.R. Botha, Secretary of the South African Department of External Affairs, 8 September to 16 November 1937. SANDFA, DC Group 3, 2243, file no.: 705/2, Chapter 1, 2 and 3: Consular representatives and Consuls of Foreign Countries in South Africa.

1941 onwards when the United States joined the conflict that Chile underwent tremendous pressure from the United States to join the Allies. Early in 1943 Chile declared war on the European Axis countries and stopped all relations with Japan. Although Chile gave her allegiance to the Allies, she never sent combat troops.

Chile's initial decision to remain neutral strained relations with South Africa as Jan Smuts had managed to obtain the electoral support of the white South African population to aid Britain in the conflict and would have liked Chile to follow suit. In his eyes having relations with a country not actively siding with the Allies to the hilt could spoil South Africa's credentials in the British Commonwealth. However, in 1941 Chilean President Aguirre Cerda died and was replaced by Juan Antonio Ríos. 47 Once Ríos was in office, he broke all relations with the Axis powers and Japan. His efforts to restore consular relations with South Africa were successful during 1943.

From 1943 onwards the appointment of Chilean Consulates was no longer done by Britain or the Union of South Africa but by the Chilean Government. From 1943 their Consulates were career appointments. They were Chilean citizens and, unlike the honorary consuls, devoted their full time to the consular office. On 6 November 1942, the Chilean Ambassador to London, Manuel Bianchi, informed his counterpart, the South African High Commissioner in London, Sidney F. Waterson, of the Chilean Government's decision to appoint Edmund Rogelio Piffre, a former Chilean army officer, as the new Chilean Consul.

⁴⁶ NAR, SAD, BTS, file no.: 1/42/3 vol. 1: Chile Annual Foreign Reports, Annual report on Chile, May 1943.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Gamboa, *Diplomatic and Consular Relations*, p. 127.

⁴⁹NAR, SAD, BLO 701, file no.: 38/36: Correspondence between Manuel Bianchi, Chilean Ambassador, and Sidney F. Waterson, South African High Commissioner in London, 6 to 11 November 1942.

been the mayor of a town near Santiago in Chile and was president of the Lunares Areo Club. He was officially appointed and granted the status of career consul in February 1943.⁵⁰

However, as early as July 1943, Piffre started to damage relations between Chile and South Africa. He was arrested at Komatipoort, on the Mozambiquan border, which had been declared a "prohibited area." He was not in possession of his passport or an identity document or, at any rate, did not show one. On 13 July 1943, Piffre was convicted by the Barberton Magistrates' Court, fined £15 and jailed as he was unable to pay the fine. However, on 16 July the South African Department of External Affairs informed the Police of Piffre's identity, that he had diplomatic immunity and that he had been granted permission to leave the Union. Piffre was subsequently released and he vacated the post of Chilean consulate. This incident understandably caused tension between Chile and South Africa and led to yet another break in relations for forty-four months. So

Thus in October 1943, when Carlos Casto Ruíz applied for the post of Chilean Consul General in South Africa, his application was rejected by the South African High Commissioner, Sidney F. Waterson, in London. Ruíz had been a counsellor of the Chilean Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, as well as the Minister of Finance in President Aguirre Cerda's

⁵⁰NAR, SAD, URU 2080, file no.: 522: Grant of Provisional Recognition to E.R. Piffre as Consul, Minute from the Prime Minister's Office, 22 February 1943.

⁵¹NAR, SAD, URU 2133, file no.: 3137: Permission of Sentence passed on E.R. Piffre, Report from H.G. Lawrence, Minister of Justice, to the Prime Minister's Office, 21 October 1943.

⁵² Ibid.

SANDFA, DC Group 3, file no.: 705/2, Chapter 1: Consuls of Foreign Countries stationed in the Union of South Africa, Lists of consular representatives in South Africa, 1942 to 1948.

Government between 1939 and 1941.⁵⁴ Although Ruíz was highly recommended, his application was rejected and the Chilean Government stifled efforts to have further diplomatic and consular relations with South Africa until 1947.

The reasons for the renewal of diplomatic relations between Chile and South Africa in 1947 were three-fold. Firstly, it occurred as a result of the efforts made by Britain to attract the interest of British entrepreneurs, as well as those in the dominions, to opportunities available in Latin America. This was done in an effort to counteract moves by the United States to increase its commercial power in the areas that had once been dominated by Britain. As a result of this campaign, in May 1946 the British Embassy in Chile compiled a report on the commercial opportunities available in Chile. It highlighted the role that the United States was playing in economic and social activities there. The purpose of the report was to rescue Chile from the "black books of His Majesty's Government." 55 The report described the industries that existed in Chile, namely the agricultural, lumbering, fishing and mining industries, as well as the presence of oil in Tierra del Fuego. Furthermore, the report emphasised that trade and commerce with Britain was generally viewed with favour by most sectors of the Chilean population.⁵⁶ According to this article:

Chile. . . is perhaps the only one in Latin America where, for historical reasons, Great Britain is held in genuine affection for herself alone, and not merely on account of self-interest. . . [It is also]. . . a country. . . that only needs cultivating to be once more a focus of pro-British sentiment. . . ⁵⁷

⁵⁴NAR, SAD, BLO 701, file no.: 38/36: Correspondence between D.B. Sole, Secretary of External Affairs, and S.F. Waterson, South African High Commissioner, 1 to 22 October 1943.

⁵⁵NAR, SAD, BTS file no.: 1/42/4: Chilean Economic and Financial Matters, Printed report from the British Foreign Office to the Dominions on Anglo-Chilean Trade, 14 June 1946.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

Secondly, it was in response to the change in the world order that had occurred after the Second World War. Prime Minister Smuts' ambition for South Africa was for her to play a leading role in the British Commonwealth and on the African continent. In order to snub the criticisms which the Union received from India and the Soviet Union concerning its racial policies, Smuts encouraged the Department of External Affairs to set the wheels in motion for the establishment of direct diplomatic ties with Brazil, Argentina and Chile during 1947.

On 16 May 1947, the Chilean Ambassador, Manuel Bianchi, enquired from G. Heaton Nichols, SA High Commissioner in London, whether the Union was interested in establishing direct diplomatic relations with Chile. Heaton Nichols informed Bianchi that he would refer the matter to the Department of External Affairs for consideration. South Africa had already accepted Legations from twelve European countries since in the preceding twelve months.⁵⁸ Heaton Nichols advised the department that he was worried that if they refused this request from Chile, "we may create the impression of discriminating against the South Americans on the grounds of colour."59 In July 1947 Prime Minister Smuts advised the Department of External Affairs that it believed that the time was right to exchange diplomatic representatives with the Governments of Brazil, Argentina and Chile. The British monarch, King George VI, had given his approval on the establishment of direct diplomatic ties with these three countries. 60 As a result, between February and March 1948, South Africa agreed to establish a South African Legation in Santiago, Chile. The legation would be headed by Stephanus Francios du Toit who would be the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for both Argentina and Chile with R.H. Coaton as the temporary Chargé d' Affaires stationed in

⁵⁸NAR, SAD, BLO 701, file no.: 38/36: Letter from G. Heaton Nichols, High Commissioner, and D.B. Sole, Secretary for External Affairs, 16 May 1946.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., Letter from D.B. Sole, Secretary of External Affairs, 8 July 1947.

Santiago, Chile. Du Toit would live in Argentina and once South Africa had sufficient foreign service personnel, a separate minister would be appointed in Chile. Du Toit had been a journalist, had worked in the Senate in Cape Town since 1920 in various positions and had served as the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Sweden in 1946. In May 1948, the South African Legation in Santiago opened.

The third reason for the resumption of relations between Chile and South Africa stemmed from President Juan Antonio Ríos who encouraged both Britain and United States to take more interest in Chile. The interest that Britain showed provided incentives for the Chilean Government to become similarly involved with Britain's dominions. In May 1947 the Chilean Government, via its Embassy in London, informed the High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa, G. Heaton Nichols, that it was keen to establish diplomatic relations with the Union of South Africa.⁶¹ Between May 1947 and May 1948, negotiations were held between representatives of the Chilean and Union Governments concerning the forging of diplomatic bilateral relations. Chile also wanted to establish a Legation in Cape Town but likewise had a personnel shortage in their Foreign Service Department. In order to fill the diplomatic post, Chile appointed José Serrano Palma as an honorary consul to the Union of South Africa. Palma had served in the Chilean Foreign Service in Japan and the Far East, and had been an employee of the Chilean Nitrate Corporation. 62 On 13 May 1948 he was officially recognised as the Chilean Chargé d' Affaires in the Union of South Africa. 63 Thus, by the end of May 1948, for the first time in

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, Correspondence between Manuel Bianchi, Chilean Ambassador, G. Heaton Nichols, SA High Commissioner, and D.B. Sole, Secretary for External Affairs, 8 to 10 May 1947.

⁶² *Ibid.*, Correspondence between Manuel Bianchi and G. Heaton Nichols, 24 July 1947 to 24 March 1948.

⁶³NAR, SAD, BSA 1, file no.: SC 10/8: Diplomatic Relations between the Union of South Africa and Chile, Extract from departmental directive, 13 May 1948.

their histories, both Chile and South Africa had established direct diplomatic relations with each other.

CHAPTER TWO: CHILE, SOUTH AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL EVENTS, 1795-1880.

Events on the international scene had great impact on Chile and South Africa, as well as on their economic and diplomatic relations during the period 1795 to 1880. Simultaneously, Britain was a catalyst in the domestic affairs of both nations, and their involvement with one another, Therefore, international situations which affected both Chile and South Africa during the period 1795 to 1880 need addressing. Both countries were affected by events that occurred in Europe and Britain. Neither Chile nor South Africa was in a secure enough economic or political position to escape these events. From the late eighteenth century until the 1820s, the Napoleonic Wars and the Industrial Revolution in England occupied the centre stage. These two developments brought British people to the Cape and British merchandise to the Chilean coast. As a result of the turmoil in Europe caused by the Napoleonic Wars, and the presence of British merchant and naval vessels in the Atlantic Ocean, merchandise was exchanged between South Africa and the South American continent in 1801. Then from 1820 until the 1880s, Britain dominated the world and its influence was evident in both South America and southern Africa. The presence of Britain in both Chile and South Africa resulted in the increase of commercial activity, and both these southern hemisphere countries investigated the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations.

* * * *

Britain's industrialisation not only allowed that country to become a world power but also enabled the British to extend this power across the seas. Industrialisation meant that from the 1760s, Britain was able to produce manufactured goods more abundantly than her European rivals, like France and Spain. Simultaneously, the Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815) centred in Europe had great impact on Britain. In 1806, Napoleon instituted his continental blockade policy which in effect, prevented Britain from trading with Europe. As a result of closed markets there, Britain

sought alternative markets for her merchandise which Napoleon could not block. Britain thus began to trade with emerging nations in Latin America and the Far East, thereby opening new markets for her products. Britain's industrial commodities were in great demand, particularly in the New World. Many of the Spanish settlements were eager to trade with Britain because these goods were more abundant, cheaper and more readily supplied than those from their mother country, Spain. Thus, it is small wonder that the Spanish American colonies encouraged supplies of British manufactures to their shores.

Until 1818, Chile was a Spanish colony and thus dependent on Spain for its supplies. During the prolonged colonial period the items developed and produced for exchange were wheat, hides, tallow, cloth, minerals and agricultural produce. Chile, together with Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, became renowned for textiles since Inca textiles before 1492 were better than those of Lancashire in the twentieth century. Thus, of all the South American nations, Chile and the three others had the potential to achieve more developed positions within the world economy. But, as a result of Britain's industrialisation and trade along the Pacific Coast from the late eighteenth century onwards, Chile did not develop as it should have done. Instead it imported most of its cloth from Britain. Elements in Chile were not averse to this trade because of the feeling that Spain had a parasitic hold on their economy. Spain accepted the raw produce of the colonies, sold it in Europe but kept the wealth in Spain. Very little was reinvested in Latin America. This meant in effect that the Spanish American colonies

¹ M.E. Chamberlain, Pax Britannica? British Foreign Policy, 1789-1914, p. 64.

²C. Pregger-Román, 'Nineteenth Century Chile: A Case Study. Subordination, the class process, and the relative autonomy of states,' *Latin American Perspectives* (henceforth *LAP*), 18, 1, (Winter 1991), p. 117.

³A.J. Bauer, 'Industry and the Missing Bourgeoisie: Consumption and the development in Chile, 1850-1950,' *Hispanic American Historical Review* (henceforth *HAHR*), 70, 2, (May 1990), pp. 228-253.

were generally expected to fend for themselves economically.⁴ Britain, on the other hand, in exchange for its manufactured goods bought the raw materials that Chile produced. It is small wonder that the Chileans during the 1810s saw themselves as the "English of South America."⁵

Scholars on Latin America who have analysed this region's commercial and economic relations with both Spain and Britain during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as Raúl Prebisch, James Cockcroft, André Gunder Frank and Johnson L. Dale, have described this period in Latin American history as one of "dependencia." In 1806, in the memoirs of William Jacob, a British official who served the British Foreign Office in Latin America during this time, the following is recommended:

A predominant influence in the Spanish provinces of Mexico. . . Peru, Chili, and Buenos Ayres...would be of the most beneficial consequence to Great Britain, in political, commercial and naval view. . . by extending the consumption of our manufactures, and supplying us with many raw materials. . . it would be more advantageous to them to send their wool and their cotton to England, and receive it back manufactured, than to continue their fabrick (sic.) of those articles. . . ⁷

Between 1808 and 1815, the Napoleonic Wars also had an impact on Chile. In 1808, Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Spain and placed his half-brother, Joseph Bonaparte on the throne. As a result of the upheavals on the European continent, Spain granted unofficial independence to her colonies. Thus Spain, occupied with the events in Europe and unable to

⁴T.E. Skidmore and P.H. Smith, *Modern Latin America*, p. 113.

⁵M.C. Needler, *An Introduction to Latin American Politics. The Structure of Conflict*, p. 270.

⁵ W.L. Bernecker, 'Las relaciones entre Europa y Latinoamérica durante el siglo XIX. Ofensivas comerciales e intereses económicos,' *Hispania*, 53, 183, (Spring/April 1993), p. 183.

⁷*lbid.*, pp. 187-188.

⁸Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, p. 113.

attend to her colonies' needs, allowed Britain to fill the void and the country thus began to assume a larger role in this part of the world.

The above mentioned milieu simultaneously encouraged ideas of independence in Latin America. Between 1810 and 1820, Wars of Independence broke out in the various Spanish colonies. Chile was one of the South American regions that yearned for independence from Spain. In the summer of 1817, José de San Martín and Bernardo O' Higgins, two key players in Spanish American independence, invaded Chile and found that the Chilean people supported their cause to break free from Spanish rule. A Chilean-Argentine expedition was organised and the Spanish troops were defeated. When San Martín rejected an offer to rule Chile Bernardo O' Higgins became the first ruler of the independent state.

Just as the Industrial Revolution in Britain and the Napoleonic Wars had their impact on Chile, there were repercussions in South Africa as well, with the difference that the Industrial Revolution had a comparatively smaller impact on South Africa than it had on Chile. British industrialists did not receive the same degree of enthusiasm from the European settlers at the Cape that they enjoyed from the Chileans. The former were mostly from the Netherlands and France. These settlers thus identified with their own nationalities and not with the successes and achievements of Britain. They had settled at the Cape as early as 1652 and managed to obtain a remarkably high level of prosperity before the British arrived. Britain took control over the Cape in 1795 as a result of wars in Europe and out of concern that the sea route to and from the East would end up in French hands. In order to prevent this happening, Britain arranged with the exiled House of Orange in the Netherlands for an invasion of the Cape Colony in 1795.

⁹J. Stickter, Allende and the Saga of Chile, pp. 90-93.

¹⁰V.T. Harlow, 'The British Occupation, 1795-1806,' in E.A. Benians, E.A. Walker and A.P. Newton (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire. Volume III. South Africa, Rhodesia and the Protectorates*, pp. 167-168.

The British assumed control over a colony whose European settlers owned most of the well established and wealthiest farms in the area. They also had control over the trade monopolies that had been sold off by the Dutch East Indian Company (V.O.C). These monopolies controlled commodities like bread, tobacco, meat, vegetables and wine. In South Africa, no manufacturing industries existed at the time to provide alternative employment to farming. The V.O.C. had made it their policy to discourage local industries. Its attitude had been consistent with mercantilist theory, which expected colonies to provide markets for the mother country, and not to compete with it. 12

In 1795 when the British occupied the Cape for the first time, they promulgated the *laissez faire* policy for the Cape Colony. The reason for this was that Britain had learnt from experience in the American War of Independence ending in 1783, that it was fatal to place unbearable restrictions on colonies, since they provoked revolts against the mother country. Nevertheless, Britain did impose some degree of restrictions on trade and navigation. These restrictions were enforced so that colonists could not conduct trade with French vessels. They were also prevented from trading with neutral ships for fear that these vessels would smuggle goods to the enemy, namely France. These restrictions, of course, were imposed essentially to protect British interests. Despite the European settlers' apparent apathy towards British industrialisation, the arrival of the British in 1795 had, nevertheless, many economic advantages. New small

¹¹R. Ross, 'The Cape of Good Hope and the world economy, 1652-1835,' in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds.), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840*, pp. 248-270.

¹²J.B. Peires, 'The British and the Cape, 1814-1834,' in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), Shaping of South African Society, pp. 490-491.

¹³E.A. Walker, *History of Southern Africa*, pp. 126-127.

scale industrial enterprises were encouraged and they developed notably in the spheres of milling, forestry and whaling.¹⁴

Britain's initial occupation of the Cape was brief ending in February 1803. The Peace of Amiens signed in February 1803 voluntarily restored the Cape to the Batavian Republic (Netherlands). However, it remained under Dutch rule until 1806, and the policy of free trade advocated by the British continued.¹⁵

In 1806, war broke out yet again between France and Britain. As the new Batavian Government in the Netherlands proved to be a French ally, all Batavian colonies, like French colonies, became vulnerable to attack and occupation by Britain. Thus, in 1806, the Cape was re-occupied by the British as a direct result of events that had unfolded in Europe. ¹⁶ Similarly, across the Southern Atlantic Ocean, Argentina was invaded by Britain to prevent the Southern Cone nations from becoming occupied by France and her allies. ¹⁷

By 1806, the Cape had achieved greater significance in Britain's eyes. As a result of Britain losing her North American colonies, the political and economic structure of the British Empire had shifted away from the New World and the North Atlantic towards countries in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Cape economy thus became intimately linked to that of Great Britain. This meant that whatever happened in Britain would have a spin-off effect on the Cape, and on the Cape's relations with nations involved with Britain.

¹⁴W.M. Freund, 'The Cape under transitional governments, 1795-1814,' in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping of South African Society*, pp. 328-329.

¹⁵I.R. Christi, Wars and Revolutions, Britain 1760-1815, p. 259.

¹⁶C.W. de Kiewiet, *British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics*, 1848-1872, pp. 40-41.

¹⁷ H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Cenutry, pp. 5-9.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Britain was becoming a world power. The British felt that they had obtained the Cape by right of conquest. Thus, when the British returned to the Cape in 1806, the colony was governed more autocratically. Supreme authority was assigned to the British governors appointed there. Yet despite autocratic rule, the British did manage to establish an atmosphere encouraging the progress of the colony's economy. Britain continued to develop the Cape on the foundations that had been established during the period of the first British Occupation. Ventures were thus undertaken in order to promote economic activity in the colony. The British believed it was vital to improve communications between Cape Town and the outlying districts. They, therefore, undertook the task of improving the infrastructure of the Cape Colony. They even established a discount bank, to provide short term credit to local entrepreneurs. 19

In order to stimulate economic activity and to populate diverse areas of the Empire with British subjects, the British Government encouraged numerous immigration schemes. In 1820, one of these was implemented in order to alleviate the economic depression and unemployment situation in Britain which had come about as a result of industrialisation and the war. Many people battled to find employment in Britain. Emigrants from Britain were given the opportunity to settle in British colonies. Among these were British settlers who arrived to settle in the Cape Colony. This civilian influx as well as the British garrison established off the Cape Coast at St. Helena, where Napoleon was held captive until his death in 1821, helped to stimulate the economy.

¹⁸Freund, 'Cape under the transitional governments,' in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), Shaping South African Society, pp. 325-333.

¹⁹Ross, 'Cape and the world economy,' in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping of South African Society*, pp. 258-263.

²⁰T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa. A Modern History, pp. 43-45.

²¹Ibid.

The period 1795 to 1820 is hazy about contacts between the Cape Colony and Latin America. From the few earliest documents, dated between 1795 and 1818, it is difficult to determine whether actual trade occurred specifically between the Cape and Chile. But it seems that, at least, links between South Africa and the South American continent were established. This was made possible by British merchant vessels sailing between the African and American continents. Several Cape Town merchants and small businessmen actually tried their luck by selling goods to South America paid for by Spanish gold bullion brought to the Cape.

For example, in November 1801, two Cape Town merchants, Joseph Payne and Robert Ross, obtained licenses from Francis Dundas, appointed by the British as the Acting Governor and Commissioner-in-Chief of the settlement of the Cape of Good Hope, to export British manufactured goods to the Spanish American settlements.²² In July 1811 permission was granted by the Earl of Caledon to a merchant called M. Becker to import Latin American products such as wheat and West Indian rum.²³ It is also recorded that wheat, grain and flour was exported from the Cape to there during the months of July and August 1817 by two merchants, N. Christian and W. Bird.²⁴ In 1818, Cape wine was exported to Latin America in order to purchase mules from there for the Cape Colony. 25 All of these transactions were conducted by subjects of the

²²Cape Town Archives Repository (henceforth CAD), British Occupation. Memorials Received (henceforth BO) 122, file no.: 63: Robert Ross requesting licence to import bullion from South America, 13 November 1801. CAD, BO 122, file no.: 69: Joseph Payne requesting licence to import bullion from South

America, 30 November 1801.

²³CAD, Colonial Office, Memorials Received (henceforth CO) 3883, file no.: 228: M. Becker. Request to Customs House re American produce on Board, 6 July 1811.

²⁴CAD, CO (Memorials Received) 3910, file no.: 52, part 1: Application for permission to export wheat and flour to South America, 30 July 1817. CAD, CO (Memorials Received) 3910, file no.: 123: Permission to export wheat and flour to South America, 2 August 1817.

²⁵CAD, CO (Memorials Received) 3911, file no.: 8: Permission to export wine to South America, 4 February 1818.

British Empire and/or British companies that were established in Cape Town. It is clear that without Britain's naval supremacy, such trading would have been impossible. By then Britain had, due in large measure to being the first nation to industrialise, become a super power and could arrange interaction between peripheral states like Chile and South Africa. Such links however, were on a small scale in comparison with Chile's relations with Britain, South Africa's relations with Britain and those of other nations whose ships reconnoitered the Cape of Good Hope.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the only way that Chile and South Africa could make contact was via British ships. As the American and African continents were peripheral market areas for Britain and North Western Europe, the contacts made between the communities in Chile and South Africa were infrequent or sporadic. Neither Chile nor South Africa had their own vessels. Thus, without Britain's shipping Chile and South Africa would not have had any relations. The latter two were short of money and what their governments generated was spent in dealing with domestic and border issues rather than constructing ships.


Because of Chile's geography she had greater capacity to forge relations with other nations like Britain, Australia and North America and in fact exploited her close location by supplying wheat and other foodstuffs to the goldrush miners in California and Australia during the nineteenth century. The Cape settlement, even though also situated in an advantageous geographical position was less concerned with establishing diplomatic or trading ties with other nations, in general, and Chile, in particular, until the late 1860s. From then until the late 1880s, efforts were made by the Chilean Government to have honorary consuls established at Cape Town and later Port Elizabeth. The consular posts were filled by British subjects living in the Cape Colony. The focus of the Cape Colony remained

²⁶T.M. Bader, 'Before the Gold Fleets: trade and relations between Chile and Australia, 1810-1848,' *Journal of Latin American Studies*, (henceforth *JLAS*), 6, 1, (1974), p. 35.

primarily in aiding passing ships and settling land disputes with the indigenous groups in the interior.²⁷ During the early nineteenth century, the Cape had relations with France, the Netherlands, Britain and her colonies, and merchant vessels that stopped at the Cape en route to or returning from the East.

During the nineteenth century, South Africa was composed of the territories of the Cape and Natal which became British colonies, and the two Boer territories of the Orange Free State and Transvaal, With regard to Chile, although this area was never conquered as an official British colony, it was nevertheless as dependent upon Britain's actual colonies for her economic well-being. The Industrial Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars propelled South Africa and South America into commercial relations using British vessels, thus, South African products found their way to South America. This made Britain the centre and South American nations, like Chile, the periphery. Manufactured goods went to these South American countries which in turn had their primary produce sold on world markets. The contact between Chile and metropolitan Britain enabled her to have contacts with Britain's colonies around the globe. As a result of Britain's commercial power, other areas of the globe not conquered by her were nevertheless dependent on her for their economic well-being. In this way, Britain was in a position to make demands to ensure that facilities in these countries were favourable to British trade and investment. Britain's position in the economies of South Africa and Chile was not threatened by any other nation until the late nineteenth century when Germany began its campaign to become a powerful nation on the international stage and peered with interest at South Africa and Chile.

²⁷L. Guelke, 'Freehold farmers and frontier settlers, 1657-1780,' in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), Shaping of South African Society, pp. 65-102.



CHAPTER THREE: CHILE, SOUTH AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL EVENTS, 1880-1919.

The late 1880s saw Britain's dominant position threatened by Germany who subsequently became involved in the economic, social and political affairs of both Chile and South Africa. Britain naturally resented the infiltration of Germany. The significant position that Germany had on the world centre stage from the late 1880s until the 1940s resulted in several international conflicts which had a major impact on relations between Chile and South Africa. Germany had become a dominant force in several Latin American economies including that of Chile. During the nineteenth century Chile was the leader of the world's nitrate industry. Like Britain, Germany had great interest therein as nitrates were used not only in agriculture but also in the manufacture of ammunition. The Germans who were pro-Boer during the South African War (1899-1902) helped the Republics to obtain supplies of nitrates and other military materials from Chile. Similarly, during the First World War, Chile's nitrates were also in great demand by both the Allies and the Central powers. Therefore, Chile chose to remain neutral in the conflict. The Allies, in particular Britain, undertook a virulent anti-German propaganda campaign and imposed an economic blockade against Germany and her allies. But in 1913 Germany retaliated and began to develop synthetic nitrates and once it became difficult to sustain their war effort with natural nitrates, they went into full production. The production of synthetic nitrates at the Haber-Bosch plant, situated at Oppau (Ludwigshafen), was more expensive than obtaining them naturally from Chile but the Germans persisted. The result was that the Chilean economy was devastated because Chile lost one of her chief trading partners, that being Germany, and many of the pro-Allied nations were prevented or discouraged from having trade relations with Chile. Britain's anti-German campaign resulted in a period of strained relations between neutral Chile and pro-British South Africa.

* * * * *

Between 1880 and 1919, the first international factor to affect Chile and South Africa was the rise of Germany, On 24 September 1862, Bismarck became the ruler of Prussia and undertook the campaign of uniting Germany. By the time Germany had been unified in 1871. German capitalism had obtained powerful momentum.1 The German economy particularly in the fields of mining, iron and steel demonstrated impressive rates of growth and Bismarck's ambitious foreign policy was regarded as an expression of the state's power. The rise of Germany and its aggressive foreign policies threatened Britain's domination in the world economy. Britain regarded itself as the financial powerhouse of the world; a source of capital for the peripheral areas, like Chile and southern Africa; a major importer of primary products and thus, felt threatened by Germany's advancement.² Towards the end of the nineteenth century Germany was making advances into the economic pursuits of foreign countries which Britain had previously regarded as its own domain.3 It is therefore no wonder that Germany's interest in both Chile and South Africa in the late 1880s was a cause of great concern to Britain.

Germany's influence in Chile became apparent from the 1880s, particularly in Chile's mining and agricultural activities. In 1883-1884, Chile annexed the Atacama Desert and the Peruvian province of Tarapaca after defeating Bolivia and Peru in the War of the Pacific (1879-1884). The result was that Chile obtained a monopoly in the mining of nitrates in these areas where they were abundant.⁴ Nitrates with their ambiguous uses became Chile's leading export from the late 1880s. The promise of improved economic conditions in the nitrate fields attracted both British

¹A. Wood, Nineteenth Century Britain, 1815-1914, pp. 244-249.

² V. Bulmer-Thomas, *The Economic History of Latin America since Independence*, p. 156.

³D. Blackbourne and G. Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History. Bourgeois Society and Politics in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 127-155.

⁴W.F. Sater, The Southern Cone Nations of Latin America, pp. 32-33.

and German investors. This was the first time since Chilean independence that Britain's position in Chile's economy and society was really threatened by another competitor.

During the later nineteenth century, the Germans formed communities in Chile mainly in the southern Frontera región. These Germans and their enterprises received unconditional financial support from Bismarck's government.⁵ The Frontera región included the settlements of Malleco, Cautín, Valdívia, Llanguhue and Pitrufquén. The abundant streams and mild climate attracted the Germans who settled in this region. All of these features were similar to natural conditions in north western Europe and the German immigrants thus adjusted easily to the region. Although immigrants from other European nations, like Switzerland, France, Spain, Holland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia also settled in the region, 94% of all the farms in that area were German-owned. The economic pursuits of these Germans in the Frontera región were farming, trade, town planning and mining. German schools were introduced and Lutheran churches established.6 The German influence was so strong that according to the author, G. McCutchen McBride, the town and province of Valdívia practiced a "distinct Teutonic culture." According to Chilean Eduardo Zomosa, this area was renowned for that with German being the main language spoken.⁸ Throughout Chile, from the northern mining districts to the southern areas, the German influence was evident in economic, social and political activities. In 1885, a British diplomat, William Roberts, made the following observation: "Foreign commerce is represented in

⁵H.C. Evans, *Chile and Its Relations with the United States*, p. 135.

⁶G. McCuthchen McBride, *Chile: Land and Society*, pp. 297-299.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 291.

⁸Information obtained during conversations with Eduardo Zomosa, a Chilean resident in South Africa, during November 1992

Valparaíso by England first, and then by . . . Germans." In the 1890s, the growing German influence in Chile became an even greater matter of concern to the British. In November 1899, Audley Gosling, British Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Santiago from 1897 to 1902, informed the Foreign Office in London that Germans commanded Chile's military and naval forces with distinction. Gosling claimed further that because of the "German influence . . . the Chilean population had become hostile to Great Britain."

Similarly, Germany's attention was attracted to South Africa during the late nineteenth century. Prior to 1870, when the diamond industry was established, the economy was predominantly based on agriculture. In the 1870s, the diamond industry came into being and was followed with the development of the gold mining industry from the 1880s. The mining industry overturned the pattern of economic activity in South Africa. This industry attracted the attention of Britain, as well as that of other European nations, in particular Germany, so that in South Africa as elsewhere British investors no longer dominated. With the subsequent development of the diamond mining industry in the Orange Free State and gold mining in the Transvaal, there too, the British Government became concerned that these two territories would be engulfed by another European Power, most likely Germany. Furthermore, Germany was not only gaining strength with its mining capital and machinery, but also had emotional connections with the *Boer* population and was represented by an extensive consular

⁹Evans, *Relations with United States*, p. 155.

¹⁰Who was Who, 1897-1916, p. 287.

National Archives Repository (henceforth NAR), Transvaal Archives Collection (henceforth TAD), Microfilm Collection M594, Foreign Office (henceforth FO) 2/269, pp. 108-111; Chilian sympathy for Boers. Correspondence from Audley Gosling, British Minister in Santiago, 1 November 1899.

¹¹C.W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa: Social and Economic, p. 117.

¹²J.A. Hobson, *The War in South Africa. Its Causes and Effects*, pp. 96-97.

service which made Britain very nervous.¹³ Therefore, Britain was determined to ensure that these two independent territories were governed in a manner which did not threaten Britain's presence on the continent, and was prepared to go to great lengths to protect this interest.

In 1884, Germany established its military presence in German South West Africa (Namibia). Britain felt it was being placed under pressure from Germany fearing that this new German colony would link up with the Transvaal. In order to prevent this happening, Britain annexed Bechuanaland (Botswana) in 1885. Germany's ambitions concerning the Transvaal, in particular, were aided by the fact that the Transvaal Government was weary of British cultural domination and political control. Growing tensions between the *trekker* republics and Britain developed in the 1880s and were further fuelled by Germany's presence in the rest of the African continent. In 1880, Chief Justice Reitz and a German editor of the *Free State Express*, Carl Borckenhagen, encouraged the white inhabitants of the Transvaal and Orange Free States to oppose Britain and obtain assistance from Germany when the need arose. Is

In the 1890s, Britain's position in southern Africa was hampered by the pressure Germany placed on the Portuguese at Delagoa Bay. Germany encouraged the formation of economic and diplomatic ties between the Transvaal and Mozambique. Access to Delagoa Bay enabled the *Boers'* allies, France, Germany and Norway amongst others, to supply them with arms and ammunition.¹⁶ The British, on the other hand, were subjected to discriminatory railway rates by the Transvaal Government, an increase in

¹³D.C.M. Platt, A.J.H. Latham and R. Michie, *Britain's Overseas Trade*, 1873-1914, p. 116.

¹⁴Davenport, South Africa, pp. 200-205.

¹⁵E.A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa, p. 389.

¹⁶Davenport, South Africa, pp. 204-205.

the volume of non-British trade, a growth in foreign shipping and foreign immigrants into the Transvaal, as well as the loss of commercial wealth to rival European powers, chiefly France and Germany. In December 1895, in an attempt to bring the Transvaal Government under British rule, the Jameson Raid was organised. 17 However, this attempted coup failed and the Transvaal Government arrested the culprits. Immediately after the raid, Germany congratulated Kruger and offered assistance to the Boers in their cause against Britain. Fearful of losing South Africa and her empire to Germany, the area was subsequently declared by the British as their sphere of influence. From 1897 onwards, British naval vessels patrolled the Mozambique coast implying that Britain was prepared to go to war if the *Boer* republics would not submit themselves to British dominance. ¹⁸ As a result of pressure from British officials both in London and South Africa, as well as the Uitlander community in the Transvaal, the South African War broke out in October 1899. Germany was still involved and assisted the Boers to obtain arms and ammunition. Firms in Germany, Norway and France manufactured many of the weapons used by the Boers. 19

Germany also staked her claim in the regional cooperation and interaction between South Africa and South America, and Chile in particular, during the period 1880 to 1918. However, Britain was always close on Germany's heels to do battle if the need arose. This was particularly evident up to and during the South African War. The Jameson Raid enabled the Transvaal Government to realise that they were inadequately armed to defend themselves from a British onslaught. As already mentioned, the *Boer* republics received most of their firearms from firms in Europe. Germany and France were responsible for the majority of the arms and ammunition

¹⁷R.V. Kubicek, Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice. The Case of South African Gold Mining Finance, 1886-1914, pp. 6-8.

¹⁸A.N. Porter, 'Lord Salisbury, Mr Chamberlain and South Africa, 1895-9,' *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 1, (1972-3), pp. 18-20.

¹⁹F. Pretorious, *Kommadolewe Tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog, 1899-1902*, pp. 26-27.

that the *Boers* obtained from 1896 until the end of the South African War in 1902.²⁰ In fact, a group of Chileans in the areas of Iquique and Valdívia, with assistance from France and Germany, also manufactured machineguns and supplied ammunition to the *Boers* during their struggle against Britain.²¹

Audley Gosling, British Ambassador to Chile, kept the Foreign Office in London informed of the anti-English sentiment present in Chile during the South African War.²² Not all of Chile's population were anti-British during this conflict and it is clear from by Audley Gosling's reports that much of the anti-British sentiment was fuelled by Germany. Like Chile, several South American nations aided the *Boers* during their conflict against the English.²³ Consignments of arms, ammunition, food and donkeys en route to the Transvaal from South America were confiscated by British officials at the South African ports. Britain retaliated by imposing restrictions on communications between Chile and South Africa.²⁴ This scenario would be repeated on a grander scale during the First World War (1914-1918).

The First World War broke out on 4 August 1914 when Britain declared war on Germany. The international balance of power was shattered and the world that had evolved since the end of the Napoleonic Wars was thrown into disarray.²⁵ Britain was determined to maintain her naval supremacy over Germany being of the opinion that as long as she was

²⁰ thid.

²¹NAR, TAD, Staatssekretaris, Buitelandse Sake (henceforth SSA) 876, file no.: RA 5207/99: Nieuwe Mitrailleuse te Verkoopen, 17 July 1899.

²²NAR, TAD, M594, FO 2/269, pp. 108-111: South African War. Chilean Sympathy for Boers, 1 November 1899.

²³lbid.

²⁴NAR, TAD, M596, FO 2/271, pp. 70-78: Shipment of nitrate of soda to Boers, 9 to 11 November 1899.

²⁵ Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America, p. 155.

able to preserve her naval predominance, her world position and empire would be safe. ²⁶ The British Foreign Office was intent on imposing a weapons embargo in order to bring Germany to its knees. During the war, Britain undertook the responsibility of keeping sea lanes open for food supplies and other war materials required by the Allied Forces fighting on the European continent. Simultaneously, however, Britain sought measures to deprive the Germans of these items in the hope of forcing Germany to abandon her military efforts. Britain was insistent that her colonies adhered to the same principles. They were thus required not to provide food and other war supplies to the Central Powers. That which British colonies could produce would be utilised only by Britain and the other Allied nations. ²⁷

In order to convince the colonies and the United States of America to support the Allies in their struggle against Germany, Britain undertook an extensive anti-German campaign, which continued throughout the First World War. M. Sanders and P.M. Taylor: *British Propaganda during the First World War*, 1914-1918 describes it well. The campaign had negative effects on South Africa's relations with Chile, which decided to remain neutral in the conflict thereby being automatically branded by Britain as "pro-German." As a British colony, South Africa was discouraged from having commercial and diplomatic relations with Chile. The anti-German propaganda campaign was directed not only at Germany but also at those nations like Chile, who chose to remain neutral in the war.²⁸

²⁶Z. Steiner, 'Elitism and Foreign Policy: the Foreign Office before the Great War,' in B.J.C. McKercher and D.J. Moss (eds.), *Shadow and Substance in British Foreign policy*, 1895-1939. Memorial Essays, pp. 26-29.

²⁷C. Cross, The Fall of the British Empire, pp. 21-23.

²⁸M. Sanders and P.M. Taylor, *British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-1918.*

Right from the beginning of the conflict in Europe, Chile did indeed choose to remain neutral and proclaimed a policy of non-alignment with neither the Allied forces nor the Central Powers. Chile at that stage still had a leading position in war applicable nitrates. Despite her neutrality, Chile was strongly pressured for exclusive supply of nitrates by both Allied and Central forces. Even after June 1915 when presidential elections had been held in Chile and Juan Luís Sanfuentes was elected into power, their Government was adamant about maintaining neutrality throughout the war.29 However, as with other neutral countries, Britain exaggerated Germany's influence in Chile to the Allied nations and British dominions to the point of being ridiculous. Everyone was assured that Chile's military system had become Germanised and that even the Boy Scouts were learning to goose-step.30 In 1917, the United States of America joined the war as an active military force. Once this happened, Chile was also pressurized from the United States to abandon its neutrality stance. Nevertheless, Sanfuentes maintained Chile's neutral position in the war. He maintained his belief that it was more important for Chileans to concern themselves with domestic affairs than become involved in the international conflict, even though the anti-German campaign that had been initiated by the British was intensified by the North Americans.31

Despite Chile's neutrality during the early war years of 1914 and 1915, the Chilean coast became a field for naval operations between German and British navies. On 9 March 1915, the German cruiser *Dresden* cast anchor in Cumberland bay off the island Más-a-Tierra which belongs to the Juán Fernández group of islands and is approximately 500 miles from the coast of Chile. (Refer to map, p. 56.) The commander of the *Dresden* requested permission to remain in the bay for eight days while the vessel was being

²⁰H. Muñoz and C. Portales (eds.), *Elusive Friendship*, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1984), p. 13.

³⁰ Evans, Relations with United States, p. 173.

³¹Muñoz and Portales (eds.), *Elusive Friendship*, p. 13.

repaired. On 14 March 1915, however, a British squadron composed of the cruisers *Kent, Glasgow* and *Orama* arrived in Cumberland Bay and immediately opened fire on the German cruiser. The *Dresden* hoisted a flag of truce and despatched an officer to inform *Glasgow* that it was in neutral waters. This was disregarded by the British squadron, who then subsequently fired and sunk the German cruiser. ³² Although the incident caused much embarrassment to the British authorities, Britain justified their actions by stating that the *Dresden* had posed a threat to British commerce in the region. ³³ Britain suspected that any German vessels in Chilean waters were obtaining nitrates to sustain their war supplies.

Germany's reasons for engaging in naval operations along the coast of Chile during this period was a result of two factors. In the south of Chile, as explained previously, many Germans had settled and provided supplies and aid to German vessels, rather than to those of Britain. Most of the naval manoeuvering of German vessels in Chilean waters occurred in the Southern Pacific near to German settlements to obtain food supplies and maybe a bonus of clandestine nitrates. The second factor was that, despite the development of synthetic nitrates in 1913 by the German processing plant Haber-Bosch at Oppau (Ludwigshafen), this process was more expensive than obtaining them naturally from Chile. According to Couyoumdjian, despite the efforts of Britain and later the United States of America to impose blockades and blacklisting, they were not able to squash trade with Germany entirely. In fact, he recorded that German and

³² NAR, Central Archives Collection (SAD), Office of the Governor-General (henceforth GG) 663, file no.: 9/87/13: War 1914-1915: Parliamentary Papers. Correspondence re sinking of German cruiser. Report from the Colonial Office in London, 16 April 1915.

³³lbid. Letter from Sir Edward Grey of the Foreign Office in London to Augustín Edwards, Chilean Minister, 30 March 1915.

³⁴ S. Colliers and W.F. Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-1994, pp. 165-166.

British nitrate trades continued throughout the war to do business alongside each other in Valparaíso.³⁵

The demand for nitrates was an exception and more generally the First World War had a serious effect on Chile whose export economy was disrupted by the war. Pre-1914 Britain and Germany had become Chile's two leading trading partners. But as a result of blockades imposed by Britain, Chile's access to its major markets in Germany and Belgium was blocked. During the latter half of 1914, even nitrate exports decreased by more than half which resulted in the closure of several oficinas. 36 However, during 1915, the nitrate industry recovered slightly because of Allied demand for explosives and munitions. The vaccuum created was filled by the United States of America. Britain had a more urgent agenda in orchestrating its war effort than being obsessed with production and efficient management of the nitrate industry. Instead, the United States of America purchased supplies of Chilean nitrates for the Allies. As a result of the war, Britain was not able to export manufactured articles and other commodities to Chile as it had been doing ever since the late 1780s. The United States of America's wartime interest in Chile sparked a resurgence of general economic activity and industrial expansion. The United States of America successfully managed to enhance its commercial links with Chile and became Chile's chief trading partner. 37

The specific boom in Chile's nitrate industry during the war was short lived however because the Haber-Bosch processing plant went into full production to produce synthetic nitrates. It was soon copied by the Allied nations and Chile's natural nitrates were no longer in demand. Chile's

³⁵R. Couyoumdjian, *Chile y Gran Bretaña durante la primera guerra mundial y la posguerra, 1914-1921*, pp. 285-287.

³⁶H. Blakemore, 'From the War of the Pacific to 1930,' in L. Bethell, (ed.), *Chile since Independence*, pp. 68-69.

³⁷Couyoumdjian, *Chile y Gran Bretaña*, pp. 288-297.

leadership on nitrates, and the attendant prosperity it brought to the country, was thus diminished.³⁸

In the meantime, South Africa had become a member of the British Empire when it became a Union in 1910. The South African Act of 1909 had altered the status of the self-governing territories. The areas of Natal, Cape, Transvaal and Orange Free State could therefore no longer have independent foreign policies. The Union of South Africa, like other British dominions at that time, was a self-governing entity only as far as its internal affairs were concerned. Furthermore, the Union was in a position of allegiance to Britain and trade arrangements could only be concluded once they had been signed by British officials.³⁹ In 1911 at a Conference in London concerning the British dominions, Britain decided that in the interests of her colonies she would handle their international negotiations. With the declaration of war by Britain in August 1914, South Africa was thus automatically a participant. Prime Minister Louis Botha and General Jan Smuts opted to send troops and assist Britain in her fight against Germany and the other Central Powers. This was in spite of General James Barry Munnik Hertzog and other Afrikaners who wanted South Africa to remain neutral in the war. The Union undertook an active role in the conflict by supplying troops and protecting the strategic position of the Cape. 40 This demonstrated the lengths to which Britain could get loyalty from its colonies.

In Chile, the government maintained its position of neutrality throughout the war despite pressure from the United States. The campaign which the United States of America undertook against neutral countries, resulted in

³⁸Blakemore, 'War of Pacific to 1930,' in Bethell (ed), *Chile since Independence*, p. 69.

³⁹E.S. Munger, Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy, pp. 13-16.

⁴⁰M.E. Muller, Suid-Afrika se Buitelandse verteenwoordiging 1910-1972, p. 47.

countries like Chile being branded in Allied quarters as pro-German.41 As already mentioned, Britain tried its utmost to discourage British colonies from trading with the enemy. The intentions of Britain to brand Chile as pro-German appeared in a memorandum, received by the Secretary of Defense in South Africa on 5 January 1917. The document describes how German propaganda was transmitted in neutral countries. According to it, the government department responsible for the general pursuit of propaganda was the German Foreign Office. The branch of the Foreign Office which dealt with such matters was called the Zentralstelle für Auslandsdienst. In South America the propaganda was issued more for the purposes of securing an unassailable position for Germany, than of influencing the inhabitants on war related issues. It was stated furthermore, that newspapers like the Gazeta de Chile, Revista del Pacífico and Deutsche-Chilianische Bund were reputed to be active propaganda media utilised by the Germans in South America, in general and in Chile, in particular, 42

Britain continued her own campaign by declaring in a circular dated 16 March 1917, that it refused to issue licenses for exports to firms of neutral or pro-German countries. The British colonies, including South Africa, were encouraged to adopt a similar policy. Encouragement from Britain and persuasion from the memorandum sent to the Secretary of Defense in January 1917, resulted in the South African Prime Minister's Office issuing a refusal to allow coal exports to be sent to the Chilean-German coke company *Companía Carbonífera y de Fundición Schwager* in Coronel.⁴³ In January 1918, Britain informed South Africa of an agreement that had

⁴¹T.A. Bailey, *The Policy of the United States towards Neutrals*, pp. 18-22.

⁴²South African National Defense Force Archives (SANDFA), Secretary of Defense. Group 2 (henceforth DC) 782, file no.: DC 2351/9199: German system of press control and propaganda, 5 January 1917.

⁴³NAR, SAD, GG 589, file no.: 9/51/123: War 1914-1917: Refusal of all exports to Chile, 16 March 1917.

been concluded between it and the United States. This involved the shipment of goods from Britain and the British Empire to consignees in both Central and South America. Numerous consignees there were considered to be pro-German. They were included on both the British Statutory List and United States Enemy Trading List and their citizens could be subjected to detention.⁴⁴ The country of Chile was so regarded since it maintained its non-alignment policy throughout the war and this constrained South Africa's relations with Chile.


An incident occurred in August 1918 which illustrated the strained relations between Chile and South Africa and which was the outcome of the publication of the British Statutory List and the United States of America's Enemy Trading List. This incident was also due to the agreement which both Britain and United States of America had signed in January 1918. The incident unfolded when the London Chilean Legation informed A.J. Balfour, an official of the Foreign Office in London, that a Chilean citizen, Don Felipe Santiago Fonck, had bought shares in the South African East Rand Proprietary Mines Limited (E.R.P.M.). The British authorities suspected, however, that Fonck was actually a German subject. Fonck had given a Hamburg address when purchasing the shares, although he was at the time living in Viña del Mar (refer to map on p. 56) in Chile. The British authorities disregarded the fact that he was living in Chile at the time. They wanted to work under the agreement which Britain had entered into with the United States of America. The South African Government was ordered to pay a portion of the dividends of Fonck's shares to the Public Trustee in London and the rest to the Custodian of Enemy Property in Pretoria.45

⁴⁴NAR, SAD, GG 565, file no.: 9/27/242: War 1914-1918: Trading with the Enemy. Reciprocal arrangement with United States. Letter from the Foreign Office in London to Viscount Buxton, Governor General, 24 January 1918.

⁴⁵NAR, SAD, GG 566, file no.: 9/27/273: War 1914-1918: Trading with the Enemy. Shares belonging to Chilean citizen, 14 August to 18 September 1918.

All of the above incidents illustrated the control Britain wielded over the colonies and their external relations with nations not in Britain's favour. South Africa and Chile maintained somewhat strained relations throughout World War I. This negative effect on the relations between Chile and South Africa was, firstly, due to restraints imposed by Britain and the United States of America. Secondly, it was due to the manner in which Chile and South Africa's ruling authorities responded to these restraints. Their restrained relations during the First World War demonstrated that both countries submitted to the great powers.

The rise of Germany in the 1880s and the threat she posed to Britain's position in the world order, had serious effects in both South Africa and Chile. The Germans became involved in the economic activities of both of these countries, and challenged the position which Britain had occupied since the beginning of the nineteenth century. As a result of Germany's interference in the South African War (1899-1902) and the number of German colonists who had settled in Chile in the late nineteenth century, a sector of the Chilean population, resentful of the hold which Britain had managed to exert on the Chilean economy, supplied the Boers with arms and ammunition in their battle against the British. To summarise, shortly after the South African War ended in 1902, another international disaster, the First World War (1914-1918), had an impact on South African-Chilean relations. The Chilean economy was affected by the demands from both the Allies and the Central Powers for nitrates for their war efforts. Chile decided to remain neutral in the conflict being scared into a serious economic depression after the British, and then the United States of America, blacklisted and imposed blockades on Chile as they decided to brand the republic as being pro-German. As South Africa was a British colony she was obliged to side with Britain in the First World War. South Africa was only allowed to maintain consular relations with Chile during this period and was prevented from having any commercial or other diplomatic relations with Chile.



CHAPTER FOUR:

CHILE, SOUTH AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL EVENTS, 1919-1948.

The rise of communism and the 1929 Great Depression had a bearing on both Chile and South Africa's domestic affairs, which in turn affected their bilateral relations. These nations' domestic affairs dominated their attention more than their commercial relations with each other did. Another international factor to influence relations was the emergence of the United States of America as a new force in the world centre stage after the First World War. The United States of America began to replace Britain as a dominant force in Latin America, and more particularly in Chile's economy, society and politics. Towards the end of World War II, Britain realised that she was losing her grip on South America. In 1946 Britain therefore undertook a campaign to propagate amongst British investors the commercial advantages of South America. Relations with Chile were encouraged and the dominions were given favourable reports. As a result South Africa established direct diplomatic relations with Chile in 1948 by opening the South African Legation in Santiago.

* * * *

After World War I, as a result of the loss of the European nitrate markets due to competition from the German synthetic nitrates and in response to the world economic recession in 1919 and 1921, Chile experienced economic hardship. Their economy was thrown into the grips of a severe economic depression long before the 1929 Wall Street Crash. The Chilean post-war economic recession was brought about by the Allies' Nitrate of Soda Executive. This body was responsible for obtaining a constant supply of nitrates to fuel the Allies' wartime effort against the Central Powers. However once the war was over it dumped its supplies of nitrates onto the world markets, which brought prices down and reduced Chile's exports by 66 percent. Many mines were forced to close and unemployment levels rose.¹ As a result of the economic distress, Chile

¹S. Collier and W.F. Sater, History of Chile, p. 202.

experienced much political instability and social unrest.² During the 1920s, the Chilean Communist Party, under the leadership of Luis Emilio Recabarren, worked closely with organised labour and protested against the exploitation of the Chilean proletariat. The working class participated in strikes and riots that were widespread from Iquique in the north to Puerto Natales in the south.³ Between 1920 and 1927 several Chilean presidents tried to improve the economic and social conditions of the country, but they all failed and were overthrown and replaced by someone new.

In 1927 when Carlos Ibáñez became Chilean president he imposed a dictatorship and remained in power until 1931. Ibáñez implemented authoritarian politics by imprisoning political opponents and labour leaders. He tried to squash the communist ideas by censoring and restricting free political activities. Ibáñez also imposed his statist activist ideas that led to a slight improvement in the economy. The Chilean Government for the first time in the twentieth century expanded the role it played in the economy. The mining export industry was encouraged to improve productivity, industrialisation was stimulated, a mild programme of agrarian reform was instituted and the country's infrastructure was improved. Loans and foreign investment that came largely from the United States of America financed all of these ideas. During the 1920s, the United States of America began increasingly to replace Chile's other foreign investors and trading partners, like Britain, Germany and France.

Chile's economic recovery was however short lived. In 1929 as a result of the Wall Street Crash, mineral exports fell and financing from foreigners

²G. Grant, 'The State and the Formation of a Middle Class: A Chilean Example,' *LAP* 10, 2 and 3, (1983), pp. 151-152.

³A. Barnard, 'Chilean Communists, Radical Presidents and Chilean relations with the United States, 1940-1947,' *JLAS*, 13, 2, (1981), p. 347.

⁴T.E. Skidmore and P.H. Smith, *Modern Latin America*, pp. 124-125.

⁵Ibid.

ceased. The depression emphasised the republic's vulnerability to upheavals on the international scene. The depression struck and affected the mining sector first and hardest. The value of copper and nitrates dropped. The world prices for agricultural goods fell, the consumption of food from the mining areas dwindled, and the depression reverberated from the mining sector into the agrarian. As foreign exchange, savings and investment dried up, landowners and industrialists alike blamed the government and Ibáñez was overthrown in 1931.

During the 1930s, Chilean reformers criticised the excessive national dependence on the foreign sector. In response, Chile under President Arturo Alessandri between 1932 and 1938 embarked on a nationalist-development path that centred on import-substitution industrialisation. Alessandri followed a trend that was similar to other Latin American countries which turned away from "export-led growth towards inward looking development based on import-substituting industrialization." The nationalist-development model was based on a combination of state capital, private local capital and foreign capital as the main propellers of indigenous economic growth. Pursuing Chile's intention of increasing her export revenues a Chilean mission under the leadership of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Francisco Landerstoy, visited South Africa in 1934 to extend her commercial relations. During the 1930s, Chile signed

⁶Grant, 'State and Middle Class,' LAP, 10, 2 and 3, (1983), p. 154.

⁷P. Drake, 'Chile, 1930-1958,' in L. Bethell (ed.), *Chile since Independence*, pp. 93-95.

⁸Ibid.

⁹V. Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America, p. 17.

¹⁰Grant, 'State and Middle Class,' LAP, 10, 2 and 3, (1983), p. 155.

¹¹NAR, SAD, Dept. of Trade and Industry (henceforth HEN) 4317, file no.: 747, vol. 1: Trade with Chile. Trade relations and Treaties. Extract from the Cape Times, 24 April 1934.

commercial agreements with France, United States and Britain as part of her ambition to boost exports, 12

Chile utilised these export revenues to stimulate manufacturing development and invested them in the construction of infrastructure necessary for the national industry. State enterprises were established in areas necessary for the growth of the consumer industry like public utilities, petroleum, pharmaceuticals and sugar refining. This economic reconstruction programme was successful, partly because of the gradual revival on the international market. 13 But despite the aim to reduce its dependency on the foreign sector and to achieve greater self-sufficiency, United States of America's investments there grew by 80%. United States of America's companies dominated Chile's mining sector. During this period copper and nitrates made up nearly 80% of Chile's exports. The United States of America thus became Chile's premier trading partner so that Britain and Germany were no longer her chief source of export revenue. 14 During the 1930s, World War II and afterwards, Chile relied on the U.S.A. for manufactured consumer goods, food and capital goods. The U.S.A. was ever-taking over larger portions of the Chilean economy that had once been dominated by Britain. 15 In response to the intensified threat that the U.S.A. presented to British trade and commerce with Chile the British Government from 1936 onwards encouraged British investors to pursue commercial interests with Chile. Accordingly, the British Ambassador in Chile, Robert Mitchell, compiled favourable reports on conditions there. 16

¹²NAR, SAD, Dept. of Foreign Affairs (unarranged group), (henceforth BTS) file no.: 1/42/3; Chile Annual Foreign Office Reports, 1931, 1934, 1936.

¹³Grant, 'State and Middle Class,' LAP, 10, 2 and 3, (1983), p. 155.

¹⁴Drake, 'Chile, 1930-1958,' in Bethell (ed.), Chile since Independence, p. 87.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶NAR, SAD, BTS, file no.; 1/42/3; Chile. Annual Reports, 1936, 1938.

In 1939 World War il broke out and once again the world was divided into two camps, supporters of either the Allies or the Axis Powers. The Chilean Government under Aguirre Cerda remained neutral in the conflict, as it had during World War I. There were two reasons for this decision. Firstly, in 1939 Chile had experienced a devastating earthquake, with the result that her attention was thus focused on the domestic problems and not participating in the war. Secondly, the Chilean Government feared that pro-Allied moves would provoke a political reaction from the German settlement in the south of Chile. 17 They contributed greatly to the national economy and the Government had no wish to antagonise them. Nevertheless, between 1939 and 1941 while the U.S.A. remained a neutral force in the war, the North Americans were purchasing large supplies of nitrates from Chile which they in turn supplied to the Allies for their war effort. However, in December 1941 after the bombing of Pearl Harbour, the United States abandoned its neutral stance, and subsequently placed tremendous pressure on Chile to join the Allies. Finally, in January 1943, the new Chilean President Antonio Ríos declared war on the Axis Powers. The reasons for joining the Allies were that President Ríos knew how dependent Chile was on U.S. foreign investment and trade. Furthermore, he also remembered the hardship that the country had suffered during World War I as a result of blockades and blacklisting.18

Unlike in World War I, Chile was not placed under pressure from Britain during the first years of the war. Britain realised that Latin America was increasingly becoming infiltrated by the United States. Thus, despite disapproving of these countries remaining neutral, Britain did not alienate the area completely.¹⁹ Britain's colonies were not encouraged to break off

¹⁷NAR, SAD, BTS, file no.: 1/42/3, vol. 1: Chile. Annual Reports. May 1943.

¹⁸M.J. Francis, The Limits of Hegemony: United States Relation with Argentina and Chile during World War II, pp. 23-34.

¹⁹NAR, SAD, BTS, file no.: 1/42/3, vol. 1: Chile. Annual Reports, 1941 and 1942.

relations with Chile. Nevertheless, only in 1943 did Edmund Rogelio Piffre fill the post of Chilean Consul in South Africa, which had been vacated by Mrs Dora P. Marais in 1938.²⁰

In the years after the Second World War, the United States intensified its campaign to monopolise as much of the Latin America economies as it could. The United States was now a world power and managed to displace Britain and exert her own influence throughout the globe. Like other Latin American countries, Chile's dependence on the United States also deepened. In 1946, Gabriel González Videla became Chilean president and he made it his aim to keep United States investors happy. By ensuring that the United States was satisfied with local conditions, the Chilean Government hoped to retain the support of the upper and middle classes which benefited directly from United States involvement.²¹

After the war, Britain tried desperately to improve her status in the world order. She realised that she was losing her grip on the economies of Latin America. In a desperate effort to maintain her dignity she launched a campaign to encourage British investment, and stronger diplomatic and commercial relations between herself, her colonies and the Latin American countries, particularly Chile, Argentina and Brazil. Britain also encouraged diplomatic ties not only between Chile and herself but also with British colonies. ²² Following up in May 1947, the Chilean Ambassador in London, Manuel Bianchi, inquired about establishing direct bilateral relations with

²⁰SANDFA, DC 2243 Group 2, file no.: 705/2, Chapter 1: Consular Representatives. General List of Consuls of Foreign Countries stationed in the Union of South Africa.

²¹Barnard, 'Chilean Relations with United States,' JLAS, 13, 2, (1981), pp. 361-363.

²²NAR, SAD, BTS file no.: 1/42/4: Chilean Economic and Financial Matters, Printed report from the British Foreign Office to the Dominions on Anglo-Chilean Trade, 14 June 1946.

South Africa. A year later, Chile re-established the Chilean Consulate, headed by José Palma Serrano, which had been vacant since 1943.²³

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Like Chile, during the period 1919 to 1948. South Africa was affected by upheavals on the international scene. Chile had suffered from an economic depression during the later war years and up until the early 1920s while South Africa experienced similar dilemmas. As a result of the increase in the cost of equipment and the general production of gold mining, together with the declining gold price during the war years, more than half of the gold mines in the Witwatersrand were threatened with closure by 1920. The economic situation caused unrest and strikes from miners who feared that their jobs were at stake.²⁴ However, unlike in Chile where the workers united to protest against their exploitation, the South African workers were divided along racial lines. The black miners accounted for approximately 89,3% of the total work force in 1920 and they were paid lower salaries than their white colleagues.²⁵ A colour bar was also implemented which restricted certain jobs in the mines to whites only and vice versa. Despite these fissures, both white and black employees protested against the lower salaries. The South African Government had proposed that in order to reduce costs, the mines employ less whites and more blacks as they could be paid much less. This caused much tension and led to bitter clashes between white and black miners. During this period in the 1920s, South Africa was also influenced by communist ideas. However, they were mainly propagated for the whites

²³NAR, SAD, Ambassador London (henceforth BLO) 701, file no.: 38/36: Foreign Legations and Consuls. Correspondence between the Chilean Ambassador Manuel Bianchi, and the South African High Commissioners, G. Heaton-Nichols and Leif Egeland, 16 May 1947-13 May 1948.

²⁴D. Yudelman, The Emergence of Modern South Africa: States, Capital and the Incorporation of Organised Labor on the South African Gold Fields, 1902-1939, pp. 134-142.

²⁵Davenport, *South Africa*, p. 280.

under the slogan, "Workers of the World unite, and Fight for a white South Africa." 26

South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts, who took office in August 1919 after the death of Louis Botha, had to deal with the economic and political crises that beset South Africa in the 1920s. He wanted to have the gold mining industry functioning productively as the country's economy and prosperity depended on it. In 1922 General Smuts instructed the South African Police to use whatever force was necessary to quell the unrest and restore order. Partly, as a result of this episode, Smuts lost the 1924 general election and General JBM Hertzog became Prime Minister.²⁷

During the 1920s while the United States was expanding into the markets of Latin America, Britain's colonies were trying desperately to break off their imperial shackles. South Africa, under the leadership of their new Prime Minister, Hertzog, led the way. This was made possible by the fact that Britain had allowed her Dominions to sign the 1919 Treaty of Versailles alongside her, thus promoting the Dominions to a higher status in International Law.²⁸ In 1926, Hertzog requested that the position and role of the Dominions be defined and described clearly and this was to be set down in writing. In 1926 the Balfour Declaration came into being which defined the Dominions as:

autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate to another in any respect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.²⁹

²⁶lbid., pp. 281-283.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸S. Pienaar, South Africa and International Relations between the Two World Wars. The League of Nations Dimension, pp. 7-10.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 21-22.

Following up the Balfour Declaration, South Africa established her Department of External Affairs in 1927 and the South African Government could now determine with which nations it wished to have diplomatic relations. In 1930 Britain and Chile signed the Anglo-Chilean Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which was a gesture from both nations to facilitate, extend and regulate trade and commerce between the two of them as well as with Britain's colonies. However, when Chile actually asked for this agreement to be extended to the Empire, Britain advised her to pursue separate agreements with each of the Dominions. The main reason for this was that the South African Government for one refused to comply with the agreement, as it saw no benefit to itself. In the south African Government for one refused to comply with the agreement, as it saw no benefit to itself.

The next bombshell on the international scene to affect South Africa's relations with Chile was the Great Depression, which deeply affected both national economies. As a result of the depression, South Africa's diamond trade collapsed while other major exports such as gold and wool, also suffered as prices plunged on the world market. On the political scene, the National Party's popularity began to wane and in order to salvage a joint victory in the 1934 election, the National Party under Hertzog and the South African Party under Smuts formed a coalition dubbed the South African National Party. Hertzog stayed on as Prime Minister and as Minister of External Affairs. 32

Between 1932 and 1937 there was a lapse in diplomatic relations between Chile and South Africa, with the resignation of Arthur Dennison Hinde as Chilean Consul who had been appointed as Chilean Consul in 1915.³³

³⁰lbid., p. 22.

³¹NAH, SAD, BLO 689, file no.: PS 35/7, vol. 1: Americas. Chile. Draft treaty sent from South African High Commissioner, Adv. Charles T. de Water, to Minister of External Affairs, J. Hertzog, April 1930.

³²Davenport, South Africa, pp. 302-305.

³³SANDFA, DC Group 2, 2243, file no.: 705/2 Chapter 1, 2 and 3: Consular representatives and Consuls of Foreign Countries in South Africa.

Despite the break in consular relations, small scale commercial relations persisted between the two countries. But the general attitude of the South Africans was an ambivalent one. Without much push or shove, the South African Government were more drawn to western Europe and the United States, than to the Latin American sub-continent.

In September 1939 World War II broke out and this international catastrophe affected South African politics as well as bilateral relations with other nations. The outbreak of the war caused a split in the South African Cabinet between Prime Minister Hertzog, who wanted to remain neutral, and Smuts, who was in favour of breaking off relations with Germany. After a parliamentary vote of 80 to 67 votes, South Africa declared war on Germany. All General Jan Smuts thus became the South African Prime Minister until 1948. Although Britain did not as hard as in World War I Smuts' South Africa was guided only to pursue relations with nations who were in good standing with Britain. 35

At the end of the war in September 1945, the mood on the international stage had changed. Britain's world power status, waning since World War I was now virtually extinguished. The United States now occupied that position. Having absorbed the markets which had once been dominated by Britain. Secondly, many of Britain's colonies were striving for their independence and many, like India, had revolted against the racial undertones of British Imperialism. South Africa's internal policies of racial segregation were intensifying. As a result of new independent Asian and African states, South Africa began receiving external criticisms of her policies. Prime Minister Smuts, a founder member of the United Nations, wanted South Africa to play a more prominent role both in the British Commonwealth and on the African continent. He was however, not

³⁴Davenport, South Africa, pp. 327-328.

³⁵G. Olivier, 'South African Foreign Policy,' in Worrall (ed.), *South Africa: Government and Politics*, p. 289.

expecting the international scene to change so drastically. In order to alleviate criticisms, particularly from India and Russia, regarding South Africa's domestic policies, he made an exerted effort to establish diplomatic relations with countries not on the European continent. Between April 1947 and April 1948, Smuts attempted to establish bilateral relations with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile. However, he was only successful in doing so with Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Uruguay allowed South Africa to send a representative to Montevideo but, did not reciprocate. Thus in May 1948 when the National Party came to power, direct bilateral relations between Chile and South Africa were already in place. 37

³⁶lbid., pp. 290-291.

³⁷NAR, SAD, BLO 701, file no.: 38/36: Correspondence between G. Heaton-Nichols and Lief Egeland, South African High Commissioners, and D.B. Sole, a senoir official of the Dept. of External Affairs, May 1947 to March 1948.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE INFLUENCE OF CHILEAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND FIGURES ON BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFFRICA, 1830-1902

International events during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were not the only factors that determined relations between Chile and South Africa. During the period 1830 to 1902, several personalities and political parties in Chile, South Africa and Britain also had a major influence.

Special emphasis has to be placed on the role which Chilean personalities and parties played in influencing relations with Britain and subsequently South Africa during the period 1830 to 1902. Between 1831 and 1871, the Chilean political scene was dominated by the Conservative Party which obtained its support from the elite sectors of the population who benefited especially from trade and involvement with British vessels along the lengthy coastline. The national presidents from the Conservative Party, General Joaquín Prieto (1831-1840), General Bulnes (1841-1850), Manuel Montt (1851-1860) and José Pérez (1861-1870) did everything in their power to maintain good relations with Britain in order to satisfy their electorate. During the Conservative era, several missions were undertaken by individuals like Ramón Friere, a former national president, and Diego Portales, a merchant, to forge relations with Britain and her colonies. During the 1830s Chile established relations with Australia which was a British colony. Chile's relations with Britain were also favourable. However, she only established direct diplomatic relations with the British colony at the Cape in the late 1860s. British ships regularly sailed between the continents of South America and southern Africa en route to the east, providing opportuntities for trade and contacts between South Africa and Chile.

In 1871 Federico Errázuriz became president and the Conservative Party no longer had the upper hand over the electorate. In the 1860s they formed an alliance with the Liberal Party in preparations to contest the 1871 election. Through the Conservative Party, whose supporters were Chile's bourgeoisie who benefitted the most from external relations with Britain, relations with Britain and her colonies were maintained. However, during the 1870s the world recession affected the Chilean economy very badly as the demand for copper and silver declined on the world market. The result was that certain elements of the Chilean Liberal Party became nervous of having the Chilean economy so dependent on Britain.

In 1879 when Anibal Pinto was president, the War of the Pacific broke out between Chile, Peru and Bolivia. It ended in 1884 when Chile defeated the other two nations and seized the provinces of Antafogasta and Tarapacá. (Refer to maps on pages 56 and ix.) These areas were rich in nitrates and as a result of the victory, Chile obtained a monopoly of the industry. Shortly after the war, both British and German investors were interested in obtaining shares in the lucrative industry. In 1886, José Manuel Balmaceda, a Liberal, was elected as president. The Conservative Party was no longer prime in Chilean politics. Balmaceda objected to the stranglehold that Britain had on the Chilean economy and launched a campaign to curb it. He tried to nationalise industries, particularly mining, or alternatively tended rather to favour and encourage investment from Germany. However, the oligarchy, with assistance and encouragement from Britain, managed to overthrow Balmaceda in a Civil War in 1891. During his term of office, Chile maintained restrained diplomatic relations with Britain and her colonies. The Balmaceda Crisis in effect split the Chilean population into pro- and anti-British groups which determined relations with the four South African territories in the 1890s and early 1900s. After Balmaceda had been ousted, Federico Errázuriz returned to the presidency as he favoured involvement with Britain. In 1896, he asked the British monarch, Queen Victoria, to assist in settling a border dispute with Argentina which demonstrated the lengths that elements in the Chilean Government were prepared to go to maintain favourable relations with Britain for the benefit of this collaborating oligarchy.

* * * * *

As already mentioned in the period between 1831 and 1871, the Chilean political scene was dominated by the Conservative Party. It received its mandate predominantly from the landholding and commercial elite, who were avid supporters and immediate beneficiaries of economic relations with Britain. As a result, national presidents during this period did their utmost to support and encourage commercial and diplomatic ties with Britain and her empire.

The first Chilean personality to establish diplomatic ties with one of Britain's colonies, namely Australia, was General Ramón Friere. During the 1830s, this former Chilean president while in exile in Sydney, set the wheels in motion and forged diplomatic relations with Australia. Friere had been responsible for leading a rebellion in 1823 through which he replaced Bernardo O' Higgins as president. He hung on to the presidency until 1826 when a civil war broke out, his forces were defeated by General Joaquín Prieto driving him into exile.²

During the 1830s, Diego Portales who served under General Joaquín Prieto's presidency, managed to stabilise Chile and did his utmost to protect and nurture the interests of the supporters of the Conservative Party. Its supporters were essentially the landholding and commercial elites who wanted a strong unitary state. From the 1830s until the 1870s, Chile was governed by a strong central and conservative government whose diplomatic orientation was towards Europe and Great Britain in the commercial, financial and cultural fields. Chile's commercial relations with

¹ Bader, 'Before the Gold Fleets,' *JLAS*, 6, 1, (1974), p. 45.

² Stickter, *The Saga of Chile*, pp. 99-100.

countries like Australia and Britain flourished.³ Portales, together with the Minister of the Treasury, Manuel Rengifo, did their utmost to eradicate problems and attract greater interest from Britain and Europe in the way of commerce. In 1832 a national merchant marine was created to ensure a ready supply of ships to transport Chilean products to the world markets.⁴ Chilean farmers were encouraged to cultivate new land. Irrigation projects were initiated, canals were constructed and farmers began modernising their methods of production.⁵ The agricultural produce was exported in exchange for luxury items. From the 1830s, Chile began its spiral of dependency on Britain. Loans from Britain formed the backbone of funds used by the Conservative Government to develop Chile's economy.⁶ The involvement of Britain in the Chilean economy provided the Chilean Government with an incentive to establish relations also with Britain's colonies.

Chile's relations with Britain and her colonies began in the 1830s with Australia as we have seen. Under the Conservative Government, Chile forged links with the present day states of New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria. In the 1830s and 1840s, under Conservative Chilean President General Bulnes (1841-1851), many ships travelled regularly between the port of Valparaíso and the Australian port of Sydney. From the 1830s onwards, virtually all the Chilean agents managing trade were affiliated to foreign trading concerns whose head offices were in London. During this period many British companies made their base in Chile and were all intimately linked to international trade. Britain emerged as Chile's

³ Bauer, 'Industry and the Missing Bourgeoisie,' HAHR, 70, 2, (May 1990), pp. 233, 247.

⁴ C. Véliz, *Historia de la marina mercante de Chile*, pp. 52-60.

⁵ Sater, Southern Cone Nations, p. 22.

⁶ Grant, 'State and Middle Class,' LAP, 10, 2 and 3, (1983), p. 153.

⁷ Bader, 'Before the Gold Fleets,' *JLAS*, 6, 1, (1974), pp. 35-57.

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 42-44.

most important trading partner and from 1831 until 1871, the Conservative Party did everything in its power to maintain and strengthen such relations.⁹

Throughout the Conservative Era, 1831-1871, the Chilean Presidents from Prieto to José Pérez respected the wishes of the Chilean bourgeois class and remained in good favour with Britain as this assured them of victory during elections. Chile's merchants and mine-owners supported the idea of free trade, with the reasoning that an increase in Chilean exports would result in a lower price for their favoured imported luxury items. 10 From the 1830s, Chile's silver, copper and nitrate mining enterprises had already attracted the attention of British investors. Coal mining also became a wellestablished economic activity in Chile, and similarly, attracted the attention of Britain. In the early 1840s, the development of steam navigation created a demand for coal from Chile, with the British company Pacific Steam Navigation purchasing the largest quantity. 11 From the 1850s, the nitrate industry with the backing of British investors stimulated commerce and industry in Chile that resulted in the establishment of modern infrastructure. 12 The revenue and foreign investment generated from the silver, copper and coal mines financed the importation of technology and technicians. This led to many internal developments in Chile. Its first railway was constructed from Chanarcillo to the port of Caldera, while smelters were established in Tongoy, Guayacán and Lota. 13 (These places are indicated on the maps on pages 56 and ix.)

⁹C. Pregger-Román, 'Class and Politics in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Chile,' *LAP*, 18, 1, (1991), p. 136.

¹⁰M.C. Needler, An Introduction to Latin American Politics. The Structure of Conflict, p. 13.

¹¹L. Ortega, 'The First Four Decades of the Chilean Coal Mining Industry, 1840-1879,' *JLAS*, 14, 1, (1982), pp. 2-3.

¹²C.G. Pregger-Román, 'Origin and development of the bourgeoisie,' *LAP*, 10, 2 and 3, (1983), p. 39.

¹³Sater, Southern Cone Nations, pp. 25-26.

Analogous to the landholders and merchants, the mine-owners were also stalwarts of the Conservative Party, likewise beneficiaries of Britain's involvement in the Chilean economy. Despite the prosperity that Britain and the export-based economy brought to these people, discontent was rife amongst other sectors of the population. Towards the late 1850s, the Chilean economy actually began to lose momentum. This was the result of a decline in the demand for foodstuffs from countries like Australia and the United States, once their gold mining enterprises had become less productive. 14 The resultant economic problems laid the basis for civil war in Chile in 1859. Silver miners from the north, coal miners from Lota and Coronel, and farmers nationwide joined forces in a rebellion against the government. Though the government managed to squash it, the domination of politics by the elite was weakened as from that date.15 The opposition party, the Liberal Party, who since the 1820s had advocated less centralised government, limited presidential power, legal equality and freedom for individuals, splintered, and the dissidents founded the Radical Party.¹⁶ It addressed the interests and concerns of the lower middle class and proletarian miners. Furthermore, they favoured a decentralised government, honest elections, secular government and the abolition of binding government to the Catholic Church.¹⁷

Despite the changing political attitude towards the Conservative Party from the 1850s, the Chilean Government continued to satisfy the demands and needs of the elite groups in Chile and resolutely maintained amicable economic and diplomatic relations with Britain. In the mid-1860s, under President José Pérez, Chile gave Britain permission to establish an

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹⁵ Stickter, The Saga of Chile, pp. 102-103.

¹⁶ Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, p. 114.

¹⁷ Sater, Southern Cone Nations, p. 28.

honorary Chilean Consul at the Cape Colony. The Consulate was to be manned by officials appointed by the British Government. Those officials were prominent businessmen from the Cape Colony. In August 1867 Guillermo Jorge Anderson was appointed as honorary Chilean Consul in Cape Town. In 1868 Britain approached the Chilean Government for their consent to appoint another honorary Chilean Consul in the Cape Colony stationed in Port Elizabeth. This was done in 1869 when an honorary Chilean consular post, occupied by David Ferguson Stewart, was established in Port Elizabeth. Thus, by 1870 Chile had two honorary consular posts in the Cape Colony and this was consented to and undertaken to satisfy the Chilean interests who benefited from favourable relations with Britain.

The mood of optimism and confidence that characterised Chile in the 1850s and 1860s was severely shaken in the mid-1870s when Errázuriz ruled. From approximately 1873, the world including Chile was beset by economic depression. This was due to the collapse of the silver boom; the appearance of new and more efficient producers of wheat on the world economy; the decline in copper prices also as a result of new producers and the end of the Franco-Prussian War; the shift to the gold standard by Germany and other countries which caused a drop in the value of silver; as well as severe floods and droughts.²⁰ The recession experienced on the international markets caused financial panic in Britain, Europe and United States, plunging them into severe economic crises. In Chile, the economic situation resulted in social unrest.²¹ Luckly for him Errázuriz ended his term before the economic crisis vented its full force on Chilean

¹⁸ CAD, Government House (henceforth GH) 1/316, file no.: 73: Issue of Exequatur to the Chilian Consul at Cape Town, October 1867.

¹⁹ CAD, GH 1/322, file no. 57; Issue of Exequatur to the Chilian Consul at Port Elizabeth, February 1869.

²⁰ S. Collier, 'From Independence to the War of the Pacific,' in L. Bethell (ed.), *Chile since Independence*, p. 29.

²¹ Stickter, The Saga of Chile, p. 30.

society. Anibal Pinto, who came in as president in 1876 and remained in office until 1881 was forced to address the economic situation and tackle the social problems that the depression left in its wake. Not only was the economy in the grips of depression during the late 1870s; there was also much squabbling in political life amongst the various parties. Pinto tried addressing this animosity by accommodating the political differences, but this was regarded as weakness by the Chilean public. 22 For, during Pinto's term of office, he was forced to take the Chilean currency off the gold standard in 1878. This feebleness hurt the pride of Chile's middle and upper classes. These sectors were further offended by the decision of the government in the same year to impose a tariff system to protect native industries and producers.²³ However, before the political situation could become a full-scale crisis, the Chilean Government managed to distract the electorate by plunging into a border dispute with its northern neighbours, Peru and Bolivia, which detonated the War of the Pacific (1879-1884),

Of course, there was nothing all that new in this ploy. Ever since independence Chile and its northern neighbours, Bolivia and Peru had been involved in boundary disputes. In the late 1870s, the boundary became an issue when the resources in the area, namely nitrates became commercially viable. Successions of treaties between the separate states were made.²⁴ One such treaty was signed in 1874, in which Chile agreed to abandon its claim on the Atacama Desert, on condition that the Bolivian authorities did not increase taxes on Chilean corporations in the area. However, in 1878 these corporations complained that Bolivia had indeed raised taxes. When the Chilean Government reacted, Bolivia confiscated the companies, and an international border dispute followed. Hilarión

H. Blakemore, 'From the War of Independence to the War of the Pacific,' in Bethell (ed.), Chile since Independence, pp. 34-35.

²³ lbid.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. **3**5.

Daza, Bolivian President, and General Mariano Prado, Peruvian President, formed a military alliance. When Bolivia refused to yield to demands from Chile, it declared war on both Bolivia and Peru in April 1879.²⁵ Despite Chile's unpreparedness to enter the war, the economic crisis and looming political uncertainty, it managed to capture the Bolivian coast in the first month of the war. In spite of this the war lasted another five years. In October 1883, the Treaty of Ancón was signed between Chile and Peru in which Peru had to cede the province of Tarapacá. Meanwhile, the provinces of Tacna and Arica were handed over to Chile for ten years, after which a plebiscite was to determine their final ownership. A separate truce was secured with Bolivia in 1884. Bolivia was required to give away the province of Antofagasta and thus cede its coastline to Chile, becoming a landlocked country.²⁶

As a result of the annexation of the Atacama Desert, the Peruvian province of Tarapacá and the Bolivian province of Antofagasta, Chile obtained a monopoly on nitrate production. The nitrate industry helped to compensate for Chilean losses that had resulted from the decline in the value of copper and silver. Nitrates emerged as Chile's new primary export product. Despite this, very few Chilean entrepreneurs were able to participate in the industry.²⁷ The British investors were attracted to the promise of improved business conditions on the nitrate fields and were there first. They were further encouraged by the Chilean ruling elite to expand their control. Yet besides Britain, a new, more aggressive competitor now also emerged on the scene in the shape of Germans who formed settlements in Chile that received support from their Government.²⁸

²⁵ Sater, Southern Cone Nations, pp. 31-32.

²⁶ Blakemore, 'War of Pacific to 1930,' in Bethell (ed.), *Chile since Independence*, pp. 35-36.

²⁷ H. Blakemore, *British Nitrates and Chilean Politics, 1886-1896. Balmaceda and North*, p. 7.

²⁸ C. Pregger-Román, 'Nineteenth Century Chile,' LAP, 18, 1, (1991), P. 125.

The nitrate industry attracted so much attention that Chile's earlier developing agrarian and industrial sectors were seriously neglected by the foreign investors and Chilean government.²⁹

During the War of 1879-1884, the Chilean Government held elections. The Chilean electorate was especially unhappy with the manner in which Pinto's Government had dealt with the economic crisis, which Chile had experienced as a result of changes on the world markets. The decline in the demand for silver during the 1870s had a major impact on Chile. The result was that Domingo Santa María, a Liberal, was elected as president. But, his term had to be focussed on the War of the Pacific. In 1886, José Manuel Balmaceda, was elected president. Balmaceda was an ardent nationalist who believed in using state machinery to develop the Chilean economy. He especially wanted to "Chileanize" the nitrate industry and used it to expand the economy in other spheres.30 The programme he implemented aimed at the expansion of the manufacturing sector reducing the importance of foreign markets and importing goods into Chile. In order to achieve these ideals. Balmaceda was forced to confront foreign groups, particularly the British, who, by now, dominated Chile's commercial and financial activities. His first tactic was to give protection to Chilean produce against foreign competitors by imposing importation tariffs. Secondly, he tried to reduce Britain's influence in Chile. He did this by trying to minimise Chile's reliance on Britain and to hand contracts to other countries as well.31 An unidentified British Minister made the following observation while in Chile:

I have not failed to observe that government contracts for public works, . . had been conducted chiefly with. . . French and. . .

²⁹ J.F. Rippy, 'British Investments in the Chilean Nitrate Industry,' *Inter-American Economic Atlairs*, 8, 2, (1954), pp. 3-4.

³⁰ Pregger-Román, 'Class and politics,' *LAP*, 18, 1, (1991), p. 137.

³¹ Pregger-Román, 'Origin and Development of the Bourgeóisie,' *LAP*, 10, 2 and 3, (1983), p. 52.

German firms instead of English firms as was formerly the case. 32

Balmaceda's third tactic was to recapture control of the nitrate industry that had passed into the hands of British investors. This caused dissatisfaction among British diplomats and investors whose general reaction was that Balmaceda was being "anti-foreign." His fourth tactic was to try and stimulate the development of the industrial, agricultural, coal, copper and silver mining sectors with the support of Chile's ruling class. Fifthly, Balmaceda used government revenue to improve the infrastructure of the country. 34

Balmaceda's campaign affected Chile's relations with South Africa, more particularly the Cape Colony, during the 1880s. In 1886 Britain was not granted permission from Balmaceda's Government to fill the vacant Chilean honorary consular post in Cape Town. The post had become vacant as a result of William S. Anderson's resignation. He had occupied that position since the early 1870s after the resignation of Guillermo Jorge Anderson.³⁵ However, the honorary consular post in Port Elizabeth occupied by David Stewart remained intact.

Despite Balmaceda's good intentions to make Chile more self reliant, less dependent on Britain, and to diversify the economy from its exclusive export-base, he made many enemies in Chile's ruling class and among people in Britain.³⁶ By 1890, British investors and capitalists regarded Balmaceda as a threat to British prosperity in the Chilean nitrate fields. These investors feared that Balmaceda would again secure a majority in

³² Ibid.

³³ Pregger-Román, 'Nineteenth Century Chile,' LAP, 18, 1, (1991), p. 127.

 $^{^{34}}$ Pregger-Román, 'Origin and Development of the bourgeoisie,' *LAP*, 10, 2 and 3, (1983), pp. 52-53.

³⁵ CAD, GH 1/322, file no.: 13: Resignation of Chilian Consul at Cape Town.

³⁶ Pregger-Román, 'Relative Autonomy of States,' LAP, 18, 1, (1991), pp. 127-130.

the elections on 1891. British investors encouraged Chile's wealthy nitrate mine-owners to organise a rebellion to overthrow Balmaceda. The involvement of British mine-owners was visible in a report compiled by Patrick Egan, United States ambassador.

[It was]. . . officially reported to the government that the managers. . . of the English [nitrate] oficinas in Tarapacá urged their workmen to join the revolutionists, promising them £2 per day during their term of service and holding out the threat that unless they did join they would never again get employment in Tarapacá. . . 37

The groups supporting Balmaceda were the copper, silver and coal mining entrepreneurs, many industrialists and some entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the nitrate entrepreneurs, bankers, some agriculturists and their foreign supporters opposed Balmaceda.³⁸

In 1891 a civil war broke out. Balmaceda's forces were defeated and he fled to the Argentine embassy in Santiago. His defeat left British interests in the nitrate industry unscathed.³⁹ The Balmaceda Crisis left a period of uncertainty and effectively divided the Chilean population into two camps, those that supported Britain and those who disliked Britain. These two factions determined the relations that Chile had with the four South African territories, particularly during the South African War (1899-1902).⁴⁰ The pro-British group offered assistance in the form of horses, mules, donkeys and soldiers to the British forces fighting in South Africa.⁴¹ Meanwhile the anti-British group, with the assistance of France and Germany, supplied the *Boer* republics with arms, ammunition in the form of nitrates and food

³⁷ Ibid., p. 129.

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ Sater, Southern Cone Nations, p. 44.

⁴⁰ NAR, TAD, Microfilm Collection M594, Foreign Office (henceforth FO) 2/269, pp. 108-111: Chilian Sympathy for Boers, Correspondence from Audley Gosling, British Consul in Santiago, 1 November 1899.

⁴¹ NAR, TAD, M560, FO 2/337, p. 28: Volunteers for South Africa from Chile, Correspondence between Chilean volunteers and Audley Gosling, 25 April 1900.

supplies during their campaign against the British at the turn of the century.⁴²

In 1891 Admiral Jorge Montt, a member of the Conservative Party, was appointed as president. He was described as mild-mannered. Montt's presidential powers were seriously curtailed by the new 1891 Chilean Constitution, which embraced the parliamentary regime, with the Legislature having supremacy over the Executive. The status of foreign investors was protected and improved. The option of the nationalisation of enterprises was abandoned by the Chilean Government in order to meet the demand of foreign investors. The Chilean elite recovered well from the crisis, and were now eager to participate in the North Atlantic export economy. They furthermore ensured that their interests would be protected and they would continue to govern the country, with the Chilean presidents being their puppets, until the 1920s. 44

Despite the situation in Chile during the 1890s, the presidents had achieved a few points in their favour. The economy was growing, there were improved amenities in the major cities and the country was kept out of war. Furthermore, several Chilean presidents played an active role in encouraging trade and diplomatic relations with foreign nations, including Britain. During Federico Errázuriz's later presidency between 1896 and 1901, a dispute arose between Chile and Argentina concerning their national boundary in the far south. War threatened and Errázuriz requested the assistance of King Edward VII to resolve the conflict. 46

⁴² NAR, TAD, M595, FO 2/271, pp. 70-78.: Nitrate of soda as contraband of war, Correspondence between Colonial office and Foreign Office, 9 to 11 November 1899.

⁴³ Blakemore, 'War of the Pacific to 1930,' in Bethell (ed.), *Chile since Independence*, p. 56.

⁴⁴ G.Vial, *Historia de Chile, 1891-1973, Vol. 2*, p. 7.

⁴⁵ Blakemore, 'War of the Pacific to 1930,' in Bethell (ed.), *Chile since Independence*, p. 67.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Despite efforts from the Chilean presidents during the 1890s to repair relations with Britain, the latter viewed Chile with suspicion particularly as they were aware of the anti-British sentiments present in sectors of the population.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the presence of the German colonies in Chile, together with the support and financial assistance from the German Government and the threat that Germany posed against Britain's position in the Chilean economy made Britain reluctant to pursue ambitious programmes with Chile.⁴⁸ This attitude had repercussions for Chile's relations with the Cape Colony. In 1894, the Chilean honorary consular post in Port Elizabeth, occupied by David Ferguson Stewart since 1869, became vacant as he was declared insolvent.⁴⁹ The British Government never made any attempts to contact the Chilean Government to obtain their consent to fill the position and the Chilean honorary consular post remained vacant until 1915.


To summarise a complex history, during the period 1830 to 1902, each of the Chilean presidents, from Prieto to Errázuriz, played their part in influencing Chilean relations with the British colonies, particularly the Cape. The Conservative presidents did everything in their power to maintain and strengthen relations with Britain in order to satisfy the Chilean elite, from whom they obtained their electoral support. Between 1879 and 1884, as a result of Chile's victory in the War of the Pacific against Bolivia and Peru, Chile obtained a monopoly on the nitrate industry. It attracted the attention of foreign investors the British and the Germans. The nitrate industry gave the Chilean Government a certain amount of bargaining power.

⁴⁷ NAR, TAD, M594, FO 2/269, p. 108.: South African War: Chilian Sympathy for Boers, Letter from Gosling, 1 November 1899.

⁴⁸ McCuthchen McBride, Chile: Land and Society, pp. 283-284.

⁴⁹ CAD, GH 23/40, file no.: 83: Cancellation of Stewart's Commission as Consul for Chili, July 1894.

The Transvaal and Orange Free State Governments would obtain their supplies of nitrates to use as ammunition during the South African War (1899-1902), thus opening a new common interest for relations between Chile and South Africa. During the late 1880s when President Balmaceda was in power, relations between Chile and the Cape Colony were somewhat strained because of Balmaceda's attitude toward Britain. This was not helped by the fact that in 1886 the vacant Chilean honorary consular post at Cape Town remained unoccupied as Balmaceda refused to give Britain the necessary consent. Furthermore, because of the anti-British climate in Chile in the 1890s, and despite the determined intentions of Chilean presidents Montt and Errázuriz to bring Chile back into Britain's favour, when the honorary consular post occupied by David Ferguson Stewart in Port Elizabeth was vacated in 1894, Britain was reluctant to fill the post and it remained vacant in South Africa until 1915. Balmaceda's term as president managed to divide the Chilean population into two camps, the pro-British and anti-British. These two camps played roles in the South African War with the pro-British groups assisting and supporting Britain while, the anti-British groups sent supplies to the Transvaal and Orange Free States Governments.



M. Wilson and L. Thompson, (eds)., The Oxford History of South Africa II: South Africa, 1870 - 1966, p. 288.

CHAPTER SIX: THE INFLUENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN PERSONALITIES ON BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH CHILE, 1830-1902

Between 1830 and the late 1860s, little contact occurred between South Africa and Chile. There were no South African personalities who wanted to establish commercial and diplomatic relations with foreign countries other than the Netherlands, France and Britain. However, this indifference changed from the late 1860s onwards. In the Cape and Natal, three knights Henry Barkly, Bartle Frere and Theophilus Shepstone together with their home-based counterparts, Colonial Secretaries Lords Granville, Kimberley and Carnarvon, created the incentives for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Chile. Later in the South African Republic (Transvaal), Commandant-General Piet Joubert and State Secretary and Transvaal Minister Plenipotentiary in France and Europe, Dr. W.J. Leyds were also important in intensifying ties with Chile prior to and during the South African War (1899-1902).

* * * *

Unlike most Chileans who between 1830 and 1902 regarded the presence of the British as an opportunity to advance their economy and place Chilean commodities on the world market, the South African community's incentives were small scale because of the monopolistic practices of the Dutch East India Company (D.E.I.C.). The D.E.I.C. discouraged its colonies from competing against the mother country for markets and goods. Furthermore, the early European settlers at the Cape were generally anti-British and felt that the D.E.I.C. looked after their needs in the Cape of Good Hope. The composition of the European population at the Cape of Good Hope at the beginning of the nineteenth century was predominantly of Dutch origin with a small percentage of French origin. The occupation of the Cape by Britain in 1806 had little impact as an incentive for economic growth by the colonists. Although Britain tried to implement policies to benefit both the Cape and Britain, these policies and

they together with the attitude of the British provoked national and religious antagonisms, particularly amongst the Dutch settlers. 1 Between 1836 and 1848, in an effort to elude British encroachment, approximately 15 000 Boers decided to emigrate. Some of these trekkers moved into Natal; others across the Orange River; while others went further north across the Vaal River. This exodus meant that for the rest of the nineteenth century South Africa would be composed of four separate territories which had their own separate involvements with foreign nations such as Chile. The trekkers who moved further into the interior of South Africa engaged in an exchange economy. They traded their various manufactured articles and ammunition with the indigenous people in exchange for livestock and other frontier products.² As an unintended result of the trekkers, opportunities were opened for the development of trade and naval relations with Britain and other European countries such as Portugal at Delagoa Bay and Port Natal.3 In 1842, Britain annexed Natal and a year later declared it a British colony. Although Britain did not claim the territories occupied by the Boers north of the Orange and Vaal Rivers these Boers were nevertheless classed as British subjects. However, because of the expensive wars being waged against African inhabitants of the eastern Cape, the Colonial Office in London decided to grant independence to the South African Republic (Transvaal) in 1852 and to the Orange River Colony in 1854.4

Thus by 1855 South Africa was composed of four separate territories each determining its own foreign relations and policies. Of the four, the Cape was the most advanced and most capable of pursuing relations with distant countries like Chile but did not actually do so until the 1860s. Natal

¹ Davenport, South Africa, pp. 49-53.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 76-83.

³ W.M. Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton. The Making of the South African Native Problem, p. 222.

⁴ Davenport, South Africa, pp. 81-82, 188-189.

shared the advantage of access to the sea. It was also part of the British Empire but, in spite of that saw no incentive to established diplomatic relations with Chile.⁵ Probably the reason for this was that the main focus of their activities was directed towards their mother country, Britain.

The Cape and Natal colonies were merely two of forty British colonies established around the globe. Britain's imperial policies, however, pivoted around India. As a result the development of export economies for Natal and the Cape were very low on the agenda. The domestic and external affairs of the Cape and Natal colonies were determined in London. Neither could make decisions, above all, as regards foreign relations, without consulting Britain. The executive power of the Cape was placed in the hands of a governor and a lieutenant-governor in Natal. Both of these officials were appointed by Britain and followed instructions from London.7 The cabinet in London relied on the knowledge and experience of officials of the Colonial Office when making decisions about the colonies. The Colonial Office depended on the serious commitment and liaisons between the Colonial Secretary and the High Commissioner in each particular colony. At the London end, the Secretary for Colonies deployed sufficient rein to afford the High Commissioner wide discretion concerning colonial affairs.8 Thus, the territories of the Cape and to a lesser degree Natal were in the most favourable positions to establish relations with the outside world, for example, Chile. In addition, they had the geographical advantage of coastlines. It is thus not surprising that throughout the nineteenth century, the only territories to have official contact with the Latin American sub-continent were the colonies of the Cape and Natal.

⁵ G.C. Olivier, *Suid-Afrika se Buitelandse Beleid*, p. 15.

⁶ L. Thompson, 'Great Britain and the Afrikaner Republics, 1870-1899,' in M. Wilson and L. Thompson (eds.), *The Oxford History of South Africa. Vol. II: South Africa 1870-1966*, pp. 1-2.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 289-290.

On the other hand, the Orange Free State and Transvaal, both landlocked, were forced into deals with their neighbours to gain access to port facilities and naval vessels to conduct trade with overseas nations like Chile. From the late 1860s diamonds were discovered in the area of Griqualand West, and later gold was unearthed in the Transvaal. Moreover, there arose the German Government's flirtations with the *Boer* republics. To counter this the British Government wanted the two British colonies and the two Afrikaner republics to become a white-controlled federal Dominion under the British Crown. By this ploy London could ensure that British entrepreneurs dominated the foreign trade of the region. Further, it meant that London determined and controlled any and all foreign relations developed with other nations.⁹ British officials in dealings with the *Boer* republics could impose conditions as the price of permission to utilise the coastal facilities and infrastructure of the Cape and Natal colonies.¹⁰

Despite the ambitions of the British Government and its officials, both the South African Republic (ZAR) and Republic of Orange Free State were, nevertheless, regarded as sovereign states by the international community. As independent nations they had the right to establish diplomatic relations without the consent of Britain. The South African Republic was the first southern African territory to establish a fully fledged department of foreign affairs with a State Secretary in charge. The person who filled this portfolio was Dr W.J. Leyds. The ZAR had plenipotentiary ministerial representatives in The Hague, France, Germany and Portugal, also consular representatives in London, Paris, Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfort, Lisbon, Brussels, Madeira, Lourenço Marques, Rome and Durban. Similarly, from 1855 onwards the Orange Free State had consular

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹Olivier, Buitelandse Beleid, p. 15.

representatives abroad in the Netherlands, Britain, United States, Italy, France, Portugal, Germany and Belgium. 12

Unlike Chile, which since the 1820s had a series of national presidents who each contributed to Chile's domestic and foreign relations, the leaders of the Natal and Cape colonies during the nineteenth century predominantly carried out instructions from Britain. During the period 1830-1866, no personality in either of the two British colonies or the two *Boer* republics distinguished themselves with any bold steps in the field of foreign policies and diplomatic involvement with other nations.¹³

The later British officials who forcefully pursued the grand design to have the whole South African sub-continent under the British Crown, were Colonial Secretaries Lords Granville (1868-1870), Kimberley (1870-1874), and Carnarvon (1874-1880); High Commissioners and Governors of the Cape Colony Sir Henry Barkly (1870-1875), and Sir Bartle Frere (1877-1881), and Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Diplomatic Agent to the "Native Tribes" of Natal. ¹⁴ That grand design, in a way, brought in Chile.

From the mid-1860s, the British Government developed a heightened interest in South Africa due to the discovery of diamonds. Under the direction of Prime Minister Gladstone the British Government pursued a federalist policy for southern Africa, similar to the one they pursued with Canada in 1867. One of the incentives for pursuing this policy was to boost the Cape Colony's economy as well as that of Britain by assigning certain powers and duties to the Cape Government in an effort to make

¹² Ibid.

¹³Thompson, 'Great Britain and Afrikaner Republics,' in Wilson and Thompson (ed.), Oxford History of South Africa, pp. 289-290.

¹⁴ Ibid.

the colony self-reliant and less dependent on taxes from Britain. ¹⁵ From the 1860s, many of the British officials occupying offices involved with the Cape and Natal colonies favoured the idea of the whole South African sub-continent becoming a self-governing white-controlled, federal dominion under the British Crown. The ambitions of these officials for the Cape and Natal colonies also stretched into the realm of diplomatic involvement with nations, like Chile, who were in good favour with Britain. The purpose of pursuing relations with nations like Chile as well as Argentina and Brazil was also driven by Britain's desire to have the southern hemisphere under her control. ¹⁶ Britain already had extensive commercial relations with many South American nations. ¹⁷ The British Crown also had a paramount presence in Australia. Thus the desire to greatly expand the British Empire on the African continent, in particular, and on the globe, in general, dominated Britain's political and strategic agenda until the outbreak of World War I.

The above-named officials, who sought measures to encourage the governments of the Transvaal and Orange Free State to form a union with the Cape and Natal colonies under the British Crown, wanted the new Dominion to stretch as far north as the Limpopo River at least, if not to the Zambezi River and beyond. Simultaneously, these visionaries brought in relations between South America and South Africa as, for example, trade agreements were entered into between Natal and Chile.

These same British officials were also responsible for fuelling the fire which culminated in the South African War (1899-1902), which forced the

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, pp. 43-45.

¹⁸ Thompson, 'Great Britain and Afrikaner Republics,' in Wilson and Thompson (eds.), Oxford History of South Africa, pp. 291-293.

Boer republics to look for sources to supply them with arms and ammunition. The pressure which the British exerted on the Boers worked to attract the sympathy and fellow-feeling of elements in Chile who were similarly opposed to the hold that Britain had on their society and economy. The attention of these Chileans was alerted by events set in motion when Lord Carnaryon instructed High Commissioner Bartle Frere and Theophilus Shepstone to take more drastic measures by assigning them the no mean task of annexing the Transvaal in January 1877. Shepstone and Frere promised to defend the Transvaal against the Zulu threat developing on the country's south-eastern border. However, in January 1879, the British regiment was severely defeated in a separate conflict at the Battle of Isandlwana. During the same month, the executive council of the South African Republic instructed Paul Kruger and Piet Joubert to present a petition to the British cabinet in London signed by 6591 Transvalers against their annexation. 19 On the other hand. Gladstone's cabinet was adamant and the republic was prepared to go to war to stop annexation. In February 1881, the British were severely defeated by the Boers at the Battle of Majuba. In August 1881, both parties signed a peace treaty called the Convention of Pretoria. Amongst the provisions agreed to Britain was entitled to move troops through the Transvaal during times of war and monitor its external relations against threats from European aggressors. Nevertheless, as a result of the setbacks of defeats at Isandlwana at the hands of the Zulus and Majuba at the hands of the Boers, Britain's plans for the expansion of their empire in Southern Africa were shelved for fourteen years.²⁰

In 1890, Cecil John Rhodes was appointed Prime Minister of the Cape Colony. Just as before with the discovery of gold deposits in the Transvaal, the reluctance of the Dutch community to introduce up-to-date production methods together with the growing interest of European

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 296-299.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 305, 307.

competitors in the gold mining industry, inspired new moves to bring the Transvaal and Orange Free State Republics under the British Crown.21 Rhodes had the vision to see that whoever controlled the Transvaal could determine the destiny of the whole sub-continent and was famous for wanting the British Empire to extend all the way from Cape Town to Cairo.²² He tried to persuade the Transvaal Government to modernise the methods of production to make the gold mining industry a profitable enterprise.²³ He even obtained assistance from the *Uitlander* community in the Transvaal, the majority of whom were British, to convince Kruger of the benefits of being part of the British Empire. It was only after all such attempts had failed that, under the direction of Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, Rhodes organised an attempted coup in December 1895 known as the Jameson Raid.²⁴ But it failed, Kruger was re-elected for a fourth term of office in 1898, and the South African Republic embarked upon an arms build up in case of another attempted forced annexation by the British.²⁵

In 1896 immediately after the Jameson Raid, the Transvaal Government conducted a survey to establish stocks of arms and ammunition in the republic. That Raid had made the Transvaal realise how vulnerable they were to invasion. The survey indicated that 41% of all Transvaal military conscripts did not possess firearms at all; while 59% possessed weapons that were hopelessly obsolete. Appalled by this survey, the South African Republic launched a secret drive campaign to accumulate arms and ammunition by the Executive Council during the week 17 to 26 January

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 306-308,

²² De Kiewiet, *History of South Africa*, p. 117.

²³ J.A. Hobson, 'A Small Confederacy of International Mineowners,' in T.C. Caldwell (ed.), *The Anglo-Boer War. Why it was fought? Who was responsible?*, p. 21.

²⁴ A.H. Duminy, *The Capitalists and the Outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War*, pp. 4-5.

²⁵ Pretorius, Kommandolewe Tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog, p. 26.

1896.²⁶ The chief duties of the Executive Council were to arrange for the purchase of weapons, cannons and ammunition. The Orange Free State Government similarly became conscious of their vulnerability to a British onslaught. To assuage their fears, they formed a political alliance in March 1897 with the South African Republic Government. The two sister republics agreed to aid each other militarily and in other ways in the case of an attack or invasion. From this date, the Orange Free State also began an arms and ammunition build-up. As in the Transvaal so in the Orange Free State artillery was fortified and adequate defence systems were organised. By the time the South African War broke out in October 1899, the two republics had already accumulated 49 800 Mauser rifles, 43 800 Martini-Henrys, 5 150 Guedes, 2 730 Lee-Metfords, 100 Krag-Jorgensons, 83 cannons and 87 machine-guns.²⁷ F. Pretorius in Kommandolewe Tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog, 1899-1902, describes this armament. He mentions the various European countries from which the republics obtained supplies of arms and ammunition. However, he like other authors on the South African War, fails to mention the arms and ammunition obtained from Chile. Their nitrate industry was tapped to provide the essential ingredients to manufacture gunpowder while the anti-British lobby in Chile manufactured weapons for the Boer republics, which were channelled to South Africa via France and Germany. Chile did not have her own vessels capable of sailing directly to South Africa. France and Germany were two of Chile's trading partners, apart from Britain. Boer sympathisers in France and Germany made sure the nitrates and weapons reached the South African Republic. However, it must be said that a relatively small number of weapons were supplied by Chile compared with whar the Boer republics obtained from Germany, France and Norway.²⁸ The build-up of arms, ammunition and other war supplies

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

²⁸ Ibid.

by the *Boer* republics was made possible by Dr. Leyds who was stationed in Europe as the South African Republic's Minister Plentipotentiary in France and Germany. He made every effort to ensure that the South African Republic and Orange Free State received adequate supplies and funds from abroad to support the cause against the British.²⁹ He not only made appeals for supplies of arms and ammunition but also set up a fund in Europe to aid the *Boer* widows, orphans and refugees which was particularly well supported by the Germans, French and Norwegians.³⁰

Nations as far afield as Russia, United States, Australia, Mexico, Spain, Portugal and Italy all became involved in the conflict. Meanwhile, on the South American continent not only Chile but Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Venezuela participated.³¹ Actually also most of the South American nations provided war supplies to both the British and *Boers*. As regards commodities, the Argentines, for example, supplied beef, while others supplied wheat, donkeys and weapons. Some sent soldiers.³² In fact, Argentina supplied beef to the pro-*Boer South African Supply and Cold Storage Company* and to the British forces through the *Imperial Cold Storage Co. Ltd.* This latter venture was financed by *De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd.* with the encouragement of one of its key players and former Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, Cecil Rhodes.³³ Like

²⁹ L.E. van Niekerk, 'Dr. Leyds and some plans to help the Boers, 1899-1902,' *Kleio*, 11, 1 and 2, (1975), pp. 1, 15-16.

³⁰ !bid., p. 1.

³¹ NAR, TAD, M564, FO 2/349: Argentine Government. Ammunition for *Boers*, 10 May 1900.

NAR, TAD, Microfilm Collection A304, FO 2/267: Mules for South Africa from Rio de Janeiro, 20 October 1899.

NAR, TAD, Staatssekretaris (Afdeling Buitelandse Sake) (henceforth SSA) 511, file no.: RA 2073/97: Consul of Venezuela Kaapstad. Toezending van de wapens en vlaggen, 9 April 1897.

³² NAR, TAD, A304, FO 2/267: President, Buenos Aires, offers to sell military stores. 19 October 1899.

NAR, TAD, A305, FO 2/269: Offer of mules, transport and hay from Chili, 4 November 1899.

³³R. Gravil, The Anglo-Argentine Connection, 1900-1939, p. 61.

Argentina and Chile, many of the South American nations had two internal factions, one that supported the British and another supporting the *Boer* republics. The pro-British supporters were those South Americans who benefited from British commerce and involvement in their nations' economies. On the other hand, the anti-British groups were those who resented the stranglehold which Britain had on their domestic economies and sympathised with *Boer* resistance in their equivalent plight. After Britain's victory in the South African War many *Boer* families emigrated to the Latin American countries of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Venezuela and Mexico.³⁴

In Chile, the group opposed to the British were the mine-owners, industrialists and agriculturists that had supported Balmaceda in the late 1890s. This sector of the Chilean population received much support from the German and French communities living in Chile, as well as the home governments of Germany and France. As a result of the allegiances with the French and German communities in the areas of Iquique and Pitrifquén, the South African Republic (ZAR) was able to obtain weapons and nitrates from Chile. The strong anti-British enclave in Chilean society had high visibility in October 1895, when the Chilean Government decided to officially denounce the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, which had been signed between Chile and Britain as long ago as 4 October 1854.³⁵

CAD, Government House (henceforth GH) 1/482, file no.: 155: Foreign Colonization in Chile, 17 October 1903.

³⁴D. Fig, 'Proletarianisation or Patagonia: Reassessing the rationale for the Afrikaner Migration to Argentina, 1902-1906,' *Social Dynamics*, 17, 2, (1991), pp. 103-125.

NAR, TAD, M590, FO 2/649: Emigration of Boers to Paraguay, 16 May 1902.

NAR, TAD, Governor of the Transvaal Colony (henceforth GOV) 1034, file no.: PS 89/1/06: Boer Settlement in Venezuela, January 1906.

NAR, TAD, Lieutenant Governor (henceforth LTG) 76, file no.: 84/14: *Boers* and Burgers. *Boer* Colony in Mexico, 1903-1906.

³⁵ Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository (henceforth NAD), Colonial Secretary's Office (henceforth CSO) 1445, file no.: 5488/1895; Report on Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Chile, 1 October 1895.

Assistance to the Boers from the South American nations began in 1897. Several consignments of firearms, ammunition, mules, donkeys, horses and soldiers made their way to the ZAR from South America. In June 1897, a consignment of 550 mules, 80 horses and 4 000 donkeys all "intended for military purposes" were disembarked at Durban harbour. 36 According to Major R.F. Frost, veterinary surgeon of the Natal Army's Veterinary Department in Pietermaritzburg, the animals, most in a bad condition, were en route to the ZAR. 37 During April 1897, a consignment of weapons from Venezuela passed through Cape Town, likewise bound for the ZAR. These weapons were sent to the South African Republic with the intention of using them in the struggle against the British. 38 In July 1899. Gustav Marc Barbarie, a Chilean gunsmith living in Valparaíso, informed Dr. Leyds in France that he had newly designed machine guns which he wanted to sell to the South African Republic. According to Barbarie, these automatic weapons were a new series that would prove themselves indispensable in modern warfare. He was particularly eager to see them used against the English and he agreed to manufacture the weapons in Chile under top secret conditions. 39 The prospect of an arms trade with Chile went down well with the ZAR authorities principally because the British were more suspicious of cargoes coming from Europe to the Boer republics than from Chile. Nevertheless, Barbarie agreed to make these brand new weapons clandestine by appearing to be "machines to manufacture cigarettes." 40 Dr. Leyds received similar offers from various

³⁶ NAD, CSO 1523, file no.: 4950/1897: Horses, mules and donkeys transported from South America to Durban, 17 June 1897.

³⁷ *Ibid.*: Report of R.F. Frost re shipments of mules and horses in Durban en route to Pretoria, 29 April 1897.

³⁸ NAR, TAD, SSA 511, file no.: RA 2073/97: Consult of Venezuela Kaapstad. Toezending van wapens, 9 April 1897.

³⁹ NAR, TAD, SSA 876, file no.: RA 5207/99: G.M. Barbarie wenscht deze regeering eener nieuwe mitrailleuse te verkopen, 17 July 1899. (This document is in French.)

⁴⁰ Ibid.

parts of the globe from as early as October 1899 and throughout the duration of the War.⁴¹

The Boer republics backed up by the German and French Government during 1899, managed to obtain the Portuguese Government's acquiescence in the use of Delagoa Bay to channel arms and ammunition.42 As well as having this loophole, the South African Republic and Orange Free State managed to sneak supplies through the ports of Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. On 5 November 1899, a letter was sent from the Foreign Office to H. Bertram, Secretary of State of the Colonial Office in London, informing him that nitrates from Chile and sulphur from Sicily were being consigned on ships going to Delagoa Bay with cargoes for the ZAR. On board the vessels in question were also German-made 37 millimetre rifles destined for the Orange Free State. Bertram himself was instructed to be on the lookout for these consignments and he was further instructed to forewarn the Portuguese officials at Delagoa Bay of these dubious vessels. Then again on 9 November 1899, a discussion occurred amongst officials in Britain's Colonial and Foreign Offices concerning nitrates sent from Iquique in Chile, to the ZAR via Port Elizabeth. 43 W.E. Davidson owner of William, Walker and Co., responsible for the shipment, informed Bertram that the consignment was earmarked for the "more peaceful arts of alkali manufacture . . . and as . . . agricultural manure."44 Davidson assured the Colonial Office that the shipment could not be regarded as "contraband of war."45 Thanks to him, this particular shipment was allowed through Port

⁴¹ Van Niekerk, 'Dr. Leyds and some plans to help the Boers, 1899-1902,' *Kleio*, 11, 1 and 2, (1975), p. 15.

⁴² D.D. Diespecker, 'British intelligence operation in Mozambique in August 1900,' *Military History Journal* 9, 6, (December 1994), pp. 219-225.

⁴³ NAR, TAD M595, FO 2/271: Question of Nitrate Soda being contraband of war, 11 November 1899.

⁴⁴ Ibid.: Letter from W.E. Davidson to H. Bertram, 13 November 1899.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

Elizabeth to the Transvaal while throughout the war, uncounted shipments of nitrates were delivered to the *Boer* republics under the pretence that they were bought for agricultural purposes, especially as the *Boers* were famous as a farming people.

On the other hand, at the beginning of November 1899, less than a month after the war had begun, Audley Gosling, the British Ambassador in Santiago, informed the Foreign Office in London, that in Chile a "spirit of sympathy" for the Boers prevailed. 46 Gosling informed the Foreign Office in London, that he had briefed the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rafael Errázuriz, of the patience and forbearance which the British Government had exercised during negotiations with the Transvaal Government concerning the voting rights of the *Uitlander* community. In an attempt to persuade the Chilean population to be more pro-British, Gosling offered to the Chilean newspapers her views of the "true causes of the war." On 24 November 1899, Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rafael Errázuriz, received a letter from the Marquis of Salisbury informing him that a "state of war" had existed between the United Kingdom and the two republics since 11 October 1899.47 In the Chilean newspaper, El Chileno, dated 15 March 1900, an article appeared congratulating Queen Victoria on the defeat of the Boer forces in Ladysmith, Natal, and the capture of Bloemfontein by British forces during February and March 1900.48 The article furthermore, expressed admiration for the British soldiers fighting in South Africa, describing their deeds as "an example of patriotism . . . dying for their Queen and country."49 A few days after this article's appearance, Audley Gosling received several applications from Chilean

⁴⁶ NAR, TAD, M594, FO 2/269: South African War: Chilean Sympathy for Boers, 1 November 1899.

⁴⁷ NAR, TAD, M594, FO 2/274: Notification of State of War. Correspondence between Audley Gosling and Rafael Errázuriz, 24 November - 1 December 1899.

⁴⁸ NAR, TAD, M560, FO 2/337: War in South Africa. Article in *El Chileno*, 15 March 1900.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

citizens wanting to volunteer for active military service for Britain in South Africa. However, these volunteers were turned away as the British officials were not totally convinced that all of their loyalties were solely with the British. Nevertheless, the Chileans were responsible for sending shipments of horses, mules, wheat and other foodstuffs for the British regiments fighting in South Africa.

After the South African War, Chile's relations with South Africa remained small scale. Trade in agricultural produce and nitrates occurred between Chile and the four South African territories. Between 1903 and 1906, a group of *Boers* disgruntled with Britain's victory in the war, emigrated to Chile. These *Boers* settled around Pitrufquén which was part of Chile's German enclave. ⁵¹ Furthermore, from 1907 onwards, Chile made efforts to resume honorary consular relations with South Africa.

⁵⁰ NAR, TAD, M560, FO 2/337: Volunteers in Chile. Correspondence between volunteers and Audley Gosling, 17 March to 25 April 1900.

⁵¹NAR, TAD, GOV 55, file no.: GEN 1230/03: Emigration of Boers. NAR, TAD, GOV 83, file no.: GEN 5/06: Boers in Chile.

CHAPTER SEVEN:

THE INFLUENCE OF CHILEAN POLITICAL FIGURES AND PARTIES ON BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, 1902-1948

During the period 1902 to 1948 several political parties developed in Chile and each of the Chilean presidents elected during this period naturally played a role in determining Chile's relations with other nations. The parties which featured on the Chilean political scene were the Conservatives, Liberals, Nationalists, Radicals, Liberal Democrats, Democrats and Communists.

Under the government of Pedro Montt, between 1906 and 1910 efforts were made to strengthen diplomatic relations, while commerce and trade were opened not only on the South American continent but also, for example, with South Africa.1 The proof is that in 1907, the Montt Government encouraged the re-establishment of consular relations with South Africa while, in April 1908 the Chilean training ship General Baquedaro paid a visit to Cape Town.² Between 1910 and 1915, Ramón Barros Luco was elected president and he was also aware of the importance of forging diplomatic relations with Latin American neighbours. He established a Treaty of Friendship that was signed by Chile, Argentina and Brazil, and a railway line was constructed between Chile and Bolivia. During Luco's administration in 1915 a Chilean consulate was opened in South Africa in Johannesburg as a result of steps initiated by his predecessor. After World War I broke out in Europe, Jan Luis Sanfuentes became president of Chile and he had to adopt a position on it. He was adamant on keeping Chile neutral in the conflict. His reasons were, firstly, that he felt it was more important for Chile to give priority to its domestic

¹ NAR, SAD, Prime Minister's Office (henceforth PM) 17, file no.: 26/7/1907: Consuls. Chile, July 1907.

² CAD, GH 1/496, file no.: 42: Chilean Training Ship *General Baquedaro* from Valparaíso to Cape Town, April 1908.

concerns rather than become involved in the international conflict. Secondly, Sanfuentes realised that Chile's nitrates would be in great demand by both the Allies and the Central Powers. Thus by remaining neutral and supplying both sides with nitrates, Chile's economy would boom. Between 1915 and 1917 the nitrate industry did indeed boom but only because the United States of America became a major trading partner, who managed to replace Britain ironically because of the blockades which Britain imposed on Chile.

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In 1915 Britain and her Allies imposed blockades on Chile to prevent her from supplying Germany with nitrates. Of course, the Allies needed nitrates too, and the U.S.A., though not yet officially involved in the war, obtained supplies from Chile and thereby assisted the Allies in sustaining their war effort. However, in 1917 the U.S.A. officially joined the war and added its mighty pressure on Chile to abandon its neutral stance.³ Chile refused and her economy suffered the consequences of remaining neutral.

During World War I, Britain launched a propaganda campaign to have Chile branded as pro-German. Britain's colonies were discouraged from being involved with Chile. As a result of Britain's attitude, the South African authorities refused to assist Chilean citizens from obtaining money due to them from shares which they held in the South African mining industry, together with shares blocked by boycotts imposed on Chilean companies. Therefore, in 1916 when the South African Government approached Chile to obtain information concerning the operations of their mining industries, Sanfuentes' Government ignored the request.

During the 1920s, as the result of the economic depression caused partly by World War I, Chile experienced large-scale political turmoil with numerous strikes, coups and counter-coups because the Chileans were

³ T.A. Bailey, The Policy of the United States Towards Neutrals, pp. 153-157.

unhappy with the prevailing economic circumstances. Between 1895 and 1925, it was impossible for a presidency in Chile to remain in power for long. Political instability was reinforced by the fragmentation of major political parties, which had increased to the six identified above. This proliferation of parties resulted in the formation of coalition governments. since it was difficult for any of them to win control of the legislature.4 Political control remained in the hands of the oligarchy, which represented primarily the interests of the agricultural faction. Some opposition came from merchants with urban interests, while workers also began to exert pressure.⁵ During this period, Chilean society became polarised between the wealthy few and the deterioration of the standard of living of the masses. The wealthy few were those sectors of the population that benefitted from Chile's commercial and diplomatic relations with Britain and her colonies, and evermore increasingly with Germany. The Chilean Governments were unresponsive to the pleas of the masses and exploitation of the workers by their employers. Thus provoked many of the labourers to participate in nation-wide strikes and riots.⁶ Towards the end of this period, under the dictatorship of General Carlos Ibáñez, Chile's economy began to improve and much financial aid was received from the U.S., who became ever more enticing in luring the Chilean economy away from Britain.7

However, the 1929 Wall Street Crash ended this period of economic prosperity in Chile and saw Ibañez replaced by Arturo Alessandri who served as president from 1932 until 1938 with a programme of political stability. During 1934, a Chilean delegation visited South Africa with the

⁴ Sater, Southern Cone Nations, p. 45.

⁵ Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, p. 121.

⁶ Sater, Southern Cone Nations, p. 47.

⁷ S. Colliers and W.F. Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-1994, p. 220.

⁸ Ibid.

intention of strengthening commercial relations between the two countries. This was frustrated by the political uncertainties in Chile to which South Africa responded by suspending its diplomatic relations with Chile from 1932 until 1937. The five year break in diplomatic relations began in 1932 when Arthur Hinde resigned as the Chilean honorary consul. However, by 1938 when the Popular Front won the elections in Chile and Aguirre Cerda became president, Chile once again began to boom and prosper. In September 1937 consular relations were once again established in South Africa but only lasted until 1938 when they once again collapsed until 1942. This time diplomatic relations were hampered by an international event which placed Chile and South Africa on opposite sides. In 1939 World War II broke out and Chile once again remained neutral until 1942 when the United States joined the war. South Africa's Prime Minister Jan Smuts had pledged his loyalty to the Allies and thus broke all ties with nations not supporting the Allies. The consular relations were only resumed once Chile had declared war on the Axis powers and Prime Minister Smuts was convinced that Chile was on the side of the Allies.

The Popular Front was an alliance of the Communist and Radical Parties. Despite his political connections, prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, Cerda managed to obtain support from the upper and middle classes by implementing policies that they favoured by establishing even stronger diplomatic and commercial relations with countries like the United States of America, Britain and her colonies, and Germany. During Cerda's term, consular relations with South Africa were resumed. In 1942 Juan Antonio Ríos became president and his office was faced with choosing Chile's side in World War II.

Since the beginning of the Second World War, Chile fell evermore under the sphere of influence of the U.S. as she depended greatly on the Colossus of the North for her economic well-being. From December 1941 onwards, after the bombing of Pearl Harbour and the U.S. declaration of

war on the Axis Powers, Chile was placed under such pressure to abandon her neutral stance that she broke relations with the Axis Powers and declared war on Japan but never supplied troops as, for example, Brazil did. As a result of Ríos's decision to allow Chile to side with the Allies. Chile was able to re-establish commercial and diplomatic relations with the Union of South Africa. In 1946 Gabriel González Videla took over as president and during his term Chile's economic ties with the United States increased. The traditional elite in Chile, who had once favoured Britain, now defected to the U.S.A. While González Videla was president, Britain made gallant efforts to improve and strengthen relations with Chile. Britain realised she was losing her influence and trading power status over Chile to the United States of America. Britain thus encouraged her colonies to pursue further commercial ties and forge diplomatic relations with Chile. As a result, in April 1947 the Chilean Ambassador in London, Manuel Bianchi, approached the South African Department of External Affairs on the possibilities of establishing direct bilateral relations between the two countries. It was followed through when in May 1948 the South African Department of External Affairs, with encouragement from Britain, established a South African Legation in Santiago, the inland capital of Chile. The establishment of this legation was put into place by the Smuts Government prior to the 1948 elections when the National Party came to power.9

Labour unrest during this period became a matter of prime concern to governments, particularly with the emergence of the Communist Party under Luis Recabarren in 1906. The stronger governments in power like that of Pedro Montt (1906-1910), managed to bring improvements, such as the construction of a railway link from Santiago over the Andes to Argentina. During Montt's term, as already mentioned, the first Chilean training ship *General Baquedrano* visited Cape Town setting the trend for

⁹Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa and of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, No. 24 of 1948, pp. 1241-1243.

future journeys for their other training ships. 10 Under him Chile made arrangements with Britain for the re-establishment of the Chilean Consulate in South Africa. While, between 1910 and 1915, under President Ramón Barros Luco a railway was built between Chile and Bolivia; a Treaty of Friendship was concluded between Chile, Argentina and Brazil; and the Chilean School of Aviation was founded. 11 Luco was not only interested in forging relations with the neighbouring South American nations. During this period, Chile's relations with Britain strengthened as Britain's exports doubled and in fact, coincided with Britain's commercial expansion into Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. The expansion of British interest in Latin America, and particularly Chile, appealed to the bourgeois and middle classes that displayed their support for Pedro Montt. In the early 1900s, several shipments of nitrates were dispatched to southern Africa for agricultural purposes. Chilean farmers also sold their prize-bred livestock to farmers in the Transvaal. 12 From 1910 Luco continued to ensure that Chile basked in Britain's favour. 13 Following on steps initiated by Pedro Montt, during Luco's reign he continued with efforts to arrange for the re-establishment of a Chilean Consulate in South Africa and in March 1915, Arthur Dennison Hinde was appointed their Consul in Johannesburg. 14

¹⁰ The Chilean training ship, the *Esmeralda*, has made regular stops at Simonstown since the 1970s.

¹¹ Stickter, The Saga of Chile, pp. 115-116.

¹²NAR, TAD, Colonial Secretary (henceforth CS) 420, file no.: 571/04: Fertilising agents for South Africa, Correspondence between F.B. Smith, Director of Agricultural, and Commissioner of lands, Pretoria, 11 December 1903 to 8 February 1904. NAR, TAD, Lieutenant Governor (henceforth LTG) 53, file no.: 67/63: Prize Well-bred Stock exported to Chile, Correspondence between Foster Rogerson, Barnato Chamber, and Sir Arthur Lawley, Private Secretary of Lieutenant's Office, 4 to 8 November 1904.

¹³ D.C.M. Platt, A.J.H. Latham and R. Michie, *Decline and Recovery in Britain's Overseas Trade, 1873-1914*, pp. 95, 123.

¹⁴ NAR, SAD, GG 1012, file no.: 20/1/1910: Application for appointment of Consul of Chili, January 1910. NAR, SAD, GG 1022, file no.: 20/582: Consuls Chile. Issue of exequatur for Hinde, march 1915.

In 1915 Juan Luis Sanfuentes was elected president a while after World War I broke out in Europe and Chile remained steadfastly neutral in the conflict. Sanfuentes felt that Chile's own economic development, popular unrest and strikes were more pressing issues for his government than participating in the war. Furthermore, the demand for nitrates by both the Allied Forces and the Central Powers to sustain their war effort appealed to the Chilean Government. He did not want to forfeit the enticing economic prosperity for Chile resulting from remaining neutral and being in a position to supply nitrates to both sides. 15 Despite pressure from Britain and later the United States, Chile hung on to neutrality then. In 1917, Britain and the other Allied nations imposed blockades and blacklisted firms in Chile effectively, denying the Germans any access to the nitrate supplies.16 In order to sustain its war effort, the Germans converted to synthetic nitrates. The Allied Forces soon adopted this process with serious consequences for Chile. The blockades, blacklisting and development of synthetic nitrates severely affected Chile as well as her relations with Britain and her colonies.

On 16 October 1916, the Governor-General Viscount Buxton in South Africa dispatched a letter to obtain permission from A. Bonar Law, Secretary of State of the Colonial Office in London, to appoint a State Mining Commission. This commission was assigned the responsibility of investigating and reporting on the advisability of state mining; financial organisation and control matters affecting them, together with their creation; and the legislative framework which would be required for such ventures.¹⁷ In order to perform its task efficiently, permission had to be sought and was obtained from the Secretary of State of the Colonial Office

¹⁵ Evans, Relations with United States, p. 173.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

¹⁷ NAR, SAD, GG 1820, file no.: 52/177: Mines. General. State Mining Commission. List of Questions re information required, 16 October 1916.

to obtain information concerning these issues from other governments which had mining operations of their own. The countries that the Commission identified were Great Britain, her colonies such as India, Canada, New Zealand, Egypt, Tasmania, South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales; Britain's allies France, Belgium, Holland, and United States. 18 The State Mining Commission was also interested in obtaining information concerning the operations of state-owned mining companies that were essentially German. As this State Mining Commission was performing its investigations while the World War was raging, it decided to approach a neutral country, namely Chile to obtain this information. 19 Between the end of October 1916 and January 1917, detailed questionnaires were sent to these various countries. The fact that Chile's neutral position did not really pose a threat to Britain is evident from this Commission. Moreover, the British Colonial Office had no problem in granting permission to obtain information from Chile and more particularly, from German-owned mines there. 20 However, it appears as if Sanfuentes' Government chose to ignore the request as no response was received from them. Sanfuentes's probable reasons for ignoring this were firstly, because of Britain's wartime trade embargo. The second reason was in response to the refusal of the South African Government to assist Chilean Don Felipe Fonck to obtain his dividends from his shares in the East Rand Proprietary Mines Limited. Instead his dividends were paid into the Public Trustee in London and the Custodian of Enemy Property in Pretoria as was done with the money owed to all pro-German subjects.²¹

¹⁸ *Ibid.*: Correspondence between Viscount Buxton, Governor General, and Bonar Law, Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 25 October 1916.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ *Ibid.*: Correspondence between the South African Governor General and various governmental heads of these countries re information for Commission, 25 October 1916 to 28 January 1917.

²¹NAR, SAD, GG 566, file no.: 9/27/273: War 1914-1918. Trading with the Enemy. Shares belonging to Fonck, Chilean citizen, August to September 1918.

In 1920 Arturo Alessandri was elected president and entered Chilean politics while the country was facing a period of acute post-war economic depression. As a result of the weak economic climate, there were many strikes and riots during Alessandri's presidency. In 1921, unlike any of the previous governments, the state intervened in the labour disputes. Although it initially supported the labourers, after endless criticisms it sided with the employers. However, by 1924 many Chileans had become dissatisfied with the manner in which Alessandri dealt with the problems in the country. Consequently, in early September 1924, the armed forces intervened and replaced Alessandri and his government with a military junta.²² However, by January 1925, when the military junta was unable to restore order the junta was overthrown by a second military coup and this time the military was in full command. In March 1925, Alessandri was recalled to the presidential seat while the revolutionary forces were still active in Chile. From June 1925 to January 1927 there were bitter clashes between the government and organised labour. The government's inability to address the economic crisis as well as problems of unemployment failed to restore stability.²³ During the inter-war period as a result of economic circumstances and political uncertainties, Chile's relations with the Union of South Africa were small scale, but consular representation was nevertheless maintained in South Africa.

In May 1927, General Carlos Ibáñez was elected president with the reputation of being "strong man" of Chilean politics.²⁴ He was the officer who had restored order in 1924 when Alessandri stepped down. Once elected, Ibáñez consolidated a regime that lasted until 1931. It was the toughest government of the twentieth century up to then that Chileans found themselves living under. Ibáñez placed the press under strict censorship; free political parties were not allowed to exist; and opponents,

²² Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, pp. 123-124.

²³ Ibid

²⁴ Stickter, *The Saga of Chile*, pp. 119-120.

particularly labour leaders were arrested. He also instituted ambitious projects to boost the economy. His government played an even larger role in the economy than when Balmaceda was in control. By means of foreign loans and investments mainly from the U.S., projects envisaging the construction of roads, railways and power facilities were undertaken. While Ibáñez was in a power, fruit was exported from South Africa to Chile demonstrating that he still acknowledged the importance of Britain and her colonies as trading partners. However, after the Wall Street Crash, Chile's very brief prosperous period during the mid-1920s ended and the country was thrown into the grips of the Great Depression. Various sectors of the population, from workers to employers, voiced their dissent from the government by participating in such protests that in July 1931 Ibáñez conceded defeat and resigned.

In 1932 Arturo Alessandri was again elected president. During eight turbulent years of coups, counter-coups, popular revolts, military dictatorship and the rise of left and right extremism, he managed to bring about a period of stability in Chile. He introduced a battery of measures to stimulate the development of the economy. His government imposed higher tariffs on imports and tax exemptions to encourage the construction of public works programmes. He, furthermore, instituted social reforms, such as a minimum wage for private enterprise employees, a health care programme for individuals in the social security programme and investment of funds in the provision of public housing.²⁹ The national economy recovered as a result of Chile's ability to restrain its international

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, p. 125.

²⁷ NAR, SAD, Executive Council Minutes (henceforth URU) 1037, file no.: 410: Regulations re Export of fruit to continent of South America, Minute from Prime Minister's Office, 15 December 1928.

²⁸ Collier and Sater, History of Chile, p. 202.

²⁹ Sater, Southern Cone Nations, pp. 57-58.

creditors' demands. More land was cultivated for agricultural purposes and cereal production increased as a result of spreading technology. These fruits and cereals were sold domestically rather than made to compete on world markets with producers like United States of America, Australia and Canada.³⁰

Between 1932 and 1937, Chile's consular relations in South Africa lapsed because of the political and economic uncertainties evident in Chile and South Africa's own vicissitudes such as the impact of the Great Depression and droughts on the economy. Nevertheless during 1937 officials from the South African Department of Agriculture participated in an expedition to South America to acquire knowledge on forestry and agricultural. This expedition was organised by the Imperial Agricultural Bureau. During this period South Africa imported fruit trees from Chile and Argentina. 32

During Alessandri's term he received support from the rightist Conservatives, Liberals and Democrats, while those with more leftist views broke away and formed their own parties. In 1936, the Communist and Radical Parties joined forces in a Popular Front. Chilean politics was no longer the exclusive domain of the traditional upper classes. On the contrary the 1938 election was contested by a broad spectrum of political parties. They were the Radicals, Communists, Democrats, and a new party, the Confederation of Chilean Workers.³³ Alessandri's Government had managed to acquire the confidence of the Chilean populace so that

³⁰ Collier and Sater, *History of Chile*, pp. 230-231.

³¹ NAR, SAD, Dept. of Treasury (henceforth TES) 540, file no.: 2/449; Agriculture and Forestry: Expedition to South America, 27 January 1937.

³² CAD, Plant Inspector, Cape Town (henceforth APC) 5, file no.: 36 part 5: Nursery Quarantine Stellenbosch Importation of Fruit Trees, June 1938.

³³ Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, p. 126.

his party in the Popular Front won the election of 1938 and Aguirre Cerda became president.³⁴

This victory enabled the Radical Party to snatch all key government positions from the Right. In an effort to draw support for the Radical Party from the middle and upper classes Aguirre Cerda implemented policies which favoured them. During his presidency, Cerda pursued a model of paternalistic state capitalism in which government and private enterprise collaborated in the development of a mixed economy.³⁵ In an attempt to become more industrialised, the government mobilised the labour movement behind national economic development rather than by attempting to quell working-class discontent by mere social welfare. During Cerda's term, in 1939 Chile was struck by a devastating earthquake in the area of Chillán. Approximately 50 000 people were killed, and the agricultural potential of this area was severely damaged.³⁶

In an effort to alleviate the suffering caused by the earthquake, the Chilean government, with financial assistance from the private sector and the U.S.A., established a new industry, the *Corporación de Fomento (CORFU)*. This corporation evolved into a venture for state capitalism, as well as private and foreign interests.³⁷ The economic policy of the Popular Front, like those of previous Chilean governments, was essentially driven by international factors. Under the Popular Front, the U.S.A. doubled its sales and tripled its purchases of goods to and from Chile. The result was that Chile's overseas orientation increasingly swung towards the U.S.A. rather than Europe and Great Britain, as had previously been the case.³⁸

³⁴ Sater, Southern Cone Nations, pp. 59-60.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, p. 126.

³⁸ Drake, 'Chile, 1930-1958,' in L. Bethell (ed.), Chile since Independence, pp. 108, 111.

The establishment of CORFU and subsequent industrialization benefited several sectors of the population. Industrialists, although slightly apprehensive about these new developments, eventually realised that state intervention in the economy actually helped boost private enterprise rather than being an either/or situation. There was also the fact that the economic nationalism implemented by the Popular Front defused social conflict. This was due to subsequent improvements like better organisation, representation, health, housing and education which came about as a result of the improvement in the economy. Meanwhile, the middle class benefited from the increase in employment opportunities and the improvements in community services like health, housing, education and social security. The Radical Party was thus able to retain the support of these beneficiaries for the next decade.³⁹ In response to the Chilean government's attraction to the United States during this period and the increase in United States investment and trade with Chile, Britain became concerned that it was losing its hold on the Chilean economy and fought back to keep Chile within Britain's circle of influence.

After Aguirre Cerda's death in November 1941, the Radical Party managed to secure the political arena for another decade. Although its political base altered somewhat from obtaining support from essentially reformist ideals, Juan Antonio Ríos was elected as Cerda's successor. Ríos was described as a businessman who identified with the anti-Communist right wing of the Radical Party. He served as president from 1942 until 1946. His presidential goals were to devote efforts to increase national unity, social stability and economic growth. He assumed office while World War II was raging in Europe and the Atlantic so his administration was forced to deal with the wartime scarcity of imported capital goods. Nevertheless, the Chilean populace were encouraged to maintain high levels of productivity. Between 1940 and 1945, Chile's

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 111-112.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

November 1944, the South African Secretary for Commerce and Industry, Francois du Toit, made preparations for the establishment of a direct shipping service line between South Africa and Chile as well as the development of reciprocal trade between the two. Du Toit, however, had certain reservations about the direct shipping line and trade agreements. The reason was that he felt South Africa was unable to export anything substantial to Chile in exchange for Chilean phosphates required for agriculture. The South African Government under Jan Smuts decided to suspend the venture temporarily. However, in November 1948 South Africa did establish a direct shipping service with Chile and the vessels deployed belonged to the South African Railways and Harbours (SAR&H). 42

Despite a measure of prosperity that the World War brought to Chile, it also placed its government in an awkward position on maintaining a neutral stance. Ríos' administration was forced to make a decision that would, firstly, ensure that Chile could remain in a favourable light with its prominent trading partners, Britain and the U.S. and, secondly, attempt to accommodate the wishes of the German entrepreneurs concentrated in the south who had invested and contributed much to the well-being of the Chilean economy. As in World War I so in World War II, Chile's initial intentions were to remain neutral. Yet in 1942, under heavy pressure from the U.S., concerned, above all, about the Pacific theatre of War, Chile declared war on Japan. Even so the Chileans finally declared war on Germany and Italy in the European theatre as late as the first quarter of 1945. There were two reasons for the eventual war declaration. The first

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⁴¹ *ibid.*, p. 116.

⁴² NAR, SAD, HEN 4317, file no.: 747, vol. 1: Trade with Chile. Trade relations and Treaties, Memorandum from F. du Toit, secretary for Commerce and industry, and Jan Smuts, Minister of External Affairs, November 1944.

⁴³ Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, pp. 126-127.

was because in March 1942, a Chilean vessel, *Tolten*, was sunk by what appeared to be a German sub-marine. However, according to the 1942 annual report compiled by Sir Colin Orde, British Ambassador to Chile, the sinking of this ship was perpetrated under the orchestrations of the United States to spoil the prospects of stronger commercial relations with the Axis powers, particularly Japan. The second reason was that Chile's recently appointed Foreign Affairs Minister Barros, was a supporter of the United States and he insisted that Chile unmistakeably pledge her loyalty to the United States' cause.⁴⁴ Despite this nailing of colours to the mast, no Chilean troops were ever sent to fight in World War II.⁴⁵

In 1946, Gabriel González Videla, a member of the left wing faction of the Radical Party, became president. During his term from 1946 to 1952, he promoted industrialisation, technological modernisation in agriculture, and improvements in transportation by means of increased state intervention and an expanded public sector. He also expanded Chile's oil-refining process and encouraged the construction of several hydroelectric projects.46 González Videla had obtained much support from the Communists during the run-up to the elections and in a gesture of gratitude he invited them to join his cabinet. Although, the Communists displayed strong anti-North American feelings, Chile's economic ties with the U.S. tightened during González Videla's term as productivity in the mining sector scaled new heights. Chile's export revenues from the U.S. increased from \$406 million in 1945 to \$547 million in 1952, while in the same period, her import expenditures from the U.S. increased from \$187 million to \$430 million.47 Foreign investment from the U.S. totalled nearly seventy percent, while foreign loans mainly from the U.S. to CORFU,

⁴⁴ NAR, SAD, BTS file no.: 1/42/3, vol. 1: Chilean Annual Foreign Report, May 1943.

⁴⁵ Stickter, The Saga of Chile, p. 127.

⁴⁶ Sater, Southern Cone Nations, p. 71.

⁴⁷ Drake, 'Chile, 1930-1958,' in Bethell (ed.), *Chile since Independence*, p. 119.

continued to encourage industrialisation. As a result of the economic advantages of the United States for Chile, González Videla was forced to distance himself from the Communists and ask their members in his cabinet to resign. Chile's subsequent economic prosperity, the result of increased involvement by the United States, appealed to the middle sectors of the population. The traditional elite, who during the nineteenth century had been avid fans of British involvement in the Chilean economy, were now turncoats loving the United States. These sectors of the Chilean population, with assistance and encouragement from the U.S., were determined to do everything in their power to pursue a future that worked.

It was into this scenario under the González Videla administration that South Africa re-established direct diplomatic ties with Chile and established a direct shipping line of South African commodities by SAR&H to Chile in exchange for Chilean cargoes of timber for railway sleepers and nitrates. In reaction to the United States' aggressive campaign to seize Latin American markets which had once been Britain's, the British Government sought to make British merchants and industrialists aware of the potential of the Latin American markets, including Chile. As a result favourable reports were compiled which resulted in the establishment of a South African Legation in Santiago, Chile in 1948.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹NAR, SAD, HEN 4317, file no.: 747 vol. 1. Correspondence between the South African Legation in Chile to D. de Waal Meyer, Secretary of Commerce and Industries, 12 November 1948.

CHAPTER EIGHT: INFLUENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN PERSONALITIES ON BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH CHILE, 1902-1948.

Between 1902 and 1948, the personalities in South Africa who influenced relations between Chile and South Africa were Jan Christian Smuts and James Barry, Munnik Hertzog, Both of these characters influenced domestic events as well as South Africa's diplomatic involvement with other countries. Smuts was a Boer general in the South African War (1899-1902). He was responsible for trying to encourage the *Boers* of the advantages of cooperation with Britain and of being part of the British Empire. Smuts' attraction to Britain determined his attitude towards relations with Chile during his terms as Prime Minister. Hertzog, on the other hand, was also a former Boer general in the South African War, but unlike Smuts he was bitterly opposed to having the Union of South Africa incorporated into the British Empire. His dissatisfaction with Britain led him to establish the South African Department of External Affairs in 1927.1 Prior to 1927 all matters related to South Africa's foreign affairs were determined by the British Government. Hertzog was Prime Minister between 1924 and 1939 and during these years South Africa's bilateral relations with Chile remained limited restricted primarily to small-scale trade in agricultural produce in exchange for nitrates and phosphates. As a result of the decision to join Britain in the Second World War Hertzog departed from the South African political scene. Under Smuts, after the war, efforts were made to establish direct bilateral relations between South Africa and the Latin American countries of Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile.

During 1947 Smuts led the way to the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with these South American nations.² Because of the imminent independence of numerous non-European British colonies, like India.

¹ E.S. Munger, Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy, p. 13.

² NAR, SAD, BLO 701, file no. 38/36.

Smuts felt pressurised into making white South Africa more presentable to the international community. Because of her racial policies, South Africa was increasingly branded as a "homeland of neo-fascism." To counter such sentiments, she established relations with the South American countries of Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile. The populations of these countries were regarded by the South African Government as "bevolk... van gemengde oorsprong" (people of mixed origins). In April 1948, Stephanus Francois du Toit was appointed as the new South African Minister to the mission established in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In May 1948 the South African Legation opened in Santiago, Chile, and Du Toit was also appointed as the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

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Throughout the period 1902 until 1960, South Africa's domestic and foreign policies were dominated by the "constant tension, not only about Britain, but also with Britain." In essence, the general focus of South African affairs was with the power struggle between the English and Afrikaans population. For the Afrikaner, the struggle, personified by Hertzog, was the attainment of national self-determination and a solution to the problems of the restless non-white majority.

In South Africa between 1902 and 1910, the political scene was dominated more by domestic concerns than trying to establish diplomatic

³ D.P. Wessels, 'Die Internasionalisering van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika se Posisie in die Wêreldpolitiek,' *INCH*, (December 1981), p. 69.

⁴ M.H.H. Louw, 'Die Uitwaartse Beweging na Latynse-Amerika,' *Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleenthede Nuusbrief*, 2, (May 1969). p. 3.

⁵ S.F. du Toit, *Home and Abroad*, pp. 60-75.

⁶ J. Spence, 'South Africa and the Modern World,' in M. Wilson and L. Thompson (ed.), Oxford History of South Africa, p. 478.

⁷ Ibid., p. 477.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 480.

relations elsewhere. During this period, Britain's main objectives, personified by British High Commissioner Lord Milner, were to consolidate *Boer* and Briton and to have the gold mining industry brought to full production. Milner introduced Anglicization policies, encouraged British farmers to immigrate to the rural areas, limited the use of the Dutch language and stressed the advantages of *Boer*-Briton cooperation.⁹

General Louis Botha became Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa in May 1910. He dedicated his mission to the process of reconciliation between Briton and Boer. In an effort to heal the wounds of the South African War, Botha appointed a ministry that gave equal representation to both Boer and Briton. The cabinet of the Union essentially consisted of two camps, the South African and Unionist Parties. 10 Both parties liked the idea of a single nation, dominated by the white man, the enforcement of a "native policy," material development and economic prosperity. However, none of these parties were too perturbed about granting special protection to the Afrikaner and as a result, Hertzog showed strong opposition to these parties. He fought bitterly to ensure that Dutch and English received equal status in business and for a bilingual public service. He was also bitterly opposed to British Imperialism and he had no qualms about expressing these views publicly. He furthermore, condemned Botha and Smuts' policy of reconciliation and advocated South African nationalism. 11 As a result of Hertzog's continual attacks on Botha's policies, he had Hertzog expelled from his cabinet in 1912. Hertzog abandoned the South African Party and established a new outfit, the National Party in 1914. 12

⁹ Davenport, *South Africa*, pp. 225-228.

 $^{^{10}}$ R. de Villiers, 'Afrikaner Nationalism,' in Wilson and Thompson (ed.), *Oxford History of South Africa*, pp. 368-369.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 368-370.

¹² S.J. Schoeman, 'Die J.B.M. Hertzog-Versameling,' *Archives News*, 8, 10, (April 1966), p. 21.

During the early years of Union, the country's scope of external affairs was confined to Britain. South Africa, like the British Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand were regarded in international law as colonial portions of the mother country. This in effect meant that all diplomatic activity was conducted via the channels provided by the British Foreign Office. Within South Africa, the Prime Minister's Office and the Office of the Governor General, who represented the British Government, handled the external affairs of the Union.¹³

During the period 1910 to 1920, General Smuts was the Union's Minister of Defence. His responsibilities were to establish and maintain the Union's defence forces and cadets. He was also required to exercise control over all imports, exports, as well as the sale and acquisition of arms and ammunition. Smuts was Minister of Defence for the duration of World War I, and convinced Prime Minister Botha to declare war on the Central Powers and offer aid to Britain. In April 1915 in his capacity as Minister of Defence, Smuts was able to restrict the release and subsequent publication of the events surrounding the sinking of the German cruiser, *Dresden*, by the British squadron *Kent*, *Orama* and *Glasgow*, off the Chilean coast. He are publication of this event in the South African newspapers, Smuts prevented this information from reaching the South African anti-British enclave.

As Minister of Defence, Smuts was one of the first South Africans to read the memorandum of January 1917 that was compiled by the British War Office, and distributed to the Dominions' secretaries of defence Governments, concerning the activities of the Germans in South America, in general, and in Chile, in particular. Smuts convinced Louis Botha to refuse the sale of coal to the Chilean coke-company, *Compania*

¹³ Public Records Office information leaflets on roles of the Foreign and Colonial Offices in London.

¹⁴ NAR, SAD, GG 663, file no.: 9/87/13: War 1914-1915. Report from the Colonial Office re sinking of German cruiser, 16 April 1915.

Carbonífera de Funcidión Schwager in fear that it would be used in the manufacture of weapons. In September 1918, a second separate incident occurred when Smuts refused to allow Chilean Don Felipe Santiago Fonck to obtain his dividends from his E.R.P.M. (Pty) Ltd. shares. Smuts arranged for this money to be confiscated. A portion of it was paid to the Public Trustee in London and the rest into the Custodian of Enemy Property in Pretoria. By carrying out this move, Smuts was complying fully with the 1918 agreement which Britain and the United States had signed. In this agreement both the U.S. and Britain agreed not to trade nor have liaisons of any sort, with countries or their nationals that were considered to be pro-German. Such countries were listed on both the U.S. Enemy and the British Statutory Lists and Chile was one of them. Smuts' loyalty to Britain and her cause caused strain in South Africa's bilateral relations with Chile because she adamantly remained neutral.

During 1916 and 1917, the South African State Mining Commission was appointed and instructed to obtain information on the state-owned mining operations of the non-British territory, Chile, which was targetted because she had decided to remain neutral in the war. Smuts acknowledged that gold mines were the Union's pulse and their efficiency was also vital to the British Empire. Although consent was given from the Prime Minister's Office to approach Chile for similar information, this was done only after Britain had given her consent via the Governor General Viscount Buxton. Nevertheless, despite all the precautions taken Chile did not provide the commission with any information about her mining potential.¹⁷

¹⁵ NAR, SAD, GG 589, file no.: 9/27/273; War 1914-1918. Correspondence re Refusal to sell coal, 16 March 1917.

¹⁸ NAR, SAD, GG 566, file no.: 9/27/273. E.R.P.M. shares, September 1918.

¹⁷ NAR, SAD, Commission on State Mining (henceforth K70), vol. 1: State Mining Commission Minutes 26 January 1916 to 8 December 1917. Minutes of the Second meeting, 4 October 1916.

After the First World War, the United States emerged as a dominant power, the inter-war period saw the United States' upsurge displacing Britain and Germany in foreign investment and trade. Not only was Britain's position as the world's commercial power being threatened by the United States, for it also hit her colonies. At the end of the war, the position of self-governing Dominions such as Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa were altered in the direction of full statehood under international law. 18 In 1919, representatives of the British Dominions signed the Peace of Versailles. Botha and Smuts signed this treaty on behalf of South Africa. The signing of the treaty coincided with South Africa's entry into the League of Nations. Since Britain guaranteed permission for the Dominions to sign all treaties on behalf of their governments, these dominions achieved a higher status. 19 From 1919 onwards, the dominions were allowed to consider and ratify treaties separately and were no longer considered as subordinate to Britain. Hertzog who had become Prime Minister in 1924, insisted that the possession of sovereign independence should be put in writing and in 1926 the Balfour Declaration was drawn up.²⁰

In response to this declaration, Hertzog set in motion the process for the establishment of the Department of External Affairs in June 1927. From 1927 until 1953, each Prime Minister held the portfolio of Minister of External Affairs. During Hertzog's combined term as Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, he exerted efforts to have South Africa acknowledged in Europe and United States, by establishing South African Legations in The Hague, Rome and Washington.²¹ In 1931, the Statute of

¹⁸ G.C. Oliver, 'South African Foreign Policy,' in D. Worrall (ed.), *South Africa: Government and Politics*, p. 286.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

²⁰ Ibid.

J. Barratt, 'The Department of Foreign Affairs,' in Worrall (ed.), *Government and Politics*, pp. 332-333.

Westminster stated Britain's acceptance of the Commonwealth Concept as was promulgated in the Balfour Declaration. Hertzog proliferated by appointing more South African representatives in Paris, Berlin, Stockholm, Brussels and Lisbon.²²

During Hertzog's term as Minister of External Affairs between 1924 and 1939, bilateral relations between Chile and South Africa were meagre. His disinterest in South America, in general, and Chile, in particular, was illustrated by four actions. The first was the establishment of diplomatic relations with European nations and the United States. Secondly, in October 1931, Chile and Britain signed the Provisional Commercial Agreement in which both countries agreed to give each other favourable treatment with regards to customs and excise costs on their products. Chile wanted this agreement to be extended to the British Dominions. However, the South African Government refused to be a part as they were of the opinion that there were no benefits for the Union. Therefore, in response to the South African Government's attitude, Britain advised Chile to forge independent agreements with each of the Dominions. The third incident was the resignation of the Chilean Honorary Consulate Arthur Dennison Hinde in 1932. Hinde had served officially in this position for seventeen years. Hertzog made no effort to encourage the appointment of another person to this post. He believed that the Union's small-scale relations with Chile, perseveringly looked after by Hinde, were structures which Britain rather than South Africa put into place to allow the United Kingdom to remain one of Chile's chief trading partners. Fourthly, in 1934 in a Chilean expedition under Francisco Landerstoy, the Chilean Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, visited South Africa with the intention of extending commercial ties with the Union. His delegation was not received too enthusiastically by the South African Government. It proposed the establishment of a direct shipping line between the two countries.

²² Olivier, 'South African Foreign Policy,' in Worrall (ed.), Government and Politics, p. 288.

However, the South Africans turned down the proposal as they felt there was not much to gain from such a venture. Despite these views, in 1948 during the last months of Prime Minister Smuts' term, the South African Government set the wheels in motion and in November of the same year, a shipping line was created between the two countries.

In 1939 when hostilities broke out in Europe, all South Africa's missions, except for Stockholm and Lisbon were closed, and the war drove a rift into the South African political scene. According to the Balfour Declaration, the Dominions were not obliged to side with Britain in the war. Nevertheless, because of Smuts' view that South Africa had a common destiny with Britain and had obtained a mandate from the white South African voters to participate in the war, declared war against Germany after Hertzog resigned in 1939. General Smuts' reason for involving South Africa in the Second World War was to secure South Africa's position in the British Commonwealth. As a result of Hertzog's resignation General Smuts became Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs for the period 1939 to 1948 and South African-Chilean relations were determined by Smuts' loyalty to Britain.

During World War II, because of Chile remaining neutral until early in 1943, Smuts was reluctant to renew Chile's consular relations with the Union. As Smuts was a major role player in the South African National Party, he encouraged the South African Department of External Affairs to allow Chile to resume her consular relations with the Union. In 1937 a South African resident, Dora Marais, was appointed as the Chilean Honorary Consul though she stayed there until her resignation in 1938. Her appointment maybe fitted to the favourable British Foreign Office reports that were distributed to the Dominions in the hope that they would

²³ Barratt, 'Foreign Affairs,' in Worrall (ed.), Government and Politics, p. 333.

be attracted to establish and strengthen commercial ties with this South American nation.

During the period 1939 to 1942, no recorded trade was exchanged between Chile and South Africa. In February 1943 when Chile had declared war on the Axis powers, Smuts welcomed the appointment of Edmund Rogelio Piffre as career consul for Chile. However, as a result of an incident in July 1943, when Piffre was arrested at the Mozambican border with no form of identification, the issue became embarrassing for both the South African and Chilean Governments and consular relations were abandoned until 1948. Nevertheless, despite the abandonment of consular relations from the middle of 1943, South Africa and Chile did have small-scale commercial relations during the later war years once Smuts was ultimately convinced that Chile was on the side of the Allies.

At the end of the war, the world order had changed dramatically. Many states that had been under colonial rule challenged and revolted against their mother countries. Anti-colonial sentiments, and condemnation of racial discrimination characterized world opinion.²⁴ These attitudes were directed towards the Union of South Africa with its colour bar on the non-whites.

Before though, in 1940 Prime Minister Smuts hoped that the Union would take its "rightful place as leader in pan-African development, and in the shaping of future policies and events in. . . [the] vast continent." However, in 1946 at the first meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Smuts received violent criticisms from the Indian and Soviet delegations on South Africa's racial policies. ²⁶ Increasingly after the

²⁴ Spence, 'South Africa and the Modern World,' in Wilson and Thompson (ed.), *Oxford History of South Africa*, p. 506.

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 508.

war, Smuts felt it was vital for South Africa to be accepted by the international community to effectively function as a member of the British Commonwealth.27 In order to eliminate these criticisms levelled against South Africa for solely promoting the interests of the Europeans, Smuts made arrangements for consular and diplomatic involvements with nations not on the European continent. In order to win the support of the international community, Smuts encouraged the establishment of bilateral relations between South Africa and the South American countries of Brazil. Uruguay, Argentina and Chile. During the period 1947 to May 1948 direct bilateral relations were established with three of these countries. Uruguay was the only one not to reciprocate by sending a representative to South Africa. The incentives for establishing relations with these South American countries were several. The first incentive was the favourable reports compiled by the British ambassadors serving in these countries distributed to the various Dominions. The second reason was to convince the international community that the South African Government was not solely European-orientated in either her foreign or domestic policies. The third reason was to establish diplomatic relations with countries on the globe whose people were of mixed race in order to prove to countries like India and the Soviet Union that her policies were not racist. The fourth and final reason was that Smuts wanted to gain Britain's approval by the establishment of bilateral relations with these South American nations. Eventually in May 1948, all of these factors led to the opening of the South African Legation in Santiago, headed by Stephanus Francois du Toit.²⁸

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ NAR, SAD, BLO 701, file no.: 38/36: Foreign Legations and Consuls.

CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF WORLD POWERS IN SOUTH AFRICAN-CHILEAN BILATERAL RELATIONS, 1795-1948.

The period selected for investigation begins with the impact of the Napoleonic Wars and Britain's industrialisation. Throughout the period 1795 to 1948, the bilateral relations between Chile and South Africa were small scale. When relations did occur, be they diplomatic or commercial, it was due to or in response to both nations' relationship with the international community. The period chosen not only traces Chile-South African bilateral relations but, also marks Britain's rise as a world power, her position under threat from Germany, and finally to the devolution of her world power status to the United States beginning after the First World War and intensifying and eventually collapsing after World War II.

The approach adopted by the author of this thesis is vastly different from that of D.C.M. Platt who has been one of the few authors to mention Chile and South Africa in the same works. In his book, The Cinderella Service. British Consuls since 1825 he describes in detail the various experiences of British officials working in consulates around the world. The first half of his book describes and discusses conditions in the British Consular Service in the nineteenth century, while the second part deals with similar issues experienced by officials in the twentieth century. The topics which are addressed include the functions, recruitment of officials, training received, service conditions, salaries, promotions, incentives, and the subordinate relationship of the consuls with the Foreign Office. Platt describes the experiences of the different British officials who occupied posts on behalf of the British Government around the world. Thus, the British honorary consul established in Chile is mentioned and the experiences of British subjects appointed as honorary consuls for other governments in the British colonies are addressed. The main aim of his

¹ D.C.M. Platt, The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825.

work is to give a grim-gram account of the sufferings endured by consuls in these outlandish corners of the globe. Concern with the plight of Latin Americans is totally absent.

In a chapter entitled "Trade Competition in the Regions of Recent Settlement" in a combined work by authors D.C.M. Platt, A.J.H. Latham and R. Michie, *Decline and Recovery in Britain's Overseas Trade, 1873-1914*, Platt elaborates on Britain's trade experiences with areas of European settlement such as Canada, South Africa, Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Brazil. Once Britain's trade commitments to India, the United States of America and Continental Europe began to decrease, she shifted to these areas of European settlement and they became her chief trading partners. My work, on the other hand, specifically concentrates on the bilateral diplomatic and consular relations which Chile and South Africa had during the period 1795 to 1948. It provides a more in-depth and systematic approach to the subject than has been attempted before. This thesis intensely examines the influence of international and domestic factors and personalities on bilateral relations between Chile and South Africa.

Both countries during the period of study experienced domestic and external upheavals and challenges. Chile broke away from her colonial master, Spain, and became an independent country in 1818. During the nineteenth century, she traded extensively with Britain and her economy was on the export-import model with the majority of the merchants as well as the shipping companies being British. In fact, this sovereign country became an unofficial or informal British colony. Her wealthy landowners and mining elite were bourgeois and were the major beneficiaries of Chilean trade with Britain. During the 1800s, she sold raw agricultural produce, coal and nitrates to Britain in exchange for manufactured goods

² D.C.M. Platt, A.J.H. Latham and R. Michie, *Decline and* Recovery *in Britain's Overseas Trade*, 1873-1914, pp. 91-129.

such as British linen, crockery and leather. Between 1818 and 1881, all the Chilean presidents did their utmost to satisfy and meet the needs of the British marine merchants in order to please the powerful sectors of the Chilean bourgeois who were thoroughly integrated into the British enclave.³ This resulted in trade occurring between Chile and the British colonies, like Australia and the Cape Colony.

However, in 1886 José Balmaceda became President and he disliked the hold which the British had over the Chilean economy. As a consequence of the War of the Pacific (1879-1884), in which Chile defeated Peru and Bolivia, the subsequent treaties drawn up gave Chile the provinces of Tarapacá and Antafogásta and the monopoly of the nitrate industry. Britain was naturally attracted to the economic potential of the nitrate industry but had a new competitor to deal with in the shape of Germany. However, Balmaceda was xenophobic and particularly anti-British. Once he became president he undertook determined campaigns to "Chileanize" the nitrate industry as well as other sectors of the national economy. The only foreigners who were permitted to invest in the nitrate industry were the Germans. In 1891, Chile's wealthy bourgeois classes in league with British mine-owners overthrew Balmaceda and put in his place a government that would adhere to their needs and preferences.

During the 1890s until the 1910s there prevailed a rather turbulent period in Chilean political history as many governments took power and were replaced. The presidents who remained in office longest were those who satisfied the wishes of the ruling classes. Such leaders did their utmost to maintain and strengthen relations with Britain and her colonies. However,

³C. Véliz, *Historia de la marina mercante de Chile*, pp. 58-60.

⁴C. Pregger-Román, 'Class and Politics,' LAP, 18, 1, (1991), p. 137.

⁵C. Pregger-Román, 'Origin and Development of the bourgeoisie,' *LAP*, 10, 2 and 3, (1983), pp. 52-53.

during this period there began to emerge a sector of the Chilean population that was German and retained strong affiliations to Germany. During the period 1890 to 1914, Germany became Chile's second largest trading partner. As a consequence of this German enclave and its affiliations, when both world wars broke out, the Chilean population was divided as to whom they should support. It is thus small wonder that the Chilean Government generally opted to remain neutral in the conflicts. In World War I, Chile's neutral stance damaged her economy severely as both Britain and, eventually, the United States, placed trade embargoes and blacklisted Chilean products. In the Second World War, Chile initially chose to remain neutral, but was pressurised to abandon her stance once the United States entered the War in December 1941. These international conflicts and Britain's reactions towards Chile had a severe effect on the bilateral relations with Britain's colonies, particularly the Union of South Africa.

Like Chile, South Africa was also classed as a periphery nation in comparison to Britain, the countries of North Western Europe and United States who formed the centre. In Chilean history Britain played an influential part in its course, while in South Africa the major historical events during the period 1795 to 1948 also occurred because of Britain's participatory role. The first British occupation of the Cape in 1795 occurred shortly after Napoleon had invaded the Netherlands. Britain was worried that the route to the East would fall into French hands and thus arranged for a take-over. The Cape was returned to Batavian Rule in 1803, but in 1806 when the British realised that the Netherlands Government was actually a French ally, they arranged for a re-occupation of the Cape and then remained on the continent until the 1960s. Britain and her appointed officials at the Cape and later Natal colonies significantly influenced major South African historical events, as well as bilateral relations with Chile.

⁶G. McCuthchen McBride, *Chile: Land and Society*, pp. 283-284.

⁷V. Bulmer-Thomas, *Economic History of Latin America*, p. 156.

These officials and Britain herself were largely responsible for the migration of thousands of *Boers* further into the interior of South Africa as they attempted to escape from the pressures and restraints which they felt the British imposed on them. During the 1850s as a result of these migrations four separate territories were established, those being the Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal (South African Republic). Each of these territories had their own involvements with Chile which were all rather small, and involved trade of products like barley, wheat and nitrates.

Britain and her officials also became major contenders and contributors to the South African diamond and gold mining industry during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Britain's interest and pressure in the gold mining industry was one of the factors that provoked the South African War (1899-1902). The second factor was that Germany began to threaten Britain's position on the southern African continent, particularly with the annexation of German South West Africa. The South African War had an impact on the Chilean population and created a division between those who supported the *Boers'* cause and those who supported Britain. The pro-Boer enclave supplied arms, ammunition, horses and other livestock to the *Boers*. Meanwhile, the pro-British enclave supplied food, livestock and other war materials to the British forces fighting in South Africa.

The South African War was won by the British and eventually in 1910, the four separate territories became one under the Union of South Africa. The Union's foreign policy from 1910 until 1926 was determined by the British Foreign Office in London. As South Africa was a British Colony, she had to adhere to the policies and instructions of London.

Two South African personalities, Jan Smuts and James Barry Munnik Hertzog, and their individual attitudes concerning relations with Britain, had ramifications when it came to South Africa's bilateral relations with Chile. Smuts, for example, believed that it was essential for South Africa to be an integral part of the British Empire and accordingly respected and adhered to Britain's wishes. Smuts only pursued commercial and diplomatic relations with nations who were in good standing with Britain. This was particularly evident in both world wars when Chile wanted to remain neutral. In World War II shortly after Chile declared war on the Axis Powers in 1942, in his capacity as both Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, Smuts immediately granted permission for the resumption of a Chilean Consulate in South Africa which had been vacant since 1938.

Hertzog, on the other hand was a different kettle of fish. He was bitterly opposed to Britain's hold over South Africa and tried everything in his power to allow South Africa to become an independent entity, without having to answer to Britain. In 1924 when Hertzog became Prime Minister he immediately set the wheels in motion to have a document written by the British Government which allowed the British Dominions to be more autonomous. A certain degree of autonomy was evident when at the end of the First World War, South Africa, like Britain's other Dominions, was allowed to sign the Treaty of Versailles alongside Britain. This in effect meant that the international community no longer regarded these countries as subordinate to Britain. In 1926 after much pressure from Hertzog, the British Government drew up the Balfour Declaration. In 1931, this declaration was published and approved. It became known as the famous Statute of Westminster. Following up the 1926 Balfour Declaration, Hertzog established the South African Department of External Affairs that opened in June 1927. Hertzog regarded the portfolio of Minister for External Affairs to be of such major importance and so assigned it to himself. From 1927 until 1953, the portfolio of Minister of External Affairs was always assigned to the Prime Minister of the day. The Balfour Declaration allowed the dominions to determine their own foreign policies but within reason. Hertzog's attitude towards Britain and his admiration for Western European countries, like Germany, and the United States played an important role in the South African-Chilean relations during his terms as Prime Minister. Hertzog's focus was more towards Europe and the United States, than to peripheral areas like Latin America.

At the end of World War II, Britain lost her world power status to the United States and her colonial empire began crumbling with more and more colonies wanting their independence. Not only was Britain no longer a major contender on the world centre stage but, the international community had also changed. South African Prime Minister Smuts, a major contributor to the establishment of the United Nations, hoped that after the war South Africa would be able to play a central role in pan-African development. Instead he was faced with an international community which severely criticised racial policies for which he was not responsible. South Africa was faced with harsh attacks from countries, such as India and the Soviet Union. In order to alleviate these attacks, to convince the international community that South Africa was not only interested in having relations with European countries and the United States, and not to discredit Britain, Jan Smuts encouraged G. Heaton Nichols, South African High Commissioner in London, to encourage the establishment of direct diplomatic bilateral relations with the officials stationed in London in the Latin American countries such as Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile. The inhabitants of these countries were described by officials of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs as "gemengde volk" (mixed race) and were regarded as a good means of camouflaging their racial policies. Between 1946 and May 1948, South African missions and legations were established in these four countries.

⁸M.H.H. Louw, 'Uitwaarste Beweging na Latyns-Amerika,' *Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut vir Internasionale Aangeleenthede Nuusbrief*, 2, (May 1969), p. 3.

Similar structures were placed in South Africa by the Brazilian, Argentine and Chilean Governments but, not Uruguay.9

South African-Chilean bilateral relations remained small scale throughout our period. One of the reasons which was highlighted by Lesley Boyd of Anglo American during his visit to Chile in August 1993, "The one disadvantage of Chile was it is on the wrong side of South America and this adds to shipping costs."10 Although, from 1801 accounts of merchandise traded between the Cape and Latin America can be located, it is only in 1867 when direct diplomatic relations were established between Chile and South Africa. During the 1860s when Britain was undoubtedly Chile's chief trading partner and the Conservative Government, under President José Peréz, who wished to maintain and strengthen these relations, gave Britain permission to establish an honorary Chilean consulate in Cape Town in 1867 and another one in Port Elizabeth in 1869. These consulates were filled by officials living in the Cape Colony who were appointed by Britain. The officials selected for this job were prominent businessmen from the Cape Colony. Despite being selected by Britain, these officials received their salaries for their consular duties from Chile. In 1886 when President Balmaceda came to power, he refused to renew consular relations whenever these posts became vacant. The resumption of Chilean consular relations in South Africa were only really reactivated from 1912. Between 1892 and 1912 the reasons for the break in relations were factors both in Chile and in South Africa. In Chile once Balmaceda had been removed from power in 1891, the British Government remained sceptical about Chilean loyalties towards Britain. Secondly, Britain feared that the anti-British lobby in Chile would attempt to aid the *Boer* republics in their ordeal against Britain.

⁹Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa and of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, No. 24 of 1948, pp. 1241-1243.

¹⁰Citizen, 30 August 1993.

In 1915 the Chilean honorary consulate was finally established with the appointment of Arthur Dennison Hinde who served in this portfolio until his resignation in 1932. Despite bureaucratic bungling with his initial appointment, he served the Chilean Government during many changes and wars, and was often faced with the task of negotiating for Chile when its policies conflicted with those of Britain, such as in World War I when Chile remained neutral. Hinde was assigned the task of trying to obtain money and shares of Chileans who had investments in South Africa. However, because of Britain's wartime propaganda campaign to have Chile branded as pro-German, he was unable to aid these Chileans properly. Nevertheless, during Hinde's term he managed to facilitate small scale trade agreements between Chile and South Africa. During his period South Africa exported fruit trees and agricultural products to Chile in exchange for nitrates and phosphates. The two countries also exchanged their knowledge and expertise on mining and agriculture.

During the 1930s and until 1942, South African-Chilean diplomatic relations and commercial relations were minimal and somewhat restrained. The are several reasons for this phenomenon. Firstly, during the 1930s South African Prime Minister Hertzog was in power and, as already mentioned, also the Minister of External Affairs, and he regarded South Africa's relations with Chile to be a British move. Secondly, Hertzog was also more interested in having South Africa recognized in Europe and United States and thus, sent foreign representatives to The Hague, Paris, Berlin and Washington rather than to Latin America. Thirdly, the general attitude of the South African Government during the 1930s was that Chile was of no importance as a consumer of South African products and that the Union had nothing to gain by establishing trade agreements with Chile.¹¹ The fourth factor relates to World War II when Minister Smuts was

¹¹NAR, SAD, HEN 4430, file no.: 791/42: Trade Relations and treaties: United Kingdom and Chile. Correspondence between Secretary for External Affairs and Secretary of Mines and Industries, 20-25 september 1931.

in power in South Africa. Smuts was very pro-Britain and strongly encouraged the Union to assist in the war. At the beginning of the Second World War, Chile decided to remain neutral and because of Smuts' loyalty, he did not encourage Chile to renew its consular post once it was vacated by Dora Marais. She served in this portfolio between 1937 and 1938.

This situation however, changed in 1942 when Chile also decided to declare war on Germany and Japan. Wheels were set in motion and Edmund Rogelio Píffre was appointed as honorary consul but did not last long. His aftermath was so bad that in October 1943 when Carlos Casto Ruíz applied for the post of Chilean Consul, this request was turned down by the South African Department of External Affairs. Between 1943 and 1947 there was once again a lapse of consular relations. However, small scale trade did occur between the two nations.¹²

Immediately after the Second World War, Britain realised that she was losing ground to the United States worldwide. In a desperate attempt to rescue her waning commercial empire, particularly in Latin America, Britain encouraged her ambassadors and officials to propagate the advantages of British trade and to stimulate interest amongst her own colonies to become more commercially and diplomatically involved with Latin America. Favourable reports were written by British officials stationed in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil and Venezuela, which were distributed to the various British colonial governments for their attention and interest. As a result, Prime Minister Smuts responded to these favourable reports and plans were initiated with the South African Railways and Harbours to investigate the possibility of establishing a direct

¹²SANDFA, DC Group 3, file no. 705/2, Chapter 1: Consuls of Foreign Countries stationed in the Union, 1942-1948.

¹³NAR, SAD, BTS, file no.: 1/42/4: Chilean Economic and Financial Matters. Printed reports, 1945 to 1946.

shipping line between Chile and South Africa to exchange products. Eventually in November 1948, as a result of these efforts, Francios du Toit established a direct shipping line and a reciprocal trade agreement was signed by both countries. This was in spite of the fact that in 1934 there were elements in the South African Government who were sceptical about such ventures with Chile.¹⁴

Secondly, the whole world order had changed at the end of the Second World War, and South Africa became a scape-goat with her racial policies. In 1946 when G. Heaton Nichols, the South African High Commissioner stationed in London, was approached by four South American delegations from Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile about the possibilities of establishing direct bilateral diplomatic relations with South Africa, he made a comment to Smuts that he feared if South Africa turned these delegations away it would be seen in a racial light. Therefore, to avoid criticisms, the South African Department of External Affairs under the leadership of Smuts began intensive negotiations to establish diplomatic relations with these four nations. 15 In South Africa in May 1948, José Serrano Palma was appointed as the Chilean Chargé d' Affaires and Consulate General, While L. Fernandes-Pinheiro and M.A. Barcena were appointed as the Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary for Brazil and Argentina respectively. During the same period extending from February to May 1948, South Africa, as mentioned, appointed Stephanus Francois du Toit as the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for both Argentina and Chile, with R.H. Coaton as the South African Consulate General in Chile. In Brazil, E.K. Scallan was appointed as the South African Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Rio de

¹⁴NAR, SAD, HEN 4317, file no.: 747, vol. 1: Trade with Chile. Trade Relations and Treaties. Correspondence between F. du Toit and Prime Minister Jan Smuts, November 1944.

¹⁵ NAR, SAD, BLO 701, file no.: 38/36. Correspondence between South African High Commissioner and Secretary for External Affairs, 16 May 1946.

Janeiro, and J.A. Chapman as honorary consul in São Paulo; while in Uruguay J.G. Malan was appointed as an honorary consul in Montevideo. Uruguay did not reciprocate by sending one of her officials to South Africa.¹⁶

By the time the National Party under D.F. Malan came to power in May 1948, Smuts had already established nineteen diplomatic posts abroad, with four in South America. Malan did not replace any of the foreign affairs staff appointed by his predecessor and he did not interfere with consular relations already established. However, he like Hertzog, strove even more determinedly to follow an independent foreign policy outside of the British Commonwealth, based on anti-Communist and pro-Western ideas. The year 1948 marked a watershed in South African-Chilean bilateral relations and this was three-fold. Firstly, it marks the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in both countries. Secondly, it marks the establishment of the first direct shipping line between Chile and South Africa; and thirdly, both countries entered into a reciprocal trade agreement of their own.

From the late eighteenth century until the 1970s, both Chile and South Africa remained periphery nations who both looked to the Northern Hemisphere for markets, investment and economic opportunities. Britain, North Western Europe and United States were the chief trading partners of both nations. South African-Chilean bilateral relations never featured as a major priority to either country's government. It was only from the 1970s that this changed when both Chile and South Africa pursued domestic policies, which displeased the international community. As a result of sanctions and boycotts they were forced to establish and forge firm relations under the governments of Pinochet in Chile and P.W. Botha in South Africa but, this is a topic on its own. However, suffice to say the period 1795 to 1948 demonstrates how both South Africa and Chile

¹⁶ Official Yearbook of the Union, No. 24 of 1948, pp. 1241-1243.

responded to the tribulations of the international community, the whims of the super powers and the effect on their bilateral relations.

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1. Unprinted Official Papers

1.1 National Archives Repository (Central Archives Collection)

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Vol. 956, file 19577

Governor of the Transvaal Colony

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Abbreviations:

HAHR	-	Hispanic American Historical Review
INCH	-	Journal for Contemporary History
JICH -		Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
JLAS	-	Journal of Latin American Studies
LAP	-	Latin American Perspectives
LARR	-	Latin American Research Review
SAHJ	-	South African Historical Journal

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