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THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: A RELIGIOUS INVESTIGATION

by

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SUMMARY

The Arab-Israeli conflict is examined from its religious aspect, presenting people's experience of religion without passing judgement. Selected concepts are compared and contrasted and interpreted hermeneutically. The roots of the antagonism are traced back historically, showing that it comprises more than a claim to the same geographical territory. Each religion's notion of statehood is described. Internally Jewish-Zionist friction over the ceding of territory arises through divergent interpretations of the same texts; Islam, Nationalism and religious rivalry, being at variance, have engendered Arab tensions. Their respective doctrines on war and peace suggest, broadly speaking, a Jewish-Zionist leaning to *shalom*, and Islam-Arab Nationalism to *jihad* (struggle). While the religious perspective does leave an opening for a solution to the conflict, pragmatism may lead to compromise. Finally the suggestion is made that the religious dimension is necessary for a holistic understanding of political issues.

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MODERN GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD

Israeli Jewish and Arab groups

ABNA al-BALAD: Supports PFLP and rejects the existence of the State of Israel.

al-ANSAR: Supports Fateh.

GUSH EMUNIM: Espouses Religious Judaism, messianism and non-Socialist Zionism.

LAND OF ISRAEL MOVEMENT: Advocates retention of all Territories.

PEACE MOVEMENT: Ideological arguments are both secular and religious.

SHALOM AHSHAV: Left-wing groups advocating return of Territories with minor adjustments for security in exchange for peace.

Israeli Jewish and Arab political parties

AGUDAT ISRAEL: Ashkenazi Ultra-orthodox, mainly Hasidim.

ALIGNMENT (MA'ARACH): Former alliance of different Labour parties and Left-wing parties.

AVODAH (LABOUR): Labour Zionist.

DEGEL HATORAH: Ashkenazi Ultra-orthodox, Mitnagdim.

DEMOCRATIC ARAB PARTY (DAP): Supports the PLO as sole representative of the Palestinian people.

DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR PEACE AND EQUALITY (DFPE): Members mainly from the old Communist Party, but also includes non-Communists and Jews.

HERUT: Revisionist Zionist.

KACH: Right-wing Zionist party advocating 'transfer' (of population). After one Knesset term was banned from elections.

LIKUD: Alliance of Centre and Right-of-Centre Zionist parties.

MAPAM: Left-wing Zionist Socialists.

MERETZ: An alignment of Ratz, Shinui and Mapam for 13th Knesset.

MOLEDET: Right-wing Zionist party advocating 'transfer' (of population).

MORASHA: Religious Zionist.

NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (NRP): Religious non-Socialist Zionist party comprising the former Mizrahi and Hapoel Mizrahi parties.

PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE (PLP): Mainly Arab members but also Jewish supporters who favour Fateh.

RATZ (CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT): Left-wing Zionist.

SHAS: Sephardic Ultra-orthodox.

SHINUI: Left-wing Zionist.

TEHIYA: Right-wing Zionist.

UNITED TORAH JEWRY: An alignment of Agudat Israel, Degel Hatorah and Morasha for the 13th Knesset.

Islamic Revivalist groups

AMAL: Lebanese Shia with links to Syria.

HAMAS: Considered to be more militant branch of al-Ikhwan.

HIZBALLAH: Lebanese Shia with links to Iran.

al-IKHWAN (MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD): A Sunni group which advocates bringing the umma back to Islam and establishing Islamic states before embarking on jihad against the enemy.

JIHAD: Advocates jihad against the enemy before bringing the umma back to Islam and establishing Islamic states.

pro-KHOMEINI: Shia with links to Iran.

al-TAHRIR: Advocates establishment of Islamic states.

Arab Nationalist groups and parties

COMMUNIST PARTY: Advocates symbiosis between Palestinian state and the State of Israel.

FATEH: Palestine Liberation Movement founded and led by Yasir Arafat.

FATEH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL: Breakaway group from Fateh, led by Abu Nidal.

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION (PLO): By the 1980s there were three factions in the PLO:

- FATEH and its allies,
 - PALESTINE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (PNSF),
 - DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DFLP).
- No side wanted to leave the organisation officially in case of external threat.

PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC): Latterly considered parliament in exile.

PALESTINE NATIONAL FRONT (PNF): Established by Palestinians in the Territories in 1973.

PALESTINE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (PNSF): Consists of PFLP, PFLP-GC, Abu Musa's group, Sa'iqa, Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) and Fateh Revolutionary Council.

PALESTINE POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT (PPSF): Established in the Territories after the 1967 War. Headquarters in Damascus.

POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PDFLP): Marxist-Maoist, led by Na'if Hawatma.

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP): Semi-Maoist, led by George Habash.

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE—GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP-GC): Breakaway group from PFLP, led by Ahmad Jibril.

al-SAIQA: Connected to Baath Party of Syria.

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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Relations with the State of Israel (*Medinat Israel*) and her predominantly Muslim neighbours have been an on-going problem for at least the past four decades. In 1978 Egypt signed a peace-treaty with Israel, after which many of Egypt's brethren states severed political relations with her. Since 1987 the *Intifada* (uprising) in the Territories (West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip) has made it imperative that a solution be found to the "problem of the Palestinians". Moreover the firing of Scud missiles from Iraq to Israel during the Gulf War is an entirely new phenomenon in the Arab-Israeli conflict because civilians have now become targets in war.

The problem is a very complex one. No matter how well-intentioned the Super-powers may be, no solution can be found until they have an understanding of Judaism and Islam and their various ideologies. One way of understanding people is through their religion. It will be shown that religion and politics are inextricably interwoven in both sides of the conflict.

According to Bernard Lewis who was interviewed on Israel Television in January 1989, both Islam and Judaism are legal religions, have codes of war, and are political religions. Islam is a religion which has been in power for centuries while Judaism has been out of power — in the sense that Islam is political *de facto* and not *de jure*. In the 19th century Islamic states were mostly secular. However this century there is a move towards Revivalism. According to Halpern (1987:1067) Zionism arose from within Judaism and shows the history of a people in a world religion. "Its purpose was to restore the dispersed stateless Jews to sovereign independence in the land from which ... they had been exiled by God's will as a punishment for their sins."¹ Since the adherents of four religions² live beside one another in the State of Israel, it is desirable that each understands the other in order that they may live in harmony. This applies equally well to Israel's neighbours. Even if different ethnic groups may not be able to accept the differences, at least an understanding of one another's aspirations may permit a concordant *modus vivendi*.

However such an ideal is not as clear-cut as it seems on the surface. It will be shown that different sects and schisms within the same traditional religions cause problems for adherents'

understanding of each other in the same religion or ideology. For example Judaism ranges on the continuum from the Naturei Karta to the Secular Zionists, and Muslims extend from the Revivalists to Secularists to Nationalists. Finally there are dialectic tensions between the two Semitic peoples. All these tensions will have to be shown, compared and contrasted.

1.2 RESEARCH PREMISES

- A knowledge of all the religious traditions and their variations of all the participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict will lead to an understanding of their present political positions.
- If each group of participants can understand the political positions of the others, it may facilitate the attainment of a peaceful symbiosis.
- Understanding of the political positions of each group could lead to a dialogue, which could open the way for negotiations towards some kind of compromise between individual groups and between the two main protagonists.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

All research must have some guide-lines. Although this investigation has been undertaken through the literature, this thesis has been structured to find answers which will provide insight into the Arab-Israeli conflict. This entails dialectic tensions in each field and between the two sides. It also includes a comparison of both fields. Structure means methodology.

The methodology in this thesis consists of the phenomenological approach used in conjunction with Hermeneutics. Adherents to a religion are people, and people live in this world in a specific place at a specific time. Nor do they live in isolation, but are part of a society with their own culture, and each person has his or her own psyche. For these reasons all these factors should be taken into consideration when probing for answers. Therefore the phenomenological approach will be used in this thesis as seen by both Waardenberg and Krüger (King 1985:107; Krüger 1982:20).

1.4 PHENOMENOLOGY

Phenomenology is a philosophy, but it is also a method of research (Krüger 1982:16—17). This method seeks to accept phenomena for what they are, without passing judgements. Therefore it is applicable to Science of Religion which seeks to describe, explain and interpret how people experience their religion. (Krüger 1985:40—3)

The phenomenological method uses epoche and eidetic vision. The two provide a tension between objectivity and subjectivity. (King 1985:39—40) Intentionality allows people to express how they themselves experience their world (Krüger 1982:17—18; King 1985:40).

1.4.1 Epoche

Each phenomenon is taken as fact. Researchers suspend their own judgements by putting their own views and values in brackets so to speak. (Krüger 1982:18) This provides the researcher with an objectivity (King:1985:40). Epoche is on the 'describe' level and does not yet seek to explain or interpret (Krüger 1985:66). Therefore phenomena from the sources will be described.

1.4.2 Essence

One looks for the essential character of phenomena — everything which makes a phenomenon unique (Krüger 1982:19). This is eidetic vision and entails empathy and intuition (King 1985:39).

Many Jews believe that the State of Israel is the culmination of God's promise to Abraham, Moses and Joshua.³ The majority of Jews believe that in times of persecution the Jews must have a homeland to which they can return, where they will be free.⁴ This is also stated in the Proclamation of Independence of the State of Israel (Rolef 1987:348).

For Muslim Revivalists the essence of this thesis is the divine injunction for the Muslim *umma* to live together according to the Path set out in the revelations of the Prophet Muhammad. This includes living in the land of Palestine which is considered Islamic *waqf* territory.⁵ Muslim Nationalists want to live in the country which was formerly Palestine. They consider that this is their land which was taken from them by the Zionists with the permission of the Colonial powers.

1.4.3 Intentionality

Intentionality addresses the question of how people experience their world (Krüger 1982:17). People are allowed to speak for themselves. Intentionality asks what meaning do Jews attach to the State of Israel?⁶ Many believe that the land was promised to them by God in the Bible, others believe that living in this land will ensure survival, while still others believe that the land

has a messianic significance. Therefore

- they defend their right to live in the Jewish State. This is done both militarily and polemically;
- they refuse to dismantle the State of Israel;
- they constantly call on their Arab neighbours to enter into peaceful negotiations with them.

In this thesis intentionality asks what meaning do Muslim Revivalists attach to renewal and reform? There seem to be four main answers:

- They wish to return fellow-Muslims to the Path of Islam, which is a complete way of life and not merely a religious ritual. This is done by quoting verses from the Quran or by propaganda or by personal example at the universities.
- They want to bring Islam up to date to be applicable to the modern world, for example reopening the 'gates' of *ijtihad* for the Sunnis and the use of modern inventions, such as the cassette recorder in Iran. "... if the Prophet's model society were reconstituted today it will be done with the added benefits of modern technology ..." (Shepard 1988:16).
- They want to cause the end of secular rule and the use of alien ideologies. This can be achieved through revolution, confrontation, revolt or Intifada. Islamic states could then be established according to the Sharia.
- Everything is always justified by quotations from the Quran and Hadith.

Muslims Nationalists have their roots in Islam. Implicit in Islam is success.⁷ Therefore they strive for success.

- They try to gain power to lead their people.
- They strive to obtain a Palestinian homeland by conducting *jihad* against Israel.
- They have refused to enter into negotiations with the State of Israel because any compromise would signify defeat.
- They use strategies of freedom-fighters to draw attention to their cause.

1.5 HERMENEUTICS

Hermeneutics can be understood in a narrow and also in a wider sense. The latter can uncover the hidden meaning of religious phenomena. (King 1985:109) Therefore this method is seen as complementary to phenomenology and qualitative research.

Hermeneutics involves understanding and interpretation. These two concepts are closely linked.

If one does not understand, one cannot explain; and if the researcher cannot explain, he or she cannot interpret. Therefore there must be facts which have to be understood. (Krüger 1982: 20—23; 1985:42—43)

Understanding is a circular process comprising the researcher and the phenomena researched. Hermeneutical thinking prevents uncritical dogmatism on the part of the researcher. It is the critical thinking about the facts, from which the unadulterated truth emerges. (Krüger 1982:21—22)

Hermeneutics is usually associated with texts, and as such involves language. However texts and people's experience should be seen at a certain point in history. Moreover Heidegger's 'being' and 'time' have made provision for understanding to have an ontological meaning. Therefore understanding can be seen as a process which involves linguistics, history and ontology. (Palmer 1969:224;232;227;228) Furthermore Palmer(1969:234—235) suggests that understanding should take into consideration what was not, or could not be, said.

The hermeneutical concepts for the Jewish people are *covenant*, *messianism*, and *survival*. Covenant relates to God's promise to Abraham, Moses and Joshua. If the State of Israel is considered part of the biblical land of Israel, there does not seem to be any room for compromise, although it will be shown that there are different shades of political thinking on this issue. Messianism refers to Eretz Israel as necessary for the process of redemption. Survival can be linked to *pikuah nefesh* in Judaism, where it is not only possible but mandatory to break the Sabbath in order to ensure the survival of one life (B.T. Shabbat 122a). Survival is also seen as a response to the Holocaust in Nazi Germany. Graduating officers of the Israel Defence Force (IDF) swear their oath of allegiance on the top of Massada.

The hermeneutical concepts related to the Islamic movement and Revivalists are *texts* and *struggle*. Texts relate to the Quran and Hadith. It will be shown that these are sometimes distorted to justify a particular way of thinking. However, in the main, as with all practising Muslims, the Revivalists do take texts literally because Islam is a way of life. Struggle refers to the struggle against the umma to bring them back to the Path of Islam according to the Quran and Hadith. There is also the struggle against the Sunni clergy to bring Islam up to date in the modern world without compromising on the scriptures, e.g. ijthihad, the struggle against rulers who adopt alien ideologies, the struggle against these ideologies, and the struggle against the State of Israel, whom they blame for usurping Muslim land.

The hermeneutical concepts for the Muslim Secularists and Nationalists are *power* and *success*. In order to be successful one must have power. Power means leadership. This means suppression of their own brethren, for example the banning of Ikhwan in Egypt or the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the Gulf War. Power can also sometimes mean international and local freedom-fighter strategies or the Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to bring their aims and aspirations to the attention of the world at large. Success means dismantling the State of Israel and regaining the land which was formerly Palestine. This does not leave room for compromise or negotiation. However it will be shown that in recent years there has been a rethinking on this issue.

1.6 RELIGION

Since this thesis is trying to understand politics through the religious dimension the term needs clarification. Religion can be defined in an infinite number of ways depending on one's perspective. The definition used in this thesis is in the phenomenological perspective and is thus applicable to Science of Religion.

Religion is the experience of radical transcending with a view to totalising. This means that one wants to transcend the ordinary, find one's place in the Cosmos and live in harmony with it. (Krüger 1985:6:5:4; 1988:212) This is a substantive inclusive definition and can include ideologies (Krüger 1982:63—4).

1.7 COMPARATIVE RELIGION

Comparative religion can be understood in two ways. Firstly it can be used as a global term for religious study as a whole discipline. Secondly it can mean a branch of study within, for example, Science of Religion. (Whaling 1985:165—6) Comparative religion will be used in the second, narrower sense in this thesis.

According to Krüger (1986:2) this is an era of dialogue where religions "can no longer ignore or oppose one another but must reach an understanding — and in doing so come to understand themselves anew." This idea seems most apposite for the participants themselves in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

One could compare only similarities or differences, or highlight both (Whaling 1985:195). A comparative study of the religions involved would find the relationship among them. It would

find links and patterns with regard to correspondences and differences. *Correspondences* suggest that there are differences and *difference* hints at some correspondence. Therefore such a study would show that each religion is unique. (Krüger 1987:1:2:43f.)

1.7.1 Some problems associated with a comparative study

Even with a comparative study of two or more religions, there are many ways in which the investigation can be approached. This would depend on the stand-point of the researcher. Whaling (1985:177) mentions the three different meanings of Comparative Religion. Firstly the subject could be approached with a particular value judgement which could be theological. Secondly one could compare, for example, all the historical or all the primal religions; and finally there is a non-judgemental comparison and classification. The latter method is applicable to the present study.

The next issue to be addressed involves what data will be compared. There are many options available, for example a specific theme or Pye's four elements. (Whaling 1985:257:269f.) His methodology (Pye 1972:passim) seems apposite as it is neutral and suitable for existential, ontological comparison of religions in the Middle East.

Another problem is the comparability of religious phenomena. They may seem to be so on the surface, yet if one looks deeper they are not. W.C. Smith has shown this clearly in his comparison of the *Word of God* in Islam and Christianity. (Whaling 1985:188f.)

Hultkranz (Krüger 1987:48) has pointed to three errors which can occur in comparative studies. Religious and cultural contexts are not taken into consideration when examining data. The type and quality of phenomena are so different that they should not be compared. History should be considered when making comparisons.

From the foregoing it is clear that the selected data for comparison should have a clearly specified methodology. In this respect Pye's methodology will be followed.

1.7.2 Comparative methodology

Michael Pye (1972) mentions history and seeing data in context (p. 28). He advocates the phenomenological approach with epoche, essence and intentionality (p. 16). He mentions understanding and interpretation (p. 16—17).

Pye has distinguished four themes which can lead to an understanding of all religious traditions. These are *religious concepts*, *religious actions*, *religious groups* and *religious states of mind* (p. 13f.). He specifically mentions groups as sociological, and states of mind as psychological (p. 15); and he advocates an interplay (p. 28) of these two with concepts and actions. There is a further sub-division into more complex comparisons where one can find an inter-relationship among them (p. 153—183). Under the heading "All Four Aspects" (p. 182) he suggests that certain religious thought and action may be affected by states of mind. He gives examples of threatened persecution and death of founder. This is very relevant to this investigation.

On p. 89 he addresses the subject of prophets. He poses the question of whether the prescribed office or a certain individual alone is important to an adherent's understanding of a prophet. Since Moses, Muhammad and the other prophets are very relevant to this research, this issue has to be addressed (see Section 7.3.9.).

Furthermore Civil Religion is taken into consideration (p. 78). Zionism could be classified as Civil Religion. Religion can be a means of justifying opposition to government policy in addition to obeying it (p. 189). This could apply to the various movements in Israel.

Pye suggests that social crisis and change (p. 190) could address three issues. There are communities which have to confront advanced Western society. This could apply to Islam for example. There are revolutionary movements which wish to see a change in society. This could apply for example to the Gush Emunim settlers. On the other hand there are groups who withdraw from society and offer their members minority alternatives. One could cite the example of the Naturei Karta. From the foregoing it seems that Pye's comparative methodology offers the holistic approach upon which this research rests. Indeed Whaling (1985: 270) points out that there is an infinite number of possibilities with this comparative approach.

Krüger's (1983:6f.) conceptual framework for cosmic orientation isolates positive religion, naturalism, scepticism and negative religion. In *positive religion* adherents to a religion admit the existence of another reality which is beyond everyday reality. This Ultimate Reality can be conceived of in positive terms, anthropomorphically, such as 'Lord', 'Redeemer', 'State', 'Flag'. According to this idea, both Judaism and Islam and their ideologies can be classified as positive religion.

1.8 DIALECTIC TENSIONS

The word *dialectic* derives from the Greek meaning 'a method of conversation or debate' (Lacey 1967:51). Various philosophers⁸ have used the word to mean different things.⁹ Hegel saw dialectic as a world process because there are contradictions in society and nature as well as in thought, even though they are not contradictions in formal logic (Edwards 1967:388). Hegel believed that the "world develops dialectically by the interplay of opposites" (Lacey 1976: 52). Therefore dialectic will be used to disclose the tensions of latent oppositions and contradictions (Reece 1980:129) in each religion and between them through debate.

1.9 THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Although the majority of citizens in Israel are Jews, there are many Muslims, Druze and Christians who hold Israeli citizenship. Therefore the term Arab-Israeli conflict is a misnomer. The term 'Israeli' should refer to anyone who is a citizen of the State. For this reason the term 'Israeli' in this thesis will have to be qualified. Nevertheless the meaning of *Arab-Israeli conflict* in the title should be understood according to common usage.

1.10 ORDER AND TERMINOLOGY

When writing from the Jewish-Israeli perspective, the term *Eretz Israel/Palestine* will be used, and when writing from the Muslim-Arab position the term *Palestine/Eretz Israel* will be used. The League of Nations awarded Britain the mandate over *Palestine*. Therefore this term alone will be used alone in the context of world history.

1.11 TRANSLITERATION OF HEBREW AND ARABIC WORDS

The English spelling adopted will be according to the most frequent usage in the literature consulted, which transliterates the Hebrew *chet* and *chaf* inconsistently by *ch/kh/h*. The literature from the Jewish-Israeli position rarely uses diacritical marks with the exception of an apostrophe to separate two vowels; correspondingly diacritical marks will not normally be shown in Arabic names and terminology drawn from the Muslim-Arab perspective.

1.12 CITATIONS OF SOURCES IN THE TEXT

Although it is widely-accepted practice to cite sources alphabetically, this convention has not been followed. Instead the first-mentioned source contains most of the information, and

subsequent sources ancillary facts.

1.13 DIVISION OF CHAPTERS

In order to show all the foregoing, this thesis has been divided into seven chapters. Since nothing can be discussed in a vacuum, some ground-work needs to be laid. As the conflict needs to be placed in perspective, Chapter 2 will trace a brief historical overview. Since Judaism is the oldest religion chronologically, it will be presented before Islam, and only then will ideologies be addressed. Chapter 3 will describe the idea each religion has of a state. Chapter 4 will highlight the tensions inside the Israeli-Jewish ideological field, and Chapter 5 will provide the same function for the Arab religio-ideological field. Chapter 6 will unfold the doctrines of war and peace in all the religions under discussion. Finally Chapter 7 will discuss and interpret the data and present conclusions.

1.14 SOURCES

In order to eliminate bias as far as possible, Jewish authors were chosen in preference to other sources for the Judaic-Zionist perspective, and Muslim-Arab authors from the Islamic-Nationalist side. When relevant publications from Jews or Muslims were not available to the researcher, material from authors sympathetic to either side was used. Sources were drawn from books, collected essays in books, predominantly Jewish or Muslim journals, items in newspapers and periodicals, and seminars attended by the researcher. The PLO and Hamas charters and some pamphlets of the Intifada were also consulted. The Bibliography contains a list of all sources cited in the text and notes, whether published or unpublished.

- 1 After the conquest of Babylon the Persians freed many Jews in 538 B.C.E. They returned to Jerusalem with Nehemiah "to re-establish their lives and temple there." (Hopfe 1987:294). There they made a covenant with God and promised to observe ten *mitzvot* (commandments) (Neh. 9:38; 10:29—39).
- 2 Christianity is not addressed in this thesis because it is not considered by the world community to be part of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Druze seceded from Islam at the beginning of the 11th century. They also serve in the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). (Rolef 1987:77)
- 3 Gen. 17:7; Deut. 34:1—4; Josh. 1:1—5.
- 4 In *Hatikvah*, the national anthem of the State of Israel, there is a passage which states: *Liyot am khofshi be-artzeinu* — 'to be a free nation in our land' (Levanon 1969:161).
- 5 This is part of the political philosophy of the Revivalist movement, Hamas (a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood), which is active in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Satloff 1989:397).
- 6 The existence of the State of Israel is so important to most of the Jewish people that there is a school of political thinking in Israel called the 'Massada Complex'. Advocates believe that it is better to fight to the last citizen than to lose the Jewish State. The basis of this concept is the suicide of the Jewish Zealots at Massada in 73 C.E. (Rolef 1987:214)
- 7 Two verses in the Quran show this:
 "... Victory cometh from Allah, the mighty, the wise ..." (S.3:126)
 "... To help believers is incumbent upon Us." (S.30:47)
- 8 Reese (1980:129—130) mentions the ways in which 14 philosophers have used the term.
- 9 Edwards (1967:385) mentions eight meanings related to reasoning and logic.

CHAPTER 2 : HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The Arab-Israeli conflict is a very complicated phenomenon which did not start this century. Rather its roots go back to the beginning of the history of Judaism and of Islam. While there were periods of peaceful symbiosis between Jews and Muslims there were also periods of conflict. Both Judaism and Islam are revealed religions. The Torah (Pentateuch) and the Quran are considered to be the word of God and are therefore immutable. Both were canonised.

Over a period of time each religion underwent changes. These were caused by events in world history at that particular point in time or by the people themselves. As both religions developed they both became political — a fact which needs to be documented. While they developed along parallel paths there were similarities but there were also differences. This development will be shown here in historical context.

Zionism arose as a result of eras of Jewish persecution. However this religion could only have emerged because of the *Haskalah* (Enlightenment) Movement in 19th century Europe when Jews found themselves able to become more secularised. Adherents to Zionism found their place in this religion because it was able to accommodate religious Judaism, Jewish Socialism and Jewish Revisionism. Consequently many Zionist political parties emerged, each with its own ideology, within the framework of Zionism. Section 2.14.1 will show how Zionism can be considered a religion. There were anti-Zionists — the Ultra-orthodox Jews who considered the establishment of a Jewish state to be contrary to Jewish messianism. On the other hand religious Zionism revolves around the doctrine of the messiah. These also created tensions in the Jewish field.

Arab Nationalism emerged as a result of the decline of the Ottoman Empire and Western Colonialism. It will be shown that until that time Muslims had adhered to Islam, but after they had been introduced to Western ideologies, some adopted them while others wanted to keep their Arab identity and heritage.

The Arab/Jewish-Israeli conflict with regard to territory started with the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Britain promised land to the Arabs and also to the Jews. However since borders were

not explicitly stated, there were conflicts over territory even during the Mandatory period. Until the last two decades the Arab states which are in direct confrontation with Israel had assumed responsibility for the Arabs who had left Palestine/Eretz Israel before 1948. Therefore in order to have a broader understanding of the situation, mention should be made of these states in their relevant time-frame.

Palestinian Arab Nationalism developed further as a result of the inability of the Arab states to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict for various reasons. Therefore the development of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) needs to be traced. It will emerge that there are tensions within the PLO due to different factions. Nationalism as a religion will be addressed in Section 2.14.1. Since Muslim Arabs were becoming Nationalists or had adopted alien ideas and ideologies, religious Muslims, who had adhered to Islam, wanted to bring their brethren back to the true Path of Islam. This caused the emergence of the modern Islamic Revivalist Movement. This is not a new phenomenon, as it will be shown that throughout history there were moves towards a return to Islam. It will become apparent that even within the Revivalist Movement there are different groups which are not united in their method or in their interpretation of Islam.

From the foregoing it is clear that there are tensions within each of the four religions. It is this disunity which makes a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict very difficult. This issue will be addressed in subsequent chapters.

The present chapter will show the roots of the conflict and trace the development of each religion. Events will be placed in their historical context in order to show how world history and the people themselves influenced changes, conflicts and tensions. Jews and Muslims are living in this world and therefore interact with it.

Chapter 2 will be divided into convenient sections according to world history. The development of each religion and any tensions or conflicts will be presented from each perspective in the same historical framework. History will begin with the creation of the world and end with the present day.

2.2 THE BEGINNING OF RELIGIOUS HISTORY

"In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth" and all that was in it. (Gen. 1:1—31;

2:1—25) Both Judaism and Islam have accepted and believe this.¹

Before the time of the Patriarchs the people were a nomadic race worshipping many gods (Noss 1984:352) until Abraham from Ur of the Chaldees accepted one god who made a covenant with him.² This was renewed with his son Isaac and grandson Jacob. (Gen. 26:11; 18:13) Thus Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are known as the patriarchs.

2.3 EARLY JEWISH HISTORY

Jewish history starts with God's command to Moses to lead his people out of the land of Egypt. This section will describe relevant historical events up to the emergence of Islam. The redaction of Holy Scriptures will also be addressed.

2.3.1 Sinai and the Promised Land

Because of a famine in the land of Canaan the Israelites migrated to Egypt where they were enslaved. Many years later God commanded Moses to lead them out of the land of Egypt. (Noss 1984:354:358) They wandered in the desert for 40 years, and during this time God promised Moses that if the children of Israel would keep His covenant, He would make them a holy nation. (Exod. 19:5—6) This was the beginning of the Jewish religion.

Moses gave his people the Decalogue wherein God commands obedience to Him alone and behaviour is regulated among the people. Moses also gave them the Ark of the Covenant and the Tent of Meeting (Hopfe 1987:290), but he was not destined to enter the Promised Land. After seeing it from a hill-top, he died. (Deut. 34:1—5) God appointed Joshua as his successor and renewed His covenant with him (Josh. 1:1—5).

The books of Joshua and Judges give conflicting accounts of immediate subsequent history. Nevertheless it seems certain that the Jewish people lived in Canaan.³ (Hopfe 1987:290—1) During the era of the Judges, the biblical twelve tribes constituted a democracy with each tribe selecting its judge as ruler (Dimont 1962:47). Each ensured that his people worshipped the one and only God (Epstein 1970:34). Towards the end of Samuel's life the elders of Israel asked him to appoint a king as successor because his sons were corrupt (1 Sam. 7:1—5). He asked for guidance from the Lord and then gave his followers guidelines for the monarchy (1 Sam. 8:6—7, 10:25). Thus Samuel was the last of the judges. During this period the Philistines had settled in the southern coastal belt. (Epstein 1970:34)

About 1000 B.C.E. a constitutional monarchy was established by Saul who succeeded in unifying the Hebrew tribes. David was the first ruling king. At this time the kingdom was divided into Israel in the north and Judah in the south, but David had received permission from the north to govern both. (Dimont 1962:49:51) He established Jerusalem as his capital, midway between the north and the south. He also organised a sanctuary for the Ark of the Covenant. In this way Jerusalem was the national and religious focal centre for a unified nation. (Epstein 1970:35) When he died⁴ his kingdom extended from the Euphrates River to the Gulf of Aqaba (Dimont 1962:49). During the lifetime of Saul the Philistines conquered the land,⁵ and it was David who slew Goliath, their champion (1 Sam. 17:1—57).

David was succeeded by Solomon who made Jerusalem the political capital and built the Temple there to house the Ark (Dimont 1962:52). However the idolatry of the alien religions⁶ of his foreign wives, for whom he built shrines, influenced his subjects' religion. (Epstein 1970:37)

After Solomon's death there was a civil war between the north and the south which lasted for 100 years (Dimont 1962:52). In 721 B.C.E. the Assyrians destroyed the northern kingdom with its ten tribes. Judah survived with its two tribes until it too was destroyed in 586 B.C.E. by the neo-Babylonian empire. (Hopfe 1987:294) After the demise of the kingdom of Israel this name was used by all the descendants of Abraham (Epstein 1970:45).

2.3.2 The Babylonian exile and the return

While most of the Israelites were taken to Babylon in captivity, some fled to Egypt and a few remained in Jerusalem. In Babylon they were permitted to follow their religion. (Noss 1984: 379)

The Exile was a watershed in Judaism. Since they were unable to offer sacrifices (which might only be made in the Temple in Jerusalem) it was a test of faith, because people could have believed that God had deserted them. There was a yearning to return,⁷ but they adapted to the situation by establishing synagogues in which sacred texts were read on the Sabbath. This meant that these had to be recorded and interpreted, as they were especially important for the generation born in captivity. (Noss 1984:379f.)

The Prophets were of help during this period. From Isaiah Chapter 40 onwards there is a

change in the emphasis of monotheism to God's people, Israel. There is salvation for the nation which thought itself punished for its sins — it was not their God but the people themselves who had brought about captivity. This new idea was important to the exiles, because making sacrifices to the Lord was now seen as not indispensable. They could continue their lives in another country, yet still continue their personal relationship with Him and worship Him in an entirely new way.⁸ (Epstein 1970:61—2:64)

In 538 B.C.E. Cyrus conquered Babylon and allowed the Israelites to return to Jerusalem with Ezra and Nehemiah. There they built an altar on the ruined Temple site. (Noss 1984:338) They also made a covenant with God to observe His commandments (Neh. 9:38; 10:29—39). The Second Temple was rebuilt and rededicated between 521 and 517 B.C.E. (Wigoder et al. 1989:694). It was also after the return that the Torah was codified under the direction of this scribe and this prophet (Dimont 1962:70).

There was now a new phase in Jewish history. A theocratic state was established where the High Priest was the head of the government, called *nasi*, and was aided by other priests and scribes. (Smart 1969:284) These constituted the Sanhedrin (Wigoder 1989:623f.). The Torah regulated social and private behaviour in that marriage with non-Israelites was eschewed, observance of the Sabbath and festivals was enforced, and people worshipped in synagogues (Smart 1969:284).

In 332 B.C.E. the Greeks conquered the country and the theocracy came under Hellenistic influence.⁹ Thereafter the Ptolemies of Egypt and the Seleucids of Syria overran the land. The king of Syria denied the Jewish people the right to the full practice of their own religion. Moreover he desecrated the Temple in Jerusalem and sacrificed pigs and commanded the Jews to do likewise.¹⁰ This precipitated the Maccabean revolt and the Temple's rededication¹¹ in 164 B.C.E. and also the rise of the Hasmonean dynasty between 167 and 67 B.C.E. (Noss 1984:387—388) According to Wigoder (1989:328) a Jewish presence with its monotheism was re-established throughout the land of Israel during this century.

During the Second Temple era there arose four parties, viz. the Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes and a Zealot faction.¹² The differences lay in interpretation of doctrine.¹³ (Wigoder 1989:550f.; Noss 1984:391f.:393f.)

Tensions between the Sadducees and Pharisees caused civil war, which led to the conquest of

the country by the Romans in 63 C.E. The Roman rulers controlled the selection and disposition of the High Priests. As a result the Jews revolted against Rome in 66 C.E. In retaliation Titus ordered the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 C.E.¹⁴ (Wigoder 1989: 694:693)

Thus began the Jewish dispersion which became a national migration. Jews fled to Babylon and the Arabian desert, Syria, Asia Minor, Rome, North Africa, Spain and the Mediterranean countries. However, many remained in the country yearning to return to Jerusalem and to restore it. Sixty years later the Bar Kochba revolt tried to liberate the country, but this was unsuccessful, and Jerusalem was made a Roman colony which was barred to the Jewish people. (Noss 1984:395:396f.)

Pilgrimages to Jerusalem and sacrifices in the Temple could not be made, and the Sanhedrin could no longer function. The seat of Jewish life was now established in the Galilee. The Sanhedrin was moved to Beth-shearim, then to Sepphoris, and finally in the third century to Tiberias. In the third century the power of the *nasi* was abolished and by the fifth century the Sanhedrin was divided into two. (Safrai 1976:317—318:335f.:345f.:355)

In 614 C.E. Jewish rule was established in Jerusalem under the Persians. This lasted for three years but was then reversed. Shortly afterwards the Byzantine army recaptured the country and expelled the Jewish people from Jerusalem and its environs. (*Israel pocket library* 1973:169f.)

The sixth century C.E. saw the rise of Islam. This was later to have implications for the Palestinian Jewish community. (Safrai 1976:363)

2.3.3 Redaction of the Jewish scriptures

The Jewish scriptures consist of many sections which evolved over aeons. These need to be placed in their time-frames.

In 69 C.E. Jochanan ben Zakkai, a follower of Hillel, established an Academy of Learning at Jabneh on the coastal plain. Leaders of a new council carried out some functions of the Sanhedrin. Their major function was the critical examination and redaction of the writings which were read and taught in synagogues. (Noss 1984:397)

The Jabneh scholars addressed the *Torah*, *Nibi'im* and *Ketubim*.¹⁵ The Torah had been

canonised during the time of Ezra and Nehemiah. The books of the prophets had sacred status since the third century B.C.E. Therefore all the books comprising these two sections were considered the Word of God and were a "fixed canon". No alterations could be made. (Noss 1984:397—8) The Mishnah consists of teachings which were handed down in oral form through the centuries¹⁶ (Safrai 1976:312).

During Hadrian's rule the Jabneh Academy was forced to move to the Galilee. The Mishnah was completed by approximately 220 C.E. After about a century Galilee Academies became less important although they did produce the Jerusalem (Palestinian) Talmud, which is incomplete. (Noss 1984:388—9) This was completed in 390 C.E. (*Israel pocket library* 1973: 255:167). With the completion of the *Gemarah* in Tiberias in about 500 C.E., the final version of the Jerusalem Talmud came into being¹⁷ (Peters 1990:xviii).

2.4 RELIGIONS IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA — PRE-ISLAM

Religions in the Arabian Peninsula before the advent of Islam were mainly polytheistic and animistic. Allah was considered to be the god who created the world. There was also Uzza, the goddess who was venerated by the Quraysh tribe. These deities were worshipped at the Kabah in Mecca which was a place of pilgrimage.¹⁸ (Smart 1969:372f.)

There were a few Jewish tribes in Arabia from 1200 B.C.E. but there was a surge of immigration between 132—135 C.E. after the uprising against Rome. In Yethrib (Madina) they accounted for about half the population. (Farah 1970:28f.) They were active in economic life. There were also some Christians in this peninsula. (Smart 1969:373).

On the historical front this was the age of the Byzantine and Persian empires. Both had borders with the Arabian Peninsula (Lewis 1967:33; Smart 1969:373).

2.5 THE RISE OF ISLAM

Little is known of the early life of Muhammad. He was born ca. 570 C.E. to parents of the Quraysh tribe. He was orphaned when very young and raised by his grandfather. The family were custodians of the Kabah. It is reported that Zayd ibn Amr, a Meccan outcast because of his monotheistic beliefs, reproached the young Muhammad for his idolatry. According to tradition the lad then consciously ceased this practice. (Farah 1970:38:41) He married the widow Khadija and managed her business (Hourani 1991:15).

Muhammad was prone to wander outdoors. In about his 40th year, in the month of Ramadan,¹⁹ he was alone in a cave on Mount Hira, where he received his first revelation.²⁰ This was the start of much doubt and soul-searching as to whether Allah (the monotheistic God of Islam) had indeed chosen him as His Prophet. (Farah 1970:40)

He was supported by his wife and her cousin (Farah 1970:40). Khadija and his cousin Ali²¹ (Lewis 1967:39) and Abu-Bakr²² (Farah 1970:42) were his first converts. After the second revelation²³ his doubts dissipated and he was sure that it was Allah who had commanded him and not the jinn, spirits associated with the practice of magic (Farah 1970:40—1). Muhammad began to preach to the people of Mecca. Yet after three years there were only 30 converts, the majority being from the lower social order. (Farah 1970:42) Among these were Umar from Banu and Uthman from the house of Umayya,²⁴ one of the elite families of Mecca (Lewis 1967:40).

The people of the tribe of Quraysh tried unsuccessfully to put an end to the Prophet's teachings. Nevertheless his uncle supported him until his death although he himself had never converted to Islam. Muhammad's wife died in the same year. In 615 he sent some of his followers to Abyssinia for refuge while he himself moved to Taif, but was also unsuccessful there. (Noss 1984:504; Farah 1970:44f.)

Meanwhile Yethrib was in a state of turmoil. There was feuding between two rival Arab tribes, the Aus and the Khazraj. Jewish people maintained the balance of power but were disliked because they were economically and culturally superior to the Arabs. (Lewis 1967:40) In 621 representatives of the two tribes made a pilgrimage to Mecca. There were Jews among them. The pilgrims were impressed with Muhammad and swore an oath of fidelity to him. The following year he was invited to go to Yethrib. (Farah 1970:47)

Muhammad's migration to Yethrib (Madina) in 622 is known as the Hijra and is the beginning of the Muslim calendar. It signified the end of *jahiliyah* (age of ignorance) and the start of the Islamic era. (Farah 1970:48)

Not all the people at Yethrib had agreed that Muhammad should be called in to arbitrate in their disputes. Therefore the city was divided into the *Ansar* (the helpers) or those who supported him, the *Munafiqun* (hypocrites) and the *Muhajirun* (the Meccan emigrants). The name Yethrib was changed to *Madinat al-Rasul* (the city of the messenger). Its more popular

name is Madina (Lewis 1967:41—2; Farah 1970:48)

Muhammad made a unilateral proclamation which controlled relations between the *Muhajirun* and the tribes of Madina, and between these and the Jews. Each tribe was allowed to retain its customs and obligations towards outsiders, but all disputes had to be referred to him. The Quraysh were exempted. Separate peace with outsiders was banned and anyone who transgressed against the umma (community of believers) was barred from it.²⁵ (Lewis 1967:43f.)

Communal services for worship were held on Fridays. There was a call to prayer from the roof of the mosque.²⁶ During prayer, believers prostrated themselves in the direction (*qibla*) of Jerusalem.²⁷ Other moral and ethical rules were also laid down. (Noss 1984:505)

The Prophet had hoped that the Jewish people would adopt his religion (Lewis 1967:42), but they had become convinced that he was not the promised messiah (Farah 1970:50). Therefore Muhammad made a treaty with them wherein they were allowed to practise their religion and own property, but certain conditions were imposed on them²⁸ (Lewis 1967:42).

In the following years there was a series of raids and battles. In 624 a raid was carried out against a Meccan caravan at Badr. Victory for the Muslims under the leadership of Muhammad was attributed to Allah's goodwill.²⁹ After the battle the revelations at Madina were related to the umma. Because the Kabah in Mecca was designated as a place of pilgrimage, it became a religious duty to conquer this city. (Lewis 1967:44f.)

In 625 the Muslims were defeated at the battle of Uhud by the Quraysh. This was not a serious setback because Muhammad's army followed this up with the defeat of a Jewish tribe.³⁰ (Lewis 1967:45)

A Meccan army besieged Madina in 627. In reply the Muslims used trench warfare as suggested by a Persian convert. Since this was a new way of fighting, the Quraysh withdrew after 40 days. (Lewis 1967:45) The Muslims then turned to Quraiza, a Jewish tribe. As they had violated their oath and betrayed the Muslims by aligning themselves with the Quraysh, 600 people of the Jewish tribe were executed. (Farah 1970:52)

The Prophet next turned his attention to Mecca in the spring of 628. He realised that an attack would be premature and made a peaceful pilgrimage. (Lewis 1967:45) He made an agreement with the Quraysh which gave Muslims the right to make the pilgrimage the following year, on

condition that Muhammad would accept a ten-year truce. Moreover the Muslims were permitted to preach their religion and gain converts. This pact tacitly recognised them as equals. Part of the umma was disappointed at the aborted attack. Therefore the Prophet set upon the Jewish tribe at Kaybar in retribution for an attempt to poison him and his Companions at a banquet. (Farah 1970:53) The Jewish people were allowed to keep their land, yet they had to pay a substantial tribute. (Lewis 1967:45)

In 629 the Prophet made the pilgrimage to Mecca, accompanied by a large number of Muslims. Many people there converted to Islam. Among these were Amr ibn al-As and Khalid ibn Walid. Both men would play a part in later Islamic successes and record them. (Farah 1970:53; Lewis 1967:47f.)

When some Muslims had been murdered after incitement by the Quraysh, Muhammad decided to act. He set out for Mecca with a large force in January 630. Before he reached the city, a delegation of Quraysh, led by Abu-Sufyan met him and requested to be converted to Islam. Thus the Prophet entered Mecca in peace. There very large numbers of citizens submitted to Allah. Idols in the Kabah were destroyed, and this became the principal shrine of Islam.³¹ (Farah 1970:55)

Thereafter other tribes converted to Islam, and ten years after the Hijra the whole of Arabia was Islamised. The Prophet made agreements with the Jews and the Christian tribes whereby they were protected, but they had to pay a special tax.³² (Farah 1970:56—7)

Allah's apostle, Muhammad, died in 632.³³ The fact that he did not appoint a successor was to affect the subsequent development of Islam. (Noss 1984:505)

2.6 THE PERIOD 632 TO THE END OF THE 15th CENTURY

Historically this is a vast canvas for both Judaism and Islam; therefore only events relevant to this thesis will be described. The relationship between the Muslims and the Jews during this epoch needs to be explored. The development of the religions and their religious law will be addressed in order to place them in their time-frames. The codification of the Jewish and Islamic scriptures will be mentioned.

2.6.1 al-Khalufa al-Rashidun (the Rightly-Guided Caliphs)

After the Prophet's death there was a struggle for succession. There were several groups who felt that Muhammad's temporal authority should pass to one of its members. The contending groups were the Prophet's closest associates or Companions, the Muhajirun (emigrants) and the Ansar (supporters). Later some people felt that succession should be hereditary, i.e. Muhammad's descendants through Fatima and her husband Ali. Subsequently the Umayyads who came from the Prophet's tribe demanded their claim to be legitimate. (Noss 1984:514)

The Companions were the first to assume office. Abu Bakr ruled from 632 to 634 when he died. He was succeeded by Umar ibn al-Khattab, whose office extended from 634 to 644, when he was assassinated by a Persian slave. Uthman ibn Affan became the third caliph (644—656). After his nepotism with regard to the Umayyads, he too was murdered.³⁴ The last of the Rashidun was Ali ibn Abu Tahib, whose rule extended from 656 until his murder in 661. (Noss 1984:514ff.; Hourani 1991:487)

During the era of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs there was a significant spread of Islam. Abu Bakr was caliph of the umma from southern Syria to the head of the Persian Gulf, excluding Palestine. Umar's army captured Damascus from the Byzantines, then continued to the Taurus Mountains. In 638 Jerusalem fell and thereafter the whole of Palestine. Thereafter the Muslims captured most of Egypt, Libya to the west, Isfahan to the east, and also Iraq. (Noss 1984:514f.; Smart 1969:393) Shortly after the capture of Jerusalem the first al-Aqsa mosque was built and Jews were allowed to return to Judea (Peters 1990:xiv). Umar also paid a visit to this city (Hourani 1991:28). Under Uthman's rule the Persian Empire was conquered as well as the area up to the borders of the Caucasus. Upper Egypt and the whole of Libya surrendered. (Smart 1969:393)

The years of Rashidun rule also saw the formal codification of the scriptures. Umar started the formal collection of the Quran, which did not have canonical authority. It was Uthman who canonised the Quran³⁵ in 653. (Farrah 1970:97; Goldschmidt 1988:373) The Sunna of the Prophet were not collected into the Hadith literature³⁶ and made authoritative until more than two centuries after his death (Noss 1984:518f.).

2.6.2 Dissension in Islam

Uthman had been elected above Ali as the third caliph. On the death of the former, Ali was chosen as his successor. Since Ali failed to bring Uthman's murderer to justice³⁷ there was dissension among the Muslims which led to civil war. Muawiya,³⁸ an Umayyad and a relative of Uthman, was also the governor of Syria. He refused to accept Ali as caliph and engaged him in an inconclusive battle at Siffin. (Mortimer 1982:41)

Meanwhile Ali's supporters formed themselves into Shiat Ali, meaning 'party of Ali' (Lewis 1987:21). He changed his administrative capital from Madina to Kufa and decided to bring the matter of his removal from office to arbitration (Noss 1984:516). Some of his supporters rejected arbitration because Allah could be the only judge and Uthman had received his punishment (Mortimer 1982:41). In 659 arbitration went against Ali and two years later he was murdered by a member of the Kharijites.³⁹ (Smart 1969:395)

Ali was survived by his sons Hasan and Husayn, Muhammad's grandsons, who were too weak to prevent Muawiya from becoming the next caliph and establishing the Umayyad dynasty. They were, however, to become important in subsequent Islamic history. (Mortimer 1982:43)

2.6.2.1 The Shia schism

At Ali's demise in 661 Shiat Ali was only a party or faction which supported his claim to the caliphate. This idea was accepted by a growing number of people who believed that Muhammad's descendants were the legitimate leaders of the Muslim community. Thus they believed that the umma could only live in harmony according to the Quran and the Prophet's example when ruled by his rightful heirs. Furthermore they would be Mahdis, directly helped by Allah. (Mortimer 1982:43)

Hassan, the elder son of Ali, had renounced his right of succession, but Husayn, his younger son, started a revolt against the Umayyads. He and his followers left Madina for his father's capital, Kufa. When they arrived at Karbala in 680 they were massacred. Husayn's head was taken to Damascus, and consequently he became a martyr and role model⁴⁰ to his Muslim followers. (Smart 1969:396f.; Goldschmidt 1988:63)

During the Umayyad era there were frequent revolts by the Shiat Ali. Eventually Abbas, Muhammad's uncle, was successful in overthrowing the Umayyad dynasty, which resulted in the

establishment of the Abbasid Caliphate with its capital in Iraq. The Abbasids refused to recognise the ideas of Shiat Ali and created their own dynasty. It was then that the Shia schism took place. (Mortimer 1982:44; Goldschmidt 1988:73)

What began as a political disagreement among the Muslims took on religious overtones in that doctrinal, legal and directional differences developed.⁴¹ (Lewis 1987:22f.) Over the years different groups formed their own sects, mainly as a result of doctrinal differences⁴² (Mortimer 1982:46—50).

2.6.3 The period of the Umayyad dynasty : 661—750

The Umayyad dynasty of Damascus ruled from 661 to 750. During this epoch the Dome of the Rock⁴³ was built on the orders of Caliph Abd al-Malik in 692, and his son al-Walid was instrumental in the rebuilding of al-Aqsa.⁴⁴ These mosques were erected on the site of the ruins of the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem.⁴⁵ This site was now declared al-Haram ash-Sharif, the Noble Sanctuary, thereafter referred to as al-Haram. (Hourani 1991:28; Tibawi 1970:12:14; Peters 1990:xix)

This period saw the emergence of the Sufi mystic movement ca. 700 (Peters 1990:xix). The Arab conquest of Spain in 711—12 was to have implications for the Jewish people when the majority of Jews lived within the Muslim sphere (Elazar & Cohen 1985:137f.). After the Abbasids had ousted the Umayyads, the latter set up their dynasty in Cordoba in Spain (Goldschmidt 1988:72f.).

2.6.4 The Abbasid dynasty : 750—1258

From 750 to 1258 the Abbasid caliphs ruled Dar al-Islam from their capital, Baghdad. (Peters 1990:xix) This dynasty was established by Abbas, an uncle of Muhammad, after a successful revolt against the Umayyads (Mortimer 1982:44). It will be shown that this was a period relatively free of conflict between the Muslims and the Jews themselves.

2.6.5 Development of religions, religious law and codification

Although there was a similarity in the development of Judaism and Islam, there were differences too. Therefore each religion will be discussed separately, since it will be easier to see the development if they are not compared directly in this section.⁴⁶

The years in Babylon and the Golden Age in Spain were an era of peaceful co-existence. As the First Crusade had catastrophic repercussions for both the Jewish and Muslim peoples, they will be mentioned together.

2.6.5.1 Judaism

For the Jews, this was the age of the Ge'onut⁴⁷ (Elazar 1985:146). Academies in Sura and Pumbedita in Babylon and also in Jerusalem were each headed by a Ga'on. There was semi-official recognition of these houses of scholarship by the caliphs in Babylon. (Wigoder 1989:278:608)

The Talmud is digressive wherein many theoretical questions are addressed, and many discussions do not come to a conclusion. It also leaves room for a developing world where new problems can arise. Therefore the layman cannot use it as a practical guide. For these reasons *Halakha*⁴⁸ had to be systematically and concisely arranged. This was the duty of the Ge'onim. *Halakhot Psukot* of Yehudai Ga'on was the redaction of the first Halakhic codes in ca. 760, and later the *Halakhot Gedolot* of Simeon Kayyara in ca. 825. (Wigoder 1989:311; Elazar 1985:147; Eliade et al. 1987:8:151; Epstein 1970:181—2)

Since this period was the start of massive migration to Europe, Jews in different countries sent questions on Jewish law to these academies. However it was only the Ga'on who was permitted to reply to them. Consequently a large legal Responsa literature emerged. (Wigoder 1989:278; Elazar 1985:147; Eliade 1987:8:150; Epstein 1970:182)

Among all the Ge'onim in Babylon there were three who made a significant contribution to the development of Jewish law and Jewish scholarship. In 928 Sa'adia Ga'on was appointed in Sura. His colleagues in Pumbedita were Sherira Ga'on and, after his abdication, his son Hai Ga'on. (Wigoder 1989:278)

Sa'adia Ga'on (882—942) translated the Bible into Arabic.⁴⁹ He also wrote an exegesis in Arabic on many books of the Bible,⁵⁰ and monographs on Halakha.⁵¹ His compilation of the Prayer Book contains relevant laws and customs. He was also a Jewish philosopher. (Wigoder 1989:609)

Sherira Ga'on (ca. 906—1006) preserved the literary history of that period (Wigoder 1989:650). Nearly 1000 Responsa on theological and philosophical questions written by Hai Ga'on exist

today. He ruled that when there is a difference between the Jerusalem and the Babylonian Talmuds, the latter must take preference over the former. (Wigoder 1989:306) There had once again been tensions between Eretz Israel and Babylon, as the former desired to lead the Jewish people and restore the *Nesi'ut* (Elazar 1985:146; Epstein 1970:184f.).

The death of Hai Ga'on in 1038 saw the end of the Ga'onut and the Academies at Sura and Pumbedita. The two merged in Baghdad and lasted for another century and a half. Thus began the emergence of the European rabbinical authorities. (Elazar 1985:146; Wigoder 1989:278)

Spain (Sepharad)⁵² and Germany (Ashkenaz)⁵² now became the centres of Jewish scholarship (Elazar 1985:163). From 1050 to 1300 most of northern Europe was influenced by the Ashkenazim (pl.) while southern Europe and north Africa came under the sphere of the Sephardim (pl.) (Wigoder 1989:163; Eliade 1987:8:172:151ff.; Epstein 1970:186).

Isaac Alfasi's (1013—1103) most important work is *Sefer ha-Halakhot* ('Book of Legal Decisions'). This book deals only with pure Halakhic decisions and halakhot relevant to that time in history, and he influenced all later development of Halakha. He also contributed to the Responsa literature and was responsible for the codification of the Talmud. (Wigoder 1989:45f.)

Rashi [R. Shlomo Yitzhaki] (1040—1105) of northern France wrote exegesis on the Bible and Talmud. His commentaries⁵³ have become standard text for students today. (Wigoder 1989:583)

The last major Talmudist of this era was Moses Maimonides (1135—1204), known as the Rambam. He was born in Cordoba but had to flee due to persecution from a group of Muslims of the Almohad dynasty. He trained as a medical doctor in Fez, north Africa and eventually settled in Egypt. There he became court physician to Salah al-Din's vizier, al-Fadil. Maimonides wrote an exegesis of the Mishnah⁵⁴ summarising and clarifying complicated passages. He also emphasised its ethics and wrote the *Thirteen Principles of Faith*. Influenced by Alfasi's *Sefer Halakhot*, the Rambam wrote the *Mishneh Torah*⁵⁵ for students of the Babylonian Talmud. This was immediately canonised although there were detractors.⁵⁶ However this work is accepted world-wide today as the most important summary of Jewish law. His third major work was the *Guide for the Perplexed* in which he reconciled Judaism and philosophy. Because of Maimonides, a centre for religious scholarship was established in Egypt,

which was continued by his disciples until the start of the 15th century. (Noss 1984:402; Wigoder 1989:442—5; Eliade 1987:8:174:153; Epstein 1970:215)

Jewish mysticism⁵⁷ is rooted in the Bible and has a messianic tendency⁵⁸ (Epstein 1970:224:223). In the latter part of the 12th century there was one school of mystics in Spain and southern Europe and another in the Rhineland. These were the Kabbalah and Ashkenazi Hasidim who constituted many independent groups. The Ashkenazi groups were associated with the Kalonymus family in Spain and Worms. (Wigoder 1989:513)

During the Ga'onut period the *Sefer Yetzirah* ('Book of Creation') appeared. Its subject-matter is cosmogony and cosmology (Epstein 1970:226—7). Moses de Leon of Spain wrote the *Zohar* ('Splendour'), except for two sections, in the latter part of the 13th century. This was completed at the beginning of the following century by an anonymous Kabbalist. The work was written in Aramaic, and together with the Bible and Talmud make up the trilogy of Judaism's most sacred books. (Wigoder 1989:570:571; Epstein 1970:229f.)

2.6.5.2 Islam

For the Muslims the death of the Prophet had ended direct access to Allah.⁵⁹ Therefore they had to formulate a workable method of religious law. (Reinhart 1983:189)

The Quran had been codified in 653 by Uthman (Farah 1970:97). However, advanced training is necessary in order to understand the law in this Holy Book, and only about 600 lines are on legal topics. For these reasons the Sunna of the Prophet had to be collected. His Companions had started a collection, but two centuries were to pass before a true Hadith collection⁶⁰ could be redacted and codified. (Mayer 1984:229)

The Sahih of al-Bukhari (d. 870) and of Muslim (d. 875) are the most important. The other collections in descending order of importance are by Abu Daud (d. 889), al-Tirmidhi (d. 892), al-Nasai (d. 915) and Ibn Majah (d. 886). (Reinhart 1983:199n; Doi 1984:54) The Sahih were declared genuine after all tests had been applied (Doi 1984:56). In addition to these there are other collections of Hadith.⁶¹ There are about 4000 reports which pertain to many subjects. (Mayer 1984:229)

Fiqh originally meant 'discerning' or 'understanding', but developed into *ilm al-fiqh* (the science of fiqh). This process is a method of a search for *hukm* or ruling.⁶² (Reinhart 1983:187f.) The

product of fiqh is Sharia meaning 'Path to be Followed',⁶³ and the role of Sharia and Fiqh is a combination of canon law and mundane law (Farah 1970:164).

Usul al-fiqh is the roots or sources of understanding or jurisprudence. General rules were laid down that the primary sources of fiqh are the Quran and the Sunna. However in order that man can interpret these scriptures and expand them, use may be made of *Qiyas* ('analogical deductions') and *Ijma* ('consensus of opinion'). The latter two are considered secondary sources. (Doi 1984:6f.; Eliade 1987:7:435—7) When a successful judgement could not be obtained through these four methods, the use of *ijtihad* was allowed⁶⁴ (Doi 1984:78—81; Noss 1984:520n).

There were four major Sunni classical schools of law. Their basic principles are similar but the differences are centred on *furuat* (branches of theology). Chronologically they were founded by Abu Hanifa (d. 767), Malik ibn Anas (ca. 715—795), Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafii (d. 820) and Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855). (Doi 1984:85) The doctrine of each is a coherent whole and a given group of Muslims subscribe to one school only (Schacht 1971:14).

The Hanifite school was founded in Kufa and was more theologically orientated. Since this school was in the geographical area near Baghdad, the early Abbasid caliphs favoured this school. (Schacht 1971:4:20; Eliade 1987:7:434)

The Malakite school was located in Madina. Based on the authority of opinions of the Companions of the Prophet and on the Prophets' Sunna, the Madinan fiqh was codified by Malik. (Doi 1984:100—1)

The Shafii school also came from Madina. al-Shafii declared that the Sunna had equal weight to the Quran. In fact if an Hadith was more specific and clearer than something written in the Quran he advocated the former source. (Noss 1984:521)

The Hanbalite school was founded in Baghdad. This school concentrated on orthodoxy. (Schacht 1971:10)

Classical Islamic law tended to concentrate on specific issues (Mayer 1984:231). During the early Abbasid period, Islamic law had developed fully. Details were worked out during the ninth century, and by the beginning of the tenth century scholars in all the schools had come to the conclusion that essential questions had been addressed. Consequently the 'gates' of

ijtihad were closed. This meant that for Sunni Muslims, ijtihad was banned forthwith, and one was obliged to follow one of the recognised authorities which one's parents followed. This is the doctrine of Taqlid. (Schacht 1971:21; Doi 1984:470) Taqlid was established ca. 900 and prevents Muslims from deviating from the true Path of Islam (Mayer 1984:227).

Closing the 'gates' of ijtihad and the imposing of taqlid was partly in response to the Ismaili branch of Shia. They had threatened orthodox Islam. However theologians emphasised that taqlid was not enough because each Muslim should believe without being shown proofs. (Schacht 1971:21)

al-Ghazzali (d. 1111) reviewed Sharia teachings in relation to theology. He wrote several books on fiqh, the most important being *Ihya ulum al-din* ('The revivification of religious sciences'). He tried to find a synthesis of Islamic teachings and designate the role of the Sharia with other religious dimensions. He maintained that one should attain virtue by repentance from sin and by filling oneself with God. He also built a bridge between philosophy and orthodoxy. He had his critics, but was eventually thought to be the greatest Muslim thinker. (Eliade 1987:7:440; Noss 1984:528)

By the ninth century the mosque was central to a system of religious buildings. Provision was made for a place where the *qadi*⁶⁵ dispensed justice and pilgrim hostels, to name but two. Shrines too became important for pilgrimage. The main shrines were at the Kabah in Mecca, the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and the tomb of Abraham in Hebron. (Hourani 1991:55) From the beginning of the tenth century scholars of the Hanafi school wrote material aimed at the Muslim umma as a whole (Schacht 1971:19).

By the 11th century one could distinguish between various schools of fiqh (Hourani 1991:158). Thereafter there was no further development in Muslim scholarship until Ibn Khaldun in the 15th century.⁶⁶ (Schacht 1971:22)

The period under discussion also saw the development of Shia theology and fiqh. From the tenth century the doctrine of the *imamate* gradually developed. The Shia believe that imams are descended from the Prophet through his daughter Fatima and her husband Ali. He was the first imam and was succeeded by 11 others. The main Shia branch accept that the 12th imam disappeared in 874 not far from Baghdad.⁶⁷ However he will return in the fullness of time as the Madhi, one who is divinely guided. (Hourani 1991:181f.; Noss 1984:531f.)

In the meanwhile the umma needed guidance, and from the 13th century mujtahids could use *ijtihad*. They were not divinely inspired but Muslims were obliged to adhere to the teachings of the mujtahids of the time. (Hourani 1991:182)

By the end of the tenth century rational theology⁶⁸ had emerged. This could justify and explain Shia faith. (Hourani 1991:182)

Shia *fiqh*⁶⁹ also began to develop in what is now Iraq. In the main, this followed Sunni jurisprudence but with significant differences.⁷⁰ Eventually a corpus of Shia law had been produced. (Hourani 1991:183)

From the tenth century pilgrimage was encouraged to the tombs of the imams.⁷¹ The festival of *Ashura*⁷² came into the Islamic calendar in the 12th century. (Hourani 1991:183f.)

2.6.6 The Golden Age in Spain

For the Jewish and Muslim peoples this was a period of peace and co-operation. It was also an era of religious and cultural development. (Epstein 1970:192; Rahman 1982:7; Eliade 1987: 8:172; 7:342)

The Muslims in Spain recognised the Umayyad caliphs of Damascus and also gave tacit acknowledgement to the Abbasid dynasty in Baghdad until 912. However after the Abbasids gained control in 750, Abd al-Rahman I, an Umayyad, established himself as Umayyad caliph in Cordoba in 756. This was to last until 1030. (Eliade 1987:7:341; Goldschmidt 1988:72f.) Since the Umayyad caliphs of Spain tried to gain intellectual superiority for their state, they encouraged Jewish scholarship and gave Jews equal rights and freedom of development (Epstein 1970:192; Rahman 1982:7).

A Jewish statesman, Hasdai ibn Shaprut, (ca. 915—ca. 990) was appointed principal minister and court physician to Caliph Abd al-Rahman III (913—961) and his successor, Hakim (961—976). Shaprut established an academy in Cordoba where scholars from other countries went to study the Talmud and contribute to scholarship. Moses ibn Ezra (b. ca. 1070) wrote penitential prayers and hymns which are still used today. (Epstein 1970:192:193)

Apart from religious scholarship, Jewish poetry and philosophy flourished. Alfasi and Maimonides have already been mentioned in connection with philosophy (see Section 2.6.5.1).

The first Spanish Jewish philosopher of this era was Solomon ibn Gabirol (ca. 1021—1069). Yehuda Halevi (ca. 1085—1140) was responsible for a change in Jewish religious philosophical thinking. (Epstein 1970:201f.:204f.:193; Eliade 1987:8:174—175:59f.:61f.) Ibn Gabirol and Maimonides had an influence on medieval Western Christian philosophy (Rahman 1982:7).

Spain was also the place for Muslim philosophers. Ibn Rushd, known as Averroës (1126—1198), established a school of philosophy which influenced Muslim intellectuals and Jewish and Christian thought. (Eliade 1987:7:340; Hourani 1991:174—5)

Most of the established schools of fiqh had their influence in Spain. However other schools arose among Spanish Muslims. (Eliade 1987:7:337—339)

The Golden Age lasted until the end of the 15th century. In 1492 the Christians conquered Granada and forced the population to convert to Christianity or be expelled. (Eliade 1987:7:343; 8:157)

Some Jews accepted Christianity but remained 'secret Jews' (*Maranos*), others became forced converts (*conversos*), but more than 150 000 Jews were expelled from Spain. This was a turning-point in Jewish history. Thus began another dispersion — to the Maghreb, mainly Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia⁷³ and Europe. (Eliade 1987:8:157—159)

Muslims too were allowed to choose between conversion and expulsion. Many were 'baptised', but tried to keep their faith. They were known as the *Moriscos*. Scholars made Aljamiado translations of the scriptures. As a result the Muslims forgot their language and could not recite the Quran in Arabic.⁷⁴ Between 1568 and 1570 Muslims in Spain rose up in rebellion and in 1609—10 they were expelled. This saw the end of Islam in this country. (Eliade 1987:7:343f.)

2.6.7 The impact of the First Crusade on the Jewish and Muslim peoples

In 1095 members of the Council of Clermont decided that the Holy Land should be captured and restored to Christendom. The following year saw the beginning of the First Crusade, but their army only reached Palestine in May 1099. Jerusalem was besieged for about five weeks, but the defenders finally capitulated after the population was massacred. Many Jews were murdered or burned in synagogues while some were captured and sold as slaves in Italy. Very few were able to flee to Ashkelon and Egypt. (*Israel pocket library* 1973:185) Muslims too were

slaughtered, including women and children who took refuge in the Haram and its mosques (Tibawi 1970:19:21).

Thus in 1099 the Crusaders had destroyed the Jewish community in Eretz Israel/Palestine (Elazar 1985:160). Mosques were desecrated (Tibawi 1970:19) and for Muslims, the loss of Jerusalem created a crisis, because it is the third-holiest city in Islam (Hiro 1988:23).

In 1178 Salah al-Din captured Jerusalem from the Crusaders at the battle of Hittin (Goldschmidt 1988:377). He re-entered the city on the anniversary of the nocturnal journey of the Prophet Muhammad and ordered the mosques of the Haram to be purified (Tibawi 1970: 197), and by 1268 the Jewish community in Jerusalem had been re-established (Elazar 1985:160).

2.6.8 Relevant events in world history

The year 1258 saw the end of the Abbasid dynasty in Baghdad when the Mongols captured this city. They in turn were conquered by the Mamluks who ruled western Arabia and its holy cities. (Hourani 1991:85; *Israel pocket library* 1973:193) The history of the Middle East towards the end of the period under discussion is very complicated. However the Muslims no longer ruled the whole area. (Goldschmidt 1988:81) Palestine came under Mamluk rule from 1291 till 1516 and thereafter became part of the Ottoman Empire (*Israel pocket library* 1973: 200ff.:212ff.).

2.7 THE PERIOD 16th CENTURY TO THE END OF THE 18th CENTURY

By the 16th century the Muslims had re-established their authority. Four new empires had emerged. These were the Uzbek in the basin of the Oxus—Jaxartes, the Moghul in India, the Safawi in Persia and the Ottomans in Asia Minor, Palestine/Eretz Israel and Egypt. The Ottoman sultan was the guardian of the holy sites. (Noss 1984:518; Hourani 1991:207:86:223)

Until the 16th century Jewish history had been mainly a record of the Sephardic Jews. From the 15th century Ashkenazim were to make their contribution to history. (Dimont 1962:246)

For the Muslims this was a period of reconsolidation in their empires. Yet it was also an era which saw a brief religious revival — *tajdid* ('renewal') and *islah* ('reform').⁷⁵ This was to have wider significance at the end of the 19th and this century. (Hourani 1991:221:275f.;

2.7.1 Relevant events in Jewish history

Eretz Israel/Palestine had become part of the Ottoman Empire in 1516 and attracted a large Jewish migration. There were Jewish settlements in Nablus, Hebron, Gaza and Jerusalem; but it was Safed which attracted the scholars and mystics.⁷⁶ (Eliade 1987:8:161; *Israel pocket library* 1973:218ff.; Epstein 1970:244) Hebron and Gaza were to provide temporary sanctuary in the following century during times of trouble in Jerusalem. Towards the middle of the 18th century the Jews of Hebron were to suffer because of constant strife between the Arabs of Hebron and Bethlehem who belonged to different factions of two tribes. (*Israel pocket library* 1973:224:231)

Joseph Caro (1448—1575) compiled the *Shulhan aruh* ('prepared table') in Safed. This is an authoritative code of law which presents Halakha⁷⁷ in understandable terms. (Epstein 1970:263; Wigoder 1989:153)

In Europe the Ashkenazim were starting to make their contribution to Jewish history. From the start of the 16th century a central Jewish leadership, who would administer their own affairs, was encouraged by the Polish authorities. This led to the establishment of the *Va'ad Arba ha-Arazot* (Council of the Four Lands).⁷⁸ These included Great Poland, Little Poland, Podalia and Volhynia. In 1623 the Lithuanian Council of Brest-Listovsk, Grodus and Pinsk (*Va'ad Lita*) was established. This was followed, after 1651, by a central *Va'ad* of Bohemia and Moravia. In regional affairs they held unchallenged authority. (Elazar 1985:181; Ben Sasson 1976:670—687)

Modern Hasidism, a Jewish pietist movement, emerged and developed in eastern Europe from the time of Israel Ba'al Shem Tov, known as the *Besht* (1698—1760). The movement spread, and dynastic Hasidic houses⁷⁹ were founded throughout eastern Europe. (Eliade:1987:6:203:206; Wigoder 1989:323ff.:96ff; Epstein 1970:262—3; Ettinger 1976:770—2) On the other hand the *Mitnagdim*⁸⁰ were opponents of the Hasidim, because mysticism was seen as a threat to Judaism both in a religious sense and also as a way of life. Therefore a *herem* (ban of excommunication) was placed on the Hasidim and they could be denounced to the authorities. The leader of the Mitnagdim was Elijah Ben Solomon Zalman, the Ga'on of Vilna.⁸¹ The conflict between the two continued into the 19th century until the common enemies of Emancipation and Enlightenment allowed the bitterness to abate. After 1770 many Mitnagdim immigrated

to Eretz Israel/Palestine and settled in Jerusalem,⁸² the largest Ashkenazi community in the country at the time. (Wigoder 1989:497; Epstein 1970:280f.; Ettinger 1976:772—774)

Towards the end of the 18th century, there arose the Jewish Enlightenment Movement (Haskalah),⁸³ which was influenced by the European Enlightenment. Haskalah was the precursor to the Reform Movement in Judaism.⁸⁴ (Ettinger 1976:782; Epstein 1970:287ff.)

2.7.2 Relevant events in Islamic history

At the beginning of the 16th century the Ottomans were the controlling military and naval power in the eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Therefore it was able to create stable rule. (Hourani 1991:215) Sometimes they used the title of caliph, but this did not have a religious connotation. The Sultan was the protector of the Holy Places in Mecca, Madina, Jerusalem and Hebron. (Hourani 1991:221;222)

The ruler instituted Sharia law according to the Hanafi school. There was an official *ulama*, and *muftis* were responsible for interpreting the law in *qadi* courts. It was the duty of the Sultan to uphold Sharia law, which was not the only law in the empire. He could make his own regulations, provided that they did not contradict the Sharia. Furthermore there was a political, military and bureaucratic corps. (Hourani 1991:223—225)

Works of fiqh and Hadith were compiled in large Arab cities by people sent from schools in Istanbul. This school was considered superior to the al-Azhar, Damascus or Aleppo schools. (Hourani 1991:241)

During the 17th century tensions arose among the Shia with regard to the use of *ijtihad*. The Akhbaris were a new school which emerged. They demanded the acceptance of the literal meaning of the traditions of the imams.⁸⁵ During the second half of the century this school was influential in the holy cities. (Hourani 1991:254)

Towards the end of the 18th century a class of local 'notables'⁸⁶ had been created. These people were from the elite families in Arab cities. (Hourani 1991:254)

During the 18th century *tajdid* and *islah* occurred among the Sunni Muslims as well. In India, Shah Waliullah (1703—1762) maintained that Muslims should be ruled according to the Sharia, and furthermore that the 'gates' of *ijtihad* should be opened. He also thought that there should

be a merger of the different schools into a single system and that Sufi-ism should be limited. (Hourani 1991:257)

In central Arabia Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703—1792) advocated returning Muslims to the true Path of Islam,⁸⁷ according to the school of Hanbal. al-Wahhab rejected such practices as the veneration of dead saints who were believed to intercede with Allah, and also the devotion of the Sufis. He created a mini-state which rejected the Ottomans as the guardians of Islam. (Hourani 1991:257f.)

The Ottoman Empire had ruled Egypt since 1517 although they allowed the Mamluks local control. The latter had ruled the country since 1250. In 1798 Napoleon invaded Egypt beginning an occupation which was to last for three years until the French were expelled by the Ottomans and the British. The French invasion was a watershed for the Muslim people and for Islam.⁸⁸ (Hourani 1991:265; Goldschmidt 1988:157f.)

At the end of the era under discussion the Ottomans had been ruling for 500 years. Most of the Arab countries had been under their sovereignty for nearly 300 years. (Hourani 1991:250)

2.8 THE PERIOD 19th AND BEGINNING OF THE 20th CENTURIES

These two time frames belong together because there is a degree of overlap. It will be shown that there were both Jews and Muslims who lived at the turn of the century and they were to have a great influence on events in this century.

2.8.1 The 19th century to World War I : the Jewish people

For the Jews the main event was the rise of Zionism. This movement was to advocate Jewish immigration to Eretz Israel/Palestine and this was to become part of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was also a time of inchoate political parties which later developed sufficiently to take their place in the Knesset (parliament of the State of Israel).

2.8.1.1 Situation in Eretz Israel/Palestine in the 19th century

At the beginning of the 19th century there was a religious trend to settle in the Holy Land. Between 1808 and 1810 Mitnagdim from Vilna went to live in Safed. Six years later many relocated to Jerusalem and thus began the foundations of an Ashkenazi community there.

Other immigrants settled in Tiberias, Hebron, Acre and the Galilee. (Ettinger 1976:915f.)

In 1831 Muhammad Ali's son conquered the land, but his rule lasted for only nine years, when the Ottomans regained their sovereignty. After 1824 the Ashkenazim were again allowed to settle in Jerusalem, the capital. The chief rabbi of the Sephardim was recognised by the Turkish authorities, because they were citizens, while the Ashkenazim were not.⁸⁹ The latter also tended to live in their own small communities according to their place of origin, while the Sephardim retained their cohesion. (Ettinger 1976:917)

The Jewish community had become well-established. It was only in the latter part of the century that Zionist immigration began. (Ettinger 1976:916)

2.8.1.2 Situation in Europe in the 19th century

Israel Jacobson was the first person to try to reform Jewish religious ritual at the beginning of the 19th century. The year 1818 saw the establishment of the first Reform Temple. There was a response by many Orthodox scholars including Rabbi Moshe Sofer, known as the Hatam Sofer of Bratislava.⁹⁰ Orthodox newspapers began to appear and the first Jewish political party emerged in Europe, in Hungary in 1867. Subsequently there were others. (Eliade 1987:8:192)

The Damascus Blood Libel of 1840 and the revolts of Russia and Poland, where Jews were forced to choose sides, caused reactions of some Orthodox rabbis. Rabbi Yehuda Alkalai and Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalisher⁹¹ thought that the best solution would be a return to the Holy Land. Both wrote that redemption should be preceded by a return to Eretz Israel/Palestine. This created tensions between them and the more traditional rabbis who believed that only miracles of divine grace would cause the coming of the messiah. (Hertzberg 1959:103:119)

Moshe Hess was a product of the Haskalah. In one of his books he addressed the issue of Jewish Nationalism. Therefore he can be seen as a precursor of secular Zionism. (Hertzberg 1959:118) Mention should also be made here of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda. He was a secular Nationalist, who made *Aliyah*⁹² to Jerusalem. Ben-Yehuda is considered the father of modern Hebrew as a spoken language.⁹³ (Hertzberg 1959:159—60)

The Russian pogroms of 1881 were different from anything before because of their extent and the formation of the mobs. In response, Leo Pinsker wrote a pamphlet which was published anonymously, entitled *Auto-Emancipation*. His premise was that Jews were persecuted because

of Judophobia. Therefore they had to live in a country of their own.⁹⁴ He joined the *Hovevei Zion* (Lovers of Zion) Movement and some of its members ultimately settled in Eretz Israel/Palestine. (Hertzberg 1959:180f.; Ettinger 1976:897)

Nathan Birenbaum was the first person to use the word *Zionism* to indicate Jewish nationhood in Eretz Israel/Palestine.⁹⁵ In 1894 he was instrumental in convening an international Zionist congress in Paris, but the ideology⁹⁶ did not take hold. (Ettinger 1976:898)

2.8.1.3 The rise of modern Zionism

Modern Zionism began with Theodor Herzl. Because of the Dreyfus affair, Herzl published *The Jewish State* in 1896. He believed that the only solution to Jewish persecution was the establishment of a Jewish State. The first Zionist congress was convened in Basle in 1897 and the 200 delegates accepted that "Zionism aspires to the securing of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, guaranteed by public [i.e. international] law." Two years later the second Zionist congress adopted a resolution encouraging settlement in Palestine, even without political guarantees. (Ettinger 1976:898—900)

Ahad Ha'am tried to develop a secular Judaism based on principles of orthodoxy. This idea did not take root, but he was to advise Chaim Weizmann in 1917 for negotiations of the Balfour Declaration. (Ettinger 1976:897; Hertzberg 1959:251)

The first Aliyah started in 1881. In May 1882 the Ottoman authorities banned immigration to Palestine/Eretz Israel. Nevertheless Jewish agricultural settlement expanded, and by the end of the century the Arabs thought that Jews should be barred from buying land. (Ettinger 1976: 918f.:924)

The growth and development of Zionism are not relevant here. Yet mention should be made of Aaron David Gordon, who connected religion and labour, Berl Katznelson who tried to adapt traditional Jewish festivals and rituals to the new homeland, and David Ben Gurion who advocated the development of a new national culture based on a return to the Bible. (Eliade: 1987:15:574)

2.8.1.4 Emergence of Jewish political parties

The second half of the 1870s saw the appearance of the Jewish Socialist movement. This

developed into socialist Zionism around the turn of the century. With immigration to Eretz Israel/Palestine these parties took root there. (Ettinger 1976:908:910:912:922)

A religious Zionist group was founded in 1902 within the World Zionist Organisation called Mizrachi.⁹⁷ Members saw themselves as guardians of religious education and public practice in Eretz Israel/Palestine. (Eliade 1987:15:575) Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook⁹⁸ settled in Jaffa in 1904. He believed that by returning to Eretz Israel/Palestine divine redemption would be hastened. (Hertzberg 1959:417) Agudat Israel was established by Orthodox German Jews in 1912 and later took root in eastern Europe (Rolef 1987:12). Ze'ev Jabotinsky, who was active in Jewish defence in pogroms in Odessa in 1903 was to found the Revisionist movement in Paris in 1925⁹⁹ (Rolef 1987:162:261).

By the time of the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 political parties had become fully developed. The main parties were to consist of those which had their roots in the Yishuv.¹⁰⁰ (Rolef 1987:246)

2.8.2 The 19th century to World War I : the Muslim people

Events in world history caused changes for the Muslim people too. British occupation in Egypt in 1882 and also in India further introduced Western ways. This led to a Sunni call for tajdid and islah. Persia also came under Western influence through the policy of the Shahs. Consequently the ulama¹⁰¹ tried to bring about a religious revival there. It was also a time which saw the emergence of Nationalism. (Hourani 1991:303:307—309; Noss 1984:542:543; Hiro 1988:148—9) The Revivalist movements were to develop and spread during this period. Nationalism too would escalate. Today they all have their part to play in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

2.8.2.1 Situation in Egypt, India, Mecca and Persia

During the rule of Muhammad Ali and his successors, Nationalism along the lines of creating a modern society continued. In 1882 Britain occupied the country to suppress the nationalist movement. This increased contact with Westerners and in some places families were speaking English instead of Arabic. The middle of the century saw the beginning of the tourism industry which gave rise to a new educated class, causing a cleavage between the generations. (Hourani 1991:282f.:303;209:306—7)

India had also had contact with the British since the late 18th century. During the period under discussion her influence in this region was still strong. (Hourani 1991:261; Noss 1984:542) Since the modern world had produced changes for the Muslim umma, they tried to make their doctrines and laws compatible with it by *tajdid* and *islah*¹⁰² (Noss 1984:542).

The Wahabi movement had reached India and this indirectly helped Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817—1898). He asserted that the Prophet, the Quran and Sunna were relevant to the modern day because Allah had created the whole world so that science could not contradict religion. He established an Anglo-Oriental college which taught Islam together with courses in Western natural and social sciences. (Noss 1984:542)

Jamal al-Din al-Afghani¹⁰³ (1839—1897), the founder of the pan-Islamic Movement, stressed the necessity of ideological and political cohesion. This would unite them against the West. He believed that Islam could be adapted to the modern world without making compromises; hence Muslims should return to Islam but also use modern science and philosophy. (Farah 1970:234; Noss 1984:542)

Muhammad Abduh (1849—1905) was an *alim* at al-Azhar University in Cairo. He was also a disciple of al-Afghani. Abduh advocated that Islam should be purified from corrupting influences and practices and that Muslim doctrines and laws should accommodate 'modernism'. These ideas resulted in the formation of the Salafiyah Movement which was a reformed traditional school headed by his disciple, Rashid Rida. (Farah 1970:229f.; Noss 1984:542; Hourani:1991:307f.)

Rida (1865—1935) was also an *alim* who defended Islam's doctrines. He showed how the Sharia could be made relevant to modern times. This included the idea of a modern Islamic State according to the Sharia and opening the 'gates' of *ijtihad*. His ideas were later to be adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood. (Enayat 1986:81:79:83; Noss 1984:542)

Muhammad Iqbal (1873—1938) was influential both in Asia and the Middle East, including Persia/Iran. At the beginning of this century he became disillusioned with the West and realised the need for a return to Islam, but with reforms. He believed that Islam should be integrated into modern politics and society, and is considered the spiritual father of modern-day Pakistan. (Esposito:1983:175)

During the last decade of the 19th century Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (d. 1902) tried to bring back the caliphate in Mecca. There was limited support but the idea did not take hold. (Goldschmidt:1988:191)

In Persia the Shia ulama tried to stop the Shah's westernising policies. One such example is the Tobacco Protest of 1891—2 which led to the Constitutional Revolution in 1906; but the ulama were unable to stop the formation of a constitution. They themselves were split into 'purists' and 'pragmatists' and the latter were divided further into moderates and radicals. In 1909 Muhammad Ali Shah abdicated in favour of his minor son and the Regent dissolved Parliament two years later. This ended the Constitutional Revolution. From 1905 to 1911 the ulama took an active part in politics, but after 1911 there was no further opportunity until the end of the 1970s. (Hiro 1988:148—50)

2.9 THE PERIOD WORLD WAR I — 1948

In order to have a clearer understanding of the modern Arab-Israeli conflict, one needs to view it in the context of world history with regard to the establishment of Mandatory territories in the Middle East.¹⁰⁴ The abolition of the Caliphate after the First World War by Mustafa Kemal had an impact¹⁰⁵ on Sunni political thought.

Then the situation in Palestine/Eretz Israel during the Mandate will be shown. Tensions in the Jewish and Arab fields¹⁰⁶ and between the two fields need to be uncovered. This was also the time of the rise of inchoate Nationalism in the Arab field.

2.9.1 Middle East history 1914—1920

In 1914 the Ottoman empire allied itself with Germany in World War I. Britain responded by communicating with Sharif Husayn of Mecca¹⁰⁷ during 1915—16, encouraging him to make jihad against the Ottomans. Since the delineation of territory promised to him in return was ambiguous, the correspondence ended indecisively. Husayn did carry out the revolt which enabled the British to conquer Jaffa and Jerusalem, and Britain allowed Faysal, the sharif's son, to occupy Damascus. (Goldschmidt 1988:195—7)

During the war the allies wanted parts of territory from the Ottoman Empire. This led to the signing of a secret agreement in May 1916, known as the *Sykes—Picot Agreement*, between Britain, France and Russia. The terms of the agreement were leaked during the Russian

Revolution of 1917.¹⁰⁸ It was now clear that the only sphere of Muslim influence without foreign rule would be the Arabian desert. (Goldschmidt (1988:197f.)

The third agreement was published. This was the *Balfour Declaration*¹⁰⁹ of November 2, 1917 in which Britain promised to help establish a national home for the Jewish People in Palestine. The Arabs maintained that this territory had been promised to them in the *Husayn—Mc Mahon* Correspondence. Moreover they constituted the majority in this territory and no one had consulted them as to whether they agreed that immigrants from other lands should settle there. Finally the declaration made no provision for non-Jewish indigenous people. All these points foster resentment among the Arabs even today. (Goldschmidt (1988:198f.)

At the San Remo Conference in 1920 Britain received the mandate for Mesopotamia,¹¹⁰ Palestine and what is now Jordan. The terms of the mandate in Palestine¹¹¹ were such that it was to be administered according to the Balfour Declaration. (Goldschmidt 1988:200; Shimoni 1987:430)

At the same time France received the mandate for the territory of present-day Syria and Lebanon. France created four cantons in this area according to the religious population in a region.¹¹² (Goldschmidt 1988:201) Modern Syria became independent in 1936 (Hourani 1991: 330f.) and Lebanon in 1943 (Goldschmidt 1988:381).

The Hijaz (west coast of the Arabian peninsula) became autonomous. Sharif Husayn tried to establish himself as Caliph of Islam, but this was not successful and in 1924 the Saudis ousted him. (Goldschmidt 1988:200—2)

In 1921 Britain ceded part of Palestine east of the Jordan River¹¹³ to Abdulla, one of Sharif Husayn's sons. This new state was called Transjordan, which was semi-autonomous. In 1946 it became the independent Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. (Goldschmidt 1988:202; Shimoni 1987:253)

Egypt obtained its independence in 1936. However Britain was allowed to maintain armed forces in the area of the Suez canal. (Hourani 1991:330)

Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon were all to play a greater or lesser direct role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. These countries have their own particular internal problems which have their roots here; some of them will be mentioned in Section 3.6f.

2.9.2 Abolition of the caliphate

After the Ottoman Empire had been defeated in World War I Mustafa Kemal (Attatürk) wished to establish a secular state in Turkey. To this end the Caliphate was abolished in November 1923 and this had an impact on Sunni Islam.¹¹⁴ (Enayat 1986:53f.)

2.9.3 The rise of the modern Islamic movement

Hasan al-Banna (1904—1949) was the son of a Hanbalite scholar, and al-Banna himself was a primary school teacher. (Hiro 1988:60; al-Abdin 1988:56) In 1928 he established the Muslim Brotherhood (Jamaat al-Ikwan al-Muslimin) as a youth club which stressed social and moral reform. It was only after the Anglo-Egyptian treaty in 1935 and the Arab revolt in Palestine/Eretz Israel against the British and the Jews in 1936—7 that the Muslim Brotherhood became a political entity. (Hiro 1988:61; Hourani 1991:348f.) The movement was not merely philosophical. It meant jihad, struggle and work (Aly & Wenner 1982:339). He believed that the whole Muslim world should be freed from foreign domination and Islamic states established according to the Sharia (al-Abdin 1988:58).

After his imprisonment by the British he founded a sub-group within al-Ikwan,¹¹⁵ known as the Special Apparatus. This was a more violent wing for jihad against the British in Egypt and the Zionists in Palestine/Eretz Israel. (Aly 1982:341; al-Abdin 1988:66) After the establishment of the State of Israel this wing assassinated the Egyptian prime minister, whom they blamed for allowing this to come about. The government's political police assassinated al-Banna on February 12, 1949 in retribution. (Aly 1982:341)

2.9.4 The rise of Arab Nationalism in Palestine/Eretz Israel

Incoherent Arab Nationalism began with the San Remo Conference¹¹⁶ (Shimoni 1987:43; Ettinger 1976:997). In the early years of the British mandate the Arab political leadership consisted of notable families. (Jankowski 1973:221; Muslih 1987:82:87).

By the third decade of this century the Muslims in Palestine/Eretz Israel were living under a colonial power, and consequently the Sharia and the ulama were no longer pertinent to government. Moreover people had been influenced by al-Raziq. (Hourani 1991:345—6)

By 1930 the mandate was solidly entrenched in Palestine/Eretz Israel. At the beginning of the

decade a wave of pan-Arab Nationalism arose in the country as well as in neighbouring Arab regions. The first resurgence took place at the beginning of 1930. The 'Green Hand Gang' operated briefly against the Jews of Safed. (Kayyali 1978:155:156)

Hajj Amin al-Husayni,¹¹⁷ the mufti of Jerusalem and head of the Supreme Muslim Council for Palestine/Eretz Israel, convened a General Islamic Congress in Jerusalem in December 1931. He emphasised the importance of Palestine/Eretz Israel to Muslims and to Islam. al-Aqsa Mosque was declared sacred. Furthermore the British policy and Zionism in Palestine/Eretz Israel were condemned. (Kayyali 1978:165—6; Jankowski 1973:222) Because of family factionalism the Nashashibi family¹¹⁸ formed the Palestine Liberal Party. This caused tensions between the two families, but initiated an awakening of political consciousness in Palestine/Eretz Israel.¹¹⁹ (Kayyali 1978:165:167)

The Istiqlal (Independence Party) was established in 1932.¹²⁰ In the same year an Arab Scout Movement was formed. The next few years saw a surge of new Arab political parties in the country. In 1933 the Islah Party and the National Bloc were established. The following year the National Defence Party emerged, and in 1935 the Palestine Arab Party. They were all against the mandate and Zionism, but their proliferation was due to selfish motives.¹²¹ (Kayyali 1978: 167—8:177—8)

Qassam, a member of Istiqlal, organised and initiated the jihad against the British and Zionists in 1935. He was killed but his heroism made him a symbol of martyrdom. Although he did not succeed he paved the way for the Palestine revolt in 1936.¹²² The aim of the Palestinian struggle was "complete Palestinian independence within the framework of Arab unity". By 1939, when the Palestine forces were weakened and exhausted, the revolt started to decline. Moreover World War II overshadowed local events. (Kayyali 1978:180—1;187;192:223)

During al-Banna's visit to Palestine/Eretz Israel in 1946 he established a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jerusalem. The Nationalists saw al-Ikhwan as an ally in their struggle, and several branches were set up all over the country. (Shadid 1988:659) In 1948 al-Banna sent three brigades of trained volunteers¹²³ from Egypt to fight in the Arab-Israeli War (Hiro 1988:63; Shadid 1988:659).

2.9.5 Situation in Palestine/Eretz Israel : Arab-Jewish tensions

During deliberations at the San Remo Conference in 1920 groups of Arabs attacked Jews in the old city of Jerusalem killing and injuring many of them.¹²⁴ Since the British army did not intervene, the Va'ad Le'umi¹²⁵ decided that it was necessary to establish an independent Jewish defence force even if it would have to operate clandestinely. (Ettinger 1976:998) This was called the Haganah¹²⁶ (Rolef 1987:136).

The following year groups of Arabs made attacks in Jaffa and murdered, among others, a prominent Jewish writer. In response, the British High Commissioner temporarily halted immigration and set up a commission of inquiry. As a result, Jewish leaders refused to carry out their duties until Winston Churchill, the Colonial Secretary, rescinded this ban. (Ettinger 1976:998)

The same year the High Commissioner reported that combining Jewish national expectations with Arab interests was possible. However "The degree to which Jewish national aspirations can be fulfilled in Palestine is conditioned by the rights of the present inhabitants."¹²⁷ (Ettinger 1976:999)

In June 1922 the Churchill White Paper mentioned that the Jewish national home should be founded "*in Palestine*", not in the country as a whole. The Colonial Secretary stated further that, at the previous Zionist Congress in Carlsbad a resolution had been adopted expressing Jewish determination to live with their Arab neighbours in harmony and mutual respect. Britain regarded all citizens as Palestinians by law. The Supreme Muslim Council had complete control of waqfs (religious endowments) and Muslim religious courts. (*The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:46:49) The Zionist Organisation accepted this White Paper but the Arab citizens did not. Furthermore in 1923 they rejected the establishment of an Arab Agency along the lines of the Jewish Agency.¹²⁸ (Ettinger 1976:999)

At the end of the decade a dispute arose over Jews praying at the Western Wall¹²⁹ and groups of Arabs attacked Jews in the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem. These uprisings spread to agricultural settlements, Tel Aviv, Haifa and Safed. The Haganah was able to end these attacks except for the town of Hebron.¹³⁰ The British appointed a commission of enquiry which found that the Arabs were responsible. However mitigating circumstances were found to be the perception that Jewish immigration posed a threat to Arab livelihood. Consequently the British

government again barred immigration to Palestine in May 1930. (Ettinger 1976:1007) Jewish leaders resigned and this led to the 'Mac Donald Letter' to Chaim Weizmann¹³¹ wherein the British government assured the Zionist leadership of intentions to fulfil the terms of the mandate (Ettinger 1976:1008; *The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:50—6).

The Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936—9) has already been mentioned (see Section 2.9.4). In 1936 the British government sent Lord Peel to investigate the situation, and its findings were published in July of the following year. It was concluded that the Arabs wanted national independence and they feared the establishment of a Jewish national home. Since the British were committed to this under the terms of the mandate, the Peel Commission recommended partition in Palestine, i.e. a Jewish State, an Arab State and a British enclave. (Ettinger 1976: 1012; *The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:56—88; Hourani 1991:332)

The Jewish leadership applauded the plan although there was opposition by the Mizrachi and some factions in the Labour Party. It was also opposed by the right-wing Revisionist Party. The Arab Higher Committee rejected partition and asked other Arab states to support them. Although the Nashashibi Party in Palestine/Eretz Israel and Emir Abdulla of Transjordan supported the plan, they could not express their sentiments openly. A pan-Arab conference¹³² met in Syria in September 1937 and planned an armed struggle and Palestinian Arabs started their revolt at the end of the month. (Ettinger 1976:1013)

Because Jews, British and even moderate Arabs were murdered, the Arab Higher Committee was banned by the administration and its members exiled. Hajj Amin escaped to Syria and then travelled to Germany. (Ettinger 1976:1014)

The British government invited representatives of the Jewish Agency, Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states to a conference in London. This was the first time that the Arab states became officially part of the Arab-Jewish conflict. Since the Arab representatives would not sit with the Jews, parallel and separate sessions took place. Neither the Jewish nor the Arab representatives accepted the British proposals. (Ettinger 1976:1025)

In August 1939 at the Geneva Zionist Congress David Ben Gurion¹³³ suggested a cessation of co-operation with the British government. Since World War II started a few days after the end of this conference, members of the Yishuv volunteered to fight with the British against Nazi Germany. In September 1940 the British Administration decided to recruit a Palestinian

infantry battalion composed of similar numbers of Jewish and Arab units. As many Arabs did not wish to join the British army there were more Jewish units. (Ettinger 1976:1016:1040)

On November 29, 1947 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution¹³⁴ to partition Palestine into a Jewish State and an Arab State, while Jerusalem was to remain an international city. The Arabs rejected this plan and a day later carried out raids on Jews. The Arab states mobilised a Liberation Army which was not prevented from entering Palestine by the British. The Arabs carried out acts of freedom fighters/terrorism against Jewish civilians. After many were killed or injured, the Haganah responded with some success and many Arabs started to flee before Jewish units arrived.¹³⁵ This exodus was intensified after the Irgun¹³⁶ had attacked Deir Yassin,¹³⁷ a village near Jerusalem. (Ettinger 1976:1056—7)

Britain withdrew from Palestine on May 14, 1948. On the same day Ben Gurion declared the State of Israel independent. The United States and Russia immediately recognised the new state, (Hourani 1991:359) de facto by the former and both de facto and de jure by the latter. (Ettinger 1976:1058)

2.9.6 Situation in Eretz Israel/Palestine : Jewish tensions

After the British had begun their rule in Palestine a secular Jewish leadership controlled the affairs of the Jewish community. In line with the terms of the mandate, religious law was given to the Chief Rabbinate and rabbinical courts. In February 1921 a Sephardic Chief Rabbi and an Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi were elected heads of the former. Since Agudat Israel refused to accept their authority its members were permitted to set up their own recognised courts. The ultra-religious groups did not accept the secular community.¹³⁸ (Ettinger 1976:1001)

Tensions between the various political parties have their roots during the 1930s. For example, at the Zionist Congress in Basle in 1931 Jabotinsky reiterated his demand for the "establishment of a state in Palestine, on both sides of the Jordan, with a Jewish majority and self-rule". The Mizrahi and General Zionist parties supported this, but the Congress did not. Consequently he walked out, and one of the Labour factions gained control of the Zionist Executive. Two years later the head of its political department was murdered in Tel Aviv, reputedly by Revisionists. Chief Rabbi A.I. Kook opposed this theory. (Ettinger 1976:1008—9)

Tensions in the secular community included matters of defence. Because Jabotinsky disagreed

with the response of the Haganah in the 1929 riots, he supported the establishment of an alternative organisation, the Irgun, and became its supreme commander.¹³⁹ Furthermore in 1940, after the Irgun had decided to stop attacking the British, dissident members founded *Lehi*.¹⁴⁰ (Rolef 1987:162:158:202) Under pressure from the British, the Haganah acted against these groups, but later ceased. The former action was a cause of much resentment in the Yishuv. (Ettinger 1976:1044f.)

2.10 THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT : 1948—1967

On May 14, 1948 Ben Gurion of the Provisional State Council proclaimed the independence of the State of Israel¹⁴¹ (*The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:125ff.). The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen invaded the newly-created state.¹⁴² They were met by Jewish defenders who had not yet had time to become organised into an army.¹⁴³ During the first half of the following year separate armistice agreements¹⁴⁴ were concluded with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Iraq never agreed to such an arrangement. (Shimoni 1987:49; Goldschmidt 1988:266:268:269; Hourani 1991:359; Ettinger 1976 1058:1060—2; Rolef 1987:151)

The armistice agreements provided Israel with 75 to 80% of Mandatory Western Palestine, while Jerusalem was divided. Egypt obtained administration of the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank of the Jordan River was annexed by King Abdulla in 1950. (Ettinger 1976:1062; Hourani 1991:360; al-Shuaibi 1979:74; Rolef 1987:30).

The second result of this war was population movement. The *Law of Return* was passed unanimously by the Knesset (Israel's parliament) in 1950 stating "Every Jew has a right to immigrate to the country". While many Arabs had remained in the country and had obtained Israeli citizenship, many others left and went to settle in other Arab states. Some had wished to return in 1949,¹⁴⁵ but this was not to be. (Rolef 1987:30:77; *The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:128; Shimoni 1987:236:50; Hourani 1991:361; Ettinger 1976:1076)

In the following years Israel tried to build up and consolidate the state, but the Arab-Israeli conflict was to continue. The Suez Canal was barred to Israeli shipping by Egypt. There were also frequent border clashes and clashes with the *Feda-iyyn*¹⁴⁶ and al-Fateh came into being.¹⁴⁷ In 1956 President Jamal Abd Nasser of Egypt ordered the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba to be blocked, which prevented Israeli ships from access to their port at Eilat. This led

to the Sinai Campaign/1956 War when the Israeli army occupied most of the Sinai peninsula and the blockade was broken. In March the following year all the territories were evacuated by Israel and the United Nations Emergency Force was stationed there. Subsequently there were tensions over water from the Jordan River. (Shimoni 1987:51-3; Rolef 1987:31-3; Ettinger 1976:1080)

In 1966-7 Egypt concluded military pacts with her brethren Arab states. They all began concentrating troops along Israel's borders, calling for jihad against Israel. On May 16, 1967 Nasser expelled the UN forces and six days later renewed the blockade of the Straits of Tiran. Western powers remained passive. All these measures led to Israel's pre-emptive strike on June 6, 1967. (Ettinger 1976:1082f.; Shimoni 1987:53f.; Rolef 1987:33) Israel sent a message to King Husayn of Jordan via the UN to stay out of the war. He chose otherwise. (Rolef 1987:279)

2.10.1 Arab Nationalism : 1948 —1967

During the first two decades of the period under discussion the Arab states surrounding Israel were undergoing social and political change. Egypt wanted the British military presence to leave, and in 1952 Nasser took power from the monarchy.¹⁴⁸ Four years later the British and French played a role in Egypt in the 1956 War/Sinai Campaign. In Syria there were coups and counter-coups.¹⁴⁹ Lebanon was prosperous, but a civil war broke out in this country in 1958.¹⁵⁰ King Abdulla of Jordan was assassinated because of his secret links with Israel. His son and then grandson, King Husayn, ruled the country,¹⁵¹ according citizenship to people who had been Palestinians. (Cobban 1990:21)

In October 1948 Arab Palestinians decided to form a Palestinian government at the Gaza conference. This was recognised by the Arab states and the Arab League but opposed by Jordan. She annexed the West Bank of the Jordan River in April 1950. Consequently the first attempt to create an independent state of Palestine had not materialised.¹⁵² (al-Shuaibi 1979: 71:74:77)

The year 1958 saw the formation of the United Arab Republic with Egypt and Syria. In the same month there was an 'Arab Union' (al-Ittihad al-Arabi) between Jordan and Iraq.¹⁵³ (Shimoni 1987:38)

After the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 1957 the journal *Filastinuna*¹⁵⁴ started to

appear. It advocated that Palestinians should themselves be responsible for their struggle against Israel. Its fourth issue suggested a homeland, and subsequently it called for liberation. Yasir Arafat¹⁵⁵ was one of the co-founders of al-Fateh¹⁵⁶ in 1958. This group believed that a Palestinian entity should be built from a fundamental level by Palestinians themselves. (al-Shuaibi 1979:80f.:82:79; Shimoni 1987:88; Cobban 1990:28)

The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was established by Ahmad Shuqairy in February 1964 in (East) Jerusalem. This movement was endorsed by Palestinians, but Hajj Amin severely criticised it as a conspiracy of colonialism and Zionism meant to destroy the Palestinian cause. Later Arab countries accepted the PLO as a *fait accompli*. The Palestinian National Charter set forth twenty-nine clauses on May 28, 1964. The aim of the organisation was sole representation of the Palestinians. The same year a military wing was established. (al-Shuaibi 1980a:52—4; Cobban 1990:31:30:32)

At this stage Fateh was separate from the PLO and was concerned with armed actions against Israel. These together with the formation of the PLO were to play a role in the development of Palestinian Nationalism after the 1967/Six-Day War. (al-Shuaibi 1980a:54; Cobban 1990:34)

2.10.2 The Muslim Revivalist movement : 1948—1967

During this period one must distinguish between the West Bank under the Hashemite regime and Gaza, which was administered by Egypt. The two authorities had a different impact on Arab political organisations in these territories.

The policy towards al-Ikhwan in Gaza was the same as in Egypt. From 1949 till 1952 the Muslim Brotherhood operated clandestinely because they were banned. From 1952 to 1954 they had a fairly close relationship with the authorities. In 1954 they were banned again after their colleagues' attempt to assassinate President Nasser. During the 1956 war al-Ikhwan favoured an armed struggle against the occupation. By the late 1950s they were banned again. As a result, by the mid sixties there were very few members of the Brotherhood in Gaza. (Shadid 1988:659—60)

In the West Bank/Judea and Samaria the situation was different. In 1952 former members of the Brotherhood formed al-Tahrir which advocated the establishment of an Islamic state. (Cohen 1981:194:232) For this reason the Hashemite regime outlawed the party and it

operated clandestinely. (Sahliyah 1989:89)

In contrast to al-Tahrir, al-Ikhwan was not a political party, but an organisation which supported King Husayn and his government, and was allowed to function openly (Cohen 1981: 251:130:133; Shadid 1988:660—3). In April 1957 political parties were banned in Jordan, but the Brotherhood was allowed to function (Cohen 1981:1—2; Shadid 1988:661).

2.11 THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 1967—1982

The UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 called for the establishment of a "just and lasting peace in the Middle East". The resolution called for, among other things, "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories of recent conflict:" and "For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem:" and "... guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area ..." (*The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:365)

At the Khartoum conference in September 1967 Arab heads of state refused to negotiate with Israel or recognise Israeli conquests (Hourani 1991:414f.). However Egypt and Jordan did accept the resolution, as did Israel; but as it amounted to de facto recognition of Israel, Syria only agreed to abide by it after 1973. However there were various interpretations of its meaning.¹⁵⁷ (Goldschmidt 1988:308—9)

The 1967/Six-Day War was a watershed in the Arab-Israeli conflict. East Jerusalem,¹⁵⁸ the West Bank/Judea and Samaria¹⁵⁹ and the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula were now under Israeli occupation/administration. The conflict became ethnic between the Israelis and the Palestinians, in addition to the inter-state conflict between Israel and the Arab states. (Battah & Lukacs 1988:2:1; Goldschmidt 1988:306) The political vacuum which had occurred in the West Bank/Judea and Samaria and Gaza was filled by the PLO which resorted to an armed struggle and became increasingly important in Palestinian life¹⁶⁰ (al-Shuaibi 1980a: 67:55).

During the period under discussion there were several military engagements. In 1969—70 the War of Attrition was continued between Egypt and Israel. In the October 1973/Yom Kippur War,¹⁶¹ Egypt¹⁶² and Syria drew Israel into another war, and in 1982 Israeli forces entered Lebanon. (Battah 1988:2)

On the other hand Israel and her neighbours signed several agreements: Sinai I in 1974 and

Sinai II in 1975, the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.¹⁶³ The latter fell short of the Palestinian demands for self-determination. (Battah 1988:2) Camp David and the subsequent peace treaty was the result of President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 (Shimoni 1987:42).

Throughout this period there were guerilla/terrorist activities and reprisals. There was also the expulsion of Arabs responsible for these activities by the Israeli authorities, as well as arrests and detentions. (al-Shuaibi 1980b:101:103; Livingstone 1990:82) The March 1978 attack on civilians in a bus in Israel led to the Litani Operation in Lebanon (Livingstone 1990:32; Rolef 1987:205).

In June 1981 the Israeli air-force destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor, only to be condemned world-wide. December 1981 saw the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights. (Goldschmidt 1988:363)

2.11.1 Palestinian Nationalism : 1967—1982

Between 1967 and 1973 some Arab people wished for a stable political order, while others opted for revolution.¹⁶⁴ From 1973 to 1977 there was quasi-state development and between 1977 and 1982 the PLO no longer depended on the Arab states. (Aruri 1988:73f.; Abraham 1984:397:406)

There was no real political leadership during the first few years, but after Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem in 1968 the Higher Islamic Council and National Guidance Committee were formed (Taraki 1991:57; Cobban 1990:170). The Arab states were interested in retrieving the lost territories and the people of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria were content to return to Jordanian rule. Consequently when Israeli authorities tried to give these Arabs some kind of self-administration, there was opposition. (al-Shuaibi 1980a:56:58:64—6; Sahliyah 1988:88) On the other hand the PLO was becoming more important and blocked any emergence of local political leadership (al-Shuaibi 1980a:55:60; Sahliyah 1988:83:85).

Between 1967 and 1969 a number of Palestinian groups was formed.¹⁶⁵ They were all members of the PLO. (Livingstone 1990:72ff.; Cobban 1990:139:167; Hudson 1969:298—9) The Palestine National Council (PNC) met in Cairo in July 1968 and amended the Palestinian National Covenant¹⁶⁶ in which seven new articles were included (Cobban 1990:43—4).

In 1969 Shukairy was ousted and Yasir Arafat of Fateh was elected chairman of the PLO. There were ideological and tactical tensions in the organisation. Nevertheless Fateh and the PLO were committed to the liberation of Palestine and to carrying out guerilla/terrorist operations against the IDF and the Israeli administration.¹⁶⁷ (Hudson 1969:299; Abraham 1984:401)

By 1970 the PLO in Jordan had tried to make a state within a state. As this was a threat to Jordanian sovereignty it led to civil war. Finally the PLO were expelled and they went to Syria and Lebanon. (al-Shuaibi 1980a:69—70; Cobban 1990:49; Livingstone 1990:81f.)

In 1972 many colleges and universities in the West Bank/Judea and Samaria set up the community work programme where students are obliged to complete thirty hours per year of community work. University students became active in politics on the campuses. (Taraki 1991:59:61; Baramki 1987:17)

The Palestine National Front (PNF)¹⁶⁸ was established by the people in the Territories in August 1973. The Palestine National Council endorsed this group, and thus commenced political co-operation between the local Palestinians and the PLO leadership living abroad. (Taraki 1991:58) After the October/Yom Kippur War there was a surge of Nationalism in the Territories.¹⁶⁹ After the disengagement agreements the PLO had to decide on their position and formulate a policy. This included the question of a Palestinian state. (al-Shuaibi 1980b:115:104; Gresh 1988:131)

At the PNC meeting in June 1974 the PLO agreed that there should be a struggle "to liberate Palestinian land¹⁷⁰ and establish the people's national, independent and fighting sovereignty on every part of Palestinian land to be liberated." (Taraki 1991:58) Furthermore UN Resolution 242 was rejected again and the main goal was the establishment of a Palestinian authority (al-Shuaibi 1980b:108). At the Rabat conference in October all the Arab countries recognised the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people;¹⁷¹ Jordan finally had to accept this. (al-Shuaibi 1980b:115:100:104; Aruri 1988:74) In December Yasir Arafat addressed the United Nations and the PLO was granted observer status in this organisation.¹⁷² A few days later he was received in Moscow by Soviet leaders. (al-Shuaibi 1980b:115; Aruri 1988:76; Cobban 1990:60:62—3)

After the PLO had gained world recognition the leadership publicly condemned guerilla/

terrorist activities. On the other hand Arafat spoke of martyrdom when Palestinians were killed on a mission. (Livingstone 1990:101)

The Israeli authorities sponsored municipal elections in the Territories in 1976. The PLO gained complete control of the Hebron, Nablus, Ramalla and Tulkarm municipalities. (al-Shuaibi 1980b:122:123; Aruri 1988:76) Later the same year the Riyadh Arab mini-summit endorsed the goal of an independent Palestinian State.¹⁷³ A few months later the PLO agreed on a national programme including a Palestinian State. (al-Shuaibi 1980b:100:124)

From 1977 to 1982 the Arab states were preoccupied with their own affairs. Since the Camp David Accords did not make provision for the Palestinians, the PNC condemned this treaty and called for a general strike. (Cobban 1990:99:100:103; Aruri 1988:74)

The Iranian revolution in 1979 was applauded by the Palestinians.¹⁷⁴ Ayatolla Khomeini invited Yasir Arafat to Teheran where he established a PLO mission in the former offices of the Israeli mission. (Cobban 1990:104; Livingstone 1990:154)

At the beginning of the last decade Palestinian Nationalism had become an integral part of life in the Territories. This was helped by, among other things, the local newspapers. (Taraki 1991: 62:63)

After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 the PLO were forced to leave that country and Arafat went to Tunisia. When he wished to return to Lebanon the following year the Syrians used their influence against this move. (Livingstone 1990:83f.)

2.11.2 The Muslim Revivalist movement : 1967—1982

The Islamic Revivalist movement¹⁷⁵ in the Territories is divided into various groups. The Muslim Brotherhood are the largest and most influential faction. The pro-Khomeini Liberation group¹⁷⁶ is smaller. There is also a pro-Khomeini independent group and a pro-Fateh Islamic group.¹⁷⁷ (Lesch & Tessler 1987:238) The Islamic Movement in Gaza is stronger and more militant. Since the 1967/Six-Day War the mosques in the Gaza Strip have doubled in number and the university is an Islamic institution. (Talhami 1988:184f.)

During the first decade of occupation/administration, al-Ikhwan did not participate in armed resistance. After 1976, and especially after the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Brotherhood re-

emerged as a political force.¹⁷⁸ This group used mosques, universities and clubs to oppose the PLO and the State of Israel. (Shadid 1988:662; Legrain 1991:175f.)

In Lebanon the Amal and Hizballah groups are of relevance here.¹⁷⁹ Amal, an acronym for Afwaj al-Muqa Wama al-Lubnaniyya (Groups of the Lebanese Resistance) was founded in 1974 by Imam Musa al Sadr. After his disappearance in Libya in 1987 Nabih Berri assumed leadership.¹⁸⁰ The latter had links with Syria.¹⁸¹ Amal is reformist but anti-Zionist. (Deeb 1988:683:685:686:687:692:697) Hizballah (Party of God) was established in Lebanon in 1982. Its leader is Sheikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. Three years later he became an ayatollah. The ideology of this group is similar to Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution, and there are links with Iran.¹⁸²

The Egyptian parliamentary elections in April 1978 showed the influence of the Islamic Revivalist Movement today. The Muslim Brotherhood formed an alliance with the Liberals and Socialist Labour Party. Their campaign slogan was "Islam — that is the solution". The Brotherhood-led alliance received 17% of the vote which gave them 60 parliamentary seats; therefore they were able to displace the main opposition party. Since the Brotherhood retained 36 seats, they planned to demand application of the Sharia. However they were in the minority. (Hiro 1988:85—6)

In September 1981 President Sadat of Egypt ordered members of the Islamic Movement to be imprisoned for their open criticism of the peace treaty with Israel. A month later he was assassinated at a national military parade by a member of the Jihad group (Munazzamat al-Jihad).¹⁸³ (Hiro 1988:78)

2.11.3 Unrest in the Territories : 1967—1982

Unrest in the Territories started after the 1967/Six-Day War mainly by youths and students, although adults also took part in civil disobedience. The 1967—68 school year began two months late. After Arafat's address at the UN and the burning of the al-Aqsa mosque and again after the Lebanese war in 1982 there were upsurges of violence. Strategies, such as general strikes, demonstrations, stone-throwing and burning of tyres, were used. (Shalev 1991: 56f.:58:60)

The military government tried to prevent unrest occurring by maintaining a dialogue with local

leaders, issuing warnings to public figures and notables, making a show of military presence on sensitive anniversaries, and making pre-emptive arrests. In spite of this, when disturbances occurred, curfews and closure of educational facilities were imposed and if these measures failed, people were deported. (Shalev 1991:60—2)

2.11.3.1 Universities in the Territories since 1967

After 1967 there was a rapid expansion of higher education in the Territories. This was due to difficulties for students going abroad. Two decades later the Territories had six universities with a combined enrolment of about 16000 students. These are Birzeit, Bethlehem, al-Najah, Hebron, Gaza Islamic and Jerusalem universities. Several thousand more are enrolled in smaller colleges and polytechnic institutes such as the nursing college at Ramallah and the Sharia college¹⁸⁴ near Beit Hanina. (Baramki 1987:13)

Nationalist students have the majority on most student councils, but students from the Islamic Movement have made significant gains in recent years. There have been tensions between the two.¹⁸⁵

Universities are also the place of political demonstrations and unrest (Shalev 1991:56:61). There has been censorship of books and material, closures and deportations of student leaders by the Israeli military authorities. Some students have also been killed and wounded. (Baramki 1987:18—19)

2.11.4 New Israeli Nationalist movements : 1967—1982

The *Land of Israel Movement* (Hatnu'ah Lema'an Eretz Israel Hashlemah) came into being in 1967. A group of intellectuals wanted Israel to retain all the captured territories¹⁸⁶ and advocated urban and agricultural settlement under Israeli law therein. Members were drawn from the Zionist Labour Party although there were people with Revisionist and religious orientations. When the governing Labour Party decided on territorial compromise in 1973 some members of the Land of Israel Movement formed an independent faction. After the establishment of Gush Emunim and, in 1979, Tehiya (a political party), the Land of Israel Movement began to decline but intellectuals still try to use their influence when necessary. (Rolef 1987:187—8; Isaac 1976:45:60:61:72:49)

The *Peace Movement* developed concurrently with the Land of Israel Movement. Adherents

saw the Six-Day War/1967 War as an opportunity to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict and put an end to wars. Leadership of this political thought came mainly from Mapam,¹⁸⁷ Israeli academe and the Ultra-orthodox Aguda political party. Ideological arguments were both secular and religious.¹⁸⁸ Moreover it was believed that the conflict had its roots in Jewish Nationalism and Palestinian Nationalism, where each wanted its own homeland in the same territory. This was the opposite view to the Land of Israel Movement which saw the conflict in terms of Jewish Nationalism and Arab Nationalism where the Palestinian people played a minor role. (Isaac 1976:73:74:78:81:88:89f.)

The *Kach* group has its origins in the Jewish Defence League in the United States. After its leader Rabbi Meir Kahane immigrated to Israel, he established Kach as a political party to contest a seat in the Knesset elections. He failed to achieve this in 1973 or in 1977 but was successful in 1984. (Rolef 1987:174) This party was considered politically further to the right of Gush Emunim. In 1972 leaflets were dropped over Hebron calling for a show trial of the town's mayor for his part in the 1929 massacre. When Kahane attempted to enter the town he was prevented from doing so. In 1982 when the Rafiah salient was to be returned to Egypt, he and his followers entered an underground security shelter and threatened to commit suicide. This episode was recorded by the world media. (Sprinzak 1985a:16:15:19:18:20) Kach's ideology is evolved from a selective religious interpretation with a marked Revisionist influence¹⁸⁹ (Sprinzak 1985b:3). In 1972 Kahane encouraged Arab emigration with a promise of full compensation for property (Sprinzak 1985a:18).

Gush Emunim (Bloc of Faithful) was founded in 1974. Two years later about 20 000 Israelis took part in a march organised by them through Samaria/West Bank north of Jerusalem. (Avruch 1978/9:207; Schnall 1977:149; 1987:171; Aviad 1984:205) Initially this group was affiliated to the National Religious Party (NRP) but the split was above party politics. Its aim was to establish Jewish settlements (*hitnahluyot*) beyond the areas permitted by the Labour Government.¹⁹⁰ The founding of each new settlement was the integration of more land of Eretz Israel/Palestine towards a Third Jewish Commonwealth.¹⁹¹ (Avruch 1988/9:202:207; Schnall 1977:153) Until the rise of the Likud-led coalition government in 1977 Gush Emunim organised civil protests against the interim agreements with the Arab states. There was also propagation of the religious, historical and strategic importance of Judea and Samaria/West Bank. There were marches, marathons and candle-lighting ceremonies. This group also established settlements, usually near large Arab towns, for example Kiryat Arba near Hebron.

(Schnall 1987:171)

When Begin became Prime Minister in 1977 his first post-election speech was made at Kaddum, a Gush Emunim settlement (Avruch 1978/9:208; Aviad 1984:206). In 1982 when the government-initiated settlement in the Rafiah salient was to be returned to Egypt, members of Gush Emunim resisted withdrawal. Three months later saw the war in Lebanon, and some members saw this territory as the land of Asher and Naphtali in the Bible. (Aviad 1984:202:216; Schnall 1987:175) Gush Emunim has tried to modernise traditional Zionist ideology, and show a response to the anti-Zionist or non-Zionist Ultra-orthodox (Avruch 1978/9:214; Aviad 1984:2001). Before the impact of this group, the territories captured in the Six-Day War/1967 War were seen as bargaining-chips towards a negotiated settlement with the Arab states. Gush Emunim has now influenced the NRP to move progressively to the right politically, and the former has become part of mainstream Israeli society. Some of its members belong to the Tehiya political party which was founded in 1980.¹⁹² (Schnall 1987:188:187:191:189)

Shalom Achshav (Peace Now) was established at the beginning of 1978. Three hundred and fifty reserve army officers sent a letter to Prime Minister Begin asking him to adopt a policy towards peace. Since the signing of the peace treaty with Egypt members of this group have held mass demonstrations for peace. *Shalom Achshav* is not a political party nor is it a pacifist movement. It considers itself patriotic although the political right has accused it of treason. Members have their roots in the Ashkenazi section of the population and have university degrees. The group's ideology is based on five basic guidelines for a negotiated peace.¹⁹³ Since members support the political Left, they tend to vote for the Alignment, Shinui and Civil Rights Movement (Ratz) political parties.¹⁹⁴ (Rolef 1987:249)

2.11.5 Israel's Knesset elections : 1977 and 1981

After the Zionist centre had been transferred from the diaspora to Eretz Israel/Palestine in 1935, a Labour-orientated elite had predominated, and since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 Labour-led coalitions had ruled. The Israeli population blamed them for the Yom Kippur/October 1973 War and consequently the Labour Alignment lost its right to form the ruling coalition. The Sephardim saw themselves discriminated against by the Ashkenazi elite and voted for the Likud. This brought Menachem Begin and the Likud Party to power in 1977 and he was able to form a coalition with the NRP¹⁹⁵ and Agudat Israel.¹⁹⁶ (Sandler 1989/90:19:20:17:21:22)

In the 1981 elections the Likud Party increased its number of Knesset seats in spite of the newly-formed Tehiya Party. The NRP had its mandates reduced to half. This was due to Tehiya, who won three parliamentary seats, and also a new Sephardic religious party (Tami). The coalition¹⁹⁷ consisted of Likud, Agudat Israel, Tehiya, Tami and the NRP. On the other hand the Labour Alignment did increase its mandates, but at the expense of a left-wing party which did not contest this election. Therefore coalitions of statist parties were now displaced by religious, nationalist and ethnic political parties. (Sandler 1989/90:19)

2.12 THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT : 1982—1987

April 1982 saw Israel's withdrawal from Sinai¹⁹⁸ except for an area along the Gulf of Aqaba called Taba (Goldschmidt 1988:361). This was subsequently returned to Egypt.

From Israel's point of view the invasion of Lebanon/Mifsa Shlom Hagalil (Operation Peace for Galilee) in 1982 was fought to destroy PLO bases in southern Lebanon because Katysha rockets had been fired at Israeli towns in the Galilee, and there had been numerous terrorist/guerilla infiltrations into Israel from Lebanon.¹⁹⁹ Three days into the operation it was decided to continue further north, and the Israeli army finally reached Beirut.²⁰⁰ (Rolef 1987:195:196) From the Muslim-Arab Nationalist perspective the war was waged over control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria and also the Gaza Strip, where Israel could force its Autonomy plan on the Palestinians without interference from the PLO.²⁰¹ (Battah 1988:2f.; Hourani 1991:431; Abraham 1984:416; Peretz 1990:19)

Initially the IDF were welcomed by Shia Muslims in the south because they thought that the Israelis would clear their area of the PLO and perhaps weaken the Lebanese Sunni Muslims. It was ultimately Amal and the Hizballah who were largely responsible for Israel's withdrawal in June 1985. (Goldschmidt 1988:367:368)

2.12.1 Palestinian Nationalism 1982—1987

After the 1982 War/Mifsa Shlom Hagalil the PLO was dispersed to nine Arab states and Arafat had to travel from Tunis to Arab capitals (Gresh 1988:227). This organisation was now dependent on the Arab states. During the war no high-ranking PLO member had been killed although Israel had lost two generals. (Abraham 1984:424:418)

Arafat was unable to confirm an agreement with King Husayn of Jordan in 1983 due to conflict

between the PLO executive committee and the Fateh central committee.²⁰² Two years later the former did not accept American conditions for dialogue due to similar reasons.²⁰³ (Sayigh 1989:247; Gresh 1988:227)

The Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF) was established in March 1985 in Damascus. Groups who joined included the PFLP, PFLP-GC, Abu Musa's Fateh, Saiqa and the Palestinian Struggle Front (PSF). Subsequently they were joined by Abu Nidal's group. The PNSF refused to recognise Israel and rejected any political solution. Members advocated a higher degree of armed struggle and they condemned Jordan and Egypt. The DFLP refused to join this new faction although they were critical of Arafat. (Gresh 1988:240)

At this stage there were three factions in the PLO : Fateh and its allies, the PNSF and the DFLP, but no side wished to leave the PLO officially in case of external threat. This separation did come about when the Shia Amal group in Lebanon besieged three Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. (Gresh 1988:240)

In order to convene the 18th session of the PNC in Algeria in April 1987 Arafat had to make concessions. At this meeting UN Resolutions 242 and 338 were rejected and in addition Resolution 181. (Gresh 1988:242; Sayigh 1989:247)

When Arafat's leadership was threatened, the people in the Territories united and supported him, but in the main they too were divided in their backing for Fateh, the anti-Fateh faction, PFLP and DFLP. There was also support for the Communist Party which was against Arafat and advocated a symbiosis between a Palestinian state and Israel. In addition there was a resurgence of support for Islamic groups, especially in Gaza, which led to tensions between the Secularists and the religious Muslims. (Peretz 1990:24)

Within the Territories, factors such as deportation, acquisition of land for settlements, water-supply, stagnation of industrial development, economics and low-paid work inside Israel contributed to civil resistance. Moreover the occupation/administration authorities' iron fist policy was considered offensive. (Peretz 1990:16:9:10:29:13:11; Farsoun & Landis 1991:22:23:24: 21) Palestinian flags or national colours were displayed and there were calls for independence with the chant of slogans (Peretz 1990:7).

The Haram/Temple Mount²⁰⁴ provided another point of tension. Militant Jewish Nationalists

demanded that this area should be under Jewish control in order to rebuild the Temple and they wanted the government restrictions removed so that Jews could pray there. In 1984 they tried to place explosives at the two mosques, but this was foiled. The attempt at sacrilege sparked off riots, particularly among religious Muslims. In 1986/7 the Faithful of the Temple Mount sued the Israeli authorities for allowing Muslims illegal construction in the area. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and head of the waqf asserted that this area was under the jurisdiction of the Muslim waqf establishment. (Peretz 1990:21f.:29)

Yet another factor which added to tensions between Palestinians and the Israelis also contributed to Palestinian Nationalism in the Territories. In mid-1987 a poll conducted for the Hebrew newspaper *Ma'ariv* showed that two-thirds of the Jewish population thought that Israel should annex Judea and Samaria/West Bank.²⁰⁵ In November, shortly before the start of the Intifada,²⁰⁶ another agency conducted a poll among Israeli teenagers. Results indicated that more than 40% of the respondents wished "to reduce the rights of Israeli Arab citizens".²⁰⁷ By way of contrast, the Labour Party condemned the idea of 'transfer', and 16 high-school students wrote a letter to the Minister of Defence requesting that they be exempted from military service in the Territories.²⁰⁸ (Peretz 1990:301)

There was by now a new generation of Palestinians who had only known Israeli occupation/administration. Throughout the years they had grown to hate the Israelis; therefore a new generation of political activists emerged, many stemming from the refugee camps. By 1987 there was *sumud muqawin*.²⁰⁹ Palestinians in the Territories had grown to be more independent of the PLO abroad and more active as leaders. They now started making their own decisions. Since the Arab League summit in November 1988 had placed the Palestinian problem on a back burner, those in the Territories felt "shame for being an Arab, but pride at being Palestinian." (Peretz 1990:23:26:33:34:19)

All the events described above were a threat to dispossession, dispersion and loss of identity²¹⁰ (Farsoun 1991:29). The incident which started the Intifada was a fatal traffic accident in the Gaza Strip (Schiff & Ya'ari 1990:17).

2.12.2 The Muslim Revivalist movement : 1982—1987

The Islamic Jihad group had become active in the Gaza Strip by September 1978. Several of their members had been imprisoned for violence against the Israelis and the secular

Palestinians. (Peretz 1990:34)

2.12.2.1 Islam in the 1980s

Islam is what Muslims in the modern era make of this religion. Some Muslims think that the umma should return to the true Path of Islam as taught by the Prophet. Others believe that only the Quran should give guidelines for life on this earth.²¹¹ Still other Muslims believe that the whole inherited tradition that has developed over the years should be followed, and changes made in a responsible and cautious way.²¹² (Hourani 1991:457)

In Syria the role of the Muslim Brotherhood is different from Egypt because this Sunni Islamic group opposed the Syrian Alawi umma. The revolution in Iran came about as a result of circumstances specific to Iran, whereas the Shia ulama in Iraq are unable to make their influence felt on their government. (Hourani 1991:457-8)

2.12.3 Israel's Knesset elections : 1984

The Knesset elections in 1984 produced a stalemate. The Likud garnered 41 seats and the Labour Alignment 44. This led to a national unity government with rotation between the two leaders for premiership. (Sandler 1989/90:20)

This election saw the emergence of a new religious political party, Shas²¹³ (the Sephardic Torah Guardians), who managed to win four seats. (Sandler 1989/90:20) Another Zionist party, Morasha,²¹⁴ won two seats. Tehiya also increased its mandate, and Meir Kahane's Kach party managed to achieve one mandate. Voters were moving to the political right, and in spite of the fact that the Likud were numerically less than the Labour Alignment, the smaller parties preferred a coalition with the Likud.²¹⁵ (Sandler (1989/90:20)

2.13 THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND INTERNAL TENSIONS : FROM 1987

Only those aspects of the intricate history of the Intifada, namely the part played by the Revivalist and Nationalist Movements during this period, will be mentioned here. The internal tensions in the Muslim-Arab and Jewish-Israeli spheres will be shown. Two other events which need to be placed in their time-frames are the Gulf War — Operation Desert Storm and the Madrid peace conference. The Intifada took the Israeli authorities by surprise. Because neither the army nor the government made a correct evaluation of the situation, it was allowed to

escalate. (Shiff 1990:31:33; Shalev 1991:34ff.)

Both the Revivalist and Nationalist Movements claimed responsibility. Both put out *bayanat* (leaflets) which to this day instruct the population in the Territories how to act and react. (Taraki 1989:30) Over the years the Intifada has waxed and waned. The Shabiba, Palestinian youth, began by throwing rocks, then they used Molotov cocktails²¹⁶ and in recent years live ammunition. Arabs suspected of collaborating with the Israeli authorities have been summarily tortured and put to death.²¹⁷

The Israeli response to the Intifada has been the imposition of curfews, the use of anti-riot weapons and occasionally live ammunition. Other measures have included demolition of houses and the closure of schools. (Shalev 1991:122:111ff.:117ff.) On the other hand, in January 1988, 161 IDF reserve soldiers held a press conference in Jerusalem where they declared that they would "refuse to take part in the repression of the insurrection and revolt in the occupied territories", demanding a political solution. (Peretz 1990:231)

During the year 1991 the prominent Palestinian leaders in the Territories called for a re-assessment of the Intifada.²¹⁸ Others have suggested that the violent nature of the uprising may alienate Israelis who want peace,²¹⁹ while still others feel that the Palestinian intelligentsia should take over the leadership, since they understand how to deal with Israeli democracy.²²⁰

During the Gulf War/Operation Desert Storm 1990/91 a new kind of inter-state warfare was waged against Israel in that the Iraqi army fired Scud missiles at its civilian population.²²¹ Since the PLO had supported Saddam Husayn in this war (Indyk 1991:30), Palestinians in the Territories danced on the roof-tops as the missiles landed on Tel Aviv.²²²

At the end of Operation Desert Storm, the United States Secretary of State, James Baker, embarked on intensive diplomatic missions to the Arab front-line confrontation states, Israel and the Palestinians in the Territories.²²³ This eventually resulted in the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991,²²⁴ which was the start of on-going negotiations.²²⁵

2.13.1 The Islamic Revivalist movement : from 1987

Because of al-Ikhwan's objective of reforming Muslim society before confronting the Israelis, the Muslim Brotherhood were not equipped for physical struggle at the beginning of the

Intifada. On the other hand Jihad is a military organisation and was prepared to use violence. (Satloff 1989:396) A group called Hamas²²⁶ arose in Gaza at the beginning of the Intifada and spread to the West Bank/Judea and Samaria. Hamas is an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (the Islamic Resistance Movement) and is considered a wing of the Brotherhood. (Taraki 1989:30)

In August 1988 this group published its political philosophy in a 40-page Covenant called the Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement, which contains 36 articles²²⁷ (Taraki 1989:30). It calls for expunging the Zionists from Muslim territory (Satloff 1989:397).

Other Revivalist groups which are active in the Territories are the Islamic Jihad, al-Ikhwan and the Islamised Fateh (Satloff 1989:393:396). These groups have already been mentioned (see Sections 2.11.2 and 2.12.2).

In 1979 the Muslim Brotherhood started propagation of their ideology among the Israeli Arabs inside the Green Line. Growth was gradual, but has accelerated in the past few years. (Shadid 1988:676) Umm el-Fahm, the second-largest Arab town in Israel, has a population of 27 000. In the municipal elections in February 1989 an Islamic party received 11 seats in the 15-seat town council.²²⁸ Results of a poll conducted in 1990 showed that an Islamic bloc could win at least two Knesset seats. (Wright 1991:26)

In Jordan's national elections in November 1989 al-Ikhwan and independent Islamic candidates received 34 of the 80 seats (Wright 1991:25). The Muslim Brotherhood, which holds 22 seats, oppose the peace process.²²⁹ One of their members is the Speaker in the parliament and has recently won a second term for this position.²³⁰

In the Territories there have been violent clashes between Fateh and Hamas. When the PLO offered the Revivalist group seats in the PNC, the latter demanded 40% of the seats, and negotiations came to an end.²³¹

Three members of the Islamic Jihad group tried to enter Israel from Lebanon a day before the Madrid Peace Conference. Two were killed and the third, who was captured, said that they had been told to kill adults only, in an attempt to upset the talks. He is reported to have said, "Our mission was to die for the holy war. Those killed in liberating the land of Palestine go straight to heaven."²³² Hamas supporters threw stones at Faisal al-Husayni, the leader of the advisory

group to the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks,²³³ when he addressed a meeting in Tulkarem on December 30.

2.13.2 Palestinian Nationalism : from 1987

When the Israeli authorities imposed curfews at the beginning of the Intifada, committees were set up in the Territories. They issued *bayanat* (leaflets) to advise people how to deal with this new situation. From these groups the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) emerged. It was only later that the PLO leadership abroad became co-equal partners. (Peretz 1990:88f.)

One of the first *bayanat* ordered Palestinian flags to be hoisted from minarets, churches, rooftops and electricity poles (Shiff 1990:193). Subsequently a new version of the Palestinian national anthem was written by imprisoned members. It is called *Biladi Biladi — My Country, My Country*. (Peretz 1990:115) In August 1988 leaders in the Territories urged the PLO leadership in Tunis to declare the state of Palestine and form a government in exile. They also started pressing for PLO recognition of the State of Israel, but when this was not forthcoming, Faisal al-Husayni, one of the leaders in Jerusalem, drafted a plan for a new Palestinian State.²³⁴

In January 1988 the PLO Central Committee held an extra-ordinary session in Baghdad, devoted mainly to the Intifada.²³⁵ The statement closed with "We promise the martyrs' souls that we will continue along the revolutionary path until liberation and victory. Revolution until victory." (Documents 1988:181:184)

The PLO leadership abroad now had to make a decision. A trial balloon was floated with regard to Resolutions 242 and 338.²³⁶ (Peretz 1990:111f.) There were also differences in opinion among Arafat, Habash and Hawatmeh with regard to a Palestinian state (Shiff 1990:283). Finally at an extra-ordinary 19th session of the PNC in Algiers, Palestinian independence was declared on November 15, 1988.²³⁷ (Documents 1989:213ff.; Sayigh 1989:247) On December 14, the administration of the United States agreed to a dialogue with the PLO and on the same day 150 member states of the UN, including all the EEC countries, "welcomed" the PNC decision and called for an international peace conference which would include the PLO. The declaration of Palestine was recognised by 104 members, in a separate vote. The PLO observer delegation was now changed to that of the *State of Palestine*. In January one of its members

addressed the Security Council "on terms normally reserved for member countries." (Sayigh 1989:247:269)

Thereafter an American Jewish delegation met with Arafat in Sweden. He assured them that the PLO would recognise Resolutions 242 and 338 and therefore the State of Israel. Furthermore freedom fighter/terrorist activities would stop. (Peretz 1990:179:230)

In the Territories the Declaration of Independence resulted in the formation of a "Popular Army". When the Intifada waned the Shabiba pressed for the use of explosives and other arms. (Shiff 1990:286:287) The reaction of Hamas was to issue *bayanat* condemning any recognition of Israel (Shiff 1990:287:285). However this Revivalist group declared loyalty to the PLO, and the Islamic Jihad co-ordinated with the PLO-led UNLU (Sayigh 1989:267).

2.13.3 Israel's Knesset elections : 1988

The year 1988 saw a resurgence of the religious political parties.²³⁸ They were able to garner 18 seats in this election, which was six more than in the previous Knesset.²³⁹ The NRP remained stable but Agudat Israel nearly tripled its strength. A new Ultra-orthodox party, Degel Hatorah, managed to obtain 1.5% of the vote and Shas doubled its power.²⁴⁰ (Sandler 1989/90:17)[§]

2.13.4 The Labour Party : religion and state

At the Labour Party convention in November 1991 a resolution was adopted to separate state and religion.²⁴¹ This did not include marriage and divorce, which would remain under the Rabbinical Court authority. Voting for the resolution were 390 delegates against 302. Since there were about 3000 delegates to the convention, the party leader, Shimon Peres, wanted this resolution overturned. Labour needs both religious and secular support and perhaps future coalitions with the religious and Ultra-orthodox parties.²⁴² Therefore this was retracted.²⁴³

§ In the 1992 Knesset elections there was a political upheaval which saw the return to power of the Labour Party and the political Left. Meretz (an alignment of Ratz, Shinui and Mapam) won twelve seats, which placed them third after Labour and Likud. NRP won six seats, Shas six, and United Torah Jewry four. The last-mentioned consists of Agudat Israel, Degel Hatorah and Moriah. (*The Jerusalem report*. July 16, 1992; *Ma'ariv*. July 13, 1992) Shas was the only religious party to enter the Labour-led coalition (*The Jerusalem report*. July 30, 1992).

2.13.5 The Ultra-orthodox in Israeli politics

In an interview on Israel Television in December 1991, Rabbi Moshe Ze'ev Feldman, a member of Knesset for Agudat Israel, stated that women should not have the right to vote. Furthermore they should not serve in the Knesset.²⁴⁴

Shas prevented the passage of the budget for 1992 by the stipulated last day of the previous year because of the demand for additional funds for their cultural institutions. This was opposed by the NRP. Shas only relented after the NRP demanded the possibility of eliminating the special allocations in 1992. The budget was then passed after the new year.²⁴⁵

2.14 DISCUSSION

This section will be divided into two parts. Firstly some links and patterns will be shown in order to explain the foregoing factual description. This will consist mainly in the development of the various religions and their changes. The subject of peaceful symbiosis will also be addressed.

Both Hultkranz (Krüger 1987:48) and Pye (1972:28) have advocated understanding religion through historical context. The former has pointed out that although phenomena may appear to be the same on the surface, there are differences when the deeper meaning is sought. Pye (p. 15:28:185) has further mentioned that groups are sociological and psychological and that there is an interplay between the two. Religion can be a means of justifying opposition to government policy as well as obeying it (Pye p. 189). All these things will emerge in the first part of the explanation.

The second part of this section will show how the conflict between the Arabs-Muslims/Israelis-Jews and the tensions within each field can be explained through the religious dimension. It will be shown that through this perspective there is practically no room for compromise. Use will be made of Pye's methodology of *concepts, actions, groups* and *states of mind* (1972 passim).

Subsequent chapters will probe the possibility of a solution within religions in modern times. Since this section addresses an interim explanation, interpretation through phenomenology and hermeneutics will be made in the final chapter.

2.14.1 Political religions

It has been shown that *Islam* was a political religion from the time of the Prophet's rule in Madina. During the course of time *Judaism* became a political religion. At Sinai the people were a loose federation of Jews led by Moses. During the time of the Judges there was a democracy with each tribe selecting its own ruler. Under the kings there was a constitutional monarchy. This change was caused by people themselves, since Samuel's sons were corrupt and the Jewish people did not want them as leaders. After the return from Babylon (as a result of an event in world history) a theocratic state was established, but the Sadducees and Pharisees fought over doctrine. During the time of the Second Temple political parties emerged, namely the Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes and a Zealot faction. Later in Europe Va'adot were established.

Zionism is an ideology which arose as a result of persecution of the Jews, but this religion could only have come about as a result of the Haskalah Movement in Europe. This gave legitimacy for Jews to become secular. Both persecution and Haskalah were events in world history. This period saw the emergence of all shades of Jewish political parties. Zionism can accommodate religious Judaism, Jewish socialism and Jewish Revisionism in spite of the tensions among them. Therefore there was some kind of unity with regard to the establishment of a Jewish State. There were also tensions between Alkalai (religious Zionism) and Kalisher (Ultra-orthodox). The latter claimed that the messiah must come before the establishment of a Jewish State. This tension is due to difference in interpretation.

The UN voted for partition of Palestine, and Herzl's idea of a Jewish state culminated in the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 with a democratically elected Knesset. From the idea to the act took about half a century, but this was due to world events, namely the Ottoman Empire and the British mandate in Palestine. The secular state was based on statism with the national flag and national anthem. IDF officers swear oaths of allegiance on the top of Massada which is a symbol that the State of Israel will never fall. In ideologies as a religion, the state can be considered the Ultimate Reality, the national flag a symbol or icon, and the national anthem a hymn. Yet the State of Israel was not completely separated from Judaism. Ben Gurion guaranteed the *status quo* in order to accommodate the Ultra-orthodox. In recent years this has been tacitly eroded due to the more active participation of the Ultra-orthodox parties in the government. This is a new phenomenon. There were also tensions with regard to the official language of modern Hebrew in preference to Yiddish/Judeo-Spanish.

Arab Nationalism arose in response to Western colonialism and the decline of the Ottoman Empire, both events in world history. Muslims were exposed to alien ideas and ideologies. Nationalism comes from the West and there is nothing like it in Islam.

In 1952 Nasser came to power after a coup in Egypt. This eventually led to Pan-Arabism, e.g. the UAR between Egypt and Syria, and the Arab Union between Jordan and Iraq. Both leaders were Hashemites at this time. This was a response by people themselves and had nothing to do with Israel. Later there were two streams — Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islam. The Revivalists wanted to bring the Nationalists back to the true Path of Islam and then embark on jihad against the enemy or vice versa, depending on the group. This was a difference in interpretation. Revivalism is not a new phenomenon as it has been shown to occur in the past. This disunity creates tensions. They all believe that victory comes from Allah. There is a similarity between their beliefs and Kahane's ideology. From a youth group in 1928, members of al-Ikhwan sit in elected parliaments in Arab countries. This too has taken about half a century, perhaps due to the fact that people were satisfied with Pan-Arabism for a while.

Palestinian Arab Nationalism resulted from the inability of Arab states to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict for various reasons. This was due to people themselves. Originally Fateh was formed as a Fedayin group, but later it became part of the PLO and Arafat was elected its leader. Although this organisation does accommodate different ideologies, there are tensions among Arafat, Habash, Hawatmeh and other groups, which for a long time prevented the declaration of a Palestinian State.

Since the people in the Territories had been cut off from Jordan and Egypt, the 1967/Six-Day War was a turning-point. Israel had wanted a peace-treaty, but when this did not materialise, the PLO filled the political vacuum. This organisation struggled for the sole representation of the Palestinian people which was agreed upon at the Rabat conference. Subsequently the PLO was accepted by many countries in the world, and after Arafat's address to the UN, accorded observer status in this world forum.

After the PLO had tried to make a state within a state, members were expelled from Jordan. They went to Lebanon and after Israel's first full-scale war against the Palestinians they dispersed. Different groups went to different Arab countries. These changes were caused by people themselves.

When Arafat's leadership was questioned, people in the Territories with all shades of political belief supported him. There was vacillation with regard to the declaration of the state of Palestine. This was a result of disunity and tensions among the different groups.

In the Territories, the Shabiba had grown up under occupation/administration and they wanted to shrug off the yoke. This resulted in the Intifada. Palestinians were ordered to hoist the flag (symbol, icon) from electric pylons, which could endanger life. The new national anthem, *Biladi Biladi* (hymn), was composed. All that remained now was a Palestinian State (Ultimate Reality). Because Faisal al-Husayni drew up his plan, the PLO had to come to a decision with regard to the State. It seems that this change was precipitated by the people in the Territories, and by one person in particular.

The PLO then declared the state of Palestine, accepted Resolutions 242 and 338, but did not amend its Covenant. This is a paradox as far as Israel is concerned. It seems as though the declaration was due to pragmatism. Thereafter 104 nations accepted the state of Palestine and their UN mission was upgraded.

Links and patterns have been shown in the development of Zionism and Arab and Palestinian Nationalism. However, although there were similarities, the reasons for the changes in their developments were not the same. Zionism had developed relatively quickly through necessity, in order to save Jews in the diaspora. It also became a political religion through necessity due to world events. On the other hand Arab and Palestinian Nationalism was a slow development because there were no pressing issues. Palestinian people were living in other Arab states, and although in many instances under difficult situations in refugee camps, they were not oppressed. Nationalism became a political religion mainly due to people, namely the Israeli occupation/administration of the land, the Shabiba and the Intidafa and al-Husayni's plan for a state.

2.14.2 Development of Judaism and Islam

There were watersheds at the beginning of both Judaism and Islam which could have led to their extinction, but the reasons for their change were different. For the Jewish people, the Babylonian exile (event in world history) cut them off from their Temple in Jerusalem. Therefore it was a test of their faith. They responded by establishing synagogues and recording the scriptures to be read on the Sabbath. The Hijra was due to the people of Mecca. In

Madina Muhammad gained more converts to Islam, and there was a change in the content of the revelations from Allah. The Madinan suras were more orientated to the Muslim umma in contrast to the Meccan suras which addressed issues between Allah and man.

God's appointment of Joshua to succeed Moses and making of a covenant with the former, provided continuity. On the other hand Muhammad did not appoint a successor, and this led to a struggle for succession which eventually resulted in the Shia schism, precipitated by the people themselves.

The Talmud and the recorded opinions of the Geonim and rabbis of later periods (collectively known as the Responsa literature) provide solutions for contemporary problems on an on-going basis. In marked contrast to this was the finality of the closing of the 'gates' of ijti had and the mandatory use of taqlid for the Sunnis. This does not leave place for interpretation of problems in the modern world and has thus caused tensions between the Revivalists and the ulama.

Halakha comes from the word 'walk', i.e. a path to be followed, and is rabbinic jurisprudence based on sources which are binding. When the *Shulhan aruh* was first written, it did not take into account the practices of the Ashkenazim. This was a source of tension between them and the Sephardim until changes were made.

The *Sharia* is a path to be followed and is based on sources which are binding. *Fiqh* is Islamic jurisprudence and there are several recognised schools of law, which Muslims can choose to follow.

There were differences in interpretation and teaching of Hillel and Shamai. The Sunni and Shia have differences in their Hadith literature and with regard to ijti had, and also in the mode of acceptance for codification.

Maimonides reconciled religion and theology although he had his detractors, especially in Babylon. al-Ghazzali did a similar thing for Islam and he too had his critics.

After the conquest of Spain by the Christians, the population was forced to convert to Christianity. *Marranos* were Jews who had converted but practised their religion in secret. *Moriscos* were secret Muslims. Since translations had been made of their scriptures, they forgot their language and could no longer read the Quran in Arabic. The Christians had contempt

for people who had abandoned their religion under pressure, and this led to the Spanish Inquisition. Both Jews and Muslims were forced to live in ghettos. These changes were due to events in world history and also to the people themselves.

After the desecration of the Temple in Jerusalem, the Maccabees set about purifying it. After Salah al-Din retook Jerusalem from the Crusaders, he too purified the Haram mosques before praying there.

The Jewish religious response to persecution was passive acceptance, but the secular reaction was the rise of Zionism. On the other hand the secular reaction to modernisation and colonialism was away from Islam, whereas the Revivalists call for a return to religion.

A few issues which on the surface seem the same have been compared. However, probing the causes and responses at a deeper level has shown differences. This makes each religion *sui generis*.

2.14.3 The modern Arab-Israeli conflict

The modern Arab-Israeli conflict was caused both by events and people in world history. The fall of the Ottoman Empire led to the establishment of mandates in the Middle East. The Mc Mahon correspondence, the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration seem to have been in conflict with one another. Furthermore the last-mentioned never stated explicit geographic differentiation, nor were borders clearly defined.

In 1922 Britain divided the mandated territory into two — Palestine and Transjordan. The division caused tensions for the Jewish people, as many felt that Jews should be permitted to settle in the latter territory as well, — according to the Balfour Declaration. On the other hand the Arab Revolt of 1935-39 tried to stop Jewish immigration and land sales to Jews. The Arabs felt that since they were the majority, the British had no right to apportion part of their land to the Jews. World War II put an end to the revolt and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem sided with the Axis powers. Before the British withdrawal from Palestine, the Jews were in control of Jaffa, Ramle, Lod and Haifa, and the mass emigration of the Palestinians had already started.

After the 1956 war the Israelis returned all the territories captured by them. This could have been perceived as a precedent. However after the 1967 War Israel tried to negotiate with the

people in the West Bank/Judea and Samaria, but they refused, since they saw themselves as Jordanians. Thereafter the Israelis wanted to negotiate with the Arab states for peace treaties. This could have been perceived as a change in the rules of the game. The whole of Palestine/Israel was seen as Arab land; therefore the Arab Summit in August 1967 declared no recognition of the State of Israel and no negotiations with its government.

UN Resolution 242 called for recognition of all states in the area, withdrawal from occupied areas (without the definite article) and a solution to the refugee problem (not the Palestinian problem). It seems to be a case once again of vague wording and appeasement which cause differences in interpretation and therefore conflict.

In 1971 Sadat made overtures for peace, but the Israeli government did not believe him. There are only two ways of regaining territory lost in war — the political option which failed, and war. Therefore the October 1973/Yom Kippur War seems to be the result of people perhaps misreading the situation. It was the month of Ramadan and a suitable time for jihad against the enemy. Many Arabs saw their successes in this war as being attributed to Allah's forgiveness of Muslims for straying from the Path. Kissinger was responsible for arranging the disengagement agreements. These were seen by the Arabs as victory, therefore Sadat could negotiate from strength. This time the Israeli government took his suggestions for peace seriously, and its decision culminated in the Camp David Accords and peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Sadat's 'treachery' in negotiating with the enemy resulted in his assassination by a member of the Jihad Revivalist group. Furthermore other Arab states broke off relations with Egypt. Perhaps they considered Sadat a traitor to Pan-Arabism.

The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon was the first war against the PLO. Initially the Shia welcomed the IDF, since it thought that they would rid the former of the Palestinians in their area; but the longer the IDF remained the more they were resented. Many Muslims believe that the Intifada began with the war in Lebanon.

The Gulf War 1990/91 marked a change. It seems that Saddam Husayn wanted to establish himself as the new leader of Pan-Arabism. For the Arab-Israeli conflict a new kind of warfare with Scud missiles placed Israeli civilians in the front line and the IDF was forced into inaction. This type of warfare changes Israel's security needs, and perhaps territory is not as important as it was previously. One could speculate as to whether this leaves an opening for negotiations for peace in the area.

After the Gulf War, the Madrid Peace Conference took place due to Baker's shuttle in the Middle East. It was the first time that the Lebanese, Syrians, Jordanians and Palestinians had been prepared to sit round the same table, officially, with the Israelis. In the past the United States of America has always forced some sort of solution, e.g. the disengagement agreements or forcing the parties to remain at Camp David until some solution had been reached. Therefore it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that this could happen again. On the other hand it is 500 years since the expulsion from Spain. During the Golden Age Muslims and Jews had lived together peacefully. Therefore, although there does not seem to be room for compromise through the religious dimension, perhaps there are certain groups within each religion who could find some sort of solution. This would have to be probed.

2.14.4 Conflict and peaceful symbiosis in history

During the time of the Prophet, 600 Jews of the Quraiza tribe were executed and members of another Jewish tribe were killed at Kaybar. At that time it was not uncommon for tribes to attack each other. However Muhammad's example set a precedent for belligerence. After the Battle of Badr, he said that victory had come from Allah (Quran 3:13, 8:17, 22:38-40). Moreover the concept of jihad advocates struggle and war.

On the one hand Islam had accepted the Old Testament and the New Testament (Quran 2:136) making the people of the Book protected — dhimmis — but they had to be "brought low" (Quran 9:29); on the other hand the doctrine of tahrif relates to a corruption of the meaning and the words in these scriptures by the Jews and the Christians (Hughes 1988:61f.). Therefore the religion of Abraham was a surrender or submission to the Lord of the Worlds (Quran 2:128:124ff.)

There was peaceful symbiosis between the Muslims and the Jews in Baghdad where Sa'adia Ga'on was recognised by the Caliph. In Spain Jews lived together in peace with Muslims and were encouraged to develop scholarship, because the ruler wanted to make Spain a cultural centre. In Egypt Maimonides was appointed physician to the Muslim court and he was permitted to establish Yeshivot.

It seems that when the Jews were prepared to accept the state of dhimmis, they were allowed to live in peace. However dhimmis are never permitted to rise to high positions in government according to the Sharia. This makes them 'second class citizens'. For example Butros Ghalli,

a Copt from Egypt, was never allowed to become head of state, yet he is now Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2.14.5 Resolution of the conflict/tensions from history?

From the Israeli Jewish perspective, both Temples were built in Jerusalem, the first before the Exile, the second after the Return. When they returned to Ottoman Palestine they settled in Nablus, Hebron, Gaza, Jerusalem and Safed. Nablus/Schem is the biblical city of Jacob's wanderings. Six of King David's sons, including Solomon, were born in Jerusalem (1 Chron. 3:1-5). According to tradition, the Patriarchs and their wives are buried in Hebron. God promised that the Jews would return after exile (Deut. 30:3:5) to the land He had promised them (Josh. 1:1-5).

In more recent years this is the political position of the Zionist Right wing. The ideology of Rabbi A.I. Kook, as adopted by Gush Emunim, is messianic; therefore it would be heretical to return any part of the land. On the other hand, many Secularists see the withholding of territories as an affront to basic moral values and could also endanger the nation's existence. Furthermore the Shalom Achshav group believe that all sides should make a compromise, and Israel should be recognised within secure borders. While these different stances cause tensions in the Jewish-Israeli field, there does seem as though there is some room in which to manoeuvre.

From the Muslim Arab perspective, Jerusalem is the third-holiest city in Islam. It contains al-Haram and its mosques. The Prophet is believed to have ascended to heaven from this place. Furthermore the Arabs claim that they have lived in Palestine uninterruptedly since Salah al-Din recaptured Jerusalem from the Crusaders. They see the Balfour Declaration as illegal, since they were the majority in Ottoman and Mandatory Palestine. The Revivalists see Palestine/Eretz Israel as waqf territory. Therefore it belongs to the Muslim umma in perpetuity. Article 20 of the PLO Charter dismisses the historical links between the Jews and their country, since they do not conform to historical fact. At the Madrid Peace Conference the head of the Syrian delegation charged that the head of the Israeli delegation had distorted history in his opening speech.

The Muslims believe that Allah had sent a series of prophets whose teachings were followed for a time, but were later abandoned or distorted. Muhammad was the last of the prophets and

the Muslims had accepted his teachings. Therefore it is logical to assume that, for Muslims, history starts with the rise of Islam.

Given all the foregoing beliefs, it seems that from the religious dimension there does not seem to be room for a successful resolution between the two fields. The political Left in Israel seem to have left an opening. Whether something similar exists in the Arab field needs to be explored.

2.14.6 Explanation of the Arab-Israeli conflict through Pye's methodology

Michael Pye (1972) has suggested that religion can be explained through four categories, either singly or in combination. There are *religious actions* (p. 37f.), *religious groups* (p. 73f.), *religious states of mind* (p. 95) and *religious concepts* (p. 119f.). In this section, his categories will be extrapolated to suit this thesis, and are not necessarily used in the way he suggests.

These categories will be used to explain the religions Judaism and Islam and also secular Zionism and Nationalism. Thereafter the politics of all four categories will be used in combination.

2.14.6.1 The religions : Judaism and Islam

The *groups* are Jewish people who adhere to Judaism and Muslim people who adhere to Islam. They believe that the scriptures (*concept*) are the word of God. For Judaism it is written in the Torah that God promised His people a return after exile (Deut. 30:3:5) to the land which He promised them in the Book of Prophets (Josh. 1:1-5). For the Muslims, Allah sanctions those who fight because they have unjustly been driven from their homes (Quran 22:39—40). Furthermore there are many suras in the Quran promising victory to believers (Quran 3:126; 30:47). Therefore both peoples refuse negotiations for peace (*action*). There can be no room for compromise (*state of mind*).

2.14.6.2 The religions : Zionism and Nationalism

Secular Zionists and Arab/Palestinian Nationalists are groups. They all adhere to ideologies. The ideology underpinning modern Zionism is a Homeland (*concept*) for the Jewish people, especially those who have been discriminated against and persecuted in the diaspora. For the Arab Nationalists the PLO Charter (scripture : *concept*) declares that UN Resolution 181 was

illegal. Moreover Palestine was taken from them by war. Therefore there has been a refusal to negotiate for peace (*action*) because there is no room for compromise (*state of mind*). This is in agreement with Judaism and Islam.

2.14.6.3 Politics of Judaism, Zionism, Islam, Nationalism

In the Jewish-Israeli field one can distinguish between Judaism and Zionism. These groups are further subdivided and each acts in accordance with its position.

The Jewish Ultra-orthodox consists of the Hasidim, the Mitnagdim and some Sephardim. None of these groups recognises the State of Israel (*state of mind*) because of their interpretation of messianism (*concept*), but they support the government in return for funding of their own educational system (*action*).

The religious Zionists are divided into the NRP and Gush Emunim. The former believe in the Torah and Avodah (labour) (*state of mind*) and have established their own kibbutzim this side of the Green Line (*action*). The latter believe that *hitnahalut* is a sacred duty (*state of mind*); therefore they are prepared to risk their lives in establishing settlements in the Territories (*action*).

Other religious groups in Israel are Conservative and Reform Judaism. There are tensions between the two and also between them and the Orthodox and Ultra-orthodox Jews. However there is no evidence to show where these groups stand politically.

Among the secular Zionists the right-wing political parties support the concept of the biblical land of Israel and *hitnahalut*. Therefore they act accordingly. The left-wing political parties arrange and attend demonstrations. Some soldiers in the IDF refuse to serve in the Territories. The Left and political Centre are prepared to make territorial compromises in return for a peace treaty guaranteeing secure borders.

In the Muslim-Arab field there are the Revivalists and the Nationalists with their different groups. The main Revivalist groups are al-Ikhwan, Hamas, al-Jihad, a pro-PLO group and a pro-Khomeini group. Furthermore there are tensions between the Sunni and Shia Muslims. They all believe that they should wage jihad against the secular Muslims, but there is a difference of opinion as to whether Muslims should first be brought back to Islam and then wage war against their common enemy or vice versa.

Among the Nationalists there are the Fateh, PFLP, PDFLP, and other *groups*. There is disagreement over their *actions*, i.e. whether to embark on acts of freedom fighters, whether to declare Palestinian statehood and whether to support the peace process or not.

The *actions* between the two fields, from the Israeli-Jewish field, are defensive wars, punitive actions against civil disobedience in the Territories and a call for face-to-face negotiations. On the other hand the *actions* from the Arab-Muslim field are guerilla activities, jihad against the enemy and a preparedness to talk peace.

The *states of mind* towards other groups in its own field causes tensions (*concept*). The *states of mind* between the two fields causes conflict (*concept*).

This section has shown how the Arab-Israeli conflict can be explained through the religious dimension. Since all religions are political, politics and religion are an important factor in a peaceful resolution, because it has been shown that conflict and tensions are also interlinked.

- 1 "He it is who is appointed the sun a splendour and the moon a light, ... differences of day and night and all that Allah hath created in the heavens and the earth ..." (Quran 10:6—7)
- 2 "And I will establish my covenant between me and thee and thy seed after thee in their generations for an everlasting covenant to be a God unto thee and thy seed after thee." (Gen. 17:7)
- 3 The borders of this land are clearly defined. (Deut. 34:1—3)
- 4 "And the days that David reigned over Israel were forty years; seven he reigned in Hebron and thirty and three years he reigned in Jerusalem." (1 Kings 2:11) Six of his sons were born in Hebron (1 Chron. 3:1—4) and Solomon, among others, was born in Jerusalem (1 Chron. 3:5).
- 5 The name Palestine is reputed to be linked to the Philistines. According to Cruden's *Concordance* (1990:480) *Palestina* is mentioned three times in the Bible, but this name is a reference to the land where the Philistines lived and not to the territory of modern Palestine.
- 6 The purity of Israel's religion was affected by assimilation.
- 7 "By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea we wept when we remembered Zion. "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning. If I do not remember thee let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy." (Ps. 137:1:5—6)
- 8 This was to have implications for the dispersion in later centuries.
- 9 The most notable influence can be seen in the writings of the Jewish philosopher, Philo of Alexandria in Egypt (Noss 1984:389).
- 10 Pigs are explicitly forbidden to the Jews (Lev. 11:3).
- 11 The festival of *Hanukkah* commemorating this event entered the cycle of festivals in the Jewish year (Wigoder 1989:319).
- 12 The Sadducees faded into oblivion and the Essenes disappeared from Jewish history, although the latter are associated with the Dead Sea scrolls (Wigoder 1989:551:234). During the Roman period the Zealots committed mass suicide on top of Massada, rather than surrender to the Romans (Rolef 1987:214; Noss 1984:395). However Judaism is based on the foundations laid by the Pharisees (Wigoder 1989:551).
- 13 The Pharisees (*Perushim*) maintained that the oral law was as important as the written law, since the former had evolved through interpretation of the written law. On the

- other hand the Sadducees (*Zedukim*) believed that the written Torah alone was holy. (Stern 1976:235—6) The Pharisees were divided further into two schools — the house of Hillel and the house of Shamai. This cleavage concerned Halakha (the path wherein Israel walks) which is part of the oral law. (Shafrai 1976:312; Stern 1976:283)
- 14 *Tishah Be'Av* commemorates the destruction of both Temples. This is a fast in the Jewish calendar with mourning rituals. (Wigoder 1989:705)
- 15 The *Nibi'im* was the literature of the prophets and the *Ketubim* was literature which had become sacred or semi-sacred (Noss 1984:397).
- 16 The Mishnah comprises mainly Halakha (unwritten law) and Agadah (stories of instruction) (Safrai 1976:312). *Gemarah* developed as a commentary of the Mishnah (Wigoder 1989:684). The Mishnah and *Gemarah* constitute the Talmud (Noss 1984:399f.).
- 17 As Academies in Babylon were of far greater significance (Noss 1984:399), the Babylonian Talmud is of far more importance (Safrai 1976:356). The redaction of the Babylonian Talmud was achieved by the end of the fifth century C.E. (Noss 1984:400).
- 18 At one stage about 167 deities were associated with the Kabah, although Allah was the main god (Farah 1970:28).
- 19 Ramadan is the ninth month in the Arabic calendar (Smart 1990:130).
- 20 There are two versions of how this occurred. The first says that an angel (Gabriel) appeared to him in the form of a man and told him that God had chosen him to be His messenger. The second records that the angel's voice commanded him to recite. (Hourani 1991:16) Farah (1970:40) combines the two and writes that the archangel Gabriel "brought to Muhammad the command of God:"
- "Read: in the name of the Lord who createth, Createth man from a clot.
Read: And thy Lord is the Most Bounteous,
Who teaches by the pen,
Teacheth man that which he knew not." (Quran 96:1—5)
- "... But prostrate thyself, and draw near (unto Allah)." (Quran 96:19)
- Pickthall (1958:x) points out that Muhammad was thrice commanded to "read". Twice he said that he was illiterate and the third time he asked what could be read. Sura 96 is considered to be the first revelation.
- 21 Ali was later to become the fourth caliph (Lewis 1967:39).
- 22 Abu Bakr would succeed the Prophet (Farah 1970:42).
- 23 "So remember the name of the Lord and devote thyself with a complete devotion — ... there is no God save him; so choose thou Him alone for thy defender —

And bear with patience what they utter, and part from them with a fair leave-taking. Leave Me to deal with the deniers, ... " (Quran 74:8—11)
According to Pickthall (1958:420) the revelation in these verses was a commandment to start preaching al-Islam.

- 24 Umar and Uthman were destined to become the second and third caliphs respectively (Noss 1984:514:516).
- 25 Therefore this first constitution related to civil and political relations of the people themselves and their external relations. It also established the Prophet as a source of authority, and since he was Allah's chosen apostle, the authority was ultimately His. This gave the umma the dual character of a political organism and a religion, and Madina was a theocracy. (Lewis 1967:44)
- 26 In the beginning the call to prayer was only made for services on Fridays, but later this call was made at the time of private prayer each day (Noss 1984:505).
- 27 The qibla was later changed to Mecca. Noss (1984:505) suggests that the change was due to the Jewish conspiracy against the Prophet. Farah (1970:285,n.53) sees Madina as the qibla of Islam as the result of the Meccans' adoption of Islam.
- 28 Ahl al-Dhimmah are the people of the covenant. They may live in an Islamic state under its protection with regard to life, property and honour. (Doi 1984:426)
- 29 "Lo! Allah defendeth those who are true. Lo! Allah loveth not each treacherous ingrate. Sanction is given unto those who fight because they have been wronged; and Allah is indeed Able to give them victory. Those who have been driven from their homes unjustly only because they said: Our Lord is Allah ... Verily Allah helpeth one who helpeth Him ..." (Quran 22:38—40)
... one army fighting in the way of Allah, and the other disbelieving, whom they saw as twice their number, clearly, with their very eyes. Thus Allah strengtheneth with His succour whom He will. ..." (Quran 3:13)
- Pickthall (1958:63) points out that this verse refers specifically to the battle of Badr.
"Ye (Muslims) slew them not, but Allah slew them ..." (Quran 8:17)
- 30 After Uhud the Meccans had not continued on to Madina (Lewis 1967:45).
- 31 Now the umma were expanded and united.
"The believers are naught else than brothers. Therefore make peace between your brethren and observe your duty to Allah ..." (Quran 49:10)
- 32 "Fight against such of those who have been given the Scriptures as believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, and forbid not that which Allah hath forbidden by his messenger, and follow not the religion of truth, until they pay the tribute readily, being brought low." (Quran 9:29)

This tax is called jizyah meaning tribute and is only levied on Jews and Christians who

claim aman (protection) (Hughes 1988:248).

- 33 According to Farah (1970:60) Abu Bakr announced the Prophet's death thus:
"O Muslims! If any of you has been worshipping Muhammad, then let me tell you that Muhammad is dead.
But if you really do worship God, then know ye that God is living and will never die!"
- 34 Bernard Lewis (1987:27) points out that Umar had been assassinated by a foreign infidel but Uthman was murdered by a Muslim. Lewis writes that this could be justified by the Quran and Hadith. He quotes the Hadith where the Prophet said:
"There is no obedience to sin."
One could cite the following Quranic verse:
"Whoso doeth an ill deed, he will be repaid the like thereof, while whoso doeth right, whether male or female, as is a believer (all) such will enter the Garden, where they will be nourished without stint."
According to Lewis (1987:27) Ali saw Uthman as an unjust and wrongful ruler. Therefore his execution was seen as justice and Ali refused to hand over the executioner to Uthman's kinsman, Muawiya, who perceived the third caliph as a just and rightful ruler.
- 35 The city of Madina held one copy of the Quran while three others were sent to Basra and Kufa (in Iraq) and Damascus (in Syria). All other defective copies were destroyed. Although the Quran was considered the word of Allah, different meanings could be understood from some words. Therefore exegesis was necessary. The earliest main commentator was Tabari (839—923). Centuries later there were others such as Zamakhshari and Fakhr-al Din al-Razi, to name but two. (Farah 1970:97—100)
- 36 According to al-Tirmizi the Prophet had said,
"Convey to other persons none of my words, except those ye know are a surety. Verily he who represents my words wrongly shall find a place for himself in the fire." (Hughes 1988:639)
The Hadith literature conveys the sayings, actions and examples of Muhammad as remembered by his Companions. Since much time had elapsed, strict rules had to be laid down in order to record only genuine and authentic material. (Noss 1984:518—20; Doi 1984:45—84)
- 37 Bernard Lewis (1987:27) points out that Uthman had been a legitimate ruler who had been murdered by a *Muslim* rebel. By shielding the murderer, Ali was committing a sin. A Hadith states that "There is no obedience to sin." Therefore Ali was overlooking the sin of murder. On the other hand he and his supporters saw Uthman as an unjust ruler,

who had been elected in place of Ali, who was related to the Prophet. For these reasons they saw the execution as legal and legitimate. Schacht (1971:15) refers to this as the first theological problem in Islam which divided the umma into three groups.

38 Muawiya ibn Abu Sufyan was subsequently to become caliph and founder of the Umayyad dynasty. He was the son of one of the Prophet's Companions and was to institute the hereditary Caliphate. He is hated by the Shia. (Hughes 1988:366)

39 The Kharijites were members of the party opposing arbitration. They believed that the will of Allah should be expressed through the whole umma, and unjust rulers should be disposed of and jihad undertaken. (Smart 1969:395f.) Mortimer (1982:41) maintains that they were the first sect in Islam.

40 This event is remembered every year by the Shia in a passion-play in the month of Muharram. Therefore, although Husayn's death was a political and historical event, it acquired a religious implication. (Noss 1984:397) Today the Shia are prepared to die for their religion (Lewis 1987:29).

41 These differences will be more fully explored in Section 2.6.5.2.

42 Since many of these sects are relevant to this thesis they need brief mention. The *Zaidis* were followers of the grandson of Husayn. Today they are found in Yemen. The *Ismailis* were followers of the sixth imam. Their modern form are led by the Aga Khan. The *Fatimids* were descendants of Fatima and Ali through the line of Ismail. They ruled Egypt from 969 to 1171. Another branch of the *Ismailis* are the *Alawis* who are found in modern Syria. Their doctrine is extreme but they themselves claim to be Muslims. The *Druze* were also a branch of the *Ismailis*. (Mortimer 1982:46—50) The *Druze* seceded from Islam at the beginning of the 11th century (Rolef 1987:77).

43 The Dome of the Rock is the traditional site of the Prophet's ascent to heaven (Tibawi 1970:12).

"Glorified is he Who carried His servant by night from the Inviolable Place of Worship to the Far Distant Place of Worship, the neighbourhood whereof We have blessed ..."
(Quran 17:1)

44 According to Tibawi (1970:14) the original al-Aqsa mosque had been a primitive structure for prostration in prayer.

45 Since Jerusalem plays an important part in the Arab-Israeli conflict this will have to be addressed in more depth in Section 3.7.

46 Halakha and Sharia will be mentioned again in Section 2.14.2.

47 Ga'on (pl. Ge'onim) was the title given to the heads of the Academies at Sura and

Pumbedita in Babylon from the seventh to the eleventh centuries. Their authority surpassed that of other Academies in the preceding Talmudic age. There was a Ga'on in the Palestinian Academy, but those in Babylon held the supremacy. After the end of the Ge'onut, the term was used for great scholars and spiritual leaders in eastern Europe. (Wigoder 1987:278:608:279)

- 48 Halakha is rabbinic jurisprudence which comprises ritual (between person and God) and interpersonal relationships with one's neighbour. All laws are binding and take into account Judaism as a way of life. The source of Halakha is the Bible, particularly the Torah. Talmudic Sages distinguish between the Written law (Torah) and the Oral law which a sage transmitted to his pupil. It is believed that Moses received the Oral law together with the Written law. (Wigoder 1989:308)
- 49 Yemenite Jews use this translation which is printed opposite the Hebrew text (Wigoder 1989:608).
- 50 Some portions of this commentary have been found and published together with a Hebrew translation. (Wigoder 1989:608)
- 51 This was written in Arabic. However only one still exists today. (Wigoder 1989:608)
- 52 The main religious difference between Sephardim (pl.) and Ahkenazim (pl.) is in the liturgy. The Ashkenazim follow the Palestinian rather than the Babylonian group. (Wigoder 1989:82:635)
- 53 His disciples added *Tosafot* (additions) which are explanations of Rashi's exegesis. (Wigoder 1989:584:713)
- 54 The Rambam formulated a Jewish philosophical creed in his Mishnah commentaries (Eliade 1987:8:156).
- 55 *Mishneh Torah* is variously translated as 'The Torah Reviewed' (Noss 1984:402), 'Repetition of the Torah, or Code of Law' (Eliade 1987:8:174), 'The Second Torah' (Wigoder 1989:452).
- Each group of laws is placed in a framework rather than chronologically or text-orientated, as in previous codes (Wigoder 1989:453).
- 56 Detractors, who saw the Rambam as a threat to their supremacy, came mainly from Babylon (Eliade 1987:8:153).
- 57 Jewish mysticism is mentioned because the modern Hasidim have their part to play in the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the other hand Muslim Sufi-ism is not relevant to the conflict; hence the subject will not be addressed in depth in this section.

- 58 Wigoder (1989:513) distinguishes four periods in the development of mysticism. In the 12th and 13th centuries there were mystical schools in Europe. During the 13th to 15th centuries there was the Kabbalah in Spain, which spread to Europe and the east. There were further developments in the 16th to 18th centuries and finally the unfolding of modern mysticism.
- 59 Muhammad's main task had been to interpret the will of Allah and dispense *adl* (justice), thus ensuring peace among the umma and also between the Muslims and their Creator. The Prophet had also sent judges to administer justice, for example in Yemen. (Doi 1984:85:14) Therefore legal development in Islam had started in his life-time. (Farah 1970:160)
- 60 In order to prevent pious forgeries there had to be a specific chain of transmitters (Doi 1984:53ff.; Mayer 1984:230).
- 61 For example there are the Muwatta of Malik ibn Anas and the Musnad of Ahmad ibn Hanbal. It will be shown presently that these two were founders of different schools of law. (Noss 1984:519) There are also further collections (Doi 1984:60).
- 62 Ilm al-fiqh allows judgments to be made on things not known in the world during the Prophet's life-time. The process is grounded in the scriptures and there are set prescriptions for arriving at a ruling. (Reinhart 1983:192; Eliade 1987:7:435—7)
- 63 Allah ordained and divulged this Path to His Prophet Muhammad. He showed it to his umma for their guidance which would deliver them (Doi 1984:2). Therefore the Sharia regulates every aspect of a Muslim's life, and Islamic law and theology are interwoven. Consequently "Islam is a religion of the Law, in the same sense that Judaism is, and that the sacred law is the core and kernel of Islam itself." (Schacht 1971:3:4)
- 64 Ijtihad is independent reasoning, but this could only be used after qiyas and ijma. There were strict rules as to who could be a mujtahid (the person exercising ijihad) and there were fixed rules for cases where this process was forbidden. (Doi 1984:78—81)
- 65 The qadi is a Sharia court judge. After the expansion of Islam, rulers appointed qadis who were subordinate to them. The former decided which school of law should be used. Many fuqaha (specialists in Islamic jurisprudence) did not wish to compromise their independence and integrity; therefore they refused appointments. Since there is no appeal in the Sharia court, the qadi had final ruling. Qadi courts had to depend on government enforcement, since they have no powers of their own. If there was a problem which had not been solved in previous Sharia scholarship, a *mufiti* could be

- consulted. His ruling was known as a *fatwa*. (Mayer 1984:234:235)
- 66 In the 16th century the Ottomans tried to apply Islamic law. This present century has seen an increasing religious revival. (Schacht 1971:22)
- 67 The main Shia branch are known as the 'Twelvers'. Since the 16th century this branch of Islam has been prevalent in Persia, now Iran. (Noss 1984:531f.)
- It is held that this twelfth imam became hidden and continued to communicate through his agent. This is known as the "lesser occultation". Subsequently the communication stopped and he was only seen in dreams or visions — "the greater occultation". (Hourani 1991:182)
- 68 al-Mufid (ca. 945—1022) advocated that revelatory truths should be explained by *kalam* (dialectic theology). al-Murtada (966—1044), his disciple, maintained that reason should show religious truths. (Hourani 1991:182)
- 69 Scholars responsible for this development were al-Mahaqqiq (1205—1277) and al-Allama al-Hilli (1250—1325) and later Muhammad ibn Makki al-Amili (1333/4—1384). (Hourani 1991:183)
- 70 The only Hadiths acceptable to the Shia were those which a member of the Prophet's family had transmitted. The Sunna of imams were on the same level as the Prophet, but they should not be contrary to the Quran or Prophetic Hadith. The only valid *ijma* was that of the *umma* gathered round an imam. (Hourani 1991:183)
- 71 There were four tombs of imams in Madina. Ali's place of burial was at Najaf and Husayn had been interred at Karbala. The tombs of the other imams were at Kazimayn, Samara in the present-day Iraq, and one at Mashhad in Kurasan. (Hourani 1991:184)
- 72 *Ashura* commemorates Husayn's death and martyrdom at Karbala (Hourani 1991:184).
- 73 The Jewish people were *dhimmi*s in these Muslim countries.
- 74 It is incumbent on Muslims to read the Quran in its original language (Eliade 1987: 7:343).
- 75 These two concepts revitalise Islamic faith and practice. The specific meaning depends on the circumstances of the Islamic *umma*. However there always has been an individual or communal effort to clearly define Islam according to Allah's revelation. (Voll 1983a:32—3)
- 76 Jewish mysticism reached its pinnacle in Safed during the 1560s when Isaac Luria arrived in Safed (Eliade 1987:8:161; Epstein 1970:244ff.; Wigoder 1989:441—4; Hourani 1991:241).

- 77 Joseph Caro was born in the Iberian peninsula and was therefore a Sephardic Jew. His compilation omitted Ashkenazi practices, but the latter were added by Moses Isserles of Cracow (ca. 1520—1572). Since 1578 these additions or ‘glosses’ have been included in the *Shulhan aruh*. (Epstein 1970:262—3) This work would be used as a constitutional guide in later years (Elazar 1985:180).
- 78 The ground is being laid for Jewish polity which will be discussed in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.3.2.1).
- 79 While the spread of Hasidism and the founding of dynastic houses in eastern Europe are not relevant to this thesis, there are at least six Hasidic dynasties in the State of Israel. According to Rabinowicz (1982) they are from the dynasties of Ger (105ff.), Vizhnitz (119ff.), Belz (130ff.), Santz (141ff.), Shlonim (176ff.) and Satmar (288ff.). This last dynasty was established in Transylvania this century just before the Holocaust (Eliade 1987:6:212). There is also a Habad group founded by the Rabbi of Lubovitch, J.J. Schneersohn of New York (Rabinowicz 1982:212ff.). Hasidim do have an influence in Israeli politics, especially during the past few years. Hasidim will be discussed in Sections 3.3.1, 4.4.2 and 4.4.4.
- 80 In the main, the Hasidim have considered any Ashkenazi Jew who does not subscribe to their beliefs as Mitnaged (sing.), no matter whence he comes (Wigoder 1989:497). Until the 1992 parliamentary elections in the State of Israel the leader of the Mitnagdim had a powerful influence on Israel’s political scene (see Section 3.3.1).
- 81 The Gaon of Vilna was a great scholar who wrote more than 70 works on the scriptures. Perhaps the most important is a commentary on the *Shulhan aruh*. (Epstein 1970:282)
- 82 In the State of Israel today there are still tensions between the Hasidim and Mitnagdim, and these will be shown in Section 3.3.1.
- 83 The founder of Haskalah was the philosopher Moses Mendelssohn (1729—86). He had been influenced by Spinoza but did not shun Judaism because religion had bound Jews together for centuries. (Ettinger 1976:782—3)
- 84 Although the first Jewish Reform Temple was to be founded in 1810 by Israel Jacobson, it was David Friedländer (1756—1834) who established the basic principles of Reform Judaism. These still hold true today. Friedländer was a disciple of Mendelssohn. (Epstein 1970:292:291)
- 85 This could be considered tajdid and islah.

- 86 The 'notables' were to have a role to play during the British Mandate in Palestine.
- 87 The thought of al-Wahhab was the precursor of modern revivalism which was to emerge at the end of the 19th century and escalate until the present day. This subject will be addressed in Sections 2.8.2.1 and 2.9.3.
- 88 This was the first time that the Muslim umma had come into contact with a European power and their culture. Blasphemous behaviour, lewd conduct and public drinking were alien to Muslims. (Hourani 1991:265; Goldschmidt 1988:158) Western civilisation had introduced a new culture and new technology with which the Muslims had to contend. Muhammad Ali received permission from the Sultan to become ruler, and he instituted a number of reforms. He built up an army and imported Western instructors to teach engineering and medicine and to give military training. Muslim students were sent abroad where they came into contact with Western culture. He also took control of agriculture and made much of the land into waqfs — Muslim endowments. (Hourani 1991:273; Goldschmidt 1988:160) During the next two centuries when the Muslim Revivalists were to blame Western imperialism, the roots take hold here.
- 89 The Sephardic chief rabbi had the backing of the Ottoman government, even to the extent of sanctioning his verdicts. On the other hand the Ashkenazim had elected to be permanent residents under foreign consular protection. The government advised alien Jews to become citizens and passed a law that native-born people could not inherit property until they renounced consular protection. According to these facts, Jewish settlement in the country was opposed by the Turkish authorities even before the rise of the Zionist movement. (Friedman 1986:280:283—4)
- 90 The Orthodox rabbis particularly objected to the fact that these changes had been undertaken by people who were not scholars. Nevertheless these religious reforms continued. The spiritual father of Reform Judaism was Abraham Geiger (1810—74) who tried to find the essence of Judaism and rejected any laws and customs which had developed after the Mosaic Law. (Ettinger 1976:835; Hertzberg 1959:23)
- 91 Kalisher had been active in the controversies between the Reform and Orthodox on the side of the traditionalists. He believed that a return to Zion would solve the problem for the Jews of eastern Europe and convinced some people to buy land for settlement near Jaffa in 1866. (Hertzberg 1959:110) Kalisher and Alkalai were the precursors of religious Zionism.
- 92 The word *aliyah* literally means 'ascent'. However it has come to mean the immigration

of Jews to Eretz Israel/Palestine. The concept has an ideological connotation for both religious and Zionist Jews. (Rolef 1987:15ff.)

93 Before Ben-Yehuda, Ashkenazi Jews spoke Yiddish, while the Sephardim spoke 'Judeo-Spanish' (Hertzberg 1959:160; Wigoder 1989:741:400). Speaking modern Hebrew created tensions between the religious and secular Jews in Eretz Israel/Palestine.

94 According to Hertzberg (1959:181) the "*Auto-Emancipation* is the first great statement of the torment of the Jew driven to assert his own nationalism because the wider world had rejected him."

95 Even before the death of Moses, God had promised the children of Israel that after captivity they would return.

"That then the Lord thy God will turn thy captivity, and have compassion upon thee, and will return and gather thee from all the nations, whither the Lord thy God hath scattered thee." (Deut. 30:3)

"And the Lord thy God will bring thee into the land which thy fathers possessed, and thou shalt possess it, and He will do thee good, and multiply thee above thy fathers." (Deut. 30:5)

96 Modern Zionism and Nationalism are ideologies, and according to the definition of religion in this thesis can be regarded as religions.

97 Mizrachi is derived from *mercaz ruhani* (spiritual centre). The party was composed of two factions. One rejected "cultural" matter in the Zionist movement in case they would be secularised. The second group advocated adopting a role of religious influence. Mizrachi established a youth wing, Bnei Akiva (Sons of Akiva) in Eretz Israel/Palestine during the 1920s. The religious Zionists also established their own settlements. (Eliade 1987:15:575) Today many graduates of Bnei Akiva are members of *Gush Emunim* and advocate settlement in Judea and Samaria/West Bank (see Section 2.11.4).

98 Rabbi A.I. Kook was chief rabbi of Jaffa and surrounding agricultural settlements from 1904. In 1921 he established, and was elected to, the Chief Rabbinate as Ashkenazi rabbi. The development of this institution was due to him. He gave equal weight in membership to the Ashkenazi and Sephardic communities, including the establishment of the posts of chief Ashkenazi rabbi and chief Sephardic rabbi. The title of the latter is *Rishon le Zion* (First of Zion). (Rolef 1987:65; Hertzberg 1959:418)

99 The Revisionists were secular Zionists who were later to come into confrontation with the Zionist Socialists. Until the 1992 Israeli parliamentary elections, members of the original Revisionist Party led the ruling coalition government in the State of Israel.

- 100 *Yishuv* means 'settlement' or 'community'. The word refers to Eretz Israel/Palestine during the time of Zionist immigration; this is distinguished between the 'old Yishuv' of the religious communities before the advent of Zionism. (Rolef 1987:330)
- 101 Ulama is the plural form of alim, meaning a scholar. The plural form is used to indicate the clergy. (Hughes 1988:650)
- 102 According to Voll (1983a:35—43) there are three themes in major eras of Islamic history with regard to tajdid and islah. The first is a call to strict application of the Quran and Sunna. The second is the assertion by Sunni Muslims of the right of independent ijtiḥād of the Quran and Sunna, rather than having to rely on prior taqlid. Finally there is the re-affirmation of the authenticity of Islam in contrast to adopted alien ideas and ideologies. As will emerge, at times this involved a struggle.
- 103 al-Afghani was born and raised in Persia (Farah 1970:233). Therefore he knew both Shia and Sunni Islam.
- 104 The Middle East is usually understood to mean Turkey, Persia/Iran, the Arabian Peninsula, the Fertile Crescent, present-day Lebanon and the State of Israel. (The Fertile Crescent consists of present-day Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait.) Since Egypt also has a role to play in the Arab-Israeli conflict, this country needs to be included. (Foda 1991. Unpublished lectures: see Bibliography.)
- 105 The concept of a modern Islamic state is important today because Revivalist groups are trying to bring Muslims back to the Path of Islam. These Muslims are prepared to wage jihad even against other Muslims to achieve this. Since some Revivalist groups are active in the State of Israel today, and since they are also in conflict with the Arab Nationalist Movement, this subject will be addressed (*passim*).
- 106 The word 'Arab' is used here because there was a time when the Christian Arabs were united with the Muslims during the rise of Arab Nationalism. This is also true to a certain extent today.
- 107 Sharif is a descendant of the Prophet (Shimoni 1987:443). This is known as the Husayn Mc Mahon Correspondence. In return Britain promised financial and political support against the Ottomans as well as his own opponents. They also promised help in establishing sovereign Arab governments in the Arabian Peninsula and "most parts of the Fertile Crescent". Since the boundaries were not clearly stipulated the Arab people maintain that this included Palestine. After 1918 Mc Mahon believed the reverse. (Goldschmidt 1988:195) The text of Mc Mahon's letter of October 24, 1915 can be

found in *The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:16—7.

108 According to the terms of the Sykes—Picot Agreement, France would control much of modern-day Syria. Britain would rule the territory of lower Iraq directly and counsel an Arab government in the land between the Egyptian border and eastern Arabia. An area surrounding Jaffa and Jerusalem would come under international control. (Goldschmidt 1988:197f.)

109 The wording of the Balfour Declaration is as follows:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." (*The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:18)

110 Modern Iraq received its independence in 1930 (Hourani 1991:329).

111 *Article 2* of the mandate specifies this. It further safeguards "the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion."

Article 3 mentions "an appropriate Jewish agency ... recognised as a public body ... advising and co-operating ... Administration ..."

Article 7 mentions a nationality law "to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine."

Article 9 deals with respect for different peoples and religious interests. "In particular, the control and administration of waqfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders."

Article 22 stipulates that the official languages of Palestine shall be "English, Arabic and Hebrew."

Article 23 recognises the holy days of all the different communities. These are "legal days of rest for members of such communities."

Article 25: "In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provisions for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provision of the Articles ..."

This document was signed on July 24, 1922 in London (*The Israel-Arab reader*

1976:34—42).

It seems that the roots of the modern Arab-Israeli conflict over territory begin here.

112 This was the beginning of what was to become the conflict of the different religious groups in Lebanon. It was also the reason why modern Syria insists on retaining a foothold in Lebanon with the ultimate objective of including Lebanon in Greater Syria. The conflicts in these countries have an indirect effect on the State of Israel.

113 The Zionist leaders objected to the establishment of Transjordan because it was considered to be part of the Palestine mandate, and as such should have been available for Jewish settlement (Goldschmidt 1988:202).

114 It has been shown (*passim*) that Islam is a political religion, therefore a secular state would be against the religion. There was now a religio-political vacuum which was to cause the rise of modern Revivalist groups. They would call for a return to the true Path of Islam and the establishment of Islamic states according to the Sharia. These movements would have their role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Moreover some scholars such as Abul-Kalam Azad, Muhammad Iqbal, Ali Abd ar-Raziq and Rashid Rida tried to find justification for the abolition of the caliphate. ar-Raziq's ideas went beyond acceptable bounds and he was excommunicated. (Enayat 1986:59:62—5)

115 Over the years al-Ikhwan has either been tolerated in Egypt or its members have been imprisoned. Its history in that country is not relevant to this thesis. However this group has its part to play in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Muslim Brotherhood have also established branches throughout the Arab world.

116 Demonstrations were held during the celebration of *Nabi Mussa* in April 1920. This led to attacks on the Jews. (Shimoni 1987:43f.)

117 The Husayni family claim descent from the Prophet and for the past three centuries many of their members had held the office of Mufti, or mayor of Jerusalem or served in the Ottoman Parliament. Hajj Amin (ca. 1893-1974) was Mufti of Jerusalem and a politician. He studied for a year at al-Azhar in Cairo under Rashid Rida. Hajj Amin established the Supreme Muslim Council in 1921 and was elected its chairman. This council controlled the waqf. In 1936 he founded the Arab Higher Committee and organised the Arab Revolt. The following year this committee was banned by the British and he directed the uprising from Lebanon and Syria. (Shimoni 1987:215—7)

118 The Nashashibi family rose to prominence in the 19th century. Family members also

- held various positions of high office including adviser to the British High Commissioner. They were active in their opposition to Hajj Amin and wanted to accept the 1937 partition plan. They advocated participation of Arabs in British battalions in World War II. During the fourth decade of this century their influence declined. (Shimoni 1987: 349—50)
- 119 Muslih (1987:89:91) distinguishes between 'older politicians' and 'younger politicians'. The former had held positions in the Ottoman regime while the latter had not. Hence the 'older politicians' preferred legal opposition, such as petitions to the British Government, while the 'younger politicians' "ideology, strategy, tactics and organization were shaped accordingly." Both groups were secular even though they identified with Islam. Therefore an independent Palestine/Eretz Israel meant Arab self-determination and not an Islamic revival.
- 120 Istiqlal was committed to struggle against the British, Jewish land-sales and immigration and the establishment of an Arab government (Kayyali 1978:167).
- 121 Muslih (1987:86) agrees with this assessment.
- 122 The Palestine Revolt began as a complete boycott of everything Jewish, but then escalated into a general uprising. This was in response to increased Jewish immigration, which resulted from events in Nazi Germany, and also against the British policy in the mandated territory. (Shimoni 1987:44)
- 123 The slogan of al-Ikhwan's soldiers was "The Quran is our Constitution, the Prophet is our Guide; Death for the glory of Allah is our greatest ambition." (Hiro 1988:63)
- 124 This showed opposition to the agreement to the establishment of a National Home for the Jews in Eretz Israel/Palestine (Ettinger 1976:998).
- 125 Va'ad Le'umi : National Council of the Jewish community in Eretz Israel/Palestine. This body was established in 1920 and was recognised by the British in 1928. Its purpose was administration and taxation of the Jewish community. After the establishment of the State of Israel this body was supplanted by the Provisional Government. (Rolef 1987:310)
- 126 Haganah is the Hebrew word for 'defence', and its function was defence of Jewish life, honour and property. In 1941 some members formed the Palmach which was a military wing ready for defence against a German and Italian invasion. (Rolef (1987:136)
- 127 Ettinger (1976:999) maintains that the 'rights of the inhabitants' refers to "... the total opposition of the Arabs to the Jewish National Home. Thus we see that the Jewish

High Commissioner and the British Government regarded the fulfilment of their mandatory obligations in accordance with the degree of Arab pressure. The outcome of this policy was that Arab opposition to the National Home grew even stronger."

128 *Article 4* of the British Mandate provided for "an appropriate Jewish agency" which would be recognised to advise and co-operate with the Palestine Administration with regard to economic, social and "other matters". It should also "assist and take part in the development of the country" but the administration would be in control. (*The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:35)

129 The Western Wall is the last remaining retaining wall of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Jews believe that this portion was never destroyed since "the Divine Presence rests there". This explanation can be found in the *Midrash*. (Exod. R 2:2; Num. R 11:2; Lam. R 1:31) At the end of the last century the Western Wall became a symbol of Jewish nationalist aspirations, and there is conflict between the Muslim and Jewish peoples since the Haram is the place where the Prophet ascended to heaven. (Wigoder 1989:727f.)

130 Many Orthodox Jews and Yeshiva students lived in Hebron and they were unable to defend themselves. Elderly people, women and children were among those killed. (Ettinger 1976:1007)

131 Chaim Weizmann (1874—1952) was president of the Zionist organisation from 1920 to 1931 and again from 1935 to 1948. He was also active in the struggle for the creation of the State of Israel between 1946 and 1948, and became Israel's first State President. (Rolef 1987:318)

132 The resolution which was adopted, stated that "we must make Great Britain understand that to choose between our friendship and the Jews, Britain must change her policy in Palestine or we shall be at liberty to side with other European powers whose policies are inimicable to Great Britain." (Ettinger 1976:1013)

At this time Hitler was consolidating his position in Germany and some Arabs had met German and Italian agents (Ettinger 1976:1012).

133 David Ben Gurion (1886—1973) immigrated to Eretz Israel/Palestine from Poland in 1906. Although he was a Zionist-Socialist, he convinced his party colleagues that "The party will strive for an independent state for the Jewish people in this country". From 1935 he was chairman of the Zionist Executive and the Jewish Agency. He declared the independence of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, and was its first prime minister

- and minister of defence. (Rolef 1987:58f.)
- 134 This was Resolution 181. (The Jerusalem post. Friday, November 29, 1991)
- 135 The Palestinian Arabs started to leave the country in April 1948 before the British withdrawal and before the State of Israel had been declared (Ettinger 1976:1056).
- 136 *Irgun Zva'i Le'umi* means 'national military organisation'. It was a dissident movement founded by the Revisionist Party after a disagreement with the Haganah. (Rolef 1987:158)
- 137 Deir Yassin was attacked by members of the Irgun in April 1948. The villagers, including women and children, were killed and the village itself was destroyed. The Jewish leadership and the Haganah denounced this massacre. (Shimoni 1987:149)
- 138 The tensions between the Ultra-orthodox community and the secular leadership have their roots here and the situation today is unchanged.
- 139 Menachem Begin (1913—92) was commander of the Irgun in 1943. Subsequently, due to its activities, £10000 was offered by the British for his capture, but he was able to evade capture. In 1977 he became prime minister of the State of Israel, and in 1979 was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize together with President Sadat. (Rolef 1987:56f.)
- 140 *Lehi* is a Hebrew acronym meaning 'fighters for the freedom of Israel' (Rolef 1987:202). Yitzhak Shamir (b. 1915) was a member of the Irgun and subsequently Lehi, which he commanded from 1942. He was arrested in 1941 and 1946 by the British. He escaped the first time and was exiled to Eritrea where he escaped again. He became prime minister of Israel for the first time in 1983 (Rolef 1987:271f.) and he held the post until 1992. In November/December 1991 he led the Israeli delegation to the Madrid peace conference (Shimoni 1991:252).
- 141 "With the re-establishment of the State of Israel ... the Jewish people. During these forty centuries, from the twentieth century B.C. to the twentieth century A.D., they struggled, fought, fell, revived, regressed, and advanced over four continents and through six civilizations, surviving against all odds." (Dimont 1962:414)
- 142 The United Nations (UN) appointed Count Folke Bernadott to mediate in the conflict, but his recommendations were opposed by both Israel and the Arab states. He was assassinated in Jerusalem by Jewish dissidents. (Shimoni 1987:122)
- 143 On May 31, 1948 Ben Gurion, who was also minister of defence, ordered the creation of the Israel Defence Force (IDF). The following day the Irgun agreed to integration

into the army in separate units, and the IDF officially came into existence on June 27, 1948. However the Irgun had purchased a ship, the *Altalena*, which was to bring arms and Holocaust survivors and volunteers to the country. The Irgun had informed the government of its impending arrival off the coast of Israel on June 19. Ben Gurion demanded that the arms be given to the government since the Irgun was being integrated into the IDF, but Begin wanted recognition for his men and organisation. When Irgun volunteers tried to unload the arms, a canon was fired from the shore and fire broke out. People on board jumped into the sea and several drowned. The government action showed its control militarily and politically; yet this incident contributed to the tensions between the Israel's political Left and Right. (Ettinger 1976: 1060f.; Rolef 1987:20:151)

144 The 'proximity talks' were held on the island of Rhodes. Since the Arabs refused to sit in the same room with the Israelis, Ralph Bunche was the mediator between the parties. (Goldschmidt 1988:269)

145 Israel refused to allow full-scale repatriation for three reasons: people had left voluntarily and had rejected the idea of becoming citizens of the State of Israel; those who had emigrated would be hostile and could undermine the State; and since there was a large-scale immigration of Jews from Arab countries, there was a population exchange. Israel proposed that an agreed number might return, and showed willingness to compensate for immovable property and land. These offers were rejected. (Shimoni 1987:50)

On the other hand the Western powers and Israel believed that the refugees would be absorbed into the host countries. However this could not happen because "the Palestinians themselves cherished their identity," ... and insisted on their right to return instead of resettlement in the Arab countries. The Arab states could not absorb them due to economic and social factors and a preservation of ethnic and sectarian balances. (Hourani 1991:360; al-Shuaibi 1973:68)

146 *Feda-yyun* are guerilla groups. The concept comes from the Ismaili Shia. (Shimoni 1987:181)

147 al-Fateh will be addressed in Sections 2.10.1 and 2.11.1.

148 Nasserism: The masses were spoken to in the language of Islam, but in a secular form in tune with the modern world. Hence Arab Nationalism and unity were stressed and since social reform was needed, Nasserism came to mean 'Arab Socialism'; al-Azhar was

- strictly controlled by the government. (Hourani 1991:405f.)
- 149 Baath (Resurrection) ideology stressed the right of Arabs to live in their own states as in the days of the Prophet. In the mid 1950s the Baath Party merged with a socialist party and social reforms and socialism were stressed. In 1963 the Baath Party came to power in Syria and Hafez al-Asad took a leading role. He is an Alawi. (Hourani 1991: 404f.; Shimoni 1987:98)
- 150 The Muslims favoured joining the United Arab Republic (paragraph 3) while most Christians wanted separate independence, a pro-Western foreign policy and a neutral stance in inter-Arab affairs (Shimoni 1987:293).
- 151 Jordan's King Husayn is for the most part pro-West and turns to these countries in times of crisis (Shimoni 1987:258).
- 152 Arab leaders and their loyalties were not united (al-Shuaibi 1979:77).
- 153 The Arab Union broke up in July 1958 and the UAR in 1961 (Shimoni 1987:257:495). While these two events have no direct bearing on the Arab-Israeli conflict, they show that the Arab states were pre-occupied with their own problems and were disunited. Consequently the Arabs who had been citizens of Palestine/Eretz Israel had to find their own solutions.
- 154 This journal was published each month in Beirut under the auspices of Yasir Arafat and Khalid al-Wazir [Abu Jihad] (al-Shuaibi 1979:80).
- 155 Yasir Arafat (b. 1929) is related to the Husayni family. He obtained an engineering degree at the Cairo University where he was active in the Students' Union. (Shimoni 1987:88)
- 156 Fateh is an acronym of *Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watanni al-Falestinia* (Palestine Liberation Movement). Hataf (the reverse of the acronym) means 'conquest' or 'victory'. The word *Fateh* appears in the Quran. (Livingstone & Halevy 1990:67)
- "And (He will give you) another blessing which ye love: help from Allah and present victory. Give good tidings (O Muhammad) to believers." (Quran 61:13)
- 157 Resolution 242 was proposed by the British (Ettinger 1976:1068). The first clause states "from territories" and not "from *the* territories". This causes conflict because Israel maintains that this does not mean a complete withdrawal, since a partial withdrawal would allow her to live within secure and recognised boundaries. The second clause did not mention the Palestinians. Some Arabs saw the "just settlement of the refugee problem" to mean that Palestinian refugees who wished to return to Israel could do so.

- On the other hand, Israel brought forth the argument of population exchange. (Goldschmidt 1988:308—9) The third clause recognises Israel's right to exist (*The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:365).
- 158 East Jerusalem is the site of Muslim holy places (Hourani 1991:413).
- 159 Judea is the area of the West Bank south of Jerusalem, and Samaria lies to the north of it (Rolef 1987:343).
- 160 In December 1967 a Ramallah resident advocated the establishment of a Palestinian state "in part of the territory of Palestine, co-existing with Israel in the other part." Members of the PLO shelled his house and said, "We reject and resist any solution that ensures the survival of the embodiment of the Zionist movement, because our goal is the total liberation of Palestine territories." (al-Shuaibi 1990a:63) There were also overtures by the Israeli authorities to the people of Judea and Samaria/West Bank with regard to self-administration. These were rejected. (al-Shuaibi 1980a:64)
- 161 October 6, 1973 was Yom Kippur for the Jewish people. This date also coincided with the month of Ramadan and consequently the war was considered a jihad against Israel. Many soldiers of both sides were fasting. Some Muslims see the Arab advances and successes as a sign that Allah had forgiven them for their straying from the Path of Islam in the past.
- 162 In 1971 Anwar Sadat (1918—1981) was prepared to start negotiations for peace. Since the State of Israel would not accept his pre-conditions the only other option to liberate his captured territories was through war. (Shimoni 1987:245)
- 163 Because of the Peace Treaty, Egypt became isolated in the Arab world, and members of the Muslim Revivalist Movement reacted and many were imprisoned. President Sadat was finally assassinated by a member of the Jihad group. (Hiro 1988:78)
- 164 Fateh adopted the slogan "the revolution has a Palestinian face and an Arab heart." (al-Shuaibi 1980a:56) At this stage Fateh was still separate from the PLO. Fateh saw four phases in their struggle: 'hit and run', 'limited confrontation', 'temporary occupation', and 'permanent occupation' (Gresh 1988:15). Fateh did not want a *status quo* of Israeli occupation/administration. Therefore this group established bases on the east bank of the Jordan River and continued a harassment campaign against Israel. At the end of March 1968 the IDF attacked the town of Karameh where they encountered stiff resistance. Arafat claimed a military victory and this battle has become a symbol for the Palestinians. Karameh is an Arabic

- word meaning 'honour', and the fighters had defended the honour of all Arabs. (Hudson 1969:300; Cobban 1990:41f.; Livingstone 1990:80f.; Gresh 1988:33; Taraki 1991:55f.)
- 165 Only the more well-known groups will be mentioned.
- 1967:* Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was founded by Dr George Habash, which has a semi-Maoist orientation (Shimoni 1987:407:201; Livingstone 1990:75).
- 1968:* Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) was established by Ahmad Jibril. This is a breakaway faction of Habash's group. (Livingstone 1990:76; Hudson 1969:297:298)
- 1968:* al-Saiqa was established by the Baath party of Syria. It is pro-Syria and remained a member of the PLO until 1983 (Livingstone 1990:75; Hudson 1969:298:297; Shimoni 1987:428).
- 1969:* Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) was established by Na'if Hawatma. Its ideological stance is Marxist-Maoist. This group became estranged from the PLO but later returned to the organisation (Shimoni 1987:407:202; Hudson 1969:298; Livingstone 1990:76).
- There were also tensions in Fateh in 1969 when one of their members gave an interview to a newspaper. He declared that "We reject the formula that the Jews must be driven into the sea". Fateh condemned this. (Gresh 1988:33)
- Furthermore in 1973 Abu Nidal (Sabri Khalil al-Banna) was to break away from Fateh and from the Fateh Revolutionary Council. The dissident group subsequently tried unsuccessfully to return to the PLO. (Livingstone 1990:74)
- 166 *Article 15.* "... to liquidate the Zionist presence in Palestine ..."
- Article 19.* "The partition of Palestine, which took place in 1947, and the establishment of Israel, are fundamentally invalid, ..."
- Article 20.* "The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate instrument, and all their consequences, are hereby declared null and void. The claim of historical or spiritual links between the Jews and Palestine is neither in conformity with historical fact nor does it satisfy the requirements for statehood. Judaism is a revealed religion; it is not a separate nationality, nor are the Jews a single people with a separate identity; they are citizens of their respective countries."
- Article 33.* "This charter may only be amended with a majority of two-thirds of the total number of members of the National Assembly of the Palestine Liberation Organization

at a special meeting called for that purpose."

(The Palestine National Covenant, June 1968: Pamphlet: see Bibliography.)

- 167 Hudson (1969:303) maintains that the violence has three positive effects. Firstly there is depression of Israeli morale, and cleavages in Israeli politics when these acts continue. Secondly this gives the Arabs in the Territories time to organise themselves into active resistance against the Israeli authorities. Finally the violence forces Israel to retaliate with consequent condemnations by the world community and Arab states.
- 168 The PNF saw themselves as "an integral part of the Palestine National Movement as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organisation". The local movement declared support for any activity which would put an end to occupation/administration. They would furthermore protect their culture against distortions, show their attachment to the land and "struggle to defend it." (Taraki 1991:58)
- 169 Raising the Palestinian flag replaced the Jordanian flag and was used at every Nationalist event, demonstration and funeral (al-Shuaibi 1980b:103).
- 170 This was the first time that the West Bank/Judea and Samaria was claimed to belong to the Palestinian people with their own authority, in contrast to their former resignation as part of Jordan. West Bank/Judea and Samaria residents adopted three slogans: "No to occupation." "No to the restoration of Jordanian rule." "Yes to the PLO." (al-Shuaibi 1980b:99)
- 171 This was a change for the PLO but not for Israel because the Palestinians still did not accept Resolution 242 (Foda 1991: unpublished lectures: see Bibliography).
- 172 The Palestinians in the Territories expressed their approval with a general strike. This was the first time that a Palestinian leader had presented their cause before a world body. (al-Shuaibi:1980b:121) The official English text of Arafat's address to the UN can be found in: *Journal of Palestine studies*, vol. 4, no. 2, Winter 1975, p. 181—92; *The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:504—18.
- 173 The PNC is considered the Palestinian parliament in exile. (Livingstone 1990:70)
- 174 Refugee camps in Lebanon hung out posters of the Ayatolla Khomeini. The slogan was "Today Iran! Tomorrow Palestine." (Cobban 1990:104)
- 175 There are differences in the ideologies of the various Islamic groups. However there are three points of unanimity:
- The Palestinian question is a religious one. Islam as a world religion is in a favourable position to free Palestine. This was achieved once before during the

- Crusades. Therefore Islamic ideas must replace secular ideas. (Sahliyah 1989:95)
- The struggle with Israel must take place on religious grounds. The Revivalists believe that the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 symbolised the triumph of evil over justice, while the Likud Party, which came to power in 1977, use religious arguments for their policies. Israel is seen as aligning itself to the West to cause rifts among Arabs, erode Islamic cultural identity, and alienate Muslims from their religion. (Sahliyah 1989:95)
- "Many people of the Scripture long to make you disbelievers of your belief ..." (Quran 2:109).
- From the perspective of Islam there is no room for compromise in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore Muslim Revivalists cannot recognise the State of Israel or conceive of the PLO negotiating with it. Indeed the Islamic Movement considers itself at war with any organisation or country accepting or recognising territorial compromise with Israel. The struggle against Israel should be comprehensive and total. Since the State of Israel was established because of Islam's decline and the demise of the Ottoman Empire, Islam's unity must be re-established. (Sahliyah 1989:95)
- 176 The pro-Khomeini group maintains that the Muslim Brotherhood do not take into consideration the differences between the Shia and the Sunni Muslims. The Iranian Revolution was a Muslim victory in modern times and triumph over the West. This group is militant and hostile to Israel and the West. (Sahliyah 1989:92)
- 177 There are practising Muslims who support Fateh. They believe that some day the PLO will accept Islam. (Sahliyah 1989:94)
- 178 The whole of Palestine/Eretz Israel is Islamic waqf territory; therefore not even one inch is negotiable. Establishment of a Palestinian state in the Territories is a betrayal. The only solution is a return to Islam, which is a weapon which has been proved in the past. Then there will be promise of victory by embarking on a jihad against Israel. Violence is justified against fellow-Palestinians or the enemy. (Shadid 1988:688—70)
- 179 The Amal and Hizballah groups have come into direct confrontation with Israel either by guerilla/terrorist activities against civilians or the IDF.
- 180 Amal under the Imam was not militant. His objective was to supplant the secular leadership of the Shia community in Lebanon with the ulama. Berri had no links with the clergy or the ruling families. (Deeb 1988:683:686)
- 181 In Syria Sunni Muslim Revivalists undertook a series of uprisings because President

- Asad, an Alawi, was not accepted by them. On the other hand the Shia of Syria regard Alawis as legitimate Muslims. (Deeb 1988:687)
- 182 It is imperative to struggle against "imperialism in all its forms". Therefore the slogan adopted is "No East and no West, only Islam." Since the West wants to destroy the Quran, the umma must live together in an Islamic state, and the ulama should be leaders. (Deeb 1988:694f.)
- 183 Faraj, the chief theoretician of Jihad, outlines his theory and plan of action in *Al-Jihad: The Forgotten Pillar and Absent Obligation*. Islam obliges every Muslim to struggle for the revival of the Muslim umma. Any Muslim leaders who do not adhere to the Sharia are apostates. (Hiro 1988:80) "Let not believers take disbelievers for their friends in preference to believers ..." (Quran 3:28). Jahiliyyah (period of ignorance) can only be ended and the Muslim umma revived by jihad. Faraj asserts "the only acceptable form of jihad is armed struggle; anything less implies cowardice ..." (Hiro 1988:80) According to Abu Said al-Khudri, "The highest kind of jihad is to speak up for truth in the face of a ruler that deviates from the right path." (Shah 1987:52). Hiro (1988:80) maintains that there are two new concepts in Faraj's thought. Jihad is considered the Sixth Pillar of Islam, and also a conversion of the non-Muslim world into the Islamic umma.
- 184 Educated young men from the Sharia colleges are now replacing the more conservative imams and Sharia court judges. They can foster a higher level of political consciousness in established Muslim institutions. (Lesch 1987:237) Students from these colleges deliver sermons during the Friday prayers. Their themes are a call to return to Islam and the glories of the first Islamic state. (Sahliyah 1989:92)
- 185 Lewis (1990:35—38) (Unpublished treatise: see Bibliography.)
- 186 There was a difference of opinion with regard to the Sinai peninsula. Some people maintained that the Decalogue had been given there, and so this territory had to be retained. Others believed that Sinai was not part of the Holy Land since the Jewish people had wandered there before entering the land of Canaan. Moreover this peninsula had never been included in the British mandate. (Isaac 1976:60f.)
- 187 Mapam (Mifleget Po'alim Me'uchedet — United Workers' Party) is a Zionist socialist party which was established in 1948 as a result of a merger with pre-state parties. Its members still have seats in the Knesset today. (Rolef 1987:213—4)
- 188 The Secular general consensus saw withholding the Territories as an affront to basic moral values whether Zionist, Jewish, humanitarian, Socialist or Liberal. (Isaac 1976:88)

Religious arguments were three-fold: Because Jewish survival is paramount, keeping territory could endanger the nation's existence. Furthermore the Land of Israel argument was a political issue rather than a religious one, and finally the messianic redemption would never occur in a socialist Zionist Movement. (Isaac 1976:81)

189 According to Kahane the Jewish people are unique, singular and holy. No other nation was chosen by God, therefore they will succeed. Moreover, "Esau (the Arab) is especially hateful to Jacob (the Jew)." (Sprinzak 1985b:4)

"And the Lord said unto her, Two nations are in thy womb, and two manner of people shall be separated from their bowels; and the one people shall be stronger than the other people; and the elder shall serve the younger." (Gen. 25:23)

Kahane's second fundamental axiom is that the Land of Israel is sacred. Therefore the State of Israel must have sovereignty over this land which was promised in the Bible. "There is only one land — the land of Israel — and not one inch is not ours and not one inch dare be given back." Furthermore God directed the victory of the Six-Day/1967 War from above. Consequently Jews should rather die than surrender the Territories. In addition messianic redemption could have taken place had the government of Israel immediately annexed the Territories, expelled the "alien worship" from the Temple Mount/Haram and expelled all "enemies of the Jews" from the State of Israel. (Sprinzak 1985b:3—5)

190 *Hitnahalut* (sing.) as a word cannot be translated. The concept means settlement and messianism. Jewish people must settle the land through religious obligations and cultural imperative. This right is not negotiable because it is a prerequisite to the Redemption. This will occur through "the settlement of the land and the revival of Israel in it." (Schnall 1987:179; 1977:151)

191 The ideology of Gush Emunim comes from religious Judaism and non-socialist Zionism. Members refer to the writings of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, as interpreted by his son, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook. There is a mystical link between Jews and their land with regard to messianism. According to Rabbi A.I. Kook the State of Israel has sacred status. When Jews returned to their land, this was the beginning of the Redemption process which would culminate in the messianic era. It did not matter whether they were religious or not, they were performing a holy mission. According to this a return of any part of the land would be heretical because every piece is holy. Rabbi Z.Y. Kook said, "... as it is impossible to force us to eat pig and profane the Sabbath, so is it impossible to force us to leave this place [a settlement called Elon Moreh]." He also

said that "A Jewish government which creates a Pale of Settlement within its own land violates the commandments of the Creator ..." Rabbi A.I. Kook had said that the power of the messiah is aroused when there is war in the world. This idea comes from the Talmudic Tractate Megilla. Members of Gush Emunim have pointed out that Shechem/Nablus is the biblical city of Jacob's wanderings and the violation of Dinah, his daughter, as recorded in the Book of Genesis. Furthermore Mount Eval and Mount Gerizim are the places where tribal leaders gave blessings and admonitions to the people of Israel. This is recorded in Deuteronomy. Another example quoted is that Kiryat Arba at Hebron is close to the burial-place of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and their wives. This settlement is also not far from the tomb of Rachel. Consequently it would be impossible to cede their claim on this territory. (Aviad 1984:202:214:215:217; Avruch 1978/9:209:210; Schnall 1977:150; Schnall 1987:177:178—9:176) Schnall (1977: 153) concludes that the ideology/philosophy of Gush Emunim combines religious faith with *realpolitik*. Consequently secular Jews support its activities.

- 192 The Tehiya political party was founded by members from the Herut faction of the Likud Party, the Land of Israel Movement and Gush Emunim. This was in response to the Camp David Accords. Tehiya means Revival. This party called for the abolition of opposing camps in Israeli politics such as religious and secular, doves and hawks, and Nationalists and Socialists. Tehiya adopted the slogan "going it together". In 1979 Rabbi Z.Y. Kook instructed students from his yeshiva to co-operate with this secular party. As a result many members of Gush Emunim joined Tehiya. (Rolef 1987:295—6)
- 193 Shalom Achshav advocates that both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict should compromise on its historic rights over territorial partition. Secondly the Arabs must recognise the right of the existence of the State of Israel with mutually-recognised boundaries. Thirdly Israel must recognise the Palestinian people's right to a national existence. Fourthly Israel must have secure borders without major adjustments to territory. Finally re-united Jerusalem must be the capital of the State of Israel but different religions should be provided for. (Rolef 1987:249)
- 194 The *Alignment (Ma'arach)* is an alliance of different labour parties which existed before 1965. Over the years some parties have joined or left the Alignment. Until 1977 it headed all coalition governments, but with the rise of the Likud it went into the opposition except when it joined the national unity government. (Rolef 1987:15) *Shinui (change)* was founded after the Yom Kippur/October 1973 War. Founding members

were against the refusal of the government to take responsibility for the mistakes which allowed the outbreak of the war and its subsequent conduct. Among other issues, Shinui advocates negotiations and territorial compromise in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. This party further wants electoral reforms and a written constitution ensuring basic rights of all citizens. (Rolef 1987:274—5) The Civil Rights Movement (popularly known as *Ratz*) was established in 1973 after a split from the Labour Party. Ratz advocates electoral reform. This party supports a Palestinian entity and their right to self-determination. It further demands the separation of religion and state, and equal rights for women. (Rolef 1987:68)

195 The NRP had always aligned itself with the Labour Party since the days of the Jewish Agency. Moreover this religious party had served in every coalition since the founding of the State of Israel. In 1977 it joined the political Right. (Sandler 1989/90:19)

196 Until 1977 Agudat Israel had seen the State of Israel as de facto, and gave tacit support to the government. In return it received government allocations for its own educational system which was recognised by the Education Ministry. Since Begin was sympathetic towards religion, the elected members of this party gave more active support and accepted positions in their own sphere of interest, for example as chairman of the Knesset finance committee. (Sandler 1989/90:21:22)

197 The Likud, Tehiya and a large part of the NRP believed that the Land of Israel (Eretz Israel) belonged to the Jewish people through history and in essence. Therefore the international boundaries of the State of Israel should be identical to the biblical land of Israel and cannot be partitioned. (Sandler 1989/90:19:23) Consequently members of Gush Emunim were permitted to establish new settlements in Judea and Samaria/West Bank (Goldschmidt 1988:361).

198 Jordan and Iraq subsequently resumed diplomatic ties with Egypt, who supplied aid to the latter in its war with Iran. In 1983 Yasir Arafat was welcomed to Cairo. (Goldschmidt 1988:361)

199 This aim was supported by the Labour Alignment party, but its members objected to the IDF advance beyond the 40 km. radius north of Israel's border (Rolef 1987:198).

200 This advance was to help a Christian, Bashir Jemayel, become president, after which he would sign a peace-treaty with Israel. It was also expected that the Syrian forces would withdraw from Lebanon. The State of Israel had been helping the Christians in Lebanon for some years. (Rolef 1987:195)

- 201 This was the first Israeli-Palestinian war. There was however as indirect inter-state conflict with Syria. (Battah 1988:2f.) This extension of the theatre of war caused a cleavage in Israeli politics. Parties from the Centre and Left maintained that this was the first time in the history of the State where Israel had chosen to fight a war. They also argued that it would be impossible to destroy the PLO physically. Furthermore the Lebanese would not accept an unpopular government, nor could their internal conflicts be solved in this manner. Finally the Syrians could not be driven out of Lebanon. On the other side of the political spectrum it was argued that criticism only sabotaged the war effort, which was correct and just. After the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps by the Lebanese Christian army, Israel's Defence Minister resigned and an Israeli commission of enquiry was set up. (Rolef 1987:189)
- 202 Arafat and Husayn had drafted an agreement accepting UN Resolution 242. On this basis it was agreed that a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation would be prepared to join the peace talks. (Sayigh 1989:247)
- 203 The conflict among the various groups affiliated to the PLO was due to their own political positions (Sayigh 1989:253—4).
- 204 Orthodox Jews do not go up to the Temple Mount/Haram area. Since they do not know the exact site of the Holy of Holies, they are afraid of walking on holy ground. (Peretz 1990:21)
- 205 Very few of those polled thought that the Palestinians in this annexed area should be given Israeli citizenship, and of those supporting annexation, half thought that the Arabs should be transferred to other Arab countries. The concept 'transfer' had now become respectable in Israeli right-wing politics. *Moledet* (Motherland) was a new political party which was established to contest the 1988 Knesset elections. Its political platform was 'transfer'. This provided an alternative to people who could not bring themselves to vote for Kach. (Peretz 1990:31f.)
- 206 *Intifada* is an Arabic word meaning 'to shake off'. It is popularly used to mean 'uprising'. (Peretz 1990:4)
- 207 This prompted the Minister of Education to provide additional funds for courses in schools on democracy and racial tolerance (Peretz 1990:31).
- 208 They maintained that the IDF had become an army of occupation. Some stated that they would rather face imprisonment than serve in the Territories. (Peretz 1990:13)
- 209 *Sumud* means 'steadfastness' (against the occupation). *Muqawin* means 'resistance'.

- Sumud muqawin* sought resistance to, and undermining of, the occupation/administration. (Farsoun 1991:28)
- 210 According to Shalev (1991:13) Rashad al-Shawa (d. 1988), a former mayor of Gaza city, was interviewed on the English language service of Israel Radio two days after the start of the Intifada. He is reported to have said, "One should expect such things after twenty years of miserable occupation. The people have lost all hope. They are absolutely frustrated. They don't know what to do. They have taken a line of Fundamentalists, being the last resort that they can look up. They have lost hope that Israel will ever give them their rights. They feel that the Arab countries are unable to accomplish anything. They feel that the PLO, which they regard as their representative, has failed to accomplish anything."
- 211 President Qadhafi of Libya has suggested that Muslims could freely interpret the Quran (Hourani 1991:457).
- 212 This conservative attitude is held by the Saudi regime and the Iranian revolutionary regime. However their cumulative traditions are not the same. (Hourani 1991:457)
- 213 Shas refers to the Babylonian Talmud. Medieval Christians believed that the Talmud was defamatory to Christianity. Consequently they appointed censors to examine Talmudic literature. These censors referred to the Talmud as 'Shas'. (Wigoder 1989:642)
The success of the Shas Party at its first attempt, especially at the expense of the NRP, signified a rise of Ultra-orthodoxy (Sandler 1989/90:20).
- 214 *Morasha* was founded in 1983 by defectors from the NRP and another Ultra-orthodox party which failed to enter the Knesset in 1981. *Morasha* had rigid religious positions and encouraged settlement in the Territories. Half-way through the Knesset term, one member of the Knesset returned to the NRP, leaving *Morasha* with only one seat. (Rolef 1987:224)
- 215 Parties to the Left of Labour were unable to reconcile the gap between themselves and the religious camp (Sandler 1989/90:20).
- 216 In January 1988 the military wing of Fateh issued a pamphlet with specific instructions on how to prepare incendiary devices both in a bottle and in a plastic bag. This pamphlet further instructed people to fight with any weapon available, such as stones, Molotov cocktails and arms.
- 217 *The Jerusalem post*: Friday, September 20, 1991.
Pamphlet 73 of the Unified Leadership advocated the halting of collaborator-murders

but Pamphlet 74 called for its renewal.

218 *al-Fajr*. June 6, 1991.

219 *al-Fajr*. July 4, 1991.

220 *al-Fajr*. July 8, 1991.

Of the 14-member Palestinian delegation to the Madrid Peace Conference, 11 have university degrees. Of the six advisors to this delegation, five have university degrees while one attended university but did not complete his degree. (*Arabs in Israel: monthly newsletter from the Institute for Arab-Jewish Affairs*. vol. 1, issue 23, December 1991)

221 Apart from the 1948 War/War of Independence and the Katyushas from Lebanon, the civilian sector has never been in the front-line in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Consequently a new complexion has been placed on Israel's security needs. (Schiff 1991:19)

222 *The Jerusalem post*. Friday, August 30, 1991.

223 *The Jerusalem post*. Friday, March 1, 1991.

224 *The Jerusalem post*. Thursday, October 31, 1991.

This was the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict that the Arabs have sat together with the Israelis round the same table. In Israel many people, including the State President, mentioned the fact that 1991 would be 500 years after the Expulsion from Spain. Furthermore rabbis at that time had declared a *Herem* (ban of excommunication) on Jews going to Spain. This *Herem* is now coming to an end. Consequently many people in Israel see these events as signs that there is a good chance for peace, since during the Golden Age in Spain, the Jews and Muslims lived together in harmony.

225 *The Jerusalem post*. Sunday, November 3, 1991.

226 Hamas issues leaflets and its rhetoric is more inflammatory than that of other groups. They reject peace in the area. According to a leaflet in March 1988, they ask: "Where is the justice with them still possessing one inch on the coast of Haifa and Acre?" (Satloff 1989:396)

227 *Article 1* states that the Islamic Resistance Movement follows the Path of Islam by using its ideas and concepts of existence, life and the human being.

Article 8 "Allah is the goal, the messenger is its miracle, the Quran its constitution, the jihad is its way and death for Allah is the most exalted of its aspirations." This is its slogan.

Article 11 explicitly states "Palestine is Islamic waqf land of Muslims of all ages until the end of time." Therefore it cannot be renounced or conceded.

Article 13 rejects an international peace conference. These conferences are the appointment of infidels as judges over Muslim land. "When have infidels ever dealt justly with the faithful?" (*The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement*)

228 *The Jerusalem post*. Friday, March 3, 1989.

229 *The Jerusalem report*. December 26, 1991.

230 *The Jerusalem report*. December 12, 1991.

231 *The Jerusalem post*. Sunday, September 22, 1991.

232 *The Jerusalem post*. Friday, November 8, 1991. He is further reported to have said, "I joined them because I am a good Muslim, and a very good Muslim joins ... Our ideology is to free Palestine in line with the laws of Islam."

233 Faisal al-Husayni is a member of the Jerusalem al-Husayni family who claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad. However they do not use the title Sharif. He is considered to be close to Fateh but advocates peaceful co-existence with Israel. (Shimoni 1991:110)

234 This state would be a multi-party democratic republic. The president and parliament would be elected, and there would be freedom of religion and guarantees of Human Rights. (Peretz 1990:110)

235 There was also discussion on "confronting the racist, fascist, Zionist enemy and its bestial crimes" (Documents 1988:181).

236 It was argued that the PLO could not accept these resolutions because they did not mention the rights of the Palestinian people. Furthermore a Palestinian state would not threaten Israel because it would be democratic and consequently unlikely to attack its neighbours. (Peretz 1990:112)

237 "The State of Palestine is committed to the principles and purposes of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ... It furthermore announces itself to be a peace-loving state, in adherence to the principles of peaceful co-existence. It will join with all states and peoples in order to assure a permanent peace based upon justice and the respect of rights ... believes in the settlement of regional and international disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with the UN Charter and resolutions." (Documents 1989:215:216)

In none of the literature consulted has there been any mention of any change to the PLO Covenant from 1988. Therefore presumably all articles remain as written.

238 The election campaign had stressed foreign policy issues, such as the Palestinians and the Territories. Therefore religion and state were peripheral issues. Moreover pre-election surveys by four different polling agencies did not find or predict this trend.

(Sandler 1989/90:17) On the other hand the Ultra-orthodox parties used their own strategies in the pre-election campaign. The Council of Sages of Shas were shown on national television where they promised those who voted for this party a release from religious vows. The Habad Hasidim, which supported Agudat Israel, circulated a letter where people who promised to vote for the Aguda could ask for the blessing of the Lubavitcher Rabbi. There were also reports that observant women were warned that if they did not vote according to the way a particular rabbi instructed them, they would become barren or their children would fall ill. (*The Jerusalem post*. Friday, July 19, 1991.)

As a result of this strategy the Knesset passed an amendment to the Knesset Election Law which forbade this practice in the future (*The Jerusalem post*. Friday, July 19, 1991).

239 The Lubavitcher Rabbi supported Agudat Israel (*The Jerusalem post*. Friday, July 19, 1991).

240 The strength of representation of the religious parties in the Knesset has upset the *status quo* (*The Jerusalem post*. Friday, May 24, 1991). In June 1947 Ben Gurion sent a letter to Agudat Israel wherein he promised not to change any religious laws from Mandatory Palestine. In return this party was to undertake not to obstruct the founding of the Jewish State. (Rolef 1987:287f.; *The Jerusalem post*. Friday, May 24, 1991).

241 The resolution stated:

"We believe that the politicization of religion has caused hatred and alienation of Jews, from their religion. Many believe that the representatives of the religious institutions are abusing the values of democracy. ... Therefore, the independence of religion and the state must be ensured. ... Religious pluralism will be ensured by a constitution based on the principles of equality and freedom of choice, by keeping religion out of politics." (*The Jerusalem post*. Friday, November 22, 1991.)

The motivator of this resolution is a religious Zionist, Avraham Burg. He maintains that one of the main causes of tension between Israel and the Jews in the diaspora is the religious establishment. Therefore religion and state need to be separated. He believes further that in any event the Ultra-orthodox parties distinguish between state and religion. On the other hand, for the NRP, religion and Nationalism are inseparable; therefore they would have problems coming to terms with such a division. (*The Jerusalem post*. Friday, November 22, 1991.)

242 *The Jerusalem post*. Friday, November 22, 1991.

243 *The Jerusalem report*. January 9, 1992. The link between state and religion was acknowledged as positive. However it was stressed that there was a need for ensuring

independence of religion from politics.

- 244 In a speech to an international conference on women in law, the State President referred to "medieval" remarks by a member of Knesset. He pointed out further that in Israel a Muslim woman serves as a judge in a civil court. This conference adopted a resolution calling on political parties to condemn the Rabbi's remarks. (*The Jerusalem post*. Friday, December 20, 1991.)
- 245 *The Jerusalem post*. Friday, January 3, 1992.
The Jerusalem report. January 9, 1992.

CHAPTER 3 : THE STATE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The Arab-Israeli conflict is essentially a conflict over territory. In order to understand the positions of each side, one should consider what meaning each religion gives to the concept *State* and also the situation of minority religions within each state. In addition it would shed light on the subject if the political theory of each could be linked to religion.

Since the political stance of each side is, to a greater or lesser extent, determined by their political parties and factions, the question of the role of religion in each state should be addressed. This could also provide an understanding on the place of citizens of minority religions in each state.

As far as possible this chapter has been written for a comparison of all the religions concerned. Should it at times seem unbalanced the reasons will become apparent.

The State of Israel exists and is an accredited member of the community of nations. The emphasis here is to show how religion can justify the existence of the state (Pye 1972:186) and how religion can be used to determine its type of government.

On the other hand the Muslims/Nationalists maintain that the geographical territory of Israel is also the geographical territory of the state of Palestine. This too is justified through religion. Since from the Muslim/Arab perspective there is no de facto state of Palestine, it can only be shown how such a state should function were it a reality. For this reason the concept of an Islamic state and a Secular Palestinian state will be addressed in depth.

As far as the Arab states surrounding Israel are concerned, the role religions are allowed to play, in some cases directs their policies. In other cases the policies direct the role of religion.

This chapter will be divided into convenient sections. The idea of a traditional *Jewish State* will be addressed with its political theory. Furthermore there were many *Zionist* ideologues who expounded their idea of a Jewish State. However their notions depended on their own particular political positions. Therefore only the Secular Herzl, the religious Pines, and Ahad Ha'am, who tried unsuccessfully to bridge the gap between the two, will be discussed.

The *State of Israel* will be described together with the role of traditional religion in the country, and will also be linked to political theory. Since the early Zionists in Israel eschewed traditional Judaism in the main, a kind of Civil Religion adapted from the Bible developed in the public religious dimension. Since this did not seem to provide citizens with successful cosmic orientation, Civil Religion declined and a New Civil Religion or Ethno-nationalism took its place. This type of religion incorporated more elements of traditional religion and provides an understanding of the Israeli government's position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although this type of religion tried to incorporate Israeli Arab citizens, it seems this was limited. The subject of the Israeli Arabs will be discussed in Section 5.5.

The Muslim/Arab field, too, has an Islamic political theory, and since the Quran only gives guide-lines for an *Islamic state*, there does not seem to be any consensus of what this should be. For this reason the thoughts of five leading Muslim ideologues will be presented, and a composite of an Islamic state will be described. Although Saudi Arabia and Iran are not in direct confrontation with Israel, they both have an influence on other Arab states; therefore they are included in this study.

The concept *jihad* is important in Islam. Its relevance to the Arab-Israeli conflict will be shown in Section 6.3.

The *Arab nation-states* in direct conflict with Israel will be described, together with the role of religion in their countries. This does have a bearing on their positions vis a vis the State of Israel. As the Palestinians are currently taking part in the Peace talks, the concept of a *projected Palestinian State* will be described.

Finally, since Jerusalem/al Baitu l-Muqaddas/al-Quds is central to all the participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict, its position in all four religions needs to be shown. It will transpire that there does not seem to be any room for compromise in any religion.

3.2 THE JEWISH STATE

Judaism is a way of life which sanctifies all dimensions of life. After the exodus from Egypt the Jewish people became a nation where every Jew is responsible for each other (Wigoder 1989: 397:398). A nation requires a state within a political framework in order to express itself completely (Peri 1988:45). Consequently the question must be asked: "What does Judaism have

to say about the phenomenon of life within an institutionalised society?" (Belfer & Grielsammer 1987:715)

Josephus Flavius believed that politics had no role in Judaism, while Spinoza saw Jewish existence as being only political. There is a modern school which holds that there is a basic political doctrine within Judaism; a leading exponent of this view is Daniel J. Elazar. Still others believe that there are some political ideas in Judaism. (Belfer 1987:716)

With regard to Zionism, all ideologues of the 19th century grounded their political ideas on a national land and/or language which already existed. However this concept of state depended on whether they held a belief in Judaism or an ideology or perhaps both. (Hertzberg 1959: 15:16)

After the establishment of the State of Israel there was a rise of statism (*mamlaktyut*)¹ and Ben Gurion was its exponent (Liebman & Don-Yehiya 1983:81:84; Peri 1988:43). According to this orientation, the physical geographic territory where its citizens live, is important but "it is not a goal in or of itself". For this reason the Arab-Israeli conflict is seen as a political conflict. (Peri 1988:46:47) After 1967 Ethno-nationalism² became more prominent and this was strengthened with the rise of the Likud in 1977. (Liebman & Don-Yehiya 1984:53; Peri 1988: 44f.) In this type of religion the land has sacred status, especially if blood was spilt for it, and this influences their position in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Peri 1988:46).

After the declaration of independence in May 1948, the State of Israel came into being. Relevant issues pertaining to this state will be discussed.

3.2.1 Jewish political theory

In Judaism, God alone is sovereign and the human being can only use delegated powers. The foundation of the Jewish people's relationship with God, the world and other people is grounded in a *Covenant* partnership.³ (Elazar 1981:44:41) The Jewish polity starts with 'kinship' and 'consent'. Jews are born as Jews and as such belong to the Jewish Tribe which is bound by their Covenant with God. Individuals have voluntarily assumed ties of citizenship and not merely that of kinship, which was forced on them. Thus, by assuming ties of citizenship, they have consented to be bound by their covenant. (Elazar 1974:64)

The partnership of the Jewish community is public — *res publica*, therefore republican. The

leaders are responsible to the people but ultimately everyone is responsible to God. (Elazar 1974:68)

Following the biblical texts the SINAI COVENANT could portray the *Keter Torah*⁴ which was transferred from Moses to the prophets, to the sages, to the rabbanim (rabbis). The COVENANT WITH AARON'S SONS established the priesthood (*Keter Kehuna*); the COVENANT WITH KING DAVID gave kinship and civil rule (*Keter Malkhut*); but there is a wider significance to the *Ketarim* (pl.). The *Keter Torah* is a way of expressing Divine constitutional teaching, which comes from God to the people through a prophet, the Torah or the Talmud. The *Keter Kehuna* brings God and the nation in close propinquity through rituals and symbolic expressions, which "tends to involve human initiatives directed heavenward." The *Keter Malkhut* is a means for civil authority to use power within the nation stressing political relationships among humans. (Elazar 1985:16)

Elazar (1985:23 et passim) has divided Jewish history into fourteen constitutional epochs. He has analysed each according to the three *Ketarim*.

He has summarised the Jewish political worldview using classical political terminology. The Hebrew words are generally those used in the Bible in connection with the covenant. (Elazar 1985:7f.) This summary will be quoted here in full:

"The family or kith (*moledet*) of tribes (*shevatim*) descended from Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob which God raised up to be a nation (*goy*) became the Jewish people (*Am Yisrael*) through its covenant (*brit*) with God, which, in turn, laid the basis for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth (*edah*) under Divine sovereignty (*malkhut shamayim*) and hence bound by the Divine constitutional teaching (*Torah*). The *am* so created must live as a community of equals (*kahal*) whose locus is the Land of Israel (Eretz Israel), under the rule of law (*hukah, hok*) which applies to every citizen (*ezrah*), defined as a partner to the covenant (*ben-brit*). Every citizen is linked to his neighbour (*rea*) by covenant obligation (*hesed*). Within these parameters there is latitude in choosing the form of government or regime as long as the proper relationships between the various parties just referred to are preserved. That, in turn, requires a system of shared authorities (*reshuyot*) — what today would be termed 'checks and balances'. These *reshuyot* are combined under three authoritative categories (*ketarim*): the authority of Torah (*keter torah*), the authority of civil governance (*keter malkhut*), and the authority of the priesthood (*keter kehunah*), each of which plays a role in the government of the *edah* through a system of shared powers. At any given time, different religious and political camps (*maḥanot*) and parties (*miflagot*) within those camps compete for control of the governing institutions of the *edah*. Moreover, since the full achievement of its religio-political goals requires reformation of the existing order (*tikkun olam*) and redemption (*geulah*), the

Jewish political worldview is messianic in orientation, looking toward a better future rather than a golden past."

3.2.2 EARLY ZIONIST IDEOLOGUES

In this section the ideas of three early Zionist ideologues will be presented. Theodor Herzl is considered to be the father of modern Zionism who represents Secularists; Yehiel Michael Pines (1842—1912) was an Orthodox religious Zionist, and Ahad Ha'am tried to bridge the gap between the two.

3.2.2.1 Theodor Herzl

Herzl is considered to be the founder of modern Zionism (Eliade 1987:15:574). He maintained that there would always be anti-Semitism but since Jews were one nation, there could be one solution to the problem.⁵ This would be the establishment of a Jewish state under Jewish sovereignty somewhere in the world.⁶ "Palestine is our unforgettable historic homeland. ... The holy places of Christendom could be placed under some form of international ex-territoriality. We should form a guard of honor about these holy places ... [which would be] the great symbol of the solution of the Jewish question after what were for us eighteen centuries of affliction." (Ettinger 1976:898; Hertzberg 1959:22f.)

The best way of achieving a Jewish state would be through political activity. He thought that the methods of *Hovevei Zion* in Palestine with the help of Baron de Rothschild would be counter-productive. (Ettinger 1976:899)

Herzl tried to persuade others to adopt his plan. This was accepted at the First Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897. (Ettinger 1976:899)

3.2.2.2 Yehiel Michael Pines

Yehiel Michael Pines went to live in Jerusalem in 1879. He believed in the uniqueness of the Jewish national identity through religion.⁷ A secular Jewish nation was not possible because there is an unbreakable bond between religion and nationhood,⁸ as Jewish destiny is grounded in religion. Therefore a Jewish national community should live in Palestine within the framework of traditional Judaism. (Hertzberg 1959:408)

However he conceded that the religion had developed historically, as there had been modifications in some of its forms through the ages, but this had been permitted only in so far as it was an unconscious process. A person had no right to make conscious reforms, and orthodox religious Zionism has subscribed to these views since his time. (Hertzberg 1959:408)

3.2.2.3 Ahad Ha'am

Ahad Ha'am openly opposed Herzl's idea of the settlement of the majority of Jews in their own country. Judaism was part of Jewish national culture and could only develop in a Jewish national home which could in turn infuse new life into the Jewish Diaspora.⁹ Assimilation and a decline of the Jewish religion had weakened the Jews there spiritually. (Ettinger 1976:900:279; Eliade 1987:15:574)

He criticised the *Hovevei Zion* for buying land and strengthening settlements because this depended on the philanthropist Baron Edmund de Rothschild. "A political ideal which is not grounded in our national culture is apt to seduce us from loyalty to our own inner spirit and to beget in us a tendency to find the path of glory in the attainment of material power and political dominion, thus breaking the thread that unites us with the past and undermining our historical foundation." (Ettinger 1976:897; Hertzberg 1959:56)

Most of the Zionist movement rejected his views.¹⁰ However he was subsequently an intimate adviser to Chaim Weizmann in negotiating the Balfour Declaration. (Hertzberg 1959:251)

3.3 THE STATE OF ISRAEL

The independence of the State of Israel was proclaimed in Tel Aviv on May 14, 1948 by the Provisional State Council,¹¹ which body was the precursor of the state leadership. The following day British troops left the country and this saw the end of the British mandate in Palestine. (*The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:126)

Relevant parts of the Proclamation itself will be quoted here:

"THE State of Israel will be open to the immigration of Jews from all countries of their dispersion; will promote the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; will be based on the principles of liberty, justice and peace ...; will uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens, without distinction of religion, race or sex; will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, education and culture; will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and will loyally uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter." (*The Israel-Arab*

reader 1976:127)

"... call upon the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve the ways of peace and play their part in the development of the State, on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its bodies and institutions — provisional and permanent." (*The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:127)

"We extend our hand in peace and neighbourliness to all the neighbouring states and their peoples, and invite them to co-operate with the independent Jewish nation for the common good of all. The State of Israel is prepared to make its contribution to the progress of the Middle East as a whole." (*The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:127)

The Declaration ends, "with trust in the Rock of Israel ..." (*The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:127). This symbolic term was accepted by both Orthodoxy and the Secularists since each could interpret the phrase in its own way (Rabinowitz 1978:414).

The first national elections in the new state took place in January 1949.¹² The combined religious bloc garnered 16 seats in the Knesset. (Cohen 1986:42f.) The Knesset is a unicameral parliament of 120 members¹³ elected by universal secret ballot, whose primary function is legislation of both domestic and foreign nature. Israel has no written constitution,¹⁴ but there is a set of basic laws which may be amended or changed. (Bin-Nun 1990:42:43:37; Kraines 1961:33f.:45) An example of this is the Law of Return which grants automatic citizenship to all Jews in the Diaspora who wish to live in Israel¹⁵ (Shetreet 1979:183; Cohen 1986:47). Every government headed by a prime minister has to be approved by the Knesset and can fall after a vote of no confidence, but an individual minister cannot be removed in this way.¹⁶ Members of the Knesset also elect the state president. (Bin-Nun 1990:44:45:47) In addition there is local government in the State of Israel (Bin-Nun 1990:47—50).

3.3.1 The place of traditional religion

In Israel religion and state are inextricably interwoven. However this does not mean that religion is recognised in the accepted sense. (Elazar & Aviad 1981:166; Shetreet 1979:182)

Provision is made for the non-Jewish population to organise its own institutions in accordance with what has been laid down by their religions. Their own law courts rule on religious matters; marriage, divorce and burial are conducted according to their religions¹⁷ and they have their own religious schools. There is a Ministry of Religions (plural) (*Misrad Hadatot*) which renders service to Muslims, Druze, Christians and others as well as Jews. (Elazar & Aviad

1981:184:163; Cohen 1986:46) Saturday is the official day of rest, as are certain Jewish festivals. However the non-Jewish citizens may choose this day according to what is prescribed by their religions. (Shetreet 1979:182)

As far as the Jewish citizens are concerned, the supreme religious governing institution is the Chief Rabbinate. There is an Ashkenazi and Sephardi chief rabbi and these communities are equally represented in the Council.¹⁸ There is a connection between the National Religious Party and the Chief Rabbinate (Gutmann 1979:202). There are also local religious councils and rabbinical courts.¹⁹ (Rolef 1987:65; Elazar & Aviad 1981:184) The IDF has its own rabbinate (Gutmann 1979:204).

The Ultra-orthodox (Haredi) community does not recognise the Chief Rabbinate or its institutions, for which reason the *Mo'etzet G'dolei Hatorah* (the Council of Torah Greats [Scholars]) was established by the Hasidim. The Council's spiritual leader comes from the court or dynasty of Gur. Politically Agudat Israel have to act on instructions from this Council although there is some leeway. On the other hand R. Eliezer Schach, aged 94, is the leader of the Mitnagdim and is considered to be the most powerful Ultra-orthodox leader in Israel. The Sephardi Haredi community have their *Mo'etzet Hahmei Hatorah* (Council of Torah Sages), whose spiritual leader is R. Ovadia Yosef, a former Sephardi Chief Rabbi.²⁰

Politically the situation is further complicated by the fact that many Sephardi rabbis and yeshiva students have studied under R. Schach. Therefore he gave his blessing to the establishment of the Shas party before the 1984 elections. As a result Shas continues to take instructions from him on crucial issues notwithstanding the fact that R. Ovadia Yosef and his Council are the party's supreme rabbinical authority.^{§§} Before the 1988 elections R. Schach ordered the formation of the Haredi Ashkenazi Degel Hatorah Party. (Rolef 1987:12:13;²¹)

The Haredi community is exempt from military service (Elazar & Aviad 1981:175). Apart from trying to obtain legislation for the Ultra-orthodox population of Israel they use the political system for their own ends.²² The tensions in the Ultra-orthodox field are relevant to the Arab-

§§ After the 1992 Knesset elections Shas cut adrift from the control of R. Schach and against his wishes joined the coalition. This is seen as due to denigrating remarks he made against the Sephardim before the elections. Because R. Schach had banned any Ultra-orthodox party from entering a government which includes Meretz, his power over the government was nullified. (*The Jerusalem report*. July 30, 1992)

Israeli conflict since the Haredi parties hold the balance as to which party will form a government and rule the country.²³ Their councils also decide whether their followers should take part in elections (Gutmann 1979:202).

The Interior Ministry portfolio is held by a Shas member who commands the respect of the Israeli Arabs and Druze communities for helping them solve local community problems. Among them is Sheikh Abdallah Namir Darwish of Kfar Kassem, leader of the largest Revivalist group in Israel.²⁴

3.3.2 Israel and Jewish political theory

According to Elazar (1985:278) the institutions in the State of Israel can be classified in terms of the *ketarim* (see Section 3.2.1) even though these institutions have been adapted from European models. In terms of the *Keter Torah* and *Keter Malkhut* Israel is the central point for the entire *edah*.

Poskim (rabbinical decisors) and dayanim (rabbinical judges) uphold the *Keter Torah*. This is manifested in the Council of the Chief Rabbinate, the chief rabbis, the rabbinical courts, yeshivot and universities. Most of the latter are secular. (Elazar 1985:278f.; 1987:423)

The *Keter Malkhut* applies to the Knesset, government, prime minister, government ministers and their departments, the president and the civil courts. These are institutions of state. (Elazar 1985:278; 1987:423)

Work carried out by the institutions of *Keter Torah* and the Ministry of Religions can be categorised as *Keter Kehuna*. These bring God and the nation in close proximity through rituals and symbolic expression. (Elazar 1985:279; 1987:423)

3.4 THE PUBLIC RELIGIOUS DIMENSION IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL

Israel being a 'Jewish State' has religious implications. While individual Jewish Israeli citizens may have their own beliefs, they want to see the 'Jewishness' reflected in the state. As a result Israeli Civil Religion has developed. (Liebman 1983:13)

Civil Religion can be seen as ceremonials, myths and creeds which legitimate the social order, unite the population, and mobilise the society's members in pursuit of its dominant political

goals. There are characteristics of traditional religion in Civil Religion in Israel, which excludes Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bahai and Circassians who are also citizens of the state.²⁵ (Liebman 1983:ix:4:12f.)

For this reason the term *Ethno-state* religion will be preferred in this thesis and will be used together with *Civil Religion*, since this term is used in the literature. Ethno-state religion can be seen as a system of ethos, symbols and rituals which express the public religious dimension of the majority of citizens, whilst privatising their own personal religious beliefs.²⁶ This type of religion unites the majority within a political framework. Ethno-state religion can also include such concepts as martyrs, sacred places, sacred events and prophets.

3.4.1 Statism : Ethno-state/Civil Religion

After the establishment of the State of Israel there was a massive ingathering of the exiles, many of whom came from Muslim countries and were grounded in traditional Jewish culture and traditional Judaism. The state leaders felt that they should be completely integrated and socialised in Zionist values. (Liebman 1983:82:83) A symbol system which would unite the Jewish citizens behind the state and its institutions would achieve this. *Mamlaktyut* arose from the Labour movement and expressed the Jewish national spirit, the achievement of the Jews of liberty and sovereignty in their own land, and guaranteed national unity in the State of Israel. (Liebman 1983:82:88:85; Aronoff 1981:3:5)

By another method the Statists tried to prevent the enrolment of the children of Jewish families from Muslim countries in religious schools. The religious establishment objected to this and in response, *Mapai*²⁷ created facilities within the Labour movement to meet the needs of these children, which in turn caused tensions between the Statists and the religious parties. The ruling party had to agree to the existence of the religious parties in order to avoid a *kulturkampf*. The latter were even invited to join government coalitions. (Liebman 1983:91—2)

Ben Gurion was devoted to Judaism. He believed that the Jewish people had survived because of the tradition derived from the periods of the First and Second temples. However the exile had alienated the Jews from the Bible, and in order to understand this holy book one had to identify with *mamlaktyut*. Only Jews who had returned to Israel to lead an independent life could really appreciate the Bible. He demanded that senior government and army personnel change their names to Hebrew — preferably biblical, and tried to influence government and

Knesset members to do this as well; only the names of biblical heroes should appear on IDF medals. Immigration was a process of redemption which could only take place by immigrant absorption. (Liebman 1983:89:90:94:91)

3.4.1.1 Symbols

At first there was a difference of opinion as to the proposed national *flag*, but finally the blue and white with the central Star of David was adopted. The blue and white bands are incorporated in the Jewish prayer shawl. (Aronoff: 1981:4) The red flag of the workers was also flown together with the national flag, particularly on May Day. (Liebman 1983:107f.:56)

The *menorah* (seven-branched candelabrum) was adopted as the State symbol.²⁸ After the Romans had destroyed the Second Temple they incorporated the menorah into the Arch of Titus in Rome. Consequently the menorah symbolised the return of Jewish sovereignty to its rightful heirs, while Secularists saw it as a symbol of light. (Liebman 1983:108f.; Aronoff 1981:4)

After the establishment of the State of Israel, *Massada* declined in importance, for it did not belong to the biblical period and the Zealots were only a sect in their own time and even signified defeat. After archeological excavations in 1963 its centrality was restored and the State of Israel became a legacy of the Massada defenders. Some IDF recruits swear an oath of allegiance there by solemnly declaring, "Massada shall not fall again." (Liebman 1983:99—100:148)

A museum called the Shrine of the Book was specially constructed opposite the Knesset to hold the *Dead Sea Scrolls* (Aronoff 1981:4). Their return was seen in the light of a cultural redemption and also as a link between the State of Israel and an earlier period of Jewish sovereignty. (Liebman 1983:111)

3.4.1.2 Heroes

Builders of modern Israel were almost equated with biblical heroes who, according to Ben Gurion, were ideal role models for young Israelis. The biblical era was a time of Jewish independence and spiritual creativity; whence the Jewish nation was formed and was able to survive. (Liebman 1983:94)

In 1949 the Knesset passed a law wherein *Herzl's* remains were to be transferred to Israel and re-interred on Mount Herzl at a state ceremony (Aronoff 1981:4). His grave was considered a sacred site and the date of his death became IDF Day during the early years of the State. He was called "the prophet of Israel's freedom" who was among "the Holy and great builders of the eternity of Israel." A member of the Zionist Labour Movement recorded that Herzl Day was a "ray from the sunlight of freedom and redemption shining above our heads [since he] felt the touch of the wing of the spirit of God and appeared with a supreme human aura." (Liebman 1983:95f.)

The disciples of *Ben Gurion* considered him to have qualities of biblical leaders and therefore their successor. He was compared to Moses by Moshe Dayan. (Liebman 1983:95)

The *sabra* (person born in the State of Israel) and the Israeli citizen were also considered heroes who were fearless but neither servile nor materialistic. For this reason sabras should put aside the Jewish tradition and customs of the Diaspora and be new Israelis grounded in the culture of their own state. (Liebman 1983:96f.)

The *IDF soldier* was a continuation of the courage of the warriors in the biblical period, and therefore accorded special sanctity by the institutions of state (Aronoff 1981:4). Anyone who passed criticism against soldiers was considered as "profaning the holy." (Liebman 1983:97f.)

3.4.1.3 Rites

In 1950 the day preceding Independence Day was dedicated to the IDF soldiers who had given their lives in the War of Independence. This is known as *Memorial Day for the IDF Fallen* (Aronoff 1981:4). The connection between the two days was deliberate. State ceremonies were held at army cemeteries where the ritual consisted of the flying of the national flag at half mast, the lighting of torches, laying of wreaths and the recitation of the military Yizkor prayer.²⁹ Apart from Memorial Day, monuments were built and forests planted to remember the heroes.³⁰ (Liebman 1983:119)

On the *Eve of Independence Day*, i.e. at sunset on Memorial Day, a national ceremony was introduced wherein twelve³¹ watchfires are lit³² by twelve Israelis who announce their countries of origin. This symbolises the ingathering of exiles. (Liebman 1983:114)

Independence Day was the chief holiday of *mamlaktyut* and celebrated Israel's freedom,

continuity and succession. In the early years military parades were held signifying strength and achievement, and in 1952 *Hagadat Ha'atzmaut* was written to follow the traditional Passover *Hagadah*. This was read at banquets at army bases, and Israelis were encouraged "to sanctify Independence Day" with family festivities incorporating the reading of the Declaration of Independence. The annual Bible quiz also took place on this day under government patronage. There were also tree-planting ceremonies which symbolised Israel as being replanted in its own soil and natural environment. In 1954 the Israel Prize was established where the awards were presented on the evening of Independence Day. Provision was made for twelve (symbolising the ancient tribes) recipients who were honoured for their contribution to science and Torah studies, including the arts and humanities.³³ (Liebman 1983:113—117;112) Israeli Arabs were also encouraged to celebrate this day, where ceremonies were organised in Arab villages (Liebman 1983:113f.).

Until 1952 *Holocaust Day* was not officially observed because this event signified surrender rather than resistance. The Jewish National Fund, a non-government institution, planted forests, of which the Forest of Martyrs is an example. The Ministry of Religions organised a site for remnants of Torah scrolls saved from the Nazis and also ashes of Jews from the crematoria. It was only after the Chief Rabbinate had declared a day of observance that the Statists established an official memorial day on the date of the Warsaw ghetto uprising, which symbolised the resistance and bravery of those Jews living in Nazi-controlled Europe. In 1953 Yad Vashem (a memorial and a name) was established.³⁴ This museum is a symbol of the six million Jews who perished and thus gave the Jews a legitimate right to Israel. (Liebman 1983:100—103:9)

For the first few years of statehood *May Day* was celebrated and was considered as important as Independence Day, when national elements were stressed during parades, together with socialism and pioneering. However this day gradually lost its significance. (Liebman 1983:120f.)

Traditional Jewish festivals were secularised. For example Shavuot (festival of weeks) was considered a holiday of agriculture and nature; and Pesach (Passover) represented national freedom (Liebman 1983:121:50; Aronoff 1981:4).

3.4.1.4 Myths

Ben Gurion saw the exodus from Egypt, the assembly at Mount Sinai and Joshua's conquest

of the land as precursors of the establishment of the State of Israel. With the latter, "Jewish redemption acquired a program and a practical basis ... therefore, the state became a force that united and integrated the Jewish people in the Diaspora as nothing else had ever before integrated and united them." While other religions in the world had merely a spiritual attachment to the land, a young generation with superior qualities had achieved the ultimate in Jewish history. Therefore the *establishment of the State of Israel* was the central myth of statism.³⁵ (Liebman 1983:98f.)

3.4.1.5 Language

Biblical phrases and aphorisms were adopted to give a sense of the sacred or ceremonial. These expressed an identification with the Bible and biblical era. (Liebman 1983:93)

Since the IDF had sacred status, a few examples will be given. "Israel trust in the IDF, it is your help and defender."³⁶ A photograph of some Israeli aeroplanes was published in a newspaper with the caption "The guardian of Israel neither sleeps nor slumbers."³⁷ In one army base a banner read: "In the beginning the IDF created the soldier, and the IDF created the nation."³⁸ (Liebman 1983:93)

Commandment or *covenant* were used as an expression of devotion and loyalty to the state and its institutions. Actors in a pageant on Independence Day said: "On Independence Day we assume the burden of the commandment of loyalty to our State."³⁹ On presenting his first government to the Knesset Ben Gurion stated that all Jews, whether Zionist or not, feel love for the State of Israel, "except for that small group of violators of the covenant." (Liebman 1983:93)

Biblical terms were re-interpreted. For example *komemiut* (erect, upright) came to mean sovereign and independent. The War of Independence/1948 was referred to as the war of *komemiut*, and *kibbutz galuyot* (ingathering of the exiles)⁴⁰ now meant immigration of Diaspora Jews to Israel. (Liebman 1983:93)

3.4.2 Ethno-nationalism/the new Civil Religion

After the Six-Day/1967 War there was a weakening of *mamlaktyut*. All Israelis were now able to travel freely in the Territories which were considered the ancestral homeland. (Peri 1988:49) Statism had not been able to legitimise the Jewish state for many Israeli Jews. This was further

aggravated by Israel's claim to the new territories in accordance with security and historical rights. (Liebman 1983:129:130) In addition, by this time the Sephardim had become the majority of the Jewish population. Even the non-Orthodox or non-observant among them respected tradition. Many also remembered their treatment by Mapai. Since Menachem Begin respected traditional Judaism they were willing to support him.⁴¹ (Elazar 1983:34:36:38)

According to Liebman (1983:131) "The new civil religion seeks to integrate and mobilise Israeli Jewish society and legitimate the primary values of the political system by grounding them in a transcendent order of which the Jewish people and the Jewish tradition are basic components. The importance of traditional religion is affirmed as part of Jewish identity and Jewish history, as the citizen is not expected to practice the traditional religion, but this is not excluded. Therefore this new type of religion respects Judaism and its adherents. "God has reentered civil religion, but only as a name, not as an active agent who confers legitimacy or to whom one can appeal for help." (Liebman 1983:135:136)

Everyone of those who gave their lives in all Israel's wars is remembered on *Memorial Day for the IDF Fallen*.⁴² The traditional Yizkor prayer is recited in national ceremonies. (Liebman 1983:154; 1975:20)

Religious Zionists recite special prayers in synagogues on *Independence Day* but they also participate in civil ceremonies. High school pupils from Israel and the Diaspora participate in the international Bible quiz, which is televised live. Army parades have ceased to take place and most of the population spend the day at picnics or touring some part of the country, while many people fly the national flag from their homes.⁴³ (Liebman 1983 212:154:117)

The *Holocaust* has become a central symbol of Jewish history and the Jewish people because it legitimates the necessity for a Jewish state, due to the insecurity of the Jews in the Diaspora. Visiting foreign dignitaries are taken on a visit to Yad Vashem and all men and married women are expected to cover their heads in conformity with religious tradition. *Heroes and Martyrs Remembrance Day* is marked by a closure of all places of amusement, and special television and radio programs are devoted to the Holocaust. A siren is sounded for two minutes in memory of the six million Jews who perished. (Liebman 1983:137:144:145:151f.; Aronoff 1981:4) In recent years high school children from Israel and the Diaspora have been taken on tours to Auschwitz on this day. In 1992 there was a 'March for Life' from Auschwitz to Birkenau.⁴⁴

Although *Jerusalem Day* has never been established by law, workers are allowed to select this day as an optional vacation day. It is celebrated on the date on which the Old City fell to the IDF. Jews from all over the country go to Jerusalem to celebrate.⁴⁵ (Liebman 1983:154f.)

Traditional religious holidays are seen and interpreted more closely to their traditional meaning. However they are also seen in the context of a national meaning. (Liebman 1983:155)

The *Western Wall* has become a national-religious symbol. In conformity with traditional religion there is separation of the sexes and covering the head is mandatory for everyone who approaches. The Western Wall is a place of prayer, and people are expected to conduct themselves accordingly. (Liebman 1975:20) The Ministry of Religions is responsible for this site (Wigoder 1989:729).

New terms have come into the language of Ethno-nationalism/new Civil Religion. *Eretz Israel* is used in place of "the State of Israel"; the former includes the Territories. (Peri 1988:50) The West Bank is referred to as Judea and Samaria (Hebrew: Yehuda veShomron), which were provinces round Jerusalem in biblical times (Rolef 1987:343).

3.4.3 Civil Religion and Arab citizens of Israel

Mention has already been made that Statists encouraged Israeli Arabs to celebrate Independence Day (see Section 3.4.1.3). Arab citizens are in constant contact with the symbol system, and children are taught Jewish customs and Jewish history in their schools. Some eat matzah during Pesach in spite of the fact that leavened bread is sold in Arab areas. (Liebman 1983:161:162)

Israel is a Jewish state whose men and women have died for its defence.⁴⁶ "If Arabs are to be truly integrated, if they are truly equal, then how will Israel remain a Jewish State?" Furthermore Israeli Arabs identify with the Ethno-nationalism of neighbouring countries.⁴⁷ (Liebman 1983:162)

3.5 THE ISLAMIC STATE

Islam is a way of life which sanctifies all dimensions of life. It includes relationships of Muslims to each other and to society throughout their lives. Since they lived in an Islamic State in Madina under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad, (Farah 1970:1:48) Islam has a

political foundation (Khadduri 1955:3ff.) which will be described.

The concept 'Islamic State' is not as clear-cut as it seems. Theoretically guidelines are given in the Sharia, but in practice, different people and different Revivalist groups have made their own interpretations of what has been laid down in the Sharia.

There is also the difference between the Sunni and the Shia with regard to *ijtihad*, and the difference between the two sects with regard to their conception of head of state. All these have to be taken into consideration in any discussion on the concept of an Islamic State.

3.5.1 Islamic political theory

According to Islam, Allah sent a series of prophets to the different peoples of the earth. These prophets gave them divine law which was to be a covenant between Him and those people, but covenants were broken and teachings distorted.⁴⁸ Therefore He sent Muhammad, the seal of the prophets (*Kharam an-nabiyyin*)⁴⁹ who gave the final, definitive teachings for all people. Those who accepted these teachings agreed to submit to the will of Allah. (Khadduri 1955:7f.; Farah 1970:71; Maududi 1967:169f.)

In Islam God alone is sovereign and the *umma* is united by common obligations to Allah.⁵⁰ According to the Tradition, Muhammad saw the Muslim *umma* as "a single hand, like a compact wall whose bricks support each other." (Khadduri 1955:3—4)

The foundation of the Muslim *umma's* relationship with Allah is a compact of submission where they agree to be governed by Him as the supreme governor. Hence "the individual basis of submission was recognised on the basis of *pactum tacitum*." (Khadduri 1955:8f.; Maududi 1967:169ff.)

The Prophet was the intermediary between Allah and the *umma*, and, as a human being, ruled the latter.⁵¹ Muhammad made a treaty with the people of Madina, the first part of which united the *umma* into one nation which was different from all other nations. This was an embryonic stage for the constitution for an Islamic State. He also united the executive, legislative and judicial functions on behalf of Allah. (Khadduri 1955:10:206—209; Maududi 1967:204)

After Muhammad's death the caliphs assumed temporal authority⁵² but not his prophetic

functions. They were chosen by the people and administered and enforced divine law and interpreted it. Thus there was a new contract between the umma and the caliph, who carried out his obligations; but at the same time the umma's allegiance to Allah was renewed through the primary contract of submission by both temporal ruler and ruled. (Khadduri 1955:10—11:12; Maududi 1967:218)

During the Prophet's lifetime authority was "directly derived from and exercised by God." After his demise the "authority [was] derived from a divine code endowed by God but enforced by his vicegerent (or by a secular ruler) which is equally binding upon the latter and the people." (Khadduri 1955:14)

3.5.2 The concept of the Islamic state

An Islamic state is inextricably interwoven with society because Islam is a way of life. The state is a political expression of the Muslim umma and is founded on the doctrine of *tawhid*, unity of God and human life. (Turabi 1983:241) Thus it could never be an absolute sovereign entity.

The Quran and Sunna "delineate only the outer limits" for the Islamic state (Shah 1987:36). There are legal situations pertaining to times and situations which need interpretation through *fiqh*; there are various schools of Islamic law with their *furuat*. There are never differences of opinion with regard to the basic principles of Islam because they all use the primary sources of the Quran and Sunna before resorting to other methods. (Doi 1984:85) Nonetheless the use of different secondary sources could account for subtle differences in interpretation of the concept of an Islamic state — particularly the concept of *ijtihad*. Shah (1987:39) concludes that there are many forms of an Islamic state, since Muslims in every era have to find a form most suitable to their needs. This is catered for in the Quran.⁵³ (Shah 1987:38)

3.5.3 Muslim ideologues and theoreticians

The ideas of five leading Muslims will be depicted. They are Abul Ala Maududi who founded the Jamaat-i-Islami, Muhammad Iqbal who was considered the spiritual father of Pakistan, Muhammad Rashid Rida and Muhammad Ghazzali who were associated with al-Ikhwan, and Fauzlur Rahman, a contemporary scholar who died in 1988.

3.5.3.1 Abul Ala Maududi

For Maududi, the "Sharia is a complete scheme of life and an all-embracing social order where nothing is superfluous and nothing is lacking". Therefore there is no division between the state and religion. (Adams 1983:113; Maududi 1967:3ff.)

The Islamic state should recognise the sovereignty of God and the authority of the Prophet. Therefore if a state legislates laws contrary to those revealed, they have no authority on the umma. (Adams 1983:115f.; Maududi 1967:232—237)

The head of state should rule by *shura* (consultation) among Muslims so as to prevent autocracy, which is contrary to Islam. The community should be allowed freedom of opinions as long as this is not imposed on others and does not disrupt peace in the state. Since the leader represents God and the umma, he has to be a righteous, pious and moral man, capable of running the affairs of the state. He rules in consultation with the *Majlis-i-Shura*. These members should be elected by the community. (Adams 1983:117:120:123:124; Maududi 1967:257:268:261:357) Ijtihad should be used, but the mujtahids should be highly qualified. Maududi warned that ijtihad should conform to the norms of the Sharia, (Enayat 1986:101) since nothing can contravene what God has decreed. (Adams 1983:125; Maududi 1967:80—81; 1963:114f.)

Maududi defended the punishment for criminals in the Sharia (Enayat 1986:102; Maududi 1967:54—55) but advocates the abolition of the judiciary as it now exists. There should be a new kind of judiciary, independent of the executive. He mentions the state treasury but does not delineate its nature, powers or functions. (Adams 1983:128; Maududi 1967:391)

He demanded that women should wear veils. They should not be allowed to hold political office, but on one occasion he modified this stance and said that they could become head of state, "although this was not desirable". (Enayat 1986:110)

Finally, dhimmis should be allowed to follow their religion and be afforded the protection of shura the state (Maududi 1967:302f.). Adams (1983:122) maintains that Maududi see them as second-class citizens.

3.5.3.2 Muhammad Iqbal

Iqbal believed that Islam provides Muslims with 'selfhood'. According to a Hadith, "The whole of this earth is a mosque." Since the Prophet was the leader of the umma at Madina, there can be no division of religion and state. (Esposito 1983:178; Iqbal 1962:155)

The Islamic state should be founded on the doctrine of *tawhid*, and legislation should be based on the Sharia. However when necessary *ijtihad* should be used. The closing of the 'gate' of *ijtihad* for the Sunnis "stopped a dynamic process of re-interpretation and re-application of Islamic principles to new situations." (Esposito 1983:179:186; Iqbal 1962:147:154:168)

Ijtihad should be used together with *ijma*. He also went a step further when he advocated that these two things should be transferred from the authority of the *ulama* to a Muslim legislative assembly. In the modern world there are complex problems, which need to be solved by experts. He believed that the elected Muslims would be able to do this. (Esposito 1983:187; Iqbal 1962:74)

3.5.3.3 Muhammad Rashid Rida

Rida is considered the founding theoretician of the concept of a modern Islamic state. His influence can be seen in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and among the Sunnis in the Muslim world. (Enayat 1986:69)[§]

His concept of an Islamic state does not advocate a total return to Islamic origins. Everything possible should be sought in the general principles of the Quran, Hadith and Sharia; however the use of *ijtihad* was imperative for solving problems not found in the primary sources. (Enayat 1986:81)

For Rida, the head of an Islamic state should be a *mujtahid* and should be aided by representatives of the community, and together they would have the power to legislate. He should be elected by these representatives, but need not have any specific political or military skills. (Enayat 1986:81)

He should rule in the interests of the community, but if his laws run contrary to the principles

§ As the original writings of Rida are unavailable to the researcher, his theories, as summarised by Enayat, are cited here.

of Islam, the umma have the right to challenge his decisions. Otherwise they should obey him. (Enayat 1986:81)

With the exception of heads of households, leadership in prayer and the office of head of state, women are equal to men. Dhimmis have the right to follow their own religions and live in peace in the Islamic state. (Enayat 1986:82)

Enayat (1986:83) maintains that Rida's ideas are "far from being an all-powerful system, regulating every detail of the social, political and cultural life of the Muslims." However it can be said that his advocacy of *ijtihad* was a new idea for the Sunnis. This has been taken up by their Revivalist groups. The understanding of an Islamic state by al-Ikhwan "is an accentuated form of Rashid Rida's". (Enayat 1986:87)

3.5.3.4 Muhammad Ghazzali

Although Ghazzali was a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood, he left the movement after 1948. However his ideas on the concept of an Islamic state are still held by the movement today. (Enayat 1986:87)

The Islamic state should be established according to the Sharia. There one finds provisions for social, economic and political life and there should be total integration of religion and politics. The injunctions of *jihad*, *qiyas* and *zakat* (alms tax) must be enforced by the state and not individuals. He called these 'social worships' and accorded them the same status as ritualised religion. (Enayat 1986:89; al-Ghazzali 1975:3—4:13:25f.)

With regard to the punishment of crimes, Ghazzali believed that literally amputating a thief's limbs is against the spirit of Islam. Women should be educated in order to carry out their family responsibilities; "Ghazzali blocks all careers to them." (Enayat 1986:92f.; al-Ghazzali 1975:8:125)

3.5.3.5 Fazlur Rahman

Since Islam is a way of life, the Muslim umma should elect the officers of state, the head of which must act in consultation with a legislative assembly. He does not need to be an alim. The *ulama* should function as a religious leadership and they can help with *ijtihad*. Any competent person can be a *mujtahid*. (Rahman 1967:267:269).

New ideas could be presented to the umma via the mass media. When ijma has crystallised, it can become law, which may be amended or repealed, and one ijma can replace another. Therefore to Rahman (1967:262f.) ijihad and ijma are important to Islamic legislation. He further maintains that "the 'closing of the door of ijihad' and the irrepealability of earlier ijma were twin doctrines whereby Islamic progress committed suicide." (Rahman 1967:270) Criticism of the government is permitted, but must come about by peaceful means and not by subversion. (Rahman 1967:265)

All executive powers are vested in the head of state who is also the chief administrator in both religious and civil matters. His council of ministers should be upright men who work towards the interests of the umma and must also protect the state, ensuring public law and order, internal security and threats from outside. (Rahman 1967:265:267—8)

There should be goodwill towards all nations. The Quran decrees that Muslims should honour their treaties and international pacts, and not break them⁵⁴ unless unilaterally abrogated by others. (Rahman 1967:271) Finally Rahman (1967:271) believes that a Muslim state should cement unity among Muslims of the world and in this way they would "contribute positively to the rest of the world."

3.5.4 Composite of Islamic state according to the Sharia

The Prophet Muhammad was appointed by God. After his death the caliphs were elected by the people⁵⁵ (Turabi 1983:243) and they lived in an Islamic state (Shah 1987:39).

3.5.4.1 Head of state

The head of state is subject to the will of the Muslim umma. This implies consultation with representatives of the people. (Turabi 1983:243) The Amir, head of state, must provide the umma with a common faith, moral outlook and justice, freedom and dignity for all men, women and children (Shah 1987:42).

Only a Muslim can be head of state. The phrase "most righteous of you"⁵⁶ implies that he must be wise, mature and of good character. Since the Sharia does not lay down any conditions for eligibility or method of elections, these have to be decided by the umma to suit the specific time and place. (Shah 1987:45)

The head of state has no special immunities. Therefore he is accountable for everything he does in private or public life, even to the extent of prosecution, if necessary. (Turabi 1983:248f.; Shafiq 1983:26)

3.5.4.2 Elective assembly

Shura (consultation)⁵⁷ in a large Islamic state would have to refer to the representatives of the people. This would be *majlis al-shura* — a consultative body or elected council. (Turabi 1983:243) In order to be truly representative, this council would have to be elected by all the citizens. Since there are no clear-cut guidelines in the Quran or Sunna, the means of election is left to the umma. (Shah 1987:46)

3.5.4.3 Relationship between executive and legislature

The head of state has to be the leader of the *majlis*. He directs its activities and presides over its deliberations. Since Islam is opposed to autocracy, there can be no radical separation of the legislature and the executive branches of the government. The stipulation *amruhum shura baynahum* makes consultation among the elected representatives of the umma obligatory. (Shah 1987:47)

If there is a difference of opinion between the *majlis* and the head of state, this must be settled by reference to the Quran 4:59.

"Obey Allah, and obey the messenger and those of you who are in authority; and if ye have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to Allah and the messenger ..."

Shah (1987:48) interprets this verse to mean that if the dispute cannot be settled with reference to the Quran and Sunna, it should be referred to a tribunal for arbitration.

3.5.4.4 Relationship between the state and its citizens

The first part of the sura quoted above has implications for the umma as well as the government. Firstly the state must be ruled according to the Sharia: (Shah 1987:43f.)

"Whoso judgeth not by that which Allah hath revealed; such are evil-livers."
(Quran 5:47)

Secondly

"... when Allah and His messenger have decided an affair (for them), that they should (after that) claim any say in their affair; and whoso is rebellious to Allah

and His messenger, he verily goes astray ..." (Quran 33:36)

Nothing which contravenes the Sharia can be valid; a third implication of these verses is that it is a Muslim's religious duty to obey a properly-constituted Islamic government. (Shah 1987:44)

A legally elected head of an Islamic state is considered to have the loyalty of the umma — not merely those who voted for him. The Prophet said:

"The hand of God is upon the community (*al-jama'a*); and he who sets himself apart from it will be set apart in Hellfire." (Al-Tirmidhi) (Shah 1987:49)

"To hear and to obey, in hardship and in ease, in circumstances pleasant and unpleasant." (Al-Bukhari and Muslim) (Shah 1987:49)

These injunctions imply absolute obedience of the umma to a legitimately-constituted government, which rules in the name of Allah. Disruption of unity is considered high treason and must be severely punished.⁵⁸ (Shah 1987:49—50) However there are provisions for limits of obedience (Shah 1987:50—51).

"No obedience is due in sinful matters; behold obedience is only due in the way of righteousness (*fil-maruf*)". (Abu Bukhari and Muslim) (Shah 1987:50)

"No obedience is due to him who rebels against God." (Ahmad Ibn Hanbal) (Shah 1987:51)

While citizens have the right to criticise the government, they are not allowed to rebel. Only a majority of the umma can cause the removal of an Islamic government, and then only by peaceful means. On the other hand the government is duty-bound to protect the lives, honour and property of its citizens.⁵⁹ (Shah 1987:52:54)

3.5.4.5 Economic system

The Sharia gives specific guidance on the economic system. This includes trade and commerce, distribution of wealth and the banking system. (Doi 1984:348—405)

3.5.4.6 Crime and punishment

Crime and punishment are dealt with in depth in the Sharia (Doi 1984:218—269). The theoreticians such as Ghazzali have stated that literal amputation is against the spirit of Islam (see Section 3.5.3.4).

3.5.4.7 The Islamic state's relationship with non-Muslims

It is the religious duty of every Muslim to honour dhimmis and guarantee protection of their lives and property.⁶⁰ They have complete religious, political and administrative freedom because they are dhimmis and protected by Allah. In return they should show loyalty to the state and pay the jizyat tax, which should be used for administration and defence of the state. (Doi 1984:426—7) If any Sharia rule is incompatible with their religion they are absolved from following it⁶¹ (Turabi 1983:250).

3.5.5 Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia was founded in 1932 on Islamic principles. Although it is a monarchy, it is the guardian of Mecca and Madina and as such administers Islam's two most holy cities. (Shimoni 1987:434:435) At the outset certain precepts, such as the shura, were flouted and promises were also broken. In 1962 the present form of state came into being. (Hiro 1988:116f.:118)

The state is based on the Quran and Hadith and gives the umma fundamental rights within the precepts of Islam. In 1975 the Supreme Judicial Council was formed, which deals with modern problems according to the Sharia; local imams, ulama and qadis co-operate with the government. The *muttawin* (religious police) work together with the local imams in ensuring that, for example, shops are closed during worship, women are properly attired in public and Ramadan is scrupulously observed publicly. (Hiro 1988:118)

The Minister of Religion and Justice, who is a respected alim, assists the king. In Saudi Arabia "the ulama enjoy more power and prestige than in any other Sunni state. They are the key element in bestowing legitimacy in the Saudi regime." (Hiro 1988:119)

One of their functions is *nizam* (drafting of royal orders). These pertain to things relevant to the modern age, where there is no guidance in the Sharia. They are permitted to use different schools of fiqh if their own schools cannot supply the answers. For example, they may use the Hanbali School, which did not close the 'gates' of ijtihad. (Hiro 1988:120)

Modern technology, such as telephones and aeroplanes, is permitted because it contributes to the 'welfare of society'. The Quran is also read on Radio Riyadh. (Hiro 1988:121)

The rights of women are strictly in accordance with the Quran. This applies to non-Muslim

women as well. The ulama were against education for women, but were eventually convinced that the Quran allows learning for every believing Muslim. (Hiro 1988:124)

The Saudi monarchs stress their custodianship of the holy places. They are patrons of the Hajj and support all the Muslims in the world. (Hiro 1988:137)

3.5.6 Iran

The Shia concept of state differs from the Sunnis'. Iran's constitution is based on the ideas in Khomeini's book, *Hukumat-e Islami: Vilayat-i Faqih* (Islamic government: rule of religious jurist).⁶² There was initial opposition, but the Ayatollah is reported to have said, "The *Vilayat-e Faqih* is not something created by the Assembly of Experts ... it is something God has ordained." (Hiro 1988:151:172)

Article 12 of the constitution states, "The official religion of Iran is Islam with the twelver Jaafari school of thought, and this principle shall remain eternally immutable. However other schools of thought are to be respected and their followers may abide by their own jurisprudence for religious devotions, religious education and matters of personal status. (Hiro 1988:172)

The head of state must be a just and pious faqih with an understanding of current affairs and with leadership abilities. He is head of the Supreme National Defence Council, with authority to dismiss or appoint commanders of various branches of the army. He can also appoint jurists on the Council of Guardians, which body examines everything passed by the *Majlis*. (Hiro 1988:173)

The state is ruled according to public opinion by means of elections where the electorate choose the president of state, representatives of the National Consultative Assembly and numerous councils. These have to legislate according to the command in the Quran.⁶³ (Hiro 1988:174)

Every citizen has access to the law courts and its highest authority in the judiciary is the Supreme Judicial Council (Hiro 1988:176). Punishment is carried out according to the Quran⁶⁴ (Enayat 1986:95f.). Women are guaranteed rights within Islamic law. There is also freedom of the press except when this is "detrimental to the fundamentals of Islam or the rights of the public." (Hiro 1988:176). Hiro (1988:177) maintains that Iran's constitution is a pioneering

effort.⁶⁵

3.6 ARAB NATION-STATES : THE MIDDLE EAST

Nation states, as applied to this thesis, refer to sovereign states where Arabs are the majority. Each has a head of state and an elected parliament, whether it is a one-party or multi-party state. It will emerge that although each is based on some ideology, the state is by no means an Islamic state according to the Sharia, even though there may be provision for Islam in some of its laws.

In this section there will be a departure from the framework used in this chapter till now. In order to understand each state's position in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it would be more useful to mention the form of government from its independence until the present time. In addition, the role of Islam and any tensions from other religions would help to shed light on their internal and foreign policies. Nevertheless one should not lose sight of the fact that the head of each state, whether practising Muslim or not, has his roots in Islam.

The states which will be discussed will be limited to the confrontation states in the Middle East, namely Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. This will therefore exclude all the other Arab states including those in the Maghreb. Thereafter a projected concept of a Palestinian state will be described.

3.6.1 Arab politics

Since World War II there have been two distinct trends in the Arab world, namely Pan-Arabism (al-Qawmiyya al-Arabiyya) and state nationalism (Wataniyya).⁶⁶ The former unites the Arabs according to language, culture and a common past. The latter refers to individual Arab states which place priority on their own interests. The dissolution of the United Arab Republic and also the Union of Jordan and Iraq points to a tendency towards individual state-nationalism. However, many Arab heads of state in the region believe that national interests coincide with Pan-Arabism. (Freedman 1979:89f.)

The nation state has a government which supports some ideology. It passes laws, has certain powers and its citizens have certain rights and obligations. (Zubaida 1987:26) It has been the practice in states in which Muslims are the majority, not to allow non-Muslims to occupy high posts in government. These governments accept and recognise the traditional place of non-

Muslims in Islam. Furthermore Revivalist groups reject non-Muslims in high positions as being contrary to Islam. These groups challenge nationalism as undermining Islamic solidarity and the unity of the umma because Islam has been forced to become privatised. (Esposito 1987: 231:232:233)

3.6.1.1 Egypt

From its independence Egypt was a monarchy until the coup by the "Free Officers". Since then the constitution has been changed several times, but the country has remained a presidential republic. (Shimoni 1987:156)

The state's attitude to religion and the Revivalist groups can be seen under President Jamal Abd Nasser, Muhammad Anwar Sadat (Israeli 1984:65ff.:70ff.) and Muhammad Husni Mubarak (Shimoni 1991:163; Ibrahim 1984:358). The main groups are al-Ikhwan, Jamaat al-Fonniya al-Askariyya (Technical Military Academy) and al-Takfir waal-Hijra (Repentance and Holy Flight). There are others. (Ibrahim 1984:354; Zubaida 1987:39f.; Voll 1983b:117)

Nasser was a pragmatic socialist who saw conservative religion as inhibiting and posing a threat to his authority, yet it would be an alternative, should his socialism fail. Therefore he suppressed Muslim opposition to revolution. (Israeli 1984:65:66) From 1949 till 1952 al-Ikhwan operated clandestinely because this group was banned. From 1952 to 1954 they had a fairly close relationship with the authorities, but in 1954 they were banned again after their colleagues' attempt to assassinate him. (Shadid 1988:659—660) As he had to feign a policy of interest in Islam, his hajj to Mecca in 1954 was widely publicised and he was one of the founders of the Muslim Congress. In 1956 Islam was re-affirmed the state religion but Sharia courts were abolished and al-Azhar was nationalised. (Israeli 1984:67:65:68) After 1967 the policy of Pan-Arabism had failed and there was a return to Islam which could lift Egypt out of humiliation and defeat. Consequently Nasser publicly took part in the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet⁶⁷ and released many members of al-Ikhwan who then overtly condemned nationalism. (Israeli 1984:69—70)

Sadat became president of Egypt after the death of Nasser. He found a place for Islam in his domestic and foreign policies, permitting the on-going debate about the use of the Sharia as a legislative source. (Israeli 1984:70f.; Voll 1983b:115) He also personally attended public religious festivals. On the other hand he was committed to science and technology which he

tried to balance with faith. (Israeli 1984:71:72) In spite of this, members of the Jamaat al-Fonniyya al-Askariyya attempted a coup d'état which failed. Two years later al-Takfir waal-Hijra kidnapped a former cabinet minister and threatened to kill him if their imprisoned comrades were not released. During the mid seventies the Revivalist groups gained landslide victories in the student councils at all Egyptian universities. This resulted in Sadat's decree to dissolve all student unions in 1979 (Ibrahim 1984:354:357). In the Egyptian parliamentary elections in 1978 al-Ikhwan formed an alliance with two other parties, whose campaign slogan was "Islam — that is the solution." This resulted in 36 seats for the Muslim Brotherhood.⁶⁸ Sadat asked for, and received agreement from, al-Azhar for his peace initiative (Israeli 1984:76), which the Egyptian people as a whole applauded (Freedman 1979:103; Israeli 1984:75). However the Revivalists were against this policy, which led to his assassination by a member of the Jihad group (Ibrahim 1984:358:354).

Mubarak, who succeeded Sadat, has pursued a policy of gradual democratisation. There has been no censorship of opposition newspapers, and two new political parties have come into being. These are the *New Wafd* and *Umma*. The former is secular but some leaders of al-Ikhwan have joined this party. The Revivalist groups too are being integrated into Egyptian politics. They are treated fairly, but if they transgress the law they are tried by state courts which are open to the media at large. Dealing with government corruption has stemmed charges of a jahiliyya society. Mubarak does not invoke religion either positively or negatively in his political speeches. All the foregoing have reduced religious tension since he came to power. (Ibrahim 1984:353:360:358:359) With regard to the State of Israel, Mubarak did not abrogate the peace treaty in spite of persuasion from other Arab states. However there remained a "cold" peace and after the 1982 invasion of Lebanon/Operation Peace for Galilee, the Egyptian ambassador was recalled, but after Taba was returned to Egypt a new ambassador was appointed. (Shimoni 1991:163; Ibrahim 1984:359) During the 1990 Gulf War/Operation Desert Storm, Mubarak took a leading role in supporting the other Arab states on the side of the Allies. At the subsequent Madrid Peace Conference, Egypt was also represented. (Shimoni 1991:163:254)

In 1945 there was a pogrom against the Jews, while thousands were incarcerated in 1948, 1956 and 1967, and many were expelled. During the war in 1967 "Jews were put into concentration camps administered by former SS men." In 1948 the Jewish population was 76 000, as

compared to less than 100 in 1976. (*Mid East policy papers 1976*)[¶]. On the other hand Sadat retracted official government recognition of the Copt Patriarch. Since this community regarded him as their spiritual leader a grave crisis was caused until Mubarak re-instated him in January 1985. (Shimoni 1987:148)

3.6.1.2 Syria

From the time of Syria's independence there were coups and counter-coups (Shimoni 1987:475—478). In November 1970 Hafez al-Asad, a member of the Baath party, took power. A new constitution came into being and the Syrian republic was now a "popular-democratic and socialist state". The principle source of legislation was the Sharia and the president could only be a Muslim. (Shimoni 1987:478)

This was a source of opposition by the Sunni community and also by al-Ikhwan (Voll 1983b:115; Shimoni 1987:478; Shimoni 1991:37). They maintained that Asad, an Alawi, did not meet the criterion. Consequently the Muslim Brotherhood embarked on armed resistance which culminated in the battle of Hama, where they were finally suppressed. (Shimoni 1987:478; 1991:37)

On the one hand no Syrian, whether Muslim, Druze, Christian or Jew, has the right of free emigration or free travel. On the other hand only Jews travelling within the country must have Musawi (Mosaic) stamped on their passports, and they are the only group barred from emigration. If they travel abroad they have to post a substantial bond and at least one member of the family must remain in Syria; they cannot meet with aliens without permission, but are permitted to follow their religion although they may not study modern Hebrew. By the end of the seventies there was a high proportion of young women who were unable to find marriageable Jewish men, but through the intervention of the United States a few Jewish women were allowed to leave the country after the arrangement of proxy marriages. This practice was subsequently halted. (Gross 1992:59—60)

The 1967/Six-Day War resulted in the loss of the Golan Heights to Israel (Voll 1983b:111). Though al-Asad adhered to the disengagement agreements, he headed the rejectionist camp against Egypt after Sadat's peace initiative. In 1976 Arab countries endorsed the Syrian

¶ The pages of this pamphlet are not numbered.

president's military intervention in Lebanon, whence he subsequently allowed raids into Israel, but he prevented these attacks from Syrian territory. He rejected Arafat and al-Fateh but has encouraged other Palestinian groups. (Shimoni 1991:38:37) He also supports Nabih Berri of Amal (Shimoni 1987:123).

During the Gulf War/Operation Desert Storm al-Asad sided with the allies against Saddam Husayn (Shimoni 1991:38; Gross 1992:60:61), and Syria was represented at the Madrid Peace Conference (Gross 1992:59; Shimoni 1991:254). The Syrian president has linked Jewish emigration from Syria to the return of the Golan Heights to Syria (Gross 1992:61:60).

3.6.1.3 Jordan

Since its independence the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan⁶⁹ has had a constitutional system of government with a bi-cameral parliament (Abu Jabber & Fathi 1990:67:81; Shimoni 1987:12). During the 1948 war Transjordanian troops refrained from attacking areas which were designated for the State of Israel, but the West Bank/Judea and Samaria was later annexed in 1950. After King Abdulla's assassination at the al-Aqsa mosque by a Palestinian the following year, he was succeeded by his son Talal. The latter agreed to a new constitution where the cabinet was made responsible to Parliament, and could only be dismissed by a two-thirds majority. Due to illness he was later succeeded by his son, Husayn, who amended dismissals to a simple majority. King Husayn was the only ruler of an Arab state who gave full citizenship to Palestinians in his country. (Shimoni 1987:225:226) Since 1928 there has been provision for minorities in parliament. There are seats reserved for non-Bedouin Muslims, Bedouin, Circassians and Christians (Abu Jabber 1990:73). There are no Jews in Jordan (*Mid East policy papers* 1976).

In 1952 former members of al-Ikhwan formed al-Tahrir and advocated the establishment of an Islamic state (Cohen 1981:194:232), which led to its outlawing and clandestine operation (Sahliyah 1989:89). Since the Muslim Brotherhood was not a political party but an organisation which supported King Husayn and his government, it was allowed to function openly (Cohen 1981:251:130:133; Shadid 1988:660—663). In April 1957 political parties were banned in Jordan but al-Ikhwan was permitted to function (Cohen 1981:1—2; Shadid 1988:661).

For many years after the 1967/Six-Day War no parliamentary elections were held because the West Bank/Judea and Samaria were under Israeli occupation/administration (Abu Jabber

1990:68). In addition the relationship between Jordan and the PLO was such as to pave the way (see Sections 2.11.1; 2.12.1) for all links to be abolished with the other side of the Jordan River in 1988. Elections were called for the end of the following year. (Abu Jabber 1990:68; Shimoni 1991:113) Normally only legally-recognised parties may put up candidates; but a Communist candidate was allowed to stand, permitting free elections to take place (Abu Jabber 1990:72).

The Muslim Brotherhood campaigned under the slogan "Islam is the solution". They received 21 seats in the lower house and a group of Islamist independents garnered 13 seats. Consequently the Islamic Bloc account for 43% of the lower house. al-Ikhwan was not represented in the cabinet because they had demanded sensitive ministries, but three members of the Islamists received Cabinet posts. (Abu Jabber 1990:75:81:84f.) Notwithstanding, the speaker of the lower house is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁷⁰ Abu Jabber (1990:84) points out that less than 40% of the electorate used their right to vote. Jordanian Palestinians comprise about half the population. Many felt that they should be cautious in casting their votes since the PLO is their representative and not the Jordanian parliament (Abu Jabber 1990:79).

In 1967 the Israeli government sent a message to King Husayn via the UN saying that Jordan would not be attacked if she remained passive. However, honouring his treaty with Egypt, King Husayn joined the war with the resultant loss of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria. In 1973 he sent a token force to help Syria. During the sixties and seventies he had many secret meetings with Israeli authorities, but these talks were unproductive. (Shimoni 1987:258; 1991: 111:112)

Husayn condemned Sadat's peace initiative and broke off relations with Egypt, which he resumed in 1984. (Shimoni 1987:261:263) During the Gulf War/Operation Desert Storm his attempt at mediation failed. Officially Jordan remained neutral but its position was pro-Iraq and anti-Allies. In the subsequent Madrid Peace Conference Jordan headed a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. (Shimoni 1991:113:252)

3.6.1.4 Lebanon

In Lebanon religion is so intertwined with politics that this could be the subject of a complete thesis. For this reason only selected facts will be described.

No formal census has been conducted for political reasons since 1932. At that time 53.7% of the population were Christians.⁷¹ Non-Christian groups accounted for 45.3%.⁷² (Shimoni 1987:289)

An unwritten "National Pact" (al-mithaq al-watani) was made in 1943 where Lebanon's independence was accepted by the Muslims, and the Christians agreed to the country becoming part of the family of Arab nations. Moreover the state would be governed by a fixed ratio of 6:5 Christian:Muslim composition of parliament. A Maronite would be president, a Sunni Muslim the prime minister, and a Shia Muslim would occupy the post of president of the parliament. The heads of the armed forces and the Security Services were to be Maronites. Although not part of the pact, it has been the practice for a Druze to occupy the defence ministry. (Shimoni 1987:292; Faksh 1991:36)

Civil war has been waged from time to time since the late fifties and in the seventh decade there was a proposal to change the pact to provide equality in parliament on a 50:50 basis between Christians and non-Christians. (Shimoni 1987:293—8:297) By the early seventies the Shia had become one-third of the total population of Lebanon (Faksh 1991:40) and therefore the Muslim majority demanded supremacy. (Bailey 1987:219)

After the PLO expulsion from Jordan they set up bases in Lebanon. This further complicated the situation. Syrian troops entered the country in 1976 in an effort to implement reforms and have remained there ever since. (Shimoni 1987:297) According to an agreement Syria is due to withdraw from Lebanon by September 1992.⁷³

Israel's involvement in Lebanon has already been addressed (see Sections 2.11; 2.12). The state of war between the two countries was terminated by an agreement in 1983, but due to opposition, mainly by the Muslim Left and Syria, it was not ratified but annulled the following year. Israel finally concluded the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon a year later. (Shimoni 1987:301) Israel's first stage withdrawal from the Shuf mountains caused tensions between the Druze and Sunnis⁷⁴ (Bailey 1987:224).

The problem became more involved with the rise of Hizballah and Amal (see Section 2.11.2; Faksh 1991:41.ff.:49:52). Not only are both groups part of the Shia Muslim community with a gulf between their ideologies and policies, but they are also backed by Iran and Syria respectively. Moreover the Hizballah are active against Israel and this causes retaliations.

(Shimoni 1987:303f.; Faksh 1991:52) However in spite of the Shia religious element, one researcher has found that Sunni Muslim university students advocate Pan-Arabism⁷⁵ (Khashan 1991:115).

Lebanon was represented at the Madrid peace conference (Shimoni 1991:254). However she has linked any progress with Israel to progress in the Syrian-Israeli talks.⁷⁶

3.6.1.5 Iraq

Since July 1970 Iraq has been a "Sovereign People's Democratic Republic". The Revolutionary Command Council has a maximum of twelve members "recruited" from the Baath Party. The chairman of the Council serves as president of the republic and as supreme commander of the armed forces. Ten years later an elected National Assembly was established with powers of legislation, but in practice these are held by the Council. (Shimoni 1987:224)

Saddam Husayn became sole ruler in 1979⁷⁷ with a blood purge. There were times when his stance towards the Kurds⁷⁸ was moderate, but when they rebelled in 1974—5 he ordered the use of poison gas to crush the uprising and also their resettlement by moving Iraqi Arabs into their areas. He succeeded in suppressing the pro-Iranian Shia Revivalist movement and was able to control the Iraqi Shia in the south. After the 1991 Gulf War he put down the Shia rebellion and promised limited autonomy to the Kurds. His support for the Palestinian freedom fighters/terrorists caused tensions with Jordan in the early '70s, and was the reason for the direct attacks on Israel in 1991. His pro-PLO stance gained him their support in the 1991 war. (Shimoni 1991:108:109:33)

The government nationalised land belonging to Jews in 1970. They were either confined to ghettos or placed under house-arrest, while many were incarcerated, tortured or put to death for alleged espionage, and have been denied emigration. In 1976 the Jewish population in Iraq numbered about 600. (*Mid East policy papers*. 1976)

An Iraqi division took part in the 1948 War/War of Independence against Israel and some troops were sent to the north of Jordan in the 1967/Six-Day War. However the latter were withdrawn about three years later. During the 1973/Yom Kippur War two divisions were sent to Syria, and Saddam Husayn broke off relations with Egypt after Sadat's peace initiative. (Shimoni 1987:226:228:229) Iraq's first direct participation in the Arab-Israeli conflict came

during the 1991 war when Iraqi troops fired Scud missiles at Israeli civilian centres. Saddam Husayn called this war a jihad and anyone who opposed him was against Islam and the whole Arab nation. (Shimoni 1991:109)

3.6.2 A projected Palestinian state

Article 31 of the Palestine National Charter states that the organisation shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance and an anthem. These will be decided upon taking into consideration appropriate regulations.⁷⁹

In 1970 Fateh published its conception of a Palestinian state,⁸⁰ which would occupy the territory of Mandatory Palestine and would be part of the Arab Nation.⁸¹ The right of citizenship would be accorded to all Jews, Muslims and Christians living in Palestine or those forcibly exiled. The latter have the right to return, whether they were born in exile or in Palestine. Jews living in Israel would be permitted to remain provided they rejected Zionism and were prepared to live in the new Palestine as Palestinian citizens.⁸² The president of the new state could be a Jew, Muslim or Christian because the state would be secular. Any theocratic, feudalistic, aristocratic, authoritarian or "racist-chauvinistic" form of government would be rejected. The system of government would be decided upon during the process of liberation but the aim would be full expression and equal opportunities for all its people. "It is quite logical for example to have both Arabic and Hebrew as official languages taught in government schools to all Palestinians, Jews and non-Jews." There would be the right of free travel, and people who wanted to leave the country would be permitted to do so. In the first instance only exiled Palestinians would be allowed to return⁸³ but later "immigration would be open without discrimination." However the state would be open to tourists and pilgrims of all the monotheistic religions.⁸⁴

Shaath (1971:3—4) points out that since the Palestinian state will include the territory of pre-1948, the Zionist state will have to be destroyed by liberation since the latter cannot have "even ... one inch of Palestinian soil." There can be no accommodation with Israel by setting up the state of Palestine in the Territories as this would be considered a "Palestinostan". On the other hand Jews and other minority groups can live as first-class citizens without discrimination of religion, race or colour, having to contest for seats in parliament or its offices.

The PFLP recognises that Judaism is a religion but not a nationality. On the other hand the

PDFLP tend to recognise a Jewish nationality, (Waxman 1973—1974:7) though nationhood can only have a cultural dimension and Israel's right to statehood is completely rejected (Harkabi 1970:3:4).

The Nationalists reject the Jewish/Zionist historical claim because they displaced other tribes living in the country before its conquest. Furthermore they do not accept the claim of return after many centuries as being valid, because no Arab has laid claim to Spain which was lost to them 500 years ago and over which they had ruled for over seven centuries. (Asad 1982:15)

Towards the end of the seventies Arafat and other PLO leaders stated that they were prepared to accept a Palestinian state in the Territories.⁸⁵ This was seen in response to Israeli settlement in the area.⁸⁶ (Sheehan 1977:8:10)

In November 1988 the PNC in Algiers proclaimed the establishment of the state of Palestine on Palestinian territory,⁸⁷ declaring Jerusalem (al-Quds ash Sharif) its capital. The state will be governed by a democratic parliamentary system which includes different political parties. "Governance will be based on principles of social justice, equality and non-discrimination in public rights on grounds of race, religion, color, or sex under the aegis of a constitution which ensures the rule of law and on an independent judiciary." Minorities will have rights; being an Arab state it will be an integral part of the Arab nation and will abide by the charter of the League of Arab States. In addition it commits itself to the principles of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Non-Aligned Movement. The state is peace-loving and will "join with all states and peoples in order to assure a permanent peace based upon justice and the respect of rights ..." Therefore it requests other such states to help it gain these objectives and "to terminate Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories." The state of Palestine reserves the right to defend itself but "rejects the threat or use of force". The declaration ends with a verse from the Quran. (Documents 1989:215—216)

3.7 JERUSALEM/al BAITU L-MUQADDAS/al-QUDS

Jerusalem, the city, is cited about 750 times in the Hebrew scriptures, and Zion approximately 180 times. There are a few hundred other mentions of Mount Moriah, City of David, Temple Mount, Holy City, Shalem, Ariel and the city. "Altogether there must be some 2000 mentions of Jerusalem in the Hebrew canon." These statistics show the centrality of Jerusalem in biblical thought. (Talmon 1971:301:302) This is due to religious and political decisions of King David,

who made the city his capital.⁸⁸ First he moved the Ark of the Covenant there,⁸⁹ and then bought land to erect an altar,⁹⁰ which was on the site of the Temple Mount. (Wigoder 1989:381) Jerusalem was also the place chosen by God.⁹¹ Consequently this city became a symbol "and the most significant exponent of the transfer from 'peoplehood' to 'nationhood' to 'statehood'." (Talmon 1971:307)

Jerusalem also has a central place in Jewish liturgy,⁹² and the city is linked to Jewish eschatology⁹³ (Wigoder 1989:382). The borders of Jerusalem are clearly defined⁹⁴ (Jer. 31:38—40); therefore the whole city is holy to Judaism, in contrast to other religions which revere selected sites which are related to specific events in their religious history (Talmon 1987:501). Another illustration of the importance of Jerusalem is the following:

"As one whom his mother comforteth, so will I comfort you; and ye shall be comforted in Jerusalem." (Isa. 66:13)

The city has always been populated by peoples of other religions (Gen. 38; Ruth 4; 2 Sam. 3) but it was advisable not to have contact with them (Talmon 1971:312; Isa. 2:6; Isa. 7:4—92). Contemporary archaeologists have found an inscription from the first part of Isaiah 66:14 in the stones of the Western Wall (Talmon 1971:314f.; 1987:502).

In December 1949 Ben Gurion stated that Jerusalem was the only capital of the State of Israel (Rolef 1987:56). In 1967 East Jerusalem came under Israeli "law, jurisdiction and administration". The Arab population who did not wish to become Israeli citizens retained their Jordanian nationality but were given Israeli identity cards as Jerusalem residents. This gave them the right to participate in the Jerusalem municipal elections. Since this population is against annexation, the majority have not taken part in elections. (Rolef 1987:165)

There is freedom of the East Jerusalem press, although it is subject to censorship. Newspapers which support the PLO are permitted to appear regularly. (Rolef 1987:165)

The city's status was settled on July 30, 1980 with the passing of a basic law stating that "integral and united Jerusalem" is the capital of the State of Israel, the seat of the state president, the Knesset and government, and the supreme court. This law also guarantees rights to the holy places of members of all religions and provides preference for the city's development. There is also a national consensus against re-partition. (Rolef 1987:56:166)

The name Jerusalem is not mentioned in the Quran. The city has always been called *al-Baitu l-Muqaddas* (the holy house) in the Traditions and Muslim writings. Later it became known as

al-Quds, the holy city, and is the third-holiest city in Islam. (Tibawi 1970:14; Hughes 1988:227)

Two most important mentions in the Quran refer to the change in the qibla (Quran 2:142ff.)¹ and the Prophet's night journey (Quran 17:1). It is recorded in the Hadith literature that the Prophet described the place of his night's journey to Umar to help him to recognise it when he saw it. In another Hadith Muhammad is reported to have said that one prayer prayed in Jerusalem surpassed a thousand prayers anywhere else. (Busse 1968:454:465)

The Dome of the Rock mosque stands on the site of the Prophet's ascent to heaven (Tibawi 1970:12; Busse 1968:459). This mosque is also seen in Islam as "the successor to Solomon's Temple."⁹⁶ (Busse 1968:458)

al-Quds is linked to creation⁹⁷ and the Day of Judgement⁹⁸ (Busse 1968:463:467). Therefore this city is a place for pilgrimage⁹⁹ and there are fifteen prescribed sites to be visited (Busse 1968:465:466).

Historically Umar and Mu'awiya have been connected with al-Quds and several Companions of the Prophet went there where some of them died and were interred (Tibawi 1970:10:13:23:14). After the Crusaders took the city from the Muslims, Salah al-Din reconquered it in 1178 and ordered al-Aqsa mosque purified before he would pray there. (Tibawi 1970:19:20:22)

Since his reconquest, Muslims have been living uninterruptedly in this city (Tibawi 1970:21:passim). The capital of the state of Palestine has been declared al-Quds ash-Sharif (Documents 1989:215).

Asad (1982:14) maintains that Jerusalem should always be accessible to Jews and Christians because of an ayah in the Quran.¹⁰⁰ He argues further that the scriptures prohibit reviling things held sacred by others (Quran 6:109).

Their place of worship should be protected (Quran 22:40). However, even though Jews respect the religion of others, their prophets will always be regarded as "false prophets"; and while the Christians accept what is written in the Old Testament they cannot accept Muhammad and the Quran. On the other hand "We make no distinction between any of them ..." (Quran 2:136). Therefore "the Muslim community should be specifically entrusted with the custody of Jerusalem as a city open to all three communities" (Asad 1982:15).

3.8 DISCUSSION

The discussion on this chapter will be divided into two parts. Firstly the phenomena in the preceding sections will be explained, compared and contrasted. Then Pye's concepts (1972: passim) will be used in conjunction to explain the actions of all the participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict to the geographical state. Concepts, actions, groups and states of mind will be extrapolated to suit this thesis, but no attempt will be made at interpretation or final conclusions. This will be done in the final chapter.

Five themes have emerged during the course of this chapter. These are political theory, ideologies, state, place of minorities in the state and Jerusalem/al Quds. These will now be addressed.

3.8.1 Political theory

In Judaism, God alone is sovereign and humans have delegated powers; while in Islam only Allah is sovereign and humans are His vicegerents. Jewish political theory is based on a covenant which is a mutually-binding contract between two parties not necessarily of equal status. Since the Jewish people are born Jews they are bound by the covenant but they do have the choice of consent regarding citizenship. The Covenant was renewed from time to time, e.g. Joshua et al. On the other hand Muslims are born into the umma and in order to remain members therein they are obliged to submit to the will of Allah. It seems that choice is missing here.

Divine constitutional teachings were given by God to His prophets (plural) for his people. These are recorded in the Torah and Talmud — Keter Torah. God and His nation are united together through rituals and symbolic expression — Keter Kehunah; and political relationships among the Jewish people are regulated by Keter Malkhut. In Islam Muhammad was the last of the prophets sent by Allah and was an intermediary between Him and the umma. The Prophet received direction from Allah and ruled the umma according to His laws. These directions are recorded in the Quran and the Hadith literature. After his death the Caliphs assumed temporal power and there was a contract between the umma and each Caliph. Since all parties had to submit to Allah, this was renewed with each succeeding Caliph.

Muslims believe that Allah had sent a series of prophets to His peoples on this earth. However their teachings had either been distorted or abandoned; therefore Muhammad was the Seal

of Prophets.

Two main differences have been highlighted. In Judaism adherents are bound by their covenant with God but there is a choice as to kinship, to which one can assent or not. In Islam people are born Muslims and in order to remain a member of the umma one has to submit to the will of Allah. There is no choice.

God sent His teachings to the people of Israel through different prophets of whom Moses was the first. On the other hand Caliphs had no direct contact with Allah, and their function was to lead the umma and enforce and interpret divine law.

Political theory of the State of Israel can be linked to Jewish political theory. Rabbis of the Rabbinical Councils and judges of the rabbinical courts give rulings — Keter Torah. The government, Knesset and civil courts can be regarded as Keter Malkhut and the Ministry of Religions (Keter Kehuna) bring God and the nation together through the symbolic expression and rituals.

Although there does not seem to be a Palestinian Nationalist political theory, perhaps one could be extrapolated, based on Articles #1, #3, #5, #26 and #31 of the Palestinian National Charter. Nationalists reject any theocratic, feudalistic, autocratic, authoritarian or racist-chauvinist form of government (see Section 3.6.2). The system of government would be decided upon during the process of liberation.

The State (Ultimate Reality) is sovereign — #1. The PLO leaders (Prophets) (#26) on behalf of the State (Ultimate Reality) gave the PLO covenant (scriptures) to the Palestinian people. This binds them all together as Palestinian Nationalists and is a contract between the Palestinians and the state with the PLO as intermediaries. Anyone born of a Palestinian father (#26) is a Palestinian and only the Palestinian people have a legitimate right to live in their homeland (#3). There is an implicit element of submission since the PLO are the sole representatives of the people. Only a few Palestinians, who are citizens of Jordan, voted in the last parliamentary elections in that country, since most see themselves as Palestinians and not Jordanians. The State (Ultimate Reality) and the people, including the PLO (prophets) are united by the national anthem, *Biladi, Biladi* and the Palestinian flag (#31) which are involved in rituals and symbolic expressions. All this is in direct antithesis to Islam and hence causes friction between the Islamic groups and the PLO.

The political theory of the State of Israel is based on Jewish political theory. The 'political theory' of Palestinian Nationalism has been extrapolated from the Muslim political theory. However while both the Jewish and Muslim Ultimate Reality are transcendent, the Nationalist Ultimate Reality is immanent but wholly mundane. The prophets are in all cases humans.

The Arab nation states are founded on some ideology. Therefore the extrapolation of the state as the Ultimate Reality, the leaders as prophets, the constitution as scriptures, and the flag and national anthems as symbolic expressions, can be applied here as well.

3.8.2 Ideologies

While the three Zionist ideologues agreed that the Jewish people should live together in a sovereign state, there were points of difference. Herzl saw this state as wholly secular; Pines thought it should be based on religion; and while Ahad Ha'am agreed that religion should have a part to play in the state, he did not think that all Jews should live there: he saw a place for them in the Diaspora.

There was also no consensus among Muslims as to the structure of an Islamic State, although there were some points of contact. They all agreed that since Islam is a way of life there should be no separation of religion from politics. Furthermore the Sunnis felt that there is a need for ijthihad for matters not catered for in the Sharia, but there was a division of opinion as to who should exercise this. There was also consensus on the state of dhimmis, since this subject is addressed in the Sharia, but there were four main points of disagreement. Firstly was the question of who should be head of state. The only point of contact on this subject was that he should rule according to the precepts of Islam in consultation with other Muslims elected by the umma. Secondly punishment varied on a continuum from the literal punishment in the Quran to this being against the spirit of Islam. Thirdly views on the status of women ranged from their traditional place to Maududi's thought that they could become head of state although this was not desirable. Finally the ideologues discussed in Section 3.5.3 could not reach any consensus with regard to delineation of a bureaucratic hierarchy.

It appears that when some issue in a religion has not been decreed by a transcendent or immanent, but mundane, Ultimate Reality, humans cannot come to a complete agreement. One can assume that since humans are living in this world they are at a very low level of transcendence on a spiral continuum (Krüger 1985:110) and in addition they are influenced by

this world. Although the Zionist ideologues are members of the Jewish people, and the Muslim ideologues belong to the Muslim umma, they all have their own psyches and are able to reason for themselves. Therefore it is pragmatic, logical and conforms with reality that there will always be a difference of opinion among humans. This is presumably the reason why the teachings of a non-this-worldly Ultimate Reality have always been recorded in scriptures which have been decreed immutable.

3.8.3 State

The State of Israel is a democratic Secular Jewish State but 'Civil' and traditional religion are inextricably interwoven. In the early years of the Jewish state there was a need for cohesion of Jewish immigrants from different cultures. Since the leaders were of European and Western origin this was achieved by *mamlaktyut*. Politics was based on the political ideology of Zionist Socialism but Ben Gurion was aware of his and his people's roots — hence Ethno-state Religion.

Once the highly diverse population had been united into an Israeli nation by Ben Gurion's Ethno-statism (*mamlaktyut*), and especially after the Six-Day/1967 War with the capture of the Territories, there was a new awakening to its traditional roots. By this time the Sephardim had become the majority, and they remembered their discriminatory treatment by the establishment. Even though they may have been Secularised they still subscribed to the tradition of their forebears. All this gave rise to Ethno-nationalism.

When the Jewish Israeli citizens felt that the time had come to "punish" the government for losing touch with the nation, there was massive support for Begin since he subscribed to traditional Judaism. This saw the rise of the Likud Party. However he needed the religious parties in order to form a majority coalition, and this was the first time that the Haredim had ever been members of the government. At first they were politically naive, and were content with the status quo, but after they became experienced they used the political system for their own ends.

Even though R. Eliezer Schach was not a member of the Agudat Israel Council of Torah Greats, it was his instructions which they followed; and since the Sephardi Shas Party had been founded with his blessing, its members abided by his rulings on matters of importance rather than on those of R. Ovadia Yosef, their spiritual mentor and head of the Council of Torah

Sages. R. Schach became very powerful politically, which is a paradox because he and the other Haredim are against the establishment of the State of Israel (see Section 4.4.2), and they had the power to determine which government ruled the country. On the other hand religious Zionists such as Gush Emunim (see Section 4.4.6) and other secular political parties supported the concept of Eretz Israel, i.e. the inclusion of the Territories under Jewish sovereignty.

Support for the Likud has prevented progress in the peace talks until the June 1992 Knesset elections. Shortly afterwards former premier Shamir was reported as telling an interviewer that he had intended prolonging the autonomy negotiations for ten years. This would have provided time for the settlement of half a million Jews in the Territories, thus making it virtually impossible for any form of compromise.¹⁰¹

After Likud's electoral "punishment" for losing touch with the nation in 1992 (see Section 2.13.3) there has been a rise of the Labour Party. Prime Minister Rabin has included Shas in his government by choice. Since he has a 'blocking bloc' (*gush hosem*) the Haredim do not have the power they once had. Furthermore since they do not recognise the Territories as sacred land (see Section 4.4.2) perhaps there will now be more room for manoeuvre.

Because in Islam the condition of nations is ruled by Allah's laws, Muslims must live according to them in order to gain the ascendancy. According to the Quran Allah made all Muslims His vicegerents on this earth and they have to care for His creation. By adhering to the Path of Islam as set forth in His revelations they will be in harmony with His laws. Therefore cohesion and unity of the umma are essential.

Islam is a way of life and not merely a ritual. Therefore the umma must live according to the scriptures and the Sharia and undertake jihad. This means living in an Islamic state. The insistence that Islam is a way of life is in response to those who compromise and are influenced by the West. Contamination by the West causes jahilliyah. The only way to ascendancy and salvation is to establish Islamic states as in the time of the Prophet at Madina.

Because the Arab nation states are founded on an alien ideology, the Muslim Revivalists are seeking tajdid and islah and want to establish Islamic states in their place, after overthrowing their rulers. Some heads of nation states such as Egypt and Jordan have allowed a certain latitude in the role which religion plays in their countries. This might be due to pragmatism since they do not want to be supplanted. Other rulers, such as those in Syria and Iraq, have

suppressed any role of religion in their states. Perhaps they see this as a threat to their administration, or perhaps they wish to be seen as leaders of Pan-Arabism and therefore traditional religion has no place here.

As far as the Secular state of Palestine is concerned, there does not seem to be any place for religion except perhaps in the private domain. Since the Palestinian National Covenant has not been amended, the suggestion that the head of state could be a member of a minority religion is a contradiction in terms.

3.8.4 Place of minorities

In a theological Jewish State there would be no room for minority religions. In the State of Israel their equal status is set forth in the Proclamation of Independence and legally they have the same rights as Jewish Israelis. However in practice this does not seem to be the case. In Islamic states the dhimmi, although a protected minority, does not have the same status as Muslim citizens. In the projected state of Palestine the situation of minority religions is dubious according to the Palestine National Covenant. The record of nation states towards their minorities speaks for itself.

In any pluralistic state where the majority subscribe to a certain religion, adherents to minority religions cannot have full equality. Even in the State of Israel, where *de jure* Arabs are equal and are even represented in the Knesset by their own parties, they are not completely equal, for example Statism and Ethno-nationalism and the Right-wing objection to the Arab parties in the Knesset supporting a Peres government. This may be linked to the perception of some Jewish-Israelis of the Arab identity with the neighbouring states. For this reason most Arabs do not serve in the army and this precludes them from certain jobs whose qualification is post-national service. The dhimmi and the minorities in Arab nation states are other examples. The majority of citizens in the latter have their roots in Islam.

3.8.5 Jerusalem/al-Quds

The centrality of Jerusalem/al-Quds to the Jewish people can be seen from the fact that there are about two thousand mentions of that city in the scriptures, including clearly delineated borders. In addition the liturgy is permeated with its connections and all prayers are recited facing Jerusalem. This city is not mentioned in the Quran, and in the Traditions and Muslim

writings it is referred to as al-Baitu l-Muqaddas. It is the third most holy city in Islam and originally Muslims prayed facing towards it until the qibla was changed by the Prophet to Mecca. al-Quds/Jerusalem is also the place of Muhammad's night journey and his ascent to heaven. In Judaism the whole city is considered holy, whilst in Islam there are 15 prescribed places of pilgrimage.

Jerusalem/al-Quds is linked to Jewish eschatology. This concept will be expanded in Section 4.2. The city was the capital of King David, from whom the Jewish messiah will be descended. After chaos and destruction, eternal peace will reign in the city. On the other hand al-Quds/Jerusalem is also linked to Islamic eschatology, but there is a difference: on the Day of Judgement al-Quds/Jerusalem will rank higher than Mecca and Madina and will survive these two cities by 40 years. On the Day of Resurrection the Kabah and all the mosques will relocate to this city, and after the defeat of the Dadjdjal the dead will be resurrected. In Judaism the advent of the messiah is not linked to the Day of Judgement nor to the Resurrection of the dead (see Section 4.2).

Not only is Jerusalem/al-Quds the de jure capital of the State of Israel, but in the Proclamation of the Palestinian State too al-Quds/Jerusalem has been declared its capital. This city has been ordained through the scriptures and theologies of two traditional religions to be of the same importance to both, at least as far as an *eschaton* is concerned. Therefore it seems that there is no room for compromise either by Jewish Israelis or Muslim Arabs.

3.8.6 The geographical state according to Pye's methodology

Pye (1972:182) mentions that *concepts, actions, groups* and *states of mind* can be used together in the explanation of phenomena. In this section they will be used to show how the state of mind of each group with regard to the state (*concept*) does not allow them to compromise although most groups are prepared to talk to one another (*action*).

In Judaism the non-Zionists (*group*) do not recognise the Jewish State, since this should be linked to messianism (*state of mind*). This will be addressed in Section 4.3.1.

Religious Zionists (*group*) see the State of Israel as a place for persecuted Jews. The state must be located in Eretz Israel/Palestine and the Territories because of God's covenant with Moses and Joshua. In addition there is an eschatological messianic meaning to the geographical land

and Jerusalem/al-Quds (*state of mind*).

In Islam the umma (*group*) must live together in an Islamic State according to the Sharia. The territory must be former Palestine, since it is Islamic waqf land. Jerusalem must be the capital because of the Prophet's night journey, ascent to heaven and its place in eschatology (*state of mind*).

Some political Zionists (*groups*) are prepared to make some compromise action in return for a just and lasting peace (*state of mind*). Other political Zionists (*groups*) maintain that the Territories cannot be returned (*action*) because they are part of the historical land of Israel (*state of mind*).

The Palestinian Nationalists (*group*) must live in their state in former Palestine (*action*) because they have been living there uninterruptedly for many centuries since the reconquest by Salah al-Din. The Balfour Declaration and partition were imposed on them, since no one asked them what they felt about the matter although they were the majority in the country at the time. Jerusalem must be the capital of Palestine. The Jewish claim of return is tantamount to the Arabs wanting to return to Spain after driving out the Christians (*state of mind*).

This chapter has shown how the concept of state can be explained through the religious dimension. Since all the religions are political, they have some form of political theory and views on how their state should be structured. Furthermore citizens of each state feel the need for the dominant religion to be theirs. This subjects adherents of minority religions to a place of secondary importance. Finally although it has been shown that there are dialectic tensions within each religion, the dialectic tensions between each religion seems to point to an impossibility of a compromise by any of them.

- 1 Statism demands that its citizens place their own beliefs secondary to the interests of the state, thus declaring its sanctity as an ultimate value. For the State of Israel *mamlakhtiyut* was the desire of the Jewish people for the freedom and sovereignty in their own country which could guarantee Jewish national unity. Statism had its own symbols and rites. For example the Labour Party flew the red flag of the socialist internationale together with the national flag on festive occasions. (Liebman 1983:84:85; Peri 1988:44:47)
- 2 Ethno-nationalism seeks to unify and integrate the society according to the State's notion of the Jewish tradition, culture, language and people. (Liebman 1984:53; Peri 1988:44f.) This could have ramifications for its non-Jewish citizens. For example in 1984 the Ma'arach tried to establish a government with the support of Arab Knesset members. However the Tehiya members of Knesset would not recognise such a government because of the non-Jewish support to achieve a majority. This is a case where Ethno-nationalism overrode a minority group with full citizenship rights. Ethno-nationalism permits only the national flag. (Peri 1988:45:47)
- 3 A covenant is a contract between parties (which do not necessarily have equal status) which allows joint action or obligation to achieve something specific, in terms of mutual respect. This protects the integrity of everyone involved. Moreover a covenant is valid in perpetuity. (Elazar 1981:22; 1985:8f.)
- 4 *Keter* means a crown. The Mishnah: Avot 4:13 records R. Simeon Bar Yochai as saying: "There are three crowns: the crown of Torah, the crown of priesthood, and the crown of royalty; but the crown of a good name excels them all." (Elazar 1985:39,n.36)
- 5 In the conclusion to his treatise, *The Jewish state*, (1896) he wrote:
 "... the Jews will always have sufficient enemies, just as every other nation. But once settled in their own land, they can never again be scattered all over the world." (Hertzberg 1959:223)
- 6 At the end of this same treatise he wrote:
 "The Jews who will it, shall achieve their State.
 "We shall live at least as free men on our own soil, and in our own homes peacefully die." (Hertzberg 1959:225)
- 7 In 1895 he wrote that any attempt to separate religion from nationality would be
 "to deprive a living body of its soul in order to revive it by an electric shock, which may have value in resuscitation, but no substitute for real vitality." (Hertzberg 1959:411)

his days shall be an hundred and twenty years." (Gen. 7:3)

This makes *ad me'a va-esrim* (till 120) a traditional Jewish greeting for a long life (Wigoder 1989:296).

14 Agudat Israel opposed a written constitution because man was not capable of drafting this. Any contradiction of the Torah would be a revolt against God. On the other hand anything the same as the Torah would be superfluous. Originally Mizrachi looked with favour on a constitution but later opposed it, fearing criticism from the Aguda. (Rabinowitz 1978:414; Cohen 1986:44)

15 The Law of Return was amended in 1970 (Cohen 1986:48).

16 For this reason, ministers who were considered by the Knesset as being responsible for the Yom Kippur/October 1973 War and the Operation Peace for Galilee/Lebanese War in 1982 were able to remain in office.

17 In Israel this is the exclusive province of religious law (Bin-Nun 1990:144ff.).

18 Its functions are everything connected with Israeli marriage, divorce and burial, and regulation of the public observance of the Shabbat and Kashrut (dietary laws). It has at times dealt with things outside its terms of reference, such as the relocation of Jewish children from Christian institutions to their Jewish parents who had survived the Holocaust. (Rolef 1987:65)

19 The Conservative and Reform Jews do not have their own institutions since Orthodoxy does not recognise their authority. Therefore they have to resort to the Orthodox institutions when necessary. (Elazar & Aviad 1981:184f.) This non-recognition is related to interpretations of Halakha. Furthermore they are not represented in the chief rabbinate. (Rolef 1987:68:255:66)

20 Since R. Schach is a harsh critic of the State of Israel and Zionism, there are tensions between him and R. Ovadia Yosef (*The Jerusalem report*. February 6, 1992).

21 *The Jerusalem report*. February 6, 1992.

The Jerusalem report. February 20, 1992.

22 An example of each will suffice.

□ A Shas member of Knesset proposed a bill which would abolish a minute's silence on memorial days because it was a custom of the non-Jews. The bill called for reciting Psalms and chapters of Mishnah instead, which was more in keeping with Halakha. This was in response to a news item on prime time Israel television showing some Haredim who had ignored the siren. However the bill was defeated. (*The Jerusalem post*.

8 In the same year, he wrote:

"After the Jewish people acquired a homeland and formed a sovereign state, it still did not look upon statehood as the essence of its peoplehood; it was generally willing to accept foreign domination with minimal protest and rose in revolt only when its religion was threatened. Conversely, when it was deprived of its homeland and was scattered abroad, and even ceased speaking its national language, the Jewish people continued to live as a national entity only by virtue of the Torah, which accompanied it in all its wanderings and lived with it in every country in which it settled." (Hertzberg 1959:412)

9 In a letter to Dr J.L. Magnus in 1910, Ahad Ha'am wrote:

"In my view our religion is national ... product of our national spirit — but the reverse is not true. If it is impossible to be a Jew in the religious sense without acknowledging our nationality, it is possible to be a Jew in the national sense without accepting many things which religion requires belief ..." (Hertzberg 1959:262)

In 1897 he wrote:

"Of course not all the Jews will be able to take wing and go to their state; but the very existence of the Jewish state will also raise the prestige of those who remain in exile, and their fellow citizens will no longer despise them ..." (Hertzberg 1959:265)

10 Ahad Ha'am's ideas have been included because the Arabs claim that Jews should live in the countries of their birth. This is not unlike what Ahad Ha'am has said.

11 In the opening paragraph of the preamble it is written:

"The land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and national identity was formed. Here they achieved independence and created a culture of national and universal significance. Here they wrote and gave the Bible to the world." (*The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:125)

The second paragraph states:

"Exiled from the land of Israel the Jewish people remained faithful to it in all the countries of their dispersion, never ceasing to pray and hope for their return and the restoration of their national freedom." (*The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:125)

The sixth paragraph states:

"The recent holocaust, which engulfed millions of Jews in Europe, proved anew the need to solve the problem of the homeless and lack of independence of the Jewish people by means of the re-establishment of the Jewish State, which would open the gates to all Jews and endow the Jewish people with equality of status among the family of nations." (*The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:126)

The final paragraph of the preamble states:

"It is the natural right of the Jewish people to lead, as do all other nations, an independent existence in its sovereign State." (*The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:126)

Cf. the Palestinian Proclamation of Independence (see Section 3.9, n.87).

12 Seventeen parties contested these elections (Cohen 1986:42).

13 "And the Lord said, My spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he is flesh: yet

Thursday, February 20, 1992.)

▣ The finance committee is the most powerful of all the Knesset committees. The chairman has customarily been a member of Agudat Israel, but this committee has usually been a "rubber stamp". The chairman from 1988 to 1992 managed to obtain approval for more finance to the Haredi educational system than ever before by holding up the approval of the state budget. He also managed to obtain more money for the Gur Hasidim than for the other Haredim. This caused tensions. (*The Jerusalem post*. Friday, March 20, 1992)

23 In March 1990 Shas, with the blessing of R. Ovadia Yosef, helped the Ma'arach to topple the national unity government and promised Peres they would form a government under his leadership. However R. Schach ordered Shas to join a Likud-led government without Labour. They complied and the Labour Party "was left reeling". (*The Jerusalem report*. February 20, 1992; *The Jerusalem report*. February 6, 1992)

24 *The Jerusalem report*. February 20, 1992.

25 Robert Bellah saw American Civil Religion as "the set of views, symbols and rituals that express the public religious dimension." The Ultimate Reality of Civil Religion is law and order and is concerned with mundane historical events in America. This type of religion encompasses the whole nation. On the other hand, in a multi-religious society Ethnic religion provides identity to a minority group. (Goosen et al. 1985:306-9) Therefore it is a moot point whether one is correct in speaking about Civil Religion in Israel. Consequently this researcher will use the term, *Ethno-state religion*. This will be clarified in the body of the text, but the reasons for using it will be argued here.

If Civil Religion unites the whole nation and Ethnic religion relates to a minority group, then neither term is apposite for this discussion. Yoram Peri (1988:44) maintains that Statism in its "extreme expressions, demands that individuals direct their total faith to the state in such a way that any additional focus of faith must be of secondary importance, ... in many cases, statism sanctifies the state and its executive branch in particular." Therefore 'state' seems to be a logical word to use. Since Israel is a "Jewish State" with a Jewish majority (Peri 1988:44:41; Liebman 1983:13) the Jewish ethnic component predominates. It will transpire that although Judaism per se does not apply here, elements of this traditional religion have been adapted. (This is not to be confused with the place of traditional religion in the State of Israel. Cf. Section 3.3.1) Moreover the term *state-ethnic* religion could imply that the state has adopted a minority religion.

Hence the term Ethno-state religion.

- 26 The private beliefs of Israeli Jews range through all varieties of Judaism, to Secularism and other ideologies and even a variety of new contemporary religions, called cults in Israel.
- 27 Mapai was the forerunner of the Labour Party.
- 28 God had instructed that a menorah be constructed and placed in the Tabernacle at Sinai. Later there were gold menorot (pl.) in the Temple. (Liebman 1983:108)
- 29 Yizkor is a prayer for the dead. The original IDF prayer did not include Kiddush hashem (sanctification of God's name usually for Jewish martyrs, nor the section which prayed for the soul of the departed to ascend to heaven.) "The military *Yizkor* sanctified the heroism and courage of the fallen who gave their lives for the nation and state." God was not mentioned. The traditional prayer starts with "*Yizkor Elohim*" (let God remember) but the army version started with "*Yizkor am Israel*" (let the nation of Israel remember). After the decline of mamlaktyut the traditional version was introduced and today either may be chosen. (Liebman 1983:119f.)
- 30 In Judaism the dead are remembered through prayer, study of the Torah and a visit to their graves (Liebman 1983:119).
- 31 The number twelve represents the twelve tribes of ancient Israel (Liebman 1983:114).
- 32 According to the Bible fires were lit on mountains to signify the new moon and hence the start of a new month (Liebman 1983:114).
- 33 The Israel Prize ceremony was a control balance to military parades since "... the Bible and Hebrew poetry were part of the arsenal which each of our warriors bore with him" (Liebman 1983:114).
- 34 Yad Vashem, situated on Mount Herzl, is a museum which contains everything which was found pertaining to the Holocaust, including German documents (Liebman 1983:151).
- 35 Liebman (1983:99) maintains that: "The emphasis on achievement, victory, success, courage, confidence, power, and capacity are the characteristic elements of this myth." Phenomenologically a myth can be seen as a sacred story which provides a person with an aetiology, ontology, soteriology and eschatology.
- 36 "O Israel, trust thou in the Lord: he is their help and their shield." (Ps. 115:9)
- 37 "Behold, he that keepeth Israel shall neither slumber nor sleep." (Ps. 121:4)
- 38 According to the phenomenological definition in note 35, this sentence could provide

an aetiology for ontological existence.

"In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." (Gen. 1:1)

39 "burden of commandment" (*ol mitzvot*) is taken directly from the language of the rabbinical tradition (Liebman 1983:93).

40 *Kibbutz galuyot* has a messianic significance (Liebman 1983:93).

41 By the early eighties the Sephardim comprised about two-thirds of the Herut party membership (Elazar 1983:39). Herut is the major party in the Likud alliance (Rolef 1987:204).

42 A siren is sounded to bring the country to a standstill in memory of the fallen (*The Jerusalem post*. Thursday, February 20, 1992).

43 National flags can be seen in all main streets together with the municipal flags.

44 Israel television, April 30, 1992.

45 In 1992 the theme of Jerusalem Day was the anniversary of the re-unification of the city. There was an organised central ceremony on Mount Herzl in memory of those who fell, a national assembly in the presence of the state president and a signing of "The Jerusalem Covenant" at his official residence. There was also a march with singing and dancing. The day culminated in a thanksgiving ceremony at the Western Wall attended by the prime minister, chief rabbis and Minister of Religions. (*The Jerusalem post*. Friday, May 29, 1992)

46 This includes Druze and Bedouin.

47 The situation of the Israeli Arabs will be expanded in Section 5.5ff.

48 Quran 2:83; 2:87ff.

"How shall Allah guide a people who disbelieved after their belief and (after) they bore witness that the messenger is true and after clear proofs (of Allah's sovereignty) had come unto them. And Allah guideth not wrong doing folk." (Quran 3:86)

49 "Muhammad is not the father of any man among you but he is a messenger of Allah and the Seal of Prophets; and Allah is aware of all things." (Quran 33:40)

50 "Knowest thou not that it is Allah unto Whom belongeth the sovereignty of the heavens and earth ..." (Quran 2:107)

"Unto Allah belongeth whatsoever is in the heavens and whatsoever is in the earth, and unto Allah all things are returned.

"Ye are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind ..." (Quran 3:109—110).

51 "Lo! I am about to place a viceroy in the earth ..." (Quran 2:30)

52 "And remember how he made you viceroys after Allah and gave you station in the earth ..." (Quran 7:74)

"He it is who made you regents in the earth ..." (Quran 35:39)

"He it is who has placed you as viceroys on the earth and hath exalted some of you in rank above others that He may try you by (the test of) that which he hath given you ..." (Quran 7:166)

53 "For each We have appointed a divine law and a traced-out way." (Quran 5:48)

54 "How can there be a treaty with Allah and His messenger for the idolaters save those with whom ye made a treaty at the Inviolable Place of Worship? So long as they are true to you, be true to them. Lo! Allah loveth those who keep their duty." (Quran 9:7)
"And if they break their pledges after their treaty (hath been made with you) and assail your religion, then fight the heads of disbelief. Lo! they have no binding oaths in order that they may desist.

"Will ye not fight a folk who broke their solemn pledges, and purposed to drive out the messenger and did attack you first? What! Fear ye them? Now Allah hath more right that ye should fear Him, if ye are believers." (Quran 9:12—13)

55 "And there may spring from you a nation who invite to goodness and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency. Such are those who are successful." (Quran 3:104)

Shafiq (1983:27) sees this sura as an injunction for the umma to elect a government to lead them.

The concept "successful" recurs several times in different suras. Implicit here is that if Muslims act as Allah has commanded them, then they will be successful. Other examples will be pointed out when used and this theme will be addressed in the final chapter.

56 "It is not righteousness that ye turn your face to the East and the West; but righteousness is he who believed in Allah and the Last Day and the angels and the Scriptures and the Prophets; and giveth his wealth for love of Him to kinsfolk and to orphans and the needy and the wayfarer and to those who ask, and to set slaves free; and observeth proper worship and payeth the poor-due. And those who keep their treaty when they make one, and the patient in tribulation and adversity and time of stress. Such are they who are sincere. Such are the God-fearing." (Quran 2:177)

57 "And those who answer the call of their Lord and establish worship, and whose affairs are a matter of council ..." (Quran 42:38)

58 "He who withdraws his hand from obedience will have nothing in his favour when he meets God on the Day of Resurrection, and he who dies without having considered himself bound by the pledge of allegiance ... has died the death of the time of Ignorance ..." (Muslim) Quoted in Shah 1987:50.

59 "O ye who believe! Enter not houses other than your own without first announcing your presence and invoking peace upon the folk thereof ..." (Quran 24:27)

60 There are a number of Hadiths which refer to dhimmis:

"Whoever hurts a Dhimmi, I shall be his complainant, and for whosoever I am a complainant, I shall ask for his right on the Day of Resurrection."

"One who hurts a Dhimmi, he hurts me; and one who hurts me, hurts Allah."

Whoever persecuted a Dhimmi or usurps or took work from him beyond his capacity,

or took something from him with evil intentions, I shall be a complainant against him on the Day of Resurrection." (Quoted in Doi 1984:430)

61 It is clear that a non-Muslim could never hold a high position in the government of an Islamic state. However perhaps this might not preclude a minor position in the civil service.

62 This was published in 1971 (Hiro 1988:161).

63 "And those who answer the call of their Lord and establish worship, and whose affairs are a matter of council, and who spend what We have bestowed on them." (Quran 42:38)

64 "The only reward of those who make war upon Allah and His messenger and strive after corruption in the land will be that they will be killed or crucified, or have their hands and feet on alternate sides cut off, or will be expelled out of the land. ..." (Quran 5:33)

Enayat (1986:95f.) points out that the interpretation of this verse can be open to abuse.

65 "While it draws its inspiration from Islamic precepts, it is designed to serve the needs of the community living in modern times, incorporating such concepts as the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, and basing the authority of the faqih and the president on popular will, expressed directly as in the president's case, or indirectly, through the Assembly of experts to be convened to select the successor(s) to Khomeini." (Hiro 1988:177)

66 Originally the Arabic word *watan* meant "one's place of birth or residence" and there was no political implication. During the present century the word has acquired the meaning of "fatherland", but has kept its emotional connotation. (Lewis 1988:40f.)

67 Until 1967 this festival had been privately celebrated and any public display had been discouraged (Israeli 1984:70).

68 Lewis (1990:14) (Unpublished treatise: see Bibliography.)

69 Previously this country was known as the Emirate of Transjordan (Shimoni 1987:254).

70 *The Jerusalem report*. December 12, 1991.

71 Maronites 29%; Greek Orthodox 10%; Greek Catholics 6.3%; Armenian Orthodox 5.1%; Armenian Catholics 1.1%; Protestants, Syrian Orthodox and others 2.2% (Shimoni 1987:289).

72 Sunni Muslims 20.8%; Shia Muslims 18.2%; Druze 6.3% (Shimoni 1987:289).

73 However Syria demands that Israel carry out a complete withdrawal first, and Israel insists on progress in the peace process with Lebanon before her troops will leave. This is difficult since Lebanon does not want to conclude any agreements without progress in the Syria-Israeli talks, and the latter are stalemated. (*The Jerusalem report*. February 13, 1992)

74 The Druze feared that they would be driven out of the area since it was part of what

the Christians saw as 'Small Lebanon'. On the other hand Nabih Berri did not oppose the withdrawal although the Shuf mountains was important to the Shia of South Lebanon. However a few days before the withdrawal the Druze and Shia leaders met and were able to thwart the Christian aims. (Bailey 1987:224f.)

75 Khashan (1991:107) surveyed 462 Muslim Lebanese students at the American University of Beirut and Beirut University College. The Sunni students as a whole were apolitical. Those who are affiliated to a party tend to support the Islamic Revivalists. (p. 108) He points out that "it appears that if Sunni students cannot express their political orientation in Pan-Arab terms, most would rather not express it at all". (p. 109) On the other hand Shia students have more political options and are more politically involved (p. 109).

76 *The Jerusalem report*. February 13, 1992.

77 Saddam Husayn was de facto ruler for some years due to the ill health of his predecessor (Shimoni 1991:108).

Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims and those in Iraq live mainly in the north of the country. In the early years of this century the British promised them self-administration and cultural self-expression, but these undertakings were not fulfilled. (Shimoni 1987:277:227)

79 *The Palestine National Covenant*, June 1968. (In Bibliography under the heading: *Pamphlets*).

80 *Towards a democratic Palestine*. 1970. (In Bibliography under the heading: *Pamphlets*.)

81 The Balfour Declaration is null and void.

"The claim of historical and spiritual links between the Jews and Palestine is neither in conformity with historical fact nor does it satisfy the requirements for statehood ..." Article 20, *The Palestine National Covenant*. 1968.

The 1947 partition of Palestine and the establishment of the State of Israel are invalid because it denies the right of the Palestinians to their homeland and is against the principles of the UN Charter (Article 19).

"The liberation of Palestine is a national obligation for Arabs ... to liquidate the Zionist presence in Palestine ..." (Article 15).

82 Article 6 of The Palestine National Covenant defines as Palestinians "Jews who were normally resident in Palestine up to the beginning of the Zionist invasion ..." Therefore the change is a paradox. Some Fateh leaders went on record as saying that Moshe Dayan and Yigal Alon could not expect to receive citizenship even though they had

been born in Palestine. They were considered "racist Zionists". On the other hand new immigrant Jews who were anti-Zionists could obtain citizenship. (Harkabi 1970:5)

83 Article 5 of the Palestine National Covenant defines Palestinians as "Arab citizens who were normally resident in Palestine until 1947. This includes both those who were forced to leave or who stayed in Palestine. Anyone born to a Palestinian father after that date, whether inside or outside Palestine is a Palestinian." Moreover "The Palestinian Arab People alone have the legitimate rights to their homeland ..." (Article 3)

84 Article 16 provides for this.

85 This is in contradiction to Article 1:

"Palestine, the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people, is an inseparable part of the greater Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are a part of the Arab Nation."

86 Many Israelis perceive this as a first stage to the destruction of their state (Sheehan 1977:10).

87 In the opening paragraph of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence it is written:

"Palestine, the land of the three monotheistic faiths, is where the Palestinian Arab people were born, on which it grew, developed, and excelled. The Palestinian people was never separated from or diminished in its integral bond with Palestine. Thus the Palestinian Arab people ensured for itself an everlasting union between itself, its land and its history." (Documents 1988:213)

The second paragraph states:

"Resolute throughout that history, the Palestinian Arab people forged its national identity, rising even to unimagined levels in its defense as invasion, the design of others, and the appeal special to Palestine's ancient and luminous place on that eminence where powers and civilizations are joined ... All this intervened thereby to deprive the people of its political independence. Yet the underlying connection between Palestine and its people secured for the land its character and for people its national genius." (Documents 1988:213)

The next paragraph mentions "consolidating a union between itself and its patrimonial land." (Documents 1983:213)

The final paragraph of the preamble states:

"And in exercise by the Palestinian Arab people of its rights to self-determination, political independence, and sovereignty over its territory; ..." (Documents 1988:215)

Daniel Pipes (1989:248:255ff.) points out that the official English translation sometimes departs from the Arabic original in nuance. There are also many similarities to, and differences from, the Israeli Declaration of Independence. Therefore he maintains that

perhaps the person who drafted the PLO documents "kept the Israeli declaration at hand while he was composing. Similarities can be seen in subject matter, organization, and even in specific phrasing."

88 2 Sam. 5:1—13.

89 "... So David went and brought up the ark of God from the house of Obed-edom into the city of David with gladness." (2 Sam. 6:12) "And as the ark of the Lord came into the city of David ..." (2 Sam. 6:16).

90 2 Sam. 24:21—25.

91 "And he built altars in the house of the Lord, of which the Lord said, In Jerusalem will I put my name." (2 Kings 21:4)

"For the Lord hath chosen Zion; he hath desired it for his habitation." (Ps. 132:13)

92 The Jewish people also pray facing towards Jerusalem. (Cf. the Muslim qibla.) In grace after meals there is a prayer for the rebuilding of Jerusalem. In an introductory psalm recited on week-days is the vow, "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning." (Ps. 137:5) The Amidah is a central prayer recited three times each day in which adherents plead to God to return to Jerusalem, rebuild the city and re-establish the dynasty of David. Furthermore the phrase 'next year in Jerusalem' concludes the service of Yom Kippur and is recited during the Passover Seder. In the cyclical year there are three fasts mourning the destruction of Jerusalem. The most important is Tishah Be'Av. The Jewish people are also commanded to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem three times a year (Exod. 23:17; Deut. 16:16—17). (Wigoder 1989:382:381)

93 Jerusalem is the city where eternal peace will begin after wars of chaos and destruction. This city will become the capital of the kingdom of the Davidic dynasty. (Talmon 1971:314; Joel 3:16; Jer. 22:4)

94 "And the whole valley of the dead bodies, and of the ashes, and all the fields unto the brook of Kidron, unto the corner of the horse gate toward the east, shall be holy unto the Lord; it shall not be plucked up, nor thrown down any more for ever." (Jer. 31:40)

95 At the Masjidu-n-Nabi at Madina, the mithrab faced Jerusalem, but after the change in direction this was moved to Mecca (Hughes 1988:348).

96 Christians tried unsuccessfully to rebuild the Temple thrice, but only the Muslims succeeded due to Allah's help. The cupola was damaged during an earthquake in 1068 but was miraculously restored because of Allah's protection. (Busse 1968:458)

97 Although the creation began at Mecca, Allah then linked it with Madina and united the

latter with Jerusalem. The whole world was created in a single act a thousand years later. (Busse 1968:463)

- 98 On the Day of Judgement, Jerusalem will rank higher than Mecca, and will survive the two most holy cities in Islam by 40 years. On the Day of Resurrection all mosques, including the Kabah, will relocate to Jerusalem. There will be a struggle between the Dajjal and the anti-Christ and Jerusalem will be successfully defended by the Mahdi. Then there will be the resurrection of the dead. (Busse 1968:468) Dajjal means 'lying' or 'false' and is used in a similar sense to the anti-Christ. According to tradition the Prophet had mentioned about thirty. (Hughes 1988:64)
- 99 According to a well-known tradition the Prophet specifically mentions Jerusalem together with Mecca and Madina. However there is no fixed date for the ziyarah (visit) to Jerusalem and can be decided upon by the pilgrim. (Tibawi 1970:14:24)
- 100 "Say (O Muslims): We believe in Allah and that which is revealed unto us and that which was revealed unto Abraham, and Ishmael, and Isaac, and Jacob, and the tribes, and that which Moses and Jesus received, and that which the Prophets received from their Lord. We make no distinction between any of them, and unto Him we have surrendered." (Quran 2:136)
- 101 *The Jerusalem report*. July 16, 1992.

CHAPTER 4 : DIALECTIC TENSIONS : THE JEWISH-ISRAELI FIELD

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The modern Arab-Israeli conflict is over territory and the legitimate claims of all parties involved to the geographical area concerned. Using Rosenak's categories (1987:911) will provide an understanding of why each section of the Jewish-Israeli population has differing views on a solution to the conflict. The ethos of each causes dialectic tensions within the Jewish-Israeli field.

After a revision of the literature, Rosenak (1987:910) has identified four concepts with regard to the Jewish-Israeli attitude to the State of Israel. These are messianism, Eretz Israel, the Jewish people and the Torah. All except messianism have already been addressed (*passim*); therefore Jewish messianism needs to be described in this chapter.

It will emerge that this concept is subject to different interpretations, as each group's theology determines its stance politically. All these concepts can be linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict and ultimately they include the Territories as well. Through the theological categories suggested by Rosenak (1987:911), the different positions of each group and hence intentionality can be shown.

The first section will address Jewish eschatology. As there is very little in the Torah to suggest a Jewish messianism, it will be shown that this was conceived by the prophets.

Then Rosenak's categories will be described, and these will be related to the various Ultra-orthodox, religious Zionist and secular Zionist groups. An understanding of their religious beliefs will shed light on why they act as they do politically.

The discussion will relate to explanations of the phenomena. These will be interpreted in the final chapter.

4.2 JEWISH MESSIANISM

Initially there was no messianism in Judaism.¹ The Jewish people were living in this world and were commanded to live according to God's commandments and endeavour to be holy.² Since this could only be achieved in this world, there was no need for a soteriology or an eschatology. Reward and punishment were related to the mundane.³ (Sharon 1989:108:106; Werblowsky

1987:597:598:600)

Because of the exile and suffering, messianic doctrines evolved. Since the present is unsatisfactory, a negative evaluation of the present is intrinsic to messianism. Therefore the dimension of time is basic to messianism because an imperfect world will culminate in a better or perfect future. (Werblowsky 1987:600:598) Redemption (*ge'ula*) depends on performing all the commandments and living a moral and spiritual life, but is also related to an eschaton, the coming of the messiah, *kibbutz galuyot*, the unity of mankind in God's service and the resurrection of the dead. (Cohen 1987:761:762; Werblowsky 1987:600:601)

The messiah in Judaism is a mortal,⁴ an anointed king descended from King David.⁵ God will choose and guide this person,⁶ whose primary task will be *kibbutz galuyot* and the re-establishment of David's kingdom according to God's laws.⁷ Although he himself will not perform any miracles, God will cause peace and justice to reign in the world.⁸ (Sharon 1989:129)

The advent of the messiah will be preceded by a period of turbulence and degeneration called *hevle mashiah* (birth-pangs of the messiah).⁹ At this time a descendant of Joseph will fight the forces of evil and will die in the war of Gog and Magog. Only then will the messiah, son of David, appear for the final redemption. (Sharon 1989:126f.; Wigoder 1989:482)

The messianic advent does not necessarily correspond to the Day of Judgement or resurrection. The Davidic messiah will appear to a specific living generation¹⁰ and prepare it and the world for the Day of Judgement and also the world to come. (Sharon 1989:129)

Messianism became so important that the Rambam incorporated this concept in the *Thirteen Principles of Faith* in Judaism¹¹ (Wigoder 1989:634:570f.), and pseudo-messiahs emerged (Ben-Sasson 1976:701). Consequently their failures increased the power of the established rabbinical leadership who maintain that when God will decide that the time is right to send the messiah, there will be no question as to his identity or true power. (Sharon 1989:124)

4.3 THEOLOGICAL CATEGORIES RELATING TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL

Until the modern era all Jews shared a common belief grounded in theological assumptions on the relationship of the Jewish people within the demands of the Torah to Eretz Israel and messianism (Rosenak 1987:911). These have been mentioned in the previous section.

Rosenak (1987:911ff.) has shown how each community in the State of Israel and the Diaspora has developed its own theology according to its own understanding of different concepts in Judaism. Nuances in the beliefs of each affect the way they relate to the State of Israel, the Territories, and ultimately the Arab-Israeli conflict.

4.3.1 Theologies of negation

According to these theologies, the State of Israel is a rebellious act against God or is historically regressive. The redemption can only be initiated by Him, and His messiah who will fulfil the prophetic and midrashic promise. Therefore Zionists are heretics who have adopted and supported a false messiah, and in doing so have delayed the true redemption. (Rosenak 1987:911f.) Moreover the self-initiative at redemption would lead to a total departure from Judaism (Schweid 1987:540).

Jews in the Diaspora have been granted citizenship of countries of residence, and these should be regarded as *patria* and Zion should only be a symbol of universal redemption. Consequently there could not be a re-establishment of Jewish sovereignty. (Schweid 1987:539)

4.3.2 Theologies of symbiosis

The State of Israel is a vital part of Jewish civilisation, and living as a community in Eretz Israel can lead to a full and balanced Jewish life. Those Jews who wish to leave their homes amongst non-Jews in the Diaspora have a country where they can live their lives as they see fit. (Rosenak 1987:911:913)

4.3.3 Theologies of Torah and Eretz Israel

In Judaism, living in the land of the Covenant is of central Halakhic and moral significance. The Torah laid down relationships between it and Eretz Israel and the latter is the locus of the former, and there are also certain commandments which can only be carried out in Eretz Israel.¹² (Rosenak 1987:911:913f.)

Humanists emphasise the place of Eretz Israel in the life of the covenant. This is seen as moral demands, hence Israel should construct a society "that will be truly a kingdom of God." (Rosenak 1987:914)

4.3.4 Theologies of historical redemption

The State of Israel is the expression of God's saving acts which show the fulfilment of His promise to end the exile. In modern times He has led His people back to Eretz Israel as He did after the Egyptian exodus. The victories of the War of Independence and the Six-Day War are of theological significance, because of divine intervention. Returning the Territories after God had allowed them to come into Jewish-Israeli hands would necessitate a further conflict to enable Him to carry out His deliverance. Thus a peace between the State of Israel and her neighbours would only delay the complete ge'ula with universal peace. (Rosenak 1987: 911:914f.)

After the Holocaust the State of Israel provides Judaism "with a new lease of life." Judaism is an historical reality but there is more than mere historical meaning to the state. (Rosenak 1987:915f.)

Humanistic formulation of this theology sees salvation through aliyah, a just Jewish society and a dedication to the moral destiny of Israel. Some people see the end of the exile and the creation of the new state as a necessity of trying to understand the Jewish religious tradition and learn from God's modern redemptive acts. (Rosenak 1987:915)

4.4 JEWISH GROUPS RELATED TO THE THEOLOGIES

In this section it will be shown how the beliefs of each group determine its position with regard to the State of Israel and the Territories. Firstly the different Ultra-orthodox groups will be mentioned, then the secular Zionists, and finally the religious Zionists. They will all be related to the different theological categories.

4.4.1 Naturei Karta

The Naturei Karta seceded from Agudat Israel in 1935 under the leadership of R. Amran Blau, because the latter was too tolerant of the Zionist groups.¹³ The ethos of the former is grounded in the four oaths which is a religious prohibition against ending the exile and taking the initiative to return to the land of Israel.¹⁴ The establishment of the State of Israel is considered as "storming the barricades", challenging divine will. (Shashar 1987:434; Lamm 1971: 41; Rosenak 1987:912) This state is a "satanic kingdom" under the chief demon, Samael (Lamm 1971:48) and the beginning of a new and more serious exile since the destruction of the

Temple. This phase of the satanic conspiracy allows the demon to cause temptation through the success of the wicked. (Marmorstein 1969:119) Although they oppose the State of Israel they favour Israel, the people. "We may deplore them, but we must not indiscriminately condemn them (as has been done) as religious anti-Semites." (Lamm 1971:53)

R. Amran Blau refused to visit the Western Wall and the other holy places after the Six-Day War since this would imply support of the Zionist state, but many of his followers have done so (Shashar 1987:435; Lamm 1971:50). Members of the Naturei Karta would rather become martyrs than enter the Knesset (Lamm 1971:47); therefore they refuse to participate in elections or to pay taxes (Shashar 1987:435).

The relationship of this group to any foreign rule is pragmatic in order to be favourable to Jews. The Territories should be handed back¹⁵ (Shashar 1987:434:435) and negotiations with the PLO about the best conditions of living under Arab rule are favoured (Jacobovits 1982: 191). While living under Israeli rule, leaders of this community published a manifesto demanding "the laws of the autonomy in Arab territories be applied in our neighbourhood (Meah Shearim) too, without dependence on the Zionist regime."¹⁶ (Shashar 1987:435). Finally R. Blau once presented a petition for a UN-supervised internationalised Jerusalem (Marmorstein 1969:90).

4.4.2 Agudat Israel and Degel Hatorah

The ideology of Agudat Israel is largely pragmatic. There is an accommodation with the State of Israel although in the past this community was strongly opposed to Zionism. No religious significance is given to the state because religious concepts cannot be mingled with political Secularism. (Shashar 1987:435:436; Rosenak 1987:912)

People refuse to sing the national anthem, recite the prayer for the State of Israel or celebrate Independence Day and as a result the Hallel prayer¹⁷ is not recited on this day (Jacobovits 1982:190:191). According to Rosenak (1987:912) there is "a curious ambivalence" in the accommodation with the state because Eretz Israel and the Jewish leaders could return to true Judaism. For this reason it is permitted to take part in elections and participate in the government although this is devoid of ideological or Halakhic significance (Shashar 1987:436). It has already been shown how their Council of Torah Scholars decided which party should rule the country (see Section 3.3.1). Many are prepared to return the Territories on the ground of

*pikuah nefesh*¹⁸ (Shashar 1987:436).

What has been said about Agudat Israel applies to the Mitnagdim of Degel Hatorah since R. Eliezer Schach is their spiritual leader. This has been addressed in Section 3.3.1.

4.4.3 Shas

It is difficult to ascribe a particular theology to Shas. On the one hand many of its members studied under R. Schach, which places their members in the Haredi camp and does not recognise or ascribe spiritual significance to the State of Israel and the Territories. On the other hand R. Ovadia Yosef was a former Chief Rabbi of Israel and as such he was co-head of the Chief Rabbinate. (See Section 3.3.1) Furthermore the Chief Rabbinate was responsible for composing a special prayer for the State defining it as "the beginning of the redemption" (Shashar 1987:437). Presumably it was this authority which also decreed the recitation of the Hallel prayer on Independence Day (cf. Jacobovits 1982:191).

However Shashar (1987:435:436) mentions that Shas has a pragmatic ideology and that R. Ovadia Yosef subscribes to the return of the Territories on the principle of *pikuah nefesh*. This pragmatism can also be seen in the decision as to which of the two main parties would form a government (see Section 3.3.1).

4.4.4 Habad Hasidim

The Rabbi of Lubavitch has declared that the State of Israel "has nothing to do with the Redemption or the Beginnings of the Redemption" although it is a safe place for the Jews and the Torah. Kibbutz galuyot can only be realised after the Temple has been rebuilt. Consequently the aliyah of millions of Jews cannot represent the Ingathering of the Exiles. The Israeli government can only lead a large community of Jews and cannot have any Jewish sovereignty. (Jacobovits 1982:200n.5) In the 1988 Knesset elections the Habad Hasidim were directed by R. Schneerson to vote for Agudat Israel, but there has been a rift between the two since then.¹⁹

The rabbi was vehemently opposed to the Camp David Accords and in particular the return of Sinai. He bases his policy of not yielding "an inch or less" of Eretz Israel on a Halakhic ruling,²⁰ and has also decreed that the land is sacred. (Jacobovits 1982:200n.5)

At the beginning of the last decade the Lubavitcher Rabbi rejected the view that events indicated redemption and considered Jews living in Israel as still living in exile (Jacobovits 1982:200n.5). However towards the end of the decade he instructed his followers to prepare for the coming of the messiah.²¹

4.4.5 Secular Zionists

Secular Zionists can be classified as belonging to theologies of symbiosis. Jewish people who live in Israel believe that Jews should live in their own homeland where they can live together without discrimination. On the other hand those who live in the Diaspora see Israel as a state within the community of nations, which has enabled Diaspora Jews to be regarded with respect and they can continue to live their lives in their respective countries as they see fit. (Rosenak 1987:913)

Professor Y. Leibowitz, a religious Israeli scientist and philosopher, condemns the idea of any religious significance to the State of Israel, and maintains that it is a state like any other. In his view the establishment of the state was not a beginning of redemption and no religious meaning can be ascribed to the results of the Six-Day War. In his view the return of the Territories is a political, national and social issue, which required a unilateral return of the Territories after the 1967 War, since a hostile Arab population could damage Israeli society. (Shashar 1987:440)

4.4.6 Religious Zionists

It will be shown that religious Zionists can be classified as holding either theologies of Torah and Eretz Israel or theologies of historical redemption. This depends on their religious views.

Around the time of the establishment of the State of Israel the religious Zionists wanted to accommodate the Secularists, making them more open to compromise. The Bnei Akiva youth movement and Yeshiva high schools were also more tolerant. (Shashar 1987:437) There was a messianic hope and a Halakhic demand "not to rely on miracles". From this perspective there was the covenant between God and the people of Israel. (Jakobovits 1982:197) Since divine intervention gave the Territories to the State of Israel, they could not be returned (Shashar 1987:437). The state and the Territories are religiously significant "as a wondrous manifestation of Divine favor" (Jakobovits 1982:196).

Ben Gurion, who contended that the Jews had survived because of their credence in redemption, said: "He who does not believe in miracles is not a realist" (Jakobovits 1982:197). He further maintained that aliyah was a necessary condition for redemption and that the process of immigrant absorption culminated in redemption. (Liebman 1983:91:89)

There are two versions of the Prayer for the State of Israel. The one sanctioned by the Israeli Chief Rabbinate makes reference to the state as "the beginning of the sprouting forth of our Redemption." Therefore this links the land to the promised redemption. In a second version authorised by a chief rabbi in the Diaspora the phrase on redemption is omitted. This latter prayer is used in many Diaspora countries. (Jakobovits 1982:196)

Since the Chief Rabbinate's prayer for the State of Israel contains the words 'beginning' and 'redemption' the religious Zionists of Gush Emunim do not need their previous defensive positions. Their religious theology stems mainly from the teachings of the late R. Zvi Yehuda Kook, head of the Mercaz HaRav Yeshiva in Jerusalem. (Shashar 1987:439:438:437)

Jewish history must be seen in its totality. The present cannot be isolated from the past or from the future. The period of redemption has started in modern times with the establishment of the State of Israel, the return there of the Jewish people and the return of many people to traditional Judaism. The ge'ula does not need to occur through miracles; God can cause it to happen through a natural process of conquering and settling in Eretz Israel. "The redemption which is unfolding before us appears in stages — not all at once.²² All the Jewish people have to be living in Israel before the kingdom of God is revealed. (Aviner 1991:143:152:140)

One aspect of the redemption demands that the nation of Israel must be independent in its own land. Political statehood fulfils this. Since the prophets called for *kibbutz galuyot*, Jewish sovereignty is a sacred established principle of the Torah, which makes Zionism more than a political question or a solution to a Jewish problem. Redemption is open to the whole Jewish nation, religious and non-religious alike. (Aviner 1991:145:152—153)

War is also a condition for the beginning of redemption. The IDF are fighting a *milhemet mitzvah*,²³ and miracles occur when one is willing to die for the State of Israel. Therefore the Israeli government and army are acting as God's agents.²⁴ (Aviner 1991:202—3;172f.:368)

The messiah is also a process which develops over time. The State of Israel, the reunification

of Jerusalem and the Russian aliyah are all precursors of the messiah. Modern Israel has certain aspects of *malkhut* which in time will attain its destined perfection. The oath against "storming the barricades" was nullified by the Balfour Declaration.²⁵ (Aviner 1991:275f.:278f.:288—291:295f.)

In the messianic era Israel will be liberated from non-Jewish rule (Rambam, *Law of Kings* 12:1—2); accordingly today a large part of Eretz Israel is under Israeli rule, and the Jews returned to Israel because of a divine command. Therefore no ruler in the world can alter this since "We have absolutely no right to relinquish control over any piece of Eretz Yisrael." (Aviner 1991:319:376:180)

"We are in the middle of the journey, only in the middle. We are still in the beginning of the Ge'ula. Though we attain great and mighty advances, we must recall that the redemption of Israel comes a little at a time." (J.T. Berachot 1:1) "The Almighty, who, Doesn't slumber and doesn't sleep," (Psa 121:3—4) "arranges the history of the world. Hashem is not lazy, G-d forbid. He causes the salvation to appear, and brings redemption to completion, step by step. We must accustom ourselves to gaze on these matters with perfect Emunah, and to trust in the Ge'ula of Israel, and in its inexorable unfolding." (Aviner 1991:322)

During R. Zvi Yehuda Kook's visit to the Western Wall when it fell into Israeli hands, he told television and radio interviewers "... We announce to all of Israel, and to all of the world, that by Divine Command, we have returned to our home, to our holy city. From this day forth, we shall never budge from here. We have come home!" (Aviner 1991:374f.)

R. Kook participated in proceedings when a settlement in Shilo was about to be established. He mentioned that Samuel the prophet had heard God's voice on the hills, the High Priest Eli had officiated there and the Jewish people had made pilgrimages there three times a year to bring sacrifices to, and worship before, the ark of the Lord.²⁶ (Aviner 1991:359)

R. Kook set a personal example by planting a tree²⁷ at the first attempted settlement in Shomron, and when soldiers showed him an eviction order, he refused to leave. It was only after a senior Knesset member persuaded him to leave that he allowed a high-ranking soldier to escort him from the site. (Aviner 1991:353f.)

While the Israeli government was carrying out the withdrawal from Sinai, according to the Camp David Agreement, R. Kook wrote: "All our generations protest ... against the treachery of the present government ..." He wrote to the Yamit citizens two months before his death encouraging them to protest to a withdrawal. (Aviner 1991:357:358)

A settler in Sebastia is reported to have said: "We won't raise a hand against an Israeli soldier because the IDF is holy." In addition members of Gush Emunim view the government as "lost souls" who need to be awakened nationalistically and returned to the "righteous path". (Shashar 1987:441:439)

4.5 DISCUSSION

The discussion on this chapter will provide an explanation of the different interpretations of different groups to the same sources. These lead to tensions in the Jewish-Israeli field and these can be related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Interpretation will be made in Chapter 7.

The Jewish-Israeli attitude to the State of Israel and the Territories rests on the concepts of sanctity of the land and eschatology. The religious groups in Judaism all use the same sources, namely the Bible and the Talmud including Halakha and Agadah, while the Secular Zionists have based their interpretations on Zionist ideology.

People who subscribe to theologies of negation such as the Naturei Karta, Mitnagdim, Hasidim and some Sephardim all believe that there is no sanctity attached to the land, and that returning to live there is "storming the barricades". However the Naturei Karta base their interpretation on Agadah while the other groups use Halakha. At the other end of the continuum the religious Zionists Gush Emunim group believe that the land is indeed sacred, and that by returning to or inhabiting it the process of redemption has started. This is based on the section *Berachot* in the Jerusalem Talmud. Moreover R. Zvi Yehuda Kook has based his interpretation that God has allowed Jews to return to their own land on one of the oaths. While the Haredim believe this to be "storming of the barricades", R. Zvi Yehuda Kook sees the Balfour Declaration as a nullification of this oath. Other religious Zionists believe that the Jewish people can only live a full Jewish life in Eretz Israel where they can carry out all the mitzvot in the Bible.

The Secular Zionists see the State of Israel in an historical and cultural context, regarding the country as a place for the Jewish people in times of persecution. This is based on Herzl's doctrine. The Likud policy towards the Territories as part of the Greater Land of Israel has coincided with the theology of Gush Emunim, but the return to power of the Labour Party in the 1992 elections has brought about a change. Premier Rabin maintains that there is room for manoeuvre within limits of Israel's security requirements, and he has formed his coalition

with the Meretz Party and Shas. The former advocates a return of the Territories with minor border adjustments in return for a just and lasting peace. This party rests on Secular Humanism, while Shas provides the right-wing balance with regard to religion. As far as the return of the Territories is concerned R. Ovadia Yosef maintains that their return can be justified on the basis of *pikuah nefesh*.

Pye (1972:189) points out that religion can be used to resist government policy as well as to obey it. The first could apply to the Naturei Karta, and the Secular Peace Now group under the Likud, while Gush Emunim under the Likud is an example of the latter.

He also suggests that there are groups which withdraw from society and provide a minority alternative to social change, while revolutionary movements try to change society (Pye 1972:190). The former could apply to the Naturei Karta and the latter to the Gush Emunim; the Mitnagdim, Hasidim and some Sephardim have a pragmatic approach. They join the Israeli government in order to receive material gains for their community, and ensure continuance of a certain amount of traditional religion in the secular state. They prefer the Likud because, until recently, this party has been dependent on the Haredim and the religious Zionists for a coalition in the Knesset. This has led to power by a religious minority in the country and may have been one of the reasons for the fall of the Likud in 1992. As has been mentioned above, these elections provided Rabin with a means of eroding this power.

Pye (1972:182) maintains that certain religious thought and action may be affected by states of mind. The return of the Territories for peace is a concept.

The Naturei Karta (*group*) sees no religious significance to the State of Israel, and asserts that "storming the barricade" will delay the redemption; this is based on Agadah (*state of mind*). Therefore they do not recognise the state — to the extent of refusing to pay taxes and non-participation in all elections (*action*).

The Mitnagdim, Hasidim and some Sephardim (*groups*) also do not believe in the sanctity of the land, nor do they believe there is any eschatological significance; this is based on Halakha (*state of mind*). However they participate in elections and enter the government for their own ends (*actions*).

Some religious Zionists (*group*) believe that they can only live a full religious life in the State

of Israel based on the precepts in the Torah (*state of mind*), while others (*group*) believe that the Territories are a process of ge'ula, based on a section in the Jerusalem Talmud. They further believe that returning the Territories will delay redemption (*states of mind*). Therefore they set up *hitnahluyot* (pl.) and have at times refused to leave illegal settlements. They also perceive the IDF as holy, being part of the redemptive process and consequently will not actively fight against Israeli soldiers (*actions*).

Secular Zionists (*groups*) have different perceptions of the Territories. The Likud see them as part of Eretz Israel (*state of mind*) and are against their return. Therefore they were prepared to negotiate with the Arabs over a period of ten years while concurrently strengthening settlements in the Territories (*actions*). The point would have been reached where there would have been so many Jewish settlements in the Territories that there would not have been anything for negotiation.²⁸ On the other hand Labour believes in a more pragmatic approach (*state of mind*) and feels there is room for compromise in negotiations²⁹ (*action*). The Meretz party (*group*) believe that most of the Territories should be returned with minor border modifications in return for peace (*state of mind*). Therefore they act accordingly.

This chapter has shown the dialectic tensions in the Jewish-Israeli field, which refer to the sanctity of the land and its place in Jewish eschatology. It has transpired that different religious groups have used the same sources but have interpreted them in different ways. It seems that with the fall of the Likud and the rise of Labour there may be some room for manoeuvre due to the composition of the coalition government.

- 1 'Messiah' originally meant 'anointed' and was a person on God's special mission (Werblowsky 1987:597).
- 2 "And the Lord hath avouched thee this day to be his peculiar people, as he hath promised thee, and that thou shouldst keep all his commandments;" (Deut. 27:18)
- "Speak unto all the congregation of the children of Israel, and say unto them, Ye shall be holy: for I the Lord your God am holy." (Lev. 19:2)
- 3 "Behold all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine: the soul that sinneth, it shall die." (Ezek. 18:4)
- Ezek. 18:5—18 mention different types of sin.
- 4 "For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given: and the government shall be upon his shoulder: ...
- "Of the increase of his government and peace there shall be no end, upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgement and with justice from henceforth even forever. ..." (Isa. 9:6—7)
- 5 "And there shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a Branch shall grow out of the roots:" (Isa. 11:1)
- 6 "Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise unto David, a righteous Branch, and a King shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgement and justice in the earth." (Jer. 23:5)
- 7 "And I will gather the remnant of my flock out of all countries whither I have driven them, and will bring them again to their folds; and they shall be fruitful and increase." (Jer. 23:3)
- 8 Isa. 11:1—10; 2:2—4.
- 9 BT, Sanhedrin, 97a:98b. (Quoted in Sharon 1989:125f.)
- 10 According to the Babylonian Talmud (Sanhedrin 98a) it will depend on the generation as to the messiah's method of appearance. This is an interpretation of Zach. 9:9 and Dan. 7:13—14. (Sharon 1989:128f.)
- 11 These principles are recited each morning by every Jew. Of relevance here is: "I believe, in a complete faith, in the coming of the Messiah, and even if he is delayed, I shall wait for him to come any day." (Sharon 1989:123). The Amidah prayer, recited three times a day, contains five benedictions for messianic hope (Wigoder 1989:482:51).
- 12 For example the Sabbatical year and the tithes (Rosenak 1987:914; Schweid 1987:536). Other commandments include laws of harvest which guarantees food for the poor.

- These mitzvot remind the Jews that they are not absolute owners of the land. They are living there because God decreed it, but ultimately belongs to Him. Therefore the land is sanctified. (Schweid 1987:536)
- 13 The Naturei Karta live in Israel, Brooklyn and the Diaspora. There are tactical differences between the rabbi from Williamsburg and the Jerusalem group but not in ideology. This has been recorded by R. Teitelbaum, the "Satmarer Rebbe". (Lamm 1971:38:39)
- 14 In the Talmud (Ket. 111a) an Halakhic problem is raised. Appended to this there is a discourse on a number of oaths which God administered to the Jewish people at the beginning of the exile to Babylon. Although the former is considered Halakha and the oaths Agadah by Maimonides, the Satmarer insist that they are both law. (Lamm 1971:41f.)
- There are four premises to their ethos:
- ❑ People must remain passive and await divine redemption.
 - ❑ There can be no redemption without prior repentance.
 - ❑ Only the pious can be agents of divine redemption, therefore the irreligion of the Zionists is an obstacle to the ge'ula.
 - ❑ The messianic state can only be a true theocracy. (Lamm 1971:40:46)
- 15 The sanctity of the Holy Land would not be violated by returning the Territories to non-Jews. The land has been, and always will be, holy, but since 'sanctity' is a religious concept, it cannot be relevant to Secular Nationalism or the modern State of Israel. (Shashar 1987:435)
- 16 This liberates them from the "sins" of the Zionist State of Israel (Shashar 1987:435).
- 17 The *Hallel* (Praise) prayer consists of hymns of praise from the Psalms recited on festivals. There are three different forms of this prayer for different occasions. (Wigoder 1989:316)
- 18 *Piku'ah nefesh* is consideration for human life. If a human life is endangered, religious laws may be ignored. This includes observance of the Sabbath. (T. Shab. 132a; T. Yoma 85a) (Wigoder 1989:553)
- 19 *The Jerusalem report*. March 12, 1992.
- 20 It is permitted to violate the Sabbath in order to protect a Jewish border-town even if non-Jewish people "come merely to take straw and stubble, lest they capture the city and find it easy to make further conquests". This is cited in the *Shulhan aruh*, Orah

Hayyim, 329:6. (Jacobovits 1982:200n5)

- 21 According to him the demise of Communism and the Gulf War were precursors to the messianic advent. The messianic prediction has caused tensions between him and other religious Jews, particularly R. Schach. (*Time international*. March 16, 1992)
- 22 In the Jerusalem Talmud (Berachot 1:1) there is an analogy of the redemption to a sunrise which gradually lights the sky (Aviner 1991:140:137n4).
- 23 *Milhemet mitzvah* is a war commanded by God and the Torah (Wigoder 1987:726). This concept will be explained in Section 6.2.
- 24 This is learned from the prophet Eliyahu who treated King Ahav with respect even though rebuking him (1 Kings 18:46) (Aviner 1991:355f.).
- 25 "The argument of the Shavuot (Oaths) is a matter without substance," [R. Z.Y. Kook] said. "The first oath is Not to rebel against the nations of the world. There was no rebellion or revolution in our coming back to Israel. We came here with permission. ... Two generations ago, the British received a mandate to temporarily rule here, on our behalf. The nations of the world agreed that this Land belongs to us, and they decided that another nation would temporarily assist us. The British were here through their rightful claim to the land, but afterwards, they forgot this, and wanted to rule here instead. There wasn't a rebellion against them. They were not ruling here legally! They distorted their mission to temporarily rule in our stead." (Aviner 1991:289—290)
- "The second oath is, Not to hasten the End. We don't hasten the End — the End hastens us! The Master of the House is insistent." (Avot 2:20) "First of all, the Gemarah does not say, not to hasten the End, but, rather, Not to push the End away. Rashi explains, By your sins." (Ketubot 111A)
- "And only as a secondary understanding, Rashi adds that we are not to make exaggerated petitions over the end. We are not supposed to be 'nudniks' and clamor, 'Redeem us! Redeem us! Redeem us!' without end. The meaning here is that we are not to hasten the End of the exile through spiritual means. It is not talking about building the Land of Israel." (Aviner 1991:290)
- "The third oath is, Not to go up to Israel like a wall. This is a figurative expression. What is a wall? The Iron barrier which separates Israel from their Father in heaven." (Pesachim 85B; Sotah 38B) "This is the situation of Galut, and anything which prevents the immigration to Israel. The wall is gentile rule over the Land. Who raised it up? The Master of the Universe. Therefore, The mouth which forbade is the mouth which makes

it permitted." (Mishnah, Ketubot 16A) "Today there isn't a wall. The Balfour Proclamation isn't a coincidental thing, but the work of the Causer of Causes, of the Master of the World. Hashem raised up the wall of gentile rule over our Land, and Hashem broke it down. This situation is similar to a man who takes an oath that he will not enter a house. When the house collapses, he doesn't need to disavow the oath." (Yoreh Deah 216:6, beginning "There are those who say ...") (Aviner 1991:290f.)

26 1 Sam. chapters 1—3.

27 "And when ye shall come into the land, and shall have planted all manner of trees for food ..." (Lev. 19:23).

28 *The Jerusalem report*. July 16, 1992.

29 When Rabin presented his government to the Knesset, after calling on the Arab states and the Palestinians to negotiate with Israel for peace, he said, "You will not get everything you want. We too will not get everything which we want." (*Ma'ariv*. Tuesday, July 14, 1992)

CHAPTER 5 : DIALECTIC TENSIONS : THE MUSLIM-ARAB FIELD

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Since the Arab-Israeli conflict is mainly over territory and the legitimate claims of all parties involved to the geographical area concerned, Palestinians of all political persuasions inside and outside the Territories agree that the state of Palestine should be established in former Palestine. The tensions within the Muslim Arab field rest on Islam versus Nationalism. These will be uncovered and the way each group experiences its religion will be shown. The attitude of each to the peace process will also be mentioned.

After the establishment of the State of Israel, the Arab citizens of Israel were cut off from their brethren in neighbouring countries and Israeli Arabs found themselves without a leadership. On the one hand they were a minority religion in the Jewish State, yet loyal to it; on the other hand they were part of the Arab nation. This crisis of identity was resolved in 1967, and over the years they reached their political maturity as a result of identification with either the Islamic Movement or Palestinian Nationalism. This process will be described.

The discussion will only address the explanation of the phenomena. Interpretation will be made in the final chapter.

5.2 THE PALESTINIANS

The Palestinians refer to people living inside the Territories (al-dakhil) and also on the outside (al-kharij). This includes the Nationalists and also the Revivalists. (Jarbawi 1991:287:288ff.: 293f.; Litvak 1991:1ff.:16ff.) The leadership in both religions is very complicated and beyond the scope of this thesis.¹ Therefore only a few relevant groups will be mentioned here.

5.2.1 The Islamic Movement

Most Muslim thought on religion and society is justified by the Quran.² Several verses suggest that Allah has ordained the struggle in this world between righteousness and evil.³ (Haddad 1983:17:18)

The Revivalists' belief that Muslims have a leadership role is based on the fact that they alone submit to Allah and obey His commandments.⁴ Its status is granted and guaranteed to the

umma by Allah whose supreme rule is uncontested and absolute. Acceptance of this sovereignty is necessary for the understanding of the Islamic revolution because all human activity is subordinate to divine law.⁵ However success is not automatic. It depends on whether Muslims live lives where they are responsible for every action.⁶ (Haddad 1983:19:21:22)

It is also obligatory for observant Muslims to take power in all Muslim countries and establish Islamic states according to the Sharia (see Section 3.5.2). If necessary there may be armed struggle against fellow Muslims.⁷ It is also incumbent on every Muslim to continually search his environment and criticise for the common good.⁸ (Haddad 1983:27—28) The Prophet said: "He who upon waking does not concern himself with the affairs of Muslims is not a Muslim." (Hiro 1988:154).

In August 1988 Hamas published a covenant of its political philosophy. Article 11⁹ explicitly states that Palestine is Islamic "waqf land for Muslims until the end of time" and must be ruled according to the Sharia. (Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement 1988; Satloff 1989:397) Since the PLO has a "shared homeland, disaster, destiny and common enemy" the Revivalists look forward to the day when the PLO will adopt Islam as a way of life and the enemy can be vanquished."¹⁰ (Article 27, Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement 1988; Satloff 1989:398f.)

al-Ikhwan advocates two phases: firstly the West Bank and the Gaza Strip must become an Islamic society, and then jihad can be waged against Israel (Shadid 1988:680). On the other hand the Jihad group advocate ousting the enemy and then they will try to return Muslims to the true Path of Islam (Satloff 1989:394).

From the foregoing it is clear that there are differences in the ideologies of the Islamic groups. However the Palestinian question is a religious one. Islam as a world religion is in a favourable position to free Palestine. This was achieved once before during the Crusades. Therefore Islamic ideas must replace secular ideas. (Sahliyah 1989:95)

5.2.2 The Nationalists

"Palestine [is] the Homeland of the Palestinian Arab people ... [and they] ... alone have legitimate rights to their homeland ..." (Articles 1 and 2 of The Palestinian National Covenant). Since the PLO received recognition as the sole representative of the Palestinian people at the

Rabat conference (see Section 2.11.1) members envisage the founding of a secular state where theoretically the head of state could be a non-Muslim (see Section 3.6.2).

From 1981 Fateh established in the Territories the Youth Committees for Social Action (Lijan al-Shabiba lil-Amal al-Ijtimai). This was known as al-Shabiba. Other groups in the PLO founded similar organisations. (Litvak 1991:3; Shiff 1990:64f.) With the outbreak of the Uprising, the Unified National Command (UNC) of the Intifada (al-Qiyada al-Wataniyya al-Muwahhada lil-Intifada) came into being. This consisted of Fateh, the DFLP, PFLP and Palestinian Communist Party (PCP). The UNC support the PLO outside the Territories. (Litvak 1991:7f.; Jarbawi 1991:297:298) The Black Panther Organisation is connected to Fateh and the Red Eagles are affiliated with the PFLP. Members of both groups mask their faces with kafiyes.¹¹

5.3 INTENTIONALITY

Intentionality refers to how people experience their world and their religion. This can be related to actions, i.e. what they do. (See Section 1.4.3)

5.3.1 The Islamic Movement

Particularly since the beginning of the Intifada, graffiti cover any available surface in the Territories, such as walls, monuments and trees. The Palestinian flag or its colours are used by religious as well as secular groups, while the Dome of the Rock is incorporated by Hamas. This signifies that the struggle is religious and not political. This group often uses the slogan, *Hamas hiya al-assas* (Hamas is the foundation). The Communists edit this to read, *Hamas hiya al-wuswas* (Hamas is the whispering Devil). As a deterrent to this practice a slogan such as "Internal fighting is poison" is used.¹²

al-Ikhwan initiated the 'Islamic Wedding'. This is a traditional celebration but with religious expressions, names and symbols. Other groups condemn this strategy, but this kind of wedding has found acceptance among the population. (Shadid 1988:670)

The use of cassette recordings is very popular. These consist of verses from the Quran and music with an Islamic content. Cassette recordings have also been produced with a political message, for example decrying Nationalism, and political settlement for the Palestinians. (Shadid 1988:670) In Islamic theatre, which has become well established, the content of the

productions deals with serious issues and satirises the Nationalists. (Shadid 1988:671)

There is an emphasis on the wearing of clothes conforming to Islamic teachings. There is high conformity at the West Bank and Gaza Universities. However even in refugee camps and rural areas, non-religious women have taken to wearing shari dress because of peer and family pressure. (Shadid 1988:671) Hamas subjects women and girls who do not conform, to physical or verbal abuse, and graffiti on walls. Examples of slogans used are "any woman not wearing the Islamic garb is a traitor to her home-land" and "Hamas warns any girl not wearing the Islamic dress."¹³

al-Ikhwan conducts other forms of 'policing activity'. This attempts to control community social behaviour. Anything contrary to Islamic teachings is dealt with by violence. A few examples will illustrate this. When women in Gaza swam in the sea after a ban to this effect, they were sprayed with acid. Men and women sitting together at a wedding celebration in Nablus were stoned. The concert of a British band was cancelled at al-Najah University after threats from the Brotherhood. (Shadid 1988:674)

During the last decade students from the Revivalist groups gained increasing support in institutes of higher learning. This was reflected by their representation on various student councils,¹⁴ and has been the cause of tensions between the Revivalists and the Nationalists. At the end of August 1987 the al-Najah student council suspended lectures as a reprisal for 'unauthorised' celebration of the Islamic new year arranged by the Islamic Bloc students. The student council had already held its own celebrations and the second event was perceived as a challenge to the council. A major clash was averted when the authorities closed the university and two months later a compromise solution placed the university mosque under the authority of the Department of Religious Studies.¹⁵

The Islamic Movement has been making inroads into the professional and commercial unions in the Territories. In the 1990 elections to the Engineers' Organization on the West Bank, Hamas won five out of eleven seats. Fateh garnered only three seats. This gives Hamas control of this organisation.¹⁶ The following year Hamas won seven out of nine seats of the Accountants' Association in the Gaza Strip. This body has 894 members, one of whom serves as accountant of UNWRA.¹⁷ The same year the Islamic Bloc won six out of eleven seats to the Commercial Bureau in Hebron. The PLO bloc garnered four seats, whilst the remaining seat was won by an independent. This was the first election since 1964.¹⁸ These gains have

caused Arafat to order an inquiry into why Fateh has been losing ground.¹⁹

In August 1992 Israeli Security captured three members of al-Qassam, which is affiliated to Hamas. This group had made and distributed in Gaza a recruitment propaganda film, which was later shown on Israel Television. al-Qassam claims that its orders are derived directly from the Quran and admits that they have been responsible for the murders of Israelis as well as Arabs from Gaza whom it claimed were collaborators.²⁰

5.3.2 The Nationalists

The Nationalists too make use of graffiti. Some examples include the fist, flag, rifle, gun and map. Slogans are also used. The Shabiba incorporate the fist to symbolise resolute or violent action. This may be used together with a knife, gun or banner. The flag is such a powerful symbol that the Shabiba often endanger their lives by hanging it on high-tension lines or the summits of minarets. The rifle has appeared in graffiti with the slogan, "Why fear? Why fear? The stone becomes a Kalashnikov." The gun is also a powerful symbol since Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly while wearing a pistol. His portrait and name appear frequently. The map of "All Palestine" is also used in Nationalist graffiti.²¹ Arafat's triumph over death in an air crash and subsequent brain surgery has gained him support from Palestinians.²²

Slogans are used against the Revivalists as well. When Hamas tried to force women to wear veils (see Section 5.3.1) Nationalists used slogans such as "Fateh warns against attacking the respectable girls of al-Rimal" or "The PFLP will deal harshly with anyone attacking the respectable girls of our nation."²³

The Black Panthers operate mainly in the Jenin area in cells of five or six. Their main goal is to kill suspected Palestinian collaborators with the Israelis, although this group does operate against the IDF soldiers and Israeli civilians. The modus operandi of this masked group is usually kidnapping, torture and the killing of the victim by shooting or having him "hacked to pieces with swords and axes". They maintain that collaborators must be eliminated since they undermine the Intifada and endanger the lives of those fighting the enemy. Any masked person killed in action is considered a martyr.²⁴

A source of tension at the al-Najah University in July 1992 drew Israel into the struggle.²⁵ Six armed Nationalists entered the campus to persuade students to vote for the Fateh bloc. The

IDF placed the university under curfew, which ended four days later after agreement by the armed men to be deported to Jordan²⁶ with the consent of the PLO abroad.²⁷

5.4 THE PEACE PROCESS

Hamas, the PFLP and Saika called for a general strike in the Territories on the opening day of the Madrid peace conference. These groups are opposed to the peace process. This caused violent confrontation between them and Fateh supporters, resulting in injuries to a large number of people. The rejectionists flew black mourning flags from roof-tops and members of Fateh pulled them down.²⁸

Even though the Black Panthers are affiliated to Fateh, they oppose the peace process. They have accused the Palestinian delegation to the peace conference of selling out to the enemy and squandering money which could be used to further the Intifada. The Panthers have also threatened to kill Faisal al-Husayni.²⁹

5.5 ISRAELI ARABS

The term, 'Israeli Arabs' refer to people who are citizens of the State of Israel. The generic term refers to Arabs of different religions, although the emphasis in this section will relate to Muslim Arabs.

The subject covers a wide canvas and is itself a field for research. Of relevance here is the place of Israeli Arabs as a minority religion in the majority Jewish State of Israel and their links with the Islamic and Nationalist movements.

5.5.1 Citizens of Israel

At the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 there were 150 000 Arabs³⁰ who found themselves an ethnic minority in the new Jewish State. This gave rise to dual feelings of belonging to the wider Arab community and simultaneously being Israeli citizens. (Rekness 1989:119; Ginat 1989:182) After the 1948 war Israel adopted a nation-state ideology (al-Majid & Rosenfeld 1989:204; Sections 3.4.1; 3.4.3).

From the early years Israeli Arabs have taken part in the democratic process. Mapam was the only Zionist political party which accepted Arabs as full members. The other parties formed

Arab affiliated lists. Consequently Israeli Arabs were represented in the Knesset.³¹ This situation would change at a later date (see Section 5.5.3). Today the Israeli Arab population is 810 000.³²

Sociologically Israeli Arabs are included in the various systems, although not always under conditions similar to the Jewish population (al-Haj 1989:209:210). However there are exceptions. In the 12th Knesset an Arab was a deputy Speaker of the Knesset (Regev 1991:31). In the 13th Knesset the deputy ministers of Health and Agriculture are Arabs.³³ In Nazareth Raiq Jarjura was appointed to the magistrate's court.³⁴ Emile Habibi, a former Communist member of Knesset, was awarded the 1992 Israel Prize for Literature.³⁵

Israeli Arabs have expressed their loyalty to the State in deed as well as words. Three examples will suffice: when a Jewish teenage girl was stabbed to death in Jaffa by a Gaza Hamas member, Abdel Ghani Karim tried to come to her aid and gave his life in the attempt;³⁶ when Johar Abu-Lashin was contending for the World Federation Boxing Championship, he took the flag into the boxing ring and stood while the Israeli national anthem was being played;³⁷ after three IDF recruits had been murdered at an army base by Arab citizens of Israel, Israeli Arab leaders condemned the perpetrators.³⁸

After the 1992 Knesset elections the non-Zionist parties gained enough seats for Labour to hold a majority bloc. Although these parties are not part of the government coalition, the Labour Party wrote a document of its policy on peace, social issues and equality in the Arab sector.³⁹

5.5.2 The Islamic Movement in Israel

Following the establishment of the State of Israel there was no political, cultural or religious leadership among the Israeli Muslim Arabs for nineteen years. After 1967 they were reunited with their brethren across the Green Line, and contact with a full religious life and institutions was re-established.⁴⁰ (Rekhess 1989:134; Ginat 1989:185:186) Israeli Muslims were able to study at religious institutions in the Territories and the Supreme Muslim Council paved the way for their participation in the Hajj to Mecca from 1978 (Rekhess 1989:135). This provided a sense of belonging to the Muslim umma and not merely to the Arab community.⁴¹

The Islamic Movement in Israel emerged during the latter part of the 1970s, but only spread

to the Galilee during the 1980s (Ginat 1989:188). al-Ikhwan started propagating its ideology inside the Green Line in 1978 (Shadid 1988:676). Activities began among the lower economic strata and mosques became community centres (Regev 1991:30; Shadid 1988:676).

The Israeli Communist Party, which had hitherto been supported by Israeli Arabs, no longer provided political answers. Therefore these were supplied by the Islamic Movement, which coined the slogan, "If the government does not help us, we will help ourselves."⁴² A growing number of Israeli Muslims is returning to Islam.⁴³ This has resulted in a high degree of conformity in women and girls wearing shari dress.⁴⁴ Furthermore the Islamic Movement is training female doctors to treat Muslim women.⁴⁵

Another example of the growth of the Islamic Movement in Israel can be seen in the 1989 municipal elections. Umm el-Fahm is the second-largest town in Israel. It has a population of 27 000. From the beginning of the 1970s, this municipality was dominated by the Communist Party. However in the municipal elections in February 1989 an Islamic Party contested the election with the slogan, "Islam is the solution". The party was headed by Sheikh Raid Mahajne and received 8 000 of the approximately 10 000 ballots cast. This represents 11 seats in the 15-seat town council.⁴⁶ (al-Haj 1989:236) Recently a new Islamic group was founded in this city as a response to alleged nepotism in the existing Movement.⁴⁷

The Islamic Movement decided not to found a party to contest the 13th Knesset elections,⁴⁸ but advised support for any Arab party which would further the Palestinian cause. In spite of this, some voted for Zionist parties and several thousand Arabs voted for Shas. This is seen as due to Deri's help for local Arab councils. On the other hand Sheikh Salah of Umm el-Fahm banned elections.⁴⁹ Some Muslims see participation in Knesset elections as an acceptance of the legitimacy of the State of Israel, which is a non-Muslim ruler,⁵⁰ while others, such as Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish feel that it is a citizen's civil right to vote as long as this is not contrary to Islam.⁵¹

The Intifada is seen as an Islamic revolution which has Allah's help. Therefore Sheikh Darwish told Israeli Arabs that it was their duty to identify with the umma in the Territories by giving people food and monetary aid. (Rekhess 1989:150)

The Islamic Movement in Israel tends to concentrate on an educational and moral message since it cannot establish an Islamic state according to the Sharia. The Movement's ultimate

goal is a Palestinian state, but not in Israel. A very parlous state exists. On the one hand it cannot leave itself open to contravening Israeli laws, while on the other hand it cannot compromise on the Sharia. Therefore time is an ally; for it is flexible enough for the Movement to take a long-range view.⁵²

5.5.3 Palestinian Nationalism in Israel

From the establishment of the State of Israel until the 1956 Suez war, there was a lack of leadership and an uncertainty among the Israeli Arabs. Thereafter they decided upon a gradual integration into Israeli society. The 1967 war was the watershed which reunited the Israeli Arabs and the people in the Territories. (Ginat 1989:185f.; Rekhess 1989:119f.) In 1972 the PNC passed a resolution strengthening ties of national unity among the Israeli Arabs, and those in the Territories and the diaspora. Furthermore the Rabat conference in 1974 and Arafat's speech at the UN the following year resulted in a strong identification with the PLO. After 1982 the PLO media in East Jerusalem started reporting events and publishing investigative articles related to the Israeli Arab population. (Rekhess 1989:126:132:141f.)

Within the next few years groups such as Abna al-Balad (sons of the village) and al-Ansar, a break-away group, were formed. The former support the PFLP and reject the existence of the State of Israel, while the latter support Fateh. This group is based in Umm el-Fahm. (Ginat 1989:187)

After the Israeli confiscation of land on March 30, 1976, now known as Land Day,⁵³ the National Committee of Chairmen of Arab Local Authorities was formed by Israeli Arab municipal leaders. This provided Israeli Arabs with a political leadership for the first time. (Ginat 1989:189) Another result of Land Day was the establishment of the broad-based party, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE). Although members were drawn mainly from the old Communist Party, there were also non-Communist and Jewish candidates, and in the 1984 Knesset elections it won about half the Israeli Arab vote. (al-Haj 1989:225) In the same year the Progressive List for Peace (PLP) was established. This party drew a mainly Arab membership, but there were Jewish supporters. Both the DFPE and PLP advocated the establishment of the state of Palestine in the Territories and peace between it and the State of Israel. (Ginat 1989:189; Rekhess 1989:142) The PLP supported al-Fateh and the DFPE the Popular Front, the Democratic Front and the Palestinian Communist Party (Rekhess 1989:143).

Abd al-Wahab Darawsha was a member of Knesset for the Labour Party. He supports the PLO as sole representative of the Palestinians. (Rekness 1989:145f.) After the outbreak of the Intifada he left the Labour Party and established the Democratic Arab Party (DAP). This was the first time that an independent Arab party was represented in the Knesset. (Ginat 1989:189f.)

In 1984 there was a hint from the PLO for Israeli Arabs to vote for the DFPE. In 1988 the PLO favoured those parties which supported the creation of a Palestinian state (Ginat 1989:190) and in 1992 Arafat called on Israeli Arabs to cast their vote in the Knesset elections, since this parliament was a suitable forum for political warfare.⁵⁴

The outcome of the 1992 elections was that the Arab parties received 47% of the Arab vote in comparison to 1988, when they received 58%. This time Israeli Arabs voted for Zionist parties, although their electoral participation (69%) was lower than usual. Some Israeli researchers see this as a protest against the Arab parties which could not present a unified front.⁵⁵ There are eight Arab and Druze members of the 13th Knesset, two more than in the immediate past: DFPE 2, DAP 2, Labour 2, Meretz 1, Likud 1.⁵⁶ The PLP did not cross the minimum vote threshold.⁵⁷

After the recent elections Darawsha criticised Rabin for not considering the DAP as a coalition partner, but nevertheless promised his party's support for a limited period. In return he wants an improvement in the conditions of the Israeli Arabs and progress in the peace talks. He asked for a complete freeze of settlements in the Territories and the release of administrative prisoners; but these were not conditions.⁵⁸

Some Israeli Arab leaders visited Tunis, the PLO headquarters, to attend an annual cultural festival. Since all Israeli citizens are banned from meeting PLO officials, this was perceived in Israel as a test of the Labour government's commitment to an amendment of this law. Delegation members denied this. In any event the visit shows the determination of Israeli Arabs to take part in regional affairs.⁵⁹

5.6 DISCUSSION

The discussion on this chapter will provide an explanation of the tensions in the Muslim-Arab field. These are caused by the conflict between Islam and Nationalism and the differences of

groups in each field. An interpretation will be offered in Chapter 7.

There is a consensus among all Muslim Arabs that the state of Palestine should be established in Mandatory Palestine. This is based on the doctrines of each religion. In Islam it is justified by the Quran and Hadith. Muslims are vicegerents on this earth, who have to look after Allah's creation. This means that they must concern themselves with the affairs of the umma — in this case set up an Islamic state in Palestine according to the Sharia since this geographical territory is waqf land. For this reason they cannot compromise either with the Nationalists or with the State of Israel. On the other hand the Nationalists want to set up a secular state, even to the extent of a non-Muslim ruler. This is not in accordance with the PLO Covenant, but it together with the secular state is a source of tension to the Revivalists.

In the Islamic Movement al-Ikhwan want firstly to return Muslims to Islam and after that embark on a jihad against the enemy. The Jihad group have reversed their priorities. While the Black Panthers are affiliated to Fateh they do not agree with Fateh's policy.

The Islamic Movement and some Nationalist groups have rejected the peace process advocated by Fateh. While the reason is clear according to Islam, it seems that the doctrines of certain Nationalist groups preclude any compromise.

Both the Revivalists and Nationalists make use of graffiti, but each group uses symbols which relate to its own religion. The former satirised the latter in theatrical productions, while the latter tried to sway students at al-Najah to vote for Nationalist lists at gun-point. At the same university the Revivalists held their own new year celebrations which angered the Nationalists. There is also a clash between the two as to the wearing apparel of women.

Pye's categories (1972:passim) can explain the foregoing phenomena. Tensions (*concept*) between the Revivalists and the Nationalists (*groups*) create clashes (*actions*) between the two. These are due to the beliefs and scriptures of each religion (*states of mind*). The tensions (*concepts*) within the Revivalist or Nationalist field (*groups*) also create a struggle (*action*) within each field. This could be due to a difference in interpretation (*state of mind*) of how to experience each religion. Although people are culturally and anthropologically from the same group or society, each has his or her own psyche and emotional make-up.

With the establishment of the State of Israel the Arabs who had remained in the country found

themselves cut off from the other Arab states and without leadership. This engendered an identity crisis. They were accorded citizens' rights in the fledgling state, but did not feel equal to the Jewish majority mainly because Civil Religion did not include them, and notwithstanding their de jure rights, in practice their social conditions were not on a par with those enjoyed by the majority religious group. Even though some Arabs were elected to the Knesset they were part of a Zionist party. Nevertheless they were loyal to the state.

The year 1967 was a turning-point. Contact was re-established with the people and religious institutions in the Territories. Thus began the process of Palestinisation of Israeli Arabs. Some were attracted to the Islamic Movement, and with the help of the Muslim Council in Jerusalem have made the Hajj to Mecca. Others have identified with the PLO Nationalism and gradually the Arab citizens of Israel reached political maturity. Currently the Democratic Arab Party is a purely Arab party and is represented in the 13th Knesset by two members. Its platform identifies with the PLO Nationalism.

The fact that many Arab Israelis voted for Zionist parties in the 1992 elections could be explained in two ways. Firstly a vote for Labour or the Left could have been a means of bringing about the downfall of the Likud. This in fact did happen. Rabin's pre-election political platform promised progress in the peace talks, and more attention to domestic affairs than settlements across the Green Line. The social issue is the second reason. The vote for Shas could also be explained in two ways. Firstly the former Interior Minister, Deri, had provided help to the Arab sector and secondly the fact that Shas is a religious party may have attracted practising Muslims.

The Islamic Movement in Israel is trying to bring Muslims back to Islam, and mosques have become communal centres for an educational and moral message. The Revivalists are walking a thin line, wanting to act within the laws of the country in order to function freely, while they cannot compromise the Sharia. As a result there is no talk of setting up an Islamic state in Israel according to the Sharia. This is in contrast to the umma in the Territories who have no such constraints.

The Israeli Arabs in the Nationalist camp too keep within the law, and their leadership of all persuasions has condemned the killing of IDF recruits. The Nationalists have a legal platform from which to make their voice heard. Even though Rabin's coalition does not include non-Zionist parties, the latter have promised to support his government in return for better

conditions. This support provides him with a larger majority and even without the Shas party gave him a blocking majority where no one but he could form a government. Therefore one can say that in contemporary Israel its Arab citizens have reached their political maturity.

This chapter has shown that the tensions within the Muslim-Arab field rest on Islam versus Nationalism, since adherents to both religions agree that the state of Palestine should be established in former Palestine. It seems that the tensions within each field are caused by the interpretation of adherents of how to experience their religion.

Arab citizens of Israel underwent an identity crisis which was gradually resolved after 1967. Some identify with Revivalist groups while others with Palestinian Nationalism. Today they have all reached political maturity.

- 1 For further in-depth information on leadership, see the following articles:
 Sahliyah, E. 1988. *In search of leadership: West Bank politics since 1967*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institute.
 Sahliyah, E. 1988. The West Bank Palestinians and the politics of marginalisation. In: *The Arab-Israeli conflict. Two decades of change*; edited by Y. Lukacs and A.M. Battah, Boulder: Westview, p. 83—92. (Suggests reasons for lack of local leadership and includes a postscript to cover the Intifada.)
 Schiff, Z., Ya'ari, E. 1990. *Intifada. The Palestinian uprising*. New York: Simon and Schuster. Chapter 7. The Unified National Command. p. 188—219. Chapter 8. The Islamic Resistance Movement. p. 220—239.
- 2 "... a Scripture which We have revealed unto thee ... bring forth mankind from darkness unto light, by permission of their Lord ..." (Quran 14:1)
 "... This day have I perfected your religion for you ... chosen for you as religion ..." (Quran 5:3)
- 3 "... We said: Fall down, one of you a foe unto the other ..." (Quran 2:36)
 "... And if Allah had not repelled some men by others the earth would have been corrupted. ..." (Quran 2:251)
- 4 "... My righteous slaves will inherit the earth:" (Quran 21:105)
- 5 "... Victory cometh only from Allah the Mighty, the wise ..." (Quran 3:126)
 "... To help believers is incumbent upon Us." (Quran 30:47)
- 6 "... they disbelieved Our revelations and so Allah seized them for their sins. And Allah is severe in punishment." (Quran 3:11)
- 7 "And fight them until persecution is no more ... But if they desist, let there be no hostility except against wrong-doers." (Quran 2:193)
- 8 "... Whoso judgeth not by that which Allah hath revealed: such are disbelievers." (Quran 5:44)
- 9 "Lo! this is certain truth
 Therefor (O Muhammad) praise the name of thy Lord, the Tremendous." (Quran 66:95—96)
- These two verses are cited in connection with Article 11 (The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement).
- 10 Support for Article 27 (The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement 1988) is the verse:

"And who forsaketh the religion of Abraham save him who befooleth himself? Verily We chose him in the world, and lo! in the Hereafter he is among the righteous."
(Quran 2:130)

- 11 *The Jerusalem report*. April 2, 1992.
- 12 *Contact. The Jerusalem post magazine*. June 21, 1991.
- 13 *Arabs in Israel*. vol. 1, no. 11, May 26, 1991.
- 14 The trend is outside the framework of this thesis but can be found in the following articles:
- Johnson, P. 1986. Palestinian universities under Occupation. June—August 1986. *Journal of Palestine studies*, vol. 16, no. 1, Autumn, p. 120—127.
- Johnson, P. 1987. Palestinian Universities under Occupation. November 1986—January 1987. *Journal of Palestine studies*, vol. 16, no. 3, Spring, p. 134—141.
- Johnson, P. 1987. Palestinian universities under Occupation. May—June 1987. *Journal of Palestine studies*, vol. 17, no. 1, Autumn, p. 129—135.
- Johnson, P. 1988. Palestinian universities under Occupation. August—October 1987. *Journal of Palestine studies*, vol. 17, no. 2, Winter, p. 143—150.
- Johnson, P. 1988. Palestinian universities under Occupation. November 1987—January 1988. *Journal of Palestine studies*, vol. 17, no. 3, Spring, p. 100—105.
- Lesch, A.M. & Tessler, M.A. 1987. The West Bank and Gaza: political and ideological responses to occupation. *The Muslim world*, vol. 77, no. 1, January, p. 229—249.
- 15 Lewis 1990:36ff. (Unpublished treatise: see Bibliography.)
- 16 *Ma'ariv*. September 7, 1990.
- 17 *Ha'aretz*. July 21, 1991.
- 18 *Arabs in Israel*. vol. 1, no. 14, July 14, 1991.
- 19 *The Jerusalem report*. June 4, 1992.
- 20 *The Jerusalem post*. Sunday, August 9, 1992.
Ma'ariv. August 9, 1992.
- 21 *Contact. The Jerusalem post magazine*. June 21, 1991.
- 22 *Time international*. June 15, 1992.
The Jerusalem report. June 4, 1992.
The Jerusalem report. April 23, 1992.
- 23 *al-Maydan*. May 10, 1991.
- 24 *The Jerusalem report*. April 2, 1992.
The Jerusalem post. Friday, July 3, 1992.
- 25 *The Jerusalem post*. Friday, July 17, 1992.

- 26 *The Jerusalem report*. August 13, 1992.
- 27 *Ma'ariv*. July 23, 1992.
- 28 *The Jerusalem post*. Thursday, October 31, 1991.
- 29 *The Jerusalem post*. Friday, July 3, 1992.
- 30 Rekhess, E. 1992a. (Unpublished lecture: see Bibliography.)
- 31 Rekhess, E. 1992a. (Unpublished lecture: see Bibliography.)
- 32 *al-Sinara*. May 8, 1992, as summarised in *Arabs in Israel*. vol. 2, no. 8, July 1992.
- 33 *The Jerusalem post*. Wednesday, August 5, 1992.
- 34 *al-Sinara*. May 22, 1992, as summarised in *Arabs in Israel*. vol. 2, no. 8, July 1992.
- 35 *The Jerusalem report*. May 21, 1992.

This is the first time an Israeli Arab has been awarded this prize. He was personally informed of the decision of the panel of judges by the Minister of Education and Culture. (*Arabs in Israel*. vol. 2, no. 3, May, 1992.)

- 36 *The Jerusalem report*. March 26, 1992.
- Karim had recently returned to the true Path of Islam and was murdered during Ramadan (*The Jerusalem post*. Friday, March 27, 1992).
- 37 *The Jerusalem report*. August 27, 1992.
- The Jerusalem post*. Friday, August 7, 1992.
- 38 *The Jerusalem post*. Thursday, March 7, 1992.
- The Jerusalem report*. March 19, 1992.
- Arabs in Israel*. vol. 2, no. 2, April, 1992.
- 39 *Arabs in Israel*. vol. 2, no. 6, August, 1992. The text of the document is published here.
- 40 Rekhess, E. 1992b. (Unpublished lecture: see Bibliography.)
- 41 Rekhess, E. 1992b. (Unpublished lecture: see Bibliography.)
- 42 Rekhess, E. 1992b. (Unpublished lecture: see Bibliography.)
- 43 *The Jerusalem post*. Friday, April 3, 1992.
- 44 *The Jerusalem post*. Friday, September 20, 1991.
- 45 *Arabs in Israel*. vol. 1, no. 8, March 26, 1991.
- 46 *The Jerusalem post*. Friday, March 3, 1989.
- 47 *al-Sinara*. May 22, 1992, summarised in *Arabs in Israel*. vol. 7, no. 5, July 1992.
- 48 *Arabs in Israel*. vol. 1, no. 22, November 10, 1991.
- 49 *Arabs in Israel*. vol. 2, no. 6, August, 1992.
- 50 *The Jerusalem report*. March 19, 1992.

- 51 *The Jerusalem post magazine*. June 12, 1992.
- 52 Rekhess, E. 1992b. (Unpublished lecture: see Bibliography.)
- 53 In 1992 Land Day was declared an official national holiday for Israeli Arabs (*Arabs in Israel*. vol. 2, no. 3, May 1992). Arabs outside Israel also celebrate this day (Rekhess 1992a. Unpublished lecture: see Bibliography).
- 54 *al-Sinara*. April 2, 1992.
- 55 *Arabs in Israel*. vol. 2, no. 6, August 1992.
- 56 *Arabs in Israel*. vol. 2, no. 5, July 1992.
- 57 *Arabs in Israel*. vol. 2, no. 6, August 1992.
- 58 *The Jerusalem post*. Friday, July 3, 1992.
- 59 *The Jerusalem post*. Friday, July 24, 1992.

CHAPTER 6 : WAR AND PEACE IN THE RELIGIONS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In Judaism and Islam the Ultimate Reality sent a prophet to give His people a religion; in Ethno-state Zionism and Palestinian Nationalism, prophets gave people a religion on behalf of the Ultimate Reality. All these religions are in conflict over territory, which causes war and can only end with peace if a solution is to be found. Territory and state have already been addressed in Chapter 3, and the Ultimate Reality and prophets were specifically mentioned in Section 3.8.1.

Therefore the concepts *war* and *peace* need to be clarified in this chapter. How each religion sees them is essential to a complete understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict through the religious dimension, and could perhaps could determine whether a solution is possible through this perspective.

Similarities and differences will emerge. If a solution to the problem were to be found through the doctrines of war and peace, this could provide an opening for peaceful symbiosis. There does seem to be room for compromise in the Judeo-Zionist field, but other factors previously shown should also be taken into consideration. These will be addressed in Chapter 7.

6.2 WAR AND PEACE IN JUDAISM

"And if ye go to war in your land against the enemy that oppresseth you, then ye shall blow an alarm with the trumpets, and ye shall be remembered before the Lord your God, and ye shall be saved from your enemies." (Num. 11:9) Since God could never be defeated, any reversal was considered by the Jewish people as their betrayal of God's covenant with them, for example their routing after trying to enter the Promised Land against His will. (Num. 14:15)¹

David was not permitted to build God's temple because he fought too many wars. (1 Chron. 22:18; 28:3) It was Solomon, the advocate of peace, who built this sanctuary. (Wigoder 1989:726) Nevertheless there are laws in the Bible concerning war (Deut. 20:1—20). These mention exemptions for participants (Deut. 20:5—8) and also conduct during a war. Before a city may be attacked, the population should be offered peace; if they refuse then they may be besieged (Deut. 20:1—12). However, women, children and animals should be spared and taken

prisoner (Deut. 20:14). It is only the "cities of these people, which the Lord thy God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth:" (Deut. 20:16).

In the Mishnah (Sot. 8:7) there are three kinds of wars. *Milhemet hovah* is an obligatory war because of aggression by the enemy. This refers to wars against the nations of Amalek and Canaan in the Bible. The second type is *milhemet mitzvah* which is a war ordered by God and the Torah. This should be conducted for self-defence and national survival and even biblical exemptions are cancelled in this case. The third category is *milhemet hareshut*. This is an optional war carried out for political purposes, such as extensions of borders or an improvement of the economy. Such wars could only be conducted by kings with the consent of the seventy-one-member Sanhedrin. (Wigoder 1989:726)

During the period of the Emancipation most Halakhic responsa agreed that Jews could serve in the armies of the countries of their birth. However it is forbidden for a Jew to become a mercenary. (Wigoder 1989:727)

Shalom (peace) comes from the root meaning completeness or wholeness. The concept is linked to the idea of *shlemut*, perfection, which could refer to an absence of war and enmity or quarrel and strife. *Shalom* is generally used in the Bible to intimate a state of affairs such as prosperity and harmony both on the physical and spiritual level. The word is also used to refer to a value.² (Ravitzky 1987:685f.)

Peace refers to an ethical value in the rabbinical literature. Every individual is obliged to pursue peace in the sense of overcoming strife, quarrel and social tension, including the prevention of hatred and war. All Jewish scriptures starting with the Bible concede that war is part of human existence, but is viewed as part of human sin.³ (Ravitzky 1987:686:690:691) The wars in the Bible took place during eras in the past, and the pre-messianic wars are in the future.⁴

The centrality of peace in Judaism can be seen in its liturgy. All the major prayers such as the Amidah, the Kaddish and the grace after meals end with a prayer for peace. This is also a main concept in the priestly benediction.⁵ (Wigoder 1989:547)

According to Islam the world consists of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-harb. The former is the House of Islam under Muslim rule and Islamic law; the rest of the world comprises the latter.⁶ (Lewis 1988:73)

Jihad stems from the Arabic word *al-Jahd*, which means a struggle, or striving in the sense of suffering in order not to compromise with one's enemies. *Jahada* means 'he has struggled or striven'. (Doi 1984:438) It is incumbent on the Islamic state to enforce jihad⁷ (Khadduri 1979:60) and the commander of its forces should be a mature, pious and wise Muslim who is disciplined and has the respect of his forces (Doi 1984:445).

Jurists have differentiated four ways of jihad. Firstly Muslims can use their *heart*. This involves not succumbing to evil or to the devil. The second and third are with the *tongue* and the *hands* where one can support right and correct wrong. Finally jihad can be waged with the *sword*. (Khadduri 1979:57)

It is the duty of Muslims to convert mankind to Islam. This obligation may not cease until the whole world has been Islamised or has "submitted to the power of the Islamic state." (Lewis 1988:73; Khadduri 1979:102) Martyrs who die for Allah are assured of salvation⁸ in paradise⁹ (Khadduri 1976:61f.).

The doctrine of jihad is a permanent state of war but not continuous hostilities (Khadduri 1979:64:144). During the fighting, women, children, the elderly and invalids may not be killed in any circumstances, and there must be protection of their property and freedom. (Doi 1984:445) Warfare must cease if the enemy wants peace.¹⁰

A peace-treaty may be made with the enemy¹¹ if it is expedient for the Muslims. However leaders are advised not to engage in war whence insufficient forces may not attain victory. On the other hand, should there be a defeat, lives of surviving Muslims must be protected by a withdrawal. Hostilities could always be resumed at a more propitious time, leaving warfare in abeyance. (Khadduri 1979:202:136)

If Muslims conclude a peace-treaty they are obliged to abide by its terms.¹² Should the head of state believe that the enemy will attack again, it is incumbent on him to inform the enemy of the treaty's termination.¹³ In any event treaties are only valid for a period of ten years

according to the Sharia. Treaties involving this time-span may only be made after negotiations between Muslim and non-Muslim representatives, making diplomacy part of the law of jihad. (Khadduri 1979:204f.:220:249—50)

When an Islamic state engages in diplomatic negotiations with a non-Muslim state, this does not mean that the former recognises the latter. Negotiations only signify that there is an authority beyond Muslim sovereignty at that time. Thus the law of peace can only be something temporary during non-hostile periods. (Khadduri 1979:144—145) According to the Sharia the state of war can only be interrupted by an armistice or a limited truce. Muslims should be patient because their enemies will have to capitulate in the end.¹⁴ (Lewis 1988:73; Khadduri 1979:145:13)

The self-proclaimed Jewish state, Israel, has assumed control of Jerusalem. Since this whole area has been part of Dar al-Islam, the territory has a religious significance for Muslims and must therefore be returned to them. This suggests that the division of the world into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-harb are still relevant today. As a result Muslims worldwide call for a jihad against Israel and this is seen as "a righteous struggle on behalf of a just cause." (Mayer 1991:216)

"He it is who hath sent his messenger with the guidance and the religion of truth that He may make it conqueror of all religion however much idolaters may be averse." (Quran 61:9)

6.4 WAR AND PEACE IN THE JEWISH-ZIONIST STATE OF ISRAEL

The State of Israel was founded on the basis of peace and the hand of peace was extended to its Arab neighbours. This was enshrined in its proclamation of Independence. (*The Israel-Arab reader* 1976:127) The Israeli army was established as the Israel Defence Forces and is under the control of the Minister of Defence who is a civilian politician and is in charge of the IDF. Its activities are restrained by the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, the Knesset Finance Committee and the State Controller. Every decision connected with war and peace is taken by the government in consultation with the Chief of Staff and other high-ranking professional soldiers who serve in an advisory capacity. (Rolef 1987:151:152)

The IDF Chief Rabbinate have issued directives governing the conduct of war. In any emergency situation this body has the power to waive religious obligations where life is

endangered on the grounds of *pikuah nefesh*.¹⁵ (Wigoder 1989:727:553)

All the wars fought by the State of Israel with the exception of the second phase of the 1982 war in Lebanon are considered *milhemet mitzvah*. The latter has been considered as *milhemet hareshut*. (Wigoder 1989:727)

In November 1977 Prime Minister Begin invited President Sadat of Egypt to Jerusalem. This was the start of the negotiations for a peace settlement which led to the Camp David Accords which were approved by the Knesset, and the process culminated in the signing of a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. (Rolef 1987:57:64:65) When Yitzhak Rabin presented his government to the 13th Knesset in July 1992, he invited the presidents of Syria and Lebanon and King Husayn of Jordan to speak in the Knesset. He also offered to travel to Arab capitals for peace talks and invited the Palestinians to meet him in Jerusalem for the same reason.¹⁶

6.5 WAR AND PEACE IN ARAB NATIONALISM

Muslim nation-states in the modern world have recognised the legality of public international law. Since no human law may take precedence over Islamic law, some Muslims have tried to reconcile the two; others have legitimated this kind of state by relinquishing the division of the world into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-harb and redefining jihad as defensive, thus banning aggression; still others cannot accept the mundane law. (Mayer 1991:196:199:198:203)

Even though President Sadat of Egypt had obtained a ruling from al-Azhar theological university that the Egyptian-Israeli peace-treaty was not in contradiction of the Sharia, he was assassinated by a member of a Revivalist group. Its members maintained Muslims were duty-bound to take up arms against non-believers because Islam had been spread by the sword and the former were allowed to break treaties with the latter; but alien rulers should first be removed and Islamic states established. Only then should a jihad be waged against Israel. (Mayer 1991:209)

6.6 WAR AND PEACE IN PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM

Mayer (1991:217) suggests that since both Muslims and Christians belong to the PLO, the concept of jihad "has been drastically transformed." For this reason the doctrines of war and peace have been extrapolated from Articles of the Palestinian National Covenant and the

Palestinian Declaration of Independence.

The state of Palestine must be liberated through armed struggle (#1),¹⁷ which together with popular revolution is the only way for recovery of, and return to, the homeland (#9). This should be carried out through commando action, but there should be unity among the different Palestinian groups and the Arab masses in order to achieve victory (#10). It is the national obligation of the Arabs to free Palestine and liquidate the Zionist presence. Therefore Arab nations have a duty to give material and manpower support (#15).

The Palestinians have a legitimate right to free their country (#29). Consequently "On the international plane, the liberation of Palestine is a defensive measure dictated by the requirements of self-defense" (#18) and they reject any other solution to regaining their country than through Palestinian armed revolution (#21).

The state of Palestine will be a peace-loving state allowing peaceful co-existence, which is enshrined in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence. This called for all peace-loving people and states to help "terminate Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories." Regional and international disputes should be settled peacefully according to the UN Charter and resolutions. The Palestinian state will reject any force, violence or terrorism against it and will not use these measures against other states. (Documents B2:215:216)

6.7 DISCUSSION

The discussion on this chapter will provide an interim explanation of war and peace in the religions. Interpretation will be made in the final chapter, when it will emerge that there are more differences than similarities in comparing these concepts as seen by the religions concerned. However there are points of contact. Pye's methodology (1972) will summarise and provide an understanding of the position of all sides to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but it will be shown in Chapter 7 that this is not the complete picture.

Adherents to a religion cannot blame the Ultimate Reality for their defeat. Therefore the Jewish people blamed themselves for betraying God's covenant with them, when they persisted in entering the Promised Land against His will. Muslim Revivalists perceive the defeat in the 1967 War as straying from the true Path of Islam, while the Israelis were successful because they had kept their faith. Both these examples show that humans realise their frailty, and that

there is a power superior to theirs which must be obeyed in order for them to achieve success. In this case this power refers to God and to Allah.

In Judaism God does not favour wars: King David's record, for example, prevented him from building the Temple. Nevertheless there are certain circumstances where He commanded the people of Israel to wage war. In such cases nothing was to be left alive. In Islam it is incumbent on Muslims to convert the world to Dar al-Islam (Quran 61:9). Therefore the state of war may not cease until this has been achieved. This does not necessarily mean a permanent state of hostilities if not expedient for Muslims; it only means that there is a more powerful mundane authority at that point. In Judaism war is permissible but peace is preferable except in the case of enemy aggression, and in the cities which God gave the Jewish people as an inheritance. This applies to selected periods in the Bible. On the other hand Allah commanded that Islam be "conqueror of all religions". This led to the doctrine of jihad as a permanent state of war. 'Struggle' and 'striving' are inherent in Islam, and Muslims are to be protected if there is no immediate chance of success.

Before attacking a city it is mandatory that the Jewish people offer peace to its population. If they refuse then war may be waged, but women, children and animals must be spared. According to Islam, war must cease if the enemy wants peace. However if the head of state thinks that the enemy will attack, he should inform them of the termination of a treaty. Women and children should not be killed. Judaism provides the enemy with the option of preventing war, while Islam gives the enemy the option of cessation of hostilities, but reserves the right to renew them before a counter-attack by the foes. In both religions women and children must be spared. Perhaps this is the reason why the Hizballah ceased their rocket attacks against northern Israel after the world media had reported that a small child had been killed as a result of one of their missiles.

There are three kinds of wars in Judaism, viz. obligatory as ordained by God, self-defensive, and for political reasons with the permission of the Sanhedrin. This body no longer exists. It has been shown that after the achievement of the first phase, the 1982 Lebanese War was considered *milhemet hareshut*. Jihad can be waged with the heart, tongue, hands and swords. The Revivalists try to bring Muslims back to the true Path of Islam, and they want to depose secular rulers and establish Islamic states in their place. Although these are both numerical categories associated with war, this is an illustration where the data are so different that they

cannot be compared. (Cf. Hultkranz, Section 1.7.1.)

In Judaism peace is a moral and ethical concept — shalom rests on shlemut and war is viewed as part of human sin. By contrast, peace in Islam means a cessation of hostilities with an armistice or a peace-treaty for a maximum of ten years. Therefore inherently Judaism is pro-shalom and Islam is pro-jihad. The meaning of the latter does not necessarily have a militant connotation. In Islam there is also an underlying spiritual meaning and in Nationalism it is ideological. Militancy could also refer to self-defence and jihad could mean correcting what is wrong in this world (cf. Section 6.3). In the same way that the concept of an Islamic state is open to interpretation (cf. Section 3.5), there could be different interpretations from state to state on the meaning of jihad (see Section 6.5). In Section 6.3 it was mentioned that the head of state has obligations with regard to the doctrine of jihad. Since he is only human, this concept could be interpreted differently by different people.

The State of Israel was founded on the basis of peace, and its army is a defensive military machine. For practical considerations the state was forced to fight for its right to exist immediately after its establishment. All Israel's wars, including the first phase of the 1982 war in Lebanon are considered *milhemet mitzvah*. At that stage the war aim was protection of the Galilee population from PLO rocket and mortar attacks from Lebanese territory. Another example is that in 1967 Israel sent a message to King Husayn of Jordan informing him that the kingdom would not be attacked if Jordan stayed out of the war. Israeli leaders have always called for peace with its neighbours, although Prime Minister Rabin is the first to call upon Palestinian leaders to meet him in Jerusalem.

The state of Palestine must be liberated by any kind of armed struggle which is seen as a defensive measure. This includes acts of freedom-fighters/terrorism and intifada. Once the state will become a reality, Palestinian Nationalists envisage peace.

On the surface, it seems as though the world community permitted the establishment of the State of Israel without the Jewish people having to resort to war for this purpose, whilst the Palestinian Nationalists have to fight for the establishment of their state. If one delves deeper, this same community offered both sides partition of mandated Palestine, which the Arabs could have accepted; and after 1948 this state could have been established in the West Bank, but King Abdulla annexed this territory to Jordan. Both the State of Israel and a future state of Palestine wish to live in peace. However this seems to be a paradox and an anathema, since

the State of Israel exists on a given tract of geographical territory, and according to the PLO Covenant the state of Palestine must be established on the same tract of geographical territory.

Using Pye's methodology (1972:passim) concepts in this chapter are war and peace. These will be related to groups, states of mind and actions.

In Judaism (*group*) all wars except for *milhemet mitzvah* should be avoided if at all possible (*state of mind*). That is why Jewish people should seek to live in peace linked to *shlemut* (*action*).

It is incumbent on Muslims (*group*) to Islamise the world. Until this happens there can be periods of freedom from hostilities but not the state of war (*state of mind*). Thus there can only be a truce or an armistice (*action*).

In political Zionism (*group*) wars are only waged for defensive purposes (*state of mind*). Therefore Israeli leaders constantly call for peace negotiations with neighbouring states (*actions*).

According to Palestinian Nationalism (*group*) there must be a defensive armed struggle in order to liberate Palestine (*state of mind* and *action*). After the establishment of the state there will be no future cause for struggle or wars (*state of mind* and *action*).

This chapter has described the doctrines of war and peace in Judaism, Islam, the Jewish-Zionist State of Israel and Palestinian Nationalism. More differences than similarities have emerged, and in one case surface similarities were not really comparable. The application of Pye's methodology has shown how these doctrines can be related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

- 1 There is a general belief among Islamic Revivalists that the defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict can be attributed to the fact that Muslims strayed from the Quran and had ignored the will of Allah, and for this they were punished. On the other hand Israel is a religious state and the Jews had maintained their faith. Consequently their success was achieved through the power of their religious faith. (Lewis 1990:41 : Unpublished treatise: see Bibliography.)
- 2 "These are the things that ye shall do; Speak ye every man the truth to his neighbour; execute the judgement of truth and peace in your gates:" (Zach. 8:16)
- "The law of truth was in his mouth, and iniquity was not found in his lips: he walked with me in peace and equity, and did turn many away from iniquity." (Mal. 2:6)
- 3 "A time to love, and a time to hate; a time of war, and a time of peace." (Eccles. 3:8)
- "The wicked have drawn out the sword, and have bent their bow, to cast down the poor and needy, and to slay such as he of upright conversation." (Ps. 37:14)
- 4 After the advent of the messiah, peace will reign. (See Section 4.2)
- "And he shall judge among the nations, and rebuke many people; and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." (Isa. 2:4) Cf. Mic. 4:3.
- 5 "The Lord bless thee and keep thee: The Lord make his face to shine upon thee, and be gracious unto thee: The Lord lift up his countenance upon thee, and give thee peace." (Num. 6:24—26)
- 6 *Harb* is the Arabic word for war (Lewis 1988:71).
- 7 "Go forth, light armed and heavy armed, and strive with your wealth and your lives in the way of Allah! ..." (Quran 9:41)
- "The (true) believers are those only who believe in Allah and His messenger and doubt not, but strive with their wealth and their lives for the cause of Allah. ..." (Quran 49:15)
- "... strive against his disbelievers and the hypocrites, and be stern with them. ..." (Quran 66:9)
- 8 "O ye who believe! Shall I show you a commerce that will save you from a painful doom?
- "You should believe in Allah and His messenger, and should strive for the cause of Allah with your wealth and your lives.
- "He will forgive you your sins and bring you into Gardens underneath which rivers flow, and pleasant dwellings in Gardens of Eden. That is the supreme triumph.
- "And (He will give you) another blessing which ye love; help from Allah and present victory ..." (Quran 61:10—13)

There is again mention in the last ayah, of victory with Allah's help.

- 9 "And know that paradise is beneath the protection of the swords." (Bukhari) (Ali s.a.:261)
- 10 "And if they incline to peace, incline thou also to it, and trust in Allah. ...
"And if they would deceive thee, then lo, Allah is sufficient for thee. He it is Who supporteth thee with His help and with the believers." (Quran 8:61—62)
"I have been commanded that I should fight these people till they bear witness that there is no god but Allah and keep up prayer and pay zakat. When they do this, their blood and their property shall be safe with me except as Islam requires, and their reckoning is with Allah." (Bukhari) (Ali s.a.:255)
- 11 "How can there be a treaty with Allah and with His messenger for the idolaters save those with whom ye made a treaty at the Inviolable Place of Worship? So long as they are true to you, be true to them. Lo! Allah loveth those who keep their duty." (Quran 9:7)
- 12 "Fulfil the covenant of Allah when you have covenanted, and break not your oaths after asseveration of them, and after ye have made Allah your surety over you. Lo! Allah knoweth what ye do." (Quran 16:91)
"Excepting those of the idolaters with whom ye (Muslims) have a treaty, and who have since abated nothing of your right not to have supported anyone against you. (As for these) fulfil their treaty to them. Lo! Allah loveth those who keep their duty (unto Him)." (Quran 9:4)
- 13 Treaties with dhimmis may never be terminated because they have agreed to live under the protection of Muslim rule. Therefore they are not considered part of Dar al-harb. (Khadduri 1979:220)
- 14 "Some people from among my community shall remain in the ascendant, until the command of Allah comes to them and they shall be triumphant." (Bukhari) (Ali s.a.:255)
"A party of my community shall not cease fighting for the Truth — they shall be triumphant over their opponents." (Abu Dawud) (Ali s.a.:255)

These two Hadiths also promise victory to believers.

- 15 *Pikuah nefesh* is "consideration for human life" (Wigoder 1989:553).
- 16 *The Jerusalem report*. July 30, 1992.
- 17 #1 and subsequent numbers refer to the Palestinian National Covenant.

CHAPTER 7 : CONCLUSIONS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter all the data will be drawn together and divided into five themes. The findings will then be interpreted using the hermeneutical concepts from Section 1.5. Judaism, Islam, Secular Zionism, the State of Israel, Arab Nationalism and Palestinian Nationalism will be related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Then the intra-field dialectic tensions between Judaism and Zionism and Islam and Nationalism will be interpreted, as well as statehood and way of life. Unexplored data will refer to what has not or could not be said, but are relevant to the religions and relate either directly or indirectly to this study.

Research premises will once again be examined, and the following questions will be debated: whether or not, or to what to degree, they have been shown to be valid. This investigation has led to a suggestion of a theory which needs to be argued. Lastly conclusions will be drawn from this research.

7.2 THEMES FROM THE RESEARCH

This research has disclosed five themes. Judaism, Islam, Zionism and Nationalism are all political religions with political theories; each has its own ideas on the concept of state, doctrine of war and peace, and there are dialectic tensions in each field. It has also emerged that all are ways of life.

Islam is the only religion which has had a polity almost from the time of its emergence, when the Prophet ruled the umma in Madina. Revelations from Allah ceased at Muhammad's death, but these were codified in the Quran not long afterwards because he had not appointed a successor. For the religion to continue, the teaching had to assume sacred status. It took about two centuries for the canonisation of the Sunna into the Hadith literature. The Sharia developed concurrently.

Judaism developed slowly into a political religion from Sinai to the establishment of the Second Temple and later the *va'adot* in Europe. This was due to a combination of events in world history as well as the people themselves. Although the *Torah* had been canonised after

the Babylonian exile, centuries were to pass before the *Nibi'im* and *Ketubim* received sacred status. Subsequently the *Talmud: Mishnah, Gemarah* and responsa literature came into being.

Zionism evolved politically within a few years due to Jewish persecution in Europe. Although all Zionists believe in Herzl's doctrine of the Jewish State, other ideologues wrote treatises. Thus there are many Zionist scriptures.

While Arab Nationalism arose in the response to the decline of the Ottoman empire and the rise of Western colonialism (both phenomena in world history) there was no urgency for national self-expression. Many years passed before the rise of Pan-Arabism and subsequently Ethno-statism in each Arab nation-state.

Palestinian Nationalism needed nearly half a century to evolve as a political religion, because the Arab states had failed to find a solution to their problem. Yet once the Palestinians decided that the responsibility was theirs, the PLO Covenant was written and made sacred, and this organisation pressed for, and obtained the right to, sole representation of its people.

Political Zionism set forth the practical plan for establishing the State of Israel, but its popular support lay in the spiritual Zionism of Herzl, Ben Gurion, Jabotinsky and other ideologues. In the same way the goal of Palestinian statehood, which plays an important role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, finds its popular support in the Islamic ideal of the true community. The ultimate goal of spiritual Zionism and the umma are virtually identical — the creation of a just society on earth.

Concepts of state, doctrines of war and peace, dialectic tensions in each field and all the religions as a way of life will be analysed in the various sub-sections of Hermeneutics. This will be done in order to avoid duplication, since similar data can be categorised under different sub-sections.

7.3 HERMENEUTICS

In Section 1.5 it was stated that hermeneutics is generally associated with texts and involves language. Since texts are part of the corpus of scriptures, 'language' will refer mainly to the latter, although it can refer to anything which is written or even said. Texts and experience should be seen at a specific period in history, and the latter should be considered. Understanding can also have an ontological meaning through Heidegger's 'being' and 'time', where people

are living in this world at a certain point; therefore ontology will be taken into account. Furthermore Palmer (1969:234—235) suggests that understanding should address what was not or could not be said.

The hermeneutical concepts for the Jewish people are 'covenant', 'survival' and 'messianism'; for Islam and the Islamic Revivalists, 'texts' and 'struggle'; and for the Muslim Secularists and Nationalists 'power' and 'success'. All these concepts will be shown to be relevant from the research data.

7.3.1 Judaism and the Arab-Israeli conflict

For the Jewish people, history starts with the creation of the world. The word *bereshit* ("in the beginning") in the Book of Genesis begins with the letter, *bet*. Since Hebrew is written from right to left, the letter's configuration suggests a beginning. Abraham was the first person to make a covenant with God when he accepted monotheism, and Moses may be considered the founder of Judaism when he gave his followers the Decalogue at Sinai. He was succeeded by Joshua, who was appointed by God, to lead the children of Israel into the promised land.

Thus history is linked to geography. The territory in the Bible was promised by God through various covenants with the descendants of Abraham because they in turn promised to keep His commandments. Even though the Israelites were exiled because of their sins, to Babylon and later by foreign conquerors to the Diaspora, God promised them in biblical times that He would allow them to return to this land. During the exile they continued to practise their religion and were a homogeneous people, tending to live apart from other peoples, only accepting converts after rigorous requirements had been met. Therefore in the context of entitlement, the territory which comprises the State of Israel is part of this "promised land". Furthermore the Territories captured after the Six-Day/1967 War are seen by some people as included, while others do not agree. This will be discussed in Section 7.3.6.1.

Although in Judaism war is allowed, it is considered a sin. Judaism rests on *shlemut* and its adherents are expected to live in peace and harmony, and while *milhemet mitzvah* is allowed, it may only be waged for defensive purposes. The Jewish people desire to live in peace with their neighbours, with some going so far as to acquiesce in Arab rule over themselves. This point has become contentious because of different interpretations of the sanctity of the Territories, and needs to be addressed in Section 7.3.6.1.

7.3.2 Islam and the Arab-Israeli conflict

According to Islam revelations were given to the prophets in the Old Testament and to Jesus in the New Testament, but these teachings were distorted. For this reason Allah chose Muhammad, the Seal of Prophets, to make Islam the religion of Allah (Quran 3:19). Therefore Islam is the only religion which has the divine truth. It follows that history begins with Islam, and by extension, geography as well. Every place associated with Abraham (Ibrahim) and subsequent prophets is a Muslim holy site. Therefore in the context of entitlement, every holy place mentioned in the Bible belongs to Islam and is waqf territory.

According to the doctrine of *jihad* the land belongs to Dar al-Islam from the perspectives of the scriptures and also by conquest after the spread of Islam, when Jews were *dhimmi*s. Since they proclaimed a Jewish state on this land and continue to rule over Muslims, this has caused a reversal of the trend of history. The doctrine of peace allows Muslims to suspend *jihad* whenever there is a mundane authority stronger than the *umma*, to protect the lives of believers. Since the IDF has proved and continues to prove itself efficient, Muslims are justified in allowing a peaceful symbiosis until such time as it is expedient to re-embark on *jihad*. For this reason a suspension of war is admissible. In any event peace treaties are only valid for a period of ten years, but if Israel continues to be strong militarily, then this state of 'peace' could continue indefinitely. Such a solution is not as simple as it appears on the surface, because various Islamic groups have differing opinions. (This will be addressed in Section 7.3.6.2.)

7.3.3 Secular Zionism and the Arab-Israeli conflict

Until the 1880s the Jewish people had accepted persecution and anti-Semitism without retaliating. They were a minority in the different countries of the Diaspora, involved in practising their religion while trying to live apart from other indigenous people. Influenced by the Haskalah movement in eastern Europe, many Jews became Secularised and though they did not practise traditional religion, still perceived themselves as part of the Jewish people, with their roots in Jewish history and culture.

Jews who followed the trend of the Haskalah felt that it was time to take a stand against anything anti-Jewish, and the response was the rise of modern Zionism. They advocated living in a Jewish state where they would be free from persecution and able to live a full cultural life

as Secular Jews; the most logical locus for them was the land of the Bible. Hence history is related to geography.

From the foregoing it is not surprising that their doctrines follow that of Judaism. The State of Israel was founded on peace and its neighbours were asked to live together with it peaceably. The IDF is a defence army which defends the country; even though it had to fight many wars, Israeli politicians have always tried to prevent them, and in 1967 sent a message to King Husayn informing him that Jordan would not be attacked if she did not take up arms. In addition Israeli prime ministers have repeatedly asked their Arab neighbours for peace.

Zionism is an ideology which can accommodate other ideologies. According to these there are different interpretations of the status of the administered Territories. This issue needs to be discussed in Section 7.3.6.1.

7.3.3.1 The State of Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict

For Israel, the 1948 war was a war of liberation where she had to fight for her survival. The armistice agreement gave her 75—80% of Mandatory western Palestine, and there was population movement. In 1956 Nasser had closed the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, and in 1967 the Straits of Tiran. Both measures prevented ships from reaching the port of Eilat, and goods needed for daily survival were denied to Israel. Therefore the stranglehold had to be broken. In 1973 Egypt and Syria invaded Israel in order to regain territories they had lost in the previous war. Since Israeli soldiers were in the front line and were being killed, this was also a defensive war. The IDF invasion into Lebanon in 1982 was undertaken to eliminate Palestinian bases in the south, from which missiles were sent to destroy the civilian population in the Galilee. The second phase of this war was not defensive, but had political motives. Except for this stage of the campaign, all wars fought by Israel have been for her survival.

In 1982 Israel withdrew from the territories captured from Egypt in return for peace, and later that decade from Lebanon, except for a security/self-proclaimed zone for her defence. This is also linked to survival.

7.3.4 Arab Nationalism and the Arab-Israeli conflict

Before the third decade of this century Muslim Arabs in the Middle East were living in the Fertile Crescent and in the Arabian peninsula; the former was under Ottoman rule and the

Muslim umma was able to practise its religion. With the fall of the Ottoman empire and the division of the Fertile Crescent into separate mandates this situation changed and the region was divided arbitrarily into different segments. This was due to the fact that Britain wanted a sea route to India, and France was interested in expansion of her role in the world.

These two colonial powers set up parliamentary systems which were alien to Islam, leaving the umma to cope with this form of foreign democracy which contributed to Secularisation of Muslims and away from Islam. After the termination of the mandates and the establishment of nation-states, Muslims were left with this fragmentation and felt the need to return to a homogeneous cultural group. The result was the rise of Pan-Arabism; but each ruler had power which he was reluctant to relinquish. Therefore this ideology gave way to Ethno-statism which again divided the umma and continued to place Islam in the private domain.

The different Arab states in the Middle East adopted Western ideologies, they became members of the UN and accepted international law. Since this could be in conflict with the Islamic doctrine of war and peace, some states tried to reconcile the mundane law with the Sharia. Rulers were also accountable to their own citizens. Some people such as the Revivalists advocated jihad against alien ideas and ideologies and wished to depose leaders espousing anything anti-Islamic, and establish in their place Islamic states based on the Sharia. For this reason some states such as Egypt and Jordan tried to accommodate them by allowing them to sit in their parliaments, while other states such as Syria and Iraq have suppressed them. Furthermore minority religions in all these states are treated as dhimmis. This is not surprising according to the definition of Ethno-state Religion.

The situation in Lebanon is different from the other nation-states because of its plurality of religions. This is due to the fact that the French had divided the mandate in this region into cantons, according to the religious majority in each area. Over the years the Christian majority was overtaken by the Muslims, thus leading to civil wars in the country. During the first phase of the 1982 Israeli-Lebanese war, the Shia welcomed the IDF, since the latter's aim was to drive the PLO out of southern Lebanon. This would have been of benefit to the former. Yet after the mission had been accomplished and the Israeli army had forged on to Beirut to help the Christian president, there was resentment by the Muslims especially over a treaty between the government and the Israelis. The Lebanese president was assassinated. As the Muslims constitute the majority in the country, they want power, and as the Christians and the Jews are

dhimmis, they could have been perceived as conspiring against the Muslim umma. In addition an alien power had invaded sovereign territory. As a result the treaty was never signed and the Shia Hizballah group started reprisals against the IDF and the civilian population in northern Israel. Although this state of affairs is on-going, Lebanon has joined the peace process. This may be due to pragmatic reasons since there is constant strife within the country, and Israel supports the south Lebanon army which is considered a militia. Another reason could be its solidarity with its brethren states.

Since the Arab nation-states have their roots in Islam, a Jewish state in the region on former Arab territory is an anathema. This led to the 1948 and subsequent wars. During the first war Israel proved superior militarily; but after the 1956 war her return of territories could have been interpreted as weakness. Hence Nasser could close the Tiran straits, making Israel's retaliation inevitable, as her port of Eilat had been cut off from international shipping. Once again the IDF proved stronger, but the defeat of the Arab states incurred shame. As peace can only be achieved through wars or negotiations, Sadat tried the latter, which was misconstrued by the Israeli government at that time. For this reason he reverted to the first option, which proved successful and erased the shame, replacing it with honour.

The Revivalists saw the defeat in 1967 as due to straying from Islam, whereas Israel succeeded owing to its commitment to religion. The victory in the 1973 war was perceived as Allah's forgiveness after many Muslims had returned to their religion. Implicit in Islam is success, as many *ayas* from the Quran have shown (passim). Therefore if Muslims do not succeed, they are not in harmony with Allah's laws.

Sadat was now in a position of strength, and towards the end of the decade he could make overtures again for peace.¹ Leaders of other Arab states saw this as an act of disloyalty and broke off relations with Egypt. He was assassinated by a member of a Revivalist group. Diplomatic relations were subsequently re-established. Although Mubarak did not abrogate the peace treaty, he allowed a 'cold' peace to continue. He also demanded and finally received the enclave of Taba, thus recovering every last inch of territory captured by the Israelis.

After the 1992 Gulf War all the Arab confrontation states, with the exception of Iraq, attended the Madrid peace conference, and negotiations are continuing. Saddam Husayn had tried to establish himself as leader of the new Pan-Arabism, but his brethren aligned themselves with the Allies. This was probably seen as a traitorous act. It seems that the Arab heads of nation-

states have accepted the fact that Israel is a strong military power. Therefore it is not contrary to the Islamic doctrine of jihad to negotiate for peace, but the Revivalists do not agree. The decline of Communism in the former USSR and eastern Europe has caused loss of super-power support, and the USA is interested in peace in the area. Living peaceably in the region can be pragmatic, and advantageous for discussions on mutual environmental and other common problems.

7.3.5 Palestinian Nationalism and the Arab-Israeli conflict

The British mandate in Palestine had fragmented the Muslim umma, and the Balfour Declaration had supported a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine without consulting the indigenous Arab population. Furthermore there were land-sales to the Jews and Jewish immigration to Palestine. All these factors led to the Arab revolt of 1936—39, which was the start of inchoate Palestinian Arab Nationalism. This population rejected partition as they refused to leave their homes.

Palestinians did not take part in the 1948 war, and the following year the 'young guard' wanted to establish the state of Palestine alongside Israel on the west bank of the Jordan River. The 'old guard' were more conservative and against this move. The delay allowed King Abdulla to annex this area to his Hashemite Kingdom, since he had always believed that this territory should have been included by the British as part of Transjordan. Palestinians were given Jordanian citizenship, and so began a process of de-Palestinisation. Once they became Jordanian subjects they could not claim to be Palestinians. Those people who had left Palestine before the establishment of the State of Israel were now refugees in other Arab states; but it was not in the latter's interests to absorb these people. Therefore they remained Palestinians in exile without a state of their own. Israel had denied return to those who desired re-union, and this caused grievances between the parties.

After the demise of Pan-Arabism the PLO was established in 1964, but at that stage Fateh was not part of the organisation. The Palestine National Charter was formulated in such a way that it was difficult to change any of its articles. This gave the document a form of sacred status. Five years later Arafat was elected chairman of the PLO which was then committed to guerilla/terrorist activities. These can be used by people to bring attention to their plight or cause.

Following the 1967 war there was a rise in Palestinian Nationalism. This could have been due to the isolation of the people in the West Bank from Jordan, and to the want of a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. By the beginning of the following decade this religion had become so powerful that its adherents were able to establish a state within the state of Jordan. Consequently they were expelled and settled in Lebanon.

After the 1973 war the PLO received recognition as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Land Day of the Israeli Arabs also had an influence on the Palestinians in the Territories. By now there was a re-Palestinisation of the people, and even Israel's war against them in Lebanon and their expulsion from this country failed to subdue their power or influence. They forged links with the Arab citizens of Israel who began to see themselves as Israeli Palestinians. This strength enabled the PLO to declare the independence of the state of Palestine in 1988. Arafat subsequently recognised UN resolutions 242² and 338, but the PLO Charter was not amended. This is a paradox for the Israelis. According to the Declaration, jihad will be waged until the territory of the state is reclaimed, but once established it will live in peace with its neighbours.

Since leaders of the PLO were involved in the international scene they had neglected their people in the Territories. A generation had grown up under the Israeli occupation/administration and they felt that Palestinians on the outside had lost touch with them and their problems. Consequently the former took matters into their own hands and started the Intifada. The latter did become involved by issuing directives, but in the main the uprising was motivated and continued by people in the Territories.

During the 1990 Gulf War the PLO supported Saddam Husayn, and Palestinians in the West Bank/Judea and Samaria danced on their roofs as missiles fell on Israeli populated areas. The Iraqi ruler had wanted to establish himself as the leader of Pan-Arabism and since none of the other confrontation states had ever actively promoted the Palestinian cause, perhaps their leaders felt that he might help them in return for their allegiance. As he was not victorious they had no option other than to join the peace conference. Furthermore their participation gave them de facto recognition by the Israeli government. From inchoate Nationalism, the Palestinians have attained equal partnership in the world community, and it is logical to assume that they cannot now halt their power and success until they have territory on which to establish the state.

7.3.6 Intra-field dialectic tensions

In Section 1.8 it was stated that Hegel saw contradictions in society, nature and thought. He also believed that the "world develops dialectically by the interplay of opposites". In this section the concept will be used to disclose the tensions of latent oppositions and contradictions in each religions' thought with regard to the State of Israel and the Territories in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Interpretation will take into consideration the hermeneutical concepts applied to each religion.

7.3.6.1 Judaism and Zionism

Dialectic tensions in Judaism rest on the sanctity of the land and its place in eschatology. Different groups base their positions on the Jewish scriptures. The Naturei Karta, Mitnagdim, Hasidim and some Sephardim see in them no sanctity and no ideological significance. Furthermore the founding of the Jewish state and the inclusion of the Territories are contrary to God's will by violating one of the oaths and delaying redemption. Some religious Zionists believe that the land is sacred and that by returning to live on it, the process of redemption has started, but the Balfour Declaration nullified the oath. Other religious Zionists believe that the Jewish people can only carry out all the *mitzvot*³ in the Bible when they live in *Eretz Israel*.

The Haredim seem to have taken the texts literally and the difference between the Naturei Karta and the other groups is due to the former's use of the *Agadah*, whilst the latter use the *Halakha*. R. Zvi Yehuda Kook has used the Jerusalem Talmud as his source, but has also taken into account events in modern history, namely the Balfour Declaration, which he saw as the nullification of the oath against return, and also Israel's victory in the Six-Day/1967 War, which he interpreted as God's permission to return. Since He had allowed these events to happen, the process of redemption has started and will be completed when He so decrees. For these reasons the land has sacred status, and the Territories may not be returned. Here salvation is linked to messianism. Other religious Zionists also agree on the sanctity of the land but they base their reasons on the Bible. Therefore in order to live a full Jewish life, they must live in the State of Israel. They believe that they are not absolute owners of the land because, according to the laws of the harvest, they are only living there because God so decreed.

All religious Zionists believe that the State of Israel must also be a haven for their persecuted brethren in the Diaspora. While they all believe in the sacred status of the land, some do

maintain that the Territories may be ceded for peace. This is based on *pikuah nefesh* which is related to saving lives.

Judaism makes provision for interpretations in the modern world. (Cf. Heidegger's 'being' and 'time'.) A possible explanation of why the Haredim take the scriptures literally is that a Secular Jewish state is against Judaism and contrary to the laws of God. A Jewish state should be theocratic and ruled by the Sanhedrin as in biblical times. Their views regarding the secular state as delaying redemption have two possible explanations. Firstly no human being can possibly know when God will decide to send the messiah. Secondly by stating that the redemption would be delayed, they want to admonish against Secularism and perhaps warn those who do practise traditional religion that they are acting contrary to their religion.

Secular Zionists relate to the State of Israel historically and culturally. They see the state as a haven for Jewish people in times of persecution, thus providing for their survival. This is based on Herzl's ideology. The Labour Party followed several ideologues, including Ben Gurion, whilst the Likud espouses Jabotinsky's thought, and Meretz rests on Secular Humanism. The last-mentioned is an ideology, which is a religion according to the definition in this thesis.

Since the Likud believes in the Greater Land of Israel, and some of its members include the territory on both sides of the Jordan, the Territories may not be ceded. Labour is more pragmatic and is prepared to return most of the Territories except for the areas essential to the state's security; this cession can only take place in return for a peace treaty. Meretz favours a return of all the Territories with minor border adjustments for peace.

Even though people can belong to the same cultural group and live in society alongside one another, they are only human and have the ability to reason. Since each person has his or her own psyche and views, these lead to differences of opinion. This is in contrast to a transcendent Ultimate Reality who is all-knowing and who ordains a religion for adherents.

7.3.6.2 Islam and Nationalism

In contrast to the dialectic tensions in the Judeo-Zionist field, those in the Muslim-Arab Nationalist field refer to conflict and struggle between Islam and Nationalism. There are further tensions within each field regarding how to experience the religions.

There is consensus that the state of Palestine must be established in the territory of Mandatory Palestine. This is based on the scriptures of each religion, but the difference lies in whether this state should be Islamic or Secular in orientation. The Muslims strive for the former, since the Prophet had ruled the umma in Madina, whereas the Revivalists want to compel the Nationalists to return to Islam through jihad. On the other hand the Nationalists have had power which they are reluctant to relinquish. Power brings success and this is seen as the establishment of the secular state. The Revivalists are against the peace process since they maintain that there cannot be peace with dhimmis, notwithstanding the Islamic doctrine of jihad, but the Nationalists are prepared to be pragmatic in order to gain their objective. A state in the Territories will not necessarily preclude waging war against Israel at a later stage in order to obtain the territory of the State of Israel. At one stage this was part of Fateh's aim, but the Revivalists want the whole area at once, and not piecemeal.

The dialectic tensions within the Muslim field refer to clashes between al-Ikhwan and Jihad as to whether the state should be established first before bringing the umma back to Islam and then waging jihad against Israel or vice versa. The former would increase the numerical support and strength of the Muslims. The conflict in the Nationalist field is over power. Each group in the PLO has its own ideology by virtue of the fact that leaders are human, each has its own views, and each wants leadership. All these point to disagreements on how to experience each religion.

7.3.7 State

Political religions have already been referred to (see Section 7.2). The importance of the state and its geographical situation as well as the role played by religion were discussed in the immediately preceding sections. Therefore of relevance in this section are the place of religious minorities in the state and Jerusalem/al-Quds.

In a theocratic state there would be no room for minority religions, as this form of state is based on religion where the Ultimate Reality is sovereign. Since the Ultimate Reality of the minority religion is perceived in a different way from that of the majority religion, adherents to the former could not accept this sovereignty. These statements have to be qualified in Islam since provision is made for dhimmis who are under its protection and therefore part of Dar al-Islam, but it has been shown (*passim*) that dhimmis have a specific status and are not equal socially and politically to the Muslims.

In countries where Ethno-state Religion and Ethno-nationalism predominate, votaries of minority religions can practise these in the private domain, but the public dimension does not include them. They can have full rights but may not occupy certain positions in society. For example non-Jews sit in the Knesset, but since most Arabs do not serve in the IDF they cannot hold positions which make military service a pre-requisite. (For these reasons the term 'Civil Religion' is not apposite for the State of Israel.) The foregoing is one of the reasons for the trend among Israeli Arabs to identify with Islamic Revivalism and Palestinian Nationalism. It has also emerged that Jewish citizens in some Arab nation-states have been allowed to practise their religion, but they have controlled rights and are discriminated against.

In states such as Lebanon (see Section 3.6.4) where different religions are accorded equality, there is constant strife. This is probably because adherents to each see their religion as possessing the whole truth, since the Ultimate Reality of each is all-knowing and all-powerful. Therefore it is their right to have mundane power as the dominant group.

The centrality of Jerusalem/al-Quds to the Jewish people (see Section 3.7) is linked to Jewish eschatology. al-Quds/Jerusalem is not mentioned in the Quran, but in the Hadith and Muslim writings it is referred to as al-Baitu L-Muqaddas and is also linked to Islamic eschatology. Although the de jure capital of the State of Israel, the city has also been declared the capital of the state of Palestine.

In Judaism, covenant is linked to messianism with regard to Jerusalem/al-Quds. If the Jewish people keep God's laws they will be returned to a theocratic Jewish state as in biblical times, and He will send the messiah for their redemption. Since his advent is linked with this city, it is of fundamental importance to this religion. In Islam the Hadith is a primary source of scripture; therefore Muslims are duty-bound to struggle for the control of the city. As most Secular Zionists see their roots in Jewish history and culture, Jerusalem/al-Quds has a sacred status for them as well and it can never be relinquished. Furthermore it is not logical to cede a de jure capital, recognised by most countries in the world. The city was part of Mandatory Palestine and as such it is historically part of a future Palestinian state. For this reason the Palestinian Nationalists must use their power in order to succeed in regaining it.

7.3.8 Way of life

In Judaism God alone is sovereign and humans have delegated powers. As soon as Jews are

born they are bound by the covenant, but have a choice regarding citizenship. Every waking moment is regulated by the Halakha and reward and punishment is related to the mundane, e.g. on Yom Kippur they stand before God in judgement. Another name for this day is *Yom ha-Din* ("day of judgement"). There is also collective reward and punishment. Aetiology begins with the creation of the world, Halakha regulates ontology and soteriology, and messianism relates to eschatology in Jerusalem/al-Quds.

Religion has been defined as the wish to transcend the ordinary, find one's place in the cosmos, and live in harmony with it (see Section 1.6). 'Transcend the ordinary' refers to a central prayer, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one."⁴ Finding themselves in the cosmos is achieved by following Judaism as a complete way of life and not merely a ritual. By adhering to God's laws they will be in harmony with them, and hence in harmony with the cosmos. This interpretation includes politics.

In Islam, Muslims are born into the umma and if they want to remain members they must submit to Allah. The Sharia regulates life, and reward and punishment are related to the mundane and also to soteriology, e.g. by adhering to the Path of Islam they will be successful, and the reverse will bring failure; but the former will lead to peace in paradise. Aetiology relates to the creation, ontology to the Sharia, and eschatology to al-Quds/Jerusalem. 'Transcend the ordinary' refers to Muslims' belief in Allah as the one and only God. This is the First Pillar of Islam. Finding themselves in the cosmos is achieved by following Islam as a complete way of life and not merely a ritual. According to the Quran Allah has made all Muslims His vicegerents on this earth and they have to care for His creation. By adhering to the Path of Islam as set forth in His revelations, they will be in harmony with God's laws and hence in harmony with the cosmos. This includes jihad (struggle).

Secular Zionism too is a way of life (ontology), e.g. defence of the state for its citizens' survival, army service and reserve duty. Reward and punishment relate to the mundane, the former being for valour or some contribution to the state, and the latter for espionage or criminal activities. Aetiology begins in Jewish history. Soteriology means being prepared to give up one's life in defence of the country for one's fellow-citizens. The *eschaton* is to be avoided at all costs, i.e. the destruction of the state and the Jewish people, as at Massada or in the Holocaust. 'Transcend the ordinary' refers to the State as the Ultimate Reality, and finding themselves in the cosmos implies adhering to the way of life, which will bring them into

harmony with the cosmos. Religious Zionism and Traditional religious Zionism are a combination of the foregoing, where relevant, and the previous interpretation of Judaism.

In Arab and Palestinian Nationalism the state is sovereign and Western colonialism and the PLO prophets gave people a religion on behalf of the state. This binds them together. There is an element of submission where the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Way of life and reward and punishment are similar to Secular Zionism, but in Palestinian Nationalism, refer to striving by any means for the establishment of the state of Palestine.

Aetiology, ontology, soteriology and eschatology answer questions such as why they were born, how they must live on this earth, why they must die and what will happen at the end of time. These are questions which pre-occupy a human being and the answers can be supplied by religions.

7.3.9 Unexplored data

Palmer (1969:234—235) has mentioned that understanding should consider what was not, or could not, be said. These will now be discussed.

Pye (1972:89) questioned whether a prescribed office or a certain individual alone is significant to a votary's understanding of a prophet. God appointed different prophets to give His teachings to the children of Israel. Therefore the office is significant, but since there were many individuals, each is seen and respected as such. Yet it does not seem that this was due to the charisma of anyone in particular. The office of Muhammad is of paramount importance, since he was the Seal of Prophets, and there were none after his demise. He always gave credit to Allah for the revelations, as can be seen in the Quran (passim). He is also esteemed as a man, but this does not seem to be in the charismatic sense. Today Zionist prophets are respected as individuals, while the Palestinian Nationalist prophets appear to be charismatic. The latter are able to draw adherents not only in accordance with their ideologies, but also because these ideologies relate to acts of freedom-fighters/terrorism to varying degrees, e.g. Hawatmeh ascribes a greater role to these than does Arafat. Perhaps all this is due to the fact that the state of Palestine has not yet been established, because a similar situation existed in Zionism before 1948. While it is not suggested that charisma must necessarily be related to violence (cf. the founder of the Ja'ama religion in the Congo) it may have some connection (cf. Jim Jones). It seems that Yasir Arafat, the individual, is important to Palestinians of all political

persuasions in the Territories, as they united behind him when his leadership was threatened. In addition his escape from death in an aeroplane crash and subsequent brain surgery, seems to have provided him with a form of sacred status.

Mention has been made of the fact that the Islamic doctrine of jihad makes allowance for a mundane power stronger than the umma (see Section 7.3.2). If the State of Israel will continue to have the upper hand indefinitely, this could cause resentment to build up in some Muslims — true to human nature — since Jews are dhimmis, and implicit in Islam is success. Therefore the question arises whether there is anything in Islam which could obviate this impasse.

One solution could be the practice of *ijtihad*, but for the Sunnis this was closed in Baghdad and they have to rely on *taqlid* prior to that. This makes the Sharia static with regard to modern times. (Cf. Iqbal, Section 3.5.3.2). If the ‘gates’ of *ijtihad* could be opened, as advocated by Rida (see Section 3.5.3.3), then perhaps some justification could be found for a peaceful symbiosis which would not be contrary to Islam, and therefore in accordance with the jihad doctrine. This would replace a feeling of shame with honour. Although the Shia are permitted to practise independent reasoning, they have the role model of Husayn for martyrdom. Therefore for them it would be better to die for a just cause than to live peacefully alongside dhimmis.

On the other hand, Halakha is dynamic and allows for rulings in modern times. Thus for religious Zionists, although the Territories may have sacred status, use may be made of *pikuah nefesh* in order to save lives. According to Judaism, he who has saved one life is as if he has saved the whole world.⁵

7.4 RESEARCH PREMISES

In Section 1.3 three research premises were listed. These will now be discussed.

□ The author averred that to understand the multiplicity of religious traditions of all the participants would contribute to an understanding of their present positions.

This claim has been vindicated, in that all the religions have sects or groups which differ in some way from the parent religion. Sociologists of religion maintain that adherents to sects claim to practise the parent religion in a purer form, and hold beliefs which the mainstream religions do not have. These can be referred to the Arab-Israeli conflict and can explain, for example, the difference in stance of the Haredim and Gush Emunim regarding the sanctity or

otherwise of the land. Another instance is the differences in ideologies of the Likud and Labour. From the Muslim perspective one could cite the difference in belief between al-Ikhwan and Jihad on the returning of Muslims to Islam and jihad against the enemy, or the difference between the Sunni and Shia on the role of martyrdom in a just cause. The Arab Nationalists also have different ideologies.

□ The suggestion was made that if each group could understand the political position of every other, the ground would be prepared for peaceful symbiosis.

While this premise has not been proved it seems realistic, logical and pragmatic. Although one may not expect the votaries of each religion to accept the political standpoint of the others, at least each group may be able to tolerate, in the sphere of religion, fellow human beings whose Ultimate Reality or prophet gave them a religion prescribing a way of life, including guide-lines on the subject of politics.

□ Understanding the political stance of each group could lead first to dialogue and then to negotiations to find a compromise between individual groups and between the two main protagonists. Negotiations for peace are currently being undertaken between the Arabs and the Israelis. The remarks of Syria's chief negotiator regarding the head of the Syrian desk in the Israeli delegation are of significance — the Israeli professor has written books on his country which have been studied closely, he accords respect to the Syrian delegation, and "He also speaks very good Arabic. I wish I knew Hebrew the way he knows Arabic."⁶ This seems to be a step in the direction of rapprochement, which could be applied to groups in each field and to the other protagonists. Therefore this premise has been at least partially vindicated.

7.5 APPLICATION OF DATA TO THEORY

The literature consulted mentioned 'Civil Religion' with regard to Israel. Since the concept as defined by Robert Bellah and applied to the USA was not apposite in this case, the concept, 'Ethno-state Religion' was proposed. This was defined as a system of ethos, symbols and rituals which express the public religious dimension of the majority of citizens, whilst privatising their own personal religious beliefs. This unites the majority within a political framework and can include martyrs, sacred places, sacred events and prophets. This concept could also be applied to the neighbouring Arab nation-states where Muslims are in the majority.

This research has shown that, in order to understand politics in a holistic way, the religious

dimension should be considered, among others. This does not only apply to religions which are political in orientation, such as in this study. The fall of Communism could have come about because this ideology did not give people a successful cosmic orientation. There is now a return to Islam and Christianity in the former communist bloc, and to Judaism and Zionism in the former USSR. There is also the struggle between the Muslims and Armenians in Azerbaijan, and Nationalism seems to have taken a hold in the eastern bloc. In Yugoslavia, apart from the Nationalist element, there is the traditional religious conflict: Serbia is Eastern Orthodox, Slovenia and Croatia are Roman Catholic, and Bosnia and the province of Kosova are Muslim, remnants of the Ottoman empire.

Before independence in India in 1947 there was a struggle between Gandhi and Janna. As neither would compromise, finally Pakistan was established on Islamic principles. Still in India, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by a Sikh, and her son Rajiv by a suspected Muslim. Furthermore the Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims are involved in frequent clashes.

In Northern Ireland the conflict is between Protestants and Catholics, and in Lebanon among the Christians, Sunnis, Shia, Druze and Nationalists. During the first half of this century, the German Third Reich rested on National Socialism, an ideology which espoused the purity of the Aryan race.

Closer to the Middle East in the Maghreb, Muslim Revivalists won the last elections in Algeria, but this victory was declared invalid. Returning to the region of this study, the Iraqi government has suppressed the Kurds in the north and the Shia in the south. These few examples will suffice to argue the point, but there are undoubtedly others. It remains for this theory to be proved or disproved in other research projects.

7.6 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE RESEARCH

Before embarking on this study, there did not seem to be room for compromise in the Arab-Israeli conflict through the religious dimension. However the research premises and findings have pointed to a positive possibility.

❑ The Haredim do not recognise the State of Israel since it is contrary to what God has ordained. Therefore, as far as they are concerned, it has no religious significance and some are prepared to live under Arab rule.

❑ For Secular and religious Zionists, the State of Israel has sacred status and is therefore not

negotiable. There are different interpretations with regard to the Territories, and some groups are prepared to cede them in some form or another in return for peace, while others are not.

❑ On the surface in Islam, the State of Israel must be dismantled, and this is the view of the Revivalist groups. But if one looks for a deeper meaning, the doctrine of jihad provides for patience as long as there is a mundane power which is stronger than the umma. Therefore if Israel can maintain her military strength indefinitely, there could be some kind of peace or peaceful symbiosis which could last.

❑ Muslim nation-states have accepted international law and some states have tried to reconcile this with Islamic law. It would be pragmatic to allow Israel to take her place in the region with co-operation regarding their mutual problems.

❑ According to the PLO Covenant the State of Israel must be dismantled, but over the years there has been a more pragmatic approach. Leaders now speak about the establishment of the state of Palestine in the Territories which will live in peace with its neighbours thereafter.

❑ All these political religions want an identical goal — the creation of a just society on earth. Since this is the case it seems from the foregoing that there is room for compromise and negotiations for peace from every one of the four religions. All that is needed is pragmatism on the part of leaders.

❑ The status of Jerusalem/al-Quds remains problematical as there does not seem to be room for compromise.

❑ The concept of Ethno-state Religion has evolved during the course of this research. It can be applied to the State of Israel and also most of the nation-states in the region where Muslims are in the majority. Furthermore a theory suggested that in order to understand politics in a holistic way, the religious dimension, among others, should be considered; but this will have to be proved or disproved in further research.

No more fitting conclusion can be written than the words of the scriptures themselves:

"... and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." (Isa. 2:4)

"A kind word with forgiveness is better than almsgiving followed by injury. Allah is Absolute, Clement." (Quran 2:263)

- 1 "No more wars, no more bloodshed." (President Anwar Sadat, interviewed in Jerusalem for Israel Television and world media, November 1977.)
- 2 The wording of Resolution 242 referred to "territories" and not "*the* territories", thus leaving the text open to interpretation. (See Section 2.11) Perhaps the resolution was deliberately formulated in this vague manner in order to secure its acceptance by all parties concerned.
- 3 This obviously excludes those commandments which relate to the Temple.
- 4 Deut. 6:4.
- 5 *Talmud*. Sanhedrin 37b.
- 6 *The Jerusalem report*. September 24, 1992.

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